THE BEGINNING, CONTINVANCE, AND DECAY OF ESTATES: Wherein are handled many notable Questions concerning the establishment of Empires and Monarchies.  
Written in French by R. de Lusing, L. of Alymes: and translated into English by I. F.  
LONDON, Printed for john Bill. 1606.   

TO THE MOST REVEREND Father in God, RICHARD, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury his Grace, Primate and Metropolitan of all England, and one of his majesties most Honourable Privy Council, etc.  
MOst reverend Father, it pleased your Graces right worthy predecessor, to vouchsafe my unworthy letters sent him in my travails, a gracious acceptance. The greatest trouble they put him to, was to peruse them; so were the proofs he gave of his virtue, and the signs of his love towards me, the only end and use I ever had or made of them. Your Grace hath had the happiness, with the merit, to succeed him in his dignities: his virtues were already yours in propriety. Of his love I may say, as of your Graces; that I then did, as I now do, rather desire to deserve it, then deserving it, desire to make bold use of it. Love that descends on us from men of virtue and eminency, is itself both hope and reward, hire and payment. That to-boote which we call doing good, or a benefit, as it is an effect that true love matched with ability, will even strive to produce, so is it then most welcome when it cometh sooner imparted then expected. With this freedom of mind, and duty of respect, I present to your Grace this new appareled discourse: It hath already put on the habit of three several languages, and if my judgement err not, our English fashion will not ill become it. I met with it in my wanderings, and brought it along with me, with an intent, for my private exercise of that tongue it first spoke in, to translate it: that performed, my determination to recommend it to your Grace's patronage, fell to be at this late dangerous time, when the devil (arch-enemy of truth) and his execrable ministers held their general counsel how they might make but one firework of our whole estate: but the consideration of your Grace's most just employments in so weighty a business, withheld me with a reverend fear of their disturbance, till I weighed that even this subjects handling might perhaps do good to some bad that had a head, if not a hand (for so great a clock could not strike without many wheels) in so damnable a project: since if they will needs outstrip former ages, or foreign countries in strange plots of ruining kingdoms and common wealths, they may by this discourse be drawn to practise them upon the common enemy of Christendom, and not upon us that acknowledge with them one jesus, one Bible, one Baptism. Your Grace seeth the reasons and scope of these my well intended endeavours, which subject their allowance or disallowance to your Grace's most grave censure, so doth my unworthy service with myself, to your much desired employment, as  
Your Grace's most serviceably devoted, JOHN FINET.   

The Epistle Dedicatory of the Author to the Duke of Savoy.  
OF all we admire in these times there is nothing comparable to the fortune of the Ottomans, and the increase of their greatness; if we examine their beginning and means, for they are by nation Tartarians, sprung from the most base and remote parts of Asia, in former times as unknown as unworthy: If we consider their conditions, they bewray no feeling of civility or courtesy: If we regard the parts of their mind, where shall we see aught more rude, and rough hewn then the spirit of that people? What have been the soldiers they have had through whose valour they have advantaged themselves by so many memorable victories? No better than slaves haled in their infancy from the breasts and laps of their mothers, children of tribute tithed every year from amongst the miserable Christians over whom they command and domineer. Yet we see that with these feeble means they have, in less than three hundred years, conquered Asia as far as Tigris, and the Gulf of Persia, possessed themselves of Egypt, Numidia, and all the red sea. More, having achieved these glorious conquests they have been seen to march, as they say, with colours flying thorough Europe, to overrun large countries, seize themselves of kingdoms and most puissant Estates, finally to become monarchs of Greece, and to have carried the Empire of Constantinople; whose neighbours have not been exempt from the havoc of their forces, so many armies overthrown, so many Princes ruined, so many rich cities and towns sacked and razed. Their power, overflowing in happiness, is at this day the scourge of the East and the terror of the West: In sum, they are fearful to the whole world. But the greater is the astonishment, when we consider, that naked and unarmed, they have marched victorious over the bellies of the most warlike nations under the heavens, the best provided of forces and all munition necessary for the wars, that such a people as they unskilled in navigation should become masters almost of all the seas. Many have gone about to search out the cause of this thriving greatness, and I amongst others have for my part with no small diligence perused such authors as have written their history; but when I have narrowly sifted all they have said of that matter, I find not this my honest appetite and curiosity as I would contented; rather as one ill satisfied with the diversity and negligence of their Historiographers, all of them nothing near approaching the course and knowledge of the first and essential cause of this their so raised fortunes, I have sought to please myself with setting down as I have, the many acts and observations I have thereof collected, and which well deserve to be published: not that I so far forget myself as to think myself able to fly a higher pitch than others whom I much honour and esteem; but because I have taken clean an other way; with this hope nevertheless, that huely representing and distinguishing by order as I do, the establishment of this Monarchy (answerable to what may be understood thereof) the appearance and truth of my discourse will somewhat enlighten this subject & afford me an honest excuse upon the defects which may be discovered in my opinion. The argument then of this book consisteth of three points, whereunto the order of the whole discourse hath reference: In the first place I summarily handle the means they have practised for their advancement and greatness; secondly with what cunning and deceit they maintain what they have gotten: and lastly how we may be able to assail them, and turn the chance of their victories and powers. This my travail (most mighty Prince) taketh his flight strait to your Highness to range itself under the shelter of your protection, armed with the allowable opinion, that your Aighnesse as a generous Prince cannot but take especial pleasure to hear, see, & weigh such speculations. To say the truth, the ordinary discourses of your highness table are no other but sundry questions, which it pleaseth your Highness usually to propound to all those noble spirits that attend you; but above all, when any one awaketh matter concerning either Estate affairs, or the achievement of deeds of arms; then is the time your Highness dareth an attentive ear to such as discourse thereof, and to all men's admiration resolveth the most difficult points of the matter in handling, wherein you discover a judgement so far beyond the vulgar and surpassing your age, as we cannot but confess that the propositions you make are so many proofs and resolutions which you deliver, and please to draw from out the capacity of your servants. Which considering often with myself, I find forthwith allayed in me the heat of the intention I had to dedicate this my book to your Highness, but at the same instant finding represented before mine eyes; the excellency of your judgement, together with your noble and gentle disposition, which knoweth how to accommodate your greatness to the honest designs of your subjects, such especially as reverence you like me, fear immediately vanisheth and my desire gathereth strength, with assurance that you will be so gracious, as, though I be the least of your servants, you will not spare to entertain and honour this my little labour with your judgement: practising upon me what the Sun (common father of generation) doth on the earth, bestowing his beams indifferently as well upon the low plants as high trees. It may please your highness then to vouchsafe to receive this treatise with the like countenance as you would aught else especially laboured, in imitation of the divine Majesty (only Idea of all perfection) which as well excepteth the offering of the poor widow, as the presents of great Princes. Again, it may please your highness not to think amiss so farforth to protect the whole discourse, that it may, supported by your authority, pass with that credit as I wish among men, and remain free from the many censures of such as take no other delight then in reprehending other men's inventions. This assurance will make me lift my head higher than otherwise I would, for two causes: The one for the honour and particular contentment I shall receive having performed aught pleasing to your Highness, the other for the testimony I shall hereby have of the participation of your favour beyond my merit and expectation: for which I offer up myself not to die ungrateful, as  
Your highness most humble Subject and vassal, R. de LUSING.   

To the Reader.  
THe world had never more Books, Books never less worthy matter: learned, unlearned, all will be writing, and of these the most affecting the glorious names of Authors, become the authors of their inglorious names.  
Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli.  
The Readers skill,  
Makes Books thrive well or ill.  
But the true life of a work, and sound discretion of the writer, appear not more in the well handling, then wise choice of a subject. I know divers courses may meet with one end, as many ways lead to one city, so may one theme entertain a world of inventions; but of these (like the same meat served in in several fashions) some few only shall carry the true pleasing relish and temper; the rest (as knots in names) stand rather for ornaments or flourishing differences, than matters regardable or of consequence: well may the will or appetite for a time transport us, but reason as sovereign must in the end control and check us. In the compass of my observations, I have seen discourses and styles, otherwise hollow and unsound, sway even the best judgements, not alone to allowance, but imitation. Whether this were the infection of ignorance, that seizing the most might spread to the best; or the tyranny of fashion, which must, howsoever monstrous, (if ourselves will not seem monstrous) be followed, I know not: one thing I am sure of; time hath discovered their weakness, and truth his concealed daughter is come to light, when such light owls live (or to say better) die confined to perpetual obscurity. This work seems to have passed the pikes of such dangers; it hath for a sufficient time undergone the view and censure of the best discerning nations of Europe: it hath been taught to speak both their and the old Roman language: if England should not now afford it kind entertainment, I should think it in an error (not to say of judgement) of custom, as being not yet clear of the imputation it carries of harshness towards even worthy strangers; but since I find (as do themselves that suffer) that this discourteous fault is laid upon the common sort, and the contrary extolled in the gentry & persons of more eminent quality, Vilia miretur vulgus: We will appeal from their ignorance, to the more generous and better bred understandings. And to awake these, let me tell them, they shall find it a discourse not faint or languishing, but such as like a well breathed runner, gathers more strength towards the end of the race, than was bewrayed in the beginning. Now to others which shall perhaps object, that the scope hereof lying out of our distance, asketh as small heed, as it smally concerneth us; I answer, that then the gout or gangrene is not to be regarded because the great toe only hath it. Time and sin may one day (which God turn from us) make us more sensible, and this subjects debating more necessary: such as it now is, or may prove (Reader) I here expose it to thy view and censure. I know some acquainted with me and my courses, will expect rather matter of mine own, than others invention. They have reason in this, howsoever I have ability: but I cannot yet forget an honest learned Physician I once observed, who (it seems) to spare others, so spent his own spirits in the personal practice of his medicinal conclusions, as his body yet suffers the injuries of such selfe-offered violence. I am not so charitable; neither hold I him the unwisest, that out of others trial frameth his own confirming. It is time that begets judgement and assurance. And to this purpose I will close with a saying of that ever most reverenced Master of morality Seneca, Non ignoro etiam quae in speciem laborant, dignitatem dico & eloquentiae famam, & quicquid ad alienum suffragium venit, mora convalescere.  
I. F.   


The Table of the Chapters of the first Book.  
THe Turk hath applied his thoughts wholly to the wars. Chap. 1.  
He hath always sought to make offensive war. Chap. 2.  
He hath made no account of fortresses. Chap. 3.  
He hath trained up his soldiers to valour and hardiness. Chap. 4.  
He hath maintained his soldiers in military discipline. Chap. 5.  
He hath made no reckoning of other forces then his own. Chap. 6.  
He hath to power joined cunning and deceit. Chap. 7.  
He hath been always served in his war by good and valiant Captains. Chap. 8.  
He hath made no skip in his enterprises. Chap. 9  
He hath not spent time upon enterprises of small importance. Chap. 10.  
He hath laid hold on occasion. Chap. 11.  
He hath behaved himself with nimbleness and celerity upon his occasions. Chap. 12.  
He hath gone himself in person to the war. Chap. 13.  
He hath evermore gone well appointed to the wars. Chap. 14.  
He hath never fought out of season. Chap. 15.  
He hath never divided his forces. Chap. 16.  
He hath not long held war with one alone. Chap. 17.   

The Table of the Chapters of the Second Book.  
OF religion. Chap. 1.  
Of the direct dependency of the Turks subjects upon their sovereign. Chap. 2.  
How he hath deprived his subjects of strength. Chap. 3.  
The causes that may move a people to fury. Chap. 4.  
The common remedy applied by the Turk against the force and fury of the people. Chap. 5.  
How the Turk curbeth the power of the great men of his Estate. Chap. 6.  
How he confoundeth the practices of foreign Princes his neighbours. Chap. 7.   

The Table of the Chapters of the Third Book.  
THe causes of the fall and ruin of Estates. Chap. 1.  
From what conjectures the continuance of Estates may be gathered. Chap. 2.  
That the Monarchy of the Turk is comprehended within the number of great Estates. Chap. 3.  
Whether the Empire of the Turks draw towards an end. Chap. 4.  
By what kind of causes the Empire of the Turk might most easily fail. Chap. 5.  
That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turk. Chap. 6.  
Why the leagues amongst Christian Princes are commonly of small effect. Chap. 7.  
The defects which may be observed in the leagues of the years 1537. and 1571. Chap. 8.  
A league which may be treated without danger of the former defects. Chap. 9  
Wherein consisteth the greatest forces of the Turk. Chap. 10.  
Where the Turk might be most easily assailed to overcome him, either by sea or by land. Chap. 11.  
Of the inward causes whereby the Empire of the Turk may come to ruin. Chap. 12.  
Of the mixed causes. Chap. 13.  
How particular persons may be gained. Chap. 14.  
How the people of the Turk may be wrought from his obedience. Chap. 15.    

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE Greatness of the Turkish Empire.  
Wherein are handled the manner how it is become so great, the means whereby it is maintained, and how it would be easy to bring it to ruin.  

1 The sum of this discourse.  
2 The division thereof into 3. principal parts.  
3 The argument of the first book.  
4 Steps to the Turkish greatness.   
FIrst: My purpose is to examine in this treatise how the Empire of the Turk is grown to that height and greatness. 2: And the better to effect it I will divide the whole discourse into three principal parts. The first, what way he hath taken to attain to the top of such a raised greatness as his now is. The second, with what means and are he behaveth and maintaineth himself therein; and finally I will declare how the pride of this Tyrant may be abated; his greatness diminished, and his Empire ruined. 3: The subject then of the first book shall be to examine what have been his courses in his conquests; and though they have been without any order, reason or faith: yet will it be no hard matter to discern, by the success of such counsels as he hath put in practice in his most difficult enterprises, the good from the bad, and also to separate in the course of his actions all whatsoever hath been profitable; from what hath been hurtful and ill undertaken: herein imitating the Bee which from bitter herbs sucks most sweet honey. These are in my opinion the steps and designs he hath followed to attain to his greatness, whereby as by degrees he hath built his strange fortune which makes us at this day so much to fear him.  

1 First he hath applied himself wholly to the wars.  
2 His war hath been always offensive.  
3 He hath made slender account of fortresses.  
4 He hath fashioned his wisdom to valour and hardness.  
5 He hath maintained his great and mighty armies in military discipline and policy.  
6 He hath made no reckoning of other forces then of his own.  
7 He hath to power joined cunning and deceit.  
8 He hath been served by excellent Captains.  
9 He hath not made any skip in his enterprises.  
10 He hath not spent time upon matters of small importance.  
11 He hath laid hold on occasions.  
12 He hath speedily put in execution his designs.  
13 He hath gone in person to the war.  
14 Well appointed.  
15 In a fit season.  
16 He hath not divided his forces.  
17 He hath not long continued war with one alone.   

CHAP. I.  
That he hath applied his thoughts wholly to the wars.  

1 Books held by the Goths a let to arms.  
2 Charles the 8. his expedition to Naples.  
3 Christians held unfit for wars, because so intent to study.  
4 The Turks wholly addicted to the wars.  
5 The Romans most martial.  
6 Barbarous nations most warlike and prompt in their attempts.  
7 The Turks despisers of Liberal arts.  
8 They invade Italy.  
9 Their military virtues.  
10 Whether liberal arts disable their followers for the wars.  
11 The use of History and the Mathematics.  
12 Letters and arms fitly married together.  
13 Learning and valour necessary in a Commander, obedience in a Soldier.   
1 AT the time that the Goths made a most fearful sack of Greece, and as a violent stream overflowed her fruitful plains, ransacking her many cities and rich towns; amongst other spoils there fell into their hands a great number of books of all sorts of professions; wherewith not knowing what to do, as unprofitable stuff, they would have burnt them, if one amongst the rest had not opposed himself: who stepping forth cried out; it was requisite they should carefully preserve them, and leave (quoth he) this poison amongst the Grecians, since in time they will bereave them of all martial courage, as ordinarily they do all such as apply themselves too much to the like learning and knowledge, making them become tender, effeminate, and altogether unfit for the use of arms; so as failing of courage they will prove more easily the pray of our fortunate conquest.  
2 When Charles the eight of France with so small an army made his way through Italy, 
1494. Guicciard. li. 1.  and that without vnsheathing his sword or couching his lance, he became master of the kingdom of Naples, and of the greater part of Thoseany; the French Nobility reasoning among themselves whence such a base cowardliness, as they had found amongst the Italians, should proceed, imputed the cause thereof to the study of learning, as that which softeneth the courage, and is not fit for aught but to make a man fearful, unapt, and of a weak resolution for the wars.  
3 Heretofore and at this day, the Turks have and do esteem the Christians of little valour in martial affairs, because of the variety of Arts whereunto they usually addict themselves; and though a man be so smally durable as he cannot attain to perfection in divers sciences, nor so enable himself to the attention of sundry matters as he may game the mastery for which he striveth; yet all men will busy themselves about knowledge, and intermeddle with all Arts and practices, not heeding that in stead of forwarding themselves, they recoil from that perfect knowledge which is requisite for them, and so remain unfurnished, or but weakly grounded in one only profession.  
4 On the contrary, the Turks fashion their whole designs to the war, and bend all their thoughts and studies to the exercise of arms, rejecting all other courses, and pleasing themselves only in what may stand them in stead for that profession.  
5 There is nothing more true (and we find it in histories) then that the Romans were most excellent Soldiers, but especially before they opened their gates to Arts and Sciences presented them by the Greeks, and that they gave themselves over to the pleasures of the East. Then were they at the best for true carriage of marshal affairs when their Consuls scorned not to hold the plough; when Physicians, Surgeons, & men of such like profession were in no credit amongst them. And to say the truth, we find that if afterward they did achieve any worthy enterprise, it was not by means of any valour which was remaining with them, but by the reputation & strength they had formerly gotten. For proof hereof we may plainly perceive that as soon as they had given entertainment to foreign sciences, made tender by study, they received notable and dishonourable overthrows, as well at the hands of jugurtha, Mithridates, the Cimbrians, Numantins, Spartans', the Parthians, as of others.  
6 For confirmation whereof we observe in ancient histories, that the most warlike people, & withal such as have performed the memorablest acts, have been the most gross, rude and enured to pain and hardness, far from all civility; free from such delicacy and wantonness as is corruptly stepped in amongst us; such as had no learning or taste of any knowledge or action which might allay or never so little shake their courageous resolutions and warlike designs. Of this composition were long since and are at this day the Scythians, who sometimes made their worthy arms resound as far as the most remote parts of the East, as far as the Danow and the banks of Nilus. It is not long since that they, 
Zingis.  conducted by Quingus their King, overran all the East, harrowed the plain country, and replenished all with misery and desolation. The memory of the famous acts of great Tamberlane is yet fresh, who only hitherto may vaunt that he hath in a ranged battle vanquished the Turkish armies, & led their Commander captive, making him serve as his footstool. 
1397.  In our time the Mogores, a gross and ignorant people sprung out of Scythus (or to say better) out of Tartary, have achieved great conquests towards India. Every man also knows that the great Cham, as rude & rough hewn as these, is nevertheless one of the most mighty potentates of the world, ruling over a people of the least civility that can be imagined. But not to wander out of Europe, let us behold the Swissers, & we shall find that for knowledge and civility they are no better than these, yet have they performed many worthy exploits as well at Nancy, 
1477.  Dijon, Nouare, Marignan, Dreux, as else where: 
1513.  In such sort as, not infected with our vanity, 
1515.  they give (as a man may say) the law to the mightiest Princes that seek their assistance.  
7 Now the Turks above all nations have ever professed to follow this course of life so barbarous and rude, and even at this day they contemn all knowledge and profession of whatsoever art, be it never so noble or industrious; among the rest they abhor painting and engraving, neither make they any account of architecture: and in very deed we see that they have ever held it an especial offence towards God, to engrave or paint him. As for learning they reckon it as mere foolery: In a word, there are none amongst them so slenderly esteemed as men learned and seen in any kind of knowledge. In their garments they affect not stuffs wrought, embroidered or curiously cut and fashioned, but such as are whole and lasting; laces, fringes and other ornaments are by them rejected: beaten and massy gold is only in request amongst them. In the wars they seek rather to appear fierce and terrible, then gallantly set forth and appareled: their whole delight is set upon war and arms; insomuch as it is hard to find any one of them who will not manifest by his fashion of living that he is rather borne for the wars than ought else: so as when there is any levying of Soldiers, such as are left at home hold themselves highly injured; so honourably do they esteem of the life of a soldier. Whence it proceedeth, that they are so feared in all their attempts, either for besieging, battering, or forcing of places of greatest strength; for skirmishing on foot or on horseback, in set battles by sea or by land, or for fortifying and defending.  
8 Whereof they gave sufficient proof when having gotten Ottranto they valiantly made it good against the forces of all Italy; 
1480.  even till the death of their master Mahomet the 2. 
1482.  leaving behind them, trenches, bulwarks, ramparts and all other sorts of fortifications, so well contrived and disposed, as they have served since for patterns and models to our Commanders of Christendom.  
9 Such is their laborious virtue in the wars, as there is no place so strong, or enterprise so difficult which will not prove easy at the enforcing of their powers.  
10 Returning now to that I said concerning knowledge: I expect that some one should say: And what I pray, is learning a let to military virtue, or a means to hinder a man from becoming a perfect soldier? surely no: I am of a contrary opinion, and I ground it in part upon the experience of such Captains as I will here reckon. Alexander the great and Caesar who were of the principal most adventurous, and politic Masters of the wars were most excellently seen in all sorts of knowledge; for my own part I hold it very difficult for any without the aid of History or the Mathematics, to deserve the name of a great Captain and sage conductor of armies:  
11 Since History by the variety of examples both of good and bad success furnisheth a man with heedfulness and discretion, with resolution and advice in all occurrents, and makes him more considerate in what he undertaketh; like as the Mathematics refine his knowledge and judgement, as well in engines of war as in fortifying.  
12 In conclusion, it is not to be denied but that learning is most proper to mould and perfectly fashion a heart and courage borne and disposed to arms: for this cause they would in old time, that Pallas armed should signify unto us the marrying of letters with arms. Now to come again to the Turks rudeness, we shall find (examining some of their Princes) that somewhat must be abated. Let us consider what were Mahomet the 2. and Selim and Soliman his sons (the most valiant Princes of the race of the Ottomans) and we shall see that they delighted in reading Histories, and in studying the Mathematics: so as though nature dispose a man to hardiness and magnanimity, it is sure that if he be wholly unfurnished of arts and learning, he will be of a disposition doubtful, vnassured, unresolved and without any true stomach or valour; parts especially required in a Soldier. This hath been seen in those of the Ottomans which wanted the virtues of the three above named; and amongst others Bajazet the second and Corcas his son can witness it. These indeed had in some measure the knowledge of good letters, but these performed no valiant act, because they had not hearts and courages borne to the wars.  
13 Whence it followeth that the study of learning availeth much to the forming of a wise and discreet Captain, and to help him to attain to the perfection worthy his name; nature withal disposing him to valour and generosity.  
As for the private Soldier I hold that he needs not know more then to obey it, not being necessary he should be instructed in so excellent an understanding of matters as the Commander, considering that humane Sciences and the liberal arts in an unsettled mind make it embrace civility, wantonness and ease in stead of travel; make us love quietness; fear death, fly hunger and thirst, with other pains and periles of the wars: In sum, they imprint in a man rather a desire to husband his life then to lavish it for the glory and good of his country, and for his particular honour: which is more dangerous in a soldier then in a man of any other profession: for this reason such an one need know no more then to obey, go well armed, and valiantly defend himself against his enemy.   

CHAP. II.  
That he hath always sought to make offensive war.  

1 Of offensive and defensive war.  
2 The author's opinion thereof.  
3 Others opinions.  
4 Reasons in behalf of the offensive, and inconveniences of the defensive war.  
5 Commodities of the offensive war.  
6 Spoils in our enemies or our own country: their difference.  
7 Machiavelli confuted.  
8 The chief cause of the Turkish greatness hath been the Christians idleness.  
9 The war upon the Turk must be offensive.  
10 Examples of good success in that kind.   
1 IT is a doubt often disputed, and not yet resolved, whether it be better to assail the enemy at his own home, or to attend till he assail us: The Lord of Langei, Machiavelli, and others of our times have discoursed hereof to the full.  
2 For my part I am of opinion (as also the worthiest captains have been) that it is always better to assail, then stay till we be assailed: Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar, and many other Romans serve to approve it; and all these would have laughed at such as should have otherwise counseled them.  
3 Yet some there are in our times which have endeavoured to prove the contrary by demonstrations subtle enough (but unsound) and to this very purpose of the Turk, to wit, that it were better to attend him then to seek him out upon his own dunghill: These are counsels more curious than well grounded, whereof consequently ensue few effects of moment: we may couple such men with those vaunting Ingenours or Artists, who discoursing upon some work of their invention promise of it wondrous effects, and set forth some simple module which serveth but for demonstration only; but when it cometh (as they say) to the push, and that they must put their instrument to his true trial and use, then is it that they are far to seek, and that they confess the difference between an essential effect and a superficial flourish, such as their first module afforded. Just in this manner these contemplative state-Philosophers will attend the Turk at their own home, whom they dare scarce look in the face neither in nor out of his country.  
4 It is most certain that he which assaileth hath always more resolution and courage than he that attendeth. For he hath already form his determination and provision when the other goeth by heeresaie and likelihoods: moreover in assailing, the war is undertaken with more advantage, and commodity then otherwise it would be; and he which mindeth to force a country or province may make his use of all such advantages and commodities as he findeth may serve his turn in the country he intendeth to conquer. As among others, if he have set on foot some practice, or hatched some treason in the minds of two or three, such of the subjects of the prince he assaileth as he knoweth offended or malcontent. Or if he have plotted some matter of purpose for an universal rebellion. All which encountering with the designs of the supposed conqueror, he makes them serve his turn with more advantage in going to seek out the enemy; then he should do in staying for him at his own home. By these means Charles the eight King of France found the way open to the conquest of Naples; 
1494.  and jews the 12. possessed himself of the estate of Milan: 
1499.  by the like occasion also the Empire of the Mamelucks subjecteth their necks to the yoke of Selim the first. 
1516.   
5 But of all this we may collect a more sure proof of my proposition then when the enemy is at our doors, and that the astonishment surpriseth us, overthroweth and confoundeth all counsel and courage; at such a time unexpected disorders hem us in on every side; necessity presseth us; all things become suspected and difficult, so as most commonly we know not to what Saint to recommend us; nor what course were best to be taken; for since we must have an eye, misdoubt, make provisions in sundry places, bestow garrisons where most need requireth; we shall find that applying remedies on the one side our affairs will grow desperate on the other. Moreover by distributing garrisons in this sort, it must needs follow that we so much the more weaken the body of our army, and that through this constraint we quit the field to the more strong; which disadvantage commonly draws with it the ruin of our whole estate.  
If chose we will preserve all our forces in one body, we leave to the assailer many passages and places where he may set down and fortify himself there to hold us play and train us on at his pleasure; but if it should so happen that the assailer were encountered by him which attendeth with equal force, with as brave a countenance, and like courage, the retreat and defence rest at his election, so he be a Captain wise, and advised, such as was Solyman when he marched into Hungary, and when the Emperor Charles the 5. went courageously to meet him.  
6 And because the Disastrous chance of war may sometimes light upon the assailer be he never so wary and valiant; it is to be presupposed (that being granted) that he will sell his skin at so dear a rate, as the forces of the assailed shall remain thereby so disordered, as he will not be able to offend the vanquished, or disturb his affairs, notwithstanding that his country be far distant from the country assailed: this may be seen by the example of the overthrow the French received, and the taking of their King prisoner before Pauye insomuch as that loss (besides that of their Prince) did not afford aught to the victorious whereby he might advantage himself upon the kingdom of France. 
1524.  Also it is much more easy to set a foot again an army discomfited, abroad then at home; because if fortune have showed herself adverse and our foe at our home, then is the time that such as are malcontents and mutinous lift up their heads, and that our people stand amazed and for the most part untractable. Then must we travail amain to put our men in heart, then must we make much of those few good men, the remains of a battle to bestow in our Towns and trust them with the government thereof. On the other side if these losses betid us far from our home and in another country, the fear and the stonishment will be the less amongst our subjects, and they more pliable and forward to succour us, were it but to keep the danger aloof from themselves.  
7 methinks Machiavelli much abuseth himself when he so opiniatively maintaineth, 
Mac. disput. lib. 2. c. 12.  that if the Romans had received out of Italy the blows Hannibal gave them by the overthrow of * three armies, 
At the river of Trebia, where Sempronius was slain, at the lake of Thrasimenus where Flaminius was overcome, and at Cannas where Terentius Varro and L. Paulus lost the field.  that they had never been able more to have held up their head or re-established their affairs as they did: Machiavelli layeth this ground; That they had never found means again to set a foot so soon as they did the residue of their forces, had it been out of Italy. Mark I pray how he erreth; for it is well known that the overthrows they had in their own country made them lose, besides their soldiers, many good towns, and bred revolt in their Colonies which followed the fortunes of the victorious, with divers other accidents that shook their estate; all, which had not succeeded with such disaster if the loss had befell them far from Italy: for in this case both heart and means had served them more abundantly than they did, to assemble new forces and as great as they had lost. 
Maharbals saying to Hannibal, was, Vincere seu Hannibal, sed victoria uti nescis. Liu. Dec. 3. l. 2.  It is also certain that if Hannibal had known how to make good use of his victory the Romans had been utterly overthrown. It must needs be, that their means and power were very great, and that God had an especial hand in their affairs, seeing that in such disorder they should recover themselves; & that with such courage, as they refused to serve their turns with those which had by flight escaped from their overthrows, neither made they any account of redeeming those which were taken prisoners, nay rather in stead of doing this they deprived some of them of all honour and confined others into Sicily. It seemeth to me that these reasons may serve to confute those of Machiavelli, and that it is high time we return to that principal point concerning the fortune of the Turk.  
8 We will say then that the fainthearted slackness of the Christians hath made way to the Turk for the enlarging of his limits, so as they about almost of all sides upon Europe, and hath been a means that he can now not only attend the enemy (as Machiavelli saith) but go to rouse him at his own home. It is the course he hath observed and taken; to ruin his neighbours round about him, and increase his power, which he hath so done as he hath clean bereaved us of all stomach to assail him, yea or once to dare to attempt it. For though there be Princes enough which hold it necessary for the good of Christendom to set upon him at his home, yet to this day we see none that will begin to strike the first stroke, or set first hand to the breaking of this ice.  
9 But if ever God gave us the courage virtuously to attempt this enterprise in revenge of the oppression and wrongs Christendom hath endured at his hands; we must not think to undertake it by other means then those he hath himself put in practice against us, & that is to seek him out at his own home and nobly to embrace the designs himself hath observed; which doing, and having God to guide, we shall doubtless obtain those victories of him which he hath had of us. Admit he have been for a time our Schoolmaster, and that we have learned of him to our cost, it is now high time that we show how we have profited by his instructions, and that we know how to put them in practice and pay the interests of our damages.  
10 Now to make it appear that it is not a matter of that difficulty and danger that some imagine, let us note these examples which are in a manner familiar unto us. Had not Andrew Dorea the courage with a small number of ships to enter into Greece where he got Patras and Coron? 
1532.  Don john of Austria, did he not afford a notable proof hereof in the year 1571. when being General of the league, he sought the enemy out in the inmost parts of the Levant where he gave him battle with that courage, that though he were inrferior to him in men & galleys, yet failed he not (assisted by God) to overthrow the most puissant & great army that the Ottomans ever set forth by sea against the Christians: There is nothing the Turk so much feareth, as to be set upon by the Christians, both because he knows they have valour in them, as also for the jealousy he conceiveth of the great number of them under his obedience: All which would without question rise in arms if they might but once see the Christians Colours flying, and so accompanied, as that they might to some purpose make head against the Ottomans.   

