A TREATISE of the Nature of God.  
By T. Morton.  
Psal. 18. 11.  
He hath made darkness his secret place.  
LONDON Printed by Tho. Creed for Robert Dexter, dwelling in Paul's Churchyard, at the sign of the Brazen Serpent. 1599   

TO THE READER.  
Hereiss (good Reader) a little Treatise of a great Argument, in the which (if ever in any) that may be seen, which doth daily come to pass, that the Book itself doth nothing less than perform that which the title doth promise and pretend: as we see and find often that the countenances of men do make a fair show of many singular virtues and excellent parts, which in trial are not to be found in any part either of their souls or bodies. How then (may any and will some man say) do you of purpose go about to deceive us with glozing titles, which have under them no substance of matter? or were you yourselves deceived in taking in hand that which you were not able to accomplish? Surely whatsoever we were, he having the truth plainly told him, and the fault revealed, need not now be deceived unless he will himself, and then volenti non fit iniuria: but for our parts we did enterprise this conference, not in hope of sounding the depth of this bottomless mystery, but only purposing to content ourselves with that knowledge of it which is revealed in the word of God. The which no doubt is most needful, and also comfortable to all Christians: for what either is or shall be our happiness but the true knowledge and continual contemplation of God? To the which purpose, if this Treatise do any whit further thee, we are glad: otherwise take our good will in good part. And so we commend the (good Reader) as we desire to be commended by thee, to the gracious assistance of God's holy spirit, to be by him instructed and preserved in all truth.   

THE EPISTLE Dedicatory.  
SIr, my duty remembered unto you, desiring of God your welfare as heartily & more earnestly, than I either do, or ever did mine own. I had once purposed not to make any dedication of this little pamphlet, that so none should need to be troubled with it, save only they (if there were any such) that would trouble themselves with it. But the persuasions of some friends wishing that this little body going abroad, might have some head to direct it, have prevailed so far, that I began to think of some friend with whom I might make so bold as to use his name (at least understood the which may serve for once, unless we have imitated that unskilful painter, who must needs set this epigram over every thing that he painted: This is such a thing) the forefront of this treatise, to give to these few sheets of paper, the name and title of a perfest book, the which they do so earnestly affect. Whereupon while I did bethink myself of the reasons and respects which usually men follow in dedicating books, among the rest (for there are divers beside) yet above the rest (for they are the chief) these three came to mind, the first is necessarium, the second utile, and the third honestum. Necessity maketh men (writing of matters not only greatly controverted, but even flatly contradicted, yea perhaps spitefully oppugned) as is almost every truth by one or other) shroud themselves under the authority & countenance of some great parsonage, that so they may have shelter against the storms and tempests, which their malicious enemies raise against their persons, and the truth which they do profess. But this seemed not needful for this treatise, which being rather a Philosophical than a Theological discourse, of the nature of God in general, wherein, not only all Christians, but also the jews, yea the very Turks and all other infidels do agree, may safely travel into any country without a safe-conduct, or arrive on any coast without a convoy. The second motive is utile, a Planet that now adays reigneth by his powerful influence in the very wills of men, (the which God himself cannot compel) and is the Cynosura or North star, by whose aspect most men lay their plots & courses. And surely men are not to be blamed, if by this officious kind of saluting and acknowledging the virtues of worthy men (it being done without flattery) they labour to procure unto them deserved fame & renown, & to purchase to themselves some lawful favour, as a recompense of their good affection. This may be done, yet it is more lawful than commendable, for it is better to give then to to take, and (in the opinion of some men) to want then to crave. The third respect, is the most honest and praise worthy, for it hath an eye not to present safety, or to future profit, but to benefits past and gone, and in a manner worn out of mind, the voluntary acknowledging whereof, especially before so many witnesses, showeth a good nature, and a most ingenuous mind. Here I did set down my staff, as minding out of this company to make my choice, yet was I not as yet come to my journeys end: for as we all have many benefactors, to whom we are much indebted, so it may be doubted, which of them may by best right challenge this duty to himself. Our best benefactor is he, from whom only cometh every good and perfect gift, who hath enriched us both with temporal and with spiritual blessings, and therefore doth most worthily deserve to be honoured above all others, with the first and best of all the things we have.  
