THE ART of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute.  
Made by Ralph Lever.  
Seen and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queen's majesties Injunctions.  
¶ Imprinted at London, by H. Bynneman, dwelling in Knightrider street, at the sign of the Mermaid. Anno. 1573.  
These Books are to be sold at his Shop at the North-west door of Paul's church.   

¶ To the right honourable Lord, Walter, Earl of Essex, Uiscount Hereford and Lord Ferris of Chartley, Lord Bourghchier, and Louvain, and Knight of the mo●… honourable order of the Garter: Ralph Lever wisheth increase of knowledge, with the true fear of god.  
IT pleased you, (●…ighte honourable) about nine years ago, to accept me into your service: and being then desirous to study the art of reasoning, you made me your reader: and used at sundry times to confer with me in that kind of learning. There was in you (be it spoken to the praise of God, and without all suspicion of flattery) both a gentle nature, easy to be ttained to take pleasure in study: and also a sharpness of wit, ready to conceive at the first any doctrine that was orderly taught. So that doubtless, if there had not been a lack in me, your L. had long ago profited right well in this art. The lack which was in me then, and which I now remember with grief, was this: I used no good trade to 'cause your L. to take pleasure in study, and not to fail of your appointed hours. verily it is requisite in all them, which shallbe readers to men of noble birth, that besides knowledge and diligence to teach, they have also a certain sleight, and cunning, to 'cause their scholars to delight in learning: and so to use the matter, that personages of high estate be neither drawn from the love of their book, by to much forced exercise: nor suffered to loose their appointed time of study, for lack of a grave and alurable calling upon, for the one breeds a loathsomeness, and the other a forgetfulness. But albeit that your L. hath had loss through my lack of skill in this point, yet it so falls out now, that many are like to make gain of your loss. For the lack which was in me, when I served your honour, hath since been the chief occasion why I have written this book, to make some part of recompense to you. In consideration whereof, I most humbly desire you, to take in good part, that I dedicated this simple work unto your L. for my desire is, that it may pass forth under your protection. If you like well of it, I shall not only think my pains well bestowed: but myself also to have a sufficient defence against all ill reports. Martin Bucer read over this art, in his old days, and renewed in his age, the rules that he learned thereof in his youth. If you mind to renew your study, and once again to assay, what you can do to obtain this excellent art, I offer unto you my service and diligence, as may best stand with your pleasure and my calling. The rules of this art are general, and upon them groweth a general knowledge. Who hath a pregnant wit, and is cunning in this faculty, shall have both to speak, and to judge, of any matter whatsoever. If learning be joined to virtue and honour, so that they three take place in one person at once, it is a wonder to see, how all men's eyes are bend upon such a one, and what hope they conceive of his well-doing. My prayer is therefore, that your L. may so consider of this, that as you, in two of these, do exceed almost all: so in the third you might not be inferior to many. But having always afore your eyes the fear of God, the love of your Prince, and the duty, you do owe to the common wealth, your L. may live many joyful days with your loving spouse, increase your noble house with immortal fame, and finally, at the good time appointed, rest with the Lord Christ for ever.   

The Forespeache.  
TO prove that the art of Reasoning may be taught in english, I reason thus: First, we Englishmen have wits, as well as men of other nations have: Whereby we conceive what standeth with reason, and is well done, and what seemeth to be so, and is not. We have also framed unto our selves a language, whereby we do express by voice or writing, all devices that we conceive in our mind: and do by this means let men look into our hearts, and see what we think. Then, as English men can compass this Art by wit: so can they also declare and set it forth by speech. Now whereas a number of men do suppose, that our language hath no words little to express the rules of this Art: and where as some men do argue, that it must needs be so, because they that speak or writ thereof at large, use terms and words, that no mere English man can understand: It is plain, that neither their supposition is true: nor yet their reason good. For as time doth invent a new form of building, a strange fashion of apparel, and a new kind of artillery, and munitions: so do men by consent of speech, frame and devise new names, fit to make known their strange devices. As for strange and inkhorn terms, (used of many without cause) they argue a misuse to be in the speaker: but they prove not directly, that there is any lack in our language: no more than the rudeness of Lawyers latin, proveth that there is a want of good words in the Latin tonnge. I see and confess, that there be Plura rerum, quàm verborum genera, (that is, more things, than there are words to express things by) and do know withal, that Aristotle found that want in the Greek tongue, which for fineness of speech, and store of words, far excels all other languages. Yet is there this help in speech, that we oft use many worms to express one thing: yea & sometimes one word is used to signify sundry matters. Moreover, one language borroweth of another, and where there is want, men sometimes devise new names and compounded terms. So that after a man hath conceived any new devise in his head, and is desirous to have the same published, and made common to many, he finds ever some shift, by one mean or other, to make the same known. And because there is none so good a way to do it by, as speech, man maketh that his chief mean. Thus you may see the original groundwork, & beginning of arts, Man first doth conceive trim devices in his head, and then (as the poets do feign of jupiter) is pained as a woman in travail, till he have uttered and published them, to be seen, & commended of others. So that when as arts are begun at the first by one, and after laboured by many, they grow by continuance of time to perfection, as well in the utterance of the speech, as in the devise of the mind. As for devising of new terms, and compo●…ding of words, our tongue hath a special grace, wherein it excels many other, & is comparable with the best. The cause is, for that the most part of english words are short, and stand on one si●…lable a piece. So that two or three of them are oft times fitly joined in one.  
Of these kind of words, I have devised many, and am now to give a reason of my doing. But first I desire thee (gentle Reader) not to scoff at them afore thou know what they mean: or that thou hast found out thyself, or learned of others, more apt and fit terms than they are. And if any man do cast out a reason, and say, Loquendum ut vulgus, that is to say, he that speaketh, must use such terms as the common people is in ure withal: and therefore that we may not devise new names, but retain and use the old. I answer, this common saying taketh place, where there are words already extant, and in use, fit to make the mind of the speaker, known to his audience: but the matter stands not so with us. Therefore consider the case as it is: An art is to be taught in that tongue, in which●… it was never written afore. Now the question lieth, whether it were better to borrow terms of some other tongue, in which this said Art hath been written: and by a little change of pronouncing, to seek to make them English words, which are none in deed: or else of simple usual words, to make compounded terms, whose several parts considered alone, are familiar and known to all english men? For trial hereof, I wish you to ask of an english man, who understandeth neither Greek nor Latin, what he conceiveth in his mind, when he heareth this word a backset, and what he doth conceive when he heareth this term a Predicate. And doubtless he must confess, if he consider the matter aright or have any sharpness of wit at all, that by a backset, he conceiveth a thing that must be set after, and by a predicate, that he doth understand nothing at all. The like shall fall forth when comparison is made, betwixt any of our new terms compounded of true english words, and the inkhorn terms derived of strange and foreign languages: For he that is an englishmen born, and understandeth no tongue but his own, shall at the first, either conceive the meaning of our words by himself, or else soon learn them upon an other man's instruction and teaching: but for these inkhorn terms, it is certain, that he shall neither understand them by himself: nor keep them in remembrance when he is taught their signification of others, because the word can make him no help. We therefore, that devise understandable terms, compounded of true & ancient english words, do rather maintain and continued the antiquity of our mother tongue: then they, that with inkhorn terms do change and corrupt the same, making a mingle mangle of their native speech, and not observing the property thereof. They that will have no new words devised where there is want, seem not well to consider how speech groweth, or wherefore it was devised by man: For names are not given unto things afore the things themselves be invented. Therefore old names will not serve to make new devices known. It is a fondness (I grant) to devise new names, where there are old in use, which agreeing to the property of the speech, may serve the turn well enough. For no man is of power to change or to make a language when he will: but when fit names are devised and spoken, they force the hearers to like of them and to use them: and so do they by consent of many, grow to a speech. Therefore (gentle reader) if thou doubt, what is meant, by any of our strange and new devised terms, consider their parts, as they are taken by themselves alone: and the consideration of the parts, shall lead thee to the knowledge of the whole. But if this shall not serve thy turn, thou mayst look in the table placed in the end of our book, and it shall show thee in order their meaning, either by numbers referring thee to the places, where they are plainly taught: or making some short exposition of them, if there be none in the book afore. There shallbe added also (for some men's better contentation) the Latin terms. And thus much, for proof, that this art may be taught in our mother tongue, and for defence of the terms that we have devised to teach and set forth the same. New let us answer them, which judge it hurtful, to have this art written and setfoorth in english. They build chiefly upon two points. first they suppose, that it should be a great decay and hindrance unto learning. secondly, that it should minister unto many, matter of contention and strife. The first part of their supposition is proved to be false by plain experience: for what man of experience and wit seethe not, that learning did never so flourish in England in our forefather's days, as it doth now, and hath done of late, even since men have begun to writ of Arts in our english tongue? And as for contention, which groweth betwixt party and party, when they argue and dispute of matters to and fro: that is no fault to be imputed or ascribed unto art: but an infirmity and heat of choler, incident to the nature of sharp wits, and commonly chancing▪ when men leave the cause, and bestow their speech upon by matters: which thing the art of reason reproveth, terming it a shift, and a wranglers point. But let us consider the profit that cometh of this art, so shall we best see, that learning hath no enemies, but them that are ignorant, & those which know not what profit cometh of knowledge. This art serveth to many singular purposes. For she doth not only teach an order to reason wittily of doubtful matters, and to speak forcibly of them either of or on, But she also yieldeth to them, that are cunning and expert in her, a general understanding to judge of all matters whatsoever, and to discern what is said or done according to reason, and what is not. And where every particular science hath but one special matter to entreat of, as Arithmetic to entreat of numbers, Geometry of bigness, Physic of health, etc. This faculty that we here speak of, is tied to no special matter: but taketh in hand the debating of all things, so far as wit and reason can extend. Her precepts are very general, and are used for grounds, and principles in all sciences. She trieth whether the rules of art be true or false: she is a searching faculty, by reason whereof she teacheth a man the sooner to espy, what is right, what is wrong, what maketh for him, and what maketh against him. But to speak more particularly of her work, she sorteth all words, and placeth every kind by itself, eaching what they signify, as they are considered, and taken alone: she declareth what sense words do make, when they are coupled and knit together: she painteth forth the perfect form of a reason by rule. And to conclude, she doth minister matter to confirm, and lay forth a troth: and teacheth a way, how to disprove, and discover an error. He that is cunning in this faculty, shall seem ignorant in no learning: and who that is altogether unseen in this, can be deeply seen in none. Doubtless a wise man must needs take great pleasure, and wonder, to see a few rules lead men to an infinite knowledge. These things I trow may profit many, sure I am, they can harm none. A scholar or one that is but a beginner, may not think that he should understand at the first sight, if perchance he read in this book at adventure here or there: For the rules of this Art are couched together like to billets in a pile of wood: so the things that are laid down in order, must be orderly taken up: neither do men draws out billettes at the breast of the pile: but they ascend to the top, and taking them in order as they rise, they quickly dispa●… mu●…e with ease: otherwise they shall hardly in long time, writh out one from amongs many. And though these roles and terms sem's hard at the 〈◊〉 all strange and unacquainted thin●… 〈◊〉) yet use shall make them easy. And 〈◊〉 understanding of hard points, use these helps. First consider with yourself, what the author's purpose is in 〈◊〉 place, how that special point may agree with the general issue: then seek to know, what every word in the sentence may signify by itself alone: & after weigh what sense they ●…ake as they are all knit, and coupled together: then try if aught may 〈◊〉 put to the sentence, or taken from it, to make it plainer or truer▪ Last of all, seek for divers and 〈◊〉 examples▪ etc. by these means you shall at the length not only understand the meaning of that you read, but also discern▪ & judge, whether the saying be true or false: plain, or obscure. Now to let every writer have his deserved praise, I confess (to them that desire to know whom I follow) that in my three first books, I ●…ely follow Aristotle: both for matter, & also for order: who is in my judgement, an author, the far passeth all profane writers: not only for that ●…he writeth more true, and profitable things than others do: but also, for that his manner, and trade of writing, is more perfect and plainer, than any others is that I have read. As for Ciceronians & sugar tongued fellows, which labour more for fi●…nes of speech, then for knowledge of good matter, they often speak much to small purpose, and shaking forth a number of choice words, and picked sentences, they hinder good learning, with their fond ●…hatte. But in my fourth book, which entreateth of the places, & showeth a way how to provide store of arguments: I have thought good neither fully to follow Aristotle: nor yet any other that I have seen. For Aristotle's invention serveth best, for university men, when a question is brought to some general issue, as to prove that the backset is, or is not, the saywhat, the kind, the property, or the Inbeer of the foreset. Howbeit, men use in disputing or writing, to argue to and fro, never bringing the matter that lieth in question, to any of these four general issues. Now though the latter writers, think they find just fault with Aristotle in this behalf: yet in mine opinion, they themselves neither devise so many places as may be devised for store of matter: nor yet name them, or handle them so aptly or handsomely as is meet. If it be my hap, dissenting from all men in this point, to find out a plainer and more easy way, then hath been found out heretofore, thou oughtest (gentle reader) neither to blame their lack of skill: nor much to praise my mending. For Arts are like to Okes, which by little and little grow a long time, afore they come to their full bigness. That one man beginneth, another often times furthereth and mendeth: and yet more praise to be given to the beginner, then to the furtherer or mender, if the first did find more good things, than the follower did add. Experience teacheth, that each thing which is invented by man, hath a beginning, hath an increase, and hath also in time a full ripeness. Now although each work is most commendable when it is brought to his full perfection: yet where the workme●… are many, there is often times more praise to be given to him that beginneth a good work, then to him that endeth it. For if you consider the books that are now printed, and compare them with the books that were printed at the first (Lord) what a diversity is there, and how much do the last exceed the first? Yet if you will compare the first and the last Printer together, and seek whether deserveth more praise and commendation: you shall find that the first did far exceed the last. For the last had help of many, and the first had help of none. So that the first lighteth the candle of knowledge (as it were) and the second doth but snuff it. This I writ, for that some adding but patches to other men's works, and after publishing the whole in their own name, convey to themselves (as it were by stealth) the fame & praise that others do deserve. As for those that mar the thing they take in hand to mend, do not only publish to the world their own unskilsulnesse, in finding out any profitable matter: but also do bewray their unability to judge of things well found out to their hands. To such I say, it is far easier for a mean crafts man, to make a work of his own devise, then to finish the work, that a cunning man hath begun. I writ thus much, because some men by such kind of dealing, have misused both my doings & my name. For the book, named the Philosopher's game, and printed about nine years ago, is entitled to be set forth by Kaphe Lever, and to be augmented by one W. F. But I assure thee (gentle reader) that, the pamphlet or work never passed from me, with so many & so gross oversights, as in the book now printed are common to be seen. For trial whereof, I refer myself to the copy that this day is extant in sundry of my friends hands. Surely I think myself much discredited, and that great wrong is offered unto me, for that the same is set forth, and suffered to pass under my name, without my knowledge, or assent. Reason would, that each man should bear the blame of his own deault. But I marvel most at him, which would correct and augment the tables that I drawn forth, for beginners to look on, when they played at this game. For sure I am, that I comprised in them, both plainly and briefly, all the examples of taking and triumphing, which are possible to be found, in that kind of exercise. Now hath this correcter or augmenter (term him as you will) altered, and changed mine examples, in an hundredth places, and more: committing in each place, a manifest error: either leaving out them which are necessary: or interlacing them, which are altogether impertinent to this play, or utterly false, and not agreeing, to the rules and principles of Arithmetic. It were therefore to be wished, that no man's work should be printed, nor no man's name put to any work, except the party first known thereof, and were welwilling thereunto: and that they which take in hand to amend or augment another man's writing, should use certain marks, whreby each man's doing might appear by itself. So should each person bear the report of his own desert, whether it were good or bad. There are two common marks, that this arte shooteth at: the first is, to make a good reason: the second is, to show the faults of an ill reason. Of the first, I have written so much, as I thought convenient and meet: of the second, I mind to writ hereafter, if the Lord God shall make me able, and occasion me so to do. In the mean time, I have yielded to the earnest request of my friends: and have published this first part, without the second: not minding for mine own ease to stay that, which is thought, will yield present profit to many. Learn thou (gentle reader) by this which is already written, to make true reasons, and to use an upright kind of dealing: and then shall no coloured or deceivable arguments drive thee from the truth, or lead thee into error. Farewell from Duresme, the. 24. of November. 1572.   

In the table of the faults, read for Fol. side, and for line, verse. And know, that a shewsay in Latina is called Pronunciatum, Enunciatio, or Propositi●…. Why I term it so, look. 66. 11.   

¶ THE first book of Witcraft.  


What Witcraft is.  
1 WItcraft is a cunning to frame and to answer a reason.   

The parts of a reason.  
2 A reason standeth of certain sayings, and a saying of words.  
3 So that words are the first and the lest parts of a reason: and therefore first to be taught and learned.  
4 For he that will keep a good trade in teaching, must begin with small and easy matters at the first, and by them proceed to greater and harder points, so far till at the last he attain to the end, which is first in purpose, and last in work.   

What words are.  
5 Words are voices framed with heart and tongue, uttering the thoughts of the mind.   

The first dividing of words.  
6 Words either agree in sound, and differ in meaning: or they agree in meaning, and differ in sound: or they agree in both: or else they descent in both.  
7 They of the first sort may ●…ée termed Lykesounding words: They of the second sort, like meaning words: They of the third sort, playne●…: ●…ng words: and they of the fourth sort, words fully differing one from an other.  
Words 


Lykesounding.  
Lykemeaning.  
Playnemeaning.  
Fully differing.     
8 Lykesounding words, are words of double understanding, which have one sound of letters, and according to that one sound, divers say what's, expressing sundry substances.  
9 For example thus: The Woodcock hath let my woodcock fly away.  
10 Now this word Woodcock in both places of this one sentence, for sound of letters is one and the same:  
11 But if you seek the true meaning of this word Woodcock, as it is twice placed in this one saying: you shall find in either place, a sundry sayewhat, expressing in the first place, an unwitty man:  
12 And in the second place, a bird haunting the woods, and making his flight of pleasure only in the twilight.  
13 The double understanding of words and sayings, must be warily marked, and declaration made of their sundry meanings: that it may certainly be known, in what sense they are to be taken.  
14 Words restrained to one saywhat are no longer words of double understanding.  
15 Lykemeaning words are one in meaning, and divers in sound as rich, wealthy: colour, hue, quickening, bar●…e, yeast:  
16 Plainmeaning words have one sound, & according to that one sound, one saywhat.  
17 Here we understand such a saywhat as declareth the substance of a thing: and not such a one as only noteth the force & signification of a word.  
18 Words fully dissenting are such as have neither one sound, nor one saywhat: as an herb, and a tree.   

The second division of words.  
19 Words are also thus divided, some signify a thing that hath his being by itself: some signify a thing that hath his being in an other.  
20 The first may be called an Inholder: the second an Inbeer. For example thus: Man, beast, herb, tree, corn, grass, stones, metal, fire, air, water, earth, and all other substances bodied, or bodylesse, are Inholders:  
21 But length, breadth, thickness, weight, measure, number, power, shape, virtue, cunning, sleight, vice, ignorance, heat, called, moistness, dryness, and all other words placed in any storehouse, (except the storehouse of substance) are inbeers.  
an Inholder is called in latin Subiectum. Inbeer Accidens.   

The third division of words.  
22 There is a third division of words to be likewise considered.  
23 For some words are common, and are affirmed of many things, as man is said of many several men.  
24 Some are sole words, and are said but of one thing alone: as john, or this man, are said of no more men than one.  
a common sole word.   

Certain precepts or general rules to be learned afore you enter into the treatise of the storehouses.  
25 There are rules in every art, which authors use as grounds and sure principles, not to be denied or doubted of.  
26 For if nothing should be clear and certain of itself: then should we be driven by wranglers from point to point, to make reason upon reason infinitely, and never come to issue of any one matter.  
27 Therefore hath God appointed some things to be evident and certain of themselves, that they might be as stays to man's wit, and as helps to find out and to discuss things that are not so evident as they are.  
28 And this is the cause why you may not ask of a Principle why so? yet may principles be opened to beginners by examples,  
29 Which is a kind of proof by Experience, though it be no proof by rule.  
30 A common Inholder is said of others: but it hath not his being in an other.  
31 A sole Inholder is neither said of any other thing, besides itself: nor yet hath his being in any thing, but in itself.  
32 A common Inbeer is both said of others: and hath also his being in others too.  
33 A sole Inbeer, hath his being in an other: but it is not said of any other.  
34 divers kinds, whereof one is not subject to an other, have sundry kindred's, and sundry differences, as a wight and an art.  
35 For the kindreds of a wight, are man and beast: but the kindreds of art are, The art of numbering, the art of measuring, witcrafte, speachcraft, starrecrafte. etc.  
36 Again, the differences of a wight are flyable, goable, swimmable, and créepable: For one wight differeth from an other by these means:  
37 But the differences of arts are, some to teach, to number: some to measure: some to speak: some to reason: some to tell things to come.   

Of the ten storehouses, and of their use.  
38 There are ten general words which may well be called storehouses, not only for the store of words, which they contain (comprising all plain meaning words,)  
39 But also for the good order they keep in placing of words in their particular rooms, with brief rules, (as notes set on packets,) declaring their nature and properties.  
40 So that storehouses teach the nature of simple words as they are considered by themselves. For there is no playnmeaning word but it signifieth either, 

The names of the storehouses.  a 


Substance.  
Quantity.  
Quality.  
Respect.  
Doing.  
Suffering.  
Where.  
When.  
Placing.  
Having.       

