A PREAMBLE UNTO AN ENCOUNTER WITH P. R. THE AUTHOR of the deceitful Treatise of Mitigation: Concerning the Romish doctrine both in question of Rebellion and of equivocation:  
By THOMAS MORTON.  
Am I your enemy because I tell you the truth?  GALAT. 4. 16. 
Published by Authority.  
LONDON, Printed by Melch. Bradwood for john Bill and Edmond Weaver. 1608.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, and his singular good Lord, ROBERT Earl of SALISBURY, Principal Secretary to his Majesty, etc. and the most worthy Chancellar of the University of CAMBRIDGE, Grace and peace.  
THere are not many weeks past (Right Honourable) since a person, disguised by these dumb characters of P. R. had covertly sent forth a Book, inscribed, A Treatise of Mitigation, which he adventured to address unto both the Universities, especially that, wherein, by the blessing of God, I have had my education, and whereof this is the happiness, that it hath your Lordship Chancellar and Protector. I therefore esteemed it my duty in presence of your Honour, by this Preamble, to sponge out such vile imputations, wherewith he endeavoured through me (alas) one of the least of the Prophets to distain both my Mother and her Sister the famous Universities; and those honourable persons unto whose care and providence they are committed. At the first reading thereof, although (I confess) I received some such impressions as that I was not able to imagine that any, professing Divinity, could be so utterly destitute of humanity, as when he clamorously inveigheth against (as he pretendeth) multiplicity of falsifications, he himself should most usually and egregiously falsify: yet then, even in my greatest jealousy of mine own miscarriage, I conceived a double matter of comfort: first, from myself, that knowing I durst present my supplications unto the judge of the secret thoughts of all hearts, and just Revenger of all lying wickedness; I did not doubt but that being able with true confidence to appear before God, I should not greatly fear the censure of man. Secondly, from my Auersarie, presuming that he that would write in defence of their Mental equivocation, would be found to aequiuocate in writing. But much more was this my divination fortified at the review of his Treatise; for even as the Greek Commander, who being in appearance mortally wounded, demanded of his Soldiers, Numquid tuta est Civitas? numquid clypeus meus integer? Is the City safe? is my shield sound? And being satisfied in both recovered his health, and afterwards became victorious: So I likewise, under so many ghastly wounds of a virulent pen, having generally inquired and uprightly answered myself, that my cause was safe, and my conscience sound, and free from any notorious and wilful falsity; I than began more resolutely to confront my Adversary in this Prelude and First assault: and promise (if God shall be pleased) a more forcible Encounter, after that I have discharged my part in another task of more importance, namely, in The Answer unto the misconceived Catholic Apology: which by this calumnious Treatise of P. R. his Mitigation, as by an adverse tempest, hath received some interruption. This Preamble (Right Honourable) as a Survey of some particulars, which being unfolded, may, if not satisfy the expectation, yet at the least stay the prejudice and precipitation of some, I do humbly present unto your Lordship, as unto a most zealous Patron of the Truth, a vigilant Discoverer of malignant practices, a provident Director of one of those Universities, whereunto my Adversary presumeth to appeal; submitting myself unto the equanimity of your honourable judgement; to which, if by this Brief it be not manifest, that P. R. hath in this Treatise prevaricated in his whole cause both in the question of Rebellion and of equivocation, betrayed his countries State, disgraced the Romish Schools, strangled his own conscience, I refuse not, that to the crimes objected against me by him, this may be added, That I durst affirm thus much before your Lordship. For whose continuance of health, increase of honour, accomplishment of all Spiritual Graces I shall not cease to pray. Our Lord jesus preserve us to the glory of his saving Grace.  
Your Honours in all Christian duty THOMAS MORTON.   

A PREAMBULATORY EPISTLE unto P. R. the Mitigator.  
THere be but two Romish Maladies (Master P. R.) which in my books of Discovery and Full Satisfaction might stand need of your Mitigation: the one is the usurped and transcendent jurisdiction of the Pope advanced above all Christian Kingdoms, to the troubling or subverting of all Princes and people of contrary Religion; the other is your professed Art of mental Equivocation. The first of these I have proved to be (in the Protestant States) the Dam, and the second the Bawd to rebellion: therefore have I been by you censured for a false and slanderous Libeler. But if, as the woman in pleading of her cause appealed from the judge sleeping unto the same judge better informed, you will give me leave to appeal from P. R. as he is a Passionate Railer, unto P. R. as he is a Placable Reasoner; then I am sure no man shall prove either me a false slanderer, or you a true Mitigator: because you in your Treatise have established such a Papal authority, which (after denunciation of sentence) may deprive Protestant Kings (in your opinion Heretics) of their Kingdoms; making all such Protestant Princes and all their adherents also alliable unto all those penalties, which the Popish Canons, by you defended, have awarded against Heretics, which are, loss of lands, of honours, and of their lives; so far, as to allow that every man may in such a case sheathe his sword in his brother's throat: not disproouing your fellows, who conclude that all this must be done, when there is sufficient means of performance. And shall not Protestants (except they will acknowledge themselves to have deserved a new Massacre) call this your doctrine execrable and rebellious? We read of Petilian a Donatist, who to the end he might moderate and mitigate the sharp reproach of the cruelty of his sect intended against the Orthodoxal Professors, did make a great boast of courtesy and humanity: against whom S. Augustine writeth thus: Isto modo & miluus, 
Aug. lib. 2. adu. Petil. cap. 83.  cum columbos rapere non potuerit, columbum se nominat; ubi enim potuistis, & non fecistis? That is, By this means (saith S. Augustine) a Kite, when he can not seize upon a Dove, will be a Dove: for, I pray you, when did you spare us, being able to hurt us? The like boast of other Heretics, called Rogationists, received the like Answer: 
August. Ep. 48. ad Vincent.  to wit: Nulla bestia, si neminem vulneret, proptereà mansueta dicitur, si dentes & ungues non habet: saevire vos nolle dicitis, ego non posse arbitror; si autem possetis, quanta faceretis, quandò nihil potestis, & non cessatis? That is, There is no beast, which may be called tame, because it doth no hurt when it hath neither teeth nor talant: You (Rogationists) say you will not mischieve us; but I rather think you can not: for how will not you do what possibly you can, seeing you cease not to be doing, when you can do nothing at all? Are not these Rogationists and you Romanists equally bend to like mischief? Is not your Defence (P. R.) Miluus & Columbus, A Kitish Dove? For by the Title pretending Mitigation and Obedience, it may seem to be a Dove, but by the Treatise itself professing a plain rebellion, it proveth a Kite. Whereby we may suspect that in the capital characters of your name P. may betoken a Petilian, and R. a Rogationist. Otherwise, answer your Adversaries sincerely unto this their Interrogatory; Did you ever spare us, being sufficiently able to hurt us? For the time past you can not satisfy; for the time to come you will not engage yourself further than your Preface hath promised, viz. It is not impossible for us to live in subjection. But will you know the best way to prove your Adversary T. M. slanderous? Then must you teach your Disciples to cease to be murderous. Your second, and (as you call it) the special part, which is the Defence of Mental Equivocation, is no whit better fortified: for the main reason to free it from a lie, is, because the outward speech, [as I am no Priest] is mixed with a clause reserved in the mind, [as, To tell it unto you.] Wherein again I appeal from your Position to your Confession, granting, That there is a mental Equivocation, which no clause of reservation can save from a lie. Which one Confession is sufficient to convince all your Mental Equivocators to be apparently liars. Having thus obtained my cause in both questions, although you rage and rave, disgorging your stomach, and casting upon me all the cankered and galfull terms it could utter: yet can I not be offended with you, except only (as Tully spoke in the like case) Quiame nocere vol●isti: Because you meant to do me injury. After you had laboured, by disabling my judgement concerning the cause, to wound me in the head, you proceed further, to prejudice my conscience, by pretending multiplicity of frauds and falsifications, seeking thereby (for so I may call it) to stab me at the heart. But know (P. R.) that your false and calumnious objections of falsifications are in this Preamble so far discovered, that I may truly think the Scripture verified upon you, 
Rom. 2. 1.  where it is thus written: Therefore art thou inexcusable, o man, whosoever thou be, that judgest; for doing the same things, by judging another thou condemnest thyself. Therefore I wish you in the fear of God, so to use your judgement in this life, as still remembering, that after death you must be called to judgement. Our Lord jesus preserve us to the glory of his saving Grace. Farewell.  
Yours to warn, and to be warned, THO. MORTON.   

A table of the particular contents, and Paragraphes of the ensuing Preamble.  

FIrst part is concerning the sufficiency of P. R. to undertake any challenge. §. 1. pag. 1  
An argument that P. R. his wit was in a slumber in answering to the point of the sleeping soldiers. §. 2. pag. 2  
An argument of his memory bewraying his free will to lying in the point of the clause of Reservation. §. 3. pag. 5  
P. R. his skill in Logic, provoking all Universities to laugh at him, both in the point of Syllogizing, §. 4. pag. 7. And also in dividing pag. 12  
P. R. objecting Greek and Hebrew texts, and thereby gaining to himself the opinion of rare ignorance. §. 5. pag. 12  
P. R. glorying in a triumphant falsehood in his objection of falsity concerning the testimony of Carerius. §. 6. pag. 15  
P. R. his presumptuous falsehood in charging T. M. with falsity in allegation of the testimony of Dolman. §. 7. pag. 18  
P. R. his four malicious tricks of falsehood in objecting a falsity concerning the testimony of Frisingensis. §. 8. pag. 25  
The second part, proving that P. R. is no sufficient Advocate for our English case, deciphering the disposition of both my Adversaries, viz. the Moderate Answerer and this Mitigator, by way of a Dialogue bringing them upon the stage. §. 9 pag. 30  
The third part showeth that P. R. hath not performed his challenge in respect either of his cause or conscience. §. 10. pag. 34  
That the very Title of the book of Mitigation is ominous and unlucky unto them whom P. R. laboureth thereby to defend. §. 10. pag. 34  
That P. R. betrayeth his whole cause in question of Rebellion, by many impossibilities of subjection. §. 11. pag. 36. showing his sportful or rather execrable impostureship therein. pag. 39  
That P. R. hath by necessary consequence overthrown his whole defence of mental equivocation. §. 12. pag. 43  
A general answer to the accusation which P. R. urgeth concerning malicious falsehoods. §. 13. pag. 49  
The hypocritical, prodigal, and prodigious ostentation which P. R. maketh in avouching the integrity of his Romish writers. §. 14. pag. 50  
Pope's falsificatours. pag. 51. num. 57  
A notable spectacle of manifold contradictions of Romish Doctors in perverting three testimonies of antiquity in one controversy about Images. pag. 53. as namely the Council of Eliberis, pag. 53. the Council of Francford, pag. 55. the Epistle of Epiphanius. pag. 59  
An instance in a notable Romish falsificatour, to wit, Cardinal Bellarmine. §. 15. both in slandering his adversaries, pag. 62 and also in the corrupt allegation of testimonies of Fathers, §. 16. pag. 66. by many examples even in one controversy of Purgatory. pag. 68  
Another notable Romish falsificator, even P. R. himself. §. 17 pag. 71  
One falsehood of his, about the clause of Reservation. pag. 72  
A second, in turning one Doctor into many Doctors. pag. 72  
A third and fourth in changing condemnation into justification. pa. 73. num. 82. 83  
A fifth, in changing Campian into Bellarmine. pag. 74. num. 84  
A sixth, in changing a denial into a confession. pag. 75. num. 85  
A seventh, in changing an interrogation [Have you any thing to say to their practice?] into an asseveration, & a manifest noting an objection into an hypocritical dissimulation. pag. 76. nu. 86  
An eight falsity changing Holinshed into Fox. pag. 79. num. 88  
A ninth, noting falsely a corruption of the English text. pag. 81. num. 90  
A tenth, eleventh and twelfth. pag. 82  
A thirteenth falsity in his claim of universal consent for the doctrine of Equivocation. pag. 82. num. 93. wherein he is convinced of notorious falsehoods by the known testimonies of three jesuits, as Azorius, pa. 84. num. 96. by Emmanuel Sà and others, pag. 86. num. 98. by Maldonate. pag. 99  
Answers to the particular accusations of falsehood which P. R. hath falsely objected to T. M. and wherein he hath gloried and insulted most. pag. 88 §. 18  
First his insultation in the testimony of Polydore, concerning the change of Pope's names. pag. 89. num. 101  
A second insultation in the testimony of Nauclerus, concerning the Pope choked with a fly. pag. 91. num. 104  
A third insultation in the testimony of Bouchier, de justa abdicatione, concerning kill of Tyrants. pag. 95. num. 108  
A fourth, in the testimony of M. Reinolds. pag. 99 num. 115  
A fifth out of Gratian. pag. 103. num. 120  
A sixth also out of Gratian. pag. 106. num. 124  
A seventh concerning the text of Esay 29. pag. 109. num. 129  
An eighth concerning the testimony alleged of the Extravagants. pag. 109. num. 130  
A ninth in the testimony of Bellarm. about putting in Illos, and putting out Hoc. pag. 112. num. 134  
A tenth in the testimony of Carerius about vero and verè, etc. pag. 115. num. 138  
An eleventh in the testimony of Dolman. pag. 116. num. 139  
A twelfth about the succession of Protestant Princes. pag. 116 num. 140  
A thirteenth in the testimony of Frisingensis. pag. 117. num. 141  
A fourteenth and most rigorous accusation in the testimony of Lambertus Scaffnaburg. pag. 117. num. 142. etc.  
The falsehood, foolishness, unfortunatenesse, and impiety of that Accusation. pag. 120. 121. 123. 124  
A challenge against P. R. §. 19 pag. 126. num. 150. etc.    

A PREAMBLE UNTO THE ENCOUNTER WITH P. R. in Confutation of his deceitful Treatise of MITIGATION.  
§. 1.  
1 EVery man reprehending his Adversary, thereby bindeth himself to good behaviour: otherwise to reproach another in his own guilt, is to throw dust against the wind, which will reflect and return with greater violence upon his own face. My Adversary P. R. to make me odious to his Reader hath plashed me, as it were, with these aspersions, of Ass, Silly fellow, Unlearned, Not understanding Logic, Shameless, False, Malicious; which a man would think he could not have spoken without presuming of his own Wit, Learning, Truth, Modesty, Charity, together with all their compliments in himself. In ostentation whereof he offereth himself to the trial of all Divines, Schools, Universities, and every Reader of his Treatise. But I (alas) what shall I say? who shall plead my cause? who? though all Divines should condemn, Nobility disdain, and Universities hiss me out of Schools, yet is there one, unto whom I dare appeal, even P. R. himself in his Book of MITIGATION: where I find, that this my most rigorous Adversary will prove my rightful Advocate; his wit freeing me from silliness, his learning from ignorance, his modesty from shamelessness, his charity from malice, his truth from lying. And though he vilify me with terms of indignity and tread upon me with his dirty footings, as men do upon brass, I shall not be greatly offended, being assured that the more he rubbeth, the brighter I shall appear both in my cause and conscience unto every Christian and conscionably affected Reader.  
2 To this purpose I divide this Preamble into Three Inquiries: The First is, What sufficiency and excellency there is in P. R. to make so great an insultation as he doth: The Second, Whether he may be thought a sufficient Proctor in this case or no: The Third, Whether he hath sufficiently performed his task either for the Defense of his cause or justification of his conscience: together with a Challenge against him in them both.   

THE FIRST INQVIRIE.  
The true Symptoms and Arguments concerning the sufficiency and excellency of the wit, memory, learning, charity, modesty, and truth, of P. R. by a taste in each one, even in such instances, wherein he glorieth and boasteth most.  

An Argument of P. R. his kind of wit, which may seem to have been a slumber when he made his Reply.  
§ 2.  
3 LOquere ut te videam, that is, Speak friend, that I may see thee, said the Philosopher unto a young man; because (Oratio, being or is ratio) the reason of man can not be outwardly discerned better than by the mouth, which is the messenger of the heart. Therefore let us see P. R. speaking thus: 
a The treatise of Mitigat. Epist. Deed to the Vniversit. num. 24.  The chief proof of Thomas Morton (to show our Priests to be bad Doctors) consisteth in a certain comparing of them with those jewish Priests of the old law, in Christ's time, who taught the soldiers which watched at the Sepulchre of our Saviour to say, That whilst they were sleeping, his Disciples came and stole him away. [Common sense (saith Thomas Morton) might have replied, How could you tell what was done when you were asleep? But minds enthralled in the opinion of a never-erring Priesthood (which confirmed that answer) could not possibly but err with their Priests. Such (alas) is the case of all them etc.] Do you see how substantially he hath proved this matter? Let us examine the particulars: First the story, than the inference. About the story S. Matthew recounteth in the 28. Chapter of his Gospel, how Christ our Saviour being raised miraculously from death to life with a great and dreadful earthquake and descent of an Angel, so as the soldiers which kept the Sepulchre were astonished, and almost dead for fear; some of them ran and told the Chief Priests thereof, who making a consultation with the Elders, devised this shift, To give them store of money, and to bid them say, That in the night when they were asleep his Disciples came and stole him away: and so they did. And S. Matthew addeth, That this false bruit ran currant among the jews, even until that time wherein he wrote his Gospel. This is the narration. What hath Tho. Morton now to say to this against us? for thereunto is all his drift. First, he saith, as you have heard, That this device was improbable, and against common sense itself. Common sense (saith he) might have replied (to the soldiers) What could you tell what was done when you were asleep? See here the sharpness of Tho. Mortons' wit above that of the Priests, Scribes, and Pharisees. But what if one of the soldiers had replied to him thus? We saw it not when we were asleep, but afterward when we were awakened we perceived he was stolen away. What rejoinder would our Minister make? As for example, if Tho. Morton were walking with a Communion-booke under his arm thorough a field, and wearied should lie down to sleep with his Book by his side, and at his awaking should see his Book gone, were it against common sense for him to say, That his book was stolen from him while he was asleep? Or is not this an Assertion fit for one of those Doctors, whereof S. Paul talketh, that understand not what they say, nor whereof they affirm? But this will better yet appear by the second point, which is his inference.  
4 The Minister hath only this to rejoin, That his Adversary P. R. hath showed himself, by this his Inference, both shameless and witless. Shameless, to impute that for an absurdity unto me, which he might have known to be the wise and learned Inference of ancient Fathers, amongst whom S. Augustine saith to this Answer of these soldiers thus: 
b Aug. tom. 10. homil. 36. ad finem.  O mal●, o pessimi, aut vigilabatis, aut dormiebatis; & quid sit factum nescitis: impletum est enim quod à Spiritu Sancto multùm antè per 
* Psal. 20.  Psalmistam praedictum erat, Cogitaverunt consilium, quod non potuerunt stabilire. That is to say, O evil and most wicked men, either you were awake or asleep, and knew not what was done, etc. intimating this Dilemma; Either were you awake or asleep: if awake, then confess what was done, Christ is risen out of the grave: if asleep, than you knew not what was done. For say, 
P. R. grossly ignorant in Divinity.  I pray you, P. R. When Christ by the power of his Godhead raised himself out of the grave, had it been a good answer of the soldiers (supposing they had slept) to say, We know that Christ was stolen out of the grave, when we were asleep, because we found him not when we were awake? This Inference P. R. doth hold for good: whereby my Reader may guess how acceptable a servant he would have been unto those jewish Priests, if he had lived in that Synagogue, in setting on foot that bruit of infidelity, by persuading the people, that the soldiers reason was good; the Conclusion whereof is, Christ did not rise, but was stolen out of the grave: though, I hope, P. R. his faith is not so far asleep, as so to prejudice the chief Article of Christian faith, The resurrection of Christ from the dead: without which, as the Apostle S. Paul teacheth, 
* 1. Cor. 15.  our preaching is vain, and faith vain.  
5 Howsoever, I am sure he hath shown himself herein very witless, who knowing that I set down the main question in these words in great letters, for distinction sake, His Disciples came and stole him away: specifying the persons, His Disciples, the principal subject of that question: And could sleeping soldiers tell what was done of Christ's Disciples? As for example, If I falling asleep in the field, and having twenty shillings in my purse, one should come and pick my pocket, and cut my purse; after, I awaking, and conventing P. R. before a Magistrate upon suspicion of felony, should yield no other reason, but that when I was asleep, sure I am, P. R. came and cut my purse. 
P. R. confuted by the Text.  Then the justice of Peace replieth, How know you that P. R. did it, you being then asleep? What rejoinder would P. R. teach Tho. Morton to make? I could have vexed P. R. with a more familiar example, if I had been bend to scurrility. It is sufficient to understand, that as it pleased God so to infatuate that lying Priesthood, when they thought themselves most wise, for the greater glory of Christian faith, as to build their incredulity upon no better foundation than a feigned senseless report of men asleep: even so it falleth out with my Adversary P. R. who hath bewrayed his singular sottishness in the Inference, wherein he meant to give us a special Argument of his wit.   

An Argument of the rare memory of P. R. bewraying his free-will to lying.  
§ 3.  
6 TO make me seem ridiculously cautelous, as intending whensoever their Equivocating forgery was to be spoken of, to keep the clause of mental reservation under a Latin lock, and not Englished, lest weak ones might learn to practise that Magical Art, P. R. opposeth hereunto, 
c Treatis. Mitigat. Ep. Deed to the Vniversit. num. 21.  He (meaning Tho. Morton) hath not to my remembrance set down the clause of Reservation in Latin but once throughout all his book, and that in four words in the second page, the said Reservation being mentioned in English more perhaps than 〈◊〉 times.  
7 If my Reader will be willing for my sake to lose so much time as to peruse but the places which I have noted, he shall find the clause of Reservation set down by 
d As for those set down in the Moderate Answer, I am not to answer.  me in English not above 
e See Satisfac. part. 1. c. 17. lit. (a) & lit. (e.) And Part. 3. c. 3. lit. (b)  three of four times thorough my whole Book, and in the Treatise professedly written of that subject of Equivocation it is (the thing itself challenging so much) but once: but it is couched in Latin phrase above twenty times. See the Full Satisfact. Part. 3. 
f 1. 2. See Satisfact. Part. 3. c. 1. lit. (c) the 3. in chap. 2. the 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. in the chap. 3. the 9 10. in the chap. 4. the 11. in cha. 5. the 12. 13. 14. in the cha. 7. the 15. 16. 17. 18. in cha. 8. the 19 20. 21. in the chap. 11. the 22. 23. in the chap. 13.  First, ¹ Vt quis teneatur illud detegere. Second, ² Vt tibidicam. ³ Vt tibi revelem: in one Chapter. ⁴ Vt tibi significem. ⁵ Vt tibi revelem. ⁶ Vt tibi narrem. ⁷ Vt narrem tibi. ⁸ Vt narrem tibi: five times in one Chapter. Again, ⁹ Vt tibi significem. 10 Vt tibi significem. 11 Quatenùs vir longissimè abbess potuit. 12 Vt in common bonum conferamus. 13 Vt aliis largiamur. 14 Vt vobis significemus: and ¹⁵ Vt narrem tibi. 16 Vivit in Purgatorio. 17 Vt tibi revelem. 18 Vt tibi revelem; four times in one Chap. and ¹⁹ Vt dicam vobis. 20 Vt dicam vobis; ut vobis significem. 21 Vt vobis significem, 22 Abomni spe obtinendi Rom. Imperium. 23 Admodùm exiguam. Thus often it is expressly set down even in those places whereunto P. R. himself hath shaped such Answers as his want of grace did permit: so that he could not pretend ignorance herein. Wherefore what this his so open lying might portend, I know not, except he felt his wit wax somewhat blunt, and therefore meant to deserve the whetstone.  
8 The excellency of his memory appeareth in this, that he could remember fourteen English clauses of the Reservation, where there was (I think) not above four: but of twenty Latin clauses he would remember but one. Now seeing that one instance doth confute a general assertion, as he that shall say, There is not any Stew allowed in Rome, is easily confuted if but one may be proved to be there: He therefore wilfully denying that there is any such Latin clause, excepting only one, must, upon the evidence of three and twenty more, be thought to have made two and twenty lies at once. And shall we expect, that when he is brought into exigents and straits of greater importance, that he will speak truth, who doth lie so lavishly in a matter so needless? No, for an horse is like to stumble in the rough way, who falleth flat of all four in the plain. Next followeth   

An Argument of P. R. his kind of learning in Logic, wherein he hath provoked all Universities in the world to laugh at him.  
§ 4.  
9 FOr proof of his dexterity in Logic, he taketh upon him to discuss an absurd Syllogism (as he calleth it) of Tho. Mortons', in this manner. 
g Treatis. Mitig. cap. 11. pag. 473. & 474. num. 50. 51. 52. 53.   
His Syllogism (saith he) is in these words: [The competency of God, by whom we swear, maketh every one competent judges and Hearers, to whom we swear. But by swearing by God, whom we can not deceive, we religiously protest, that in swearing we intent not to deceive. Ergo your deceitful Equivocation is a profanation of the religious worship of God.] This Syllogism I leave to be discussed by Cambridge Logicians, where I hear say the man learned his Logic (if he have any) for here he showeth very little or none at all, no boy being among us of four months standing in Logic or Sophistry, which will not hiss at this argument, both for form and matter.— Because it hath six terminos,— and there should be but three. For it is no more a Syllogism than this: viz.  

h q. sup. pag. 475. num. 51  Every man is a living creature:  
Every Ox is a four-footed beast:  
Ergo every Ass both two long ears. Where you see there be six termini, as in Tho. Mortons' Syllogism, without connexion or dependence one of the other. And as much concludeth this as that.— And now compare this his skill (I pray you) with that brag of his in the beginning of his Treatise against Equivocation, when he said to his Adversary, Dare you appeal to Logic? This is the Art of Arts, and the high tribunal of reason and truth itself, which no man in any matter, whether it be case of Humanity or Divinity, 
P. R. his Thrasonical insultation.  can justly refuse. Who would not think but that the man were very skilful in that Art, wherein he presumeth to give such a censure?  
10 I would gladly do my Adversary the credit, as to think that not he himself, but rather some of his boyish Sophisters hath thus canvased that silly Argument, but that throughout his whole Book I find him so prodigal of his wit, time, and paper, every where pleasing himself in such superfluous vanities. Here therefore he calleth that a Syllogism, which I named only in a more general term a Reason, and not a Syllogism. Now there be many forms of reasonings beside Syllogisms; neither did I, indeed, intent to make an exact and formal Syllogism, but only such an Argument, which by due inference and deduction might prove my Conclusion good: and P. R. confesseth of that my Argument, that by a double Inference the reasoning is made good. I can not see therefore what cause he had to be more offended at me for delivering that in gross, which being divided into his parts was good reasoning; no more than a man may mislike to-pences because it is not a couple of single pence. As for his example of a Syllogism, it can not admit any such Inference to make any good reasoning: for by what deduction can he make his creature man and his other creature ass with long ears meet? But how will P. R. now use me upon this advantage? 
i Mitig. Epist. Dedic. to the Universities, num. 17. P. R. amplifieth his own vanity.  I do show him (saith he) to be a silly Disputer, as that he knoweth not how to make a Syllogism, and therefore am forced to send him again to Cambridge to reform his Logic, and to learn more. O good Sir, deal not so extremely with me, to put me to that trouble, charge, and shame, but rather vouchsafe (I pray you) to teach me yourself, you shall find me docible I warrant you. P. R. 
k Mitig. sup. lit. g. pa. 475. num. 53.   
Now then let us help him out to make his foresaid Syllogism in form. It should have been thus, if he would have said any thing in true form;  
The competency of God, 
P. R. frameth a Syllogism.  by whom we swear, maketh every one competent judges, to whom we swear:  
But in every oath we swear by God either expressly or implicatively:  
Ergo in every oath they are competent judges, to whom we swear.  
And then by another inference again, 
I spare the examination of this second inference, leau●ng this labour to his Sophisters, which will make them sport.  he might have argued, That unto every competent and lawful judge we have confessed before that a man is bound to answer directly, and to swear to his intention, and not only to his own. Ergo in no oath to whomsoever, may a man equivocate, which is his principal Proposition. And thus had his form of reasoning been good, according to the rules of Logic.  
11 If there had been either sinew or sap of Logic in this Priest, it stood him upon here to express his best Art, where he meaneth to play his prize, especially now when so scornfully he insulteth upon his Adversary, and so confidently appealeth unto Universities, as though he would hereupon raise his Io poean and triumph. Had we not now reason to expect as absolute a Syllogism as all his wit, art, and industry could invent? I am not worthy (I confess) to enter in comparison with men of great learning, because I think myself inferior unto thousands in our own Kingdom, yet some Logic I have learned, and sometime publicly taught; upon which little I dare presume to make a general appeal to Cambridge, Oxford, Rheims, Rome, and unto all Universities, whether of Protestants or Romanists, whether Christian or Pagan, yea, even to his own hissing boys and Sophisters, who P. R. saith are able to make Syllogisms in one month, and challenge P. R. for this his false Syllogism, willing (if he dare) that hereupon we venture our degrees, 
The manifold absurdities of his Syllogism.  which we have taken in the Schools. To come to the point: This Syllogism can find no place either in mood or figure, by reason of four capital faults. First, there be in it five termini, as namely, ¹ competency: ² God by whom we swear: ³ every one competent judges to whom we swear: ⁴ in every oath: ⁵ either expressly or implicatively: whereas, according to his own censure, there should be but three. Secondly, these words, The competency, being part of the Medium, should have been repeated in the Minor proposition, thus: But in every oath there is a competency of God by whom we swear. Otherwise it is no better than if P. R. should dispute thus:  
Every Mitigation of doctrine concerning rebellious positions, which are imputed unto us, will procure us favour of the State:  
But this is the doctrine of rebellious positions imputed unto us:  
Ergo this doctrine of rebellious positions imputed unto us will procure us favour of the State.  
The fault in this Syllogism is because this word, Mitigation, which is part of the Medium, is not repeated in the Minor. Thirdly, there should be but one minus extremum: with this, We swear by God, he hath joined another in these words, either expressly or implicatively: which words being a part of the minus extremum, should not have been omitted in the Conclusion. Like as if a man should reason thus:  
Every penitent Confessarie must receive absolution:  
But every Drunkard is a penitent Confessarie, repenting either of drinking too much, or of drinking too little:  
Ergo, every Drunkard must receive absolution.  
The fault of this is the addition to the minus extremum [either for drinking too much, or too little.] The fourth, the Verb and copula [maketh] every one competent, is altered in the Conclusion into [Are] competent judges: than the which there can not be a greater absurdity in Syllogisms. As may appear by this like example.  
Every man in framing his last Will and Testament, maketh his own Executor:  
But T. B. frameth his last Will and Testament:  
Ergo T. B. is his own Executor.  
The fault is the changing of the copula or Verb [maketh] into [is.] What will now P. R. do, after that this his montanous boast of A true Syllogism hath brought forth this ridiculous mouse? It is to be feared, that his hissing Sophisters will turn him into a Proverb, for thus disgracing their College, calling him P. R. the Syllogizer, when they will note any man so egregiously absurd, as in his greatest vaunt of skill to bewray his greatest want. But I may not be so unthankful as not to reform him, who was so willing to help me; thereby to redeem him from scorn: and therefore wish him to frame his Syllogism thus:  
Every speech, wherein we swear by God, either expressly or implicatively, doth by the competency of God, by whom we swear, make the judges competent, unto whom we swear:  
But every oath is a speech wherein we swear by God, either expressly or implicatively:  
Ergo, every oath doth by the competency of God, by whom we swear, make the judges competent, to whom we swear.  
12 But I fear lest I may seem too much to detract from his skill in Logic, who hath given us so many tokens of his rare faculty therein, especially in exact dividing and subdividing; a principal property of that Art. As for example: 
l Mitigat. chap. 12. num. 4. pag. 485. initio.  Wherefore all our speech, saith he, in this place shall be about the second kind of Equivocation, which is false and lying, and thereby also ever unlawful; which though not properly, yet in a general manner, may be called Equivocation, 
A fond division of P. R.  as I have said, for that the hearer is always wrongfully deceived or intended to be deceived by some falsity, which is known to be such by the speaker, and consequently is plain lying. And for that lying also hath been showed before to be divided into two sorts; the one a material lie, when the thing spoken is false in itself, but not so understood by the speaker; the other a formal lie, when the speaker doth know it, or thinketh it to be false, and yet speaketh it. This kind of equivocation, which really is a lie, must have also the same subdivision, so as the one sort thereof may be called a material lying Equivocation, and the other aformall: and so much worse, as a formal lie is in itself (which always is sin) than a material (which often times may be without sin of the speaker) by so much is a formal lying Equivocation worse than a material. There is no boy (I think) in his College, but he can analyse the members of this division thus:  
A lying Equivocation is that which is known to be such unto the speaker. And this is to be subdivided, for it is either  
A material lie, which is when the thing spoken is a lie in itself, But not so understood of the speaker.  
Or, A formal lie, when the speaker Doth know it, and think it to be false.  
Where he maketh a material lie, which is not known of the speaker, to be a species or member of that lying equivocation, which is known to the speaker. As if he should say, Some liar knoweth what he speaketh, when he knoweth not what he speaketh. And could any say thus but a liar? here indeed is Logic whereat the boys of our Universities may hiss, and the boys of his College may blush▪ yea, any rural boy (if of any mean capacity) may laugh, by sight of the like: for his division is all one as if he had said thus:  
Every one of our Priests is shaven in the crown, whereof  
Some are sent into England, and they have no shaven crowns.  
Others remain beyond the seas, and they are shaven in the crowns.  
Which division if it were true, then might a man conclude by good Logic, that a man with a shaven crown hath no shaven crown. And yet P. R. our great Logicioner can tell us, that 
m Mitigat. Epist. Ded. unto the Vniversit. num. 3.  According to Aristotle's observation, Prudentis est distinguere: It appertaineth to a wise and discreet man to distinguish, whereas the ignorant▪ and the unlearned doth commonly confound all without distinction. But my friend P. R. (I must needs say) is not one of those Ignorants, who confound things without distinction; but worse: for he hath taken pains to confound things by distinguishing. I can not be delighted with these kind of taxations, and except it were against such a scornful Adversary, I would not have insisted upon them. My purpose is only to teach him hereafter to be more serious, who still multiplieth his vanities, as next appeareth in   

An Argument of his kind of skill in Greek and Hebrew, whereby he hath gained the opinion of rare ignorance.  
§ 5.  
13 YEt again, to expose me to the scoff of his Reader, the conceited Gentleman saith thus: 
n Mitigat. cha 2. pag. 88 num. 58.  And yet truly I can not well pretermit, for ending this Chapter, one little note more, of rare singularity in this man above others, which I scarce over have observed in any of his fellows, and this is, That the very first words of Scripture alleged by him in the first page of his book, for the poesy of his pamphlet, are falsely alleged, corrupted and mangled, though they contain but one only verse of Isay the Prophet; and then may you imagine, what liberty he will take to himself afterward throughout his whole Discourse. His sentence or poesy is this. Isay. 29. vers. 9 But stay yourselves and wonder, they are blind and make you blind: which he would have to be understood of us Catholics. But let any man read the place of Isay itself, & he shall find no such matter either inwords or sense, but only the word, wonder, to wit; Obstupescite & admiramini, fluctuate & vacillate, inebriamini & non à vino, monemini & non ab ebrietate. And according to this are the Greek and Hebrew texts also. So as what should move T. M. to set down so corruptly the very sentence of his book, and cite the chapter and verse wherein his fraud may be descried, I know not, except he observed not the last clause of the Prophet's precept, Movemini & non ab ebrietate. And so much for this.  
14 Which is much more than any man of a temperate sense would have objected: for let any man read the English translation, and he shall find the same words expressly set down. Seeing therefore that P. R. doth intimate to his Reader, That I have forged a new Text, and that the words are by me falsely alleged, can there be a more false, yea and (if wilful rashness do not take the upper hand of impudent boldness) a more shameless cavil than this?  
15 Thus much of the words, Ye are blind, etc. His next quarrel is against the sense, he repeating the Latin, yet but manglingly, and doth not English it, lest (I think) his common Reader might apprehend the sense: or else he left it for me to translate. Thus then: 
* Isa. 29.  Be ye astonished & wonder, waver ye and reel, ye are drunk, but not with wine, ye are moved, but not with drunkenness: because the Lord hath mingled for you the spirit of slumber, he will shut your eyes, he will cover your Prophets and chief ones, which see visions, etc. The sense of all is delivered by S. Hierome 
Hierom. Com. in Isa. 29.  in his Comment upon the same place: Scitote ergo, etc. Know therefore ye Scribes and Pharisees, who are the chief among the jews, for you hearing the Lord▪ and Saviour would not understand, and have shut your eyes, that you should not see: Therefore will God shut your eyes (who are the Prophets) by whom you received the knowledge of God. A little after: 
P. R. his arrogancy in urging the Greek and Hebrew text.  Or according to the Septuagints, he will shut the eyes of them, who boasted they saw secrets, etc. In all these we hear of the spirit of slumber, of covering and shutting of eyes, of not seeing: and can these signify any thing but a spiritual blindness? Again, Pagninus translateth the text according to our English: 
Pagninus.  Excaecati etc. They are blind, and make you blind. And not this only, 
Pintus.  but their own late authorized Doct. Pintus, in his Comment upon the same place, saith: In Hebraeo est in hunc modum, etc. Thus it is in the Hebrew text (saith he) Your Priests shall be blind, and make others blind.  
16 Let us confer circumstances together. First, I am noted by P. R. to have forged a text, but am acquitted by the English Translation, They are blind, etc. This then is his first falsehood. And next, for his sense he objecteth the Latin and Greek, but by the exposition of S. Hierome both the Greek Septuagints and Latin vulgar have the same sense, to wit, Shutting up of eyes, which is to be blind: which may argue his second falsehood. In the last place he opposeth the Hebrew text, as different from the English, which by the judgement of Pagninus, and Pintus, is almost the same both in words & sense, wherein is discovered his third falsehood. So as I can not guess what moved P. R. to deal so slanderously with me, in noting me of fraud and corruption, except it be that he meant we should reckon himself in the number of these Priests thus mentioned in the Text, You are blind, and make men blind: or in the words following, You are drunk but not with wine: With what then? I pray God I may not say with malice. In this, both P. R. and I may learn a caution, to take heed we do not peremptorily meddle with Hebrew texts: for if they say true who know him, as I can say of myself, we are but Alephbetharians in this language.   