And without question, the zeal and good affection of those men, who (even in this our age) in thankfulness to God the giver of all knowledge and wisdom, have made him and no other, the Patron of their books and labours, yea though they were not directly written of his nature, deserveth highly to be praised: yet me thinks as it is not lawful to give to man, the honours which are due and proper to God, so it soundeth somewhat harsh (though in truth it be not evil, and to be condemned as simply unlawful) to give those honours to God, which are commonly bestowed on men: and therefore even the godliest men have thought it most meet to dedicate their books to men like to themselves, and themselves both body and soul to God. So then we must descend to human benefactors, of all which we must acknowledge the public Patrons & fathers of our country, to be as most beneficial to us (howsoever the envy which men bear to the good one of another, maketh common benefits not to be esteemed) so most worthy, to whom in the first place all honour, love and duty, should be performed both by this, and by all other means whatsoever. Yet we are not to stay here, for though public persons be to be preferred, yet private duties must not be neglected: the which thing the very heathen did see by the light of nature, and therefore assoon as they had ended their public services and sacrifices to the public Gods of their countries and cities, they did without fail look homewards & carefully (though superstitioussly & foolishly) honour with due rites and ceremonies their deos penates, their household Gods. Neither did they herein think their public gods to be injured or dishonoured: for being (though fond) persuaded that they received much good even from their private Gods, hereupon they inferred as a most undoubted truth, which no man endued with common sense would deny, that whosoever was sufficient to bestow benefits on men, the same was sufficient to receive honour and thanks at the hands of men. And in very truth, he that would make a separation & divorce betwixt the bestowing of benefits, and the receiving of thanks, he should go about to take heat from the fire, light from the sun, and all sense of humanity out of the hearts, and from the societies of men. But howsoever this duty of thankfulness ought most religiously to be performed, yet we see that none is more profanely neglected: especially towards those, to whom in respect of near conjunction of nature, we own double love and duty: but they what good soever they do to us, serve thankless Masters, whereas we know that Idolatrous and unjust Laban could say to jacob, Though thou be my near kinsman, yet it is no reason, that thou shouldst serve for nought, and be defrauded of the wages due unto thee. And now at length to come to our purpose, I do most willingly confess (as I would more willingly have done long ere this, if it had pleased you to accept that homage, which I think you could be content still to spare) that if ever any man might of an other, then may you of me expect and require all thankfulness of mind, all thanksgiving in word, and all actual testification of it by this or by any other means, whatsoever is or may at any time lie in me to perform. Your title is as good as is his (who having with great expense purchased the feesimple of a fair and fruitful Orchard, and enjoying it in quiet possession for many years together, no man making any claim to it, or to any part or parcel of it, or once offering to set either foot or face into it: yea planting it with the best trees that could be had, and not suffering them to grow wild, and to bring forth sour fruit, but pruning and lopping them (yet almost so as it is said of David, 1. King. 1. 6.) and grafting them with the best sciences that could be had either at home or in foreign countries) to take and taste an apple of some tree in this his own Orchard. If you should say, the which I am persuaded you did never think, that this were a dear apple, and a sorry recompense for so great cost and care: Indeed I must confess, that you might have bought ten thousand such books with less charges, yet we see this to be the course of the world, that when as men have most extremely both charged and toiled themselves in planting Orchards & setting Gardens, yet if they do but taste of the fruit of the one, and smell of a flower of the other, they think that they have enough for their money, and are better paid, then if they had had given them a thousand cartload of any other (though far better) either fruit or flowers. For all things are not to be esteemed by profit, or to be numbered by Arithmetical, but rather to be weighed by Geometrical proportion, which is the better: and truly I have always thought, and so it may be, that many others think, that you do make more account of a public good, (the which happily even these small treatises may procure more or less) then of a great deal of your private profit: As I have often heard you say, that you thought it meet that the first borne should be dedicated to the study of Divinity and the service of God according to the equity of Moses law made to that effect, the which ought still to remain in some sort, though it do not necessarily bind.  
And therefore instead of a better testimony of a thanking, yet more thankful mind, I am bold to send unto you, together with a little treatise of repentance, for the which you wrote in your last letter, another of the same pitch and stature, being his younger brother, to accompany him. It is needless I know, to use many or any words, in commending them to you, Nepotesavis, quam filii patribus chariores esse solent: Admit them I pray you into your family, as did old jacob, Ephraim and Manasses, the sons of joseph, and let your name be named upon them. Yea, if you please, lay your hands upon them, in perusing them as your leisure will permit. Yet do not imitate him in crossing his hands, and in preferring the latter before the former, (for he was by the extraordinary spirit of prophecy, privileged to cross his hands, and with all the law of God, yea which is more, because they are more the laws of God, the laws of nature, and of nations) for the former is fit for your purpose, and will be more profitable for you, so much as the true practice of Christianity, set down in some sort in that treatise of repentance, is to be preferred before naked speculation, to the which kind I must needs confess that this latter treatise doth more properly belong. I do heartily wish and earnestly desire of God, that as you have been the means of existing to them, so they may return unto you in way of thankfulness, some spiritual good, the one for practise, which is the better part, and the other for knowledge, which is not to be neglested. Neither do I doubt, but that God will in some measure hear my prayer, with whom nothing is more righteous and pleasing, then that every one should reap the fruits of his labours, especially of their godly endeavours which do directly tend to the good of his Church: you have sown the seed, and therefore may well take the crop into your barn, you have both planted and grafted the tree, and why then should another pluck away the fruit? It would (perhaps) have been more profitable, if according to the common course of the world, I had by this duty worshipped the sun, not occidentem (for who regards the sun any longer th●n they see the light and feel the heat of it) but Orientem, whose benefits are not in the past but in the future tense. And yet as it hath pleased God hitherto to make you the only means (in a manner) of profit unto me (I speak of private benefactors) even from my cradle and first infancy to this present hour, yea so that you do not yet fail or faint, (as you might well have done since you began, without any blame) but that your last & late benefits & bounty do exceed the former: so if I were so minded as to use mai●●er utile for my Pilot, and the director of my ship and course, I know no cause why I might not hope to have as good a Chapman of you, as of another. So then, both honestum and utile have given their voices to this choice, to the which if necessity could be brought to give his assent, than it were done unanimi consensu, without any gain saying: and surely in my mind he is not hard to be entreated. Pompey surnamed the great, for his great conquests and triumphs, (although he might more truly be so called for the greatness of his mind and virtues) being sent by the Senate into one of their Provinces, would needs take ship and sea in a great tempest, saying: It is needful that I should go, because it is needful that I should discharge my duty, but not that I should live: and so we are to account it more needful to avoid the foul crime of ingratitude, then to have either our writings, or persons safely protected. I may not though I would, trouble you any further: it remaineth only that I desire God to return seven fold into your bosom, as I doubt not but that he will do, either in this or in a better life) all that good which you have done unto me: and so leaving you in the most sure protection of God, in whom I am persuaded that you trust, I take my leave till further occasion be offered, either of writing or of coming unto you.  
