portrait of Petrus Ramus or Pierre de la Ramée 
PETRUS R. M. S. AET LVII    

THE LOGIC OF THE MOST EXCELLENT PHILOsopher P. Ramus Martyr, Newly translated, and in divers places corrected, after the mind of the Author.  
PER M. Roll. Makylmenaeum Scotum, rogatu viri honestissimi, M. Aegidij Hamlini.   printer's or publisher's device ANCHORA SPEI 
Imprinted at London by Thomas Vautroullier dwelling in the Blackefrieres.  
ANNO M.D.LXXIIII.  
CUM PRIVILEGIO.   

The lively pith of Plato's wit and Aristots ingeine,  
The pleasant vain of Cicero, and of Quintiliane  
The judgement high, here thou mayest see: therefore if thou be wise,  
Not farther seek but in this book thyself do exercise.   

TO THE WORSHIPFUL M. ROBERT WYKES OF Dodyngton in the county of Glouceter Esquyer.  
ALexander King of Macedon (most Worshipful Maecenas) not so much for his valiant and martial facts (although they were most victorious) as for his great love and ardent zeal which he bore to virtue and knowledge, hath been of all men had in most worthy estimation and goodly memory. job called the servant of God, although he was worthy to be praised of all men for his justice and equity, yet he was most commended for his singular patience in time of tribulation and great calamity. But when I consider with myself your insatiable desire and most fervent love, not only in the following of your own study, but also in the promoving and furthering of others: your great patience and incredible constance, in suffering affliction and abiding equity: I am compelled to confess that there is none neither amongst the profane and ethnycke authors, neither amongst thecclesiastical and spiritual fathers (of what estate or quality so ever they were) with the which ye may not be compared, yea or rather preferred. For if Alexander were praised that in the midst of his triumphant victories he did bear abroad with him Ilyas the famous work of homer containing the battles and destruction of Troy: How much more are ye to be commended that in the midst of your calamity do both night and day where soever ye be, carry and read a more worthy and precious work? Alexander in prosperity took pleasure to read Homer treactinge, of martial facts, to th'end he might guide his army according to the exact rule therein declared: ye take pleasure in adversity to read the holy scripture and word of God, to th'end ye may govern your life according to the will and commandment of God. Where Alexander was, there was profane Homer: where ye are there is the holy Bible. When Alexander did sleep Homer was his bolster: when ye do sleep, the Bible is your pillow Alexander for all his riches is praised for the continual reading of one book: what shall I then say of you that have bestowed no little part of your goods in buying of most worthy works. job which is set before our eyes th'example of a singular patience being extremely afflicted in outward things, and in his body, through his great torments and afflictyons brasted forth into many inconveniences both of words and sentences, and showed himself as a desperate man in many things, and as one that would resist God, You having no less occasion to complain being most unjustly spoiled of your goods troubled in mind and conscience, threatened daily by your enemies do notwithstanding constantly resist acknowledging God to have secret judgements, to chastise those fatherly whom he loveth, and to let the reprobate run to destruction. These and other your most singular virtues having considered and experimented the good will and mind which you bear to the furtherance and setting forth of all sciences, I could find none more apt, or worthy under whose name this golden treasure should come abroad, than his whose virtue and good behaviour, might give some place and authority to the same. For although there be many more adorned with riches and possessions of this world yet in setting forth of virtue and singular patience I find none at all. Now therefore to conclude (Sithence, I know you to be most alienated from all ambition) I beseech you to receive, this my small present in good part, having rather respect to the mind of the giver then to the gift itself, although most precious. So I commit you to the protection of God almighty wishing his heavenly Majesty, that ye may constantly persevere as ye have begun, both in your spiritual and temporal affairs, to th'end that ye living godly in this world may obtain that heavenly Crown of glory which our Saviour jesus Christ hath prepared to all those that do patiently: watch for his appearing to whom with the father and the holy Ghost be all laud, honour & praise world without end.   

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER CONTAINING the occasion of the setting forth of this book, the utility and profit of the same, the use and facility, with the declaration of three golden documents or rules appartaining to the matter of every art, and last a brief declaration of the method and form to be observed in all arts and sciences.  
SING it is the duty of all Christians (beloved Reader) to labour by all means, that they may profit and aid their brethren, and to hide or keep secret nothing, which they know may bring great utility to the common wealth: I thought it my duty (having perceived the great commodity which this book bringeth to the Reader of what state and quality soever he be) to make thee and all others to whose knowledge it shall come per takers thereof. But lest thou think that thy labour and pain should be lost in reading of the same, seeing so many books going abroad under glorious names, having in dead little or no utility, but wrapped all together with innumerable difficulties: I shall in few words show thee, the matter contained in this book, the method and form of the same, how easy it is above all others to be apprehended, how thou shalt apply it to all arts and sciences, and shortly that no art or science may either be taught or learned perfectly without the knowledge of the same. As fore the matter which it containeth, thou shalt understand that there is nothing appertaining to dialectike either in Aristotle's xvij. book of logic, in his eight books of Physic, or in his xiv. books of Philosophy, in Cicero his books of Oratory, or in Quintilian (in the which there is almost nothing that doth not either appertain to the invention of arguments a disposition of the same, but thou shalt find it shortly and after a perfect method in this book declared. For thou shalt find no argument which is not either referred to one of the nine arguments artificial, or to the unartificial: no sort of disposition which doth not appertain either to the judgement of the proposition, syllogism or method. But thou wilt say how is it possible that this little book is able to contain all that, which the forenamed books (being so many) doth entreat? In deed thou hast no little occasion to marvel, but (having more deeply considered the matter) I believe thou shall not marvel so much. For in this book there is three documents or rules kept, which in deed aught to be observed in all arts and sciences. The first is, that in setting forth of an art we gather only together that which doth appertain to the Art which we entreat of, leaving to all other Arts that which is proper to them, this rule (which may be called the rule of justice) thou shalt see here well observed. For here is all which doth appertain to logic, and nothing neither of Grammar, Rhetoric, Physic, nor any other art. This is that document which Apelles many years ago did signify to us, for when as the Shoemaker reprehended the shoe of Apelles image, Apelles took it in good part, because it did appertain to the shoemakers art: but when passing his bounds he began to find fault whith the clotheses also, Apelles said to him, Nihil Suitor ultra crepidam, which signify the that the Shoemaker should keep him with in the bounds of his art. And therefore (beloved Reader) all those which either writ or teach either divinity, Physic, the law or any other thing do violate and break this document, when they degress from their purpose and do rail upon other things nothing pertaining thereto. For howsoever they writ or teach (so it be from their purpose) it is to be had of no estimation. Is he not worthy to be mocked of all men, that purpose the to write of Grammar, and in every other chapter mynglethe something of Logic, and some thing of Rhetoric: and contrary when he purpose the to writ of Logic doth speak of Grammar and of Rhetoric? that taketh a text to preach of fasting and disputeth the most part of his hour of images or swearing? that promiseth to show me the causes and signs of the stone, and telleth me many tales pertainning to the gout? that when he is asked of contracts or obligations, answereth of liberty or bondage? Or if the Astrologian being asked of the eclipse of the son, should answer me some thing concerning the motion of the stars? And yet we see the most part of our learned men both in their teaching and writing (to the great hurt and damage of youth) most unshamfullie do use the same which I would to god were amended. The second document (which diligently is observed in this book) is that all the rules and precepts of thine art be of necessity true, which Aristotle requireth in the second book of his Analitikes and in diverse chapters in his former book. Thou shalt violate this document, whensoever amongst thy precepts in writing or teaching, thou shalt mingle any false, ambiguous, or uncertain thing: as if in theaching me my logic, which consisteth in rules to invent arguments, and to dispone and judge the same, thou shouldest begin to tell me some tricks of poisonable sophistry: and when thou shouldest teach me the word of God truly, thou goest about to deceive me by telling me man's inventions: and if thou shouldest (being destitute of good arguments to prove thy matter) be lie some aunciant writer to beguile the rude and ignorant people, or forge some Authors to colour thy knavery which never was, or wrote at any time. I doubt not (gentle Reader) but thou hast read of such fellows: always call thou upon god that it will please his heavenly Majesty to plant this our rule of verity in the hearts of all men, but most chiefly in the breasts of the Pastors of the Church, who have the charge and dispensation of his holy word. The third document which thou shalt note herein observed, is, that thou entreat of thy rules which be general generally, and those which be special specially, and at one time, without any vain repetitions, which doth nothing but fill up the paper. For it is not sufficient that thou keep the rule of verity and justice, without thou observe also this document of wisdom, to dispute of every thing according to his nature. Do not entreat therefore general matters particularly, nor particular matters generally, for in so doing thou playest the Sophistes part, as Aristotle teacheth in the first book of his posteriors, and shalt be compelled to use tautalogies and vain repetitions which thou knowest to be most pernicious to all arts and sciences. For if I ask thee what is Logic? and thou answerest, that which teacheth to invent arguments, thou answerest truly but not wisely, because thou intrearest a general thing particularly: I ask the for the definition of the whole art, and thou givest me the definition of invention, which is but a part of the art. And contrary, if I ask the what is invention, and thou answerest an art which teacheth to dispute well, surely thou answerest not wisely, for thou entreatest a particular thing generally: I ask of thee, the definition of a part of the art, and thou givest me the definition of the whole art. Note well these three rules in reading of thine Authors: see, if they ●ntangle themselves, with things nothing appar●eining to their purpose: if they trouble thee with ambiguous or deceitful speakings, and do not handle every thing after his nature. Take the forenamed books, and with thy rule of justice give to ●uery art his own, and surely if my judgement done not far deceive me, thou must give some ●hing to the art of Grammar, some thing to Rhetoric, some thing to the four mathematical ●rtes, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astrology and music, some thing also (although but little) to Physic, natural Philosophy, and divinity. And yet all ●●at is in these books (only the fore said digressions ●●cepted) doth appartaine either to the invention ●f Logic, or else to the judgement. Now gather ●geather that which remaineth, after every art 〈◊〉 the received his own, and see if there be any false, ambiguous or uncertain thing amongst it, and if ●here be (as in deed there is some) take thy docu●ente of verity, and put out all such sophistical ●●eakinges. And last perceive if all things be handled according to their nature, the general gene●●lye, and the particular particulerlie, if not, take thy rule of wisdom, and do according as the third document teacheth thee: abolish all tautalogies and vain repetitions, and so thus much being done, thou shalt comprehend the rest into a little room. And this much concerning the matter entreated in this book. The form and method which is kept in this art, comaundethe that the thing which is absolutely most clear, be first placed: and secondly that which is next clear, & so forth whith the rest. And therefore it continually proceedeth from the general to the special and singular. The definition as most general is first placed, next followeth the division, first into the parts, and next into the forms and kinds. Every part and form is defined in his own place, and made manifest by examples of ancient Authors, and last the members are limited and joined together with short transitions for the recreation of the Reader. This is that only perfect method which Plato and Aristotle did know observed by many noble writers, both Historiographers, Orators, and poets, and now last (being suppressed by ignorance many years) raised as it were from death, by the most learned and Martyr to God, Petrus Ramus, who hath not only proved with strong arguments, but in very deed set before our eyes that this perfect method may be accommodate to all arts & sciences. What shall we say then of those, that in teaching and writing (to the great hurt of the memory) doth put as it were the tail formest, having no regard how every thing is placed, but even as it chanceth to come into their Mouths, so letteth it go. Did ever Plato or Aristotle so? no in deed. But that thou mayest a little the better perceive the utility of this art, and how far the use of it doth extend, I will shortly show thee how thou shalt accommodate the same to all arts and sciences, setting before thine eyes one or two for an example. And first what art so ever thou purposest to entreat of, thou must come garnished with these three, justice, Verity, & wisdom, as before is said: and then if thou be a divine this method willeth thee that in place of the definition, thou set forth shortly the some of the text, which thou hast taken in hand to interpret: next to part thy text into a few heads that the auditor may the better retain thy sayings: Thirdly to entreat of every head in his own place with the ten places of invention, showing them the causesis, th'effects, the adjoints and circumstances: to bring in thy comparisons with the rest of artificial places: and last to make thy matter plain and manifest with familiar examples & authorities out of the word of God: to set before the auditor (as every head shall give the occasion) the horrible and sharp punishing of disobedience, and the joyful promises appertaining to the obedient and godly. If thou be a Physician and willing to teach (as for example) of a fever, this method willeth thee to show first the definition, that is, what a fever is, next the division, declaring what sort of fever it is, whether the quartan, quotidian, hectic, or what other: thirdly to come to the places of invention, and show first the causes of the fever every one in order, the efficient, as may be hot meats, the matter as melancholy, choler, or some rotten humour, and so forth with the formale causes and final. The second place is th'effect, show then what the fever is able to bring forth, whether death or no. The third place wisheth thee to tell the subject of the fever, whether it be in the veins, arteries, or else where. The fourth to show the signs and tokens which appear to pretend life or death: and to be short, thou shalt pass thorough the rest of the artificial places, and do that which is required in every of them: And last come to the confirming of thy sayings by examples, authorities, and (as Hypocrates & Galen have done) by histories and long experience. After this method Heraclitus the Philosopher examined the physicians which came to heal him, and because they were ignorant and could not answer to his interrogations he sent them away, and would receive none of their Medicines: for (said he) if ye can not show me the causes of my sickness, much less are ye able to take the cause away. So the lawyer shall plead his cause, in proving or disproving after as his matter shall require, with these ten places of Invention, & dispone every thing orderly into his propositions, syllogisms, and method. So shall the Orator declaim: the Mathematician set forth his demonstrations: and to be short both in writing, teaching, & in learning, thou mayest always keep these three golden documents in entreating thy matter, and this most ingenious and artificial method for the exact form and disposition of the same. After the exact observation of the foresaid material documents and natural method thou hast this little book set forth to thee, which being well perused is able to bring more profit to thee (I speak after experience) than all thy four years study in Plato or Aristotle as they are now extant. And besides the great utility which thou shalt apprehend of this book, the facility and easiness of the same is not a little to be commended. For hear thou hast nothing to learn (and yet thou shalt learn all) but only ten places of invention, with the disposition of the proposition, syllogism, and method. Every place of invention and every sort of disposition is made so clear and manifest with examples chosen out of the most ancient Authors, that almost by thyself (if thou have any quickness of spirit) thou mayest attain in the space of two months the perfect knowledge of the same. Hear I will speak nothing of the envious, that thinketh it not decent to write any liberal art in the vulgar tongue, but would have all things kept close either in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latyn tongues. I know what great hurt hath come to the Church of God by the defence of this mischievous opinion: yet I would ask them one thing that thou mayest know their deceitful policy, and that their saying hath no ground of verity. Whether wrote Moses (the Hebrew and divine) and after him Esdras in the Hebrew and vulgar tongue or in some other strange tongue? Did Aristotle and Plato Greek Philosophers, Hipocrates and Galen Greek Physicians, leave the Greek tongue, because it was their native language, to seek some Hebrew or Latin? Did Cicero who was a Latinist borne writ his Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Greek tongue, or was he content with his mother tongue? and surely as he signifieth himself he had the perfect knowledge of the Greek tongue, yet he wroth nothing therein which we have extant at this day. Shall we then think the scottish or English tongue, it not fit to wrote any art into? no in deed. But peradventure thou wilt say that there is not scottish words for to declare and express all things contained into liberal arts, truth it is: neither was there Latin words to express all things written in the Hebrew and Greek tongues: But did Cicero for this cause writ no philosophy in Latin? thou will not say so, jest I take the with a manifestly. What then did Cicero? he laboureth in the Latin tongue, as Aristotle before him did in the Greek, and thou envious fellow aught to do in thy mother tongue what so ever it be, to wit he amplified his native tongue, thinking no shame to borrow from the Hebrucians' and Grecians such words as his mother tongue was indigent of. What, shall we think shame to borrow either of the Latin or Greek, more than the learned Cicero did? or find some fit words in our own tongue able to express our meaning as Aristotle did? shall we I say be more unkind to our native tongue and country than was these men to theirs? But thou wilt say, our tongue is barbarous, and theirs is eloquent? I answer thee as Anacharsis did to the Athenienses, who called his Scythian tongue barbarous, yea sayeth he, Anacharsis is barbarous amongst the Athenienses, and so are the Athenienses amongst the Scythyans, by the which answer he signified that every man's tongue is eloquent enough for himself, and that others in respect of it is had as barbarous.  
Thou seest (good Reader) what a ground they have to defend their opinion, and how they labour only to root out all good knowledge & virtue, and plant mere ignorance amongst the common people. Now for to conclude, it shallbe thy duty to receive this my little pains in a good part, and to call upon God that the use thereof, may tend to the glory of his holy name, and profit of our brethren.   