CHAP. III.  
That he hath made no account of Fortresses.  

1 We must endeavour as well to keep as conquer.  
2 The reason and use of Colonies amongst the ancient.  
3 Their discommodities.  
4 The causes of rebellions.  
5 An other discommodity of Colonies.  
6 The Portugals manner of planting Colonies.  
7 Their benefit.  
8 Fortresses the second means of preserving an estate.  
9 Their use and necessity.  
10 Machiavel's vain opinion confuted.  
11 Forces ever in readiness, the third means of preserving an Estate.  
12 Whether is better to maintain Fortresses upon the borders, or to have an army ever ready.  
13 How the Turks countries live in peace by means of the latter.  
14 In keeping the second means, in getting the third is most approved.  
15 Whence the power of the Turk doth grow.  
16 Wars abroad beget peace at home.   
1 PRinces generally strive by all means to preserve not only their own estates, but such provinces also as they have conquered; observing what the time, the humour of the people, and their means will permit. But because each one takes a different course, and of this difference happeneth both good and evil, I judge it necessary to say somewhat thereof by way of discourse: I will spare to meddle with the form each one keepeth in the politic government of his dominions or principalities; and will draw myself within compass of handling, in three several points, all that may be said or alleged upon this subject. First then we will speak of Colonies, next of Fortresses, and last of Armies, entertained for the defence of the country.  
2 Colonies have been one of the means which the Ancients have most ordinarily observed; and at this day they are practised to maintain a subdued people under the obedience of a new sovereignty. Such then as allowed of this manner of preserving Estates, by way of Colonies bestowed the lands of those they had conquered upon their natural subjects, equally distributing them according to their merits; supposing that in so doing, they should sow the country conquered with new men, which might behave themselves with a like devotion and dutiful observance towards them, as vassals perform toward their Sovereign.  
3 The Grecians used them first; and then the Romans: but this manner of assurance is not so commendable, as many may suppose, insomuch as it draweth after it these two dangerous consequents. The first is, that when a Prince depriveth such of their goods as are natural owners thereof, to bestow them upon his own subjects, it winneth him and his immortal hatred, accompanied with an everlasting thirst of revenge, and of regaining their liberty, for though such as are so despoiled of their goods be but few in number in regard of the Colony, yet it is to be imagined that they have many kinsfolks and friends interessed in their miseries, and that there need but three or four men of resolution to draw all the rest to a mutiny and revolt. If this be held a difficult matter, yet is it a thing natural to become wise by another's mishaps, and to fear and be provident lest we fall into the like inconvenience as our neighbours. The apprehension of which calamity makes us ofttimes conceive worse of the evil than it deserveth, especially when the actions of the conquering prince are grounded rather upon force then reason, as ordinarily they are.  
4 Most commonly the rebellions and insurrections of people and cities, happen not so much for the outrage done to a whole commonalty, as for the injuries particularly received by some of those which have revolted: but howsoever, such wounds always breed the universal destruction of a common weal. 
●●●●t. lib. 3. c. 8. Rer. Hisp. Ri● Neap. l. 2. Reg. Hisp. 〈…〉 de Christ poem. lib 1.  To this purpose we may allege the example of Roderick King of Spain, who having ravished Cuba the daughter of Count julian, the indignity of the fact entered so far into the hearts of all the Nobles of the country, as every one took the wrong to be his, and having thereupon taken arms to aid the father in his revenge, it grew to a worse matter; for hereby they gave the moors entrance into the Estate who put to death their King: and were themselves beholders of the spoil of their country by persecuting vengeance upon so infamous an act performed by the disordinate lust of him who ought to have reproved and chastised it in others.  
5 The other discommodity which they meet who will settle the establishment of their fortunes upon the erections of Colonies is, that in succession of time those men so removed from their own country into another newly subdued, fashion themselves unto the climate, humours, and complexions, and to the same mind of preserving their estate, as those amongst whom they are sent to inhabit. And having thither transported their goods and begotten children, they thenceforth make more reckoning of the country whither they are come as Colonies, then of their natural country whence they were displaced: like trees which planted in an other soil change much both of their nature and taste. This the more easily happeneth to Colonies by how much the more remote they are from their native place of abode. For proof, find we not that even the neighbour Colonies of Italy during the time of the second Punic war would not in any wise contribute to the necessities of Rome their original mother? 
Lin. dec. 3. li. 7. 7. Annal. v. c. 545. Olymp. 144.   
6 The Portugals observing these inconveniences have to assure the Indies, practised a manner of Colonies much more sure, tolerable, and less envied; which is thus: They plant their Colonies not all at once, but few at a time by Caravans or companies according as need requireth, to inhabit the countries by them newly discovered; yet not thoroughly to people them, but after as they shall see they thrive, and so accordingly they by little and little replenish the Colony. Goa is the best provided of all they have established, and there they contract alliances with the ancient inhabitants, and take and give their daughters in marriages: by this means (which is as I have said the more plausible) they live free from violence, assured of the good wills of the first inhabitants who enrich themselves greatly by their traffic and commodities. In this manner they multiply and are scarcely perceived how, growing to such a multitude of people as they serve to enlarge and establish the name and government of the Portugals. From year to year they add to this increase which serveth them instead of a fortress amongst such as they subdue, and in such provinces as they will people and accustom to their fashions and rule.  
7 Time and experience make it plainly appear, that these forms of Colonies are more tolerable and sure than any heretofore practised, for in these the natural inhabitants are so far from being thrust out of their houses, as on the contrary, they are therein maintained and more confirmed in the peaceable enjoying o● their goods. Moreover the union and commixture of blood one with another softening their natural roughness, retaineth and redoubleth the affection as well of the ancient inhabitants, as of those of the Colony. The Spaniards do the like in the West Indies that which I find most notable herein, is, that the one and the other rest not satisfied only with establishing Colonies, but further they convert and instruct the Indians in the Christian faith, to God's glory and theirs: It is that which the king of Spain performeth and continueth by means of such religious orders as he hath planted among them: for not being able to store so many and so large countries as those are with natural Spaniards and Portugals, they by this conversion and Baptism, make those people become Portugals and Spaniards.  
8 Having discoursed of the form of Colonies, and how the conquering Prince may profit himself by them, it is now time that we come to the second thing which may afford assurance to an estate. The means are many, but the Christian's most usually make choice of fortifications, as seeming to them most strong bridles to rain in and curb both the ancient and newly subdued provinces. There they appoint their Magazines for munition and other provision for the wars; there they bestow garrisons of soldiers for their defence; some places they fortify upon the frontiers, where they constitute for Governors and officers, creatures of their own fashioning, the better to contain all under the obedience of the victorious.  
9 Yet is it that which Machiavelli reproveth and rejecteth as unprofitable: 
Dis. l. 2. c. 24.  but because they are reasons or opininions so weak as that like Spiders cobwebs, they are easily broken, I will not spend time farther to confute them; only I will say thus much, that Alfonso king of Naples, a most judicious prince, whose authority should carry credit, always esteemed this practice of fortification most necessary and profitable, especially in a country newly conquered, and not to leave it open and consequently subject to injury and revolt. The proceedings in this kind, of Francis Sforce duke of Milan, of the Emperor Charles the 5. and of so many other Princes and Captains which have won reputation and renown amongst men, are such as who well considereth them will laugh at the opinion of Machiavelli. Without seeking any further, have we not the French for example? who made no account of erecting citadels in the I'll of Sicily: but after they had conquered it, 
1281. 13. Ap.  they assoon lost it not without a most lamentable slaughter executed on them by the inhabitants; but chose deriving their wisdom from their own misery, after they once took in hand to make fortresses in sundry places of Italy, there was no means but by peace to dislodge them. 
1516.  The Mamelucks who were in the same error of not trusting to Fortresses, found themselves in less than two days deprived by Selim of the most part of their lives, estate, and powers. The Spaniard embracing the indifferency of this opinion, and desirous to gratify the Flemings whom they thought to appease by this moderation, returned into their hands the strong holds of their Provinces: which they had no sooner done, but they were near-hand expelled the Low-countries.  
10 And though all these examples are but too sufficient to confute the opinion of Machiavelli, yet will I bring him once more upon the stage, and sift him a little better: See here the substance of what he saith: Either thou art able (saith he) to bring sufficient store of men into the field (in which case fortresses are not any ways necessary) or thou hast not means to levy such forces as are requisite to defend and warrant thy estate, and then they are unprofitable. Mark, I pray, the wrong course he taketh, walking as he doth in extremes, without keeping the mean, most necessary in these propositions: to say the truth, he is much mistaken; since this matter as others, should be distinguished by the portions and qualities thereof, the better and more easily to understand it. In my opinion then (which I deliver not to exclude others) we must say thus: Either a Prince hath means to levy men out of hand by an ordinary continuance of arms, or else he must have time to do it, be it either by levying a sufficient number of his subjects trained up to arms, and by the assistance of friends and associates, or of neighbours, which in regard of their particular interest, will willingly join with him, that he may protect them from the same injury he may himself receive. In these two first cases, Fortresses would prove more profitable than necessary: or else a Prince is of that power as he is able at once to assemble so many men as he will keep or win the field from the enemy, or will be able, at least, commodiously to succour the place besieged. In these two respects, Citadels are necessary though not much profitable, because they by their constant defence, stop and entertain the enemy, afford by such temporizing, means and leisure to order matters; for (as the Venetians say) Chi ha tempo, ha vita, who hath time, hath life.  
11 The third means for a Prince to preserve his estate, is that which those allow of, who not trusting to Fortresses, and making no account of Colonies, do ordinarily entertain strong companies of horse and foot, and in such numbers, as they may always contain their subjects in natural obedience, hinder rebellions, and which most importeth, repel, and oppose the enemy, and as occasion requireth, visit him at his own home. In time passed the Mamelucks practised this form of government; 
Aemil. lib. 3. Tuicae.  and the Turks at this day observe it in all points. The Visconti sometime Lords of Milan, used this form of preserving their estates, and amongst others Azzo-Visconti ordinarily gave entertainment (yea even in time of peace) to 22000. horse, and they did him no small service.  
12 A man may yet put one doubt more of this matter, the resolution whereof shall fit very well for the course and concluding of the discourse. That is, which is best either to erect Citadels or always to maintain a great army. Experience (our common Mistress) teacheth us that for the conservation of great Prince's estate fortress are the best; because they do not so much encumber nor dislike the subject as doth an army, whose troops dispersed in divers parts of the country waste and disorder all: on the other side soldiers shut up in a fortress are not so insolent and licentious as those commonly are which keep the field, yea and that oft-times with more havoc then if the enemy himself had ransacked and overrun it. The liberty which armies dispersed throughout an estate challenge and assume to themselves, is such as makes them forget all policy and military discipline: the example of the Milanois herein will not be beside the purpose. They never complained of the Garrison of the Castle, 
1765.  but when it came to that that jews the 12. would have lodged his horse within the town they presently revolted; whereupon ensued the loss of the estate. What was it that wrought the revolt of the Flemings? was it not the obstinate mutining of only 1500. Spaniards, who crying after their pay overran and made spoil of all the country? The self same Spanish nation disquieted the Estate of Milan under the Marquis of Guasto and the I'll of Sicily under Ferdinand Gonzaga. 
1526. Paul. jou. lib. 7. de Vita vir. ill.  The Sorians and the Egyptians no sooner saw Selim's standards displaced but they rebelled against the Mamelucks, whose armies had marvelously oppressed them, they having been constrained to maintain them at their own charges.  
13 Whereto I know may be replied, that the Turk nevertheless peaceably holdeth his estate after the same manner we speak of, his forces being evermore on foot and in a readiness: it is true, and so is it that to clear this, two principal reasons may be alleged. The one that he hath deprived such his subjects as are Christians and of a different law, of all use of arms; and that he hath brought them to this pass that they cannot vaunt to hold any thing in propriety: which was not practised towards the above mentioned; moreover all assemblies upon whatsoever cause are expressly forbidden them: he keeps them under and makes no more reckoning of them then of sheep penned up in a fold using them like brute beasts, not once vouchsafing to employ them in the wars. The other reason is that they have no power of themselves to oppose the Turks so mighty forces; and (which is worst of all) they never have had any foreign succour to encourage them to such an enterprise.  
14 I will forbear to dive any deeper into this subject; me thinks we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are Citadels, than armies ordinarily entertained. But if we speak of conquering, I allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses, considering that we thereby enjoy means to embrace all occasions offered, and at an instant to execute both the will and design of a Prince so provided.  
15. To say the truth it is that which the Ottomans have practised, to advance their Empire to such greatness as at this day we see it; it is that which hath heaped on them the honours of so many victories, and which hath endowed them with authority, reputation and means. They have always had (as they yet have) their armies in a readiness, and have fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much advantage as a man armed against one that is naked.  
16 Some I know will marvel how such a number of people so armed, can contain themselves from revolting. I am of opinion, that if they were not ordinarily employed as they are, in attempts of war, that in the end their multitudes grown rank with quiet, would easily be drawn to rebellion or mutinies; which the soldiers of Alexander the Great can witness, for whilst the enemy kept them in doings, who were then they more hardy and valorous? but after their victories, who more insolent and unsufferable? The Roman armies, how fortunate were they whilst they had continual war, achieving all their enterprises in a manner as they could wish? but after their conquest they became so turbulent and unquiet, as they assumed to themselves the authority of creating Emperors, and for the most part so licentiously, as every army made his particular choice, so as there was no remedy but to try by fight who should carry it; which occasioned the overthrow of the state. The French, have they not evermore faithfully served their king against strangers? but so soon as they had peace with the English, and after with the Spaniard, they filled every corner of their country with sedition, sackings, cruelties, and slaughters; and that with such obstinate persisting, as the contagion thereof hath not been able for 25. years space to be removed. But that which is most to be lamented, is the scandal they have brought upon the church. This self thing may be appropriated to the Flemings, and the cause may be imputed to idleness, and the exceeding plenty wherein they lived. The example of Bajazet the second shall serve to close up this discourse, for he being given over to his ease; the soldiers, who could not brook such idleness, so awaked the courage of his two sons, Selim and Acomath, as all the forces of the Empire (which had established the Turkish sceptre) were divided into two, and it lacked not much of being utterly overthrown, every one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sons against the father.   

CHAP. FOUR  
That he hath trained up his soldiers to valour and hardiness.  

1 Why the armies of these days consist not of so good soldiers as in former times.  
2 Principal causes of victories.  
3 What care is to be had in levying of good soldiers: and this to be wrought by a fourefould means.  
4 By election.  
5 Exercise.  
6 Honours and profit.  
7 The Turks proceeding herein.   
1 IT is seldom seen that the armies of these times consist of good soldiers, for the more we vary from the course our forefathers took to bring them to perfection, by so much the more are we deprived of that happiness which were to be desired and seriously sought after by Princes, and those which as Commanders would reap honour and profit by the wars.  
2 Victory (which dependeth of the divine will) deriveth her success and principal ground from the multitude of men, but especially from the wisdom of the Commanders and from the valour and generosity of the Soldier.  
3 It is requisite then that we look more narrowly than we do unto their choice, and that they be such as we may honour and profit ourselves by them: now we must deliver how we may light upon, or make good and hardy soldiers, which is done in my opinion by a four fold means, by election, exercise, honour, and profit.  
4 By election, because all those which we levy for the wars have not that natural inclination to valour and courage, nor a constitution of body fit to endure the travails and dangers incident thereunto. Moreover a gallant fashion and spirit are not found in every one, much less a resolution to attend, defy, and assail the enemy; also every man's heart will not serve him to enter the trenches, throw himself desperately into the dike, scall the walls, offer himself valiantly, to make good a breach in despite of the Cannon, of stones, of wildfire, and of death itself: Their complexions perhaps will not brook that they should spend the whole day in continual turmoils without eating, and the night without rest, so as where some make account that Antwerp is able to make 30000. men, Venice 40000. Gant 60000. Paris 100000. all fit and able to bear arms, me thinks they should be understood that they are such as have the age required, but not the disposition proper to such a profession. For proof hereof have we not of late seen that the Prince of Parma hath ranged under the obedience of the King of Spain even with small forces those of Gant & Antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their Sovereign? 
1584. & 1585.  The Romans held in such esteem this manner of making choice of their Soldiers as when they would express a levy of men they termed it Delectum agere vel habere to make a choice. In our times no man hath been more careful and circumspect in the choice of his soldiers (at the least of the Captains of Italy) than Cosmo de Medici Duke of Florence; and indeed he was provided of the best and most approved soldiers of his time.  
5 To election we are to add exercise, 
Veget. lib. 1. c. 15.  without the which there is no forwardness or constitution of body be it never so strong, able to attain to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish, as appertaineth to a good, brave, and noble soldier.  
6 But if the General be so wise as to join to exercise profit and honour, 
Eo enim impenditur labour & periculum aplirisque unde emolumentum & honos speratur: T. Liu.  then is it that there is no danger or difficulty be it never so great which his soldiers will not overcome; no encounter which they will not force; no enterprise which they will not happily compass. As for a Prince there is no money better bestowed then that wherewith his Captains whet and entertain the courage of the Soldier. 
Plut. lib. 2. c. 5. & 6. li. 1●. c. 4. Gel. lib. 5. cap. 6.  This was the cause why the Romans beside the ordinary pay of their armies, ordained crowns for them which had in the wars saved the life of a citizen, first entered the breach, or boarded a ship: these were termed Coronae Civicae, Murales, & Navales.  
7 The Turks, to our confusion, are not inserior to the Romans, be it either for the choice they make of their soldiers, or for rewarding them. For they choose from among the nations under their obedience, the most warlike, and take of them but the flower and such as are most proper for the wars, sparing not afterwards to recompense them at the full. It is a thing incredible with what continual excercise they enure their soldiers, in so much that even from the cradle (if a man may so say) they train them up unto the wars. The entertainment the Turk giveth them is sufficient; but as for the rewards, honours, and commodities he shareth among them, it is hardly to be expressed: There is not any Prince at this day living that may in this regard be compared to him; and which is more, the meanest of his soldiers upon his virtuous behaviour in arms is capable of attaining to the most eminent charges and dignities of his estate, and of enriching himself with inestimable treasure. To confirm this, the goods which Meehmet Bassa left behind him, (who of a Christian Apostate aspired to that greatness) were valued at two Millians of Crowns. In a word they are sure that reward waiteth always upon valour. Moreover the prowess of the private soldiers cannot be smothered amongst them, it is rather immediately discovered and notice taken thereof. Of all the Ottoman Princes Mahomet the second was the most bountiful, for he gave beyond measure, so as sometime he increased the soldiers pay a thousand fold. Selim the first did the like; and it is worth the noting, that as those two surpassed the residue in liberality, so did they in honourable and triumphant victory.   

CHAP. V.  
That he hath maintained his Soldiers in military Discipline.  

1 A very great army may be easily overthrown by a mean army.  
2 The cause hereof, and benefit of the latter.  
3 Care is to be had that an army be not overcharged with baggage.  
4 A Generall-with more ease may command a mean, then too great an army.  
5 Soldiers are animated by the persuasion and presents of their chief commander.  
6 They are in service to be well acquainted with one an other.  
7 The encumbrance of huge and over great Armies.  
8 How it cometh to pass that the Turks so great numbers of men prove victorious.  
9 Defects in Christian armies.  
10 Obedience of the Turks.  
11 Battles lost through disobedience of the Soldiers.  
12 The military discipline of the Turks notable.   
1 THe happy success of battles by those of ancient times with such wisdom achieved, makes it most apparent unto us that most commonly the mean armies have overcome the great. Alexander the Great, divers Grecian Captains, amongst others Miltiades and Themistocles, and among the Romans Lucullus, Scylla, Pompey and Caesar always assailed and vanquished the barbarous people rather with unequal then equal numbers, if we respect the multitude; but they went far beyond them if we consider their military virtue. In these latter times the Commanders of the Emperor Charles the 5. and of King Philip his son have likewise gained the victory of many armies greater than this.  
2 To such as demand the reason of it, I will answer that it was because the principal strength and sinew of an army consisteth, in affection, in military Discipline, and in a well disposed order in the day of battle: without which parts an army is as frail as glass. A few may be more easily and orderly ranged then many. Virtue united is always more powerful then separated and disjointed. Hence is it that bodies of an indifferent stature are for the most part more vigorous than such as are over great and huge, which the Poet (speaking of Fidaeus) expressly signifieth in these words. Mayor in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus. Great virtue in a little body reigned. And Virgil alluding to the Bees saith, Ingentes animi angusto in corpore versantur. In slender bodies they have mighty minds: questionless a mean army must needs be more stable and united then a great, because multitude is naturally accompanied with confusion, commonly waited upon by disorder.  
3 Moreover, it is a thing of high consideration to be able to take such order that a camp be not encumbered with baggage: rather that it be free and manageable, so as it may be every where commodiously conducted, ranged and ever in a readiness to gain and make good dangerous & difficult straits and passages; that it be not tired and discouraged for the long marches it must often undertake; that it do not faint for such accidents as diversly chance, nor for any exploits or executions which present themselves unexpected. All which a mean camp will be more proper to perform then a great: for it shall not need so great a quantity of victuals, nor so great an encumbrance of baggage or carriage as the other.  
4 Moreover seeing it is more profitable and necessary that an army be conducted & governed by one only General; and that it depend of no other than him; It will be more easily effected in a mean then a great army, especially compounded of divers nations. And this dependence shall be better ordered if the General can content himself with small store of luggage and that well trussed up. The multitude of mean causes slacketh always the course of the efficient, and keepeth back the fruit thereof. A little army hath not need of so much luggage as a great.  
5 And it is much better that the Captain himself know his soldiers and they him; then to rely upon the credit and report of such as are under his charge; for the soldier that shall hear himself named by his Captain advanceth himself so much the more, and becometh more desirous of honour. Whereas if he see himself forgotten and untespected of him which commandeth, he groweth distasted and out of heart, and almost careless how matters have their proceedings. Who doubteth that the presence of the Captain or General of an army doth not serve as a motive to the soldier to make him diligently preserve his reputation, and to shun the reproach of cowardice? which he will not so carefully perform, if he find himself out of the presence of his Commander, or that his Commander make as if he did not see him.  
6 It is good also that the soldiers frequent brotherly together, for that assureth them more, and maketh them trust to one another's assistance in time of the most cross fortunes. All these parts encounter and are entertained more easily in a mean, then in a great army.  
7 Which is often attended upon by more inconuenienences than the other, as by famine, plagues, contagious mutinies and dissensions. There is yet another dangerous inconvenience which is most usually the companion of a multitude; that is, that they form to themselves a confidence of their own forces greater than they ought: of this confidence followeth a contempt of the adverse power, of this contempt a presumption, author of infinite mischiefs.  
8 But how happeneth it then (will some say) that the Turks have every where gained the victory by multitude? Would you know how? Because they have betimes trained up and instructed their great armies, to keep so good an order, as well in execution, judgement, military discipline, readiness, as disposition to arms, that they are become as tractable, and easy to manage as ours though mean and few in number.  
9 On the other side we have suffered our armies to slide into such insolency and liberty, as we can hardly rule and conduct them without so many dangers, confusions and luggage, as it were enough to trouble Captains of great policy and experience; and to say the truth, see we not that the Turk more easily furnisheth an hundred thousand men with victuals, than we fifty thousand? for beside that his soldiers make not, as ours, any account of the diversity of victuals, of delicacy or of toothsome morsels, they drink no Wine nor Beer, which importeth the consideration of almost the one half of our munition and charge.  
10 What need I speak of obedience, nurse of the order observed amongst them? since it was never seen that the Turks ever lost battle through disorder, much less left off pursuing any attempt for their soldiers mutinies.  
11 Whereas almost all the battles we have bid them, had not been lost, but by the mere disorder and disobedience of our men. Whereto may we impute the miserable loss of Nicapolie, 
1396.  but to the disordinate rashness of the French, who served at that time in the army? Sigismond king of Bohemia (afterward Emperor) seeing that contrary to his will and commandment they advanced themselves as courageously as unadvisedly. What shall we speak of the overthrow of the same Sigismond which happened some few years after? 
1409.  came it not to pass by means of the disordering of his infantry? which being not yet fully set in battle array were covered with a cloud of arrows, let fly by the enemy so to the purpose as they were all hewn in pieces even under the noses of his horse; which seeing themselves destitute of foot were struck with such a fear as they betook themselves to flight not without the loss of many good soldiers and worthy Captains, all to the shame and confusion of the Christians. Ladislaus King of Polonia, 
1444.  was he not overcome at Varna through the disorders of the Bishops of Strigonia and Varadin? who to the end to chase inconsiderately the enemy, shaken and flying in one part of his army, forsook their ranks to pursue them, so making way for them: who laying hold on the occasion came with the rest of their army to charge them there where they lay most open, in such sort as they won the victory most miserably slaughtering the Christians. 
1541.  At Buda, 
1538.  at Exechium, 
1560.  at Gerba, and in sundry other places where we have been overcome, it proceeded rather of our disorders then of the Turkish forces.  
12 So as we must acknowledge that the Turk excelleth us both in number of good Soldiers and in all other military discipline: He is followed with such numbers of men as it seemeth he relieth wholly on their multitude, but it is in so good a manner as if he respected nought but order & military discipline, parts (to our dishonour) far from us.   

CHAP. VI  
That he hath made no reckoning of other forces then his own.  