Of the ten Demaunders.  
41 There are also ten demaunders, every one peculiarly pertaining to som●… one storehouse.  

The names of the ten demaunders.  
1 What?  
2 How much, or how many?  
3 Whatkynone?  
4 To whom, or then what?  
5 Doing what?  
6 Suffering what?  
7 Where?  
8 When?  
9 How placed?  
10 Having what?   
42 What? demandeth a substance: how much or how many? demand a quantity: whatkinone? demandeth a quality: to whom? or then what? demand a respecting term: doing what? demandeth a doing: suffering what? demandeth a suffering: where? and when? demand time and place, with some circumstance either of the person, of the fact, or of the matter: how placed? demandeth a placing: and having what? demandeth an having.  
43 For example thus. If you be asked what is a man? you must answer that which doth appertain to the substance of a man, saying a man is a wight endued with sense and reason.  
44 But if you be asked, how much is a man? or how many men are they? then must you answer such matter, as pertaineth to the quantity of a man.  
45 And say for his bigness, according to his length, breadth, thickness, talnes, grossness, and so forth, and for the multitude, according to the number they be of, more or less.  
46 If you be asked whatkinone is a man? you must answer, such things as appertain to the quality of a man, as wise, foolish, liberal, covetous, learned, ignorant, a runner, lame, sober, hasty swart, fair, black, foul, proper, ill fa●…ored or such like.  
47 If you be asked to whom? or then what? man is this or that: you must answer, father to his son: husband to his wife: higher than this thing, or lower then that, which answer standeth of respecting terms.  
48 If you be asked what doth a man? you must answer that a man diggeth, ploweth, soweth, reapeth, buildeth, playeth, hauketh, hunteth, rideth, goeth, walketh, which words and such like are placed in the Storehouse of doing.  
49 If inquiry be had, what this man or that man hath suffered: that return is made that he hath been spoiled, rob, maimed, stiefeled, killed, and these words do import a suffering.  
50 If you be asked where this or that man is? you must answer, within, abroad, at home, from home, in the City, or in the field, which sayings are referred to the Storehouse where.  
51 If you be asked when this man or that man did this or that: ye must answer, an hour, a day, a week, a month, a year ago, which sayings are ascribed to the Storehouse when.  
52 If you be asked how is man placed? you must answer, he lieth, be sitteth, he boweth, he leaneth, he frowneth, he smileth, which words do ever thsynuate a placing.  
53 If you be asked how man is apparelled or furnished: you must answer, he is naked, clothed, armed, weaponed, booted, shod, friended, moneyed, wyved, which words do always import an having.  
54 Here ye must take heed that every demander have such an answer shappen unto it, as may be placed in the Storehouse, whereto the demander properly belongeth: other ways, ye shall not answer directly nor to the purpose.    

Of Substance the first Storehouse. Chap. 2.  
1 Substance is an inholder, the very groundwork, stay, and upholder, of quantities, qualities, and all other inbeers.  

How substance is divided.  
2 There is a sole substance, and a common substance.  
A Sole Substance. Common  
3 A Sole substance, is a substance peculiar and proper to one self thing alone, as john, William, this man, or that man.  
4 For although many men be called by the name of john, or William, yet when we add john, William, or any other proper name to man, or else add this, or that to any common word: we mean to separate it from all other things, and to point out a sole thing: so that though these names be referred to many men, yet the thing meant by them is one self thing.  
5 A common substance is either a kindred, or a kind, containing many sole substances, as a horse is a kindred, containing all particular horses: and a wight is a kind containing all kinredes of beasts, flying, swymming, going, creeping, drawing, or stilstanding.   

Of certain peculiar rules which belong to the storehouse of substance.  

1  
6 A Sole substance is neither said of another: nor yet hath being in another.  
7 That a sole substance is not said of another it is plain by examples.  
8 For john is verified of nothing in the world, but of himself.  
9 He is verified of himself when we say, this man is john, for in this saying, john and this man signify both one substance, though the terms be divers.  
10 And where we say, that a sole substance hath no being in another, it is proved of the general rule: which is,  
11 That every substance hath a being by itself: and not a being in another thing.  
12 That hath being by itself, which is known to stand in nature by itself, and to have need of no other thing, to support and bear up his being, as an horse, an Ox. etc.  
13 But that hath being in an other thing, and no stay of itself, which is in an other not as a part, and yet can not be without the thing in which it is.  
14 As learning is in man, as no part 〈◊〉 man, and yet can not be without man, or some other substance apt for the same: as for substances they have being of themselves, and need no other thing to support them.   

2  
15 Sole substances occupy at one time, but one place. Common substances are in no place properly and fitly.  
16 We say properly and fitly, because they are said, unfitly and after a sort, to be in many places at once: by reason, all their parts (which are Sole substances) do at one moment of time, each one occupy his several room.   

3  
17 A part of any sole substance is no substance: but if it be cut of from his whole, then is it no longer a part, but a substance by itself.  
18 For if the parts of a Sole substance should be substances: then should there be no diversity between a common and a Sole substance.  
19 For they differ in this, that a Sole substance containeth but one substance where a common substance containeth many: now where every whole containeth many par tes, it should follow, that if every part of a Sole substance were a substance: the●… should Sole substances contain many substances, as common substances do.  
20 How be it, in very deed a Sole substance containeth many parts and is but one substance in the whole.   

4  
21 Sole substances are most properly called substances: among common substances that always which is nearer to a Sole substance is mere properly called a substance, then that which is further of: as kindred rather than kind: yet substances of like condition and sort, do admit no degrees of more or less.  
22 As one man is no more a substance, nor no less a substance then an other man is: this man rather than this horse.  
23 For though this man be greater or lesser, worse or better than that man is: yet they are not so said, in respect of substance: but in respect of quantities and qualities.  
24 The like reason may serve for kindreds and for kinds.   

5  
25 Sole substances receive contraries by a certain change that is in them selves, as one man some times good, some times bad, some times hot, some times cold.  
26 Certain other things may receive contraries as well as sole substances do.  
37 For this saying: Socrates is sick, may be both true and false at divers times.  
28 Yet is there this diversity, that when sole substances do receive contraries, it is ever by a certain change, which is in ●…e substances themselves: but when a saying receiveth contraries, there is no change in the saying, but in the matter expressed by the saying.   

6  
29 One substance is not contrary to an other substance, neither is there any other thing contrary to a substance at all.  
30 For contraries are two inbeers which drive by course one another out of their inholder▪ as hot and cold drive one an other out of some bodied substance.  
31 Though water drive air, and air water out of some vessel: yet these and such like drive each other as out of a place, being inholders, and not as out of an inholder being inbeers.  
32 Every Sole substance standeth of one inholder and many inbeers, in such sort that neither the inholder could have any being, if all inbeers were taken from it: neither could the inbeers, have their being alone by themselves, without some inholder, to support and bear them.  
33 The thing that standeth of one inhol●…er, and many inbeers, is called a sole substance: for example thus.  
34 Any one man is a Sole substance, his inbeers are length, grossness, talnes, years, virtue, vice, learning, ignorance, sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, sourness, sweetness, colour, shape, beauty, doing, suffering, office, Lordship, and other things in manner infinite: his inholder is that Sole nature, that beareth all these.  
35 Now as quantities, qualities, and other inbeers can not be but in some substance: so Sole substances should have no being in deed, if all inbeers were seque●…red and taken from them.  
36 Further if all Sole substances were taken away, then should both all common substances be taken away, and all inbeers too.    

How Substance is divided.  
37 Substance doth admit many divisions according to his manifold and gaynse●… differences, as. 1. a bodied substance, a bodylesse substance. 2. a mortal substance, animmortall substance. 3. a natural substance, an artificial substance, or a substance partly artificial partly natural. 4. a living substance, a lifeless substance. 5. a feeling substance, a substance void of sense. 6. a reasonable substance, a witless substance. 7. a movable substance, an immovable substance. 8. a tame substance, a wild substance. 9 an earthly substance, a watery substance, an airy substance, a fiery substance. ●…c.  
Here followeth the table of Substance.    

Of the second Storehouse called Quantity. Chap. 3.  
1 Quantity is that whereby all things are known, how many or how few, how much or how little they are.  

How Quantity is divided.  
2 Some quantities stand of severed and ●…ncoupled parts: as number, speech: 〈◊〉 of parts that are ●…ed and ●…ed together by some common bounder: as a line, an overshew, a body, time and place.  
3 A common bounder is the end of one thing and th●… beginning of another, and ●…et part of neither.  
The common bounder of a Line is a Prick Ouershew Line Body Ouershew Time Moment Place line  
4 That the parts of number are not joined or knit together 〈◊〉 any common bounder it is plain by particular examples.  
5 For three and five being the parts of eight▪ are not coupled together by any common bounder: neither can one show in a number any common bounder where the parts do meet and join together.  
6 The like may be said of speech, for though syllables and words have some more time in pronouncing, & some less, yet are they not joined one to another, without pause at all, for then there should be no distinction in speech.  
7 That speech is placed in this storehouse, it is plain, because it is measured by syllables short and long.   

Another division of Quantity.  
8 Quantity admitteth also this division that some stand of parts which have a placing one by another, some stand of parts which have no placing at all.  
9 A line, an overshew, a body and a place stand of parts that have a placing, for that their parts are seen to lie somewhere.  
10 But in number no man can show how his parts are placed one by another, or where they are set, or how they are joined or coupled together.  
11 The like may be said of time, for seeing the parts of time stay not, how can they admit any placing.  
12 Yet there is an order among the parts of time and number: because one time cometh before, and another time cometh after, and in the natural rue of numbers one is reckoned afore two, and two afore three, but placing of parts are not either in number or time.  
13 The like may be said of speech also, for each word and syllable passeth away as it is spoken, so that the parts of speech tarry not, nor stay not to have any placing.  
14 The lest thing that can be imagined in a number is one: and the lest thing that can be imagined in a line is a prick: here note that one is a part of each number, but a prick is a bounder of a line and therefore no part thereof.  
15 A number is a multitude of one's.  
16 A line is length without breadth.  
17 An overshew is length, and breadth, without thickness.  
18 A body is length, breadth, and thickness.  
19 Not man can mount by adding to the greatest number: nor come by dividing to the smallest bigness.  
20 For as number is able ever to admit some number to be added to it, to make it bigger: so is bigness able ever to admit some bigness to be taken from it to make it less.  
21 For every body is divisible and able to be divided into many bodies, and every overshewe into many overshewes, and every line into many lines: and all bigness consists in these three.  
23 All kind of measures which are considered in respect only of length, are referred unto a line, as an intch, a foot, a pace, a fathom, a mile. etc.  
24 And those that are considered in respect of Length and breadth, are referred unto an overshewe, as a triangle, a foursquare, a circle, a r●…de, an acre. etc▪  
25 And those that are considered in respect of length, breadth, & thickness, are referred unto a body, as a foot of timber, a tun●… of timber, or any other measure where respect is had to these three kinds of bigness.  
26 All other measures & weights which have no respect to length, breadth or thickness, are referred unto number, as an ounce, a pound, a stone, a pint, a pottle, a penny, a grote, a shilling etc.  
27 Time is a space or number measured by the course of the heavens, as a minute, an hour, a day, a week, a month, a year, an age, a world.  
28 A place is an hollow overshew of an hollow body.  
29 These things afore rehearsed, are properly of themselves called quantities, other things unfitlye, that is, not of themselves but by reason of another, to wit, respect had unto these.  
30 For we use sometimes to say, here is much white, or here is a long work, for that the overshew where the white is is much: or that the time is long while the work was a doing.   

Of the propreties of Quantity.  
31 One quantity is not contrary to an other: As for many and few, great and little, they are not quantities, but respecting words, neither are they contraries at all.  
32 Respecting words they are, for things are said to be many or few: great or little, in respect of others of the same kind: else should there never be little hill, or great musterséede: few in a City, or many in crib.  
33 And contraries they are not, because they may be said of one thing at one time, as twenty in respect of two are many, but in respect of a thousand, they are but few: so Gogmagog hills in respect of the Sophister's hills by Cambridge are great: but in respect of the Alps, they are but small. These therefore and such like, as hung only upon respect, can have no contraries at all.  
34 One quantity is bigger or lesser than an other is, as sixteen is a bigger quantity than six: and a shilling is a lesser quantity than a pound: yet is not one ●…e quantity rather a quantity, or less said to be a quantity then an other.  
35 For six are as well a quantity a●…●…xscore: and a long line is no more a line then a short line is.  
36 This is a thing most peculiar and proper to quantity, that by it things should be equal or unequal one to an other.  
37 As one body is equal or unequal to an other body: one overshewe equal or unequal to an other overshewe: one line to an other line: one time to another time: one place to an other place: one number to an other number: as for like and unlike they are ever said of qualities properly, as one colour like or unlike to an other colour: one voice like or unlike to an other voice: one fashion ly●…è or unlike to an other fashion.    

Of the third Storehouse called Quality. Chap. 4.  
1 Quality is that whereby men are led to know whatkinone each thing is.  

Of the division of Quality.  
2 This storehouse is parted unto four several rooms.  
3 The first room containeth those qualities which are given to the inholder by nature, and those also which come by reason nature is letted of her course.  
4 The second room containeth those which the inholder getteth by doing.  
5 The third containeth sensible qualities, and affections of the mind.  
6 The fourth containeth the shape and form of every thing.   

Of Qualities first room.  
7 In the first room are placed all the powers either of the body alone, of the soul alone, or of that, that standeth of them both: to this place are added also, all weakness and want of power natural.  
8 Weakness and want, differ in this, for that of Weakness there both proceed imperfect actions: but of ●…ant there can arise no action at all.  
9 As blearedness causeth a man through weakness of sight to judge unperfectely of colours: but blindness through wa●…t of sight, letts a man to give any judgement of colour at all.  
10 Power is a gift of nature, whereby the Inholder may the better do, or with less harm suffer.  
11 The common Inholder of words placed in this room is very general. For there is no substance which hath not some power.  
12 Here is to be noted, that no inholder is said to want any power, which either nature hath not appointed it should have: or else the time of having it, is not fully expired.  
13 For it is unproperly said, that either a stone, or a child new born, wanteth power to go or to run of itself. For God hath not ordained that a stone should go or run at all: and the time is not yet come, for a new born child to do either.  
14 But if the time be fully expired when as nature hath appointed, that children should go and run of themselves, and that certain children at that time can do neither: then may it well be said, that such children lack power to go, and are lame.  
15 Here is to be noted, that from power to want, we may fall both by nature and by chance: but to return from want to power again, it is impossible.  
16 As from sight to blindness, from speech to dumbness, we may fall at any time: but the return from dumbness to speech, or from blindness to sight, is a thing that can not be brought to pass, either by art, or nature, or any other mean, (Gods extraordinary doings only excepted.)  
17 Note further, that the power is not always taken away where the instrument is hurt for a time, or letted: as if a man's eyes, tongue, and ears, were so hurt for a time, or letted, that he could neither hear, speak, nor see,  
18 Yet were it not for all that to be said, that the power of his seeing, speaking or hearing were taken away or diminished: but rather that the action and work of his ears, tongue, and eyes, were letted for a tyme.  
19 If the instrument of sense be so hurt, that it be uncurable, and never able to do any part of his work, then do we say, that the power is utterly destroyed or taken away.  
20 Memory of things past, judgement of things present, foresight of things to come, & other qualities of the mind, as they are given to any inholder by nature, are placed in the first room of quality: but as they are increased by art and diligence, in the second.   

Of Qualities second room.  
21 Qualities that are got by doing, are either deeply rooted in their inholder, and continued in it long: or else they come and go lightly, and tarry but a short time.  
22 Virtue, vice, science, knowledge, art, craft, cunning, sleight, vr●…. etc. which a man can not soon altar and change, are are such dispositions, as commonly take deep root in their inholder, and by reason of long use, and many actions whereof they grow and spring, they may be called grounded dispositions.  
23 But sudden anger, light displeasure, small knowledge, a smattering sight. etc. for that they spring and rise of few actions, come & go lightly, and therefore may be termed wavering dispositions, these being as it were, the first entry into settled dispositions.  
24 The inholder of qualities placed in this room is not so general, as is the inholder of those of the first room. For this inholder is but each wight, which by practice can attain to any good or bad trade, in doing of things well or ill.   

Of Qualities third room.  
25 In the third room of this storehouse we place all such qualities as either properly move one of the five senses: as colour moveth sight: sound hearing: savours smelling: taste tasting: heat cold, moistness, dryness, hardness, softness, and feeling.  
26 Or else the affections of the mind, as mirth, gladness, grief and fear, with other affections which spring of these in manner infinite: as mercy, pity, love, lenity, softness of mind, hope, affiance, trust, envy, hate, disdain, spite, distrust, contempt, paleness, blushing, trembling. etc.  
27 Affections considered as they are given of nature, must be placed in the first room of this storehouse: but considered as they are got by doing, in the seconds: and being taken as they move the outward or the inward sense, in the third: we see, hear, smell, taste, & feel,  
28 By receiving a certain influence, and suffering of an action that doth proceed from the thing seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or felt, into such parts of each wights body, as hath in it those foresaid senses.   

Of Quantities fourth room.  
29 In this room are placed the form & figure, shape, and fashion of every thing.  
30 The inholder of words in the third or fourth room of this storehouse, is the same that is of those which are placed in the first room.   

Of Qualified things.  
31 There are certain words which do signify qualified things, relation had, both to the quality, and to the inholder thereof.  
32 As a just man, a liberal man, a craftsman, a lame man: or just, liberal, lame, without adding the inholder in which they are. These are to be placed in the rooms of the qualities, whereof they are derived.   

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.  
33 Some qualities and qualified things have contraries, and some have none: as right is contrary to wrong: and a righteous man is contrary to an unrighteous man.  
34 But qualities and qualified things which are placed in the first and fourth room: yea and many of those which are placed in the second and third room, of this storehouse, admit no contraries at all.  
35 Qualities and things qualified, admit degrees of more and less, as among many learned men it is commonly seen that one is more or less learned than an other.  
36 This rule taketh place not in all. For among many circles, triangles, and squares, one is not said to be rather a circle, than an other: or rather a triangle, or a square.  
37 Here is to be noted, that qualities considered as they are in foam inholder, admit degrees of more and less: but if you in mind sever them from their inholder, and consider them apart, (as you define them and tell what they are) then do they admit no degrees of more or less.  
38 For all and every art of Physic do equally and indifferently agreed to the say what of Physic: but Hypocrates physic, and 〈◊〉 physic admit degrees, the one being more and the other less, and so doth Fuchsius physic alone considered, when he had great experience, and when he had small.  
39 To make things like or unlike, is a work belonging only to quality.  
40 If any man gainsay this rule, affirming that it is commonly and truly said, how that one man is like or unlike to an other, in going, riding or speaking: which things being deeds and no qualities, the foresaid rule may seem untrue:  
41 It may be answered, that the likeliness standth not in the action itself properly and in very deed: but in the manner of doing, which is referred to the store house of quality.  
42 For the murderer and the hangman do both kill and commit one general action: yet the manner of doing in them is divers, which causeth the one to be guilty, and the other guiltless.  
43 For it is not the deed, but the manner of doing, that maketh the crime.    

Of Respecting words. Chapter. 5.  
1 Respecting words be of two sorts, some are called respecting words properly: some are termed respecting words in part.  
2 Respecting words, properly so called, are two yokefelowes, whose nature and being is, the one to depend and have his being upon the other, as a husband, a wife, a master, a servant.  
3 Respecting words in part depend not so straightly each upon other, that of force they must be and cease to be both at once: but the one may be though the other were not at all: as knowledge and knowable:  
4 For though there were no reasonable creature in the whole world, (which thing presupposed there could be no knowledge) yet should many things remain to be known, which may be termed, and are in deed, knowable.  
5 Though one husband have many wives: one father, many sons and daughters: one friend, many friends: one king, many kingdoms: yet these being many in numbered, bear no other respect to their yokefellowes, nor their yokefelowes to them, then if they were but one a piece.  
6 For he is as well a husband, a father, a friend, a king, that hath but one wife, one child, one friend, one kingdom, as he that hath never so many: so that many and few in this case, have all one respect in reason.  

The propreties of respecting words.  

1  
7 Respecting words properly so called are and cease to be both at once: but respecting words in part do not so.   

2  
8 He that knoweth and is able to say what one of the respecting words is: must of force know and be able to say what the other is also.   

3  
9 There are degrees in some respecting words, but not in all:  
10 For one man being like to many men, may be lyker to one man than to an other: but one father can be no more, nor no less a father to one child than to an other.   

4  
11 Some also have contraries, some none at all, as bondage is contrary to liberty: riches to poverty: but single, double, threefold, father, mother, and such like, have no contraries at all.   

5  
12 Respecting words depend and hung each upon other: and so that one of them is not afore or after an other in tyme.  
13 In this storehouse are placed all words that signify any comparison or proportion, any equalness, or unequalness, any likeliness or unlykelynesse, any office or officer, any cause or effect, any whole, or any part, any end, or means tending to any end, any age, any degree, any diversity of kind, any kindred or affinity, any society or fellowship, and other more in manner infinite.  
14 If you doubt in what storehouse to place any word, the surest way is to place it here.  
15 For many kinds and kindreds which considered by themselves alone, are to be placed in some other storehouse, may (upon respect had with others) be also right well assigned unto this.     

Of doing and suffering. Chapter. 6.  
1 Doing and suffering are respecting words, and differ not in matter, but in respect.  
2 For they both are but one moving, which considered as a thing being in the inholder from whence it cometh, is called a doing: But if the same moving or action be referred to the inholder which receiveth it, than it is called a suffering. For example thus.  
3 The murderer and the murdered, communicate in one moving or deed: which deed or moving considered as it cometh from the murderer, is an action or doing: But considered as it is received of the thing that is murdered, it is a suffering.  
4 Of this it is plain, that doing is a moving, proceeding from the doer: and suffering is a moving received of the sufferer.  

