SOLON HIS FOLLY, OR A politic DISCOURSE, TOUCHING THE Reformation of commonweals conquered, declined or corrupted. BY RICHARD BEACON GENT. STUDENT OF GRAY'S INN, AND SOMEtimes her majesties Attorney of the province of Monster in Ireland.  
AT OXFORD, Printed by JOSEPH BARNES, Printer to the University. Anno Domini, 1594.   

TO HER MOST SACRED MAJESTY.  
IF all the acts and monuments of former ages, most mighty and renowned Queen, and Empress, which might recommend this action of reformation unto all posterities, were committed to oblivion, yet the records and monuments of your majesties most happy government, may sufficiently revive the same: 
The act of attainder of Shane Oneile, Ann. 11. Elizab.  where it is said, that your Highness hath achieved unto that which is most rightly termed the greatest magnificence of a Prince, which doth not only consist in high blood, haughty progeny, abundance of private riches and substance, wherewith your Majesty is every way plentifully adorned, but it resteth chiefly in populous and well governed regions, & in beautiful Cities and Towns; all which being impaired in your Realm of Ireland, by the iniquity of former times, now as well the one as the other, by your majesties most godly and careful course of government, are recontinued, amended, and augmented. What more? Have you not reform all exactions grievous unto that people? Have you not reform that horrible and most detestable custom of Coiney and Livery, that fretter of the people's lives and substance, that Nurse and teat which sometimes gave suck and nutriment unto all disobedience, rebellions, enormities, vices and iniquities of that Realm, over foul and filthy here to be expressed? Have you not in place of sorrow, famine, howling, and cursing, brought joy, jollity, plenty, and every where blessings of so gracious a Queen? Have you not reform that dangerous custom of captainship, which by factions did dismember the state of Ireland? 
Anno. 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fo. 168.  for all which if we should be found unthankful, yet the statutes and records of that land, would witness the same against us. Great is the honour which is due unto Robert Fitz Stevens, which first opened the way of Ireland to the Earl of Stranguile: and great is the honour due unto the Earl, which opened the same unto Henry the King: & great is the honour which is due unto the King, which opened the way unto john his Son greatly is he to be praised, that first so boldly began; and worthy of greater praise is he, that after the beginning so nobly came to execute the thing so well begun; but most of all he is to be praised, that shall perfect and finish the same; which praise by God's divine providence is light on your Majesty; 
Anno. 11. Elizab.  for so the subject of Ireland in the act of Attainder of Shane Oneile doth liberally confess: therefore go forward Brutus, for thy glory in reforming, is far greater than the glory of Romulus in building and instituting of the city of Rome. All nations with the Romans' shall honour your presence, as another Time-sitheus, for reforming and restraining the Lyparians from their accustomed robberies and spoils; all nations shall rightly honour you with the Ladies of Rome, which sometimes offered their jewels to be sold for the furtherance of public services; for huge be the charges already employed by your Majesty, for bringing to pass so great things tending to the sound & universal reformation of this your Realm of Ireland, 
Act of subsidy Ann. 11. cap. 1. fol. 148.  as in the act of subsidy more at large may appear. What further honour now remaineth due unto your Majesty, for the accomplishing of so great & worthy actions, if not that which was sometimes given unto janus? for that you have changed the life of man which before your time was rude, cruel, and wild, in Ireland, and brought it for the most part to be obedient, gentle, and civil, in such sort as we may truly say with the subject of Ireland, this is the favour which your Majesty hath found in the sight of God to augment, strengthen, and honour your imperial crown of England, by the thorough reformation of this your Realm of Ireland. All which considering with myself, I could not suffer so honourable actions to be buried in oblivion, without leaving some special remembrance to all posterities, but have made this plat & counterfeit, the which I here present unto your majesties sacred hands, in base colours than princes do usually behold, or so weighty matters may require: but I hope that your majesties accustomed clemency will impute this to Solon his folly and lunacy, which now for his boldness craveth pardon, rather than commendation.  
Your sacred Majesties most humble and loyal subject RICHARD BEACON.   

The Author to the Reader,  
GENTLE Reader, with the unskilful archers of our times, I did first aim and shoot at the public good and profit, according to the trust reposed in me, and now as one that hath lost his arrow, and miss his mark, I have at all adventures discharged the second time, to the end that my second labours may draw home my first losses, if my hand be fortunate to pierce the secret parts of thy tender and kind affections, and move in thee a friendly acceptance of these my rude labours; if not, look no more for my return to accompany the pleasant fields, and meadows, for henceforth I take up my habitation amidst the rocks and deserts, where my arrows may not pierce, nor the strength of my bow withstand the bitter winds, and the hard and hoary frosts, where I shall no more play the fool with Solon in the marketplace, but the wild man in the deserts. But if thou shalt vouchsafe to recall so unskilful an archer again into the fields, I may perhaps win a bet, that shall pay for the loss of a rubber. Receive then, Solon his folly, not as a testimony of his skill, but rather of the goodwill he beareth unto thee, and his country, whereof if thou shalt make acceptance, the same is thy honour, and not his: which with thy bounty and goodness, hast now overcome as well the giver, as the gift. But if thou shalt censure it by his own proper worth, he hath foretold thee the value thereof, and before thy face hath now weighed the same in equal balance, with Solon his folly, but not with his wisdom.   

The book unto the Reader.  
SITH Circe at the instance of Ulysses hath once again granted unto dumb creatures liberty of speech, I may not but complain, for that she hath brought us from our former rest & silence, now to speak before that wise Ulysses, who having not tasted of the sweetness and pleasure of this our solitary life, since which time Circe first changed us Grecians into the habit of mute and dumb creatures, may fortune to advance his wisdom, and to hold our former silence and rest as contemptible. And again of the other side, we being long deprived of the use and art of subtle speaking, shall much discontent wise Ulysses, with our homely discourses. But O Circe, hath the love of Ulysses, and the country of Greece, drawn thee unto this indignation against us, as with Epaminondas, naked and unarmed, I must oppose myself against the scorns and reproaches of all ages, as against a Grecian army? And with the fond lover in Petrarke must thou of force make me a sorrowful minister thereof? And with the silly birds fast tied and bound, must I represent the face of thy loving thoughts? Then what comfort remaineth, If I may not say with them, though here we remain fast tied and bound, subject to all scorns and reproaches, and bereft of our former liberty and delights, yet this one joy resteth, that the Author of these our Calamities, is fallen more deeply than ourselves therein, in such sort as with us he must taste the bitterness of disdain and contempt, with the which comfort, I here present myself unto your most friendly view, hoping that this my naked and innocent simplicity shall have your leave if not your liking.   

In reformatam ornatissimi Beaconi Rempub: seu simulatam Solonis Insaniam, Carmen.  
INsidias fugiens, & laetum caede tyrannum,  
Brutus, nobilium gloria prima patrum,  
Prudens desipuit; quantum O fuit utile Brute  
Desipere, ingenio qui periturus erat.  
Crede mihi gratus furor est, & amabilis error,  
Vt teipsum serves negligere ingenium.  
Insignem simili fama est usum arte Solonem,  
Amissam patriae dum Salamina petit.  
Illum quip furor, praecepsque insania mentis,  
Effrenis rabies, & vagus error agunt:  
Illi barba impexa, comae sine lege fluentes,  
Et loca sola placent, & sine teste nemus.  
Sic ambo insani sunt, sed cum dispare laud,  
Hic furit, ut scipsum servet, & hic patriam.  
Robertus Wright Bacc: Theol.   

Viro verè politico, civiue patriae benevolentissimo, Richardo Beacono Salutem.  
QValis in Euboico Salamis fruit Insula ponto,  
Quâ freta vicinas interlabuntur Athenas:  
Talis ad occiduum, pelagi propè marmora, Solem,  
Agnovit (Regina) tuos Hybernia fasces.  
Cincta mari Salamis, cincta est Hybernia utrisque,  
Ardua per medios consurgunt maenia fluctus.  
Quàm bene munitum, fati haud ignara futuri  
Composuit natura locum, tàm docta tueri  
Si foret, & dubijs si consulat Anglia rebus;  
Non te Hispane ferox, populi praedator Eöi,  
Dira per insolitos minitantem praelia motus,  
Non lectos iuvenes, non robora gentis Iberae,  
Non volucrem in tumido salientem gurgite pinum,  
Fluctus cum gemitu, ventosque labore prementem,  
Hâc primùm attonitus spectaverat Anglus in era.  
Nunc ubi quisque sibi sapere, & succurrere malit,  
Quàm patriae, videatque aequis securus ocelli●  
Labentem, & valido tibicine sustentandam,  
Prona ruit tacito sensim respublica casis.  
At tibi pro meritis tantis, pro tam benè factis,  
Proque hoc in patriam officio, pietate, fideque  
Contingat (Beacone) decus post fata perenne.  
johannes Budden Magist. Artium.   
A BOOK ENTITLED, SOLON his folly and lunacy, made for the better reformation of commonweals, conquered, declined or corrupted, by R. B.  
EPIMENIDES PHAESTIAN. 
Well met good Sir Pisistratus, in this holy place of the temple of Venus, where though the sacrifices be finished, yet notwithstanding your devotion is highly to be commended.  Pisistratus. 
You also are happily well saluted right wise and famous Epimenides, and this devotion which you have friendly now commended, is but a duty first unto the Gods, and next unto my friends, amongst whom I enumber you not the least.  Ep: 
I am the least in power I must confess, that is worthy of Pisistratus, but not in goodwill: but what matter of importance hath caused your arrival so unexpected upon this coast and haven?  Pisistratus. 
We lead here a strong army by the commandment of the council of Athens unto Salamina, for the better repossessing and reforming thereof.  Ep: 
What? contrary to their former decrees and proclamations, which were so straight, and that upon pain of death, that no Citizen of Athens should be so hardy, as once to move the question to the counsel of the City, for the repossessing and reforming of Salamina?  Pisistratus. 
Yes verily: for when the Athenians did once behold that their long and troublesome wars, the which they had now sustained against the Megarians, for the repossessing and reforming of Salamina did arise unto them, not from the nature of the people, nor from the difficulty of that action, but rather that they received all their advertisementes for the advauncement of those affairs, from such as gave counsel therein, more for their private profit then for the public good, but chiefly for that sundry governoures there placed, were found either negligent, or ignorant in the managing of public affairs, they willingly revoked their public proclamations, and made choice of Solon, a most wise and expert governor for leading and conducting their armies, now here landed for the repossessing and reforming of Salamina.  Ep: 
But who persuaded this first unto the Counsel of Athens?  Pisistrat: 
Solon that faithful counsellor of Athens.  Ep: 
But how durst Solon the wise offend their public laws and proclamations?  Pisistrat: 
Solon holding it for an open shame the which would be left unto all posterities, if the City of Athens should not be able to repossess and reform Salamina, now commanding the most parts of Greece, feigned himself to be out of his wits, and caused it to be given out that Solon was become a fool: and soon after on a day, clothed with the habit, gesture, and countenance of a fool or man possessed with lunacy, he ran suddenly out of his house with a garland on his head unto the market place, where the people straight swarmed like bees about him, and raising himself upon the stone where all proclamations were made, did so effectually persuade the repossessing of Salamina unto the people, as what with the weight of his reasons, and the laud and praise every where spread by his friends of his proceeding therein, their former proclamations were revoked, & the wars for the repossessing and reforming of Salamina with greater fury than before were followed, they giving unto Solon as I said before, the leading of the army, and the whole managing of that action.  Ep: 
After this manner did Brutus by a feigned frency and lunacy, not only reform the mighty City of Rome, but wisely acquitted himself thereby, of the suspicion and jealousy of Tarquin, by the which manner of proceeding, he delivered as well the City of Rome, as his own person from peril & danger, so as this common proverb did first arise, Simulare stultitiam nonnunquam sapientis est. But where remaineth Solon my dear and familiar friend, that I may salute him, and give him the best comfort I may, in this worthy action of reformation?  Pisistrat. 
He is newly landed with his whole army, and hath now for his better recreation withdrawn himself into a pleasant and solitary garden near unto the temple of Venus, whereunto if your leisure serve, I will readily conduct you.  Ep: 
I readily follow you.  Pisistratus. 
Sir I go before as the best guide, and not the best man, and behold Solon in the most solitary place of the garden.  Solon. 
Thrice welcome my dear and familiar friend Epimenides, behold, this solitary and pleasant place, as also the times, hath even newly conspired with my thoughts and desires to impose a great and weighty labour upon you.  Ep: 
No labour may be thought ever so great as shall exceed the greatness of my goodwill I bear unto Solon. But what may the same be? Tell it unto me.  Solon. 
As you have of late most friendly lent unto me, your faithful council, and best advice for the reformation of the City of Athens, greatly to the advancement of that estate, in like manner now I am earnestly to entreat your most friendly advise for the better reformation of Salamina.  Ep: 
This labour and travel▪ I must confess is due unto Solon, if there wanted not wisdom, which should give strength for the performance thereof: but I have chosen at this time, for our old familiarity and friendship, to give you just cause rather to reprehend my skill, then to accuse any part of that office and duty, which in the highest manner belongeth unto Solon; so as when the fault appeareth, you shall acknowledge the same to be imposed by yourself, and not received by me without your commandment.  Solon. 
Then friendly Epimenides, before we enter into this large discourse for the reformation of Salamina, I will declare unto you a dream, which this last night amazed my thoughts.  Ep: 
I pray thee tell it unto me.  Solon. 
This night I seemed to behold fair Diana with a beautiful Dove glistering like gold, placed upon her shoulder, sliding and wavering every where, in such sort, as it seemed to me to be in great jeopardy of falling, but forthwith moved with compassion I stretched forth my right hand, to better and reform the place of her standing: wherewith I might behold Diana with a sharp and sour countenance to threaten the loss of my hand whereat being amazed, I did awake out of my drowsy sleep.  Ep: 
The people of Salamina, is the threatening Diana, hating all reformation: the golden Dove, is the pleasant country of Salamina: the wavering of this Dove from place to place, is the frailty and mutability, whereunto this country of Salamina hath ever been subject: the compassion which you have taken of this golden Dove, is the love you bear unto Salamina: the moving of your body and hand, to secure this golden Dove, is the ardent desire now newly kindled in you for the reformation thereof: the loss of hand threatened by Diana, is the difficulties and dangers, which shall from time to time, oppose themselves against you in this action of reformation.  Sol. 
Describe therefore unto us, first, what you intend by this word reformation, and then the difficulties and dangers that follow the same, and lastly the ways and means, whereby we may readily eschew those dangers and difficulties.  

CAP. 1. OF THIS WORD REFORMATION, AND A general description thereof, and how the same is divided into two several parts and members.  
A REFORMATION of a declined commonweal, is nothing else but an happy restitution unto his first perfection: this word Reformation being thus described, may in like sort be divided into two parts and members: the one may be termed an absolute and a thorough reformation of the whole body of the commonweal, namely of the ancient laws, customs, governementes and manners of the people: the other may be termed a reformation of particular mischiefs and inconveniences only, which like unto evil and superfluous humours daily arise to the annoyance and disturbance of this politic body. For like as in our natural bodies, saith the Physician, so in common weals there daily ariseth that, Quod curatione indiget, & nisi tollatur, inde morbos laethales parit. This manner of reformation of particular mischiefs and accidents consisteth of two parts and members: the one by the profitable laws, which are framed to meet with such mischiefs and inconveniences, which do or may arise to the annoyance of the commonweal: such was the law called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which pacified the poorer sort of people called Hectemarij, then in arms against the rich and better sort of Athens: the other is the true discipline and execution of laws so made and established. This manner of reformation of particular mischiefs and inconveniences by good and profitable laws, was mightily endeavoured by yourself, when as the Athenians made choice of you as their general reformer of their laws and commonweal. For you did not change the whole state thereof, but altered only that which you thought by reason you might persuade your Citizens unto, or else by force you ought to compel them to accept; and framed your laws to the subject and matter, and not the matter & subject unto your laws, as sometimes Lycurgus did in his reformation of Sparta.  Sol: 
You have said the truth, for if I should have attempted to turn up side down the whole government, & to have changed the whole state thereof, I might afterwards never have been able with that small power and forces then granted unto me, to settle and establish the same again. Again, I did not think, but that Athens then declined, might well have been restored by this kind of reformation.   

CAP. 2. What commonweal may be restored unto his first perfection by applying thereunto this manner of reformation.  EPI: 
No verily: for Quae primis institutis omninò corrupta fuerit, eanunquam in tales casus incidet, propter quos novis legibus institui queat. For this cause the first institution of Athens being merely popular, corrupt, and unperfit, could never after by any laws made for the reformation thereof, be defended from the tyranny of such as did aspire unto the principality, or from the ruin first conceived in the corrupt institution thereof. For notwithstanding they established many laws for the reformation of the insolency of the noble men, as also to restrain the liberty of the people, non eam tamen conservare supra centessimum annum potuerunt. But such commonweals as have their first institution and foundation good▪ though not altogether perfect and complete, at any time declining from the first state and perfection, may by this manner of reformation (made by profitable laws as occasion shall them require) be not only restored to their first perfection, but the happy estate thereof may thereby belong continued and augmented: such was the commonwealth of Rome, whose first institution and foundation was so well laid by Romulus & Numa, as that after by new laws made for the reformation thereof, as the necessity of that common weal did require, the same was rendered long, happy, and prosperous, in so much as it attained at the last an happy temper and form of government, compounded of three sorts and kinds of government, namely the Monarchia, Aristocratia, and Democratia: so that we may conclude, that those commonweals which have their foundation good, though not perfect and complete, ex ijs quae subinde occurrunt, emendari & perfici queant ad exemplum Romae: for it is said, non prima illa Romanae reip: institutio tantum a recta via aberrabat, ut perfici non posset. Lastly such commonweals which in all the parts thereof are found corrupted and declined from their first institution, may not by profitable laws made and established as occasion shall them require, be reform; whereof sometimes the City of Rome and now the state of Salamina may be unto us an example: sith neither the one after her final declination, which did chiefly grow by a general corruption of manners in the people, could be reform by the laws against Captainship, against Coyney, and Lyvery, or against the unlawful custom of supporting and maintaining of rebels or any other new law whatsoever; nor the other by their laws sumptuarij ambitus, and such like, the reason whereof shall more at large appear in this discourse following.  Sol: 
There remaineth now the discipline of laws as the second part and member of this particular reformation not as yet consulted of.   

CAP. 3. Of a reformation made by the discipline of laws.  Epi: 
This manner of reformation is nothing else but a fear to offend, bred in the hearts of the people by the true discipline of laws, after which manner the City of Rome was sometimes reform per supplicium de Bruti filijs sumptum, poenam Decemviris impositam, Spurij Moelij caedes, & similia, post captam urbem Manlij Torquatipaenan de filio sumptan, eò quod pugnasset cortra Imperatoris mandatum, Fabii Magistri equitum accusationem a Papyrio cursore institutam, eò quòd praeter Dictatoris imperium pugnam commisisset, Scipioni diem dictan, all which being most memorable and fearful examples, did admonish all others of their duty and obedience unto laws and magistrates.  Sol: 
Therefore wisely saith a learned writer, In conservandis imperiis regnisque faciendum est, ut antiquae leges & consuetudines in usum reducantur, ex earum praescripto vitia puniantur.  
After this manner by a severe discipline of laws, did the Lord Grace in times past, and now Sir R. Bingehame, mightily reform and advance the government of Salamina, so as we may truly say, by such governors must this nation be reform. By this manner of reformation hath France in times past, mightily advanced their government, and especially the City of Paris, which always hath most severely punished offenders.  Sol: 
But what order of times in this reformation made by profitable laws and discipline thereof is rightly observed?  Epi: 
This manner of reformation is made after two sorts: either by laws limiting the times certain for this reformation; or accidentally thereunto led and provoked by occasions: for so the City of Rome after the overthrow given by the power of the Gauls did reform their commonweal and all discorders formerly by them committed. The Athenians also after the Megarians had recovered from them the isle of Salamina, and the haven of Nicoea, reform that commonweal. And not long after the sedition betwixt the people of the mountains, the valleys, and sea coasts, did occasion a general reformation to be made of our City and commonweal of Athens. Again, the Romans' to give an end of many contentions raised betwixt the senators & people, sent Sparke: Posth: Albus, A. Manlius, and Sulpitius Gamerinus, as legates unto Athens, that they might the better be informed of the laws which you Solon had established for the reformation of Athens, that thereby as by a line, they might the better reform the City of Rome; and further made choice of their Decemviri to perfect this their intended reformation by profitable laws.  Sol: 
Now you have declared to us the reformation which is made accidentally: there remaineth now the other reformation, which is made by force of laws & at times certain, wherein I would willingly understand the reason, that should limit the times certain of our reformation, and that by laws certain in that behalf established, sith the accidents, and occurrants in all commonweals, which do occasion this reformation made by profitable laws, be in themselves uncertain, and accidental.  Epi: 
This manner of reformation made of particular accidents at times certain, and that also by laws and statutes certain, established in that behalf, is found more profitable than the other which is made accidentally. For laws are required herein, Ne opus sit per vim peregrinam idem praestare, and time herein is also to be respected, ne si impunitas longo tempore concedatur, usque adeò augeantur vitia, ut sine periculo publico deinde nec puniri nec extirpari queant; and for these causes especially, the rulers and governors of Florence were accustomed to say, Singulis quinquennijs redintegrare formam reip: oportere, otherwise the discipline of law may not be well preserved. And therefore it is said, that if Room, singulis decennijs, secundùm leges, aliquod magnum exemplum in delinquentes statuissent, nunquam tanta morum corruptela potuisset civium animos occupare; sed quia tandem rara esse caepit, aucta est tantopere morum corruptela, ut remedium nullum adhiberi potuerit. In like manner may we truly say, that so great a corruption could never have possessed the minds of the people of Salamina, if there the exact disc●ipline of laws had in good time been applied.  Sol: 
Now sith you have declared at large the order and time, which is rightly observed in this manner of reformation, proceed unto the dangers and difficulties, which do usually accompany the same.   

CAP. 4. The sundry difficulties and dangers that follow this manner of reformation.  EPI: 
The difficulties which herein arise, may lively appear by the question, which Caesar propounded sometimes unto Pampey, and Crassus, when he was Consul preferring then unto the Senate, the law for division of lands, called Agraria; do you Crassus and Pompey, saith he, give your consents unto the laws which I have now propounded? They answered, yea; then he prayed them to stand by him, against those that threatened him with force of sword to let him. It may appear also by that action of Pompey, when as he filled the marketplace with soldiers, and by open force established the laws, which Caesar made in the behalf of the people. The same also was sometimes lively expressed in the person of Lycurgus, which for the better establishing of profitable laws, gauged the loss of his eye; and you Solon the loss of your credit and reputation with the people of Athens; when as by the law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, otherwise called discharge, you incurred the general displeasure and hate, as well of the poor as of the rich: all which sometimes you lively expressed after this manner.  
Even those which erst did bear me friendly face,  
And spoke full fair where ever I them mei:  
'Gan now begin to look full grim of grace,  
And were like foes in force against me set:  
As if I had done them some spite, or scorn,  
Or open wrong, which were not to be borne.  Sol: 
You have now revived the memory of my former sorrows, the which I labour rather to forget. Proceed therefore unto other difficulties, or rather tell me, why such dangers should arise and follow these actions, which are found so profitable for the commonweal.  Epi: 
They arise, partly from the contrariety of humours, and opinions, lodged in the breasts even of the wisest; partly from the insolency of the multitude.  Sol: 
It is most true: for Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, allowed the division of lands, and established the law Agraria; but Calphurnius, Bibulus, Cato, Considius, and other Senators rejected the same: the people allowed thereof, but the nobility condemned it, and the ambition of Caesar. In an other assembly also of the Senate of Rome, Crassus, Appius, and Nepos, prayed the Senate to prorogue the government of Caesar for five years livelier, and to deliver money unto him out of the common treasure to pay his army, but others impugned the same; especially Phannins.  Sol: 
For these causes (be you remembered) I held it a matter very difficult and dangerous, to deal betwixt the poor and the rich, whereunto I was required sometimes by the City of Athens, fearing the covetousness of the one, and the arrogancy of the other; the poor desiring, that the land might again be divided; the rich also of the contrary, that their bargains and covenantes might a new be confirmed. But what ways and means may be found that may avoid these difficulties and dangers?   

