THE NEW ART OF LYING, COVERED BY Jesvites under the veil of EQVIVOCATION, DISCOVERED AND DISPROVED BY Henry Mason. LONDON: Printed by George Purslowe for john Clarke, and are to be sold at his Shop under Saint Peter's Church in Cornhill. 1624. TO THE MOST REVErend Father in GOD, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury his Grace, Primate of all ENGLAND, and metropolitan. Most reverend Father, THe first news that I heard of the Equivocating art, a Pr●efa● praefixâ Sex preelection. cap. 1. & cap. 1. de Mendac. num. 12, 13, 14. was that which I learned out of your grace's writings. And well might this be to me the first news. For, if I mistake not, you were the first Writer, that published those tricks in print to the World: though (as beginnings use to be) that discovery of this Art was but brief in comparison, either because that occasion did not admit of any long or full discourse, or because, but little of this mystery could then at the first be discovered; the professors of that Trade, as yourself also signify, labouring to hide their secrets from the knowledge of other men. And indeed it may be observed, that in managing of the Papacy, they have certain mysteries of State, which the more they use, the more they coceale. One of which, is their power to murder Kings, and blow up Parliaments, & kill all that stand in their way, like the Assassini, who held it a point of great merit to murder all that were their adversaries in Religion: but yet they are not willing that the world should know that this is any part of their creed. Another such policy may be that of their Indices Expurgatorij, by which they have circucised the lips of such Writers, as spoke any word against the Roman Church: but this they kept as a great mystery among some few of themselves, till misfortune brought it to light, full sore against their wills. And for a third suchlike policy, I may reckon also this Art of Equitiocation, which the Masters thereof did keep secret as long, and as much as they could. And therefore it was no marvel, if your first discovery of this mystery were but brief in comparison. But afterward a D. Morton B. of Lichfield and Coventry, Confutat, of Equiuccation. another reverend & learned Prelate, lighting upon a more complete Treatise then formerly had appeared, penned by a Popish Priest in defence of this art, and approved by the archpriest, and the provincial of the Jesuits: he pursued the point more fully according as that Treatise gave him just occasion. The cry of which pursuit did unkennel the old equivocating b Persons, who by occasion of the Bishopps book wrote a large Treatise in defence of Equiuoca●on. fox, and hunted him into the open field, there to display himself, and to show what tricks he could use, for saving his new Art from the infamy of lying. And here I finding him well chafed, did by the sent follow after him unto his Den, to espy if I might, what he and his Cubs were devising in the dark. And I found them very busy in hammering reservations and mental frauds, upon every occasion and in all kinds of dealing, thereby to catch us at unawares, who being plain and simple men ourselves, could not suspect such frauds and impostures in others. And in case these things should come abroad, as in part themselves had discovered them against their wills: yet so confident and resolute did I find them, to maintain all for good and honest dealing, as that Father a Mitigat. cap. 9 nu. 81. p. 403. Persons maketh a wonder of it, and thinketh that God should deal worse with men than he had done with beasts, if he should not grant them equivocating tricks, and reserved wiles, as he hath granted to the Hare and the fox, their leaps and turnings, and windings, and going back again in the same trace they come, to deceive the dogs that pursue them. And yet all this confidence I take to be but a copy of their countenance. For even in their printed Apologies of this art, they seek to cast mists before the Readers eyes, that he may not be able to see the depth of their meaning. These things when I had found, as I thought, (though I know I am much short of finding all) I was willing, according to my ability, to impart them unto wellmeaning Christians, that they seeing the deep frauds of these men, may learn to shun their company and acquaintance. In which endeavour of mine, what service I may have done for the public good, I cannot tell: but sure I am, if there be any good in it, I should in reason return it thither, where I first found it. The consideration whereof, hath made me to presume so far upon your grace's clemency, as to lay down at your feet thi● poor Treatise, the grounds whereof I first learned from your own pen: desiring (if therein I be not overbold) that it may, vinder your name and protection, be sent forth into the world. Which being all, that at this time I have to say, I humbly take my leave, desiring the God of peace and truth, to preserve you from every evil word and work, that you may maintain his truth in this world, and enjoy his peace both in this world, and the World to come. Your grace's devoted in all service, Henry MASON TO MY LOVING AND dear beloved Parishioners, the Inhabitants of S. Andrews undershaft in London, grace. and truth in Jesus CHRIST. IN the ordinary exercise of my ministry among you, when I came to speak of the ninth commandment, the first thing that I met with to be considered, was the matter of Truth and Lying. And considering hereof, I found two sorts of lies frequent among men: the one, an open and professed lie; and the other, a cunning and artificial Lye. The former was defended by the Priscillianists, an old kind of heretics: & the latter is now defended by the Romanists, a latter sort of false Prophets. Both of them are odious to God, who is honoured by Truth; and pernicious to the society of men, which is upheld by Truth: but the latter is the more dangerous, because under a colour of Truth it beguileth simple souls, who are otherwise enemies to Lying. The consideration hereof, made me to inquire a little further into this art; which the favourers thereof have sought to conceal, by calling it by a new name. For being ashamed of the name of Lying, they have christened it by the name of equivocating: a name as unknown in this meaning, as the art itself was unheard of before these latter days. The mystery and juggling tricks of which device, I did then and upon that occasion, in part discover unto you: but briefly and plainly, the time, and place, and occasion not admitting of any long or school-like discourse. But since considering, that together with the increase of false Prophets in this kingdom, this art of falsehood hath abounded also: I thought it a part of my duty, (God having pleased to place me as a watchman over your souls) to give you a fresh warning of this danger, and that in a more ample and large discourse, then formerly I had done, and in such a manner and sort, that you might have something lying by you, that might advertise you of this dangerous deceit, when I could not have opportunity to speak unto you our of the Pulpit. And this I was moved to unat this time the rather; because I have of late observed, that these artificial liars (among their other devices and forgeries, which upon confidence of this art, they take liberty to use without remorse) do instill into the minds of their credulous followers, an opinion; and do labour to spread abroad among others a suspicion, that among our Learned men, many in heart are of their Church, howsoever for the world's sake they dissemble their opinion: and that there are a good number among us of the clergy, who are better persuaded of their Religion, then of our own. Doctor Sheldon, a man well acquainted with their dealings, as having lived in their bosom, and taken the Orders of Priesthood in their Church, doth write, that * Sheldon of the mira●les of Antichrist, ca 4. pag. 52. whilst he fed on Rome's husks, he often heard of many grievous imputations laid upon some of the greatest clerks in the Church of England, as though in heart they were theirs, which he then believed to be true, as others did; but since hath found to be much otherwise. And myself have met with some, (which persuadeth me, that they abuse others in this kind, beside our greatest clerks) who have more than intimated to myself, that I knew that which might justify their cause, if I would speak it. Which might well put me into a muse, what had ever slipped from me, why they should be persuaded that I had such an opinion of their Church: saving that I considered, that this might well be one of the jesuires equivocating devices, to instill that opinion concerning us, into their Disciples minds, that so they might gain more credit to their cause. Upon which occasion, entering a more serious consideration of the point, I perceived, that besides this art, they use other devices also, for this purpose, which I thought good, for your better caution and safety, briefly to relate in this place. First then, if they meet with any of our clergy, which are of weak brain, and vnsettled resolution, (as it is possible, we may have some such as well as they) they set upon such weaklings, with plausible tales in commendation of their Church; whose open abominations practised at home among themselves, are not so well known to us, who have never traveled into Popish countries'. And if by this means they chance to pervert a weak and vnsettled man, than the cry goeth, that such a Learned man, is become a Catholic, because evidence of truth forced him to forkake his old Profession. Secondly, if they meet with men, who being either opinative of their own worth, think their good parts not sufficiently rewarded; or being indeed of good parts, have but slender means: they tempt such, as the devil did our saviour, with offers of gifts and preferments. And if by these allurements they can bribe any man to become their Proselyte, for filthy lucre sake, than they blaze abroad the conversion of such a great and learned Scholar, who could not withstand the light of truth shining in the Roman Church. Thirdly, if by these, and such like policies, they prevail not: (for these devices fit them best, because than they bring men over to their side, with their own mouths to publish their own shame; but if thus they prevail not) yet one shift they have behind, which is, to device lies, of such and such men's conversion to their Church, who ever hated it from their very souls. In which kind of forgery, they have so fare proceeded, that they have spared neither living nor dead. For, as if they had cast off all fear of shame, which was sure in the end to be their reward, they have in writing belied in this manner, the chiefest Doctors in our Church, who have survived to refute, and to detest their forgeries in Print. But when men are dead, than they become more bold: and of the most constant and zealous Professors of our Religion, they give it out to the world, that such and such men of chief esteem in the Protestant Church, did recant upon their death beds, it being then no time to dissemble any longer. And when themselves have first devised these tales on their finger's ends; then they produce them in their serious books of controversy, as grave arguments to confirm the Roman faith by. The discovery of which falsehood, I wish it may work the like effect in your hearts, that it hath done in mine: which is, that whereas I utterly disliked popery before, I do now detest it more than ever. And for this purpose I was the rather moved to pen this small Treatise, that you, of whose souls I know myself to have undertaken the charge, seeing these forgeries, may learn to beware of Equivocating Spirits: who, though otherwise they profess strictness of conscience, & according to the rules of the Roman Faith, are very devout and religious; yet can cousin you with an hundred lying devices, and never feel the least grudge of conscience for it. For so Father Persons telleth us, that * apology of Eccles. Subordinat. cap. 12. in the very end. Equivocations are allowed principally to 〈◊〉 of scrupulous conscience, for avoiding of lying. By which he giveth us a fair warning, (and I desire you take notice of it) that if there be any scrupulous and tender consciences amongst them (as some no doubt there are) though they would not tell a lie, if they knew it, for all the world, yet even such men may without any scruple or fear, deceive us with equivocating reservations, and mental devices. And having thus given you this fair warning, now me thinketh I may speak unto you, to the same purpose as our Lord did to his Disciples; Matt. 24. 5, 23, 24. If they shall say unto you, Lo here is Christ, or lo there, believe it not; for there are many false Prophets arisen, and do deceive many. Behold I have told you before. And if after all this warning, Ez●k. 33. 4, 9 any of you shall suffer himself to be deluded by lying equivocators, his blood will be upon his own head, but I have delivered mine own soul. But I fear not this in you, of whose constancy and zeal I have had good experience: Gal. 5. 10. so that I may rather take up that saying of the Apostle, I have confidence in you through the Lord, that ye will be no otherwise minded; but that, if any man shall trouble you, (or seek to withdraw you from your faith) he shall bear his judgement, whosoever he be. And in assurance hereof, Gal. 6. 18. I leave you to God's grace, in the words of the same Apostle; Brethren, the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your Spirit. Amen. Yours, the unworthy Minister of Jesus Christ, and your servant for Jesus sake, Henry MASON. To the READER. WHen the Impression of this Treatise was almost finished, I obtained the sight of two several papers of Latin Verses, composed long since, in the year 1606. by two than Students in the universities, now Doctors in divinity, and my worthy friends. Which Verses being (according to the academical custom) made upon Questions then disputed in both the universities, in Publicis Comitijs, and happily concurring with the subject of this Treatise, as I was glad that myself had gotten, so I was willing to impart them to the Reader, presuming that my two friends, and much-respected brethren, will not be offended, that I send them their Verses back again in Print. Aequivocationis tenebrae pugnant cum rationis lumine. Quaestio philosophica in Comitis Cantabr. Ecloga. Cui nomen Pseudolus, siue Aequiuocator. Personae. Simia. Pseudolus. Sim. HOc quoque Vide passi● Horatij Satyram quintam, & Plauti Pseudolum, cui●ste supp●r. docte Pater, praeter narrata, petenti, Pseudole, responde, quibus artibus invia re●●̄ Essugiam, nostrae propriora pericula Sectae. Nonne vides quàm non satis est maria omnia circum Romuleae quaesisse diu responsa Cathedrae, Vnctos, adrasos, jesu cognomen adeptos, I am revehi in patriam, Româ duce, & auspice Româ! Hinc crucis, hinc urget malus horror carceris; aut nos. Explorat densus, capita heu damnata, Satelles. Pseud. a Sic Blackwellus Archipresbyter in sua ad Cathol●cos Epistola. dat. 7. novemb. 1605. Nos nil interea mis●ri, nil tendere contra, Nos tantum lachrymas, & nulli auditae Deorum Vota damus: vel, si nostra hoc Ecclesia poscat, Idque b V●nculo cucae obedicnlpe obstringi omnes jesuitas & no●itios Seminariorum pullos abunde noluin est; Quo tenentur, quidquid Superior imperaverit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exequi, Patri (qui nos in Sancta incepta remittit) Praecepisse lubet, bello, sicauè venenouè Extinxisse nefas, & gentem abolere nefandam Conamur; vel, si zelus slagrantior adsit, Forsan sulphureo disperdimus obvia statu. Sim. Cuncta piè ac rectè. Pseud. Quid rides? Sim. Simia vester Ille ego. Nos inter quasi c I●upus jupus novit, etc. nos non norimus. Pseud. Euge Simia quandoquidem tam sanctè, tamque severè Ista rogas, nostram missis ambagibus Artem, Artem, quam magnus docuit Pater d Arij haeresiarchae sophiticuns & Acquivoc atorium coram Imperatore Constantino iusiurandum recole apud S●cratem Hist Eccles. lib. 1. c. 25. Arius, Artem, Cortinam quae Phoebe tuam, quae te quoque Proteu, Vinciat, & vincat (paucis adverte) e Plautus in Pseudolo Act. ●. Scen. 4. Pseud. Onerab●meis praeceptis Simians Quid agat, ne quid titube●, doctè ut hanc sera● sallaciam. docebo. Putide Tiresia. Quicquid loquere aut erit, aut non: O quàm divinare tibi donavit Apollo. Lentum est. Quicquid ego edixo simul ipsum erit, & non. Aequivocare mihi Stygius dedit f Apocal. 9 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sim. Est, & Non semper sibi contradicere dixi, Et didici à puero. Si iam haec mutaverit aetas, Ausa ratam violare fidem, & convellere prima Fundamenta, quibus verorum innititur ordo, Submetuo ne nos (quotum venerabile nomen Amsanctum populis, & formidabile Sceptris Nunc sedet ad primas) g Quod olim femplarijs, quid ●i tandem jesititis accidat! olim, volventibus annis, Mutati in peius fastidia publica simus. Sed tu perge loqui quorsum haec adeo ardua tendant. Pseud. Rectâ ad te, fili. Si te, sub iudice (qualis Haereticae nimium est vigil indagatio turbae) Contigerit responsa peti, vel dicere causam, Accipe quâ ratione queas nec prodere verum, Nec male mentiri, nec te obiectare periclo, Nec reticere tamen. Captes astutus oportet Lucifugam sermonem, & versicoloria dicta. Sim. Vt ne vireludam pueri de more Sophistae? Praeterea, si quid perplexi subloquar, omnes, Evolve, Aristot. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1. cap. 1. ingeminant. Pseud. Vah nil sapis: utere verbis Ex se perspicuis, sed ment interprete tortis, Mente tua, non ment illa, quae consona voci. Sim. Me vero memini primo didicisse Lyaeo Sensa animi rerum, sensorum symbols v●ces. Scilicet utibilem linguae articulantis honorem Naturam tribuisse patet mortalibus, ut sit In quo conveniant, & posint mutna fungi. Quinetiam ratio.— Pseud. h Act. 2. Sc. 2. Pseud. Tu inventus verò meam qui 〈◊〉 fidem? Num tu rationibus audes Iniussu certare meo? meminisse decebat, Me Patre cum primum nostratum elementa Scholarum Imbiberes, in verba manus te nostra dedisse. Imperio iam disce meo: ac, dum prosequor, audi. Forsitan hoe de te quaeratur, Tune Sac●r●os? Non ●go Respo le. Sim. Quid? mentiar? Ha●d ita Romae. Pseud. Ipse fui Romae; mentiti nefcio. Num tu Esse Sacerdotem te credis Apollinis, Orci, Isidos, aut Cereris? Tu si● intellige. i Act. 2. Sc. 3. Pseud. Dy immortales 〈◊〉 contra non 〈…〉 Fraus haec Argento contra non chara est, aut ori●halco. Sic itidem. Tw● Roman 〈◊〉? Non ego Romam V●quam adii (capite incede s, aut compede vinctus, Aut furcam ore gerens, humerove molatile saxum) Simia, ne risu te ruperis. Haec ego trado Sobrius, ac prudens. Sim. k Act. ●. Sc. 8. Nimis 〈◊〉 mortalis d●●tus, n●mis 〈◊〉, nimis m●bes O te, Pater alme, ce●ebri Foelicem! quàm Dia doces! Haud talia dictant Pythagoras, Superavit do●●m Troianum at●●● 〈◊〉 Pseudolus. Anytiuè reus, vel dogma Platonis. Pseud. Te praestas nobis l Act. 2. Sc. 2. Pseud. Hic mihi incusest, procudam ego hodie hine multes Deloes. incudem Simia: tecum, Dum loquor, ipse novas videor producere t●chnas. Si, to mule reseruatio●un mentali● Ies●ui● usitatae. Non no●i i.e. 〈◊〉. cui consilii socium te adiunxeris, idem Cum suerit Patriae suffossor, petque-duellis, Is coràm sistatur, & hunc norisne rogeris? Haud te nosse hominem, Non vidi. 〈◊〉 c. visione b●ati●ic●i. ptiùs aut vidisse, repone. Non nosse (ex avium cantu, ' Boreave susurro, Non ex Aethiopum, histori●s, Troiaeve ruinis, Non ex notitiâ, quae Demonstratio dicta est.) Non vidisse (oculis palpebrae tegmine clausis, Velnon ut dicom tibi. Non oculis Argùs, non alt●▪ nostis in umbris, Non disiunctarum trans saxea septa domorum, Non hoc, quem Coelum dabit oli● Patria, visu: Denique non, ut rent tibi, judex improbe, narren●.) Sic non lingua tibi mendax, sed dictio fallax. Interea m Act. 2. Sc. 1. Pseud. Ego in m●o pectore ita param c●pias dupli●ts triplicis dolos Posidies, ut vbiet●nque 〈◊〉 hostibus congrediar malorum mcor● Fr●tus virtute dicam mea indust●a & maltitia Fraudulent●a Facil● ut vin●●l, facile ut ●pelicm mcos perducllis me● persidijs. duplicies condens in pectore sensus, Viceris, & trbidos praedâ spoliaveris hostes. Sim. O Pater; ô nulli quidquam mentite, quid autem, Quid si iuratos recta ad responsa lacestant, Si tangendae arae, si coelum in vota vocandum, Fallemusne fidem? Pseud. Fidei est sine corpore nomen Haereticis concessa ●ides. Periuria non sunt, Quae varium sumunt ex vocum ambage colorem, Aut iniuratae sunt dissona nuncia mentis. Sim. Haec super Haeretici iurabunt protinus omnes, Papicolis non esse Deum: n Act. 1. Sc. 3. Quid ais quanti● terra tegit hominum 〈…〉 etc. Bal. fat●or. Cal. nempe conceptis verbis. Bal. ●tiā consultis quoque. Cal. periuravisti Judibria Coelo Conceptis fieri, consultisque impia verbis: o Ibidem. Pseud. Non potest pietate obsisti ●uic, ut res sunt 〈◊〉, Deos quidem, quos maximè aequum est metuere, eos minimini facit. Non posse (ut reliquae cessant hoc nomine lites) His pietate malis obsisti. Pseud Simia, quicquid Hic nob●s inimica cohors obganniat (ut se Ruperit invidiâ) tu sic, licet undique crescat Suspicio, corvum Iudes p Act. 5. Sc. 4. Pseud. Quid 〈…〉 Ch. Anguilla est, el●bitur. elapsus hiantem Tortilis in morem anguillae, & nova slumina inibis. Deprendi miserum est, vel Apolline iudice vincam. Me memini quondam bis teruè his artibus usum: q Act. 4. Sc. 6. Bal. Malum & s●clestum, peri●●rum arebant esse me. S. P●l haud mentitu● st. Bal. 〈◊〉 iratus fui. Periurum a●ebant. Quid tum? Non hoc mihi bilem Moverat. Irascor, quòd non irasceris hosti Arcius. Sim. Ipse quidem (sic me rationis egentem Dementisse modo fat●or) vix ista putaram Digna side▪ jam me Magnae reverentia Romae, jam tua me virtus, censuraque nescia falli Imperiis egere suis, ut singula credam, Et cupiam ut capiam tam sanctae imitamina fraudis: jam liqueo in laqueos, totusque interfluo rimis: jam me utinam celebres Romani nominis hostes Exagitent. Sic est. An mecum Pseudolus unquam Verba habuit, quaerunt. Nunquam, respondeo, quicquam Verborum (virides urentum flatibus ornos, Aut animas Erebo, Scopulis, glacieve cientum. Non per canalem sonuit, Taurumve Perilli. Non Arabum lingua Chaldaeorumve locutus, Non lingua 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pseud. Quo tendis nnbila supra? Sim. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pseud. Satis ô satis. Vnde sed ista? Sim. Nomina sunt longè populorum utroque sub Indo, Quos è barbarie nuper sub foedera Christi, Pontificisque iugum nostri misêre Sodales. Pseud. 1 Act. 4. Sc. 1. Pseud. O heminem lepidum! It quoque etiam dolis O lepidum, charumque caput, quàm Pseudolicissas! Simia non magis est imitatrix, Simia, quàm tu. Te mihi, te servet Romae, ac sibi Jupiter. Sim. Atqui Pluris adhuc ego sum. Siquando (scilicet haud sunt Semper in occulto nostrae mysteria Sectae) Suspicio est caecos verbis me affingere sensus, Atque etiam menda●●s. Jupiter te mihi seruet. jurabo me non hoc fingere: dumque ita iurem, Interea me non quicquam finxisse, negantem Fingere, iurabo. Tum tertia, quarta secundis juramenta superiiciam catus. Omnia falsa, Et falsura omnes. Haec aequivocatio nomen Me tribuente, potest Reflexa aut * aequivocatio circularis. Orbica dici. Pseud. s Act. 4. Sc. 1. Vt ego ob tuam, Simia, perfidiam te amo, et metuo, & magnifacio. Dapsile ob inventum hoc, nequeo, mi Simia, quin te Osculer, argutumque caput demulceam. Abundè I am scio te nostris aurem adiecisse lubentem Consiliis; &, quae superaddis, facta daturum. Sim. Quî verò nosti num non, dum, Pseudole, tecum Haec loquor, aequivocè me iam tibi credere fingam, Aequivocè tibi pollicear me strenuè in hostes Vocibus aequivocis usurum? Pseud. O improba virtus! Sim. Dum t 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. pullum doceas oculos transfigere, corve Ipse tuis caveas. Pseud. u Act. 4. Sc. 3. Pseud. Peiorem ego hominem, magisque versutè malum, Metuo malè, Nunquam aedipol quenquam vidi quàm hic est Simia, ne malus iste, Nimisque ego illum hominem metuo, & formido male, Ne malus item ergame sit, ut ergaillum fuit; Et nimiùm praecox Patris anticipator, Ne in resecunda mihi obuertat cornua. ab hoste Protinùs in nostros obuertat cornua. Sim. Nam quid Impedit, in Caium qui sit periurus eundum In titium quoque— Pseud. Sed nostris sermonibus eccùm Nescioquis captator adest. Discede. Sim. Valeto. Quid ni igitur Pseudolus aequivocare docens, & Simia discens, Verborum laqueos ambo luant laqueo● THO. GOAD Magister Artium. An Societati humanae infestiores sinte vafr Amphibologi, Quaestio philosophico ptoposita in 〈…〉. quam aperte periuri. Affirm●. * Guido Faux. FAuxerebi patriae fax, faex mundi, * Garnet les. unum at habebis Patrem flagitii, slagitio parem. Herculeas ●mbo sceleri posuere columnas, N●l ultra, hic calamo pessimus, hic manu. Nomine qui varius, qui vestibus, ore, colore es Vectus trans mare tu? Non ( * Parenthesis includit mentalem Iesuitae rescruationem. mare mortuum) Curia Papalis tibi visa est? Non (sine scortis) Sacris Papa caput? Non (caput aneum) Num tu mendicans abraso crine Sacerdos? Non (ritu antipodum; Non (apud inferos) Nonne a te binis gravidata est Fuluia natis? Non, verum fateor (bimula cum fores.) Heus laqueo nodos claudas hos ocyus uno, Et nodo laqueos, in cruce carnifex. Ignare aequivocae fraudis constringito fauces, Garnetto univocè guttura frangito. Pendeat infoelix, membris truncetur, apertè Periuro aequivocus crimine dirior. Pectore diffisso videas, quae ment reseruat; Euulsi latebras cordis et explices. Ancipiti gladio Iesuitica texta secentur: Solvi nam nequeunt ancipites doli. DAN. FEATLY, Magister Artium. THE NEW art OF Lying, covered by Jesuites under the veil of equivocation. THe a Thes. 2. 7. Apostle describing the state of Antichrist, doth signify, that a mystery of iniquity should appear in the managing of it: and this doth imply, that in the kingdom of Antichrist iniquity should reign under a coue●t of holiness. And the same Apostle doth foretell, b 1. Tim. 4. 1, 2. that in the latter times (which are the times of Antichrists reign) men should speak lies in hypocrisy. And this, though it may be extended farther, yet cannot be more literally understood, then of such as teach a practice of lying, under a pretence of preserving truth. Now of these Prophecies of the Apostle I may speak in a like manner, and almost in the same words, as our c Luke 4●1. Lord spoke of the prophecy of Isai; This day are these Scriptures fulfilled in our eyes; for now we see those who exercise a mystery of iniquity, and speak lies, pretending thereby to maintain and preserve the truth: as (to omit all further instance) may evidently be seen in a newfound art of equivocation. For the Masters and maintainers thereof do tell us, d Lequendo cum Arte dissimulationis vitatur peccata, quae comwiter, committuntur, etc. Rodrique● sumâ, v. menda●. nu. 4. That by speaking according to this art of dissembling, sins are avoided, which, without it, are commonly committed. And that e acquivocatio, quam ●citam 〈◊〉 omnino ad mendacia 〈◊〉, vitanda consert. Heissias' Re●ut. Aphoris. cap. 4. Aphor. 4. nu. 130. Equivocation altogether serveth, or is of good use for avoiding of lies and perjuries. And f sive recreationis gratiâ, sive quocunque al●o fine, iuret se non fecisse aliquid quod revera fecit, intell●gendo intra se aliquid aliud etc. revera non mentitur. San●ho● oper. moral. to 1. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 15. pag. 25. that for what end or reason soever a man swear, that he did not do a thing, which indeed he did do, yet having his reservation within himself, he in very deed telleth no lie. And g Per 〈◊〉 doctrinam singularem, postumus evitare innumera peccata, 〈◊〉 passim aliquot neg●gentiores admittimus negando vel assumando passim sine aliqua subintellectione, cum qua coniuncta essent vera. Navar. Commen●●n C. Humanae aur. q. 3. nu. 13. that by this singular doctrine we may avoid innumerable sins, which through heedlessness diverse of us do every foot commit, by denying or affirming things usually, without a reservation understood, with which if they were joined, they would be true. And to this purpose it is, that Father h Proceeding against Traitors. 〈◊〉 l. 1. Garnet, a Master of this art, when a book was to be licenced by him, the title whereof was, A Treatise of equivocation, he scored out that title, and put this in the place of it, A Treatise against lying and fraudulent dissimulation. By all which it may appear, that these men, while they teach the art of equivocation, do profess notwithstanding, that all which they do, is with a religious observance and preservation of the truth. But now in the second place I offer to prove in this short Treatise, that whatsoever shows they make to the contrary, yet this device of equivocation is in truth, an art of falsehood and deceit, and such as the Scriptures do condemn under the name of lying. Which point if it be once cleared, then there can be no doubt, but that the Church of Rome, and her Doctors, are they which exercise a mystery of iniquity, and speak lies in hypocrisy. Now for the clearing hereof, and that the world may see more fully what to think of this mystery, there are five things, which I have thought necessary to be considered of. 1 The name, or what is meant by the word equivocation in this Question. 2 The original of it, or who be the Authors and upholders of it. 3 The object and matter, or in what cases they allow it to be lawful. 