Of the propreties of doing and suffering.  

1  
5 Doing and suffering are both at once, and one is not afore nor after an other.   

2  
6 Doing and suffering are in two divers inholders: yet may two bodies meeting together in one act, be both doers and both sufferers at once: as when two cups do push together, either putting force unto other, and either receiving force from other.  
7 They admit degrees of more and less: and some have contraries, and some have not.     

Of the two Storehouses, Where, and When. Chapter. 7.  
1 Where and when, differ from place and time, for that they have always respect unto some matter that was mentioned afore: where as time and place are known and defined as they are considered by themselves, without respect had to any other thing.  
2 For if any man should hear one say where? (no talk had afore hand) he would strait way think with himself, where what? looking for some person, fact or matter, that he might appoint to some place, thereby to answer the question.  
3 Therefore where, is not a place but a declaring of things which shall be, are, or have been in place.  
4 And when, is not a time, but a showing of things done or to be done in time.  

How, where and when, are divided.  
5 As time and place are divided, so are where and when.  
6 Time is divided into time to come, time present, and time past.  
7 It may also be many other ways divided, by reason of the manifold variety of matters that chance in it.  
8 As the time of war, the time of peace, the time of dearth, the time of plenty, the time of sickness, the time of health, the time of shutting in the doors, the time of opening of the doors.  
9 Furthermore, spring, summer, harvest, winter, are several seasons and times of the year.  
10 Likewise a minute, an hour, a day, a week, a month, a year, an age, a world, are common words, used of men to note and set forth particular times.  
11 There are six differences of place, as above, beneath, on the right side, on the left side, afore, and behind.  
12 These are two ways taken, either as they are placed in respect to us ward: or else as they are appointed by nature.  
13 Although above and beneath: on the right side, and on the left: afore, and behind: in respect to us ward, be not always one and the same, but altar as we are altered: yet in nature they are always certain.  
14 For above, by nature is that where unto light things ascend.  
15 Beneath, that where unto heavy things descend.  
16 The right side, which is toward the West.  
17 The left side, which is toward the East.  
18 Afore, which is toward the South.  
19 Behind, which is toward the North.  
20 For trees and plants have heels, which while they grow in the earth, are always toward the North.  
21 Above and beneath, are the begynninges of length: the right side, and the left side, are the beginnings of breadth: afore and behind, are the beginnings of thickness.  
22 Places are thus divided, some are natural, some artificial, some feigned, some near, some far of: some holy, some profane: some common, some private: some healthful, some contagious: some fertile, some barren: some hot, some cold, some temperate.  
23 There are many other divisions of time and place, and they in manner infinite: but of these few any mean wit may with ease find out many more to serve his purpose as he shall be occasioned.    

Of the ninth Storehouse, called Placing. Chap. 8.  
1 This Storehouse containeth all words that signify any placing, setting, or ordering of a thing, as to hung, to sit, to lie, to bow, to bend, to compass, to mow, to fleare, to frown, to be scattered, to be imbaulmed, to be enrolled. etc.  
2 Here is to be noted, that frowning taken for a moving, is an action: but being taken for the brows knit and drawn together: it is a placing.  
3 Words placed in this Storehouse, have no contraries at all, some admit degrees of more and less, and some do not.   

Of the tenth Storehouse called having. Chap. 9  
1 Some take having only for an appareling, howbeit, it is much more larglye taken.  
2 As for an appareling, it is but either when one thing is hanged upon another, as when a horse is trapped,  
3 Or when one thing is set to another, as when a shaft is feathered,  
4 Or else when one thing compasseth an other in part, or in whole, as when one is ringed or armed.  
5 But having, is of any thing whatsoever, whether the thing had be a substance a quantity, a quality, or else referred to any other of the Storehouses, or of things exempted out of the Storehouses.  
6 And therefore this storehouse teacheth us not so much to consider the nature of the things that are had: as to mark what cometh of the having of such and such things.  
7 Many men think, that many words placed in this Storehouse, admit degrees of more and less: and that some have contraries also.  
8 Because it is commonly said that some men are better moneyed than others, better friended, better weapned: and that this man is armed, and that man unarmed: that he is friended, and he foed.  
9 Howbeit, if the matter be thoroughly ●…ted, the increase and the contrariety standeth not in the having of these things: but in the things that are had.  
10 Though every plain meaning word have his proper place in some one Storehouse alone: yet may the same indirectly & after a sort be also referred to some other.  
11 As a father is properly a respecting word: but indirectly he may be taken for a substance, because a father is a man, which is properly a substance.  
12 The cause is, for that things which directly pertain to an inholder, are so●…e times in common speech indirectly sayd●… of his inbeer.  
13 And again, such things as properly belong to some inbeer: are said of his inholder.  
14 So we say, a line is an inholder of straightness: yet indirectly, for directly a bodied substance, is the proper inholder of straightness, and not a line.  

That Storehouses help to enlarge a matter, and that every word may after a sort be deduced through them all.  
15 The Storehouses serve: not only to teach us the source and nature of each plain meaning word, as whether it doth signify a substance, a quantity, a quality, a respect etc.  
16 But they serve also to amplify and to set for the a matter at large, and then they teach us to seek the substance, the quantity, the quality, the respect, th●… place, the time, the ordering and the having of the thing we speak of, and so to deduce one word through all the Storehouses. Which though it be properly placed in some one: yet indirectly and after a sort, it may be deduced and brought through them all.    

Words exempted out of the Storehouses. Chap. 10.  
1 These nine kind of words following, are exempted out of the Storehouses, as not properly placed in any one of them.  

1  
2 The words of art invented to express the rules of any science, as a noun, a pronown, a verb, etc. a foreset, a backset, a shewsay. etc.   

2  
3 Unperfite words, which by them selves teach the hearers no matter, but serve only, to help to furnish out a sentence, and to make it perfit, as, or, if and, etc.   

3  
4 Words that signify lack or want of any natural power, as, dumbness, deaffenesse, darkness. etc.   

4  
5 Words that signify matters which are not in deed, but are feigned to be, as Hobthrus, rawhed, purgatory.   

5  
6 Words that signify a part of any whole thing, as an hand, a soot, a leg, an arm: so long as they remain parts not severed from their whole.   

6  
7 God for that he is infinite, and not able to be comprehended of any thing, howbeit some men do judge him to be a most perfect substance.   

7  
8 Words that signify all things without distinction, as a thing, a matter, a whatsicallit.  
9 The Storehouses are called general words, for that they contain many, but these may be termed surmounting generals, because they contain all.   

8  
10 Two or more words expressing matter that is contained in divers Storehouses, as a white horse a righteous man.  
11 For white and righteous are placed in one Storehouse: and man and horse in another.   

9  
12 Words of double understanding: for these afore they be restrained to one saywhat, may have place in divers Storehouses: and therefore unfit to be assigned to one.    

How words of double understanding may be known. Chap. 11.  
1 What like sounding words are, and how in arguing and conference of talk they are to be restrained to signify but one thing, we have said afore.  
2 Now for the better discussing of the matter, we shall show a mean how one may be sure, that this or that word is of double understanding: and yield a reason for the same.  
3 But here we will only set forth certain rules, to discern such as cannot easily be perceived of many: for those which easily show themselves, need no teacher.  

1  
4 First if any of his gay●…ettes be of double understanding: then is the principal also, as:  
5 Sharp, is a word of double understanding: for his contrary gainset, in voice is, flat: and in edge, dull.  
6 Therefore it must follow of necessiti●… that it is not one sharpness, which is contrary to flatness in voice, and to dullness in edge.   

2  
7 If it be found to be in many storehouses, as this word grey sig●…fiyng a beast that pastureth in the night, is a substance: but signifying a colour mixed, and made of black and white, it is a quality.   

3  
8 If it be perceived by divers senses, as clearness, for it is not one and the same clearness that is seen & herded: the one consisting in colour and the other in sound.   

4  
9 If his offspring be diversly taken, then is his original also: or contrary wise if in the original there be doubleness, then is there dublenesse in the offspring too, as,  
10 If to judge rightly ●…e two ways taken, the one to give sentence according to the evidence brought in: the other to give sentence according to the truth of the matter:  
11 Then must a righteous judge be two ways taken, that is, righteous so far as ●…idence leadeth: and righteous so far as truth requireth.   

5  
12 If a word have divers saywhattes, not differing only in words, but also in meaning.  
13 And here it is sometimes good to consider the say whattes of words as they are defined and set forth wh●… they are coupled and joined with other words.  
14 For taking so much away from the saywhattes, as is proper to each word annexed to the original: the rest in all the saywhattes, must be one and the same.  
15 For example thus: if you join to this word clear, air, and voice, defining a clear air, and a clear voice severally: and then after take so much from either say what, as properly appertaineth to air and voice: the rest that remaineth in both the saywhattes, shall be one, if clear were a plain meaning word.  
16 Now the thing that remains▪ is not one, and therefore clear is diversly taken.  
17 For a clear voice is a voice pleasant to the ear, without hoarseness, or jarring.  
18 But a clear air, is an air void of clouds: so that voice, and air, taken from these two saywhattes, the rest that remains is not one in them both.  
19 For pleasant to the ear, and without hoarseness or jarring, is a thing dissenting much from that which is void of clouds.  
20 By these means and such like, words are proved to be of double understanding,    

Of disagreeable words. Chap. 12.  
1 Words which cannot be coupled and joined together in a true & perfect yeasay, are either differing words, or gainsettes.  
2 Differing words, are those whereof one differeth from many, in like manner and sort.  
3 Gaynsettes are two disagreeable words whereof the one so setteth foot against the other, as against no other thing in like sort: in so much that neither the one can be affirmed of the other: neither they both of any third thing, at one time, and in one respect.  
4 These gaynsets are divided into four sorts: into contrary terms, respecting terms, depriving terms, & denying terms.  
5 What contrary terms and respecting terms are: we have said afore.  
6 Depriving terms are taken in this place, not only for words that note a want of natural power: but for want and power compared together, as Light, Darkness.  
7 In like manner denying terms are taken, both for the yeaword, which affirmeth: and also for the nay-word, which denieth: as a man, no man: a stone, no stone.  
8 Here is to be noted that the nay-word, which is infinite, containeth all things, save his yeaward, which hath his limitation and is certain, and as they both are said of no one ●…hing, so the one of them is verified of every thing.  

What difference there is between depriving terms and contrary terms.  
9 Depry●…ing terms differ from contrary terms which have no mean, for that the one of such contrary terms, must at all times be in his inholder: where as the depriving terms, may for a time be both absent.  
10 I mean the time, afore power cometh to the inholder by nature.  
11 Now from contrary terms which have a mean, they differ in this:  
12 For that there is a time appointed by nature, when as the one of the depriving terms must of force be said of his inholder: but of contraries which have a mean, there is at no time any such necessity.  
13 For example thus. After nine days that a bitch hath whelped, her whelps must of force either see or be blind: but afore the time be expired that nature hath set and appointed that whelps should see in, you can not rightly say that the whelps are either blind or do see.  
14 As for white, and black, which are contraries that have a mean, they have no such force in a whelp at any time, that the one must be in it, and the other from it,  
15 Because the whelps may at all times be of some other mean colour.    

How many ways one thing is said to be afore or after another. Chap. 13.  
1 The first and principal way that one thing is said to be afore another, is, in tyme.  
2 For that which is more ancient, is said to be afore that, which had his being in a latter season.  
3 As, King Henry the eight, was in time afore King Edward the sixt.  
4 The second way that one thing is said to be afore another, is, by nature: as when the being of the latter, enforceth, a being of the former, but contrary wise, the sequel of the former, shall not infer a necessary sequel of the latter.  
5 The kind and the kindred, the general and the special, are fit examples to teach the meaning of this rule.  
6 For if there be a man here, it followeth of force, that the same be a wight: but the sequel on the contrary part, is not good: that if there be a wight here, the same should be a man▪  
7 For there are many wights which are no men.  
8 Therefore we hold, that the general is in nature afore the special, and that john, William, and other several men, must first be substances, creatures, bodies, and wights, afore they come to be men.  
9 The third way that one thing is said to be afore an other, is, when things go one afore an other in order: as letters are learned afore syllables, and syllables afore words: substance is placed afore a quantity, and quantity afore quality.  
10 The fourth way that one thing is said to be afore an other, is, when one thing passeth and exceedeth an other in worthiness: as the king is afore his subject in honour: the master afore his servant, by estimation:  
11 For that the King and the master, pass and exceed, the subject and the servant, in worthiness.  
12 Of this it is clear, that one thing is said to be afore an other four manner of ways: as, 
Afore in 


1 tyme.  
2 nature.  
3 〈◊〉.  
4 worthiness.      
13 After, is so many ways taken as afore is.  
14 For gaynsettes have like trade in teaching: and he that knoweth one gaynset, must needs know the other.   

Of the being of things at once. Chapter. 14.  
1 Those things are most properly said to be at once, which are done, or have their being, both at one tyme.  
2 As twins are both at one's: or as the Eclipse of the Sun and the direct●… placing of the Moon, between our sight and it, are both at once.  
3 In nature those things are said to be at once, which are such as the being of the one, followeth upon the being of the other, and yet neither of them cause of others being.  
4 As a husband and a wife, a double part, and an halfepart, are both at once by nature.  
5 For if there be a wife, then is there a husband: and if there be a husband, then is there a wife.  
6 Again, if there be a thing that is a double part: then is there a thing, that is an half part to that double.  
7 And yet is an husband no more cause of the being of a wife, than a wife cause of the being of an husband: nor a double part any more the cause of an half part, than an half part is cause of a double part.  
8 Membres of one division are also said to be all at once, as,  
9 Man and beast being membres of one division, are supposed by Nature to be both at once, and one of them not to be afore or after an other.  
10 But a man and a wight are not both at once, in the respect of nature.  
11 Because a wight is man's general, and Nature always supposeth the general, to be afore his specials.   

Of moving. Chap. 14.  
1 Moving is not only taken for the passing of a bodied substance from place to place: but moving is also taken for the begetting or corrupting of a substance: for the increasing or diminishing of a quantity: or else for the altering of a quality.  
2 Begetting or ingenoring is a moving, making that to be in deed, which afore was but in power to be.  
3 Corrupting is a moving, causing that thing not to be which afore had a being.  
4 Begetting and corruting are but one moving, considering the act in itself, being in deed but one act, and done at once.  
5 They differ, only in respect of the sundry bodies, whereunto they are referred.  
6 For whatsoever is corrupted, is corrupted into some thing, that succéedeth in his place:  
7 And whatsoever is engendered or begotten, ariseth of some thing, which ceaseth to be, that the other may succeed in his room. For example thus:  
8 In the burning of wood or any other matter, this act referred unto the wood that is burned, is called a corrupting: for it taketh away the wood, and causeth it to have no longer a being in nature.  
9 But if you refer the self same act of burning, unto the smoke, flame, & ashes that arise of the wood, when it is consumed by fire: it is called an engendering or begetting.  
10 Now look how the wood consumeth by little and little: and so do ashes, smoke, and flame, arise and spring.  
11 So that a man may plainly see, that as one substance passeth away, and is consumed to naught: an other substunce springeth up, and succeedeth in his room.  
12 And again, as one substance cometh up and is begotten, an other substance ●…asseth to be, and makes (as a man would say) room for it: For else it could not have any being in nature at all.  
13 Theridamas is no space or distance of time, betwixt begetting, and corrupting: neither is the one of them before, or after an other, but both at once, even at one instant and moment of time.  
14 If this were not, you should be forced to grant, that either two bodies might be in one place at once: or else that there were a place in nature utterly void of any body at all.  
15 For when a new thing is made, which must fill a place by itself, and no former thing taken away to make room for it: th●…r must be either a void place in nature to receive it: or else there must be two bodies in one place at once, that which is newly made, and that which was afore.  
16 Now neither of these two ways can be, as we may learn by many experiments.  
17 Therefore it followeth of necessity, that the bringing in of a new body into the frame of nature, is a taking away of some former body, which had a being in the same frame afore.  
18 Increasing is a moving that causeth a greater quantity: and diminishing that causeth a less.  
19 Altering is a changing from quality to quality: as when a man changeth from virtue to vice.  
20 Many men d●… hold an opinion, that nothing can be increased or diminished in quantity: but that the same doth withal admit an alteration of quality▪ a change of place, and an engendering of substance.  
21 Howebéeit experience doth teach the contrary.  
22 For a square just compassing the two sides of a foursquare plat, augmenteth the quantity, and nothing altereth the for●…e thereof.  
23 Likewise, when things are altered in any quality, they are not of force withal, either increased or diminished: engendered or corrupted: or else moved from place to place.  
24 The form of a square in numbers is this, in bigness this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
25 The form of a foursquare plat in numbres is this, in bigness, this,  
26 Moving in our English tongue is most properly, and in manner altogether taken for moving in place, so that it being but a part, borroweth in our speech, th●… name of his whole: for that it hath no special name of his own, as other particular movings have.  

Of contrariety in moving.  
27 Generally, rest is contrary to moving: but particularly begetting is contrary to corrupting: and increasing to diminishing: and moving in place, to resting in place: or else moving upwards contrary to moving downward.  
28 And as for alteration which is a moving in quality, it hath either rest from such a moving, to be his contrary: or else a change into a contrary▪ quality.     

The second book of Witcraft.  

Chap. 1.  
1 IN our former book we have entreated of the Storehouses, showing the nature and dis●…nction of words, and began with that which was the smallest part, and portion of this art.  
2 It followeth now in due order, that from words we proceed to entreat of sayings, for that sayings are immediately framed of words.  
3 Both words and sayings are means to express the thoughts of the mind: but sayings express the thoughts of the mind, as matter is coupled to matter: and words express the thoughts of the mind without any joining of things together at all.  
4 Thoughts of the mind, and matters whereof men use to speak and to writ, us in all countries one and the same in kind: but letters and the voice whereby such things are uttered, are not.  

What a saying is.  
5 A saying is a voice whose several parts do by consent signify some matter.  
6 I say by consent, for that every language or speech groweth by consent, and is learned by imitating and following of others: neither is there any tongue given naturally to man without a teacher, as weeping and laughing are.   

That there are divers kinds of sayings, and which of them are proper to this art.  
7 There is a perfect saying, and an unperfect saying.  
8 A perfect saying maketh a perfect sense of itself, as, man is mortal.  
9 An unperfect saying causeth the hearer to look for more words to make up a full meaning, as, man mortal.  
10 Again a perfect saying is divided into three sorts, into a shewsay, a bidsaye, and a wishsaye.  
11 In the first we show or declare, in the second we bid or command, in the third we wish or desire things to be or not to be.  
12 For example thus: john cometh hither, is a shewsay: come hither john, a biosaye: I would john came hither, a wishsaye.  
13 Of these the shewsaye only appertaineth to this art, for it only may be true or false.    

Of the Shewsay, and first what a shewsaye is. Chap. 2.  
1 A shewsaye is a perfect saying standing of a noun and a showing verb.  

The matter of a shewsay.  
2 A noun and a verb are the matter whereof a shewsay doth stand.   

Of a Noun.  
3 A noun is a voice signifying some thing by consent, & noting besides no difference of time, whose parts severally taken, signify no matter: as a man, an herb, an house, virtue, righteousness. etc.  
4 As for letters and syllables, they signify a sound only, and do not further import any matter.  
5 An hour, a day, a month, a year, do limit and appoint times: but yet they note no difference of time, as the verb doth, who ever includeth either times present, time past, or time to come, which are rightly called the diff●…rences of tyme.   

Of a Verb.  
6 A verb is a word noting some difference of time, unto the which if ye add a noun in fit order, there doth arise a perfect understanding, as, is, was, shallbe.   

Of the form of a shewsay, and what appertaineth to the perfect knowledge thereof.  
7 More things appertain to the form of a shewsay then to the matter.  
8 For to the form it appertaineth to consider whether the shewsaye be simple or compounded, one or many: secondly whether it be a shewsaye of the first order or of the second: thirdly, how the backeset agreeth or disagreeth with the foresette: fourthly, how the one of them may be changed into the room or place of the other: fifthly, which shewsaye is general, which special: 6, which affirmeth which denieth: 7, which is true, which is false: 8, which is an impossible shewsaye, which is a necessary shewsaye, and which is a chanceable shewsaye: 9, what gaynsettes each shewsaye hath: 10, which be shewsayes of like force and strength.   

Which is a simple shewsaye and one and which is a compounded shewsay and many.  
9 A simple shewsaye standeth of one verb: as man is mortal. A compounded shewsaye of many: as if you marry my Daughter I make you mine heir: or impossible it is, that a stone should have feeling.  
10 Often times in a shewsaye one verb is but once spoken: and yet the meaning of the same shewsaye requireth the same verb to be divers times understand: such a shewsaye is compounded, and not one, but many.  
11 For, john and William are rich and in health, is not one shewsaye, but many: for it is as much to say, as john is rich: john is in health: William is rich: William is in health.  
12 first we will entreat of a simple shewsay, and after of a compounded shewsay, in his proper place and order.   

Of the two orders of a simple shewsaye.  
13 There are two orders of a simple shewsaye: a shewsaye of the first order, showeth only the being or not being of a thing, as, man is, or, man is not.  
14 A shewsaye of the second order, affirmeth or denieth one thing of another, as, man is just: man is not just.  
15 A shewsay of the first order, standeth ever but of one noun and one verb: a shewesaye of the secoude order, of two nouns and one verb, one always placed afore, and another after the verb.    

