A NEW-YEAR'S GIFT FOR ENGLISH CATHOLICS, OR A Brief and clear Explication of the New Oath of Allegiance.  
By E. I. Student in Divinity; For a more full Instruction, and appeasement of the consciences of English Catholics, concerning the said OATH, then hath been given them by I. E. Student in Divinity, who compiled the Treatise of the PRELATE and the PRINCE.  1. PET. 2. 
Fear God, Honour the King.   christogram 
I H S.  MATTH. 22. 
Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's: and the things that are Gods to God.  
With licence of Superiors. 1620.   

A BRIEF SUMMARIE of what is contained in this TREATISE.  
1. FIrst, An Admonition to English catholics, to examine their consciences exactly concerning this New Oath of Allegiance: for that by refusing the same if it be lawful and ministered by good and full authority, (as this Treatise convinceth it to be) they hazard not only their temporal estates, but also their eternal salvation, by disobeying and resisting lawful authority, and the ordinance of Almighty God.  
2. Secondly, are set down a Copy of the new Oath of Allegiance, The 13. Priest's Protestation; Mr. john colleton's Petition wherein he confirmeth his former Protestation: and the Acknowledgement of Mr. Thomas Greene, (a Religious Priest of the order of Saint Benedict, and Professor of Divinity) concerning his opinion of the said Oath of Allegiance, with certain notes and Observations added by the Author to the said Protestation, & Acknowledgement.  
3. Thirdly, Certain general Observations are set down, to know first, the nature and conditions of every lawful Oath. Secondly, what rules are to be observed for the understanding and interpreting of the true sense and meaning of any ambiguous word or sentence contained in any Law, and consequently in this Oath of Allegiance established by a Parliamental Law. Thirdly, what was the intent and meaning of his Majesty and the Parliament, in framing and proposing this new and unwonted Oath of Allegiance, devised upon occasion of that unwonted Barbarous and Devilish Conspiracy of the Powder-Traytours; to wit, not to make a distinction, betwixt Protestants & Catholics, but between Catholics & Catholics, in point of their loyalty and civil obedience, especially concerning the Pope's authority to practise the deposition of Princes, which was the ground of that damnable Powder-Treason. Fourthly, to know upon what assured grounds the Pope's authority to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, may not only be barely denied, but also abjured as damnable; impious, and heretical: to wit, for that it is a controversy among learned Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to deprive Princes or no: and consequently, that it is open injustice in the Pope; and manifest Treason in the Subject to attempt the dispossessing of any Sovereign Prince, by virtue of this pretended authority and claim, so long as this Controversy remaineth a foot, and is not decided by a lawful judge, and who without all doubt and Controversy is known so to be. Fiftly, page 64. it is showed, that the Pope is no lawful judge to end and decide this Controversy concerning his own pretended authority to deprive Sovereign Princes; for that it is a Controversy among Learned Catholics, and approved by very many famous Prelates, Cardinals, and Doctors cited by the Author, that the Pope, without the consent and approbation of a lawful and undoubted general Council, hath not authority to decide, determine, or define any doctrinal question at all, and much less in his own particular cause, as is this Controversy betwixt Him and Christian Princes: and that therefore although he should take upon him to decide this question, yet the Controversy would still remain a foot, and be undecided as it was before.  
4. Fourthly, In the first eight Chapters it is clearly showed, that there is not any one Clause of the Oath, which wanteth either Verity, justice, or judgement: and that therefore English Catholics not only may lawfully, but also are bound in conscience to take it, when they are urged thereunto by the Magistrate, whom the Prince and State hath appointed to tender the same: otherwise they resist lawful authority, and the Ordinance of God, which whosoever resist purchase to themselves damnation. Rom. 13.  
5. Fiftly, In the ninth and last Chapter are clearly answered the Pope's declarative Breves, forbidding English Catholics to take the Oath, for that it containeth many things, which are manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation; which Breves therefore do not make, but only suppose the Oath to be unlawful, as containing in it some manifest falsehood or injustice: and therefore, abstracting from the Pope's Breves, some particular clause of the Oath must be proved to be unlawful, which this Treatise doth evidently convince to be untrue. And first in this Chapter it is showed, that it is no disobedience or irreverence, not to obey. such declarative Breves, seeing that they are grounded upon one of these two (or rather upon both) false suppositions: to wit, that either the doctrine for the Pope's power to deprive Princes is certain, of Faith, and out of all Controversy, and the contrary not approved by learned Catholics, which supposition is manifestly false: or else that the Pope's power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, and to absolve from Oaths in general, and consequently his Spiritual authority is denied in the Oath, which also is no less untrue: and that therefore English Catholics not only may lawfully and without any disobedience or irreverence, but also are bound in conscience not to obey them, considering that they are so prejudicial to themselves, so scandalous to the Catholic Roman Religion, which they profess, and so injurious to their Sovereign Prince, who, being in real possession of his Kingdom, cannot upon any controversed Title or Power with out open injustice be dispossessed thereof. Secondly, it is showed, that albeit diverse Popes have since the time of Pope Gregory the VII. challenged to themselves authority to deprive Sovereign Princes, yet they cannot be truly said, to have been for any little time in possession of this their pretended authority, right and claim: for that they have ever been resisted and contradicted by Christian Princes and Subjects in this their pretended right and claim, whereas, to possess authority, right, or claim to any thing, it is necessary, according to the approved doctrine of Molina, and Lessius both jesuites, and of all Divines and Lawyers, that it be without resistance and contradiction of the adverse part: but one may truly and really possess corporal things, as Lands, Houses, Kingdoms, although he, that pretendeth to have right to the same, yea and perchance hath true right thereunto, contradict and resist never so much. Thirdly, it is showed, that howsoever any man may under pretence of following a probable opinion, think himself excused in conscience and in the sight of God (wherewith Princes in their Tribunals do not meddle, but leave men's consciences to the judgement of God, the only searcher of all men's hearts) by concurring with the Pope to the deposing and dispossessing of his Sovereign Prince; yet considering that it is not only probable, but also most certain, that he is excused in conscience and in the sight of God, by defending his Prince against such damnable, and traitorous practices, which are grounded at the most upon a probable power, title, and claim, and also that he cannot be excused from formal Treason in the external Court, both Ecclesiastical and Secular of his Sovereign Prince, who is in actual possession of his Kingdom, & cannot without open injustice be dispossessed upon any uncertain and controversed power, claim, or title though it were never so probable; it is evident, that those Subjects might justly be accounted worse than mad, that would in such damnable and traitorous practices concur with the Pope to the dispossessing of their Sovereign Prince, under pretence of a power, or title, which, even in speculation, and abstracting from practice, can be at the most but probable.  
6. Lastly, are set down, First, the Oath of France, or the first Article of the lower House of Parliament, wherein of two hundred Deputies for the third Estates were but six Protestants: Secondly, two Arrests or Decrees of the Parliament of Paris, forbidding under pain of Treason Cardinal Bellarmine's Book against Barckley, and Suarez Book against our King's Majesty's Premonition, and thirdly another Decree of the said Parliament, ordaining likewise that no person of what quality or condition soever do teach the said doctrine of deposing Princes as problematical or probable. All which Decrees are proved to be agreeable to truth and justice, and that Christian Princes, by virtue of their temporal power, have good and full authority, both to forbid the teaching, maintaining, and publishing of all unnecessary doctrines & positions, be they never so probable, as the teaching and publishing of the same tendeth to the subversion of States-and to the disturbance of the public peace in the Civil Common, wealth, and is dangerous to the Crowns and lives of temporal Princes; and also to punish with temporal punishments the teachers, maintainers, and publishers of the same.   

AN ADMONITION TO ENGLISH Catholics.  
1. COnsider with yourselves, (Dear Countrymen) how greatly this new Oath of Allegiance concerneth you all, not only in your temporal states and liberty, which in conscience you are bound to regard, and not wilfully to cast away, (and the more if you have a charge of Wife and Children, for whom in nature you are obliged to provide) but chief in your soul's health, which above all temporal things in this World you are bound to prefer. For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole World, and sustain the damage of his soul? 
Mat. 16.  Now if this new Oath be truly an Oath of temporal Allegiance, and ministered by lawful authority, (as this Treatise doth convince it to be) doubtless you incur the danger of eternal damnation if you refuse it, by disobeying and resisting the just commandment of lawful authority, and the Ordinance of Almighty God, from whom all power and authority doth proceed. For he that resisteth power 
Rom. 13.  (or authority) resisteth the Ordinance of God; And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation.  
2. First therefore, it behooveth you that are Laymen, to examine diligently this matter, and not to be led hoodwinkd into the pit both of spiritual and temporal misery, especially by blind and ignorant guides, who neither understand, nor are desirous to know the true grounds of this important Controversy, and therefore can hardly be drawn for the informing of your consciences to descend with you in particular to the examination of the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of every Branch of this Oath, which many of them, (I speak with grief, and not without Book) have not so much as ever read, but to cloak their ignorance under colour of Zeal and Devotion, without any further examining, they only cry out to you in general terms, The Church, the Pope, the Rock is that, which good Catholics ought to cleave unto; not knowing themselves, what authority is spiritual and due to the Pope or Church, and what authority is temporal and due to temporal Princes, and that the Pope is not the Church, but only the chief member thereof; and that the Pope's opinion, and consequently his Declarative Breves, when they are grounded either upon false suppositions, or else only upon his opinion, are not the Rock, whereon Catholics ought to build their eternal salvation; and lastly, not considering, that many times when Popes and Princes have been and shall be in opposition, the Popes both have been, may lawfully be, and also aught to be resisted. As the resistance, which Philip the Fair made to Pope Boniface the VIII. (who deprived the said King, & gave his Kingdom to 
a Genebrard. lib. 4. ad annum 1294.  Albertus the Emperor, and declared, that he accounted them for Heretics, who did not believe that the said King was subject to him in spirituals and temporals) 
b Vignerius ad annum.  and the resistance, which Lewis the XII. made to Pope julius the II. (by whom he was deprived, and his Kingdom 
c 
Genebrard. lib. 4. ad annum 1503.  
Guicciardin. lib. 11. hist.  
Richeome in Apoleget. cap. 24 25.  
See Brerely in the Preface of his Protestants Apology, etc. Sec. 20. 21. & seq.   given in prey to any that could take it) is well commended by Lewis Richeome Provincial of the jesuites, and proposed for an example to be imitated; yea and he showeth, that whensoever any Bishop of Rome should offend the King of France, as those Kings were offended by those Bishops, the jesuites in such an occasion would do that which good Clergymen, and good Frenchmen together with the said King Philip, and Lewis did in those times, who defended their rights against those Popes, Boniface and julius, without any irreverence to the Sea Apostolic. And therefore, I beseech you, (Dear Countrymen) to take heed upon what guides you rely for the directing of your souls in these important affairs, and remember that Admonition of our Saviour, 
Mat. 15.  Blind they are, and guides of the blind. And if the blind be guide to the blind, both fall into the ditch.  
3. Secondly, you that are Priests, and have taken upon you to guide others in the way to salvation, and aught to be always ready to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith which is in you, 
1. Pet. 3  if you think in your consciences the Oath to be lawful, and ministered by good and full authority, you ought to take great heed, that your souls be not defiled, nor your consciences stained with some worldly respect, and that neither hope of gain or preferment, nor fear of want or disgrace keep you back from giving warning to those, whom you are bound to guide, direct, and instruct, to beware of the danger, which they are like to fall into by resisting the Ordinance of God, if they refuse the Oath, when it is tendered them by lawful authority; lest that you foreseeing their danger, and not crying out to them to take heed, be not only partakers of their spiritual harm, but do also cooperate to their temporal ruin, and so have cause to rue your silence, and to cry out yourselves when it is too late, Vae mihi quia tacui, Woe is me because I have held my peace. 
Isa. 6.  But if perchance any of you, who in your consciences think the Oath to be lawful, should for some worldly respect, (which God forbidden) cry out against the takers or approovers thereof, this were not only to sin most damnably against your own consciences, but also in some sort against the Holy Ghost, and to impugn that, which in your souls and consciences you think, and acknowledge to be true, which how hardly it is forgiven either in this World, or the next, 
Mat. 12.  our Saviour himself doth expressly witness.  
4. Lastly, those Priests that in their consciences think the Oath to be unlawful, and thereupon do not only give warning to those, whom they have taken upon them to guide and direct, to take heed, and beware of the spiritual danger, which they think will arise by taking the same, but also in their zeal do cry out against their Catholic Brethren, who either do take the Oath, or think it to be lawful, as Apostates from the Catholic Faith and Religion, and disobedient children to the Pope and Church, (giving the like occasion to others to cry out against them, as Apostates from their natural Allegiance, and disobedient & disloyal Subjects to their temporal Prince) it behoveth them most of all to look to themselves, and, (according to the admonition, which Card. Bellarmine upon occasion of relating the fearful death of Pope Innocentius the III. giveth to Prelates and Pastors 
Bellar. de ge●…itu, columbae, lib. 2. cap. 9 ) to examine all the secrets of their consciences most exactly, lest perchance it be erroneous, albeit to them it seem to be sound & just: and that their zeal (albeit to them selves seem pure, and according to knowledge) be not blind, and grounded upon wilful or culpable ignorance, like that, which the jews had in crucifying our Saviour, and Saint Paul, (when he was Saul) in persecuting his Disciples, who thought thereby to do God great service.  
5. And truly if their Zeal were hurtful to none but to themselves, they would doubtless be the more excusable; but considering how prejudicial it is both to his Majesty's honour, and also to his temporal Sovereignty, how scandalous it is to Catholic Religion, and how injurious it is to their Catholic brethren, not inferior to themselves in virtue and learning (whom they seek to disgrace, and to make odious to all Catholics, epecially to their benefactors and friends, and so by taking from them their good names and maintenance, to bring them into extreme want and misery, and, as much as in them lieth, into manifest desperation (for which they are one day to render a most strict account) they have great cause to examine their consciences narrowly, and carefully to consider, upon what assured grounds they can excuse themselves at the dreadful day of judgement, for taking such scandalous, injurious, and uncharitable courses, both against their Sovereign Prince, (whom next under God they are bound to honour and obey in temporals) and also against their Catholic brethren, who not only are as learned and religious as themselves, but also have examined this important controversy, and all the danger both spiritual and temporal that dependeth thereon, as diligently, if not fare more, than they themselves have done.  
6. To the end therefore that all of you, (my dear Countrymen) may examine your consciences in this point of the Oath, more easily and eactly, and be more fully instructed therein, than you have been by I. E. the Author of the Prelate and the Prince, (who, if the common rumour be true, will hear shortly with shame enough what goodly Instructions he hath given you) I have out of Roger widdrington's express doctrine and grounds collected this little Treatise, which for that it was finished this first day of the year, I am bold to present it to your Charities for a New-yeares-gift, as a small token of the great desire I have both of your spiritual and temporal welfare. And my only request is, that you will be pleased to read it, as I hope you will, it being neither so prolix, but that in some few hours you may mane it over, nor so obscure, but that any man of mean capacity may understand it, and after you have read it, to judge thereof accordingly. And if I shall hear, that you have reaped any benefit thereby, I shall think my pains exceeding well bestowed; but howsoever, I shall not think my labour lost by giving you this evident token of my love: for that the love and duty I own to my Prince and Country, to the Catholic Religion, and to you my dear Catholic brethren, and above all to God Almighty, the Author of all truth, yea truth itself, and who will in due time render to every man according to his works, 
Rom. 2.  hath, for the defence of a necessary truth, moved me to take this pains. And so with my best wishes, I bid you hearty farewell, hoping that you will be wise, and not be transported with a blind and intemperate zeal towards Prince or Prelate, but that you will be careful to fear God, to honour the King, and without all partiality, to render to God and Caesar (and consequently to Popes and Princes) that which is their due.   


A Copy of the new Oath of Allegiance, divided into eight Branches as it is in this Treatise explained.  
1. I A.B. do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my conscience before God and the World, That our Sovereign Lord King james, is lawful and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other his Majesty's Dominions and Countries.  
2. And that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church, or See of Rome, or by any other means which any other hath any Power or Authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of his Majesty's Kingdoms, or Dominions, or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy Him or his Countries, or to discharge any of his Subjects of their Allegiance and Obedience to his Majesty, or to give licence or leave to any of them to bear Arms, raise Tumults, or to offer any Violence, or hurt to his majesty's Royal Person, State, or Government, or to any of his Majesty's Subjects within his Majesty's Dominions.  
3. Also, I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any Declaration, or Sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope or his Successors, or by any Authority derived or to be derived from him, or his See against the said King, his Heirs or Successors, or any absolution of the said Subjects from their Obedience, I will bear Faith and true Allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all Conspiracies and Attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against His, or their Persons, their Crown and Dignity, by reason or colour of any such Sentence or Declaration or otherwise, and will do my best endeavour to disclose and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies, which I shall know or hear of to be against him or any of them.  
4. And I do further swear, That I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine, and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever.  
5. And I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof.  
6. Which I acknowledge by good and full authority to be lawfully ministered unto me, and do renounce all Pardons and Dispensations to the contrary.  
7. And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words without any Equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever.  
8. And I do make this recognition and acknowledgement hearty, willingly and truly upon the true Faith of a Christian. So help me God.   