THE FIRST BOOK OF dialectic.  

CAP. I Of the definition and divisions of dialectic.  
dialectic otherwise called Logic, is an art which teacheth to dispute well.  
It is divided into two parts: Invention, and judgement or disposition.  
Invention is the first part of dialectic, which teacheth to invent arguments.  
An argument is that which is naturally bent to prove or disprove any thing, such as be single reasons separately and by themselves considered.  
An argument is either artificial or without art.  
Artificial is that, which of itself declareand is either first, or hath the beginning from the first.  
The first is that which hath the beginning of itself: and is either simple or compared. The simple is that, which simply and absolutely is considered: and is either argeable or disagreeable.  
agreeable is that, which agreeth with the thing that it proveth: and is agreeable absolutely, or after a certain fashion.  
Absolutely, as the cause and the effect.   

CAP. II Of the cause efficient.  
THe cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therefore this first place of invention is the fountain of all sciences: for that matter is known perfectly, whose cause is understanded: So that not without good reason, the Poet doth say: 
Happy is the man withouten doubt,  
Of things who may the causes well find out.   
The cause is either efficient and material, or formal and final.  
The efficient is a cause from the which the thing hath his being. Of the which although that there be no true forms, yet a great abundance we find by some certain means distinct.  
And first the thing that engendereth or defendeth is called the efficient cause. As ovid, in his first book of the remedy for love calleth slothfullness the efficient cause of love, which being taken away love ceaseth: for thus he there sayeth.  
When curable thou shalt appear therefore,  
By my science thy health for to attain.  
give ear, this is my counsel evermore,  
From sloth and Idleness thou do abstain.  
For these to filthy lust thy mind provoketh  
And do maintain that, which they have once wrought  
these be the causes with food that nourisheth,  
This evil which now is pleasant in thy thought.  
The father also, and the mother which engendereth, and the nurse's which bring up, are causes efficients. As Dido. in the 4. book of Eneidos being sorely offended with Aenee, and seeking a cause of his cruelty, denieth him to be Venus or Anchises son, and feigneth other parents to him.  
O false Aenee thyself why dost thou fayne,  
Of Venus' fair the god's son to be:  
Or that Anchise which dardam height by name.  
Thy author was by way of parentie,  
For dreadful Caucasus did thee beget  
On terrible and ragged rocks in filled:  
And raging Tigers noryshes was set,  
To give the suck of udder rude and wild.  
So Romulus was builder of Rome, and after him, Kings, Conulls, Emperors and Tutors were the upholders of it: which all are called causes efficients.   

CAP. III  
secondly the cause efficient is either solitary or joined with some others, of the which some be principal and chief doers, others helpers & servers to the principal. An example of the cause solitary we have in the 9 of Eneidos: 
Here, here, am I (oh Rutilleus) in me  
Your sword bore, thrust in with pithy hand.  
The fraud is mine, I am the cause only  
The impotent nothing durst take on hand.  The solitary cause with others diverse both principals and adiwantes in the Oration which Cicero wrote for Marcus Marcellus is diversly showed.  
For often time (sayeth the Orator) some useth to extenuate martial virtues by words, and pull them away from the Captain and principal doers, and communicate them to Soldiers, that they should not be proper to the Governor of the war: And certainly in war, the fortitude of the Soldiers, the opportunity of places, the aid of the Allies, navies, and provision of victuals helpeth much: and fortune lawfully doth ascribe to herself the greatest part, so that whatsoever is prosperously done, that almost all she esteems her own. But of this glory (oh Caesar) which thou hast not long ago obtained thou hast no fellow: for all how much so ever it be (which verily is most great) all I say is thine, for neither the Centurion, the Captain, the bonds of men, nor yet the troops, may pluck any thing of this away from thee: yea that more is, fortune that mistress of all things offereth not herself in the society of this glory. She giveth thee place, and confesseth this glory wholly to be thine own.  
The instruments also are numbered amongst the causes adiwantes. By this argument the Epicure proveth that the world was never made, as Cicero signifieth in his first book of the nature of Gods.  
With what eyes of mind (sayeth he) might your Plato behold that composition of so great a work, by the which he maketh the world to be made of God: what labouring: what toolles: what bars: what scaffoulds: who were servants of so great a work?  
This ungodly Epicure knew not that God was able to make the world without any instrument, or other causes either material or adiuuante.   

CAP. FOUR  
thirdly the cause efficient worketh by itself, or by accident.  
The efficient by itself is that, which worketh by his own strength, such as by nature or counsel do work. As for example the natural working of the winds is set forth in the first book of the Eneidos.  
Then Eurus rose with North-east raging blast,  
Upon the sea, all tossing from the ground.  
And Nothus with a cruel noise right fast,  
Of whistling wind did blister up and down.  
And Affricus with ruffling tempest rushed,  
Forth of the sooth, the roaring sea to move.  
So that the stormy waves from deep out bushed,  
And raised was the sandy banks above.  
The confession of Cicero containeth an example of counsel, as.  
The war being taken up, yea and almost ended (oh Caesar) by no strength of hand, but of mine own mind and will I come unto these wars, which were raised against thee.  
By accident the cause worketh, which by some external power worketh, as in those things which are done by necessity, or by fortune.  
By necessity, when the efficient is compelled to do, Such a one is the excusation of the Pompeyans:  
If I would seek (sayeth the Orator) a proper and true name of this our sorrow, there appears a fatal calamity to be suddenly fallen, which hath prevented unawares the minds of men: So that no man aught to marvel that the counsels of mortal men are overcome by the fatal necessity of the Gods.  
Fortune is a cause by accident, when besides the intent of the worker, some other thing chanceth: as,  
By chance (sayeth Cicero in his 3. book of the nature of Gods) jason was healed by his enemy, who with stroke of sword opened his rotten impostume, which the Physicians could not heal.  
Amongst these sort of causes, ignorance or lack of foresight is numbered: as, ovid, in the 2. book of sorrowful matters excludeth himself and lamenteth that he had seen by chance some of Caesar's secrets: as, 
Why did I see or yet behold with eye,  
What was the cause, I did by sight offend  
And unto me unwise and foolish why,  
Was ever the fault by any manner kende  
Although by chance that Actaeon did see,  
The nude Diane upon the hearrie bent.  
Yet for all this she did make him a pray:  
To his own dogs which him in pieces rend.  
Wherefore I see, that hap or negligence,  
Among the Gods, no mercy hath at all:  
But who so doth by fortune or by chance,  
Offend the Gods, they shall in trouble fall.   
Here riseth the ask of pardon, as Cicero for Ligarius.  
Pardon and forgive father he hath erred, he hath done amiss: he thought not to do so: if ever he shall do such a thing again? etc. And a little after, he sayeth, I have erred: I have done rashly: I repent me of my doing: I fly to thy clemency, I ask pardon, I pray thee that thou wilt forgive me.  
The ignorance of the cause raiseth the opinion of fortune. For when any thing chanceth beside the hope & entension of the doer, it is commonly called fortune. And therefore wisely it is said of Juvenal.  
If wisdom present be,  
There is no God absent:  
But fortune we thee set on high,  
And eke a Gods vaunt.   