An Argument of P. R. his kind of Charity, attended with a triumphant falsehood.  
§ 6.  
17. I Do not mean to bring in, as tokens hereof, his disgraceful and reviling terms, calling me Ass, Silly grasshopper, Lewd lad: which kind of Rhetoric the learned call Caninam eloquentiam, that is, Doggish eloquence, wherein this fellow hath (I must confess) a singular gift, which I shall rather pity than envy, till I see it better employed. In the interim it can not offend me to be called Ass in that cause, wherein I carry my Saviour in his Hozanna; nor to be termed Grasshopper in that cause, wherein I may be a plague unto Egypt, I pray God rather for conversion than destruction: nor to be named Lad, whilst I carry a stone in a sling, In nomine Domini, wherewith a noble and gracious Lad did hit an enemy of the true worship of God, a vaunting Goliath, in the forehead. But I have a better argument of his charitable devotion towards me than this. For thus P. R. 
o Treatis. of Mitigat. cha. 6. num. 60. pag. 234.  I let pass as trifles in this very place (but yet such as show a guilty mind and meaning) that he citing the book of Alexander Carerius, a Doctor of the Canon law in Padua, which he wrote of late De potestate Romani Pontificis, putteth in of his own, contra huius temporis haereticos, against the heretics of this time, which are not in the title of that book. And then whereas the said Author, naming or citing many other Writers to be of his opinion, doth say, Nuperrime verò Celsus Mancinus in tract. de jurib. Princip. etc. and last of all Celsus Mancinus doth hold the same in a certain Treatise of the rights and principalities: this man to frame unto himself some matter of insultation, turneth verò into verè, and then playeth ridiculously upon his own fiction in these words: Carerius citeth another called Celsus, by interpretation high or lofty, and therefore instiles him with Verè Celsus, as truly so named, and so truly he may be, if we judge him by the loftiness of his style and Conclusion. So he. And do you see this folly? Or will you think it rather folly than falsehood, that could not discern between verò and verè? Or not be able to judge by the contexture of Carerius his speech itself, that it could not be apt construction be verè if he had lighted upon a corrupt copy, as he could not; for that there is but one, and that hath very plainly verò, and consequently all this Commentary of Tho. Morton is out of his own invention. And where now is the assurance of his upright conscience protested to his Majesty in his Epistle Dedicatory? Where is his simplicity in Christ jesus? Where is his naked innocency? Can this be ignorance? Can this be done but of purpose, and consequently by a guilty conscience? What may the Hearer believe of all he saith, when every where he is found entangled with such foolish treachery? But let us proceed. Thus far P. R. 18. It is but a point of Oratory in this man to say he letteth pass, which notwithstanding he insisteth and dwelleth upon as violently and virulently as upon any one taxation in the whole book, and yet the matter, we see, is but only about trifles, as himself saith, and therefore such, as not only Christian equity, but even common humanity might have either spared: or if I deserved correction, yet with moderate Schoolmasters to know when to use a ferula, and when a rod. The fault objected is a wrong intituling of a book, which notwithstanding the title which P. R. allegeth (being De Pontifice Romano) might have born out, because it is the very scope of that book: so that my error therein could have been no more than if in signs which hang in the street, I had taken an ivy bush for an Holly, both which do equally betoken a Tavern. The next excuse might have been from a possible weakness of sight in taking verè for verò. 
A forced and strained calumniation.  But this man's charity is so hot, that whatsoever slip his Adversary maketh, it must rather be falsehood than folly. Must it be even so then P. R? And shall the Minister find no more favourable construction at the hands of a Priest, than to be pronounced guilty of forgery for such an easy escape, not of a sentence, or word, or syllable, but for this little element ò? ôthen give me leave to plead for myself, and know P. R. that the Book itself will witness against you, which many have seen in my hands, and any may see that will. Carerius, then in the Book above mentioned, printed at Colen, Anno Domini 1601. in 8ᵒ. (and joined with another book of Zecchius De Indulgentijs & jubilaeo, which hath the first place in the volume) hath in the front and beginning of the whole Book this title followieg: viz.  
De potestate Romani Pontificis, adversus impios Politicos, & nostri temporis haereticos, Authore Alexandro Carerio Patavino. That is:  
A Treatise concerning the authority of the Pope of Rome, against the wicked Politicians and Heretics of our times, by Alexander Carerius, etc. Which title is again repeated alone in the beginning of Carerius his Tract, after F. 4. De potestate Romani Pontificis adversus Politicos & huius temporis haereticos, etc. A Treatise concerning the authority of the Pope against the politicians and heretics of these times. I have therefore committed no fraud in the title.  
19 The second is of the particle Verè, which is also as plain in the place by me alleged out of Carerius lib. 2. cap. 9 pag. 133. about the midst of the page, before the end of that Chapter, Nuperrimè verè Celsus Mancinus in Tractat. de iuribus principatuum, etc. Of late truly Celsus Mancinus, etc. Which the contexture may seem also to import, because after that he had recounted sixteen Authors for maintenance of his Conclusion, 
A peremptory falsehood of P. R.  and coming last unto Celsus Mancinus, may well be thought by that particle verè, to have honoured Celsus with the note of Truly lofty, that by the excellency of the Author he might have gained grace and dignity to his cause. Where then is the sincerity of this man's conscience? Shall excuse him by diversity of Editions? He will not be thus excused: For (saith he) there is but one Edition. What Menippus (whom the Poets fain to be the man in the moon, beholding all the infinite corners of the world) could have made so peremptory a negative as this? There is but one, that is, there is no other Edition in the world? seeing that it is free for all Universities in France, Spain, Germany, Italy to print and reprint all such privileged books, and yet P. R. dare avouch that there is but one. Take heed P. R. nay it is passed take heed, for you are already fallen into a whirlpool: because if there be but one, then hath P. R. wickedly falsified the Author, by turning verè into verò (which all men may find in the Colen Edition, anno 1601. where it is verè) if there may be another, then hath he wilfully bolted out this exception, saying, that there is but one Edition. The guilt of the first must be needs malice; of the other, madness: whereby (I hope) my Reader may judge, that the sincerity of my conscience herein hath been where it ought, even in the heart of a Minister of Truth: and that it is no marvel, if the conscience of my Adversary hath been (according to his profession) in the heart of an Aequivocator, who saith furthermore, I let that pass, which notwithstanding even upon a wrong sense he prosecuteth in titles and triflels so curiously, or rather (if desert may speak) so currishly, and with such spiteful insultations, viz. Where is his naked innocency? Where is his upright conscience? Where is his simplicity in Christ jesus? And is not this a passing treachery, trow we? Yet this also is excusable in respect of many others, whereof (so much as the nature of a preamble may require) I shall give my Reader that taste, which may prepare him for a sufficient presumption of the rest. But some will say, in so manifestly impudence how can any argument of modesty appear? Behold   

An Argument of P. R. his kind of modesty, accompanied with a presumptuous falsehood.  
§ 3.  
TO this my Objection, 
p See Full Satisfact. part. 1. cha. 13. pag. 39  All Popish Priest's 〈…〉 abolish the title of succession in all Protestant Princes, by a pretended prerogative either of Pope or people: producing for proof of this Popish doctrine the testimonies of their own Doctors, to wit, Reinolds, Stapleton, Symancha. Hereunto. P. R. taketh two exceptions. The first thus: 
q Treatise of Mitigat. cap. 2. pag. 71. num. 71.  But let us see and consider how falsely and calumniously this Makebate doth hereupon argue in his third Reason, inferring for his Assumption or Minor Proposition thus: But all Popish Priests upon this pretended supremacy and prerogative of Pope and people do utterly abolish the title of succession in all Protestant Princes. Ergo. Wherein to show him a notable liar, it shall be sufficient to name all the Protestant Princes that have had title of succession in our Country (for thereof he speaketh principally) since the name of Protestant hath been heard of in the world, being three in number, to wit, King Edward the sixth, Queen Elizabeth, and King james that now reigneth, all which were admitted peaceably to their Crowns aswell by Priests as Catholic people, who notwithstanding in some of their admissions wanted not means to have wrought disturbances, as the world knoweth: so as if one instance only doth truly overthrow any general proposition, how much more doth this triple instance, not able to be denied, overthrow and cast to ground this universal false assertion of T. M. which averreth, That all Popish Priests do utterly abolish the succession of all Protestant Princes? Will he not be ashamed to see himself convinced of so great and shameless overlashing?  
21 What have I said, which I have not proved? From the Priest Reinolds 
r Full satisfact. part. 1. chap. 13. pag. 39  I reported this testimony, The right of King's Christian must depend rather upon their religion than order of succession, and therefore all Christians must cut off all hope, lest any such (speaking of Protestants) may aspire unto the throne. Secondly, from M. Stapleton, this: If they do not withstand such a succession (speaking of Protestant Kings) what do the people else but even prefer man before God? Thirdly, from Symancha, this: That if the heir apparent (speaking of Protestants) be heretical, than the Catholic Commonwealth may choose another, and if the Commonwealth be heretical (noting Protestant's) then the choice belongeth to the Pope, and so the kingdom (which was to make way for the Spanish Invasion against England, in 88) may be taken by Catholics. From which three testimonies (besides that of Dolman, which followeth) I made bold to conclude a general, That all Romish Priests are of the same opinion: and am therefore censured for a notable liar: his reason, Because three Protestant Princes have been peaceably admitted unto the Crown, when yet there wanted no means of disturbance. It can not be but that this P. R. when he calleth any man liar, doth presently lick his own lips, as we may perceive by his strong breath: for first, I reported not mine own conjectures, but the express positions of their own principal Doctors, 
A calumnious falsehood.  finding no one of that side, writing of our English cause, to hold the contrary.  
22 Which is herein more apparently the general doctrine of all their Priests, in as much as this Priest P. R. even now, when the case challenged him to answer concerning that doctrine, yet neither could oppose, of the infinite number of all his crew, any one Priest who ever set pen to paper to confute that doctrine, neither durst he in this answer condemn it himself. And therefore where my question is Deiure, that is, of the doctrine, Whether their Priests think it lawful for subjects to admit a Protestant Prince, and heir apparent, to succession, he answereth De facto, that is, of the events of things that happened, to wit, That three Protestant Princes have been quietly permitted to succeed, giving his Reader an alms of a piece of chalk for a morsel of cheese. As for example: It is a law amongst thieves (no one of them holding the contrary) not always to rob, when they may make disturbance, but then only, when they are in most probable hope to enjoy their prey: so that it falleth out many times, that when they meet with passengers, they entertain kind and courteous talk with them, and yet dog them on their way, with purpose to rob them in some presumed place of advantage: but then by the sight of more company of true men they, being frustrate of their hope, let them pass without any manner of disturbance. 
P. R. his calumniation manifested by a Simile.  If, notwithstanding such escape, any shall affirm, that all thieves profess robbery and spoil, whensoever their opportunity may serve: shall he therefore be termed a slanderer of thieves, and a notable liar? I know P. R. is witty, and can apply this similitude unto himself, whom it most concerneth: for he who in this place bringeth in a triple instance of Protestant Princes, who were admitted peaceably to their Crowns, insinuating that therefore they were willingly admitted on the Romish part, may be easily confuted by another triple instance taken from himself. 1. Of the now K. of France, 
s See hereafter §. 12. num. 38. and §. 13. num. 39  who being K. of Navarre, was resisted, that he should not succeed in the kingdom of France, lest being in that disposition (meaning a Protestant) he might have altered religion in France. 2. of Q. Elizabeth he hath also said, that she was excommunicate by the Pope, 
A falsehood full of dangerous delusion.  (by whose Bull she was also pronounced to be no Queen) because she had changed religion. Will they not for the same reason hinder succession, for the which they have endeavoured to disturb a possession▪ 3. The third instance is in our dread Sovereign K. james, P. R. in his Dolman hath held against his succession to the Crown four arguments of exclusion. Observe now three singular notes of this man's modesty: 1. He accuseth me to be a slanderer for avouching a report, proved true by incontroleable consequence, and whereunto no instance of any Priest was or could be objected. 2. He offereth to satisfy a question of Right and justice with an instance of fact and event, as if he would teach us to reason thus: Romish Priests do not say Mass publicly in England: Ergo they think it utterly unlawful that Mass should be said publicly in England. 3. He hath so assoiled the question by a triple instance, that by another triple instance of his own he is more strictly and dangerously entangled. Let me mention, for further discovery of this his delusion, the Breve of Pope Clemens the 8. commanding that at the death of Q. Elizabeth none should be suffered to succeed, who was not a professed Romish Catholic. This M. Garnet confessed at the Bar, which his confession remaineth in public Record. If any shall require a reason why they resisted not his majesties entrance, they can not possibly yield any, but only want of means of disturbance. So that I might confess myself very shameless indeed, if I should not blush and sorrow in his behalf, to see any man by so presumptuous falsehoods to murder his own soul.  
23 Which is yet more visible by the second part of this accusation which P. R. inferreth thus: 
t Treatis. of Mitigat. chap. 2. num. 35. pag. 72. The objected falsehood out of the testimony of Doleman answered and confuted.  What or how far this fellow may be trusted in these his assertions may be gathered by the last sentence of all his discourse in this matter, where he hath these words: [F. Parsons (in his Dolman) doth pronounce sentence, that whosoever shall consent to the succession of a Protestant prince, is a most grievous and damnable sinner.] And is it so Sir Thomas? And will you stand to it & lose your credit, if this be falsely and calumniously alleged? then if you please, let us hear the Authors own words, viz. And now (saith Doleman part. 1. pag. 216.) to apply all this to our purpose for England, and for the matter we have in hand, I affirm and hold that for any man to give his help, consent or assistance towards the making of a King, whom he judgeth or believeth to be faulty in religion, and consequently would advance either no religion, or the wrong, if he were in authority, is a most grievous and damnable sin to him that doth it, of what side soever the truth be, that is preferred. So he. And his reason is, for that he should sin against his own conscience in furthering such a King. And is there here any word peculiar of a Protestant Prince, or of his successor? nay doth not the Text speak plainly of making a King, where none is? doth it not speak also indifferently of all sorts of religion, of what side soever the truth be? How then can this malicious cavilling Minister expect to be trusted hereafter, or how may any man think that he speaketh or writeth out of his conscience, seeing him to use such gross shifts and falsehoods in so manifest and important a matter? It is no marvel if he set not his name at large to his book, as not desirous to have the due praise of such desert.  
24 Venture my credit, Sir? yes that I will, though I value nothing to be more precious among men, and therefore willingly put it into this affirmative balance concerning the sentence of Doleman, proving it true in that sense it hath been alleged, if you will put yours in the other, which is the negative, our Reader shall hold the scales, and the evidence of Dolemans book shall cast it.  
The subject of our question is, whether Doleman, one of the three Romish Priests, doth account it a damnable sin in his Catholics to suffer a Protestant Prince to succeed in the Crown: after I had proved this to be the Romish doctrine by the testimony of three Priests, I added this fourth, which was Doleman. Wherefore we must examine whether this be the judgement of Doleman or no. It belongeth to me to prove the affirmative, to wit, that this was the judgement of Doleman.  
25 The title of that book is, A conference about the next succession to the Crown of England (namely, next after the death of Q. Elizabeth) and about all such as may pretend a right, whether within England or without. One of the contents of the first Chapter is, that Nearness of blood may upon just causes be altered. And of the sixth Chapter: that, An heir apparent to the crown before he be crowned may be justly put back. After this he proceedeth to express his just causes, the principal he delivereth in the ninth chapter, the very place now alleged: The Contentis this, That one principal cause of excluding any Prince is diversity of Religion. Whereof he resolveth thus: 
u Doleman. part 1. cap. 9 pag. 212.  Nothing can more justly exclude an heir apparent from his succession, as want of Religion, nor any cause whatsoever justify the Commonwealth, or conscience of particular men, that in this cause should resist his entrance, than if he find him faulty in this point, which is the head of all the rest. Where we see, that the person spoken of is an heir apparent. By which word cannot be meant a successor by Election, but a successor by natural descent and right of inheritance. Of this heir apparent he 
x Doleman pag. 213.  saith further; that as when a woman is espoused unto an husband which is an Infidel, this contract (by the doctrine of the Apostle) may be dissolved: so is the case of an Infidel pretender unto the Crown. And lest any may doubt who in this case may be held an Infidel, he addeth that 
y Ib. pag. 214.  Seeing there can be but only one faith available unto salvation, certain it is that unto my conscience whosoever believeth otherwise than I do, and standeth wilfully in the same, is an Infidel, for that he believeth not that which in my faith and conscience is the sole saving faith. This ground thus laid, he cometh at last unto the application before specified, saying: And now to apply, etc. affirming that, Whosoever giveth any help to the making a King, whom he judgeth to be faulty in Religion, is a most grievous and damnable sinner.  
26 One Syllogism will assoil the whole doubt.  
Every man is a damnable sinner, who admitteth any Prince to succeed in the Crown, 
Maior.  whom he thinketh faulty in Religion.  
But every Romish Catholic thinketh all Protestant Princes faulty in Religion. 
Minor.   
Ergo, every Romish Catholic, who admitteth of a Protestant Prince to succeed in the Crown, is a damnable sinner.  
What is there in all this Syllogism which Doleman alias Parsons, can deny to be his Assertion? The Mayor he hath said, He that admitteth of any to the Crown, whom he thinketh to be of faulty religion, is a damnable sinner. Is it the Minor? why, he hath said that, There is but one true Religion. And Parsons being a Romish Priest must intend that all Protestants in the judgement of all Catholics are of a faulty Religion. Will he then deny the Ergo or Conclusion? this were against the Law of Logic, and then his Sophisters would deride him. How then can my assertion be thought slanderous, which necessary consequence of reason proveth to be too true? 
The idle and ridiculous calumniation of P. R discovered by two Similes.  As for example, Suppose that this P. R. hath promised his Creditor to pay him four Nobles, at a certain time appointed, at what time his Creditor challengeth him saying, Sir you are to pay me twenty six shillings eight pence, according to the words of your own promise; by and by P. R. (purging his choler) answereth, This is falsely and calumniously urged, was there any such word of twenty six shillings eight pence in all my promise? Nay did I not expressly say, that I would pay thee four Nobles? What a malicious cavilling Creditor art thou, or how shall any think thou seekest thy debts with good conscience, seeing thou usest these shifts and falsehoods in a sum of this importance? Would not bystanders either laugh at him, as at a lunatic, or else suspect him for a cozening cheater? because he that promiseth four Nobleses, promiseth twenty six shillings eight pence, though not in the same literal words, yet in the real sense. Or else more pertinently thus: Let us suppose this to be a general doctrine amongst his Catholics, that no person borne without England can be accounted lawful heir to that kingdom: which 
y Doleman part. 2. cap. 5. pag. 116.  Doleman insinuateth by his particular observation of the same Maxim against the succession of our dread sovereign, than the only king of Scotland, and that some thus libeling were taken, and by some Protestant accused of treason, for affirming that K. james had no right to the Crown of England: the libeler should answer saying: This accusation is false and slanderous, I named not K. james, but only said in general (though particularly I intended K. james) that none borne without England was a just successor to the crown: 
See a further answer hereafter in this Preamble.  the judge should say, well then thine own mouth hath condemned thee, inasmuch as if thou shouldest now say that there is no king in England, (although none be named) because the right one, who is K. james, is disabled, when every one is excluded. It is true, (saith the libeler) by just consequence, but yet I named none. Would P. R. if he heard this, pronounce this fellow unguilty? then is he no Mitigator: would he justify his accuser? then am I no liar. For the case is alike, especially knowing that the scope of that whole book, called Doleman, and penned by Parsons a Priest, is only this, to disable the titles of all Protestants (yea even K. james by name) and to debar them all hope of succession in Great Britain: and to prefer the Infanta of Spain before all other pretenders. This then hath been but his cavilling malice thus injuriously to accuse me of malicious cavilling. There remaineth only   

An Argument of P. R. his kind of truth, full of triumphant treachery.  
§ 8.  
27 THough all the former Arguments of P. R. his wit, memory, learning, and modesty contain in them the lively characters and demonstrations of a liar, yet have I reserved to this last place of truth, such an accusation, from whence one would think he had gained a triumph saying: 
z Treatise of Mitigat. cap. 6. num. 36. pag. 215.  In the very next page (saith P. R.) after, he talking of the great and famous contention that passed between Pope Gregory the seventh, called Hildebrand, and Henry the fourth Emperor of that name, about the year 1070. he citeth the Historiographer Otto Frisingensis, with this ordinary title of Our Otto, for that he writeth that he found not any Emperor actually excommunicated or deprived of his kingdom by any Pope before that time, except (saith he) that may be esteemed for an Excommunication which was done to Philip the Emperor by the Bishop of Rome, almost 1400. years agone, when for a short time he was inter poenitentes collocatus, placed by the said Pope amongst those that did penance; as that also of the Emperor Theodosius, who was sequestered from entering into the Church by S. Ambrose, for that he had commanded a certain cruel slaughter to be committed in the city of Thessalonica: both which exceptions this Minister of simple truth leaveth out of purpose, which is no simplicity, as you see, but yet no great matter with him, in respect of the other that ensueth, which is, that he allegeth this 
* Frisin. l. 6. hist. c. 32.  Frisingensis quite contrary to his own meaning, as though he had condemned Pope Gregory the seventh for it, whereas he condemneth that cause of the Emperor, and commendeth highly the Pope for his constancy in punishing the notorious faults of the said Henry. Hildebrandus (saith he) semper in Ecclesiastico rigore constantissimus fuit: Hildebrand was ever the most constant in defending the rigour of Ecclesiastical Discipline. And again in this very Chapter alleged by T. M. Inter omnes Sacerdotes & Romanos Pontifices praecipui zeli & authoritatis fuit: He was among all the Priests and Popes that had been of the Roman Sea of most principal zeal and authority. How different is this judgement of Frisingensis from the censure of T. M. who now after 500 years past compareth the cause of Pope Gregory to that of pirates, thieves and murderers, and so citeth our Otto Frisingensis, as though he had favoured him in this impious assertion? Can any thing be more fraudulently alleged? is this the assurance of his upright conscience whereof he braggeth to his Majesty?  
28 In the Full Satisfaction Part. 3. Cha. 11. Pa. 28. that which was intended to be proved was this: That not till a thousand years after Christ did ever any Prelate or Pope attempt the deposing of Emperors and depriving them of their Crowns. For proof hereof I brought in the testimony of Otto Frisingensis from the witness of Tolossanus lib. 26. De Repub. cap. 5. in these words, I read and read again, and find, That Pope Hildebrand, in the year 1060. was the first Pope, who ever deprived an Emperor of his regiment. Wherein now have I wronged my conscience? Is it because Otto Frisingensis is cited contrary to his meaning? If this should be supposed to be true, yet could it not prejudice my conscience, because I cited not the Author himself, 
A treacherous falsehood.  but only Tolossanus a Romish Doctor, who reported that sentence of Frisingensis. And is not this a fine treachery of my Accuser to conceal the Author, and so eagerly and bitterly to inveigh against me, who am only the Relater, and might answer him, That if I be deceived your own Doctor hath deceived me? This answer I use here to demonstrate the malice of my Accuser, and not (although it might suffice) to satisfy the point in question, in behalf whereof I avouch my Allegation to be true. And why not? Otto Frisingensis (saith P. R.) mentioneth ancient examples of two Emperors, who were excommunicate, both which the Minister of simple truth leaveth out of purpose. I left them out of purpose (I confess) otherwise I should have been like to yourself in this and other such cavilles, who desire to say much, though nothing to the purpose. For to what purpose, I pray you, had this been, seeing our question was not to show what Emperors had been excommunicated, but who, being excommunicate, had been deposed from their Royalties? Then my case is no otherwise, than supposing that P. R. or any other had been degraded in any University, and demand being made concerning the time, when this was done: I should answer (and that truly) that it was in the days of Elizabeth Queen of England: 
A dull taxation, as the simile showeth.  presently P. R. after his ordinary manner of salvation should call me Liar, because I ought to have told that he was admonished and excommuned before he was degraded. So dull and frivolous is his present taxation in a question of Antiquity, concerning the time when first any Pope did take upon him to depose Emperors. Frisingensis saith plainly, that Hildebrand was the first: he saith moreover (commending him) that Hildebrand was constant in punishing faults. Say then (good P. R.) seeing both these two are true, can one of them be a lie? As if when two noble men H. and B. contend whether of them are of more ancient descent, I should hear F. an Herald say, that the house of B. is not so ancient by much: yet is B. (saith the Herald) in his own person both in regard of valour and bounty far more honourable than H. Then I, purposing to answer to the question, report the Herald's speech: 
A Simile.  to wit: The house of B. is not, by much, so ancient as is the house of H. Would P. R. hearing this, presently cry out, o notorious and intolerable liar! said the Herald so? did he not commend B. for valour and bounty? Could any by-stander contain laughter, to hear such a senseless exception as this? because that although I omitted the commendation of bounty, yet did I truly relate the observation of Ancientrie, which was the principal matter in question. I leave the application unto P. R. let H. be Henry the Emperor, B. the Bishop of Rome, F, the Herald, Frisingensis, etc. But P. R. is jealous of his Father's honour, and therefore will have it known that he is commended by Frisingensis, and yet could not be ignorant, that the next witness, whom I 
a Full Satisf. part. 3. chap. 11. pag. 28.  produced, Claudius Espencaeus, their own Romish Bishop, doth plainly aver, that Hildebrand was the first Pope, who without any example of antiquity made a schism between Emperors and Popes, and by his example provoked the Pope's following him, to take arms against Kings excommunicate. 
A falsehood in concealment.  This Author disabling not only the antiquity of that rebellious practice of the Pope, but also condemning the fact itself. Therefore hath P. R. by wily silence made as it were a pocketing of this Author, as of a medlar. And was not this a piece of fine fraud?  
29 But P. R. is not contented to have noted me in the former (as he calleth it) notorious fault, but repeateth it again, making himself therein in a manner triumphant, saying, that 
b Treatise of Mitigat. chap 6. num. 39 pa. 217.  Otto Frisingensis commendeth Hildebrand, and yet is brought in to condemn him. After this again he insulteth upon it in this sort: Truly, if any man can show me out of all the Catholic writers that be extant, English or other, that ever any one of them used this shameful fraud in writing, where no excuse can free them from malicious and witting falsehood, then will I grant that this is not proper to the Protestant spirit alone. 
Mark how heinous he maketh his accusation.  Hitherto, I must confess, that I never found it in any, and if I should, though it were but once, I should hold it for a sufficient argument not to believe him ever after. And this shall suffice for a taste only of M. Mortons' manner of proceeding. For that to prosecute all particulars would require a whole volume, and by these few you may guess at the man's vein and spirit in writing. So P. R.  
30 Aristotle telleth us of one Antiphon, who was of that weak sight, that whensoever he walked he saw his own image reflecting upon him in the air. What shall we imagine of this exclamation against shameful and malicious fraud in writing, except it had been spoken in respect of the reflection of his own image, 
Four excellent tricks of falsehood in one.  who hath played me four malicious tricks in one page? One is, To lay an imputation of falsehood upon me, as though I had cunningly pretermitted the examples of Emperors excommunicate, whereas the question was only concerning Emperors deprived of their state and dignities. The second cavil is, Not acknowledging the commendation of Hildebrand in Otto Frisingensis, when as I intended not to prove out of this Author the equity, but only the antiquity of that practice. Thirdly, In making me so perniciously envious, as to condemn Hildebrand without a witness, when as I produced their own Bishop Espencaeus to condemn him. Lastly, In charging me with a wilful perverting of the meaning of the Author Otto Frisingensis, when as (if it had been so abused) yet not I but their own Doctor Tolossanus was the Author of that report.  
31 The view of all these and other formerly mentioned wilful and transparent falsities of P. R. together with some other the like desperate calumniations to be pointed at in this Preamble, causeth me justly to present him with his own image, professing unfeignedly, that I never found any Writer of any profession whatsoever, who hath used such shameful fraud in answering. And this, I doubt not, but the Christian Reader will confess, when he shall see this transfigured Parson appear in his own likeness.    

THE SECOND INQVIRIE.  
Whether P. R. may be judged a competent Advocate for this cause which he hath assumed: and whether he hath not been excepted against by his own fellow.  