4 The use, or rather abuse of it, or for what turns it may serve the Patrons of it. 5 The Grounds, or what the proofs or reasons are either for or against it. CHAP. 1. Of the name, and what is meant by the word equivocation in this Question. THat we may the better understand what is meant by this word, we must note that there are two famous acceptions and uses of the word equivocation among men. The first is a proper and ancient use of it, frequent among all sorts of writers, but handled and spoken of, especially in logic. The second is an improper and abusive acception of it, which was of late years devised by some writers and Doctors of the Roman Church. Father Parsons calleth the form, verbal, and the later, mental equivocation. And of these he saith, a Mitigat. cap. 8 nu. 10. pa. 314. that the verbal is proper equivocation; the mental is so called, rather by a certain similitude, than propriety of speech, and that a Ibid. nu. 15. the verbal is only true and proper equivocation, for that mental in rigour is none. And again, that b Ibid. nu. 10. Equivocation hath of later years only been accustomed to be used in this sense, that is, for mental equivocation. And Heissius another Jesuite, & Patron of this Art, saith, c Refut. Apho●r. cap. 4. Ap●ons. 3. nu. 129. that their mixed speech (which they call mental equivocation) is not properly equivocation. By which speeches of these Jesuites (especially seeing the one of them is a man so well seen in this art, and so much exercised in this argument of equivocation) I presume I have sufficient warrant to say as I did, without the control of any of our puny Jesuites, that the one use and acception is proper and ancient, the other unproper, and of a later growth, that is, since the mystery of iniquity did open itself more fully to the world, and men did more apparently speak lies in hypocrisy. But yet for the distinguishing of these two kinds, I will rather call the first Logical equivocation, as being that which logic doth only acknowledge: and the later I will call jesuitical equivocation, as having, if not its first devising, yet at least, its polishing from men of that Order. The Question in this place is only concerning the later, which I call jesuitical equivocation. Notwithstanding for the better clearing of the point in controversy, somewhat is first to be said concerning the former, which I call logical. First then for the logical equivocation; it is an ambiguous or doubtful saying, when one word or speech hath mo● senses than one, and it hapeneth three ways. 1. When a word by itself hath diverse significations and meanings; as this word [to know] hath. For sometimes it signifieth to apprehend and understand the certainty of some truth: ●. Joh. 3. 20. as when S. John saith; GOD is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. 2. [To know] is as much as to approve and allow of: as when David saith; Psal. 1. 6. The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous. And when Christ saith to the foolish Virgins; Math. 25. 12. Verily I say unto you, I know you not. The meaning is; I do not acknowledge you for any of mine. In this, and such like words as this, there is an equivocation; because the word hath diverse acceptions and uses. 2. When words, which have but one signification of themselves, yet are so joined together in some sentence, as that they may, by reason of the composition, make and yield diverse meanings: or when by reason of their contexture, they may have more meanings than one: Acts 19 5. as when S. Luke saith; When they heard this, they were baptised in the Name of the Lord Jesus: these words are diversely construed by the Learned. For some think them to be the words of S. Paul, and to have reference to the speech of john Baptist, immediately going before: and then the meaning must be this; that when those brethren, there spoken of, heard John so teaching concerning Christ, they were baptised of john, in the Name of the Lord Jesus. But others think them to be the words of S. Luke, and to have reference to the former speech of S. Paul: and then the meaning must be; that when those brethren had heard Paul discoursing in this manner of John and his baptism, than They were baptised of Paul, in the Name of Christ. In this Clause then, there are two senses given by the Learned; and that showeth that there is an ambiguity; but that ambiguity riseth not from the diversity of significations in any of the words, but from the different consideration of the contexture or composition of the sentence. 3. When the circumstances of time, place, persons, etc. are such, as that in reason, and in the judgement of sober men, being well and duly considered, they may limit or restrain the speech to some special matter or subject; or otherwise alter the meaning of it from that which it should have, if it were in some other place, and upon some other occasion. As for example: when S. Paul saith; I have not shunned to declare unto you all the counsel of God. Acts 20. 27. These words considered by themselves, do comprise all the Secrets of God, and all the mysteries of His wisdom: but if we consider the circumstances of the persons, time, place, and occasion; as that the speaker was Paul, an Apostle, whose office and employment was to teach the mysteries of Religion; that the hearers were the Church of Ephesus, who expected information in matters of salvation; and that the occasion of their meeting at this time, and in this place, was only for teaching and learning the Word of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ: these circumstances, in reason, may teach us, that in this place, those words [all the counsel of God] are not to be extended to all the secrets and depth of God's wisdom; a great part whereof, is neither revealed, nor necessary to be known of any man; and some part whereof, though it be revealed, yet was not pertinent to this occasion; but rather, that those words are to be limited and restrained, according to the present occasion, to signify and note, all necessary things for them to know for their soul's health and salvation. Or, to give a more familiar example, and such as a Jesuite hath given instance in● we may suppose, that two men going together in a journey; the one of them (his money sailing him) desireth to borrow ten pound of his fellow; who maketh answer, that he hath not so much: here his meaning must be supposed to be, that he hath not so much in his purse, or so much in a readiness about him, though he had four times the like value in his Chest at home. But if the same thing should be desired of him, when he were at home in his own house, than the meaning would be, that he had not such a sum at home. And the same answer, which was true, being given to his fellow. Traveller by the way; would be a lie, if it were uttered to him in his house. Thus there may arise an ambiguity in a speech, by reason of the circumstances of person, place, time, and occasion; where otherwise there is no ambiguity either in the signification of any word, or in the composition of the sentence, considered in and by themselves. And in what kind soever, of these now specified, there happeneth an ambiguity; that I call a Logical equivocation; concerning which our present question is not. For as the Doctors of the Roman Church, so the learned of our side do acknowledge, that there may be a lawful use of equivocal speeches in every of these kinds, if they be not extended too fare, or misapplyed to a wrong cause. For, to speak more particularly, it is granted. 1. That we may lawfully use words, which may indifferently be taken in diverse acceptions and meanings, as they are then used. And this is plain, partly because the Scriptures are full of such speeches; and partly, because our common conversation and life cannot be without them. 2. It is not unlawful, when some case of further good doth require it, to use these ambiguous speeches in the less known and common signification, and in another meaning than it is likely the hearers will understand them for the present. For so, when our Lord said, Lazarus our friend sleepeth: joh. 11. 11. He meant that he was dead, which was the less common and known signification; and therefore the Disciples, according to the more usual meaning, understood him of natural sleep. And he did this for good purpose, and for the profit of the hearers; that they might hereby learn, either that death in general is to God's children but as a sleep, by which they are refreshed, and made the more lively: or that this death of Lazarus, was rather to be called asleep, than a death, because he was so speedily raised from it again. 3 It is not unlawful, if there be just cause for concealing of a truth, to use an ambiguous speech in any of these kinds, that thereby we may hide some thing from the hearers, which they should not know. This assertion hath not so direct proof from Scripture, as the others have; & yet it is not without all proof from the Scriptures neither. For there we find, that a man may lawfully utter one truth, thereby to hide another truth from the hearer. As for example, a 1. Sam. 16. 1, 2. God appointed Samuel to go to Bethleem and anoint one of Jesses' sons to be King; and when Samuel objected, How can I go? If Saul hear it, he will kill me. The Lord said, Take an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord. And so Samuel did, as it followeth in the same Chapter; and by this he concealed his purpose of anointing a new King; which was the special intent of his going to that place. And if it be lawful and warranted by Gods own appointment to utter one truth, for the concealing of another: then in reason I think it cannot justly be condemned for unlawful, if a man, upon just occasion, do use an ambiguous speech in a true sense, thereby to hide from the hearer, something which he should not know. For if in so doing any thing be faulty, it must be, as I take it, the one of the two; either because an ambiguous speech is used in another meaning than it is likely the hearer will take it; and that to be lawful, is proved in the former assertion: or because this true sense in the ambiguous speech, is uttered to conceal another thing from the hearer; and that to be lawful, is clear by this example of Samuel. And therefore I think the conclusion may hence be inferred, that it is not unlawful, if there be just cause for concealing of a truth, to use an ambiguous speech, that thereby we may conceal some other thing, which is not fit to be uttered. And hereto agree our learned divines also For one, speaking of equivocation, as it consists in the ambiguity of words uttered, addeth, a 〈…〉 maximè in liber● sermon, hoc quidem sensu uti licere nemo dubitat. Abbot Antilog. Adversus Eudaemono loan. cap. 2 fol. 18. That this kind of equivocation, especially in ordinary speech, no man doubteth but that it may lawfully be used. And, b Sit per illam ce●ndus consiligs, tegend isque arca●● swo locus. Ibidem. this equivocation may have his due place for concealing of Counfe●s, and hiding of secrets. And again, speaking to his adversary, c Tuscias taciturnitates illas, quas narra●, Confessionum & consi●●orum, ubi amphibologijs, & ambiguitatibus consistunt, noble non improbari: damn●ri prors●s à nohis, ut mendacio tegantur: know (saith he) that those concealments, whether of Confessions or Counsels, whereof you speak, where they do consist of ambiguities in the words, we dislike not: only if they be covered with a lie, that we do wholly condemn. And another learned writer in our Church, speaking of one, that magnified the use of equivocation, adjoineth, d Si appellatione acquivocationis, simplicem quandam & modest● reticent●am signisicet, aut dissimulationem consiliorium in hac miscra vita saepe necessariam; planè cum ipso sentio. Casaubon. epi. ad Fronton. Duc. pag. 110. If by the name of equivocation he understand a plain and sober concealing and covering of secret counsels, which in this miserable life is oft times necessary, I am of his opinion too. This is the opinion and judgement of our learned men, concerning the use of Logical equivocation; and herein we agree with them of the Church of Rome: or if there be any difference among the learned of both sides in these cases already mentioned, as perhaps about some circumstances in the use of those ambiguous speeches there may be, it is nothing to the present Question in hand, which is not concerning any of the kinds of these Logical equivocations, which consist in the ambiguous acception and meaning of the words uttered. And therefore when the Equivocaters of our time do labour to confirm their art, by the authorised use of such speeches, as are ambiguous by reason of the diverse meanings which the words may receive, they miss the mark, beat the air, and spend their labour to no purpose. And this being briefly noted, concerning the true and Logical equivocation, I come now to the improper and jesuitical. And that what it is, I will set down in their own words, who profess to be Patrons of it. Father Persons a Mitigat. cap. 9 nu. 53. pa. 382 then, a man very laborious in the polishing of this art, defineth it thus; Equivocation or amphibology in this our controversy, is nothing else, but when a speech is partly uttered in words, and partly reserved in mind, by which reservation the sense of the proposition may be diverse. And again, b Mitigat. Ca 12. nu. 3 p. 484. mental equivocation (saith he) is, when any speech hath or may have a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of the words themselves, but only by some reservation of mind in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from the sense which the words that are uttered, do bear or yield without that reservation. And Sanchez giving a Rule concerning the words used in this their equivocation, saith, c Posium absque mendico 〈◊〉 verba usurpari, etiams● exs●● significatione non suit ambigua, nec eum seasum verum admittant exse, nec ex circumstantijs occurrentibus, sed tantum verum serisum reddant ex aliqo addito ment proferentis retento, q●●●elique illud sit. Sanch. oper. moral. l. 3 c. 6. nu. 15. A man may without telling of a lie, use those words, although they be not ambiguous by their signification, and do not make a true sense, either by themselves, or by reason of the circumstano●s then occurring, but do only make a true sense by some addition, kept in the speakers mind, whatsoever that addition be. Thus they. By which descriptions it appeareth, that jesuitical equivocation, is a mixed proposition, (as Persons also diverse times calleth it) part whereof is uttered in words, and so taken it hath one sense; and another part of it is reserved and understood in the speakers mind, which being added to the words spoken, maketh another sense; as for example, A seminary, or a jesuite-priest being asked by a Magistrate, Are you a Priest? He answereth, I am no Priest, understanding and reserving in his mind this clause, So as I am bound to tell you, or any other which himself pleaseth to like purpose: here (say they) is but one mixed proposit●● part whereof is uttered in words, namely, I am no Priest; and that taken alone as it is uttered, breedeth a false s●tise, and in this sense they would have the Magistrate to conceive it: & another part of that proposition is reserved and kept secret and close in the priest's mind, & that is this, So as I am bound to tell you. And this secret & mental reservation, being added to the words, maketh this one entire Proposition; I am no Priest, so as I am bound to tell you: and that being taken all together, maketh a true sense, and so the Priest understandeth it. And therefore, if he do but keep, or reserve, or understand that or any such clause in his mind, though the words which he speaketh bee never so false, yet this man telleth no lie, nor speaketh no untruth. Such is the virtue of this new found art; and thus they describe it. But that it may yet appear more fully and more distinctly, it will not be amiss to set down the mystery of this Art in certain distinct Propositions, all gathered from their own writings, and approved dealings. l. That this mixed Proposition of theirs, or this equivocation, as they call it, whether we consider that part of it which is uttered in words; or the whole Proposition, as it hath the reservation added to it, which is kept in the speakers mind; hath in neither respect or consideration, a Mitigat. cap. 8. nu. 10. pag. 313. as F. P. saith, any doubtful sense of speech or words, by their doubtful or double signification; but only that it uttereth not all the whole sense of the speaker; & therefore cannot be properly called equivocal, according to Aristotle's meaning & Definition. And again, These mixed Propositions ( b Mitig. cap. 11. nu. 14. pag. 447. saith he) be not properly equivocal in the sense that Aristotle did define, etc. for that they do not of themselves nor their own natures, signify equally diverse things; but being understood wholly, have a simple and single signification in the mind and understanding of the speaker: yet, for that the hearer concerning but 〈…〉 thereof, apprehendeth a different sense from the speaker; they may ab effectu, be called ambiguous; for that they leave a different sense in the hearer & speaker, albeit of themselves they be plain, cle●re, and true, etc. Out of which words, considered & joined with that which was formerly cited out of Sanchez and Parsons, we may note three things. 1. That there is no ambiguity or doubtful sense, either in the words uttered, if they be taken alone; nor in the whole Proposition, as they compound it of the words uttered, & ●he reservation understood, taken together. 2. That therefore they call it equivocation, or an Equivocal Proposition or speech; because they signify or express one meaning to the hearer, which is false; and retain or understand another sense within themselves, which is true. 3. That the taking of this word equivocation in this meaning, is not proper, and such as Aristotle did understand and conceive by it. He might have said, that it is not proper, nor such as either Aristotle, or any man either learned or unlearned, having but common sense in his head, and common honesty in his heart, did ever acknowledge before this last Age. And the truth is, they therefore call it an equivocation, though the word was never known to have any such meaning or signification▪ because they are ashamed to call it by its right name, which is, A Lye. But as the covetous man, though he practiseth the thing, yet abhors the name; and therefore will be called a good husband, or a thrifty man: And as a thief is ashamed of his right name, and when he meeteth with a traveller to whom he would signify his e●rand; he saith, that he is a goodfellow which wanteth money: So the Romanists teach an art of lying; and because they are ashamed of the infamous name of liars, they call themselves equivocators: and that which other men call Lying, they call equivocating. 2. That if a man will use this benefit of equivocating, he must be wary and careful, that he reserve some secret clause in his mind, which being added to the words uttered, do make a true speech; or else all is marred, and he, for want of that clause, become a plain liar. To this purpose, Father Persons a Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 22. pag. 424 saith, that the equivocator speaketh a truth in his own meaning, and in the sight of God; which always he must do, when he useth this evasion; for that otherwise he should lie, and commit sin, if he had not some true sense reserved in his mind, etc. To declare this yet further: Say that two Priests were questioned by a Magistrate, whether they were Priests or no; and the one should say, I am no Priest: and should withal reserve in his mind this clause, So as I am bound to tell you: and the other should answer in the very same words, I am no Priest: but should forget or neglect to frame or imagine in his mind that reservation, or some such like: the former, who imagined that reservation in his mind, should be an equivocator, Risum teneatis, amici? and speak the truth; but the latter, who had omitted it, should be a liar, and utter a falsehood and untruth, though he speak none but the very same words; and they have none but one signification and meaning. This they say, to show us, how an equivocator doth differ very much from a liar. The truth is; this equivocator and this liar do differ as much as two false knaves, the one of which is called a thief, and the other, a goodfellow that taketh a Purse. 3. That whatsoever a man do say or swear, be it otherwise never so false and absurd; yet if a man do imagine a clause in his mind, which being added to the words spoken, would make a true meaning; then the former speech or saying, how false soever otherwise becometh true, and without all compass of lying: because (saith Father a Mitigat. cap. 10. nu. 14. pag. 418. Persons) it is freed from the nature of a lie, by the due & just reservation in the speakers mind. By the due and just reservation, saith he. But suppose the reservation be not just and due, but that a man use this art, when he ought not to equivocate? Why, yet even then, he is by this reservation freed from telling of a lie, though not freed from all sin. For though is should not be properly the sin of Lying, nor against the negative Precept of Truth: yet should it be another sin, against the public good of civil society, and consequently against the affirmative Precept of Truth, etc. Thus speaketh Father a Mitigat. cap. 10. num. 23. pag. 424 Persons. And to the like purpose Valentia b Tom. 3. disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. pag. 1136. . But Sanchez more plainly and roundly: If a man ( c 〈…〉 sine propria sponte; sine recreationes gratiâ sitie quocum● alio sine iurets● non secisse aliqurd quod revera fecit, intelligendo ●●tra se aliquid al●●d, quod nonfecit, velal am diem ab eain qua fecit, vel quodius aliud add●●um verum, revera non mentitur, etc. Sanchez op. moral. l. 3. cap. 6. num. 15. p. 25. saith he) either alone or before company, either being asked or of his own accord, either for recreation sake, or for any other end, do swear that he did not do something, which indeed he did do; understanding within himself some other thing then that he did doc; or some other day then that in which he did do it, or any other addition that is true; this man, in very deed, doth neither lie nor forswear. Thus they speak, and so must all they that will maintain this Arte. For whereas Father Persons, speaking of the Wife of Ananias, saith; d Mitigat. cap. 11. nu. 29. pag. 459. that she being lawfully demanded by S. Peter in a lawful cause, touching her own vow and promise, no clause of reservation could save her speech from lying: he doth herein not only contradict himself, as liars usually do, but doth also thereby overthrew the very grounds of this fond Arte. For if a reservation in the mind do free the equivocator from lying; because that being added to his words, both together do make a true Proposition; why should not a reservation in this woman's mind, save her speech from lying, if it were such, as being added to her words, both together might yield a true meaning; which, according to the rules of this art, it had been easy for this woman to frame▪ 4 That in any case, in which equivocation may be used, a man may frame any reservation, whatsoever himself pleaseth, so it be such, as being added to the words, doth make the whole compound to be true. e Mitig c. 10. nu. 22. p. 424. Persons sometimes seemeth to require, that the reservation be conformable to the matter, time, and place; & not feigned at random, as some fond do imagine. But he doth but mock his Reader; making show of following the former schooledoctors, whose words these are; when he hath no such meaning as they had in them. For, when he speaketh plainly, and so as you may understand his distinct meaning. them his a Mitig. cap. 8. nu. 55. p. 344. words are; I do truly and really mean, that I am no Priest, in the sense that I speak it, which may be any that pleaseth me, or that I list to frame to myself: so as I may mean, that I am no Priest, such as I should be, such as I desire to be, such as is worthy of so great an office, and sacred a function; such as he ought to be, that occupieth the place of God in governing of souls; I am no Priest subject to the demander, or obliged to answer his demands; or the like. Thus, and such like, whatsoever he pleaseth, he professeth may be his reservations, when he denyeth himself to be a Priest: and what conformity these have, at least the most of them, with the Circumstances, I leave to be declared by the Patrons and Masters of this Arte. Sure I am, if such large scope may be granted, and yet the reservation be conformable to the matter, etc. and not feigned at random, than it will be an easy matter to keep within compass, and to observe the wise rule of this grave Father. But, let Persons go with his doubling, and let us hear what others say. Sanchez alloweth any words, if they yield a true sense, b 〈…〉 dito, ment proferentis retento quodcunque illud sit. Sanch. op. moral. l. 3 c. 6. nu. 15. pa. 25. By any addition, reserved in the mind● of the speaker, whatsoever that addition be. And jacob 〈◊〉 Graffijs, proposing a Case of one, who being taken by thiefs, doth for fear promise them somewhat with an oath; c Siiste aliud ment cogitaverit, verbi gratia, promitto dare aut sacere, si à Iudiac ●oactus fuero, vel si coelum ruat, aut quid simile, tune à peccato erit immunis. Decis. Aur. par. 1. l. 2. ca 17. nu. 12. If (saith he) he do imagine some other thing in his mind, for example, I promise to give this, or do that, if the Judgo shall compelme to it, or if the sky shall fall, or the like, than he shall be clear from sin. And Sanchez, d Oper. mor. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 26. pag. 28. that a man may lawfully answer, that he killed not Peter, meaning another man of the same name, or that he killed him not, antequam nasceretur, before he was borne. And Strange the Jesuite, to show what strange and unlimited liberty they do take in the framing of this fancy, affirm that he was in the company, reserving and intending secretly as added, this word, Not; when he was questioned before the Lord chief justice of England, Proceeding against Traitors. litt. l. 1. and the King's attorney. These reservations, and others not much better, do they allow and practise in the art of equivocating, whereof there is frequent mention in their books and Treatises of this argument. By all which it appeareth, that they approve of any reseruatirn, which a man can fancy, if the case be such as they allow of, and the clause such, as may signify a truth. 5. That this equivocation of theirs, is lawful, not only in ordinary speech, but in oaths also. This is plainly avouched by Father Persons, and upon this reason, a Mitigat. Ca 11. nu. 17. pag. 449. Because it is a most certain principle, as well in reason, as in divinity, that what a man may truly say, he may truly also swear. And again, b Mitig. c. 11. nu. 43. pa. 468. As all divines held (saith he) that which may lawfully be said, may also lawfully be sworn. And to this do agree others of this crew, who commonly handle this question of equivocation in their Treatises of oaths, and allow it as a thing very lawful, and of good use. 6. That this art was devised, and so by them is used, that by it they may deceive the understanding of the hearer, and make him believe an untruth, when it may serve for their turn. To this purpose those words of Father Persons sound, c Mitig. c. 7. nu. 14. pag. 284 Equivocation must sometime be practised, when no other evasion can be found for defence of innocence, justice, secrecy, and other like urgent occasions. And speaking of some cases of inconvenience, which he would have to be avoided by equivocation, he demandeth, d Cap. 7. nu. 22. pa. 289. Hath God and Nature, and Law of justice left no lawful evasion in such cases? And again, e Cap. 7. nu. 2. pag. 274. We delight not (saith he) in this art or manner of evasion by equivocation. By this it appeareth, that equivocation (to use the Jesuites own words) is an Art of evasion, which cannot be understood without a meaning and purpose to deceive the hearers understanding, and to make him believe an untruth. The same Doctor of this art goeth on, and teacheth us, that this their equivocation is, a Mitig c. 12. nu 3. pag. 484. when any speech hath, or may have a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of the words themselves; but only by some reservation of mind in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from that sense which the words that are uttered, de bear, or yield without that reservation. And by this is employed, that the purpose of this is, to imprint one sense in the speaker, which they acknowledge to be false, and to keep within themselves another, which they imagine to be true. Becanus also, another Jesuite, having first proposed the question, An liceat uti aequivocatione: Whether it may be lawful to use equivocation: he explaineth the point thus; b Sensus est, an licea● alios fallere, decipere aut cludere per aequivocationes. Manual Controu. l. 5. c. 21. pag. 530. Whether it be lawful to deceive and beguile others by equivocations. In the prosecution of which question, though he wrangle, & would gladly shift off from themselves the imputation of this equivocating fraud; yea, and flatly denieth it: yet by explaining the question in such sort, he acknowledgeth, that their meaning who defend it, is to beguile and deceive men. And in like sort Tolet saith. c Aliquando licet uti aquivocatione, & fallere audientem. Tolet. Instruct. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 9 It is sometimes lawful to use equivocation, and to deceive the hearer. And therefore when Father Persons d Mitig. cap. 8 nu. 58. pag. 346 & 347. See also, Sober Reckon. c. 4. nu. 89. pag. 285 saith, that his intention is not to deceive in this mental proposition, but to defend himself, etc. and that the Priest (who denieth himself to be a Priest) that his principal intent is not intentio fallendi, an intention of deceiving; but rather, evadendi desiderium, a desire to escape and defend himself: he doth either too boldly presume upon his Readers simplicity, or too grossly bewray his own. For first, when he saith, that his principal intent is not to deceive, but rather to escape, he implieth, that an intention he hath to deceive, though that be not his principal intention; and that is enough to prove (which he denieth) that his equivocation doth herein agree with the nature of a lie, that as a lie is said to be, cum intentione fallendi, so his equivocation cannot be denied to have the same purpose and intention in it. And secondly, where he saith plainly that his intention is not to deceive, but to defend, he speaketh as wisely, and to as good purpose, as if a thief by the high way side should say, that he intended not to take away the true man's purse, but to supply himself with money for his own spending. For as the thief intendeth to rob, that thereby he may supply himself; so the Jesuite intendeth to deceive, that thereby he may defend himself. 