A MODEST REPLY TO Certain Answers, which Mr. Gataker B. D. in his Treatise of the Nature, & use of Lots, giveth to Arguments in a Dialogue concerning the Vnlawfulnes of Games consisting in Chance.  
And Answers to his Reasons allowing Lusorious Lots, as not evil in themselves.  
By james Balmford, minister of jesus Christ.  2. Cor. 13. 8. 
We can do nothing against, but for the truth▪  Ephes. 5. 11. 
Have no fellowship with the unfruitful works Darkness, but even reproove them rather.  
❧  
Imprinted 1623.▪   

A SHORT AND PLAIN DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE VNLAWfulnes of playing at Cards, or Tables, or any other Game consisting in chance.  
OFFERED TO THE RELIGIous consideration of all such as make conscience of all their ways.  1. Thessal. 5. 21. 
Try all things, and keep that which is good.  
Imprinted at London for Richard Boil 1591.▪  
Reprinted 1623.   

To the right Worshipful Master Lionel Maddison, Maior, the Aldermen his Brethren▪ and the godly Burgesses of Newcastle upon Tine; JAMES BALMFORD wisheth the kingdom of God & his righteousness that other things may be ministered unto them.  
THat which heretofore I have propounded to you (right Worshipful & beloved) in teaching, I do now publish to all men by printing, to wit, mine opinion of the unlawfulness of Games consisting in chance. My desire is either information, if I err in judgement, or reformation, of so lewd a practice. But whether I err or no (which yet I would gladly understand, 
Rom. 3. 7.  for I ought not to teach an untruth, though to God's glory) yet there is none, zealous indeed against sin, desirous from the heart to reclaim sinners, and who deeply considereth the grievous abuses, which accompany dicing and carding, (as horrible swearing, dangerous quarrelling, loss (I say not of good hours, but) of nights and days, & the pitiful undoing of too too many) but will remember that all things are not 
1. Cor. 6. 12.  expedient, which are lawful, and therefore abstain from such Heathenish pastimes, that ifby their example they cannot reform, 
1. Cor. 8. 9  they may be sure they do not confirm gamesters in their inordinate walking. Which respect▪ the 7. Injunction forbidding Ministers to use these unlawful games, may besupposed to have. Now that which authority exacteth of Ministers, doth Religion require of all true Professors. For as the one are to be ensamples to the flock, 
1. Tit. 5. 3. Phil. 1. 5. 1. Cor. 8 10. 13.  so the other are to be lights in the world. And therefore as Paul saith, If meat offend my brother, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth: so every true Christian should say, and that with more resolution (for Play is not so necessary as meat) If play offend my brother, who seeing me▪ having knowledge, play, is boldened to follow gaming, I will not play while the world standeth. Which care unto edification, if 
Psal. 50. 16. 17.  all, who have the word in their mouths, and would not be thought to hate to be reform, would manifest in their sincere conversation; and if Magistrates, who 
Rom. 13 4. 33. H. 8. c. 9 ●. E. 6. c. 25.  should not carry the sword in vain, would do what they may by law, to banish these forbidden pastimes, or rather lost-times, I doubt not, but that preaching and writing against them would more mightily prevail, and this good would come of it, many would apply themselves to better exercises, there would be less time misspent in Alehouses, and Godless provoked to displeasure against us. But these things I refer to the consideration of the wise, and this my Dialogue to the judgement of the godly, chiefly to you, whose good I wish especially. Farewell: From my study the first of januarie 1593.   

A short and plain Dialogue concerning the unlawfulness of playing at Cards or Tables, or any other game consisting of chance.  Professor. 
SIR, howsoever I am persuaded by that which I read in the common places of Peter Martyr, par. 2. pag. 525. b. that Dice (condemned both by the Civil laws, and by the Fathers) are therefore unlawful, because they depend upon chance: yet not satisfied with that which he writeth of Table-playing, pag. 526. b. I would craven your opinion concerning playing at Tables and Cards.  Preacher. 
Saving the judgement of so excellent a Divine, so far as I can learn out of God's word, Cards and Tables seem to me● no more lawful (though less offensive) than Dice. For Table-playing is no whit the more lawful because Plato compares the life of man thereunto, than a thief is the more justifiable, because Christ compareth his second coming, ●o Burglary in the night, Mat. 24. 4●▪ 44. Again, if Dice be wholly ●●ill▪ because they wholly depend upon chance, than Tables & Cards must needs be some what evil▪ because they somewhat depend upon chance. Therefore consider well this reason, which condemneth the one as well as the other: Lots are not to be used in sport; but games consisting in chance as Dice, Cards, Tables, are Lots: therefore 
joh. 8. 40. 1. Cor. 11. 15.  not to be used in sport.  Prof. 
For my better instruction, prove that Lots are not to be used in sport.  Preach. 
Consider with regard these three things: First, that we● 
1.  read not in the Scripture that Lots were used but only in serious matters both by the jews, Ios. 18. 10. and Gentiles, jon. 1. 9 Secondly, 
2.  that a Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the special providence & determining presence of God, as an oath in the nature thereof doth suppose the testifying presence of God. Yea so, that (as in an oath, so) in a lot prayer is expressed, or to be understood, 1. Sam. 14. 41. Thirdly, 
3.  that the proper end of a Lot (as of an oath, Heb. 6. 16.) is to end a controversy: and therefore for your bettet instruction examine these reasons. Whatsoever directly, or 
1.  of it sefe, or in a special manner, tendeth to the advancing of the name of God, is to be used religiously, Mal. 1. 6. 7. and not to be used in sport: as we are not to pray or swear in sport, Exod. 20. 7. Esa▪ 29. 13. jer. 4. 2. but the use of Lots, directly of itself and in a special manner tendeth to the advancing of the name of God, in attributing to his special providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and expecting the event, Pro. 16. 33. Act. 1. 24. 26. Therefore the use of Lots is not to be in 
2.  sport. Again we are not to tempt the Almighty by a vain desire of manifestation of his power and special providence, Psal. 78. 18. 19 Esa▪ 7. 12. Matth. 4. 6. 7. But by using Lots in sport we tempt the almighty, vainly desiring the manifesta● of his special providence in his immediate 
3.  disposing, Therefore, etc. Lastly, whatsoever God hath sanctified to a proper end is not to be perverted to a worse, Matth. 21. 12. 13. But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, namely to end troversies, Num. 26. 55. Pro. 18. 18. therefore man is not to pervert them to a worse: namely to play, & by playing to get away another man's money, which without controversy is his own. For the common saying is, Sine lucro friget lusus, No gaining, cold gaming.  Profess. 
God hath sanctified Psalms to the praise of his name, & bread & wine to represent the body & blood of our crucified Saviour, which be holy ends: and the children of God may sing Psalms to make themselves merry in the Lord, and feed upon bread & wine not only for necessity but to cheer themselves; why then may not Gods children recreate themselves by lottery notwithstanding God hath sanctified the same to end a controversy?  Preach. 
Because we find not in the Scriptures any dispensation for recreation by lottery, as we do for godly mirth by singing, jam. 5. 13. and for religious and sober cheering ourselves by eating and drinking, Deut. 8. 9 10. And therefore (it being withal considered that the ends you speak of, be not proper, though holy) it followeth, that God who only disposeth the Lot touching the event, and is therefore a principal actor, is not to be set on work by lottery in any case, but when he dispenseth with us, or giveth us leave foe to do: But dispensation for recreation by lottery cannot be showed, Therefore, etc.  Profess. 
Lots may be used for profit in a matter of right, Num. 26. 55. why not for pleasure?  Preach. 
Then oaths may be used for pleasure, for they may foot profit, in a matter of truth, Exod. 22. 8. 11. But indeed lots (as oaths) are not to be used either for profit or pleasure, but only to end a controversy.  Profess. 
The wit is exercised by Tables and Cards, therefore they be no lots.  Preach. 
Yet lottery is used by casting Dice, and by shuffling and cutting the Cards before the wit is exercised. But how doth this follow? Because Cards and Tables be not naked Lots, consisting only in chance (as Dice do) they are therefore no lots at all. Although (being used without cogging, or packing) they consist principally in chance, and therefore from thence they are to receive their denomination. In which respect a Lot is called in Latin Sors, that is, chance or hazard, and Lyra upon Prou. 16. saith, To use Lots, is, by a variable event of foam sensible thing, to determine some doubtful or uncertain matter, as to draw cuts, or to cast Dice.  
But whether you will call Cards and Tables Lots, or no, you play with chance or use Lottery. Then consider whether exercise of wit doth sanctify playing with lottery, or playing with lottery make such excercising of wit, a sin, Hag. 2. 13. 14. For as a calling God to witness by vain swearing is a sin, 2. Cor. 1. 13. so making God an umpire, by playing with lottery, must needs be a sin: yea, such a sin as maketh the offender (in some respects) more blame-worthy. For there be more occasions of swearing than of lottery. Secondly, vain oaths most commonly slip out at unawares, whereas lots cannot be used but with deliberation. Thirdly, swearing is to satisfy other, whereas this kind of lottery is altogether to fulfil our own lust. Therefore take heed, that you be not guilty of perverting the ordinance of the Lord, of taking the name of God in vain, and f tempting the Almighty, by a gamesome putting of things to haard, and making play of lottery, xcept you think that God hath o gouvernment in vain actions, r hath dispensed with such lewd ●ames.  Profess. 
In shooting there is a chance, ● a sudden blast, yet shooting is no lottery.  Preach. 
It is true, for that chance comes by accident, and not of ●he nature of the game, to be used.  Profess. 
Lots are secret, and the whole disposing of them is of God, Pro 16. 33. ●ut it is otherwise in Tables and Cards.  Preach. 
Lots are cast into the ●ap by man, and that openly, lest conveyance should be suspected: ●ut the disposing of the chance is secret, that it may be chance indeed, and wholly of God, who directeth all things, Prou. 16. 13. 9 33 So in Tables, man by fair casting Dice truly made, and in Cards by shuffling and cutting, doth openly dispose the Dice and Card so, as whereby a variable even may follow: but it is only and immediately of God, that the Dice be so cast, and the Cards so shuffled and cut, as that this or that gam followeth, except there be cogging and packing. So that in fair play man's wit is not exercised in disposing the chance, but in making the best of it being past.  Profess. 
The end of our play is recreation, and not to make God an umpire: but recreation (no doubt) is lawful.  Preach. 
It may be the soldiers had no such end when they cast lots for Christ his coat, Matth▪ 27▪ 25. but this should be your end when you use lottery, as the end of an oath should be, to call God to witness. Therefore as swearing, so Lottery, without due respect is sin. Again, howsoever recreation be your pretended end, yet remember that we must not do evil that good may come of it, Rom. 3. 8. And that therefore we are to recreate ourselves by lawful recreations. Then see how Cards and Tables be lawful▪  Profess. 
If they be not abufed by swearing or brawling, playing for too long time, or too much money.  Preach. 
Though I am persuaded that it is not lawful to play for any money, considering thanks cannot be given in faith for that which is so gotten, De●t. 23. 18. Esa▪ 61. 8. Gamesters work not with their hands the thing that good, to be free from stealing, Eph. 4. 18. & the loser hath not answerable benefit for his money so lost, Gen▪ 29. 15. contrary to that equity which Aristotle by the light of nature hath taught long since, Eth. ●. ●. 4. yet I grant that Cards and Tables so used as you speak are, less sinful, but how they be lawful I see not yet.  Profess. 
Good men and well learned use them.  Preach. 
We must live by precepts, not by examples, except they be undoubtedly good. Therefore examine whether they be good, and well learned in so doing or no. For every man may err, Rom. 3. 4.  Profess. 
It is not good to be too just, or too wise, Eccl. 7. 18.  Preach. 
It is not good to be too wicked or too foolish, Eccl. 7. 19 in despising the word of God, Prou. 1. 22. and not regarding the weakness of others, Rom. 14. 21. Let us therefore beware that we love not pleasure more than godliness, 2. Tim. 3. 4.  
FINIS.   

