A PATTERN OF CHRISTIAN LOYALTY: Whereby any prudent man may clearly perceive, in what manner the New Oath of Allegiance, and every Clause thereof, may in a true, and Catholic sense, without danger of Perjury, be taken by Roman CATHOLICS.  
AND All the chief Objections, which are usually made against the said Oath, either in particular, or in general, may according to the grounds of Catholic Religion be easily answered.  
Collected out of Authors, who have handled the whole matter more largely.  
By WILLIAM HOWARD an English Catholic.  
Fear our Lord, my son, and the King.  Proverbs 24. 
LONDON, Printed by R. BADGER, 1634.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, THOMAS, Lord HOWARD, Earl of Arundel and Surrey, Premier Earl, and Earl Martial of England, Baron HOWARD, Mowbray, Segrave, Brus of Gower, Fitz-Alan, Clun, Oswaldestre, Maltravers, and Graystocke, Knight of the most Noble Order of the GARTER, and one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.  
My very good LORD;  
THe Titles on which this Dedication is grounded have proved stronger than my bashfulness, or fear; for your singular candour of mind, makes me hope an acceptance of my good intentions, though joined with weak abilities, and (besides the honour of my relation to your Lordship in blood) the experience I have had of your Noble and gracious favour to myself in particular, gives me assurance, that you will not be displeased, if for protection in an undertaking exposed to much opposition, I address myself to your Lordship. For so earnest have they been in this controversy, as now at last (even since this little Treatise was under press) they have objected to me; that we are bound to believe as matter of faith, the generalities delivered by the Pope's Holiness, though the wisdom (say they) of the See Apostolic for bearing to irritate Christian Princes, descends not to particulars. Thus endeavour they to bear us in hand, that we are bound to profess what they conceal from us, and that Catholic faith must be all one with mystery of State, and consequently every good Christian being bound to profess his faith, with the loss of his life and living, we must in this question be tied to no less, for a secret in policy, thought fitting to be kept from us out of reason of State.  
The very laying down of this their last refuge, sufficiently discovereth the weakness thereof: so it only resteth that I crave your Lordship's pardon for presenting it out of due place to your Lordship's View; to whom as Chief, both by nature and merit, I am obliged to profess myself,  
A faithful and humble servant, WILLIAM HOWARD.   

A PREMONITION to the Reader.  
THere is one thing (Courteous Reader) which I wish thee first of all to observe, to wit, what great disagreement there is among the learneder sort of our English Catholics, by whom the less learned are for the most part guided, in their opinions concerning the new Oath of Allegiance. For some condemn it for altogether unlawful, nor to be taken with a safe conscience by any good Catholic. Others approve it for lawful, and to contain nothing besides a profession of true temporal Allegiance, and therefore not to be refused by any good Subject. A third sort there is, who carry themselves negatively, and in express words will neither approve it, nor condemn it, but leave every man to his own conscience, which in very deed is to any judicious man, all circumstances considered, a tacit approving thereof.  
Those who condemn it, are of two sorts, the one extremely violent, and are not afraid to tax those Catholics who approve it, of flat heresy, and to accounted them no true Catholics, but rather heretics, falsely pretending, That the Pope's power to depose Princes, is by all learned and good Catholics a confessed and undoubted point of Catholic faith; That his power to Excommunicate, and to absolve from Oaths in general is denied in the Oath: And that the King, 
See these objections answered, nu 7.11.17.  and Parliament do take upon them in this Oath the Church's authority to define matters of Faith.  
Others there be who are not so violent, but much misliking the former objections, they chief except against the Second, and Fourth Clause, how any man can truly swear, That the Pope hath not any power to depose the King, etc. seeing that he hath at the lest a probable power to depose him: and consequently how any man can truly abjure, as damnable and heretical this doctrine, and position, That Princes which be deprived by the Pope, 
See these, and others answered, nu. 9.13.14.  may be deposed by their Subjects, or any other, seeing that it is at the lest a probable doctrine, it being approved by the Pope himself, and by many other most learned Catholic Divines. And against the Oath in general they urge, That our supreme spiritual Pastor hath forbidden it, 
See these answered, nu. 26.32.39.  That to take it, is scandalous, and that to refuse it, is the safer way.  
Now when I perceived the best learned Priests of our Nation to disagree so much in their opinions concerning this great, and dangerous controversy of the Oath betwixt the Pope's Holiness, and the King's Majesty, the one by his constitutive precept first commanding it under the penalty of a Praemunire, supposing it to contain nothing but true temporal Allegiance, the other by his declarative Breves forbidding it, as containing many things plainly repugnant to faith and salvation, and that both their commandments could not be obeyed, being opposites one to the other: And considering with myself first, that I must needs incur either spiritual disobedience, by not obeying the Pope, if his commandment were just, or, if otherwise, temporal disloyalty by disobeying the King; and that, according to the common doctrine of Divines 
a See beneath, num. 26. , the constitutive precept of a lawful Superior must be obeyed, unless it be clearly unjust, according to that which shall be said beneath 
b num 3c. : Secondly, that both the Pope, and the King may sometimes err in their judgements, and command that which is not just, for that their judgements are not always grounded upon truth 
c Can. A nobis de sent. Excom. cap. 28. , which never deceiveth, nor is deceived, but sometimes they follow opinion, which may oftentimes deceive, and be deceived: Thirdly, that I could not therefore be secure in conscience, by obeying either the Pope's commandment against the Kings, or contrariwise, with blind obedience, jest blinded with wilful ignorance I should fall into the ditch 
d Matth. 15.  either of spiritual, or of temporal disobedience, by not examining with judgement of discretion, which of their commandments is just, and therefore to be obeyed, and that my own conscience must be to me the inward judge of all my actions, and omissions.  
And lastly, that I could not secure my conscience, by giving credit only to those, who writ, and pled in favour of the Pope against the King, without reading, and examining what they who writ, and pled for the King, do answer in his defence, or contrariwise, considering that both of them may relate each others reasons, and answers falsely, lamely, or corruptly, and that in a controversy, betwixt two parties he cannot be accounted an upright judge, who will hear, read, and examine the reasons, answers, and allegations of the one side, or of the other, only in that manner, as it shall please the adverse part to propound them for his own advantage, and that therefore to forbidden any man, who is to be a judge in a controversy betwixt two parties (as in the Court of Penance, every Ghostly Father is to be a judge of whatsoever his Penitent shall confess unto him, and in the inward Court of Conscience every private man is to be his own judge) to read, hear, and understand the reasons, and answers of either side, but only in that manner as his Adversary shall propound them, is in very deed no other, than to forbidden him to be an upright judge. All which considered, to inform my conscience uprightly in this dangerous controversy of the Oath, not betwixt two inferior parties, or betwixt the Defendant, or party sued, and the judge, but between two supreme, and independent judges in their degree, the one in spirituals, the other in temporals, contending whether this new Oath, which the one commandeth, and the other forbiddeth, be a temporal, or a spiritual thing, contain a profession of true temporal Allegiance, or a denial of true spiritual obedience, I thought it not secure for me, to rely upon the bore relation, and information either of the one side only, or of the other.  
Whereupon to find out the truth herein according to the capacity of my understanding, and to frame my conscience accordingly, I have diligently read, and examined what books soever have been published, as well against the Oath in favour of the Pope, as for it in the King's defence. And I confess ingenuously, that those which have been written in favour of the Oath, and of Sovereign Princes not to be deposed much less to be murdered, or killed by the Pope's authority (which is the only principal thing denied therein) have given me full satisfaction in this point, out of which I have at sundry vacant times, to help the weakness of my memory, collected the Explications, and Observations following, which because they do clearly convince my understanding, and may perchance give the like satisfaction to others, and also stir up some, who are more learned than I am, to defend their Princes right, being assaulted by such powerful Adversaries, I thought it necessary for diverse reasons to propound them to the public view of the world, to have them examined by learned Divines, as well in regard of mine own good, as of the good of others: especially seeing that but few of our English Priests among so many, who in their conscience approve the Oath, dare for some worldly respects make known their minds herein but only to some of their trusty friends, because, as some of them who favour the Oath, have said to me in plain terms, the misery of these times is such, that by taking, or publicly approving the Oath, and maintaining the King's sovereign right in temporals against such violent opposers thereof, they shall gain little or nothing, in comparison of that, which they shall loose thereby. So that many Lay Catholics are in daily hazard to loose their whole estates (which is a pitiful thing) for want of being instructed by these men for worldly ends, in this controversy of the Oath, which they in their own conscience think to be very lawful.  
One reason therefore, for which I thought it necessary to publish these brief Explications of the Oath, is the great grief I have to see some few of our English Priests both Secular, and Religious, now lately to revive again this scandalous controversy (which for divers years hath here through silence, and connivance been well appeased, and to oppose themselves most vehemently against the Oath, though not by public writings to satisfy our understandings, yet by seeking to draw us to embrace their opinions against it by violence, and terrors, in labouring to make a Schism among us, and to exclude us from the holy Sacraments, and Ecclesiastical communion, only for our opinions (as they themselves call it) of the Oath, against the known practice of many learned, and virtuous Priests, and among the rest their last Archpriest, Mr. Doctor Harrison, as divers letters of his written to one of his Assistants (which are yet extant) can give sufficient testimony. But if these men had well observed, in what manner Saint Austin writeth against the Donatists', 
S. Aug. Epht. 48 add Vincent. & de Bapt. contra Donatist.  for their breach of Ecclesiastical unity, and in commendation and excuse of Saint Cyprian, (who although he opposed himself vehemently against Pope Stephen in the question of Baptism administered by Heretics, yet they (till kept Ecclesiastical communion with each other) doubtless they would have been fearful to have proceeded against their Catholic brethren with so little charity, but would have remembered that saying of Saint Austin, 
S. Aug. l●b 3. de Bapt contra Donat. 16.  that those men have not charity, or the love of God, who love not the unity of the Church, but fear not to make a breach thereof only for their opinions, and which for undoubted Doctrines of faith, they will needs obtrude not only upon the unlearned, but also upon those who are as learned as themselves.  
An other reason is, the great pity I have to see some Catholics of good account, now lately, by the bad counsel of their Instructours under a false pretence of Catholic faith cast themselves headlong into manifest danger, not only of a Praemunire, to the beggering of themselves, their wives, and children, but also of their souls (if ignorance do not excuse them) by disobeying the just commandment of their Sovereign Prince in point of their loyalty, and due obedience, and giving thereby no small occasion to His Majesty to be scandalised at our Religion, and to accounted it a nourisher of disloyalty, and all us Roman Catholics to be disloyal Subjects, if the contrary were not by some of us made manifest unto him. And is it not a lamentable case, and able to move a stony heart to tears, that we Lay Catholics, whom this Oath doth chief concern (for Priests can lose little, or nothing by refusing it, being subject to greater penalties, then is a Praemunire, although by persuading others to refuse it, because the Pope's power to practise the deposition of Princes is denied therein, they may perchance incur greater danger, as liable to suspicion of disposing the Subject's minds to Rebellion when time shall serve, as any man of judgement may easily perceive) that we, I say, should by any of our English priests (who should rather be a comfort unto us, then add affliction to affliction, knowing the severity of the laws, to which we are otherwise subject in regard of our Religion, if His Majesty out of his great clemency were not more merciful unto us) be compelled under pain to be deprived of Sacraments, and Ecclesiastical communion, to lose all that we have in this world, liberty, lands, and goods (and which being once lost by their bad counsel, they can never be able to restore to us back again) only for that we cannot be persuaded by them to approve as an undoubted doctrine of faith, their opinion for the Pope's power to depose Princes (the only chief thing denied in the Oath) which in France is not permitted to be publicly taught by any of their Priests for so much as probable. 
e See the A●●●, of the parliament of parn 2 jan. 1615. printed at Paris by the King's Printers and in the French Mercury tom. 3 the year 16.5. pag. 327.   
A Third reason is, for that His Majesty perceiving this controversy to be kept still on foot more by faction, then by reason, and that the Pope will not be drawn to name any one particular thing, which in the Oath is clearly unlawful, is resolved (as I hear) to maintain his supreme temporal authority against all opposers thereof, and that therefore his Subjects should do well, dutifully to shun this damnable and seditious doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope● pretended power which is the main scope, and substance of this new Oath (as both the words thereof do plainly show, and also his Father of renowned memory, who was the maker of the law, hath oftentimes declared 
f See beneath nu. 3.  by public writings) which opinion is indeed to be abhorred, detested, and abjured by all loyal Subjects in this Kingdom, no less then in France, where by many Decrees of Parliaments it is accounted false, damnable, seditious, and books written in defence thereof forbidden under pain of Treason, 
See beneath num. 7. and 47  and also by a special Censure of the Sorbon Doctors (to which sixteen French jesuites promised to subscribe) is expressly condemned, as new, false, erroneous, contrary to the word of God etc.  
The last reason is, that great desire I have not to err through ignorance (for wilfully by God's grace I will never err) in the lest point which may concern the Catholic faith, or my duty to God, and Caesar. And therefore I would have no man to conceive, that I am so audaciously arrogant, as to take upon me here to teach learned Priests, who aught to instruct others, their duty, knowing the great weakness of my own learning in comparison of theirs, but rather to be taught, and instructed by them, if perchance they shall found me to be in an error, which as soon as any of them will vouchsafe to make manifest unto me, I promise' faithfully to retract the same forthwith. For my only desire is to inform my conscience rightly, and to give both to the Pope's Holiness, and to the King's Majesty, that spiritual, and temporal obedience respectively, which according to the law of God, and the grounds of Catholic Religion is due to either of them. But if they will be silent, and not confute with solid reasons the ensuing Explications and Observations, and yet will still go on with their accustomed clamours against the Oath, and the takers, or approvers thereof, all prudent men may well presume, that they are not able to convince me of any error and by their silence I shall be the more confirmed in my opinion.  
And if their Answer shall be no other, then by labouring (as some of them have lately done) to procure new Breves, prohibitions, or Censures only in general terms (as the former were) after so many humble Supplications, 
g See Widdringtons Theological Disputation's in the Epistle, and the Conclusion, his Purgation, and Sapplication to Pope Paul the Fift. And Thomas Prestone, and Thomas Green's Supplication to Pope Gregory the xv.  that His Holiness would be pleased to name some one particular thing of so many as the former Breves have affirmed, to be in the Oath, and consequently in those Books which defend it, plainly repugnant to faith, and salvation, they may well suppose, that those Catholics, who out of a pure heart, good conscience, and unfeigned faith, or obedience both to their spiritual Pastor, and also to their temporal Prince, desire to be assured of the truth in particular (for generals being subject to deceit according to that common saying, Dolosus versatur in generalibus, can give them small satisfaction) will not be daunted with such general prohibitions, or Censures in a matter of so great prejudice, unless they shall clearly perceive them to be agreeable to truth, and justice, they being not ignorant, that according to the common Doctrine of Divines, 
h Navarre 〈◊〉 Enchir. c. 27. nu. 3. Cova●●● tom 2. Relect. 1 de fractis. paragr. 7. Suar. ●isp. 4. de Cons●r see. 7. and other who ●●at 〈◊〉 s●●●s.  prohibitions, and Censures, which are unjust, and invalid for want of a just cause, and where there is no Mortal sin, do not bindin conscience, and will more hurt the souls of the procurers then of those, against whom they are unjustly procured.  
Neither can these men be ignorant, what small account some Catholic Princes, and their Subjects both in former ages, 
i See the Protestants Apology trac a. see 4.  and also in these our times, have made of some Pope's Breves, Bulls, and Censures, for that they have supposed them to be unjust. And besides the late example of some the greatest of our Secular Priests, in not admitting the Breves of this Pope's Holiness being prejudicial to their pretended ends, may be a fit Precedent to us Lay Catholics, not to admit easily, and without due examination such prohibitions, Breves, or Censures, which do tend to the great prejudice of the King's Majesties temporal Sovereignty, and to the temporal ruin of all as his Catholic Subjects.  
Wherhfore it were fare more convenient in my opinion, for the public peace and unity of the Church, for the honour of the Sea Apostolic, for the general, and particular safety of themselves, and of many others in their souls, bodies, and goods, and for the avoiding of future scandals, and contentions; which may arise betwixt the Kingdom, and the Priesthood from new prohibitions, that these men would be a means to procure of His Holiness, that either the former Breves, and prohibitions may be buried with honour in silence, and oblivion, and every man left to his own conscience, or that some particular thing in the Oath, which is plainly repugnant to faith and salvation, be more expressly declared, that men's minds may not be troubled, nor the unity of the Church distracted, only for opinions in things which may concern the temporal rights of Princes, but that, according to the prayer of the holy Church, 
k The Thursday in Easter week.  there may be one faith of minds, and piety of actions, notwithstanding diversity of opinions, until the Church, which is the pillar, and ground of truth, 
l 1 Tim. 5. S. Aug. l. 1de Bapt. contra Donatist. c. 18.  and is no party in this strife, shall decide the controversy, or, as S. Austin speaketh in the excuse of S. Cyprian, until by the sentence of a plenary Council the consent of the whole Church shall confirm what is to be followed in this matter. For so long as His Holiness will permit some learned men to writ books in his behalf against our King in things belonging to his supreme temporal rights (as doth this new Oath of Allegiance) no prohibitions, or Censures can justly hinder, but that his Catholic Subjects, both Priests and Lay men, may also publish in print what may be answered in the King's defence. To conclude, I make no doubt, but that Truth will 'cause hatred, as flattery doth friends, but withal I am assured, that Truth is great, 
m 3. Esdr. 4.  and will prevail at last, and that Blessed are they who in the mean time till it prevail, do s●ffer persecution, at whose hands soever they suffer it, for truth, and justice sake, 
n Matth. 5.  for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.   

