THE lawyers Logic, exemplifying the precepts of Logic by the practice of the common Law, by Abraham France.  
AT LONDON, Imprinted by William How, for Thomas Gubbin, and T. Newman. 1588.   

To the Right honourable, Henry Earl of Pembroke, Lord Herbert of Cardyffe, Marmyon, and S. Quynten, Lord President of the principality of Wales, and the Marches of the same, Knight of the most noble order of the Garter, and Lord Lieutenant of Wales, of the Marches, and of the counties of Wy●… and Somerset.  

IF Laws by reason framed were, and grounded on the same;  
If Logic also reason be, and thereof had this name;  
I see no reason, why that Law and Logic should not be  
The nearest and the dearest friends, and therefore best agree.  
As for the fond conceit of such which never knew them both,  
Better believe some men's bare word, than their suspected oath.  
I say no more than what I saw, I saw that which I sought,  
I sought for Logic in our Law, and found it as I thought.  
If all that I have sought and found your Honour do content,  
(Let scribes and petty penmen talk) I think my time well spent,  
And labour herein well employed: Acceptance is my meed,  
I crave no more, I have no less, if you vouch safe to reed.   
Your honours most unfeignedly affectionate Abraham France.   

TO THE LEARNED Lawyers of England, especially the Gentlemen of Gray's Inn.  
THere be almost seven years now overgone me, since first I began to be a meddler with these Logical meditations: And whilst I have said and unsaid, done and undone, and now done all a new, me thinks these seven years have quickly overgone me. I first began, (when I first came in presence of that right noble and most renowned knight sir Philip Sidney) with a general discourse concerning the right use of Logic, and a contracted comparison between this of Ramus and that of Aristotle. These small and trifling beginnings drew both him to a greater liking of, and myself to a further travailing in, the easy explication of Ramus his Logic.  
Six times in these seven years have I perused the whole, & by a more diligent overseeing corrected some oversights: thrice at S. john's college in Cambridge, thrice at Gray's Inn, since I came to London. This last alteration hath changed the name of the Book, & this new name of the Book proceeded from the change of my profession. For having resolutely determined to acquaint myself with our English laws & constitutions, I thought good to make trial, whether my eight years labour at Cambridge, would any thing profit me at an Inn of Court, whether Law were without Logic, or Logic not able to help a Lawyer. Which when I proved, I then perceived, the practice of Law to be the use of Logic, and the method of Logic to lighten the Law. So that after application of Logic to Law, and examination of Law by Logic, I made plain the precepts of the one by the practice of the other, and called my book, The Lawyer's Logic; not as though Logic were tied only unto Law, but for that our Law is most fit to express the precepts of Logic. Yet, because many love Logic, that never learn Law, I have retained those old examples of the new shepherds Calendar, which I first gathered, and thereunto added these also out of our Law books, which I lately collected.  
I doubt not, but that some well-willers, and many maliciously disposed cavyllers will as much reprehend this strange conjunction of Law and Logic, as they did marvel at my sudden departure from Philosophy to Law. To those that mean well, and speak according to their meaning, I wish no worse use of Logic than may be had in Law. For the rest, which make proclamations without authority, and exclamations with greater indignation than discretion, I leave them to their standish, and pray for their good success, that after the term of seven years fully complete and ended, they may be in their blue velvet nightcaps solemnly called to the Bar for their extraordinary skill in making of obligations.  
Tully, at the earnest request of Trebatius, a towardly Lawyer of Rome, hath eloquently put down the first part of Logic in his Topikes, to the precepts whereof he applieth Lawlike examples, for the better instruction of Trebatius and help of other Lawyers. Servius Sulpitius, as the same Tully reporteth, became the most excellent Lawyer in all Rome, and that only by the help and direction of Logic: insomuch that he only, by these means, was said to have the art & knowledge of the Law, whereas the rest had nothing but the practice of the same, by continual beating of their brains about endless controversies. He knew what was Law, & what was the reason of Law; they like good Catholics and modest minded men, believed as the Church believed, but why the church believed so, it never came within the compass of their cogitation.  
But all this notwithstanding, it cannot be, said one great Tenurist, that a good Scholar should ever prove good Lawyer. God forbidden, good sir, you offer yourself tootoomuch injury: for we, countrymen, take your worship for a great wise learned man, and I doubt not but that yourself are well persuaded of your wondrous knowledge in the Law, and yet you say, that Law and Logic can never stand together. 'tis great pity, God wots, that these two excellent qualities can never be reconciled. Alas; what should ail them, if it like your good mastership? Marry, quoth he, these fine University men have been trained up in such easy, elegant, conceited, nice, and delicate learning, that they can better make newfound verses of Amyntas death, and popular discourses of Ensigns, Armoury, Emblems, Hieroglyphikes, and Italian Impreses, than apply their heads to the study of the Law, which is hard, harsh, unpleasant, unsavoury, rude and barbarous. Well said good john a style. 
Dij ●…e, Damasippe, deaeque  
Uerum ob judicium, donent ionsore; sed unde  
Tam benè nos nosti?   
For myself, I must needs confess I was an University man eight years together, and for every day of these eight years, I do not repent that I was an University man. But for that delicacy of study whereof you dream, because it seemeth somewhat strange, a word or two, before we go further. Surely sir, by your patience be it spoken, it seemeth you came abruptly from a country school to an Inn of court, or else riding post towards London, you changed horse at the University, and coming thither late in the evening, and riding away early in the morning, saw nothing but by candle light. It was incident to my nature (as I think) to be carried away with as delicate and pleasant a kind of learning, as any of my time in Cambridge. Which (notwithstanding an inestimable delectation that drowned the pains of study) did yet so rack my ranging head, and bring low my crazed body, that I felt at last when it was too late, the perpetual vexation of Spirit, and continual consumption of body, incident to every scholar.  
And if the most easy conceits in Universities be so hard, the most delicate studies so full of toil, how troublesome then and painful the foundation of arts, the framing of an English tongue to unknown languages, must in any case be, I leave to be judged of them, who can discern between a superficial appearance and true substance, between the bravery of a Midsommers' Comencement, and the seven years pains of a Master of arts.  
Now for the study of the law, which, by these lawmens' report, is so hard, so unsavoury, so rude, and so barbarous, she may well pronounce of her professors, as Horace of his guests.  

Tres mihi convivae propè dissentire videntur,  
Poscentes vario multum diversa palato.  
Quid dem? quid non dem? renuis tu, quod jubet alter,  
Quod petis, id certè est invisum acidumque duobus.   
For the hardness and difficulty, I say no more, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and if Philosophy be hard, and law be hard, I am sumus ergò pares. In deed the want of teachers and good discipline which is in Universities, makes law seem hard, and Philosophy very easy, which, if either we had, or they had not, no doubt, law would sooner be learned in seven years, than seven arts in one & twenty. But the law is unsavoury, saith an other: But the fault is in your corrupt taste, say I, not in the nature of the thing, which unto the wisest is most acceptable, unless you play the part of Philoxenus, and under pretence of abhorring the loathsome savour of the law, intent the devouring of all profits proceeding from the law, which seemeth indeed to be the scope you aim at. You would love the law but sine rivali: you would reign, but alone: Hinc illae lachrymae. For otherwise I can hardly think so hardly of you, as to measure your discretion by the unprobable assertion comprised in your two last Epithets, wherein you disgrace the law with rudeness and barbarism. For, as for that Hodgepodge French, stuffed up with such variety of borrowed words, wherein our law is written, if this be all the Dunsicalitie you talk of, you are far more nice than any University man of mine acquaintance. I know by experience, there is no word so outworn, no speech so vast and gaping in Brytton, Bracton, Glanuyll, Lytleton, Parkins, and the rest of our Law authors and reporters of the law, as is in Bricot, Burley, Bonaventure, Duns, Durand, D'orbell, Aquinas, Andreas, Albertus, and a far more infinite number of those Moonkish cloisterers devoured of Scholars, than be of these others perused by Lawyers. And yet, notwithstanding all their Persoities, Formalities, Quiddities, Haecceities, Albedinities, Animalities, Substantialities, and such like, he that would not gather gold out of Aquinas dregs, as Virgil did out of Ennius, I shall think him as wise, as some silly Pettyfogger, who rather than he would trouble his conscience with Feetayle and Feesimple, will live like a simple fool, and never take fee.  
Whether it be malice therefore and envy, or ignorance and simplicity, that causeth you to wrangle and chat so undiscreatly, you may see how you do err by the one, and are deceived by the other. For neither are University men so dainty, as to lose their dinner because the Cook had not on his holiday apron, neither is the Law more unsweet, than other learning unsavoury, whatsoever you cast out to the contrary.  
But the Law is in vast volumes confusedly scattered and utterly undigested: so was all other learning not long ago: yet herein blame not the Law, if it be datke, but Lawyers themselves that had no light: blame not the Law, I say, which was out of order, but Lawyers themselves that never knew Method: Nay, blame neither Law, nor ancient Lawyers, who by reason of the general misery of their obscure age, could not see every thing, but exclaim against yourselves, who in this flourishing time and blessed opportunity, will see nothing. If those ancient fathers of our Law had lived now, all had been well, but if you had been extant then, all had been worse. For neither can you do what you should, nor will let others do what they would for the more orderly explication of the Law. Such is the untowardly disposition of this scornful age of ours, wherein no man praiseth any more, than he thinketh himself able to perform, but seeketh to cloak his own ignorance by deriding other men's skill, being himself so simple in other men's judgement, and wise in his own conceit, that when he hath spoken without measure to a dozen of points, all is not worth a penywoorth of pings: for neither himself can well understand his unjointed discourse, nor the hearers conceive his uncohaerent jangling.  
But I fear me, I have moved their patience, whom I most desire to be patiented, and to suffer without grudging Scholars to be Lawyers, as they wish some Lawyers to become better Scholars. Which if it were so, then would there not be so many upstart Rabulae Forenses, which under a praetence of Law, become altogether lawless, to the continual molestation of ignorant men, and general overcharging of the country, with an overflowing multitude of seditious cavyllers: who, when their fathers have made some lewd bargain in the country, run immediately to the Inns of Court, and having in seven years space met with six French words, home they ride like brave Magnificoes, and dash their poor neighbours children quite out of countenance, with Villain in gros, Villain regardant, and Tenant per le courtesy: much like the swarming rabble of our coistrel curates, which when their fathers have either compounded with their Landlord for some pelting vicarage, or paid ready money for a better parsonage, convey themselves to Cambridge or Oxford, where having once known the price of an Admission, Salting, and Matriculation, with the entertaining of Freshmennes in the Rhetoric schools, they return whence they came, with their mother's wit and father's learning carefully kept together, that when they have wearied men with reading scarce true English on the Sunday, all the week after they may plague poor boys with false Latin in a belfraye. Or else, if the old Parson be not yet dead, they stay a little longer, and under a precise cloak of Divinity, (notwithstanding they be Arch-asses in all humanity) creep in among Bachelors of arts with cross caps on their gross pates, and sheeps skins cast over their lubberlike shoulders, whereof they are more proud than ever was any fool of his bell and bauble: then come they home to ring their bells, to the utter disgrace of the Universities, the perpetual plague of the Country, and everlasting shame of the corrupted Clergy.  
Yet I hear say, that some great lawyers have had little learning, and some good churchmen have been no great clerk: Whereunto I answer, that it were but folly to contemn ordinary means, because some men have extraordinary gifts, and if those rare qualities of nature had been directed by precepts of art, I think they had proved much more excellent.  
But to return thither from whence I came, and to make an end with that wherewith I began, thus much I dare be bold to affirm, notwithstanding the prejudicate conceit of twenty civilians, and as many common Lawyers to the contrary, that if the civil law be elegant and delectable, the Common law is neither barbarous nor unsavoury. For the volumes, theirs be far greater, and much more infinite. For the style, it is more easily determined that both be bad, than which is better: and yet both Bartolus his Latin, and Brytton his French, in some men's judgement is therefore sufficiently elegant, because it is fully significant. For the matter, all is Law, although not all one Law: and he that liketh the one, let him leave the other, or join them both together, if his leisure be so good, and his ability correspondent.  
It is not my meaning to disgrace the one, or advance the other in comparison wise, by superlative words, and hyperbolical amplifications: I have enough if I have this granted, that our Common law is as easy, as short, as elegant, and as delightsome as is the civil, which every man extolleth, and I am well content, as long as I see these two things in credit with other men, whereunto I have already betaken myself. For, as for Fortescues comparing of them both together and praeferring of ours, it maketh all with me, yet I urge not all: albeit I think, as by office he was a judge in Court of conscience, so in this Treatise he dealt not summo iure, with the Cyvilians, but reasonably and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
But the civil law will some man say, is both in itself more constant and philosophical, and also by justinian more methodically, and by later writers more eloquently put down.  
I said before my meaning was not to enter into any needle's discourse of comparison between these two laws, yet because these be objections of latter time, I must praesume a little further. And first, for the constancy and philosophical foundation of the Roman Law, which justinian calleth the civil law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as Homer is called the Poet) the name, civil, being common to the several laws of any peculiar kingdom: no doubt, this objection was made by them, that heard somewhat at the University of the civil law, but never read any thing of our Common law. They have Plebiscita, Senatus consulta, Principum placita, Magistratuum edicta, Responsa prudentum: We have ruled Cases, Maximaes and Principles, Customs and Usages both general and special; and lastly, continual reformation of new abuses by Statutes and Acts of Parliament. Now let any one skilful in both, judge of the reason and certainty of either, and remember withal, what Aristotle saith of the imperfection of all Laws, lest he impute that as a special blemish to our Law, which is a general want incident to the nature of every Law.  
There is no Lawmaker so provident, as that he can in particularity foresee, and, as it were, by some prophetical spirit foretell and prevent the infinite variety of future inconveniences, by application of so many peculiar provisoes, and special constitutions, but must of necessity leave his Law general, referring the addition, detraction, or mitigation of words, unto the conscience and discretion of the learned and understanding judge. Thus much would I have remembered, and then let that Law be accused as least sufficient which is most general, and therefore not so well able to prevent imminent mischiefs.  
For, as for the method of justinian, it doth not so well content the Cyvilians, but that they daily contend with new innovations and continual printing of fresh methods, to bring it unto better order. Yet if it be such, as some say it is, than I say, we have our Common law penned after the self same method two hundredth years ago, by that famous and learned judge Henry de Bracton, skilful in both these Laws. And if it be not justinian's order that these men fancy, but rather the late Abridgements of finer heads, let them not then with reviling speeches discourage them, which hope to see the Common law of England brought to as good and easy a method, as ever was any.  
For the style of these late Cyvilians, which is somewhat more laboured and less unseemly than that of their forefathers, we may as justly say that there is the like diversity to be manifestly perceived between the homely speech of our ancient Lawyers, and the finer phrase of late writers in our Common law. Words are like leaves, as Horace reporteth: leaves spring before Summer, and fall before Winter; and the same inconstancy is in words. Let us therefore use that phrase which is most usual: and though in knowledge and conceit we contend to be singular, yet in uttering our thoughts, let all be made partakers.  
But lo, I see on the sudden this extravagant discourse abruptly cut off by the importunate exclamations of a raging and fireyfaced Aristotelean; who seeing Ramus his Logic in some estimation, maketh small account of his own credit in uttering such impatient speeches.  
Good God, what a world is this? What an age do we now live in? A Sopister in times past was a title of credit, and a word of commendation; now what more odious? Aristotle then the father of Philosophy; now who less favoured? Ramus rules abroad, Ramus at home, and who but Ramus? Antiquity is nothing but Dunsicality, & our forefather's inventions unprofitable trumpery. New-fangled, youngheaded, harebrayne boys will needs be Masters that never were Scholars; prate of method, who never knew order; rail against Aristotle assoon as they are crept out of the shell. Hereby it comes to pass that every Cobbler can cog a Syllogism, every Carter crack of Propositions. Hereby is Logic profaned, and lieth prostitute, removed out of her Sanctuary, rob of her honour, left of her lovers, ravished of strangers, and made common to all, which before was proper to Schoolmen, and only consecrated to Philosophers.  
I have heard the like speeches to these before this, and I look for no better hereafter: I never esteemed of those, and I little care for these. Yet, good master Quidditary, if you had been as diligent in meditation of the cause, as you have been over earnest in admiration of the effect, the knowledge of the one would have removed the strangeness of the other. For, if the wisdom of the ancient Sophi be now degenerate into the idle subtleties of the newfound Sophistae, what marvel is it, if when the thing is not answering to the name, the name become odious?  
Ramus doth not so rule, but that he can suffer reason to over rule him. Old doting graybeards talk much of Baralipton, whilst youngheaded boys bear away Logic. They think much that a boy should conceive that in a week, which they could scarce perceive in a year: but more, that their old learning should be corrected by new teaching, and their labour lost with so little profiting.  
cobblers be men, why therefore not Logicians? and Carters have reason, why therefore not Logic? Bonum, quò communius, eo melius, you say so yourselves, and yet the best thing in Logic you make to be the worst, in thinking it less commendable, because it is more common. A spiteful speech, and a meaning no less malicious, to lock up Logic in secret corners, who, as of herself she is generally good to all, so will she particularly be bound to none. Touching the grief you conceive for the contempt of Aristotle, it is needles and unnecessary: for, where Aristotle deserveth praise, who more commendeth him then Ramus? Where he hath toomuch, Ramus cutteth off, where too little, addeth, where any thing is inverted, he bringeth it to his own proper place, and that according to the direction of Aristotle his rules. Then, whereas there can be no Art both invented and perfected by the same man, if Aristotle did invent Logic, as he persuadeth you, he did not perfect it, if he did not finish it, there is some imperfection, if there be any want, why then allow you all?  
But alas, see how far I have overshot my mark: 'tis more than time to make an end of this ranging digression. I end therefore, yet with an endless desire, that no less profit may be perceived by others in practising, than I had pleasure in perusing this last explication of Ramus his Logic.  
Abraham France.   

Faults escaped.  
PAg: 6, a: line, 3: after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Pag: 12, b, line, 11: for pius, read, puis: Pag: 15. a: line, 23: for deius, read, deius: Pag: 19: b: line, last but two, for, or, read, ou: Pag: 26, b: line, last but 4: for miguarde, read mignarde: Pag: 39: a: line, last but 8: for essigne, read, assign: Pag: 40: a: line, 2: for reddit read, redit: Pag: 45: a: line, last but 6: for le, read, de: Pag: 48: a: line, 10: for his, read, her, and line, 11: for her, read his: Pag: 56: b: the first four lines of the 13 chapter be out of their proper place a little: Pag: 61: a: line, 21: for Britton, 17: read, Britton 17: & elsewhere: Pag: 62: b: line, last but four, for possuit read, posuit: Pag: 73: a: line, last but one, for cause, read, cause: Pag: 86: b: line, last: for men's, read, mens: Pag: 99: b: line, last but one, for the word that is blotted out, read, a plague, a torment: Pag: 108: a: line, 19: for n'est, read, est: Pag: 110: a: line, 13: for there, read, then: Pag: 113. a: line, last but two, for, and syllogism, read, and a syllogism. Pag: 113: b: line, 21: for, the, read, this. Pag: 119: a: line, last but two, for learnings, read, learning. Pag: 122: b: line, 8: for, appeareth: read, appeareth. Pag: 128: a: line, last but slew, for, les, read, lease. Pag: 129. b: line, 17: for de, read, le. Pag. 137. a: line, last, for 4. 4. 4. read, 7. 7. 7.  
Some other faults there be: but these be the greatest.   

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE FIRST BOOK.  
What Logic is. Logic is an Art of Reasoning. Annotations.  
ALthough this word, Logic, be generally received of Englishmen, and used even of them that know no Logic at all, yet for that it was a stranger at the first, I think it not impertinent to seek from whence it came, and what it doth betoken: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore in Greek signifieth Reason, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is derived this word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say, Reasonable, or belonging to Reason, which although it be an adjective, and must have some such like word, as Art, Science, or Faculty, to be adjoined unto it as his substantive, yet is it substantively taken and used in Latin, as also in our English tongue.  
Sturmius and some ●…ers, derive this word Logic from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 betokeneth ●…éech or talk: whose opinion, although the other name of this Act (which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to speak or talk) do in some respect seem to confirm, yet for that the whole force and virtue of Logic consisteth in reasoning, not in talking: and because reasoning may be without talking, as in solitary meditations and deliberations with a man's self, some hold the first derivation as most significant.  
Dialectica & Logica, saith Hotoman, dictae sunt a sermone sive oratione, sed illa propriè ab eo genere sermonis, qui cùm altero interrogando & respondendo commiscetur. Fictum enim verbum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod est, verba cum altero commutare, colloqui, disputare, sermocinari, sermons caedere. Nam cùm philosophorum consuetudo haec esset, ut de rebus ad artes suas pertinentibus saepè inter se commentarentur, eruditas illas collocutiones, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (ut Laertius in Platone scribit) apellarunt, earumque habendarum artem, Dialecticam, qua de causa eandem Laertius eodem loco definit artem sermonis, per quam ex eorum quibuscum sermo est interrogatione, & responsione aliquid vel confirmatur vel refellitur. Quod cùm ita sit, difficile dictu est, dialecticae nomen non eius sermonis esse proprium, qui in dialogis habetur, cum perpetua non continuatur oratio, sed in rebus singulis insistitur & intelligitur quid quisque concedat aut abnuat, ut ex concessis disputatio concludatur. Et infra.  
Ex quo intelligi potest, cùm & Graecorum & Latinorum consuetudine, nihil quicqual●… inter dialecticae & Logicae verbum, preter vocis sonum intersit, videri tamen Logicae vocabulum, ad eam disserendi rationem quae perpetua oratione constat, & quà hody plurimum utimur, ac multo magis ad eas disputationes quae literis mandantur, accommodatum esse. Thus far Hottoman.  
Some others have said, that this art may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of the internal form, essence, and nature thereof consisting in reason: but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the external manner and order of working, which is commonly done by speech and talk, as that word importeth, although Ramus use them both as one, following Plato herein, who expoundeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to use reason.  
Diogenes Laertius in the life of Plato, writeth, that Plato was the first who called this Arte Dialectica, and Valla reporteth that Aristotle was the first that named it Logica.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hath a certain relation to accounts, whereupon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 itself whence both they come, are used for accounting and deducting of sums, and by a Metaphorical sense are applied to Logic, but especially to Disposition the second part of Logic, where discoursing and drawing of one reason from another is put down. But use hath accepted them in a general sense for the whole Art of Logic, as we shall see hereafter the like in those Latin words, Disserere and disputare.  
[Is in Art:] An Art is a Methodical disposition of true and coherent precepts, for the more easy perceiving and better remembering of the same: and this Methodical or orderly disposition of divers precepts is taught in Logic, as pertaining essentially thereunto. So that Logic was deservedly called the Art of Arts, the iustrument of instruments, the hand of Philosophy, because by the help thereof, not only the grounds of natural reason are artificially put down, but all other Arts also are made to be Arts, as we shall hereafter show when we come to the place appointed for the due explication of Method.  
It is therefore said here, that Logic is an Art, to distinguish artificial Logic from natural reason. Artificial Logic is gathered out of divers examples of natural reason, which is not any Art of Logic, but that engraven gift and faculty of wit and reason shining in the particular discourses of several men, whereby they both invent, and orderly dispose, thereby to judge of that they have invented. This as it is to no man given in full perfection, so divers have it in sundry measure. And because the true note and token resembling nature, must be esteemed by the most excellent nature, therefore the precepts of artificial Logic both first were collected out of, and always must be conformable unto those sparks of natural reason, not lurking in the obscure head-péeces of one or two loitering Friars, but manifestly appearing in the monuments and disputations of excellent autors. And then is this Logic of Art more certain than that of nature, because of many particulars in nature, a general and unfallible constitution of Logic is put down in Art. So that, Art, which first was but the scholar of nature, is now become the master of nature, and as it were a Glass wherein she seeing and viewing herself, may wash out those spots and blemishes of natural imperfection. For there is no one particular nature so constant and absolute, but by examining and perusing her own force, she may be bettered: no nature so weak and imperfect, which by the help of Art is not confirmed.  
Hottoman in the third Chapter of his first book hath these words: Estne igitur dialectica quaedam naturalis, quaedam artificiosa? nequa quam: sed eius initia & semina quaedam in hominum mentibus natura ingeneravit, quae cum praeceptis ac disciplina, tùm usu & assiduitate excoluntur. Eademque cum aliarum artium omnium, tùm praecipuè Musicae ratio est. Nam omnibus a natura rudis quaedam canendi facultas data est: ab arte vero, quam naturae notatio atque animaduersio peperit, certa ratio traditur. Non enim ars naturam imitatur tantummodò, verumetiam, ut veteres docuerunt, confirmat & amplificat: causamque, cur quidque, vel hoc vel illo modo fieri debeat, reddit, quod praestare natura non potest, eaque sola re artifex ab inscio discernitur.  
Wasserleider therefore in seeking to reform Ramus his Logic, bewrayeth his own ignorance; for having first generally defined Logic to be an Art, he afterwards divideth it into natural Logic and artificial, as though the natural faculty of reason were an Art of reasoning, which is contrary to all reason, and includeth in itself a manifest contradiction. To conclude this point, there ought nothing to be put down in Art, whereof there is no ground in nature, for ars imitari debet naturam, and as that painter is most cunning who can most lively express his face whose counterfeit he is to draw, so he that teacheth Logic must set forth no idle conceits of extravagant brains, but the true use of natural reason and understanding: which is a necessary confutation of that absurdity maintained by Logicians, and invented in Cloisters, that ficta, yea falsa exempla, be good enough to make precepts plain, whereas Plato in Theaeteto calleth examples, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sponsores & praedes rationes, tanquam ab eis fideiussum persolueretur. And Aristotle in the eight of his Topikes requireth such examples as Homer can afford, not such as the pelting Poet Chaerilus did invent.  
[Of Reasoning:] This our English word, Reasoning, is more proper and fit to express the nature of Logic, then either that other word, of disputing, derived from disputare, or the like, as disserere, and docere, used of Cicero and Melanchton: although I know that Beurehusius standeth in defence of these words, disserere, and disputare, which Ramus also useth: and I am not much to mislike them in respect of any other Latin word, yet not altogether to compare them with this our English word of reasoning. For the word, disputing, which cometh of disputare, it is Metaphorical, as Varro reporteth, and so is disserere: the one being borrowed of the Uinemayster, the other fet from the sour: for as the first cutteth off superfluous branches in his vine, which is properly disputare, so the other disperseth his seed in divers places, and not confusedly throweth all on one heap, which is the natural signification of this word, disserere. Now because the Logician cutteth of all idle and unnecessary curiosities, whereof there is no use in reasoning, severeth truth from falsehood, that which followeth from that which followeth not, order from confusion, and handleth divers arguments and axioms in divers places distinctly, not every thing in every place disorderly: therefore hath he friendly presumed upon the good nature of these two countrymen, in using their words of husbandry, to express a more elegant conceit, although at the first not properly, yet by continuance of time, so conveniently, as that the Metaphorical sense is now better known than the natural signification. Yet for that both these rehearsed properties of Logic, be rather particular functions of method, than general operations of the whole art, it is plain, that this word disputing, with his original disputare, and that, disserere, if you respect the natural signification thereof, cannot express the whole nature of Logic. Although I am not ignorant, as I said before, that Ramus and his interpreter Beurhusius, apply these words to the general use of this art, not restraining them to those two functions belonging to method: whose judgement as use alloweth, so I do not reject, yet by their leave leave their Latin words behind our English.  
Melanchton useth this word, docere: Docere, is to teach, and Logic is an art of teaching: but then mark what I mean by teaching, for you must not restrain the signification of it in such sort, as though there were no teaching but only in schools among Philosophers and schoolmasters, or in pulpits among doctors and divines: but generally, he teacheth, whosoever maketh any other man know that, whereof before he was ignorant, whether he do it by explication and illustration, or proof and conclusion: and thus if we take this word, docere, it is somewhat more general than disputare, or disserere, put down by Tully and Ramus: yet not so ample, as the nature of this art, whose virtue is seen not only in teaching others, but also in learning thyself, in discoursing, thinking, meditating, and framing of thine own, as also in discussing, perusing, searching and examining what others have either delivered by speech, or put down in writing: this is called Analysis, that Genesis, and in them both consisteth the whole use of Logic.  
As far then as man's reason can reach, so far extendeth itself the use and virtue of this art of reasoning, wh●…se most ample and almost infinite use and power, hath never had in any tongue a more general and yet proper name, than this of reasoning, as we use it now adays. Men reason in schools as Philosophers, in Westminster as Lawyers, in Court as Lords, in Country as worldly husbands: whatsoever it be, nay whatsoever thou canst imagine to be, although it be not, never was, nor never shall be, yet by reason it is invented, taught, ordered, confirmed: as the description of fame in Virgil, of famine in Ovid, of Elysian fields, of Styx, of Acheron, of the golden apples, and a thousand such poetical imaginations. And therefore Logic hath been of a loong time untolerably abused by those miserable Sorbonists, & dunsicall Quidditaries, who thought there was no reasoning without, Arguitur quod sic: Probatur quod non: no part of Logic without Ergo and Igitur. Whereas indeed the true use of Logic is as well apparent in simple plain, and easy explication, as in subtle, strict, and concised probation. Read Homer, read Demosthenes, read Virgil, read Cicero, read Bartas, read Torquato Tasso, read that most worthy ornament of our English tongue the Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, and therein see the true effects of natural Logic which is the ground of artificial, far different from this rude and barbarous kind of outworn sophistry: which if it had any use at all, yet this was all, to feed the vain humours of some curious heads in obscure schools, whereas the Art of reasoning hath somewhat to do in every thing, and nothing is any thing without this one thing. Same Arts are appliable only so some certain subject, but Logic is scientia scientiarum, as I said before, not tied to one thing, but apt for any thing, free from all, yet fit for all, framing orderly, proving strongly, expounding plainly, persuading forcibly, any Art, any cause, any question, any man whatsoever.  
What then, will some man say, need we any other Arts, if Logic alone can suffice for all? I answer, Logic alone is sufficient to help all, yet Logic sufficeth not for all. Logic ●…elleth how to reason, dispute, examine, prove, or disprove any thing▪ but the thing that is to be reasoned, disputed, examined, proved or disproved, that Logic cannot afford, and therefore it is to be sought for at such Arts, as profess such things, so that Logic is profitable unto all, and yet not any of them unprofitable: but even as they without this be mangled and confused, so this without them is bare and naked. Logic is necessary for a divine, yet Logic yieldeth no divinity: but when a Preacher hath by continual perusing of the sacred Scriptures furnished himself with store of matter, than Logic will teach him how to teach others, & not only that, but also how to learn himself, to defend, to confute, to instruct, to reprehend. Logic showeth generally what an argument is, and how to use an argument, but the several arguments are else where to be had. For as Arithmetic teacheth to count money, not to find money, and Geometry to measure ground, not to purchase ground: so Logic can tell you how to reason of things, and yet reserveth the peculiar doctrine of the same things to the several professors thereof. I do not deny, but one and the same man may purchase ground, measure ground, and also reason of the same ground, but he purchaseth it by one Art, measureth it by another, and reasoneth of it by a third, he purchaseth it as a worldling, measureth it as a Geometer, reasoneth of it as a Logician: and although one man may be furnished with all these three properties, yet every Art must have her own by the law of justice, confusion must be avoided, and the precepts of every Art distinctly put down, although the use of the same precepts may be common and concur altogether in one man, if one man be skilful in all these Artes.  
Ramus addeth this word, well, in the end of the definition, which me thinks were as well left out as put in, for although it may seem to sever the perfection of Art from the imbecility of nature, yet indeed, the very name of an Art, includeth this word, well: every Art being an habit of doing that well whereof it is an Art. Howsoever it be, it appeareth, that to reason well and artificially, is the duty and end of Logic: for it is not essential unto Logic always to persuade, no more then to a Physician always, to heal, but to perform those things which are prescribed in his Art, although the hoped event and success do not always ensue.   

The second Chapter. Of the parts of Logic, and the several kinds of Arguments.  
THere be two parts of Logic, Exposition of the nature of arguments, and Disposition of the same. Exposition is the first part of Logic which expoundeth the divers kinds of arguments by their several affections and mutual relations one to another, which for that it helpeth to invent arguments, is called Invention. An argument is any several conceit apt to argue that whereunto in reason it is referred.  
First, an Argument is either inhaerent, or fet elsewhere. Inhaerent is that which is invented by consideration of the nature of the thing argued: and is either original and first or secondary and derived. First is that which hath his beginning of itself. It is agreeable or disagreeable. Agreeable is that which agreeth with the thing which it doth argue. The agreeable is either fully agreeable, or agreeable in part: fully agreeable is that, where there is a greater coherence and affinity between the argument and the thing argued: fully agreeable is first, the cause and the thing caused.  

Annotations.  
THe Art of Logic, as is declared already, layeth down the right use of natural reason: and this that we call showing or declaring how to reason, is no giving of reason to him that had it not, but an applying or directing of the mind to the view and contemplation of that, which of itself it might perceive, if it were turned and framed thereunto. For, as Plato saith, 7. de repub. the truth of the things comprised in Arts is as naturally propounded to the view of the mind, as colours be to the sight of the eye: and therefore Aristotle in his first book of Elenches hath set down that which common experience doth confirm, that every common person or silly soul useth Logic in some part, and practiseth of himself by natural instinct that which artificial Logic doth prescribe in her several rules and constitutions. Artificial Logic than is the polyshing of natural wit, as discovering the validity of every reason, be it necessary, whereof cometh science: or contingent, whence proceedeth opinion. Although I know there is a great controversy and contention among the ancient Philosophers, concerning these two: whilst some of them maintain only Science, some others hold with opinion only. Heraclitus called opinion the falling sickness, for that thereby men many times fell headlong into divers delusions and erroneous conceits. So in like manner, the stoics held this for one of their Paradoxes, that Sapiens nihil opinatur, a wise man is not opinative, a wise man never judgeth according to opinion. On the other side Anaxarchus was of this opinion, that all man's judgement was but opinion, and that his understanding could perfectly understand nothing, which the Pyrrhonians taught after him, and the new Academikes: and a man may conjecture that Plato and Aristotle sometimes inclined that way; for Plato in his book called Timaeus, ascribeth truth to God and God's children, leaving nothing but truelike to mortal men, and Aristotle in the second of his Metaphisikes' compareth man's understanding in respect of perfect knowledge of truth to the dazzling eyes of a Bat in the broad day light. But yet notwithstanding these forealleged places, both Plato and Aristotle have elsewhere evidently declared that man is capable both of Science and certain Knowledge, as in things contained in Arts: and also of opinion, as in infinite affairs which are daily incident: and this was long before their time, elegantly put down by the famous Poet and Logician Parmenides.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Oportet verò te omnia nosse,  
Tùm veritatis suasufacilis sententiam,  
Tùm verò mortalium opiniones, quarum non amplius fid●…s vera.   
Because of these two kinds of conceits, Aristotle would●… needs make two Logikes, the one for Science, the other for Opinion: wherein (if so it may be said of so great a Philosopher) it seemeth he was but an Opinator. For although among things conceived and known, some be necessary and unfallible, some doubtful and contingent, yet the Art of Knowing and Reasoning of the same (I mean Logic) is only one and the same, as the sight of the eye in perceiving all colours, be they changeable or not changeable. And aswell might a man say there must be two arts of Grammar (if Grammar be a distinct Art) one for courtly speech, an other for country talk: or two distinct arts of making of cups, one for golden cups, an other for cups of silver, as two Logikes, one for unfallible Arguments, and another for Contingent. Therefore one Logic sufficeth to dispute of all things, necessary or contingent whatsoever. Yet this one Logic herself in respect of her precepts is always necessary and never contingent, for otherwise it were no Art, but the application of it may be in contingent causes aswell as necessary.  
[Two parts of Logic:] The Stoical division of Logic into Invention and judgement, although both Aristotle himself seem to commend it in some places, as in 8. Topi. 3: Rhet: and Tully and Quintilian do altogether observe it▪ is yet reprehended of some, who think that judgement is not any several part of Logic, but rather an adi●…ct or property generally incident to the whole Art: because, say they, there is use of judgement even in invention. But in my fancy they might better have found some fault with these words, judgement, and Invention, than reprehended the distribution, which is most true, if they consider what the stoics did understand by these words. For by the first part called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they intent the explication of the divers kinds, natures, affections, relations, and proprieties of several arguments, which because it helpeth invention, is called Invention, as I said before: although indeed a man shall no more find arguments by this first part ●…f Logic, than he shall get Latin words by Etymology the first part of Grammar: which made me alter the words, as not proper, but rather borrowed from the Mathematics, where two▪ or three numbers being received or put down, a third or fourth number proportionable is found out, which of them is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Invention.  
And by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ judicium, judgement, is meant nothing else, but a Disposition, ordering or placing and settling of these several arguments already invented, to the intent that a man may the better judge of them, so that here judgement is taken for Disposition, the effect for the cause, for judgement ariseth of the ordering and disposing of arguments.  
They might therefore have changed the words, and kept the thing, which yet they have not done: but brought in new divisions of Logic, correspondent to the settling and placing of Aristotle's Logical discourses in his book called Organon: sometimes into three parts, as apodictical, Topical, elenchtical, sometimes into two, by name apodictical and dialectical▪ Topical, or dialectical they will have to be a several kind of Logic by probable arguments. apodictical, that which disputeth by necessary conclusions, as though there were not one and the same Art, Science, and order of reasoning both by probable and necessary arguments, as I said before, and the self same places of arguments both in the one and in the other, as causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. both contingent and necessary. For, as for that third kind of Logic, which they call elenchtical, seeing it is no Logic at all, but rather the abuse and perversion of Logic, I see no cause why it should be taught in Logic: yet if any man think that the true precepts of Logic once known, will not be sufficient to des●…ry the falseness of sophistical argumentations, he may for his contentation seek for a full discourse thereof out of some commentary, and not overcharge the Art itself with unnecessary institutions. I grant there is something profitable in the Elenches, as also in some other tractates of the same kind, but if we shall put down all in Logic, for true Logic, which doth in any respect help Logic, we shall never make an end of Logic.  
[Exposition is the first part:] As in Grammar, Aetymologie concerneth several words, and Syntaxis the due coherence of the same, so Exposition the first part of Logic, declareth the particular affection and nature of every several argument, and Disposition the second part, by ordering and settling the same, causeth judgement and understanding. And as several words be in respect of Grammar, so severed reasons in respect of Logic, and as of many words is made speech, so of divers arguments arise axioms.  
Exposition and Disposition are not two several arts of Logic, as though we should have one Logic to expound the natures of several arguments, and another to judge of the same by Disposition, but they be two essential parts of the whole, which joined together make one true Logic.  
The doctrine of Invention or Exposition is general, and not restrained only to the finding out of a Medium, which they commonly take for the only argument, but absolutely and universally appliable to the inventing of any thing, either true or feigned whatsoever.  
Again, the arguments in Invention must be considered severally, singlely, and alone, then after to be disposed and ordered by certain precepts, thereby to judge of the truth or falseness of the same: as for example.  
Paris A good shepherd. These two singly put down as two arguments, to wit, the subject and the adjunct, are afterwards disposed in an axiom, to judge of the truth thereof, as thus: Paris is no good shepherd.  
But because this proposition is contingent and doubtful (for the arguments be but in part agreeable) therefore it is confirmed by another argument, that is to say, by an effect and working of Paris, I mean that which Thomalin putteth down in july, in these words. 
But nothing such thylk shepherd was whom Ida hill did bear:  
That left his flock to fetch a lass, whose love he bought too dear.   
So then, here be three several arguments, or two joined in the axiom before, and the third following in these verses of Thomalin: which third they call, Medium, or third argument, thus:  

1 Paris:  
2 A good shepherd.  
3 To leave his flock to fetch a lass.   
Whereof it is concluded in this wise syllogistically, by disjoining the two first arguments, the subject and adjunct, Paris, and, The good shepherd. 

He that leaveth his flock to fetch a lass, is no good shepherd:  
But Paris did leave his flock to fetch a lass,  
Therefore Paris is no good shepherd.    
That which they call Medium, and third argument, is, as it were, an Arbiter honorarius, a determiner, a reconciler, a days man: which if it agree with both the other arguments, maketh the conclusion affirmative: but negative, if with one only, as in the former example of Paris, the Medium, the arbiter, the determiner, is that effect of Paris, To leave his flock to fetch a lass: which because it is agreeable with the nature of Paris, but is flatly repugnant to the duty of a good shepherd, therefore is the conclusion negative, Paris is no good shepherd. So in Master Ploidens reports, fol. 474. Saunders is a murderer. The Medium is that effect of Saunders, to minister venom to the intent to poison: which, because it agreeth as well with the nature of murder, as the affection of Saunders, maketh the conclusion affirmative, thus: 

He that doth minister venom to poison any one, is a murderer:  
But Saunders ministered venom to poison one,  
Therefore Saunders is a murderer.    
In this order, first of single arguments we make axioms: which axioms, if of themselves they be perceived and granted, they be straightway judged as true or false. And this is the first part of judgement in axioms, called axiomatical, determining only truth and falseness in propositions or axioms. Now if these propositions be doubtful, then thereof be made questions, which are to be proved by third arguments, fet from the affections of the other two which were joined in the axiom, and lastly are to be concluded by syllogism, the only judge of all coherence or consequence: as finally, Method hath only to deal with the ordering and settling of many axioms, thereby to give sentence of methodical proceeding or unorderly confusion. And therefore I see no reason why I should with the common Logicians, cho●… in Canons, Maximaes, and rules of consequence, as they call them, applying them to every argument of invention, seeing that syllogisms, and only syllogisms are the true and only rules of consequence and inconsequence, as I said before.  
The occasion, as I think, of this their error, hereof arose: because if an Enthymeme be denied, we commonly confirm it by some axiom, which indeed is nothing else, but the supplying of the part wanting, as either the Mayor, or Minor, as they term them, or else some prosyllogisme. And this rule, Canon or Maxima, being so supplied, a plain syllogism proceedeth, the only determiner of coherence. And as all the force of consequence is in syllogisms, so all the virtue of arguing is in the several affection of every argument to the thing argued: which affection is truly and artificially put down in Invention: in such sort that from every definition, and precept in Invention, such rules, maximaes, canons, axioms, consectaries, corollaries, or howsoever you term them, may easily be deduced: and, when necessity requireth, shall be of us put down distinctly in their several places. For, as for most of those outworn maximaes huddled up in schools, they be either unnecessary, and may be easily perceived by the definitions and explications of the arguments, or else not generally true, but in part: and therefore in no wise to be put down in art, but rather to be reserved for Commentaries, as that, Quod efficit tale, magis est tale, etc. which cannot stand, but by a number of frivolous and sophistical distinctions. Let him read Beurhusius, if any list to see the true canons of Ramus his Logic, compared at large with these lame rules. It shall suffice at this time to understand, that the true maximaes, or canons of Invention, are nothing else but certain rules concerning the several force or affection of arguments: The canons of axioms, such precepts as declare the use & force of axioms: and so, in a word, the canons of syllogisms and method, are precepts touching the consequence and inconsequence of the one, & the perspicuity or confusion of the other. Neither are there any rules of consequence at all, but only those of syllogisms. I have in my text kept myself only to such maximaes both in Invention and Disposition, as are put down orderly by Ramus, and are essentially belonging to this art: yet for the satisfying of the expectation of some young Logicians, somewhat unacquainted with this new-found Logic, as it pleaseth some to term it, I will hereafter, as occasion shall serve, put down in the annotations, some of the other stamp.  
But here may a doubt arise? For, seeing that every axiom and rule of Invention is a part of judgement (because it is an axiom, and every axiom is of judgement) it may seem that Invention and judgement be not distinct parts, but rather, as was objected before out of Carpentar, confounded the one with the other. I answer, the rules and precepts of Invention be indeed axioms, and therefore consequently proceed from judgement: but so, as you must take them to be the fruits of judgement already showed in ordering the axioms and rules of Invention: or examples of judgement, teaching the part of Invention: Not as though these precepts were put down in Invention to teach a man how to judge, either axiomatically, syllogistically, or methodically, which only belongeth to the second part of Logic called judgement or Disposition: And if you so take them, than every axiom is not strait way a part of judgement: but only such rules and precepts, as teach to make, order, and frame axioms. For otherwise, every precept of every art, because it is an axiom, should be taken for a part of judgement in Logic: whereas indeed they be but the fruits and examples of that Logical judgement appearing in the orderly constitution of every art. And so in Invention, every rule is an axiom, every rule doth judge, but every rule teacheth not how to frame an axiom, every rule showeth not how to judge, which only is the peculiar duty of Logical judgement.  
The art and doctrine of every argument, is distinct, firm, constant, and immutable: yet the affection of arguments may be altered, changed, and diversly considered, either in the same things diversly compared among themselves, or in one thing referred to divers, as in those examples, put down by Beurhusius and Talaeus,  
God Created man. So the affection is of the Cause procreant with the effect. Preserveth man. Cause conservant with the effect Is not man. Disparats among themselves. Is not like man. Unlikes among themselves.  
Where the things be as they were, I mean, God, and Man, which are here compared together, yet the divers kinds of relations and respects, make the self same things have divers names and titles, according to their several and divers affections.  
In like manner also it is, if one thing be referred to many, and drawn, as it were, through the places of arguments, although some arguments be not incident to some things:  
As, Man referred unto God, his maker, hath the affection of Effect procreated. Body, his matter, Effect material. Reason his form, Effect form. God's glory, his end, Effect final. Actions, his effects, Cause. Body, his part, Whole. World, his whole, Part. Living creature, general, Special. Paul, special, General. Earth, subject, Adjunct. Riches, adjuncts, Subject. Tree, his disparate, Disparate. Beast, contrary, Contrary. Homo ab humo, the notation. Name interpreted. Reasonable, living, The thing defined. Creature, definition,  Angel, equal, Equal. Blub, like, Like.  
Yet the art is certain and immutable, for, that which is a cause, can never be an effect in the same respect and relation, which relation changing, altereth the argument, not the art.  
[An Argument:] Every thing hath his several name according to his natural propriety, or by the imposition and fancy of man, but Logic respecting a second use in these several things, hath given them an artificial and secondary name. As, fire hath this his name usually known: but because it is sometimes considered of Logicians, as a cause of heat, therefore hath it his second note and name, and is called a Cause, one of the arguments, for that it argueth heat as his effect, and so in others. And by this affection we learn whether one argument agree or disagree with another, and how it agreeth, whether as a cause with his effect (which is an absolute and full agreement) or as an adjunct with his subject, which is but an agreement in part, and after a certain manner, and so of the rest. So that arguments be nothing else, but singularum rerum affectiones extra collocationem consideratae, quibus ad arguendum sunt affectae & comparatae, sed ut Grammatica non voces, non vocum significationes, sed vocum affectiones, sic Logica non res, non rerum naturas, sed rerum inter se habitudines explicat. Itaque omnia argumenta sunt relata: sed quia istae relationes variae sunt, itaque varia sunt argumentorum genera. This affection of arguments is by Hottoman expounded in this manner. Affectio ista est ratio quam quaeque res habet ad alteram. Graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appellant; itaque commodius rationem appellare possemus, sed vitandae ambiguitatis causa, nomen affectionis delegimus, quo eodem Cicero, & in topicis, & in ꝑartitionibus hac eadem in re est usus. Rationis autem verbum á Mathematicis sumptum est, qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 definiunt duarum eiusdem generis quantitatum comparationem; interpretes proportionem Latinè nominarunt: quidam habitudinem: nonnulli habitum: qui commodius, respectum: barbari fortasse correspondentiam appellarent. Huius vis ac facultas ea est, ut declaret, quaenam rei cuiusque cum altera ratio sit, quemadmodum invicem affectae sint, quomodò se inter se habeant, qualis inter ipsas comparatio aut affectio sit, sitne pars an totum, genus an species, consentanea an dissentanea, etc.  
[To argue:] To argue, is general; either in inventing only one argument by the affection of the other, as when by the notion of the cause we seek the effect, or else in placing them axiomatically, syllogistically, or methodically, we argue some other thing either by explication or confirmation. The first consideration is of arguments severally conceived and alone by themselves, the second as they be placed by disposition: and therefore Piscator's animadversion in this place is to small purpose, whereas he reprehendeth Ramus, for saying that every several thing considered alone is an argument. For he in so saying meaned not, that an argument should be so alone, as though it had no affection or relation to any other thing, but so severally considered, as that in Invention we should not intermeddle with axiomatical, syllogistical, or methodical conjoining and setting together of the same several arguments, for that doth wholly and only belong to Disposition.  
[Any several conceit:] Except those words which do but bind and knit together the parts of speech, as conjunctions, which signify no several and distinct thing in nature. Except again copious and Rhetorical phrases, where many words express but one thing, as, A man of an excellent and heavenly wit, where the words be many, the arguments but two, that is, the subject and the adjunct. Lastly, except full comparisons, divisions, definitions, and descriptions, where the argument is put down in a whole proposition. This is Beurhusius exception, although to small purpose: for Ramus saith not, all such words as are alone, but all such reasons, conceits, and things as are alone, and by themselves conceived severally, as these arguments be which he here excepteth: for though there be many words, yet they all express but one conceit of reason, and that is this single and sole argument which we here talk of.  
But to let that pass, he that taketh this word Argument, only for a proof or confirmation, deceiveth himself, and bereaveth Logic of half her dignity. Indeed it is usually taken for that thing only which doth prove and confirm, but here it hath a more general signification, and betokeneth not only confirmations, but also declarations without any syllogism or form of concluding, and so doth arguere in Latin signify, declarare, ostendere, perspicuum manifestumque facere, ut in Virgilio,  
Degeneres animos timor arguit, id est, ostendit.  
Yet nevertheless the same kind of argument may commonly serve both to declare and to confirm (although some there be which only declare) so in the end of the first Aegloge of the shepherds Calendar, Hobbinol useth an argument of the cause, only for explication sake. 
Ah faithless Rosalind, and void of grace,  
Thou art the root of all this ruthful woe.   
And in the ninth Aegloge, Diggon Davy useth the same kind of argument to the same purpose. 
Their ill haviour garres men missay,  
Both of their doctrine and of their faith.   
And yet here the cause argueth the effect, although there be no syllogistical probation intended, for that the proposition of itself seemed to Diggon true enough. And in our law, In every count, bar, replication, rejoinder, etc. Arguments of asseveration and exposition be as much used as those of proof and conclusion. Now for the other part, no man doubteth but that an argument of the cause may be very well used for confirmation, whereof examples are every where apparent. Let no man therefore think there is no Logic, where there is no syllogistical conclusion, for every argument serveth not every where only for confirmation.  
[Inhaerent:] I use this word till I meet with a better. I mean not so Inhaerent, as though it should always agree with the thing argued, for many times it is flatly repugnant thereunto, but so conjoined, as that the thing argued in manner offereth the argument to the Invention of the Logician, and this is true in disagreeable arguments: otherwise it is in testimonies, which be as it were borrowed from other matters, and brought to the Logician to be framed accordingly.  
Ramus divideth an argument into artificial and inartificial, whereupon Piscator took occasion of reprehension. For I see no reason, saith he, why testimonies should be called inartificial arguments, seeing that there is as good Art showed in applying them, as in finding other arguments: and if in Art there ought to be nothing without Art, either Invention wanteth Art, or testimonies are not inartificial, they answer him thus. They be not called inartificial, for that they want Art, but because they argue not of themselves, but by the force of some artificial: Which answer doth not fully satisfy me: For the testimony of God argueth most absolutely of itself, neither can we well say, that his testimony were not to be believed, unless he were verus, bonus, justus etc. sith we cannot distinguish these so from his divine essence, but that whatsoever is in God, is God: and therefore it is an unfallible argument, God spoke it, therefore it is so, ipse dixit, is here sufficient, neither need we seek for any artificial argument to confirm it, as we do in the testimonies of men.  
I hold on the same course which Ramus doth in dividing still by certain steps and degrees, till I come at last to the lowest. For it were against Plato's precept and all Art, to jump abruptly from the highest and most general, to the lowest and most special, without passing by the subalternal.  
[First:] First may be conceived of itself, without respect had to any other, as not depending on those that follow. So the cause may be known without any mention of a definition, but the definition can never be conceived without notice of the cause, as being made thereof: therefore the cause is first and original, the definition secondary.  
[Fully agreeable:] Seribonio & Piscatori non placet ista distinctio: nam si Logicè considerentur, aequalis & eadem est consensio: nam subiecta & adiuncta aequè non possunt alterum esse absque altero, atque causa & effectum: sin physicè, tùm accidentalis illa consensio est aeque in his & illis: nam faber po●…est non facere, quomodò puer potest non esse tinctus literis. Et nec omnis causa essentialiter convenit cum effecto, nec omne subiectum accidentaliter cum suo adiuncto. haec illi. Quia tamen diversi sunt gradus dissentaneorum, ideò & consentaneorum videntur esse eodem modo. Itaque hic nihil mutavi. haereo.  
These general heads of arguments have been diversly termed of divers Philosophers, as appeareth by Diogenes Laertius, and Aristotle. For sometimes they are called Categoremes, and the handling or discoursing of the same, Categories, both which are Greek words of like signification, borrowed from the place of judgement, and applied to philosophical conceits. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to say, or affirm one thing of an other, as in accusations it is usually ●…éene, and in arguments easily perceived: where one thing added to an other, is affirmed of the same, or else denied. Otherwhiles the precepts of them be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereupon, Aristotle's books where these be handled, are entitled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a place, and therefore Tully called them in Latin, locos, sedes, fontes, places, seats, springs or fountains of arguments. Sometimes they have more apt and easy titles, as when they be called Principles, Elements, Reasons, Proofs, Arguments, Termini and Media. Of all which, I use for the most part, this word Argument, and sometimes Reason, and Proof, as most usual and significant, the rest being rather strange and metaphorical.    

The third Chapter. Of the efficient and material cause.  
ACause is that by whose power and force a thing is caused: therefore this first place of Invention is the fountain of all knowledge, and that thing only is known, whose cause is understood. A cause is either before the thing caused, or else, in and with it. The cause before the thing caused, is either the efficient or the material. The efficient is a caus●… from the which a thing is: which although it cannot be artificially divided, yet it may be for order, thus distinguished. First the efficient worketh either of itself and by his own proper force, or else accidentally and by some external power. By itself, either naturally as the winds blow, the fire heateth, or with advice and voluntary deliberation as man in his several actions. Accidentally, either by necessity, as when the efficient is by some violent compulsion constrained to do this or that, or by chance and hazard, when any thing happeneth contrary to the purpose and intent of the worker, as if a man digging for stones should find treasure, which coming to pass by some secret cause, is by us ascribed to fortune: Secondly the cause efficient either worketh alone, which of itself without any help of others bringeth to pass his effect, as fire heateth, these be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or with others, which is holpen by others, these be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this is either principal, which in working ruleth the instrumental, as the Carpenter the axe, or instrumental which is used of the principal: and is either idle, and of itself hath no action, but is only moved of the principal, as the Saw of the Sawyer, or helping, as being moved of the principal, and yet moving itself also, as all such instruments which have life, as the Ox ploweth partly by his own motion, partly moved by the ploughman. Again it is such as the efficient cannot work without it, as the writer without a pen, or contrarily.  
Lastly, the cause efficient either maketh or destroyeth: that which maketh causeth a thing to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and doth either procreate or bring forth that which was not before, as God the world, king Lud the City of London, or preserve and keep that in being which before was procreated, as God the world, magistrates the cities. The destroying is that which causeth a thing not to be that was, and doth either utterly abolish and make that to have no being which before was, as the flood, or in part destroy and deface, as sickness the body.  
In june Hobbinoll reciteth a number of particular efficients of delight and pleasure, describing thereby the place where he was, thus:  

Lo colyn here the place whose pleasant site  
From other shades hath weaned my wandering mind,  
Tell me what wants me here to work delight?  
The simple air, the gentle warbling wind,  
So calm, so cool, as nowhere else I find.  
The grassy ground with dainty daisies dight,  
The bramble bush, where birds of every kind  
To the waters fall their tunes attemper right.   
colyn in the first eclogue maketh love the efficient of his weal and woe.  

A thousand scythes I ●…ursse that careful hour,  
Wherein I loved the neighbour town to see,  
And eke ten thousand siths I bless the stowr●…  
Wherein I saw so fair a sight as she.  
Yet all for nought, such sight hath bred my bain,  
Ah God, that love should breed both joy and pain.   
In April Hobbinoll declareth the procreant causes of Elissa▪ 
Pan may be proud that ever he begot such a bellibone,  
And Syrinx rejoice that ever was her lot to have such an one.   
And in july, Thomalyn describing that time of the year, poetically, in the end bringeth in the doggestare as causing death.  

