THE LINE of Liberality duly directing the well bestowing of benefits and reprehending the commonly used vice of Ingratitude.  
Anno. 1569  
Imprinted at London in Fleetstreet near to S. Dunston's Church by Thomas Marsh.   

To the right worshipful Sir Christopher Heydon knight his ●ost courteous Creditor of many his bounties and benefits.  
IN requiting courtesies good turns, and benefits received at others hands (right worshipful,) heedily ought we to follow the fertile and frut●ful grounds: which yield in profit the manifold doubled gain of the labour cost and travail that their tiller and husbandly man employed upon them, and charyly i'll the sower and naughty nature of barren soil: which after many tillinges, great charge bestowed of pain and costs, in fine, answer scarcely or not at all the own seed again. worthy to be resembled to insatiable swallowing gulfs devouring still, without show of any receipt. And forsomuch as (according to thadvise of Cato,) it behoveth him that presumeth to give precepts and to advertise others, warily to take regard he deserve not reprehension himself for that he rebuketh others for, I thought it more than high time after so many benefits and courtesies, so much travail and costs sundry ways at divers times abundantly received by me and had of your worshypps great bounty joined with courtesy, to show now at length some proof of the nature of the soil whereupon so frankly you have employed the same. Concerning which point of gratitude and thankful nature consisting in requiting benefits, courtesies, and pleasures received at your worship's hands, although in ability many do, in goodwill yet well meaning and thankfulness, no one shall surmount ne pass me. For albeit that blind Fortune through want of eyesight pouring out or pinching in blindly her gifts without regard, granteth to some ability to surcharg by giving: and again pincheth others some by abridging their power to be able to answer like for like received: yet sith that (as tully saith) the best and principal part of requiting benefits and yielding condign thanks for benefits and courtesies received resteth in the mind, which when it hath unfeignedly declared itself to be willing to requite what hath been received, is to be thought to have made recompense abundantly: As one thorough eased herewith of the heavy charge wherewith the huge burden of your bounties, and Fortune's pinching partiality oppressed me, amid this narrow strait of my disability not fainting but triumphing over Fortune's blind despite, I present your goodness (lo) with a mind welmeaning, and thankful heart: supplying that defect with the certain riches of the mind, which the frail and fl●tting wealth of the body will not permit me to do. A simple present for your worthy parsonage: and inferior in value far to any of yours received: yet such as shall suffice to discharge me of Ingratitude. In wi●he self same seeking to requite your benefit passed, I must of force yield me your double debtor. Touching myself, ●or your gentle acceptance of my poor goodwill: touching this my poor present for your granted patronage, which simple gift of mine without all regard had to your passed deserts (which on my part notwithstanding may in no wise be wrapped up in oblivion,) of very due for titles sake may challenge to be dedicated to your worship. For why to speak freely and yet void of all suspicion of flattery, (the verity whereof I refer to the report and judgement of infinite wellnigh and those credible,) who is he to whom the report of your worships name hath come, but with the same report hath likewise heard your worthy renown, and verteves well-nigh of all sorts, such as may challenge and claim your deserved crown of immortality. Among which what shall I recount your rare sobriety, great lenity, pasling familiarity, commendable policy, gentle gravity, pregnant wisdom, deep discretion, large liberality, painfulness to pleasure all honest persons, ample hospitality, to the admiration and wellnigh astonying of all that see such rare gifts so plentifully placed in your own person: with an infinite number well-nigh of virtues beside, in the lest of which resteth true woorshyppe. For which causes with one voice (as if they had conspired together) all Norfolk soundeth each where your immortal praise. In number of which company, simplest I, yet deepest bounden, acknowledge among the rest my vowed duty with happy acclamations and wellwyshynges testifying my conceived perfit joying at your haypie estate, and desirous what in my slender power doth consist (for witness of my assured well meaning mind dedicated to your woorshyp altogether,) to record by my simple skill confirmed with ample testimony of wellnigh infinite, your welldeserued praise unto posterity. wherein for your wonted goodness, and benevolence accept in good part my well willing heart, and seclude me not from your favour passed. Thus I leave troubling your worship whom to the great wealth and earnest contentation of all your country with many others confy●es, God of his goodness preserve and increase in prefit health with abundance and felicity to his pleasure.  
Your worship's deep debtor. Nicolas Haward,   

THE LINE OF Liberality. ☞ The first Book.  

Chapter. 1.  
Among the number and those great vices with reign among men that live discorderly & are not guided with the rule of Honesty, I dare well say there is no one that breedeth so much hurt as this: That we know not duly how to bestow upon others, nor to receive at others hands, such benefits and pleasures as either we do ourselves, or else by others are done to us. By mean whereof, it followeth that benefits evilly bestowed, are in like manner evilly repaid and of such over late we complain when we find them not as we would wish them recompensed. For those benefits account I as lost, which are so bestowed without due regard. And certes it is no whit to be marveled at, though among all the faults of men which in deed are exceeding great and well-nigh innumerable, there is not to be found any one ryfer and more in use then unthankfulness: 
Ingratitude the m●st common vice & the cause why.  which undoubtedly I see doth happen through divers causes. The first and chiefest is, for that we have no respect on whom we bestow our benefits. But if we were to lend money to any one, doubtless we would inquire diligently before hand, what manner of man he were, of what credit & ability. Neither is any ploughman so unwise we see to sow his corn on ground which he knoweth to be barren. But our benefits which far excel any other thing that we can give, we bestow here and there without any consideration before had, whether they are duly employed, and upon such as deserved the same or not. And verily I can not say whether is more discortesie to be thought in him that is to be plesured if he refuse a benefit when it is proffered, or in him that doth the pleasure to require recompense for that which he hath done. But if we mind to benefit any man, we ought before hand to conceive this good opinion of him, that with his good will we shall at his hands receive asmuch commodity again if we need, as we presently do unto him. Which hope conceived though we hap to fail to find it satisfied yet is it a most dishonest and vile part to make complaint thereof. For why, in him that is to discharge such credit conceived, it is not wealth ne substance that are to be required, but only a mindful and thankful heart. For he hath sufficiently requited the benefit which he hath received at an others hands, who willingly doth acknowledge himself his debtor. But like as there resteth a fault in those which show themselves to be both in word and deed unthankful, 
Very unthankfulness, in word & deed and the causes.  forgetting utterly and refusing to requite the pleasures that have been showed them, so riseth there oftentimes on our parts no small cause of this their Ingratitude. For as we find divers that are of their own natures unthankful, so do we ourselves make many Ingrat which otherwise perhaps would not have been so. For sometime we cast in their tethe and upbraid unto them what we have done for them: and otherwhile we exact importunately at their hands, recompense for such benefits as we before have done unto them. Otherwhiles again we show ourselves to be so inconstant of mind that forthwith it repenteth us of the pleasure that we erst did. And thus complaining our case and changing our minds in the torning of a hand, we do not only disgrace the pleasure we before showed, and lose the thanks which otherwise should have been dew for the same, but also we aggrieve greatly the party to whom we did the same. For who is he almost that will show himself easy to be entreated, or that would do any pleasure to speak of, with only ones being desired? 
The true descripsion of him that doth no pleasure but by importunate request.  Who is ●e that understanding that his Friend being in need would request any thing of him, but either he bended the brows at it, or turned his face aside, or feigned to have a thousand lets and a thousand businesses otherways? Or who is he that by long process and manifest feigned excuse, hath not sought busily to shift of the occasion of dealing for his friend whereby he thought he should be troubled, or hath not devised a number of delays to dispatch himself of such matters as have been urged upon him? To be short, who is he that being very earnestly requested by his friend to do him a pleasure, hath not long tracted the time before he would assume it on him, or else plainly made denial to do it. Or if hapless his promise scaped him with much a do and after long entreaty wearied, hath not yet done the same with such doubts casting and ceremonies using that far better it were to be quite devoid of his such pleasure, then with such a do to have it? Now is there any man (judge you) that hath cause to think himself beholding to such one at whose hands with hart-grutching he hath been plesured, or that hath benefited him to this end only that he may brag thereof, or for that he would be rid from being any longer disturbed with such importunate suet? If there be any that thinketh he should account himself his debtor whom he hath deluded with delays, annoyed with attendance and wearied with scornful talk before he would pleasure him, he is much deceived. For pleasures ought to be requited with like mind and will as they are done● and for this cause, is it requisite that they be not done negligently. For each one ought to render both that which he received, and in such order as he received it. Whereupon, who that hath showed pleasure after long entreaty, or by constraint (as it were) is worthy after the same sort to be rewarded. Wherefore the benefit or pleasure that is done, should not be done slowly or with over great deliberation. For as of each thing that is done, the mind of him that doth it declareth the order how it is done so the benefit that is done slowly and with much requesting, 
Benefits ought not to be done slowly & upon request.  argueth that he who did it in such sort, refused long to do the same. Neither ought pleasures to be done iniuriousely and with reproach. For as by natural reason those things persist longest and are of longest continuance which are engraven deeper in respect of them which have but a very light imprint, so likewise injuries who naturally have a déepar séet then benefits, parsist also longer and rifar in mind. What reward or guerdon may he justly claim, that would seem to pleasure a man, and yet in very deed worketh him grievance and displeasure? He doth sufficiently acknowledge the pleasure and good that hath been showed him, who confesseth the same. And albeit that the number of unthankful people be in deed very great, 
The multitude of ingrate people should not make us the slower to do good●  ye● ought we not (this not withstanding) to become any whit the slower or less willing to do good. For first as I have said, we augment and increase thereby the number of them. Moreover w● leave thereby to show ourselves to be followers of the living God, who will not change (we see) his largesse & liberality for the heinous offences & sacrileges of such as contemn and despise him, but intendeth his goodness still indifferently to those that are such offenders aswell as to them that offended not. For as his nature is to do good to all men, (I should say to all things,) so with them that be good, succoureth he also them which show themselves far unworthy thereof. Let us therefore follow him as our guide, so far as our frail and week nature will parmit. Let us do good & secure others, & that without desiring usury therefore. He is worthy to fail of his purpose who doth a benefit for this cause only, that he may reap the like again. But some one perhaps will say that I am much deceived herein. To whom I answer thus. That albeit that our wives & children do often hap to frustrate & deceive thexpectation which we conceived of them, yet notwithstanding we may not cease to foster & bring up our children, nor seek therefore to be divorced from our wives. Again if it be so that we arm ourselves to endure the thorough trial of worldly affairs, & that for no manner loss in battle, or wreck on sea, we faint to attempt the same again, 
That we should persist on in well-doing.  of more strong reason than is it fitting & fit for us, to persist & continue on in our welldoings. From which if a man cease once for that he was not rewarded for the like he hath done toforetime, it is to be presupposed y● that which he then did, he did it to no other end, but for that he hoped by doing thereof, to reap the like again. Whereby right well he excuseth thunthankfullunthankful man, who for this cause only is accused, that he doth not requite the pleasure that others have showed him. See we not how many there are in the world unworthy to behold the brightness of the Son, and yet he casteth his beams aswell upon them, as upon the good men. How many are there I pray you that exclaim against nature, cursing her that ever she suffered them to be borne into the world, and yet giveth she offspring to this unthankful sort that wished erst not to have been, and for all their unkindness permitteth them to live. It is the property of a stout and princely courage, and of a worthy man not to pursue and follow after the fruit & reward which follow benefits & pleasure showed, but to regard the worthiness only or the same good deeds themselves, so that though he happen to light upon some unthankful persons, yet he dismayeth no whit thereat, but seeketh to bestow the residue of his benefits upon such as will more thankfully accept the same. For in all this world who is he that benefiteth a multitude, and among them all, findeth not some that will frustrate his expectation? But upon this point dependeth the force and efficacy of a benefit, 
Wherein consists the force of a benefit.  when the giver thereof looketh not after any reward for the same. Of which benefit in such sort bestowed, a noble heart hath thereby already reaped sufficient recompense. Undoutedly it is so far unseemly that the want of finding pleasure for the like showed should dismay us from persevering in so honest a thing, that out of question if I were exempt from all hope that I should ever find any one that would bear in mind and acknowledge the pleasure which I should do to him, I would yet rather wish to find no one of my pleasures requited, then for any ingratitude that I might have showed me, I would success from doing good wherein I might. For who that will not apply himself to benefit others, is far worse to be judged of, than any unthankful person. And to conclude, this is my opinion. He that neither will acknowledge nor render the benefits which he hath received, is no more to be blamed than he that being requested refuseth in due time and season to pleasure him that standeth in necessity.   

Chap. 2.  
Beneficia in vulgus cum largiri institueris,  
Perdenda sunt multa ut semel ponas bene.  
Qui veult fair plaisir a plusieurs, pour vng coup  
quill addressera bien, il perdra beaucoup.  
Who that on a multitude pleasures bestows  
For one that he gives well, a number shall louse.  

Immeasurable giving is commendable in no thing.  IN the first line immoderate and bestowing of pleasures without dew regard before had upon whom they are employed, is reprehended. For indeed we should give nothing after such a careless sort. But of our benefits especially, we should not be so lavish: for if they happen at any time to be given unadvisedly, and without due consideration, forthwith thereby they lose the name of benefits by due right, & would rather be termed by some other name. The second line is strange, as that which with the well bestowing of one only benefit and good deed, recomforteth the grief which might haply grow by the loss of a number. Mark well I pray thee and tell me if it be not meet & agreeable with the worthiness of him that may do good, that we exhort and move him thoroughly to persever in well-doing and plesouring of all men, notwithstanding that it be not his chance to employ any of his benefits so, that he may think them well bestowed. For verily I suppose that that is not to be much accounted of which is in th'end of the second verse (to wit) That he shall lose a number of his benefits. For why no benefit is lost. For he who is to do any benefit, must beforehand when he mindeth to bestow any such benefit, make this account, that he looketh not to receive any thing again for that which he is to do. The reason which moveth men to pleasure one an other is plain and single. grudge not to bestow thy benefits. If he that doth receive them yield thee the like, take it for advantage. If th●u hap not to find the like, but contrariwise Ingratitude for thy benefits, yet art thou no whit damnified hereby. For thou must thus think with thyself. That which I gave, I did it as fully resolved and determined before hand to give it, and to that end that I might account it given, without looking to receive any the like again. None should note in his book of remembrances the pleasures and benefits which he doth to others. 
Benefit●s done should not be remembered by him that did them  For the niggish and greedy usurer we see doth not always object to his debtor the very hour when his det was dew. The honest franckharted man never taketh regard to the pleasures which he hath done, when they are one's past, nor mindeth them any more, except he that received them by his acknowledging and thankesge●ing revive the memory of them. For if he should otherwise do, and require recompense (as I said) for them, than might they not justly be said to be given, but lent as it were for a season only. And questionless there can be none so foul and dishonest usury of any thing, as to look for recompense for that pleasure that once hath passed thee. Howsoever thou hast been considered by them to whom thou hast heretofore done good, yet c●sse not thou to do good still. And persuade thyself that those benefits are of all others best bestowed, that are done to unthankful persons. For either shame, or the like need, or fear shall at one time or other cause than to acknowledge the benefits precedent, and show themselves thankful at length. Cease not therefore to benefit still. strain thine ability: play the part of a good man. Help him with thine own goods. Aid him with thy word & credit. assist that other with thy favour. Let him have thine advise. give him some of thy wholesome council.   

Chap. 3.  
THere is not one among the very brute beasts that hath not perseverance of such good as is done unto him● 
Brute bests acknowledge good done to them.  Again, there is not one of them so wild and savage of nature, and hard to be made tame, but diligence and pains taking with them, causeth them to forget wholly their old feritie, and love them that keep them. The lions keeper may handle him with such security, that without all peril he thrusteth his hand in his mouth. The Elephant of nature most haughty and crewel, to his Foster yet humbleth himself in most lowly wise. so much prevaileth and of such efficacy are benefits, that the continual doing and renewing of them, maketh the very brute bests devoid of all Reason and understanding, keep them rife in memory. The like effect whereof they shall also work assuredly in thunthankful man. Who though perhaps he forgot one good torn done to him, he will not so neglect the second: or if he show himself to have slenderly remembered those two, yet doubtless the third shall enforce him too call to mind the former twain which he had erst forgotten. He may well be said to have lost the benefit which he did, that forthwith thinketh it lost so soon as he hath done it. But he that doth persever still heaping afresh new benefits upon them which he hath already done, shall enforce the receiver to acknowledge the same at one time or an other, were he never so hard hearted or currish of nature For who that shallbe so overlaid w●th benefits shall not have the heart to life up his eyes against thee, but he shall forthwith condemn himself of In●gratitude, if he have not dealt with thee accordingly as he ought, which way soever he would turn him, thy benefits shallbe so rife before his eyes, that by no means he shallbe able to shake them out of mind. By thy good deserts and heaping on of benefits, give him cause to think that he is thoroughly bound unto thee. Which benefits of what force and effect they are to make good nature in any man, I shall hereafter declare, so soon as I have showed my fantasy in one point or two, somewhat different from our matter in hand. That is to wit, For what cause it is said that there are three Graces, 
Three graces.  wherefore thy are called sisters, why they go linked hand in hand, what is the cause why they are always smiling and of merry countenance, what is the Reason why they are ever young. Finally wherefore they are virgins, attired with their garments louse and ungirt about them: and the same so thin that a man may see through them. Of these three Ladies, called Graces, th'opinion of some is, that the first of them bestoweth benefits: the second receiveth the same, and then third confesseth the receipt, and requiteth them. Others some there are that by these three Graces, would signify three kind of benefits. Namely the benefits which are given: the benefits which are received, and the benefits which are received and repaid, togethers. But whether of these two opinions is worthiest to be allowed, it is not much material to examine, and for that I will leave it at large undiscust. Let us then see why these three Ladies whom I called Graces, do still behold th'one the other, and make a ring as it were each holding other by the hand. 
Why the iii Graces hold one tother by the hand  verily it is for this cause. The gift that passeth from the giver, if it keep due order from the one to the other, it returneth again from him that received it unto the giver by dew orderly course. Which order if it be broken or any whit discontinued, forthwith thereby should it lose all the worthy commendation which the said benefit should require: like as we see if any of these Ladies should louse hands, the fashion of the King were broken, and straight should lose that name. They are always smile and merry countenanced, 
why they laugh.  for that they should represent to us thereby, that those that are of good natures ought when they bestow benefits which may sound to the furtherance of others, no less to rejoice, and show themselves wellapaid thereat, than they should do who are by them in such sort pleasured. 
why they are young & Virgins  They are always young, for this that the remembrance of benefits ought in no wise to wax old or fade forth of fresh memory. Virgins they are, for this that benefits ought to be pure, incorrupted, not stained, and to be done without constraint or enforcement. They were their garments louse, which are so clear and thin that a man may see through, 
why they are so appareled.  to declare that benefits would be also seen and not hidden. With those Ladies Mercury is also by some associated as companion: not for that eloquence is any whit requisyt to commend the benefit that is done, or the order of doing the same, but only for that it so liked the painter to devise the same Chrysippus to whom for his great subtility of wit divers attribute no small praise for that he so exquisitely accustometh to sift out the truth of things, applying all his whole talk to the matter he treateth of, and that with no longer process of words than is requisite for the thoroughunderstanding thereof, hath yet stuffed his whole book full of these and such like table: so that he speaketh himself very little or nothing at all touching themploying, receiving, and rendering of benefits. In which his book, he doth not only now and then use these tales, but he doth so thoroughly store it with them, that it savoureth almost of nothing else but of such trifles. For besides that which he writeth of Hecates, he reporteth also that these three Graces were jupiters' daughters begotten upon Eurinome: in youth, comeliness of countenance, and beauty most excellent, and for this cause were they all three appointed to have the keeping of Heaven gates, and to be attendant on the Lady Venus. Moreover. Chrysippus in his said book noteth also that not without good cause their mother whom I showed you of, was called Eurinome, whom for that th'interpretation of her name showeth her to be rich & of great ability, he feigneth therefore to distribute benefits and friendly pleasures. As though the mother of force must be named after the qualities and conditions of her daughters, or else what name soever the poets pleased to attribute to any thing, was the very name of the thing indeed.   

Chap. 4.  
BUt lest I myself offend in that which before I objected against Chrysippus, I will overpass th●se things, which as they vary from our matter in hand, so concern they it no whit at all. For we have taken in hand to spéeke of benefits, and to give precepts of that which above all other things knitteth and conjoygneth the society of mankind together. We are I say to prescribe rules and precepts for men to frame their lives by, lest that under colour of courtesy some fall into excessive prodigality: and lest that others some by overnere scawing and heed taking in bestowing of benefits, 
The law of life ●s to show the way how to live & to be conversant among others.  should happen clean to extinct and lose the right way of liberality. Which as indeed it ought not to exceed, so neither should it be overmuch scanted, but to observe a just, dew, and laudable mean. Touching which matter, these are th'instructions that we give. That men accept thankfully such benefits as are done unto them, 
The contention of honesty resteth in giving, taking & rendering benefits  and that gladly in likemanner they requite the same. We are moreover to propose unto them a great contention which ought to be between the giver and the receiver of benefits. Which is, that we should not content ourselves to render the like only of that which we have received at the hands of those that have pleasured us, but that we should strive to excel them far in well meaning and mind to pleasure them again. And impossible it is that any man can requite a good turn, except before hand he have found it. For which cause they that do any pleasures or employ any benefits, are to be advertised that they make none account of their benefit after they have once bestowed it, and they that have received the same, to think themselves somuch the more indebted to them for so doing. Of which honest and commendable contention this is the whole and th'only end: 
The right use of this contention.  to strive earnestly to over match and excel them at whose hands we have found pleasures, by doing greater good to them theu we before received. To which contending to match or rather excel our benefactors, Chrysippus in like manner exhorteth us. Saying that forasmuch as these Ladies Charites or Graces (of whom I told you before) are jupiters' daughters, we ought to account it no small offence if we should commit any thing that might seem repugnant to the natures of those fair damoiselles. But here would I gladly O Chrysippus that thou hadst showed me the mean and way how I might have become more liberal by showing friendship and pleasures, and more grateful to them that for their goodness and benefits have well deserved at my hands. How the minds of the plesurers and those that are plesured aught to contend. Again how they that have benefited others should tread the remembrance of those their benefits under foot, without thinking on them any more, And those who have received the said benefits, how they should frame their memory to be always thinking on them without forgetting. But as for those foolish and fantastical fables which Chrysippus reporteth in his book so commonly, let us leave them to poets whose whole drift and meaning is given only to please and delight men's ears, 
poets common liars and flatterers.  and to devise pleasant tales. But they that purpose to cure evil disposed minds, and to conserve faithfulness & honesty among men, and cause them to call to remembrance without forgetting such benefits and pleasures as are done unto them, had need to order their words with good advisement, to talk earnestly, & chose to frame his tale with words of most weight and importance. Unless you think that light and foolish talk, and old wives tales be able to redress the cause and root from whence so great hurt and mischief is like to ●nsew, 
What hurt riseth by Ingratitude.  that may well sound to the utter ruin and decay of the wh●le world. Namely that a man should make no more account of him that hath highly benefited him, than he would of such one at whose hands he never found any kind of pleasure, or el●s that you suppose that this giving of precepts touching the welgeving, receiving & rending of benefits is but a new found thing and of late devised.   