ERRATA.  
Pag. 4. l. penult. r. Also. pag. 15. l. 24. r. Montpillier. pag. 37 l ●● r. Soocher. pag. 58. l. nit. in Margin r. num. 28.   

A BRIEF OF SIX PRINCIPAL HEADS HANDLED IN THIS TREATISE.  
FIRST, the form of the new Oath is propounded, and every Clause thereof briefly explained: And that the main point denied therein, is only all true, lawful, and valid power of the Pope to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition: and that the Doctrine which approveth this practice, being clearly false, as approving open injustice, may be abjured for false, and consequently as impious, damnable, indirectly, or by a necessary consequence repugnant to the Word of God, and in this sense heretical, as both by Protestants, and by the most part of Catholic Divines, the word [Heretical] is usually, and properly taken.  
Secondly, that in penal Laws (as is this for taking the Oath) all doubtful words are to be understood in the more favourable sense, and which may make the Law to be just and reasonable, and that therefore what doubtful words, or sentences soever are contained in the Oath, they must be taken in the more favourable sense, and which may make the Oath to contain no falsehood, or injustice.  
Thirdly, that Perjury is defined by Divines, to be a Lie confirmed by Oath, and that therefore whatsoever may excuse from Lying, may also excuse from Perjury. And that albeit there be danger of Perjury to swear doubtful words in that sense, which is doubtful, yet to swear doubtful words in a true, and determinate sense, and which is not doubtful, but clear, and morally certain, there is no danger of Perjury.  
Fourthly, the difference betwixt Declarative, and Constitutive precepts is declared, and that because the Pope's Breves forbidding the Oath are declarative, and grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions, therefore English Catholics are not bound to observe them.  
Fifthly, what Scandal is, and how many sorts of Scandal there be, is declared, and that the refusing, not the taking, of the Oath is truly scandalous.  
Lastly, which is the safer way is declared, and that it is safer to take the Oath, than to refuse it; yea, and that to refuse it, is not safe at all: and the example of choosing the more safe, and the more probable Physic is confuted, and shown, that it is no fit example to dissuade any man from taking the Oath, being commanded by the constitutive precept of our Sovereign Prince.   

THE FORM OF THE new Oath of Allegiance divided into eight parts or Clauses, as they are explained in this TREATISE.  
1 I A. B. Doc truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience before God, and the World; That our Sovereign Lord King CHARLES is lawful, and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other His Majesty's Dominions and Countries.  
2 And that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church, or see of Rome, or by any other means with any other, hath any power, or authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of His Majesty's Kingdoms, or Dominions, or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade, or annoyed Him, or His Countries, or to discharge any of His Subjects of their Allegiance, or Obedience to His Majesty, or to give licence, or leave to any of them to bear Arms, raise Tumults, or to offer any violence, or hurt to His Majesty's Royal Person, State, or Government, or to any of His Majesty's Subjects within His Majesty's Dominions.  
3 And I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any Declaration, or sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation, made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope, or His Successors, or by any Authority derived, or to be derived from Him, or His See against the said King, His Heirs, or Successors, or any Absolution of the said Subjects from their Obedience; I will bear faith, and true Allegiance to His Majesty, His Heirs, and Successors, and Him, and Them will defend to the uttermost of my power against all Conspiracies, and Attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against His, or their Persons, their Crown or Dignity, by reason, or colour of any such Sentence, or Declaration, or otherwise; and will do my best endeavour to disclose, and make known unto His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and Traitorous Conspiracies, which I shall know or hear of to be against Him, or any of them.  
4 And I do further swear, that I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine, and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever.  
5 And I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any Person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof.  
6 Which I acknowledge by good, and full authority to be lawfully ministered unto me, and do renounce all Pardons, and dispensations to the contrary.  
7 And all these things I do plainly, and sincerely acknowledge, and swear, according to the express words by me spoken, and according to the plain, and common sense, and understanding of the same words, without any equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever.  
8 And I do make this Recognition and Acknowledgement, hearty, willingly, and truly upon the true faith of a Christian. So help me God.   

The first Clause explained.  
1 THe First Clause, I A B, etc. all English Catholics (although otherwise vehement impugners of the Oath, as Doctor Kellison 
a In his Treatise of the Prelate, and the Prince, etc. cap. 15. nu. 12. , and Father Parsons) do willingly admit; for that every English Catholic (saith Father Parsons 
b In his Book entitled, The judgement of a Catholic English man, etc. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13.16. ) will swear and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and Clauses of the Oath, which do any way appertain to the Civil and Temporal obedience due to His Majesty, whom he acknowledgeth for his true and lawful King, and Sovereign over all His Dominions. Neither can there be any difficulty therein, except only to know, what is that, which in this Clause, and the next, by virtue of the express words, and the plain, and common sense of them (to which the Seventh Clause expressly bindeth the Swearer) I am bound to swear immediately; to wit, whether by force of the words I must swear immediately, That our Sovereign Lord, etc. And that the Pope, etc. or only my sincere acknowledgement thereof. For although in regard of the matter, it is lawful to swear them both, that is, both the things themselves, and also my sincere acknowledgement of them, and therefore we need not to contend about the words: Yet it is very probable, if not certain, that by force of the words I am bound to swear immediately only my sincere acknowledgement. Because all the swearing both in this Clause, and the next, consisteth only in those words [Before God] which being taken away, there would be no swearing, or Oath at all, in affirming, or denying any thing contained in these two Clauses. And the plain meaning of these words [Before God, and the World] is this, that I A B do call God, and the World to witness, that I do truly, that is, unfaignedly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my conscience, That our Sovereign Lord, etc. And that the Pope, etc. although, as I said, in regard of the matter, it is lawful to swear them both.   