CAP. V Of the material cause.  
THe matter is a cause of the which the thing hath his being: as, ovid in the 2. book of the Metamorphosis, setteth forth the composition of the sons house, by the material cause, as gold, carbuncle stone, ivory, and silver.  
The pryncelie Palace of the fiery Son,  
Which Pillar haught, surmounted far the sky:  
With glistering gold, and eke with precious stone,  
In form of flame, ascending up on high.  
Whose top above was laid in fine order:  
With ivory smooth in colour white to see,  
The double doors were made of silver pure:  
Casting their beams upon the door entry.  
Caesar in the first book of civil wars commandeth his soldiers to build Ships of such a matter as they had learned before in britain, To wit, that they should make the keel and bottom of some light and lieger matter, and the rest of the body of the Ships with twigs covered with leather.   

CAP. VI Of the formal cause.  
THe efficient and material cause being expounded, now followeth the formal and final.  
The formal cause is that by the which the thing hath his name and being. And therefore every thing is distingued from another by his form.  
The form also is engendered together, with the thing itself: as, a reasonable soul is the form of man, for by it Man is man, and is distingued from all other things. The Geometrical figures have their form, some being triangles, and some quadrangles. So hath natural things: as the heaven, the earth, trees, fish and such others. So that every thing is to be expounded as the nature of it is, if we may attain to the knowledge thereof, as in artificial things is more easy to be found. Cesar in his 7. book, setteth forth the form of the walls of France.  
The walls of France are almost builded after this form: The beams of one piece direct in longitude, every one being equally distant from another, are set on their two ends in the earth, hard bound within, and covered with a great countermure. The places betwixt the beams are stuffed up before with great stones: these being so placed and set together, there is added, to over above the same another rank, so that the same space and distance is always kept, that none of the beams do touch another, but each beam being distant from the other by an equal space, is fast joined together with stones, set in betwixt beam and beam. And so consequently, the work is joined together, until the height of the walls be accomplished and filled up. And this work is both well favoured, by reason of his form and variety: having here a beam and there a rank of stones one after another, observing their ranks in a strait line: And also it is much convenient for the profit and the defence of cities. Because both the stone doth keep it salf from danger of burning, and likewise the stuff and matter from rushing or beating down: Which for the most part being made fast forty foots inward with continual ranks of beams, may neither be broken through, nor beaten a sunder.  
On this manner doth Virgil describe the form of the heaven.  
There is with in this long place solitare,  
An Isle extending out two points right far.  
Making a road, where banks on every side,  
From the deep sea the waters do divide.  
And turn in manner of a gulf right deep,  
On either side be hills and banks so step.  
Most huge and high eke from the sea do rise,  
Two fearful rocks, which seem to touch the skies.  
Under whose tops, the waters in their place,  
Came without stir, doth seem to hold their peace.  
Fast by a grove and wood are to be seen,  
With fearful shade, & shaking leaves green.  
Right over against his front thou may perceive,  
On hanging rocks, a dark den or a cave.  
Within the which are springing waters sweet,  
With seats of stone, a house for Nymphs most meet.  
Within this haven, when weary Ships do land,  
They have no need of cable nor of band.  
Nor crooked anchors pitched to make fast,  
For they be sure from all tempestuous blast.   

CAP. VII Of the final cause.  
THe final cause is that for the which the thing is made or done. The end, of natural things is man, and of man God. Also every art hath the final cause: as, The end of Grammar is to speak congrouslie, Of Rhetoric, eloquentlie, and of Logic to dispute well and orderly. juno. 1. of Eneidos, promiseth to Aeolus the fair Nymph diopeian for solace and procreation of children.  
Nymphs I have of body fair and bright,  
Fowrteen, whereof she that diopeian height:  
Most beautiful, I will in wedlock give,  
To thee Aeole that she with the may live.  
For thy reward the whole course of her age,  
Indoting thee with gift of parentage.  
In the defence of Ligarius, Cicero urgethe his accusator Tubero, with the final cause of the wars raised against Cesar, and surely (sayeth he) he joined battle against Cesar in arms.  
What did thy naked sword (oh Tubero) in the Pharsalike army? whose sides pierced the point thereof? which was the sense and feeling of thy weapons? what mind, eyes, hands? what fervency of spirit? what didst thou covet or desire? what diddest thou wish?   

CAP. VIII Of the effect.  
THe effect is that which riseth of the cause. And therefore the moving of things that are engendered, corrupted, or by any other manner of way moved: and the thing also that by the moving riseth is called the effect, as for example, Christ in the 11. chap. of Math. proveth himself by this place, to be the true Messiah promised: being asked of john Baptist's disciples, Art thou he that should come, or shalt we look for another? And jesus answering said unto them.  
Go and show john what things ye have hard and seen: The blind receive their sight: the halt go: the lepers are cleansed: the deaf hear: the dead are raised up: and the poor receive the Gospel: and blessed is he that shall not be offended in me, the sayings and works of men are contained under this place as the wise men's sayings and Plato's and Aristotls' works, counsels also and deliberations although the never take effect.  
Virtue also and vice have their effect, as Horace in the first book of his Epistles, setteth forth the effect of drunkenness: as, 
What thing is not through drunkenness commit?  
For hid secrets he maketh come to light:  
Hope most unsure, full sure is made by it,  
And naked men constrained for to fight.  
From pensive minds, all care it taketh away,  
Science and arts full often doth he teach:  
Full cups of wine, at some time do not they,  
Make ignorance be eloquent in speech?  
The strength of wine, doth it not eke make free,  
The poor man from all care and heaviness:  
Forgetting all his former poverty,  
Unmindful of his dolorous distress?    

CAP. IX. Of the subject.  
NOw followeth the argument which doth agreed after a certain fashion: as the Subject and the Adjoint. The Subject is that which hath any thing adjoined unto it, as, the soul is the subject of knowledge, ignorance, virtue, vice, because these are added to the soul, besides the substance of the same. The body is the subject of health, sickness, strength, infirmity, beauty, deformity, and such others. A man, is the subject of riches, poverty, honours, infamy, clotheses, & of his train. A place is the space in the which the thing placed, is contained: So the Philosophers do attribute to their divine substances (although void of all magnitude) a place: So the Geomatricians unto their figures Geometricalles, give both place, & the differences of places. The natural philosophers also more accurately in the heaven, simple elements, and compound things, doth acknowledge a place: Which is nothing else, but the subject of the thing contained in it: as for example.  
The land of Canaan (a subject) is praised in the 12. of Numeri by the adjoints or things adjoined unto it.  
So Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and said unto them: go up this way toward the south, and go up into the mountains, and consider the land, what it is, and the people that devil therein: whether they be strong or weak, either few or many. Also what the land is that they devil in, whether it be good or bad: and what Cities there be that they devil in, whether they devil in tents, or walled towns: And what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be Trees therein or not, and be of good courage, and bring of the fruit of the land. And after forty days they returned again and told Moses, saying, we came into the land whither thou hast sent us, and surely it floweth with milk and honey: and here is of the fruit of it, never thelesse the people are strong that devil in the land, and the cities are walled, and exceeding great: And moreover we saw the sons of Anacke there: The Amelekytes devil in the South country, and the Hethites and the jebusites, and the Amorites devil in the mountains, and the Canaanites devil by the sea, and by the costs of jordan.  
Here Canaan is the subject: The people of the land, the cities, the fruits, trees, and the goodness and badness thereof is the adjoints for the which it is either praised or dispraised.   

CAP. X. Of the adjoints.  
THe adjoint is that which hath a subject to the which it is adjoined: as, virtue and vice are called the adjoints of the body or soul: and to be short all things that do chance to the subject, beside the essence, is called the adjoint: as, time, quality, either proper: as laughing to men: barking to dogs: or common: as in the example following. Cicero in the Oration for Rossoius Comodus.  
Doth not his very head and over brow altogether shaven and scraped so clean, signify that he is malicious and savorethe of knaneverie? do they not utter and cry that he is a crafty fox? Doth he not appear from the top of his head to the sole of his feet (if the proportion and figure of the body without any speaking or uttered words may bring a conjecture) that there is nothing in him but craft, deceit, and lying: who therefore hath his head & over brow always scrape and shaven, lest some should have the occasion to say that he had an hear of an honest man. So doth Martial in his 2. book, mock Zoilus.  
Thy hear is red, thy mouth is black with all,  
Thy feet are short, one eye thou hast to see:  
Zoyle, if thou be good, we may say all,  
There is no little fact commit by thee.  
Clotheses also, and things pertaining to our train are numbered amongst the adjoints: as, Dido, passing to the hunting, is set forth magnifickly by her adjoints, in the fowerthe book of Eneidos.  
In the mean time while that Aurora bright,  
Left the main sea ascending up on height:  
And Phoebus rising brought the light of day,  
The chosen lusty youth in best array  
Went out the streets toward the port or gate,  
Having their nets with meshes wide and great:  
And hunting staves with Iron heads sharp & broad  
The martial horsemen, next after rushing rood:  
With Spaniall, dogs, which hunt by perfect sent.  
Great multitude also were there present:  
Them which of Carthage greatest Princes been,  
Abiding all the coming of the Queen.  
Which as yet in chamber did abide,  
Thou shouldest have seen eke standing there beside:  
A princely horse most goodly to behold,  
richly arrayed in purple and fine gold.  
Of courage fierce, a beast for fight most fit:  
With frothing teeth biting his bridle bit.  
And last of all the Queen herself comes out,  
Accompanied with soldiers in great rout:  
With purple cloak beset about with guards,  
Having a queaver, well furnished with darts  
Behind upon her shoulders eke did hang,  
Her plaited hearres like bright gold glistering:  
Her purple clotheses most comely to behold,  
Were knit and tied with clasps of shining gold.   

CAP, XI. Of differing arguments.  
THe agreeable argument being expounded, now followeth the disagreeable, which dissenteth from the matter. The arguments disagreeable are equally known among themselves, and disprovethe equally one another: yet by their dissension, they do more clearly appear. They be parted into differing arguments, and gaynesettes.  
The differing arguments be such, as be disagreeable by some fashion only: and are known by these notes: not this, but that: although, not withstanding: as, Cicero for Pompey.  
They did not bring home the victory, but the signs and tokens of the victory. And ovid 2. of love: Ulysses was not fair, but he was eloquent. Also Virgil. Although Priamus was almost dead, yet he did not abstain: Likewise Terence in Eunuchus: Although I be most worthy of this contumely, yet thou art umworthy to do it unto me. Also Cicero for Ligarius, Callest thou it a mischievous act oh Tubero? Why? surely as yet it was called by no man so: some in deed called it an error, others fear: some naming it more hard, either hope, desire, hatred or obstinacy, those that call it most hard, name it rashness: a mischievous act, no man as yet but thou.   