1 The wars are to be maintained by our own strength, neither must we rely upon foreign powers.  
2 The good and ill that resulteth of both these.  
3 Conditions of confederate forces.  
4 Other inconveniences which arise from assistance of foreign powers.  
5 Examples of Leagues against the Turks.  
6 Their defects, hindrances of their success.  
7 The Turks not accustomed to make Leagues with any, but using their own forces, have overthrown many armies confederates.  
8 With whom they might well have joined in league to their advantage.   
1 ALl high enterprises either for preservation of an estate, or for denouncing of war, have been ill plotted and as ill carried when they have relied upon the assistance and favour of a third power, and not of our own; seeing that from hopes and projects so ill grounded we never come to enjoy the fruits which such a succour, the design of him that enterpriseth, & his extraordinary preparation promised us; rather they are infallibly attended on by some lamentable accident which utterly overthroweth them.  
2 Since oftentimes it falleth out that the expectation of such succour promised, serveth rather to slack the course of our endeavours, and lessen the preparation of the enterprise, than otherwise to forward or better them; were it not for the confidence of such succour he that attempteth would prepare his forces proportionable to his project, and not trust to outward helps either of friend or confederate. Who doubteth, when we so repose ourselves upon an others forces, and that he is at charge for our loves sake, that he doth not make us more backward to provide and disburse of our own store? But this is not all: the worst is, that while we thus expect, time wasteth unprofitably, and occasion (which once escaped cannot be laid hold on) is let slip and lost without recovery: for whilst we so attend our assistants our practices are discovered.  
3 And who will believe that a friend or associate will embrace the desseign of him he assisteth, or wish his good fortune with such hearty affection, as he will not be ready upon the least occasion he shall desire to find, to leave him in the lurch? And without question this occasion will offer itself at any time whensoever he hath a purpose to dissolve the league and covenants agreed upon between them; especially if he be the stronger and more mighty, and find not himself interessed in the success of the enterprise, for which he took arms and became confederate.  
4 We may also add another defect and imperfection; & that is, if the succour we attend be to be assembled from divers places, or, that the winds (if it be by sea) or some unlooked for accident (if by land) hinder by so many means the preparations for the war and intended voyage, as that the season fit for execution escapeth him that enterpriseth; so as before he begin to march or set forward to the Rendezvous his opportunities of attempting or achieving any memorable act, utterly fail him in a matter which he had before discreetly enough plotted and disposed: moreover he cannot bear sway as master of the confederate forces, insomuch as he which sendeth succours may underhand deliver to his Commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited, than the necessity of the undertaken affair would permit. Also the least distaste either of the Prince which assisteth, or of the Captain which conducteth such succours, serveth oft-times to dismiss the promised forces, deceive the others expectation, and bring all he undertaketh to nothing: So as he remaineth not only more weak by this disappointment, but his own forces also become unprofitable, and consequently himself exposed to all wrong and ruin: for as if one only wheel of a clock be out of temper, it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion; so where the undertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troops, the effects, which in part depend thereon, likewise fail, and the course of his warlike designs remain crossed and perverted. I will not forget also to say that a camp consisting of such borrowed pieces, hath necessarily need of many heads to command it, and an army compounded of so many heads (because of the diversity of opinions and affections) will most commonly have the worse when it cometh to handy blows.  
5 We may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch us near, and are familiar unto us, and were not long since practised; for this cause I will more willingly, then otherwise I would, here produce them. In our time we have seen two most memorable leagues between the Pope, the king of Spain, and the Venetians, consenting and united to undertake one war against the Turk: the one was under Pope Paul the third, 
1537.  and the other in the life time of Pius Quintus. The first was carried with an excessive charge, yet without any effect worthy so great an assembly: The cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to join in one body the confederate forces, and draw them together at the Rendezvous in due season: for they met not till the end of September. Although an other inconvenience may be alleged to this purpose, which overthrew, the good success of such a holy and Christian attempt; yet it may appear that to avoid the shame and dishonour that followed thereof, it had been easy to have performed somewhat of more memorable consequence, than was the taking of Castle-novo, if we had known how to husband the times and occasions fit for the employment of so combined a power. Concerning the second, which was (as I said) in the time of Pius Quintus, 
1570.  the army of the Venetians, very gallant and strong, spent all the summer in attending the Galleys of Spain which were to convoy succours into the I'll of Cypress then attempted by the Turk; so as this slackness of assembling the Galleys was a cause that the army became almost quite unfurnished of good soldiers drawn together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitiful havoc among them. Notwithstanding all this they forbear not to make towards Cypress so late, as by the way they received the news of the lamentable taking of Nicosia: Which made them imagine that the Turks had, upon that commodity, most strongly manned their Galleys (as it was likely enough) with land Soldiers, and that therefore there was more appearance of danger than of good success in assailing them: upon which consideration they held it best to turn their course homeward and refer that business to an other time; having then thus dishonourably behaved themselves: returning they encountered so many misfortunes, as well weather beaten by reason of the Winter then approaching, they at length arrived at their home sorely bruised and spoiled. The year following the army of the confederates met, notwithstanding all this very late, yet undertook they to encounter the enemy, of whom they got that so renowned victory in the year 1571. if God had permitted us to reap thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect. Now for all this Cypress was not recovered but remained to the infidel as the reward and wages of his valour. The third year of the league the king of Spain, in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the Turk as he had determined, caused Don john of Austria Admiral of his fleet to stay at Messina, because he then doubted that the French would assail Flanders, with such forces as they had that year rather suffered to take breath then wholly cased and dismissed: So as the whole season was spent unprofitably without attempting aught worthy such preparation, as the confederates had in due time set forth. This was an occasion of excessive charge, and that the armies did not once stir till it was too late, attending what their neighbours would do, who, as I have said, seemed to threaten the King of Spain with some attempt upon his country of Flanders. In the mean time the Venetians, tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose, treated a peace with the Turk.  
6 Who will make any question now (those things well weighed and considered) that if the leagues (both the first and second) had been well carried without these cross, jealousies and suspicions which accompanied them, (though vainly and upon no ground) but that they would have brought forth some worthy and honourable fruit, to the glory and honour of God, the peace of his church, the increase and establishment of the Christian commonwealth? This may be enough to prove that forces compounded of divers nations, depending of many and different heads, are in marching more slow, and at a time of need less effectual than others. It may appear to some that I hereby infer, that leagues between Princes are unprofitable, and therefore not to be made: so far is it from me to maintain that opinion, as I rather willingly embrace the contrary: but I reserve a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league, (especially against the Turk) when I shall arrive at the place appointed for this purpose, to the end I may discourse of it at full. 
Vid. l. 3. c. 7. 8. 9  Now let us return to the argument of discourse in handling.  
7 The Ottomans never made league, either offensive or defensive with any: and never had help of strangers: on the contrary, they have always had to do with armies compounded of different nations confederate, and conducted by sundry Commanders, all which (as ill united, not understanding one another) they have evermore vanquished. Moreover we have ordinarily seen them more forward and deliver about their enterprises being alone, then accompanied; and consequently more united in their force, more nimble in execution, and (it must needs follow) more renowned and fortunately victorious.  
8 Yet they had no lack of whom where with to practise their associations (if they had approved them as good & necessary) as among other with the Sultan of Caito, with the kings of Carmania and of Persia, and with many other great princes all of their own sect and religion, who would not (as it is to be supposed) have set light by their league and amity; especially then when they saw them so increase in power and greatness. But they have ever made very slender account of such practises and confederacies, esteeming them unprofitable for him, who of himself hath a high courage, and forces answerable wherewithal to go through with a conquest, which they judge will admit no sharing or division, since the ambition of rule strives to be alone and brooks no fellowship, no not between brothers; as little between father and son. It is true, the Turks have sometime taken to their service some few troops of Allarbs paid as mercenaries, in like manner as now a days the French entertain the Swissers and other foreign nations; but they never termed them, as they now use, Confederates or Associates, titles invented purposely to give colour and applause to such levies.   

CHAP. VII.  
That he hath to power joined cunning and deceit.  

1 Machiavel's perverse opinion of not observing faith, rejected.  
2 The ground of a Prince's authority and estimation laid by the observation of his faith.  
3 Confutation of Machiavel's opinion.  
4 Breach of faith a heinous crime.  
5 Other mischiefs that spring out of Machiavel's position.  
6 To observe faith is godly, honest, and profitable.  
7 What we are to conceive of the Turks falsehood and perjury:   
Machiavel amongst other virtues wherewith he would adorn his imagined Prince, 
Princ. c. 18.  wonderfully commendeth disloyalty in a great person, affirming that he ought not to make reckoning to observe his treaties of peace or aught else he undertaketh, at the least when his game is fair: and that he may at such a time without scruple of conscience, or other honest respect, violate his faith, break the laws of nations, and his oath. A thing questionless unbefitting a magnanimous spirit, and which ought never to have place among the actions of a Christian Prince, to the end he may not by so foul and dishonest a stain disgrace the residue of his virtuous operations. This makes me esteem this axiom so lewd and detestable, that we should blush, so much as to imagine it, much less to propound it as a precept for Princes; who are not to profess other than justice and generosity. It is good for none but those whose case is desperate, and who respect not that their posterity condemn them for men of foul and cauterized souls.  
2 To say the truth, no man can with reason gainsay, renown and a good reputation, as well at home as abroad, to be the most firm foundation of all principality. And what reputation can a Prince have either among his own people or strangers, if he be noted for a disloyal, unfaithful, and perjured person, one that stands neither to his word nor agreement?  
3 Machiavelli to conceal the fault he not ignorantly committeth, saith, that this is sometimes most requisite for the good of Prince's affairs, since occasion once passed is irrecoverable. What more mere folly could he discover to his confusion, then in thus concluding, that a Prince is not to regard the bond of his faith, if the good of his estate present an occasion to violate it? Truly none at all: neither were it necessary according to God's laws, or the carriage of human affairs, that Christian Princes were of that mind; for it would prove the direct course never to see but fire and sword amongst us.  
4 Such as are good detest these opinions, 
1539  as did heretofore Frances the first; who professing faith and honour, rejected such counsel when the Emperor Charles the 5. about the establishment of the affairs of Flanders, passed thorough France, and upon the King's word, crossing his country came to Paris. That word this Noble Prince preferred before the greatest good that could betide his estate, if he would have retained the Emperor, and constrained him to forego the places and estates he held in Lombardy and Italy, whereto the King pretended a right, which he often unprofitably disputed, as did also Henry the second.  
5 By the same reason a man may also say that sometimes it is well done to ransack Churches, rob Altars, oppress innocents, and succour the wicked: for there is not any vice so detestable, or crime so heinous that sometime carrieth not with it a show and colour of good, and proveth not profitable to him which in due season performeth it; were it for nought else but because he attaineth the effects of his corrupt will. If that were not, should we have so many murderers, falsifiers, sacrilegious persons and men given over to all reproachful vices? if thereby they did not reap some temporal commodity?  
6 I will yet add further, and maintain it to the end, that for a man to keep his promised faith, and be so accounted of by the world, is a work of God and without comparison much better than to violate it and embrace such a damnable opinion as that of Machiavelli, yea though the profit were immediate and such as might afford wherewithal to balance his breach of faith and promise: Not to keep touch with one is enough to incur the suspicion and ill conceit of all; neither is there any which will not think he doth God good service in performing the like towards all such Princes as shall take such courses; which will yet farther administer matter for an other repentance, to see that when they shall tell or mean truth no man will believe or trust them. I could illustrate this proposition with infinite examples but I will content myself with that one of Duke Valentine son of Pope Alexander the 6. cited by Machiavelli, as a perfect Captain; who without respect of truth, his oath, reverence of religion, or honour, which is so charily to be preserved amongst men ordinarily, abandoned himself to all disloyalty, breach of faith, and whatsoever other wicked and traitorous courses; so they carried with them some show of present commodity. This man during the life of his father went thorough with certain his designs, borne out rather by the Pope's authority then any fortunate success of his mischievous attempts. After the death of his father it was quickly seen how smally durable are all such estates as are founded upon deceit. 
jou. lib 8. hist.  For he found himself immediately forsaken of his friends and pursued by his enemies; so as more lively to express what he came to, after he had most maliciously hatched & achieved so high enterprises, he served (as they say) but for a cipher, and was as one that had no being, leaving nought behind him but only the footsteps and a cursed memory of his wickedness, which made his life and name infamous to all posterity.  
7 Some one will tell me that the Turks have done the like, and have used all sorts of cunning, deceit and treachery, towards their neighbours, and that nevertheless they have thrived by it. It is true, but the causes are different, and yet we see that the most disloyal amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their treacheries. Amurath the second, Mahymeth the second, Bajazeth the second, Selim the second, were held the most subtle Princes of their race; but we must grant that if those their wicked proceedings thrived for a time, it was more through the coldness and dissensions of the Christians when they should have revenged and repelled their injuries, then that we should therefore believe that it is well done to prove perjured and disloyal. Amurath the second made proof of it to his cost, and having received an overthrow at the hands of Ladislaus King of Polonia, 
At the Mountain Hemus.  he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against Caramania, where whilst he was busied, Ladislaus judging (so persuaded and backed by Pope Eugenius) that he should not do amiss to falsify his faith with a Barbarous Turk of so insolent a nature, and so capital an enemy of Christendom as all breach of peace might seem as a true performance thereof; resolved to make war upon him on the sudden, which proved so dangerous as Amurath was near tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery; so as his estate was never more shaken and endangered; if the Christian army (which followed their victory) had not, as I have said, disordered themselves: Whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the Infidels to the great misery and confusion of the Christians. 
At Varna.  Selim the second, 
1444.  having unlooked for, attempted upon the Venetians to the prejudice of his vowed faith pulled upon his neck the forces of the league, 
1570.  & had too late repent himself if God in regard of our sins had not in such sort sealed up the eyes of the Christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his divine Majesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the loss they received at Lepanto. Soliman that was held the most wise Prince of all the Ottomans (if wisdom be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and Christian belief) having understood at such time as he caused his army by Sea to fall down towards Ottranto the year 1537. that Mercurin de Gatinaro and the Citizens of Castro were made prisoners after they had surrendered the place contrary to promise, he forthwith commanded that they should be released, saying that disloyalty to violate their faith and word once passed, was not the means to win the hearts and like of strange nations.   

CHAP. VIII.  
That he hath been always served in his wars by good and valiant Captains.  

1 Whether an experienced Commander and raw Soldiers: or experienced Soldiers and an unskilful Commander be the better.  
2 The first best allowed and the reasons.  
3 Examples hereof.   
1 IT is ordinarily disputed amongst Soldiers and martial men, which is the better, a good Captain employed about the conducting of an army consisting of raw Soldiers, or an army of old Soldiers committed to the command of a raw and unexperienced Captain.  
2 As for me (if my opinion may carry credit amongst so many, sufficient to decide this question) I hold it better that a worthy and valiant Captain should have the charge of an army of untrained men without experience, then that an army of old Soldiers trained and beaten to the wars, should be recommended to a Captain, yet a novice and unskilled in the profession of arms. The reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plain to such as without being obstinate or passionate, in behalf of either party, will entertain them, as they are not to be gainsaid: for is it not much more fit and easy that a good Captain make and fashion a camp of raw Soldiers, than that good and experienced Soldiers prepare and fashion their Captain to the conduct of an army? who can without shame deny that an army doth not rather obey the voice and command of their Captain, than the Captain of his army? 
Male imperatur cum vu●gus regit duces. Senec. trag.  otherwise it were as they say, to set the cart before the horse.  
3 Now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make clear the truth of my proposition. If we will as we ought, examine how many times the Christians have been overthrown by the Turks, we shall undoubtedly find, that it hath evermore happened rather through want of experience, 
1396.  courage, sufferance, concord, and authority in the Commanders; then for any other default. So at the battles of Nicepolis, for that such like Captains did set light by the Turks forces, and took not a sufficient survey of them, they received a most shameful overthrow, a worthy reward of their weak experience, in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations, 
1526.  whom they might well think wanted neither skill nor valour. Did not jews king of Hungary by means of the Bishop of Tomerea (who brought him almost to the slaughter) endure the like disgrace, at the battle of Mogoria, for want of experience in matter of war, and of judgement sufficiently to discover the enemy's forces, and the passages of the country where he was to buckle with him? In like sort was not the unskilfulness of the Italians cause of that victory the Turks gained at Grado, who had then for their leader Homarbay, General of the Turkish army? Also the year 1537. at Exechium (Mahomet jahiaoglis being Governor under Soliman of Belgrade and the frontiers of Hungary in the time of king john) the great Caziaver losing his courage, did he not abandon to spoil, death, and ruin a fair and strong army, which he commanded for the Princes of Germany and Italy, some one troop excepted, which dishonourably together with him saved themselves by flight? Also before this heavy loss, did not Anthony Grimani General of the Venetian army fail of courage when with great advantage he might have charged the Turks, 
Sabel En. 10. l. 9  and put them to the worse? 
1471.  The very like want of experience and valour was seen in an other Venetian General, who shamefully left the I'll of Negropont to the spoil of the enemy. To conclude, have not the Christians been so many times put to the worse near about Buda, for want of valiant and experienced Captains, as it cannot without grief be related? On the contrary, the Ottomans have never suffered misfortune of war; at the least for lack of authority, command, or wisdom in managing their armies: for they themselves have in person conducted them, and been present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them achieved. They have likewise evermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affairs of war to the most valiant and experienced Captains amongst them, whom they had formerly well known, trained up, and exercised to such charges by infinite proofs of their courage and wisdom in most dangerous and difficult occasions. In sum, experience is that which perfecteth valour. The Turkish Emperors have always given to their Captains ample power & commission freely to dispose of their most important affairs, wherein they have been thus happy that we cannot find that ever such Captains lost battle for lack of command or obedience; or that they ever for want of courage or experience in the art military, made stay or question of their proceedings. Of all the Bassa's that ever had the managing of matters of importance, & had greatest hand in the affairs of their Masters, Acomet was the chief (who served Mahomet the 2. and added much to his greatness by obtaining many glorious victories) insomuch as he was no less feared than his Sovereign. To him Sinam may be joined who lived under Selim the first, and being slain at the battle of Matarea (wherein he won the victory for his Master) Selim said of him that the death of so worthy a man as he, was cause of such great grief unto him as it equalled the joy he conceived for so happy a victory: such also was Barbarossa that famous pirate, who for his many warlike acts won the renown of a valiant Captain, and was most highly reputed of his Master Soliman, for whom he performed many memorable enterprises as well by sea as by land. Hence we may gather that undoubtedly a great Prince cannot do worse than commit the charges of his wars, the dignities and conducts of his armies, to them which enjoy his favour but unworthily: he should consider the deserts of others, & especially of such as with more sufficiency would render an honourable account of so worthy an employment. We see it fall out oftentimes that for default of well measured elections a Prince plungeth himself and his estate in a thousand dangers and confusions through the insufficiency of his unskilful ministers: the examples of such infortunate events would fill this volume if I would stand to relate all such as my memory presenteth unto me. But omitting all I will only put you in mind of the Emperor Charles the fifth well known for most judicious in all his elections, marvelous in his actions, mighty for the great number of his excellent Captains bred and trained up under him; all which can witness the care he had in his choice, and in very deed they did him such service as by their means he enlarged his dominions with many rich Provinces, adorned his sceptre with most memorable victories, and his house with triumphs to his immortal glory.   

CHAP. IX.  
That he hath made no skip in his enterprises.  

1 United virtue strongest.  
2 The strength of kingdoms by their situation.  
3 What it is to skip in an enterprise.  
4 Kingdoms preserved by the conjunction of their subject provinces.  
5 Confirmation of the Roman Empire.  
6 The means of establishing an Empire by confederacies.  
7 The French as quick in losing as in conquering countries.  
8 We are not to endeavour so much to conquer as to keep.  
9 The Portugals and Spaniards distracted government.  
10 Industry of the Ottomans in conquering.  
11 An admonition to Christians.  
12 Horror of the Turks.   
1 NOthing would be so strong as a point, if it were to be found in nature; at the least if the rules of the Mathematics be true as they be held, because being most simple, it cannot be corrupted either by inward beginnings, or outward causes; so is a body more enduring and powerful, the nearer it approacheth to the resemblance of a point, that is to say, the more it is united and compact in itself. And in very deed as nature unable to bring to pass that all the world should be one only body, made it continued and joining one part upon another; and as to preserve this continuation, she in all she may opposeth Vacuum, which is only able to corrupt and destroy her:  
2 So estates become more durable, and of greater ability to maintain themselves when they are (as I may say) sowed, linked, and bound together, the one helping to entertain and preserve the other. Hence we may gather that such provinces as have their situation trussed up together in a round form, are more strong and mighty than such as extend themselves in length: as for example, one may say of France in comparison of Italy, because this latter resembling a leg stretched out is less fit to defend itself then France, which is round, as her provinces lie and are situate: whereby she is consequently not only more united in her forces then Italy, but also more nimble and able to maintain herself then the other.  
3 Now let us come to our discourse and make it appear what it is we understand by this discontinuation, and that which we term to skip in our enterprises. It is properly when we regard not the contiguity (if I may so say) or near adjoining of our estates; and that happeneth as often as we leave an enemy behind us, at one side of us, or otherwise, in such sort, as he may cross, cut off, besiege, or enclose us when we so inconsiderately skip or stride; we may likewise say that he truly skips who crosseth from one country to another so far distant, as by that time he hath finished his voyage, his strength fails him and his troops prove so out of heart and tired, as they become utterly unprofitable. We may allege for example that which befell the Emperors of Germany, the king of France and of England in their voyages of the holy land, for the length of the journey, the far distance of the country, the diversity of the Climate, the change of the air, and many other such like inconveniences, so tired and discouraged them by reason of the travails and miseries they had suffered upon the way, as they could not attempt any matter of importance, or go thorough with their enterprise according to their project: not unlike a ball which stirreth not from the place where it is once settled, through want of that moving power which should toss and raise it. So if these Princes at the first arrival did afford any proof of their courage, valour, and likelihood of good fortune; the languishing of the principal motive suddenly made them lose their advantages, and reduced the whole to terms unworthy the merit of their holy intentions and travels.  
4 We must then allow that it is requisite for the preservation of estates, either that their provinces touch and entertain the one the other, or that their forces be of ability to maintain themselves of themselves: for this continuation hath of itself such force and efficacy for the lasting and preservation of estates, as we see that commonweals and mean kingdoms have thereby longer maintained themselves then great and rich monarchies. We may allege for example the commonweals of Sparta and of Venice; of the kingdoms of Persia and France, whose rule hath much longer endured then that of the Saracens, of the Mamelucks, or of other more mighty Empires. The cause proceedeth, as I have said, of the union of that entertainment and conjunction of provinces, abutting the one upon the other, which is of such virtue and efficacy to give strength and continuance to a monarchy, as it almost exceedeth conceit and imagination.  
5 The Romans which saw well enough that the enlarging of their Empire's limits, trained after it a consequence of a necessary dispersing of their forces, endeavoured by all means possible to reunite this body, augmented and made huge by their advantageous conquests; reducing to their obedience and rule, all they got both by maintaining sufficient forces upon the frontiers of their Empire or garrisons in places of importance, as also by establishing Colonies, and enfranchising many strong towns, with bestowing on them the like liberties as the people of Rome enjoyed, by them termed Municipia. In other places also they instituted certain fraternities and assemblies of people, with prerogatives of the Romans privileges, which they named conventus: Moreover, they committed estates and entire kingdoms to the government of certain Princes held and esteemed as friends of the people of Rome. By these means joining them to their love as well by gratifying them with their liberty and bounty, as with other privileges, honours and dignities, whereof they did partake in their town as in right of Citizens: They termed these towns and people their confederates, and the Kings their friends. As for example in Africa they had Massinissa, and juba; in Asia, Eumenes, Prusias and the King of Egypt. In Europe those of Marseilles, Autumn, Auerg●●●, Rennes and others; making account more to avail themselves by such confederacies and amities then by means more strict and severe: so than power is established and continued either by our own forces, or by annexing of the forces of our friends which serve us as a continued rampart and conducteth us out of danger even into the country which we intent to invade, and that with so much the greater advantage, when upon some part it confineth with the country of our confederates.  
6 But because we are never able with good assurance (especially Princes amongst whom this is a tickle point) to maintain so good intelligence, it is requisite if we will make this use of an other, to make him confident either through the hope of participation in our conquests, or else by intimating unto him (if he be our inferior) an evident assurance in our proceedings, and such a plainness and integrity in all our other actions, as even that may rid him of the distrust he might conceive of being one day prayed upon and brought under by that insolency which accompanieth the prosperity of fortune, and may serve to stretch the conscience of a conquering Prince. After we have in this manner framed an impression of our integrity in the heart of our neighbour, we may march in his country as securely as in our own, and rest assured that we shall by him be furthered and assisted.  
7 The French could never keep any country by them conquered abroad, unless it were Piedmont and Savoy: for it one day they had gained a foot of land, they were enforced to forego it the next, no sooner winning it, but they lost it.  
8 We commonly say, that there is no less virtue in him that keepeth them in him that getteth. 
Non min●r est virtus quam quaerere, part● tueri.  I affirm that there is need of more dexterity in keeping then in getting, for an amazement of the people we invade, a rebellion in our behalf, or any other such like stir makes us easily masters of that whereto we aspire; but to preserve what we get, we must maintain a continual counsel which must have all the parts thereto appertaining, as gravity of judgement, ripe deliberation, nimbleness to dissemble, industry joined with a daily heedfulness and patience to attend occasions. The French (which are reputed the most warlike nation under the sun,) are but too sudden, open, impatient and of too stirring a nature; for proof you shall observe that what they achieve not when they first attempt, they almost never compass it: all their boilling heat is soon exhaled and spent by the sudden fervency of their courage, which most commonly transports them beyond all moderation and advice most requisite in what we undertake, without heeding the end for which they begun. This negligence together with their impatience hath made way to all the misfortunes which out of their country they have induced: The voyage of the Terseras and certain other attempts upon the Portugals have not long since confirmed this opinion, and made the wound of their unhappiness bleed a fresh. Lews the eleventh, a prince of an approved wisdom and clear sighted in matters of estate, would never lend any ear to the persuasions of sending an army into Italy or other remote parts; rejecting all such practices, as well for the reason formerly alleged, as because of the infidelity which he thought to be in the Italians, and particularly in them of Genoa. If Charles the 8. his son, jews the 12. Francis the first, and Henry his son had inherited this their predecessors opinion, they had not with such excessive charge, mishap, and misery attempted Italy.  
9 here some one will object that nevertheless the dominion of the Portugals is of 90. years continuance or thereabout in the Indies, so far distant from the first spring and original. The like appeareth in the government of Philip King of Spain spread and divided in so many places aswell in Europe as in India. Surely it is not possible to imagine a greater distance then from Lisbon to Ormus, Goa, Malaca, and Ternate, so as from Portugal to their farthest Conquests, there are no less than twenty thousand miles; and although they endeavour to join these estates so severed, by the nearness of sundry fortresses here and there bestowed in the midway (as Zofala, Mohambique, Melinde, which belongeth to a certain King their Ally, besides other like means) yet all these are but weak sinews long to sustain the union of so far separated members. But it is God's pleasure that by how much the foundations of this rule are more feeble and subject to be shaken, by so much the more we should admire the omnipotency of his divine Majesty, whereby they are maintained, fortified, and protected. The dominion likewise of the King of Spain is spread into so many parts of Asia (especially by means of annexing the crown of Portugal) of Africa, of Europe, and of the new found world, as there appeareth in this preservation a greater miracle than counsel or human providence, for in very deed to rule so many and so severed nations differing in religion, manners and tongues without stirring from home, is it not a work of heaven rather than of human policy or discourse? God therefore which hath of his goodness made him owner of so many and so goodly countries, hath not denied him wisdom and counsel to know how to order and maintain them, as he doth, under his obedience.  
10 The Ottomans have ordinarily behaved themselves more judiciously in this one part of conquering (without inconsiderate skipping) then in any other of their actions. For neither covetousness of enriching or enlarging their estate, nor the easiness of attempting, nor the enticements of people's insurrections, nor the thirst of revenge (which commonly makes Princes mighty in men and money, forget themselves when the maintenance of their authority & credit is called in question, especially perceiving the law in their hands to execute more readily than can particular persons) nor any such like motives have been able, as I said, to induce the Turks indiscreetly to skip or to engage themselves in any enterprise far from home. Rather on the contrary they have marched fair and soft from country to country, and devoured (as they continue still to do) all such as confine and are neighbours unto them. Hence hath grown the consequence of so many happy victories, the benefit of so great and rich conquests; the course of so easily preserving what they have gotten.  
11 I have said that for the most part they have not inconsiderately skipped or strid in their enterprises, as the Christians do and have done: and as we see, when any of them have taken such ways to greatness, the fruits and effects have not proved answerable to their project and promised fortunes. This unhappiness, common with the error founded upon the reasons formerly alleged, ought henceforth to serve as an instruction to make us become more wise and regardful than we yet are, to the end that after we have by an holy and universal amendment appeased the wrath of God, we may war against them with the same policies and advantages as they have practised in raising themselves to our cost and confusion. These examples also should admonish us of what is to be feared, to wit, least failing to chastise & humble ourselves, his divine Majesty inflict upon us a more severe punishment, then that we have hitherto endured, and for this cause open a more large gate to those infidels utterly to ruin and destroy us.  
12 Now lest any one should think I have against reason held that the Turks have not, as we, forgotten thus inconsiderately to skip, I will recite certain examples to that purpose. The first than that did it, was Mahomet the second, which unfortunately attempted Italy, Soliman performed the like against the same country, after the enterprise of Diu in the Indies, which was undertaken the year 1537. then that of the year 1542. that of Ormus 1552. and finally upon good grounds the attempting of Malta which was so valiantly defended by the Knights of the order, as (next the honour due unto the divine Majesty) all those brave Gentlemen, who with their grand Master Parisot, made it good against the Infidels, deserve to be consecrated to all praise, and to a most glorious and eternal memory.   

CHAP. X.  
That he hath not spent time upon enterprises of small importance.  

1 Get the greater, the less will follow.  
2 The besieging of some small hold, may be the hindrance of the whole expedition, this exemplified.  
3 The Turks discretion in their expeditions and sieges.  
4 The best course is, to become masters of the field.  
5 Error in the siege of Malta.   
1nature as wise and provident, doth not busy herself about the birth of every particular thing, but rather setteth her hand to the generation of the substance, which without any further pain, is afterward attended on by the accidents every where inseparably accompanying her. In like sort a good and discreet Captain in the carriage of his enterprises, should not aim at aught else but to conquer the places of importance; for of their consequence other inferior parts of the estate come tumbling in (as it were) of themselves, which as unseparable accidents or qualities, undoubtedly follow the first examples of greater moment, whereon dependeth and subsisteth the others being.  
2 We have often seen, that a paltry Sconce (either because of the natural strength of the situation, thickness of the wall, goodness of the matter, courageous obstinacy of the defenders, or some other accident not foreseen or dreamt of, hath stopped the proceeding of a royal army, and hath proved itself as able to withstand the force thereof, as a city greater, richer, and more peopled. And though we become after masters of such blockehouses and small forts, yet that is no furtherance to a more important conquest; or help to the enterprise begun. We find written that the Emperor Maximilian, because he to no purpose spent so much time about Asola (which he strived to subdue by the way, for the reputation and credit of the army, he conducted to Milan) inconsiderately lost the occasion offered him to become Lord of that Dukedom; and performed not any thing after to the good of his affairs. The French also, after they had passed the Alps in the time of jews the 12. thrived not in their attempts of the kingdom of Naples; having upon an ill ground undertaken Rocca-Secea, where they engaged both their honours and lives; for having besieged it certain days, and given the assault in vain, they lent leisure and courage to the Spaniards, to bethink themselves: made their powers less valued for so bad a beginning, and discouraged the people for ever attempting any thing in their behalf, as no doubt they had done if they might have seen a fortunate and better digested proceeding then theirs was, the name of the Spaniard being then odious amongst them. This fault made the Spaniards so bold as to say, that the rest of the kingdom was reserved for them, and not for the other, who had so ill husbanded their opportunities. In the year 1556. holding on the said design for the conquest of Naples, did they not vainly spend time, money, their forces, and pains at Ciuitella, to the ruin of that goodly army which Henry the 2. of France sent thither under the command of the Duke of Guise: who was nevertheless a valiant and discreet Captain, and who had perhaps done better if his particular interest, or the overmuch trust he reposed in the Pope's Nephews, had not blinded him: Other reasons may be alleged for the small good this army did the king, who had conceived of it great and honourable hopes; but I will refer them to such as write that History. The Spaniards also have thrice attempted the I'll of Gerbes, 
1560.  and every time lost a goodly and flourishing army, able to have performed a far greater matter than they could hope for by getting the henroust (if I may so term it.) The year after the battle of Lepanto the army of the confederates, 
1572.  which was then in the Levant, having their forces augmented by the arrival of Don john, made Ochiallo General of the Turkish army, retire to Modon, as fearing those of whom he had made trial the year before. If they had put him to it as they should have done, no doubt but they had found him dismayed, and hardly bestead how to defend as well the fortresses as his army by sea: for he had not left above 60. galleys, to guard the haven, and had bestowed the rest of his forces one year. But when he saw they went to besiege Navaria near Modon, and that they had no saying to him at his landing, as he feared they would, he took heart at grass, and after made a jest of the designs of the Christians army, which he in such sort held play and entertained, as it performed nothing worthy such a power assembled immediately upon the good success of a former victory.  
3 The Turks in what concerneth the ordering, commodity, and assurance, in their enterprises, surpass (to say the very truth) all other nations for well managing of warlike affairs: for they never attempted place that the design thereof was not far more worth than the pain they employed about it; or that the enterprise did not deserve the like or more expense: carrying themselves thus, they are by the effect of their enterprises grown mighty, for force and means, and have opened the way to the increase of their greatness and success of their affairs: which in such sort assuring (wherein they have aimed principally at profit) they have more and more weakened our forces, not without an evident consequence of extreme danger: when they took in hand the conquest of Cypress, they were wise enough not to bestow time in taking Cerynes' a fortress almost impregnable. They foresaw that it was of small moment, at the least not to import much in that they intended to compass, but they rather directed their course and endeavours against Nicosia, as against the principal place of all the Island, whereabouts they so well employed their pains as they carried it. By which conquest it was found that Cerynes soon followed, (as of a necessary consequence) the disaster of their capital town.  
4 In all the executions of their hardy designs they have always at the very first been Masters of the field, which hath so furthered them as thereby the strongest holds of the country, which they could not otherwise have gotten but by force of arms, have been surrendered up unto them. Such fortresses being unable long to hold out when all hope of succour is cast off by the opposition of so strong and mighty armies as theirs are.  
5 At the war of Malta it seemeth God did dull them, 
1560.  overthrowing the policies and practices which are ordinary with them. For the Bassa (who would needs begin with S. Hermes because it seemed commodious to stop up the haven and after to get the suburbs where the knights made their abode) consumed much time about it, and lost the better part of his best soldiers. In the mean space the season of the year spent so fast, and the resolutions and valour of them in the town proved such, as in the end he grew confounded, perceiving too late how flenderly he had prevailed, and that he must necessarily begin a new with the principal place, which he should have at the first attempted, if God (as I said) for the good of Christendom, had not blinded him in his enterprise. Dorgut Raiz Viceroy of Algiers, who was to second this Bassa in all his war, and to whom he was commanded to communicate his designs assoon as he should arrive, (which he did some few weeks after his first setting down and beginning to batter) soon discovered his error, and could upbraid him with it, telling him he should have gone right on to the fountain, without stooping to the shallow streams. So as after the taking of S. Hermes, they did not perform or attempt any matter of importance, but as men tired and discouraged, they trust up bag and baggage to be gone assoon as the succour appeared before Malta; these leaving behind them the memory and testimony of their shame, and ill grounded advise, and the knights of their honour and valour.   

