AN ADJOINDER TO THE LATE CATHOLIC NEW YEARS GIFT, Or Explication of the Oath of ALLEGIANCE. Wherein Certain principal difficulties, objected by a very learned Roman-Catholike, against the said New-year's Gift, and Explication of the Oath, are very clearly explained. Published by E. I. the Author of the New-year's Gift. ✚ IHS. Occultari potest ad tempus veritas, vinci non potest. Truth may for a time be suppressed, but it cannot be overcome. S. Augustin in Psal. 61. Permissu Superiorum. 1620. To the Reader. 1. IN the New of this year, I presented to your charities (Dear Countrymen) A Catholic Newyears gift, or A brief, & clear Explication of the Oath of Allegiance, partly upon occasion of the public acknowledgement, which Mr. Thomas Greene, a very learned Divine, and Religious Priest of the Order of S. Benedict, made of his opinion concerning the said Oath, to wit, that in his own private judgement he thought, that there is nothing in the Oath, which may not, according to Roger widdrington's Gloss, and Explication, be lawfully taken by English Catholics; and partly to instruct and appease more fully the consciences of you, my Catholic Brethren, concerning the said Oath, than you were instructed by that false, and pestiferous Explication, compiled by I. E. the Author of the Treatise commonly called, The Prelate and the Prince. 2. Now in the last end thereof, I am bold to annex, for your better instruction, a little Addition, or Adjoinder to the aforesaid Newyears gift, upon occasion of a Reply, which a Religious Priest hath made to a very learned Roman-Catholike, in answer to diverse difficulties, doubts and scruples, which he objected against the said Newyears gift, or Explication of the Oath. By which Reply you may clearly see, that this difficult, dangerous, and scandalous controversy, concerning the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and the Oath of Allegiance, is now in some sort brought to a final issue, for that all the exceptions, which hitherto have been urged, or with any colour of reason may be alleged against the aforesaid Oath, are fully satisfied by these four general assertions, which partly in the Newyears gift, and partly in this Adjoinder are made so plain and manifest, that no man of learning and conscience can contradict the same. 3. The first assertion is, that it is a doctrine truly probable (it being approved by so many learned Catholic Divines, and Lawyers, both ancient and modern, confirmed by so many public Decrees of the Parliament of Paris, grounded upon so many pregnant proofs, which are taken from the authority of the holy Scriptures, the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, the practice of the Primitive Church, and diverse other Theological reasons) that the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose absolute Princes, or to dispose of their Crowns and lives, for any cause, crime, end, or good whatsoever. And this assertion is so manifest, that the most learned and Illustrious Cardinal Peron not only affirmeth, That the Pope doth tolerate in France, those Catholics, who hold against him in this point a En Harangue autier Estate. pag. 98. , and, That this controversy ought not to hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church b In his Reply. ca 91. p. 633. , but also (which is more to be admired) he seeketh to excuse Card. Bellarmine himself c See beneath Sect. ●. num. 9 , as though he thought it absurd for any man to conceive, that so learned a man, as Card. Bellarmine is, should publicly teach, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to dispose of all temporals, is an undoubted point of faith, and to which all Catholics are bound, to adhere under pain of Excommunication, and Anathema. 4. The second assertion consisteth of these three points. 1. That a mere probable, and imaginary power, to wit, which is only in the imagination, conceit, or approbation of learned Catholics, and is contradicted by others, is no true, real, lawful and sufficient power, or ground, to punish, depose, or deprive any man of that; which he actually possesseth, and to which also he hath a probable title. 2. That it is not lawful for the Pope, or other Christian Princes, to dispossess by violence, or force of Arms, any lawful Prince of his Dominions, under pretence of any probable title, which is grounded upon an uncertain spiritual authority, especially supposing (which is most certain) that Christ hath left in his Church a peaceable way to find out, and decide infallibly the truth and certainty of all such controversed and doubtful titles. 3. That it is most certain, and out of all controversy, that a lawful Prince, who is in peaceable possession of his Dominions, may lawfully defend himself, & his Dominions, against all such, that shall invade him & his Countries, under pretence of any such probable title, which is grounded upon spiritual authority, and that he may lawfully put them to death, as Traitors, or enemies to his Crown and State, that shall in hostile manner assault him and his Dominions, under pretence of any such uncertain, and controversed right and authority. And these two assertions do make clear the Second Branch of the Oath, wherein is acknowledged, That the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose the King, to absolve his Subjects from their allegiance, or to authorise any foreign Prince to invade, or annoy him, or his Countries, etc. 5. The third assertion is, that every false doctrine, which is either directly and expressly repugnant to the Word of God, or indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence deduced from two premises, whereof the one is expressly contained in the holy Scripture, and the other evidently known by the light of nature, is, both in the opinion of Protestants, and also of most Catholic Divines, truly and properly heretical, and that the Church hath not any authority to make any Catholic verity, or heresy, but only to declare it, when there is made any doubt thereof, and to make it known to all Catholics, which before her declaration was not known to all, but only to some, more or less, who saw the necessity of the consequence deduced from both the premises. And by this assertion the verity of the Fourth Branch is made plain and manifest, for that all the stiff impugners of the Oath, do ground all their exceptions against that Branch, upon the word [heretical.] So that by the aforesaid three assertions are cleared all the particular Branches of the Oath, for that upon the verity of the Second, and Fourth Branch, is wholly grounded the verity and justice of every particular clause, except only of the First Branch, wherein our Sovereign Lord King james is acknowledged to be the lawful and rightful King of this Realm etc. which Branch is so clear and manifest, that no English Catholic ever durst be so impious and presumptuous, as to take the least exception against the same. 6 The Fourth assertion is, that it is no disobedience, or irreverence against the See Apostelike for Catholics not to obey the Pope's commandment, whensoever they have doubt, that it is unjust, Sotus de detegendo secreto memb. 3. q; 2. Vasques and others cited by Wriddringt. in the discovetie of Schulcken. his slanders, §. 15. and in prejudice of a third person, who is in possession of his goods, & good name, so that they do most humbly propound to his Holiness the reasons of their doubt. This assertion is in plain & express terms set down by that most learned and religious Dominicus Soto, approved by Vasques and many other Divines, grounded upon manifest reason, and sufficiently confirmed by the Canon Law itself, in Cap. si quando, extra, de Rescriptis, where Pope Alexander the third giveth this advertisement to the Archbishop of Ravenna, that he ought either to obey the said Pope's commandment, which he enjoined him by his Breues, or else by his letters to yield a reasonable cause, why he ought not to obey it. Whereupon observe, saith the Gloss, expounding that Canon, that the Superiors commandment ought either to be obeyed, or a cause to be yielded, why it is not obeyed. Seeing therefore, that Mr. Widdrington hath by divers public and printed letters signified to his Holiness in most humble manner the reasons, why English Catholics think themselves bound not to obey his Breves forbidding the Oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, because they are grounded, by the bad information of Card. Bellarmine, and his adherents, upon two very false suppositions, The one, that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the Oath, which is manifestly false, The other, that his power to depose Princes is an undoubted point of faith, which is no less untrue; neither as yet hath he, or other Catholics received from his Holiness, or any other, any answer or satisfaction of these their doubts, truly they cannot be justly taxed of any disobedience, or irreverence against his Holiness, for not obeying his Breves in the aforesaid case, but contrariwise (as in a case not much unlike very well observeth and proveth, that holy and learned Bishop of Lincoln, S. Robert, d Apud Matth. Paris pag. 843. in vita Henrici tertij. in answer to certain Breves of Pope Innocentius the fourth, which he thought unjust) it were disobedience, irreverence, and rebellion against God, and the See Apostolic to obey any such Breves, which are grounded upon false informations, and suppositions, and tend to so great dishonour, and injury of his Majesty, and the whole kingdom. 7 So that with fare greater reason might be taxed with disobedience and irreverence against the See Apostolic, not only the aforesaid holy Bishop S. Robert, for the cause alleged, but also that most learned and religious Dominicus Soto, and other famous Divins, for contradicting the Pope's Breves concerning their dispensations in actual, but not consummate marriage, and for saying, that the Popes erred therein following the doctrine and opinion of the Canonists, as having in it no show or shadow at all of probability, * Sotus in 4. Dist. 27. q 31. ar. 4. than Mr. Widdrington, and other English Catholics, may be justly taxed of any disobedience, or irreverence against the See Apostolic for contradicting the Pope's Breves, which forbidden the Oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, and for saying, that he erred therein, following the bad information and opinion of Card. Bellarmine, & other jesuites, which hath in it a fare less show and shadow of probability, then hath the doctrine of the Canonists concerning the Pope's power to dispense in actual, but not consummate Marriage: for that all the world now seethe plainly, that neither the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the Oath, nor the doctrine for his power to depose is an undoubted point of faith, but a great controversy among learned Catholics, and which therefore ought not to hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church e See Card. Peron above num. 3. Considering therefore, that the aforesaid four general positions are now made so plain and manifest, that no man of learning and conscience can with any colour of reason contradict them, and that by them all the chief arguments, which can be objected either against any particular clause of the Oath, or against the Oath in general in regard of the Pope's Breves forbidding the same only in general terms, are most clearly answered, I beseech and adjure you (my dear Catholic brethren) by the love you bear to God, by the duty you own to your Prince and Country, and by the care you ought to have of your eternal salvation, that you will not any longer, for fear or flattery, seek to impugn, especially by indirect, sinister, and uncharitable courses, so manifest a truth, to the great injury and dishonour of your Sovereign, to the great scandal of your Religion, and to the great danger of your temporal and spiritual overthrow. For assure yourselves, that Truth is great, and will in the end prevail, f 3. Esdr. 4 and rather than it shall be overcome, God almighty, the Author of all Truth, yea and Truth itself, will raise up Babes & Infants to defend it, to the confusion of the greatest Rabbins, that shall impugn the same: and into what danger you cast your souls either by coining new articles of faith, or concurring and consenting to the coiners thereof, and by seeking in that respect to make a Schism and Disunion among your Catholic brethren, you may with fear and trembling perceive by this, which the beloved Disciple of Christ S. john threatneth in the end of his Apocalyps, If any man shall add to these things, God shall add upon him the plagues written in this book. For undoubtedly whosoever shall add to the holy Scripture that which is not Scripture, or to Catholic belief that which is not Catholic, or shall believe with Catholic faith that which is not Catholic, or shall forge new articles of faith, or consent to the forgers thereof, especially in things belonging to temporal allegiance, and shall separate himself in Ecclesiastical communion from those, who contradict such forgeries, and cause a Schism or Disunion in regard of opinions which ought not to hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church, * For so Card. Peron expressly saith about num. 3 can not in that respect be accounted a loyal subject, a true Catholic, or right believer; but endangereth himself to be blotted out of the book of life, and to be punished in the next world with Traitors, Schismatics, and Misbelievers, and in the mean time he will have much ado to clear himself in this world from the guilt, penalty, and imputation of manifest Treason, Schism, and Misbelief: of all which crimes (besides most manifest forgery, detraction, and slandering) those violent hot spurs, that exclaim so bitterly against the Oath, and their Catholic brethren who favour the same, will to their great shame and confusion, ere it belong, be publicly accused, and in my judgement most clearly convicted, unless they speedily change their uncharitable courses, & cease to make a Schism and disunion among Catholics in regard only of opinions, which as witnesseth Cardinal Peron, ought not to hinder the reunion of those who are not Catholics, and should desire to be reconciled to the Catholic Church. 9 And lastly, for my own part I protest unfeignedly, that as I have not been afraid, in regard of the duty & obligation, wherein I stand bound to God and Caesar, to my Prince and Country, and to the Catholic Religion which I profess, to defend with my pen this manifest truth, concerning the indissoluble bond g of temporal Allegiance, See the Protestants Apology for the Roman Church tract ' 3. sect. 5. due to our Sovereign Prince by the law of God and Nature, although I foresaw the great disgraces, which both in the Court of Rome, and also here in England among our Catholic brethren, would come to me thereby, so I will (God willing) be ever ready to confirm and seal the same truth, if need shall require, with my blood, until the Catholic Church, which is the pillar & ground of truth, h 1. Tim. 3. (to whose censure I most humbly submit myself, and whatsoever hath, or shall be written by me) shall infallibly define the contrary, which as I am fully persuaded, she never will (not to say can not) i See Card. Caiet. in opasc. de concept. B. virgins cap. 5. & Canus lib. 7. de locis cap. 3 who upon the like grounds think assuredly, that the Church never will (though Canus saith expressly she can not) define, that the B. Virgin was preserved from original sin. define, for that in my private judgement, speaking with all submission, she hath no sufficient grounds, either from the holy Scriptures as they are expounded by the ancient Fathers, or from any other undoubted rule of faith, so to define; but that, if she will determine either part, she will declare and define according to the true and universal doctrine of the ancient Fathers, k See the ancient Fathers in M. Widdringt. discovery of Schulkenius slanders § 17 that absolute Princes are supreme in temporals, & therein subject to none, but God alone, and also that the Ecclesiastical power, by the institution of Christ, doth extend to the giving of spiritual graces, not earthly kingdoms, to the remitting of sins, not of debts, to the losing of spiritual, not corporal bonds, to the inflicting of spiritual, not temporal punishments, and to the disposing of spiritual, not temporal goods. This 27 of December 1620. Yours in all love, and duty, E. I. The Author of the Newyears gift. A brief SUMMARIE OF THE CHIEFEST things contained in this ADJOINDER. IN the first Section is showed, that to prove the Oath of Allegiance, to be unlawful, evident demonstrations are required, but to prove it to be lawful, only probable arguments, and answers are sufficient. In the second Section is showed; First, that the immediate object of an Oath must be morally certain to the judgement of the Swearer, and that it need not to be morally certain to all others. Secondly, that in the second Branch of the Oath is denied, both the Pope's power to practise the deposition of Princes, and also the practice itself in all cases whatsoever: and that albeit the denial of some particular practice doth not imply a denial of the power itself to practise, yet a denial of all practices and effects, is a virtual denial of the power itself to practise. And thirdly it is showed, that a mere probable power to depose, or punish is no true, real, lawful, and sufficient power, and for practise, as good as no power at all, to depose, or punish. In the third Section is showed, that every doctrine which containeth a falsehood against the holy Scriptures, is truly and properly heretical, both according to the doctrine of Protestants, who hold the holy Scriptures to be the only rule of faith, and also of most Catholic Divines, who hold that the Church doth not make any Catholic verity, or heresy; but doth only declare it, and make it known to all, which before her declaration was not known to all. Neither is it required in the opinion of Protestants, to make any doctrine heretical, that it subvert the foundation