CHristian Reader; it is no new thing that men▪ learned, wise, and judicious, holding the same orthodox, and sound truth of God, in respect of main, and fundamental points of Christian Religion, do sometimes differ in their opinions, and be of different judgements touching some things of less importance▪ It pleaseth God (who ordereth all things most wisely for the spiritual good of his own) by his wise disposing hand to order differences in opinion, and judgement in the smallest matters for the further good of his Church. Though the jarring of Paul, and Barnabas (Act. 15. 37.) caused a separation of the one from the other, yet (God so disposing) the Church got much good by it and things questioned, and controverted (though of lesser weight are commonly more narrowly searched into, and upon diligent search into them, they come to b● better cleared, and the gifts o● worthy men to be better known It were no hard matter to instanc● in many particulars clearing thi● from many ages foregoing; but ● list not to enter into that large field. The ensuing Reply considered with the occasion of it, may, in part, evidence, the truth herein▪ Some years since, the Author o● this Reply, published a Dialogue touching Lottery, and Lots, disprooving, (by divers arguments,) the using of Lots in sport, and in play; and now some few years past finding his arguments opposed, and held as weak, and insufficient, by a worthy, reverend, and judicious Divine, in a treatise of his printed touching the Nature, and use of Lots, he held himself bound, upon further, and more serious consideration of the point called into question, either to alter his judgement, or to endeavour, to strengthen his former arguments: He hath set upon the business, and now offered to thy view (Christian Reader) his Reply tending to the further strengthening▪ and confirmation of those arguments. My poor judgement touching this Reply being desired by the Author, I could not but yield it unto him, he being my reverend, and loving friend, to whom I am obliged by many bonds of love. I have perused it, & so far as I, (in my weakness) can judge, the Author hath herein carried himself wisely, and judiciously, and so as, I think, may satisfy any indifferent reader, and with all (as I take it) modestly, and temperately, and without the least breach of charity towards the worthy Opponent. Happily I may be thought unfit thus to give mine opinion, because (as I freely confess, & have openly made known) I jump with this Author in judgement in the point controverted, but I profess before him, who knows the hearts of all men, that, which here I put down, is (as I conceive) according to the truth, without any inclining, or partial affection to the one one side, or to the other, and I desire not to entertain the least thought, that may prejudice the worth of the reverend, learned, and godly Opponent, being also my dear, and loving friend, and one whom I am bound, in many respects, both to love, and reverence. Look upon this Reply (whosoever thou art) with an unpartialleye, and consider it seriously, and fin ding that good by it, which is intended, bless God for it, who guideth, and blesseth all things to his own glory, and to the good of his own.  
Thine in the Lord Iesu● Edw: Elton. B. in D. and Pastor of S. Mary Magda len's Bermondsey near London.   


2. Tim. 3. 4.  To the Christian Reader being none of those men▪ who, (according to S. Paul's prophecy,) love pleasures more than God.  

jonah. 1. 7.  SOme years are passed since Mr. Gataker took occasion, from casting of Lots to find out for whose sake a dangerous storm was, to justify playing with Dice, Cards, etc. and to confute me by name in open pulpit. I hearing thereof by many, sent him this message. If it would please him to send the substance of the Confutation (for I dare not rely upon report) I would either reply, or change mine opinion with thanks to God for him; though for the present, I thought he failed in Indgment, Discretion, and Charity. In judgement. Because that Doctrine was not drawn from his Text; Except this be a judicious deduction. Gentiles cast Lots in a most serious matter, therefore Christians may use Lottery in dicing, carding, etc. In Discretion. Because that Doctrine (though occasioned by his text, yet) so insisted upon, encourageth gamesters in their sinful course and buildeth up those abuses, which the Laws of our Land, would pull down. In Charity; Because he confuteth me by name, (as I was certified) not having had any conference with me either by speech, or by writing, though I be his neighbour Minister. Well; Mr. Gataker, sent me his answer to my dialogue. I acknowledge it with hearty thanks. But why have I not replied in so many years? I answer, Sa●●itò, si sat benè. To speak freely I think, I should never have replied, in hope that the question would have died, had not Mr. Gataker confuted my Dialogue in print▪ But now, the rather, being provoked▪ by many learned Ministers & other, who tell me, that, seeing of all those whom Mr. Gataker confuteth, viz: Peter Martyr, Zuinglius, Cartwright, 
10 1.  Danoeus, Perkins, Fenner, etc. I only live, I ought to reply, lest my silence should give way to impiousiniquity, I am ready to perform my promise in replying. Which (indeed) I could not have done so conveniently before, because the answer, which Mr. Gataker sent me, had not the positive grounds of his opinion, which the printed book hath.  
Before I proceed▪ I protest before God, that I esteem Mr. Ga●aker as a learned, painful, and faithful Minister, and a right honest man, and therefore pray thee (Christian Reader) that whatsoever I write may be considered as concerning the question between us, and not in any wise applied to the least praejudice of so reverend a brother, or to any of his excellent parts; So excellent, that I wonder what moved him to publish his opinion in print, and the more, because of many passages in his book. First, He taketh knowledge 
1▪  of many enormous crimes, which accompany Dice, Cards, etc. pa. 193. & in the quotations. Secondly; 
2.  He giveth this rule, That, that, which is no necessary duty, but a thing indifferent only, otherwise, may not be done, where is strong presumption upon good ground yet it shall spiritually endanger a man's self, or others, by giving occasion of sin unto the one, or the other. pag. 107. 108. 109.  
If many and grievous sins attend dice, cards, etc. If those games be too too commonly abused, as he confesseth. pa: 194. and if an indifferent thing may not be done which giveth occasion of sin, I wonder why Mr. Gataker writeth in defence of dice, etc. and the more, because he granteth, that, where the use, and abuse of a thing are so enwrapped, and entangled together, that they cannot easily be severed the one from the other, than the use of the thing itself, (if it be unnecessary otherwise) would be wholly abandoned, pag. 262. 263. Thirdly; He showeth in many pages▪ how severely tables, but especially dice, be condemned by Laws, Civil, Canonical, and Municipal, that is, our English statutes, as ●e showeth at large, Lib. 8. § 5. 8. He wisheth the Laws were yet ●ore severe, & put in better execution, pà. 206. He saith, yet our ●ommon dicers may be marshaled among ye flock, of ye devil's follower's, pa. 217. He affirmeth most ●ifelings, and Lotteries to be little ●etter than unlawful games, pag. ● 20. And he teacheth, that, by ●heis games, we must not give offence to the Laws under which ●ee live, pa. 251. Now I wonder, ●hat so good a man is not afraid to offend our Law by allowing forbidden games, even Dice, as well ●s Cards, etc. which consist not only of Lottery. Here I have occasion to think, that I may have ●ome more comfort in mine opinion, than Mr. Gataker can have in ●is; For he nameth famous, learned, and godly men concurring with me in opinion: But in t● multitude o● his quotations, I find none approving Dice in play, an whereas some learned Divines, i some sort, allow games consistin of Lott, and ●itt, but altogethe condemn D●●e, Mr. Gataker defe●deth mine opinion, disapproovin● a mixed▪ as well as a mere Lott, b●cause (as he saith) a true Lott is i● either, pa. 126. and, He deemet● them to be amiss, who allow Lott in game, and yet add for a caution that Religionsnesse be used in th● action, in regard that Holy things must be done in an holy manne● 
4.  pa. 133. Fourthly, He granteth tha● Prayer specially applied to th● Lott may be conceived, where th● matter is more weighty, and th● event of some consequence, pa. ●1● And yet he holdeth, that the less● weighty the matter is, wherein ● Lott is used, the lawfuller the Lott is, pag. 111. The reason, why I wonder at this passage, shall be given in my Reply. The last passage now to be observed as matter of my wondering, is this; Notwithstanding, he confidently affirmeth that we may not do aught without warrant, pag. 301. Sufficiently confirmeth the same, because such an Act is not done of Faith, and therefore not free from sin, Rom. 14. 23. but is a mere presumption, and tempting of God, pag. 313. and quot. A▪ and B. and Earnestly reproveth one kind of Lottery (why not all, against which the same reason is of like validity?) because not found revealed in any word of God, but brought in either by Satan, or by some of his instruments who are addicted to Vanity, pag. 315. and 316. and, yet he avoucheth, That it is a sufficient warrant for the use of Lots, In that the oppugners, being learned, can say nothing against them▪ but what hath been, or may be sufficiently answered, pag. 235.  
May I not wonder that so judicious a scholar doth not observe this discrepance? Lottery is unlawful, if not warranted by the word which position supposeth the Wor● to be perfect, as is the Author thereof, and 2. Lottery is lawful if Learned men can say nothing ou of the Word against it. Which position supposeth two things, viz That the Word is like the Laws o men, that is, Imperfect, as be the Authors thereof; and, That Learne● men cannot so fail in Diligence o reading, Clearness of understanding, and Firmness of Memory but that▪ if there were in the Wor● anything against Lottery, the● could nor but see it. Well; It ma● be seen shortly, how Mr. Gataker Diligence, Understanding, and Memory have served him in defenoing Lusorious Lots. In the mean while, Sufficiency of his answering is but upon the Trial, and not yet adjudged.  
All these passages well reveiwed by Mr. Gataker I should think he cannot wonder that a man of 64. years complete, (and therefore his wits may fail) doth wonder that so godly, wise, and learned a man, the faculties of whose mind are at the best, did not say to himself, before he preached, much more before he penned this lusorious doctrine, Let Baal plead for 
judg. 6▪ 31. ●2. Esa. 5. 18  himself; and, These gamesters shall, without any encouragement from me, draw on their iniquity ●ith these cords of vanity; and the rather, because he acknowledgeth that account is to be given unto God of gaming pa. 261. If of the act much more of justifying it. Fro m which account good Lord deliver me. For I fear, that in justifying lusorious Lots, I should put false spectacles on a gamester's nose, whereby the bridge seemeth broader, than it is, and so he falleth in without fear, to use Mr. Gataker similitude, pag. 264. But Mr. Gataker believeth, that he hath written the truth, (Preface to the Reader) and is confident that truth is to be known, especially concerning matters of common practice, pag. 263. and giveth four reasons, by which he was moved to defend 
1.  lusorious Lots, pag. 264. The first is, To draw men from Superstition in restraining themselves, when God doth not restrain them. This beggeth the question, (as I hope) will appear in the Reply. 
●.  A 2. motive is, Because arguments against lusorious Lots have made many stagger in the necessary use of serious civil Lots. It may be so some failing in their judgement: But it may be also, that many more will be made to stagger by reading Mr. Gatakers' exceptions against arguments for, and cautions, in those serious Civil Lots, Cap. 5. and by his Maxim, [The less weighty the matter is, wherein a Lott is used, the lawfuller the Lott is, pag. 111.] A 3. motive is, To take away 
3▪  much heartburning; Nay, rather this justifying Lusorious Lots will not only cause more heartburning; but encourage also gamesters to overcrow such, as are scrupulous. For, if many well affected have been constrained, in regard of scruple, in this kind, to strain themselves to some inconveniences by refusal of those games, when by those, whom they had dependence upon, upon or familiarity withal, they have been urged occasionally thereunto (which to prevent hereafter, is a 4. cause of his writing) How will those supporters, and familiars insult upon the scrupulous▪ now they have so learned a Patron of their gaming? Some have strained themselves, to some inconveniences for not pledging drunken Healths, being drink offerings to Bacchus. To prevent which hereafter, should Mr. Gataker do well, unto aedification, to preach, and write in justification of these Healths? The sum of his causes (as he expresseth himself in his preface to the Reader) is, To set at Liberty the entangled consciences of Godly disposed persons. Indeed; If any conscience, simply for playing with Lots, should seek his his satisfaction in private, then if Mr. Gataker quieted him by his grounds (supposed true) it were not amiss. But is every doctrine, though true, to be insisted upon both by preaching, and printing, and that affirming matter in question, and of no necessary use? I say, Affirming, remembering the holy wisdom of the Apostles, and Elders, who decreed touching offensive things (yet some of them lawful, if conveniently used) only negatively, and deemeth it not necessary 
Act. 15. 28. 29.  to decree affirmatively things that were then, and might be in use for a time. Many (I fear too many) learned Divines approve Usury in their judgement, thouh condemned by Law. Yet none, that I know, ever insisted upon the justification thereof by preaching and printing. Again; Was there ever any so troubled with playing with Lots? I doubt it; But without doubt thousand will now more boldly use lusorious Lots without regard of the cautions, in these licentious times. As Usurers regard not the cautions which Divines set down. For it is enough to them, that some godly Divines affirm Usury to be lawful. O that Mr. Gataker had considered what he writeth, pag. 107. before cited, and what he writeth, pag. 103. and 104. viz: Where inconveniences, that shall necessarily, or in good probability, appear to accompany the thing questioned, or ensue upon the doing thereof, shall be such, and so great as the Conveniences, which stand on the other side, shall not be able to countervail, there that action is worthily disallowed as Inconvenient, and ● Lott consequently unlawful, wha● he writeth in his spiritual Watch pag. 27. viz: The rifer any evil i● in those places, or ages we live i● the more careful should we be to shun, and avoid such a sin. No doubt he would have taken heed how by writing he make way to the sin of, or by, Lusorious Lots. Many Divines and intelligent men, though of opinion that Lusorious mixed Lots may be used lawfully, yet wish that Mr. Gataker had never published his book. For a running horse (say they) needeth no spurring. For my part I wish, that Mr. Gataker had been affected in writing, as he professeth himself to be in the use of lusorious Lots, pag. 266. Well; Whatsoever he writeth dogmatically, he wisheth thee (good Reader) to imitate him in▪ his practice, to wit, That, albeit in judgement thou art rightly informed of the truth concerning the lawfulness of these games in themselves; yet in godly discretion, thou wouldst rather abandon them, considering the too too common, and ordinary abuse of them, and that many (it may be) among whom thou livest may remain unresolved, and unsatisfied, touching the lawfulness of them, pag. 267. I desire the same, and therewith a suspending thy judgement until thou hast well considered my Dialogue, Mr. Gatakers' answers, and my Reply, together with mine answer to his positive grounds. Here I promise (with Mr. Gataker, pag. 128.) to raze what I have reared, if my Reply and answers be proved insufficient, and so commend thee to God, and to the Word of his Grace, which is able to build further. Only, consider what I say, and the Lord give thee understanding in 
Act. 20. 32. 2. Tim▪ 2. 7.  all things.  
14. Septemb. 1620.   