The second Clause explained.  
2 IN the Second Clause, And that the Pope, etc. (which is the root and ground of all the Branches following) there is no such difficulty as some pretend, if we duly consider the express words thereof, and the occasion, end, and reason, for which this new Oath was devised. For, as Suarez doth well observe, 
Suarez lib 6. de Leg. cap. 1.  Upon the will, and intention of the Lawmaker (which is the soul of the Law) the substance, and force of the Law doth chief depend. Whereupon, if by any means the will of the Lawmaker may be known, according to it especially we must interpret the words of the Law, because that is the true interpretation of the Law, by which we follow the will, and meaning of the Lawmaker: not his will merely internal, but as it is expressed by words, because a Law is not enacted by the Princes will, unless by the words of the Law it be sufficiently expressed, seeing that the will alone is not of itself sufficient to bind, neither also is it sufficient, that it be privately known by some other way, but it is necessary, that it be sufficiently contained in the Law itself. And especially we must consider the beginning, Preface, or Preamble of the Law, and join with it the rest which follow: for to the beginning if there be no other let, all that followeth is to be applied, because in the beginning, or Preamble of the Constitution is usually contained the final end, cause, and reason, which chief moveth the Lawmaker, and which morray is a sure means to find out his will, and meaning, and by which the ambiguity of any doubtful word, or sentence is chief to be determined.  
3 Now upon the occasion, and discovery of those barbarous Powder-Traytours, who were all of them Roman Catholics, and, as it appeareth by their confessions, grounded their devilish Conspiracy chief upon the Pope's power to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms, and Lives for the good of Religion: The King's Majesty knowing right well, that many other Roman Catholics did from their hearts detest, and abhor such Traitorous and Diabolical practices, and the wicked grounds thereof, thought it needful for the better discovering and repressing of such bloody Assassinate's, and their disciples, to device, and establish in the next Parliament following such an Oath, wherein true temporal Allegiance due to all temporal Princes what Religion soever they profess, should be acknowledged, and no true spiritual obedience due to the Pope's Holiness should be denied, and yet the wicked principles of that most damnable Conspiracy should be detected, and abjured. Whereupon the Parliament, in the very beginning, or Preamble of the Oath 
c Anno 3. jacobi cap. 4. sect. And for the better trial, etc. , setteth down the end, and reason thereof, to wit, for the better trial how His Majesty's subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty, and due obedience, which (as afterwards in the next 
d Anno 7. jacobi cap. 6.  Session they declare) every true and well affected Subject not only by the bond of Allegiance, but also by the commandment of Almighty GOD aught to bear to His Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors. And moreover, the King's Majesty Himself hath often by public writings 
e In his premonition pag. 9 and i● h●s Apology for the O●th, pag. ●. & 9  in express words declared, that in this Oath He intended to demand of His Subjects nothing else, than a profession of that temporal Allegiance, and Civil obdience, which all subjects by the Law of GOD and Nature, do own to their lawful Prince, with a promise to resist, and disclose all contrary uncivil violence, and to make a true distinction, not betwixt Catholics and Protestants, but betwixt Catholics of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Catholics as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody Maxims, as the Powder-traytours did. Whereupon He caused the lower House of Parliament, who at the first would have had the Oath to contain a denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate Him, to reform that Clause: So careful was He, that nothing should be contained in this Oath, except the profession of natural Allegiance, and civil, and temporal Obedience. He said [in this Oath] for as the Oath of Supremacy, saith His Majesty, was devised for putting a difference between Papists, and them of our profession; so was this Oath ordained for making a difference between the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the Powder treason.  
4 First, therefore, in this Clause is not denied the power, authority, right, or title, which temporal Princes, or Commonwealths have, or may pretend to have in temporals, as to make war, invade, annoy, etc. upon just cause. For this temporal power either of Princes, or Commonwealths, and consequently of the Pope, as he is a temporal Prince, is not in this Clause meddled withal, neither is there any thing concerning it affirmed, or denied therein, as the express words do plainly show, but only concerning the power, and authority, which the Pope formally as he is Pope, Bishop of Rome, or supreme spiritual Pastor, or Prince, either of himself, or by any other means with any other, hath to depose the King, etc.  
5 Secondly, neither in this Clause is denied that that power, or authority, which the Pope, as Pope, hath to command temporal things, as invading, annoying, etc. in order to spiritual good, or, which is all one, to concur therein with others, who have, or may pretend to have such power to invade, annoy, etc. by way only of moral influence, or motion, as by hiring, persuading, or commanding; neither can the words of this Clause, being taken properly, admit this sense. For to have power or authority to do a thing, as to invade, annoy, etc. is a fare different thing, than to have power, or authority only to command the doing thereof, or to concur by way only of moral influence, with others who have true, and lawful power to do it. As to have art, or skill to paint, is a fare different thing, than to hire or command a Painter who hath skill, to paint, or to concur with him to the making of a picture by way only of moral influence, or motion. Neither can a King, who hireth, or commandeth a Painter to make such a picture, be truly said to make or paint that picture, or to concur to the painting thereof, as having himself art, or skill to paint it. And in like manner it is to be said that a Pope, who by way only of moral influence, as by persuading, hiring, or commanding, concurreth to the invading of a King with others, who have perchance true and lawful power to invade him, be truly said to invade that King, as having himself true and lawful power to invade Him, of which power and authority to invade, annoy, etc. and not of moral influence, or of power only to command Invasions, etc. this Clause expressly speaketh. And therefore albeit we should falsely suppose (which some do greatly, but perniciously, indiscreetly, and to no purpose urge against this Clause) that the Civil Commonwealth in some case hath power to punish and depose her Sovereign Prince, and that the Pope may concur with her therein by way of moral influence, or motion (which nevertheless for practice, which is chief to be regarded, is certainly false, for the same reason, for which as I will show forthwith, it is certainly false, that the Pope hath not any true, and lawful power to depose, or practise the deposition of Princes, because so long as it is but probable inspeculation, or, which is all one, so long as it is but an opinion, or controversy among Philosophers, and Divines, the Prince being in possession, cannot upon any probable, or controversed power or title, be deprived thereof without open injustice) yet this being falsely supposed, would no way impugn this Branch of the Oath, which speaketh not of the Pope's concurring with any other to deposing, invading, annoying, etc. by way only of moral influence, but only of his Power, or authority to depose, invade, annoy etc. or of his concurring with any other to the doing of those actions, as having himself true power, and authority to do them.  
6 Neither thirdly can any man with any modesty, charity, or reverend respect to the King's Majesty conceive, that He would by Act of Parliament have all His Subjects to swear, or sincerely to acknowledge by Oath that to be true, which Himself, and all the Christian world know to be clearly false, to wit, that the Pope, as Pope, hath not any power to depose the King, as also other Princes, so much as in the opinion of the Pope himself, and of many other Divines, who are of his opinion. For His Majesty knew right well, and which being a thing so manifest, no man of any judgement can deny, which therefore Father Lessins, 
f Lessins in his Singleton de Discussione decreti Lateran. concilii part 2. num. 38.  and Doctor Kellison, 
g In his Treatise of the Prelate, and the Prince etc. cap. 11. num. 7. pag. 241.  do in express words acknowledge, that a power, which is not altogether certain, but only probable, or in controversy, cannot be a sufficient ground, whereby immediately any man may be punished, and deprived of any his right, and Dominion, nor can be practised without open injustice. And consequently that a power to depose, which is only probable, is not any true, real, lawful, sufficient, and valid power to depose, and therefore for practise neither in law, nor conscience to be accounted any power at all: seeing that power, and practice are correlatives, which do mutually infer, and destroy each other, 
h Arist. in Praedicam. cap. 3.  and where there can be no true, real, and lawful effect, or practise, there is no true, real, and lawful power. For in vain is that power, and therefore none, seeing that God, and Nature do nothing in vain, 
i Arist. lib. 3. de Coelo ●ea. 32  be reduced to effect, or practise.  
7 And that it is a Doctrine truly probable, it being approved by so many learned Divines, who have seen and examined all the arguments on either side, nor grounded upon any reason, or principle which is clearly false, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, it is manifest.  
First by the Acts, and proceed of the Sorbon Doctors 
k See the French Mercury tom. 2. ad Ann. 16●2. p. 597. & seq.  against the English controversy of Becanus, who held, that it is certain, and out of all controversy among Catholics, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms, yea and of their lives, falsely pretending the High Priest in the old Law to have the same authority, and therefore the Pope in the new.  
Secondly, by the Censure of the said Theological Faculty 
l This Censure is printed at Paris in Latin, and may be seen in French in the French Merc tom 11. add Ann. 1626. p. 9●. and see it beneath nu. 44.  against the Doctrine of Santarellus, which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes for heresy.  
Thirdly, by the public Declaration of Sixteen the chiefest jesuites of France dated the sixteenth of March 1626.; and exhibited to the French King, 
m See the French Mere. tom. 11 ad An. 1626. pag. 92.  wherein they renounce, and detest the Doctrine of Santarellus as wicked, in that which concerneth the Persons of Kings, their Authority, and their States etc. Promising to subscribe to the censure, which shall be made against that pernicious Doctrine by the Clergy, or the Sorbon.  
Fourthly, by the public Declaration of three French Bishops, to wit, of Auranches, of Charters, and of Soissons, 
n See the Fren. Merc. tom. 11. ad Ann. 1626., pag. 105.  wherein also they insinuate, that the Bishops of France in their General Assembly did agreed with them in these three propositions: 1. That it is not lawful to rebel, or take Arms against the King for any cause, or occasion whatsoever. 2. That all Subjects are bound to obey the Kings, and that no person can dispense with their Oath of Allegiance. 3. That the King cannot be deposed by any power whatsoever, nor under any pretext, or occasion whatsoever,  
Fifthly, by the first Article, 
o See the Fren. Merc. tom. 3. ad. Ann. 1615. pag. 235.  or Oath of France (which in substance is all one with our English Oath) agreed upon in the year 1615 by the Third Estates, or Lower House of Parliament, wherein of two hundred Persons, or thereabout, there were but six Protestants, and no one Protestant was present at the making thereof, or privy thereunto, as Precedent Miron, Speaker for the House, did publicly before them all, Cardinal Peron being then present, confidently affirm 
p Ibid. p. 312.   
Sixthly, by the uniform consent of all the French Prelates in the general Assembly of all the Estates held the year 1614 1615. who (as the Bishop of Montxillier 
q Ibid p. 253.  and the Lord Cardinal Peron 
r Ibid. p. 270.  sent by the Ecclesiastical Chamber to the Third Estates about their First Article do affirm) were willing to join with the Third Estates in this common Article, That it is not lawful for any man to touch the person of their Kings for any crime, or upon any cause or occasion what soever; which they offered to sign not only with their hearts, but also with their bloods, and to cry Anathema, eternal malediction, and damnation against all those, who shall attempt to kill their Kings for any crime, or upon any cause whatsoever. And nevertheless (as Precedent Miron very well answered the said Cardinal's Oration ex tempore) the Doctrine of deposing, and of kill Kings, are Cousin Germane, 
t Ibid. p. 320.  for that they proceed from the same root, and offspring of the Pope's power to dispose of all temporals, and consequently not only of Kingdoms, but also of Lives in order to spiritual good; and also (as the Prince of Conday 
t Ibid. p 332.  in his learned, and Religious speech to the King sitting in Council doth well observe) the Doctrine of deposing Princes, as a thread in a needle, leadeth to usurpations, Rebellions, and the murdering of Sovereign Princes.  
Seventhly, and lastly by the testimony of Cardinal Peron, 
Card. Peron in his great Fren. Reply. cap. 91 pag. 633.  who expressly saith, that this controversy, concerning the Pope's power indirectly in temporals, aught not to hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church: To omit the Decrees of the Parliament of Paris forbidding under pain of Treason the Treatise of Cardinal Bellarmine 
u See the Fren. Merc. tom. 2. ad An. 1610. p. 19  against Doctor Barclay, the Defensio Fidei Catholicae, etc. Of Suarez: 
x Idem tom. 3. ad An. 1614 pag. 441. See also tom. 3. ad An. 1615. pag. 327.  the Treatise of Santarellus de Haeresi etc. 
y Idem. tom 11 ad An 1626. pag. 87.  The burning of Doctor Schulckenius Apology for Cardinal Bellarmine against Widdrington 
z Idem. tom. 3. ad An. 1623. pag. 277.  by the sentence of the Provost of Paris, besides many learned Catholics both of our own Nation, as Bishop Watson, Abot Fecknam, Doctor Cole, john Harpsfield, Nicolas Harpsfield, john Hart, james Bosgrave, the Thirteen Priests protestation, and also of other, related, and confirmed by Mr 
a In his contatation of Mr Fizherbert p. 1. per●c●●●●.  Widdrington against all the exceptions, which Doctor Schulckenius hath taken against them: All which do so clearly convince the probability of this Doctrine, which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, that no man of any reading can from his heart now deny the same.  
8 Wherhfore the plain meaning of this clause is, [That the Pope] that is, properly, and formally as Pope [neither of himslefe] that is, as a sole, and total Efficient cause [nor by the authority of the Church, or See of Rome] that is, as an instrument or Minister of the Church, or See of Rome [or by any other means] that is, as a Principal Agent, using some helps or means, as his instruments [with any other] that is, as a Partial Agent concurring partially with some other. Which Partial Agents although they have not always complete and sufficient power to produce the effect severally, and by one of themselves alone, yet if they be properly Partial Agents, 
b See the Philosophers upon 2. Phys. or 5. Metaph. where they treat of the Efficient Cause, and also show the difference betwixt a Physical or Real Agent, and a Moral, who sometimes is reputed a Principal Agent in gene●● moris, 〈◊〉 ●h 〈◊〉 rea●h d●th nothing.  they must always have in themselves the same specifical active or virtual power, by which they concur jointly with each other to the producing thereof: As two men drawing a Ship, which one of them alone is not able to draw. And therefore a Master, who only by moral influence, as by commanding, or hiring, concurreth with his Servants to the drawing of the Ship, is not properly a Partial Agent concurring with them, nor is said to draw partially with them the Ship, but he is a Principal Agent of a fare different kind, and nature, to wit, Moral; and his Servants, as drawing by his appointment, are only his Moral Instruments.  
9 [Hath any power or authority] that is, not merely probable, or in the conceit, opinion, or speculation of the Pope, and of many other learned men, for this, as I said, is for practise to be accounted no power at all, but true, real, lawful, sufficient, and valid power, or authority [to depose the King] that is, by his definitive sentence to deprive him of his Regal authority, and to make him to true, and rightful King, but a private man: [or to dispose any of his [Kingdoms, or Dominions] that is, to take them away from him, and to give them to an other, which supposeth, that the Pope hath power to depose the King, and to deprive Him of his Royal right and Dominion: [or to discharge any of his Subjects of their obedience] because, according to Cardinal Bellarmine, and Suarez, every Subject by the law of God, 
Bell. in Tract. contra Barcla. cap. 21. p 2●2 Suar. in Defen. etc. lib 6. cap. 3. num. 6.  and Nature, oweth true obedience, and Allegiance to his lawful Prince, so long as He remaineth Prince: [or to authorise] that is, to give authority to any foreign Princes to invade, or annoyed Him, or His Countries: Because all the authority, which temporal Princes have in temporals, to invade, or annoyed etc. they have not derived from the authority, or commandment of the Pope, as he is Pope, but granted them by the Law of God, Nature, or Nations: [or to give licence, or leave to any of His Subjects to bear Arms etc.] Because the Pope, as Pope, hath no such authority, licence, or leave himself, and therefore cannot give it to others. And by this is easily answered the common objection urged against this Clause, that no man can swear a probable opinion to be certainly false, but it is a probable opinion at the lest, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or, which in substance is all one, no man can swear, that the Pope hath not any power to depose the King, seeing that he hath a probable power to depose him; but a probable power to depose is some power. For it is not a probable opinion in practice, howsoever it be in mere speculation, and abstracting from practice, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, supposing, which is most manifest, that it is not altogether certain, but only probable, and in controversy among learned Catholics that he hath power to depose them, unless we will absurdly admit, that it is a probable opinion, that the Pope may lawfully commit open injustice. Neither is a mere probable power any true, lawful, and sufficient power to depose, punish, or dispossess (of which power only this Clause is to be understood) and therefore for practise neither in law, nor conscience to be accounted any power at all.   