And now the sun hath reared up 
Such examples as want in the Calendar, shall be supplied out of our law.  his fiery footed team  
Making his way between the cup and golden Diadem.  
The rampant Lion hunts he fast with dog of noisome breath:  
Whose baleful barking brings in haste pines, plagues, and dreary death.   
In May, Piers useth conservant causes. 
But tract of time, and long prosperity,  
That nurse of vice, this of insolency:  
Lulled the shepherds in such security, etc.   
Master Plowden, Folio, 262: a: Et quant a ceo, ils disoyent, que le forfeiture icy avera relation all temps del original offence commence, que enforce le mort, et ceo est le metter luy en ewe, et ceo fuit fait en sa vie, et ceo act fuit felony, et l'enditement dit, et doyt dire, que il mist luy en le ewe feloniousement. Car ceo que cause mort, doit estre dit feloniousement faith: et pur ceo si un per●…ust un a●…ter, issintque apres, il de ceo morust, l'enditement doit dire, que il luy feloniousement percusse, issintque felony est attribute all act, lequel act est fait per vive home, et en sa vie, come Brown dit. Car il dit; sir james Hales fuit mort, et comment aveigne ill all mort? Poet est redit per surrounder, et que surrounde luy? poet este respond, sir james Hales. Et quant ●…ist il ceo? Poet estre respond, en son vie. Issint que sir james Hales esteant en vie causa sir james Hales d'estre mort, et l'act del vive home fist le mort del mort home. Here sir james Hales did of himself voluntarily drown himself.  
Issint. Fol. 366. Si estrange all fine, que est de bon memory, deveigne de non sane memory, ou est imprison le tierce an apres les proclamations fait, et issint continue tanque les sinque ans soyent expire, et pius il vyent en son memory, ou est horse del prison, il ne serra conclude: carlach●… ne puit estre assign en luy que fault memory, ou liberty en son prosecution, et pur ceo ne fueront comprehend en le intent. Mes si en ceo case lestraunge all fine, en le tierce an, vst ale ouster le mere, ou vst prize baron, et issint vst continue tanque les sinque ans ussent estre pass, la ils serront lie. Car le aler oustre le mere, ou prender del baron fueront acts voluntary: Mes insanity del memory, et imprisonment sont encounter le volunt del party, et issint ils disoyent, que reasonable sense doit estre add all letter.  
Fol. 9 b. 13. b. 18. b. 19 a. b. Les parols del ley de nature, del ley de ceo realm et dauter realms, et del ley de dieu auxi voile yelder et doner am a ascun acts et choses faits encounter les parols de mesme le leys et ceo est lou les parols del ley sont infringe pur avoider greinder inconveniences, ou pur necessity, ou per compulsion, ou per involuntary ignorance. Pur avoider greinder inconveniences, come le bater del person de ascun home en ascun cases, uncore le batre et naufre de ascun home per altar, est cybien encounter le ley de nature, come encounter le ley del terre.  
Mes uncore en 22. lib. ass. lou home fuit en arrage et non sane memory, et fist grand male, et le home, et ses parents auxi luy pristeront, et luy lieront, et bateront oue vierges, et est la tenus, que ils puissoy enter ceo justifier en avoidance deal grand male que il puissoit fair, esteant de non sane memory. Et uncore le ley de nature, et le ley del realm prohibit generalment ascun de bater altar: mes cest especial case pur avoider de greinder mischief, ad●… un exemption et special privilege. Et nous voiromus auxi (come jay dit) que necessity en toutes leys sirrah bone excuse, et que touts leys done lieu all necessity. Car il est common proverb, que Necessitas non habet legem: et pur ceo, In praecipe quod reddat, le tenant excusera sa default per cretein de ●…aw, et uncore chescun default est abhor en nostre ley, pur ceo que il est un contempt del court: mes pur ceo que sans peril de mort, il ne puit veigner, le necessity del chance en tiel case, entant que nul default est en luy, luy excusera.  
Issint enfriender del prison est felony en le prisoner mesme per lestatute De frangentibus prisonam, uncore si le prison soit ignie, et ils que sont eins, enfreindre le prison pur le salvation de lour vies, ceo serra excuse per le ley del reason: et uncore les parols de lestatute sont encounter ceo. Issint in 14: H. 7. les jurors que fueront iures sur lissue, pur fear d'un grand tempest departont dillonques et severont eux mesmes, 〈◊〉 fuit la tenus que ils ne serra amercies, et que lour verdict apres fuit bone, et que ils ne fesoyent malement, et ceo fuit issint tenus pur le necessity del chance: mes auterment ils serra gréevousement puny. Et issint pur salvation de ma vie, ie●… puis tuer auter que assault moy. Car coment que effusion del sang, et tuer des homes est prohibit per le comen ley, uncore chescun home en son defence, ou come champion en trial en brief de droyt, ou tiels semblables poyent tuer autres; et ceo est pur le necessity del salvation de son vie ●…n son defence, et en l'auter case pur le necessity del trial.  
Issint per le common Custom deal realm, les hostelers sirrah charges pur les biens de lour gests perdus, ou embeseles de lour measons: uncore si lour measons soyent enfreints per les enemies de roy, et les biens dillonques prizes, ils ne serra charge pur eux. Car per reason, ceo ne poet estre resist: et pur cest cause ceo violence infringera le violence del custom. Et auxi le ley de Dieu done lieu all necessity. Issint que les parols del ley de dieu poient este infringe per necessity sans offence all dieu: et pur ceo en le viel ley, per le ley de dieu il fuit prohibit que nul comederoit le sacre pane l. panem propositionis: uncore il appiert que david pur necessity de famine comede le dit pane, et il ne infringe le ley, comment que il infringe les parols del ley, come Christ mesme declare en le gospel, pur ceo que il ceo fist pur necessity.  
Issint les Apostles del Christ per necessity del famine avolsont les spices deal frument dauters persons, et les comederent, et comment que ils infringe le●…presse parols deal far scripture, que prohibit a prendet les biens del auters sans le volunt deal owners, uncore ils ne offenderont per ceo, come il apiert per le gospel. Issint que per ceux cases nous veyomous que le ley des homes et de dieu yield et done am all necessity.  
Et compulsion auxi est bon excuse en nostre ley, come 〈◊〉 home fist obligation per dures, il avoydera ceo. Issint si le brache de ascun est traie per compulsion, et le weapon e●…n main tue un altar, ceo ne serra felony: et issint en touts auters cases lou home fait chose esteant a ceo coa●… et compel, il ne serra pur ceo damnify. Et auxi si home infringe les parols del ley per involuntary ignorance, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 enfreinder deal ley. Come si un infant de tender age ●…ue un home, ceo ne ferra felony en luy, pur ceo que il navoit discretion, ne intelligence, et pur ceo le ley impu●…e 〈◊〉 a so●… ignorance, le quel est a luy a ceo age per nature, et issint nul default en luy, et pur ceo il est dit Inuoluntary ignorance. Car it ne puit esse ●…ayient ne ●…age, comment que i●… voil, mes est ignorant per compulsion; et pur ceo il serra excuse, et ●…iel act est proprement dit destre fait ex Ignorantia. 〈◊〉. lou involuntary ignorance est adjudge le cause del act. Issint si une home de non sane memory tue un altar, comment que il ad enfreint les parols det ley, uncore il nad enfreint le ley, pur ceo que it navoit a●…m memory, ne intelligence, mes mere ignorance, lequel vient a luy per le main de dieu; et pu●… ceo est dit involuntary ignorance; a quel le ley impute le act deste fait, en tant que nul default est en luy, et pur ceo il serra excuse, entant que it est ignorant per compulsion, et tiel act est dit et term de●…e fait ex ignorantia, s. eoque involuntary ignorance est is cause. Et in Deuter. in principio cap. 9: Dieu provide especial remedy, que ce●…y que fi●…t chose per tiel ignorance ne serra puny pur ceo: car la il est ordeigne, que si un laborer est all labour one vn hatchet, et le test del hatchet eschew, et tue un que est south luy, que tiel laborer ne serra mice all mort, mes un especial ville fuit ordeigne pur sanctuary pur luy, pur ceo que il ceo fist per involuntary ignorance. Mes lou home enfreint les parols del ley per ignorance voluntary, la il ne serra excuse: come si un home que est yure, s. drunk, tue un altar, ceo serra felony, et il serra pend pur ceo, et uncore il fist ceo per ignorance. Car quant il fuit yure, il navoit intelligence ne memory: mes entant que ceo ignorance vient a luy per son act et folly demesne, et il puit resister cest ignorance, il ne serra privilege pur ceo, et Aristotle dit, que tiel home est dign de double punishment, pur ceo que il ad dooblement offend, s. en esteant yure, en male example de auters, et en feasance del act. Et ceo act est dit et term deste fait ignoranter, s. ou il est cause de son ignorance demesne: et issint le diversity perenter choose fait ex ignorantia, & ignoranter. Et issint come jay dit, lou les parols del ascun ley sont infringe pur 〈◊〉 greinder inconvenience, ou per necessity, ou per compulsion, ou per involuntary ignorance, que en touts ces cases le ley nest offend. Et adonques veyoromus et examineromus nostre case. Et en nostre case le woad fuit eject, et le incerteintie fait pur auoyder le grein der mischief. Car le vie de chescun home est plus precious que ascun biens sont, et le perder del vie del home est plus grand mischyefe que le perder del biens. Et issint en avoidance del ceo plus grand mischief, le eiectement, et le incerteintie fueront faits. Auxi ceo fuit per necessity, et per le plus grand necessity que puissoit este fait, s. per necessity en avoidance del mort. Et le necessity icy fuit cy grand que en les auters cases avant dits, s. le necessity en le case de creteine de ewe, et del famine: car est pur salvation de vie en l'un case et l'auter. Et auxi l'act poet estre dit d'estre fait per compulsion: Car quant un chose veigne a tiel point, que sil ne fait tiel act, que adonques il presentment morera, et en avoidance del present mort il ceo fait, tiel act poet bien este dit d'estre fait per compulsion, et per le plus grand compulsion que poet estre. Car il nad plus grand compulsion que compulsion del mort, s. que il morer●…, sil ne fist tiel chose, et issinticy 〈◊〉 del wo●…de, et le incertainty del remanant vient per compulsion. Et auxi il ne peet este deny mes que le ignorance icy del incertainty fuit involuntary, entant que l'eiectement del woad que fuit cause del ignorance, fuit per compulsion, que est involuntary. Et entant que le ignorance del incertainty est deste ascribe et impute tantsolement all necessity et compulsion, et pur avoider greinder mischief, queux choses per providence ne puissent este prevent, ne per circumspection eschew, ne per poiar resist, adonques ieo die, que nul default est in Fagassa etc.  
Principal, instrumental. Fol. 98. Car ils disoyent, que quant plusors veignont a fair un act, et lun solement ceo fait, et les auters sont present, abbettant luy, ou prist de luy aider en le fait, ils sont principals a tous entents cy fortement come cesty que fait le act. Car le presence de les auters est terror a cesty que est assault, et occasion que il ne osast luy mesme defender. Car si un viest son enemy, et 20. de ses servants veignant a luy assaulter, et ils touts trayeront lour espees, et luy environ, et un solement luy percust, issint que il de ceo morust, over les auters serront per bone reason aludge cy grand offendohrs que cestuy que luy percust.  
Car si les auters, nussent este present, il peradventure voile aver luy defend, et issint eschape. Mes le number de les auters present et pressed a luy percusser auxi, serra adjudge grand terror a luy, et abatement de sa courage, et occasion a fair luy despeirer a se defender, et est occasion de sa mort. Issint que lour presence est la cause de son terror, et le terror est cause que il receive les plagues, et les plagues sont cause de sa mort, et donques entant que ambideux les choses, s. les plagues, et le presence les auters que ne donont pas les plagues, sont aiudges la cause de sa mort, il ensuit que touts eux, s. les ferriors, et les auters present sont en semblable degree, et chescun est participant deal fait del altar. Et le fait, quant a cesty que est mort, et quant all punishment de ceo, (comment, que il consist de deux parties) uncore en le ley il est sans division. et nyent contristeant que ne soit que un plague, done per un solement, uncore il serra adjudge en le ley, le plague de chescun, s. done per cesty que le done pur luy mesme, et done pur les auters per luy come lour minister et instrument. et est cy fortement le fait de les auters, sicome ils touts ount tenus jointment oue lour maynes le baston, ou le altar instrument, oue que le plague fuit done, et ussent touts ensemblement percusse l'occise.  
Fol. 497. et 498. Touts les justices agreont en un, que le ordinary, le Patron, et le roy, doyent agréer a fair un appropriation, et sont actores huius fabulae (come le signior Dyer le term) cestassavoir, le ordinary inferior, ou supreme. Car il est le principal agent en ceo, eo que il ad le spirituel jurisdiction, et lact del appropriation est chose spiritual. Et lordinary dit, Appropriamus, consolidamus, & unimus, come principal actor en le cause, come Manwood justice dit: eoque le chose que concern le cure de esglise, est chose que concern les alms des parochians, de queux, deins sa diocese, le evesque ad charge. Et pur ceo en le appropriation le ley attribute a luy principal part. Et ceo que le ordinary del diocese puit fair, ceo le pape que vendicat a luy supreme jurisdiction oultre touts ordinaries, usast de fair deins le realm, come supreme ordinary, et fuist long temps suffer de ceo fair, et issint il vsast de fair visitations, corrections, dispensations, et tolerations, deius chescune diocese de ceo realm, et tolle de les evesques deins ceo realm tout come luy plest: et ensuant cest usage il vsast de fair appropriationes sans l'euesque, quel fuit prise d'estre bone et l'euesque, que ne fuit account forques come inferior ordinary, ne unques counterdist ceo, mes ceo fuist use et accept come bone et tiel authority et jurisdiction que le pape usast deins ceo realm fuit agnise per le parliament in Anno. 25. H. 8. et auters statutes, deste en le dit roy Henry le Huyte: et de luy descendist all successors: donques le appropriation fait per le roy solement sans l'euesque, est si bone, come si l'euesque vst le fait, ou sicome il fuist prise en ancient temps quant le pape le fist. Mes coment que le ordinary inferior, ou superior est celuy que doit fair le apropriation uncore il ne poet ceo fair sans le bon volunt deal patron. Carl Patron ad en le advowson, temporal inheritance cestassanoir, fee simple, le quel le ordinary, ne en ancient temps le pape, ne puit toller de patron, ne alterer sans le bone volunt del patron. Mes en appropriations le patron est un part, car il doit accepter ceo: et le ordinary est le agent, et il est le patiented. Et son assent en submission de luy all volunt le ordinary, et en acceptance del son order, et en exeqution del ceo que est ordeigne, est declaration de son intent: et tout serra intend deste fait a son request, car le benefit est soen: et issint le ordinary, et le patron sont duo actores huius fabulae. Et oultre eux, il y ad un tierce, que ad part a fair en cest action, et ceo est le roy, come roy: car il puit este lede per cest marriage. Car le avouson est tenus de luy mediatment, ou immediatment, etc.  
Fol. 79. a. Car troy's choses font ceo un act (ill intend un act de Parliament) s. l'assent de les signors, de les commons, et de le roy: et l'un, ou deux sans le tierce ne fait ceo un act. Car eomentque les seigniors et commons agree all chose, uncore n'est act tanque le roy ad assent auxi. Cause en compaigne.  
Cause procreant. Fol. 214. Adonques icy en le principal case, le roy Henry le quart fuit fits et heir a john de Gaunt, que fuit un des fits le roy Edward le tierce, et fuit auxi fits et heir all Blanch feme del dit john de Gaunt, que fuit file et heir Henry Duke de Lancaster. Issintque le Duchy de Lancaster vient aldit Henry le quart per descent del part sa mere.  
Folio 242. b. Car del heure que tout justice, tranquillity, et repose est deryve del roy come del fountain de ceo, le ley e●… tous ses besoignes et choses luy favour come le chief test del ceo.  
Cause conservant. Fol. 315. b. le roy est le test del bien public, et les subjects ses membres: et l'office le roy que le ley a luy appoint, est, de preserver ses subjects.  
The matter is the cause of the which a thing is made.  
So in August Willy showeth what matter his cup was made of, thus: 
Then lo, Perigot, the pledge which I plight,  
Amazer ywrought of the maple war.  In December colyn in his complaint, 
Where I was wont to seek the honey Be  
Working her formal rooms in waxed frame,  
The grisly toadestoole grown there might I see,  
And loathed paddocks lording on the same.  Again, 
And learn'de of lighter timber coats to frame,  
Such as might save my sheep & me fro shame.  Again, 
To make fine cages for the Nightingale,  
And baskets of bulrush was my wont.  Master Plowden. Fol. 15. b. Les ulnes del pan sont le matter del toge.  

Annotations.  
ARistotle sometimes calleth the efficient, the beginning of motion and rest, as in the first of his Metaphysikes, and second of his Physikes. And otherwhiles he useth this very name, Efficient, as in his Topikes and Demonstrations.  
The ancient Philosophers made great discourses concerning this cause, but some very fabulous, saith Aristotle 3. Metap. As Hesiodus and Parmenides made Love the maker of all things; some obscure and ambiguous, as Hermotimus and Anaxagoras said that a certain divine spirit was the author of all; so Empedocles gives all to Concord & Discord, and divers others to other divers things. Wherefore Aristotle compareth them to young fresh soldiers and unexperienced fellows, that many times hit home, and lay on load, but without either artor order.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek is a cause in English. It is sometimes taken generally for any reason or argument by common custom and use of speech: but here it hath a more special and proper signification, and containeth only these four kinds of causes following. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, be very significant words to express the cause and that which is made of the cause: The Latinistes have none so good, unless you take that dunsicall derivation, Causa, Causatum, which we imitate in English to very good purpose, thus, the cause, and the thing caused: Where, as the word, Cause, comprehendeth efficient, material, formal, and final cause, so, the thing caused, answering 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek, and Causatum in Latin, containeth the several effects of every particular cause, as proportionably we may say, the end and the thing whose end it is: the form and the thing form, the maker and the thing made, the matter and the thing materiate. For otherwise, although in Latin, Effectum do stand for all four, yet properly it only betokeneth that which is caused by the efficient. For thus we may distinguish the several virtues of the four causes, although I know they all concur together in causing, so that the constitution of the thing caused is not fet from this or that alone, but from all four jointly.  
Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, saith Virgil. For although by effects and other arguments we may have a probable guess and make sensible conjectures at things: yet no true science or knowledge is had but from the causes: By the effects and events we see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that things be so: but by the causes we know 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, why they be so: and that is only worthy the name of knowledge.  
These divers sorts and distinctions of efficients are greatly to be considered in daily affairs, as containing in them the reason of the well or ill doing of any thing: of all punishments, rewards, excuse, compassion. etc.  
Omnis procreatio & conseruatio fit natura, consilio, per se, vel per accidens: itaque illa primo, haec postremo in loco collocavi.  
[Naturally:] So all natural things be made, marred, augmented, diminished, altered, and removed from place to place by this operation of nature.  
I said before that the efficient was rather distinguished then artificially divided. For in truth the preserving cause is the efficient rather of the preservation itself, than of the thing preserved. And the instrumental cause, as it is an instrument, is no efficient at all, but rather a helping member or part of the efficient, sith it hath no power in itself to cause the thing caused. Causa sine qua non is of some referred to helping causes. Occasio est agendi tempestivitas sive opportunitas casu oblata, quod postremum ex nominis etymologia intelligitur, reliquum ex appellationibus graecis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quorum nominum extremum, notat tempus unde agens initium agendi facit, quod graecè expressius sonat, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. videtur occasio esse causa per accidens, sed diversa ab illis duabus a Ramo positis.  
Aristotle in the second of his Physikes distinguisheth between Fortune and Chance, as making Fortune properly incident to those efficients only which work with advise and deliberation, yet then use it not, and this is called Imprudentia, when we do a thing unawares. But Chance he will have that to be which is found in things void of such deliberation. So that if a man should call the stones that cover some honourable parsonage, fortunate, for that they be somewhat honoured, this were but an unproper kind of speaking by Aristotle's rule.  
A man goeth towards Westminster to talk with his counsellor, and misseth of him, here his going was in vain: but in going he findeth a ring: His going to Westminster was the cause of the finding of the ring, but yet such a cause as we call Fortune, or Haphazard. So Ovid excuseth himself for seeing somewhat more than he should, before he would.  

Cur aliquid vidi? cur noxia lumina feci?  
Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est?  
Inscius Actaeon vidit sine vest Dianam,  
Praedafuit canibus non minus ille suis.  
Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est,  
nec veniam laeso numine casus habet.   
In like manner Tully reporteth in his third book de natura deorum, what good fortune befell jason Phaereus, who having an impostume, as he thought, incurable, went to fight with purpose to die, but with a wound his impostume was opened, a thing which neither himself nor his physicians ever imagined: Here then was fortune on either side, in jason that was wounded, and in him that gave him the wound: good in the first, bad in the second. For the enemy's weapon was by fortune a cause of jasons unexpected health, whereas death was desired of the one, and intended by the other, for he that gave the stroke, thought rather to make a new wound than cure an old disease. This is fortune with Aristotle. Now on the other side, if a thrée-footed stool should fall from aloft, and yet in falling stand on his feet, this with him is chance, for the stool fell for no such end, and it is a thing altogether senseless. Epicurus said that the world was made by the casual concourse and mixture of little round indivisible bodies, like moats in the funne, whose ridiculous blasphemy Tully mocketh not without deserved cause, 2. de nat. deorum: for so, if a man should by chance cast abroad an hundred thousand or more of characters or Printers stamps, he might as well read on the ground all saint Augustine's works or Cowpers dictionary by the casual scattering of A. B. C. These be examples of chance with Aristotle, not of fortune. But it is folly t●… stand upon this nice and frivolous distinction of Chance and Fortune, sith in common speech they be taken all as one, and so they be here to be understood.  
In this kind of cause, ignorance and unwitting simplicity have place as I said before, whereof come excuses and supplications, when a man pleadeth ignorance, and therefore hopeth to find pardon, as Tully for Ligarius, Ignosce pater, erravit, lapsus est, non putavit, si unquam posthac. And again, Erravi, temerè feci, ad clementiam tuam confugio, delicti veniam peto, ut ignoscasoro. But indeed, this name of Fortune, Chance, Hap, or Hazard, was only invented by such as knew not the first cause, God's providence: And therefore when any thing fell out contrary to their expectation, whereof they neither understood the cause, nor could yield any reason, they said it came by chance, fortune and hazard. Whereupon Fortune was made a goddess of good luck: and many christians use these profane terms, God send me good luck, and good fortune. Whose idle prayers be noted by an Ethnic Poet.  

Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia; sed te  
Nos facimus, fortuna, deam, caeloque locamus.   
Aristotle calleth Fortune, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, improvidum, incertum, dubium, humano judicio ambiguum, and yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut divinum quiddam & beatum.  
Canon's incident to causes generally.  
God only is the first and principal cause of all things. All other causes whatsoever are secondary, and subject so his eternal direction.  
Nothing is without a cause.  
If all the causes concur, the effect will follow.  
To whatsoever thing you ascribe the cause, or deny the cause to the same you attribute or deny the effect or thing caused.  
Such as the cause is, such for the most part is the thing caused: this holdeth not in destroying causes.  
Particular Canons of the efficient.  
When many efficient causes join and concur together in any action (as the principal cause with other helpers and instruments) there they all jointly together be only the full and perfect efficient cause of that effect.  
Cause natural, voluntary, accidental, violent.  
God hath distributed to every creature some natural proprieties, virtues and operations.  
If the natural virtue, and property of any thing be affirmed, the natural effect will follow, unless that natural faculty be otherwise let or hindered, and if the effect be, the cause must also have gone before.  
If will, and advise, or deliberation be, than the effect may be.  
Such as the natural disposition and will is, such is the effect judged to be.  
If the cause be in hazard, that is, if the cause be to us uncertain and unknown, then may the effect fall out uncertainly and by hazard, or when we look not for it.  
Alone and with others.  
If the sole cause work continually, the thing caused is always, if not, then otherwise: if the efficient do necessarily require the help of others in working, then without them nothing can be done: if not, then otherwise: if it work by instruments, then are those instruments required. If the efficient work alone, than it dserueth the more, either praise or condemnation, if with others, than the less, so Nisus 9 Aeneid. accuseth himself, and excuseth  
Euryalus. Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum, o Rutuli, mea fraus omnis, nihil iste, nec ausus, Nec potuit.  
Procreant, conservant. No efficient cause, except God, can make any work without matter. Hinc illud, gigni,  
E nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil posse reverti. And if the matter be, the work may be made.  
If the procreant and conservant cause be, the thing may be procreated and conserved. If the undoing and destroying cause be, then must the thing decay.  
If the cause efficient be good, the effect will be good: and bad, if bad.  
If the destroying cause be good, the thing destroyed was bad: If the thing destroyed be bad, the cause destroying must be good, that is to say, hath done some good, hath brought some profit.  
The efficient may be expressed by variety both of Grammatical cases and Rhetorical figures: as in procreant causes, God is the father and fountain and well of all goodness. The beginning of every good thing is in, of, and from God.  
From procreant causes the Poets do oftentimes fetch their epithets & circumloqutions, as, Sole satus Phaeton, etc. Phaeton borne of the sun.  
If you put down, or take away, that is, if you affirm or deny the cause efficient, procreant and conservant, in time fit and convenient to work, and being not idle, than the effect must be put down, or taken away: but diversly, according to the diversity of the causes themselves. For,  
If such a cause be, as that it worketh of his own proper force, plainly and certainly, no other thing helping it, then must the effect follow certainly.  
Now let us see a little the use of these Canons, in comparison of the plain definitions and explications of proprieties put down by Ramus. Let this serve for an example. 

He that is idle, is wanton:  
But Paris is idle,  
Therefore Paris is wanton.    
In the proposition, which is the first axiom of the three, Idleness, as a procreant cause, doth argue Wantonness, as his effect. In the second axiom which maketh the assumption, the same Wantonness, is an adjunct of Paris; that is, a quality adjoined, or incident to the nature of Paris. Now according to the common Logicians, in this sort must you judge by disposition.  
Paris is idle,  
Therefore he is wanton,  
For the cause being put down, the effect will follow. But otherwise; if you believe Ramus, thus:  
The proposition, which was this; He that is idle is wanton, is a doubtful and contingent axiom, and yet, for the most part, most true, by reason of the affection of such a cause to such an effect. The assumption was this, But Paris is idle, which is also a contingent axiom, and must be confirmed by the manners and behaviours of Paris. The conclusion itself doth follow necessarily, by force of the form and constitution of the syllogism: but yet, of itself, it is but a contingent axiom, although the deduction of it from the premises, be, as I said, necessary, by reason of the lawful framing of the syllogism. If therefore the proposition be denied, I answer, that it is a contingent axiom, for the most part true, and therefore you cannot judge it altogether false. And this I confirm by the definition of the efficient cause already put down, thus; The efficient is a cause from which a thing is, which cause if it be, the thing caused either is, or may be. This now is a new and prosyllogistical argument, fet from the very natural definition of the argument itself, that is of the cause efficient: nay rather this is that common maxim used of others, if the efficause be (that is, in due time, and not hindered) the effect will follow. But here, the variety of efficient causes is diligently to be marked, as some be alone, some with others, some accidentally, some of their own force; as before I have showed. So then, by this we perceive, that the Canon or Maxima, doth nothing concern the consequence, but only the confirmation of the proposition and thing itself. Thus much for the proposition.  
Now if any man deny the assumption, it must, as I said before, be proved by the life and conversation of Paris himself. For in every syllogism, the premises, as they term them, that is, the proposition and the assumption, must be proved and confirmed, either by axiomatical judgement in Logic proceeding from the several affection of arguments to the things which they argue, or else by other arts and daily affairs incident to man's life. And commonly the propositions are proved to be either contingent or necessary axioms, by Logical definitions of arguments, and certain rules or canons, which are, as it hath been told, brought in for new and prosyllogistical arguments for the confirmation of the said proposition, and not as proofs of the conseqution. And if you thus apply rules, canons, and maximaes, whether proper to this Art, or those common received ones, you shall not do amiss.  
Lastly, concerning the conclusion of this syllogism, if any man do so much want good manners, as to deny it, you may justly say, there is no reason why it should be denied, unless the constitution of the whole syllogism be not lawful and artificial.  
I will here insert a few examples gathered out of our Law books, for the better understanding of some of these canons, & those distinctions of efficient causes put down before.  
Cause principal and instrumental. Hitherto may be referred, what is said of principal and accessaries. Stamford, lib. 1. cap. 44. Nota que in grand treason, yly ad nul accesiories, eins touts sont principals. Vt patet, An. 3. H. 7, fol. 10. Issint que quecunque offence fait home accessary en felony, mesme l'offence in grand treason fait luy principal. Mes en petit treason, ou felony, ou auters ●…els crimes, accessaries poient estre.  
Accessaries sont devant l'offence perpetrate, in procuring or commanding altar de fair un felony, mes n ient esteant present a le fait: issint, apres l'offence perpetrate sont ceux qui recevont un fellow attaint, bien conusants del fait que il ad fait, ou luy favoront, ou aydont, etc. In attainder sur apparance et default, le principal doit estre attaint devant l'accessory: et l'acquitel del principal est auxi acquitel deal accessary.  
Accidental. De Homicide per misadventure, vide Fitz. tit. co. 3. E. 3. P. 354. & P. 302. P. 2. H. 4. P. 69. & P. 11. H. 7. F. 24.  
Si homicide soit fait nient per home, eins per altar casualty, de ceo surda Deodandum. Deodandum est ou home avient a sa mort per misadventure d'ascun chose que chiet sur luy, ou per misadventure dun laps que il mesme suffra, in chiant de ascun chose sans estre enche sonée per ascun altar home; ceste chose quelle enchesona sa morte, serra forfeit, et pris come Deodand. Vide Fitz. tit. coron. P. 403.  
Concerning casual homicide, I remember an odd history of a certain man who falling from the top of a house, lighted on an other man's neck, and crushing him to death, preserved himself. The son of the dead man, procuring the revenge of his father's death, caused him that fell to be had before the judge: Where he no less prettily then reasonably, offered him this fair play: get thee up, qd he, to the top of the same house: I will stand where thy father did: and if by falling upon me thou bruise me to death, and save thyself, I promise thee, my son shall never seek to revenge my death.  
Necessity, Fortune, etc. Stamford: lib. 1. cap. 5. Homicide fait de necessity inevitable pur avancer justice, est justifiable. Car le viscount, bailie, ou ascun altar, qui ad garrant darrester home indite de felony peut bien justifier le tuer de luy, sil ne voile suffrir luy mesme estre arrest, eins estoit all defence tielment, que l'officer ne peut fair l'arrest sans luy tuer. et en tiel case l'officer serra discharge sans attender le grace le roy. s. sans, acquerer pardon, ut patet 22. lib. Ass. p. 55. et tit: coro in Fitz: P. 22. E. 3. P. 2. 61.  
Item si plusors veignont a comburer ma meason, moy esteant la dedeins, et invironnont la meason, mes ils ne ceo comburont: et ieo saetta horse, et occida un de eux, ceo nest felony, ut patet 26. lib. ass. p. 23. Mesme ley est sils veignont a ma meason pur moy robber, et mon garcon qui est one moy in la meason, tua un de eur. Fits: tit: coro: 3. E. 3. Itiner. North: P. 330. per Louth.  
Mes comment necessity serra interpret in homicide seipsum defendendo. Vide Fitz. tit. coro: P. 266. an 43. lib. ass. P. 31. & 3. E. 3. P. 284. P. 286. P. 287. & P. 297.  
Item, 21. H. 7. 39 Per Tremayle justice, servant poit occider home in savant le vie son master, sil ne poit auterment eschaper.  
That this hath been practised in England continually, it may appear by the discourse of Bracton, who wrote in king Henry the thirds time, in this manner.  
Est enim inter alia crimina, crimen quod ex part tangit ipsum regem cuius pax infringitur, et ex part privatam personam, quae nequiter & contra pacem regis occiditur. unde primò videndum est de homicidio, quid sit & unde dicatur, quae eius species, & qua poena homicidae punientur.  
Est enim homicidium, hominis occisio ab homine facta. Si autem àbove, cane, vel alia re: non dicitur propriè homicidium.  
Dicitur propriè homicidium, ab homine, & caedo, quasi hominis cedium.  
Species homicidij sunt multae. Nam aliud spirituale, aliud corporale: de spirituali verò ad praesens non est dicendum.  
Sed corporale est quo homo occiditur corporaliter: & hoc dupliciter committitur; lingua, & facto. Lingua tribus modis: s. praecepto, consilio, defension vel tuitione. Facto quatuor modis; s. justitia, ut cum judex vel iusticiarius reum justè damnatum occidit. Istud autem homicidium, si fit ex livore, vel delectatione effundendi humani sanguinis, licet ille justè occidatur, judex tamen peccat mortaliter, propter intentionem corruptam. Si verò hoc fiat ex amore justitiae, nec peccat judex ipsum condemnando ad mortem, & praecipiendo ministro ut occidat eum; nec minister si iussus à judice occidat condemnatum. Et peccat uterque si hoc fecerint juris ordine non seruato.  
Necessitate: quo casu distinguendum est utrum necessitas illa fuit inevitabilis, an non: Si autem evitabilis, & eam evadere potuisset occisor absque occi sione, tune erit reus homicidij. Si autem inevitabilis, quia occidit hominem sine odij meditatione, in metu & dolore animi, se & sua de liberando, cum aliter evadere non potuisset, non tenetur homicidij.  
Casu, sicut per infortunium, cum quis proijcit lapidem ad avem, vel animal, & alius transiens ex insperato percutitur, & moritur. Vel siquis arborem inciderit, & per occasum arboris aliquis opprimatur, & huiusmodi. Sed hic distinguendum est, utrum quis dederit operam rei licitae an illicitae, ut si lapidem proijciebat quis versus locum per quem consueverunt homines transitum facere: vel dum insequitur quis equum, vel bovem, & aliquis à boue vel equo percussus fuerit, & huiusmodi, hîc imputatur ei. Si verò licitae rei operam dabat, ut si magister causa disciplinae discipulum verberavit, vel dum quis deponebat foenum de curru, vel arborem incidebat, & huiusmodi, & adhibuit diligentiam quam potuit, s. respiciendo, & proclamando, nec nimis tardè aut dimissè, sed tempore congruo & ita clamosè, ut si aliquis ibi fuisset, vel illuc venisset, potuisset aufugere, aut sibi praecavere, non imputabitur ei. 〈◊〉 ●…is est de magistro non excedendo modum verberandi ●…ipulum.  
Voluntate, ut siquis ex certa scientia, & in assultu praemed●…tato, ira vel odio, vel causa lucri, nequiter & in felonia, contra pacem domini regis, aliquem interfecerit. Et fit aliquando hu●…smodi homicidium pluribus astantibus & videntibus, aliquando verò clanculum & nemine vidente, itá ut sciri non possit, quis sit occisor: huiusmodi homicidium dici poterit murd●…m, secundum quod inferius dicetur.  
Poena verò homicidij duplex est, spiritualis videlicet & corporalis: spiritualis tollitur per poenitentiam. Et occidit quis alium dupliciter: quandoque lingua, quandoque facto. Lingua, ut si quis dissuadendo, retrahit aliquem à proposito volentem alium liberare à morte. Et sic aliquandò indirectè facit quis homicidium. Poena verò homicidij commissi facto variatur. Nam pro homicidio justitiae justa & recta intentione facto, non est aliqua poena infligenda.  
Si sit aliquis qui mulierem pregnantem percusserit, vel ei venenum dederit, per quod fecerit abortiwm, si puerperium iam formatum vel animatum fueri●…t, & maximè si animatum, facit homicidium (Mes contrarium tenetur. Fitz. cor. P. 263. & 146. Car a fair homicide, il est requisite, que le chose occise soit in rerum natura.) Possunt & multi-culpabiles esse homicidij sicut & unus, ut si plures rixati fuerint inter se in aliquo conflictu, & aliquis sit interfectus inter tales, nec apparet à quo, vel à cuius vulnere; omnes dici possunt homicidae, & illi qui percusserunt, & tenuerunt malo animo percussum dum percussus fuerit. Item & illi qui voluntate occidendi venerunt, licet non percusserint. Item & illi qui non occiderunt, nec voluntatem occidendi habuerunt, sed venerunt ad praestandum auxilium & consilium occisoribus etc. Item & ille qui praecepit percutere & occidere, quia cum non sint immunes à culpa, immunes esse non debent à poena.  
I have written the whole discourse, for that there is herein contained the practice of most of these precepts concerning efficient causes.  
hereunto may be added also, our essoins de malo lecti, deal creteine del ewe, etc. as standing all upon the same grounds of violent and compulsive causes, and therefore in themselves reasonable excuses of absence.  
Ceux parols, Heirs, tantsolement font l'estate d'enheritance en touts feofments et grants. Litleton pag. 1. for the sole cause. So again Littleton, fol. 166. a. Home ne voyt unques que cest parol, Defendemus, fuit en ascun fine, mes tantsolement cest parol, Warrantizabimus. Perque semble que cest parol et verb, Warrantizo, fait la Garrrantie, et est la cause del guarantee, et null altar verb en nostre ley.  
For the destroying cause, Vide 47. E. 3. fol. ultimo. Nota, que divorce poet estre per cinque voyes, s. Causa professionis, praecontractus, consanguinitatis, affinitatis, frigiditatis. Et nota, que apres divorce causa professionis le feme serra endow, et le heir inherit: mes en auters cases el ne serra endow, ne le heir inherit. Here divorce is a dissolution of matrimony, and the constitution of the one is the destruction of the other.  
For instrumental causes, see 21. E. 4. 16. per Brigges: Qui fait per altar, fait per Luymesme; Come de servant etc. et Fayrfax, la. 44. b. For voluntary advise and deliberation, 41. E. 3. 30. per finch. Si deux sont vouch per lour faith demesne, et all sequatur sub suo periculo l'un vient, et l'auter faith default; et le tenant surmit que cestuy que fist default n'ad rien de fair en value, il avera l'entiere guarantee verse cestuy que appiere, car fuit son folly de ioynder en guarantee oue cestuy que rien ad. Sic si feme sole ad title d'entre en terres, et priest baron, que suffer descent et ne entra, la feme serra bar del entry apres le mort son baron: car serra dit sa folly de prendre tiel baron, que n'entra en temps. Here the free choice, will, and election taketh away all occasion of excuse.  
Material cause. The material causes, as also all other arguments Logical, are not to be tied only to sensible or bodily matters: but generally to be applied to any whatsoever, be it subject to sense, or conceived by reason. As, a man conceiveth in his mind or memory the Art of Logic or any other science, the matter whereof is their several rules and precepts, the form, the due disposition of the same: and yet nether first nor last is subject to sense, but only understood by reason, and imprinted in the inward power of man's soul. The old honest philosophers have had many odd conceits and fantastical imaginations touching this cause, as appeareth by Aristotle in the first of his Metaphysics. For Thales thought the water was the material cause of all things, as the Mystical fellows and Pagan divines thought the Ocean, Thetis, and Styx to be. Anaximenes' said it was the air, Heraclitus, the fire, Hesiodus the confusion of the world, Pythagoras' numbers, Plato little and great, all which and others also are but derided of Aristotle, as though they had thus spoken of the Logical material cause, which should be general to all things, and not rather of the material ground of natural things.  
Canons. If the thing be made, than the matter must needs be. If the matter be, the thing materiate may be: if not, than it cannot be, in secondary causes.  
The matter showeth the excellency or goodness of the things made thereof: for if the matter be good, the thing made is good: if better, better: therefore in deliberation and consultation of diet, of building, of weapons, of garments and such like, as also in praising or dispraising of any thing made, there is an especial consideration and regard had of the matter.  
Theloall his definition of a writ containeth both the material cause and others also. Un brief est un formal letter ou epistre del roy, escript en le langue latin, en perchemyne, selée ovesque son seal, direct all ascun judge, officer, minister, ou altar subject, all suit deal roy mesme, ou all plaint et suit d'auter subject, commaundant ou autorisant ascun choose conteigne en mesme la letter de estre fait pur la cause brieffement en cell letter express, que est d'estre discuss en ascun court le roy per la ley.    

The fourth Chapter. Of the formal and final cause.  
THe cause before the thing caused, is as I have already taught. Now followeth the cause in and with the thing caused, which is either the form, or the end.  
The form is a cause by the which a thing is that which it is, and therefore by the form things be distinguished.  
The form is ever engraven, as it were, in and together with the thing form, as the reasonable soul in man, and with man the self same instant.  
The form is either internal, or external: Internal which is not perceived by sense. external, which is subject to sense. external is either natural, which is engraven in every thing naturally: or Artificial, which Art hath framed and performed.  
The natural and internal forms of things be hardly either known and understood, or expressed and made plain.  
The artificial and external, is much more easily both conceived in reason, and expressed by word: and of such there be many.  
In August, Willy describeth the form of his cup which he laid against Perigots spotted lamb.  

Then lo, Perigot, the pledge which I plight,  
A Mazer ywrought of the maple war,  
Wherein is enchased many a fair sight  
Of Bears, and Tigers that maken fierce war.  
And over them spread a goodly wild Vine  
Entrayled with a wanton ivy twine.  
There by is a lamb in the Wolves laws:  
But see how fast runneth the shepherds swain  
To save the innocent from the beasts paws,  
And here with a sheephook hath him slain.  
Tell me, such a cup hast thou ever seen?  
Well mought it beseem any harvest queen.   
In February, Cuddy describeth the girdle he gave Phillis by the form. 
I won thee with a girdle of gelt,  
Embossed with buegle about the belt.   
And in the same eclogue he layeth down the accidental and external form, together with some effects of his bullock.  

Seest how brag yond bullock bears  
So smirk, so smooth his pricked ears?  
His horns been as broad as rainbow bend,  
His dewlap as lieth as lass of kent.  
See how he venteth into the wind.  
Weenst of love is not his mind?   
Master Plowden: Fol. 15. b. ut supra in le material cause: Car le shaping et ●…esance del toge, ere form del toge.  
The end is a cause for the which, or for whose sake the thing is. Palinode in the fift Aegloge, 
Good is not good, but if it be spend:  
God giveth good for none other end.   
Thenot in the second Aegloge.  

It chanced after upon a day  
Th'usbandman self to come that wa●….  
Of custom for to survey his ground,  
And his trees of state in compass round.   
The end of goods, is to be spent: the end of the husbandman's going abroad, was to view his ground.  
Master Plowden: Fol. 18. a. Et pur ceo le scope et fine de chescun matter est deste consider principalment en toutes choses: et si le scope et fine del dit statute est satisfy, donques tout le matter et lentent del matter est accomply. Et icy le substance et fine del dit statute, et lentent del feasors de ceo fuit, que le roy auera le subsidy, et ceo solement fuit le scope et sum del dit statute, et del intent deal feasors de ceo. et si lagréement icy est sufficient a donor le subsidy, et de fair le roy deste en surety de ceo, adonques il ensuist que lestatute et l'entent del feasors de ceo est perform et satisfy. Et que ceo issint est, ieo ay prove devant; car lagréement garrant et autorize le roy del weyer la woad per son collector, a quel temps que plerra luy, et quant ceo est fait, le roy ad title de action, et essint est en surety.  
Fol. 59 a. Et issint chescun vener sur le terre ne'st entre, Car fuit dit que Littleton en son lyeur tyent le ley destre, que continual claim doit estre fayt sur le terre, s'il osast vener la. et en tiel case, sil vient sur le terre, et faith claim, et depart mayntenant, ceo ne serra en son disadvantage adiudg un entre; car il avera assize del primer disseisin, et recovera damages deal primer iour del assize▪ car son intent fuit de fair claim, et nyent de prendre profit, ou de expeller le tenant tout ousterment, et de custodier le possession: et issint lintent del vener sur le terre est destre respect.  

Annotations.  
THe formal and material cause be essential parts of the thing caused: the end and the efficient are not so.  
The form is always made by the efficient, the matter is commonly prepared, not always made by it, as the quill is the matter whereof a pen is made, here the maker of the pen, doth but order, polish, and prepare the quill, but he altogether maketh the form and fashion of the pen. And although forma be effectum efficientis, yet it is causa formati. Dicitur forma à formando, differentia verò quia differre facit: una enim eademque res est, etsi diversa nomina: and according to these two names, hath Aristotle in the first of his Topiks assigned it two properties; The one for giving essence and knowledge of the same essence, the other for causing difference: And in respect of the former, it is sometimes called, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quod quid erat esse, as 1. post. Sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ratio essentiae, 1. de ortu animal: sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, essentia rei, 1. Philo: sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ●…atio specifica & essentialis, 4. Phil: sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, specifica, completiva, constitutiva, as in Porphyry: and sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, forma & ratio: sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, species & exemplar, 5. Phil. In consideration of the latter propriety, it is commonly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, differentia, for that especially by the form things differ one from another; so the formal cause of man is his reasonable soul, for this maketh man, to be man, and to differ from all other things that be not man. So eu●…y natural thing hath his peculiar form, as a lion, a horse, a tree, etc. the heaven, the earth, the sea, etc. So every artificial thing also, as a house, a ship, etc. So things incorporal, as virtue, vice, etc. So in a word, whatsoever is, by the formal cause it is that which it is, and is different from all other things that it is not.  
Only the form among all other causes is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simul congenita, extant at the same instant with the thing form: so that there is a most necessary and reciprocal consequence between the form and the thing form. But now, as the understanding of the formal cause causeth surest knowledge, so hardly can we understand what the formal cause is; which peradventure made Democritus think that truth lay hidden in the bottom, and plunged in the deep. Indeed we generally conceive and gather, that every particular thing hath his peculiar form, but what is the peculiar form of every particular thing, that we know not; or if peradventure we guess at them now and then, yet hardly can we express our conceits with laboursome and tedious circumlocutions. So that, for the most part things be not known, and if they be in part perceived, then have we no name●… for the things. Here therefore the ancient philosophers were wonderfully troubled, as Aristotle reporteth 2. Meta. Pythagoras would have his numbers to be the cause of things, and that every thing was an image or resemblance of numbers: and Plato altered their words a little, saying that Idea was the form, and that things form were communications and participations of Ideas: of whom Aristotle concludeth thus▪ that they valdè simpliciter & imperitè egerunt, & he seemed but nugari, & poeticas metaphoras loqui.  
Canons. IF you remove the form, it is impossible for the thing formed to consist.  
Such is every thing, as the form permitteth it to be.  
The form is the fountain of actions.  
The form of every thing is the especial part of the thing, and the alteration of the form changeth the thing form, and maketh it an other thing: but here we must distinguish between the universal changing of the form, and the particular alteration thereof. For if a house be utterly defaced, though it be reedi●…ied of the self same timber and stone, yet it is not the same house, but if it be but a little decayed and so repaired in part, it remaineth the same house still, though in continuance of time, every stick and stone be altered by often repairing of it.  
The formal cause is general, as all other parts of Logic. For the declaration whereof I will purposely note out some examples of the formal cause in actions and exercises aswell as things corporal.  
Formality in pleading is now partly abridged by the statutes of 32. H. 8. ca 20. 18. Elis. ca 14. and 27. Elis. but how much it was esteemed heretofore, see 14. H. 8. 27. per Brooke justice. Car un form covyent d'estre tenus et use, ou auterment touts choses serra en confuse et sans order. Car en trespass covyent donor colour (et uncore le sentence n'est le melieur en le verity del matter) pur ceoque est formality. Et a une plée en l'affirmatiue covyent prendre averment: et si soit en le negative, covyent concluder all negative, et ceo n'est forsque formality: et formality est le pluis chief chose en nostre ley.  
And the book of Entries standeth all upon formal precidents of declarations, bars, replications, rejoinders, surrejoinders, rebutters, issues, verdites, judgements, executions, process, continuances, essoynes etc.  
Brytton, whose book was published in Edward the first both time and name. Folly 42. describeth the order and form of battle, but somewhat discrepant from the form described, 17. E. 3. and 19 H. 4.  
In 11. H. 6. 7. the joining of battle in a writ of right is solemnly set down, between sir Piers Colts and the Earl of Northumberland for the manner of Capenhow.  
See 14. E. 4. 8. the form of punishment called Fort et dure, pronounced in Newgate by justice Needham. vide 8. H. 4. 2.  
Final cause. Ramus in his French Logic placeth the end first, sith, according to Aristotle in the second of his Physikes, the end is first in conceit and consideration, though last in execution. But in the last edition of his Latin Logic he setteth it in the last place, respecting rather finem rei, then efficientis scopum & intentionem, which last resolution of his I follow at this present, yet not so resolutely, but that I can be content to hear their advise, who bid us take heed that we confound not the final cause with the thing caused: which we shall the better do, say they, if we consider exactly the order and due coherence of the four causes in the absolute constitution of a thing caused. For first, the final cause, the end, purpose, intent, drift, mark, or scope, as it were of the whole action, is propounded to the efficient, and so urgeth and moveth him to prepare the matter, and apply the form thereunto for the full accomplishing of the enterprise: which being once performed, the efficient cause now ceaseth, as having obtained that it sought for. And this being thus achieved, is not the final cause, but the thing caused. As for example, I purpose to sweat, and therefore I dance: here the sweeting is not the final cause, but the intent and purpose which I had to sweat, is the cause that moved me to dance, and so caused me to sweat, which sweeting is the thing caused: and although in vulgar speech, the use of a thing and the end of the same thing be confounded, yet by art and reason they should be distinguished, the one a cause, the other a thing caused. If any man object, that if we say the end is only the purpose of the efficient, than this place will be restrained to such things only, as use reason, and can purpose, where all Logic must be general, and appliable as well to Non ens, as to Ens, to that which is not, as that which is: they answer, that we need not take this word, purpose or deliberation so strictly, as to apply it only to reasonable creatures, but generally say, that every thing worketh for some end and purpose, whether it be by nature's instinct, or voluntary consultation. Or if this seem more philosophical than religious, we may say, that in all artificial things, and such natural things as have no deliberation, that which we call the end, is but the thing caused by them, and the cause final is the purpose of God in natural things, and the intent of the artificer in things that be artificial.  
Et finis movet efficientem, & cogitatio de fine: finis ut obiectum, cogitatio de fine, ut adiunctum agenti inhaerens, saith Piscator. Some others make the final cause to be nothing but a part of the efficient, and no distinct cause itself, sith it only moveth the efficient to forward the operation.  
The end is chief, or subordinate: chief, which the efficient desireth for itself, as the covetous man Riches, and it is either universal, to the which all things in the world generally be referred, as God's glory; or special, whereunto every thing in his kind is referred, as the house is the end of the builder, for he seeketh no further. Subordinate is that which is not for itself desired, but referred to the chief end.  
Canons. If the end be, than the thing must also be whose end it is: and if the end cease to be, than the thing whose end it was, can no longer be,  
Every thing is referred to his end.  
The end doth either allow or disallow every man's action; Or thus, that is good, whose end was good, and contrarily: Sic Aristotle 3. Rhet. Laco, cum rationem de Ephoratu in judicio redderet, rogatus, an ipse alios iure perijsse existimaret, assensus est: Ille verò, nun haec tu cum illis decrevisti? & ille assensus est: nun igitur & tu (inquit) peribis? Minimè verò, inquit: illi enim pecunijs acceptis haec commiserunt, ego verò nequaquam, sed ex sententia.  
The end is more to be desired, than those things that be referred to the end. He that seeketh the end, seeketh also those things that be referred to the same end.  
All the arguments that common Rhetoricians fetch from Honestum and utile, are for the most part derived from the end or final cause, sith for the cause of these two, most things are enterprised. In like manner, the guesses and conjectures of judges are fet from the end, as, he was most like to work the mischief, who might have any end or profit in practising of the same.  
Whose use is good, that is good, but not contrarily, the thing is bad, because it is abused.  
The end doth not always follow the efficient cause, either because the efficient could not accomplish the thing alone, or else because he would not. Theloall. lib. 7. cap. 2. Le final intent deal chescun que pursuit brief, est, ou a recoverer seisin ou possession de terre ou tenement, ou d'auer ●…hose dont home peut aver heritage, ou franktenement, ou term; ou d'auer remedy et recompense pur injury et damage a luy avenue per le act, ou non feasance d'un altar, ou pur le non performance des contracts et obligations ou auters parts et causes que sont come contracts.  
Home vient pur avower son attorney, cest presence ne serra dit appearance, car son intent, ne fuit d'apperer all brief etc. 8. H. 7. 8.  
Abuses of causes. Sophistry, as I have said elsewhere, is no Logic: & therefore lest I should injury the art by joining sophistical fallacians with Logical institutions, I have rather reserved them to these annotations, than thrusted them in among the precepts. Some use, I confess, there may be had of them (although I know, that who so thoroughly perceiveth the truth of this art, needs to seek no other means to avoid these deceits, sith Rectum est index sui, & obliqui.) But if we shall put down every thing in Logic, which hath any little show of profit thereunto; Grammar will be good Logic, because it helpeth us to utter the which we have Logically conceived.  
The word, Sophista, was at the first, a title of commendation, and only applied unto him that was a Philosopher or teacher of wisdom. But now it is become odious, as Tyrannus, and such like. Sophistry therefore is the abuse of Logic, deceiving the simple with a glorious show of counterfeit reasons, commonly called Fallacians.  
Fallacians be either in the word, or in the reason. Fallacians in the word be of two sorts, some in a simple word, some in the conjunction of words. In a simple word be three. The first is when v●…uall and upstart words be foisted in, as he putteth his felicity in circumpugnable goods, circumpugnabilibus bonis, meaning Riches, because men fight about them. Le seignieur des Accords in his Bigarrures, pag. 198. hath many of this making, although somewhat more tolerable, because of the ridiculous application. Ils font (saith he, speaking of some French Carmini●…cators) de petitelettes descriptionettes qui sont fort agreabletets aux oreillettes delicatelettes, principallettement des mignar delettes damoisellettes, Come 
Ma nymph follastrelette,  
Ma follastre nymphelette.  And after 
je vous vens une goutette,  
une gout clairelette:  
une claire goutelette,  
Qui vient d'une fontenette,  
Miguarde fontenelette,  
Fontaine mignardelette. etc.  And page 65. of another sputatilicall goose, he saith thus.  
Un certain predicant qui veuloit▪ Pindariser en chair, et choisir des mots courtesans, pour applaudir a quelques damoiselles fraischement revenues de la cour, avoit coustume ●…e ●…uenter des mots, et entre auters, ill appelloit la destinée, Fatum in latin, fat in Francois, sur quoy un gentle parsonage rencontra ce distique  

Frere jehan Chassepoi, tu te romps trop la teste  
De nous prescher le fat escrit par Ciceron:  
Ne t'eschauffe pas tant, va, tu n'es qu'vne best,  
Pour bien monstrer le fat, host ton Chapperon.   
The like absurdity would it be for a man of our age, to affectate such words as were quite worn out at heels and elbows long before the nativity of Geffrey Chawcer.  
The second is, when doubtful and ambiguous words be used, as in those verses of martial, where, tuus, is either thine by ●…argayne, or by invention. 
Carmina Paulus emit; recitat sua carmina Paulus: nam quod emis possis dicere iure tuum.  And that, 
All the maids in Camberwell may dance in an egg shell.   
Of a little village by London, where Camberwell may be taken for the Well in the town, or the town itself. So that, Ware and Wadesmill be worth all London. Where Ware is either the town Ware, or else merchandise. So lastly, the Mayre of Earith, is the best Mayre next to the Mayre of London. Where the town, God knows, is a poor thing, and the mayre thereof a seely fellow, in respect of the Mayres of divers other cities, yet it is the very next to London, because there is none between.  
Accords pag. 96. une ieune damoiselle interrogée en quelle espece d'oy seau elle desireroit veoir son amy, si nous estions aux temps des Metamorphoses, elle dit, qu'elle le voudroit veoir en Phaisant: vrayement vous aves raison, dit dame jaquette caquillon, il ne scauroit estre plus agreeable qu'en le ●…aisant. Hear not the word written, but the voice and sound caused the ambiguity.  
The third and last is, when store of Metaphorical words is the cause of a ridiculous obscurity, as if a man meaning to be brief, should promise that he would gallop over all the rest of his text. Wherefore Arist. reprehended Plato for that his speech was obscure and ambiguous by reason of Metaphors▪  
When any of these three fallacians be used, we may say with him in Tully, Sputa quid sit, scio: Tilica, nescio. We may desire him to speak better English.  
In the coupling or conjunction of words be two: the first is Amphiboly, when the sentence may be turned both the ways, so that a man shall be uncertain what way to take, for this is the signification of the Greek word Amphiboly, and this fallacian cometh not from the divers signification of any one word, but from the ambiguous construction of many words, as that old sophister the Devil deluded Pyrrhus by giving him such an intricate answer. 
Aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse.  
I now foretell the thing to thee which after shallbe known;  
That thou, king Pyrrhus, once shalt see, the Romans overthrown.   
Where this word, overthrown, may either be the nominative case and appliable to king Pyrrhus; or the accusative, and attributed to the Romans. The like is that given to Croesus.  
Croesus' Halyn penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim. Where he hoping to have destroyed Cyrus and the Persian power, overturned his own estate, as Herodotus reporteth. Such an one was that also given to the countess of Flaunders concerning the battle between her son Ferrande and king Philip, Que le roy seroit abatu, foulle aux pieds des chevaux sans sepulture, et Ferrand receu a Paris en grand pomp et triomphe apres la victory. Where the king, although trodden down, yet died not, but overcame, and triumphed at Paris over Ferrande, who was then taken prisoner contrary to the expectation of the Countess. Cardan de Martin Abbot of Assello, had this verse over his gate.  

Porta patens esto nulli.  
Claudaris honesto.   
Where, by the error of the Painter, the point being mace after, nulli, caused the Pope which road that way, to displace Mar●…yn, and prefer another to his room, who retained the verse, but altered the point, & put it immediately after esto, thus. Porta patens esto. Nulli claudaris honesto.  
Whereupon these verses went together.  

Porta patens esto. Nulli claudaris honesto.  
Ob solum punctum caruit Martinus Asello.   
The verse of itself is very ambiguous, if the point be altogether omitted, Porta patens esto nulli claudaris honesto.  
The second is in the unorderly expounding of the words, as  

No sickness can be health:  
Dido is sick,  
Therefore she cannot be whole.   
For if you turn the words into good order of exposition, the falseness of the proposition will easily appear, thus, No sick body can be whole.  
Thus much of such fallacians as be in the words either severed or conjoined: which indeed are rather Grammatical and Rhetorical than belonging to Logic: Those that are in the reason be more Logical: whereof some belong to Invention, some to Disposition.  
Fallacians of Invention are either common to all the places, or peculiar to some certain places.  
Common to all be two. The first is called, Petitio principij, the requesting of the thing in controversy: when, to prove any thing, we seek to have, either the same in effect granted us, or some other thing as doubtful. Petitio principij then, is either when the same thing is proved by itself, as, The soul is immortal, because it never dieth: Or when a doubtful thing is confirmed by that which is as doubtful, as 

The earth moveth,  
Because the heaven standeth still.    
The second is, Superfluity: either when we cast in things impertinent: or else in unnecessary repetitions of the same things.  
For the first, that may serve for an example, which Tully hath in his second book of Divination: as if a physician should command his patient to take such a beast, as is bred of the ground, walketh on grass, carrieth her cottage, and wanteth blood, whereas he might with less labour, and to better purpose have willed him take a Snail, which he calleth  
Terrigenam, herbigradam, domiportam, sanguine cassam.  
To this example you may add that of martial, as more convenient. lib. 6.  

Non de vi, neque caede, nec veneno,  
Sed lis est mihi de tribus capellis:  
Vicini queror has abbess furto,  
Hoc judex sibi postulat probari.  
Tu Cannas, Mithridaticumque bellum,  
Et periuria Punici furoris,  
Et Sulla's, Mariosque Mutiosque  
Magna voce sonas, manuque tota.  
jam dic Posthume, de tribus capellis.   
Much like as if a preacher in expounding a text of charity, should talk out his hourglass, in discoursing of Bell the Dragon of Babylon. To such fellows we may say, turn to your text, or jam dic Posthume de tribus capellis.  
For the second, which is unnecessary repetition of the same thing, this shall suffice, that when I have generally put down the nature of an argument, it were sophistical to repeat the same in every particular, as, when I have once said generally, that an argument is that which is affected to argue, what need I in the particular discourse of a cause to say, a cause is that which is affected to argue.  
Now let us come to the particular fallacians of several places, And first for the causes. It is sophistical to argue from that which is no cause: as if it were a cause. So Sinon the false caitiff feigneth a cause why the wooden horse was builded. 
Hanc pro Palladio moniti, pro numine laeso,  
Effigiem statuêre, nefas quae triste piaret.   
It is, and always hath been a common practice among lewd men, to pretend counterfeit causes to cloak their malicious intent, and disgrace other men's good meanings. The true cause therefore must be carefully distinguished from the shadow overcast: Arist. 2: Rh. à non causa quasi causa, quip prop terea 〈◊〉 simul, aut post eam evenerit: quod enim post illam est, aequè ac propter illam accipiunt, maximeque qui in republica versantur, ut Demades, Demosthenes' politiam causam calamitatum omnium extitisse, quia post eam bellum est excitatum.  
Also in efficient causes, the divers kinds of working must be diligently considered, as, what causes can work alone, what require the help of others, what work necessarily, what voluntarily, and so forth.    

The fift Chapter. Of the thing caused.  
THe thing caused is that which is made by the force of all the causes, which usually, although not so properly, is called the effect.  
Howsoever any thing be altered, moved or changed, the motion, and the thing moved, or changed, belong to this place, and are called effects, or things caused: as also, sayings and writings, thoughts and all cogitations, although neither uttered nor accomplished.  
Matter of praising and dispraising commonly is fet from this place. So in February, Thenot telleth how the Briar made a pitiful complaint to the husbandman, dispraising the Oak, and exclaiming against it, by reason of his injurious dealing: which he at large putteth down to incense the husbandman against the Oak.  

How falls it then that this faded oak,  
Whose body is sear, whose branches broke,  
Whose naked arms stretch unto the fire,  
Unto such tyranny doth aspire?  
Hindering with his shade my lovely light,  
And robbing me of the sweet sun's sight?  
So beat his old boughs my tender side,  
That oft the blood springeth from wounds wide.  
Untimely my flowers forced to fall,  
That been the honour of your coronal.  
And oft he lets the cankered worms light  
Upon my branch to work me more spite▪  
And oft his hoary locks down doth cast,  
Wherewith my fresh flowers been defaced.  
For this, and many more such outrage,  
Craving your goodhyhead to assuage  
The rancorous rigour of his might,  
Nought ask I but only to hold my right.   
In May Piers proveth the shepherds to be evil, by their effects, thus:  

Those faytors little regarden their charge,  
While they, letting their sheep run at large,  
Passen their time that should be sparely spent,  
In lustyheade and wanton merriment.  
Thilk same been shepherds for the devils stead,  
That playen whiles their flocks be unfed.   
In the same Aegloge Palinode setteth forth the effects of youth agreeable to the pleasantness of the time.  

Youth's folk now flocken in every where  
To gather May buskets and smelling briar.  
And home they hasten, the posts to dight,  
And all the kirk pillars ere day light,  
With hawthorn buds and sweet Eglantine,  
And garlands of roses, and Sops in wine.   
In july, Thomalin praiseth Christ the great shepherd, by his effects. 
O blessed sheep, o shepherd great, that bought his flock so dear,  
And them did save with bloody sweat from Wolves that would them tear.   
In the eight Aegloge Piers rehearseth the effects of love, in these words.  

Ah fone, for love does teach him climb so high,  
And lifts him up out of the loathsome mire.  
Such immortal mirror as he doth admire,  
Would raise one's mind above the starry sky,  
And cause a captive courage to aspire,  
For lofty Love doth loath a lowly eye.   
Colyn in December repeateth the pastimes and effects of his youth in these verses.  

Whilom in youth, when flowrd my joyful spring,  
Like swallow swift I wandered here and there.  
For heat of headless lust me so did sting,  
That I of doubted danger had no fear.  
I went the wasteful woods, and forest wide,  
Withouten dread of wolves to been espied.   

I wont to range among the mazy thicket,  
And gathered nuts to make me Christmas game,  
And joyed oft to chase the trembling pricket,  
Or hunt the heartless hare till she were tame.  
What wreaked I of wintry ages waste?  
thou deemed I my spring would ever last.   

How often have I scaled the craggy oak,  
All to dislodge the raven of her nest?  
How have I wearied with many a stroke  
The stately walnut tree? the while the rest  
Under the tree fell all for nuts at strife,  
For ylike to me was liberty and life.   
And so after, in the same pitiful lamentation, the effects of his summer and winter be set down.  
But in March, Thomalins long tale of Cupid, hath almost nothing else, but a rehearsal of his own doings and Cupids. The narration is this.  

It was upon a holiday  
When shepherds grooms han leave to play,  
I cast to go a shooting:   

Long wandering up and down the land  
With bow and bolts in either hand  
for birds in bushes tooting.   

At length within an ivy tod,  
There shrouded was the little god,  
I heard a busy bustling.   

I bent my bolt against the bush  
Listening if any thing would rush,  
But than heard no more rustling.   

thou peeping close into the thick,  
Might see the moving of some quick,  
Whose shape appeared not.   

But were it fairy, fiend, or snake,  
My courage earned it to awake,  
And manfully thereat shot.   

With that sprung forth a naked swain,  
With spotted wings, like peacocks train,  
And laughing lope to a tree:   

His golden quiver at his back,  
And silver bow which was but slack,  
Which lightly he bent at me:   

That seeing I, leveled again,  
And shot at him with might and main  
As thick as it had hailed:   

So long I shot that all was spent,  
The pumy stones at last I hent  
And threw, but nought availed.   

He was so wimble and so wight,  
From bough to bough he stepped light,  
And oft the pumyes latched.   

Therewith afraid I ran away,  
But he that erst seemed but to play,  
A shaft in earnest snatched:   

And hit me running in the heel;  
For than I little smart did feel,  
But soon it sore increased;   

And now it rankleth more and more,  
And inwardly it festreth sore,  
Ne wots I how to cease it.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 163. a. Et certes, les cloisterers communement en pheasant lour leases et faits, avoyent un form, lequel ils cy precisement voile te●…er, et pursuer, que ils voillent, marrer tout, pluistost que alterer lour custom: et i●…int purceoque ils ne voilent encliner lour form all ley, mes voilent aver le ley a incliner a lour usage, ils destroyeront le force de plusours fayts.  

Annotations.  
THis argument of the thing caused containeth not only deeds and works, but also thoughts, and words, counsels and deliberations, and all motions whatsoever. Parmenio the father, and Philotas the son, were both put to death for suspicion of treason against Alexander: Where, their cogitation and compassing of their Sovereigns death, were such effects as were plagued by death. For like occasion also were Lentulus, Cethegus and other complices of Catyline brought to confusion.  
Yet when sayings, writings, counsels, and deliberations be brought in as testimonies, then are they arguments borrowed, assumpta aliunde.  
Canons. We commend men by their causes and adjuncts, as for their noble ancestors, great possessions, etc. but especially by reason of their effects, as for that they did this or this etc. 
Nam genus, & proavos & quae non fecimus ipsi,  
Vix ea nostra voco.   
And as for Riches, perinde sunt, as he that useth them: good, if he apply them well: bad, if otherwise.  
If the thing caused be, than the cause either is or was, but not always contrarily.  
Such as the thing caused is, such commonly is the cause.  
That which is attributed, or not attributed to the thing caused, must be applied or not applied to the cause.  
Fit. Cor. 22. E. 3. p. 26. Thorpe recita comment un gaoler vient all jail oue un lantern en sa main a veier ses prisoners, queux avoyent debruse lour fers, et estoyent touts priests d'auer occise luy, et batoyent et naufroyent luy malement: mes il auoyt un hatchet en sa main, oue quelle il occist trois de eux, et puis eschapa, et fuit adjudge per tout le counsel, que il auoyt bien faith.  
Stanford: lib. 1. ca 9 Nota, que en ancient temps la volunt fuit cy material, que il fuit repute pur le fait. Fit. Cor. 15. E. 3. P. 383. ou un compassant le mort d'auter, luy naufra●…y gréevousement, que il luy lessa giser pur mort, et pius s'enfua, et l'auter reviua, et non obstant, fuit adjudge felony, 〈◊〉; quant sa volunt apiert cy ouertment de luy aver tue, voluntas reputabitur pro facto et oue ceo accorda Bracton qui dit, In maleficijs spectatur voluntas & non exitus, & nihil interest utrum quis occidat, an causam mortis praebeat. Mes le ley n'est issint a cestiour. Car il doit morir en faith, avant que il serra adjudge felony. Et si home ferist altar oue intent de luy bater, mes nemy a luy tuer, uncore sil morust de tiel bater, il est felony en luy que ferist: perque a cest iour, home peut conuerter le dit tert de Bracton, et dire, que Exitus in maleficijs spectatur, & non voluntas dundaxat.  
Elenches. martial useth this argument sophistically in his first book. 
Extemporalis factus est meus Rhetor,  
Calphurnium non scripsit, & salutavit.  As though this were an affect of an extemporal Rhetor, to salute a man by name without premeditation. But here his meaning was to be merry, in taunting the man for his ill memory, who could scarce remember his familiar friends name, unless he had written it before, and learned it without book.    

The sixth Chapter. Of the whole, part, general, special.  
HItherto of the first division of arguments fully agreeable, in the cause and the thing caused. Now followeth the second. Secondly therefore the argument fully agreeable is either the whole and his part, or else the general and his special.  
The whole is that which containeth parts: the part is that which is contained of the whole. The whole is integral, or universal: The whole integral is that which hath his essence or being of the parts, as Logic hath two parts, exposition of arguments, and disposition of the same, and of these two parts the whole essence and nature of Logic consisteth. So a messsage is made of two parts, del terre et structure. And here the part is called a member, and is that which giveth essence to the whole, as Exposition and Disposition in respect of Logic, terre and structure in respect of a messsage.  
The whole universal, called the general, is such a whole as giveth the essence or being to his specials; as, an Inherent argument, is the general, containing original arguments, and those that are secondary as his specials. For here an inherent argument is a whole essence, which doth equally pertain to original arguments, and such as are secondary.  
The special is a part of the general, as arguments first and secondary are specials of an Inherent argument, as being parts put under it indifferently and equally or alike.  
The general is either most general or subalternal, the special is either most special or subalternal, that is, put under.  
The chief or most general is that which hath no general above, As in Logical Invention, an argument, is the most general, comprising both Inherent and borrowed arguments under it.  
The general and special subalternal, or under another, are those which may be in divers respects both generals and specials: generals, in respect of their inferiors; specials, in respect of their superiors, as, a cause, is a special in respect of an argument fully agreeable: but it is a general in respect of the material or formal cause.  
The most special is that, which cannot be divided into specials, as this or that singular material or formal cause containing none other under it.  
General's are certain resemblances of causes in themselves comprehended; as specials are of effects. Special examples referred to their generals, belong to this place.  