To the Reader.  
THat I may do Mr. Gataker no wrong I am to let thee know that the 14. of March. 1622. Still: Ang. Mr. Gataker denied naming me when he confuted mine arguments in Pulpit, yet confessing that he named me in Pulpit, with others, diversely dissenting from him in judgement touching Lusorious Lots when he entered into the question of playing with Lots.   

An Answer to Reasons inducing M. Gataker to allow lusorious Lots, as not evil in themselves, Lib. 6. § 4.  
THIS Tenent seemeth to me more fearful▪ then beseemeth a learned man, who, after the turning over a wonderful n umber of books to compile his Historical, and Theological Treatise of the Nature, and Use of Lotres, setteth down his judgement. Allowing lusorious Lots only as not evil in themselves, whereas he affirmeth them to be lawful in themselves, pag. 266. So that if these games be used with due observation of all his cautions, why is he fearful to allow them as good in themselves? How then may a scrupulous man, who remembreth 
Ezek. 36 31.  not only his wicked wicked ways, but his deeds also that are not good, build upon such quagmiry grounds? Again; Allowing these games only as not evil in themselves doth not manifest that Love of God, which (I doubt not) is in Mr. Gatakers' heart. For whereas God is glorified by good works, 
Math. ●. 16.  and these games be too too common, and accompanied with many crying sins, whereby God is every where, and daily much dishonoured, the Love of God would have constrained him, if doing 
john. 5. 21.  truth, to have brought these games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. Last; By this Tenent he showeth not due Charity to his neighbour. For now it is enoug for Gamesters to plead; A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not evil in itself. Therefore they will not seek, further to know, whither it be good in itself, forgetting that it is written▪ 
Math. 3. 10.  [The axe is put to the root of the trees, therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit▪ is hewn down, and cast into the fire.] Is not then hereby his neighbour's spiritual danger occasioned? But here (perhaps) it may be said, The first Reason, proving that a Lott may be matter of Recreation, doth give me a check: It is a check? Then I will try if I cannot avoid the Mate. The Argument, collected with all faithfulness, (as the rest, and his answers be,) is this.  

M. G. 1.  That which may be ordinarily used in other Civil affairs, be they more or less weighty, may also be used for matter of recreation, and delight: But a Lott may be ordinarily used in other Civil affairs. Therefore I see not what should banish it out of our disports, more than out of other (though serious yet) Civil affairs.  

I. B. 1.  Is not this a fearful conclusion like the Tenent? Why doth not Mr. Gataker conclude positively thus. Therefore a Lott may be used for matter of recreation, and delight. He (forsooth) see's not. Can a blind man go stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) Mr. Gataker seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia. For, if God had opened his eyes in this point, he might have seen plainly what should banish a Lott out of disports, more than out of other Civil affairs. To wit, Because God alloweth a Lott to be used in them, but not in these; and It is presumption, of set purpose, to employ God but as it may stand with his pleasure. Hereof more hereafter. In mean while, in further answer to this argument I deny the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily used in other Civil matters, yet not for matter of Recreation: Whereof also more hereafter. Now I proceed to the 2. reason, which is set down in two shapes; The former is this.  

M. G. 2.  That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lott, may a Lott most lawfully be used unto: But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lott: Therefore about things of that nature may a Lott most lawfully be used. The Proposition he proveth thus. Great is the uncertainty of a Lott. Therefore not fit to be used in any weighty affair.  

I. B. 2▪  A Lott is sometimes taken for the instrument of purpose disposed unto casualty, as [The Lott is cast 
Prou. 16 3●. 1. Sam. 14. 41▪  into the lap:] and sometime for the event, as, [Give a perfect Lott] Which, howsoever it be casual in relation to the former, yet, falleth out certainly this, or that, by God's whole disposing the former, Prov. 16. 33. I therefore deny both the Proposition, and Assumption persuaded that Mr. Gataker would never have set down this supposed reason, if a Lott, in the former acception, had not drawn his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lott in the latter acception. So that I marvel much, that he findeth a Lott to be not fit to be used in any weighty affair. For why? Dividing the Land of promise, Numb. 26. 55. by Lott. Discovering Achan. johs. 14. Choosing of a king. 1. Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle Acts: 1. 26. were they not weighty affairs? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lott may more lawfully be used about weighty affairs. But indeed▪ whether the subject matter be more or less weighty, a Lott may be used about it, provided it be with God's allowance. For want whereof both Divinatory, and Lusorious Lots be equally unlawful. The other shape of his reason, more particularly (as he saith) for the present business is this.  

M. G.  A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully do, or not do, and it is not material whether he do, or omit, such may a man lawfully put to the hazard of the uncertain motion of the Creature, whether he shall do it, or not do it▪ But the using of a Lott in game is but the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event. Therefore the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lott, is not evil simply in itself.  

I. B▪  What a trembling argument is this? In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lott in the former acception. In the Assumption, of a Lott in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himself. In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulness but concludeth only, as not evil simply in themselves. Indeed, the conclusion is to follow the worse part: But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is general▪ What? Is Mr. Gataker afraid to put (The using of a Lott in game) into the conclusion? is not the Minor to be the Subject, and the Mayor to be the Predicate of the Conclusion? I will not quaestion the Figure of this pretended argument if Sub: prae: prima: will serve the turn; and though I find it in no Mood, yet will I answer the two fore-pieces thereof. The former is not true, except Mr. Gataker understand a matter of mere indifferency controverted. For though such a matter may be the subject matter of a Controversy, yet a matter controverted is the only subject matter of a Lott, otherwise it is no Lott, as Mr. Gataker truly writeth even in this case, pag. 167. If Mr. Gataker so understand, than there is some necessity of ending the controyersy put to the determination of a Lott, and consequently it is not then merely in the will of a man whether he shall do it, or no do it. In the other piece I observe, that Mr. Gataker speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be uncertain. Which is begging the question, for the reason given in mine answer to his former shaped argument. Neither it is true that if in game, a controversy (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of mere indifferency is put to hazard. But more hereof in my 3. reply. In mean while, consider whether this 2. shape be more particularly for the present business, so as to conclude the question, than the former; and Note, that in both these shapes, only Lightness, and indifferency of matters put to Lottery are pressed as causes most justifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped arguments proposition, he positively affirmeth that we shall find a Lott not fit to be used in a weighty affair▪ If so, then Weightnesse, and Necessity of matters controverted make Lottery less lawful, if not altogether unlawful. But thereof also more in that reply. I therefore proceed to his 3. reason pag. 131. Which is this.  

