A TREATISE OF UNION OF The two Realms of ENGLAND and SCOTLAND.  
By I. H.  
AT LONDON Imprinted by F. K. for C. B. and are to be sold at his shop in Paul's Churchyard at the sign of the Swan. 1604.  

This treatise consisteth of two parts, 

A commendation of Union, 

General, Chap. 1.  
Particular, of the two Realms of England and Scotland, wherein is considered, the 

Utility, viz. 

The extinguishing of wars, between the two Nations, whereby 

1. Our victories have been hindered.  
2. Invasions have been occasioned.  
3. The borders between both Realms have always been laid waste.  
4. The inner parts have been often distressed.    
Enlargement of Dominion from whence will proceed 

1. The Dignity and repatation of the State.  
2. assurance of Defence.  
3. Strength to enterprise.  
4. Ease in sustaining the public charge of affairs. 

Cap. 2.        
Necessity, Cap. 3.      
The means whereby this Union may be assuredly effected, and this consisteth in two points, 

1. By incorporating both people into one politic body: and this is done, by binding them together with the same Laws, (particular customs always reserved) which are the very nerves of a politic body, Chap. 4. Here two opinions are considered. 

1. That the Laws of England since the time of Brutus, were never changed, which is fabulous.  
2. That change of Laws traineth many disorders with it: But this faileth in two cases, 

1. Where the change is not great.  
2. Where it is not sudden, but in time, and by degrees. 

Cap. 5.          
2. By knitting their minds in one contentment and desire, Chap. 6. Herein two circumstances are principally considered, 

Equality in 

Liberty and Privilege  
Capacity of office & charge 

Cap. 7:      
Conformity or Similitude, Cap. 8. especially in 

Habit and behaviour, Cap. 9  
Language, Cap. 10.  
Name, Cap. 11. wherein is further considered. 

What common name is most fit, and whether the like change in name hath been usual or ●. Cap. 12.  
Certain objections, concerning 

Matters of State inward, or matters of Law. Cap. 13.  
Matters of State foreign, or matters of intercourse, Cap. 14.  
Matters of honour and reputation. Cap. 15.              

The Preface.  
I Am not ignorant, how adventurous it is to intermeddle in those controversies, wherein the minds of men being stiffened in conceit, and possessed with prejudice of opinion, they esteem a man in that degree learned or unlearned, wise or weak, according as he doth either jump or jar with them in judgement. But in these high controversies of state, it is dangerous also for a private man to deal; partly, for that he may be assured not to escape the blows of them, whose envious disposition cannot look right upon any thing, nor endure the burden of another man's deserving well; but especially, for that divers times he engageth his safety upon uncertain events, wherein his hazards do very far surmount his hopes.  
And yet, because in civil differences we cannot but hold such for enemies, as, either through negligence, which is ill, or through fear, which is worse, stand in show of Neuters, expecting the issue with an idle eye; for that it often happeneth, that by withdrawing ourselves in the beginning of dissensions, we are afterwards able to afford no other either comfort or relief, but to mourn with the rest in the public misery; I have advised, and thereupon adventured to thrust myself into the common throng: being rather assured than in hope, that howsoever I be both private and mean, 
Opera ●●nesti 〈…〉.  yet the pains of an honest Citizen is never unprofitable.  
And hereof I have the more reason to presume, for that I find not myself carried by any peevish humour of discontentment, which will ruinate so many as it doth rule; nor by any servile desire of pleasing or flattering, which I have always esteemed more base than begging; nor by any false and foolish overweening, whereby many do conceive that nothing can be well either determined or done, except they have a finger in it: but first, for love to the good of the state, whereto we are by all true rules most nearly tied; and next, in duty toward his Majesty, to whom we are not only in conscience but in necessity bound to be loyal. Touching whom, it concerneth us also to consider, in what state of reputation he shall stand, and how others will be encouraged to use insolency against him; (the thoughts of men advancing by degrees) if in his first purposes, having reason and equity concurring with his power, he shall not find the means to prevail.  
It behoveth us to be, as resolute and constant for the good of the state, so wise in discerning what is good; otherwise we are not resolute but rash, and our constancy is no other than an ill grounded obstinacy. It behoveth us again, not to be more witty to frame fears, than wise to judge them, assuring ourselves, that those things which seem dangerous and are not, do daily decline and diminish by degrees; and that those counsels which proceed, not from judgement well grounded, but from some distemperature of affection, after they have a little thrown up their fume and fire, do suddenly dissolve, and vanish as vain. Lastly it behoveth us to foresee, that a time may come, which will manifest how profitable it might be, not to have been negligent in things which seemed to be small: for that oftentimes upon matters appearing of little weight, things of great consequence do depend.   
A TREATISE OF UNION.  

CHAP. I. A commendation of Union in general.  
I Will not write generally of the nature of union, whereof divers have diversly made discourse. And concerning the excellency thereof, I know not what need there is to add any thing to that which S. Augustine saith: 
Lib. de Parad so.  not only that it representeth unto us the soul of man, which is a most pure and simple substance, not distracted by communicating itself to every part of the body; but also that it is the very image of God, who both perfectly containeth, 
Lib. de quaest. vet. & noutest.  and infinitely exceedeth the excellencies and perfections of all creatures; who being the only true one, loveth this similitude of himself in all his creatures. And of this point the Philosophers also seemed to have attained a taste: 
In som. Scip.  for Macrobius referreth perfect union only unto God, terming it the beginning and end of all things, being altogether free from beginning, change or end. The more ancient Philosophers have likewise held, that from unity, which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all things do proceed, and are again resolved into the same. 
In Princ. lib. De●itis senten●●●sq●e Philos.  Of which opinion Laertius writeth that Musaeus of Athens the son of Eumolpus was author, who lived long before the time of Homer: but afterward it was renewed and followed by Pythagoras, 
Plut lib. de dogmat. Philos.  as Plutarch, Alexander and Laertius do report; who added thereunto, that unity is the original of good, 
Alexan succession. Philos. Laer. de vit. Philo lib. 8. H●er. 1. co co●tra jovin. C. 〈◊〉. 32. di. 1. Desan. tu. lib. 6  and duality of evil. And this opinion was maintained also by S. Hierome, whose sentence is to this purpose repeated in the Canonical decrees, but under the title and name of S. Ambrose. Hereupon Homer doth often call good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and the affection to do good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: applying the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to vexation and trouble. Hereupon Galen also the Prince of Physicians writeth, that the best in every kind is one, but the vicious or defective are many. Plato produceth all things from one 
1 In Timaeo. ; measureth all things by one 
2 In Philebo. : and reduceth all things into one 
3 In Epinomide. . And generally all true testimonies do agree, that the greatest perfection of glory, beauty, stability or strength, is either occasioned by union, or therein found.   

CHAP. II. More particularly of the Union of the two Realms of England and Scotland: and first of the utility thereof.  
But to descend into particular consideration, touching the union of these two Realms of England and Scotland, the benefits which are presented thereby are so many and manifest, that the chiefest impugners thereof are not able, even in the greatest tempest of their judgement, directly to deny them, only they seek either in silence or generalities to pass them over, or else by propounding many difficulties, to qualify our wills from pursuing them by desire. For, whereas there are two respects which combine and knit people together, the one a vehement fear, either in preventing or in removing of some evil; the other (which is the weaker) an urgent hope and desire, in attaining of some good: both these do present themselves most lively unto us; and from these two principal respects, two principal benefits do infallibly ensue. The first is, the extinguishing of wars between the two nations: the second is, the enlargement both of dominion and power.  
Touching the first, it always falleth, that the breaking of one country into divers principalities, is an assured ground of misery and war, by reason of the diversity both of the interest and of the ends of those that possess it: neither is there any means to reduce the same into conditions of quiet, but by restoring it again to the state of Union. This means hath in a short course of time altogether appeased the cruel and inveterate, not only butcheries but hate, between the English and the Welsh; and I am not assured whether the want of this hath made all other appliancies, whether of clemency, or of justice, or of arms, if not unprofitable, yet insufficient, to repress the riotous rebellions of Ireland. And how great have been the miseries and mischiefs, which have heretofore proceeded from the wars between England and Scotland, it may evidently appear, by several consideration of the effects thereof.  
First therefore the course of our conquests, especially in France, 
Victories hindered.  hath by this means been often interrupted. For to this end the French have always held correspondency with Scotland, as the only way to divert the enterprises of the English against them. So that if this gap be closed past their entrance, we have taken from them their surest defence. 
Invasions occasioned.  Secondly, opportunities have been opened to foreign invasion; the people of both Realms being hereby weakened, the store and treasure wasted, matters of themselves sufficient to beat open their gates to any one that would attempt upon them. And in truth, it was upon no other advantage that the Saxons, and after them the Danes found so easy entrance into this Realm: calamities lamentable even for strangers to hear of, much more for those wretches to endure, upon whose necks the law of destiny had laid so hard and heavy a yoke. Thirdly, by means of these wars, 
Confines laid waste.  the confines of both nations have continually been held under the cruel calamity of the sword; they have been a nursery of rapines, robberies and murders; they have been not only unprofitable, but very chargeable to the State, by continual maintenance of many garrisons. 
Inner parts distressed.  Lastly, the inner parts of both Realms have been often pierced, and made a wretched spectacle to all eyes of humanity and pity: wherein notwithstanding the English stood upon the disadvantage, in that they fought against them who had least to lose.  
Now, for the largeness of the benefit of enlargement of dominion, we are chiefly to consider both the nature and abilities, as well of the country which shall be joined unto us, as of the people which possess it. The country is if not plentiful, yet sufficient to furnish, not only the necessities, but the moderate pleasures of this life: wherein, whosoever is brought up and bred, he will never be grieved to abide. The people are, great in multitude, resolute in mind, for service apt, in faith assured, in wills tr●etable, moderate in hopes, bearing one common desire to commit their lives to any adventure, not only for the safety, but for the glory of their state: and generally their conditions so well furnished, as they did never better than now flourish in all mortal felicities. By addition of such both people and place, many particular benefits will inseparably ensue.  
And first, it will be a greater increase of dignity 
〈…〉  and reputation to the common state, than our highest thoughts can easily imagine. For, that which is more general, is more generous also and honourable as Decius teacheth us; for that it compriseth 〈◊〉 particulars within it: which is advowed also by that which Baldus saith; that by reason of universality a thing may be esteemed of greater worth. Hereto agreeth that sentence of Solomon; The honour of a King is in the multitude of people. And therefore the Scripture reporteth it as a great part of his glory; that he reigned over all kingdoms from the river (Euphrates) to the land of the Philistims, 
1. 〈…〉 24.  and unto the border of Egypt; and in all the region on the other side the river.  
And if in our hearts may be any desires more violent than of glory, there are other effects of this increase of dominion and power, more mighty to move us, or at the least more necessary. For hereby also our defence will be the more assured; 
Defence.  because against the forces and felicities of these two Nations, it will be so hard, as almost impossible, either for foreign enemy or domestical rebel to have power to prevail. And whereas heretofore the ports of either nation have been so many gates for invasion of the other; the borders also between them have been a place of assured retreat to the rebels of both countries, in case their enterprises did not succeed: these passages being now closed, all secret supportance withdrawn, and both people knit in a common defence, it will not only frustrate the end, but cut off the hope of any such attempts.  
Further, 
Enterprise.  we shall be strengthened hereby in any foreign enterprise, whensoever time shall cut out occasions favourable to our desires. Whereas in a people rather confederated than united, is seldom seen, either a conformity in will, or a joint readiness in power, whether to pursue resolutely the favour of fortune, or constantly to resist the storms of distress: because in such enterprises as are occasioned by diversity of interest, and draw with them diversity of ends; disdains, distrusts, and all kind of disorders are easily kindled.  
Lastly, 
Ease.  both our liberty and our plenty by this means will increase; and we shall with far greater both alacrity and ease sustain the defrayments of public affairs. For generally, in small principalities, the people are more wronged in person and wrung in purse; their estates are more nearly raked and gleaned; they have less advantage both by traffic and trade, than they who live in large dominions. And this will be the accomplishment of our felicity, if by our evil either fortune or advice, we suffer not the occasion to be lost.   