The Third Clause explained.  
10 THe Third Clause, Also I do swear etc. hath in it no difficulty, supposing the former, to which it hath relation, as practice hath to power. For if it be lawful to acknowledge before God, that the Pope hath not by any means, either of Excommunication, Deprivation, Absolution, or any other Sentence, or Declaration, any true, lawful, sufficient, and valid power, or authority to depose the King, and to make him no King, and consequently to discharge or absolve his Subjects from their Allegiance, it clearly followeth, that I may also promise' by Oath, that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, Deprivation, Absolution, or other Declaration made, or to be made by the Pope, or his Successors, against the King, his Heirs, or Successors, First, I will bear faith, and true Allegiance to His Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors: Secondly, I will defend Him, and them to the uttermost of my power against all conspiracies etc. And thirdly, I will do my best endeavour to disclose, and make known unto His Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and Traitorous Conspiracies etc. Because to perform these three things every faithful Subject, although he neither had, nor should make any express Oath, or promise' to perform them, is bound by the absolute law of God, and Nature to perform, so long as the King remaineth King, and cannot be deprived of his Regal authority by the Pope.  
11 Secondly, in this Clause is not meddled withal, but rather supposed, th●n denied the Pope's power to Excommunicate, as King james of renowned memory hath by 
c In praefat. Monitor. pag 11.12 & in Consu●at. mendaciorum Torti, mendacio 1.  public writings not only declared to all Christian Princes, but also very well proved against Card. Bellarmine. But this only is here denied, that Excommunication, being a spiritual Censure can work this temporal effect, as to make a King, no King, but only of a Christian, as a Heathen, and a Publican, and to deprive him of Ecclesiastical communion, but not of his Regal authority. Thirdly, by Heirs, and Successors are not understood Usurpers, but such only as shall lawfully, and by right succeed: for as according to law, 
d Glossa in can Faciat 22. q. 2 & leg. Vulgo f. de statu hominum lib. 1.  we can only do that, which we can lawfully, and honestly do, so in law, and conscience they only are reputed Heirs, and Successors, who lawfully, and by right shall succeed. Lastly, by Treasons, and Traitorous Conspiracies are not understood improper, positive, or spiritual Treasons, and which in regard chief of Religion are by the positive laws only of some Kingdoms, or Nations, but not of all made Treasons, as are the coming in of Priests into this Realm ordained by the Pope's authority etc. But only such Treasons are he●re understood, which are true, proper, and natural Treasons and which all Kingdoms, and Nations accounted for such, as being repugnant to that Natural, and civil 
e See above ●am. 3.  Allegiance, which all Subjects both Heathen, and Christian by the law of God, and Nature do own to their lawful Sovereign, whatsoever Religion He, or they shall profess.   

The fourth Clause explained.  
12 THE Fourth Clause, And I do further swear, etc. if it be rightly understood, is as clear as the former. For therein, by force of the words, the practice only of the Pope's power to depose, or murder Princes, and the doctrine which maintaineth it for lawful, to wit, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may, that is, by virtue of the Pope's sentence of Ecommunication, or Deprivation, be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, is abjured, I do not say, as an heresy, but as the words of this Clause are, as heretical. For (as Petrus Aragona, 
Aragona 2 a. 2 ae. q. 11. ar. 2. Suarez disp. 19 de Fide. sec. 2. nam. 8.  and Suarez, do well observe) heresy, and an heretical proposition properly, and in rigour are not the same, but do differ as the act, or sin, and the matter thereof; because heresy properly doth signify a certain sin of infidelity, but an heretical proposition doth only signify the matter of that sin: And therefore although pertinacy belongeth to the nature of heresy, it doth not therefore follow, that it belongeth to the nature of an heretical proposition. I said (saith Suarez) properly, and in rigour; for heresy may also be distinguished into material, and formal, and so it may be said, that an heretical proposition is a certain heresy, not formal, but material, and so it is not necessary, that it depend upon the pertinacy of the speaker; for this only belongeth to formal heresy, which is a sinful act, and doth formally make an Heretic, as whiteness doth formally make the subject, wherein it is to be white. From whence it followeth (saith Aragona) that when Doctors call an heretical proposition an Heresy, they speak not properly, because it is not to be called an heresy, but an heretical proposition. For according to all Divines, 
f See S. Thom 2a 2. e q. 11. art. 2. Cajet. Bannes, ibid. Aragona art. 1. Suarez disp. ●9. de Fide sec. 3.  to Heresy, as it is a sin against Faith, and maketh a formal Heretic, is required pertinacy against the Doctrine, Declaration, and Sense of the Church.  
13 Now supposing these two principles, which are so clear and evident, as I have showed above 
g n●● 6▪ , that no man of any reading, and judgement can deny either of them: the one, that it is a great controversy among learned Catholics, and a doctrine approved by many of them, that the Pope hath not power to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms, much less of their Lives; and therefore truly probable, their approbation being not grounded upon any principle, which is clearly false: The other, that a power, which is not altogether certain, but only probable, and in controversy, can be no sufficient ground to punish, depose, or deprive any man of any his right, and dominion, or of any other thing, which he possesseth; and consequently, as Mr. Doctor Kellison well inferreth, cannot be practised without open injustice: it clearly followeth, that this Doctrine, which approveth the practice of deposing, or murdering Princes by the Pope's authority, and by virtue of his sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation is manifestly false, as teaching open injustice, to wit, Theft and Murder in a most high degree, and may therefore be abjured for such, and consequently for impious, damnable, indirectly, and by a necessary consequence repugnant to faith, and divine truth revealed in the holy Scriptures, 
h Exod. 20.  Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill; Kill him not, etc. Tender to Caesar, etc. and in this sense heretical, as the word [Heretical] is usually, and properly taken both by Protestants, and also by the most part of Catholic Divines 
i R●● 26 M●●●. 21. i● S T●●●●. 2 a. 2 a q. 1 ●●rt 2. Baan. s & Atagon ibid. Turrec●em. in Summa de Eccles. l. 4. part. 2. c. 3. Director. Inquisit. par. 2. c●m. 27. p. 233. Canus, lib. 6. de l●ci●, c●●lt. ad. 10. Scot in 3. dist. 35. Vulpes tom. 1. ●isp. 2. art. 5. & disp. 3. art 7 Faber. q. 1. Prologi, disp. 6. cap. 1. Cast●o lib. 1. contr. haeres▪ cap. 8. Vega li●. 9 in Concil. Trid. cap. 39 T●a●c. a Christo, 〈◊〉 3. see t. dist. 23 q 3. de hae es● Co●er. l. 4 〈◊〉 ●●. Reg●at. c. 14. Molina in part. 1. q. 1. a●. 2 〈◊〉 p. 1. Vasquez ibid. disp. 5 c. 3. Fassolm ibid. q. 1. dub. 13. , who hold, that the Church doth not make any doctrine to be heretical, or of Faith, but only declare it to be such, which before her declaration was truly such, and that whatsoever is indirectly, secondarily, or by a necessary consequence repugnant to faith, is truly and properly heretical, although he that without pertinacy should maintain any such doctrine in this sense heretical, before the Church hath declared it to be such, is not to be accounted an heretic, nor doth incur Anathema, or any other penalties ordained against Heretics.  
14 I said above [their approbation being not grounded, etc.] Because the approbation of Doctors, though they be never so many, if it be grounded upon any principle, reason, or supposition, which is manifestly false, cannot make their opinion to be truly probable, to those especially (as Vasquez 
k Vasq. 1 a. 2ae aisp. 62 cap. 4. sect. Observandum tamen m●xime est.  well observeth) who see the manifest falsehood of that principle, reason, or supposition. As all those Popes, and Doctors, who have approved, or do approve the lawful practice of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, either did, or do think, and suppose, that it is most certain, and of faith, nor in controversy among learned Catholics, that the Pope hath such power to depose them, which all the world now seethe to be clearly false; or else they did not, or do not consider the difference betwixt mere speculation, and practise, and betwixt a probable power to favour, and to punish, depose, or dispossess; whereas all learned Catholics, both Divines, and Lawyers do agreed in this manifest principle, that a power, right, or title, which is not certain, but in controversy, is no sufficient ground to deprive, or put any man out of his possession, nor can be practised without open injustice, until an undoubted judge, and whose authority for the determining of that matter is not questionable (as is the Pope's authority to define undoubtedly matters of faith without a General Council, 
See Beneath. num. 29.  as I will show beneath) shall decide the question.  
15 I omit now two other Expositions of this Clause, and which some learned Catholics do greatly applaud. The one of the Adverbe [as heretical] which being an Adverbe of similitude, doth always by force of the word, signify a similitude, and not a reality, or identity, but only in regard of the matter, to which it is applied. So that considering in penal laws (as is this law for taking the Oath) all doubtful words are ever to be taken in the more favourable sense, and which maketh the law to contain no falsehood, or injustice, they will have the sense of this Clause to be this, I abjure this doctrine, and position as heretical, that is, as having only a similitude, and affinity with that doctrine and position, which is heretical. The other is of the Conjunction disjunctive [or murdered] which according to the usual signification of our English speech, whensoever it immediately followeth the verb [may] implieth a free choice to take which part of the Dis-junction we please, and maketh not an absolute, but a conditional dis-junctive proposition, which, for as much as concerneth the truth, or falsehood thereof, followeth the nature, and conditions of a copulative, and not of an absolute, or common dis-junctive proposition. And it maketh the sense of this Clause to be equivalent to this; I abjure as heretical this doctrine, and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, and murdered by their Subjects: Which doctrine, and position in regard of the second part, [and murdered] being by all Catholics accounted heretical, especially seeing that murder is always taken with us for an unjust, and wicked kill, and not for every kill, or manslaughter, the whole entire conditional dis-junctive proposition in regard only of this part may be truly abjured for heretical. But because the First Explication may abundantly suffice to make it apparent even to such Catholics, as are willing to take all the exceptions they can against any ambiguous word, or sentence contained in the Oath, that not only the practice of murdering, or killing, but also of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, may be abjured for heretical in a true, proper, and usual sense, as I have showed, without making him that without pertinacy shall maintain it, to be properly an heretic, and also that these two later may be seen more at large related, and confirmed by Mr. Widdrington 
l In the Adjoynder to the second part of his Confutation of M. Fitzherbert, per t●tum.  against all the exceptions, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath taken against them, it may suffice for this present only to have touched them thus briefly.   