A Copy of the Protestation, which thirteen Reverend Priests made of their Allegiance to Queen Elizabeth, by a public Instrument the last day of january 1602. in the last year of her Majesty's Reign.  
WHereas it hath pleased our Dread Sovereign Lady to take some notice of the Faith, and Loyalty of us Her natural borne Subjects Secular Priests (as it appeareth in the late Proclamation) and of her Princelike clemency hath given a sufficient earnest of some merciful favour towards us (being all subject by the Laws of the Realm to death by our return into the Country after our taking the Order of Priesthood since the first year of Her Majesty's Reign) and only demandeth of us a true profession of our Allegiance, thereby to be assured of our fidelity to Her Majesty's Person, Crown, Estate and Dignity, We, whose names are underwritten, in most humble wise prostrate at Her Majesty's feet do acknowledge ourselves infinitely bound unto Her Majesty therefore, and are most willing to give such assurance and satisfaction in this point, as any Catholic Priests can or aught to give unto their Sovereigns.  
First, therefore we acknowledge, and confess the Queen's Majesty to have as full Authority, Power and Sovereignty over us, and over all the Subjects of the Realm, as any Her Highness' Predecessors ever had: And further we protest, that we are most willing and ready to obey Her in all Cases and Respects as fare forth, as euer Christian Priests within this Realm, or in any other Christian Country were bound by the Law of God and Christian Religion to obey their Temporal Princes; as to pay Tribute, and all other Regal Duties unto Her Highness, and to obey Her Laws and Magistrates in all Civil Causes, to pray unto God for Her prosperous and peaceable Reign in this life according to his blessed will and that she may hereafter attain everlasting bliss in the Life to come. And this our acknowledgement we think to be so grounded upon the Word of GOD, as that no Authority. no Cause, or pretence of Cause can or ought (upon any occasion) be a sufficient Warrant more unto us then to any Protestant to disobey Her Majesty in any Civil or Temporal matter.  
Secondly, whereas for these many years past diverse Conspiracies against her Majesty's Person and Estate, and sundry forcible attempts, for invading and conquering her Dominions, have been made under we knew not what pretences and intendments of restoring Catholic Religion by the sword (a course most strange in the World, and undertaken peculiarly and solely against Her Majesty, and Her Kingdoms among other Princes departed from the Religion and Obedience of the See Apostolic (no less than she) by reason of which violent Erterprises, her Majesty, otherwise of singular clemency toward Her Subjects, hath been greatly moved to ordain, and execute severer Laws against Catholics (which by reason of their union with the See Apostolic in Faith and Religion, were easily supposed to favour these Conspiracies and Invasions) then perhaps had ever been enacted or thought upon, if such Hostility and Wars had never been undertaken; We, to assure Her Majesty of our faithful Loyalty also in this particular cause do sincerely protest, and by this our public fact make known to all the Christian World, That in these cases of Conspiracies, of practising Her Majesty's death, of Invasions, and of whatsoever forcible Attempts, which hereafter may be made by any foreign Prelate, Prince or Potentate, whosoever either jointly or severally for the disturbance or subversion of Her Majesty's Person, Estate, Realms, or Dominions, under colour, show, pretence or intendment of restoring the Catholic Roman Religion in England, or Ireland, We will defend Her Majesty's Person, Estate, Realms and Dominions from all such forcible and violent assaults and injuries. And moreover We will not only ourselves detect and reveal any Conspiracies or Plots which we shall understand to be undertaken by any Prelate, Prince, or Potentate against Her Majesty's Person or Dominions for any cause whatsoever as is before expressed, and likewise to the uttermost of our power resist them, but also will earnely persuade, as much as in us lieth, all Catholics to do the same.  
Thirdly, if upon any Excommunication denounced or to be denounced against Her Majesty, or upon any such Conspiracies, Invasions or forcible Attempts to be made as are before expressed the Pope should also excommunicate every one borne within Her Majesty's Dominions that would forsake the aforesaid defence of Her Majesty and Her Realms, and take part with such Conspirators, or Invaders in these and all other like Cases, we in these and all such like Cases do think ourselves, and all the Lay-Catholikes borne within Her Majesty's Dominions not bound in conscience to obey this or any such like Censure, but will defend our Prince and Country, accounting it our duties so to do, and that notwithstanding any Authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever either denounced or to be denounced as is aforesaid, to yield unto Her Majesty all obedience in Temporal Causes.  
And because nothing is more certain, then that whilst we endeavour to assure Her Majesty of our dutiful Affection and Allegiance by this our Christian and sincere Protestation, there will not want who will condemn and misconstrue our lawful Fact, yea, and by many finister suggestions and calumnies discredit our doings with the Christian World, but chief with the Pope's Holiness to the greatest prejudice and harm of our good names and persons that may be, unless maturely we prevent their endeavours herein, We most humbly beseech Her Majesty, that in this our recognising and yielding Caesar's due unto Her, we may also by Her Gracious leave be permitted, for avoiding Obloquy and Calumnies, make known by like public Act, that by yielding Her right unto Her, we depart from no bond of that Christian Duty which we own unto our Supreme spiritual Pastor.  
And therefore we acknowledge and confess the Bishop of Rome to be the Successor of Saint Peter in that See, and to have as ample and no more Authority or jurisdiction over us and other Christians, than had that Apostle by the gift and commission of Christ our Saviour, and that We will obey him so fare forth as we are bound by the Laws of God to do, which we doubt not but will stand well with performance of our Duty to our Temporal Prince in such sort as we have before professed. For as we are most ready to spend our blood in the defence of Her Majesty and our Country, so we will rather lose our lives then infringe the lawful authority of Christ's Catholic Church.  


William Bishop.  
john Colleton.  
john Much.  
Robert Charnocke.  
john Bossevile.  
Anthony Hebborne.  
Roger Cadwallader.  
Robert Drury.  
Anthony Champney.  
john jackson.  
Francis Barneby.  
Oswald Needham.  
Richard Button.     

This Protestation of the thirteen Catholic Priests (to which a great number more would have subscribed, if the Articles which those Priests gave up to the State, had been returned them back, but some few days before the end of the time prefixed to them by the Proclamation, to make known to the State their Allegiance) was the ground and foundation from whence the Parliament (as the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury D. Bancroft told a friend of mine) framed the form of this new Oath of Allegiance, as agreeable to the doctrine, which any Catholic subject, according to the grounds of true Catholic Religion, might lawfully maintain, to make thereby a true distinction not between Protestants, and Catholics, but between civilly obedient Catholics, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Catholics as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody maxims that the Powder-Traitours did. 
See beneath in the third Observation.  And doubtless, whosoever will compare the new Oath, and their Protestation together, and do withal consider, that Queen Elizabeth was long before that time deprived of all Regal power, authority, dignity, and jurisdiction by the Bull of Pius Quintus, and also observe upon what assured grounds and principles those Priests could lawfully acknowledge her Majesty to have as full Authority, Power and Sovereignty over them and all the Subjects of this Realm, as any Her Predecessors ever had, and also could lawfully promise, that they would yield to Her Majesty all Obedience in Temporal Causes, notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever denounced or to be denounced against Her Majesty, or Her Subjects, as is aforesaid; he will clearly perceive, that their Protestation is all one in effect and substance with this new Oath of Allegiance, and that the only difference betwixt them is, that in the Oath the Pope's authority to depose the King, etc. is expressly and in plain words denied, and in their Protestation the denial thereof is only covertly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence employed; notwithstanding all the evasions, tergiversations, turnings, windings, sayings and unsaying, which any one of these Priests (if for some worldly respect or other motive he should now repent him of what he had done) could to excuse himself from Perjury, possibly use or invent.    

A Copy of Master john colleton's Petition to the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury's Grace, wherein he confirmeth his former Protestation, many years after the new Oath of Allegiance was established.  
IF your Grace and the State saw the present affections of my heart, and were pleased to look on my carriages past, neither trouble some, or unrespective, I hope the favour I am to desire, albeit it may seem extraordinary, yet the same could not altogether be deemed unworthily extended. The voluntary and free Recognition I made in the late Queen's Reign as it then sufficed, and is now extant in print, so doth it still witness the readiness of my professed Allegiance in all Secular and Civil affairs. Neither have I been, am now, or by God's grace ever shall be otherwise affected, then in like sort to acknowledge his Majesty that now governeth, for my lawful Dread Sovereign, obey in all Political administration, and defend his sacred Person, Crown, and Dominions to the uttermost of my power against all enemies of what place and calling soever. The commiseration I most humbly beseech your Grace to take of my aged years, accompanied with sundry infirmities, is, to stand so good Lord unto me, as to enlarge me upon sufficient security for my appearance before your Honour, at the time your Lordship shall think fit to assign, An evident means of lengthing my life, beside the easing of the heavy charge my imprisonment imposeth. I would very gladly have been herein my own Solicitor in person, but that I hold the boldness greater in respect of my disgraceful state, than I durst to adventure on without your Lordship's good liking thereunto first understood.  
26. of March, 1610. Your Grace's most suppliant Petitioner, JOHN COLLETON.   

A Copy of the Declaration and Acknowledgement which Master james Houghton, alias Thomas Green, a Religious Priest of the Order of Saint Benedict, and professor of Dininitie, made under his own hand writing to the Lord Bishop of Durham, the first of November, 1619. touching his opinion of the Oath of Allegiance.  

james Houghton, alias, Thomas Green, his opinion touching the Oath of Allegiance.  
1 FIrst, I do ingenuously confess, that his Majesty had very just cause, by occasion of that most treacherous plot of the Gunpowder-Treason, to propose to all his Subjects English Catholics 〈◊〉 Oath of civil fidelity and obedience due unto Kings both by the Laws of God and Nature, and that in most effectual and peremptory terms, for trial of their fidelity and loyalty to H●… Majesty their true Sovereign Lord and King.  
2. Secondly, it seemeth to me that the Church had done her duty, if she had showed her dislike of that odious practice of the Gun-powder-Treason, by some public declaration in detestation thereof, both for his Majesty's satisfaction, and for the confirmation of his Catholic Subjects in their fidelity and allegiance unto Him.  
3. Thirdly, I do ingenuously confess, that to me it seemeth most true, that the doctrine, which approveth murdering of Kings by their own Subjects or any else, is both damnable and heretical, yea, though it be in casu Apostasiae a fide aut Infidelitatis, in case of Apostasy from faith, or of Infidelity.  
4. Fourthly, I do ingenuously grant, that it seemeth to me in my private judgement, that there is nothing in the Oath, but that it may, according to Roger Widdrington his Gloss and Exposition, be lawfully taken of English Catholics His Majesties Subjects, though some both Learned and Religious hold the contrary.  
Yet I find three scruples concerning the Oath, which cause me to entreat some further time of consideration and conference for my better satisfaction.  
The first is, concerning the Roman Council under Gregory the seventh, and the Council of Lateran, sub innocentio tertio, whether they have defined any thing in this point.  
The Second is, whether it be fit for me to oppose my private judgement to two Breves of the Pope, that say in the Oath there be many things contrary to faith and salvation, though they express not any thing in particular.  
The Third is, whether by taking the Oath I shall not give scandal to many learned Priests and Catholics, who refuse it, and for refusal hazard their lives and Estates.  
In regard whereof I humbly pray further respite, for better consideration and confererence: And in the mean time I promise and vow to be a true & faithful Sabiect to His Majesty & His Successors during my life, and so am fully resolved to continue, notwithstanding any Sentence from the Pope whatsoever of Excommunication, Deposition, or Absolution of his Majesty's Subjects from their natural obedience to Him, and his Heirs, etc. for whom I most affectionately pray God of his infinite mercy, specially to direct and assist in all their actions and proceed.  
Thomas GREEN.   

But as touching the three scruples mentioned in the fourth Article, it is to be observed, that all of them are particularly and very clearly answered by Roger Widdrington. 
Widdringt. in Discuss. Discuss. part. 3. sec. 2. & in detectione calum. D. Schulck. §. 7 nu. 16. & seq.   
And first to the Council of Rome under Pope Gregory the Seventh, he showeth, that in the Canon, Nos Sanctorum, nothing is defined, if we regard the rules, which Cardinal Bellarmine allegeth to make a true definition, 
Bell. lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. c. 12.  neither is there any mention made in that decree of any consent of the Bishops, who were present; and that albeit any thing mentioned in that degree had been expressly defined, yet considering that it is a probable doctrine, that the Pope's definitions in a Provincial Council, as was that Roman Council, are uncertain and fallible, they cannot make the doctrine, which they define, to be certain, and the contrary to be improbable.  
Secondly, he showeth, that neither from the words of that Canon it can be gathered, that the Pope hath authority to deprive Sovereign Princes, but only inferior Lords and Magistrates by the consent and authority of those absolute Princes, to whom they are subject in temporals: and that therefore that Canon Nos Sanctorum is to be understood only of those, who are subject to the Pope in temporals, and hath force to bind only in his own Territories, or it was confirmed by the consent and authority of other absolute Princes, as many learned Canonists mentioned by Pope Innocentius, Hostiensis, and joannes Andrea's expound the Canon, Ad abolendam de haereticis. 
In can. Ad abolendam.  And as concerning the Dictatus Papae, which Lessius urgeth and attributeth to a Roman Council, wherein it is expressly said, 
Widdringt. in Disput. Theol. cap. 3. sec. 1.  That the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor: That he hath power to absolve subjects from their Allegiance, Widdrington showeth that they neither belong to any Roman Council, nor contain any definition, but only a declaration of the said Pope Gregory's opinion, who thought he had such authority, and that he might lawfully practise it, wherein nevertheless, as being a thing never heard of before that Age, saith Onuphrius, 
Onuphrius lib. 4. de varia create. Rom. Pont.  he was greatly, and might lawfully be contradicted by true and virtuous Catholics, as also at this present many other opinions of Pope's concerning their Dispensations and Absolutions in other things are contradicted by virtuous and learned Catholic Divines.  
To the Council of Lateran, Widdrington hath answered at large, both in a peculiar Treatise of the Decree of this Council against Lessius, and also in his Confutation of Fitzherberts Reply, wherein he showeth, that, according to the doctrine and exposition of famous and learned Canonists and Divines, the Decree of this Council neither was, nor could be understood of Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, who in temporal matters, wherein they are supreme and subject to none but God, are not comprehended under any general names, if the matter be penal and odious, and much less under the general name of a Temporal or Principal Magistrate or Lord, (as neither an Abbot is in penal and odious matters comprehended under the general name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the general name of a Priest) but that it is only to be understood of Dukes, Earls, Majors, Bailiffs, and such other inferior temporal Lords and Magistrates (as likewise by the names of a Temporal and principal Lord or Magistrate, they are comprehended in the Emperor's Decree, who useth the very same general words;) and that therefore this Decree of the Lateran Council had force to bind only in the Pope's temporal Dominions, or it was confirmed by the authority and consent of Sovereign Princes, to whom such inferior Lords and Magistrates were subject.  
To the second Scruple concerning the Pope's Breves, Widdrington hath fully answered in his Theological Disputation, and more at large in his Answer to Fitz-herbert: 
Cap. 10. sec. 2. part. 3. cap. vlt.  and partly in the last Chapter of this Treatise, wherein he showeth, that it is no disobedience or irreverence not to obey these declarative Breves, being grounded upon false suppositions, as he convinceth them to be, and that it is not only fitting, but necessary for every good and virtuous Catholic, not to obey any such Breves, especially when they command a thing which is in prejudice of a third person, as is the forbidding of this Oath, which is so prejudicial not only to His Majesty and his subjects, but also to the temporal Sovereignty of all other absolute Princes.  
To the third Scruple concerning the scandal, Widdrington hath fully answered, partly in the Preface of his Apologetical Answer, 
nu 21. cap. 10. sec. 3.  and more fully in his Theological Disputation wherein he hath showed, that if the Oath be lawful, and doth not contain any falsehood or injustice, but is an Oath of true temporal Allegiance, and ministered by good and full authority, as this Treatise doth make manifest, it is no giving of scandal to take the Oath, but that those Priests and Catholics do give great scandal by refusing it, and give just occasion to all Protestant Princes and subjects to think, that true temporal Allegiance due to a temporal Prince cannot, according to the grounds of the Catholic Roman Religion, stand with true spiritual obedience due to the Pope and other spiritual Pastors, whereby they mightily wrong all temporal Princes, they greatly scandalise the Catholic Roman Religion, & as much as much as in them lieth, they seek to avert all Protestant Princes and subjects from showing any favour to the professors of the same.     

A Plain and necessary Preamble, wherein certain important Observations are set down, for the better understanding of this new Oath of Allegiance.  
BEfore I come to explain the particular branches of this new Oath established by Act of Parliament, I think it not amiss to set down by way of a Preamble or Preface certain general Observations, which may give no little light to the better understanding of the same.  

The First Observation.  1. First, therefore to know the nature and conditions of an Oath, it is to be observed, that every lawful Oath must be discreet, just, and true; according to that of the Prophet jeremy, 
jerem. 4.  And thou shalt swear in Truth, and in justice, and in judgement.  
judgement is required chief in regard of the swearer, that he take not the Name of God in vain, rashly, irreverently, without just and urgent occasion, and not duly examining the truth of what he sweareth; for the matter or thing which is sworn, may oftentimes be true and just, and yet the Name of God may be taken in vain, and without just cause or necessity to confirm the same.  
justice is required chief in a promissory Oath, to wit, wherein something is promised for the future time to be done or omitted: and therefore as it is unlawful to promise any thing which is unjust, so is it more unlawful to confirm that unjust promise by Oath. Yet justice may also sometimes be wanting in an assertory Oath, as when one revealeth a secret, which in justice he is bound to conceal, and confirmeth the same by Oath, for than he sweareth truly, but unjustly.  
Verity or Truth is necessary in all Oaths, for also in a promissory Oath two kinds of verity are required; the one is for the pesent time (wherein it resembleth the nature of an assertory Oaeth) for he that promiseth to do, or not to do any thing, must have his words agreeable to his mind, and therefore must for the present have a mind or intent to perform what he promiseth; otherwise he sweareth untruly; the second verity is for the future time; for he that promiseth any thing, calling God for witness of his promise, and through his own default doth not perform his promise at the time appointed, is forsworn, and his promissory Oath wanteth verity: But truth and verity is chief required in assertory Oaths, to wit, wherein some thing is affirmed to be true or false. And therefore as it is unlawful for one to affirm that to be true, which he knoweth to be false, and contrariwise, for this were expressly and formally to lie, or to affirm that to be true or false, whereof he is uncertain or doubtful, for this were to expose himself to danger of speaking an untruth, so also it is much more unlawful to confirm the same by Oath.  
2. Whereupon Perjury is defined by the school-divines to be a lie confirmed by Oath. 
Magister in 3. dist. 39 S. Thom.  And therefore as a lie is divided into a formal lie, to wit, when one affirmeth any thing to be true or false, and thinketh otherwise in his mind (for to lie, saith Saint Augustine, 
August. lib de Mendacio.  is to speak against that which he thinketh in his mind,) and into a material lie, to wit, when one speaketh as he thinketh, and yet in very deed it is otherwise; So Perjury is divided into material and formal Perjury, for that Perjury is a lie confirmed by Oath, and only addeth to a lie the calling of God to witness of what he speaketh. And therefore whatsoever may be affirmed without danger of lying, may be sworn without danger of Perjury: and as the falsehood which maketh a formal lie, is not to be taken from the thing as it is in itself or ex parte rei, but as it is conceived by the speaker, for that to lie is to speak against the mind, so the falsehood, which maketh formal Perjury, is not to be taken from the thing which is sworn, as it is in itself, or ex parte rei, but as it is against the mind and knowledge of the swearer.  
3. For the verity, which is required in an Oath, consisteth in this, saith Gregorius de Valentia & Sayrus, 

Valentia tom. 3 disp. 6. q. 7. p. 3.  
Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 4. nu. 7.   that the thing be true, at least wise according to the reasonable judgement of the swearer. And therefore it is to be observed, that to judge whether an Oath be true or false, we must not so much regard the thing sworn, as the mind and knowledge of him that sweareth. So that whosoever affirmeth a thing by Oath, saith Silvester and Petrus Aragova, 

silvest verbo Periurium q. 1.  
Aragona, 2. 2. q. 89. art. 3.   in that manner as he knoweth it to be true, is not formally forsworn: as if he swear his opinion, acknowledgement, or persuasion, he must be morally certain, that he is so persuaded, if he swear it absolutely to be so, he must be morally certain it is so, otherwise he exposeth himself to danger of being forsworn, and although in very deed it fall out otherwise, than he is morally certain, yet he is excused in the Court of Conscience from the sin of Perjury, and he is not formally, but only materially forsworn.  