CAP. 5. The ready ways and means to avoid these difficulties and dangers.  EPI: 
Such Princes and governoures, which will avoid the difficulties and dangers, which commonly arise in establishing of profitable laws and ordinances; by reason of diversity of humours, opinions, and factions, they must of necessity remove for a time, or otherwise employ the leaders and heads of all such factions, as may give any ways impediment unto their proceed; imitating herein Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, who purposely sent Cato unto Cypress, knowing assuredly, that he would otherwise give impediment unto their laws and proceed, especially for the proroguing of Caesar his government, and allowance for his army; or otherwise with Caesar, they shallbe forced to suppress them by authority, and to put Cato to silence by imprisonment, the which may fortune to displease as well the nobles, as the people.  Ep: 
Or otherwise, we are to delude either faction by fair promises and sweet words, the which subtlety you Solon sometimes used (as Phanias the Lesbian writeth) when as you secretly promised the poor to divide the land again, and the rich also to confirm their covenantes and bargains; when as you used these words and sentences, namely that equality did bre●de no strife; by which equivocation of words, you did win as well the poor as the rich, unto a reformation of disorders; the one supposing, that all things should be measured according to the quality of the men, and the other took it for their purpose, that you would measure things by the number, and by the paul only, whereby you did safely proceed, and mightily further your law called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and did therein overcome all difficulties, by the which, the mighty sedition, which was then entertained betwixt the poor and the rich, was appeased.  Sol: 
You say truly: and for the better justifying of this manner of proceeding herein, you shall understand, that in a public magistrate, the same is rightly termed policy, but in private persons, the same is not unjustly condemned by the name of deceit.  Ep: 
We have remembered the same, not as condemners, but as approvers of the fact, and therefore needless you have justified yourself herein.  Sol: 
Be it so: proceed then further unto other difficulties and dangers, which arise herein from the insolency of the multitude, whereof you made mention in this former treatise but did not at large discourse thereof.  Ep: 
Many dangers and difficulties arise from the insolency of the multitude, as I have said, for that never with one consent of mind, they do admit or obey any new laws or ordinances, until they plainly understand the same to be necessary; but the necessity of laws never appeareth without danger to the commonweal, which often falleth to his last ruin, before the laws can be perfectly established, which might support the same. The Athenians first received the evil and mischief, even into the bosom of that commonweal, before they sought to withstand the same by profitable laws, yea they suffered the sedition, & uproars, betwixt the issue of Megacles & Cylon, still fight & quarreling, before they could be persuaded to choose you Solon, as the reformer of there commonweal.  Sol: 
You may best witness the same, for they suffered the invasion of the Megarians, they lost the haven of Nysea, and the isle of Salamina, before they sent unto you Epimenides into Creta, by whose advice they then reform there commonweal, greatly to your laud and praise.  Ep: 
But more greatly Solon to your commendations, were the mighty factions long entertained betwixt the people of the mountains, valley, & sea coasts, quenched and pacified to the great good of Athens.  Sol: 
they suffered the factions betwixt the poor and the rich, so long to fester in the bowels of the commonwealth, as the poorer sort did rise in arms with a purpose to choose unto themselves a captain, and to subvert the whole state of that commonweal, before they could be persuaded to make a general reformation of their laws and commonweal: they suffered many uproars and brawls, before they condemned the excommunicantes. The state of Florence also may with their peril and danger witness the same: which contended not to suppress the corruptions in the Aretine's, before they well near tasted of their rebellions. In like manner, the Athenians could not be induced, either by my authority, or else by the vehement persuasions which then I used, to withstand the tyranny of Pisistratus, before they endured the weight thereof so heavily, as they could neither cast the same from their shoulders, neither yet endure the burden thereof.  Ep: 
This did occasion you sometimes to write and speak after this manner, 
Each one of you o men in private acts,  
Can play the fox for sly and subtle craft:  
But when you come fore in all your facts,  
Then are you blind, dull-witted and be daft, etc.   
But if we suffer dangers and difficulties in the establishing of good and profitable laws, how much greater shall these dangers appear unto us, when we shall use and apply the sharp discipline of laws? the same no doubt is great, and far exceedeth the other; for at such time as Claudius was accused, and indicted of high treason, by one of the Tribunes of the people, and by others of the nobility and Senate, the rude multitude and people, did so boldly and stoutly maintain his unlawful facts, as the judges for fear durst not proceed against him, whereby he was discharged of his accusations: after the like manner did they compass the Senate house, & called for Caesar, and willed the Senate to let him out at such time, as he was to answer sundry accusations laid against him. But what ways and means are now left unto us, whereby we may overcome these difficulties and danger?   

CAP. 6. The several ways and means to overcome all difficulties and dangers, which arise in this action of reformation, made by profitable laws and the discipline thereof.  EPI: 
First we are to remove all occasions, which may move the people or beholders, to pity or favour offenders. For when Manlius Capitolinus was sometimes accused as a mover of sedition in Rome, his case was no sooner pleaded, but the sight of the Capitol troubled his accusers, and the judges also; when as pointing with his hand, he showed the place unto the Gods, and weeping tenderly, laid before them the remembrance of the hazard of his life, in fight for the common liberty and safety of Rome, and in defending the Capitol itself, and repulsing the Gauls; in such sort, as the judges moved with pity, knew not what to do, and therefore put over the hearing of his cause unto another day, because the place of his so notable good service was ever still before their eyes: wherefore wisely Camillus finding the cause of delay of justice, did make the place of judgement to be removed without the City into a place called the wood Petelian, from whence they could not see the Capitol, where his accusers gave apparent evidence against him, and the judges considering all his wicked practices, conceived a just cause to punish him as he had deserved, so as they gave sentence of death against him. Further no orator, or pleader of causes, is to be suffered to speak in the behalf of offenders, either to move the judges to compassion, or to win the offenders favour in the eye of the beholders. The mischief which ariseth hereby, did sometimes appear, when as Caesar was suffered to speak in the behalf of Lentulus, and Cothegus, companions of Catiline in his conspiracy, by whose eloquence the offenders had then been delivered, or at the least not committed to the hands of the officers to be put to death, if the gravity and authority of Cato, and vehemency of Catulus, had not dissuaded the contrary. Lastly, the more often princes shall acquaint their subjects with the discipline of the law, the more great obedience shall the subjects yield, as well unto laws, as magistrates, and the less difficulty and danger shall princes find therein. For the right discipline of laws, doth admonish men of their duty, and doth cause them to lead their lives agreeable to law, and from time to time doth suppress the malice of the offenders. For proof whereof, the Romans' so long as they used the just and exact discipline of laws, they punished the offenders without fear danger, sedition, or mutiny; yea farther, when as they condemned Camillus unjustly, there was found no friend, no soldier, the number whereof were many and great, that durst make any resistance in his behalf: for when as he called unto him his friends and soldiers, which had served under him in the wars, or that had taken charge with him, which were many in number, he earnestly besought them, that they would not suffer him thus vilely to be condemned, through false and unjust accusations laid against him, and to be so scorned and defamed by his enemies: his friends having laid their heads together, and consulted thereupon, made him answer, how that for his judgement they could not remedy it, but if he were condemned, they would all join together with a very good will for the payment of his fine. But not long after, Cum toto decennio nullum Romae statuebatur exemplum paenae delinquentium, then could not the Senate examine Cesar with their safety, neither yet could the judges condemn Claudius without peril.  Sol: 
Therefore in such commonweals, where the manners of the people are altogether corrupted, for not applying in good time the discipline of laws, it behoveth the judges, and such as shall revive the force of ancient laws by the exact discipline thereof, strongly to be guarded, according to the example of Cicero being accompanied with a strong guard of lusty men, when as Consul he was to convict and execute Lentulus, and Cethegus, for their conspiracies with Catiline. But Caesar unadvisedly refusing a guard in such cases for the safety of his person, did eftsoons with the loss of his life approve his folly: for Brutus, and others, finding him asked in the Senate, without any strength, or guard did easily execute their malice upon him.  Ep. 
In like manner, governors in cases of great extremities, for the avoiding of dangers and difficulties, may proceed against offenders, without observing the usual ceremonies of law. After this manner did Cicero proceed against Lentulus, and Cethegus, when as upon proof only, in open Senate, without any lawful indictment or condemnation, he commanded their delivery into the hands of the officers to be put to death; for so much may be gathered out of Caesar his Oration, who at that instant mightily inveyed against that manner of proceeding, saying, it was not lawful, neither that the custom of Rome did bear it, to put men of such nobility to death, without lawful indictment or condemnation, but in cases of extremity. This severe course and manner of proceeding in cases of extremity, may not be deemed any part of tyranny, if either we will give credit unto the opinion of Caesar, or unto the fact of Cicero, and the Senate; or follow the custom of Rome, or deem Cato to be mild and just, who then being in the Senate, did vehemently persuade the same, and whose heart was so far from cruelty, as beholding the dead bodies slain in the camp of his enemies, in the last skirmish betwixt Pompey and Caesar, he covered his face and went away weeping.  Sol: 
I call to remembrance one Sir R. Binghame provincial governor of Salamina, in my time a most valiant and honourable Knight, and withal a most wise and grave governor, being given to understand of a general rebellion, with an intention, not only to overthrow the state and government, but also to make deliverance of principal rebels of the sect and nation of the Burkes, then in prison and safeguard, did forthwith deliver those traitors and rebels to be put to death, without lawful indictment or condemnation. For seeing himself fallen into these extremities, that either he must spare the lives of open and manifest rebels to the damage of the commonweal, or execute them without lawful indictment and other ceremonies, like a wise governor, two mischiefs offering themselves at once, made choice of the least, not being as then to learn that which Caesar sometimes taught Merellus, The times of war and law are two things: so as in this action and in all other parts of his government, he hath showed himself to be the person, which Archilocus describeth in these his verses 
He is both Champion stout of Mars his warlike band,  
And of the Muses eke, the arts doth understand.   EPI: 
It seemeth also convenient for the better avoiding of difficulties and dangers, that such heads and leaders, as shall be found to give impediment unto this manner of reformation, be committed to some safeguard or prison, and there detained; all which Dionysius advised Dion sometimes by his letters, wishing him thereby, not to set them at liberty, which hated him and the action which he had then undertaken of reformation.  Sol: 
If the Earl of Desmonde late of Salamina, committed to safeguard & prison for his sundry rebellions against the City of Athens: had there been safely detained, the wars of Salamina had neither been chargeable nor troublesome unto the City of Athens, and if james Fitz Morris in like manner being in safety and custody of officers to answer all accusations of high treason, had not been set at large by the justices for the time being, he had not then wasted, burned and spoiled a great part of Salamina, neither had he put the City of Athens to so huge and mighty a charge, nor yet combined with the enemy to the great danger of that estate. Therefore it is a chief surety unto Princes, and great furtherance unto actions of importance, to commit to safeguard and prison, such as may give impediment thereunto: for the which cause king Frederick did no sooner intend the wars against the French, but he apprehended and put in prison the Prince of Bisignan and the County of Molotte, as friends unto the French. But now sith we have spoken at large of the first part and member of this reformation, let us descend unto the other, which you have termed a reformation absolute and universal.    

THE SECOND BOOK OF Solon his folly.  

CAP. 1. A description of a reformation universal, and of the whole state and body of the commonwealth.  EPI: 
This reformation universal of the whole state and body of the commonwealth, is nothing else, but a thorough and absolute mutation and change, of ancient laws, customs, and manners of the people, and finally of the commonwealth itself, unto a better form of government.  Sol: 
It seemeth then, that this reformation respecteth three matters principally: first, the mutation of ancient laws and customs; secondly, the alteration and change of manners in the people; and finally, a new institution and a better form of government, than before, prescribed.   

CAP. 2. Of the reformation of ancient laws and customs.  EPI: 
You have well observed my meaning and purpose: and to this effect, a subtle writer making mention of this reformation general and absolute, saith, that he which shall attempt the same, must alter and change all the ancient laws and customs, quia ne leges quidem, quae in ipso ortu reipub: à bonis viris late sancitaeque sunt, sufficientes utilesque sunt ad eos c●ves frenandos, qui in eadem repub: à maiorum virtute degenerarunt, & pravi facti sunt, for, saith he, where we find, the times and people thoroughly changed, embracing now that which is found contrary to their former course and manner of living, we ought also to change the ancient laws and customs: for, contraria subiecta non debent eodem modo tractari. The Romans' may herein be unto us a lively example: for after they had subdued Asia, Africa, and in a manner had reduced under their governemental Greece, they fell eftsoons into a corruption of manners, contrary to all their former discipline, institution, and accustomed manner of living: their ancient laws and customs established for creating of Magistrates, they mightily abused; selling their voices of election openly in the market place for money: in like manner did they abuse all other their ancient laws and customs, namely the laws and customs, which divided the commonweal and power thereof into the hands of the people and Senators, so as there could not be a reformation of that estate, without a mutation made of those ancient laws and customs, then grown by the iniquity of those times out of use.  Sol: 
But what need we search foreign examples? when Salamina doth afford sundry proofs thereof, where we may behold many ancient customs and privileges, granted (no doubt) at the first, for the advancement of public services, but now turned by a general corruption in the subject, to the ruin of themselves and the land of Salamina; which must of necessity be altered and changed, before any thorough reformation may there be established: all which may appear unto such as shall read the Act of Absentes, which is left unto us as a register of the fall and declination of the state of Salamina; wherein it is manifest, that the Lords of the several counties, of Carthelagh, and Wexforde, being places privileged, may keep and hold all manner pleas within the same, by occasion and under pretence and colour whereof, the king's laws, writs, or other processes, be not obeyed, neither any other law or justice there used or administered, for the quieting and good ordering of the subject: so as in default thereof, the king's enemies have them in servage; all murders, robberies, thefts, treasons, and other offences, remain unpunished; the king's wards, reliefs, escheats, and all other his profits and revennewes are there withdrawn; and the service, strength, and assistance of the said subject, is greatly minished; all which more at large shall appear to such as shall peruse the said statute: so as we may conclude, that without a mutation, made of these ancient customs and privileges now grown out of use, and declined from their first institution by a general corruption in the subject, the state of Salamina may never be perfectly and thoroughly reform. For as the state of Rome, in manner as afore declined, could not by the laws, sumptuarij ambitus, neither by any other new law be sustained and underpropped, without a thorough alteration made of all other the ancient laws and customs thereof; so may we not expect in these days a thorough reformation of Salamina, by the laws of Captainshippe, the laws against Coiney and Livery, the laws against taking of pledges, the laws against wilful murder, or any other new law whatsoever made for the reformation of Salamina, without a thorough alteration made of the ancient customs and privileges thereof, all which we there sometimes employed in that service, were daily taught, rather by experience then by any learned or deep discourse, that may be made thereof. In like manner if the custom of Captainshippe, the custom of Coiney and Livery, and the custom of taking of pledges, the custom of Tanistery, the custom of protecting and supporting of traitors, had not been abolished by laws, than all new laws whatsoever would have been found unprofitable for the reformation of Salamina: for in such cases it is said by learned writers, that leges novae minus prodesse queant ad tollenda vitia quae regnant. Now sith it is evident, that a thorough reformation may not be made without a mutation of ancient laws & customs, which are found evil in themselves, or else by mutation and change of times have now lost their first vigour and force, it behoveth that we do understand, what order and rule herein is to be observed, for the more ready effecting thereof.   

CAP. 3. Of the reformation of ancient laws and customs, and what things therein chief are to be considered.  EPI: 
In all mutations made of ancient laws and customs, three matters especially fall into deliberation: first the means; secondly the form and manner; lastly the subject and matter. The means are in number five: the first is authority; the goodwill and consents of the people, the second; the third persuasions; a sufficient power and force, is the fourth; the fifth and the last is a magistrate, of rare and excellent virtues, which may suppress the envy and malice of such, as shall oppose themselves against this intended reformation, made by the mutation of ancient laws and customs.  Sol: 
But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation? For this as the first matter, you have well observed to be requisite herein.  Epi: 
All authority herein granted is after two sorts: the one absolute; the other limited by time, and other circumstances. This authority absolute, was given sometime into your hands by the Athenians; for after such time as they had well tasted of the law and ordinance, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they forthwith did choose you their general reformer of the law, and of the whole state of the commonweal, without limiting this power then granted unto you, but referred all matters indifferently unto your will, as the offices of state, common assemblies, voices in election, judgements in justice, and the body of the Senate. Finally, they gave unto you all power and authority, to cease and tax any of them, to appoint the number, and what time the cease should continue, and to keep, confirm, and disannul at your pleasure, any of the ancient laws and customs, then in being. But this authority absolute, without any limitation of the power itself, or of the time and continuance thereof, hath sometimes turned to the great prejudice and danger of such as formerly have granted the same: for the Romans' after they had elected their Decemviri, for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the commonweal of Rome, they forthwith gave into their hands the sole and absolute power of Rome, so as all other authorities and jurisdictions either of Consul, Senate, or Tribunes, ceasing, they wholly and only governed Rome, without any provocation or appeal to be made to any other. Thus when no Magistrate remained, which might observe the actions of such as were found ambitious, easily did Appius Claudius, fall into the thoughts of the principality of Rome; he doth strengthen himself with friends, & clients, and daily increaseth his wealth, and now of a Citizen is become a fearful enemy to the state of Rome; in such sort, as they may neither endure his pride and insolency, neither may they safely suppress the same without their common peril and danger. Therefore more wisely did the Lacedæmonians give great authority to their kings; and likewise did the Venetians to their Dukes; but yet with certain limits and bonds, not lawful for them to exceed; and farther did appoint certain watchmen, as daily beholders and observers of all their actions and doings.  Sol: 
But what limitation of time, in granting this absolute authority, may breed safety unto him that giveth the same? This is the second and last matter, now remembered by you, and worthy of consultation.  Epi: 
The provincial government over the Gauls, with an absolute power given into the hands of Caesar, for the better reformation thereof, was so long prorogued and continued, as at the last with the sword of the Romans', and the money of the Gauls, he became terrible, as well to the Gauls, as to the Romans', & returned not a Citizen now of Rome, but as a fearful enemy, and conqueror, as well of the City, as of all the other territories and dominions thereof. And was not also the provincial government of Spain sometimes given into the hands of Pompey with an absolute authority for the reformation thereof, so long prorogued and continued, as with one stamp of his foot he was able, (as himself reported) to fill the City of Rome with weapons, and armed men? And did not Appius Claudius by proroguing his authority but for one year, become fearful to the City of Rome? And did not the Romans' by making a Dictator perpetual, lose the liberty of their City? and doth authority thus easily corrupt the manners of good subjects? and is the age also wherein we live free from such corruption? Nay, more than that, is there not an enemy on foot, that laboureth the corruption of the whole? Then what authority here may be limited so strait, as in this time may not be thought too large? what time may be so short, which may not be deemed too long? Therefore let every good and faithful councillor unto the state, with Cato resist here the proroguing of Caesar his government, lest too late with Pompey they acknowledge their error: it shall not suffice here to grant but one year more unto Appius Claudius; neither is it sufficient that Caesar is holden in disgrace with the City of Rome; neither may we here safely believe all which shall say unto Pompey, Caesar is hated of the garrisons, and soldiers: for when Caesar cometh with his fortune, he shall then force, as well Pompey, as the City of Rome, to acknowledge their former follies and errors:  Sol. 
But now unto what person may this authority be safely granted, is a matter herein, not unworthy of consultation.  Ep: 
It is safely granted unto a man approved to be good and honest, with this caution, that he be not of such power and force, as the state may stand in fear of his greatness. For the best sometimes have fallen by reason of honours and dignities into a general corruption of manners, and therefore we receive it as a proverb, honores mutant mores.  Sol. 
At no time than is it safely committed into the hands of personages of great might, power, and wealth.  Ep: 
You have said the truth: for what danger did arise to the state of Athens, by constituting garrald Fitz garrald attained, Lieutenant of Salamina? who having at once might, power, and sovereign commandment in his hands, did eftsoons conspire, and combine, sundry treasons, and rebellions.  Sol: 
The records of Salamina doth witness so much as you have said, for there it is alleged, that he did conspire with the French king and Emperor, for the invading and possessing of Salamina: he did also in proper person invade the County of Kylkennie, there burning, destroying, & murdering the kings subjects: he did invade also with O'neill, and his forces, O Coner, and other of the said Earl his friends, allies, and servants, by his commandment the County of Vriell; wherein he was aided, and assisted by Sir john, brother unto the said Earl. The like or greater danger did grow unto the state of Athens, by constituting Thomas Fitz garrald, son and heir to the said Earl, Lieutenant of Salamina: who succeeding in the place of his father, having the like might, power, & forces lent unto him by his friends, allies, and servants, and sovereign authority given from the king, did eftsoons revile that famous City of Athens, and his lawful sovereign, and moved all rebellions against them; and did therewith also address his letters unto the Bishop of Rome, & the Emperor, for the invading of Salamina: and farther did put to death, and cruelly murdered all those which were resident within the land of Salamina, being borne Citizens of Athens, and amongst others did put to death that reverend father and faithful counsellor john Allin Archbishop of Deublin, and primate of Salamina. More than this, he constrained with his power and forces, the subjects of Athens, to give unto him an oath of obedience, & forthwith besieged the Castle of Deublin, where with his whole army by the sea coast he encamped, for the better resisting, destroying, and murdering the army of Athens, 
Statutes of Ire: 35. H. 8. ca 3. fol. 11.  as they landed. No less dangers than these formerly rehearsed, appeared at such times, when as the Duke of York pretending himself Lieutenant of the said land, did with his power, and forces, occupy and possess all the territories and dominions thereof. Therefore of late days, hath the Counsel of Athens most providently committed this sovereign authority unto such, as may not be able with forces and power to usurp the same. But if unto this authority thus given, to effect a reformation, the consents and goodwills of the people be found agreeable, no doubt the ●am● shall mightily further that action.   

CAP. 4. The goodwill and consent of the people is a ready means to effect a reformation.  EPI: 
You have said the truth: for where the goodwill of the people is first won and obtained, there the mutation is made, without difficulty and danger. All which may lively appear in the history of Tarquin, who having lost as well the goodwill of the people, as of the Senate, by changing the ancient laws & customs of the City of Rome, was easily expelled that kingdom.  Sol: 
It is true that you have said; for he did draw unto himself all the authority, as well of the Senate, as also of the liberty of the people, which sometimes they enjoyed under their former kings, and for this cause chiefly, he failed of the goodwill of the people, in this his mutation and alteration of things. But Brutus on the contrary, having won the goodwill of the people, for the effecting of a reformation, and expelling of Tarquin, did change the state of the commonweal, without any difficulty, danger, or injury sustained by any other, than the expelling of Tarquin. Likewise, when the Medicei Vrbe Florentinorum Anno salutis M. CCCC.XL.IIII. pellebantur, the change was made without danger and difficulty, for as much as the same was effected by the goodwill and consents of the people. Sith therefore the consent of the people, doth give so great furtherance unto this action of reformation, it seemeth a matter very necessary, that every Magistrate should retain the art, skill, and knowledge, of persuading and inducing the multitude, as you have in the first chapter of this book well remembered.   