7 That to forbear the use of this equivocation (unless where by duty a man is bound to use it) is better and more Meritorious then to use it. To this purpose speaketh the great Master of this art; Mitig. c. 7. nu. 2 pag. 274. we delight not (saith he) in this art or manner of evasion by equivocation, though it be no lie at all; but rather do allow and like far better of simple, plain, and resolute speech in all Catholics, concerning aswel matters of ordinary conversation, as of their conscience, etc. And presently he addeth; Yet for that perfection is one thing, and obligation is another, we may not bind men to more than God's precept bindeth. By which speech he plainly teacheth, that though it be not unlawful to use equivocation, because it is not forbidden by any precept; yet it is a work of perfection, (such as they use to call a work of supererogation) not to use a man's lawful liberty in this case. And yet f●rther, It is evident, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, Cap. 7. nu. 5. pag. 276. and prepared to suffer injuries, may live without going to Law, without swearing, without divorcing their wives, without equivocation, etc. yet for all that, men are not bound to this exactness, etc. And yet again, My wish is (saith he) that Catholic people, Cap. 13. nu. 3. pag. 548. but especially Priests, whose example must instruct the rest, should yield also of their right, for increase of their merit and crown in heaven, and use all plainness and sincerity in speech, and free discovering, not only of their religion, but also of their state, where it is hurtful to none but themselves. See Persons also in his Sober Reck. ca 7. nu. 22, & 23. pag. 484, 485. And in a word, plainness and sincerity of speech, he compareth with virginity, (which in their esteem, is a glorious work of perfection or supererogation:) and the practice of equivocating to wedlock, which is lawful, but not of such merit. Now hence I infer two Conclusions. 1 That the practice of Protestants in using plainness and sincerity in speech, according to their doctrine, is by the confession of the Jesuite, better and more holy, than the practice of Papists in using evasions and equivocations, according to the doctrine of the equivocators. 2 That according to the doctrine of Popish equivocators, Jesus our saviour was not so perfect, nor used not so much exactness in his speech, nor merited not so much, as the Jesuites do, many of them at least. For Father Persons saith, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, may live without equivocating, yet etc. he meaneth that though it may be seen in such men, yet others are not bound to that exactness: and he implieth, that men desirous of perfection, do use to do so. And such, I trow, the holy Order of jesuites is, who for desire of this perfection, have by solemn vow abandoned the world, and all the glory, and profit belonging to it. Besides, Father Persons grave advice is, that not only Priests, but other Catholics too, should yield of their right, by forbearing to equivocate, for the increase of their merit and crown in heaven: and, I trow, the followers of Jesus will not be slack to perform, what one of their own Fathers doth advice to be so behooveful, not only for seculars of the clergy, but for lay● Catholics also. But now Jesus our Lord, see how fare off the Jesuite maketh him to be from this degree of perfection. For he was so frequent in equivocating, that Father Persons a Sober Reck. Append. nu. 16 pag. 682. findeth him to have used the same in one only Chapter of S. john's Gospel, above seven or eight times at the least. Nay, and that b Sober Reck. in append. nu. 24. pag. 687. more than one equivocation was used by our saviour in one sentence: and that eight or nine equivocal speeches at the least, are contained within a piece of one only Chapter of our saviour's talk with the Jews, Scribes and Pharisees. And indeed he hath recited and alleged nine several examples out of our saviour's words, recorded in the latter part of the eighth Chapter of S. John. And sure, he that did equivocate so often in so little compass, cannot be imagined to have forborn his right in this practice, for the increase of his merit and crown in heaven. Or if they will say, that notwithstanding this frequent use of equivocation in so short space, that yet he did forbear his right still, and so increased his merit thereby; then they will give us occasion to think, that Jesuites and Priests, and other Roman Catholics may attain this height of perfection, unto which Father Persons adviseth them, and cousin and deceive us silly fellows with their equivocations seven, or eight, or nine times in one hour. I leave it then to be considered by the wise Reader, whether Father Persons do cog with us all this while, and make no small use of this deceitful art, while he laboureth to defend it: or, whether in good earnest he thinketh that our Lord and saviour did not follow so exact a rule of perfection, as he adviseth all his Catholics unto. These be the most special properties belonging to jesuitical equivocation, as near as I could gather and observe them out of their books, which be the abettors of this art, among whom the principal, Father Persons, must needs be acknowledged to be. For he hath laboured herein more than they all. Out of all which observations laid together, I leave it to the consideration of any understanding man, to judge, whether these two things do not follow. 1 That the Roman Doctors have such rare wits, as that they can by their devised sleights, transform the nature both of words and things, even as well as alchemists can turn lead into gold. For as in matter of State, they a Clerici Rebellio in Regem non est 〈…〉 S●. Aphor. v. [Clericus] printed at Antwerp, 1599 and allowed and commended by Silu. Pardo, the Inquisitor. have found out a mystery; that a clergyman of their Church may move Rebellion against his Prince, and yet be no traitor: so in Conferences with men, they have found a like mystery; that any man of the Roman Church, may speak, and say, and swear whatsoever himself pleaseth, though it be never so false, and yet be no liar. The one they fetch from their doctrine of Exemption; and the other from their doctrine of equivocation: both dangerous practices to all humane society. The one whereof should teach Kings to be ware of their Swords, and the other should teach all men to beware of their words. 2 That by their doctrine, a man is at liberty to lie, without any grudge in his conscience; and that the Abettors of this art, by a secret juggling device, do s●t open a school for deceit and perjury; Cuius●cne ficio, qui ad normam men●iatur aut peicret, bawd ille periurio aut mend●cioreus c●nsendus sit. in which they teach an art of Lying; by the help whereof, he that can lie & forswear by the Rule, shall be free either from lying or perjury: as b Abbot. Ant●log. adu. Eudeaemon-Ioann. c. a. in prine. fol. 11. fac. 1. a reverend and learned divine hath noted. But hereof there will be fit occasion given to say more hereafter. In the mean while, thus much shall serve to be said of the first Point. CHAP. II. Of the original of equivocation; and who they be that uphold it, and give life unto it. COncerning the original of this art, a Hospinian. Histor. Jesuit. l. 4. c. 2. p. 228. some learned men refer 〈◊〉 to the Priscillianists, or Arius the archheretic, who are read to have used fraudulent and deceitful speech. And such heretics had not been unmeet Fathers for such a deformed child. But this Brat was not then borne, nor for many Ages after those days. For mine own part, unless I shall hereafter meet with some thing more clear than yet I have seen, I must say with a judicious and learned Writer, b Quos Autores habuerit, non 〈…〉 Casaub. epist. ad ●●ont. Du●●um. pag. 108. I cannot readily say who were the first founders of this Arte. Nor is it marvel, that a thing of this nature, though found out but yesterday, should appear to the world without the name or notice of his Author. For, as the head or spring of Nilus hath been long enquired after, and for aught I know, is yet scarce heard of; and the reason may be, because it is supposed that that river doth rise somewhere in montibus L●nae, in some place of those great mountains, whose greatness doth hide the place of the wellhead or Spring: So devices of State, which never prosper after they are discovered, are commonly smothered for a time, and do usually appear without name; themselves being unwilling to own them, and others being unable to d●scrie them. And such is this art of equivocation, hatched by some rare wit, who yet had rather lose the glory of the invention, then to lay open the mystery of it: and smothered by the Roman State as long as was possible, till misfortune brought it to light against their wills And yet now, that the river appears with a full stream, notwithstanding, the Spring will hardly be found. And if any Rom●nist shall hence infer, that this Doctrine is therefore an Apostolical I●radition, and came from Christ himself; because I cannot tell who was the first Author, and at what time since it was first hatched; as they use to dispute in other cases against us: I will send him to find me the head of Nilus, and when he hath found that, I will go about to inquire for the original of this Arte. And yet in the mean while, though I cannot precisely say who was the first Father of this black art, yet some things may be said, not impertinent to this purpose. And those (as I conceive them for the present) I will, lay down in certain Propositions or Assertions. And they be these. 1 It is certain that it is a late device, and found out the other day. Persons claimeth Universality, Antiquity▪ and Consent, for the proof of this art, a Mitigat. c. 7. nu. 12. & 13. p. 281. & 282. His words are, that every man may hear him speak in his own dialect; Let us consider (saith he) how this absurd and impious opinion (if such it be) could come to be received so generally, both in approbation & practice, doctrine & action, throughout the Christian world, that is to say; The Doctrine in all schools, Pulpits, chairs, universities, where teaching hath been used, extant also in the books and works of all learned men of what sort soever, before Jesuites were borne or heard of: but especially those have most treated thereof, who have written most tenderly of matters belonging unto conscience, whom we call Casuists. Lawyers in like manner, both Canon and civil; divines, both scholastical and positive, have approved the same. And as for practice, it hath in due cases been received in all Courts, in all Countries, in all Tribunals, and S●ates of judgement, both ecclesiastical and temporal; and never refused, condemned, or controlled by any, so it were used with the due circumstances, etc. And alittle after; Was there no man to stand for truth and reason in any country, in any province or State? in any place or time for this 400. years, & c? Where it must be noted, that when he mentioneth 400 years, his meaning is not to limit the approbation of this art to the compass of those years; but because he supposeth, but falsely, that his adversary had granted so much; and so here he disputeth ex Concessis upon the Confession of his adversary: but he intendeth and meaneth the consent of former times also; as himself signifieth in the same Chap. a Nu. 16. p. 285. whereof he there promiseth to speak afterward; & so he doth. b cap 9 nu. 17, etc. and repeateth it against in his Sober Reckon. cap. 7. nu. 26, etc. For he bringeth the testimonies & practice of the patriarches, Prophets, and Apostles, and Jesus Christ himself, and that frequently declared. Where it may be noted, that this Father is as bold to allege Universality, Antiquity, and Consent for the proof of this art, as the rest are for the proof of their Church. And sure the proof is as good and sound in the one, as the other. Only, Father Persons affirmeth more boldly, and confirmeth what he saith, more weakly. But the reason is alike good in both cases. But here I have only to deal with Persons, about his equivocation. And against these great cries, Da mihi unum exemni homivii antiquitate, Ethnica, luda●●a, Christiana; dauci unum, cut Reseruatien●s istae tuae probate su●t, misi siq●i fort in infamni●● not al●, etc. I oppose the confident and just challenge of a reverend man; Name me one man (saith he) out of all antiquity, Heathenish, Jewish, Christian: name but one man, who ever approved these your reservations, unless perhaps some who were noted with infamy for their pains. I may add; Nay, name me one, who defended this equivocation, which Jesuites call a mixed or mental Proposition, or by a secret reservation, in all the time from Adam to the Trent council. I will not say none such can be named; Abbot Anti. cap. 2. fol. 25. for who can say or presume, that he knoweth the sayings and opinions of all former Ages? but this I will say, that whereas the Abettors of equivocation have been challenged by two learned Doctors in our Church, to show any who in former times have allowed this devilish art; hitherto I have seen no one man produced, who doth give any plain or direct allowance hereof. For as for the many autorities, which Persons doth allege, they be Conclusions of his own, spun out of other men's sayings, by such consequences as himself fancieth or pleaseth to frame. For where holy or learned men have used speeches, that may admit diverse interpretations, either by reason of the words used, or some circumstance occurring, according to which only former Ages were wont to expound them; he presently runneth away with an outcry of mental reservation, or mixed Proposition: as every man that considereth the Allegations, may easily perceive. In a word, Persons claimeth very boldly, and to speak truth, impudently, Universality, Antiquity, and Consent, for this novel, new-devised, and upstart fancy of their own. Where I wish the Reader to consider, how fare he may credit such men, when they lay the like claim to all Antiquity and Consent of Nations, either for the proving of their Church, or for maintaining of any other subordinate point of controversy. For mine own part, till they show me one who approved a mental equivocation or reservation, I will think and say there is none. And this is my first assertion; whereof see further proof in the next assertion. 2 My second is, that the latter sort of schoolmen and Casuists gave occasion, and laid grounds for this ensuing art; which at that time themselves, it seemeth, did not so much as think or dream of. For, whereas some Cases were then debated, how fare a Priest might deny the things which he had heard in Confession; and in what sort any man that was questioned by an unlawful judge, or proceeded against in an unlalwfull manner, etc. might deny the things which he knew to be true: they, considering the circumstances of the persons, place, and business, did allow some hard equivocations, which the words would hardly bear in any true sense, yet such as they thought might be allowed and gathered out of those circumstances, and might well be understood in those words, as there and then they were uttered. As for example; If a Priest were questioned, whether he knew or had heard any thing of such or such a matter; he might say, No: if he did not know or hear it any other way, but only by Confession. And the reason of this answer is, because, a Voces co modo significant, quo 〈◊〉 à populo: populus autem Christianus, ●um audit Sacerdotem iurantem se nii●l scire, nihil intelligit de 〈◊〉 quae noiut in confession: Qua●e verba illa solum significant nihils● sciire extra confessionem. Words (saith Dominicus a Soto) do so signify, as they are understood or taken by the people. Now Christian people, when they hear a Priest swear, that he knoweth nothing of such or such a matter, they understand him not to speak or mean any thing that he heard in Confession. And therefore those words (of the Priest) do only signify or import, that▪ he knoweth nothing out of Confession. And the like defence of this answer is given by Sepulueda, de Rat. dicendi test. cap. 3. Again, it is a further Case, If the Priest be asked concerning the same thing, whether he know or have heard it in Confession; whether may he then say, No, I heard it not? And the common opinion of the Doctors was, Soto Relect. de Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 2. § Hi●reto. that in this case, h● may swear he did not hear it. b Relect. de secreto memb. 3. q 3. Cond. 4. § Hactenus opinionem. pa. 312. But Soto, upon better advice, disliketh this answer, because in this Sentence, Nihil audivi in confession; I heard nothing of it in Confession; the Restriction allowed in the former case, cannot fitly be understood, to say, I heard nothing in Confession, to wit, out of Confession. And therefore he concludeth, that that answer in this case cannot be excused from being a lie; because the words cannot have that construction. Another case is proposed; Suppose a tyrant should ask of a Priest, whether Peter (for example) did kill John (which the Priest knew in Confession only) may the Priest say and swear, that Peter did not kill John? Adrian, who afterward was Pope, and was called Adrian the sixth, he resolved the question, that he might answer negatively, that ●e killed him not: but Soto again replieth, that this which Adrian said, had no show of reason; because the words admit no interpretation, that may excuse them from a Lye. For, saith he; a Ineptisima interpretatio 〈◊〉, non occidit, ut dicam. It were a most fond interpretation to say, He killed him not that I may tell you, or (as our equivocators use now a days to speak) He killed him not, so as I may tell you. And he giveth a further reason hereof, b Quia facta non habent or dinem immediatum ad hoc quod est, dicere; sicut scire & alia verba sensationum. Soto ibid. pag. 314. because deeds have no immediate relation to this word, [that I may tell it] 〈◊〉 the wo●d [I know] and other such words of sense have. And in his book de justit. & jure, disputing the like question, whether a man being questioned concerning his own Act, may by Ambiguity elude the question; he resolveth, It c Quod liceat ei diceu se non fecisse, nullatenus est sustentabile. Soto de Ius●it. & jure, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. prope finem. can no way be defended, that he may lawfully say, that he did not do it: and hereof he giveth this reason; d Quoniam, Non feci, nullo modo amplecti potest sensum, Non seci, ut dica. [facere] enim non habet 〈…〉 cum eo, quod est, ut dicam, quaem habet [scire.] Because this speech [I did not do it] cannot receive this sense; I did not do it, to tell it, or that I may tell it, etc. His meaning in more plain words, is this; that the Priest might truly say in the case proposed, I know not that Peter did kill John; because he might reasonably understand it thus, or with this restriction, I know it not out of Confession. And of such a knowledge the judge is supposed to ask, and men do usually understand the Priest to speak. But the Priest might not say without telling a lie. Peter did not kill John; because, this restriction cannot without absurdity, be applied to those words,. And consequently, these words could not be so understood by the hearers. A fourth case may be added, and with that I will end. Suppose a guilty person be against order of Law examined by a judge, whether he have committed such a crime, which indeed he hath done, but is not in this case bound to answer him: suppose (I say) he be enforced to answer, may he truly say, I did not do it? And Adrian's resolution of the doubt, was; that in such a case, a Potest secundi● omnes Doctores respondere quòd nihil de sacto ille 〈◊〉, velcertè, quod non 〈◊〉. Adrian. in 4. de Sacr. Cons. ●esp. ad 2. prin. pag. 143. col. 4. he may truly answer, according to the opinion of all schooledoctors, that, he knoweth nothing of that fa●t, or at least, that he did not 〈◊〉 it. And his reason is, because in this answer, he is supposed to speak b Descientia, en quatil●● eat revolare. of such a knowledge of the fact, as he may lawfully discover. But Soto replieth again, c Nescio qui s●nt ill● omnes De●tores: fateor me nullum legisse. De Secreto, mem. 3● q. 3. Concl. 4. p. 316 v. etiam de lustit et jute, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. I know not who all those Doctors are, that Adrian speaketh of: I confess, I have read none of that opinion. And he addeth; d Se●sus ille violent●ssimu● est etc. That meaning, in which Adrian interpreteth these words, is a most forced and violent sense. Thus Soto declareth his own opinion, and the opinion of other schooledoctors and Casuists of that time, in these and other cases of like nature. And the like doth Io. Genesius Sepulueda, another learned man of the same nation, and about the same time. For having heard some defend some such like equivocations and ambiguities, he undertaketh to prove, and that by the testimony of ancient divines, that in witness-bearing (for thereof he doth in particular intreat) a witness may not, arte vorborum, by cunning words, deceive the judge; but that he is bound to speak plainly, and according to the meaning of the judge, who asketh the question. And of the contrary opinion, he saith, e Nemo veterum & nobilium Theologorum, quod equidem sciam, affirmavit. Sepulu. de rat. dicend. testi●. cap. 17. None ancient and renowned divine that I know, did affirm it to be lawful. And in the Preface to that book, he saith, that while he was in Rome, he met with one, who maintained this opinion, which he calleth f Quorundam iuniorum Theologorum decretis consentan●am. agreeable to the Determinations of some young or late divines: and when he came back again into Spain, that praeter spem, contrary to his expectation, he found some of their learnedest divines, maintaining, and instilling into their Students hearts and ears, g ●llam veterum 〈◊〉 summorum Theologorum consensu damnatam opinionem. that opinion which was condemned by the ancient and chief divines. And, Chap. 15. he showeth who they be, whom he calleth ancient divines; and that is in his own words, h Nastrâ & patrii memori● superiores, qual● est Aqui. Thomas. those which lived before our and our father's days, such for example sake, as Thomas Aquinas is. Out of which testimonies and sayings of these two learned men (the one of which was Confessor to Charles the fifth, and the other his Historiographer; and the one flourished about the year 1560. as Possovin saith, and the other died in the year 1572. saith the same Possevin, out of these their sayings) I gather and observe these things. 1 That in the days of these two learned men, which was about some 60 years ago, there was little or no speech of any equivocation by mental reservation, or of any such mixed propositions, as the Romanists now fancy. This I gather, first, because Soto, in oppugning these ambiguous answers and speeches allowed by some schooledoctors of that time, doth no where (to my knowledge) charge them with any such opinion, or ever labour to refute it. Which (considering the argument that he had in hand, and the diligence that he used in handling of it, and clearing of all doubts that belonged unto it) no man may with reason imagine that he would have for borne to do, if those times had given occasion of disputing such a question. Secondly, the same learned man, in oppugning that liberty, which others did grant, doth still overthrow or confute their opinion, because the interpretation and the meaning which they do allow those answers to be taken in by the speaker, are such as do not agree to the use and signification of the words spoken, nor cannot be applied to them, without incongruity and absurdity. By which reason of his, he implieth, that these divines meant no other ambiguity, or interpretation, or meaning, in those answers, than such as they thought, the words in that case in which they were uttered might bear. Or else his reason had been insufficient and foolish; which yet he supposeth to be such, as that his adversaries could not dislike as impertinent, if the thing which he urged were true. Thirdly, the same Author doth still so set down his opinion, that in the cases proposed, and others of the like nature; he alloweth any ambiguity or amphibology, Quam vsita●us sermo citra mend●cium ferre possit. Soto de lustit, & lure l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. which the use of the speech can bear without a lie, as in express words he explaineth himself, but refuseth and condemneth all such, as is not noted and implied in the words. Fourthly, Sepulueda, he also disputeth against those, who think themselves not bound in the cases propounded to answer according to the common meaning, and acception of the words: and confuteth them, who hold it lawful simply to deny the crime truly laid to their charge, although they purposely speak some other thing in their mind, Which the judge, taking their words in the common meaning, understandeth not: Cap. 17. & throughout the whole book. But yet I have not observed in all that book any speech, in which he mentioneth a mixed proposition, a mental equivocation, or an ambiguity made by a reservation Against which opinion, (if there had then appeared any such to the world) he might have disputed with more probability and show of substantial reason. But he no where (as fare as I can observe) either refelleth or mentioneth any such opinion among these late and puny divines. For whereas in the place last cited, he hath these words, though purposely he speaketh some other thing in his mind, 〈◊〉 ex industria aliud praeter ea ment liquatur. that maketh nothing, as I think, for the mental reservation, which our equivocators have devised. For he meaneth nothing else, as I take it, but that the speaker doth frame in his mind, another sense and meaning of his words, than they in the common understanding of men do make, or then the judge according to the common understauding doth take them in. And therefore those very schoole-divines, whom he and Soto do refute for going too fare, and allowing too much liberty, yet go not so fare as our now Jesuites do, who build all upon a fancied reservation of their own framing, no way included in the words spoken. Fiftly, say that those divines, whom these learned men do refute, did maintain such a mixed proposition, & mental reservation as our Romanists do strive for: yet Soto saith, that he had read no Schoole-Doctor, who allowed such a fancy as Adrain imagined, which yet by a reservation of a Jesuite, might easily be solued. And Sepulueda, when he came out of Italy into Spain, thought it strange, that he found divines, who contrary to the meaning of all the Ancients, did allow that opinion, which he there refuteth. And therefore if we shall say, that the divines against whom these men wrote, did hold this Equivocal reservation, yet it was then a novel opinion, lately sprung up, such as Soto had read in no Schoole-Doctor of former time, and such as Sepulueda did marvel to find set on foot in his own country, where he lived. But, as I said, these learned men did not know of any such opinion risen up at that time. And therefore in those days either this art was not yet found, or if it were, it was rather whispered in corners, or taught obscurely, then published in schools. Secondly, I gather out of these learned men's writings alleged before, that schooledoctors about that time, allowed and gave liberty for such ambiguities, as in opinion of these men, and in truth the words could not bear: and therefore their interpretations were forced & violent, and such as could not free their speeches from being lies. This without further deduction, is evident by the words before cited. Thirdly, I observe, that these hard and harsh equivocations, by some divines then allowed, and the violent constructions that they made of the words, were then newly taken up, and were unknown to the elder and more judicious schoolmen. And out of all this, I leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader, whether I may not upon good reason infer; that therefore in all probability, the later sort of schooledoctors, by the hard equivocations, which they allowed, did give occasion & laid grounds for this jesuitical Art of equivocation, though at that time themselves did not think of it. For, may it not hence be reasonably conceived, that the progress and proceeding to the framing of this Art, was on this manner? that first of all, and in elder times, there was nothing, but simplicity in their oaths and answers, or if any ambiguity was allowed to be used, it was but in some such sense, as the circumstances of the persons, time, place, and occasion, did put upon them, and that according to the intention of public laws, and the reasonable construction that the Hearers might make of them: and that afterward they allowed violent constructions, and such as the words, together with the circumstances, could not bear, in any reasonable man's understanding, but such as the speaker, in his mind did fancy to be agreeable to that business and occasion. And lastly, that this overbold liberty in them, in framing such a sense, as the words in reason & congruity could not bear, made way to fine wits following after, to add something to the former invention, and to frame a sense of words spoken, which they acknowledge not to be signified by them, but made up by a reservation in their own breast, such as themselves would please to fancy, what ever it were, either pertinent to the business, or as fare different from it, as the falling of the sky is different from the paying of money. But this will appear yet more plainly, if it be considered, that Navarre, a navar. Com. in c. Humanae aures, q. 1. nu. 4. & nu. 8. & 9 who lived at the same time with Soto, & Sepulueda, but wrote after them, and when they were dead, doth from the opinion of those divines, and in special from the opinion of Soto also, and from his sayings, labour to infer and prove the lawfulness of the jesuitical equivocation; because (as he saith) there is the like reason of them both. How truly he inferreth his Conclusion, from the sayings of Soto and the rest, I dispute not; I only note in his course of disputation, that he taketh their assertions for a ground to prove his own by. And that showeth that those former Writers gave occasion, etc. And thus I have declared my second Assertion concerning the original of this new Art. 3. The third is, that whosesoever wit devised it, yet it seemeth to me most probable, that it received the first life and credit from the See of Rome, and the Roman state. My reason is from these grounds. 