CHAP. XI.  
That he hath laid hold on occasions.  

1 Occasion portrayed.  
2 It is to be observed.  
3 Examples of the Ottomans diligence in laying hold on occasions offered by the Christians.  
4 The difficulties of a defensive and offensive league.  
5 The false guess of the selfe-ruine of the Turkish Empire.  
6 The weaker Princes are easily subdued by the mightier.  
7 Other occasions offered by the Christians to forward the Turkish greatness.   
1 THe ancient Romans signified unto us by the picture of occasion (whom they adored as a goddess, putting wings to her feet, supported with a bowl, behind bald, and before hairy) that we must be diligent to apprehend her when she presenteth herself, and not in any case to let her slip: considering that if she once escape us, she leaveth us nought but a vain and vexing repentance.  
2 And to say the truth, in all a man's actions. There is nothing more commendable then to be able to make the best use of occasion and especially in matter of war. In as much as he that knoweth his advantage, how to take it and to carry the time before him is furnished with the principal adorning virtue of a Captain, occasion being no other thing, than an opportunity that the time more by accident then providence offereth unto us, for the well performing of what we have in hand, and for the abstaining and well coming off from a dessine unsesonably attempted, as the event of the above mentioned enterprise may sufficiently witness. This is that these Infidels have studied at such times as God hath made them his instruments to afflict and chastise us, and this is that we ought to do against them, for the glorifying of God's divine Majesty, not yet for aught I see pleased with us. In a word all such as have enlarged their estates have either enjoyed or hammered out some notable occasion which they wisely laid hold on, and have consequently reaped the fruits of an unusual advancement. The Grecian and Roman histories can teach us this, but I omit them as too far from us, to betake myself to such as are more familiar and near unto us. Pepin and Charlemagne were by the Romish church called into Italy: 
735.  the like was Charles of Anjou into the kingdom of Naples. 
800.  Those of Arragon were invited to Sicily by the people and to the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by Queen jone the second: 
1263.  The house of Austria is at this day enriched with many goodly kingdoms brought them by their alliance and marriages: one whereof subjecteth unto them the Low countries, 
1476.  the other gave them Spain with her appurtenances, the third for a perfect raising of this houses greatness, annexed unto it the crown of Portugal and the east Indies, 
1579.  so as if we nearly consider humane casualties, we shall find that force without occasion is fruitless or smally available.  
3 The Ottomans have not attained to the height of so mighty an Empire but by such occasions as we have too carelessly, 
The Christians ministered occasion to the Ottomans of their own overthrow  unworthily, and as of our free bounty, presented unto them. The first sprang from the negligence and cowardice of the Emperors of Greece, who through their extreme lasciviousness and sloth (Sardanapalus and Heliogabalus like) became deformed monsters of all looseness and riot: 
1 The first occasion: the sloth of the Emperors of Greece.  So as abandoning themselves to all voluptuousness and excess, that martial vigour which had till than honoured and preserved them, began by little and little to decline amongst them, and next amongst their people, (these framing their manners after their governors) which prepared means and occasions for the Turk to set foot one while into some inferior province, and ere long into a mighty kingdom. 
2. Occasion: envy of the Emperors of Greece.  The second occasion which showed itself favourable and proper for the Turks, was, when the Grecians upon a malicious envy began to disfavour and oppose the designs of the Christian Princes which had by league united themselves for the conquest of the holy land, and so ill advised they were as instead of seconding them they crossed them in all they might, to the end to stop the fortunate proceeding of their worthy armies, not heeding poor souls that they thereby befriended the Turk; who did but watch his opportunities. For they well observing this fault, and temporizing the occasion which after appeared, failed not to spy when they might surprise them (as they did) all beaten, tired, and disunited in force and means, whereupon it finally ensued that the Christians were utterly expelled jury, 
About anno 1290.  by the Turks, who after turned their armies against the greeks themselves and bereaved them of their Empire. These were mischiefs and wounds by them well deserved, neither are they to be pitied, but so far forth, as they have bread the calamities and ruins which have and do still continue to afflict Christendom. 
3. Occasion: the civil wars of the Emperors of Greece.   
The jars and divisions of the Princes of Greece ministered the third time an occasion to the Turkish thriving greatness: 
john Paleologus.  This happened at such time as the Emperor of Constantinople was so ill advised, as to crave the aid of Amurath the first to defend him. This Prince which lay still in wait, willingly sent his troops, not to succour, but to discover the country for the better advancement of his designs; and in very deed the soldiers returning from that voyage, delivered so advantageous reports of the riches, pleasantness, and fruitfulness of that country, painting it out unto him so abounding in all commodities necessary for the life of man, as he forthwith resolved to attempt it, 
1363.  so as not long after without bidding, he in person passed the Straight, and so well husbanded the occasion to settle himself in Europe, as since his successors have there made the principal seat of their Empire. The divorce and separation of the Greek church from the Roman, 
4. Occasion: the separation of the Greek Church from the Roman.  prepared a large way for the fourth occasion, embraced by the Turks, more advantageously to overtop us: since this division was a mean to distaste and allay the courage of the Princes of either party, neither hath it ever since been possible to reconcile or unite them by any good or firm intelligence, so as remaining in this sort divided, they have never been able to enterprise aught worthy Christian piety, or the greatness of their powers and monarchies; thereby to cut off and overthrow (as they might and ought) the proceeding of the common enemy of Christendom; who getting by his negligence, scope and liberty, is grown greater to our universal hurt, which those princes have evermore fostered; a disease now by their obstinate division grown remediless. 
5. Occasion: the Turks aid called into Italy.  This evil hath proved the more lamentable because of the discord amongst other Christian Princes which refuse to make their benefit of others calamities, or to acknowledge them as corrections coming from the hand of God.  
This mischief grew greater at such time as some Potentates of Italy inconsiderately called the Turk to their succour, showing him the way into our seas farther than was convenient. In this regard our ports stood open unto them, they entered and conversed with us as with friends and associates, a thing most abominable before God and man, and of most dangerous consequence. And to the end I be not held an outlasher, I will reckon some of those that have so overshot themselves. Alfonso the second king of Naples, 
1498.  and Lodouick Sforza duke of Milan, were those that brought in Bajazet the second: that against the French, this against the Venetians. Isabella Queen of Hungary craved aid likewise of Soliman, 
1540  against Ferdinand king of the Romans. 
1543.  Francis the first of France, and Henry the second that succeeded him, d●d not only let in the Turkish power into our seas, but suffered them also to land at Nice and in Corsica, leading captive at their return, an infinite multitude of poor Christians, (without respect of amity, age, or sex, which they snatched up in those places and along the Adriatic coasts.  
The sixth occasion observed and embraced by the Turks, 
6. occas. the plurality of the Christian Princes.  may be said in my opinion to proceed from the consideration they have had of the plurality of Christian Princes, supposing (as it is true) that it could not be without that jealousy and suspicion which each man particularly conceiveth of his own estate, rank, and dignity, and and so the whole being divided into divers governments, it must follow the parts should be more feeble and scanted of means to undertake against him: since (as we have said) virtue united in one entire body, is always more strong then separated into many parcels. That which is worse, is, that in this division of Monarchies, the ambitious thirst of greatness, hath taken dangerous footing amongst Princes, and hath bred (as by a necessary consequence) discord, separation of wills, diversity of designs, and variety of pretences, of all which partialities, hath sprung suspicion, the common plague amongst princes. This suspicion like a canker hath contaminated the union and rid the means how to knit and establish a holy league and confidence amongst them for a defensive or offensive war.  
4 Now to make a defensive league against the Turk is in these days a hard matter in so much as the princes of Christendom are so far from one another, and some especially from the enemy, as like men out of danger they weigh it not esteeming themselves most assured: And to undertake to establish an offensive league is no less difficult seeing the profit of their conquest cannot be drawn to a proportionable equality, it may be also every man fears the greatness of his companion (although never so much his partner for aid and common association) but above all he that hath the most commodious havens or his Provinces most proper for the managing of the war. Or else he who can better maintain his conquests would prove the most suspected and maligned. These considerations hinder them from uniting and assembling themselves as they ought for the common good.  
5 Moreover every one flattereth himself that time and the world's ordinary change will breed ruin and alteration in the estate of the Ottomans, and settle their affairs without being constrained to expose themselves to danger, travel, and charge.  
6 Another reason and inconvenience may yet be alleged that each of these princes being weak in respect of the other they cannot so courageously resolve to undertake what were profitable and necessary for them; whence it groweth that the feebleness of their strength is yet made more feeble by this irresolution; so as a mighty power charging them they shall remain subject to the discretion of the indiscreet enemy: by these means the lords of the several parts of Lombardy became the prey of the Venetians who subdued them with as much facility as resolution; But had the repulse when they attempted the state of Milan, utmost limit of their power, dominion, and conquests. After the same sort also the French in time passed brought under all the Provinces of Gall, but when they would enter the confines of Spain, the opposition of that neighbour-greatnesse stopped their course and was a rampart to defend them from further proceedings. In the very like manner the Turks having devoured all the Princes of Greece, Macedonia, 
1408.  Bulgaria, and Servia attempting the invasion of Hungaria, 
1412.  they had their hands full, since the valour of these Kings and people (so fashioned, 
1438.  hardened and enured, of a long time to the wars, as they were the better able to make head against them) discovered itself to be greater than the consideration of their indifferent estate could well bear, as witness the exploits of Ladislaus and Mathias Coruin, who found the Turks play to their cost. But so soon as those Kings and people did forego this first valour and suffered the exercise of arms to degenerate, 
1521.  Soliman overcame them both at Belgrade and at Mogacia. 
1526.  After the Turks had gone thus far, they met with that bar of the house of Austria seconded by the Germane forces, and supported by the power of the king of Spain; who showed himself always fearless of the Turkish forces: As for the Venetians they have evermore (backed with the Popes and the Spaniards power) behaved themselves most honourably: one happiness there is that those places of Christendom which border nearest upon the Turk were never in more mighty hands, nor had ever so few Princes to rule them, as at this day: whence groweth an infallible consequent that they are more easily defended and maintained, especially having that particular conjunction of the power of Spain, which is such as the Turk cannot stur without incurring an apparent danger; It being manifest that beside that the king of Spain is of ability without fear to resist him, he can also with his own forces curb him and bring him to reason. So as the Turk awed by so mighty a king, will not, as he was wont, so so one bend his forces against the Christians his neighbours. The Muscovit on the one side, and the kings of Polonia and Persia on the other, are of such power and courage, as they will always make the fame of their particular forces, to be both respected and feared.  
7 The diversity of opinions in matter of religion, have made way to the seventh occasion, 
7 Occasion: the diversity of opinions in Religion.  have disunited the courages, spent the forces of the Christians, & have made them rise up in arms one against an other. In the mean time the Turk getteth footing, groweth great in sight of all men, and is become a terror to Christian Princes.  
Disloyal and traitorous Renegades or Apostates, 
8 Occasion: treason and disloyalty.  are those which have discovered to the Turks the Christians secrets, have acquainted them with the advantages of landing and invading, have been guides to their armies into the very hearts of our richest countries, and have opened the door of the eight occasion.  
But for the ninth, 
9 Occasion: the Turks peace with some Christians, to war with others.  let us consider what subtleties they have practised, and whereon that hath been principally grounded. I am of opinion, that the better to order their affairs, and seize upon the Christians with more security, their leagues, treaties of peace, and suspensions of arms, passed between them and our Princes, have been their greatest furtherances: for the Turks never warred with any Christian Prince or Infidel either to defend their own estate, or with hostility to assail an others, but they first of all made their country sure against the power of their neighbours, but above all, such as (seeing them elsewhere busied) had means to disquiet their affairs, invade their territories, and assail them at unawares. The peace they have so long maintained, with the Polonians can testify as much: Again the quiet they have suffered the Venetians to enjoy for these many years sufficiently bewrayeth with what care they handle this business. The continued peace they keep with the French teacheth us likewise with what providence and wisdom their matters are carried; to the end not to receive any encumbrance or interruption by means of strange enmities, at such time as they proceed in their enterprises; They take truce with the Emperor always to their advantage; and lately intending to war upon Persia they dealt for a suspension of arms with the King of Spain, so as making all sure on one side they in a trice assail the other, hereby so well playing their parts, as having the law in their hands they remain as arbitrators of peace and war, pursuing always the course of their dessines with an advantage too great unworthy and preiudicious to the Princes of Christendom; whose greater part is so awed by their forces, as they have often chosen to enter into conditions of a dishonest peace or truce though never so vnassured, rather than to expose themselves to the danger of their mighty armies: not heeding that thereby they have lost many fair occasions of doing good upon them: whereof we need not seek farther for examples then now that the King of Persia keepeth them in continual war (at least if such news as comes thence be true) and that he hath lately given them an overthrow near Taurijs of above four score thousand men. Which if it be so, what better occasion can you desire (o ye Princes of Christendom) to set upon them and revenge the dishonour of our passed injuries? Can it be otherwise but that in their former encounters and in this last they must have lost the flower of their captains and choice soldiers, and is it possible that the swelling pride of their command and greatness should not shortly undergo some change and decrease if you will entertain the occasion which God offereth you? o but you sleep and are altogether unprovided to assail them. They are our sins that hinder us and have bred the disorders of civil wars which disquiet France and the Low countries, with such obstinacy and cruelty as these Princes have work enough to order their own affairs: their neighbours in the mean time having their ears filled with the noise thereof, looking what will become of such stirs and fearing lest the fire which so cruelly burneth their neighbour's house, should fasten upon theirs, which makes them stand upon their guard to keep out such broils & disorders. In the mean time the Turk wanteth no time to recover his losses; and to laugh at our inconsiderate follies; follies indeed for us, but wisdom for him. It is a marvelous matter to consider with what success and advice he hath quieted his neighbours, in such sort as he hath been never known to have had two quarrels in hand at one time. Imitating herein the wisdom of the Romans who had an especial care not to have two enemies to deal with at once, but if they assailed one, they took order by device and friendly means that the other were lookers on, or associates in their travails. Selim the first, which warred with the Persians, so ordered the rest of his estate, as during all the time he was employed that way, 
1514.  the soldan of Egupt never disturbed him: his son Amurath continuing the same enterprise, never received let of any Christian potentate.  
The designs of the Princes of Europe, 
1536.  & the wars they have so long and so wilfully maintained one against the other, have afforded the Turks a large passage for the tenth occasion to benefit themselves by their obstinacies & divisions; 
10 Occasion: Christian Princes warring one upon an other.  neither have they omitted nimbly to lay hold on it to some purpose for the good of their affairs. What enmities were evermore cruelly exercised with fire and sword then those our ancestors and we ourselves have seen between France and Spain? What malice was ever more deeply rooted then that of the two Kings? What nations are there in the world more mighty or more valiant than these are; and hence let us consider what profit, what comfort would have redounded to Christendom, and what fearful ruin to the Turk, if by some holy league they had been united; such undoubtedly as there should have been no memory of them, whereas they are now most mighty, and most dreadful. If we will descend to particulars, was there ever Prince that had better means to conquer the Turk then Charles the fifth? For besides his valour, invincible courage, and other notable parts which shined in him, he had sufficient force to execute his enterprises: he was followed by Captains of incomparable virtue, his soldiers were most resolute, his people and Provinces were all most desirous of so holy a war, he had havens and roads fit wherein to harbour his ships, and in a word he had whatsoever was necessary, but how? He was always constrained to have an eye behind him, to stand upon his guard, because of his neighbours who spared not to molest him as soon as he did but once aim at so holy an enterprise. King Philip his son hath met with the like encumbrances: so as we may well say our sins have ministered occasions enough to the Turks to assail us with such advantage, as it hath been an increase and establishing to his estate, we always shrinking at the cruel shock of his mighty forces. Amongst all the Ottomans Amurath the first was the most diligent to hunt after, and embrace occasions, who (as we have already delivered) sent his supplies to the Emperor of constantinople, 
1360.  passed the straits in person and got into his hands the two Castles. Bajazet the first, his son showed himself noless politic and prompt to discover his advantages, 
1363.  patient to attend his occasions, and diligent to gather the fruits wherewith his hopes presented him.   

CHAP. XII.  
That he hath behaved himself with nimbleness and celerity upon his occasions.  

1 The fortune of war consisteth not in discerning but in the use of occasion.  
2 Celerity in wars most expedient.  
3 The Turks readiness and wisdom in that kind.  
4 Furtherance of this celerity.  
5 Impediments of the Christians in their expeditions.  
6 Treasure requisite.  
7 Exact obedience in Captains and Soldiers and an observation of military discipline.  
8 Strength and ability of men and horse.  
9 Examples of the Turks celerity.  
10 In their sea-actions and their order:  
11 Defects of the Christians shipping.   
1 BEcause this Chapter, in regard of the continuance of the matter in handling, is but as one dependency and conjunction with the former, we will still make use of this word Occasion, heretofore discoursed upon, as of a table wherein is represented all whatsoever our forefathers have conceited of it; and what we ought to admit thereof: following this path we are to remember that who in time layeth not hold on occasion, shall never more enjoy a like time to recover it with the like commodity of well doing as he once had, if he had known how to entertain it as he ought. To discover then the opportunity of affairs, is not all that is required: 
Veg. lib. 3. c. 26.  That which most importeth, is to serve our turns with it at an instant, when it presenteth itself, to guide our intentions to that perfection we aim at.  
2 Celerity is an especial matter in all affairs of importance, but above all in the wars, wherein it is more necessary then in any our actions. Because (as said Selim the first) the least delay we therein use, turneth to a gross error, especially since it bereaves us of the commodity and advantage offered to put in execution, what we had wisely and with study determined: Hannibal a worthy and renowned captain, was noted of slowness, not in resolving but in embracing his occasions of victory which might have assuredly established his affairs. That great Pompey was likewise subject to the same imperfection, which did utterly undo him. In a word, no motion wanting speediness, can be of much force, or produce worthy effects: Violent agitations lose alike their force with their swiftness, but such as are natural attain it, and fortify themselves in it.  
3 This is that the Turks know well enough how to practise, fashioning themselves to quickness, nimbleness, ability, and to a certain store of whatsoever may seem necessary to that purpose, so as their promptness and forecast hath never omitted the occasions presented unto them without reaping the fruits and glory thereof.  
4 But some one will say, that it is requisite for the suddenness of occasion that many things rely in the power of him that will follow this course. I grant it, for they indeed who will fitly make use of such advantage, must be always in arms, and herein also the Turk surpasseth us, for he continually entertaineth so many soldiers, as it were hard to take him unprovided, or to find him (when need requireth) without a mighty army, which serveth to hearten him, and to awake his courage: but above all, he hath so great a number of horse ordinarily in a readiness, as that is but too sufficient to make him proudly humour his own will; so as thought and execution are in a manner one with him. This is yet farther accompanied with a powerful commodity which addeth facillititie to his promptness; and this is, that his horse and foot are lightly armed, and without encumbrance of luggage, so as by this means he more easily assembleth his troops, ordereth them, and conducteth them wheresoever he pleaseth, without distinction of time. Again, sobriety and sparing (familiar among his soldiers) make much to the advancement of his enterprises, contenting themselves, as they do to drink water and eat rice and salted flesh, which they reduce into powder, so as every one carrieth with him his provision almost for a month, and when that faileth, they live by the blood of their horses, which they salt themselves, like as do the Muscovites and Tartars.  
5 On the other side, when our soldiers march, they must have such store of munition follow them, to their so strange confusion and hindrance, as they are never able to go thorough speedily with any notable attempt. This bringeth a twofold let to their enterprises. The first in their provision, which in the unmeasurableness thereof is never made in due time. The second, in the convoy thereof, never so well ordered as it ought, whereof the event of the enterprise of Exechium, is but too true a testimony, the soldiers then suffering more in regard of the famine and difficulty of conveying victuals unto them, 
1538.  then of-the enemies forces. 
Qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat vincitur sine ferro. Liu. l. 3. c. 26.  Whose attempt had been unprofitable if the camp had not been disordered by this inconvenience, whereby the soldiers became half dead for hunger, and grew so feeble, as the courage to defend themselves utterly failed them. Which the General of the Turkish army foreseeing, waited till such time, as the famine had brought them low, and made them strengthless, that he might upon their enforced retreat assail them behind, and so weary them with continual skirmishing as they should at length chase and overthrow themselves, as indeed it came to pass. I remember I have heard one worthy to be credited, 
1557.  say to this purpose; that when Emanuel Philibert Duke of Savoy, deceased, was General of the army in Flanders, he found no difficulty in the wars more important than the discommodity of proportioning and carriage of necessary provision as he had oftentimes approved. On the contrary, it may be said to the Christians shame and confusion, that never any of the Turkish armies were known, through such default, to suffer extremity or to be disordered.  
6 Let us now come to the point of sudden execution, and to the instruments thereof, and let us dwell somewhat thereupon. I find the most necessary and profitable is to have always store of money in our coffers: and that is a hard matter, especially for such as are not provident, and that in all things so pamper themselves as the Christians do; but not for the Turk, for he hath (when and what he will) in store to serve his need for the wars, and for whatsoever belongeth thereto. This is the sinew of war, and the only means to hasten forward occasion, and attain (as he doth) to a happy end of his enterprises, but at his return home, he observeth a barbarous and insolent course of remboursing his charge: After he hath performed what he undertook, he repayeth himself by new impositions, whereto he enforceth his subjects to contribute: This to him is easy: but to us the most difficult material point is the procuring of money: for the greater part of Christian Princes are so bad husbands and of so small forecast, that they have scarce one cross in store: and are always at the borrowing hand, or enforced to pawn their lands and domains. And though the Christians be not so covetous as the Turks, yet they are of so good a hold fast, as no small time will serve to draw money from them, so as while that is doing, occasion hath already turned her back and left us nought, but the shame and sorrow of our enterprises ill success and effect. And if it chance that we hold on our courses, it is with such headlong rashness and ill advice in all we do, but particularly in providing of arms, horse, munition, and other necessaries, as all being performed out of season, there is neither the forwardness, the array, the election, the abundance, the resolution, nor the well disposing of matters which would otherwise have been, and which we see to be in our adversaries.  
7 There is another thing which addeth much assurance to the Turks designs, and makes them more easily to execute: and this is the incredible obedience of the Captains towards their General, and of the soldiers towards their Captains and such is the love amongst them as there is no danger or difficulty (be it never so great) which they will not easily overcome, so willingly they perform what is enjoined them. It was never heard that any revolt or mutiny stopped or slacked the course of their conquest.  
8 They have yet another most considerable advantage and that is the strong constitution of their men, spirit and speed of their horse. Where on the contrary our forces dare scarce budge unless they be backed and strengthened by foreign succours either Almines or Swissers, people faint and of little courage upon a sudden and unexpected action, as being framed of a dull and slow metal serving for nought but to make good the entire body of a battle, and be unto it as a solid and unmovable rampart. 
1542.  The encounters they have had with the Turk at Buda and elsewhere have taught us how unprofitable they are & of how slender effect for the speedy and happy advancement of the affairs of Christendom in those parts: Moreover the Turks horse are of more speed and strength than ours: the spanish Jennet is indeed nimble and full of Spirit, but wanteth strength and breath: chose the horse of Germany is able and strong but tender withal and not ready upon the hand, so as he is more proper to make a stand and defend then to assail, skirmish, or give the chase. The Napolitane is good and strong but of such a nimbleness as is not held for perfect speed, on the other side the enemy hath the Hungarian good for service, the Barbary horse of incredible swiftness, the Valachian, the Turkish, and the Moor almost hard for enduring of travail and well breathed, so as we may conclude that he enjoyeth whatsoever is necessary for the war, better, more ready, and in greater abundance than we, and that this is it which makes him speedily and with advantage, to serve his turn with all occasions which present themselves.  
9 There are so many examples of this advantageous celerity in their actions as they are almost innumerable; but I will only note two or three which may seem in a manner prodigious so admirable hath been their success. Amurath the second having intelligence of the great forces levied by Ladislaus King of Hungary (with whom he had formerly concluded a peace) with an intent to overrun him, 
1444.  being then busy in the wars of Caramania; he suddenly quitted that enterprise, and with such marvelous speed crossed all the Hellespont as in seven days he arrived at Varna with four score thousand men, In like manner Scheder Bassa employed by Bajazet the second to divert the attempt of the Venetians upon Milan, 
1498.  came with such extraordinary speed as he appeared in the territory of Treviso before they could have news so much as of his departure, less of his arrival in those parts. 
1516.  Selim the first marched so speedily from Cesaria to Aleppo, crossing the mountain Aman with his army and artillery, as he came upon the soldan before he dreamt of him supposing him to be as then rather upon his way to encounter the Persian then to attempt him.  
10 This particular diligence of the Ottomans is not to be limited all only with their land wars: they have performed as much by sea, so vigilant and wary have they showed themselves in exalting the honour of their names, and of their great estate, by them maintained even unto this day: And since they are so incredibly nimble and advised in maritine exploits, I hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they observe in assembling their forces. They reject the vessels and ships of great burden as over-heavy and unwealdy if the wind fail them, rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them. Their Galleys and Galliots are speedy, well manned and well appointed.  
11 We on the contrary drag with us a great number of ships and Galleons as our best strength and choice provision, but they are in proof the cause of such encumbrance to the service in hand, as we for the most part waste the season unprofitably and spend our opertunities in rigging and attending them; being also oft times enforced to disorder our Galleys, to the end these great carts may keep with us. Hence groweth yet another discommodity, and that is, that having placed a kind of hope in our ships, we in foregoing them, find ourselves too weak and failing of courage to assail the enemy; who is not to be forced to fight but when he please, 
Anciently called Nicoplu a city of Epirus.  having too open a field to fly and espy his occasion, as it happened at Preveza the year 1537. and at the battle of Lepanto which was the year 1571. for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of soldiers unprofitable for that action, in regard they could not arrive there time enough. The year after they encountered the like discommodity: since for the very same cause the army of the league, goodly and mighty fought not at all, neither performed aught worthy so great a preparation. And when the Galleys of the Pope and Venetians met, and that they attended Don john (who abode still at Missina, because of the then beginning troubles of Flanders) the army of the Turk being then commanded by Oechially, 
1572.  he once presented battle, but because of the advantage of the wind which without other helps drove our ships, and fearing the encounter of our round vessels, he made his escape by means of a certain stratagem, which for the strangeness thereof put the counsels and judgements of our army to a plunge. In very deed it is worthy the noting: for seeing the whole strength of our ships united with such confederate Galleys as were then there, make towards him, he gave commandment that in every one of his Galleys they should put fire to a barrel of powder and row backwards (not making for all this any show of flight, the prows of their galleys still appearing towards them) and as soon as the smoke had covered his fleet he halled on a main, and in an instant hoissing up all his sails shaped his course to Napolis in Romania, our ships not daring to follow him.  
In regard he had gotten the advantage of them they bearing but their mizzen sails, and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designs, to break company: eight days after we coming near together there followed some light skirmishes, but so soon as they perceived us to faint, as being deprived of our ships, they charged us with the whole army, in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired. So as it was then found by experience that the great ships served but to keep us from buckling with the enemy.  
I have made mention of this encounter in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in Latin, and somewhat more at large then I here deliver, for I was present in the army during all that voyage, under the command of the Duke de Maine.   

CHAP. XIII.  
That he hath gone himself in person to the war.  