of faith, ex parte obiecti materialis, or of the fundamental things, which are to be believed, which are the general articles of our Creed, or Christian Belief, but that it contain a falsehood (although it be in points of a less matter, then are the Articles of the Creed) repugnant to the Word of God, which is the rule of faith: and consequently, subverteth the foundation of faith, ex parte obiecti formalis, or the formal cause of our belief, which is the infallible truth of God, revealed to us in the holy Scriptures. In the fourth Section is showed First, both by manifest reason, and also by the testimony of many learned Catholic Divines, that every Theological Conclusion, which is evidently deduced from two premises, whereof the one is expressly contained in the Word of God, and the other manifest by the light of Nature, is of faith, and the contrary heretical, and against faith, and that therefore although it be not clear in Scriptures, expressly and directly, that it is manifest wrong to depose a Prince, excommunicated and deprived by the Pope, yet it is clear in Scriptures indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence, that it is manifest wrong to depose such a Prince, and consequently to deny the same is properly heretical: and secondly, that maxim of the Logicians, The conclusion followeth the weaker part, is clearly explained. In the fifth Section is showed; First, that it is against the holy Scriptures indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence, and therefore against faith, and properly heretical, that it is lawful to murder Princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope. Secondly, that it is very false and seditious, to apply the doctrine of killing manifest Usurpers, to the kill of Princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope; for that manifest Usurpers have no probable title to the Crown, but Princes, after the Pope's sentence of Excommunication, and also deprivation, have beside real possession, a true probable title, and right to the Kingdoms, which they possess. Thirdly, that albeit a Prince should yield up his Crown after deprivation, yet it were not heretical, according to my Adversary his grounds, to kill such a Prince, although my Adversary doth grant it to be evident murder, and therefore virtually repugnant to the holy Scriptures. In the sixth Section is showed First, that the Author of the Newyears Gift did not bring those examples, of taking a purse from one, who leadeth a wicked life, or killing him with a pistol, to compare them to the deposing, or murdering of Princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope; but he brought them only to prove, that to make a particular proposition to be heretical, it sufficeth, that it be contained in the general proposition, which is expressed in the holy Scriptures, so that it be sufficiently proved, to be contained therein. Secondly, that the comparison nevertheless had been apt and convenient to prove, that to make any doctrine heretical it sufficeth, that it be indirectly, virtually, or by a necessary consequence, repugnant to the holy Scriptures. Thirdly, that no Catholic Writer, except only Suarez, durst ever adventure to teach expressly, that a Prince after deprivation, may by the Pope's commission be killed by any private man; but because this pernicious doctrine of Suarez is grounded upon a most false and absurd supposition, and which all the world seethe to be false and absurd, to wit, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose and murder wicked Princes, is most certain and of faith, and out of all controversy among learned Catholics, his doctrine being grounded upon a supposition so manifestly false & absurd, cannot by any Catholic be accounted probable. In the seventh Section is showed, that Mr. widdrington's explication of those words [depose, or murder] being grounded upon the nature of a conditional disiunctive, is true, proper, and agreeable to the common sense and understanding of the words, nor repugnant to His Majesty's intention, albeit Mr. Widdrington doth not rely only upon that explication. In the eighth Section is showed, that according to the doctrine of many learned Catholic Divines, and manifest reason, that rule of the Law, In the like case the condition of the possessor is the better, aught to be understood, not only of a true doubt, and when the mind doth fluctuate, and giveth no assent to either part, but also of a probable doubt; neither can any man with reason imagine, that when both parts have probability, the case is not therein alike. In the ninth Section is showed, that a Prince in keeping his possession, to which he hath a probable title or right, doth neither wrong the Pope, Church, or any other, according to that vulgar maxim, He that useth his own right, doth no man wrong, nor hindereth unjustly any greater good, and the same is in the beginning of the next Section confirmed by a most manifest argument ad hominem. In the Tenth Section is showed, that according to Vasques doctrine, which he thinketh to be certain, and the contrary false, improbable, absurd, and pernicious, it is not lawful for any Prince only upon a probable title to make war against an other Prince, who hath not only a probable title, but also possession: But this question is impertinent to the matter of this present Oath, and to the right, which Princes may pretend to make war upon probable titles, which are grounded upon the Pope's power to depose Princes, as it is more at large declared in the thirteenth Section. In the eleventh and twelfth Section is showed, that a Prince, in keeping his possession, to which he hath a probable right or title, doth no man wrong, nor hindereth unjustly any greater good, and that although a probable title be good for something, and in some cases better than no title at all, yet forasmuch as concerneth the making of war against him who hath both a probable title, and also possession, it is in Vasques doctrine, which he thinketh to be certain, as good as no title, although we suppose the title to be merely temporal, but if the title be grounded upon a probable spiritual authority, in all learned men's judgement, and according to the approved grounds of Divinity, it is as good, as no title at all, which is at large confirmed in the thirteenth Section. In the thirteenth Section is showed a manifest disparity betwixt the lawfulness of making war upon probable titles, which are merely temporal, and which are grounded upon a probable spiritual authority, for that there is no assured and infallible way on earth to decide, or know undoubtedly, by way of sentence and judgement, the truth of mere temporal titles, which are in controversy betwixt two absolute Princes, who in mere temporal affairs are subject to the judgement and sentence of none but God alone, but Christ hath left in his Church an infallible way to decide, and know undoubtedly the truth of all titles, which are grounded upon whatsoever pretended spiritual authority, to wit, the determination and decision of a lawful and undoubted general Council: whereupon it is clearly inferred, that albeit Princes might lawfully make war upon probable titles which be merely temporal, because there is no way to decide the controversy but by war, yet they can not lawfully make war upon probable titles, which are grounded upon a probable spiritual authority, because Christ hath left in his Church an infallible and peaceable way to decide certainly by way of sentence and judgement, without making of war, the truth of all such doubtful and controversed titles, which infallible and peaceable way he hath now left to decide by way of sentence and judgement, the truth and certainty of probable titles, which are merely temporal. In the fourteenth Section is showed, that Mr. Widdrington's last Explication of those words [as heretical] is true and proper, and agreeable to the common sense and understanding of the words, nor repugnant to His Majesty's intention, although he do not rely only upon that Explication. In the fifteenth Section is showed, that the obligation of all declarative Breves, as well belonging to faith, as manners, dependeth upon the fundamental reason, & former precept, which they suppose and declare, and that therefore the Pope's Breves forbidding the Oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, which is the fundamental reason of his declarative prohibition, have not force to bind, because this fundamental reason is grounded upon two suppositions, which are manifestly false, to wit, that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the Oath, and that his authority to depose Princes is an undoubted point of faith, nor in controversy among learned Catholics. In the sixteenth Section is showed, that the sixth Branch of the Oath is lawful, to wit, that the Oath is ministered by good and full authority, even to those Catholics, who are persuaded the Oath to be unlawful. In the Last Section is showed, that the last Branch of the Oath is lawful, for that every good & loyal subject may and aught to take it very willingly, although great penalties be imposed against those, who refuse to take the same: And lastly the Author, who hath brought these exceptions against the Oath, is friendly admonished not to make any Schism or Disunion among English Catholics, for defending that doctrine, which the Pope himself tolerateth in France, a So satth Card. Peron ●n Harangue austiers' estate. pag. 94. Card. Peron in his last great Reply cap. 91. pag. 633. and which (as Card. Peron well observeth) ought not hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church, especially seeing that it hath been by many public Decrees of the Parliament of Paris in France approved, & the contrary doctrine under pain of Treason condemned, for false, pernicious, scandalous, and seditious. The Copy of a letter written by R. P. a religious Catholic Priest to M. B. a very learned Roman Catholic, in answer to certain difficulties objected by the aforesaid M. B. against the late Catholic New-year's Gift, or Explication of the Oath of Allegiance. Worthy Sir: THere was left for me, in the end of the last Trinity Term, & in my absence, a letter with this superscription, [To the worshipful, and his most respected friend E. I. give these] and the Party who brought it, said, it was sent and meant for me. Which after I had opened, and perused the first beginning thereof, I was a little grieved in this respect, that a friend, and old acquaintance of mine, should seek, as than I conceived, to put a trick upon me, in making me to be the Author of the late Newyears Gift, whereas the Author thereof (knowing belike how displeasing such books are in the Court of Rome) was desirous (as you might have gathered by the Inscription thereof) to have his name concealed. Whereupon some friends, to whom I shown your letter, endeavoured to persuade me not to meddle at all therewith, but to return it back to the Party, who brought it. Nevertheless, because I did not attribute this your error to any evil affection, or meaning in you towards me, but rather to some want of discretion, or consideration in you, and for that as it seemeth, you are desirous to have from me some answer to your objections, I myself, having also read and perused the said Newyears Gift with all diligence, and not disliking the grounds and principles thereof (which I am not afraid publicly to acknowledge) will in regard of our old acquaintance, without more ado, or seeking any other Reply from E. I. the Author thereof, take the pains to answer, according to Mr. widdrington's grounds, to the principal objections contained in your letter, which I will entirely, ad verbum, and orderly set down, only dividing it into certain parts, or Sections, without altering, or inverting the order of your letter. Thus therefore you begin. Sect. 1. Objection. 1. WOrthy Sir, and mine old acquaintance: Having read and perused with all diligence, your late book for the Oath of Allegiance, me thinketh I find not in it that fullness of satisfaction, at the least in all points, which was expected, and I and others could have wished. And therefore I make bold (presuming of our ancient amity) to trouble you with some few lines, concerning the chief doubts and difficulties I find about your book, and exposition of the Oath. Blame me not (good Sir) that I make thus bold to trouble you in this business; for it is a matter, which concerneth much both myself and others, and such indeed as requireth great discussion, and most diligent examination. If the Oath might lawfully be taken, as you labour to prove, and (whatsoever others think) as I am persuaded, with great sincerity, zeal to God, and love to your Prince and Country, I should be glad, and none more glad; for it would yield great content to our Prince, (a thing much to be wished of all loving and loyal subjects) and no small comfort to our poor afflicted brethren, wearied and almost wasted to nothing, for refusal of the same. But if it cannot (as I much fear) at the least in that sense it is exacted at our hands, no marvel if we, who have daily to deal with poor men's consciences, labour what we can, to have it throughly examined. And this I would have you assure yourself, that whatsoever scruple or doubt you shall find, that I do make about your doctrine, and exposition of the Oath, I will not do it of any evil affection, contradictious spirit, or humour to wrangle (for of that sort there hath been too much said, and done already, and a happy atonement were hearty to be wished) but merely for love of truth, and desire of satisfaction to poor afflicted consciences, which through the Pope's Breves, on the one side, together with many other stiff defenders of that doctrine, and your late exposition of the Oath, and the allowance thereof on the other, still, God not, remain perplexed, and hardly know yet what to do. Answer. 1. BUT first, I do not well understand, what fullness of satisfaction in all points you did expect, and have not found in the late Newyears Gift. For if you expected, that Mr. Widdrington, from whom the Author of the Newyears Gift, hath collected his Explication of the Oath, should have taken upon him in this controversy of the Oath, (which is forbidden by the Pope's Breves, though upon false informations and suppositions, and also impugned by divers learned men upon the same false grounds) to prove it to be lawful by such clear and evident demonstrations, as that no wrangling spirit, or stiff Impugner of the Oath, could allege any doubt, difficulty, or scruple against his arguments, or answers; you were herein greatly mistaken, neither had you any reason to expect the same: especially if you had duly considered what he did observe in his Theological Disputation a In the Epistle n. 4. ; both for that to bring such evident demonstrations in any controversy whatsoever among learned Catholics, is a very hard matter; and also because it was sufficient for him to answer probably all the arguments, which could be brought against the Oath, and to allege such probable proofs, grounded both upon the clear principles of Philosophy, Law, and Divinity, and also upon the testimony, authority, and confession of his chiefest Adversaries, which might persuade any prudent, learned, and indifferent man, that there is nothing in the Oath, repugnant to faith, or salvation, and consequently, that it may with a safe conscience be taken. And whether he hath sufficiently performed this, or no, the learned Reader must judge, & you yourself, by the answers to your doubts, difficulties, or rather, as you well term them, scruples, may easily perceive. 