The Lord be with you. London this 7. of February. 99   

A TREATISE OF THE NATURE OF God.  

CHAP. I. That there is a God.  

Sect. 1.  Gent. 
el overtaken Syr.  Scholar 
You are welcome Gentleman.  Gent. 
No great Gentleman sir, but one that wisheth well to all that mean well: I pray you, how far do you travel this way?  Sch. 
As far as York.  Gent. 
I should be glad, if I might have your company thither.  Sch. 
And I, if my company might stand you in any steed: but howsoever it be, you may command it: and by vouchsafing me the benefit of your company, maketh me much beholden to you.  Gent. 
Not so sir: but without question, the company of men of your profession, is both pleasant and profitable, & much to be desired for the attaining of knowledge & wisdom.  Sc. 
I pray you sir, whom do you take me to be?  Gent. 
Surely, it should seem by your apparel, that you are a Scholar, or some Minister.  Sch. 
Indeed, if you call a learner a Scholar, I do confess myself to be of that profession: but if (as I suppose) you mean by a Scholar, not a learner, but a teacher, or Doctor, one able to instruct, and direct others, you take your marks amiss: for (as we s●y in the Schools) Cucullus nonfacit monac huum.  Gent. 
I mean by a Scholar, not one that learns his ABC, or his Accidens, but a Student, one that hath been brought up in learning in some University: able with a little labour, and in a short time, to do much good to us that are ignorant. In this sense I am persuaded, that you are, and may be both called and accounted a Scholar.  Sch. 
It pleaseth you sir, of your gentleness, to think and speak of me, far better than I do deserve: but if it were, as you do ween, and wish, yet I know no cause, but that I both may and aught, look for profit and increase of knowledge, as well at your hands as you at mine.  Gen. 
Why that cannot be: you give yourselves continually to reading, and all other means of attaining knowledge: whereas we follow other matters, and spend our days about worldly profits or pleasures, as our callings, places and degrees do require.  Sch. 
The more is the pity if it be so: you (for the most part) have leisure enough to seek knowledge: yea you are of ability to provide for yourselves, all things belonging unto study, the which Scholars do often want, to their great grief and hindrance. And surely (in my mind) it were far more commendable and honourable, for men of wealth, place, & account, to pursue and huntafter knowledge and wisdom, by the which they might benefit much their country, both Church, and Commonwealth, then to spend their time and goods, in vain and unprofitable pleasures.  Gent. 
You say true sir, in the opinion of the wisest: but for this time, we will rather take it as we find it, them dispute how it ought to be: if you look for any great learning at my hands, you are deceived, and will in the end be disappointed. Yet I pray you, let us pass the time and way in some good conference, and give me leave to ask your opinion and he●p in some points of divinity, whereof I either am altogether ignorant, or else do greatly doubt, and would gladly be resolved. It would without question be a great ease, and make that we should neither fee●e the wearisomeness of our tedious travel, nor yet complain or cry out of the length of these Northumberland miles: yea I do not doubt, but it will be profitable to us both: for I shall be instructed, and you by calling to remembrance your former reading, shall imprint it more deeply into your mind, and have it more ready against an other time.  Sch. 
Indeed conference is always good, and especially in travel: yea, and for the matter of our conference, you have chosen the better part, in that you had rather bestow the time in some points of divinity, whereby we may be edified in religion, and in the knowledge of God, then spend it in other matters, which are either vain & needless, or at the least, not comparable unto it, either in use or excellency. Yet I must needs tell you plainly, that you are too careful of your own ease, in that you would lay the whole burden of answering all questions, and resolving all doubts upon my shoulders, and shift it wholly from your se●f. You know, that it is the custom, and as it were, a law among travelers, not to put any one continually to the trouble of seeking and leading the way, but to do it by course. And therefore I may not agree to this motion which you have made, unless it please you to accept these two conditions: first, that you give me the like liberty, in propounding to you those doubts which trouble me, and be content to show me the like favour, in helping me out of the briars wherein I shall stick. Secondly, that in hard and intricate questions, that answer be accepted for the time which may be had: for it is a plain case, that any one man may move more questions in an hour, than all the learned men in the world can answer and resolve, all the days of their lives.  Gent. 
Your conditions are very reasonable, & although my answering of your doubts will be, as the proverb is, Sus mineruam, (in the which respect, and not in any partial favour of myself, as you do charge me, I referred the matter wholly to your disposition) yet for so much as you give others beside Scholars, leave to have knowledge, I will do my best to satisfy your desire, and rather show my ignorance and folly, then seem injurious and unthankful.  Sch. 
You may speak your pleasure: but by all likelihood you are a Scholar, according to your own acception, howsoever it pleaseth you to make yourself for the time, one in my sense: and it may be you are so by your calling and kind of life, howsoever your outward state seemeth better than usually Scholars attain unto: yea, I am persuaded, by this great desire to increase in knowledge, which appeareth in you, that you have already attained to a great measure of it, and know what belongs unto it, as we see that usually the richest are most covetous.   

Sect. 2.  Gent. 
WEll, well: let us leave these things, and come to the purpose: yet for all this haste, one thing I must needs desire of you, and it is this. That you would not be offended, nor yet think scorn to answer and resolve me, even in those questions, which are most certain, manifest, and without all question, as if I should desire to be resolved of this point, that there is a God, that made and ruleth, and governeth all things. Not that I doubt of this, or any other main point of Christian religion, but that I may know and hold that more firmly, which I do already both believe, and also know in part.  Sch. 