§ 9  
32 THis P. R. hath bestowed six or seven sections in censuring me and my Adversary the Moderate Answerer, concerning whom he writeth thus: 
c Treatise of Mitig. chap. 3. pag. 101.  I must needs say that the Answerer hath endeavoured to effectuate so much as he promised in the title of his book, which was, of A just and moderate Answer, & in performance thereof hath not only borne on matters temperately, as before hath been showed, but spared also his Adversary in many points, and namely in passing over his allegations without note, or check.— In the rest the Answerer quitteth himself learnedly, and showeth much reading in particular, as by the multiplicity of Authors by him alleged doth well appear.  
33 Say you so P. R.? Did your fellow answer Learnedly? Why who are you, and where is your abode, tell me? 
d Treatise of Mitig. chap. 3. pag. 92. num. 3.  The Book of Tho. Morton was sent me out of England. Then belike this Mitigator is out of England, who, by the constant and general voice, hath his residence at Rome. May it now please him to hear what this Moderate Answerer (whom he so greatly commended) hath judged of such extravagant persons as he is, if peradventure any such write books concerning our English State? That answerer being pressed with the testimonies of many foreign Jesuits and others, who defended the first ground of all rebellious positions and practices, was driven for a Moderation, to use this evasion; 
e The Mother. Ans. chap. 2. §. wherefore to purge, etc.  I suppose, (saith he) that no learned Catholic within this kingdom (yet such can best judge of this country cause) doth defend this opinion. Hereby censuring all Priests without the kingdom less fit or sufficient to meddle in this cause. We see that this Mitigator hath commended the Moderator for a learned Answerer, and that Moderator by this his general censure, hath taken exception unto this Mitigator, concluding him to be an Answerer (in his opinion) insufficient.  
34 If both these should meet upon one stage to act their dispositions, they could not but make good sport for the beholders. As for example (for I will feign nothing in their names, which shall not be consonant & agreeable to their conditions.) First then the Moderate Answerer might have said, P. R. you have been altogether presumptuous to take upon you this Answer called the Mitigation, knowing that you shall but bewray your ignorance, because residing out of England, you cannot be rightly experienced In this our Country cause. To whom the Mitigator might rejoine, saying; Nay I have not been arrogant, but thou hast been rash and precipitant, for if thou by thy former answer mightest have been thought sufficient for a Reply, what needed such posting to me beyond the seas for a supply of a more exact and learned Rejoinder? Then the Mod. Answerer; Have patience, I pray you, For when I perceived so many of our Authors objected, all of them by due consequent giving Protestants cause of hatred against us, as against those that had by our doctrine decreed a depriving them of their debts, goods, crowns and lives, whensoever opportunity might serve, I was enforced to use this answer for a refuge, taking exceptions to all Authors out of England, who writ of this English case: and to appeal rather to other Catholics, 
Craft in Titles of books.  who being in this kingdom, have written nothing hereof. This is the ground of my Moderation, which not the truth of our cause, but the necessity of the time did exact at my hands. Whereunto the Mitigator thus: Thou hast done well, and such hath been the cause of my commendation of thy Answer, as thou mayst perceive, for I have said that 
f Mitig. supra.  I must need● say that the Answerer hath acquitted himself learnedly. Not that I could think so, but because (thou knowest) we must commend and justify one another, especially in these times, wherein our malice and madness both in doctrine and practice hath been so fully discovered. And therefore I thought it necessary also to entitle my Book a Mitigation, concealing in my mind this reservation [To delude my Reader.] Thus it must be, when we raise a flame of rebellion, which shall not succeed, than it is policy to cast about us some holy-water sprinkle of plausible terms Moderation and Mitigation, as though we intended to quench that with our water, which we had rather do with oil. The Mother. I perceive you are subtle and therefore willingly yield you place to answer my Adversary, the rather because I think you are troubled with the disease of some of our Catholic Lawyers, of whom you have said, 
g Treatis. Mitig. preface to the Reader num. 10. P. R. his disease in so oft writing.  They itch to be doing, and answering M. Attorney. This was also my disease, but I after found a scratch, and so may you. Then Mitig. Tush, we need not care, nameless are blameless, for thou settest no name unto thy Moderation, and I only set down mute and dumb characters, which are as good as nothing, to my Mitigation. Again, we have many great and principal odds of Protestants, besides railing, viz. When our Adversary proveth any thing by many testimonies out of our own Authors, and we are not able to satisfy the common opinion objected against us, then to single out any allegation of any one of his witnesses, which he hath produced, and if thou perceive him to fail in the manner of alleging, squeeze every such answer to make him, at the least, seem to be fraudulent: And if thou canst find him faulty in one, it is no matter though all the rest of our Authors cited against us be never so true, we shall wound the cause in his person, as he doth our persons in the cause. Furthermore be always echoing out against him some opprobrious terms, as Mountbanck, 
Railing.  Grasshopper, Malicious, shameless, false, and what not? The Moderate. I remember I have often charged him with slanders when as not he but myself did falsify; which he hath discovered, and in a manner silenced me. The Mitig. We need not fear any such event, because of our manifold advantages: 
The advantages the Romish faction hath.  For Protestants are licensed to read any books, and some in curiosity, as Eve, some in doubtfulness, as the Capernaitans; many in presumption, as Balaam, most for the delight which they find in an eloquent and invectory style of writing (o mine is excellent!) as Athenians; So that it cannot be but where so many mice be still nibbling at the bait, some will daily be catched. But our Professors be kept secure under the lock and key of the vow of obedience, or else have their hearts so stupefied with that Opium of implicit faith and blind devotion: that though my adversary in his Answer shall prove me never so monstrously calumnious and slanderous, yet of our Catholics few can, and none dare examine or believe any thing against a Priest: this is our sufficiency. The Mother. You have forgot an other policy we use, which is, though our Adversary write never so methodically and orderly, yet not to follow him exactly in his course, and commonly to pretermit those authorities which he bringeth, and wherein is the chief strength of his cause. Mitigat. And is not this good policy? he that will cunningly put away a counterfeit piece of coin in stead of currant, must do it apart from the other money, for if true and counterfeit be compared together, the good will discover the bad, and his book thou knowest is A Discovery. Again, thou mayest perceive that when I use no method myself, I challenge him for 
h Mitig. pag. 113. cap. 4. §. 2. num. 15.  want of method. But why do we spend time in talk, let us about our business. I will be writing a Mitigation for security of our Catholics in England, whilst our fellows are practising rebellion in 
i See the late Proclamation.  Ireland for the subversion of Protestants. Thus, thus it must be. Farewell. In all this there is no more represented than is too certainly acted by the Romanists, as in our Encounter unto P. R. will more plentifully appear. It is time we come unto    

THE THIRD INQVIRIE:  
To examine how sufficiently P. R. hath performed his challenge as well for the equity of his cause, as for the integrity of his conscience: His cause, both as it is premised in the title of his book, and as it is discussed in the Treatise.  

Of these summarily and in order. FIRST: That the title of the Book of P. R. called A Mitigation, is very ominous and unlucky to them, whom especially he laboureth to defend.  
§ 10.  
35 THe subject of his whole Mitigation is by P. R. thus propounded in the Title of his book, viz. That it is not impossible for Subjects of different Religion (especially Catholics and Protestants) to live together in dutiful obedience and subjection under the government of his Majesty of Great Britain.  
It is not impossible, good: For why? It is not impossible for 
k 2. Reg. 1. 10  fire to descend from heaven, and the 
l Exod. 14. 22.  people of God to pass safely thorough the Red sea: It is not impossible for 〈◊〉 
m Num. 22. ver. 28. 29. 30.  Ass to speak reason, and the 
n Matth. 8 29. & alibi.  Devil to tell truth: It is not impossible for the 
o joh. 11. Matt. 9 etc.  dead to be raised to life, and for the Disciples of our Saviour by 
p Matt. 21. 21. Marc. 11. 23. etc.  faith to remove mountains. Nothing is impossible with God: who as he prescribeth the raging Sea his bounds, which it can not pass, though naturally it affect an overflow and deluge of the whole world; so doth he by his gracious providence often repress the fury of rebellious spirits in what profession soever; and, notwithstanding they travel with mischief, yet he keepeth them in an awful subjection. And shall now this Mitigation of fears, conceived by Protestants against the bloody designments of their Romish Adversaries, consist of no better terms then the possibility of things, which are in the ordinary course of nature impossible? Though a man taken upon suspicion of felony be charged by his accuser to be most certainly the man, who assaulted him by the way, might not be thought to satisfy the justice, saying, Sir he chargeth me that it was impossible but that I must have done this mischief; Nevertheless I shall prove the contrary, to wit, that it was not impossible, but an other might have done it, and not I. Although this Answer might confute his accuser, who said, It is impossible but that it was you: yet could it not satisfy the justice, because still the answer implieth as well a possibility that he did it, as an impossibility that he did it not. Hath not therefore P. R. their learned Advocate merited of his Clients, 
P. R. a miserable Advocate for his Catholics.  a Catholic, that is, an universal fee, who now intending a Mitigation of their punishment, hath given the State so great cause of suspecting their disloyalty, as that he dare promise no better assurance in their behalf, then only, It is not impossible for them to live in obedience? S. Paul's charge concerning temporal obedience is, 
q Rom. 13. 1.  Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; And again, 
r vers. 5.  We must be subject not because of wrath only, but also for conscience sake. Wherein he hath prescribed us not a may but a must; and thereby enjoined not a possibility, but a necessity of loyal subjection. But this [It is not impossible to live in obedience] is no more by Logical conversion than this; It is possible to live in obedience. Which so suspicious and imposturous a Title of his whole book can minister no more hope to Protestants of his pretended Mitigation and composition, than an adulterous woman can satisfy her husband, and mitigate his jealousy by this manner of submission: 
Simile.  Be contented, good husband, though I have committed folly as often as I had presumption of secrecy and opportunity to satisfy my lust; yet now may you be better persuaded of me, for I protest unto you, it is not impossible that I shall live honestly hereafter. This case is nothing different from the former. What shall we then think of P. R. but as of the man, who had purposed with himself either to scorn Protestants, or else to betray his Catholics? Nevertheless as worldly feasters usually offer their guests 
s joh. 2. 10.  The best wine first, and then that which is worse: So he hath prefixed in the forehead of his book this Title of Mitigation, although prodigious and intolerable (as we have heard) yet more plausible than the whole Tract of the book itself, which teacheth indeed an impossibility of all voluntary subjection unto Protestant Princes; insomuch that after but a summary view hereof, it will appear that the title of his book and his Treatise are no more proportionable and agreeable, than the head of an Ape joined with the body of a Bear. From the Title we proceed unto the Treatise, and manifest   

That the Mitigator in his Treatise hath betrayed his whole cause both in the question of Rebellion, and equivocation.  
§ 11.  
36 WHen the Apostle S. Jude in his Catholic Epistle, speaking of men opposite unto the soundness of faith, exhorteth Christians to 
t Vers. 22.  Have a compassion on some in putting a difference, And others to save with fear, pulling them out of the fire: he teacheth us likewise a lesson of great discretion, which is, to distinguish between men who are adverse unto us in Religion. 
A difference of Romish professors concerning the case of rebellion.  So now I write against our Adversaries, but not without note of difference and distinction, being verily persuaded that divers even of the zealous amongst them, partly by the power of the engraffed law of reason, partly from a glimpse of the truth of the Gospel, do abhor such doctrines and practices, as have been discovered in the cases of Rebellion & equivocation. So that my only aim hath always been at those, who are so inspired with the persuasion of their Priests, as to believe their doctrine in both these specified Articles. Concerning whose pretended voluntary obedience, I shall prove to be in a manner, a confessed impossibility of dutiful subjection unto Protestant Princes; and consequently as sensible an opposition as was between jews and jebusites in one kingdom, Isaac and Ishmael in one house, jacob and Esau in one womb: as by this Treatise of P. R. will directly appear.  

The First confessed Impossibility.  
37 We first demand what Sovereignty our Mitigator will allow his Majesty of Great Britain: and whether there may be any foreign Potentate, whom he would advance above him in respect of his temporal charge? P. R. resolveth thus: 
u P. R. Treatis▪ in the Preface pag. 24. num. 22. which he applieth to the Pope, pag. 70.  Whether with this Commission in spiritual affairs our Saviour gave also immediately and directly, the charge and oversight of temporalities in like manner, or rather indirectly and by a certain consequence, that is to say, that when the government of spiritual affairs, to wit, of souls to their eternal bliss and salvation is so letted and impugned by any temporal governors, as the said spiritual Commission cannot be executed without redress or remedy, in such cases, and not otherwise, the said supreme Pastor to have authority to proceed also against the said temporal governors, for defence and preservation of his spiritual charge. Of which question the Canonists do commonly defend the first part, but Catholic Divines for the most part the second: but both parts full agree, that there is such an authority left by Christ in his Church, for remedy of urgent cases. 
Romish doctrine against the oath of due allegiance unto Protestant Princes.  Thus far P. R. See then that by this arguing he seeketh to establish a Papal power and oversight even in Temporal affairs, whether directly or indirectly it skilleth not, seeing (that in his opinion) both do agree: But the oath of Allegiance with Protestants is otherwise: namely, that No foreign personor Potentate hath any such supremacy in Great Britain. Therefore the Mitigation of P. R. standeth of no more possibility, than Pope and no Pope, King's supremacy and not supremacy. Which opposites can never be reconciled together.   

The Second confessed Impossibility.  
38 Secondly, because he hath told us, that there is a Power ordained against Kings in temporal affairs, it may concern us to understand the first extent thereof, whether against the goods, or persons, or lives of such Princes as shall resist the spiritual jurisdiction of Popes? He doth deliver his meaning in two examples: 
x P. R. Trea. cap. 2. pag. 77. num. 42. Romish doctrine derogatory to the Crown and dignity of Protestant Princes.  Two Protestant Princes were excommunicated, censured, molested by the Sea Apostolic, Q. Elizabeth of England, and K. Henry then of Navarre, now of France: the first of these two for the violent change of Religion which she made in the Realm with deprivations and imprisonments of Catholic Bishops, Prelates, and Clergy, etc. The other for fear he coming to the Crown of France in that disposition, wherein he then was presumed to be, should attempt the like change in that great Kingdom, etc. These examples are both plain and pregnant, a Protestant Queen must be deprived for resisting the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, and a Protestant King also must be deposed, lest peradventure he may make any resistance. Now we see that the same Papal authority is by the laws of Great Britain as expressly excluded, their Religion suppressed, their Clergy exiled, and Protestants religion (according to former proceedings) continued. All which doth argue as great an impossibility of dutiful subjection, as it is for hindrance and sufferance, change and continuance of the same Religion to be matched and married together. And could our Mitigator show himself a more egregious Prevaricator than thus?   

The Third confessed Impossibility.  
39 Because P. R. hath told us that Protestant Princes have been molested by the Pope, it will be material to inquire what this word Molestation may mean: For a man would think it some qualifying term, and to import no greater injuries than either reviling the names of Kings, or disgracing their Ambassadors, or damnifying their Merchants, or such like wrongs. Tush no, for all such like contempts are contemptible, and may easily be devoured, but this molestation (according to the discovered positions and practices of rebellion, whereunto this Mitigator neither hath or could take any exception) is, 
y The Bull of Pope Pius Quintus. See the Satisfact. part. 1. pag. 51.  Because the Queen of England hath forbid her Clergy and people to acknowledge the Roman Church, or obey her decrees, etc. And because we understand her to be so obstinate, as not to suffer our Legates to come into England, etc. We therefore pronounce her heretical, anathematizing her and all her adherents, and furthermore deprive her of her Crown and dignity, absolving all her subjects from the oath of allegiance. So likewise of the K. of France, 
z Lib. de justa abdicat. Hen. pag. 370.  Pronouncing him to be deprived of his Regal dignity: 
a Reinolds his Rossaeus, pag. 466. See Satisfact. part. 1. pag. 58. & 40. Romish doctrine bloodily treasonable in the Protestant government.  Because he is a Caluinist. Upon this followed the Spanish Invasion, the Rebellions in Ireland, the troubles in France, none without an effected or intended horrible and tragical bloodshed. All these with P. R. are but Molestations. So the powder-treason, an immanity barbarous and matchless, which he calleth but 
b P. R. Treatis. cap. 1. pag. 50. num. 27.  A particular temerarious fact of half a score young Gentlemen, put in despair by apprehension of public persecution, without demerit of the persecuted, though this also be inexcusable. By which his so tender touch of so cankered and desperate evils, we may well think that Nabal by his foolery never deserved better to be so called, than this book hath merited in this only respect, the name of Mitigation: being indeed nothing but an hatching of a Cockatrice's egg, and a close professing of subverting all Protestant Princes, whensoever they shall seek the like public maintenance of Religion. This Mitigation therefore as yet affordeth us no more possibility of their voluntary obedience, than to hope that reverence and violence, Subjection and Rebellion, pole arctique and antarctique, may be drawn into union. And because this is so plain, that blindness itself may seem to behold it, therefore doth P. R. cast his Reader into a sleep with a does of his Opium. Let us see   

The Fourth Impossibility, wherein may be observed, A sportful or rather execrable Impostureship of P. R.  
40 Lest Protestants might, from experience of former dangers arm themselves against future designments, P. R. thought good by preoccupation to possess his Reader with better hopes, saying: 
c P. R. Treatis. of Mitig. cap. 3. pag. 95. num. 8.  That we do ascribe power to the Bishop of Rome in certain cases to censure▪ excommunicate, and deprive Princes, whereof is inferred that such & such dangers do ensu: which finally is nothing else but a [May:] So as the question being de futuris contingentibus, of things contingent to come (whereof the Philosopher saith there is no science) all remaineth in uncertainty, but only the suspicion and hatred, which he would raise against us. I cannot laugh for wonder and horror to see any Englishman conceit so basely of the wits and worth of his Countrymen, as to imagine they could be deluded with so senseless, so shameless, so pernicious, so impious a Mitigation as this is. For, to be persuaded therefore not to labour for preventing Ensuing dangers, because they be contingent, that is, such as may happen, what can be more senseless? For Science properly taken is a certain knowledge of conclusions, arising from infallible demonstrations, as this conclusion, The number of 3. is a less number than 9 from this demonstration, Every part is less than the whole. And so is the opinion of P. R. good, There is no science of things contingent, because science standeth upon demonstrable principles. But Science in a more common and large sense is exercised upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, every thing which is subject to man's will: whereupon it is that Physicians prescribe diets to prevent future diseases; passengers provide weapons to defend them from future violence; kingdoms provide laws and officers to avoid future mischiefs: Nay what is there almost in mankind, considered in itself, but case of contingency? So that all are actions of providence directed for the preventing of future evils and dangers which may happen. And is not this then a stupefying receipt, which P. R. hath propounded, casting the State into a slumber, of not regarding Ensuing dangers, because they may be hereafter? Doth not nature in beast, reason in man, precept of God teach us the contrary law of providence, even therefore to seek to prevent Ensuing dangers, because they are contingent, and may be hereafter?  
41 It is also most shameless, for 
d P. R. Treatis. cap. 2. pag. 77. num. 42. P. R. contradicteth himself.  Henry K. of France (saith P. R.) was excommunicated, censured and molested, lest he should attempt the change of Religion in his kingdoms And again (speaking of the necessity of Papal jurisdiction over Kings) he saith that 
e Preface to the Reader pag. 25. num. 22.  If Christ had not left such a remedy to his Church, he should not have provided for the necessity thereof. Concluding that therefore Popes may impugn temporal Governors. here we see he challengeth a necessary providence in the Popes against Kings, who happily may (de futuris contingentibus) abuse their authority. And shall Kings therefore neglect their States, because Popes by Antichristian usurpation (de futuris contingentibus) may seek to subvert and ruinate their kingdoms, and so make themselves to their enemies no better than a matter of a May-game?  
42 I have also called this Mitigation pernicious. For our Adversaries have taught that 
f Bellar. See Satisfact. part. 1. pag. 56.  Kings must not be suffered to reign, when they draw their Subjects unto heresy. But, 
g Sanders, Creswell, in the same place.  Must be rooted out. 
h Sanders ib. pag. 67.  Which must be done by all means possible. Whether it be as 
i Bowchier.  jehu did jezabel; or as 
k Parsons.  David did Goliath; or as 
l Reinolds.  judith did Holofernes; or as 
m Bellar. See all these Satisfact. part. 1. pag. 56. & 57  A shepherd doth a Wolf, etc. 
n The Bull of Pope Urban against Protestants in Germany. See Satisfact. pag. 9 and Saunder. pag. 67.  And not Kings only, but all the favourers of heretics, by what name so ever they be called, must be destroyed. All these their cursed resolutions P. R. passeth in silence. In all which we hear prescribed a must for necessary destruction of Kings, and yet this Mitigator will allow but only a may for their preservation. This is fine May-butter which he hath mixed in this receipt, or rather deceit of Mitigation: made thus pleasant and palitable only that the too credulous patient may be more sweetly poisoned, especially knowing that all his fellows have professed all violence, 
o Bannes, Creswel, lib. de just. Abdicat. Bellar. See Satisf. part. 1. cap. 24. P. R. would flout and delude the State of England.  As soon as they shall have force to resist. Therefore this Mitigation is but as if P. R. would have thus counseled our English State in the last danger, saying; Trouble not your thoughts (o King) with divination upon that letter, for peradventure that Terrible blow doth signify nothing else than that there may be a blowing up of the Parliament with fire. And you Officers of his Majesty what need you to use such diligent search under the vault, where you see nothing but billets, under which it may be there is hidden many barrels of powder. Yea and now again, though the like (if yet the forge of he● can devise the like) may be prepared hereafter, Yet what necessity is there of preventing ensuing dangers? What is this else than to seek to catch our State, as a man would do an horse, offering bread in the one hand, and holding an halter in the other behind him? Dutiful subjection in the Preface, and lurking treason in the Treatise. In a word the impossibility of this Mitigation is no less than to think that murderers and murdered can host well together.  
43 Last I call it impious, because this profession of their forbearance of rebellion, until they may resist, hath been proved by incontrolable testimonies of 
p See Satisf. part. 1. pag. 185. Allen, Parsons, Martin, etc.  Tertul. Cypr. Athan. Nazian. Leo, Basil, August. Greg. (besides the confession of our Adversaries, Tolossan. Espencae. Barclay) to be contrary to the discipline of the ancient Catholic Church for a 1000 years continuance. By all which testimonies the now Romish faction is so notably condemned, that even P. R. thought it the best security of his cause to pass almost every testimony (except one) without any particular examination. As yet therefore we hear them only pretending that they may perform obedience, which they profess they must not, whensoever they shall be able to make a possible resistance. So hopeless is this his pretended possibility of subjection.   

The last Impossibility in the practice of equivocation.  
44 The use of Aequiuocating even in an oath is taught by P. R. to be most lawful, whensoever a party is examined before an unlawful judge, yea or before a lawful judge examining unlawfully. Now what opinion they have of the Magistrates and Officers of England their Priests have told us (amongst whom is Parsons himself) viz. that 
q See Satisf. part. 1. cap. 27.  It is lawful in England for Priests to equivocate even in their oaths before Protestant Magistrates and Officers, etc. To let pass the daily experience of the professed damnable practice hereof by M. Garnet and his fellows. Wherefore this Mitigation standeth still of as great an impossibility, as it is for cozenage and simplicity, a lie and truth to harbour in one heart. Hitherto we have spoken of the question of Subjection, only mentioning equivocation, as it is in the vs●, a bawd to Rebellion. We are therefore to speak of the nature thereof, and to consider whether mental Reservation be a lie: and briefly show▪    

That P. R. hath flatly overthrown his whole defence of mental equivocation. Which is made so evident, as that no wit of man can possibly excuse him.  
§ 12.  
45 SAy (P. R.) what is your mental Equivocation? 
r P. R. Trea. Mitig. pag. 321. cap. 8. What jesuitical equivocation is.  We restrain our speech to Equivocation only, which is mental reservation. To wit, [I am no Priest] so, as I am bound to tell it unto you. The first part thereof [I am no Priest] uttered with my mouth, the latter [viz. To tell it unto you] is reserved in my mind. Which Thomas Morton saith is not an hidden truth, but a gross lie. 
s Treat. of Mitig. in the same chap.  But I say it is a truth, because the speech agreeth with the mind of the speaker, etc. How now would my Reader hear this noble Equivocator confuted? by Fathers? or by his own Doctors? or by sensible reasons? This will be no hard matter to perform, as I hope (God willing) to avouch in due time. But here is offered unto me a briefer course, more fit for a preamble, and for the triumph of truth more glorious; which is to see (as politic Achitophel hanged in his own halter) so this Doctor of the art of lying confounded by his own assertion. I desire every child of truth to lend me attention, and see  
The whole Treatise of P. R. in defence of equivocation subverted by his own consequence.  
46 The sentence of P. R. is to be found in these words: 
t Treatise Mitig. pag. 459. num. 29.  Let us come (saith he) to the application of this example against equivocation, which he hath chosen to use principally about the woman's speech. The woman is asked (saith T. M.) sold you the land for so much? her answer is, yea for so much, meaning but one half, & concealing the other, in which dissimulation it is impossible but that your reserved clause must have come into her head to think, but for so much to give in common: or to signify unto you. 
Example of aequiuocating in an accursed person.  So T. M. teacheth that poor woman to aequivocate after this manner of equivocation, that is to say, lie: for that now, I suppose, he hath learned by that which hath been set down in our precedent chap. that to speak an untruth, or conceal a truth, or use any equivocation, when we are justly demanded by our lawful superior, and when no injury or violence is used unto us, is a grievous mortal sin in our Catholic doctrine; and consequently she being lawfully demanded by S. Peter in a lawful cause, touching her own vow and promise, No clause of Reservation could save her speech from lying, as our Minister doth foolishly imagine. So P. R.  
¶ Know first (gentle Reader) that the last words, viz. [As our Minister doth foolishly imagine,] do not betoken that the consequent going before, viz. [Therefore no clause, etc.] is my collection, but the quite contrary: for I said that a clause of Reservation might aswell have saved the woman's speech from lying, as the clause which Priests use can free a Priest: he holdeth the contrary, because (saith he) she being lawfully demanded, etc. no such clause could save her speech from lying. This kind of phrase is usual in our English tongue. As for example: a man bringeth a piece of some kind of metal unto a goldsmith, which the bringer thinketh to be good gold: the goldsmith after touch answereth him saying, Friend, this is not good gold, as you suppose: which words do not signify that the owner did not suppose it to be good gold: and the words, It is not gold, were the words of the goldsmith, and not of the owner. So here: which I therefore explain, to make it appear that in these words, (And consequently no clause of reservation could save her speech from lying) P. R. hath set down his own conclusion. And now we proceed to the main matter in hand.  
47 The supposed equivocation of the Woman was this, I have sold it but for so much, reserving in her mind (for aught that you shall know:) which is agreeable to their own example of equivocation (I am no Priest) meaning (To tell it unto you) This latter P. R. hath defended thorough his whole book, and now of the other he is enforced by the word of truth to say that it is a lie: yea, and that, No clause of Reservation could save it from a lie: From whence it shall invincibly follow, that Priestly equivocation is a Satanical lie. These two speeches being so semblable in themselves, if he shall say they differ, then must the difference be either in respect of the speakers, or in respect of the hearers. But first  
The difference of these two kind of equivocations, viz. of that woman, and these Priests (the one whereof is confessed to be A lie) can not be in respect of the speakers.  
48 She indeed was a woman, and a Priest is a man, but P. R, knoweth that it is as possible for a Priest, a 
a That he do not object unto me the woman pope joan.  man, to lie, as for a woman to tell a truth. Neither may he object, that her lie was in respect of her vow; for the question in this place is not about her vow unto God, whether she had promised to sell all their possession, and to give up the whole price to the Apostles for the common good of the Church, or no: but it is concerning her speech unto man about the sum and proportion of the sale of their goods, Whether sold you your possessions for so much? And she answering, But for so much; is (notwithstanding all supposed clause of Reservation) condemned by S. Peter for a Liar. And this is the very case of P. R. for (if he be a Priest) he hath vowed himself to the Order of Priesthood; and yet being demanded whether he be a Priest or no, professeth it lawful for himself, by mental equivocation, sometime to answer, I am no Priest. In the next place we are to show▪  
That (concerning the nature of a lie) there can be no difference between that equivocation of the woman, and this other of these Priests, in respect of the hearers.  
49 The only cloud of words which may hinder the perfect view of truth for this confession that all equivocation is a lie, may seem to be because she is said hereby to have intended to deceive S. Peter, being then a competent judge, whereas the Priests admit no equivocation except only in examinations and judgements incompetent. But P. R. can not object this without gross and stupid contradiction to himself throughout his whole Treatise. For our question is not of deceiving, or not deceiving, which is only the effect of lying (as P. R. also every where acknowledgeth) but it is about the speech itself, and the very nature of a lie. Now that there can be no difference hereof in regard of hearers, whether they be competent judges or incompetent, our Mitigator himself will demonstrate unto us.  
First from his one exposition of mental Equivocation, 
b Treatise Mitig. cha. 8. num. 55. pag. 344.  I say (saith he) that in mental reservation the speech agreeth with the mind of the speaker, for that I truly and really mean that I am no Priest in that sense I speak it, which may be what pleaseth me, or that which I list to frame to myself: so as I mean I am no Priest, such as I should be, or such like.  
Mark, the truth of equivocation is not suspended upon the understanding of the hearer, who may conceive or misconceive the speech, and so might pervert the speakers truth into a lie, that seeming false to the hearer, I am no Priest, which in the sense of the speaker (as P. R. resolveth) is by virtue of reservation (as To tell it unto you) a perfect truth. Well then the supposed equivocation of the woman was such a like fancy, I have sold it but for so much, to give it in common, or, Tell it unto you. And yet hereof hath P. R. concluded, that 
c Supra.  No clause of reservation could save her speech from a lie. Consequently condemning himself and all other mental Aequivocators for fantastical liars.  
50 Secondly, as we here find a woman making a lie unto S. Peter, a competent judge, so do we read that S. Peter made a lie unto a 
d Mat. 26. 70.  woman, an Examiner incompetent. So that the difference of hearers doth not alter the nature of the speech. The reason is that which hath been already specified, to wit, because (as is confessed) 
e In the same place, num. 46. pag. 338.  The essence and formality of a lie requireth that the speech disagree from the mind and understanding of the speaker. And yet again, 
f In the same place, num. 47.  A false speech is only a lie as it hath the essential point before mentioned of dissenting from the mind of the speaker. And lastly, 
g In the same place, num. 55. pag. 344.  My speech is truth as it is truly spoken in my sense, not in the sense of the hearer. By all which is signified, 
An evident conviction of P. R.  that it is not the person of the hearer, but the understanding of the speaker, which maketh a lie formally a lie: and consequently, as a slander is a slander, so a lie is a lie, and truth is truth, whether it be uttered unto man or woman; whether to Prince or people; to Simon Peter, or to Simon Magus; yea, whether to Archangel or to Satan; judge competent or incompetent, it can not free a lying speech from the nature of a lie. So that seeing (notwithstanding the woman's supposed clause of Reservation) there was formally a lie in her equivocation; it consequently followeth, that the Priest's equivocation must be as formally a lie.  
51 Thirdly, in mental Equivocation (saith P. R.) the clause of Reservation mixed with the outward speech maketh but one proposition, which is as true in the mind of the speaker, as if it were wholly delivered in the outward speech. As for example: I am no Priest, mixed with this clause conceived in mind, To tell it unto you, is as true (in the judgement of P. R.) as if it had been without Reservation fully expressed with the mouth, 
A plain demonstration.  saying, I am no Priest, to tell it unto you. Now then, say P. R. (for I mean to fetter you with your own shackles) The woman, when she said to S. Peter, I have sold it but for so much, if she had reserved in her mind this clause, To give it unto you: either had it been by the virtue of Reservation a truth, or else (notwithstanding that Reservation) it had been a lie. If the clause of Reservation might have made it a truth, then hath not P. R. said true in concluding, that No clause of Reservation could save it from a lie: if chose the trick of Reservation could not save it from a lie, then doth not the reserved clause, To tell it unto you, being mixed with the outward speech, I am no Priest, make up one true proposition. And consequently, it must be concluded of the Priestly Equivocation, as is here by P. R. confessed of the woman's, viz. No clause of Reservation can save their speech from a lie. For if she had said unto S. Peter in plain words [I have sold it but for so much to give it in common] or such like, this every one knoweth had been a true speech: yet saying, I sold it but for so much, with mental reservation, reserving in her mind [To give in common, or, To tell it unto you] was notwithstanding this Reservation (even by the judgement of P. R.) a flat lie.  
52 Let us, 
The lying woman and the lying Priests paralleled.  for conclusion, parallel both these examples which are very near a kin: for if we do compare speaker with speaker, that is, the woman and a Priest, both will be thought to be Votaries: if outward speech with outward speech, that is, 
h For, But for so much hath the nature of a negative, & is as much as, Not for any more.  I have sold it but for so much, and, I am no Priest, both are negatives: if Reservation with Reservation, as [To tell it unto you] or [To give unto you] both are mental: if the form with form, both equally answerable to the mind of the speaker: if, finally, end with end, both are to deceive the hearer. Wherefore P. R. granting, that No clause of Reservation could save her speech from a lie, must by irrepugnable consequence be forced to confess, that his [I am no Priest] uttered by a Priest, to whomsoever it be spoken (notwithstanding any mental Reservation of [To tell it unto you etc.) is a Satanical and damnable lie.  
53 And where is now P. R. his boast of Scriptures, Fathers, Reasons? where is his challenge of Canonists and Schoole-divines? where is his appeal unto both our Universities? nay, where is this man P. R. himself, the new select Advocate for this cause? may he not say hereafter, I was ashamed, and therefore I hid myself? so naked doth his deformity appear. He hath said, That his Adversary T. M. is like one, who, when the game is desperate, will notwithstanding play it out, and see the last man borne. here he himself hath made such a blot as can not but be the unfallible loss of his whole game, who being pressed with this example out of 
i Act. 5.  Scripture, is driven to such a vertigo and giddiness, that even when he would defend his Art of Equivocating from a lie, is by consequence from God's Word forced to confess an outward speech, which No clause of Reservation could save from a lie. Whereby his own Magis (I doubt not) will be brought to acknowledge, that digitus Dei hic est, this is the power of God's truth. Thus being contented, for this present, to have my whole cause in both questions, equivocation and Rebellion so justifiable, that my Adversary his own confessions may free me from his imputation of slander; I do with better alacrity proceed unto his next challenge, yielding   

A general Answer to his accusation of malicious falsehoods.  
§ 13.  
THe sum of all is this: P. R: 
k Treatise Mitig. c. 11. num. 3. pa. 441.  I have taken Thomas Morton in so many falsifications of things alleged by him, as before you have seen. And the law saith, Whosoever is once evil, is presumed to be so still, until he prove the contrary. 
l In the Preface, and elsewhere.  But he hath bewrayed everywhere malicious falsehoods.  
54 From the imputation of malice against the persons of men, if I should need the testimony of man, my Adversaries may acquit me, who have acknowledged in me better measures by their own experience, as M. D. Wri. M. Const. M. Ga. I have half injuried them with half naming them: but I hope they will pardon me this wrong, knowing that it is not spoken in exprobration to them, but for justification of myself, forasmuch as selfe-commendation, if forced, is (in the judgement of the Apostle) a wise folly. Howsoever, I can not understand, 
Why we may not malice any man's person.  how any man beholding others with Christian eyes, should be malicious: for either he perceiveth them wandering from grace and salvation, which moveth pity; or else discerneth them to be companions with him in the way of life, which worketh love. But neither can malice be pitiful, nor love malicious. If my Adversaries shall further persist in this despiteful objection of malice, they must give me leave rather to fear God's denunciation of Woe, than their Wrath. 
m Esa. 5. 20.  Woe unto them (saith God) that put light for darkness, and darkness for light, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for sour. And if I prove not their doctrine concerning Rebellion and equivocation to be as bitter as the water of Meribah, then let them note me for a man above the nature of mankind malicious. Otherwise, I must expostulate with them according to the Apostles example: 
* Gal. 4. 16.  Am I your enemy, because I tell you the truth? Which truth in my Encounter to the Mitigator (God willing) I shall shortly avouch.  
Thus from malice the gangrene of a wicked conscience, we come unto falsehood, the 
n He that lieth slayeth his own soul. Sap. 1. 11.  cutthroat thereof. Concernign which two things must be discussed: First the protestation P. R. maketh, in justifying the sincerity of all Romish writers, presuming them to be free from all falsehood: Secondly, his accusation against myself, whom he hath notoriously traduced. Now of both these orderly.   