CHAP. III. Of the necessity of this Union, and by what means it may be perfected.  
I Will not further enlarge upon these several benefits; partly because I address not my speech to such sick judgements, as esteem nothing sound which doth not bear a beautiful show; partly because they appear unto me so certain and plain, that I hold it not reasonable to stand and dispute them: but chiefly for that this utility of union is seconded also with a kind of necessity; which is mighty to bend those minds that are invincible against all other means. For, if people reduced under one government be not therein united; if they be set together, and not into one; they are like sand without lime, subject to dissipation by every wind: they are like unto stones, heaped, but not compacted together, easily severed by their proper weight. Hereupon Livy saith: Tolle unitatem, & omnes imperij contextus in multas parts dissident: Take away unity and all the frame of the Empire will separate into many parts. Which is also confirmed by that saying of Christ; A kingdom divided cannot continue. So that if any man, either blinded by adverse and perverse destiny, or else carried, whether by fear, the underminer of all determinations, or by envy, the rebel to all reason, shall now make offer, directly or by circumstance to oppose against this Union, and to encounter the benefits thereof with private respects; we have just cause, not only to deny him audience, but to bear a hard opinion of him; as not knowing to what ends his thoughts are disposed.  
It remaineth only that we consider, by what means these benefits may be best assured; that is, by what means both nations may be reduced to an inseparable embracement. To this purpose we are to respect the two parts of perfect Union of divers states; The first is, by incorporating the people into one politic body; the second, by knitting their minds in one contentment and desire: even according to that which Saint Paul saith: 
Pphes. 4.  one body, and one spirit. Of these two parts of Union, the first may be termed of law, and the second of love; whereof I will speak now in order, so briefly as I may not be obscure; and so fully as the avoiding of tediousness will permit.   

CHAP. FOUR Of the bodily Union, or Union by law.  
THe bodily or politic Union is no other thing, but the collecting of both people under one common government and command, and the joining of them in obedience unto one head. For these two points of commanding and obeying are the very soul of a commonwealth, the absolute offices of civil society, the only objects of a perfect stateseman: for as without command there is no direction, so without obedience there is no strength: as direction needeth strength, so is strength unprofitable without direction. Of the first of these two Seneca speaketh: 
1 De Clem. lib. 1 Istud est vinculum, per quod resp. cohaeret; ille spiritus vitalis. quem haec tot mili●trabunt; nihil ipsa per se futura nisi o●us & sraeda, si m●●s illa imperij subtrahatur.  This is the band of coherence in a commonwealth; this is the vital spirit which these so many thousands do breath; who would become nothing by themselves but a burden and a pray, if this soul of command be taken from them: Of the second Livy: 
2 Lib. 3. Vires imperij in conssersu obedientium sunt.  The strength of the Empire consisteth in consent of those that obey: Sophocles of both: 
3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  There is no greater evil than want of government: but obedience of Subjects saveth many lives. These are the two legs to support, the two arms both to feed and defend the commonwealth: if one of these be taken away, both do perish, the unity of state dissolveth, Idemque dominandi finis erit, qui parendi fuerit: and there will be (saith Seneca) the same period of ruling which shall be of obeying.  
But, because there is no form of government now but by laws; because laws are the instrument and mean both of obedience and rule; if followeth, that there is no firm connexion in one form of government, that there is not one entire and undivided subjection and command, where the people are not bound together by one common law. But as, how cunningly soever a painter layeth on his colours to make two boards seem one, yet if they be not made firm in the joints, they will always remain, and in short time appear to be two: so, whatsoever appearances are used to make two states seem one, if they have not one community of laws, they remain notwithstanding, and upon small occasions will show themselves disjointed, 
Lib 10. Eiusdem juris esse deal ent qui sub todem rege victu●i sunt.  even in the noblest and strongest limbs of government. Hereupon Curtius saith: They ought to be of one law, who are to live under one King. And Tacitus lkewise affirmeth, 
Quicquid est authoritatis crebris destivitur contradictionibus.  that upon such diversities: All authority is overthrown by continual contradicting. And this is manifest by that which happened in the infancy of the popular state of Rome, when the Senate made laws for themselves, 
Theoph. just. de iur. gent. nat. & ciu. § Plcbiscitum.  which they called Senatus consulta: and again, the common people made laws for themselves, which they termed Plebiscita: but herewith they were divided in company, which was more dangerous unto them, than the invasions of their best appointed enemies. Neither could those disorders be ranged into any tolerable form, until by the law Hortensia, the laws of both were extended equally unto all. Afterward for avoiding the like inconveniences, the Romans permitted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, propriety of laws, to no province which they did absolutely subdue; but reduced them under government of the Roman laws. According to which example King john also planted in Ireland the laws which were then the laws of this realm.  
And this made the Union of all the kingdoms of Spain, and likewise of little Britain with France both more easy, and also more sure, because they had commonly received the same civil laws. For laws are the common bands of all cities and societies of men; the very ligaments and nerves of every politic body: and therefore in those countries that are ruled by different laws, though other differences may be quieted, composed they cannot be. This is plainly confirmed by that which Cicero saith: 
〈◊〉 Pa●●●. lus 〈…〉 In supply. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Law and equity are the bands of cities: whereto that of Euripides is agreeable in sense.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
This is that which holdeth cities together,  
When men do well observe the Laws.   