The Second Observation.  4. Secondly, to know in what sense the words of every Law, and consequently of this Oath, which is established by a Parliamental Law, aught to be taken, it is to be observed out of the doctrine of Franciscus Suarez a famous jesuite, 
Suarez lib. 6. de Legibus cap. 1.  that the " words of every Law are commonly to be understood according to their proper and usual signification, and that if any words have many proper and usual significations, that sense is to be taken, wherein the Lawmaker doth understand them, because upon the will and intention of the Lawmaker (which is the soul of the Law) the substance and force of the Law, doth chief depend. Whereupon if by any means the will of the Lawmaker can be known, according to it especially we must interpret the words of the Law, because that is the true interpretation of the Law, by which we follow the meaning and will of the Lawmaker. But if by the declaration of the Lawmaker we cannot gather the meaning of any equivocal and ambiguous word or sentence contained in the Law, than we must use those rules, which in all ambiguous and doubtful speeches are prudently to be observed: to wit, that the matter or contents of the Law, with the antecedents, & consequents, and other circumstances be diligently considered, for by them the meaning of the words, and the will of the Lawmaker will easily be gathered. And especially we must consider the beginning, Preface or Preamble, of the Law, and with it to join the rest that followeth: for to the beginning, if there be no other let, all that followeth is to be applied; because in the beginning, or Preface of every Law is usually contained the final end, cause, and reason, which chief moveth the Lawmaker, and which is morally a sure means to find out his will and meaning, and by which the ambiguity of any word or sentence is chief to be determined. And finally we must always, if there be no other let, interpret the words of the Law, when they are doubtful, in the more mild and favourable sense, especially if the matter be odious, and penal, aeccording to those approved rules of the Law, Benignius leges etc. 
Leg. Benignius ff de legibus. De regulis juris in Sexin.  Laws are to be interpreted in the more favourable sense, etc. And it is meet that odious things be restrained, and favours be enlarged. " Yea, and if the words of the Law being taken in their proper signification should argue any injustice, or like absurdity to be in the mind of the Lawmaker, they must be drawn to a sense although improper, wherein the Laew may be just and reasonable, because this is presumed to be the will of the Lawmaker, as it hath been declared by many Laws in ff. tit. de Legibus. Name in ambigua voce, etc. 
Leg. in ambigua ff. de legibus.  For in a doubtful word of the Law, saith the Law, that sense is rather to be chosen, which is void of all default, especially seeing that the will also of the Lawmaker may hereby be gathered: because it ought not to be presumed, that the Lawmaker did intent to command any absurd or inconvenient thing. Thus Suarez. What blame then do they deserve, who seek to wrest the words of this Oath, to a sense which they account to be most false and absurd, with so great prejudice to the souls and temporal States of English Catholics, and with no less irreverence to his Majesty and the State whom next under God they are bound to honour and obey in all temporal affairs, whereas they may expound the words, according to their proper and usual signification, in a true, convenient, and favourable sense, as the Reader may see beneath?  
5. Thirdly, to know the end and reason of this Oath and of the makers thereof, it is to be observed, that the Parliament in the very beginning of this Act, (to which according to Suarez, we must, if there be no other let, apply all that followeth) did expressly set down the cause, end, and reason, for which this new Oath was devised, to wit, to make a better trial how His Majesty's subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty, and due obedience. For His Majesty and the State perceiving, that the Powder-Traytors. who were all of them Roman Catholics, did ground, as it doth appear by their confessions, their barbarous and devilish plot chief upon the Pope's power to take away the Crowns and lives from temporal Princes in order to spiritual good, and knowing with all, that many other Roman Catholics did from their hearts detest, and abhor such traitorous and diabolical practices, and the wicked grounds thereof, thought it needful, for the better discovering and repressing of such bloody Assassinate's, and their disciples, to device such an Oath, wherein true temporal Allegiance due to all temporal Princes of what Religion soever, should be demanded, and no true spiritual obedience due to the Pope, or other spiritual Pastors should be denied, and yet the wicked principles of that most damnable Conspiracy should be detected and abjured. And the substance of this new Oath they did take from the Protestation of those thirteen Catholic Priests (as the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, Doctor Bancroft told a dear friend of mine) only using another form of words, and expressing some things concerning the Pope's pretended authority, which in their Protestation are not expressed, but only supposed, employed and virtually contained, for in effect and substance they little differ, as partly you have seen above, and more fully shall perceive when you have seen all the branches of the Oath explained. 
In his Premonition pag. 9 & in her Apology for the Oath. pag. 2. & pag. 9   
6. And not only the Parliament hath set down the end and reason of this new Oath, but also His Majesty Himself hath often by public Writings in express words declared, that He intended to exact in this Oath nothing else of His Subjects, than a profession of that temporal Allegiance and civil Obedience, which all subjects (what Religion soever they profess) by the Law of God and Nature do owe to their lawful Prince with a promise to resist and disclose all contrary uncivil violence; and to make a true distinction not betwixt Catholics and Protestants, but betwixt civilly obedient Catholics, and such Catholics as are the Disciples of the Powder-Treason. Whereupon he caused the lower house of Parliament, who at first would have had the Oath to contain the denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate him, to reform that clause. So careful was He, that nothing should be contained in this Oath except the profession of natural Allegiance, and civil and temporal obedience. He said in this Oath; for as the Oath of Supremacy, saith His Majesty, was devised for putting a difference between Papists, and them of our professions so was this Oath ordained for making a difference between the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the Powder-Treason. And again, This Oath, saith His Majesty, was ordained only for making a true distinction between Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good subjects, and such other Papists as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody maxims that the Powder-Traytours did. The same also but in more ample words affirmeth His Majesty in His Apology for the Oath.  
7. Wherefore we must distinguish betwixt the understanding, belief, or persuasion of His Majesty, and His will, intent, or meaning as He is a Lawmaker. For albeit His Majesty should believe and be fully persuaded, that the Pope is not the Supreme Head of the whole Church, and consequently that he hath not by the institution of Christ any power to excommunicate him, yet his will and meaning is not, that His subjects shall in this Oath profess the same, or renounce any spiritual obedience due to the Pope, which every Catholic, according to the grounds of true Catholic Religion, is bound to acknowledge, but only, that they make a profession of that temporal Allegiance, and civil obedience, which all subjects, of what Religion soever, do own to their lawful Prince. From whence it clearly followeth, that albeit there were in this Oath some ambiguous or doubtful sentence (as there is not) which might be applied as well to the denying of that spiritual obedience, which, according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, is due to the Pope and other spiritual Pastors, as to the professing of that temporal Allegiance, which is due to temporal Princes, we ought to interpret the words in that sense, wherein, according to the will, mind, and end of the Law, and declaration of the Lawmaker, only temporal Allegiance is demanded, for that by the end and reason of the Law the ambiguity of the words, saith Suarez, 
Suarez lib. 6. de Legibus cap. 1. nu. 19  is chief to be determined, and it is morally a sure means to find out the will and intention of the Lawmaker, especially that reason which is expressed in the Law, for then the reason of the Law is in some sort a part thereof, because it is contained and supposed therein.  
8. Fourthly, it is to be observed, that albeit English Catholics might at the first, before they examined particularly the end, reason, matter, and contents of this new Oath, justly suspect it to be unlawful, and to contain in it more than temporal Allegiance; and that His Majesty and the Parliament under pretence of demanding that temporal Allegiance, which by the Law of God and Nature is due to all temporal Princes, did intent to have covertly at leastwise abjured some spiritual obedience, which by the institution of Christ is due to spiritual Pastors, both for that it is a new, uncouth, and unwonted Oath of Allegiance, and expressly denyeth the Pope's authority, to depose wherewith other Christian Princes, in the ordinary Oaths of Allegiance, which they demand of their subjects, do not in plain and express terms intermeddle; and also for that it was devised by those, who are opposite to the Catholic Roman Religion; yet this bare suspicion can be no sufficient cause, ground, or motive to condemn it (as likewise no man upon a bare suspicion is to be condemned) but only to have it examined, and if after due examination it be found faulty, to reject it, if otherwise to approve it. But doubtless whosoever will sincerely, and with a pure desire to find out the truth, and to yield without all partiality as well to Kings as to Popes that which is their due, examine the occasion, end, matter, and contents of this new and unwonted Oath, will quickly find, that it is condemned by some, upon a bare and naked suspicion and without due examination; by others, upon a blind and inconsiderate zeal to the See Apostolic, not regarding in like manner the duty which by the Law of God they own to their temporal Prince; and by all that think it unlawful, without sufficient ground.  
9 For the occasion of this unwonted Oath, was that unwonted barbarous Powder-plot of certain Catholics, who pretended to justify their never heard of Barbarism under the colour of Religion, and the Pope's authority to dispose of the Crowns and lives of temporal Princes in order to spiritual good; and so no marvel, that to prevent the like unwonted cruelty was devised this unwonted remedy. And albeit the inventors of this Oath are opposite to the Catholic Roman Religion and are fully persuaded, that the Pope by the Law of God, hath no authority over this Kingdom, so much as in spirituals, yet there meaning was not, as you have seen above, to meddle in this Oath with that spiritual authority, which is granted him by all Catholics, but only to demand a profession of that temporal Allegiance, which all the Subjects of this Land, of what Religion soever they be, do own to their temporal Prince, and not to the Pope.  
10. And therefore, which is carefully to be observed, this Oath doth not meddle positively with the Pope's authority, for that it doth not belong to temporal Princes to declare what authority the Pope hath, but it meddleth positively with the King's temporal Sovereignty, and negatively with the Pope's authority; and it doth not declare ●… what authority the Pope hath, but only what authority he hath not. And what man, I pray you, can be so blind as not to see, that whosoever expressly affirmeth King james to be his true and rightful King and Sovereign in temporals, and to have over him and his other Subjects all Kingly Power, Authority, and jurisdiction, doth consequently and virtually deny the same of the Pope? Wherefore if we well examine the matter and contents of this unwonted Oath, we shall find, that His Majesty and the State do herein deny no other authority of the Pope expressly and by name, than which not only in the Protestation of those thirteen Catholic Priests, but also in all other usual Oaths of Allegiance, which absolute Princes are wont to demand of their Subjects, is virtually, covertly, and in effect employed. For whosoever sincerely and from his heart acknowledgeth, any Prince to be his only rightful King and Sovereign in temporals (which all absolute Princes in their usual Oaths of Allegiance demand of their Subjects) he must virtually acknowledge, that the Pope is not his Sovereign Lord in temporals, and consequently, that he hath no authority over his Prince or him in temporals, and therefore neither to depose his Prince, or to dispose of His temporal Dominions, for that these are temporal things for what end, cause, crime, or pretext soever, either spiritual or temporal, they be done.  
11. Fiftly, to know upon what assured grounds the Pope's authority to depose Princes, or to attempt and practise their deposition, is by Catholics denied in this Oath, it is to be observed, that as Leonardus Lessius, a famous jesuite, noteth very well, 
Lessius in his Singleton, part. 2. nu. 38.  a power which is not altogether certain but probable, cannot be a sufficient ground or title, whereby immediately any man may be punished or deprived of that right, dominion, or any other thing which he actually possesseth, but such a power or title must be most certain, and without all doubt or controversy. Wherefore neither can the Pope, nor any other Prince, without manifest injustice invade the Kingdom of another Prince, make war against him, or seek to depose or dispossess him upon a probable, uncertain, or controversed title. For certes, saith the Author of the Prelate and the Prince, (and who is known to be a famous Doctor and Professor of Divinity though masked under the name of I. E.) 
Cap. 11. pag. 235.  as it is injustice to put one out of his land or house, who hath probable right and and withal possession, because poti●…r est conditio possidentis, better is the condition of him that is in possession, So were it open injustice in the Pope to deprive a King of his Crown and Kingdom, who hath probable right and withal possession. And this also is the received doctrine of all Divines and Lawyers, 

Victoria in Relect the ture belli. nu. 29. & seq.  
Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 64. cap. 3.  
Gregorius de Valentia 2. 2. and Pope Adrian with many others cited by Valentia.   and grounded in the light of natural reason, and declared by the approved rules of the Law, that no man can be justly invaded, or be put out of his possession upon an uncertain or controversed title, because In causa dubia, sive incerta potior est conditio possidentis, In a doubtful or disputable cause the condition of the possessor is to be preferred, and Cum sunt iura partium obscura favendum est reo potius quam Actori. When the rights or titles of the parties that are in suit are obscure, or not clear, the Defendant is rather to be favoured then the Plaintiff. And this is the first assured ground and principle, for which the doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority may not only be barely and simply denied, as it is in the second clause of the Oath by force only of the words, but also be abhorred, detested and abjured as impious, damnable, most clearly repugnant to the Word of God, and in that sense heretical, as it is in the fourth clause. The second manifest principle is, that it is a controversy among learned Catholics, and approved by many, and therefore truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Princes of their Regal Power and Authority.  
12. For the better clearing whereof, it is to be observed sixthly, that, as joannes Azorius a famous jesuite expressly affirmeth, 
Azor. tom. 2. lib. 11. c. 5. q. 8.  it hath ever been a great controversy betwixt Emperors and Kings on the one side, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, whether in some certain cases the Pope hath a right and power to deprive Kings of their Kingdom. For some Kings have oftentimes (yea since the time of the great Lateran Council) contended with Popes about this matter, saying, that they have their Kingdom from God, and not from the Pope, and that in those things, which are civil and temporal the power of Kings is supreme and absolute, and that herein Kings are not subject to the Pope, although in sacred, Ecclesiastical and spiritual things the Pontifical power is supreme, and that herein Kings and Princes are subject to Popes, as children to their Fathers, and sheep to their Pastors, etc. And many complained that Gregory the seventh did excommunicate Henry the fourth, and deprive him of the administration of his Kingdom. Thus Azor. And it is a controversy among the Schoolmen, (saith joannes Trithemius 
Trithemius in Chron. Hirsaug. ad annum 1106. ) and as yet it is not decided by the judge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor or no. And the Ecclesiastical power (saith jacobus Almainus 
Almain. de d●minio nature. ciu. & Eccles in probat. 2. conclus.  a famous Doctor of Paris, and whom Azor relateth 
Azor. tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 14.  among Classical Doctors) cannot by the institution of God inflict any civil punishment, as are death, exile, privation of goods, much less of Kingdoms, etc. Nay nor so much as imprison, ut plerisque Doctoribus placet, as is the opinion of most, or of very many Doctors, but it is extended only to a spiritual punishment, as is Excommunication, and the other punishments, which she useth, do proceed from the pure positive Law, or as Gerson speaketh, 
Gerson de potest. Eccles considerate 4.  from the grant of Princes. And the liberty of the Church of France, saith Petrus Pithaeus 
Pithaeus in Cod. libert. Eccles. Gallicanae printed at Paris by authority of the Parliament, in the year 1594.  (whom Antonius Possevinus the jesuite commendeth for a man truly learned and a diligent searcher of Antiquity 
Possevinus in verbo Petrus Pithaeus. ) is grounded in this principle, which France hath ever held for certain, that the Pope hath not power to deprive the French King of his Kingdom, or in any other manner to dispose thereof; And that notwithstanding any whatsoever Monitions or Monitories, Excommunications, or Interdicts, which by the Pope can be made, yet the subjects are bound to yield obedience due to the King for temporals; neither therein can they be dispensed or absolved by the Pope; Which position is in very deed the whole substance both of our new Oath, and also of the late Oath of France, which the lower house of Parliament would have had established for a fundamental law.  
13. And to omit now many other learned Catholics cited by Widdrington, 
Widdrington in his Answer to Fitzherb. part. 1.  that it is a controversy among Catholics, and approved by many, and therefore truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, it is so manifest, that no learned man, unless he will be shamefully impudent, can deny it, and the public Writings of learned Catholics on both sides, 
See beneath in the end of this Treatise, the Oath of France the condemnation of Suarez and Bell. Book, and a decree of the Parliament of Paris touching the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose.  the proceed of the Parliament of Paris against the Books of Cardinal Bellarmine, of Schulckenius, and of Suarez, the propounding of the aforenamed Oath by the lower house of Parliament, wherein of two hundred Knights and Burgesses there were but fix Protestants, besides the complaint of some Doctors of Paris to the College of Sorbon against the Controversia Anglicana of Becanus, and infinite other testimonies of learned men of our own Nation, not only of those who have taken the Oath, or think it to be lawful, but also of many others, do most clearly convince the same. In so much that Cardinal Peron, 
Card. Peron. in his speech to the lower house of Parliament.  compelled by so manifest a truth, doth plainly confess the same; and thereupon acknowledgeth, that the Pope himself doth in France tolerate those Catholics, that hold against him in this point, tolerate, I say, not as public Usurers, Harlots, or other notorious sinners, are in some Countries permitted, but by admitting them to Sacraments, which neither the Pope, nor the Prelates of France could lawfully do, if for holding that doctrine those Frenchmen were to be condemned of Heresy, Error, temereity, or any other damnable sin. So that it is most clear & manifest to any man of judgement, that it is a great controversy among learned Catholics, and that it is approved by many of them, and therefore truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to depose or deprive Sovereign Princes. See also the Author of the protestants Apology for the Roman Church in his Preface from Sect. 19 to the end, where you may see his dislike of this doctrine for the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and taxeth them, who overcharge the supreme Pastor with incompetent attributes of Authority in temporals: and in his own authentical Manuscript he more particularly and expressly showed, that the Pope hath no Authority in temporals, either directly, or indirectly, which last words it pleased those who had commission to print his Book to leave out, whereof he greatly complained to a friend of mine. And likewise for the dislike, which this learned Author showed in his Preface, of this authority of the Pope to dispose of temporals, it pleased the Author, who translated his Book into Latin, to leave out the Preface altogether, which nevertheless is a chief part of his Book, and it deserved to be put in Latin as much if not more than any other part thereof. But the Authors of Books must now adays, if they look not themselves to the translating & publishing of them, speak as it pleaseth the Translators & Censors.  
15. Neither is it sufficient for any man, which also is to be observed, to condemn any doctrine as temerarious or improbable, for that in his judgement and opinion it is repugnant to Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Counsels, Canons, practice of the Church and Theological reasons, if it be approved by other learned Catholics, who have examined all the arguments on either side; for otherwise the Thomists might condemn of temereity the Scotists, and the Scotists the Thomists in the question of the B. Virgin's Conception; The Divines of Rome might condemn of temereity the Divines of Paris, and the Divines of Paris the Divines of Rome in the question of the Pope's infallibility, and superiority of the Pope and a General Council; and the jesuites might condemn of temereity the Dominicans, and the Dominicans the jesuits, in the question of the efficacy of Grace: for all of them allege for their opinion, Scriptures, Fathers, Counsels, Canons, & Theological reasons, & it is usual in most Theological questions to bring such arguments on both sides. But true probability and improbability, and whereof not only learned men, but also the unlearned without any great difficulty or perplexity of conscience may judge, is to be taken not from intrinsical grounds, which are unknown to unlearned men, but from extrinsecall grounds, to wit, the authority of learned men who are known to approve that doctrine. And therefore Aristotle, 
Aristotle lib. 1. Top. cap. 8.  whom all Philosophers & Divines do herein follow, did by extrinsecall grounds define probable, to be that which is approved by wise, learned, and skilful men in the Art which they profess: as in a matter of Law that is probable, which is approved by learned and skilful Lawyers; in a matter of Physic that is probable, which is approved by learned and skilful Physicians, and in a matter of Theological learning that is probable, which is approved by learned and skilful Catholic Divines: which definition of probable is grounded in the light of natural reason, for that it is not against prudence, and therefore no temereity to give credit to one in a matter wherein he is skilful, according to that vulgar maxim, Vnicuique in sua arte perito credendum est, Credit is to be given to every man that is skilful in his Art.  
16. These be the two principal grounds, for which the doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority may lawfully be denied, and also abjured in the manner aforesaid; for if it be certain, that it is open injustice to dispossess any man upon a probable, uncertain, and controversed power or title, and it is also certain, that it is a controversy, and not certain, whether the Pope hath authority to depose Princes or no; it followeth evidently, that it is as lawful for any man to swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, as that he hath no authority to commit open injustice. But of this probability see more beneath in the end of this Treatise.  
17. The Seventh and last Observation is, that we must carefully consider, what the swearer is bound to acknowledge and swear in every branch of this Oath by force and virtue of the express words, and according to the plain and common understanding of them, to which by the seventh branch he is expressly tied, and what he may lawfully acknowledge and swear by reason of the matter; for this distinction may no little avail to the better understanding of some clauses of this Oath, seeing that it may often fall out, that in regard of the matter one may lawfully swear that, which by force of the words he is not bound or demanded to swear. As for example, if one be commanded to swear, what his judgement, opinion, persuasion or acknowledgement is concerning something, whereof notwithstanding he is certain; by force of the words he is bound only to swear, that he thinketh, judgeth, is persuaded, and acknowledgeth it to be so, yet by reason of the matter which to him is certain, he may lawfully swear that absolutely and assuredly it is so. Likewise if one be commanded to abjure as false, and heretical a conditional disiunctive proposition, which implieth a choice to take which part of the disjunction he please, by force of the words he is bound to abjure but one part of the disjunction as heretical, because to make such a disiunctive proposition to be false and heretical, it sufficeth that one part only of the disjunction be false and heretical, yet sometimes by virtue of the matter, when both parts of the disjunction are heretical, he may lawfully abjure both as heretical, albeit by force of the words he be not bound thereunto. As these propositions, Any man may lawfully honour, or blaspheme God, The Pope by virtue of his Pastoral power may excommunicate or murder any wicked Christian, are false and heretical, and yet one part of the disjunction is true, and only the other is false and heretical: but both parts of this proposition, any man may lawfully hate or blaspheme God, are false and heretical, & so by reason of the matter both parts may be abjured as heretical, although by force of the form of words, to abjure the whole proposition as heretical, it sufficeth to abjure only one part thereof as heretical, And how this also may be applied to the fourth branch of the Oath, wherein a conditional disiunctive proposition is contained, and whether the doctrine not only of murdering Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, but also of deposing them, may be abjured as heretical, you shall see beneath. These Observations being considered, there will be found little or no difficulty in any part or parcel of the Oath.   