CAP. 5. The force of persuasions, and how necessary the same is to effect a reformation.  EPIMEN: 
So it is indeed, for the goodwill and consent of the people, doth promise no small security unto the Magistrate which intendeth this action of reformation: and therefore not without cause, Pythagoras was of all sorts of persons greatly honoured, for his singular art and knowledge in winning the affections of the multitude, and in persuading, and dissuading the people, all which Plutarch witnesseth after this manner, 
Pythagoras which loved to dwell,  
In highest dignity:  
And had a heart to glory bend,  
And past in policy:  
Much like a man which sought,  
By charming to enchant:  
Did use this art to win men's minds,  
Which unto him did haunt.  
His grave and pleasant tongue,  
In sugared speech did flow,  
Whereby he drew most minds of men,  
To bend of his own bow.   
Though Lycurgus was the eleventh which descended from the right line of Hercules, though a man of great authority, of great force, of long continuance a king, yet indevoring a reformation of many disorders, which did chiefly arise in that estate, by the inequality of lands and possessions, therein (as Plutarch witnesseth) he used more persuasions, than force: a good witness thereof was the loss of his eye. You Solon also altered and reform that in the commonwealth of Athens, which you thought by reason you should persuade your citizens unto, or else by force you ought to compel them to accept.  Epi: 
The Romans' therefore well understanding the force of persuasions, in all actions of reformation, did institute the holy order of the Faeciales, who retaining the art of persuading, and dissuading the people, did much further the commonweal of Rome; for they went many times in person to those that did the Romans' injury, and sought to persuade them with good reason to keep promise with the Romans', and to offer them no wrong: they did also persuade the people, to deliver Fabius Ambustus, unto the Gauls, as one that had violated the laws of arms, and farther proved by many reasons, that a present reformation made of that disorder and injustice, would deliver Rome from many calamities, then like to ensue by the power of the Gauls. By this art and skill of persuading, did Camillus appease the great sedition and mutiny, raised sometimes by the people of Rome against the Senators, for that they had not their full mind and liberty, to inhabit the city of vieth. By this art and skill, you Solon have now of late induced the Athenians to make wars with the Megarians for the possessing of Salamina, contrary to their former liking, public laws, and proclamations made in that behalf: and the like honour did you sometimes win by your oration, made in the defence of the temple of Apollo, in the city of Delphos, declaring, that it was not meet to be suffered, that the Cyrrhaeians should at their pleasure abuse the sanctuary of the oracle; by force of which persuasions, the council of Amphictions was thoroughly moved, so that they sought a present reformation thereof. By this your art and skill, you also persuaded those which in Athens they sometimes called the abjects and excommunicates, to be judged, whereby you did quench and appease two mighty factions, the one supported by the issues of the rebels, that rose with Cylon, and the other by the offspring of Megacles.  Sol: 
I acknowledge this your friendly report, not as a testimony of any art or skill, but of the office and duty which I bear unto the city of Athens. But after this manner sometimes a notable mutiny and sedition raised by the citizens of Salamina, against the justices of assizes and jail delivery, in my presence was happily appeased. But now sith the necessity of the art and skill of persuading is sufficiently made known unto us, there remaineth, that you describe unto us the art itself, with the parts and members thereof.   

CAP. 6. The art and skill of persuading, worthily known and observed of all public Magistrates.  EPI: 
The art and skill of persuading, consisteth in the knowledge of two matters especially: first we must know how to commend the matter, or person of such as we intend to persuade; then how to move, win, and dispose the affections of the people. For the first, the Poet saith truly, that he singeth most sweetly, that singeth my praise and commendation.  Sol: 
This which you have said, did manifestly appear after the battle of Xerxes fought with the Grecian army, for then all the Grecian Captains being in the strait of Peloponnesus, did swear upon the altar of their sacrifices, that they would give their voices after their consciences to those they thought had best deserved it, where every one gave himself the first place for worthiness, and the second unto Themistocles. After this manner, did Publicola win the goodwill of Appius Claudius, a man of great strength and reputation among the Sabines, in giving honour unto him, by the way of an embassage, whereby he gave Claudius to understand, that he knew him right well to be a just man, and hated without cause of his citizens; and therefore if he had any desire to provide for his safety, and to repair to Rome, leaving them which causeless wished him so much evil, they would publicly and privately receive him with due honour; by which means, Publicola did not only win Appius Claudius with those of his faction, which were great and many in number, but also stayed and turned the wars from the Romans', then intended by the Latynes and Sabines.  Sol: 
There remaineth now, that you disclose unto us the knowledge, how to win, move, and dispose the affections of the people, as the second part and member, of the art and skill of persuading.   

CAP. 7. The skill and knowledge how to win, moon, and dispose the affections of the people.  EPI: 
Herein three matters especially are found worthy of consideration: first the affections what they be; secondarily the subject and matter, wherewith they usually are moved, and carried away, as with the violence of some tempest; thirdly the ways how to win, move, and persuade the people, according to the example of the worthiest and wisest in times past. The affections which be the first, are in number these; love, hatred, hope, fear, despair, and such like; the matter and subject which is the second, is parentage, consanguinity, friends, goods, possessions, lands, the custom and manner of living, honours, liberty and life; the presence whereof we love and embrace, and with their absence we are soon carried away unto wrath, hatred, revenge, hope, fear, and despair: therefore from hence as from a fountain, have the wise governors in former ages, drawn all the force of persuading; by the same have they induced the people to embrace matters profitable to the commonweal, even against their wills. And how mightily these transitory things have always appeared in the eye of the multitude, it may appear by the answer given from the Athenians unto Themistocles, whereas he persuaded the people to leave their city, goods, possessions, and lands, and to get them to the sea for the better eschewing of the Barbarian forces, which then were so mighty, as the same might not well be withstood by the proper forces of the Athenians: In vain (saith the people unto Themistocles) do we then seek the preservation of our lives, when we shall forsake the graves of our fathers and ancestors. Such was the love they bore unto those transitory things: and therefore one amongst the rest, spoke in choler unto Themistocles after this manner; Themistocles, for a man that hath neither city nor house, it is an evil part to will others that have, to forsake all; but Themistocles turning to him, replied, we have willingly forsaken houses and walls (saith he) cowardly beast that thou art, because we will not become slaves, for fear to lose things that have neither soul nor life.  Sol: 
Now you are to give us to understand, of the sundry ways and means, how to win, move, and dispose the affections of the people, which is the third and last matter by you remembered, worthy of every public magistrate, which shall endeavour the knowledge and art of persuading.   

CAP. 8. Persuasions are after two sorts; the wales, and means, how to persuade, and induce the multitude; the art and skill required in all persuasions ordinary.  EPI: 
The ways and means how to win, move, and dispose the affections of the people, are usually after two sorts: the one ordinary; the other extraordinary. The ordinary ways and means, are in number three: First you shall wisely observe the affections of such persons, as you intend to persuade; secondarily, you shall wisely acquit, and deliver, as well the matter, as the person of him that persuadeth, from all suspicion of fraud and guile; lastly you shall draw the people unto a particular consideration of the matter you intend to persuade. We must diligently observe their affections; for so Phanias Lesbian writeth, that the mighty and dangerous faction sometimes entertained betwixt the rich and the poorer sort of the city of Athens, was by you Solon easily pacified, in that you diligently observed the affections of either, and did secretly promise the poor to divide the lands, wherewith they remained highly pleased, to the rich you promised the confirmation of their contracts, which was the matter they chiefly desired. Also you did not let to feed their humours and affections with the daily publishing of this sentence, equality doth breed no strife; the which did please as well the rich and wealthy, as the poor and needy sort; for the one conceived of this word equality, that you would measure all things according to the quality of the men, and the other took, for their purpose, that you would measure things by the number, and by the paul only; thus both being pleased with you, for that you well observed their humours and affections, they gave into your hands sovereign authority for the ending of all quarrels, whereby that mighty faction was happily appeased, to the general good of Athens. You also well observed the affections of the people, when as you clothed things bitter and unpleasant, with pleasing names; calling taxes, contributions; garrisons, guards; prisons, houses; and such like: by the which policy, you made even things odious, pleasing and acceptable to the people, and easily thereby persuaded the embracing thereof. In like manner Themistocles endeavouring like a wise general to augment his strengths by the aid of the jonians, in his wars against the Persians, did wisely observe the affections as well of the jonians, as of the Persians then his enemies: for passing by some places, where he knew the enemy must of necessity fall upon that coast for harbour, he did engrave certain words spoken unto the jonians, in great letters in stone, which he found there by chance, or otherwise brought thither for that purpose; these were the words, that the jonians should take the Grecians part, being their first founders and ancestors, and such as sought for their liberty; or at the least they should trouble the army of the Barbarous people, and do them all the mischief they could, when the Grecians should come to fight with them: by these words thus in graven, and dispersed in fit places, where the enemy was likely to harbour, he hoped either to induce the jonians to take their part, or at the least, that thereby he should make the Barbarous people, jealous and mistrustful of them.   

CAP. 9 How that the Magistrate which intendeth to persuade the multitude, must wisely acquit himself of all suspicion of fraud.  SOL: 
Now you have sufficiently discoursed of the first means, whereby the multitude do rest persuaded, the second now remaineth, namely, the knowledge how to deliver the matter and person of him that persuadeth, from all suspicion of fraud and guile; for then all persuasions move mightily, and make a deep impression in the hearts of the people, when like unto clear waters, they descend from the pure fountain of integrity. Therefore when Alcibiades persuaded the people of Athens to invade and occupy the empire of Sicilia, well hoping that the people would assign him general of that army, Niceas a man of rare and excellent virtues, rather regarding the public good than his private profit, dissuaded the contrary; and to the end the people should be thoroughly persuaded of his integrity herein, he spoke unto them after this manner: in times of peace, the City of Athens affordeth many Citizens, which shall have place before me, but in times of war, I nothing doubt but to be the chief and first among them; and therefore be you confident in this, that I now dissuade the wars, for that it standeth more with the public good, then with my private profit. In like manner Numa, the better to deliver himself from the suspicion of fraud, in all matters wherein he laboured to induce and persuade the people, he observed two matters especially: first he persuaded them, that he did work t●e reformation of that commonweal by the means and help of the Gods, in which action no fraud may receive place, for that they be for the most part, always accompanied with integrity and sincerity of mind; secondly he persuaded nothing unto the people, but that which himself performed in person: for Numa judging it no light enterprise (saith Plutarch) to pluck down the haughty stomachs of so fierce and warlike a people, did pacify their fierce courages to fight, with daily sacrifices, prayer, and devotion, wherein he ever celebrated himself in person. In like manner, when you Solon were to publish your law called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the better to persuade the people of your integrity herein, you were the first that followed your own proclamation, and clearly released your debtor of fifteen talents then due unto yourself.  Sol: 
So I did, though it stood with my loss and hindrance. But now there remaineth the third and last means, wherewith the multitude is mightily induced and persuaded, formerly by you remembered, worthy of consultation, namely, that we draw the people unto a particular consideration of such matters as we intend to persuade.   

CAP. 10. The magistrate which intendeth to persuade the multitude, must draw them unto a particular consideration of such matters as he endeavoureth to persuade.  EPI: 
You have remembered that which I could not well forget, the fame being always found the most assured way to induce the people: for in consulting and disputing of matters in general, they greatly err, judging all things to proceed from other causes, then from the true causes thereof. Therefore wisely Camillus, when as he endeavoured to persuade the people of Rome, from the inhabiting of the city of vieth, then for the same cause being fallen into a mutiny, he descended unto particulars with the multitude, and pointed with his finger unto the graves of their fathers, and ancestors, saying, will you needs inhabit the city of vieth? And will you forthwith forsake the graves of your fathers and ancestors? And will you now leave the holy temples dedicated to the Gods, and sanctified by Numa and Romulus? And will you suffer the holy fire now newly kindled, now once again to be put out? And finally, will you leave this your natural city (pointing with his finger unto the city of Rome) to be inhabited by strangers in time to come, or else to be a common pasture for wild beasts to feed on? By which manner of persuasion he eftsoons appeased the mutiny, and quenched their ardent desire for the inhabiting of vieth. After this manner, did Pacuvius proceed in pacifiing and subduing the people's affections from killing their Senators; which matter by them was fully determined, until such time, as he conventing the people and Senators, as for the hearing and determining of some public and weighty cause, did proceed with them after this manner: now my friends and Citizens (saith he) that which you have even with an ardent desire and affection long wished, namely the punishment and correction of this detestable and wicked Senate, the same hath fortune now given into your power and hands, freely to dispose of them at your pleasure, being now altogether naked, and closed in on every side with walls, where, without tumult of the City, and peril of your persons, you may freely dispose of them; but lest you should prefer the desire of private revenge, before the common safety of all here gathered together, it behoveth before you give sentence of these Senators, whom you do mortally hate, that you proceed first to the choice of others; for of force you must either have Senators, which always have been the most wise and fit councillors of free estates; or otherwise you must of necessity fall into the hands of a Lord or King, which free estates have ever hated; proceed therefore to the election of new, and make choice of better men, which may supply their places: this matter appearing unto the people doubtful, did hold them long in silence, but at the last one among the rest being nominated, their clamour and noise far exceeded their former silence, some affirming they knew him not, some accusing his person, others despising his base art and science; and much more in the choice of the second, and third, this dissension was increased, they being more base and obscure, than the first: then beholding the ground, with shame fastness they confessed their former error, saying, they did choose rather to tolerate an old evil, than a new, which might far exceed the old. In like manner the people of Rome, consulting at large, found that they sustained in all wars the greatest force of the enemy, they found themselves also to be called to all labours and works, whereby the commonwealth was to be preserved or augmented, and so forthwith they judged themselves as worthy of the office and dignity of the Tribuneship, and Consulship, as any Patrician whatsoever: and thereupon contended, that the Tribunes should be equally elected, as well of the one as of the other sort; the which being unto them granted, and descending to make election, could find none in particular worthy of that honour, or at the least so worthy as the Patricians and nobles were; then forthwith they did acknowledge their former error, and made choice of the Patricians only. After this manner, the people generally consulting of the delays and cunctation, which Fabius used in repelling the forces of Hannibal, forthwith they condemned him to be a coward and faint hearted; but afterward they weighing that their council by the several events and overthrows they received by the rash and overhasty proceeding of Varro the Consul, and of Marcus Senteinius, with others, they did soon after adjudge the wisdom of Fabius to be some rare and divine influence received from the Gods. In like sort the people of Rome, after such time as Brutus and Cassius had fully executed the conspiracy then intended against the person of Caesar, generally consulting of that action, remained for a time, as indifferent beholders thereof, neither accusing, neither yet making allowance thereof; but no sooner did Caesar his friends show forth his testament, his several legacies unto the people, his many and cruel wounds, and those every where freshly bleeding and increasing like a running stream, the people as possessed with some fury or frenzy, every where in the market place, every where in the corners of the street, in private houses, in the fields, and in the woods also, cruelly murdered all such, as were partakers with Brutus in that action. After this manner, the ancient Tyrants of Athens, contending sometimes to persuade the people to labour, and especially to till and ploughed the ground, thereby to render them more obedient unto their government, did give out a certain fable; they tell of the Goddess Pallas, that she contending with Neptune about the patronage of the country of Athens, brought forth and showed to the judges the Olive tree, by means whereof she obtained the pre-eminence: by which particular demonstration made, the people were mightily induced to labour and till the land. After this manner the people of Rome, generally consulting of the division of lands gained by conquest, did fall into mutinies and seditions against the Senators; then wisely the Senators deducted forthwith certain colonies out of the confines of Italy, whereby eftsoons the multitude were given to understand, of the particular charge, travel, and other sundry inconveniences, that did arise by possessing of lands gained by conquest, wherewith all mutinies were appeased. Thus the magistrate that intendeth to persuade the people, must not generally consult of matters, but must descend unto particulars with them; and therefore that orator shall most readily persuade, which shall draw his arguments and the force of his persuasion, ab effectibus, ab exemplis, or such like: and these be the ordinary persuasions.  Sol: 
There remaineth now the other foot, termed by you persuasions extraordinary,   

CAP. 11. Persuasions extraordinary, and when or at what time they be requisite and necessary.  EPI: 
Such were they which Themistocles sometimes used, for (saith Plutarch) when all other persuasions failed, and could not work that public good which he then intended, he did threaten the Athenians with signs from heaven, and with Oracles, and answers; and when as he could not persuade the Citizens of Athens, no not for the safeguard of their lives, to depart the City at the coming of Xerxes, whose forces they were not able to withstand, he politicly caused a brute to be spread abroad among the people, that the Goddess Minerva, the protector and defender of the City of Athens, had forsaken the City, pointing them the way unto the sea; and again, he won them with a prophesy, which commanded them to save themselves in walls of wood, saying, that the walls of wood, did signify nothing else but ships; and for this cause Apollo in his Oracle, called Salamina divine, not miserable and unfortunate, because it should give the name of a most happy victory, which the Grecians should get there; by which extraordinary persuasions, he did induce them at the last to leave the City of Athens, and to betake themselves to the sea: by occasion whereof, they did not only deliver themselves from the hands of their enemies, but became at the last conquerors, and victors over them. In like manner, when all ordinary means of persuading failed to effect the reformation sometimes intended by Numa, he made his recourse to these extraordinary helps and means, laying before the people's eyes a terror and fear of their Gods, bearing them in hand, that they had seen strange visions, or that he had heard voices, by which their Gods did threaten them with some great troubles and plagues: whereby he did pull down and humble their hearts (as Plutarch witnesseth) and made thereby a thorough change and reformation, aswell of the commonweal, as of the manners of the people. Therefore Plutarch not without judgement affirmeth, that the multitude in matters weighty, and difficult, rest satisfied and persuaded, rather by extraordinary, then by ordinary means: all which he doth lively manifest, whereas he induceth the multitude exclaiming upon Themistocles, for not sacrificing the three young prisoners, in so much as Themistocles forced by their rage and clamour, did sacrifice at the last the three prisoners; wherewith the people remained fully persuaded, that the victory should be given unto them over their enemies. Again, sometimes it fareth with the multitude, as with the sick patient, which being overcome with the greatness of his malady, is thereby become so impatient, as he refuseth all wholesome medicines, which may breed his health and safety; the which malady sometimes possessed the people of Athens, when as they rejected your counsel for the withstanding of the tyranny of Pisistratus, having then newly with his forces entered the castle, and fort of Athens, wherewith the people stood so amazed, as they showed themselves more willing to suffer that evil, then able to prevent the same by your counsel.  Sol: 
This happeneth oftentimes, when the people with the suddenness or weightiness of the matter, are found dulled, mazed, and oppressed, and thereby as with some great malady remain overcome; or otherwise, when they find themselves formerly deluded, by the like matter, or by the same persons, & dare not, or will not now give confidence, though for the present he persuadeth nothing, but that which is expedient & profitable for them: the which matters, the people of Rome objected sometimes against the Senators, when by the fear of foreign wars, they went about to frustrate the law of division: and in these cases as Danta reporteth in his Monarchy, even with open voice, they embrace their ruin, and abhor their safety and welfare. But now let us proceed unto the fourth way and means, namely, sufficient forces which in such cases are to be prepared, whereby the Magistrate with greater safety and assurance may effect a reformation.   

CAP. 12. How strength, power, and forces, are necessary for the better effecting of a reformation, and how in good time, the same aught to be applied.  EPI: 
In the reformation of Athens, you Solon found the necessity of forces, when neither the goodwills and consents of the people, neither the absolute authority which they gave into your hands, neither yet the art and skill of persuading which then in the highest manner you retained, was found sufficient to suppress the ambition of Pisistratus, or to confirm the reformation which you had newly established, for that you wanted sufficient power and forces, for the better effecting thereof. Therefore this magistrate which shall intend this action of reformation, must with Publicola have sufficient power to execute his virtues and well disposed mind: for by this means especially did he alter, change, and reform a mighty kingdom, which had continued a long time, and was thoroughly established.  Sol: 
For this cause chiefly, I must confess, that I was altogether unprovident in taking upon me the function and office of a king, to decide all controversies and broils, at the instance of my friends and citizens, and yet refused the kingly name and power, the which then was offered unto me, and without the which I found by experience, that I could never safely execute that which seemed to me then profitable for the better reformation of the commonweal of Athens.  Epi: 
So it appeared; for soon after you well understood your former error, the which you did sometimes liberally confess, saying after this manner, that with the authority and power then committed into your hands, a man possibly 
Can not control the people's minds,  
Nor still their brains that wrought like winds.   Sol: 
You have said the truth: and for the same cause also at another time, I could not appease the sedition which did sometimes arise in Athens by reason of the inequality of lands and possessions after the example of Lycurgus, by making an equal division thereof, for that I had not then the power, force's, and authority of Lycurgus. Howbeit I performed that which possibly I might with the small power and forces then given into my hands by the Citizens of Athens.  Epi: 
Surely this occasion of reformation is full of difficulties, as you have said, and many will still be found, which shallbe discontented therewith; the which hath been espied by men of wisdom, and such as have been experienced in such cases, and sometimes yourself not without just cause did acknowledge in these verses following.  
Full hard it is all minds content to have,  
And specially in matters hard and grave.  
Many and unjust are the accusations and attempts of the multitude, against such as have authority and commandment over them; great and many be they in number, especially in commonweals corrupted in manners, which do labour and travel so with envy against all excellent men, as that they rather wish their country's destruction, then by them a prosperous reformation thereof; by the which occasions, the faith and services of men, are oftentimes sinisterly interpreted, sometimes by opinion, sometimes by malice, as well to the overthrow of great and profitable actions, as also of worthy and faithful servitors.  Sol: 
Therefore Moses, before he could establish the laws, which God unto him had delivered, and commanded, found it necessary, with forces to remove such, as being pricked forward with envy, did oppose themselves against his intended reformation, And Hieronymus Savanarole wanting sufficient forces, was soon oppressed by the envy of others, and failed of his intended reformation, as it may appear by his sermons, Contra sapientes huius mundi.  Ep: 
Neither is it sufficient in these cases to have forces, but as necessary it is to make use thereof, and in due time to apply the same to the better furtherance of this action of reformation: whereof Lycurgus failing, did establish his reformation with the loss of his eye, and with no small danger unto his person, for that he contended rather with persuasions then with forces, to establish a reformation of ancient laws and customs, and of the lands and possessions of the Citizens. In like manner Peter Soderin, having sufficient forces that might well have overcome the envy and malice of such as were found to oppose themselves against him, did not in time apply the same, and make use thereof, but rather contended with benefits and with a just and honest course of life, to overcome the envy and malice of such as withstood his reformation; whereby in a short time, he did not only perish and undo himself, but also did overthrow his country and regiment; forgetting that which now is every where in experience, that the malice of the envious man, may neither with offices nor benefits be pleased and reconciled.  Sol: 
If the necessity of forces be great to effect a reformation, (as it plainly appeareth by that which hath been said) in such commonweals especially where the manners of the people are found corrupted, then much greater is the necessity thereof, when reformation is to be made of a commonweal, gained by the sword and conquest, as also corrupted in manners; for that the people having here sustained many injuries by force and violence, whereunto the conqueror is drawn oftentimes by their disobedience, may not at any time after with new benefits, offices, and rewards, be reconciled and pacified: neither shall we find here profitable laws, or any sufficient means to effect a reformation, without sufficient forces, to repel all dangers, and difficulties: all which Salamina may well witness unto the world; for when as the governor there, did contend to suppress by public proclamation through out the whole province of Monster, that detestable custom of Coiney and Livery, and other extortions, which had then consumed the marrow and fatness of that commonweal of Salamina; than it was found not sufficient to have the same established by late laws, whereunto the whole parliament had agreed and consented; neither was it sufficient, that the same tended to the universal good of the commonweal; but forces herein also were requisite, to suppress the Butlers, and Garroldines, which then on every side did arise in the maintenance of that detestable custom of Coiney and Livery: all which Sir Warram Sentlenger, then provincial governor, can well witness: by whose care and diligence together with the aid and assistance of the forces and garrisons of Salamina, they were soon suppressed. Forces being thus necessary for the effecting of a reformation, into whose hands the same is to be given, is the fifth and last means worthy of consultation.   