Of the foresets and back sets that are in a simple shewesaye. Chap. 3.  
1 The foreset is a noun placed afore the verb, and the backset after, as, man is just: man is the foreset, and just, is the backeset.  
2 Sometimes a whole sentence or a clause of a sentence is a backset, or a foreset: as to rise early is a wholesome thing: in this shewsay, to rise early, is the foreset, and a wholesome thing is the backsette, they both supplying the room and office of an noun.  

To what use foresettes and backesettes serve.  
3 The storehouses serve to show the nature of words as they are taken and considered by themselves alone.  
4 The foreset & backset of a shewsay declare the respect that words have one to an other, as they are coupled and links together in a perfect saying.   

To know what respect the backset hath to the foreset in every simple shewsaye of the second order.  
5 If the backset ●…is divided and parted a sunder from the foreset by a naysay, then doth it but either differ from it, or else it is a gainset to it.  
6 What differing words and gaynsets are, we have showed afore in the. 12. Chapter of the first book.  
7 If it be affirmed & coupled to the foreset by a yeasay: then must the foreset and backset be such as either may be said of other turn for turn, or not ●…ide.  
8 If either may be said of other turn for turn, then is the one of them the kindred, and the other his saywhat: or else one the kindred and the other his property.  
9 For only the saywhat and the property compared to the kindred, may be said of it, and it of them, turn for turn: but the saywhat expresseth what the kindred is, and the property doth not.  
10 If the backset be said of the foreset, and the foreset can not be laid in like sort of it again: then is the backset to be reckoned, either in the number of those things, that are used to be placed in the sayewhat of the foreset, or not used to be placed there.  
11 If the backsette be 〈◊〉 the number of those that are used to be placed in the saywhat of the foreset: then is it either the kind or the difference: for a saywhat standeth of these two.  
12 If the backset be said of the foreset, and be neither his sayewhat, property, nor difference: then is it an Inbeer.  
13 For that we count an Inbeer, which being in a thing, is neither his saywhat, property, kind, nor difference.    

Of a saywhat, and of things that are handled and entreated of in like manner that it is. Chap. 4.  
1 A saywhat is a saying, showing what a thing is, as man is a wight, endued with sense and reason.  
2 Those that make declaration of any thing by a word, or by any other means whatsoever cometh to hand, do not by and by give a perfect saywhat, of the thing they take in hand to speak of.  
3 Yet such declarations, because they are handled and entreated of in like form and manner, that a saywhat is, are taken in arguing, as a thing that occupieth the room and place of a saywhat.  
4 For he that sayeth the foremost of yonder company, is the King: Or this city is London: or to behold, is to see: would seem after a sort, to express the thing whereof he speaketh.  

General rules appertyning to a saywhat.  
5 Five points are to be observed in a perfect saywhat.  

1  
6 First, that the saywhat show what the kindred is.   

2  
7 Secondly, that it contain neither more nor less matter, than it should.   

3  
8 thirdly, that it stand of the next kind, having most proper differences put thereto.   

4  
9 Fourthly, that it be plain.   

5  
10 Fiftly, that it be brief.     

Of a Property. Chapter. 5.  
1 A property doth not express what the kindred is, as the saywhat doth: but is said of the kindred, and the kindred said of it turn for turn: as each man is apt to langh: and each thing apt to laugh, is a man.  
2 No man accounteth that for a property, which is in any other thing than in one kindred: or which chanceth to be in one kindred, but for a tyme.  
3 If any such thing be said to be a property, it is not properly so to be taken: but a property for a time, or in respect of an other: and thus there are four sorts of propreties.  

1  
4 Some appertain to one kindred alone, though not to all the self things of that kindred: as to be cunning in physic, pertaineth only to man, but not to eachs man.   

2  
5 Some appertain to each self thing of one kindred: and yet not to that kindred alone: as to have two eyes appertaineth to all men, but not only to man.   

3  
6 Some appertain to one kindred alone, and to each self thing of that kindred: but not at all times: as to ware gray-headed in age, appertaineth only to man, and to each man that is aged, but not at all times.   

4  
7 Some apertain to one kindred alone, to each self thing of that kindred, and at all times: As feeling appertaineth only to a wight, to each wight, and at all times. And this is most properly called a property.    

Why we entreat in this place of self things and kindreds, and what they are. Chap. 6.  
1 Many self things make a kindred, and many kindreds, a kind. Therefore to proceed by order from the lessc to the more, we here interlace the treatise of self things and kindreds.  

Of self things.  
2 A self thing is that which is said but of one solo thing alone: as London, England, this man, or this horse.  
3 Self things are not properly handled of any a●…te, but so far as they are contained in some kindred or kind.  
4 For art entreateth of general masters: as physic teacheth not to cure William, or Robert, but man thus or thus diseased.   

Of a kindred.  
5 A kindred is said of many, differing but in number only, and aunswerabl●… when drmaunde is m●…r, what self t●…nges are.  
6 Or t●…us, a kindred is that, which is contained of a kind, or whereto a kind is answerable, when it is demanded what a kindred is.  
7 The first of these saywhats appertaineth to the lowest kindred: the other two say whattes appertain to a large kindred.  
8 The lowest kindred is next unto self things, and ever called a kindred, w●…er it be compared to self things that are under it: or to the kind that is above it.  
9 A large kindred is that which death other kindreds under it, and may be taken both for a kindred (as it is referred to the kind that is above it:) or for a kind (as it is said of kindreds that are under it.)  
10 For example thus: A wight is a large kindred, for it hath under it, a man, and a beast, which are kindreds themselves: so that if you refer a wight to a substance, then is it a kindred: but when you refer a wight to a man, or a beas●…, then is it a kind containing many kinredes of wyghtes under it.    

Of a Kind. Chapter. 7.  
1 A kind is that which is said of many kindreds, and answerable when it is demanded what kindreds are.  
2 As a wight is a kind, for it is said of man and beast, which are many kindreds.  
3 And if it be demanded what a man or a beast is, the answer aught to be made, man is a wight, or a beast is a wight.  
4 There is a general kind and a special kind.  
5 A general kind is that which is ●…aken always for a kind, as ever referred to that which is under it: such are the te●… general words called storehouses.  
6 A special kind is that which may be both a kind, and a kindred: as a wight is a kind, referred to a man: but referred to a creature, it is a kindred.  
7 The thing that is placed in any storehouse, is in that respect always, either a self thing, a kindred, or a kind.  
8 Self thing●… are said but of one: kindred, and kinds of many.  
9 All kindreds are specials, which lie betwixt the lowest kindred and the general kind.  
10 We must never by ascending amount above the general kind: neither by descending fall beneath the lowest kindred.  
11 For self things to us are infinite, and do not belong to art, but are judged by sense: And by surmounting generals we are not taught.  
12 For they contain all things without disc●…ion.   

Of a difference. Chap. 8.  
1 A difference is a mark whereby one thing is discerned from an other.  

How differences are divided.  
There are three sorts of differences, a common difference, a proper difference, and a most proper difference.  
3 A common difference is a removable mark, whereby a thing differeth from itself, or from some other thing, by any manner of means.  
4 A proper difference is an inseparable mark (chanceable notwithstanding) whereby one thing differeth from another.  
5 A most proper difference is that which is that which is said of many differing in kindred, when we demand whatkin a one, a thing is.  
6 This difference is either taken in a saywhat to shew●… what a kindred is: or in a division to 〈◊〉 a kind.  
7 A difference differeth from a property, for a property is said ●…ut of one kindred: and a difference of many kindreds.  
8 One word according to divers respects, may be both a difference, and a property: as feeling referred to a wight, is a property: and compared to a man, it is a difference.    

Of an Inbeer. Chap. 9  
1 An Inbeer is that which may be or not be in one self inholder.  

How inbeers are divided.  
2 There are two sorts of inbéers, one removable, the other unremovable.  
3 A removable Inbeer may in deed be severed from his inholder: as knowledge from a man.  
4 An unremovable inbéer may in thought, but not in deed be severed from his inholder: as blackness from a crow, and heat from fire.    

Of the turning of a shewsay. Chapter. 10.  
1 The turning of a shewsay is the removing of the backset into the room of the foreset.  
2 There is a right turning of a shewsay and a wrong turning.  
3 A shewsay is rightly turned when as both are necessarily true: but if when you have turned a shewsay, the one shewsay be false, and the other true: then is the shewsay turned amiss.  
4 Again a shewsay is rightly turned two ways: either when the sign doth remain, whether it be general or particular: or else when the general sign is rebated into the particular.  
5 The general naysay, and the particular yeasay are rightly turned, when their signs and marks remain: as no man is a stone, and no stone is a man: or some men are apt to swim, and some things apt to swim are men.  
6 The general yeasay is not rightly turned, but when the general sign is rebated into the particular: as all men are creatures: and some creatures are men.  
7 The particular naysay, is not of force apt to be turned at all.  
8 Because the kind may be denied of his kindred in part: but the kindred (being wholly contained under the kind) cannot again be denied of him in part.  
9 For we may well say: some creatures are no men: but we can not rightly say, some men are no creatures.  
10 When the backset is a saywhat or a property, the general yeasay is rightly turned, the general sign not rebated.  
11 As all men are apt to laugh: and all things apt to laugh are men, or every man, is a wight endued with sense and reason: and each wight endued with sense and reason is a man.  
12 These sayings and such like are thus turned, not by force of any rule that pertaineth to the turning of a shewsay: but by reason the foreset and backset of such shewsayes, are terms that may indifferently be said each of other, turn for turn.   

Of a yeasay, and a naysay. Chapter. 11.  
1 Every simple shewsay, whether it be of the first order, or of the second order, is either a yeasay, or a naysay.  
2 A yeasaye of the first order, affirmeth the being of a thing, as man is.  
3 A yeasay of the second order, coupleth the backset to the foreset, and affirmeth one thing of an other: as man is a wight.  
4 A nayesaye of the first order, denieth a thing to be: as, man is not.  
5 A naysay of the second order, denieth a thing to be this or that: as, man is not an angel.   

Of the quantity of a shewsay. Chapter. 12.  
1 The quantity of a shewsaye dependeth only upon the foreset.  
2 For as the forset is generally, or particularly taken: so is the shewsay either a general or a particular saying.  
3 If the foreset be a sole word, then is the shewsaye singular: as London is a City.  
4 But if the foresette be a common word, then hath it, either an universal sign before it, and is called an universal shewsay: as, all men are creatures: or else a particular sign, and is called a particular shewsay: as, some men are learned: or else it hath no sign at all, and then it is called an undetermined shewsay: as, man is mortal.  
5 The singular and undetermyned shewsayes, are always taken in a reason, as particulars.  
6 No shewsay is true, where the backset being a common word, hath an universal sign joined unto it: as, All men are all creatures: or men are all creatures.  
7 But in a singular shewsay it may●…▪ as, these men are all the friends, I have.   

Of signs and marks which show the quantity and quality of each shewesay. Chapter. 13.  
1 There are four sorts of signs and marks, so termed, because they note the quantity and quality of every shewsay. a General yeamarke as all General naymarke none Particular yemarke some Particular naymark somenot  
2 The particular naymarke is commonly expressed in our mother tongue, by two words, some and not (some other words always being placed betwixt them:) for we use not to say, some not men are learned: but some men are not learned.   

Of a true and a false shewsay. Chapter. 14.  
1 If men do affirm that thing to be, which is not: or do deny that thing to be, which is: they make a lie, and their shewsay or saying is false.  
2 But if that thing be in deed, which they affirm to be: or if that thing be not in deed, which they deny to be: then is their saying true.  
3 So that the truth or falsehood of men's sayings, dependeth wholly of the matter, that is uttered by their words.  
4 To know whether each matter fall out according to this or that man's saying, or not: it appertaineth not only to witcraft to decide, but each saying is tried to be true, or false, by that art where unto it doth properly appertain.   

To know which is a necessary shewsay, which is an unpossible shewsay, and which is a chanceable shewsay. Cham 15.  
1 If the backset be a saywhat, a property, a kind, a difference, or a natural and an unremovable Inbéer: the shewsay is necessary.  
2 If the backsette be a removable inbeer, the shewsay is chanceable.  
3 But if the backset be none of these: then is it an unpossible shewsay.  
4 A necessary shewsay differeth from an unpossible shewsay: for that, this is always false: and the former always tru●….   

Of gaynsaying shewsayes. Chapter. 16.  
1 Gaynsaying shewsays are two shewsayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysay, changing neither foreset, backset, nor verb.  
2 There are three sorts of gaynsaying shewsays: Contrary shewsays: less than contrary shewsays: and more than contrary shewsayes.  
3 Contraries are two general shewsayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysay: as each man is good: and, no man is good.  
4 Less than contraries are two particular shewsayes: the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysaye: as some men are good, and some men are not good.  
5 Moore than contraries are two shewsayes, the one being general, the other particular: the one a yeasaye, the other a naysay: as all men are good, and some men are not good: or no man is good, and some men are good.  
6 Contraries are never both true: yet chanceth it sometimes that they are both false: as when the backset is a removable inbeer: as each man is learned, and no man is learned.  
7 Less than contraries are never both false, but may in chanceable such says be both true: as some men are learned, and some are not learned.  
8 Moore than contraries are most repugnant one to another: for if the one be true, the other of necessity is false: or if the one be false, the other of necessity is true: as all men are learned: and, some men are not learned: or no man is learned, & some man is learned.   

Of Shewesayes that are of like force. Chap. 17.  
1 Those shewesayes are of like force and strength which differ in words and agree in meaning.  
2 It doth properly pertain to grammar and not to Witcrafte, to know which sayings agree in sense, and which do not.  
3 Yet for so much as arts are knit together, in such a band of knowledge, that no man can be cunning in any one, but he must have some knowledge in many, they do by usurpation some times borrow one of an other, so much as doth serve their present purpose.  
4 Therefore many writers of Witcraft, entreat in this place, of shewesayes that are of like force, only by reason of this nay word (not) diversly placed afore, or after though signs.  
5 But here is to be noted, that the same rules hold not in our English tongue that the Latyns use hereof in their tongue.  
6 Therefore take these as certain: and as for the rest, know that either they are not in use, or ●…they held not in such sort as the Latin authors do appoint.  
7 In our mother tongue we use to ●…e this word (not) either only afore the sign: or only after the sign, as for to place it afore the sign, and a●…ter two, in one sentence, it standeth not with the property of our speech.  
8 (Not) joined in a shewesaye, to a general yeamarke, altereth the quality and diminisheth the quantity thereof, and makes the saying all one, whether it be placed afore or after the sign.  
9 For of a general yeasay, it makes a particular naysaye: as not all that speak you fair, are your friends: or all that speak you fair are not your friends.  
These two sayings are both one in sense and meaning: and as much to say as some that speak you fair are not your friends.  
10 Now it is plain that this last sentence is a particular naysay: therefore the two former sayings, must needs be so too, being of like force and value that it is of.  
11 If (not) be placed in a shewesaye before a particular yeamarke, it altereth the quality, and augmenteth the quantity thereof, for not one is as much to say, as none.  
12 (Not) being placed afore few, signifieth many: and being placed afore many signifieth few.  
13 More ways of placing of (not) afore the sign to make any good sense in our mother tongue, I find not.  
14 These few examples do show all in small room, that is necessary to be spoken of, touching this matter. 1 Not all are All are not is as much to say as 1 some are not 2 Not one is 2 none are 3 Not a few 3 many 4 Not many 4 a few   

Of a compounded Shewsay. Chap. 18.  
1 What a compounded shewsay is, we have said afore, side. 66. verse. 9  
2 There are two sorts of compounded shewsayes.  
3 They of the first sort do speak with adding of, if, and, or, cause, or time.  
4 They of the second sort, add the manner of being by some one of these four preambles, as: it chanceth: it is possible: it is unpossible: it is necessary: or else by some other terms of like force, that these, or some one of these is of.  
5 A shewsay compounded with, an (if), may be called an ifsaye, and doth simplelye neither affirm nor deny, but upon condition, as, if you do well, you shall be well reported: or if ye do ill, ye shall not be well reported.  
6 In these two sayings nothing is affirmed simply or divided, but upon condition of well doing, or ill.  
7 A shewsay comp●…unded with (and) is called a coupling shewsay, & this is never true, except all parts be true.  
8 As john, William, and Robert are learned, is not true: except all parts be true: but false it is, when any part is untrue.  
9 Also john is learned, discrete and rich: this saying is false, if john be either not learned, not discrete, or not rich: and true it is not, but when all the things recited, take place in him.  
10 A shewsaye compounded with (or) is a parting shewsaye, and is true when any part is true: and never false ●…cepte all parts be false: as john, Robert, or William, is at home.  
11 This is true if any of them be at home: false, when none of them is at home.  
12 A shewsay compounded with adding the cause: as, because you served faithfully I give you this form: and a shewsay compounded with condition of time: as, when I die you shall have my land, may well be referred to an ifsaye: for in affirming and denying, they observe the same law that it doth.   

Of Shewsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being. Chap. 19  
1 There are four Preambles, whereby the manner of being or not being of things, is set forth. 
as 


it chanceth.  
it is possible.  
it is unpossible.  
it is necessary.      
2 When any shewesaye hath any of these preambles put unto it, than it is called a shewsaye compounded by adding the manner of being, or not being.  
3 Two things are chief to be handled in these compounded shewsayes.  
4 The first is to show, when they affirm and when they deny: the second is to show, how they agreed and how they follow each upon other.  

Of the affirming or denying of a Shewsay compounded by adding the manner of being or not being.  
5 Generally they never deny, but when this nayworde (not) is placed afore the preamble.  
6 For if it be not put to at all: or else placed after the preamble, they affirm.  
7 For example, it chanced that john coming from London, was rob: the naysaye is, it did not chance, that john coming from London was rob.  
8 As for this saying, it chanced that john coming from London, was not rob, is a yeasay: and thus in like manner of the rest.  
9 This saying it is unpossible, for man to fly, is in form and manner of speaking, a yeasay, and in meaning a naysay.   

How Shewsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being follow one upon another.  
10 Shewsays compounded by adding the manner of being, or not being follow one upon another, but not in like sort. It chanceth to be hath these following upon it 1 1 it is possible to be 2 it is not unpossible to be 3 it is not necessary to be It chanceth not to be 2 1 it is possible not to be 2 it is not unpossible not to be 3 it is not necessary not to be It doth not chance to be 3 1 it is not possible to be 2 it is unpossible to be 3 it is necessary not to be It doth not chance not to be 4 1 it is not possible not to be 2 it is unpossible not to be 3 it is necessary to be  
11 For where we afore divided a shewsay, 
Side. 87. ver. 1  reckoning some to be 〈◊〉, some necessary, some unpossible, we had 〈◊〉 how the foreset was coupled or not coupled to the ba●…kset upon the sequel of the matter.  
12 But here dividing a shewsay, into a chanceable shewsay, a possible shewsaye, an unpossible shewsay, and into a nessarye shewsay, we do respect the pr●…amble only for the naming of the shewsay. As for the truth of such sayings, that is to be considered, as it falls forth in matter uttered by them.     

The third book of Witcraft.  

Chap. 1.  
1 WE have spoken heretofore of words and sayings: it remains that we now proceed to entreat of a reason.  
2 Let us therefore here set down those things which are necessarily required for the due understanding of a perfect reason.  
3 First we will show what a reason is: secondly we will declare how many kinds of reasons there are: thirdly we will lay forth the parts of a reason: fourthly, we will tell how such parts are to be found out, and how they are to be ordered and disposed, to make a reason that shall infer a necessary endsaye.  

What a reason is.  
4 A reason is a compounded shewsaye, proving that which lieth in controversy by known and granted sayings.  
5 For even as certain words must be coupled together in due order to make a perfect sentence: so must certain shewesayes be joined together in a due 〈◊〉 to make a perfect re●…son.    

That there are but two kinds of reasons and what either kind is. Chapter. 2.  
1 There are but two ways to prove a doubtful matter.  
2 For either we rise by examples of selfethings and specials, to the knowl●…dge of the general: or else contrariwise we fall by the rule of the general, to the knowledge of special and selfethings.  
3 The first way may be called a reason by example: the second a reason by rule.  

Examples of a reason by example.  
4 If a skilful Lawyer be the best Lawyer: and a skilful Mariner the best Mariner: and a skilful Physician, the best Physician: then is he accounted best in each art, that hath most skill therein.  
5 Another: all light things ascend: for smoke, breath, flame, and fire do so.  
6 Here are we brought by divers particulars 〈◊〉 by examples, to come to the knowledge of two general rules.  
7 The fir●…t rul●… is, that he is best artificer, that hath most skill in his art.  
8 The s●…conde is, that all light things ascend.   

Of a Reason by rule.  
9 A reason by rule, is a reason that standeth of three shewesayes, framed in such sort, that two of them being granted to be true, the third must by force of them be true also: for example thus.  

All light things ascend,  
Breath is light,  
therefore,  
Doth breath ascend.   
10 For he that granteth that all light things do ascend, & also that breath is light, must needs grant by force of these, that breath doth ascend too.    

What diversity there is betwixt a reason by example, and a reason by rule. Chapter. 3.  
1 A reason by example pertaineth so common sense and experience.  
A reason by rule belongeth to art.  
2 A reason by example serveth to prove the principles of art, by certain▪ particular examples: A reason by rule proveth particular cases by principles and general rules.  
3 So that a reason by example ascendeth to the general: a reason by rule descendeth to the particular.  
4 A reason by example allureth the ignorant: a reason by rule forceth the learned.  
5 The number of shewesayes in a reason by example are uncertain, sometimes many, and sometimes sew: but the number of shewesayes in a reason by rule, is ever certain, and so that they are never more nor less but three.  