P. R. his hypocritical, prodigal, and indeed prodigious ostentation, in the avouching of the integrity of Romish writers, and freeing them from all note of wilful falsifications.  
§ 14.  
55 
o Treatise of Mitigat. pag. 489. chap. 12. num. 11.  IN this then, if you please to insist a while, and let Thomas Morton bring forth any Catholic authors whatsoever, that wrote against Protestants since these heresies began, that hath been taken in this impiety, I mean, that hath set down in Print any such falsity, as can not be excused either by ignorance, oversight, negligence, error of print, translation, diversity of editions, or the like, but that it must needs be presumed, that he knew the untruth, and yet would set it forth: of this kind (I say) let him show me but one example among all Catholic writers of our time, and I will in my conscience greatly mistrust, and discredit the Author, whether it be another or myself: But if he show me two or three in any writer of this kind, I shall never be able to believe him more. And whereas the number and variety of Catholic writers is so great, as the world seeth, it were no great labour to show it in some, if that spirit did reign among them.  
56 What if one of his late Authors have been found presumptuously false in any one report, or else any one but in three points, though this be even his own self? Doth the man (who maketh mention of his 
* Mitig. cap. 3. pag. 89.  Interruption by sickness) know what he hath now said? whether he spoke this being in his fever-fit, or in temper? whether in a dream, or awake? whether in his right mind, 
P. R. his unlucky ostentation.  or in distraction? For sure I am, that this ostentation will prove in the issue as infortunate unto P. R. as ever was boast either by Thraso on the Stage, or by Goliath in the Camp, or by Gorgias in Schools: by the which he must be driven unto so miserable and shameful a palinody, as ever hereafter utterly to discredit his own friends, and work a perpetual discontent within himself, as presently will fully appear.  
57 But before I can come to manifest this, I may not deny even this my Adversary his due commendation of modesty, who being ashamed (we may think) of the Romish frauds and falsifications of former times, will insist only upon such men's examples as have professedly written of late against Protestants. It were to be wished, that his fellow jesuit Costerus had kept himself within the same precincts; but he maketh a more general challenge, thus: 
p Costerus jes. Enchirid. cap. De summo pontiff. §. Constat.  Nemo hactenùs vel Princeps, vel Praesul, vel Scriptor fuit, qui mendacij, vel malae fidei Romanos arguerit: that is: Never yet (saith he) did any Prince, or Prelate, or Writer accuse the Romanists of falsehood. When he could not be ignorant of that which their own volume of Counsels hath made observable for perpetual remembrance, 
Three Pope's falsificators.  how three Popes, Sozimus, Boniface, and Celestine, at the Council of Carthage in Africa, did claim a right of appeals unto Rome by virtue of a Canon of the Council of Nice, as they pretended. And when all the ancient copies of that Council had been diligently sought, it appeared by the testimony of three patriarchs, viz. of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch, 
q In quibus non erat Canon ille de appellando ad Rom. Pontificem deprehensus. Lindanus Panopl. lib. 4. cap. 89.  That that Canon concerning Appeals to the Bishop of Rome (as their Lindan speaketh) could not be found in those Copies: Or, as the Council itself speaketh: 
r Liber Conc. De Actu Conc. Carthag. 6.  Istius Concilij Africani seu Carthaginensis ducenti tres tribus Papis restiterunt, & Canonem Concilij in defensionem Primatus sui falsum esse deprehenderunt. A little after: Concludunt tandem nemini licere ad Romanum Pontificem provocare: that is: Two hundred and three Fathers of the Council of Carthageresisted the three Popes, and found, That they suggested a false Canon for defence of their Primacy. Therefore in the end they concluded, That it should not be lawful for any of Africa to appeal unto the Bishop of Rome. Will P. R. believe any claims which Popes make for Papal jurisdiction, seeing that three patriarchs, and two hundred and three Bishops, have convinced three Popes of so apparent a falsehood as this? 
Gratian a falsificator.  Or what can be said for the defence of Gratian their public Compiler of the Decrees of Popes, 
s Concil. Milevetanun statuit nè quis ad transmatina loca putaverit appellandum: Respondent aliqui cum Gratiano, qui addidit ad hunc Canonem exceptionem, Nisi fortè ad Apostolicam sedem appelletur. Sed haec exceptio non videtur quadrare, Nam praecipuè propter Rom. Ecclesiam Africani statuerant, ut non liceret appellare ultra mare. Bellar. lib. 2. De Rom. Pont. cap. 24. §▪ tertiò.  who (as Cardin. Bellar. witnesseth) citing a Canon of a Council of Milevet, wherein it was decreed that none should appeal beyond the sea, did add of himself this exception, Except it be unto the Apostolic sea of Rome: when as that Council in forbidding appeals beyond the sea, did especially intend to forbid appeals to Rome?  
58 Many such like falsehoods might be alleged, wherein Popes and Popish ones have entangled themselves, and deluded the world, not in school cases of Sic videtur, & non, or in strifes de stillicidijs, and such trifles: but about the right of Appeals, yea spiritual and also temporal jurisdictions. But the nature of a Preamble will not suffer me to pursue old forgeries: and I must yield something unto P. R. his modesty, who to pass over the blemishes of ancient Authors, doth challenge only an instance in new writers, whether it be of his fellows, or of himself. And I will endeavour to give him satisfaction in both. And first tender  
A Satisfaction unto P. R. his first Motion concerning his fellows, who have entangled themselves in open falsifications.  
59 Though it be just in God, who is justice itself, to impose this law upon man, He that offendeth in one is guilty in all: yet man with man may be more partial, than for the guilt of one testimony to renounce him in all. And P. R. is more merciful, therefore he requireth three sensible instances, as it were three witnesses against any one. And yet this also is horribly unmerciful on their part. I wish he had but named any one, whose credit he valueth most, that I might have answered his challenge in that one. Howsoever it will be no more easy a task for me to find one falsehood in many, than many in one: whereof I exhibit some examples, and  
First a notable spectacle of their own manifold contradictions in perverting three testimonies of antiquity in one controversy.  

The First testimony.  
60 In the Controversy about Images the Protestants appeal unto antiquity both of Counsels and Fathers: the first Council is that of Eliberis about the year of Grace 305. which 
1 Opponit calvinus Canonem 36. Conc. Elibertini, in quo sic dicitur, Placuit picturas in Ecclesia esse non debere, nè quod colitur aut adoratur in in parietibus depingatur.] Huic variè respondent Catholici Vasques jes. de Adorat. l. 2. disp. 5. c. 2. num.. 120.  Protestants urge as forbidding that there should be any Images in the church. Now let us try the spirits of their answerers▪ 
2 Payva respondet, solùm prohiberi imaginem Dei, quae pingitur ad effigiem Dei repraesentandam. To whom  Payva answereth that, They meant only to forbid such an Image as was made to represent the nature of God. Not so, saith Bellarmine, 
3 Bellar. Sed non videtur satisfacere, tùm quia loquitur Conc. de picturis in genere, tùm quia huiusmodi imagines non erant in usu eo tempore. Bellar. l. 2. Imag. cap. 9  For such images were not then in use. The second, they forbade Images, (saith Sanders) upon a particular occasion peculiar to that time: to wit, 
4 Nicolaus Sanderus l. 2. de cultu Imag. c. 4. respondet, Concilium illud prohibuisse imagines in templis, quia tempus & locus id require bat: tunc enim periculum erat, nè Gentiles existimarent nostros adorare ligna & lapides.  For fear lest the Heathen seeing Images in the Churches of Christians might think that Christians worshipped them idolatrously, as did the Heathen. So he▪ 
5 Haec solutio bona est. Bellar. l. 2. de Imag. c. 9 §. Nicolaus. Immediately after speaking of the same answer:  This is a good answer, (saith Bellarmine:) although in the same place he confess that that same reason of the Canon 
6 Fateor t●lrationem illam Canonis (nè id quod adoratur & colitur in par●●tibus depingatur) non multùm quadrare huic expositioni▪ Idem ibidem.  agreeth not much with this exposition. Which is a very charitable defence, and all one, by interpretation, as if he had said, The answer is good, but that it is nought. We expect a better. The third, They were forbid (faith Alanus Copus and others) not because Christians seemed to commit Idolatry with those Images, 
7 Alanus Copus in Dialog. l. 5. c. 16. dicit hîc prohiberi imagines, quia ab illis Christianis adorari coeperant, tamquam Dij, & hunc esse sensum; Placuit in ecclesia non esse picturas, nè aliquid in parietibus existens adoretur & colatur ut Deus. In quem sensum accipit istum Canonem B. Ivo in suis Decretis, par. 3. c. 40. Bellarm. quo iam supra. Hanc interpretationem amplectuntur Martinus de Ayala, & Sixtus Senensis Bibl. l. 5. Annot. ●47. Vasques De Adorat. l. 2. disp. 5. c. 2. num. 126.  But because they did so indeed. But, 
8 Sed huic etiam expositioni ratio Canonis non omninò quadrat, nam debuisset dici potius, Nè id quod pingitur adoretur, quam, Nè id quod adoratur pingatur. Bellar. quo sup. §. Alanus. And another, Mihi non probatur: Si enim à Patribus illius Concilij zelo religionis ita factum esset, ut omnes imagines etiam in tabulis depictae, aut in materia aliqua sculptae è templis eijcerentur, Gregorium Magnum posteà non latuisset, etc. Vasques quo sup. num. 127.  This exposition (saith Bellarmine) is not agreeable to the Canon. Therefore Sanders, Allen, Turrian, and Bellarmine, all four, resolve upon a fourth answer, telling us that those Images 
9 Altera interpretatio Alani accomodatior esse videtur, quam sequuntur etiam Sanderus l. 2. Ador. c. 4. & noster Franciscus Turrianus l. 3. de dogmat. charact. Dicunt ergo pro tempore & loco summopere fuisse conveniens, imagines è templis auferre; Imminente enim Gentilium persecutione, quae sanè in Ecclesia Dei adhuc perseverabat (ut ex multis Canonib. illius Concilij colligitur) oportebat Christianos secum imagines defer, & occultare, nè in templis ludibrio Gentilium expositae manerent. Id autem fieri non poterat, si in parietibus templi, benè tamen si in tabulis depingerentur, aut in materia aliqua sculperentur, etc. Vasques ibid. num. 128. Another: Huic expositioni aptissim● convenit ratio Canonis. Bellarm. De Imag. lib. 2. cap. 9 §. Alij ergo dicunt.  were forbid to be painted upon walls, lest that in that time of persecution they might have been made a scorn and contempt unto Infidels. But 
10 Caeterùm secunda illâ interpretatio Canonis 36. mihi non probatur, quòd cum ratione, quam in ipso Canone Concilium expressit, minimè conveniat. Ideò enim dicit, Placult imagines in Ecclesia esse non debere, nè scilicet quod adoratur in parietibus depingatur. Si tamen praedicta interpretatio vera esset, dicere potius deberet in hunc modum, Placuit in parietibus Ecclesiae imagines non depingi, nè persecutoribus fidei nostrae ludibrio esse possunt. Vasques ib. nu. 131.  I cannot allow of this exposition (saith the jesuit Vasques) because it agreeth not with the intention of the Canon. Wherefore he deviseth another which we may call the fifth, and which he calleth the best, saying: 
11 Interpretatio, quae mihi caeteris omnibus praeferenda videtur, haec est, Non prohiberi imagines in tabulis depictas aut in alia materia sculptas, sed solùm in ipsis templi parietibus depingi: judicat enim Concilium indecens esse, ut id quod colitur parietibus sit affixum, sed debere potius in tabula aut alia materia reverentèr collocari, nèsplendorem amittat. Vasques lib. 2. De Adorat. disp. 5. cap. 2. num. 132.  They were forbid to be painted on walls, lest by the decay of the walls they might lose their lustre: but yet were not forbid to be painted in tables. Which best how good it may seem to be, may appear by their sixth and last answer. 
12 Recentiores aliqui pondere illius Concilij quasi oppressi, tamquam optimum effugium elegerunt, authoritatem Concilij ne. gare, quòd prouinciale fuerit 19 Episcoporum tantùm, nec ab ullo summo Pontifice confirmatum. Existimant verò nullius debere esse authoritatis, quia etiam in multis aliis Canonibus manifestè erraverit, denegans viz. Poenitentiae sacramentum in extrema necessitate propter aliqua angentia crimina: aut, ut aliis placet, Communionem Eucharistiae, id quod errorem etiam intolerabilem esse autumant. Atque hac forsan de causa Canus l. 5. de locis. c. 4. post sextam conclusionem de Conc. Elibertino, inquit, eâ part, quâ erravit, semper à Catholicis explosum fuisse. Et sanè si aliâ viâ Concilio satisfieri commodè non possit, hoc nobis effugium sufficiat: nec calvinus contra universalem Ecclesiae definitionem prouinciale Concilium obijcere deberet. Vasques ib. q. sup. num. 121.  divers late Divines (saith the jesuit) oppressed with this objection, taken from the Council of Eliberis, have thought it their best refuge to deny the authority of the Council, because it was but provincial, and never confirmed by the Pope. Which refuge (saith he) might serve us in good stead, if a better could not be found. And though Bellarmine and Baronius made the 
13 Etiam Canus loc. Theol. Bellar. l. 2. Imag. c. 36. Hanc Synodum aiunt erroneam esse, & à nullo Romano Pontifice confirmatam. Baronius Tom. 1. Anno 57 num. 119▪ ob eandem causam quasi propè fines Novatiani dogmatis Conc. hoc attigisset, paulò liberiùs & acriùs de eo scripsit. Sed ea deinceps Tom. 2. Anno 305. num. 42. valdè mitigat, ita enim de eodem Canone [Lapsos nè quidem in articulo mortis absoluendos] cum quae ab illis de ea re statuta sunt ab Innocentio Pontifice excusentur, nemo sit qui accusare praesumat. Existimat igitur hanc Synodum legitimam fuisse, atque ab omni errore liberam. Binius De Conc. Comment▪ in hunc Canonem, pag. 245.  same Answer, yet this latter together with Binius confess and prove that, It was a lawful Council, and free from all error. So that whatsoever the occasion of forbidding might have been, this is a confessed conclusion of Senensis, that 
14 Populus Christianus recèns à superst●tione ad Christianismum addu●tus, ad idololatriam nimis pronus erat, idcir●ò omninò vetuit Synodus Elibertina imaginum cultum. Sixtus Senens. Biblio▪ lib. 5. Annot. 247.  The Council of Eliberis did absolutely forbid the worship of images. Which one testimony being so tortured by so distracted and contradictory Answers, as though they had professed to prove each other a liar: it cannot be (especially seeing some of them are confessed to have been oppressed with the force of this objection) but divers of them must incur (for aught that man can see) the guilt of wilful falsification. The like is as manifest in   

The Second testimony, from the Council of Francford.  
61 Protestants object the Council of Francford, which condemned (they say) the second Council of Nice for approving the worship of Images: hereupon their Adversary Surius▪ doth bitterly inveigh against them, calling Protestants 
1 Haereticorum nostrorum, qui se Euangelicos dici volunt, incredibilis impudentia in hoc apparet, quòd docere velint in Concilio Francofordensi damnari Conc. Nicaenum secundum: adferunt pro se Decretum Francofordiensis Synodi, quo illorum deplorata mentiendi & quidlibet fingendi libido ita coarguitur, ut mirum sit illos unquam in cuiusquam boni viri ausos esse prodite conspectum. And a little after.  Men of such incredible impudence, and so dissolute lust of lying, that it is a marvel they dare appear in the presence of any honest man. A fearful crimination. Shall we know the cause? 
2 Vbi homines versuti vellent persuadere Lectori Nicaenam secundam de adorandis imaginibus damnatam esse, decretum Francofordiense corruperunt quidem, sed mirabili Dei judicio, ut illorum impostura omnibus proderetur, obliti sunt Constantinopolin eradere, atque eius loco Nicaeam substituere. etc. A little after. Sed valeant isti cum malis suis artibus. Surius Praef. in Synod. Francofordi.  Because they would craftily persuade men to believe that the second Council of Nice was condemned in the Council of Francford for the point of the worship of Images, when as they corrupted those Counsels, albeit by the marvelous providence of God their fraud is made notorious, for they forgot to race out the name of Constantinople, and put in stead thereof the Council of Nice. Was it then the Synod of Constantinople, that was condemned in the Council of Francford, and not the second Synod of Nice? 
3 Concilium Francofordiense provinciale fuit, in quo Episcopi 300, etc. Acta Concilij Nicaeni secundi in causa imaginum confirmârunt. Paulò post. Ita docuit Alanus Copus, Sanderus, Surius, Suarez. Hactenùs Binius Com. in hanc. Synod. pag 429. Scriptores illi cum dicunt Synodum 7. in Francofor. Conc. damnatam, non intelligunt Nicaenam secundam, quae verè septima fuit, sed damnabant Ephesinam secundam. Coster. jes. Enchir. ca 13. Multi recentiores historici dicunt in Francfordiensi non damnari Synodum de adorandis imaginibus, sed de tollendis, Platina, Blandius, Sabellicus. Bellar. l. 2. De Conc. cap. 8.  No, (say nine of our Adversaries together) the second Synod of Nice was not condemned, but rather confirmed in the Council of Francford, by three hundred Bishops there. Now it is like that by these men's verdict Protestant's shall be adjudged unto the Pillory, for Surius is the chief of that inquest, who hath said, that Protestants sought by forgery to corrupt a Council. Can there be a more grievous accusation than this? But behold one Vasques a jesuit, as it were another Daniel, ready to acquit the innocent, saying and proving that 
4 Huic (sententiae Surij) duo manifestè obstant, unum est, quòd si Francofor. Synodus de Constantinop. Concilio loqueretur, non diceret [Quam pro adorandis imaginibus fecerunt] ea enim contra imaginum venerationem celebrata est. Loquitur ergò, sicut Historici omnes, de vera septima Synodo Nicaena secunda, quae reue● à pro adorandis imaginibus habita ●uit: alterum est, quod praefatio asserit, ut referunt Authores, Synodum illam, quam abrogavit Concilium Francoford celebratam fuisse in Bythinia, in qua quidem provincia est Nicaea, non autem Constantinopolis. Vasques l. 2. Imag. c. 4. num. 225.  The sentence of Surius cannot stand, being contrary unto all Historians, who affirm that the second Synod of Nice, and not the Synod of Constantinople, is mentioned in the Council. And of Francford Bellarmine more plainly acknowledgeth that that Synod of Nice was condemned in the Council of Francford in this point of the worship of Images. And therefore can do no less but 
5 Sententiam Alani optarem esse veram, sed suspicor esse falsam, quia etc. Bellar. l. 2. Conc. c. 8 §. Propter hanc. Et paulò post, Videtur igitur mihi in Francoford. Concilio verè reprobatam fuisse Nicaenam secundam.  wish that it were otherwise. Lastly 
6 Reverendis. Cardin. Baronius hanc sententiam veriorem esse judicat. Binius Comm. in Conc. Francof. pag. 391. col. 1.  Baronius also doth agree with Bellarmine. What will P. R. judge of those three Jesuits, Sanders, Suarez, Coster, with their complices, who maintain that the second Synod of Nice was confirmed in the Council of Francford, wherein (in the opinion of Bellar.) it was condemned? or how will he censure Surius, who chargeth Protestant's with impudence and forgery in such degree, as though they were unworthy the company of men; and when the matter is examined, by three Jesuits, their opposite Adversaries, Vasques, Bellarmine and Baronius, the defence of Protestants is warranted for true? Will now our P. R. call Surius, Furius, (who hath published the body of Counsels) and annihilate all his credit hereafter?  
62 But I proceed to their second Answer, 
7 Damnavit illa quidem Nicaenam secundam, sed per errorem & materialitèr, eo prorsus modo, quo Synodus Ariminensis damnabat homoousion. Name Author librorum Carolinorum Synodo imposuit per duo mendacia; unum erat, illam Synodum cultum latriae imaginibus oblatam approbâsse. Bellarm. l. 2. De Conc. c. 8. §. Videtur. Et paulò post. Concilium Francof. quod frequentissimum fuit, errare potuit, & erravit non in juris sed in facti quaestione: nec mirum est quòd errare potuit, quia non consenserunt legati Romani, ut Magdeburgenses dicunt: Papa autem non modò non consensit, verùm etiam reprobavit illud Concilium, ut patet ex libro Adriani, etc. Bellar. ib. §. Si dicas. Idem sensit illustriss. Cardinalis Baronius, Patres Francof. Concilij mendacijs & imposturis Autorum libri Carolini fuisse deceptos, ut Nicaenam secundam, quasi ipsa imagines cultulatriae, soli Deo debito, colendas sanxisset. Teste Binio, Com. in Conc. Francof. pa. 397. But,  Though the Council of Francford (say their two Cardinals) did condemn the Council of Nice in this point, yet did it err herein in a question not of faith but of fact, for being deceived by reports of the Author of those books, which are entitled in the name of Charles the Emperor, they did erroneously think that the Council did allow, that Images should be worshipped with an honour proper unto God. This answer also is so preiudicious to their own cause, that their own Doctors Vasques, Suares, and Binius do openly confute it, proving first that the Council of Francford 
8 Definitio septimae Synodi non minus nota esse potuit Conc. Francofordiensi, quam Autorib. libri Carolini, siquidem eodem tempore liber ille conscriptus fuit. Vasques Alorat. l. 2. disp. 7. cap. 5. num. 230.  Could not be deceived by that information. Secondly, that the 
9 Rursus Concilium Francof. habuit Legatos Adriam Pont. ut tradunt omnes in quaestione praecedenti citati, & ex subscriptionibus constat, atque haeretici Centuriatores fatentur. Ibid. num. 232.  Legates of the Pope did subscribe unto it. Thirdly, that the contrary answer 
10 Ego cum viro doctissimo Francisco Suarez sentio, istam responsionem infirmis niti fundamentis. Binius q. supra.  standeth not upon any sound ground. And if I shall object the answer of Bellarmine, I think P. R. will return me no satisfaction: he to allow the Council of Francford thus far, as to think i● did not err in a question of right or faith, but only failed in an error of fact. Tell me in good earnest P. R. if the Fathers of the Council of Francford judging that the second Council of Nice, confirmed by the Pope, did err in defending Idolatry, did they err in faith or no? if they did, then where was the faith of Bellarmine and Baronius, who say it did not err in question of faith? if those Father's judging the Council of Nice to err in faith, did not err themselves than it is not prejudicial to faith to think that The Pope and his Council may err in defending Idolatry, and consequently heresy, and what not? Therefore yet they have not satisfied the Protestants objection.  
63 Their last refuge is to contemn it as being only a 
11 Si Conc. Francofordiense aliquid contra Synodum septimam (which was Nicaena secunda) statuisset, tamen nullius esset momenti, tum quia Prouinciale non valet contra generale, tum quia non erat à Pontifice Romano approbatum. Bellar. l. 2. De Imag. c. 14.  Provincial Council: and amongst others their Binius teacheth his fellows how to wind themselves out of this whirlpool. 
12 Necessario igitur fatendum est, vel Historicos errâsse, vel aliqua ex part depravatos esse, vel certè non de vera, sed de Pseudosynodo locutos esse. Denique possit quis liberè negare quicquam actum esse in Francof. Synodo siuè pro Imaginibus, si●è contra illas. Binius Tom. 3. Conc. Comment. in Conc. Francof.  We must necessarily confess (saith he) that either our Historians have erred, or else the Acts of the Council have been corrupted, or else that it condemned some other false Council: or else freely deny that it maketh neither for us, nor against us▪ He might have added, Or else let us grant (as we ought) the objection of Protestants to be true. To all the other not the equity of the case, but desperate necessity hath enforced them, as may appear by their intestine war among themselves, one of them proving another's answer to be flatly repugnant unto the tenor of the Council which could not have been without gross falsity on some part. Wherefore we conclude with the saying of the jesuit Suares: 
13 Periculosum & temerarium est, acta illius Concilij veluti supposititia & apocryphas reijcere, quia nihil in eyes acts, ut nunc extant, reperitur, quod non ad veram religionem stabiliendam valeat. Suares Jes. disp. 49. sect. 3. Teste Binio, in loco suprà citato.  It is a dangerous rashness to reject the Acts of that Council of Francford as false: And proceed unto   

The Third example.  
64 Protestants object the testimony of the ancient Father 
1 Obijciunt Protestantes nobis Epiphanium, qui in Epistola ad johannem Hierosolymitanum sic scribit. cum venissem, inquit, ad villam Anablatha, & in Ecclesiam intrâssem, ut orarem, inveni ibi velum pendens in foribus eiusdem Ecclsiae, habens imaginem quasi Christi aut Sancti ●●●usda●: cumque vidissem in Ecclesia Christi, contra authoritatem Scripturarum, hominis pendere imaginem, s●idi illud velum, etc. Vasques Jes. lib. 2. de Adorat. disp. 5. cap. 3. num. 136. Bellar. lib. 2. de Triumph. Eccl. cap. 9 §. ●.  Epiphanius, who by his own report entered into a Church at Anablatha to pray, and perceiving a curtain, wherein was a Picture as if it had been the image of Christ, or some Saint, he took the curtain and rend it, as being an abuse contrary to the authority of holy Scriptures. Our Adversaries are changeable to answer thereunto. Therefore first Waldensis is bold, and saith that 
2 Hoc fecit Epiphanius propter periculum erroris Anthopomorphitarum, qui Deum corporeum, & membris compactum esse asserebant. Waldens'. Tom. 3. tit. 19 cap. 157. Sic quidem Waldensis, qui reprehendit in Epiphanio zelum nimium, & non secundum scientiam.  Epiphanius did this upon a good zeal, but not according to knowledge, all for fear of giving advantage unto the Anthropomorphitae. But Cardinal Bellarmine cuts him short, telling him, that 
3 Verùm Waldensem textus ipse resutat, non enim erat Dei imago, sed hominis cuiusdam. Ergo non potuit Epiphanius hac occasione motus velum abscindere. Vasq▪ q. sup. disp. 5. c. 3. num. 137.  His answer is confuted by the text. The next is Vasques the jesuit, noting Protestants for dullards, who could not perceive that the image, which Epiphanius rend, 
4 Hinc intelligi potest, quanto ●udioris ingenij fuit calvinus, & alij, qui hoc nobis testimonium obijciunt. Si enim attentè legatur Epiphanius nè verbum quidem de sanctorum imaginibus habet. Vasques q. sup. c. 3. num. 144. Sed loquitur de imagine hominis prophani, quae in sanctarum imaginum Catalogo ferenda non est. Ibid. cap. 4. num. 148.  Was not the image of a Saint, but of some profane man. But Cardinal Bellarmine will tell him that, 
5 Alij dicunt loqui de imagine hominis profani, sed communior & verior solutio est, verba, etc. Bellar. lib. 2. de Triumph. Eccl. cap. 9  There is a better and more common answer than this. Sure, for this is nought, forasmuch as their Senensis hath taught them that Epiphanius in other his Epistles 
6 Epiphanius in alia Epistola, quae in acts primae Synodi citatur, Estote, inquit, memores, dilecti filii, nè in Ecclesias imagines inferatis, nec in coemiterijs statuatis. Sixtus Senens. Bibl. l. 5. Annot. 247.  Doth forbid Images to be brought into the Church. We require therefore a better answer than this. Alphonsus de Castro, to rid his hands of Epiphanius, numbereth him among those whom he calleth 
7 Epiphanius inter Iconomachos haereticos fuit. Alphons. de Castro haeres. Tit. Image.  Iconomachos haereticos, heretical Image-breakers. This will not be currant with Vasques, who supposing that it was the Image of some profane man, saith that 
8 Velum habens quasi Christi aut Sancti cuiusdam: Illa vox [Quasi] significat hominis profani imaginem ibi pependisse, tanquam esset imago aut Christi aut Sancti alicuius: ideoque merito fuisse abscissam. Vasques quo supra. cap. 4. num. 149.  Epiphanius did well to take it away. As yet nothing is said which may give satisfaction. Where is that which was called the Common answer? 
9 Alanus & Sanderus difficultate oppressi responderunt, verba suposititia esse. Vasques ibid. num. 140. Corrupta est haec Epistola a veteribus Iconoclastris. Costerus Jesuita E●●hi●id. cap. 13. §. Corrupta. Esse quidem supposititia probatur, primò, secundò, tertiò, etc. nonò. Bellar. quo supra.  Allen, Sanders, Coster, Bellarmine have all resolved to cut the knot, which they cannot untie, and therefore say, The Epistle in that part is forged or corrupted by Heretics. It is no marvel they be so brief, for Vasques hath told us, that those which answered thus 
10 See in the next number before.  Were oppressed with the difficulty. Wherefore he concludeth directly, 
11 Verba, quae alij suppositia esse putant ad eandem epistolam sine dubio pertinent, nam postquam Epiphanius se excusabat ad johannem Hierosol. de erroribus, quos johannes in eo notâsset, meritò aliam causam, cur alij de se murmurarent, subiun●it, dicens, Cum venissem Anablatha, etc. Vasques Jes. lib. 2. de Adorat. disp. 5. cap. 3.  That without all doubt the Epistle is not counterfeit. It may be Bellarmine will not speak any thing without reason: 
12 Hieronymus in Epistola ad Pammachium contra johannem Hierosol. Episcopum, totam ferè hanc epistolam Epiphanij à se Latinè factam recitat, & tamen non meminit huius veli. Ergo illa verba supposititia esse videntur. Bellar. l. 2. de Triumph. Eccle. cap. 9  Hierome (saith he) in his Epistle unto Pammachius against john Bishop of Jerusalem, doth translate almost this whole Epistle into Latin, and yet maketh no mention of this part of the Epistle concerning this image. Therefore is this part counterfeit. Who would think that this great Rabbi could have been ignorant of that which any man may see, and his own learned Doctors have acknowledged, that 
13 Est Epistola Epiphani● ab Hieronymo translata & approbata in haec verba [Cum venissem Anablatha. Senens. l. 5. Bibl. Annot. 247. Haec epistola Epiphanij de velo ponitur inter Epistolas Hieronymi, ordine 60: imò idem Hieronymus in epistolam ad Pammachium huius epistolae mentionem facit. Vasq. quo supra. It is found in the epistle of S. Hierom. ad joh. Hierosol.  The Epistle which is translated and approved by S. Hierome, hath this part in it concerning the Image [when I was at Anablatha] Which is evident to them who will read the Epistle of S. Hierome to john Bishop of jerusalem: yet doth Senensis instance in the authority of 
14 Cum verò Damascenus dicit (id quod Bellar. obijcit supra) Epistolan Epiphanij esse con●ictā:  Damascene to prove this Epistle a forged device: but Damascene is falsely alleged, saith Vasques: adding that 
15 Non de hac Epistola ad johannem Hierosol. (ut falsò Senensis autumat) sed de epist. ad Theodosium intelligit. Ergò hoc commune & frequens nostrorum effugium mihi non placet, & Hieronymo necesse non fuit in epistola sua ad Pammachium huius veli meminisse, quia Hieronymi institutum erat tantùm de johannis Hierosol. erroribus agere. Vasques ibid.  This our common refuge, in excepting against the Epistle as counterfeit is no way allowable. Hitherto they have delivered no Answer sufficient. We marvel why their great jesuit Valentia hath been so long silent: therefore he, 
16 Aut si maximè exploratum sit eam epistolam esse genuinam, respondemus, apud nos Ecclesiae authoritas plus ponderis habet. Greg. Valent. jes. l. 2. de Idol. c. 7. pag. 719. una hirundo non facit ver. Anglo-Rhemens. transl. in non. Test. vide Indicem de Imaginibus.  If it shall appear that it was the proper Epistle of Epiphanius, yet we answer that the Church is of greater authority with us than Epiphanius. Whereunto we oppose that which Epiphanius preferred before any pretence of the Church, when he said that the abuse of that image was 
17 cum vidissem (inquit Epiphanius) contra authoritatem Scripturarum hominis pendere imaginem, etc. Epiphan. ut est ab ist●citatus.  contrary to Scriptures.  
65 In all that hath been spoken we see many falsehoods, and that in a part of but one controversy. If P. R. shall desire 500 of this kind, I bind myself unto him by a faithful protestation in a months warning to satisfy him, whensoever he or any for him shall exact it. Neither shall I need to borrow oil for this lamp to make it manifest unto the world, that in all their passages in all controversies of greatest moment when they are to be discussed by Scriptures, Fathers, and reasons, there are such cross, thwart and contradictions among them, as though (as the Poet feigneth) the teeth of the Dragon were fallen out of his mouth and metamorphosed into armed men, presently bend to kill one another. But I will come one step nearer to P. R. his demand, Offering him    