1 A question concerning the Prince's presence in the wars:  
2 The first commodity is, if the Prince be there in person, it adds courage to the soldier.  
3 The second is, it causeth plenty of all things in his army.  
4 The third, it increaseth the army.  
5 The fourth, it worketh facility and speed in advice and execution.  
6 Of the power of Lieutenant Generals in the wars.  
7 The fifth commodity, is the Prince's authority and dignity.  
8 The first discommodity growing from the prince's presence, is, that thereby the enemy proceeds more providently.  
9 The second, that his Commanders use less diligence in discharge of their places.  
10 The third, is emulation of the leaders, whence groweth contention.  
11 The fourth, the emulation of the Lieutenant general toward the Prince.  
12 Examples to this purpose pro and contra.  
13 The preposition defined by distinction.  
14 The Ottomans wars in their persons have succeeded well.  
15 Exhortation to Christian princes to undertake wars against the Turk.   
1 whether the prince should in person go to the war, or else send his Lieutenant, is a question often disputed with such reasons and earnestness by sundry grave personages, as whatsoever may be now delivered to that purpose would prove but an unprofitable repetition of what hath been formerly digested by so many rare spirits. This then excusing me, I will refer the deciding thereof to men of more experience than myself; yet will I not forbear by way of discourse to deliver my opinion; and cite such examples as may help for the clearing of these doubts. First then we are to reckon the commodities the King's presence affordeth in his army, and so in order of the other consequences.  
2 Whereof one of the principal is, that it putteth spirit and courage into the soldiers, it so nearly presseth them as they must of force, as it were, make their valour appear, especially when they join battle where the Majesty and life of the Prince, yea and their own too is in hazard. Then is it that the honest desire of preserving their master's life groweth fervent in them, and so much the more by how much it is far more precious than the life of a captain or general, either mercenary or subject which the Prince might have sent to command them. This occasion more than any other moveth them more freely to hazard their lives and means for their Prince's service, which they would not so courageously perform under any other that should command in his stead. They likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others.  
3 Again, the king is always better followed; he is attended on with the consequence of far greater provisions either of victuals, munition, money, or whatsoever may be necessary for the enterprise, than his lieutenant, who hath his power limited, his allowance stinted, and cannot dispose but in part of the credit and authority of his master, to whom he remaineth as countable. Moreover, the subject fixeth his eyes and affection upon his Prince, and lavisheth his life and means according as the business is, 
1525.  and he is addicted. Francis the first, King of France, being before Pavy powered money forth (as a man may say) by bushels, yet Odet de Lautrey his lieutenant general, lost the Duchy of Milan for lack of three hundred thousand crowns that were assigned him for his charges, but were never delivered him. Whereupon the Swissers failing of their entertainment (whom he had till then fed with hopes of pay) he was constrained to fight with such disadvantage as he miscarried, 
1522. Guic. lib. 14.  and his whole army was put to flight; which had not happened if the King had been there in person, for either money had not failed, or else the credit and authority that accompanieth the Prince's presence had wrought them to patience and contained them in entire devotion.  
4 Moreover the great train of Nobility and men of quality that the Prince bringeth with him is a strengthening to his army, and addeth to it life and beauty, every man striving to appear more gallant than other; which they would not vouchsafe to do nor to subject themselves, commanded but by an ordinary General; for there are always about the King, by election or necessity, many great personages equal in power and dignity, and some differing too in rank and charge, either as being Princes of the blood, or for honour and authority won by desert, all which would perhaps do little for the General, but would most willingly obey and expose all for their King and master to whom they owe a duty both of nature and benefit. These great men's followers serve also to increase the army.  
5 Beside these considerations the King bringeth evermore with him a resolution of his enterprises, wherein a General most commonly proceedeth with a restraint and advise, as fearing in his too forward attempting, to exceed his commission. In the mean while, time passeth, and occasion escapeth, most often to the Prince's hindrance and blot to his reputation.  
6 In this regard if the wisdom and loyalty of the Captain be approved, Princes ought not too strictly to limit their charges: but if they doubt of them, it is indiscretion to put them into their hands, as we may see by these examples. Don Emanuel King of Portugal having sent the Duke of Braganza General into Africa, he fortunately won and made sure for his Prince the town of Aza Azamor: but that performed he would not take Morocco (as at that time he might have easily done) though he were counseled thereto by the wisest and greatest of his army, because that (said he) it went beyond his Commission: Lopez Zoares General for the same King lost in like manner the opportunity to take the city of Aden, of especial importance for the affairs of his master (for it standeth just in the mouth of the Red sea) though the inhabitants would have delivered him the keys. Insomuch as he should have taken upon him (as he said) more than his commission allowed him. The thing was of that consequence as he might well have forborn the observation of his fast, to swallow such a morsel. Neither had the service been one of the least, he could have performed for his master.  
7 In conclusion we are to grant that the presence of the king bringeth with it a certain greatness, and more aweth the enemy than his Lieutenant; as it was seen at the enterprise of Tunise; for Barbarossa sharply took up and reproved those who said that the Emperor Charles the fifth was himself in person in the Christian army, inferring hereby that he should then have his hands fuller than he made account, and that nothing could be lacking in the enemy's camp, when their Prince was there present. This is that may be said of the good redoundeth from the presence of the king in his army. Let us now see what may be alleged on the contrary.  
8 First it may be said that the King which goeth to the wars in person ministereth greater occasion than he would to his enemy to provide himself of forces, means and friends: and affordeth him matter also of pretending a more glorious victory, with the hopes whereof and of rich spoils, he putteth courage in his men, disposing them to attempt valiantly all things be they never so hazardous, so heartening them to fight.  
9 It may be said likewise that the presence of the King maketh his Captains less heedful and diligent at all occurrants and advantages, because they in part rely upon the vigilant eye of the Prince, who is to carry away the whole honour of the enterprise, their valour remaining as dimmed and eclipsed. This happened at the battle of Pavia. 
1523.  For the Commanders relying upon the king's presence and discreet carriage of matters, had no regard but of their pleasures in stead of diligently bethinking themselves of the duty of their several charges, which in the end turned to the ruin and dishonour both of their masters and themselves.  
10 Again an army where the King is in person, is always replenished with Princes and great personages, all which promising themselves great matters, seek not but to excel one another in place and command, whence grow among them jealousies, envies, and sundry differences breeding infinite disorders, to the overthrow or hindrance of their Master's affairs. Who is not without his part of fear to discontent some in contenting others? This plague of ambition, is such as it will sometimes so wrest the consciences and honours of these great men, as they will not stick to hinder the service of their Masters only to oppose the fortune and worth of such a one, as they see outstrippeth them in preferment; yea oft times their ambition groweth so extreme, as for despitethey will utterly forsake their Prince's service: Their virtue and valour being perhaps in the mean time not of the meanest, and such as if it were well employed would gain honour and victory to the army.  
11 There is yet another discommodity, and that is, that the king carrying with him the party, whom in his absence he intendeth to constitute his Lieutenant, he in the mean time repineth at his Master's worthy exploits, considering how the honour should have been his, if alone he had the managing of the army; again, knowing that all such misfortunes or discomfitures, as may befall, it shall be attributed to the insufficiency of the Prince, and not to him, he the less regardeth it. In a word, the glory we pretend, and the jealousy we have of our particular honours, are two especial powers, to shake and curb generous spirits. The Emperor Charles the fifth, had sufficient trial of it: for some of his Captains and Lieutenants could oft times with small store of money, and few men, gain triumphant victories, as well at Milan and Naples as else where, which perhaps in presence of the Emperor, would not have been so fortunately achieved.  
Notwithstanding all that hath been said, the question is not yet fully determined, rather it remaineth diversly balancing to and fro, as appeareth by these and the following examples.  
12 Charles of France, 
About 1364.  surnamed the Sage, never set foot out of his study to command his armies, yet knew he so well how to make the best use of his captains valour, and manage his affairs suitable to the time, that he finally recovered his whole kingdom, and expelled thence the English, who possessed the greater part thereof. On the contrary, the Emperor Ferdinand, who warred by his Captains, himself not stirring out of Vienna, received great and dangerous overthrows. Charles the fifth, on the other side, won more honour and victories by the valour of his Captains, than ever he did in those wars and enterprises himself undertook in person. 
1524.  If the attempt upon Marseilles had taken effect, it might have been truly said that his Captains had been in all places victorious: witness Pavia, the Bicock, Landrino, Naples, Coron, Genova, Rome, and afric; but where he went in person, as in Saxony, at Tunis, Dura, and Vienna, his fortune proved indifferent between good and bad. But at Algiers, in Piedmont, and at Metz, he encountered on all sides such misfortune, as it deemed (as a man may say) the lustre of his renown and victories formerly gained.  
13 Mark the effects of success and fortune so different, as it were a hard matter to pass a sound and determined judgement upon this proposition: so as the more I imagine by the contrariety of these examples to enlighten it, the more obscure me thinks I make it; the final deciding thereof, may be framed thus. The King which undertaketh the conduct of an army, is either a discreet and advised Captain, or else he is altogether unskilled in the mystery of war. In this last case I should think that it were most for his good, to rely upon an others relation and execution, especially if privy to his own imperfections, he want a dexterity to make the best use of another man's valour, wisdom and counsel. But if so be he be capable of the government, and conduct of an army, and that he have courage to execute, in mine opinion he cannot do better than to undertake the war and attempt himself in person: for if in all military virtues he equal the most valiant of his army, he will surpass them in fortune, credit, and authority, and in all the other good parts above mentioned. Kings compounded of these excellent parts, always crown their eminency with honourable triumphs. Theodosius the Emperor, Charles the Great, and sundry others can witness this sufficiently; jews the 12. of France, having been always conqueror, and never conquered in whatsoever he undertook himself in person, was put besides the kingdom of Naples, by means of a battle which his captains lost near the river of Garillion, 
1503. Guicc. lib. 6.  for lack of resolution and advice; which mischance was by that good prince so lamented, as he made a vow, thence forward to command personally in his wars; And to say the truth, if the Captain be not discreet, valiant, and of long approved experience, it is strange if he ever perform worthy act: in such cases the presence of one only Turnus is more available then of a thousand such Captains.  
14 The Turkish Emperors who go themselves to the wars, have tasted the sweetness thereof by so many and so notable victories, as we are at this day their admirers. Selim the first was wont to say that battles gained in the Prince's absence were not to be termed accomplished victories, and we see that they have scarce ever enterprised aught which hath not taken effect in the end. Yea it hath been observed that when their Captains have been overthrown, if they themselves went afterward in person, they always returned victorious. Amurath the second went himself after Carambeius general of his army (who was overthrown by Ladislaus King of Polonia) to war upon that Prince, 
1444.  whom he overcame and cut his whole army in pieces: 
1481. 1522.  Mezat Bassa was employed by Mahomet the second in the enterprise of Rhodes, which he shamefully abandoned; but Soliman going himself in person, carried it by plain force, and chased thence the Knights of Saint john of jerusalem, who disquieted his estate by their ordinary excursions in the Levant. 
1469. & 1407. 1474. 1583.  Amurath Captain of the said Mahomet received a notable overthrow at the hands of Vsumcassan King of Persia: but Mahomet going after himself in person vanquished the enemy already victorious, and put him to a desperate plunge. The Mamelucks overthrew Querseolus and Calubeius, Bajazet the second Commanders: Selim the first after personally undertaking them, overcame them, and wholly rooted out both them and their Empire. Amurath the third now reigning hath been so many times beaten by Cudabenda King of Persia in person, and through the unskilfulness of his Commanders, that a man may well say that never any of the race of the Ottomans received so notable overthrows as this hath: Whereto may be added, 
1585.  that he met with last of all before Taures; where he lost about 80000. men together with the Bassa General of his army; a great blot to the glory of his ancestors, yet the loss being so far off from his estate, he received not so great a shake as if it had been near him or in his country.  
15 But who will take hold of such advantages to do good upon him, seeing the greatest Princes of Christendom are turmoiled in civil wars and troubles of their own estates? surely none: Nay rather he is like to gather strength more than ever, which he would not so easily do, if he were to encounter the Christians well appointed, resolute and in a readiness jointly, and with one consent to make their benefit of so goodly an occasion.   

CHAP. XIIII.  
That he hath evermore gone well appointed to the wars.  

1 That our deliberations may take good effect, we must prove all courses, but undertake nothing rashly.  
2 Rather superfluous then but necessary provision is to be made of what belongeth to the wars.  
3 Advantages of errors committed in military provision.  
4 The wisdom of the romans and Turks in their provision.   
1 NOthing can be imagined more contenting the spirit then the happy success of that every one undertaketh answerable to his condition: much more a great Prince when he hath resolved upon any thing, espeically the war, is not to forget any one thing of what soever may perfect his design, which he ought to conceal and keep to himself all he may. We have one notable example hereof yet fresh in memory, and that is of the Prince of Parma Alexander Farnese, who for a time had the managing of the troubles and wars in Flanders, where he almost never attempted any thing which according to his intent, he did not perform: In very truth his acts were such as he deserveth to be reckoned as one of the most judicious, wise, and advised Princes of our age, particularly in this point of making provision of things necessary in due season. And to say the truth, who soever disposeth his affairs, is evermore attended on rather by shame, reproach, and repentance, than honour, glory, and contentment: That Prince which once loseth his reputation by this default, hardly recovereth it, but remaineth infamous; he is less feared of his neighbours, and which is more, he himself entereth into a certain ill conceit, and distrust of himself, which in such sort accompanieth him, as in whatsoever he afterward a new undertaketh, he resteth vnassured, doubtful, confounded in all his determinations, and is uncapable of constant and resolved counsel, carrying always the repentance of his former fault with a sorrow which tormenteth his very soul, so much the more strangely, by how much such a Prince is the greater, or is well conceited of himself.  
2 This is an advertisement which should open the eyes of all such not to undertake any thing but what is well digested, and with such order and forecast, as there be rather abundance than necessity: for when the provision is small and that it never so little miscarry, it depriveth the Prince, not of courage but of confidence and advice, of whose lack ensueth the want of wherewithal to warrant and shelter his reputation, unless it be that he will say, I had not thought, words most dangerous in the wars where he can err but once, and unworthy ever to proceed out of the mouth of one wise and advised, unless he mean that the miss of these two virtuous parts be to be borne withal.  
3 Prospero Colonna a great Captain proved this to his cost at such time as he undertook to assail Parma without cannon or other munition of war requisite wherewith to take such to task as were the French soldiers then in the town. 
jou. lib. 20.  For they sent him away well laden with blows, shame and displeasure, unable to perform aught of what he too unadvisedly attempted. Frederick of Bossola met with the like at the same place for want of counsel, money, and other means which are not borne as Pompers soldiers in striking the ground with our foot: Guicciardin was then within the town and had a command within that garrison.  
And though the Captain be wise, yet if the army once discover that their provisions fail them, that they be far from succours, far from places of retreat: then is it, lo that they become astonished, that fear and disobedience seizeth them, and that all these meet in one, make a foul ado; which the enemy perceiving (as it is unpossible but he should) will if he be wise, make his benefit of our necessity; which will serve him as a rampart and bridge at his pleasure to assail and harm us, but to preserve himself safe and untouched: It is that the Turks taught our men at Exechium.  
4 The Romans more wary, never fought but in gross and answerable to the proportion of the enterprise, their armies were either Praetorian or Consulary: the Turk hath always sent to the field mighty forces, and advantagioussy furnished; neither hath he ever quitted enterprise for lack of men, munition, or money. What was his provision of artillery at the siege of Malta, but in a manner infinite. For not to reckon his other charge, he there discharged threescore thousand cannon shot. At the siege of Nice, where the French were, Barbarossa General of the Turkish army, brought such store of artillery, as the French that were at their own doors had lack of powder to continue their portion of battery which they had undertaken; and were constrained to borrow of the Turks, to whom they should rather have lent; since the enterprise was theirs, and they brought the other thither.   

CHAP. XV.  
He hath never fought out of season.  

1 Especial wisdom to be used in giving battle.  
2 Errors of Charles the 5. and other Christian Princes in their Sea-fights.  
3 The Turks wisdom in that kind.  
4 Sea actions unseasonably undertaken.  
5 Advantages that the Turk hath in such cases above the Christians.   
1 EVery man is able to resolve that he will fight with whatsoever force shall present itself, 
Capienda saepius seius in malis praeceps via est.  & with hopes of victory, 
Sencca. Agamemnon.  or else to sell his life at a dear rate; but to perform it against heaven and time, was never heard of; for in such cases courage, wisdom, and power become daunted, so as consequently there followeth a despair rather than any honourable fruit of a labour & endeavour well employed. In a word, who so precipitates his enterprise without attending fit time and season, seeketh nought else but to lose his time, his pain, charge, and reputation (which is the main point) to his ruin and confusion.  
2 The Emperor Charles the fifth might make us wise, since having obstinately undertaken the siege of Metz our of due season, and without mature advice; he was constrained to rise from before it with such a disorder, shame, and loss, as he afterwards hardly thrived; Not long before that, for lack of applying himself to the time when he enterprised upon Algiers, how many ships and men lost he? so many as it was a long time ere he could recover himself, learning this lesson to his cost, That earth cannot force heaven. And though the valour and policy of the Turk can challenge no part in that action, yet can he make use of the Christian losses to his advantage. Now if tempests and inconstancy of weather opposed this prince both at Algiers and Metz, they did not less at such time as he attempted the voyage of Tripoli in Barbary: for the contrariety of winds made him waste much time at Saragossa, and after by the like constraint and violence, as much at Malta, during which time the most part of his soldiers died, and in the end utterly despairing to reach Tripoli in due season, the army abode at Gerbes, where it was after overthrown as well by tempest as by the Turks, who knew well enough how to advantage themselves by this disorder. The first year of the war of Cypress, the armies of the Pope and of the Venetians encountered notable losses by tempest of sea, even in the mouths of their own havens, and all for too late assembling themselves.  
3 The Turk never fought, especially by sea, but when the season and opportunity would permit him.  
4 Some one that may perhaps long to overthrow this position will allege that the Princes of Christendom have nevertheless in the winter attempted voyages by sea. It may be, but I should think it was either in regard of the hope they had, not to encounter the Turk as they might, in the summer, then for any assurance they had or might have in the well-speeding of a voyage inconsiderately attempted.  
5 In brief, if we must adventure beyond reason, it were better we did it fight against the Turks, then against the winds, with the moors then with storms and shipwrecks. To say the very truth, our Princes of Christendom have their forces and estates so far separated one from the other, that before we can reduce them to one consent and body; time and opportunities are fled. But the Turk hath his powers so limited and ranged, not depending but of one only head, as he is always in a readiness to repel all assaults almost before the threatening of them can be with him. In conclusion, if all these reasons suffice not to clear the proposition, yet should they teach us at the least to prove wise, resolute & advised hence forward not to enterprise aught so out of season, as that we should be driven to fight with time rather than men; they should teach us to gain rather than to lose occasions; to abound rather than want; to seek to be honoured and to thrive rather than to receive dishonour and loss: but the main point in all is to have God on our side as our chief strength and most assured conductor.   

CHAP. XVI.  
That he hath never divided his forces.  

1 Wisdom of the Turks in undertaking one, not many wars at once.  
2 Division of forces dangerous.  
3 Those few good Commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be far separated.  
4 The overthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest.  
5 Provision cannot be made at once for many expeditions.   
1 Such hath been the wisdom and foresight of the Ottomans, as they have never almost had to do with two enemies at once. chose they have so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawn on the beginning of an other; but when they forsook this beaten and sure way, 
1481.  then lo misery overtook them, as it happened to Mahomet the second, who would needs war with three armies at one time, sending one for Italy, at such time as he took Ottranto: the other to Rhodes, where his General and army were well beaten: the third he himself went to conduct against the Mammoelucks, if by death he had not been prevented. He had in these three armies above three hundred thousand men, besides his army at sea, consisting of above five hundred sail. The voyages and designs ill digested, all these three armies were discomfited; for that of Italy, though it took Ottranto, got nothing by it; seeing that assoon as the soldiers understood of their master's death, 
1482.  they quitted the place upon composition.  
2 But me thinks this proposition, whereby I maintain that it is not good at once to set a foot divers enterprises, may be thus impugned. That the success of the Turks death, and the commotion it wrought amongst his people, was cause that those armies miscarried, and not the separation of them and their enterprises. I confess as I ought, that whatsoever betideth us, necessarily happeneth by way of a first or exciting cause. But to come to the ground of our principal matter; without farther subti●●tsing this discourse, it is easily seen how hard it is for a prince to provide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises, at the least upon a sound foundation thereby to reap honourable fruits: since all division of forces bringeth with it a debility, and becometh rather a subject of injury then to be able to injure others, to be beaten then to beat, to be others pray rather then to pray upon others: for as a body divided by parcels is not of that weight taking it severally, as when it is reduced to the first unity: In like sort the forces of a prince, when they are divided and disunited have not that virtue and subsistence as they would have in their unity and well-ordered consunction: for proof, who considereth that Mahomet had three hundred thousand men, will say that the unity of such force was invincible; but divided it proved not so (though indeed each of these powers by itself (at the least in regard of the Christians) was a most mighty army, had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt) and if this mass of 300000. soldiers had marched in one entire body it had been easy for them to have attained their purpose, one seconding another as he might have done with that of Rhodes, Patros, and Ottranto, which he had in this case undoubtedly conquered.  
3 An other reason may be yet alleged, and that is, that it is hard to find such Captains as are fit for the conduct of armies; that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute soldiers; and that they which are such being once by their division (as a man may say) diminished, it is a kind of gelding the army of those which may serve by their example to assure and encourage the other confused multitude.  
4 Moreover when we undertake three enterprises at once (as Mahomet, who serveth to this purpose did) if it happen but one of them to fail, the news of their misadventure, maketh the rest (undoubtedly depending the one upon the other) to fail of resolution.  
5 Again, as we have before delivered, it is necessary that the war be undertaken in gross, and that assay be made of our forces as soon as may be, that we may not be driven long to entertain a great army (which for delay of execution doth oft times disband, break up and overthrow itself with itself, but especially with answerable provisions the better to enjoy great happiness with small charge; which will never befall him that divideth his forces and at once attempteth in divers places. We will then conclude that the Ottomans for the most part have not had but one enterprise in hand at once, and that to achieve it they have so well provided for it, as the victory hath remained on their side.   

CHAP. XVII.  
That he hath not long held war with one alone.  

1 Why the Turks have not continued war with one alone.  
2 A long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy.  
3 It moveth neighbours out of the fear of their own like misery to aid the oppressed.  
4 The Turks manuer of shifting his wars, and making peace at his pleasure.   
1 WHat more assured testimony can we have of a continued wisdom, or to say better of a well carried subtlety amongst the Ottomans, then in that they have always come off well in concluding their wars, 
This was Lycurgus rule to the Lacedæmonians.  and have not maintained them long against one and the self same enemy? The practice of this policy hath been most advantageous unto them; 
P●ut. vitu. Lic.  such people as they have not been able at the first to subdue, they have left in peace, yet have not forborn in the mean time to turn their arms elsewhere. I have fashioned to myself two especial causes of this discreet course.  
2 The first is the fear they have ever had lest they might make good soldiers of those against whom they should wilfully maintain a linger war. A thing ill practised by the Spaniards in Flanders and the low-countries; for continuing war many years together against them, they have acquainted that people (before soft and effeminate) with the fearful clash of their arms, they have so encouraged and emboldened them, as at this day there are few nations more industrious about their fortifications, or more resolute in the field.  
3 The other occasion which hath withheld the Turk from making war long time together upon one people, is, in mine opinion the fear he hath to incite their neighbour Princes to take arms against him. For if the compassion & fire which burneth our neighbour's house doc not move us, the fear of the like to light on us will make us bestir ourselves.  
4 The Turk then following these steps one while assaileth the Venetians, despoiling them now of a Province, then of a good town or place of strength. And having there made up his mouth he prayeth next upon the Hungarians, doubting lest he might pull upon his neck a general league of the other of Italy. He evermore pretendeth in show that he will attempt no further: rather that he meaneth to plant the utmost of his limits at the place by him last conquered: In the mean time he forgetteth not to be watchful where he may seize himself of some other place of more importance, more easily to encroach upon us. After he hath gotten from the Hungarians some piece of their country, he retireth himself before their neighbours be assembled, or that they have means courageously to revenge themselves of their injuries. In conclusion he so well behaveth himself as he hath never suffered us to fasten upon him whatsoever wars he hath made upon us, and he hath always so timely made his retreat, as he hath not enforced the neighbours of the country assailed to join and be in league together; he in the mean time resting upon his advantages of having a great number of soldiers well trained and entertained in continual wars whereby they become more experienced in all occurrents, than ours; by these means attaining to the triumphs of so many crowns and estates.  
The end of the first book.    

THE SECOND BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  
Of Religion.  

1 Religion the principal bridle of the subjects.  
2 Excellency of the Christian religion.  
3 The vainness and abomination of the Mahometan religion.  
4 Disputation of religion forbidden amongst the Turks.  
5 The great Turks example is a confirmation of his religion.  
6 So are the calamities of the Christians, and of others different from them in opinions.   
IN like sort as by the disposing of what hath been before handled we have made it apparent by what ways & means the Turk is become great; so are we now to deliver the manner how he holdeth, and maintaineth what he hath already gotten.  
1 All such as have gone about to lay the foundation of sovereignty have begun with religion, as that whereof princes must necessarily make use, to contain their people in obedience and worship of one God true or false; if this were not, it were impossible they should acknowledge one Sovereign in earth▪ were they without the fear & knowledge of one Supreme in heaven: We might allege ancient histories whereby it would appear that all such as have gone about the establishment of a monarchy, have had an especial care to ground it on the pretence of religion, by whose mystery and ceremonies they held in those whom they sought to range to their laws, by this scruple making them more tractable and pliant to receive instruction; Numa Pompilius, 
Vid Pluit in their lives.  Lycurgus, Sertorius, and others are sufficient proofs, whose credit grew from the communication they gave out they had with some Divinity; others that could not hit of the way to frame a new religion fortified themselves nevertheless with a pretence of it, in reforming the old, as did not long since Ishmael King of Persia and his Coosine Harduellas, who performed great matters in the parts of Asia by introducing a new superstition of religion. 
About 1499.   
2 But to the purpose, we must avow that as there is no religion more true, so is there none more favourable to Princes then the Christian, for the quiet and preservation of their estate and mind. In somuch as this by way of conscience subjecteth to the king & all other superiors (howsoever perverse and vicious) the heart, the person, & goods of the subject; what greater reason or instrument of state can we meet with then that which bringeth the people under a full and perfect obedience? If our Saviour Christ submitted himself to the law of the Emperor and paid tax and custom for himself and Saint Peter, who will doubt that his disciples are not to do the like as true observers of his precepts? I remember a discourse written by the Jesuits of a certain Prince of a country newly dscovered in India, who as one very politic and wise perceiming the simplicity and purity of the Christian doctrine, though himself were an Idolater, permitted that his subjects should be baptised, cathechized and instructed in our faith; and was present at their baptism; furthering to his power all the actions of the Jesuits; because (said he) I am assured if these men observe their law as they are bound, they will fail neither of loyalty nor obedience, and will pay me my tributes and revenues without fraud or contradiction.  
3 Let us now enter into the principal matter of the subject which we have undertaken to handle. The law of Mahomet is full fraught with fables and gross absurdities, and so far from reason to maintain them, as it would be an easy matter by way of some holy manifestation of their errors to alter the estate & government of the Turkish Empire. What more strange impertinency can there be then that of their Koran? It is impossible to devise more absurdities, dreams and cozenings, than those their law giver Mahomet hath introduced: but he perceiving well enough that the foundation of his false doctrine was such as it would be easy to overthrow it; knew cunningly how many ways to remedy it. First he framed all the precepts of his law according to natural sense, and made them suitable to the course of things base and earthly, thereby to make their observation so much the more pleasing and easy to be admitted and maintained, as being founded upon the pleasures of the flesh and the world; he could never better charm the reason and lull asleep the spirit of that dull and wholly illiterate nation, then to tie them to the performance of a law altogether sensual.  
4 The other means he held to make his law lasting, was the express forbidding to enter into disputation about any one point of it, unless it were with the edge of the sword: In regard whereof he termed it, the law of the sword. Thus the Prince of the Turk who hath in his hand the sword & force, is also consequently the Arbitrator & judge of the doubts and controversies which arise in his law, and determineth them as he seeth good, so as he is wise enough to suffer any new opinion to take footing. For as soon as that happeneth he turneth his sword against the authors thereof, and that with such rigour and cruelty as he utterly rooteth them out not leaving so much as a seed or any parcel of them. The troubles and dissensions which heresies have brought in amongst the Christians serve him for examples, he seeth such histories daily verified; he is very well informed of them, and turneth them to the best use beyond the experience his predecessors have had of such fruits as spring from a new interpretation of their law. Harduclles in a very small space won such credit amongst that barbarous people, that by means of a certain new interpretation of the points of their sect, he busied all Asia, where he sowed so many troubles, as he well near endangered the whole estate of Bajazet the second.  
5 But that which maketh the law of this cursed race more durable is, that the Emperor himself observeth it with that devotion, honoureth it with that reverence, embraceth it with that religion, and preserveth it in that credit and authority; as it is hard to imagine a man more devout and affected towards it.  
6 Again, the misery and vexations that the Turks (deprived of all other light but that their mother sense affordeth them) behold other nations dispersed thorough their dominions and of a contrary belief to endure, wholly weddeth their dull souls to this false doctrine: neither is there that misery which that vile Mahometan race make not all those to suffer who embrace not their religion, but above all the Christians.   

CHAP. II.  
Of the direct dependency of the Turks subjects upon their Sovereign.  