CAP. XII. Of gaynesettes, or opposita.  
GAynesettes are arguments always disagreeing, so that they may not be attributed to one part of a thing after one respect, and at one time: as, Socrates can not be white and black on one part: father and son of one: sick and whole at one time: yet he may be white on a part, and black on an other, father of one man, and son of another: hole this day, and sick to morrow: And therefore upon the affirmation of the one, followeth the negation of the other. And contrary wise also. Gaynesettes are parted into disparates and contrary arguments.  
The disparates are gaynesettes of the which the one is opponed to many: as, green, ayshe colour, read, are mid colours betwixt white and black, of the which every one is a disparate argument both with the extremities, and among themselves also. So liberality, a Man, a tree, a Stone, & other things innumerable, because that one of these can not be said to be the other: as, Virgil 1. of Eneidos.  
O virgin what should I call thee, for thy visage and voice declareth that thou art no mortal woman, Truly thou art a Goddess.   

CAP. XIII. Of Relatives.  
Contrary arguments are gaynesettes, of the which the one is only opponed to the other: and be parted into affirmatives & negatives. They are called affirmatives when they both affirm: as the relatives & repugning argument. The relatives are contrary affirmatives, of the which the one hath his being of the mutual society & affection with the other, for the which cause they are called Relatives: as, he is a father: which hath a son, & he is a son which hath a father for by this mutual relation they are and cease to be both at once. So that whosoever knoweth the one perfectly, knoweth the other also, as Martial against Solibian.  
Thy father when Solibian,  
Thy master thou dost call:  
Thyself then dost thou grant certain,  
Seruaute to be withal.  
Athanasius proveth the eternity of the son of God thus: as, It is not possible that a father may be before the son (meaning of the relation) But the father hath been father from the beginning (as all men do grant) ergo the son hath been from the beginning. And Quintilian in his 5. book the 10. chapter sayeth thus, If it be honest to the Rhodians to set out the custom, it is honest also for Hermacrion to higher it Hear (set forth) & (higher) are relatives. After the same manner Cicero in his book de Oratore sayeth: Is there any danger (sayeth he) jest some should think it filthy, to teach others a glorious and excellent art, the which to learn was most honest. Here (teach) and (learn) are relatives. these also the advocate and client: the lessor and the lessee: free and bond: big and little: the host and the guest: the husband and the wife, with such others.   

CAP. XIIII. Of repugning arguments.  
THe repugning arguments are contrary affirmatives, which among themselves do repugn continually: as, Eneid. 11.  
There is no health in war, therefore we ask the peace. So hot and could, white and black, virtue and vice, repugneth. Likewise Cicero in Parad. against the Epicurians. They held this opinion stoutly & diligently do defend, that pleasure is felicity, which appears to me to be the voice of bruit beasts, and not of men, for thou when God or the mother of all things nature, hath given to thee a soul of all things most excellent and divine, so thou contemptously castest away and abasest thyself that no difference thou esteamest betwixt thee and a bruit beast.  
Here Cicero opponethe beasts and men, as pleasure is beasts felicity, therefore it is not man's, So liberty and servitude: as in Tibullus 2. book.  
Hard servitude I see to me prepared  
In time to come my mistress for to be:  
Far well therefore thou which hast me decored,  
freedom and eke paternal liberty.   

CAP. XU. Of denying arguments.  
Contrary negatives, are when the one affirmeth and the other denieth the same. And are parted into denying and depriving arguments.  
Denying arguments are contrary negatives, of the which the one denieth every where: as, Just not just: a beast, not a beast: blood not blood: as Cicero in the defence of Murena.  
Thou shalt forgive nothing, yes some thing, not all. Grace shall have no place, yes when office and duty requireth. Be not moved with mercy, yes in dissolving of severity, yet there is some praise of humanity. I stand to my purpose, yea surely, without a better get the victory.  
Also Martial in his first book, 
We know fabella thou art fair,  
A maid also, true thou, so are:  
And rich with all who may withstand?  
But when thou dost to much prepare,  
Thyself with praises to up bore:  
Then neither art thou rich nor fair,  
Nor virgin I dare take in hand.   
Likewise Cicero in the first book of his Tusculane questions compelleth the Epicurian by this argument to grant that the dead are in no misery: which thing the Epicurian defendeth. Now (sayeth he) I had rather thou shouldest fear Cerberus the dog with three heads porter of hell, then that thou shouldest so unadvisedly speak these words. Atticus. What his the matter? Marcus. The same which thou deniest to be, thou admittest to be. Where is the Sharpness of thy understanding? For when thou sayest that the dead be in misery, that thing which is not thou admittest to be. And after a long disputation, Atticus sayeth, Now I grant that they are in no misery which are dead, because that by strength of argument thou hast obtained that those which be not at all, are nowise in misery. This fellow (sayeth Terence in his Eunuch.) sometime affirmithe and sometime denieth.   

CAP. XVI Of depriving arguments.  
depriving arguments are contrary negatives: of the which the one denieth upon that subject only, in the which the other which affirmeth, is naturally contained. And the affirmative is called the habit, the denying argument, the privation. So moving and quietness: Sobrrietie and drunkenness: as Martial in his 9 book.  
There is no sober man that would do so, Ergo thou art drunk.  
So to be blind and to see: Rich and poor: as Martial in his 8. book.  
If poor thou be, thou shalt always be poor Aemilian, for nothing is now given: but to the rich. Of this sort be life & death: as Cicero for Milo. Sit you revengers of this man's death, whose life if you thought it might be restored ye would not.  
To speak also and to hold peace: as the first for Catiline: Why dost thou wait for the authority of the speakers, whose minds, thou perceivest by holding their peace.   

CAP. XVII Of equal arguments.  
COmpared arguments are those which are compared amongst themselves, and are equally known, although the one be sometimes more manifest and clear then the other.  
The comparaison is either in quantity or quality.  
Quantity is that whereby the things compared are known how much or how little they are.  
And quality is either of equal or unequal things.  
They be equal which be of one quantity. The equal argument is, when an equal is declared by an equal: whose signs and notes be, equal, alike, the same that, aswell as, asmuch as, asmanye as, neither more nor less: There is a great abundance of such comparisons in the holy Scripture, as the most part of the parables which Christ useth: as in Matthew. 11.  
The Kingdom of heaven is like a grain of muster seed, Deut. 11. Also I will 'cause thy seed to multiply, as the stars of heaven. This argument is diversly, used by the Ethnic authors: as Cicero for Silla:  
Neither may I perceive wherefore thou art moved against me: if because I defend him whom thou accusest: why am I not moved with thee also that accusest him whom I defend: if thou say I accuse mine enemy: I answer a like, I defend my friend. So the 5. of Tuscul. When as they grant no little strength to be in vice, to live a miserable life: must it not be also granted, the same strength to be in virtue to live godly? This also I pray thee tell me Xenophons' wife (sayeth Aspasia) if thy neighbour had gold more precious than thou hast, whether had thou rather have hers then thine own? hers sayeth she, and if she had clotheses and the rest of the ornaments of women, of greater estimation than thou hast, haddest thou rather have hers? yea sayeth she: Go to then if she had a better husband? then thou, haddest thou rather have her husband also? here she was ashamed to answer. Then Aspasia began to speak to Xenophon, I pray the sayeth she, if thy neighbour had a better horse than thou, whether haddest thou rather have his or thine? his sayeth he: and if he had a better ground than thine, haddest thou rather have his? his, to wit the best: and if he had a better wife than thou, hadst thou rather have his also? here Xenophon held his peace also.   

CAP. XVIII. Of the more.  
THey be unequal which be of a diverse quantity.  
The unequal be either more or less: That is more, whose quantity exceedeth: whose notes are, not only, but also: I had rather this then that: seeing this much more that: as, Eccle. 24. Behold that I have not laboured for myself only, but also for all them that seek wisdom. Psalm. 84. I had rather be a door keeper in the house of my God, then to devil in the Tabernacles of wickedness. Rom. 5. But God setteth out his love, that he hath to us, seeing, that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us: much more than now (seeing we are justified in his blood) shall we be saved from wrath thorough him. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his son: Much more, seeing we are reconcilied, we shallbe preserved by his life. Not only so, but we also joy in God by the means of our Lord jesus Christ, by whom we have received reconciliation. And Cicero for Milo: Not only he yielded himself to the people, but also to the Senate neither to the Senate only, but also to the stronghe garrison of soldiers: yea not to these only, but to his power & authority to whom the Senate hath given cure of the whole common wealth, of the whole youth of Italy, & of the whole munition of the people Roman. ovid in the remedy for love, 
seeing the body for to bring out of thrall  
Both sword and fire gladly thou wilt endure:  
Thy soul for to relieve, nothing thou aught at all,  
For to refuse, seeing it is more pure.    

CAP. XIX. Of the less.  
THat is said to be less which an other doth exceed by quantity: whose notes be these: not this only, but not that: this before that: as Cicero for Catiline. 2. There was no man not only in Rome, but in no corner of Italy overlaid with debt whom he had not associate to the incredible league of that mischievous enterprise. Cicero to Philippica 9 All men whatsoever age they be, which in this city have the knowledge of the laws, if they were gathered together in one place, are not to be compared with Servius Sulpitius.   

CAP. XX. Of the similitude.  
THe comparison as yet hath been in quantity, now followeth the comparison in quality: By the which we know what kind of one each thing is, whether like or unlike. These are said to be like which be of one quality: as Math. 23.  
Who be unto you Scribes and Pharisees, ye hypocrites, for ye are like unto whytned tombs which appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all filthiness, so are ye also: for outward ye appear righteous unto men: but within ye are all full of hypocrisy and iniquity. Gen. 1. Furthermore God said, let us make man in our own image according to our likeness. Philip. 2. Let the same mind be in you that was even in Christ jesus, who being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God, but he made himself of no reputation, and took on him the form of a servant, and was made like unto man, and was found in his apparel as a man. And 1. Eneid. Both his mouth and shoulders were like a God. And Cicero in 9 Philip. Although Servius Sulpitius might leave no monument more clear, than his son, which is the very picture and shape of his conditions, virtue, constancy, piety, and engeyn. The similitude is either separated or joined together. The similitude separated is when the 4. or single terms are separated and distingued: as in Math. 23. jerusalem, jerusalem, which killest the Prophets, & stonest them which are sent to thee, how often would I have geathred thy children together, as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but thou wouldst not. And Virgil in Eglog. 5.  
What thing that sleep and rest on grass,  
To weary men appear:  
The same to me of thy sweet verse  
The melody so clear.  
Here, as the hen to her chickens, so God is to the Israelites: And as sleep to the weary, so verse is to the hearer. And again Cicero ad fratrem 1. As the best governors of Ships often times may not overcome the strength and rage of the tempest: So the most wise man may not always vanquyshe the invasion and violence of fortune. The joined similitude is when as the first term hath itself to the second, so the second to the third: as Cicero 3 Ligar. Perceive ye not that the magistrate hath the power to oversee and prescribe good and profitable things agreeing with the laws, For as the laws are above the magistrate, so the magistrate is above the people.   