The fifth Clause explained.  
16 IN the Fifth Clause, And I do believe, etc. is not denied the Pope's power to absolve from all Oaths, or any part thereof, because there is not the same reason of this Oath, as there is of many other Oaths, which do not concern a third person, from which that the Pope hath power to absolve, or to dispense in them, no Catholic will deny. Neither is there in this Clause any other thing immediately sworn, than that I do believe, that is, not with divine and supernatural belief, but only with moral credulity, and humane persuasion, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any other person hath power to absolve me from this Oath, or any part thereof, that is, can give me leave and licence not to perform those three things, which in the Third Clause I promised to perform. For, according to the doctrine of all 
m See S. Thom. 2 ● 2 ● q. 89 ar. 7. & 9 Cajec. ibid. Aragona art. 3.7. & 9 Silvester verbo juramentum, 1. qu. 2 & juramentum 5 q 2. Sotus lib 8. de justitia, art. 9 Vatentia, tom. 3. disp. 6. quest. 7. punc. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri, cap. 2.  Divines, Absolution, and Dispensation, hath not place in assertory Oaths, wherein some thing is affirmed, or denied, which, as soon as it is spoken, is immutably, and indispensably true, or false, but only in promissory Oaths, wherein something is promised to be done, or omitted. And to perform those three things, although I had made no Oath, or promise' to perform them, I am bound by the absolute Law of GOD, and Nature 
n See above, num. 10. , from which neither the Pope, nor any other Person hath power to absolve, or to dispense therein.   

The sixth Clause explained.  
17 IN the Sixth Clause, Which I acknowledge, etc. there is no other thing immediately sworn, than my acknowledgement, that this Oath is lawfully ministered unto me by good, and full authority, which doubtless I may lawfully acknowledge, and also swear, supposing it to be an Oath of true temporal Allegiance, and no falsehood, injustice, or denial of any true, spiritual obedience due to the Pope's Holiness to be contained therein. Neither do the King, and Parliament take upon them in this Oath (as some do ill infer) the Church's authority to define matters of faith, as what doctrine is heretical, and what Oath is lawfully ministered by good, and full authority: But only with the inward judgement of their understanding, (which, to distinguish from judgement of authority, or of a judge doing justice, is usually called judgement of discretion, and is nothing else than a right determining, 
o S. Thom. 1a. 2ae. q. 93. ar. 2. & 2a. 2ae. qu. 60 art. 1. Bannes, Aragona, ec Salon, ibid. Sotus lib. 3. de justitia, q. 4. ar. 1. Hurtadus dist 7. de anima, sect. 2. paragr. 9  or discerning of the understanding betwixt truth, and falsehood, good and evil in every matter either speculative, or practical) they did determine, define, judge, and suppose the whole Oath, and every part thereof to be lawful, and to contain no falsehood, or injustice, but only a sincere profession of true temporal Allegiance, and that a temporal Prince hath good, and full temporal authority to command the abjuring of any false, and heretical doctrine, if it be repugnant to this Allegiance, and thought necessary to the public quiet of the Kingdom, whereof the Prince hath charge, and to forbidden, and punish with temporal punishments, spiritual actions, as ministering of Sacraments in a poisoned matter, the public maintaining of Heresies; yea, of unnecessary opinions, though they be probable in speculation, if they be occasion of Tumults, not as they are spiritual actions, but as they disturb the public temporal peace, and in regard of the temporal wrong done to the Commonwealth, they become temporal injuries. And upon this their inward judgement of discretion, and determining of their understanding, which is agreeable to the grounds of Catholic Religion, 
p See ●ellar. lib 5. de Rom. Pont cap. 7. 1● quinta ratione loan. Paris. de potest. Reg & Pag. cap. 2●●d 37 S●tus. ●n 4 dist. 29. q. 1. ar. 4. Victoria Relict. 1. de poorest. Eccle. sec. 7. paragr. oct●●● propositio. Pannes 2 a. 2 ae. q. 11 at. 4. q 1. in fine, Arragon. ibid.  they thought it requisite for the public peace of the Kingdom, for maintaining the King's temporal Sovereignty, and to prevent the danger of future Conspiracies like to that of the Powder-Treason, to ordain this new Oath of Allegiance, and to bind all the Subjects of the Realm under the penalty of a Praemunire to take the same, which doubtless, as I said, the King, and State have good, and full authority to do, supposing it to be an Oath of true temporal Allegiance, and no falsehood, or injustice to be contained therein. Neither do those words [and do renounce all Pardons etc.] imply a renouncing of all Pardons, and Dispensations in general, but only of such, which shall dispense with me, or give me leave to do contrary to that which I promised in the Third Clause, to bear faith, and true Allegiance to his Majesty etc.   

The seventh Clause explained.  
18 THe plain meaning of the Seventh Clause, And all these things etc. is, that I must use no fraud, or guile, but plainly, and sincerely acknowledge all the former things, and also swear them all, either immediately, or mediately, according as the express words of every Clause, and the plain, and common sense, and understanding of the same words shall import, without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever; that is, I must neither equivocate, or use equivocation, which is to speak equivocal words, or which have divers significations, not in that sense, wherein the hearer, or Lawmaker doth, or aught in reason to understand them: nor use mental, or secret reservation, that is to reserve in my mind some hidden, and inward sense, which the outward words by me spoken, according to their imposition, and the common understanding of them, all circumstances considered, cannot signify to others. As if one being demanded, whether he ever heard Peter speak such words, should answer. that he never heard him speak such words, reserving in his mind, in the Tower of London, or the like: which inward, secret, and reserved sense those outward words, cannot signify to others. And therefore this mental reservation (howsoever the speaker in his mind, which is unknown to others, intendeth to make a chimerical mixture, and union of the reserved sense, and the outward words) is nothing else then a flat, and formal Lie, as to Lie is taken, and defined by Saint Austin, and other Divines. 
S. Aug. lib 1. de Meadacio cap. 3 S. Th●m 2 a 2 e. q 110 See S. Austin beneath▪ nu. ●3  So that know, whether I am bound to swear immediately every thing contained in any clause, or only my sincere acknowledgement, declaration, belief, or resolution of that thing, I must regard the express words of every Clause, and in what manner they bind me, either to swear the thing immediately, or only my sincere acknowledgement etc. thereof.   

The eight Clause explained.  
19 THe last Clause, And I do make etc. hath in it no difficulty, supposing the Oath to be lawful, and commanded by good and full authority: for that every good Subject is bound to obey the constitutive precept of his lawful Superior in that manner as I will show beneath, 
q num. 26.  hearty, willingly, and truly, that is unfaignedly, not only for wroth, or fear of punishment, as the wicked do, but for conscience, obedience, and virtue 
r See Vasquez 1 a 2 ae. disp. 51. cap 3. & disp 73. cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5.  sake.  
Five general observations for the better understanding, how all the chief objections, which are usually made against the Oath in general, may be easily answered.  
20 HAving explained all the clauses of the Oath in that brief, and perspicuous manner as you have seen, whereby any prudent man may easily answer all the chief objections, which are commonly made against any Clause thereof in particular, I think it not amiss to annex hereunto five general observations concerning doubtful words, Perjuries, the Pope's Breves, Scandal, and the safer way, whereby all the principal arguments, which are usually urged against the Oath in general, may also according to the grounds of Catholic Religion be clearly confuted. For against the Oath in general it is commonly objected, First, that there are contained in the Oath divers ambiguous, and doubtful sentences, which may have a double signification, good and bad, true and false, which therefore being so doubtful cannot be absolutely sworn without danger of Perjury 2. That the Pope's Holiness our supreme spiritual Pastor; whose voice we are bound to hear, and follow, hath by his Breves forbidden the Oath, as containing many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation. 3. That to take the Oath is no small scandal to the weaker sort of Catholics, which our Saviour in the Gospel 
f Matth. 18.  with a fearful curse, and woe be to that man by whom scandal cometh, commandeth us to avoid. Lastly, that to refuse the Oath is the more safe, and the more probable opinion, which every man in those things, which are dangerous to the health of the body, much more of the soul, aught in wisdom to prefer before that, which is the less safe, and the less probable.   

The first Observation.  
21 FIrst therefore concerning doubtful words it is to be observed, that in penal laws (as is this for taking the Oath commanded by Act of Parliament under the penalty of a Praemunire) all doubtful words, which have divers significations not improper, nor unusual, are always to be taken in the more favourable sense, and which may make the law to be just, and reasonable, and not to be drawn to a false, odious, and inconvenient sense, and which maketh the law to be unjust. And this is the common Doctrine of Divines, and Lawyers, and agreeable both to the Canonical, 
t can. Cum tu de testibus c. 16 can. Ad nostram de jureiurando cap. 21 & de Regulis juris in Sexio. reg. 49 In. paenis.  and Civil law. For laws are to be expounded more favourably (saith the civil law 
u leg. Benigai●s, ff. de legibus. ) that the will, or meaning of them may be conserved. And in a doubtful, or ambiguous word of the law, that sense is rather to be chosen, 
x leg. In Ambigua, ff. de legibus.  which is voided of all default, especially seeing that the will also, or meaning of the law may hereby be gathered.  
22 Yea, which is more, according to Suarez, if at any time the property of the words should induce any injustice, or like absurdity concerning the mind, or meaning of the Lawmaker, 
Quarez lib. 6. de legibus cap. 1  they must be drawn to a sense also improper, wherein the law may be just, and reasonable, for this is presumed to be the mind of the Lawmaker, as it hath been declared by many laws in ff. tit. de Legibus. Thus Suarez. Whereby it is evident, that what words soever in this Oath may be doubtful, and have divers significations, especially not improper, nor unusual, as I acknowledge before God, I believe, Successors, Treasons, as heretical, or murdered, or any other whatsoever, we aught to expound them in the more favourable sense, and which may make the Oath, and the meaning of the Lawmaker to be just, and reasonable, and not to draw, much less to wrist them to a false, odious, and inconvenient sense, and wherein we will needs make the Oath to be in our judgement unreasonable, and wicked.   