1 Subjects must have their eyes chiefly upon their Sovereign.  
2 Tyrant's strength and guard of strangers.  
3 The absolute authority of the Ottomans.  
4 The Prince's sevour, the subjects safety.  
5 His subjects exact obedience and the cause thereof.  
6 Rebllions whence proceeding.   
1 THe best cement that can be made to give long continuance to an estate, is to work so, as that the subjects, of whatsoever quality or condition they be, may have always need of him that is their Commander, to the end they may immediately depend upon him and reverence him: but because it is hard to bring all the world to this pass, especially in a great monarchy: those at the least are to be drawn to it, as far foorth as is possible, who should be the sinews and supporters of the Prince's power.  
2 This moved such Tyrants as durst not assure themselves of such people as they had subdued, to have about them Captains, Soldiers, and servants which were strangers and had neither kinsfolks, nor friends in that country, but relied absolutely upon them. This heretofore was the manner of the Sultan's of Egypt; and though they be courses so violent, barbarous and unworthy of Christian Princes, as they should never be set before them, yet may they someways advantage them in the consideration of their ends and aim of their intentions, applying them and appropriating them so far forth as Christian policy and the interest of faith may permit.  
3 Now then we will deliver what use the Turk in these times makes of them. He to establish his Empire and amplify his greatness and authority, entitleth himself not only Prince and Monarch of his estates, but Lord also and peaceable Master of the persons, abilities, goods, houses, and possessions of his vastals; neither is there inheritance or succession so assured, be it never so lawful, but it dependeth of the disposition and free will of the Turk, so as if any ask of his subjects whose house it is wherein he dwelleth, and to whom belongeth the land he tilleth, he makes no other answer, but that they are the great Turks his Master; moreover they all term themselves slaves of their Prince: whence followeth that they can not any way maintain the quiet possession of their goods, nor account of any thing as of their own but by his especial favour. Much more if they aim at raising themselves to any eminent place of honour they are to beg it of the magnificence and pleasure of their Prince; means which serve to curb those barbarous people, yet to be rejected of Christians and abhorred of lawful Princes, who receive and hold their monarchies of the hand of God. There are more honest precepts to be given, whereby they may purchase and preserve the love and obedience of their people, without using such cruelties and tyrannies. But because the argument propounded requireth that I relate the means this barbarous race hath observed to become great, and that I am fallen into that matter, I will continue it: yet not as approving any such course, or as endeavouring to set them down, by them to form a receivable example, or to induce Christian Princes to make them their pattern of governing their estates.  
4 By this former discourse than we have delivered how the Turks subjects have need of him, some to preserve what they have gotten, others to attain to dignities and places of honour. And in a word, their being and life depending indifferently upon the Prince, their principal care is to win his favour.  
5 Thi● dependency fortifieth itself & increaseth by the obedience and government of great personages, employed by the Turk in his service, and fashioned by himself to this end, who are from their infancy brought up at the Prince's charge, and instructed every one according as he is naturally inclined either in the exercises of arms or any other laborious trade, so as such not knowing other father or benefactor than their sovereign (from whom they receive both goods and honours): never think of kindred or friends, neither have they any touch of blood or natural alliance, dedicating their body, mind and whole devotion to the only good of their master's affairs, whose creatures they acknowledge themselves to be, to whatsoever degree of honour they be preferred: neither is it in their power to amass other wealth then that which is rawght them by the hands of the great Turk. To make it more plain to the Reader who these are; they are the Spachis, Spachioglani and janizzars; in these consisteth the strength and guard of the Turkish Empire. I hold it not amiss to discover in a word (as by the way) what is the form and condition of these bands and companies: so to deliver a more clear understanding of their manner and power. The Spachis and Spachioglani are horse men, whereof there are a thousand in number, which march at the right hand of their Lord. The Selactari or Soluptari, are other thousand horse, which accompany the great Turk on the left hand, when he marcheth, as the Spaihioglani on the right; of these two companies are chosen the Governors of Provinces, and upon these according to their merit, the Turk bestoweth his daughters in marriage. The Vlufezgis are other thousand which march after the above named, who in part are called out of the bands of janizzars, as men noted for their especial valour: or they are such as have been slaves, and for their notable service performed toward their masters, or for having saved the life of some Bassa or Beglerbee in the wars, attain to this degree of being one of the Turks guard. The Charipies are of like number as the Vlufezgis, and march after them. The janizzars follow after, who are foot, and appointed for the guard of the Turk: These at their first institution were few in number, but now they amount to 4000: In these two sorts of foot and horse, consisteth the strength of the Turk, being as the seminary of the Sangiaks, Bassas, and Lisirs. This great number we speak of, give no arms or any other mark of hereditary gentry, being in such sort ordained as they cannot attribute to themselves any thing in particular, nor attain to any pre-eminence, but such as by their virtue they may invite their Prince to bestow upon them. It is the only means whereby the Turk gaineth all the obedience and loyalty he can wish; obedience in regard they are (as I have said) trained up unto it from their infancy, which in them turneth to a natural habit, placing the fruit of their labours in the assurance of such a servitude: Loyalty, in as much as they expect from him their whole advancement, and acknowledge to receive more benefits of him then of any other Prince; neither hath it been known that they ever committed treason of importance, unless it were the revolt of Gazeles at Damascus, 
1520.  and of Acomat Bassa at Cairo, 
jou. l. 13.  in the time of Soliman. Which was but (as a man may say) a fire of stubble extinguished at the very first appearance and pursuit of their Master. Now the janisars, and the other mentioned, who are the sinews and principal foundation of the Ottomans greatness, and who receive so many commodities by this dependency, and do daily expect more; have no more dear care, then to uphold their Master's safety, and preserve the greatness of his estate, whereunto their own fortune is linked.  
6 To show by what means the Turk maintaineth this dependency, let me say that all dependency of the subject upon his Master and Sovereign, may receive an alteration either by 

force  
fury 

of the people:    
authority, of some great man of the country. by the support of a for●en Prince.   Matters thus disposed (not to inquire nicely after all sorts of inconveniences) it resteth that we see how he remedieth these kind of accidents, and preventeth the causes of such like infirmities as these, which in time might weaken and ruin his Empire: let us begin then with the strength of the people.   

CHAP. III.  
How he hath deprived his Subjects of strength.  

1 Wherein consisteth the strength of an estate.  
2 The Turkish Empire maintained by the use of arms, as that of the Romans.  
3 Tithing of Christian children by the Turks.  
4 The manner of their education: and the commodity accrueth thereby to the Turks.  
5 Great assemblies amongst them forbidden.   
1 THe strength of an Estate consisteth in the valour of the Nobility, love and faithfulness of the Subject, reputation of arms, multitude of Soldiers, and commodities of horse, which may be therein bred or nourished.  
2 The Turk then which would attain to this point, only by arms, horse, and Soldiers, observeth evermore this rule: He taketh away all use of arms from such Provinces as he hath newly reduced to his obedience, he forbiddeth them the commodity of horses fit for the war, & endeavoureth all he may to choke in them the springing up of men proper for the exercises of arms; and hath an ere that in all his dominions, not any man have in his house weapons for the war, no not so much as a knife, unless without a point; Moreover, he alloweth not any jew or Christian to have or keep any horse, imitating herein the manner of the Romans, who observed both the one and the other, especially at the surprises and surrenders of towns; The principal conditions were always, that they should forego their weapons, their horses, and deliver hostages: hence is it that we read so often in Caesar, Arma proferri, iumenta produci, obsides dari jubet. Hereby depriving the subdued people of all means to undertake or maintain a rebellion. Again, Hostages gave them a future assurance of the fidelity and obedience of their subjects: for amongst such as they admitted, the chief of the Counsel and such as were valiant men at arms, were the first mentioned: but above all, those of whom they might conceive any doubt or suspicion. We read that Caesar having taken Auxerra (which was not one of the greatest not best peopled towns of France) drew thence six hundred Hostages: So as it is to be thought, that the rest after such an abatement, could not be of any great courage or strength to revolt.  
3 The Turk without troubling himself with the care how to train after him an unprofitable multitude of Hostages, in an instant riddeth his subjects hands of their best forces, and strangely armeth and fortifieth himself with themselves, against themselves; and herein he thus proceedeth. He maintaineth in pay about two hundred Commissaries, who as Superintendents travel up and down all the countries of his obedience, to see and oversee all that is said and done by the Christians. These men go throughout Grecia, Wallachia and Bosnia, and extort by way of tenths, the children from the bosoms of their fathers and mothers, according as they esteem them fit and likely to be fashioned to the wars.  
4 These children thus culled & assembled from all countries of his obedience are after sent to Constantinople and distributed amongst the Merchants, and Citizens by name, and inroulement; to the end they may be there instructed in the law of Mahomet, and taught the Turkish tongue: After (when they come to the age to bear arms) to be of the number of janizzars. For during their youth they are trained up to all such military exercises as may put valour in them, and make them soldiers; and this by particular Masters appointed to teach them to shoot, wrestle, leap, vault, and so to harden their bodies as the tranailes of the wars may be after held but as pleasures and natural actions. Thus the Turk by this tithing of Children assureth himself of his people in a twofold manner; in despoiling as he doth the Provinces of the flower of their martial men; and applying them to his own strengthening both at home and abroad.  
5 Hereunto he addeth the express forbidding his subjects all assemblies, or building of any strong houses, which may stead them in time of sedition or tumult, neither are they allowed the use of bells, by whose sound they might call themselves together to the execution of some plotted revolt, or mutiny. In a word, they are naked of all means, to fortify, to arm, to assemble themselves or to become any ways; fit for the wars; no other subject is left them to work upon but the tillage of the land, whereto, as to all other mechanical arts, they apply themselves; so becoming base, abject, and unapt for the wars.   

CHAP. FOUR  
The causes that may move a people to fury.  

1 Despair armeth the weak.  
2 How to avoid tumults and civil commotions.  
3 Fear amongst subjects is upheld by justice, and plenty of things necessary.  
4 Praise of peace and justice.  
5 Execution of justice amongst the Turks pleasing and tolerable, though unjust.  
6 An exhortation to Christian Princes to administer justice.   
IT hath oft happened, and in our times we have had trial of it, that the people, though unarmed, have in their despair and fury disquieted a whole estate, and brought the commonweal into an exceeding distress and perplexity. Furor arma ministrat (saith Virgil) jamque faces & sax a volant. We have the testimony of the Romans time, in those civil wars which happened in Italy & in Sicily, & of the mischiefs which followed those rebellions; as much hath been seen to happen in these times in the I'll of S. Domingo about the change of government introduced upon those conquered people, forced to subject themselves to a new kind of servitude. In very deed that people is not weakly armed which hath a heart, a good spirit, and a nimble hand.  
2 This is the cause why the Turk to prevent these popular commotions, hath deprived the people of all sorts of arms, to the end they may forget both the use and courage to handle them, and that they may not by them take occasion to mutiny. Now to provide that so barbarous a yoke drive them not to despair, he maintaineth a general peace and tranquillity throughout his estate: he hath a care that justice be equally distributed: that they have plenty of victuals, and all other usual commodities, the better to lull asleep their fury.  
3 By these means every one maketh the best of his fortune and liveth quietly at home, embracing that natural desire of holding his own, which to perform every man emploieth whatsoever may proceed out of himself: moreover this quiet and ease of mind doth so soften men, as they rest free from the thought of plotting or undertaking stirs and rebellions: justice, quiet, and plenty, are three things which have for their opposites, the violence of soldiers in time of war, the corruption of judges in time of peace, and scartsiy and famine in both. The injustice, the abuse, and avarice of officers and magistrates, are those which procure the subversion and unavoidable ruin of a country. I could add to this discourse many examples & domestical proofs, but not to enter into too deep a sea I will spare them, and will content myself to say only that all those of ancient times, and such as have had any touch of a good mind (either Christians or infidels) have evermore confessed that the sincere execution of justice is the strongest pillar of all well ordered estates, as on the contrary injustice is the overthrow, not alone of men and countries, but of beasts also.  
To return to our matter, it is sure that when the common subject hath wherewith to nourish, cloth, and handsomely accommodate himself and family; when in the midst of arms he is safe in his own home; when he standeth not in fear of forged crimes, or bribery of judges; then is it that he falleth asleep in security, and careth not but to entertain that tranquillity, rejecting all thought of rebellions. This is it which the Turk (who warreth continually with his neighbours) putteth in practice to maintain peace throughout his dominions, and to be beloved and faithfully served of his subjects, whom he tieth to him with those strong bands, which are to say the truth (besides justice and tranquillity) most proper for preservation. A great help hereunto is his continual employing his Captains and Soldiers in the wars, especially out of his own country, and to the spoil of his enemies.  
5 Peace is the horn and true mother of abundance: Then is it that every man tilleth his land without disturbance, and quietly enjoyeth and increaseth his own store, since as the Poet saith, Pax arua colit: justice Queen of virtues, is that which serveth as the base and most sure foundation to peace, which could not otherwise subsist, nor the laws likewise; then is it that they gain strength and vigour.  
5 And though the form of the Turkish justice be not without much vanity and oppression, and though all matters be determined amongst them by way of witnesses, who are alike bought and sold; and that judgements pass as gold and silver is stirring: yet the quick dispatch they receive, maketh them forget this inconvenience; and though the sentence of such judges be often pronounced against all order of justice; yet is there thus much good gotten by it; that men consume not themselves body and goods in pleading and trotting after Lawyers and Attorneys, which have their consciences as large as the other, who are bought more dearly: besides the delay, vexation and uncertainty of the judgement. And though the sentence of such men be much displeasing, yet the people have this to comfort them, that they many times see them endure most notable and exemplary punishment: for the Turk sometimes upon the least complaint brought against them, putteth them to death, be they never so great personages, as well to enrich himself with their spoils, as to manifest himself to be a Prince most respective of justice and equity, and to give also a manner of satisfaction to his subjects so oppressed as Selim, left that example of Bostand Bassa.  
6 Hence Christian Princes are to fetch an advertisement how to be more careful than they are in making their ministers observe a more upright and speedy distribution of justice amongst their subjects: not upon the grounds and intents of this barbarous Turk; but rather because they are one day to render an account before God, who to this end established them in place above others.  
Questionless the long delaying of suits is the most damnable plague to be found at this day in all estates: The abuses committed otherwise by the ministers of Princes are more to lerable than these; where the whole is in question. For this cause Princes ought to look more nearly to this then to any other thing.   

CHAP. V.  
The common remedy applied by the Turk against the force and fury of the people.  

1 Another way of preventing popular seditions, by having always bands of foot and horse in a readiness.  
2 The Turks strength in his court.  
3 His other strengths.  
4 Inconveniences that grew by the Roman Legions:  
5 Prevented by the Turk.   
1 THough the means formerly delivered be sufficient to keep the Turks subjects from rebelling, yet there are stronger by him practised, wholly to prevent and extinguish even the least spark of sedition, and to provide against other like inconveniences. He maintaineth a great number of horse and foot always armed, always in pay, and distributed in garrisons thorough out his Empire, especially in places most proper to resist or assail. These curb the people, and upon the least show of rebellion lay hands on them, repress their insolency, and suffer not the least appearance of sedition to take root, removing the causes even at the first without respect to any. This is the reason that there hath never been known any popular rebellion in his estate.  
2 The port of the great Turk, as they term it (as who would say his court and guard) consisteth chiesely and ordinarily of four thousand horse, distributed into four companies, to wit the Spahioglani, who are in all a thousand besides their servants, which march not in their rank but apart, and of these every one hath seven or eight. These range themselves on the right hand of their Lord wheresoever he become; and the Solastri (equal in place and authority) on the left. These two sorts are accounted as children of the great Turk, and are nourished and brought up in the Sarraglio at his charge (as hath been said) and there trained up in all exercises of arms. After these, march the companies of the Vlifezgis & Charipici, inferior to the other in rank and authority. Those on the right hand, these on the left, either consisting of a thousand horse. And wheresoever the great Turk go, they never forsake him. These four thousand horse together with twelve thousand janizzars are the strength and guard of the person and port of the Turk, with these forces he is always able to hold in awe and subjection a city more populous than Constantinople, and not stand in fear of any attempt against his person.  
3 In other places of his Empire he bestows other great numbers of the janizzars to be assistant to the Governors and Bassas, besides the succours they are to have of such horse and foot as those are bound to furnish on whom the Turk hath at other times bestowed such arable lands as have been conquered by arms, whence he draweth one man or more as the necessity of his affairs requireth, and according as is the value of what they possess. These are called Mozzellini. Such as are tied to this contribution may be compared to the Feudataries of our Prince, towards whose service they are to find a light horse or musket, and some of them two, more or less according to the imperial institutions of such fees and tenors as so bind them. After all those we have named, march the Alcanzi, or Aconizij, as a man would say Adventurers, which have no wages, & are appointed to march a days journey before the camp, pilling, harrowing, and havocking all before them, whereof they are to answer the fifth part clcere to the great Turk: of these there are thirty thousand, besides them there are the Azapi (of mean quality) but such as serve his turn for Galleyslaves, mariners and pioneers to entrench, fill up ditches, raise engines, and perform other such like servile offices, their number is 40000. Over and above these under two Beglerbees or Lientenants general, the one in Europe the other in Asia; he hath near an hundred thousand horse in ordinary entertainment. The Beglerby of Grecia or Europe (which is as much to say as Prince of all Princes) hath his place of residency at Sophia a town of Servia. That of Asia abideth at Culhea a town of Galatia. Each of these hath under his obedience many Sangiacks (as much as to say sheriffs or bailiffs) the very children of the great Turk which govern in the Provinces where they command are bound to obey them. This great multitude of horsemen are so well mounted and armed, as none can choose or wish a more fit or direct means then their ordinary strength to hinder all popular revolts or rebellions, be they never so great. That which happened to Gazeles after the death of Selim doth sufficiently approve it; 
about 1529.  he thought to stir against Soliman, and to move Syria to rebel; but he was prevented by that mighty power which Soliman found even then in a readiness, wherewith he overthrew him. These ordinary provisions of war are the more terrible and effectual, in regard that all the people of his obedience are entirely disarmed of whatsoever offensive weapons.  
4 The Romans observed this custom, to distribute divers of their legions about the frontiers of Germany alongst the Rhine and Danowb, to the same end and purpose as the Turk entertaineth his horse. But it seemeth that he proceedeth therein more discreetly than did the Romans, for they kept all their forces together in one place, and under one General, of whom depended the absolute command of the armies: whence it fell out that to accommodate themselves, they overthrew the houses of particular men, ruined, and famished the country, as well by the havoc they made (which always attendeth so great a multitude) as by their large provisions most necessary for an army: The other provinces far distant were exempt from this oppression, yet not from contribution, but those which sustained the army, were so overburdened, as their misery incited them to rebel, and shake off their obedience. But chose, the Turk which disperseth his horse and foot into divers Provinces, under the command of sixty and six Sangiacks, draweth not after him such disorder or ill satisfaction as did the Romans. Their great assembly in one place was cause of seditions, debates, mutinies and other mischiefs, most difficult to be prevented. They did not perceive how this manner of proceeding was a means that the Soldiers grew too much to affect their Captains, and that the Captains found themselves by them enabled to attempt (as they often did) many things to the prejudice of the Empire. And in very deed it oftentimes happened that their armies made choice of their General for Emperor, in despite of the Senators authority; either in regard of the valour they knew to be in them, or of some pecuniary corrupting their affections, which the Senate could not remedy: And in truth it was a very easy matter for the General, so far from home, and holding his forces united in one body, to practise the Colonels, and the Colonels to bargain and buy the hearts and affections of the Soldiers, by them to possess the Empire, so as sometime the army of Spain chose their General Emperor, and at the same time that of Germany theirs: whereof we have many examples, as also of the calamities and miseries which did thence accrue to the Estate and subjects.  
5 It is an inconvenience whereto the Turk cannot be subject; for keeping his troops and armies so spread abroad and dispersed, they have not the means to mutiny (especially being in no place over strong) nor yet grow to affect their beglerbies or Governors, whom they seldom see or repair to: much less can the Beglerbee in his own behalf easily win or entice the hearts of the Sangiacks, or affections of the Soldiers, as he might well do if the troops were always together in time of peace, and abroad in one and the same province.   

CHAP. VI  
How the Turk represseth the power of the great men of his estate.  

1 The authority of a Prince (if his virtue be not eminent above all the great men of his kingdom) is by their virtue obscured, whence groweth the diminution of the subjects observance.  
2 From whence the authority of the Nobility doth proceed.  
3 The detestable cruelty of the Turkish Emperor against the next of his blood.  
4 Usage of great men taken by the Turks.  
5 The uncertain fortune and estate of the Turks officers.   
1 TO the end the dependency and authority whereof we have hitherto entreated be without alteration maintained, it is requisite that the Prince have a care, that there be none in his country who for their greatness may encourage the people, and embolden them to attempt aught, backed by their authority, countenance and conduct.  
2 This greatness may grow from three principal causes: either in regard they are Princes of the blood, or for that they are noted to be nobly descended and rich, or else for the reputation they have gotten, and a long while preserved, either by cunning, or by their own valour, and merit: things that win credit and name amongst the common people. Concerning the first cause, the children, brethren, and kinsmen of the Turk, are great by consanguinity. The Barons of the country obtain the second rank, whereto the nobleness of their family calleth them: for the third, such ministers and officers as bear a stroke and sway in matters of the highest consequence, are accounted great.  
3 The Ottoman Princes, of nature barbarous and cruel, ordinarily shelter themselves from these inconveniences, with courses far from all humanity, in as much as without all respect of Law, religion, or other civil consideration, they upon the least scruple that may be, rid their hands by execrable murders, of their nearest kinsfolks and friends, yea even of their fathers and brethren, alone to enjoy and by their death to assure to themselves the quiet possession of their kingdom. Selim the first murdered two of his brethren, procured the death of all his nephews, yea and of his father also. He would often say that there was nothing more sweet then to reign out of the suspicion and shadow of his kindred; and that he deserved pardon for what he had committed, since it was the same play and usage he should have received, if any other but himself had attained to the crown. Amurath the third which now reigneth, made his entry by the death of his brother, and searched the establishing of his Empire, even in the belly of his mother, then great with child, making for this end, one end of her & what she went withal: these cruelties are monstrous in the sight of God and man, and full of horror and infamy: yet hath it not been known for all this, that ever any city, any people, or army, did revolt or mutiny. This inhumanity is amongst them grown to that lawful and ordinary consequence, as they usually put it in practice, without fear of blame or reproach. The examples thereof are as infinite as their memories, stinking and abominable. In a word, this butchering is amongst them an hereditary succession, descending from one to another, which God would revenge with our hands if we would amend our lives.  
4 As for the Barons and Lords of the country, Mahomet the first, destroyed their seed, expelling them out of his estate, as he did all the originary Turkish Princes his allies; and if by chance there remain any of the Ottoman race, he is so kept down, as he traileth (as they say) his belly upon the ground, living most poorly without all charge, and manage of affairs: so as neither valour nor riches can make him appear or shine in the world's eye; rather he remaineth eclipsed amongst the vulgar sort, without honour, credit, or estimation.  
As for the Princes and mighty men of the country by them subdued, they know well enough how to rid their hands of them, in sort as we have before declared: so as never Empire was raised, or maintained with more execrable murders, than this hath been in these days; they neither sparing Princes of their blood, nor the chief Potentates of their provinces; for they blind them, if not kill them.  
5 Now concerning the ministers and officers, who by long managing of weighty affairs, have attained to Honourable places, authority and reputation; there is not one, be he never so great, which at the least wink, wrath, and pleasure of his Lord, loseth not his life immediately. Bajazet caused Acomat Bassa to be put to death, an excellent man of arms and a worthy Captain, saying the too much reputation of the servant was a cause of the too great jealousy of the master. Selim likewise put many to death, and amongst others Mustafa Bassa, whom he caused to be strangled at Prusa, and after to be cast out to the dogs. This was his recompense for favouring him in the usurpation of the Empire against Bajazet his father then living, and for making riddance of his two brethren Acomat and Corcut. He suspected it was he that had revealed his secret (as indeed he had) to Aladin and Amarath children of his brother Acomat, because contrary to his expectation he sought their death. It is in a manner an ordinary course with Princes that one light offence obscureth and maketh them forget a thousand good services performed for the good of their affairs. For my part I am of opinion that this rage, and inhuman cruelty familiar with the house of the Ottomans, is but a true and just judgement of God, who will by their parricid hands chastise the Apostasies and wickedness of one by another, considering the greater part of them are Christians who have denied their faith, and by that miserable act climbed up to the height of those eminent charges and dignities they possess. As not long since his divine Majesty permitted a poor simple soldier to kill Mahomet Bassa, a man most mighty in credit and authority; but more rich of power and means; yet such a one as had been a Christian and had taken upon him the orders of Priesthood.   

CHAP. VII.  
How he confoundeth the practices of foreign Princes his neighbours  

1 The divorce of the Greek church from the Romish confirmeth the Turkish Empire.  
2 What were requisite to stir up the Turkish subjects to rebellion.  
3 The greeks utterly destitute of means for such proceedings.  
4 His own subjects thoroughly kerbed.   
1 ONe of the most assured means practised by the Turk, as an infallible course of settling his estate against the intelligence which his people might hold with Christian princes, is the divorce & separation he maintaineth between the Greek & the Romish church, supposing while this schism shall continue amongst them, that they will never establish between them a sound amity. This made the conquest of Constantinople easy unto them; this hath forwarded the proceeding of his victories, and as it were, put into his hands all those rich and goodly Provinces, whereof he is at this day the peaceable, but Tyrannical owner: moreover he so narrowly observeth our unhappy discord, as he by a perpetual counsel endeavoureth all he can possibly, that the patriarchs render no obedience to the Pope: neither is it long since Zacharias, patriarch of Constantinople, was like to be staked for having admitted the new Calendar and the reformation of the course of the year, made in the time of Gregory the 13.  
2 Now to return to the principal point, it is to be presupposed that the projects and carriage of popular rebellions, cannot be undertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth, means, and authority, in the country which we would surprise; and that Princes will not budge to set a foot these plots and enterprises, but by offered occasion of some fortress which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate, and may serve for a refuge to recover their decayed strength: or else that their destigne relieth upon some promised succour, or finally upon the consideration that those who invite them to this conquest are so strong within themselves, as they may hope for an honourable issue of their enterprise.  
3 These are all necessary particularities, but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the greeks abased by extreme servitude, and so far from having any fortress at their devotion, as they cannot once stir without being discovered; and though they were disposed to undertake, they have at their back so great a number of men at arms, as at the least breath of a rebellion, they would cut them off before they should have means once to peep forth of their shells.  
4 The Turk again maketh them sure to him so many ways, though all barbarous and uncivil, as he scarcely alloweth his subjects leave to draw their breath, nor suffereth his mighty men once to hold up their heads; or foreign Princes to be able in due time to attempt aught against him.  
The end of the second Book.    

THE THIRD BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  
The causes of the fall and ruin of estates.  

1 Estates are subject to change.  
2 Some of longer, some of less continuance.  
3 Great, small, and mean estates, and their causes of ruin; external, internal, and mixed.  
4 Less estates come to their ends soonest by external causes.  
5 The great by internal.  
6 The mean more durable, yet subject to alteration.   
1 THe order that nature observeth in all things created doth plainly enough teach us that whatsoever is borne passeth and hasteneth towards death; and that all things which have a beginning necessarily and interchangeably roll towards their end. This proceedeth either of an ordinary and natural course, or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies. Hence we draw this construction, that estates change, monarchies fail, and the ruin of one serveth as the raising to the other.  
2 Again, as of humane bodies some are more strong, vigorous, and of a better composition than others, and so are of longer continuance; so we see the same difference in kingdoms and estates: in as much as some preserve themselves longer, either because by their nature they are more surely founded (as for example the Signory of Nobles is more lasting than the popular estate, and a Monarchal estate more than a commonweal, because a Monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloof from her; or is policed with better laws) or because of the situation which is naturally more strong than the other, as we see at this day in the Signory of Venice.  
3 But because this assertion is subject to divers objections, we will divide it only into two propositions. First then of principalities, some are small, some great, some indifferent, either in regard of their subsistence or first essence, or of the comparison which may be made between them and their neighbours: Secondly, the efficient causes of the utter ruin of estates are either inward, or outward, or mixed: The inward are to be fetched and conceived in respect of the negligence, ignorance, and riot of Princes which give themselves over to all voluptuousness; whereto may be added the factions, secret practices, ambitions, and desperate humours of subjects, with sundry other occasions, all fit to bring estates to their utter ruin. The outwad causes are the stratagems, arms, and force of the enemy. The mixed are such as participate of both, as are the rebellions of the people, treasons of particular men, put in execution by foreign aid and force. Since than it is so that all principalities are subject to ruin by one of these three causes; we are now to unfold what maladies may infect, as well great and indifferent, as small estates; and draw all within the compass of inward, outward, and mixed causes.  
Now like as in natural things natural corruption is more tolerable than violent, so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weals chance by reason of age, or by the violence of some not foreseen cause.  
4 Returning then to our former division and well examining it, we shall find that small Estates come to their ends rather by means of outward causes (brought in by force and violence) then otherwise: In as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts, they are at the first encounter overset with the storm of his conquests; in this manner the several Signories of Lombardy fell in subjection either of the Duke of Milan, or of the Venetians; the free cities of Thoscany became a prey to the Duke of Florence: The Princes of Africa to the King of Fez-Marocco, and Algiers.  
5 On the contrary, great Empires are usually subverted by means of inward causes; either by ease & plenty, which customarily makes Princes to swell with insupportable pride; by voluptuous riot (whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone) or else by insolency and presumption seizing the great ones of the country when they see themselves much followed and reverenced, all fit enticements to dispose a heart (but indifferently generous) to plot for his own raising.  
Nec quenquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem,  
Pompeiusue parem.  
Then is it (as one saith) that Caesar cannot brook a superior, and that Pompey stomaketh an equal.  
6 Mean estates undergo danger as well as the two former, yet far less, since they hold the mean as the other the extremes, for they are not so unfurnished of strength, as that it would be easy for every one to invade and oppress them, neither are they of that greatness and wealth, as to afford matter to particular men to grow mighty, or else abandon themselves immoderately to delights & pleasures, or to transport themselves beyond the limits of reason. This is it that so long preserved the common weals of Sparta & of Venice, which evermore respectively entertained a mean and equality.  
The mixed causes of the ruin of Estates are inward treacheries and outward force. Treason hatched within an Estate much more endamageth a great then a small or mean Empire. For a monarch is not able to turn his eye upon every corner of his Kingdom; and stirring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity (the nurse of vices in all Estates and governments) or with the opinion they have conceived of not being discovered till such time as their projects meet with some good success. These things happen sooner, when the Prince is far off then at hand. Spain can witness it, which was so unhappily betrayed by Count julian, 
Anno 714.  as it thereby fell into the hands of the moors. So was the Empire of the Mamelucks by the treason of Caierbeius possessed by Selim Emperor of the Turks. 
1516.  Who would search more narrowly into Christendom shall find that the civil wars of France minister more examples for proof of this then is necessary. Thus we see that small estates are most to stand in fear of foreign force, since they have not wherewitheither of or in themselves to be able to resist or to take breath: That the mean estates are always less offended by outward force then the smallest, and more free from inward treason than the greatest.   

CHAP. II.  
From what conjectures the continuance of estates may be gathered.  