CAP. XXI. Of the dissimilitude,  
THey be unlike whose quality be diverse: as 2. Peter 6. Lord God of Israel there is no God like the. And therefore the ethnic Antisthenes useth this argument. There is nothing like God, therefore God can no wise be known, by any image or sign made by men. The author of the book of Kings 2. the 18. chapter. Having declared the good qualities, the which Esekyah was adorned with, sayeth thus: He trusted in the Lord God of Israel, so that after him, was none like him among all the Kings of juda, neither was there any such before him, Cicero 2. Phillipic. Hath a great company of dissimilitudes, speaking of Varro his grounds which Antonius had obtained by strong hand. O miserable buildings (sayeth he) by how unlike a master (but how is he a master?) were they with holden: Marcus Varro they should have been for his studies, and not a resorting place for filthy lusts, what excellent things were spoken before within that manner place, what things there written? The laws of the people Roman: The monuments of our forbeers, all manner of wisdom and learning: But now sense thou hast dwelled on his grounds (having no right thereto) all the house ryngethe with the clamour of drunkards, the floor overfloweth with wine, the walls be moist: children of good inclinations with those that were set for advantage, and whores amongst men's wives were dwelling.   

CAP. XXII. Of offsprings.  
WE have hitherto expounded the first arguments: Now do follow those which have their beginning of the first, which beareth themselves to the thing that they prove or disprove: as the first whence their are driven. Such be offsprings: the etymology, distribution, and definition.  
offsprings are arguments which do begin alike, but end diversly: as just, justice, justly: freedom, free, freely: love, lover, lovely: good, goodness, goodly: man, manliness, manly: as, justice is fled out of the Realm, therefore there is no man just within the Realm. Propercius lib. 2.  
Sense freedom to no lover doth remain,  
No man is free, that doth to love give mind.  
Here freedom is the cause why thou art free. Cicero 3. book of the Nature of gods, when he speak the of Dionysius the tyrant: Now (sayeth he) he chargeth that all the golden tables should be taken out of the Temples in the which (after the fashion of the Grecians) it was written of good gods, saying he would use their goodness. The gods are good, therefore their goodness is to be used. Here he disputeth from the effect to the cause also, He is a man, why may he not be then manly.   

CAP. XXIII. Of the notation or etymology,  
THe Etymology is the interpretation of a word: For words are nothing else but notes of matters signified: as Isaac, was so called because his mother laughed at the promise of God made to her. And in the 25-of Genesis, is said, After ward came his brother out, and his hand held Esau by the heel, therefore his name was called jacob: that is to say: an overtbrower or deceiver. And therefore Esau being twice deceived by jacob, sayeth thus in the 27. of Genesis. Was he not justly called jacob, for he hath deceived me now two times: He took my birth right: and lo now he hath taken my blessing. Exod. 2. And she called bis name Moses, because said she, I drew him out of the water. The Hebrews use to give their sons and their daughter's names which might ever put them in remembrance of some point of religion, and know when they come to perfection, that they were of the chosen people. And therefore Nabuchadneser 1. of Daniel, commandeth the chief of the eunuchs to give other names to Daniel, Anania, Misaell, and Azaria, which were chosen to stand in te Kings palace, and teach the learning and tongue of the Chaldeans. The Grecians did use the same, for some were called Timotheus, that is to say, an honorour of God: some Philotheus which is a lover of God: some Demosthenes, the strength of the people: & therefore (some say) that Aeschines his mortal enemy should have said thus: shouldest thou be called Demosthenes? no not so, but rather Demovorus, that is a devourer of the people. So do we in the scottish tongue (to stir the youth to the imitation of them whose name they bear) call some Abraham, others Isaac or jacob, and some Susanna after the Hebrews: And again other some Timothy, and Christofor after the Grecians. This argument is copiously used amongst the Ethnic authors: as Cicero 4. Verr. O trim Swyppinges? for to what place diddest thou ever come, to the which thou diddest not bring with thee this day? To what house, to what city, yea and shortly to what Church? which thou diddest not leave spoiled? clean swipped behind thee? Therefore these thy doings may well be called swyppinges, not so much for thy name (although thou be named verres, which may signify a swypper) as for thy manners & nature. Cicero 2. Philip. Bambalio was father to thy wife, a man of no estimation, and above all things contemned: who for his stutting and stamering of his tongue and dullness of spirit, had this surname Bambalio, for a rebuke and a taunt. The physicians also do give names to their herbs: to some from the cause: as Hirundinaria, from the inventor: Filipendula, from the form: To other some, from the effect and working: as Selfwhole, and such like: from the subject and place: as parietaria, and sea trifolie. From the adjoint and quality: as styncking marubium dead nettle: from the similitude which they have with other things: as Mouse ear, fox tail, dogs tongue: And so forth from the rest of the places of invention. The use then of this place is, to prove or disprove, praise or dispraise any thing by the Etymology of it: as in the former examples, thou mayest perceive.   

CAP. XXIIII. Of the distribution.  
YEt there remaineth of the arguments which have their beginning of others. The distribution and definition: both the one and the other doth reciprocate: in the distribution, the whole with the parts: in the other the definition, and the thing that is defined. Distribution is a division of the whole into his parts. The whole is that which doth contain some parts within it. The part is that which is contained of the whole: And as the dividing of the whole into his parts, is called distribution: So the collecting of the parts to the whole, is called Induction. The distribution riseth of arguments, which doth agreed with the whole, but among themselves doth disagree. And therefore how much the whole with the parts agreeth, and the parts among themselves disagreeth: so much is the distribution the more accurate.   

CAP. XXU. Of distribution taken from the cause.  
THe first sort of distribution is of those that agreeth absolutely, to wit the cause and the effect. The distribution is taken from the cause, when the parts are causes of the whole. So Grammar is parted into Etymology and Syntaxe. Rhetoric, into Elocution and Action: dialectic, into Invention and judgement. For of these parts the arts do consist: So Virgil divideth his Georgickes into four parts: as, 
Hear first I will descrive what is the cause,  
Doth make the corn so pleintifull to rise:  
Under what sign and month of the son,  
Thou shalt begin, to till thy filled and ground:  
Eke at what time thou may unto the elms.  
Setto the wines, and so shortly after this,  
What care thou aught to have of thy oxen,  
And of thy cattle the food and husbanding:  
And last of all how great experience,  
The sparing bees have into their science.  Cicero for murena. I understand (honourable judges) that their was three parts of the accusation, one in rebuking and blaming of his life: an other in contention and strife of dignity The third to consist in the crimination of unlawful suit for offices. Catullus doth use this argumnete both from the parts to the whole, and from the whole to the parts: as, 
Fair Quintia to many doth appear  
white, long, and straight, she doth also to me:  
Yet will I not for this say she is fair,  
Seeing in her that there is no beauty:  
Nor yet in to her body large and big,  
A wshyt of grace or any plesanutnes.  
Fair Lesbian in beauty doth exceed,  
And from the rest hath stolen all pleasant grace.    

CAP. XXVI. Of the distribution from the effect.  
THe distribution from the effect is when the parts are effects, as in the similitude of Cato, wherein he showeth them to have erred that said, old men did nothing. Those (sayeth he) that affirmeth old men constitute overseers of the common wealth to do nothing, sayeth asmuch as if they should say the Governor of the ship doth nothing, when some of the Mariners clymethe the mast, others run the hatches up and down, some do make the pomp empty the Governor in the hinder part of the ship guideth the rudder and stern. Hear the distribution of the general argument into the special doth excel. The general is the wohole, of one essence with his parts: The special or kind is a part of the general, as Animal, a living thing is the whole, whose essence or definition, (to wit, a corporal substance having life and senses) doth alike appertain to men and beasts, which are the specials contained as parts under the general animal. So is Man the general to single men, and a lion to single lions: and again single men are the specials of man, and single lions, of the lion. The general argument is either chief general or subalternal. The special argument is either subalternal or most special. The chief general is that which hath nothing a 'bove it more general: as in our division set forth in the first chapter, the argument is chief general of arguments artificial, and of the inartificial: The most special which might not be divided into other inferiors was the martyr and the form. The subalternal which may be the general in respect of one, and special in respect of another as the cause contained under the artificial argument, as a special, and was general to the matter and form which it did contain under itself. The general and the special are notes and signs of the causes & the effects. For the general containeth the cause, which doth equally appartaine to his specials: and again the special containeth the effect of their general. This is then the reason wherefore the universal excelleth in dignity, by reason it containeth the cause, as, ovid in his Metamor. divideth the general, to wit, A living thing into his specials, as stars (to the which he giveth a life, as the Philosophers do) fowls, beasts, fish, and men: as, 
That no kind, place, or region should be,  
Of living things left void or else empty:  
The Gods do make their habitation,  
Among the stars, into the high Region:  
The scaly fish also, by lot and kevyll,  
The flowddes clear obtained therein to devil:  
The earth received the beasts fierce and wild,  
The easy stirred dire, the flying fowl:  
But yet the living thing, which doth these all excel,  
In holiness, and eke more capable:  
Matters divine in mind for to conceive,  
Was not present, the rest in guide to have.   
Therefore at last was man borne, etc. So, Cicero, in the first book of his Offices, divideth virtue, into four special kinds: wisdom, justice, Fortitude, & Temperance. All things (sayeth he) that are honest, doth rise of one of these four parts, either it consisteth in the perfect knowledge of the truth and quycknesse of wit, or in the defending of the Society & felloweshipp of man, by giving to every man his right, & fullfilling of things promised: Or in the noble courage and strength of a valyante and mighty spirit: Or last in observing a good manner and order in all things, either done: or said, in the which modesty and temperancy consisteth.  
Sometime we argue or reason from the general to the special: as, All men may marry who have not the gift of Chastity, ergo, priests and ministers may marry. And contrary from the special to the general in a part: as, Abraham was justified by faith, therefore man may be justified by faith.   

CAP. XXVII. Of the distribution from the Subject.  
NOw followeth the distribution of those that after a certain fashion doth agreed: as of the Subject and the adjointe. The distribution is said to be of the subject, when the parts are Subjects: as, The xii tribes of Israel had the Land of Canaan, which was a subject parted among them, unto the Rubenytes the plain of Medeba, etc. unto the Gaddes, jazer and Gylyad, etc. unto Manasses the kingdom of Og, etc. unto juda was given the wilderness of Zin, etc. unto Ephraim from jericho to the wilderness, etc. unto Benjamin from jordan up the side of jericho on the north part, etc. unto Semeon was given Beersheba Sheba and Moladah, etc. unto Zabulon from Sarid eastward unto Chisloth, etc. unto Issachar Izreelah Chesulleth, and Shunen, etc. unto Assur, Nephtali, and Dan, every one his portion: as is described the 13. 15. 19 18. and 19 chapters of josua. Cieero 5. Tuscul. There be three sorts of goods: Goods pertaining to the body: goods pertaining to the soul. & external goods. He who doth attain the heavenly goods pertaining to the soul, is rather to be named most blessed, then blessed.   