The second Observation.  
23 SEcondly concerning Perjury it is to be observed that Perjury speaking properly (for sometimes it is taken for every unlawful, and idle swearing, although it want not verity, the first, and chief companion of an Oath) is defined by Divines, 
y Magister in 3. dist. 29. S. Thom. 2 a. 2 ae. q. 98. ar. 1. & Theologi ibid.  to be a Lie confirmed by Oath. And therefore as a Lie is divided into a material Lie, when one speaketh as he reasonably thinketh, and yet in very deed it is otherwise, and into a formal Lie, when one affirmeth that to be true, which he thinketh to be false, or contrary wise, for to Lie (saith Saint Austin) is to speak against the mind, 
S. Aug. lib. 1. de Mendacio c. 3.  or to have one thing in the mind, and to affirm an other by words, or any other signs; So Perjury is divided into matertall, and formal Perjury, for that Perjury is nothing else then a Lie confirmed by Oath, and only addeth to a Lie the calling of God to witness of what is spoken. Wherhfore as it is unlawful for one to affirm that to be true, which he knoweth to be false, or contrariwise, for this were expressly, and formally to Lie, or to affirm that to be true, whereof he is ignorant, or doubtful, for this were to expose himself to danger of being forsworn, and he that loveth danger shall perish therein, 
z Eccles. 3.  So also it is much more unlawful to confirm the same by Oath, whereby he maketh God, who is Truth itself, either the Patron of a Lie, or to be ignorant of the truth. So that whatsoever may be affirmed, or denied without danger of Lying, may also be sworn without danger of Perjury, And as the falsehood, which maketh a formal Lie, is not to be taken from the thing as it is in itself, or à parte rei, but as it is in the mind of the speaker, for that to Lie is to speak against the mind, so the falsehood, which maketh formal Perjury, is not to be taken from the thing as it is in itself, or ex parte rei, but as it is against the mind, and knowledge of the swearer.  
24 Wherhfore in all Oaths, as well promissory, as assertory, to avoid the sin of Perjury, Truth is always required. In a promissory two fold truth is necessary, One for the present, that the words outwardly spoken be agreeable to the mind, and that therefore the swearer have for the present a mind, or purpose to perform what he promiseth; the other for the future, that he verily think, the thing which he promiseth he is able, and may lawfully perform, and that for as much as lieth in him, at the time appointed he perform the same. But the truth, which is required to an assertory Oath, consisteth in this (saith Gregorius de Valentia, and Sayrus) that the thing be true, 
Valentia tom. 3. disp. 6. q. 7 pu●c. 3. Sayrus lib. 1 Thesauri cap. 4. num. 7. Azor. tom. 1. justitut lib. 11. cap. 2. q. 5. Sauchiz lib. 3. in D●calogum cap. 4. num. 10.  at lest wise according to the reasonable judgement of the swearer. And to the truth of an assertory Oath (saith Azorius, and Sauchiz) it is required, and sufficeth, that the swearer think it to be so prudently, and not moved by light, or slender, but by assured, and likely or probable conjecture, and therefore according to the swearers judgement agreeable to reason, whether the thing be in very deed, or ex parte rei, true, or false, for this (saith Sauchiz) is to be morally certain. The like hath Silvester, Sotus, Arag. and Suarez. 
Silu. verbo Perjurium q. 1. Sot. l. 8 de justitia q. 2. ar. 3. Aragona 2 a. 2 ae. q. 89. ar. 3. Suar. tom 2. de Relig. l. 3.3. c. 5.  And if moral certainty, or reasonable assurance were not sufficient to excuse from Perjury, no man could lawfully swear, or acknowledge by Oath, any King whatsoever, to be a true and lawful King, or any Bishop whatsoever to be a true, and lawful Bishop, because of these, and all such like, we can have but moral certainty, or reasonable assurance.  
25 And by this it is evident, that albeit there may be brought some probable arguments to show, that divers words, and sentences contained in the Oath, being considered barely by themselves, and without due circumstances, may be doubtful, and ambiguous, that is, not clear, and morally certain, and so for one to swear them in that doubtful sense, were to expose himself to danger of perjury, yet considering, as I shown above 
a num. 21.22. , such doubtful words are to be taken in the more favourable sense, and which maketh the Law to be just and reasonable, and to contain no falsehood, or injustice, all danger of Perjury is avoided thereby. For albeit there be danger of Perjury to swear doubtful words in a doubtful sense, yet to swear words which of themselves are doubtful in a true, and determinate sense, and wherein they are not doubtful, but clear, and morally certain, there is no danger of Perjury.   

The third Observation.  
26 THirdly, 
Hugolin. par. 2. de Censuris, c. 6. in prins.  concerning the Pope's Breves, which (as Hugolinus noteth) are nothing else, than the Pope's letters made by his Secretaries, and sealed by the Pope in read wax with the Fisher's Ring, and have the same force, which have the Pope's Rescripts, or his Letters written in answer to other letters, and are therefore called Breves, 
Rebussius in praxi benefic. part. 3. nu. 4. Archidiaconus, & Geminianus in cap. Quis ●esciat. dist. 11.  because they are written briefly, and in few words: when reas the Popes Bulls are so called (as Petrus Rebaffius, and others observe) for that they are signed with a round tablet of lead, wherein the pictures of Saint Peter, and Saint Paul are engraven. We must observe first of all the difference betwixt a declarative, and a constitutive Law, or precept. For a constitutive precept doth make the thing which it forbiddeth, to be unlawful, which otherwise would be lawful, as is the precept to abstain from flesh in time of Lent, and from servile works upon Sundays, and commanded Holidays: And this precept especially Ecclesiastical, abstracting from scandal, and contempt, which are forbidden by the Law of GOD, and Nature, doth seldom, or never bind with danger 
b See Salas disp. 11. de leg. sect. 11.  of death, or any other great corporal, or temporal harm; and moreover it must be obeyed so long as it is not manifestly unjust 
c Vasq. tom 2. in jam. 2ae disp. 151. c. 4. in fin. Suar tom. 5. i● 3. part. disp. 4 sect. 6. nu. 5. & lib. 1. de leg. c. 9 nu. 9 Valentia tom. 3. punc. 2 Sayrus lib. 1. Thesauri, c. 12. Salas disp. 10. de leg sect. 2. , nor in prejudice of a third person 
d See Beneath numb 31. , neither is it sufficient, that it have only a probable show of injustice. For, as Doctor Kellison 
e In his Treatise of the ●●●late and Priace &c cap. 15 〈◊〉. 74  well inferreth from Vasquez 
f Vasqu. 1a. 2ae disp 62. nu. 3●  doctrine (although he doth not well apply it to the Pope's declarative Breves) every Subject is bound to obey his lawful Superiors commandment, to wit, constitutive, when he commandeth according to a probable opinion, though he command a thing, which is against the Subject's opinion, and that also probable, because the Subject may follow any man's probable opinion, and consequently his Superiors, that also being probable, and if he may, he must, because his Superior commandeth. And the reason is, because all the obligation of this precept dependeth chief upon the will and authority of the Superior, who is in possession of his authority, so long as it is not doubtful, or questionable, and the thing commanded be not manifestly unjust, nor in prejudice of a third person, who also is in possession of his good name, and goods, which cannot be justly taken from him under pretence of a mere probable authority, right, or title.  
27 But a declarative precept doth not make, but only declare, and suppose the thing which it forbiddeth, to be otherwise unlawful, as being forbidden by some former law, as are the laws of Princes made against Theft, murder, drunkenness, or the like, which are otherwise forbidden by the Law of GOD, and Nature. And all the obligation of this precept, 
Suarez lib. 3. de leg. cap. 14. & cap. 20. nu. 10.  as Suarez well observeth, doth depend upon the reason, and supposition, for which this declarative precept is imposed, and upon the obligation of the former Law, which this precept doth suppose, and declare. So that if the reason, and supposition, for which this declarative precept is imposed, be not true, and that there be no such precedent law, or prohibition, which the declarative precept doth suppose, and declare, the declarative precept hath no force to bind at all. And if the precept be sometimes mixed, that is, in part declarative, and in part constitutive, it must in part, as it is such, participate the nature, and conditions of them both.  
28 Secondly, we must observe, that the Pope's Breves, forbidding English Catholics to take the Oath, do not constitute a new law, or make the Oath to be unlawful, but they do only suppose, and declare it to be otherwise unlawful, and forbidden by the Law of GOD, for that it containeth many things (say the Breves) which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation. And because these his declarative. Breves are grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions, to wit, upon the Pope's opinion, and of some other his Divines, especially Cardinal Bellarmine, that either his power to excommunicate, to bind, and lose in general, to absolve from Oaths in general, is plainly denied in the Oath, which is manifestly false, or else that his power to depose Princes, which is plainly denied in the Oath, is most certain, and of faith, nor disproved by many learned Catholics, which all the World now seethe to be no less clearly untrue, it is evident, according to Suarez doctrine, and manifest reason, that English Catholics are not bound to observe them. Wherhfore unless one at leastwise, I do not say probable argument (for this is not sufficient to demonstrate a matter of faith, and the Oath to be plainly repugnant to faith, and salvation) but clear, and convincing can be brought, which no man hath hitherto, nor can in my judgement produce to prove some one thing in the Oath to be contrary to faith, or salvation, that English Catholics are bound to obey the said declarative Breves, being grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions, no man of any learning, or judgement can sincerely, and from his heart affirm.  
29 To say, that the Pope hath by his Breves defined ex Cathedra the Oath to be unlawful, and to contain many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation, is not only most clearly untrue, but also to little purpose though it were true: first, for that they want those conditions, which according to Canus, 
Canus lib. 5. de locis, ca 5. q. 4. Bellar. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. c. 4. & 5. & lib. 2. de Concil. c. 12.  Cardinal Bellarmine, and other Divines (who hold that the Pope hath authority to define infallibly matters of faith without a General Council) are required to a definition ex Cathedra, among which this is one, that they must be directed to the whole Church, and not only to some particular Churches, or Kingdoms; for which cause they are well called by joannes Eudeamon a learned jesuite, 
joan. Eudaemon in Praefat. Parallelli Torti.  the Pope's private Letters to the English Catholics, and besides it were a strange definition ex Cathedra, wherein no one particular proposition among so many is expressed: Secondly, for that although they did contain a definition ex Cathedra, yet considering that it is a very probable doctrine, it being approved by so many excellent Divines 
g Patres Concilii Constantiensis, & Basil. Had●ionus Papa in q. de confirm. Card. Camerac in Tract. de authority Ecclesiae. Card. Cusanus, lib. 2. deconcord. Cath. cap. ult. Card. Florent. in cap. Significasti de elect. Card. Pa orm. ibid. Abulenisis in c. 18. Matth q. 108 & in Defensorio, part. 2. cap. 69. joan. Paris. Gerson, Major, Almainus, & Doctores Parisienses communiter. Victoria in Rolect. de potest. Papae proposi●. 3a. Navarre in c. Novit de judiciis notab. 3. num 84. who hold this opinion to be probable. , and Canonists, that the Keys were given principally to the Church, and to Saint Peter, as he represented the Church, and that the Pope cannot define any thing to be of faith certainly, and undoubtedly without a General Council, to which according to these Doctors he is subject, and not superior, and consequently sequently that his definitions can be no infallible, and undoubted ground of Catholic faith, it clearly followeth, that no Catholic is bound to give more credit to his definition in this point, that to his doctrine, and opinion, which is not certain, but only probable. And therefore whensoever the Pope defineth any doctrine to be of faith, which indeed is Catholic doctrine, and of faith, we must not believe with Catholic faith that doctrine to be Catholic, and of faith, because the Pope hath defined it (for so we should build our faith upon a reason and ground, which is not certain to all learned Catholics, but uncertain, and fallible) but because the Catholic Church, which is the pillar, and ground of truth 
h 1 Tim. 3. Sotus de secret● tegendo memb. 3. q. 2. in Resp. ad 1 m.  hath by express, or  consent approved, and accepted it for such.  
30 Moreover, as Dominicus Sotus doth well observe (whose doctrine in this point is agreeable to the Canon law, and the Expositors thereof) Prelates, and judges are not in possession in respect of their Subjects, but so far forth as they command things that are just, and therefore when it is doubtful, whether they command that which is just, then if it be inprejudice of a third person, because that third person is also in possession of his good name, and goods, the Subject doth nothing against obedience, if he require of his Prelate a reason of his commandment, propounding humbly the reasons of his doubt. Wherhfore Pope Alexander the third in his Letters, or Breves the Archbishop of Ravenna, giveth him this lesson, 
i In c. Si quando de Rescriptis.  that considering diligently the quality of the business, he either reverently fulfil his commandment, or by his letters pretend a reasonable cause, why he cannot fulfil it. Whereupon all the Expositors of the Canon Law, who expound this Canon, do give this general rule, 
k Glossa joannes Andreas, Panomitan. Petrus Anchoranus, Felinus, and others.  that the Superiors commandment aught either to be fulfilled, or a reason yielded, why it is not fulfilled.  
13 Seeing therefore that English Catholics, as it is well known and public to the whole world, have most humbly propounded, and yielded to His Holiness the reasons, for which they are doubtful, or rather without any doubt are fully persuaded, that his declarative Breves forbidding them to take the Oath, are unjust, and grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions, and also prejudicial to themselves, and to the King's Majesty, it is evident, that with such manifest danger of their own spiritual, and temporal ruin, and so great prejudice to the King's supreme authority in temporals, they are not bound to obey them against their Prince's commandment, especially seeing that his commandment to take the Oath, going before the Pope's commandment to refuse it, must, as I said above, 
l num. 26.  be obeyed, so long as no one Clause of the Oath can be clearly convinced to be unlawful. And although no inferior may examine, and judge his Superiors commandment with judgement of authority, which supposeth a Superiority over the person, whose actions are examined, and judged, yet that with judgement of discretion, which is the inward guide, and rule of every man's conscience, every Subject may examine, and judge his Superiors commandments, and consequently the Pope's Breves whether they be just, or unjust, constitutive, or declarative, in prejudice of a third person, or not in prejudice, and upon what reasons, and suppositions they are grounded, no man that hath any judgement can deny.   