M. G. 3.  If the use of Lots in game be of itself evil, then must it needs be a sin either against Piety in the first table, or ag: Charity in the 2. But the use of Lots in game, is not of itself, a sin against either Piety, or Charity. Therefore it must be justified as agreeable to God's Word. The Assumption is proved thus▪ No man avoweth the use of a Lot in game, (as it is a Lott) to be against Charity: and A Lusorious Lot is not the profaning of any thing hallowed, by any divine institution from the Word, to an holy Use. Therefore not against Piety. Indeed, if Lots be holy, they may in no case be made matter of sport.  

I. B. 3.  Here I observe one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the 2. reason to wit▪ The conclusion containeth more than the premises. For the Conclusion saith A Lot in game is agreeable to God's Word, and then it must be [Good of itself,] which is more, than [Not evil of itself.] For that is good of itself, for doing whereof there is either precept, or permission in God's word, pag. 137. But to the Assumption, an d proof thereof I answer, That the use of a Lott in game is, (of itself), a sin against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by divine institution from the Word, as shall be manifested hereafter. Yet here I think fit briefly to show 2. things. One is, 
1.  That an Oath is hallowed to mak● an holy use of the testifying presence of God, So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy use of the determining presence of God. If Mr. Gataker deny a Lott to be holy, except it have a more remote holy use, I say He may as well deny an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of 
2.  this point in my 2. reply. The other is, That use of a Lott is against Piety, which is (I say not, [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the Word. For it is without faith, therefore a 
Rom. 14 23.  sin, yea Impiety. So disputeth Mr. Gataker against a Divinatory Lott, pag. 313. and so do I against a Lusorions Lot. If then a lawful Lott be holy, it is (saith Mr. Gataker) in no case to be made matter of sport. Nay, I may make yet more advantage. For I may say; That maintaining the use thereof in gaming, as it is a Lott, by practice, much more by writing, is against Charity, as well as against Piety. For so [a weak brother is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against] that brother being occasioned, by error of judgement, to stumble. I have this reasoning from Mr. Gataker himself, pag. 255. Now then with some comfort I proceed to the 4. argument, as Mr. Gataker calleth it, pag. 134.  

M. G. 4.  By virtue of Christian liberty, every Christian man hath a free use of all Gods good creatures, to employ them unto such purposes, as by any natural power, they are enabled unto: But in lusorious Lots the Creature is used to no other end or use, but what it hath a natural power unto, and such as by the mutual consent, and agreement of those that use it, it may be enabled to effect. Therefore it's no more to be exiled from a Christian man's recreation, than any other creature whatsoever, that hath any power to delight.  

I. B. 4.  So general & eager is the pursuit after Liberty in this licentious age, that a godly, and charitable Christian, (much more being a minister), ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any 
1. Pet. 2. 16.  much less too too many, to make Liberty a cloak of Naughtiness▪ But Mr. Gataker speaketh of Christian liberty, not of Licentiousness▪ Then let us consider what he saith▪ For both the premises of this argument are flatly to be denied▪ For sundry good Creatures have a natural power to empoison; But Christian Liberty giveth us not free use thereof to empoison a● pleasure. Neither is it true that any creature hath a natural power to be a Lott, no more than a stone hath a natural power to be carried upward. For as a stone is carried upward by a power; that is without it: so all creatures are moved, & applied to be Lots by a power without them. God keep me from teaching that Christian Liberty warranteth the unlawful use of any Creature, what natural power soever it hath to that use. If any creature have any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be used unto Lottery, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such use thereof. To the enforcing of the conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, It is a begging of the question. For though a dog having a natural power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation yet ought a Lot-creature to be, for reasons given, and to be given, or rather defended hereafter. Now then to a 5. argument A concessis, (as Mr. Gataker termeth it,) pag. 135.  

M. G. S.  Any thing in different is lawful matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing indiffertnt; Lottery therefore may be made lawful matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by the words of M. Fennor. Christian (saith he) recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessary refreshing of body, or mind. The Assumption is also proved by Mr. Fennor. Indifferent in nature is that, which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded, or forbidden to use it: But such is Lottery (saith Mr. Gataker) Not simply commanded. For Prov. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept, or, Not so much a Commandment as an advise commending that as a prudent course; Nor any where forbidden as evil in itself.  

I. B. S.  Mr. Fennor's book, from whence these allegations be drawn, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be used in sport, doth prove that lusorious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What help then hath Mr. Gataker from Mr. Fenners grants? and his own proofs help him as little. For it is granted, that if Lottery be either commanded, or forbidden, it is not indifferent, to pass by the former, only observing that Mr, Gataker doth not absolutely deny it to be commanded, Prov. 18. 18. I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appear evidently, that a Lusorious Lott is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. But to speak a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden, I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidd●̄ by just consequence, as that which is expressly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by just consequence as that which is expressly permitted. Mr. Gataker affirmeth, the latter, pa. 137. and will not (I dare faith) deny the former. Again, The Word of God is so perfect, that whatsoever it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expressly, or by just consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things especially such as have relation to God, aught to have some warrant from the word. If Mr. Gataker put me to prove this, I dare undertake to prove it demonstratively. But I presume he will not. For, in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the Word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawful, and therefore not inndifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth pag. 95. Speaking of this word [Indifferent,] ●s it is opposed to good, or evil, & ●he wing how some say, that to be ●ndifferent which is neither good, ●or evil, he determineth the point ●hus. Nevertheless most true it is, That ●o particular moral action, or No action ●f the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, ●ut it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy Word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I ●onder, why Mr. G. should say ●ere, Lottery in game is not any ●here forbidden as evil in itself. ●s it not evil, if forbidden, except ● be otherwise evil of itself? ●hat is good of itself which is ●ither commanded, or permitted, ●ag, 137. Therefore that is evil of ● self which is forbidden. It grei●eth my soul to see what a wide ●ore to lusorious Lottery this doctrine will make. For now Lot-mongers will chop Logic, and say, What if a lusorious Lot be forbidden by just consequence, ye● they are not forbidden as evil in themselves, and therefore they are indifferent. Now to come to Mr. Gatakers' last reason, which, like an Orator, he amplifieth to leave a deep impression behind. Bu● let it be well considered, as in i● self, so whether it prove that th● use of Lots in game is not agaia●● God's word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, pag. 136. It is this.  

M. G. 6.  Where the Wisdom of God, hath not determined the subject matter, the manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawful in itself, there all such are lawful, a● the Word doth not forbid, and a● no Circumstance that a man shall make choice of, shall be against the general rules of the word concerning the same: But a Lott is a thing lawful in itself, and the subiect-matter, manner, & other Circumstances thereof are not determined by God's Word, nor against the general rules. Therefore a Lott in game is not prohibited, nor is against the general rules of God's Word otherwise. The Proposition he confirmeth. First, touching a thing lawful in itself, by showing 
1.  that act to be lawful in itself, which in God's word, is either commanded, or permitted expressly, or by just consequence. Secondly, touching the manner etc. by proving 
2.  the rest of the Proposition; which he endeavoureth to perform. (1.) By the Authority of Calvin. (2.) By Luke: 9 50. (3.) By a gloss (4.) By showing that the circumstance of time for free will offerings being not determined, they might have been offered at at any time, and Sacrifices might have been in any place before a certain place was determined 
3.  Thirdly, touching both the doing o● every act, & the doing of it in this or that manner, by showing that i● natural reason will not, of itself afford sufficient direction, the● must warrant be had out of God● 
Rom. 14. 23.  Word, because, Whatsoever is not o Faith is sin. Which Word is give● us in moral matters to supply th● defect of it caused by our first parents their fall. Neither doth th● Word abridge us of the help, an● use of natural reason for direction in such actions. The Assumption is thus proved. Recreation, i● general, is warranted from th● Word as permitted, and enjoined▪ if not expressly, yet by just consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate ourselves, there is nothing determined. Therefore any means that are not against the general rules Of comeliness, and decency, Rom. 13. 13. 1. Cor. 14. 40. Of conveniency, and expediency, 1. Cor. 6. 12. and 10. 23. Rom. 14. 21. Of Religion, and Piety, 1. Cor. 10. 31. Colos. 3. 17. and the like, are by the Word of God allowed.  