The First Chapter. The First Branch of the Oath, and an Explication thereof.  I A.B. do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience before God and the World, That our Sovereign Lord King james is lawful & rightful King of this Realm, and of all other His Majesty's Dominions and Countries. 
1. This Branch (which is the ground and foundation of the whole Oath, and as it were the root and fountain, from whence all the other branches, wherein the Pope's authority is any way denied, do spring and are derived) is so clear and manifest, that no learned and well affected subject can take any colourable exception against the same. In so much that Fa. Parsons 
* In his Book entitled, The judgement of a Catholic English man, etc. part. 7. nu. 22. pag. 13. & 16.  himself feareth not to affirm, that there is no man, who sticketh or maketh difficulty to acknowledge our Sovereign to be true King and rightful Lord over all his Dominions, for that every English Catholic will swear and acknowledge most willingly all those parts and clauses of the Oath, that do any way appertain to the Civil and Temporal Obedience due to His Majesty whom he acknowledgeth for his true and lawful King and Sovereign over all His Domioions. And Martinus Becanus a famous jesuite in the first Edition of his Controversia Anglicana writeth thus: 
Becanus in Controversia Anglic. cap. 3. p. 102  And truly to me it is certain, that all the parts and propositions of the Oath are not false if they be well declared. For these are true: first, that King james is lawful King of England, Scotland and Ireland: Secondly, that in the same Kingdoms he is the Supreme or Sovereign Lord in temporals.  
2. First therefore, if we consider the end of this Oath (which is only to make profession of our temporal Allegiance, and to make a true distinction not betwixt Catholics and Protestants, etc. the express declaration of His Majesty, and the rules before mentioned in the second and third Observation, it is evident, that by those words [Sovereign Lord] is not to be understood the King's Supremacy in Spiritual and Ecclesiastical, but only in Temporal and Civil causes.  
3. Secondly, it is also evident, that albeit by force of the express words, and the plain and common understanding of the same, to which the seventh branch of this Oath tieth the swearer, we are bound only to acknowledge that King james is lawful and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other His Majesty's Dominions and Countries, and not that He is the Sovereign Lord of the same, both for that those words [Sovereign Lord] are put only ex parte subiecti, and not ex parte predicati, and therefore by virtue of the words are not affirmed; as likewise he that styleth the Pope most holy and most blessed, doth not affirm him to be most holy and most blessed unless the words most holy & most blessed be put ex parte predicati; & also that if we regard the force and virtue of those words [Sovereign Lord] they have not the same sense, which the words [lawful and rightful King] have, seeing that one may be a lawful and rightful King, and yet not the Sovereign Lord of His Kingdom, as if the Emperor should make the great Duke of Toscan King of Hetruria, he would be lawful and rightful King of that Country, and yet not the Sovereign or Supreme Lord of the same, because he is as a feudary subject to the Emperor. Nevertheless because the lawful and rightful King of England. is also the Sovereign Lord of the same, by reason and virtue of the matter we may lawfully, and if it be demanded at our hands, are bound to acknowledge and swear, that King james is not only the lawful and rightful King of England & of all other His Majesty's Dominions, but also the Sovereign or Supreme Lord of the same. And in this sense, both the XIII. Priests, and also M. Greene understood the word Sovereign in their Protestation and Declaration.  
4. Neither is it to the purpose which some object, that the King of England is the Pope's Vassal, and as a feudary subject to him in Temporals, and therefore the Pope, and not King james is the absolute Sovereign and supreme Lord in Temporals of this Kingdom. For although we should absurdly admit, that for the title and claim of Temporal Sovereignty, which the Pope pretendeth to have over this Kingdom by vettue of some grant of former Kings, may be brought some probable proof, as there cannot, seeing that it is evident, that no King of England hath authority to give away His Kingdom, or make it subject in Temporals to another Prince without the consent of the Kingdom itself; and that no colour of any probable proof can be brought from any Authentical Instrument to show, that the Kingdom of England ever consented to any such grant, yet considering that no probable title can be a sufficient ground to deprive any man of that Right, Dominion, or any other thing which he actually possesseth, but such a title must be most certain and out of all controversy, as I shown above in the Fift Observation, it is manifest, that, notwithstanding any such probable title, every subject of this Land may lawfully acknowledge by Oath, that King james is not only the lawful and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other His Majesty's Dominions and Countries, but also the Sovereign or supreme temporal Lord of the same.   

CHAP. II. The Second Branch of the Oath, and an Explication thereof.  ANd that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church, or See of Rome, or by any other means which any other hath any Power or Authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of his Majesty's Kingdoms, or Dominions, or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy Him or his Countries, or to discharge any of his Subjects of their Allegiance and Obedience to his Majesty, or to give licence or leave to any of them to bear Arms, raise Tumults, or to offer any violence or hurt to His Majesty's Royal Person, State, or Government, or to any of His Majesty's subjects within His Majesty's Dominions. 
1. This Branch supposing the former Observations, hath in it no difficulty at all, although we should admit, that the immediate object thereof, or which is all one, that, which in this Branch by force of the words we are bound immediately to swear, is not only our sincere acknowledgement, and persuasion, but also that absolutely and assuredly the Pope hath not any authority to depose the King, etc. For considering that the whole tenor of this Branch tendeth to practise, namely, to depose, to dispose, to invade, annoy, bear Arms, raise Tumults, offer violence or hurt, and to discharge subjects of their Allegiance, and also, that it is a doctrine approved by many learned Catholics, and who have examined all the arguments on both sides, and consequently, that it is truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Princes, or to dispose of their Temporals, it is as clear and manifest, that any man, whether he be the King's subject or no, what opinion soever he followeth in speculation concerning the Pope's authority to deprive Princes, yet he may as certainly acknowledge and swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, that is, to practice his deposition, or any other of those things mentioned in this Branch, as it is clear and manifest, that he may certainly acknowledge and swear that the Pope hath no authority to commit open injustice, and that in a doubtful uncertain, and disputable case, the condition of the possessor is to be preferred.  
2. Neither do temporal Princes, or other private men that have any thing in their possession greatly regard, what learned men, who by the subtlety of their wits can easily find out some probable colour of a broken and pretended title, may speculatively dispute in Schools concerning their titles, so that in practice, notwithstanding such disputations and speculations, they be secured from being put out of that which they really and bona fide do possess. And doubtless most miserable were the state of all men that possess any thing of worth, and much more of Princes, if upon a title, which some learned m●n may in speculation approve, it were lawful to invade their possessions, before a lawful judge, and who is certainly known so to be, hath decided and determined the title or controversy▪ To prevent which mischief all Natitions being guided herein by the light of natural reason have agreed in this manifest principle, that it is open injustice to put any man out of his possession upon any title which is not most certain and free from all controversy until a lawful and undoubted judge hath decided the matter. (I said a lawful and undoubted judge) for if it be doubtful, uncertain, and questionable whether he be a lawful and competent judge to determine that cause, his decision cannot be sufficient to end the controversy. For which cause the Pope is not to be accounted a lawful and competent judge to decide this question concerning his own pretended authority to deprive Princes, for that it is a controversy among learned Divines and approved by very many (as Pope Adrian, the Cardinaell of Cambray, the Cardinal Cusanus, the Cardinal Panormitan, the Cardinal of Florence Master to Panormitan, john Patriarch of Antioch, Abulensis, joannes Parisiensis, joannes Gerson, john Maior, Almain, and almost all the University of Paris cited by Widdrington 
Widdring. in the discovery of D. Schulkevius slanders. §. 7. ) that the Pope is not a competent judge to decide or define infallibly any doctrinal point (and much less in his own cause) without a true and undoubted general Council, and therefore although he should hereafter, (as yet he hath not) attempt to define and decide this question, his decision could not end the controversy, nor give sufficient warrant to any man to practice the deposition of Princes, upon so doubtful, uncertain, and questionable power or title.  
3. Nevertheless it behooveth temporal Princes to be very careful, that their titles to the Dominions which they lawfuly possess, be not so much as speculatively, or only for Disputation sake disputed pro and contra, by learned men, lest that some ignorant or turbulent spirits, which either do not know, or of set purpose to colour their practices, under a pretence of a probable title, will not take notice of the manifest difference betwixt speculation and practice, may take occasion thereby to disturb the public peace, and to molest, annoy, or to offer any violence or hurt to their Royal Persons, States, or Government. For which cause the Parliament of Paris hath with great wisdom and reason oftentimes by public Edicts ordained, 
See beneath in the end of this Treatise some of these Decrees.  that the doctrine of deposing their Kings should not be so much as taught and maintained to be probable, or problematike, that occasion be not given to seditious spirits (who know not, or will not take notice of the difference betwixt speculation and practice) to attempt, under pretence of a probable title any violence against the Crowns or sacred Persons of their Kings. And the reason is manifest, for that the temporal Commonwealth hath good and full authority to forbid the teaching and publishing of any doctrine which is not necessary, whereby probable danger to the Crowns and lives of temporal Princes, and perturbations in the Commonwealth may arise.  
4. First therefore, by those words of this Branch [nor by any other means with any other] it is evident, that the Parliament, which representeth the whole body of the Kingdom or Commonwealth did not intent to meddle with the authority which the whole Kingdom or Commonwealth may (according to the opinion of some Doctors) pretend to have in some cases over their sovereign Prince, as Lessius and others (whom the Authors of the Prelate and the Prince, doth seem to follow) do idly object. And although the meaning of those words were, to deny, that the whole Kingdom, or Commonwealth hath no authority to depose their King, yet considering that it is also a probable doctrine, & approved by many learned Catholic Divines, and Lawyers cited by Widdrington, 
Widdr. in Apolog. nu. 111. and in his Answer to Fitzherb. part. 3. & cap. 11. nu. 36. 37.  that the Commonwealth hath no such authority, it is also lawful for any man (of what opinion soever he be in speculation concerning this authority of the Commonweath) to acknowledge and swear, that the Commonwealth hath no more authority to depose the King, that is, to practice his deposition, than she hath to commit open injustice; But the true meaning of His Majesty and the Parliament is, as the words themselves do plainly signify, only to deny the Pope's authority to depose, etc. to wit, that the Pope neither of himself, that is, neither as a sole and total cause, nor by any authority, etc. that is, neither as an Instrument or Minister of the Church or See of Rome, nor by any other means with any other, that is, nor as a principal, or true and proper partial cause or Agent, hath any authority to depose the King, etc.  
5. Neither by those words [or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy Him or His Countries] did His Majesty and the Parliament intent to deny the authority which temporal Princes may have in som● cases to make war against their neighbour Princes, and consequently against His Majesty, if he should give them just cause of war (yet ever observing, that no probable power, cause, or title can be a sufficient ground to punish any Prince, or to invade His Countries) but, as the express words do plainly show, only to deny the Pope's authority, to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy Him or His Countries: because all the authority which temporal Princes have to make war, or to invade the Kingdom of an other Prince for what cause, crime, or end so ever it be, is derived from their temporal Sovereignty grounded upon the Law of Nature, or Nations, & not from the Pope's authority. And likewise all the authority, which the temporal Commonwealth may pretend to have in some cases to rise up in Arms against their Prince, is not derived from the Pope's warrant, licence or authority, but (if there be any such power) from the Law of Nature. And therefore with great reason this Clause denyeth in the Pope all power and authority to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy His Majesty, or his Countries, or to give licence or leave to any of his subjects to bear Arms, raise Tumults, or to offer any violence or hurt to His Majesty Royal Person, State, or Government: because although they should have any such authority, leave, or licence, wherewith His Majesty and the Parliament would not in this Oath intermeddle, they have it not from the Pope, but from the Law of Nations, or Nature.  
6. Secondly, in this Branch is not denied the Pope's authority to command in temporals in order to spiritual good, or to declare, that they who have authority to depose, or to make war, are bound to use their temporal authority, and to draw forth the temporal Sword, when the necessity of the Church, and the spiritual good of souls shall require the same; for this authority of declare and command doth not exceed the limits of spiritual power, as Widdrington hath showed at large heretofore: 
Widdr. in Apol nu. ●…. and in all his other Books very often, but especially in his Answer to Fitzherb.  But here is only denied the Pope's authority to depose temporal Princes, to dispose of their temporals, to use or draw forth the temporal Sword, or to authorise temporal Princes or subjects to use or draw forth the same: for whosoever giveth authority to another man to use the temporal Sword, hath authority to use it himself, although sometimes for want of strength or some other necessary Instrument he cannot use it himself, yet still he hath authority to use it.  
7. And although a Commander (which I wish the Reader to observe for the Author of the Prelate and the Prince) is commonly said to do that thing which is done by his Commandment, (and so he that counseleth, consenteth, or any way concurreth although per accidens, and not by any proper virtue, or influx of his own, is said to do that thing) as he that applieth fire to straw, or commandeth, counseleth, yea, or doth not hinder the applying thereof, when he is bound to hinder it, is said to burn the straw, although he be no true and proper efficient cause of the burning thereof, but only a cause per accidens) yet a Commander is not said to do that which he commandeth, as a true and proper cause, or as having authority to do that thing which he commandeth▪ (whereof this Branch of the Oath doth only speak) but only as a cause per accidens, (which according to the doctrine of all Philosophers, is no true and proper efficient cause) unless by his proper power, virtue, influx or authority he concur to the doing thereof, and that the person commanded hath his power, virtue, or authority to do that thing derived from the Commander, or depending on him.  
8. For which cause a Painter, who commandeth his Servant to make a Picture, and giveth him rules and directions how to mingle his Colours, and afterwards to apply them, which without the directions of his Master, he himself could not do, is the principal cause and agent of making that Picture, and the Servant is only his Instrument or Minister, for that all the Art he hath to make that picture is derived from the commandment and directions of the Painter, and depending on him, and yet a King, who hath no skill to paint, and commandeth the Painter to make a picture, is no true and proper efficient cause of making that picture, but only a cause per accidens, by morally applying the Painter that hath skill to use the same. So likewise a Prince, who commandeth his Officers to condemn and put to death an egregious malefactor, is the principal cause of his death, and the Officers are only his Instruments, Ministers, and Executioners, for that all the authority, which they have to condemn and kill that malefactor, is derived from the Prince, and depending on him, because only the Prince doth authorise, or give them authority to pronounce and execute that sentence: And yet the Pope commanding a Prince to use his temporal sword, power, or authority when the necessity of the Church shall require the same, as to make war, invade any Country, or to put any egregious malefactor to death, is only a cause per accidens, of that war, etc. by applying morally, to wit, by his commandment, the person, who hath authority to make war, etc. to the making thereof. But the Pope is no true and proper cause of that war, etc. neither can he be said to make that war, as having authority to make it, or as authorising, or giving authority, leave, or licence, (whereof only this branch maketh mention) to the Prince to make that war, etc. Neither is the Prince in making that war, etc. the Pope's Instrument, Minister, or Executioner, (as the Author of the Prelate and the the Prince absurdly affirmeth) for that he hath not his authority to make war, etc. derived from the Pope's commandment, or depending on it, whereas (according to the doctrine of all Philosophers) it is necessary to an Instrument, that it have all it virtue to work derived from the principal Agent, or depending on it; but all the authority, which temporal Princes, or Commonwealths have in temporal affairs, is derived from the law of Nations, or Nature, and not from the Pope's authority or commandment.  
9 By which it is apparent, how grossly the said Author of the Prelate and the Prince, in excepting against this Branch, was mistaken, for not considering the difference between a Commander, who hath only authority to command, but not to execute, or do that which he commandeth to be done, and a Commander, who hath authority both to command, and also to execute or do that which he commandeth to be done, although perchance he cannot effect it for want of strength or effectual means, but not for want of authority, as every lawful Prince hath sufficient authority to subdue his Rebels, and yet he cannot always effect it, not for want of authority, but for want of strength, force, or effectual means, because his Rebels are more strong and potent than he is.   

CHAP. III. The Third Branch of the Oath, and an Explication thereof.  ALso I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any Declaration, or sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope or his Successors, or by any Authority derived, or pretended to be derived from him, or his Sea against the said King, his Heirs or Successors, or any absolution of the said subjects from their obedience: I will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies & attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his or their Persons, their Crown and dignity, by reason or colour of any such sentence or declaration or otherwise, and will do my best endeavour to disclose and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs & Successors, all Treasons, & Traitorous Conspiracies which I shall know or hear of to be against him or any of them. 
1. This Branch of the Oath is somewhat clearer than the former, because it doth not expressly and in plain terms deny the Pope's Authority to deprive or depose Princes, but it only containeth in express words a promise, which the Subject confirmeth by Oath, that if in case the Pope hath denounced, or hereafter should denounce any sentence of Excommunication or Deprivation against the King, his Heirs, or Successors, or any absolution of the said Subjects from their obedience, yet he will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, and him and them will defend, etc. Nevertheless the lawfulness or justice of this promissory Oath supposeth for the principal ground thereof, the verity of the former assertory Clause, and therefore it implieth, and virtually containeth a denial of the Pope's authority to deprive or depose Princes, and to absolve Subjects from their temporal allegiance: for that whosoever doth swear, that notwithstanding any sentence of deprivation, or absolution of subjects from their obedience made, or hereafter to be made by the Pope or his Successors against his Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, to make this promise just and lawful, he must consequently deny, that the Pope hath Authority to deprive Princes, or to absolve Subjects from their obedience, as Suarez examining this Branch of the Oath doth most clearly demonstrate. 