CAP. XXVIII. Of the distribution taken from the adjoint.  
THe distribution from the adjoint is: when the parts and members of the distribution are adjoints: as Of men some be whole, some sick, some rich, some poor. So Virgil 1. of his Georgickes, parteth the world after the adjoints into five parts, whereof the middle is parching hot, the two extremities could, and the rest temperate.  
Circles there by which part the firmament,  
In number five, whereof is one ardente,  
With the hot beam of glistering son and fire,  
About the which one other doth appear  
On every side with frozen ye congealed  
And storms black: eke those there doth divide  
Two other, which doth hold the mid region  
Granted to pensive men for habitation.  
By gift of God.  
Caesar the first book of French wars. Gallia (now called France) is parted into three parts, whereof the people called Belgi, do hold one: Aquitani an other part, and Celti, the third part.   

CAP. XXIX. Of the definition.  
THe definition is an Oration which doth clearly declare what the thing is, The definition, is either perfect and called properly definition, or unperfect and called description. The perfect definition is a definition which consisteth of the sole causes that accomplished the substance of the thing defined. Such as be the general argument and the special or form. So Man is defined a reasonable living thing: Here (by living thing) which is the general argument, we understand a corporal substance partaker of life and sense, which is the matter of Man: and part of the form: unto the which, if ye will put to (reasonable) ye shall comprehend the whole form of man: So that the perfect definition is nothing else but a collection of the causes which do constitute and perform the substance and nature of the thing defined: such as be the definition of Artes. Grammar an Art which teacheth to speak well and congruously: Rhetoric eloquently: dialectic, an Art which teacheth to dispute well: geometry, to Measure well.   

CAP. XXX. Of the description.  
THe description is a definition which defineth the thing not only with the causes, but with other arguments also: as, a Man is a reasonable thing mortal, and apt to learn: Here with the cause are joined both the common and proper adjointe. This compendious and short briefness is not always to be found in this sort of argument, but desireth sometimes to have a more excellent & magnifical explication: as Glory, is described by Cicero in his oration for Milo. yet of all the rewards of virtue, if there were a respect to be had of rewards, I judge glory to be the most great: which only doth comfort the shortness of this life with the memory of the posterity to come, which doth make us when we be absent, to be as present, and when we be dead doth make us to live. And likewise fame is that, by whose occasion and mean, men seam to ascend and mount up to the heavens above. So fame is described by Virgil 4. Eneidos.  
Anon through all the Cities great,  
Of Afric fame is gone:  
The blazing fame a mischief such,  
As Swifter there is none.  
By moving more, she breads, and as  
She rounes, her might doth rise:  
By low for fear, she lurketh first,  
Then strait aloft in Skyees,  
With pride on ground she goeth, and, perchethe  
The clouds with head on height:  
Dame earth her mother brooded forth  
(Men say) that child in spite:  
Against the Gods, when Giants first,  
Of Serpent's feeted line:  
ENCELADUS & CEUS wrought  
high heavens to under mine.  
Then for disdain, (for on themselves  
Their own work jove did fling)  
Their Sister crauled forth, both swift,  
Of feet and wight of wing  
A Monster ghastly great for every  
Plume her Carcase bears:  
Like number leering eyes she hath,  
Like number hearkening ears,  
Like number tongues and mouths she wags,  
A Wondrous thing to speak:  
At midnight forth she flies, and doth  
Under shade her sound squeak.  
All night she wakes, nor slumber sweet,  
Doth take, nor never sleeps:  
By days on houses tops she sits.  
Or gates of Towns she keeps:  
On watching towers she climes, and she  
Great Cities makes aghast.  
Both truth and falsehood forth she tells  
And lies abroad doth cast.  
Such be the descriptions of plants, and beasts in natural things: Of floods, mountains, and towns in geographical and historical.   

CAP, XXXI. Of divine testimony, The first sort of the unartificial argument.  
THe artificial argument being expounded followeth consequently the unartificial. The argument unartificial or without art is an argument which proveth or disprovethe not of his own nature, but by the strength which it hath of some argument artificial. And therefore when the matter is deeply considered, it hath but a little strength to prove or disprove. In civil and temporal affairs, the authority of the disputer giveth no little credit there unto if he be wise, virtuous, and have the benevolence of the auditor: all these by one name may be called a testimony. The Testimony is parted into a divine and humane. Amongst divine and spiritual testimonies are numbered not only the Oracles of the gods, but also the answers of prophets and diviners: as Cicero the third for Catiline. And to omit (sayeth the Orator) the lightning torches which did appear by night in the Occident, the vehement and parching heat of the heavens: as thrawes of lightnings, and fire breaking out of the clouds, earthquakes, and many other such tempests, which (I being Consul) did appear, so that the gods with a loud voice seamed to sing those things which be now present. And a little after, he sayeth: At the which time when out of all Hetruria the Soothsayers being gathered together, concluded that great slaughter and burning did approach, the destruction of the laws, both civil and domestical wars, and the utter ruin of the whole town and empire: without the immortal gods by all means appeased had by their divine power, changed almost the very fatal necessity. Tibullus.  
If that in holy Church the oracles,  
Doth tell the truth, on my name tell her thus,  
Apollo Delius doth sure to the promise,  
An happy marriage: therefore if thou be wise,  
Keep well thyself, seek not the company,  
Of other men, for that is not godly.   

CAP. XXXII. Of humane testimony.  
THe testimony humane is either general or singular. General, as the law, and famous sayings. There is an example of the law, both written & unwritten in the oration of Cicero for Milo: as, There is a law (honourable judges) not written, but naturally sprung up, which we have not learned, read, nor received of others, but taken, received and drawn from nature itself, the which to attain, we are not taught, but made: not instructed by other, but taught by nature. To wit, That if our life should fall into an ambush or conspiracy, into the power and weapons, either of robbers, or of our enemies, that we should by all honest means, deliver our selves from all danger. And a little after. If the 12. tables would a thief taken in the night to be killed by any means, and a thief taken in the day (if he by weapon defended himself) to be killed also without danger: who is he that think the Slaughter to be punished, howsoever it be committed, seeing he may perceive, that the very laws themselves: do offer to us sometime the sword to kill men. proverbs are numbered amongst famous sentences: as like draweth to like. The sayings also of wysewen: as, Know thy self. Mediocrity is best of all things. There is an example of the singular testimony. Cicero 1 ad fratrem. And surely that prince of engeine and knowledge Plato, had this opinion that the common wealths should then be most happy and blessed, when that either learned and wise men began to govern them, Or that those who had the care over them, should give themselves to wisdom and knowledge. So Christ himself, the Apostles, and Evangelists do confirm their doctrine, by the law of Moses: The Physicians, by the authority of Hypocrates, Dioscorides, Galen, and such others: the Philosophers, by Plato and Aristotle: the lawyers, by justinian: and the mathematicians, by Euclides. So when there riseth any question or controversy of lands or slaughter & such other matters, we use to produce their obligations, and bind them whith their confession and oath, we have an example of Obligation, of Cicero, in 5. Phillippicke. Yea I shall be bold to bind my faith to you (belowed judges) & to the people Roman, which if nothing compelled me I would not take in hand but would very much fear (in a most dangerous matter) the fame and suspicion of rashness. I promise', I undertake, I bind myself (honourable judges) that Caesar shallbe at all times such a Citizen as he is this day, and such a one as you aught to wish and desire him to be. We may comprehend under the name of obligations, gauges given for the surety of any thing: as, Virgil 3. of Eglogs. A herdman having no artificial argument to prove that he could sing better than his fellow, braggeth that he will say down an heifer for a gage. The confession is either voluntary, or forced. Voluntary, when we do grant any thing of our own will. Forced, when by torments we are compelled to grant that which otherways we would not, and is properly called a question. milo's enemy useth such an argument against him, but it is mocked of Cicero: Go too I pray you (sayeth Cicero) what was the question, or after what fashion? ho, ho? where is Rushio? where is Casca? hath Clodius wrought treason against Milo? he hath wrought, than a certain Gibbett for him. He hath wrought none, than there is a hope of his liberty. Hereto also may be referred the sort of argument which we use, when we do offer to prove our sayings by experience: as Cicero 4. of Verren. Is there any body that would have given to Volcatius (although he cometh of himself) the tenth part of a denier? Let him come now and see: there is no man that will receive him within his house. Terence in Eunucho. Examyn in knowledge and learning, in wrestling and fygthing at the barriers I shall give you one conynglye learned in all things, which is decent for a gentleman to know. And Oath is also numbered amongst the testimonies: as, Virgil 6. Aeneidos.  
I was thy cause of death, alas,  
Now by the stars I swear:  
By all the gods, and if there be,  
Remaining yet one where  
Unfeigned faith, if truth on ground  
Or under ground may be  
Against my will (o Queen) from thy  
Dominions did I fly.   
FINIS.   

THE second BOOK OF dialectic CONtaining the disposition.  

CAP. I, Of the definition and division, of the disposition and proposition.  
WE have entreated in the former book the first part of dialectic, which is invention: Now followeth consequently the other part, which we did name judgement and disposition. Disposition is a part of dialectic, which teacheth to dispone and place orderly the arguments invented, to the end we may judge well and rigthly: for we judge of every thing according to the disposition thereof. And therefore this part of Logic is either called judgement or disposition under one signification. Disposition is parted into the proposition (otherwise called enunciation) or syllogism and method. Proposition is a disposition in the which one argument is spoken for another. The proposition hath two parts, the first is called the antecedent, the second the consequent: Of the which the qualities of propositions do rise. And first the affirmation and the negation. The proposition affirmative, is when the consequent affirm upon the antecedent: as, a man is mortal. The proposition is negative, when the consequent denieth upon the antecedent: as, Man is not mortal: and here riseth the contradiction of propositions, when one consequent doth both affirm and deny upon one antecedent   

CAP. II Of the true proposition and false, contingent, necessary, and impossible, and of the three documents of arts.  
THe proposition is either true or false. It is true when the consequent is truly joined with the antecedent, or truly separated from the same: as here it is truly joined: all man are sinners: and here truly separated: no man is just. The proposition is called contingent, when the consequent be truly said of the antecedent, so that sometime it may be false: as fortune helpeth hardy men, for granting it to be true to day, it may be false to morrow: So that the verity of this sort of prositions is only certain in things present, or past, and not in things to come. The proposition is necessary when the consequent may at all times truly be said of the antecedent: as, all men are mortal. And contrariwise, the proposition impossible, is when the consequent may at no time be said of the antecedent: as, A man is a horse. The necessary is either of one kind, or of a diverse kind. The necessary of one kind is when the parts are coessential among themselves, as when the general is said of the special: as, A man is a living thing, or the difference of the form, as, a man is reasonable, or the adjoincte of his proper subject, as, A man may laugh. And this sort of proposition is sometime reciprocate, when the consequent, not only may be said alway of the antecedent, and of all things contained under the antecedent, but of itself also, so that the antecedent contrariwise may be said of the consequent, on the same manner: as Man is a reasonable living thing. number is equal or unequal. The proposition of diverse kind, is when the parts are not coessential: as, A man is black or white. And here we have three general documents to be observed in all arts and sciences. The first is that all the precepts and rules should be general and of necessity true: and this is called a document of verity. The second that every art be contained within his own bounds, and withhold nothing appartaining to other arts, and is named a document of justice. The third, that every thing be taught according to his nature, that is: general things, generally: and particular, particularly: and this is called a document of wisdom.   