Annotations.  
HOttoman. Totum & parts utrum prius an posterius sunt, arm simul? primum distinctio adhibenda est, ut aliud sit totum naturale, veluti arbour, fundus, avis, equus: aliud artificiosum, veluti domus, navis, currus. si naturale totum est, verissimum est quod Aristoteles libro de natura octavo scribi●… prius esse, & naturae, & temporis, & rationis ordine, id quod perfectum est, eo quod est inchoatum. sin autem artificiosum est, tum eiusdem Aristotelis monitu, altera distinctio adhibenda est, utrum subtiliter & artis ratione, an populariter ex sermonis consuetudine disseratur. Nam quia subtili ratione ea demum pars verè proprièque dicitur, quae suo munere fungitur, fungi autem suo munere, nisi suo toti inhaerens, non potest, certè totum & pars naturae ac temporis ordine simul sint necesse est. Nam ubi est domus, ibi necesse est esse tectum, & ubi tectum revera tegens, ibi necesse est esse domum: ubi currus, ibi rota; & ubi rota revera, & actu voluens est, ibi currus: sin autem populariter loquamur, & homonymia, id est, communione nominis abutamur, tum verò pars dicetur esse prior, totum verò posterius, ut area, quam juris consulti potissimam domus partem appellant, priòr est aedificio: & fundus priòr vitibus, aut arboribus, aut fructibus,  
Canons of the part. If you put down or affirm all the essential parts, you must also put down the integral itself. But if you put down one, or some of the parts only, you cannot therefore put down the whole; for the parts, not seu●…d, but all jointly, make up the nature of the whole.  
If you de●…y or take any one essential part away, the whole is also gone.  
Of the integral. Prohibitus à toto, prohibitus est à qualibet part.  
He that hath the whole, hath also the principal or essential parts.  
Although ye put down all the parts, yet unless they be conjoined, the whole will not necessarily follow.  
If you deny the whole, all the parts are not therefore straightway denied, unless you mean, that the whole being gone, the remnant is not properly to be called a part, Vt non est tectum, nisi tegat, etc.  
7. H. 7. 8. a. b. 20 acres fueront agree d'estre touts temps parcel del manor, Ergò sil deuy seisie del manor, ill devy seisie des. 20. acres.  
That which agreeth with the whole integral, must also agree with the parts conjoined, but not severed.  
If the whole be not attributed to any thing, it will not follow, that therefore no part should be applied unto it.  
The whole integral cannot be affirmed of any one of his parts: for a part is not the whole: but all the parts together make the essence of the whole. But the general may be affirmed on one special, for that the whole nature and essence of the general is in every one of the specials, so that the special is the same thing indeed with the general, (although not in such ample manner) or rather a pattern and resemblance of the general. Yet, as the special containeth in it somewhat more than the general (I mean, his proper formal cause moreover and besides that he had of his general) so the general comprehendeth under it more than one special; as being therefore common and indifferently appliable to many, because it is abstract from all, and not determinately bound to any. Whereupon they say in schools▪ Genus abstrahit ab utroque, ut possit esse utrumque, and conteyne●… under it, not in it, repugnant specials, according to Porphyry. Yet, notwithstanding all this, you may affirm the integral on his part in a simple axiom, so that this word, Part, be added thereunto, as, Invention is a part of Logic, the body is a part of man. integral.  
21. H. 7. 21. per Fineux, & Tremayle justices, le person avera trespass de arbres coupes et emportes en le cimitorie, et d'entry et infreindre del eglise, car l'eglise, le cimitorie, et les dismes ●…ont le rectory. General.  
Litleton. pag. 80. Si soit rent, il serra rent service, charge ou seck, mes n'est, etc. Ergo. Et pag. 90. Chescun que ad francktenement, ad vel fee, vel tail, vel pur vie, vel altar vie: mes n'est issint icy. Ergo. General.  
21. E. 4. 79. Si essoin gist pur corporation, tùm yel hoc vel illud, etc. sed nec l'essoyne de mal vener gi●… pur ceo, nec de malo lecti: car ceur excuse default, et ils ne poient appearer in person; et ils touts ne serront sick ensmble: nec de seruitio, nec de ultra mare, nec de terra sancta, car ils ne serront intends d'estre touts in tiel case, Ergo nul essoin gist pur corporation.  
In assize, le pl. dit, que le terre est tenus d'un tiel, come de son manor de D. que est ancient demesne: le def. in manner confess ceo, et tamen il priest general averment, que parcel del mesme le manor, le quel il ad conus d'estre ancient demesne, serra frank fee, sans monster comment per matter special; que n'est reason, car chescun choose serra intend del mesme le nature, come le chose est, dont il est parcel. Sic hic le manor de D. est conus d'estre ancient demesne, & sic per conseqnens serra intend, que tout ceo que est tenus del dit manor, serra deal mesme le nature prima fancy. 3. H. 6. 47. a.  
General. Special. The general is nothing else, but a multitude or universality of things like in essence, or one like essence in many things.  
Hottoman. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (ut Zeno apud Laertium definite) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Itaque plures cognati qui sanguinis eiusdem communione inter se co●…aerent, quam ab uno eodemque capite duxê●…unt, idcirco à Graecis appellantur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cum alij, qui gentis ac stirpis alterius sint, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, alieni & extranei nominentur. So that this word, Genus; is Metaphorical.  
The higher you ascend, the more general things be: the more general things be, the fewer particular proprieties are they tied unto: and therefore the most general doth agree to most particulars. But, the lower you descend, the more is always in particularity comprehended in the words, so that they can not be applied to so many.  
The general precepts put down in all Arts, were first invented by the induction of many particulars and specials.  
The general being affirmed universally, every one of his specials must also necessarily be affirmed. But if the general be but indefinitely, simply, or undeterminately put down; some one of his specials must indeed be put down also, and that necessarily, but no certain one above the rest, but only contingently, as If there be any driggle draggle in Shrewsbury she must be either jenny Dymmocke, or some other: this is necssarily true: but it is but contingent to say, that if there be any, it must needs be she: for there may be many others also.  
Generi per speciem derogatur. Nam qui de una aliqua specie loquitur, is caeteras sub eodem genere contentas species non dissimulanter excludit, sic legatum speciale detrahit generali.  
Deny the general, howsoever you list, and all his specials be denied.  
Whatsoever is attributed to the universal nature of the general, must be given to the specials. But there may be many things applied to the indefinite nature of the general, which cannot be ascribed to any of his particulars, unless the thing be common both to the general and special.  
Of the special. The special doth only conclude affirmatively, unless all the specials be denied together.  
If you put down one, more, or all the specials, you also put down the general, for that the nature and essence of the general is in every of the specials. If you deny one only special, you deny the whole general in his most ample and largest universality: but not as he is indefinite. But if you deny every special, than the general is taken away, howsoever you mean it.  
Whatsoever agreeth with the specials, agreeth also with the general: if so be that the thing applied ●…ée common, and not peculiarly proper to one special alone, as apud Tribalos patrem immolare est laudabile, ergo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hottoman.  
Quod uni speciei non convenit, non continuò generi indefinito non convenit, ut, si homo est animal, quod non est animal id non est homo: sed non, siquid non sit homo, id continuò sequitur, non esse animal. Nam etsi contrariorum contraria sunt consequentia, tamen differentiae causa hic est in negatione posita, quae cum privatio sit; aff●…matione, quae habitus est, semper est deterior neque parem cum illa vim habet.  
Species eiusdem generis sunt simul natura: est tamen aliqua differentia ordinis, ut in arte speciem hanc illi preponas.  
The Grecians call the most special, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Individuum, quod dividi in parts corporatas sine interitu non potest. Nam si totum in parts distrahatur, nulla pars erit totum, neque totius nomine appellari poterit. There was never any Logician before Ramus that durst absolutely pronounce an Individuum, as Socrates, to be a special, or a man to be a general: yet I could never see either good reason, or reasonable experience to the contrary. Neque enim audiendum est quod dici videtur à Porphyrio, & nonnullis praeterea in Aristotelea bibliotheca locis, individua non differre forma essentiali, sed proprietate accidentium, ut mas, & faemina: quae accidentia in He●…maphrodito miscentur. Nam tum detractis (quod omnino saltem cogitatione fieri potest) accidentibus, omnes homines essent unicus & singularis homo: imo neque deus, neque daemon, neque homo, neque ulla prorsus essentia esset (quod est ab Aristotele nominatim improbatum, cum idealem hominem eiusmodi derideat) sed accidentia sola. Talaeus.  
Hottoman. Plato ea demùm esse verè ac propriè dicebat, quae à sensibus remota, tantùm ratione & animo perciperentur, propterea quod semper uniusmodi essent, neque ortum neque interitum haberent: cum individua infinita, fluxa, & caduca essent, orirenturque & occiderent, nec diutiùs uno & eodem statu essent. Aristoteles verò nullas putabat esse extrinsecus substantias, sed intellectam plurimorum inter se differentium similitudinem, vel genus, vel speciem appellabat. Primus Aristoteles, ait Cicero, species labefactavit, quas mirificè Plato fuerat amplexatus, ut in ijs divinum quiddam esse diceret. Ac de utrisque istiusmodi substantijs idem Cicero in lib. de universitate ex Platonis Timaeo ita scribit.  
Quid est quod semper sit (haec idaea est) neque ullum habet ortum. Et quod gignatur (hoc individuum est) nec unquam sit. Quorum alterum intelligentia & ratione comprehenditur, quod unum semper atque idem est: alterum quod affert opinionem per sensus, rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est, id gignitur & interit, nec unquàm esse verè potest?  
Vtrius igitur illorum probabilior sententia videtur? Non est humilitatis nostrae tantam inter summos omnium philosophos controversiam disceptare. Magis tamen aliquanto ad notionum nostrarum rationem accommodata Platonis sententia videtur: quippè cum satis constet, non omnes notiones ex oblata extrinsecus individuorum corporum impulsione existere, sed quasdam per se constare; neque vel aliundè originem habere, vel alto quàm suo ac proprio fundamento niti. Quo in genere sunt intellectae res omnes, ut quantitates & qualitates, veluti longitudo, latitudo, & altitudo. Item justitia, temperantia, eloquentia: Item morbus, valetudo, imbecillitas: quae si in subiecto aliquo insunt, per se tamen, & tanquam awlsae & abstractae considerantur. Infra.  
Videsnè quam sutores & calceolarij formam calceorum appellant? Nimirùm lignum oblongum, calcei instar, proportione aptum, atque incisum. At ijdem formam calcei aliam in mente atque intelligentia impressam atque insignitam habent: quae una verè proprieque, tum Idaea, tum forma, & est, & dici debet. Ad quam, tanquam pictores ad exemplar, suam picturam; ità illi opus suum dirigunt. Forma igitur calcei lignea subiectum est: species in mente insita, awlsa atque abstracta est.  
In an other place more plainly.  
jubent enim (s. Plato & Aristoteles) poni Calliam procul ad nos longo interuallo venientem. Ea species extrinsecus oblata sensibus continuò generis universi notitiam in animo informat. Primùm enim corpus esse intelligimus, mox, ubi propiùs accessit, animal: tùm hominem: ad extremum, Calliam, Sic, qui in station sunt, & procul aliquem venientem intuentur, primum corpus esse animaduertunt; secundò, ex cursu animal esse judicant: tertiò, equitem: quartò, ex colore, amicum vel hostem: postremò, Titium, vel Sempronium. Atque hi sunt nimirùm notionum & intelligentiarum gradus.  
So much I have borrowed of Hottoman, concerning general Ideas: too little for Quidditaries: enough for our purpose. He that desireth more shallbe sure to find too much, if he do but once show himself willing to entertain those everlasting praters de universalibus.  
Morrell in july, to enforce the general commendation of hills, bringeth in special examples, as saint Michael's mount, S. Brigets Bower, Mount Olivet, Parnassus, Ida: etc.  
Before I go further, it were expedient to yield some reason why I sever the general, special, whole and part from the tractate of division, where Ramus placed them. For Genus saith Talaeus, significat causam speciei, & species ideo significat effectum generis. itaque originem suam e primis argumentis ostendunt, quotiesque genus explicatur à speciebus causa arguitur ex effectis; quoties contra species arguitur è genere, effectus arguitur è causis. Alia tamen est hic inventionis via, quàm illic. Causa enim & effecta subtilius illic explicantur, hic comprehenduntur. Which yet can hardly make me believe that they be arguments made of the first, as they should be, if they were secondary arguments: For I call that secondary which is made of some original, as division and definition is. For as for Coniugates and notation although I give them leave for a time to sojourn among the annotations, yet I dare not admit them into the text.  
[The general] haec definitio generis & speciei adversas superioris & huius topici differentias ostendit: illic integrum sumit essentiam è membris: hîc genus essentiam speciebus tribuit: illic membra constituunt totum, hîc species constituuntur à genere.  
Theloall. Et sunt quaedam brevia formata super certis casibus de cursu, & de communi consilio totius regni concessa & approbata, quae quidem nullatenus mutari possunt absque consensu & voluntate eorum: il intend original briefs. Sunt etiam brevia ex ijs sequentia, dicuntur judicialia, & saepius variantur secundum varietatem placitorum etc. haec ex Bracton.  
Done est une nosme general pluis que n'est feoffment. Car done est general a touts choses moebles et nyent moebles, et feffment est riens forsque de soil. Britton 87. a.  
Generale crimen falsi plura sub se continet crimina specialia, quemadmodum de falsis chartis, de falsis mensuris, de falsa moneta etc. Glanuil.  

Essonium est 

de malo veniendi 

ultra mare 

de seruitio regis.  
terra sancta.    
citra mare    
malo lecti     
Bracton. 339. 21. H. 7. 16. Frowike. Si ieo voyle prescriber, que ieo et touts ceux etc. ont use de temps etc. a distreyner touts les tenants a term de vie, ou d'ans deal manor de D. pur un haroit apres le mort de chescun tenant etc. ceo est bon prescription: car il est in le generality; issintque comentque un ou deux, ou trois des tenures soyent determines, uncore auters poyent demurrer, issint la poet il estre un continuance de les tenants, comentque divers morreront etc.  
In 4. H. 6. 30. There is an argument used from the denial of all the specials to take away the general. Recordare, le def. fist conusance come bailie A. B. file et heir P. le pl. dit, que A. B. est bastard etc. et sur ceo le def. pria aid de A. B. et per Bab et Cott: il avera aid: mes contra per Strang et Martin. car par luy, il doit aver pria l'ayde in le conclusion de son conusance: et in ple personell home avera aid puis plée plede et nemy devant; mes in ple real home avera aid devant ple plead. Et n'ad mes deux manners de entries de aid: l'un est de aid devant ple plead, s. qd defendens vel tenens petit auxilium de A. sine quo ipse non potest respondere, et si soit puis ple plead, le entry est, quod def. petit auxilium de B. ad manutenendum exitum. Et in cest case il ne poet estre ad manutenendum exitum, car nul issue est join: et il ne poet estre, sine quo non potest respondere, car il ad respond all action, et in le conclusion del ceo ne ad pry aid et ideo il est passa l'aduantage del ceo et ne sont plusors entries deal aid, mes ceux deux.  
Elenches of the whole.  
A double Elench lurketh in this place, one of composition an other of division: for composition thus. Humphrey Crowther is a good fiddler, therefore he is good: and this fallacian is from the whole, because those two things so joined together seem to make up the whole, whereupon afterward the part may be concluded, as though in this example, Humphrey Crowther were a whole integral thing, made and consisting of these two parts, goodness and fidlery. Some other call this à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter, when we apply that absolutely and generally which was spoken but in part and in respect, as here Humphrey is called good, not generally, for his good conditions, but particularly in respect of his gittern. Issint in 9 H. 7. 19 a. Cestuy que est heir all pere et mere, est heir all peer, mes l'issue del baron et sa second feme donées in special tail, est heir all pere et mere, ergo il est heir generallment all pere et simpliciter, non sequitur, car le pere poet auer fits per le primer feme. Vavisor. expone Maiorem & apparebit fallacia, Cestuy que est heir all pere et mere coniunctim, est heir all pere divisim; ore ceo est false. Vide. L. 5. E. 4. 43. Leas fuit fait per abbe et covent, ergo per abbe sole, nul reason. q. an sirrah intend mesme le leas.  
Now on the other side, Division is a fallacian, as it were from the parts, when things are severally propounded and jointly concluded, as 

Antony Now-Now is good, and a singer, therefore  
Antony Now-Now, is a good singer.   For indeed these two things severally put down are not essential parts of Antony Now-Now, but only accidental qualities: whereas if they had been his essential parts the argument would have followed, as here 

A man is a living and sensible creature, and also reasonable, therefore  
A man is a reasonable living creature.   And so in composition, thus, 

A man is a sensible creature endued with reason, therefore  
A man is sensible; or therefore A man is reasonable.    
Elenches of the part.  
First when you infer the who●…e, some of the parts wanting. Isabella Greenesleeves hath a fair hand, a good leg, a quick eye, therefore she is a proper fair woman: it followeth not, for she is splayfooted, crookbacked: tunnebellied, sawtoothed etc. The like is that of Catullus. 
Quintia formosa est multis, mihi candida, longa, recta est: haec ego sic singula confiteor.  
Totum illud, Formosa, nego. Nam nulla venustas, nulla in tam magno corpore mica salis.  So elsewhere of Formianus his trull.  

Salue nec minimo puella naso,  
Nec bello pede, nec nigris ocellis,  
Nec longis digitis, nec ore sicco,  
Nec sanè nimis elegante lingua,  
Decoctoris amica Formiani:  
Ten' provincia narrat esse bellam?  
Tecum Lesbian nostra comparatur?  
O saeclum insipiens & infacetum.   
Vide 44. E. 3. 13. a. b. Vbi Wickingham & Persay disputant, ytrum le plaint d'un molyn in assize abatera, eoque fuit troue, que parcel del molyn fuit sur auter terre, issint il n'avoit entier molyn. Et sic come un sophister petit plus quam oportuit.  
Home esteant seisie en fee de certain terres in un ville, et in deux hamlets del mesme le ville, devisa touts ses terres esteants in le ville, et in une de les hamlets per nosme et devy; riens del terre in l'auter hamlet passera: car son intent appear per l'expressing d'un des hamlets. Mes Browne ex rigore Logices fuit è contra, per un argument à toto, car le ville conteigne les hamlets, Ergo etc. mes le ley favour devices, quia sont faits quant homes gisont in extremis, sans reason ou erudite counsel pur le pluis part, 9 Eliz. 27. Dyer. Mes certes auterment, le devisor played but the sophister. Come in trespass verse I. deal parish del Aluale in come. S. yeoman; le def. dd. judgement deal brief, car in le parish del Aluale est un ville appelle Wilton, et le def. iour del brief purchase fuit demurrant en Wilton, sans ceo que il demurra in le parish del Aluale; cest, sans ceo, est repugnant all matter devant; car s'il demurra in le ville, et le ville est in le parish, donque il demurra in le parish, L. 5. E. 4. 20. a. Issint in l'auter case, il dona touts ses terres in le ville, et ambideux les hamlets sont in le ville, Ergò il dona touts ses terres que sont in les hamlets.  
Secondly, this place is abused, when the whole is divided into such parts as be not his own: as when Rhetoric is divided into Invention, Disposition, etc. For both these be the parts of Logic, not of Rhetoric, as they are commonly taken: but of Elenches in division more in the tractate of Division.  
Elenches of General and Special.  
If a man, when he knoweth one or two specials, thinketh that he knoweth the general; he is much deceived: but more, if when he hath gotten a general notion of any Art, he thinketh himself a sufficient artificer. For it is one thing to have a general and superficial sight in an arté, but another matter, to be able to practise those general precepts in every particularity.  
In 26. H. 8. 6. a. Shelley abuseth this argument: Si ieo ay le manor de grand Dirtleby, ieo ay le manor del Dirtleby. Et le case fuit, que fine fuit levy del manor de D. et in mesme le county fueront deux D, grand et petite, et null sans addition, hîc Shelley dit, que passa per le fine pur le reason avant dit: mes Fitz. denia ceo, car ne fuit ascun tiel manor, mes per feffment le manor intendus passeroit per le livery. Shelley fuit deceive in ceo que il prist grand D et petit D, d'estre specials, et D, sans addition d'estre le general: et issint revera, st jeo ay grand D, ieo ay D, come, ceo que est, homo est animal: mes in verity, grand D et petite D, s●…nt individua, s. singular lieves conves per tiels nosmes sans ascun general chose que conteigne ambideux.  
Issint 7. H. 6. 39 Hals arguit eodem modo, Uous ne dedits, mes que il y ad D mayor, & D minor deins le county, Ergo il you'd D, argumentum ab inferiore ad suum superius, issint est prove, que il you'd tiel ville. But by his favour it followeth not, because there is upper Dale and nether Dale, therefore there must be a third Dale, without addition at all, that is neither upper Dale nor neither Dale, but distinct from them both. For, if in one county there be two manors, the one called grand Higham, the other petite Higham, t●… true general to these two singular manors, is, this word, Manor; and so it will follow well. Is. hath the manor of grand Higham, Ergò Is. hath a manor: but the manor of Higham is no such general as should include the manors of grand Higham and petite Higham. Vide L. 5. E. 4. 47. Mesme le error, que Combe conteigne long Comb et short Comb.    

The seventh Chapter. Of the Subject.  
THus much shall suffice for the argument fully agreeable: now it followeth to speak of that which is agreeable but in part and after a certain manner, as is the subject and the adjunct.  
The subject is that whereunto some thing is adjoined. The subject receiveth the adjunct, either in it, as the mind learning, the place the thing placed: or to it: & this is either affected by the thing adjoined, as the body receiveth garments to it, and is of them affected: or else it doth affect the thing adjoined, as a sick man receiveth unto him the physician, and doth affect him, by occupying and busying his head and mind in inventing remedies for him.  
Thenot in February.  

You thinken to be Lords of the year,  
But oft when you count you freed from fear,  
Comes the breame winter with chamfred brows,  
Full of wrinkles and frosty furrows.   
Where the brows be the subject of wrinkles and furrows.  
In April, Hobbinoll beginneth his song, in praise of Elysa, with the subject of the place, in these verses.  

Ye dainty nymphs that in this blessed brook do bathe your breast:  
Forsake your watery bowers, and hither look at my request.  
And eke you Virgins that on Paernaesse dwell,  
Whence floweth Helicon the learned well.  
Help me to blaze  
Her worthy praise.  
Which in her sex doth all excel.   
Where the Brook is the subject to their bodies, and Parnassus Mount, to the Well, Helicon.  
In April by Hobbinoll, Elysa is described by her garments and place.  

See where she sits upon the grassy green o seemly sight.  
Yelad in scarlet a maiden queen and ermines white.  
Upon her head a cremosin coronet,  
With damask Roses and Daffadyllies set,  
Bayleaves between  
And Primroses green  
Embellishe the sweet Violet.   
Where Elysa is the subject to these particulars, and the grassy green the subject to Elysa.  
Master Plowden: Fol. 217. b. Et enfancy, que est grand disability, est repugnant all estate del roy; et coment que enfancy est in le natural corpse, uncore quant le corpse politic del roy est conjoin a ceo, et un corpse faith de eux ambideux, tout le corpse avera les properties, qualities, et degrees deal corpse politic, que est le greinder et le pluis dign. en que il nad my, ne poet estre, ascun enfancy.  
Fol. 237. a. Le roy auoyt en luy troys choses, s. poyar, justice, et Mercy, poyar a fair, justice a enforcer luy de fair: et Mercy a stayer luy de fair.  
Fol. 500 b. Et quant all quart point, si usurpation poet este eu sur person en personée, touts les justices agréeent en un que il ne poet, eo que leglise ad incumbent, et est pleine. Car cesty a que le appropriation est fait, est incumbent, et cy perfect, sicome altar incumbent serroyt, que vient eins per presentment, institution, et induction. Etadonques ne poyent esse deux encumbents d'un mesme eglise a une mesme temps. Car destre incumbent est l'office d'un corpse, et si un incumbent est, et auter est present, admit, institute, et induct, tout ceo est void, sicome une est officer dune office pur vie, come seneschal del manner, ou tiels: patent fait a altar de mesme l'office presentment, est void, et le primer person avera action de trespass verse cesty que est darreynement admit; et issint person en personée avera action de trespass verse un auter que est present, institute, et induct all eglise appropre a luy, sil intromitte oue le glebe et dimes.  
Fol. 280. a. Si home vst morust intestate le propertie de ses biens vient per le comen ley, all ordinary, entant que le mort navoit appoint eux a ascun. Car sicome franckt●…nement per le course del comen ley serra en ascun, et ne serra en suspense, issint per le comen ley, le property del biens serra en ascun, et ne serra en suspense. Et quant home ad property en biens, le property ne poet estre pluis longement que il vive, et apres sa mort les biens sont a un altar. come le ancient verse est, da tua dum tua sunt, quia post mortem tua non sunt: adonques entant que ne point estre soiens apres sa mort, et il nad appoint eux a ascun altar, mes ad relinque eux al monde, le ley done le propertie de eux all ordinary, et a luy (pur ceo que avoyt cure de sa alme en sa vi●…) le ley done les bi●…s a disposer apres sa mort.  
Lieu. Fol. 149. b. Et issint religious, persons serront intend touts foits a demurrer a lour meason, et ne poyent estre intend destre ail●…s.  
Fol. 37. b. Et en ceo realm sont divers authorities, et nul poet exceder ses limits et bounds, et pur ceo si le marshal teigne plée de chose fait horse del verge, ou le Admiral de chose fait en corps le county, ceo serra void, car lour authority sextend all am certain, et deins certain precinct, et nemy aylours. Et si cesty que priest sanctuary, va horse, chescun poet luy prender car il nest privilege de horse, et issint touts foits le precinct del liberty ne poet estre exceed, et icy le viscount nad a fair forsque en Loundres, et donques quant le prisoner vient horse del liberty del Loundres, a mesme cesty instant il est discharge.  
Fol. 396. a. Mes icy, sir Thomas White et les companions ne fueront justices auterment ne as auters cases, que a ceux, queur le commission le roy essigne. et sils sont assign a fair une chose, et ils font altar, cest auter est sans authority. Come si un est eslie arbitrator a fair arbitrement sur vue chose, et il fait arbitrement sur altar chose, tiel arbitrement est voyd tout nest. Issint icy, ceo que sir Thomas White et ses companions ficront fuit coram non judice, et merement void.  
Fol. 15. a. b. Et pur ceo ieo intend ceo come un principle, quant il est agree perenter ascuns que un principal chose serra fait ou ewe, et devant que ceo poet este fait ou ewe, 〈◊〉 yad un altar chose primes deste fait, et n'est certeinement agree, que fair le dit altar chose, que le ley appoint cesty que ad le pluis science et skill, a fair le dit altar chose, come le brazier a weyer et mettre en few les bells, le tailor a shaper un toge, le collector a weyer chose pur que le subsidy serra pay all roy.  
Vide Fol. 320. b. Le proper subject del courts le roy, come Exchequer, common bank, Bank le roy, en l'information pur mines, l'analysis du quel est annex all fine de cest liver.  

Annotations.  
A [Subject:] Not only, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an essence, or substance, as the common Logicians usually take it, but also whatsoever can ●…ée imagined or feigned to have any thing adjoined unto it, in it, or about it: so one quality may be the subject to another, as in this axiom, Virtue is commendable, where commendation is adjoined to virtue, being the subject thereof.  
That subject wherein the adjunct is exercised and (as it were) used, is called an object, or matter subject, as colours be the object of seeing, sounds of hearing, soldiers be busied in fight, plowmen in ploughing, etc. as in those verses, etc.  

Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat arator,  
Enumerat miles vulnera, pastor oves.   
Which being turned, touch those that intermeddle with matters of other men's professions.  

Navita de tauris, de ventis narrat arator,  
Enumerat pastor vulnera, miles oves.   
The verses be made by Propertius, and by Ronsard translated into French, thus,  

Des vents parle le marinier,  
Le labourer de ses toreaux,  
Ses plays count le guerrier,  
Et leurs brebis les pastoreaux.   
Claudian hath the like.  

Omnia quae sensu voluuntur vota diurno,  
Pectore sopito reddit amica quies.  
Venator defessa thoro cum membra reponit,  
Mens tamen ad syluas & sua lustra re●…dit.  
Furto gaudet amans, permutat navita merces,  
Etvigil elapsas quaerit avarus opes.  
judicibus lights, aurigae somnia currus,  
Vanaque sollicitis meta cavetur equis.  
Me quoque Musarum studium sub nocte silenti  
Artibus assuetis sollicitare solet.   
Canons. If the subject be, then by nature, the proper adjuncts must also be: the other that be not proper, may be, and may not be.  
If the subject be taken away, the adjunct cannot stand.  
To whom you give the subject, to the same you give the adjunct.  
Whatsoever you attribute to the subject, that you must give the adjunct: but in due and convenient order.  
Of the subject things be sometimes praised and dispraised. The house is esteemed by him that dwelleth in the house. The place giveth occasion to judge of that which was borne in the place, as, He was borne in Boeotia, therefore he is but a muddy-pated ass.  
Explications, illustrations, amplifications, and extenuations are fet from this place: So Cicero to his son, Thou art at Athens, therefore thou shouldest be learned. 'tis a Northern Nag, therefore quick, 'tis a Shrewsbury fryse, therefore the best.  
From hence are almost all poetical epithets deducted.  
As the subject is, such is the adjunct. The place oftentimes augmenteth the crime. Locus est entis & non entis, corporum, daemonum, etc. sic domus somni, hortus Hesperidum in loco collocantur.  
2. H. 4. 19 Per touts les justices, que les justices de peace ne poyent prendre appel de nul approver, ne de altar. Car lour commission n'extend cy avant.  
9 H. 6. 5. In pleading d'arbitrement, le party doit monstrer le am ou le submission fuit fait, et les nosmes des arbitrours.  
Master Crompton, Folio. 79. 80. etc. Les justices de peace enquirera ad chescun le lour general sessions, de ceux que parlont irreuerentment de sacrament de corpse et sank nostre signior jesus Christ. 1. E. 6. cap. 1. & 1. E. cap. 1.  
Item de reteyners, liveries, maintainers, imbracers, bowstaves, archers, illoyall games, forestallers, regrators, vitailers et Inholders, et de chescun de eux, per, 33. H. 8. cap. 10. & 37. H. 8. cap. 7.  
Item de cestuy que tue weinlinges que sont desus l'age de deux ans, all intent de vender. contr. 24. H. 8. cap. 9 & 14. El. cap. 11. Et issint de plusors auters.  
Pur le subject del lieu, Vide L. 5. E. 4. 7. 8. En annuity verse le Prior de S. Mary Oueres in Southwark, in le county de Surrey, le pl. count sur fait a Londres in le parish de S. Dunstane, in le guard de Faringdone, et le fait est dated, in domo capitulari eiusdem domus. Per Choke, ceo ne poet estre per comen intendment, que le Chapter del S. Mary Oueres in Southwark que est in Surrey ferra le fait in Fleetstreet in Londres etc. mes per special matter monster il poet, car ubi personae, ibi Capitulum: Mes si le date esset, in monasterio domus praedictae, ceo per null intendment serra prise alibi, que in Southwark ou le meason est, car le material meason n'est removable, come le Chapter est.  

Accessorium sequitur suum principale, hinc versus  
Quicquid plantatur, seritur, vel inaedifi●…atur,  
Omne solo caedit, radices si tamen egit.  
Sublato principali, tollitur accessorium.   
Name, non entis non sunt qualitates. jeo enditera un home pur asporter ieunes pigeons horse de mon Columbier, ou ieunes goshawks engendres en ma park, car le propertie est in moy et ieo poy eux prendre a mon pleasure, car ils ne poyent aler dehors. Contrà deal ancient hawks ou pigeons que poyent sure. Sic ieo enditera pur prisel des pikes ou tenches horse d'un pond ou trunk, causa qua suprà, contrà sils soyent prises en le river, eoque a o'er ieo ay null property in eux, 18. E. 4. 8.  
Elenches. The Law abhorreth such things as are done without or commission, coram non judice. So 10. H. 4. 2. Praemunire facias issist de ceo que le def. auer sue all court de Rome de choose dont conusance apertient all court le roy. See the book called, Diversities des courts et lour jurisdictions, wherein the matter subject of the Marshalsea, King's bench, Common place, Chancery, Exchequer, Cinque ports, etc. is distinctly put down. For the authority of courts is limited, neither is it lawful to intrude sophistically, or injuriously incroache one upon another. Vide 3. 4. P. & M. 14. Dyer. Fuit enact, que les quarter sessions de Anglesey serront tenues in Beaumaris: et les justices de peace teigne eux ad Newburghe, et la preigne inditements de felony: ceux inditments fueront void, et coram non judice. Vide 22. E. 4. 33. a. b. Commission est direct as certain homes de oyer tantum, et ils oyont et determinont, cest coram non judice: Sic s'ils oyont matters horse deal compass del commission. Sic si in common bank un appeal de mort ou robbery soyt port, etc. et le party est attaint, cest coram non judice, car lour patent ne dona all eux cest poyar et authority.    

The eight Chapter. Of the Adjunct.  
AN adjunct is that whereunto something is subject. An adjunct is either Inherent in the subject, or adherent to it.  
The adherent adjunct doth either affect the subject: or is affected by it. So virtues, vices, learning, and all such qualities are adjuncts to man's mind.  
And as every place is the subject of the thing placed: so, time, that is to say, the continuance of every thing, is the adjunct of those things which do continue in time.  
So all qualities which either be proper, as laughing to a man: or common, as whiteness to a stone, and a wall, are truly called adjuncts.  
Finally every thing which agreeth unto an other, being neither the cause, nor the effect thereof, is an adjunct of the thing whereunto it doth agree.  

Colyn Clout in january saith.  
All as the sheep, such was the shepherds look,  
For pale and wan he was, alas the while.  
May seem he loved, or else some care he took, etc.   
Thenot in February of himself, 
Self have I worn out thrice thrittie years,  
Some in much joy, many in many tears:   
Where the thrice thritty years, be an adjunct.  
In March Thomalin argueth the spring to be at hand, by these adiunctes. 
The grass now gins to be refreshed,  
The swallow peeps out of her nest,  
And cloudy Welkin cleareth.   
In july Thomalin describeth Abel by his adjuncts compared.  

As meek hee-was as meek mought be,  
Simple, as simple sheep:  
Humble, and like in each degree  
The flock which he did keep.   
And in the same discourse displaying the demeanour of our shepherds and their pomp and gorgeous attire.  

But now (thanked be God therefore) the world is well amend,  
Their weeds been not so nighly wore,  
Such simplesse mought them shend.  
They been y●…lad in Purple and Pale  
So hath their God them blessed.  
They reign and rulen over all,  
And Lord it as their list  
Ygyrt with belts of glitter and gold, etc.   
In August Perigot describeth his bouncing Bellibone by hi●… attire.  

I saw the bouncing Bellibone hay ho Bonnibell  
Tripping over the Dale alone,  
She can trip it very well.  
Well decked in a frock of grey.  
hay ho, grey is greet.  
And in a kirtle of green say  
The green is for maidens meet.  
A chapelet on her head she wore  
hay ho chapelet:  
Of sweet violets therein was store,  
She sweeter than the Violet.   
In November Colyn useth this argument very oft in declaration manner, where he bewaileth Dido's death, as  

Coloured chapelets.  
Knotted Rusheringes.  
Gilt Rosemary.  
Mantled Meadows etc.   
Thomalin in july.  

The hills where dwelled holy saints  
I reverence and adore,  
Not for themselves, but for the saints,  
Which have be dead of yore.   
By consideration of all these agreeable arguments, things that differ one from an other, are called one, the same, or agreeable.  
So before, Colyn in january, was said to have the same look that his sheep had, 
All as the sheep such was the shepherds look,  
For pale and wan he was, alas the while etc.  Meaning one in adjunct, not in essence. And so in like manner of the rest of the agreeable arguments we may say.  
Fol. 357. a. Et quant all ceo, ils disoient que fines ount estre de tresgrand antiquity all comen ley. Car ils ount este si longement come ascun court de record ad estre. Et ils fueront per le comen ley assurance pluis fort, et de plus grand force et puissance. Et issint sont term per lestatute de modo levandi fines. etc.  
Fol. 413. b. Le devisor serra account inops consilij, pur ceo que voluntes de pluis sovent sont faites quant homes sont gisant en extremes et faudront council. Et pur ceo le ley enterpretera les parols, et directera sa operation accordant all intent del party.  
Fol. 101. b. Et donques icy, quant il fuit arraign pur le tuer del home sur malice prepense, le substance del matter fuit, s'il luy tue ou nemy, et le malice prepense n'est que del form ou circumstance de tuer. Et coment que le malice prepense fait le act plus odious, et pur ceo cause l'offendour de perder divers advantages que auterment il averoit, come sanctuary et clergy, et tiels semblables, uncore il n'est auter que le manner del fait, et nemy le substance del fait. Car le substance del fait est le tuer-de luy: et adonques quant le substance del fait et le manner del fait sont mise en issue ensemblement, si les jurors troveront le substance, et nemy le manner, uncore judgement serra done sur le substance. Come si home arraign assize pur disseisin oue force, et le defendant plead all general issue, et les jurors troveront le disseisin, mes nemy oue force, uncore le pl●…intife avera son judgement: car le torcious expulsion fuit le substance, et le force, le manner. Et adonques quant le substance est troue, il avera judgement pur ceo, et serra acquit del force, etc.  
Fol. 381. Et quant all altar point, il dit que coment que le rent charge est novel rent commenceant per grant, uncore il est issint appropre all office que il ne serra severe del office cy longement come le office continue: issint que si le office ne serra forfeit, le rent que est annex all ceo ne serra forfeit. Car si un grant estovers a un autre d'estre arse en tiel meason, il est appurtenant all meason. Et issint comen grant en tiel am a un pur ses avers levant et couchant en son ferme de Dale, le comen est fait appurtenant a ceo, issint que il que ad le meason per quecunque title que il vient a ceo apres, avera les estovers: et il que apres viendra al ferme, avera le comen: et les estouers ne poient estre severe del meason, ne le comen del ferme, si non per extientisment. Car s'il que ad le meason voile granter les estovers a un altar reseruant a luy le meason, ou le meason a un altar, reseruant a luy les estovers: les estouers ne serront separate del meason per ceo, pur ceo que serront expend en mesme le meason. Et issint le fee icy est grant pur le exercise del office, et l'office fuit receive en respect del fee, & sic officium & foedum sunt concomitantia, et l'un ensue l'auter et le fee continua oue l'office come incident inseparable: & quae sequuntur in eodem loco, del annuity grant pro consilio impendendo; de office del roy de Haroldes, grant a Garter, cum foedis & proficuis ab antiquo etc. 5. E. 4. Fol. ultimo. Et del grant dex. li. à Garter ad terminum vitae suae ratione & causa officij. 7. E. 4. Fol. 23. et del annuity grant per le roy, johanni clerico coronae, ad terminum vitae suae; en queux cases, le fee est annex all office, et est determinable oue l'office.  
Fòl. 26. b. Si un retain un altar a server pur an pur le salary de xx. s. la si le servant demand les xx. s. il doit monstrer que le temps est pass, cest assavoir, l'an expire, et doit ceo pleader certain, pur ceo que son action est done en respect deal an pass, et del choose fait en temps, et le temps est parcel del cause del demand, et precede le demand.  

Annotations.  
Adjunct:] The same almost which the Grecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, circumstances, if you take that word largely for whatsoever is added to a thing after it is once framed and made of his essential causes, and some of them proceed from the uniting and conjunction of the form and matter immediately, which are commonly inseparable, as laughing to a man etc. Some are but hangs-by and remoovable, or separable, and, as it were, tenants at will, as white, black to the wall, etc.  
Adjuncts therefore, not Accidents are they here called: for Accidens is of itself, infinite and undeterminate, and doth properly appertain to the accidental cause, which we before termed chance, hap, or hazard: and it containeth effects, adiunctes and comparates; so that the name being neither fit, nor appliable to this place, I have displaced it purposely.  
[One and the same:] Here is Logically put down all that, which others perversely teach in their divers sorts of Idemtitie. as, Genere, Specie, Numero.  
Some there be that give a proper and peculiar place to signs and conjectural tokens: but frivolously. For they belong all either to this of adjuncts, or that other of effects, or else they be testimonies and witnesses.  
Canons.  
If the proper adjunct be, than the subject must commonly be: and if the subject be, the proper adjunct must also be.  
To whom soever you ascribe the adjunct, to the same you must attribute the effect proceeding from the same adjunct.  
That which is rightly applied to the inherent adjunct, must be applied also to the receiving subject.  
Here are gathered divers physiognomical conjectures, as that of martial.  
Crine ruber, niger over, brevis pede, lumine loesus, 
Rem magnam praestas, Zoile, si bonus es.   
Hence are also fet praises and dispraises, deliberations and consultations. Herein are contained all those Rhetorical places concerning the gifts and qualities of body and soul, as also external and those of fortune.  
If the adjunct be occupied or exercised, than the subject must be that exerciseth the same.  
To whatsoever you ascribe the adjunct which is occupied, to the same you must give the subject: and what you apply to it, you must also attribute to this.  
Sometime the adjunct together with the subject is taken but for one only argument, as when I say: The murdering and usurping Tyrant, Richard the third, was deservedly slain: and yet nevertheless here the subject is argued in some respect by the adiunctes, in that it is thereby described and declared.  
Some adiunctes be antecedent or going before, some again present and conjoined, lastly some others consequent and following. Therefore some other Logicians have made these three kinds of adjuncts, three several kinds of arguments, as Antecedentia, adiuncta, consequentia.  
Natural Philosophers, Physicians, Astronomers, and other professors use much this place: as when they dispute of change of weather, diversity of causes and occasions of diseases, signs of storms and tempests, as, vento rubet aurea Phoebe, when the Moon is red, she betokeneth wind. These common adiunctes be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
10. H. 6. 21. Merchant est bon addition, & eadem lex de widow, on single woman.  
Servant n'est addition, car est trope general. L. 5. E. 4. 22. Vide 14. E. 4. 7. quell sirrah le addition d'un feme, que est ne maid, widow, ne wife.  
Vide 31. & 32. H. 8. 5. Dyer. Spynster est addition cybien all home, come all feme, car per Spylman in Norfolk sont divers homes qui sont woorsted spynsters.  
Master Lambard. justit. lib. 2. cap. 5. M. Marrow saith, that five principal things be most commonly requisite in presentments before justices of peace.  

1 The name, surname, and addition of the party indicted.  
2 The year, day, and place, in which the offence was done.  
3. The name of the person to whom the offence was done.  
4 The name and value of the thing in which the offence was committed.  
5 The manner of the fact, and the nature of the offence, as the manner of the treason, murder, felony, or trespass.   
Ad: Temp. Master Lambard. just. lib. 2. cap. 19 Touching the continuance of these quarter sessions, I have shortly but this one thing to say: that almost two hundred years ago, it was ordained by statute (12. R. 2. cap. 10.) that they should be continued three days together, if need were, upon pain of punishment. And yet, in these days of ours, wherein the affairs of the sessions be exceedingly increased (and consequently more need to continue them now then before) many do scantly afford them three whole hours, besides that time which is spent in giving of the charge.  
Master Crompton. just. Fol. 65. hath a number of adjuncts, effects, subjects, etc.  
Inprimis covient consider le quality del home, lequel, il est semble a fair tiel felonious act, ou nemy.  
Item quell chose doit luy mover d'attempter tiel enterprise.  
Item lequel il fist le murder, sur ascun displeasure devant conceve, ou sur sudden anger.  
Item lequel il expect per son mort, d'auer ou receiver ascun commedity, come terre, office, argent, ou ascun altar gain.  
Item lequel il est un que ne regard le tuer de home, ou sil ad ewe pardon ou ad estre acquit pur tuer de home avant cest temps, car tiels choses face homes d'auer luy in suspicion.  
Item le pais ou home fuit nee, declare ascun foits son natural inclination, come sil vst etre nee, ou educatus enter les homes de Tyddesdale et Ryddesdale, poet estre plutost suspect.  
Item dequel trade il est, et per quel occupation il vive.  
Item lequel soit gamester ou haunter de alehouses, ou un companion inter ruffians.  
Item dequel ability il est, et coment il avient a ceo que il ad, sil ad ascun chose.  
Item quel apparel il use, et lequel il ama daller bravement ou nemy.  
Item dequel nature il est, lequel soit hasty, heady, ou priest de quarreller.  
Item queux shifts il ad de temps en temps, et quel chose luy move de fair tiel heinous act.  
Item lequel le home fuit tue In le haut chemyn ou en boys, ou perenter deux hills, ou lequel prochein un hedge, ou altar secret lieu.  
Item lequel fuit en le matyne, ou sere en le nuite, et lequel fuit view la circa ciel temps.  
Item lequel il senfua apres l'act commit, ou avera ascun sank sur luy, ou sil tremble ou staggar, ou soit contrary, en disant de son tale, et coment il gard son countenance.  
Item lequel aver esperance de garder son fact secretment per reason del place, temps, et le maner de son secret feasans.  
Item daver tesmoignes examines de son esteant en ceo place, ou en altar place, all temps del act fait.  
Item compare le force de murderer oue le weakness, armour oue le nakedness, stoutness oue le simplicity d'auter.  
Item son confession demesne, Wilson Rhet. Fol. 17.  
Item si soit vagrant, & nullam exercens a●…tem, neclaborem, ou si certain d esbiens embles fuer in son possession. 7. E. 4. 10.  
Item siquis appellatus fuerit à probatore, & f●…gerit propter appellum, & mortuo probatore redierit, est suspiciosus per Bracton.  
Item fama quae suspicionem inducit, oriri debet apud bonos & graves, non quidem malevolos & maledicos, sed providas & fide dignas personas, non semel, sed saepius; quia clamor innuit, & defamatio manifestat, & vanae voces populi non sunt audiendae. Idem Bracton.  
Item si ascun soyt imprison pur suspicion de felony, et eschapa, ou fait tout que en luy est, de eschaper, est grand suspicion que il est culpable. Stamf. 180.  
Item si quis noctu cubauerit in domo solus cum aliquo qui interfectus sit, vel si duo vel plures ibi fuerint, & hutesium non levauerint, nec plagam à latronibus vel interfectoribus in defension facienda acceperint, nec ostendunt quis, de se, vel de alijs hominem interfecerit, his casibus mortem dedicere non possunt. Bracton.  
Item si quis notum vel ignotum in domum suam acceperit, qui vivus ingredi visus sit, verum postea nunquam nisi mortuus: dominus domus, si tunc domi sit, vel alij de familia qui tunc interfuerunt, poenam capitalem subibunt, nisi fortè per patriam fuerint liberati. Idem.  
Item communis vox & fama est sufficient cause de suspicion de felony, sans altar especial matter allege. per Curiam. 5. H. 7. 2. H. 7. 6.  
Item si home soit rob, ascuns voile prender le measure de les pées de les robbers, et de les chivals, et si cesty que est rob ad suspicion d'ascun il voile causer le measure d'estre mis al pée de tiel person, et son chivall, et sils accord, ill poet estre suspicious.  
Item si home appelle altar traitor, et il dit rien a ceo, il est cause le luy arrester pur suspicion, et pur ceo covient que il respond a ceo. Fitz. coro. 24. 37. H. 6. per les justices, issint semble ou home appelle altar thief, et il dit rien a cell, etc.  
Item Nota, il est use, on home est suspect d'auer murdre altar, d'amesner luy al mort corps et sur cel il ad estre view, que le corpse ad novelment met horse sank, videlicet, hath bled freshly, sicome vst este novelment tue. Et sur ceo il ad este pris, et condemn, et quant il ale all execution, il ad conus le fact.  
Adjuncts be more plentiful, saith Ramus, but subjects more forcible in arguing, as, he looks, ergo he loves, it followeth not so well, as thus, he loves, ergo he looks. Yet some like not of this note. For, say they, if you consider the subject and the adjunct Logically, than the one doth equally argue the other, but if phisically, then that is heterogeneum and impertinent.  
As the place, so the time may enhance or diminish the value of things. So that, as a man may plus petere loco, so may he also tempore. Qui tardius soluit, minus soluit, sic qui commodori loco. Qui citius petit, plus petit, sic qui loco magis remoto. Nam ut dies est pars obligationis, sic tempus.  
11. H. 4. 31. b. Hill. Home priest mon fits bien vestue, luy despoil, et dona a luy un drape, ieo avera le drape quia ieo avera le corps que il cover: sic adulter vest ma feme etc.  
A les justices pertient pur donor judgement, oyer, recorder, agarder process etc. a les clerks pur escriver ceo que les justices agardont, a le viscount pur returner briefs a luy directs etc. 7. H. 6. 30. Hals.  
Si action de wast soit o'er done generalment vers tenant in tail apres possibility dissue extinct, triple damages serront recover vers luy sans plusors parols, car ceux sont adjoints a ceo per le former statute: et quant ceo est done in novel case, tout que est adioynt a ceo est done oue ceo similiter.  
Donatio officij del Exigenter de London etc. pertinet ad dispositionem capitalis justiciarij pro tempore existentis, ut incidens inseparabile ad personam dicti capitalis justiciarij spectans, & hoc ratione praescriptionis & usus. 1. & 2. Elis. 25. Dyer.  
1. H. 4. 6. per Gascoigne, si le roy per parols generals graunta choses a queux auters sont incidents queux ne sont severables, les incidents passont. Come sil graunta moy terre cum pertinentiis, a que common est appendent, le common passa.  
Tyrwit dit, si le roy graunta moy le foundation d'un abbey, le corody passa: Issint sil graunta fair, ieo avera un court de pipouders incident a ceo.  
Vide Parkins page. 24. Des incidents que passont per le grant des principals: come fealty est incident all homage et all rent, rend all reversion, advowson all manor.  
Acquittal est incident all franckalmoigne, Littleton, 32. a. acquittal et garrantie sont incidents all Homage auncestrel, Little. 32. Distress all rend service, 51. Distress all rent reserve sur egalitie del partition, 55. Suruyvor all joint-tenancy. 62.  
Vide 12. H. 8. 7. 8. 9 Brooke justice saith that, le person ad le féesimple in iure ecclesiae, whereunto agreeth Elyot. Brudnell, semble que le person ad le féesimple, car le patron n'ad ascun interest mes solement le presentment. But pollard will have it in the Patrome.  
Elenches. This place, as others, is then abused, when false adjuncts ●…ée applied, or others not orderly applied.    

The ninth Chapter. Of the divers or different.  
HItherto of arguments agéeable, now follow the disagreeable.  
A disagreeable argument is that which disagreeth from the thing which it doth argue.  
The one of these joined or compared with the other appeareth more plainly.  
disagreeable arguments be either divers or opposite. divers or different are disagreeable arguments which differ only in respect, and are only fit for declaration: they are often in authors, and many of them be expressed by these signs, Not this, but that.  
Colyn in january, Colyn lo'ude not Hobbinol, but Rosalinde.  
Master Plowden: Fol. 82. a. Car parols, que ne sont altar, que le verberation del air, ne sont l'e statute, mes solement le image del statute, et le vie del statute rest en les ments del expositors deal parols, quells sont les seasors del statute.  

Annotations. Elenches.  
Only in respect:] not indeed, and naturally, in respect of the things themselves, which may very well oftentimes concur in one, but only in respect of his meaning, that so put them down. Therefore the use of divers arguments is in dinstinction, and evident explication, not in confirmation. L. 5. E 4. 7. per Bryan: les walls, timber, coverture, peers etc. deal Chapterhouse, ne serront dits properment le Chapterhouse, mes lou le covent et Chapter sont, l●… properment est le Chapterhouse. In that saying of Christ, I come not to send peace, but the sword, if we intend this conclusion, I come to send the sword, therefore not peace, than the arguments be repugnant, saith Wasserleider: but if we take it as spoken only for explication and distinction, than they be used as divers.  
Ramus first found, diversa: Rodolphus Agricola, disparata, which he calleth differentia.  
This place is abused, when such things be put down for divers, which are not divers properly.    

The tenth Chapter. Of Opposites.  
OPposites are disagreeable arguments which disagree both in respect, and in matter itself, and therefore cannot agree unto the same thing, according to the same part, respect, or time, as the same man cannot be hot and cold in the same part of his body, at the same time. So Socrates cannot be father and son to the same man: sick and whole at the same time: Insomuch that if one of them be affirmed, the other must be denied, and contrarily: but necessarily in the first; contingently in the second.  
Opposites are either Disparates or contraries. Disparates are sundry opposites whereof one is equally and in like manner opposed unto many.  
Hobbinoll in April in his song of Elisa.  

Bring here the Pink and purple Cullambine with Gelliflowres:  
Bring Coronations, and Sops in wine worn of paramours.  
Strew me the ground with Daffadowndillyes,  
And Cowslyps, and Kingcups, and loved lilies,  
The pretty Paunce,  
And the Chevisance  
Shall match with the fair Flowredelîce.   
All which herbs be equally differing one from another, and are therefore Disparates.  
M. Plowden Fol. 170. a. b. Mes un gross nosme poet conteigner divers choses corporal, come Manor, Monastery, Rectory, castle, Honour, et tiels semblables. Car eux sont choses compound, et poyent conteyner tout ensemble, messaages, terres, prées, bois et tiels semblables.  

Annotations.  
Equally:] not as though one Disparate should differ equally from all the other. But equally signifieth vicissim, simul, alike, in like manner, again, etc. Wasserleider.  
Disparo signifieth to sever, or separate. Of that word cometh Disparata, that is, things severed, or put a sunder one from another.  
Canons. If one Disparate be equally opposed to many, then certainly, if one of them be affirmed, all the rest must be denied. But if one among all be denied, you cannot straightways infer any other what you list, but some one of the same kind of things. And therefore, from the first part of the Canon, cometh a necessary axiom, but from the second, a contingent. What then if I should thus reason?  
If this man be not a Lawyer, he is a Divine.  
Or thus, out of Virgil.  
If the Spartan maid be not a woman, she is a goddess. be these axioms false or no? I answer, they be not altogether false, but contingent. And therefore I said before, that if one of them ●…ée affirmed, the other must be denied, and contralily, that is, if one of them be denied, the other must be affirmed: for, as in this argument, so in many others, the common Logicians very rashly say, it doth not follow, if it do not follow necessarily: Whereas notwithstanding it may follow, although it follow contingently. So then the one affirmed, the other is denied necessarily: but the one being denied, another shall be affirmed contingently, as I said in the text.  
Master Lambard. just. lib. 1. cap. 12. Capital or deadly punishment is done sundry ways, as by hanging, burning, boiling, or pressing.  
Not Capital is of divers sorts also, as cutting of the hand or ear, burning or marking the hand or face, boring through the ear, whipping, imprisoning, stocking, setting on the pillory or cucking-stool, which in old time was called the tumbril, and of old, but not now, pulling out of the tongue for false rumours, cutting off the nose for adultery, taking away the privy parts for counterfeiting of money.  
Pecuniary punishments be divers, as issues, fines, amerciaments, and forfeiture of offices, goods, and lands etc.  
The Romans used specially eight sorts of chastisements, Damnum, vincula, verbera, talio, ignominia, exilium, servitus, mors.  
Elenches. When divers be put down as Disparates. So in martial. 
Pinxisti venerem, colis, Artemidore, Mineruam,  
Et miraris opus displicuisse tuum?   
For both these things might be done together by Artemidorus well enough, and yet his work displease no man.    

The eleventh Chapter. Of Contraries.  
COntraries be such opposites, whereof either one is only opposite to one, or one to two, but more to the one of them, than to the other. They be Relatives or repugnant. Relatives are contraries, whereof the one is so opposed to the other, as yet there may be in other respects a mutual consent and reciprocal relation between them, whereupon they be called Relatives, as father, son, husband, wife, etc.  
In May Palinode. 
So schooled the gate his wanton son,  
That answered her mother, all should be done.  Master Plowden. Fol. 121. b. Le greinder est in respect del meynder: et issint en ceo que il affirm le conusance del greinder number, il affirm auxi le conusance del meynder etc.  
Repugnant arguments be such contraries, whereof one is so opposite to one, or at the most to two, as that there can never any agreement be found between them. So War is only opposite to peace: but covetousness to liberality and prodigality, yet more to prodigality.  

Shepherd I list none accordance make  
With shepherd that does the right way forsake:  
And of the twain, if choice were to me,  
Had liefer my foe than my friend to be.   
Colyn in December. 
Love they him called that gave me checkmate,  
But better mought they have behot him hate.  Perigot in August. 
Ah Willy, when the heart is ill assayed,  
How can bagpipe, or joints be well apaid?  Master Plowden Fol. 467. a. Et issint il apiert diversity, (he should have said rather Repugnancy) enter les deux equity's, car l'un abridge, l'auter enlarge: l'un dymynisha, l'auter amplify: l'un tolle de le letter, l'auter ad al ceo.  
Fol. 274. a. Car horse de memory, et hors de conusance, est tout un. Et ambideux ces phrases signify ignorance deal temps●…et quant le party priest conusance del temps, iln'estroit en sa bouche a dire, que il est ignorant de mesme le temps. Car ignorance et science sont contraries repugnant, et d'affirmer contraries, nats' serra suffer per nostre ley.  
Under Repugnant arguments be contained Privatives, as blindness is opposed to sight; darkness to light; death to life.  
Piers in May. 
For what concord han light and dark same?   
Uillen et franck home sont privatives. see Plowden 397. a.  
And thus much of disagreeable arguments, by which one thing is said to be different from another.  

Annotations.  
THis word, Contrary, betokeneth no distinct and special determinate argument, but is a general affection incident to divers specials. Therefore in judgement we should not say, the argument is from the contrary, but from this or that kind of contrary, for all contraries argue not alike. And so in other arguments we must not stick in the generality, but descend to particulars, as, what cause, what subject, what adjunct.  
Cum res duae ità comparantur, ut ex earum altera affirmata, affirmetur altera, ex altera negata, negetur altera, tum illae sunt consentaneae, ut Aegistus est otiosus, ergò adulter: Efficiens non habet instrumenta ad aedificandum, ergò non potest aedificare: Causa & efficiens utrobique: Sed cum ex una affirmat a, altera negatur, vel ex una negata altera affirmatur, tùm sunt dissentaneae, ut Sophroniscus fuit pater Socratis, ergò non filius: & Socrates fuit Sophronisci filius, ergò non pater: hîc causa & effectum sunt, sed considerantur, ut dissentanea: quià ex altero affirmato negatur alterum. Et non est absurdum, quod una eademque res, diverso respectu, sit & consentanea & dissentanea. Itaque te neamus Relata. Piscator.  
Scribonius would have the nature of Relatives generally put down immediately after the general definition of an argument in the first chapter. Because, as a father cannot be somuch as imagined without a son, nor a son without a father, so no more can a cause without a thing caused, thing caused without a cause, subject without adjunct, adjunct without subject etc.  
Sometimes the Relatives have both distinct names, as father, son, sometimes but one name, as a brother is he that hath a brother, a disparate is that which hath a disparate.  
One Relative doth define and expound another. So the cause is defined by the thing caused, and this by that etc.  
Relata sunt simul natura, for though David were David before Solomon was borne, yet David was never salomon's father, before Solomon was David's son.  
Relata ita contraria sunt, ut non sint sine medio: nam inter patrem & filium, est medius, qui neque pater, neque filius est.  
I. Guyer fuit indite devant le Coroner super visum corporis, del mort Emeline Guyer sa feme. Et l'enditement fuit, que le dit Emelyne fuit in pace domini regis, quousque antedictus I. Guyer, vir praefatae Emelyne Guyer etc. cest indictment fuit challenge. Car il poet estre intent assets bien per l'enditement, que le feme n'est occise, mes est in vie, et issint repugnant en luy mesme, eoque le dit I. Guyer est appelle vir prefate Emelyne, ou il serroyt, nuper vir, car vir est correlative all feme, et ne poet estre vir nisi in respectu uxoris etc. 31. 32. H. 8. 3. Dyer.  
Il ne est possible, que un person poet estre sovereign et subject. 4. Elis. 22. Dyer.  
That which agreeth with one of the Relatives, commonly agreeth with the other, as if it be honest to teach, it is no shame to learn.  
Relatives in our law be, as, signior tenant, paramount per avail, plaintiff defendant, demandant tenant, guard garden, feffor feffée, donor donée, grauntor grantee, lessor lessée, disseisor disseisée, conuser conusée, baron feme etc.  
Repugnants. If one repugnant argument be denied, the other must be affirmed, if there be no third thing put between them.  
Although Contraries cannot be applied unto the same thing, yet the same thing may be applied unto contraries.  
Privatives. Privatives they call those whereof one denieth only in that subject whereunto the affirmative agreeth by nature (affirmative is that which doth affirm and lay down some thing to be or imagined to be) and here the affirmative is called the habit, the negative the privation thereof. A stone therefore cannot be called blind, for that it was never framed of nature to be capable of sight, but it may be called, not seeing.  
Crompton: Fol. 29. Home tua altar quant est ebrius, il serra pendus quant est sober.  
Privatives be, In prison alarg, compos mentis, non sane memory: avengle surde, mute. etc.  
Privatio praesupponit habitum, unde illa consectaria, non videtur rem amittere cuius propria non fuit. Non potest videri desisse habere, qui nunquam habuit. Quod quis, si velit, habere non potest, id repudiare non potest. Eius est non velle, qui potest velle. Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent. Qui tacet, non utique fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non negare. Cum architecti quidam palatium aedificarent in via publica, & cum proiecto lapide proclamassent, quidam iter illac faciens, lapide vulneratus, architectos omnes in ius vocavit: ab his consultus Pyleus, animaduertit, eos probare non posse, quod proclamassent: itaque non ius, ait, deficit, sed probatio. Cum igitur cras in iuditium veneritis, cavete, ne verbum proferatis, sed me solum loqui sinatis: die igitur judicij constituto, cum à judice accusationi respondere iussi essent, & Pyleus illos ut mutos excusaret, ibi adversarius id pernegare caepit, quoniam ipsos, cum vulneraretur, clamantes audisset, ut sibi caveret: quae verba Pyleus statim ad acta referri jussit, & ita eos à lite liberavit. Baldus in sua pract. tit. de cautelis.  
As for contradictories, it were utterly impertinent to make any discourse of them in this place, as wholly belonging to axiomatical disposition, whereunto all contradictions are naturally incident, howsoever Beurhusius distinguish in this case.  
Elenches. In relatives, Omnia castor emis, sic fiet ut omnia venda●…, martial. Indeed if Castor buy all, some body must needs sell all: but it followeth not that therefore, Castor must sell all.  
In Repugnant: Whiteness is a colour, therefore blackness is no colour. It followeth not. For, as I said before, contraries generally are not such, of the which one and the same thing cannot be affirmed, but such as cannot be affirmed of one and the same thing.  
So in Relatives. Tibullus lib. 1. 
At vos exiguo pecori, furesque, lupique  
Parcite: de magno est praeda petenda grege.   
It followeth not, that because a pray is to be taken of a great flock, therefore nothing is to be taken of a little one.  
So in Privatives, 

He that seethe is alive, therefore  
He that is blind, is dead.      

The 12. Chapter. Of secondary Arguments.  
THus much of original and first arguments. The secondary remaineth which is made of the joining together of the first, and argueth as the first do from whence it is derived, as the cause therefore argueth absolutely, so such secondary arguments as are made of the cause, and so in the rest, according as their several kind of arguing is.  
The Argument made of the first is either Distribution or Definition.  