Suarez in Defence. lib. 6. cap. 3.  
See Widdring. against Fitzherbert part. 1. cap. 5.   For if the sentence of deprivation to be made at any time hereafter against the King, his Heirs or Successors, for any manifest cause or crime whatsoever, may be just, lawful, and effectual, it is as unlawful to take this clause, as it is unlawful for one to swear, that he will not obey the Pope's sentence and commandment, which hereafter he shall impose, be it never so iust, and without all error or default: But if this sentence of deprivation at any time hereafter to be made can never be just, it must needs follow, that the Pope hath no more authority to deprive or depose the King, his Heirs or Successors, than he hath authority to commit open injustice.  
2. Wherefore those thirteen Reverend Priests, who solemnly protested to Queen Elizabeth, that notwithstanding any authority (which words are fare more general, then notwithstanding any sentence of deprivation) or any Excommunication either denounced, or to be denounced against her Majesty etc. they would yield to her Majesty all obedience in temporal causes, would then have made no difficulty to take this Branch of the Oath, and consequently to free themselves from perjury, they must also deny the Pope's Authority to deprive and depose Princes, for that the justice of this Branch implieth & supposeth as a chief ground thereof a denial of the Pope's authority to deprive and depose, as Suarez doth most plainly convince.  
3. First therefore in this Clause is not denied the Pope's power to Excommunicate, but only that Excommunication being a spiritual censure doth not work this temporal effect, as to make Kings no Kings, or to deprive them of their Royal right and Sovereignty, and consequently not to absolve Subjects from their natural allegiance, which, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine and Suarez they do by the law of God and Nature own to their lawful Prince. 

Bell. in Tract. contra Barclaium cap. 21. pag. 202.  
Suarez in Defence. etc. lib. 6. cap. 3. nu. 6.   And thus much his Majesty hath also in express words declared. The truth is, saith his Majesty, 
The King's Majesty in his Premonition etc. pag. 9  that the Lower house of Parliament at the first framing of this Oath, made it to contain, that the Pope had no power to Excommunicate me, which I forced them to reform only making it to conclude, that no Excommunication of the Popes can warrant my Subjects to practise against my Person or State, denying the deposition of Kings to be in the Pope's lawful power, as indeed I take any such temporal violence to be fare without the limits of such a spiritual censure as Excommunication is, And also that deprivation or deposition from temporal kingdoms is not an effect of Excommunication, Widdrington hath showed at large heretofore, and Becanus and Suarez do also in express words affirm the same. 
Widdrington in his Apology nu. 346. in his Answer to Suarez part. 2. sect. 4. and in his Answer to Fitzher. part. 3. cap. 1.  Fron hence it is very apparent saith Becanus, 
Becanus in quest. de fide haereticis seruanda ca 8. nu. 16. and in his Controversia Anglic. cap. 3. qu. 2.  that Heretics by this precisely that they are excommunicated, are not deprived of their Dominion or jurisdiction either over their subjects, or over their temporal goods, but this deprivation is a destinct punishment, and inflicted by a destinct law. And again, It is one thing, saith he, to excommunicate a King, and another thing to depose him, or deprive him of his Kingdom, neither is the one necessarily connected with the other. Many Kings and Emperors have been excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed, and contrariwise many deposed, and yet not therefore excommunicated. See also Suarez cited by Widdrington in his Apology, 
Suarez tom. 5. disp. 15. sect. 6. nu. 3.  and in his answer to Suarez and Fitzherbert.  
4. And therefore in very truth I am sorry, and do in some sort pity the Author of the Prelate and the Prince (a man whom heretofore I have much loved, respected, and honoured) that he should so grossly forget himself, as to bewray so palpably such great want of learning, judgement, and sincerity, in affirming so boldly, and without any proof at all, 
Pag. 298.  that deprivation of Regal authority is an effect of excommunicating Kings and Princes, and so in denying the effect, the cause is denied. For as, saith he, if you should say, A man is not risibilis, that is, hath not power to laugh, you should deny him to be a man, so in denying that the Pope can deprive Princes of their Kingdoms, you deny in effect that he can excommunicate. Whereas this Author knew right well, that Widdrington in that very Chapter which he citeth, did, by the express doctrine of Suarez and Becanus, but now related, clearly prove against Lessius, (who urged even as nakedly and without any proof at all the same objection) that deprivation is no effect at all of Excommunication, much less proprium quarto modo, as risibilis, a power to laugh is to a man, as this Author most unlearnedly affirmeth. And yet forsooth he taketh upon him, as it may appear by the very Title and Inscription of his Treatise, to give a full Instruction and appeasement to the consciences of English Catholics concerning the Oath of Allegiance. But this shall suffice at this present for an imperfect portraying of this Authors want of judgement and sincerity in his Explication of the Oath of Allegiance, (especially if we consider his person, the Office he now beareth, and the doctrine which in former times he held) for that (as I am told) his perfect Picture both in this and other points is already drawn, and will be set forth in lively colours ere it be long.  
5. Secondly, it is evident by the former Observations, that those words [Heirs and Successors] do not signify Usurpers, as some would wrest them contrary to the meaning of the Law, the plain and common signification of the words, and the rules before alleged: For albeit this word [Successor] may in general be taken for every Successor, who either unlawfully or unlawful doth succeed, yet particularly and properly when it is placed in a Law, it is usually taken only for a lawful Successor: wherefore according to that rule of the Civil Law before mentioned in the second Observation, that the doubtful words of every Law must be taken in that sense, which is without default, this word [Successors] must in this Oath established by His Majesty's Law be limited only to lawful Successors, and who according to the Laws of the Kingdom do succeed. For as according to Law, Id tantum possumus quod iure possumus: We can only do that, which we can do lawfully or by Law, so according to Law, he only is accounted to succeed, who by lawful right doth succeed. Whereupon the Civil Lawyers do define Inheritance, to be a succeeding to all the right of one deceased, and an Heir, who succeedeth him in all his right, without adding lawful succeeding, or lawfully succeedeth, for that it is always so to be understood, and therefore being necessarily supposed, it is not expressed, but altogether omitted in the definitions of an Heir and of Inheritance. And whensoever in the Common or Statute Laws of this Kingdom any mention is made of the King and his Successors, this word [lawful] is but few times added, although always it ought to be understood.  
6, Thirdly, it is also evident by the former Observations, that by those words [Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies] are only understood true, proper, and natural Treasons, and which among all Nations, what Religion soever they profess, are accounted Treasons, and repugnant to natural Allegiance and Temporal and Civil Obedience, and not such Treasons, which in regard chief of Religion are by the positive Laws of some Nations made Treasons, and accounted Treasons only for that they are punished with the penalties which are due to proper and natural Treasons, as are the coming in of English Priests into this Kingdom made by the Pope's authority, and all reconcilements to the Pope, though in matters that concern Religion. For as His Majesty and the Parliament have declared, the only intent of this Oath is to contain the profession of natural Allegiance, and such civil and temporal duty and obedience, which every true and well-affected subject aught by the Law of God to bear to their lawful Prince and Sovereign with a promise to resist and disclose all contrary uncivil violence. For to prevent such heinous attempts and mischiefs, which in time to come might be plotted by the example of the Powder-Traytours, who under colour of Religion attempted that barbarous and devilish Conspiracy, this form of Oath was framed, saith His Majesty, 
In his Apology, pag. 2. nu. 2.  to be taken by all my subjects, whereby they should make clear profession of their resolution, faithfully to persist in obedience unto me, acrording to their natural Allegiance; to the end that I might hereby make a separation, not only between all my good subjects in general, and unfaithful Traitors that intended to draw themselves from my Obedience; but specially to make a separation between so many of my subjects, who although they were otherwise Popishly affected, yet retained in their hearts the print of their natural duty to their Sovereign; and those who being carried away with the like fanatical zeal, that the Powder-Traytours were, could not contain themselves within the bounds of their natural Allegiance, but thought diversity of Religion a safe pretext for all kind of Treasons and Rebellions against their Sovereign. Whereby it is apparent, that only such Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies are here understood, which are repugnant and contrary to natural Allegiance, and not such Treasons which are not natural Treasons, but only in regard of Religion are by positive Laws made Treasons, and to be punished with the ordinary penalties of true proper and natural Treason. And in this sense also those thirteen Reverend Priests understood the words Conspiracies, Attempts, and Practices in their Protestation.   

CHAP. FOUR The Fourth Branch of the Oath and an Explication thereof.  " ANd I do further swear, That I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical this damnable doctrine, and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever. 
1. Although this Branch may at the first sight seem somewhat suspicious in regard of that word heretical, yet if it be duly examined, according to the former Observations, it will easily appear, that it containeth no such difficulty, as some impugners of the Oath would seem to imagine, but that if it be lawful to abhor, detest, and abjure the aforesaid position, as clearly false and injurious to Princes, which the former Discourse doth plainly convince, it is also lawful to abjure it as heretical: or, which is all one, as containing in it a falsehood, which is repugnant not only to natural reason, but also to the Word of God revealed in the holy Scriptures: For, as every Doctrine and position, which is agreeable to that truth, which God hath revealed, is to be accounted of faith: so contrariwise, every Doctrine and position, which containeth in it a falsehood, which is repugnant to the Word of God revealed in the holy Scriptures, is to be accounted heretical, and repugnant to faith. And in this sense, the word heretical is not only by all Protestants, but also by many learned Catholic Divines commonly and usually taken, as Widdrington hath showed at large in his answer to Fitz herbert. 
Widdrington in his Adjoinder to the first and second part.   
5. Neither is it necessary, that we must take the word heretical, as likewise no other ambiguous word contained in this Oath, in that strict and rigorous sense, wherein some Catholics take the word heretical, to wit, for that doctrine which not only containeth a falsehood repugnant to the holy Scriptures, but also which by the Church or a general Council, which representeth the Church, is expressly and particularly declared and defined so to be, but it sufficeth that we take the word, heretical, in a proper and usual signification, and wherein Catholics do commonly take it, especially when this common sense is agreeable to the meaning and understanding of the Lawmaker: for that, according to the approved rule before set down in the second observation, in a penal and odious matter, when the words of any Law are doubtful or ambiguous, and there be many common senses of the same word or sentence, we ought to take them in that common sense, which is more favourable, especially when it is not against the meaning of the Lawmaker.  
6. Neither also is it necessary to make any Doctrine or Position to be heretical, that the proposition with all particular circumstances therein expressed, must be contained in the holy Scriptures, but it sufficeth, that it contain a particular falsehood, which only in the general is expressed in the holy Scriptures, and that no particular word, or circumstance be added in the particular proposition, which doth make it not to be contained in the general falsehood, as a particular in the universal. For which cause, these propositions, It is lawful for one to take from his neighbour his purse, or to murder him with a pistol, if he live a wanton or wicked life, are heretical, and repugnant to those words of holy Scripture, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill, 
Exod. 20.  although those particularities of being a wanton or wicked man, or of killing him with a pistol, are not expressly contained in the holy Scriptures, because they do not give any warrant to stealing or killing, or make that particular stealing or killing not be included in those general words, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill.  
7. First therefore, although by reason of the matter of this Branch we may truly abjure as heretical, not only the Doctrine of murdering, but also of deposing Princes, which are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, yet if we only regard the force and virtue of the express words, according to the plain and common sense and understanding of them, to which the seventh clause of the Oath tieth the swearer, we are not bound to abjure both Doctrines as heretical, but it sufficeth, by virtue of the words, to abjure as heretical, only the Doctrine of murdering such Princes, as Widdrington hath showed in his Theological Disputation, 
In his Theolog. Disp. cap. 5. Sec. 2.  and proved more at large in his Answer to Fitzherbert, in the end of the second part. And the reason is, for that to make heretical a conditional disiunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take either part of the disjunction if we please, it sufficeth that one part of the disjunction be heretical, although the other part be not heretical, but perchance most true and of faith, which contrariwise happeneth in an absolute disiunctive proposition, which supposeth and implieth no such condition or choice. As for example, This proposition, It is lawful for any man to honour or blaspheme God, if he will, or, which is all one in sense with this, Any man may lawfully honour or blaspheme God, is false and heretical, and may be abjured as heretical, although one part only thereof be heretical, and the other part of faith: For such conditional disiunctive propositions, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of them, do not follow the nature of an absolute and ordinary disiunctive proposition, but of a copulative proposition, to the verity whereof is required, that both parts must be true, and to make it false and heretical, it sufficeth that only one part thereof be false and heretical, whereas contrariwise to the verity of an absolute disiunctive proposition, which implieth no such choice or condition, it sufficeth that one part thereof be true, and to make it false and heretical, both parts thereof must needs be false and heretical: for which cause this proposition, God is honoured or blasphemed by good and virtuous men, is true, because one part of the disjunction is true, and this proposition, God is honoured and blasphemed by good and virtuous men, is false, because both parts of the proposition are not false, but one of them is true.  
8. That this proposition, Subjects may lawfully depose, or murder their Prince, who is excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, or which in sense is all one with the Doctrine and position contained in this Branch of the Oath (seeing that only the Verb passive is changed into the active) is such a conditional disiunctive proposition, as implieth a free choice and condition to take either part of the disjunction if we please, as likewise all such disiunctive propositions, wherein the Conjunction [or] followeth the Verb [may] do imply and suppose, according to the usual signification of our English phrase, a free choice and condition to take either part of the disjunction if we please, Widdrington proveth by many examples of propositions, neither can there be alleged scarce any one proposition, wherein it is not commonly so taken. As for example, You may stay here or departed: You may eat or drink: you may buy in such a place Wine or Oil: You may have in the shambles Beef or Mutton: You may go to such a place by land or by water: You may buy that land in fee-farm or by lease. The King by virtue of an Act of Parliament, may take of convicted Popish Recusants, twenty pounds for every month, or the third part of all their lands. The Sheriff may presently hang a thief condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of any other Lord, then of the King, by Knight's service, he may give, dispose, or assure by his last Will and Testament, two parts of the said lands holden by Knight's service, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearly value of two parts. If a man by his last Will and Testament ordain, that his Executors may bestow twenty pounds upon the poor, or repair such a Bridge, it is in the free power of the Executor to choose whether of those two he please. Finally, in clauses of revocation, where the words are, That one may by any deed in his life time, or by his last Will and Testament, revoke the said uses, and limit new, it is in his free power and choice, to do it by the one or by the other, as he shall think good. In these, & infinite such like examples, which may be brought, the Verb [may] implieth a free power to choose either part of the disjunction one pleaseth, neither can there scarcely be alleged any one example, wherein the Conjunction disiunctive [or] immediately following the Verb [may] is not commonly so taken: and especially when the latter part of the disjunction, which is affirmed, is no way less certain, but rather more certain than the former part: which note, I wish the Reader to observe chief for the Doctrine of this present clause, which doth not affirm, that Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered or deposed by their subjects, for then some might imagine the sense to be that such Princes may be murdered or at least wise deposed, because the deposing of such Princes, is lesser than the murdering of them, but seeing that it is affirmed, that such Princes may be deposed or murdered, it is manifest, that the Conjunction [or] can not signify at least wise, because if the Doctrine of deposing such Princes may be abjured as heretical, much more and not much less the Doctrine of murdering them may be abjured as heretical.  
9 And by this it is apparent, that to abjure as heretical this Doctrine, & conditional disiunctive position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever; it sufficeth by force and virtue of the words, only to abjure as heretical the Doctrine of murdering such Princes, although, by reason of the matter, it be lawful (as you shall see forthwith) to abjure as heretical not only the Doctrine of murdering, but also of deposing such Princes.  
10. That the Doctrine of murdering such Princes is heretical, or, which is all one, containeth in it a manifest falsehood, which is repugnant to the Word of God, it is evident by those two places of holy Scripture cited by Widdrington, Thou shalt not kill, Exod. 20. which words are general and common to every unjust kill, and Kill him not, for who shall extend his hand upon the Lords anointed, and be innocent, 1. Reg. 26. Which words are proper and peculiar to the murdering of Princes. Neither doth the excommunicating, or depriving of Princes by the Pope, which are added in this Doctrine and position, give sufficient warrant to murder such Princes, although we should admit that the Pope hath authority to deprive them; for that Excommunication depriveth only of spiritual graces, and deprivation only of temporal Kingdoms, but neither of them of corporal life, as Suarez also confesseth. 
Suarez in defence. etc. lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 10. & seq.  Yea we may truly abjure as manifestly false, damnable, and repugnant to those words of holy Scriptures, Thou shalt not kill, and consequently as heretical, this Doctrine and position, That it is lawful for every man to kill a malefactor, who is condemned by the judge to dye, for that the sentence of death denounced against him by the judge doth not give leave, licence, warrant, and commission to every man to put him to death, but only to the Sheriff, or others, who are apppointed Executioners of justice in that case.  
11. That the Doctrine also of deposing such Princes is heretical, and containeth a manifest falsehood repugnant to the Word of God, it is evident; for that to take away by force and violence the Crown and Kingdom of a Prince who is in possession thereof, only upon a probable or controversed title, is open injustice, as you have seen before in the fift Observation; and consequently Theft and Rapine in a most high degree, and therefore repugnant both to that precept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not steal, and to the third Commandment, Honour thy Father and Mother, wherein the honour and reverence, which is due from subjects to their Prince, who is the Father of the Country, is according to the doctrine of all Divines included, and it is also specially against that commandment of our Saviour, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, which precept includeth also the negative, not to take away from Caesar that which is his due, 
Matth. 22.  as contrariwise that precept, Thou shalt not steal, includeth also the affirmative, to render and restore back what hath been wrongfully taken away. Wherefore there is no more scruple to be made, to abjure the aforesaid Doctrine and position as impious, damnable, and heretical, then to abjure it as manifestly false and injurious to Princes, seeing that the manifest falsehood and injustice contained therein, is expressly repugnant to the word and commandment of God revealed to us in the holy Scriptures: and it is also grounded upon these two manifest principles, and which without manifest impudence cannot be denied by any man; The one, that it is a contoversie among Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to deprive Princes, & the other, that it is open injustice to depose, or to thrust one out of his possession upon a title, which is not most certain but in controversy.  
12. Lastly, I wish the Reader to consider the third and last exposition of this Branch, which Widdrington brought in his Theological Disputation, and defendeth at large in, his Answer to Fitzherberts Reply against the same, to wit, that albeit in regard of the matter, we may lawfully abjure for heretical, the doctrine not only of murdering, but also of disposing Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, yet, by force and virtue of the words, we are not bound to abjure either the doctrine of deposing, or also of murdering such Princes, for heretical, but only as heretical, that is, for a very false and injurious doctrine in the highest degree almost of falsehood and injustice, and which therefore in regard of the abhorring, detesting, and abjuring thereof, hath some resemblance and similitude with heretical doctrine, although we take the word heretical in the most strict and rigorous sense that may be. And the reason is, for that the adverb [as] being an adverb of similitude, doth properly and usually by force and virtue of the word denote only a similitude, and if at any time it signify an identity, equality, or realty, as (sometimes it doth, but most commonly it doth not) it is not by force of the word, but only in regard of the matter, to which it is applied. And this Explication will serve very well to convince the wilfulness of him, who out of his hatred to this Oath, will contrary to all reason, and the rules before assigned out of Suarez, needs have the word heretical to be taken only for that, which the definition of the Church maketh heretical, and which before was not heretical, although it was most evidently false, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and the word impious only for that, which is against piety, which is due to God or carnal Parents, albeit otherwise it be never so wicked and injurious to Princes who are the Fathers of the Country. For we may very well answer him, that the adverb as being an adverb of similitude, and by force of the word, and, according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same, signifying only a similitude, & not a reality, but in regard of the matter to which it is referred, doth in this Branch denote only a similitude of that strict and rigorous Heresy and Impiety, because the matter, to which it is applied, will not suffer it to signify a doctrine impious and heretical in that strict and rigorous manner, but only by way of comparison and similitude: and then the sense and meaning of this Branch is, that I do abhor, detest, and abjure that doctrine and position as impious and heretical, that is, in a most high degree of horror and detestation, and not much unlike to the detesting of that doctrine, which is impious and heretical, in that overmuch strict and rigorous manner. Nevertheless this Explication, as hath been showed above, is not necessary, but only for such wilful persons, as do seek to expound the words of the Oath in the most odious sense, contrary to the plain and common understanding of them, and the true meaning of the Lawmaker.   