I. B. ●.  I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordian's knot with one chop, and say, The use of Lots in game is forbidden in the Word, referring myself to what I have, and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answer more particularly, not doubting, but that the Proverb may (now) prove true, viz: In many words there cannot want iniquity. 
Pro. 10. 19  First, I observe fearful shifting, 
1.  and then unsound arguing. The former thus appeareth, He supposeth the thing must be lawful in itself, and disputeth only about the subiect-matter, etc. Again, In the introduction he saith. Th'use of Lots in game is not against God's Word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position. [That is against the Word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it.] But in the Proposition of the main argument his ground is; [Such things are lawful, which the Word doth not forbid.] Four of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his conclusion is answerable: Is not this a fearful shifting course of reasoning? Now let us consider his unsound arguing. Touching the Proposition of his main argument, I marvel why Mr. Gataker avouching such subiect-matter &c. to be lawful as are not forbidden, limiteth this assertion with these words (Of a thing lawful in itself) As if such a thing may warrant our recklessness in, and about the subiect-matter etc. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, [Love Adverbes] An Oath is a thing lawful in itself; Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect-matter, etc. be agreeable to the Word of God? But I marvel much more at this ground. [Such things are lawful, as the Word doth not forbid.] I set it down thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted, and therefore the subiect-matter, etc. of a thing lawful in itself. I marvel (I say) the more because Mr. Gataker confirmeth a thing or act itself to be lawful in itself, if it be in the Word, either commanded, or permitted expressly, or by just consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so clear a truth, that (me thinks) Mr. Gataker cannot, but, in proportion of reason, if he believe the Word to be perfect unto every 
Psal. 19 ●. 2. Tim. 3. 15. 16. 17.  good work, hold All things to be unlawful, which are not lawful one of these two ways, and the rather because he peremptorily affirmeth, pag. 95. All particular moral actions, be they never so iundifferent, to be either conformable, or disconformable to God's Word, and, by particular actions, he meaneth actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that Mr. Gataker would hold to this doctrine! 
john. 3. 21.  Then should he thereby provoke all, who make consciences of their ways, and do truth (that is▪ do good works sincerily) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary; If he bring not disciples to the Law, and 
Is a. 8. 20.  Testimony, by doctrine according to the Word, but writhe from it, by teaching that to be lawful which is not forbidden, as therein his light faileth, so there by he shall make men careless to seek for their warrant, and wilful to seek after their own heart, and eyes after which 
Num. 25 39  they go a whoring. Well, let us examine his confirmations. First, Mr. Calvins' 
1.  testimony in English is this. [When the Scripture delivereth general rules of a lawful use, the use is to be limited according to them.] From hence Mr. Gataker concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choice of, that is not against those rules. Mr. Calvin speaketh of an Use, and of an Use do we dispute, Mr. Gataker concludeth a Circumstance: Mr. Calvin saith, According, Mr. Gataker concludeth, Not against. Is 
●.  this sound arguing? Is the 2. confirmation from Luke: 9 50. much better? The words set down by Mr. Gataker be these. [He that is not against me, is with me.] This place (forsooth) is a rule holding in the subiect-matter, etc. neither determined, nor forbidden. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against me, Math. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subiect-matter, etc. determined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not M. Gatakers'? conceit be the same touching things, or actions? But let us see, whether the conceit be not a be-misted fantasy. In the former place Christ his words are occasioned ●y his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Devils in Christ his name. Forbid him not (said Christ) for, He, that is not against me, is with me. In the latter place Christ spoke those words upon occasion of the pharisees their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions together, this, indeed, is the sum. All men are either with, or against Christ. For there be no Neutralles. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat, is a sheep, and He that is not a sheep is a goat. But Mr. Gataker's argument is this. All men who are not against Christ, are with him. Therefore Circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawful. Is this sound arguing? The third confirmation is from a Gloss. 
3.  Here I remember an old saying [A cursed gloss corrupts the Text.] Now let us see whether Mr. Gataker have any blessing by this gloss, the words whereof in English, be these. [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note, that it speaks of things. Therefore it makes as well for actions, as for circumstances▪ Is this Divinity? But what Law? If the Civil Law, what is that to the point? Except Mr. Gataker can prove, the Civil Law to be a perfect rule to us; and whatsoever it permitteth is allowed of God. Howsoever, (I say) this course of fetching proofs from any other Law, than God's Law, is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth Unwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorise traditions of men, than for one, that feareth 
Deut. 10 12.  God to walk in his ways. Is then this glozing sound arguing? Hath 
4.  the fourth confirmation more validity in it than the rest? The former 3. proofs speak not directly of Circmmstances according to the proposition, (so doth Mr. Gataker dispute Adidem) here he doth▪ here then jinquire, If the Circumstances of Time, and Place be at the pleasure of him that v●eth a thing lawful in itself, doth it follow thereupon, that the subiect-matter, and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessity there must be a time, and place, when and where it may be done, Even when, and where there is just occasion of the Act▪ It is to be obscrved, that, as here, so, in the Proposition itself Mr. Gataker slideth from the subiect-matter, and manner, to circumstances only. Is not this fainting? Let us now proceed to that, which Mr. Gataker writeth, touching both the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this, and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the Word if natural reason, of itself, afford sufficient direction▪ Good Lord! What fearful shifting from the Word is here? But why doth he join the doing itself of an Act. with the manner thereof? I'll tell you, even to make a way to his Assumption. For, if he stick close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it self is lawful in itself, if, in the Word, it be, either commanded; or permitted expressly, or by just consequence, he forseeth, that it will be answered to the forepart of his assumption, that every Lott is not lawful in itself. Therefore he would trouble the Reader's head with a supposed direction therein of natural reason, and that sufficient, (I say) Supposed; For he showeth no direction therein of natural reason either sufficient, or insufficient. But let us with fear, and trembling, consider Mr. Gataker his most strange position to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the Word, if natural Reason of itself, afford sufficient direction.] Let us consider it (I say) together with his reason. For (saith he) the Word is given us in moral matters, to supply the defect of natural reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seek sufficient direction, in moral matters, from natural reason, before wc consult with God in his Word? For the said direction is the 2. time urged thus. I say where natnrall reason doth not, of itself, afford sufficient direction, and need not a man know, that he hath warrant srom God's Word if, in his persuasion, he have sufficient direction from natural Reason? Doth the Maxim of God's Spirit quoted here, by Mr. Gataker 
Rom. 14 23.  to wit, [What is not of Faith is sin] intimate. That whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natural reason, is of Faith? Became natural reason only defective, and not corrupted also by our 
Rom. 8. 7.  first Parents their fall? O God have mercy upon us! For I see that the Wisdom of the Flesh is Enmity against thee; For it is not fubiect to thy Law, neither, indeed, can be. But why do I vex my soul with this fearful doctrine, seeing Mr. Gatakers' heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For, at last, he cometh to say. Neither doth the Word abridge us of the help, and use of natural reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authority (to wit, Of not abridging us of the help, etc.) given to the Word. For it doth imply, that the Word might abridge us, etc. Therefore ou● most warrantable way is to be well informed, when, and how far, the Word doth give us leave to use the direction of natural reason in moral matters. If this be so, than the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the scriptures quoted in the margin. So then I proceed to the Assumption of the main argument. In the former part whereof, it is to be denied (as was said before) that every Lot is a thing lawful in itself. For as a Divinatory, by him, cap. 11. so a Lusorious Lott by me, and others, is denied to be a thing lawful in itself. More clearily to answer the other part. It is to be observed, that, in this large, argument it cannot be gathered wrath M. G. meaneth by Subiect-matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which ought not to be. But 
Acts. 15 24.  by that which he writeth, pag. 230. I understand he meaneth the Matter whereabout the Lottery is employed. If so, I affirm that the fubiect matter of a Lott is determined by God, namely, A Controversy to be ended thereby; and therefore I also affirm lusorius business (to use Mr. Gataker own word pag. 130.) to be a subiect-matter of a Lott, no less against the general rules of the Word, than was the finding out of jonas, in Mr. Gatakers' judgement, pag. 278. If then a Lusorious Lott be not a thing lawful in itself, & If Lusorious business be a subiect-matter of a Lott, that is against the general rules, then how can the manner, and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the use of a Lusorious Lott? Now then, Let us try the force of the Assumption's confirmation. It is true that Recreation in general, indefinitely understood, is warranted by God's Word. But I believe Mr. Gataker will not affirm all recreations taken up by men, to be so warranted. Yes (saith Mr. Gataker) we may recreate ourselves with any thing, that is not against the generales rules, because, touching things, wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.  
Of this evasion [Not against] I need not speak at this instant. But touching things not determined, so much inculcated, I ask whether things must be determined particularly, or by name; or else, if not so forbidden, they are lawful. If so, why doth Mr. Gataker (speaking of diverse particulars,) as of a key, and a book, of a pair of shears, and a ●ive, and such like so earnestly ask, Are they any where found revealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind, than here, arguing thus. Not found there commanded, or permitted; therefore unlawful. If it be said, Not so found there, to find out a thief. I then say; Neither are Lots so found there for Recreation. But if by Not determined be meant, Things wherewith we recreare are not determined in the Word either expressly, or by just consequence, then, whosoever saith so, if he be wise, will add [So far as I do remember, and know.] For who can remember all the sentences of holy Scriptures, and know all just consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus add then his Negation is of no validity, but he himself is too bold in denying, upon presumption, that another remembreth, and knoweth no more than he. At last let us religiously consider the general rules so often spoken of, and we shall find, that Mr. Gataker should have done well not to have pleased Libertines by pleading Not against, but to have given the Word due honour by saying with Mr. Calvin. [The use of things is to be limited according to the general rules.] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the use of things not undecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted that in 1. Cor. 6. 12. and 12. 23. Paul saith not, all things are lawful, but some things are inexpedient, but in both places thus. [All things are lawful, but all are not expedient.] Let us consider these rules yet somewhat more nearly to the point. Touching the first. The words of the Apostle, 1. Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly, and by order] In which is no intimation, that all things are in themselves lawful to be done, which are done honestly, & by order, but a charge that all things, be they in themselves never so lawful, be done honestly, & by order. Those drink offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths (per Antiphrasin,) are solemnised sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, always with putting of hats, and some speech more or less, are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, Then be Lots, and the users of them in gaming never so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore justified. 
2.  Touching the second rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edify, 1. Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sin who stumble, or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weak, Rom. 14. 13. 21. But Lusorious Lotts' occasion thousands to fall into sin, & to be weak in goodness. Therefore they do not edify, and therefore are not expedient. Concerning the 3. rule. Let all things to be 
3▪  done to God's glory, 1. Cor. 10. 31. Is this to God's glory, to use his name in any other case than wherein God is well pleased his name should be used, & then to take that name in vain? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lottis to use God's name in an other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be used, and then also to take that Name in vain, & it is a grievous tempting of God as shall be proved. Therefore playing with a Lots is not to God's glory, & by consequence not agreeable to Religion, and Piety. Though it be sufficiently proved that Lusorious Lots are directly aga in●t tw● of the general Rules, and not warranted by the third, so that Mr. Gataker hath not beat red his cause by appealing to them, yet it is to be observed, that all the rules require, Things, and Actions to be according to them, But Mr. Gataker by only speaking of them, would justify circumstances, and means of playing with Lots if (forsooth) they be not against them. Thus having evidently showed Reasons inducing (not drawing) Mr. Gataker to allow Lusorious Lots to be both fearful, as these evasive speeches. [Not evil in themselves.] [Not prohibited.] [Not determined.] &, [Not against the general rules,] do import, & otherwise unsound, I will now (with God's help I hope) reply upon M. G. answers to mine arguments against playing with Lots, contained in my Dialogue.   

A Reply to M. Gataker's answers to arguments contained in a Dialogue against the unlawfulness of games consisting in chance.  

Dialog.  WHatsoever directly, or of it self, or in a special 
Mal. 6. 7 Exo. 20. 7. Isa. 29. 13. jer. 4. 2. Prov. 16 33.  manner tendeth to the advancing of God's Name is to be used religiously, & not to be used in sport, as we may not pray, or swear in sport: But the use of Lots directly, or of itself, and in special manner tendeth to the advancing of the name of God in attributing to his special Providence in the whole, and immediate 
Acts. 1. 14. 26.  disposing of the Lot, & expecting the event. Therefore the use of Lots is not to be in sport.  