Chap. 5.  
NOw therefore likewise as I passed over the things that were superfluous, & concerned not our purpose, right so it is requisite & very necessary that I show the way how we shall learn to acknowledge the good and pleasure that we have received of others. For some one that hath at time of his need received money at an others hand thinketh that he oweth that or somuch money as he received. one other being preferred to the dignity of a Consul judgeth he doth owe the enjoying of his Consulship to him by whose means he was so preferred. Some other being rewarded with a spiritual promotion supposeth he is to render the same. Other like wise that by the procurement of some or other have attained the rule and government of a Province, ascribe the same as dew to that person at whose hands he received his said office. Indeed truth it is that each of these who hath received any such or like thing at an other bodies hand, is to think himself of duty bound, and indebted for the same to them at whose hands or by whose mean they had or received any such benefits or pleasures. Howbeit if we will nearly examine the nature of benefits, and list to see what a benefit is, we shall then find that any those things above named or any the like of them are not to be called benefits, but only the signs and shows of benefits. 
Where is the very seat and pla●e of benefits.  For no benefit may be handled with the hand, but hath his seat and abiding place in the mind alone. And there is great diversity between the benefit itself, and the matter or substance by which the benefit is represented. Whereupon we must know that neither silver, nor gold, nor land, nor offices, nor fees, nor any thing else what soever our dearest friends bestow upon us ought to have the names of benefits, sith as I said they consist only and wholly in the mind of the bestower of them. Nevertheless the rude and ignorant people suppose that thing only that is seen with the eyes, given with the hand, subject to our senses, and in our possession, to be the benefit And asfor the friendly mind which indeed ought chiefly to be had in price and regarded, that weigh they nothing at all. Wherein how muche they are deceived, each one may well and easily discern. For why, those things which we possess, which we see, and whi●hewe so greedily hunt after, are very uncertain and transitory. The mutability of fortune, the danger of the time, the violence and force of enemies may quickly bereft and deprive us of all these things. But the true benefit still persisteth, and decayeth not, 
Benefits never decay.  no though all that perish and be lost quite that was given us. That only should be called a benefit, which no violence, no force, no misfortune is able to undo, pluck from us, or make frustrate. As by way of example. I rescued a friend of mine from Pirates and robbers on sea: and when I had delivered him on this sort and was gone other enemies took him and cast him. In prison. In this case, they that so took him deprived him not of the benefit which I did to him, but the use thereof only, Again. I delivered a number of men from drowning or burning. Of which company sith that time, certain of them died by sickness, certain of them by other misfortunes ended their lives. I say yet notwithstanding the benefit I did to them remaineth still and decayeth not, no though the parties be dead themselves to whom it was done. Then appeareth it that all those things which falsely abuse the apellacion or name of benefits, ought rather to be called friendly turns, or such things by which the friendly mind doth declare itself. The like whereof is to be gathered in other matters, whereas otherwhiles a word is used only significatively to represent as it were the truth of things, by signification or colour of sense, & otherwhiles is usurped for the thing itself. As you may see here. The Chefetain of the band rewardeth such as he hath approved valiant after the feat wherein he hath experimented his said valiantness sometime with a Chain or collar of gold, otherwhiles with a garland properly appointed for such as give the onset at scaling the walls at any siege, 
Corona muralis.  & otherwhiles with a garland assigned to him that saveth a citizens life in wars. Which either Chain or garland if a wan will consider apart by itself, 
Corona Civita.  and not having any relation to any farther thing, what great excelencie or preciousenes consists in them? What great magnificence or worship resteth there I pray you in the Senators gown trailing on the ground, purfled and embrowdred round about, if we consider it only in that it is a gown or hath this or that fashion? There is no one of these that is the honour itself, but the only signs and shows of honour. In like manner none of those can be said a benefit that is discerned with the eye, but are only mere tokens of benefits.   

Chap● 6.  
THen mayst thou well demand of me what it is that I call a benefit. The true descripsion whereof admit this to be. 
The discripsion of a benefit.  A benefit is a courteous and friendly deed which being done giveth cause of rejoicing to others, and conceiveth pleasure itself in doing the same thing, ready of itself without constraint to do that which it doth: So that it appeareth it maketh no matter what the thing is that is given or done: For that (as it is said.) The benefit consisteth not in the thing that is given or done, but only in the mind of the giver. And that there is a great diversity between these twain, thou mayst easily know hereby. The benefit always is simply and of his own nature good. 
The heart all one commendeth all things  But the thing that is given or done, is of itself commonly neither good nor evil. It is the mind that extolleth and commendeth things of small valour, and of no regard, and disgrateth & quite debaseth other some things of estimation and great price. The things which we seek and pursue after so earnestly, are of themselves neither good nor evil. The diversity of their qualities riseth only upon the minds of them that have the rule and disposing of the same: by which disposing, they purchase either their commendation or the contrary. Then may we thus conclude. That a benefit is not that thing which is given with the hand. Like as things offered up in sacrifice be the same never so fat and fair, or richly adorned with gold and rich jewels, yet the divine honour doth not rest nor consiteth in any of the same oblations, but only in the well meaning and disposed minds of the sacrificers. For the immolations and offerings of godly, devout, and well-disposed persons God accepteth well and in good part be the gift never so simple. Yea though it were but a courtsye of Corn and that in an earthen vessel, whereas wicked men shall not escape the punishment of their impiety and the revenge thereof, no though they offer up never so plentiful and the same rich sacrifices.   

Chap. 7.  
FOr if it were so that benefits consisted in the things which are given, 
simple things given with a goodwi● more acceptable than rich gifts with grutching.  and not in the mind of him who giveth the same, then should it also follow, that lok how much greater in value the thing is that is given, so much greater should the benefit be to be accounted of. But that is untrue. For somewhiles we are more beholding, and to think our selves depelyer bound to him that giveth us things but of small value, whose goodwill notwithstanding aught to be more dear to us and higher in estimation then any the great abundance and riches of Princes. For admit that his gift was but simple, his heart yet was magnificent and liberal, in that he regarded not his own poverty, he was so glad he had to serve my great want presently. Wherein he declared himself not only to mean well to meward, but also to have an earnest zeal and desire in himself to declare & accomplish the same In which his well-doing, he seemeth to take delight, bestowing those his benefits as one not looking or hoping after any Recompense, more than if he had given me no whit at all. But of his own accord seeketh to find and take occasion to profit and pleasure me. On tother side (as I have said before) these things are neither pleasant nor acceptable which though of themselves they seem to be of great value and price, yet they are not without great entreaty, and importunate seute and request obtained at the hands of the graunters, or else which by chance and unadvisedly escape them. But far more thankfully is the little simple gift to be received, given with assured goodwill and frankly, then is plenty and affluence given with grudging and repining. For why, in such case thus may I say. Truth it is: that which this man hath given me is but a small thing, but weighing his ability, he is much to be commended, for he gave it me with a very good will: and beside, his wealth could not extend to give me any thing of greater value. Again, the present of that other. I confess was very much and of great price, but with what distrust did he it and long delay, and how much did he repent him after that he had done it? He did it for vain glory only, and to th'end he might triumph over me, and report to others how much he had pleasured me, and in what necessity I stood of his help. So that good cause I have to persuade myself that he did it not for good will, and earnest love, or affection he bore to me, but to blaze abroad his own name and take occasion so to do at my necessity. Who that to this end bestoweth his benefits, I say he doth not only deserve notes to be accounted liberal, but rather an evil natured niggard.   

Chap. 8.  

A notable example of liberality of one having nothing to give gave him self.  ANd for proof that small gifts given frankly and of a mere good will deserve greater commendation far, than richer and costlier gifts which are bestowed with difficulty and evil will, this notable example may make proof abundantly. Socrates that worthy and famous Philosopher being accustomed to reed publicly and give precepts of good government, had repairing to his said Lectour a great and populous audience. Among whom there were both rich and poor. It fortuned that his scholars with a common consent on a time concluded among themselves that each of them after their ability in token of their goodwills towards their said master, should present him with little or much, which they did. Eschines one of the company in wealth far unequal to the residue as he that had utterly nothing, and yet in good will to gratify his master not inferior to any the best, when he saw every one of his companions to give unto Socrates their master presents of great Price, came with a merry cheer also to Socrates, and said. Sir in all this world have I nothing that I may present thee withal. Whereby I acknowledge easily my great poverty. Howbeit in all this hard extremity, that only one gift which I have to give, I make present with. Namely mine own person. Which simple present I beseech thee accept in so good part as I now willingly offer the same to thee, persuading thyself that though my companions here have indeed richly presented thee with gifts, yet hath each of them left himself far more in store than he hath here departed withal. Whereas I have given thee all without reserving to myself any whit at all. To whom Socrates as thankfully answering said. And why? Thinkest thou not that thou haste also given to me a great present? Unless thou makest none account of thyself being in state as thou now art, wherefore assure thyself that I will restore thee to thyself far bettered than I now received thee. Lo by this gift almost of no value, did Eschines far surmount the bountiful heart of Alcibiades who was no less gentle and courteous then wealthy. And in Socrates' judgement passed the largesse and munificence of all his young companions.   

Chap. 9  
HEreby may you well see that a noble mind is able to find out matter whereby he may declare his liberality, even in the extremity and narrowest straits of all his poverty. In which case Aeschines (me seemeth) might well have said thus. A hard and cruel Fortune. Yet hast thou gained nothing hereby that thou haste made me thus poor. For though I have nothing of thine wherewith I may worthily or at all present my master, I will not yet let to do my duty, but I will now do it of mine own. And yet should noman think that he accounted nothing of himself for that he presented so himself (as is said,) For hereby the witty young man found occasion to bind Socrates to him after a sort. So that (to return again to our purpose) it appeareth that it is not the excellency or value of the gift which is to be regarded, but the heart with which it is given and the order of the doing thereof. The haughty and curious Courtiers who are in office, 
●he courtyar.  and by mean thereof have that seek unto them, will hardly and with much a do be spoken with of their suitors about any matter of weight, and yet when they are spoken with, they food fourth silly folks with many fair words and bare promesses, which in th'end standeth them in very small or no stead. And yet of a far worse nature judge I him to be, that with opprobrious and cruel words, with a churlish and frowning countenance uttered after a despiteful sort, displayeth what he hath done for this man or that. For therehens cometh it that although we see the poor outwardly make a face and show of goodwill toward the rich, yet inwardly they hat● them in their hearts to the death. And that altogether for their fortune. And yet divers there are of them that hate one an other for doing some things which they that reprehend them perhaps would do, if they were in like power and authority. Few there are but emprove their Lands to th'uttermost to maigntaine their own avarice. They regard nothing but despice othermennes poverty, and seek to the uttermost all the means they can how to shun it themselves, fearring nothing else but falling into penury. For redress and preventing whereof, they cease not to molest their underlings and inferiors, oppressing their poor tenants, always vexing them that are not able to make resistance, and keeping them down still with might and main. And yet what can a man well say against some such pilling of provinces and making the uttermost of such offices as thou hast thyself paid dearly for, seeing that the Common Law among men which proceedeth and is grounded upon natural reason permitteth thee to sell again the thing that thou bowghtest.   

Chap. 10.  
BUt lo the grief to see things somuch disordered hath caused me to stray father from my matter in hand then I thought to have done, for that sufficient matter to talk of, still offered itself. Wherefore for this time I make here an end, for fear lest I deduce the like cause of blame to these our days. Our ancestors and forefathers have complained them of this heretofore: 
cause of complaint upon naughtiness hath not wanted in old time.  we ourselves at this present find us aggrieved thereat, and I fear very much that our posterity shall have like cause to be wail them● to see that good conditions and honest manners among men are so corrupted, that naughtiness hath altogether got their places: & that worldly affairs fall out each day worse and worse with so much evil that almose there can be no more. And now are these things rooted so, and settled as it were in this state, that likely they are so to continue and hold on still, only now and then perhaps they may chance to be tossed to and fro a little, like the waves of the sea: which when they have for a season, been still and quiet with in the shore, if there happen to rise a sudden flaw or a sharp pyrry of wind, straight way they work aloft and toss up and down for the time. So may it chance to far with these evil conditions of men. For as the times do alter and channge, right so follow they. Somewhile shall ye see dalliance and bodily pleasure bear chiefest sway: eftsoons again unmeasurable feasting, riotous banqueting, and superfluous feeding shall play his part. Sun after shall all they be exiled forth of place, & then none shall rule but sumptuous appareling and trimming the body with costly array. And more than effeminate painting and pranking the visage, the most certain argument of the foulness & deformity of the mind with wasteful profusion and spending of large patrimonies and ample inheritances. Again before a man would almost think it could be so, all these vices are quite shut up as if they had not been, and Tyranny only taketh place, then fall they to Civil wars, whereby all holy things are profaned, Laws and good order quite extinguished, goodness and god lines wholly abolished. Drunkenness for a time beareth the bell. And it shallbe deemed a virtue in him that shall bear most drink. So that a man may see, that vices neither continue always in one stay: but as they are altogether devoid of steadfastness, and at variance among themselves, so they force one to give an other place. So that we may well pronounce of ourselves to our great shame and reproach, that we have been evil, that we are evil and that we are like (it grieveth me much to say it) to be evil still. For why, there shall not fail to be among us from time to time, manquellars, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, encrochers of other men's goods, committers of sacrilege, & traitors aswell hereafter, as heretofore, and at this present. And yet Ingratitude ought no less to be detested then any the vices that I have named before: 
Ingratitude the ro●e of all vices.  as that from whence and by which, all those others do proceed and have their rooting. Without which it is impossible that any evil could spring and take his increase at full as it doth. Wherefore, each one shun & flee it as the horriblest vice that may happen to any man. And yet if it be thy fortune to bit upon any that showeth the Ingratitude: 
Ingratitude the greatest vice that may be done, and the lightest that may be suffered.  forget and forgive it still, as the lightest fault that thou mayst find among all others. For the greatest loss that can happen to thee hereby, pardy is but the loss of thy benefit only. And yet he to whom thou diddest it, can not accuse thee that thou pleasouredst him not, which is the commendablest thing that may be, and deserveth most praise. For as we should diligently in plesouring of all men, especially have regard to do it to them that we judge will prove thankful and acknowledge it wilinglye again, so ought we not to make restraint of benefiting those whom already we know precisely they will prove unthankful: and that by proof had of them in times past. As suppose tha● it lay in me to restore to any man his Children, whom (to do it) I must rescue with great peril & danger: I ought no whit to stick at the doing hereof, unless I were to sustain assured lie great harm and hindrance thereby myself. And as for him that I know worthy to he pleasured by me, I may in no case refuse or lingar to do it, were it so that I should spend my blood and adventure my life for him. And asfore him that I know assuredly unworthy to whom I should do any pleasure, yet if I saw him in danger of thieves, 
The perfect trial of a liberal heart.  and that by my outcry I might save him & deliver him from them, I may not stick to cry as lowed as possibly I can for his such safeguard.   

Chap. 11.  

The manner how men should do their benefits  NOw followeth it that we show what those benefits be that we should do the one to the other, and how we should do them. First of all the things which we ought to give, should be such as be necessary to him to whom we give them. Secondly they should be profitable, Thirdly acceptable and such chiefly as are of longest continuance. It behoveth then that we begin with those things that are necessary. Which are divided into two sorts, under th'one of which, are contained those things which conserve man's life. Under tother, are included those things which do well govern the same and cause it to be of long durance. For among men ye shall find some that will wake but small account of the receipt of such benefits as are transitory and of no continuance, 
One as evil as an ingrate person.  and others some shall ye find which disdain to receive any benefit at an other bodies hand: saying. It sufficeth me that I have of min● own: I am well enough contented therewith, I will not trouble myself with any more to endet or endanger me withal. By which means he refuseth not only to render the thanks & courtesy dew for the offer of pleasure made to him, but with shameful desdaigne rejecteth the same. 
A division of benefits.  Farther it is to be understood that among the necessary pleasures which men may do the one to the other, there be certain degrees, of which some are principal as those without which we can not live: some next them and second as it were, as those without which we can not live well: and other some third, as those without which we will not live. Of the first sort are these. To be delivered from the hands of our enemies, from the fierce cruelty of Tyrants, to be saved from exile, and sentence of loss of goods and Lands, 
Causes why benefits seem the greater.  and other such like dangers, which as they are indeed very great, so is our life on each side assaulted with the same. And these I say are of that nature that how much greater and more perilous they seem to be, 
Causes by which our benefits may s●me ●●e greater.  and thereby causers of greater fear, so much the more shall they who are delivered from them, think gentleness in us ●y whose means they are so dispatched from the same. For why, the great fear which they were in, shall make the benefit when they find it, seem to them much the greater. In which behalf, we may if the cause will conveniently bear it without damage or detriment to be sustained by the party so endangered, some what delay the speedy doing of the pleasure to th'end thapparent show of the danger, may cause him both to account better, and bear in mind the longer, the benefit when it is showed. The benefits which occupy the second place and degree, are those without which we may after a sort live, but yet so, that we were better dead then living in such manner. As to be barred of liberty, to be deprived of good name and fame, to lose a man's senses & wits, and others such like. In which degree may be numbered also all such things as by affinity of blood, by use or long custom do become dear to us, as our friends, our wives, our Children and such like things to which our mind is so tenderly affectionate, that it seemeth to us less grief to los● our life, then to departed with any the things afore mentioned. Next after these, as it were in the third place succeed those things that are profitable. which part extendeth very large and includeth a very great multitude of things, as money not superfluous or excessif, but competent and reasonable s●muche as may maintain us in good state of life. Hitherto are also referred preferments of honour, or attainment of any higher degree. And among all the things that are accounted profitable, there is no one better than for a man to endeavour to advantage and profit himself. As for all other things which are not so necessary for man's life as the above named things are, whe● they are had, they breed but superfluity and excess, which bringeth men to a certain wantonness and haughty mind. But the things which we mean, and of which we now do entreat, 
we ●u●ht to show profitable plessours.  rest in this point chiefly, that for the commodiousenes of the time & place which they serve, they may well seem to be pleasant. And again that they be such as be not common to every man. For by diligent noting of these circumstances, as time, place, person, and thing presented, we shall stand well assured that lighty we shall neither give nor send to any man that thing that shallbe either superfluous or not acceptable. As to send books to a rustical person and unlearned, or nets to a studious man and one altogether addicted to his books, seem both gifts not fit, for that they are not agreeable with the qualities and natures of them to whom they are sent. In like manner behoveth it that we send no such presents to any man that the present may smell to touch any vice or infirmity of his to whom we send the same. 
Things to be noted in sending presents.  As to send wine to one that we know will lightly and commonly be drunk: and plasters and salves to him that is much given to sickness, or troubled with sores. For in so doing we shall quite disgrace our present, and forne good will which we would seem to seek. Wholly into disliking, for that the party may (after a sort) seem to be put in mind by our said present of the vic● which well enough he knoweth to be in him.   

Chap. 12.  
Wherefore if we will do any pleasure or else bestow any benefit upon any man, above all other thing we shall seek to do it by things of longest continuance, to this end that o●r said gift, and the memory thereof may continue the longer. For there are very few that be of so good nature to bear still in mind the pleasure that hath been showed them, if it be not still tofore their eyes. But those that are very forgetful and unthankful, 
Unthankful & forgetful men  the present remaining of the benefit before their sight which hath been bestowed upon them, shall not permit them to be forgetful, 
Gifts ought to be o● longest continuance  but of force shall cause them, by beholding the same forthwith to remember who it was that did them that benefit. Therefore in seeking to do pleasure it behoveth us to do it by things of longest durance. To this end that by the continuance of the thing given, the memory of the giver may also remain so rife, that we shall not need our selves to upbraid them therewith again, to who● we have done any such benefits: For better it were that the gift itself should revive the remembrance thereof, when haply it doth decay, than the giver by reporting it himself, should disgrace his said gift. And as for me if I were to give goods, rather would I chose to give it Bullion or plate, than Coin. Sooner would I give costly Images and Pictures of wood or stone, than a gown or other garment of small continuance & lasting, which quickly fadeth with the time. For there are a number of people who remember the gift of any thing no longer while, than the use and occupation of the same endureth. For which cause I would not if I might choose, give such a thing that should pass over so lightly and come to nothing, but would do it by such things as by the same still remaining before their eyes the remembrance of the pleasure they found by my means, they might continue fixed and rooted (as it were) in the heart of them to whom I did such pleasure. For as there is noman I guess so void of understanding, and deprived of his senses, that would give light and thin summer gowns in cold winter, or thick furred gowns for summer, So doth it behove in employing of benefits and friendly pleasures to way diligently both the time, the place, the nature and qualities of the person. For certain it is that there are some times, yea and some minutes and instantes of time, in which some things are pleasant and acceptable, which self same things at some other season, are asmuch displeasant and uncommendable. Who seeth not what great diversity there is between these twain. To give the thing that no man else hath at that time, and to give that whereof then presently each man hath abundantly. Again to give that which a man hath long sought after and could not find, 

Things rare most acceptable.  
Omne rarum charum.   and to give that which in every place with out travel one may have plentifully: It appeareth then that it doth not skill somuch how dear and valewable the gifts are, as it doth, how rare and excellent they are, whereby they purchase no small thanks even among the richest sort. As for example. A few sorry apples which are timely ripe before any else in any other place, we see what marvelous great thanks the giver getteth for the novelty of them, when as within a short while after, a great multitude of them are not worth godamercies, whereas before they were taken in better stead than if they had been things of double value.   

Chap. 13.  

A notable example of arrogancy & pride  ALexander king of macedony who for his innumerable and those great conquests was surnamed the great, as he returned one time victorious from the east parts homewards, was so puffed up with pride and insolence, that contemning to be called any more a man, having deserved as he thought more than any man, 'gan to parswade his army, and charge them to. To honour him as a God. Which his good and fortunate success each country friend & in league with him seeming to rejoice at sent some under the name of the whole, to meet him as he returned, and to present him with one thing or other. Among others, thinhabitantes of the City of Corinth to declare their unfeigned rejoicing at his good fortune, sent ambassadors also under the City's name who in token of their faithfulness should signify to him that the Corinthians were contented to assume him into the number of the burgesses of that their City. When Alexander had heard the tenor of their message, and scorned their offer, as nothing in respect of his magnificence, one of th'ambassadors mildly answered. What Ale●ander, why makest thou so light of this our offer? Never was the like made yet to any, saving to Hercules and now to the. Which when Alexander understood, he accepted with great thanks the offer as honour, which the Corinthians made unto him, & gave as courteous entertainment to th'ambassadors as possible he might. Howbeit he regarded not the simpleness of them that did him the honour, but in thassuming of the same so thankfully, respected only the worthiness of him that he was partner made withal, which was Hercules Thus may you see he was altogether addicted to pursue honour whereof notwithstanding he knew neither the true way nor mean to attain there to, but followed th'example of Bacchus, whose mind was so hoven up with pride, that he was some way matched with Hercules, that forthwith he thought he should reach the heavens and there join with Hercules also, as he did at Corinth. 
Very manhood.  But behold how unfit matches th●se twain were. For Hercules never delighted to spoil any place. He went through the world too. But not for any covetousness or desy●r that he had to get any part thereof to himself, or any whit that he coveted that any part thereof should be subject to him, but only for the zeal he had to revenge the injures of them that without desert were afflicted, and to redress the tyranny of naughty and cruel oppressors. A defender he was of them that were good, and a pacifier of troubles both on sea and land. But Alexander even from his very youth trained himself in showing and doing oppression: a decayer and utter despoyler of all countries where so he became. An utter destruction aswell to his Friends as his enemies. Reposing his only felicity in making himself to be dread of all men.   