What things are chiefly to be noted in a reason by rule.  
6 There are in a reason by rule (as in each other thing whatsoever) two special points to be mack▪ the matter, and the form.    

Of the matter whereof a reason by rule is made. Chap. 4.  
1 Three shewesayes, and three terms, are the matter whereof a reason by rule is made: but shewesayes are nearer, and terms further of.  
2 For a reason is resolved into shewsayes, and shewesayes are resolved into terms.  

What names the three Shewsayes have, which are in a reason by rule.  
3 The two first shewsayes that are placed in a reason by rule, are called foresayes, the third may be t●…rmed, an endsay.  
4 This is proved, and they do prove.  
5 This is first in purpose, and last in order: they are first in order, and last in finding out.  
6 When you go precisely to work, you must express three shewsayes in each reason that is made by rule: yet men in writing, and common speech, use often to leave out some one of them.  
7 When any one is left out, to know which it is: you shall have a rule for it hereafter.   

Of the three terms which are in a reason by rule.  
8 The three terms that are chief to be noted in a reason by rule, and whereof the three foresaid shewsayes are made, be thus named: the general term: the special term: the proving term: each term being twice repeated in one reason. the general term. special proving  
9 The backser of the endsay, is always the general term.  
10 And the foreset of the endsaye is ever the special term.  
11 The proving term is that term, which is placed in both the foresayes: and is the mean whereby the other two terms agree or disagree among themselves, in the endsaye.    

Of the form of a reason by rule. Chapter. 5.  
1 After you have thus generally considered of the matter of a reason by rule: you must proceed to the form.  
2 Which is in very deed nothing else but a right ordering and disposing of the matter.  
3 For it standeth in the right placing of the terms: and in the due quantity and quality of the shewsayes.  
4 So that when the three terms are rightly placed in each shewsay, and when the due quantity and quality of shewsays is kept withal: then is the form of a reason by rule always necessary, and the endsay is true, by force of the foresayes.  
5 But if either the terms be not rightly ordered, or that the due quantity & quality of shewsayes be not kept: then the form of the reason is not good, and that reason itself, is in deed, a deceivable reason.  
6 Now for the placing of the terms, there are ranks devised, and for the furnishing of the shewsayes with due quantity & quality there are seats appointed.  
7 So that the ranks teach where the three terms are placed in each shewsaye: and the seats tell what quantity and quality the three shewsayes must have whereof a reason by rule is framed.  
8 A rank is a rew of seats, teaching where the three terms are placed in each shewsaye of a reason.  
9 A Seat is a special form of arguing, noting the quantity and quality of each shewsay, which is placed in a reason by rule.  
10 There are three ranks or rues of seats, where all reasons framed by ●…ule, are couched.  
The 1 rank. 2 3  
11 The first rank is a rue of those seats, which ever place the proving term betwixt the general and the special term, in such sort, that it be under the general, and above the special.  
12 The second rank placeth the proving term above the general and the special term, so that it is said of them both.  
13 The third rank placeth the proving term beneath them both, so that they both are said of it.  
14 This is further to be marked concerning the ordering of the terms, that the general term and the proving term, make always the first foresay: the proving term and the special term make the second foresay: and the general and the special term make the endsay.  

How many ways a reason by rule may be made.  
15 A reason by rule may be directly framed fourteen ways, and more ways it can not. Four ways in the first rank: and four ways in the second rank: and six ways in the third rank.  
16 Now for these four●… several forms of arguing, there are fourteen words artificially invented, each word appointed to his proper seat, which parte●… into three syllables a p●…ce, serve for divers purposes.    

The names of the particular seats, and what is generally to be learned in each one of them. Chap. 6.  
1 The four seats which are placed in the first rank, are thus named and ordered.  
The 

first 
Bar ba ra.  Second 
Ce la rent.  third 
Dari j  Fourth 
Fe ri o.     
2 The four seats that are placed in the second rank, are named and ordered thus.  
The 

first 
 a re.  Second 
Cam es tres.  Third 
Fes ti no.  Fourth 
Basilius ro co.     
3 The six seats which are placed in the third rank, are named and ordered thus.  
The 

first 
Da rap ti.  Second 
Fe lap ton.  third 
Dis am is.  Fourth 
Da 'tis i  fift 
Bo car do.  Sixth 
Fe ris on.     
4 For clearness and memory sake, I think it good to set forth the names of the seats, as they are appointed to their several ranks, in four english verses.  

Proper seats appointed for each rank.  
Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, to the first rank.  
Cesare, Camestres, festino, Baroco, darapti: Felapton, Disamis, datisi. Bocardo, Ferison. Six last here down set, be seats proper ay to the third rank.  
6 Besides the name of each particular seat, learn also of this that followeth, what matter each one of these artificial words doth include in itself.  
7 first, as each reason by rule standeth of three shewesayes: So each seat is parted into three syllables. The first syllable is set against the first foresay, the second syllable against the second foresay, the third syllable against the endsaye.  
8 The first and capital letter of each word showeth to what seat each unperfect reason must be reduced unto.  
9 For the reasons made in the second and third rank, must (or they be accounted perfect) be reduced to those seats of the first rank, which begin with the same capital letter that they do: as,  
Baroco to Barbara. Bocardo  
Cesare to Celarent. Camestres  
Darapti to Darii. Disamis Datisi  
Festino to Ferio. Felapton Ferison  
10 M. p. s. c. show how the vnperfect●… seats must be reduced.  
11 M. noteth, that the foresayes must be changed each into others place.  
12 P. noteth a turning of the shewsay, with rebatement of the sign.  
13 S. Noteth a turning of the shows a without rebatement of the sign.  
14 C. If it be not placed in the first syllable, noteth a reducing of the reason by way of impossibility.  
15 The vowels note the quantity and quality of each shewsay: as,  
A E I O noteth that the shewsay set against it, must be a general yeasay, general naysay, particular yeasay, particular naysay.  
16 The rest of the Letters serve to no purpose, but to make up the verse.  
17 Although this which we have now said concerning the matter and form of a reason by rule, may seem to a pregnant wit, to be sufficient: yet to make the matter plain to beginners, and to those that lacks an instructor: we will declare what manner of three terms will serve, and how they must be furnished and set forth with quantity and quality, to make a good reason in every particular seat, setting forth the same by plain examples.    

Of the first rank. Chap. 7.  
1 To this rank are assigned four seatt, as is aforesaid, in the first seat is concluded a general yeasaye: in the second a general naysay: in the third a particular yeasay: in the fourth a particular naysaye: So that there is no shewsay which may not be proved in the seats of the first rank.  
2 The proving term in this rank, is placed betwixt the general and the special term.  

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the first seat of the first rank.  
3 When you have three terms, whereof the first may wholly be said of the second, and that the second also may wholly be said of the third, they do serve to make a reason in Barbara concluding that the first term is generally said of the third: as,  
1 Creature this is the general term. 2 Wight proving 3 Man special  
4 If you will say forth this reason at large, and furnish every shewsay w●…h due quantity and quality, you must utter it thus.  
Bar ba ra 


All wights are cereatures,  
All men are wights, therefore  
All men are creatures.      

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the second seat of the first rank.  
5 When you have three terms whereof the first is wholly denied of the second, and the second wholly affirmed of the third: they serve to make a reason in Celarent, concluding that the first term is generally denied of the third: as,  
1 Natural this is the general term: 2 learned by imitation proving 3 language special  
6 Set this reason down at large thus  
Ce la rend 


nothing learned by imitation is natural  
every language is learned by imitation, therefore,  
No language is natural.      

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the third seat of the first rank.  
7 When you have three terms whereof the first is wholly affirmed of the second, and the second partly affirmed of the third, they serve to make a reason in Darii, concluding that the first term is affirmed of the third in part:  
1 Commendable this is the general term 2 virtues proving 3 Sparing special  
8 Set this reason down at large thus.  
Dari i 


All virtues are commendable  
Some kind of sparing is a virtue therefore,  
Some kind of sparing is commendable      

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the fourth seat of the first rank.  
9 When you have three terms whereof the first is wholly denied of the second, and the second partly affirmed of the third, they serve to make a reason in Ferio: concluding that the first term is denied of the third in part: as,  
1 To be used this is the general term 2 wanton tricks proving 3 dances special  
10 Set this reason down at large thus.  
Feri o 


No wanton trick is to be used,  
Some dances are wanton tricks, therefore  
Some dances are not to be used.     
11 If the terms whereof you be willed to make a reason by rule, bear not such respect one to an other, as is set forth in these foresaid rules: know for a certainty, that no good reason can be made of them: to be placed in the seats of the first rank.  
12 For when the three terms are such as none can truly be said of an other: or when the first is said of the second but in parts: or the second is denied of the third, either in whole, or in part: the reason that is made of such terms, hath no necessary sequel, but is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is a reason which standeth in rank and maketh a show of an argument, but it is not placed in any seat that keepeth a necessary form of arguing.    

Of the second rank. Chap. 3.  
1 In the second rank the proving term is the backsette in both the forsayes: and as the three terms are placed in order, it is the highest.  
2 To this rank belongeth also four seats: two generals, and two specials: but they all serve to disprove, and none of them to prove.  
3 For it followeth not, because one kind is said of two differing kindreds: that therefore the one kindred should be said and affirmed of the other.  
For though all wheat be corn, and all rye be corn too: yet it followeth not therefore, that any rye is wheat, or any wheat rye.  

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the first seat of the second rank.  
4 When you have three terms whereof the first is wholly denied of the second, and wholly affirmed of the third: they serve to make a reason in Cesare, concluding that the second term is wholly denied of the third: as,  
1 to have a taland this is the proving term. 2 tame by nature general 3 hawk special  
5 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Caesario a re 


Nothing tame by nature hath a taland,  
All hawks have talandes therefore,  
No hawk is tame by nature.     
6 C. in this word Cesare, showeth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced unto Celarent: and S. telleth how, even by turning of the first foresay without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the second seat of the second rank.  
7 When you have three terms, whereof the first is wholly affirmed of the second, & wholly denied of the third, they serve to make a reason in Camestres concluding that the second is wholly denied of the third: as,  
1 to have a talant this is the proving term 2 hawk general 3 tame special  
8 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Cam es tres 


All hawks have talands  
no tame foul by nature hath a taland therefore  
no tame foul by nature is a hawk     
9 C. in this word Camestres, showeth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Celarent: and M. and the two S. S. teach how, to wit, that the foresayes must be changed each into ethers' place: & that the second foresay and the endsaye, must both be turned without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the third seat of the second rank.  
10 When you have three terms whereof the first is wholly denied of the second, and affirmed of the third in part, they serve to make a reason in Festino, concluding that the second is denied of the third in part: as,  

1 Forbidden  
2 Lawful  
3 Apparel.   
11 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Fes ti no 


Not lawful thing is forbidden,  
Some apparel is forbidden, therefore  
Some apparel is not lawful.     
12 F. In this word Festino showeth that the reasons placed in this seat must be reduced to Ferio: and S. showeth how, even by turning the first foresay, without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the fourth seat of the second rank.  
13 When you have three terms, whereof the first is wholly affirmed of the second: and denied of the third in part, they serve to make a reason in Baroco, concluding that the second is denied of the third in part: as,  
1 Indifferent this is the proving term 2 Lawful general 3 Apparel special  
14 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Ba ro co 


All lawful things are indifferent,  
Some apparel is not indifferent, therefore,  
Some apparel is not lawful.     
15 B. In Baroco noteth that the reasons placed in this seat must be reduced to Barbara and C. showeth that they must be reduced by way of impossibility, taking a sentence more than a contrary to the endsay with the first foresay, and concluding more than a contrary shewsay to the second foresay: as, 
Bar ba ra 


All lawful things are indifferent,  
All apparel is lawful, therefore  
All apparel is indifferent.      
16 The endsaye in this reason is manifestly false, therefore one of the foresayes must needs be false too, but the first foresay it can not be, for that was granted to be true in the first reason, therefore it must needs be the second, whose more then contrary shewsay, was denied to be true afore, so that by this means the answerer is forced to grant that which can not be, to wit, that more than contrary shewsays should both be false.    

Of the third Rank. Chap. 4.  
1 In this rank the proving term is the foreset in both the foresayes, and as the three terms be placed in order, it is the lowest.  
To this rank belongeth six seats, three yeascates and three nayscats, but all concluding particular sentences.  

What manner of terms, will serve to make a reason in the first seat of the third rank.  
2 When you have three terms whereof the first and the second, are both said of the third generally, they serve to make a reason in Darapti, concluding that the first must needs be said of the second in part: as,  
1 Evil this is the general term 2 Creatures special 3 Devils proving  
3 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Da rap ti 


All Devils are evil,  
All Devils are creatures, therefore,  
Some creatures are evil.     
4 D. In this word Darapti, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Da●… and P. showeth how they must be reduced, even by turning of the second foresay, without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the second seat of the third rank.  
5 When you have three terms whereof the first is generally denied of the third, and the second generally affirmed of it too, they serve to make a reason in Felapton, concluding that the first is denied of the second in part: as,  
1 Forgotten upon (the sudden this is the general term 2 A gotten qualititie special 3 Arte. proving  
8 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Fe lap ton 


No art is forgotten upon the sudden,  
All arts are got qualities, therefore,  
Some gotten quality is not forgotten upon the sudden.     
7 F. In this word Felapton, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat are reduced to Ferio, and P. showeth how they must be reduced, even by turning of the second foresay without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the third seat of the third rank.  
9 When you have three terms whereof the first is said in part of the third, and the second wholly affirmed of it too: they serve to make a reason in Disamis, concluding that the first is said of the second in part: as,  
1 Necessary this is the general term 2 Better for the present time special 3 Correction proving  
9 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Di●… am is 


Some correction is necessary,  
All correction is bitter for the present time, therefore  
Some thing bitter for the present time is necessary.     
10 D. In this word Disamis, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, are reduced to Darij: and the two. S. S. and M. show how they must be reduced.  
11 For the two. S. S. do note, that the first foresay and the endsaye must be turned without rebatement of the sign: & M. noteth that the foresayes must be changed each into others place.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the fourth seat of the third rank.  
12 When you have three terms whereof the first is generally said of the third, and the second is said thereof but in part: they serve to make a reason in Datisi, concluding that the general is said of the special in part: as,  
1 Reprovable this is the general term 2 Magistrate special 3 Offender proving  
13 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Da 'tis i 


All offenders are to be reproved,  
Some offender is a magistrate, therefore,  
Some magistrate is reprovable.     
14 D. In this word Datisi, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, are to be reduced to Darij: and S ●…eweth how they must be reduced, even by turning the second foresay, without rebatement of the sign.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the fift seat of the third rank.  
15 When you have three terms, whereof the first is denied of the third in part, and the second wholly affirmed of it too: they serve to make a reason in Bocardo, concluding that the first is denied of the second in part.  
1 Evil this is the general term 3 Minister special 3 True preacher proving  
16 Set down this reason at large thus,  
Bo car do 


Some true preacher is not evil,  
All true preachers are ministers, therefore,  
Some minister is not evil.     
17 B. In this word Bocardo, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Barbara: and C. showeth how, to wit, by forcing the adversary to grant an impossibility in reason, which in Bocardo is done thus.  
18 You must take more than a contrary to the endsay, with the second foresay, and conclude more than a contrary to the first foresay: for example,  
Bar ba ra 


All Ministers are evil,  
All true preachers are ministers, therefore,  
All true preachers are evil.     
For the rest, look the. 16. sentence of the third chapter.   

What manner of terms will serve to make a reason in the sixte seat of the third rank.  
19 When you have three terms, whereof the first is generally denied of the third, and the second affirmed of it in part: they serve to make a reason in Ferison, concluding that the general is denied of the special in part: as,  
1 Pleasant this is the general term 2 Profitable special 3 Correction proving  
20 Set down this reason at large thus.  
Fe ris on 


No correction is pleasant,  
Some correction is profitable, therefore,  
Some profitable thing is not pleasant.     
21 F. In this word Ferison, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Ferio: and▪ S. showeth how, even by turning the second foresay without rebatement of sign.  
22 In this rank, no form of arguing is good, where the second foresay is a naysay: that is to say, when the special term, is denied of the proving term, either wholly or in part.    

If either of the foresayes be left out of a reason by rule, to know which it is. Chap. 10.  
1 If the backset be one in both the shewsayes, the second foresay wanteth, either in the first, or the third rank.  
2 But if the foreset be one in both the shewsayes, the first foresay wanteth, either in the first, or the second rank.  
3 If you have two shewsayes, concluding a reason, and one word a foreset in the first, and a backset in the later, there wanteth the second foresay in the second rank.  
4 If you have two shewsayes concluding a reason, and one word a backset in the first, and a foresette in the latter, there wanteth the first, foresay in the third rank.  
5 Try these rules by the examples set forth already in each seat, and you shall see they never fail.  

To know in how many seats each endsay may be concluded.  
1 An universal yeasaye is only proved in Barbara.  
2 An universal naysaye is three ways concluded, in Celarent, Cesare, and Camestres.  
3 A particular yeasay is four ways proved, in Darij, Darapti, Disamis, and Datisi.  
4 A particular naysaye is concluded in six seats, in Ferio, Festino, Baroco, Felapton, Bocardo, Ferison.  
5 By this it is plain, that an universal yeasaye is most hard to prove, and most easy to disprove: & that a particular naysaye is most easy to prove, and most hard to disprove.     

The fourth Book of Witcraft.  

Of Invention or finding out of arguments. Chap. 1.  
1 How the proving term must lie, to the foresette and backsette of each demand, that a necessary reason may be made of three terms, we have showed afore, in our third book.  
2 It followeth now, that we teach a way, to get store of proving terms.  
3 For as the good and ready merchant provideth store of sundry wares, and sorteth every kind by itself, adding special marks for his better direction, that he may with convenient speed fit and serve his customer when he calleth: So the quick and sharp reasoner, must gather general rules together, and place them in order, that he may have in a readiness when need shall be, store of reasons, for proof or disproof of matters in doubt.  
4 Therefore is witcraft well divided of the Grecians into two parts: whereof the first is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, in english, the decerning part: the other is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as much to say, as the finding part.  
5 This, for that by searching it findeth out the proving term: The other, not only for that it judgeth of the form of an argument: but also for that it descryeth the truth and falsehood of all sentences: and noteth the force, and signification of wordès.  
6 Some men do think, that the finding part, is first to be taught, and that by the course of nature it aught to come afore the other in order.  
7 For as he that will make an house, first provideth timber, stone, brick, clay, lime, nails, pings, and other things, whereof he will have his house to be builded: and after hireth workmen, to set these things together, and to frame them in order: which done, his devised house is finished and made: Even so the cunning reasoner first finds out (say they) by the use of the places, the matter whereupon he will speak: and after seeketh by the rules of a perfect reason, how to order and dispose the same.  
8 This reason in my judgement serveth neither for him that would practise Witcrafte, nor for him that should teach it.  
9 For how can a man either invent or teach any good reasons, to prove matters that lie in doubt, the nature of sentences and words, being not first known?  
10 Seeing each question standeth of them and is not thoroughly known, afore the force of each word be deeply considered, with due consideration had, how the words, agreed or disagree in a perfect sentence.  
11 Now to return this similitude, and to make it good against our adversaries, we say:  
12 Not craftsman can fit himself of stuff, afore he hath cast in his mind the shape and form of the thing, that he will make.  
13 In like manner, no good reasoner can find out the proving term, by the use of the places, afore he have learned by the rules of a perfect reason, what manner of proving term will serve his purpose.  
14 That is to say, how the proving term in the two foresayes, must be coupled or uncoupled to the forset or backset of the question, that the same may be directly concluded.  
15 By this it is plain, that the shape of a thing that is to be made, would first be devised in mind, afore the stuff were provided:  
16 Otherwise, it will commonly fall forth, that there will be either loss in providing to much, or lack in providing to little.  
17 We have therefore in our three former books, spoken of the decerning part of Witcrafte, and have reserved the finding part to be entreated of in this our fourth Book.  
18 But here I advise thee of one thing (gentle reader) that thou look not, that I should set forth all the places, whereof men use to gather arguments, and omit none.  
19 For that thing I suppose no man hath done heretofore: nor shall do hereafter.  
20 Neither is it one man's work to begin and end an art, in such sort, as nothing can be said more.  
21 It is well if we write that, which may profit many: neither is it fit to leave many good things undene, or many profitable things untaught, because we cannot do and say, all that is good and profitable.  
22 Now because the ten storehouses are fit for invention, I have thought good to appoint them for places.  
23 And where as there are divers other places beside, which can not conveniently be referred to any of the ten storehouses, I have added and interlaced them in such order, as I judged was fittest, either for memory or invention.  
24 The general places which I have gathered out of sundry authors, to yield a reasoner store of arguments, are in number twenty and two: I think good to name and order them thus.  
Of 


1 Substance.  
2 Quantity.  
3 Quality.  
4 The cause.  
5 The effect.  
6 Preparation.  
7 Doing.  
8 Suffering.  
9 Time.  
10 Place.  
11 Order.  
12 Having.  
13 The forecommers.  
14 The after-comers.  
15 The withcommers.  
16 The likelier.  
17 The unlykelyer.  
18 The aslyke.  
19 A similitude.  
20 Witnesses.  
21 Oaynsettes.  
22 The differing term.  
23 Division.  
24 Proportion.     
25 These places may be reduced to a few general points, and divers writers use so to do.  
26 Howbeit in mine opinion that hind●…reth Invention, and forceth further matter upon words, than their usual sign●…cation doth bear.  
27 Division doubtless is a necessary mean to teach by: and it furthereth learning very much, to pass by division from point to point: so that you take that occasion which nature or art offereth, and keep the property of the speech which you use  
28 In discoursing upon the places, I mean●…o keep this order.  
29 First I will define the place, and after divide it: then I will set down certain general rules, in each particular place, that the groundeworke and chief cause of a reason may be viewed & considered.  
30 Fourthly, I will add examples that a beginner may learn by imitation to do the like.  
31 Finally I will tell how reasons held of each place, and how they hold not: that the diligent reader may see, what sequel there followeth in reason upon the grounds and principles of invention.  
32 If any one of these five points be (at any time) omitted, it is either for that such things need not to be spoken of (being very plain of themselves) or for that they are sufficiently entreated of elsewhere.  
33 For that which hath been taught heretofore, and may seem necessary to be interlaced in the discourse of the places, I pass ever of purpose.  
34 Pointing thee (gentle reader,) nevertheless, by two numbers, where thou master at the first sight, find out that which else were necessary to be here repeated.   