2. Secondly, I cannot blame you, for labouring to have this controversy of the Oath, to be throughly examined, considering it doth so nearly concern our duty to God and Caesar; and consequently, the spiritual safety, or hurt to our souls (to omit now all temporal losses) by taking or refusing the same. But truly, in my conceit, if without all partiality, or overmuch affection to either part, you would be as curious and careful to find out favourable Expositions of the Oath, as you have been to invent doubts, difficulties, or rather scriples against the same, you would easily perceive, that no convincing and demonstrative argument can be brought, to prove the Oath unlawful. And the variety, and diversity of the grounds, whereupon the stiff Impugners thereof do chief insist, some disproving the Oath for this clause, some for another, some for this reason, others not for that, some for the Pope's Breves, others not daring to ground themselves on them, and few agreeing among themselves in any one point (besides the silence, both of the Pope's Holiness, in not expressing as yet any one clause, or proposition in the Oath, which is clearly repugnant to faith, or salvation, although he hath been often most humbly requested to declare the same, and the silence also of Mr. Widdrington's chiefest adverlaries, to whom he hath replied, who, as it seemeth, have left him in the open field) and moreover, the weakness of your doubts and difficulties, which, after so long a discussion of this controversy, as the most principal objections, you have singled from the rest, do sufficiently confirm, that no convincing argument can be brought to prove the Oath unlawful. Now to your difficulty. Sect. 2. Objection. WEll then (good Sir) the first difficulty that I find, Object. is about your doctrine in the Exposition of the first Branch (you would say the second Branch) of the Oath, how it can be true, which you seem to teach, That we may lawfully swear not only our acknowledgement, but also the absolute proposition, That the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, when the contradictory proposition, to wit, That the Pope hath that authority, is probable, and holden for such not only by the ancient school-divines & Casuists, who might peradventure not have marked all your grounds, but also by our own modern Doctors, who, no doubt, have seen the reasons, and examined the grounds on both parts, when, as you know, the matter of an Oath ought to be certain, and when one part of the contradictory is probable, the other cannot be certain. I mark well, how you say, for answer of this difficulty, that in the Oath you swear, That the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, not meaning it speculatiuè, in speculation or conceit, but practicè, for as much as concerneth practise: which is as much as to say, you do not swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, but that he can practise no such power upon any Prince being in possession, so long as it is but probable, the Pope hath that power; and this always is most certain, grounded on that rule, In pari casu melior est conditio possidentis, In the like case the condition of the possessor is the better; and so may be the matter of an Oath, and lawfully sworn: But this in my conceit will not serve the turn, for that the words in the Oath in their proper signification can have no such meaning, but do signify, that we swear not only that the Pope can practise no such power and authority, but that he hath no such power. And although Princes, or private men, do little regard what learned men do speculatiuè in speculation dispute, or teach in Schools concerning their titles, so they may be secured of their estates, yet when the words of the Oath in this Branch in their proper signification import a denial of the power, and not of the practice; and the controversy betwixt Popes and Princes hath ever been of the power, and not of the practice; and when by the Seventh Branch we are tied to take the words of the Oath in their proper signification, and according to their common sense and meaning, I can not see, how this Clause absolutely (making the denial of the Pope's power to depose Princes the immediate Object of the Oath) may be sworn without perjury; Especially seeing it is most likely, that the intention of the Lawmaker was, that we should by this Oath abjure not only the practice of this power, but rather the power itself, which both might be and had been the root and origine of the practice of such power; which if it were not, it were graciously done of our Prince, to declare his intention to be otherwise, that his Catholic subjects might know, how to comport themselves in these affairs: For his Magistrates, and Officers, appointed to see this Law executed, do seem to insinuate every where, that the meaning of the Prince and Commonwealth is, that not only the practice, but also the power should be abjured; And therefore if any chance to take this Oath upon frailty or otherwise, they will not stick to tell him in open audience, that he hath abjured the Pope's power, and consequently his faith b As Card. Bellarmine and other jesuits have very falsely & scandalously declared the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith. . Answer. 1 But this first difficulty of yours is easily answered. And first, although the matter of an Oath ought to be certain, yet it is to be understood of the immediate matter, or object of the Oath, and also of moral certainty, and that also not in respect of all men, but in respect only of the swearer, or, according to the reasonable judgement of the swearer, as hath been sufficiently declared in the Newyears gift; c In the first observation for the same thing may be certain, or probable to the judgement of one, which is not certain, or probable to the judgement of an other. From whence these two things may be inferred. 2 The one, that Becanus holding for certain, Becanus in controversia Anglicana anno dom. 1612. impressa pag. 102 that King james is the Sovereign Lord in temporals of his Dominions, might lawfully swear the same, although some others improbably hold, that the Pope and not King james is the Sovereign Lord in temporals thereof. And Vasques holding for certain, that it is not lawful so make war upon a probable title against a Prince, who hath not only a probable title, but also possession (for he affirmeth, d See beneath sect. 10 num. 2. that the contrary doctrine hath in his judgement no probability at all) might lawfully swear the same. And likewise they who hold it for certain, that the Pope hath no lawful power or authority to depose Princes, or, which is all one to practise their deposition, may lawfully swear the same. And the reason is, for that the Verity, which is required in an Oath, is not to be taken from the thing sworn, as it is in itself, or a part rei, but as it is in the understanding of him that sweareth. 3 The other, which may be inferred, is, that if the immediate object of this second Branch of the Oath be not this absolute proposition, That the Pope hath not any authority to depose the King etc. (as it hath been sufficiently proved by Mr. Widdrington, and also your silence, in not impugning that first Explication of his, seemeth to confirm the same) then by this difficultly of yours it can not be sufficiently proved, that this second Branch of the Oath is unlawful: for when two answerers are given to one objection it is necessary to confute them both, to prove the objection to be of force. 4. But secondly it is manifest, that also M. widdrington's second Explication of this Branch is very true, notwithstanding your objection against the same. For all the force of your difficulty consisteth in your false glozing of those words, The Pope hath no power or authority, practicè (that is for as much as concerneth practise) to depose Princes: Which is as much as to say (say you) we do not swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, but that he can practise no such power upon any Prince being in possession, as long as it is but probable, that the Pope hath that power. But this Gloss of yours is very untrue, and also expressly repugnant to the words themselves. For the plain meaning of these words, The Pope hath no power or authority practicè (that is for practise) to depose Princes, is, that the Pope hath no true, real, sufficient, and lawful power, or authority to practise the deposition of Princes, at any time, for any cause, crime or end whatsoever. And besides M. Widdrington saith in express words, That the Pope hath no power or authority to depose, or practise the deposition of Princes, and not only, that he can not practise their deposition, or, which is all one, depose them: as though you would have him to grant, that the Pope hath a true, and lawful power and authority to depose Princes, but that he can not lawfully or without sin practise this his authority. 5 Moreover, I can not perceive any difference in substance and effect, betwixt these two propositions, which you would seem to distinguish, The Pope hath no power or authority to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, and, The Pope can not practise any such power or authority to depose upon any Prince, seeing that whosoever denieth all effects of any power, doth virtually and in effect deny the power itself, Frustra enim est illa potestas, & proinde nulla (cùm Deus & Natura nihil faciant frustra) quae nunquam reducitur adactum: for that power is vain or idle (seeing that God and Nature doth no thing idly or in vain) which is never brought to act. Whereupon Suarez from those words of the third Branch [notwithstanding any sentence of deprivation or absolution of the subjects from their allegiance, made or to be made etc. I will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty etc.] doth well conclude a denial of the Pope's power to deprive Prince, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance, to be virtually contained in those words, for that the denial of all effects of any power doth imply a denial of the power itself. 6 Wherefore if M. Widdrington, and the Author of the Newyeres gift, had denied the practice of the Pope's power only in some particular cases, as M. Blackwell did at the first deny the practice of the Pope's power to depose the King, for that rebus sic stantibus, things standing as they do at this present, the Pope could not, without great hurt to English Catholics, practise upon him his pretended power to depose Princes, and thereupon did ill conclude, that the Pope had no power nor authority to depose the King, then indeed you might well infer, that they did only deny the practice of the Pope's power to depose, but not the power and authority itself, which is repugnant to his Majesty's meaning, who by this Branch of the Oath intended to deny the Pope's authority to practise his deposition, in any case, or for any cause, crime, or end whatsoever, and consequently to deny, not only the practice, but also the power itself. But considering that they in express terms deny both the Pope's power & authority to practise the deposition of his Majesty, and consequently of any other Prince not directly subject to the Pope in temporals, & also the practice thereof in all cases whatsoever, although the crime should deserve deposition, and the Pope should have sufficient forces, and also convenient means to put in execution his sentence of deprivation, truly you had no reason, nor colour of reason to say, that they denied only the practice of the Pope's power to depose, but not the power and authority itself. 7. But because you shall see, that my meaning is not to conceal, or obscure any difficulty, I will urge this objection of yours against Mr. Widdrington somewhat more forcibly in form and show, than you have done, in this manner. Whosoever acknowledgeth, that the Pope hath some power and authority to depose Princes, cannot lawfully swear, nor acknowledge by oath, that the Pope hath not any power, or authority to depose them. But Mr. Widdrington acknowledgeth, that the Pope hath some power and authority to depose Princes: Therefore he cannot lawfully swear, or acknowledge by oath, that the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose them. The Mayor is manifest, for that in so swearing, he should commit manifest perjury, in swearing, or acknowledging by oath that to be true, which he acknowledgeth to be false, seeing that to have some authority, and not to have any authority, are contradictories. The Minor is proved thus: A probable power to depose is some power; But Mr. Widdrington acknowledgeth, that the Pope hath a probable power, saltem speculatiuè, at least in speculation, to depose: Therefore he acknowledgeth, that he hath some power to depose; And yet in the Oath we must swear, or at least acknowledge by oath, That the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose the King, etc. 8. But this objection is easily answered. For the true meaning of those words, That the Pope hath not any power or authority, to depose, &c, according to their plain, proper, and usual signification, and the intention of his Majesty, is, that the Pope hath not any true, real, sufficient, and lawful power, or authority to depose, etc. But a mere probable power to depose, is no true, real, sufficient, or lawful power, but for practise and effect it is only an imaginary power, or a power in the conceit and imagination of some Doctors▪ but in very deed, and for practise & effect it is no true, real, lawful power at all, or which may be a sufficient ground to depose. For every power hath relation to the effect, and where there can be no real and lawful effect, or practice, there is no real and lawful power to practise; for power, and effect, or practice, are correlatives, and one dependeth upon the other. And this is so plain and manifest, that there needeth no declaration of his Majesty, to explain the same. And therefore I wish you to remember, that when the words of penal Laws may, according to their proper and usual signification, be expounded in a favourable sense, we ought not, contrary to the rules prescribed by Divines, for the interpreting of laws, seek to wrest them to an absurd and inconvenient sense. Neither can any man, with any colour of reason imagine, that his Majesty would have us to swear, or acknowledge that, which he himself knoweth to be untrue, to wit, that the Pope hath not any power or authority to depose, so much as in the conceit, imagination, and opinion of some Catholics, yea and of the Pope himself; but his meaning is, to have us to swear, or at least acknowledge by Oath, that the Pope hath no true, real, and lawful power to depose, and which may be a sufficient ground and foundation, to practise the deposition of any absolute Prince, notwithstanding this their conceit, imagination, or opinion. 9 But perchance you will object, that both the power to depose, and also the practice itself is approved for lawful and sufficient, not only by the ancient school-divines, who peradventure (as you insinuate above) might not have marked all widdrington's grounds, but also by our own modern Doctors, who no doubt have seen the reasons, and examined the grounds on both parts, therefore the Pope hath at least wise a probable, lawful, and sufficient power to practise the deposition of Princes. But this objection hath been answered at large in the Neweyeares' Gift * Cap. 9 num. 9 For those Doctors, who approve the practice of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, do ground their doctrine upon a very false principle, and which all the world now seethe to be false and absurd, to wit, that it is certain and unquestionable among Catholics, that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes; or else they did not observe the manifest difference betwixt the lawful practice of a probable power concerning favour, and punishment. But that doctrine ought not to be accounted probable in respect of extrinsecall grounds, or the authority of Doctors, when it is grounded upon a principle, which is known to be manifestly false, as is this, that it is not now a controversy among Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, or no. Neither can you allege any one ancient, or modern Doctor, who holding the doctrine, for the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be but probable, approveth the practice thereof to be lawful. For which cause they have so much laboured these latter years, to prove it to be certain, and of faith, but all in vain. And therefore they have now thought it best to be silent, then to write any more of this controversy, lest their further writings prove the doctrine, which they in times past would have had to be certain, to be now scarce probable. Yet I cannot but commend the ingenuity of Becanus, who although some years past was as hot in this question, Becanus in Tract. de fide. ca 15. q 4. as any of the rest; for before he affirmed, that it is certain at the least, f In Controversia Anglic. cha. 3. q. 3. that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, yet now having some occasion to treat thereof again, is content to leave it as a difficulty, or controversy. Certum est, etc. It is certain (saith he) that if we regard only the Law of God, or Nature, heretical Princes are not deprived of their Dominions, or jurisdiction, de facto: But whether a Prince may, by the Law of the Church, and the Pope's sentence, be deprived of his Dominion and jurisdiction, it is a difficulty. And therefore Card. Peron now in his last book, cap. 91. p. 633. expressly affirmeth, That this controversy ought not to hinder the reunion of those, who should be reconciled to the Church. In so much, that he laboureth also to excuse Card. Bellarmine, and saith, that Card. Bellarmine hath admonished his Readers, that what he propounded, concerning the Pope's power indirectly in temporals, he did not propound it as a doctrine of faith, and whereof we must needs hold the one part, or the other, under pain of Excommunication, and Anathema: which is as much as to say, that albeit Card. Bellarmine did hold it to be a doctrine of faith, yet he did hold it to be so only in his own private opinion, which others of the contrary opinion were not bound to follow under pain of Excommunication and Anathema. As likewise, although the jesuites in times past held their doctrine de auxilijs gratiae, to be of faith; yet because they held it to be so only in their private opinion, they knew right well, that the Dominicans, who held the contrary, were not bound to follow their private opinion, under pain of Excommunication, and Anathema: and therefore they did not thereby cause a Schism in the Church, by seeking to exclude them from Sacraments, and Ecclesiastical Communion. Neither ought they now, according to Card. Peron his doctrine, proceed otherwise in this controversy of the Pope's power to depose Princes. 10. And if you object again, which you urge beneath, Sect. 11. concerning a probable title, that if a probable power to depose and punish, be not a sufficient and lawful power to practise, it is as good as no power at all. I answer, that for as much as concerneth practice, it is in very deed as good as no power at all, for that a probable power cannot be a sufficient ground to punish, or deprive any man of that which he possesseth, as Lessius, and P. Kellinson well observed, yet speaking generally your consequence is not good, for no power is good for nothing, but a probable power to punish and depose, is good for this, to have the matter examined by a lawful and undoubted judge, who in respect of the deciding of the Pope's power to depose Princes, can only be a lawful and undoubted General Council, as hath been declared sufficiently in the Newyears Gift. And this may suffice for the clearing of this difficulty. Sect. 3. Objection. SEcondly I find (say you) another difficulty about your exposition of the fourth Branch; for I cannot see, how any with safety of conscience can swear, that the doctrine, which maintaineth, That Princes which be excommunicated and deprived, may be deposed, or murdered by their own subjects, etc. is impious and heretical, though we should take heretical in that sense, which you do take it (which yet in my conceit is not so proper with us, nor Protestants, who most of them hold that for heretical, which subverteth the foundation of faith, and not that which is contrary to Scripture.) Answer. 