We cannot, if we speak properly, call this a point of Christian religion, for all the heathenish religions that ever were, or that are at this day in the world, agree in this, as in the foundation and ground whereon they rest, that there is a God, for otherwise there could be no religion. Yet you say very true, that our knowledge both in this, and in all other points concerning God, is unperfect: and therefore we may lawfully, yea we must necessarily labour for an increase of it, and for that Pleerophoria, that is, a full knowledge and certain persuasion, mentioned in Scripture. Yea, if you please, we will begin with this point, for that (if it must needs be handled, as it is seldom, it being seldom called into question) it ought to have the first place assigned unto it.  Gent. 
Indeed it is strange, that this blockish Atheism should be in any that hath a reasonable soul: yet he that doth consider the lives of many, led without any knowledge, fear, love, care, or any regard whatsoever had unto God, may see that verified, which is spoken Psal. 14. 1. The fool hath said in his heart there is no God. yea I have heard of such as would openly profess themselves to be of that judgement, and as far as they might without danger, defend it by argument against any whosoever. The which shameless impiety, although I do from my heart detest, and shall (I trust) while I live, yet (to tell you plainly) there have often such doubts risen and ●unne in my mind, as I should be ashamed, and therefore would be loath to utter.  Sch. 
Nay, it is a shame to conceal & cherish, not to declare and abandon them: but what I pray you, hath at any time made you doubt of God?  Gent. 
Surely, to deal plainly with you, me thought there was no order of gon●rnement, but rather extreme confusion in the world, that things came to pass not by any providence or power of God, but partly by the force and efficacy of natural causes, working according to the ordinary and set course of nature, and partly by the inclinations, devices, consultations and purposes of men, proceeding from the free motion of their own minds and wills: that foolish and superstitious people did ascribe many things, as war, dearth, famine, plague, sickness, poverty, and many other casualties, to some extraordinary work of God, which the wise did plainly see to come by the ordinary connexion and consequence of natural causes: that as touching those few who did wholly depend and rely themselves upon God, and did daily and hourly call upon him for such things as they stood in need of, it happened to them no better: yea, for the most part, far worse than to the wicked: that for all their faith and prayers, they must either betake themselves to the ordinary course of the world, or else utterly perish and miscarry: that many who most outrageously blaspheme, yea openly both deny & defy God, (as we read of a certain Pope, who said that he would have and eat of a meat that he fancied, in despite of God, and so he did) prosper and far as well, yea much better, than they that serve him most devoutly: that there were not to be seen in the world, any arguments of God's power and presence, nor any thing which might make a wise man wonder: whereas in all reason, it should seem more possible to hide the sun, being above our horizon, so that it should not either by heat, beams, light, or any other means, show itself to be present, then that God should be in the world, and yet no way apparent.  
As for the Scripture out of the which we use so plainly to teach, prove, and demonstrate the being of God, as out of his only evidences, that there was no certanitie could be had of any thing contained in it: that every Kingdom, Country, and City, yea almost every private man, did gather out of it a divers and different ●orme of religion and serving GOD: that many things in it might be proved to be false and fabulous, as of the flames of Purgatory, the fire of Hell, and the light of heaven, prepared and appointed for the souls of men departing from their bodies, according as they had lived in this world, either well or else wickedly: that all these doctrines, and infinite others of the same kind, were but counterfeit, and both devised and used to keep people in some awe and order: yea (which seemed worst of all) that the Scripture was contradicted not only by others, but also by itself in many points and places, whereas in truth, there is not any discord or harsh jarring, but a most sweet and full consort and harmony. So that for these reasons and divers other, that I will not trouble you with, me thought I might say of God, as Elias saith of Baal, that in all likelihood he was either a sleep, or in bat tell, or about some weighty affairs, or (as he thought and mentindeed) no where existing, yet these doubts were but as flying clouds in my mind, which the glory, majesty, and truth of God, shining both in his word and work, as clearly as the sun doth at noon day, did soon dissolve, yet not so, that you should think it lost labour to speak somewhat to that effect,  Sch. 
I may for fashion's sake, but I am persuaded, that it is in a manner needless, and that you are not now to learn, how that God, having revealed himself sufficiently by divers evident means, doth now in a manner hide and absent himself from the world, yea even from his church and chosen people, and that upon good ground, in respect both of the elect, and of the reprobate. First for the elect, we know that in the first ages of the world, God did reveal himself unto them by many means, which now he hath laid aside, as first in sensible apparitions, visions, voices, and dreams, yea sometimes in as plain and familiar manner, as men use to talk and converse with their friends, face to face, without any colours, shows or vizards. Secondly, God did usually bestow upon his servants many temporal blessings, and power forth upon the wicked, grievous plagues and punishments. This was done in respect of the infancy and weak estate of the Church and the godly, who being as yet endued but with a small measure of knowledge and faith, (the time being not come, wherein the mystery of eternal salvation in Christ, was to be unfolded) would soon have fallen into distrust and forgetfulness of God, if that he had been strange with them: and therefore it pleased him in mercy to visit them often in this sensible manner of bodily apparitions, and of temporal blessings, that so he might (as it were) keep his acquaintance with them, the which otherwise would soon, by reason of that small measure of spiritual graces which they had, have been forgotten and come to nought. But now in this time of the Gospel, wherein spiritual graces are plentifully given, and eternal glory so certainly promised to the faithful, yea even pointed at with the finger, as being hard at hand, and almost in sight, should God still dandle them in in his lap with temporal blessings, as with laking to toy and play with? and still appear in visible manner, as if the Gospel could not be, either for doubtfulness believed, or for obscurity understood? We see that when as children are grown up to any stature and strength, they are not only ashamed, once to think of sucking the dug again, but also are by painful toil & labour continually exercised, for the increase both of strength in their bodies, and of patience in their minds, howsoever it be grievous unto them, and make them doubt of the love of their parents, by whom they are tied to so unwelcome a task.  