A Satisfaction to his first demand in a particular instance of a noble Falsificator on his side.  
§ 15.  
66 P. R. requireth an example of Any one, who hath been found so grossly false, that in the eye of man he may not be acquitted either by Ignorance of translation, etc. Which demand if it proceed from unfeinednesse, it seemeth unto me so intolerably reasonable, that now I am driven to a twofold trouble in yielding satisfaction; the one is that I know not with what one to begin first, the falsificators be so many: the second is, when I shall begin with any choice one, how to make an end, so manifold are their falsifications. Therefore in respect of the falsifiers I would require of P. R. to propound unto me any one of his Doctors, in whom he hath best assurance of integrity, whether Greg. de Valentia, Stapleton, Bellarmine, Coccius, Suarez, Turrian, Campian, Gretzer, Fuerdentius, the Remish Translat. in their Annotations: or any, I say, of those which have been publicly authorized of their Church, and I will not doubt but to give him thrice three examples of their fraud. In the mean time I think it requisite to single out of all such an one as is commended of all: to wit, Cardinal Bellarmine, that P. R. may not repine, saying: he hath chosen a David the least in his father's house: but confess that I have preferred a Saul, one higher by the head and shoulders than any of the rest: not a dead man, who cannot interpret his own meaning, whether he had falsified upon ignorance, negligence, etc. but one, which now living is able to answer for himself, whose credit P. R. doth tender, and with whom he may consult to know whether I do him injury or no. Now to the point.  
First, examples of such kind of falsities in wilful slanders, whereof Cardinal Bellarmine hath been guilty, as will appear even by the evidence of his own confession.  
67 Let P. R. for a while take Cardinal Bellarmine into secret confession, and first ask him with what conscience he hath charged Calvin with the heresy of the 
1 Pelagiani docebant non esse in hominibus peccatum originale, & praecipuè in filijs fidelium. Idem docent calvinus & Bucerus, etc. Bellar. lib. 4. de Eccl. milit. c. 9 §. Pelagiani.  Pelagians, who denied that there was any original sin in infants, especially in the children of faithful Christians? For as he could not be ignorant 
2 Hic proprius erat Pelagianorum error, negare peccatum originale esse haereditariam naturae nostrae corruptionem. Greg Val. Jes. lib. De orig. pet. c. 2. in initio.  That this doctrine of denying original sin was (as their own L. jesuit confesseth) the proper heresy of the Pelagians. And not so only, but saith furthermore that 
3 Calvinus & Lutherus, caeterique Protestantes adeò non negârunt originale peccatum, ut illud prodigiosis loquendi modis exagitant, etiam in renatis manner dicunt, etc. Idem Ib. cap. 8. & in Tom. 2. disp. 6. q. 11. punct. 1. §. Quam quaestionem.  Calvin and all other Protestants are so far from denying original sin, that they do monstrously extend the nature thereof even unto persons regenerate. I let pass a dozen such criminations cast by him upon Protestants, which by the testimonies of his own Doctors may be proved to have been lewd and intolerable slanders. I insist now only upon such his confessions, whereby it may appear he hath been, in his injuries against his Adversaries, the greatest Adversary to his own conscience.  
68 First he maketh Protestants guilty of the heresy of 
4 Novatianorum error praecipuus erat, non esse in Ecclesia potestatem reconciliandi homines, nisi per baptismum: Posteà etiam addiderunt, non debere baptizatos inungi chrismate ab Episcopis. calvinus negat ullum esse Sacramentum poenitentiae praeter Baptisma, Lutherus Poenitentiam reijcit. Bellar. l. 4. De not. Eccle. cap. 9 §. Novatianorum.  The Novatians, in taking from the Church all power of reconciling men unto God. When as his own Author's note that, 
5 Novatianorum haeresis peccantibus omnem poenitentiae virtutem tollit, dicens eos, qui semel post Baptismum lapsi sunt, nunquam posteà consequi remissionem peccatorum, etiamsi eos poeniteat. Alphon. De castro. lib. 12. haeres. 3. tit. Poenitentia. Omne peccatum lethal post Baptismum commissum irremissibile censuerunt. Vega. l. 13. de Justif. c. 2. pag. 486. In joh. 5. 4. Dixit Christus, Noliampliùs peccare, nè deterius aliquid tibi contingat. Ex quo loco probat Pacianus contra Novatianos', non negandam esse poenitentibus veniam, nec enim dixisse Christum iam noli peccare, quia non sanaberis iterùm, sed, nè deterius aliquid tibi contingat. Maldonat. Jes. Comm. in ●um locum Joh.  The heresy of the Novatians was this, viz. to deny any man, who should sin after baptism, all hope of remission of sins, although he should repent. Yea and also Bellarmine himself in behalf of Protestants confesseth elsewhere that 
6 Dicunt Protestants in Christianis post Baptismum requiri fidem & poenitentiam, ut iustificentur & remissionem consequantur. Bellar. lib. 3. de Justif. cap. 6, & saepè aliâs.  They require repentance and faith in Christians, that they may be justified and obtain remission of sins. Nor this only, but 
7 Non de quavis poenitentia inter nos & Protestants controversia habetur, potest enim vera poenitentia vel in sola mentis conuersione, atque interna peccati detestatione consistere, vel in externis signis, ut moerore, lachrymis, confession, corporis afflictatione se prodere, neque de hac re ulla est controversia. Ipsi adversarij calvinus & Chennitius opera externa laboriosa, ut signa verae poenitentiae internae non reijciunt. Deindè absolutionis ritum aliquem fere omnes agnoscunt. Sed hic est status controversiae, utrùm poenitentia signis externis manifestata, accedente ad eam verbo absolutionis, sit Sacramentum propriè dictum. Bellar. lib. 1. de Poenit. cap. 8. §. Vt igitur.  There is no difference between us (saith he) and Protestants about repentance as it is a conversion unto God with detestation of sin, or as it consisteth in outward signs of sorrow, weeping, confession, and outward chastisements, yea and almost all of them allow an outward rite of absolution. But the only controversy between us is, whether Penance be properly a Sacrament. The contradiction is this, to impute unto Protestants an heresy which taketh away all manner of Repentance and hope of remission for sin past, and yet to acknowledge in them a contrary orthodoxal truth, which is, to profess a necessity of Repentance, and reconciliation and remission of sins.  
69 Again, he attributeth unto Calvin the heresy of the Manicheis, 
8 Manichaeorum est (inquit Hieronym.) hominum damnare naturam, & hominum auferre arbitrium, & peccatorum originem non tribuunt Manichaei libero arbitrio, inquit Augustinus. Idem Calunius. Bellar. l. 4. de Not. Eccles. cap. 9 §. 8. Manichaeorum.  Who (saith he) did condemn the nature of men, depriving them of free-will, and ascribing the original and beginning of sin unto the nature of man, and not unto his free-will. Seeing he hath himself observed that, 
9 johannes Calunius docet quòd in initio homo habuerit liberum arbitrium, nunc non habet. In hac integritate (inquit) libero pollebat homo arbitrio, quo, si vellet, adipisci posset vitam aeternam. Bellar. l. 1. degrat. primi hominis. §. in eodem principio.  Caluine teacheth that man in his first creation had free-will, whereby in his integrity he might, if he would, have attained unto eternal life. This contradiction in this point is no more than this, to charge Calvin with that which he did not believe. Is not this singular falsehood? and yet behold a more notable than this.  
70 He accuseth M. Bullinger of 
10 Henricum Bullingerum non puduit scribere tres esse in divinitate personas non statu sed gradu, non substantiâ sed formâ, non potestate sed specie differentes. Certè personas gradu, formâ, specie differentes, vix Ariani ipsi dicere ausi essent. Bellar. praef. in Contro. de Christo. §. Henricum.  Arianisme, because of this sentence [Tres sunt, non statu sed gradu, etc.] Notwithstanding he knew this was the very sentence of 
11 Sic scribit Tertullianus in libro adversus Praxeam, Tres sunt non statu sed gradu, non substantiâ sed formâ, non potestate sed specie. Greg. Val. Jes. lib. de vinit. & Trinit. c. 9  Tertullian. And is therefore elsewhere expounded as orthodoxal and justifiable by 
12 Tertullianus in libro adversus Praxeam cum dixit filium distingui à Patre non statu sed gradu, per gradum intelligit ordinem personarum. Bellar. l. 1. de Christo, c. 10. §. Respondeo secundum.  himself.  
71 Though P R. require but three examples of falsehood, yet may I not envy him a further choice, because I know not the curiosity of his palate. Therefore let him again consult with Cardinal Bellar. in another taxation of Protestants, saying in one place that, 
13 Secundùm errorem Caluinistarum (speaking of a Christian soul departing this life) non ad Deum ibat, sed ad inferos, aut alium locum extra coelum, ubi non magis Deus est, quam hic nobiscum. Bellar. l. 1. de Beat Sanct. cap. 4. paulo post initium.  They teach that the souls of faithful men departing this life do not go directly unto heaven. In another place he himself together with his fellow jesuit have publicly recorded that it is a common 
14 Octava obiectio (answering to the objection of Protestants) sumitur ex 2. Cor. 5. [Si domus terrena nostrae habitationis dissoluitur, habemus domum non manu factam in coelis] rectâ igitur post mortem sinè Purgatorio pij homines transferuntur in coelum. Respondeo etc. Bellar. l. 1. de Imag. c. 8. §. Octava obiectio. And Obijciunt nobis Protestantes loca Scripturarum & Patrum, in quibus duplex status eorum, qui moriuntur, significatur, impiorum in supplicium aeternum, & justorum in vitam aeternam. Deinde huiusmodi loca Scripturarum urgent, quibus determinatè significari videtur, eos qui ex hac vita discedunt in statu gratiae statim recipi ad beatitudinem. ut Apoc. 14. Beati qui moriuntur in Domino, requiescunt à laboribus: Simo (inquiunt) omnes beati, tùm nulli in Purgatorij cruciatibus continentur. Greg. Valent. de Purg. c. 8. and the Rhemish Annot in Apoc. 14. 13.  Objection of Protestants proving from Scriptures against the doctrine of Purgatory, that the souls of the faithful presently after death go directly unto heaven.  
72 He resteth not here, but once again challengeth 
15 Quidam antiqui haeretici fuerunt, qui negabant Eucharist●am esse veram carnem Christi, & tantùm esse volebant signum & imaginem corporis Christi. Hanc haeresin refert Theodoretus, eandem docent hoc tempore Zuinglius, Calvin's. Bellar. l. 4. de not. Eccl. c. 9 ad finem.  Caluine for (as he calleth it) an ancient heresy alleged by Theodoret, affirming, that there is only a figure of Christ's body in the Eucharist. And yet in another place affirming both 
16 Quae sententia citatur à Theodoreto in Dialogo, ubi tamen nunc non habetur. Sed nè glorientur Caluinistae sententiam suam valdè antiquam esse, illud est obseruandum, antiquissimos illos haereticos non tàm sacramentum Eucharistiae, quam mysterium incarnationis oppugnâsse. Bellar. l. 1. de Euchar. c. 1. in initio.  That that opinion is not ancient, nor yet now to be found in Theodoret, and also that, 
17 Docet calvinus symbola & corpus Christi, licèt inter se loco plurimùm distent, tamen coniuncta esse non solùm ratione signi, quia unum est signum alterius, sed etiam quia unà cum signo Deus exhibet verum Christi corpus & sanguinem, quo animae nostrae alantur ad vitam aeternam. Bellar. ib. §. Secundò docet.  The foresaid doctrine of Caluine doth teach that in the Eucharist there is to be exhibited unto the faithful not only a sign of Christ's body, but also the body and blood itself by which men's souls are nourished unto eternal life. Or as another jesuit testifieth for Caluine, 
18 Docet calvinus corpus Christi ab animis nostris in Eucharistia substantialiter communicari.  That our souls communicate with the body of Christ substantially. here is no more odds in this accusation, than ancient and not ancient, heresy and not heresy. All these contradictions do certainly evince that he hath by public imputations slandered those, whom in his conscience he did acquit. And shall we think that his conscience could be sincere in alleging other men's testimonies and witnesses, 
Greg. Valent. Jes. tom. 4. disp. 6. q. 3. punct. 1. §. Item.  who is found thus perfidiously unjust in exhibiting his own? I spare to produce multitudes of this kind which I have in store, and will be a debtor to P. R. for many of this sort, ready to pay my debt as soon as this my promise shall be exacted.   

Some examples of Cardinal Bellarmine his falsifications in the allegation of testimonies.  
§ 16.  
SAint Cyprian saith, 
1 Cyprianus epist. 10. ad Pomp. unde est haec traditio? an ex dominica autoritate descendens, an de Apostolorum mandatis & epistolis? ea enim facienda esse quae scripta sunt testatur Deus. Hereunto Bellarmine.  Whence is this tradition? is it derived from the Lords authority, or from the precept of the Apostles? For God willeth that we should do those things which are written. From whence Protestants conclude, that the Scriptures are of sufficiency for our direction in all questions of faith. Bellarmine answereth, that 
2 Respondeo, Cyprianum haec scripsisse cum errorem suum tueri vellet, & ideo non mirum si more errantium tunc ratiocinaretur. Quare Augustinus contra Donatistas' cap. 23. & ●equentibus hanc epistolam meritò refellit. Bellar. lib. 4. de verb. Dei, cap. 11. §. profert Cyprian. etc.  Cyprian spoke this when he thought to defend an error, and therefore it is no marvel if he erred in so reasoning, for the which cause S. Augustine (saith he) did worthily refute him. The question is not what error Cyprian held, but whether his manner of reasoning from the sufficiency of scripture were erroneous, or no. Bellar. pretendeth that S. Augustine did worthily reprove him. But whosoever shall consult with S. Augustine in the chap. specified, shall find that this point by him is excellently commended, 
3 Quod Cyprianus monet ut ad fontem recurramus, id est, Apostolorum traditionem, & indè in nostra tempora canalem dirigamus, optimum est, & sine dubitatione faciendum▪ Traditum est igitur ab Apostolis quòd sit unus Deus, unum Baptisma, una fides, Ephes. 4. August. lib. 5. de Baptismo. cap. 26.  That Cyprian warneth us (saith S. August.) to run unto the fountain, that is, unto the tradition of the Apostles; from thence to derive a conduit to our times, it is chiefly good and doubtless to be performed.  
74 Secondly, Bellarmine to establish the authority of the Pope, doth give this prerogative to S. Peter, to wit: 
4 Vigesima secunda praerogativa Petri est, quod solus Petrus Episcopus ordinatus fuerit: caeteri autem à Petro. Probatur ex Anacleto Epist. 1. In novo Testamento etc. à Clement Alexandrino, à Cypriano lib. 4. Epist. à Leone Sermone 3. de assumptione sua ad Pontificatum etc. Bellarm. lib. 1. de Pontif. Rom. cap. 23.  That S. Peter was the only Bishop, and that other Apostles took their orders from him: which he laboureth to evince from the testimonies of Anacletus, Clemens Alexand. Eusebius, and Cyprian; wherein he is refelled by his own Doctors. One saying, that 
5 Nonnulli contendunt caeteros Apostolos eam potestatem jurisdictionis accepisse, idque probare conantur ex authoritate Anacleti, Cypriani, Augustini, Leonis, Clementis Alexandrini. Sed revera non faciunt id quod istius sententiae autores volunt. Franciscus de victoria relect. 2. conclus. 1. §. quod.  Indeed those Fathers mean no such thing: Another, that 
6 De epistola pontificum Clementis & Anacleti, multa sunt quae manifest ostendunt illas esse supposititias, quibus nituntur ij, qui plus quam expedit Sedis Romanae authoritatem amplificant. Cardinal. Cusanus de Concord. Cathol. lib. 3. cap. 2.  The Epistles of Anacletus are counterfeit, which many urge more than is meet to the end they may advance the authority of the sea of Rome.  
75 Again, where Bellarmine citeth the testimony of 
7 Extat apud Platinam forma electionis Hildebrandi in haec verba: Nos sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae etc. Bellarm. lib. 4. de Roman. Pontif. cap. 13. §. Extat, etc.  Platina for the commendation of Pope Hildebrand: And in another place finding Platina objected in the question of confession, answereth for the disabling of the Author, saying, 
8 Being urged with his testimony in the case of Romish Confession, by the Decree of Innocentius, he answereth: Sed neque Platina publica authoritate & ex publicis archivis vitas illas Pontificum scripsit. Bellarm. lib. 3. De Poenit. cap. 13. §. Sed neque.  that Platina had no public authority to pen the lives of the Popes from public records. Which is notably false, Platina himself in his epistle Dedicatory unto the then Pope writing thus: 
9 Tu Theologorum Princeps (maxim Pontifex) non frustrà mandâsti ut res gestas Pontificum scriberem. Platina in Praefat. operis.  Thou (o Prince of Divines, and chief of Bishops) hast commanded me to write the lives of the Popes: whose history is therefore greatly commended by Balbus, as being 
10 Quae Platina de vitis Pontificum scripsit vera sunt existimanda, quip cum ea ex publicis tabulis scripsit, aliisque legitimis documentis deprompsit: in quibus res gestae Pontificum historica fide continentur. Hieron Balbus de coronatione. §. Post mortem Constantini, etc.  True, and taken out of public monuments. I could furnish P. R. with infinite such like delusions, and will also whensoever my Adversary shall renew his demand: for such a multitude of examples I could bring, that I find it a greater difficulty for me to subtract, than to multiply.  
76 Therefore I will now confine myself within the precincts of but one only controversy concerning Purgatory: where Bellarmine distinguishing of the divers acception of the word fire in the writings of ancient Fathers, concludeth that, 
11 Vocatur purgatorium locus quid à, in quo, tanquam in carcere, post hanc vitam purgantur animae, quae in hac plenè purgatae non fuerant. De hac est tota controversia. Bellar. lib. 1. de purgat. cap. 1. § vocatur. Patres aliqui per ignem non intelligunt ignem purgatorij, sed ignem divini judicij, quomodo loquitur Paulus in 1. Cor. 3. cum ait, uniuscuiusque opus quale sit ignis probabit. Bellar. lib. 2. de purgat. cap. 1. §. Add. Apostolus 1. Cor. 3. lgnis probabit] loquitur de igne severi & justi judicij Dei, qui non est ignis purgans & affligens, sed probans & examinans. Bellar. li. 1. de purge. cap. 4. §. Superest.  When the Fathers speak of the fire of the day of doom, when all the world shall be of a flame, they mean not Purgatory fire, which souls suffer immediately after death. After this he allegeth. 
12 Sunt apertissima loca ex patribus, ubi asteritur purgatorium, quorum pauca quaedam afferam. Bellar. lib. 1. de purgat. cap. 6. §. Denied etc.  Most plain places, (as he calleth them) out of the Fathers for proof of Purgatory. Amongst others (in his first book de Purgatorio) S. 
13 Vide Ambrosium Serm. 20. in Psal. 118. Ibidem, §. Ambrose etc. Is in Psal. 118. Serm. 20. Omnes, inquit, oportet transire per flammas, sive joannes sit sive Petrus etc. Bellar. lib. 2. de purgat. cap. 1. §. Ambrose. Et paulò post  Ambrose serm. 20. in Psal. 118. for proof of Purgatory fire: which he himself confesseth in his next book 
14 Ambrose hoc posteriore loco (speaking of the Psal. 118) videtur per ignem non intelligere purgatorium. Bellar. ibid. §. Add etc. He urgeth Hilary  not to be meant of Purgatory. So he dealeth also with S. 
15 Inter apertissima loca. Hilarius in Psal. 118. illud [concupivit anima mea desiderare judicia tua] nobis (inquit) est ille ignis obeundus in quo subeunda sunt gravia illa expiandae à peccatis animae supplicia. Bellar. li. 1. de purga. ca 7. §. Hilarius. Rursus  Hilary, urging his sentence upon the Psalm. 118. as an evident place for Purgatory, which by his own judgement 
16 Hilarius in Psal. 118. in illa verba: Concupivit anima etc. ubi insinuat B. Mariam transire debuisse per illum ignem. Bellar. lib. 2. de purgat. cap. 1. §. Idem videtur: Rursus. Aliqui (amongst whom he citeth Hilary) videntur non intelligere ignem purgatorium ut (answering to the place above mentioned) Hilarius. ibid. §. Add.  Seemeth not to signify Purgatory. And yet again, among his 
17 Sunt apertissima loca in patribus. Bella. lib. 1. de purgat. cap. 6. §. Deinde sunt, Paulo post.  manifest places of the Fathers for Purgatory, he allegeth the testimonies of 
18 Vt Origenes homil. 6. in Exod. Saltus fit si quid forte plumbi habent admixtum.  Origen, 
19 Et Basilius in Isa. 9 quod depascatur & devoret ignis purgatorius.  Basil, 
20 Et Lactantius lib. 7. cap. 21. perstringentur igne atque comburentur.  Lanctantius, 
21 Et Hieronymus in fine Comment. in Isaiam: quorum opera in igne probanda.  Hierom, 
22 Ambrose in Psalm. 36. Non exuremur, tamen uremur, etc. Haec omnia Bellar. lib. 1. de purga. cap. 6.  Ambrose: all which are acknowledged expressly by 
23 Origenes dixit: Omnes homines excepto Christo, aliquo modo urendos esse igne conflagrationis divini judicij. Et Hilarius unà cum Ambrosio Origenem sequu●us est. Eodem pertinere videntur quae Basilius annotavit: ad eandem opinionem aparet allusisse Hieronymum, & long antè Hieronymum quoque Lactantium. Sixtus Senensis Bibliothe. lib. 5. annot. 171. Lactantius lib. 7. cap. 21. perstringentur inquit etc. loquitur de iis qui in resurrectione sunt igni tradendi. Suarez jesuita in part. 3. Thom. qu 59 art. 6. disp. 57 sect. 1. §. Ambrose in Comment. in Psal. 36. consentire videtur cum Origene qui dicit omnes homines, Christo excepto, probandos esse & aliquo modo urendos igne conflagrationis divini judicij. Sixtus Senens. Bibliothe. lib. 5. annot. 171.  Sixtus Senensis, from the evidence of the contexts to have spoken only of the fire of the day of judgement, and consequently as 
24 See afore numb. 12.  Bellarmine hath taught us; not of the fire of Purgatory. Lastly he professeth to confirm the doctrine of purgatory out of most of the 
25 Purgatorium ex Patribus Graecis & Latinis probamus. Bellar. lib. 1. de purgat. cap 6.  Greek and Latin Fathers. And another jesuit saith more largely 
26 Omnes veteres Graeci Patres agnoverunt purgatorium & Scriptis suis luculentissimè prodiderunt. Salmeron Jesuit. Comm. in 1. Cor. 15. disp. 25. in fine.  of all the Greek Fathers: which is an assertion as false, as peremptory, even by the confession of their own Bishop saying: 
27 Legat qui velit Graecorum veterum Commentarios, & nullum, quantum opinor, aut rarissimum de purgatorio sermonem inveniet: Sed neque Latini simul omnes huius rei veritatem conceperunt. Roffens. art. 18. advers. Lutherum.  That there is very rare mention of Purgatory in the Greek Fathers; and that the Latin Fathers did not all at first apprehend the doctrine thereof.  
77 If any shall but observe in this one controversy the number of witnesses brought in for the confirmation of this their new Article in the name of ancient Fathers, which are by confession of our Adversaries merely counterfeit. as Clemens his Constitutions, Clemens Epistles, Athanas. in quaest. Eusebius Emissenus, josephus Ben Gorion, Hieron. in Proverb. August. ad fratres in Eremo, the Liturgies of james and others: All which as they are urged for proof of Purgatory, so are they rejected by their own men (I desire to be challenged for proof hereof) as forged, or corrupted, or Apocrypha; and indeed no better witnesses for truth, than the Knights of the post be fit men for a jury. If further he shall mark how true Fathers and Scriptures are instanced in for proof of the same Article, whereof (when I speak of Fathers) most of them (when I speak of Canonical scriptures) all of them are found by the judgement of their own Doctors to be tortured, wrested, and forced, as it were, to say that which they never meant. If he, lastly, consider how almost every one of them endeavouring the defence of the same doctrine is in his own assertions contradicted by himself, which may be in this one controversy concerning Purgatory, a late Article of their faith, most plainly discerned.  
78 These observations may give our Reader such a scantling of their dealing, that we may justly pronounce P. R. his censure upon themselves, Not to be believed hereafter. So desperate hath his demand been, when he required any one overtaken in a triple falsity, as though he would venture all the credit of all the Annotations upon the Remish Testament, all the volumes of Baronius his Annals, all the monuments of Counsels in their Binius and Surius, all the disputes of Bellarmine, of Greg. de Valentia, of Coccius, and all other their late Doctors, upon (as I may so call it) only trey trip, a triple falsity, and then never to be credited again. I am persuaded that no Protestant, who hath been conversant in reading and examining their Authors, but he will stand astonished to hear this grant our Mitigator maketh, as being (as I have said) intolerably disaduantagious unto the Romish part: but he will easily cease to marvel when he perceiveth by whom it is made, to wit, P. R. the Author of the book of Mitigation, who himself is guilty of thrice three palpable falsities, so that none shall hereafter need to wonder why he hath been so lavish in hazarding other men's credits, seeing he is so desperately prodigal of his own. Let us draw near unto him to show this, for he calleth us unto him.   

A Satisfaction unto P. R. his second demand concerning himself, in the discovery of his own not orious falsehoods, enforcing him by virtue of his own promise never hereafter to credit himself.  
§ 17.  
79 P. R. amongst others is bold to insert himself: 
a Pref. to the Reader pa. 28. num. 25.  If any (saith he) hath set down in Print any such falsity, so that it must needs be presumed that he knew the untruth, and yet would set it forth: I will in my conscience greatly discredit that Author, whether it be another or myself, if two or three such falsities may be shown. So he.  
Our Mitigator would seem to have a conscience, and so I doubt not but he hath; but so miserable, as (if it be lawful to judge by probabilities) it were a kind of happiness for him to have no conscience at all. Let our Reader witness between me and him according to the evidence of testimonies which shall be brought against him; most of them shall be so apparent, that any one understanding English may presently discern them. I will not urge him with his own contradiction, who in his preface to his Reader saith, 
b Pref. to the Reader num. 25. pag. 28.  I return to the Treatise of T. M. for more of his name we cannot yet find out. And yet had in his Epistle Dedicatory unto both the Universities, which is set before the Preface, mentioned T. M. in his express name 
c Epist. Ded. num. 5. & num. 25. and again, num. 25. and num. 28.  Thomas Morton, five several times. But this fault were very pardonable, were it not in him who will think no fault pardonable in his adversary: nevertheless I hold it excusable by the virtue of this common Proverb: Cart before the Horse, as we say. I therefore note not this for a falsity, because a lie is only then, when the tongue or pen goeth against the mind and wit of the speaker or writer. But in this contradiction I think rather that P. R. his pen run before his wit, and so will he excuse himself, except he had rather be accounted lyingly witty, than witlessly rash. Other such like stumblings I overpass. I come to note such his falls, as may seem to be recoverable by no excuse.  

One falsehood of P. R.  
80 Let that be first which I 
d See above §. 3. num. 6. 7. 8. etc.  have already mentioned, where peremptorily he affirmed that the Clause of reservation was not by me set down in Latin throughout my whole Treatise against equivocation above once: whereto the Reader may answer for me that it is set down in Latin above twenty times. What excuse can he pretend? ignorance, oversight, negligence? why, the book was present before his eyes, even in those places which he particularly discussed. Could that error be by error of Print, diversity of translation, or difference of Editions? (for these are all the pretences which he will allow) not one of all these (he knoweth) can redeem him from guilt: and therefore I may pronounce against him in his own words: He must needs be presumed to have known the untruth of his assertion, and yet would set it forth. And therefore by this one example may learn hereafter to mistrust himself.   

A Second falsehood.  
81 Where I writ of my Adversary the Moderate Answerer thus: 
e Full satisfaction Epist. to the seduced brethren.  He (say I) wilfully seating himself in the chair of those Doctors, whom the Apostle describeth, saying [They will be Doctors, and yet understand not what they say, nor whereof they affirm.] By which particle, [He,] even the vulgar Reader may understand that I described but one, which was, my Adversary the Moderate Answerer, who used to satisfy objected testimonies, saying: If this be these men's opinions, and never inquired what their opinions were. Therefore I judged him to be a Doctor of that chair signified by the Apostle: where the Doctor faith, he knoweth not what. This my application unto only that one, our P. R. setteth on his own tenters, and stretcheth it unto all, saying, 
f Treatis. Mitigat. Epist. Dedic. num. 23.  But whether this description of fond presumptuous Doctors doth agree unto our Catholic Priests or to Protestants, will appear, etc. And again, Now let us see how he goeth about to prove our Priests such bad Doctors, etc. Which he did to make me seem so presumptuous, as to think all Romish Doctors unlearned, which had been (I confess) an odious presumption. Let them be as greatly learned as they are, or else as they would seem to be, yet must there be a con, I mean an heart zealous of the truth, to be joined with science to make up a perfect conscience, which is the true Doctor indeed: otherwise we know, that 
g Gen. 3. 1.  The Serpent by being the most subtle of all the beasts in the field, will deserve no better commendation, than to be accounted the skilfullest Seducer. Of which kind P. R. will prove himself to be; for what excuse may he now use to free himself from falsehood? Editions? Translations? Prints? here is only one Edition, and that only in English. Will he say, that it was an error of ignorance, oversight, negligence? So might some peradventure judge of it, who do not observe that he is everywhere over-diligent to draw upon me an imputation of arrogancy and malice.   

A Third falsehood.  
82 Where the Moderate Answerer, to prove the doctrine of Protestants rebellious, objected unto me the positions of Goodman, I made this answer, 
h See Full satisfact. Part. 2. chap. 3. pag. 103.  If I should justify Goodman, although your examples might excuse him, my heart should condemn myself. Signifying, that although Goodman were graceless in his conclusions, yet compared with the heinous practices of Romish Priests, might (but as tire and Sydon in respect of Capernaum and Bethsaida, that is, as the less sinner in respect of the greater) be thought excusable. And I added also hereunto these words, Let us leave Goodman as a man who by his false and wicked positions hath falsified his name. Yet P. R. adventureth to say thus; 
i Treatise of Mitig. cap 3. num. 14. pag. 100  He (meaning Tho. Morton) doth particularly justify Goodman. What falsity shall we call this, where an accusation is laid against me for justifying that man, whose positions I call false and wicked; whose person I hold unworthy of the name of a good man; whom, I say, I cannot justify without condemnation of mine own soul? What excuse now shall P. R. make? shall it be edition, print, translation? there is no difference in these kinds. Was it negligence or ignorance? the words are plain and all in English. Wherefore if my speech concerning Goodman be a justification, then may not P. R. be offended to be justified by me in like terms, thus: If I should justify P. R. his accusations, or think that he writ with a good conscience (although the example of some libeling spirit might excuse him in this kind) my heart should condemn myself: and therefore I pass him over as one who is not worthy of any name, except P. R. which may signify Perfidiae Reus, that is, a man guilty of perfidiousness, his positions are so rebellious, and his accusations so false and calumnious. Whereof he will give us many examples.   

A Fourth falsehood.  
83 The Moderate Answerer objected also the examples of Knox and Buchanan as Doctors and Actors of the rebellion in Scotland. My Answer was, that 
k See Full Satisfact. Part. 2. cap. 4. pag. 107.  Their seditious doctrine was condemned in Scotland, noting them to have been worthy of all condemnation. Nevertheless P. R. doth object, that 
l Treatise of Mitig. cap. 3. num. 14. pag. 100  He (meaning Tho. Morton) taketh upon him a justification of all Protestants for rebelling against their Princes in any Country whatsoever, but more particularly some in England, and others as Knox and Buchanan, and the like Ministers in Scotland, turning upside down the States against their Sovereigns. This is no more, than if an Italian objecting unto me that we have thieves in England, and I should answer, It is true we have so: but yet so far is theft from being tolerable in our State, that when thieves are catched, they are forthwith condemned and hanged: and then the Italian should challenge me that in thus answering I justified thieves. The crimination of P. R. is altogether alike, and consequently he must needs be presumed to have known the untruth, and to have objected this for the prejudice of my conscience, to the strangling of his own.   

A fifth falsehood.  
84 In my book of 
m See Full Satisfact. Part. 1. chap. 7. pag. 20.  Satisfaction I had this passage, concerning an objection against some Protestants, answering, Deny Christ's to be God? God forbid! but to be God of God only in a particular sense, this indeed they do. But can you find no more Protestants of this opinion, (to wit, besides M. Willet, and D. Fulke?) Your jesuit reckoneth up Calvin and Beza, and I think he saith truly. I would either he or you did as truly understand them. But yet we wish to hear what your Doctors think of this Protestants opinion: your Campian calleth it monstrous, etc. A little after I added; This doctrine, Doth (in the judgement of your famous Bellarmine) seem Catholical: because they deny not the son to be from the father; but they deny the essence of the Godhead to have any generation. Hence P. R. inferreth and enforceth thus: 
n Treatise Mitig. ca 6. num. 53. & num. 54. pa. 230.  Thomas Morton saith that Bellarmine reckoneth up Caluine and Beza to be of that opinion. And who would not think upon this Assertion of T. M. but that Cardinal Bellarmine were contrary to himself, accusing Caluine, and yet justifying his doctrine? You see how many sleights are used here in deceiving the Reader. As though I had endeavoured to make Bellarmine contrary to himself, when as against the jesuit Campian accusing Calvin and Beza, I opposed Bellarmine the greatest champion among the Jesuits as to be contrary unto the other for defence of Calvin's doctrine: manifesting this difference of Campian and Bellarmine, in these distinct letters r, s, z. Yet this Falsificator to make me seem to have used sleights as falsely herein to make Bellarmine seem contrary to himself, hath with his own nimble sleight confounded the different testimonies of Campian and Bellarmine, who were produced as contrary one to another. What excuse may be admitted in this place? ignorance, negligence? etc. Why P. R. looketh upon the place, and understandeth English: and yet falsely objecteth a sleight of deceiving my hearer, himself by a fine sleight abusing both me and the hearer. The only excuse (I fear) must be that he beheld the place with a squint-eid malice, which can never rightly discern the truth.   