Annotations.  
RAmus to these two which I have put down, addeth other two, Coniugates, and Notation, as arguments made of the first. As for Coniugates, I see in them no new different force of arguing, as he is just, for he dealeth justly: here is nothing in effect, but the cause and the effect. For as for the derivation of this word, just, from justice, it seemeth altother grammatical: and whereas they both do fitly allude in she end and falling, thus, justice Just, justly, that cometh from a Rhetorical figure, called Polyptoton, which concerneth the elegancy that is in the divers fallings and terminations of words.  
So in Notation, the interpretation of the name, seemeth rather the duty of a dictionary, then of any Logical institution, as Argumentum ab arguendo: where again there is no force of arguing but from the cause and the thing caused. For as for the pretty and conceited change of the word, argumentum ab arguendo, it seemeth also a Rhetorical agnomination: yet as not fully resolved herein, I leave them in these Annotations.  
Coniugates or offspringes, be words diversly derived from one head, as justice, Just, justly, he dealeth justly, therefore he is just. The primitive word containeth the cause of his offsprings, as here justice of just dealing.  
Aristotle commendeth this place highly 7. topie.  
Canons.  
If you put down or remove one Coniugate, you must put down, or remove the other: That which is given or taken, to or from the one: is given or taken, to or from the other: but here Contingency is more usual than necessity, therefore heed is to be taken in distinguishing the one from the other.  
In 4. H. 7. 9 b. Un brief de partitione facienda del terre et rent fuit port. Et Keble plead pur le rent, que le def. fuit sole seisie, sans ceo que il tient pro indiviso oue le pl. et per Bryan, cest bon plée, car il n'auera partition deal chose dont il ne ad ascun part.  
Coniugates from the cause.  
Terence in Hecyra Act. 3. scoen. 4. Dedecet iam ira haec, etsi meritò iratus es. This anger becomes you not, although you have cause to be angry.  
From the thing caused.  
Tully in his oration for his house: Primum dico, Senatoris esse boni, in Senatum venire. First I say, it is the part of a good Senator, to come into the Senate house.  
From the subject.  
Tully to Atticus, Quia homo es, humana tibi ferenda est ratio. Because thou art a man, thou must bear such things as are incident to men.  
From the adjunct.  
Tully in his epistles: Rege interfecto, regios omnes nutus tuemur. The king being killed, we maintain every kingly beck and countenance.  
Elenches.  
Some learned men be lewd livers, therefore learning is lewd: Where it should be thus; Learned men live lewdly, therefore they be lewd: or thus, Learning maketh men loud, therefore it is lewd.  
Notation.  
Notation or Etymology, is the interpretation of the word. For words be notes of things, and of all words either derivative or compound, you may yield some reason fet from the first arguments, if the notation be well made. It is called Originatio, quod originem verborum explicet: and Etymologia, id est, veriloquium.  
Nomina sunt argumenta, non quatenus ad rem significandam referuntur, sed quatenus referuntur vel inter se mutuò, ut coniugata: vel ad suae originis interpretationem, quae Notatio dicitur. Sed sic non considerantur ut nomina, id est symbola, sed ut res quaedam, seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quaedam. Piscator.  
Grammatica notatio exponit vocum adsignificationem: Logica verò causam explicat, cur hoc nomen huic rei sit impositum.  
Piscator putat, à nomine ad rem significatam argumentari, nihil aliud esse quàm a testimonio argumentari: ut Christus in scriptura dicitur Deus, ergò est Deus.  
Canons.  
To whom the interpretation of the name agreeth, to that also the name itself and contrarily. Yet, saith Corasius, ab interpretatione ad nomen ipsum derivatum, sicuti est à genere ad speciem, desumpta argumentatio inanis est, quod etymologia latiùs pateat, quam nomen ipsum. Certè re ciprocatio in his obscura & incerta est. Sed à derivato ad derivationem argui melius potest, ut tutor est, ergò tueri debet.  
When the name is false, unknown, or ambiguous, than the reason is dangerous.  
That which agreeth with the one, agreeth with the other.  
Duips, taunts, jests, and conceits are often fet hence.  
All Plato's Cratilus is spent in the interpretation of words after this manner.  
Nihil ambigi potest, ait Cicero, in quo, non aut res controversiam faciat, aut verbum, in dictionibus igitur aequè atque in rebus versatur Dialectica. Hottoman. 
Examples of notations.  
From the cause.   
Billingsgate, a gate in London builded by king Belus.  
From the effect.  
Provident, of foreseeing future chances. And so in the rest.  
Gospel, a good spell, or God's spell, or saying. A Lordane signifieth an imperious idle fellow, of a lord Dane. Winchelsea, of wind, chilly, and sea: so in Latin it is called Frigmareventus, of frigus, mare, ventus. Little john, for that he was wonderfully tall and big, here the notation is from the contrary, as Lucus, quia non lucet, parcae, quia non parcunt, Bellum, q●…a non bellum, & so of Ludus, Eumenides etc. Mutuum quasi meumtuum. 
Victima, quae dextra cecidit victrice, vocatur:  
Hostibus à domitis, hostia nomen habet.   
Arist. 2. Rhet. Draconis leges, non hominis, quod erant asperae. Dracoes' laws were a Dragon's laws, for their cruelty.  
Territorium dicitur, quia magistratus eius loci, intra suos fines, terrendi, id est, coercendi ius habent.  
The Court of pipowders incident to fairs, is called Curia pedis puluerisatis, for fairs commonly are dusty. 13. E. 4. 8.  
Choke in 17. E. 4. b. Conclude que null contract serra, si non ambideux les parties simul consentiant. Car contractus dicitur à con, quod est simul, & traho, to draw together.  
servus a seruando, as well as of seruiendo, quia seruaban●… capti in bello, ut postea venderentur. Manumissio, quasi 〈◊〉 manu dimissio. Mancipia, quasi manu capta. Bracton lib. 1. Fol. 4.  
Dyer semble que un remainder all feme pur vie apres le mort le baron, ne poet estre termed ne prise pur une jointure, purceoque el doit prendre estate jointment one son baron accordant all etymology del parol, jointure. 17. Elis. 50. Dyer.  
Per Needham 4. E. 4. Praecipe quod reddat gist properment verse le tenant del terre, de terris ou tenementis, car la il poet reddere: contra deal common de pasture appendent ou in gross; lafoy quod permittat gist que il suffer le demandant occupier son common etc. Socage à soca. Littleton. 26. 7.  
Fearmes, quasi feormian, qu'est un Saxon parol, signifiant pur féeder ou tender victual, car les ancient reservations fueront pur le pluis part in victuals et nemy argent. Terms of the law. pag. 967.  
Aulnage, ex quo Aulnager, est le measure et le metre per le yard, in Latin, Vlnagium & ulnator, ab ulna. 13. & 14. Elis. 49. Dyer.  
Shyrréeve, of two Saxon words, Geresa, a ruler, and Scyran, which is to cut: as it were the ruler of the shire. For the Realm is divided and cut, as it were, into such parts, called hereupon shires, and allotted to several shyrréeves as their shires. In Latin he is called Vicecomes, quasi vicarius comitis, in seeing justice executed in the shire, and the kings revenues brought in aerarium. Which the Count, Earl, Comes himself should, but could not by himself, as attending for the most part upon the king in wars, as the name beareth, Comes quasi comitans principem.  
Constable, quasi Kyninstaple, or Kingstaple, the stay and hold of the king, for so was the Lord great Constable of England, who had authority in matters of war within & without the Realm. Out of which office this lower Constableship was first fet. 13. E. 3. Stat. Winchester: where two constables in every Hundred were appointed to take view of armour.  
Tythingman, Headborough, Chiefepledg, Borsholder, is in a manner all one with a petite Constable. Although before William Conqueror it was ordained, that all free borne men should cast themselves in companies by ten in each company, and that every of the ten should be pledge and surety for his fellow, and amerced for his default if he escaped. Hereof these companies be called Boroes or Bo●…hes, a pledge, and tithing of ten. And because ten of these companies sometimes met for matters of weight, and ten times ten is an hundred, their general assembly was called an hundred. The speaker and chief man was called the Tythingman, the Borsholder, quasi elder Boroe, and head-borohe, chief pledge. In these meetings among other things it was observed, that every of these pledges should yearly be presented by the chief pledge at a general assembly, yet called the view of Frankepledge, visus Franciplegij, or the leet court. Master Lambard.  
Laths, Rapes, and Wapentakes, be so called of the divisions of parts of shires. Lathe is a barn, Rape a reaping. Sir Thomas Smith thinketh them to be names of service, for that so many towns met in one day to reap or carry the Lords corn into his barn, and Wapentake of taking weapons, for that in those assemblies▪ he that could not find surety for his good abearing, had his weapon taken from him.  
But M. Lambard in legibus Edwardi regis, writeth thus.  
Totus ille conventus dicitur Wapentac, eo quod per tactum armorum suorum ad invicem confederati sunt: of W●…pun & Tac, tangere vel confirmare, quià omnes praesentes cum lanceis suis tangebant hastam praefecti ipsius Wapentachij, & ità se consirmabant.  
Bracton. Dicitur ideo breve, quia rem de qua agit, & intentionem petentis, paucis verbis breviter enarrat, etc.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 357. a. Quia fines in curia nostra levati finem litibus debent imponere & imponunt, ideo fines vocantur maximè. Sic Fol. 368. b. ex Bracton. Finis est extremitas uniuscuiusque rei, hoc est, idem in quo unaquaeque res terminatur, & ideo dicitur finalis concordia, quia imponit finem litibus.  
Fol. 250. a. b. Et le nosme del estate fee tail fuit done sur le certainty del inheritance, come Littleton dit, car il dit, que Talliare, idem est quod in certitudinem ponere. Et pur ceoque en le done il est express de que corps les heirs que enheritont, isseront, pur cel cause il priest, que il fuit appelle tail. Ou plustost puit aver le nosme de cest Francois parol, tailor, lequel est decowper, car a tailor boys, est a cowpe●… boys, et purceoque l'estate est docked, on cut off (car devant il fuit fee simple, et a o'er le fee est decise de ceo, et l'estate per ceo est docked, cut off, ou fait meynder) ill poet bien estre dit estate tail, cestascavoir, estate decoupe, decise, ou deminue.  
Fol. 193. a. Terres venues en mains des ●…omes de religion, sont appelle en ley de viender en mortmayne, per le resemblance (come Weston justice dit) all tenure d'un home en extremes, que tient en son main queconque que il soit, tanq▪ que il soit mort. Et issint le continuance del inheritance en ceux de religion est suppose cy longement, que le meason continue. Vide Doctor & Student accordant oue ceo. pag. 172. a.  
Fol. 198. b. Et le parol, Expiration, est properment breathing up, ou yielding up the breath, come le signior Dyer dit, et est apply all home ou auters choses animate: et est use pur le mort d'un home; car quant il yield up his breath, adonques il morust, car sans son breath il ne poet viuer. Et comentque il est properment use a choses animate, que breathont, uncore per un similitude il est refer all choses inanimate. Come usomus en nostre ley, Reverter, que est properment use in choses animate que soy removent: mes ascun foits nous usomus ceo in chose inanimate, come diomus, lou tenant en tail morust, le terre revertera all donor. Et issint expiration use icy per similitude del choses vi●…ant, imply ●…ine queconque. Car come signifiomus per expiration le mort del home, et son darreine fine, queconque voy, que il vient, issint ceo parol, expiration, add all estate pur ans, poet aptement signifier le fine de ceo queconque. Et issint expiration del estate pur ans, et fine del estate pur ans, est tout un.  
Court baron, of Barones, quasi virones, magnates, among the Saxons called Thani. Court leet, of the Saxon word Lant, which is law, so Lant-day by corruption of speech is come to be called Law-day. Barrettor, of the French Barat, deceit: or of the Latin, Baratro, or Balatro, a vile knave. Apprentice of Apprendre to learn. Sessions à sedendo. Acquittance, quasi acquietantia, etc.  
Indictment, of the French word, Enditer, which Stephanus, deriveth from the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, defero, accuso, postulo in judicio, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, deferor, causam dico quod circa publica secus aliquid admiserim. Hereof is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, delatio, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, delator, quadruplator. Master Lambard in his justice of peace. lib. 2. cap. 5. saith thus. The understanding or knowledge which the justices of peace do take by the travail of these enquirours is by the mean of their report, put in writing, and commonly called an inditement, or presentment: between the which two words (howsoever they be confounded in common speech) me thinketh that there doth easily appear a certain difference. For I take a presentment to be a mere denunciation of the jurors themselves or of some other officer without any other information: and an inditement to be the verdict of the jurors, grounded upon the accusation of a third person. So that a presentment is but a declaration of the jurors, or officers without any bill offered before, and an inditement is their finding of a bill of accusation to be true. The one seemeth to come of the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I accuse, the other of the French, presenter, to offer unto a man, or set before him.  
Master Lambard: just. lib. 2. cap. 16. Hereof also the fine took first his name, of the Latin Finis, because it maketh an end with the Prince for the imprisonment, for the offence committed, against his law, and in that respect chief doth it differ from an amerceament. For when the offender hath not so deeply trespassed, that thereby he deserveth not any bodily punishment at all (as if he be nons●…ite in an action, or do commit any such like default) he is said to fall into the kings mercy, because he is then mercifully to be dealt with. And by the great charter, cap. 14. that amerciament and sum of money which he is to pay for the same, aught to be assessed and afeard by the good and lawful men of the neighbourhood, which also Glannil, lib. 9 cap. 11. affirmeth to have been the law of the land long before that time, saying misericordia domini regis est, qua quis per ●…uramentum legalium hominum de vicineto eatenus amerciandus, ne aliquid de suò honorabili contenemento amittat. But when the offence or contempt falleth out to be so great, that it asketh the imprisonment of the body itself, and that during the kings will and pleasure, then is the party to redeem his liberty with some portion of money, as he can best agree with the king or his justices for the same, which composition is properly called his fine, or his ransom, and in Latin Redemptio, as may be plainly seen by the statute of Marlebridge. 52. H. 3. cap. 1. 2. 3. & 4. and by the statute called Ragman, and divers other ancient statutes.  
The humanity and conscience which Christian religion doth teach, hath engendered a certain fear and scruple in the hearts of our men, to have slaves and bondmen. Yet necessity on both sides, of the one to have help, and the other to have service, hath kept a figure or fashion thereof. So that some would not have bondmen, villains in gross, as ye would say immediately bond to the person and his heirs; but ascriptitios glebae, or agris censitos, and villains regardant and bond to the manor or ground, as members belonging to the place, and following him who had the place; to the intent their service might be furnished, and that the country being evil, unwholesome, and otherwise barren, should not be desolate. Others afterwards found out the ways and means, that not the men, but the land should be bound, and bring with it such bondage and service to him that occupieth it, as to carry the Lords dung unto the fields, to blow his ground at certain days, sow, reap, come to his court, swear faith unto him, and in the end to hold the land but by the copy of the Lords Court roll, and at the will of the Lord. This tenure is called also in our Law, villeine, bond, or service tenure. Yet, to consider more deeply, all land, even that which is called most free land, hath a bondage annexed unto it, not as naturally the lower ground must suffer and receive the water and filth which falleth from the higher ground, nor such as justinian speaketh of de seruitutibus praediorum rusticorum & urbanorum; but the land doth bring a certain kind of servitude to the possessor. For no man holdeth land simply free in England, but he or she that holdeth the crown of England: all others hold their land in fee, that is upon a faith or trust, and some service to another Lord of a manor as his superior, and he again of a higher Lord, till it come to the prince and him that holdeth the crown. So that if a man die, and it be found that he hath land which he holdeth, but of whom no man can tell, this is understood to be holden of the crown, and in capite, which is much like to knight's service, and draweth unto it three services, Homage, ward, and marriage: that is he shall swear to be his man, and to be true unto him of whom he holdeth the land. His son who holdeth the land after the death of his father, shallbe married where it pleaseth the Lord. He that holdeth the land most freely of a temporal man (for frank alms and frank marriage hath an other cause and nature) holdeth by fealty only, which is, he shall swear to be true to the Lord. So that all free land in England is holden in fee, or fedo, which is as much to say, as in fide or fiducia, that is, in trust and confidence, that he shallbe true to the Lord, of whom he holdeth it, pay such rents, do such service, and observe such conditions, as were annexed to the first donation. Thus all, saving the Prince, be not veri domini, but rather Fiduciarij domini & possessores. This is a more likely interpretation then the which Littleton doth put down in his book, who saith that foedum, idem est quod haereditas, which it doth betoken in no language. This happeneth many times to them who be of great wit and learning, yet not seen in many tongues, or mark not the deduction of words which time doth alter. Fides in Latin, the Goths coming into Italy, and corrupting the language, was turned first into feed and at this day in Italy they will say, in fide, en fede, or a lafoy fe. And some uncunning lawyers that would make a new barbarous Latin word to betoken land given in fidem, or as the Italian saith, in fede, or fe, made it, in feudum, or fedum. The nature of the word appeareth more evident in those which we call to feoff, feoffee or feoffees, the one be fiduciarij possessores, or fidei commissarij, the other is, dare in fiduciam, or fidei commissum, or, more Latinely, fidei committere. The like error is in Wythernam, which some interpret vetitum navium: whereas in truth it is in plain Dutch, and in our old Saxou language wither nempt, alterum accipere: iterum rapere: nâm is, pignoris ablatio, wither, signifieth altera. But to return thither where we did digress: ye see that where the persons be free, and the bodies at full liberty and maxim ingenui, yet by annexing a condition to the land, there be means to bring the owners and possessors thereof into a certain servitude, or rather Libertinitie: that the tenants, besides paying the rent accustomed, shall owe to the Lord a certain faith, duty, trust, obedience, and, as we term it, certain service, as Libertus or cliens patrono: which, because it doth not consist in the persons, (for the respect in them doth not make them bond) but in the land and occupation thereof, it is more properly expressed in calling the one tenant, the other Lord of the fee, than either Libertus or cliens can do the one, or Patronus the other: for these words touch rather the persons, and the office and duty between them, than the possessions, but in our cause, leaving the possession and land, all the obligation of servitude and service is gone.  
So much have I collected out of sir Thomas Smith, concerning this word fee. lib. 3. cap. 8.  
Master Lambard. just. lib. 2. cap. 14. Arraignment seemeth to have borrowed the name out of the word Array, which is the panel or jury, because he that is arraigned, must be tried by them, being first called, sworn, and tried in order for that service.  
Master Lambard. just. lib. 1. cap. 13. This saving then, or delivery of a person out of prison, before he hath satisfied the law, is uttered by three terms in our statutes, that is to say bailment, mainprize or manucaption, and replevin: and they be indifferently used to express that surety, which the prisoner is to find in such a case. Nevertheless it seemeth that a replevin had his original of the word, pledges, which denoteth them that undertake for the party, that he shall abide to be justified by law: and it is used in divers other cases▪ as in replevin of cattle upon distress, replevin of franchises in a quo warranto, replevyne of land upon a grand cape in old time, and replevin of the person of a man in case of villeinage.  
Baylement is derived from the French term Bayler, and that also cometh of the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they both signifying to deliver into hand. For he that is bailed, is taken or kept out of prison, and delivered, as it were, into the hands of his friends, as sureties for him. Whereof also the word Manucaptio, or mainprize, which is all one, giveth good evidence, the one mentioning the delivery, the other the receyning. And in this respect, the book of the Norman customs calleth baylement, a live prison, for that the party thereby becometh prisoner to his friends that do undertake for him.  
Master Lambard. just. lib. 1. cap. 21. As in old time every kill of a man was of the effect, called Murder, because death ensued of it (and of the Hebrew word Moth, saith Postellus, cometh the Latin Mors, which the Saxons our elders, called Morth and Morthor, as we yet sound it) so was that wilful manner of ●…aying with malice prepensed, long since, and most properly, called Felony, because it was done felleo animo, in malicious heat and displeasure, and therefore per feloniam, as the statute at Marlebridge cap. 15. doth plainly term it.  
Master Lambard. just. lib. 2. cap. 19 Riot seemeth to come of the French word Rioter, which signifieth to brawl or scold; for that commonly Riots indeed, do follow of brawling in word. And it is taken to be where there is any unlawful assembly (An unlawful assembly is the company of three persons or more gathered together to do such an unlawful act, although they do it not indeed) of men gathered together, and going about to commit an unlawful act, and they do execute it indeed, as to beat a man, or to enter upon a possession forcibly, or such like.  
Our Rout is the same which the Germans yet call Rot, meaning a band or great company of men gathered together, and going about to execute, or executing indeed any Riot or unlawful act. And, saith Marrow, it is said properly of the multitude that assemble themselves in such disorderly sort for their common quarrel: as if the inhabitants of a towneship do assemble to pull down a hedge or pale, to have their common, where they ought to have none, to beat a man that hath done them some public offence or displeasure.  
M. Lambard. just. lib. 1. cap. 17. The words Affray and Assault be indifferently used of most men, and that in our book cases, but yet in mine opinion, there wanteth not a just difference between them. For Affray, is derived of the French, Effrayer, which signifieth, to terrify, or bring fear, and is the more heinous irespasse: for the Law understandeth it to be a common wrong, and therefore it is enquirable and punishable in the turn of the sheriff, and in a léete, 4. H. 6. 10. and 8. E. 4. 5. Otherwise it is of an assault, as it seemeth by those very books. Yet may an affray be without word or blow given: as if a man, shall show himself furnished with armour or weapon, which is not usually worn and borne, it will strike a fear into others that be not armed, as he is, and therefore both the statute of Northampton. 2. E. 3 cap. 3. made against the wearing of armour and weapon, and the writ thereupon grounded, do speak of it, by the words, Effray del pais, and, in terrorem populi.  
But an Assault, as it is fetched from another fountain, namely from the Latin Assultus, which denoteth a leaping or flying upon a man: so can it not be performed without the offer of some hurtful blow, or at the least of some fearful speech. And therefore to rebuke a collector with fowl words, so that he departed for fear without doing his office, was taken for an assault. 27. lib. Ass. Pl. 11. And to strike at a man although he were neither hurt, nor hit with the blow, was adjudged an assault. 22. lib. ass. pl. 60. For this assault doth not always necessarily imply a hitting: and therefore in trespass of assault and battery, a man may be found guilty of the assault, and yet excused of the battery. 40. E. 3. 4. and 45. E. 3. 24.  
Estreates are called of the word Extracta, because they be short notes or memorials, extracted or drawn out of the Records by the Clerk of the peace, and by him indented and delivered sunderly to the sheriff, and to the barons of the Exchequer, bearing this, or the like title: Extracta finium, amerciamentorum forisfactorum, ad generalem sessionem pacis tentam apud Maydstone etc. coram etc. For the whole form of the making hereof, there is full direction given to all clerks of estreates, by the statute. 7. H. 4. cap. 3. whereunto I refer them.  
I have purposely inserted a number of notations, for that I would make it plain, how the notion of the thing is oftentimes expressed by the notation of the word, contrary to the prejudicate opinion of some seely penmen, and illogicall lawyers, who think it a fruitless point of superfluous curiosity, to understand the words of a man's own profession.  
Elenches.  
A Woman is a woe man, because she worketh a man woe. Agreamentum, quasi aggregatio mentium. But all the sport is to hear the Moonkish notations of words both Greek and Latin, whereof they knew neither sense nor signification, as Diabolus, of Dia, that is two (say they) and bolus, which signifieth a morsel, because the devil maketh but two morsels of a man, one of the soul, and another of the body. Hypocrisis, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is over, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, gold, because hypocrites be cloaked with a golden show overcast: whereas the one cometh of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to cast in accusations: the other of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to dissemble.    

The 13. Chapter. Of Distribution.  
IN Distribution and Definition there is a most necessary reciprocation or conversion: in distribution, of all the parts with the whole: in definition, of the thing defined, with the definition itself.  
A distribution is, when the whole is distributed into his parts. And as the distinguishing of the whole into his parts, is called Distribution: so the collection or gathering together of all the parts to make up the whole, is named Induction.  
Distribution is made of arguments which are agreeable to the whole, but disagreeable among themselves: so that it is so much the more perfect distribution, by how much the parts do more agree with the whole; and disagree among themselves.  

Annotations.  
REciprocation:] In other arguments not necessary. For it is not in all causes, but only between the form and the thing form: not in all subjects, but between the subject and his proper adjunct, not in all contraries, but only in Relatives. Whereas in distribution and definition, the reciprocation is perpetual.  
Such is the excellency of distribution and definition, that almost they alone do suffice for the absolute putting down of any art. Therefore Socrates in Phaedro Platonis saith, that if he find any man who can cunningly divide, he will follow his steps, and admire him for a God.  
[Induction:] Therefore as the one is an argument, and no argumentation, so also is the other. Nam Inductio arguit distributum sive totum, sine ulla dispositione tertij argumenti.  
[More agree with the whole:] For in distribution of the subject and adjunct, the parts and the whole do not essentially agree, as we shall see hereafter. Therefore by this rule the best division is from the cause and effect. Again, the more that the parts do disagree among themselves, the better is the division. By which it appeareth that the best division must be of parts that be most repugnant, which can be but two, therefore Dichotomia is most excellent, a division consisting only of two parts. For, as among agreeable arguments the cause and thing caused do best agree, so of all disagreeable; the repugnant be most disagreeable. But as in the most general and subalternal, Dichotomia must be observed, so in the most special it is not to be exacted.  
Elenches.  
Plato in Phaedro compareth inartificial dividers so bungling Cooks, who in stead of artificial ear●…ing, use rudely to break and dismember things. This is a lamentable want in our law, I mean exact divisions, in place whereof we have nothing else, but either A B C method without coherence, or primo notandum, 2. not. 3. not. 4. not. & so on 〈◊〉 till he come to decimotertiò notandum, like dunces in schools, and séelly babblers in pulpits: that a man were far better make a new speech, than remember their waste and confused Schediasmata. Lyttleton did what he could in this behalf, although it were but little, as in those his distinctions, Estate tail is general or special: Dower is per le comen ley, per custom, ad ostium ecclesiae, ex assensu patris, de la pluis beale. Uillen per prescription ou confession: Item in gros ou regardant. Rend est rend service, charge, seck. Conditions in faith, en ley. guarantee, lineal, collateral, perdisseisin, etc.  
Well then, one general Elench in a distribution, is the not using of it, when the matter requireth. Another is, when we use it, but inartificially, when any thing either wanteth in it, or is supersivous. Want, as in that which Virgil hath 5. Aeneid. where he propoundeth in his distribution only four kinds of exercises, but afterwards expoundeth five.  

Prima citae Teucris ponam certamina classis,  
Quique pedum cursu valet, & qui viribus audax,  
Aut iaculo incedit melior, levibusque sagittis,  
Seu crudo fidit pugnam committere cestu,  
Cuncti adsint, meritaeque expectent praemia palmae,  
o'er favete omnes, & cingite tempora ramis.   
For besides these four, followeth the fift, not named here in the distribution, and that is the race of horses.  
For superfluity, that shall serve which Tully hath in his second book De finibus, where he speaketh thus of Epicurus.  
Quomodo autem philosophus loquitur tria esse genera cupiditatum? Naturales & necessarias, naturales & non necessarias, nec naturales nec necessarias. Primùm divisit inleganter: duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria: hoc est, non dividere, sed frangere rem. Qui si diceret, Cupiditatum duo esse genera, naturales & inanes: naturalium quoque duo, necessarias & non necessarias, confecta res esset. Vitiosum est enim in dividendo, partem in genere numerare.    

The 14. Chapter. Of Distribution of Causes.  
DIstribution is made either of arguments fully agreeable, or agreeable in part: fully as first of the cause.  
The distribution made of the cause is, when the parts are the causes of the whole. And this is called partition, when the whole integral is divided into his members.  
Hobbinoll confuteth Diggon Davy in September, proving by a distribution of England into her parts, no Wolves to be in England.  

Fie on thee Diggon, and all thy fowl leasing,  
Well is known, that sith the Saxon king,  
Never was Wolf seen, many nor some,  
Nor in all Kent, nor in Christendom.   
For most part of England being Christian in Ethelberts' time, Kent only continued in Paganism, and was therefore counted no part of English Christendom. So that partition is used both in a distinct propounding of parts, where any long matter is to be handled of Poets, Orators, Preachers, Lawyers, etc. and also syllogistically in arguing either the whole by the parts, or the parts by the whole.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 170. a. Terre ne poet perteigner all messsage. Car messsage consist de deux choses, del terre et structure, et terre ne poet perteigner all terre, etc.  
Fol. 151. a. Reversion deal terre consist des deux choses del terre, et del residue ou remnant estate. Come Manor deal services et demesne; stagnum del terre et ewe; Piscaria del ewe et terre etc.  

Annotations.  
ECausis singulis distributio esse potest. Ex efficient, ut ius est naturale, civil, gentium; ex materia: vestes sunt laneae, lineae, etc. Ex forma, lanx est, quadrata, rotunda, etc. Ex fine, vestes sunt induendi causa, vel praecingendi, insternendi, etc.  
For the Elenches touching distribution of the integral, see before in the tractate of the integral.    

The 15. Chapter. Of distribution of Effects.  
THe distribution of the thing caused or of the effects is, whose parts are effects of the whole, and this is properly called Division, when as the general or universal is divided into his specials. And as the first called Partition; so this called division is handled as well in form of Distribution, as in arguing the one by the other.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 132. b. Il n'est rent: car si serroit rent, adonque il couyent de necessity d'estre rent charge, rend seek, ou rent service, car ne sont plusors rends que ceux trois, et rent charge il n'est my, car null distress est done, nec ascun terre charge oue ceo, nec seck ou service, quia n'est issant horse d'ascun terre, Ergò n'est rent.  
Elenches.  
Althusius thus divideth unlawful pleasures: into stuprum and adulterium. Stuprum inter personas solutas, and is voluntarium or violentum. Voluntarium fit ab extraneis, aut à consanguineis, ut incestus. Ab extraneis, naturaliter, vel contrà naturam: naturaliter à mare & faemina. Contra naturam, à mare cum mare, à faemina cum faemina, aut cum bestiijs. Adulterium est cum alterius coniuge vel marito. The whole constitution of this division is erroneous. For most of the things which are contained under stuprum, may as well, and do as well belong unto adulterium. Fenners division therefore is far better: where he saith they be  
Praeter naturam, or secundum naturam: praeter naturam est vel coufusio tum specierum, tum sexuum, vel incestus. Specierum, cum bestiae verè vel spiritus specie hominibus miscentur voluptatis causa; sexuum, confusio est, cum mares maribus, faeminae faeminis miscentur. Incestus sunt, cum propinqui carne miscentur etiam in coniugio.  
Secundum naturain est scortatio vel adulterium: Scórtatio est, cum matrimonio soluti illegitimè miscentur. Adulterium, cum altera persona saltem sit desponsata. Nam si utraque sit desponsata, graviùs est adulterium.  
It is all one whether the general be divided into his specials, or into the forms of the specials, as Animal is either rationale or irrationale, where the specials be as significantly put down as if they were expressed by their own proper names, man and beast.   

The 16. Chapter. Of Distribution of arguments after a certain manner agreeable.  
THe second kind of Distribution is made of arguments agreeable after a certain manner, as of subjects and adjuncts.  
The Distribution made of the subject is, when the parts are fet from the subject.  
Hobbinoll in his song of Elysa, divideth her beauty being the adjunct, into her several subjects, as, face, eye, cheek, etc.  

Tell me, have ye seen her angelic face like Phoebe fay re?  
Her heavenly haviour, her princely grace can you well compare?  
The red Rose meddled with the white yfeare,  
In either cheek depaynten jively cheer:  
Her modest eye,  
Her majesty,  
Where have you seen the like but there?   
M. Plowden Fol. 279. b. Et quant a ceo, troy's y sont (come Walshe dit) que ount a intromitter oue les biens del mort, cestassavoir, l'executor, le ordinary, et les administrators etc.  
The Distribution of the adjunct is, when the parts are fet from the adjuncts.  
Diggon in September.  

For either the she pheards been idle and still,  
And led of their sheep what way they will;  
Or they been false or full of covetise:  
And casten to compass many wrong emprise:  
But the more been fraught with fraud and spite,  
Ne in God nor goodness taken delight.   
Master Plowden Fol. 328. Mynes de plumb sont fertile, on sterile, etc.,  

Annotations.  
PIscator would have some divisions to be of things, as those that Ramus hath put down: and some of words, to distinguish the divers acceptions of ambiguous words, as Littleton pag. 51. in this word Assize, which he saith is equivocum, etc. But that belongeth rather to a Dictionary-maker, than a teacher of Logic, saith one. And, indeed, as another answereth, words be divided together with the things: as Liberty and freedom is either bodily or spiritual: where, as well the thing, as the word is divided.  
All Logic is general, and appliable as well to things imagined, as things that be extant in truth: and therefore to words also, as words have causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, and other arguments to be considered. Logicus, saith Hottoman, insitam vocum inter se rationem, habitum, respectum, affectionem: Grammaticus tantùm accidentia, & popularis sermonis in ijs iungendis consuetudinem exquirit, etc.  
Sith these two last kinds of distribution be said to be made of arguments agreeable after a certain manner; we are to understand, that neither the whole here, is of the essence of the parts, nor the parts of the nature of the whole: so that this is no true distribution indeed, but rather an imagined distinction. And these be parts, not of any whole, but rather of order, distinction, and particular rehearsal or enumeration.  
Canons.  
Therefore if you affirm or deny, either the adjunct which is the whole, or the subjects which be the parts, you may contingently affirm or deny the one or the other.  
And so in the other of the adjunct, the adiunctes as parts being affirmed, the subject as whole may be also affirmed.  
Distrib. in Sub.  
Stamford. praerog. reg. cap. 1. For which cause the laws do attribute unto him (the king) all honour, dignity, prerogative and pre-eminence, which prerogative doth not only extend to his own person, but also to all other his possessions, goods, and cattles. As, that his person shall be subject to no man's suit, his possessions cannot be taken from him by any violence or wrongful disseisin: his goods and cattles are under no tribute, toll, or custom, nor otherwise distreignable.  
Elenches.  
If a false adjunct be divided into false subjects: as arguments be either affirmative or negative. Or if a false subject be divided into unfit adjuncts, as spirits some be white, some black.    

The 17. Chapter. Of a Definition.  
A Definition is that which declareth what a thing is: it consisteth on two parts, the general and the difference. Whereof the first is common to the thing defined, and all his other fellow specials, but the difference is proper only to the thing defined, and distinguisheth it from all other his fellow specials.  
A definition is perfect or unperfect; whereof the first, for the excellency, is called definition by the common name: the second is termed a description, by a more special title or word.  
A perfect description is that, whose difference is fet from the formal cause of the thing defined, as, A man is a sensible creature endued with reason, where, sensible creature is the general, and endued with reason, is the difference: so that whatsoever is in a definition placed after the general, that I call in this place the difference.  
By an argument from the definition, Piers in May proveth hirelings, to be no shepherds, because the true definition of a shepherd agroeth not with them. 
Thilk same been shepherds for the devils stead,  
That playen whilst their flocks be unfead.   
Where after followeth a definition (a country definition) of an hireling, by application whereof unto them, he proveth them to be h●…relings.  

Well is it seen their sheep be not their own,  
That let them run at random alone:  
But they been hired, for little pay,  
Of others that caren as little as they,  
What fallen the flock, so they han the fleece,  
And get all the gain paying but a piece.   
Master Plowden Fol. 54. b. Car covin, solonque le vray definition de ceque est un secret assent, determine en les coeurs de deux ou plusors homes, all prejudice d'auter. Come si tenant pur vie voyle secretement conspirer oue un altar, que l'auter recouera en prejudice de cestuy en reversion. Car per ceo son reversion serra toll. Et ceo conspiracy est et poet estre term, et dit covin; car touts les parts del couyne sont la perimplies. Car la est unity de lour deux coeurs; et est secretement faith, et est en prejudice deal tierce person, et issint perfect covin sans mayheme ou blemish.  
Fol. 261. a. Et quant all quality del offence, quel le offendor icy ad faith, il dit, que est in degree del murder, et nemy de manslaughter. Car manslaughter est le occider del home fe●…niousement sans malice prepense. Mes murder est occider del home sur malice prepence. Et icy le occider de luymesme, fuit prepence et resolve en sa ment devant le act faith. Et auxi il agree in altar point oue l'auncient definition deal murder, que fuit tiel, Murdrum est occulta hominis occisio, nullo praelente, nullo sciente. Issint icy sir james Hales secreatement surround luymesme, ne auterment il serroit stay ou interrupt de ceo fair.  
Fol. 359. a. Le signior Dyer define claim en tiel manner; Claim est challenge per ascun home del propriety ou ownership deal chose que il ne ad en possession, mes que est deteigne de luy per tort.  

Annotations.  
DEfinition is not set among the last, as though it were one of the worst, but because it is made of those other going before, and therefore cannot be conceived without them.  
Here we teach what a definition is, and how to make it, therefore it cometh after the other arguments of which it is made: but in the tractate of Method, we show how and where to place a definition already made; and therefore according to her excellency, we allow her the first place.  
Divisio est quasi sectio rei in parts: Definitio contra, quasi collectio & comprehensio partium ad rem explicandam.  
Theloall hath taken some more pains in defining and dividing a writ, than either the author of the Register, of old Natura brevium, or Fitzherbert. Theloals definition is already put down elsewhere.  
Tenant in fee simple est celuy que ad terres ou tenements a tener a luy, et a ses heirs a touts iours. Littleton pag. 1. Disseisin est un tortuous ousting del francktenant per entrée nyent congeable. 62. a. Plowden.  
Nous voulons que prison soyt tenue place per nous bound dedeins certain bounds assigns pur le guard del corpse del home. Brytton, 17. appeal est pleynte de home fait sur altar, ovesque purpose de luy atteyndre de felony par mots a ceo ordeynes. Brytton, when he had thus defined matrimony, Fol. 246. Matrimony est assembly de home et de feme, a lour deux assents par jointure de saint eglise, pur demorer ensemble ausi come un chair a touts lour vies, sans espoyre de partir: afterwards, Fol. 252. he proveth that if a man have two wives, the second is not feme de iure by this definition, thus; et deux ne poyt ill my aver a une foits, sicome apiert per le definition de matrimony, ou est dit, que matrimony est assembly de home et de feme, et nemy de home et femes, ou feme et homes, mes singulerment feme et home. It is shame that Brytton were not newly printed, and pity that he and Bracton be no more read: for though the Law be much altered since their time, yet there is no essential part of the Law, which he and Bracton do not define, divide, and handle accordingly. So that by discretion a man shall by one chapter of Brytton more plainly perceive the nature of Garde, villain, etc. then by turning and tossing of forty uncoherent cases in yeare-bookes, which do not expound the nature of, Guard, villain, etc. but are spent in the determination of some obscure point touching Guard, villain, etc. and do presuppose a general notice of them, before we come to the examination of particular difficulties discussed in yéere-bookes. And indeed it seemeth a preposterous thing to jangle of moot conceits in essoin, Protection, etc. not knowing what an essoin is, what a Protection meaneth. But as in Universities, so in Inns of Court, the greedy desire of a superficial show in unnecessary trifles maketh us want the true substance: they for haste to get a prebend by a degree, make light work and run over two or three Epitomes; and we by a moot book and a Brooks abridgement climb to the bar, & bar ourselves utterly from the substance of the common Law. But omnis definitio in iure civili periculosa est, and so in the common Law. That's true, but M. Theloall, as also Freigius, who is of the same mind, mistook the word; for I think Ulpian, by this word, Definitio, meaned not the Logical definition which expoundeth the nature of a thing, but brevem & circumscriptam quandam juris sententiam, quam iurisconsulti regulam, Dialectici Thesin, seu positionem; Medici Aphorismum nominant. And yet, be it as it may be, I doubt not but who so attempteth to make Logical definitions in the Law, shall find it somewhat dangerous, because it is very difficult.  
Cambiparticipes sunt, qui per se vel per alios placita movent, vel movere faciunt, & ea suis sumptibus prosequuntur, ad cambipartem, vel pro part lucri habenda. Stat. an. 33. E 1.  
Toftum est ou meason ad este, et ore est nul mesuage, mes le site del meason apier●…. Curtilagium est un soil ou garden apperteignant a une mess, quasi curta pecia terrae. Fayrfax. 21. E. 4. 52.  
Glanuil. lib. 9 Fol. 7. Dicitur autem purprestura, vel porprestura propriè quando aliquid supra dominum regem iniustè occupatur, ut in dominicis regis, vel in vijs publicis obstructis, vel in aquis publicis transuersis a recto cursu, vel quando aliquis in civitate super regiam plateam aliquid aedificando occupaverit, etc.  
24. H. 7. 12. read. Misprision properment est lou un chose est agree destre vray, come nosme del ville ou del person, et puis en mesme cel plée, cel chose est autrement nosme, Come ou ieo sue nosme en formedome R. Read, a que ieo face defence, et en mon bar ieo moy entitle per le nosme del T. R. ceo serra amend, car serra intend que le clerk fuit ignorant que ceo escript issint. Mes si en brief verse moy per le nosme de R. ieo dy, vous aves cy le dit T. ceo nest misprision amendable.  
In stead of giving a true definition or explication of the nature & essence of any thing in our law, these singlesowld Lawyers and golden Asses answer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: put down a particular case, as if I should ask what is a man: A man, say they, is such a thing as Willy the milman: Robin the pannierman, etc. Where a general definition being put down, would give a special light to the matter in hand.  
Accurata definitione utendum est in artibus, & cum doctis hominibus: in vulgus autem, & imperitorum sensus, descriptiones aptiores sunt.  
Heriettum est quaedam praestatio, ubi tenens liber vel servus in morte sua dominum suum respicit de meliori averio suo, vel de secundo meliori: quae quidem praestatio magis degratia quam de iure fit. Fleta: lib. 4. cap. 3. Elis. 58. Dyer.  
Collegium est societas plurium corporum inter se distantium: & dicitur collegium propriè, cum simul habitant, quoniam simul colliguntur, & collegium constituitur in ecclesia vel per privilegium concessum a superiori post fundatam ecclesiam, vel si a principio fuit ordinatum, quod ecclesia esset collegiata, vel si longo tempore vixerint collegialiter & sunt in quasi possessione collegij. Item ecclesia potest fieri collegiata cum consensu episcopi & patroni. 9 & 10. Flis. 13. Dyer.  
If some of these examples by me collected seem rather good descriptions, then perfit definitions: thou that so thinkest, must think this also, that I could find no better.  
Therefore 
Si quid novisti rectius istis,  
Candidus imperti: si non, his utere mecum.   
A definition is called of the Grecians, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which is a translated word from bounds and limits of ground. For as they hedge in and include the ground: so doth a definition limit and circumscribe, or, as it were bind in the nature of that which is defined.  
And that also is the natural signification of this word which the Latinistes vs●…, finire, or definire: from whence come finitio, and definitio: Which we now use as an English word. Finis is an end, finire, and definire, signify to limit and end, or circumscribe one from an other, that so it may be known from other. The chief use then of a definition is, to show and make plain: yet an argument proving may be fet both from the definition to the thing defined, and from this to that, negatively, and affirmatively, and so it is in descriptions.  
[The difference:] This difference is sometimes fet from the very internal form and essential cause of the thing defined: which is best, but hard to be found: and therefore, instead thereof, sometimes the end is used, sometimes the proper adjunct, sometimes many adiunctes together, sometimes the subject.  
One Relative doth define an other.  
Canons.  
If the definition be, than the thing defined must be, and contrarily: but if not that, than neither this, and contrarily.  
To whatsoever, the definition either may or may not be applied, to the same also the thing defined either may, or may not be attributed, and contrarily.  
Whatsoever agreeth, or not agreeth with the definition, the same thing either will agree or not agree with the thing defined and contrarily.  
In genere asciscendo satis erit proximum ponere, neque altius a capite repetere. Nam qui proximum genus po●…suit, is etiam superiora omnia posuisse intelligitur. Quandoquidem (ait Aristoteles in topicis) in inferioribus ea quae suprà sunt intelliguntur.  
Hottoman.  
Master Lambert; just. lib. 1. ca 1. justices of the peace be justices of record appointed by the Queen to be justices within certain limits: for the conservation of the peace, and for the execution of sundry things comprehended in their commission, and in divers laws committed unto them.    

The 18. Chapter. Of a Description.  
AN imperfect definition or description, is that whose difference is fet elsewhere then from the formal cause, and it is sometimes brief, sometimes more largely amplified.  
Thenot in February describeth the oak, thus,  

There grew an aged tree on the green,  
A goodly oak sometime had it been,  
With arms full strong and largely displayed,  
But of their leaves they were disarayde:  
The body big, and mightily pight,  
thoroughly rooted and of wondrous height:  
Whilom had been the king of the field,  
And muchel mast to the husband did yield,  
And with his nuts larded many swine,  
But now the grey moss marred his ryne.  
His bared boughs were beat with storms,  
His top was bald and wasted with worms,  
His honour decayed, his branches sere, etc.   
In May Piers describeth the kid.  

She set her youngling before her knee  
That was both fresh and lovely to see,  
And full of favour as Kid mought be.  
His vellet head began to shoot out,  
And his wreathed horns began to sprout.  
The blossoms of lust to bud did begin,  
And spring forth rankly under his chin. etc.   
Where afterwards followeth the description of the counterfeit peddler, the fox, by adjuncts, effects, etc.  

It was not long after she was gone,  
But the false fox came to the door anon,  
Not as a Fox, for than he had be kend,  
But as a poor peddler he did wend,  
Bearing a truss of trifles at his back,  
As bells, and babes, and glasses in his pack,  
A biggen he had got about his brain,  
For in his headpiece he felt a sore pain.  
His hinder heel was wrapped in a clout,  
For with great cold he had got the gout.  
There at the door he cast me down his pack,  
And laid him down, and groaned, alack, alack.  
Ah dear Lord, and sweet saint charity,  
That some good body would once pity me. etc.   
Master Plowden Fol. 273. a. Terminus, si sit refer all temps, est le fine del ceo, come Weston dit: et poet estre refer all am, come le signior Dyer dit, come terminus loci; et adonques il est prise come precinct ou lymite del un am, come bound est inter terres de divers homes, et issint ad mesme le sentence, come certainty ad, soit il refer all temps, ou lieu: et terminus loci poot estre dit certainty en lieu: terminus temporis est certainty en temps.  
Fol. 88 a. Et moy semble que pretenced droyt ou title nest forsque en une case, et ceo est l'ou un est en possession de terres, ou tenements, et auter que est horse del possession, claim ceo ou sue pur ceo; ceo est pretenced droyt ou title.  
Fol. 368. b. Description de peace per Catlyn, et Fol. 195. a. Description deal fearme per Browne et Dyer etc. Ibidem,  
Le common ley, n'est que comen use.  

Annotations.  
AS brevity is commended in a perfect definition, so copious amplification is fittest for a description: yet so as swelling superfluity be always avoided.  
Descriptio is called of the Grecians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Some call it in Latin, Allusio: it hath of divers men, upon sundry occasions divers names. Sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were a certain delineation: if any person be described, they call it Prosopographia, if a place, Topographia, if a nation, Chorographia, if the earth Geographia, if the water, hydrographia, if the wind, Anemographia, if a tree, Dendographia, if the time, Chronographia, etc.  
Aristoteles a●…t, neque unam duarum rerum, neque unius rei duas definitiones esse posse. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Nam cum unius rei una natura sit, quae definitione explicatur, rectissimè à Galeno scriptum est, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Licet plures unius rei definitiones conficere vocibus tantum differentes, non rationibus.  
Quod Zeno de Dialectica & Rhetorica dixit, illam pugno, hanc palmae similem esse, idem de definitione dici & definito potest, idque multò magis accomodatè. Re namque sunt eadem, sed alterum evolutum, alterum involutum.  
M. Lambard. just. lib. 1. cap. 16. Budaeus in his Greek Commentaries is of the opinion, that the French word Arrest, which with them signifieth a decree or judgement of a court, took beginning of the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is Placitum, and, as we might say, the pleasure or will of a Court. And albeit that it were not out of our way, to think that it is called Arrest, because it stayeth, or resteth the party, yet I believe rather that we received the name from the Norman laws, because we use it in the same sense with them: for commonly with us, an Arrest is taken for the execution of the commandment of some Court, or of some officer in justice. But howsoever the name began, An arrest is a certain restraint of a man's person, depriving it of his own will and liberty, and binding it to become obedient to the will of the law; and it may be called the beginning of imprisonment. The precepts and writs of the high courts of law, do use to express it by two sundry words, as, Capias, and Attachias, which signify to take or catch hold of a man. But this our precept noteth it by the words duci facias, cause him to be conveyed etc. for that the officer hath after a sort, taken him before, in that he cometh to him, and requireth him to go to some justice of the peace.  
Ibidem. Surety of the peace is an acknowledging of a bond to the prince, taken by a competent judge of record for the keeping of the peace, and it is called surety of the word securitas, because the party that was in fear, is thereby the more quiet and secure.  
Idem. Lib. 1. cap. 13. The Latin men use, Recordor, when they will signify, to keep in mind, or to remember, in which sense the poet said: 
Si ritè audita recordor.   
And after the same sense also doth our law use it: For Records be nothing else but memorials or monuments of things done before judges that have credit in that behalf.  
One may affirm a thing, and another may deny it, but if a Record once say the word, no man shall be received to aver or speak against it. For otherwise there would never be any end of controversies.  
Stamford. lib. 2. cap. 38. Sanctuary est un am privilege per le prince, ou sovereign governor, pur le safeguard de vie de home qui est offender, et est foundue sur la ley de mercy, et sur le grand reverence, honour et devotion, que le prince add all lieu, deins quel il granta tyel privilege, etc. An issue is said to be status causae, it is called Issue, of an issue in some vessel, whence only the water is voided etc.  
Elenches of all definitions.  
First, if it want where it should be: Then if it be, but be false: or be obscure, as that of the snail, where the definition is more obscure than the thing defined, and that in Pac●…ius, Testudo est quadrupes tardigrada, agrestis, humilis, aspera, capite brevi, cervise anguina, aspectu t●…ci, cuiscerata inanima, cum animali sono.  
Arist. in 6. Top. compareth an obscure definition to the pictures of old bungling painters, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; which had the names of the things painted, put over the pictures, or else they would never have been taken to be the pictures of such things.  
Homo est animal bipes, implume, quod erectum ingreditur, qd. Plato. And the next day after comes me Diogenes with a cock plucked clean without feathers, and throwing him into Plato his school, said, Ecce hominem Platonicum, lo here is Plato's tall man, a twoo-footed creature, without feathers, going upright.  
Again, if it either want, or have too much.  
In an unperfect definition, the conversion and reciprocation of it with the thing so defined is not precisely to be exacted: but in the other, it is necessarily required, the want whereof is an infallible token of a sophistical definition.    

The 18. Chapter. Of the argument borrowed.  
SIth we have sufficiently discoursed of the nature of inherent arguments, it now remaineth to speak of the borrowed elsewhere, which is properly called a testimony or witness, and is only fit for proof or confirmation. First, a testimony is either a famous sentence, as proverbs, etc. or a law. A law is either natural, or written.  
Secondly a testimony is either simply propounded, as an edict, etc. or written before.  
Thirdly, a testimony is either with oath, or without oath. So much of the common affections of a testimony: the specials follow.  
A testimony is either of God, or of man. Of God either immediately, or by prophets, Angels, etc., of this kind be divinations, etc.  
That of man, argueth not of itself, but by the virtue of some inherent argument: and in exquisite searching out of the truth of any thing, is but of small force, but in civil affairs it much prevaileth, when the testimony of any man is believed, by reason of his virtue, wisdom, etc. which indeed be inherent arguments.  
In May, the Fox would prove himself kin to the Kid, because his grandsire told him so. 
And if that my Grandsire told me be true,  
Siker I am very sib to you.   
Morrell in july. 
Besides (as holy father's sayne) there is a hilly place,  
Where Titan riseth from the main, to ren his daily race.   
And Thomalyn in july useth a proverb to confute Morrell, the commender of hills. 
Ah, God shield man, that I should climb, and learn to look aloft,  
This reed is rife, that oftentime great clymbers fall unsoft.   
And again, 
To church the nar, from God more far, hath been an old said saw,  
And he that strives to touch a star, oft stumbles at a straw.   
Man's testimony is either of one man, or of many. That of one, is either obligation or confession. To obligation be referred pledges or sureties. So in August the two shepherds, Perigot and Willy, for want of better arguments to prove their skill in singing, lay down wagers, the one a cup, the other a spotted lamb. This is commonly called the fools argument.  

Willy.  

Then lo, Perigot, the pledge which I plight,  
A mazery wrought of the maple war,  
Wherein is enchased many a fair sight  
Of Bears and Tigers, that maken fierce war,  
And over them spread a goodly wild vine,  
Entrayled with a wanton ivy twine.   

Thereby is a lamb in the wolves jaws,  
But see how fast runneth the shepherds swain,  
To save the innocent from the beasts paws,  
And here with his sheephooj hath him slain.  
Tell me, such a cup hast thou ever seen?  
Well mought it beseem any harvest queen.    

Perigot.  
Thereto will I pawn yonder spotted lamb,  
Of all my flock there nis sick another,  
For I brought him up without the dam,  
But Colyn Clout raft me of his brother;  
That he purchased of me in the plain field.  
Sore against my will was I forced to yield.   
I remember Diggon in September sweareth by his soul, to give credit to his assertion, which I should have put before.  

They say they come to heaven the nigher way,  
But by my soul I dare undersay,  
They never set foot in that same trod,  
But baulk the right way and strayen abroad.   
Master Plowden Fol. 5. a. b. Et quant all distinction de Brytton parenter inheritance et purchase, sir ieo n'ay grand regard a ceo, car son lyeur conteigne mults errors.  
Mes le lyeur de Lyttleton, que est solonque le primer edition, en que les novels additions sont omise, que est le very et pluis sure register deal fundaments et principles de nostre ley, define, quod foedum simplex idem est quod haereditas legitima vel pura. Et issint il prist chescun fee simple deste inheritance. Et il dit que ceo parolle, inheritance, n'est solement intend lou home add terre per descent, mes auxi chescun fee simple, ou tail, que home ad per son purchase, est inheritance tamen vis verbi hoc non vult.  
Fol. 161. b. Et le cavillation oue les parols contrary all simple intent, come Tullius dit en son liver de officijs, est calumnia quaedam & nimis callida, sed malitiosa juris interpretatio, ex quo illud, summum ius, summa iniuria. Come il missed exemple de un que auoyt prise truce pur 130 iours one son enemy, et en le nuyet il destruist et depopulate ses possessions pur ceo, come il dit, le truce fuit pur iours, et nyent pur les nuyctes. Lequel Tullius account mere injury et injustice.  
Fol. 321. b. Et ialemeins fuit dit per Gerrard que en le liver appelle expositiones vocabulorum, que fuit mice en print 40 ans pass, il est declare que mynes de ore et argent en quecunque terres, que ils sont, afferont all roys deal ceo realm. Issint Wray dit, que Hesket apprentice que fuit bien apprise en le ley, en son lecture extant sur lestatute de charta forestae. affirmast, que si fueront mynes de ore et argent en terre del subjects deins le forest, que ceux afferont al roy. Issint il dit, que il auoyt vieu les leyes de s. Edward le Confessor, en queux fuit conteigne, quod Thesauri de terra pertinent domino regi. Et issint dit Barham del leys William conqueror, queux il anoyt view, queux avoyent semblables parols.  
The offering of trial and proof, belongeth to this place, as when a man seeing his words not believed, biddeth them try and then trust, as in Terence of the boy, fac periculum in literis, fac in musicis, fac in palestra: quae liberum scire aequum est, solertem dabo: try the boy in learning, try him in singing, try him in wrestling: I will undertake you shall find him sufficient in whatsoever belongeth to a free borne boy.  

Annotations.  
ADrianus rectè rescripsit, se testibus, non testimonijs crediturum, itaque testium dignitas consideranda est: neque enim quia affirmatum sit, aut negatum, ideo erit, aut non erit, Arist, de interpret: but because he that spoke it, was so honest and wise a man, as that he would not affirm an untruth. Arist. 20. Rhet.  
God is to be believed without exception, because God spoke it: but men are so much either more or less credited, by how much their behaviour & learning is more or less esteemed. Therefore the Pythagorians were very foolish in thinking their master Pythagoras so wise, as that it were a sufficient argument, the thing were so, because Pythagoras said it was so, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ipse dixit: ipse autem erat Pythagoras. Those men, saith Plato in Protagoras that use the authority of others instead of arguments of their own, are like to seely souls of the country, when they keep their wakes: quum enim propter inscitiam nequeant invicem propria voce suisque sermonibus ipsi colloqui, mercede exhibita tibicines introducunt, ut aliena voce, id est tibiarum flatu, conuivium transigant. Vbi autem boni, praeclarique & eruditi viri conveniunt, neque tibicines, neque saltatrices, neque cantatrices ullas videas, sed voce propria, remotis ijs nugis iocisque conuivium celebrare & alternis interrogationibus responsionibusque modestè disserere, etiamsi vinum abunde bibant. And in Gorgias he saith truly, that in these borrowed testimonies there is no reason or persuasion, but rather violence and compulsion. Therefore, in Charmide, he biddeth us consider, not who speaketh, but how true that is which is spoken. So said Aristotle of his own master Plato, Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, magis amica veritas. I love Socrates and Plato well, but I like the truth better. So in 5. E. 4. 112. est dit, que precedents et course ne rule le ley, mes le ley rulera cux. Et pur ceo la fuit dit, que un vtlagary fuit reuers, quia il fuit ad Com. Lancaster ibidem tent. et ne dit apud Lancaster, ou tiel am certain, a que le ibidem poet estre refer, nient obstant que fueront 100 precedent de cel return. Donque à fortiori, d'un precedent, quia una hirundo non facit ver. 1. & 2. M. 14. Dyer.  
Canons.  
Here, they are usually wont to say, unicuique in sua arte perito, credendum est. Every man is to be believed in that art which he professeth, and wherein he hath skill and experience.  
The Rhetoricians dispute with, and against extort testimonies, as present occasion is ever offered unto them.  
In our law, twelve be chosen and sworn; their verdict is quasi verèdictum. The suspected men may be ousted by challenge. Hereupon we have challenge peremptory, challenge per cause, etc.  
Master Lambard just. But especially there ought to appear such jurors, as be returned by the sheriff, and warned by his bailiff, whether it be for inquiry or trial: and in this behalf, both the commission, the common form of the precept, and the Law itself (11. H. 4. cap. 9) willeth that they should be probi & legales homines. For if any of them be discredited in Law, as by attainder in conspiracy, attaint, Decies tantùm, subornation of perjury, or such like, they be not probi, and their presentment is void by it, unless there be 12. besides them, that are not so blemished. Again, if they be outlawed, abjured, condemned in a Praemunire, or attainted of treason, felony, or such like, then be they not legales, and their presentment is merely void also, as it may be gathered upon the case. 11. H. 4. 41.  
And women, infants under fourteen years of age, aliens, and such as be within orders of the ministry of the clergy, cannot be impanelled amongst others. Generally also, these jurors ought either to be inhabiting within the shire, or else to have lands there: for, the commission willeth, that they should be such per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit: which must needs be understood of such, as have cause to know the country: and the precept is usually according to the same form. But especially in the county Palatine of Lancaster, each juror ought to have to the yearly value of five pounds by order of the statute. 33. H. 6. ca 2. Now by 27. Elis. every juror must have iiij. pound by the year.  
But these men be not truly jurors, till they be sworn, as their name pretendeth, and otherwise their presentment is utterly void.  
Each jury of inquiry ought to contain twelve in number at the least, & if there be 18. or more, it shall not be amiss. Yea the common order with us is, to have them of an odd number, as 17. 19 or 21. to the end (as it seemeth) that if they should dissent in opinion somewhat equally, yet there should be always one, to weigh downe the side, and cast the balance: but if 12. of them do agree, the gaynesaying of the residue cannot hinder the presentment. Les jurors tryeront le faith, et nemy le ley, quia sont ignorants: mes les judges le ley, itaque travers est prise sur le matter in fayt et non sur le matter en ley. Vide Plowden. Fol. 231.  
Fortescue, Lord Chancellor, in Henry the sixth his time, preferreth this order of trial before that used in the Civil Law. His comparison is to this effect.  
Si coram judice contendentes, ad litis perveniant contestationem super materia facti (quam legis Angliae periti exitum placiti appellant) exitus huiusmodi veritas per leges civiles, per testium depositionem probari debet, in qua duo testes idonei sufficiunt. Sed per leges Angliae veritas illa non nisi duodecim hominum de vicineto ubi factum huiusmodi supponitur sacramento, judici constare poterit: and afterward.  
Per leges civiles pars quae in litis contestatione affirmativam dicit, testes producere debet, quos ipsemet ad libitum suum nominabit. Negativa autem probari non potest, videlicet directè: licet possit per obliquum. Ex illis quippè creditur esse potentiae, minoris quoque industriae, qui de omnibus quos noscit hominibus, duos reperire nequit ita conscientia & veritate vacuos, ut timore, amore, vel commodo, omni velint contrair veritati. Hos potest tunc ipse in testimonium producere in causa sua; & si contra eos pars altera dicere velit, vel contra eorum dicta, non semper continget eos, eorum quoque mores aut facta apud contradicere volentem agnosci, ut ex eorum foeditate & vitijs testes illi possint reprobari. Et dum eorum dicta affirmativam contineant, non facilè poterunt illa per circumstantias aut obliqua alia improbari. Quis tunc poterit suorum aut suijpsius sub lege tali vivere securus, dum cuilibet sibi inimicari volenti lex tale praestat subsidium? Et qui iniqui duo tam incauti sunt, quod facti de quo ipsi examinabuntur in judicio, non, antequam in testes producantùr, occulté fingant imaginem & figuram; componant quoque eidem omnes circumstantias, quales sibi affuissent, si illud in veritate constitisset? Prudentiores namque, ut dicit Dominus, sunt filii huius mundi, quam filii lucis. Sic Iesabel sceleratissima, testes duos filios Belial, contra Nabot in judicio produxit, quo ipse vitam perdidit; & Achab rex, eius vineam possidebat. Sic duorum senum etiam judicum testimonio, mortua fuisset pro adulterio uxor castissima Susanna, si non eam miraculosè liberasset Dominus inexcogitabili prudentia, quam à natura non habuit puer junior nondum aetate provectus. Et si ipsos depositione sua varia convicerat puer ille esse falsarios, quis nisi solùm Dominus novisse poterat eos in dictis suis taliter variaturos? dum non de arboris natura sub qua imputatum facinus fiebat, lex aliqua eos arctabat reminisci, quia testes sceleris cuiusque considerare non putantur omnia umbracula & caetera vicina illi facto, quae ad aggravationem vel detectionem criminis illius minimè operantur. Sed dum de arborum speciebus, judices illi nequam ultrò deponentes variabant, eorum dicta ipsos veritatis fuisse praevaricatores demonstrabant, quò & talionis poenam meritò incurrerunt. And so forth in the example of one john Fringe, that at his death protested he was not guilty of the fault, whereof two men accused him. Et alibi. Non igitur contenta est lex Franciae, in criminalibus ubi mors imminet, reum testibus convincere, ne falsidicorum testimonio sanguis innocens condemnetur. Sed mawlt lex illa reos tales torturis cruciari, quoúsque ipsi eorum reatum confiteantur, quam testium depositione, qui seepè passionibus iniquis, & quandóque subornatione malorum ad periuria stimulantur. Quali cautione & astutia, criminsi etiam & de criminibus suspecti tot torturarum in regno illo generibus affliguntur, quod fastidit calamus ea literis designare. Quidam vero in equuleis extenduntur, quo eorum rumpuntur nerui, & venae in sanguinis fluenta prorumpunt. Quorundam verò dinersorum ponderum pendulis dissoluuntur compagines & iuncturae: & quorundam gaggantur ora, usque dum per illa tot aquarum infundantur fluenta, ut ipsorum venter montis tumescat more, quo tunc venter ille fossorio vel simili percussus instrumento, per os aquam illam evomat ad instar balaenae quae cum halecibus & alijs pisciculis mare absorbuit, aquam despumat, ad altitudinem arboris pini. Piget, proh pudor, iam penna exquisitorum ad haec cruciatuum enarrare immania. Nam eorum variatus numerus vix notari poterit magna in membrana, Leges etiam ipsae civiles deficiente testium copia, in criminalibus, veritatem consimilibus extorquent tormentis, qualiter & faciunt etiam quamplurima regna. Sed quis tam duri animi est, qui semel ab atroci tanto torculari laxatus, non potius innocens ille omnia fateretur scelerum genera, quam acerbitatem sic experti iterum subire tormenti; & non semel mori mallet, dum mors sit ultimum terribilium, quàm totiens occidi, & totidem gehennales furias morte amariores sustmere? Then followeth an example of one that by torture confessed things untrue etc. Taliter, proh dolor, & quamplures alij miseri faciunt, non veritatis causa, sed solum urgentibus torturis artati. Qúid tunc certitudinis resultat ex confessionibus taliter compressorum?  
Caeterum, si innocens aliquis non immemor salutis aeternae in huiusmodi Babylonis furnace, cum tribus pueris benedicat Dominum, nec mentiri velit in perniciem animi sui, quo judex eum pronunciat innocentem, nonne eodem judicio judex ille, seipsum reum judicat omnis sevitiae & poenarum quibus innocentem aff●…ixit? ô quàm crudelis est lex talis, quae duni innocentem damnare nequit, judicem ipsum condemnat?  
Et alibi. Praeterea si ex contractibus illatisuè iniurijs, vel haereditatis titulo, ius accreverit homini, agendi in judicio, si testes non fuerint, vel si qui fuerint, moriantur, succumbet ipse agens in causa sua, nisi ius suum probare valeat iveuitabilibus coniecturis, quod facere crebrò non contingit. Quare de dominijs & alijs possessionibus iure civili regulatis similiter & in omnibus actionibus cadentibus sub eodem iure, actiones agentium pro defectu testium quampluries suffocantur, ita quod earum vix pars media optatum finem sortiatur, etc. The order of our common law followeth.  
Regnum Angliae per comitatus, ut regnum Franciae per Ballivatus distinguitur, ita ut non sit locus in Anglia, qui non sit infra corpus alicuius comitatus. Comitatus quoque dividuntur in Hundreda, quae alicubi Wapentakia nuncupantur. Hundreda verò dividuntur per villas, sub quarum appellatione continentur & burgi atque civitates. Villarum etenim metae non muris, aedificijs aut stratis terminantur, sed agrorum ambitibus, territorijs magnis, hamletis quibusdam, & multis alijs, sicut aquarum, boscorum, & vastorum terminis, quae iam non expedit nominibus designare, quia vix in Anglia est locus aliquis qui non infrà villarum ambitus contineatur, licèt privilegiati loci quidam infrà villas, de eisdem villis pars esse non censentur. Praetereà in quolibet comitatu est officiarius quidam unus regis vicecomes appellatus, qui inter caetera sui officij ministeria, omnia mandata & judicia curiarum regis in comitatu suo exequenda exequitur. Cuius officium annale est, quo ei post annum in eodem ministrare non licet, nec duobus tunc sequentibus annis ad idem officium reassumetur. Officiarius iste sic eligitur. Quolibet anno in crastino animarum, conveniunt in Scaccario regis omnes consiliarij eius, tam domini spirituales & temporales, quàm alii omnes iusticiarii, omnes barones de Scaccario, clericus rotulorum, & quidam alii officiarii, ubi hi omnes communi assensu nominant de quolibet comitatu tres milites vel armigeros, quos inter caeteros eiusdem comitatus, ipsi opinantur melioris esse dispositionis & famae, & ad officium vicecomitis comitatus illius melius dispositos: ex quibus rex unum tantum eliget, quem per literas suas patentes constituet vicecomitem comitatus de quo eligitur, pro anno tunc sequent. Sed ipse antequam literas illas recipiat, iurabit super sancta Dei evangelia, inter articulos alios quod benè, fideliter & indifferenter exercebit & faciet officium suum toto anno illo, neque aliquid accipiet colore aut causa officij sui ab aliquo alio quàm à rege. His iam sic praesuppositis, ad eorum quae quaerimus, indaginem procedamus.  
Quotiescunque contendentes in curijs regis Angliae ad exitum placiti super materia facti devenerint, concitò, justitiarij per breve regis scribunt vicecomiti comitatus in quo factum illud fieri supponitur, quod ipse venire faciat coram eisdem justitiarijs ad certum diem per eos limitatum, duodecim probos & legales homines, de vicineto, ubi illud factum supponitur, qui neutrum partium sic placitantium ulla affinitate attingunt, ad recognoscendum super eorum sacramenta, si factum illud factum fuerit, sicut una earundem partium dicit, vel non, sicut altera pars negat. Quo adveniente die, vicecomes returnabit breve praedictum coram eisdem justitiarijs una cum panello nominum corum quos ipse ad hoc summonivit, quos, si venerint, utraque pars recusare poterit, dicendo quod vicecomes panellum illud favorabiliter fecit pro part altera, viz. de personis nimis indifferentibus. Quae exceptio, si comperta fuerit vera per sacramentum duorum hominum de eodem panello ad hoc per justitiarios electorum, mox panellum illud quassabitur, & justiriarij tunc scribent coronatoribus eiusdem comitatus, quod ipsi nowm faciant panellum. Quod cùm fecerint, si & illud consimiliter repertum fuerit viciatum, etiam & illud quassabitur: & tunc iustitiarij eligent duos de clericis curiae illius, vel alios de eodem comitatu qui in praesentia curiae per eorum sacramenta facient indifferens panellum, quod deinde per nullam partium illarum calumniabitur. Sed cùm venerint sic impanellati in curiam, quaelibet partium excipere potest contra personam cuiuscunque corum, sicut & potest in omni casu & omni tempore, quo aliquis qualitercunque impanellatus comparuerit in curia super veritate exitus huiusmodi iuraturus: dicendo, quod impanellatus ille est consanguin eus vel affinis parti alteri, vel amicitia quacunque tali sibi coniunctus, quod indifferens ipse non est ostendere inter eos veritatem: qualium exceptionum tot sunt genera & species, quod non licet eas brevi explicare sermone: quarum si aliqua reperta fuerit vera, non tunc iurabitur ille contra qùem exceptio illa proponitur, sed cancellabitur nomen eius in panello. Sic quoque fiet de omnibus nominibus impanellatorum, quousque duodecim eorum iurentur ita indifferentes, quod versus eos neutra partium habeat aliquam materiam calumniae. Horum autem duodecim ad minus quatuor erunt de hundredo ubi villa in qua factum de quo contenditur, fieri supponitur, sita est. Et quilibet iuratorum huiusmodi habebit terras vel reditus pro termino vitae suae ad minùs, ad valorem annuum 40. s. (now 4. li. by stat. 27. Eli.) Et hic ordo obseruatur in omnibus actionibus & causis criminalibus, realibus & personalibus, praeterquam ubi damna vel debitum in personalibus non excedunt 40. marcas monetae anglieanae quia tunc non requiritur, quod iuratores in actionibus huiusmodi tantum expendere possint. Habebunt tamen terram vel reditum ad valorem competentem juxta discretionem iustitiariorum, alioquin ipsi minime iurabuntur, ne per inediam & paupertatem iuratores huiusmodi de facili valeant corrumpi & subornari.  
Et si per tales exceptiones, tot iuratorum nomina in panello cancellentur, quod non remaneat numerus sufficiens ad faciendam inde iuratam, tunc mandabitur vicecomiti, per breve regis, quod ipse apponat plures iuratores: quod & saepius fieri potest, ita quod inquisitio veritatis super exitu placiti, non remanebit ob defectum iuratorum etc.  
juratis demùm in forma praedicta duodecim probis & legalibus hominibus habentibus ultra mobilia sua, possessiones, ut praedicitur sufficientes, unde eorum statum ipsi continere poterint, & nulli partium suspectis nec invisis, sed ijsdem vicinis, legetur in Anglico coram eye per curiam totum recordum & processus placiti quod pendet inter partes: ac dilucidè exponetur eis exitus placiti de cuius veritate iurati illi curiam certificabunt. Quibus peractis, utráque partium per se vel consiliarios suos in praesentia curiae referet & manifestabit eisdem iuratis, omnes & singulas materias & evidentias quibus eos docere se posse credit veritatem exitus taliter placitati. Et tunc adducere potest utraque pars coram eisdem iustitiarijs & iuratis omnes & singulos testes quos pro part sua ipsa producere velit, qui super sancta Dei evangelia per iusticiaros onerati, testificabuntur omnia quae cognoscunt probantia veritatem facti de quo partes contendunt. Et si necessitas exegerit dividentur testes huiusmodi, donec ipsi deposuerint quicquid velint, ita quod dictum unius non docebit, aut concitabit eorum alium ad consuniliter testificandum. Quibus consummatis, postquàm iuratores illi deinde ad eorum libitum super veritate exitus huiusmodi, deliberatione quantam ipsi opta bunt, colloquium habuerint, in custodia ministrorum curiae in loco eye ad hoc assignato, ne interim eos aliqui subornare valeant, revenient illi in curiam, & certificabunt iustitiarios super veritate exitus sic iuncti, in praesentia partium, si interesse velint, & maximè, petentis. Quorum iuratorum dictum per leges Angliae, Veredictum nuncupatur; & tunc secundum huiusmodi veredicti qualitatem, iustitiarij reddent & formabunt judicium suum. Tamen, si pars altera, contra quam veredictum huiusmodi prolatum est●…, conqueratur se per illud iniustè esse gravatum, prosequi tunc potest pars illa versus iuratores illos, & versus partem quae obtinuit, breve de attincta. Virtute cuius, si compertum fuerit per sacramentum viginti quatuor hominum in forma praenotata retornatorum, qui multo maiora habebunt patrimonia quàm iuratores primi, quod ijdem iuratores primi falsum fecerunt sacramentum, corpora eorundem primorum iuratorum prisonae regis committentur▪ bona eorum confiscabuntur, ac omnes possessiones eorundem in manus regis capientur; domus quoque eorum & aedificia prosternentur, bosci succidentur, & prata arabuntur, ipsi etiam iuratores primi extunc infames erunt, nec alicubi recipientur in testimonium veritatis, & pars quae succubuit in priori placito, restituetur ad omnia quae ipse perdidit occasione eius. Quis tunc, etsi immemor salutis animae suae fuerit, non formidine tantae poenae, & verecundia tantae infamiae, veritatem non diceret sic iuratus? Et si unus forsan tantus sui honoris prodigus esse non pepercerit, aliqui tamen iuratorum tantorum famam suam non negligent, neque bona & possessiones suas taliter distrahi patientur propria culpa sua. Nonne iam hic ordo revelandi veritatem potior & efficacior est, quàm est processus qualem pariunt civiles leges? Non hîc pereunt caviae aut ius alicuius per mortem, aut ob defectum testium, non hîc producuntur testes ignoti, conductitij, pauperes, vagi, inconstantes, aut quorum conditiones vel malitiae ignorantur. Vicini sunt testes isti de proprijs vivere potentes, famae integrae, & opinionis illesae, non per partem in curiam ducti, sed per officiarium nobilem & indifferentem electi, & coram judice venire compulsi. Isti omnia sc unt quae testes deponere norunt, & isti testium productorum agnoscunt constantias inconstantiasque & famam. Quid ultra? Verè nihil est quod veritatem dubij de quo contendi poterit, detegere valebit, quod iviatoribus talibus latere quomodolibet potest aut ignorari, dummodo possibile sit, illud venire posse in cognitionem humanam.  
And then after, de causis criminalibus. Si reus quispiam de felonia aut proditione in Anglia rettatus, crimen suum coram judicibus dedicat, mox vicecomes comitatus ubi facinus illud commissum est, venire faciet coram eisdem judicibus viginti quatuor probos & legales homines de vicineto villae ubi illud factum est, qui rettato illi nulla affinitate attingunt, & quorum quilibet centum solidatus habeat terrae & reditus, ad certificandum judices illos super criminis illius veritate. Quibus comparentibus, rettatus ille eos calumniare potest eadem forma qua in actionibus realibus fieri debere superius deseribitur. Et insuper reus ipse, in favorem vitae suae calumniare potuit olim trigintaquinque homines quos ipse maximè formidat, qui ad eius calumniam cancellabuntur in panello, aut signis talibus notabuntur, quod (ut verbis legis utar) illi super eum non transibunt, licet ipse nullam causam assignare sciat exceptionis seu calumniae suae. Quis tunc mori possit iniquè in Anglia pro crimine, cùm tot iwamina habere ille poterit ob favorem vitae suae? Et non nisi vicini eius, probi & fideles homines, versus quos ipse nullam habet materiam exceptionis eum condemnare poterunt? Mallem revera viginti facinorosos mortem pietate evadere, quàm justum unum in iusté condemnari.  
Nec tamen reum quemplam sub hac sorma, reatus sui poenam evadere posse suspicandum est, dum eius vita & mores timori deinceps erunt eis qui eum sic purgatunt à crimine.  
In hoc equidem processu nihil estcrudele, nihil inhumanum, nec laedi poterit innocens in corpore aut membris suis, quarè nec formidabit ille calumniam inimicorum eius, quia non torquebitur iste ad arbitrium ipsorum. Igitur sub hac lege vivere, quietum & securum est etc.  
Somuch I thought good to borrow of Fortescue, concerning witnesses and testimonies, tortures, rackings, and such other grievous & extort confessions used, as he saith in France and elsewhere. The rudeness of the time wherein he wrote, must excuse the manner of his writing, which is not over elegant.  
Read the statutes made, 17. E. 2. and there see the oath of a villeine doing fealty unto his Lord: from whence Littleton, hath fet the precscript forms of oaths to be used of fréemen in doing homage, and fealty to their Lords, partition, 91. 85. 86. 87. 88 89.  
Of the writing, ensealing, and delivering of deeds and evidences, Parkins hath a special tractate cap. 20. Where the misdating, rasing, interlyning, adding new letters upon the old, hanging in the smoke, breaking of the seal, utter quashing of the print, heating of the wax and fastening thereof to the Label from whence it was once severed, with other such imperfections, make the deed suspcious.  
Of the ancient manner of sealing with crosses and such marks, of Edward the thirds fashion in biting the wax with his tooth, read the exposition of our Lawtearmes.  
Elenchs.  
A false testimony is descried by the wickedness, and malicious nature of him that gave witness. The world is full of false forsworn knaves, desperate careaways, and rascallike shwashbucklers, that borrow citizens gowns to sell hired oaths, to the utter subversion of justice, and undoing of well-meaning neighbours. So that no one thing is more common than that damnable speech, juravi lingua, mentem iniuratam gero, and jura, periura, secretum prodere noli.    