1. Doctor Navarre, who (as Persons saith, Mitig. cap. 7. nu. 41. pag. 301.) is held to be one of the most liberal and largest in admitting equivocations both in words and oaths, was thought a fit man to be the Pope's Reader of Cases in Rome. And if I mistake not, he was the first that broached this new art. For he read at Rome not long after the time of Soto and Sepulueda, who (as before was noted) had not yet heard any thing of this art. And there he read & framed that a Praefat. ante initium Commentar. in c. Human. aures▪ Commentary, in which he teacheth this mystery, for the instruction of the Jesuits college and dedicated the same unto Gregory 13. the present Pope: which may breed suspicion, that the Pope was well pleased with this new device of Navarre, of whom he made choice to be his public Reader of Cases; and who, while he was employed in this service, did perfect that art, and from whose Readins, the very Jesuits themselves may seem to have borrowed the grounds of that Doctrine, which afterward they polished with great dexterity and care. Secondly, In Queen Elizabeth's time, there was a Treatise found out, which before was in the secret keeping of Jesuits or Priests: in which, beside the Resolutions of Navarre, were contained sundry instructions and directions, given by Sixtus Quintus, for the practising of this mystery of equivocation. Which, if the Reader be desirous to know more fully, he may read a Relation thereof set down by a G. Abbot in the Preface to his six questions. cap. 1. pag. 7. 8. etc. a most reverend and learned Prelate. Thirdly, I find that Emm. Sà in his aphorisms v Mendac. had given his opinion concerning this Equivocal reservation, in this manner: that in a case, b Quidam dicunt,— posse respondere aliquid subintelligendo, ut non esse, s●z ●ta ut e● dieere teneatur; ve●se non habere, scilicet ut ei d●t. At alij id non admill●nt, & sortè potiori ratione. Where a man is not bound to reveal the truth according to the intention of the Demander, some say, that a man may answer by understanding or reserving something in his mind, as that is not so, to wit so, as that he is bound to tell him: or that he hath not such a thing, meaning, that he hath it not to give it unto him. But others admit not of this kind of answer; and perhaps, upon better ground and reason. Thus he gave his judgement of this point; and so the book passed in the Low Countries, and with approbation and commendation of Silu. Pardo, the Inquisitor and Censor there, and was printed at Antwerp 1599 But when it came to be perused, and revewed at Rome, the Censor there, Io. Maria, Master of the sacred Palace, he purged the book, and put out the last words, which were, c Et sortè potiori ratione. And perhaps upon better reason. In which words Sà had signified, that he inclined to their opinion, who disliked this equivocating by reservation. And hence it appeareth, how acceptable and welcome this Doctrine of equivocation is in the Pope's Palace. For whereas F. d Sober Reckon. cap. 4. nu 76. pa. 276. Persons saith, that in the last Edition of Sàes' book at Rome 1607. this whole last sentence was left out, as though he had changed his opinion. And e Ibid. nu 80. pag. 279. that it seemeth that Emm. Sà did afterwards change his opinion; it is but a trick of juggling, such as this Father often useth to delude his Reader with. For Sà died, as f Ribaden. Catalogo Scriptotum Soc. Jesu. in ●man. Sa. Ribadeneira reporteth, in the year 1596. eleven years before this edition of Rome, and three years before the impression of Antwerp, being then above threescore and ten years old. And if Sà, after so many year's deliberation, had changed his opinion, how came it about that that change was not seen in the Antwerp Copy, which was printed 3. years after he was dea●▪ Besides, the Edition of Rome, reprinted also at 〈◊〉, An. 1612. doth profess, that that Book was purged by joan. Maria, the Master of the Palace, and not that it was corrected or amended by Sà, the first Author of it. Further, Persons giveth no one piece of a reason, by which the Reader may imagine, that Sà did ever change that point. And therefore, this is but one of Persons usual tricks of fittening, with which his Brethren of the secular Clergy do so often charge him. Now these considerations laid together, make me think it very probable, that this art received its life from the State and See of Rome. But if any man can show me, whence it might rather have its first ground, I will willingly yield to him; and be thankful to him, that can and will discover the Spring, or wellhead, whence first flushed forth this muddy Nilus, so fertile of Crocodiles, I mean of this sophistique Crocodilites, whereby unware men are overreached and caught. 4. My fourth Assertion is; It is observed by learned men, that whosoever was the Author, yet the Jesuites, especially those of our English Nation, have been the chief Abettors, Defenders and Polishers of this Arte. For proof of this, I will set down the words of some learned men. The a Relation. nu. 33. fol. 36. learned Gentleman, who wrote the Relation of Religion, speaking of false news, frequent at Rome, for advantage of their Sect, addeth, that he found by observation, and judgement of some wise men, that the Jesuites were the Masters of that Mint, and that all those coins were of their stamp; and, that the Jesuites were noted by some of their own friends, to be too hardy equivocators, and their equivocations too hard. And Hospinian a Histor. Jesuit. l. 4. cap. 2. pag. 228. having cited many testimonies of Jesuites for this art, concludeth that thereby it is evident, that many Jesuits with great care have explained and defended it, b 〈◊〉 non immeritò Autores & inventores eius esse vulgò dicantur. that not without cause they are commonly thought to be the Authors and inventors of it. add hereto that which the learned Casaubon observed, who was well acquainted not only with the writings of all sorts of Jesuits, but with the proceed and dealings of our English Jesuits also. He telleth Front● 〈◊〉, a learned Jesuit, c Constat multos vestri 〈◊〉 Theologos— ●am 〈◊〉 magna cura, & expli●uisse & asseruisse. Sed qui p●aecipnè Acqui●oc catione● ex●o●uerint, ●os video fuisse Anglos. Cas●ub. Epist. ad Front. Ducaeum, pag. 108. It is a clear case, that many divines of your orders have explained and maintained that art: but they which have especially polished it, I find to be English men. Yea and their own Brethren, the Secular Priests, lay the overbold use of equivocation in their dish. e Reply to Father Persons libel, fol. 22. &c 23. For so famous (say they) and so notorious are their equivocations, and so scandalous, that the very Protestants take notice thereof, etc. and, such jugglings, and shift of late have been used by them, that not only Protestants, but also Catholics, yea Priests can scarce tell when they speak sincerely, when otherwise. And a little after, Howsoever this kind of dealing may seem excusable unto them, under the name of honest equivocation; sure I am that few honest men will excuse it from dishonest lying. And Master Watson f Quodl. 2. art 6. pag. 39 calleth it the Jesuits rule of swearing and forswearing in a contrary sense and meaning; and g Quodl. 3. art. 4. pag. 66. a shift, which they call a lawful equivocation. And again, he h Quodl. 2. art. 4. pag. 31. calleth these equivocations, their absurd paradoxes of equivocation. And the like speeches may be found in diverse other places of the Priests books. By all which it may appear, that learned men on both sides, not only among the Protestants, but also among Popish Priests, have noted this device especially in the Jesuits: which may be reason enough, (beside that which is to be found in their own writings) to make any sober man resolve, that the Jesuites have had their fingers chief in this new devised Arte. And reason may persuade the same to be most likely; because the Jesuites are an Order consecrated and devoted from their very first birth to the Pope's will, to do what may serve his turn. For so the Jesuites themselves, who published Sanchez. Moral work, do profess in the Epistle dedicatory to Pope Gregory 15. a Prefixed before the second tome. that their first founder b Se suamque Societatem Pontisieijs imperijs more pro●sus novo mancipavit. did make himself and his Order or society vassals to the Pope's command, in a new and unheard of manner. And therefore if the See and State of Rome, did (as before I shown) give life, and credit and authority to this art; then, in reason it must be conceived that the Jesuites, who by their first institution are created the Pope's vassals, to serve at his pleasure, and to do his will, would be the most forward in the rank, to uphold and maintain with all their wit, this dear child of the Popes own breeding. And yet when I conclude that the Jesuits are the most forward, and the men that have polished this art, my meaning is not, either to include all of that Order within this compass, or to exclude all others not of that Order from it. For first among the Jesuites, Becanus doth disclaim it, as c Manual. Controu. l. 5. cap. 21. & Opusc. Theolog. tom. 1. Opusc. 17. in Respons. ad Aphoris. 13, 14, 15, 16. & tom. 2. Opusc. 1. in Append de fide Haer. seruandâ in exam. 4. propositionis. being not taught by the Jesuites, and unlawful to be practised by any. Wherein he saith well, that it is unlawful; but ill, that it is not taught by the Jesuites. For their Doctrine this way is so clear, and so open to the view of all men, that Becanus in denying it, must needs either use the art of equivocation, which himself condemneth, or else tell a flat and downright lie, which is not much better. And the like may be noted in the writings of some other Jesuites, who deny and renounce this device. But they had best keep themselves from Rome; for if they come in the Censors hands, it is to be feared he will deal with them, as he hath done with their fellow S● already; that is, circumcise their lips, and teach their pens to speak the Roman Language more purely. Secondly, among those that be no Jesuites, we have experience and examples good store, of them who have learned this art, and maintained it as stiffly, as the best Jesuite can. In which number, I may place Doctor Norrice, who being apprehended in Oxford, denied himself to be a Priest, and afterward in prison did defend it by this sleight of equivocation, and that he maintained to be lawful, by the example of our blessed saviour; Mar. 13. 32. But of that day & hour knoweth no man, neither the Son, etc. and joh. 7. 8. Ego non ascendam, etc. For so he then alleged the place, as Father Persons also doth, against both the Greek, and their own approved Latin. In expounding, and applying of which Texts to his purpose, how weakly he behaved himself, he may now be pleased to call to his remembrance: that as he braggeth of his victories over other men, so for his humiliation, he may sometimes call to mind his own infirmities. And that perhaps may stand his soul in as good stead, as the meritorious forbearing of equivocation, when he might lawfully use it: which (as Father Persons saith) may increase his crown and merit in heaven. But in earnest, he shall do well, if in the next edition of his Antidote, he place this question of equivocation among the rest of his controversies, and tell us in good sadness, what, after so many years more, he thinketh of this Point. But in the mean while, the Reader may understand, that Dr. Norrice is not the only man that joineth with the Jesuites in the practice and maintenance of this Arte. For in this small Treatise may be seen diverse testimonies for it, out of other Writers. And the secular Priests, though they charge & upbraid the Jesuites with a nimium, too often and too bold a practice of it, yet themselves do allow it, even when they show greatest opposition against the Jesuites. So Master Watson a Quod lib. 3. art. 4. p. 66, 67. speaking of equivocation, as a shift which the Jesuites use; saith, that though there be no question to be made of it, but that in some sense it may be lawful, etc. In which place, the sum of that, wherein he showeth his dissent & dislike of the Jesuites, (for his own words are too many to be set down in this place) is in these two things▪ First, That the Jesuites do allow equivocation in a case, wherein he thinketh a man is bound to speak the plain truth. And secondly, that they do hold, that they may not only to their adversaries (to Protestant's) but even also to any Catholic Magistrate, yea to the Pope himself, answer one way, and mean another. And to like purpose, the Author of the reply to Persons apology, being to answer for D. Bagshaw, whom Persons had reproved, as denying the doctrine of equivocation; saith, that the Doctor, b Cap. 17. in the very end pag. 331. no doubt, knoweth in what cases doubtful answers and equivocations are to be made to curious questions: neither is it to be thought (saith he) that he dissallowed thereof, but only of the liberty, which is in the Jesuites and their Adherenes, in all their dealings with other men. By which it may appear, that the difference between the Secular Priests and the Jesuites in this point, is not about the equity & lawfulness of this art, but about the liberty and large scope that the Jesuites take, to practise it among their own Brethren, and before their own Magistrates and superiors, and in all their dealings. And surely, for our own experience, I cannot learn any thing to the contrary, but that our Tribunals and places of judicature, our Bishops, justices, and other Officers, who have to deal in their Examinations, yea and that our common sort of Christians who converse with them, do find in their experience, that Secular Priests, and ●ale Papists of all sorts, do jump with the Jesuites in the practice of this Arte. Notwithstanding, if any among them, which call themselves Catholics, do renounce and disclaim it, as well in deeds as in words; I am so far from fastening any imputation of disgrace upon them for this iniquity of their brethren, as that I wish and pray they may go on, to forsake and abandon all other the abominations and errors of the Roman Church. But (to draw toward an end in this Point) all things considered, my Conclusion cometh to this head; That this mystery of iniquity spreadeth fare and near in the papal kingdom, having received authority and countenance from the very Roman See, and finding entertainment and acceptance among all inferior sorts: but yet the Jesuites are they that have chiefly polished it, and most boldly practised it; and among the Jesuites, our Englishmen (be it spoken to the credit of our Nation) do bear the bell away. And from hence the Reader may see why our divines do usually ascribe this Doctrine to the Jesuites: and consequently what we have to answer to Becanus his question. For a Quaro eur h●nc fallendi artem appelles aequivocationem jesuiticam. to●. 2. Opusc. 1. in Append. in examinatione ●. propos. I desire to know (saith he) why you call this art of deceiving, jesuitical equivocation: and our answer is ready; We call it jesuitical, because men of that order, have been the chief Abettors and polishers of that Arte. CHAP. III. Of the matter or object of equivocation, or in what cases it is allowed by the Patrons of it. FOr the matter or object, about which this art may be exercised, F. Persons a Mitigat. cap. 7. nu. 7. pa. 277. & cap. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. & cap. 11. nu. 31. p. 460. & cap. 13. nu. 2. p. 547. seemeth to except two cases, in which they hold it unlawful to equivocate First, In matters of faith: and secondly, in buying and selling, in common conversation and humane traffic, to the hurt or prejudice of any. But this is but another trick of his juggling, by which he would blear the eyes of his Reader; and make the world believe that they use no fraud, either in matters of Religion, or in businesses with their neighbours, so that any body should be hurt or beguiled by them. For first, where he saith, that they may not use equivocation in matters of faith, perhaps in this saying he doth equivocate with us; and meaneth, that we may not so use equivocation, as to deny any point of faith. But that in handling & dealing about matters of faith, it may be lawful with them to use this art; there are good proofs from their own Writings, beside all the experience of their practice. For F. Persons saith, that b Mitig. c●. 11. nu. 23. p. 454. in matters of Religion, it belongeth to the faith of the hearer-to seek out the speakers reservation for his better assurance. Which is but a slender comfort to a poor Christian, who had as good seek a Needle in a bottle of hay, as a reservation locked up in an equivocators mind: but hence it followeth, that he alloweth equivocation in matters of Religion. A-Againe, the same Father Persons telleth us, that a Mitig. cap. 13. nu. 3. p. 548. no man can deny, but many facts and cases may fall out concerning matters of Religion, not tending to Confession (especially in time of persecution) wherein a man may, or perhaps also must by obligation use equivocal speeches. Here he granteth, that by their principles, it is an undoubted conclusion, that in cases concerning Religion, a man may equivocate, so the case be not such, as tendeth to Confession; 1. as I understand it, if by equivocating he do not seem to deny the Roman faith, which at such times, they hold it necessary for their Children, without any tergiversation to confess. But elsewhere he unfoldeth himself a little more plainly, when he saith of equivocation, b Sober Reckon. in Append. nu. 25. pag. 687. that it may not be used in matters of Religion, where Confession of our Faith is required. For this implieth, that where Confession of faith is not required, there it may be lawful enough to equivocate. But evident and clear it is, that the c Mitigat. cap. 9 num. 25. & seqq. Jesuite maketh our blessed saviour to equivocate in sundry matters of Religion, and thence would persuade us, that by his example, they may do the like. As for example, he did equivocate, when he said of the day of judgement, d Mar. 13. 32. Of that day and hour knoweth no man, nor the son, etc. And when he said of himself, e joh. 8. 15. I judge no man: the Jesuite saith, that this speech without a mental reservation is false, and cannot stand, for that it should be contrary to many other places of Scripture: and should imply a denial of Christ's office to be our judge. He proceedeth to other examples, and telleth us, that Christ did equivocate about the Sacrament of baptism, when he said, f Mar. 16. 16. He that shall believe, and be baptised, shall be saved: and about eating of the flesh of Christ, g joh. 6. 51. If any man shall eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and about Prayer, when he said, h joh. 16. 23. If ye shall ask any thing of my Father in my name, he will give it you. Now the points here spoken of, and others of like nature, in which the Jesuite findeth equivocation to have been used in Scriptures, are, I trow, matters of faith and Religion. And hence it followeth, that equivocators must either confess that they abuse the world in alleging these and such like Texts, to prove and uphold jesuitical equivocation, which is not there meant; or that they hold their equivocations to be lawful, and sufficiently warranted, even in principal matters of Religion, such as are Christ's office of judging, the doctrine of the Sacraments, and prayer in Christ's name. In the first place then, when Persons excepteth matters of faith from the practice of equivocation, he mocketh his Reader with general speeches, when he meaneth no such thing; but only that men may not equivocate, by denying in words their belief of the Roman faith, or some such like. Secondly, where Persons saith that they allow not equivocation in common conversation, in buying, etc. it may be observed that Navarre, a Comm. in c. Human. aures. q. 3. nu. 1●. the famous Reader in Rome, doth highly commend this equivocation as a b Per hanc doctrinam singularem possunius evitare innumera pe●cata, etc. singular point of Doctrine, by which we may avoid innumerable sins which we commit by denying and affirming without this mental reservation, with which if the words spoken were joined, they would become true. This he explaineth and confirmeth thus: c Passim enim interrogamur, Quò vadimus, quid comedimu●, etc. We are asked & demanded every foot, whither we go, what we have eaten, how much money we have, or have borrowed, or have given, what letters and news we have received, what we have written and related; what such or such a man said to us, what we know of such or such a one: and many hundred like. To all which (saith he) we might answer without sin, d Subintelligendo aliqua, quibus fient vera quae annuimu●, vel falsa quae negamus. by understanding somewhat in our minds, which may make that true, which we affirm, and that false, which we deny: As for example, when a man asketh of us, money, or a book, or news, etc. if we answer him, I have them not, or I know them not; understanding, e Ita ut tenear vel conveniat illi praestare, tradere, dicere, etc. so as I am bound, or, as it is convenient to do it, or give it, or to speak and make is known. The like is affirmed by a Summa v. mendac nu. 4. pag. 385. Emm. Rodriquez, who alleging this determination of Navarre, and transcribing also some of his words, addeth in the end, to show how he esteemed this device, b Quae doctrina deb●t notari. which Doctrine ought to be marked and observed. And Fernandes c De precept. 2. §. 1. nu. 8. p. 49. in his Examen saith, that if a man being requested to lend a thing to his neighbour, d Causam habeat non illam dandi. have a cause or reason, why he will not grant or give it, etc. he may swear by equivocation, that he hath not such a thing. And Sanchez, e In comm●●n locutione interrogato de re, quam secretò seruare exp. dit, licitum est dicere, se nescire, intelligendo, ita ut expediat dicere. Sanchez O. per moral l. 3. c. 6. num. 25. In common talk (saith he) if a man be asked of a thing which it behooveth him to keep secret, it is lawful for him to say, that he knoweth not, understanding so as that it is expedient to tell it. And Father Persons f Mitigat. c. 9 nu. 81. & 83. pag. 403, 404. also thinketh it most just and necessary, if a man come to borrow money, whom we may not deny without inconvenience, that we may then answer equivocally that we have it not; understanding, with any mind to lend it: or that we have it not in our purse, etc. Which instances and examples, if they be not matters of common life and conversation, I know not where to find any. But it may be said, that Persons, when he excepteth matters of common conversation in buying, etc. he addeth, to the hurt or prejudice of any; as if he meant by that restriction, to leave a liberty of equivocating, even in buying and selling, and humane traffic; so it be without the hurt of any man: but then utterly to forbid it. And I grant, he addeth those words: but I cannot tell, whether he meant the vulgar Reader to conceive that meaning in them. Howsoever, there is a mystery in those words, which g In c. Human. ●ures. q. 2. nu. 12. Navarre, (who useth to deal above-boord, and to speak more plainly) hath unfolded, when he calleth it, h Verum & iniustum damnum. a real and unjust hurt or prejudice; by which he understandeth such an hurt, as we may not do to another, without sin and injustice. And then, the meaning of this goodly Exception of Persons, will be this; that in buying, and selling, and humane traffic, and common conversation, we may not equivocate, if thereby we do hurt any man unjustly and unlawfully: but else, if any of their Catholics should think that the hurt which redoundeth to one of us, is lawful and just, that then they may freely delude us with their amphibologies and reservations, in what matter soever, and for what end they please, though it were for massacring of an assembly, or for murdering of a Prince, or for blowing up of a Parliament, or for the invasion of the kingdom by hostile and foreign forces. And so by this exception we are well freed from the fear of these deluding and equivocating spirits. Let us then dismiss Persons, with his shifting Exceptions and inquire more particularly and directly what the cases be, wherein they do in sober sadness allow their scholars to use the benefit of this Art. And for this purpose I find two things said by them. First, that whensoever a man may lawfully keep silence, and say nothing, or whensoever he is not bound to reveal and lay open the truth, than he may lawfully equivocate, and use this sleight of amphibology: be it a matter of faith, or a business of commerce and traffic, or a point of State, or what else you will, it mattereth not to this purpose. For proof of this, first take the resolution of Father Garnet. He being prisoner in the Tower, and required to declare his opinion concerning this point, set down his mind in writing, which is yet kept upon Record: and it was this, a De Aequinocatione ita censio. In rebus moralib. & communi usa vitae, quando veritas inter amicos requiritur, uti aequ●ocatione haut licet: id enim Societati hominum magno mala cedere●. Quare hoc remedio in istis null●● loc●●. Quoties verò de necessary defension agitur, dequs, iniuria aliqua evitanda, aut damno, aut de consequando aliquo non parui. momenti hon●, sine vll● cuiusqua●r periculo, tum luita est. Aequinocati●. Casaub. Ep. ad Fronton, Du●. pag. 1. 1. Concerning equivocation this is mine ●●pinion. In moral matters and common use of 〈◊〉; to have among friends it is required of a man to speak truth, than he may not use equivocation, etc. But as oft as there is occasion for necessary defence, or for avoiding of some injury or damage, or for obtaining some good of weight or moment, withal the peril of any 〈…〉 equivocation 〈…〉. In which speech, Master Casaubon doth truly note by the way, that those words, without the peril of any man, are only added for a colour, and to blind the simple with: as I noted the like before, in a like sentence of Father Pers●ns. But the thing that I now note for this purpose, is, that he saith; In common use of life, when it is required of a man to speak truth, than it is not lawful to equivocate. By which words he implieth, that where a man is not of duty bound to speak or reveal the truth, there he may obscure & hide it by this Arte. The same Father Garnet, while he stood at the bar, in fewer words, and plainer manner explaineth his meaning thus; a Proceeding against traitors, lit. U 4. No man may equivocate when he ought to speak the truth, otherwise he may. To like purpose Fernandes b Ea etiam uti licet, quum iustè quis interrogatur, si datur rationabilis causa non responderdi ad metem Interrogantu. Fernand. Exam. de praec. 2. cap. 5. § 1. nu. 8. p. 49. A man may lawfully use it also, when he is justly or lawfully demanded, if he have a reasonable cause not to answer according to the meaning of the Demander. And Heissius the Jesuite, c Non solum Qu●● iniuriosa est interrogatio, sed etiam absque culpa interroganti, saepe non tenemur ad mentem eius respondere, quandocunque scilicet Interrogans non habet ius impe●a●● responsionem, & Interrogato id●nea miniineq, levis illius dene gandae causa suppe●t. Nam cui tacere licet, 〈◊〉 praeter quaesita, aliud quid cum Deo Coelitibus, aut sec●●n loqui po●si, seu ●ocall, seu 〈…〉 se● mixta, ●i. partim vocali, partim mentali. Heiss. Refut. Aph. c. 4. Aph. 2. nu. 117. p. 191. Not only (saith he) when the question is unjust, but also when it is without fault; we are many times not bound to answer him that asketh the question, according to his intention and meaning: and that is, whensoever the Demander hath not right to command an answer; and the Demanded hath a sufficient and not idle reason to deny it. For he that, may lawfully hold his pe●ce, ●ay, passing by the things that are asked him, speak some other thing with God, the heavenly Spirits, or with himself, either by vocal or mental speech, or by a mixed, speech, which is partly vocal and partly mental. In these two last testimonies, the instance is in a particular case, when a man is examined or questioned: but the ground on which they build their determination, is a general Rule, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, than he may lawfully equivocate, and speak by a mixed Proposition; as appeareth plainly in the reason of Heissius, now set down in his own words. And in a word, equivocators say, that if a Persons mit. c. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. Greg. de Valent. tom. 3. Disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. §. Ad. 2 Arg. Sanchez moral●. 