CAP. 13. How a Magistrate of rare and excellent virtues is required in this action of reformation.  EPI: 
This action of reformation with sufficient forces, for the better effecting thereof, is to be given into the hands of some man of rare and excellent virtues, by whose constancy and integrity, the envy and malice of the enemy may be quenched. Therefore the Florentines did not a little err, which in the times of their difficult wars, held Antony jacomine above all others in great estimation, for that only he had taught the Florentine army, as it were with his finger, to fight, conquer, and command: yet in milder times, when as the wars by his industry were grown easy and placable, they little regarded those his virtues, in such sort, as when three Captains were propounded to be chosen for the suppressing of the Pisans, he was not accepted to be one of that number; from the which error this mischief did arise unto the Florentines, that the Pisans, which by the industry of Antony might easily have been reform, and forced to have obeyed the Florentines, made eftsoons head against those unskilful Captains so strongly, as the Florentines were forced dishonourably to purchase their obedience with money. Again Philip of Macedon, after he had beheld the affairs of the Athenians to be given into the hands of Molosses, Caridemus, and such other unskilful Captains, he conceived a great hope to overcome them. In like manner, the weakness and facility of Collatinus the Consul, did much encourage the traitors, in such sort, as he had never prevailed against the Tarquines, nor reform the state of Rome, if the great virtue and severity of Brutus had not governed at that time the helm and stern; whereby the courage and boldness of the traitors, raised by the sufferance and lenity of Collatinus, as a tempest was suddenly calmed and pacified.  Sol: 
Therefore provident were the counsel of Athens in committing this action of the reformation of Salamina, sometimes into the hands of the L. Grace, sometimes into the hands of Sir William Russell as unto another jacomine, by whose rare skill and knowledge in military discipline, the Pisans have and will be forced at the last to obey the Florentines. But let us now proceed unto the form and manner of altering of ancient laws and customs, as the second part and member of your general division, worthy of consultation.   

CAP. 14. The form and manner of altering the ancient laws and customs of commonweals.  EPI: 
The form and manner of altering ancient laws and customs, is usually after two sorts: either simulac statim; or otherwise, s●●sim panlatimque, antequam ab omnibus id animadvertatur. After this first manner, you Solon reform the city of Athens: for you did not strait pluck up the mischief by the roots, but by little and little you changed their laws, customs, and manner of living. After this manner, did Numa alter and change the accustomed manner of living, and the manners of the citizens of Rome, from a warlike liberty to a life peaceable and obedient, and that by little and little as (Plutarch witnesseth.) But others led with the opinion and reason of Plato, say, that to reform a mischief after this manner, is no other but to cut of one of the Hydra's heads, of the which came afterwards seven in the place: and therefore Agis and Cleomenes took upon them to make a change and innovation even at once, and as it were with one constant stroke of the hand, to cut of all the mischiefs of their country, so as we may conclude, that the forms and manners of reforming of mischiefs in the commonweals, be sundry and divers, the which proceed sometimes of the diversity of means and occasions, which diversly do offer themselves; as also from the diversity of the subject and matter, which being divers in itself, requireth a different form of government.  Sol: 
You have said the truth; and therefore a wise governor doth govern diversly according to the means and occasions offered, taking every thing in his best time wherein he means to deal, the which commendation was sometime given not undeservedly unto Publicola.  Epi: 
You Solon did sometimes reform the city of Athens, not as you might have done, neither yet as the necessity of that commonweal required, as well in respect that the first institution thereof was mere popular, corrupt, and not durable, as also for that it was declined by many and infinite disorders, so as it could not for these causes rehearsed have long continuance, without making a thorough reformation of ancient laws, customs, and government, and without pulling up the mischiefs even by the roots; the which with that small power and means then left unto you, you durst not attempt, least by turning upside-down the whole government, you might afterwards have never been able to settle and establish the same again: for these defects chiefly in that reformation, it hath been observed even of the wisest, that you Solon have already seen the overthrow of your commonweal of Athens, and the tyranny of Pisistratus.  Sol: 
Yes verily, I did well foresee the same, but yet having neither means nor power to resist so hard destinies, I was forced to sustain the person, rather of a sorrowful beholder, than a reformer of so great calamities: but more happy and fortunate was Lycurgus, Publicola, and Cleomenes, and such others, though nothing superiors to myself in that care and love which every citizen beareth unto his Country, for that they had sufficient power and means left unto them (as Plutarch witnesseth) to execute their virtuous desire, whereby they made a thorough change and reformation of their commonweals, by cutting up all mischiefs by the roots, by reason whereof the state of their commonweals continued long, happy, and prosperous.  Sol: 
But what difficulty ariseth from the diversity of the subject and matter?   

CAP. 15. The consideration of the subject and matter of all reformations, and how the same is diverse in itself, and consequently requireth a different form of government.  EPI: 
The matter and subject of all reformations is divers in itself, and therefore admitteth the sundry forms of reformation aforesaid: for sometimes the matter or subject which is to be reform, is a mischief or evil by long continuance inveterate, and grown to the height of his strength and perfection, and there the same shallbe more wisely sometimes endured, then hastily rooted out, to the overthrow of the commonwealth: the which caution if Tiberius Gracchus had sometimes well observed, the city of Rome had not so hastily declined, and fallen to her last ruin and destruction.  Sol: 
But Plutarch led with a contrary opinion, commended the law Agraria, as the worthiest act that ever Tiberius performed.  Epi: 
Therein he erred much: for this law was not unworthy only of a wise citizen in those times, and in that manner as he then preferred the same, but farther was the overthrow of the commonweal.  Sol: 
It seemeth also requisite, that so often as the subject or matter of this reformation cometh in question, that we make a difference in the manner of reforming of a free and popular estate, from the Monarchy; for in this one, we shall wisely make a thorough alteration and change, without leaving any resemblance or shadow thereof; but in the other, we are to change the substance, leaving in the place only a shadow and resemblance of that which is changed, for the better contentment of the people; for they discern all things by the outward sense, and not by the sound discourse of reason, judging things to be such as they seem to be in outward appearance. This order did the Romans' sometimes observe in instituting of there popular government, and in reforming of ancient laws and customs, after they had expelled their kings; for they altered the substance, and left in place thereof only a shadow and resemblance of the things altered; for in place of their kings they produced two Consuls, sed unum tantum faces habere voluerant, & quidem totidem numero quot reges usurpare solerent: and whereas their kings in person did perform certain public sacrifices, regem sacrificulum creant qui hisce sacris praeesset, ut nequaquam apud eos regum desiderium esset. Thus by retaining the shadow only of ancient laws and customs, the people remain thereby persuaded, that nothing of the substance thereof is taken away or diminished: in like manner, they carefully observed this rule of policy in the creation and election of Magistrates and officers, for although they assigned unto them new offices & functions, yet they did wisely hold the ancient names, style, and number with their former magistrates, that the people might deem thereby nothing to be altered and changed.   

CAP. 16. Of the right institution and reformation of a monarchy.  
BUT otherwise we are to institute and reform a Monarchy, by making there a thorough alteration and change of ancient laws, customs, and government, yea and of the honours, titles, and dignities also, not leaving any shadow or resemblance in place thereof. For after this manner did king David establish an universal reformation. In like manner Lysander, did pull down the pride of the city of Athens, and took from them the liberty of a popular government, whereby in former times it was ruled and governed, and established there sharp and severe magistrates. But some others carried with a contrary disposition of mind, have not attempted a thorough and general reformation of the commonwealth, but reserved only unto themselves a principality and commandment, the which form of government was observed by Sylla; for when he had taken the city of Athens, after the citizens had made fierce wars with him, yet he left it free unto them, enjoying their own laws. The same counsel did other of the Romans' follow, as it appeareth by the words of Camillus used unto the Senate after he had conquered the Latins: Dij immortales ita vos potentes huius concilij fecerunt, ut sit Latium an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint, si vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victosque; sed si vultis exemplo matorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppetit. It seemeth therefore by the words of Camillus, that the Romans made not at all times a thorough and universal reformation of commonweals which they gained by conquest, but embracing rather the counsel of Sylla, reserved only a prncipalitie and commandment; for by this means, they did easily nourish the ambition which they had in conquering: for such as have a purpose to perform great acts, and to win fame and glory, having a mighty power to effect the same, they may safely follow the steps of Sylla, and other of the Romans', they may say with Camillus, let us exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi persummam gloriam suppetit: but such as shall contend to make continuance of their conquest, being not of great forces and power, should imitate Lysander, and make a thorough and absolute reformation of the whole commonweal. For Plutarch erred not, when he said that Sylla did perform the greater acts, but Lysander committed the fewer faults, and did possess with greater security that which he conquered. Philip of Macedon, followed the steps of Lysander, whereby, possessing at the first but a small kingdom, he became in a short time a mighty commander of all Greece.  Solo: 
The Gauls in like manner following the steps of Lysander, did securely possess for a long time the parts of Italy, called Longobardia: some others have been found neither to imitate Sylla, nor Lysander, but have held a mean course betwixt both, in establishing their government. Such were the Florentines, which in suppressing the rebellion of the Aretine's, did remove some of their principal commanders from their place and offices, others they banished, many they condemned, but they did not resume into their hands the lands, which might have afforded sufficient maintenance unto their citizens, neither did they destroy the principal city, but preserved the same; whereby they lost the opportunity of confirming their empire and government, and of augmenting their commonweal. This mean course hath never as yet been found happy and prosperous: For not thoroughly conquering our enemy, neither by sword, neither yet by our bounty and liberality, we may not long hold them, either as subjects or friends. Therefore such as shall contend to be prosperous, and make continuance of their state, and government, must with the Romans', so suppress and sharply punish the Latins, as at no time they be able to rebel, or with bounty and goodness so win the affections of the privernates, as at no time they should be willing to rebel. The mean course in times past hath been holden for the government of Salamina by a long space; In which times they were never found happy and prosperous in their government.  Sol. 
Now sith we have discoursed at large, of the reformation of ancient laws and customs, and of the helps means and other rules therein to be observed, as the first and principal matter in all reformations absolute and universal to be respected, there remaineth now a reformation of manners in the people, as a second matter worthily considered.   

CAP. 17. Of the reformation of manners, and how that this universal and absolute reformation may not be effected without the same, and how that the corruption of manners may be discerned by his fruits and effects.  EPI: 
The reformation of manners, doth mightily advance all commonweals, and doth render them prosperous, and fortunate, of long continuance.  Sol: 
Therefore not without cause did the Romans, constitute judges, and Censors of the manners of the people, which did carefully from time to time, execute all the laws, De morum censura. Neither was the place of the Censores holden to be sacred, without due consideration of the commonwealth: Neither were they without cause above all other officers honoured in that commonwealth, in such sort, as they did depose, and displace, sometimes the Consuls, sometimes their Dictator, at their pleasure; for no doubt, what by the refomation made by the industry of their Censors, and by their skill and knowledge in military discipline, they quietly governed at home, and fortunately conquered abroad in all parts of the world. Therefore since the reformation of manners, is a matter of so great importance unto estates and commonweals, it shall be convenient, that you do describe at large unto us what you intend thereby.  Epi: 
We intend nothing else by a corruption of manners, but a departure from the fear and reverence of God, from the honour and obedience due unto Prince's governors and Magistrate's, from the love which we own unto our Country, and generally a declining from a just care and regard of public affairs, and all heroical virtues, unto pleasures, wantonness, vices, and other such private respects and regards.  Sol: 
You have exactly described the same; for as the fatness and goodness of the earth, is easily discerned by the large profit and benefit it yieldeth to the labouring hand; and the goodness of the tree by his pleasant fruit; so the corruption of manners in the people, by his infinite evils, miseries, common calamities, ruins, and destructiones of states, which every where it begetteth and bringeth forth, as by his several fruits and effects may be discerned. For it breedeth in men a base opinion and estimation of virtues, and a contempt of magistrates, it offereth in open market the sale of offices, the voices of election, yea even justice itself, it enableth Caesar with the money of the Gauls to purchase not only favour, and offices, but even the liberty of Rome. From this fountain springeth ambition, desire of revenge, mutinies, sedition, treason, and rebellion, finally it leaveth no place, no not the Senate house of Rome, nor the pulpit for orations, nor the image of Pompey, no not the open & public market places undefiled and free from blood, no not the palace of princes, Vte Galbae & Pertinaci accidit, both which most virtuous kings were killed by their subjects; the which mischief did arise unto them, chiefly for that the manners of their subjects and soldiers were corrupted by the malice and evil government of their predecessors, so as generally it may be reputed the mother, and nurse of all common calamities.  Epi: 
That detestable custom, and more detestable confirmation thereof, for receiving and supporting of traitors, rebels, and evil disposed persons, coming and arriving into the land, did first occasion so general a corruption of manners in Salamina, 
Anno. 10. H. ●.  as more at large the same may appear in the act of repeal thereof made by king H. the 7.  Sol. 
Sith then this general corruption of manners doth draw with it so many public miseries and calamities, as are before remembered, we can not, except men be altogether void of humanity and reason, but abhor even the remembrance of these lamentable times, and be forthwith kindled with a desire of reformation.   

CAP. 18. The several occasions which breed in the hearts of the people or nation, a general corruption of manners.  EPI: 
That we may the better effect this reformation of manners, it behoveth us to understand the several occasions which do nourish the same, and lastly the sundry ways & means which may be found for the better reformation thereof.  Sol: 
First let us understand the occasions as you have said.  Epi: 
Sometimes we remain corrupted in manners by ease, wealth and security, with the Romans' after their several conquests of Asia, Africa, and the greatest parts of Greece, and with the invincible army of Hannibal, by the pleasures of Capua; sometimes by bitter adversities, with the Athenians we become haters & despisers of virtue, and we make unto ourselves that hateful law of Ostracismus, whereby we banish and put to death men of rare and excellent virtues, with the Hectomarij and Hiereling; sometimes we mutiny, and rise in arms against the rich, and other times with the poorer sort of the oppressed faction of Marius, we compass the Senate house, and demand the delivery of Caesar; sometimes by the malice and practices of foreign enemies with the isle of Euboea and the other parts of Greece, by corruption of Phillippe of Macedon we depart from our obedience; sometimes by contempt and neglect of religion and the professors thereof with Samaria & the city of Niniveh, we fall into a general corruption of manners, lastly either by our lightness or incredulity with the Vandals, sometimes in Africa of the Arrian sects we dismember the body of the Church by sects and factions, so as either with the Churches of Greece, Rome, and Ravenna, we rise in arms one against another, or at the least the common people amidst so great variation of sects and opinions, finding no an core or place of rest, that may quiet their troubled souls and consciences, die and live for the most part in great anxiety and incredulity.  Sol: 
Now you have at large discussed the occasions which may draw the people into a general corruption of manners, it shall not be impertinent, to entreat of the several remedies which may be found to resist so great an evil, which worketh the ruin of states and commonweals.   

CAP. 19 The ready ways and means to reform and resist a general corruption of manners.  EPI: 
The chief and principal remedies are found to be in number three: namely a secret prudence and wisdom; secondarily good laws well executed; thirdly a succession of severe Magistrates: for no doubt like as the wild olive and fig tree, by the continual addressing of a skilful husbandman, is made at the last kindly, profitable, and fruitful, and not inferior to the natural branches; so a commonwealth overgrown with a general corruption of manners, and thereby become savage, barbarous, and barren, like unto the wild olive and fig tree may by the continual pruning and addressing of a skilful magistrate, be made obedient, civil, and profitable unto that prince, whom God hath constituted to be the labourer in that vinyeard; the which is to be effected by the three ways and means before remembered: the first whereof is a secret prudence and understanding, wherein two matters principally are found worthy of consideration: first the subject and matter; secondarily the time; for as the infirmities in our natural bodies, growing upon contrary causes, receive not their cure by one self same council, and medicine, for the which cause we endeavour, to cure the frenzy by rest, and by motion the lethargy; so it fareth with the infirmities of a politic body; for where the corruption of manners in the multitude groweth by wealth, rest, and security, there it receiveth his present cure with the lethargy by motion, dispersing the humours, and finally by sharp correction and discipline: but otherwise it is where the same proceedeth from extreme adversity for there it receveth a happy cure, with the frenzy by ease, patience, and sufferance, for Contraria subiecta non debent eodem modo tractari: Wherein Charles the fift hath left unto us an example, when as he stood before Meats in Loranie with his army, which was then so distressed by extreme sickness and famine, as they openly railed on him, especially his Spanish would call him the son of a mad woman with all the vile words they could devise, yet he would not hear them, but threw crowns amongst them, saying to his nobility, hearken these knaves, yet if I call the worst by his name, he will not refuse to do any thing for me though it cost him his life. The like wisdom was showed in the like matter by Caro, and other Senators of Rome, at such time as when the poor and needy persons which at that time had reposed all their hope and confidence in Caesar, had compassed the Senate house and called aloud for Caesar then accused before the Senators, bidding them to let him out, Cato then to acquit the commonweal of the insurrection of the poor and needy persons, did not severely correct them, but contrariwise persuaded the Senate to make a frank distribution of corn amongst them for one month the which amounted to one hundredth and fifty Myriad made at the common charge of the citizens, by the which council he quenched not only a present great fear, but did in happy time scatter and disperse abroad the best part of Caesar's force and power, at such time as he was made Praetor, and that for respect of his office he was most to be feared. The same council did Pericles sometimes embrace, when as the people of Athens did mutiny against him, for that he would not suffer them to hazard the battle with the Lacedaemonian army, then burning and spoiling in all the parts of their country; for he did not then with bitter speeches and sharp punishments pacify that mutiny, but contrariwise with a large distribution which he caused to be made amongst them out of the common treasure, and division of lands that were gotten by conquest, he did quench that sedition. And it is said, that when Luctatius, one of the greatest authority at that time in Rome, did inveigh against Caesar, in that he had seditiously set up the honours and victories of Marius' contrary to their public laws and decrees, and urged then a condign punishment answerable to so great an offence, he spoke nothing for the punishment of the people which then gathered themselves together for the aid of Caesar, and the rather for that they being of the faction of Marius, had been long oppressed and trodden under foot by the authority of Sylla. In like manner, when we shall behold men of rare virtues and great deserts towards the commonweal, in times of peace and liberty contemned and despised, with Narcetus that rare and excellent captain, lest thereby they fall with him into a general corruption of manners, and combine with the king of Lombardy, for the invading of Italy, we shall wisely with the Venetians in such cases, always better the fortune of those which have faithfully served, & never remove them from their former dignity, without giving to them places of higher and greater commandment, and with Themistocles not only speedily revoke the banishment of Aristides, and such others of his quality, but also to advance them to greater honour than before, fearing least otherwise he take part with the Barbarian nation to the ruin of the state of Greece. But herein one caution is wisely observed, that in such cases contending to remove a corruption of manners, which may otherwise possess the minds of rare and excellent personages, by a contempt and disdain which followeth them, chiefly in times of happiness, wealth, and security, we do not endanger thereby the whole state of the commonwealth, the which we shall then easily prevent, if we shall not employ them in the greatest places of commandment, least contending to acquit themselves with Claudius Nero, of all disgraces and injuries wrought by the deceit of Hasdruball, they desperately hazard, and put in adventure the whole state thereby. Neither are we in such cases with the Romans', to give unto Camillus discontented with his banishment the supreme commandment of the City and army; for after slaughter made of all other their captains by the power of the Gauls, they were led thereunto rather by necessity, then by wisdom; neither do all men banished and disgraced, carry with them that honourable mind of Camillus, and that ripeness of judgement, to prefer the honour and public good of the commonweal before his private reputation and welfare: But on the contrary, if we shall labour to cure the corruption of manners that groweth by peace, wealth, and security, we are in such cases, with Luctatius to remove the same by sharp discipline, whose council if the Senators had then followed, many miseries and public calamities, which the ambition of Caesar soon after wrought against the city of Rome, had been wisely foreseen and prevented: or otherwise in such cases, if we shall like unto the wise physician disperse abroad those pestilent humours according unto the example of Camillus, and with him employ the citizens of Rome, now puffed up with the pride and insolency of their new obtained victory and conquest of vieth, and with the rich spoils thereof, now in mutiny against the Senators and nobles, now resorting with great tumult about the pulpit for orations, for establishing of laws tending rather to the destruction then to the division of Rome, as in the wars against the Phalerians, and there besiege the chief city, not so much with a purpose to win the same, but rather with him to keep our country men busied, least by repairing to Rome, they should take occasion to mutiny; whereby with the wise physician we shall disperse abroad those humours, which may trouble the quiet state at home. Lastly if we shall wisely take hold of time, whilst she is running her swiftest course with her force and violence, perhaps we may be carried more than with an ordinary expedition unto the height of our thoughts and desires; for the times which shall represent unto us the show and face of public calamities, as famine, plague, pestilence, poverty, and wars shall mightily advance this action of reformation: for so the Senators of Rome by an appearance of foreign wars did often pacify the mutinies and seditions of the citizens of Rome, raised for the law of division of lands gained by conquest: and the Romans' after the battle of Cans gave due obedience unto Magistrates, and did severely prosecute their laws against the Vestal Nuns, and finally whatsoever the Magistrates did command, the people would most readily obey. The like obedience was sometimes found unto laws and Magistrates, after the people of Rome had received their overthrow by the power of the Gauls, in such sort, as the corruption of manners that then reigned in them was soon quenched and reform. The times also which did produce sundry public calamities in Ulster parcel of the dominions of Salamina, did work there the like effects, as it appeareth in the statute of Attainder of Shane Oneile; where it is said after many public calamities sustained by the wars, they cried first for mercy, and then for justice, in such sort, as the reformation of that country did offer itself easy unto the hands of the Magistrates that would lay hold thereof, as by express words of that statute more at large may appear. Wisely therefore Plutarch in comparing the acts of Fabius with Pericles, saith, that Pericles governed the Athenians in their chiefest prosperity and wealth, whereby they were corrupted in manners, and rendered insolent, and mutinous, and not easily governed; but Fabius then governed Rome, when as it was humbled by many adversities, esteeming it a matter of no great difficulty, to rule a city all ready brought low by adversity, and which compelled by necessity is contented to be governed by a wise man.  Sol: 
But sith this matter is at large discoursed, let us proceed unto the other means which are left unto us for the better resisting of a general corruption of manners, and what force, good & profitable laws may have therein.   