The 20. Chapter. Of compared arguments.  
HItherto then of the first division of arguments. Now secondly, an argument is either simple, or compared. Simple is that which is simply considered without any respect of comparison. Compared is that which is compared with another. Compared arguments are sometimes briefly expressed by plain and evident signs, and sometimes largely distinguished by two parts, whereof the first is called the proposition, which propoundeth and putteth down the first part of the comparison in the first place: the second is the Reddition, which addeth the second part, and applieth it unto the first.  
Comparison is either in quality, or quantity. Quality is that whereby things compared are called either like, or unlike.  
Like are those which have the self same quality: this likeness is called Proportion, and the things like proportionable. The signs be these, like as, even as, so, and a denial of the unlike.  
Diggon in September. 
They looken big, as Bulls that been bate,  
And bearen the nag so stiff and so state,  
As Cock on his dunghill crowing crank.   
Again  

Well away the while I was so fond,  
To leave the good that I had in hand.  
In hope of better that was uncouth,  
So lost the dog the flesh in his mouth:   
And below. 
Thus chatten the people in their steds,  
Ylike as a monster of many heads:   
The gate of her kiddy in May: 
For even so thy father his head upheld,  
And so his haughty horns did he weld.   
Piers in May.  

Sike mens folly I cannot compare▪  
Better than to the apes foolish care,  
That is so enamoured of her young one,  
And yet, God wots, such cause hath she none:  
That with her hard hold and strait embracing,  
She stoppeth the breath of her youngling.   
Sometimes there be no notes at all, as, Thenot in February.  

For youth is a bubble blown up with breath,  
Whose wit is weakness, whose wage is death,  
Whose way is wilderness, whose Inn penance,  
And stoope-gallant age the host of grievance.   
The parts of a similitude are sometimes more largely put down, and that by three parts and déegrées of comparison, or else by four. The first is called a continued similitude, the second a distinct and severed similitude: For the first, Cuddy in February hath this:  

The keen could blows through my beaten hide,  
All as I were through the body gryde:  
My ragged rontes all shiver and shake,  
As done high towers in an earthquake.   
Where one part must be twice repeated to couple and continue the similitude, thus, As towers shake in an earthquake, so my ronts shake, where this word, shake, is twice mentioned.  
Colyn in january useth a distinct similitude with four terms.  

You naked trees, whose shady leaves are lost,  
Wherein the birds were wont to build their bower  
And now are clothed with moss and hoary frost,  
Instead of blossoms wherewith your buds did flower:  
I see your tears that from your bows do rain,  
Whose drops in dreary Icicles remain.  
Also my lustful leaf is dry and sear,  
My timely buds with wailing all are wasted.  
The blossom which my branch of youth did bear,  
With breathed sighs is blown away and blasted.  
And from mine eyes the drizzling tears descend  
As on your boughs the Icicles depend.   
Feigned similitudes have like force with others: and here in these similitudes thus largely put down, Esopicall fables have very good grace. So Menenius Agrippa using the tale of the rebellion between the belly and other parts of the body: and comparing that with the rebellion between the common people and senators of Room, persuaded those that were fled to the holy hill, quickly to return home to Room, and become conformable citizens.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 31. b. Semblable reason semblable ley.  
Fol. 369. b. Et Catlyne resemble le fine per ceo act, all janus, quel, il dit, fuit Noah: mes les Romaines sur occasion luy nosme janus, et use de picter luy oue deux faces, un aspectant arere, s. backward, en respect que il avoit view le former monde que fuit peri per le inundation, et altar, aspectant avant, s. forward, in respect que il commence novel monde commenceant de le inundation et procedant dillonques en evant. Et pur ceo ils luy appelle janus Bifrons et auxi portant clyffe en sa main, signifiant per ceo clyffe son poyar per son generation de renouater le novel monde. Issint ceo act fait un inundation, per quel tout former droit devant le fine serra merge per non claim, car non claim est le flud et le fine produce novel generation, quel est le novel droyt. Car le fine fait novel droit, et est le commencement de novel monde, quel proceed del temps del fine en avant.  
Fol. 272. Et il dit que il y ad diversity enter lease conditional, et condition, d'auer lease. Car lease conditional est bone tanques le condition est enfreint, et la le lease va devant, et le condition vyent apres. Mes en condition d'auer lease, le condition va devant, et le lease vient apres, et le lease ne serra unques adjudge destre lease, tanque le condition soit primes perform. Come si ieo grant a vous que si vous faces tiel chose, vous averes lease en tiel mon terre, la, il dit, le condition precede le lease, come le needle precede le file, et sicome le needle trey le file puis luy, issint fait le condition le lease la.  
Fol. 465. a. De cest judgement, et le cause boys veyer, (lecteur) que les parolles del ley, ne sont le ley, mes le internal sense. Et nostre ley, come touts autres leyes, ad deux parts, cestassavoir, carnem & animam. Le letter de le ley est le chair de le ley, et le sense et reason del lay, est le alme de le ley, quià ratio legis est anima legis. Et le ley poet estre resemble a un noix, que ad un test, et un cerneau deins. Le letter represent le test, et le sense le cerneau; et sicome ne serres le meliour pur le noix si arrestes sur le test, nyent pluis serres pur le ley, si arrestes sur le letter. Et sicome le fruit et profit est en le cerneau, et nient en le test, issint le fruit et profit de ley est en le sense pluis toft que en le letter, et sovent foits quant vous saches le letter, vous ne saches le sense. Car ascun foits le sense ne serracy large come le letter est, et ascun foits le sense serra pluis large que le letter: et equity, que en Lattin est appelle, aequitas, amplify, ou demenuist le letter, come sa direction veult.  
Fol. 486. a. Car soyt le atteinder per statute, ou per comen ley, le forfeiture all roy ensue, come le umbre ensue le corpse, come Dyer le term.  
Fol. 529. b. Et il dit, sicome femme que ad recover dower, ne poet entrer, mes doit aver seisin deliver a luy per le viscount. Et sicome un copyholder, a que un copyhold tenement est descend, doit este admit per le seigniour avant que il avera seisin in judgement del ley. Issint cesty que est admit, ou institute all prebend, parsonage, ou vicarage, ne poet aver seisin, ne est plain incumbent, tanque le archdeacon ad luy induct, ou, si soit prebendary, devant que le Deane et le chapter del Cathedral eglise lou sa prebend est, ont luy enstalle.  

Annotations.  
Feigned similitudes be very populare and plausible, and have in them this one good thing, that where as it is sometimes hard to find out true similitudes, it is an easy matter, to fayne some odd parable. But like examples of things done in deed be best. Aristo. 2. Rhet. hath that of the bridled horse, and hungry flies.  
Bracton: descent dit ius quasi ponderosum quid, cadens deo●…sum recta linea, vel transuersali, & nunquam reascendit ea via qua descendit post mortem ante cessorum: à latere tamen ascendit alicui propter defectum haeredum inferius provenientium. Master Lambard just. lib. 2. cap. 1. As a man that hath received hurt in his body by a stroke whereof he bleedeth freshly, will be content for the present to admit the help of any leech or surgeon coming next to hand, for the staunching of the blood and binding up of the wound, and yet would more gladly have used the conference of divers expert surgeons for doing the same if the danger of the hurt would have granted the time, that will be lost in calling them together: so also, the common counsel of this realm, finding that the body thereof may be deeeply wounded in some one member, and perceiving that some evils must be resisted at the very first (lest otherwise they grow past help and wax incurable) hath many times thought it good to commit to one or to a few justices of the peace (for that they be ready and at hand) the stopping of the blood, as it were, and first dressing of the wound by repressing of force and other outrages that do suddenly arise: and hath yet nevertheless, when as the time and matter will permit, politicly established an assembly and conference of all the justices, at certain times in a full court and open session.  
When it appeareth that the things which we compare together, be like, because that thing wherein they be compared, may be applied to them both; then we look whether it be applied to them in equal proportion and quantity, or unequal: if in equal, than they be pares, equal: if in unequal, then impares, of the which the one is the more, the other is the less, which is the comparison of quantity: therefore I have put quality before quantity. For it were absurd to ask whether Higs of Balkot, or Shepherd of Tugford, were the falser knave, unless it were first granted that they were both false knaves.  
Affectio similium inter se, (ut caeterorum argumentorum) est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Inuerse & alterne. Inuerse quando invertitur ordo propositionis & redditionis tantum, aut etiam terminorum. Itaque si quaedam similia fuerint, inversè similia erunt, ut aurum ad ignem, sic fides ad periculum, ergo ut fides ad periculum, sic aurum ad ignem, Item ergò, ut periculum, ad fidem, sic ignis ad aurum. Alternè, quando similitudinis antecedens antecedenti, & consequens consequenti comparatur: si quaedam fimilia fuerint, alternè similia erunt, ut aurum ad ignem, sic fides ad periculum, ergò, ut aurum ad fidem, sic ignis ad periculum.  
I have made a second general division of arguments, into simple, and compared, as perceiving the nature of comparison to be incident to every argument that is not simple.  
Canons.  
One like argueth an other: as this is in respect of that, so the other in respect of the other: As this is in that, so an other in another.  
Of likes there is like reason. Likes agrre to like.  
Vbi eadem ratio, ibi idem ius. 19 H. 6. 18. b. Newton & Littleton, que sont en semblable reason, sont en semblable ley. pag. 301.  
Vide 9 H. 6. 24. b. Bab. Home poet deviser que sa terre serra vendue per les executors, et issint home avera francktenement de cestuy que ne avera riens, come home avera fire dun flint, et uncore null fire est in le flint. Sic in 19 H. 6. 24. Mark: Executors poyent donor chose que ils n'avoyent, come vn whetstone, que done sharpness a un cuttell, et uncore null est en luy.  
Si cui simpliciter via per fundum cuiuspiam concedatur vel relinquatur, quà primum viam direxerit, ea demum ire, agere debet, nec amplius mutandae eius potestatem habet, argumento rivi, quem primò qualibet ducere licet, posteaquam ductus est, transfer non licet.  
Elenches.  
As a new coat is better than an old: so new friendship, and new wine; these be not like.    

The 21. Chapter. Of the unlike.  
THe unlike is that whose quality is unlike. The notes are these, unlike, differing, otherwise, and the denial of the like.  
Thomalin in july. 
But nothing such thilk shepherd was, whom Ida hill did bear:  
That left his flock to fetch a lass, whose love he bought too dear.   
The notes be oftentimes omitted, and the dissimilitude more fully enlarged.  
Colyn in june.  

O happy Hobbinoll, I bless thy state,  
That Paradise hast found which Adam lost,  
Here wander may thy flock early or late:  
Withouten dread of wolves to been ytossed,  
Thy lovely lays hear mayst thou freely boast:  
But I unhappy man whom cruel fate  
And angry Gods pursue from coast to coast,  
Can nowhere find to shroud my luckless pate.   
Master Plowden Fol. 76. b. Et quant a ceo que est dit, que en le brief de droyt, quandò capitalis dominus remisit curiam, que l'assent del signior est primes conus, et issint en le Recordare, le clause est, si causa sit vera, aliter non: sir, ceo est bon reason, et nyent semblable a nostre case. Car la, est parcel del inheritance del seigniour d'auer le plée tenus en son court, et d'auer les profits et casualties veignant per ceo, lequel n'est reason a toller de luy sans cause. Mes en nostre case le viscount n'est forsques minister all roy per luy appoint, et n'ad ascun profit, mes solement allowance pur son labour, s. les fees usual pur le execution deal briefs: et si altar serve les briefs, le viscount ne perde riens, car il ne prist ascun labour. Et issint si le roy change son officer, n'est ascun tort faith all officer, et issint il ne poet este semble a les auters cases. So much of Quality.  

Annotations.  
DIssimilitudinis explicatae redditio, hîc appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dissimilis redditio.  
Ramus.  
The difference between arguments unlike and arguments divers, is, that in divers, the simple and absolute disagreeing of two things is considered: but in unlike arguments, the unlike comparison of four terms, that is of two things, and the two qualities of the same. In divers we affirm the one, and deny the other after a certain manner; in unlykes we deny neither, but only distinguish the one from the other by the difference in quality. So that all disagreeable arguments may be handled as unlike, if the divers quality he respected.  
Canons.  
Of unlikes there is unlike reason.  
Unlikes agree with unlike, etc.  
Examples be every where extant of likes and unlikes in our law.  
Elenches.  
Gold is tried in the fire, but not so, is trust and fidelity in adversity. This is false: for these things be like, not unlike.    

The 22. Chapter. Of the Equal.  
Quantity is that whereby things compared are said to be of this or that quantity.  
Quantity is either equal or unequal. Equal are those whose quantity is equal. And therefore it is an argument from the equal, when one equal is argued or declared by an other.  
The equal hath certain proper signs, whereby it is often expressed in authors, and may, if they want, always be added, for the plainer declaration thereof, as, Equal, Alike, The same that, Aswell as; Somuch howmuch; Somany howmany; No less, no greater; and such like. Yet equals are sometimes expressed without any note at all.  
Thomalin in july useth notes. 
Al soon may shepherds climb to sky, that lead in lowly dales,  
As gotheard proud that sitting high upon the mountain sails.   
Willy in August. 
Never dempt more right of beauty I ween  
The shepherd of Ida, that judged beauties queen.   
Master Plowden Fol. 15. a. Car come proprement come il appent all office del brazier en l'auter case a weyer et metter en fiew le dit bell, ou all office del tailor, a shaper le pan; cy properment il appent all office del collector a weyer chose pur que le subsidy serroyt pay.  
Fol. 7. a. Issint si home est tenus in un obligation sur condition de enfeoffer I. St. et il faith lease pur ans, et release a luy en fee, il ad perform le condition, comment que il n'ad perform les parolles. Et uncore les parolles d'un condition d'obligation doyent este perform cy straytment come les parols dascun statute: mes entant que l'entent et effect est perform et ceo que counteruaylera les parols, ill suffist.  

Annotations.  
Canons.  
THis Logical quantity is most generally to be understood. And therefore all those words be utterly rejected, which are not ample enough to express the general nature of this Logical quantity: As 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, facilis, difficilis, credibilis, incredibilis. Aequè, magis, & minus probabilis; etc. As though no argument were of the more or greater, but that which were rather in, which had more probability, which were more easy: And so in the less and equal. If a man will restrain the general nature of this quantity in this sort, he shall find himself entangled with repugnant examples in such sort that for his heart he shall not be able to rid himself out. If any think I do but jest, let him read the third part of Beurhusius, and make a trial of his own skill.  
Canons.  
Of things that be equal, there is equal reason and judgement.  
Of equals, if one either be, or not be; the other must in like manner be, or not be.  
Equal things agree with equal.  
Such things as are equal to any other thing, are also equal among themselves. This holdeth not in unequals, as 3. and 3. are unequal to 2, and yet equal among themselves.  
If you do either add or detract equal things from things that be equal, the whole, or remnant will be equal.  
You shall, as is said, sometimes meet with equals without any notes at all, as in Terence.  
Quando ego non curo tuum, ne cura meum. Sith I meddle not with thine, meddle not thou with mine.  
Again, the equal is returned against the equal now and then, without any form.  
If any one thing be, or seem to be in some two things equally: then if it be not in the one, it shall not be in the other, but if it be in the one it shall be in the other. For the last part, take this example.  
If a tutor must be faithful, then also a procurator.  
But a tutor must;  
Therefore the procurator must also.  
Or thus more briefly in a contracted syllogism called an Ethymeme.  
A Tutor must be faithful and true,  
Therefore a procurator must be so also.  
Other Logicians commonly, to confirm and prove the consequence in the Enthymeme, bring in the Canon before alleged out of Aristotle, if any one thing etc. But I had rather say, that this connexed syllogism is good and artificial, so that no man ought to doubt of the consequence, which is already determined by the lawfulness of the syllogism, which is the only rule of all consequence and coherence.  
Now for the parts of this consequence, I mean the proposition and the assumption; I say, the proposition is true, and that I prove by the definition of the equal. Because there is one and the same, or equal quantity, that is to say, an equal reason in a tutor, and in a procurator. And as for the assumption, it is allowed by the civil law.  
Yet we are not altogether to reject these rules and Canons, but to use them in writing and speaking, as certain corollaries, or fruits of this art: and not to put them down in the art, for that most of them be too particular, or doubtful and contingent, and also unnecessary and superfluous.  
The second Canon is this. If two things be equally in a third; then if the one be, the other shall be: if not this, neither that. As, he useth to lie, therefore to steal. It is not proper and peculiar to man for to see, therefore neither to hear.  
The third and last. If two be equally and indifferently in two, then if this be not in that, the third shall not be in the fourth: but if that be, than this also, as in that out of Terence whereof we spoke before, Demea said to his brother Mitio:  
Quando ego, non curo tuum, ne cura meum. Sith I care not for thy son, Aeschinus, meddle not thou with my son Ctesiphon.  
To this place also belong those consectaries, which proceed from contraries, but are handled by a certain comparison of equals, as that in martial. 
Tum servum scis te genitum blandeque fateris  
Cum dicis dominum, Sosibiane, patrem.   
Sosibian calleth his father master, therefore he confesseth himself to be a servant.  
Arist. 2. Rhet. Iphicrates, when he saw his youngest son, because he was big and tall, preferred to office; said thus. If you take great boys for men; you will surely make little men boys.  
4. E. 4. 33. b. Ardern. En praecipe verse un que n'ad riens in le dd. iour del brief, mes puis il enter in le terre on purchase ceo, ore per son fait demesne il ad fait le brief bon. Donque come le fait le tenant fait mal brief bon, per mesme le reason, le fait le demandant fra un bon brief male, come en le case all bar, si le demandant enter en parcel del demand pendant le plée on brief.  
Choke in 8. E. 4. 21. b. confuta Markam: Fol. 11. 4. Que sic argua, les parties que submittont etc. ne dischargeront les arbitrors sans notice, Ergò les arbitrors ne chargeront les parties sans notice. A que Choke dit, que ceux ne sont contraries, s. discharger les parties sans notice: et charger les parties sans notice: mes charger les arbitrors sans notice, et discharger eux sans notice sont contraries, car come le charge, ne sirrah sans notice, issint le discharge ne serra sans notice.  
This kind of arguing is not always effectual, as a man is mortal, therefore a beast is immortal: it holdeth best when the arguments be repugnant.  
Elenches.  
Martial in his first book.  

Quod Alpha dixi, Codre, penulatorum,  
Te nuper aliqua cum iocarer in charta,  
Si forte bilem movit hic tibi versus.  
Dicas licebit Beta me togatorum.   
These be not equal. For although Alpha and Beta seem neighbours in the Greek Alphabet, yet they are nothing equal in signification. For Alpha signifieth the chief or principal: whereas Beta either signifieth that which is second, or else hath no signification at all.    

The 23. Chapter. Of the Greater.  
HItherto of Equals. Unequals are those which have not the same quantitis.  
Unequal is either more or less.  
The more is that whose quantity is the greater: The signs be such as these. Not only, but also: Rather this, then that: more than: if this, much more that: and also the Grammatical comparison.  
Diggon in September. 
For lyker been they to pluck away more,  
Then ought of the gotten good to restore.   
And after 
Yet better leave of with a little loss,  
Then by much wrestling to leave the gross.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 85. a. Le roy poet wayver un issue, et demurrer en ley, et contra: et auters prerogatives ill y ad, mes uncore, per misrecital, ou misuser, ou misconceiver del action, il serra lie, et sur tiels matters les briefs abateront, come en les cases de comen persons. Et si le ley soit tiel lou le roy est sole party, à multo fortiori sera tiel, lou altar person est party oue le roy.  
Fol. 160. Et si le habendum donera estate en choose nyent done devant, et a person nient nosme devant, et altra l'estate done devant, adonques il mieux puit declarer le sense del parolles en les premises en nostre case, et nosmant ou les premises comprehend le choose en le habendum, come il fait en nostre case. Here is oftentimes a Logical gradation, sometimes joined with a Rhetorical climax.  

Annotations.  
WHen this note is in the consequent, much more, than it is an argument from the less, that is, from the less probable. But when it is said, Much less, it is an argument from the greater, that is, from the more probable. This is Piscator's judgement. So that all arguments from the greater should be negative; and, affirmative from the less. But, as I have already showed, so I now affirm again; that we may reason as well affirmatively as negatively from equals, greater, less, and all other arguments whatsoever, except divers. For Ramus doth not tie this Logical quantity, to such particular consideration of probability, as Piscator doth imagine and teach out of Aristotle (for if he so did, contrary examples would confute him) but leaveth it free and general, appliable to any thing whatsoever we can imagine to be equal, more, or less in any respect or consideration whatsoever, and as fit for confirmation as confutation.  
This Logical quantity therefore may be attributed to any thing incident and convenient to our purpose, as, to dignity, praise, reproach, ability and power, greatness, multitude, conveniency, commodity, opportunity, facility, difficulty, care, neglect, excellency, vileness, and in a word, to whatsoever may be said to be equal, more, or less.  
They that do otherwise determine of this matter, are, as I said, wonderfully troubled with repugnant examples, contrary Canons, and variety of opinions.  
They that will have all arguments of the more to be negative and only fit for confutation; all of the less, affirmative and serving for assertion, do put down these Canons out of the 4. chapter of the a. book of Aristotle's Topikes.  
When two things are affirmed of one, if that which is more like to be in it, be not in it, neither shall that which is less like, as, 
satraps, si siet amator, nunquam sufferre eius sumptus queat: nedum tu possis.   
If a Lord were her lover, he could never maintain her; much less thou.  
When one thing is spoken of two, if it be not in that, where in it is more like to be, neither shall it be in that, wherein it is less like to be: as, If the just shall scarce be saved, where will the wicked appear?  
When two things are affirmed of two things, if that which is more like to be in the one, be not in it, neither shall the other be in the other: as, You break not the Sabbath day in losing your ox, and bringing him to the water; therefore much less I in losing the daughter of Abraham from the bands of Satan.  
Others, as Cicero, Quintilian, and sometimes Ramus, would have the greater only to serve for confirmation, and the less, for confutation: taking that to be the greater which is the more excellent, more difficult and more incredible: that to be the less which is more abject, easy, and sooner believed: and therefore they lay down these Canons.  
That which hath force in the greater, must have also force in the less, as,  
We have suffered worse things than these;  
Therefore these that be less may be borne of us.  
Ramus in his last edition leaveth this place free, lose, and at liberty, fit for affirmations and negations. An affirmative argument from the greater, is this out of Virgil, which I put down last.  
If the Trojans have suffered greater things, they may also suffer less.  
But the Trojans have suffered greater dangers than these.  
Therefore they may also bear these less.  
The proposition is true, as gathering the less of the more. For if the greater be, the less will also be: and in this place, that is called the greater, which is more uncredible and intolerable, as to suffer greater mischiefs.  
The syllogism itself is connexed, and artificial, therefore the consequence is good. A Negative example is, that in Terence.  
If a Lord cannot maintain her, much less thou. But a Lord cannot, therefore neither thou.  
Feigned arguments from the greater have good grace as in this last example.  
From this place be derived pretty gradations conjoined sometimes with a Rhetorical climax, and sometimes alone without it. With it as,  
Neque verò se populo solùm, sed etiam senatui tradidit: neque senatui modò, sed etiam publicis praesidijs & armis: neque his tantùm, verumetiam, etc. Tully pro Milone.  
Without any climax, is that in Terence between Thraso and Gnatho.  
Th' Magnas verò agere gratias Thais mihi? Gn. Ingentes. Th. A'in tu? laeta est. Gn. Non tam ipso quidem dono, quàm abs te datum esse: id vero seriò triumphant.  
Where, (although there seem to be nothing but a simple exposition) is contained a syllogistical probation, thus.  
Thais giveth you exceeding great thanks, and she triumpheth for joy, that the gift came from such a giver.  
Therefore, no doubt, she thanketh you, and is glad that you bestowed this on her.  
Sometimes the greater is used without any notes or signs at all, as in that of Virgil.  

Talibus insidijs periurique arte Sinonis,  
Credita res, captique dolis, lachrimisque coactis:  
Quos neque Tydides', nec Larissaeus Achilles,  
Non anni domuêre decem: non mill carinae.   
Counterfeit tears circumvented them, whom neither the cruel Diomedes, nor fierce Achilles, nor ten years war, nor a thousand ships could overcome.  
Canons.  
If a greater quantity be (I take quantity generally, as I said before) then the less may also be: but if the greater be not, neither shall the less be.  
If the greater and more valiant cannot perform a thing, neither can the less and weaker. But if the greater can do it, it followeth not straightway that the less shall also do it.  
If any chance unlooked for, happen to the greater, it may more easily light upon the less and inferior.  
Si grammatica comparatio addatur ei quod comparatur & in quaestione versatur, reddit idipsum maius, ut id cui comparatur, sit minus, argumentumque sit a minori: si vero addatur ei, quod ad arguendum adhibetur, argumèntum est a maiori, itaque tam in maiorum quam in minorum collocatione locum habet. Nam comparatiws & superlatiws superant positiuum, & id cui adduntur, maius esse significant, ut etiam verba quae similem vim habent; ut malo, praestat etc. Wasserleider.  
Falsum est, saith Snellius, quod vulgò dicitur, propositionem hic continere maius, redditionem minus: imo respiciendum est perpetuò ad id quod arguit, si enim illud est maius, argumentum est a maiori, sin minus, a minori, quocunque in loco ponatur.  
In maiori inest minus. Non debet, cui plus licet, quod minus est, non licere. unde illa consectaria: Cui ius est donandi, eidem & vendendi, & concedendi ius est, plus enim est donare: (quod profusionem quandam patrimonij continet) quam vendere (quod administrationis & utilitatis est propter pretium) aut concedere, quod amicitiae est, ut in commodato aut precario. Et illud, cum quis poterit alienare, poterit & consentire alienationi.  
3. E. 4. 24. Danby lest: de 8. H. 6. ca 9 Done triple damages verse cestuy que enter oue force, ou teigne oue force. Et si lesta: done triple damages pur l'un tort tantum, à fortiori pur ambideux. Issint le brief bon que join utrumque.  
He that may do the more may do the less: Doct. Stud. pag. 114.    

The 24. Chapter. Of the less.  
THe less is that whose quantity is less. The signs of it are these. Not this only, but not that. The denying of the equal, or equality: a grammatical comparison.  
In August, Perigot and Willy. 
A chapelet on her head she bore, hay ho chapelet:  
Of sweet Violets therein was store, she sweeter than the Violet.   
Thenot in November. 
She, while she was (that, was, a woeful word to say)  
For beauty's praise, and pleasance had no pear.   
Master Plowden Fol. 57 a. Et quant a ceo que fuit auxi dit per luy, que si le party serroyt force a monster comment il avoit title, que donques poet estre, que il avoyt double title (come en le case mice) et le monstrans de ceo fairoyt le plée double: sir, quant a ceo, les plaintiffs ont prevent ceo assets bien: car pour doubt que le plée serroit double, ils ount monster riens: et ore il est pier que double plée: car double plée ad matter de substance, mes icy n'est ascun matter de substance.  
There is also a gradation sometimes from the less.  

Annotations.  
AS before in the greater, so here in the less, the common Logicians differ. Some will have that to be less which is less probable: briefly, when the antecedent in the Enthymeme is less probable than the consequent. These men will have all arguments from the less, to be affirmative; and they frame axioms hereof accordingly, correspondent to those of the greater.  
If any thing be in that, wherein it is less like to be, it shall also be in that, wherein it is more like to be, as, If brute beasts love their young ones, how tender a care should we have of our children?  
If that be in a thing which is less like to be in it, then that must be in it, which is more like to be in it, as, God careth for the fowls of the air, therefore much more for you.  
If two things seem to be in two, the one in the other: and that be in, which is less like to be in, than the other shall be in the other. 

If we, being enemies to God be reconciled unto him by Christ his death, than  
We, being now reconciled unto God, shall be saved by Christ his life.    
Others, (whom Ramus followed in two editions of his Logic) take that for the less, which is less difficult, which may sooner be in the thing: Where they might perceive, if they marked, that indeed, such things as are more easily in, be commonly the greater in strength, power, and dignity. But they, not regarding this, have framed such an axiom or Canon.  
If a thing be not in that, wherein it is most like to be, than it shall not be in that, wherein it is less like to be: so that, according to their mind this place should serve only for negative arguments, they use this example.  
A Lord cannot keep her, therefore neither thou.  
Where the argument is rather from the greater.  
Ramus therefore at the length left this place also general and appliable as well to affirmation as negation. An affirmative is this out of ovid. 
If thou care for the body, much more wilt thou care for the soul:  
But thou dost that: therefore this.   
A Negative.  


If God do not reject the sparrows, much less you:  
But he contemneth not them: therefore not you.    
As the argument of the equal is used oftentimes in opposing one equal against another, so these of unequalles, be sometimes in a very long continued speech matched together, as in Ovid, where he by a continued comparison of his own miseries with those of Ulysses, inferreth that which he intended, that he was more to be lamented then Ulysses: And these may be feigned also, as ante leues ergò etc. in Virgil. Here is also sometimes a gradation, as in this, facinus est vincire civem Romanum: scelus verberare: propè parricidium necare: quid dicam in crucem tollere? Ramus.  
Glanuil chief justice in H. 2. days, lib. 7. ca 10. Notandum quòd si quis in capite de domino rege tenere debet, tunc eius custodia ad dominum regem plene pertinet, sive alios dominos habere debeat ipse haeres, sive non, quià dominus rex nullum habere potest parem, multò minus superiorem.  
Elenches.  
As when you take that for less which is not less. As if a boy can paint, than a man can paint, for although a boy be less than a man, yet a boy may sometimes sooner paint then a man.  
So then by these general heads thus distinguished, we have the means and way of invention put down. Although Menon make a great show of proof that there is no art or order in invention: for it were in vain, quoth he, to seek for that which we have found already, & it is impossible by search to find the which we know not when we see it: Socrates goeth about to dissolve this Dilemma, by I cannot tell what mystery of Pythagorical philosophy, and saith that our Discere is nothing else but Recordari; and that our souls were adorned with perfection of all knowledge from eternity, but enclosed in this fleshly dungeon of the body, waxed dull, yet by the application of one thing to an other, remembered that again which they had forgotten before.  
Aristotle answereth it after an other manner, and saith, that he who seeketh, knoweth generally what he seeketh, though not in particularity: so by this general note and mark he may observe the special, whereof he was ignorant before. And this is true in part, for when we have conceived the general precepts of any art, then do we search the particularities by the general direction of those rules. But if Menon should go further, and bring in that first invention of man, when there was no observation either of general or special, how would this answer suffice? Therefore, for a final resolution, I say, that man's soul hath in it a natural power and ability, whereby it is apt to conceive any thing, if it be directed, turned, applied, and bend thereunto: so saith Aristotle, 2. de demonst. that our soul brought not with it into the body the knowledge of things, as Socrates imagined, but only a faculty and power of understanding; as our eyes have not the distinct kinds of colours engraven in them by nature, but only an ability of seeing colours. So then, as a man looking on colours, seeth: in like manner by applying his spirit and understanding to things unknown, he may by the diligent perusing of these general heads, find, what he seeketh now, and knew not heretofore. But to him only, as Tully saith, will these general predicaments or Categories of arguments become profitable indeed, which hath been a travailed and a well experienced man in matters of importance, which age and continuance of time affordeth, or hath read much and heard more, which study and diligence yieldeth. Subacto enim ingenio opus est etc.  
If we shall for exercise sake use to draw any one word through these general places of invention, it will breed a great plenty and variety of new arguments, while we mark what be the causes, effects, parts, whole, general, special, subjects, adiunctes thereof, and so forth in all the rest: and this either in making and inditing ourselves, or else in resolving, and as it were dismembering that which others have done.  
For the first, let that example of Nobilitas, serve, put down by Sturmius: For the later, we will take, Amicitia, out of Tully's dialogue, called Laelius. The examples be placed according to the usual distribution of arguments framed by Ramus, not according to this lately put down by myself. The matter is not great: it may soon be altered, and should have been now, if time had suffered.  
Causae efficientes Nobilitatis. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Maiorum praeclara facta, & generis diuturna comprobatio, stirpisque antiquitas atque amplitudo: hae procreantes, conseruantes istae.  
Virtus & continentia in posteris, quae maiorum laudibus respondeat.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Liberalitas, fortitudo, clementia, caeteraeque virtutes cum corporis pulchritudine copulatae.  
Destruentes.  
Morum turpitudo, ignoratio, inhumanitas, vultus Centau●…icus, & habitudo Polyphemi Cyclopica.  
Materia.  
Ipsa generis antiquitas, & propria virtutis praestantia, frequenti actionum celebritate confirmata.  
Forma.  
Ista ipsa nominis amplitudo, longinquitate temporis confirmata, & hominum comprobatione stabilita.  
Finis.  
Vt quae à maioribus praeclarè jacta sint nobilitatis fundamenta, à posteris perficiantur, ut & sibi honori, & amicis voluptati & reip. emolumento esse possint.  
Effecta.  
In Tyrocinio & exercitationibus militaribus aut caeteros aequales superasse viribus & virtute, aut melioribus & magnis, industria fuisse parem: Sub literarum magistris magnam & diuturnam operam navasse, & progressus magnos in doctrina fecisse: summa semper temperantia & sobrietate praeditum fuisse: optimis & clarissimis imperatoribus stipendia fecisse: In nullo nisi justo bello militasse: in hostem lenem & misericordem, non saewm & crudelem extitisse: in acie & oppugnandis civitatibus femper inter primos visum fuisse: Duxisse exercitum: Appellatum imperatorem à militibus: parva manu magnas copias saepè fudisse: Seize pro patria devouisse, aut voluisse devouere, si permisissent milites: Ex praeda, vel nullam pecuniam accepisse, vel ceteris parem: Res à se gestas historia complexum esse: Domi & in pace prudentem senatorem, charum suis, jucundum omnibus sese praebuisse: Principem senatus fuisse: Bis triumphasse: Tertiò consulem fuisse: semper fuisse verum & constantem, nunquam vanum & levem.  
Subiecta.  
Animus revera nobilis & magnanimus, & virtutum praesidijs undique circumseptus.  
Adiuncta.  
Clarum esse, & illustrem: omnium gentium literis ac linguis celebrari: deduci: assurgi: etc.  
Diversa.  
Non omnem à maioribus habuit nobilitatis opinionem, sed & suis virtutibus exornatam.  
Disparata.  
Non in simulata ementitae nobilitatis umbra delitescit, non pecuniarum copijs evectus est, sed & suis & suorum factis illustratus.  
Relata.  
Nobilitas est rei nobilitatae nobilitas.  
Aduersa.  
Nobilitas & obsc●…ritas: novitas & antiquitas: humilitas & amplitudo.  
Privantia.  
Nobilis & ignobilis. Clarus, obscurus.  
Paria.  
Claritas & splendour: Antiquitas & vetustas.  
Maiora. Minora.  
Pulchrius est fieri, quàm creari nobilem.  
Ortus praeclarus est exoptandus, multò magis itaque animus generosus, & mens excelsa.  
Similia.  
Civitas in qua nobiles non sunt, similis est ijs hortis, in quibus flos nullus est insignior.  
Dissimilia.  
Non ut herbae vitiosae abijciuntur, ita si quis nobilis vitiosus aliqua in part sit, spoliari debet avito nomine.  
Coniugat●….  
Nobilitas, nobilis, nobilitare, nobilitari, nobile factum, homo nobilitatus, & virtus nobilitata; nobili loco natus, & natus nobili genere, & nobiliss●…a familia, aut stirpe 〈◊〉 ortus, & generosa stirpe procreatus.  
Notatio.  
Nobilitas indè nominata est, quod eorum qui nobiles sunt, nota virtus esse debeat.  
Distributio ex causis.  
Nobilitas in civitatem, familiam, gentem distributa est.  
Ex effectis.  
Nobilitas alia vera, orta ex clara familia, & virtutibus maiorum respondens, alia nova quidem, non adiuta maiorum gloria, bona tamen & industria, & cupida honestatis. Tertia, calida & malitiosa, quae non virtute, sed simulatione, & falsa specie virtutis sibi nomen ●…natur comparare. Quarta verò quae vitijs atque flagitijs dedita est, dedecus familiae suae, profundens omnes opes, amittens domesticam laudem, profligatae audatiae atque malitiae.  
Ex subiectis.  
Nobilitas, vel Graecorum est, vel Romanorum, vel Persarum, vel Medorum, vel gentium aliarum.  
Ex adiunctis.  
Hominum alij nobiles▪ alij ignobiles.  
Definitio.  
Nobilitas est generis antiquitas, ortum habens vel à dinino aliquo principio, vel maiorum virtute praeclara, humanae societatis consensu comprobata.  
Descriptio.  
Nobilitas est nominis amplitudo, virtutis comes, virtu●…e conformata, quae brevitatem vitae posteritatis memoria consolatur, quae facit ut absentes adsimus, vivamus mortui: cuius denique gradibus homines in coelum videantur ascendere.  
Testimonia.  

Malo, pater tibi sit Thersites, dummodo tu sis  
Aeacidae similis, Uulcaniaque arma capessas;  
Quàm te Thersitae similem producat Achilles.  
Inquit Iwenalis'.   
Nobilitas sola est, atque unica, virtus. Vt rectè Poeta.  
Non domus dominum, sed dominus domum nobilitare debet si fidem Cicer oni adhibeamus.  
Thus have we drawn this argument, Nobilitas, throughout most of the places of Logical Invention: which shall suffice at this time for an example of Genesis in this first part of Logic. Now let us in order of Analysis. apply such arguments to this word, Amicitia, as we can readily find in the forenamed Dialogue.  
Causa efficiens. Natura, Uirtus.  
Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quàm ab imbecillitate orta amicitia, & applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quàm cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura etc.  
Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eyes quos nunquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in host etiam diligamus, quid mirum si animi hominum ●…oueantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse poss●…t, virtutem & bonitatem perspicere videantur?  
Causa adiwans.  
Quanquam, confirmatur amor, & beneficio accepto, & study perspecto, & consuetudine adiuncta, qu●…bus rebus ad ill●… primum motum animi & amoris adhibitis, admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo, quam siqui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quam quisque assequatur quod desideret, humilem sanè relinquunt, & minimè generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia nasci volunt etc.  
Adiungitur etiam & rerum convenientia, & morum similitudo, & voluntatum summa consensio.  
Destrue●….  
Contentiones, luxuriae conditiones, vel commodi, honoris ambitus, pecuniae cupiditates, iniquae postulationes, morum dissimilitudo: dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur: quorum dissimilitudo dissoluit amicitias, etc.  
Materia.  
Id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio.  
Form●….  
Ipsa an●…morum coniunctio.  
Finis.  
Vt usu eius quem diligere cepêrunt, fruantur & moribus; sintque pare●… in amore, & equales, propensioresque ad benè me●…endum quàm ad reposce 〈◊〉  
Et in●…a.  
Alios autem dicere aiunt etiam multò inhumanius, quem locum breviter perstrinxi paulò antè, praesidij adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque charitatis, amicitias esse expetendas.  
Effecta.  
Cui potest esse vita vitals, ut ait Ennius, qui non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat? Quid dulcius, quàm habere quocum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Quis esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aequè ac tu ipse gauderet? Aduersas verò res ferre difficile esset sine eo qui illas gravius etiam quàm tu, ferret. Denique, caeterae res quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus ferè singulis: divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas. Valetudo, ut dolore careas, & muneribus fungaris corporis: Amicitia plurimas res continet, quoquò te verteris prestó est, nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiva, nunquam molesta est.  
Infra.  
Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, & adversas patiens communicansque leniores. Cumque plurimas & maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum prestat omnibus, quod bona spe prelucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur: verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tanquàm exemplar quoddam intuetur sui. Quocirca & absentes adsunt, & egentes abundant, & imbecilli valent, &, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui viwnt: tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum, etc.  
Subiectum.  
Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi inter bonos amicitiam esse non posse.  
Et  
Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intelligi maximè potest, quod ex infinita so●…ietate generis humani quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est, & adducta in angustum, ut omnis charitas aut inter duos, aut inter paucos iungeretur.  
Et,  
Itaque verae amicitiae difficilimè repe●…iuntur in ijs, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur.  
Adiuncta.  
In amicitia autem, nihil est fictum, nihil simulatum: & quicquid in ea est, idem verum & voluntarium est.  
Et,  
Vt igitur & monere & moneri, proprium est verae amicitiae, & alterum libere facere, non aspere; alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est, nullam in amicitijs pestem esse maiorem, quam adulationem, blanditias, assentationem.  
Diversa.  
Suis autem incommodis graviter angi; non amicum, sed scipsum amantis est.  
Disparat●….  
Quocircà, moerere hoc ●…ius eventu, vereor ne invidi magis quàm amici sit.  
Relata & Coniugata.  
Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic in hoc libro, ad amicum amicissimus de amicitia scripsi.  
Aduersa.  
Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est quae non odijs atque dissidi●…s funditùs possit everti?  
Privantia.  
Benevolentia, amor, affectio, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Paria.  
Itaque non aqua, non igni, non aenre, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur quàm amicitia.  
Et,  
Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tanquam exemplar quoddam intuetur sui.  
Et,  
In amicitia, èquè nefas sit, turpè aliquid & facere rogatum, & imperare.  
Maiora. Minora.  
Apertè enim odisse magis ingenuum est, quàm fronte occultare sententiam.  
Et,  
Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quàm animus eius, qui ad alterius non modò sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?  
Quod si haec apparent in bestijs, volucribus, agrestibus, natantibus, cicuribus, feris, primùm se ut ipse diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur) deindè ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantes, idque faciunt cum desiderio, & cum quadam similitudine amori●… humani, quantò id magis in homine fit natura, qui & seipse diligit, & alterum requirit, cuius animum ita cum suo commisceat, ut efficiat poenè unum ex duobus?  
Similia.  
Est igitur prudentis, sustinere, ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae: quò utamur quasi aquis tentatis, sic amicitijs, aliqua ex part periclitatis moribus amicorum?  
Et illud.  
Veterimae quaeque, ut ea vina quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debent suavissimae: verumque illud est quod vulgò dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. Novitates autem, si spem afferunt, ut tanquàm in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiande, vetustas tamen suo loco conseruanda est.  
Dissimilia.  
Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut quemadmodum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus.  
Coniugata.  
Plurimùm in amicitia amicorum benè suadentium valeat autoritas.  
Notatio.  
Vtrumque enim, & amor & amicitia, dictum est ab amando.  
Divisio.  
Sed nescio quo pacto, ab amicitijs perfectorum hominum, id est sapientum▪ add leaves amicitias deflexit oratio.  
Definitio.  
Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum, cum benevolentia & charitate summa consensio.  
Descriptio brevis.  
Amare autem nihil aliud est nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla utilitate quaesita.  
Descriptio explicata.  
Equidem exomnibus rebus quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possit comparari. In hac mihi de Republica fuit consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectation●… fuit. Nunquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem sens●…m, nihil audivi ex co ipso quod nollem: una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis: neque solùm militia, sed etiam peregrinationes, rusticationesque communes. Nam quid ego de studijs dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? In quibus remoti ab oculis populi, omne otium tempusque contrivimus?  
Testimonium.  
Agrigentinum doctum quendam virum, carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam.  
Et,  
Rectè Ennius, Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur.  
Et illud.  
Verum igitur illud est, quod à Tarentino Archita, ut opinor, dici solitum, nostros senes commemorare audivi, ab alijs senibus auditum; si quis coelum ascendisset, naturamque mundi & pulchritudinem syderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationemeis fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, nisi aliquem cui narraret, habuisset.  
Postremò  
Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andri●… familiaris meus Terentius dicit, Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.  
Thus much for these two words, Nobilitas and Amicitia. The like would I have all Logical Lawyers to attempt in our common Law. At the first it will seem hard and troublesome: but undoubtedly the speedy profit accompanied with a sweet delight, will soon overtake, and quite overcome the pains before sustained: and so much the rather, for that it is impossible, any profession whatsoever, to be more Logical than is the Law. For proof; if you take but that little tractate of Uillenage in Master Littleton, you shall find, if not all, yet not many less than all these arguments, used in the same discourse, within the compass of eight little leaves, whereof some be bestowed on some other matters.    

THE SECOND BOOK. Of Disposition. THE FIRST CHAPTER.  
hitherto of Exposition of Arguments called Invention, the first part of Logic: Now followeth the second, which is Disposition.  
Disposition is the second part of Logic concerning the disposing of Arguments, thereby to judge well of them: and therefore this second part is called both judgement and Disposition.  

Annotations.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Grecians, is Disposition with the Latinistes. So then the second part of Logic is called Disposition of the form of the same second part, for that, as in Grammar Syntaxis being the second part, ordereth & disposeth simple words handled in the first; so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Disposition in Logic doth artificially place, settle, and dispose single arguments one with an other, and that first axiomatically, in severed axioms: then, proceeding forwards to a Syllogism and method, as occasion shall serve. For example's sake, this sentence, a villeine regardant is a villeine, is true English, because the nominative case and the verb be placed Grammatically, according to the prescription of Syntaxis: so the same sentence is a true Logical axiom, because the general is affirmed on the special, in a simple axiom, according to Art in Disposition. Now, this second part of Logic is also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, judicium, judgement, of the use, commodity, and end thereof. For that, by a certain direction, rule, and prescription of Disposition, ariseth judgement of the truth or untruth of any axiom; the consequence or inconsequence of any Syllogism: and the perspicuity or confused obscurity of any method or proceeding.    

The second Chapter. Of Axioms affirmative and negative.  
DIsposition is either of one sentence, called axiomatical: or of more than one, called dianoetical. An Axiom or proposition is a disposition of one argument with an other, whereby we judge a thing to be, or not to be.  
An Axiom hath two parts, the band, and the parts bound: the band is that, which bindeth the other parts together. The parts bound, be either the former or the later. The former is that which goeth before, and is called the antecedent: the later, that which followeth, called the consequent, As  
Ah God that Love should breed both joy and pain.  
Where, Love, being the cause and first part, is coupled, by the band, should breed; with his effects, both joy and pain, the latter part.  
An Axiom is either affirmative or negative, affirmative when the band of the Axiom is affirmed. Negative, when it is denied, and although in English, the negation come after the band, yet in reason it goeth before, and denieth the band aswell as in other languages.  
From this affirmation and negation arise all contradictions, when the self same Axiom is both affirmed and denied, As, 
Dido my dear, alas, is dead,  
Dido n'is dead, but into heaven hent.   
Dido is dead, Dido is not dead.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 10. b. Les statutes doyent estre construes solonque les reasons deal common lay: the negation whereof will make this contradiction, les statutes ne doyent estre construe solonque les reasons deal common ley.  

Annotations.  
SIcut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, à verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, à 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur. Illud verbum à nomine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, meus; hoc à 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mentis agitatio. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apud Aristotelicos est cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verò, mentis seu rationis quidam quasi discursus, qui aliter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ratiocinatio dicitur, cùm ratio ex quocunque proposito aliud deducit, movens se ab uno ad aliud investigandum, ut praepositio declaret motus tractum, ac transmissionem ipsius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
[An Axiom:] The Greek word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifieth dignity, authority. The Logicians, as it should seem, took it for any thing spoken, pronounced, told, as it were, with authority. It here signifieth any sentence or proposition whatsoever, wherein one argument, reason, conceit, thing, is so conjoined with, or severed from another, as that thereby we judge the one either to be or not to be, the cause, effect; whole, part; general, special; subject, adjunct; divers, disparate, relative, repugnant, distribution, definition, testimony, like, unlike, equal, more or less to the other.  
[Affirmative:] It is proper then to axioms, not to simple arguments, to affirm or deny: as it is to a syllogism, to confute or confirm. Affirmatio & negatio enunciati, nihil aliud est quàm partium compositio & divisio.  
[The band:] The band in a simple axiom is always a verb: but this verb is sometimes put between the two arguments, sometimes of itself it supplieth the place of the second argument, as will appear if you resolve such implicate propositions thus, Plato disputeth learnedly, Plato is a learned disputer.  
[Contradiction:] In our Traverse, which took name of the French Traverse (that is de transuerso, on the other side) there is always a manifest example of an exact and Logical contradiction between two axioms, the one affirming, the other denying the self same thing that was affirmed: See Master Lambard just. lib. 2. cap. 13.  
Home n'auera express averment encounter le return del viscount, quia il est officer all court, itaque le court doit donor credence a luy. Mes si le viscount return attach, le party dira encounter ceo, nyent attach per 15 iours: issint s'il return, que le ten. est summons, le tenant poet dire, nyent summons solonque le ley del terre, car ceo ne traverse expresmentle return del viscount, mes estoit oue ces assets bien sans ascun contradiction.  
Vide 1. H. 6. 8. Rolf. Enseint et nyent enseint, bon issue.    

The third Chapter. Of a true and false Axiom.  
SEcondarily, an axiom is either true or false. True, when the thing is even so as it is said to be: false when contrarily: and here according to the affection of the arguments, we must grant the true, and deny the false, absolutely.  
Both these be either Necessary, or Contingent. Necessary, when an axiom is either true or false without exception: (yet to a general axiom, exceptions may be added to make it generally true.) 
What ever wanteth changeable rest,  
Must needs decay when it is at best.   
This is necessarily true, and his contrary, necessarily false, so this:  
There is no greater estate, then see simple. Contingent is, when it is true in such sort, as it may be false, or so false, as yet it may be true. As,  
Great climbers fall unsoft. This is doubtful and contingent.  
So Master Plowden: Fol. 50. Femes facile sont illudes et entice all covin: For although some great climbers have great falls, and many women be seduced, yet oftentimes it falleth out, that many of the first escape from falling: and more of the second prevent illusions. Here we must neither absolutely affirm nor deny, but distinguish. The judgement which we can have of this Contingent or doubtful Axiom, is called Opinion, which in things already past or present, may be certain unto man; but in things to come, it is altogether uncertain, although to God there is no such difference of things in respect of time, to whom all things be present.  
All precepts of Arts are or aught to be necessarily and always true without exception, and so rules of truth: but besides this, they must also be rules of justice, as it were, and also of wisdom or discretion, or compendious brevity.  
A rule of justice is an axiom which giveth unto every thing his own, in coupling those things together which agree naturally, wherein usually are disposed together, the formal cause and the thing form; the general and his special; the subject and his proper adjunct.  
A rule of wisdom, discretion, or brevity, is an axiom wherein the arguments disposed may be mutually affirmed one of another. So that, as the later is verified of the former, so the former may be of the later. The judgement of these three kinds of axioms is most certain and infallible knowledge.  