CHAP. V. Whether all change of Laws be dangerous to a State.  
THIS strain peradventure will sound harsh unto many, in whose ears suspicion doth sit, to beat back the credit of any kind whether of persuasion or proof. From these I expect two principal objections. The first is, that the laws of England were never changed since the time of Brutus; not only in the peaceable state of the realm, but not by any of the several conquerors thereof: not by the normans, Danes, saxons; no not by the Romans, who usually changed the laws of all other countries which they brought under the sway of their sword: but that in all other changes, whether of inhabitants, or of state, the laws do still remain the same, which Brutus compiled out of the Trojan laws; and therefore it is not fit they should in any point be altered. I will not now spend time upon this opinion; partly because it is not commonly received, but especially for that I have in a particular treatise examined at large, the parts and proofs of this assertion. Not as derogating any thing from the true dignity of the common law; but as esteeming hyperbolical praises now out of season; as never suitable but with artless times.  
The second objection will be, that change of laws always traineth so many disorders, as are sufficient to shake the whole frame of a state, if not to dissolve it. Tacitus saith: 
1 〈…〉.  In all affairs the provision of former 〈◊〉 is best, and every conn●●sion is a change to the worse. Whereupon Valerius hath written: 
2 〈…〉 Se● answer to Dol. man. p. g. 23.  Even in least things we must not alter the least point of ancient custom. This may be further fortified by the great care and severity which many nations have used; and most especially the Spartans, Athenians, Epidaurians, ●●rians and Scythians, as well to prevent as to punish all attempts of innovation; as taking the same, either for a cause or presage of some confusion.  
For my part, I do utterly condemn either light or often alterations of laws; knowing that so reverent respect is borne to antiquity, that ancient laws are oftentimes of force without help of magistrates to maintain themselves: but new laws are so far from this gravity and grace, that many times they draw the residue into contempt. The plant thriveth not (saith Seneca) which is often removed. 
〈…〉.  For who can stand long that will not stand still? but every day change the form of their government, as lightly as they do the fashion of their garments? yea, it is a rule of policy generally approved in that state which hath long flourished under one kind of government, 
〈…〉. Senc. 〈◊〉. Lib. 2.  not to admit alteration, although it beareth a fair face of profit. And this was the counsel which Dio reporteth that Augustus gave in the Senate of Rome: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Keep the laws which you have strongly; change not any of them, for those things that abide in the same state, although they be worse, are more profitable than those that are always changed, although in appearance they seem better: Which was also the opinion of Alcibiades in Thucydides; 
Thucid. lib. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that those men remain most safe, who are governed by their present customs and laws without change, although the● be worse.  
And yet on the other side, I am as far from allowing a strict and severe tenacity of laws; which (being another extreme) is many times more either hurtful or unprofitable, than the light change of them. For who will commend the counsel of the Epidaurians, who for fear of attracting innovation, interdicted their people from all foreign both travail and trade? or that of the Locrians, who to keep their laws both from change and increase, erected an use, that whosoever would have a new law established, he should propound the same, his neck girt in a halter, that if it were not esteemed necessary, his law and life might end together. Sometimes entire alteration of government is necessary. For so Plutarch writeth, 
In Pomp.  that Cratippus declared to Pompey, being cast into flight, and complaining of the providence of his Gods, that the perverse state of Rome stood in great necessity of the government of one man: 
Annal. 1.  and so Tacitus likewise reporteth, that certain wisemen discoursing of the life of Augustus after his death, affirmed rightly, that there was no other means to appease the disorders of the state, but by reducing it under the principality of one. But the change of some particular laws is many times grounded upon so great respects, that all nations do usually vary them, as occasions do alter: and sometimes as Tacitus saith; 
Hist. 1. Necet priscus rigour & 〈…〉.  Old rigour and too great severity is hurtful unto us, because we are not able to match. Neither is any inconvenience by such particular change of laws either feared or felt, if two circumstances be therein observed. One, that the change be not great; the other, that it be not sudden, but at leisure and by degrees.  
Now, to reduce the laws of England and Scotland into one body, it seemeth the change will not be great. First, for that customs and privileges of particular places are not to be impeached; for these are divers in every nation, without any notable inconvenience, so that conformity be held in one common law. Secondly, the fundamental laws (as they are termed) of both kingdoms and Crowns do well agree. In other laws of government they hold good conformity, as having heretofore been under one sceptre; but now by long severance the laws of either nation are like a shoe worn long upon one foot, and thereby made rather unseemly than unserviceable for the other. Of these laws, they that are divers but not contrary, may still be retained and communicated to both people: 
〈…〉.  for so Alexander said, that his great Empire could not aptly be governed, but by delivering to the Persians some laws and customs of the Macedonians, and by receiving likewise some things from them: and even so among the Romans, those laws which the common people made only for themselves, and those also which the Senators had made, only to bind themselves, were by the law Hortensia made common unto all. So then, the change shall be only where the laws are contrary; which will not be either great or unprofitable, if it be not laid only upon the laws of one people, but indifferently divided between them both.  
Examples are obvious of the like commission of laws: but I will insist only upon one; which is most memorable, and most properly concerneth both our country and our case. When King Edward surnamed the Confessor was advanced to the Crown, he found the realm governed by three different laws; the Westsaxon law, the Mercian law, and the Dane law. Out of these three laws, partly moderated, and partly supplied, he composed one body of law, commonly called S. Edward's laws: which were of so great equity, that when they were abrogated by the Conqueror, and the Crown fell into controversy between Maud the Empress and King Stephen, the people always inclined to favour that part, who put them in fairest hope of restitution of those laws. And afterwards in many civil contentions, the greatest demand of the people appeareth to have been, the restitution of King Edward's laws.  
And yet these alterations are most safely wrought in some mean course and compass of time; 
Ad Attic. lib. 11 Epist. 19 Dio. 52.  and as Cicero saith: Et quam minimo sonitu orbis ille in rep. convertatur: That this circle may be turned in the state, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  without any great sound. And so Dio writeth, that Augustus did not presently put all things in practice which were decreed: Fearing that he should err, if he would suddenly apply men unto them; but some things he redressed presently, and the rest afterwards: upon which manner of proceeding Tacitus also reporteth of him, that he did by degrees advance himself and draw the offices both of laws and Magistrates into his hands. 
l●s●gere pa●la●●m, 〈…〉 s●tr●h●●e.  For, as in a natural body, no sudden change is without some peril; so in a politic body it is so much the greater, as there are more humours to receive a hurtful impression. And in this regard the proceeding of Alaricus King of the Goths is fully to be equalled, 
C●ia. Ap ad R●n●onem.  if not preferred before that of Augustus. For Alaricus finding the Romans in other points tractable, but unwilling to be governed by the laws of the Goths, he permitted them the use of the Roman laws, but by interpretation in a short space he drew them, to bear the same sense with the laws of the Goths.  
For, if it be true that Zenophon saith: 
1 2. P●ri. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  It is easier to rule all other creatures than man: and which Seneca affirmeth; 
2 De clem. lib. 1. Nullum animal morosiu● 〈◊〉, nullum ma●ori artetractandum.  No living creature is of harder conditions, none to be handled with greater art: If it be true also which Livy saith: 
3 Excellentibus ingeniis ●tius d●●fuerit ars qua civem regant, quam qua 〈◊〉 superent.  Excellent wits shall sooner fail in the art to govern subjects, than to vanquish enemies: it followeth, that oftentimes a people may be ruled, more fitly by following, than by striving or opposing: even as nature driveth not violently at any effect, but enfoulding her ends in the desires of her creatures, hath her purposes pursued, not as hers, but as their own. And as the Sun is continually carried with the sway of the first movable Sphere, and yet performeth his proper motion in a contrary course: so a Prince may oftentimes yield to the violent minds of the multitude, 
Ad Lentul. ep. 9 Si recta portum tenere nequea●, idipsum mutata velificatione assequi.  and yet effect his own purposes and desires; even as Cicero counseled: When we cannot bear into the haven with a full and fair wind, to do the same by changing sail.   

CHAP. VI Of union of minds or of love.  
I Will proceed now to the union of minds, without which the bodily union is of little strength, either for present use, or for continuance. For all forced governments are both weak and momentany, because they leave out the will of man, without which it is impossible there should be either any firm or long coherence. For although other creatures may be enforced beyond their wills, yet the will of man is not subject to constraint; because it a ways followeth the direction of reason; (though sometimes darkened or abused by affection's) which having a most high and eminent liberty, it must be persuaded and not enforced: the understanding must first be wrought and won, and that is the only means to bring the will into obedience.  
This union of will and of mind Seneca termeth, 
De Clem. lib. 1. cap. 4.  the common band of states, the vital spirit, the very soul and life of an Empire: Rege incolumi mens omnibus una. And herein the first Christians were commended, 
Act. 4. 32.  for that they were of one heart and soul; that is, retained one mind, will and desire. This union S. Paul calleth, the band of peace: 
Ephes. 4. 3.  and therefore desired in his prayer for the Romans; 
Rom. 15. 5.  that they might be like minded: 
1 〈◊〉. 1. 10.  and requested the Corinthians, to knit together in one mind and judgement: 
Ephes. 4. 3.  The Ephesians also; to keep the unity of spirit in the band of peace: 
Phil. 2. 2. 3. 17. 4. 2.  and likewise the Philippians; to mind one thing, and to proceed by one rule. And with him agreeth S. 
1. Pet. 3. 8.  Peter also, in exhorting us all to be of one mind.  
But this union of minds between the English and the Scots is not to be esteemed a matter which may easily be effected; by reason of the great differences which have been between them. For in old enmities it is hard to establish both a present and perfect reconciliation; because either suspicion, or contempt, or desire of revenge are proper and assured means, either always to continue, or readily to renew the ancient hate. And yet this will prove most easy and plain, if industry be applied to the opportunity present. And the rather, for that it hath pleased God to open the way to this Union in such a time as there is almost no memory of any war between the two nations: insomuch as the long peace which hath now continued more than fifty years, and the mutual offices which in the mean time have been showed, have now either worn out, or at least much weakened the hate, which in former times, by reason of continual war, was almost grown to be natural. Only some circumstances must be considered, without which it is always hard, and whereby it is never impossible, to work the wills and desires of divers people into one. These circumstances may be reduced to two principal heads: the first is equality; the second, conformity or similitude in all things whereby any notable difference should be maintained or made.   