3. c. 6. nu. 16. p. 26. a man use equivocation with mental reservation, he doth not offend against the negative Precept, which for, biddeth a man to lie; because, whatsoever he speaketh in that manner, is a truth: only he may offend against the affirmative Precept, if he do then equivocate, when he is bound to utter and reveal the truth. And hence I infer, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, as not being bound to reveal the truth; then in these men's opinion, he may lawfully speak by equivocation. And this is the first thing that they say for this purpose. The second thing is, that b Causa iusta utendi his amphibologiis est, quoties id necessarium aut utile est ad salutem corporis, honore, res samil●ares tuenda, vel ad quemlibet alium virtutis actum: ita ut veritatis occultatio censeatur, tunc expediens ac studiosa. Sanchez op. moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 19 there is just cause for using of equivocation, whensoever it is necessary or expedient for preserving of bodily safety, honour, household goods, or for any other act of virtue; so that the hiding of the truth may then be thought to be expedient and honest. So speaketh Sanchez, meaning this rule of such an equivocation as is joined with an oath. For else, c Dum Sotus ait non esse culpam Amphibologus uti joco, & in ridiculis, intelligo quando absque iuramento id fieret. Tunc enim honestus ille ludus, recreationis iusta causa exereitus, honc stum redderet amphibologiae usum. At si iuramentum adesset, est manifesta culpa, propter vanamet indiscretam divini Nominis usurpationem. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 22. if there be no oath used, then honest sport used for lawful recreation, may make the use of equivocation lawful. But if there were an oath added, than it is an evident fault, because of the vain and indiscreet using of God's Name. So speaketh the same Author not long after. From which words of the Jesuite we may gather two things. 1. That an easy cause may suffice for justifying of equivocal speeches, in a simple assertion without an oath. If there be no other cause but only for merriment and recreation, yet that is reason enough to make the use of equivocation lawful and honest. 2. That when other equivocators do require some kind of necessity or utility which may draw men to use it; they are to be understood of equivocation joined with an oath, and not when it is used in a bare and simple affirmation or negation: unless we may conceive, that sport and merriment goeth with them for a matter of necessity or great moment. And indeed, this difference given by Father Sanchez, between equivocation with an oath, and without it, hath reason in it, if we consider their grounds and principles. For in affirmations and negations, there are two things required. 1. That no lie be told: for this is required by the negative precept of truth, as they use to speak. And this fault, as they think, they avoid by their art of reservation. And secondly, that men conceal not a truth, when they are bound to disclose it: for this is required by the affirmative precept of truth. But in an Oath, besides truth in the speech, there is a third thing required, and that is, that it be undertaken with judgement, that is to say, advisedly and with due discretion. Else, by swearing a truth unadvisedly, God's Name may be profaned. There is reason then for this difference which Sanchez maketh. And now by all this, the Reader may see, that an easy cause is thought sufficient for the using of this Arte. If it be for ease of the body, safety of a man's goods, preserving of his credit, etc. then by their doctrine, a man may equivocate with an Oath: but if it be for sport and merriment only, yet than it may be lawful in affirmations and negations without an Oath: provided that it be such a case, in which a man may lawfully hold his peace, and be not bound then to disclose the truth. By this it appeareth in general, in what cases they allow the use of this Arte. But for fuller satisfaction of the Reader, and for more distinct conceiving of their meaning in this point; it will not be amiss to point out some special and particular Cases, in which they give express leave for the practising of this sleight. And they be these, and such like. 1 If a Priest, that hath heard another man's Confession, should be demanded, whether such a one had confessed such a sin unto him, or not;— he may answer directly, that he hath not confessed any such thing unto him, albeit he had done so: yea, he may swear also this answer of his, understanding and reserving in his mind, that the Penitent hath not confessed the same unto him, so as he may utter it. These be Father Persons a Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 2. pag. 407, 408. words. And he saith, they be agreeable to the mind of all schooledoctors. 2 b Vltimò, Deducitur Poenitentem temerè rogatum, an hoc vel illud peccatum fassus sit, posse iurare se non confessum, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illi explicare. Sanchez mor. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 44. If a Penitent be asked without a just cause, whether he have confessed such or such a sin (which he had confessed to the Priest) he may swear he confessed it not, understanding, so as that he is bound to tell him. So speaketh Sanchez, and citeth others of the same opinion. 3 c Si contra iustitiam petit, et iuridice eum non interrogas, potest uti aequivocatione, et iurare secundum propriam mentem. Tolet. de Instruct. Sa. l. 4. c. 21. num. 10. If a judge do against justice question a Defendant, and do not question according to order of Law; the Defendant may use equivocation, and swear according to his own meaning: that is, by a secret reservation kept in his mind. So saith Tolet. And Sanchez saith the like, d jisdem amphibologijs potest uti Reus, quando judex interrogans non est legitimus Interrogati judex, aut in hoc casu peculiari, Sanchez l. 3. c. 6. nu. 27. When the judge that questioneth, is not the lawful judge of him that is questioned, or is not his judge in that peculiar case; the Defendant may use equivocation. And the like he saith, if the judge be an Excommunicate person. And the like Father Persons doth largely confirm, e Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 11. and in the rest following. When the judge is not lawful, or not competent at least in that cause, or proceedeth not lawfully. In these cases, they think that a man questioned before a Magistrate, may upon his oath, by an equivocal reservation, deny that which he knoweth to be true. 4 f Si quis hominem ignoranter, putans esse feram, occidat, aut in propriam defensionem-potest de eo facto rogatus in iudicio, id negare. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 29. If one do ignorantly kill a man, thinking him to be a wild Beast, (a dear for example) or if he kill a man in his own defence; he may being questioned of the fact, deny it upon his oath. 5 g Quando taxa alicutus rei est iniusta, si pluris vendens, aut defraudans in pondere & mensura, ita ut sibi satisfaciat propretij injustitia, & reddat correspondentes merces pretio date; potest hic interrogatus à judice, an pluris vendiderit vel desecent in pondere aut mensura id negare, assacreque se pretio taxato vendidisse & integre pondus & mensurate tradi ●isse, intelligendo haec, ita ut pluris vendens aut deficiens in pondere aut mensura deliquerit. Sanehez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 29. When an unjust tax is set upon a commodity, if a man sell it for more, or maketh light weight, and scant measure, so that he make himself satisfaction for the wrong of the tax, and yet sell his commodities worth the moeny; he being examined by a judge, whether he sold the commodity for more, or came short in his weight or measure, he may deny it, and say, that he sold it for the price that was set him, and that he gave full weight and measure; meaning so, as that selling for more, or coming short in his weight or measure, he did commit an offence. 6 a Si reperto cadanere, quis interrogatur, an gladius ibi repertus fit suus, vel tali ho●● illaec transierit, quae vera sunt, & petuntur ab eo, tanquam illiu● homi●idiji indi ●ia quod verè no commisa potest negare. Sanch l. c. nu 30. If a man be found slain, with a Sword lying by him; and a guiltless person should be asked, whether that sword were his, or whether he passed that way at such an hour, (which things are true, and are inquired after as signs of that murder, which he committed not) he may deny it. 7 b Ratione optima docent cum, qui nummos mutuò acceptos soluit, posse a judice rogatum de mutuo, iucarese illud non accepisse, intelligendo ita ut teneatur id soluere.— Atque idem credo si tunc non teneretur soluere, eò quod terminus, ad quem matuum datum fuit non est impletus; vel prae paupertate excusatur debit or a tunc soluendo. Sanch l. c. nu. 31. If a man have borrowed money, and paid it again, and be examined of the judge, concerning the money that he borrowed; he may swear that he borrowed not that money; understanding so as that he is now bound to pay it. And so a man may swear, that he had not such money, which he did receive; if through poverty he be excused from making payment, or if he should be urged to pay it, before the day that it is due. 8 c Nonò, deducitur Creditorem virtute Instrumenti publici exigeteur eoram judice debitum,— et si pars illius sunun●● debita s●luta sibi sit. etc. Si debtor reconcentat eoram judice Creditorem, ut iuret an pars illius debiti soluta sit sibi, potest ivarare solutam non esse, intelligendo ut modò non sit tantundem sibi debitum. Sanch. l. c. num 36. If a Creditor have money owing him upon Bond, part whereof is p●yed unto him, but as much is due unto him some other way, for which he hath no Instrument to show: if he be required before a judge, to swear whether part of that debt were paid him; he may swear that it was not paid, understanding, so but that as much is now due to him, some other way. 9 d Vndecimo deducitur, co●ctam aliquam actipere in sponsam, quam ducere non tenetur, posse iurare se accepturum, intelligendo in●●a se, Si teneor vel si postea placuent mihi. Sanchez ibid. num. 39 Tolet. de Instruct Sacerd. l. 4. 21. nu. 11. If a man be forced to promise marriage to a woman, whom otherwise he is not bound to marry [the meaning is, if he be urged and pressed by a judge against reason, to make that promise] he may swear, that he will marry her, though he mean it not, understanding within himself, If I be bound to do so, or, if afterward I shall like of it. 10 a Si vir ab uxore petat an sit●dultera, ista potest dicere, Non sum, squam●is verum fuerit eam adulterium commississe) intelligendo, ut tibi revelem Tolet. Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11. Sanch. moral. l. 3. ●6. nu. 41. Persons, mitig. c. 10. nu. 37. pa. 436. If a Woman, that hath played the whore, be asked by her husband, whether she have committed adultery, she may swear that she hath not done it, understanding within herself, so as I may or mean to tell you of it. 11 b Contraxit quit matrimonium per verba de praesenti, qua de re postulatus corum Episcopo, potest ad●ibito iuramento respondere, non se contraxisse per verba de praesenti; seruata sibi clausula, ita ut matrimonium fuerit. Treatiso of equivocation, allowed by Blackwell and Garnet, cited by D. Abbot Antilog. cap. 2. fol. 13. and Casaub. Epist. ad Front. pag. 115. If a man have contracted himself to a woman, and afterward make another contract with another, by words de praesenti: and being called before the Bishop, and there asked, whether he made such a contract de praesenti with this later woman, he may swear he did not, understanding, so as that it is a marriage. 12 c Decimo quintò deducitur, eum ti quo mutuò pecunia petitur, quam revera habet, posse iureiurando affirmare se eam non habere, intelligendo intra se, ut det. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 43. & Navart. Com●n c. Human. aures, q. 3. num 13. Persons mitigall. cap. 9 num. 81. pa. 401, 403. If a man be requested to lend money, when he is not bound to lend it, though he have the money by him, yet he may swear that he hath it not, understanding within himself, so as that he will lend it him. 13 d Jondino quis, sauten●e ibi peste, proficiscitur Countriam, qu●m magistratus de vebis suae imolumitate soilicu●, diversai ìibi non pert●untur, misi prius iuret se Londiat nuper non fuisse, non ende venisse, turare poterit non se venisse Londino, cum hac reseruatien● mentis, ita ut insectus po●le venerim. Treatise of equivocation, apud D. Abbot Antilog. c. 2. fol. 13. The like is said by Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 35. by Tolet. de Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. num. 12. by Navarre Enchirid. cap. 12. nu. 19 If a man come from London in a time of Infection, to Coventrie, were he cannot be admitted to ledge, unless he will swear, that he came not lately from London; he may swear that he came not from London, reserving in his mind, so as that I am infected with the plague, if upon good reason he think that he is not infected. 14 e In communi loqtuitione interrogato de re quam secre●ò seruare expedit ●citum est dicere se nescire, intelligenda, ita ut expediat dicere.— potest estam— uti quavis alia amphibologia etc. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 25. If a man in common talk be asked of any matter which it behooveth him to keep secret, he may lawfully say, that he knoweth not, understanding, so as it is behooveful to tell it: or with any other reservation that he will imagine. Lastly, a Obseruandum quoties ●icitum est ad se tuendum uti aliqua aequivocatione, id quoque erit licitum, etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam aequivocationem. and, Quatum cunque reduplicet iniquus Interrogator, ut inret se nulla aequivocatione uti, & absque omni prorsus aequivocaione id intelligere: adhuc id iutare potest intelligendo its ut planè debe at loqui et explicare vel aliquid aliud ment concipiendo, quo verum id reddatur. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. ● num. 45. and the same is said in the Treatise of equivocation apud D. Abbot Antilog. fol. 13. fac. 2. If he that asketh the question, do exclude the use of equivocation, and require a man upon his oath not to use any equivocation, and that he meaneth what he speaketh without any equivocation at all (as it is in the Oath of Allegiance) yet he may swear it still, understanding, so as he ought to speak plainly; or framing some other reservation in his mind, by which it may be made true. These and such like be the cases, in which they allow their equivocating frauds. I could add more, but I fear I have wearied the Reader by too many already. Surely, by this that hath been said, we may learn two things, which it is requisite all plaine-meaning Christians should take notice of. 1 That equivocators, and such as are instructed in this art, do take unto themselves a large liberty of using this fraudulent device. For out of the premises it may appear, that whatsoever business or occasion be offered, be the matter sacred or civil, public or private, in open Courts of justice, or in common practice of life; yet if they can persuade themselves that they have any serious cause to conceal the truth, whether it be for some good to their souls, or for safety of their bodies, or keeping of their goods, etc. they may freely swear the contrary to that truth, by an equivocal or mental reservation. And if they have any light cause or reason, if it be but for sport or merriment to recreate themselves, than they may deceive us by an equivocation, in a simple affirmation or negation, having no Oath in it. And this being so, I desire every Christian, that would not be deceived, to consider with himself, whether he can think of any business that passeth between man and man, in which he may promise to himself plain dealing, or may presume that he shall not be deceived by some mortal device or other, if he have to do with them, who do profess this equovicating Arte. Secondly, we may learn, that there is no limitation, or exception, or explication, be it never so wise or wary, nor any thing which man's wit can device, that may restrain or keep back these equivocators, from deluding us by their equivocal speeches; but that say or do what a man will or can, they will take liberty to equivocate still: so that no oaths, how warily and carefully soever they be framed, can hold these men, further than themselves will. a Vide intanta astutia quanta sit simplicitat, Quii omnem sec●●ritatem in eo i●●amento sibi statuisset, talam se m●dum iuramenti, tot circumstantijs conne●●●isse existim●bat, qui, saluâ conscientiâ, nulla ratione à quoquam dissolui posset. Sed videre non potuit, si Pontifex iuramentum dissoluerit, omnes illius nexus, sive de sidelitate Regi praestanda, sive de dispensatione non admittenda, peritor dissolutos fore. Immo aliud dicam admirabilius. Nosti, credo, iuramentum iniustum, si tale esse evidenter s●tatur, vel aperte declaretur, neminem obligare; Reg● iura mentum iniustum esse, ab ipso Ecclesie Pastore sufficienter declaretam est Barthol. Pacenius, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Epistol. Monit. Jacob. Regis lit. ●. 2. & 3. Pacenius discoursing of the Oath of Allegiance, laugheth at the simplicity (as he calleth it) of our King and State, who thought by that Oath to provide for their safety: as having hedged it about with so many circumstances, as that, to their thinking, no man could wind himself out of it with a safe conscience. But they consider not (saith he) that if the Pope shall dissolve this Oath, all the bands of it, either for performance of fidelity to the King, or for not admitting a dispensation from Rome, are shattered in pieces. Nay, I will say one other thing (saith he) that is more admirable. An unjust Oath, when it is declared to be such, bindeth no man: but that this Oath is unjust, hath been sufficiently declared by the Pastor of the Church. he meaneth the Pope. And hereupon he inferreth in an insulting manner; b Vades igitur tam in sumum ab●●sse Illius obs●gatione; ut unculii quod à tot sapientibus ferreum putabat●●, manus fit quam stramilie●. Thou seest now (saith he) that the band of that Oath is v●nished into smoke, so that the 〈◊〉 which so many wise men thought to be as strong as Iron, proveth weaker than straw. Thus this man boasteth, that by the Pope's dispensation, or declaration of the unlawfulness of it, no Oath in the world is any thing worth. A great privilege sure for them, that can so easily wind themselves out of bands, even the strongest that can be thought of, among men. And yet me thinketh, aliud admirabilius, the equivocators have found a more admirable device than this of Pacenius is. For he sendeth a man to Rome, to fetch a dispensation thence, or to get the Pope's declaration of the unlawfulness of the Oath, and then they may break all. But our equivocators have that at home, and within their own breasts, that may free them from all. For if themselves do but think that the thing is unlawful, or that they have some reasonable cause, to dissemble, they may take this or any other Oath whatsoever, and by an equivocal reservation, break the band of that Oath, before they take it. And if such be the privileges of these men, how great is their danger, that live and converse with them? God preserve all wellmeaning men from such deceitful tongues. CHAP. four Of the use, or rather abuse of equivocation, and for what turns it may serve. Equivocation, such as hath been described before, may be beneficial to them that use it many ways, and for diverse purposes. For in the general it may serve them for all turns, in which by mis-leading the Hearer, they may make any advantage to themselves: and more particularly it may serve them for these special ends and purposes. First, in State-businesses, and matters of policy, it may serve great men, to hide their plots, and to work their ends by: and yet to make fair weather towards all men, and beat them in hand that they mean nothing but friendship and love. In this kind a In c. Human. aur. q. 3. nu. 14. pag. 353. Navarre telleth us of a great Monarch, Monarcha ●um prim● maximu●. who he thought had used, and did then use this good art (as he calleth it) by the benefit whereof, every man was contented and pleased, that came to him, or had to deal with him about great affairs. b Creditur enim ita excipere & audire ad se vementes, & sic ijsdem respondendo, significare tam gestu, quàm verbis & factis, ut placeaut eyes, cum quibus rem gerit, intellecta secundum intentionem illorum, licet sint in se falsa, etc. For (saith he) he is thought so to entertain and to hear those that come unto him, and in answering, so to express and declare himself unto them with whom he hath to deal, as well by gesture, as by words and deeds, that the things being understood according to their meaning, do please and content them●, though in themselves they be false, but are true according to the reservations understood by the Answerer. The same Navarre addeth further, c Ibid. nu. 15. that he thinketh another great Monarch meant to teach his son d Hanc doctrinam & artem bonam. this doctrine and good art of equivocating, when for some secret defect, he drew him back from the study of learning, saying, I would not have my son to have any more Latin, then only that one Apophe he give, * He that knoweth not to dissemble, knoweth not to reign. Qui deseit dissimulare, nescit regnare. do they thus instruct their Catholic Princes, to dissemble and equivocate? and call they it a good art, by which they may possess men with a good opinion of them, when they mean quite otherwise; that so they may work their ends, and bring about their projects and plots? Why, then I need not fear to say, that one turn, for which the Doctrine of equivocation doth serve them, is in State businesses to hide their plots, and to work their ends by it. Which as it is advantageous to themselves, so it is dangerous for those that have to deal with them. Secondly, It may serve them, for a means to hide their mischievous plots against the State and Religion, and yet to escape the hand of justice after all. For when they have plotted and acted Treasons, or are about any unlawful business, forbidden by the wholesome laws of the kingdom; equivocation serveth to hide both themselves and their associates, from the enquiry of the Magistrate, be he never so vigilant and careful. For if one of them be examined or asked, whether he have reconciled such a man to the Pope, or absolved such a subject from his bond of Allegiance, or have conspired against the life of the King, or have been acquainted with a plot of blowing up the Parliament; though all these things be most true, yet he may without scruple deny them all upon his Oath. Or in case one be detected otherwise, and examined, who were his associates, whether such a Priest, or such a Jesuite, or such a Gentleman were privy to the thing; though these men were all of them as deep in the villainy, as himself; yet he may swear that none of them all did know the least jot of the matter. And by these tricks they can work all mischief to Kings, and Nobles, and People, and Parliaments; and yet wind themselves and their complices out of the hands of justice; unless God do disclose them, as many times he doth beyond the providence or expectation of man. For rather then Treasons should go unespied, God maketh a Eccles. 10. 20. the Bird of the air to carry the voice, and that which hath wings to tell the matter; saith Solomon. This use southwell the Jesuite made of this Arte. For, fearing to be detected, b G. Abbot praelect. de mendacio. pa. 50. nu. 13. & R. Abbot Antilog. cap. 2. fol 13. fac. 2. he instructed a Woman-Disciple of his, that if she should be examined, whether himself were or had been in that house, she should upon her oath utterly deny it; and so she might safely do, using but the help of this art, though she had often seen him there, and knew him to be in the house. And to like purpose c Proceeding against Traitors. C●. 2. Tresham, one of the gunpowder Traitors, upon examination did confess that Father Garnet was privy to the Treason, and had talked with him about it: but afterward, having been better instructed or confirmed in this rare mystery, when he lay sick on his deathbed, and not above three or four hours before his death, he protested, and took it upon his salvation, and set it down under his hand, that his former Confession was false, and that he had not seen Garnet of sixteen years space before, at the least. And thus he died. Which protestation of his, upon his oath, was proved not long after, to be most untrue. Yea, and Garnet himself confessed, that within that space he had seen him many times. Whereupon this grave Father, and grand equivocator being demanded what he then thought of Treshams' testamental protestation, he answered, a Proceeding against Traitors. Y. 3. It may be he meant to equivocate. And this reverend Father himself, who was provincial of the Jesuits, when after secret conference between him and Hall, another Jesuite in the Tower, he was asked before all the Lords Commissioners, whether Hall and he had any conference together, and was desired not to equivocate; he stiffly denied it upon his soul, reiterating it with so many detestable execrations, as wounded their hearts to hear him. And afterward, when he knew that the thing was known, and that Hall his fellow-Iesuite had confessed it; he cried the Lords mercy, and said he had offended, if equivocation did not help him. And though the Priests accuse the Jesuites for it, yet when they are examined before a Magistrate, or Officer, they also say and swear and protest all manner of falsehoods and untruths, that so they may wind either their fellows or themselves out of the danger of the Law. And indeed this is the chief and principal turn, for which equivocation is intended to serve them. Thirdly, In matters of Religion this good Art may serve them to avoid arguments and evident reasons brought against them, which their own consciences do acknowledge to be true. For hereby they can gloss the father's sayings against their meaning, and deny all sorts of authorities that are alleged against them. For so themselves profess to their friends in secret, a Quum in Catholicis veteribus alij●, plurim●s feramus c●r●res, & extenuemus, excusemus, excogitato commento persaepe negemus, & commodum ijs sensum offingamus, dum opponuntur in disputationibus aut in constictionibus cum Aduersarijs: non videmus cur non eandem aequit item & diligentem recognitione mereatur Be●tramus. Index Belgic. lit. B. in Bertramo. pag. 12. in 8●. Seeing (say the Belgic Censurers) in other ancient Catholics, we bear with very many errors, and do lessen and excuse them, and very often by some devised shift do deny them, and feign unto them some commodious meaning, when they be objected against us in disputations and conflicts with the adversaries: we see no reason why Bertram may not deserve the like equity or favourable dealing, and diligent revising. This they profess among their friends (for their meaning was not that ever it should come to our sight:) and being that they hold all lying to be so sinful, that they may not tell a lie for the saving of a soul, it were too hard a censure to think, that against the light of their own consciences, they would so wilfully thrust themselves on that danger, and so boldly profess it in the ears of their friends. But by this fine art they can quiet the murmuring of their consciences, because by it, they can say any thing, never so false, and yet by a reservation, make it as true as the gospel. This consideration maketh me not to marvel, when in men, that profess such religious strictness, (as Father Persons b Mitigat. Ca 7. num. 34. & seqq. saith they do,) I find such broad and unreasonable expositions and glosses of Fathers and other Writers, as that no man of understanding who readeth the places, but will see, that the gloss doth corrupt the Text, and the expositions do clearly deprave the author's meaning. For I know that an equivocator hath an art, by which he can make all speeches to become true, if once they do but come forth of his mouth. Fourthly, It may serve them for devising and counterfeiting of strange apparitions, and heavenly visions, and divine miracles. This, how frequent it hath been heretofore, the wisest and most learned among their own Writers do confess and bewail. And of late years their own c The Author and the Publishers of the Jesuites catechism. Brethren do say, that the miracles and visions reported of d L. 1. c. 18. fol. 64. Ignatius, and e L. 1. c. 17. fol. 62. Justinian and f Ibid. Xavier, and others of the jesuitical strain and order, are not much better. And what should let us to think, but they which presume so much in other things, in ordine ad Deum, and pro bono societatis, in reference to God, and for the good of their Order; would not stick to fitte● and fain and tell of glorious facts, and admirable wonders which were never done, and make fair shows without substance, if these may help to advance the papal dignity, or the jesuitical order, especially seeing they know how to say and write and swear any thing for so great a good, without the least grudge of conscience? Fiftly, It may serve them for forging and diuulging of false, especially slanderous reports against their adversaries and enemies of their profession. A thing so generally and so boldly practised by the men of this faction, especially by the Fathers of Ignatius his Order, that g Relation of Religion, num. 33. Beza Red●●●. Epist. ad Gul. Stuck. wise men have much wondered, when in such politic persons as Jesuites are, they have seen and observed such a strange liberty in coining of forged tales, as that the untruths which they have broached, might well be called splendida mendacia, transparent lies, such as by their own light bewray themselves, or such as within a few day's might and have