Annotations.  
THe first rule which Ramus calleth a rule of truth is termed of the Grecians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of the Latinists, de omni, because it is absolutely and in most general manner pronounced of all, without any exception. And it must be affirmative. For a negation doth but deprive and take away; and not imprint in man's mind the knowledge of any thing certainly. So that no negation, although it be generally true, is fit to make any precept of art, exactly put down: whose duty is, to teach truth; not unteach untruths, or to tell what is not true. Therefore saith Aristotle, an affirmation is more honourable than a negation.  
As a true axiom is either contingent, or necessary: so the false axiom in like wise is either variable, or else necessarily false, that is impossible. For, the necessary false hath a proper and distinct name, to wit, impossible: but the necessary true hath no several name: but is called necessary, by that general word.  
The second rule of arts is the rule of justice: so called of Ramus, for that according to the nature of justice, in this axiom every argument hath that adjoined unto it which is by natural right, his own, as the form his thing form, the subject his own proper adjunct, the general his special: examples whereof I thought it nothing necessary to heap up in the text, for that in the chapters of the form and form, subject and adjunct, general and special, they are already discoursed upon: and there wanteth nothing but the putting of them together in an axiom, which may soon be performed by the direction of rules of axiomatical judgement. This rule is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Latin, per se: for that both the arguments in this kind of axiom, be essentially and by themselves, their own nature, force, power, virtue, and inclination linked together. Of these Latin words, per se, Paulus Venetus, and other schoolmen, have framed this dunsical word of art, Perseitas, and thereof made many kinds, and long discourses.  
The third and last rule, is named of Ramus, the rule of wisdom or discretion; of the effect which it worketh in us, which is wisdom, saith Rodingus. For, then only are we wise, then only have we the perfect knowledge of any thing, when we know it by the first causes, that is, by such which are immediate, equal, neither higher, nor lower, neither too general, nor too special, but jump, fit, meet, that is, first, and therefore reciprocal: and this is performed by this rule. This rule is therefore the rule of wisdom; teaching general things in their due place, once, and generally: Special things in their convenient time and order, specially, with their several specials. Whereas, if a man teach a special thing generally, in general, and in a general place: or a general thing in special, specially, and in a special place, he shall bewray his folly and want of discretion in troubling the auditors with his gross error, and tedious Tautology: Error, in applying a special and peculiar thing to a general and universal matter: Tautology and vain inculcation of the same thing, in repeating that many times confusedly, which both might and should have been taught but once, and distinctly. For if I teach a general thing specially, that is, in a special and inferior place, I must of necessity repeat that so many times, as there be special things to which it is appliable, because I left it out in the beginning: whereas if I had put it down generally, in his higher place, above his specials, this once putting down had sufficed for all: because it is placed as a general; and every general includeth the whole society of his specials, and to every of them is equally appliable, by the order of art and nature.  
The Grecians call this rule, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: the Latinistes, universaliter primum. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is then, as I said before; when in an axiom, both the arguments joined together be jump, fit, meet, first, equal and therefore reciprocal: equal I call them, which are as general or special, the one as the other: so that the one containeth no more than the other, neither is the one higher than the other, such an one is this, A man is apt to laugh: A man is reasonable: A villeyne is either, in gross, or else regardant: Logic consisteth in Invention, and Disposition: Logic is an Art of reasoning, for here either the definition and the thing defined, or the subject and his proper adjunct; or the form and the thing form, or the general and his specials, or else whole and parts be joined together. Such as these, be according to this rule, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And it is so called because the second part of the axiom (in this, A man is apt to laugh) is verified of no other thing before man in general, but first of man, then secondarily of singular men, as Plato, Socrates, etc. and whatsoever is thus spoken first of the whole antecedent, must needs be reciprocal with the same antedent. Hereupon, I say, was it called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, universaliter primum.  
Prima regula, saith one, falsos; secunda peregrinos; tertia nimis elatos aut abiectos cives è civitate philosophica excludit. The first excludeth all false and lame precepts, which if it were observed in our law, than all repugnant dreams of Sergeants and Counsellors that serve the time and speak for money should not run so currant for good law: nay every judgement given either without reason, or with partiality, should not stand for justice: every Semble, should not pass for a sentence, nor every Dictum fuit, for a Dictator's constitution.  
It is not necessary that every ariome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, should be general, saith Scribonius, for, in astronomy, there be many particulars, but it is therefore called De omni, for that it is necessarily true, with affirmation, without exception. Yet a general rule with his particular exception is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nam exceptio non solum restringit regulam, sed etiam confirmat.  
The second rule rejecteth all impertinent matters which are not coherent, nor suitable to the proposed argument, but discrepant and disagreeable, as precepts of Rhetoric among axioms of Logic, as in a discourse of guarantee, to talk of Rickhils remainders: in a chapter of releases, to lay down the pleading in a writ of right: in the explication of conditional estates, to declare the nature of a deed indented, and a deed polle: among the precepts of tenants in common, to cast in pieces of releases; as the custom is among little grand mootemen, who cast case upon case, as Carters do billets upon billets, and for every collateral trifle, run over all the 633. titles of Brookes abridgement.  
The third rule, as it is in practice hard, so in observation it is most commendable, and if it be violated, it argueth a most gross oversight in the unskilful artificer. As if a professor of Logic should say, that a cause is ever inherent, or, as it were, engraven in, and together with though thing caused; this were absurdly spoken, for in teaching a special thing generally, he applieth that generally to all causes, which is appropriate naturally to one cause, and only one cause, I mean the form, which is always inherent in the thing form, and imprinted in the same, whereas other causes be not so. Again, if the same Logical Doctor should say, that the material cause were the fountain of all knowledge, or should affirm the same of all the other kinds of causes specially and in severalty, he might justly be reprehended for a double fault, the one, for making a general adjunct be restrained and tied to one peculiar subject: the other, for vainly repeating that in divers specials, which was in generality to have been laid down but once for all. There is in effect no part of our Law that ever was ordered according to this rule: yet it appeareth that the founders of our Law had a liking thereof, in that they detested the contrary vice. Car nous eyomus une erudition, que si home ad brief framed in le Register pur son special case, praeter le general brief, et il use le general brief pur son special case, c●…o brief abatera. Et vide 7. H. 7. In trespass per le baron et feme, et count del trespass faith all feme dum sola fuit, ceo abatera le brief. 7. E. 6. 80. Dyer.  
Aristoteles affectiones has tres ad propositiones syllogismi Demonstrativi restrinxit, sed Ramus eas ad omnia artium praecepta rectius accomodavit. In Logic, saith Scribonius, we are not to give peculiar precepts fit only to put down arts (as Ramus in this place seemeth to do, where he maketh the foresaid rules of Truth, justice, and Discretion, proper and peculiar directions for the conformation of arts) but general for Ens, and non Ens. So that he would have no mention made of the constitution and framing of arts purposely and ex professo, for that were impertinent, but only obiter, and by the way, in manner of a Corollary or Consectary, that it might be the more tolerable and Homogeneum, that is, the more suitable and coherent. And so I make it here no distribution at all, but only a Corollary.  
Impossibile quadruplex, saith one, Naturae, ut coelum digito attingere: juris, quod bonis moribus & rationi repugnat: Contradictionis: Facti; hinc impossibilium nulla est obligatio, the like whereof is in Parkins and divers year books.    

The fourth Chapter. Of a simple Axiom.  
THus much of the common proprieties of axioms, the specials follow.  
An axiom is either simple or compound: Simple is that whose parts be coupled together with a verb.  
In july. They been y●…lad in Purple.  
Master Plowden. Fol. 497. a. Le prior de. s. john's avoit l'estate deal templars.  
In November, Dido n'is dead.  
M. Plowden. Fol. 5. a. Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. And this is the first disposition of arguments invented.  
In the first affirmative example, the former part is the subject: the later the adjunct: In the first negative, Dido, the former part, is opposite unto dead, which is the later part: and dead is opposite unto Dido, which is the former part.  
And as we see in these examples the disposition of agreeable arguments, as of the subject with his adjunct in the first: and of disagreeable arguments, as of the opposite with the opposite in the last: so we may dispose after the same manner all arguments agreeable and disagreeable: always affirming the agreeable, and denying the disagreeable: except distributions and full comparisons, such as have three or four terms or parts, and therefore cannot be disposed in a simple axiom, but in a compound.  
The simple axiom is either general or special: General is when the later part is generally referred and attributed to the former. And in general axioms, one of them contradictory to the other, is not always true or always false; for if they be both variable, they may be both false, as,  

All that is lent to love will be lost.  
Nought that is lent to love will be lost.   

Chescun tuer d'un home est prohibit per le ley.  
Nul tuer d'un home est prohibit per le le ley.   
As also if they be not variable, as here:  

Every creature is reasonable.  
No creature is reasonable.   

Chescun custom est ground sur reason.  
Nul custom est ground sur reason.   
The special axiom is, when the consequent or later part, is specially attributed unto the antecedent or former part, not generally: whereof one being contradictory to another, is always true, or always false.  
The special is either particular or proper: Particular, when the later part general is attributed unto some of the former, but without any certain limitation, and to this the general is contradictory.  
In May Piers, of shepherds. 
Some 'gan to gape for greedy governance.   
The general contradictory whereof, is, 
None 'gan to gape for greedy governance.  
Ascunes' mines sont royal  
Null mines sont royal   
The proper Axiom is when the latter part is attributed unto the former, being a proper, singular, or one thing.  
Diggon in September. 
Indeed thy Ball is a bold big cur,   
Whose negative and contradictory, is 
In deed thy Ball is not a bold big cur.  
john vane Salisbury tue l'home feloniousment,  
john vane Salisbury ne tue l'home feloniousement.   

Annotations.  
The judgement of this simple axiom is most natural, but in part common to brute beasts aswell as to man, as in all singular matters comprised in the axioms called proper. For as Aristotle teacheth in the second of his demonstrations, every sensible creature hath a natural power and faculty of judging, which is called sense; & this sense 2. Topic: is of him said to be a certain kind of judgement: and without doubt, the sense is a most upright judge of such things as are properly under his jurisdiction, as the sight of colours, the hearing of sounds, the smelling of smells, 4. Metap.  
This judgement of the senses is more exact and exquisite in some sorts of beasts, than it is in man. For although man do surpass other creatures in tutching, yet the Eagle seethe more clearly than he, the Vulture smelleth better, and the Mould heareth sooner, as Plynie reporteth in the second of his natural history. So that the judgement of a simple axiom is not altogether proper and peculiar to man only, but that of the general axiom is man's alone. For although it seem that beasts have some little sparks of reason, as Aristotle in the second of his Physikes speaketh of the Spider and the Ant, whereunto Galen also seemeth to yield, yet in truth this judgement is nothing else in them, but only the fantasy or imagination of sensible notions, neither can any beast conceive any general. And though Epicurus did so much abase man's dignity, as to attribute the sovereign judgement and determination of all things unto sense, not unto reason and understanding, yet we know what an infinite & unspeakable capacity man's soul is endowed withal, how far the general is more honourable than the singular, & how wonderfully man's mind worketh of itself alone without any help of sense, whatsoever be objected by that sensual, or rather senseless and brutish Philosopher Epicurus.  
[And in the general, one of them contradictory to the other, is not always true or always false:] this is false, saith Scribonius, therefore we must say thus, 

All that is lent to love will be lost:  
Not all that is lent to love will be lost.    
For, saith he, the general nature of a contradiction is, to divide between truth and falsehood. But there is a general kind of contradiction in propositions or axioms, when two general axioms are so opposed the one against the other, as what the one doth affirm, the other denieth of and in the self same thing, and these can never be both true, but they may be, both false. This general contradiction is of Aristotle called a contrariety in axioms by a distinct name and title, not a contradiction.  
another kind of contradiction there is which is special, and is called by the general name, a Contradiction, not a Contrariety, when the one is a general affirmative axiom, the other a particular negative, or contrarily: which indeed as Scribonius saith, can never be either both true or both false; Thus than we see the cause of this reprehension, what it is and how much worth. The divers acceptation of this word, Contradiction, caused an error, and this error a needles reprehension.  
Et quia quidam recognitorum modò comparentium non fecerunt visum, & quidam non venerunt, ideo iurata remanet usque ad proximam assisam. Ceo fuit error per troy's justices, car l'un part del record est contrariant alauter: car per le pri mer parcel, s. quia quidam recognitorum modò comparentium; I' appearance de touts est affirm: et in le second part, s. & buid●…m non venerunt, le non appearance del parcel des jurors est affirm, sic contrariant, s. omnes juratores venerunt (car comentq le general note, Omnes, ne soit la mice, uncore est include et imply solonque cest opinion:) & quidam juratores non venerunt. 22. E. 4. 16. 17.  
33. H. 6. 26. b. Prisot. Le brief est repugnant en luymesme, s. quod cum ipse habeat quoddam Cheminum ratione tenurae suae ad ecclesiam de D. le def. levauit quendam murum, per quem murum Cheminum habere non potest. Issint il rehearse comment il ad un chemyne in le premis del brief, et in le perclose, il rehearse, quod habere non potest, nisi ita exponas, habeat de iure, habere non possit de facto.  
A general:] Axioma generale esse potest, etsi nullum symbolum generale adijciatur, cuiusmodi sunt omnis, nullus, etc. Itaque sententia axiomatis consideranda est, sic, Malus usus abolendus est, generale est axioma. In every general axiom both the former and later part must be a thing general and common to many: and also the later part must be generally attributed to the former part, that is to say, to all the nature of the former part, and to all things contained under the same former part.  
A simple axiom, saith Piscator, is general or special: general is universal or particular: universal either definite, as every man is reasonable, or indefinite, as man is reasonable: But Ramus expelleth that uncertain and indefinite axiom; for every conceit of the mind is determinately either general or special, and special, either particular or singular, as in that axiom uttered by Hanck. 11. H. 4. 47. Damnum poet estre absque iniuria, the sense is determinate, that aliquod damnum est absque iniuria, as in that case of the three schoolmasters, where the thirds diligence withdrew all the scholars from the other two.  
As for those which they call Subcontrarias; or under contraries, they make no true contradiction. For they may be both true: nay they rather make an argument of partition. For, these axioms: 

Some men be lawyers,  
Some men be not lawyers.   Be nothing else but a distribution of men, as if a man should divide men into two parts, whereof the one should be lawyers, the other should be no lawyers: and these axioms may be both true.  
The other that are called Subalternae, be both affirmative, or both negative, the one being general, the other his special: so that they make an argument, of the general to his special: As, 

Every knights service draweth with it guard, marriage, and relief.  
Some knights service draweth with it, guard, marriage, and relief.    
Equipollence is Grammatical, Brian in 11. H. 7. 23. entangleth a plain case with this obscure sophistry of Aequipollentia. Conversion of propositions turneth good axioms many times out of their wit: whatsoever is good in it, is fet either from reciprocation in arguments, or from syllogisms: De modalibus, they say, Non gustabit asinus: Let fine headed cloisterers love them, sine rivali: they be nothing but additions of several affections of arguments in an axiom. Suppositions are built rather upon idle supposals of schoolmen, then grounded upon any sure foundation of natural experience. For these and all like these, no more, but this, As good they were never named, as ever believed.    

The fift Chapter. Of the congregative Axiom.  
HItherto of the simple axiom. Now followeth the compound. The compound axiom is that whose parts be coupled together with a conjunction, and the parts of the contradiction are always one of them true and the other false. Here the turning of the parts is very usual.  
The compound axiom, according to the nature of his conjunction, is either congregative, or segregative. Congregative is that which gathereth or coopleth together the agreeable and disagreeable arguments, affirming the one, and denying the other.  
The congregative is either copulative, or connexive: copulative is that, whose coninuction is copulative, as that of Thomalyn in july. 
But shepherd mought be meek and mild, well eyed, as Argus was:  
With fleshly folly undefiled, and stout, as steed of brass.   
Master Plowden. Fol. 75. b. Assizes sont le plus speedy suits que le ley done. Et le ley plus grandement ceux favour, et favour auxi les choses que font speed et expedition en ceo, et abhor touts delays que sont en retardation deal assizes. 
The negation and contradiction is,  
But shepherd mought not, etc.  And 
Assizes ne sont, etc.   
The true judgement of this copulative axiom dependeth on the truth of every part: for if all the parts be true, it is then a true axiom: false, if any be false.  
hereunto must be referred full comparisons and similitudes, wherein the conjunction is the very relation itself, as, Colyn in january. 
And from mine eyes the drizzling tears descend,  
As on your boughs the ysicles depend.   
Here the judgement is compound, as if he had said, the ysicles depend on your boughs, and the tears fall from mine eyes.  
The contradiction of these, are the denials to every part.  

Annotations.  
COmpound:] the word, hypothetical, which is here commonly used, is neither proper nor fit for this purpose. For, in absolute copulative and discretive axioms, there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no condition at all.  
Whereas I have already oftentimes in this second book used these words, a verb, and a Ceniunction: it is to be understood, that I mean not the naked words: (for that were Grammatical, and belonging only to speech: not Logical, and pertaining to reason:) but the verb and conjunction of the mind, wit, and reason: which indeed is commonly, although not always, expressed by some such Grammatical verb and Conjunction.  
The negation in a copulative axiom is not the denying of the parts conjoined; but the denying of the conjoining of the p●…rtes As thus,  
shepherds must not be both meek and mild, and welleyd, and undefiled, and stout, altogether.  
Q. An copulatum axioma sit sine notis copulativis, ut Titius, Mevius, Decius haeredes sunto.  
In 22. E. 4. 32. In debt sur le custom de Londres de foreign attachment, le def. plead en bar, un copulatine, s. le record del recovery, et auxi le custom de Londres, le pl. traverse l'un part, s. le custom, et est troue faux per certificate, ergo tout est faux, car le nature d'un copulative, est que si part de luy soit faux, tout serra faux. Bryan.  
Legulei aliquando accipiunt, Et, pio, aut, & contra. Vt, home bargain ou vend sa terre a un altar, et covenant de fair un bone et sufficient estate in féesimple all bargainée et ses heirs in le term de s. Michael, procheine; et devant le term de s. Michael, le bargaignée morust, hîc le bargaignor poet et doit fair estate in term de s. Michael all heir le bargaignée: et uncore les parolles fueront, que il fairoit estate all bargaignée et ses heirs: hîc, et, est prise, pro, aut. Sed barbarismus imperitorum ne doit estre prejudicial all art.  
In omni composito axiomate, praeter discretum, duplex est modus contradicendi. Primo, cum contradicitur vinculo compositionis, & tùm contradictio dividit verum & falsum, ut Esopus & ingeniosus fuit & formosus, Esopus non & ingeniosus fuit & formosus. Secundo, cùm contradicitur compositi partibus, ut Esopus fuit & ingeniosus & formosus, Esopus nec ingeniosus fuit, nec formosus, & tum non dividit verum & falsum ait Piscator.    

The sixth Chapter. Of a connexive Axiom.  
Aconnexive Axiom, is that, whose conjunction is connexive, as, Hobbinoll in june. 
Then, if by me thou list advised be,  
Forsake the soil that so doth thee bewitch.   
Master Plowden Fol. 11. b. Car en 2. R. 2. in trespass, i●… est tenus come un maxim, que si ascun home ad interest a ascun choose per le grant ou assent d'un altar: et le partio que ad tiel interest, ne poet aver le principal chose sans fair altar chose, que il poet fair le dit altar chose, et ceo justifier, eo que il est le meynes a vener a son profit.  
Whose contradiction is, though thou be advised by me, yet thou needest not forsake the soil etc. And, comentque il ne poet aver le principale chose sans fair altar chose, uncore il navera ceo etc. For, the affirmation signifieth, if the former part be true, than the later must needs follow; wherefore the negative and contradictory must be thus: if, or though the antecedent be granted, yet the consequent doth not necessarily follow.  
Wherefore when we judge the connexive a●…iome to be absolutely true, we judge it also to be necessary. Albeit the necessity ariseth only of, or dependeth upon the necessary coupling together of the parts: which may be when as, notwithstanding, both the parts severally disposed are false, as in the first example: for neither did he leave the soil, nor follow Hobbinols counsel: which counsel if he had followed, then must he necessarily have left that country: for this was his counsel.  
The judgement of this axiom is certain knowledge, when the connexion of the parts is necessary, but if the parts be variable, and the connexion only probable, than our judgement thereof is only an opinion.  
In May the gate to her kiddy: 
Thy father had he lived this day  
To see the branch of his body display,  
How would he have joyed at this sweet sight?   
Hitherto must be referred that relation which is expressed by an adverb of time.  
In December. 
Whilom in youth when flowrd my joyful spring,  
Like swallow swift I wandered here and there.  
As often as thy brother offends, so often forgive him.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 541. Quant divers choses sont dit a un mesme instant, et l'un ne poet prendre effect sans altar; le comen ley aiudgera ceo de preceder et ensuer, eu pheasant lentent de parties de prender effect.  

Annotations. Elenches.  
THe other axioms are not so easily abused as this. For here the negation is of no force at all, unless it be directly referred to the band which is a conjunction. Therefore although a man might think this to be a Negation.  
If Dido live, she is not dead: Yet indeed, it is an affirmation, whose negation should be thus.  
Not if she live, therefore she is not dead, or, it doth not follow, that if Dido live, therefore she is not dead.  
Beurhusius giveth this Canon, which seemeth strange to many. There may be an affirmation, though both the parts be denied, as, if he be not industrious, he will not be learned.  
This is Berhusius his example: the like whereof is this.  
If he be not in London, he is not in Cheapside. Ista negatio aequipollet affirmation●… s. he that is out of London, is out of Cheapside.  
And unless this be granted to be an affirmative axiom, there will be a very good syllogism made of only Negatives, contrarily to the common received verse: for, I can very well reason thus. 

If it be not in London it is not in Cheapside:  
But it is not in London, therefore  
It is not in Cheapside.    
A connexive axiom is that also in Master Plowden: Fol. 10. b. Et il y ad un principal on foundation en le comen ley pur construction des parolles, ou clauses, ou sentences, s. que en chescun grant, ou done, 〈◊〉 les parolles soyent ambiguous et doubtful, que ils serra prise plus fort encounter les grauntors ou donors, et plus beneficial a ceux as queux le grant ou done fuit faith.  
[Connexion only probable:] Contingens est connexio, quando partes pro sua probabilitate tantùm ponuntur, id est, neque absolutè consentiunt, neque planè dissèntiunt. Itaque etiam axiomatis veritas ex argumentis sive rebus dispositis, non ex sola connexione dependet: si enim necessitas ex sola connexione esset, omnis connexio esset necessaria, quod nemo dixerit. Wasserleider.  
[adverb of time:] Fit. cor. P. 385. P. 15. Quant le defendant pleda all appeal de rien culpable, priest a defender per son corpse, ill doit getter son gaunce in le court, etc. The same force is in an adverb of place in our law, as in that of 1. H. 5. 3. per Hull. Lou un home demand certain chateux, et per son brief est prove, que le property est deuestue de son possession per le prise, la il couyent a luy de metter le price. Here these words, lou and lafoy, be in sense no more but, if, and then, or when and then.  
Connexum duobus modis negatur: simpliciter quando negatio praeponitur coniunctioni; apertius, quandò inconsequentia etiam exponitur; ut fi dies est, lucet: non, si dies est, lucet. Et, si dies est, non ideò lucet, vel non sequitur lucere. Itaque, non satis accuratè Boetius dicit, ad consequentem propositionem respiciendum esse, ut affirmativa vel negativa, propositio connexa iudicetur: ut, si est A, est B: affirmativa est, ait Boetius: si est A, non est B; negativa: at, inquam, tam est affirmativa secunda propositio haec, quam illa prima. Deceptus est autor huius dogmatis dissensionis specie, quia illa enunciata dissentirent, nec simul esse vera possent, ideò contradicentia putavit. At contradictio est affirmatio & negatio eiusdem de eodem, illic, si est A, est B; affirmatio est consequentis affirmati de antecedente affirmato: hîc, si est A, non est B, affirmatio item, sed consequentis negati de affirmato antecedente: at affirmatio affirmationi non contradicit, licet opponatur alio genere.  
Connexive axioms be called Conditional: of these there be infinite in our law, as may appear by the large titles and discourses of conditions in Littleton, Parkins, Fitzherbert and Brooke. Conditio, saith one, triplex est: concipitur enim aut in praeteritum, praesens, aut futurum. In futurum conceptae sunt possibiles vel impossibiles. Possibiles sunt vel simpliciter voluntariae fortuitaeque (volgo potestativae & casuales dicuntur) vel mixtae.    

The seventh Chapter. Of the disjunctive Axiom.  
THe segregative axiom is that whose conjunction is segregative, and therefore is fittest to dispose disagreeable arguments, which must be severed.  
The segregative is either disjunctive or Discretive. disjunctive is that whose conjunction is disjunctive, whereunto is referred the distributive. These are fittest to dispose repugnant arguments, and divisions of two parts.  
In September. 
Diggon Davy I bid her good day.  
Or Diggon her is, or I missay.  
Touts mynes sont royal ou base mines.   
Here the contradiction doth not make the parts necessarily true or false: for if the disjunction or separation be true absolutely and also necessarily without any third thing put between, than the whole axiom is true and necessary, notwithstanding the special parts by themselves considered may be contingent, as here: 
Or Diggon her is, or I missay.  The disjunction is necessary; & yet Diggon her is, is a contingent axiom; also, I missay, is a contingent axiom. But the necessity of the disjunction dependeth on the necessary opposition or disjunction of the parts, not on the necessary truth of the parts. If therefore the disjunction be but contingent, or upon a supposition, than it is not absolutely a true axiom, as when Laeander said, he would either be drowned or have his desire. Otherwise the judgement of this axiom, when the opposition is necessary, is a certain knowledge.  

Annotations.  
PIscator ait axioma disiunctiwm praeponendum esse discreto, ut copulatiwm prius est connexo. Name in copulativo & disiunctivo, pars altera notio simplex est, altera verò notionum complexio; at connexi & discreti utraque pars tum antecedens tum consequens non simplex notio est, sed notionum complexio enunciativa.  
Idem Piscator putat axioma disiunctiwm differre à distributivo. Nam disiunctio est qua partium disiunctarum una aliqua pro vera asseritur, ita ut caeterae res sint falsae, scilicet, cum partes de specie aliqua eius generis, ad quod partes propriè pertinent, enunciantur, ut Socrates est rationalis, aut irrationalis, sanus aut aeger. At distributio est, qua partes enumeratae omnes pro veris asseruntur, unaquaeque cum toto quod distribuitur, particulariter disposita, scilicet cum partes de ipso genere aut integro, ad quod propriè pertinent, enunciantur, ut animal aut rationale est aut irrationale, aut sanum aut aegrum, ac si dicerem, animalium aliud est rationale, aliud irrationale, aliud sanum, aliud aegrum.  
[Laeander:] the verses be these;  

Aut mihi continget foelix audacia saluo,  
Aut mors solliciti finis amoris erit.   
Lease fait pur ans, payant annuelment xx. s. ou un toge. This, as also the whole title of Election dependeth on this disjunctive axiom. The difference is now when it is but for once, or when continual; if continual, eliget grauntor etc. Vide 9 E. 4. & 17. E. 4.  
Congregare, segregare, copulare, connectere, discernere, disiungere, be Latin words, yet by use made English. I need not make any interpretation of them.  
The necessity of the disjunctive axioms, as is said before, dependeth of the necessary opposition of the parts, not of the necessary truth of the same. Which thing being not considered, caused not only Epicurus, who was but a dunsicall Logician, to be deceived, but those also who thought themselves great experienced men in this profession, as Chrysippus and Diodorus: for they imagined that if the disjunction were necessary, than the one or the other part of the axiom should be also necessary, and into the same error doth Tully himself fall in his book de fato.  
Elenches. Sith the disjunction is not necessary, but when the parts have no third thing between, this axiom is false when we thus say, Paris must needs either walk or dance, for he may aswell hold his peace and stand still. So this, Every francktenement is either feesimple or feetayle, for there be other fréeholds, as pur term de vie, and pur altar vie.    

The eight Chapter. Of the Discretive Axiom.  
THe discretive or discerning axiom is that whose conjunction is discretive. Wherefore of disagreeable arguments it is fittest to dispose those that are divers and differ only in respect.  
In December.  

But ah unwise and witless Colin Clout,  
That kidst the hidden kind of many a weed,  
Yet kyds not one to cure thy sore heart root,  
Whose rankling wound as yet doth rifely bleed.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 82. a. Car parols, que ne sont que le verberation del air, ne sont lestatute, mes solement l'image del statute.  
This axiom is judged to be true, when the parts be not only true but divers also the one from the other: false and ridiculous, when otherwise.  

Annotations.  
Dissentanea argumenta etiam congregativo axiomate enunciari possunt, ut mel & dulce est & flawm, hîc diversa enunciantur congregativo copulato. Quin & simplici etiam axiomate diversa enunciari possunt, ut flavedo mellis non est du●…cedo eius.  
Vt occupativa axiomata non admittunt contradictionem, ita nec discretiva; sed illa apta sunt ad respondendum & contradicendum consequentibus falsis enthymematum illlorum hominum quibuscum loquimur: haec ad contradicendum enunciatis copulatis ex part falsis, ut Aesopus & ingeniosus fuit & fonnosus, hoc falsum est ex part posteriore: Si ergò hanc falsitatem velim ostendere contradicendo, non satis erit negare copulationem, sic, Aesopus non & ingeniosus & formosus fuit. Hinc enim nondum liquet, utram partem falsam putem: instituenda est ergò discretio sic, Aesopus non fuit ille quidem formosus, sed tamen fuit ingeniosus, & hic solus est discretorum usus.  
Enunciata per, quanquam, et, tamen, videntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut,  
Hic Priamus, quanquam in media iam morte tenetur,  
Non tamen abstinuit etc. Vbi Virgilius, nihil discernit, sed lectoris cogitationi occurrit, & contradicit, nam lector videns Pyrrhum a●…matum, facilè obijceret, Priamum non audere loqui. Occurrit itaque Virgilius & dicit, quanquam etc. Non tamen etc. Hic est solus horum usus. Piscator.  
Elenchs. It is a ridiculous discretive axiom wherein such things are severed, which naturally go so together, as that they can not somuch as be severed in respect, much less in deed.    

The ninth Chapter. Of a Syllogism and his parts.  
THus much touching the disposition and judgement axiomatical, or of one axiom. Now followeth the disposition of more than one which is called dianoetical.  
The disposition dianoetical is, when one axiom by reason is inferred of another, or drawn out of an other, and then it is called either syllogism or method.  
A Syllogism is a disposition of three axioms, whereby or wherein a doubtful question disposed with an argument invented, and the antecedent or former part being put and granted, is necessarily concluded and determined: for, where an ariome is doubtful, it maketh a question: therefore for proof of the truth, we must invent a third argument, and dispose it with the parts of the question severally, one with the one, and one with the other.  
There be two parts of a syllogism: the antecedent, and conclusion: The antecedent proveth the conclusion, and hath two parts, to wit, the proposition and the assumption.  
The proposition is the first part, wherein the whole question, or at the least, the latter part of the question is disposed with the argument invented.  
The Assumption is the second part, which is taken out of the proposition.  
The conclusion is the last part, proved by the antecedent, and concluding the question which was in doubt.  
If any part of a syllogism be wanting, it is called then an imperfect syllogism, or enthymeme. If any thing be added more and above these three axioms appertaining thereunto, that addition is called a prosyllogisme:  
The parts also of the syllogism are oftentimes disorderedly and confusedly disposed or placed: notwithstanding, if any doubt shall arise hereof, the axiom which is wanting must be supplied, the superfluous prosyllogismes or additions must be cut off, and every part orderly reduced to his own place.  

Annotations.  
A Man may here ask, why I do not aswell put down the nature of a false syllogism as I have done the definition of a false axiom. I answer: that, truth and falsehood being incident to the nature of an axiom, both were to be put down, for that in them both, appeareth the fruit of axiomatical judgement: but it is one thing to divide an axiom into that which pronounceth truth, and that which containeth falsehood: and another thing, to tell what is a false, and an inartificial axiom, made against these rules and prescriptions of Art: the one I did, for it was to be done: the other, as I did it not in the tractate of axioms, so will I not do it in this discourse of syllogisms: the ambiguous signification therefore, of this word, false, was the only occasion of this doubt.  
As in Grammar, and Rhetoric, the natural ordering of nouns and verbs with other parts of speech is commonly altered and changed into a more elegant and artificial conjunction, so in Logic the proposition is not always in the first place: but is diversly disposed, to avoid satiety, and suspicion of Arte.  
We perceive here, by the definition of a syllogism, that the necessity and virtue of consequence dependeth upon the orderly disposition of the question with the argument invented: so that, not the argument properly, but the syllogistical disposition doth either prove or disprove the question.  
He is greatly deceived who thinketh there is no part of judgement but only in syllogisms. For, besides method; the first, and almost the chief kind of judgement is in axioms, yea and the very foundation of all other judgement. For hereby we judge of all the principles of all arts, of all plain and manifest axioms. Yea all such questions to the which we cannot answer yea or nay (as these be: what is it? what parts hath it? where is it? what qualities hath it? when will it come?) are answered by this kind of judgement. For, if you make answer to that which is demanded; the hearer is satisfied.  
But if these axioms be not plain enough of themselves, they must be sent to syllogism, there to be discussed, and so to method, there to be ordered. So that, whatsoever is either by syllogism, or method judged, it is all judged by the help of this first and axiomatical judgement. For if the premises in a syllogism be not sometimes certain and so judged by axiomatical judgement, and granted; there will be no end of making syllogisms: when still we call the grounds thereof into controversy, for want of axiomatical judgement.  
[A Syllogism:] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is, as it were, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Arithmetical deduction of sums in accounts, and so here metaphorically of axioms and arguments.  
The necessity of the consequence in a syllogism dependeth on that old ground, that such things as agree in any third thing, must also agree among themselves. As then, in things that be to be measured with line or by weight, we judge of them as they agree both either in line or weight: so it is also when an axiom doth affirm or deny any thing of an other, whereof we doubt. For, if the line or measure, I mean the third argument, agree with both the parts of the question, it showeth that then the affirmation is true: but if it agree but with one of them, it declareth the negation to be true.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Non enim ex omnibus propositionibus veris syllogismus duntaxàt efficitur, sed ex duabus necessario consequentibus, & inter se non minus cohaerentibus, quàm annuli inter se coherent. Oportet enim conclusionem ex superiorum propositionum consecutione exprimi.  
There is but one kind of argumentation, and, that is a syllogism. For, an Enthymeme is nothing but a contracted syllogism. If the subject be one and the same in both the propositions, than the Mayor wanteth: but if the predicate, than the Minor. Aristotle calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It hath his name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is in Latin cogitare, & commentari, to think, to excogitate; to toss a man's mind, and meditate. For the mind never rests when an imperfect syllogism is put down, before it hath supplied that which wanteth, the better to judge of the whole perfect syllogism: whereupon the satirical poet saith, aut curtum sermone rotato, Torqueat Enthymema. Juvenal satyr. 6.  
Master Plowden Fol. 361. a. Stowell le ayel fuit estrange all fine, et de pleine age all temps del fine leave, ergò il fuit lie. Add the proposition hereunto, it will be a plain and perfect syllogism. So again in the same place;  
Stowell le demandant fuit estrange all fine, et deins age all temps del fine leave: Ergo il est exempt. Add the proposition, and this also will be a full syllogism.  
[The proposition:] in a compound syllogism, which they call hypothetical, the proposition, that is, the Mayor, as they term it, contains the whole question: but in a simple one, which they term a categorical syllogism, it containeth only the later part of the question, which is called of them praedicatum▪ or attributum, the predicate or attribute, because it is spoken, affirmed, attributed or applied to the former.  
[The assumption is taken out:] as from a thing put down and granted, and now applied more nearly to the purpose, of the Latin, Assumo.  
The schoolmen have commonly four kinds of Argumentations, Syllogism, Enthymeme, Induction, Example, to the which some add Sorites and Dilemma: others also there be, but these are the most famous: and all these, as I said before, come all to one. For an Enthymeme is but a contracted and short syllogism: An example, but an argument from the like or equal, a facto simili seu pari, and no argumentation of itself without the help of a syllogism: An Induction, which is called the Socratical Argumentation, is but an argument concluded by a syllogism, from the enumeration of the parts: A Sorites, but an enthymematical progression by certainy degrees. Tully calleth it Penelope's telam, because it is woven as it were, by ascending and affirming, but unwoven again by descending and denying: the stoics used this very much: it is called Sorites of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. aceruus, a heap, because, as of many grains is made a●… heap of corn, so of many degrees an argument called Sorites, by this enthymemati●…all progression. Whereupon the Poet saith:  
inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acerui.  
It is commonly called, à primo ad ultimum, but not so aptly, for as well may it be called, ab ultimo ad primum. As in that which Themistocles was wont to use:  
The Athenians rule all the other Grecians: I rule the Athenians; my wife, me; my boy, my wife:  
Therefore my son ruleth all Greece. Or thus,  
My son ruleth my wife; my wife commandeth me:  
I the Athenians; the Athenians all Graece:  
Therefore my son ruleth all Graece.  
Master Plowden Fol. 229. b. hath a Sorites of divers degrees. Le plaintiff derive son lease de Cock, quell derive son title del Count del Pembroke, quell derive son title del roy Edward, quell derive son title per descent del roy Henry le huict, quel derive son title per descent del roy Henry le scpt, quel deryue son title per le fine, et per le morant del Marques sans issue. Issintque si le plaintiff ne prove sufficientment, que le Marques est mort sans issue, et que le roy avoyt estate en la terre puis sa mort, il ne prove sufficientment sa title ne interest.  
Bracton. lib. 5. Fol. 335. Item, cum nulla summonitio nec defalta, nulla sequi deberet Captio: & cum Captio nulla, nulla sequi deberet possessionis amissio: Ergò à primo, ubi nulla summonitio, nulla sequitur possessionis amissio, quia ubi primum & principale, quod est summonitio, non subsistit, nec ea quae sequuntur, locum habere debent.  
Lastly, a Dilemma, is nothing else, but an argument from the contraries or opposites, or any disagreeable argument. It is called Dilemma, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to take on both the sides: because the arguments are so set, as that there is no way left to escape, as in that of Protagoras the master, and Euathlus the scholar: where Euathlus gave some money in hand to his Rhetorical Doctor Protagoras, and covenanted to pay the rest when Euathlus should win the first cause that ever he pleaded for. Protagoras suing Euathlus for his money, said, if Euathlus overcome me, then by bargain & composition he must pay me the money; if he lose, then by the course of Law. Nay qd Euathlus, if I lose, then by covenant you get nothing: if I win, then will the judgement discharge me.  
The like is that which Bias used, and was reforted by Phavorine: If you marry any woman, she must either be fair and so shall you have her 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, common: or else fowl; and than you shall find her 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉: therefore marry none at all. Nay, said Phavorine, there be women of middle beauty, neither so fine, as to make every man to love, nor so foul, as to make every man hate them. Therforé a man must marry.  
So in Arist. 2. Rhet. A certain precise priest would not suffer his son to have any dealing or conference with the people. For saith he, if thou speak truth, thou shalt displease men, if untruth, God: Nay rather fear not to meddle with the multitude, for if thou tell the truth, thou shalt please God, if untruth, men.  
Plowden: Fol. 362. Browne a most Logical Lawyer concludeth his witty disputation with this Dilemma, si Stowell fuit lie per le puruieu del statute, il est apres except: si ne'stlye per le puruieu, ne besoigne destre except, ergo il est, alarge.  
I said before, that Exemplum, an example, was but an argument a facto simili, seu pari, and that the only force of argumentation therein proceedeth from disposition syllogistical: so it is in 4. H. 6. 13. brief de maintenance fuit port per deux, ou le tort fuit faith all troy's, lafoy Newton prove que le brief abatera, quia ne fuit port per touts troy's, sic, si le tort fuit en common, donque eur couyent de prendre lour action en common, et que le tort fuit en common, ieo provera, car si eux fuesont nonsuit per cause del maintenance, cest in common: si soysoyent bars per cause del maintenance, cest in common, et les expenses del suit sont en common. ergo, etc.  
Neither in these, nor in that called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Violentum, and such like, is there any new disposition or art of consequence, but only that of syllogism.  
[A prosyllogisme:] Vide 4. H. 6. 30. In repl bastardy fuit allege in le master le avowant, le question fuit, an ill avera aid de son master, devant que il reioy●…●…l bastardy, et per Martin, il ne auera.  

Le syllogism est is●…t.  
ou nul entry del aid, la nul aid.  
Icy nul entry del aid, car 

Si ascun entry del aid icy, 〈◊〉 serra v●…l ●…co que est dwant ple, s. petit auxilium d'un ti●…l, sine quo ipse non potest respondere: vel apres ple, s. petit auxilium ad manutenendum exitum, le consequens est prou●…, 

ne sont plusors que deu●… manners de ent●…ies deal aid, devant ple, ou apres, ●…'un in real action, sauter in personal.  
Ergo si sort omninò, opo●… tet quòd sit vel hoc, ve illud.    
mes icy. 

il navera l●…ntry devant ple, s. fine quo non potest 〈◊〉 spondere, car 〈◊〉 ●…sme ad respond, s. ad faith Conusance.  
Nec l'entry apres, ad manutenendū●…xitum, car icy nul issue est join inter eux.    
Ergo nul entry omnino. 

In 3. H 6. 21. b. Rolf usa une prosyllogisme, vide le am,      
Ergo nul aid icy.   
Canons, Elenches. In every simple syllogism that is not proper, there must be some affirmative and general argument.  
Interdum quoque simplex syllogismus ex enunciatis compositis constare potest, si modo compositio ipsa argumenti simplex sit. Vt apparebit aliâs. Freigius. Snellius. Ramus.  
Here then generally it is a false syllogism, when all the ariomes be either negative or proper. Ex omnibus enim specialibus, aut negatis, nullus communis syllogismus in ulla figura simplici, concluditur. Ramus. 2. lib. animaduers.  
Proximum genus syllogismi & Methodi ignoratur, itaque ponitur dispositio.  
Vt in connexo & disiuncto axiomate veritas pendet ex connexione & disiunctione, non veritate partium, sic syllogismus ex necessitate consecutionis, licet omnes partes sint impos●…ibiles, ut, omnis arbor est lapis, omnis leo est arbour, ergo omnis leo est lapis.  
In every syllogistical conflict and controversy, there is a defendant & an opponent. The first is to urge, prove, conclude; the other to repel, avoid, and drive back. The disputation being once begun, it is an unorderly confusion for the same man sometimes to answer, sometimes to reply, and never constantly to play out his own part: much like the two clowns in Virgil, which, when they could not answer what was propounded, begin a fresh with a new doubt on the neck of the old: Dic, quibus in terris, quoth the one, and Dic, quibus in terris, quoth the other, Arréede me a riddle, saith Damaetas: and Arreede me a riddle replieth Menalcas, thinking it a fair conquest, to have taken and given blow for blow, as Bakers and Butchers use to do, who never care for any curious wards, but lay on load like good fellows, one for one, till both begin to stagger, with their valiant blood about their bruised pates. I have therefore in a word or two, laid down some general, instructions and directions for orderly disputations.  
Logical exercise is that which expresseth that in particular practice which is generally put down in art. For as art followeth nature, so exercise followeth art Herein let us consider 

1. The adjuncts & affections of it, for it is performed. either by writing or speaking. & either of these is either continued, as in long discourses & tractates. or interrupted as, in 

Di●…logues.  
Disputations. Vide B B.    
2. The specials of it. Vide A A.    
B B. Disputation is an argumentable discussing of a doubtful proposition▪ where ●…te. 

1. The disputers 

The proponent, who defendeth the proposition or position: whereunto also the modera for and determiner of the disputatton is referred, who commonly man●…eyneth the position.  
The opponent, who defendeth the contrary.    
2. The duties of the disputers, either, 

common to both them, as in 

preparation and fur niture, 

of instruments for the disputatiion, as be 

Logic.  
Rhetoric    
things requisite for the same, it must be noted therefore. 

1. What may confirm or confute the position.  
2 What sect of philosophy the adversary followeth.  
3. They must have in memory the general heads of arts, which are commonly used in disputations.      
Conflict and asassault: they must neither 

Wrangle about trifling words,  
Nor make long and impertinent excursion and vagaries.  
Nor seek starting holes.  
Nor bring in any such thing as may rather make against them, then with them.  
Nor seek to supplant or cirumvent one another injuriously.  
●…or overween themselves, or be obstinate and singular in conceit.  
Nor fa●… to threatening and railing with undecent terms.      
Proper to either of them. C C.      
C C. The proper duties of the 

Opponent be 

1. To have his weapons in a readiness, that is, to have his objections framed artificially with syllogistical disposition.  
2. Not to cast his arguments confusedly on a heap, but to use them distinctly, one after another.  
3. To have Prosyllogismes in a readiness, for the confirmation of such parts of his syllogisms, as may by likelihood, be denied.  
4. To bring in nothing which hath not some probability or show of truth in it.  
5. Sometimes to deal directly & openly: sometimes covertly, and by bringing his adversary to an absurdity or impossibility.  
6. Never to chop in impertinent matters, which make nothing at all to the matter in controversy.    
Defendant be 

1. In choice of his position, that it be not 

Repugnant to sense.  
Contrary to equity & honesty.  
Too hard and difficult.    
2. Both in 

Repetitions of the objections made, & that either by the self-same words, or with the self same sense, in the like order as they were propounded: with a kind of courteous preface: that both himself may have some meane-space of conceiving a solution, and the auditors better understand what was objected.  
And also in answering of the same.        
D D. The objections be answered. 

either 

By scorning, and rejecting, if absurd fooleries be objected, or such as no man understandeth.  
By granting and confessing, when such things be brought in, as make nothing against the position.  
By affirming or denying, when any interrogation is ●…adr: or else by ask what he meaneth by his interrogation, if it ●…e ambiguous and sophistical.    
Or by direct soluti on, & that 

either perfect, when the very cause is showed, why the conclusion is not sufficient, and it is 

1. by denying either of 

The premises and prosyllogisms when they be false,  
Or the consecution & consequence, when the fault is in the form of conclusion: for the conclusion itself must never be denied.    
2. either 

by distinguishing when either 

The questions and interrogations be captious and doubtful.  
Or the premises be true not absolutely, but in part. And here frivolous distinctions must be avoided.    
Or conditional granting, as I grant, if you so understand it. Sometimes the defendant doubteth of the truth of some one of the premises, and doth therefore leave it▪ of purpose to answer to the other that is more plain, Thus, Let the Mayor pass for a while, I now answer to the minor.      
Imperfect by bringing in some instance, that is by taking a particular exception to a general proposition.      
A A. somuch of the affecctions of this logical exercise the specials now follow, which be 

Analysis, in vnd●…ing & examining that w●…ich is already made, & is 

either belonging to Invention: as 

to search and invent the question itself.  
to pick out the arguments and proofs.  
do refer them every one to their several heads, & there to inquire of their sufficiency, as whether that be used for a Cause which is no cause, etc.    
or to Disposition & that either 

axiomatical, where all the axi●…mes must be also brought to their heads, and their truth or falseness diligently examined.  
or dianoetical which is either 

Syllogistical, for the examination and trial of consequ●…ion, what followeth, or not followeth.  
Methodical, for proof of order and Methodical handling of the ma●…ter discoursed upon.        
Genesis, in making or framing of any thing by our own industry, 〈◊〉 that either by 

way of imitation and that either of the whole work or of some part either of these is 

in words, called Translation.  
in things called properly imitation, we must Imitate 

neither all authors, but the best of ●…l:  
nor all things but the best, & that freely, not seruile●…y, as binding our judgement to othermen's fancy.      
Or by proper Invention, where we must 

First peruse every place of Logical invention for the inventing of proofs and arguments.  
then dispose them artificially both by judgement. 

axiomatical:  
and dianoetical & that both 

Syllogistical,  
& Methodical.              

The tenth Chapter. Of a simple syllogism.  
A Syllogism is either simple or compound. The simple is that, wherein the later part of the question is disposed in the proposition, the former part in the assumption, and is affirmative when all the parts be affirmed: Negative, when the conclusion with the proposition, or the assumption is denied. General when the proposition and assumption be general; Special, when one of them only is general: Proper, when both of them are proper or singular.   

The eleventh Chapter. Of the contracted syllogism.  
THere be two kinds of simple syllogisms. The first when of the former argument in the proposition either affirmed or denied, but in the assumption affirmed, the conclusion is special.  

Affirmative general.  
Constancy is a virtue. 
Da-rap-ti.   
Constancy is confidency,  
Therefore some confidency is a virtue.   

Neg. general.  
Rashness is no virtue, 
Felapton.   
Rashness is confidency:  
Some confidency is no virtue.   

Affir. special.  
Some wise man is rich, 
Disamis.   
Every wise man is praise worthy,  
Some praiseworthy man is rich.   

A wise man is prayseworthie, 
Da-ti-si.   
Some wiseman is poor,  
Some poor man is prayseworthie.   

Neg. special.  
Some fool is not fortunate, 
Bo-car-do.   
Every fool is contemned,  
Some contemptible man is not fortunate.   

Fools be not happy, 
Ferison.   
Some fools be fortunate,  
Some fortunate men be not happy.   

Affir. proper.  
Socrates is a philosopher,  
Socrates is a man,  
Some man is a philosopher.   

Neg. proper.  
Thersites is no philosopher,  
Thersites is a man,  
Some man is no philosopher.   
But the clearness of reason and judgement requireth no such disposition, but is content with a more contracted kind of argumentation. This contraction is, when the argument invented to a particular question, is put for an example, in such sort, that it go before either part, and be affirmed in the assumption, thus: 

Some confidence is virtue, as Constancy:  
Some confidence is not virtue, as Rashness.    
For here the argument invented cometh before both the parts of the question, as though it were expressed thus:  


That constancy is a virtue, and confidency a virtue,  
Therefore some confidency is a virtue.   And, 

Rashness to be no virtue, yet a kind of confidency,  
Therefore some confidency to be no virtue.    
And after this manner, Use, the master of syllogistical judgement, doth always contract it, and never otherwise express it. So in that example.  
Ascun Husbandman tua sa file, come Saunders; which, if you express it, will be thus: 

Saunders poisoned his daughter,  
Saunders was an husbandman,  
Therefore some husbandman poisoned his daughter.    

Annotations.  
THis chapter containeth the third figure of Aristotle.  
In all those artificial words, Darapti, Felapton, etc. and others of the same kind, there be certain significant letters to be observed, as, A, signifieth a general affirmative axiom: E, a general negative: I, a special affirmative: O, a special negative: besides some consonantes which be notes of Reduction, which I little esteem of.  
The old verses be thus,  

Asserit, A: negat, E: sunt universaliter ambae:  
Asserit, I: negat, O: sunt particulariter ambae.   
Valla rejecteth this contracted syllogism, so doth Scribonius, sith, as they think, there is no example hereof to be found: and by Scribonius, there is no new syllogistical disposition here, but only an argument from the special. But Lazarus Schonerus, adducit haec exempla, Primum est in Miloniana. Negant intueri lucem fas esse ei, qui à se hominem occisum fateatur. In qua tandem urbe hoc homines stultissimi disputant? Nempè in ea quae primùm judicium de capite vidit, M. Horatij fortissimi viri, qui nondum libera civitate, tamen populi Romani comitijs liberatus est, cùm sua manu sororem esse interfectam fateretur, syllogismus hic est, 

M. Horatius populi comitijs absolutus est,  
M. Horatius confessus est se sua manu caedem fecisse,  
Ergò aliquis à se hominem occisum fassus, est absolutus.    
Item in eadem. Quod si duodecim tabulae nocturnum furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo defenderit, interfici impunè voluêrunt, quis est, qui quoquo modo quis interfectus sit, puniendum putet, cum videat aliquando gladium ad occidendum hominem ab ipsis porrigi legibus?  

Syllogismus hic est,  
Furem nocturnum interficere licet,  
Furem nocturnum interficere, est hominem occidere,  
Ergò hominem occidere aliquando licet.   

Huius generis est illud,  
Rivos deducere est licitum diebus festis,  
Rivos deducere est opus rusticum,  
Quaedam igitur opera rustica sunt licita festis diebus.   
Virgilius sic judicat, 1. Georgic. sed pro argumento exemplum sextuplex, subijcit particulari quaestioni.  

Quippè etiam festis quaedam exercere diebus  
Fas & iura sinunt: rivos deducere, nulla  
Relligio vetuit, segeti praetendere saepem,  
Insidias avibus moliri, incendere vepres,  
Balantumque gregem fluuio mersare salubri.  
Saepè oleo tardi costas agitator aselli,  
Vilibus aut onerat pomis, lapidemque revertens  
Incusum, aut atrae massam picis urbe reportat.   
Exempla specialia suo generi particulariter sic interdum in artium praeceptis accommodantur, quale est illud de similitudine, lib. 1. dialecticae Rameae, cap. 20. aliquando nota nulla est, Virg. Aeg. 2. O formose puer etc. Syllogismus hic est. 

In hoc exemplo nota est nulla,  
Est autem similitudinis:  
Ergò aliquando similitudinis nota est nulla.    
Sic in Rami Arithmetica, lib. 1. cap. 1. Numerus potest esse minimus, ut unitas, syllogismus hic est. 

unitas est res minima,  
unitas est numerus:  
Aliquis igitur numerus est minimus etc.    
Elenches. Among all these syllogisms, there is not any one good, where the assumption is negative.    

The twelfth Chapter. The explicate Syllogism.  
IN a Syllogism simple of the second kind the proposition must be always general or proper: the conclusion negative, if either the proposition or assumption be negative.  
There be two kinds of them: The first wherein the argument invented doth follow both in the proposition & assumption, and must be denied in one of them.  
The first general; Piers in May.  

He that playeth while his flock is unsed, can give 
Caesar:  no account to great God Pan,  
A good shepherd can give account to great God Pan.  
Therefore a good shepherd playeth not while his flock is unfed.   

Master Plowden Fol. 213. b.  
Nul secret verdict deal jurors fait le plaintiff nonsue, 
Ce-Sa-Re.   
Chescun verdict de droit bien rendue, fait le plaintiff nonsue.  
Ergò Nul verdict bien rendue, est secret.   


The second general in May.  
The hireling letteth his sheep run at random: 
Ca-Mes-Tres.   
The good shepherd letteth not his sheep run at random, Therefore  
The good shepherd is not a hireling.   Master Plowden: Fol. 5.  

Chescun bone agreement covyent este perfect, 
Ca-Mes. Tres.   
Nul incertain agreement est perfect:  
Ergo nul incertain agreement est bone agreement.   


The first special in july.  
A good shepherd is not idle: 
Fes-Ti-no.   
Paris is idle, therefore,  
Paris is not a good shepherd:   Master Plowden: Fol. 28. b.  

Nul bone remainder poet commencer sur condition: 
Fes-Ti-No.   
Cest remainder fait per le prior de bath a William  
Beiushm est limit de commencer sur condition, s. si ipse habitaret, & residens esset etc.  
Ergo Cest remainder n'est bone remainder.   


The second Special.  
He that sitteth safely sitteth below: 
Baroco.   
Algryn did not sit below, Therefore  
Algryn sat not safely.   Master Plowden: Fol. 34. a.  

Chescune bone condition est compulsive, 
Baroco.   
Cest limitation en William Beiushm, n'est compulsive.  
Co. Ergo cest limitation nest bone condition.   


The first proper.  
Morrels brain was not bruised by an Eagle,  
Algrins' brain was bruised by an Eagle,  
Therefore Algrin is not moral.   Master Plowden, Fol. 101. a.  

john vane Salisbury ne tue Oliver ap David avec malice prepence:  
Richard Salisbury tue Oliver ap David avec malice prepence. Ergo,  
Richard vane Salisbury n'est john etc. vel,  
N'est d'estre acquit, come, john etc.   


The second proper.  
Paris was proud  
Moses was not proud, Therefore  
Moses was not Paris,   Master Plowden: Fol: eodem.  

Richard Salisbury fuit murderer,  
john vane Salisbury ne fuit murderer Ergo,  
john n'est semblable all Richard etc.   

Annotations.  
Negative if:] Here upon the schoolmen give out this rule. Conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem. For a Negation is worse than an affirmation, as we have heard already. But that which they put down generally as incident to all syllogisms is here artificially set down in his proper place.  
Others have left out these two last kinds of syllogisms; but injuriously: for they are as artificial as the rest, and oftentimes used to discern singulers that seem to be the same. Singularia, say they, non considerantur in arte etc. absurdè. Nam tota Astrologia est de singularibus de sole etc. tamen praecepta sunt catholica. Sic in foro, curia, rostris, etc. omnia singularia. Sic accusare solemus hunc, defendere illum, etc. Omnia singularia.  
As before, the contracted syllogism was according to the disposition of the third figure put down by Aristotle, where the Medium is the former part in either of the premises: so this first kind of the explicate syllogism is the same that Aristotle comprehendeth in his second figure, where the Medium, or third argument is the later part in either premisse. Lastly, the second kind of explicate syllogisms, which followeth in the next chapter, is contained in the first aristotelical figure, wherein the third argument is the former part in the proposition, and the later part in the assumption: according to the verse:  
Sub, prae, prima: bis prae, secunda: tertia, bis sub.   

Annotations. Elenches.  
NO good syllogism can be made in this kind, if either all the axioms be affirmative, or the proposition be special, as, 

That which useth reason is best,  
The world is best,  
Therefore the world useth reason.    
For so (saith Cotta in the third book of Cicero concerning the nature of Gods) a man may conclude, that because nothing is better than the whole world, therefore the world can play on the Lute.  
Yet I say not this, as though no truth could be concluded by the like disposition: for, true things are sometimes concluded by sophistical and deceitful disposition, as that of Persius in his ●…st satire. 

An quisquam est alius liber, nisi ducere vitam  
Cui licet, ut voluit? licet, ut volo, vivere: Non sum  
Liberior Bruto?   

He is free that lives as he list,  
I live as I list, therefore I am free.    
But it is therefore noted as sophistical, for that, of true things, by the self same disposition, an untruth may be concluded, As, 

A man is a living creature,  
A horse is a living creature. Therefore,  
A horse is a man.   Again, 

He that affirmeth a man to be a living creature, saith truly.  
He that saith, thou art an ass, affirmeth a man to be a living creature, Therefore  
He that saith, thou art an ass, saith truly.    
Thus much for the first fallatian, when all the axioms be affirmative. The second followeth, when the proposition is special, as in that which was objected against Diogenes. 

Thou hast that which thou didst never lose,  
But horns thou didst never lose,  
Therefore thou hast horns.    
For if you resolve it thus, 

He hath horns that never lost horns,  
Diogenes never lost horns,  
Therefore Diogenes hath horns.    
Then either the proposition will be false, if it be general, or the syllogism will prove sophistical, if it be special.  
The proper duty therefore of a syllogism is, to lay down a certain, true, and infallible rule of reasoning in such sort, that the premises once granted, the conclusion must in any case follow, and therefore this manner of reasoning, as all such like, is left out, as not artificial, constant, and immutable; but, doubtful, uncertain, and deceitful. For, although sometimes thereby a truth may be concluded, yet seeing that it also for the most part causeth error, it is not admitted as a law syllogistical.    

The 13. Chapter. Of the second kind.  
IN this second kind, the argument goeth before in the proposition, and followeth affirmatively in the assumption.  

The general affirmative.  

Bar-Ba-Ra.  That which bringeth to good, is good,  
Death bringeth to good, Therefore  
Death is good.   

Colyn in November.  
Unwise and wretched men to weet what's good or ill.  
We deem of death as doom of ill desert:  
But knew we fools what it brings us until,  
die would we daily once it to expert.  
Fair fields and pleasant lays there been,  
The fields ay fresh, the grass ay green.  
o happy hearse:  
Make hast ye shepherds thither to revert,  
o joyful verse.   
Master Plowden Fol. 315. a.  


Bar-Ba-Ra.  Les choses pluis excellents del terre perteignont all roy,  
o'er est le chose plus excellent del terre:  
Ergo ore perteigne all roy.   

The general negative.  

Ce-La-Rent  Men must not be bound to more misery than men can bear,  
Shepherds be men,  
Therefore shepherds must not be bound to more misery then etc.   

Hobbinoll in September.  
Ah Diggon, thilk same rule were too straight,  
All the cold season to watch and wait,  
We been of flesh, men as others be,  
Why should we be bound to such misery.  
What ever thing lacketh changeable rest,  
Mought needs decay when it is at best.   
Master Plowden Fol. 332. b.  


Ce-La-Rent  Ceo que vient al roy en respect que il est possessor del corone, ne passera per grant del terre,  
Ore vient al roy come possessor del corone:  
Ergo, ore ne passera per grant del soil.   

The special affirmative.  

Da-Ri-j.  He that hath loved, aught to pity lovers,  
Pan hath loved,  
Therefore Pan ought to pity lovers.   
Colyn in january. 
And Pan thou shepherds god, that once didst love,  
Pity the pains that thou thyself didst prove.   
Master Plowden Fol. 64. a.  


Da-Ri-j.  Cestuy que priest obligations come viscount pour lesser home a mainprize, faith ceo colore officij,  
Lewis Dyve priest obligation de john Maningham etc.  
Ergo Lewis Dyve faith ceo colore officij.   

The special negative.  

Fe-Ri-O.  The pipe which pleaseth where it should not, shall not be kept,  
Colyns pipe pleaseth where it should not,  
Therefore Colyns pipe shall not be kept.   

Wherefore, my pipe, although rude Pan thou please,  
Yet for thou pleasest not where most I would,  
And thou unlucky muse that wontst to ease  
My musing mind, yet canst not when thou should,  
Both pipe and muse, shall sore the while abye,  
So broke his oaten pipe, and down did lie.   
Master Plowden Fol. 64. b.  


Fe-Ri-O.  Nul obligation fait pur aider le viscount pur un tort, 〈◊〉 est loyal,  
Cest obligation de Maningham all Dyve est fait pur aider le viscount pur un tort,  
Ergo cest obligation n'est loyal.   

The proper affirmative in july.  
The great God Pan saved his flock with bloody sweat,  
Christ is the great God Pan,  
Therefore Christ saved his flock with bloody sweat.  
O blessed sheep, o shepherd great, that bought his flock so dear,  
And them did save with bloody sweat from wolves that would them tear.   
Master Plowden, Fol. 401. a.  

Richard Cole tue Elizabeth Pembroke,  
Cestuy que done le coupe le 12. iour del February, est Richard Cole,  
Ergo cestuy que done le coupe, tue Elizabeth Penbroke.   

The proper negative, in April.  
Elysa cannot be blemished with any mortal blot,  
She that sits upon the grassy green, is Elysa,  
Therefore she that sits upon the grassy green cannot be blemished with any mortal blot.   
Master Plowden Fol. 475. a.  

Alexander Archer ne fuit culpable deal mort del Elyanor Saunders,  
Cestuy que counsel john Saunders de tuer sa feme, fuit Alexander Archer,  
Ergo cestuy que counsel etc. ne fuit culpable deal mort del Elyanor Saunders.   

Annotations.  
BArbara, is fittest for a general confirmation; Celarent, for a general confutation; Darij, serveth to prove in part, Ferio, to disprove in part, according to those two old school verses which I rehearsed before.  
As for that kind of demonstration of syllogisms which is done by Reduction, it is more troublesome than needful. For, syllogisms, if they be once artificially made, need no further demonstration, as being of themselves sufficiently confirmed by their several definitions, divisions, examples, and explications.  
Elenches. The syllogism is here nought, if either the proposition be special, or the assumption negative, as, 

A liquod animal est equus:  
Omnis homo est animal:  
Homo igitur est equws.   And, 

Omnis homo est animal:  
Nullus equus est homo  
Nullus igitur equus est animal.      

The 14. Chapter. Of the first kind of a connexive Syllogism.  
THus much for the simple syllogism. The compound syllogism is that wherein the whole question maketh the one part of the proposition affirmed and compounded: And the argument invented, maketh the other part of the proposition, or is contained in it.  
To deny or remove any part in a compound syllogism is to set down the special contradiction thereof.  
The compound syllogism is either connexive, or disjunctive.  
The connexive is that whose proposition is connexive, and is made after two sorts.  
First when the former part of the proposition maketh the assumption, the later part the conclusion. As in this, 

And if that my grandsire me said be true,  
Sycker I am very sib to you.  
If my grandsire told me truth, I am sib to you,  
But my grandsire told me truth,  
Therefore I am sib to you.   Master Plowden Fol. 76. a.  

Si le brief est fait en le nosme du roy, et seal oue son seal, adonques est le fait le roy.  
Mes icy, ceo brief, est fayt en le nosme etc.  
Ergò est le fait del roy.   
Here oftentimes the former part of the proposition maketh not the assumption, but that which is greater, and of more force to conclude than it is, as, 

If there were none but other beasts thine enemies, yet oughtest thou to take heed,  
But now the Fox also, the master of collusion, is thine enemy,  
Therefore much more oughtest thou to take heed.    
Piers useth this in May, in the gates speech to her little one.  

Kiddy, quoth she, thou kenst the great care  
I have of thy wealth and thy welfare,  
Which many wild beasts liggen in wait  
For to entrap in thy tender state:  
But most, the Fox, master of collusion,  
For he has vowed thy last confusion.  
For thy, my kiddy, be ruled by me,  
And never give trust to his treachery.  
And if he chance come, when I am abroad,  
Spar the gate fast, for fear of fraud:  
Ne for all his worst, nor for his best,  
Open the door at his request.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 11. a.  

Si nul forsques un comen person est grantee, on donée, uncore les parolles ambiguous sirrah prize pluis beneficialment a luy.  
Mes icy, le roy mesme est grauntée ●…u donée,  
Ergo, a multo fortiore, les parolles doubtful ferra pluis beneficial a le roy.   
The same kind of syllogism or reasoning is framed by a conjunction of time, with the same force, which this connexive hath, As 

When night draws on, it's time to go homeward,  
But now night draws on, Therefore  
it's now time to get homeward.   Willy in March. 
But see, the Welkin thicks apace,  
And stooping Phoebus steeps his face,  
It's time to haste us homeward.   
Master Plowden: Fol. 263. a.  


Quant sir james Hales met luymesme en le ewe, donques il forfetoit ses biens.  
Mes il met luymesme en le ewe, quant il fuit en vie,  
Ergò, quant il estoit en vie, adonques il forfetoit ses biens.    

Annotations.  
THe special contradiction:] when that which was affirmed in general, is denied in special: or contrarily, affirmed, when it was denied: and when the same thing in special, is both affirmed before and denied after.  
[Connexive or disjunctive:] So then of an axiom copulative or discretive, we understand, that no several and peculiar disposition ariseth.  
Vide 10. E. 4. Lyttleton contra Danby: si le propertie des biyus le mort soit en ascun, tunc serra in le testator, vel in les executors: mes est en ascun, ergò in l'un ou l'auter: ●…est connexive: Then again: 

Le propertie est in le testator, ou in les executors,  
Mes nemy in le testator,  
Ergò in les executors: cest un disjunctive.    
In composito syllogismo, assumptio, praeter argumentum, nihil assumit quaestionis; quod tamen fit semper in simplici syllogismo.  
If not the whole question, but only the latter part of it be contained together with the argument invented, in the proposition, than the syllogism is simple, although the proposition be compound. For as I said elsewhere, whensoever the disposition is simple, there the syllogism is simple, though the parts be compound. So that in Catullus is a simple syllogism. 1. Gen.  