CHAP. VII. Of Equity.  
I Do not speak of Arithmetical equality, which is equal in the thing, giving to all alike; but not in the persons (as is Geometrical) allowing unto every man according to his due: I speak not of equality in degree, or in estate, for that were the greatest inequality that could be; but in liberty and privilege, (which is the main supporter of peace) and in capacity both of office and charge. That as the Sun riseth and shineth to all alike, so the law should comprehend all in one equal and unpartial equity. Of this equality Plato saith; 
1 De legib. li. ●. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Equality maketh friendship, and is the very mother of friendship: which he citeth as an old saying of Pythagoras, and doth exceedingly both allow and commend the same. 
2 Polit. 5. cap. 1. & 2.  Aristotle doth esteem inequality the ground of suspicion; which the 
3 16. q. 7. l. cum oportet C. de bo. quae lib.  law also accounteth the fuel of discord: but of equality he saith; 
4 Ethic. 8. ca 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In Phoeniss.  All these friendships are by equality. And to the same purpose Euripides hath written; 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
Equality bindeth friends to friends, cities to cities, and confederates to confederates. For equality is law to men. But the less is alway enemy to the greater, and forthwith entereth into hate.  
Hereto agreeth that of Theognis:  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Omnes hisese venerantur, amantque vicis●im,  
Vicini, aequa ●is viribus, atque s●ncs.  
Among the Latin writers Seneca, saith: 
All these bear reverence one to others, equal neighbours, and aged persons.  Equality is the principal part of equity. 
〈…〉.  And this right is termed by Cicer●par: as being equal unto all, and proceeding from nature, and held in use by common consent whereby it is often familiar unto men (as Tacitus saith) To make other men's advantage as gri●u● is unto them, as their proper injuries. And his was one principal mean, whereby the Roman state received both continuance and 〈◊〉; because the people did so easily impart the libertie● of their city almost unto all. 
A●●t Platarch. in agel.  For Epaminondas 〈◊〉 that peace is then firm, when equality is observed: according to which sentence Livy writeth, 
Lib. 8.  that when the Romans demanded of the Ambassadors of the Princrnates, whether peace should be durable if it were granted unto them, they returned answer; that it should be perpetual if the conditions were equal, otherwise for so long time as their necessity should endure. For let us not believe that any people will bear unequal conditions, any longer time than necessity doth continue. To these I will add that which Saint Ambrose saith: 
De Offic. lib. 1. V●●im as p●●es paribus maxim 〈◊〉. In P●adro. lib. de les. Patria● c. cap 2. 〈◊〉 aequalis gratia etc.  We see that equals do best joy together: which sentence seemeth to be taken out of Plato, and is by him in another place in this sort confirmed: Let them be joined in equal favour who are joined in equal nature. What do you marvel if strife rise among brethren for house & for ground, when because of a coat the children of holy jacob did burn in envy?  
Hereupon the law doth always incline to maintain equality among brethren, in case of succession; and that whether we respect the praetorian 
1 L. 1. C. unde lib. l. si post. §. si. d. de bon. 〈…〉. , or civil law 
2 L. inter fil●os. C. 〈…〉. , or else the imperial constitutions 
3 I. pen. C. come. d●u. l. ult. C. come. 〈◊〉. iudi●. C de collat. per to tot. t●t. . And Baldus noteth, that all statutes which admit children unequally to succeed, are against natural equity 
4 In d. l. inter filios. . Generally, not only the interpreters, but the authors also of the civil law, do so favour equality among brethren, that for this cause they extend or restrain the disposition of a testator 
5 I. Cum Pater. § cuictis D. de l●g. 2. l. ult. C. come. utr. 〈◊〉. & ibidem Dd. ; insomuch as sometimes that is intended to be comprised in a legacy which otherwise should not 
6 L. Quaesuu. §. sed & ipse. D. de fund. instr. : and a doubtful word shall also receive a forced construction 
7 Franc. 〈◊〉. in l. filiabus. D. leg. 1. Bald. Angel. Sali. in l. in testamento. C. de test. mili. . Further, the privileges that are granted to those testaments which parents make among their children, do then take place, when the testator doth equally dispose among them.. 
8 Ro. con. 179. Phil. Dec. in l. 1 in 2. no. C. unde lib. & cons. 349. & 361.  And when many testaments are extant of such nature, that is adjudged of force which doth equally dispose 
9 Pau. ca in Auth hoc inter. C. de te●●a. Pau. Paris. cons. 24 lib. 2. . And in conflict and opposition of opinions that is to be followed, which maintaineth equality among brethren 
10 Soct. in rep. l. cum. mus. D. de cond. & 〈◊〉. & co●s. 1●8. libr. 3. Marcia pater ipsius. con. 4. jam si. . In a word, brothers do so nearly affect equality, that thereupon was form an ancient Greek proverb; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereby is signified that brothers will go so near in departing the goods of their ancestor, that they will not leave a few figs undivided. Of this proverb Martial writeth.  
Calliodorus habet censum, quis nescit? equestrem,  
Sexte, sed & fratrem Calliodorus habet;  
Quadraginta secat, qui di●it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
uno credis equo posse sedere duos?  
So that it is little marvel which other authors do report, 
Epi●r. lib. ●. a● Calliodorum. . that Charicles and Antiochus two brothers in Pontus, when they divided their father's goods, caused a silver cup to be cut in the midst, because neither should have any more than the other. 
In Pyrrho.  From hence also was taken that tragical exclamation which Plutarch useth but borrowed out of Euripides. 
In Phuniss.   〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
And yet howsoever capacity of offices or preferments should be equal to both people, 
To divide this house with a sharp iron.  a moderation must be used for a time, that either nation be governed by officers of the same: otherwise the advantages and advancements of the one, would work both grievance and prejudice to the other. For first, no people will easily digest, that more should be attributed within their state to others, either in trust or in authority than unto them: secondly, they are not the most fit, either to counsel or contrive the affairs of a state, who are but newly acquainted with the government thereof; even as Cicero said Ad consilium de rep. dandum caput esse, nosse rempublicam: 
●. De orat.  To give advise in affairs of a commonwealth, it is a principal point, to have knowledge of the same. Officers and employments of state are in the hands of the King as grains, to make the balances equal; and must not promiscuously be bestowed, until by benefit of time, the band of Union be made fast and indissoluble. For as things in nature excellent ripe not hastily, so commonwealths least of all; which rise not to the period of their perfection in many ages, moving leisurely, and by insensible degrees: and the more slowly they do rise, the more surely for the most part do they stand. In a small compass of time, how little distasteful it will be, that the men of one nation should bear office and authority in the other, we have a fair example by them of Wales; who, so far from envy, as without any note; do many times enjoy very high places of preferment in England. And I make little doubt but that this respect hath dazzled the judgement of some persons, by whom whatsoever is pretended, either against the whole Union, or against any part of the perfection thereof, the surmise is (as men entered into suspicion are prone, both to interpret and conjecture all things to the worst) that all the sweet of the land will hereby be drawn from the ancient inhabitants of the same. Hereof all labouring in one common doubt, and one increasing the fear of another, they minister occasion of boldness unto such, who suppose, by advanceing popular advise, to raise some reputation to themselves. But it cannot be conjectured that a King, ripe in age, full of experience, holding much of himself, yet not rejecting the advise of others, will give so confused form to these affairs; and that he will kindle such a fire of emulation, between both people, as cannot but cast forth dangerous sparks.   

CHAP. VIII. Of conformity or similitude.  
ANother principal means of affection and good will is similitude or likeness; which is the fittest reconciler and surest knitter of minds, the mother of all faithful familiarity and friendship; and the more true and perfect the similitude is, the more firm is the friendship which thereupon doth arise. To this purpose Siracides saith: 
Ca 13. 16, 17.  Every beast loveth his like, and every man loveth his like. All flesh will resort to their like; and every man will accompany such as are like himself: Which seemeth to be more briefly comprised in that speech of Melanthus in Homer. 
Odiss. lib. 17.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Of which sentence Plato maketh mention; 
Always God guideth like unto like.  and addeth thereto, 
In 〈◊〉 & in 〈◊〉 & de 〈◊〉 li 6. Deleg. lib. 8.  that every thing doth necessarily love, and naturally both incline and adhere to that whereto it is like. Again he affirmeth, that a friend is one like unto a man's self; and that therefore dissimilitude maketh friendship hard, rough and easy to be changed. 
Ethic. lib. 8.  Wherein he is also followed by Arist●tle, who accounteth friendship a kind of similitude; from whence the common saying did proceed; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Like unto like: to which purpose he citeth also a saying of Empedocles; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Like desireth the like. And generally he concludeth thus: Likeness seemeth to be the ground of friendship. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
Alcinous, one of Plato's followers saith, that friendship is nothing else but a mutual goodwill, whereby we equal others to ourselves; 
jab. de dust. Plat. ca 32.  which equality is neither begun nor held but by similitude. Chalcidius, another of the same school delivereth as an opinion of Pythagoras, 
In comment. in 〈◊〉 P●at. ad Osum.  that nothing is comprehended but by the like; and to that purpose he allegeth certain verses of Empedocles.  
Cicero, 
In 1. Cicero D. de P●n. se pro. Aul. Cl●ento.  in that oration which Triphonius, one of the authors of the civil law doth cite, useth these words; Hoc fere scitis omnes, qu intam vim habeat ad coniungendas amicitias studiorum ac naturae similitudo; This all of you do know, of what force is similitude of studies and of nature, to join friendship. Again he writeth: 
1 De amic. 〈…〉.  Nothing doth so allure and draw to anything, as similitude doth to friendship. Hereto agreeth also that of Pliny: 
2 jah. 4. Epist. ad Fandanum. E●t ad connectend●s animos vel t●●atissinium vinculum similitudo.  Similitude is a most firm band, to knit and fasten minds together. 
3 Iab. 7. rei rust.  Columella accounteth this band to be natural: So doth Symmachus 
4 Sym. in Epist. : And Pliny, an excellent interpreter of nature, doth teach, 
5 Lib. 56. ca 42.  that insensible creatures which have no similitude by nature, as stone and wood, iron and clay, are never firmly joined together. All this is confirmed by express sentence of the Canon law 
6 C. Nerui. §. quod melius. 13 di. c. transmissam. de elect. . This the ancient wisemen did also shadow, by the fable of an earthen pot, which refused to join in help with a brass pot in labouring against the stream: and again by the fable of a fuller, who denied that he could dwell in one house with a collier. This did the poets also signify, when they feigned Narcissus to be in love with his image. For what is more like unto us than our own image? and whosoever loveth another man, what else doth he love but his own image in him?  
From hence it proceedeth, 
7 I. cum qui. C. de Ep. & Cle. c. inter solicitudines. de pur. ca c. clericus di. 81. c. pervenit. 2. q. 7. c. di dici. 1. q. 7.  that a man is judged like unto those, with whom he holdeth familiarity and friendship. And Angelus saith, 
8 Ang. in auth. de mona. §. cogitandum.  that a witness deposeth well, when he testifieth that a man is good or evil, because he seeth him converse with men of good or evil fame and report. Which is also confirmed by Baldus 
9 Bald. in l. dat. C. qui acca. ●po.  and by the Glossographer 
10 Glo. in ●cum oportet. de acc. & in c. definimus 18. q. 2. , and generally by all interpreters both of the Canon and Civil law. To whose sentence we may add that which Cice hath most elegantly written: 
11 De office li. 2. Facillim: aut●m & in meliorem partem cognoscuntur adolescentes. etc.  Young men are most easily known, and for the better part, who join themselves to men famous, and wise, and of good advise for the common wealth: with whom if they be often conversant, they raise an opinion among the people, that they will be like unto those whom they chose to imitate. Suetonius reporteth of Claudius Caesar, 
In Claud.  that by conversing with base men, to his old note of negligence and sloth, he added the infamy of drunkenness and dicing. Pliny speaking of a certain young man saith: He liveth with Spurma, 
Epist. lib. 4. ad Falconem. Vivit cum Spurma, vivit, etc.  he liveth with Antony, hereby you may conjecture how his youth is reform, seeing he is so loved of grave old men. For that is a most true saying: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Every man is like unto those, 
Ad Cleomacham, & ad Nesum.  in whose company he doth delight. Libanius Antiochenus in like manner writeth: We are commonly esteemed like unto those who are joined with us in friendship and society. 
Ad Demetriadem.  Here hence. S. Hierome adviseth Demetriades, to have always grave women in her company: because the quality and disposition of women is commonly judged, by the behaviour of those that do either accompany or attend them. And therefore Baldus doth not unfitly put judges in mind that they inquire with what persons he did usually converse, 
In tract. quaestio.  who is accused of any crime. Which before him Albert. 
Tract. de mazes. tit de praes. & ind. d●bit. & tit. de qu. & tor.  Gand. did think worthy to be often given in advise.  
So then, seeing likeness is a great cause of liking and of love, it followeth, that to make a perfect Union and amity between two divers nations, all differences must be removed, and both people reduced to one common conformity; and that especially in three things. First, in habit and behaviour; secondly in language; thirdly in name.   