1 Causes of the change of Estates.  
2 The ruin of Estates is most answerable to their beginnings.  
3 The roots of common wealths how maintained.  
4 Security especially to be avoided.   
1 I Will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter, nor dive into the other efficient causes of the ruin of estates: for should I handle what might be farther said of this matter, I should wander too far from the propounded subject, and perhaps rack the argument beyond his due pitch. I will then tie myself only to the conjectures of the continuance or fall of estates, omitting other causes, as also all that may be referred to the judgement of the heavens, the influence of the stars, and to their virtue; sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof, as I will spare to search too far into it: Though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vain, and that those celestial bodies move not by chance, but rather by divine order and disposition. Again, the errors of their Ephemerideses and the different supputation of the first masters of their profession, make the knowledge to be uncertain and their so surely grounded maxims to afford contrary resolutions. Let us not meddle then with the aspects of the stars, or the nativities of estates, but regard and consider the effects of what is at our own home without taking so high a flight. We say then that estates suffer either by the unremovable ordinance of God, or by the natural course of time, wherewith in time they grow feeble, and change: or else by the wills of men, so unstable and light, as they ordinarily breed an universal alteration thorough out a whole estate and commonweal. We will only draw our conjectures from natural causes (not to meddle with the judgement of the divine Majesty or man's inconstancy) nakedly and simply to speak of them as near and familiar, to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heavenly and most remote.  
2 So then we are to think that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning. It is with them as with sensible creatures, which the more they hasten to arrive at the perfection of their being, the sooner also they fail and die: the contrary is seen in those which with a slow and measured pace attain to a more fair maturity and perfection: as for example, among beasts the horse, amongst trees the willow are of no long endurance: but those that (as the Hart and Olive) make by degrees and slowly towards their ripeness, are likewise more lasting. We may say the like of Empires and Estates: for as we see them slow or swift in their increase, so are they more swift or slow in their ruin. Have not the French more than once conquered the duchy of Milan and the kingdom of Naples, and that as a man may say almost in a moment? so have they many times lost it and all in a moment: such conquests resemble Torrents tumbling down the mountains, which in less than an hour, by reason of the great shouts of waters they bring with them, become fearful and dangerous; when soon after in an instant, we see them fallen and shallow, so as a child may wade thorough them without trouble or danger. Now not to leave this conquest of Milan and Naples, we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition: which to perform, I will set before you the manner how the Spaniards conquered and held these provinces.  
I find it hath been by a long course of time, and infinite travail accompanied with all the pains and troubles, which those who set up their rest upon a conquest and resolve to abide out the wars, ordinarily endure. Hence their labour hath taken such root, as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands, howsoever they have been oft times galled and put to their plunges. It is requisite than that Empires have their roots to sustain them, which must be deep and sound, otherwise it is impossible they should long continue. Now that they may be such, there is an especial wisdom and many years required.  
3 The true roots of an estate are the love of the people towards their Prince, the sincere and holy distribution of justice amongst the subjects; military discipline well policed and observed by the soldiers; honours, rewards, and benefits bestowed according to virtue and merit: that great men be not slightly set by, abased or contemned: that the common sort of people be entertained with all honest satisfaction: necessary provisions for the maintenance of places of strength; well husbanding of the treasure; friendly intelligence with neighbour Princes; uncorrupt election of officers; modesty in their proceedings: these are the very true roots able to fortify and make monarchies to flourish and raise them to eternity: which roots can never prove settled spring, or send forth worthy fruit, unless they be planted in the soil of wisdom, advice and industry, and husbanded by the continuance of time.  
4 It is often seen that great Conquests and victories attained without loss or labour, so blind the Conqueror, as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good appearance, but are inwardly hollow and of frail substance. They cause him to contemn his companions, and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories, but more the subdued people, whence ordinarily followeth, that the higher is his fortune, the nearer is his fall. We have strayed sufficiently. It is now high time to return to our principal discourse: and as we have heretofore made it appear that there are three sorts of estates; so we are now to unfold in what rank of the three the Turk is to be bestowed.   

CHAP. III.  
That the monarchy of the Turk is comprehended within the number of great estates.  

1 The substance of the ensuing Chapters.  
2 Greatness of the Turkish Empire.  
3 Compared with the romans.  
4 The marvelous success thereof inwarre.   
1 From the division of estates delivered by us in the former chapter, this is to take his foundation, and by these causes we are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest; by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the other may undergo a change, either outwardly or inwardly, and in which rank of the three we are to lodge the Turk. Some one perhaps will judge this question superfluous and unprofitable, seeing his renown, his conquests, and his long rule do but too much teach us what he is: notwithstanding all this I should not think it besides the purpose a little to particularise the causes of his greatness.  
2 The estate of the Turk is held without question to be one of the greatest and mightiest, as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth, as of his power: he is great because of so many Provinces reduced to his obedience; and though he have not so great a share in Europe as the romans sometimes had, he hath to countervail this, more advantaged himself in Asia and Africa: for when the fortune of the romans was at the greatest, and that they had their arms most at liberty, yet went they not beyond Euphrates: It is very true, that trajan went farther, but all the Provinces he subdued were soon abandoned by Adrian his successor.  
The Turk hath not done so, for he hath extended his dominion as far as Tigris; he possesseth all Mesopotamia, or as they term it Diarbecke. From thence he reacheth as far as Balsera or the Gulf of Persia, which the Romans never saw, and the Gulf of Arabia. And to say better, all is his from the red sea to the City Aden, which is in the main continent beyond the mouth of this sea, more than an hundred and fifty miles: he hath also enlarged his dominions toward the South far beyond Egypt. In afric all is his, except three places of strength which the king of Spain holdeth, Pegnon de Veles, Oran, and Melila: Mauritania also is his, only three fortresses excepted, which are Tanger, Arsilla, and Mazagan, conquered by the Portugal: when I name afric, I intent that country commonly termed Barbary, and not Ethiopia.  
3 Having now seen the largeness of his dominions, we are next to discourse of his means and power. I find that he hath better established the one and the other, than the Romans ever did when they were at their intirest greatness, because in such a most large compass of his country, there is no king or common weal beareth sway to distinguish his dominions: which was otherwise with the Romans, who had many such wedged in, within the continent of their Empire.  
There is not any one of his subjects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth, or the land he tilleth, is his own. They acknowledge to hold all they have of him: he ordinarily entertaineth divers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land. So as it must needs be granted that he is greater in his estates, means and power, than ever were the Romans, for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered, as he can no ways undergo the troubles and wars which the Romans endured at the hands of Mithridate, the Parthians, Farnaces and others. Moreover, next Europe the Gauls are not his enemies. The Cymbrians are his associates; so as he fostereth such a tranquillity and obedience on all sides, as he amasseth inestimable treasure.  
4 And more, (a thing worth the noting) in three hundred years space since he began first to reign, he hath received but four notable overthrows (that excepted which he received the year passed near Tauris) But the romans in less time received more and greater at the only hands of the Carthaginians. In sum, there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories in so short a space, or to have triumphed of the captivity or death of so many kings and great Princes, as the great Turk; or that have with such happy success and discipline so soon raised so mighty an Empire as his is at this day. Is it not a fearful matter to hear it related that Mahomet the second (an infidel) hath had such favour of the heavens, as to have been able in the space of 32. years reign, to subdue two Empires, usurp twelve kingdoms, and take by force two hundred cities? That which affordeth the greatest cause of wonder, is, that all this hath succeeded in the very time when the art of military engines & fortifications were in their perfection, and wherewith we might have armed ourselves to withstand him. In conclusion, what shall we say of Selim the first, who in less than four years space vanquished the Mamelucks, subdued all Syria, Palestina, the red sea, a great part of Arabia and all Egypt? These are questionless goodly and notable Trophies of the Turks greatness, but most dishonourable and dangerous for all Christendom.   

CHAP. FOUR  
Whether the Empire of the Turk draw towards an end.  

1 The Ottoman Empire leaneth toward ruin.  
2 The reasons are the bordering princes upon the Turks estate, and their providing for their safety.  
3 Made wise by others harms they stand upon their defensive war.  
4 They are bridled by strong fortresses.  
5 Contrary arguments.   
1 WE have discoursed as briefly as might be of the fall and ruin of estates, of their efficient causes, and upon what conjectures a man might gather them. It is now time that we see and examine in like sort whether the empire of the Turk be near his end, and abatement of his greatness, according as a man may draw from conjectures it leaneth towards his declining; and though the foundation hereof be built upon reasons so clear and evident as they are not to be contraried, yet will I allege one that carrieth more appearance than all the other; and that is, that the greatness of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruin of Princes by him expelled, vanquished and made away one after an other, whilst he hath in the mean time triumphed of their estates and rich spoils; but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so favourable issue as had the other: his ambition, heart, and courage will grow idle and languish; whence in time will spring the ruin of his Empire; Is he not already come to that pass? The Princes that confine upon him, though more weak than he to bid him battle, assail, or defend, have nevertheless so ordered their affairs and means, as they are able at this day to shield themselves sufficiently from his attempts.  
2 Amongst others the King of Persia, doth he not so balance his power as he hath given him many great overthrows, and one lately (as I have said) near Tauris? The Tartarians also hold him play and more provoke him then he them; and of late they got from him Caffa a strong and wealthy town; moreover whilst he was busied about the wars of Persia the Georgians took and sacked Xistiss; but they were not able to hold it; so as the Turk hath repossessed himself of it. The Muscovit doth not only defend himself from the incursions of the Turks, but he oft times also skirmisheth with them, commanding as he doth above an hundred and fifty thousand horse. The King of Polonia likewise more mighty than the Muscovit, is so strong as he will not take wrong; but is able rather at all times to repel the violence of his enemy. The house of Austria together with the aid of the Princes of Germany, hath wherewithal to make their party good and to oppose him: the Venetians, united with Italy and Spain (which in such a case will not abandon them) are likewise able enough to defend themselves and hold their own. As for the king of Spain, he is so mighty by sea and by land, both of men and money, as he dareth undertake himself to encounter the Turk in battle, much more to defend himself if assaulted. The King of Fez is not any way awed by him, and is more strong than he, at the least in Africa; which he approved to the common hurt of Christendom by that overthrow and death of the King Don Sebastian of Portugal, where so many Christians miserably ended their days. The last of those which about upon the Turk is Prester john, who hath hitherto behaved himself so honourably against him, as he hath never showed any token of fearing his forces. So as being now unable by reason of the concord & stout opposition of his neighbours, to gain farther ground; he must of necessity (unless God in regard of our sins be otherwise pleased) begin to recoil; and that greatness which he hath built upon others ruins must decay and lessen; since the matter which gave the increase is on his part wanting.  
3 There is yet an other point which fortifieth this opinion, and that is: that all such Princes as confine upon the Turk, are by others example made more wise, advised and considerate, than they were before the ruin of such as served for a pray to the Ottomans; whereby they will discreetly look to themselves how they courageously hazard their persons or estates at one battle: they will rather be content to stand upon their defence, attending while time beget some apparent occasion, roundly and to the purpose to set upon him.  
4 Again, there are at this day so many fortresses, so strong and so well appointed, as they are in a manner impregnable, so as the Turk is not like to find the way so open as heretofore he did to carry them: but if he should put himself upon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one, it were as much as to become the author of his own ruin.  
5 Neither aught any man in opposing this, 
1570.  allege the loss of Cypress, since it happened not so much through the Turks power, as because of the distance of Venice, which was to supply them with men and munition. A man may by a contrary argument say as much of the saving of Malta (speaking according to humane causes) for it was not protected either by the forces within itself, 
1565.  or by the succour sent thither from other parts: but only because the Island was so far distant from Constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receive their provisions and be refreshed as was requisite, nor well employ such as were sent thither. If it would please God that the Turk might often make such voyages, he would prepare us fair occasions to attempt the revenge of the outrages Christendom hath by him sundry ways received.   

CHAP. V.  
By what kind of causes the Empire of the Turks might most easily fail.  

1 The power of the Turk not to be easily overthrown by outward causes.  
2 The power of Princes & estates bordering upon the Turk, as the Persians, Tartarians, Moscovites, Polonians, Germans, Venetians, Spaniards, etc.   
1 AS we have at large entreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruin; so are we now to come to that of the Ottomans, as one of the greatest; and examine by what inconveniences it may undergo a change. I am of opinion that this their so raised greatness can hardly decay by virtue of outward causes; seeing the Princes bordering upon their estate, 
Quae non prosunt singula, multa ●uuant.  are every one in particular weak to assail them, as they might well do if they were peaceably united.  
2 This weakness presupposed, it followeth that it will prove a hard matter to ruin him by foreign force, whose strength and means it is requisite we examine to enlighten this opinion.  
First, those that confine upon the Turk next Africa, are the King of Fez, of Morocco, and Prester john: next Asia, the Sophi and the Tartarians: in Europe the Duke of Muscovy, the King of Polonia, the Emperor, the Venetians, and the King of Spain.  
As for the King of Fez he hath men enough, but small store of money, so as he hath not the means or ability to maintain a lasting war: Again, though I should suppose he were able to be at the charge, yet I find him naked of other things necessary to advantage himself upon the Turk, such as are places of strength to forward his proceedings, and assure his retreat: so as he is like enough to come short of his aim: and if he should perform some worthy exploit in afric, doubtless the King of Spain his neighbour would soon be jealous of his good fortune. And in very deed this is not the point, for it is all one with Christendom whether the King of Fez be too strong for the Turk, or the Turk for the King of Fez, since both are the Christians enemies. As for Prester john, all the world knoweth he hath enough to do to defend himself against the Turks forces; neither is it long since he won from him all the havens he had upon the red sea, and amongst others that of Archiech and Mazzua: now for the Sophi, if we search their histories we shall find that the kings of Persia have always had the worse of the Turks, & among all other Mahomet the second overcame Vsumcassan; 
1474.  after him Selim the first did as much to Ishmael whom he forced into the remotest parts of his country. Tarmas' also met with the like measure at Soliman's hands: and on the contrary we see that Cudabenda hath had such a hand of Amurath the third now reigning, as he hath often vanquished his armies, and now of late at Tauris: and though he have achieved most worthy victories, yet hath he nothing advantaged himself. In the Turks country, he hath not won one fortress of importance, or aught else that might countervail the charge of his wars: This hath succeeded in regard the Soph●is strong of horse, but unprovided of foot, which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend. Moreover, to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon & other munition, all wanting to the Sophi, who may well meet the enemy in the field and bid him battle, but not pursue and assail him if he retire into his fortress; because of the above said defects of foot & artillery; & though he were provided of them, yet wants he the skill how to use them like others. The example of Tauris approveth this sufficiently, for after he had this last year vanquished the army of the Turks, and slain an hundred thousand men, he could never take the Citadel wherein the Turks had drawn all their munition of war, and left above eight thousand men; neither is there any news hitherto that he hath taken it & expelled them thence. The Tartarians are as ill stored with foot and artillery as the Persians, and except that they last got of the Turk, it may be truly said that they never did him harm. As for the Moscouit which abutteth upon him (as do also the Polonians) they have in regard of the Turk small store of men, horse and money; so as the most they can do is to hold their own. Now concerning the Germans, they have lost much of their ancient reputation by the overthrow they received of the Turk at Exechium, Buda, and sundry other places; so as they are glad to keep home without daring to assail him. The Venetians have been so unfortunate, as they have never moved war against the Turk but it hath succeeded contrary to their hopes: and which is the worst of all, they never consented to any treaty of peace, but they did forego some important member of their estate. And to say the truth Mahomet the second got Negropont, Scutari, and Groya; Bajazet took from them Lepanto and Modon, and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with S. Moor; in an other treaty they left to Soliman Napoles of Maluasia: Selim the second won by force the I'll of Cypress, Duleme, and Antiuari: And though these be heavy losses, yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable than if they had been near hand, so ought they now more than ever advise how to strengthen themselves against the Turk by their brave resolution and provision, which they may better do now then ever, in regard their forces are more lively, and the members of their commonweal more united and compact then heretofore. Now we are to come to the king of Spain. Let us say that he hath store of money and all provision necessary to be employed in the wars; that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alway in pay; that he hath the commodity extraordinarily to levy so many men as may make the Turk stand in fear of him; that his forces by sea are good and strong, and that he can increase them at his pleasure; that he hath store of victuals, commodity of havens, for convenient landing in his countries; and in a word that he is so mighty, as that neither he standeth in awe of the Turk, neither dareth the Turk assail him: yet this power and ability could never hitherto be employed to the purpose against the common enemy of Christendom. Not for want of will or inclination thereto, but because he is hindered by the revolt of Flanders. The suspicion also and fear of his neighbour's arms, would never permit him to display an united and firm power against the Turk: he hath rather been enforced to waste his time and means upon the particular preservation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other, in stead of courageously exploiting them against the Turks to the good and consolation of Christendom. But our sins are they especially which have deprived us of the glorious fruits and advantages we might have gained by so worthy a power. In conclusion, we must grant that since the Empire of the Turk cannot receive any damage or alteration by outward causes (which are wont to ruin estates) it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixed effect it; yet before we discourse of these two means I hold it not amiss a little to examine, whether his estate may be by main and open force overthrown.   

CHAP. VI  
That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turk.  

1 The Turk is not invincible.  
2 Examples of their sundry overthrows.  
3 A comparison of their good and ill success in battles. All proofs that they may be conquered.   
1 THe conclusion of the argument of the former chapter, is, that the Turk cannot by way of open force receive harm or ruin of importance; because of the mighty power and means he hath of his own. But hereby is not inferred that therefore Christian Princes should fail of courage or hope, to go thorough with their affairs to his prejudice; rather otherwise placing their confidence in the Almighty, they are to hope better than ever, for the reasons I shall hereafter allege; by the handling whereof I hope to prove that so far is he from being invincible, as on the contrary he may be easily vanquished as many experiences may resolve us.  
2 We have elsewhere said that Bajazet the first was overcome and taken alive at the battle he fought at Mount-Stella against the great Tamburlaine, 
1397.  under whose hands he died a captive. 
1439.  Carambeius Bassa of Amurath the second, was discomfited by Ladislaus King of Polonia in the valley of mount Hermus: 
1440.  he came with an intention to revenge himself of the loss and dishonour that the Bassa of Notalia had received at the hands of john Huniades, which at one time recovered from him a part of Servia and all Moldavia: but instead of performing this he became himself prisoner of that King, and had almost all his army put to the sword. Bajazet the second sent Calibeius and Querscogles his son in law into Asia against Caitheus Sultan of Egypt with a great army to revenge the entertainment the Sultan had given Zizimus his brother, 
1482.  whom he had succoured with men and money against him: his army was overthrown near Adena a town of Cilicia, where the Turk received the most notable overthrow that was ever given him. For of an hundred thousand which presented themselves in the battle, the third part remained not alive; yet those that performed this noble execution, were scarce one against six; but the advice of two Italians and of the Mameluckes so furthered the affairs of Caytheus, as he spied a time to charge the Turks when they least expected it. Soliman left the siege of Vienna with loss of 60000. 
1529.  men which were there slain, having given twenty general assaults to the town. The year following he assembled an other army of 200000. men, with intention cruelly to revenge the harms he had received; but the Emperor Charles the fifth went to meet him, with such forces, as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leisure to save his baggage. Don john of Austria natural soon of Charles the fifth in the year 1571. got at Lepanto that so renowned victory of the army of Selim the second; this hath since made them walk (as they say) with the bridle in their hands, and confess they had passed too rash a judgement upon the power of the Christians either by sea or by land: I omit to speak of the prowess & noble acts of Scanderbag against the Turks, and how many times he overthrew the Commanders of Amurath the second: and valiantly recovered Albania the place of his birth whereof he and his predecessors had been deprived by that Tyrant, neither will I again cite the examples of john Huniades or Matthew Coruin, who in a manner with a handful of men opposed and discomfited the Turkish forces, nor of the Portugals, though they have at sundry times assailed the Turk near the red sea, barred him of passage, and rid him of the means of farther issuing out of the mouth of that sea. What should I speak of the Tartarians, who but lately took from him Taurica Chersones (called at this day Perocopsky) if the reports which come from those parts be credible?  
3 Such as have been curious in the search of the Turkish history have observed, that in the space of two hundred and fourscore years they have fought with their neighbours thirty and six battles, whereof they have only gained eighteen and lost the rest. These are all signs and successes whereby a man may conclude that they are not invincible, and that their fortune hath been balanced between gain & loss, so as we may believe, if God for our offences did not busy the forces of Christian Princes elsewhere then against the Turk, where he hath had the overthrow once, he had had it thrice: by all these foregoing examples we may collect that this proud enemy hath not his head so hard as it may not be broken, or else sorely brufed. And though Christian Princes are not of power sufficient apart and of themselves to take him to task, yet may they do it by ranging themselves to that union and concord, as that there be amongst them but one common fortune. This being granted (as I presume it shall) we are to unfold how they may purchase his ruin.   

CHAP. VII.  
Why the leagues among Christian Princes are commonly of small effect.  

1 Leagues are concluded for the respect of honour and profit.  
2 The inequality of gain bringeth a difficulty to the conclusion of leagues.  
3 Christian Princes the farther they are from the Turk, the less have they fear of dangers wherewith other more near him are possessed.  
4 No man vainly exposeth himself to an apparent danger but where an evident commodity invites him.  
5 While each strives to protect his own frontiers from the Turk, others are neglected.  
6 The inequality of aid begetteth a contention who shall command most in the wars.  
7 Remedies against such difficulties and calamities.   
1 THere are many respects and causes, which customarily make the leagues of Christian Princes altogether uneffectual, which may appear to some a matter of hard digestion, and for this cause I hold it requisite particularly to clear it. It is a received maxim that all the actions of Princes are undertaken for two principal causes, honour and profit: that the consideration of honour often masqueth under the pretence or good of their affairs: we will then only meddle with profit which we may term interest.  
2 Now this interest (a common mask for all faces) cannot be a like equal between Christian Princes with one consent undertaking the war against the Turk: for they diversly confine upon the common enemy, and this diversity breedeth a difference also between their resolutions and interests; and though this be an inconvenience not in the case in handling to be contemned, yet the principal difficulty dependeth not herein: It rather consisteth wholly in the concord of the treaty of the league, and this concord is hard to be wrought for these following reasons.  
3 All these Princes are not neighbours of the Turk in the same equality: some are more strong than other: this difference of strength affordeth to some a commodity to defend themselves or offend him with their own forces: others are weak, and consequently exposed to the incursions and spoils of the Turk. It is an infallible maxim, that the farther Princes are from the danger, the less forward are they to stir, prepare for the war, or contribute to the charge or means requisite for the undertaking thereof with the like fervency and affection as they would if they saw themselves so near to the mischief, and that there were apparent danger.  
4 Again, that Prince which seeth no great profit or interest in such an enterprise doth less regard it then he whom necessity enforceth to stand upon his guard, and fear that tyrant's invasion. Moreover, if the Princes united to this league and combination shall once know that they shall get little or smally advantage their estate, it is not to be expected (when they enter into it) that they will bring with them that courage, resolution, affection, and forwardness as the business would require. See then how the disposition of the interest makes the beginning difficult, the proceeding and issue uncertain, by reason of the divers alterations and varieties which accompany every associated Prince, suitable to his passion or affection; Whereupon would undoubtedly follow an impossibility of establishing this league, and union upon so sure foundations, as that the beginning may be good, the middle and end better: since the effect without union amongst many agents remaineth evermore as nothing or nothing worth.  
5 We fall then far short of our reckoning, unless we can minister some remedy to the diversities of this interest and profit. This inconvenience is attended on, and counterpeized by an other of as great or greater consideration: And this is the interest and particular consequence of the neighbourhood that every one indifferently hath with the Turk; by the which indifferency, each one according as his fear is, will desire the war may be undertaken to his advantage. As for example, Spain feareth the neighbourhood of Algiers; Venice of Albania: hence will grow that the league taking effect, the Venetians will strive that the forces of the league may be employed in the Levant, the Spaniards toward the South: so as it will not be possible to manage the enterprise to both their satisfactions.  
6 There is yet another inconvenience that our Princes will not be able by an equal portion to enter into the league, inasmuch as one wanteth means to contribute thereto in money more than a sixth part, another a fifth part; others that have no money, will contribute men or ships; others more mighty in both, will undertake half or a second. These are all the portions by whose assembly a league may be form. Of their indifferency groweth yet another difficulty or inconvenience (as we list to term it) and that is, that whosoever contributeth the half, would likewise have in his hands (as the greatest and mightiest) all the power and sway. In which it will follow, that the other shall not undertake or perform aught but by his advice, direction, and assistance: If he will make a stand, they are not to go forward; if he list to march elsewhere, than their desires carry them, they must follow him: If his affairs press him to alter his resolution and mind, and that he will retire to his home, they are constrained to do the like, so as all their charge, pains, and holy intentions, are utterly overthrown, and they oftentimes rest exposed to the injury and revenge of their dangerous neighbour, against whom they jointly rose in arms.  
7 These are, to say the truth, considerations and inconveniences of that value and consequence (measuring them by their parts, and not by the whole) as we must conclude that none but God is able to tune this league to an agreeing harmony, which we are most humbly to crave at his Almighty hands with a strong faith, a true amendment of life, and a more perfect charity then this age affordeth.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The defects which may be observed in the leagues of the year 1537: and 1571.  

1 The conditions, success and errors of the league in anno 1537.  
2 Of that of 1570.  
3 How a league may be established to avoid the formerly committed errors.   
1 COntinuing the matter of the former chapter, it will not be beside the purpose, by the way to touch the defects which were found in two the most memorable leagues that have been made in our time between the Princes of Christendom. The first resolved upon in the time of Pope Paul the third, 
1537.  between him, the Emperor Charles the fifth, and the Venetians. It was then, beside the conditions, agreed upon that the Emperor and the Knights of Malta should set forth 82. Galleys, the Venetians a like number, the Pope 36. only. Andrew Doria was chosen General of the emperors army, Vincentio Capelli of the Venetians, and Marco Grimani Patriarch of Aquileia of the Popes, having for his Lieutenant Paul justinian; and for the main land service Ferdinand Gonzaga was chosen General. Moreover it was concluded between the princes, that whatsoever they should get from the Turks with the forces of the league either in Greece or Dalmatia should be left to the Venetians as in recompense of their so great expense and loss that they should suffer by warring upon the Turk. Soliman seeing the forces of the league assembled, made haste to launch his Galleys forth into the main. Such was his diligence as they were within a few days in a readiness and went for Candy, where they made some havoc, but of no great moment. After these roads Barbarossa made a stay of all the army in the gulf of Larta, there to attend the Christians which came onward, but so slowly as the season passed without performing aught, or without that they once met together, and that which was yet worse, our men enforced by tempest, retired themselves to Corfú whence they set forth. Barbarossa followed them as far as Antipaxo within an hundred miles of Corfú, but perceiving them to prepare themselves to fight he speedily retired to the gulf of Larta, so as our army was resolved for Dirachium, otherwise called Drazo or la Velona, but that being a dangerous harbour for the galleys, they turned their force upon Castle Novo which they carried by assault: an exploit (to say the truth) of that small importance (respecting their charge and provision) as it won them as much dishonour as profit, the town being won the Spaniards seized themselves of it. The Venetians disputed it as a thing appertaining to them according to the articles of the league; but it was to small purpose, wherefore quieting themselves since it was not to be remedied they took an occasion thereupon to shift themselves of the league. The year following Soliman recovered Castle Novo with the loss of those Spaniards which kept it, who were all put to the sword, those which escaped enduring a most miserable servitude: and though the peace treated by the Venetian was somewhat disaduantageous, yet they endured that more willingly, then to be otherwise dealt with then was agreed upon: other causes might be alleged, as the ceasing of traffic and many other discommodities, besides the impoverishing of their Estate, all which necessarily attend the entertainment of armies.  
2 The last league of the year 1571. 
1570.  yielded not much better fruits, for after a great charge, and the gaining of so famous a victory, no other good redounded thence to the Christians, but that the Turk made an assay of their valour; and by little and little the confederate forces divided themselves: the Venetians departing upon occasion of almost the same jealousies, as in the former league.  
3 It will be now time to deliver how all these inconveniences may be stopped, and the league become firm and durable, without consideration of any particular interest, to the end that every one may voluntarily in devotion consent thereto to the glory of God with a free heart, and an undaunted magnanimity: In which case, the conditions being rather free then forced on either side, we may reap thereby fruits worthy and honourable: These two leagues heretofore mentioned, happened in a time so dangerous for the Venetians, as it was more than necessary that the Christian Princes (though not interessed) should unite their forces to assist and protect the other. So the one standing in the water up to the throat, and encompassed with danger, and the other on the contrary, free from fear of peril, they entered into the covenants and conditions of the league, not such as they ought to have been to make them lasting; but such as were presented to men standing in need of them, who enforced by necessity, might not refuse them, to the end to clear themselves of a near threatening mischief. League's will then be durable when they shall be established at a time when men are free and exempt from all constraint; and not to attend as they do, till the Turk affright one of the confederates, and that he be already come into the field so strong both by sea and land, as the Venetians or some other of the confederates are already by him assailed. At such a time to seek a remedy by their hasty assembling, is the way to imprint a certain fear in their people; and make them flock together in the fold as sheep in presence of the wolf. It is requisite then that the league be contracted at leisure, in a time of peace, and in a season when the associates may be invited, not by any urgent danger, but voluntarily, and with such an alacrity of heart, as they may unite their persons, their means, their powers, and their courages all together to offend the common enemy.   

CHAP. IX.  
A league which may be treated without danger of the former defects.  