appeared to the world to be loud and lewd lies, that might shame their Master. And we might well wonder, if we knew not the Jesuites new art, that men of any either conscience or honest mind, could let pass out of their mouths, or from their pens, such shameful and yet shameless fictions. For example (to give the Reader a taste of their forgeries and lying slanders) Luther was a great maul, that battered their Babel; and of him they reported, and printed it too, that he was dead and buried, which was no great wonder: but (that which was worth the straining of their wits) when he lay a dying, he took order, that his body should be laid on the Altar, and adored as a God. And when he was dead, and buried, that there was such a terrible noise and tumult about his grave, as if heaven and earth had gone together. And the night after his burial, that there was a much greater and more hideous noise and shricking then before. And when, upon the occasion of this fearful noise, which frighted all the Citizens out of their sleep, his grave was opened the next day, there was neither body, nor bones, nor graue-clothes to be seen; but so hellish a stink came out of his grave, as with the poison of it, it had almost killed the standers by. And all this while Luther was alive, and did help to demolish their Babel still; and not long after the same time, published a book in print, & gave it this title, Contra papatum à diabolo institutum, Against the papacy sounded by the devil. This story if any man be desirous to see, he may read Melch. Adamus, in the book which he wrote of the lives of Germane divines. a In vita Luther● pag. 152. Where he may also read the words of the lying Relation, printed by them in Italian, and afterward translated into Latin. After this practice against Luther, they fell upon Calvin, the wounds of whose pen were deep in their sides; and of him they scattered this news in the Courts of the Germane Princes, and in a general Assembly in Germany, that Calvin now was weary of his Religion, had revolted, and was turned Papist. And at this very time, was he printing his book of Institutions: and in a b Directed to the Reader. Preface prefixed before this book, doth make answer to this slander, and telleth these lying Spirits, c Fallitur cum tota sua caterna diebolus, etc. The devil and all his rout of lying spirits are deceived, if they think by lading me with base lies, to discourage or hinder me in my course. In like manner, but with more shameless impudence, they afterward traduced Beza. Of whom there were not only false reports scattered through Italy, See the Jesuits Cate chisme, l. 1. cap. 17. f. 62. Germany, & other Countries, but letters also were written & diuulged to this purpose; That Beza a Vise morti vicinum sensit, ●oram pleno Sena●u genevensi palinodiam 〈◊〉. Beza Red●●●. Epist. Coloniâ misaâ, pag. 9 a little before his death had recanted his Religion in a full Assembly of the Senators of Geneva, beseeching them that if ever they would be saved, they should renounce Caluins errors, and betake themselves to the profession of the Romish faith; that for more full testification of his unfeigned conversion, after his death he desired them to send for and to be advised and directed by the Jesuites; that hereupon the Pope had appointed the Bishop of Geneva to absolve Beza, and other learned men, such as could be had near at hand, to go to Geneva, and consider of the business, and deal with the Inhabitants, if any were more backward, about points and Articles of Religion in question. After which Relation, the Reporter addeth, that this news is most certain and true; as may appear by the numberless company of letters written to this purpose, and will (as he saith) appear at the next Frankford Mart, by the store of books which would then fly abroad in the World, for the witnessing of this thing. He yet goeth on further, and for more abundant proof, telleth us, that Puteanus, the general of the Jesuites, who lived within twelve miles of Geneva, had by writing related this news, adding moreover, that himself was one of those Fathers, whom the Pope had appointed to go and instruct the Citizens of Geneva. Yea, and moreover, saith the Relator, the Landgrave of Hessen, being scared with this news, sent messengers to Geneva, who after their return confirmed all this to be true. This they reported of Beza; without either fear of God or reverence of men. For all this while Beza was alive; and continued preaching and writing against the superstitions and idolatries of the Roman Church, for diverse years after. And for the clearer detection of this shameless lie, he wrote a book, the title whereof is Beza rediviws, Beza returned to life again: Wherein he hath laid open the Jesuites forgeries, to the shame of their Order. I could bring more instances of their abominable forgeries of this kind, but I am afraid to cloy the Reader with such unsavoury fictions. Yet two examples there are, (both within mine own knowledge and experience) which I cannot omit, without some short rehearsal. The one is, of the famous divine, Doctor Rainolds, precedent of Corpus Christi college in Oxford: and the other, of the worthy Prelate Doctor King, Bishop of London, my ever-honoured Lord. Of the former, some well-willers to the Romane-Church, were discovered to have diuulged reports, in the time of his long sickness, (for he died of a lingering consumption) that he voided his own Ordure upward by the mouth: (of which lie what construction ill minds would frame, any man may easily conceive.) This report was brought to him while he was yet alive, which made him to send for the party, who was said to be the author, or at least a reporter of this forgery, and shown him what the matter was, that he used to spit out of his mouth, even the very same that other such sick men use to do. But these liars might have proceeded perhaps to fouler fictions, had they not been prevented by the timely providence of some learned, and his loving and religious friends. For they remembering and considering the shameless practices of Papists, in scattering false news to disgrace the Worthies of our Church, came to him the day before his death, put him in mind of their false dealing, and desired him, that for the preventing of such slanders after his death, he would now make an open confession of his faith, and constant belief. Which he being not able to do with his own mouth, his speech having failed him some days before, left the composing of a form of Confession to them, to which he would subscribe. And they considering his weakness, framed it in general and few words, in this manner▪ These are to witness unto all the world, that now in this my weakness, wherein I look for my dissolution, and hope shortly to be with my Christ, I die in a constant belief, persuasion, and profession of that holy truth of God, in defence whereof I have stood both by writing and speaking, against the Church of Rome, and what soever other Enemies of God's truth. And for mine own resolution touching mine own state of salvation after this life, I assure myself thereof, by the merits of Christ Jesus only, into whose hands I commend my spirit, as unto my faithful Redeemer. To this he readily subscribed with his own hand; john Rainolds. And his friends then present, who had been eye-witnesses and eare-witnesses of the whole passage of this business, did by their hands witness the truth of the act to the world, in these words: That he made this Subscription with his own hand, with such willingness and cheerfulness, as ministered great comfort unto us, who were then present; we testify by this subscription of our names also hereunto. May 20. 1607. Henry Airay vicechancelor. Henry Wilkinson. Edward Rilston. Richard Taylor. Henry Hindle. Daniel Faireclough. Henry Mason. Alexander How. john Dewhurst. The original hereof signed with Doctor Rainolds own hand, and subscribed by the afore-named parties, I have in my custody: out of which this is a true and faithful Transcript here published. Now blessed be his counsel, and blessed be he of the Lord, that gave this advice for the stopping of these slanderous mouths. For had not this prevention been used aforehand, we may fear that such as belied him in his sickness, would not have spared him after his death. And for want of some such providence and prevention it is, that that reverend and learned Prelate, (whose memory is precious with all good men that knew him) our late Bishop of Lo●don I mean, mine ever-honoured Lord and patron: for want, I say, of some such providence aforehand, this glorious soul hath been traduced by worthless pens, and foul-mouthed fiends (the indignity of the thing maketh me, against my nature and custom, to give them that name whereof they are most worthy) as if he had made defection to the Roman Church; to whose errors notwithstanding he shown himself an Enemy to his dying-day: as those that knew him inwardly, do know very well, how in the very time of his sickness, he spared not upon occasion to express his zeal that way. But of all foule-mouthes, that have slandered that blessed soul, he that wrote the Bishop of London's legacy, is the most shameless and impudent liar. The Author of the Protestants plea is but a milksop to this noble Champion: and Father Persons himself must now be forced to resign up to him the Whetstone, which his secular Brethren bestowed upon him for his excellency in the fittening Trade. For they and other of their fellows, have played their prizes well: 〈…〉. but this L●yer excelleth them all. He hath made two publications of one individual book, qualifying, or rather destroying in the latter, some transparent lies, which with an whore's forehead, and without regard of the world's censure, he had averred in the former. For, in the year 1622. when he first diuulged this libel, he made the worthy Bishop to speak those silly motives, which his worthless self ●ad devised. And so he went masked under the Bishop's name: but with such difformity and disproportion every way, as made me remember the ass in the Fable; which presuming to wear the lion's skin, did by his long ears bewray himself to be an ass notwithstanding. He saith, that the Bishop himself did pen those motives, and delivered them to this Publisher, this public liar, to be committed to the press. I would the world were worthy to understand what rare man this is, that had such inward acquaintance with that learned and wise Bishop, as to hear from him the secrets of his heart, and to receive from him the studied Reasons of his conversion, which were never made known to any body else. And sure, it were a great honour to see that face, that could come and go, and converse with the Bishop about these weighty affairs, and in this serious manner, without being once seen of any other man; as if by the virtue of some Gyges his Ring, he had been transformed into an invisible Spirit. But he goeth on, and saith that the man is known that reconciled the Bishop to the Roman Church. But it is to be feared, he will never make known the man's name to the world, lest if the Reconciler should prove more shamefast, than this Publisher is, he might return the lie upon the Author that devised it, and spit his shame in his own face. And yet say, he both can and will name the man, what great mastery is in this? or what great credit might such a circumstance, coming from an equivocator, gain to his cause? For did not Puteanus the provincial of the Jaesuites, name the man that reconciled Beza to their Church? Yes▪ He said expressly (not with Ifs and Ands, as this Publisher doth) that the man was the Bishop of Geneva. And did he not name beside, both the man that was sent to catechise the Citizens of Geneva in the Roman Faith; and the man that sent messengers to inquire of this news in Geneva, & found it to be true? Yes. For, for the one▪ he nameth himself, who among others, was going to Geneva to instruct them. And for the other, he nameth the landgrave of Hessen, who was a Prince not fare off, and knew the undoubted truth of this news. Jesuites and equivocators are ashamed of nothing. And yet, I would we might be so much beholding to this Publisher, as to publish the reconcilers' name, that performed so great a work for this great man. To this purpose this public liar spoke in the first publication of his book; which not long after was suppressed and kept from the view of the world. I suppose, some of his superiors more wary than himself, being ashamed of such shining lies, did call in the book, till some kind of qualification might temper those shameless and hideons untruths. And then in the year following 1623. he made a new publication of the same worthy work, changing only the Title-leafe, and the Preface to the Reader. And in this second publication, he is contented to own his own abortive Brat, which in the former he had without shame fathered upon the worthy Bishop: and wisheth that himself may be taken to have written those motives, as a precedent or pattern warranting any Protestant in the change of his Religion, though by a poetical freedom peculiarly applied to the Bishop. And whereas throughout the whole book, he maketh the Bishop speak what himself had forged; he now giveth his Reader leave with his full consent and allowance, to suppose all these passages to be fictiones personarum, and warranted by the figure Prosopopeia, that is, a fiction of the Person. It were some sign of grace, if he had acknowledged the whole fiction, as he doth this part of it. But he goeth on still: and even in the new altered Preface, or advertisement to the Reader, he accuseth the Bishop of defection from his Religion; and by a figurative kind of preterition, he spareth pere●●p●orily to affirm, that the Bishop did write and deliver to others any Reasons or motives of his change in Religion. In which speech, this Slanderer would have his Reader to understand that, which himself dareth not speak; that when it shall appear to be a shameless forgery, he may wipe his mouth with the Whore in the proverbs, and say, that he said it not. But, foule-mouth, if thou hast any thing to say, spit out: and labour to give some satisfaction to the World, to avoid the evidence of cozening the living, and slandering the dead. For know, that the World already is possessed with this opinion, that thou must needs be some ignorant Jesuite▪ (for none else can be imagined to be so Bayardly bold.) And if now thou forbear to produce some proof, or some probability, or some possibility, how these things might be; we shall resolve upon it, that Persons his ghost is risen from the dead, and hath brought with him seven other spirits worse and more lying then himself▪ and that that is the reason, why such vast and shameless Forgeries do show themselves in this man. But I leave this liar for this time: and humbly pray the Worthies of our Church, that they would take these things into their consideration: and as men that deal with thorns, do fence their hands with thick gloves; so seeing they do live, and must die in the midst of such slanderous Tongues, they would arm themselves against such malice, by an open profession of their Faith, at such times especially as they are ready to leave the World; lest they may be slandered after their deaths, when they will want liberty to defend themselves. But here I stay my course. For I perceive I have in part digressed already; and yet not so, as that I am gone from the matter in hand. For I was saying, that equivocation did serve the Masters of it for this turn among others; that by it they might without scruple of cons●lence, defame and belie the Worthies of our Church, that so they might gain the more credit to their own. Now how they use to defame our learned men, I have declared fully by this digression, if the Reader will so esteem it: and what use equivocation may stand them in this practice, will not be hard for any man to conceive. For a wonder it might seem, that men of any religion or conscience, should endure themselves, while they broach such broad-faced lies. But the art of equivocation will presently remove all such scruple or grudge. For it teacheth how to speak all untruths, without telling of the least lie: and so the equivocator needeth not to have any scruple in that respect. And this doubt being once removed, there can be no further let to hinder their proceeding. For, what though the heretics complain of wrong and injustice done to them in their good name? that skilleth not. For, in ordine ad Deum, and pro bono Societatis, that is lawful enough, or rather very meritorious. For the a Reply to Persons Libel. pag. 18. Seculars tell us, that when a Priest complained to the Jesuites, or some one among them, of wrong done to Master Bennet by their defamation, reply was made, that it was necessary or convenient he should be disgraced, because he was against their society. Where the Author or Authors of that book add further, that the Jesuites hold such devilish Principles, whereby they may at pleasure defame whom they please. And if they take such liberty of Conscience against their own Catholic Brethren; they will out of question make no bones to slander and disgrace an heretic. This then is one turn among the rest, and it is a special one and of great use for their purpose, that by this art of equivocating, they can defame and disgrace, and (as we plain-dealers do call it) belie whom they will, without any offence or grudge of conscience. Sixtly, In ordinary dealings and course of life, equivocation may serve them, for concealing of any truth, or persuading of any untruth, if either of them may make for their advantage. So a Comment. in c. Human. aur. q. 3. nu. 13. Navarre telleth us, that if we be asked what we have eaten, how much money we have, what we have heard, etc. In these and all such cases as these, if there be advantage to be gotten by it, we may by this fine art, conceal the truth, or speak an untruth, so as by subintellection▪ or a mental reservation, we make up the matter. And the b Reply to Persons Libel. pag. 23. Seculars tell us, that the Jesuites make equivocation to serve their turns so frequently in this kind, as, that their own Catholic Brethren; nay, their fellow- Priests can scarce tell when they speak sincerely, when otherwise. They might have added, no nor their holy Father the Pope neither. For, Father Standish cozened and deluded him also, by equivocation, thereby to oppress the Secular Priests; as c Reply to Persons Libel. cap. 3. pag. 57 True Relation pag. 55, 56. Quods. 3. art. 4. pag. 66. in the Margin. they complain in diverse places of their books. And if this art can serve for this turn, when they deal with his holiness himself; no marvel if they make the same use of it, whensoever they have to deal with 〈…〉 enemy's of their religion: as Father 〈…〉 who d answer to a Letter of a jesuited Gentleman, p. 104. giving his Faith, in verbo 〈…〉 prisoner to the knight-marshal, yet did 〈…〉 word and that Oath. But the good Father (say his Secular Brethren) had perhaps some mental 〈◊〉▪ wherewith to rescue his soul, at least from remorse, though not from the devil. As for example, as he was in that mind he would be true prisoner, or for any thing the Keeper should know to the contrary, till he were escaped; or that he meant not to run away on his head, but on his feet; or that he would not break away so long as the knight-marshal or his deputy stood by and looked on; or that he wo●ld not break away as a Priest, but is a Jesuite; or that he would not 〈◊〉 with a mind ever to come again with his will 〈◊〉 that null● fides s●uanda Haereticis; or, how many Orseolo might I make upon this point? saith the Author of that book. But the point is plain, and as well proved to be true, of all sorts, as here it is affirmed of the Jesuites; though I will not deny these Fathers the precedency in this practice. Equivocation then serveth for many singular turns, and for uses of great consequence and moment: and therefore it is no marvel that they do so hug and embrace it, as a darling of great worth. CHAP. V. Of the Grounds and Arguments, either for or against equivocation. IN setting down the Reasons on either side, I shall not need to be long; because I have been large already in unfolding the nature and conditions of this Art, in the points hitherto spoken of: and the discovery of such a monstrous device is argument enough to disprove it. It may then be sufficient for this place, first, to answer the chief Arguments, which are brought in defence of it; and then in the second place, to set down some few Reasons, that may refute it. And first, for their Arguments, they are many in particular; for Father Persons findeth 8 or 9 at least, in one piece of a Chapter: & how many then might he have found, if he had sought all the Chapters of the Bible, in the like manner? But the Wren hath more birds than the Eagle: and errors do more usually abound with their rotten proofs, than Truths do with sound and substantial Reasons. And it is no marvel. For a false Conclusion hath no direct or good proof at all: and cavils and impertinent flourishes for every thing, may be infinite and without number. And so it is in this case. For such proofs, as the 8 or 9 are, which Father Persons findeth in one Chapter, he might have found 8 or 900 in the compass of the Bible. But howsoever the particular allegations be so many; yet all of them may easily be reduced to some few heads: and so many of them together may be cut off at one blow. The Heads then, to which the substance of all that they say, may be reduced, are these three. 1. Examples of holy men. 2. Examples of God himself. And 3. Examples of Jesus Christ our blessed 〈◊〉. And first, for Examples of holy men, they being in, the patriarchs and Prophets, Gen. 20. ●. and other Saints of God. For Abraham, say they, did equivocate, when he said of Sarah, Gen. 27. 19 that she was his Sister: and 〈◊〉, when he said, Exod. 5. 1. & 8. 27. I am thy firstborn Esau● and Moses, when he said to Pharaoh, that they would 〈…〉 the wilderness, but meant to go to 〈◊〉 and Samuel, when he said, 1. Sam. 16. 1, 2. he went to offer 〈◊〉, but principally intended to anoint David to be King of Israel: and David, 1. Sam. 21. 2. when he told Ahimelech▪ The King 〈…〉 a business, etc. and jeremy, when ●o question of the Nobles, who demanded of him, What saidst thou to the King, jer. 38. 25, etc. etc. He answered, I presented my supplication to the King, that he would not cause me to return to Jonathans' house, to 〈◊〉 there: whereas he talked with 〈◊〉, concerning his yielding up to the King of Babylon. For answer to these and the like, I note 〈◊〉 things, by way of preamble. 1. That the old heretics, th● Priscillianists, who defended the lawfulness of 〈◊〉, as now the Papists do of equivocating, did allege 〈◊〉 same places and examples, at least m●ny of them, for proof of their heresy; which our Jesuites do for confirmation of their opinion. And they had better show of reason then these men have; for diverse of those Instances were either direct and culpable untruths, or seemed at least to border too near upon such obliquity: but as for this new found equivocation by mental reservation, it hath no show nor semblance of probability, to be gathered from them. 2. That neither S. Augustin, who most diligently confuted those heretics, nor any other ancient Writer, for answering of these objections, did ever flee to this art of equivocation; or once say, that those Fathers and holy men did not lie in any of those speeches, for that they spoke the truth by a mental reservation. Which answer, if it had been true, had been most pertinent and easy; as our late, equivocators do not only confess, but brag of it too. For a Comm●n C. Human. aures q. 3. nu. 7. Navarre saith; that from his doctrine of equivocation, there ariseth, or may be gathered, nows modus excusandi à mendacio Patriarchas, a new way to excuse the patriarches from lying. Where, when he saith that it is a new way, he acknowledgeth that it was not known to St. Augustin, or those other Worthies, who in former times did beat down these errors of the heretics. And when he saith, that this way ariseth out of his doctrine, he intimateth, that if the Fathers had known this, they might easily have answered the Priscillianists, by interpreting those Texts after his new way. Now from hence it followeth, that the Ancients did not understand these passages of Scripture, as making any thing for equivocation. And therefore, when equivocators allege S. Augustin, and some others of the Fathers, for their interpretation, they abuse both their Readers, and the ancient Fathers. These things being first noted, I come to give a more direct answer to the objections; and it is this; As they affirm, so I deny, that these or any of these sayings alleged, were meant, or are to be understood and construed with any Equivocal reservation. Yes, say they, that they are. For if they be not so construed, they are apparent lies, which may not be supposed of those holy men. Answ. 1. If they be not understood and made true by mental reservation, they are apparent lies, say they. If this do not follow, than our equivocators do great wrong to those ancient Worthies. And plain it is, for diverse of them, that they do so. For when Abraham said of Sarah, She is my Sister; and when Moses said to Pharaoh, We must go three days etc. and when Samuel said to the Elders of Bethleem, I am come to sacrifice unto the Lord—; and when jeremy said, I presented my supplication etc. these speeches were all of them true, in the words as they lie, and according to the common acception and meaning of them. And therefore there is in them no jesuitical equivocation, in which the words are false, till a secret thought doth make them true. And in this sense, and to this purpose, Abraham doth interpret his own meaning, and explain his words. For when Abimelech challenged him for concealing his wife, and asked, What sawest thou, that thou hast done this thing? he answered for himself, Gen. 20. 11, 12. Because I thought, Surely, the fear of God is not its this place, etc. and yet indeed she is my Sister; she is the daughter of my Father, but not the daughter of my Mother. In which answer we may note three things. 1. He showeth the reason which moved him to conceal her to be his wife; Because I thought the fear of God, etc. 2 He defendeth his speech to be true as the words do sound; and yet indeed she is my Sister. q. d. That which I said is very true. And hereby it appeareth, that Abraham did not equivocate; because Abraham's words in their usual signification, and as they were uttered by him, were true: but the words of an equivocator, as they are uttered, are false, till an inward reservation do patch them up, and make a truth of them. And it further hereby appeareth also, that F. Persons did not only belie Abraham, but Almighty God himself, when he saith, that a apology for Eccles. Subo●d. c. 12. in the end fol. 202. both Abraham and Sarah said, that she was not his Wife, but his Sister: and that this was one among diverse sayings and speeches in Scripture allowed by the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, Abraham explaineth his words, or rather showeth how they were true and unfeigned, and that is, because she b So S. Aug. interpreteth this place, lib. contra mendac. cap. 10. was his near kinswoman on the father's side, and such women in the usual language of those Countries, were called their Sisters. Abraham then showeth that his speech was true, because the thing was so, as his words did sound; and not because he had some secret reservation in his mind, by addition whereof they became true▪ And this showeth again, that in these words of Abraham, there was no equivocation, such as our new Doctros do imagine. And Abraham's example in interpreting his own words, may serve us for a pattern to interpret the rest by. And so; as he said, Indeed she is my Sister, as I said: so we may say of them, Indeed, and intruth the things were so, as they said. Only in these examples, though all that was said, was true: yet something that was true, was concealed; which we grant to be lawful: nor doth it any way help the Jesuites, or favour their imaginary fiction. Answ. 2. When they say, If the speeches be not understood with mental reservation, than those men told a lie: I answer, that that may be granted of some of them, without any absurdity, or wrong of those worthy men. For if we be forced to confess, that David did commit murder, why should we be afraid to confess that he told a lie, if he uttered any such words as had not a true meaning, as our equivocators say that he did? And if we grant it in David, what harm is there, to acknowledge it in others of God's best servants, if by the Text and their own speeches, any such thing do appear? If then any of these holy men did speak words which were untrue, we may without inconvenience grant, that as they did sin in other things, so they might in this: and therefore herein we must not take example by them, to do as they have done before us. This answer S. Augustin maketh to the Priscillianists, when they alleged the example of ancient men and women, to prove that Lying was lawful. For a Haec quando in scriptures sancti● legimus, non ideo quia facta credimus, etiam faciend● cred●mus, ne violem●● praecepta, dum passim s●ctamur exempla. Aug. contra menda●. c. 9 p. 18. A. when we read of these things in the Scriptures (saith he) we must not therefore think that we may do them, because we know that they did do them; lest we violate commandments, while without choice we follow examples. Say then, that the words of some of those holy men cannot have a good meaning or true construction, in themselves considered; it will be no inconvenience, to grant that such good men did therein do amiss, and made a Lye. And (to speak more particularly to the point) so I think Jacob did, when he said, I am thy firstborn Esa●: and David, when he said, that he had made a road against the South of Judah, etc. 1. Sam. 27. 