1. BUT before I go any further, Answ. to set down and examine the proofs of what here you say, it is strange to me, that a man of your learning and reading should conceive, that the taking of heretical in that sense, wherein Widdrington doth take it, to wit, for that false doctrine, which is contrary to the holy Scriptures, is not so proper neither with us, nor Protestants. For the Protestants hold the Scriptures to be the only rule of saith, and consequently that to be heretical, or against faith, which is contrary to the Word of God, which is the rule of faith. And therefore every falsehood, which is repugnant to the Word, and testimony of God contained in the holy Scriptures, is in the doctrine of Protestants, and also of the most Catholic Divines, heretical, and repugnant to divine and supernatural faith, though it be only in a point of some historical narration, as to deny, Euod. 3. that God appeared to Moses in a flame of fire out of the mids of a bush, & that the bush burned with fire, & was not consumed, job. 1. or to deny that job had seven sons, and three daughters, or such like: for albeit these, and such like falsehoods, do not directly and expressly subvert the foundation of faith, ex parte credendorum, in regard of the material object of supernatural faith, which is principally contained in the Articles of our Creed, yet they subvert the foundation of faith, ex parte regulae fidei, and in regard of the formal object of faith, which is the infallible truth and testimony of God revealed to us in the holy Scriptures: and so the averring of these fashoods make God a Liar, and do indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence subvert the first Article of our Creed, and destroy the infinite power, knowledge, or goodness of God, and consequently God himself, and therefore are truly and properly heretical falsehoods, or repugnant to faith, both according to Protestants, and most learned Catholic Divines. Whereupon all Divines commonly do put in the first place, or degree of heretical propositions, those which are expressly and formally against the holy Scriptures, and in second, or third place those, which are repugnant to the definitions of the Church. See Cardinal Turrecremata in Sum. de Ecclesia lib. 4. part. 2. cap. 10. Canus lib. 12. de locis cap. 7. Bannes' 2 a 2ae. q. 11. ar. 2. Franciscus de Christo dist. 25. in. q. 3. de haeresi, in Excursu de Catholica veritate. Directorium Inquit sitorum part. 2. comment. 27. in prima regula, besides Alphonsus de Castro, and Couerruuias, cited by Mr. Widdrington, in his answer to Mr. Fitzherbert, part. 2. Append. p. 69. 2. Veritas Catholica est veritas, etc. (saith Franciscus à Christo) Catholic verity is a verity delivered supernaturally, and made known by God alone; Whereof there are four kinds. The first kind is of those truths, or verities, which are formally and expressly contained in the holy Scriptures. And beneath saith he: Therefore the first degree of heretical propositions is of those, which are against Catholic verity, or truth contained formally & expressly in the holy Scriptures. The same saith Turrecremata in the places above cited. Catholicae veritates illae habendae sunt, etc. (saith Franciscus Pegna in Comment. 27. upon the Directory of the Inquisitors part. 2.) Catholic verities are to be accounted those, which are contained in the holy Scripture of the old and new Testament. And a little above in q. 2. Illa propositio etc. That proposition is heretical (saith Eymericus, whom Pegna glosseth) which is against the holy Scripture approved by the Church. 3. And therefore (as well saith Card. Turrecremata cap. 3.) Ecclesiae determinatio etc. The determination of the Church doth not make, nor can make heresy, or an heretical proposition, as neither Catholic verity: because, as Case tholike verities without all approbation of the Church; of their own nature are immutable, and immutably true, so immutably they are to be accounted Catholic: And likewise, heresies without all condensnation of the Church are heresies. The same saith Castro and Couerruuias cited by Widdrington g In his Appendix to the second part of Master Fitzherbert. num. 206. pag. 69. . Wherefore you must distinguish (as the aforesaid Doctors do well observe) betwixt Catholic verities and heresies secundùm se, & quoad nos, according to their own nature, and in respect of us; for heresies without all condemnation of the Church are heresies, although before the Church hath declared them to be heresies, they are not always known to all Catholics, but to some more or less, who see, that either directly, or indirectly, they contain a falsehood repugnant to the holy Scriptures. See also the definition which S. Robert of Lincoln maketh of heresy, related by Matthew Paris, in the life of K. Henry the third. pag. 846. Sect. 4. Objection. FOR though it be (say you) clear in Scriptures, Object. that none must do wrong, yet it is not clear in Scriptures, that the subject, or other deposing the Prince after deprivation, doth wrong. It is only grounded on your rule, In pari casu melior est conditio possidentis, In the like case the condition of the possessor is the better; which, though it be true, and grounded on reason, yet it is not de fide, of faith, or set down in Scripture, and consequently the doing against it not heretical. For (as you know) when a conclusion dependeth on two premises, whereof the one is de fide, of faith, the other not, when according to the Logicians rule, The Conclusion must follow the weaker part, the conclusion cannot be de fide, of faith, and consequently the contrary proposition to that conclusion cannot be heretical. And so, though it be clear in Scriptures, we must do no wrong, yet, because it is not in Scriptures proved, that it is a wrong for the subject, or other, to depose the Prince deprived, but proved so to be by your rule, which is no Scripture, it can not be sworn, that the doctrine so teaching is heretical. Answer. 1. BUT this discourse of yours is fare more weak, Answ. and insufficient than the former. And first to show the insufficiency thereof by some inconveniences; It is manifest, that, according to your principles, no particular proposition is of faith, and the contrary heretical, although it be never so clearly contained in the general proposition, which is expressed in the holy Scripture, unless both the premises, to prove the particular proposition to be included in the general, be expressly contained in the holy Scripture. And so by your manner of arguing, it is not lawful to abjure as heretical, any particular doctrine, which approveth the dishonouring of particular Parents, which approveth any particular adultery, theft, or murder; although they be never so unquestionable dishonouring, unquestionable adultery, unquestionable theft, or murder. For to prove these particular and unquestionable unlawful actions to be included in those general precepts, Honour thy father and mother: Thou shalt not commit adultery: Thou shalt not steal: Thou shalt not kill: one of the premises is not contained in the holy Scripture, but it must be deduced from natural reason, or humane testimonice, which are not Scriptures. For although it be clear in Scriptures, that we must honour our father and mother, yet it is not set down in Scriptures, although it be otherwise certain, that this particular man, or woman, is our father, or mother, but this must be proved by humane testimonies, and natural reason, which are not Scriptures. And although it be clear in Scriptures, that we must not commit adultery, yet it is not clear in Scriptures, although it be otherwise unquestionable, that this woman is another man's wife, and consequently, that particular abuse to be adultery, but this must be proved out of Scriptures: And although it be clear in Scriptures, that we must not steal from any man his goods, yet it is not clear in Scriptures, although it be otherwise certain, that these goods are an other man's, but this must be proved out of Scripture. And although it be clear in Scripture that we must not kill, and consequently an undoubted lawful King, yet it is not clear in Scripture, although it be otherwise certain, either that this particular kill of a privare man is done by private, and not by public authority, or that particular man to be a lawful King, or a King, yea or to be a man, but these must be proved by principles, which are no Scriptures. Many other examples may be brought out of the new Testament, as of Priests to remit sins, of Popes to be the chief Pastors of the Church, of Sacraments to be effectual outward signs of invisible grace, for that out of Scripture only we cannot prove any man whatsoever to be a true Priest, any Pope whatsoever to be a true Pope, or any Sacrament whatsoever to be a true Sacrament, but to prove them to be such, one of the premises must be taken out of the holy Scripture. 2 But lest you should object, that to draw one to an inconvenience is not to solve the argument, Secondly, I answer directly, that it is very untrue in my judgement, and also repugnant to the common doctrine of Divines, that to make a Conclusion to be faith, and the contrary heretical, both the premises must be expressly and formally contained in the holy Scriptures, but it is sufficient, that one only of them be expressed in the holy Scripture, and the other certain by natural reason. Ad fidem aliquîd pertinet dupliciter etc. To faith a thing belongeth two ways (saith S. Thomas 2.2. q. 11. ar. 2.) one way directly and principally, as the Articles of faith: an other way indirectly, and secondarily, as those things, from which doth follow the corruption of some article. Which words of S. Thomas Bannes declareth more plainly & distinctly in these words: Illa secundùm D. Thomam indirectè sunt fidei etc. Those things, according to S. Thomas, are indirectly of faith, by the denying whereof, it followeth necessarily by a good consequence that to be false, which is affirmed firmed by faith. As if one deny Christ to have power to laugh, doth err in the Catholic faith consequently, and indirectly. Because it well followeth by a consequence known by the light of nature, that Christ is not a perfect man. 3 Et notandum est, aliquam propositionem esse de fide duobus modis etc. And it is to be noted (saith Franciscus de Christo h Pag. 23 ) that a proposition is of faith two ways, one way, proximè, and immediately, of which sort is every proposition, which is formally and expressly contained in the holy Scripture, as that Abraham had two sons: the other way a proposition is of faith mediately, of which sort is every proposition, which by a good consequence is deduced from that which is immediately of faith, as that Christ had not power to understand, & that he had not a will etc. Therefore that proposition, which is deduced from that, which is formally contained in the holy Scriptures, is of faith, and the proposition repugnant to that is heretical. Thus he. And Franciscus Pegna in his Annotations upon the Directory of the Inquisitours part. 2. Comment. 27. citing for the same Cardinal Turrecremata, and other Doctors, putteth in the second place, or degree of Catholic verities, those; which are by a necessary consequence deduced from the holy Scriptures. And a little after he affirmeth, that those propositions are to be accounted heretical, which are repugnant to these Catholic assertions. And therefore I marvel, that you should conceive that proposition not to be heretical, which is deduced from two premises, whereof the one is expressly repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and the other deduced necessarily from the light of natural reason, or sensible experience, although we should take heretical in that sense, wherein Widdrington doth take it. For according to your principles, M. Widdrington could not maintain, that it is heretical to affirm, that Christ had not humane understanding and will, and that, every Tyrant may and ought lawfully & meritoriously be slain by any whatsoever &c. which nevertheless are expressly condemned by General Counsels for heretical; Because to prove these propositions to be heretical, one of the premises is only deduced from the light of natural reason, which is no Scripture. 4 And if perchance you should answer, that these propositions are therefore heretical, because General Counsels have condemned them for heretical, now you fly from taking the word heretical in that sense, wherein Widdrington with most Catholic Divines, and all Protestants do take the word heretical, who hold that the definition, or declaration of the Church doth not make any Catholic verity, or any doctrine heretical, but suppose it, declare it, & make it known to all Catholics, which nevertheless before any declaration, or definition of the Church, was indeed Catholic verity, or heretical doctrine, and also known so to be to divers learned men, who evidently saw the necessary consequence from both the premises. For also, as well writeth Molina a most learned jesuite, Concursus, Molina 1. part. q. 1. ar. 2 disp. 1. quo spiritus sanctus praesto adest Ecclesiae etc. The assistance, wherewith the holy Ghost is present with the Catholic Church, is not to make any thing of faith, which before was not of faith, but only that she do not err in declaring those things, which mediately, or immediately belong to faith. Wherefore, as in the Church there is not power & authority to make any thing of faith, which before was not of faith, but only to declare to the faithful, which is certainly to be held of faith, so also neither is there power and authority to make any sacred Scripture, or to add to it any canonical book, or any part, but only to judge betwixt canonical books, and not canonical. Thus he, wherein, as you have seen above i In the third Section. , he agreeth with the common doctrine of Divines. 5 Now to that Logical maxim, That the Conclusion followeth the weaker part, which is the chief ground of your objection, I answer, that although it be frequent in every man's mouth, yet you are not ignorant, that it is not by learned men understood, and expounded alike. And first, if you will understand it without exception, limitation, or declaration, how will you make good Aristotle's saying in his first book of the Priors cap. 10. When the Mayor proposition is necessary, and the Minor de inesse, the Conclusion is necessary, and not de inesse, if the Conclusion do always follow the weaker part? 6 Secondly, you know, that many learned Divines, whom Molina the jesuite in the place above cited doth follow, expound it thus, That the Conclusion followeth the weaker part quoad certitudinem & evidentiam, in respect of certitude and evidence, wherein the Conclusion dependeth upon both the premises, non quoad supernaturalitatem, not in regard of supernaturalitie, wherein it only dependeth upon Divine and supernatural faith. For to make an act supernatural, it is sufficient, that one of the causes be supernatural, as it is apparent in the acts of contrition, of faith, hope, and charity, to which concur the understanding. and will of man, which are natural causes, and yet they are supernatural acts, because they are produced by a supernatural habit, for which cause they affirm, that a Theological conclusion deduced from one principle of faith, and from the other known by the light of natural reason, is supernatural, because it is produced by the supernatural habit of faith. 7 Thirdly, others (who hold with S. Thomas, and the common doctrine of Divines, that doctrine to be of faith which either directly and expressly, or indirectly, and virtually is contained in the holy Scripture, and the contrary to be heretical, & that the Church doth not make Catholic verity or heresy, but only doth declare, and make it certainly known to all Catholics, which before her declaration was not certainly known to all) do answer thus: That the Conclusion followeth the weaker part, principally, directly, and immediately: but when the weaker part is necessarily connected with the stronger, than also the Conclusion doth follow the stronger part, secundarily, indirectly, and mediately. And the reason hereof is evident; for when one thing is necessarily connected with an other, that which followeth the one, must consequently follow the other, at the least secundarily, indirectly, and mediately. Wherefore, seeing that all dishonouring of Parents, all Theft, all Murder, all Adultery are against Scripture directly and expressly, it necessarily followeth, that every particular contained in the general, being sufficiently proved to be contained therein, (of whatsoever kind that proof be) is also indirectly, virtually, or by a necessary consequence repugnant to Scripture. And hereby also appeareth the weakness of the application you make of your argument to the murdering of Princes which are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, in these words following. Sect. 5. Objection. IN like manner (say you) though it be clear in Scriptures, Object. we must not murder, yet it is not clear in Scripture, that it is murder, if a private man go about to kill a Prince deprived, if he still usurp, when Tyrannical Usurpers may be slain by private men, as all do grant. I say, if he still usurp; for if he do not, but yield up his Crown, as some have done after deprivation, it were evident murder to kill such a Prince, as all do teach. It is only deduced out of your rule, In pari casu etc. In the like case etc. to be murder; which rule when it is not in Scripture, as I said before, the opposite doctrine can not be heretical. Answer. 