1 The qualities of perfect leagues.  
2 The conditions of leagues, and what each of the confederates is to attempt upon the enemy.  
3 The commodity of them so concluded.  
4 Advise for a general contribution against private gain.  
5 That the danger we stand in of the Turk, is greater than many suppose, and that therefore those that are most remote, ought willingly to contribute.  
6 What should move us to join in league against the Turk.   
1 NOw then to reap the worthy and honourable fruits of a holy league & association, we are to remove the defects and inconveniences which have made the former leagues prove abortive: And the better to effect it, it is necessary that their treaties be voluntary: that Princes voluntarily join their powers & means to one end, though by different courses: so as growing to capitulations, the one do not advantage himself upon the straightening of the others affairs. This is it which equalling the conditions, will cause every one to partake in the enterprise, without all suspect or particular jealousy: It is not enough that the defects of these leagues be discovered, if they make us not more wise in the framing of other to come: to the end we may with all devotion and sincerity build them on a strong and unmovable foundation; and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding.  
2 It is not required that to establish this league and make it fructify, the confederate forces should assemble in one place, but at one time: my meaning is, that our Princes must be ready to assail the enemy at once in divers places, and that every one bend his forces towards parts which are nearest to him, so to begin the war to some purpose: As for example, the Spaniards should invade the parts of Algiers: the Venetians and the Pope, of Albania: the galleys of Savoy, Malta, and Florence, should continue their ordinary courses against the Turk; unless they would join with the Venetians or the king of Spain: the Polonians should set upon Walachia: the Emperor and Princes of Germany upon Hungary.  
3 Questionless if each of these did in this manner assail him, their courage and force would be the greater, as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprise, without any respect of pains or expense, hoping all would redound to their honour, profit, and particular security: which they cannot expect from the other leagues, and this is that which hath in part made them defective. The enemy that should be so many ways set upon, would be constrained to divide his forces, which consequently would become less able to protect him, on all sides wheresoever he should be assailed. First, the galleys of Malta assisted with some other, and scouring (as they might) the Levant seas, would keep in such awe those that guard Alexandria and Rhodes, as they would not dare to peep out: Again, if Spain would invade Barbary, the galleys of Algiers would be sure to keep home: so as the strength of Venice joined with that of the Church, would do what they list, and would meet with no encounter by sea which they should not easily overmatch: especially if at the same time the Emperor and the King of Polonia, would war likewise upon the Turk. We have an example of the times which verifieth our position. When Soliman undertook the war of Hungary, 
1532.  against Charles the 5. Andrew Doria General of his galleys, with a very small army troubled all the Levant, took by main force Coron and Patras, and harrowed all those seas without control or encounter of the enemies: whence followeth, that if the Christians would as I have said, at one instant set upon the Turk, they would force him no doubt into a narrow strait.  
4 There is one point that would make the enterprise easy, more forcible and lasting, but it would hardly be digested, and that is to draw all Christian Princes which confine not with the Turk, to contribute unto it. All these suppose themselves free from danger and make no reckoning of others sufferings, in whose behalf they think they should not contribute, as those that were like to have but the charge and the other the profit. In a word, all catholic Princes are so wedded to this particular interest, which is ever more differing and unequal among them (as hath been before alleged) as the league would never be thoroughly concluded or of long continuance, this must of necessity be forgotten, and the only desire of the exaltation of the Church of God must be that which must range them to the necessary point, whereof they need not travel to seek examples out of their own houses, which if they would but imitate all would succeed well, to invite them to it I will allege one.  
The principal aim of the league set on foot by Godfrye of Buillion, 
Alcut 1088.  and of so many Princes and Nobles some greater than himself which accompanied him, was not placed but upon the particular honour of the Majesty of God, whereabout every man employed himself with such zeal and devotion, as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great King or Emperor, they drew together an army of an hundred thousand horse and three hundred thousand foot, wherewith they subdued almost all the east.  
5 Leaving apart all these considerations let us come to the opinion that some have of their being far from danger, and we shall find peradventure that they are nearer thereto than they are aware.  
When Amurath came first out of Asia into Europe was not Hungary (which is now subject to the Turk) farther off from the confines of the Ottomans Empire then are now the countries of Saxony or of Bauiers, 
1363.  than they of Franconia, the Swichzers and the French? yet we see it now most in his possession.  
6 Shall we then say because we have a mountain before us, or a river between us, or some estate that seemeth to shelter us, that therefore we should hold ourselves happy and in security, and not be touched with others danger and misery? No surely. For if we be Christians we ought not only to have compassion of others calamities, but afford them also our good and charitable assistance: moreover he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present, findeth himself oft times beguiled; we are to have such provident care of what is present, & to come, that we may leave to ours the same assurance we wish to ourselves, to the end to preserve them by this providence from such danger as they might incur after us. And though we should not carry that regard of our children and posterity, and that the consequence of our estate did not spur us on to such an enterprise, shall there remain in us so little courage and charity, love and devotion to the glory of God, from whom we have our being and of whom we hold our powers, as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard, and expel thence such as intrude themselves into it and pollute it? wherefore serve all those heaps of treasure which the Princes of Lombardy amass, one in envy of an other? whereupon will those so mighty Princes of Germany and the Imperial towns spend their revenues and incomparable riches? what occasion can all of them find more goodly than this to attain to an immortal glory? It is then for the enlarging the kingdom of Christ that we must employ all we have, and for the deliverance of those sacred places over which those barbarous infidels tyrannize, to redeem so many thousand of poor Christian slaves which suffer and groan under the yoke of that enraged dog, to give life to an infinite number of Christians, to revenge their wrongs, to punish the iniurires & blasphemies which that tyrant and his hellhounds have breathed out against the glory of God, his holy name and church. And if humane appetite must needs be an actor in this theatre, it would be an easy matter for great Princes that send their forces, to urge this consideration in the capitulations, that they should have in favour of their contributions part of the spoils and conquests that they might happily obtain. Again, if the love of the service of God had a working in them, they might undertake in person the General conduct of the army, or command part of the confederate troops. Godfrey a poor Prince, in comparison of those that now sway Christendom, alienated the Duchy of Bovillion for so godly a voyage. Stephen Count of Chartres did the like with his estate, as did also many great men, who had no other motive thereunto then the enterprise of the holy land. Charles the seventh King of France, did he not succour the Emperor of Constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him under the conduct of the greatest personages of his kingdom? And must we sit idle with crossed arms whilst the cruel flames of this infidels tyranny burn and consume the houses of our neighbours?   

CHAP. X.  
Wherein consist the greatest forces of the Turk.  

1 Whether the janizzars be the chief strength of the Turk.  
2 That horse are more necessary in the war then foot.  
3 The progress of the Turk before and after the institution of the janissaries.  
4 Victories gotten by the horse.  
5 Overthrows given by the enemy's horse to the Christians.  
6 Conclusion that horse in service excel foot.   
IT seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the Turk attribute his chief strength to the band of janizzars, as the only sinew of his power: and amongst other reasons wherewith they strive to fortify their opinion, this is one. It hath happened many times that the army of the Ottomans hath been so hardly laid to, as the battle hath been in a manner lost, yet have they gathered strength and kept themselves on foot, yea they have gotten the victory, and all through the virtue and valour of these Legionaries.  
2 Machiavelli discourseth upon this point, 
Machiavel's opinion for foot.  and as one much passionate holdeth himself to this argument, that foot are more necessary than horse in all exploits of war, and he layeth his principal foundation upon the example of certain Roman Captains, which (saith he) to break into, and force the enemy on foot have caused their men at arms to alight from their horses and fight on foot against them: It is a poor argument and of small importance, since that for once that they made their horsemen alight, an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horse back if they had the commodity of horse; he which is on horseback may when he please alight, but a footman cannot get up on horseback when he will. This money shall serve to pay Machiavelli whom I leave to proceed forward. I affirm, that in a ranged battle, and in the plain field the forces of the Turk consist and principally rely on the horse. The proofs are clear and at hand, as the process of this discourse shall discover.  
3 First no man is ignorant of the great victories the Turk got long time before the institution of the janizzars. Amurath the second the year 1420. was he that first ordained them: yet Ottoman had before that taken Sebasta (a city of importance in Asia) where he slew above an hundred thousand of his enemies. 
1305.  Orcan his son had despoiled the Emperor of Constantinople and of Bithynia at several worthy encounters. 
1363.  Amurath the first had passed Asia into Europe, with his forces took Gallipoli, Filipoli, and Andrinople; and we may think that he did not obtain those victories without dangerous and bloody encounters: he conquered also divers other cities and won many other victories of the Princes of Servia and Bulgaria, whom he compelled to stoop under the yoke of his obedience. 
1396.  Bajazet the first overcame Sigismonde King of Bohemia, and put all those French to the sword which Charles the 6. of France sent to his succour. Calepin his son understanding that Sigismond had raised an army, upon the news of the overthrow given by Tamburlaine to Bajazet, to salve his losses went to meet him at Salumbezza, and so valiantly encountered him, as his whole army was cut in pieces, so as it cannot be said that the victories the Turk hath obtained since the institution of janizzars have been either greater or more memorable than the former, rather they were the steps to these other happy achievements. The beginning of things contain in them the efficient virtue of the whole. This disputation might prove great and might balance on either side, if I did not add weight to one of the opinions.  
I will then say, that before the institution and seminary of janizzars, 
1397.  the Turks received but one memorable overthrow at mount Stella at the hands of Tamburlan the most strong enemy that ever they assayed, and that after their institution they received more and greater, as were those of Vsumcassan, of john Huniades, of Matthew Coruin, of the Mamelucks, of the great Scanderbag, of Don john of Austria, of the Kings of Persia and others.  
4 The second proof which I will produce to fortify the truth of my proposition, is, that all such as have had the better hand of the Turks, ever had it by the means of their horse, wherein they did exceed the enemy in number and strength, as we have so often said of the Persians and of the Mamelucks. The great Sophi ismael, had he not vanquished Selim the second with the strength of his horse, if when he did set upon the rierward, where the Turk was in person, the thunder of his Cannon had not so affrighted the horse, as they ran away with their masters, to the disordering of the whole army? The only thing that overthrew the fortune which the Persian had almost already in his possession. Cudabeuda King of Persia, hath many times overcome the Turkish forces, by the only strength of his horse, whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other. The Hungarians in like sort have many times put the Turks to the worse by their fight on horseback.  
5 The third and strongest proof of my assertion, is, that all the harms we have received of the Turk, have come by his horse, as at Nicapolis, at Salembezza, at Varna, at the river of Morava, at Exechium, at Buda and elsewhere.  
6 And if it ever happened that the janizzars recovered the battle hall lost, it is to be imputed to this, that they were reserved for the rearward; so as it was easy for fresh men to repel those which were already weakened and tired. But I think no man but will grant, that if instead of the janizzars they had been as many horse, they had performed as much. As on the contrary, if the other had kept in store some fresh troops of horse, as the Turks, they had dealt otherwise with them, and kept them well enough from bereaving them of the victory. In conclusion, the horse are they that defeat the enemy, and become masters of the field, that prepare the way for the foot to the besieging of towns, and give them time and leisure to force and take them.   

CHAP. XI.  
Where the Turk might be most easily assailed to overcome him either by sea or by land.  

1 Examples of sea victories.  
2 The goodness of our havens.  
3 The number of our skilful mariners.  
4 The Christians far beyond the Turks in maritime matters.  
5 The Turks horse fearful to the Christians, unprofitable at sea.  
6 That the Turks are easily to be overthrown at sea.   
1 THere were much matter for doubt and disputation upon this question, if reason and experience did not clear it: for experience we have it fresh in many accidents; which instruct us that an attempt by sea, would be less difficult to us, and more hurtful to the Turk, for the reasons and examples which I will deliver. As often as our forces have to some purpose put themselves into the Levant seas, they have been evermore victorious, as at Metelin, at Cafalonia, at Prevesa, at Scorsolari. If any one opposing me object the overthrow of our army at Gerbes, 
1580.  which happened about the same time, let him read the discourse of the History, (as is requisite) and he shall find that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy, but rather through our own fault; insomuch as our army could not take their opportunity to dislodge in due time; but suffered themselves to be besieged by the hardness of the season, and by tempests; which so disordered them as it was easy for the enemy to force them. Grimani General of the Venetians, let slip the occasion of a worthy victory, when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enemy, as he might well have done at Sapienza. But on the contrary, 
Vid. 181.  as often as the Emperor Charles the fifth set forth an army to some purpose, the Turk durst never look abroad; as when he undertook the voyage of Tunis and of Algiers, where nevertheless he encountered many disasters, he brought before Tunis seven hundred sail, and before Algiers five hundred only. Thus much for experience.  
2 Now we must see what reasons we have in store to prove that we may more easily assail the Turk by sea then by land. Among others this may pass, that our seas are more frequented, and our ports more rich and safe than those of the Levant. For first (set aside Constantinople) there is not throughout their obedience, any one port that may be equalled to those of Venice, Lisbon, Seville, Antwerp, London, Amsterdam, Lubec, or Dansk, etc. and very few also that may be compared with those of Naples, Genova, Villa-Franca, Nessina, Palermo, Ragusa, Marsseilles, Tolon, Bourdeaux, New-Haven, Rochel, and Rovane, etc.  
3 It is clear then that we surmount the Turk not only in numbers of Ports and good harbers for the retreat and shelter of our armies, but also in Mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas. Moreover, there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affordeth greater plenty of men then that of Genova, Dalmatia, Sclavonia, Venice, Candye. Again, there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better proof for sea affairs, then are those of Marseilles. I omit to speak of the Catalonian, the Portugal, the Biskayan, the English, the Norman, the Hollander, and Zelander, all people marvelous skilful in Navigation.  
4 I would willingly demand, what it availeth the Turk to possess a large and spacious sea bordering country, if it remain unhabited; neither were it enough if it were: for the exploits of maritime war, it is requisite they be valiant, resolute, and such as can endure travel and pain. Alongst all the coast of Africa, the Turk hath not one Haven of account besides Algies. In all Egypt he hath only Alexandria, and Dalmatia, at the least which are held in any consideration. In Soria, take away Saffo and Pamphilia, those near Tirus, Ephesus, Cicize, and the rest so celebrated in ancient times, remain at this day nameless, and buried in their own ruins. They have Gallipoli which is of no great traffic: they have that of Constantinople, whereof they stead and vaunt themselves most of all: Moreover, all these Ports are not so good or so convenient as ours, either if we consider the form, or the commodity of situation, nor so well stored with artillery as ours are.  
5 Again, fight by sea, we shall not need to fear their horse, whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror unto us; relying as they do upon them, as the principal nerve of their forces; but as for foot, we excel them in number and valour:  
6 For conclusion, it is most certain, if we could once deprive the Turk of the use of the sea, he would be soon overthrown by land with a sufficient number of galleys, which might be maintained in the Archipelago: we should cut him off from all traffic with Egypt and Soria, as also keeping certain galleys in the Strait and channel, we should hinder the commerce of Asia and Constantinople, which he could not be long without, so that by continuing this manner of warring upon him without intermission, we should by little and little heave him out of the whole Empire of Greece, where there would be enough to satiate the greedy ambition of the Christians.   

CHAP. XII.  
Of the inward causes whereby the Empire of the Turks may come to ruin.  

1 Of inward causes by which an Estate may be overthrown.  
2 The occasions of the change of the Turkish Empire, are, a defect that may happen of the Ottoman race:  
3 The hatred, contempt, and disobedience of the Turks officers and servants:  
4 The discord that may arise between his children about the succession.  
5 That it is hard now to stir up and maintain dissension amongst them.  
6 Another occasion may be the jannizzers liberty and insolency towards their master:  
7 Another the rebellion and revolt of his countries and their Governors.   
1 AS we have before delivered by what outward causes the Empire of the Turks may soon receive an alteration, so we are now to handle the means whereby he may be inwardly weakened, and whether by the infirmities which are begotten in other estates, that of the Ottomans may be likewise distempered and corrupted; of the inward causes of this corruption, some concern the Heads and Ministers, others are derived from among the people. I will then produce some few examples noting the errors of such as sway a Sovereign authority, and so orderly come to the other, to collect thence what may serve to procure the Turks ruin.  
2 That which would fall most to our purpose would be if the great Turk should die without heirs of the true line and race of Ottoman. For in such a case it is likely the beglerbies, Viziers, Bassas, Sangiacks, and the greatest personages of the Turkish nation, would each one for himself endeavour to possess himself of whatsoever he could most easily compass.  
3 The second cause would be, if in regard of his cruelty, or negligence, the Prince should give his subjects occasion to hate and contemn him: but the mischief would prove yet greater if it did arise from the cowardliness or sloth of the Prince. For his strength consisting wholly in the great numbers of his soldiers ordinarily entertained, how could he possibly contain such mighty armies in devotion and quietness; if he did not daily busy them in the exercise of war? And less how could so many nations be held within compass of fear and obedience without the fear of ordinary arms? It is not to be doubted then if they had a Prince who were given over to idleness and a loose life, or that they descried him to be a coward & slothful, but they would be forward to draw their swords against him, and thence work their own destruction. Bajazet the second had proof of this, for abandoning himself to all pleasures and resolving upon a private and retired course of life, 
1511.  to spend his time in reading good authors; his son sought his destruction, and in the end favoured by the janizzars deprived him of his life and kingdom. For though Bajazet repressed the first violence of his sons ambition, yet he was at the last forced by the janizzars not only to pardon his rebellion, but also to send him with an army against his other son Accomat, who supposing his father meant to prefer Selim before himself, who was the elder, caused the noses and ears of his father's messengers most shamefully to be cut off; the enormity of this fact ill digested, and worse interpreted was that which canceled the greater faults of Selim, to take vengeance of this last & less outrage; whence it came to pass in the end that these same janizzars possessed Selim of the empire, who soon after put to death his unhappy father. Amurath the third now reigning having withdrawn himself from the actions of war to live in ease and quiet hath lost much of his soldiers and servants ancient obedience, zeal, and observance, such as they were wont to carry towards their Sovereign's greatness. The Bassa of Cairo who had the government of Egypt, named Ragusei, being summoned (according to their Imperious custom) to make his appearance at the port, flatly refused to come thither and made his escape with a world of treasure which he had amassed by extortions and pilling of the people, during the time of his administration. The janizzars which were at those times appointed for the wars of Persia, would not once move a foot to march thitherward: but as half in a mutiny said plainly they would not any more go upon any enterprise unless the great Turk their Lord would unchamber himself from among his concubines, and undertake the voyage himself in person, so as he was constrained by virtue of gifts and increase of pay to win them to the war. Moreover of late after the overthrow of Tauris, the Turk having appointed a new general for the succouring of his vanquished army, and reenforcing of such as remained within the citadel; all the commandments he could lay upon him, could not prevail so much with him as to get him to march forward, rather he grew to capitulate with him, and that finished, he made the most ado in the world to muster up twenty thousand men, who refused likewise to go to that war, otherwise then upon all the advantages they could devise to demand: not like subjects and slaves, but as if they had been neighbours, allies, and confederates. These breaches already made in the obedience they were wont to render their lord and Master, may persuade us that they will easily rebel, upon the first occasion that shall present itself without respect of their Prince's greatness, or observation of their ancient military policy.  
4 The third occasion might befall, if there were many brethren to debate the Empire after the death of their father, as it happened between Zizimus, and Bajazet, sons of Mahomet, and between Acomat and Selim, sons of Bajazet. This Bajazet was favoured of the janizzars against his brother. Zizimus was upheld only by the aid of the Sultan of Cairo, 
1482.  and King of Persia. Selim likewise was borne by the janizzars and Bassas, and Acom●nt by foreign Princes: they encountered and fought cruel battles, whose victories brought the whole Estate in danger: Bajazet and Selim remained conquerors, each one his party by means of the great numbers of men that accompanied them, 
1513.  and of the valour of the soldiers of the old bands which served under them. Notwithstanding all these opportunities which God so to the purpose prepared, not one Christian Prince once stirred, or so much as made offer to arm in favour of the weaker of those which contended: which would no doubt have entangled both of them in a long and dangerous strife, enough finally to have ruined or much decayed the house of the Ottomans, when they should have called such an one to their succour as would have rather blown then quenched their fires. Amongst all the Princes of Christendom there was none but the great master of Rhodes, which sent some supplies of artillery to Zizimus, and which after received and defended him from the hands of Bajazet, when he was driven to retire himself to his protection.  
5 These domestic quarrels cannot now become so strong (especially such as might happen between brethren) as than they might, considering that the Mamelucks, who as neighbours might have fomented and given entertainment to such differences, are now extinct and their name no more mentioned. They were in their time the only emulators of the Turks glory: Rhodes hath made an exchange of her fortune, and is now in the power of this tyrant. Cypress beareth the like yoke. These two islands afforded an especial commodity to sow dissensions among the Turks, to favour and succour one of the parties.  
6 The fourth cause would easily arise from the presumption and headstrong rashness of the janizzars, likely enough to attempt and execute as much as sometime did the Praetorian bands of the Romans, who made slender account to fill the Empire with slaughters and massacres, wherein many Emperors ended their days: they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the Senate, and the love and reverence they ought to have borne towards their country. The like may we hope or expect from the janizzars, that they will one day assume to themselves the same power and learn to perform the like, whereof they gave an assay at such time as they compelled Bajazet the second to resign the Empire to Selim his son. They did almost the like when Soliman caused his son Mustapha to be murdered; for they besieged him and environed his tent for certain days space, crying out they would know the cause of that young Prince's death. In the end by the devise of the Bassa and with store of coin, he won to him four thousand of them, who disengaged him of the fear and danger wherein he was plunged.  
7 The fifth cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the country, or of ministers swaying the supreme authority & credit in places of government. Gazeles governor of Soria made way for a revolt of the like quality, as did also Acomat General of Egypt: Gazeles, assisted by the Mamelucks, Arabians and those of Rhodes, endeavoured to set himself up against the great Turk: but he was discovered by Cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy. This man either for fear (as looking into the danger of the enterprise) or for envy of his companions greatness, revealed all to his Master Soliman, who presently dispatched against him Faratha Bassa, by whom he was vanquished in battle. Acomat had not the leisure to proceed far in his attempt, for as he did inconsiderately precipitate himself into the trial thereof, so was he as speedily discovered, and in an instant suppressed and slain, without having thrived aught in his designs.   

CHAP. XIII.  
Of the mixed causes.  

1 What are the mixed causes.  
2 How Estates are overthrown by mixed causes.   
1 IN this third book we have at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes, Estates may be endangered: now we must speak of causes compounded, of the one and the other, which, to discourse more intelligibly, we term mixed, which likewise are of power of themselves to alter an Empire and to bring it, either by an universal or a particular change, to a lamentable ruin. These mixed causes than are those whereby both the enemy abroad, and the subject at home may by a common consent conspire against an Estate and subvert it.  
2 One of the causes or means may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy, or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by foreign practices; or to term it better, the treasons which subjects may hatch in favour, and by the means and authority of their neighbours. This happeneth in a twofold manner, when the subject beginneth and setteth on foot the practice, or when a stranger layeth the way open unto them under some coloured pretence, or else when some one particular person or all a whole communality frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression. Finally, this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one, two, or three, of the principal men to revolt against their prince and take arms in hand to overturn and ruin the Estate.   

CHAP. XIIII.  
How particular persons may be gained.  

1 How his people are to be provoked to rebellion.  
2 How his great men and chief officers are to be gained.  
3 These courses at the first not succeeding, are to be oftener attempted.  
4 Wary proceeding is requisite, lest those that manage the business incur danger.  
5 To whom such businesses are to be committed.   
1 IT resteth now that we make it appear how such practices may be set on foot and cherished: we will then begin with the enterprise to be plotted by some particular person, by whose assistance it may take effect. We must presuppose that this person is either private or public, the private persons are those which suffer themselves most often to be corrupted by money, and with these there need not so many ceremonies or brookings, but if they be public persons of rank and authority, either in regard of the greatness of their family, or managing of state affairs; there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other: yet if we may but discover in them the stings of ambition and desire of greatness, and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours, for the execution of the des●●gne; then is it that we bring them to dare any thing, especially if they have never so little disposition to be revenged of some received indignity. It is indeed a hard matter to work particular and private persons without great uncertainties and dangers.  
2 But if we must have to do with the great persons of the Estate, we must warily make choice of our time, sound them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their Prince, either in respect that some one is advanced to their prejudice, or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoke and seize themselves of the Estate. These are the means and occasions, which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our Christian Princes, smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruin of the common enemy; putting on (as they say) the fox's skin when the lions is wanting. The displeasure and jealousy which Faratha Bassa conceived against Hebraim Bassa because he saw him raised by Soliman to greater honour and estimation than himself, so deprived him of all reason, as suffering the desire of revenge by little and little to transport him, he began to plot a rebellion, but discovered he was forthwith put to death: the self same occasion was the overthrow of Pirrus and Mustapha raised by Soliman. In our time in the court of Amurath the third now reigning, these jealousies and hartburning have been great between Mahomet and Mustapha, and since that between the same Mustapha and Cicala (who hath outstripped him) and all for favour of their Master. If these humours and ill dispositions had been well looked into and wisely employed to their best use by some great Prince of Christendom, they had been fit matter to have bred a dissension and revolt amongst those barbarous people.  
3 Now though such practices should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to work that universal change which we wish in that tyrant's Empire; yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismayed; remembering that most commonly the beginnings of innovations and commotions so extraordinary, are feeble, and that that wisdom showeth itself like itself which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attain to a happy growth. I am of opinion, that when we encounter with instruments that are not without ambition, courage, and a thirst of revenge; after we have felt and sounded them once, twice, or thrice, we shall in the end make a breach in their loyalty and obedience; especially if we set before them (be it under a true or false title) the certainty of some mighty succour, whereof they may see the preparatives; for so they will the more courageously attempt against the life and estate of their Prince.  
4 Moreover it is not to be forgotten, that when such practices shall be discovered by the Turk, and that he shall see the Christian's more diligent than hitherto they have been, to sound the affections of his servants and subjects: he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them, as even that will make him offer them some hard measure. This distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspicions and hard conceits in his servants, and subjects, either for the managing of affairs, or for the danger that the opinion of loyalty incurreth, when it hath to deal with such a distrustful and suspicious Prince, as this would prove: so as by little and little it would work us out some occasion fitting our purpose, especially, if whilst this practice were hatching, and on foot, the children of the Turk should take arms one against the other, or that during their father's life, they should dispute the possession of the Empire: for the ice being already broken, there would be a more easy passage and better success, then if it had not been taken in hand at all.  
5 But because an especial judgement, patience, and much wisdom are requisite in such businesses, we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts, to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportunities and times, to sow these dissensions, and that there be not want of money to distribute amongst this people, which are farther in love therewith, than any other nation the world affordeth.   

CHAP. XV.  
How the people of the Turk may be wrought from his obedience.  

1 How the Turk's Christian Subjects are to be wrought to rebellion.  
2 A place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebel.  
3 The vain fooleries of their Alkoran are to be discovered.  
4 How books written to that purpose may come to his subjects hands.  
5 How such books are to be composed.  
6 What fruits are to be hoped from their reading.  
7 Exhortation to the janizzars.  
8 The conclusion of this work.   
1 THe Turk hath two sorts of people subject to his Empire; one followeth the sect of Mahomet; the other the truth of the Gospel of jesus Christ. The mahometans are quiet, as those which being of one and the same law, have no cause to make any tumult. The Christians cannot stir, as being over topped and awed by a greater power than their own, which curbeth them so, as there is no better way to move them to rebel, then to make them handle (as it were) and see the assurance of an approaching succour, to provide them of arms and all other furniture for the wars: for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least show once to move, whilst they have the enemy over them always in a readiness and armed, who would in a moment confound them, especially being as they are naked and unprovided of arms, offensive or defensive. Selim the second doubting the worst, by the counsel of Occhially, caused all the Christians inhabiting the sea coasts, to retire themselves far up into the main land, to the end the presence of the Christian forces should not encourage them against him, as it happened at such time as Andrew Dorea achieved the enterprise of Patras and Coron.  
2 If the Christians should ever undertake the like design they ought to take especial heed how they unship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand, since they were likely enough by their strength to choke at the first the revolt of the Christians, for so mighty are they in horse, and of such speed and dexterity, as they would in an instant bear down before them whatsoever should oppose them. Wherefore it would be better to enter by Albania and by places mountainous and of difficult access, where the horse are not able to serve, as in the plain. This is as much as we meant to say of such Christians as are under the Turks dominions, all which I will imagine want not will to rebel, if the Princes of Christendom would furnish them of means.  
3 Now let us see what way were best to be taken to provoke the Mahometans to revolt, and to fill their countries with troubles, and civil dissensions. If we will but consider how their religion is fraught with untruths, their Alcoran abounding in follies, we shall find it easy to pick matter enough out of it to set them together by the ears, especially if we do but disperse among them certain books fit to convert them, or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they observe, composing them for Europe in the Sclavonian tongue, and for Asia in the Arabian.  
4 But because it would be hard to convey these books into the countries of the Turks obedience but that they would soon perceive the device and speedily remedy it: It were best beginning far off, in the Indies and in the parts of Asia and Africa held by the Portugals: for because of the traffic which is great in those parts many Turkish Merchants and others arrive there from all quarters. They come to Mozambique in Africa, to Zophala and Quiloe in Asia. They descend also as low as the Moluccas, Cochien, Goa, Dia, Ormus, and sundry other parts appertaining to the crown of Portugal. These books also might be dispersed abroad in the country of the Gentiles, which are friends and confederates of the Christians, as in Calicut, Zailan, Cambeia, and others; and the like at Oran, Arzilla, and in other parts of Arabia subject to the crown of Spain and Portugal, and in all other parts of Europe which border upon the Turks.  
5 There must be a care had that the title of the book be so coloured, as it do not at the first discover the intent of the author, but rather that it entice them to peruse it with a certain curiosity and show of pleasantness and delight. It is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with any disputations or subtle point against the Articles of their belief, but that chose it be full of tales and matter fit to move laughter; yet with some well conveyed passage which may by the way discover or make them doubt of the fables of their Alcoran.  
6 The Turkish Merchants or others, into whose hands this book should light, would confidently read it in those parts where the Turk is not obeyed. And though perhaps they durst not adventure to carry it with them, yet the impression and substance of what they had read would remain fixed in their minds, so as they would after relate it as news to their friends and families, in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be divulged thereabout, whence would spring a longing in others which should come and go into those countries to buy & read them: In this manner the Alcoran in process of time would grow out of credit amongst them, and those things which with scruple and observation they collect thence, would turn to a jest and subject of laughter, whence there could not but ensue some schism and division amongst them, for the most religious men of their sect and the most interested would oppose themselves wilfully to maintain it. Neither would it make for the purpose to make mention in any sort of our Saviour Christ, much less to let it be known that the author thereof were a Christian: for the immortal hatred they bear to that name would make it odious, and would bring it at the very first to be rejected. It should rather be so contrived as if it came from some other of an other sect, wherein a man might borrow the hand of the inhabitants of Cambaia, of India, of Arabia, or of Persia. In this manner it would be better welcome and would carry with it more estimation and authority.  
7 It were well also if there were framed and published a remonstrance to the janizzars in the Sclavoman tongue, whereby might be signified unto them their original, and how in their infancy they were cruelly halled from the bosoms of their Christian fathers and mothers, conveyed into Turkey, and there nuzzled up in the sect of Mahomet, not having judgement as then to distinguish of good and evil; that they are the pillars to uphold this Tyrant which hath set his foot upon the throat of their father's liberty, and which keepeth them as slaves under the yoke of a dishonourable and barbarous servitude. This would avail much, especially if there were thereto annexed an exhortation to take better knowledge of themselves, and hence, forward like good children to embrace and free their miserable parents, which daily lament them; and above all to persuade them to return to the dear bosom of the church wherein they were first, regeverate and which attendeth with spread arms to receive them, entertain them, and save them.  
8 These things well carried would in the end make the Turk so suspicious, and untractable, as he would offer occasions enough to his people henceforth to rouse up themselves, and better advise how to shake off that cruel and unsupportable yoke which so mightily oppresseth them, and to fashion themselves to a more happy and secure life for the quiet of their consciences and salvation of their souls. This is that whereof the Christians ought diligently to bethink themselves; and not to work one an others ruin and destruction, as they spare not to do against the express commandment of God, which so often recommendeth unto us love and charity towards our neighbours.  
FINIS.