Chap 14.  
BUt let us now return again to our purpose. The good or pleasure which is done to all men in common and a like, 
pleasure general to all men is acceptable to no● in private  deserveth singular thanks of no man privately. For why there is no cause why any man should yield great thanks to any vintner or ordinary tabler of gests, for that he had wine of him, or dined with him. For he may well say in this case. What great pleasure hath any of those (I named) showed me for any the things specified? He hath done me herein no more pleasure than he would do to his enemy or the most dishonest parson of the world. For to what end did he show me the friendliness which he did, but only to serve his own turn? That thing therefore which thou givest, and wouldst have taken in good part and well thought of, let it in no wise be such as thou dost commonly and to many. And yet would I not that any man should think I spéeke these things as though I would make any restraint of liberality. But yet must it be so done, that it may seem to keep the right way, and that it purchase not reproach to the giver. It is lawful to give every where. And yet who that receiveth a benefit in the open face and presence of a multitude, ought not therefore to deem less well of the gift as though the presence of the others were any whit a disgracing to it. Again, it doth behove each man to have a good persuasion with himself, and to think that although others be benefited aswell as he, and that at his hands who benefited him, yet that he did it with a better will to him then to the rest. As thus I confess I have received but the like benefit or pleasure that this other hath done, howbeit it came to his own motion that which he did to me and without any request of mine. He showed such one the like pleasure as he did to me, but yet he did it quickly to me and without delay, whereas that other had it not with out desert, and that of long time to. Many bestow sundry things to several parsons, and yet not to each man after one sort Fort to some it is done upon light request, and to● some upon long entreaty. To some upon condition that they shall do the like again when they are required thereto. And to othersome for that old age and wantte of children of their own on whom they might bestow their pleasures, easily persuaded them to do it there where they did. But who that would have his benefits and the pleasures which he is to do to divers, acceptable and well accounted of by each of them, must find the means how to deserve a like well of them all, and to cause that each of them in his own persuasion may think himself preferred and esteemed above the residue. I would be loath to seem to hinder the benefits and pleasures that any man is minded to do what soever they are. But this wot you well that how much greater and magnificent the benefits are, so much the greater honour and commendation shall they purchase to them that do the same. And yet must a man use discretion in giving. For benefits which are done rashly and without consideration, 
Regard to be had in benefiting.  can by no means be either pleasant or commendable. So that when I council that these things be used wisely, with moderation, & due regard, if any one there be that for that thinketh that I prescribe bounds and limits to Liberality and restrain the same, & not to augment and, increase it rather, verily he doth not understand these my precepts aright. For what virtue I beseech you should we have in greater price then this? Or to what virtue should we parswade people unto, rather than unto this, which continueth and linketh together the society of mankind?   

Chap. 15.  
HOwbeit as there is no honest virtue of the mind that is rooted and grounded aright, 
what pleasure is well employed.  unless the same be ruled and governed by Reason, so is there no benefit rightly and duly employed, except the same be done with moderation and discretion. Wherefore I would not advise ne counsel any man to be ●uerlauash and prodigal in bestowing his benefits, seeking thereby to purchase the name of liberality. For that benefit is well bestowed, and deserveth to be liked of all men, when he that doth the same, doth it with advise and employeth it upon him that deserved the same. We ourselves willingly would not accept benefits at each man's hand, for fear lest we should not be able to make amends thoroughly as we would, for all such benefits as haply might be bestowed upon us. Noman calleth that a benefit whereof he is ashamed to confess the Author. Crispus Passiona was wont to say that there were some to whom he would repair for their judgement, good advise, and council, rather than for their benefits. 
● witty ●●yinge.  And again that there were othersome of whom he would rather accept their gifts then their council: and expressed their names. I would rather (quoth he) have the good and sage advise of Augustus then of Claudius.  
And rather would I wish to find the munificence and liberality of Claudius then the same of Augustus. But in mine opinion a man should not make any great account of the benefit that such one doth to him, whose judgement is but of small regard. Why then may you say Should not a man accept the benefit that Claudius giveth? Yes verily that shall he do. But yet he shall way of it as of a thing coming by chance only, which a thou wottest well is lightly variable from good to evil. What meaneth it then that we join these things in such order that the one of them may not seem to be perfect without that other? It is assuredly for this cause. There can not be any thing rightly said to be a benefit, that wanteth the better part which it should have. (That is to say) iudgegement and discretion.  
And thereof it followeth that if any man have given thee a great sum of money and hath not done it with good will and as a benefit should be done, it is no more to be accounted for a benefit, then if by chance or good fortune of thine, thou shouldst happen to find any treasure. So that it appeareth that we must yet receive some things when they are proffered us, for which not withstanding we are not any whit to think ourselves to rest indebted.    

The second Book of the Line of Liberality.  

Chap. 1.  
LEt us than consider that which followeth next upon the first part of this book. 
Now we should pleasure others.  That is to say, after what sort we should do our benefits. For the parfitte knowledge whereof, (as me seemeth) I can not show an easier or more brief way then to say That we should benefit and pleasure others after the same manner and in such sort as we would desire our own selves to be pleasured at others hands. Whereby it followeth that we must do it willingly, quickly, and that without stay or tarriance. For that benefit●e or pleasure is not acceptable that hath lingered long time in thandes of the giver, which argueth that he did it with grudging and evil will, and that it was by violence and perforce (as it were) gotten at his hands. In like manner he that in doing of a pleasure, doubteth whether he were best to do it or not, is next neyghtbour to him that plainly denieth to do it, and deserveth at all neither commendation nor thanks therefore. For like as in any benefit bestowing, there is not any thing that commendeth the benefit so much as the unfeigned good will of him that giveth the same, so must we say that who that by his delays hath declared that he did it with evil will can not be said to have done it truly, and as it ought to be, but for that he could not longer withhold it. But those benefits are ind●ed commendable which are soon ready, 
Which benefits are most commendable.  which are easily obtained, and prevent the expectation of him on whom they are bestowed, and in which there is used no manner of delay. Which who that will do aright and as they ought too be, must frame himself to examine and understand the natural desire and appetite of them whom he would pleasure: and when he hath so learned it, straight ways bend himself to serve their said desire. For far better is it that we prevent their need by giving, then to stay giving until we be asked. For that many very honest natures are bashful. And so ashamed to ask that they would rather want the pleasure that they need, than they would demand it. Now he that with free giving of his own accord, delivereth any such from that blushing bashfulness, deserveth double thanks and recompense for his such gift. But he that is driven to ask and request any thing before he can have it, though he than obtain it, 
Nothing so dear bought●s that is boughty with entreaty.  yet can he not be said to have it freely and for nothing, although he give no more for it. For as divers our ancestors and those wise and sage men men have thought, there is nothing de●elyer bought, then that which is obtained by entreaty. Were it so that every request that men should make, were to be made openly & in the face of a multitude, doubtless petitions would not bemade so rifely as they are. For not so much as the prayers which we make to God, but so near as we can we de●ier to make them in secret.   

Chap. 2.  

A benefit done upon request cometh to late.  IT is a grievous and strange word, and such one as is not uttered without blushing and scant daring to look in the face of him to whom it is spoken, to say I pray or beseech you. The need or cause of using which word should not he given to any friend, or him whom through thy good deserts thou wouldst make thy friend. There is none but doth that pleasure to late which he doth upon request, let him dispatch than never so speedily. Wherefore we must so near as we can, conjecture each man's desire and imagine their need: and those known, of our own accord deliver them from that urgent extremity of their need without any their request. 
That benefit most thankful that is done without request.  For that benefit is acceptable pleasant, and longest will continue in the mind of him to whom it is done, which preventeth his ask. And if it fortune that by no means we can prevent but we shallbe requested, yet must we cut of and abridge the abiding of many words at our friends hands, and being long entreated, that yet by that speed making we may seem as though we had not stayed to have been desired. And so soon as we understand once the effect of their minds, we must yield ourselves with speedy grant to do it. For by that hasty dispatch, we shall yet somewhat give them to understand that we had a will to have done them pleasure even before any their request made. For in like manner as meat given in dew season is able to be digested by him that is very sick, and as water given in time convenient oft serveth the turn of costlier medicine, 
A pre●ye similitude.  right so the benefit be it never so simple, yea and common withal, yet if it be readily done and willingly, and in the very nick (as a man would say) it deserveth greater thanks, and is far more to be esteemed, then is the benefit of greater value lingered forth long, and done with pausing and delay: For dawtles who that doth any pleasure with pausing, and long deliberation, is never to be said to do the same with a free heart and willingly. Again who that doth it gladly, his very countenance will declare how willing he is to do it.   

Chap. 3.  
THe slackness of a number and sparing to speak, 
Want● of speaking breedeth want of speeding  and their using sometime of a superfluous strangeness, is the cause why oftentimes they want sundry pleasures which haply for the speaking they might find at others hands. And again the lowering & sever countenances of some when they do promise pleasures, cause many of them to whom they do so promise, to conceive & think therein half a denial. O how far more commendable were it to join pleasant words with the pleasures which thou wilt do, and to commend thy beneficence with courteous language? As if thou met with one who either for simplicity or want of audacity would gladly have this or that pleasure at thy hands, & yet his heart faileth him to prefer his own cause to thee, and maketh his substitute and spokesman, thou mayest friendly and gently pick this quarrel of unkindness to him. As to say, well I am not well content that you would not by yourself do me to understand of this or the pleasure that you would me to do for you but make others your solicitors. And ●et godamercies that you would find some way and take some occasion to make proof of my good will to you ward. Wherefore know you that from henceforth wherein I may stand you any ways in stead, in any reason you shall command me, and for this one time I pardon your bashfulness. By this means shalt thou make him whosoever he be, to esteem more of thy friendly gentleness, then of all that, be it never so much that he would request of thee. Then shall the unfeigned benevolence & the undoubted courtesy of the giver be manifest and plainly appear, when he that came to make request, after his departure shall have just cause to say to himself, verily I thank God, this day have I made a passing good mart. 
True acknowledging of good will  Assuredly it rejoiceth me no less, but doth me asmuch good that I found him so tractable. As the thing which I have obtained would have done, if it had been far more valewable and gotten with great a do. Undowtedly I take thought how I shallbe ever able to render dew thanks and sufficient for his pssing gentleness.   

Chap. 4.  
BUt th●re ●●e a number of so froward and naughty natures, 
The worst kind of nature that do good.  that through their sharp and bitter words annexed to their beneficence turn the thanks which should and would ensue the benefits they have done, into mere malice, hatred, despite, and disdain. And by such their outrage and overthwart words, cause them that have received the same pleasures, to repent them of ever seeking to them, and much to be sorry that it is their hap to have found that benefit at their hands, and to wish rather to have failed of it, then by it to be laid at so, with such crooked language. Again, some others three be contented to make promise of pleasure showing: but when they have promised, they stay very long before they will perform it. And surely there is no one thing that cutteth a ma● more to the gall, then to be forced still to entreat as it were ane●●, for that whereof long before he had the government and promise at full. divers there are at whose hands with more difficulty and pain a man shall get the bare doing and dispatch of a matter, than he shall at some others obtain the gift or government of a matter or sewt itself, 
Better & easier leaving to the head then to the fet.  and that of weight. This man must be entreated that he will but put his master in mind, and solicit the matter. That other must be desired that he will dispatch & do that which his master hath granted, yea & commonly these will not spend somuch as their speech a little, without great Fees, whereas their master, for the thing itself granted requireth nothing, but doth it gratis. Thus when so many are to be entreated and sewed unto, about thobtaining of one self thing, each one that cometh after the first grantor diminisheth parcel of the thanks which otherwise should wholly redound to th●●lye first grantor. And when on pleasure passeth through so many hands before it hath his perfection, it happeth oftentimes that the least part of plesonr is his that requested it as a plesour● wherefore if thou wouldst do a pleasure and wouldst have it accounted of as a friendly pleasure, then in any wise see it be not such that shall come from hand to hand be tossed from post to pillar, and pass the picks (as the proverb is) but that it come wholly from thyself and that immediately, to them to whom thou wouldst show such pleasure. For there is none that can get any thanks by the gift which thou givest, but of force it must lessen somewhat of that which otherwise should have been wholly dew to thyself.   

Chap. 5.  

Long delay bredeth weariness.  THere is nothing that breedeth so great grief or is such a corosif to a man, as to be long foded fourth with wan hop, and in fine fail of his purpose also. For few there are but had rather be abridged of their hoping with a flat denial at ones, then to be lingered forth with fair promises, and find no deeds when all is done. But there are a multitude which of set purpose and for vain glory they have to be sewed to, will readily make fair and faithful promises enough, fearing least their number of sewtours would else perhaps decay, 
Foolish pride.  and so the blasoning of their authority should fail, if there were not a number who with their painful and harmful to themselves dancing of attendance might record and testify it to them that see it. Such are many officers in Court, and divers other placed in authority and room about Princes & other Lords of honour. Who repose no small point of glory to rest, in manifesting & making their pride to be apparent, persuading themselves it were quite dashed, unless the multitude of seely following suitors should show their authority. Like glorious Peacocks boasting only in their tail. The injuries and wrongs that such list to off●r are ready enough: but the pleasures which they show, so slack and faint, that their feet are not able to bear them forward. They never will dispatch any one sue● at ones Remembering nowhyt nor troubling their brains with the saying of the Poet comical.  
Quid? tu non intelligis tantum te gratie demere, quantum more adiicis?  
Comment? nentends tu pas que moindres sont les graces?  
Du bien, dautant ques lo●g avant que tu le faces?  
Who doth not understand, that tra●● of time and space.  
The beauty of the benefit doth thoroughly disgrace?  
ANd hereof cometh it that some of very anguish and grief after long gaping and nothing catching. For dire pain are forced to say. Sir I beseech you if it be so that ye mind to pleasure me, and to do for me in deed as you have long borne me in hand you would, do it then. If the matter be of no great danger nor difficulty, why do you thus lingar it? I had rather you would quite deny to pleasure me then on this wise to delay me. Which tarriance maketh me well-nigh through weary, and to loath the benefit, rather than I would thus long tarry and attend for it. And is any man to be called hasty, churlish or disdaignefull that having just cause shall thus say judge you? No never adeale. For as it is a great piece of cruelty by tracting the time to increase and augment a man's death, and again a piece of courtesy to hasten the speedy dispatch of his death that is condemned & needs must die without pardon or ransom, rather than by lingering the time to make him die a thousand deaths, Right so deserveth that pleasure innumerable thanks that is done without delay, in respect of the which is tracted by long time and delayed. For painful is the long waiting even for good things. And forasmuch as by sundry benefits & pleasures are helped and redressed sundry griefs and harms, He that causeth any man to be long vexed and grieved whom he may ease quickly, or hindereth his attaining to a benefit whom it lieth in him to farther, seemeth in that, to lay violent hands on him and for that time to conspire his death (as it were) Take this for certainty. 
Courtesy seeketh quickly to pleasure.  Courtesy alway hasteth to do that which it can do: and it is the property of him that willingly doth any pleasure, to do it without delay. Who so showed pleasure and stayed but one day to do it, doubtless never did it willingly, if he might aswell have done it afore. Whereby he lost two worthy and precious things. The time, and the show of friendly good will.   

Chap. 6.  
IN every thing that is to be done, chiefest regard is to be had after what order & manner every such thing is to be done. 
Delay to do plea●our hurtful.  For like as speedy dispatching doth much advantage, so doth long tarriance not a little annoy. For as in darts the Iron is always one, and a like able to hurt, but the odds and diversity riseth whether it be cast with a strong or week arm, and as the sword of itself is apt and pliant either to hurt but lightly, or wound deadly, or not at all, as force is used to it, and the place of the blow lighting chosen, So fareth it by benefits: For that which is given or done remaineth always one, at a stay, and vncha●nged, But yet the mind with which it is given, declareth great diversity to be therein. How pleasant and acceptable is that benefit, for which he will not receive thanks that did it, but even while he doth it, endeavoureth to forget that he did any such pleasure? Again, to taunt and check and hit one in teeth with the benefit thou didst, is an apparent sign of a naughty nature and churlish and unfréendly stomach of thine, and disgraceth that quite, which otherwise thou deservedst praise for. See therefore that in no wise thy benefits be interlaced with sorrowfulness, or cause of discomfort. And if there be any other thing whereof thou wouldst advertise and as a friend admonish him of, whom thou hast benefited, chose a fit and convenient time and place thereto, and in no wise do it by commemoration of any thy said pleasures passed and done.   

Chap. 7.  
Fabius' verucosus was wont to liken and compare, the benefit which any hard natured man with pain did, to gravely or gréety bread. Which notwithstanding he that is very hard pinched with hunger, feedeth well on, & seemeth to find savour & sweetness therein, though it be ●er so painful in chewing. But what doth not necessity? As none would feed on such bread that might choose, and could get other, so none would accept such rough benefits & unrepentant pleasures, 
unpleasant pleasures.  that might well spare them, & do well enough without. Tiberius Cesar being requested on a time by Marcus Aelius his nephew that had been sometime Praetor of Rome, to discharge & pay certain his Creditors their det for which he was endangered, willed to give him in writing both th● names of his said Creditors, & the sums also. He did not now promise to discharge the detts, but demanded to know his Creditors. when he had received a note of their names, he wrote back by letre to Aelius not that he had, or would discharge them, but that he had given commandment they should be discharged, with divers sharp taunts and nips, whereby though by his means Aeliu● stood acquitted of his detts, he had yet but small cause to conceive courtesy in him He sawst his gentleness so strongly and made it so sharp that it might seem clean to dull the taste of Aelius Howbeit I suppose that Tiber●us had a farther meaning therein, then was expressed: namely, to prevent others from making the like request to him as his Nephew did, and therefore seemed to deal the roughliar with Aelius to fear others from making the like attempt. But who that mindeth to do a benefit a right, must deal therein far otherwise●   

Chap. 8.  
THerefore when thou mindest to do any pleasure to any man, thou must endeavour thyself what in thee doth lie, to cause the same to be most acceptable to him to whom thou dost it. For otherwise thou couldst not say it was a benefit which thou gavest, but rather a good turn joined with a check and rebuke. And to say freely that which I think in this behalf, Doubtless it is no Royalty for a Prince to give any thing, which to do he is enforced by compulsion or for thavoyding of evil report. Neither yet could● Tiberius for all the sly means he used in writing so sharply to his nephew when he besought him to discharge certain his debts, avoid that which (as I said) I did judge he thought to have forebarred others of. For not long after, divers there were who made the very same petition to him as his nephew had made before. Whom he commanded openly in the ●ace of the Senate to declare the cause why they came endetted so to such and such their Creditors. 
Odious● manner of benefits  which when they had exponed, he willed th●re should be given to them certain sums of money toward the discharge thereof. Was this worthy to be called Liberality think you? No verily: but rather an ignominy to his person. It may well be termed a help or subsidy granted by a Prince toward thalleviating the payment of a more somme. A benefit is such a thing that when it is done, the doer may well abide the hearing it reported again, without any whit blushing at it. If I be sent to desire any thing at a judges hand. I can there but yield the cause of my demand, if I be thereto requiered.   

Chap. 9  
Whereupon it is thadvise of all wise men that we should bestow certain of our benefits openly, & again certain of our benefits secretly & closely. Openly all such as renown followeth the attainning of them. Of which kind are those rewards that are given for feats achieved by chivalry, & such like dignities & promotions, which are beautified & more commended when a multitude knoweth of them. And these things wherein consisteth neither renown nor estimation, but be only easers of need and poverty, and saviours of honesty, those I say are to be given secretly, that they may be known only to those to whom they are available. And yet in some cases we should beguiel him whom we help, that though he have that that doth serve his need, yet he should not know at whose bands he received the same at that present, nor yet from whence it came.   

Chap. 10.  
Archesilaus' on a time having a dear Friend of his fallen in to poverty, and yet for bashfulness would not discover his great need, and were it for thought, or for disease fallen sick, Archesilaus saying and pitying his case, thought it was then high time of his own accord to succour him though his friend by no means would make him privy to his necessity. Whereupon, taking with him a bag of money went with speed to this sick man making ●ys errand to visit him: and being set on his b●d besides him, finding and taking occasion of Talk, 
A true liberal act.  privily conveyed the bag of money under the pillow of the sickman without any word speaking of it, and when he saw his time, took his leave and departed.  
wishing that his friend that was more bashful than wisdom would, might yet by chance find that that might serve his wantte, rather the● then lack still, or else be haply stricken out of conceit with himself that any man should know his penury. But here will some one perhaps say. What? should not he that received a benefit know of whom he had it? 
whether it be requisite that he that is pleasured know by whom he was pleasured,  I answer again. That at the fi●st, though he know not, it maketh no matter: & yet doth that so bestowing of benefits, include a great part of principal beneficence. But when I have thus benefited him privily, I will not there cease, I will do him sundry other pleasures beside. I will do many more things for him whereby he may gather that it was I that did him that other pleasure also tofore. And yet though perhaps he never know that he had that benefit through me, I shall notwithstanding be sewer myself that I gave it. But thou mayst say perhaps. That is but a simple reward. Truth it is if thou diddest it to have gain thereby, and to reap recompense. But if thou hast as thou shouldest have, respect to this point only, that that which thou givest may pleasure him to whom thou givest it, thou give it free lie without any such regard taking. Let it suffice thee, that thyself art privy to the gift, for else thou shouldest not seem to take delight in well-doing, but that thy desire were to be seen to do well. Thou art not yet satisfied perhaps, but wilt still say I will needs have him know it. Then tell me this. Whether thou wouldst he should think himself beholding to thee or no? Still thou sayest thou wil● have him that receiveth pleasure at thy hands, know whence he hath it. What if it be more profitable, if it be more honest, if it be more acceptable for him that is pleasoured, not to have it known? Wilt thou not then change thy mind? But all this notwithstanding thou wilt say he shall needs know that he had the pleasure at thy hands. I see well then thou wilt not suffer him to continue in ignorance and darkness. In very deed I grant that so often as the matter shall permit, the giver may if he please take pleasure of the acknowledging receiver. Howbeit if it lie him upon that we help him, and again that it will turn him to reproach if our plesouring him should be known abroad, in this case I would not that that benefit should be Chronicled. Thou wilt yet perhaps say. And wherefore should I not do him to understand that it was I that pleasured him? What though this be one of the most principal precepts to be observed in bestowing of benefits that I should not upbraid the same and cast him in the teeth with it to whom I did it, may I not for that show him that it was I that pleasured him? No surely. For between any two this is the Law positife touching the doing and taking of benefits. 
the l●w of benefices.  That he that gave, for get so son as he hath given that he gave any thing. That he that received the same, be never unmindful that he received a benefit at his hands. There is nothing that more vexeth or troubleth the mind of any man then the often repeating and reciting the pleasures which have been done to him.   