1 But first, although it be not clear in Scriptures directly and immediately, Answ. that it is murder to kill a Prince excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, if he will not obey his sentence of deprivation (not to use your unrespective words, if he still usurp, seeing that a Prince, who hath possession, and a probable title, is by none accounted an Usurper) yet it is repugnant to Scriptures indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence, to kill such a Prince: for that neither Excommunication, which depriveth him only of spiritual graces, nor deprivation, which depriveth him only of his kingdom (according to those that hold it for certain that the Pope hath authority to deprive Princes) & not of his life, can hinder, that the kill of such a Prince is not included in that general, Thou shalt not kill. 2 Secondly, I wonder that you holding it probable (as I suppose) that the Pope hath not authority to deprive Princes, should so dangerously & seditiously apply that similitude of kill Usurpers, to the kill of Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, seeing that the doctrine of kill Usurpers is understood by all that approve it, of known, manifest and undoubted Usurpers, and not of such, as have possession, & also a probable title to the Crown, as have all those Princes, which are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, supposing it to be a controversy among Catholics (as undoubtedly it is) whether the Pope hath authority to deprive wicked Princes, or no. if 3 Thirdly, that which you say [that he yield up his Crown as some have done, it were evident murder in any one to go about to kill such a Prince] is very true, yet it is not clear and expressly contained in Scripture, but to prove it evident murder, you must use the help of an argument, whereof one of the premises is not formally and expressly contained in Scripture. And therefore, according to your grounds, you could not abjure as heretical that doctrine, which should maintain it for no murder, although you grant it to be evident murder. 4 Fourthly, if you will call to mind the Histories of those Princes, who have yielded up their Crowns after deprivation, whereof you can name but very few, you shall find such stuff about the practice of this doctrine of deposing, that any zealous Catholic may be ashamed thereof. Among those few Princes, remember our king john, who rendered up his Crown after deprivation. But to whom did he yield or render it? Not to the next heir of the blood Royal, who after King john's deprivation was forthwith the true King by right, if King john was truly and really deprived, but he gave it to the Pope. And how, I pray you, could he give that to the Pope, whereof he was deprived, and consequently had no right therein, if the Pope had truly authority to deprive him? Or how could the Pope accept thereof, if King john when he gave it to the Pope was deprived thereof, and consequently had no right to give that which was not his. But let us on to the rest of your Discourse. Sect. 6. Objection. ANd as for the examples you produce to prove (say you) that these particulars are contained in the generals, Object. me think they are not so good and apt for that purpose, and in them I find a great disparity. For to take a purse from our neighbour, or to kill him with a pen knife, if he lead a wanton life, are unquestionable theft, and murder, and included in the generals; and that one liveth a wicked life can no way be excuse for the fault committed: But to depose or kill a Prince deprived, if after deprivation he usurp, is with many questionable, and probably thought by some neither theft nor murder: and so though to you, according to your rule, they may be thought so to be, yet by others they are no more reputed such, or included in the general proposition of theft and murder, then taking a Cow or Horse from the enemy in time of war, when the cause is just, or killing a Tyrant in call Usurper in a Commonwealth, which neither are Theft nor Murder, nor can with safe conscience be sworn so to be. Answer. 1 But first, you greatly abuse the Author of the Newyears gift, Answ. in affirming, that he brought those examples to make a parity or similitude betwixt them, and the deposing and murdering of Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope. For he brought them only to show, that it is not necessary to make a proposition de fide, of faith, and the contrary heretical, that it be formally, and expressly contained in the holy Scripture, but that it sufficeth to be contained virtually, & by a necessary consequence, and that no word, or circumstance expressed in the particular proposition do hinder, that it be not included in the general proposition, which is formally and expressly contained in the holy Scripture. Neither did he apply them otherwise, as you may see, if you will peruse the place. 2 Secondly, although he had compared them together, as he did not, yet the parity is not so unapt, as you would seem to make it. For albeit there be a great disparity betwixt them (as there is betwixt salt and sugar in taste but not in colour) yet they both agree in this, for which only purpose he brought those examples, that they are not formally and expressly contained in the holy Scriptures, but only by a necessary consequence proved to be Theft and Murder; as also the deposing and murdering of Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, are by a necessary consequence proved by the said Author to be Theft and Murder, and consequently comprehended in those general words, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill, as particulars in the universals. 3 But to take a purse from his neighbour, or to kill him with a pistol, if he lead a wicked life, are unquestionable Theft and Murder (say you) and included in the generals etc. This is very true, and for that cause the Author of the Newyears Gift brought those examples. But you can not prove by Scriptures only, that they are unquestionable Theft and Murder, because they are not formally and expressly forbidden in the word of God, but to prove them to be unquestionable Theft and Murder, you must use a Syllogism, whereof one of the premises is not in the Word of God, but grounded on the light of natural reason, which is no Scripture. And so, according to the Discourse you made above, although this Theft, and Murder be undoubtedly contained in those generals, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill, yet you cannot abjure, as heretical, that doctrine, which approveth them to be lawful. Nay, according to your grounds, you cannot abjure as heretical that doctrine, which holdeth it lawful to kill any particular man whatsoever, although it be most assuredly Murder, for that you cannot prove by Scriptures, that he is a man, but this premisse you must prove by natural reason, or evidence of sense, neither of which is Scripture. 4 But to depose (say you) or kill a Prince deprived, if after deprivation he usurp, is with many questionable, and probably thought by some, neither Theft, nor Murder, etc. To kill a Prince deprived by the Pope is by no man questionable, Suarez in Defence. fidei Cathol. etc. lib. 6. ca 4. num. 10. unless the Pope, after deprivation, give a particular commission to kill him. And in this case only Suarez among all that ever I read, durst adventure to teach expressly, That if the Pope give such a commission to any private man, he may lawfully kill such a Prince. But considering that this seditious, or rather diabolical doctrine is, grounded upon a most false and improbable foundation, to wit, that it is a clear point of faith, and out of all controversy among Catholics, that the Pope hath authority to dispose of the Crowns, and also life's of temporal Princes in order to spiritual good, which all the world seethe not only to be a controversy among them, but also to be condemned by the Parliament of Paris, for a false and seditious, damnable and pernicious doctrine, it is manifest, that the conclusion, which is grounded upon this false and improbable foundation, cannot be probable. And therefore those your words [and probably thought by some, to be neither Theft, nor Murder] are very untrue, and dangerous, and also the examples you bring in taking spoils from the enemy in time of just war, and killing a Tyrant in call an Usurper, are unaptly and perniciously (not to say seditiously, applied by you to the kill of a Prince deprived by the Pope, or taking from him his Crown: both for that deprivation doth not take away the right he hath to live, neither is that Prince, keeping his Crown after deprivation, such a known and manifest Usurper, as that he hath not at least a probable title to the Crown, of which manifest Usurpers only, those Divines, who approve the kill of Usurpers, do speak. And that it is manifest Theft, to take from a Prince his Crown, to which he hath a probable right after deprivation, you shall see more plainly beneath. Sect. 7. Objection. BEsides your exposition (say you) of those words [depose, Object. or murder] taken out of Widdrington in his Theological Disputation, to prove the lawfulness of swearing this Branch, seemeth to me not altogether so sound. For though indeed such examples may be found sometimes, yea and oftentimes (as he well doth demonstrate) wherein for the truth of a conditional disiunctive proposition, it sufficeth, that the one part be true, though the other be false, and consequently we may swear the whole proposition, if the one part be but true, yet hic & nunc in this Oath, and with these circumstances, with the words going before, and the words coming after, adding thereunto the intention of the Lawmaker, who no doubt would have us no less detest the one, than the other, it cannot be, but they must by the Oath be both abjured as heretical; and consequently, this evasion of the conditional disiunctive can help nothing here to save from perjury. Answer. 1. BUT first, Answ. you are greatly mistaken in setting down Mr. widdrington's doctrine concerning the nature of a conditional disiunctive proposition. For he doth not say, that to the truth, but to the falsehood of a conditional disiunctive proposition it sufficeth, that the one part be true, though the other befalse, and consequently that we may, he doth say, swear, but abjure the whole proposition, if the one part be but true. But this your mistaking I do not attribute to any want of you in the understanding of Mr. widdrington's doctrine in this point, but only to the error and hastiness of your pen. 2. Secondly, he doth not only say, that sometimes and oftentimes, but also that most commonly the conditional disiunctive proposition, to wit, when the Conjunction [or] followeth the Verb [may] is so to be taken; and that there can scarce be alleged any one conditional disiunctive proposition, wherein it is not so to be taken: and that therefore, according to the Seventh Branch, we ought to take it so in this Clause. 3. Thirdly, I marvel, that you should so resolutely affirm, without alleging any reason, that without doubt the intention of the Lawmaker is, that we should no less detest the one part of the proposition, than the other; especially, seeing that Mr. Widdrington hath answered at large this objection in his Confutation of Mr. Fitzherbert, who urged the same objection more fully, than you have done, and yet you urge here Mr. fitzherbert's objection, and take no notice of Mr. widdrington's answer to the same. And is it possible, that a man of your learning can imagine, that his Majesty doth detest no less (that is in the same degree of detestation and falsity) the doctrine of murdering Princes excommunicated, or deprived of the Pope, than he doth of deposing them? Or, that he conceiveth, that the doctrine of murdering the said Princes, is not more manifestly false, and against Scripture, then is the doctrine of deposing them? If you had diligently perused his Majesty's books, you might have seen, that against the doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, he bringeth many proofs, both out of the old and new Testament, but against the doctrine of murdering them, he doth not so much labour; for that he supposeth it to be so manifestly false, that no Catholic, or Christian Divine could be so temetarious, as to approve the same. 4. But howsoever his Majesty be persuaded, yet his intention (which in this Oath we must chief regard, and not his belief, persuasion, or opinion) is (for as much as by reason, and his Majesty declaration we can conjecture) that we should take the words, according to the common sense and understanding of them, as we are expressly bound by the Seventh Branch of the Oath, which, as Mr. Widdrington hath proved, is, that we are not bound to abjure both parts for heretical. And truly I wonder, that whereas you may, and are bound to expound the words in a favourable sense, you seek all evasions and devices, to expound them in a sense most false and absurd, to the overthrowing of the temporal estates of English Catholics, to the disgrace of his Majesty, and to the scandal of the Catholic Roman Religion. Sect. 8. Objection. Moreover, Object. the ground (say you) whereon the lawfulness of swearing, that the doctrine, which maintaineth the Pope's authority to depose Princes after deprivation is heretical, is not so certain. For it is this sole rule, In dubio melior est conditio possidentis, In a doubt the condition of the possessor is the better: which rule seemeth to me to be understood rather in vero dubio, in a true doubt, and when neither side hath probability, as when the mind doth fluctuate betwixt two, and can yield assent to neither part of the contradiction, than otherwise; but about the Pope's power to depose Princes there is no such doubt, or fluctuation, but both parts by you are thought probable, at the least speculatively. Answer. 1. BUT first, Answ. albeit this rule be oftentimes cited by Doctors, In causa dubia, or In dubio etc. In a doubtful cause, or In a doubt, etc. yet both the Canon and Civil Law, and you yourself above do cite it, In paricasu, etc. In the like case, etc. And why do not you now cite it in the same manner as you did above. In the like case etc. but, In a doubt. Is it possible, that you can imagine, that when both sides have probability, non est par casus, The case is not alike? 2. Secondly, not only this rule, In pari casu etc. In the like case etc. But also (besides that other rule, Cum sunt inra partium etc. When the rights of the parties, who are in strife, are obscure, or not clear; the Defendant is rather to be favoured, than the Plaintiff,) The common doctrine of Divines, whereof some are cited in the New-year's Gift k In the first observation. nu. 11. pag. 43. , who understand it not only of a true, but also of a probable doubt, and who also in my judgement prove the same by convincing reasons: And yet you bring no other reason, or authority, that it is to be understood only of a true doubt, but your own conceit [which rule seemeth to me (say you) to be understood rather in a true doubt, and when neither side hath probability, than otherwise] Is this (think you) a sound and sincere confutation of widdrington's doctrine in a matter, which is so injurious to the sovereign right of Princes, and so prejudicial and dangerous to the souls and temporal estates of English Catholics? Sect. 9 Objection. AND although Lessius and others with you seem to hold (say you) that none can be deprived of his right upon a probable title only, Object yet that must be understood first, if that right be not retained with the wrong of others, or the retaining of that right be not the hindrance of a greater good. Answer. 1. BUT first, Answ. why do you use those words [seem to hold] as though they did not in very deed hold, that none can be deprived of his right to that, whereof he hath possession, upon a probable power, or title only, whereas it is manifest, that they do expressly hold the same? 2. Secondly, why did you omit those words [upon a probable power] whereas there is a great difference betwixt a probable power to punish, and depose, and a probable title, Lessius in his Singleton, part. 2. num. 38. and Lessius speaketh expressly of a probable power to punish, and to deprive one of that; which he actually possesseth. 3. Thirdly, Lessius proveth the insufficiency of a probable power to punish by a convincing argument: For if it were any way doubtful, the person accused might except against the judge, and not obey him. And hereupon credit is not given to delegates, to the prejudice of another man unless by an authentical Instrument they show their authority, so that no just cause of doubt be further left: And D. Kellinson * In his Treatise called, The Prince, and the Prelate, cap. 11. pa. 235. with others prove the insufficiency of a probable title, without possession by those two rules above cited, In pari casu, etc. and Cum sunt iura partium obscura, etc. And Vasquez confirmeth the same, as you shall see beneath, l Sect. 10. num. 2. by other reasons in his judgement unanswerable. And yet you, without bringing any authority, reason, or proof at all, affirm too too resolutely [that it must be understood first, if that right be not retained with the wrong of others, by whom you mean the Pope and Church] whereas they understand it generally, and also the former Authors speak expressly of the Pope's power to depose wicked Princes: where you falsely suppose a wrong done to the Pope and Church, in resisting the Pope's sentence of deprivation: For a Prince, being deprived only by a probable power, doth no man wrong by keeping his probable right and possession, according to that maxim of the Law, grounded on natural reason, Qui utitur iure suo nemini facit iniuriam: He that useth his right doth no man wrong. 