Aunsw. pa. 149.  The Assumption is not true, if it be understood universally. The proof annexed I deny; Neither do the places produced prove it. The former of them, concerning ordinary Lots, or Lots in general, was answered sufficiently before. The latter is an example of an extraordinary Lott, wherein was (indeed) an immediate, and special Providence. But extraordinary examples make no general rules Neither is it a good course of arguing to reason from the special, or a singular, to the general, and universal: Much less from one extraordinary act or event, to all ordinary courses of the same kind. Herein is the difference between the one, and the other That the one could not but fall certainly, were it never so often cast, whereas the other, cast often in the same case, would not certainly fall out still the same.  
The assumption understood universally 
Reply 1.  is true, and the places quoted make good the proof thereof, as shall be made manifest. First therefore let us consider the 
1.  supposed distinction between ordinary, and extraordinary Lots Mr. Gataker speaketh of a distinction, but showeth not wherein, (touching the Lots themselves,) it doth consist. Indeed, touching themselves, (as they be Lots,) there is no difference; For in an ordinary, as well as in an extraordinary Lott, the things are by man, of purpose intentionally disposed unto a variable event, & they are wholly disposed by God unto this, or unto that event, which the user of a Lott expecteth. If so, than it followeth, That the use of all Lots, (as they be Lots) whether ordinary, or extraordinary, directly, or of itself, & in special ma●ner, tendeth to the advancing of the Name of God. How? The use of Lots attributeth to God's special Providence In the whole, and immediate disposing of the Lott, & In expecting the event- Doth this scarce carry good sense? Is there then no difference between an ordinary, and extraordinary Lott? The only difference is the subiect-matter whereabout the Lott is employed. The subiect-matter of an ordinary Lott, is, by God's allowance, A Controversy to be ended: The subiect-matter of an extraordinary Lott is any other matter, whereabout a Lott is employed by God's special direction; otherwise it is unlawful, as be lusorious, and Divinatory Lots. In regard of which difference only, Mr. Gatakers' Logic holdeth good, as thus. From the use of a Lott about an other matter than ending a Controversy and that by God's special direction, it followeth not, that it is lawful to use a Lott about any other matter, than ending a Controversy, as gaming, without God's special direction. But Mr. Gataker maketh an other difference to wit, An immediate, and special Providence in an extraordinary Lott, which is not in an ordinary Lott. He doth so; and therefore in his Logic, he cunningly joineth a supposed extraordinary Event to a supposed extraordinary Act, & declineth the proof of an extraordinary act, which rather he should have done, because mine argument standeth upon the Use of Lots. Neither doth he fondly prove an immediate, and special Providence, or extraordinary event, to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lott. For, as it is a tempting of God to cast an extraordinary Lott the first time without God's special direction, pag. 313. so it is a tempting, yea, a greater tempting of God, when he hath given his iudgmentalready by the event of the Lott, to cast the Lott again without his special direction. How then can Mr. Gataker so confidently affirm, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly, were it never so oft cast? Indeed, The certain event of an extraordinary Lot may, in faith, be expected, because of God's special direction. And why not so in an ordinary Lott? Seeing God adviseth us, pag. ●35. to use Lots for the ending of controversies. Prov. 18. 18. and assureth us that the whole disposing of them is of him, Prov. 16. 33. But Mr. Gataker hath answered this place before. Let us then consider what he hath answered. Before he saith, pag. 144. Good Authors expound this place of singular, extraordinary, and miraculous Lots only. But (saith he) the words seem to be more general, and are, word for word, thus in the Original, [The Lord is cast into the Lap, but every judgement, or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who hold only extraordinary Lots to be meant in this place, and translating the Text [Every judgement] and expounding it, [Or disposing of it,] show plainly that this place proveth mine Assumption to be universally true? So that I much marvel that he denieth this place to prove mine Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in general. For if it do so, than it proveth that ordinary, as well as extraordinary Lots tend to the advancing of the Name of God. Again pag. 145. Mr. Gataker taking the words, as they are usually read in the Genevatranslation, and the King's edition, to wit, [The Lott is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof is of the Lord,] granteth that the whole event is of God. A grant though true, yet turning the reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lott cast into the lap.] If then the Lot cast into the lap, that is, of purpose disposed by man unto a variable event, be wholly disposed by God, so, as the event be that, which pleaseth him, than God doth not mediately dispose the Lot to this, or that event, if not mediately, then immemediately, because the whole disposing is of him. Doth not then this place make good mine Assumption? But for all this Mr. Gataker will not have it so; For as he translateth this place, he saith It importeth thus much, [That there is a Providence in all things, even the least, and most casual] and this he would confirm by these my words, viz: [The disposingꝭ of the chance is secret, that it might be chance indeed, & wholly of God, who directed all things.] Do these words justify Mr. Gatakers' interpretation of this place? Yes; For they say plainly, God directed all things, and, they say withal; The disposing of the chance (that is of the things purposedly disposed by a man unto a variable event) unto a certain event, is secret, that it may be chance indeed, that is, an event not by the will of man, but wholly of God. So that my words imply this argument. God directeth all things, Therefore much more, in our discerning, a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is far from saying that this place importeth only, That there is a Providence in all things. Neither doth Mr. Gatakers' translation infer this imported interpretation. For this discretion. [But] doth so oppose every judgement, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth judgement) to a Lot cast into the lap, as that Every disposing, is all one with The whole disposing. This place so troubleth Mr. Gataker that from it he would have no more gathered, than that the whole event (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by means in the most of them, and not implying and immediate Providence universally in them. I need not examine the means, or immediate Providence of all the instances quoted in the margin For here it is impliedly granted (for he faith not All, but the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by means, and that there is an immediate Providence Particularly, for he denieth such a Providence only, as being universally. Howsoever it be in other things, I think it is manifest to all, that will see, that God, without means, and therefore immediately, doth wholly dispose the Lot cast into the lap unto this, or that event, what pleaseth him, whereas man disposeth the things only unto a variable event. As at cards, man shuffleth them of purpose to dispose them unto a variable event: But, by the immediate Providence of God, they are so shuffled, as that this, or that event followeth. Therefore (with Mr. Gataker favour) any reasonable man may judge it not senseless to say (which he doubteth of pa. 147.) that in children's plays, at Even, and Odd, or at Heads, & Points, there is an immediate Providence, In inclining the will of the child, and guiding his conjecture. Thus we see this place doth confirm mine assumption, and the proof annexed, Mr. Gatakers' interpretation notwithstanding. But he giveth 2. reasons against an immediate providence in ordinary Lots, which 
1.  are also to be considered. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing, as it is such, agreeth necessarily to ȧll things, that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate Providence in a Lot, as it is casual, then there is an immediate providence in all things, that are casual: But the latter is not true; ergo not the former, pag. 143. Why not the latter? if the is Positions be true. That which seems Chance to us, is a certain Word of God (saith Bernard, But Mr. Gatak. translateth 
Sermo quidam  it, Is as a word of God) acquainting us with his Will, pag. 17. and In casual events there is nothing guiding them, but God's Providence, pag. 22. But suppose that there is not an immediate Providence in all things, that be casual, what is that to the purpose? For all things casual are not such, with a Lott, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man unto an uncertain event, which things, so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God unto a certain event, this or that; so it is not in all other things, that be casual. Therefore all other casual things, and Lots are not such▪ Neither is it said an immediate Providence is in a Lot, as it is casual, but as the Lot being made casual is wholly disposed by God to this, or that event. So that from Mr▪ Gatakers' axiom this argument may be framed. An immediate Providence, in an extraordinary Lot, is acknowledged by Mr. Gataker as it is a Lot (say I) wholly disposed by God; Therefore an immediate Providence is in an ordinary Lot (as it is a Lot) wholly disposed by God. For there is no difference between these sorts of Lots, (as they be Lots) and so disposed. For Mr. Gataker hath showed that Prov. 16. 33. speaketh as well of one sort of Lots, as of another. The other argument is this▪ which is the kill-kow. If in every Lott there be necessarily an immediate work, and Providence of God, then is it in the natural of man to make God work immediately at his pleasure: But to say, that it is in man's power naturally to set God on working, immediately, at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an immediate work, and Providence of God necessarily in every Lott. Mr. Gataker like an Orator, seemeth desirous to draw his adversary into hatred by they words [Necessarily, Natural power, Sett God on working, At pleasure, To say, and Absurd] Verba dum sint, surdo canit. But hoping better, I answering his Logic, deny the Assumption. For it is as much in man's natural power to set God on work immediately, in an ordinary, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God, and man do respectively as much in the one Lott, as in the other. But an extraordinary Lot is by the special direction of God: True; So is an ordinary Lott by God's special advice to end a controversy. If then every Lot be a setting of our glorious God on work, there ought to be prayer, if not by words; yet in heart in the use as well of ordinary, as extraordinary Lots. If so, than Lots are not to be used in sport. Here then will I proceed to the defence of my second argument, which is this, pag. 150.  

Dialog.  We are not to tempt the Almighty 
Psal. 78. 18. ●9. Isa. 7. 12 Math. 4. 6. 7.  by a vain desire of manifesting his power, and special Providence: But by using Lots in sport we tempt the Almighty, vainly desiring the manifestation of his special Providence in his immediate disposing; Therefore we may not use Lots in sport▪ The Assumption (saith Mr. Gataker) they seem to prove on this wise. To call God to sit in judgement, where there is no necessity so to do, for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mock God: But by the use of Lots in sport, God is called to sit in judgement, where is no necessity, for the determining of trifles. By the use of Lots in sport therefore, we do tempt, and dishonour God. This argument Mr. Gataker hath from Dan●eus that learned man of reverend memory. To prove the Assumption whereof, he allegeth these words out of my Dialogue. A Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the Providence, and determining presence of God, as an Oath, in the nature thereof, doth suppose the testifying presence of God, yea so, that, as in an Oath, so in a Lot, prayer is expressed, or to be understood.  

Aunsw.  The Assumption of the main Argument is not true, but only in extraordinary Lots, used not with out special direction. Yea rather, if a Lot be such as is here said, it is not lawful to use Lots in any case whatsoever. Because thereby we require a work of God's immediate Power, and Providence, and so tempt God. And to speak as the truth is. By this course, and force of this discourse, the only lawful use of a Lot is condemned, & an unlawful use of it is allowed in the room of it. Again: An Oath, and a Lot are not alike. The comparison therefore laid between them will not hold. For neither is the right of aught in an ordinary Lot, put to the special providence, and immediate work of God, as the truth of the thing testified is in an Oath, put to his Testimony: Neither is there in every Lot any such solemn invocation of God, as there is in an Oath ever, either expressed, or implied. For the definition of each thing containeth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without mention of Prayer, as appeareth in the definition thereof in the Dialogue: But so cannot an Oath. Therefore Prayer is not of the essence of a Lot. Neither do the places, 1. Sam. 14. 41. Acts 1. 24. (whereof the former was a faithless prayer) prove it. They prove only, that prayer was sometimes used before an extraordinary Lot, for an immediate Providence to direct the event of it. Which is not lawful in ordinary Lots. For in setting forth tithes, Levit. 27. 32. it was not lawful to pray God to give a right Lot. In election of offices sacred, or civil prayer ought to be used, yet it followeth not therefore, that Prayer is part of the choice, or that therefore the Election, in the nature thereof, doth necessarily suppose a special providence, and determining presence of God. Lastly, A Lott is not in itself an holy thing always, and necessarily, as hath been showed, nor indeed was ever any so save extraordinarily. Therefore there is difference between Lots and Oaths. Indeed, Whosoever shall contemn an extraordinary Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing, and God's Name.  