Chap. 11.  
WHo that should often tell me what benefits and pleasures h● had done for me I would answer him as did one that had sentence given against him that he should go into exile and be banished his native Land, 
An example of them that upbraid others with their benefits  and yet by the special instance and entreaty of a dear friend of Caesar's was delivered from the sentence executing He then who had thus saved him, took the saved person and causing him to be led round about the City, followed himself with a loud voice saying. This is he whom I have sa●ed from being banished.  
And when without end he persevered this still vaunting and triumphing over him, the sellie man not able long to endewer his clamour, in presence of all the people said. I beseech thee put me again 〈◊〉 the grace of desire. Let him deal with me after his pleasure. How long wilt thou continue thus casting in my tethe, I am he that hath saved thy life? I did deliver thee from banishment? if this had been acknowledged by me without thy telling, it had been asmuch worth as double my life, but sith that by thee it is thus notified, it seemeth worse to me then death. I have little cause to think courtesy in thee, or to thank thee for, if thou savedst me only for this end, that thou mightest boast over me. When wilt thou cease carrying me about to show? When wilt thou suffer me to forget my misery and state unfortunate? It might have sufficed thee, and over much had it been, to have led me about the City only ones in a triumph on this wise, to show what thou hadst done for me. Hereby it appeareth that we should not make report of that we have given. 
A benefi● ought no● to be recited by him that did it to him to whom he did it.  For who that reciteth to him whom he hath pleasured what pleasure he hath done for him, in that self same act seemeth to demand his pleasure again. We ought not by any talk seem to put him in mind of our passed benefits done but if perhaps we think that oblivion hath crope in his mind, let us do him an other pleasure. That by the receipt thereof, he may call to memory the former also. But in any wise we must be ware that we make no report to others, of that that we have done. He that doth any pleasure to any other, let himself keep silence, and refer it wholly to the reporting of him that received it. To him that reporteth what he hath done for this man and that, it were well answered as it was to one that had never done with publisshing the pleasure which he had showed here and there. Whereupon one demanded the cause why he had not made an end of reporting his benefits sith he had been so sufficiently recompensed for the same. When he denied that ever he had any recompense for any of them and demanded the place where. Marry quod that other in every such place where thou madest any report of them by thine own talk. So that you may see a man ought not to report his own good deserts and usurp the office of an other. Any other with more honesty may play that part, whose report shall purchase thee commendation whereas thive own mouth shall procure thee slander and rebuke. In hearing report made what henefites thou haste bestowed, thou must be so chary for incurring the danger of vain glory, that were it so that others should recite to thee, what benefits thou hast bestowed, thou must answer that he whom th●w haste so benefyted, in thy judgement was worthy of more ample benefits than thy power according to thy will and his deserts would permit thee to match. Neither must this refusal of praise be done colourably, and after a dissembling sort, as some do who would seem to refuse thanks when indeed they most desire them. Moreover those whom thou dost benefit, thou must use courteouselie, with unfeigned fréendlines. The husbandemanne undoubtedly were in danger to lose both his seed and labour if he should give over pains taking so soon as he hath made an end of sowing. A great deal more diligence is required before it come to be ripe Corn after that the seed is cast into the ground: So that if he hope to have the fruit of his travail and labour, he must with equal diligent pain pass each point from the first unto the last. Right so must we deal with our benefits. Can there be any getter benefits think you then those that the parents can afford to bestow upon their Children? And yet should they quit lose the thanks & praise precedent, if straight way in their infancy they should neglect and forsake their said Children, and not nourish them up accordingly. So is it with all other benefits. Which except thou persist to maintain and make perfect thou losest al. It is but a very small matter to have pleasured any one, except thou continue on still in that mind. If thou desire that they whom thou plesourest should think themselves bound to thee, use them so that they may think thou lovest them still. And especially beware using any taunting or checking talk that may grieve them to here. To nip a man for neglecting the benefits he had received, 
Inconveniences that grow by repeating our benefits.  breedeth weariness to hear thereof: and to upbraid the pleasure ones done, engendereth hatred. In employing of benefits there is no one thing so much to be avoided as pride and arrogancy. For to what end should a man in that behalf use haughty looks, or many words to set fourth his benefits, when the thing done deserveth of itself sufficiently to have commendation? The matters themselves shall declare our acts abundantly, yea though we say never a word: It is not only a thankless benefit, but to be abhorred also, which is scornfully given.   

Chap. 12.  
CEsar on a time gave Pompée the Punicien his life (if we may say he gave life that took it not away) whereupon when Pompée bowed down himself humbly to have reverenced Cesar, For his life pardoned, Cesar offered him forth his life foot to kiss. Which presumptuous fact of Caesar's, they that seem to excuse, say that he did it not for pride or disdainfulness of mind, but for that he would he should see the golden buskin he then wa●e on, richly garnished with pearl and stone. But when all is said and the best they can made of it, was it not shame enough judge you that he that semd to be borne to no other end but to change the Romain liberty into the thraldom of the Persians, could not find any honester or more decent place of his body to offer to so grave a man as Pompée was, who had also been Consul but make him kiss the buskin upon his foot? He made but small account of this, that so noble and ancient a man having borne so high dignity and office in the weal public, debased himself so much as to humble himself to him upon the ground in the presence of such an assembly of so many great personages and men of honour, in such sort that vanquished enemies to get grace at their Conquerous hands could not do more. What seemed he to do hereby, but to tread as it were despitefully the weal public under his feet? But some will say that the kissing of his left foot could avail but little to the undoing the state of the weal public. Very truth but he shrewdly showed his welmening mind. Overmuch had it been reproach to him to have dealt with so worthy a man as Pompée was in giving sentence in such sort as he did upon him, though after such scornful wise he had not forced him to kiss his foot.   

Chap. 13.  
O Foolish wantonness and pride of men that are one's clymen to honour. O passing great folly and madness that rayggneth in them. How happy is he that hath not to deal with such, nor needeth to seek for pleasure at their hands? How soon they can turn benefits to injuries, and pleasures to pain? What pleasantness & delight take they in excess? How unseemly are all their doings? And how much the loftiar they seek to climb, so much the lower they fall down at last. Whereby they give men just cause to think that they know not themselves nor weigh their estates. What may it b● that puffeth them up so with pride and insolency? give they never so much it is counted but lost. I would here demand of Cesar as I would also of any man else, what it is that they bear themselves so lofty on? What it is that should change into worse nature both the countenance and behaviour of men? Those pleasures, gifts, or benefits only are pleasant, 
The nobler the parsonage is the court●ouslye d●th his benefit, so much more praise worthy  that are given or done after a courteous manner and gentle sort. As when one that is far my better, giveth me any thing, and yet doth not triumph over me for that his munificence, but with all gentleness and debonairety maketh semblance as if he had nowhyt pleasured me in such sort as he did, choosing by his own accord to do it, and that quickly with expedition to prevent the time, rather than to differre it until I had need. Necessary is it therefore that such as are disposed to pleasure others, take good regard that they commit no folly whereby they shall lose the grace of the said benefit which they have done, and again that they deem the pleasures they have showed, to be no whit the greater for that they are many in number, 
Uanglorie 〈◊〉 full  which argueth for all that, never the greater bounty in them. And that in any wise they avoid the desire of vain glory for any their such pleasures done: which causeth their doings to be hated, which otherwise would be loved, commended, and had in great prite.   

Chap. 14.  
ANd yet some things there are which of their own natures are hurtful to those that request the same: 
Confide rations to be had in doing ou● benefits  which it is more friendliness to deny then to grant. Wherefore in passing our grant, we are to weigh aswell the profit as the sati●fienge the mind of the requesters. For many times we make earnest pursuit after things that are harmful to us, and can not of ourselves discern how pernicious they are for us, for that our blind affection for the time, dimmeth the clearness of our judgement. But so soon as that heat beginneth to slake, when that burning desire which erst vanquished discretion is some what quailed, we ourselves then dislike and detest the counsellors and fortherers of those evils. For as we should not give cold water to him that is in the fit of a shaking ague, nor we: 'pon to him that is beside his wits, no more ought we to grant the request of every one by and by that humbly, earnestly, with compassion and pity desireth some things of us? For Reason would that we should take as good regard to th'end as to the beginnings of such pleasures as we are to do: and that we should give such things whereby a man may take pleasure not only when he receiveth them, but afterward also. But some one will say to himself perhaps, well. I know that that which such one desireth of me shall not advantage nor pleasure him, but hurt and hindar him & yet what should I do? He requesteth it of me so earnestly that I may not say him nay. Let him see to his own safeguard, he shall not have cause to blame me. This opinion is very falls, yes mary shall he have cause to blame thee, and that worthily. For when he shall be better advised on the matter, and that the hot fit of his shallbe qualified, why should he not hate him that in his time of folly forthred him to catch his bane? To give the assent to harm one, is cruel pity. And as it is a very charitable act to save them that through folly's rage would without nay mischief and destroy and undo themselves, so is it to grant hurtful things to each man for the asking, as sign apparent of pitiful cruelty. Let us endeavour to give such things that the longer they are enjoyed and kept the more pleasant and profitable they may appear to be, and never fail of their goodness. My money will I not give to an adulterer, for that I would not seem to be a fortherer of his wickedness. But if I know precisely such folly to have place in him, I will what I may dissuade him from it. Neither would I give it to a common quarreler nor one that hath no stay nor government of himself, for fear that an other day he say Such one by loving me overmuch and to tenderly undid me.   

Chap. 15.  
IT chanceth oftentimes that there is but small odds between the friendly fréendshyp that some men show, and the evil wishing of the enemy. For what harm the foe wisheth may chance to a man, the same his very and dear friends over timely frindlines showed, otherwiles procureth and performeth. Then see what a miserable and piteous case this is, that there should be but one & the same effect. and sequel both of hatred, & Love, evil wishing and well meaning. 
Regard to be had whom & how we benefit.  But let us so near as we can to show our good wills, give such things as shall never turn to our reproach. And for that it is the chiefest point of friendship to make our friend equal with ourself, it followeth that for his well doing and safeguard we provide as for our own. I will give my friend that he needeth: but yet so that I be not thereby driven into necessity myself. I will gladly help him being in danger to be lost, but yet in such sort that I cas● not away myself. I will not give any man any such thing that I can not get, but if I ask it myself with reproach and shame. If I have done pleasure, I will not spread it abroad, and by talk boast small things to make them seem great. Neither will I account of benefits received, less than they deserve. And as he that casteth him in the teeth whom he hath benefited with the pleasures he hath done for him, loseth there by the commendation and grace of his benefit, so he that vaunteth what he giveth getteth not praise thereby, but reproach. Let each man have an eye to his own ability, and that according to that, he give neither more nor less. Let him again in giving, have a good respect to the person to whom he giveth. For as there are some things which for their smallness of value are not to be given to men of estimation, so are there again other some things more than meet to be given to mean or simple persons. For which cause there is to be weighed aswell the quality, condition, and desert of the receiver, as of him that giveth, & coutrarywise. Wherefore such things as thou givest, note well whether they be more than thou mayest well give, or according ●o thine ability and state. Again, whether they be such that he to whom thou givest the same, may well enough accept for the worthiness, or refuse or at least make small account thereof for their slenderness.   

Chap. 16.  
ALexander on a time (as he was desirous to seem magnificent) taking no regard nor making any account of any thing except it were of very great value, made offer to a simple man that had pleasured him some way, to give him a great lordship i● recompense. He to whom this offer was made, weighing with himself his own mean estate, and fearing the envy and disdaigne that some others, (as he thought) might conceive against him that he should be so far above many of them rewarded, strained much courtesy to receive it, alleging that he was but a simple man, & far unfit to have such a reward. To whom Ale●ander answered. It is not thy fytnes to receive, but my fytnes to give, that I regard. Doubtless this proceeded of a stout and bountiful heart, and yet though a king pronounced it, it was but foolishly spoken. For having regard to himself only and his own worthiness alone, he should give nothing. It is expedient in giving gifts, 
Circumstances to be noted in bestowing ben●fites  to note both the gift, the person, his qualities, the time, the cause, the place, and all other circumstances, without which, due order in giving can not be observed. Note here the passing great arrogancy and pride of Alexander. If it were not meet for the poor man to accept that offer, neither was it fit for him to g●u● it to him. Dew consideration ought to be had both to the personages and their degrees. And seeing that the chiefest point of any virtue is to observe a measure and indifferency, it is aswell to be adjudged a fault what exceedeth & is to much, as that that is oversparing and wanteth. Though fortune had dealt so favourably with Alexander. That he thought a City as small a gift as he with his honour might ge●e, was it not also think you a token of as noble a heart in the poor man that refused the acceptance of a town when it was offered him? Yet verily. For though Alexander had such an insatiable and greedy appetite that he could devour and swallow up a number of whole countries & Realms as ●e did in his days, rasing them down, wasting them and leaving them desolate as if there had never been any such things, and yet never surfeit any whit upon it, yet he should weigh that there were in like manner some feebler stomachs that were not able to digest one lordship.   

Chap. 17.  
Diogenes' surnamed Cinicus for his beastly and doglike life, 
An honourable answer of antigonus  desired king Antigonus on a time that he would give him a Talon of silver. Antigonus answered that it was not fit for such one as he was to demand so great a gift. Then Diogenes seeing that he was denied the request for the value besought him to give him a penny. That again quoth Antigonus is less than is fyt●ing for a king to given Such shifting of men is very dishonest For by this means he rid himself from giving any thing at all. In the ask of a penny he regarded the honour of his own estate, in the demanding of a Talon he respected the simple condition and degree of Diogenes: though he might well enough for his ability have given both the penny as a meet gift agreeable with the poverty of Diogenes and the Talon also as a gift age fitting with the magnificence of a king to give. And though that one sounded somewhat more in value than that Diogenes simple estate might well demand, that other notwithstanding that it was very small yet was it seemly enough in due place, and time for him to give. If any one there be now will say that indeed Diogenes ought not to demand so great a some, I will also assent thereunto. For to say the truth it is not meet that any such one should request money which is himself an open despiser of the same. And if he profess that he quite contemneth money, it shall behove him altogether to declare himself to persever in that mind, and to play the part of Cinicus thoroughly, and not to have a desire to be rich and yet to colour it under a cloak of voluntary poverty. But return we to our present matter in hand. Who that is to give any gift, aught to take as good regard to his own person, as to his to whom he giveth it, and both alike. 
● good similitude of Tennis play.  To the apt declaration whereof me seemeth I can not use a fitter similitude then that of Chrysippus which he useth of tossing the handeball. For sewerlye when the ball falleth to the ground, it happeth so to do through the default of th'one of the players. But then the ball keepeth his corpse trimliest, when with like indifferency of both Parts it is cast and tossed from that one ●o that other, and is not suffered to fall to the ground. In which behalf, the cunning player will take good regard not to cast it at all times a like, with the like strength, but will be sewer to moderate or increase the same according to the nigh standing or far of being of his companion. The which consideration is to be had in bestowing of benefits. For unless they be fytlye applied to the persons both of the giver & receiver, questionless they shall neither departed from the giver, nor come to him whom they are meant unto, duly and as they ought to do. And yet farther respect is also to be had herein. For like as if we are to play with one well practised at Tennis, howsoever we hap to strike almost, yet he for his execcise and practise, if any fault happen in our play, with his quivernes and readiness can well hide it and save it from being openly espied by them that stand by. But if we have to deal therein with one that is mere unskilful and void of knowledge, then behoveth it us to be the more circumspect, and with our play which must be used with great observance & moderation, direct and govern his play, and (as it were) take on us both the part of the striker fourth and sender back again. If he stand far of, to play even in his bosom, and if he strike short, to pain ourselves to run and meet it as it cometh. And so must we do in bestowing of benefits. At first we must instruct and teach them how they must do, and think it enough if we perceive that they will endeavour, apply, and declare themselves willing to do as we teach them. But indeed to say the truth we our selves for the most part that do pleasures, 
Ingratitude oft growth by us.  are the causers that there be so many ingrate and unthankful people as there are, and cause them so to continue. For when we have once done such a pleasure as is indeed of great value, and more a great deal than he to whom it is done is able to make recompense for, or to render the like, we should deal as do these crafty gamesters that gladly would get and train into play some simple body to cousin him (as they say). Which devise of theirs that they may the easilier bring to pass, they affirm constantly that they are as unskilful in play as possible is for any to be. And when they have once by little and little trained him in, to make and as the proverb is, then to encourage him to play frankly, they let him at the first draw good hands on them to give him a stomach to hold on, which doubtless the simple man could never do if they should play their best, neither would that sellye soul except he were very singly sold, venture his money among them were it not that they with their own losses for the time tolle him forward until he have with exercise and through practise got him a bold stomach. But there are a number now a days that when they have once done a pleasure to a man, they had rather lose altogether and cause him whom they have benefited to become more unthankful, than they would seem to admit his thanks giving, and accept them in am and place of sufficient recompense of their former benefits. A proud kind of people, and such as lose themselves the whole grace of their said deserts. How much better and séemelier were it and more courtesy to be though in them, to conceive so good opinion of them whom they pleasured, as they would tother should of them for being pleasured at their hands? To seem still to owe like good will to them? To deem courteously of mean things, and to accept and allow their rendering thanks somewhile in place of full recompense of their gentleness: In fine, to show themselves so well meaning to them when they have pleasured, that with all their hearts they will be content to discharge them, from so much as thinking that they would look they should owe any thing to them for the pleasure they received, or that they looked to reap any pleasure at their han●●s again for the same? 
The vs●r●r.  The cruel usurer why is he cry●d out upon and detested of all men, but for that he taketh unreasonable interest, or for delayeinge of men and making by his such delays, men's need more urgent to th'end that they should give him his own asking? But as a man in no wise should ask recompense for his benefits and pleasures done, so ought he easily to admit and accept in good part an●e thing (were it never so small) that seemed to be rendered by way of recompense for the same. Undowtedly he is worthy highly to be commended in this behalf, that of his own accord, willingly bestoweth his benefits, without ever requiring recompense: and yet if haply he find courtesy to be showed for them, he rejoiceth passingly at it. And for all that he never thought upon them longer then while he was doing of them. Therefore if any recompense be haply answered him for the same, he accepteth it, not as due for any his deserts (having clean forgot what he did) but as a good turn done to him causeless.   

Chap. 18.  
ANd as there are some kind of men which with great pride and arrogancy give their benefits and pleasures, 
How we ought to receive benefits.  so are there other some which in like manner receive amiss such pleasures as are done to them: which in no wise should be committed. Now for a time let us leave her showing how men ought to do pleasures, and let us now declare after what order men should receive them at others hands. Every duty that hath relation and respect to two persons, requireth the like of th'one as it doth of tother in each degree. For who that list thoroughly to examine and scan what is required to be in a Father, or incident to that name, let him understand that asmuch and nowhit less is to be required in him that shall bear the name of a child. divers things there are to be looked for at the husbands' hand to his wife, and no ●ewer ne lesser are there to be required at the wives hand toward her husband. And as it is impossible that th'one of these could keep his name but in respect of the other, as to wit to be a Father if he have not a Child, or a husband if he have not a wife, right so is there for their better conservation, a mutual and like duty to be required for each at others hands, which is very hard. For as Hecaton saith. Every perfect ho●est thing is full of difficulty. And by the same reason, so is every other thin● the nearer it approacheth to the absolute perfection, in respect of that that is not so nigh. All things of which order, it is not sufficient to do, but it is requisite to do them by Reason. Reason must be sturreswan and hold the helm. Reason must guide them and direct them the way. Both matters of least weighty and things of greatest importance must needs be ordered by Reason's rule. And as she shall will and council us, right so must we dispose ourselves and our doings. And as for her, wots you well she will not advise you to accept benefits and pleasures at each man's hand. 
Benefits ought not to be taken at each man's hand.  At whose hands then (it may hap) you will say shall we receive pleasures? To which question to answer briefly, know you that we should chiefly wish to receive them at their hands, to whom we tofore have done the like. For with far more diligence ought we to seek out him to whom we may owe a good turn them one to whom we may lend it. For to th'end we may avoid all discommodities and that none should ensue, whereof notwithstanding follow many divers times, it can not but be a grief to become bound to him to whom thyself would not. And again it is a joyful thing and right pleasant to receive pleasure at his hands whom thou now lovest, although he have harmed thee sometime before. Again there is no one thing so displeasant or that grieveth an honest nature so much, as of force to be compelled to love or owe duty to him whom by no means he can abide. Howbeit I must still put you in mind that I speak not these things ne give these precepts to sober wise men who delight in nothing but that which is reasonable, 
To whom these precepts are given.  and bridle their affections with the reins of equity prescribing to themselves Laws and good orders, and follow them when they have so done, but I give these precepts to ignorant and unskillful men, who though they have a very earnest zeal and desire to measure their doings and life by Reason's lore, yet do their fond affections and foolish fantasies bear such sway in them, that needful it is to give them often advertisements what is most expedient for them to do. It appeareth then that we must use discretion in choosing out him of whom we will receive any benefit or desire to be pleasured. And to be plain with far more diligence and heed taking should we seek out him by whom we would be pleasured, than we would do any one to borrow money of. For to him tha● I borrow money of, I am not bound to yield any more, but so much money again as I received. Which when I have delivered & paid I am for that discharged, and on clear board with him. But to him at whose hands I have received a benefit, I can not be so excused. I own to him far more than I received. For when I have repaid that or asmuch as he gave to me, yet are we bound to be Friends assured the one to the other, and so to continue. And when I have rendered, to him asmuch as I have received, then must I straight way begin afresh again. To which conjunction the Law of true friendship and amity would not that we should admit any one that is unworthy. such I say and so straight is the sacred Law of benefits, from whence, and by whose means proceedeth love between man and man, and is thereby established and confirmed. I may not yet always (will some chance to say) refuse a pleasure that is offered. For somewhiles I may be constrained to accept it whether I will or not. As admit that a cruel Tyrant should offer to do me a pleasure and would think I scorned his gift if I should refuse it whereupon he would with displeasure take occasion to work me some great mischief, might I in this case take it or no? Again put the case that some Pirate or Thief that still persevereth in his piracy or robbery will offer to do me any passing great pleasure, what will you advise me to do in this case? well I know that none of all these is such that I may well think myself bound to any of them for any pleasure they shall hap to show me. What shall I therefore do? I answer thee that it resteth in thy choice to whom thou wilt yield thy sel●fbounden. Howbeit so that thy said election be free and quite devoid from all violence and terour. But if any of them hap to come in place, all free choice must of fine force stand aback. If thou be free, and that it lieth wholly in thy hands to take which thou list, then note well my words I have said: But if thou be barred of that free choice and liberty, 
A benef●te enforced not to be repaid as of duty  then note well thou dost not choose it, but hast it perforce for that thou canst not avoid it. Noman hath cause to think himself bound for the having of that which he could not be suffered to forego. Well then sith thou knowest what my mind is herein, show me how I may do to refuse it. admit that any such as thou diddest name hath pardoned thee thy life. That maketh no matter. For it recketh not what the thing be that is given, except it be done by one that is minded to do it, and that to him that is minded to receive it. Though such one hap to save a man's life, he deserveth not therefore to be called a preserver of life. The strongest poison that is somewhile serveth in better stead than the holesomest medicine that is, & yet is it not numbered among the wholesome things that are commonly to be eaten. Whereby it appeareth that divers things there be that be good and profitable to be received at some time, and yet he that receiveth them hath not to think himself any whit bound for the receipt thereof.   