4. Moreover, your first exception [if that right be not retained with the wrong of others] is frivolous, for that always in the case of rights to temporal Kingdoms and goods, it may be presumed, that the right is retained with the wrong, or rather detriment of others, because temporal Kingdoms and goods, if they do not belong to the Prince, or person deprived, they must needs belong to others. And beside, as it hath been said above, a probableright with possession is retained without wrong to any man. And lastly, your second exception [or if the retaining of that right be not a hindrance to a greater good] doth savour too much of that false principle, over much frequent in the mouths and actions of some unlearned jesuites, Ad maiorem gloriam Dei, etc. To the greater glory of God, etc. For good ends, and greater good are not to be effected by bad means: And therefore, albeit the retaining of that right should be an hindrance to a greater good, it little importeth, unless it be an unjust hindrance, and unless the Prince deprived by a probable power only, in keeping his probable right with possession, hindereth unjustly a greater good: which to be an unjust hindrance, you cannot possibly prove with any colour of a probable argument, as more plainly you shall see beneath. Sect. 10. Objection. AND secondly (say you) if they who contend about that right, Object. have a Superior to decide the controversy, and determine unto whom the right belongeth: But if one, by retaining that right upon a probable title, should wrong others, whose good is more to be respected, then his, who is in possession of that right; or if those, who contend about right, have no Superior to decide the matter, and to determine to whom the right belongeth, I see not, why one may not be deprived of his right upon a probable title. And so we see, that Kings and Princes, who have no Superiors, but every one is supreme Lord in his own dominions, oftentimes fall to wars, and one seek to dispossess another only upon a probable title. Answer. 1. BUT first it is manifest, that no man, Answ. who hath a probable right, and withal possession, doth any wrong to another, of what quality, condition, or state soever he be, by keeping his probable right and possession: and that no good is to be procured by unjust means, and consequently, that the retaining of a probable right with possession cannot be an unjust hindrance to the good of any, whether it be the Pope, or Church itself. For if to invade the Kingdom of a Prince, only upon a probable title without possession, be no wrong, or any unjust hindrance of a greater good (as you, in Vasquez judgement, very falsely, perniciously, and absurdly suppose) much more it is no wrong, nor any just hindrance to greater good, for a Prince to defend his Kingdom, to which he hath not only a probable right, but also possession thereof. And therefore that exception of yours [But if one by retaining his probable right, should wrong others, whose good is more to be respected, then his, who is in possession of that right] is idle, and cannot be applied to a Prince, who justly retaineth his probable right, to the Kingdom whereof he hath possession, and consequently without any wrong to others, whose good must not be respected, or effected by doing wrong to him. 2 Secondly, albeit you do not see why one may not be deprived of his right upon a probable title, if those who contend for right have no Superior to decide the matter, and to determine to whom the right belongeth, yet you might easily have seen a reason thereof, if you had called to mind the doctrine of your Master Vasquez, who saw and yielded a reason thereof so clearly, Vasques 1.2 disp 64. c. 3. that he feared not to tax this your doctrine not only of falsehood, but also of pernicious improbability, and absurdity. Immo semper existimavi hanc doctrinam nihil probabilitis habere etc. Yea I have ever thought (saith he) this doctrine to have no probability, and to have been in no little mischief, and detriment of the Christian Commonwealth. And therefore he would not have sticked to detest your doctrine, as false, improbable, pernicious, and the contrary to acknowledge for certain: and he proveth it by these reasons, which, in his judgement, are convincing: For war is an act of punitive justice, inflicting a punishment, and chastising Rebels: and the nature of just war consisteth in this, that by vindicative justice he be punished, who is worthy of punishment in regard of some fault, either actually committed, or at least wise justly presumed. But it cannot be justly presumed, that a Prince committeth any fault, who, by way of defence, retaineth his prohable right to the kingdom which he possesseth, against the pretensions of any one, who claimeth only a probable right without possession. Et praeterea omnis controversia etc. And moreover every controversy, saith he, which is in opinions concerning some right, is not to be decided by powerfulness and arms, but by judgement. For it seemeth to be the custom of Barbarous men to decide the better right to reign in the more powerful arms. Quod si dicas, posse duos illos Principes etc. And if thou say (saith Vasques) that those two Princes may make just war on either side, for that both of them are led by a probable opinion, and think that the right to reign belongeth to them, this is manifestly absurd etc. which he doth there, in his judgement, most plainly convince. Nevertheless, as you shall see beneath m Sect. 13. nu. 2. I rely upon a more assured, & less questionable ground, than this doctrine of Vasques; for this question concerning Princes making war upon a probable title, which is merely temporal, I will show to be impertinent to our present controversy, concerning the Pope's authority to depose Princes. 3 Thirdly, albeit some few Divines do hold (which Vasquez accounteth to be manifestly absurd and improbable) that it is lawful for Princes to make war upon a probable title, yet some of them expressly affirm, that those Princes, who contend about their probable title, are bound, before they can lawfully make war, Novar in Zion. cap. 25 nu. 4. to choose and admit Arbitrary judges to decide the controversy, for that there is no other peaceable way (they being both supreme judges, nor the one subject to the other, or to any other superior judge in temporals) to end it but by arbitrement: which if any of those Princes refuse to admit, than the other Prince (say these Divines) may make war, but not in regard only of his probable title, but for doing wrong in not admitting Arbiters, to end the controversy in a peaceable manner, without making war, for that war must not be waged, when the controversy may otherwise be peaceably ended. But neither also with this controversy will I intermeddle. 4 Fourthly, whereas you say [that Kings and Princes, who have no Superiors oftentimes fall to wars, and one seek to dispossess an other only upon a probable title] you might for answer hereof have called to mind, what Card. Bellarmine, related by Widdrington n In his Apology for the right of Princes, nu. 445 , answereth to such kind of arguments, Aliud est facta Regum refer etc. It is one thing to relate the facts of Kings, and an other to prove their power & authority. And besides it may very well be, that the Prince, who beginneth the war, thinketh his title to be certain, and the others title not to be probable. And moreover the title, for which they make war, may be merely temporal, which belongeth not to our case, as you shall see beneath. But let us go on to the rest of your objections. Sect. 11. Objection. ANd if a probable title (say you) were not sufficient excuse for the dispossessing of the right, Object. which an other holdeth, it were as good have no title at all, as a probable title without possession. Answer. 1 But first, Answ. your consequence is not good. For no title is good for nothing, but a probable title without possession, in subjects is good for this, to call the title in question, and to have it examined & decided by a lawful and undoubted judge: and in absolute Princes, who have no Superiors in temporals, it is good in the opinion of some Divines to have the matter put to arbitrement or compromise, which if the Prince, who is in possession refuse, the other Prince may (according to the doctrine of these Divines, wherewith I will not meddle) make war against him, for the wrong done him in not admitting Arbiters. Also a probable title without possession is better than no title, for that it is good after the decease of them who have possession, to have the matter decided by the Kingdom or Commonwealth, to whom it belongeth (as well observeth Vasquez) to determine doubtful titles, when none is in possession: As also, according to the doctrine of all Divines, it belongeth to the Church, or Spiritual kingdom of Christ (which a general Council doth represent) to determine and decide the doubtful titles of two Popes, although both of them be partly in possession. 2 Secondly, your consequent, for as much as concerneth the making of war upon a probable title without possession, Vasquez would not fear to admit. For it is not absurd to grant, that a probable title without possession is as good as no title, for the making of war against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession. As also it is no absurdity to grant, but rather a most certain doctrine, that aprobable matter of Baptism is in some case, for as much as concerneth practise, as good as no matter, See Vasques 1.2 disp. 63 & disp. 64 cap. 4. for that it is not lawful in some case to baptise with a probable matter, to wit, when we may use a certain and undoubted matter: And a probable medicine is in some case as good as no medicine, for that it is not lawful to apply to one a probable medicine, when an undoubted medicine may be applied. Sect. 12. Objection. NOw in this contention (say you) betwixt the pope, Object. & the Prince, though the Prince have a probable title after deprivation, and also possession, it is holden with wrong to the Church, & prejudice to Christ's flock, whose good is more to be respected, than the private good of a temporal▪ Prince. And so it seemeth, he may be deprived of his right upon a probable title (though absolutely abstracting from such case it may not be done) Answer. 1 But this hath been fully answered above: Answ. For it is a most false and seditious doctrine to hold, that a Prince in keeping the possession of his Crown, to which (as you confess) he hath a probable right after deprivation, doth any wrong, or injury to the Church, or any unjust prejudice to Christ's flock, or that the good of the Church, or of Christ's flock is to be respected, or obtained by unjust means, and with the wrong of any man, much less of Princes, who in using & defending their probable right being in possession, do no man wrong: For if it be no wrong (as you, in Vasquez judgement, falsely and absurdly suppose) for the Pope or Prince, who hath only a probable title without possession, to invade and assault an other Prince, who hath both a probable title, and also possession, much more it is no wrong for this Prince so assaulted to defend himself. And therefore you must not be so mindful of the good of the Church, or other good ends, that you forget, that the good of the Church, and all good ends must be obtained by good means, for as you know, Bonum est ex integra causa etc. Good proceedeth from and entier cause, Dionysius Areo pag. 4. cap. de diu. nom. but evil from every defect. 2 Secondly, I do not well understand that exception you make in your last words [though absolutely abstracting from such case it may not be done] For I do not see, but that, according to the principles of your doctrine, if an heretical or wicked Prince be deprived by the Pope, his Kingdom must always be held by him with wrong to the Church, and prejudice to Christ's flock etc. and so that exception of yours, whereby you would seem to limit your former false assertion, is in my conceit to little purpose. And moreover, whether it better for God's glory, and the good of the Church, Leo serm. 1. de SS. Petro & Paulo to have sometimes persecutions, Whereby (as S. Leo saith) the Church is not diminished, but increased etc. We cannot so easily know, and therefore we ought rather to leave it to the judgement of him, who maketh a man that is an hypocrite reign for the sins of the people, job. 34. than over rashly to judge of the secrets of God's providence. Sect. 13. Objection. Again, though in your conceit and opinion (say you) the Pope and Prince have a Superior or head to judge the controversy betwixt them, Object. to wit, a general Council, yet in the opinion of others, who hold, that the Pope is above the Council, and consequently hath no head, it seemeth the Pope may (as other Princes may without injury) go about to depose a Prince deprived upon a probable title, though in full possession of his right and dominions. Answer. 1 MY conceit indeed is, that it is very probable that a general Council excluding the Pope is above atrue and undoubted Pope, Answ. and that to conceive the contrary is altogether improbable and absurd. Now to your argument: First therefore I have showed above, that according to the doctrine of Vasquez (which he thinketh to be certain, and the contrary improbable, absurd, and pernicious) no Prince can lawfully in regard only of the probability of his title, make war against an other Prince, who, besides a probable title, hath also possession. 2 But secondly (because I will not meddle with this question concerning Princes making war upon probable titles, which are merely temporal, for that it is impertinent to our controversy concerning the Pope's authority to depose princes) you may observe a great disparity betwixt the titles or rights, which temporal Princes do commonly pretend to the kingdoms which other Princes possess, and the right or title, which any Prince can pretend, by virtue of the Pope's sentence of deprivation to the kingdom of an other Prince. For the first titles or rights are for the most part merely temporal titles, nor grounded upon any spiritual authority, and therefore they are not subject to the determination of a General Council, or to the decision of the Spiritual authority of the Church, which, by the institution of Christ, hath infallible assistance to determine and decide only Spiritual, and not mere temporal causes: But the second right is grounded upon the Pope's pretended authority to deprive Princes of their temporal rights, which authority (if there be any such as I am fully persuaded there is not) it being a Spiritual matter, and depending chief upon the institution of Christ, delivered to us in the Word of God, is to be decided, when it is called in question among learned Catholics, by Spiritual and not temporal authority, and therefore it is subject to the determination and decision of a General Council, which, without all controversy among Catholics, is an infallible means, to know certainly, what authority Christ hath given to the Pope or Church. 3 And if you had duly observed this disparity betwixt temporal and spiritual titles, you might easily have perceived the weakness of your objection. For it is too too manifest, that all Princes are bound to search out, by all possible & convenient means, the truth, or falsehood of the rights, which they with probability pretend to the Kingdom, which an other Prince possesseth with a probable title before they can justly make war against him, in regard only of their probable title; and if there be any assured and peaceable way to find out the truth, they are bound to try the same, before they can, by war or violence, dispossess any Prince, who hath a probable title to his Crown: because according to the doctrine of all Divines, no Prince can lawfully make war (wherein the blood of so many innocent men is by all probable conjectures likely to be shed) to try an uncertain title, if the certainty of his title, may be clearly known and decided, by any other assured & undoubtted peaceable way. Seeing therefore, that Christ hath left in his Church an assured and infallible way, and which all Catholics acknowledge to be infallible, to find out the truth and certainty concerning the titles, which are grounded upon the Pope's pretended authority to deprive Princes, to wit, the determination and decision of a lawful and undoubted general Council, it is evident, that both the Pope and Catholic Princes, are bound by this infallible and peaceable way to find out the truth of such pretended titles, before they can justly make war, to dispossess any Prince of his probable right, by virtue of the Pope's uncertain authority to deprive Princes of their temporal Kingdoms. 4 Wherefore this consequence of yours is not good, although the antecedent proposition were supposed (as it is not) to be true. Temporal Princes may make war upon probable titles, which are merely temporal: Therefore the Pope and temporal Princes may make war upon probable titles, which are grounded chief upon a probable spiritual authority. Because there is no authority on earth to decide infallibly the differences betwixt two absolute Princes in mere temporal affairs, wherein they are subject to God alone, neither are there now any Prophets, as there were in the Old Law, to declare undoubtedly the truth, and will of God: And if there were now any such infallible way, Princes were bound to try the same, before they could lawfully make war, only upon a probable title, against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession. But Christ hath left in his Church an undoubted infallible way, to wit, the authority of an undoubted Ecumenical Council, to determine and decide infallibly, what authority belongeth to the Pope or Church, & consequently to determine infallibly all doubtful and controversed rights or titles depending thereon. Neither is it to the purpose, whether a General Council, not including the Pope, be Superior, and above the Pope or no; for neither do I speak here of a General Council in this sense, as it excludeth the Pope. but as it includeth all the Prelates of the Church, and doth perfectly represent the whole body of that Church, which is without all controversy the pillar and firmament of truth: and moreover it is most certain, that the Pope is no less subject, and bound to submit himself to the definitions of faith ex Cathedra of such a General Council, to which Christ hath promised the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, than any inferior Christian whatsoever. And so likewise, if Christ had promised the like infallibility to arbitrary judges for the deciding of mere temporal causes, which he hath promised to a general Council for the deciding of spiritual, there is no doubt but that temporal Princes were bound to submit themselves to the judgement of Arbitratours, before they could lawfully make war upon any doubtful or controversed title, be it never so probable, against any Prince, who hath not only a probable title, but also possession. 