CAP. III Of the simple proposition.  
THe proposition is either simple or compound. The simple with the which a simple saying is declared: and therefore it containeth a simple consequent: which if it do affirm, maketh the whole to affirm, and contrariwise, if it denieth, the whole denieth: as, fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water. Here, burneth, hot, and water, are the simple consequentes: upon the affirmation or negation of the which dependeth the affirmation or negation of the whole. And this is the first disposition of things invented, when the cause is joined with the effect, as in the first example. Or the subject with the adjointe as in the second: Or the disagreeable with the disagreeable, as in the third. After the which manner all sorts of arguments may be pronounced (except full comparisons and distributions) the agreeable by affirming, and the disagreeable by denying.  
The simple proposition is either general or special. General, when it speaketh generally. And here the one part of the contradiction is not always true, & the other false. For in things contingent they may be both false: as, All man are learned: Not man is learned. And in things also which be not contingent: as, All living things are reasonable. No living thing is reasonable. The proposition is special, when it speaketh specially and of a part. And here the one part of the contradiction is true, and the other false. The special is either indefinite, or proper: Indefinite when it speaketh of no certain thing: as, Some man is learned, whose general contradiction is, No man is learned. Proper when the consequent is said of some proper name: as, Fabella is fair, whose contradiction is, fabella is not fair.   

CAP. FOUR Of the proposition compound,  
THe proposition compound is when more sayings then one are joined together by some conjunction. And therefore upon the affirmation or negation of the conjunction, dependeth the affirmation of the whole proposition: and here the one part of the contradiction is true, and the other is false. The compound proposition is either congregative or segregative: The proposition is congregative, when the conjunction gathereth, and is either copulative or connexive. Copulative, when the conjunction is copulative, as. Both Eurus and Africus rushed forth. Whose negation and contradiction is, not both Eurus and Africus rushed forth. And here is to be noted, that the verity of the proposition copulative dependeth upon the verity of both parts: for if one part be false, the whole is said to be false, as in this example. Both man and beast are reasonable, the whole proposition is false, because the last part is false. Hereto may be referred the proposition containing the relation of qualities, in the which the relation standeth in place of the conjunction: as.  
Such thing as sleep, and rest on grass  
To weary men appear:  
The same to me, of thy sweet verse  
The melody so clear.  
As though he would say, sleep is sweet to weary men, so is thy verse to me. Whose negation is, 
Not that which sleep, and rest on grass,  
To weary men appear:  
The same to me of thy sweet verse,  
The melody so clear.    

CAP. V Of the proposition connexive.  
THe proposition is connexive, whose conjunction is connexive: as, if thou have faith, thou must have charity: Whose negation is, not althyoughe thou have faith, it folowthe that thou must have charity. Cicero de fratre. Neither if a proposition be true or false, by and by it followeth that causes are immutable. The affirmation signifieth that if the antecedent be, the consequent must be also. The negation or contradiction signifieth, that although the antecedent be, the consequent must not be therefore. Whereby we must understand, that whensoever this sort of proposition is true, it must be necessary also. The necessity is known by the necessary connextion of the parts, and not by the verity of the same: for both the parts may be false, and the connexion necessary, as this: if a man be an horse, he hath four feet, is a necessary connextion. But if the connextion be contingent, and only for his probability supposed to be, there ariseth no necessary judgement, but only opinion: as, Terence in andria. If thou do that (Pamphile) this is the last day that ever thou shalt see me. The proposition containing the relation of time is hitherto referred: as, when justice is maintained, then shall peace be in the Realm.   

CAP. VI Of the proposition segregative.  
THe proposition segregative is, whose conjunction doth segregate: and therefore it speaketh only of disagreeable arguments. It is parted into discerning propositions and unjoining. The discerning is, whose conjunction doth discern. Cicero in Tusc. 5. Although that by the sense of the body, they be judged, yet they are to be referred to the spirit: whose negation and contradiction is, Not although that by the sense of the body they be judged, they are therefore to be referred to the spirit. This sort of proposition is true, when both the parts is true and discerned also. Otherwise it is false and ridiculous.   

CAP. VII Of the proposition unjoining.  
THe proposition unjoining, is a proposition segregated, whose conjunction doth unjoine: as, either it is night or day: all living things, are either man or beast: whose negations are, It is not either day or night: all living thingeh are not either man or beast: Here the negation declareth, that the one part or the other is not true of necessity. For if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary, and the parts opponed immediately one to another. Yet although the true disjunction be necessary also, it is not required that the parts separated be necessary: as, This is a necessary disionction: A man is either good or not good: and yet this, (A man is good) is not necessary: Nor this, (a man is not good:) But the necessity of the disjunction dependeth upon the necessary opposition and disjunction of the parts, & not of their necessary verity. The disjunction is sometimes with a condition, as if one should ask, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? because it was so promised that the one should only come. And therefore if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but only opynable, such as oftentimes we use in comen speaking: as, ovid in Leander's epistle.  
Either happy courage shall save me,  
Or death of careful life the end shall.   

CAP. VIII Of the syllogism.  
A syllogism is a disposition in the which the question being disponed with the argument is necessarily infered in the conclusion. For if the proposition be doubtful, it is made a question: And to prove the question, we take an argument, & dispone it with the question. The syllogism hath two parts: one which goeth before, another that followeth, & may be called, the antecedent and the consequent. The antecedent which proveth or disprovethe the question, and hath two parts: the proposition and assumption, otherwise called the Mayor and the Minor. The proposition is the first part of the antecedent, in the which the whole question or the consequent of the question is disponed with the argument. The assumption is the 2. part of the antecedent, which is assumed under the proposition. The consequent is the last part of the syllogism, which containeth the parts of the question, and concludeth the same, and therefore it is called the Conclusion: if any of those parts be absent, it is called a mutilet syllogism, or Entymema) if any thing be more than those three parts, it is called a Prosillogisme. Sometime also the order is confounded: therefore if any doubt shall rise through any of these things, it is good to put to that to which is absent, and pull away that which aboundeth, and last to put every thing in his own place.   

CAP. IX. Of the first form.  
A syllogism is either simple or compound. Simple when the parts of the question are disponed with the argument, so that the consequent be in the proposition and the antecedent in the assumption. The syllogism is affirmant, when the proposition & assumption affirmeth: And negant, when either the one or the other is negant. General, when they are both general: Special, when there is but one general: Proper, when they are both proper. The simple syllogism is either mutilate or whole. Mutilate, when the conclusion is brought in after on proposition or on assumption: as, 

All men be sinners  
Ergo Socrates.   And 

Socrates is a man,  
Ergo he is a sinner.   The simple syllogism is of two sorts: first the argumentt only goeth before, or followeth only. The first sort then of this kind is, when the argument going before in the proposition sometime affirmatively and sometime negatively, and in the assumption only affirmatively inferethe a special conclusion: as, in the examples following.  

Affirmant general, as.  
Constancy is a virtue:  
But Constancy is Confidence:  
Therefore some Confidence is virtue.   

Negant general, as:  
Folyshehardines is no virtue:  
But folyshehardines is Confidence:  
Some Confidence therefore is no virtue.   

Affirmant special, as,  
A wiseman is to be praised:  
But some wiseman is a poor man:  
Therefore some poor man is to be praised.   

Negant special, as:  
A fool is not always happy:  
But some fool is fortunate:  
Therefore some fortunate is not always happy.   

Affirmant proper: as,  
Socrates is a Philosopher:  
But Soceates is a man:  
Therefore some man is a Philosopher.   

Negant proper, as.  
Thersites is no Philosopher:  
But Thersites is a man,  
Some man therefore is no Philosopher.   
But here, in common speaking to the end we may judge the more easily, we use to dispone thus: 

Some Confidence is a virtue, as Constancy:  
Some is not, as, folyshehardines.     

CAP. X. Of the second form.  
THe second form is, when the argument being consequent affirmatively in the proposition or assumption, in the proposition definitely: the conclusion is brought in like to the antecedent: as,  

General. 1.  
The troubled man reasoneth not well  
The wiseman reasoneth well:  
The wiseman therefore is not troubled.   
And Cicero in 3. Tuscul. As the eye (sayeth he) being troubled, is not able to satisfy his office very well: and the rest of the parts, yea the whole body being moved out of his good state, is not able to perform his office: even so the spirit being troubled is not well disposed to execute his duty well and wisely, and the duty of the spirit is, to use reason: but the wise man his spirit is always so disposed that it may most perfectly use reason, and therefore he is never troubled.  

General 2. as.  
Mortal things are compound,  
The spirit or soul is not compound:  
The soul therefore is not mortal.   
As Cicero Tuscul. 1. proveth the immortality of the soul by this syllogism.  
In the knowledge (sayeth he) of man's soul we may not doubt (without we be most dull and ignorant in natural things) But there is nothing admixed with the soul, nothing compact or made of elements, nothing compound or double: Which, if it be so, surely it may neither be put a sunder nor divided, nor torn, nor pluck in pieces. For death is nothing else but the departing, separating and division of those parts, which before death were coupled together by some copulation.  

Special 1. as.  
The envious is not valiant,  
Maximius is valiant:  
Maximius therefore is not envious.   
As ovid in Elegia 3 doth conclude, 
Ill will and spite full slothful vices be,  
And never doth to gentle manners tend,  
And as the lurking vyperfull lowly,  
Doth alway creep out through the lowest ground  
But (maxime) thy spirit is valiant  
And doth above thy lineage reach I win,  
But yet although thy name be great I grant  
It doth no way excel thy swift engeynne  
Therefore let others overthrow the innocent,  
And let them wish that all men should them fear,  
Eke let them bear their darts about the point,  
Well died with biting venom shining clear:  
But (MAXIM) thy house and family,  
Is well accustomed all prostrate for to mend,  
Among the which I pray the haretefully,  
To number me, and so I make an end.   

Special. 2. as,  
A dancer is Riotous:  
Murena is not Riotous:  
Murena therefore is no dancer.   
Which Cicero for Murena, hath under this form. Almost no sober man without he be mad doth leap either when he is alone, or yet among a moderate and honest company: for immoderate dancing is the companion and follower of inordinate banqueting, pleasant & delectable places, and shortly of all delights, and pleasant fantasies. But thou captiously takest that which most needeth be the extreme of all vice: and yet unawares leavest those things, without the which that vice is not to be found, for thou showest no filthy banqueting, no inopportunate love, no feasting: no love of body: neither any extraordinary expenses. And seeing those things be not to be found, what may these words, voluptuousness or sensuality signify and those things which be vices? believest thou to find the umber and shade of riotousness in that in the which thou canst not find riotousness itself.  

Proper. 1. as,  
Agesilaus is not painted of Apelles:  
Alexander is painted of Apelles:  
Alexander therefore is not Agesilaus.   

Proper. 2. as,  
Caesar oppresseth his native country:  
Tullius oppresseth not his native country:  
Tullius therefore is not Caesat.    

CAP, XI. Of the second kind of syllogism.  
WE have hitherto expounded the two sorts of the first kind of the simple syllogism: Now followeth the second. The simple syllogism of the second kind is, when the argument definitely going before in the proposition, and following affirmatively in the assumption, the conclusion is brought in like to the antecedent.  

Affirmant general.  
That which is just, is profitable,  
But that which is honest, is just,  
Therefore that which is honest is profitable:   
Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludeth thus. The Philosophers of greatest authority, yea very sharply & honestly have by cogitation distingued these three, which be confused. For whatsoever is just, that also they esteem to be profitable: and that which is honest, the same to be just: Of the which it is concluded, that whatsoever thing is honest, the same to be profitable.  