10. And so we may say of Rahab, and the midwives of Egypt, and some others. Object. But S. Augustin b Contra mendac. cap. 10. doth excuse those words of Jacob, from being a lie. Answ. 1. Be it so. Yet S. Augustin doth not interpret them to be understood and made true by any reservation in the mind. And this doth no way help our equivocators at all. 2. Say that S. Augustin do give unto those words a more favourable construction; yet Cornelius à Lapide disliketh that, and preferreth the other opinion, which granteth that Jacob did lie, in Gen. 27. 19 before this of S. Augustin. And for that interpretation, he citeth S. chrusostom, Lyra, Caietan, Lippoman, Pererius, and others. 3. Dominicus Soto, Relect. de Secreto memb. 3. q. 3. Conclus. 7. pag. 3●1. a learned friar, doth defend or excuse both Saint Augustine & Jacob in this manner; It may be (quod puto sentit Augustinus, Which I think was Augustine's meaning) that those words of Jacob, were used in that country, in that signification and meaning that they might be uttered by him, without telling a lie. But howsoever it be, Jacob was so plain a man, (saith à Lapide) that it is not to be supposed that he did use equivocation in his speech: nor doth any of former time so understand his words. 2. The second head of Arguments, containeth the example of almighty God, the God of Truth. But what hath this just God, this God of Truth done or said, for which he should be thought to equivocate, that is, to keep one meaning to himself, and to deliver another to his people, and by a double-sensed proposition to deceive them, whom he professeth to teach? Yes, say these men, he said to Niniveh, Yet forty days and Niniveh shall be overthrown, jon. 3. 4. And he said to Ezekias, Set thine house in order: for thou shalt die and not live. I●. 38. 1. And yet neither of these came to pass, according to these words spoken. And therefore they are not true, unless they be helped by some inward reservation, seeing in the sense that the words yield, they were not fulfilled. Answ. These and other such speeches of God, are words of Commination and threatening. Now words of Commination in Scripture, are meant by almighty God that spoke them, and are understood by men that hear them, with exception of repentance and amendment, or some such conditions in the persons against whom they are uttered, as may move GOD to revoke the sentence. For God himself hath declared his own meaning to be so, in such like sentences and speeches. a jer. 18. 7, 8. At what instant (saith he) I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up and to pull down, and to destroy it: if that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil, that I thought to do unto them. And b Ezek. 33. 13. when I shall say to the Righteous, etc. And when I say to the Wicked, Thou shalt surely die: if he turn from his sin, etc. none of his sins, that he hath committed, shall be mentioned unto him▪ etc. And according to this plain Rule given by God himself concerning his own words, we are to understand God's threatenings, with some such exception. As for example, yet forty days, and 〈◊〉, etc. that is, unless Nineu●h repent, and obtain God's favour for their preservation. And, Thou shalt die, etc. that is, unless thou by prayer and humiliation obtain God's favour, to lengthen thy life beyond the ordinary course, or such like. And these exceptions are not secret reservations, kept in Gods own breast, and concealed from the hearers, as the jesuites reservations are; but they are conceived and ever have been understood by men acquainted with God's language, to be meant by the very words. And therefore when God had threatened the Jews, yet the Prophet exhorteth them to repentance, that so they might move God to stay his judgements, c Joel 2. 14. Who knoweth (saith he) if he will return and repent, and leave a blessing behind him? And Daniel, when he had told Nebuchaduezzar of God's Decree against him, yet he giveth him counsel d Dan. 4. 27. to break off his sins by righteousness, and his iniquity by showing mercy to the poor, that this might be a means to lengthen his tranquillity. Yea, and in the very examples alleged to the contrary, when Jonas pronounced, yet forty days, etc. the men of Nineu●h, as either having had some advertisement thereof by Scriptures, or by some of God's people, or conceiving so much by the common light of reason, they did understand these words of the Prophet as a threatening, that employed an exception of repentance. And therefore the King with his Nobles proclaimeth a Decree, a Jonah 3. 8, 9 Let Man and Beast be covered with sackcloth, and cry mightily unto God, etc. For, who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not? And when God had threatened Ezekiah, Set thine house, etc. yet Ezekiah b Isai. 38. 2. turned his face to the wall, and prayed to the Lord, etc. Where his prayer for freedom, showeth that he understood not Gods threatening to be meant without exception. And thus the people of God have ever been wont to understand such like speeches, till our late Doctors of Rome have made God to be an equivocator, that they might allege him for a patron of their sin. The third head of Arguments, containeth the example of our blessed saviour; who though he were the Truth itself, and that there was never any guile found in his mouth, yet these men will needs draw him in, to be a favourer and ringleader of their falsehoods and untruths. And so did their Predecessors, the Priscillianists do before them. For they (as c Contra Mendac. cap. 2. pag. 14. A. Saint Augustine saith of them) for defence of their Doctrine of lying, brought testimonies out of Scriptures, and encouraged their scholars by the examples of patriarches, and Prophets, and Apostles, and Angels, non dubitantes addere etiam ipsum Dominum Christum, making no scruple to adjoin also our Lord Jesus Christ, as a pattern of their lies. And right so for all the world, do our equivocators deal nowadays. They bring examples of patriarches, and Prophets, and Apostles, and blessed Angels, not fearing to draw in God himself, and Jesus Christ his blessed son, to be Abettors of their frauds. But of God we have heard what they say already: let us now hear what they say of Jesus Christ: and how, and when, and wherein he used this art of equivocation. Yes, say they, he did equivocate, when being with two of his Disciples, d Luk. 24. 28. he made as though he would go further: and when speaking of the day of judgement, he said, a Mar. 13. 3●. But of that day and that hour knoweth no man—, nor the Son, but the Father only: and when he said to his Brethren, b joh. 7. 8. Persons Mitig. c. 7. num. 29. pag. 293. Ego non ascendam, etc. I will not go up to Jerusalem to this Feast, and yet he meant to go up, and so went; and diverse other times. Ans. Neither in these, nor in any other place, was our Lord, the spotless lamb of God, ever found to equivocate, according to the rules of this new Arte. Not in the first place, Luke 24. 28. For first, there our Lord is said to do something; he made as though he would go further: but he is not said there to have said any thing in which this supposed reservation might be understood. Ob. Yes, but deeds also may signify as well as words. Ans. deeds sometimes are equivalent to words, and do signify as well as words do: and that is, when as words, so they do declare our meaning, ex instituto, or by some kind of compact and agreement among men. And that may be done two ways. First, expressly, when some words joined with the deeds, do declare that to be the meaning and purpose of him that useth them. As when Judas kissed his Master: this signified that he was Jesus, whom they came to apprehend, because before he had given them this sign, c Matt. 26. 48. Whomsoever I shall kiss, that same is he. And when Jesus gave a sop to Judas, that signified that he was the Traitor, because he had told them before, d joh. 13. 26. He it is, to whom I shall give a sop, when I have dipped it. And so, when an oath is ministered or tendered unto us, if we lay the hand upon the book, and kiss it, this signifieth that we consent to the taking of the Oath, because that is appointed and required for this purpose. Secondly, deeds may be equivalent to words, when by some outward circumstances we do declare, that we intent them as signs of our meaning, and do refer and use them to that purpose. In this kind, we may see a man, who is borne deaf and dumb, to talk and confer with his neighbours. And in this kind a shrug of the shoulder, (if as Persons saith, it be so meant and taken in Italy) may be a sign, and have the signification of a Negation or denial. And when a man openeth his mouth, and showeth a defect in his tongue, and maketh a gabbling noise and undistinct sound, this is a signifying deed, and doth import that that man is dumb. In either of these kinds, deeds and gestures are equivalent to words, and may contain truth or falsehood in them, as well as words do. But else, deeds and gestures, if in some such manner, ex instituto, by appointment and agreement among men, a Facta nihil huc auin●●, nisi certam & expectatam 〈◊〉 altera parte sine siga● ficat●onem si●e quasi respension● contra 〈◊〉 de●●●u. Abbot. Antilog. c. 2. Pag. 26. And again, Otio●è totum hoc de shategemets vs●●satcy quia nulla ibi consiliorum Communicatio, nulla signorum intercessio, quae mentibus nostris inui●em aperiendis constituta sunt. Ibid. pag. 26. they be not referred and intended for signification of our mind, though they may carry show, and men may gather some meaning from them, yet they are not equivalent to words; neither is there any lie contained in it, though the show be not answerable to the thing. And such a deed as this, was that of our saviour, when he shown by his gesture, a purpose of going further: and therefore this needeth no reservation to make it true; seeing without any reservation it hath no false or lying signification, such as words have. And thus Lucas Brugensis, a learned divine of the Roman Church, doth understand and interpret this place. His words (that the Reader may judge of his meaning the better) are these, b Non magis in ●oc facto video inendacij specie, quam in eo quod simulavit se peregrinum seu ●●ator●m. Lucas B●ugens. in hunc locum. I see ●o more show of a lie in this fact of Christ, then when before he seemed to be a stranger or a way-faring man. And he giveth his reason, why he thinketh there is no untruth in this deed and gesture, c Magaum discrimen est inter voba & opera● verba exp●●ma iustitutione, significandi vim habent; non item opera. for there is a great difference between words and deeds. For words by their first institution have the power or use of signifying; but so have not deeds. And hence he inferreth that deeds, actions, and gestures, though oftentimes they be, yet they are not always signs either of some ensuing action to follow, or of our present purpose and meaning; nor have they the nature of a lie in them, etiamsi ad decipiendum aliquando siunt, though they be sometimes done, to deceive the understanding of the beholder, and to make him believe that which is not true. So that if our Lord did make show of going further, and intended it not, as Father Persons saith; yet in this learned man's judgement, there was no lie in it: and consequently there needeth no mental reservation to save it from being a lie. Secondly, and more agreeably to our saviour's mind, we may answer and say, that our Lord made as if he would go further: yea, and meant it too, if their entreaties and importunity had not stayed him. Therefore the Text saith, They constrained him; that is, they importuned him to stay; and he, overcome by their entreaty, stayed with them. The clearer meaning of which words, we may the better conceive and understand by a like speech, Luke 9 53. For there it is said, The Samaritans received him not, because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem; that is, by his behaviour it seemed that he meant to go thither: and so he did mean it indeed. And so in this place, when it is said, that he made as though he would go fur●●●r; the meaning is, that he took his leave, and bade them farewell, or used some other such like behaviour, which made it seem, that he meant to go further. Yea, and so he meant indeed, saving that at their request he was contented to abide with them. And thus Barradius, and Ribera, two famous Jesuites, do interpret this place. We may answer saith the one of them, a Barrad. to. 4. l. 8. c. 1●. pag. 356. 2. Dominun voluisse ulteriùs progredi, si non retineretur à Discipulis, etc. That our Lord indeed would have gone further, had he not been detained by his Disciples, and that there was no untruth in this show. And the other, a Ribera in Amos 2. nu. 21. pag. 344. Nihil veritas fingii, Christ who is the Truth doth not feign any thing. But the common sort might think that he did feign, but it was no fiction or counterfeiting; b Si enim eum non 〈◊〉, tra●●●sset sine dubio, & iss●t loggins. For if they had not detained him, he out of doubt had passed by, and had gone on further. Thus not only the evidence of truth, but the authority of Romish Doctors and Jesuites do vindicate this place from that false gloss that Persons putteth upon it; and do free our Lord Jesus from that slanderous imputation, which the Jesuite doth lay upon him, when c Mitig. cap. 9 nu. 58. pa. 386. he saith that Christ in this place did equivocate: and when d Mitig. cap. 9 nu. 72. pa. 397. he calleth this dealing of his, The dissimulation and fiction of our saviour. The second place mentioned, and produced for equivocation, is that speech of our saviour, Mar. 13. Of that day, and that hour, etc. This pr●position (saith e Mitig ca 9 nu. 45. pa. 378. Persons) had some reservation of mind, for that otherwise it had been false. Ans. Not so▪ Nay this inference of the Jesuite is false and foolish too: for our saviour, according to his wont manner elsewhere, speaketh of himself, as he was reputed and known to be, that is, as he was man. And in that sense, the words have an usual and clear construction and signification; which is, that as he was man, he knew not of that day. This interpretation (as f Mitig. cap. 9 num 48. Persons doth acknowledge) is given by ancient Fathers in great number. Nor is this a mental reservation, as Persons would have his ignorant Reader to believe: but an interpretation usually meant and understood by Christians, in these and such like speeches as these. And therefore our saviour in this sentence did not keep one secret sense to himself in his inward mind, and signify another to his Disciples in the words uttered. But if it be an equivocation, such as they fancy, what then shall the reservation be? Persons, knowing that no man before the late invention of this new Art, did ever think of secret reservations, or mental imaginations in our saviour's words; calleth every Exposition that any good Author giveth, by the name of reservation, and reckoneth that Author, for a favourer of his, like the mad man in Athenaeus, who when any ship came to the haven, put it in his Tables as one of his own. I. c. nu. 49. But that which carrieth most show of a reservation, is this; The son doth not know the day of judgement, meaning that he knew it not so, as he would discover it unto them. For this explication is given by Saint Augustine, and other Fathers, saith Persons; and he addeth, (as triumphing in so plain a proof) that this exposition expresseth the very same reservation in Christ's words, which they talk of in their mixed and equivocal propositions. Ans. To this I answer two things: First, That the Exposition given by those Fathers, doth not imply any equivocal reservation. Secondly, That it doth not give the true sense or meaning of the place. First, It containeth not any jesuitical reservation. For those Fathers which give that interpretation, The son knoweth not; that is, not to make you know it: or rather, the son knoweth it not; that is, he doth not make you to know it; do fetch and gather this exposition, not from any secret conceit reserved in our saviour's mind, but from the use and acception and signification of the word, as it is used in Scripture. For so, say they, this word, scio or novi, is often used. As when God said to Abraham, Gen. 22. 12. Now I know that thou feare●● God: Deut. 13. 3. and to the Israelites, The Lord your God proveth you, that he may know, whether ye love the Lord, etc. the meaning is, that he may make you to know. And from this use of the word scio, to know, frequent, as they say, in Scriptures; they think they may be the like reason, keeping the same proportion of speech, interpret the word Nescit, knoweth not the day; that is, he doth not make you to know it. Concerning which meaning of the father's exposition, if the learned Reader desire any further proof, Rob. Abbot An●●l. cap. 2. pag. 22, & 23. he may have enough to satisfy his mind, in that reverend and learned Bishop who wrote against Eudaemon-Ioannes. Now this interpretation of the word, being drawn from the usual acception of it in Scripture, is nothing at all to the Jesuites purpose, who fancieth a secret clause kept in the mind, but no way included in the use of the word. Secondly, This interpretation, The son knoweth no●; that is, he doth not reveal or make it known to you, as it maketh nothing for the Jesuites equivocation, so it is not greatly to our saviour's meaning. My reasons are two. First, If that were the meaning, than it would follow, that the Father did so know the day of judgement, as that he did reveal it unto them. For that which this sentence doth deny of the son, it doth by virtue of the exceptive particle adjoined, affirm of the Father; No man, no nor the son doth know it, but the Father. Where, if we fill up the construction, and make the sentence perfect, the whole speech must be this; No man, nor angel, neither the son, doth know it, but the Father he doth know it. Now in this speech take the word [know] in the sense of those Fathers, he knoweth; that is, he maketh to know, and then the sentence thus expounded, in plain words will be this, No man, nor the Angels, neither the son, doth make you to know the day of judgement: but the Father he doth make you to know it. But this is not true of the Father; and therefore that is not the true interpretation or meaning of the word. My second reason is, Our saviour in these words, No man— knoweth; meant to show how secret and unknown the day and hour of God's judgement was; but take the word in this sense, he knoweth not; that is, he revealeth not, or doth not make you to know: and then this sentence doth not imply or infer or signify any secrecy of that day. For, if thousands knew it, yet it might be said of them all, They know it not; that is, they do not reveal it, or make you to know it. And consequently, this interpretation doth cross our saviour's meaning, and overthrew that, for which he intended it. Now, lay these together, and then there is less than nothing in our saviour's speech for the Jesuites purpose: both because the word cannot bear that sense in this place, which only might seem to favour them; and because, that sense, as it was understood by the Fathers, was not meant to include any such reservation. And so I have done with this second place, which is the one of the places, that Doctor Norrice did defend his equivocation by. Only, lest some Popish caviller, according to their usual manner, should raise clamours after me, that I do deny and gainsay the exposition of the Fathers: let the Reader remember, that the other interpretation, which I follow, is confessed by Father Persons to be given by other Fathers in great number. And again, if any shall quarrel with me for leaving an exposition of some Fathers, where I have so good reason for it; let him know, that I can produce diverse of their own Writers, who do reject as great a number, and perhaps upon lesser reason. Thirdly, The third testimony is from the words of our saviour, John 7. 8. which Father Persons and other equivocators recite thus, Ego non ascendam ad diem festum istum, I will not go up to Jerusalem to this Feast; and yet (say they) he meant to go● up, and so he went. And therefore here he had a secret reservation. Asw. They corrupt the Text two ways, 1 by altering the words. 2 by perverting the sense. 1. By altering the words. For the original Greek is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, I do not yet go up. And their authentic Latin, Ego non ascendo, I do not go up. And whereas some Copies had corruptly read it, non ascendam, I will not go; a Roman. Correct. Joh. 7. 8. Lucas Bragensis, lest any man might afterward mistake, hath given admonition, that according to the Roman Correction of their Bible, set forth by the Pope's authority, they may not change ascendo into ascendam. Yea, and their Rhemists read it in their English Translation, I go not up to this festival day. Which was true in the very Letter, & meant by our saviour according to the express words. For he did not mean then to go up, but afterward when time served. And yet our equivocators, to gain some show from our saviour's words, do corrupt not only the original and truly authentics Greeke, but their own Latin Text too. But it is no marvel: for such a false art could never be upheld by true dealing. 2. By perverting the sense. For say the words had been, I will not go up, as Persons and Doctor Norice, and others would fame have it: yet the circumstances of the Text do show, that that could not be meant of the whole time during the feast, or that he would not go up at all; because it followeth in the next words by way of reason, because my time is not yet accomplished, as the Rhemists translate it; or because my time is not yet fully come, as it is more plainly in our Translation. Which words do plainly show his meaning to be this, that he would not then go, when they would have him: but would go when he saw his own time. And this he might both do and mean, according to the plain sense of the words spoken. By which it may appear, that it is want of proof, and weakness of their cause, that made them to draw in this Text, which is so clear against them. And so, it is the very same reason also, that forceth them (for necessity hath no law) to produce the many other speeches of our saviour, which have as much affinity with Popish equivocation, as there is agreement between Christ and Belial, or between Christ and Antichrist: as I could easily show, if it were convenient to stand upon all their frivolous & idle allegations. But I think it not worth the while, either to tyre the Reader, or to trouble myself with such fond cavils. Only for a general answer to them all, let this be remembered; that there is never a Text produced by them for this purpose, but that learned expositors, both ancient and modern, as well of their Church, as of ours, do interpret and expound it in some determinate sense, which they gather or observe either from the signification of the words, or the use & application of them in the Scriptures, or from some circumstances or considerations in the Text itself. And therefore such Texts, in the judgement of all such Interpreters, are not to be expounded or understood of any Popish reservations, kept secret in the Speakers mind. For such reservation as I shown before, may be any that themselves will fancy. Insomuch, that the Priests do frame seven several and distinct reservations, all alike fit for Father Listers equivocation, when he deceived his Keeper; and do intimate that they might have framed many more, and all to as good purpose. And no doubt, as they imagined those seven, they might have invented seventy more, that would have served the turn. In all which it is not possible, for the Hearer or Reader of such a speech, to imagine, what the Speakers reservation is; it being not such as the signification of the words, or any circumstances of the business do yield, but as the mind of the equivocator will fancy within his deceitful heart. Nor do they in their equivocations mean, that the Hearer should know● their reservations. For their intent is, to reserve one sense in their own breast, and to imprint another in the Hearers mind. This only short note being observed, it will be easy for every Christian, that will open his eyes, to see that no place produced by them out of the Bible, doth include their secret and hidden reservations. Or if any equivocator will cavil, or can say, that there is any testimony of theirs, which may not receive satisfaction by this general Rule, and is in his opinion worth the standing upon; let him produce it: and I will promise him either a solution of his reason, or a recantation of mine opinion. And thus much shall serve to be said concerning the Grounds and Reasons which equivocators do build upon. Now I proceed to set down some few reasons against this newfound art, and fond device of equivocation. And those for this time shall be these five. 1. Because this late doctrine of equivocation destroyeth the true nature of equivocation, whose name it beareth. 2. Because it maintaineth a practice of lying, under a colour of Truth. 3. Because it disturbeth humane society, and hindereth mutual commerce. 4. Because it impeacheth God of folly, in making his laws against Lying. 5. Because it freeth the devil from all just imputation of being a liar. Arg. 1. The jesuitical doctrine of equivocation, doth destroy the true nature of equivocation, which hitherto hath been received of all men, and now (for aught I know) is not rejected of any. This I prove thus; equivocation, in the true nature thereof, is, when a word or speech hath more senses than one. This the word doth import. For aequivocum, by the very notation of the name, is vox aequi plura significans, a word indifferently betokening more things. And in some such manner as this, do Writers of all sorts explain and describe equivocation. But in this new-devised equivocation, there is no word, nor no sentence, or saying, that hath more significatious or senses than one. For in their mental equivocal Proposition, which they fancy, neither the words taken by themselves, nor the whole saying and sentence intended by the speaker, have any Ambiguity or doubtfulness of signification, or any more senses than one; as I have showed a Cap. 1. p. 1●. before, out of the equivocators own Rules. And hence I may infer, that either their reserved Proposition, is not an equivocal and double-sensed Proposition, as they call it without reason, and consequently, that they do not by equivocation speak truth in one sense, and mislead the Hearer with another sense: or else, if notwithstanding this, that Proposition be equivocal and double-sensed still, than we must say, that there may be an equivocation, where there is but one single sense and meaning. And that destroyeth the true nature of equivocation. To this reason, first their confession is, that b Pers. mitig. cap. 8. num. 8. verbal equivocation, which is, when a word or speech signifieth diverse things equally, c Pers. ibid. num. 15. indeed is only true and proper equivocation, and agreeth only to the defivition of equivocation, delivered not only by Philosophers, but Orators also: and that d Pers. ibid. num 8. it is properly called equivocation, when a speech or word signifieth diverse things equally, if we consider the proper nature of equivocation: and, e ibid. num. 15 that mental equivocation in rigour is none. 2. Their answer is notwithstanding, that their mixed Proposition may be f Pers. mitig. cap. 8. num. 10. pag. 313. called equivocation, in a more large and ample signification, as equivocal may signify an amphibologicall, doubtful or double-sensed Proposition, in respect of the Speaker and Hearer, whereof the one understandeth the same in one sense, and the other in another. And the cause why it is so called, is rather by a certain similitude, than propriety of speech: to wit, that even as equivocation properly by community of name in things of different natures, by variety of significations in the selfsame words or speech, by custom of phrase and composition of sundry sorts, doth make different and doubtful senses and meaning to the Hearer: so in this case, by mental reservation of some part of the foresaid mixed Proposition, the like effect of doubtfulness is bred in the Hearers understanding. For more ready understanding of which perplexed speech, I note that there are three things said by this doubling equivocator. 1. That it is only true and proper equivocation, & such as is comprised in the Definitions given both by Philosophers & Orators, when there are diverse senses and significations in the words. 