Of the first general place called Substance. Chap. 2.  
1 He that will discourse orderly, and search a matter to the bottom, must begin with the substance of the thing he speaketh of.  
2 Substance is taken here more largely than it was in the first storehous●….  
3 For there it was taken only for a thing that had his being by itself: but here substance is taken for any thing that is necessarily required in the ●…scentiall being of an other, and it is divided into seven parts.  
4 The saywhat, the general term, the special term, the proper term, the whole, the part, and the offspring.  
5 Every one of these have sundry rules, and arguments gathered of them hold not all alike, therefore we will entreat of them severally.  
6 What a say what is, and how many sorts and kinds there are, what things have the same order and trade of arguing that a saywhat hath, and what five special points do appertain unto it, look side 73. Chapter. 4.  

Other general rules appertaining to a saywhat.  
7 Whatsoever the saywhat doth declare and set forth, the same in that respect is a kindred, and neither a self thing, nor a kind.  
8 The saywhat and the kindred (that is to say, the thing declared and set for the by the saywhat) differ only in words and terms, and not in substance of matter.  
9 And therefore nothing (concerning sense and meaning) is contained in the one, but the same also is comprised in the other.  
10 And whatsoever is denied or said of the o●…e, may in like sort, be denied or said of the other.   

Examples of arguments deduced of a saywhat.  
11 Each man is mortal, for every wight endued with reason and sense is mortal.  
12 If you will set down this reason in frame, according to the precise rules afore given, dot this.  
Bar ba ra 


Every wight endued with reason and sense is mortal.  
But every man is a wight endued with reason and sense, therefore,  
Every man is mortal.     
13 Every wight endued with reason and sense, is the saywhat of man: so that it being mortal, forceth man to be mortal too, by the general rule of the saywhat. Verse. 9  
14 Again thus, death maketh an end of each man: therefore every man is mortal, frame this reason in rule thus.  
Bar ba ra 


each thing ended by death is mortal  
Every man is ended by death,  
Therefore each man is mortal.      

The use of this place.  
15 The first reason is taken of the saywhat of man: the second of the saywhat of mortal.  
16 For necessary reasons may be deduced aswell from the sayewhat of the endesayes backset, as from the saywhat of the endsayes fores●…t, and that to prove or disprove in differently.    

Of the general term. Chap. 3.  
1 In seeking out of arguments, we take that for the general term, which may be truly answered of many specials, when demand is made what they are.  
2 As when you demand what stoutness or manhood is, the right answer must be, that manhood is a virtue: in like manner if you ask what temperance is, the fittest answer lieth, that temperance also is a virtue.  
3 Therefore virtue compared to manhood and temperance, is a general.  
4 ●…ere note that to these and such like demands the next general is rather to be answered then that which is further of.  
5 For when I am asked what a peach is, I shall come nearer to the matter, if I say it is a fruit, then if I answer and say it is a creature or a substance.  
6 But mine answer should be furmost off from satisfying of mine hearer, if I should say it were a thing.  
7 Because he that answereth so generally, makes no distinction in matter, but leaves the demander in as great doubt as he was in at the first.  

Rules belonging to the general term by the which thou mayst also learn the use of this place.  
8 All things are contained in the general that are contained in any special.  
9 For if life, reason, sense, learning, will, cunning, etc. be in man, the same things are also of force in a wight, in a creature, and in a substance, which three are all generals to man.  
10 What thing soever may be generally affirmed of the general, the same thing also may be generally affirmed of every one of his specials.  
11 The general is generally taken, when an universal sign is joined to it, and it not diminished of his quantity by any nay-word, as when you say, each earthly creature is mortal.  
12 Upon this general, generally granted, you may well conclude, that every man is mortal.  
13 But when a general word is joined to a particular sign, or granted in a shewsay to be true without any sign at all, than it maketh no sufficient proof of the special.  
14 As when it is alleged, that a wight or some wight is learned, these things being granted, do not of force infer that all men or some men are learned, more than any other earthly creature that hath sése.  
15 Howbeit, if the general be generally granted, it maketh good proof of all and every one of his specials: for who so granteth every earthly wight to be mortal, granteth also by good sequel in reason, that all men, and all beasts are mortal too.  
16 What thing soever is denied of the general, without restraint of any particular sign, the same thing may seem well, to be denied of any of his specials.  
17 For if it be well said, learning is not got with ease: it is also well said: wit-craft is not got with ease, speechcrafte, starcraft, Physic, law, or any other kind of learning.  
18 But if any thing be denied of the general, by restraint of the particular sign, the same is not therefore denied of any of his specials, but of certain, such as the restraint may seem to limit.  
19 For though I grant that some houseduck flieth not, yet am not I thereby forced to say, the wildduck ●…ieth not, seeing the restraint may seem to be made but to the tame duck.  
20 Not general is affirmed of any special ofspringingly.  
21 For it cannot be truly affirmed, the witness is coloured, seeing witness is a colour, and the inholder of witness is coloured, be it cloth, wool, yarn, or any thing else that is accustomed to be died or coloured.    

Of the special term. Chap. 4.  
1 The special is here taken for that whereof the general may be said, when demand is made of the special, and question asked what it is.  

Rules belonging to the special.  
2 Whatsoever is said of the special in part, is said also of the general in part.  
2 For if some men be learned, some wight is learned.  
2 But on the other side in the behalf of the general this rule holdeth not.  
3 For it followeth not though some wight be four footed, that therefore man should be four footed too.  
4 Whatsoever is granted to be in any special, must of force be granted to be in all his generals.  
5 If all the specials be granted, they are sufficient to prove or disprove the general generally, one or many are not.  
8 All specials ar partakers of their general indifferently, without respect of more or less.  
9 For an Eagle is no rather nor no more a bird or a foul, than an Owl is, nor an Owl more or less than a Wren: but they and all other fowls equally and indifferently, are named and be in deed birds, without degree of more or less.    

Of the proper term. Chap. 5.  
1 What a property is, how many kinds of properties there be, what rules may be gathered of the property, for proof of a doubtful matter: look in the second book, where we entreated of a property, beginning at the 75. side, the fifth chapter, and you shall found that may suffice to serve the turn.  

The use of this place.  
2 Of that which is most properly called a property, necessary reasons are made, either to prove the kindred, or to disprove it.  
3 But of the other three kinds, the reasons are not of like force, which thing may well be seen by examples thus.  
4 Concerning that which is most properly called a property, this is a firm and good proof.  
5 Here is present that which is apt to laugh, therefore a man is here present.  
6 Or to disprove, here is not present that which is apt to laugh, therefore no man is here present.  
7 Thus it appeareth, that of such properties as this is, necessary reasons are gathered either to prove or disprove indifferently.  
8 Because the kindred and this kind of property are necessarily annexed one to another and are never severed asunder.  
9 Now properties which appertain to the first and third kind, they serve well to prove the kindred, but they serve not to disprove it.  
10 For it followeth well, one cunning in Physic is present: or one that is grey headed, is present: Ergo a man is present.  
11 But these sequels are nought, here is none that is cunning in Physic, Ergo here is no man.  
12 Or here is none grey headed for age, Ergo here is no man.  
13 For there are many men being neither cunning in Physic nor grey headed.  
14 But there is none either cunning in Physic or grey headed, but that he is a man.  
15 Because therefore these properties appertain to self things of one several kindred, it must needs be good in reason, that where the property is granted to be, there must be also the kindred.  
16 For that only in it the property hath his being.  
17 The second kind of property serveth to disprove the kindred: but it will not always of force serve to prove it.  
18 For this is a necessary reason, not two footed thing is present, therefore man is not present.  
19 But to prove a man present, it is not sufficient to say, that which hath two feet is present, for many things else besides man, have two feet.    

Of the whole and of his parts. Chapter. 6.  
1 The whole and the part, are like in some things to the general and the special, in so much that it may be said (after a sort) that the general is a whole to all his specials: and each special is a part and portion of his general, how be it in deed they differ much.  
2 For a whole and a part are self things: and self things are said but of one.  
3 A general and a special are common things: & common things are said of many.  
4 Further the general is affirmed of all his specials: each special bearing both the name and the say what of his general.  
5 The whole is not said of his parts, but standeth of them: neither do the parts admit the apt say what of the whole, though they (sometimes) have the same name that the whole hath.  
6 For though every part of a bone be called a been, and every part of a stone be named a stone, yet the sayewhat of the whole is one, and the saywhat of each part is another.  
7 Let that be taken for a whole, which is a self thing divided into sundry parts: and that for a part, which is a piece and portion of such a whole.  
8 The whole and the parts are respecting terms: for there is no whole, but in respect of parts, nor there can be no parts but in respect of a whole.  
9 Therefore in defining of the one, we must of force make mention of the other.  
10 Parts are thus divided: some are necessary parts, some are parts tending to profit, some to pleasure.  
11 Necessary parts are again thus divided.  
12 Some are so necessary that the whole can have no being without them: some are very necessary parts to the well being of an whole, and yet not so necessary but that it may have a being without them.  
13 The head, the neck, and the heart, are very necessary parts of a man, and so is the matter and the form of each whole thing, be it natural, or artificial: without these parts the whole can have no being at all.  
14 Hand, arm, foot, leg, and such like parts, are very necessary for man, if he shall live well: yet not so necessary to any, but that he may both be named a man, and be a man in deed without them.  
15 The form is more worthy than the matter.  
16 For when the form is achieved, the whole is finished, & the matter is brought to his appointed end, which else without form shall lie void of use, and come to no profit.  
17 This may be learned at a fond builder, who bestowing great cost in providing brick, timber, lime, clay, and other stuff to build an house, letteth all come to waste, afore he bring them in frame and add for me to his matter.  
18 Further, some parts are chief parts and of great importance, some are mean parts and of small value.  
19 One principal part, will weigh against a multitude of mean parts, and such as are of small weight and value.  

Examples of parts, proving, or disproving an whole.  
20 To prove thus: his coat is well made for the collar is well, the body is well, the fleves are well, and the pleates are all well.  
21 Again, to disprove on this sort: this house is not well builded, for the roof will not well avoid water, the walls stand not right up, neither is the foundation sure and fast.  
22 But if the case so stand that you cannot allege all, or many chief parts, yet allege one: for one principal part will serve for disprove or disprayfe of the whole.   

Examples of a whole proving or disproving the parts.  
23 To prove: this coat is well made, therefore the collar, body, sleeves, and the pleates thereof are well made too.  
24 To disprove: this ceate is not good, therefore of force either the stuff or the fashion thereof is not good.   

The use of these two places.  
25 Arguments hold of these places diversly, some being necessary, some provable, some variable, and that as well when the parts are alleged to prove or disprove the whole: as when the whole is alleged for proof or disproof of his parts.  
26 If all parts be recited either to prove or disprove: to praise or dispraise the whole, the argument is necessary: if many, it is probable: if one or a few, it is variable.  
27 For though one principal part be good and of force, to disprove or dispraise foe whole: yet one or few parts of small value are not.  
28 For if the head be nought, the whole body is nought too.  
29 But it followeth not, though some one, or some few pins in an house be rotten or ill driven, that the whole house should be said to be ill and nought therefore.  
30 One or many parts, whether they be principal or of small importance, are not always of force to prove or to praise a whole.  
31 For a song that standeth of four parts, that is to say of the base, the mean, the triple, and the contratenor, is not therefore fine and good, because two or three parts be excellently well song.  
32 For in such whole things as song and melody are, all the parts are necessarily required to be good, otherwise there shallbe a discord and a jar in the whole.  
33 Neither is it a good reason to say this image is well painted because the hair of the head and of the beard, the nails of the fingers and of the toes be lively expressed and set forth.  
34 For if many or one principal part be omitted, a let may be in it or them, why the sequel is not good.   

Rules belonging to an whole or to a part.  
35 Every whole is bigger than any one of his parts.  
36 A whole is equal to all his parts.  
37 One part is not equal in quantity nor comparable in worthiness with his whole.  
38 A corruptible part in time may be both afore and after his whole.  
39 As the timber and nails of a ship may have a being both afore the ship be made, and after it is taken asunder.    

Of the offsprings. Chap. 7.  
1 An offspring is properly taken, either for a noun adjective derived of a noun substantive: or for the adverb that groweth (as it were) and springeth thereof.  
2 As of virtue is derived a virtuous man, a virtuous thing, and virtuously: of health, healthful, and healthfully.  
3 But offsprings here are taken as well for the noun substantive, which is the original: as for the noun adjective and adverb which are the derivals.  
4 For arguments are gathered indifferently as well of the derivals to prove or disprove the original: as of the original to prove or disprove the derivals: both kinds properly appert●…ining to this place.  

How of springs are divided.  
5 Some are offsprings in meaning and not in name, as goodness and well: some in name and not in meaning, as sleep●… and sleepingly: some in both, as virtue and virtuously.   

Rules belonging to an Offspring.  
6 Offsprings have like sequel in reasoning.  
7 For as one original is affirmed or denied of another: so is one derivall, affirmed or denied of another.  
8 And contrariwise, as one deri●… all is affirmed or denied of another: so is one original said or not said of another.  
9 For example thus: if wealth be a goodness, them things procuring wealth are good things: & to live wealthily is to live well.  
10 Again, if to judge erroneously, be to judge falsely, then is error falsehood.  
11 Or if erroneously, be not falsely: then is not error falsehood.  
12 Erroneously to judge, & falsely to judge, differ in this, for that he that judgeth falsely, hath always a purpose to deceive: when as he that judgeth erroneously, swerveth from the truth, & yet not for lack of good will, which thing when it chanceth, the party can not properly be called a false judge, nor his error falsehood.  
13 This rule holdeth not in those offsprings which are ofspringsonly in name: for it followeth not, though sleep be a goodness, and though those things that procure sleep, be good things too, that therefore, that which is sleepingly done, should be said to be well done: neither is he properly to be called a sléeper, that sleepeth: but he that sleepeth to much.  
14 So that sleep, a sléeper, and sléepingly, being offsprings in term and name, and not in sense and meaning, follow not one upon another in reasoning, as the other two sorts of offsprings do.   

Example.  
15 I am an housewife, therefore huswifenes should appertain unto me.    

Of Quantity. Chap. 8.  
1 After that consideration is had of so much as pertaineth to the substance of a matter, it followeth next inorder, to consider that, which belongeth to the quantity thereof.  
2 Quantity consists in number, weight, and bigness.  
3 Of quantity we have entreated in one ●…rite book side. 20. chap. 3. unto the which place the diligent reader must have recourse, if he do not well remember what was said there.  
4 It shallbe sufficient for us to set down here certain examples, thereby to teach the ignorant how reasons are gathered of this place.  

Examples of reasons which consist in number.  
5 If you will build with speed, hire many labourers: for many hands make radde work.  
6 And again, strive not against many: for force lieth in a multitude.  
7 Item, pardon me this fault: it is the first.  
8 Item, forgive this second trespass: for twice is not often.  
9 The force of these and such like reasons consist in number.   

Examples of reasons which consist in bigness.  
10 My shoes are ever ill made: for they never fit me, but are always either to long, or to short, to wide, or to straight.  
11 These arguments are framed only of bigness.  
12 But sometimes bigness and number run jointly together, sometimes number and weight, as in these.  
13 It is past your handreache, being three yards high.  
14 Or it is more than you can span, being twelve intches broad.  
15 Or it is more than you can fathom, being a yard square.  
16 Or it far passeth your lift, being an hundredth weight.    

Of Quality. Chap. 9  
1 There is greater variety of the quality of each thing, then of the quantity.  
2 What quality is, and how it is divided you may learn in the. 4 Chap. of our first book.  
3 But here, in dividing of quality, I mind to follow that division, which experience hath taught to be most agreeable to common practice.  
4 For they that do thoroughly fift the quality of a thing, use to conunder.  
the Power thereof. Will Disposition Sensible qualities Affections Passions Shape  

Of Power.  
5 No deed is achieved, except power and will concur, and meet together: it either want, the work ceaseth.  
6 It is to be considered, whether the power lie in one, or in many: whether it be near or far of: what it can do by itself, and what, if it bejoined and coupled with others.   

How arguments hold of power or want of power.  
7 Arguments taken of the want of power, are good and necessary to disprove: for this reason is of force. He had no strength or power to do this deed: Ergo he did it not.  
8 But arguments grounded upon power, that he could do such a fact, and concluding thereupon that he did it, are not good: for many good men can do ill deeds, which they will not do: and ill men can do good deeds, which they do not.  
9 Though power be not sufficient to prove a fact to be done: yet is power profitable to persuade, and to exhort, that a thing may be done. And the reasons gathered thereof, are probable.  
10 For if you would persuade a man to take war, building, or any other enterprise in hand: your purpose shall be greatly furthered, if you prove that the matter once begon, may be well accomplished, either with ease or with honour.   

Of Will.  
11 Will is a desire of the mind, to do, to speak, or to think.   

How Will is divided.  
12 There is a good will, and an ill will.  
13 A good will in our english tongue, is not always taken for a will to work that which is good: but for a readiness, when the person is priest of himself, not needing any foreign occasion to prick him forward.  
14 An evil will is a will constrained, and urged by some outward means.  
15 The first is called a free-will: and the second, a forced will.   

The use of this place.  
16 If the will of the doer be forced, and not free, he loseth the praise of his well-doing in virtue, but not in art.  
17 For no deed can be good or virtuous on the doers behalf, except it be done upon a good intent: the intent can not be good, if the will be constrained.  
18 But in deeds that are wrought by art, we praise the cunning of the crafts man, nothing considering with what good will he wrought his work.  
19 If a man be constrained to do ill against his will, there is a double consideration to be had: one of the force, another of the harm.  
20 If the harm be small, and the force great, the party is to be held excused: but if the fact be heinous, no con●…raint can make the doer unblamable, much less if the force were small, or such as he might have withstand without any great peril.  
21 Though will be not sufficient to prove an act to be done: yet may will deserve praise or dispraise, even in them that want power to do good or ill.  
22 For this reason is not good, he would have done wrong, therefore he did wrong in deed.  
23 But these are good, he would fain do well, therefore he deserveth thanks: or he would fain do harm, therefore he deserveth blame.   

Of dispositions.  
24 Consider whether they be good or ill: and whether they be settled and rooted in the party, that he cannot soon leave them: or that they be subject to sudden change, and without continuance.  
25 They of the first sort serve to enlarge, or to increase a matter, either in praise of the good, or dispraise of the bad: they of the second sort, are rather fit to extenuate, then to amplify.  
26 Here we have to consider the manners of the party, his entertainment, the usage of himself, his virtues, his vices, his cunning, his knowledge, his ignorance, his craft, his sleight, his tricks, his knacks, his pranks, his touches. etc.   

Examples of disposition, or manners.  
27 Place not this fellow in any office: for he is negligent, and a riotous person.  
28 B●…ie not this gelding: for he is resty.  
29 Commit not your life into this physicians hands: for he is ignorant in his book, and lacketh experience.  
30 Say no wager upon the running of this greyhound: for he useth to lie off.   

Of sensible qualities.  
31 The use of this place is very common, and yieldeth many arguments, some gathered of the colour, which the eye seeth: some of the voice, which the ear heareth: some of the favour, which the nose smelleth: and some of the taste, which the tongue decerneth: some of hotness, coldness, moistness, dryness, hardness, softness. etc. which feeling judgeth.   

Examples.  
32 Take this clot, the colour is good.  
33 Choose this boy chorister, for his voice is sweet and pleasant.  
34 Get some green herbs and Mayfloures, for a good smell is comfortable.  
35 Dip your meat in vinegar, and it shall taste the better.  
36 This ground is waterish, therefore it is not good to be sown.   

Of affections.  
37 There are divers opinions concerning affections: some men hold, that all affections are evil, and that no good man will use or nourish any of them: some hold, that many of them are good, and that they are given of God unto man, for sundry good purposes.  
38 Doubtless mercy, pity, love, anger, spite, disdain, hope, affiance, hate, distrust, contempt, envy, malice, mirth, gladness, grief, and fear, etc. are often alleged as good matter to prove or disprove, to exhort, or dissuade.   

Examples of affections.  
39 I will not be his servant, he is too testy: he will not long devil in one opinion, for he is fickle headed: this bitch will not hunt, for she is proud.   

Of passions.  
40 Some take passions for any affection, be it great or small: but in our English speech we use this term, when we would express a vehement pang, either of the body, or of the mind.   

The use of this place.  
41 If a fault be committed, through any passion or pang, either of the mind or body, the pang shall excuse the fact, if the patient himself were no cause hereof at al.  
42 If he were some occasion, yet not the chief occasion thereof, than it shall extenuate the fact:  
43 But if he was the only cause, or the chief cause of his own malady: then the passion procureth to the party, neither pardon nor pity: for it is commonly and truly said: He that will kill when he is drunk, shall be hanged when he is sober.   