5 Finally, because you stand so much upon the lawfulness of making war upon a probable title against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession, consider diligently (which the Author of the Newyeres gift o chap. 6 nu. 12. recommended to English Catholics) whether if the French King (for example) or any other foreign Prince, should upon a mere temporal probable title to those Dominions, which our King's Majesty possesseth, make war against him, it be not manifest, that his Majesty may lawfully, and all his subjects are bound to defend his Royal Person and Dominions against such invasions, and whether those his Majesty's subjects, who concur with any foreign Prince to invade in that case his Majesty, and the Dominions which he possesseth, may lawfully be put to death, as Traitors, and consequently, whether it be not evident, that we may lawfully detest, abhor, and abjure that doctrine, as manifestly false and indirectly, or by a necessary consequence repugnant to those words of our Saviour, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, which holdeth, that they are not Traitors, nor can justly be put to death, but rather do well in taking part against their Sovereign in the aforesaid case. And nevertheless, as I have showed above in the former Section, the falsehood and absurdity of the Doctrine, concerning the invading of Princes, and seeking to dispossess them by war, only by virtue of the Pope's sentence of deprivation, or upon any probable title, which is grounded upon a controversed Spiritual authority, is fare more manifest for the reason there alleged. Sect. 14. Objection. LAstly, Object. (say you) about this Branch your exposition of those words [as heretical] seemeth to me neither agreeing with the ordinary, and common sense of the words (which though sometimes may be taken in such sense as you expound them, yet ordinarily are not) nor with the intention of the Lawmaker, who (thinking it to be against Scriptures, that the Pope should have power to depose Princes, for that none is above Kings (at the least in temporals) but God alone, and that by Scriptures) would have all, no doubt, detest such doctrine, as shall allow the deposition of Princes, not only as heretical, but for heretical. Answer. 1 But it seemeth, Answ. that you have not well considered M. widdrington's meaning and drift, in bringing this last answer, for the expounding of these words [as heretical] in the fourth Branch of the Oath. For in his former answer he took the word [heretical] for that, which is directly or indirectly repugnant to Scriptures, and in which sense both Catholic Divines commonly, and also Protestants, and his Majesty do understand it; which sense nevertheless you above, in the third Section▪ seemed to disprove in those words [which sense is not in my conceit so proper neither with us nor Protestants, who most of them hold that for heretical which subverteth the foundation of faith▪ and not that which is contrary to Scripture] And yet now you will have the Lawmaker, who are Protestants, to take heretical for that, which is against Scriptures. Now Mr. Widdrington, taking heretical in this sense, to wit, for that which is against Scriptures, either directly, formally, and expressly, or at the least indirectly, virtually, and by a necessary consequence (which sense I have sufficiently proved above to be proper and usual both among Protestants and Catholics) affirmed, that the doctrine even of deposing Princes, being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be abjured, not only as heretical but for heretical. 2. But because some might peradventure contend (as you seem to do) that the word [heretical] according to the common understanding of Catholics, is to be taken only for that, which is expressly declared by the Church to be heretical, and repugnant to Scriptures, and which maketh a formal heretic, and to be punishable, as an heretic, by the Canons of the Church, and the Imperial Laws, Mr. Widdrington, in regard only of such contentious spirits, and admitting, for Disputation sake, that to be true, which he accounteth very false, gave this last answer, to wit, that if we will needs have the word [heretical] to be taken for that doctrine, which is made heretical by the Church, and maketh a formal heretic, and which before the declaration of the Church is not to be accounted heretical, although it be a very false doctrine, and contrary to the word of God, than the Adverb [as] doth signify, both by virtue of the Word, and also of the matter, not an identity, or reality, but only a similitude of that strict, and rigorous heretical. And this answer he hath at large confirmed in his Adjoinder against Mr. fitzherbert's Reply, where you may see, that the adverb [As] being an adverb of similitude, doth commonly, and not only sometimes, or oftentimes, signify only a similitude by virtue of the Word, and that it never signifieth a reality, identity, or equality, but only by reason of the matter, to which it is applied. And that if the matter of this Branch will not permit, without manifest absurdity, that it signify a reality, we are bound to interpret it in that sense, which is not absurd, according to the rules prescribed by Divines, for the interpreting of Laws, unless either the words will not bear a true sense, which as Mr. Widdrington hath proved, is very false, or it be apparent, that the intention of the Lawmaker was to have it taken in an absurd, and inconvenient sense, which were rashness and impiety, so to judge of his Majesty. 3. For howsoever his Majesty be persuaded in his opinion, judgement, or belief, yet his intention is not, but that we must take the words of the Oath, according to the common sense and understanding of them, as it is evident by the Seventh Branch. And therefore a great difference is to be made betwixt his Majesty's belief, or persuasion, and his intention, as he is a Lawmaker, as Mr. Widdrington, and the Author of the Newyears Gift p In the third observation. have proved at large, by his Majesty's express declaration, who, although he be persuaded▪ that he is the supreme Lord of his Dominions, not only in temporal, but also in Ecclesiastical causes, for as much as concerneth the external government by true coactive authority, and that the Pope hath not, by the institution of Christ, any authority to excommunicate him, yet his intention was not to meddle in this Oath with these points, nor to distinguish Catholics from Protestants in points of Religion, but only to distinguish Catholics from Catholics, in points of their loyalty and temporal allegiance; for in points of Religion, Catholics were sufficiently distinguished from Protestants, by the Oath of Supremacy. Neither also is his Majesty persuaded, that the doctrine of deposing Princes deprived by the Pope is heretical, taking heretical in that strict and rigorous sense, for only that which is expressly and formally declared by the Church, or some undoubted general Council, to be heretical: but he is persuaded, that the said doctrine is therefore heretical, because it is either directly and expressly, or indirectly and virtually, or by a necessary consequence repugnant to the holy Scriptures, in which sense it may be abjured not only as heretical, but also for heretical, as hath been showed above. Sect. 15. Objection. THirdly, Object. I find another difficulty (say you) about your doctrine of Declarative Breves. For you seem to say, following therein the doctrine of Suarez, That Declarative Breves of Popes set forth, and published to declare some thing, which the Church is in doubt of, do bind no further, than the Law, or ground, which they declare, and therefore if such Breves be but grounded on the Pope's opinion (as these seem to you, which are set forth to declare, that the Oath is vulawfull) they bind no more than his opinion. Which doctrine of yours, and Suarez I must needs confess, I cannot well conceive, or understand. For to me it seemeth, that Breves of the Pope, or Church, whether they be declarative, or definitive, for the certainty of their obligation should not depend on the ground, or Law, which they declare, or define, but on the assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised to the Pope and Church, when they shall declare, or define any thing ex Cathedra, for the whole Church to be lawful, or unlawful (which declaration is indeed, and in effect a definition) in my conceit that declaration must bind for the assistance of the holy Ghost, whatsoever the ground thereof be a formal Law, or but only an opinion: and so if the Pope have the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost in his definitions and declarations ex Cathedra (as in Suarez opinion he hath, though in yours not, and that also probably) and intended in his Breves to declare to the whole Church ex Cathedra, that the Oath is unlawful, I see not why it should not so be thought and taken, whether the ground of such declaration was his only opinion, or no. And so we see, that if the whole Church should in a Council declare any thing to be lawful, or unlawful, which before was in doubt (as is now of this Oath) when we all agree, that she hath the assistance of the Holy Ghost in her general decrees, as well as in her definitions, we ought to to take it for such, whether the ground of her declaration be certain, or only but probable. The same (I would think) should be thought of the declarative Breves of Popes, at the least in the opinion of those, who maintain, that the Pope cannot err no more without a Council, then with it: For if the declaration of any such thing to be lawful, or unlawful should bind us no more, than the ground of that declaration, whether it were a formal Law, or but only an opinion, such declaration were but idle, and should not afford that certainty and satisfaction, which at the Church is required in time of doubt. I know you answer this difficulty about the Pope's Breves sufficiently, in saying, that the Pope may err in declaring, or defining without a General Council, and that there was no such Council, when these Breves were set forth; but this difficulty I find about your doctrine, and much more about the doctrine of Suarez, of Declarative Breves, because you stand not upon that answer only. Answer. 1. But first, it is manifest in my judgement, that in all declarative precepts, especially belonging to manners, or of things to be done, or omitted (for only of these precepts, & not of definitions, declarations, or precepts of faith, or of things to be believed, Suarez speaketh) the obligation of the precept dependeth upon the fundamental ground, reason, & end of the precept: and that therein also is employed the intention and will of the Lawmaker (which is the soul and life of the Law) who intendeth only to bind by his declarative precept, for as much only as the thing he commandeth, or forbiddeth, is of it own nature necessary, or repugnant to some former Law of God, Nature, or some other positive Law, which the declarative precept doth declare and suppose: And therefore (as Suarez well observeth) a pure declarative precept doth not make the thing, which it forbiddeth, to be unlawful, but only supposeth and declareth it to be unlawful, as forbidden by some former Law. Whereupon it followeth, that if it be but a probable opinion, that there is such a former Law, the declarative precept can bind no more, than the probability of the opinion (which is the fundamental ground and reason of the precept) hath force to bind. 2. Neither doth your objection impugn this manifest doctrine. For, although in such general precepts, wherein the Church cannot err, to wit, when she commadeth the whole Church something, which is necessary to salvation, the certainty and obligation of the precept dependeth upon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, yet this doth not hinder, but that it must also depend upon the substantial ground, reason, and end, for which the Law was made. But this only at the most is proved by your objection, that because the assistance of the Holy Ghost is annexed to the precept, it must consequently be annexed to all those things, whereon the precept doth necessarily depend: But to affirm therefore, that the precept doth depend on nothing else, then upon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, were ridiculous. 3. As also due diligence and examining of the cause is, according to the doctrine of all Divines, necessarily required in a General Council, to define infallibly any doctrine of faith: And because the assistance of the Holy Ghost is annexed to her definition, it must consequently be also annexed to all that, whereon her infallible definition doth necessarily depend. And thereupon the Divines affirm, that if it be certain, that the Church did not err in her definition, it is also certain, that she used due diligence, and all other necessary conditions, which by the institution of Christ are required to an infallible definition: But to affirm, that because the infallibility of her definition dependeth upon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, therefore neither due diligence, nor examination of the cause, nor any other thing is necessarily required to her infallible definition, were absurd & ridiculous. 4. Wherefore you must distinguish betwixt fundamental, intrinsecall, and necessary reasons, or grounds, and Extrinsecall, or accidental, as M. Widdrington hath often affirmed from the doctrine of Bellarm: & Canus, to which also all other Divines do agree: for these last may be false, and yet the definition true. As in the second Council of Nice it was declared, that Angels might be painted, because they have bodies, the declaration was true, although this reason, being extrinsecall, and accidental, was false. But if she had declared, that it is lawful to paint Angels, because it is not repugnant to faith, or good manners, which is a fundamental ground, and reason of that declaration, the declaration can not be true, if that fundamental reason and ground be supposed to be false. And thus much concerning the doctrine of Suarez in general. 5 And therefore secondly, to apply it to the Pope's Breves, if it were certain, that the Pope, in making his declarative prohibition of the Oath, had the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, Mr. Widdrington would not stick to affirm, that as the prohibition is infallible, so consequenly the fundamental reason and ground, for which the Oath is by the Pope's Breves forbidden, is also infallible: and that therefore some thing is in the Oath repugnant to faith or salvation, which is the fundamental ground, reason, and end of the Pope's forbidding the Oath: for if there were nothing in the Oath against faith or salvation, the Pope could not forbid it with such injury to his Majesty, and so great damage to English Catholics. 6 But thirdly, this objection of yours▪ concerning the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, promised to the Church for the making of general precepts ex Cathedra either touching faith or manners, doth not sufficiently confirm the infallibility of the Pope's Breves forbidding English Catholics to take the Oath: for that Mr. Widdrington q in his Theological Disputation cap. 10. sect. 2. hath clearly proved, that the Pope both might err in the aforesaid Breves, not only because they were made without a general Council (which nevertheless, as you very well grant, were sufficient to prove, that he might err therein) but also because they are not general precepts, and belonging to the whole Church, but contain only a particular precept directed to one particular nation (and therefore they are well called by Endaemon joannes r in Praefat. paraleli torti. the Pope's private letters to English Catholics admonishing them not to take the Oath) wherein not only the Pope but also a general Council may err (as Mr. Widdrington observeth out of the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and Canus); Bell. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. ca 2. Canus lib. 1 5. de locis c. 5. q. 4. And also that the Pope did err in those Breves upon false informations and suppositions, to wit, for that he supposed his Primacy in spirituals, his power to bind and lose, to excommunicate and inflict Censures to be denied in the Oath, which is manifestly false, & that his power to depose Princes is most certain and of faith, and not questioned among Catholics, which is no less untrue, is sufficiently convinced by him in his Theological Disputation r in the place above c●te●. and in his answer to Mr. Fitzherbert s part. 3.6.17. Sect. 16. Objection. A Fourth difficulty I find (say you) about the swearing, that this Oath is ministered unto me by lawful authority: Whereupon it followeth, we may use no equivocation in taking of the same, for that none can equivocate in an Oath, that is exacted by lawful authority: For if it were certain, that no thing is exacted by this Oath, but temporal allegiance, than we might not only swear, but were also bound to swear, that such Oath were ministered by lawful authority: But when it is questionable and uncertain, whether the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, and consequently, whether the Prince exacting such an Oath of his Subjects, should cause them wrong the Pope and Church, and make them swear a thing uncertain, and with the hurt of their consciences, not being able many of them to conform themselves to those conceits you frame of the Oath, though they were true, for that they can perceive no solid ground therefore, I see not how we may swear, that this Oath is ministered unto us by lawful authority. Answer. 1 But first it is not true, that we must swear, that this Oath is ministered unto us by lawful authority, but only that we must acknowledge so much, of which our acknowledgement, which is the immediate object of the Oath, we must be assured to excuse us from perjury. 2 Secondly, it is very true, that we must not equivocate in this Oath; and this is not only deduced from the lawful ministering of the same (although this be sufficient to prove, that we must not equivocate therein) but it is also deduced from the Seventh branch wherein it is expressly ordained, that me must use no equivocation. 