CHAP. IX. Of conformity in habit and behaviour.  
COncerning habit and attire, 
Lib. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Herodian writeth, that Antoninus, to make the Germans assured unto him, would often apparel himself after their fashion: wearing a cassock according to their use embroidered with silver, and putting upon his head a peruque of yellow hair, cut after the German manner: wherein the Barbarians taking pleasures, they did thereupon exceedingly affect him. For the same cause when he went into Thracia and Macedonia, he suited himself in Macedonian attire. 
Herod. lib. 4.  And this he did (very like) in imitation of Alexander the Great, who, as well to vanquish the affections of the Persians, 
Q. Curt. lib. 3.  as he had subdued their power, accommodated himself to the fashion of their attire. For Antoninus did ambitiously aspire to the imitation of Alexander: to whose virtues he either supposed himself, or would be thought, to have attained so near, that he caused divers ridiculous pictures to be made, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  having one body and two faces; one representing Alexander, and the other himself.  
In ancient times in Rome, and afterward in Constantinople, certain games of running were used, with Chariot and upon horse; which continuing until the time of Phocas the Emperor, the runners began to clothe themselves in different colours; some in green, and some in grey. The common people which beheld these games began to be divided in affection, some applauding the one colour, and some the other: hereupon was kindled, first emulation, and then ●n●ie, watch did use by degrees to such violence and extremity. that the games ceasing, the colours were for a long time maintained; and infinite murders were thereupon committed in Syria, Egypt, Graecia, and divers other provinces, which the Emperors by their letters were not able to repress. Hereupon so many laws have been occasioned against liveries and badges, the mischiefs whereof were most famous with us, in the late badges of the white Rose and the red. And for this cause I do not only allow but commend the policy of King William of Normandy, by whom (as most industrious Master Stow hath noted) the English were compelled to imitate the normans, in habit of apparel, shaving of their beards, service at the table, and all other outward gestures; as supposing by outward similitude to draw both people to similitude in minds. 
D. 〈◊〉. 41. §. si.  Gratian adviseth, to conform ourselves in the fashion of attire, with those with whom we do converse: affirming that whosoever doth otherwise, either he is intemperate, or else superstitious. The Glossographer 
* 〈…〉  also advertiseth, that for the manner of our apparel, we respect the custom of the country wherein we do abide. And in this he is seconded by Panormitane, Benedict, Caprea 
1 〈…〉 , Speculator 
2 〈…〉  and Baldus 
3 〈…〉 : by S. Thomas also 
4 〈…〉 , and Astensanus 
5 〈…〉 : and lastly by S. Hierome 
6 〈…〉 , who commendeth Nepotianus for observing this rule.  
As for conformity in behaviour and manner of life, josephus writeth 
* 〈…〉. , that it is the chiefest means to cause concord and agreement in a city. Herodian declareth, that when Antoninus desired the daughter of Artabanus, 
Hero. li. 4.  King of Parthia in marriage, and therewith an association to be made between the two Empires; 
〈…〉.  Artabanus returned answer, that there could be no true concord between them, as neither agreeing in language and differing both in apparel, and in their manners and customs of life. Our late travailers do report, that the inhabitants of the Island japan hold immortal and merciless variance with the people of China: 
I0. Hui●h●n Van 〈◊〉. lib. 1. ca 26  and the rather to manifest the same, they differ from them in all the ceremonies of their behaviour. As namely, where the men of China use the courtesy of salutation by uncovering the head, they of japan do the like by putting off their shoes: where the men of China stand up in giving entertainment, they of japan sit themselves down. And upon the same desire of difference, they use all means to have their teeth and hair black; they sit in house with cloaks upon their shoulders, and lay them aside when they go abroad; their daughters and maidservants go before their women, and their men-servants come behind. By which and divers other contrarieties in behaviour, the opposition of their minds is mightily maintained. 
De doctrina Christ. lib. 3.  For this cause S. Augustine adviseth us, that in transitory matters we separate not from the custom of those, with whom we live. And again, by the authority of S. Ambrose, he concludeth it to be convenient, that into what place soever we come, we apply ourselves to the fashions thereof; if we will not be offensive to any man, 
Si cuiquam ne● 〈◊〉 esse scandal●m 〈◊〉 quam tibl.  nor have any man offensive unto us.   

CHAP. X. Of conformity in language.  
Conformity of language and of speech, was very general under the Empire of Rome: which, whether it were enforced by the Romans, upon the provinces which they did subdue, or whether the people did voluntarily fall into it, 
19 De civit.  many make a question. S. Augustine accounteth it the fact of the imperious City; which word imperious, whether he used in the best sense, for bearing rule, or in the worst, for sharp and severe, it is not material: for many things are severe, which are not unjust, which are not unprofitable. Assuredly, this change of speech is no ways contrary to natural equity; because one language doth no more proceed from nature than another. It may seem hard (I grant) to impose a change of language upon any people; but it seemeth more hard, to be joined with men of a strange tongue: such as are unto us the Spaniards and French. This doth God threaten as a plague to those that obey not his commandments: The Lord shall bring a nation upon thee, 
Deut. 28. 49.  whose tongue thou shalt not understand. And again, by the Prophet jeremy he menaced the jews, 
ler. 5. 15.  that he would bring a nation upon them, whose language they knew not, neither understood what they did say. Likewise he threateneth by the Prophet Esay, 
Esa. 28. 11.  that with a stammering tongue, and in a strange language he will speak unto his people. And to the contrary, it is reputed by the Prophet David, 
Psal ●. 114.  as a great blessing and benefit of God, that the jews were brought from among a people of a strange language. And howsoever S. Augustine termeth Rome Imperious, for changing of languages, 
janguarum diversitas ●ominem alienat ab homine.  yet otherwhere he saith; Diversity of tongues maketh one man a stranger to another. For, as Philo 
* Phi. de sp. le.  witnesseth, society of men is maintained by speech, as being the interpreter or rather expresser of the mind: to which purpose he hath wrote many things, in his book which is entitled of the confusion of tongues. To these I will adjoin the oracle of Philosophy, Plato, who doth truly determine those to be Barbarians, who in the manner both of their language and life hold no community or resemblance together.  
But all these differences do little concern the case in question. They are rather considerable in regard of the Irish, touching whom, the report is both constant and of credit, that being Henry the eighth if not endeavoured, yet purposed to reduce them, to one form both of habit and language with the English: But if we compare together the English and the Scots, in regard of habit (as Sosia said in Plautus) non lac lacti magis est simile; milk is not liker to milk than one of them is to the other. 
In amphit.  Concerning behaviour and manner of life, we may truly say of both people as Aristotle said of the Persians; 
Pic. 10. & Ph. 31.  We cannot possibly change their hearts, except we also change their heaven. Fo● they are both of one climate, not only annexed entirely together, but separated from all the world beside, which joined with daily society and commerce, will necessarily maintain conformity in conditions. And as for language, even in Zetland, and in the most distant islands inhabited by Scots, English preachers are well understood of the common people: so that it seemeth, that if the two nations were reduced under one common name, there should remain between them very little general, either note of difference, or provocation of dislike.   

CHAP. XI. Of conformity in name.  
FOr, that the bearing of one name doth both cause and increase affection and favour, it may appear by a case which Papinian doth form; 
In Leum silius. § pater. D. de l. g. 2.  wherein a certain testator deviseth the greatest portion of his estate to Sempronius his nephew, for the honour of his name: because (as Accursius there noteth) Sempronius did bear the testators name. Laertius in like sort writeth, that Lycon Astyanax, a cerraine philosopher, in his testament among other things disposed thus. Whatsoever I have in the city or in Aegina, I do principally give to Lycon my brother; because he beareth my name.  
When junius Brutus had expelled the government of Kings out of Rome, being stirred thereto, as well upon hatred as desire to be chief, two respects which lead men easily into desperate adventures, Livy writeth, 
Lib. 1.  that he banished Tarquinus Collatinus, who had been husband to Lucrece, and was his fellow Consul, as one that had been very forward in advancing the enterprise: and this he did for no other cause, but for that he bore the same name with Tarquinus Superbus the expelled King.  
Upon variances which began between Frederick the second Emperor, and Pope Gregory the ninth, all Italy except Venice, was divided into the two factions of Guelphs and Gebelines. Afterward when the contentions ceased between the Emperors and the Popes, these factions continued, or rather increased, without any other foundation, either of suspicion or of hate, (most mighty passions to drive on disordered thoughts) but only for diversity of name. Hereupon many insolences, many murders and parricides were daily committed. Neither was the cruelty discharged upon the persons of men only, but houses were ruined, towns were ransacked, fields were wasted, all extremities were pursued with a greater heat of hate, than if it had been against infidels or traitors. And to so high a pitch did this enmity rise, that they could not endure any conformity; not in ensigns, not in colours, not in fashion of their apparel; in disports, in feasts, in the manner of their going, riding, speaking, feeding, and generally in all things they affected a difference.  
The like cruelties have been exercised between divers families of Italy, France, England, Scotland, and many other Christian countries: the beginning whereof hath commonly risen upon some private either interest or revenge; but growing into faction, they have been prosecuted and continued either only or principally upon difference in name. Hereupon Dio writeth, that Maecenas counseled Augustus, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dio. lib. 52. Hail. lib. 2.  that it was the fairest means to cut off emulation and hate, not to permit vain names, or any other thing that might hold men in difference. And so D. Haillan noteth that to make a perfect reconcilement between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans, in the time of Lewes the cleventh, the factious names of Burguignion and Orleannois were taken away. So likewise the Adorni and Fregosi, two families in Genoa, after they had wearied and almost wasted themselves with mutual cruelties, left their old names, as the only means both to draw on and hold their reconcilement. And this did S. Paul in good time foresee, when he blamed the Corinthians for dividing in name; some holding of Paul, some of Apollo's, and some of Cephas.  
Seeing then that the bearing of one name is a mean to knit men in affection and friendship; seeing also that difference in name doth often maintain men in division of mind; what shall we say of them, who more contemning the benefit of Union, than examining the parts and circumstances thereof, do openly object, that they see neither urgent necessity, nor evident utility in comprehending the English and the Scots under one common name? that they find no grief in their present state, and can foresee no advancement to a better condition by this change? Shall we say that their judgement is captivated by affection? I cannot, I dare not, I will not hold that opinion of them. I rather fear that some evil destiny driveth them on. For it is an ordinary thing, that when any hard adventure approacheth, it blindeth the eyes of men that they cannot discern, it bindeth their hands that they cannot help, making them oftentimes both contrivers and executioners of their own mishap. Assuredly, in regard of amity there is manifest profit in community of name; in regard of perfect Union it seemeth necessary. 
§. Si. quis in nomine Inst. de legate.  For seeing (as justinian saith) names do serve to discern and distinguish one thing from another; it is a rule commonly received, that one thing should not principally bear two divers names. 
Re● eadem non d●●●t diverso romine cons●●l.  Hereupon Baldus concludeth, that upon diversity of names we are to presume diversity of bodies: For every thing is to be distinguished by the proper name. 
Res enim singulae singulis sunt nominibus distinguendae. §. Alio. inst. qu●b mod. test. in firm.   
So then the bodily Union (as it seemeth) is not perfect, where there is a severance and distinction in name: much less can two people be perfectly knit in affection and will, so long as they stand divided in those names, whereby one of them hath lately been very odious to the other. So long as they stand divided in those names of hostility and hate, not having any common name to comprise them both, every small accident (as it often happeneth) may be an occasion to sort them into sides: and the combining of them otherwise under one dominion, may prove to be like an unperfect cure, whose fore may afterward more dangerously break forth.   