CAP. 20. The necessity of good and profitable laws for the better effecting of a reformation of manners.  EPI: 
The Egyptians by a long space prevented this general corruption of manners, which either peace, wealth, security, or otherwise the fertility of place might breed in the hearts of the subjects. The like laws did Romulus, Numa, and other governoures which succeeded them, carefully from time to time establish, as neither their long peace and rest which they enjoyed in the government of Numa, neither yet the fruitfulness of the soil of that empire, nor the commodities of the sea, neither their daily victories, could by the space of a long time and many ages, corrupt the manners of the people. In like manner the Germans above all others have best continued the integrity of manners in the subject, chiefly for that they have not only been most studious of profitable laws, but also most faithful observers thereof, the which thing above all others hath preserved their people and country, as well from this corruption of manners, as also from the servitude and oppression of others. And where it is said, that Spain hath not fallen so deeply as Italy, and France, into a general corruption of manners, this proceedeth not from the goodness of their nature, but from the strict observation of the ancient laws and customs of that kingdom.  Sol: 
I have viewed the laws of Salamina, and I find them no less profitable than the laws either of the Egyptians, Romans, Germans, or others whatsoever, for the reformation of manners; so as there remaineth nothing, but that with the Germans we be faithful observers of our laws▪ for so it may appear by express words contained in the statute made against marrying and fostering, 
Act. 28. H. ●. c. 13. fo. 1.  where it is related after this manner: Notwithstanding divers good statutes and acts of parliament made for the reformation of that country, wherein is contained, that every of the king's subjects offending the same, should be a traitor attainted, yet by the default and negligence of the heads and rulers of that land under the king's highness, the said statutes were not duly put in execution, so as no reformation hath followed the same. In like manner, disorders were sometimes committed in the countries of Flamminia and Emillia, by the negligence of Magistrates in not executing the laws, before Pope Alexander the fixed had wisely displaced and removed the negligent governoures thereof; before which time, these regions were full of theft, robberies, and rebellions, the which offences did not arise from the nature of the place or people, as some did then suppose, but rather from the malice and negligence of their governors; for they being poor, would notwithstanding live richly, and sumptuously; they made laws, and were the first that offended against the same, and by their example invited others thereunto; neither did they punish any that offended the laws, until they increased to great strengths and numbers, ac tunc demum (saith the author of this history) non justiciae conservandae causae, sed praedae dulcedine permoti, paenas ab omnibus simul gravissimas exigebant; ex quare hoc sequebatur absurdum, ut expilati assiduis illis mulctis homines ad paupertatem redigerentur, atque hinc impellerentur ad vexandos alios, quibus existimabant se viribus esse superiores, quo quidem modo vitia non emendabantur, sed ad ea homines instituebantur, dependebant que haec omnia ex prava eorum regulorum natura. Lastly, the many and sundry privileges are found to give impediment unto the execution of profitable laws, and to nourish a corruption of manners in the subject, as more at large it doth appear in the act of Absentes, which is left unto us as a register of the fall and declination of the state of Salamina, wherein it is manifest that the Lords of the several countries of Catherlagh and Wexfords' being places privileged, may keep and hold all manner pleas within the same, under colour whereof the king's laws, writs, or other process be not obeyed, neither any other justice there administered, for the quieting and good order of the subject, so as in the default thereof, the king's enemies have them in servage, all murders, robberies, thefts, treasons, and other offences remaining there unpunished.  Sol: 
But what Magistrate may be found sufficient to establish a reformation of manners?  Epi: 
A severe Magistrate is herein required: for that a commonweal mightily corrupted in manners, is squared and reform only by the rule and line of justice which we call distributive, the which for the inequality thereof, may not without great motions and sharp remedies reform the enormities and mischiefs of the commonweal. Lastly where the manners of the people remain corrupted, there the laws, De morum censura, and all other laws are found unprofitable, unless by a severe and stout Magistrate they be supported and maintained. For if Brutus had not severely proceeded, as well against his own sons, as against all other traitors, he could not have reform the corruptions of Tarquin, and of other his confederates.  Sol. 
He that shall in these weighty actions of reformation proceed as you have said with lenity and softness, shall never with Collatinus be able to suppress a corruption of manners in the subject, but he shall by that course rather embolden and comfort traitors in their intended purposes; therefore herein the wisdom of Valerius was highly commended, who though by nature courteous, and gentle, and thereof surnamed Publicola, yet by wisdom now became so severe & sharp for the reformation & good of his country, as he most sharply and bitterly prosecuted the treasons of Tarquin.  Epi: 
They which shall live and govern Sparta, where the people are in manners corrupted, must with Cleomenes sharply prosecute and punish offenders; but where the manners of the people be not corrupted, there a mild course of government doth work his office, and carrieth with it allowance and commendations. For this cause it is said, that the patience of Peter Soder●n was profitable as well to the commonweal as to himself, so long as the age and time continued mild and gentle, but after the times were changed into an iron age, the same than required a greater severity than could be found in Peter Soderin, which by no means nor occasions, nor by the change of times, could be led from his accustomed patience, by the which he did not only overthrow himself, but did also perish his whole country. Therefore very well saith a learned author, for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people, and for the better reviving of the force of ancient laws, a severe Magistrate is requisite.  Sol; 
But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate, and it draweth with it sometimes peril and danger unto Princes.  Epi: 
This question admitteth one other distinction: for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of Cyrus described by Xenophon, but such as shall govern by way of deputation, are rather to follow the severity of Manlius Torquatus, lest otherwise with Peter Lawredane, we do not only make the Venetians jealous, but also disable ourselves by our lenity and softness, to perform this difficult action of reformation, wherein severity is required. To conclude, it must be that grave and severe Tymasicheus, that shall reform the licentious city of Lyparensis, and draw them from spoiling, praying, and rebelling. Lastly, we must make a continual succession of severe Magistrates, as before I have remembered. For Epaminondas with a just severity may reform a corruption of manners in the Thebans, but if he once fortune to die, the Thebans shall eftsoons return to their former corruptions.  Sol: 
Now sith you have at large discussed of the two parts and members of this universal and absolute reformation, namely the reformation of ancient laws, customs, and lastly the corruption of manners in the people, there remaineth now a new and better institution than before prescribed, as the third and last member of your general division.  Epi: 
I will proceed then unto the institution itself, wherein form matters are found worthy of consideration: first, the sovereignty and commandment; secondly, the form of government; thirdly, the form and manner of the institution itself: lastly, the several ends and scopes of this institution? For the first, which is the sovereignty and commandment, the same is given sometimes into the hands of one, sometimes in the hands of few, and sometimes into the hands of all in general. This one is termed a Democratia, or a popular estate; the other an Aristocratia; the last a Monarchy, Thus be commonweals properly distinguished by the sovereignty and commandment, and not by the diversity which sometimes appeareth in the form and government thereof: for all institutions are made after the one of these kinds, and all other are but corruptions of these estates, and no proper or distinct commonweals.  Sol: 
But which institution is to be preferred above others?  Epi: 
The institution no doubt of the Monarchy, is the most firm and durable, and freest from all dissension, mutinies, and sedition. And the wise men of Rome were not deceived, when beholding the market place filled with bows, slings, and sword, and the pulpit for orations sprinkled with blood, they said, there remaineth now no other way to give help and remedy to these troubles of our commonweal, but the authority of one man only, that may command us all. And as this estate is freest from trouble, as you have said, so is it of all others most honourable and glorious, and even the very lively image of God and nature, as Artibanus did sometimes faithfully deliver unto Themistocles. The next manner of institution in account, seemeth to be the Aristocratia, for that it acquitteth itself best of all other commonweals, from corruption & errors in their censures and judgements: for as the large and running waters, are not so easily corrupted, as the standing pool; so many wits, and minds, are not so easily deluded and corrupted, as one. But worst of all others doth this commonweal acquit itself of envy, dissension, and emulation amongst themselves, which like unto a moth or worm, gnaweth a sunder the heart and entrails of that commonweal, and at the last confoundeth and destroyeth the same. But yet the popular estate is of all others lest permanent, especially where the commonweal is mere popular, aswell in regard of the sovereignty and commandment, as of the form & manner of government; whereof the commonweal of Athens may be unto us an example, which was instituted by you Solon, and after in the same age confounded by Pisistratus:  Solo: 
So it was: for wanting sufficient power and forces, I was forced to make such laws for the instituting of that commonweal, as they were willing to receive, and not such as I was willing to give: for I must confess, that popular institution, which is equally tempered, and compounded of the three sorts and forms of government, after the manner and institution of Rome, to be more firm and durable; and this form of government also doth give a perfection and continuance to all other estates before remembered. Therefore Romulus after the death of Remus, and Tatius Sabinus, did aim at that form of government in the institution of the commonweal of Rome; for he reserved unto himself the sole and kingly authority over the army only, and to convent the Senators for the affairs public, the which form of government, in his person was kinglike, and after the form of a Monarchy; but in the person of the Senators, who had authority to consult, and publicly to persuade and dissuade the attempts for wars, and to discuss all other civil causes, as the state of that commonweal required, the form of an Aristocratia, was rightly by him observed; and in the other parts of his government, as in framing of his laws and such like, he rather affected a popular liberty, than a Monarchy.  Epi: 
After this manner the king of France hath reserved unto himself a kingly name, style, honours authority, and commandment over the Senate, and to assemble them for the affairs public, and a sole absolute and royal authority over the army for making or finishing the wars, lastly an authority for the levying and receiving of the revenues belonging to the crown, but the execution of laws he leaveth to the Senate, and judges, who govern by such laws as respect a popular liberty and free estate, in the making of which laws, the people have also their voices, like as in popular estates, where the people hold the sovereignty and commandment; so as by this form of government as well to the king, and the nobles, as also to the people, such power is granted, with so just and equal proportion, as either the dignity of the one, or the liberty of the other may justly require; in the well tempering whereof, all the skill, art, and policy of government is wholly contained, and he that shall hold the best and most just temperature herein, cometh nearest to the perfection of nature; who by how much more equally she doth temper the four humours and elements in our natural bodies, by so much we receive a more perfect strength, & a longer being & continuance.  Sol: 
This is the best form of instituting of commonweals, the which you have now described; but in this institution some are found to aim at peace, some at honour, as the butt and scope of all their actions; so as their end and scope being diverse, it seemeth they may not embrace one form of institution.  Epi: 
You say well: for they which shall aim at a commonweal peaceable & permanent, it behoveth them to seclude strangers, not to train their people and subjects in military discipline, according to the example of the Lacedæmonians, and to possess a place or fort, as well by nature and the situation thereof, as by art rendered invincible, according to the example of the Venetians. But such as shall aim at honour and glory, as the butt & scope of their institution, must entertain strangers, they must endeavour to render the commonwealth populous, they must daily train and exercise the people in military discipline, and they shall wisely deliver the feeble, and weak, from the hands of the oppressor, they must entertain many associates & friends, by the which policies they shall render themselves every where invincible according to the example of the Romans.  Sol: 
But what manner of institution is most permanent and to be preferred?  Epi: 
Neither the one nor the other may be found so happy and permanent, but at the last, with the apple in his fulripenes, they fall with their own weight and poised to the ground; the one by discord and mutinies of the soldiers, for that their citizens are rendered bold by the continual use and training in military discipline; the other by effeminacy, ease, rest, and security, hasteneth in like manner unto mutinies and discords, as to his last ruin; so as either by a fatal destiny (as it were) embraceth there own confusion: but not after one manner; for the one like unto a flower, or the pride of youth, in the height of his glory, vanisheth, away, and leaveth the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to invest a perpetual memory of a worthy and excellent Institution. But the commonweal which in his first Institution aimeth only at peace and permanency, with effaeminacy, discord, and mutinies, bred by long ease, rest, and security, embraceth with the other his final & last destruction, but leaveth not the like memory of his Institution.  Sol: 
It seemeth them by that which you have said, that the institution of that commonweal, which aimeth at virtue, honour, and glory, is to be preferred before the other, & of princes much more to be desired. But may not one self-same commonweal, aim at the one and the other?  Ep: 
No verily: for as the tree which hath but a slender root, may not long support weighty and mighty branches, against the fury and violence of the wind and tempest; so commonweals which aim at peace, having but a slender root, and foundation, laid for the supporting thereof, as before I have remembered, may not be long victorious, and hold themselves upright in actions of great importance: and if they fortune to be so with the Venetians, which have much regarded this manner of institution, they shall no sooner win, but eftsoons for want of proper forces to defend, they shall lose the same again: so as for free estates and commonweals, this manner of institution seemeth not to be the best, but for servile commonweals, and such as have lived always subject to others, as Pisa sometimes to the Florentines, Cremona to the Venetians, and Salamina to Athens, it may be holden for the safest: for by this manner of Institution, they shall more easily retain the subjects in their obedience and subjection.    

THE THIRD BOOK OF Solon his folly.  

CAP. 1. A description of this word Declination, with the several signs and tokens thereof, whereof some are termed ordinary, others extraordinary.  SOL: 
You have made a perfect anatomy of this word Reformation, and not only with the cunning Painter you have described the outward shows and lineaments, but with the wise Physician you have well known, and laid open the inward parts thereof: but now disclose unto us, the secrets which lie hidden under the words subsequent, and contained in the first and general description, namely of a declined commonweal.  Ep: 
These words offer sundry matters worthy of consideration.  Sol: 
What be they?  Epi: 
First, the description of this word Declination; secondly, the signs and tokens; thirdly, the times; four the parts and members; fifthly, the causes and occasions; and lastly, the means to resist the same.  Sol: 
Make the first step unto the description thereof, which is the first matter herein to be considered.  Epi: 
A Declination of a body politic, is nothing else but a fall and departure from his first institution, and perfection, so as we may rightly term it the subject and matter of this our reformation.  Sol: 
You have aptly described the same: therefore make your progression unto the second matter, and declare unto us the signs and tokens, which with jonas as forerunners and messengers, giveth the City of Niniveh to understand of their declination, and destruction.  Epi: 
The death of noble and worthy personages, doth threaten a declination of the welfare and happiness of estates, and commonweals. For the first token (saith Plutarch,) that threatened some great mischief to the commonwealth of Rome, was the death of julius one of the Censores: for the Romans, saith he, do greatly reverence the office of a Censor, and esteem it as a sacred place.  Sol. 
And hath not the city of Rome, of late years been deprived of grave and worthy Censores, by untimely death, not inferior to julius?  Epi: 
Yes verily: and for this cause we are greatly to fear that changing our ancient Consuls for new Decemviri with the city of Rome, we perish and fall in actions of great importance and difficulty: and therefore with that faithful and worthy citizen Camillus, I pray daily upon my knees, that this bitter calamity unto us now threatened, if the same may not be turned from us, do light upon myself, and such other private citizens of Rome, that have deserved the same, so as the city with her noble army and forces may be preserved.  Sol: 
Pass this over with this comfort, that the new Decemviri retain in them the great virtue and worthiness even of the ancient Consuls; and proceed unto signs of declination.  Epi: 
There may not be greater signs found of common calamities ensuing, than an universal security, which sometimes possesseth the minds and hearts of the subjects. The which was found in the Romans, at such time as they sustained the great overthrow by the power of the Gauls; for then all sorts of persons in the city were found to be possessed with a general security, in somuch that they neglected all religion, they contemned the holy order of the Faecials, and made no account of their propounded religion, and lastly they were found so secure, as they neglected all their former discipline of wars, yea they jested and made themselves merry with Marcus Cedicius, which gave them warning thereof. In like manner a general security did possess the Philistians, when as jonathan said to the young man that bore his armour, come, and let us go over unto the garrison of these uncircumcised, for it is not hard for the Lord to save with many or with few, so as they both showed themselves to the Philistians; but they as men secure, scorned jonathan, and said, see the Hebrews come out of the holes wherein they have hid themselves for a long time, but jonathan eftsoons put them to the sword. But for that the histories and reports of ages past, do afford infinite proofs and examples hereof, let us proceed readily unto other signs and tokens of declinations.  Sol: 
Before a general declination, the people are found possessed with a general fear; for before the overthrow given by Samuel unto the Philistians, the people were holden with a mighty fear of their future fortunes, and of the event of those wars, insomuch as it is said, there was a fear in the host, and in the field, and among all the people, the garrison also and they that went out to spoil were afraid themselves, and the earth trembled, for it was stricken with fear by the Lord. And after this manner Christ prophecieing of the destruction of jerusalem, unto such as asked what signs shall there be when these things shall come to pass, he said, there shall be trouble upon earth, and among nations perplexity, & men's hearts shall fail them for fear, and for looking after those things which shall come on the world.  Epi: 
After such time as Camillus was unjustly condemned and banished, there was not a Roman of any understanding, but believed certainly, that some great punishment would follow them incontinently, and that the wrong and injury which they had done him, would be quickly requited with some sharp and terrible revenge, not only unpleasant to think upon, but farther most notable to be spoken of through the world: then fell out so suddenly upon the same, such mischiefs towards the city of Rome, as it was doubted to be the handy work of some God, that would not suffer virtue to be unrecompensed with ingratitude.  Sol: 
There remaineth yet a greater sign of declination.  Epi: 
What may the same be?  Sol: 
When the commonwealths shall generally departed from all the parts and right rules of government, the same is a manifest sign of declination. For before the overthrow of Rome by the power of the Gauls, there was found all disorder and confusion, they were not governed by one self-same commander, as in former times, but their governors being many, contrary to the discipline of wars, bred nought else but confusion. The like disorder did they admit in all the other parts of their government, as in the history thereof more at large appeareth, the which did breed the ruin and destruction of that city. These be the ordinary signs of declination.  Sol: 
You seem hereby to give us to understand of signs extraordinary.  Epi: 
Yea verily.  Sol: 
What be they?  Epi: 
Great earthquakes shallbe in diverse places, hunger, pestilence, and fearful things, and great signs shall there be in heaven, there shall be signs in the sun, and the moon, and in the stars, the sea and waters shall roar; this is the time wherein jerusalem shall be trodden under foot of the Gentiles, until the time of the Gentiles be fulfilled; these be the times wherein they shall fall on the edge of the sword, and shallbe led captive to all nations; these be the signs whereby as by the budding of the fig tree, we know summer to be near at hand, so by these we may discern common calamities a far of, as also when they approach near unto us.  Sol: 
Before Caesar was murdered in the Senate house, there appeared many terrible signs in the heavens, in the air, and upon the earth, which did threaten his overthrow and destruction, and many common calamities unto that city: in like manner before the sacking, burning, and destroying of Rome by the Gauls, one Marcus Cedicius a man of fair condition, honest, and of good conscience, told unto the Tribunes a thing that was well to be considered of: for he said that the night before as he was going on his way, in the new street, he hard one call him aloud, and returning back to see what it was, he saw no living creature, but only heard a voice bigger than a man's, which said unto him, Marcus Cedicius, go thy way to morrow morning to the Tribunes of the soldiers, and bid them look quickly for the Gauls.  Epi: 
Surely God governeth the world, and the creatures upon earth, mercifully and lovingly, in sending sometimes Marcus Cedicius unto the city of Rome, yea sometimes jonas unto the city of Niniveh, nay that which is more, in making the dumb creatures, as well in heaven as in earth, to speak unto us, and foretell us of our destruction.  Sol: 
To the good they be tokens of his mercy and favour, and to the wicked they threaten his justice and judgement, so as what the highest hath determined in his secret foreknowledge, the same shall stand and may not pass. For in vain shall Caelphurnia cry out in the night, Caesar is slain, for he shall not give credit unto dreams; in vain shall she persuade him in the day to keep his house, & not to go abroad, for he shallbe deluded with the hopes and flatteries of Brutus; in vain shall the soothsayer forewarn him of his destruction, for he shall not regard prophecies; in vain do his friends and well-willers set down in writing the days, times, and means of his destruction, and deliver the same into his hands, for he shall not once read or regard it; so the highest hath determined and the same shall stand and may not pass: Brutus shall flatter, wound, and kill him, and he shall fall with the stroke thereof; in vain shall Marcus Cedicius forewarn the Tribunes of the people, that the Gauls with their army are marching towards Rome, for they shall laugh and make themselves merry thereat, and not foresee how they may resist them; they shall be as men amazed and bewitched, and forget even their ordinary discipline, and fall into all disorder of government, their City shall be wasted and destroyed; for so the highest hath determined, and the same shall stand and may not pass.  Epi: 
To this purpose Plutarch writing of the death of Caesar, saith, that the declinations and destinies are more easily foreseen then avoided.   

CAP. 2. The times wherein commonweals do usually fall and decline.  SOL: 
But what may be the times ordained by a secret foreknowledge in the breast of the highest, of the declination of commonweals?  Epi: 
The same only is known to the highest, and to us left uncertain.  Sol: 
But what doth he not manifest every where by his ordinary power and government of this inferior world, of that whereof we may in no sort be ignorant?  Epi: 
By his ordinary government you mean nought else but his power, whereby he giveth to all things their first being, progression, continuance, perfection, and declination.  Sol: 
Thus you make the perfection of all things, to be the end of his continuance, and the beginning of his declination, and to be the last show of his being, and the first of his declining.  Epi: 
I will show you the truth, even from the mouth of that Prophet Daniel, a mighty king shall stand up, saith he, that shall rule with great dominion and do according to his pleasure, and when he shall stand up, his kingdom shall be broken, and shall be divided towards the four winds of the heavens, and not to his posterity nor according to his dominion, which he ruled, for his kingdom shallbe plucked up by the roots, and the same given unto others.  Sol: 
By this example, you seem to infer, that kingdoms and principalities, being at the highest, do then decline and fall: for so did this mighty king Alexander (whom the Prophet Daniel now intendeth) sometimes rule great dominions, but even then saith the Prophet did he perish, even when he commanded at his pleasure, and lastly, even when this king (saith the Prophet) did stand up, and was at the highest, even than did he fall with a disease which followed his drunkenness and superfluity, or otherwise by the poison which was given by Cassander, even than was his kingdom broken, saith the Prophet, and plucked up by the roots, even than was the time wherein it was divided amongst strangers, namely his twelve chief princes, and not given unto his posterity, than it was wherein his posterity did murder and destroy one the other, even these were the times, wherein his kingdom soon after was divided towards the four winds of the heavens: for Seleucus had Syria, Antigonus Asia Minor, Cassander the kingdom of Macedonia, and Ptolomaeus Egypt.  Ep: 
You well understand as well the matter, as my meaning, and to the same purpose, saith the Prophet Daniel, there shall arise a king so mighty, that he shall do what him list, he shall exalt and magnify himself, against all that is God, but when his glory shall be every where increased, than the king of the South shall push at him, and the king of the North shall come against him, and like a whirlwind, with chariots, and horsemen, and with many ships, shall enter his pleasant country, and have power over all the treasures of gold and silver, and over all the princes things of Egypt, and none shall be found that may withstand him, he shall plant the tabernacles of his palace, between the seas and the glorious and holy mountain, but even then is the time, saith the Prophet, that he shall come to his end, and none shall help him.  Sol: 
These were the Romans, which sometimes reigned upon earth like Gods: but even then eftsoons they perished as men. For when Augustus had overcome the Parthians, and recovered that which Antonius lost, when they were found to reign quietly from sea to sea, and in judaea, then came they to their end, and none was found that could help them.  Epi: 
The same Prophet saith, the king of the South shall be angry with the king of the North, and shall set forth a great multitude, and fight with the king of the North, and the multitude shallbe given into his hands, than the multitude shallbe proud, and their hearts shallbe lifted up, for he shall cast down thousands, but he shall not still prevail, for the king of the North shall come and cast up a mount and take the strong City, and the arms of the South shall not resist, neither shall there be any strength to withstand, but he shall come and do with him what he list, and none shall stand against him.  Sol: 
The Prophet intendeth Philopater which sometimes governed great dominions, yet could he not withstand the power of Antiochus, & Philip king of Macedon, which then came against him, neither shall the Egyptians be able to resist Stopus Antiochus captain, for this is the the time wherein none shall be found that may withstand them.  Epi: 
And in the same place it is said, that when the king of the North shall take the strong city, yea even when the arms of the king of the South shall not resist him, yea then when there may not be found any strength to withstand him, even then when he hath planted himself in the pleasant land, even then, saith the Prophet, shall a Prince be found, which shall cause his shame to light upon him, beside that he shall cause his own shame to turn upon himself by retiring towards the forts of his own land, but he shall be overthrown and fall, and be no more found.  Sol: 
Thus did Antiochus sometime fall, whom the Prophet here intendeth, when as Attilius and Lucius Scipio, did put him to flight, so as for fear of the Romans, he was forced to fly to his holds and forts, and after robbing the temple of jupiter Dodonaeus, was slain by the people of the country: so as we may infer by these examples nothing else, but that commonweals do participate with the quality and nature of all other creatures, in that first they have their being, their progression, their continuance, their perfection, and lastly their declination; so as from their being they receive progression, from progression they receive continuance, from contitinuance a perfection, from their perfection a declination: for his perfection is nought else, but his ripeness which is gathered by continuance, by whose poised and weight, eftsoons it falleth to the ground and declineth.  Epi: 
You well understand the matter.  Sol: 
Then let us make our progression unto the parts and members of every declination.   