Reply 2.  To this long answer I might make a short reply. For whereas Mr. Gatakers' main ground is this. There is no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinrry Lot, and thereupon he buildeth these answers, Therefore there is no tempting of God by using Lots in sport: Therefore no prayer expressed, or to be understood is required in ordinary Lots: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is not an holy thing in itself; I might, (referring myself to the defence of my former argument,) briefly reply, and say. There is an immediate providence in an ordinary Lot. Therefore God is tempted by using Lots in sport: Therefore Prayer expressed, or to be understood, is required of them who use an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is an holy thing: But something more in replying, will have more savour in reading. Therefore I first marvel that M. G. forgetteth himself in concluding. That all Lots be unlawful, if there be an immediate providence in all Lots. What? Were extraordinary Lotts' unlawful too? Nay; He understandeth an exception of them because they were commanded by God. So I say, ordinary Lots were advised by God to end controversies. Therefore using them, in that case, is no tempting of God. I marvel also, why Mr. Gataker should so confidently affirm, that, by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate Providence in all Lots, an unlawful use of a Lott is allowed in the room of the only lawful use. But I refer the discussing thereof to the defence of my 3. argument▪ Again, It is to be observed, that he sets down a comparison between an Oath, and a Lott, which I set not down, whereby the mind of the reader may be troubled▪ For I say not, As the Truth of a thing is, by an Oath, put to God's Testimony: so in an ordinary Lot the R●ght of a thing is put to God's immediate Providence. This is that I say, As an Oath, in the nature thereof, suppo●eth the testifying presence of God: so a Lot, in the nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a controversy (I say not, Deciding a Right, for, before dividing the land of Promise by Lot, no tribe, or family could challenge more Right to one portion, than to another) Ending (I say) a Controversy is, by a Lot referred to God's determining the same by his whole, or immediate disposing the uncertain Lot) to a certain event. It is also to be observed that in the 2. comparison between an Oath, and a Lot, touching Prayer, he saith, Neither is there in every Lot any such solemn invocation. Therefore in some Lot, that is, an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate Providence to direct the event of it. For the same cause (say I) is prayer to be expressed, or understood in the use of an ordinary Lot too. But (saith Mr. Gataker) Prayer is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lott. I have said nothing to the contrary; So that he might have spared his definition of a Lot: But because he taketh a definition (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The Definition (so called) is from Lyrd, viz. To use Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtful, or uncertain matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Even by God's whole, or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principal hand in the determination? and Is not then Prayer to be expressed, or understood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the users thereof? Now then let us consider the places produced to prove it. The former (saith Mr. Gataker) was faithless, I say so too, Because that Lot was without any warrant. This (notwithstanding Prayer in this, and the other place) doth show that God's people believing that God doth signify his judgement by the whole, or immediate disposing of that Lot, did therefore think themselves bound to pray. But both these Lots were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate providence of God. Therefore they might well believe they should pray. True; So all Christians may, yea and must believe they ought to pray in the using ordinary Lots, because of God's immediate Providence exercised therein. Nay▪ It was unlawful in setting out Tithe. If so▪ Not because it was an ordinary Lot (If a Lot) but because the Lord expressly said Of all that goeth under the rod the tenth shall be holy. The instance of election of offices is beside the purpose- For it is not argued thus. Because God's people prayed when they used a Lot, therefore there is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot: But thus. There is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, therefore God's people prayed when they used a Lot. If then there be an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof, Prayer is to be expressed, or understood in lawful use of a Lot, then Praying and Playing, (though they rhyme well together, yet) run not well together in the lawful use of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both That a Lot is not to be used but in a case of necessity more, or less; and Therefore stra●nge (I will not say absurd) is Mr. Gataker his Position, pag. 111. to wit, The less weighty the matter is wherein a Lot used, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be proved, That the less weighty the m●tter is, the greater is the necessity of ending the controversy by a Lot. The said Position is more strange because he granteth, pag. 95. That Prayer specially applied to the Lot may, (in some case,) be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of some consequence, as in the choice of a Magistrate. But concerning this also more shall be said in my next Reply. Last; It serves my turn that Mr. Gataker acknowledgeth that God's Name, and an Holy thing is abusod whensoever an extraordinary Lot it contemned, because an immediate Providence of God is therein. For the same cause an ordinary Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abufed in sport. But Mr. Gataker hath shown before that a Lot is not, in itself, an holy thing. Indeed; He would have shown in his 3▪ reason inducing him to allow lusorious Lots▪ as not evil in themselves, that a Lot is not holy either in itself, or by divine institution. Whereunto I have already answered somewhat. But having learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now, for some more satisfaction, answer somewhat more. A Lot (saith Mr▪ Gataker, pag. 132. and 133.) is not holy, either in itself, because a Casualty hath no holiness in itself; For then all Casualties should be holy: or By divine institution i● the Word, sanctifying it to som● holy use. I answer briefly. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an Holy thing in itself, because of God's immediate Providence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in respect of the same Providence? If it be, Then, though all casualties be not holy in themselves, yet all lawful Lots be holy in themselves. So that as ●he Bush that burned, and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested himself to Moses in it, pag. 156, so a Lot is holy, because of God's special Presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully used, because of God's special presence therein from ●ime to time, Therefore Hows●e●er sport might have been made with the Bush the special presence of God being removed, yet ought sport never be mad● with a Lot, because God's special presence is ever therein. Again; I need not prove that an ordinary Lot to end controversies is by divine institution in the word, seeing Mr. Gataker granteth that God in Prov. 18. 18. adviseth us to use it to that end. But it is not sanctified to an holy use. I have showed otherwise. But what then? Is not a Lot therefore always holy in itself, as Mr. Gataker saith in this passage? Were all extraordinary Lots sanctified to holy uses? Yet Mr. Gataker deemeth them all holy in themselves, because of God's immediate Providence in them. Why may not I, for the same cause, think the same of all ordinary Lots? And the rather, because Mr. Gataker saith, pag. ●27.▪ Marriage, being God's Ordinance, is holy in itself: But (as he acknowledgeth, pag. 1.) a Lot is God's Ordinance; Therefore, from his grant, a Lot is holy in itself. If then a Lot be holy in itself I conclude with Mr. Gataker, pag. 133. It may in no case, with no caution, be made matter of sport. Now than I proceed to my 3. argument, which is this, pag. 166.  

Dialog. Mat. 21. 12. 13. Numb. 26. 5●. Prov. 18. 18. Heb: 6▪ 16.  Whatsoever God hath sanctified to a proper end is not to be perverted to a worse end: But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, viz: To end Controversies▪ Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worse, viz: To play, and by playing to get away another man's money, which, without controversy is his own. The Assumption is amplified by the like use of an Oath.  

Auns●.  This Argument is faulty. But may be mended thus. That which God hath sanctified to some proper use is not to be applied to any other, especiala worse. But God hath sauctifyed Lots to this proper use, to wit, the deciding of Controversies in matters of weight; A Lott therefore may not be applied to any other use, much less to a worse. But to answer the argument. The Proposition is granted, if, [To Sanctisie] be understood in a larger sense, as meats are said to be sanctified, by God's word, for man's food, and The vnbeleiving mate sanctified to the married believer, and if thereby be also understood the sanctification, and approbation of the whole kind. To the Assumption, and amplification thereof, it is answered. That place, Prov. 18. 18. doth not enjoin though use of a Lot; Nor restraineth it to the ending of strife, Much less to the ending of great quarrels only, For, ending strife is but one use amongst many, joshua, 7. 14. jonas 1. 7. 1. Sam. 14. 42. Levit. 16. 8; 9 So ●ebr. 6. 16. doth not she w that ending a Controversy is the only lawful use of an Oath. For there be other uses of it, As, to give assurance of the performance of Covenants, and promises. For, what controversy was there between jonathan, and David to be ended by 
1. Sam. 20. 16. 17. 42.  Oath when they swore either to other?  

Reply ●.  I would thank Mr. Gataker for mending mine argument, though there be not any great need, if he had not put into his Assumption these words [In matters of weight] for his own purpose, as shall appear, But to the matter. In mine understanding, and meaning, the Proposition doth sufficiently express all that which moveth Mr. Gataker to grant it. Well, Then let us consider his opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. Gataker imply a Lot not be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not enjoined? What! Is Recreation (in general) enjoined by precpt, if not directly, yet (at least) by just consequence, as Mr. Gataker in his allowance of lusorious Lots, saith is granteth by all, pag. 138? and is not so useful an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end Controversies, enjoined by precept either directly, or by just consequence? Doth God more carefully provide for recreation, than for peace amongst his people? But Mr. Gataker is not so peremptory in an other place, pag. 135. where he saith. The use of Lots is not simply commanded, For. Prov. 18. 18. is Rather a permission than a precept, & Not so much a commandment as an advice, & counsel. I will come to an issue. If it will please M. G. to set down his just consequence to prove Recreation enjoined by precept, I will undertake to set down as just a consequence to prove, that a Lot to end a Controversy is likewise enjoined by precept. In mean while I cannot be persuaded that our God of peace, 
Psal. 34▪ 14.  who commandeth us to seek peace, and follow after it, and hath ordained a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate providence, to end controversies, which otherwise cannot be ended conveniently, doth leave us at liberty in that case, to use, or not to use a Lot. But suppose the use of a Lot be not (thus) enjoined, yet doth not God's counsel (which me thinks is a commandment though it be said of man's counsel that it is no commandment) sanctify it to be used to end controversies. This (I think) will not be denied: But it is denied That the use of a Lot is restrained to end controversies, much less great quarrels only, and sundry instances are given of using Lots to other ends than to end controversies. But all those Lots were extraordinary. Therefore, whereas in the beginning of this answer where he would find fault with mine argument, he saith, That the use of Lots in play is ever to decide some question, or controversy, though a light one (it is like) yet a question, or controversy truly so termed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he mean a Lot in general, than (with his favour) he forgetteth himself in saying Lots, by him quoted were not to end controversies: If he speak of a Lot in play, as being an ordinary Lot, than he faileth in judgement, In denying that the use of ordinary Lots (whereof is the question) is restrained to end controversies, and The instances which he giveth being extraordinary Lots, are not to the point. Besides: The subiect-matter of an extraordinary Lot being by God's special direction, if it be lawful, there may (happily) be no present controversy. Whereas, the subiect-matter of an ordinary Lot, being something questioned between man, & man, there may be a great controversy. I say, May be, For if it be well observed, in an ordinary Lot there is not always a present controversy to be determined: But always some question to be decided to prevent a controversy. As may appear by Mr. Gatakers' own words, partly here, where he saith [That there must be some question, or controversy, or else it is no Lot,] but more evidently, where he saith: That the Lot used by the soldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth a serious divisory Lot, was to prevent all contention, and strife, pag. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was used about dividing, the Land of Promise, about which was no present controversy. For God, who would have no controversies, would have also such things remooved which may cause, or justly occasion controversies. Therefore Christ expounding the commandment. 
Math. 5. 21. 22.  Thou shalt not kill, forbiddeth words of provocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common, controversies, and the occasions thereof be, giveth direction in Prov. 18. 18. That which is said of an ordinary Lot may justly be also said of an Oath, that the use of it is sanctified to end controversies by present determination, or prevention. For, as it is true, that Heb. 6. 16. implieth, that God's Oath to man is more inviolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof only, M. G. taketh knowledge, so it 
pa, 17●.  is true, that Heb. 6. 16. intimateth, That, as an Oath, for confirmation, is amongst men an end of all strife▪ so God's Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question▪ or controversy▪ Else, these words ▪ An end of all strife] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me understood, appeareth in the 2▪ vexed vers. where it is written. That God bound himself by Oath as to show the stableness of his Counsel, so that the heirs of promise might have strong cousolation. So that God's Oath to Abraham took away doubting, questioning, & all strife that might be, not only in Abraham's mind, but also in the minds of the heirs of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not only end present controversies, according to M. G. understanding, but confirming a promise▪ or covenant doth also end a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is given, to wit, by Prevention. Now let us somewhat consider Mr. Gatakers' purpose in putting into the Assumption, these words▪ [In matters of weight.▪ Forsooth, By denying the the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. Because (as he saith, pag. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lots, that is, with uncertain hazard. Surely, If Mr. Gataker had acknowledged God's special presence by his immediate Providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God, to end controversies, he would not have so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot. It is true that a matter of less weight in it self may be the subiect-matter of a controversy, as a controversy may be among men, as well mean, as might, yin their state, as Mr. Gataker here saith pa. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prov. 18. 18. are meant Men strong in their affections, so as the controverfy cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the subiect-matter of the Controversy be of more, or less weight in itself; so as there is a necessity that one or both parties be satisfied. For otherwise there may be a great quarrel about a matter of less weight. Neither do I say, that only great quarrels are to be ended, or prevented by a Lot, as Mr. Gataker denieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, pag. 173.) God speaketh in Prov. 18. 18. of contentions in general. Here than we may enter into further consideration of that which Mr. Gataker writeth, pag. 135. to wit. That, by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the only lawful use is condemned's, and an unlawful use is allowed in the room thereof. What is that Only lawful use of a Lot? I can find none other than The putting of that to a Lot which he calleth (pag. 130.) A matter of mere indifferency, that is, Such as is not material, whether a man do, or omit: Howsoever there may be a lawful use of a Lot about such a matter questioned to determine, or prevent a Controversy, yet I wonder that Mr. Gataker deemeth it that only lawful. Doth not he grant, pag. 91. That Prayer specially applied to a Lot may be conceived in weighty matters, as in the choice of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as is not material whether it be done or omitted. Did God specially appoint Lots to be used about only matters of weight? and must man so far swerve from God's example as to strive only about matters of such indifferency, and then to put only such, controverted, to the determination of a Lot? So that I doubt not but that with found judgement, and a clear conscience not accusing me of not duly respecting the special Providence, of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirm. That the more weighty the subiect-matter of a controversy is, the more justifiable is the Controversy: and Be that matter of more or less weight, the greater the necessity of ending a Controversy is, the more justifiable is the use of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abusing of God's Ordinance? But (faith Mr. Gataker glad of any thing to plead for playing with a Lot.) The use of a Lot in play is ever to decide some question, or controversy truly so termed. If so, Then he might have called it a serious Lot, according to his doctrine, the lightness of the subiect-matter controverted, notwithstanding. But whereabout is that supposed Controversy? Mr. Gataker in his written answer to my Dialogue, before mentioned, saith. The Controversy tendeth to Victory, which till it be decided, there is a Controversy though a light one, yet a Controversy, truly so termed. But is that truly or worthily to be called A Victory, which falleth out by haphazard (according to M. Gatakers' esteeming a Lot) without any desert? But (say I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him, by his immediate Providence in disposing the Lot, to humour (I say not, honour) some of the vain glorious fools with supposed Victory, who make a pretended controversy thereabout, whereas (before they intended to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a Controversy truly so termed? I need say no more, and therefore proceed to the last argument (whereof, but part is mine) It is this, pag. 173.  
That, which there is neither precept for, nor practise of, in God's 
Dial. 4▪  word, general, or special, expressed or implied, that there is no warrant for in the word: But such is the use of Lots in game. For we read in Scripture that Lots were used, but in serious matters only, both by jews, and Gentiles; Neither is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous use of them, by precept, or practise, general, or special, expressed, or implied, There is no warrant therefore for lusorious Lots in God's word.  