CHAP. V The Fift Branch of the Oath, and an Explication thereof.  ANd I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. 
1. This Clause hath in it no more difficulty, then is in the former, seeing that it implieth, supposeth, and is grounded upon the justice and verity of the Third and Second Branch. First, therefore by those words. [And I do believe] is not understood a supernatural belief, but only a moral credulity, as the next words [and in conscience am resolved] which are an explication of the former, do sufficiently declare: and the sense of them is, that I do think and am persuaded in my conscience, that neither the Pope, etc. For it cannot with any reason be imagined, that the words which are last added, must diminish, but rather increase, or at least wise more fully declare the truth and verity of the former words: As for example, it were unaptly spoken to say, that such a one is a man, and also a living creature; Princes may be murdered, and also deposed by the Pope: I do most certainly believe so, and also I do think or am persuaded so.  
2. Secondly, the meaning of this Clause is not to deny the Pope's power to absolve, or dispense in Oaths in general, but only in this Oath, or any part thereof, as the express words do plainly signify; neither doth it follow, that because the Pope cannot dispense in this Oath, therefore he cannot in other Oaths, wherein there is not the like reason as of this, or that because he can dispense in other Oaths, wherein there is not the like reason, therefore he can dispense in this.  
3. Thirdly, neither is it the meaning of this Clause, that if perchance any one should offend God by taking this Oath against his conscience, thinking it to be unlawful, the Pope hath not power to absolve him in the Sacrament of Penance from the guilt of sin thereby committed, but only the meaning is, that the Pope hath not power to absolve or dispense, with any man in this Oath, or any part thereof, that is, to free, release, and discharge him from performing any of those things, which in this Oath he hath promised to perform, or, which is all one, to give him leave or licence to do against that, which in this Oath he hath promised to do, or not to do. For all the parts and parcels of this Oath are either assertory, as that Our Sovereign Lord King james is lawful and rightful King of this Realm, etc. and that the Pope hath not any power or authority to depose him, etc. or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy Him or His Countries, or to discharge any of His subjects of their Allegiance, etc. and that from my heart I do abhor, detest, and abjure as impious and heretical, etc. and no assertory Oaths can be dispensed withal, neither hath the Pope any power or authority, according to the received doctrine of all Divines, to absolve any man from the bond of these kind of Oaths; 
So S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 9 and all other Divines.  And the reason is, because the matter of an assertory Oath being of an act present or past, is now made altogether necessary and irrevocable, for that as soon as ever the Oath is made, it is either true or false by reason of the truth or falsehood of the act which now is past. Wherefore seeing that it is impossible, that the act which is past, be not past, so also it is impossible, that the Pope's Dispensation or Absolution can alter it or recall it: for it is impossible, that the act of swearing, which is now, or hath been true, be not now, or hath not been true: Or else they are promissory, to wit, wherein some thing is promised for the future time to be done, or not to be done. And only these kind of Oaths can be dispensed withal. For as well saith Saint Thomas, 
S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 7.  with whom all other Divines do herein agree, the bond of an Oath is referred to some thing which is to be performed or omitted, wherefore it doth not appertain to an assertory Oath which is of a thing present or past, but only to a promissory Oath.  
4. Now in this Oath of Allegiance only three things are promised by the swearer, all which are contained in the third Branch; to wit, that notwithstanding any declaration or sentence of Excommunication or deprivation made or to be made against the King's Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, First, he will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors: Secondly, he will defend them to the uttermost of his power against all Conspiracies etc. and Thirdly, he will make known unto them all Treasons & traitorous Conspiracies, which he shall know or hear of to be made against any of them. Wherefore there is no more difficulty in this Clause, then is in the third, whereon this Clause is chiefly grounded. And therefore it is most evident, that the Pope hath no more authority to Absolve, or dispense in any of these three things, which the swearer promiseth, than he hath authority to depose the King, and to make him no King: for that it is most certain, as Cardinal Bellarmine himself confesseth, 
Bell. in Tract. contra Barclai. cap. 21. pag. 202.  that Subjects are bound by the Law of God to bear faith and true Allegiance (which includeth the resisting and disclosing of all Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies) to their lawful Prince, so long as he remaineth Prince: seeing that it is evident, as well observeth Suarez, 
Suarez in Defence. etc. lib. 3. cap. 3 num. 3.  that the obligation of obedience in any degree or state whatsoever doth so long endure in the subject, as the dignity, or power and jurisdiction doth endure in the Superior, for these are corelatives, and the one dependeth on the other. Therefore it is manifest, that the Pope hath no more authority to absolve, or dispense in this Oath, or any part thereof, to wit, in those three things before mentioned, than he hath to make Kings no Kings, and to deprive them of their Regal dignity, power, and jurisdiction.  
5. Fourthly, neither is it the meaning of this Clause, that the Pope hath not any power to absolve the swearer from the promise which he maketh to perform those three things mentioned in the third Branch, only with this reduplication, as it is sworn or confirmed by Oath, or, which is all one, only from the sacred and religious bond of the Oath; but the meaning is, that the Pope hath not authority to absolve from this Oath or any part thereof for as much it concerneth the civil and natural obligation of temporal Allegiance; both for that, when it is said that the Pope hath authority to absolve one from an Oath, which he hath made to do some certain thing, the meaning is, (according to the plain and proper signification of the words, the common Doctrine of all Divines, and the usual practices of Popes, who when they absolve from any Oath, they absolve from all obligation whatsoever contained therein 
See the Canons Nos Sanctorum, juratos, Absolutos. ) that the Pope, hath authority to release him of that promise, and to give him leave to do otherwise then he hath promised by Oath to do: And also for that his Majesty and the State, according to whose meaning especially the doubtful words of this Oath are to be understood and determined, do little regard this subtle quircke of refined wits, whether the Pope hath power to absolve his Majesty's subjects from the sacred and religious bond of their natural Allegiance, or, which is all one, only as it is sworn, or confirmed by Oath, so that notwithstanding the releasing of this sacred bond, they may be assured, that the civil and natural obligation of the subjects temporal Allegiance, to the confirmation whereof this Oath is superadded, doth remain inviolable, and indispensable, and by the Pope's authority cannot any way be dissolved or diminished, but that his Subjects, although they might by the Pope's authority be absolved from the sacred bond of their Allegiance as it is confirmed by Oath, are nevertheless by the Law of God and Nature obliged to bear faith and true Allegiance to his Majesty, and that therein the Pope hath no authority to dispense.  
6. And although we should for Disputation sake admit, that it were the meaning of this Clause, that the Pope hath no authority to absolve the swearer so much as from the Sacred bond of this Oath, or any part thereof, or, which is all one, from any of these three things promised in the third Branch, only with this reduplication as they are sworn, or confirmed by Oath (of which nice subtlety his Majesty and the Parliament by all likelihood little dreamt) yet any man may with great reason think, and in conscience be resolved, that the Pope hath no such authority: for that, according to the common doctrine of Divines, the Pope hath not power to absolve from Oaths, when the absolving from them tendeth to the temporal prejudice of a third person, unless either directly or indirectly he hath power to dispose of the temporal goods of that person. For he hath not power, saith Sotus, Aragona, and Sayrus 

Scotus lib. 8. de Instit. q. 1. art. 9  
Aragona 2. 2. q. 89. art. 9  
Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 8. num. 4.   to release an Oath which one hath made to another man to pay him that debt which he oweth him, because he hath not power to take from another man that which is his own, and therefore he can not do him wrong in releasing the Oath which was made unto him. Wherefore this difference is between Vows and Oaths, that in changing and dispencing of Vows that only must be regarded which is more pleasing to God, but in releasing of Oaths great caution must be used, that no wrong be done to a third person.  
7. And this is fare more evident in the doctaine of Saint Thomas, 
S. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 89. art. 9  whom the greatest part of Divines do herein follow, who holdeth, that the Pope cannot dispense in Oaths by releasing directly the sacred obligation of the Oath, for that this obligation is de iure naturae, wherein the Pope cannot dispense, but only by declaring, that the thing promised by Oath, which before was a fit thing to be sworn, and therefore by virtue of the Oath to be performed, so long as it remaineth so, is now, by reason of some particular accident or circumstance, become unlawful, hurtful, or an hindrance of greater good, and therefore now no fit matter to be sworn, nor by virtue of the Oath to be now any longer performed. From whence it plainly followeth, that the Pope cannot absolve from this Oath of Allegiance, unless he hath power to declare, that temporal Allegiance, which Subjects by the Law of God, and Nature own to their lawful Prince so long as he remaineth Prince, be unlawful, hurtful, or an hindrance of greater good, which he cannot in any wise declare, unless he hath power to make a King no King. For consequently he should also declare, that God and Nature commanding Subjects to bear true faith and Allegiance to their lawful Prince, should enjoin them an unlawful or hurtful thing, or which is an hindrance of greater good, which is impossible. And so in this Clause there is no more difficulty concerning this point of the Pope's authority not to absolve from this Oath of Allegiance, or any part thereof, then is in the former clauses, wherein the Pope's authority to depose Kings, and to absolve Subjects from their natural allegiance, is denied.  
8. Lastly, by those words [nor any person whatsoever] is not understood the King's Majesty: Both for that in the Laws of this Realm the King's Majesty is not understood by the name of person, or persons, when the matter is odious: & also, as in no penal law the Prince or Lawmaker himself is included under any general word, because he is not subject to such laws, according to that principle of the law, Princeps legibus solutus est, The Prince is free from laws: 
Leg Princeps. ff. de Legibus.  so also when it is said in the Law, that no person whatsoever hath power to dispense in that law, or to change or alter that Law, the Lawmaker himself, who is above the Law, is not comprehended under those general words; yea and, as well observeth Salas and Sa, both jesuites, In a general speech the person who speaketh is understood to be excepted. 
Salas disp. 21. de Legibus sec. 3. regula 22. & Emanuel Sa verbo Interpretatio. nu. 14.   
9 And although we should admit, that the King's Majesty were included in those words [nor any person whatsoever] yet this clause would nevertheless be very true: And the reason is, for that albeit his Majesty hath power to dispense with his subjects, that they shall not take this Oath, which is not the meaning of this Clause, yet he hath not power to absolve them from this Oath, or any part thereof after they have once taken it, which is the true sense & meaning of this Branch. First, for that to dispense or absolve from Oaths (taking those words [to dispense or absolve] according to their proper signification, and as they are taken commonly by Divines) doth belong only to spiritual and not to temporal power. Wherefore the Divines make a great difference between absolving or dispencing in Oaths or Vows, and releasing or annulling the same; and they affirm, that to release or annul an Oath or Vow, a temporal power, yea and sometimes private authority may suffice, as Parents may release and annul the oaths and vows of their children; but to absolve or dispense in an Oath or Vow, a spiritual authority and jurisdiction is necessarily required. But secondly, and principally, for that his Majesty hath not power to release his subjects from their temporal and natural allegiance, unless he will cease to be their Prince, because temporal allegiance is by the law of God and Nature due to him from his Subjects, so long as he remaineth their Prince; and therefore he cannot absolve, discharge, or release them from the Obligation of this Oath or any part thereof; or, which is all one, he cannot give them leave, not to bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty, and consequently not to defend him to the uttermost of their power against all Treasons and traitorous conspiracies, which shall be made against his Royal person, Crown and dignity, and not to do their best endeavour to disclose, and make them known unto his Majesty, seeing that to perform all these things Subjects are bound by the law of God and Nature, wherein no temporal or spiritual authority can dispense. And therefore the Author of the Protestants Apology for the Roman Church, trac. 3. Sec. 5. doth very well affirm, that all Catholics are by all Laws, Divine and Humane, indissolubly obliged in the highest degree of all earthly Allegiance to his Majesty that now is, as to their true, undoubted, lawful Sovereign liege Lord and King.   

CHAP. VI The sixth Branch of the Oath, and an Explication of the same.  WHich Oath I acknowledge by good and full authority to be lawfully ministered unto me: and do renounce all pardons and dispensations to the contrary. 
1. This Branch containeth in it no difficulty at all, if we consider what hath been said before; to wit, that in this Oath is only demanded a sincere profession of true temporal allegiance, and that no authority or obedience, which is due to the Pope, is denied therein: And that to treat of the Pope's authority, not affirmatively what power he hath, but affirmatively what authority in temporals the King's Majesty hath over his Kingdom and Subjects; and consequently what authority in temporals the Pope hath not over the said kingdom and subjects: and also, that to exact of Subjects an Oath not only of their temporal allegiance in general, but also of such allegiance in particular, which his Majesty and the State shall for prudent reasons & motives think to be necessary for the preservation of the Kingdom from future Treasons, Invasions, or Perturbations, so that it be contained within the bounds of true temporal allegiance, doth no way exceed the limits of temporal authority.  
2. First therefore by those words [good and full authority] is not understood any authority of the King's Majesty in Ecclesiastical causes, but only in temporal matters, as is the ministering of an Oath of true temporal allegiance. For although his Majesty be persuaded, that he hath full and supreme authority not only in temporal, but also in Ecclesiastical affairs, for external government; and that the Pope hath not over him or his Subjects within this Realm, any authority or jurisdiction, nor power to excommunicate his Majesty, yet his meaning is not to meddle at all in this Oath either with his own, or with the Pope's Ecclesiastical Supremacy, but only with his own temporal Sovereignty, and consequently with the Pope's authority not to depose him, or to dispose of his Kingdom, or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade or annoy him, or to absolve his Subjects from their obedience, etc. And therefore, as I observed before in the third observation, we must distinguish betwixt his Majesty's understanding or persuasion, and his meaning or intention: for his meaning was not to exact in this Oath of His Subjects all which he is persuaded he might lawfully exact of them, but only to demand of them in this Oath a profession of that temporal Allegiance, which all Subjects are bound by the Law of God to give to their lawful Sovereign, as it is manifest by the declaration both of His Majesty and also of the Parliament: and therefore He was careful not to meddle with the Pope's authority to excommunicate Him,  
3. Secondly, it is certain, that albeit Christian Princes have not authority to define and determine what position is heretical, or to punish Heretics with spiritual punishments (for these are mere spiritual things) yet they have authority to command their subjects to abjure such positions as are already defined, or known to be manifestly false and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, for such: and to punish with temporal punishments the obstinate maintainers of the same, especially as the maintaining of such positions is hurtful to the public temporal peace, whereof the King hath charge: and who therefore may also by the material Sword repel the wrongs and injuries offered to the temporal Kingdom or Commonwealth by Clergymen, and also the abuses of the spiritual Sword, when they tend to the hurt of the civil Commonwealth, as Franciscus Victoria, joannes Parisiensis, and Couerruuias do well observe. 

Victoria Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. sec. 7. §. octava propositio.  
Parisiensis de potest. Reg. & Pap. cap. 11. ad 37.  
Coverruu. cap. 35. Practic. question.   Wherefore a King, saith Dominicus Bannes, 
Bannes' 2. 2. q. 11. ar. q. 1.  doth punish Heretics as most seditious Enemies to the peace of His Kingdom, which cannot be preserved without unity of Religion. And Marriage, saith Dominicus Sotus, 
Sotus in 4. dist. 29. q. 1. ar. 4.  being a Sacrament in such sort, that it is also a civil contract, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiastical Court, so in regard of the later it is subject also in some sort to the Civil. Not that Princes can alter those things which are of the substance of Matrimony, but that they may punish them, who contract they shall offend against the public peace: for against those crimes, whose judgement doth belong to the Ecclesiastical Court, they may also ordain punishments, as they disturb the peace of the Commonwealth. Which doctrine of Sotus may in the very like manner be applied to Heresy, which being a spiritual offence in such sort, that also it disturbeth the temporal peace of the Commonwealth, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiastical Court, so in regard of the later it is subject also in some sort to the Civil; not that Princes can determine and define what is Heresy, but that they may punish Heretics, when by defending heretical positions, they shall offend against the public good. For against those crimes, whose judgement doth belong to the Ecclesiastical Court, they may also ordain punishments, as they disturb the peace of the Commonwealth. And therefore Christian Princes have good and full power to compel their Subjects to abjure impious, damnable, and heretical positions for such, when it is necessary to the preservation of the public temporal peace, and to discover how their Subjects stand affectted in point of their Loyalty and due Obedience.  
4. Thirdly, it is evident, that Clergymen being truly subject to temporal Princes, in regard of their natural birth, and of their living in Civil Society with others, and consequently bound, according to the common doctrine of Divines, to observe their just Laws not only virationis, but also vi legis, by force of the Law, do own true Allegiance to their natural Prince, no less than Lay men, and that therefore he may lawfully demand of them, as they are Subjects, an Oath of their Allegiance, whensoever he shall justly suspect their fidelity. And although some Clergymen should be so capricious, as to imagine, contrary to the practice of the Primitive Church, the doctrine of the Ancient Fathers, and manifest reason, that they are not subject at all to the authority of temporal Princes, and thereupon should make a scruple to take this Oath as lawfully ministered to them by good and full authority, yet this could not be a sufficient proof, that the Oath is unlawful in itself, or that Laymen cannot lawfully take it, and also acknowledge, that it is lawfully ministered unto them by good and full authority.  
5. Lastly, in those words [And I do renounce all Pardons and Dispensations to the contrary] is not employed a renouncing in general of the Pope's authority to give Pardons and Dispensations, but, as the words do plainly signify, in them is only contained a denial of the Pope's authority to dispense with the Swearer, or to give him leave and licence to do contrary to that which he hath promised in this Oath. Wherefore the verity of these last words is chief grounded upon the lawfulness of the Fift Branch. For if the Pope hath no power and authority to absolve the Swearer from any part of this Oath, because those three things before mentioned, which he promiseth to perform, he is bound by the Law of God and Nature to perform, and that therein no authority of Pope or Prince can dispense, it is manifest, that he may lawfully renounce all Pardons and Dispensations to the contrary.   