CAP. 3. All declinations are in number two, the one ad sanitatem, the other ad interitum.  EPI: 
All declinations are after two sorts: the one, ad sanitatem; the other, ad interitum; both which declinations did sometimes appear in the commonwealth of Rome: the one, when as the Senate and people by contending for honours, gave occasions of most happy laws, and more happy restitution of the declined state of that politic body. But after declining by peace, rest, and security, unto a corruption of manners, they never could give an end unto their contentions then raised for profit and gain, so as the same may be said to be a final declination, not ad sanitatem, but ad interitum.   

CAP. 4. The several occasions and causes of all declinations, and first of occasions maliciously suggested.  SOL: 
There remaineth now that we do proceed unto the occasions and causes of all declinations, which is the fift matter remembered by you worthy of consideration.  Epi: 
You have well put me in remembrance thereof. For as the declination of our natural bodies ariseth chiefly either from occasions, as rest, labour, heat, cold, hunger, thirst, superfluity, abundance, or from the malice or distemperature of the disease or sickness itself: so the declination of this politic body groweth partly by occasions, and partly from the malice and corruption of the subject, as from the unnatural distemperature of that body.  Sol: 
The truth of your opinion neither wanteth proof nor example: for in the declination of the commonweal of Rome, in the times and regiment of Tarquin, we may behold first a general distemperature bred in the body of that commonweal by his misgovernment, so as the people and Senators did expect nothing more than a fit occasion to execute the same. And if the deflowering of Lucretia had not happened, yet no doubt this distemperature and malice of the subject would have attended other occasions, as they should conveniently have offered themselves. But if this malice and distemperature had not proceeded with the occasion, or if the occasion had not accompanied this distemperature, no doubt Brutus and Collatinus would have desired the just punishment of this offence, rather at the hands of Tarquin, then by the aid & help of the people.  Ep: 
Therefore wisely saith one, sine occasione frustra virtus, sine virtute frustra occasio sese obtulit. For in vain shall occasions proffer themselves, where they find not the malice of the subject ready to rescue and assist them. And in vain likewise shall the malice of the subject swell and overflow his bounds, when all occasions shall be removed, which are in place of the feet and legs that support this distemperature.  So: 
To disclose therefore the chief & principal occasions, which may further and nourish any way the distemperature of this politic body, seemeth a matter not unworthy of deliberation.  Epi: 
Nay it is a matter rather which should possess the highest thoughts of the mind & understanding of Princes and Emperors.  Sol: 
Let us proceed to enumber them if we may, and set them down under the account of matters necessary for the better sustaining and upholding of this politic body.  Ep: 
Occasions are usually after two sorts: either given; or maliciously sought and suggested.  Sol: 
You have said the truth: for when Darius preferred Daniel above all the other rulers and governors, because the spirit in him was excellent, they sought an occasion against Daniel, concerning the kingdom, but they could find no fault, and therefore it is said, we may find no occasion against Daniel, except we find it against him concerning the law of God: whereupon the rulers craftily conspired to go unto the king, and after this manner to advance their malice they spoke unto him, king Darius live for ever: all the rulers of thy kingdom, the officers and governors, the counsellors and dukes have consulted together to make a decree for the king, and to establish a statute, that whosoever shall ask a petition of any God or man for thirty days save of thee O king, he shall be cast into the den of Lions. Now O king confirm the decree, and seal the writing that it be not changed according to the law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not. This request feeding the ambition of king Darius, was eftsoons sealed by him, & he made a law and decree. Then these men assembled and found Daniel praying and making supplication unto his God. The which eftsoons they embraced as a fit occasion lente for the destroying of Daniel, and repairing to the king, said unto him after this manner, hast thou not sealed the decree that every man that shall make request to any God or man within thirty days save to thee O king shall be cast into the den of Lions? the king answered and said, the thing is true according to the law of the Medes, and Persians, which altereth not. Then answered they and said unto the king; this Daniel which is of the children of the captivity of judah, regardeth not thee O king, nor the decree that thou hast sealed, but maketh his petition three times a day. But understand O king, that the law of the Medes and Persians is, that no decree or statute which the king confirmeth, may be altered or broken. Then forthwith by the king's commandment, Daniel was cast into the lions den. This one example may suffice for occasions maliciously suggested.   

CAP. 5. Of occasions given by misgovernement, and such other means.  SOL: 
Let us now proceed to enumber the occasions given.  Ep: 
Occasion of declining is then given, when the nobility is not respected: for Caesar by holding a light estimation of the Senanators and nobles, at such time as they repaired to give unto him honours, and by depriving and abusing the Tribunes Marullus and Flavius, did give the first occasion, saith Plutarch, of his fall & declining: & Romulus entreating the Senators and nobles of Rome, more severely and rigorosly then in former times they were accustomed, was for this cause by treason murdered.  Sol: 
And no less occasion is then given of falling and declining, when either by the iniquity of times, or the proper industry of princes, the nobility is in so great measure advanced, as they become thereby dangerous & fearful unto the state: by the one occasion Salamina hath often & sundry times declined.  Epi: 
What by the iniquity of times?  Sol: 
Yea verily: for upon the division of the house of Lankaster & York, justice there declining, the nobility held as it were a sovereign commandment over the commonalty, they call their lands by the name of their countries, their tenants by the name of their followers and men, they give laws, and prescribe unto the people their manner of living, they oppress where they dislike, they reward whom they favour, they perish whom they hate, and finally they make themselves judges and arbitrators of the goods, lands, life, liberty, and of all the fortunes of the subject. 
Anno 〈◊〉 decimo E● cap. 7. fol. 168.  The which over great power and commandment doth lively appear in the act made for the taking away of the great authority of Captainship with all exactions: wherein it is declared, that the Lords of Salamina in the time of justice declination, under the pretence of defending the people of Salamina, & their own possessions, arrogated unto themselves absolute and regal authority within large circuits; by the distribution whereof each man had as much right as force would give him leave, by means whereof they grew unto such greatness as they acknowledged no superior, no obedience unto the counsels of Athens; they hold for laws there own wills and desires, by their proper authority they gather and assemble the people of the said pretenced countries, rules, and Captaineships, to treat, conclude, and agree for making of war, or peace, roads, injuries, granting of ceases, been volences, finding of men of war, as horsemen, footmen, galloglass, kearne, hasbutteres, horses, horseboyes, hunts, studkeepers, officers, and adherentes: and more than this, these Nobles and Lords did lead as Captains, the people thus assembled unto the accomplishing of act and acts offensive, and invasive without special authority.  Epi: 
By these statutes and records thus by you remembered, it seemeth that all the wars of Salamina did proceed from the greatness of the Nobles and Lords.  Sol: 
So much the record itself doth report, 
Anno 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168. Vid Attay. of the earl of Kildare. acts 28. H. 8. cap. 1.  where as it it is said, that their greatness was such, as they did acknowledge no superior, nor any obedience unto Athens. It is said also that the might and greatness of james sometimes Earl of Desmonde; Garralde Fitz garrald, Earl of Kildare, and Thomas Fitz garrald his son, was the occasion of many rebellions, as by the records of Salamina more at large it may appear.  Epi: 
It seemeth also by the records of Salamina, by you now remembered, that the Nobles & Lords by their greatness did mightily oppress the commonalty, enforcing them to grant ceases, benevolences, finding of men at arms, as horsemen, footmen, galloglass, kearne, hasbutters, horses, horseboyes, hunts, studkeepers, officers, and adherents.  Sol: 
Yes verily: for by way of protection and defence the nobility did levy exactions intolerable, so as they were forced to establish a law, that no man within the land of Salamina shall have any tribute, or exaction, or any other unlawful imposition of or upon any subject within the same land.  Epi: 
Herein they were provident of the preservance and continuance of the estate of Salamina; for nothing giveth greater occasion of declining then the oppression of the commonalty. For the Israelites being mightily oppressed by the Egyptians, were thereby enforced to follow Moses, by whom they were restored unto their liberty. The Persians, Medorum imperio infensi, were thereby induced to follow Cyrus. And the natural citizens of Rome, being not defended from the oppression and fury of Hannibal, took occasion of revolting and rebelling. How displeasing oppressions be every where unto the multitude, the same the people of Salamina have lively witnessed, when as they termed sometimes the exactions of Coiney and Livery, imposed by the nobility and Lords of that land, by the name of grievous exactions: nay with great Emphasies they term it the fret of our times, and substance: nay yet with greater indignation carried against this manner of oppression, they term it by the name of that horrible and most detestable custom of Coiney and Livery, yea they term it to be the very nurse, and teat, that gave suck and nutriment to all disobedience, rebellions, enormities, vices, and iniquities of that realm over fowl and filthy, here to be expressed, and such as did justly provoke the wrath and vengeance of the almighty God upon the people of that land. The like oppression of the nobility over the meaner people, was sometimes the author of many seditions in Rome, and provoked the people to demand Tribunes, which as arbitrators of the insolency of the nobility, might give them just defence from their oppression. And this stirreth the people sometimes the better, to make their deliverance from the oppression of the mighty, with the consent of the foreign enemy, even to the invading and destroying of the people & country.   

CAP. 6. The means to withstand all occasions of declining, growing unto the come: +mon-wealth by the greatness of the nobility.  SOL: 
Sith this seemeth to be a matter of so great importance, to defend the multitude from the oppression of the mighty, it shall be convenient that we now proceed unto the means whereby we may in such cases, as well abate the greatness of the Lords and Nobles, as also deliver the multitude from their oppressions and wrongs.  Epi: 
The means are sundry.  Sol: 
What be they?  Epi: 
First we are to establish laws, whereby as well the dignity of the Nobles, as the liberty of the people, may be preserved and defended, according to the example of all commonweals well governed.  Sol: 
Herein Salamina is found inferior to no nation, especially for laws, which respect the liberty and welfare of the people, the which is the matter now in deliberation.  Epi: 
What be they?  Sol: 
The laws against Coiney and Livery, the laws against Captainship, the laws against taking of pledges contrary to the common law, with many other laws prohibiting unlawful customs and exactions; so as it seemeth that good laws are not sufficient to render a commonweal, happy and prosperous.  Epi: 
No surely, no more than a medicine well prepared may cure the diseases of the body, if the same be not rightly applied: it resteth therefore, that governoures provincial, do diligently intend the observation of these laws, in such sort, as they be inviolable, whereby in a short time they shall confirm the minds of the multitude, and render them secure, quiet, and contented.  Sol: 
This which you have said, by sundry acts and records, now extant for Salamina, may appear: for there it is said, that the people were not only drawn from rebellions and unlawful attempts, by the extirpation of this exaction of Coiney and Livery, but they were sometimes by the due exaction of that law, strongly endued to affect and embrace justice and peace, so as all commandments by way of justice are there obeyed. Nay that which is more, in place of cursing and rebellions, there is found joy, jollity, and blessing of that goddess Minerva, the protector and defender of Athens, by whose providence so great an evil was removed. So as we may conclude, that nothing doth so much induce a nation or people, be they natural subjects or gained by conquest, to embrace that government which is prescribed unto them by those which have rule, power, & authority over them, there is nothing (I say) so available to render them loyal subjects, & willing embracers of government, as a just defence given by due execution of profitable laws from all oppressions and wrongs.  Epi: 
You have said the truth: for a nation conquered desire their former liberty; for no other cause so greatly, as thereby to possess that which is their own freely and securely; so as enjoying the same, they have attained the end of their desires, and rest for the most part contented with the government. But on the contrary, with the oppression of the mighty, the thoughts and desires of their former liberty are daily kindled, in such sort, as they stick not to practise with foreign enemies the restitution thereof. It is necessary therefore in such countries, that the laws for the defence of the multitude against oppressions be holden inviolable, in such sort as every one may▪ confidently say with the governoures of Darius, it is the law of the Medes and Persians which may not be broken.  Sol: 
But some provincial governoures of Salamina, have been found more studious with Savanorola in making of profitable laws, then faithful observers thereof, whereby the whole country of Salamina hath well near perished: but I could wish, that with Savanorola at the least they might lose their honour and estimation amongst the Florentines: for much evil ariseth unto Salamina, not only from the malice of the people, but by the negligence of Magistrates, in that they hold not their laws inviolable; for the which causes they may never confirm the minds of the multitude unto the state, nor render them quiet, and contented. But what other means is now left unto us to deliver the multitude from oppression?  Epi: 
Commissioners in every of the several Provinces are to be constituted, which as judges shall restrain and suppress the ambition of the nobles, and shall carefully defend the people from oppressors. Therefore wisely the king of France hath constituted a judge or arbitrator, which as a third person sine regis invidia proceres caederet, & tenuiores tueretur. Nihil melius, nihil sapientius hoc decreto esse potuit: nec regni aut ipsius regis potior securitatis causa.  Sol: 
But what number of judges may suffice herein?  Epi: 
You say well: for if one judge be ordained, the mighty and great personages shall more easily corrupt him, than many. Therefore the Florentines having entertained but one judge for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobility, whom they called Capitaneun, seeing him seduced by the nobility, in his place constituted eight judges or Commissioners.  Sol: 
But in this second institution, they found less security then in the first: for where a few are placed for the rule and government, there they be found commonly ministers and pleasers of the nobility, and contemners of the people; the which the Venetians wisely foreseeing, have not only ordained their Decemviri, but also other magistrates, quos Quarantos vocant, & further for the same only they have constituted Concilium Praegium qui summus est magistratus, to this end, that neither judges nor accusers should be wanting for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobility.  Epi: 
As you have said, this must needs be the best form of government that may possibly be ordained in such cases; for many judges are not so easily corrupted as one: again many are found to be of greater strength and integrity to resist the displeasure of the nobility than few; and like as many eyes discern more perfectly than one, and that which escapeth or deceiveth one eye, may be perceived and that without error by many; so many wits judge more sound and sincerely then one. Lastly, we all obey more willingly the censures of many, than the judgements of a few, or one person whatsoever.  Sol: 
But whither are we in such cases more to endeavour the favour of the nobility or the multitude?  Epi: 
It is said that a Monarchy governed popularlie is then secure and void of peril: for in the multitude or people consisteth the strength and force of every kingdom; the which Nabid king of the Lacedæmonians well understanding, endeavoured wholly the love and favour of the people, so as with his proper forces he was able to withstand and resist his enemies, without the aid of foreign princes. And Appius Claudius on the contrary, neglecting the favour of the people, did wholly cleave to the nobility, and lost thereby the principality and commandment which then he had obtained.  Solo: 
It must be confessed that in commonweals gained by conquest, you shall advance your government more assuredly by the favour of the people, then by the might of the nobility; for nature itself by an enforcing necessity hath taught the weaker part to adhere unto that which is the strongest; and for this cause the people divers ways oppressed by the ambition of the mighty, are forced thereby to hasten and run unto their conqueror, as unto a large palm tree, to be defended from the storms and violence of the mighty, so as delivering them from oppressions, they willingly yield their obedience; but of the contrary the nobility are not so readily won nor so easily kept. Therefore the Romans' in all countries by them conquered, did labour nothing more than to humble and deject the mighty, & to protect and defend the feeble & weak, and deliver the people from oppressions. The like order of government did the Grecians observe, especially in provinces by them conquered, which differed in language and manner of living: for there the people, if they be not carefully defended from the oppressions of the mighty, by these outward differences as signs and badges of their former liberty, do hasten for the restitution thereof unto all rebellions, and do provoke some foreign enemy to invade. Farther in commonweals where generally the manners of the people are found corrupted, there dangerous it is to advance the Lords & chieftains, 
Anno: 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168.  as it may appear by the statutes & records of Salamina: for there it is declared that the L: and chieftains of that land, in the times of justice declination, by pretext of defending the people and their own possessions, arrogated unto themselves absolute and royal authority within large circuits, by means whereof they grew unto such greatness, as they acknowledged no superior, nor obedience unto Athens, they held for laws their own wills and desires, and finally they assembled and led the people unto the accomplishing of all acts offensive and invasive, without special authority, as before we have at large discoursed. Therefore in Salamina, and in other commonweals gained by conquest, where the manners of the people remain corrupted, we are to give impediment (saith a learned author) unto all the means whereby the nobles may raise themselves unto such greatness, as thereby they may become fearful unto the commonweal, and providently shall we favour and deliver the people in such estates from oppression.  Ep: 
For this cause wisely have the council of Salamina suppressed and cut of all exactions and tributes, by a firm and stable law before remembered, as the means, whereby the nobles and cheifetaines did raise themselves unto such greatness, as they became dangerous unto the commonweal. And to the same purpose have they made another statute, whereby it is ordained and enacted, that no Lord nor gentleman of the said land, retain by livery, wages, or promise, sign or token, 
Act Anno. H. 7. ●0. cap. 6.  by indenture or otherwise, any person or persons, but only such, as be or shallbe his officers, as bailiffs, stewards, learned counsels, receivers, and menial servants, daily in household, at the said Lords proper costs and charges entertained. Thus if wisely we give impediment unto the means which raise the chieftains and nobles of Salamina unto this greatness; if with Pompey we shall impeach the forces of Caesar by calling away two legions or regiments; if with Pompey we shall withdraw from Caesar, Labienus, and other his friends and commanders; if we shall cut off all exactions, and tributes, which Caesar leavieth upon the people; if we shall cut off all that infinite number of retainers, followers, and men which follow Caesar more than his menial household according to the statute of retainers; if we shall suppress all unlawful authorities of Captainship and such like, which Caesar challengeth over the meaner people; if the great and large countries which Caesar possesseth, we shall part and dismember by drawing in the custom of gavelkind, by the which policy, Wales was sometimes reform, and brought in subjection; then Caesar shall be no more able to rebel, and we shall rightly manage the state of Salamina,  Sol: 
Do you think, that the statute against Coiney and Livery, is a sufficient bar against the Lords and cheiftaines that they raise not themselves unto their former greatness?  Epi: 
No verily: for now they challenge those exactions as lawful services and reservations by the way of tenier heretofore reserved by their ancestors, & predecessors, & by these means hold the subject in servage, or otherwise they drive them to particular shifts, which are tedious, infinite, and troublesome to the state, and the utter undoing of the subject; all which may well be appeased by way of composition betwixt the Lords and tenants: and the better to enable us to make an equal composition herein, we are to understand that these demands are of three sorts, and kinds: The one received his beginning by unlawful means, namely by force and by violence, these are commonly called by the names of black rents; such were the exactions which the Obrians sometimes levied upon the inhabitance of the country of Limbricke. Other demands there be, which did grow by way of giving protection and defence, from such as found themselves oppressed with the power and might of others; such exactions sometimes have been yielded by the inhabitants of the small country of Limbricke, unto the ancestors of the now Earl of Kildare, and such did Mac Morris sometimes yield unto the late Earl of Desmond attainted. Lastly, other demands there be which did grow by the way of tenier; these may easily be discerned from the others, in that they be due unto the Lord only, from the hands of his proper tenants or freehoulders, and the same commonly shall appear to be so by writing or indenture.  Sol: 
You have well disclosed the means whereby the greatness of the nobility and chieftains may be abated, and the people defended from the oppression of the mighty, in times peaceable, wherein law and justice doth prevail. It seemeth also that it is a matter of like necessity that the good subject be defended from the oppression of the enemy or rebel: for the natural subjects of Rome, revolted unto Hannibal, when as they found themselves not defended from his oppression.  Epi: 
We must with Fabius providently from time to time send aid sufficient to such as are our subjects and friends, whereby we shall still hold and keep them in obedience and subjection.  Sol: 
If this course had generally been holden by some governors of Salamina, the rebellions had neither been great, neither yet of long continuance; therefore wisely it is said, Qui non defendit nec obsistit si potest iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quàm si parentes aut patriam aut socios deserat: and after this manner speaketh a christian Doctor, saying, Fortitudo quae per bella tuetur â Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel â latronibus socios, plena justicia est. By which course of government, the Romans' almost conquered the whole world, as Cicero witnesseth saying, Noster populus, socijs defen●endis terrarum iam omnium potitus est.  Epi: 
It seemeth also to be a matter of like necessity, that the governors of Salamina do with all care and endeavour confirm the minds of the subjects by having a due regard of their merits and services towards the state, lest otherwise when no estimation is had of their merits and public services, they take occasion thereby of discontentment. For the slender care & estimation the French sometimes held of the public merits of such as had well deserved, gave the first occasion of their expelling out of Italy; for so much do their Chronicles and histories witness, where it is said, that the nobility were not embraced with that humanity they looked for, and much less had recompenses equal to their merits, yea they found many difficulties to enter into the chambers and audience of the king. There was no distinction of persons, the merits and services of men were not considered, but at adventure, the minds of such as were naturally estranged from the house of Arragon, were not confirmed, many delays and difficulties were suborned touching the restitution of the lands and goods of those that were of the faction of Anjou, and of the other Barons that had been banished by the old Ferdinando. And lastly favoures and graces were imparted to such as procured them by corruption and means extraordinary, & not to such as had deserved the same. Wisely therefore shall the governors of Salamina confirm the minds of such as are estranged from the house of Arragon, and countenance such as were banished by Ferdinando, and lastly if they shall impart favoures and graces to such as have deserved the same, according to the advice of Pliny, which saith, Tu largiere bellorum socijs, periculorum consortibus.   

CAP. 7. The occasions of declining, which usually arise unto the state by the disorders and oppression of the soldier.  EPI: 
No less occasion is offered of declining, when by the oppression of the soldier, the people remain discontented.  Sol: 
You say truly: for the disorder and violence of the soldiers draweth with it a suspicion of perpetual servitude, which caused the Italians to abandon the power of the French, for that they committed many disorders, and offered violence unto the people; so as that love, that desire, that affection, wherewith they honoured them before, had now taken contrary quality, and not only turned into hatred, conspiracy, and accursing against them, but also in the place of the malice they bore to the Arragon's, there was new insinuation of compassion to Ferdinando, in such sort, as all the kingdom with no less desire expected an opportunity, to repeal the Arragon's, than a few months before they had desired their destruction.  Sol: 
The same history doth witness the like in sundry other places, saying, that garrisons governed with a desire to spoil, and pray, be the authors of great discontentment: yet some there be carried with a contrary opinion, which give liberty unto the soldiers to oppress and spoil the people, following the counsel of Severus Imperator, which sometimes he gave unto his children, saying, Inter vos consentite, milites vitate, reliquos omnes spernite.  Epi: 
This counsel of Severus Imperator, no Prince may safely put in practice, but such as have a collected power and force into the strength of one entire army, which shall far exceed the force and strength of the people: as the Sulthan, the Turk, and such like kingdoms, which hath of footmen, twelve thousand in number, and sixteen of horsemen, for the guard of his person. These kingdoms and such like, shall more wisely favour and enrich, rather the soldier, than the people. But such Princes which have not a collected power, and force, and such as doth far exceed the strength and power of the people, are no farther to satisfy the soldier than justice, his deserts, and the laws of the land shall require. Therefore Carolus passing many countries, where the forces of his soldiers were inferior to the people, did straightly command, that they should abstain from committing of wrongs and injuries.  Sol: 
This which you have said agreeth with reason, but sometimes not with the necessity of times, which was never yet subject to human discretion.  Epi: 
It must be confessed, that the times of wars, and peace are not all one, but yet as well in the times of wars, as also in times peaceable, we ought to show ourselves studious in delivering the people from oppression: For what hope may we have of those cities, ubi milites in cives graviùs quam in hosts grassantur.   