Chap. 19  
THere was on a time one sent purposely to kill a Tyrant. And being come in place where he was: 
Some receive pleasures and ye● are to think them selu●sbō● for ●he ●ame.  with his naked sword struck him And supposing he had given him his deaths wound fled incontinent for being apprehended. Now it chanced so that the blow did light upon a great swelling which the said tyrant had upon his body, which was grown so perilous that all the expertest Physicians he had, durst not undertake to cure it and warrant his life. And yet by the chance that he was cut so in that place, the corruption that there was long gathered and festered purged so, that in short while he recovered his perfect health of that place by mean of that blow, whom all his most practised Physicians had before given up, as past all recure. And yet did not the Tyrant yield him any thanks for that by his cutting him he was restored to his health, neither did he deserve any. So you may perceive hereby that a man may sometimes do that act to an other that may be great profit to him and turn to his great good, and yet not always to be accounted of, as of a benefit. Except it do proceed of a mere good will from the very first beginning, it is not to be called a benefit. For pleasure that proveth so but by hap hazard and chance medely, is rather to be deemed an injury well proving, than a benefit well mente. There was on a time (as the usage was oft in Rome) in the Theatre (a place appointed for people to stand upon and behold the spectacles and shows,) divers men that had sentence of death passed on them put, and certain cruel wild beasts let in unto them, there to fight those condemned men with the beasts in the presence of the Romans, and there either acquit themselves by slaying the beasts or else be slain themselves there in presence of the people. Among the residue of the condemned men there was one brought who before time had the keeping of a certain great Lion, which beast also as it fortuned was brought in place and put in among the other beasts unto the condemned men standing at their defence. And when the Lion had a while roamed him about the place in his stately pace viewing and noting each one that stood in his danger, furthermore he remembered him that sometime had been his keeper and master: and therewithal soudainlye cast himself between him and tother cruel beasts and defended him against all their assaults. And what think you of this helping? Was not this suppose you worthy to be called a benefit? No verily. For neither of these that I have told you of, did that which they did, for this that they minded at the first beginning it should prove so well, or for that they meant it should work any pleasure to them to whom they did it. So that in this respect you may● very well match the wild and salvage beast, and him that was sent ●o slay the tyrant together. Both he and the Lion were causers of saving of life, and yet neither that one nor that other could be said to do any benefit. A man is not to be said to receive any thing as a benefit which is so forced upon him that he can not refuse it. Neither is he to be said to owe pleasure to him to whom willingly he would not be beholding. If thou mind to pleasure me, let me first be at free liberty to choose whether I will accept or refuse thine offer at my pleasure & then if I will accept it, do thy pleasure.   

Chap. 20.  
IT hath been called in question heretofore touching Marcus Brutus whether he were worthy to have his life at julius Caesar's hands or no sith that he ones gave his sentence of death upon julius. This judgement after what order it was handled, I will not here report. truly in mine opinion although he were in all other things a very notable man and great praise worthy, yet in this point he overshot himself much, and no whit followed the doctrine and precepts of the Stoiques in that he seemed to dislike & sought to destroy the name and a s●ate of a king, seeing that the best state of well governing any weal public seemeth to be when any Realm is administered and governed by one just king: 
Monarchy the best state of weal public.  or for that he doubted there would ensue overmuch liberty in the City, when all should be at the commandment of one man who by large rewards might as it were higher men to obey him, or else for fear he had, lest the ancient uses rites and customs of that common wealth being annihilated, made frustrate and quite abrogated, the City of Rome should be reduced to the former state when it was at the beginning thereof under the Tyranny of kings. And that all good laws edicts and ordinances about which he had known so many thousands ready to cut one an others throat (not for that they contended to be free and discharged from owing allegiance, but for that they knew not readily to whom they should do it,) should now be clean forgot. But see how much he forgot both the natural course of things, and the fortune of his own country also: persuading himself that if it were so that Cesar were once dispatched out of the way, who gave this first attempt to reduce the weal public of Rome to be a Monarch, the matter had been safe enough for ever after any other assaying it again. And yet knew he well enough that before time after that a number of the Roman kings had been slain some by sword, some by thunder and lightning down from heaven, there succeeded yet after them, Tarqvinius one far worse than any of them that were gone. But to come again to our matter in hand. Whether Brutus was worthy of his life or not. verily I judge he was worthy to have his life pardoned him at Caesar's hand, but yet that Cesar had not to account of him ne to call him Father as the guise was there to name the Senators. For each one that killeth not a man when he may, is not therefore to be said the saver of his life, nor that he hath done him a be●efyt, but rather pardoned him for that time.   

Cham 21.  
BUt this seemeth worthy to be doubted of, 
A pleso●r should not be received at a naughty persons hand.  if a merveilous dishonest man and such one as is quite devoid of regard of God and all godliness, and that ●abandoneth himself over wholly to all mischief villainy and naughtiness hap to get me in that trip that it is in his hands to grant me life or slay me, and of his own accord he promiseth my delivery frankly, what shall I do in this case? Should I accept my deliverance at such a man's hand? And if I do so, what thanks shall I render to him for my such delivery? shall I content myself to live with him, and frame my life after his filthy conditions? No severely: what shall I then do? I shall tell thee. If I were taken prisoner and were to pay Ransom for my delivery, and being without money myself, such one as thou hast named would offer to give me frankly so much as should dispatch the matter: well I would take it, but yet not as any benefit, but as so much money borrowed to serve the need I was in, making f●ll account to repay it again, as I would do: and besides the repayment of the money, if I should hap to see him that dy●● me that gentleness for the time, in any peril or danger, I would what in me lay save him. Or if I saw him stumble or ready to fall, I would stay him up. But as for joining any fréendshyp with him, (which can be but between them that be of like disposition,) that would I never do● And that which is more, I would not account of him as of one that saved my life, but as one to whom I owed that which I received of him in time of my need, 
we ought not to receive pleasure at our friends hand if the doing of the a●●e may hurt him that offereth it  which I would also pay him. Again, there is some man whose own proper worthiness and deserts would that I should accept his benefits offered: Howbeit, for that I know well and stand assured that it shall turn to his own harm if he should do them, I may not receive the same. As if I were culpable of a fact so apparent that it could not be denied, nor avoided, and yet one my very friend for the authority he beareth or otherwise offereth to dispatch me and save me harmless which I know well he is able to perform, howbeit if he should do it such clamour would arise thereby that it would purchase him heavy displeasure at the Princes hand in this case I ought not to desire his benefit, nor admit it if himself should offer it, but should rather put myself to stand the jump and danger of the matter, then that my friend by my means, & to show me pleasure should be displesoured or harmed. But if you will have a notable example of one that refused profit & commodity being offered which hitteth our present purpose fully, 
A notable example of refusing profit offered.  mark them the worthy examples of Crecinus julius a notable man, whom Cesar slew for this only that he was indeed a man of more worthiness than meet to be about such a Tyrant. Taking upon him at a time to set forth certain spectacles & shows which would grow to his great chargs, divers his friends for the ease of his burden, were contributory with their portions. Among the residue one Fabius Persicus sent him an exceeding great sum, which julius by no means would receive. Whereof his friends having knowledge, & blaming him much for it, Shall I quoth he receive a benefit or pleasure at his hands whom I would not pledge if he drank to me? Not lo●ge after, one Rebellius a noble man for authority as of the order of Consuls, but in qualities resembling Persicus, sent likewise a passing great deal of money to julius, & urged marvelous earnestly the receipt thereof upon him. I beseech thee pardon me quod julius, for not many days ago, I refused the like offer also made to me by Persicus ●   

Chap. 22.  
WEll then if we have once deliberated and determined fully to accept the pleasure that is offered, 
That we ought joyfully receive the pleasures that are done too us.  let us in any wise receive it joyfully, and declare outwardly what inward mirth and pleasure we conceive at it. That the giver may apparently see we do so, to th'end he may straight way reap some commodity & profit by mean of his said benefit. For doubtless it is a full cause of rejoicing, to see our friends merry and rejoice. But it is a far more just cause of rejoicing to us if by our means they have that cause of their such rejoicing and mirth. Therefore when we are pleasured let us apparently declare our rejoicing without feigning, and that not in the presence of him only who hath so pleasured us, but else where also. For who that after such a thankful manner hath accepted the pleasure which was done unto him, hath even in that repaid and discharged the first duty that was to be demanded for the same.   

Chap. 23.  

A reprehension of them that well r●ce●ue benefits in ●●net only.  SOme there are that never would receive any benefit or pleasure but pryvatele and in secret. Refusing to have any present that might record it. Whereby it appeareth how evil their mind and intent is. For how much a benefit or pleasure done by any one doth more please and content the fantasy of him to whom it is done, so much the more ought he who receiveth the same, to publish and spread the respect thereof abroad, to the commendation of him at whose hands he received the same. If thou be ashamed to confess it and acknowledge the receipt thereof, refuse also to take it. Some there are that be content to render thanks for the pleasure that hath been showed them, by stealth as it were, and in a corner privily. But indeed that proceedeth not of bashfulness, but is rather to be judged a flat denial of that they have received. He is well worthy to be deemed an unthankful man that acknowledgeth the benefit he hath received and rendereth thanks for the same then only when no man is present. Some in no wise will have any witnesses present when they are to be pleasured that might testify the giving and receipt thereof, nor will give any writing of their hand to record it. Whereby they declare their desire plainly to be, that the benefit or pleasure that is done to them, may be kept as secret as may be. They would not have it published openly, to th'end they may vaunt that they got such office, dignity, preferment, or wealth, rather by their own wit and policy, then by the mean and liberality of any other man. And commonly such men as these, show themselves most slack and negligent of all others in acknowledging and requiting the duty which of right may be demanded well at their hands by them to whom they own both that good a state of their life, and their attainment to honour. And thus while they refuse to acknowledge that which they have received, and render that duty which is incident thereto, they throw themselves headlong into a marvelous danger. Namely to deserve the name of Ingratitude and unthankfulness.   

Chap. 24.  
AGain, other some there be of so ●uill and vile natures that they do not only forget and neglect to do such duty as they ought, to those who have benefyted th●m, but they report moreover most villainy of those who have done them most good. So that it is as good to displease some kind of people as to pleasure them. Wherein they seek after a despiteful manner, matter to clear them from owing any dew●ie at all. How much the more they wrestle against, so much the more it manifesteth their nawghtye and can kard natures, and purchaseth commendation to the parties whom they seek to deface, by bringing to light and disclosing their worthy acts. Whereas ind●ed we should endeavour to th'uttermost of our power to keep & retaigne fast in our memory such pleasures as have been done to us: and still renew them by often calling them to our remembrance. For impossible it is to requite them if we do not remember them. And if any benefit or pleasure be offered us, we should not accept it over rashly and rudely, neither yet refuse it over bashfully. For who that at the first offer made of a benefit, 
divers sorts of unthankful men.  taketh it as if he cared not much for it whether he had it or not, what judge you he will esteem of it after a while when it waxeth stolen? (sith that the chiefest rejoicing for the having of a benefit, if there be any rejoicing at all, is at the very first acceptance of it.) another sort there are that take benefits when they are offered, after a loathsome manner. As who should say. In faith I need not greatly this courtesy & friendliness which you offer me: Howbeit sith you will needs force it upon me, you shall command me to take it, and use me herein for this time at your pleasure. Some other receive a pleasure offered so carelessly that he that gave it may in manner stand in doubt whether he that received it had any perseverance that he was pleasured or no. Some again for any benefit done unto them will scantly or but a little move their lips to the giver: which is yet far worse and savoureth much more of Ingratitude, then if they had altogether held their peace and said never a word. Whereas indeed a man should according to the quantity or quality of the benefit that is done to him, commend and extol the same with words: which may import his grateful acceptance and unfeigned wellyking of it. 
Ways to show ourselves thankful.  As to say. Sir through the pleasure you did me such a time, you have won the hearts of more than you are ware of. For there is no man but would that his well doing should be published and known to a great many. Again thus. Sir you know not how muche your benefits which you bestowed upon me stood me in stead, howbeit I ne may ne will in any wise conceal it from you, but must let you tunderstand that I was much more pleasured thereby then as then myself weaned for. And who that unfeignedly & without glozing doth on this sort charge himself, can not be judged to conceive unthankful lie of the pleasure he found. As thus to say. In very deed I grant I am in no wise nor respect able to render you due thanks according to your deserts & yet shall I not cease ne fail at any time to acknowledge & confess my said unableness.   

Chap. 25.  
THere was nothing that purchased Furnius somuch favour & benevolence at Augustus' hands, or that brought him to that pass that he might request & obtain what he would, as did that his humble acknowledging with submission of the favour, goodness, & bownte which Augustus had showed him, & his extolling the same without all flattery. For being on a time driven to be a petitioner for his Father's life to Augustus, & obtaining grant of his request, 
A notable & thankful saying of Furius to Augustus.  he said. Truly there is nothing O Cesar that grieveth me so much, as that I shall now by thy means live grateful (as having showed part of my duty to my Father) and shall die ingrate and unthankful, (as not able to requite thy goodness.) See now what more evident or apparent argument can there be of a mindful, careful, and thankful heart, then to grant that by no means he can be persuaded ever to have yielded thanks enough and dow recompense: and to confess plainly to be quite exempt from all hope of ever being able to attain thereto? with these I say or such like words let us declare and show what earnest inward good will we have to our power to requite the benefits we have received. Or if perhaps by words we be not able to utter it as we ought to do, yet let us in such sort as we may declare our unfeigned desire to make recompense. In which behalf assured lie our mind will not fail by our face to show how we are bend that way. Who that receiveth a benefit thankfully, in the very time of receiving it studieth how he should make recompense for it. Chrysippus sayeth that like as he that is appointed to run for a wager, must watch diligently to get the start of his fellow, or he that is in prison waiteth when he may find best opportunity to break prison and save himself, so behoveth it him that hath been pleasured, by all means he can, to devise and study how he may find convenient time to requite the benefit he hath received: and if he hap to find that opportunity to lay sure hol● on it, that it escape him not.   

Chap. 26.  
NOw we have next to consider what it is that causeth men to sh●w themselves unthankful. Which in mine opinion riseth by some of these things. To wit overmuch arrogancy, 
Causes of Ingratitude.  self liking of his own doings or substance, covetousness, or envy. These take I to be the principal heads out from whence Ingratitude floweth and taketh his being. And to th'end we may examine them thoroughly, let us begin with the first, and so descend from one to an other. There is no unthankful man all most, but (I warrant you) he will be th'only judge of his cause himself. And thence groweth it that what he hath received, he thinketh it no more then he hath deserved, and so judgeth it not worth the while to recompense, as scant worth any such labour of his. And to confirm his opinion and make his tale good, Thus will he say. Truth it is nor I will not deny but such one did this or that for me. But how long was it I pray you ere I could obtain it? 
The saying of thunthankfullunthankful man.  What labour sustained I about it? How muche more might I have benefited myself if I had bestowed the service about such one or such one, or if I had not troubled myself at all, but lived quietly with mine own? I wis I had well hoped I should have been far otherwise rewarded at his hands. I had been better to have been without his pleasures, then to have endured half these troubles as I have done about the getting of them, & they in th'end to be so worshipful as they are.   

Chap. 27.  
CNeus Lentulus (surnamed the sothesaier) was in his time noted to be a man of passing great wealth, until such time that certain which had been his bondmen and were by him enfranchised, despoiled and rob him. 
Lentulus' great covetise and avarice.  This Lentulus (as the report went) saw of his own proper goods together at one time ten Millions of Crowns which at those days was counted infinite, as at these days it were a good round sum. And in that I said he saw them I said very well. For indeed he did but see them. For that only excepted, he had no use of them. Of a passing dull & doltish wit he was in all other respects, save only in muckering up of money. And for all that he was an exceeding covetous miser, and such a penny father as would part with nothing, yet with more ease might an other get money from him than he could himself bring forth any ready and plain talk, so great an impediment he had in his speech. And whereas of duty and right he should have ascribed all his advancement and attainment to wealth to Augustus, to whom at first he came bare enough, but what through the great favour of Augustus. What through money wherewith he made way for himself, he was now become to be as it were a Prince in the City.  
And yet for all that, never ceased he complaining to Augustus how for his sake he had given over his book, and received in recompense nothing the like pleasure nor gain as he lost by leving his study. Whereupon Augustus over and beside all that he had else done for him, dispatched him also from having any more cause to complain him in that sort. Thus may you see that covetousness will not permit a man to show himself thankful, 
Co●etousnes burneth thankfulness.  though he have never so great and just cause so to do. For to him that is altogether set on having, impossible it is to give so much, until he say ho. How much more we have, so much more we desire to have. And look how much the more we grow to abundance, so much the hotter waxeth the fire of our covetousness within us, as we see the flame of the fire to be so much the more fervent, as th'abundance of substance of wood ministereth occasion. 
Ambition breedeth Ingratitude.  Neither will Ambition and inward disyer of honour permit a man to rest himself in that degree and estate, whereunto some time before, himself would never for shame have desired to aspire. For if haply he be chosen Tribune, he doth not adjudge that office thanks worthy except he be preferred to be a Praetor. And having attained thereunto, yet he holdeth not himself content until he be made Consul Neither will be rest there, if there be a●y one office above that, either in estimation or profit. For covetousness always goeth on forward, and seeketh still to have, never weighing a man's present good state, or casting the eye back thither where he began, but wholly addresseth the mind to attain that it hunteth after. And yet is envy more pestiferous and harmful than any these that I have named. 
Envy causer of unthankfulness.  As that which with her infinite and those odious comparisons making, never suffereth us to be at quiet with ourselves. Thus saith Envy. Indeed such one did me such a benefit, or showed me such a pleasure, howbeit he did much more for such one, & that with far more expedition & speed. Moreover Envy never examineth either one man's matter or other. And in th●se that touch & concern herself she is ●ut of all measure partial.   

Cham 28.  
BUt how much better and honester were it to extol set forth and commend the benefit and pleasure that we have received, 
After what ●ort we should perceive of benefits do●● to us.  and to persuade ourselves that none standeth so highly in the favour or grace of him that hath pleasured us as we ourselves? As to say: undoubtedly I had had a far greater benefit at his hands then this, saving that in very deed he might not then commodiously do it, for he had more to pleasure after the same manner besides me. Well this was the first and it is a good beginning. Let me take this in good part, it shall encourage him to do the better by me an other time, when he seeth me take so simple a thing so gratefully. Though it be but little he did now, well he will do it the ofterner. What though he pleasoured such one before me, did he not prefer me also before a number of others? I grant that neither he, nor he, were to be compared with me in no degree, and yet why should not he use his benefits as was his own pleasure? What though my parentage be better than any of theirs that were preferred before me, yet must I needs grant in that he showed me any pleasonr at all, he did more than he owed me. He extended his liberality more largely upon varlets than he did upon me, and what maketh that any matter? you may see how like herself uncertainly and unequally fortune doth sometime deal. Do you not see how naughty people are advanced to honours & wallow in wealth, and far honester than they are do want? To true it is, & yet not to be stuck at. Do we not also see that goodman's corn is stricken with blightes and blasting, & yet evil men's corn scapeth clear? As each man hath his several hap and fortune in other worldly matters, so hath he also in finding friendship. But to conclude, there is no benefit done so thoroughly nor effectually, but the naughty and perverse natures of men can quarrel against it. And again there is no pleasure so small or simple, but an honest natured receiver thereof, can enlarge it and make it seem great & ample. There shall never doubtless want cause of complaint, so long as a man will misconstrue the manner of doing of benefits, and interpret them to the worst.   

Chap. 29.  
HOwbeit it is but little or nothing to be marveled at, ●hough among ourselves we quarrel on this sort the one against tother, seeing not the ignorant and unleaned people only, but even they also who profess Philosophy, and take on them to have such understanding that they would take great scorn to be trippt any whit in their doings or judgement, exclaim in many things against god himself: and that for matters of no importance, and such again as nature neither will assent unto. 
Misconsterers of gods ordinance.  As for that men are not framed in fayture and proportion of body as huge as Elephants, as swift as Roes, as light as birds, as strong as Bulls, their skin as thick as any beasts hide, as comely to behold as does, as thick with hear as a Bear, as soft as the Ounce, his smelling as fine as the dog, as sharp sighted as the Eagle, as long lived as the Crow, and as fortunate in his nativity as any brute best, that he might straight help himself. And though some of these qualities are not possible by course of nature to agree in any one body together, as consisting in manner of contrarieties, yet blush not they to say that it is a great injury done to man's nature, that he being superior to all things created, should want the exact perfection of divers such qualities whereby his inferiors excel him. Affirming moreover that man was much wronged that he had not in his birth and with his first being perfect health, invincible strength and fore knowledge of things to come granted, Yea they have caught the bit of Reason so fast between their tethe of folly, and wax so headstrong that they run gadding so far, that uneath they can be stayed from enuienge that their nature is such as it is, and not equal with God himself. But if we weighed and considered things aright, how much more meet were it for us and agreeable with our estate, to direct the sight of our mind to behold and duly consider the miraculous form and order of those things? to render thanks for so many & sundry benefits bestowed upon us, for that we have our being here in this world in such sort as we have it, and all other things under our subjection to use at our pleasures? What soever hath been denied us by him which first formed us, we ought to judge that he did it for that he knew it neither meet, convenient, nor expedient for us. Therefore Whosoever he be that judgeth so wide of man's most perfect creation, let him consider with himself how strong beasts we master, how swift beasts and fowls we catch. Finally what thing there is in all the world but is at our pleasure to save or spill, and he shall (I think) easily perceive and confess his great error. Besides all this, what a number of excellent virtues are we far above all other creatures endued wit all? 
the true thought that christian men ought to hau● of god's ordinance.  What knowledge, what sciences and arts, and what a wit and understanding have we, which so son as it deviseth any thing, forthwith it comprehendeth it, swifter far than the stars themselves, as that which considereth and knoweth how their moving and course willbe many years before they run that course? Again what abundance of divers kinds of fruits, or riches, and to be short of all things that are to be had, have we heaped one upon an other and all at our commandment? And yet if all this can not suffice thy fantasy, travail if thou list all the world over, examine diligently and mark the nature, qualities, and in each point the condition of every thing that thou shalt there happen to see and find, and yet dare I well aver and for truth justify that among them all thou shalt not find out any one, with which thou willingly wouldst exchange thine own estate that thou now enjoyest, be the same never so simple or slender, to assume in each point that of his. Which things so falling forth, as upon dew proof they will assuredly do, than caused thou not chose (I trow) but think & say that nature, yea God hath above all other things dealt most beneficially with thee as with his own dear darling. For verily truth it is that God who is immortal both hath done, 
A certain argument of gods assured love.  and still doth love us & that tenderly, for certain token now hereof, he hath made us like himself the most evident argument of his perfect love. At whose hands we have received so great benefits beside, that impossible it is to have any greater.   