Aunsw.  The Proposition is unsound. For an argument holdeth (indeed) from the Negative in matters of Faith, but not in matters of Fact. Mnch less may a man reason from a matter of Fact, to a matter of Right negatively. For many things are of ordinary use, whereof there is no mention at all in God's Word, which yet all generally allow, as 
2.  sugar for sweetening, etc. Secondly; An action may have warrant sufficiently by permission, without precept, or practise. For where God hath not limited the use of any creature, or Ordinance, there he hath left the use of it free: Where he hath not determined the Circumstances of any action, there, what he hath not prohibited, that he hath permitted. For this cause, 
jer. 7. 31 & 19 5. Col. 2. 22 23. Deu. 12 30. 31. 32  in the point of God's worship, the argument holdeth from the Negative, for the substance of it. Because God hath determined it: But in civil affairs, it will not hold from the Negative to disallow aught, because God hath not determined them.  

Reply 4.  Mr. Gataker in his book showeth many instances of Lots used both by jews, and Gentiles, and all in serious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they, by the light not only of the Word, but of nature too, discerned, that Lots are to be used only in serious matters. O let us take heed how we put out so great light. But let us consider his answer, which is only to the Proposition, though I have already confuted many principal parts thereof. In my Dialogue to show that the Spirit sometime reasoneth from a matter of Fact to a matter of right, negatively, I quote these Scriptures, john 8. 39 40. 1. Cor. 11. 16. The words of the former be these, Ye go about to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth; This did not Abraham. The argument is this Abraham did not kill any that told him the truth, Therefore ye ought not go about to kill me, if ye would be sons of Abraham. This is Christ his Logic, wherewith I dare find no fault: Neither doth Mr. Gataker. For he saith nothing to it, because the Printer putteth for vers. 40. the 48. vers. wherewith Mr. Gataker maketh pastime, but I will let pass time now to take further knowledge of it. Of the other quotation the words be these. We have no such custom, nor the Churches of God. The consequent implied is. Therefore nomen aught not to pray uncovered. Hereunto Mr. Gataker answereth indeed, but so, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatively from a matter of Fact to a matter of Right. Which is all that I intended by the quotation, and not, to imagine this argument. The Churches of God, and faithful men do not use Lots in gaming▪ Therefore such gaming is unlawful. So that I need not herein reply upon Mr. Gataker, I only wonder that he saith. The use of Lots in games hath been common in the Churches of God. What! In the public Assemblies? as was the fault of women their heads uncovered in the Church at Corinth? But Mr. Gataker in this answer speaketh of things merely natural, or civil, as sweetening with sugar, etc. I will not now endeavour to prove that in the Word there is matter of just consequence either general, or implied (which is a part of the proposition) to allow as well sweetening with sugar, etc. as Recreation in general, and therefore they may be lawful though they be not mentioned in the Word. But suppose M. Gatakers' axiom holdeth in them, what is that to Lots, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate providence, and the use whereof is limited to end serious controversies? In regard whereof doubt I not but an argument concerning the use of them, may hold from the Negative in matter of Fact, as well as in matter of Faith, or of the point of God's worship for the substance of it. For I presume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occasion, as he did not, kill a man that told him the truth: so that all who feared God, and knew the nature, and use of a Lot, would not, as they did not, use a Lot in game. Secondly. Why may not there be for 
2.  a thing permitted, some precept in the Word, general, or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the Word, either express or by just consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. Gataker reconsileth these two axioms [Every action is indifferent,] & [No action is indifferent,] thus, Every naked and bare action simply conceived, is indifferent: But, No action clad with his particular circumstances, is indifferent, pag. 94. So that, he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular moral action, or No action of the reasonable creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity, be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto, pag. 95. These things, especially these words (Rules of God's Word, considered,) I may say, that howsoever a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawful, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. Gataker saith, Recreation in general, is both by permission, and by precept, if not expressly, yet by just consequence pag. 138. Doth then Mr. Gataker make permission a just exception against the Proposition? Touching his proof that Permission is a sufficient 
1.  warrant: I first would know what ordinance of God that is, which hath not some limited, or appointed use thereof. I am sure, and have showed, that God's ordinance 
●.  touching a Lot, hath. Secondly, I grieve to observe what a gap Mr. Gataker hath, by this doctrine, opened to Licentiousness. What! may man disposed to fin, employ any creature, whose ufe God hath not limited, to what use he will? No; For here is to be understood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason touching circumstances, viz [Any use, but that which is prohibited] Howsoever I could demur the reupon, especially if an express prohibition be understood, yet herein I will be silent having enough granted me. For the use of Lots in game is prohibited by just consequences, as I have demonstrated. For the better understanding of the 2. part of the reason, (hasting to an end) I only desire an answer to this question. Is any use of a Lot lawful where the circumstances of Time, Place, and Persons be not determined? If Mr. Gataker except an extraordinary use, I may as well except the lusorious use of Lots, In answer to the exemplification of this reason, granting that an argument holdeth from the Negative for the substance of God's Worship, I yet make this Quaere. Whether, only because God hath determined it? For in those places of jeremy, God doth blame his people only for using a worship [which he commanded not], without any intimation that he prescribed his own worship. To the same purpose writeth Paul to the Colossians against traditions of men, and will-worship, not for Mr. Gatakers' cause, but because in so worshipping they held not the Head, ver. 19 which is Christ, King of his Church teaching, and governing the same in all things. But in Deut. Mr. Gatakers' cause is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other nations served their Gods, and sendeth them to his word to observe the same, without putting anything to, or taking out from the same. Surely, I should not gather from hence Mr. Gatakers' cause, as being the only cause; Because I fear it would encourage Papists in their superstitious rites, and ceremonies called Circumstances, though, indeed, parts of the substance of God's outward worship. For they are to ready to take hold thereof and say God hath determined nothing touching these supposed Circumstances, & they are not against the word of God, therefore they are permitted, and so warranted. But I should gather from that, and the other places (I think directly, and not auckwardly) this conclusion. Because all things in, & unto the service of God ought to be precisely according to Gods Will revealed in his word, therefore whatsoever is not commanded ought not to be. And the rather (God being jealous) because of th● meaning of the fringes upon the 
Exo. 20. 5. Num. 15 39  Israëlites their garments, to wit, Tha● ye may remember all the Command▪ ments of the Lord, and do them, and that ye seek not after your own heart, nor, after your own eyes, after which ye go ● whoring. To the last I answer. That a Lot is no more a Civil affair, than is an Oath, though it, (as is an Oath,) be used in Civil affairs. And lastly, I affirm again, that God hath determined the use of a Lot to determine controversies, so as, without God's special appointment, (which is not now to be expected,) it cannot be lawfully used to any other purpose; Therefore an argument from the Negative will hold by Mr. Gatakers' rule, to disallow the use of any other Lot, as well lusorious, as divinatory. Thus having answered Mr. Gatakers' reasons inducing him to allow Lusorious Lots as not evil in themselves, and removed Mr. Gatakers' answers to mine arguments, I may more confidently hold mine opinion, which Mr. Dudley Fennor (of reverend memory) his godly treatise of Recreations hath taught me▪ to wit, That Tables, and Cards, as well as Dice, and all other games consisting in chawnce, (wherein there is use of a Lot) are utterly unlawful.   

ERRATA.  
Pag. 6. Godless re●d God less▪ Pag. 13. foam some. Pag. 31. ye the: Pag. 34. nor not. Pag. 42. with what. Pag. 46. enoug evough. Pag. 63. with what. ●ag. 75. observed observed. ●ag. 82. recreare recreate ●●g. 86. beat red bettered. ●●g. 101: they these. ●ag. 103. I serves It serves. Pag. 114. it is. Pag. 127. mightly mighty, Pag. 128. condemneth condemned.  
Pardon the rest, both literal and punctual▪