Examples of Passions.  
44 This man's deed of gift, is not good in the law: for he was straughte, and besides himself, when he sealed it.  
45 Take heed of that Dog, for he is mad.   

Of Form.  
46 Form, fashion, shape and making: are counted of some, as part of a thing, and so they be in very deed, if the matter be narrowly considered: howebéeit, a part (by the judgement of the common sort) is taken only for a bodied portion of a sole substance: and many reasons are gathered of the form of a thing, by them which neither think form or fashion any part at all.  
47 We will therefore make form a place by itself, following that in art, which we learn to be common in practice.  
48 Fairness and favour appertain to this place, they differ in this, that fairness ●…sisteth chief in colour, and favour in proportion.   

The division of form and fashion.  
49 There is a new fashion and an old fashion: a strange fashion, and an usual fashion: a trim fashion, and a rude fashion: a commodious fashion, and an unprofitable fashion. etc.   

Examples of Form.  
50 My young Lord will love my lady his wife right well: for she is both fair and well favoured.  
51 This horse and this greyhound can not choose but be good: there is such trim making in them both.    

Of the causes. Chap. 10.  
1 No man is said to know any thing thoroughly, afore he know the causes thereof.  
2 A cause is a mean, whereby any thing is made to have a being.  

The division of causes.  
3 There are four causes: the matter, the form, the workman, and the end. 
The 


1 Matter.  
2 Form.  
3 workman.  
4 End.      
4 Matter is the stuff, whereof a thing is made.  
5 Formeis the sh●…e and fashion, which added to the matter, maketh the thing perfect, and yieldeth both name and being thereunto.  
6 Woorkmen are doers, from whence moving first cometh.  
7 An end is the use of a thing that is made, causing the workman to take the enterprise in hand.  
8 Of this it is plain, that matter without form is unprofitable stuff: and that form is not added to the matter without a workman: nor that any thing worketh, except it be moved by some profitable end.  
9 Therefore do authors knit these four causes together, which knowledge are very profitable: and reasons are gathered of them very orderly.   

Examples of the causes.  
10 As if I say: My boots are good, for they keep out weet well: Mine argument is taken of the matter: for the cause is the goodness of the leather, whereof my boots are made:  
11 But if I say, I like my boots well, for they are fit for me, and well shapen: my reason is taken of the form, which consists in the fashion of the boot.  
12 If I say, My boots are well made: for he that made them is a cunning shoemaker: my reason taketh his force of the workman.  
13 If I say, I make my boots thus, for I mind to ride dry: my reason taketh his force of the end, which is the use, I purpose to have of my boots.  
14 Though form and matter may well for bréefenesse sake, be reckoned as parts, and so be referred to the first general place which we called substance, because the cause seemeth to be without the thing, where as these have their being in the thing: nay rather the thing itself is nothing else but the form and matter joined together, and taken as one: yet in common speech, we never seem otherwise to consider of a part, then as it is a bodied portion of some whole.  
15 Therefore have I made Matter and Form, places by themselves.  
16 If any man be contentious, and say, that it is but that, to teach one thing often: I answer, that it is no inconvenience, that one argument (upon sundry respects) be referred to sundry places.   

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Form.  
17 The matter may be good of a thing, though the form 〈◊〉 ill: as the gold in the ring may be good, and the fashion of the ring naught.  
18 Again, the form may be good, and the matter naught: as the shoe may be well made, and yet the leather keep out no water.  
19 So that nothing can be ill, whose form and matter are both good: nor nothing can be good, if either his matter or his form be ill.   

How workmen are divided.  
20 There are three kinds of workers: some things do work as nature teacheth them: some as reason guideth them: and some at adventure.  
21 The first worketh of necessity, the second of free-will, the third by chance.  
22 Workmen are also many sundry ways divided: for some do work things in common, and some do things alone: some work more in short time, and do it ill, and some work little in long time, and do it well: some work for pleasure, and some for profit: some of force, and some of free-will. etc.   

General rules belonging to workmen.  
23 When there are natural and necessary workmen, there must needs be necessary and natural works.  
24 And again, where the work is necessary, and natural, there the workman must be so too.  
25 One workman alone can not do a common work.  
26 He worketh fast enough, that worketh that well, which he doth.  
27 And he worketh overfasic, that doth any thing ill, or amiss.  
28 He worketh well, that worketh with advisement.  
29 And he oft faulteth in his work, that hasteth to much.  
30 He is a singular workman that will rid much in short time, and do it well withal.   

General rules and principles gathered of an end.  
31 If the end of a thing be good and lawful, then is the preparation, and all things tending to that end, lawful too.  
32 For if it be lawful to fight in defence of of a man's country, then is war, and the use of a man's weapon lawful:  
54 But if the end be unlawful, and ill, then are all things ill, and unlawful, that are appointed to that end.    

Of the Effect of things. Chap. 11.  
1 After we have searched out the causes of things, it behoveth us to consider their effect: which is nothing else, but the workman's deed.  

How works and effects are divided.  
2 Some works are done only with the body: some only with the mind: some by help of them both: some are works that tend to profit: some to pleasure: some are vain, tending to no good use at all: there is a long work, and a short work: a slow work, and a quick work, an ill work, and a good work. etc.   

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the work that is done.  
3 If the work be well done, the cost that is made thereupon, is well bestowed, and the workman deserveth his praise.  
4 If the work be not more worth, than the coast that is bestowed upon it, there is labour lost.  
5 That work is good, which commends the workman, and that a naughty work which putteth the doer to shame.  
6 The work of the mind in good things is always more excellent, than the work of the body: but in ill things, it is far worse.   

An example of an Effect.  
7 Fuchsius was a good Physician: for he hath done many notable cures.  
8 If you will set down this reason at large, do thus: 
Dari i 


Whosoever hath done many notable cures was a good Physician,  
But Fuchsius hath done many notable cures, therefore  
Fuchsius was a notable Physician.        

Of preparation. Chap. 12.  
1 As the efficient cause doth always respect an effect: so doth the end or final cause require a preparation.  
2 By preparation I understand not only the act of providing: but the things also that are prepared, as means to bring a purpose or devise to pass.  

How preparation is divided.  
3 Preparation is either great or small, sumptuous or mean: open, or secret: lawful or unlawful: to much, to little, or in a mean.   

Rules belonging to preparation.  
4 If preparation be made, there must needs be an end purposed: but contrariwise it followeth not, that if there be an end purposed, there should be by and by preparation made, because the end is in purpose, afore the means can be got, that are prepared for an end.  
5 Again, if preparation be not made▪ nor things provided that are necessarily required for an end: it followeth that the end is not obtained.   

An example of preparation.  
6 There will be war, for there is a general muster taken through the whole realm: a number of soldiers are priest into wages, the queens Ships furnished with men, victual, and shot: and great providing of armour.    

Of doing. Chap. 13.  
1 No doer, or efficient cause, can make any work: nor no preparation will serve to obtain any end without doing. Therefore in mine opinion, the storehouse of doing followeth right aptly in this place. For doing is the labour that is taken in making of a work, which bringeth the workman by means (as by steps and degrees) to his appointed end.  

How doings and labour are divided.  
2 Some doings leave a work which remaineth to be seen after the labour is ended, as the doing that is bestowed in building an house, leaveth an house to be viewed and seen when the work is finished.  
3 Some doings leave behind them no such work, as may be seen with eye, and yet a work too, as the travail and pain that is taken in getting of learning.  
4 Learning is the work that remaineth of the labour, which though it cannot be viewed by the eye, yet may it not therefore be called no work, or said not to remain.  
5 For learning remaineth in deed in the mind of man, and differeth much from the pain that was taken in getting of it.  
6 Again, there is a sharp labour, a soft labour, and a mean labour: the first serveth for speed, the second for ease, the third for continuance.   

Rules of Labour.  
7 That labour is well bestowed that bringeth forth a good work.  
8 That is lost labour, and in vain, that faileth of his appointed end.  
9 Haste in doing maketh waste in the work: as the common saying is: haste ●…keth waste.   

An example of Doing.  
10 These are ill men: for they swear, they dice, they ravish, they rob, they kill.    

Of Suffering, and of his division. Chapter. 14.  
1 We must consider, whether the suffering be in the body, in the mind, or in external things: as what loss the party hath sustained, what damage, what pain, what sickness, what grief. etc.  

An example of Suffering.  
2 He loveth me entirely: for he hath ventured his life, and sustained great displeasure for my sake.    

Of time and place. Chap. 15.  
1 What place and time are, look in our first book the. 24. side, and. 27. 28. verses.  
2 And for the division of time look. 41. ●…de, beginning at the. 6. verse, and so forth till you come to the twelfth.  
3 And to know how places are divided, look the. 43. side, and the. 22. verse.  

An example of place.  
4 I had no liberty this month to be where I would: for I was all this time in prison.   

An example of time.  
5 Aristotle was not king Alexander's schoolmaster: for Aristotle was dead afore king Alexander was born.   

Of the use of these two places.  
6 Necessary arguments may be gathered of time and place to disprove: but to prove or persuade, they are but probable.  
7 For this reason holdeth of force: the party that is accused, to have done this murder, was not in that place, where the fact was done, or had no being at that time: Ergo he is not guilty of that crime.  
8 Now if you reason, he was there at that time, and none seen there but he: it argueth a probability, that he should have been the doer, but it forceth no necessity.    

Of Order. Chap. 16.  
1 Order is a thing very necessary in all matters. For no army is of force, except the men be in array and in order: no house can stand except the timber and stone be laid in due order: no fire will burn, except the sticks and the coals lie in order: no writing can be red except the letters be set in order: no talk can be understanded, except the words be spoken in order: to conclude, nothing is weldon, that is not done in order: and nothing is ill done, but that is done out of order.  

The use of this place.  
2 This place yieldeth many probable arguments, to persuade or dissuade, to praise or dispraise.  
3 But necessary reasons to prove a fact to be done or not done, it yieldeth few.  
4 Though placing, of itself (narrowly sifted) admit no degrees of more or less: yet when the ordering of one thing is compared to the ordering of another, common speech useth to make degrees, and to say one thing is better ordered, than another.  
5 For we use to say: the army is in better order now, than it was afore: or the common weal is better governed now, than it hath been heretofore.   

An example of Order.  
6 The state of the common weal must needs soon change, all things are so farr●… out of order.    

Of Having. Chap. 17.  
1 Arguments are taken of Having, when the force of the reason dependeth of the Having of a thing, and not of the thing that is had or possessed.  
2 As when it is said: come not near this bear: for she hath whelps.  
3 The force of this reason lieth not in the whelp: but in having of a whelp.  
4 This place is very common, and arguments rise thereof very rifely.  
5 As if I say: he hath a weapon, take heed of him.  
6 Item, he hath good friends, much money, and an haughty stomach, therefore meddle not with him.  
7 Item, he hath corn of his own, what needs he to borrow, or buy in the market.   

Of Comers. Chap. 18.  
1 Comers are a general place, containing forecommers, after-comers, and withcommers.  
2 For some things coming afore hand, are signs and warnings of that which is to come: some things following after, are remembrances and monuments of that which hath been: and divers things using to chance at once, are witnesses and assurances one of another.  

Of the use of these places.  
3 Forecommers serve to prove that a thing shall be, or shall not be: and they appertain to the time to come.  
4 after-commers, serve to prove, that a thing hath been, or hath not been: and they appertain to the time past.  
5 Withcommers serve to prove that a thing is or is not: and they pertain to the time present.  
6 If the comers chance always after one sort: then are the reasons deduced thereof necessary.  
7 If they chance often, or for the more part: then are the arguments taken of them likely and probable.  
8 If they chance but seldom, and miss as often as they hit: then the reasons gathered of them are conjectural, and prognosticallike, as often false as true.   

Examples.  
9 Of forecommers we reason thus: when those things come to pass, then do these and these things follow: but these fore-things are come, therefore the after-comers will follow.  
10 For example thus: if it be a ruddy evening, & a grey morning, them the day following shallbe fair: but yesternight was ruddy, and this morning is grey, this days therefore will be fair.  
11 Of after-comers we reason thus: these things cannot be, but such and such things went before: seeing then the after-comers are past, the forecommers are passed also, as for example: this woman giveth milk, Ergo she hath had a child: for giving of milk cometh after having a child.  
12 Of withcommers thus: the sword was solemnly carried abroad in the court: Ergo. the queens majesty was there.  
13 Item, if you will have war, look for cost, trouble, and danger, for these are incident, and cleave to every person, that will live in wars.  
14 He hath a cough, a stitch, and an ague: Ergo, he hath the pl●…uresie.    

Of comparison. Chap. 19  
1 When two or more are compared together in any one thing: either they are equal, and of like force concerning the matter in which they are compared: or unequal, and of unlike force therein.  
2 If they be equal, and of like value: then they serve indifferently turn for turn, one to prove, or disprove another.  
3 But if one exceed another in any degree of worthiness: then the reasons that are taken of the likelier, hold well to disprove: and the reasons taken of the unliklier, hold well to prove: but contrariwise, the reasons are not good.  
4 For the likelier will not prove the unlikelier: nor the unlikelier will not prove the likelier.  
5 For it is no good reason to say, the lord of the soil may cell the wood of this Lordship, Ergo the tenants may cell it: or the tenants may not cell principal timber, Ergo, the Lord may not.  
6 Now the Lord is the likelier to make such a sale: and the tenants the unlikelier.  

Rules belonging to the equal.  
7 Among equal things this is a general rule, look what is good or lawful in one, the same shallbe good or lawful in another: and what is ill or unlawful in one, the same shallbe ill or unlawful in another.  
8 Item, look what one can or cannot: the rest in like manner can, or cannot: otherwise they are not equal.  
9 With thy equal thou shalt have equal law and portion: like labour, like wage: like pain, like reward: like fault, like punishment: and generally like requireth like.   

Rules of the likelier.  
10 That the likelier cannot, the unlikelier much less can.  
11 That will please the worthier, may content the meaner.  
12 Look what will not fit the likelier, the same will not fit the more unlike.   

Rules of the unlikelier.  
13 That which the unlikelier can compass, may be compassed of the likelier.  
14 Look what will serve the unlikelier, the same will serve the likelier.  
15 That which will not please the meaner, will ill please the better.  
16 They that take the likelier to be that which is more: and the unlikelier to be that which is less: and the aslyke to be that which is equal in quantity, and so term these places, places of the more, of the less, and of the equal, are foully deceived.  
17 For likelier, unlikelier, and aslike, consist in other things, as well as in quantity: whereas more, less, and equal, (if they be properly considered) consist only in quantity.  
18 Further, often times the argument that is taken of the likelier is grounded upon the lesser quantity, and that argument that is taken of the unlikelier, upon the greater quantity, which thing should never be, if their supposition were true.  
19 For if I say, two are likelier to speed then three, therefore send not three, but two:  
20 The reason is grounded upon two, the likelier to disprove three the unlikelier, yet are two in very deed the lesser number, and three the bigger.  
21 Therefore likelier and unlikelier, are not always more and less in respect of quantity, but likelier is that which is of more possibility in reason: and unlikelier that which is of less possibility, and that in any respect whatsoever.    

Of a similitude. Chap. 20.  
1 A similitude is properly no place but a kind of reasoning, when the liklines of one thing argueth (as it were by example) the like sequel in reason of another thing: for example sake, thus.  
2 As the free posting horse may not long together gallop upon the spur: so the sharp and pregnant wit, may not much without intermission, be forced to muse upon difficult and hard matters.  
3 Learned men in arguing, make small account of any similitude.  
4 For by a similitude you may as soon prove a wrong matter, as a right: yet do men of great judgement use it, but rather to persuade and lead the simple and the ignorant, then to force and overcome the witty adversary.  
5 For a good and a shamefast nature, yieldeth in that, which he seeth so lively expressed in another thing, that by no shift of reason, he can make any resistance.  
6 It is good for making or answering of a similitude, to learn wherein things agree or disagree.  
7 A similitude is well answered, when an unliklinesse is showed in that matter, wherein divers things were said to be like.   

Of Witnesses. Chap. 21.  
1 Witness is the word, writ, or deed of a credible person, proving a matter that lieth in doubt.  

How Witness is divided.  
2 The witnesses upon whose authoritis proofs are grounded, are either heavenly, earthly, or infernal.  
3 God's word, his wonders, his miracles, and his message, sent to men by angels, and Prophets, are alleged as heavenly witnesses:  
4 Law, custom, oath, bargain, writings, sayings, and so forth, are accounted as humane witnesses, and such as are taken of the credit of man:  
5 Conjuring, witchcraft, appearing of ghosts, oracles and answers of devils, are infernal and ungodly witnesses, used only of the wicked, and suffered of God for a punishment to deceive them, that will not believe the true means that god hath appointed.  
6 Witnesses are not so much found out by the art and cunning of the spokesman: as they do arise of the matter itself, and are ministered to him by the information of others.  
7 Therefore, art teacheth not so much to find out witnesses: as to urge them forceablely for prouse of the matter that lieth in question.    

Of Gaynsets. Chap. 22.  
1 I think it needless, here to repeat, how many kinds of gaynsettes there be: what each kind is, wherein they differ one from another: or what else hath been spoken of them in our former Books: because it may suffice the diligent reader, to be referred by our marginal note, to those places where these things are entreated of at large.  

Of respecting terms and yokefelowes.  
2 Respecting terms may well be named yokefelowes, for that they are knit, and coupled together with a certain band of society.  
3 For the master, and the servant: the parents, and the children: the goodman and the goodwife: the landlord, and the tenant: the guest, and the host: and all other respecting terms, are always coupled and joined together in some kind of fellowship.   

How reasons do hold of yokefelowes and respecting terms.  
4 When reasons are gathered of yokefelowes to prove the being, or not being the one of the other, they are necessary: but when they are taken of the duty and affection, that is or should be between them, then are they but probable.   

Examples.  
5 He is a father, therefore he hath a son: he is not my guest, therefore I am not his host: these and such like are necessary reasons.  
6 But if I say, the judge will take my part, for he is my friend: or if I say, he will judge against me, because he is my foe: or else my matter shall have good success in the law, for I pertain to the Court: these and such like reasons, take their force upon respect, and are but probable reasons, not necessary arguments, and such as hold of force.   

Of depriving terms.  
7 Natural power and want of natural power, compared together, and one proved or disproved by another, are taken for depriving terms.  
8 We use to reason upon them in this sort: he seeth, therefore he is not blind: or again, he is blind, therefore he seethe not.  
9 This kind of reasoning always followeth of force, that where the power is, there can not be the want: and where want is, there can not be the power.  
10 We may also reason upon the depriving terms, on this sort and manner.  
11 If lack of sight be a lack of some sense, then must sighed itself needs be a sense: or if sight itself be a sense, then must lack of sight, be a lack of sense too.  
12 Here is to be noted, that this place serveth as well to prove the want by the power: as contrariwise to prove the power by the want.  
13 Now for contraries this is to be noted: that arguments gathered of them, take their force, sometime of contrary terms, sometimes of contrary sayings.  
14 Contrary sayings are here taken not only for two general shewsayes, which differ in quality, and make no change at all, either of foreset or backset (as was said in 3. verse of the. 88. side) but also those are contrary sayings, which stand of contrary terms, and do appertain to contrary manners, be the sayings particular or general.   

How to decern contrary sayings, which are contrary by reason of terms, and not by reason of quality.  
15 When the foresette and backset of a shewesay, have either of them a contrary term, than those four contrary terms, may two several ways be coupled together, to make contrary sayings:  
16 Either when the forset is one in both the shewsayes, and the backsets be contraries: or else when the backsette is one, and the foresets contraries.  
17 Butt and if both the foreset and backset in two shewsayes be contrary each to other: then those sentences stand of contrary terms, but they are not contrary sayings: because such are of like juice in reason, neither is there any resistance in the sayings, but a contrariety in the terms.  
18 They that think this rule obscure and strange, may by this example that followeth and such like, make it to themselves familiar and plain: as thus,  
19 Virtue is worthy praise: the foreset of this shewsaye, hath vice to his contrary, and the backsette, hath blame. Now these four contrary terms, Virtue, vice, praise, and blame, are two several ways coupled together in shewesayes, to make contrary sayings.  
20 Either when the foreset remaineth one in both the shewsayes, the backsets being contraries: as, 
Virtue is 


worthy praise,  
worthy blame. or,     
Vice is 


worthy praise,  
worthy blame.      
Or else when the backset is one, and the foresets are contraries: as, Virtue is worthy praise. or, Vice Virtue is worthy blame. Vice  
21 Butt and if the foresaid four terms be coupled any third way together, to make two shewsayes: the shewsayes themselves shall not be contrary, though the terms whereof they stand be contrary, as they are compared one with another: For example thus: Virtue is worthy praise Vice blame. or, Virtue is worthy blame Vice praise.  
22 For the two first are both true and good: and the other two are both false and ill. Now for the two first, it is reason good enough, to say, they are both true and good, ergo, they are not contrary sayings. For one true saying is never contrary to an other true saying: nor one good thing, is never contrary to an other good thing.  
23 But for the two second sayings, it is no sufficient argument, to say, they are both false, or both ill, ergo, they are not contrary sayings: because an ill thing, may be contrary to a good thing, and to an ill thing too: and a false saying may be contrary, as well to a false saying as to a true. Therefore it behoveth to add this withal, that they are both of like choice, and may both at once fall to be in one man.  
24 For a man may both praise virtue & blame vice, and yet use therein no contrariety of speech at all, which thing could not be, if they were contraries in deed.   