CHAP. VII. The Seventh Branch of the Oath, and an Explication thereof.  " ANd all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense, & understanding of the same words without any equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reseruasion whatsoever. 
1. This Branch is greatly to be regarded, for that it expressly declareth, in what sense the Swearer is bound to take all the parts and parcels of this Oath. And first, by those first words And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, etc.] it is manifest, that the immediate object of all this Oath and every part thereof, or, which is all one, that which in all the former Branches I do directly and immediately swear, is my plain and sincere acknowledgement, to wit, that our Sovereign Lord King james is the lawful and rightful King of this Realm, etc. and that the Pope hath not any power or authority to depose him, etc. and that I will bear Faith & true Allegiance to His Majesty, etc. and that from my heart I do abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical, etc. and that I do believe and in conscience am resolved, etc. and that it is lawfully ministered unto me by good and full authority, and that I do renounce all Pardons and Dispensations to the contrary. Whereupon the Oath concludeth thus: And I do make this recognition and acknowledgement hearty, willingly and truly upon the true faith of a Christian. So that the plain and proper meaning of this Branch is, that whatsoever I do swear in this Oath, I do swear plainly and sincerely according to these express words, etc.  
2. Secondly, the meaning of those words [without any equivocation, etc.] is not, that there is not to be found in this Oath any equivocal words, and which may not have two proper and usual significations, especially if they be taken barely and by themselves alone (for if we consider them as they be joined with other words and make a full and perfect sentence, and do also duly regard the intention of the Lawmaker with the other observations before set down, we shall hardly find any one sentence in this Oath so equivocal or ambiguous, that according to the common understanding of men it hath two senses, equally common, which is properly to be equivocal.) But the plain and proper meaning of those words is, that the Swearer must not in this Oath equivocate, or use any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever, but that he must deal plainly and sincerely according to the mind and intention of the Lawmaker. For it is one thing to use equivocal words, and an other thing to equivocate, or to use equivocation, because one may use equivocal words, and not deceive or delude the hearer, for that he useth the words in that sense, wherein the hearer understandeth them. But to equivocate implieth a fraudulent, deceitful, and unsincere dealing by using the words in an other sense, than the hearer understandeth them.  
3. Wherefore the plain meaning of this Branch is, that albeit in this Oath there might be found divers common senses of the same words, yet the Swearer must not equivocate, but he must take the words in that sense, wherein the Lawmaker understandeth them, with whom he is bound, by virtue of this Branch, to deal plainly, sincerely, without any guile, fraud, deceit, evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever. But if perchance there should any difficulty arise concerning any ambiguous word, or sentence contained in this Oath, and the will, meaning, and intention of the Lawmaker could not be known, than we must use those rules, which, according to the approved doctrine of all Divines and Lawyers, we have above set down for the interpreting of doubtful and ambiguous speeches in any Law. And namely among the rest, that in penal Laws and odious matters the milder and more favourable sense, and which containeth in it no absurdity, is to be chosen.  
4 Seeing therefore that, according to the doctrine of all Divines, it is not lawful to equivocate, or to use equivocation, but we must answer plainly and sincerely according to the meaning and intention of the judge, when he proceedeth juridically, and demandeth no unjust and unlawful thing, but which he hath authority to demand, it is manifest, that the verity of this Branch dependeth wholly upon the lawfulness of the Oath, and upon the authority of the maker thereof, and that consequently there is no difficulty in this Clause, supposing the lawfulness of the former Clauses, and that this Oath is lawfully ministered by good and full authority.   

CHAP. VIII. The Eight and last Branch of the Oath.  " ANd I do make this recognition and acknowledgement hearty, willingly, and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian. So help me God. 
1. The lawfulness of this Branch dependeth wholly upon the verity and justice of the former Clauses, and will clearly appear, if we suppose, as hath been showed before, that this Oath of Allegiance containeth in it no falsehood or injustice, and that it is ministered under great penalties by lawful authority, to make a trial how his Majesty's subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty and due obedience. For as Vasquez observeth very well out of Aristotle, 
Vasquez 1. 2. Disp. 51. cap. 3. & disp. 73. cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5.  with whom all Divines and Philosophers do herein agree, to make an act of virtue to be morally good and virtuous, it is not only required, that it have a good and virtuous object, but also it must be done directly for the goodness and honesty of the virtue itself, and not for any other end or motive. For otherwise if one do acts of virtue, as of justice, or temperance, not for justice or temperance sake, but for some other end, as for lucre, vain glory, fear of punishment, or any other motive whatsoever, he sholl do, saith Aristotle, 
Aristot. 2. Ethic. cap. 4.  just or temperate actions, but he shall not do them justly or temperately, neither shall he for doing those actions be accounted a just or temperate man. Seeing therefore that every just and virtuous man ought to observe just Laws, not for fear of punishment as the wicked do, but hearty, willingly, and truly, that is, sincerely, and unfeignedly, for the love of virtue, it is evident, that every good and well affected subject may and aught to take this Oath of Allegiance, supposing it to be lawful and ministered by good and full authority, not for fear of punishment, as likewise we ought to observe God his commandments, not for fear of eternal damnation, but hearty, willingly, and unfeignedly, for the love of virtue and obedience. Wherefore it is manifest, that every good and virtuous Subject ought to have a fare greater willingness in observing just Laws, although they be imposed under pain of death, then hath a Merchant being in danger of drowning, to cast over board his goods for saving his life: for that a Merchant in that case is only willing to lose his goods, for that otherwise he cannot escape the danger of his life, but every virtuous man ought to observe just Laws hearty, willingly, and unfeignedly, for virtue and obedience sake, although he were in no danger of being punished for not observing the same.  
2. And thus thou seest good Reader, that this new Oath of Allegiance doth not want either Verity, justice or judgement, as well in regard of the takers, as of the makers & propounders of the same: That the State, supposing that horrible Powder Treason, which was grounded upon colour and pretence of the Pope's authority to take away the Crowns and lives of Princes in order to spiritual good, had just cause to device a new Oath of Allegiance, wherein mention should be made of the aforesaid authority, to make a true difference, betwixt civilly obedient Subjects, and the perverse disciples of those Powder Traitors, it is evident by that which hath been said before in the fourth observation: and that therefore the State in devising and propounding such an Oath did not want judgement. Also that the Subject hath just cause to take the Oath, supposing it to be lawful and ministered by good and full authority, and that consequently in taking it, after he hath examined and seen the lawfulness thereof, doth not want judgement, it is as evident, as that there is no want of judgement to observe the just commandment of his Lawful Superior, when after due examination he findeth the commandment to be just. And finally, that no assertory Clause of the Oath wanteth Verity, nor any promissory Clause wanteth justice, or, which is all one, that no falsehood or injustice is to be found in any part or parcel of the Oath, it is manifest by the former Explication of every Branch in particular.   

CHAP. IX. An Answer to the Pope's Breves.  
1. THere remaineth only one difficulty to be explained concerning the Pope's Breves, which forbidden English Catholics to take this new Oath for that it containeth many things which are plainly against faith and salvation. And although Widdrington both in his Theological Disputation, and also more fully in his Answer to Fitzherberts Reply hath cleared this difficulty, 
Wriddrington in his Disput. Theolog. cap. 10. sec. 2. and in his Answer to Fitzherb. part. 3. cap. 7.  yet I think it not amiss briefly to set down some general heads of his answer to the said Breves, whereby any judicious man may have sufficient grounds to judge not only how fare the Pope's aforesaid Breves, but also all other of the like kind may without any irreverence or disobedience to the Sea Apostolic be contradicted, or not admitted by good and virtuous Catholics.  
2. First therefore, Widdrington showeth out of the approved Doctrine of Suarez and other Divines, that there be two sorts of Laws or Precepts, the one are called Constitutive, for that they do not suppose, but make the thing, which they forbidden, to be unlawful, which, if that Precept were not, would be lawful, as the Precept of the Church to fast from Flesh in Lent, to abstain from servile works upon commanded Holidays, to receive the Blessed Sacrament at Easter, or the like: And that no Constitutive Precept of the Church doth bind, when by observing it there is danger to incur some notable corporal or temporal hurt. The other are called Declarative, for that they do not make, but suppose and declare the thing to be unlawful which they forbidden, as being forbidden by some former Law; as the forbidding of Theft, Murder, Whoredom, Usury, and such like, for that they are before forbidden by the Law of God and Nature: And that the obligation of Declarative Precepts doth only depend upon the reason and former Law, which in the Declarative Precept is supposed and declared: So that if there be no such former Law or prohibition, as in the Declarative Precept is supposed and declared, the Declarative Precept hath no force to bind.  
3. Secondly, he showeth, that the Pope's Breves forbidding English Catholics to take the Oath, do not contain a Constitutive, but only a Declarative Precept, neither do they make, but suppose and declare the Oath to be unlawful, for that, say the Breves, it containeth in it many things, which are manifestly against faith and salvation; and that consequently, if in the Oath there be nothing against faith or salvation, as the Breves suppose and declare, it is manifest, that the Breves have no force at all to bind English Catholics not to take the Oath, for that they are grounded upon a false reason, supposition, and declaration.  
4. Thirdly, he showeth that all declarative Breves are either definitive, or grounded upon some former definition, of Pope or Council, or else they are only opinative, or grounded upon the Pope's opinative judgement, persuasion, or probable opinion: And that if they be grounded upon the Pope's opinion, no man is bound to obey them, as neither to follow his opinion, whereon they are grounded: but he may as lawfully contradict them, as he may contradict his opinion, although the Pope think it to be never so probable: And that upon this ground, cause, and reason, it was lawful for Catholics to contradict the declarative Breve of Pope Nicholas the First, 
a De consecr. dist. 4. can. A quodam judaeo.  wherein he declared, that Baptism ministered in the name of Christ without expressing the three persons of the B. Trinity was valid and true Baptism: And the declarative Breve of Pope Celestine the Third, 
b Which was once extant in the Canon Law, in cap. Laudabilem de controuers. coniugot.  wherein he declared, and, as Alphonsus de Castro saith, 
b Castro lib. 1. de haeres. cap. 4.  he defined, that Marriage is so dissolved by heresy, that the party whose Consort falleth into heresy, may lawfully marry an other, which Doctrine is now condemned in the Council of Trent: 
c Sec. 24. the Reform. can. 5.  And the declarative Breves or Letters of Pope john the 22. who publicly taught and declared, that the souls of the Blessed should not see God, before the resurrection, 
d See Castro lib. 3. contra haeres. verbo Beatitudo haeres. 6. Bellar. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. c. 14. Hadrianus Papa in quaest. de Confirm. circa finem, and other Histories.  wherein he was contradicted by the Doctors of Paris, and caused to recall his Doctrine: And the declarative Breve of Pope Boniface the eight, wherein he declared, that Philip the French King was subject to him in spirituals and temporals, wherein he was contradicted by the French Nation, and taxed of wonderful impudence. 
* See Nicolaus Vignerius ad annum 1300.   
5. Fourthly, he showeth, that the Pope's declarative Breves forbidding Catholics to take the oath, for that it containeth many things which are manifestly against faith and salvation, are neither definitive, for that they are not directed to the whole Church, nor do contain any of those rules, which, according to Cardinal Bellarmine and other Divines, is required to a true and infallible definition of faith (for only of this kind of definition now we speak) and that although they were definitive, yet considering that it is a probable Doctrine, that the Pope hath no authority infallibly to define without a general Council, no Catholic is bound to give more credit to his definition, then to follow his probable Doctrine and opinion: neither are they grounded upon any former definition of Pope or Council, and which all Catholics are bound to admit for a true definition, as Widdrington hath proved at large by answering all the Decrees and Canons of Popes or Counsels; which Lessius (masked under the name of D. Singleton) hath scraped together. But they are grounded only upon the opinative judgement of the Pope, and some other Divines of Rome, who then were of opinion, that many things are contained in the Oath manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, for one of these two grounds and reasons, or rather for both: The first, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and consequently his spiritual authority is denied in the Oath: and that the Breves were chief grounded upon this reason, Widdrington convinceth by the Pope's answer to Fa: Parsons; 
Widdrington against Fitzh. part 3. chap. 17.  by the consult and resolution of the Divines of Rome; by Cardinal Bellarmine 
Bellarmine in his Answer to the Apology, pag. 9  (who doubtless would not in this point dissent from the opinion and resolution of the Pope, and the other Divines of Rome, nor they from him) affirming that in the Oath is plainly or manifestly denied to the Pope, power to excommunicate even heretical Kings, for which he is deservedly taxed by his Majesty of manifest falsehood: and lastly, by those words of the Breves, that in the Oath are contained many things, quae apertè adversantur fidei, which are plainly or expressly repugnant to faith: But none of our learned Adversaries dare affirm, that the denial of the Pope's power to depose Princes, is plainly and expressly repugnant to faith, but at the most, , and tecte, conertly, and closely, and that by many fare fetched (and ill deduced) inferences and suppositions: 
See Suarez lib. 6. cap. 1. de juramento fidelitatis.  and that therefore they supposed with Cardinal Bellarmine, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, is denied in the Oath: The second ground or reason is, that the Pope's power to depose Princes, to dipose of their temporals, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, which doubtless is denied in the Oath, is a clear point of faith, and not in controversy among Catholics, both which grounds and reasons are manifestly false, as hath been sufficiently convinced by the former Discourse: and consequently, that it is no more unlawful not to obey the Pope's declarative Breves forbidding Catholics to take the Oath, they being grounded upon the aforesaid reasons & suppositions, which are manifestly false, than it is unlawful not to approve the said false reasons and suppositions, for that a declarative precept hath no more force to bind, according to the Doctrine of Suarez, (which is also conform to manifest reason) then hath the reason & supposition whereon it is grounded.  
6. Lastly, he showeth out of the doctrine of Dominicus Sotus, & other divines, 
Sotus de de delegendo secretoto memb. 2. nu. 2. See Widdrington in the Discovery of the 15. colum of D. Schulked.  that if a Prelate, or any other Superior command a thing, which the Subject doubteth to be unjust, and the thing which is commanded be in prejudice of a third person, who is in possession of his goods and good name, it is no irreurence, or disobedience in the Subject not to obey, propounding to his Superior with all humility and reverence the reasons of his doubt. Seeing therefore that Widdrington hath in the name of English Catholics propounded to his Holiness the reasons which moved them to doubt, that his declarative Breves were not just, as being greatly prejudicial to his Mtiesties' temporal Sovereignty, and namely for that they were grounded upon the two aforesaid false reasons and suppositions, and that they have not had as yet any satisfaction concerning those their doubts, it is not only manifest, that they cannot be justly taxed of any disobedience or irreverence to his Holiness, for not obeying the aforesaid Breves, but also it is an evident sign, that his Holiness could not satisfy their doubts, and that now he plainly seethe, that he and his Divines were mistaken, and that his declarative Breves were grounded upon those false reasons and suppositions which he could not justify or make good: Otherwise he would without all doubt, in regard of his Fatherly care, and Pastoral charge, have sought to have given them all possible satisfaction in this point, which so nearly concerneth not only their soul's health, and their temporal states and liberty, but which also is so injurious to his Majesty, and so scandalous to Catholic Religion, giving occasion to all Protestant Princes and subjects to persuade themselves, that the profession of the Catholic Roman Religion cannot stand with true and constant loyalty, but that it is a Nursery of unjust Invasions, Rebellions, and Powder-Treasons.  
7. Wherefore, (for the last farewell) I beseech you again and again (dear Countrymen) not to forget those two most certain Principles, whereon is chief grounded the Doctrine for the justifying of the Oath, and for the securing of Princes from all traitorous Conspiracies, practices, and attempts, under the colour and pretence of the Pope's authority to depose them; to wit, that it is a great controversy among learned Catholics, and therefore not certain, but truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Sovereign Princes, and that no power or title, which is not most certain but in controversy, can be a lawful ground, whereby immediately any man may be punished, or deprived of that right, dominion, or any other thing which he really and bona fide possesseth; both which Principles, are, as you have seen, so clear and manifest, that no learned man can from his heart deny them, howsoever some one or other for some temporal respect, end, or motive, may speak or write contrary to his mind and knowledge.  
8. But, as Widdrington towards the end of his Answer to fitzherbert's Preface well observeth out of Molina, and Lessius, both famous jesuites, there is a great difference betwixt the possessing of temporal and corporal goods, as Lands, Houses, Crowns, Kingdoms, and the like, and the possessing of authority, jurisdiction, rights, and claims, which one may pretend to have to such temporal goods. For that possession properly is only of temporal goods; and such goods may properly be possessed, although the party, who hath true right to those goods, contradicteth never so much; but rights, and claims are not properly possessed, but they are only said to be, as it were, in some sort, or improperly possessed: and beside, to the possessing of power, authority, jurisdiction, right; or claim to any temporal thing, in such manner as right, jurisdiction, and claim may be said to be possessed, it is necessary, that the right or claim, which is pretended, be without contradiction and resistance of the adverse part. Otherwise if one should challenge any right or authority be it good or bad, true or false, and should exercise that pretended right or authority, the adverse part contradicting, he might nevertheless be said to be in possession of that right or authority, which is manifestly false and absurd. For so if a Layman should pretend to have true spiritual jurisdiction over Clergy men, as power to excommunicate, and should exercise that pretended jurisdiction, he might be said to be in possession of true spiritual jurisdiction, although the Clergy should never so much contradict and except against the same. And for this reason, albeit some Popes have for as many hundreds of years, as have been since the time of Pope Gregory the Seventh, challenged a right and authority to deprive Kings of their regal Sovereignty, yet they cannot be said to have been for one day or one hour in possession of that their pretended right and authority, because Christian Kings and Subjects, from the time of Henry the Fourth Emperor, who was the first Emperor that was deprived by Pope Gregory the Seventh, until the time of Henry the Fourth most Christian King, who was the last King who was deprived by Pope Sixtus the Fift, have ever resisted and contradicted this pretended authority and claim of Popes to deprive them of their temporals. And although perchance there should have been, or hereafter shall be some or other Christian King, who for some private or public respect and interest, hath not, or shall not resist the Pope's sentence of deprivation denounced or to be denounced against him, but rather yield thereunto, yet this cannot prejudice his successors, or be a sufficient ground, that the Pope may be truly said to be in possession of his pretended right, authority, and claim to deprive Kings in general, but at the most to deprive that King in particular, who did not resist or gainsay, but rather acknowledged the right and authority, which the Pope claimed to deprive him.  
9 Finally, although it may be objected, that divers Popes have practised the deposing of Princes, and many learned Divines have approved the said practice, therefore the practice being approved by many learned and skilful men in the Art which they profess is truly probable, even according to widdrington's grounds, which he taketh from Vasquez: Yet this is easily answered. For those Popes and learned men in approving that practice for lawful, did either think assuredly, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to deprive Princes was most certain, unquestionable, and out of all controversy, and that the contrary doctrine was not at that time, nor could lawfully be approved by any learned Catholic, which howsoever those Doctors might at that time think or be persuaded (wherein nevertheless they were greatly deceived, because even from the first broaching of this doctrine and practice by Pope Gregory the VII. A thing unheard of before that Age, saith Onuphrius, 
Onuphr. lib. 4. de varia create. Rom. Pont.  it hath ever been a great controversy, saith Azor the jesuite, 
Azor. cited above in the sixth Obseruat.  between Popes and Emperors) yet now it is so clear and manifest, that there is at this time a great controversy among learned Catholics concerning this authority of the Pope. as that all the World both by the public writings and proceed in this controversy can give sufficient testimony of the same: Or else those Popes and Doctors, did not consider and examine the difference betwixt speculation and practice, but without any further examination, thought every doctrine that was probable and approved by learned men in speculation, and might speculatively and abstracting from practice be disputed in Schools pro and contra, might also be practised, and put in execution, not considering whether it tendeth to the prejudice of a third person, and to the dispossessing him of that which he actually and bona fide possesseth, or no, whereas it is most certain and out of all controversy, (as hath been showed above) that it is open injustice to deprive upon a probable or controversed power or title any man of that which he hath really in his possession.  
10. Now it is evident, according to Vasquez doctrine which Widdrington followeth, and which stands with manifest reason; that the approbation, and authority of ancient or modern Doctors is not sufficient to make their doctrine probable to other learned men, if either their doctrine be grounded upon some principle, which to those learned men is manifestly false, or it may be confuted by some reason, which to those learned men seemeth invincible and not to be answered, and which reason those Doctors have not seen, considered, and examined; Obseruandum tamen maxime est, etc. But it is greatly to be observed, saith Vasquez, 
Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 62. cap. 4. nu. 18. cited by Widder. in disp. Theolog c. 10. sec. 2. nu. 16.  that it may sometimes fall out, that the ancient Writers, whose opinions are now in controversy, did not consider some Reason, Law, or Decree, which hath great force against their opinion: but contrariwise that the later Doctors being convinced with that Reason, Law, or Decree, do now defend the contrary opinion. If therefore a learned man seeing that Law or Decree, or considering that new reason doth defend the opinion of the later Writers against the ancient, he cannot follow in practice the opinion of the ancient Writers, against his own opinion, or which is all one by reason of their authority and approbation, because the opinion of the ancient, who have not seen, or considered that Decree, or Reason, ought not now to be accounted probable. And therefore Widdrington defining probable to be that, which is approved by learned and skilful men, for the better understanding and explication of the last words, he added, who have seen and examined the difficulty, for if they have not seen and considered that particular difficulty and controversy, they cannot be accounted learned and skilful therein.  
11. Now the particular difficulty, and controversy concerning this point, and which those Popes and Doctors mentioned in the objection did not consider and examine, is, whether, supposing it to be now a controversy, and to be apptooved by learned Catholics, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Princes, it be not open injustice in the Pope to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms and Dominions, which they really and bona fide do possess. And therefore unless it can be convinced, that it is not at this day a controversy among learned Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to deprive, which is as hard a matter, as to prove, that the Sun doth not give light at noon days, or else that it is lawful upon a doubtful, uncertain, controversed & probable power or title to thrust by violence any man out of that, which heeactually and bona fide possesseth, the practice of deposing Princes, under pretence of the probability of the Pope's power to deprive Princes, cannot be accounted probable to any learned man, so much as to excuse him in conscience, and in the sight of God from formal sin and injustice.  
12. But to conclude with this Observation, which I wish you (Dear Countremen) diligently to consider; That howsoever any Subject concurring in practice with the Pope to the deposing of his lawful Sovereign Prince, may under pretence of some probability of the doctrine to depose Princes by the Pope's authority, persuade himself, that he is excused from sin and formal Treason in his conscience, and before the sight of God, (wherewith Princes not knowing the secrets of men's hearts, but leaving them to the judgement of God, do not intermeddle in their Tribunals) yet considering these two things: The first, that it is most certain and out of all controversy, that he is excused in conscience, and before the sight of God from all sin and offence in defending his lawful Prince, who is in possession, and in resisting such invasions and depositions which are grounded only upon a probable power and title, whereas he cannot with any reason assuredly persuade himself, that he is secure in conscience by taking part with the Pope against his Prince, who is in possession of his Crown: The Second, that it is also most certain, and out of all controversy, that he may justly in taking the Pope's part against his Prince being invaded and deprived under pretence of a probable power and title (although in very deed the power and title were never so probable) be accused and condemned both in the Secular and also Ecclesiastical Court of the Prince invaded of open and manifest Treason, and as a manifest Traitor be deservedly put to death: for that it is open injustice in the Pope (saith the Author of the Prelate and the Prince) to deprive a Prince of his Kingdom to which he hath probable right, and withal possession, and consequently it is open Treason in the Subject to take part with the Pope in that case against his rightful Prince. These two things, I say, being duly considered, I think those Subjects to be stark mad and senseless, and to have neither the fear of God nor Man before their eyes, that can be drawn to approve such damnable practices, and consequently neither the doctrine, grounds, and principles thereof: or to concur with the Pope, to the deposing, and dispossessing of their Sovereign Prince, under pretence of a power, title, and claim, which even in speculation, and abstracting from practice, can be at the most but probable. And so recommending to your prudent considerations this my serious and sincere advertisement I make an end, and request you ever to have in mind, that which I said in the beginning and cannot too often repeat: Fear God, Honour the King: Render to God and Caesar (and consequently to Popes and Princes) that which is their due. 
1. Pet. 2. Mat. 22.    