A sixth falsity of P. R.  
85 here P. R. rangeth at large, saying, that 
o 〈◊〉 ●um. 〈◊〉 pag. 113.  Thomas Morton framed a second part of his book for justification of Protest●… yet in effect he confesseth all that his Adversary opposeth. Let P. R. learn what this meaneth, Litera occidit, and then let him come to be tried by my Book, and almost a child may discern that in this one objection he hath given his conscience many a mortal wound. 
Many falsehoods in one.  In effect confessed all that was opposed? What is there almost of all that was opposed by the Mod. Answ. (excepting the examples of Knox, Buchanan, Goodman, Munster, which all I justly condemned) which was not directly confuted? for in the part. 2. of the Full Satisfact. cap. 1. it was proved out of Bellarmine to be the general doctrine of Protestants, that, Spiritual men have no authority to deprive Princes of their kingdoms. In the cap. 5. is set down the express doctrine of Caluine and Beza, condemning all rebellious doctrine. In the chapter 6. are produced two Romish Historians acquitting the Protestants in France from suspicion of rebellion. In the cap. 10. the Moderate Answerer is proved to be impudently false for alleging only dumb Authors to make Luther guilty of the loss of Rhodes and Hungary, which then fell into the paw of the Turk: where I, from their own Historians, did evince that Adrian the Pope was chargeable for that great loss in Christendom, which was without any witness or conjecture objected against Luther by that Moderate Answerer. In the cap. 11. my Adversary would needs accuse Luther to be of the same opinion with Munster, who raised horrible rebellions in Germany, which is so notorious a slander, that their own Doctors (as I have showed) have acquitted Luther, confessing that Luther writ against those turbulent spirits, and taught all Christians to arm themselves against that rebellious crew, and to put them to death. These and many such confutations I used against the Moderate Answerer, convincing him of notorious ignorance and falsehood. And can now P. R. call a Confutation a Confession without a gross abuse of the confidence of his Reader, and his own conscience?   

A Seventh falsity.  
86 In the Full Satisfact. part. 2. chap. 5. the Moderate Answerer did object thus; 
p Full Satisf. part. 2. cap. 5. pag. 107.  Caluine and Beza and the rest of that holy Synod say, that the Kings and Queens, their children, posterity, and all Magistrates must be put to death. And so every Protestant must be more than a Pope. This he delivered without just witness, and this I confuted from the direct and express doctrines of Caluine and Beza. And after a long justification of them concerning their doctrine, at the length in the chap. 7. pag. 119. I concluded thus; We have heard of their opinions, have you any thing to except against their practice? Which question was not made in way of denial, as though my Adversary would not charge Caluine and Beza with any practice of rebellion; but after the manner of art and common speech, by way of Transition, to show more orderly and emphatically what was by the Moderate Answerer objected against their practice, which is set down immediately after. And yet P. R. maketh this one of his instances, and proofs of my fraudulent dealings. here I would charge my Christian Reader in the obligation of truth itself to give him audience, for his clamour is vehement, and his accusation may seem to be important. Thus then P. R. 
q Treatis. Mitig. c. 4. num. 42. pag. 131.  And having said thus, he (Tho. Morton) passeth yet further, adding a second provocation about practice, in these words: We have heard of their opinion (to wit, of Caluine and Beza) have you any thing to except against their practice? And this demand he made, when he knew and had seen his Adversaries many and most grievous accusations against them in that kind, 
Mod. Answ. c. 9  not only for moving that people of Geneva to open rebellion against their Lord and Prince the Bishop, but also the people of France, against their King and Sovereign, citing good authorities for the same, saying: Caluine and Beza armed the Subjects against their Prince of Geneva, and (as Caluive himself, Doctor Suttcliffe, and the Bishop of Canterbury be witnesses) deposed their Sovereign from his Temporal right, and ever after continued in that state of rebellion. They celebrated also a Council, wherein was concluded that K. Francis the Second, than king of France, his wife the Queen, his children, Queen mother, etc. should be destroyed. And his quotations for these things are: Beza lib. de iure Migistrat. Suttcliff. answ. to Suppl. and Survey. Calvin in Epist. Pet. Far. orat. cont. Sect. defence. reg. & relig. etc. All which being seen by our Minister, he demandeth notwithstanding, as you have heard, with this hypocrisy, Have you any thing to except against their practice? as though there were nothing at all not only not to be accused or reprehended in them, but not so much as to be excepted against. And is not this notable dissimulation in a matter so clear and evident? Who can believe this Minister hereafter?  
87 Nay is there any but will rather believe me hereafter when he shall see me abused by so intolerable impudence as I am persuaded he never heard of heretofore? For I am accused to have used that interrogation [Have you any thing to say unto their practice?] in dissimulation, as though I would have concealed my adversaries objection against Calvin and Beza, in pretence that nothing at all were not only not to be accused or reprehended, but not so much as to be excepted against. Whereunto I have only this to answer, that there is nothing in all this objection which hath not been both literally expressed by me, and also particularly confuted. Let us compare the objection as it is repeated by P. R. and see if there be any thing which I have pretermitted. First these words, Calvin and Beza armed Subjects against their Prince of Geneva: these 
r The Full Satisfaction part. 2. cap. 7. pag. 119  I have verbatim expressed, except only that for At Geneva, I have Of Geneva. Can there be any falsehood in the particle Of? In the next words, And as Calvin himself, Doctor Suttcliffe and the Bishop of Canterbury be witnesses, deposed their Sovereign from his temporal right, and ever after continued in that state of rebellion. And this 
s Satisf. part. 2. cap. 7. pag. 119.  hath been by me repeated also verbatim, excepting that for continued, I said continue. And can P. R. suspect any hypocrisy in the letter d? The next, They celebrated a Council, wherein was concluded that K. Francis the Second, the king of France, his wife the Queen, his children, Queen-mother should be destroyed. This objection also hath been set down in these words: 
t Satisf. part. 2. cap. 4. pag. 107  Calvin and Beza and the rest of the holy Synod say that the Kings and Queens of France, their children, posterity and all Magistrates must be put to death, and so every Protestant must be more than a Pope. here is more propounded than this my rigid Adversary hath noted, namely, Every Protestant shall so be a Pope. Shall he fear any ambush in this clause? Lastly the testimonies which are here repeated, 
u Satisf. pag. 119. Beza de iure magist. Suttcliff. Arch. Can. Calvin, And pag. 111. P. Frarer.  were by me particularly both noted, and answered: and most of these P. R. himself (that we may know he was not ignorant hereof) hath particularly discussed. Under what vizard then could he call a perfect manifestation of this objection a dissimulation? or a full answer unto every objected exception a concealment, as though nothing had been reprehended? or a particular repetition and satisfaction to all, an hypocritical dealing, as though there had been nothing objected at all? Sure I am, it had been more for the credit of P. R. if he had played the hypocrite in this taxation, to use some colourable slander, and not to have laid himself so nakedly shameful in this kind, that very boys, by comparing these places, may see his deformity. But O the impotency of malice! it is not unlike unto the blindness of the Sodomites, who after that they had seen Lot's house, yet groped for the door. So P. R. a little after 
x Tract. Mitigat. c. 4. n. 42. pag. 132.  discusseth some of my Answers, to this objection of Practice, and yet now will not acknowledge the beginning.   

An eight falsity of P. R.  
88 To the 
y Satisfaction part. 2. cap. 3. pag. 102.  Moderate Answerer objecting the Commotion of Wyatt in Norfolk, in the days of Q. Mary, which my friend P. R. hath observed, & thereby (to make me one of his incorporation) would conclude me a double Liar. Let us hear him. 
z Treatise Mitig. cap. 4. num. 36. & 37. pag. 128.  To that then of Sir Thomas Wyatt, the Duke of Suffolk, and others, he answereth diversly. First, The History relateth (saith he) the pretence of Sir Th●mas Wyatt thus: A Proclamation against the Queen's marriage, desiring all Englishmen to join for defence of the Realm, etc. Then that in Queen Mary's Oration against Wyatt there is not to be found (saith he) any scruple concerning the cause of Religion. Thirdly, that no Minister of the Gospel was brought in question as a Commotioner in that cause. Lastly, if intent might answer for Protestants accused in that name, then is it plain, that it was not Religion; if for Wyatt and his fellows, it is plain, that it was not against the Queen or State, but for both. So he. In all which different clauses of Answer, consider if any one be in itself true: for as for the first and second, though Wyatt pretendeth in his Proclamation the said marriage with Spain to be the chief cause, yet not alone, but that the Queen and Counsel (saith Fox) would also by this marriage, as he affirmed, bring upon the realm miserable servitude, and establish Popish religion. ¶ And the same Fox relateth Queen Mary's words in her Oration thus: 
Fox anno 1554. pag. 1289.  That the matter of the marriage is but a Spanish cloak (saith she) to cover their pretenced purpose against our religion. So as in these two points the Minister lieth openly, but more in the last, That Wiat's attempt was not against Queen Mary or the State, but for both: For that Q. Marry in the same Oration, as both Fox and Hollinshed do jointly relate, affirmed Wiat's answer to have been to Sir Edward Hastings and Sir Tho. Cornwallis, sent from her unto them, which he also at his arraignment confessed, That he and his would have the governance of her person, the keeping of the Tower, and the placing of her Counsellors.  
89 The first lie he noteth, is in relating of the Oration of Q. Marry, wherein I said there was no scruple concerning Religion: and I cited for witness Hollinshed. This Author (as we may perceive) P. R. hath examined, and could find nothing in him against me for this first point touching Q. mary's Oration: therefore he seeketh other evidence, and bringeth against me the testimony of M. Fox, wherein there is mention of Religion. What therefore? Therefore I am by him condemned for a liar. Nay, but rather by this opposing M. Fox P. R. hath wilily imitated the fraud of a fox, which creature, men say, doth usually pray furthest from home. So likewise P. R. if he would have proved me a liar, should have done it out of Hollinsheds' relation of Q. Mary's Oration, which was the witness whom I produced: but he wanting cause of reproof herein, doth therefore range further to convince me of lying by the testimony which I mentioned not. But whereas this Mitigator hath said, That 
a Treatise Mitig. pag. 92. P. R. confuted by himself.  Advertisement was given him, that this Minister T. M. was Chaplain unto my L. of Canturbury (and upon this Advertisement doth note me for his Grace's Chaplain) when he shall be more certainly informed that the Minister was never Chaplain to his Grace, I would but know whether he will give his Reader leave to call him a Liar, or no. For, if, because he was deceived in his Advertisement, he will be judged a liar, then can not he (a liar) be a fit man to charge another of untruth: if he will avouch his own truth and sincerity, because he reported nothing not whereof by his Aduertiser he had been informed, then am I no liar, who have said no more than whereunto my Author Hollinshed did direct me. So that my Adversary is now chargeable by an argument à paribus, either to acquit me, or else to condemn himself. We may suffer professors of the feats of Legerdemain to delude the beholders, to convey one man's ring into another man's pocket, & then call him a cosener; but for us Divines to play such tricks, as he hath done, changing Hollinshed into M. Fox, and then to tax me for falsehood, is a device inexcusable. His second exception is of no better moment, because even that purpose of Wyatt, To keep the Tower, wanted not the supposed intention, which was, The preservation of the Queen and State: yet so far was it from me to justify any such rebellious action, that I (according to the manner of Schools, using argumento ad hominem) objected this to our Romish Adversaries, only, that they, by accusing of Wyatt, (who professed a good intent) might learn to condemn themselves, whose only ground of Rebellion is pretence of a Catholic intent; the rather, because a good intent destitute of precept and commandment of God, is but (as the Apostle teacheth) 
b Rom. 3. 8.  a damnable good. Wherefore the two lies which P. R. would have bestowed upon me, he by virtue of his place and patent may keep to himself.   

A ninth falsehood of P. R.  
90 A ninth falsehood may be accounted, his peremptory reprehension of our English Translation upon that of Esa. 29. They are blind etc. as dissenting from the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, both in words and sense. In which censure he 
c See above §. 5. num. 15. & 16.  hath been convinced of a gross falsehood in both, by the judgement of his own Doctors.   

A tenth falsity of P. R.  
91 For a tenth take his wilful 
d See above §. 6. num. 17. & 18.  falsehood in pressing one only Edition of Carerius, thereby accusing me of falsehood in corrupting that Author: whereas the Collen Edition hath justified me, and discovered this disposition of P. R. to have been willing that I should rather be condemned rashly than justly acquitted.   

An eleventh and twelfth fraud of P. R.  
92 For an eleventh may be remembered his unjust 
e See above §▪ 7. num. 21.  crimination, in noting me as a notable liar for affirming that, which his own triple instance doth evidently evince. We may 
f See above §. 8. num. 28.  add for a twelfth his objection of the Author Frisingensis; wherein, that he might prove me a Falsificator, he doth himself play four excellent feats of falsehood.   

A thirteenth new and noble falsehood.  
93 I may not deal niggardly with P. R. especially in recounting unto him his own, and therefore to his former dozzen add one other for advantage, yet such an one as whereat most of the former, although otherwise very impudent, may seem to blush. P. R. pleadeth for their mental equivocation, (which I have truly called the Bawd or Broker of their Rebellon) after this manner: 
g Treatise Mitig. cap. 7. num. 8. pag. 279.  The Minister himself (saith he) doth in effect confess here in his second Treatise, that for the space of the last 400 years the doctrine of Equivocation hath been received for true in our Schools, and consequently practised throughout all Christendom etc. And again: 
h Ib. num. 12. pag. 281.  How can a doctrine so ugly and abominable (as T. M. calleth it) be received so generally throughout the Christian world, that is to say, The doctrine of all Schools, Chairs, Universities, Casuists, Lawyers both Canon and Civil, Divines both Scholastical and Positive approving the same? And a little after: Was there none at the first admittance of it to stand for the truth, and reason to the contrary in any Province or State, in any place or time, within the compass of 400 years? And yet again: 
i Ib. num. 15. pag. 284. ●  Seeing it hath been admitted so long time in Christendom, as our Adversaries do confess, and that it hath been received so universally and generally both by Prelates and people; and if it have been so publicly taught by all learned men, and contradicted by none, it ought to be a great argument to discreet men, that it hath some ground of truth.  
It seemeth to me, that P. R. after that by custom of falsifying he had cast himself into such a slumber, that he had little sense of lying; now at length he may be thought to be fallen into a dead sleep, and to have cast away all conscience of truth: as may appear by these so large and lavish assertions. The summary points are two:  
94 The first is in perverting my confession. The Minister himself (saith P. R.) doth in effect confess here in his second Treatise, That for the space of the last 400 years the doctrine of equivocation hath been received for true in Schools, and consequently practised throughout all Christendom, and generally received of all Chairs, Universities, Schools, Divines, Casuists, etc. Is it even so P. R? Can you extract such a general consequent out of the confession of the Minister? Did he ever acknowledge your mental equivocation so universal, as you make it, of all Universities, Schools, Divines, Casuists? Nay did not he 
k Satisf. Part. 3. cap. 12.  confute this your assertion of generality by the express sentence of your own Doctor Genesius Sepulueda? His words are these: 
l Genesius in Theoph. cap. 6.  This manner of aequiuocating is against the authority of most ancient and chief Theologers or Divines (meaning the Schoole-divines) and none before Gabriel (a schoolman ) taught it. Is this to confess a generality? Or, could it be called then universal, when but one man set it first abroach? Other testimonies of Genesius against Equivocating P. R. did seriously examine, and nimbly overskip this.  
95 Again, I never said that all Romish Priests were guilty of this part of perfidious doctrine of mental equivocation: but proved, that not above 400 years since mental Equivocation was heard of even in Romish schools, and that the first that is read of to have defended it was Gabriel Biel a lewd Sophister, after it was entertained by Sylvester and Angelus, and some other few such Glozers, but was not then general among them. We see therefore that P. R. his consequent is from a confession of a few particulars to infer a general conclusion▪ All Divines, All Casuists, etc. The lameness of this consequent I shall make appear by a like example, 
P. R. confuted by a Simile.  thus: Let me affirm with some Historians, that not above an hundred years ago (or thereabout) the Neapolitan disease, commonly called the French pocks, took possession in Christendom, since which time some parties have been miserably afflicted therewith. Upon this Assertion, by the consequent of our Mitigator, it must follow, That since these hundred years have all Cities, Towns, Villages, Schools, People, Priests in Christendom, yea even our Mitigatour himself, become such a kind of Neapolitans. And why may not this example fit? Sure I am, that mental Equivocating, whomsoever it infecteth, is nothing else than a pocke and pestilence in the soul. We leave this falsehood taken from consequent, and seek out a more sensible proof of his palpable falsity than this.   

P. R. his equivocation proved a lie, and himself a Falsifier, by the confessions of three jesuits.  
96 The second falsity is in his plain asseveration, That mental equivocation (for hereupon only we dispute) hath been universally received of all Prelates and People in Christendom, and not contradicted by any. Let us first understand what kind of equivocation P. R. doth defend. 
m Treatise Mitig. cap. 12. num. 3. pag. 484.  Mental equivocation is when any speech hath or may have a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of words themselves, but only by some reservation in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from that sense, which the words that are uttered do bear without that reservation. This kind of equivocation P. R. embraceth, and thereunto he saith, There hath been no one which hath made contradiction.   

The first witness convincing this Mitigation of falsehood is Azorius a learned jesuit.  
97 This Azorius a great Casuist, in his book of Moral Institution, printed at Rome Anno 1600 by licence of his Superiors (as the title signifieth) doth discuss this point of equivocation, and his resolution is, That 
n Meo tamen judicio illi regulam ad plura extendunt, & trahunt, quam par sit, & quam Navarrus, Sylvester, & Angelus volverint. Nihil n. tàm falsum esse potest, quod non queat ab omni mendacio liberari, si aliquid arbitratu nostro mente tacitum retineamus. Possemus enim quicquid à nobis petitur, quamuis id apud nos habeamus, diffiteri nos habere, intelligentes, ut demus: quicquid fecerimus, quicquid viderimus, quicquid cogitaverimus, decreverimus, de eo rogati, possemus absque mendacio dicere, Non fecimus, non vidimus, non cogitavimus, non decrevimus, eo nimirùm sensu, ut tibi dicamus, vel, quod tibi dicere debeamus. Quarè mihi aliud videtur, quod quibusdam regulis subiectis brevitèr perstringam. Az●r. Jes. Insti. Moral. part. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. § Meo tamen. pag. 1335. Romae cum privilegio. Anno 1600. Superiorum permissu.  there is nothing so false (saith he) which may not be freed from a lie if we may keep something secret in our minds, for by this means when any thing is asked of us, we may deny that we have it (although indeed we have it) understanding in our minds [that we may give it.] Whatsoever we have done, seen, thought, or decreed, being demanded thereof, we may by this means answer without a lie that we have not done, nor seen, nor thought, nor decreed, namely, in that sense [that we may tell it unto you.] But I am of another opinion, which I will manifest by certain rules. His fifth rule doth hit the nail on the head, which is this. 
* Quinta regula: Si reverà verba, quibus utimur, significatione suâ & communi hominum usu ambigua non sunt, nec habent nisi unum tantummodò sensum, ea usurpare debemus eo sensu, quem reddunt, nec licet nobis, etiam si contra ius fasque omne interrogemur, aliquid mentis cogitatione concipiendo in aliud detorquere; nunquam enim fas est mentiri: at is mentitur, qui verba alitér accipit, atque ipsa significant. Azor. Jes. quo supra, in fine cap.  The fifth rule: If the words we use are not according to their common signification among men, ambiguous or doubtful, and have only one sense, we ought to use them in that sense which they have in themselves: neither is it lawful for us, although we be examined against right and justice, to detort or turn our speech by our inward conceit of mind, because it is not lawful for us to lie: but he doth lie who understandeth his speeches otherwise than they do signify in themselves. The difference between our Mitigator and this jesuit is no more than this: First, P. R. defendeth an equivocation which is when the speech hath no double sense in the outward words themselves, but only in some secret reservation in the mind of the speaker. But Azorius saith, That we ought not to use any sense of speech which is not in the words themselves, but only in the inward thought of him that speaketh. Secondly, P. R. maintaineth, That his mental reservation is a truth: but Azorius concludeth, That it is a lie. And can there be a greater contradiction than this? How then could our Mitigator affirm, That mental equivocation is defended of Casuists and Doctors, and contradicted by none? Hath he any shadow of excuse by ignorance of the Author and place? No, for he hath 
o Treatise Mitigat. pag. 355. & 420. & 429. & 450.  alleged this Author, upon this question of equivocation, four times; and the place was particularly objected in my Confutation thereof: or else be helped by difference of Translation or Edition? He will not pretend this; therefore can no evasion serve him, except he will answer, That he thought good in citing Authors for defence of equivocation to aequiuocate. Whence any may discern what credit such wretched Aequivocators may deserve.   

A second witness convincing P. R. of falsehood.  
98 When I had 
p Satisf. part. 1. ca 26. in the beginning.  objected against the Romanists that popish Priests (yet not saying that all of them held this opinion) are guilty of this perfidiousness of violating an oath by mental equivocation: my first Adversary, called the Moderate Answerer, that he might a little qualify the hatefulness of that equivocating sect: did tell us that 
q Mod. Answ. cap. 10.  A jesuit famous amongst the Casuists, Emanuel Sà in his Aphorisms writeth of this matter in these words: Quidam dicunt, etc. Some there be who say that he who is not bound to answer unto the intention of the examiner, may answer by reservation of some thing in his own mind, to wit, [that it is not so, viz. that I must tell it unto you] although others do not admit this manner of answering, and peradventure upon better reason than the former. Whereby it is manifest (saith that Moderate Answerer) that all Catholics do not allow of equivocation. Thus far he: confessing hereby that divers Catholic Authors have contradicted this equivocating forgery, which P. R. hath avouched no Catholic writer did ever contradict. Is it possible that my Adversary can free himself from a falsity corroding the conscience? The Edition is but one, the translation is the same, the place was well known, being objected by the Moderate Answerer, whom he hath commended as a learned performer and is furthermore repeated in my book of 
r Part. 1. c. 27. pag. 89.  Satisfaction, which he hath laboured to confute. Say then Sir Mitigatour, will you think this Moderate Answer to be true or no; 
A dilemma.  take heed what you say, you have a Wolf by the ears (according to the proverb) if you hold him, he will bite your hands, if you let him go he will fly in your face. Say therefore: was that answer of your fellow true, wherein it is said, that divers Catholics do not allow of this doctrine of equivocation? Then are you a false Proctor, for this your wilful assertion, to wit, Not one Catholic Doctor doth contradict it. Or will you say that Answer was untrue? then must you be judged a false sycophant, for approving that for A just and Moderate Answer, wherein the Author hath acquitted himself learnedly, and yet do think it to be untrue.   

The third witness convincing P. R. of falsehood.  
99 Maldonat a principal jesuit and Casuist resolveth thus; 
s Maldonat. con. in Luc. ult. vers. 28.  Whosoever doth endeavour by feigning to deceive another, although he intent to signify something else, yet, doubtless, he lieth. This testimony 
t Satisf. part. 3 cap. 4. pa. 59  I used for confutation of this vile art. Which P. R. could not be ignorant of, because 
u Treat. Mitig. ca 14. num. 4. pa. 409. 510.  he endeavoured to satisfy other testimonies, as of Genesius and Sotus. But this Author Maldonat specified in the same place, P. R. (as a weaker Adversary will do his overmatch) did willingly pretermit. But what now will follow of all this? what will P. R. object? Let us but hear what hath been said, and then he shall know what may be said. He claimed an universal approbation of mental Equivocation from the consent of all Universities, Divines and Casuists, etc. no one contradicting that doctrine. He hath also said, that 
x Treat. Mitig. ca 1. num. 38. pag. 74.  A general Proposition is such, that if any one instance may be given to the contrary, the whole is overthrown. Now have I instanced unto his general of All Universities, all Prelates, all Casuists, all people, in three famous jesuists and Casuists, Azorius, Sà, Maldonate, and in the confession of his fellow the Moderate Answerer, acknowledging that divers Catholics do not approve their mental reservation: all from direct testimonies of these Authors certainly known unto this Mitigator. And therefore must conclude, that seeing any one known instance may overthrow a whole general, our Mitigator by these four several known instances is to be accounted a fourfold falsificator. I have exceeded the proportion of our Mitigators demand, who hath required but two or three instances in any, though in himself, of unsatisfiable falsehoods, I have offered him thirteen, as many as I could well bundle up in this brief Preamble, reserving the rest for the exact Encounter, when I doubt not, but upon the discovery of his unconscionable depravations he will wish that his brains had been asleep, when he framed this Mitigation, rather than his fraudulent and malicious disposition should be discovered. Whereof there will be yet more proof in his calumniations following: whereunto I now addressemy Satisfaction in    

An Answer to the Accusations of falsehood, which the Mitigator hath objected to his Adversary Th. Morton, singling out of many, not such which might seem unto me most easily answered: but those which P. R. hath most vehemently pressed and urged, as by his insolent insultations will appear.  
§ 18.  
100 ALthough the discovered calumnious spirit of P. R. might so prejudice the credit of his other taxations, that, in the opinion of any religious Reader, I might seem to be absolved even before I be accused; yet considering that in slander, as in a bodily hurt Etsi vulnus sanetur, cicatrix manet tamen Though the wound be cured, yet the scar doth remain: and that it was no sufficient justification for the one thief upon the Cross to tell his fellow, saying: 
* Luc. 23.  Thou also art in the same condemnation: Therefore do I willingly address my Apology and defence against his calumniations, especially such wherein he insisteth and insulteth most; whereunto I shall give (I hope) such satisfaction, as that not only the wound of slander may be cured, but even also the suspicious scar of imputation may be wiped away.  
The first objected falsification, whereupon he maketh this insultation: It is a malicious lie of the Minister, having neither simplicity nor truth, but of a lost conscience by manifest and malicious calumniations.  
101 P. R. beginneth thus: 
a Treatise Mitig. epist. dedic. num. 18. & 19  He (Tho. Morton) layeth before his Majesty a certain observation about Pope's names, as full fraught with malice and deceitfulness, as the former with vanity: and he layeth the observation upon Polydore Virgil, though citing no place for it. Polydore observeth (saith he) that the Popes a long time in their election had their names changed by Antiphrasis, viz. the elected if he were by natural disposition fearful, was named Leo, if cruel, Clement, if uncivil Vrbanus, if wicked Pius, if covetous Bonifacius, if in all behaviour intolerable, Innocentius. And with this he thinketh to have laid down an observation of importance. But why had he not adjoined also, that if he were careless of his flock, than Gregory must be his name, which importeth a vigilant Pastor? But now let the judicious Reader observe the malice and falsehood of this observation, and thereby judge whether the Author thereof be a Minister of simple truth, or no. Polydore saith only that sometimes Popes as other Princes in like manner have had names that have been different, or rather contrary to their nature and manners, which is an ordinary case, if we examine the signification of men and women's names; but that Pope's names were changed of purpose by Antiphrasis, or contrary speech to cover their defects, as here is set down, this is a malicious lie of the Minister, and hath neither simplicity nor truth in it: for that all these names here mentioned of Leo, Clemens, Vrbanus, Pius, Bonifacius, Innocentius and Gregory were chosen by the Popes that took them for the great reverence and estimation they had of certain excellent men of that name, that went before them, as also for the good abodement of their future government, and to be stirred up the more by the memory of those names to the virtues signified by them: but especially for the honour and imitation of the first Popes that bore those names.  

The Answer.  
102 The first note of falsehood he intimateth to be, because I laid my observation upon Polydore, citing no place for it. Would not his prejudicate Reader now think that I had fraudulently suggested a testimony in the name of Polydore, which cannot be found; and in the guiltiness hereof to have cited no place? But here I make a Noverint universi, to give every Reader to understand, that the sentence which I reported upon my memory is certainly extant in the ancient Editions of Polydore, lib. 4. Invent. ca 10. in these words, Primus honos, etc. which sentence because it doth not a little offend the superstitious Romanists, therefore An. Dom. 1572. by the authority of Pope Pius Quin. it is commanded in these words [
b Ind. Expurg. Belg. pag. 195.  Vsque ad, aliud sibi nomen aptaret, Deleatur] that is, fair and clean to be blotted out. Can then this be aught but a transcendent impudence to blame me for not citing that testimony, which his Pope, lest it should be cited hath utterly razed out? He seeth his Pope pulling out a man's tongue, and then would compel me to look whether I can find it in his mouth: but although they have made Polydore by their Index expurgatorius, almost in every page dumb, not suffering him to bear witness against the pride of Popes, the licentiousness of Monks, the superstitions of their Church, the novelties of their manifold traditions and inventions; yet our ancient Polydore now dwelling amongst Protestants (Printed An. 1570. Basileae) hath a tongue which will tell tales, saying plainly that, 
c Primus honos Romano Pontifici habetur, ut si minùs pulchro honestetur no mine, e●statim creato liceat illud mutare Verbi gratia, non extra iocum dictum sit, Si homo maleficus anteà fortè fuerit, ut Bonifacius appelletur: si timidus, Leo: si rusticus, Vrbanus: si improbus, Innocentus: si ferox, Clemens: si malè audiverit, Benedictus: ut saltem nomine Pontifex ornamento sit dignitati. Eius autem rei auctor fuisse dicitur Sergius secundus, cui cum Os porci diceretur, ad obscoen● nominis vocem tollendan, datum est, ut aliud sibi nomen aptaret. Polyd. lib. 4. de Inu. rerum, c. 10.  This is the first honour which is given unto the Pope of Rome, that if peradventure his name (before election) be somewhat unseemly, he may change it as soon as he is created. As for example, (which may not be spoken without a jest) if peradventure he had been before (his creation) a wicked man, that then he should be called Bonifacius, that is, a good doer: if fearful, than Leo, that is, a Lion: if rustical, then Vrbanus, that is, civil: if ungodly, then Innocentius, that is, innocent: if furious, than Clemens, that is, gentle: if infamous, then Benedictus, that is, a man of a good report, should be his name. The first Author of this change of names (which was Anno 1052.) was Pope Sergius Secundus, whose proper name was Hogsface: who, that he might avoid the ignominy of his own name, was permitted to choose another.  
103 Observe now what I have reported from Polydore, viz. that Pope's names were changed by antiphrase, or contrary speech, to cover their defects. And this is no whit different from the testimony of Polydore, who saith, that If the Pope were before his creation wicked, he did take the name of godly upon him: if rigorous, then gentle, etc. Which kind of alteration of names is not unlike a Gregorian, (as some call it) or artificial cover for a baldhead. Let therefore the judicious Reader judge from what spirit, whether of ignorance or malice, have proceeded these slanderous invectives, calling my true relation malice and falsehood: and again, a malicious lie of the Minister, which hath neither simplicity nor truth in it. It is no rare thing for women of suspected conversation, lest they should be called by their proper names, to miscall honest Matrons first. Peradventure P. R. useth the same art in naming me a Liar. But I had rather interpret his meaning in the best part, to imagine that he might mean by his own open and false detraction to prove me his Adversary, to be A Minister of simple truth.  
A second objection of falsehood, whereupon he insulteth thus: This false Lad setteth down his own fiction: and is not this perfidious dealing? can any excuse him from falsehood and malice in so open treachery?  
104 P. R. groweth yet hotter, and casteth coals about him, thus; 
d Treatise Mitig. ca 2. n. 46. pa. 79.  He (viz. Tho. Morton) hath these words: Pope Adrian being guilty of like seditious practice against the Emperor Henry the Second, was choked with a ●lie. And in his quotation citeth Nauclerus for it, Generatione 139. which should be 39 for that Nauclerus hath nothing near so many generations in that part; and in stead of Henry the Second, he should have said Frederick the First of that name, for that Henry the Second was before the time of our conquest, and almost two hundred years before Adrian the fourth our English Pope, of whom we now speak, who lived in the time of King Stephen and King Henry the Second of England, and was an holy man, and accounted the Apostle of Noruegia for converting the same unto our Christian faith, before he was Pope, and all Authors do write honourably of him▪ and so doth Nauclerus affirm: and therefore though he make mention of such a fable related by Vrspergensis that was a schismatical writer in those days (who also doth not absolutely avouch it, but with this temperament, ut fertur, as the report goeth) yet doth the same Nauclerus reject the same as false, and confuteth it by the testimonies of all other writers, especially of Italy that lived with him, and thereby knew best both his life and death. And yet all this notwithstanding will this false Lad T. M. needs set down this history as true, affirming it for such, and never so much as giving his Reader to understand, that any other denied the same, or that the only Author himself of this fiction doubted thereof. And is not this perfidious dealing? or can any man excuse him from falsehood and malice in this open treachery?   