Of the use of this place.  
25 Of this place we may gather both probable and necessary arguments, to prove or to disprove.  
26 For if I argue thus: Socrates is sick: Ergo he is not in health: or say, this line is not straight, Ergo it is crooked: the reasons are necessary, and do enforce the one a being, the other a not being.  
27 Butt and if I reason on this wise, and say, The law alloweth me to praise well doers, though I can not prove they did well, Ergo the law suffereth me likewise, to dispraise ill doers, though I want witness to prove they did ill: My reason may seem probable: for that it standeth with reason, that contrary manners should have contrary fame and report.  
28 Yet is it not necessary, seeing it doth not generally hold: neither is it lawful in a good common wealth: for one man alone without sufficient proof to dispraise, though to praise it be lawful, because there riseth no such strife about praise, as doth commonly about dispraise: therefore ●…or quietness sake, the law forbiddeth the one: and for an encouragement to well doing, it alloweth the other.   

Of those that are termed more than contraries.  
29 Arguments gathered of those which we term more than contraries, are always necessary, either to prove, or to disprove, taking their force, sometimes of the word, sometimes of the saying.  
30 Of the word, because the yeaword and nayeworde are of such property and force, that if one of them be said of any thing, the other can not be said of the same.  
31 And again, if the one be not, the other is: he therefore that proveth the one, doth consequentely disprove the other: and he that doth remove the one, enforceth the other.  
32 Of the saying, because that more than contrary sayings, are ever one true, and an other false,  
33 Therefore, if this saying (All fair women are good) be false: then this saying, (Some fair women are not good) must needs be true: and again, if this saying (some fair women are good) be true, then is this saying (no fair women are good) false.  
24 This place shall yield necessary arguments also of the word, when we change the terms, and argue thus: If man be a creature, then that which is no creature is no man: and again, if no creature be no man, then is every man a creature.  
25 This kind of arguing is always necessary, except the backset be a chanceable inbeer to the foreset, and then the argument is not necessary, because the chanceable inbéer may be said, and not said of his inholder: and therefore this reason holdeth not, man is just, Ergo he that is not just, is no man.  
26 Those arguments that drive men to an impossibility in reason, are commonly gathered of this place: and the rule whereupon they be grounded, is most certain, in so much that some authors labour to prove all principles by it, and makes it an only stay▪ why wranglers cannot proceed 〈◊〉 to an endless work.    

Of the differing term. Chap. 23.  
1 Things differ one from an o●…her by three several degrees: the first, is by kind: the second, by kindred: the third, by spec●…all being.  
2 Specials which are not comprised under one next general, differ in kind: as a man and an oak: for the next general 〈◊〉 man, is a wight: and the next general to an oak, is a tree: therefore a man and an Oak differ in kind, because they are contained under divers kinds, whereof one is not comprised of an other.  
3 Self things contained under divers kindreds, and also the kindreds themselves contained under one next kind, differ in kindred: As this horse and this ass: or an horse and an ass: for notwithstanding that these agree in their kind (by reason that each kind is indifferently said of things that are under it) yet notwithstanding they plainly differ in kindred, an horse and an ass being divers kindreds themselves: and this horse and this ass being self things contained under divers kindreds.  
4 divers self things contained under one lowest kindred, though they agree both in kind and in kindred: yet do they differ in special being: as john and William, this man and that man. For john is as well a man and a wight as William is: and William as well as john: so that they neither dissent in kindred nor in kind: nevertheless they descent much in special being: for one of them hath not the same special being that the other hath.  
5 Look how many ways there are for things to descent: and so many ways are there also for them to assent: for gaynsettes have one order and trade of learning.  
6 Things that descent in kind, descent also in kindred, and in special being: and things that agree in special being, agreed also in kindred, and in kind: But it followeth not that those things which descent in special being: should also descent in kindred, or in kind: nor that those things which agree in kind or in kindred, should therefore agree in special being. So that they descent most that differ in kind: and they agree nearest that agree in special being.  
7 When things upon divers respects are ryghtely said, either to agree, or disagree: then use this distinction of agreeing, or dissenting, as may best serve your present purpose.  

Of the use of this place.  
8 This place yieldeth necessary arguments to disprove, as when you argue and say: Yonder is a skarcrowe, and therefore no man: or an Horse, and then no Ass: Or it is William, and not john.  
9 These reasons and such like, are of force, because of things which descent in general or specal being, it cannot be, that one of them shiould be that thing, which an other of them is.  
10 But to prove this place, yieldeth no necessary arguments, except it be upon some granted supposition: as when it is suppos●…d and judged of the gaynesayers, that the thing whereabout they strive, is eythe●… an Horse or an Ass: then if one of the gaynsayers prove the thing in controversy, to be no horse: it followeth by force of the supposition granted, that it is an Ass.    

Of Division, the 24▪ Chap.  
1 That Division is a place by itself severed from other particular places, and that special Arguments are gathered thereof, it is manifest, in as much as certain general Rules for proof or disprou●…e of doubtful matters belong, unto it, which can not fitly be referred to any other particular place.  
2 We will therefore entreat of Division here among the places: And for that there is great and necessary use thereof, we will speak of it at large.  
3 For besides that it serveth for Invention, and finding out of Reasons to prove matters, the which lie in doubt: it hemmethe in the sp●…aker with certain lists and bounds, that he can not lightly digress from his purpose: it occasioneth the hearer to mark how every part of the Division is prosecuted and handled in order: it amplifyeth and serveth well to dilate and say forth a matter at large: It sharpeneth our memory, and makes us better able to call things too remembrance, by reason that in a Division things are laid forth by number and order: it lyghteneth our understanding, making an ●…asie and speedy entrance into the cause: Finally, an Oration without a division, may well be compared to a straggling Army: For as those men of war, be they never so expert o●… courageous of themselves, are of no force to give battle, whiles they wander out of battle array: even so, words and sentences be they never so apt, picked, or trim, are of no strength to persuade, when they are uttered without a division, cast (as it were) on heaps, without order, and tending to no special issue.  

How division is divided.  
4 There is a division of matter: and a division of words.  
5 Matter is divided, when a discourse is reduced and brought unto certain special points.  
6 The division of words, is three ways considered: when a word of double understanding is divided into his several significations: or when an whole is divided into his parts: or else when a general is divided into his specials.  
7 Here note, that though every one of these four ways be in common speech named and taken for a division, yet for learning sake, and to make a diversity amongst them, each one hath his several and propr●… name. The first being called an ordering of the cause: the second, a distinction of words: the third, a parting of an wholé: and the fourth, a dividing of a general.  
8 Division differeth from partition, for that in a division, the general is always verified of his specials: where as in a partition the whole is not truly said of his parts. Distinction differeth from them both: for they divide matter, and it divideth words or terms only. The ordering of the cause differeth from them three: for it entreateth of compounded matter: and they of things, as they are considered without composition not coupled together in any perfect sentence.   

Rules belonging to this place.  
9 A division aught to be plain, perfect, and brief.  
10 For plainness, you ought to seek usual terms, and to avoid borrowed speech as much as conveniently you can.  
11 For perfectness, you must see that there be in the membres, neither too much, nor too little: that is to say, that nothing be reckoned among the membres, which is not comprised in the whole: nor any thing contained of the whole, which is not set forth among the membres: that one member be not comprehended of an other member: nor that any one thing be found to be under divers membres.  
12 And for briefness, ye must bring your Division into as small a compass as may be: yet so, that if you can not come to your purpose by your first division: you ef●…soone divide the parts, and that so oft as need shall require: But here you must beware, that ye do not evercharge or confound the memory of your hearers, with many or confused divisions.   

Examples.  
13 Your sugared talk wanteth one chief point of cunning. For in many of your Orations, either ye make an unperfect D●…uisyon: or else ye use too make none at all.  
14 The matter we strive for, is contained under the first part of the Division: therefore you do wrong (the Division being good) to say, that it is contained under the second part.  
15 This thing is within the compass of the principal: therefore of force it must either be a member thereof: Or at the least be contained under one of the members.    

Of Proportion. Chap. 25.  
1 There are three sundry kinds of proportions, taking their names of three several arts, Arithmetical, Musical, and Geometrical.  
2 As for the two first, they serve nothing for our purpose, because no good reasons can be gathered of them: we will therefore entreat only of the third:  
3 Which Aristotle briefly defineth thus, expressing it to be an equality of reason: But to make this sayewhat somewhat plain to them that are ignorant in Geometry, It is to be noted: that Geometrical proportion standeth always in four terms at the lest: whereof the first hath that respect to the second, that the third hath to the fourth.  
4 As. 2. 4. 8. 16. for look what respect two beareth to four: and the same respect eight beareth to sixteen, either of them being an half part of that number, where unto they are referred.  
5 Now then, he that will be perfect in Geometrical proportion, must first learn the five general respects that all numbers bear one to another, and how by the knowledge of these five general respects, he may come to know the name and value of all particular respects what soever: which thing you may do with small pain, thus:  
6 Every bigger number compared to a lesser number, doth either, 1, contain it certain times exactly, and neither more nor less: 2, or else but once and one part more: 3, or else once and many parts more: 4, or else many times and one part more: 5, or else at the utmost it containeth it many times, and many parts m●…e.  
7 The first is called manifold: the second an whole with one part more: the third, an whole with many parts more: the fourth manifold with one part more: and the fift is termed, manifold with many parts m●…e.  
8 Again, divide these general respects into certain of their several kinds, and you shall see, as it were, how to find out the proper name of any respect whatsoever: I mean of two unequal numbers compared together.  
9 manifold is divided into twofold as 2 to 1 or as 4 to 2 threefold 3 1 6 2 fourfold etc. 4 1 8 2  
10 Here may you see, that four hath that respect unto two, that two hath to one: and that the proper name of this respect is termed twofold.  
11 Again that six do bear themselves so to two, as three do to one: and that the special name of this respect is called threefold.  
12 And also that eight do so often times force two, as four do one: and that their particular respect is fourfold.  
13 Now then if I argue and say that six must yield three, for four do yield two: mine argument taketh his force of the rule of proportion: because six bear that equality in reason to three, that four do to two.  
14 And so of any four numbers in all these examples, which stand in rue one against another: you may gather necessary reasons as well to prove as to disprove.  
15 And consequently thus may you do, with any other four things whatsoever, when two, to two, bear like equality of reason each to other.  
16 An whole with one part more is divided into an whole with an half part as 3 to 2 or as 6 to 4 third part 4 3 8 6 fourth part etc. 5 4 10 8  
17 An whole with many parts m●…e, is divided into an whole with twothird pts as 5 to 3 or as 10 to 6 threfourt pts 7 4 14 8 fourfift parts etc. 9 5 18 10  
18 Manifold with one part more, is divided 
into 


twofold with a half part more as 5 to 2 or as 10 to 4 third part more 7 3 14 6 fourth part more etc. 9 4 18 8  
threefold with a half part more as 7 to 2 or as 14 to 4 third part more 10 3 20 6 fourth part more etc. 13 4 26 8  
fourfold with a etc. half part more as 9 to 2 or as 18 to 4 third part more 13 3 26 6 fourth part more etc. 17 4 34 8      
19 Manifold with many parts more, is divided 
into 


twofold with two third parts more as 8 to 3 or as 16 to 6 three fourth parts more 11 4 22 8 four fift parts more etc. 14 5 28 10  
threefold with two third parts more as 11 to 3 or as 22 to 6 three fourth parts more 15 4 30 8 four fift parts more etc. 19 5 38 10  
fourfold with two third parts more as 14 to 3 or as 28 to 6 three fourth parts more 19 4 38 8 four fift parts more etc. 24 5 48 10      
20 I have set forth these particular respects, for that by them, and such like, you may solute all such questions, as are wrought in Arithmetic by the rule of three, or as some do term it, by the golden rul●…: which in very deed is the rule of proportion.  
21 But there men are taught to work by multiplication and division, which make the matter hard to them, that are ignorant in that art, and hide (as it were) the ground and cause, why upon such working it should so fall forth: but here ye shall at the first sight, d●…cyde the matter, perceiving withal the reason thereof.  
22 For if it be demanded and said. ii●…. s in one year do gain xv●…. s. how many shillings shall. by. s. gain: you may answer and say: seeing. ii●…. s. are five times in. xv●…. s. with two third parts more, I know that the sum demanded must contain. by. shillings five times and two third parts more of. by. s. now then. xxxv. s. containing. by. s. five times, and fourteen groats being two third parts of. by. s: I see plainly that. by. s. do gain in one year. xxxix. s. vi●…. 〈◊〉. and that the reason thereof is, for that. v●…. s. are just, so oft in. xxxix. s. vi●…. d. as. ii●…. s. are in. xv●…. s.   

A general lesson for Invention, teaching the use of our third and fourth book. Chap. 26.  
1 Aristotle in showing a mean how to find the proving term, maketh but three places, the place of the foreset, the place of the backset, and the place of the biset. 
The place of the 


Foreset  
Backset  
Biset.      
2 Foresets are called in Latin Anteceilentia, because they come always in a sentence afore the verb: backsets are termed Consequentia, because they come after: bisets are named in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they are never knit together in a yeasay: but always sundered by a naysay.  
3 Doubtless●… this division is very trim and natural: ●…or when the proving term is taken in the foresayes with the general or special term, it is either coupled to them by a yeasaye, or severed from them by a naysay.  
4 If it be coupled to them in a yeasaye, it is either placed afore or after the verb: if it be placed afore, it beareth the name of a ●…oreset: if it be set after the verb, then ●…oth it take the name of a backset: but if it be sundered from them by a naisay, then is it termed a biset, whether it be placed afore or after.  
5 So that the proving term, compared eith●…r to the general term, or the special term, must needs bear one of these three general respects: that is either to be a foreset, a backset, or a biset.  
6 And because the proving term is repeated in every reason by rule, twice, it followeth that it must always bear a double respect, one to the general term, and another to the special term, these two terms being ever extant, and plain to be since in the question itself.  
7 This thing is set forth in our third book, both by rules and examples, and that both plainly, and at large: because it is a thing most necessary for a reasoner to be ●…nning and expert in.  
8 Thus you must ever mark, that where a reason by rule standeth but of three terms, two of them are ever contained in the conclusion, and therefore ●…uident to be seen in the question at the first, the third term is that which we call the proving term, & which we use as a mean, whereby to conclude the matter that lieth in question, and so bring our purpose to pass.  
9 Now, how the proving term●… must lie to the other two terms, that the question in controversy may be concluded you must learn by the fouretene seats set forth at large in our third book, considering with yourself, what manner of shewsay the question doth contain, and in how many particular seats, the same may b●… concluded, and so shall you plainly learn the double respect, that the proving term must bear to the other two terms, I mean the general term, and the special term.  
10 This done, you must draw your qu●…stion through the places, that is to say, ye must draw the words of your question through the plac●…s, and when you found any word in any particular place, which beareth that respect to the general and special term, that the rules of the third book require, know you of a certainty, that that is the proving term, & the means whereby you may work your feat.  
11 So that you must con by heart, and have on your finger's ends, the fourteen seats expressed in our third book: and the 44. particular places set forth in this our fourth book▪ I think it good to name and order them thus: 

1 Saywhat. Substance. 2 General term. 3 Special term. 4 Property. 5 Whole. 6 Parts. 7 Offspring.  
8 Number. Quantity. 9 Weight. 10 Bigness.  
11 Power. Quality. 12 Will. 13 Dispositions. 14 Qualities perceived by sense. 15 Affections. 16 Passions. 17 Form.  
18 Matter, or stuff. Causes. 19 Form. 20 Workman, or doer. 21 End.  
22 Effect, or work.  
23 Preparation and means to obtain an end.  
24 Doing.  
25 Suffering.  
26 Time.  
27 Place.  
28 Order.  
29 Having.  
30 Forecommers. Comers. 31 Aftercommers. 32 Withcommers  
33 Likelier.  
34 Unlikelier.  
35 Aslike.  
36 Similitude.  
37 Witnesses.  
38 Respecting terms, or yokefelowes Gainset●…. 39 Depriving terms 40 Contraries 41 Moore than contraries, or denying terms.  
42 Differing terms.  
43 Division.  
44 Proportion.     

How doubtful Questions and demands are to be handled. Chap. 27.  
1 Now that we have sufficiently entreated of words, of sentences, of reasons, and of the places: it remaineth that we also entreat of a probable demand, showing an easy trade and way, how doubt●…ll questions are to be discussed.  

What a Question or demand is.  
2 A question or a demand is a shewsaye, requiring a yea, or a nay: as, do fish breathe in the waters, or no?  
3 If you answer this demand, and make your choice, saying: either that fish do take breath under the water: or that they do not: you make of a question a shewsaye.  
4 But if you proceed further, and add a reason why you so say, in concluding of     

Faults escaped.  

Fol. 60. lin. 9 for chap. 14. read chapter. 15.  
Fol. 82. chap. 10. here note that the. 11. &. 12. chapters would have been placed afore the. 10.  
Fol. 84. 1. the first, read of the first: And again in the same verse is of, strike out of.  
Fol. 92. lin. 14. smlal, read small.  
Fol. 98. lin. 11. for where, strike out for.  

Fol. 142. in place of 


13 forecommers,  
14 after-comers,  
15 withcommers.      
they would have been set thus, 13 comers 1 forecommers 2 after-comers, 3 withcommers.  
Fol. 158. lin. 25. provable, read probable.  
Fol. 176. lin. 9 which know, read which foreknow.    

¶ A note to understand the meaning of new devised Terms.  
first consider the parts of each compounded term: then turn to that place in our Book, which the two numbers do point forth, that are set upon the word: And if thou be a Latiniste, take also that help, which the Latin term doth yield.  

Altering. 62. 19 alteratio.  
a Bounder. 20. 3. so called, for that it pointeth forth the utmost reach of any thing, terminus.  
a Backsette. 71. 1. praedicatum, consequens, attributum.  
a Begetting or an engendering, or a creating 60. 2 generatio, o●…tus.  
Contraries. 70. 30. &. 88 3. contraria, adversa.  
Corrupting. 60. 3. corruptio, interitus.  
Depriving terms. 54. 6. privativa.  
Denying terms. 54. 7. contradictoria, negantia.  
Difference. 80. 1. differentia.  
Diminishing. 62. 18. diminutio.  
the Decerning part. 138. 4. judicium.  
an Endsay. 103. 3. Conclusio. And after this latin word, called a Conclusion. I call it an Endsaye, because it is a saying that maketh an end of a reason.  
a Foreset 7. 11. Subiectum, antecedens.  
Foresayes. 103. 3. praemissae.  
a Grounded disposition. 30. 22. habitus.  
Gaynsets. 53. 3. opposita, contraria.  
the General term. 104. 9 maius extremum, maior terminus.  
an Having. 45. 5. habitus.  
an Inholder. 4. 19 Subiectum.  
an Inbeer. 4. 19 Accidens. It may be called also an Indweller, for that it rests and dwelleth (as it were) in an other.  
an Increasing. 62. 18. augmentatio.  
an Ifsaye. 93▪ 5. propositio conditionalis.  
a Kind. 78. 1. genus.  
a Kindred. 77. 5. species, forma.  
Lykesounding words. 2. 8. aequivoca, so termed, because in name and sound, they are like, though they have sundry meanyngs.  
Moore than contrary sayings. 89. 5. propositiones contradictoriae, so called, for that there is greater repugnancy in them, then in contrary sayings.  
Moving. 60. 1. motus.  
a Naysay. 84. 4. 5. negatio.  
Offsprings. 161. 1. coniugata denominativa.  
an Ouershew. 22. 17. superficies. so called, because it doth show the utmost face, and view of a bodied thing.  
Playnmeaning words. 3. 16. univoca.  
a Placing. 44. 1. situs.  
a Property. 75. 1. proprium.  
a Parting shewesaye. 94. 10. propositio disiunctiva.  
Preambles. 95. 1. modi.  
The Proving term. 104. 11. medium.  
Respecting terms, which may also be called yokefelowes. 63. 3. relata, relativa, ad aliquid.  
a Reason by example. 100 2. Inductio.  
a Reason by rule. 100 ratiocinatio.  
a Rank. 106. 8. figura. 2.  
a Saywhat. 73. 1. definitio. corruptly called a definition: but for that it is a saying which telleth what a thing is, it may more aptly be called a saywhat.  
a Self thing, or a sole thing. 5. 24. &. 72. 2. Individuum.  
Surmounting generals. 49. 8. transcendentia.  
a Storehouse. 7. 38. praedicamentum, attributum.  
the Special term. 104. 10. minus extremum, minor terminus.  
a Seat. 106. 9 modus.  
Want of natural power, commonly called privation. 27. 8. privatio.  
a Wavering disposition. 31. 23. dispositio.  
a Wight. 146. 13. animal.  
Witcraf●…. 1. 1. virtus vel ratio disserendi If those names be always accounted the best, which do most plainly teach the hearer the meaning of the thing, that they are appointed to express: doubtless neither Logic, nor Dialect can be thought so fit an English word to express and set forth the Art of reason by, as Witcraft is, seeing that Wit in our mother tongue is often taken for reason: and craft is the ancient English word, whereby we have used to express an Art: which two words knit together in Witcrafte, do●… signify the Art that teacheth wit and reason. And why should handcrafte and witchcraft be good english names? and Starcraft and Witcrafte be none? the simples being known, and the composition like.  

a Yeasaye. 84. 


4. affirmatio.  
5.        

¶ Imprinted at London by Henry Bynneman, dwelling in Knightriders street, at the sign of the mermaid. ANNO. 1573.  
And are to be sold at his Shop at the North-west door of Paul's Church.