The fourth Observation.  
32 FOurthly concerning Scandal it is to be observed, that there are two sorts of Scandal, the one is called active, or given, the other, passive, taken, or received, and they are signified in the holy Scriptures by the Verbs active, and passive, to scandalise, 
m Mat. 15 17, 18.  and to be scandalised. 
n Mat. 11.15, 24.  Active scandal is defined by Divines 
o S. Thom. 21.2. e. q. 43. ar. 1. S. Hierom in c. 15. Matth.  out of Saint Hierome, to be a word, or deed less right, or less good, giving occasion to another of spiritual ruin, or falling into sin. Neither do they take the Adverbe [less] comparatively, but negatively, 
p S. Thom. above cited. Abulensis in c. 18. Mat. 9.43.  for that which is not good, to wit, which hîc & nunc in regard of some particular circumstance of time, place, or persons wanteth some moral rectitude, or goodness. Passive scandal, to wit, when one by the good, or bad word, or deed of an other taketh occasion to sin, or to be scandalised, is also of two sorts. For if one be scandalised through malice, it is called a Scandal of the Pharisees, and is not to be regarded, according to that of our Saviour, 
q Matth. 15.  Let them alone, Blind they are etc. But if one be scandalised through infirmity, or ignorance, it is called a Scandal of the weak, or little ones, 
S. Hierom in c. 15. Matth.  for the perfect, as Saint Hierome saith, are not scandalised.  
33 From whence the Divines with S. Thomas do infer, first that sometimes passive scandal may be without active, as it was in the scandal of the Pharisees, or when one by the good word, or deed of another, especially which is necessary, and commanded, is scandalised, and taketh occasion to sin thereby. Sometimes active scandal may be without passive, as when one by his bad word or deed, and ill example doth scandalise, and giveth occasion to others of falling into sin, and yet none is scandalised, or taketh occasion to sin thereby. And sometimes they may be both together, as when one by his bad example giveth, and another taketh occasion to sin thereby. Secondly, they infer, that no good works, which are necessary, as is the observing of precepts, can give occasion of sinning to any man, or, which is all one, can scandalise, or be an active scandal; neither are such good works to be omitted to avoid the passive scandal even of the weak ones, as that most learned, and holy Bishop Alponsus Tostatus, for his admirable memory, and singular learning called the wonder of the world, 
r See Bellarm. de Script. Eccles. and Possevin. in verbo Alphons. Tostatus.  doth well observe, whose express words I think it not amiss here to set down.  
34 For to omit (saith he) 
s Abulensis in cap. 18. Matth. q. 51.  such works, which are of necessity, and commanded, were to sin mortally, and for no cause aught any man to sin mortally. But if they be Counsels, it is not of necessity to do them. Yet sometimes Counsels are made necessary, either in regard of the persons as of those, who have vowed the state of perfection, or of those, to whom by their state perfection belongeth, or in regard of time, or place are also necessary for every man, as to give alms to him who is in extreme necessity. And so counsels are made to them precepts, to wit, that they are not to be omitted for any Scandal, as a religions man may not omit the observing of poverty, and chastity for any scandal. But when Counsels remain in the nature of Counsels, that is, when the observing of them is not necessary, than the scandal, which ariseth to some by this, that others observe these Counsels, either proceedeth from malice, and then it is a scandal of the Pharisees, which is to be contemned, neither is any spiritual good even not necessary, to be omitted for this scandal. Or it proceedeth from infirmity or ignorance, and is called a scandal of the weak ones according to Saint Bernard, because it belongeth to weak ones to be ignorant, and moved through weakness, of which scandal it is said Matth. 17. But that we may not scandalise them, go to the Sea etc. And for this scandal, we must refrain for a time from the works of Counsels, or we must do them secretly, lest the ignorant, whose mind is weak, be troubled, and this must be done until having yielded a reason of the works of Counsels, and shown that they are good, the scandal ceaseth, which proceeded from ignorance. But if after a reason be yeeled, the scandal shall not cease, it is not to be called a scandal proceeding from ignorance, but from malice, and to be contemned, neither aught we to refrain from any good actions to avoid this scandal. Thus Abulensis.  
35 The like hath Salmeron, and Estius: but Salmeron moreover addeth, 
Salmeron tom. v. trac. 29.  that if the Doctrine, or action, which scandalizeth, be not necessary, but very profitable, and commodious, we must yield something to the weakness of the little ones. But if the great ones [such as are Priests, and Teachers] take this scandal, and the Doctrine, or action be profitable, they are not to be regarded, for they are incurable, because they are blind, that is, they will not see, and understand, what God inspireth in them etc. And he that is weak (saith Estius) may be sufficiently instructed, 
Estius in cap. 8. ad cor. 1. ver. 13  and taught, that his brother doth well, and that he aught not to be offended by his fact. After which sufficient, and full instruction, if he still persevere in scandal, it will not be a scandal given, but received, because it will not now proceed from weakness, but from malice, as was the scandal of the Pharisees, which as our Saviour in the Gospel teacheth, we aught not to regard.  
36 And by this it is apparent, that to take the Oath, supposing it to be lawful, and commanded by lawful authority under great penalties, can be no scandal to any man, seeing that the observing of lawful precepts cannot give either to great ones, or to little ones any occasion of spiritual ruin; neither aught we for any scandal even of the weak ones, omit the observing of such precepts. But rather to refuse the Oath, and to maintain the lawful practice of the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is the main point denied therein, is very scandalous, and giveth over ample occasion both to Princes, and Subjects of manifold offence, and ruin, as I will show beneath. 
t num. 44.  And therefore all those who pretend the taking of the Oath to be scandalous, do suppose, but not sufficiently prove (neither also do they agreed in their proofs) that it is altogether unlawful, nor can be taken without danger at the lest of Perjury, if not without a flat denial of Catholic faith, which how untrue it is, I have showed above by expounding every Clause thereof in a true, and Catholic sense.  
37 Neither is it to the purpose, that many probable arguments may be brought to prove, the Oath to be unlawful, and consequently to have in it a probable show, and appearance of evil, from which the Apostle for the avoiding of scandal warneth us to refrain, from all show of evil (saith he 
u 1 Thess. 5. ) refrain yourselves. For in like manner many probable arguments, and answers may be brought to prove the Oath to be lawful, and to contain nothing besides a profession of true temporal Allegiance, and so from these words of S. Paul unless they be rightly understood, we might infer, first that we must refrain both from taking, and also from not taking the Oath, which is impossible, because as in taking it there is a probable show of spiritual disobedience against the Pope's Holiness, so in not taking it there is a more probable show of temporal disloyalty against the King's Majesty, who hath purposely commanded the taking thereof, to make a trial, how his Subjects stand affected towards him in point of their loyalty, and due obedience etc. 
x See above nu. 3.  and secondly that no man may lawfully follow the more probable opinion against the less probable, 
Vasquez 1a. 2ae disp. 62.  if the more probable be the less secure (which as Vasquez affirmeth, is against the common Doctrine of Divines) seeing that in the more probable opinion, if it be the less secure, there is a probable show of evil. Yea, which is more, 
Vasquez. ibid. cap 4. num. 4.  it is now (saith Vasquez) and hath been long since the common opinion in Schools, that it is lawful for a learned man to follow in practice against his own opinion which he judgeth to be the more probable, the opinion of others, although their opinion be the less safe, and also in his judgement the less probable, so that it be not destitute of reason, and probability.  
38 Wherhfore the words of the Apostle may be well understood any one of these three ways; First, that to avoid scandal, we must refrain from all show of evil, if in refraining there be also no show of evil, otherwise they would bind us to that which is impossible, for to refrain, and not to refrain from the same thing implieth a contradiction. Or secondly, that to avoid scandal we must refrain from all show of evil, unless that thing which hath in it a show of evil, be commanded by the constitutive precept of a lawful Superior, which as I shown above, 
y num. ●6 30.  must be obeyed, so long as it is not manifestly unjust, nor in prejudice of a third person, neither is it sufficient, that it hath only a probable show of evil. Or thirdly, that to avoid the scandal of the weak ones, we must refrain from all show of evil, until they be instructed, and admonished, that although it seem to them to be evil, and hath a show of evil, yet in very deed it is not evil, but good. After which instruction, and admonition, if they still persist in their scandal, it is not a scandal of the little ones, but of the Pharisees, and the great ones, neither doth it proceed from infirmity, or ignorance, but from malice, and is not to be regarded.   