The Answer.  
105 Not so Sir, both because (as I truly protest) I did not write this out of the Author himself, which I had never seen, but from collection out of some other book: yet in the relation itself there appeareth no shadow of malicious falsehood. First, there could not be malice in misquotation of the Generation, as an 139. for 39 
His Cavil compared.  which neither added nor detracted anything from the matter itself, no more than to say Peter is 10. or an 100 years of age doth convince a man of fraud who intendeth only to prove that Peter is a man. And whosoever shall object error of quotation, he may be quoted for one that is ignorant either what it is to write, or transcribe, or to print; for all these are subject unto misquotations. Now if there be a fault in a piece of cloth, must we necessarily judge that the spinner was to blame?  
Secondly, what skilleth it whether it was Henry an Emperor, or Frederick an Emperor, that was excommunicated by the Pope, when as the intended conclusion was only this, that Adrian the Pope did excommunicate an Emperor, and conspired against him? no more than if, when one should be examined of murder, the accuser should say that the mortal wound was given with the right hand; and the party accused should gainsay it, proving it was done with the left hand; could this difference be of any moment, when the main question is, whether this man committed the murder, or no? in all this there is error (I confess) but yet no falsehood.  
Thirdly, if where one only witness is required, I should say unto N. you told me (I think) that A. did conspire against F. and died miserably. No (quoth N.) I did not: but here is my brother V. that said something to this purpose. In all this we discern only an error in misciting the Author (N) but no falsehood for want of a witness. So here, where V. that is, the Abbot of Vrspurg was ready to say that which N. that is, Nauclerus was unwilling to affirm, concerning the conspiracy of A. that is, the Pope Adrian against F. that is Frederick the Emperor. O but Abbas Vrspurgensis did say only, fertur, that is, It is so reported: and this a man may say of a fable. But I pray you Sir, what is there in Historiographers of after times but only case of report? So that whosoever shall cite any Historian who was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, an eyewitness himself of that which he writeth; doth in citing him confess that he speaketh but upon report: yet even this word [fertur] that is, [It is so said, or, It is reported, or, The same is, etc.] doth not necessarily betoken doubtfulness in him that uttereth it: which your own jesuit 
e Posterior Caietani coniectura, quia Gregor. magnus in homilia de amissa drachma non fuit aufus hos libros B. Dionysijs asserere, & tantum ambiguè loquitur utens voce [fertur:] respondeo sic loqui non quia ipse dubitaverat qui in Graecia eius libros legerat, etc. Del Rio vi●d. Areopa. cap. 6. §. Posterior. pag. 29.  Del Rio would have his Reader to observe in a certain sentence of S. Gregory.  
106 The only colour of just exception he can bring, is this: Because (saith he) Nauclerus rejecteth it to be false, and confuteth it by all writers, especially of Italy. And what then? Notwithstanding will this false Lad T. M. needs set it down as true. If age make diseases desperate, it is better be a lad then (that I may so say) a dad in falsehood; for by how much more any is a father in lying, the more near he is in degree of kindred unto the father of lies, in which line of descent I fear P. R. will appear to be. For Nauclerus endeth his censure thus: Verùm cum multi Itali nullam de hoc mentionem faciunt, etc. hec & alia ambiguum me reddunt quid potius eligendum quidque credendum sit. Scribimus enim res gestas affectu nonnunquam plus quam veritatis amore ducti. He saith not that Italians denied this manner of death, but that they make no mention of it: neither can Nauclerus be said to have confuted that which he left as doubtful, saying, I know not whether part to believe. As for the truth of the story (for this is it which we should contend for) we oppose the Abbot Vrspergensis unto Nauclerus. But it is objected, Vrspergensis was an enemy to the Pope. Well; and it may be answered, that the Monk Nauclerus was a friend to the Pope. And therefore we may know that as the bodily sight may be hindered aswell by hot rheum as by cold, so falleth it out in passions of the mind, that love may beget as blind commendation as hatred may a blind detraction.  
107 But why should it be thought a matter incredible that such a dismal, and as it were disastrous end should befall a Pope? For, I fear, this is the only thing which so greatly offendeth the choleric old man. Wherefore I entreat his patience (if yet there can be patience in so extreme malignity) to understand what his own Doctors have written concerning the death of divers Popes. 
f joan. de turre 〈◊〉. lib. de sum. Eccles. de Anastatic. Idem habet Platina: Supplementum Cronicho. & liber Pontificalis in decret. Anastasi secundi.  Benè legitur Anastasium divino nutu percussum interijsse: that Anastasius was struck with the hand of God and perished. Their last Chronologer Binius, highly privileged, telleth us, that 
g Binius in tom. 3. conc. pag. 1054. anno Dom. 912. Binius quo supra pag. 160.  joannes decimus, quem infamis foemina infami opere in solium Petri intrusit, per impudicam Theodorae filiam ceruiciali suffocatus obijt: that is, Pope john the tenth, whom an infamous woman by a l●wd practice, did thrust into Peter's chair, afterward by the unchaste daughter of Theodora he was choked or strangled with a pillow. Again, of john the twelfth, he citeth one whom he calleth an Adversary to this Pope, reporting 
h The dismal ends of divers Popes.  joannem duodecimum quadam nocte, dum se cum alterius uxore oblectaret, in temporibus à diabolo percussum & inter paucos dies mortuum esse: huius historiae veritatem non controverto: How this Pope one night in the midst of his dalliance with another man's wife was stroke in the head by the Devil and shortly after died. A little after; I do not contend about the truth of this question. What is now wanting but that an example of one Pope be produced, upon whom the vengeance of God seized because of his rebellious opposition against temporal Lords? This 
i Binius cir●. Ann. Domin. 1198. pa. 1441.  Vrbanus Tertius (inquit Abbas Vrspergeniss) quem multi Turbanum appellabant, eò quòd in odium Imperatoris turbaret Ecclesiam, nutu Dei percussus interijt: Pope Urban the third, (saith Abbas Vrspergensis) commonly called Turbane, because in hatred of the Emperor he troubled the Church, was struck by God and perished. So little cause could I have to wound my Adversaries with forged inventions, being thus sufficiently furnished and prepared to confound them with true and plain confessed testimonies.  
A third objection of falsehood, whereupon he thus insulteth: With such we are forced to deal, that have no conscience at all in cozenage.  
108 P. R. doth further charge me thus; 
k Treatise Mitig. ca 2. n. 47. p. 80.  And another like trick he playeth some few pages before this, again citing out of Doctor Bouchiers book De justa abdicatione, these words: Tyrannum occidere honestum est, quod cuivis impunè facere permittitur; quod excommuni consensu dico: and then he Englisheth the same thus: Any man may lawfully murder a tyrant; which I defend, saith he, by common consent. But he that shall read the place in the Author himself shall find that he holdeth the very contrary, to wit, that a private man may not kill a tyrant that is not first judged and declared to be a public enemy by the Commonwealth: and he proveth the same at large: first out of Scriptures, and by the decree of the general Council of Constance: his words be these: Neque verò eo iure quod ad regnum habet nisi per publicum judicium spoliari potest, etc. Neither can a tyrant be deprived of that right which he hath to a kingdom but only by public judgement: yea further also, so long as that right of kingdom remaineth, his person must be held for sacred; whereof ensueth, that no right remaineth to any private man against his life: and albeit any private man should bring forth never so many private injuries done by the said tyrant against him; as that he had whipped him with iron rods, oppressed him, afflicted him, yet in this case must he have patience, according to the admonition of S. Peter 1. 2. That we must be obedient not only unto good & modest lords, but also unto those that be disorderly, & that this is grace when a man for God's cause doth sustain & bear with patience injuries unjustly done unto him, etc. And a little after P. R. thus 
l Mitig. ib. n. 48. pa. 81.  Let the Reader consider the malicious falsehood of this Minister T. M. who in alleging that little sentence before mentioned, about killing of a tyrant, struck out the words of most importance: quem hostem Respub. iudicaverit; whom the commonwealth shall judge for a public enemy: and adding that other clause, which I say by common consent, which is not there to be found. And with such people we are forced to deal, that have no conscience at all in cozenage, etc. So. P. R.   

The Answer.  
110 The Accusation is grievous, viz. Malicious cozenage; the Matter is heinous, viz. Killing of Kings; my Adversary is serious and urgent, saying, Consider etc. and the issue important: which will be either a branding me for a notorious Slanderer, or else my Adversary for a toxical and pestilent Mitigator. In thy examination and censure hereof (Christian Reader) I require only justice. 
m Bouchier lib. 3. de Abdicat. Hen. 3. cap. 16. pag. 267.  Bouchier in the place controverted, doth make a double consideration of a Tyrant; one is, as he doth injury unto any private man [Qui justa potestate ad privatorum iniurias abutitur.] In this case he resolveth, That à privato occidi proptereà non licet: That is, It is not lawful for any private man to kill him. The second consideration of a Tyrant is, as he doth commit any public injury, whether the case concern Religion or the civil State, whereof he doth determine thus: Qui inreligionem ac patriam tyrannidem exerceat, hunc occidere respub. possit etc. That is, The Commonwealth may kill him, who shall tyrannize and injury the religion, and the country: it is so manifest that none can doubt of it, but such as are destitute of common sense: for if the people may arm themselves against any noisome beast, which may endanger the common safety; then much more against such a Tyrant, who is worse than any beast. But who may attempt the execution hereof? It followeth in the place by me formerly alleged: Privato cuivis Tyrannum, quem hostem Resp. iudicaverit, occidere licitum est. That is, It is lawful for every private man to kill him, whom the Commonwealth shall judge to be a Tyrant. We see now that Bouchier hath defended, both that No private man may kill a Tyrant for injury against private men, and also, that Any private man may kill a Tyrant for common injuries.  
111 I have alleged the latter, P. R. hath opposed the former; both of us have affirmed a truth: where then is the falsehood? This must be imputed to him who reporteth a truth, but not truly, that is, to a false purpose: whereof our Reader may easily judge: for I have objected the testimony of Bouchier, affirming, that in the case of common injuries, whether in matter of Religion or State, every private man is licenced to kill a Tyrant: and Bouchiers words avouch no less. P. R. opposeth the other negative testimony of Bouchier, denying, that in private injuries any private man may murder a Tyrant: and doth he thereby convince me of falsehood? Nay rather doth he not seek to injury me with falsehood? For my whole Treatise of Discovery intendeth only the public, and never meddleth with private occasions.  
112 This will be plain by example. The common rule of humanity teacheth, that the Father, being but an Esquire, may in private convents and meetings have place above his son, though a Knight; but in places of public resort, the Knight, 
P. R. confuted by a Simile.  though a son, is preferred before his Father. here be two considerations of the son and the father; the one is in respect of private, the other in regard of public occasions. This Assertion of civility standing thus: Suppose my first Adversary the Moderate Answerer should aver that T. M. saith that any son, being a Knight, may take place of his father, being but an Esquire: then my second Adversary P. R. hearing this, should oppose and say, It is false which thou allegest, for T. M. saith the contrary, viz. That any Father, being an Esquire, may privately take place of his son, though he be a Knight. Can this his taxation of falsehood be thought true? It is not altogether impertinent? For the assertions of T. M. were two: the first, That any such son must be preferred in public: the second, That any such father must be preferred in private. And are these contrary? Are they not both true? And can one truth shoulder out another? The falsehood therefore resteth in the Pleader, who said, That the allegation was false.  
We read in the Gospel this command of our Saviour: 
n Matth 23 2.  The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chair: whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do: but after their works do not, etc. Here we hear us charged To do, and Not to do as the Pharisees. And are these contrary? No: for the [Do] is a commanding to follow their godly doctrine; the [Do not] is a forbidding to imitate their ungodly life.  
113 A second crime is in adding (as he saith) of this clause [Which I say by common consent.] Look in the Cha. 15. where the ground of this Position is laid, That it is lawful to kill a Tyrant, he affirmeth it, saying, Mirum est quam magnum affirmando consen●um habeat. That is, It is marvelous what a great consent this hath. Then come to the 16. Chap. upon the point now in question, he hath said, He that denieth this, is destitute of common sense. If therefore marvelous consent according to common sense may be thought more than equivalent unto a common consent, then is my Adversary unconscionably contentious to accuse me, as saying too much, where I had warrant to have said more.  
114 It may be, that the striking out of the words of importance Whom the Commonwealth shall judge to be a public enemy] may somewhat prejudice my conscience. None can imagine this, but he that is not acquainted with the Author, 
o In publicis notorij●que criminibus tanto alitèr id fieri debet, quanto damnata ea per se publico praeconio, ac naturae sensu esse solent, ut August. de Cain & Abel, Euidentia criminis non eget clamore accusationis. Si latrones, si bestiae, cum irruu●t, omni iure expugnantur, cur non tyramnus quovis latrone & bestiâ deterior? Duplex poenae genus, positivae unum, privativae alterum: quaepositiva est, formulam expectare debet; in privativa certè alitèr se res habet, quod pertecto scelere, vele troth nonum judicium vim habere inter Theologos confessam sit. Then cap. 3. Praeveniri iudic um Ecclesiae posse specialis probatio, ut Deut. 13. Statim interficies, ac sit primùm manus tua supra eum, ut Phinees scortum, Num. 25. ari epto pugione consodit. Sic Mattathias se gessit adversus Israëlitam idololatram, 1. Machab. 2. Tales alij Israëlitis liberatores Othoniel, Aiod, Barach. And a little after would prove this out of the Council of Lateran, out of the Decree of Pop. Gelasius. And in the former Chap. Ecclesiae judicium non est, nisi celebri illo Apostolicae fedis theatro, nec reipnisi in plenis & liberis comitijs esse potest. In the end of the Chapter after Chap. 5. Expectandi judicij causas omnes in Henrico praeclusas esse. After in Chap. 23. Frater jacobus Clemens, non ita pridem Sacerdos factus— post celebratum Missae sacrificium Henricum cultello, ut Aeglonem Moabitem alter Aiod im● etiam fortitèr in abdomine traijcit. Nihil iam ut fit quod judithae Holophernen, aut Davidis Goliathum obtruncantis, aut Samsonis maxiliâ Asini mill viros inter ficientis historias admiremur, quia maiora his vidimus, & clamore meritò debeamus, Dextra Domini fecit virtutem, etc. Thus much Bouchier.  who spendeth a whole Chapter in proving this Position; Praevenire judicum urgente negotio posse. That is, That the case may be so urgent, that the public judgement (against such a public tyrant) need not be expected, because where the crime is notorious, it is sufficiently condemned without further judgement: for if thieves and beasts (saith he) when they suddenly assault us, may be resisted without judicial proceeding; then much more a tyrant, who is worse than any beast. And this doctrine he assumeth to prove necessary both in case Temporal, when the King doth injury the Country, and in Ecclesiastical transgression, when he offendeth publicly against Religion: particularly instancing in Henry 3. King of France, who was murdered by jacob Clemens a Friar, before any public judgement of the Kingdom, which he ascribeth to a Parliament, or else of the Church, which he attributeth to the Pope's Consistory. And yet he magnifieth the murderer (a private man) and extolleth him above those who are recorded in holy Writ, not upon their private spirit, but by divine inspiration to have accomplished noble attempts. here, here is matter indeed, whereby to decipher my Adversary to be no better than a painted Sepulchre, who is outwardly gaily adorned with the titles of Moderation and Mitigation: but inwardly (by holding Boucheirs doctrine) full of dead men's bones, I mean the dead bodies of Protestants: But how dead? Even (as S. Hierome speaketh in the like case) Voto occidunt, cum gladio nequ●ant. That is, They wish them to be killed, whom they can not kill as they wish. But this I reserve unto my Encounter. I proceed to the next.  
A fourth Objection of falsehood, wherein he insulteth thus: This testimony is egregiously abused, etc.  
115 
p Treatise Mitig. cap. 2. num. 26. pag. 68  His fourth and last place is out of M. William Reinolds in his book De justa Reip. auctoritate, etc. whom he abuseth egregiously, both in ascribing to him that which is not his, and in delivering the same corruptedly: and by a little you may learn much, Ex ungue leonem His words he citeth thus: Rex humana creatura est, quia ab hominibus constituta: and Englisheth in this manner: A King is but a creature of man's creation. Where you see first, that in the translation he addeth [but] and [man's creation] of himself: for that the Latin hath no such but, nor creation, but constitution. Secondly, these words are not the words of M. Reinolds, but only cited by him out of S. Peter. And thirdly, they are alleged here by T. M. to a quite contrary sense from the whole discourse and meaning of the Author, which was to exalt and magnify the authority of Princes, as descending from God; and not to debase the same, as he is calumniated. For proof hereof whosoever will look upon the book and place itself, before mentioned, shall find that M. Reinolds purpose therein is to prove, That albeit earthly principality, power and authority, be called by the Apostle, humana creatura: yet that it is originally from God, and by his commandment to be obeyed. His words are these: Hinc enim est, etc. Hence it is, that albeit the Apostle do call all earthly principality a human creature, for that it is placed in certain men (from the beginning) by suffrages of the people, yet election of Princes doth flow from the law of nature, which God created; and from the use of reason, which God powered into man, and which is a little beam of divine light drawn from that infinite brightness of Almighty God: therefore doth the Apostle S. Paul pronounce, That there is no power but from God, and that he which resisteth this power, resisteth God himself. So M. Reinolds.   

The Answer.  
116 This Allegation is, of all which yet I have found, most obnoxious and alliable unto taxation; which (God knoweth that I lie not) I received from suggestion, as the Author thereof R. C. can witness. For at that time I had not that Rosaeus, aliâs Reinolds, neither by that present importunity of occasions could seek after him: which, I confess, is greatly exorbitant: for I received it as a testimony debasing the authority of Kings: Upon which presumption (if true) it could be no falsehood in me to insert the particle But, especially being acquainted with the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, who, that he may disable the authority of a King in comparison of the dignity of a Pope, doth defend, That Kings, being chosen by men, are not immediately created by God: and yet, The Pope, elected by Cardinals, hath his authority immediately from God. What is this else, but in a certain degree to distinguish the creation of a King and creation of a Pope, the one as man's immediate creature, the other as Gods? And may it not be lawful for any thus to repeat this comparison of Bellarmine, saying thus: Kings (after the doctrine of Bellarmine) have their authority immediately But from man, and that the Pope hath his immediately from God? Is the Interjection But in this repetition like a thief by the way to seduce and rob, and is not rather as a true man to direct thee?  
117 Let P. R. imagine, 
P. R. reproved by a Simile.  that a boy in any of their Colleges should be so refractory, as knowing himself to descend from gentry, he should deny obedience to his Superior, because he thinketh him but of base parentage: the boy is brought before P. R. his Accuser allegeth, That he had gloried in his own gentility, and said that his Superior was But basely borne. Will he think the accusation is false, because of the addition of But? No verily, but is by it made more plain & true, which is general in all speeches of abasement: the But is (as I may so say) a Butt which hath infixed in it the mark and scope of the whole speech. Thus much for my addition But.  
118 Furthermore, this I dare adventure to say in behalf of my Suggestor, That though that place alleged do not agree unto the collection, yet the scope of that Chapter and the next following doth imply as much, proving that a King may be deposed by the people. Which doctrine he there applieth unto our English State, and by name to our late Sovereign Q. Elizabeth: which indeed is to account a King nought else but an human creature.  
119 I know that P. R. may possibly insist, That he cited the text of S. Peter, 1. Pet. 2. who calleth a King or Governor constituted by man, Humanam creaturam, An human creature. And then how could these words be reprehensible in M. R. which are warrantable by S. Peter? We must understand, That the same speech may differ from itself by the divers intention of the speakers. The faithful Disciples of our Saviour did often salute Christ with Hail Master: we read also of the malicious jews saying likewise Hail Master: but the Disciples in reverence, the jews to scorn him. Look to the words, here is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothing can be more the same; look to the sense and intention it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothing can be more repugnant. Simon Peter maketh this confession of Christ: 
q Matth. 16.  Thou art Christ the Son of the living God. The Devil likewise maketh this confession of Christ, 
r Marc. 5. 7.  Thou art the Son of the Most High. The same confession in the sense of words, but not in the intention of the speakers: for Peter confessed, that he might confirm others in the faith; and the Devil did it, that he being privileged to preach, might seduce men from the truth. And so it might have been presumed, that M. Reinolds used S. Peter's words, but not in S. Peter's sense; which was to dignify such an human creature, as to teach the orderer man in all temporal condition [subditi estote] to be subject: but in his own sense which followeth in the next Chapter, to abase that human ordinance, teaching Subjects to depose their Princes. What is the difference? The general scope of S. Peter is subjection, the aim of M. Reinolds is rebellion. This is hereby most plain, because S. Peter writ his sentence in the days of Nero a most cruel and savage Tyrant, and notwithstanding doth not incite Christian people or others to betake themselves unto arms to depose Nero. But M. Reinolds holdeth it to be 
s Reinolds in his Rosaeo. cap. 2. pag. 62. speaking of such Tyrants not as are invaders of a country, but those who have been justly possessed of their Kingdoms.  naturam generosiorem,. i. a more generous & noble disposition, to kill Tyrants. Amongst whom he recounteth for England, K. 
t Pag 135. Traitorous doctrine.  Henry the Eight. By all which it may appear, that though not the place alleged, yet the scope of his whole book doth convince him of rebellious doctrine: as will more largely appear in the Encounter. In the interim, let every Christian learn, that that Governor whom S. Peter calleth a creature of man, S. Paul calleth 
u Rom. 13. Apostolical doctrine of subjection.  the ordinance of God: and both of them, after that Kings be once established by consent of the Commonwealth, do require in all temporal causes an unviolable subjection unto them without violent resistance, teaching that they are more than man's creatures, because he that resisteth them resisteth the ordinance of God.  
The fifth objection of falsehood, whereupon he insulteth thus: Consider, I pray you, how may frauds and falsehoods there be in one little quotation.  
120 P. R. preferreth another indictment against me, thus; 
a Treatise Mitig. cap. 2. num 49. pag. 82.  But will you hear a case or two more out of the Canon law, how dexterous Sir Thomas▪ is in corrupting that which he loveth not, nor seemeth well to understand. You may read in the 4. page of this his pamphlet (the Discovery) an ancient decree (for so he calleth it) alleged by him out of Gratian in the gloss, determining that though a man have sworn to pay money to one that is excommunicated, yet is he not bound to pay the same, and he allegeth the Latin text thus: Si iuravi me soluturum alicui pecuniam, qui excommunicatur, non teneor ei solvere: If I have sworn to pay money to any man that is excommunicated, I am not bound to pay it, adding this reason: Quia qualiter cunque possumus, debemus vexare malos, ut cessent a malo: We ought to vex evil men by what means so ever we may, to the end they may cease from doing evil. In the allegation of which little text, a man would hardly believe how many false tricks there be, to make Catholic doctrine to seem odious and absurd. For first, these words not being found in any text of law or decision of any Pope or Council, but only in the gloss or Commentary, they make not any ancient or modern decree, as the Minister falsely avoucheth, but rather show the opinion of him who writeth the Commentary: if his words were, as here they are alleged. The causes. First, the words of the gloss contain only an objection in these words: What if I have sworn to pay money to any person, or have promised the same under some forfeiture, and in the mean space he, to whom I made the promise, be excommunicated, am I bound to pay the same, or not? This is his question, and then he argueth it on both sides: but his resolution is in these words, I do believe the truer opinion to be, that albeit he that is so excommunicated, do lose the right to demand his money, yet is the other bound to pay it him. And for this he citeth divers laws and reasons. So here our Minister not of ignorance, but of falsehood taketh the objection for the resolution. The second deceit is wilful leaving out of the first words of the Author, Sed quid dices si iuravi? which plainly show an objection. Thirdly he allegeth, Quia qualitercunque etc. for a reason of the resolution, which is made against that reason. Fourthly the true resolution of the Commentator is utterly concealed, and the contrary determination put down for an ancient decree. Consider, I pray you, how many frauds and falsehoods there be in one little quotation.   

The Answer.  
121 My Adversary P. R. may satisfy himself for me, who a little after concerning this same allegation of this Author hath said that 
b Mitig. pa. 84. num. 52. , It may seem to import that he (T. M.) scarce read the books themselves, but cited the same out of some other man's notes. here, we see, in his vehement crimination of malicious falsehood, he hath inserted a charitable and true divination of my integrity. I am glad to see in the mingling of a pound of wormwood, and ten ounces of gall, he had the grace to let fall this dram of sugar, and that so seasonably: For the truth is that I took up these allegations of Gratian upon credit, and therefore return these pieces unto him, of whom I received them: who is to prove them currant, and to satisfy for himself.  
122 Thus then he: 
c M. Stock, a learned Preacher in London answereth for himself.  This allegation, with some others, I Ric. St. brought unto the Author of the Discovery, which P. R. challengeth to be maliciously cited, partly for that the words of the gloss were only set down, when the decree is mentioned: wherein I conceive P. R. complaineth no otherwise, than one, who being smitten with the scabbard, should complain that he was not struck with the sword: So he, because T. M. talked of the decree, and urged only the gloss. For the decree is far more plain against them than the gloss, Nos sanctorum praedestinatorum statuta tenentes, eos, qui excommunicatis fidelitate aut Sacramento constricti sunt, apostolica authoritate à juramento absoluimus: & nè sibi fidelitatem obseruent, omnibus modis prohibemus, quousque ipsi ad satisfactionem veniant. This is the decree, which in the general carrieth as much or more, as is set down by him, and so cleareth him from any malice in this point. Besides, in the very gloss itself, (though it was not so fully brought to his hand) is set down not by way of objection, but of a resolute conclusion. For after the objection and answer the conclusion is: Probabiliter dici potest, quòd excommunicato non sit soluendum, cum nemo debeat participare cum eo. Yea and further, that in this he was not led by malice, is proved thus: because he left out another more weighty allegation which was delivered him with this, namely, out of Greg. Decret. lib. 5. Tit. c. 16. Absolutos se noverint à debito fidelitatis, dominij, & totius obsequij, quicunque lapsus manifest in haeresin aliquo pacto quacunque firmitate vallato tenebantur astricti. Now the gloss particularly and expressly for the present purpose hath it thus: Ergo si sub poena aliquis tenetur solvere certa die, & non soluat, non incidit in poenam: & eodem modo si per juramentum, quod & verum est argumentum quòd Papa potest absoluere laicum à juramento fidelitatis, quoniam ad ipsum spectat interpretatio juramenti: in illa autem obligatione & juramento tacitè subintelligitur, si talis permanserit, cui communicare liceat. Which decree and Gloss doth a great deal more strongly smell of that impiety, teaching that a man is not bound in such a case to pay his debt: and yielding to the Pope a power of absolving men from such like obligations. Thus far R. S.  
123 By which Answer of R. S. we may perceive that the tenor of the Pope's Canon in the outward letter doth deny the payment of debts: and the gloss itself concludeth a probability of non payment, which being applied by Romish Priests unto Protestants in the name of Excommunicats, it is but an hazard whether Protestants (except it be by the vigour of law) shall recover their debts. Which I proved in the next testimony out of their Cardinal Tollet, expounding the form Canon. I proved that their ordinary Tenet is in that case, 
d Non tenentur reddere rem verbis contractam. Card. Tollet lib 1. Instruct. Sacerd. ca 13. § Sextus in his last edition. An undoubted argument of the authors sincerity.  Not to pay any debt, which consisteth only in promise. Wherein my Reader may discern an argument of my sincerity, because I would not allege the Canons in their generality of not paying any debt, though it might have made my Aduersays more odious; but chose rather the Comment. of Tollet, in the restraint and limitation for not paying debt of only promise. This my entire, and in a manner partial dealing in behalf of my Adversaries, P. R. could not be ignorant of, and yet spared not to spot me with his common note of maliciousness. There followeth▪  
A sixth objection of falsehood, with this insultation: Let the judicious Reader consider how many false tricks and corruptions this crafty Minister hath used.  
124. P. R. hath another Article against me, thus; 
e Mitig. cap. ●. num. 52▪ 53. 54. 55▪ 56. 57 pag. 84.  In the sixth page of his Discovery he hath this grievous accusation out of the C●●on law against us. Haeretici●●ly 〈…〉 dicuntur, sed in 〈◊〉 legem, 〈…〉 super eos, ut ●und●● fanguinem ipsorum. And then he quoteth thus: apud Grat. gloss. in decret. li●●. 〈◊〉 ex De●re●. Gregor. 9 caus. 22. q. & cap. Legi. Which destructed kind of quotation; separating the first and last words, that should have 〈◊〉 together, 〈◊〉 to import that he 〈…〉 the book as themselves, but 〈◊〉 the same out of so●e other 〈…〉; but that fault were easily pardoned, if he used no greater fraud in the thing itself. For first he Englisheth the words in th●●● manner: Heretics may not be termed either 〈◊〉, or kindred, but according to the old law, thy hand must be against them to spill their blood. And then in the margi● h●● setteth down this special printed note. The professed bloody massacre against the Protestants, without distinction of ●ixe or kindred. And what can be more 〈◊〉 urged than this? Now then let us see how many false tricks and shifts fit for a Protestant Minister, do lie lurking in this short citation. First this gloss or Commentary of the Canon law, is upon a Canon beginning. Si quis, which Canon is taken out of the third Council of Carthage, etc. Secondly, he hath left out the beginning of the gloss. Thirdly, he addeth these words, ut fundas sanguinem, which the gloss hath not. And now let the judicious Reader consider how many corruptions this crafty Minister hath used to bring forth to his purpose this one little distracted text for proof of professed bloody massacres intended by us against Protestants. Wherein lastly he perverteth the very words of God himself in the Law, by translating, us fundas fanguinem ipsorum, spill their blood, instead of, slied their blood: as though God were a blood-spill●●, or 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 to be unjustly done by others. By this one (of 〈◊〉 but one) you 〈…〉 etc. Thus far P. R.   

The Answer.  
125 To the allegation of this place of Gratiam, R. S. doth owe you an answer, which he hath performed in these words: 
f M. Stock.  This second place also I brought (saith he) unto T. M. the whole being no otherwise distractedly quoted, than the gloss, whence I had it, warranted by me: So that of P. R. reprove me, he must chocke his glossary: for when the gloss had set down the first part, he quoted for the latter, causa 23. q. 8. cap. legi, meaning in the decrees where it is, Sit manus tua super eos, ut fundas sanguinem ipsorum.  
126 So hath he satisfied for his allegation. It remaineth that I likewise justify both my collection and translation. For the first, I would demand of P. R. if, Romish ones applying this Canon of Murdering their kindred, etc. against Protestants, when the Pope shall judicially denounce them Heretics, whether it may be called a massacre, or no? I have now my Mitigator upon a Logic ●acke, either he must say that it is no bloody massacre, 
A dilemma.  but Catholic justice: and then what shall his Reader think upon his Mitigation otherwise than a judas his lips in betraying his Master? If he shall hold it an execrable mischief, then how shall he justify the application of this canon, when the Pope shall extend it against Protestants? He cannot answer directly, but he must manifest himself either a Traitor to his Country, or a prevaricator to his cause.  
127 His other censure is upon my interpretation, Vt fundas sanguinem, to spill their blood, in stead (saith he) of shed their blood. Why so? because otherwise, (the man may seem to have some pious and religious devotion in him) God should be said to be a blood-spiller. And must it therefore be rather translated, shed? why, so God should be said to be a blood-shedder. I marvel what new Dictionary (for he is altogether verbal) P. R. doth follow. I hope that so profound a Clerk will not want a reason of his subtlety: let us hear him. To spill blood (saith he) doth signify an unjust deed. Is this it? as though shedding of blood might not likewise signify an unjust deed. Let him consult with their own Remish translation, Rom. 3. 15. Their feet (viz. of the wicked) are swift to shed blood. And Act. 22. 20. When the blood of the Martyr Stephen was shed. And Apoc. 16. 6. They have shed the blood of the Saints, therefore hast thou given them blood to drink. And Luc. 11. 50. That the blood of the Prophets shed from the beginning of the world may be required of this generation. 
P. R. his babish foolery.  Will P. R. have the face to say, that the blood of the Martyr Stephen, and of the Prophets by the jews, or of the blood of Saints by the Heathen was shed justly? Again, the Rhemists Mark. 2. 22. No man putteth new wine into old bottles, otherwise; the wine breaketh the bottles, and the wine will be shed. This is spoken of the wine, which being shed perisheth. So is it vulgarly used, [drink is spilled, and drink is shed.] Now than what a notable Critic have I met withal, whom every goodwife is able to convince of idle dottage? But this is a man privileged to send me to the University to make a Syllogism, whom I may more justly send unto an Alehouse to learn English.  
128 The last point, which is observable in our Mitigator, is, that he affirmeth this Canon to have been decreed in the 3. Council of Carthage, 
g Read Surius upon that Council. tom. 1. Conc.  where no such thing can be found. Therefore must his own terms of falsehood, fraud, treachery, reuerberate upon himself. And yet again we may consider how zealous P. R. is in authorizing that Canon, and in urging the text of Scripture, saying, If thy brother; or friend, or wife will go about to destroy the truth, let thy hand be upon him. To what end must all this be, but that Protestants, being in their opinion heretics, may have all the penalties which are awarded against heretics executed upon them (as Bouchier and others defend) before, or at least (as P. R. holdeth) after denunciation of sentence? And consequently Protestant's may be, by these Romishones, without exception of sex, or kindred, or friendship, as it was by execution in the cruel Massacre in 
h See Thuanus hist. lib. 52.  France, and by intention in the Powder-treason, utterly consumed at once. Which being performed, the 
* This I shall prove in the Encounter out of Bouchier.  Conspiracy shall be called an holy League the Actor a zealous Ahod, the Act a Sacrifice. All which proceedeth from a false and perfidious application both of the Scripture, and of the Canon. For the law of Deuteronomy mentioneth such transgressions, Who shall entice thee, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, nor thy fathers before thee. And the Canon was directed only against such heretics, who did ruinate the foundation of Christian faith. But Protestants are so far from idolatry, that for fear thereof, they have (in the days of Q. Marie) yielded their bodies to the fire; so far from heresy, that they are ready to seal every fundamental Article of faith with their blood.  
A seventh objection of falsehood, wherein he insulteth, saying: Seeing he hath corrupted a text of Scripture, you may think what liberty he will take afterward throughout his whole book.  
129 I 
i See above §. 5. pag. 12.  have already answered unto this calumniation, showing, that both the English text, the Latin Commentaries, the Hebrew Original, and the confession of their own Doctor do free me from all suspicion of corruption: wherein our Reader may imagine, whether P. R. by objecting the Hebrew text, hath not deserved the title of an êbrition.  
An eighth objection of falsehood, wherein he insulteth in this manner: Thus much for his variety of corruptions in this little sentence.  
130 P. R. pretermitting (as his manner is) such points wherein he saw the Romish Arguments most forcibly confuted, insisteth only upon such, wherein he thinketh his ability will serve to make some sensible resistance. Therefore he saith: 
k Treatise Mitig. cha. 5. num. 43. pag. 174. Extr●●. come. de may. & obed. § unam Sanctam.  To the end you may see his Talon (in deducing proofs out of Romish Writers) we shall examine only the third Reason in this place, which he declareth in these words: Except, saith the Romish pretence, there were a way of deposing Apostata Princes', God had not provided sufficiently for his Church. And for this he citeth the Constitution extravagant of Pope Bonifacius, and saith, This objection is in your extravagants, and so it may be called, because it rangeth extra, that is, without the bonds of God's ordinance, etc. But as in all his other citations generally he is never lightly true and sincere in all points, no not thrice (I think verily) throughout all this lying book of his, so neither here: and it would require a great volume alone to examine only some part of his leaves about this point of his shifts and corruptions, they are so many and thick, and craftily huddled up together. As for example here: First, this sentence is not in the Pope's Extravagant at all, but only in a certain addition to the ordinary Gloss or Commentary of Io. Picard, which addition was made by Petrus Bertrandus a late Writer. Secondly, this Comment saith nothing of deposing of Apostata Princes, but only affirming the foresaid opinion of Canonists to be true, That Christ was Lord absolutely in this life over all, not only in spiritual authority, but in temporal also: he inferreth thereby, That Christ should not have sufficiently provided for the government of his Church and Kingdom upon earth, 
Addit. ad Com. Extra. de Ma●. in c. 1. ad finem.  Nisi unicum post setalem Vicarium reliquisset, qui haec omnia posset: except he had left some such one Substitute or Vicar after him, as should be able to perform all these things, to wit, as belong both to spiritual and temporal power, according as necessity shall require. Which latter clause you see that T. M. hath cut off, as he added the other of Apostata Princes. And thus much for his variety of corruptions in this little sentence. Now to the thing itself. So far P. R.   