In like manner it pleased God to deal with his children, not only in withdrawing from them these temporal toys, (yet not leaving them comfortless, who have both plenty of spiritual graces in present fruition & the instant hope of eternal glory, wherewith to solace themselves) but also in exercising their faith, hope, patience, and love, by continual trials and temptations, crosses and afflictions, as if he had clean forgotten them, and cast them off for ever. Whereas indeed he doth it only for the trial and commendation of their faith; which by this means is found to be firm and sound, even as gold is tried by the fire. For if whensover we are pinched with any grief, misery, or want, God were straightway at our elbows, with comfort and with such things as we desire, either for necessity or pleasure, what great matter were it to depend upon him, and to love him. The most blockish sot in the world, would trust that which he seethe with his eyes: and there is no brute beast in the world of so savage a nature, but would bear good affection to him, that did daily ply him with good and pleasant things, one in the neck of another, neither is it possible for a man to hope for that which he already hath.  
But when as by faith and hope, we take such hold of God and the promises of eternal life, that no temptations can make us let our hold go: when as in the most bitter afflictions we feel the sweet taste and relish of the love of God, when as we do steadfastly behold that which is far out of sight, then is our faith found to be not baggage dross, but pure and precious gold, fit for the service of the king of heaven. Thus Christ speaketh unto Thomas, Ioh 2. 20. 29. Thou hast seen, felt, and thereupon dost believe, that I am risen from the dead, but blessed are they that do notsee, or feel, and yet believe: that is, their faith is more strong and excellent, and therefore their salvation and blessedness more certain. Likewise in respect of the wicked, it is needful, that God should by deferring those plagues, that their blasphemies and other outrageous sins, do deserve, suffer them to go on in hardening their hearts, and in filling up the measure of their sin. For if they saw God present in the world in temporal plagues, giving to every sin the deserved punishment, as he did in old times, & so standing over them with the whip and sword of vengeance, they would then have some conscience of sin, and by fear, be restrained from that outrage whereunto now they rush headlong: yea, the nearer that the universal judgement wherein every one shall receive according to his works, is at hand, the more doth God surcease from temporal rewards and punishments, purposing by eternal retribution, to pay every one home and to the full. And therefore we cannot impute the confusion and abundance of sin which overfloweth the world, to the want of government in God, but to the just judgement, who suffereth the wicked to ●un on in their seu●rall courses of wickedness, to their final destruction: yet not so, but that he doth plainly show his power and providence in restraining these floods of wickedness, that they shall not so ouerslow the earth, but that always there is a place left to serve and praise him in, even as we see, that he keepeth by violence the sea within the appointed limits, which by nature should and if it were not restrained, very quickly would cover the face of the whole earth. As for the multitude of false religions, and the great diversity of opinions among those that profess the truth, what is that to the purpose? The pathway of truth is one and the same, by-wares are infinite: the ignorance, errors, and heresies of men, cannot prejudice the substance & foundation of it) safe and sound in the Church, Lastly, for the contradictions and untruths wherewith the holy Scripture is charged, if the spirit of God had used in penning the Scripture, we●ke men, who might err in some circumstance of the story, or some matter of no moment, as he doth daily use the ministry of men, who no doubt, together with the truth of religion. have errors and ignorance: should that make the doctrine and substance of religion itself, to be suspected or rejected? But we know that there is nothing false in the Scripture if be rightly understood, and that all the parts of it have a most perfect agreement & consonancy with the other, the Law with the Gospel, the ceremonies of Moses, with the substance in Christ: the Prophets with the Apostles, and each one with other. But I marvel why you join the fire of Purgatory, whereat now the whole world doth laugh; as at a most ridiculous toy, with hell and heaven, whereby in Scripture is meant the misery of the wicked, and the happiness of the godly in the life to come: both which we cannot doubt, but that God that hath spoken it, will accomplish and make manifest unto us.   

Sect. 4.  Gent. 
I Was always (I thank God) of that mind, & yet you have resolved me of divers points whereof before I doubted. Now that you have taken away these doubts and scruples, and weeded out these bitter roots of unbelief, which make many depart away from the living God, it is meet that you should sow some new seeds of faith in the mind, by setting down some manifest proofs, demonstrations, and evidences of God, by the which he may be certainly known, yea in a manner seen and felt.  Sch. 
That is no hard matter to do, for somuch as there is nothing in the world, which doth not afford us an evident testimony of God, who even in the least things, much more in those which are by nature excellent, is most wonderful and most apparent. But to avoid confusion as welin my speech, as in your memory, we will reduce the infinite testimonies of God to these five heads: the first are the creatures: the second is the light of nature: the third is the word of God: the fourth is his spirit: and the last are his miracles or extraordinary works. All these together, will be unto us a cloud of witnesses, even an infinite number compassing us round about, and so by their huge multitude in a manner darkening the sun, or rather so enlightening our minds, that there cannot any dark clouds of doubting or distrust remain. First then to begin with the creatures in the which God did first manifest himself, who can either deny or doubt, but that the heavens declare the glory of God, & the firmament showeth his handy work: and that if God made not them, yet they made their maker whosoever he were, to be most justly and worthily called and accounted God, in that they most plainly witness his surpassing power, wisdom, and majesty.  