Chap. 30.  
I Thought it both good and necessary to say this that I have done by the way, and to take occasion to entreat of great and weighty benefits also, sith I had waded so far in talk about the small ones, 
An argument a fortiori, that they that set ly●ht by god's benefits no marvel though they neglect men's.  partly for that fromhense this detestable arrogancy and Ingratitude taketh rooting especially. For to whom I pray you do you judge he will render courtesy, what benefit think you he will account great or worthy to be repaid, that contemneth and neglecteth the greatest benefits that may be of all? To whom will be ascribe his health his soul dew, that denieth the receiving of the same at gods hand, and yet desireth daily of him the continuance of the same? Whosoever he be therefore that teacheth men to be thankful, pleadeth for God and man. To whom (although he hath no need of them) yet we may give thanks well enough. For the not doing which duty, poverty or want of ability can not be alleged by way of excuse. As to say what shall I do? or how can I show myself willing to render the like of that I have received at his hands that is Lord and giver of all things? I say thou mayest do it with ease enough. For if thou be a niggard and loath too be at chargée about it, thou mayst yet do it without expense. If thou be slothful, yet mayst thou do it without travel or pains taking. As thus. In the very same instant that thou receivest a benefit, and so forth on still render hearty thanks for the same, which is neither great charges nor labour to do.   

Chap. 31.  
Verily in my fancy this Paradox or opinionatif Sentence of the Stoiques 
A paradox of the stoiques.  should not be counted so strange as it is, and scant worthy of credit. namely. That he hath requited the pleasure which he received, who hath joyfully accepted the same. For sith that all things are to be referred to the mind alone, I think that he hath done enough who hath declared himself willing to requite it so near as he could. And forasmuch as Piety, faith, justice, and to be short each virtue is perfect and absolute within and of itself, though a man use no act of his hand to any of them, even so may any man be thankful fully and thoroughly in will alone. For so oft as the intent taketh such success and effect as a man before de●ised with himself, so often also may he be said to reap the hoped fruit of his desire and travail. Who that giveth any benefit, what is his pretence at that time? verily to benefit him to whom he giveth it, and that he should take pleasure in it. Then if it be so that he hath done that which he would do, and that I have perfect intelligence of his mind what it was, and that we have rejoiced mutually by exchange (as it were) he hath then that which he desired himself. He did it not for this that he looked to have the like again at my hands: for them it had not deserved the name of a benefit but rather were to be called an exchange of merchandise. I say. That certainly he sailed well and made a prosperous usage that chanced safely to fall into that haven or port whither at launching first forth he directed his course. That dart was sure cast with a skilful hand that it the mark at which it was cast. Who that doth any benefit, doth it to that end that it should be thankfully accepted. If it be so received he hath that he would. But perhaps you will say he looked to reap some other commodity and gain thereby. Then certes might it not have been called a benefit. 
It is not to be said a benefit for which the doer thereof looketh for profit or recompense  The property whereof is not to look to receive any thing again. If I happened to receive that which was given me with the same mind that it was given, I have repaid asmuch as I received. In recompensing benefits and pleasures received, I must regard mine own fortune. Which if it be such that I be not able to requite like for like it sufficeth that I own a well meaning mind, for that of his. How then? I will moreover diligently obseru●●o get th'advantage both of the time and things: and shall asfar as I may, show myself desirous to satisfy him at ful● at whose hands I have had any pleasure. But truly in mine opinion they scant merit the denomination of benefits which a man may not seem to requite with bare goodwill without any more, if his power will extend no Farther.   

Cham 32.  
SOme will perhaps say that whosoever receiveth a benefit, 
That it behoveth to requite a benefit that is done.  though he receive it never so thankfully, yet hath he not done somuch as is to be required at his hands, for that he is yet to make recompense for the same beside. For like as in tossing of the ball, it is somewhat praise worthy to receive the ball skilfully and cunningly when it is tossed to him: but yet he is not to be called an expert and perfect player except he strike the ball back again as finely and readily. This example is somewhat unlike to our now proposed talk, although before it served our propose fitly enough when we talked of benefits generally but now we have straited that kind of talking of that generality and are come nearer home, to consider how they do consist in the mind. The commendation of this play consisteth in the nimble and quick moving of the body and not at all in the mind. And there all must needs be exponed and laid to the view where the eyes are to give judgement, which can give sentence no farther than they are led by seeing. And yet (to answer this objected argument.) Nothing letteth but that a man may have skill enough for ought we see as yet in his play although he cast not the ball back again which his fellow tossed to him before. For it may be that the fault is not in him why he doth not so. Yet if he will object again, that admitting he hath parfitte skill, and that as he received the ball conninglye, so he can smite it back as Artificialiye, yet is not his play perfect, so long as he doth but only receive. Whereas the perfection of it consisteth as well in that one point as in that other. I mean in observing and keeping his turn as duly to toss back to his fellow, as to receive the ball when it is to●t to him from his fellow. But I will stay no longer upon refelling these arguments. Let us admit it to be so that there is indeed some defect in the play but no want of skill in the player. And so is it in the matter we talk of. There wanteth indeed somewhat to the perfection of the thing that is to be given again, but there is no want in the mind from whence the said gift should proceed.   

Chap. 33.  
Such one hath done me a pleasure well: I receive it as thankfully as he meant it to me friendly. In this very one thing he hath the thing that he only desired: that was that I should be thankful. When he hath found this, yet resteth there that he should use me beside, and wherein I am able that I should do him the like pleasure: which is the certain sign of a thankful heart. And yet ought not this to be called the other part of a duty yet unparfyt, but rather the way and mean to attain to the perfection thereof. As for example. Phydias the painter made a picture. 
An example of a coming painter.  The fruit of his art is one, and the fruit of his artificiallnes and cunning is an other, and each far different from other. The fruit of his art was to make that which he would. The fruit of his artificiallnes and cunning, was to make it so that it might yield him some profit and gain. He may have the fruit of his art, and yet want it of his artificiallnes. For that he may have finished his work, and yet not sold it, Again the fruit of his whole workmanship consisteth in three points. The first is his own fancy which is satisfied when he hath accomplished his work in due order and decently. The second is report and fame which others give unto him for his cunningly handling it. The third is the profit which he getteth either by sale of the said picture or otherwise. Let us appoint a benefit also to have three like ●ea●es. 
Three manner profi●●● that grow by benefit●s.  The first whereof let be in the mind or fancy of the giver: wherein he is satisfied fully, so soon as he seeth he hath benefited him whom he would, in such wise as he would. The second is the report and fame he getteth thereby. The third consisteth in such pleasures as mutually the one may do to tother. Whereupon I conclude thus: that when a benefit is thankfully received, he who gave it, reaped already thereby thanks at the hands of him to whom he gave it, (which is the principal point to be regarded:) although he have not yet received the like reward again. It appeareth then that that which I own for any benefit received is no part of the benefit itself, namely the recompensing of a benefit. And as for the acknowledging thereof, I have repaid that sufficiently in that I received it thankfully.   

Chap. 34.  
BUt how can this stand with Reason will some haply say? It is impossible that any one may be said to requite the pleasure I have done to him at whose hands I never sith received suit or service. I say doubtless he hath done very much that hath received thy benefit thankfully. For first he hath therein declared to thee his good heart. secondly he hath showed himself willingly to owe like goodwill to thee as he found at thy hands: which is an evident token of a friendly and honest heart. Benefits & the things that are lent and borrowed, are not like, nor a like to be recompensed and repaid. If thou ha●t benefited any man, look not for any recompense by hand. For the requital thereof resteth chiefly in the mind and heart of the man. It shall not prove in th'end very strange to thee that which I say, though it seem at the first show somewhat to impugn & contrary thine opinion) if thou wilt give me the hearing a little, and understand by the way that there is more plenty of things in the world, than we have copy and change of words to term each of them severally by several names. By mean whereof we are enforced to shift aswell as we can with such words as we have, though they be some what improper & not full meet for that that they are applied unto. As for proof, we call the foot of our own body, the foot of a bed, and the foot of a verse, by the name of a foot indifferently. Again a dog hound, a dog fish, and a dog star, by the name of a dog alike. And this confusion by equivocation doth happen because we are not able for want and penury of several words to term each of them diversely: and therefore are we driven to use such words as we have to serve the ●orne as it willbe in this extremity. stoutness we say is a virtue that despiseth and setteth light by dangers and perils, without being moved or disquieted by them. Or else it is a knowledge showing us how we should with stand endeavour, or avoid all dangers. So do we call Fence players and desperate knaves which careless and without any regard put their lives in adventure, stout men. We do in like manner define or describe Niggishnes to be a knowledge how to avoid excessive charges: or else an understanding how to spend our substance moderately and yet we call a Miser, him that hunger drops out of his nose (as we say) one that is so near himself that he is not worthy to bear the name of a man, him call we a niggard also. Thus we see and can discern a great diversity to be between méesure and extremity: And that these things differ much in nature the one from the other. Howbeit the penury of apt and proper words, causeth us to call both the one and the other a Niggard. Again, him stout that with Reason endewreth all dangers, & that other stout also who though he cast himself head long into them yet suffereth he the same stowtlye, without seeming to be moved or any whit dismayed thereby. After the same manner, we call by the name of a benefit both the action and doing of the benefit, and the substance of the matter and thing which is given or done, as money, houses, Lands, or apparel. One only name is attributed to them both indifferently, and yet the force, nature & quality of them is far diverse.   

Chap. 35.  
Give me leave yet a little, and mark my words well. For hitherto have I not said any thing that need to be misliked much withal, or can be well denied. And now return we to our propose again. Touching so much of any benefit as the action and doing thereof doth accomplish, 
The points where upon benefits consist  if we receive the doing thereof thankfully, we have so far even now requited the same. But as touching the substance of it, that is to say the thing given, we have not asyet thereby made recompense for that, but that is referred to our own will. For that good will which hath relation to the doing of the benefit, we have answered with like goodwill by thankfully accepting of it. Notwithstanding we must think we own yet more: namely one benefit for an other, one material thing for an other. And although I say he hath rendered thanks that hath declared himself to have accepted a benefit thankfully, yet would I him to repay some thing or other besides, like to the which he received, that may also deserve to have the name of a benefit as that did which he had. Some of these things that I say seem somewhat to vary from the Common Phrase of speaking some one way: and yet some other way to agree well enough therewith. We say commonly that wise men can by no means bear wrong. And yet if a wise man hap to have a blow think you not that he hath wrong? So say we in common speech, what should Fools do with goods? And for all that, if any man should steal any thing from a fool and were appeached & attached, think you he were not like to be condemned of theft? In talk we call such and such mad. And yet we see the same which in some respect we called mad men to have the electing of Magistrates, the deputing of offices, the government of provinces, and rule of Cities. So though I say ●hat he that hath received thankfully the pleasure that is done to him, hath in his so doing rendered the like, yet do I notwithstanding aver that he is yet still in the others det for all that, and that he must make father recompense though he have already done some point of his duty: not thoroughly acquitting him of all that he ought to do. So that this saying of mine weihged aright, is an advertisement and admonition to men to requite such benefits as they have received, and no discharge thereof. But in any case let us beware that through the hugeness of the burden we faint not, and despairing by mean of our slender ability we give not over in the plain. 
The saying of the thankful man.  As if we would consider and weigh (as Reason an● honesty would we should) the whole matter with ourselves, and say. Certes such one hath done me marvelous great pleasure, he saved and cleared my good name which was half in danger to be disfamed. He delivered me from great poverty into which I was fallen, I had douhtles lost my life if he had not been. By his only mean have I my liberty which I hold dearer than my life. And how or when shall I be able to deserve his so great benefits? Which way is it possible that my goodwill can by any means seem to requite the very lest of all these? verily I say who that hath this kind of thought and mind with him hath even thereby showed sufficiently his thankful acknowledging of the good and pleasure that he hath received. Therefore if thou have a pleasure showed thee, receive it, embrace it, be glad therewith, and rejoice at it. Not for that thou receivedst it, but because thou hast thereby occasion to do the like again, which of duty thou must, and not fail to do it. And so shalt thou be well assured not to incur the danger to be called unthankful. I will not here prescribe thee any hard precepts that thou shouldst observe in requiting of benefits, to th'end thou shouldst not despair, and that the difficulty of them should not quail thy courage. Nevertheless if thou have been plesor●d by any body, I would not in any wise thou shouldest tract the time and lingar on, but with speed seek to requite it, and render the like.  
For questionless if thou be not presently, doubtless thou wilt never be thankful. 
qui non est hody ●ras minus aptus erit  Thou wilt now perhaps demand of me what thou shalt do? Whether thou shalt venture thy life in the field for him that hath pleasured thee? I say perhaps thou shalt. Again whether thou shalt endanger thy life upon the seas for his cause? Yes verly, and it may fortune it shallbe needful so to do, when it shall blow marvelous fowl wether, and be high and rough seas, and yet mayest thou not stay though wind and tide were both against thee when thou shouldest launch forth.  
But to conclude, desirest thou to render the benefit thou haste received? 
Thankful receiving, the first point of re-repay●ng a benefit.  in any wise then receive it thankfully. Therein haste thou paid some part, but yet think not that thou art so discharged, but persuade thy self that thou mayst so much the boldlier and with better assurance yield and confess thyself ●ettour for the rest.    

The third Book.  

Chap. 1.  
IT is a fowl vice and of all men worthily so accounted not to acknowledge nor render thanks for benefits received and had. 
Ingratefulmen complain upon Ingrateful.  And for-this cause unthankful persons themselves take cause to complain them upon such as they find to them unthankful. Wherein one of them espieth in an other and blameth that which in themselves is as worthy reprehension. Of which kind of people the conditions of many of them are so cross & overthwart, that they purchase disliking not only for their neglecting, or forgetting what benefits and pleasures have been done to them, but also for not doing again such benefits as they should do to us. Which happeneth to some through naughtiness and perverseness of their natures. And to others some for that they suffer time to eat out of memory the pleasures which we have done to them. Which kind of men some would not judge worthy to be called unthankful, but seem to give them (as they guess) a more manerlye name, and term them forgetful. 
Forgetfulness of a benefit, the ch●fest cause of Ingratitude.  As who would say that that could excuse Ingratitude, which (to say the truth) is the principal and master ●oot thereof. For how is it possible that that should by any means seem to excuse a man from being counted unthankful, that is found in none else but in them that are unthankful. Howbeit there are sundry sorts of unthankful men like as there are of thieves or murderers. Whose facts notwithstanding all agree in one kind: for each theft is theft, each murder murder, and each unthankfulness is unthanfullnes. But some yet are more heinous than other some are, and differre in the quantity or quality of the fact, or both. He is unthankful that denieth the receipt of the benefit which he had. He is again unthankful that dissembleth and will not voluntarily confess and acknowledge it. He is also unthankful that requiteth not the benefit which he received. But he is most unthankful of all the rest, that forgetteth it quite. The residue yet though they requite it not, yet they rest debtors for it, and there appeareth yet in them some sign and show that benefits were by them received, though they be reposed and couched in an evil conscience. And yet these persons upon some one cause or other, may hap to be moved at one time or other, to render thanks. Perhaps shame will work remembrance of their duties, or the like need at an other time th'one of these otherwyle taketh place in very naughty natures. But he that hath quite forgot that he had such pleasure showed him, seemeth to be past all hope that he ever will show himself to be thankful. And to say the truth if it should be put to your own judgement, which of these would you deem most ingrateful? 
Who is to be said most Ingrate.  him that refuseth and neglecteth to render thanks for the pleasure which was showed him, or else that other that forgetteth it quite, and remembreth it no whit at all? Indeed those are evil eyes that can not endure the brightness of the light, but they are plain blind eyes that see no whit. Assuredly it is a wicked part if any one should hate and not love his parents. But to refuse and deny, and not acknowledge them, is a manifest sign of madness. Who is so unthankful as he that hath clean rejected careleslyke, that which he should have always in remembrance, and that so setteth it aside, that he forgotteth it quite? It may be well thought that he never troubled his head much with devising and studying how to requite the benefits which were done to him, if he have suffered them to slide quite forth of memory.   

Chap. 2.  

That to requite a benefit at ●ull what are requisite.  NOw who that will requite the benefits and pleasures that have been showed him by an other, hath need of ability, time, & Fortune favowrable: who that beareth in mind without forgetting, the pleasure ●e hath received, is thankful without any Farther charge. And he that will not do that that requireth neither labour, riches nor great good Fortune, is worthy to have but little alleged for him by way of excuse. Doubtless he never mente to show himself thankful that cast benefits done to him, so far out of his sight that he did not so much as think upon them any more. For as that which is daily at hand to us, and in continual use mouldeth not ne waxeth hoar, and again those things which are laid aside out of sight and forgotten gather soil of their own accord by only lying still, So what is in the daily exercise and occupying of the mind, is never forgotten: as that which loseth nothing, except it be that that is cast aside (as it were) never to be occupied, or thought upon any more.   

Chap. 3.  
Besides this that I have alleged, there are other causes also which often times let us from remembering such benefits as are done to us. 
Exc●ss if covetise causeth in gratitude  The first and chiefest of which is. For that as we are altogether led with new desires, so we regard never what we already have had, but consider wholly what we would have, not casting any eye or regarding that which is in possession, but respecting that only which we make pursuit after. The passing greedy and covetous desire we have, causeth us to set but light by any thing that we have already, and to weigh him but little at whose hands we received it. But him we love, to him we do all manner of observance, we affirm that all the stay of our welldoing dependeth on him, so long as we list to like of the things we receive at his hands. But so soon as we begin to take a smatch of other greater pleasures, and that we feel any life (as they say) in it, that it is coming & may be got, (as the guise of men is nowadays after they have obtained great things to hunt still after greater,) than farewell that we before had in so great price, & after the other which might & main. Then weigh we no longer the things which erst have preferred us, but fix our eyes wholly to consider how that which we shoot at hath advanced to fortime those that had the same. And how can a man be both envious of an other man's state, and thankful for his own? It is impossible: For Envy is always accompanied with sadness & sorrow: & thankfulness is associated with glad●es & joyfulness. furthermore forasmuch as we regard nor weigh the passing time any longer while, then that it is in passing, seldom when we call to mind the things that passed in that tyme. Whereupon it followeth, that schoolmasters we see so usually lost their benefits which they bestow upon us in our youth. For which notwithstanding that they demeryte indeed worthily great thanks, yet for all that, they find them not repaid, for that we to whom they were done, do never call to mind, nor weigh duly what things happened within that age. neither of the time itself when it is one's past, no man maketh more account then as if it were lost. And as things done in that time, pass also with the time, doubtful it seemeth, lest when they are one's past, they be also past hope of remembrance.   

Chap. 4.  

Th● Epicures complaint.  BUt in this place me seemeth I may very well agree with the Epicure and fortify his Reason: who complaineth always that we are so unthankful & unmindful of the pleasure that is past. What commodity soever we have had, we call it not to remembrance nor account it any longer in the number of pleasures: Whereas indeed there is no one pleasure so certain as that which is past, for that we are well assured can by no means be taken from us. As for the present pleasures saith the Epicure, they stand not yet on sewer ground: 
Multa c●dūt intercalicem supremaque Labra.  for by one misfortune or an other, a man may hap to lose them. Yea perhaps when he thinketh himself most assured of them. And as for those that are to come and not yet done, but stand in hap de pays, they hang suspiciously and upon great uncertentye. But those that all ready are had and be past, they are dead sure. And who that will diligently behold the present benefits which he now enjoyeth, and but call to mind how muche those which he hath received in times past stood him in stead at the time of the receipt of the same, can not those (as I deem) but show himself thankful. But who so passeth on, still gaping for fresh benefits, doubtless will take but small keep to the benefits that are one's past.   

Chap. 5.  
AS there are some things whereof it is sufficient to give precepts for thattainment of them, 
A comparison of certain sciences & benefits.  and when they are once had, they are not lightly forgotten, so are there some other again which be they never so perfectly and thorouglye learned, yet the knowledge of them soon fadeth again, and is quite forgotten, except it be continually and almost without intermission renewed. As the science go of metry, and the knowledge of natural and supernatural things and such like, which for their subtility & perfect fineness soon beguile the memory. So fareth it with benefits: of which, some for their weightiness will not be forgot. Again othersome there are less in value but more in number: yet in time they are gone out of mind quite. Which happeneth for this cause only, that as I said we do not eftsoons call them to our remembrance, & thankfully acknowledge what we own to each man severaly. But mark what we can say when we ask any thing. There is none of us then but we can affirm that the memory of the pleasures we have found or desire to have, shall ne●er forth of our mind. None but that yieldeth himself wholly bounden for that time, 
Note.  & if there be any words of greater humility & lowliness than others, they are not th●n to seek, but we have them perfitly I warrant you & at our fingers ends. But within a while after that we have obtained our propose, & desire, then farewell all our fair speech, it waxeth them unsavoury in our mouths. And the words which no rather we thought not half good enough nor worthy the personages on whom we bestowed the same, we count to base now to proceed forth of our mouths. And so within a very little while we come to y● stay that the most & worst ingrateful men of all are a●: which is, to remember nowhyt at all what pleasure & benefits have been done unto us. And doubtless he is to be accounted asmuch unthankful, & is no less to be argued of Ingratitude that forgetteth a benefit once done unto him, them he is to be judged thankful, that still courteously & thankfully acknowledgeth the receipt of the same.   

Chap. 6.  
IT hath been demanded of some, why this passing great vice worthy to be detested & abhorred of all men that profess the name of honesti●, should be suffered still to scape without due punishment limited for it, and why the same Law is not duly executed upon thoffenders in that behalf in Cities, which hath been sometime practised in Scholes? Where it hath been permitted to the party benefiting to seek & use his remedy against him that he hath benefited if he show himself unthankful. Which seemeth to some but just and reasonable it so were. But our ancestors men of great noblesse were wont to require of their mortal enemies money or such like things as they had haply lent them in time of friendship and amity. As for the pleasures or benefits they had bestowed upon them what soever they were, like as with a frank heart th●y bestowed them at the first, so did they no l●sse liberally let them pass quite, without demanding ever again. And except the macedonians only, 
The macedoni●ns provided by order of Law against vntha●●ull men.  I know no kind of people that ever made any Law by which a man might sew him that he found unthankful. And yet is this the strongest reason and argument we can allege to prove why the unthankful body with us should not be sewed. We have say we, always assented and so usually practised it to punish sharply each heinous offence that hath seemed to us worthy of punishment, as manslaughter, witchcraft, murder, robbrye, profaning of sacred institutions and such like. Against all these in some country one kind of punishment, in some other an other kind is assigned. But everywhere there is some pain appointed for the trespassers. But as for this vice which is so commonly practised and daily in ure, it is everywhere reprehended, but no where punished. Neither yet do we clearly acquit and discharge it from desert of punishment but for that we can not agree upon it to determine punishment certain for it, therefore we adjudge it only worthy to be hated, and despyted, and refer it over wholly to the gods for revengement.   