Si quicquam cupidoque optantique obtigit unquam & insperanti, hoc est gratum animo propriè.  
Quarè hoc est gratum nobis, quoque charius auro, quod te restituis, Lesbian, mî cupido,  
Restituis cupido, atque insperanti ipsa refers to nobis: o lucem candidiore nota.  
Quis me uno vivit foelicior? aut magis hac quid optandum vita dicere quis poterit?   

Ramus format sic:  
Quod optandum redierit, gratum est,  
Lesbian Catullo optata redijt:  
Optata igitur est.   

So in 2. Gen.  
Si quicquam sit homo, tum erit animal,  
Lapis non est animal,  
Lapis ergo non est homo.   
Nay, which is more, the syllogism may be simple, though all the parts be conditional and compound, thus: 

Si sit honestum, erit laudabile,  
Si sit justum, erit honestum,  
Ergò si sit justum, erit laudabile.   As Ramus more at large putteth down in his French Logic.  
Elenches. There be two other connexive syllogisms different from these already rehearsed: but because they are not certain, constant, and always infallible: therefore they be not put down in the text, as precepts of Art: yet are they diligently to ●…e observed, for they are often in authors: especially the first, which is very usual: but the second is not so common.  
The first kind is that which taketh away the former part, that it may also take away the later. Terence in Adolphis.  
Dem: Caeterum. Placet tibi factum Mitio? Mr: Non, si queam mutare: ●…nc cum non queo, aequo animo fero.  
Cicero for Muraena.  
Etenim si largitionem factam esse confiterer, idque recte esse factum defenderem, facerem improbe, etiamsi alius legem tulisset. Cum verò nihil commissum esse contra legem defendam, quid est quod meam defensionem latio legis impediat?  
Ovid in his second book of sorrowful songs.  

Si, quoties peccant homines, sua fulmina mittat  
jupiter, exiguo tempore mermis erit:  
Nunc ubi detonuit, strepituque exterruit orbem,  
Purum discussis aera reddit aquis.  
jure igitur, genitorque deûm, rectorque vocatur:  
jure, capax mundus nil jove maius habet.   
Caesar in Sallust. Si digna poena pro factis corum reperitur, nowm consilium approbo: sin magnitudo sceleris omnium ingenia exuperat, his utendum censeo, quae legibus comparata sunt.  
Colyn in june hath the like.  

But if in me some little drops would flow  
Of that the spring was in his learned head,  
I soon would learn these woods to wail my woe,  
And teach the trees their trickling tears to shed.  
Then should my plaints, caused of discourtesy,  
As messengers of this my plainfull plight,  
Fly to my love where ever that she be,  
And pierce her heart with point of worthy wit,  
As she deserves that wrought so deadly spite.  
And thou Menalcas that by treachery  
Didst underfong my lass to wax so light,  
Shouldst well be known for such thy villainy.   

But since I am not as I wish I were,  
Ye gentle shepherds which your flocks do feed,  
Whether on hills, or dales, or otherwhere,  
Bear witness all of this so wicked deed,  
And tell the lass whose flower is wax a weed,  
And faultless faith is turned to faithless fere,  
That she the truest shepherds heart made bleed  
That lives on earth, and loved her most dear.   
For, although all the examples of this kind be not false and deceitful, but good and sufficient, as in these now rehearsed; yet, false may be concluded by the self same disposition, as 

Si arbour equus est, viveret:  
Sed arbor equus non est:  
Non igitur arbor vivit.    
In which example, the proposition and assumption are both true, yet the conclusion is false: but it is the office of a syllogism, as hath been said, to lay down, a necessary, perpetual, and immutable rule, by the which, upon the premises once granted, the consequence must be necessary.  
The second, which is not so usual, is that which taketh the latter part, that it may also have the former concluded, as in that of ovid in the fourth book of his transformations. 
Quem si cura deûm tam certa vindicat ira,  
Ipse precor serpens in longam porrigar aluum:  
Dixit; et, ut serpens, in longam tenditur aluum.   
The argumentation is thus: 

Si dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum, fiat serpens:  
Sed fit serpens:  
Ergo dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum.    
Take an other example, and you shall see, that by the same rule you may conclude that which is stark false, As 

Si arbour equus esset, viveret:  
Sed vivit arbour:  
E●…go, arbour equus est.    
For here the forerunning axioms being both true, the conclusion for all that, is manifestly false. This is called of Aristotle an Elench of the consequent: yet in truth it is no Elench of argument, but of argumentation: when we are persuaded foolishly that the consecution is reciprocal, and that the putting down of the one bringeth in of necessity the other, and contrarily, As, 

Si cygnus est, albus est colour.   This followeth. 

Sed albus est colour,   It followeth not. 

Cygnus igitur est.    
So, that of Melissus. 

Si quid factum est, habet principium,  
Ergo si principium habet, etiam factum est    
The consecution, saith Aristotle, is not reciprocal.  
Ramus in the 20. of his Logical animadversions, the sixth Chapter saith thus.  
Theophrastus' autem & Eudemus docuerunt in connexo, Antecedentis negati, & consequentis affirmati tolli posse antecedens, ut tollatur consequens; & consequens retineri, ut retineatur antecedens. In quo genere, etsi rarus error est, est tamen aliquando: Vt, 

Si nullum animal est irrationale, omnis homo est rationalis.  
Sed aliquod animal est irrationale:  
Ergo aliquis homo non est rationalis.   

Item,  
Sed omnis homo est rationalis,  
Ergo nullum animal est irrationale.    
Cum maius aliquid concluditur, videntur esse tres termini, sed revera, res illa maior contine ●…rem ante propositam in se, & quiddam amplius: Itaque tres tantum termini sunt.    

The 15. Chapter. Of the second kind of a connexive syllogism.  
THe second connexive is, wherein the later part of the proposition is removed in the assumption, that the former also may be removed in the conclusion, As 

If thou hadst been ruled by me, thou shouldest have left that unlucky soil.  
But thou didst not leave that unlucky soil:  
Therefore thou wast not ruled by me.   Master Plowden: 281: a.  


Si apres le mort le testator, tambien l'ordinary, come l'executor averoit le property del biens le testator, adonques serront deux properties d'une choose.  
Mes deux properties ne sont d'une chose,  
Ergò apres le mort le testator etc.     

The 16. Chapter. Of a disjunctive syllogism.  
THe disjunctive is that whose proposition is disjunctive: and is framed after two sorts also.  
The first doth remove one part of the proposition in the assumption, and inferreth the other in the conclusion. 

Or Diggon her is, or I missay,  
But I do not missay,  
Therefore her is Diggon.   Master Plowden Fol. 295. b.  


Ou john carrel ayel all enfant de part son pere, on Elisabeth Cuddington ails all enfant de part sa mere, doit estre garden in socage all dit enfant on manor de Suytterton:  
Mes nemy Elisabeth Cuddington:  
Ergo john carrel.    
The second is that which maketh the assumption of one part of the proposition being affirmed, and removeth the other in the conclusion, as, 

Or Diggon her is, or I missay,  
But her is Diggon,  
Therefore I do not missay.   Master Plowden, Ibidem. 

Ou john etc. ou Elisabeth etc.  
Mes Elisabeth doit este garden etc.  
Ergò nemy john etc.    
The same syllogism is also made of a copulative proposition being denied, because it hath the same force with a proposition disjunctive being affirmed, as, 

Shepherds cannot live in pleasure and pain at once:  
But they must live in pleasure:  
Therefore not in pain.   Master Plowden Fol. 281. a.  


Le executor, et le ordinary ne poyent aver le profit del byens le testator ensemble, apres le mort le testator:  
Mes le executor le avera:  
Ergo nemy le ordinary.    

Annotations. Elenches.  
FOr the first, if the assumption contain not a special, but a general contradiction, the syllogism will be sophistical.  
For the second, if the proposition have not all his parts affirmative, the syllogism is sophistical.  
The proposition in a syllogism is commonly fet from some grounds of liberal arts, as Logic, Khetorike, Ethic, Physic, etc.  
It is not a syllogism, unless it conclude and judge necessarily: yea, notwithstanding, the premises of themselves be false.  
Syllogism is only proper and peculiar to man; whereof, no beast doth in any respect participate.  
Strict syllogisms be never lightly used among authors, but either contracted or amplified, or else inverted, as I said before. The quickness of man's wit is such, that it conceiveth the whole sometimes without any proposition, another while without any assumption, and now and then it preventeth and foretaketh the conclusion.  
Ramus in his French Logic reduceth all the Oration which Tully made in defence of Milo to these three lines, making one simple syllogism.  
Le guetteur et espieur meschant est iustement occis:  
Car l'autoritè du peuple, et des judgements du Senate, de Marry, de la ley naturelle et humaine le tesinoignent: et n'y a aucune ley contrair ny du Senate, ny de Pompée. Tell est le profyllogisme de la proposition.  
Or Clode est guetteur et espieur meschant:  
Car il a espiè Milon, esmeu d'vtilité, de haine, de mawaises meurs, d'esperance d'impunitè: Ce qui a estè entendue per ses parolles et sayts. Et qu'il ayt estè meschant, les faicts country hommes et les dieus, le demonstrent. Tell est le prosyllogisme de l'assumption, dont est conclu.  
Purtant Clode est iustement occis.  
This is the brief sum of all that long oration.    

The 17. Chapter. Of Method.  
THus much for a Syllogism. Now followeth method.  
Method is a disposition of divers coherent axioms, whereby the most general is ever first placed: and of divers syllogisms whereby the best and principal is first put down, in such sort that thereby all of them may be the more easily perceived and better remembered. I call that the principal syllogism which proveth and concludeth the principal question; and that the principal question which was first propounded to be concluded.  
So then, as an ariome determineth truth and untruth, and syllogism consequence or inconsequence, in like manner is method the only judge of order or confusion.  
This method is then observed, when as that which is best known, is placed in the first room, and those which be less known of themselves, do follow in order, as everyone is better known then an other.  
Therefore this method descendeth always from the general to the specials, even to the most singular thing, which cannot be divided into any more parts.  
The most general definition is first to be placed, and distribution next, which, if it be manifold; partition into the integral parts must be set down first and the general proprieties of the thing so parted; then division of the specials must follow. And these parts and specials are in the same order to be handled, as they were divided.  
If the discourse be long, it must be knit together, with transitions, telling briefly what is done, and what is to be done, for confirmation of memory, and recreation of the reader.  
This method only, and none other is to be observed, so often as we teach any art or science, or take upon us to entreat perfectly of any general matter.  
Historiographers, Poets, Orators, and such other speakers or writers, are not bound so strictly to observe the perfection of the first method: but may, according to their matter, meaning, purpose, time, place, persons, wisely observe the best for their intent, altering, hiding, adding, detracting, when and how they lift. Poets seek to please the multitude, a beast of many heads. Therefore Homer, maketh not an historical narration of the Trojan war, from the beginning to the ending thereof, but so mingleth truth with tales, and tempereth them both with a probable show, and delightsome continuation, that neither the middle do seem discrepant from the beginning, nor the ending from the middle.  
And Virgil beginneth the Narration of Aeneas his voyage from Sicily: making him declare the rest at supper in Carthage with Queen Dido. Comical poets also, albeit they very exactly divide their Comedies into Acts and Scenes, yet for the pleasure of the people, bring in every thing in such order, as though it were by chance, hap, or hazard, come so to pass,  
Orators, as referring all to persuasion and victory, omit orderly distributions; obscure things purposely; amplify; digress; flatter; insinuate; altar; change; and turn all upside down, placing the best arguments first and last: leaving the worst, in the middle of their speech altogether, the one to help the other; that with forcible things in the beginning, the auditors may be won; and with as good in the ending, have their mind and memory wholly occupied.  
This is called the concealed or hidden method: the method of wit and discretion, for that it is rather seen in the provident conceit of him that writeth or speaketh, than perceived by any general rule of art, or precept whatsoever. So it is a good policy, if thy cause be honest and good, to use such Exordiums and beginnings, as may make the matter best known and understood plainly and simply: but, if not so good, as thou couldst wish, then to pass away stily with a smoothing insinuation.  
In like manner, if thou be to speak before thy enemies, and such as thou fearest, discretion must be used, in putting this general note which I have now delivered, in particular practice. Socrates in this sort cogged with the old Grecian Sophisters, making them say and unsay, and therefore say this, that he was a wrangler, an enchanter, a dissembler, a deceiver. In one word, it is not amiss, to imitate the cunning Surgeon, who hideth his knife, because his patient should not be discouraged. So let us in this point show ourselves skilful in art, that we may use art, without any suspicion of art.  
Yet, notwithstanding all this licence upon such necessary occasion, granted to these people pleasing men, they must, as much as they may, follow and express generally, the method which I first put down: and that somuch the rather, because it is easy to be practised in some part; and unto reason most agreeable.  

Annotations.  
SOme think, the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to belong to method; but it is not so. For, axiomatical judgement considereth the axioms alone, and several by themselves; but Method, the coherence of many distinct axioms together. The rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth simply and only show, what axiom is general, and to be taught generally; what special, and specally to be put down, because such only be reciprocal: but it telleth not which of these axioms must in order have first or second place, which only is Methodical.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth, with; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is a way. For this is the right and compendious way, in writing or speaking to be observed. The word therefore is metaphorically applied to any orderly proceeding.  
Method then, as we take it here, is an ordering of divers axioms already inuen●…ed: not a direction how to find out ariomes. The inventing of Arts came by observation of particulars; but the teaching and conformation of them now invented, beginneth at the universal. For, it both giveth more light than the special, and may be known without the special: but not the special without it: as a tree, in respect of a pearetree.  
Of a little spark cometh a great flame. Yet the spark is not therefore more clear than the flame: so although the knowledge of generals cometh by observation of particulars; yet these particulars give not more light than the generals.  
Examples are always lastly to be put down, for that they are most special; and cannot be divided into any other specials: as being nothing else but the singular observation of this and that proper and peculiar thing.  
Method is like to Homer's golden chain, whereby things are sweetly united and knit so together, that if one Lynk fall of, the whole chain is broken and dissolved. And Plato calleth it Vinculum artis etc.  
As far as man excelleth a brute beast, by the judgement syllogistical; so far doth one man surpass an other by disposition methodical. As then the practice is hard, the praise most excellent, so the Elench in Method, causing obscurity, and tautology, is most soul and detestable.  
Homer is noted for his perversion of Method, insomuch that Tully writing to Atticus, where he purposed to answer the last question first, said he would talk of the last question first, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
As in the other parts of judgement, so in this especially, use, practice, and continual exercise worketh all in all, he that hath a general sight in Logic, hath but the shadow. He that is acquainted with the particular practice, is the only true and perfect logician.  
I will never call him a physician that never sang: a Carpenter that never builded house: a Soldier that never fought, notwithstanding the general speculation of the first in Music, of the second in building, of the third in fight: no more will I think him worthy of the title & name of a Logician, that never put his general contemplation of logical precepts in particular practice. For, as it is not enough to know what virtue is, unless you live virtuously, and express your learning by your living, so it is but a fruitless ostentation to brag of a general conceit, without continuance in special and particular exercise.  
What precepts soever the common Rhetoricians put down for ordering of Exordiums and framing and disposing of the whole course of their speech fitly and according to cause, auditors, time, place, and such like circumstances; all those I say, are altogether Logical, not in any respect pertaining to Rhetoric, but as a Rhetor may be directed by Logical precepts of judgement and disposition.  
[Coherent axioms:] For otherwise a man may say here, as Horace did of a Poem patched like a beggars cloak, wherein no one piece is like another.  

Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam  
jungere si velit, & varias inducere plumas,  
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum  
Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne;  
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?  
Credit, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum  
Persimilem, cuius, velut egri somnia, vanae  
Fingantur species, ut nec pes, nec caput uni  
Reddatur formae. And after,  
Sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut  
Serpents avibus geminentur, tigribus agnae.   
[Most general:] Le chose general serra tousiours mice en demand ou pleynt devant le chose special, et l'entier devant ses parts, Come terre est genre a pray, pasture, bois, etc. et serra mice in pleint ou demand devant eux.  
Issint bois est un genre de terre ou tours manners de arbres crescent, et pu●…ed serra mice en demand devant alnetum & salicetum, que ne sont que especes de bois. Theloall. lib. 8. cap. 20. Fol. 129.  
Notiora sunt, saith Wasserleider, non quae facilius percipiuntur, sed quae percepta & intellecta plurimum notitiae & cognitionis afferunt, ut universalia, quae pluribus insunt & conveniunt. Sic, obscu●…iora, non quae difficilius percipiuntur, sed quae percepta & intellecta singula parum lucis & scientiae prebent, ut singularia, & specialissima, quae etiam sensibus percipiuntur. Hereupon is the distinction of notiora naturae, and notiora nobis. But this is confuted of others.  
[Syllogismus:] Name est quaedam methodus in syllogismis. Methodus inveniendae artis dicta est in genere & specie. Hîc agitur de methodo disponendi.  
[Definition first:] for it giveth light to all that followeth.  
[Partition first:] for it is made of causes, whereas division is of effects.  
[Transitions:] Transitio inter figuras Rhetoricas à Cicerone numeratur, cum sit planè logica. Transitio reficit auditorem, certo singularum partium fine, non aliter quàm facientibus iter multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia: Nam & exhausti laboris nosse mensuram, voluptati est: & hortatio ad reliqua fortius exequenda, scire quantum supersit: nihil enim longum videri necesse est, in quo, quid ultimum sit, certum est. Transitio imperfecta est convenientior, quando longa partis disputatio non fuerit, ut memoriae renovatione minime sit opus.  
Crypsis methodi est in Elleipsi vel redundantia. Elleipsis est, non omnium amissio, sed quarundam in methodo. Redundantia est Heterogenia vel Tautologia. In perfecta methodo docendus est auditor, in crypsei fallendus & movendus. Sic enim mutato auditoris stomacho, salubria fiunt venenata, & contra.  
As an Enthymeme is a defect of a full syllogism, so Elleipsis is in method; as a prosyllogisme is superfluous there, so digressions here: as the inversion of the premises is in the one, so the entangled circumduction is in the other. Whereof, besides Homer's Iliads, and Virgil's Aeneis, the ethiopical history is a sweet example.  
Argumentum semper disponitur, nunquam disponit: Methodus semper disponit, nunquam disponitur, ut summum genus & infima species: sed enunciatum & syllogismus sunt ut subalterna. Nam enunciatum disponit argumenta, disponitur in syllogismo, syllogismus disponit enunciata, disponitur à methodo.  
Vbi materia nulla est, ibi forma nulla esse potest, ut si pars Rhetorices imperfecta in pronunciatione docenda sit, methodus perfecta non est desideranda.  
Socrates compareth the oration which Lysias made of love, to the four verses which were written on Midas tomb, wherein the matter did so wisely hang together, that the first might be last, and last first without any danger.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc.  
Aenea virgo sum, Midae sepulchro imponor,  
Quamdiu & aqua fluet, & longae arbores virescent,  
Ipsius hic manens lamentabili in tumulo,  
Nuntio praetereuntibus, Midas quod hîc sepultus est.   
And like to Lysias speech, or Midas epitaph, be all our balductum and uncoherent pamphlets, all our yeare-bookes and abridgements.  
Imagine, saith Ramus, that all definitions, divisions, and rules of any art, as of Logic, were already invented and allowed for true, and every rule were written in a several schrole, every schrole being put into an earthen pitcher, as they use in lottaries, and there shuffled together: what part of Logic now must order these confused rules and scattered schroles. Not Invention, for they be found out already: not axiomatical judgement, for they be judged and allowed as true, every Axiom severally: nor Syllogistical; for now every question is answered, all controversies concerning these rules, be discussed: only method remaineth, by the direction whereof, I will seek in this pot for the definition of Logic, and will set it in the first place: then for the division thereof into Invention and Disposition, placing it in the second room. This done, I will take the definition of Invention and put it in the third degree; and consequently the definition and division of arguments, until all the first part of Logic be thus put down, by defining, dividing, exemplifiing, and binding together the several tractates by convenient transitious. Then will I in like manner proceed to Disposition.  
Method and order is the chiefest help of memory: therefore sith all method is altogether Logical: instructions for memory, if they belong to any art, must needs be Logical. Therefore, Sit puer, saith Ramus, qui querimoniam Penelopes apud Ouidium epistola prima de Vlyssis absentia post eversam Troiam memoriae commendare velit.  

Sed mihi quid prodest vestris disiecta lacertis  
Ilios, & murus, quod fuit antè, solum,  
Si maneo qualis Troia durant manebam,  
Virque mihi dempto fine carendus abest?  
Diruta sunt alijs, uni mihi Pergamon restant,  
Incola captivo quae 'bove victor arat.  
jam seges est ubi Troia fuit, resecandaque falce,  
Luxuriat Phrygio sanguine pinguis humus.  
Semisepulta virûm curuis feriuntur aratris  
Ossa, ruinosas occulit herba domos.  
Victor abes, nec scire mihi quae causa morandi,  
Aut in quo lateas ferreus orb, licet.  
Quisquis ad haec vertit peregrinam littora puppim,  
Ille mihi de te multa rogatus abit.  
Quamque tibi reddat, si te modò viderit usquam,  
Traditur huic digitis charta notata meis.  
Nos Pylon, antiqui Neleia Nestoris arua  
Misimus, incerta est fama remissa Pylo.  
Misimus & Sparten, Sparte quoque nescia veri,  
Quas habitas terras, aut ubi lentus abes.  
Vtilius starent etiam nunc moenia Phaebi:  
Irascor votis heu levis ipsa meis.  
Scirem ubi pugnares, & tantùm bella timerem:  
Et mea cum multis juncta querela foret.  
Quid timeam, ignoro, timeo tamen omnia demens,  
Et patet in curas area lata meas.  
Quaecunque aequor habet, quaecunque pericula tellus,  
Tam longae causas suspicor esse morae.   
Hunc totum locum cum viderit puer primo connexo syllogismo comprehensum, parts singulas notabit, earumque praecipuas exornationes. Propositionem igitur aspiciet initio in quatuor primis versibus positam.  

Sed mihi quid prodest vestris disiecta lacertis  
Ilios, et, murus quod fuitante, solum:  
Si maneo qualis Troia durant manebam,  
Virque mihi. dempto fine, carendus abest?   
Deinde sequitur assumptionis sententia: At tu abes: & amplificatio ex adiunctis ruinis eversae Troiae: ubi sex sunt versus.  

Diruta sunt alijs, v●…i mihi Pergamon restant,  
Incola captivo quae 'bove victor arat.  
jam seges est ubi Troia fuit, resecandaque falce  
Luxuriat Phrygio sanguine pinguis humus.  
Semisepulta virûm curuis feriuntur aratris  
Ossa, ruinosas occulit herba domos.   
D●…hinc repetitur assumptio, & augetur a maiori: non modò abes, sed ita abes, ut scire nequeam ubi lateas. Quod exaggeratur factis Penelope's, interrogo, scribo, mitto in omnes orbis parts, nec quicquam de te audio. Decem sunt hic versus.  

Victor abes, nec scire mihi quae causa morandi,  
Aut in quo lateas ferreus orb, licet.  
Quisquis ad haec vertit peregrinam littora puppim,  
Ille mihi de te multa rogatus abit.  
Quamque tibi reddat, si te modò viderit usquàm,  
Traditur huic digitis charta notata meis.  
Nos Pylon, antiqui Neleia Nestoris arua  
Misimus, incerta est fama remissa Pylo.  
Misimus & Sparten, Sparte quoque nescia veri  
Quas habitas terras, aut ubi lentus abes.   
Conclusionis sententia tandem vicesimo primo secundoque versibus per contrarium significatur. 
Vtilius starent etiam nunc moenia Troiae,  
Irascor votis heu levis ipsa meis.  Sed & ipsi conclusioni amplificatio accedit ex adiunctis: sex sunt versus:  

Scirem ubi pugnares, & tantùm bella timerem,  
Et mea cum multis juncta querela foret.  
Quid timeam ignoro, timeo tamen omnia demens,  
Et patet in curas area lata meas.  
Quaecunque aequor habet, quaecunque pericu●…a tellus,  
Tamlongae causas suspicor esse morae.   
Quamobrem cum hac interpretationis diligentia puer totam sententiam distinxerit, vel a diligenti pr●…ptore distinctam acceperit, & ex octo & viginti versibus, quatuor propositioni, sexdecim assumptioni, & octo conclusioni tribuerit, hac syllogismi descriptione non solùm parts, sed partium quoque sententiam sibi repraesentabit. Nam cum scie●…t hic primo loco propositionem, secundo assumptionem, tertio conclusionem esse, sciet itidem ex cognitis syllogismi legibus quae vis cuiusque partis esse debeat: quinetiam hac ratione facilimè 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 animo concipiet, per quas, imagines rerum absentium ita subijciet animo, ut cernere oculis ac presentes habere videatur. Vt in hoc exemplo concurrent antiquae urbis ruinae, agricolae, ossa, nautae, mulier sollicitè inter●…ogans, tabellarij, bella, naufragia, caedes. In longioris autem orationis & disputationis ambitu, praesertim si methodus seruata sit, memoriae praesidium praecipuum erit. Exemplum nostra dialectica commodissimum erit, ut dialectica suijpsius inprimis memoriam confirmet, que alijs opem confirmande memory pollicetur. Figuretur igitur hîc primis rerum notis, artis dialecticae summa & universa partitio, quae quod dicimus, oculis etiam spectandum proponat.  

A general Table of the whole Book.  
〈◊〉: is in 

Invention of arguments, 1. 

In●…aerent 

Original 

agreeable 

fully 

1. 

Cause 

Efficient 

of itself, or accidentally, alone, or with other●…, procreant, or conseruant.    
material, formal, final.    
thing caused.    
2. 

the whole and his parts.  
the general and specials.      
in part 

●…abiect.  
●…diunct.      
disagreeable 

divers.  
opposite 

disparates.  
contraries 

Relatives.  
Repug●…nts,  
priua●…ues.          
Secondary 

1. 

Coni●…gates.  
Notation.    
2. 

distribution of 

cause and effect.  
subject and adjunct.    
definition 

perfect.  
imperfect, description.          
Borrowed, as testimonies 

of God.  
of M●…n.      
Disposition 

axiomatical where note 

1. the parts 

the b●…nd.  
things bound 

the former part.  
the later part.      
2. both 

affections for 〈◊〉 is 

1. 

affirmative▪  
negative.    
2. 

true  
false   and ●…hease 

necessary: hereof those rules 

of truth.  
of justice.  
of discretion.    
contingent.      
and specials 

simple 

general  
spec●…all 

particular.  
proper.      
compound 

congregative 

copulative.  
connexive.    
segregative 

d●…unctiue and distributive.  
di●…tiue, & praeoccupative.            
diano●…icall 

Syllogistical 

parts 

antecedent 

proposition.  
assumption.    
consequent▪ conclusion.    
Specials 

simple 

affir: 

gen:  
spec:  
pro:   

contracted  
explicate 

1.  
2.      
neg: 

gen:  
spec:  
pro:   

contracted  
explicate 

1.  
2.        
compound 

connex: 

1.  
2.    
di●…ct: 

1.  
2.          
Methodical from th●… general to the specia●…       

2 all these be either 

simple  
compared in 

quality 

like.  
unlike.    
quantity 

equal  
unequal 

〈◊〉  
〈◊〉             
Itaque propositis hoc modo distributisque rebus, ut verborum quoque contextus facilius ediscatur (qui ab arte auxilij nihil admodum capit, nisi forte quod res ordine distributae sua vocabula secum rapient▪  
Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur) accedat, si placet, meditatio, ut per partes paulatim memotia ducatur: quinetiam modica voce in meditando animus excitetur, ut duplici motu dicendi & audiendi memoria iwetur: tum siqua ratio memoriam possit adiuuare, illa dispositionis admonitio iwabit: licebitque philosophis & oratoribus, qui locis & imaginibus artem quandam memoriae confinxerunt, per nos quidem valere: nihil enim pollicentur, quod non uberius multò faciliusque teneamus. Aiunt enim ordinem prodesse memoriae, sed externis & commentitijs eam fignis & simulachris instruunt, nos ordinis rebus insiti doctrinam certissimam & veros locos pro rerum gradibus & generibus distinctos, rerumque verissimas imagines adhibemus: illi verborum memoriam infinitate formarum conturbant, dum propter singula verba ad singulas species est respiciendum: Nos hanc partem rerum compositione & collocatione, quantum natura sert, adiwamus. Quapropter quicquid est, quod ad confirmandam memoriam doctrina possit efficere, id totum dialectice dispositionis doctrina praes●…abit.  
Hitherto Ramus concerning the help of memory by Logical disposition: to the which counsel of him, if we add some comfortable simples, & have a careful heed that we distemper not ourselves either with unorderly diet, or unhonest exercise, I am persuaded it will be more available, than all the volumes of the art of memory.  
Examples of the perfect method, appear in the artificial putting down of Arts (as in this type of Ramus his Logic already drawn) & also in some other philosophical discourses.  
For our Calendar, although shepherds be not wont to bind themselves to any over strict method in speaking, yet that song of Colyn Clout rehearsed by Hobbynoll in May, may make us believe, that even shepherds, by the light of nature, did, as much as in them lay, express this method in their speeches. For there he, after a poetical invocation, and general proposition of that which he hath in hand, I mean the praises of Elysa, cometh nearer the matter, and first putteth down the causes, than adiunctes, and other arguments, incident to Elysa.  
In stead of a definition we may use this general propounding of the matter: then divide it into some few heads: and orderly discourse of every head, using the places of invention, the help of judgement etc.  
Sir William Stamfo●…d in his crown pleas doth first de●…ne and propound, thus:  
Plées deal corone sont les ples queux conteignont l'offences faits encounter la corone et dignity le roy, perque pur le mieulx entendement de eux, est requisite a veier queux sont les dits offences: et puis de la manner comment ils serront pledus, et darreinement de la manier comment ils serront tries et judges. And so goeth on forward, defining, dividing, and making plain by examples all the special sorts of offences against the crown.  
Bracton followeth the order of the civil law altogether, insomuch that he that hath seen the one, may easily judge of the other.  
Perkins in every of his several tractates doth, as Stamford, propound, divide, and add examples.  
Lyttleton in like manner, by definitions, divisions, and induction of special cases instead of so many examples, made up his book.  
Master Theloall took occasion (as in his preface to the Lord Chancellor he confesseth) by Stamfords' good motion, to make a more methodical discourse of writs, than was extant heretofore. I will use his own words to show his own order.  
Pour ceo que mon intent est de entraiter the brief, et des choses concernantes brief, il moy semble convenient de commencer per la definition de brief, et de monster quelle chose il est.  
And afterwards, I'ay enterprinse de framer un definition, on plust oft description de brief solonque le form et doctrine ●…'eux, que le art de ceo professont, per les, genres, differences, proprieties, en tiel manner, etc. The definition I have put down in the first book.  
Then having defined it, he saith, me voyes a divider mon brief.  
After the division he useth a transition, wherein he briefly telleth, what he hath done, and orderly declareth what remaineth to be done moreover.  
Which kind of Transitions, wanting in Lyttleton, make the coherence of his discourses somewhat obscure, as in that tractate of estates sur condition, where he first divideth conditional estates, thus:  
Estates que homes out en terres ou tenements sur condition sont de deux manners, s▪ ou ils out estate sur condition en fait, ou sur condition en ley. And after the laying down of so many several cases of the first part, as could be contained within the compass of sixteen leaves: he immediately, if not abruptly, proceedeth to the explication of the second, without any transition at all: Neither telling what was done, nor what was to be done. So also in the discourse of releases, he first divideth releases thus. Releases sont in divers manners, s. releases de tout le droyt que home ad en terres ou tenements; et releases d'actions personels et reals et auters choses. And then having bestowed ten leaves wholly upon the first member of his distribution, he sets upon the second part suddenly without any warning given at all.  
Digressions be sometimes tolerable upon necessary occasion: but impertinent, or rather repugnant imaginations continually cast in, mar all. A man taketh upon him to ●…ade upon the statute of fines, and he thrummeth in 50. s●…attered & undigested cases of estate tail in possession, and as many of the same in reversion, with a cluster of other sophistical and uncoherent points, much like a foolish painter, who because he had some little skill in painting a pear tree, but no cunning at all in expressing anything else, would be sure to make a pear tree grow on every man's wall. So this fellow having met with some add learning●… of estate tail, will needs have utterance for it. An ●…ther maketh every case have one idle point of a fine, for fashion sake, whereas he fosteth in 6. 8. 10. 12. or more extravagant conceits, aswell agreeing with the nature of a fine, as a Harp doth with a Harrow; yet, who but he? Non equidem invideo: miror magis, at the frenzy of the reader, and folly of the hearer. For if the reader's intent be to explain the statute, then quorsum haec tam putida tendunt? but if he mean to make ostentation of all his imaginations, me thinks he should not make a well meaning statute the cloak of two hundred ambiguities. I grant the matter may be well worth the hearing, but Nunc non erat his locus: Therefore as Horace saith. 
Amphora caepit,  
Institui, current rota, cur urceus exit?   
To conclude I could hearty wish the whole body of our law to be rather logically ordered, then by Alphabetical breviaries torn and dismembered. If any man say, it cannot be, he should add, by himself: if he think it should not be, than I do not somuch envy his great wisdom, as pity his rustical education, who had rather eat Acorns with hogs, than bread with men; and preferreth the loathsome toffing of an A. B. C. abridgement, before the lightsome perusing of a Methodical coherence of the whole common law.  
Yet I am not he, that will once open my mouth, generally to condemn the contracting and abridging of dispersed & tedious cases: But as, Lyttleton, Parkins, Stamford, Theloall, Bracton and Britton have excelled the abridgers in light and order, so the painful abridgements of Statham and those reverend judges Fitzherbert, and Brook, are more convenient for many purposes, than those vast heaps of scattered discourses, thrown into every corner of our year books: Which, notwithstanding, are diligently to be r●… teyned: but the matter may be, for the benefit of students, more orderly contrived.  
It is not my purpose, at this time to dispute, whether the law of England, being one only proper, and singular law, appropriate to our nation, consisting of so many particularities, being subject to such continual change and alteration, can be made an art: But that the confusion of writers may ●…e removed, the manner reform, the matter better ordered, I do surely believe, because I know assuredly.  
Thus have I at last, made an end of a confused meditation, patched up, I fear me, rather in great haste, then with good speed. Wherein I think the art of Logic to be as I have put down: but the precepts of the same must be continually practised, as I have elsewhere said, or else the general contemplation thereof will prove a fruitless conceit & naked speculation. Let us follow therefore the counsel of Apelles; Nulla dies sine linea. Let no day pass without some practice, either in making, framing, and inventing of ourselves, or in resolving & dissolving of things done by others, for the trial of their skill, and confirmation of our own. Neither would I have this practice continued only in reading or writing, but in every civil assembly or meeting: wherein yet I will not be so severe a censor, as to exact every speech to the formal rules of axioms, syllogisms, etc. It shall be sufficient for us to follow a more easy and elegant kind of disputation, joining Rhetoric with Logic, and referring that precise straightness unto Philosophical exercises.  
Neither let any man think, that because in common meetings and assemblies the words and terms of Logic be not named, therefore the force and operation of Logic is not there used and apparent. For, as in Grammar we name neither Noun, Pronoune, verb, nor any other part of speech: and as in Rhetoric, we make mention neither of Metonymia, Synecdoche, Exclamatio, nor any other Rhetorical figure or trope: yet use in our speech the help of the one in speaking grammatically, and the direction of the other in talking eloquently: so, although in common conference we never name syllogisms, axioms, propositions, assumptions, & other words of art, yet do we secretly practise them in our disputations, the virtue whereof is, to make our discourses seem true to the simple, and probable to the wise.  
I have, for example's sake, put down a Logical Analysis of the second Aegloge in Virgil, of the Earl of Northumberlands case in Master Plowdens' reports, and of sir William Stamfords' crown pleas. For the Eclogue although the verses of Vugill be better known in Latin, than I can make them understood in English, (especially observing the same order of verse) yet I have attempted the interpreting of the same by a poetical Paraphiasis, for the contentation of such as understand no Latin: & withal inserted the Latin verses, for their pleasure, that disdain the English.  

Alexis 2. Aegloga Virgilij.  

FOrmosum pastor Corydon ardebat Alexin  
Delitias domini, nec quid speraret, habebat.  
Tantùm inter densas, umbrosa cacumina, fagos  
Assiduè veniebat. Ibi haec incondita solus  
Montibus, & syluis studio iactabat inani.   

O'crudelis Alexi, nihil mea carmina curas;  
Nil nostri miserere; mori me denique, coges.  
Nunc etiam pecudes umbras & frigora captant:  
Nunc virides etiam occultant spineta lacertas:  
Thestylis & rapido fessis messoribus aestu  
Allia, serpyllumque herbas contundit òlentes.  
At mecum raucis, tua dum vestigia lustro,  
Sole sub ardenti resonant arbusta cicadis.   

Nun fuit satius tristes Amaryllidis iras,  
Atque superba pati fastidia, nun Menalcam,  
Quamuis ille niger, quamuis tu candidus esses?   

O formose puer, nimium ne crede colori:  
Alba ligustra cadunt, vaccinia nigra leguntur.   

Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim, quaeris Alexi,  
Quàm dives pecoris nivei, quàm lactis abundans.  
mill meae Siculis errant in montibus agnae.  
Lac mihi non aestate nowm, non frigore defit.  
Canto, quae solitus, si quando armenta vocabat,  
Amphion Dircaeus in Actaeo Araoyntho.  
Nec sum adeò informis, nuper me in littore vidi.  
Cum placidum ventis staret mare, non ego Daphnim  
judice te metuam, si nunquam fallit imago.  
O tantùm libeat mecum tibi sordida rura,  
Atque humiles habitare casas, & figere ceruos,  
Haedorumque gregem viridi compellere hibysco.  
Mecum unà in syluis imitabere Pana canendo.  
Pan primus calamos cera coniungere plures  
Instituit: Pan curate oves, oviumque magistros.   

Nec te paeniteat calamo trivisse labellum,  
Haec eadem ut sciret, quid non faciebat Amyntas?  
Est mihi disparibus septem compacta cicutis  
Fistula, Damaetas dono mihi quam dedit olim,  
Et dixit moriens, te nunc habet ista secundum:  
Dixit Damaetas, invidit stultus Amyntas.  
Praetereà duo, nec tuta mihi valle reperti  
Capreoli, sparsis etiam nunc pellibus albo,  
Bina die siccant ovis ubera, quos tibi servo.  
jampridem à me illos abducere Thestylis orat:  
Et faciet, quoniam sordent tibi munera nostra.  
Huc ades, o formose puer, tibi lilia plenis  
Ecce ferunt nymphae calathis: tibi candida Nais  
Pallentes violas, & summa papavera carpens,  
Narcissum, & florem iungit benè olentis Anethi.  
Tum Casia, atque alijs intexens suavibus herbis,  
Mollia luteola pingit vaccinia caltha.  
Ipse ego cana legam tenera lanugine mala,  
Castaneasq nuces, mea quas Amaryllis amabat:  
Addam cerea pruna; & honos erit huic quoque pomo:  
Et vos, o Lauri, carpam, & te, proxima myrte:  
Sic positae quoniam suaues miscetis odores.   

Rusticus es, Corydon, nec munera curate Alexis:  
Nec si muneribus certes, concedat jolas'.  
Eheu quid volui misero mihi? Floribus austrum  
Perditus & liquidis immisi fontibus apros.   

Quem fugis ah demens? habitarunt dij quoque siluas,  
Dardaniusque Paris. Pallas quas condidit arces,  
Ipsa colat: nobis placeant ante omnia filuae.   

Torua leaena lupum sequitur; lupus ipse capellam;  
Florentem Cithysum sequitur lasciva capella,  
Te Corydon, o Alexi: Trahit sua quemque voluptas.   

Aspice, aratra iugo referunt suspensa iwenci,  
Et sol crescentes decedens duplicat umbras:  
Me tamen urit amor, quis enim modus adsit amori?  
Ah Corydon, Corydon, quae te dementia caepit?  
Semiputata tibi frondosa vitis in ulmo est.  
Quin tu aliquid saltem potius, quorum indiget usus,  
Viminibus, mollique paras detexere iunco?  
invenies alium, si te hic fastidit Alexis.    

The same in English Hexameters, verse for verse.  

Silly shepherd Corydon loved heartily fair lad Alexis,  
His masters darling, but saw no matter of hoping.  
Only amid the forest thick set with broad-shadoe beachtrees  
daily resort did he make: thus alone to the woods, to the mountains  
With broken speeches, fond thoughts most vainly revealing.   

O hard-hearted Alexis: I see my verse to be scorned,  
Myself not pitied, my death by thee lastly procured.  
Now do the beasts eûn seek for cooling shade to refresh the,  
Grene lyzards now too in bushes thorny be lurking,  
And for faint reapers by the sun's rage, Thestylis hastening,  
Strong-smelling wild thime, and garlic beats in a mortar▪  
But whilst I trace thee, with sun beams all to bescorched,  
Groûes by the hoarschirping grasshoppers yield a resounding.   

Wast not far better t'have borne with surly Menalcas,  
And sore displeased, disdainful, proud Amaryllis,  
Although thou white were, although but swarthy Menalcas?   

O thou fair white boy, trust not too much to thy whiteness:  
Fair white flowers fall down, black fruits are only reserved.  
Thou cârst not for me, my state thou know'st not, Alexis:  
What flocks of white sheep I do keep, of milk what abundance,  
On Sicil high mountains my lambs feed more than a thousand:  
New milk in summer, new milk in winter I want not.  
My songs like Theban Amphion's song, when he called  
His wandering bullocks, on Greekish mount Aracynthus.  
Neither am I so fowl: I saw myself by the seashore,  
When seas all calm were: I doubt not, but by thy censure,  
Daphnis I shall surpass, unless my face do deceive me.   

O, let this be thy will, to frequent my rustical harbours,  
And simple cottages, and stick in forks to uphold them,  
And drive on forward our flock of kids to the mallows:  
We will amid the forest contend Pan's song to resemble:  
Pan was first that quills with wax tied jointly together.  
Pan is good to the sheep, and Pan is good to the sheepsman.  
Neither think it a shame to thyself t'have played on a cornpipe:  
For, that he might do the same with skill, what did not Amyntas?  
Damaetas long since did give me a pipe for a token,  
Compact of seûn reeds, all placed in order, unequal:  
And thus said, when he died: One used it only before thee.  
Thus said Damaetas, this grieved foolish Amyntas.  
Also two pretty kids do I keep, late found in a valley  
Dangerus: & their skins with milk white spots be bedecked,  
Of dams milk not a drop they leave; & for thee I keep them.  
Thestylis of long time hath these kids of me desired;  
And they shallbe her own, for that thou scornest what I give thee.  
Come near, o fair boy, see the nymphs bring here to the lilies  
With full stuffed baskets: fair Nais now to thy comfort  
White violets gathering, and poppies daintily topping,  
Daffadil adds to the same, & leaves late plucked fro the sweet Dill.  
Then mingling Casia with divers savoury sweet flowers,  
With yellowish Marygold, she the tender Crowtoe bedecketh.   

I'll pluck hoar quinces, with soft down all to besmeared,  
And Chessnuts which were loûd of my sweet Amaryllis.  
Add will I wheateplumbs too: for this fruit will be regarded,  
And you laurel leaves will I pluck, and thee, pretty myrtle  
Next to the laurel leaves: for so plâst yield ye the sweet sent.   

thou'rt but a fool Corydon, for first gifts move not Alexis,  
Then, though thou give much, yet much more give will jolas'.  
But what alas did I mean, poor fool? I do let go the southwind  
Into the flowers, & boars send forward into the clear springs.  
Whom flyêst thou mad man? Many gods have also resorted,  
And Paris of old Troy, to the woods. Let towers by Minerva  
Builed, by Minerva be kept; and woods of us only regarded.  
Grim Lioness runneth to the wolf, & wolf to the young goat,  
And wanton young goat to the flowering tetrifol hasteneth,  
And Corydon to Alexis: a self joy draweth on each man.  
But see the plough comes home hanged fast by the yoke, to the bullocks,  
And shadow by Phoebus declining double appeareth:  
Yet do I burn with love: for what mean can be to loving?  
Ah Corydon, Corydon; what mad rage hath thee bewitched?  
Thy vin's scarce half cut, pestered with leaves of her elm tree:  
Leave this churlish boy, and bend thyself to thy business,  
With twigs and bulrush some needful thing be a making:  
Thou shalt find others though thou'rt disdained of Alexis.      

A Logical Analysis of the Earl of Northumberlands case.  

There be, saith Freigius 2. parts of the Eclogue. 

First the propounding of the argument, which is of the incontinency of a lover lamenting his love in solitary places.  
Secondly the complaint and lamentation of Corydon the lover, speaking 

First to his love, and that by 

Acccusing his cruelty, which is argued 

First by comparison of the unlikes, the proposition consisteth of three unlikes, the beasts, Lysardes, and reapers seek shade: the reddition is, but yet I burn with love.  
2 By the less Amaryllis and Menalcas are too cruel, but thou more cruel than they.  
3. By the cause of his pride, which was his beauty, and that is extenuated by a simile. As white primprint falls, but black Violets be gathered, so beauty decays, and blackness remains.    
Enticing him to come to his house to sing, to drive the Kids to the Mallows, etc. and that by praising of himself by his adiunctes. A A A▪    
D D D       
AAA Corydons adjuncts be these: he is 

Rich, and his riches he proved by specials 

his lambs  
his milk.    
Skilful in singing, and that is proved. 

By a comparison of the equal, in that he is equal to Amphion: and here an objection is prevented by a comparison also of the equal: neither think it a shame to play on apype, for Amyntas thought well of it. Then the praise of his singing is continued by his pipe, and his pipe by the author that gave it, which was Damaetas, and another that envy it, to wit Amyntas.    
Fair & comely: it is proved by 

The adjunct of his image in the water  
Comparison of the equal, as was Daphnis.    
Frank and free, which is proved by his sundry gifts. 

1. His Kydds, commended by their adiunctes, in that they were white spotted, well sucking, and desired of Thestylis.  
2. His basket of sweet flowers gathered by the Nymphs, they be herbs and also flowers, as, 

lilies.  
Violets.  
Poppy.  
Dylle.  
Daffadil.  
Casia.  
Marigold  
Crowtoe.    
3. His diverse kinds of 

Fruits as 

Quinces.  
Chestnuts.  
wheatplums.    
Boughs as be 

The Laurel.  
The Myrtle.          
DDD. Secondly to himself, by resisting himself, as it were, and here is contained both a 

double correction or calling back of himself. 

the first is both of the 

adjunct, pride, and contempt of his gifts and here is 

First a double exclamation: and here 

in the first he noteth Alexis his pride by two similes, the south wind, and the boar.  
in the second he entreateth again, by the equ●…le, as Paris, and the gods etc.    
More, or greater, for jolas' gave mor large lie than he.    
Secondly a permission by the unlike. Let Palace keep her Palaces, and we the woods which is our delight. The reddition is made plain by comparison of likes: where also the general is concluded by the specials in a Clymax of three degrees, Grim Lioness to the Wolf etc.    
the second is of the adiunctes both of 

The time, where there is a Pe●…phrasis of night, and an argument of the divers, albeit the heat of the sun is mitigated by the coming of the night, yet I burn still with love: the reason followeth of the adjunct of love: for love hath no mean.  
his business neglected, where is a double negligence: of 

his vine half cut  
his elm full of boughs   for both de nought.      
Remedy of love by contraries which be: 

business in making some needful thing of twigs and bulrush.  
and hope of some other lo●…, if Alexis should still thus disdain him.      
For the Earl of Northumberlands case, I have rather showed what is done by master Plowden, then what might have been done by a better Logician. Le matter fuit argue en Leschecquer M. 9 & 10. Elis. devant touts les justices d'angleterre et Barons deschecquer, per Onslow Solicitor, Gerard Attorney, Wray & Barrham sergeants le roigne, deal part le roigne: et per Shirborne et Bell. apprentices et Meade sergeants deal part le Count. Le case fuit tiel; Pattorney le roigne inform le court, que ou le roigne doit aver touts mynes de ore et d'auter mettail conteignant o'er per prerogative, el 10 Martij. An. 8. regni sui esteant seisie en son demesne, come de fee en droit la corone, del waist dit Newland, in come. Northumberland, en queux certene veins de quyure sont, conteignants over; assign T. & D, de four etc. queur fowont 600000 boys etc. et le count eux disturb: le Count, protest: que le roigne ne doit aver per prerogative etc. pro ple dit, que quant all 500000 parcel deal 600000, le terre in que etc. fuit done all count per patent le roy et roigne P. & M. dat. a Richmond, le 15 deal August 4. & 5. An. reg. etc. exgratia speciali, certa scientia, & mero motu suis etc. et que il disturb etc. et averra, que cest vain fuit overt primes puis le dit 15 iour del August. an. 4. & 5. reg. etc. s. 1. April. an. 7 Elis. et traverse le seisine le roigne le dit 15. iour del March. Et pur les altar 100000, residue deal 600000, ill plead patent le dit roigne del honour del Cokermouth, oue wrecks, mines, etc. et que le mine in que etc. fuit overt iour del date del patent et devant etc. issint il disturb prout bien a luy list. sur que l'atturney le royne, demur en ley. Les points sont general, ou special. les general points sont deux: le primer, si touts mynes d'ore et argent in terres del subjects, oue poyar de four le terre et asporter le ore etc. appertain all roy per prerogative, car nest in le treatise de praerogativa regis, et le four touch le francktenement et l'inheritance d'auter. Le second, si mines de Copper conteignant o'er ou argent, perteigne all roy ut supra. Le proper et special poyntique immediate meant concern le case del Count, est, si les mynes de quyure conteignant o'er ou argent, perteigne all roy per prerogative, Vtrum le grant P. & M. del terre en le primer case, et de touts et singular mines en l'auter case per patent de gratia etc. fait les mynes de passer del eux al dit Count, on nemy.  
Or doncques primerment est a dire de les arguments de les dits' sergeants et apprentices, puis de le indgment et opinion des justices.  
Les arguments del primer point, pur le roigne, sont in confirmando, ou confutando: les confirmant arguments sont inherent ou borrowed, come testimonies et authorities: les inherents sont quater, et Onslow fait troys de eux, et Gerard le quart.  
Le primer est deryve del adjunct excellency deal royet de ceux mettayles. etc. sic, 

Les choses plus excellents deal terre perteigne all person pluis excellent que est le roy: pro batur a pari. 

Les choses plus excellent del mer et ewe perteigne all roy per common ley. A A.  
Ergo et ceux del terre, come o'er et argent,    
Mes ore et argent sont le pluis excellent choses del terre:  
Ergo ore et argent perteigne all roy, etc. et les mynes eux conteignants etc.    
A A. Cest premier part del enthymeme est confirm per novel syllogism, conteignant un argument deal special, issint constitute. 

Le comen ley appropre al roy sturgions et baleynes que sont deius le mere en engleterre: s●…s branches deal mere: et ceo est prove per deux testimonies.  
Mes del choses de la mer, les pisches, e●… de pisches, les sturgions et balemes sont plus excellentes.  
Ergo le comen ley appropre al roy les choses plus excellentes de la mere et ●…aw.    
Le primer est de treatise de praerogativa regis, cap. 11. (que n'est novel ley, mes declaration de●… common lay) 〈◊〉. Rex habebit balenas & sturgiones captos in mari, vel alibi in●…ra regnum.  
Le second est del Britton que escry long temps devant le treatise de praerogativa regis et il monstre en son chapter de trouours que le roy auera les pisches per prerogative per le comen ley en son temps.  
Le second argument est del causes principals et coadiwants: s. le roy, et le treasure: queux ambideux devont concurrer all maintenance del realm: 

Il est reason que il que ad le regiment et tutel del people come principal cause, queux il ne peult defender sans adivant et instrumental causes, averoit ces aids et causes adiwants.  
Mes Poffice le roy que le ley a luy appoint est de defender ses subjects: et le treasure, que est term les senows del guerre, est le adiwant cause pour defender eux vers tout hostility.  
Ergo il est convenient que le roy aueroyt le treasure et mynes de ore et argent, eu queux consist cest treasure.    
Le tierce conteigne un final cause et use del money que est, d'estre coin, prince, et value. Car donques solement il est currant pur le commodity deal subjects en lour mutual commertion ou traffic 

A que il apperteigne de metre certain print et price sur le ore et argent issint que il poet estre disperse enter les subjects, per intercourse de merchandise, vender achater etc. A cestui il appertain daver l'ore et argent.  
Mes ces choses tant solement apperteignont al roy mesme, et a nul altar. Car il fuit grand treason per le comen ley devant l'estatute de Anno. 25. E. 3. ca 2. come il apiert per 23 E. 3. lib. ass. ou feme fuist arse pur fauxer ou counterfeister money  
Ergo all roy appertain les mynes et ours del o'er et argent.    
Gerard fait le quart argument, conteignant les pernicieux effects del cest donation de ore et argent all subjects. 

Ceo que ouste le conveniency et bone proportion deal members deal bien public en pheasant le subject et servant greinder que le roy et governor: doit estre remove horse deal bien public, come choose pernicieux et causant rebellion, contempt, et honor en le subject, mes deposition, peril, et danger en le roy.  
Mes le granting del mines de ore et argent all subjects fait etc.  
Ergo ceo doit estre remove horse deal bien public.    
o'er est adire deal testimonies queux sont de deux genres: les primers sont matters de record, et charters le roy: les auters sont escripts, dicts, et edicts deal certain homes: primer meant pur les primers, mittomus cest fundament derive del effects et uses et customs deal predecessors, et certain adjuncts incidents a les dits choses. 

Ceo que est use de temps del un roy puys altar, one l'assent del judges et auters sages deal lay, et dont les charters et records sont enrolles en leschequer, come choses de effect, et come foundations all accounts, ne poet estre dit torcious. Car ley n'est scye 〈◊〉 non per usage, et usage prove que il est ley.  
Mes que mynes de ore et argent, en auters soils sont all roygne per prerogative, est consonant all use etc. Vide, A A A.  
Ergo il n'est torcious.    
A A A. Le minor est confirm per divers precedentes, et matter de record horse de lesch equer que est l●… court deal revenues le roy en temps de divers royes: les ●…cords sont 

primerment recitees et sont en troy's manners, 

ascuns sont charters fait de grant de mynes de ore et argent en altar soil: Vide, O O.  
Ascuns provont accounts de revenue del tyel mines en altar soil, d'estre rendue all roy. R R.  
Ascuns provont que le roy ad impled pernours deal profit des ours etc. in terre de auters. N N N.    
Puys, lour anctoritie est confirm. B B.    
O O. Les records del 1. genre sont huyct: 

1 En temps le roy, E. 3. 32. Anno.  
2. Fuit charter le roy: R. 2. 〈◊〉. en le explicacation du quel, est conteigne cest syll: 

Si le owre de ore et argent est al roy, le ley done a luy means de vener a ceo, que est per four.  
Mes le owre de ore et argent est al roy.  
Ergo le ley done a luy means de vener a ceo, que est per four.    
3. Per le roy: H. 4. 2.  
4. Per le roy. H. 6. 5.  
5. Per le roy. H. 6. 11.  
6. Per le roy. E. 4. 15.  
7. Per le roy. E. 4. 18.  
8. Per le roy. H. 7. 1.    
R R. Ceus de second espece sont deux: 

L'un account fuit fait et rendue en l'eschecquer sur le lease deal mines de ore et argent et quiure fait per le roy Ed. le tierce a johan Balauncer, et Walter Goldbeater: per quel apiert que le roy fuit respond del 20. marks pur le primer an, et ryens pur le second an, pur ceo que les lessees moreront, et le roy avoyt grant les mines as auters.  
Lauter account fuit fait per Henry evesque de Winchester Cardinal d'engleterre, un del executors john Duke de Bedford, farmer de les mynes de ore et argent en les counties de Devon. et Corn. de le 15. part deal pure argent reserve sur le grant, s. de le 15. iour de December an: 22. H. 6. iesques all 16. iour de August an. 23▪ mesme le roy: et sur ceo account il rend trent size livers pois de pure argent, et deux ounces surdant de mesme le 15. part.    
N N. N'est forsques, un example de pernours deal hour, impledees per le roy. 36. H. 6. s. ceo de Roger Chambe●…oume, que pur son discharge fuit chase de sure all roy pur pardon, sachant per son counsel, que il ne puyst defender le matter per le comen ley.  
BB Lautoritie deal records avandits est confirm en deux manners 1. ●…er un general axiom. que est tiel, ●…es records de chescune court sent le pluts effectual proofs deal ley en choses treats en ceo court: et ceo que est use en un court, est lay en touts courts, et per tout le realm: sic hic, nul proof del revenue le roy est pluts fortque les records del court en que le revenue est rend s. Leschequer. le axiom an●…ntdit est prove per le particular enume ration de les special matters subjects deal courts le roy, Car 

Quant ●…l matters deal corone, s. en appeals de felony, et endytementes de murder et treason, et ty●…s semblables, 〈◊〉 question surde, quel est ley en tyels choses et quel non, les Records del bank le roy, sont le pluis effectual proof de ceo: et c●…o qu●…est use l●… doit estre prise come proof del ley ●…er tout le realm. Car ceo court treat de tiels choses et a jurisdiction te eux, et les records la, sont tesm●…ignes del ley en ●…ux points.  
●…t les Records et precedentes del comen bank, in le property delbiens on ch●…telsteals o●… personals, on droits o●… titles en terres et tenements.  
Ergo codem modo les Records deal ●…schequer, pur choses concernants le reuen●…e le ●…oye, et que opperteign●…nt al ●…oye et que port on attr●…t revenue all ●…oy, et ●…o est confirm per le recital deal sp●…al cases dont judgment fuit done accordant all Records deal exchequer. M. M.    
MM. Les special cases sont ceux 

Primerment le case de Littleton cap. socag. que action de account ne gist verse executors pur ascun, st non pur le roy tantsolement, est prove per le Records deal exchequer, lou accounts pur duties le roy sont discuss & respond, et que accoumpera, et que nemy.  
2. In le case vouch per Littleton cap. de grand seriantie, horse del. II. H 4. Cockein chief baron demand des justices del comen bank, s●… un tient del roy a trover a luy un home all guerre deins les 4. meres, si fuit grand seriantie ou nemy, on fuit respond, que fuit: et adonques it demand s●… le roy avera relief solonque le value del terre ou nemy, ad quod non fuit responsum, car ils ne besoigne de responder luy a ceo, pur ceo que si fuit grand seriantie, ill poet seyer per le usage en le exchequer, quel sum il payera etc.  
3. Et dillonques vient le notice del ley a Littleton, que s●… le villeine le roy purchase biens, et alien eux devant seiser, que uncore le roy poet eux seiser apres, car tyelment fuit le usage del exchequer, en quel court tiels biens fueront respondue all roy, et la il apprise, quòd nullum tempus occurrit regi.  
4. Issint en le case sir William Sentlow, que a mary le feme de sir William Candish, mice per Gerard per que il apiert, que si ascun est accoumptant all roy, ou si ascun money ou biens ou chatels personals deal roy, veigne all mains dascum subject per matter de record, ou matter en fait, que le terre de tiel subject est charge pur ceo, et subject all seizure le roy, en quecunque mains que il veigne apres, soitil per descent, o●… purchase, ou anterment.  
5. Et sur semblable reason le case est rule in 50. lib. Ass. lou un R. avoit rec●…aue certain b●…s the sir Hugh Spencer que suit attaint, per que les deniers attient all roy. R. que avoit les jointement oue sa feme, morust: et per agreement de touts les justices, le term e●…les mains le femme survivor fuit charge all execution le roy pur les deniers. Car le roy pu●…t aver execution de ceo en le vie le baron, que fuit garrant per moults records en le exchequer.    
jesques icy nous avons propose le confirmation deal Records, per une general axiom provee per divers specials: o'er est a dire del second proof, que est un argument a fortiore. 

Les reports de nostre ley sont fait pur le pluis grand part de les parols et dits de les judges, et ceo en que ils assentont est prise de estre le ley.  
Ergò a fortiori lour judgements et lour affairs entries de Record en courts, doyent estre prise de cy grand, ou pluis grand effect, que lour parols, ou dits.    
o'er est adire de second kind de testimonies s. de les escripts, dicts, et edicts de certain homes, Et sont quater. le quart de qucux est illustre per un argument a diversis. 

1. Fuit dit per Gerard que en le liver appelle expositiones vocabulorum que fuit mice en print 40. ans pass, il est declare que mynes de ore et argent en quecunque terres que ils sont, afferont all roys de realm.  
2. Issint Wray dit, que Hesket apprentice que fuit perbien apprise en le ley, en son lecture extant sur le statute de charta forrestae, affirmast, que s●… fueront mynes de ore et argent en terre del subjects deins le forest, que ceux afferont al roy.  
3. Issint il dit que il avoyt view les leys de saint Edward le confessor, en queux fuit conteigne, quòd thesauri de terra pertinent domino regi.  
4. Issint dit Barrham del leys William Conqueror queux il avoyt view, queux avoyent semblables parolles, queux leys fueront recites a luy per les sages deal realm a ceo iures, que ils devant mesme le roy W. Conqueror verament reciteront les leys detterre, nihil praetermittentes. Queux parolles Thesauri de terra, les dits servants pristeront pur ours de ore et argent, et nient pur treasure troue. Car disoyent que ils sont appelles, Thesauri in terra, et nemy de terra, et issent diversa.    
assets est dit de les arguments que fueront in confirmando, ore est besoigne de dire de les arguments in confutando. Car il poet estre dupliciter object 1. tyelment per un argument a toto. 

Touts les prerogatives le roy sont contains en le treatise de praerogativa regis.  
Mes que le roy aueroyt les ours etc. n'est conteigne en le treatise de praerogativa regis.  
Ergò n'est ascune prerogative le roy.    
A cest objection il est dupliciter respondue: Car le proposition, s. le maior est false pur deux causes. 

Primerment, le treatise de praerogativa regis n'est ascun cause per quel le roy aueroyt ceux prerogatives. Car le'effect ne poet preceder le cause. Mes les prerogatives la recitees en maner touts sueront al roy devant le dit treatise escry. Ergò ceo treatise n'est cause deal prerogatives le roy, le minor, ou assumption est prove ab adiuncto temporis, car le pluis grand part de eux est recite per Britton en son lyeur en le chapter de trouers et de droits le roy quel lyeur fuyt faith devant le treatise de praerogativa regis.  
2. N'est ascun argument a toto ad parts, car le treatise avantdit n'est totum, en respect deal particular prerogatiuts le roy. Car ceo treatise ●…e conteigne touts les prerogatives le roy, mes part de cux: et issiut le argument nient conclude. Et il est prove que ceo treatise ne conteigne touts les prerogatives le roy, per un induction de moults special prerogatives, ●…ent comprehends en ceo treatise, tielment. NN.    
NN. 

1. Le roy avera action on suit d'accoumpt verse les executors deal testator le roy, per prerogative done a luy per le ley.  
2. Il auera les biens son villcine vend devant seisur.  
3. Il seysers le terre que fuit a cesty que doit render account a luy, ou que auoyt receu ascune biens ou chateux del roy, en quecunque mains que mesme le terre veigne apres.  
4. Il poet wayver issue, et demurrer en ley, ou econtr●…, poet wayver demurrer, et plcader all issue.  
5. Il avera treasure troue.  
6. Il avera escheat de eux attteint de treason.  
7. Devant l'estatute de 1. Ed. 3. ill averoyt en feel terre tenus de luy, et alien sans licence.  
8. Il avera, pur satisfaction de sa det, ceo que est deliver en court en execution all debtor le roy. Ed. 3. 43.  
9 Slightall le patron ne present deins 6. moys, et le evesque ct apres luy de metropolitan suffer le laps, ou 〈◊〉 euesqu●… patron, et le metropolitan suffer le laps, le roy auera le presentment, per son prerogative: 27. E. 3.  
Et uncore ceux prerogatives ne sont recite en le treatise de praerogativa regis.  
Ergò le treatise de praerogativa regis ne conteigne touts les prerogatives le roy.    
Le second objection est tyel ab adiuncta iniuria. 

Ceo que touch le francktenement et inheritance del subject, ne doit estre faith per le roy,  
Mes de four terre, et prender dillonques 〈◊〉 hour, quel est part del soil, touch le fran●…tenement le subject.  
Ergo le roy ●…e doit ceo fair. 〈◊〉.    
LL. Le maior, le proposition du cesty syllogism est false: que poet estre prove perdeux arguments. 

●…e primer est a pari, a le pareil. 