A Copy of the Oath of Allegiance, or the First Article, which the Lower House of Parliament (wherein of 200. Deputies for the Third Estates were but six Protestants) propounded to the French King, to have established for a fundamental Law, in the general Assembly of the three Estates, holden at Paris in the year 1614  

The First Article of the Third Estates, taken out of a Book entitled, apology de l'Article premier du Tiers Estate. pag. 4.  
THat, to stay the course of that pernicious dostrine which some years since hath been broached, against Kings and Sovereign pours established by God, by seditious spirits, who attend only to disturb and subvert the same, Supplication may be made to the King, that he will cause to be decreed in the Assembly of these Estates for a fundamental Law of the Realm, That, for as much as he is acknowledged Sovereign in his Estate, nor holding his Crown but from God alone, There is not any power on Earth whatsoever it be. Spiritual or Temporal, which hath any right over his Kingdom to deprive the sacred persons of our Kings, nor to dispense or absolve for any cause or pretence whatsoever, their Subjects from the Allegiance and obedience which they own to them: That all the Subjects of what quality or condition soever they be, shall hold this Law for holy and true, as agreeable to the Word of God, without distinction, equivocation, or limitation whatsoever: Which shall be sworn and signed by all the Deputies of the Estates, and from henceforth by all that have Benefices or offices in the Kingdom, before they enter into possession of their Benefices, and be admitted into their Offices: That all Masters, Regent's, Doctors, and Preachers shall be bound to teach and publish, that the contrary opinion, to wit, that it is lawful to kill and depose our Kings, to rise up and rebel against them, to shake of the yoke of their obedience, for any occasion whatsoever, is impious, detestable, and contrary to truth, and against the establishment of the State of France, which dependeth immediately on none but God: That all Books which do teach that false and perverse opinion, shall be held for seditious and to be censured: All Strangers that shall write and publish it, for sworn Enemies of the Crown: All his Majesty's Subjects, that shall adhere unto it, of what quality or condition soever they be, for Rebels, infringers of the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, and guilty of Treason in the higstest degree. And if there be found any book, or Discourse written by any Stranger ecclesiastic, or of any other quality, that containeth any proposition contrary to the said Law directly or indirectly, the Eccleisastics of the same Order established in France shall be bound to answer them, to impugn and contradict them incessantly, without respect, ambiguity, or equivocation, under pain of being punished with the same punishments as above said, as abetters of the enemies of this State.   

This Article is in effect and substance all one with our new Oath of Allegiance, and the lawfulness thereof is manifest by the former Discourse; and how greatly Card. Peron was mistaken in impugning the said Article, Widdrington showeth both in his Answer to Fitz-herbert part. 3. chap. 11. num. 15. & seq. and in his Discussion of the decree of the Lateran Council against Lessius part. 2. sec. 9 and part. 3. sec. 9    

A Copy of the Arrest, or Decree of the Parliament of Paris, wherein Card. Bellarmine his book against William Barclay is condemned.  

Taken out of the Records of the Court of Parliament, the 26. of November 1610.  
THis present day the King's Solicitours, (Lewis Seruin the King's Attorney making the Declaration, and Lewis Duret the Kings Advocate subscribing) advertised the Court, that it was related to them, that some few days since there hath been divulged in this city of Paris a new book entitled Tractatus de potestate Summi Pontificis in temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, Auctore Roberto S. R. E. Cardinale Bellarmino. Romae per Bartholomaeum Zannetti, printed this present year; out of which book diverse persons, some with a good intent, and others with an evil, have divulged many things, which they have collected from thence. And because this Book doth contain propositions, which are prejudicial to the King's power and authority, and to the State of France, of whom the Author speaketh in the same manner as of other Kings, Princes, and Commonwealths, they have through their care gotten a Copy thereof, which they having exactly read and examined, thought it their duties to advertise the Parliament of those things, which are against the Powers established by God, and especially against this Kingdom. Wherefore they have observed, that Cardinal Bellarmine doth in this new Treatise not only teach those propositions, which he affirmed in his former books, as in that book which is entitled, De Romani Pontificis Hierarchia written in the time of Pope Sixtus the V and dedicated to the said Pope, which he hath divided into five books, in the last whereof he maintaineth, that the Pope hath temporal power indirectly; But they also have observed, that to this erroneous assertion others no less false, and tending further are added in the places by them cited, which the Parliament, if it be so pleased, may behold. And first the very Title is to be observed, wherein he giveth to the Pope a power in temporals. Then he bringeth divers authorities from the writings of Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, English & Scots, beginning with Pope Gregory the VII. who lived in the year of our Lord 1073. etc.  
Wherefore to the end that fraud and deceit may for the safeguard of true French men be prevented, the aforesaid Attorney general considering, that in regard of Conscience, and the office which he beareth in being the King's Attorney, he is bound sincerely to discharge his duty, produceth Cardinal Bellarmine's book, which was written, when our King Henry the Great was living (in whose reign none durst adventure to diuulge the same) but published forthwith as soon as he was dead, wherein he hath noted diverse places, which the Parliament may peruse, especially pag. 37, 38. 57 58. and 76. 77. to which may be added 160. 115. 116. And moreover, he exhibiteth in written hand the requests, which the King's Attorneys do in the King's name demand; to wit, that by Decree of the Parliament it be enacted, That none of what quality or condition soever, shall receive, have, keep, print or utter this book of Bellarmine, under pain of Treason ordained against those that shall transgress the same, etc.   

The matter being examined, The great Chamber, Criminal, and of the Edict being assembled.  
THe Court hath decreed and doth decree, that no person of what quality or condition soever, under pain of Treason ordained against those that transgress the same, do receive, keep, communicate, print, utter, or sell the said Book, which containeth that false and detestable proposition, tending to the subversion of supreme Powers established and ordained by God inciting Subjects to rebellion, and derogating from the authority of Princes, animating to attempt against their lives and Crowns, and finally to disturb the public peace and quietness.  
Those that have Copies of the said Book, or know any that have, are commanded forthwith to make it known to their judges, that, upon the demand of the King's Attorneys, Inquisition be made against the Crime, and those that be guilty be punished accordingly. It forbiddeth under the same punishment Doctors, Professors, and others, to treat, dispute, writ, teach directly or indirectly in Schools, Colleges, or other places, the said proposition. The said Court doth ordain, that this Decree be sent, read, published, recorded, and observed according to the afore said manner and form in all the Benches subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. The Substitutes to the King's Attorney are commanded to cause forthwith this Decree to be put in execution, and to advertise the Court within a month of their diligence.  
Made in Parliament upon Friday 26. Novemb. 1610. Signed VOISIN.   

The decree being made, the King's Attorneys were sent for, to whom the pleasure of the Court was signified, and according to the Decree the said Book of Bellarmine was delivered to their hands.    


A Decree of the Court of Parliament made the 26. and executed the 27. of june 1614  
Against a Book printed at Collen this present year, which is entitled, Francisci Suarez Granatensis Societatis jesus doctoris Theologi Defensio fidei Catholicae & Apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores, containing many maxims and propositions contrary to the Sovereign powers of Kings ordained and established by God, the safety of their persons, the peace and quietness of their States.  
The Place ✚ where the King's arms of France and Navarre are set 
 At Paris, By F. Morel and P. Mettayer the King's ordinary Printers and Stationers 1614 With his Majesty's Privilege.   

Taken out of the Records of the Parment.  
The Court of the great Chamber, Criminal, and of the Edict assembled, having seen the Book printed at Collen this present year, entitled, Francisci Suarez Granatensis Societatis jesu Doctoris Theologi Defensio fidei Catholicae & Apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores, containing in the third Book Chap. 23. p. 376. 79, 80, 82. Chap. 29. p. 410. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. Chap. 6. pag. 834. Chap. 8. pag. 844. and in other places many propositions contrary to the Sovereign powers of Kings ordained and established by God, the peace and quietness of their States, and that it is lawful for their subjects and strangers to attempt against their persons: Conclusions of the King's Attorney general.   

All which being considered;  
The said Court hath declared and doth declare the propositions and maxims contained in the said Book to be scandalous and seditious, tending to the subversion of States, and to induce the subjects of Kings and sovereign Princes, and others, to attempt against their sacred persons: and the discourses, making mention of King Glodoveus and Philip the Fair, to be false and slanderous: Hath ordained and doth ordain the said Book of Suarez to be burned in the Court of the Palace by the Executioner of high justice. Hath made and doth make injunctions and inhibitions to Stationers and Printers, not to print, sell, or utter it, and to all persons of what quality or condition soever, not to have, copy out, keep, teach in Schools nor in other places, nor to dispute the said maxims and propositions. It doth ordain, that, according to the Arrest made the 8. of june 1610. that the Decree of the Theological Faculty made the 4. of june the same year of renewing the doctrinal Censure of the said Faculty made in the year 1408. confirmed by the Council of Constance, together with this present Arrest or Decree, as also those of the year 1578, and 95. be read every year the 4. day of june as well in the said Faculty, as in the College of the Priest and Scholars of the College of Claremont, 
This College of Claremont, is the jesuites College.  and of the four Mendicants. And that at the instance of the King's Attorney general informations be taken of the transgressions against the said Arrests: and Inhibitions be made against the copying out, having, and keeping the like books.  
Made in Parliament the 26. day of june 1614 Signed VOISIN.   

Moreover, it is decreed, that the Fathers, Ignace Armand rector in this City, Cotton, Fronton, and Sirmund, shall be sent for the first day of the Court, and it shall be showed them, that contrary to their declaration, and the Decree of their General, made in the year 1610. the Book of Suarez hath been printed, and brought into this City against the authority of the King, the safety of his Crown and State: And it shall be enjoined them to cause their General to renew the said Decree, and that it be published; and that they bring in the Act within six months; And that they provide, that no books, containing such damnable and pernicious propositions, be hereafter made or published by any of their Society: And that it be enjoined them, to persuade the people by their Preachers, the Doctrine contrary to the said propositions: Otherwise the Court will proceed against the transgressors, as against Traitors, and perturbers of the public peace.  
The aforesaid Arrest, or Decree, and what hath been decreed, was pronounced in the presence of the Fathers, Ignace Armand, Charles de la Tour, who came in place of Father Cotton absent, Fronton du Duc, and james Sirmund: And the Arrest was executed before the great Stairs of the Palace, the 27. of june, 1614    

A Copy of another Arrest or Decree of the Parliament of Paris, wherein the former doctrine of practising the deposition of Sovereign Princes is condemned, and the former. Decrees, made against the Books of Card. Bellarmine, and Suarez, are again confirmed.  
An Arrest or Decree of the Court of Parliament touching the King's Sovereignty in Temporals, and against the pernicious doctrine to attempt upon the sacred persons of Kings.  
The place ✚ of the King's Arms of France and Navarre. At Paris. By F. Morel, P. Mettayer the King's Ordinary Printers and Stationers. 1615.  
Taken out of the Records of the Parliament.  
WHereas the King's Attorney General hath complained to the Court, all the Chambers thereof being assembled, that albeit by many Arrests or Decrees, heretofore made with great and mature deliberation, the Court hath confirmed the Maxims, which have at all times been held in France, and are naturally engrafted to the Crown, That the King doth not acknowledge any Superior in Temporals of his Kingdom but God alone, And that, no power or authority can rightfully release his Subject; from the Oath of Allegiance and Obedience which they own to Him, nor suspend, deprive, or depose him from his said Kingdom: and much less, to attempt, or to cause to attempt either by public or private authority against the sacred persons of Kings: Nevertheless it hath been advertized, that by Discourses, as well in private as in public, many persons, do presume to call in question the said Maxims, to dispute of them, and to hold them for problematike, from whence may arise very many inconveniences, which of necessity must be provided against, and that speedily: He (the said Attorney) requesteth, that seeing the Court is assembled, all businesses set aside, it will be pleased to ordain, that the said Decrees shall be renewed, and again published in all the Benches subject to the jurisdiction of this Court; to the end that the minds of all the King's Subjects, of what quality or condition so ever, may be kept firm and assured concerning the said Maxims, and Rules, and for the safety of the King's life, the public peace and quietness: With Inhibitions not to transgress the same under the penalties set down by the said Arrests. And that it be enjoined to all their Substitutes to cause the publication thereof to be made, and to certify the Court within a month, under pain to be deprived of their Offices.  
The Court, all the Chambers being assembled, hath ordained and doth ordain, that the Arrests of the 2. Decemb. 1561. the 29. Decemb. 1594, the 7. of januarie, and the 19 of july 1595. the 27. of May, the 8. of june, and the 26. of Novemb. 1610. and the 26. of june 1614 shall be kept, and observed according to their form and tenor. Forbidding all persons, of what quality or condition soever, to transgress the same. And to this end they shall be published in the Bayliwikes, Stewardships, and other Benches subject to this Court by the care of the Substitutes to the Attorney General, who shall certify the Court with in a month under pain to answer it at their peril.  
Made in Parliament the second of januarie 1615. Signed VOISIN.   

The lawfulness of all these Arrests or Decrees is manifest, partly by that which hath been said in this Treatise, in the Fourth and Fift Observation, and in the Second, Third, and Fift Chapters, and more particularly by Widdrington in his Discussion of the Decree of the Lateran Council against Lessius, part. 2. sect. 9 for that Christian Princes by virtue of their temporal power have good & full authority (according to the doctrine of joannes Parisiensis, 
joh. Paris. de potest. Reg. & Pap. c. 21. ad 37.  Victoria, 
Victoria Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. sec. 7. §. octava propositio.  Sotus, 
Sotus in 4. dist. 29. q. 1. ar. 4.  Bamnes, 
Bannes' 2. 2. q 11. ar. 4. q. 1. in fine.  Coverrunias, 
Coverr. cap. 35. pract. quest.  & which is grounded in manifest reason) to forbid the maintaining, teaching, and publishing, not only of heretical erroneous, and false propositions, but also of all unnecessary doctrines and positions, be they never so probable, as the teaching and publishing of the same is dangerous to the Crowns and lives of temporal Princes, and tendeth to the subversion of the State, and to the disturbance of the public peace in the Civil Commonwealth, whereof the Prince hath charge, and to punish with temporal punishments the teachers, maintainers, and publishers, of such dangerous and seditious doctrines.  
Haec omnia Ecclesiae Catholicae indicio subiecta sunto.   
FINIS   

Page Line Faults corrected. 8. 13. would would not. 35. 4. at first at the first. 71. 16. Author's Author. 87. 27. or unlawful or lawfully. 133. 20. bound bound. 144. 16. bound bound. 146. 10. dipose dispose. 187. 1. and to be and be. 191. 4. Deputies Deputies.