CAP. 8. The ready ways and means to resist all occasions of declining, which may arise by the oppression of the Soldiers.  SOL: 
Then we shall readily perform the same, if we shall remove the occasions which are in number two: namely the want of pay; and want of other discipline; for if the soldier were well paid, and offending by martial discipline well punished, all disorders by these means would be easily reform.  Epi: 
You say well: payment ought first to be made, and then discipline exercised, for disciplinam, inquit Cassiodorus, servare non potest icinnu● exercitus, dum quod deest semper praesumat armatus.  Sol: 
But ought this payment to be made at the charge of the Prince, or of the subjects.  Epi: 
At the common charge of the subjects? because it is a common safeguard 〈◊〉 benefit which equally redoundeth to all.  Sol: 
You say well: for garrisons are placed for nought else, but to guard the good subject from the sudden invasion or oppression of the enemy or rebel, and if they ought to defray the charge, that reap the benefit, than every subject should make equal contribution herein.  Epi: 
We do agree herein, that payment ought to be made at the common charge of the subject, but convenient it were that this charge were drawn to a contribution certain; for where the contributions are altogether uncertain by the way of cease, or otherwise, there the people are usually oppressed, and the Prince wearied with complaints, or the same rejecting, the people, take occasion thereby to mutiny and rebel. Therefore wisely Henricus secundus rex Francorum nostra aetate tributum imperarat, Anno. 1549. Quod vulgus talionum appellavit, testatus seid militum stipendio daturum, ne cum caeteris vectigalibus conturbaretur, ut plebs abiniurijs ac direptionibus militum tuta esset. At an other time, payment was made by certain cities for the maintenance of ten legions, ut ab incensionibus ac direptionibus militum tutae essent. In like manner the counsel of Athens by receiving a composition certain from the hands of the subject, in lieu of cease and duties uncertain, have thereby mightily quieted and pacified the subject, augmented the public treasury, and advanced and reform that government.  Epi: 
Show us I pray you the order and manner of the compositition.  Sol: 
The first composition taken for the west parts, was framed after this manner, as it may appear by this precedent which I do here deliver unto you:  

By the Lord President and Counsel of Monster.  
Whereas john Mac Conoghor of Corbally, in the County of Waterforde gentleman, complained unto us, that he holding and occupying two plough lands in Corbally aforesaid, the same being charged with cease, and other impositions uncertain, he desired to yield a yearly rent out of the same to her Majesty, in respect of the said cease and other 〈…〉 charges, to the maintenance of the household of the presidency, or otherwise that by occasion may be imposed upon the said County; and therefore hath granted and compounded for him and his heirs, to pay to her majesties use, yearly out of the said two plough lands, the sum of forty shillings sterling; which being by us on her majesties part and behalf accepted, We will and require you, and every of you, from hence forth in no wise to charge and impose or suffer to be charged, or imposed, the said lands, or any part thereof, with any her Majesties cease of horsemen, horse boys, kearne, galloglass, beef, mutton, pork, corn, subsidy, or any other charge or provision whatsoever, tending or belonging to her majesties service by way of cease to be demanded or challenged: In witness whereof, I the said john have to this part of the Indenture remaining with the said Lord Precedent set to my hand and seal, the xxvi of October, 1577.   Epi: 
I find sundry matters observed in the making of this composition worthy to be commended. First for that the same was effected with the consents of the subjects, and not forced and commanded, as sometimes the Israelites were by Samuel, which in his oration unto the people, said, Regem habituri estis, qui decimas fructuum vobis imperaturus est: neither here are they pressed by the authority of any duke of Alban, to render the tenth part of all things vendable, unde porro Belgarum ab Hispanis rebellantium orta seditio.  Sol: 
I hold reasonable tributes to be a matter of so great importance and necessity, as Princes may lawfully command and exact the same at the hands of the subject, and therefore saith one, Quid enim restaret, quo princeps imperium tueri possit, sublatis portorijs ac tributis? And therefore when Nero offered to acquit and deliver the subject of all tributes and impositions, wisely the Senate after thanks rendered unto Nero, dissuaded the fact, Ne Respub: aere diruta, momento collaberetur; saying, though many seditious persons desirous of innovation have promised the people immunity of all tributes and impositions, yet to grant the same it were altogether unlawful; and if it were lawful, yet ought you not to do the same for the safety of the commonweal, Cum eo veluti firmamento Resp: nitatur.  Epi: 
Be it so, that they may command a matter so necessary for the sustaining and upholding of the commonweal; yet for the avoiding of sedition, and the discontentment of the people, their consents are required, the time also is to be regarded, the nature of the commonweal is to be respected, and lastly the employment of those tributes ought to be unto public uses. For Princes in the beginning of their government are not to impose tributes, fearing lest the ten tribes for this cause shall rebel, and that a new king be chosen in the place of Roboham. But at such times they shall more wisely with the French King being newly possessed of the Duchey of Milbaine, acquit & discharge the people of all tributes, which did mightily as then advance his conquest. Again, the nature and condition of the commonwealth is a matter no less worthy of consideration, than the time: for if the commonweal hath been from time to time a free estate and not subject to others, as sometimes the Romans' were, to such estates all manner of tributes are grievous, and therefore not to be exacted, but upon urgent causes, the which ceasing, the people ought to be delivered from tributes. But the people of Florence on the contrary, having always lived in servitude, and as tributaries to others, admit willingly all sorts of impositions and tributes from time to time imposed upon them by their duke: and for this cause Salamina long ere this might have been made profitable unto Athens, for that they have always lived in servitude, and subject to all impositions and tributes, and many exactions have been reared there by force and violence, to the maintenance of idle and evil disposed persons, the which being converted to private uses and not to public services, have little profited the City of Athens; all which the records and statutes of Salamina, do many ways witness, and especially the statutes against Coiney and Livery: and therefore the last matter which is the employment of tributes to public uses, is not the least; wherein we are to have divers regards: first, care is to be had of the Prince and his family; secondarily of the stipendarily soldiers, the which two matters are chiefly respected and regarded in the composition before remembered; thirdly of magistrates, which for want of their pay and stipend, do more eagerly sometimes then the soldiers rob and devour the people; fourthly of such as have well deserved of the commonweal. Finally care is to be had of the poorer subjects, lest by want, and extreme poverty, they become movers of sedition.  Epi: 
The charge being thus defrayed, to the end exact payment may be made, it were convenient that the soldiers were paid by the paul; for if payment be made as now unto the Captains, the soldier receiving not the same in due time, dareth not complain against him, but is driven to seek his maintenance by oppressing of the people. Thus oftentimes the soldier is found to hate his captain which faileth to make payment, and the captain disliketh the soldier, because he faileth in order and government, so as by this private malice, impediment is given oftentimes unto public services. The which mischief hath reigned long in Salamina.  Sol: 
Doctor Sutliefe that learned and skilful writer hath discoursed hereof at large in his military works, and therefore we will proceed unto the other occasion of all the disorders in the men of garrison, which is the want of military discipline; for having neither a judge nor court martial orderly kept for the due trial and punishment of offenders, the soldier for the most part receiveth no punishment for his offence, or being punished in courts civil, they may well complain of their manner of trial by the native borne people of the country.  Epi: 
It is prohibited in all countries well governed to the men of garrison, to hold any affinity, consanguinity, contract, or bargains, with the native borne people of the country, fearing least by this intercourse of friendship, the garrisons may be at the last corrupted: but greater occasion of corruption is there given in Salamina, where not only these disorders are admitted by the negligence of Magistrates there placed, but that which is more, the native borne people are made triers of the life and fortunes of the men in garrison: and may they boldly prosecute in times of wars such as be enemies to the state, whom in times of peace they may justly fear as malicious criers of their goods, life, and fortunes whatsoever. Therefore most necessary it is, that a court martial be established and orderly kept, as you have said, throughout the whole province of Salamina, for the reforming of disorders and mischiefs before recited.   

CAP. 9 Occasions of declining are then given, when Magistrates placed for reformation of any Country or province, are not supported and countenanced during the time of their government.  SOL: 
There remain yet other occasions of the declining of commonweals, worthy of remembrance.  Epi: 
What may the same be?  Sol: 
If Princes, Kings, and States, shall not publicly grace, countenance, and support all governors and Magistrates by them placed for reformation of any province or nation during the time of their government, the subjects shall take thereby occasion of rebelling. For the Gauls understanding that Rome did conspire to disgrace Caesar, raised themselves forthwith in arms under the leading of Ambiorix, and Vercingentorix, in such sort, as if they had not to hastily proceeded therein, they had put all Italy in as great fear and danger, as it was sometimes when the Cimbri came to invade their city.  Epi: 
We need not search foreign examples herein: for Salamina by this error committed was for many years vexed with the rebellions of the Burkes and the Orurkes, until that famous knight Sir B. Bingham by his singular art and skill in military discipline, as an other Caesar, suppressed at the last Vercingentorix, and the rebelling Gauls.  Sol: 
What governoures were there, that were found so unskilful in their charge?  Epi: 
A late deputy of Salamina, whose name here I pass over with silence, for that I may not say, honoris causa nomino. But O you governoures, Princes, Kings, and Emperors, whatsoever, countenance all inferior governoures and magistrates placed for the reformation of any nation or province: countenance Pericles, which beholdeth always the Amazon holding his dart with a hand stretched forth even in his face, with whom as with a deadly enemy he must always be fight: countenance Camillus, which now is placed to reform and suppress the mutinous citizens, wherein if he fortune to be inferior for want of your countenance and assistance, he shall be suppressed, condemned; and banished, or at the least he must of force surrender his office of Dictator. Countenance Pericles, for otherwise he shall be as one that hath committed incest, he shall be a coward, the author of wars, yea of the plague, and of whatsoever else, which may draw with it the hatred of all the citizens of Athens. Countenance Camillus, for there shall be a Lucius Apulius, which maliciously shall accuse him for stealing part of the spoil of the Tuscans: Lastly countenance this Magistrate placed for reformation; for with David, he is placed to fight with a bear after a lion, with a Giant after a bear, with a King after a Giant, and with the Philistians after a King. They must fight with infamy after envy, with accusations after infamy, with condemnation after accusations, with judgement after condemnation, with imprisonment after judgement, with banishment after imprisonment, for Simul ista mundi conditor posuit Deus, odium atque regnum. But if you shall not countenance them, the Gauls shall rebel against Caesar, the citizens shall mutiny, but Camillus shall not be of force to suppress them; yea this action of reformation shall fall to the ground, and the commonweal itself may not long continue.   

CAP. 10. Occasions of declining, which arise unto the commonweal sometimes, by secluding a nation conquered, from bearing of offices, and dignities.  SOL: 
Let us proceed unto other occasions of declining of estates and commonweals, which arise oftentimes by secluding a nation or people conquered from bearing of offices or dignity in the commonweal: for they remain possessed with a desire to be restored unto their former liberty, for this cause especially, Vt ipsis dominari, & publicis muneribus praefici liceat.  Ep: 
And one the other side, no less occasion is given of declining, if you shall advance them unto the offices, and dignities of the commonweal. For did not Salamina decline sometimes by constituting garrald Fitz garrald attainted, Lieutenant of Salamina? did they not at other times decline by constituting Thomas Fitz garrald sometimes Lievetenaunt of the several provinces thereof? and at other times, by giving authority into the hands of james of Desmonde? all which, to them which shall view the several records of their attainder, more at large may appear. For the like causes, Nec Achaeorummerita in Romanos, vel Aetolorum unquam effecerunt, ut aliqua sibi imperij fieret accessio; nec Antiochi potentia fuerunt inducti, ut suo ipsorum consensu aliquam in ea provincia potestatem haberet. If the Lacedæmonians in their petition exhibited to the counsel of Amphictyons, held it convenient and necessary, that the towns and Cities of Greece, which were not of the league with the Grecians, against the barbarous people, should be removed from the place of a councillor; then much more, those which are not only, not parties with the Grecians, but of league with the barbarous people, yea their fee'd and sworn servants, are to be dismissed by the counsel of Amphictyons; for to such we shall more safely give offices of profit, then of commandment, whereby the multitude shall rest pleased, and the state acquitted of peril and danger: and if we shall give any higher places to any then those of profit and gain, let us then carefully with Antipater make choice of such Athenians, as shall not be studious of any innovation.   

CAP. 11. Occasions of declination, which arise sometimes by the difference of laws, religion, habit, and language.  SOL: 
You have well discussed this matter: therefore let us proceed unto other occasions, amongst which I may find none that doth more contain, and hold the subject of Salamina, in their disobedience and savage life, than the difference of laws, religion, habit, and language, which by the eye deceiveth the multitude, and persuadeth them that they be of sundry sorts, nations, and countries, when they be wholly together but one body, as the same more at large appeareth by the statutes and records of Salamina, 
Act. 28. H. 8. cap. 16.  in the which a manifest proof is alleged of that which I have said; for there it is affirmed, that those parts of Salamina, which embrace an uniformity of laws, religion, habit, and language, with the City of Athens, are found by daily experience, much more loyal, civil, and obedient, than all the other parts of Salamina, which are not as yet reduced unto so good an uniformity: for the which causes as well the counsel of Athens, 
Act: 28. H. 8. cap. 16.  as of Salamina, have established certain laws for the uniformity of religion, laws, habit, and language, and thereby have charged the subjects and governors of Salamina upon their duties of allegiance, to hold throughout all the parts thereof, one uniformity.  Epi: 
The Cities and towns which the Romans' did not destroy, were permitted as free subjects to live, and to enjoy their own laws: and it is said, that the king of France being taught by experience, that it was the most ready way to win the affections of the people, to permit them as free subjects to live, and enjoy their own laws, did revoke & call home his deputy from the government of the City of Genuenses, and permitted them to make choice of their own governor.  Sol: 
These objections which you have made, do receive several answers: and as for the Romans', they held that course and order of government by you remembered, until their power did extend beyond the confines of Italy, but then they gave Praetors, and provincial governors unto their Cities. Again, their lenity by you remembered, did as much advance their ambitious thoughts in conquering, as sometimes their knowledge in military discipline, so as it may be commended for a ready way to conquer, but not▪ as a safe way to hold and keep. And as for the French, we may not safely follow their steps as guides herein, for that they are deemed of all nations valiant conquerors, but not provident defenders and keepers thereof, so as unto them we may rightly say, Vincere scis Hannibal, sed uti victoria nescis.   

CAP. 12. The ready ways and means to remove aloccasions of declining.  
BUT now let us close up this long discourse with one policy used by the Romans', which being rightly applied may remove all occasions of declining: for after they had subjecteth Macedony unto their rule and government, for the better preventing of all occasions of rebelling, they divided the kingdom into four provinces, with a capital punishment to be imposed upon such, as should wander and travel from province to province, or should change their habitation, or contract affinities, or use merchandise with those of other provinces, by which course of government, they did eftsoons remove all occasions of declining and rebelling: for traitors and rebels having once incurred the penalty of laws, may find no safety but in wandering from province to province; their broken and decayed forces may not be repaired, but by contracting of affinities with such of other provinces, which they find to be of strength and force; and sometimes under the colour of merchandise, they transport letters, importing and nourishing thereby a general combination; by which means Shane Oneile attainted, sometimes laboured the corruption of all the West parts of Salamina, as in the statutes of his attainder it doth lively appear: and by the like practices before remembered, did the late Burkes and Orurkes of Conought nourish for a long time all their wicked rebellions. And therefore Mummius Consul Achaeis victis, quo minus rebellarent, caetibus ac societatibus interdixit, Corinthum quae duo maria brevi terrarum intervallo iungebat, disturbavit.   

CAP. 13. The subject and matter, as also the form, from whence every distemperature of this politic body hath his being and subsisting.  SOL: 
But sith we have discussed at large of the principal occasions of declining of estates and commonweals, and of the ways and means to suppress the same, it remaineth that we entreat at large of the distemperature of this politic body: for it behoveth princess not only to foresee and prevent occasions of their declining, but also to know the nature of this distemperature, and how it hath his subsisting and being, and by what means the same may be suppressed; for in vain shall occasions offer themselves, where this distemperature is not kindled, or being kindled where it is suppressed.  Epi: 
You have moved a matter of good importance, whereof the first is a distemperature of this politic body, the which is nothing else but a declining from a just proportion either in obeying or governing the subject. This distemperature with all other things hath his being and subsisting from his proper matter and form: the matter also hath his being, either from a general corruption of manners in the people, as in the times wherein Galba, and Pertinax lived and reigned, who though most just and upright kings, were notwithstanding slain by their subjects; or else it proceedeth from a corruption in the head only, the which sometimes reigned in Tarquin; for if the people had then been corrupted in manners, they could not have been found so constant defenders of their liberties, and so desirous of reformation. The form as in all other things, so unto this distemperature as unto his proper matter it giveth his subsisting & being, the which form if we shall describe, it may be resembled to a fair cloak given to cover foul practices, shaped out by a cunning workman, whereby the people oftentimes remain deluded, and the commonweal subverted; for so ambitious persons desirous of innovation, have always proceeded under an honest cloak and show, to distemper and disquiet the common peace of the weal public, and therefore it is truly said, Ambitio tam per virtutes quam per vitia nos oppugnat.  Epi: 
But here we are to observe this caution, that if this form hath not his proper matter which is the corruption of manners in the people, wherein it may make a deep impression, the distemperature that groweth thereby, shall easily be recovered: and for this cause the form which Tarquin gave to his ambition, was easily defaced by Brutus, and Valerius, for that the manners of the people were not then corrupted. In like manner Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Cassius, had set down unto themselves a form of disturbing the peace of the commonweal, and for the advancing of their own ambition, but finding the manners of the people then uncorrupted, the matter wanting into which, the form which they before had framed, might be received, they both failed of their purpose. But otherwise it fareth with the commonwealth, when this form hath found his proper matter and embraceth the same, namely the corruption of manners in the people; for in such a case there is kindled forthwith so mighty a distemperature, as without great resistance it may not be quenched: and for this cause the form of ambition which sometimes Sylla, Marius, and Caesar, had framed unto themselves, meeting and concurring at once with the corruption of manners in the people as his proper matter, did assuredly advance their ambition, to the overthrow of that estate. Therefore most false is that position, which affirmeth, that the people corrupted in manners, are more easily held in subjection, than a nation uncorrupted. The second caution to be observed, is the consideration of the sundry forms of disturbing commonweals, which usually doth advance her ambition not after one self-same manner, but sometimes with a show of profit, sometimes with the show of magnanimity, and at other times she promiseth an alteration and change of things to the contentment of al. After this last manner she presented herself sometimes unto the Athenians, and therefore it is said, that notwithstanding the citizens of Athens observed and obeyed the laws, which you Solon made for their reformation, yet they were found so corrupted in manners, partly by reason of their several factions, and partly by idleness, wherewith the city of Athens was well near destroyed, as they desired nothing so much as a change and alteration of things, every man hoping thereby to be better than his adversaries. Secondarily by a show of magnanimity, the people of Rome were sometimes induced so far to embrace the counsel of Varro for the resisting of Hannibal, as thereby they near perished themselves and the commonweal. Finally, many are no less bewitched with a glistering show of profit and gain, the which Pericles well understanding, did forthwith divide the enemy's lands gained by conquest, among the people, and did appoint them rewards for all things, and did make large distributions among them, whereby at the last he did withdraw their obedience from the counsel Areopagite, unto his sole rule and government: in like manner Philip of Macedon corrupted certain tyrants of the isle of Euboea, who with money in like sort corrupted the people, whereby they became rebels and traitoures to their country; after the same manner he corrupted and subdued the most parts of Greece, but shall not now the infinite calamities and miseries of the other parts of Greece: admonish us not to be deceived with this form of ambition which Philip of Macedon hath now framed to our utter destruction? O you Grecians, let him not say as heretofore, with my treasure I have corrupted and subdued the most parts of Greece, & have found there no fort so strong, but that with an Ass laden with gold, I might enter the same, fearing in the end he make us his Asses and Mules, to carry his silver & gold and not to use the same, or rather slaves to be committed to perpetual bondage: but let us with the noble Romans', refuse the money of Spurius Cassius, Ne libertatem vendere eo pretio videamur; let us not give credit to his flattering orators the jesuits, which bribed by Polycarphon labour the destruction of Athens; let us not be infamous with the Neapolitans for unconstancy; let us not be led this day to affect the French, and to morrow with a new insinuation of Ferdinando; for so it will be, when the yoke of the French shall once seem heavy and untolerable unto our shoulders. In vain then with the labourer of Phrygia, shall we dig the earth, and searching say, we seek for Antigonus; for such as govern, do rule as tyrants and oppressors over us: in vain with the worthy woman of Megara, shall we take up the bones of Photion in the night, & give unto them the honourable ceremonies of burial, for the affairs of the Athenians may not prosper, because Photion is dead; in vain shall we then cry and say, O dear hearth & tomb, we pray thee faithfully to keep the bones of this honourable parsonage, until such time as the Athenians shall repent them of the many injuries and wrongs done unto him, for Photion is now dead, and the affairs of the Athenians may not prosper: in vain shall we make unto ourselves a costly stand or image in remembrance of so worthy a parsonage, for the affairs of the Athenians shall not prosper, in that Photion is dead. Let us therefore in time with the wise governor suspect the flattering of this our enemy, as the calmness of the sea, which is nought else but a manifest token of a present and imminent tempest; and with Cicero and Cato, withstand in time the flattery and ambition of Caesar, lest with the Romans to late we repent the same: let us not as men overcome with the greatness of the tempest, desperately seek our safety in the midst of the rocks and sands, but rather let us fight for our Prince and country, say, we will overcome, or die.   