The fift and last Observation.  
39 FIftly, and lastly, to know which is the safer, and the less safe way, part, or opinion, and how it is distinguished from the more, or less probable and in what sense that vulgar saying, The safer way is to be chosen, is to be understood, we must observe first of all, that the safer, and the less safe, may either be taken comparatively, as the more, and less probable are always so taken, and so the less safe is ever safe, although not so safe, as is the other to which it is compared, as every Noun comparative being taken comparatively, doth always include the positive. And in this sense that vulgar saying is not to be understood, because it is sufficient to follow that which is safe, neither are we bound to choose always the safer, so that the less safe be safe enough: Or else it may be taken negatively, for that which is not safe, as the Adverbe [less] was taken above 
z num. 32.  in the definition of Scandal, and in this sense the less safe way, part, or opinion is never to be chosen, but we must always choose that, which is at the lest wise safe. But to know how the Divines do commonly take the safer, and the less safe, and do distinguish them from the more, and less probable, I think it not amiss, to relate here verbatim what Vasquez writeth of this point.  
40 Among opinions (saith he 
a Vasquez 1 a. 2 ae. disp 62. c. 1 num. 1. ) the one is safer, the other less safe, it is called the more safe, not because it is the more probable, but because he that followeth it cannot sinne. As if there be two contrary opinions concerning restitution, that which saith that some thing is to be restored, is called the safer, because in restoring there can be no sin, and the contrary is the less safe, because in not restoring there may be sin, and so of other matters. In like manner the more safe part (saith Vasquez) is to be accounted that, 
Vasquez 1a. 2ae. disp. 66. cap. 4. num. 21.  wherein there would be the lesser sin than in the contrary, when it is necessary to choose one of those two, wherein there is sin. For when soever two evils meet so together, that it is necessary to choose one of them, that doubtless is to be chosen, which otherwise would be the lesser, and consequently in choosing that there can be no sin at all. And the reason is manifest; for seeing that in no case it must be granted, that any man of necessity be so perplexed, but that he may choose the one part without any sin, and that if of two evils the one of necessity must be chosen, there is greater reason, that we should choose the lesser, it followeth, that the lesser may be chosen without sin, and so that, which absolutely considered by itself would be evil, is then no sin, when it occurreth with a greater evil. An example hereof Vasquez bringeth, and examineth at large of one, who after he is married, doubteth of some impediment, which annuleth the Marriage.  
41 Moreover among opinions (saith Vasquez) one is the more probable, 
Vasquez disp. 62. cap 1. nu. 1.  the other is less probable. The more probable is that, which hath the better grounds, and the less probable, which although it hath not better grounds, yet the grounds thereof want not sufficient probability. It may therefore fall out, that the less safe opinion be the more probable, that is, that part wherein perchance there may be sin, to be the more probable, and contrariwise that part, wherein there can be no sin, to be the less probable. As in the example of making restitution, that part which saith, that we aught not to restore, may be the more probable, and contrariwise that part which saith, that we must restore, may have fare weaker grounds, yea, and sometimes it may have no probability, or probable grounds at all. Thus Vasquez.  
42 And from hence it may be easily gathered first, that the more, or less probable opinion (which are taken here comparatively, and suppose both opinions to be truly probable) may be grounded either upon intrinsical principles 
b See ●asquez disp. 62. etc. 3. nu. 10▪ , as are causes, effects, absurdities, or other like arguments, which show the opinion to be in itself truer than the contrary, of which sort of principles, unless they be very clear, and easy to be understood, only the learned are able to judge, or upon extriasecall, and which the unlearned may easily understand, to wit, the authority of learned men, who are skilful in that opinion which they approve, and that if perchance they be mistaken in the grounds of their opinion, and that their reasons be not true but false, their authority, and approving of that opinion cannot make it truly probable 
c See Vasquez disp. 62. & cap. 4. paragr. Observandum temen maximè.  to those, who see the manifest falsehood of their principles, But how fare forth either the learned, or unlearned, who not considering the falsehood of their reasons, and principles do approve, and follow in practise their opinion, may be excused in conscience, I will not judge, but leave their conscience to themselves, and to the judgement of GOD, who only searcheth the secrets of all men's hearts.  
43 Secondly, that when Divines affirm, The safer part is always to be chosen: by the safer they understand that, which is without sin, or danger of sin; for to expose one's self to danger of sinning, is always accounted a sin, according to that, Who loveth danger, shall perish therein 
d Eccles. 3. : and by the less safe, they understand that which is not safe, because it cannot be chosen lawfully, and without danger of sin, for safe is accounted that, which is without all danger. And in this sense every opinion, which is truly probable, is a safe opinion, because it may be followed lawfully, and therefore safely, that is, without sin, or danger of sin. Thirdly, that this Maxim of the Canon Law 
e Cap. Ad audientiam, etc. Significasti, 1. el 2. de homicidio▪ & cap. juvenis de S● onsalibit●.  In doubts the safer part is to be chosen; is not to be understood of doubts as doubtful is taken sometimes for probable, uncertain, or questionable, but of such doubts, which leave the understanding so perplexed, and in suspense, that it giveth no determinate, or probable assent to either part of the question, to wit, whether the thing which is doubted of, be true, or false, lawful, or unlawful, for this is properly to be doubtful. and nevertheless how in these doubts the constitutive precept of a lawful Superior, and whose authority is not questionable, if it be not in prejudice of a third person, aught to be obeyed, and how the Subject, who so doubteth, whether the thing which is commanded be just, or unjust, may, notwithstanding this doubt, frame his conscience rightly to obey his Superiors commandment, 
Vasquez 1a. 2ae. disp. 65. & 65.  Vasquez, and other Divines, who treat of a doubtful conscience, as it is distinguished from a probable, do at large declare.  
44 Fourthly, that supposing first, that no one Clause of the Oath can be clearly convinced to be unlawful (for to heap up together never so many probable arguments against it were to no purpose) and consequently that the King, and Parliament in framing, and commanding it, followed a probable opinion: secondly, that every Subject is bound to obey the constitutive precept of his lawful Superior, when he commandeth according to a probable opinion (for, as I said above 
e num. 26.27. , there is not the same reason of a declarative) and thirdly, that the Pope's Breves forbidding the Oath, are declarative, and grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions, it is not only the safer way to take the Oath, than to refuse it, but also in refusing it there is no safety at all, if we duly consider the manifold dangers, and scandals, which do arise by refusing it, and by covertly approving the damnable practice of the Pope's Power to depose Princes, which is the only point denied therein, and for which it was purposely devised, and under great penalties so strictly commanded. All which dangers, and scandals, the most learned Sorbon Doctors in their censure of Santarellus doctrine (which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to punish Kings, and Princes with temporal punishments, depose and deprive them of their Kingdoms for heresy, and to discharge their Subjects from their obedience, etc.) do fully, though briefly relate, by condemning the said doctrine, and the sequels thereof, as new, false, erroneous, contrary to the Word of GOD; making the Pontifical Dignity to be odious, opening the way to Schism; derogating from the supreme authority of Kings, which dependeth upon GOD alone; hindering the conversion of Infidel, and heretical Princes; disturbing the public peace, overthrowing Kingdoms, States, and Commonwealths; withdrawing Subjects from their obedience and subjection, and stirring them up to factions, rebellions, seditions, and murdering of Princes. Given in the Sorbon the first, and reviewed the fourth of April, 
f See above, num. 7.  1626.  
45 Lastly, that the example of one, who being dangerously sick, aught in wisdom to choose that Physic, which is the more safe, the more assured, and the more probable, is no fit example to persuade any man not to take the Oath: First, for that no man aught in wisdom for the cure of his body to seek after the learnedst Physicians, and choose the most safe, and the most probable Physic, whereby he shall consume his whole estate, and bring himself, his wife, and children to beggary; but he aught in wisdom to content himself with such Physicians, and Physic, which one, two, or three learned Physicians without seeking after the learnedst of all, shall with mature advice, and consultation think will cure his disease. Secondly, for that this example if it be applied to the Oath, and to the cure of the soul, supposeth first, that whosoever taketh the Oath, being commanded by the constitutive precept of his Sovereign Prince, is in danger of his soul, although he follow therein a probable opinion, which how untrue it is I have showed above 
g num. 26. . Secondly, that to follow a probable opinion against the more probable, is dangerous to one's soul, although by not following it he shall incur a Praemunire, which to affirm were certes rather a great folly, than wisdom, and a fare greater folly to go about to persuade any wise man to believe the same 
h See above, num. 37. . And thirdly, that to refuse the Oath is the more safe, and the more probable opinion, because it is disproved by the Pope's Holiness, and the greater number of Catholic Divines, who follow his opinion; whereas the approving, or disproving of the Pope, or other Doctors, cannot make their opinion to be the more probable, yea, or probable at all, and so not safe to those, who see their approving, or disproving to be grounded upon false reasons, and suppositions 
i See above, num. 14. , as are the Pope's declarative Breves forbidding the Oath, as I have showed above 
k num. 59 .   

The Conclusion.  
46 NOw to make an end, these five Observations, and the former Explications of the Oath (which I have not invented of myself, but only abstracted them out of those Authors, who have written of this Subject more exactly) seem to my understanding so clear and convincing, that I have thought good to recommend them to the serious considerations of all English Roman Catholics, those especially who have taken upon them the charge of souls, and in that regard are bound to instruct the unlearneder sort of people both men, and women in their duty to God and Caesar, and to teach them truly, sincerely and without any inordinate respect of humane fear, or favour, what spiritual obedience they own to the Pope's Holiness, and what temporal to the King's Majesty, and have not perchance hitherto examined this great, and important controversy of the Oath, betwixt the Pope, and their Prince so diligently, and uprightly, as they might, and in regard of their Pastoral charge aught to have done; to the end that they may clearly perceive, that those their Catholic brethren, who out of conscience, and obedience to their Sovereign have taken the Oath, thinking it their duty so to do, and have thereby according to his commandment acknowledged that temporal Allegiance, which according to the grounds of Catholic Religion is due to our supreme temporal Prince, have no ways departed from the bond of that true spiritual obedience, which is due to our supreme spiritual Pastor. In all which if I have any way not wittingly, or willingly, I call God to witness, erred through ignorance, I most humbly submit myself to the judgement, and Censure of the holy Catholic, Apostolic Roman Church, and would also have been willing for peace, and obedience sake, to have lead captive, and blindfold my will, contrary to my understanding, to the observing of his Holiness Breves, if they had concerned a spiritual, and not a temporal matter, and also in his own cause, to the great prejudice, and against the express commandment of our Sovereign Prince, by challenging since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh (A thing unheard of before that age (saith Onuphrius) in competent attributes (as a learned Catholic calleth them 
l See the Protestants Apology for the Roman Church in the Preface sec. 20. ) of supreme authority, 
Onuphrius lib. 4 de varia create. Rom. Pont.  and principality in temporals over all the Christian Monarches of the world, to dispose of their Kingdoms, and Dominions at lest wise indirectly or in order to spiritual good, with imminen danger of the spiritual and temporal ruin of all. English Catholics, and manifest overthrow of the temporal Sovereignty of the King's Majesty, and of all other Sovereign Princes, whom the ancient Fathers with uniform consent, 
m S. Ignatius in epist. ad Smyr. Irenaeus lib. 5. cap. 24. Tertul. in Apolog c 33. & ad S●●pulam Clem Alex lib 4 S●●om●●u● 〈…〉 ● 〈◊〉 l●●●●● 24 Did●●● 〈◊〉 in 〈…〉 G●●● 〈◊〉 Pat●●● in 〈◊〉. 50. Optatus M●levit lib. 3. contra Parmenian. G●egor, N●●. in 〈◊〉 27. 〈◊〉 s●ipso. Ambros. in Apologia David, cap. 4. 〈◊〉 2 ●●●st. 7. & 〈◊〉 de ob●●●●●●dosii. Hieronymus epist 22. add Eustechium, 〈◊〉 36. add Rusticum. Chryst ●●m. 2 & 20 add pop. Antioch. & add Rom. 13. Aug de fide & epe. ib cap. 2. & in 〈◊〉 ●8. conc. 31 & tract. 115. in joan. Cyril. Al●x lib 12 i● joan cap. 56. Greg ●●●g. lib. 2. epist. 61. Isid lib. 3. sent. cap. ●. ●e ●●rd. epist. 42. ad ●●chiep. Senon. Be●a, Euthym. Arnob. Cassiod. in illud Psal. 50. Tibi soli pecca●●. Theod. Theophyl. Occumen. ad Rom. 13.  acknowledge to be supreme in temporals, and subject to the Temporal punishment of none but of GOD alone; and that to deprive Princes of their temporal Kingdoms, Dominions, or Lives, for what cause, crime, or end soever temporal, or spiritual, directly, or indirectly they be deprived, is a temporal punishment; I think no man that is ●●●●d with natural reason can deny.  
FINIS.