CHAP. XII. What common name is most fit to comprehend the English and the Scots: and whether the like change of name hath been usual or no.  
But no common name can be so fit to comprise as well the people as the countries of England and Scotland, as is the name of Britain. First, for that it hath been heretofore the ancient common name of all the inhabitants within this I'll: 
L. si. unus. §. pactus. D. de pact. & ib. Bar.  and a thing may easily be reduced to the first condition and state.  
Secondly, for that since this part of the Island was called England, by appointment of King Egbert, yet was not the name of Britain altogether cast off; but was often applied, as well to the kingdom as to the inhabitants, and by them willingly acknowledged, and sometimes assumed. King Alfred was entitled, Governor of the Christians of all Britain. King Eldred did write himself Magnae Britanniae temporale gerens Imperium. King Edgar was styled Monarch of all Britain. King Henry the second was entitled King of all Britain, Duke of Gaescoine, Guienne and Normandy. King john had his coin stamped with this inscription: johannes Rex Britonum; john King of Britain's. And generally in all ages, but chiefly since learning began last to lift up the head, the best writers of all nations have termed the inhabitants of this realm, as well Britain's as English.  
Thirdly, for that howsoever the parts of this Island have changed name, one part being called England, another Scotland, and the third Wales; yet the whole Island, from before the invasion of the Romans until this present time, hath always held the name of Britain, 
In L. Alc●and●●● n. 2. C. de decu. & cor. fill. Assamptio specialis nomi●●s non extinguit nomen generale.  according to that which Bartolus teacheth; By assuming a special name, the general name is not extinguished. So that it seemeth reasonable, that as by severance of the sovereignty of the whole Island, the kingdoms thereof grew into difference of name; so the same kingdoms being now drawn into one, it now bear the name of the whole Island again. And that especially for two respects. The first is a ground of the civil law: Nomina debent esse consequentia rebus; 
§. Est & aliud inst. de dona. L. decernimus. C. de ep. & cl●. L. 1. C de effic. paef urb. L. defenso●is. C. defence. civit.  Names must follow the nature of things. The second is a custom commonly received whereof Bartolus maketh mention: 
* Bar. in L. falsi. §. 1. D. de ●al●.  Quando quis mutat statum, semper mutatio nominis fit; Change of state is always accompanied with change of name.  
And chiefly in this change of state, when divers kingdoms are contracted into one, the change of name doth usually ensue: and that without distinction, whether the Union hath grown by conquest, or by marriage, or by blood, or else by mutual confederation and consent. 
De consu. ad Alb. 6.  Hereupon Seneca saith: Assiduus humani generis discursus est, quotidie aliquid in tam magno orb mutatur nova urbium fundamenta iaciuntur; nova gentium nomina, extinctis nominibus prioribus, aut in accessionem validioris conversis oriuntur: Mankind is in continual motion, every day something is changed in this great world; new foundations of cities are laid, new names of nations are raised, the first names being extinguished, or else made an addition to a greater.  
So Tacitus writeth, 
De mor. Germ. 1  that divers people beyond the Rhine, joining together upon occasion of enterprise, left their ancient names, and were called Germans, being a new name of their own invention. 
Nomine à s●ipsis invento.  The same people are now also called Almans; not upon any conquest, but either because of their courage and strength, or else (which I esteem more probable) because they were a confluence of all sorts of people.  
Those Germans who bordered upon the Ocean between the mouths of the rivers Elbe and Rhine, where the Chauci, and the Cananifates were placed by Tacitus, joining together in arms to recover their liberty against the Romans, 
Belli Goth. li. 1.  Precopius writeth, that upon event of divers victories they changed name, and called themselves Franci, which in the German language signifieth free men. Whereto agreeth that which Tacitus saith, in describing their first victory against the Romans: 
● Magna per Italias Galli●●●● fama, 〈◊〉 lib● 〈◊〉 celebrantur.  They are honoured with great fame through Germany and Gallia for authors of liberty. These French in course and compass of time seated themselves in Gallia, and gave name to the kingdom of that place. But after the death of Clodoveus the first, this kingdom of France was divided among his four sons; whereupon new titles were erected: Childebert being King of Paris, Clodomir of Orleans, Clotair of Soissons, and Theodoric a bastard being King of Metz. After the death of Clotharius, the like division was made among his sons, none of them being entitled King of France. Both these divisions were united again by right of blood; whereupon these particular titles did cease, and were changed into the ancient and general name of France.  
In Italy, Aeneas having attained a state by marriage, and collecting divers people into one; 
Lib. 1. Omnes eodem nomine & ●odem iure Latines vocavit.  Livy saith; He joined them in one law, and called them by one name, Latins. Afterward, when the Romans and the Sabines did knit together into one people, it was under one common name, Quirites.  
The country of Spain by means of divers conquests, of the Goths, Vandals, and Moors, was divided into many several kingdoms, not one of them bearing the name of Spain. These being united again, part by conquest, and part by inheritance, Charles the fifth comprehended them all under the ancient and general name of Spain.  
I omit the Agarens, who changed their name and would be called Saracens, as bearing themselves descended from Sara the freewoman, and not from the bondwoman Hagar. I omit the Heluetians, who now by confederation are called Suitzers, which name was occasioned by the little village Suitz; for that the inhabitants thereof were the first attempters of popular liberty. I omit many other both voluntary and casual changes of name, and will conclude this matter with one example of our own nation.  
When Egbert King of the Westsaxons had brought the Heptarchy of the Saxons under one sceptre, he changed not the names of the subdued kingdoms only, he respected not that he was possessed of the kingdoms of Westsaxons and of Sussex by right of blood; whereof the first had continued in the progenic of Cerdicius (from whom he was descended) about 300. years, the other had been annexed thereto almost 200 years before: but changed the names as well of them as of the rest into one common name of England. So that if we free our minds from rashness and dullness, the two plagues of judging right; if we esteem these and the like proceedings by their naked nature and not by appearances only and shifts, we shall clearly discern, that it is so far from wanting example, that there is scarce any example to the contrary, that divers people have perfectly and for long continuance combined together, whether by conquest, confederation, or right of blood, but it hath been under one common name. But howsoever the tried truth doth stand, it cannot be made so plainly to appear, but an itching tongue may rub against it. To men fearful or suspicious all fancies and conjectures seem matters of truth; and words do easily slide into minds that are inclined to believe.   