CAP. 14. The sundry ways and means left unto us for the suppressing of every distemperature reigning in this politic body.  SOL: 
But what means are left unto us to suppress this distemperature?  Epi: 
First we are to give impediment unto the form and manner, and with Valerius deny the ambassadors of Tarquin to speak unto the people, lest by flattery they be deluded: with Brutus we are to condemn and execute even our own sons, corrupted by Tarquin: and with Valerius we ought to deny the delivery of Vendicius unto the traitoures: thus we must give impediment unto the form, wherein this caution is to be observed, that the same be done in the beginning. For the Romans having sometimes laid a form of their ambition for the disturbing and conquering of others, the same was at the first little regarded, until they had advanced their ambition so highly, as to late their associates and neighbours did acknowledge their error, and when they much desired, they found themselves much unable to suppress the same.  Sol: 
What other means remain to suppress this distemperature?  Epi: 
First we are to proceed by good and profitable laws to the suppressing thereof: for the Romans being given to understand, that forty several nations had combined for their ruin and destruction, they did forthwith create a Dictator to manage the affairs of their wars, unto whom they gave an absolute power; all which, as well the manner of the creation, as his authority and continuance was established by laws, fearing least when this distemperature should be once thoroughly kindled in the bowels of the commonweal, they might want either time to effect the same, or that this innovation might then give occasion of mutiny. Secondly, we are to make preparation for the wars, and with Themistocles daily to arm and exercise the Athenians, to build and victual our galleys, for the battle of Marathon (saith he) will not give an end unto these wars, but rather it doth foretell us of greater troubles. Thirdly, we are to resist this distemperature by the force and strength of our allies, confederates, and associates: and herein above all others, we are highly to esteem and regard the confederation of free Cities and estates; for they do not easily, or for light causes departed the same, in regard they proceed judicially by voices, as well to establish, as to dissolve the same; the which caution Tusci olim observabant, and therefore it is said, Multum negotij fuit populo Romano cum Tuscis hoc modo inter se confederatis: by which observation they became as well by sea as by land, mighty commanders; so as it is said, Quod ante tempora Romanorum Tusci potentissimi fuerint terra marique. After this manner do the Helvetians at this day proceed in their wars: and in times past, Achaei atque Aetoli. In like manner the Romans' the better to overcome all difficulties in their wars, did make an association with other free Cities and states, by the which manner of proceeding, they did every where conquer and command. But the Lacedæmonians, and the Athenians, not making any confederation, or association with other free Cities, did not long continue their greatness. Fourthly, we must be able at all times to produce a collected power and strength of our proper subjects, well trained and exercised in military discipline, for the suppressing of this distemperature; for otherwise the Thebans and the rest of the Cities of Greece, shall decline and revolt from the Lacedæmonians; and Italy shall revolt from the Venetians, Quoniam resp: Spartanorum & Venetorum populum habuit imbellem; therefore saith one, In promptu habeas exercitum egregium ad exemplum Romanorum, quo motos liceat componere fluctus. Fiftly, necessary it is, that we do possess all the strong forts and holds, the which although they shall little avail us against any general or strong assault made against them, by such as command the field, for that either with the fort or rock of Arazze, they shall give place unto the fury of the artillery, or with the town and fort of Avon for want of succours, or with the town Valencey by the treason of Donate Raffaguin; yet they being placed upon the confines of the country, may withstand all sudden attempts, and give succour unto the wounded and diseased. Sixtly, for the better suppressing of these distemperatures, we are to take hostages and pledges with king Porsenna, from such persons as are likely to depart from their obedience, to the disturbance of the common peace, and tranquillity of the subjects, by the which way he suppressed the malice of the Romans'; then shall we safely with him dissolve our army, and withdraw our strength. The people of Salamina hath in all ages been found so factious and rebellious, even in the times before Athens made their conquest over them, as the whole kingdom being then divided into four several parts and provinces, which they termed kingdoms, yet all being commanded by the king of Ulster, they did from time to time yield many of their best and chief personages, for pledges and hostages of their obedience unto the king of Ulster: if then their native born kings allied, fostered, married, and continued even one in the others bosom, did yield pledges for their obedience, how may we in this troubled age safely dismiss pledges, and set them at liberty? may we expect greater fidelity, than they bore sometimes to their native kings? or do these times offer more security? or doth this nation use more fidelity? who so looketh into the histories and records of their new and late wars, shall find in them their old disposition to rebel; and that this universal obedience which now they yield, is nothing but a sudden heat or calm, which is the true messenger of a tempestuous weather. The seventh caution observed for the suppressing of this distemperature, is speedily to disarm the people, and not suffer them at all to be trained or exercised in military discipline, especially where the people be not free, but obedient and tributaries unto us: for the use, knowledge, and exercise of military discipline, doth render them bold, turbulent, disobedient, and rebellious against us: for what boldness and disobedience reigneth in the people of Salamina, by training and exercising them in the feats of wars, 
Anno. 10. H. 7. cap. 13  the same may lively appear in their records and statutes, where it is said, that divers persons have assembled with banners displayed against the lieutenant and deputy of the said land, whereby many times the deputy hath been put to reproach, and the commonweal set in adventure: for this cause it is said, that Veneti & Spartani opera plebis in bellis non uterentur; and more wisely the Lacedæmonians holding Thebes under their subjection and obedience, would not permit that any Citizen of Thebes should be trained in the wars, but rather laboured to render them peaceable, and by ease and rest, soft and effeminate; and there was no smith to be found through all the land of Israel, during such time as the Philistians held them in subjection, lest the Hebrews make them sword and spades, say the Philistians. Let us then draw the people of Salamina from the exercise of the wars; let us with Numa cool and pacify the hot courage of the Romans' to fight, by the daily use and exercise of religion, prayer, and devotion; and let us with the ancient kings of Athens, draw them unto planting, sowing, & ploughing the land; and let us there advance and show forth the olive tree unto the judges; let us there from henceforth honour the Goddess Pallas, and not Mars or Neptune, as heretofore; for she of right aught there to prevail, and have pre-eminence; for she it is that shall cause the people to embrace with all humility and obedience the government of kings. Put that great number of Heilotes to labour, and plough the ground, and let no man be trained but the free Citizen, saith Lycurgus, let them yield unto us magna vectigalia, and let us give unto them magnum & egregium exercitum, if need shall require. Lastly, let us advance all occupations and sciences with the counsel Areopagite, that thereby they may be drawn from the study and thoughts of innovation and change, for difficilis res est, saith a learned writer, innumerabilem multitudinem a principe vel a paucis coerceri, nisi plebs operibus intenta quaestum faciat. Therefore wisely did sometimes Pericles, Vespasianus, Augustus, and now the Venetians, hold the minds and thoughts of their Citizens always occupied and employed in labours, occupations, and sciences.  Sol: 
There are which finding this politic body distempered, have divided the same into parts and factions, whereby as a smoke parted into many rivals it looseth his principal force: for with the aid and assistance of the weaker part, they have suppressed the stronger, and then easily commanded the weaker; and for this cause it is said, that the kings of Egypt have heretofore divided their regions and kingdoms by factions, Ne unquam conspirare inter se Aegyptij omnes possent.  Epi: 
This course of government is never to be embraced, but upon a great extremity, when as neither there remaineth counsel, nor forces, which otherwise may suppress this distemperature: for thereby four mischiefs shall arise unto the state; first the rents, revenues, customs, compositions, tributes, escheats, and other profits annexed unto their crown, shall thereby cease; for it is said, the Florentines by their civil factions, that first received their beginning of the disorders which were in the government popular, were rendered as well unable to pay the French king the residue of the money which had been lent them by the Duke of Milan, as also to defray the ordinary charges of the wars with Pisa. The like mischief did arise unto the several towns of Bomagua, from their several factions and disorders; but why do we seek foreign examples? did not all compositions, customs, rents, revenues, tributes, and other escheats, and profits, for a long time cease by the extreme poverty of the subjects of Salamina, which did first arise unto that country by reason of their several factions? as it may appear by the statute of Captainship, where it is declared, that in the time of justice declination, the Lords and chieftains fell into much strife for greatness of rule and government, by reason whereof they drew unto them other inferior states to be of their several factions, whereby the country was drawn into that poverty, as for a long time, all rents, revenues, and other profits there ceased, and more than that, a new charge and trouble did grow unto Athens for the appeasing of those disorders. Again, the honour of well governing and commanding is hereby lost, which is a second mischief that ariseth unto us herein; for ob discordias civium aceidit, ut unius imperio non pareant, sed in diversas partes divisaregio nullis principibus parere cogatur. All which did sometimes lively appear in Salamina, when as the Lords and chieftains of that land, by drawing all other inferior states unto their several factions, did thereby withdraw the fear, obedience, 
Act. of captainship. 11. Eliza. cap. 7. folio. 168.  and attendance of the subject of Salamina, due unto the state of Athens, and wholly converted the same unto themselves, as in the statute of Captainship more at large may appear. Thirdly by factions and discords there groweth a neglect of all public affairs; for it is truly said, that in the civil discords of the Florentines, no man having a sound care of the affairs public, & many of the principal citizens being suspected, either to friend the Medici's, or men that desired an other form of government, things were overruled more with confusion then with counsel. Lastly, greater mischief than any before remembered, ariseth by factions and discords; for in such cases a third person shall easily achieve unto the principality, & suppress either faction at his pleasure; for so Clearchus by the assistance of the faction of the nobility, was enabled to hold the place & kingdom, as well against the people as nobles, which were then the two factions that reigned & disturbed the politic body: & it is also said, the particular factions of the citizens of Milan drawing to private counsels, did immediately conspire & take arms against Lodowicke Sforce, in such sort, as he was forced thereby to make his present departure with his wife & children, at which instant the citizens of Milan with frank & ready goodwill received the enemy: & have not several factions of Salamina, offered themselves with frank & ready goodwill to receive the enemy? hath not james sometimes Earl of Desmond sent unto the french king, & by all means excited & provoked him to send an army for the invading of Salamina, the which conspiracy did not then take his desired effect, by reason of a peace them immediately concluded betwixt King H. the 8. & the french King? again being frustate of that hope, hath he not many ways provoked the emperor, to send an army for the invading & possessing of Salamina? in like manner hath not Thomas Fitz Garrald addressed his letters unto the Bishop of Rome, as also unto the Emperor, by one Gale in Granyll, otherwise called Charles Raynold Archdeacon of Kelles, for the invading of Salamina? 
Act. 28. H. 8. cap. 1.  all which in the act of the attainder more at large may appear. And hath not Oneile, who by sufferance and tolerance, long supported his faction against the state, sometimes addressed his letters unto several foreign Princes, for the drawing in of strangers to invade and possess Salamina, the which were publicly intercepted by the Lord deputy? etc. All which may evidently appear in the statutes of his attainder. Again did not the faction of the ancient Britain's lay open a gap unto Caesar his invasion, and did he not by the aid of one faction of the Gauls subdue the rest, and them also in the end? Was not the Duke sometimes of Valentinois, emboldened to invade the dominion of the Florentines, with a weak and slender army, by the fear, suspicion, and great disagreement, that then possessed them, for that he had in his army Vitellozze, and the Vrsins, and for that also Peter de Medicis was abiding at Loiana in the country of Bollognia at his direction? for it is said that he did entertain Peter de Medicis, Vitellie, and the Vrsins, not with a mind or desire to advance them, for nothing more than that could be farther from his thoughts, but to augment the mutinies and disagreements of the Florentines, by the which he hoped to urge them either to better conditions, or be able to occupy some place of importance in their jurisdiction. And did not the Megarians during the uproars raised by the several factions then maintained by the issue of Cylon, and the offspring of Megacles, take from us the haven of Nysea, and the isle of Salamina? then we may rightly conclude, that so long as we have an enemy, which raiseth himself against us, so long we ought for the safety of the whole, strongly to suppress all factions whatsoever: for factions breed an unsettled mind in the people, and doth nourish this desire of change and alteration; the which did lively appear in the people of Athens, during the continuance of the several factions, then entertained betwixt the people of the valley, sea-cost, & mountain; for not withstanding they all kept & observed the laws made by you Solon, for their reformation, yet there was none found but gaped for a change, and desired to see things in another state, either parties hoping their condition & state of life would amend by change, and that every of them should be better than their adversaries. There remaineth now that we deduct colonies, which is the last, but not the least means to suppress this distemperature, which of all others is the most beneficial for the containing of a nation conquered in their duty and obedience; wherein four matters are worthily considered: first the necessity of deducting colonies; secondarily the benefit that redoundeth thereby unto commonweals; thirdly what order and manner in deducting colonies is to be used and observed; lastly, the impediments which are usually given unto the deducting of colonies.  Sol: 
Show us the necessity of colonies.  Epi: 
A nation conquered may not be contained in their obedience without the strength of colonies or garrisons: for may we be induced to believe, that that people or nation, who daily bewaileth & accuseth his present state and condition, may persist therein longer than they be pressed there unto by necessity? and more than this in the act of Absentes, the mere native borne people of Salamina, 
28. H. 8. cap. 3.  are termed to be mortal and natural enemies unto their conqueror and all his dominions. After this sort did the citizens of Cremona affect the Venetians; and the Pisans, the Florentines: but now to suppress this distemperature, if we should give unto them garrisones, and Praesidia perpetua, nihil isto intollerabilius est, saith a learned writer, quia tantum abest ut victi vincentium imperijs assuescere condiscant, ut non prius a novandis rebus conquiescant, quam aut praesidia interemerint, aut arces ceperint, aut finitimos principes ac populos ad bellum accerserint; whereof we need not search foreign examples, when the daily calamities of Salamina do witness the same, which happened since the times, wherein we gave unto them praesidia perpetua: for how many ways did this people incite the French King, how oft have they provoked the Pope to invade this land of Salamina? Again the Emperor and all other Princes and Potentates, what forts and holds have they not taken, and how many of our garrisons have they most cruelly slain and murdered, the same, in the several acts of Attainder of Shane Oneile, garrald Fitz garrald, 
28. H. 8. cap. 1.  james of Desmond, and by several other records, may appear at large. Neither doth this form of government draw with it a perpetual discontentment only, but also an infinite and continual charge in maintaining these several garrisons, as well to the Prince, as to the subject; for so in the act of subsidy and other records it may appear. Neither be these all the discommodities that perpetual garrisons draw with them, for these notwithstanding, 
28. H. 8. cap. 11.  we have been forced to send at sundry times armies royal to suppress disorders and rebellions, as the same more at large may appear in the act of restraining of tributes; so as we may conclude, that where colonies are not strongly and faithfully deducted, there the end of the first wars, is but a beginning of the second more dangerous than the first; the which may appear by the records of Salamina: for no sooner were the people or sects, called Omores, Odempseis, Oconores, and others, expelled by great forces and strengths, to our great charges, out of the several countries of Liece, Sl●wmarge, Irry, Glimnaliry, and Offaile, but eftsoons for that we deducted not colonies, they traitorously entered the said countries by force, 
Act. An. 3.4. Phil. & Mariae c. 2. folio. 145.  and long detained the same, until they were with greater forces expelled, all which more at large may appear in the act made for the dividing of countries, into shire grounds, so as we may conclude, that it is not for wise Princes to persevere in that course of government, which doth nourish as it were a perpetual interest in troubles, charges, and expenses: for the which causes chiefly did the Venetians willingly abandon the government of Bybienna and Pisa, and we of Athens, Salamina, the which did chiefly arise unto us, for that in steed of planting of colonies, we placed garrisons. Now than if we be willing to cast of our former and manifold troubles, if we be desirous to dismiss ourselves of these infinite and perpetual charges, and lastly if we endeavour to be strong against the invaders, and such as shall contend to occupy Salamina by force, let us lose no opportunity of deducting of colonies, for they be deducted and maintained with small or no charges, & with no great offence, but only to such whose lands and houses they possess, the which remain for the most part pacified, in that they enjoy their life which stood in the hands of the Prince, as well as their lands to dispose, for their offences: and if they should remain discontented, for that having respect to the whole kingdom they be but a handful, and also dispersed and poor, they may never be able to hurt or disturb the state, & all others which find themselves free from their losses, shall rest pacified, partly fearing, lest they commit any thing rashly or foolishly, and partly doubting, lest the like befalleth them as to those which remain spoiled for their offences. Again, being thus deducted with small or no discontentment, and maintained with far less charge, they be found also more faithful and stout defenders of the confines of the country than garrisons, and therefore it is said by a man of great understanding, Si reges nostri capto Ludovico 12. rege Insubriae, Colonias eo misissent, ut quondam Celtarum reges fecisse dicuntur, Insubria a Francorum ditione ac potestate non tam facile defecisset: nec vero Hispani praesidijs militaribus nulla Colonia deducta perpetuum eius regionis imperium tuebuntur, sed ab imperio subditi arrepta occasione desciscant oportet; non aliter quam Belgae, quos iam pridem colonijs Hispanorum ad imperium retinendum coniungi necesse fuisset, quoniam nec ulla vis diuturna esse potest, & pessimus diuturnitatis custos est metus: in like manner Salamina notwithstanding the strength of garrisons, doth daily take all occasions of declining, but in former times, after colonies were deducted, than Salamina continued for many ages in their obedience, in such sort, as none durst bear up head, but lived as vassals and obedient people, until partly by the iniquity of the times, partly by our domestical factions, and lastly by a negligence and security then found in these colonies, they were overthrown and expelled by the native borne people of that land, all which in the act of attainder of Shane Oneile more at large may appear, as also in the statutes of Absentes.  Sol: 
Now sith the necessity of colonies doth manifestly appear by unfallible proofs and examples, let us proceed unto the profit and benefit that groweth thereby.  Epi: 
The benefits that hereby arise to the commonweal, are sundry and divers: first the people poor and seditions which were a burden to the commonweal, are drawn forth, whereby the matter of sedition is removed out of the City; and for this cause it is said, that Pericles sent into the country of Cherronesus, a thousand free men of his City there to dwell, and to divide the lands amongst them; five hundredth also into the isle of Naxus, into the isle of Andros others, some he sent to inhabit Thracia, and others to dwell with the Bisaltes; as well thereby to rid the City of a number of idle persons, who through idleness began to be curious and to desire change of things, as also to provide for the necessity of the poor townsmen that had nothing, which being natural Citizens of Athens served as garrisons, to keep under those which had a desire to rebel, or to attempt any alterateration or change: secondly by translating of colonies, the people conquered are drawn and enticed by little and little, to embrace the manners, laws, and government of the conqueror: lastly the colonies being placed and dispersed abroad amongst the people, like Beacons do foretell and disclose all conspiracies, and as a garrison also are wont to suppress the mutinies of such as are desirous of alteration and change; and to this effect it is said, in the statute of Absen●es, that the colonies, which were sometimes deducted for the defending of the confines of Salamina, then and many ages after abiding in the said land, did nobly and valiantly defend the same against all enemies whatsoever, as also kept the same in such tranquillity & good orders, as the kings had due subjection of the inhabitant, the laws were well obeyed, and of all the revenues and regalties they were duly answered as in any place whatsoever: lastly, they yield a yearly rent, profit, or service unto the crown for ever; for these causes above rehearsed it is said, Romani victis hostibus Colonias deducebant: and the French conquering Lombardy, did chase out the ancient inhabitants, and in their dwelling placed colonies: in like manner the Emperor of the Turks from time to time, of Christians whom then he reduced in servitude, deduceth colonies, so as it is said, that Carolus 5. imperator debellatis Pernanae regionis gentibus, eadem quam Turcarum rex, in coloniarum translatione, ratione usus est.  Sol: 
Now sith as well the necessity as the profit of deducing colonies doth sufficiently appear unto us, let us proceed unto the manner and order of translating of colonies, as the third matter worthy of consultation.  Epi: 
In the order and manner of deducting colonies, certain rules are to be observed: first that the lands be so divided, as strengths by great numbers may be deducted, and therefore Duo cuique iugera tributa sunt; but not long after, Prolatis finibus, lege Licinia septem iugera cuique civi assignata legimus, the which order was observed by the Romans'. But otherwise the Emperor of the Turks, iugera quindecim cuique attribuit. The Romans' laboured to deduct colonies by great numbers, especially out of the confines of Italy, to the end that by the proper strength and forces of colonies, they might easily defend the confines of their dominions, and suppress all such as were found desirous of innovation. Secondly we are to plant and place our colonies in the most rich and fruitful lands, Vt in eo civibus numero auctis alimenta suppetant, potentiaque auctae huiusmodi novae urbes, omnem internam vim propulsare atque etiam opprimere queant. Thirdly, such as are to be deducted in the number of colonies, we shall wisely make them but proprietaries of the lands, during life only, Vt fructuarij occasu fructus in aerarium cogerentur, quoad principis beneficio alius succederet, quemadmodum Amurates cum Timariolis egit: by which constitution three matters beneficial to the weal public shall arise; first opportunity shall be lent from time to time, to recompense servitors by these casual profits that shall arise, without imposing any new charge upon the commonweal; secondly by the death of this tenant for life, the profits thereof grow unto the prince until the lands be newly disposed by him; thirdly, the prince or state being to dispose these lands at his or their pleasure, shall with this reward bind the proprietary of the land during life, in all services to be loyal and faithful; lastly, by holding this course, sundry inconveniences shall be eschewed which usually follow such as grant these lands in perpetuity; for in such cases they have been found in Salamina, especially after two or three descents, to intermarry and foster with the mere native people, and by that occasion decline sometimes from their obedience; at other times they are found to make leases of their lands, or to make a grant over of their estates unto such as are not well affected unto the government, to the overthrow of themselves and commonweal, as it may appear in the statute of Absentes, where it is said, that the colonies being possessed of their lands, did make leases of divers of their holds and manners unto the late Earl of Kildar attainted, by occasion whereof the same came to the possession of Thomas Fitz garrald, his son and heir, who intending a dangerous rebellion, was aided, assisted, and maintained against the state, by the inhabitants, & occupiers of the said land, so as the state was compelled of force to send thither an army royal for the better suppressing of those disorders and rebellions; lastly, these colonies must unite and gather themselves together into places of strength, walled or entrenched for their better defence against sudden incursions, and never be destitute of provision sufficient for their defence: for such of our ancient colonies in Salamina, which in times peaceable suffered their towns, holds, and castles to decay, and neglected the maintaining of such garrisons, as of right appertained unto them to maintain, were in difficult times exiled, banished, or put to the sword, only such remained and prevailed, which with a collected power and strength, did inhabit places walled or entrenched, and were not found destitute of sufficient provision for the wars, as it may more at large appear in the act of Absentes. Therefore of late days two worthy Knights, Sir Henry Walloppe Treasurer, and Sir Nicholas Bagnole Knight Martial, being the principal personages of the late deducted colonies, for the better strengthening of the confines of Salamina, have not dispersed their forces but wisely collected them into one place of strength, whereby they have repelled from time to time, all internal forces or sudden incursions.  Sol: 
You have at large described unto us the necessity, the profit, and the order and manner of deducting of colonies, you shall orderly proceed, if you now entreat of the impediments which usually are given unto such actions.  Epi: 
The impediments are sundry and divers: the first is given by such as usually oppose themselves against all new orders, for that they reap a benefit by the old disorders. The second is equal with the first, and proceedeth from a general incredulity engrafted in all sorts of persons, which never yet have given affiance or confidence unto new attempts, be they never so profitable. The third impediment ariseth greater than the rest, when the authors of these new orders, shall become faint defenders thereof, and shall give leave and way to others, which give impediment thereunto. The last impediment is the great trouble and charge, which followeth such as shall inhabit lands far removed; with the consideration whereof, the Roman Citizens were sometimes withdrawn, and discouraged from the inhabiting of the lands removed out of the confines of Italy, and the same also doth not a little withdraw the new colonies from inhabiting Salamina: But Muhamedes the Emperor sometimes of the Turks, contending to remove this impediment, Cuique coloniae duos bubulos ac sementem dedit.  So: 
Now you have at large discoursed of a reformation of declined commonweals, declare unto us what you intend by the subsequent words which follow in your general and first description, where you term it an happy restitution unto his first perfection.  Epi: 
I have termed it an happy restitution, when the same is effected without bloodshed and spot of tyranny, or cruelty; but yet it must be confessed that where sanandi medicina may not prevail, there execandi, is rightly used; neither is nature said to hate those members and parts, which she cutteth of for the preservation & safety of the whole body: and by this word perfection, I intent nothing but that good, which even from the first institution we did aim & shoot at, Nam omne principium bonum aliquod spectabat, and this is the end and scope of all reformations: as for example, when Athens had first conquered Salamina, they laboured nothing more, then to contain the subject in his obedience unto the City of Athens under good & profitable laws, & that the people might more assuredly be drawn thereunto without any great grievance or offence, they strongly deducted colonies into all parts of Salamina, and established there many and profitable laws, the which were truly and justly observed by many ages, and so continued their obedience from time to time, until these colonies were by the iniquity of times exiled. Let then our second reformation be like unto the first, for Omne principium bonum aliquod spectabat: so as I may end like as I began this discourse, saying, that a reformation of a declined commonweal is an happy restitution unto his perfection.  Sol: 
You have wisely discoursed of all the parts of this general description, and happily have made an end thereof, for behold my messenger hasteneth unto me more than with an ordinary expedition.  Nuncius. 
My Lord and general Solon, the Megarian army approacheth near at hand; for now standing upon the pinnacles of the temple of Venus, we did plainly discover their ships. Solon then turning himself unto Epimenides said, I go armed against the Megarians with the wisdom of Epimenides; in such sort, as with Numa I may safely sacrifice when as they remain in arms, in requital of which good counsel from henceforth I shall confess to hold my life from Epimenides.  Epi: 
These mean lights which I have given for the reformation of Salamina, with the wisdom of Solon as with the beams of a bright sun, remain extinguished, so as there resteth nothing but our former goodwill which may tie you to make acceptance thereof  Sol: 
And the same may never die but with Solon; farewell then Epimenides.  Epi: 
And you Solon in like manner a due.  
Then with the great noise and clattering of the weapons, and armour of the soldiers, I suddenly awaked, and remained for a small time amazed with the event of so weighty and great matters, but at the last my drowsy sense being newly refreshed, I might behold, all was suddenly vanished and nothing left in place but a vision or dream, the which according to my small skill, and understanding, I have here expressed in pelting prose and not in heroical verse; wherewith Solon as then it seemed to me, did much commend and grace the matter, which then he uttered unto Epimenides.    
FINIS.