Negant general.  
That thing which is void of all Counsel, can not be governed by Counsel:  
But love is void of all Counsel:  
Love therefore cannot be governed by any Counsel.   
As Terence sayeth in his Eunuch almost under the same form.  
Affirmant special.  
These Consuls which for their virtue are chosen, aught diligently to defend the common wealth: Cicero is chosen Consul for his virtue: Cicero therefore aught diligently to defend the Common wealth. So the Orator 2. Agrar. concludeth his own diligence and care: For seeing all Consuls aught to have a great care and diligence in keeping of the common wealth: Those aught most chiefly so to do, who not from their youth, but in open place are chosen consuls. My predecessors made no surety to the people Roman for me: They believed myself: It is your duty to ask of me that thing which mine office requireth, and to call mine own self into judgement. For as when I sued for this office, none of my predecessors commended me unto you: Even so if I offend in any thing, there is no shift that may deliver me from you: wherefore, if God prolong my days (although I am the man who is able to defend the same from their mischievous & subject conspiraties) this I promise' unto you Quirites, that ye have given the charge of your common wealth unto a vigilant man, & no fearful fellow: To a diligent man, and no Coward or feyntharted.  

Negant special.  
He that deceiveth a loving maid is not to be praised:  
Demophon is a deceiver of a loving maid, as Phillidis:  
Demophon therefore is not to be praised.   
Phillis thus inferethe in ovid.  
For to deceive a maid of tender age,  
Which trusteth in thee, it is no vassalage,  
Nor crafty gloire: For her simplicity,  
Had rather have the constant love of thee.  
I Phillis both a lover and a maid,  
Am by thy words (false Demophon) deceived:  
God grant therefore which dwells in heavens high,  
For thy deceit, that thou rewarded be.  

Affirmant proper.  
Octavius was Caesar's heir:  
I am Octavius:  
I am therefore Caesar's heir.   

Negant proper.  
Antonius is not Caesar's son:  
Thou art Antonius:  
Thou art not therefore Caesar's son.    

CAP. XII. Of the compound syllogism.  
AS yet we have entreated of the simple syllogism: Now followeth the compound: The compound syllogism is, when the whole question is the one part of the proposition affirmant and compound, and the argument the other part. But the argument is sometime consequent to the antecedent of the question, and sometime it is the other whole part of the proposition: and than it is only assumed in the assumption. The compound syllogism is either joined or disjoined. The syllogism joined is a cumpounde syllogism, whose proposition is joined with this conjunction, if, and such others, and is of two sorts: The first affirmeth the antecedent, & concludeth the consequent, as Cicero concludeth. 2. Divinat.  

If there be Gods, there is a divination:  
But there are Gods:  
Ergo there is a divination.   
Cicer. 3. office surely if nature prescribe that man should wish the commodity & furtherance of man, whatsoever he be for that he is man, of necessity it is required according to the self same nature, that the utility and profit of all be common: Which if it be so, we are contained all under one law of nature: And if this be also, truly we are forbidden by the law of nature, that one should misuse another. But the first is true, therefore the last is true. Here often times the same is not assumed, but some thing greater. 1. Catal. If thy parents should fear thee & hate thee, so that thou couldst by no means appease them, I believe that thou wouldst get thee some way out of their sight. Now thy native country, which is the mother of us all, both hateth & feareth thee, & knoweth that thou thinkest nothing but her destruction and ruin: Shalt thou neither fear her authority, neither shalt thou follow her judgement, neither shalt thou be afraid of her mighty power? The same sort of concluding is, when the proposition containeth a relation of time, as Oenone concludeth her error of foolishness. 
When Paris may without Oenone be,  
Then Xanthus shall run backward up the vale:  
Turn Xanthus, turn, run floods backwardly,  
For Paris doth without Oenone devil.   
The second sort of joined syllogism pulleth away the consequent, that it may pull away the antecedent also.  

If a man were immortal, he would be a simple substance, without composition of elements:  
But he is never without the mixture of elements.  
He is never therefore immortal.   
Alexander the great ask one of his wise men by what means a man might be God: If (said the wiseman) he shall do those things which a man is not able to do. Of the which answer I make this sillogis. 

If a man would be God, he must do that which is impossible for man to do:  
But the consequent can not be:  
Nor yet the antecedent therefore.     

CAP. XIII. Of the disjoined syllogism.  
THe disjoined syllogism is a compound syllogism, whose proposition is disjoined: And is of two sorts: The first taketh away the one, & concludeth the other: as, 

It is either night or day:  
But it is not day:  
It is night therefore.   Cicero for Cluentio. But when this choice was offered to him that either he should justly and godly accuse, or die cruelly and unworthily: he chooseth rather to accuse how soever he might, then to have died after that sort: as he would say.  

Either he must accuse or die:  
He will not die:  
He will accuse therefore.   
The second sort of disjoined syllogism taketh one in the proposition for the most part affirmant, and pulleth away the rest: as, 

It is either night or day:  
It is day:  
It is not night therefore.   And sometime the proposition negant, after this form, 

It is not both night and day:  
But it is day:  
It is not night therefore.     

CAP. XIIII. Of the method.  
THe method is a disposition by the which among many propositions of one sort, and by their disposition known, that thing which is absolutely most clear is first placed, and secondly that which is next: and therefore it continually proceedeth from the most general to the special and singular. By this method we proceed from the antecedent more absolutely known to prove the consequent, which is not so manifestly known: & this is the only method which Aristotle did observe.   

CAP. XU. Of the illustration of the method by examples of arts.  
THe chief examples of the method are found in arts and sciences: in the which although the rules be all general, yet they are distinct by there degrees: for every thing as it is more general is first placed. The most general therefore shallbe first placed: them next shall follow these which be immediately contained under the general, every one orderly unto the most special which shallbe last disponed. The definition therefore as most general, shallbe first placed: next followeth the distribution, which if it be manifold, and of divers sorts shallbe first divided into his integral parts, next into his forms and kinds. And every part and form shallbe placed and described in the same order & place which he had in his division. It shallbe expedient also if the prolixt declaration part them far a sunder, to gather them by a short transition, for that doth recreate and refresh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more easily understanded we must use some familiar example. If thou wilt ask (having all the definitiones, divisiones, and rules of Grammar written in divers tables, & mixed out of all order) what part of dialectic teacheth thee to dispone orderly these rules so confounded: first thou hast no need of the places of invention, seeing they be all ready found out: neither haste thou need of the first disposition of propositions, seeing they are disponed already: neither of the second disposition, which is the judgement of the syllogism, seeing all things which might fall into controversy is proved and concluded: only the method doth remain. The Logician therefore by the light of this artificial method, shall take a part out of this confused mass the definition (for it is most general) and place it first of all: As, Grammar is an art which teathech to speak well and congrusly. Then shall he seek out of the said mass the division of grammar, & shall dispone the same in the second place: Grammar is parted into two parts, Etymology, and syntax. And thereafter he shall found out the definition of Etymology, to the which he shall give the third place. Then he shall seek out the parts of the Etymology, & first the most general as letters: next syllabs & words. Having the parts, he must seek the forms: as words having number, & without number. And last he shall knit and ioyoe together with short & apt transitiones the end of every declaration with the beginning of the next. And so having defined, divided & knit to gather the parts of the Etymology, he shall make every thing more manifest and plain with most fit and special examples. And after the same order he shall entreat the syntax. This is a general method observed in all arts.   

CAP. XVI Of the illustration of the method by examples, of poets, Orators, and Historiographers.  
WE do not only use this method in the declaration of arts and sciences, but in the expounding of all things which we would plainly set forth. And therefore the poets, orators & all sort of writers how often soever they purpose to teach there auditor, do always follow this order of method, although they do not every where insist therein. Virg. in his Georgics parted his matter as we have said into four parts: & in the first book he entreateth of common & general things, as of Astrology, and things engendered in the air, & of corns and there manuring, which is the first part of his work: then he useth a little transition in the beginning of the second book: 
This much is spoke of stars and husbanding:  
Now will I thee Bacche begin to sing.  Next he writeth generally of trees, then specially of vines: the second translation is put in the third part, but more imperfect and without the conclusion of the third book, of oxen, horse, sheep and dogs: 
Eke thee great Pales the gods of pasture:  
And thee Apollo of sheep the governor,  
At Amphysus with praises I will sing.  And last the third transition of the fourth part is put in the begnining of the fourth book: 
Now by and by with song I will you show  
Thuplandish gifts of honey made of dew.  Here therefore we may see that the poet hath studied to place the most general in the first place, and the next general in the midst, and the most special last of all. So doth ovid in his fasts first propone the some of his work, and shortly after part the same: and last having declared the parts, knitteth them together with short transitions: the Orators also in there proemes, narrationes, confirmationes, and perorationes labour to observe this order which they call the method artificial & natural. Here Cicero first proponeth the matter and next parteth it. Thou hast been this fowerten years quaestor (sayeth he) Cn. Papyrius being consul: & I accuse thee of all things which thou hast done from that day to this day: there shall not be one hour found void of thy theft, malicious doing, cruelty, and mischief. Here is the some: now followeth the general partition. All the years (sayeth he) are spent either in the office of the questure: in the ambassade made in Asia: in the office of the preture pertaining to the town: or in the office of the preture, among the Siciliens. And therefore into these four parts my whole accusation shallbe parted. Of the which four parts, and the lest member of every part he entreateth afterward, every on in his own order and place. And in the third oration knitteth together the first three parts with transitiones. Now (sayeth he) seeing I have shown his office of questure & first dignity to be full of theft & mishievous doing, I pray you give ear to the rest. Then after he had shown the faults of the Ambassade, followeth the transition to the office of the preture. But now let us come (sayeth he) to that worthy preturie and to those faults, which be more manifest to those that be here present, then to me although I have studied & prepared myself to declare the same. This transition is more imperfect lacking an epilog. And last in the beginning of the fourth oration he maketh such a transition to the fourth, part which is of the preturie among the Siciliens. There is many things (honourable judges) which of necessity I most pretermit, to th'end I may speak a little of these things committed to my charge. For I have taken upon me the cause of Sicilia, that charge hath pulled me to this business. So Livius in the beginning comprehendeth the some of seventy years, and thereafter divideth the same by decades.   

CAP. XVII Of the crafty and secret method.  
THis method then in divers enuntiations of one kind, being known either by there own disposition, or the disposition of the syllogism shallbe observed how often soever the matter is clearly to be understanded: But when with delectation or some other motion thy chief purpose is to deceive the auditor, than thou shall put some thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, divisions and transitions: & set in there places things appartaining nothing to the matter: as digressiones from the purpose, & long tarrying upon the matter: but most chief see that in the beginning thou invert thy order, and place some antecedentes after there consequentes. And surely this more imperfect form of method in respect of the exact rule observed in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the taking away of some of the matter: and redoundeth by the eking to of things extraordinary: but having some degrees of the order inverted, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.   
FINIS.   

FAULTES ESCAPED.  

Page 8 line 2 Read argument or.  
pag. 17 lin. 21 declareth.  
pag. 24 lin. 11 again without interrogation.  
pag. 30 lin. 21 ignoranter.  
pag. 45 lin. 26 seeing thee, etc. his example aught to be put to the next Chap. 19  
pag. 49 lin. 20 Marcus Varro would they.  
pag. 72 lin. 1 of