CHAP. XIII. Of certain objections concerning matters of state inward, or matters of law.  
But, because we have ears as well as tongues, and the lightest reasons will seem to weigh greatly, if nothing be put in the balance against them, let us consider what other objections are made against this Union of name, and whether they be worthy either of yielding or of answering. It is said, that this alteration of name will inevitably and infallibly draw on an erection of a new kingdom or state, and a dissolution and extinguishment of the old; and that no explanation limitation or reservation can clear or avoid that inconveniency, but it will be full of repugnancy or ambiguity, and subject to much variety and danger of construction. That divers special and several confusions incongruities and mischiefs will necessarily and incidently follow in the present time. As in summoning of Parliaments and recital of the acts of Parliament. In the seals of the kingdom. In the great offices of the kingdom. In the laws, customs, liberties, and privileges of the kingdom. In the residence and holding of such courts as follow the King's person, which by the generality of name may be held in Scotland. In the several and reciproque oaths, the one of his Majesty at his coronation, which is never iterated; the other in the oaths of allegiance homage or obedience, made and renewed from time to time by the subjects. All which acts instruments and forms of government, with a multitude of other forms of records, writs, plead, and instruments of a meaner nature run now in the name of England, and upon the change would be drawn into incertainty and question.  
In truth this is much, if there be much truth in it. But, for my part, I will not take upon me, either to determine or dispute what the law of the realm is, concerning either this general point of erection of a new state by alteration of name, or the particular inconveniences which for the present will ensue; referring myself herein to the learned judges and professors of the same. Yet, under the favour and leave of their judgements, I will propound only two or three doubts, which will serve much to the cleared of this question; protesting therewith, that I bear herein rather a desire to be satisfied, than a purpose to contend.  
The first is, how we may be assured, that by the common laws of England the change of name doth infallibly infer, an erection of a new kingdom, and a dissolution of the old. For, the Common law is commonly taken for the common custom of the realm: and therefore in making proof thereof we usually hear alleged, either judgements and precedents in cases of the same nature, or else arguments drawn from cases somewhat like. But this case in question hath not hitherto been thus determined by the common laws of England; because the name of a kingdom hath not been changed since our common laws were therein planted. Or if it were changed by King Henry the second, and by King john, who styled themselves Kings of Britain, then was it without dissolution of the state. As for arguments à similibus, I do not see of what force they can be in case of the Crown; because by the laws of this realm, the Crown is not touched, much less ruled and ordered either by general terms or by implication; neither doth any act concern the same, if express mention be not thereof made. Again, if the change of name doth infallibly infer the erection of a new kingdom, it seemeth that the King hath power by virtue of his Proclamation to dissolve the whole state and erect a new. Lastly, the little alteration which ensued the change of the King's title in Ireland, maketh this point more questionable and suspect.  
The second doubt is concerning one of the principal inconveniences which are alleged, namely an evasion from the reciproque oaths between the King and the people. For, seeing oaths do altogether concern the soul and conscience, and therefore are understood and ruled only by the laws of religion; I do not see how they should receive construction from any nice point of positive law.  
The third is, how all these inconveniences should be, either so certain, or of such nature and quality, that no provision can clear or avoid them. What? shall we suspect either the weakness of laws, or the weak wisdom of the state? Shall we suspect either the wisdom of the state in making of laws, or the justice thereof in maintaining them? Are laws now of force to hold these matters in form, and shall they not hereafter be able to do the like? Are there any such inward difficulties which laws and policies cannot combat and overcome? For my part I think (and think that I think true) that the wisdom of the state is far above these or any other inward incommodities: especially in a Monarchy, where civil matters are easily redressed, by reason of the supreme authority of the Prince. Neither must we look to enjoy any notable benefit without some difficulty and inconvenience. When did the clouds make flourishing fields, without trouble of moisture? when did the Sun yield plentiful harvest, without annoyance of heat? Such is the weakness of man, that it cannot bear either good or evil simply, without temperature or allay.  
And yet (me think) although all other means to clear these inconveniences should be perplexed and hard, it should be not difficult and direct to avoid the same, by changing the Common law in that point only; and by new decree to establish, that the change of name in the King should not draw on an erection of a new kingdom, and a dissolution of the old; and that whatsoever hath been done or spoken by the one name, should be received by the other. And this I do the rather hold not to be unreasonable, for that then the Common law should herein agree with the Canon and Civil laws; the substance of which laws (although they be often abased by abuse) is the common practice of all the world.  
Concerning the Canon law Panormitane witnesseth: 
1 〈…〉  The Canons attribute no force unto names. 
Pan. tit. de 〈◊〉 qui al. nom. Id. in. li. intern. in si  The Civil law is herein more plentiful and plain: for although it be true which Bartolus saith; 
2 〈…〉  Change of name doth usually follow change of state; yet it holdeth not in conversion, that change of name doth likewise draw with it change of state, but it is plainly decided to the contrary; 
3 〈…〉  Although the name be changed, yet doth the condition thereby receive no change. And this did Dioclesian & Maximinian 
4 〈…〉 nom. Nallo ex hoc preiudicio futura.  by their imperial constitution decree, or rather they declared it to have been often decreed before, that as names were freely imposed at the first, so the change of them is not dangerous, if it be done without deceit. And therefore they that are free may lawfully change name, as it hath been often ordained, without any prejudice thereby to themselves. The reason hereof is plain: first in nature; because by change of accidents the substance doth not change 
5 Mutatio in non substantialibus, non d●tur nowm constitucre. Decia. 5. pr. 4. : secondly in law, because names are imposed at pleasure and do serve for signification of things only 
6 §. Si quis in nomine. 〈◊〉. de leg. 〈◊〉 D. si. cer. pet. l. 6. D. de reb. 〈◊〉. , which, so as they may be understood, it is little material what either name or means be therein used. It sufficeth only that they be known, whether by one name, or by another, or by any description or demonstration, which are equivalent to a name. And sometimes it happeneth (as Cicero saith 
7 〈◊〉. b. 1. 〈◊〉. & epist. lib. 9 ad 〈◊〉 Patum. ) that things are better understood by other names, than by their own. Hereupon the interpreters of the Civil law do agree 
8 Glo. 〈◊〉. & 〈…〉 D. fol. 〈…〉 n●min●us, pert●●bus relin suitur. , that so long as there is no question of the body, we are not to have regard to the name; and that disputation about names, is to be left unto them who are obstinately contentious.  
And this either declaration or change of this point of Common law, would not be much unlike to that which was done in the beginning of Queen Mary's reign. For, because in many ages before the invasion of the Normans, the sovereignty of state had not been borne by a woman, some curious conceits, having learned doubts out of leisure, brought into question, whether the laws which had passed before under the name of King, should then be of force under the name of Queen. Whereupon a declaration was made; 
2. Mar. 2. Par. 1.  that whatsoever statute or law doth appoint, that the King of this realm shall or may have, execute and do, as King, or doth give any commodity to the King, or doth appoint any punishment of offenders, against the dignity of the King, the same, the Queen, being supreme governess, may by the same authority likewise have, exercise, execute, correct and do, to all intents.  
By this means also another doubt may be sufficiently secured, and that is, a possibility of alienation of the Crown of England to the line of Scotland in case his majesties line should determine: for that, being a new erected kingdom it must go in the nature of a purchase to the next heir of his majesties father's side. Which, besides that it is against the natural order of succession, which is observed by all nations, in questions for descent of Crowns; besides that it is contrary to the Civil laws, whereby the law of nations is chiefly declared; besides that the peculiar law of England in this point, if it be clear from question, is neither hard nor inconvenient to be changed, seemeth also so unlike to come to pass, that it appeareth a vain thing to busy our thoughts with fear of it. But to men settled in suspicion, doubts do daily multiply; and nothing is considered and cast, nothing nourished with more sweet delight than difficulties and dangers. All those inconveniences are set in view, which jealousy or fear can any ways stir up, which suffereth not them to see, much less to expect or hope for those benefits, whereof in reason they might stand assured. In their minds lie vanquished that forwardness and force which men in counsel should especially express; and whatsoever their travailing thoughts do suspect, the same do they most certainly expect.   

CHAP. XIIII. Of other objections concerning matter of state foreign, or matter of intercourse.  
THe objections which concern matter of contract or commerce with other Princes and Commonwealths, are more easy to be answered; because they are not ruled by the peculiar law of any country, but by the common law of Nations. 
Bald. 1. cons. 263. 372. 2. 14. 3. 218. 5. 188. 352. Alc. 3. cons. 36. 5. 12. 18. 105. 8. 49. 54.  For so do Baldus and Alciate affirm, that contracts between Princes are not stricti juris, but bonae fidei; that they do altogether reject scrupulous interpretations, and are not to be taken, either in rigorous or strict terms, or else in subtle sense of positive law, (under which colour we do often err) but according to the law of Nations, according to natural equity, boni viri arbitrio, according to a good man's conscience, according to plain and direct meaning, according to right and upright judgement: that they are far from all fine fetches and strains, much more from malice and plain deceit: that they intent no subtlety, but simplicity, which Baldus saith, 
Bald. L. 5. de just.  is the best interpreter of the law of nations. For the law of nations observeth only the simple truth; 
Bar. C. de his qui in pit. lo. ord su. Ceph. cons. 713.  the simple truth only is followed by good and faithful meaning: 
* Ceph. cons. 10.  and no interpretation in this case is taken for good, which doth not sound well to common men's ears. This same is by divers others also very largely affirmed. 
Dec. cons. 4. 147 hot. cons. 15. Decian. 3. cons. 11. chas. ca p. 5. 10. 27.  Decius, Hottoman, Decianus and Chassaneus do write, that all contracts with princes and commonwealths are bonae fidei. 
* c. jurisgentium. dist. 1. Cic. 1. de office & 2. de orat.  The Canon law fort contracts of leagues, of truce and of peace, as pertaining to the law of nations. Cicero saith, that equity is the object of Foecial law; that it pertaineth to lawyers to weigh words and syllables, and not to the professors of military simplicity, which is so many ways favoured by the law. 
Tac. Agric. Alci. 5. consil. 40. ● Guic. 5. Sleid. 19  It is free and secure (saith Tacitus, and after him Alciate) and far from the cunning practices of courts of Plea. And therefore Guicciardine and Sleidan do worthily blame Charles the fifth, and Lewes King of France, because they brought interpretations of words, and of contracts, which were more fit for Lawyers, than for a Prince.  
So then, by these opinions thus grounded it cannot hold true, that upon change of name, leagues, treaties, foreign freedoms of trade and traffic, foreign contracts may be drawn into question, and made subject to quarrel and cavillation: which is further expressly denied by Panormitane in these words. 
In C. tuanos. n. 3 de spons.  Contrahens in propria persona, efficaciter obligatur, licet mutaverit sibi nomen; & est ratio, quia nomina sunt inventa significandorum hominum gratia. Sed ex quo constat de corpore non est curandum de nomine. He that contracteth in his proper person is effectually bound, although he shall change his name: the reason is, because names were invented to signify men. But where the body is certain, we must not have regard to the name. And Ulpian, 
〈◊〉 D. de conlia●. 〈◊〉.  one of the authors of the Civil law in like manner advoweth: If we disagree about the name, but the body is certain, there is no doubt but the contract holdeth good.  
And therefore if any Prince shall use pretence of change in name, as a leap from his contract, whether of consederation or commerce, he exposeth himself thereby both to the hatred and revenge of other Princes, as one that violateth the law of nations. His fact shall be no more either allowed or followed, than was that of Pericles; 
●ront. 4. ca 7.  who, having passed a promise of safety to his enemies, Si ferrum deponerent, slew them for that they had iron buttons upon their caslocks. Or that of the Plataeenses; who, 
Thucid. lib. 2.  having covenanted to restore certain prisoners, delivered them slain. Or that of Alexander, 
Diod. 17. Polye. 4. At. 4. ●lut. Ale●. Lon.  who, having conditioned safe departure to certain soldiers which had held a city against him, slew them when they were a little upon their way. Or that of the Romans; who, 
V●len. Max. 7. ca ●.  having covenanted that they should take half the ships of Antioc●us, broke all his ships in pieces, and took half of every ship. Or that of those Romans; who, 
〈…〉  being discharged by Hannibal upon oath to return, if other captives should not be delivered for them, supposed themselves to be free of their saith, for that presently after they were departed out of the camp, they returned again, as having forgotten to take something with them. 
Stro. ●. Poly. 6. 7. 〈…〉.  Or that of Agnon, Cleomenes, and of the Thracians; who, having made a surcease of arms for certain days, attempted hostility against their enemies in the night. 
Polye. 6.  Or that of the Grecians; who, having bound themselves for delivery of ships, delivered them without ruthers, oars or sails. Or that of the Locrians; who, having contracted perpetual peace, so long as they should tread upon that earth, and bear those heads upon their shoulders, shaking forth some earth which they had privily put within their shoes, and casting away those heads of onions, which they had laid upon their shoulders, they broke suddenly into war against those who by this abuse had been made secure. 
Herod. 4. Polye. 7.  Or that of Ariandes and the Persians; who, having couena●ed friendship so long as that earth should stand, by sinking the earth whereupon they stood, which had been of purpose made hollow before, they did bear themselves discharged of their oath. 
Pont. li. de. V. O.  Or that of the Perusini in Italy; who, having made peace with the Pope so long as they should bear de vite in their bodies, which word in the Italian language signifieth both life, and vine, having cast away certain vine-branches which they did bear secretly in their bosoms, they surprised the Pope with unexpected arms.  
These and the like subtle and sophistical sleights have always been equalled to flat falsehood and violation of faith; they have always been esteemed beneath the degree of any base railing or reproach. And whosoever doth use such avoydances and shifts, they are never to be held assured in faith; because they will not want one evasion or other, when occasion shall serve for their advantage. But (as I said before) in contracts of this high nature, 
Bald. 5. cons. 305.  it is both dishonourable and unjust not only to infer fraudulent interpretations, but to enforce contentions upon any strict points of law, 
3. Cons. 102.  which (as Decianus saith) in favourable contracts are never regarded: because by too much subtlety they do often overthrow the truth of meaning. 
Dec. 3. con. 84.  For, nothing is more contrary unto truth, than over sharp subtlety upon words.  
Of no less truth can it be that the King's precedence before other Christian kings (which is governed by antiquity of kingdoms and not by greatness) may by this change of laws be endangered, and place turned last, because it is the newest. For, by the common law of nations (the equity whereof is held to be most lively expressed in the Civil law) so long as the people do remain the same, and lose no point of their liberty and honour, there can be no inward change, whether of name, of seat, of title, or of form of government, whereby the dignity of their state may be endangered. Of name I have sufficiently written before. And concerning change of state, it was the same Empire whose principal seat was at Rome, and at Constantinople, and at Ravenna, and at Prage. And although it looseth in one part and gaineth on the other; although it be removed thereby out of the original seat, yet doth it remain the same Empire. 
L. 64. D. de evict.  Even as a field remaineth the same which looseth upon one part by allwion of waters, and winneth upon the other: or as it remaineth the same sea, which leaveth one part of earth, and possesseth another: or as it remaineth the same river which doth altogether change the channel.  
For change of title we have an evident example in the country of Bohemia. For, when that form of election of the German Emperor was established which is yet in use, the Duke of Bohemia had authority to give his voice, in case the other six Electors should be equally divided. Afterward, the Duke was advanced to the title of a King; which was held no such alteration in that state, that his privilege should be thereby either renewed or lost.  
The greatest doubt is concerning change in form of government; because upon change in form, 
L. 9 §. si quis. D. ad exhib.  the substance is always esteemed divers. But this is not true in accidental forms; it is true in that thing only whereof the substantial form doth perish. When the Kings were expelled out of Rome, the Monarchical form of that government did change, and thereupon the Monarchical Empire of Rome did cease; but the Empire of Rome did not therefore cease. The Roman Empire did always remain, although the government thereof was sometimes regal, sometimes popular, and sometimes mixed: although the sovereignty was transferred, from Kings to Consuls, and from Consuls to Emperors; and although these Emperors did hold, sometimes by succession, and sometimes by election; and that sometimes of the soldiers, and sometimes of the Senate, and now of the seven Electors. The form of government which was accidental, did change; but the substantial form of Empire did remain.  
But than doth a kingdom or Empire dissolve, when it loseth the liberty; and then is a state newly erected, when it beginneth to be held free, either from subjection or dependency upon any other. Of the first Ulpian speaketh: 
L. 209. D. de in. reg.  servitutem mortalitati comparamus; We compare servitude unto death. Of the second Modestinus: 
L. 4. D. de ca mi.  Eo die incipit statum habere, cum manumittitur; State and liberty begin together. So did all those kingdoms and commonwealths cease, saith Decianus, 
Dec. 3. con. 19  which were oppressed by the arms of the Romans: and so were those states newly erected, which could free themselves from that subjection.  
And in truth by no other means a state can be said to perish or cease, according to the law of Nations, but either by yielding itself into subjection, or else by being possessed with the power and arms of external enemies. But this faileth again in three cases. 
Arg. l. 1. de flu. & l. 1. de riu. Alc. 5. cons. 69.  First, when any part is retained free. For that kingdom or Empire ceaseth not, whereof any parcel is held at liberty; because the least part of a kingdom (either for hope of restitution, or for some other favourable respect) doth conserve both the name and right of the whole: even as the right of a College or of an University may be retained in one, 
Bald. in Prooem. D. & l. 9 de leg●. ●. ●an. Ca l. 22. de leg. 1.  although in one it cannot be erected. Another is, if a kingdom be overrun and spoiled by enemies, but they depart again, not holding the same in their possession and power. For this is as if a field should be surrounded with waters, 
Inst. de rer. diu.  which in short time falling away, leaveth it in the same condition and state as it was before. 
●lin. lib. 2. cap. 103.  And so the rivers Niger and Tigris do remain the same, although they run many miles under ground. The third is, when the Victorer pretendeth title to the state, and intendeth only to reign as King.   