If the creatures themselves, as namely the sun, moon, and stars (yea many earthly creatures, which in respect of these are base and contemptible, yet have been taken and worshipped for gods) are in themselves so glorious, that they have extorted from many nations, the names, titles, and worship of God, it cannot be but that they should even lead us by the hand, to acknowledge the glory and God head of him, who was their deviser and maker, and doth still continue their preserver.  
Now if we descend into this lower world, wherein we dwell, and there begin with ourselves, called by the Philosophers not without cause, little worlds, we shall find both without in our bodies, in the most cunning and curious form and frame of them, and within in our minds and souls, in their manifold faculties and effects, so plain and pregnant arguments of so great wisdom and power, that we shall cease to marvel, how Alexander the great, and Nabuchadnezar the proud, came to that pass, to suppose themselves to be not men but Gods, and shall begin to marvel why all the men in the world are not of their opinion, until we be think ourselves, that men see plainly both in themselves and in others, that they did not make themselves, but were made by an other. Yet may not man boast or brag, that this prerogative of bringing in evidence for the deity of his maker, is peculiar to himself: he must be feign to admit into the participation of this praise, all the other creatures in the world: not only those which excel himself in greatness, strength, swistnes, sharpness of sense, and in many other respects, but even the basest & silliest worm that scrawleth upon the ground: yea (which may make him lay down his peacock tail, and be quite out of conceit with himself) he must in this respect give place even to senseless things, as to herbs, trees, and stones: the virtues and operations whereof (hidden in the causes, to the sharpest wits of the most subtle Philosophers, yet manifest in the effects, to the bluntest senses of the most simple idiots) if they be as duly considered as they are daily seen, will in a manner turn men into stones: so amazing them, that they will be constrained to renounce all natural reasons, and to acknowledge that it is the finger of God.  
And so for conclusion of this point, not only they that go down into the deep secrets of natural Philosophy, but even such also as do only swim and float aloft in the superficial consideration of the frame of the whole world, and of the particular creatures therein contained, do manifestly behold, and must of necessity acknowledge the wonderful power and wisdom of God.  
And no marvel, when as the very heathen who are purblind, if not stone-blind in respect of God, have in this clear Crystal glass of the creatures easily descried, and plainly discerned the portraiture and image of God. Against whose testimony, which now in the second place is to be produced) although there might exception be taken, in respect of the particulars, for that in matters of religion, heathen men are of no credit or account, both deceiving others, and being deceived themselves, by following lies and illusions, yet in respect of the universality of it, it hath some weight, and may well be admitted.  
I am sure you have often heard and read, that Vox populi (much more than Vox mundi) est vox Dei: many may be deceived, but that is taken for truth, wherein all generally do agree: for such things are not devised by this or that man, but engraven in the mind of man by nature herself, and therefore are to be accounted true and certain, especially by Atheists, who make Nature their God.  
Yea besides the ordinary means of the light of nature, by the which all men naturally and generally attain the undoubted persuasion of this truth, it hath pleased God in all ages and places to maintain it, and put it out of all doubt by extraordinary works, of the which all profane stories afford plentiful examples.  
But we have a clearer light to direct us in this, and in all other cases of controversy, then is the dim light of nature, to wit, the word of God contained in the books of holy scripture, so full of divine wisdom, that we cannot once imagine it to have been hatched by the brain of man, angel, or other creature whatsoever.  
To let all other arguments pass, which the scripture doth afford us for this purpose, let us but consider in it how God hath dealt with his Church from time to time, always preserving it in some one corner or other, y●t never suffering it to be generally received throughout the world, yet bringing it into every part of it at one time or other, even as he suffereth his sun to shine upon all the parts of the earth, not at once, but successively and by piece-meal, one part being enlightened after another: how God hath trained up his Church from one estate to another, from the first infancy to the childhood, and so on forward to man's estate, instructing it in his will, and as it were instilling his precepts into it by little and little, and line after line: as the capacity of it would admit, (not regarding the time of their ignorance) first by temporal blessings, then by eternal promises: first by sensible appatitions, then by inward assurance, more certain than sense: first by ceremonies, then by the substance of his worship: first by types, then by the truth: first by the shadow, then by the body itself: first by prophecies, then by accomplishments: and lastly, first by the image and counterfeit, and then by the very personal presence of Christ himself, bringing unto us in his Gospel, that consummatum est, that yea and amen, even all in all, and all at once. For who knoweth not, that in the doctrine of the Gospel, we have unfolded unto us such endless treasures of divine wisdom, that (even by the judgement of those who are not affected with any love towards it, and therefore cannot be suspected of partiality) all the religions of the heathen are in comparison of it most childish, ridiculous, and trifling toys. The fourth means by the which God is revealed and made known to man, is proper to the faithful, to wit, the inward and secret operation of his spirit, renewing their minds and hearts to know and love the truth.  
This light far passeth all the other, for that it not only shineth in the eyes, as the other do, but also openeth them, that they may see and behold the truth, which thing, the other are not able to effect.  