3 Thirdly, the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of this Branch dependeth wholly upon the former Clauses: for if none of the former Clauses contain a denial of any spiritual obedience due to the Pope or Church, nor be repugnant to truth, or justice, it is manifest, that they are ministered by lawful authority. And therefore you must first prove, that some one of the former clauses is repugnant to truth or justice, before you can impugn the Oath as not ministered by lawful authority. Whereupon you return back to that which you above objected against the second Branch, to wit, the Pope's power to depose Princes, which (say you) is uncertain and questionable etc. But, as I answered there, it is certain to me (neither can any man of learning that well examineth the question, otherwise in my judgement conceive) that the Pope hath no true, real, lawful power and authority, and which may be a sufficient ground to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, but only an imaginary power, in the conceit only and approbation of some men, which nevertheless is no true, real, lawful and sufficient power to punish any Prince by depriving him of the Dominions which he possesseth. And consequently the King's Majesty in causing his subjects to acknowledge and swear, that the Pope hath no true, real, lawful authority, and which may be a sufficient ground to depose him (thereby to be the better secured from all invasions under pretence of Religion, and to discover his loyal and constant subjects from those who maintain the principles of the Powder-Traytours) doth neither wrong the Pope, nor Church, nor cause his subjects to wrong them, or their consciences, but seeketh to preserve his own right and Dominions which he really possesseth, from all invasions and Powder-Treasons, under colour of any probable, or imaginary power or title, which is grounded upon an uncertain and controversed spiritual authority. But contrariwise the Pope in forbidding this Oath, which cannot sufficiently be proved to be unlawful, doth wrong himself, the Church, his Majesty, and this whole kingdom: And those English Catholics, that bend their wits to find out scruples, or rather cavils against the Oath, and to wrest the words to the worst sense that may be, whereas they may expound them in a favourable sense, do wrong the Pope, the Church, his Majesty, themselves, and all their Catholic brethren. 4. But many (say you) are not able to conform themselves to those conceits Widdrington frameth of the Oath, though they were true, for that they cannot perceive any solid ground therefore. But First, if they be learned, they may easily conform themselves to widdrington's explication of the Oath, if they will diligently, and without partiality examine the solidity of his proofs, and cousider, that his proofs and answers are grounded, not only upon his own conceit, but upon manifest reason, his Majesty's declaration, the doctrine and authority of most learned Divines, and which is more, even of those, who be his chiefest Adversaries in this point: and if withal they will remember (as M. Widdrington hath heretofore h In the Epistle Dedicatory of his Theological Dispotation. observed) that no other solid ground, or proof is sufficient to confute the Oath, but evident demonstrations, but to prove the Oath to be lawful, and that it may be lawfully taken, it is a very sufficient and solid ground, to answer probably to all the arguments, which are brought against the same: which whether he hath performed, or no, and what kind of demonstrations, or rather most weak arguments, the impugners of the Oath have brought, (seeing that few of them can scarce agree in any one conceit) I dare remit even to your own judgement. 5. Secondly, if they be altogether so unlearned, that neither by their own reading, nor natural judgement, they are able to examine the solidity of the grounds of this controversy, they must be guided, instructed, and directed by the learned, who if through ignorance, negligence, want of due examination, inconsiderate zeal, or partiality either towards Popes, or Princes, they direct them amiss, the chiefest fault is in the Direrectors, and Instructors, for which they are greatly to answer at the day of judgement: and how fare these ignorant men, being guided and instructed amiss, are to be excused in conscience, and before the sight of God, I will not judge, but leave it to his judgement, who is the searcher of all men's hearts. This only I wish them to remember, that temporal Princes do not in their Tribunals meddle with their consciences, but only with their external actions, for which they may sometimes be justly punished by the external Magistrate, although their conscience be never so clear in the sight of God. 6. Thirdly, if some either can not, or can, but will not conform themselves to Wiiddringtons' conceits and explication of the Oath, to which nevertheless others both can, and do conform themselves, will you therefore infer from hence, that the Oath is of itself unlawful, or not ministered to them by lawful authority? Call to mind, how above in your exceptions against the second Branch you affirmed without any proof at all, that to deny the practice of the Pope's authority to depose, is not to deny the power and authority itself; and yet now from the denial of the practice of the lawful authority to minister the Oath to some, who can not conform themselves to widdrington's conceits, and explication of the Oath, you would infer, also without any proof, a denial of the authority itself to minister lawfully the Oath to them. But the plain truth is, as I observed there, that a denial of all effects, and practices of any power or authority is a virtual denial of the power and authority itself, but a denial of some particular effects & practices is not a sufficient, or virtual denial of the authority itself. And therefore although we should grant, as we do not, that the State can not lawfully, or without sin, minister this Oath to those who cannot conform themselves to widdrington's conceits and explication of the Oath, to which nevertheless other Catholics both can, and do conform themselves, yet it can not be inferred from hence, that the Oath is not ministered to them by lawful authority. As also although we should admit, as we do not, that a judge cannot lawfully, or without sin, minister an Oath to him, whom he morally knoweth will swear falsely, and against his conscience, yet it cannot be inferred from hence, that the judge hath not good and full power and authority to minister the Oath to him. For one may have authority to a thing, which nevertheless in some cases he cannot lawfully do. As a Priest being in mortal sin hath authority to minister the Sacraments, (for example of Penance) and yet as a Priest he cannot lawfully minister them being in mortal sin: and therefore although he commit sin by using and exercising his Office irreligiously, yet the Sacrament is valid because his being in sin doth not deprive him of his authority, neither doth he sin in that manner, as he should do, who ministereth the said Sacrament without priestly authority. See Widdrington in his Answer to Master Fitzherb. part. 2. chap. 10. nu. 33. pag. 286. et seq. where he handleth this matter more at large. 7. Fourthly, according to your manner of arguing, you might also prove, that the King hath not authority to minister an Oath to his subjects, that they shall acknowledge his Majesty to be their Sovereign Lord in temporals; and yet Fa. Parsons himself affirmeth, In the judgement etc. pag. 13 16. that there is no Catholic who sticketh, or maketh difficulty to acknowledge and swear the same. And Becanus also in the first Edition of his Controversia Anglicana pag. 101. affirmeth, that it is certain to him, that King james is the Sovereign Lord in temporals over his Dominions. For to use the like argument you framed above; If it were certain, that nothing is exacted by the aforesaid Oath but temporal Allegiance, than we might not only swear, but also were bound to swear, that such an Oath were ministered by lawful authority. But when it is questionable and uncertain, whether the King's Majesty, or the Pope's Holiness be the Sovereign Lord in temporals, not only of this Kingdom, but (according to the Canonists doctrine, which most learned Victoria affirmeth to be altogether improbable, as in very deed it is) of all the Christian Kingdoms in the world, and consequently whether the King exacting such an Oath of his Subjects should cause them wrong the Pope or Church, or make them swear a thing uncertain, or with the hurt of their consciences, not being able many of them to conform themselves to those conceits, which the Divines, who are opposite therein to the Canonists, do make of such an Oath, though they were true, for that they can perceive no solid ground therefore, I see not, how we may lawfully swear, that such an Oath is ministered unto us by lawful authority. But how insufficient this manner of arguing is, I have showed partly in this Section, and partly above in the Second. 8. Fiftly, if we follow M. Widdrington's first answer, which you can not convince to be improbable, to wit, that the immediate Object of this Oath, is only our sincere acknowledgement and persuasion, that the Pope hath not any lawful power or authority to depose the King, and not the absolute proposition, than the argument you make here is of no force at all, for of this our acknowledgement we must be and are most certain and assured. And nevertheless you know right well, that to prove any Branch of the Oath unlawful, you must impugn all the explications M. Widdrington hath made of that Branch, & that not only with probable exceptions, but with evident and convincing demonstrations. Sect. 17. Objection. LAst, Ob. I do not see (say you) how and one, that is not altogether of your opinions in all these points belonging to the Oath, can swear, that he doth it willingly, for that none doth willingly swear against his own opinions, although he might perhaps do it, if the opinion be probable, unless we take [willingly] for voluntarium secundum quid, which willingness is neither proper, nor sufficient, as yourself will grant. Your old acquaintance, if he be not deceived, M. B. Answer. 1. But first, Ans. this exception of yours doth not prove the Oath to be of itself unlawful, but at the most, that some, who are not of Widdringtens' opinion in ad these points, can not take it against their opinion, or rather against their conscience: And the same exception you might make, albeit the Oath should only contain, that King james is our Sovereign Lord in temporals. But this exception doth not prove, that those, who be of widdrington's opinion in all these points, belonging to the Oath, may not swear, that they take it willingly. 2. Secondly, albeit some be of this opinion, that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, yet unless they hold it for certain, and a point of faith, and the contrary doctrine altoth crimprobable, and out of all controversy among Catholics, which nevertheless all the world seethe to be a great controversy among them, they may, notwithstanding their opinion, take the Oath lawfully and willingly, for that they may, and ought persuade their consciences assuredly, that the Pope hath not any true, real, sufficient, or lawful power to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, which is the true and plain meaning of the Second and fourth Branch. 3. Thirdly, whereas you seem to insinuate, that those things, which are done through fear, are only voluntaria secundum quid, willing in some sort, but not simply, and properly willing, and so he, that should for fear of losing his liberty and goods, and incurring his Majesty's displeasure, take this Oath against his own opinion, or also conscience, should not take it willingly, simpliciter & proprie, simply and properly, but only secundum quid, in some sort, you are herein greatly mistaken. For, according to the common doctrine of all Philosophers and Divines, fear doth only cause involuntarium secundum quid, unwillingness in some sort; and those things, which are done through fear, are simply willing, which willingness is both proper and sufficient: Do not many both swear and forswear very willingly, against their opinions, yea, and consciences also, for love of their sensual pleasures, for hope of great gain and preferment, for fear of great danger, for procuring the favour of Princes, and avoiding of their indignation? You know, that a great love and concupiscence of any thing, which we greatly desire, doth not cause unwillingness, but rather increase it, and that where there is a great love and desire of obtaining any thing, there is also a great fear of losing, or not obtaining it. A Merchant doth very willingly, hic et nunc, in this particular case, when he is in danger of drowning, cast his goods into the Sea to save his life, which he more loveth and respecteth, than his goods. And many men, who prefer their corporal pleasures, and the avoiding of corporal punishment, before their soul's health, do very willingly hic et nunc, in this particular case, speak, and do many things against their opinions, and consciences also. But it seemeth, that you abstract from hic et nunc, from this particular case, and that you consider voluntarium, or willingness, if that particular case were not, which is the cause of your error, or mistaking, for quae fiunt ex metu, sunt hic & nunc simpliciter, absolutè, efficaciter & propriè voluntaria, those things that are done for fear, are, hic & nunc, in this particular case simply, absolutely, actually, effectually, and properly done willingly. 4. But Fourthly, supposing the Oath to be lawful, and ministered by lawful authority, an other most perfect willingness is to be found in taking this Oath, as likewise in the observing of all just laws. For we are bound to observe all just laws both of God, (although eternal damnation of soul and body be threatened against the breakers of the same) and also of man, (although great temporal punishments are imposed upon the transgressors thereof) not for fear of punishment, but hearty, willingly, and sincerely, for the love of virtue, and for the duty and obedience we own to God, and the King: as it hath been insinuated in the New-yeeres-gift, u Cap. 8. and declared more at large by M. Widdrington in his Theological Disputation. x Cap. 9 And therefore unless you can sufficiently prove some one of the former branches to be unlawful, you need not insist upon this clause, which according to your grounds, is therefore unlawful, because some one of the former clauses is unlawful: albeit, as I have showed, you cannot sufficiently prove that this Oath may not, hic et nunc, supposing the great temporal harm is incurred by refusing it, be taken willingly by some, who prefer their temporal state and goods of body and fortune before their soul's health, although we should falsely suppose the Oath to be unlawful: & consequently this clause may be true in regard of some that take it willingly, although they should suppose some one, or all of the former clauses to be repugnant to truth or justice. 5. And thus you see (good Sir) that I have taken a little pains, and spent some time, which in very deed I could hardly at this present have spared, to answer all your difficulties in particular, partly for your own sake and satisfaction, and partly of others, who, as I suppose, have concurred with you herein, whom, as also yourself both in regard of our ancient acquaintance, and your singular learning and great zeal, I much love and respect. And truly I make no doubt, but that if you had been as diligent to find out arguments and answers in favour of the Oath, as you have been to invent scruples against the same, you would quickly have perceived, that no one Clause of the Oath can be sufficiently proved to be unlawful: especially if you had observed, that to prove the Oath to be unlawful, evident demonstrations are required, but to prove it lawful, only probable arguments and answers are sufficient; and also that I have here said nothing, but what Mr. Widdrington hath either expressly said before, or may be clearly deduced from the grounds of his doctrine. And so wishing you all happiness, I take my leave, hoping, that if, notwithstanding this my answer, you cannot conform your conscience to Mr. widdrington's conceits & explication of the Oath, yet you will not condemn those Catholics, who both can and do conform themselves thereunto; and that you will not be any cause, or occasion in word or deed, of making a separation, disunion, or Schism among your Catholic brethren by excluding them unjustly from Ecclesiastical Sacraments in regard of this controversy, for which in France they are not excluded, nor thought unworthy to be admitted thereunto, and which (as Card. Peron notably observeth) ought not to hinder the reunion of those, Peron in his last great Reply cap. 91. pag 633. who are out of the Church, & should desire to be reconciled thereunto, especially, seeing that the contrary doctrine hath been in France by many public Edicts of Roman. Catholics, condemned under pain of high treason, for false, pernicious, scandalous, and seditious; but that you will seek, as you wished above, to make an happy atonement, reconcilement, and peace among them, and not over rashly and uncharitably to censure, for any point which is controversy among Catholics, their consciences, who, for clear and undoubted points of Catholic Religion, are as ready and willing to lose by patiented suffering, their goods, liberty, and life itself, as yourself, or any other Catholic whatsoever. From London this 13. of Novemb. 1620. Your very loving friend, and ancient Schoolefellow, R. P. Faults escaped. In the Summarie pag. C 2. lin. 5. read hath not. pag. 14. after the words King etc. add, but only our sincere acknowledgement thereof. pag. 93. lin. 24. commandeth.