CHAP. XV. Of other objections which concern honour and reputation.  
NOw, the last sort of objections which concern honour and reputation, are full of very empty easiness: and seem to serve rather for show, than for strength; to supply number, but nothing at all to increase weight. These are, that by this change, the glory and good acceptance of the English name and nation, will be in foreign parts obscured: that no worldly thing is dearer to men than their name, as we see in great families, that men disinherit their daughters to continue their name; much more in states, where the name hath been famous and honourable: that the contracted name of Britain, will bring into oblivion the names of England and Scotland: that whereas England in the style is now placed before Scotland, in the name of Britain, that degree of priority and precedence will be lost: and that the change of name will be harsh in the popular opinion, and unpleasing to the country.  
Of all these objections, the more I think, the less I know what to think. For as I can suspect nothing less than want of judgement in those that cast these inconveniences, so do they appear unto me neither so certain, nor of such quality, that for avoiding of them we should omit an advantage, both present, and of great consequence and weight. Although the 7. kingdoms of the Saxons were comprised under the name of England, yet their several names do still, & are still like to remain: and can we imagine that the names of England and of Scotland, both more famous and of longer continuance, will suddenly be either worn out or obscured? Cannot the name be altered, but it must also be forgotten? Or can we account the name of Britain either so new or so harsh, which hath continued to be the name, generally of the whole Island, but more specially of the parts of England and Wales, ever since before the invasion of the Romans? Or shall we contend for general precedence with them, with whom we intent, or at least pretend desire to be one? Can priority and unity stand together? Some (I grant) upon fond affection to their name have disinherited their daughters; but they were never allowed therein, by any well grounded opinion. S. Augustine saith, If any man disinheriteth his daughter and maketh another his heir, 
Alium quaerat consultorem, non Augustinum.  let him seek what Counsellor he can, he shall never be advised thereto by Augustine. Assuredly, I fear that it is with us, as with some good women, who are often sick, forsooth, but in faith they cannot well tell where. Our fancies run, that something will be amiss; but neither can it be well discerned by others, neither is it fully perhaps resolved by ourselves. Things of greatest surety breed many doubts in minds that are determined to believe the contrary; whereas, in matters of this nature, all points are not always cast into question which may possibly happen; for that many inconveniences are in imagination only; many are, either dissolved by time, or by industry avoided: much less are we bound to listen unto those, who confounding fear with discretion, or else covering some corrupt conceit under the name of foresight and prevention, do stretch their thoughts beyond probability, and make all doubtful accidents as if they were certain. 
Liu. c. lib. 22.  Agendo audendoque res Romana crevit, non his segnibus consilijs, quae timidi cauta vocant: By doing and by daring (saith Livy) the affairs of Rome took increase; not by these dull and heavy counsels which timorous men do term wary. A wit too curious in casting of doubts for the most part hurteth; and he that omitteth an opportunity present upon supposed dangers (if they be not both certain and also near) shall never advance his own advantage.  
King Henry the seventh aimed at this Union, when he married his eldest daughter Margaret into Scotland. King Henry the eight and all the chief Nobility of the realm expressly desired it, when they laboured to have a marriage knit between Edward and Mary, the two young Princes of both the kingdoms. In soliciting this marriage, the English made offer to communicate to the Scots the liberties and privileges of their state, and to be joined with them in the common name of Britain; as appeareth by a letter of the Duke of Somerset yet extant. For not obtaining this marriage, they led an Army into Scotland, and joined fight with the Scots in Muscelborough fields. These attempts not succeeding; our evil fortune having frustrated these good endeavours; lo here, our felicity now offereth us to kiss her cheeks; our wish, lo here; and that which lately neither by amity nor by arms we were able to effect, lo here, is freely presented unto us. Seeing therefore our good fortune hath now concurred with the good favour and inclination of men, in opening this opportunity unto us, shall we deal so far against all good office and expectation, as not to seem content with our bliss? Shall we all shut, or rather pull out our eyes, because a few do not seem to see? Or shall we, like some men, when a great good happeneth unto them, think ourselves in a dream, and not have power to taste our good? Shall we bury benefits with suspicions? Shall we labour, with counsels fearful and broken to obscure, or with dregs of doubts and jealousies to defile our own glory? Must we be entreated (like mad men) to be good to ourselves?  
I fear nothing less in us, than such want of wisdom; I fear nothing less, than that in minds so well instructed, 
Pessimum veri affectus venenum sua cuique utilitas. Ta. Histo.  particular respects (the bane, as Tacitus speaketh, of true affection) should not be far inferior to the consideration of common greatness and glory. Only I wish by way of warning, that we be not too much amazed at every accidental change, fearing we know not what, like a Deer, which then looketh most about when he cometh to the best feed. Or that we be not more regardful of light harms that are but in show, than mindful to foresee, least with loss of assured benefits, great dangers also resolve into effects; least by obstinate confirmation of our first advice such firebrands of faction be kindled amongst us, as cannot be quenched but in the blood of the state. It is good to join action to opportunity. Time is thankful to such as will apprehend it, and favoureth them with occasions convenient: but it was not unfitly portrayed by Lycippus, with hinds feet, and Eagles wings, hairy before, and smooth behind; in token that if it be not taken when it comes, it cannot be overtaken when it is gone. Fortune is serviceable to those that are forward: but they that are either careless or slow when advantage is offered, do seldom manage their affairs to an honourable issue.  
For this cause confidence for the most part is less hurtful to affairs, than faint fear, which under the fair names of foresight and prevention, looseth many benefits, which either our own felicity, or the industry of other men presenteth unto us. It beareth show of slow and sober wariness; but it is often supported with the insolency and rashness of turbulent spirits, which partly by incapacity, and partly by particular respects, hold all things in confusion. For timorousness and insolency are commonly joined in the same subject. It is not foresight but fear to provide beyond probability: but to cast many inconveniences, either contemptible, or but in show, doth savour of some other passion of worse nature.  
I will not proceed to charge any man with artificial doubling, first in casting forth a light labour for Union, and then in disposing and dispersing these objections against it: I will not (howsoever provoked) either aggravate or apply the quality of this dealing. But again I will advise (for I think it not unfit to be repeated) that we show not ourselves too subtle in suspicions; making our own fantasies the true measure of all our actions. That by moderation of mind we rather seek increase of friends, than by new attempts to procure daily new enemies; by reason whereof in the end we must be, either masters of all, or scourged by all: and which of these is likest to happen it may be easily conjectured, if we be not set to deceive ourselves.  
FINIS.