For although we cannot imagine any more plain and evident proofs of the deity, than the three aforesaid means: namely the creation and preservation of the world, the general assent and voice of all the Nations under heaven in all ages, especially of the Jews, who do generally abhor this opinion of Atheism: and lastly, the doctrine of the Gospel, wherein the whole will and counsel of God is fully and finally revealed, by some or all whereof, many are brought to acknowledge God, and to have although not a full sight, yet a glimmering of him: yet notwithstanding all these means, we see that many remain in the palpable blindness of Atheism, neither knowing in mind, nor acknowledging by word, any other God, than the ordinary and set course of nature, because as yet their eyes are fast shut and sealed up: so that they cannot see the light, although it be most clear. But the spirit of God is that ointment, joh. 2. 20. which openeth our eyes, and maketh us clear sighted: so that now it fareth with us, as with that man, joh. 9 1. that having been borne blind (had no doubt) often heard men speak of the Sun, and the light thereof, and did believe it to be so, yet not without some doubting, & not at all knowing what to make of it, or whereunto to resemble it. But assoon as his eyes being opened, he did plainly behold the Sun, with the light and beams thereof, he did no more doubt of the Sun, than he did of himself, and of his own being: so men before they be enlightened by God's spirit, they see little or nothing of the glory of God, which after regeneration, is as clear unto them as the Sun at midday, even as we read, 2. Kin. 6. 17. that Eliseus his servant could not see the huge army of horsemen and chariots, which was hard at hand, till such time, as God, at the prayer of the Prophet opened his eyes. The fift and last means, by the which God is made known, are his extraordinary and miraculous works, by the which he hath revealed himself, not only to some few of his servants, who have been the instruments by whom they have been wrought, but also in the eyes of the world, beholding them. And without question, when these are added to the former, they bring with them, to the true believers, even a huge heap of faith, and assurance, howsoever to carnal unbelievers, they are often vain and of no effect. For if unto that knowledge of God which we have by the creatures and the light of nature, by his word and spirit, God should add such immediate revelations, familiar conferences, visible apparitions, & sensible visions, such signs & wonders as he wrought in old times in and by his servants, we could not but by these means be much more undoubtedly persuaded of the power, presence, and providence of God, then now we are, howsoever the wicked did still continue in their unbelief, yea though one should rise from the dead and preach unto them. To speak any more of this matter to you, were no otherwise then if I should light a candle to show you who are sound and clear sighted, the sun shining here before us. You see that the creatures and light of nature to the heathen, the scripture and word of God to the Church, the sanctifying and illuminating spirit of God to the faithful, the gifts of prophecy, revelation, and other miraculous actions (the which are not now needful in the Church, as they were before the coming of Christ, and in the first publishing of the Gospel) to all that either have them themselves, or behold them in others, are infallible demonstrations of the Godhead, & such against the which no exception can be made: yet not withanding all this, it is a wonder (but that it is so common) to consider how Atheism doth daily prevail among men, yea far more than it did amongst either the superstitious papists, or the idolatrous heathen, of whom there were very few, which had not their religion and Gods in great reverence, and most high estimation, whereas now a days, few do make any account of religion or of the worship of God, but as of a formal and ordinary matter of course, which for order and fashions sake, is to be performed. And accordingly, it pleaseth God to deal with them in his just judgement, for the hardening of their hearts, that for so much as they have so wilfully rejected so many means of knowledge, he doth wholly abstain from any further revealing of himself by any extraordinary means, but suffereth every one to go on and to prosper in their own devices and wicked ways, that so their impunity may confirm them in their ignorance and contempt of God: the which is more to be wondered at, and to be lamented, many of them that have had some knowledge and sense of religion revealed unto them, and have made conscience of it in their lives, yet seeing no great matters or effects to come of it, but the ordinary course & fashion of the world, they faint in faith by little and little, till at length they become if not open, yet secret contemners of God & all religion. And so is fulfilled the prophecy of Christ, Math. 24. 12. 24. That in the last ages of the world, iniquity shall so abound, that it shall cool the lukewarm love of many, in so much, that if it were possible, the very elect should fall away from the faith, and be deceived: but I doubt not but that you are far from that fearful estate. Gen. That which you have said, as touching the existence of God, dothfully satisfy me and may content any reasonable man: yet because I do sometimes meet with men that are even rooted and confirmed in Atheism, and will not stick to deny that there is a God, I pray you furnish me with some few arguments, wherewith to convince and to confound them.  Sch. 
Indeed there are many, which are to be accounted Atheists, for that they deny the doctrine of God's providence, and the truth of his word and promises, made to his Church of eternal glory (the proof and declaration whereof must be referred to their proper places) wherein we did both agree: but sure I think, you meet with few or none, that are either so brutish in mind, or so shameless in face, as to deny that there is a God, neither to my remembrance have I ever either heard or read of any such. The Epicurean Philosophers among the heathen, were counted Atheists, as they might well be, for they exempted God from the care of human things, and from the the government of the world, but they neither denied nor doubted but that there was a God. And so I think of our epicures and Atheists in these days, that howsoever they might as well deny God to exist, as to contemn and reject his word, threatenings, and promises, as mere fables, and to be altogether void of any care or regard of him, yet if they were examined, I think they would confess, that they think there is a God, though they have neither knowledge nor care of him.  Gen. 
You may in favour & gentleness make the best of their Atheism, though to say the truth, the best be bad inogh) but I can assure you of my own experience, that there are such, that deny not only the providence, but even the very nature and existence of God.  Sc. 
They are not men, but beasts in the likeness of men, altogether unworthy of any favour, neither (if I met with any such) should I either bear o● show them any, but rather extreme, & yet not sufficient hatred: for howsoever I use to be (I know not how) to easy and indifferent in judging and condemning those that hold even gross heresies, as thinking, that either there may be some truth and grace with great errors, or at the least that they may be reclaimed from them: yet when I think of such monsters as you speak of, I feel my heart to rise against them so, that I could more willingly tear them in pieces with my teeth, then teach them with my tongue. Yea to tell you plainly, I think that such having lived in the Church, and in the light of the Gospel and word of God, are not to be disputed with, or persuaded by reasons, but rather as men given up to a reprobate sense, and branded with the most fearful mark of the wrath and vengeance of God, to be lest to his just judgement. For if an Heretic be to be avoided and left after a few admonitions, as being wilful and obstinate, what then should be done to these, that have rejected a thousand admonitions given them, not only by the testimony of the whole world in all ages, but also by the creatures, word, and extraordinary works of God. And therefore I pray you, let us not trouble ourselves any further with than, but rather go on to some matter, the consideration whereof, may be profitable unto us: for as you know, Contra principia negantem, non est disputandum.  Gent. 