2. That equivocation as they mean it in this question, hath no such property in it, nor is comprised in the Definition, that Philosophers and Orators have described equivocation by. 3. That notwithstanding all this, yet it may rightly be called equivocation, because as true equivocation breedeth diverse senses to the Hearer, by the Ambiguity that is in the words; so this new-devised equivocation may breed diverse senses, one in the Hearer, and another in the Speaker, by reason of the secret reservation that the Speaker imagineth in his own mind. And this may seem not so unreasonable, because words do signify ad placitum, and may be changed every day. And therefore it is no such fault, to frame a new meaning and another signification in this word, than ever any body did think of heretofore. Rep. This answer doth not weaken mine Argument, it confirmeth and strengtheneth it rather. For first, I do not except so much against their new signification of the word, as against the new explication and description of it. For they say, that they call it equivocal, because it is a double-sensed Proposition; and a double-sensed Proposition there fore they call it, because by it they signify one sense to the Hearer, and imagine another to themselves. But this doth utterly destroy the very essence & entity of true equivocation. For true equivocation cannot be conceived to be without a diversity of meanings in the speech: nor was it ever heard of, that a Proposition could be double-sensed, which had none but one single meaning: nor is it imaginable that that saying should be ambiguous, which the Hearet can take or construe but one way. Secondly, Their change and alteration of the word, to another different meaning, as it is by them here used▪ doth convince them of false and naughty dealing; such as we may observe thiefs to use, when they have purloined other men's goods. For thiefs (saith Vt reliqui ●ures, carum rerum quas cepericat, signa commutan●: sic illi— nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutaucrunt, Cic. de finib. bon. & mal. l. 5. nu. 74. pag. 111. Tully) when they have taken away other men's goods, do change the marks of them, that it may not be known whose they are, or to whom they belong. And right so do our equivocators deal in this case. For they change the names, which are true marks of things; that hereby they may conceal and hide the nature and property of the things themselves. I grant then, that names may change with times; nor is it any fault to alter the use of a word, so there be no wrong done to the thing, by the misseapplying of the word: as likewise it is no fault neither, to change the marks of goods, when there is no fraud intended by it. But if the marks of goods be changed, that the property of them may be concealed, that is a plain trick of thieverie. And so, if names be changed, that the nature of the things may be perverted or obscured, that is a trick of juggling, not inferior to that cozenage of the thief. And so it appeareth to be in this case. For this mongrel Proposition of theirs, if it should be censured by Philosophers, Orators, or other learned men, no man but would judge it at the first sight to be a lie: and so hither to all men have ever called such speeches. But now our new Artificers have found another name for their new art: they call it, equivocation. And this they do for a colourable show, that it may be thought that there is no untruth, but only an Ambiguity in the speech: and that they in deceiving men by mental reservations, do nothing but what honest men are wont to do, when they utter sentences, that may have diverse meanings. Thus, while they change the names, they do also confound the things, and destroy their true nature, which wise men, and Aristotle among the rest, have ever acknowledged to agree unto them. Object. Nay, saith Father a Mitig. cap. 8. num. 16. pag. 310. Persoons, but if Aristotle did not comprise this our reserved Proposition under 〈◊〉 of the three sorts of logical equivocation, mentioned by him in his elenches, than he erred grossly in making an insufficient division, which comprehendeth not all the parts of the thing divided. For if the said mixed Proposition (saith he) be an equivocation, (as Jesuites say it is, in spite of all reason, and against the doctrine of all ages) then must it have place among some of these three kinds; or else the division should be insufficient. Rep. A ridiculous conce it: whereto I know no example, that may be parallel; but I will imagine one as near as I can. Suppose then, a Father deuideth his Lands among his own Children, and a Conie catcher there by steppeth in, and layeth claim to a share among them: and when the matter cometh to be debated, in the Court, the judge parteth the Lands among the Brethren, to whom only they belonged, and shutteth out the Conie-catcher for a wrangler, that layeth claim where he hath no right. What if in this case, the Conie-catcher should complain of the judge, for partial dealing, and reason against him, as Persons doth against Aristotle, that if this Conie-catcher have a right, and a share in those Lands, as himself saith he hath, than the judge erred grossly, that had excluded him? Would not every Boy kick such a wrangling fool or knave shall I call him? out of the Court? And such a ridiculous wrangler, is Father Persons, who accuseth Aristotle of a gross error, for not rancking among his kinds of equivocation, this of the Jesuites, never heard of in the world before; and which the wrangler himself doth elsewhere acknowledge not to be true equivocation. Arg. 2. This doctrine of equivocation doth maintain a practice of lying, because he whom they call an equivocator, is in truth a liar, and that which they call an equivocal Proposition, is a lying assertion. I prove it thus. He that speaketh to another that which himself knoweth to be false, is a liar, and a lie it is, whensoever there is a Aug. conta mendac. c. 12. falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi, a false signification with a mind to deceive the Hearer. Or, to speak in a Jesuites words, b Tolet Instr. l. 8. c. 54. A lie is verbum falsum, cum intentione fallendi, a false speech, with an intention to deceive. Which description of a lie, so far as concerneth this purpose, he explaineth thus. A false speech is here meant, when a c Non est mendacium, dicere quod nou ita est, sed dicere aliter quàm homo putat. Tolet. ibid. man speaketh otherwise, than himself thinketh: and it is said to be with intention to deceive, because d Qui aliter qu●● sentit proloquitur, alterum fallit, et fallere intendit. Non etenim sic profert, nisi ut diversam opinionem in animo alterius generet. Hoc autem est fallere. Tolet. ibid. He that speaketh otherwise then himself thinketh, doth deceive another, and intendeth to deceive him. For he would not so speak, but that thereby he may engender a contrary opinion in another man's mind: and this is to deceive. Thus the Jesuite describeth a lie, and that agreeably to the received Doctrine of the schools. But this which is said to contain the nature of a lie, is all of it found in the new-devised equivocal Proposition. For first, that which the equivocator uttereth, is false, and so he knoweth it to be: for e Pers. mitig. c. 12. num. 2. pag. 484. & cap. 10. num. 22. p. 424. it may seem (saith Persons) to have salsitie in it; and sometimes also hath indeed, in respect of the words only, or understanding of the Hearer. And the case is clear, that the words uttered by the Equinocator, contain an untruth and a falsehood: for else they could not serve him for evasion. But the words uttered are all that the equivocator speaketh: and therefore that which he speaketh, is verbum falsum, a false word or speech. And secondly, that he uttereth this falsehood with mind and purpose to deceive the Hearer, in the sense that Tolet here explaineth it, I have a Cap. 1. pag. 16. num. 6. showed and proved out of their own writings: nor can it stand with common sense, to conceive it otherwise. And hence it followeth that the equivocator is a plain liar. Ans. Their answer is, that though the words considered by themselves, and as they are understood by the Hearer, be false: yet as they are meant by the equivocator, and as they are joined with the reservation kept in his mind, they are true. The sum is, they are false of themselves, but they are made true by the imagined reservation. Re. This is a weak answer, & an impertinent shift; because their mental reservation hath nothing to do either with Truth or Lying; as may appear by this reason. Truth as it is here meant, and Lying which is the contrary to it, are moral acts contained in the second Table of the Decalogue or ten commandments: and therefore do include a respect to our Neighbours, nor can they be understood without reference and relation unto other men: so that lying consisteth in a signification of falsehood unto others, and truth in signifying or uttering of that which is true; and without such signification, either performed by outward signs, or meant and intended to be performed, if occasion should be offered, Lying and Truth morally taken, can have no place. Upon this ground, which hath clear evidence in it, Bannes a learned schoolman doth refute their opinion, who think that there may be a lie, where there is no purpose to deceive. b Mihi usque ad●o videtur ille animus fallendi necessarius ad rationem mendacij; quòd sine illo mendacium esse non possit. Vt v. g. fi Petrus absque aliqu● teste proferat propositionem, qu● scit esse falsam; ille non mentitur, quamuis dicat folsum in voce. Similit●r si Petrus dicat ●oann●; Tu 〈◊〉 es joctnes: 〈◊〉 non mentitur, quamuis dicat falsum, quia illud non potest dicere animo fallendi ipsum joannem. Huius ratio esse potest, quia mendacium est fiotio quaeda, quae est in voluntate, propterca quòd est ad alteris per quam intendit homo, ut alius credat aliter, quam sentit ille, qui fiugit, & mentitur. Quòd autem menda●●ū sit ad alterum, patet. Name 〈◊〉 veracitas, quae est virtus oppofila, est ad àtterum, quum sit pa●s iustiti●; ut ai● S. Tho. Dominic. Baunes to. 3. in 2. 2. q. 1. art. 3. Dub. 1. § Pro decisione. pag. 16. I think (saith he that a mind to deceive, is so necessary in a lie, as that without it, a lie cannot exist. This he declareth thus: If Peter, no man being within hearing, should utter a speech, which he knoweth to be false, yet he should not lie, though he should speak an untruth in the words. In like sort, if Peter should say to John, Thou art not John, doubtless he should not lie, though he spoke an untruth, because he cannot speak that with purpose to deceive John himself. And hereof he giveth this reason, Because a lie is a kind of fiction or feigning, which is in the will, with reference to another, by which a man intendeth that another man may believe otherwise than himself, who telleth the lie, doth think. And that a lie doth include such respect and refirence to another, is plain (saith he) because that veracirie, or the virtue of speaking truth, which is opposite to lying, doth consist also in relation to another, because it is a part of justice. Thus reasoneth this learned friar. In this discourse of his we may note two things. First, His Conclusion, which is, that both lying and truth morally taken, which he calleth veracity, do consist in a relation and reference to others; so that no words uttered, without respect of signifying somewhat to some other by them, can be either the sin of lying, or the virtue of true-speaking. Secondly, we may note his reason for proof of this Conclusion; which is, that veracity, or the virtue of speaking truth, is a part of justice: and justice hath a respect to some other, to whom it giveth that which is his due. This reason I take to be unanswerable; and then his Conclusion must needs be undeniable. It is proved then that truth morally meant, for a virtue or act of speaking truth, which is a part of justice, and a duty which we own to our neighbours; doth include a reference and respect to others, which respect consisteth in signifying or declaring our meaning to them, truly and sincerely. But now in the mental reservation, shut up in the equivocators breast, there is no such reference or relation, nor doth it admit of any intendment, to signify or declare his meaning to others. Nay, it is therefore suppressed, and broken off from the speech which is uttered in words, that nothing thereby may be signified to the Hearer. It followeth then, that this reservation hath no point nor piece of moral truth in it. And therefore, if that part of the equivocators proposition, which he uttereth in words, were a false and lying speech before; it must needs remain a lie still, for any help that this reservation can yield it. Arg. 3. The Doctrine of Equmocation doth disturb humane society, and destroyeth that mutual commerce that one man should have with another. I prove it thus. This society and commerce must needs be disturbed, when men in wisdom may not believe one another, upon their words or oaths: but if this Doctrine of equivocation be received, men may not believe one another, either upon their words or oaths. This is proved thus. The equivocator professeth to equivocate, whensoever he may lawfully hold his peace; and if it be for any advantage of weight, upon his Oath too. Which how fare it may extend, I have declared in part already, and every man may easily conceive by himself: but sure in what business soever I have to deal with such a man, I cannot tell, but that he may think it lawful to conceal the truth, and consequently to equivocate with me. And in case his conscience will permit him to equivocate with me, (as in what case it will not permit him, I know not) then am I as sure to be deceived, and overreached by him, if I do believe him, as if I believed a plain and downright liar. For, my credence or belief can reach no further than to the words uttered; nor can I learn any thing from the equivocator, but that which I can gather from his words: but all that is false and lying; as hath been showed by their own Confession. And therefore if I believe a man, when he doth equivocate, I am sure to be deceived. I declare this yet further by a familiar example. Say, two Priests have laid a plot of invasion for the kingdom, and being questioned upon their oaths concerning the plot, they both deny it. And the one, he saith, I never meant or intended any such thing, understanding within himself, so as I mean to tell you of it: and the other, he answereth in the very same words, but hath forgotten to frame a reservation in his mind: the one of these by their Doctrine is a liar, and the other an equivocator▪ But in respect of being deceived by them, what difference is there between them? Shall I not as soon be deceived by the equivocator, as by the liar? Yes certainly, it is no more safe to believe an equivocating Jesuite, than a lying devil. And if this be so; then where men teach and profess the art of equivocation, there in wisdom men may not believe one another: and consequently, they cannot have that commerce and society that men should have among themselves. I conclude this argument against equivocators, in the very same manner, as Saint Augustine did against liars, only putting the name of equivocator, where he did the name of liar. a Aut non est credendum bonis; aut credendum est ijs, quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri; aut non est credendum bonos aliquando 〈◊〉. Horum trium primum pernici●sum est secund●● stultum. Restat ●rgo, ut nunquam ment●antur boni. Augustin. de Mendac. cap. 8. pag. 6. f. Either (saith he) we must not believe honest men; or we must believe them, who we think aught sometimes to tell a lie; or else, we must believe that honest men will not at any time tell a lie. The first of these three is pernicious, (and overthroweth society.) The second is foolish, (and exposeth a man to the mercy of every cheating companion.) It remaineth therefore to say, that an honest man will never tell a lie. Thus that learned Father: by whose example I may reason against equivocators in the very same manner. Either we must not believe honest men on their words or oaths: or we must believe them, who we think may equivocate with us both in words and in oaths: or else, we must believe that an honest man will not equivocate. The first is pernicious, the second is foolish: and therefore we must resolve upon the third, which is, that an honest man will not equivocate. Arg. 4. This Doctrine of equivocation defeateth all laws made against lying▪ and doth by consequence impeach God of folly for making any such laws. I prove it thus. It is a folly to make such laws, as are unavaileable, and cannot reach to the ends, for which they were made. But if equivocation be admitted, laws against lying cannot serve for the purpose, to which they are intended. This appeareth by two things. First, God's laws and precepts against lying were made for this purpose, to restrain men's tongues from speaking of falsehoods and untruths. But by the art of equivocation a man may speak any and all falsehoods that he will, and yet these precepts against lying shall never take hold of him: because by a mental reservation warranted by this Doctrine, he may make any falsehood to become true. And therefore the equivocator, notwithstanding all laws of God and men against lying, yet is at his liberty to utter what untruths he will, without the least transgression of any of those laws. Secondly, laws against lying do intent prevention of hurt and deceit to be used against our neighbour. But admit once of this new doctrine of equivocation, and no deceit toward our neighbour can be prevented by any laws against lying. For if this Doctrine be warrantable, than all laws against lying must be meant only against such as do not keep a reservation in their minds, to make true the falsehoods that they utter in their words. And so, for example, when Moses saith, a levity. 19 11. Ye shall not lie one to another: and when Saint Paul saith, b Ephes. 4. 25. Put away lying, and speak truth every man with his neighbour; the meaning of these Precepts must be to this purpose▪ Speak no untruth, nor utter no falsehoods to your neighbours, unless ye have some secret reservation kept in your mind, which if it be added, will make them to become true. For, by the equivocators Doctrine, if such reservations be kept in the mind, than all their words become true: and therefore they are no way included within these Precepts against lying. But if this interpretation of such laws may be admitted, and such liberty of speech may be granted, without any breach of these laws: then these laws do no way prevent the least danger of deceit and damage that may come to our Neighbour by untrue and false speeches; because I can deceive him as much by this equivocal reservation, as by a formal lie: as hath been proved already. And from these considerations it followeth, that Precepts against lying are vain, if the practice of equivocation be lawful. Arg. 5. If the Doctrine of equivocation be true, than neither men nor devils can be convinced of lying. First, men cannot. For though they speak never so vast and apparent falsehoods, yet who can say but that they have some reservation in their mind, that may free their words from being lies? And yet all sorts of men, when they hear evident untruths uttered, do without control of any, charge the speakers with falsehoods and lying. Which showeth that all men judge of lying and truth, by the words uttered, and not by fancies reserved in the mind. As for example, the Secular Priests do charge Father Persons with a continual practice of lying, so that c D Ely in his Notes upon the apology. cap. 9 pag. 311. D. Bagshaw in his Answ. to Persons apology, pag. 42. Reply to a brief apology, cap. 2. pag. 11. they give him the Whetstone, and leave it with him too, as if they thought there were no such a bold and impudent liar in the World, that could win it from him. But how did the Priests know, but that Persons spoke with some equivocal reservations? And if so, than they broke the rule of charity, in censuring him for a liar, when he was but an equivocator. And again, Father Persons chargeth the Seculars with a apology for Subord. cap. 12. in the latter end. infinite number of untruths, lies, slanders, and open falsehoods uttered without scruple of conscience; so that the use of equivocations was little needful for them; because they could take liberty enough without it. But how doth Father Persons know, that his Secular Brethren did not use equivocation in all these untrue speeches: and so made them true by some reservation? Thus all men, when they find apparent untruths uttered, stick not to charge the speakers with lying. But if the Doctrine of equivocation be true, no man can be convinced of the least lie, unless himself will confess it. Secondly, The devil himself, if this Doctrine be true, cannot be convinced to be a liar. For who can say, but when he telleth us most palpable untruths, yet he may reserve within himself some clause to help all? Nay, if this Doctrine be true, it cannot be supposed with any reason, that the devil ever would or ever did tell any lie at all. For, whatsoever he hath spoken at any time, be it otherwise never so false and lying; yet it might be made true by a reservation: and he neither wanted wit to device such reservations, nor will, by such or any other means to free himself from the imputation of lying. First, he wanteth not wit. I shall not need to prove this; because, as I suppose, it will be confessed, that he is as quick and nimble at such devices, as the finest witted Jesuite in the pack. But, if any man shall question it, I will engage myself to prove it. Secondly, he wanteth not will, by this or any other trick to save his credit, and to avoid the imputation of lying. For, he knoweth that the greatest hindrance to his proceed, is, because the World esteemeth him for a liar, and the Father of lies: and if he could once but gain to be accounted a true and honest dealer, (as by using equivocation, he might as well prove himself to be no liar, as any Jesuite can:) than he might find more credit in the World. For which cause, a 2 Corin. 11. 14. the Apostle saith that he transformeth himself into an angel of light. And an ancient Writer telleth of a monk, who was a strict and religious liver, that the devil, b Quum volens eum consuetudine visionum, ad credulitatem futurae deceptionis illicere, verissima quaque multo tempore, Diabolu●, velut veritatatis nuncius, reuclasset: ad ●x●●emum, etc. Cassian. Collatine. 2. cap. 8. purposing by a custom of Visions to win him to the belief of a future illusion which he intended for him, did for a lo●g time, as a messenger of truth, show him all true Visions. And when by this means▪ he had gained credit to be believed▪ then by another Vision, he persuaded him to renounce Christ, and to become a jew. And it is an usual observation among Christians, that the devil will tell some truths, that he may gain afterward the more credit to his lies. And therefore it can be no doubt, but that the devil desireth not to be reputed a liar; and would gladly put off from him all such imputation, if by any tricks he could device how to effect it. Now lay these two positions together: first, That the devil wanteth no wit to device reservations; and secondly, That he wanteth no will, by this or any other such device, to avoid the discredit of a liar: and then it will follow, that in reason we cannot imagine, that the devil ever would or did tell a lie, if by an equivocal reservation he could clear himself. And hence again it may be deduced, that as our equivocators do challenge us for slandering them; because we call them liars, when they swear falsehoods by imagined reservations: so the devil himself might challenge GOD (be it spoken with reverence to his majesty) for injustice and slander, because he hath branded him with the note of a liar, and calleth him the Father of lies. But these consequents are most absurd: and therefore the Doctrine of equivocation, from whence they follow, is most false. Thus, by God's grace, I have declared, and I trust, in some measure also cleared the points propounded in the beginning. Now, for conclusion, I will only commend one caveat to the wellmeaning Christian; and that is, to beware of trusting them, whose profession is to equivocate. For such men are both more impious and more dangerous than any other sort of liars, that I know beside. First, They are more impious, because among men of other Religions, though there may be vicious persons, that make too common a practice of lying deceits; yet that is the fault of the men, and not of their Doctrine. But in the Church of Rome, their great Doctors do not only practise this deceit, but praise it too: and commend it to their Disciples, as a good art; very fit fo● scrupulous consciences. Which doctrine cannot be conceived to be without great dishonour to God, and much disgrace to Religion. Secondly, They are more dangerous than any other sort of liars, because they come masked under a vizard of truth, & armed with resolution to protest, and swear, and pawn their souls and salvations, upon the truth of that which they say, notwithstanding that for so much as they utter, and for all that you can hear or gather by them, all is most false, which they speak. From the consideration whereof, I inferred before, that it was not safe to believe a Jesuite, or any of his fellows or scholars; for that a man may as soon be deceived by an equivocating Jesuite, as by a lying devil. Now I add, therefore wise Christians must beware of them; and if we will not be deceived, we must not believe either their words or oaths, in what business soever we have to do with them. This caveat, that it may the better appear how fare it is to be extended; I will, for example sake, set down some special cases of ordinary use, in which it will 〈…〉 to believe them. 1. ●irst than we may not safely believe them, when they are disputing▪ and arguing for their Religion, and delivering points of their faith. For they tell us, that Jesus our Lord did equivocate, when he preached of Prayer and Sacraments, and of his office of judging the World, etc. And I trow, Jesuites will be ready to imitate the example of Jesus, whose name they bear. But we need not doubt of their meaning in this case; for they therefore allege the example of Christ; that they may defend and make good their own practice. And therefore when I hear a Priest or a Jesuite telling of Pope's Pardons, and preaching of S. Patrick's purgatory, etc. and when for these, he telleth me, of the consent of the ancient Church, and allegeth many Fathers to confirm his Assertion; how can I be sure, that he doth not equivocate with me in that case? or what reason have I to think, but that he speaketh against his knowledge, and conscience? or how can I, without a note of rashness and temereity, believe that he● doth not wilfully belie the Fathers, and other Authors to serve his own turn? and when he hath done all, make up all with a secret reservation, that I never dreamt on? Secondly, we may not believe them, when they give Answers, or bear witness in a Court of justice, or before a Magistrate; no, not though they swear what they say, and take it upon their souls and salvations. For they profess to equivocate in such cases, if either the judge be incompetent, or if he proceed incompetently. And when I hear one of them speak and swear before any of our governors or Rulers, either ecclesiastical or civil, what can I tell, but he may think either the judge, or his proceed to be incompetent, and unjust? Nay sure, in most cases, in which they have to do before our governors, they are known to hold, either the judge, or the proceeding, or both, to be incompetent▪ And therefore I cannot see how we may safely believe them, when they make answer, or give evidence upon their oath. Thirdly, we may not believe them, when they tell of great wonders and Miracles, done by men of their Order and profussion; and by Saints and Images of their own making. For they profess to equivocate, when it may be for some good to themselves, and therefore much more when it may prove so great a good to their Order, to their Church, and to their Religion. And therefore, when they tell me of many great miracles don● by their men in the Indies, and by the Ladies of Lauretto and Hall; how can I tell, that they do not fitten and device all that upon their finger's end, to gain credit to their profession? Fourthly, We may not believe them, when they publish and disperse disgraceful tales and reports against the professors and Doctors of our Church. For the disgrace of these men, may breed great advantage to their Religion: and beside, it is an Axiom of theirs, He must be disgraced, because he is an Enemy to their order. And therefore, when they tell me of Luther, and Calvin and Beza and Bucer and such others, that they either despaired, or recanted, or renounced their Religion; how may I believe them, that they do not equivocate? Nay it is certain, that in the forging of these reports, they did either lie, or equivocate, or both. And therefore when they now tell us, that many of our reverend Bishops, and learned Preachers and scholars, are of their opinion, and think them to be in the right, but that for the world's sake, they dissemble their judgement; how can I give credit to their words, or to their writings? And when they tell us, that such a Doctor, upon his deathbed; and such a Bishop toward his latter end, turned Papist, and renounced in their ear, what he had taught in the Pulpit, and was reconciled to the Church of Rome, by one that came and went invisibly; shall we believe them to speak as they think? Nay, we should rather spit in the liars faces, that presume us to be so simple, as to believe an equivocator in a case so available for his Order, and in a thing so unlikely and absurd in itself; that the narration of such a thing, might call in question the truth of a known honest man. Fiftly, We may not believe equivocators in matters of common life, and civil conversation. For they profess to equivocate in most cases of common practice, and in all cases in which they are not bound to reveal the Truth, if the thing may be for their advantage. And therefore if one of them should contract to marry a man's daughter amongst us, how can any of us tell, that th● equivocator thinketh himself bound to lay op●n his heart, and to speak the truth in this case; and that therefore in his opinion he may not equivocate and deceive us? And if he promise to pay me a sum of money, how can I tell that he keepeth not a reservation behind, that may disannul his promise aforehand; as that he will pay it, if himself shall think it necessary, or if he shall have so much to spare, or if he have nothing else to do with his money? etc. And so, if he undertake to be my solicitor for my Law-businesses, or my physician for my body, or my Counsellor in any doubtful case, etc. how shall I be assured that I may believe his word, and that he doth not for some secret reason kept to himself, think it lawful to cheat me by a mental reservation? Surely, for mine own part, if I may know him that professeth the Art of equivocation, I will trust him no further than I would do a common and noted liar, that is no further than I do see him. (⸫) FINIS.