Chap. 7.  
ANd to say the truth I can allege a number and those very good and strong reasons to prove why this vice of jugratitude should by no means have been provided for by Law. 
〈◊〉 reason's 〈◊〉 Ingratitude s●uld not n●t be remedyd by Law.  For first the chief and principal part, of the benefit were lost if a man were to recover it by plea or otherwyse● as one would do money or any such like thing that he taketh of lo●e, and is to answer again, For this is the chiefest thing that is praise worthy in bestowing of benefits, to persuade our selves to lose them so soon as we have once parted with them, and to refer it wholly to the conscience of them on whom we bestow them, whether we shall in deed find them so or not. For if I should b●t o●es mountenaunce to sew him that I h●ue plesour●d, or have him before a judge for the recovering mine own benefit or the like again, in that so dealing, it resseth forth with to deserve th'appellation of a benefit, and would be named a thing lent. Besides, as it is an honest thing to render thanks for pleasures received, so doth it put of the face of honesty, and may be ashamed to presume to challenge that name when they are to to be requited of necessity and by enforcement. For were it so that sewtes penalties & punishments were limited in this case, than would none commend the grateful and thankful man any more than him that is bound to repay a some of money by such a day, who preventing the day payeth the money sooner than he needed to have done. furthermore if we should sew for our benefits, we then should lose two the most precious things in all the world Namely a thankful man & our benefit. For than what thing worthy any great thanks should there be thought to be in him, that did not do, but lend his benefit only for the time, or in him that repayeth the same not for that he would of his own accord, good nature, and free will do so, but for that he was enforced thereto to avoid the danger that might ensue? It should merit no great commendation to be thankful, except without peril and danger a man might be unthankful if he so listed. But this one thing were sufficient to discourage and dissuade us as I guess from sewing for our benefits. What and if all the places in the whole world where justice is had and cognisance of plea holden should prove not sufficient nor room enough for each party aggrieved to come in place to make his plaint? Should it come to that pass that we might sew for right in this case, who is he that should not have cause to plain, or who he that might not be impleaded?   

Chap. 8.  
FOr this cause this seemeth no meet matter to come in question of Law. And to say the truth, it were a very hard matter and full of difficulty to find a judge able to decide all such controversies and doubts as haply would fall out upon through scanning some one of these causes. So that you would wonder to think if you déepelye examine and consider the matter, how much he should have to do that should give indifferent and upright sentence upon one impleaded for this fact. Admit the case to be this. There was one that gave his friend standing in need a very great some of money without asking either interest for it or his own money again. But he that gave it was a very rich man, 
B●ne●●●● of like quontity f●r diffe●rent in qualitie●  and one of such wealth that he might spare it wellenowgh with out sustaining any damage or detriment by it. There was again an other that having his friend in great distress for want of the like somme of money, and pitying his Friend asmuch as himself, delivered him somuch money but it was not his own of store lying by him, but for the getting of it ready for his friend he was fain ●o sell a piece of his livelihood and inheritance. See now the some in these two Cases is all one. But the benefit not so, if it be duly weighed. Again this admit to be the Case. One that had his friend at such a straight that all his goods were ready to be confiscated and made port sale of, being stored so well himself that he had so much money of his own spare and doing him no pleasure in his house, let his Friend have it to save his goods. An other in like manner having his friend at the like extremity, and not having of his own to succour him withal, and yet loath to see his friend undone, being better able to shift at that pinch then that other who for care and grief witted not whither to torn him, went to that man upon his credit, to that other upon his bonds and pledges, and in fine got together so much money as should serve his friends necessity. How say yo●, count you the one pleasure and tother in this case like? There are some benefits that are accounted great not in respect of the quantity and value of themselves, but in respect of ●he time which they serve so fytlye. A benefit well and duly bestowed is accounted as necessary and as much to be esteemed, as bread given to him that is all most ●ead for hunger. It is no more but a benefit to give aman a country through which run such commodious Rivers that he may use traffic of merchandise by the same.  
And it is a benefit also to do no more but to show him th●t is passing thirsty and near deed therewith, where ●here is any spring of fair clear water. Now who is he that dare undertake aptly to compare these things together? It goeth hard when not only the matter itself, but the difficulties and hard quiddities (as they are termed among the old Logicians) are to be narrowly sifted and scanned. As sundry benefits are diversely ge●en, so do they not depend all upon one point. Such one did me a pleasure, but he did it not willingly, but he reported to others what he had done for me, but he repented him sith of that he had done, and sense that time he hath given me more proud and disdainful looks then ever he was used to do. Again it was very long before he would do that which he did, and used many delays in doing of it, whereby I was more hindered, then if he had quite denied me when I requested it first.  
Now if any of these benefits so done should come in question as I said, how can any judge I pray you indiferently and as he should do weigh these things, when as the benefit appeareth to be done and yet the talk that paste with it, the countenance of the giver, and the doubts & delays which he made before he would do it, do quite destroy and lose the grace of the said benefit.   

Chap. 9  
WHat though there be some things which for that they are so excedinghly desired and sought after, merit the names of benefits, yet are there other some things again, which though they are not so commonly coveted, they are for all that far greater in value then any those other, 
The qualit●e of the benefits breedeth their estimation.  though to outward show they appear not so to be. You count it a benefit to be made Burgess of any rich, great and wealthy City, and there to be preferred from office to office until you come to the highest. Again you count it a benefit to save his life that is condemned to die. And I beseech you what will you call it to give counsel to one for his most profit and avail? to stay him that pretended to do himself or some other some mischief? to take a sword from him that was re●ie to kill himself? with good and wholesome advise to recomfort him that was nigh spent out with mourning, and to reduce him to his pristinat state of health? to watch with him that is very sick, and brought even to deaths door, & when his fit is over past, to recomfort him with good and wholesome meats and little and little strengthen again his fading sprites? ●o bring a Physician to one almost ready to yield up the ghost despairing of li● or recovery, whereby yet he obtaineth his health? Who is he that can say how much these benefits though they appear but small, are to be esteemed? Again who is he that would adjudge these that follow worthy to be made any comparison of? Such one gave the a house. And I gave thee warning that it would fall upon thy head as it had done if I had not told thee of it and thou prevented it. Such one gave thee large inheritance. And I when thou were in the sea and r●ady to drown, threw thee a plank which saved they life & brought thee to Land. Such one fowght in thy quarrel. And I endangered my life for thee, thou neither ware of it, nor desiring me. Seeing that as benefits are divers, so they are diversely to be repaid, it were a very hard thing to order the matter with such indifferency that they could be judged one to match an other fully.   

Chap. 10.  
furthermore there is great diversity between the repaying of benefits & money loaned. For he that borroweth money, hath his day of repayment assigned him, but in benefits requiting, there is no day limited. So that he that receiveth a pleasure may wellenowgh requite the same when he shall think good or when he shall find occasion thereto. 
A benefit may be repaid at any time.  Tell me then will you say perhaps, within what time may a man be well called unthankful if he requite not the pleasure he hath received. verily the greatest benefits that are, lie privily hid in the consciences and minds of them that do and receive the same. And this I say for that we should do our benefits in such sort, that they may be acceptable and well thought of without using any witness or record bearers. What penalty shall we then assign for them that are unthankful? Assuredly I would assign but one kind of punishment to be dew to them all in general. And for that all kind of benefits are not of like quantity nor value, but some greater some lesser, I would the said penalty should be also diminished or increased according to the quantity and quality of the benefit so received and not requited. Well then admit that there are some kind of benefits of which we ought to make as good account as of our life. And some again which we have cause to weigh dearer of, then of our life. If he that hath received these show himself unthankful for the same, what pain shall we judge him worthy of? Ought it to be any less than the benefit was which he received? It were against conscience it should, Shall it be then equal with it and like? Alas, what thing were there more miserable and crewel, then that the end of benefits which in each thing ought to be the best, should be requited and paid with the death and blood shedding of those whom they should benefit.   

Chap. 11.  
BUt some will say that Parents yet ought to have certain privileges above others for such benefits as they shall do to their Children I say nay. 
Benefits of parents  For in receiving benefits done by them to us, we observe neither order nor degree more than we do in benefits received at any other body's hand. Howbeit we ought to observe and keep the reverent respect o● duty that is and aught ●o be between the parents and their children sacred and unstained, for this that it is expedient they should beget children. And to them in bestowing of benefits, a man can not well say as he would do to an other person. Consider and mark well with thyself on whom thou bestowest thy benefits any more henceforth. If thou have showed pleasure and hast not found the like answered, blame no man but thy self who shouldest have been well advised to have pleasoured such only as thou knewest worthy of the same. But though the having or not having of Children resteth not at the pleasure and discreci●n of the parents, but in the hands and pleasure of God, yet is it meet when they have them that they should have power and authority over them, which may some what recomfort them again in the patient abiding and willingly suffering such chances and casualties as are incident to them that adventure themselves to attempt that kind of fortune.  
Again great odds is there between the parents and others in bestowing of benefits. For Parents though they have once or oftener benefited their Children, and have had cause to think the same evil bestowed, yet may not they cease from benefiting them still, for all that. Moreover the benefits of all Fathers are like, for what is required of any one in that respect, that same is required of every one that beareth the denomination of a Father, and not of one or other more or less.  
But thee Nature of benefits which which are done from one to an other where there is no respect of causes why, is far other. And as those benefits are different among themselves, so can they not be comprehended under any one Rule.   

Chap. 12.  

Diversity of benefits & of the persons to whom they are done.  divers things there are that are very costly & chargeable to the givers, and other some things there are that are as thankfully accepted, and yet not so painful for charges to be given. Some things we give to our Friends and familiar acquainted, and some again to strangers and persons not known. Though the gifts which thou givest to several persons be to each of them acceptable, yet is that most commendable that thou givest to him whom thou knewest not before, but beginst by that to know, in respect of that thou gavest to him whom thou knewest before. Some are able to grant aid in troubles. Others to comfort with counsel in heaviness. And others some to give promotions and sundry preferments, whereby the havers' countenance is much amended, and his estate bettered, and as all these divers sorts of benefits differ one from an other, so shall you see divers men diversely desire the same. Some one you shall find that shall think nothing so excellent as to have one that in the deepest extremity of his misery, and when he is almost desperate with sorrow, can yet wisely recomfort him with good council Some other is there that hath more regard far, to worship and preferment attaining, then to living in safety. Again some other ther● is that doth account himself more beholding to him that saveth him from perils and dangers, then to him that carefully provideth for his honesty. So that we see any of these things is so much more or less esteemed of, as the party who is to give his sentence upon the same, doth more or less frame his fancy to like thereof. In money matters I chose my Creditor whom I list myself. But benefits sometime I have at his hands that willingly I would not, and otherwhiles I am unwittingly bounden. And what will you do in this case? will you call him unthankful that doth not requite the benefit which he received either unwittingly or against his will.   

Chap. 13.  
ONe that hath done me a pleasure heretofore, which in a while after worketh me a great displeasure. Tell me now Should I think myself bound to endewer as many wrongs and injuries as he would lay upon me for that he pleasured me one time, or else shall I set the wrong he did me against the pleasure I found before at his hands? (and as the proverb is) the hare's head against the goose ieblets? If you were to be judge in this case whether ●yde would you think the heavier? The benefit to charge the receiver, or else the injury to be a bar to the giver? Time should fail me if I would attempt to recite all the matters of diffycultye that might arise in these cases, by which the judge (if it were so that this matter should come to pleading) would by so troubled, that he could hardly say what sentence to give. But you will say that hereof it groweth that men are so unwilling to show pleasures as they are, partly for that we are so slack in requiting the same, partly for that they that are so slack are still permitted to escape unpunished. Not so neither. There are few or none that enforce benefits upon any man whether he will or not, and again who that doth benefit any man being moved so to do for the goodness and honesty of the cause that giveth him encouragement thereto, he doth that he doth gladly, and forthwith dischargeth him whom he hath benefited, from somuch as thinking that he should be indebted therefore, he doth the same so frankly. Except it be so that the party benefited of his own voluntary will, will willingly acknowledge himself his detour, and seek to requite it. For if he should look f●r recompense or demand it, all the whole glory and commendation of the fact were gone. And this I say was the cause that made men so chary from passing any Law for redress of this vice.   

Chap. 14.  
Verily if it were possible that there might a Law be made for the punishment of this vice of ingratitude, we should have less number of pleasures done: but then they that were done would then be better done. 
That benefits should be bestowed with circounspectnes and discretion  And assuredly they that heretofore would never make Law against it, yet for all that, they themselves very advisedly and with great heed and wariness, did bestow such benefits and pleasures as they showed to any, meaning thereby as it should seem that their such example of charines, might also direct us, to take dew regard and respect whom we admitted and allowed worthy, on whom we would dispose and bestow our beneficence. In which behalf, if you stand fully assured and persuaded before you bestow your benefits that he that is to receive them is worthy to have them, I dare then warrant you from having cause justly of desire to use any action for the recovering it again. When thou art to bestow any benefits, regard only the honesty of the Receiver. In so doing, thy benefits are done as they should be, and become famous. But if thou shouldest make pleading matters of them, thou shouldest disgrace them quite. It is I grant a conscionable saying and most agreeing with Law to say pay that thou owest. 
To p●ye that a man oweth is a Law grounded on natural reason.  And yet touching benefits, it is the foulest and most unseemly saying and fullest of discourtesy to say pay. For what should he pay? Sometime he oweth his life, his health his wealth and sometime such weighty things can not be paid themselves, nor any things else that may countervail the same. This is it that I say. The worthiness of so precious a thing as a Benefit is, shallbe quite lost if we make merchandise of it. We should not enforce nor willingly apply our minds to covetousness seeking of quarrels and descension, it is to prone of itself to such matters, if haply any such cause begin to grow, let us cut it of, rather than increase it.   

Chap. 15.  
WHat will some say shall the Ingrate and unthankful person escape quite & go unpunished? 
What penalties orderly follow vn●hanfull People.  Then pardon also the wicked man, the ●awghtipacke the covetous niggard, the scornful and disdainful man and the Tyrant. Why? think you that those facts that are hated and despited may be said to escape unpunished? What more grievous punishment can there be laid upon any man, then to be hated deadly of all men? He may think it punishment enough that he dare not desire any thing of any man, for fear to be noted, marked, and pointed at of every man, or at least to think that he is so: and to know that he hath lost the estimation of the beast and chiefest jewels of the woorl●e (to wit,) his honesty, credit, and estimation. Do you not count him unfortunate that hath lost the use of his eyes, or whose hearing is quit stopped up? 
who that hath no perceverence of the pleasure that is done to him is worse than he that is deprived of his senses   
Then judge him a very wretched man that hath altogether lost the understanding of such pleasures as have been showed unto him. Such one ought to think with himself that he always standeth in the danger and displeasure of the gods who are Record bearers and will be Revengers of his said Ingratitude. Besides, his own guilty conscience ceaseth not continually to molest & accuse him. And think you it not punishment sufficient the continual remembrance of the loss of so many worthy things as he thereby doth lose? Look who taketh pleasure and delectation aright at the receiving of a benefit, 
diversity between the thankful & the ingrate person and their two lives.  retaineth still and reviveth it and maketh a continual pleasure of it, by oft remembering the same● rejoicing not alone in the thing which he hath, but also in the friendly mind of him at whose hands he received the same. But the unthankful man rejoiceth but only ones, (if he do that:) namely at that instant when he receiveth the Benefit. There is moreover great diversity between their two lives. For the one of them is always sad and sorrowful: to wit thunthankful man, who honoureth neither his Parents, nor his schoolmaster, nor his bringars up duly as he should do. And contrariwise the thankful body is always merry and pleasant, always seeking occasion to requite the benefits which he hath received, and is greatly delighted if he find it: not seeking how he may fully digest it, but studying after what sort he may fully and thoroughly answer the same, and that not to his parents alone, but to his friend also and each simple wight that hath any manner of ways benefyted him. And if his bondman happen to do him a pleasure, straight way he weigheth not of whom, but what it was that he received.   

Chap. 16.  
HOwbeit some there are (as Hecaton for one,) which doubt whether a bondman or servant may do any thing that may deserve the name of a benefit to his master: & therefore they make this division, 
The d●uision of such ples●urs as may be done.  that there are Benefits, 
Benefits  duties, or good endeavours, & services. Benefits they call those pleasures which any strangers do to us. A stranger they call (in this respect) such one as may when him listeth cease and desist from so benefiting us. Good endeavours or duties, 
Duties or endeavours.  those pleasures or friendly turns which the Children do to their parents, wives to their husbands, or contrariwise, or any one of them to an other, whom affinity & alliance of blood doth will & command to help & succour each other mutually. Services they call such as the servant doth to his master, 
Services  whom fortune hath placed in such degree, that whatsoever he do in his masters behalf, he most think it all but his duty. Whosoever for all that, doth deny that the servant may benefit his master, declareth himself not to know what is right. For only it is to be regarded of what mind he was that did the benefit, and not of what degree. Uertew penneth herself up from no body, 
The way to virtue open to every person.  she showeth & offereth herself to every body to be had. She admitteth all that willbe suitors, And those that haply pass by her without regard, she calleth back of her own accord. Fréeborn, free made, bondslaves, banished men and Princes, & all a like. She chooseth neither the house nor the degree. She contenteth herself aswell with the naked man despoiled from all gifts of fortune, as with him that hath them all in most abundance. For though Fortune bear great sway in the world, yet virtue triumpheth over her. If you will say that a servant can not do a benefit to his master, then will I aver that it is not possible for a Subject too do it to his king, or a Soldier to his Captain. For though there are divers respects and sundry titles of the king, the captain, and the master, yet in this point they are all one touching the duty of them that are under them and at their commandment. For as the king hath his subjects, and the captain his soldiers, so hath the master his servants at commandment. If the baseness of his degree be an impediment to the servant that he may not attain to the perfection of his desert, as to call the pleasure he hath done, a benefit, the like shall it also work to the subject in respect of his Prince, and to the soldier in regard of his captain. Though they vary in names, yet agree they indifferently concerning their duty. But manifest it is that subjects do benefit their Princes, and soldiers their Captains, by the same reason then, why may not the servant also benefit his master? 
That a bound man may benefit his Master.  The servant may be just, strong, valiant, and one of noble courage. What then should ail him but that he may also benefit his master, sith that is a virtue aswell as the residue? To prove it brieflee this might suffice. There is no doubt but that the servant may benefit anya body. What then should ail him why he could not benefit his master among the rest?   

Chap. 17.  
TO prove that the servant can not benefit his master thou wilt happily allege, that though he lend his master money, yet he can not properly be said his masters Creditor. That only excepted, he doth that daily that may cause his master to think himself bound to him. For if he ride or go, he accompanieth him. If he fall sick he tendeth him, and doth his diligence about him. Which things if any other body had done them, they had deserved the name of benefits: but sith his servant did them they must be called but services only. A benefit say they is that friendly pleasure which such a one doth as may choose to do it, and again refuse to do if him so liketh at his pleasure. But the servant may not say nay to what he is able to do. Whereupon he can not be said to do a benefit what soever he doth, for that he doth but fulfil his duty, which he can not chose but do perforce. Admit all these things to be so: yet will I bear the bell away here, and will set the bondman in as good plight, (for of such a servant understand that I spéeke) as if he were free. Tell me by the way if I be able to show you a bound servant who without all respect of his own health and safeguard fought in defence of his master stoutly and being grievously wounded, and bleeding, by whole streams, kept his enemies still at bay whilst his master might escape and shift for himself? Will you say he hath not benefited his master because he was his servant? Again if I can show yo● a servant that would not be corrupted with any fair promises nor gyptes of the Tyrant, not feared with any his thretning, nor vanquysht with any his punishments to disclose thee secrets of his master, but what in him lay cleared the suspicions, and adventured his life for him, will you say that he hath not benefited his master neither for that he was his servant? Doubtless a benefit done by a servant too his master ought not for the estate of thee doer too lose his accounpt and perfect name, but it ought too be so much thee better judged of in him, for that thee base condition of his servitude and slavery could not dash him from doing his duty thoroughly, effectually, and faithfully.   

Chap. 18.  

The mind is always free and is exempt ●rom slavish bondage.  HE is much deceived that thinketh the servitude hath domination and rule over each part of a man. The chiefest part of him is clear from any bondage. For though the bodies be bound and at commandment of their masters, yet is their mind at free liberty, and so free, that neither that prison of the body wherein it is shut, can restrain it from seeking to accomplish that that it is inclined unto, and that tempting somewhiles of worthy enterprises. It is th'only body that Fortune hath made subject, put in thraldom, and assigned to be at the masters commandment, pleasure, and disposition. That he buyeth, that he selleth again as liketh him best. And yet for all that we have not to command our servants in each thing touching their bodies that they can do, 
The bondman may refuse doing the commandment of his master in some things  as if our commandment sounded to the damage and prejudice of the weal public, they may choose to do it, or to assist us to commit any robbery, they may refuse it.   

Chap. 19  
BUt there are some things which the Laws neither command nor inhibyt the servant to do: and yet if he do them, he may well be said to have done a benefit. For when all duty and service is had of a servant which is commonly to be required at such men's hands, yet resteth there in some of them that ability to do farther pleasure besides that may well deserve the name of a benefit. 
Wherein the boundman may benefit his master.  As when he doth us that pleasure that standeth us in great stead, this in no wise would be called a service. There are in like manner (to requite the duty of the servant toward his master,) certain things wherein the master standeth bound to his most abject servant. As to find and allow him sufficient and honest meant, drink and cloth, and yet are not these to be called benefits though the servant hath them duly and well. 
Wherein the master may b●nefyt his bo●̄dman.  But if he tender him more than as a servant, bring him well up, and cause him to be instructed in such knowledge and arts as long to Free men, then may he be well said too have benefited him. In like manner fareth it with the servant if he do more than is incident to the name and dewtis of a servant which proceedeth not by commandment and coustraint but of mere free will, 
The be●●f●t of the servant to his master.  it ought aswell to be called a benefit being so done by him, as if any other had done it.   