The Answer.  
131 If I had not purposed to set down little sentences, I am sure my Adversary his sentences and censures could not have been so great: where brevity (which I thought would be most grateful to any judicious Reader) is inverted upon me by a calumnious Adversary as most prejudicial to my cause. First, for citing the Extravagants of the Pope, whereby an ingenuous Reader would have understood a figure Synecdoche, where the part is put for the whole; as when we say, This man shall not come under my roof; meaning by roof, which is but a part of the house, the whole house itself: So here by Extravagant might have been meant the whole body of these Constitutions, which contain both Extravagants and Glosses: which is herein, found to be most consonant, because Pope 
l Gregor. 13. ad futuram rei memoriam. Reliquum est ut eiusdem Decreti unà cum Annotationibus praedictis tàm absque Glossis, quam ipsum totum cum Glossis, Sextumque & Clementinas simul & extravagantes à dilecto filies S. F. recognoscenda omnia & approbanda &c. imprimi & impressa diwlgari iusse●imus, ac ad maiorem Christi fidelium ubique commo●antium commoditatem, hoc 〈◊〉 Canonici corpus fideliter & incorrup●● 〈◊〉 exemplar Rom●● 〈◊〉, imprimi possit. Nos opportunè providere volentes, ut hoc ius Canonicum sic expurgatum ad omnes ubique Christi fideles sartum tectum perveniat, ac ne cuiquam liceat e●dem operi quicquam addere, vel immutare, aut invertere, nullauè interpretamenta adiungere, etc.  Gregory 13. hath ratified the foresaid Gloss and Annotations with privilege and authority equivalent and answerable to the authority of the Decretat● and Extravagants themselves. If, hearing one of P. R. his scholars make a Syllogism, like that which P. R. himself framed, which hath neither mood not figure, & this likewise had been approved by him, some should presently say to the boy, Sirrah, this is P. R. his Syllogism; I do not think that P. R. would call him a liar.  
132 To the second P. R. might have answered for me, That the words, Apostata Princes, were not my Addition, but the objections of my Adversary the Moderate Answerer, as may appear by P. R. his own relation. And when I said, That the same objection was in the extravagants, I could not think that any Adversary ever could have been either by reason of ignorance so sottish, or by malice so perverse, as to exact, that the objection be found in the place 〈…〉 for so there should be no end of cavilling, but be contented to find it in the true sense: which sense even this my Accuser doth plainly acknowledge, laying (as we have heard) this same Extravagant as the ground of God's providence in the Pope (his supposed Vicar of Christ) by whose power spiritual and temporal, any Prince, extirpating Christian religion, may be removed: which is no more than I said was contained in the Extravagants. But such is the malignity of this Mitigator, that he will not allow in his Adversary, which he practiseth 
m Treatise Mitig. ca 2. n. 55. pag. 86.  himself: and not he only, but even the known canons of his Popes are guilty (if it be a guilt) of the same, citing the text of Deut. ●3. 6. 〈◊〉: If thy brother, or friend, or wife go about to depra●● 〈…〉 thy hand be upon him▪ Whereas the text is, If they entice thee saying, 
P. R. his accusation redounding upon his Popes.  let us go serve strange Gods, etc. But these words, Deprave the truth, etc. are not to be found; yet because they contain the true sense I should think it impiety either in another or in myself, to note (as he doth me) his Canons, and consequently his Popes of lying shifts and corruptions.  
133 The last shift he findeth fault with, is for cutting off the clause, Nisi unicum. What needed any addition of that which was sufficiently expressed in my adversaries objection, and by me acknowledged to be contained in the Extravagants, as we have heard? If there be any shift in my citation, I must confess it thus: viz. the not adding these words of that gloss, jesus de iure naturali in Imperatorem, & quascunque alios depositionis sententiam ferre potuisset, & damnationis, & quascunque alias, etc. & eadem ratione vicarius eius potest. That is, As jesus by his natural right might enter into judgement, and pronounce sentence of deposing an Emperor, or any other person: So may (meaning the Pope) Christ's vicar also. This is the Popish gloss, and the ground of those Romish & rebellious positions, which I did discover, and which proveth our Mitigatour an excellent shifter, who saith that here was nothing said of deposing Apostata Princes', 
A fond cavil.  to the end his Reader might conceive my Answer to have been altogether impertinent. But I pray you P. R. can Apostata Princes be excepted, where All Princes and Emperonrs are included? But I will not urge against myself the former omission of the foresaid sentence of the gloss. I know P. R. will too easily pardon me this fault.  
A ninth objection of falsehood, therein insulting thus: A witting and a manifest lie, and cozenage. His Latin words were perfidiously alleged.  
134 P. R. objecteth thus: 
n Treatise Mitig. cap. 6. num. 55. pag. 231.  He (Thomas Morton) allegeth the words of Bellarmine thus: Dum rem ipsam excutio, non facilè audeo pronunciare illos in errore fuisse, While I do examine well the thing itself, I dare not presume to pronounce them to have been in error, to wit, Calvin and Beza; whereas Bellarmine's words are, Dum rem ipsam excutio, & calvini sententias diligenter considero, non facilè audeo pronuntiare illum in hoc errore fuisse. While I examine the matter itself, and diligently consider Caluins opinions, I do not easily presume to pronounce him to have been in this error: to wit, in the particular error or heresy of the Autotheans, set down and confuted by ●●enebrard, and in his sense condemned expressly by the ancient Catholic Church, for denying Christ to be and to have his essence from the Father: but yet though in some sense it seemeth to Bellarmine, that Calvin may be excused in this private and particular meaning of his, yet not absolutely, as T. M. would have his Reader to think, by striking out cunningly the particle hoc (this error) and leaving the word Error in common, as though Bellarmine had excused him from all kind of error, which is most false, for that presently after he both impugneth of purpose, and confuteth by many arguments his manner of speech as heretical in this behalf. And again. So is his cozenage herein in striking out hoc out of Bellarmine's words: so, for the same purpose he turneth illum into illos: which he could not do but wittingly and of purpose, and yet the man forsooth will not equivocate for the world, and yet will he lie for much less, as you see. Thus P. R.   

The Answer.  
135 He would not wittingly lie for all the world, who would not for all the world equivocate, lest he might he, as I fear he doth, who calleth this lapse of words [Errore and illos] a perfidious cozenage. For if I had been of so devilish a disposition as to seek to cozen my Reader, then sure (according to the malice of the Devil, who seeketh whom he may devour, that is, to devour all) I should not have left that Latin sentence untranslated, but would have Englished it, that by the Latin and English as by a double net my cozenage might have been, for the number of the seduced, far more successful: which considerations, I hope, may free me from wilful falsehood.  
136 That there is also no falsehood at all, the matter itself will show. For our dispute was only concerning this one suspected error of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which many Jesuits and others, condemned as a Paradox, a blasphemy, an atheism: against whom I opposed Bellarmine to acquit Calvin ab errore, that is, 
A stupid cavil.  from error, (which is all one as if I had said This error) which is the proper and only matter in question. Let P. R. procure a suspected fellow to be arraigned at the bar, whom the judge knoweth to be a drunkard, a profane swearer, and a person adulterous: but the indictment preferred against him is only concerning felony: the witnesses are brought forth all circumstances are examined: in the end the judge perceiving the presumptions to be frivolous, shall give this judgement, saying, Now that I have heard the matter examined, I find no fault in the man. By and by P. R. shall stand up, saying, O judge thou knowest him to be a drunkard, a blasphemer and a lewd liver, and canst thou find no fault with him? thou shouldest have said, I find not this fault of felony in him; and therefore thou hast delivered a perfidious and a cozening sentence. Again, when our Saviour Christ said to his Disciples, 
o Matt. 26. 42.  Pray, etc. for the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak; would the Divinity of P. R. correct the speech, and say, though it be spoken of mankind, yet it is too generally delivered, because there is a flesh of beasts, and a spirit of Devils: and therefore should be more expressly set down, This kind of flesh, and this kind of spirit? P. R. sitteth at his table, and when he seeth two sorts of bread, fine manchet, and courser; and expressing that he desireth rather the meaner kind, should say to one of his servitors a Sophister, Sirrah, give me the courses bread: would he (for want of mentioning This bread no the Table) allow his Sophister to run into the stable, and bring him an horse loaf? Would he not rather whip him, for his insolency, if he would not; or for his folly, if he could not perceive that when a man speaketh of This kind of bread, which is before his face, it is all one as if he had said, of this bread? Such is my case, concerning which (as I profess) I could not be so absurdly subtle, as willingly to conceal hoc, so am I persuaded, that no adversary (I only except P. R.) could be so perversely gross, as to exact a particle Hoc, i. This, knowing that the matter in question was particularly de hoc e●none, of this only error.  
137 Although this last taxation be very idle, 
Another frivolous cavil.  yet this second is (if I may so say) more frivolous, illos for illum, that is, them in steed of him. If Bellarmine justify Calvin for this opinion of Autotheos', doth he not likewise therein justify all other Protestants, which are of the same opinion? For if I condemn P. R. for a graceless Sophister, because of his defence of mental equivocation, do I not therein condemn all others, who are professed Aequivocators? This is true, will P. R. say, yet the Author's word illum, should not have been changed into illos. This Adversary, we see, is rigorous, I will appeal therefore unto another Adversary, whom I find more ingenuous, even Bellarmine himself; who in the place alleged, after that he had said of Calvin, I dare not say that he was in this error doth in the same Chapter justify Beza also, and more expressly Simlerus, another Protestant, saying, Non video cur haec sententia Catholica dicenda non sit, that is, I see no cause why this sentence should not be thought Catholical: justifying not only illum, that is, Calvin, but also Beza and Simlerus, which will make illos, even in that opinion, which Campian, the Rhemists, their Genebrard, and others have calumniously and wickedly called a Paradox, an Heresy, a Blasphemy, an Atheism. Such is the blindness of their malice, which (God willing) I shall show more fully in the Encounter.  
A tenth objection of falsehood, with this insultation: Is not this rather falsehood than folly? where is his naked innocency? where is his upright conscience? where is his simplicity in Christ jesus?  
138 The matter is only for changing a title of the book of Carerius, and altering the word verò into verè: but trifles (saith P. R.) yet such as bewray a guilty mind and meaning. But I have 
p See above §. 6. pag. 1●.  showed evidently, that I neither altered the title, nor the text, so that P. R. standeth chargeable to his Reader to satisfy for his own mind and meaning, which must have been either giddily rash, or gracelesly false.  
An eleventh objection of falsehood, with this insultation: How can this malicious cavilling Minister expect to be trusted hereafter? or how may any think, that he writeth from his conscience, seeing him use such gross shifts and falsehoods in so important a matter?  
139 I 
q See above §. 7. pag. 22. num. 23. 24. 25. etc.  have discussed this objection already: the point is concerning the testimony of Doleman, because it was not cited in the very literal words, although (as I have manifestly evinced) it was delivered according to the real and demonstrative sense. And if such accusations might prevail, than might P. R. (but I hope he will not be so blasphemous) accuse the divine Oracles of God, 
An impious cavil.  the holy Scriptures, where the Apostles citing the testimonies of the old Testament, do not commonly allege the words, but the sense: As Ephes. 5. 14. Wherefore he saith, Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light. The words [He saith] signify God speaking in Scripture, yet not by manifestation of words, but by collection and comprehension of sense. There be many such like places, as Heb. 1. 1. Heb. 3. 5. Act. 10. 43. Nay himself and their own Popish Canon (as 
r See a little before in this §. num. 132.  hath been shown) have alleged the text of Deuteronomie, but not according to express words, although not disagreeable from the true sense. And may Popes thus presume in alleging of God's truth, and may not man make as bold with man's testimony, so that still there be no depravation of the true sense?  
A twelfth objection of falsehood, whereupon he thus insulteth: Consider how falsely and calumniously this makebate doth reason: will he not be ashamed to see himself condemned of so great overlashing?  
140 The question is about the hindrance of the due succession of a Protestant prince unto his crown: This P. R. endeavoured to condemn by a triple instance, and 
s See above §. 7. pag. 19 num. 21, etc.  hath himself been confuted both by his own Doctors, and also by a triple instance taken from himself.  
A thirteenth objection of falsehood, with this spiteful insultation: He allegeth Frisingensis quite contrary to his own meaning. Is this the assurance of his upright conscience, whereof he braggeth so much?  
141 In this cavil about the testimony of Frisingensis P. R. hath played four treacherous parts, that he might (though falsely) convince me of one: as hath been already 
t See above §. 8.  proved. Yet in this, together with that which followeth, he triumpheth more than of any taxation he hath in the whole book.  
A fourteenth and most rigorous objection of falsehood, with this insultation: It is a fraud and impudency, or rather impudent impiety, a slanderous objection, shameless dealing. Will ever any man credit T. M. hereafter?  
142 I am ready to hear this grand crimination of P. R. who beginneth thus: 
u Treat. Mitig. ca 6. num 37. pag. 215.  But the next fraud or impudency, or rather impudent impiety, is that which ensueth within four lines after, in these words: Pope Gregory the seventh (saith your Chronologer) was excommunicate of the Bishops of Italy, for that he had defamed the Apostolic See by Simony, and other capital crimes. And then citeth for proof hereof, Lambertus Scaffnaburg. Anno 1077. As if this our Chronographer had related this as a thing of truth, or that it were approved by him, and not rather a slanderous objection cast out by his Adversaries that followed the part of Henry the Emperor. Let any man read the place and year here cited, and if he be a modest man he will blush at such shameless dealing. For that no Author of that time doth more earnestly defend the cause and virtuous life of Pope Hildebrand, 
La. S●aff. hist Germ. ann. 1077. sub fin.  than this man, whose words are: Sed apud omnes sanum aliquid sapientes luce clarius constabat falsa esse quae dicebantur: Nam & Papa tàm eximiè támque Apostolicè vitam instituebat, etc. But with all men of sound wisdom it was more clear than the Sun, that the things which were spoken against Pope Hildebrand were false, for that th' Pope did lead an excellent and Apostolic life, as the sublimity of his conversation did admit no least spot of wicked rumour against him, he li●ing in that great city and open concourse of men, it could not have been hidden, if he had committed any unlawful thing in his life: and moreover the signs and miracles, which by his prayers were oftentimes done, and his most fervent zeal for God in defence of Ecclesiastical laws did sufficiently defend him against the poisoned tongues of his detractors. And again: Hildebrandi constantia & invictus adversus avaritiam animus omnia excludebat argumenta humanae fallaciae: The constancy of Pope Hildebrand and his invincible mind against the corruption of avarice, did exclude all arguments of human fallacy and deceit. So Lambertus. And now let the reader consider with what conscience and fidelity T. M. hath cited him for condemnation of Pope Hildebrand. He relateth indeed what certain noblemen, captains, and others, that came with the Emperor to the castle of Canusium, and would not have had him made peace with the Pope in that place, said in their rage afterwards, for that against their counsel he had submitted himself unto the said Pope: and when a certain Bishop named Eppo was sent to their camp by the Pope and Emperor to inform them of the agreement and submission made; 
Lamb. vbi●sup.  Fremere omnes (saith this story) & insanire, verbis & manibus coeperunt, Apostolicae legationi irrisorijs exclamationibus obstrepere, convicia & maledicta turpissima quaecunque furor suggessisset, irrogare. All of them began to fret and wax fierce both in words and casting their hands, and with scornful outcries to contradict this holy Apostolical legation sent unto them, and to cast upon the Pope all the most foul reproaches and maledictions that fury could suggest unto them. Thus saith Lambertus, and setteth down the particular slanderous reproaches here cited by T. M. which he approveth not, but condemneth, as you have heard, and highly commendeth not only the virtue but also the sanctity of the Pope. And will ever any man credit T. M. any more in any thing that he allegeth, when this consciencelesse falsification is once discovered in him? yea though it were but once throughout his whole book, it were sufficient to prove that he dealeth not out of any faith or conscience at all. If an enemy would discredit both Christ, and Christian religion, and say, your own Evangelists do recount foul things against him (as here this Minister saith our Historiographer doth of Pope Gregory) and namely that he was accused by the Scribes and Pharisees for casting out Devils by the power of Beelzebub, for deceiving the people, for denying tribute to be paid to Caesar, for moving sedition, and other like crimes, which our Evangelists do recount indeed, but do condemn them as false and calumnious; were not this as good and as faithful a manner of reasoning, as this other of Thomas Morton out of Lambertus and Frisingensis against Pope Hildebrand, who is by them both most highly commended as you heard, and his adversaries condemned? Truly if any man can show me out of all the Catholic writers that be extant, English or other, that ever any of them used this shameful fraud in writing, where no excuse can free them from malicious and witting falsehood, then will I grant that this is not proper to the Protestant spirit alone. Hitherto I must confess that I never found it in any, and if I should, though it were but once, I should hold it for a sufficient argument not to believe him ever after. And this shall suffice for a taste only of M. Mortons' manner of proceeding, for that to prosecute all particulars would require a whole volume, and by this few you may guess at the man's vein and spirit in writing. Hitherto P. R.   

The Answer.  
143 Thou seest (Christian Reader) I have had patience to hear my indictment delivered unto the full, and suffered my Adversary without any interruption to say so much in this accusation, as that by this time he may seem to have run himself out of breath. For what could either the dexterity of Art, or the violence of passion force more, then to note his Adversary of so shameless falsehood, as to be without comparison maliciously fraudulent, and utterly unworthy to be credited ever any more in any thing that he allegeth? Now therefore I turn myself unto thee (good Reader) as to my judge, who may seem by this time to exact of me an Answer; and of whom I must desire and expect a just censure. Vouchsafe therefore (I pray thee) an intentive examination, and I dare presume thou wilt acknowledge this Accusation to be both so false and foolish, and unfortunate to his cause, and indeed blasphemous, as though he had studied to be either faithless, or fond, or unlucky, or impious.   

I. The falsity of this crimination.  
144 In the beginning I am charged with impudent impiety for citing Lambert Scaffnaburg to affirm that The Bishops of Italy did excommunicate Pope Gregory for capital crimes. But why is this impudence? As if (saith P. R.) this our Chronographer had related this as a thing of truth, or that it were approved of him, and not rather as a slanderous objection cast out by his Adversaries that followed the part of Henry the Emperor, etc. The point now in question is, whether this Author Lambertus Scaffnaburg did think that those Bishops of Italy had condemned this Pope Gregory (for whether they did it justly or unjustly is the second question) for such crimes or no; I have affirmed that Lambertus Scaffnaburg was of this opinion: but P. R. denieth it, calling my assertion an impudent impiety. Let us be judged by the evidence of the Author himself: who in the place alleged hath these words: Postquamper Italiam fama percrebuisset, etc. After that the fame was spread abroad throughout Italy, that K. Henry had set his foot in their coasts; [certatim omnes Italiae Episcopi, etc.] All the Bishops of Italy did flock by troops unto him, receiving him with all honour worthy the magnificence of such a person, and within a few days after an army of an infinite multitude was gathered unto him: for from the first time that he was King, they longed for his coming into Italy, because at this time Italy was pestered with thievery. And what else? It followeth a little after. Besides, they (viz. the Bishops and people) did congratulate his coming, because it was reported that he came with a resolute courage to depose (Gregory) the Pope. here we see it granted by Lambert that All the Bishops of Italy were desirous to have this Pope Gregory deposed. But after all this the Emperor goeth to Rome, seeketh absolution of the Pope, returneth back again, and the Bishop Eppo is sent after to signify to the Italians this submission to the Pope. What now? Now followeth the testimony which was alleged: Qui cum causam Italis exposuisset, etc. When Eppo had told his message to the Italians, all of them began to rage and fret, etc. casting upon the Pope all opprobrious reproaches, whom all the Bishops of Italy had before justly excommunicated, because by Simony he had defiled the sea Apostolic. Could this Chronologer but acknowledge that the Pope had been excommunicated by the Bishops of Italy, who (as he confessed in the beginning) did rejoice at the coming of the Emperor, because he came with a resolution to depose the Pope? Which is a thing so notoriously known, that never Author did deny it: Insomuch that Bimus their last and best authorized Compiler of the Counsels, an Author wholly devoted to that Sea of Rome, confesseth that 
x Binius tom. 3. Conc. pag. 1281.  Anno 1076. (viz. the year before this happened, which hath been related out of Lambert) In the Council of Papia, a city in Italy, the Bishops gathered themselves together, and excommunicated the Pope. Although he call that Council, Conciliabulum, and the Bishops Schismaticos, Schismatics, as peradventure Lambert also did esteem them; yet this truth is acknowledged of all, that The Bishops of Italy did excommunicate this Pope. Which is all that either hath, or needed to have been said. And could this deserve so rigorous a censure of impudent impiety, and whatsoever bitterness the gall of this man could vent out? I proceed to the second point, which is   

II. The foolishness of his Accusation.  
145 That being granted, which never any Historian did deny, that The Bishops of Italy did excommunicate Gregory, aliâs Hildebrand, and sought by the power of the Emperor Henry to have him deposed: the sottishness of the second objection will bewray itself at the first hearing, to wit, The Author Lambertus condemneth such proceedings against the Pope, and highly commendeth not only the virtue, but also the sanctity of the Pope: And therefore will any man credit T. M. any more? Yes, I hope, any who shall rightly discern the reason of my allegation. For my proof, taken from the testimony of this Lambertus, consisteth not in his censure of commending, or of discommending the proceedings of the Italian Bishops against the Pope, but in the judgement of those Italian Bishops, who all (as Lambertus confesseth) wished that that Pope might be deposed. A collection used of all men in the citing of all Chronologers, knowing that the proper office of an Historian is to be a witness of things done, and not a judge. For if any favourite of my Mitigator should report, saying thus, That P. R. (I do but suppose this) was expelled out of a College of Oxford by the Fellows, who did censure him for some misdemeanour; but yet I think (saith his favourite) that the Fellows did him wrong: For I have heard him to have been accounted by others of very commendable conversation. Then presently some by-stander should make bold to give out that the Fellows of a College in Oxford did so censure P. R. and name his Author; could any say that he had abused that testimony, because he gave more credit to the wisdom of those Fellows who expelled him, than to the contrary conjecture of the reporter? Shall that by-stander be therefore thought ever after unworthy of all credit?  
146 Whosoever of his faction shall read the late Catholic Apology (as it is entitled) out of Protestant writers, he will wish P. R. had been a newly professed Pythagorean, to whom a five years silence had been enjoined: for Protestant Authors are there cited, as confessing (but how truly we are not here to dispute) that some Fathers 400. years after Christ have held some Romish positions: notwithstanding the same Protestant Authors do condemn those positions as utterly superstitious. In which allegations the Apologists are contented to receive from Protestants a confession of so much antiquity of some Romish Doctrine; and yet oftentimes do not acknowledge or regard the judgement of the cited Authors in condemning such opinions. Will now P. R. permit us to answer these Apologists after his example, saying, o impudent impiety, and malicious falsehood! Will you cite Protestants for confessing such Doctrines as ancient, which they condemn to have been superstitious? I would wish P. R. to call his five wits into one Senate, and after due deliberation to shape me an answer▪ I fear he will be driven to a non plus: For either must he teach us to confute their Apologists, and to note them to have been fraudulent disputers; or else confess himself to have played the part of an idle, impudent, and an intolerable accuser.   

III. The unfortunatenesse of this his declamatory calumniation.  
147 P. R. will not have his Reader to count otherwise of this Pope Gregory, alias Hildebrand, than of a man commendable, not only for virtue, but also for sanctity: as if he had said, not only for a good man, but also for a godly: wherein it may be that P. R. hath been not only not acute, but also absurd: For as easily may godliness be separated from goodness, as sanctity from any perfect virtue. But to the matter. As it is written, Oportet haereses esse, there must be heresies, so is it implied that there must be contradictions, but to this end, that the truth may be victorious; which I hope will be verified in this present example of Pope Gregory, who may be unto us (if we believe the Romish historians) a mirror of all impiety.  
First, Cardinal Benno living in his time, set forth his life, and writeth that 
y Benno hist. de vita Greg.  He entered into the Popedom by force: that he suborned a man to murder the Emperor, when he was at divine service: that he cast the Eucharist into the fire: that he was a Necromancer; and a contemner of religion.  
Secondly, the Abbot Vrspergensis writeth, 
z Vrsperg. an. 1080.  That he was an usurper of the sea of Rome, not appointed by God, but intruded by fraud and money; a disturber of the Empire; a subverter of the Church.  
Thirdly, Sigebertus Gimblacensis, a Monk, writeth that 
a Sigeb An. 1074. & anno 1085.  Hildebrand troubled the States of Christendom; raised up the Saxons against their liege Prince; discharged subjects from their oath of fidelity; and caused Rodulph the Duke of Burgundy to proclaim himself Emperor. After reporting from a writing found after his death in exile thus; We give you to wit who have the care of souls, that Pope Hildebrand, alias Gregory, being at the point of death, called unto him one of the Cardinals, whom he did specially affect, confessing to him that he had greatly offended God and his Church in the abuse of his pastoral charge, and by the persuasion of the Devil raised hatred and wrath against mankind. If three witnesses be not sufficient against a Pope, of whom one is a Monk, an other an Abbot, the third a Cardinal, let us further understand that  
Fourthly, Severinus Binius in his new editions of the Counsels, 
b Binius conc. tom. 3. pag. 1281. and pag. 1191. Although he call them not Concilia but Conciliabula.  confesseth that the Bishops in a Council At Worms, Anno 1076. declared that Gregory was to be deposed: And that The Council at Papia Anno 1076. did excommunicate him: And that The Council of Bishops at Brixia did depose him: the Acts of which Council, as they are recited by Vrspergensis, show these causes; 
c See a little before out of the testimony of Vrsper. lit. z.  Because he was an usurper of the Sea, etc. And The Council at Mentz Anno 1085. declared him to be justly deposed. Thus we see that P. R. by denying one Council of Bishops of Italy in Papia to have opposed themselves against this Gregory, hath, contrary to his desire, gained with that one of Papia three other Counsels, one of Brixia, another of Worms, the last of Mentz. So unlucky hath he been (to use his own Simile) in a lost game to see the last man borne. I must yield him therefore the privilege of a loser, which is to fret, and rage, and rail, and to call me malicious. The matter were less heinous in him to have been only slanderous against man, if he were not also, in a sort, blasphemous against the Gospel of Christ.   

FOUR His blasphemy.  
148 If any man (saith he) would discredit both Christ and Christian Religion, and say our Evangelists did recount foul things against him (as here this Minister saith our Historiographer doth of Pope Gregory) and namely that he was accused of the Scribes and Phariseiss for casting out Devils by the power of Belzebub, for deceiving the people, for moving sedition, etc. and the like crimes, which our Evangelists do recount indeed, but do condemn them also as false and calumnious: were not this as good a manner of reasoning as this of Tho. Mortons' out of Lambertus against Pope Hildebrand, who is by them so highly commended, as you have heard, and his adversaries condemned? Thus P. R. Thomas Morton will tell you that your manner of reasoning is not so good. For suppose that T. M. in his reasoning had been guilty of some error, yet this your comparison cannot be free from blasphemy; the consequence whereof is this: It is like impiety in T. M. in citing the witness of Lambert, concerning the opposition of the Bishops of Italy, which Lambert condemned; and to give more credit unto them condemning the Pope, than unto Lambert condemning those Bishops: As it is for a man reading the Gospel, where it is recorded that the Scribes and Phariseiss opposed themselves against Christ, to believe rather those Scribes and Phariseiss, condemning Christ, than to give credit unto the Evangelists, condemning the Phariseiss. Whosoever shall exactly examine the Analogy of this comparison, must needs acknowledge it to be in a manner blasphemous. For either must Christ the son of God be compared with Pope Gregory, a sinful man, and (as some judge) the man of sin, as though it were a like impudency to say that Gregory, a sinner, might no more justly be condemned of the Italian Bishops, than Christ, who was righteousness itself, of the Scribes and Phariseiss, which in the school of Christianity must necessarily be judged a blasphemy. Or else the likeness consisteth in the comparison of the reporters, matching the holy Evangelists and their Monks Frisingensis and Lambertus together, to think it no less impiety not to believe rather these two Monks condemning the Italian Bishops (who they say were adversaries to the Pope) than those Bishops, though condemned by the Monks; than it is not to believe rather the Evangelists condemning the Scribes and Phariseiss (who were enemies unto Christ) than the same Scribes and Phariseiss, though condemned by the Evangelists. But to compare in like belief the holy Evangelists who were Calami Spiritus sancti (as S. Hierome calleth them) that is, The pens of the holy Ghost, and could not err, and the reports of superstitious Monks, who, almost, could not but err, is an inference altogether impious.  
146 But if P. R. (as I hope he will) wish his consequent to be rather proved ridiculous than so sacrilegious, then let him understand the dissimilitude and unlikeness of his comparison. For first the judgement of those Historiographers, Frisingensis and Lambertus, two Monks, in condemning those Italian Bishops is different from the judgement of Sigebert a Monk, of Vrspergensis an Abbot, of Benno a Cardinal: but the evangelical Historiographers do all of them fully consent together; therefore he not acknowledging the Evangelists condemnation of the Scribes and pharisees, and that Lambertus his condemnation of the Italian Bishops, are nothing alike.  
Secondly the pharisees were of different profession unto the Evangelists, the Italian Bishops were of the same religion with the objected Historians: therefore to credit the pharisees against the Evangelists, and to credit Bishops against Monks, cannot be proportionable, But why do I trouble myself with these my adversaries madling conceits? I hasten, for conclusion to    

A challenge against P. R. the Mitigator.  
§ 19  
150 THe challenge which P. R. hath made is peremptory; uz. 
d Treat. of Mitig. 1. cap. 3. num. 4. pag. 92.  The Reply of T. M. is full of words, without substance: of flourish, without truth: of fraud without real dealing. But what if this vaunt be but the wind of a swollen bladder, the fancy of an idle brain, the Rhetoric of a voluble and lavish tongue, whereby T. M. is calumniously traduced? what amends will P. R. make? 
e Treat. Mitiga. cap. 3. num. 3. pag. 92.  If I prove not (saith P. R.) that T. M. hath dealt fraudulently against his conscience, by multiplicity of examples, let me be thought to have done him injury. This is an excellent and Priestly discharge, he will exact of his injurious Adversaries, I doubt not, a satisfaction real; or if not that, yet a verbal confession: or at least the contrition of the heart. But you see what amends I may expect from his fatherhood, viz. when he hath injuried me, he will be content to be thought to have done me an injury; hereby affording me only the comfort to think, that being injuried, I may be thought to be injuried. This man when he hath offended, is like to prove a devout penitent, who is lame of his hands, not yielding any real satisfaction; dumb in speech, not making any confession; yea and even, in a manner, dead also without all sense of sin by contrition, not so much as thinking upon the fault himself, will only be content by others to be thought to have done an injury. By this profession P. R. may defraud a whole College by false accounts, and discharge himself, saying; My Masters, be it known unto you, I may be lawfully thought to have deceived you. Is this a Catholic Mitigation?  
151 As for the integrity of my conscience, I do avow, that if I have not in the jealousy of mine infirmity done that, which no one (to my knowledge) hath done this many ages, to wit, reviewed some of mine own books, and examined them, not as an Author, but as a censurer, discovering such my escapes, as I could at any time find, and publishing them in print with open Animadversions, to the end that mine own correction might be my Readers direction:  
If I have not earnestly desired, and, by the law of Love, challenged of my friends strict justice, in nothing such depravations, as might any where occur, and (lest they should suspect their reprehensions to become less acceptable unto me) if I have not professed it to be my greatest offence, not to be in that manner offended: If I have been ever so perversely obstinate, as not willing to be reform by any Adversary:  
Again, although I cannot but choose to be struck rather of a friend who woundeth, that he may heal, than of an enemy who intendeth only to hurt; a friendly animadversion being as an antidote, which is a reprehending of me, lest that I might be reprehensible: & the taxation of an enemy being as a toxicum calunniously poisoning whatsoever deserved good: yet, if I have ever been so wickedly perverse, as not, (whensoever justly) to be willingly reproved by any Adversary, turning, as venom into treacle, his deformation into reformation:  
If in my ordinary course of life any can charge me with a bent to this vice of falsifying, although it were for hope of whatsoever advantage: Then (not to add, If it be not almost impossible for any man citing four or five hundred testimonies, as factors in their accounts, by chance to err in some particulars, without note of fraud or cozenage) then, I say, I will confess myself worthy of all the criminations of frauds, tricks, deceits, cozenages, and whatsoever opprobrious imputations P. R. either hath or can fasten upon me.  
152 Concerning the disposition of my Adversary. If he be not manifested to have so behaved himself in terms so despitefully malignant, as if the capital letters of his name P. R. did justly betoken Princeps Rabularum:  
If not so dotingly vain in ostentation of his own wit and learning, as if P. R. did truly signify Phormio Romanista:  
If not in defence of his cause, in both the questions of Rebellion and equivocation, so dissolute, as if P. R. might be worthily interpreted Praevaricator Rasus:  
If not in his criminations & objections of falsifications so unconscionably and impudently unjust, as if P. R. might certainly deserve the interpretation of Perfidiae Reus; as partly in this Preamble, and more in the Encounter may be observed: Then will I assume all his odious attributes, as proper unto myself:  
153 Lastly, for the cause. If I do not avouch the discovery of Romish positions and practices of Rebellion to be just:  
If I prove not the Treatise of Mitig. to be like an Apothecary's box of poison, with the outward inscription of Antidote:  
If I manifest not his specious and glozing reasons for defence of their Mental equivocation, to be no better than the apples of Sodom, which vanish into ashes at the first touch:  
If, last, I show not that the chiefest advantage of Romish Adversaries, doth consist in falsifications; all which this Preamble hath but touched, and the Encounter (God willing) must handle: Then let my Treatises be purged with fire, and myself challenged to a recantation. But these things being, by God's grace, directly performed, the fruit thereof will be (Christian Reader) to establish thee both in truth of speech, and dutiful allegiance, and to put my Adversary P. R. (I hope) unto silence, I pray God, to repentance.  
Gloria Deo.