Car sicome prescription et usage poet donor title ou interest all subject en le franktenement ou inheritance le roy, come in comen, ou boy, ou estovers claim per prescription en le terre del roy, ou en wayves, estrays, wrecks, ou tiels semblables pertinent de droyt all roy, et uncore claim per prescription per les subjects: Issint et per mesme le reason, prescription et usage poet donor all roy title ou interest en altar franktenement: call il ne serra de pyer condition que le subject, que avera ceo per prescription verse les subjects et vers le roy.    
Le second est derive del un enumeration de special prerogatives que le roy ad en franktenements dauters. FF.    
FF. 

1. Devant le statute de magna charta, le roy per son prerogative puit entrer en altar boys et prendre arbres pur reparation de ces castles.  
2. Devant l'estatute de charta forestae. cap. 2. le roy puit afforester le boys deal altar home per que il fuit restraygne de succider son boys demesne sans licence.  
3. Il apiert P. 7. H. 3. que le roy, et altar per son commandment poet enfreinder un stew, que est altar francktenement, et prendre le pische pur son provision per force de son prerogative.  
4. Uilleine, que est le francktenement et l'inheritaunce d'un altar, vient en le presence le roy: le signior del villeine, ne puit luy prendre en le presence le roy, 27. lib. Ass. Car le presence le roy est protection pur luy pur le temps.  
5. Si le roy ad rent charge en fee horse del ascun terre il poet distreyner pur ceo per son prerogative, en tout auter terre de cesty que le doit payer: 13. E. 4.  
Mes en touts ceux cases, le francktenement et inheritance del altar est touch.  
Ergò le roy poet per prescription aue●… prerogatives touchant le francktenement dauter.    
Touts ceux arguments fueront faits del part le roygne. Ex part comitis, Shirbourne sole, allege le opinion de Newton: 19 H. 6. per implication deste all contrary: ou il dit, que si home done terre en fee que ne vault 40. d. et percase le terre per casuel adventure en cell, come per mine de o'er ou argent troue, vault per an 100 li. Si i'impledee vouch le feoffor all garranty, i●… poet monstrer coment le terre ne vault forsques 40. d. all temps de feoffment, et a cel i●… est prist dentrer en le garranty, ceo serra bon plea, et ne garrentera pluys que fuit all temps del ●…ment. Mes sil enter generalment en le guarantee, il rendra in value tant come il estore: ex que dit (il dit) que fuit imply per l'int●…nt del Newto●…, que le mine de o'er et argent serra recover oue le terre, et ne serra all roy.  
Quant all second general point fuit infer pur le roygne, que si issint soit que le roygne avera per prerogative touts les mynes de ore et argent en les terres de subjects, que de ceo il voet ensuer en manner come consequent, que il doit aver ceux owe res et mines de quiure ore en question, s. cybien le cinquecent mill pois contenus en le primer ple en bar, come l'auter cent mill pois contenus en le second bar: plusors sont reasons. 

Le primer est quast a part precipua que treyt a luy le tout 

Si le ore et argent appertain all roy, donques lequiure apperteigneroit: car le ore ou argent et le quiure sont ensemble, et en le seile indivisible, et leur commix ture fait cuxcome une chose entier: & omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, come ere et argent le quiure: cest confirm per troy's specials que sont semblables. (4.)  
Mes le ore et argent appertain all roy, et est confess que mesme s●…zcentmille pois de quiure conteigne en soy ore ou argent.  
Ergò le quyure a luy apperteigneroit.    
Le second est ab adiuncta absurditate, 

Si nuiure appertain all subjects que ne poet estre severe mes per founder, issint le roy serroit servant all subject pur four et founder son quyure.  
Mes ceo est tout irreasonable et absurd.  
Ergò il ne apperteigneroit all subjects, mes al roy.      
4. 

●…n cause deal charters deal inheritance esteantes en un cyste ou box enseale, s●… le possessor ent morust, les charters affer●…nt all heir, et le box, si fuit overt, all executors: Mes entaunt que est enseale, et issint les charters, et le box sont fait une chose entier, et les charters sont pluis precious que le box le heir que ad property all charters, avera le box auxi, et nyent les executors, sur le reason avantdit.  
Issint si une chariot que est traye one size chivals eschew sur un, et luy tue: les chivalles serront forfeit all roy come Deodand cybien come le chariot que ●…ue ●…home, pur ceo que ils fueront attach all chariot, et issint fueront come un chose ensemble, que occasionont son mort.  
Issint si obligation est fait a deux, ou deux sont possess d'un chyvall, et l'un est attaint, le roy auera le obligation, et tout le duty, ou le chyvall, pour ceo que il est chose entier.  
Donques per semblable reason et ley, pur ceo que le ore 〈◊〉 argent et le quiure sont ensemble, et en le soil indivisible, et lour commixture fait ●…ux entier, le roy auera tout ensemble. Quia magis dignum etc.    
3. A genere tyelment, 

Touts mines ●…t ours portants o'er ou argent et base metal en semble que sont en soil dauters perteignont all royne: et ceo est prove per specials. 

〈◊〉. Records dont le 
Primer est 
a●…. 7. E. 3.  2. 
17. R. 3.  3. 
7. H. 4.  4. 
17. H. 6.  5. 
30. H. 6.  6. 
31. H. 6.  7. 
33. H. 6.  8. 
34. H. 6.  9 
2. E. 4.  10. 
3. E. 4.    
2. accounts rend all roy dont, 

Le primer suit fait per William Wymoundham deal profits deal mines en les counties de Devon. et Corn. del 12. ●…our de August. An. 22. E. 〈◊〉. iesques le 23. de September, 25. eiusdem regis.  
Le second per William de Aulton clerk pur les profits del mines en les counties de Devon. et Corn. de●… quart del March, 26 E. 1. iesques le 18. de April, 27. eiusdem regis.  
Le tierce, per Matthew Craw. thorn, de les mines in Devon. et Corn 15. E. 3.  
Le quart per john Maneron que succeed Crawthorne, fait del 19 E. 3. iesques all 23. ●…iusdem regis.  
Le si●…que per un Roba●… Glover.      
Mes le information conteime que cest my conteigne en luy ore et argent a vec le quiure: et n'est dedit per respons, mes pleinement confess.  
Ergò cest mine est le terre le count perteigne all ●…oyne:    
Le quatt est deduct horse de les vits' records et est a genere, Issint, 

Teuts mines en quex est asc●…n argent o●… over, appertain all roy,  
Mes les mynes de quyure conteignone argent, Car nul myne d'estayne est void d'argent:  
Ergò touts les mynes de quy●…re appertain all roy.    
Et ceo est confirm per charter le roy Edw. le primer grant all subjects del count de cornwall, confirm per le charter le roy R. 2. que fuit mitigate per lesta: de 50. E. 3. per queux apiert que lour authority en Cornewale et Devon. de four et de aver estayne fuit derive del roy: et certain quantity deal estayne est payable all corone pur tyel liberty i●…sque a ceo iour: come en ascun lieus en le county de Darby le roy ad certain quantity deal plumb sur consideration que argent est en ceo, et que il absteynera de user le extremity de son prerogative. Mes en Darbyshire et ailours ou sterile mines de plumb ont este apiert tout temps, et le roy nauoyt ascun profit, les subjects ●…a p●…ient prescriber pur ceo verse le roy, et le four et prisel del plumb sans payment, est prescription pur le pays, ●…t come Hesket avantdit tient, le prescription en tiel case est bone. Car il y avoit diversity del mines de plumb, car ascunes fueront fertile, cestassavoir, conteignants en eux ore ou argent: et ascuns sterile, cestassavoir, sans over, ou argent.  
jesques icy del part le royne: ore est a dire del respons fait per part le count, et ceo en deux manners. Car 

Primerment ils, supposant le authority de Records estre tresgrande, d●…nont a eux un re●…sonable exposition. Car il ny ad ascu●…e mine de estayne, de quiure, ou de plumb, ne de far, mes que asc●… o'er 〈◊〉 argent poet etr●… treat ou finate horse de ceo (et ●…ssint le roy averoit touts mynes debase m●…ale deins le realm, que est absurd) donques ●…y le roy auera ceux prerogatives, ou le ore et argent que est en le base mettale, exceed le value deal base mettale, ou all meins suff●…st all porter touts les expenses destre defray entour le acquisition de ceo, it s●…lon cest exposition ils primerment interpretont les parols del records et le maxim de magis digno, p●…s print exception country l'information. A A.  
1. ils denyont tam bien. 

Le authority de Records, come choses faits all importunate request de eux que sure ont all royes ●…ur gaigne●…, et tolerate per les subjects, to que ils averont part del gain, issint ils vituperant l'effect pur le cause etc.  
Come ceo que est collect de●… charier le royes all ceux de cornwall: Car apiert per les parols del charter que lour liberty ne priest original commencement, mes t●…solement confirmation et direction per ceux charters et coment que le roy ad ascun profit. ceo nest en respect de ascun interest en le chose, mes pur porter le charge des officers, s. triers, controllers etc. si come il ad del merchants, car il appoint searchers etc. Queux avont s●… ipends de les merchants etc. tam●…n n●…nt ascun property in lour merchandise etc.      
A A. Selon l'exposition avant dit, ils 

primerment interpretont 

Ceux parols, aliquid auri vel argenti habetur, issint que ceo aliquid soit tant que vault le charge deal Four et searcher etc. car auterment cest aliquid, n'est aliquid, mes cest aliquid nihil est, et meyns que nihil, Car ex nihil home avera nihil, mes icy de cest aliquid il avera perde, si pur acquirer le ore de value de 4. d. il serra all charge de 5. d.  
Et le maxim, quòd omne magis dignum etc. Car ceo est intendible ou le choose pluis dign est de ascun value, ou de pluis value que le base chose est. Car de minimis non curat lex, come en action de waist deal 2. d le plaintiff navera judgement: et cest lour interpretation de ceux parols de etre intelligibles lou fuit grand abundance de ore en les mynes est confirm per le reservation del roy H. 4. S. Nonam libram de argento puro inde proveniente, issint que le roy intend grand quantity de argent de estre en les mines, entant que il n'ad reserve ascun part dauter metal.    
puis reprehendont l'information per argument a descriptione. Car, 

Information pur le roy est le declaration le roy, quel doit conteiner certainty, issint que le party avera perfect science a quel chose respondera, et le court de quel chose il adiudgera.  
Mes icy per l'information et le respons est disclose et confess que le count ad prize sizecentmille pois de owre de quiure conteignant en soy ore ou argent troue et fowe en son terre demesne, s. sinquecentmille pois en mine apert puis que le count fuit signior del soil, et centmille pois en myne en son soil apert devant que il fuit seigniour del soil: et ne api●…rt si le ore et argent en tyel hour fuit de greinder value que le quyure ou all meyns d'ascun value ouster le charge de acquisition, et ouster le base metal, pur sacher le loyalty del faith del count.  
Ergò n'est bon Information.      
jesques icy deal general points o'er est a dire del special, que est prove del part le count per un enthymeme conteynant leffect et grant le roy et royne: a partibus ad totum. 

Le roy et royne P. et M. ont en l'une case grant all count le terre en que le hour fuit, et en lauter case le mine per le nome de touts et singular mines. Car le vain dont les 500000. pois etc. ne fuit my all temps del date all count, eo que fuit close, pur ceo passera per grant del soil, come part de soil. Mes en le second plea le vain passera per nome de mines, car le vain fuit patent etc. 

Cest antecedent del enthymeme est pleinement illustre per un amplisication deal objections que poent estre fait del altar part encounter le count: et cest preoccupation est derive deal divers adjuncts incidents all patents le roy et royne QQQ.    
Ergò tout ceo que est conteigne en l'information perteigne all count.    
QQQ. Les adjuncts incidents all fait et patents sont, 

primerment recites briefement, et opposes encounter les objections deal altar part car les pa.▪ rolls, 

De gratia sua speciali, pretend grand favour le roy, et son bountifulness verse le patentee.  
Ex certa scientia pretend pleine intelligence de roy et royne en le matter, et exclude tout ignorance.  
Ex mero motu, testify, que il nauoit ascun suyt ne suggestion de patentee, mes que le primer motion, et tout le sequel all perfection del patent proceed del roy mesme, et pur ceo, le effect del patent serra le pluis amplement extend all benefice le patentee.    
secondement pluis amplifies, 

Tam bien per un distinct proposition de les objection 〈◊〉 et several applying de respons, B B,  
Come de novel confirmation d●… ceo per induction de specials. S S.      
B B. Donques le, 

Primer 

objection est tyel, car, 

Ascun de part le roy et royne poet dire, que quant ils granteront le terre, que ils ne conusteront que tyel vain de hour fuit en ceo, ou quant ils graunteont omnes & singulas mineras, que ils ne conusteront que ore ou argent fuit en les mines.    
respons est, 

1. Propose tielment. 

Sir, ils mesme ont tesmoigne le contrary, south le grand seal dengleterre, que est tesmoigne de verity, et nient impugnable en credig. Car, ont dit, ex certa scientia, que est tant a dire, qne ils ont conusance de chescune chose material.    
2. Confirm per un argument, a maiori▪ 

In 43. E. 3. Thorp dit, si un manor a que un auowson est appendent soit en le mayne le roy per escheat, ou purchase, si le roy a ceo iour done le manor a un home auxi entierment come un tiel tenoyt devant que il vient en nostre mains per voy descheate, ou que un tiel tenoit que nous enfeoffa, le auowson passera, sans dire, cum soedis & advocationibus: et le cause est pur ceoque le ley entend en tiel case, que le roy est apprise de sa droit, quòd curia concessit la, et si serra dit issint en ceo case, ou n'est prise mes per implication que le roy est apprise de son droyt: a fortiore serra prise issint, l'ou le roy issint dit perexpresse parolles.        
Second, O.  
Tierce, R.    
O. Le second 

objection, 

Si ascune voet dite que les parols serron●… strait●…ent prize verse le patentee, et beneficialment verse le roy ct le royne.    
respons, 

Sir, ceo patent fuit fait per le roy ct royne de gratia sua speciali: per queux parols ils signifiont lour favour et grace all patentce, et per ceo donont intelligence que les parolles serront favorablement interpret et largement extend a son benefit et commodity, et estraitment verse le royne.      
R. Letierce, 

objection, 

Si home voet dire que le patentee ad done information all roy et royne, et ad fait suit de aver grant, et pur ceo chescun parol serra prise estraitement vers luy.    
respons: 

Sir, le roy ct le royne ont tesmoigne le contrary, car ils ont dit, que le grant est fait ex mero motu suo, per quel ils voilent, que c●…o fait de sour mere motion prendra effect amplement.      
S. S. Le novel confirmation est per induction de siz special cases, ●…u ceux parols, ex gratia speciali, certa scientia, et mero motu, sont semblablement expounds. 

1. Per Hussey. 9 H. 7. 2. que priest difference inter patent ex certa scientia, et per informamur.  
2. 1. H. 7. 13. en charter de pardon.  
3. 3. H. 7. 6. en case de prior de Norwich.  
4. 22. E. 4. 44. en case abbe de Waltam.  
5. 36. et 37. H. 6. 24. eu le case de Quatermaynes.  
6. 41. E. 3. lib. Assis. 19 Licence de doner en mortmain. A cest derniere case est adioigne un altar reason, que si le count navera l●…s mines, donques riens passer●… per ceux parolles, omnes & singulas mineras etc. et en le general conclusion est dit que le patent fuit fait devent lestatute de 4. et 5. de le reign de les dits roy et royne, faith touchant ●…our letters patentes, & sic, est mult aid per cest statute, que patents serront beneficialment expound pur le patentee, nient obstant le defect deal very nosmer de l●…s natures, genres et sorts de les hereditaments cent●…nes in vels' letters patents.    
Le counsel le roy encounter ceo, et consider deux points 

Le primer est, si per le grant de soil en que le hour fuit, fait ex gratia speciali, certa scientia & mero motu, le owre de quyure conteignant ore, ou argent (le vain de quel ne fuit apert, mes secret) passera all patentee, ou nemy, et semble a eux, que nemy, Car. 

1. Issint arguont, 

Ceo que vient al roy en respect que il est possessor del corone, ne passera per grant de terre Vide, L. L. L.  
Mes le owre de ore et argent appertain all roy come il est possessor del corone, et nemy del terre: et en ceo respect il ad le owre en son soil, et en soil d'auter.  
Ergò ne passera etc. Car sil alien le soil, ill n'ad per ceo alien ceo point de prerogative sa corone en sa soil.    
2. Issint, et est respons all dit argument sur ceux parolles ex gratia speciali etc. 

Tar le patent que est issint fait, ●…erra prise favorablement all patentee: mes ceo est quant all chose express en le patent, que les parolles monster de estre intend de passer, mes ceo ne voet fair altar chose de passer que n'est express per parolls de patent destre intend. Car si le roy grant et intend un chose, tyels parols ne poyent fair deux choses de passer, come est en le case de Prior, de Wenlocke: Nou●… natura bre: Fol. 232.      
Le second est, si per le grant fait de touts mines, oue les parols su●…dits, si ceo myne de quiure conteignant o'er ou argent passera all patentee ou nemy, et semble a eux que nemy. P. P. P.    
L. L. L. Cest maior, seu propositio est prove per enumerati on de, 

Particular choses del prerogative que ne passont per done le soil, come 

Wayve,  
Fstray,  
Wreck,  
Et tyels semblableschoses que sont collateral a le terr e.    
Special cases ceo confirmants dont le 

Primer est de manor deins un forest le roy escheat all roy et done per le roy all altar etc.  
Second est le livery graū●… all heir de tenant le roy en capite, en quel le clause de salva all feme sa Dower per le roy assignanda, n'est conteigne.  
Tierce est en 31. E. 3. de un aduow●…n, descend a troy's coperceners et Fitz: Quar●… impedit 1.      
P P. P. Quant alsecond point, et le grant specify ●…n le second plea, s. de omnibus & singulis mineris, il est tielment argue encounter le count, 

1. Issint. 

Termes en patentes de roys que comprehendont choses annex all corone ou prerogative royal, ou de grand importance et chose de pluis base degree, serront prise et construe de fair les choses base solement de passer all patentees, et ceo est confirm per special cases. R. R. R.  
mes en c●…o patent est is issint. Car sont deux ma ners de myns 

mines royal que consist de ore ou ●…argent ou de base met●…alles conteignant en soy ore ou argent.  
Base mines que consist solement de base mettalle et substance s. quyure, estayne, plumb far ou carbones, et neyant en eux ore ou argent.    
Ergò en ceo patent les terms serront construe de fair le base mines pass●…r, et nemy le royal.    
2. 4. 4. 4.  
3.    
R. R. R. Special cases. 

1. En. 22. E. 3. lib. ass. 45. En grant all master ●…e S. Lenard de bonis felo●…um, ubi excipitu●… treitor.  
2. En return de touts maner de briefs grant alun, ou somons sont except, car touch le roy.  
3. En grant defines, issues etc. de s●…s tenants; ill nau●…●…ynes deal home que est tenant de luy et del altar.  
4. En 3 E 3, ●…z assize 4 45. de pount eschew et destre repair●… ou general charter le roy ne excuse le abbe que fuit charge pe●… special cause.  
5. En 9 H. 6. 56. En grant le roy de terres en f●… oue guarantee, le patentee ne recouera en value sans express parols. Car guarantee ad deux ●…ffects, ●…une a rebutter, et ceo il fra la: lauter a recover en value, et ceo n●… fra en l●… case le roy sans precise parols.  
6. En 2. H. 7. 6. En le case deal count de Northumberland, lou le grant le roy des amerciamentes en ty●…l county, ne tra'y●… les amerciaments deal viscount, coroner, ou auter grand officer pur son ●…sdemeanour, car ceux sont royal amerciaments.  
7. En 43. E. 3. 15. lib. ass. En grant le roy d●… duchy de cornwall a son eigne ●…s, ou per general grant, vn special guard ne passa.  
8. 5. E. 2. Fitz Quarèimpedit. 165. ou le roy pur aduowson en le county Palantine de Durrham suist Quare impedit en le common bank, lo●… pleader all jurisdiction del court grant per le roy, ne excuse le p●…adar.  
9 3. E. 3. Fitz. Grant: 102. Ou le r●…y avoyt grant a un abbe que il puit amorttser terres all value de 100 s. ●…t uncore ne puit purchase avowson tenus del roy en chief. Cest case differ del case en 4 lib. ass. cite del altar part: car la, le charter le roy nosme le mess etc. iss●…t que ne poet estre intend, que il fuit ignorant del tenure, mes icy in 34. E. 3. Le patent est general que il amortisera terre de value le 100 s. etc. Come dit Wray apprentice: mes auters ceo denyent, car le advouson fuit hic nosme auxi.  
10. 19 Fitz: Grant: 58. lou licence le roy de appropre l'aduowson ne puit fair advowson tenus del roy destre appropre.  
11. 1. H. 7 23. et 26. En case de●… sanctuary, ou le charter le roy general ne ●…uist sufficient de fair sanctuary pur treason.  
12. 18. H: 8: Brook Estates: 84: et Patents, 104. En le case de Bowrehall en Essex, l'ou fuit tenus, que nul estate de inheritance passers, nyent obstant les parols de gratia speciali, etc., per queux le roy avoyt grant ceo a un home et ses heirs males. Donques les parols en charters le roy enureront all comen ●…ntent, et ne devesteront del roy, choses de haut degree, ne chose●… a●…ere all corone in point de prerogative.    
4 4 4. Secondment ils respond a ceo que est dit del altar par●… 

Car quant a ceo que Shi●…borne dit, que s●… le count navera les mines royal, il auera ryens per le parolle, Mynes, ●…ar le base mines passeront per le grant del terre. Sir, que adonques? ills sont parols de surplisage pur mines en mesme le terre, come sont les parols de granter guards, marriages, et escheats, que sont plusors foits mice en patentes: ou auterment p●…ient prendre ●…ffect pu●… mines que Henry le count avoyt en terres dauters.  
●…t quant a lestatute de 4. et 5. P. et M. Barrham dit, que voyer est que l'act fait les letters patents bon nyent obstant l●… defect, deal very nosmer de le natures▪, genres, et sortes de les hereditamentes: mes ceo serra solōque le tenor de mesme les letters patentes. Et voyer est que l'act dit que les letterspatentes serront expound pluis beneficialment pur les patentees, mes solonques les parols et purport de les letters patents, et sur ceo ils issint conclude. 

Si en le parol, terre, en lun case le hour royal nest grant: ne en le parol, mines, en lauter case: donques, le ct nextende me●… all base hour: et pur ceux serra benefificialment expound en advantage del patent●…e: car ceo est solonque le tenor et purport del patents.  
Mes en le parol, terre, en lune case etc.  
Ergò le act nex●…d ●…es all nature deal base hour etc. car ●…extender all hour royal, serra contrary a●… purport del patent.      
7. 7. 7. 3. Deux several opin●…ōs de ceux de ceo part sont recite, car ascuns arguont 

Issint 

Ceo que est incident all corone inseparablement, ne poet estre grant ou severe del corone, per express parol.  
Mes ceo mine, est ●…ant mine royal, est incident all corone inseparablement, come escheat pur ●…reason:  
Ergò per express parolles ceo myne ne puit ●…stre grant ou sever del corone, multo minus sans express parols.    
Aascuns encounter ceo, à maiori. 

Si le ley soit ti●…l que le roy poet granter point de sa prerogative a altar, à ●…ortiore il le poet en nostre case, ou le chose n'est que revenue ou pro●…te del corone, que poet estre icy bien lease ou demise a altar, sans r●…nt, come pur rent.  
mes le ley est tyel: que est prove per deux special cases 

Le primer est en 20. E. 3. Fitz. Corone. 12. 5. lou le roy avoyt grant as citizen's de Loundres que nul gagera battle verse eux en appeal et uncore ceo est un chose annex pluys prochein●… all prerogative le roy, et all person le roy.  
Le second est issint: s●… home priest les bi●…ns le roy torciouesment le roy poet prendre ou seiser ses biens tanque i●… ad fait restitution, come le comen use del exchequer est, uncore le roy grant ceo all ville de Lynne. 8. R. 2. Fitz. Grant pl●…ito vl●…mo.    
Ergò multo magis il poet en nostre case etc.      
Hactenus des arguments in v●…amque partem: o'er del opinion des justices que est con cernant, 

Le matter en ley, in les points. 

General, ●…r 

Pur le primer ils agreont. 

Que touts mines d'ore et argent, en quecunque soil, perteigne all roy per prerogative, oue liberty de four, carrier etc.  
Que mynes de quyure, estayne, p●…, ou far sans ore ou argent, perteigne all proprietor del soil, ●…ar ●…n base metal, null prerogative.  
Et per Baron F●…euil, que●…l y ad quiure in une vain sans ore, et in four outer ill aptert over, et petite d'●…uter m●…ttayle, ceo serra dit mine de quyure de ore, et nyent de quyure solement.    
Pur le second, fuit agree per Harper, Southcot, et Weston, que s●… le value de ore ou argent ne exceed le value del bese metal, tout 〈◊〉 all proprictor deal terre: mes si exceed, tout est al roy, et serra ●…it Mine Royal.    
Special, 

Fuit agree per touts, que touts mines Royal, soyent de pure o'er ou argent, ou soyent de base metal contey●…●…re ou ●…rgent, poyent per apt paroll●… estre grant, ●…ar ne sont inseparablement incident all corone.  
Fuit agree per to●…ts forsque les ●…oys avantdits, et per eux auxi, si ceux mines in question ●…nt royal mines, que les ●…wres in le primer ple spec●…e ●…er grant del soil, ne le mine in le second per grant del mines, ●…e passeront all count per le patent, mes beso●…gne d'auer special parols, car soil et my ne icy serront prize all common intent pur base mines etc.  
Lactantio del 4 et 5. P. et M. ne aid: car l'intent del charter est del mines base, et nextend all mines royal, mes per Dyer s●… null mine soit forsque royal, donque pass●…roit, car aliter les parols serroint void, ●…s i●…y s●…nt auters mines, s▪ base pe●…que etc. et per mesme 〈◊〉 Dyer co●…tque le mine in le primer p●… ne fuit api●…t all temps de●… date de●… patent, vncor●… s●…rra dit mine, car de Mineris aliquae sunt occul●…ae, & aliquae apertae. Catlyn dit, que, les parols ad humilem petitionem eiusdem comiti●…, diminuont le force des parols, ex gratia speciali etc.      
Le pleading ●…t information. 

L'information fuit challenge per Mead, quia ne fuit monster en quel vi●… o●… H●…mel New●…ands ●…mes fuit respond, que ne besoigue, quia ●…'est en effect ●…orsque pur trespass, et nul serra recover forsque damages: contra in action real, car l'a sur recovery, 〈◊〉 viscount ne puit luy metter en ●…tsin sa●… notice del v●…lle etc.  
Le pleading deal part le co●…te suit 〈◊〉: car doit a●…er monstre que le ●…ne conteigne forsque petite ore, ne tant c●…me ferra les charges: mes ceo il ne ad fait, i●…aque per le general confession que i●… ad ore, serra prise pluis beneficialment put le roigne encounter le pleadant, que il ad assets deal over. Imò touts forsque les tr●… avantdits agree que tout serra all ro●…gne, comentque le bas●…●…tayle soit de gre●…nder value, coque est confess que as●… ore et argent fuit en ●…o.       

A Logical Analysis of Stanfords crown pleas.  
Pleas deal corone, sont que conteigne offences faits encounter le corone et dignity le roy atque hic Stanford agit, 

1. deal nature des dits offences, ubi fait ascavoir que les accessories devant, s. les procurers, ou apres s. les receiuors ou favourers, pari paena plectentur. Stanf. 40: 41: 42. 43: Home poet estre accessary all accessary, sil felonice receive un accessary, 43. b. et la, 44: Licet un statute que fait ascune choose felony, ne parle des procurers et receivers, uncore serront deins l'●…statute. Offences encounter le corone sont. 

Felony, que est offence del corone, immediatè verse un common person, et concerna les 

Biens, A. A.  
Le person, B: B:    
Treason, que est offence del corone immediatè encounter l'estate le roy & royalme, estque 

Grand 

Come compasser ou imaginer le mort le roy, sa roigne, lour eigne fits, violare le roigne, ou leigne file le roy nyent mary, ou le feme l'eigne fits le roy; Leuer guerre, adherer as enemies le roy: counter feiter le grand ou privy seal, ou sa money: porter faux money in le realm counterfeit au money dengleterre, tuer Chancellor, Treasurer, justice dascun bank, en cry, ou assizes, doyer et terminer, scants in lour place, et ce per Lest. de 25. E. 3. cap: 2: de proditionibus: Item counterfaister de privy seignet 1. M. cap: 6: vide jest: de Elis: ca: 11 et 18. Elis. ca 1. de clippers, washers, silers, rosiders, et lour abettors, quelconque soit le coin, dummodo soit currant icy.    
Petire 

Vide mesme lest: de 23. E: 3: ca 21: que n'est que explication deal common ley. Come, Quant un servant tua son master, feme sa Baron, home secular son prelate: feme sa mistress per 12. Ass. p. 30. 10. H. 6. 47. comentque soit hors de service dummodo sit de malice conceive in service. Fitz: 210. Imo les abettors hic pu niuntur eodem modo. Fitz: 216. Iten mitter excommengement south bull le pape, 30: Ass. 19 Item utlage debrusa le prison et amesne prisoners, 1: H: 6: 5:  
Vide Stamford, pag: 10. a. b.        
2 Des penalties de mesmles offences. QQ.    
Huc refer misprision, s. le concealing de felony ou treason come, justice de peace enrolla un bill denditement nyent troue per le pais: Estranger utter faux money, 3. H. 7. 10. Home trahe son espce de Ferir justice seant en son place 22: E. 3: 13: Ferir ou bater un juror, in presence des justices Fitz: judg. 174, un ferist altar in le sale de West. Fitz. Cor. 280. Vide jest 33. H. 8. ca 12. Pur drawing blood in le meason le roy. Item per Britton, Bibaud ferist un honourable home, justice arrests un que faith fray devant luy, et un auter luy rescussa, 22. E. 3. 13.  
A, A, Felony in biens est 

In bonis abductis 

Del person dascun home hinc surdont, 


Robbery scilicet,  
Sil priest de mon person licet soit south xii. d. Deal lieu, ou ieo suis present. Silius menace de moy occider, ou fist moy juror: Item sil gist en agayst, olim, contra hodiè.  
Hic de scinsors de burses: de queux Britton, 24, b.  
Hic de Hue et Cry: Vide jest. de West. cap, 9 an, 3, E, 1. Lest, de Winchest, 13. E, 1: Lest, de. 28, E. 3. ca, 11. Et 27. Elis. ca: 17,   
Piracy Vide jest. 28, H, 6, ca 13, rastal, Trial, 8.    
Vel aliter, & est Larceny si supra xii. d. aliter n'est felony, mes petit Larceny per Stanford. q. atque hîc, 

1. Agit in genere de Larceny, ubi, 

Primùm explicat naturam rei, & definite Larceny, et met divers cases et exemples: Larceny est fraudulenta rei alienae pluris quam 12. d. valentis tractatio, animo furandi: invito illo cuius res illa fuerit. Vide pag. 24. 25.  
Deinde latius illustrat furtum per les adjuncts 

Vide, C. C.      
2. De certis specibus furti ꝑ statura. 

Records emblees, 8. H. 6. ca 12. Prisel del feme invite, 3. H. 7. cap. 2. Hunting in painted visors pur stealer Uenison, et denier ceo 1. H. 7. ca 〈◊〉 Servant priest les biens son master, except prentices, et ceux que sont deins le age de 18. ans, 2. H. 8. cap. 7. Selling horses into Scotland, que est un stealing d'eux horse D'england; 23 H. 8. cap 16. & 1. Elis. cap. 8. Soldier steal away sans licence, 2. E. 6. 2. Multiplication, 5. H. 4. ca 4. Prisel de castles le roy, towers, ships, armour, ou practise de prendre: 14. Elis. cap. 1. Servant stela les biens son master apres sa mort, et ne voet aperer apres proclamations, per jest. de 33. H 6. ca 1. Escipper lane forsque a Calais. 18. l●…. 6. 15        
Destructis et ceo per 

Arsons des measons felonice, ou des Barnes adjoinant all measons. Bourglours, que felonice in temps de peace debrusont measons, eglises, mured, towers, ports noctantes, licet riens import. Huc refer Drawlatches, Wastors, R●…byeardes men, que serront arrestes pur suspicion, per jest. 5. E. 3. 14.      
C C. Illustrate Larceny per ses adjuncts. s. 

De queux choses Larceny ne serra, Come de 

Beasts savages, columbes horse del dovecoate, poisons in le river, car nulluis in bonis. Cor. 185. 18. H. 8. 2. country del debruser del dovecoate, et prender les young pigeons, 18: E: 4: 8. 10. E. 4. 15. embicer domestical dame, felony. q. sil ne conust destre domestical, mes sil prist mort, cest felony.  
Item serra de personel choses, et nemy de real; itaque si home succida arbre et priest, nest felony, contra si suit succide devant, Cor. 119. Box oue charters null felony, 10. E. 4. 15. treasure troue, wreck, deal mere, wayf, stray prize, null felony: Cor. 187. 265. car incertum, quis dominus: contrà de bonis capellae. Endit. 15.    
Poet estre de ses proper biens, come beylor stela biens baylees, & tamen le property fuit en luy semper, 7. H: 6: 45. 13. E. 4. 10.  
Larceny le possession eficant in le owner. q. pag 26.  
Quis non potest committer Larceny, s. quis ne serra dit larson comentque il priest etc. 

Feme per coercion ou commandement son Baron, q. ut nec jointment one son baron: car serra l'art le baron: mes feme poet, inscio viro. Item feme ne serra accessary pur receiver son Baron.  
Infant de tender age, come deins 12. ans per Bracton: mes contra hodiè.      
Huc pertinet le tractate de Theftboote, quant home reprist ses biens emblees: mes properment est, quant home priest ses biens dun laron pur luy favourer: nest felony mes punishable per ranson & imprisonment. Ass 346: tamen, Cor. 353. fuit felony. Biens confisques, que sont dones all roy, quia ne sont claims per ascun altar, mes disavowed del laron. Vide Stanf. 186. diversity inter biens confisques, et biens forfeits. Wayf quant le laron sur hue & cry & pursuit, pur easer luymesme del portage, wayva les biens ou part d'eux perque les officers le roy, ou altar in droit le roy seisist les biens, la le roy cux retiendra come waif, si non que le owner fait fresh suit, car donque il reauera ses biens, issint, si le laron ne wayna, mes home in droit le roy prist eux de luy pur suspicion, le owner reavera sur fresh suit. Null waif des biens prizes per trespass: null waif de biens d'un qui ad safe conduit in bonis & corpore. 13. E. 4. 10. Freshsuyte, quant le party pursue le laron cy hastymēt que il luy apprehend oue le mayor, et sur ceo port son appeal et luy convince per verdict, mes hodiè suf●…st sil fait son devoir, comentque ne soit prise deins un an apres, ou soit prise all suit d'un altar, et suffist conviction sans attainder. Mes per jest. 21. H. 8. ca 11 il auera ses biens sur lenditement del fellow, imò sil procure evidence destre done, sans ascun fresh suit, et semble, que si le servant soit rob, le master poet donor evidence et reaver etc.  
B. B. Felony in le person, et ceo vel. 

in part 

Sublata come in 

Couper des langues  
Ouster des oyeles,   Vtrumque felony per 5, H, 4, cap, 5, Hic del Maim, ubi le pl: poet eslyer de fair chescun principal, ou solement cestuy que luy ferust, et les auters accessories. Maim per Britton, est ou ascune member est toll dont home est pluis feeble a combater, come oyel, main, pee, ●…ste debruse, anterior dents: mes dents moliers, orialles, neese, n'est maim, eins blemish, hîc lex talionis, est lex Dei: mes nostre ley agard tout in damages.  
Corrupta per carnalem copulam: haec copula est 

Contrà naturam, & haec vel, 

Confusio. 

Specierum, home ou feme oue brute beasts,  
Sexuum, home one home, feme oue feme,   ceo est Bug gery, et est felony per jest: 25, H. 8, 6. & 5, Elis: cap: 17.  
Incest, inter gradus prohibitos.    
Secundùm naturam. 

Scortatio inter personas solutas,  
Adulterium, cum altera persona est desponsata, vel utraque.   Si violence soit use, dicitur Rape: fuit felony all common lay: puis, trespass per jest: West: 1: cap: 13, tempore E. 1: postremò idem rex ꝑ West: 2: ca 34, fist ceo felony, comentque le feme assent apres: vide jest: de 6, R, 2, cap: 6, several punishment verse le feme que consents, apres.    
In toto, D: D:      
D. D. In toto, s. in occisione, cùm quis iniustè privatur vita, hîc vide Stan●…: deal coroner et son poyer de veyer le corpse, a pag: 48. ad. 53. et del viscount, que quest decolla un home ou doit luy pender, cest felony: Hic agit. 

1. the certain statutes come, 

Per jest. de 3. H. 7. ca 13. st ascun del hostel le roy conspire ●…e ●…ort le roy, seigniour de privy counsel, Steward, Treasurer, Controller deal hostel, cest felony.  
Wilful poisoning est faith felony, s. est faith wilful murder, per lest: the 2. E. 6. ca 2.  
Si Jailer per dures faith home approver, cest felony per lest, the 14. E. 3. ca 9 Vide jest. de 1. et 2. P. et M. ca contrà aegyptios: & 5. Elis. cap. 16. que fait conjuration felony. Britton dit, que sorcerers et miscreants serront arses.    
2. deal comen ley ubi, 

1. Breviter describit ex Bracton, Homicidium est hominis occisio ab homine facta: sed ista descriptio nimi●… est specialis, & excludit Deodanda.  
2. Explicat latius perspecies, s. 

Homicidium, manslaughter, sance malice prepence: hic st ascun chose que n'est home, tua home, le chose mesme, & tout que est move oue ceo. serra forfeit come un Deodand. 

hîc voluntas olim fuit felony sans act, contrà hodiè.  
Olim le striking d'un feme pregnant, fuit felony, 〈◊〉 causoit abortum, mes hodiè doit estre in rerum natura, et devy deins l'an & iou●… puis le coupe.    
murder, avecmalice prepence: hîc de felo de se.        
Q Q. Dictum est deal offences: dicendum de penalties, et de manner use in punishing, ubi considerantur. 

Le nature del suyt et ceo tùm 

In le commencement del suit, ubi docetur 

Que serra judge in le suit, s. justices deal bank, d'assise: et steward del hostel deal chose deins le hostel.  
Que serra le mean de sue●…, s. per, 

Appeal: G. G.  
Indictment. F F      
In le prosecuting del ceo, atque hîc: 

Del order in pleading. N. N.  
Manner deal trial. T. T.      
Final judgement et determination del suyt. X. X.    
G. G. Appeal atque hic. 

1. Le general nature de ap peles exponitur. 

1. Per un brief definition ex Brytton. 

Appeal est pleynte del home faith sur altar, ovesque purpose de luy attaynder de felony, per motes a ceo ordeynes.    
2. per un large explication conteynant 

Certain general adjuncts deal apples 

Come, vers queux Appeal gist, s. verse touts, que poyeut fair fe. lony.  
Deins quell temps serra port, s. deins ●…an ●…t iour, in appeal de mort. q. the robbery et Rape.  
Deins quell county. s. ou le felony fuit faith. Vide jest. de 2. et 3. E. 6. ca 24.  
Devamt queux. s. Coroner. viscount, justice de bank, et jail delivery, justice de peace.  
Ou un a●…ra divers apples pur un felony. Olim ●…cuit aver un vers le principal, et altar verse l'accessory. contra iam. Tamen in speciali casu licet, comest un in un county procure altar de robber moy en autercounty. q.  
Ou un respondra all divers appeals, s. home commit several robberies as several homes, il r espondra all appeal de chescune q. in mort ou rape.  
Si l'appellant surcessa son appeal per nonsuyte, release, retraxit, marriage apres declaration, ou sil devy, le roy pursuera, ct le party ne irra alarg, mes serra arraign all suit le roy sur mesme le declarati●….    
Le proces en appeal. M. M.      
2. Les particular properties deal singular appeals: 

Mort. S. S.  
Robbery 4. 4.  
Rape. 8. 8.      
M. M. Le process in appeal ou indictment ut Capias, Exigent, Certiorari etc. 67: hîc le principal serra primes attaint, et puis le accessary, 45. hîc 

1. Le manner deal entreating les priseners quant ils sont in prison, est declare 

Vide lestatute de 14. E. 3. ca 9 contra le cruelty de gaolers.  
Vide jest. West. 1. ca 13. que notorious et rebellious felons serront en prison fort et dure.   hîc de Escapes. V V. V  
2. Le order, 

del amesner eux all bar, 

Per Britton, ills serront dischances, disceints, sans coif, en lour pure coat, horse de ferres, ne poena faciat timidos: tamen ꝑ Bracton, propter evasionis periculum interdum compedes gestare possunt. Bract. lib. 2. Britt. fo. 14.    
the lesser a mainprize 

Per le comen ley ils ne serront mainprize— 

Qui fueront prises pur mor●… dun home,  
Per commandement le ●…oy o●… ses justices.  
ou pur le forest.    
Per jest. West. 11. cap. 15●… ne son●… masnp.— 

Uilages devant, foreivors prouors, prizes oue le manor, debrusers deal prison, notorious larons, appellees des prouors vivant les prouors nis●… soyent de bone fame, arsons, fauxers deal money, ou del seal le roy, excommenge per prier levesque ou pur apert malneste, ou pur treason. 

Itaque ceux que sont in●…te de Larceny per inquest d'office ou purlegier suspicion, ou pur petite Larceny, nisi sint culpable d'auter faith, sont mainpernables. sic appellees deal prouors puis le mort de●… provor.            
V V. V Escape per jest. 1 E. 2. de fran gentibus prisonam, rumper le prison n'est felolony, si nonque it fuit imprison pur felony. Nuil esscape devant arrest. hic, 

1. Explicat le nature des escapes, tùm 

Per quandam definitionem del prison, s. 

Imprisonment n'est auter que un restraint del liberty, itaque si home soit south arrest, come in cippes, ou in le possession de ascune home, cest un prison, et lescaping del ceo, est un debruser del prison.  
Quin et rescus est rumper del prison, come si home priest le fellow horse de ma possession.    
per species 

Uolun tarry. 

Quant home arrest un, et puis lessa luy aler horse deal bounds deal prison ou il veut, voluntariò.    
Negligent. 

Quant un est arrest, et escape encounter le volunt le arrestor, et n'est freshment pursue et repris devant que le pursuor ad perde le vieu del cestuy, que escape, Vide Stanf. 33.        
Ponit quae damgeneralia adiuncta. 

Double esscape, come 

Home arrest, escape all eglise, et puis auxi fua del eglise: ceo est un double escape.    
Escape sans arrest, come 

Home est murder in un ville, per le iour, ou in city mured, per le nu●…cte: le murderer escape sans estre priest, cest un escape. Vide jest: de Winchester.    
Que serra charge oue lescape, s. le viscount, garden, ville, Hundred, etc. 34.  
Coment escape serra try et adjudge, cat prisoners sont 

per matter de record 

Quant un present in court est commit all prison per le court: lafoy lin le garden n'ad luy semper priest, il est escape sans altar enquyry nisi ad rea sonable excuse.    
per matter en faith 

Quant un est arrest per le viscount, constable, ou altar, et escape, la il ne respondra all escape devant que l'escape soit present devant justees.      
Le penalty 

De voluntary, felony. De negligent, fine. Si sot pur felony, Un hundred pound. D●…nt arrest, amerciament.        
Particular appeals come sont, 

Appeal de mort S. S. 

Feme avera appeal de mort son Baron, mes de null altar, le feme doit estre sa feme de facto & etiam de iure. Item doit estre sole. Ou le feme poet aver appeal, null altar avera ceo. Mes st le mort n'ad feme, son procheine heir male per le common ley avera ceo. vide 60.    
4. 4. De Robbery. 

Servant avera ceo.  
Baylet.  
Feme.  
Infant.  
Executors.  
merchants in common.    
8. 8. Rape. 

Feme sole ravy avera appeal: feme covert one son Baron: mes st el assent apres, tunc le Baron sole avera ceo, per jest. de 6. R. 2. ca 6. mes doyt estre Baron de iure & facto. Pur default del Baron, le pere ou altar procheine del sang auera le appeal.      
F. F. Inditements. st inditor discover le counsel le roy, cest felony. Cor. 272. 207. hic describit. 

〈◊〉. Le nature et form del 

bon Indictment 

per lestatute 

Vide jest. de 4. H. 4. cap. 2. 37. H. 8. cap. 8. que, les parols, vi & armis non ponentur in inditements de necessitate.    
per common ley, doit estre, 

certain, in 

le matter.  
l'an.  
le iour.  
le lieu.    
express, et nemy, per implication come 

abduxit equum, mal, sans cepit & abduxit.  
Furatus, malsans felonice. Carnalirer cogno●…uit, mal sans rapuit, & tamen les auters parolls implyont tant, mes ceo formality serra use.        
vicious et incertain, 

hic, et si ne vault pur felony, tamen les justices poyent fair eux serve come indictments de trespass, a mitter le party a●… fine, et poyent agarder veniref. verse linditor d'amender lincerteintie.      
Vide, 16. 16.    
16. 16. 2. Certain ad●…uncts per statutes et auterment, come. 

Deal statutes dinditementes in Leetes Deins county Palatine, 33. H. 6. cap. 2. 

31. E. 3. cap. 14.  
West. 2. cap. 13.  
1. E. 3. cap. 17.  
1. R. 2. cap. 4.  
1. E. 4. cap. 3.  
Vide jest. Elis.    
Devant just. de peace. 

11. H. 4. cap. vlt.  
3. H. 8. cap. 12. contra.  
3. H. 7. cap. 1.    
In un county deal chose fait in altar county 

33. H: S: cap. 23.  
1: & 2: P: & M: 10:  
35: H: 8: cap: 2:  
33: H: 8: cap: 20:  
2. & 3: E: 6: 24:    
Le form del indictment d'accessary, s. Que il expressera le manner del felony, 81.  
Ou verdict in altar action ou return del viscount serve pur Indictment, car. 

verdict in altar action seruera, car il y ad un verdict de 12. homes etc.  
contra de return de viscount licet soit matter de record. Vide jest: de 25: E: 3: ca: 4: de ceo.    
difference inter appeal etinditement. 

In appeal de mort, mortui nomen povetur: contra deal indictment, car le mort poet estre mangled, et issiut incognitus.  
Inditee ple●…ra misnosmer del surnosme, et poet approver, contra d'appellee.  
Si appellee pria clergy, il ne unque fra sa purgation, contra d'inditee.  
In appeal le def. poet aver trial per battle contra in indictment.      
N. N. Order in pleading, et 

1. Le count, que expressers le fact vel 

come fuit faith,  
come le ley appoint.    
2. Le response d●…appellee, quel response, vel, 

Excuse, idque 

vel orderly et solonque le ley, et ceo vel, 

defence f. 

Que if defenda touts manners de ap●… peles, agaites, assauts, purpences, et quecunque est encounter le peace le roy, sa corone et dignity.    
pleas, que 

vaont 

all brief, carl brief abaters pur faux latin, ou defaute del form etc.  
in bar, sontque vel 

proper 

all appeals 333:  
Indictment 444.    
common all ambideux, come, 

Auterfoits acquit. OO.  
Sanctuary, RR.  
Clergy, 555.        
trenchont all faith, come Rien culpas ble. 444.      
perversely, hic del pain fort et duce. 10: 10: 10:    
Coufess. 7777777.      
333. bars in appeal, et hîc, 

1. special et particular bars, come 

in appeal de mort, 

per le feme, a dire 

que el est mary arere, que ne fuit unque accouple in loyal matrimony.    
per le heir 

Le mort ad feme in vie.  
Il n'est heir, eins add eigne frere.  
Il est bastard.  
Ne fuit port deins l'an et iour.  
Le party n'est mort, eins in vie a tiel am etc. ou d'amesner lui in le court: ceux deux sont common all feme.      
In appeal the robbery, adire, que le pl: est son villain.  
In appeal de rape per baron et feme: 

a dire, ne unque accouple, ou a pleader villeinage in le pl.      
2. general, come a dire, 

Le pl: est attaint de felony ou treason: est moigne: prestre, maim per altar, insanus, surdus, mutus, lazar, ou fool natural.  
Le pl: auterfoits fuit nonsue in appeal de mesme le felony apres declaration, ou fist un Retraxit, ou que le def: fuit attaint et acquit all suit le pl:  
Le pl: add release all defendant.  
Licet le pl: plead issint in bar, tamen in favorem vitae il poet pleader ouster all felony, et son plea ne serra double, s●…non in le case deal release, car per ceo il confess le felony per implication: et quant le def: in appeal de robbery, plead villeinage in le pl: car s●…l concluderoit ouster all felony, le pl: serroyt enfraunchise.      
444: Bars all Indictment, come pardon le roy, vide Stanf, a pag: 99 ad 105. divers statutes des Charters de pardon, et coment ils serront pleads.  
OO. Auterfolis acquit●… de mesme le felony, vide Stanf. 105. etc. n'e●… ple iam in appeal de mort per jest: 3. H. 7. cap. 1 sic auterfoits convict ou atteint semble bon plea, nisi il debrusoit le prison deal ordinary et escape, car la il serra auterfoits arraign sur l'inditement.  
R. R. Sanctuary doit estre plead all commencement sur l'arraignement, icy 

1. definite sanctuary. 

Sanctuary est un am privilege per le prince pur le safeguard del vie del offendor.  
Fuit foundue sur le le ley de mercy, et sur le devotions des princess all certain lieues.    
2. Agit del sanctuary men 

Quenx averont le privilege del sanctuary, queux non, vide plusors statutes reherses per luy, 208. etc.  
Quomodo ils serrent use et demesnes. Vide statutes cities 115. etc. huc pertinet Abjuration, que est 

1. De●…ne, Abjuration est un serement, que home priest quant il ad commit ascun felony et fua all eglise ou cimitory pur tuition de sa vie, essyant pluistoft perpetual banishment horse del realm, que a estoyer al ley, et destre try del felony.  
2. Latius explicata, et rehearse divers statutes, 117. etc. deal usage des abiurors in Itinere etc.        
555. Clergy 

1. deal Clergy 

briefement per description, 

Clergy est un ancient liberty deal saint eglise qua quiconque poet lyser, s●… soyt arraine de felony devant secular judge, poet sure destre dismiss all ordinary, de fair fa purgation del dit offence. Lifer come clerk, est lyser tout le verse. Licet speller.    
Largely per adjuncts 

Quant Clergy serra plead, 

Non sur son arraignment. ut quondam, eins ill serra mice all responder all felony, et sil soyt troue culpable a son mice demesne, donque il demandera sa Clergy; si non que le prisoner voyle wayver le benefit del ceo, et pryer son lyeur sans oyer le verdict.    
Que serra judge d'allower ou disalower ceo, s. le temporal court. 

Car il appoint le verse. Il met fine sur l'ordinary, ●…l dist, que Lysa, quant ne Lysa.  
Il allowa clergy in absence del ordinary. Issint le court ne usa l'ordinary forsque come minister a confir mere lour judgement, quia est eruditus.        
2. Deal clerk 

quis avera ou non 

per common ley. 

Il que ad ascune impediment destre priest, come blind, maim, sacrilegus n'auera, sic insidiatores viarum, depopulatores agrorum. Cestuy que tua se defendendo, ou per misadventure n'auera, nec petite laron, car ne sont de prendre judgement de vie, traitor ●…auera: c●…stuy que confess felony n'auoit tanque jest. artic. Cleri. I●… que avoit semel, averoit rursus per common ley tanque jest. 4. H. 7. 13. mes home deins orders videtur exemptus. Bigamus avoyt tanque jest. de Lions, et ore jest. 1. E. 6. 12 accord our le common ley in Bigamy.    
Per jest. vide Stan. 125. vide jest. 1. E. 6. 12, 2. & 3. E. 6. 33: 5. & 6. E. 6. 10. & 9, 1. & 2. P. & M. 4.    
Quomodo serra use, cap. 48, 49. 50. ubi, de purgation.      
H H. Purgation fit per inquest des Clerks 13 9 ostendit. 

Quell Clerk, 

Ferra sa purgation: 

Clerk convict: et est celuy que pria son Clergy devant judgement done sur luy del felony, et ad sa clergy allow: tiel Clerk poet fair sa purgation, sl non in special cases.    
●…e ferra 

Clerk attaint, et est celuy que pria son clergy apres judgement, et ad son clergy allow, il ne ferra son purgation, eoque quant il est condemn del felony per judgement, il ne p●…ut contrary all judgement estre purge de ceo, le dit judgement remainant en sa force, itaque vel paret pardon, vel demurrat in prison tout sa vie.      
Du, non obstant Clergy allow, il ne serra deliver all ordinary eins remayncra in prison le roy. 

Si abiuror revyent fans licence, 〈◊〉 esteant all bar, demand sa Clergy, et ad ceo allow, vucore il ne serra deliver all ordinary, eins serra mice a prison le roy tanque il ad purchase pardon pur son revenue: car comentque le Clergy excuse le felony, uncore il ne tolie le contempt de revenuer in le realm sance licence.      
4 4 4. Rien culpable exponit. 

1. Le nature et form del cest ple. 

Car il pledra primùm son ple, et priera allowance de ceo, et ouster, quant all felony, Rien culpable.    
2. Les adjuncts. 

Il est le plus usual plec sur appeal ou juditement.  
Quia trench all faith, il est mult favour in ley, car il auera cest plea puis que il ad plead in abatement ou bar del appeal ou indictment.  
Chescune que est arraign serra enforce a cest plea, si non qu●… il ad matter de justification ou matter en ley de pleader, come sil tua le home de necessity inevitable pur advancer justice, 13. 14. ou sil tua se defendendo, mes icy le necessity doit estre inevitable. 13. 14. 15. 16.  
Mes in cest ple de rien culpable, navera ascune counsel verse le roy sur indictment (contra in appeal) mes pledra in pro per person nisi le plea exceed son cunning, quià cùm cest plea va all faith, et le party mes●…e conust le faith optimè, il poet mieux responder all ceo, et sil avoyt counsel, ils oue lour sophistry turbarent omnia, ou, st le party mesme parla, son conscience ●…y poet stimuler, son gesture et countenance poyent declarer le verily, ou son simple pariance etc.      
10. 10. 10. Perversely, ubi. il expound, 

Quell perversity ceo doit estre, 

Quant cestuy que est arraign fur felony (car in treason null tiel matter, vide left. West. 1. cap. 12.) riens respond, eins e●…oit mute de malice et mal volunte, ou plede tiel matter que nest ascun response all felony, ou tiel perverse matter que ne directment respoigne, ou fayt tiel conclusion sur son plea, que il ne peut aver as●…une trial.    
Quomodò il serra use, per pain fort et dure: 

Il ferra remaunde all prison dont il v●…ent, et mise en une base meason estoppe, et la girra nude sur le nude terre sans ascune litter, s●…rps, ou altar drapes, et sans ascune garnish environ luy, savant un chose que couera ses privy members, etque s●… girra sur son dorse, et que son teste soit vest, et ses pees estrahees, et que un brache soit trahe all un quarter del meason oue un cord, et lauter brache all altar quarter, et in mesme le maner soit fait de ses iambes: et que sur son corpse soyt mice far et pier tant come il poet porter et pluis. et le primer iour ensuant, il avera pane faith de barley, troy's morsels sans ascune boyer, et le second iour il boyers troisfoits, tant s●…come il peut del cawe que est procheine all huise del prison, except cawe currant, sans ascune pane, et ceo serra son diet tanque il soyt mort.      
7777777. Confession est le pluis sure response: apres confession it poet approver: approver avera sa vie, quia il combata pur le peace, mes serra ban. nis le realm. 

1. Exponit le na-nature del appro ver. 

briefly per description del etymoligy del nosine. 

Il peut approver, s. accuser auters qui fueront coadjutors oue ●…uy de fair felony.  
Hinc dicitur approvor, s. probator, coque il doit prover, vel per battle, vel per pais, all election appellee, ceo que est contcigne en son appeal.    
largely per adjuncts. 

De queux offences home approvera, s. de ceux felonies tantùm queux il ad faith oue auters.  
Enqueux actions 

In null action, nisi indictment soyt action, car in appeal il ne approvera, car stc il delayeroit le pl. daver execution de luy, mes il poet conuster l'inditement, et prier corover, ●…t sic approver.    
Devant queux 

Ceux que poyent assigner luy Coroner, come justices de banks, Eyre. Gaoledelivery. contra de just. de peace, Steward & suitors in court Baron, viscount et futors in le county courr, fans commission.    
comment il ferra use, 

devant son approver. 

Il doit confessor et prier le Coroner devant ascune ple plead. sil mentu, le court luy tollera de son appeal. I●… serra iure d'appeller de touts felonics et treasons que il●…acha, cerren number des tours ferra a luy appoint, in chescune de queux, il doit approver, ou ferra pendus.  
Il anera gauges cheseun tour i d, detroy. quant le coroner est assign●… a luy, il sirrah less horse deal prison, ut appellet fans coercion.    
Apres 

Quant il ad faith son appeal devant le Coroner il rehercera ceo devant justices, car ils n●… voylent liar ceo a luy, et sil fail in ascu●… parol que le Coroner ad record, il ferra pendus, come sil di●… 〈◊〉 chyvall pur rouge etc. Car p●…r le repugnancy ferra intend que il men●…u.          
vide, α α α. 2.    
〈◊〉. 2. Dappellee ubi exponit. 

1. le process vers lappellee. 

St lappellee soft 〈◊〉 mesme le county ou lappeale est fayt le Coroner agardera process tanque all exigent.  
Si in altar county, tunc les justices devant queux le Coroner record le dit appeal, come Just: de bank, et ●…yre per common ley, et del gaoledelivery, per jest. de 28. E. 1.    
ses ecceptions verse l'approuer. 

Que 〈◊〉 est attaynt de treason ou felony.  
Que il est Clerk convict.  
Que il ●…est imprison put felony ou treason, eins put debt ou trespass.  
Que il n'est prisoner, ●…ins alarge.  
Que il est deins age, ou ouster l'age de 70. aus, prestre, feme, maim etc.  
Si l'appellant apres so●… appeal, est pendus, ou prist soy a son clergy, le roy poet pursuer l'appellee, et aver luy arraign etc. Imò si soyt destre discharge verse le roy et party, le court poet luy ●…er de se benè gerendo.      
T. T. Manner deal Trial. 

In indictment est vel, 

Proper all peers deal realm, s. per 12. pares all meynes, 

Vide le order, Stanf. fol. 133. & ceo ferra tantùm in judgements, et ne●…y in apples.    
Common as auters, s. per pais, per hones de vicineto ou le felony fuit fait, et serve at Indictment et appeal. exponit. 

1. De quel county le pays vien dra. 

Vide jest. de 2. et 3. E. 6. cap. 24. quant felony est fayt en un county, et le receipt in altar, le trial in un, ct bon.  
Vide jest. 22. H. 8. cap. 14. & Stanford, ●…ag. 154.    
2. per quel process, s. venire facias: Habeas corpora: Distingas, hîc del, 

Tales, 155.  
Nisi prius. 156. 157.  
Challenge. 

peremptory fans cause in favorem vitae, all no●…ber de 35. per common ley, mes per jest: 22. H. 8. cap. 14. tantùm. 20.  
per cause 

Come, il fuit son Inditor etc.  
Et all array, si touts ●…nt engloys verse estranger.  
Item pur default defrancktenement, Vide jest. de 27. Elis.      
Evidence, chescune serra admit a donor evidence pur le roy. 163.  
verdict, estque 

vel general.  
Special, s. alarge, quant ils doubtont an soyt felony.          
In appeal hîc trial per battle est allow. sil appelle plusors d'un felony, il combatera oue touts, lune apres l'auter: descri●… bit, 

Le order del combat ex Britton, 41. Vide Stanf. 117.  
Les counterplees all battle, s. 

Ascune presumption, come sil fuit endire pur ceo, ou prise oue le manor.  
Que il esteant arrestu, fus, ou debrusa le prison.  
Imbecility in l'appellant, si soyt maim, deins 14. ans: ou ouster 70.  
Deins order, ou feme.  
Item privilege del person, come sil soyt arraign all suit le roy in lappeale. Le def. acquit recovera damages vers le pl: ou, sil ne soit sufficient, verse les abettors, Vide Stanf a pag. 168. usque ad 117.        
X. X. Final judgement, ubi, 

Exponit les several judgements, s. 

Deal felony, quòd suspendatur per Collum.  
Treason 

Grande, 

In home, I●… serra reamesnue all am dout il vient, et ferra trahe sur une hurdle iesque all am dexecution, et la destre pendus per le colie, et vive destre decoupe, et ses entrails et privy members destre excises de son corpse, et combures deins son view, et son teste destre abscisse, et son corpse destre divide in quater parts a disponer all volunt le roy.  
In feme, destre trahe et combure tam in grand treason quàm petite.  
Si feme soit ensein●… de vive enfant, el sirrah semel respite del execution, mes le judgement serra done mayntenant.    
Petite: In home, est destre trahe et pendus. pur misprision il forfetra ses biens, mes nemy terres forsque pur vie, et serra in perpetual prison. q. Vide Stanf. 37. 38. divers several penalties accordant all offences.      
les penalties, que ensuont cest judgement, & implicantur etsi non exprimuntur. 

Corruption del sangue vient per atteinder del felony ou treason, issintque les infants ne poyent estre heirs a luy, ne all ascune altar ancestor. Et sil fuit noble ou gentleman devant, il et touts ses infants sont devenus ignobles, et cest corruption ne poet estre salve forsque per Parliament solement.  
Forfeiture.      
Forfeiture. 

1. que serra forset, s. 

Biens pur treason et felony. 

Clerk convict forfetra ses biens, comentque ad faith sa purgation, et les issues del terre que il ad in son droyt, ou in droyt sa feme, tanque il ad faith sa purgation.  
Home forfetra son droyt all biens, et chose in action, come obligation etc.  
Item il forfetra biens in queux il n'ad ascune propriety, come ieo bail argent horse del bag a rebayler a moy, le baylee est attaint, le roy auera l'argent, car ne poet estre conves etc. quia horse de bag.  
Home forfetra ses Chatteaux sur fugam fecit comentque soyt acquit del mesme le felony, ou ad son charter de pardon pur mesme le felony, cest fuer en faith.  
Home forfetra ses biens sur exigent agard, sur un fuer en ley, comentque soit acquit del felony.  
Home poet forfeter ses biens sans attainter per presentment apres sa mort, Come 

Felo de se.  
Home arrestue fua, et est tue in le pursuit, ou si soit tue devamt le arrest, repugnaudo, etc.  
Home que leua guerre, et est tue in ycell.    
Quant un est troue culpable del homicide devant le Coroner, le Coroner scisera ses biens et lyvera all ville. Sur sugam fecit troue devant le Coroner, le viscount ferra in mesme le manner. Mes si un soyt indite del mesme le felony, ses biens ne serront removes horse de sa meason tanque il soyt attaint, eins serront en guard les vicins, et le fellow aver a via●…ds de ceo. Le ville serra charge oue le custody des biens, nisi ils poyent monster, que altar ad cux. Mes le viscount est semper chargeable●… oue les issues del terre.    
Vide λ λ λ    
Vide *** 2.    
λ λ λ. Terres et droyt del terres serra forfeit pur treason ou felony. mes hic l'estate serra consider, cat 

Tenant put vie on ans ●…e forfetra forsque pur son term, sic put petite treason ou felony, tevant in tail ne forfetra forsque pur sa vie, contra in grand treason, per jest. 5. et 6. E. 6. cap. 11. et per mesme lest home ne forfetra terre que il ad in altar droyt, come in droyt sa feme, sa egli●…e etc. una cum terre, les charters del terre serront forfeits.  
Pur treason del baron, (g●…ād et petite) le feme per●…ra sa dower; mes ne●… put felony, per jest. 1. E. 6. cap. 12. 5. & 6. E. 6. cap. 11.  
In petyte treason ou felony le roy auera l'an, iour, et Waste des terres que sont tenus d'auter que de luy, et donque le signior avera lescheate, mes in grand treason, le roy avera lescheate, de quocunque le terre soit tenus.    
***. 2. quant sirrah forfeit, Re lation del forfeiture. 

In terres il relate all temps del act faith mayntenant, itaque 〈◊〉 done ou alien apres le faith, le relation del attainder defeatera tout.  
Mes in biens nest issint, car le done de eux inter le felony et lattaynder, est bon.    
FINIS.