Chap. 20.  
A Bondman sayeth Chrysippus is a continual hired workman. 
The discripsion of ● boūdmā●  And like as when we have hired a workman to do such or such work, if he do that, and more also that may advantage us beside, we accept it thankfully and in good part: right so when the bondman passeth that which is commonly to be required or almost to be desired at the hands of such one, & attempteth to do that which were great thanks worthy in any one far better born in them he surmounting the opinion and credit of his master, this I say is worthy to be called a benefit. For as if our bondman should do less than his duty you would not blame us to be angry with him, but would adjudge him worthy of punishment, right so if he do more than duty, should we not seem to offer him wrong if he should not find at our hands his thanks according? But wouldst thou know when a thing is not to be called a benefit? verily then-when a man doth that which he could ●ot chose but do. But when he doth any thing which he might have refused to doo● and which was at his choice the doing of it, then lo, is his good will worthy commendation and thanks, and the pleasure which he doth merits the name of a perfect benefit. These two are contraries a benefit and a wrong. And who that may sustain wrong at his masters hands the same party may also do a benefit to his master. And to prove that a bondman may be wronged at his masters hands I need not seek any farther testimony then that there are appointed magistrates and officers by public consent to be umpars between them, to redress the wrongs offered by any such masters, to restrain their cruelty and outrage in punishing, and measure their niggishenes in giving them necessaries. So than it, appeareth likewise that the master may be said to receive a benefit at his servants hand. Yea even aswell as any one may at an others. For the servant doth what lieth in him, he offered it to his master. Howbeit he can not force it upon him except him list. And what man is he I pray you so lofty that at some one time or other may not have need of very mean personages? Well for proof of these things which I have said, I will recite unto you a number of benefits done by such men to their masters. Some that delivered their masters from being slain: some that otherwise saved their lives. Some that saved their masters from being cast away and if that be not much, that for the saving of them cast away themselves.   

Chap. 21.  
Claudius' Quadrigarius in his 
A notable history of two boundmen  xxii. book of Chronicles maketh report that at what time the City of Drument was besieged by the Romans, and that they that warded within were quite devoid of hope of being able to defend it any longer against the force and sharp assaults of their enemies, two bondmen servants in one house privily stole forth of the City by some postern gate, lowpe hole, or other privy place, and straight way fled to the camps of their enemies, making a pitiful complaint of their more than cruel usage which they found at their masters hands a sole woman within the City: from whose rigour they were so escaped, beseeching them of grace and succour: who as they were full of compassion easily admitted and allowed their complaint to be true, received and entreated them very well. Sun after, the City was taken, then did the conquerors busily apply themselves to take the spoil. But these twain as they were better acquainted with the City than the Rest, so ran they a nearer way with all speed straight home to their masters house, to prevent the other enemies: and taking her forth, drove her tofore them along the City through the midst of the enemies, which divers of them seeing, demanded of them both who she was that they entreated so cruelly ●o see to, and what they meant to do with her. This (qu●d they)? this is our devilish masters who many time hath used us sorry wretches to bad. But now is come the time that we shallbe revenged on her well enough she shall know anon what punishment means, and whether it be easy to endure or no. Thus when by this means they had brought her clean with out the City and danger of the enemies, and placed her in asmuch safety as they could devise for the time, they returned into the City, and under colour of taking it for themselves, got and saved so much as they could of her goods safe and unspoyled. Then when thee rage and fury of the of the enemies was pacified, and the broil ceased, the conquerors to declare that they were Romans, restored of those that remained each to his own again. And they when they saw all things in safety brought their masters also safe home again. Whereupon, she forthwith manumitted them both & was not ashamed to acknowledge and confess that her life was only preserved by them over whom she had authority both of life and death. This was not credit me the fact of servile hearts to assume upon them the name of manquellars for the time to th'end they might save their masters life.  

●n other notable History  Cluentius the Praetor of the Mersians was taken and led prisoner toward the Emperor of Rome. By the way as he went, one of his servants saying his master was fallen into the hands of his enemies and like to be used with great rigour and cruelty, suddenly stepping to one of them that led him, plucked forth his sword, and ran his master through therewith, rather than his enemies should glory or triumph over him. Having so done, now quoth he that I have delivered my master, time is it that I provide for myself also: and therewithal thrust himself in with the same sword.   

Chap. 22.  
CEsar after that he had laid siege long time to the City of Corfewe at last won it, 
an other worthy History of a boundman.  and took Domisius prisoner. But Domisius taking that dishonour of imprisonment so grievously, charged a Physician he had with him that was his bondman, to give him the strongest poison that he could devise to rid him quickly. Which the Physician lingered and would in no wise do, for that he would not be the fortherer of his masters death nor yet deny the doing of it expressly, fearing his displeasure which Domitius perceiving, in great angar said: why? doubtest thou to give me death and seest me réedye armed to withstand the assaulth thereof? whereupon the Physician to appease his fury gave him a certain confection which he wellenouge knew that none of the ingredi entes were either deadly or hurtful. Upon the receipt whereof, Domitius fell in a sleep, were it for the conceit he took with himself that it had been poison, or else for dolour and anguish to think of his misery, which when the Physician saw, although he assuredly known that that he gave him was not hurtful, yet the tender heart, and faithful allegiance he owed to his master not suffering him to be so thoroughly persuaded, 
● par●yt true ●art.  with great speed got him to Domitius his masters son, and besowght him that he would commit him to ward until such time the truth were known whether that which he gave his Father were poison or no. But Domitius lived and did well. And Cesar pardoned him his life but his servant saved it afore.   

Chap. 23.  
IN a Civil war that was at Rome proclamation was mad against one that who that could lay hold on him, 
a famous act of a boundman.  might lawfully kill him, which when it was publicly notified, a boundman of his against whom this sentence was passed, forth with conveyed his master aside. A●d to stay them from making pursuit and search after him whereby they might haply find him out, put on himself his masters apparel and rings on his hands, which done he so resembled his master that except it had been o●e that had been privy to the devise, none but would have said it had been his master indeed.  
When he was thus attired, boldly without any dread h● went and met them that came to seek after his master, and said. My masters lo I am here come not to crave any favour or pardon at your hands, but put myself wholly in your grace, use me as you shall think good, and with that laid down his head to them to be smitten of. O what a noble courage was he of, that willingly without constraint offered himself to die to save his master: and that at such time, when faithfulness was almost quite exiled forth of the City? And was it not more strange at that time to find such Loyalty in such one, when nothing reigned among the very best but cruelty and treason? And what greater punishment could there be devised against the rankest Traitor that ever was but death, with which he chose to be rewarded for his most trustiness.   

Chap. 24.  
I Will not pass over with silence what chanced in Rome of later time. 
an other example of a pollitik bondman.  In the reign of Tiberius Cesar, it was a common practice and a disease that held w●llnyghe every man there, to exhibit and prefer bills of accusation one against an other to Tiberius. Which devise during the while that the war Civil did last, had shrewdly shaken the nobles of Rome. There was presented what talk men had of him as they sat on their alebenche: and scantly could a man have any talk familiarly with his Friend, but it was blown to Tiberius' ear. There was no estate in safety, nor any man all most trusty. The least cause that might be was matter sufficient for him to show his creweltye. If any haply were detected, it needed not to listen what should become of him: for even before the time of his attainder it was known welenowgh whether he should. The axe and the block sat in judgement of him. It fortuned Paulus the Praetor at that time, to sup abroad from home, and ware upon his fingar a King in which was engraved the picture of Tiberius. This Paulus after he had drunk hard, had list to make water, and chanced to take the chamber pot in that hand whereon he ware that King, by Reason whereof the King touched the pot also. Which thing Maro one that was present in company, a sycophant and pick thank noted full well rejoicing mithhimself that he had such matter to report to Tiberius thinking for his tidings (as it might have proved if he could have brought his devise about,) to have had the spoil of Paulus. ●ut as he turned him about to call witnesses to testify the fact, the servant of Paulus who stood by his master and eyed Maro well, mistrusting that there was treason working against his master, suddenly plucked the King from of his masters hand. So that when Maro turned him again about to have showed the others and charged them to record how Paulus had unreverently and unhonorably abused the emperors picture with touching so unseemly things with it, the servant of Paulus (his master not able to say for himself for drunkenness,) denied it was so, and for proof, showed the King which he had in his hand, affirming that his master before he went about his necessaries delivered it him to keep for the time.   

Chap. 25.  
During the Reign of Augustus Cesar, men might yet with much more liberty, 
An history great pr●yese worthy of the sober wit and advise of boundmen  and safety talk their fancies than they might under Tiberius, for that he was not replenished with such fury and Tyranny. In that time it chanced that one Ruffus a man of good honour, who had sometime been Consul of Rome● as he sat at supper on a time and was over gone with drink, suffered this unwise wish foolishly to escape him. That Augustus might not safely return from a voyage which he was about to make, but that he might miscarry in it, adding moreover that the very oxen and calves about Rome had cause to wish the same. There wanted not to be those that hearkened and marked well his words as they passed him. On the morrow morning very early in the dawning of the day a servant of his that stood by the night afore and herd all his talk recounted orderly unto him what he had unwisely among his cups suffered to scape him, and soberly advised him (to prevent all mischiefs) with all speed to get him to Augustus, there accuse himself, and put him in his grace● When after a little deliberating with himself he was fully persuaded that his servant counseled him for the best, determined with himself to follow it. Whereupon making him ready with s●éed, got him on his way to Augustus' ward, and there attended to meet him at his first coming abroad. And having done first his obedience, put himself wholly in his grace, and exponing to him all the discourse of the matter and his disloyalty, with earnest repentance for his folly so sowlye over shot, wishing it might rather hap on himself and his, besought him humbly of his gracious pardon which. Augustus as he was bountiful and debonair granted immediately. But none quod Ruffus will credit that I stand in your favour except it may appear to them that you gave me something, and thereupon besought him that he would grant him a reasonable some of money as he then requested, which Augustus gave charge should be delivered him. And farther quod Cesar of my more ample grace this I promise thee that on my part there shallbe no cause given why we twain will ever hereafter fall out again. Did not Cesar graciously so lightly to remit the fact? but more worthy of commendation was it in that he annexed to his clemency such liberality. Who that shall but hear this History reported can not chose but highly commend Augustus, and yet can he not chose but praise this bondman before him. But would you not now look that I should tell you that he was manumitted and made Free for his labour? I think you would, and that worthily also. He was so and Augustus himself paid the money for his redemption.   

Chap. 26.  
Upon thalleging of somanye examples, I suppose there is no man that will doubt but that the master may well enough receive a benefit at his servants hand. And to say the truth, what Reason is it that the parson of the man should more disgrace the thing that he doth, them the thing that is done may commend the parson of him that doth it? All men in general have but one and the self same offspring if we judge things aright and the causes of the same as they ought to be, then shall we confess that he only is most noble, that is of best & most virtuous nature and disposition above others, 
Only one Original of all men  or more apt and given to good sciences than other. One only piece of mould was the first parent to us all how soever we derive our parentage from thence by base or noble race. The least cause of boasting that is, 
No perfect glory 〈◊〉 boast of our ancestors.  riseth of our ancestors, who if they were noble & famous for any their virtues, in which only consisteth true & perfect nobility, if we descent & disarge from their said virtuousness, with our shame and reproach enough may we record them, or make claim to them: from whom w● so far degenerate, that uneath saf saving line of blood and lineal descent we savour nowhytte of them. Asfor their wealth, honours, dignities and pre●errementes to which they were advanced for their nobleness namely their vert●wes, were but only signs and shows, and rewards of nobleness. Which who that hath by succession of inheritance, enjoyeth as in the Roman weal public he that had saved a Citizen's life and had merited the reward thereof a garland called Corona civica, might leave the same to his posterity. Who might glory therein not for their own facts, but for the acts of an other who thereby left to them an example of encouragement of attempting the like. Contemn noman be he never so base and unnoble of fame, 
No man ought to be contemned.  and simply preferred by fortunes gifts, whether they have been bond heretofore, or now presently are bond, or people of far and strange contr●y●s of what estate or degree soever they be of, let them fortify themselves, and be of good courage. Attain virtues & show themselves worthy, 
Uertew preferred of ●l persons.  and think not but as perfect nobility attendeth them as any other. Why should we be so puffed up with pride, that we should take scorn to accept benefits and acknowledge the receipt of the same at our servants hands. Only regarding their estate, and forgetting their deserts?   

Chap. 27.  
THis thought I good and necessary to be said both for the repressing of the wanton pride and folly of those men who altogether hang on fortune's sleeve, and also for the maintaining the right acceptance and true understanding of such pleasure and benefits as servants may do to their masters, & defending the same showed by Children to their parents. For it hath been doubted by some, whether Children can do to their parents any greater benefits than they have received of them. 
Whether children are able to do greater benefits to their parents then they received.  touching which matter this I know willbe granted, that possible it is that Children may attain to greater wealth, & aspire to higher promotions than ever their parents did, & that which is more, to be better also, which being so, it may be that they may also give far better things, for that their fortune is better, and perhaps their well meaning heart also. But some may happen to say. Well let the Child give what he is able to his parents, it is yet less than duty may duly demand at his hands for that he oweth to them even all that ability of giving, as which without them he could not have had. So that it is not possible for him to be overcome with an other man's benefit, whose precedent benefit was the causer of that that was subsequent. But see how greatly they are deceived that are of this opinion. At the first you know well a number of things take their original and beginning of other things which notwithstanding in process of time out-growe their said beginnings far. 
Many things excel● their beginnings  We see that seeds are the causes of many things, and yet are they the smallest of those things which by them take their beginnings. Behold Rhine & Euphrates: what are they and all the other notable and famous Rivers that are else where, if we regard the heads only from whence they ●irste break out? if there be any cause why they are regarded, they take it a great way of from the head. The great churches and Cities walls stand not without their foundations, and yet that which is the ground work and stay of all, lieth hid under the ground and is not seen. So fareth it in every other thing. For the subsequent increase and groweth shadoweth quite and overwhelmeth as it were, oftentimes the beginnings of the same. I could not you say have had my being without which I had never attained to these things if my Father had not begot me, no more could I if after my Father's begetting and time of my birth, my Nurse had not fostered me up.   

Chap. 28.  
BUt let us go roundly too work and prove that though the son have been benefited by his Father very much, yet he may render asmuch again, and more to. Admit my Father as ●e begat me whereby he gave me my beginning, 
The Father that is nourished of his some receiveth more the he gave.  so he fostered me up whereby I took increase also. If I render the like of the last part, I render more than I received. For in this case he shall have to rejoice, not only that he is nourished, but also that he is nowrished of his son, taking more comforth in my natural mind, than delectation or pleasure in the thing itself which he receiveth. Again what and if any man should so use himself, that either for his eloquence, his worthy knowledge in Civil or Martial policy he becometh famous, and by the nobleness of his said virtues shaketh of the darkness and obscurity of his base parentage, and by mean of his worthiness causeth the report of his father's name to be crowned with perpetual fame might not he worthily be said to have done an inestimable benefit to his parents? 
Immortal memory given by the children to their parents.  Ariston and Grillus doubtless long sith had been raked up in the dust and been as if they had never been with out all report, if Xenophon and Plato their worthy sons had not by their noble memory caused them also to be still remembered. And where had the famous name of Sophroniscus been now become if Socrates his son had not as it were made him live a new? It were over tedious and to long to go about to recount here the names of all those whose names certainly had never continued unto these days, had it not been that thexcellent virtues of their sons made them famous to their posterity, and as it were immortalised them. An infinite number of them assuredly had been shut up in the deep dungeon of oblivion, if the famous memory of their sons had not delivered them from that dime darkness. And though perhaps each benefit that the children may do to their parents severally considered and apart by himself be not able to countervail the deserts of their said parents, yet a multitude of them conjoined may be able to match them & pass them also.   

Chap. 29.  
IT was Scipio's chance to save his Father in a great and sharp battle, 
●altātnes of ●ong Scipio to sane his father's life  which to do, he was forced being asyet but a very child to put spurs to his horse, and abandon himself into the thickest of his enemies, before he could come to the place where his Father was. And setting light by any never so perilous adventure that might befall, stuck no whit to take to task any the most beaten and practised soldiers of his enemies far unfit matches for his age, or experience of dealing in wars, as who that never before that time had been in war fare. The same Scipio also an other time pleaded his Father's case, at what time he was accused, and by his well handling of the matter discharged him from a great conspiracy of some that pretended his death. He also procured his father to be chosen Consul thrice arrow, and advanced him to other honours. Besides all this, 
Pro●e by reasonable argument that the son may render greater benefits than he received.  he enriched his father passingly being otherways but a very poor man.   

Chap. 30.  
BUt all this while have I recited for proof of my sayings examples done by others. Now let me assay if those examples were not, how I were yet able by good and probable arguments to fortify and maintain that which I have said. And that I can so do, you shall lightly see by this.  
Whosoever hath given such a benefit as may be bettered, it may also be said he may be excelled: but the Father giveth such a benefit as may be bettered, therefore it may also be said he may be excelled. To prove he may be excelled I say thus, who that receiveth a greater benefit than he gave, may welbe said to be excelled. I prove that again thus. The often saving of a man's life is a greater benefit, than the only ones giving of life. But the father may have his life often saved by his son, which is a greater benefit than he gave therefore. etc. Or thus who of twain receiveth the benefit he most needeth of, receiveth the greater benefit. But the father who is now living receiving life, receiveth the benefit he most needeth of in respect of the sons need who is not yet living and so had less need, therefore the father receiveth the greater benefit. But some that will be satisfied neither with Reason nor ought else, will still exclaim saying. It is impossible that the benefits of the father may be excelled by the gifts of the son. For except the father had begot him and made him a living creature, how could he have gotten any thing to give? I pray you then what doth the father more herein or deserve better than he in whose hand it lieth to save the life of the son or let him die, and yet doth save his life. Hath not any such in respect of the life of the son merited asmuch as his father? Yet verily. For if any such had dispatched him before he had attained any of those things which he gave to his Father, what could the life he had at his father's hands advantage him to the getting of such things? But the benefit of any that giveth me a second life as it were by not berefting me the life I now have in use already, may be by me well enough requited, and so may that also of my fathers which was again more week and unperfecter than that, that the other gave me, as needing a number of other necessary concurrentes without which it could not be conserved.   

Chap. 31.  
HOwbeit I would not that any man should conceive that opinion that I speak these things to th'end to diminish in any one point the due reverence and obedience that ought in all places and times to be acknowledged & done to our Parents. For virtue by nature counteth to seek and purchase praise by well doing, 
Uertewe always counteth to excel.  and contendeth in the pursuit thereof to excel those chief that are most forward lie. Piety which is properly the duty which each man is most straightly bound to owe of duty to God first, and next to his parent's children kinsfolks and country native) should be the joyfuller when it is with an earnest desire done, contending to pass and excel all others therein, which if it happen so to hit, what greater cause of rejoicing may there be? What manner contention can yield a more commendable victory, then that the parent may have just cause to say, that his son hath overmatched him far in requiting his benefits? For if the parents should show themselves after such sort to account of their benefits as though they could never be sufficiently requited by their Children, then certainly they should make them so slack, that they would never undertake to give thattempt to it, as persuaded afore hand that if they should, it were but labour lost and not worth the while: where as they should rather encowrage them forward themselves, and say. Well come on my dear Children it is an honest emulation and kind of contention that is proposed between the parents and their children: 
The encouragement that the parents should give to their children to apply themselves to goodness.  namely to assay without ceasing who should be able to vanquish others in bestowing of benefits.  
I for my part and you for yours assay which of us shall win the best, and deserve most at others hands. To dispose and order this field there ●éedes no skill of captains, nor sound of Drum or other instrument to encourage men to march on stoutly not doubting but they may get that victory which hath been often had by the children against their parents.   

Chap. 32.  

A famous act of the young men of Cicilye.  THe young men of Sicily passed far the benefits of their parents For when on a time Aetna hill which alway burneth over thaccustomed manner cast forth flames and in such sort that the most part of that Island was set on fire thereby, the young men that were inhabiting those fired Towns seeing the danger was past all recovery, and that there was no safe, guard of themselves but to make their way amid the burning flames which had altogether environed them as with a pale, escape if they could, taking upon their backs their old and impotent parents of which some for wantte of sight, some for lack of their limbs could not shift any way for themselves, chose rather so to hazard their lives, then standing still in their houses or streets to be burned so cowardly. Who when they were thus armed with hardiness and in seeking their own safety neglected not the duty they owed to their parents, the cruel and raging flames (a strange thing to tell) dividing themselves as it were to reverence the piety of the fact gave them free passage a mid them without any whit hurting them. Antigonus also was no whit inferior to his Father in requiting his benefits. 
Worthy fact of Antigonus.  For when he had in a wouderfull great battle discomfited his enemy and won the kingdom of Cyprus, he gave wholly both the spoil of the battle and the kingdom also unto his father. 
A stout fact of Ma●lius where●● he also showed his assured l●ue and duty acknowledged to his father  Manlius in like manner who though he happened to have to his Father a very severe and haughty stomached man, yet in requiting his benefits showed himself no whit inferior to him. For when his Father on a time for his riotous and unbridled youth had banished him from his presence, soon after he that was then Tribune of the people in Rome, had pretended a conspiracy against Manlius Father: and the day appointed when he should be brought to his answer. Whereof Manlius having intelligence, came with speed to the Tribune, desiring to know the day when his Father's araynement should be: making semblance of rejoicing at it for that his father had dealt so roughly with him. The Tribune being privy how rigorously he had been used by his Father, at first moved his case and accused greatly the discourtesy and unnaturallnes of his Father: and hoping that for revenge thereof Manlius would what in him lay be a forthere● of his devised pretence, declared to him when the day should be.  
Whereupon Manlius so soon as he had got opportunity, and that he had the Tribune alone, drew forth a naked sword which he had privily hid under his gown, and laying hold upon the Tribune threatened him saying. Assuredly except thou presently swear unto me that thou wilt neither make nor meddle with my Father, but discharge him quite of this matter without making any farther a do about it, I will here presently run thee through with this sword. For well I stand assu●ed that it resteth wholly in thy hand, whether my father shall have any accuser or not. The Tribune saying himself at such a straight, swore he would do as he required him, and right so performed it,   

Chap. 33.  
A very easy matter if is to recite one after an other an infinity number almost of notable examples of such as have delivered their parents from great and present dangers: which have advanced them from base to high degree: and whereas they were neither of name nor fame, but inglorious, they have by their means made them to be remembered, and as it were, to live perpetually. By no efficacy of fit and sufficient words, by no exactness and exquisiteness of wit is it able to be sufficiently expressed how exc●llent a thing it is and praise worthy to make a man's fame to live perpetu●llie. What a noble praise and commendation is it for the child to be have h●●self● so, that indeed without trip he may iust●ly say I have showed myself obedient to my parents. I have done after their commandments were it right or wrong to myself that they required of me, I have framed myself to serve their appetites. In this only thing have I showed myself disobedient to them, that I would not willingly give place ne yield to them in bestowing benefits on them and requiting their received. Each child I wish to contend on this sort. No manner pesons I would should yield herein to be vanquished, namely in rendering benefits which at any man's hand they have received. And if it happen any to wax dull, herein, let them whet their edges again and begin afresh. Happy are they that shall get the victory: and happy they that shallbe vanquished, if it be not a yielded victory. What more noble thing is there then when a man may justly say I have excelled my Father in doing him pleasures, yea there is none at whose hands I ever received benefit but I have passed him far in requiting the same? Who is there that liveth more fortunate than the old parents that may upon good proof report that they have such a child that hath with great increase yielded them the benefits which they bestowed upon him? generally who can be called more happy than he that reporting the truth may say I never did pleasure nor bestowed benefit that I had cause to repent or think lost, but had it as readily repaid and requited as I was willing to do it, and that doubled many fold? And then having brought each party to that pass that they may justly so say and find what thing can there happen more happy and so haply to make an end?   
FINIS