I confess that they are in a most fearful case, & deserve to be abhorred both of god & man, yet when as I am by some necessary occasion in company with them, and hear them protest themselves to be, not wilful in gainsaying, but willing to learn the truth, I wish they might be reclaimed, or at the least, that their mouths were so stopped, that they did no harm to others: & therefore I pray you show me, how I should deal with them?  Sch. 
It is impossible to show or prove the existence of God, by any other arguments than have been brought, for that God hath revealed himself by those only, and by no other means: to wit, by his word and spirit to his Church, and by his works to the world. Now the first kind of these arguments is to be used against the temptations and doubts arising in the minds of believing Christians, but not against the horrible blasphemies of these shameless Atheists, and therefore you must insist in the works of God, the which being sensible, cannot be denied by them. By these you may show the existence of God, both by the ordinary works of the creation and preservation of the world (the which in truth, are most miraculous) as also by the miraculous and extraordinary works and judgements of God. For the first, you must ask him if he see not in the creatures, to wit, in their greatness and number, proportion and beauty, force and efficacy, cerraine signs and arguments, of some great wit, cunning, wisdom, goodness and power: would he confess this think you?  Gent. 
Surely if he denied it, I would leave him as being not a man endued with reason, but a brute beast, or rather a senseless stock.  Sch. 
Well then, if these things appear in the creatures, they must be confessed to be in some subject or person, and that either in the creatures themselves, or in some other, but that is all one, for whatsoever thing is endued with so great wisdom and power as is necessarily required to the making and preserving of the world, that without question, is to be● magnified and worshipped as God, and to be accounted God. This demonstration of the Godhead is plain, as plain need be, to any that will consider it, and yet the extraordinary works of God do more affect men, although in themselves they be nothing so miraculous: even as we see, that men do more gaze on and admire a stately house, which they never saw before, and think that there is more cunning workmanship and bravery in it, then in the frame of the whole world, which is continually in their eyes. And therefore, you must lay before the eyes of your Atheists, the strange & miraculous things, which have been done in all ages of the world (more or less) contrary to the course of nature: and if he reject all stories, both divine and profane, yet God doth never leave himself without some of of these extraordinary witnesses. Not that he doth now send his Angels visibly to good men with blessings, for they believing his word, need no extraordinary proofs, but for that he suffereth Satan to show himself to the wicked and unbelievers, not only in strange illusions, but also by searful plagues & punishments, the which I warrant you he will confess to come, not by the ordinary course of his goddess nature, but from some supernatural power, whereof we have of late had evident examples, to the astonishment of all men. And if your Atheist will not believe his own eyes, beholding the strange judgements of God in others, but will rather give his own senses the lie, then acknowledge the truth of the Godhead, let him but by some injurious deed, or contumelious word, provoke some witch of Endor, that hath the temporary power over some spirit, upon condition, that he shall have eternal power over her, and it is like enough he being void of all faith and sense of God, & so out of his protection) that he shall feel to his cost, and confess to his shame, that there is a power over and beside the ordinary course of nature.  Gent. 
Indeed these Atheists that deny God, do also deny that there is either devil or Angel, & I think will confess them all assoon as any one.  Sch. 
And they that will not be taught by God, must, will they, nill they, learn of the devil, who in my mind, is the fittest schoolmaster for such scholars.    

CHAP. 2. What God is, or of the essence of God.  

Sect. 1.  Gent. 
YOu have so fully resolved me, and settled my mind in this point, that ● trust never hereafter to be troubled with the objections which Athists make against the divine essence: especially, if that I might by any means, have the nature of God declared and described as it is indeed. For this is the cause, why men are so easily brought to doubt of the being and existence of God, because they cannot conceive or comprehend the manner or form of his essence, nor have any true notion of it settled and fixed in their minds: whereby it cometh to pass, that the imagination of man, casting god in a thousand moules, & turning him into as many diverse forms, as Proteus is feigned to have, never resting contented with any, as never finding any garment that will sit close on his back, or any form agreeing to the infiniteness & subtility of his essence, rejecteth all, and with all, even the divine nature itself: supposing it not at all to exist, which they cannot suppose how it doth exist. And therefore, if I may entreat you to take the like pains in showing the manner and form of God's essence, which you have done in proving the truth and certainty of his existence, you shall make me much beholden and indebted to you.  Sch. 
Indeed it is impossible, as for you to keep that, which you never had, so for me, either to declare that to you in words, which I myself did never conceive in mind, or to comprehend that within the compass of my narrow and shallow brain, which is in nature infinite and incomprehensible: for so we are to think of God, that his nature and essence being every way infinite, cannot possibly be comprehended by any finite creature: no not by the heavenly Angels themselves, whose nature being subtle and spiritual, doth easily pierce into the depth of knowledge: how much less than by men, who in comparison of Angels, are but dolts and dul-pates, groveling here on earth in the mud and mire of error and gross ignorance: unable by any art or industry, to find out the true nature, form and virtue of the meanest creatures, no not of the least Fly or Gnat, how much less than of the mighty jehova, whose seat is in the heaven, and whose footstool is the earth. But what need I allege the impossibility of comprehending fully in our finite minds and memories, the infinite essence of God, it being impossible for us, to commence or begin this action, by receiving into our imaginations or fancies, any true conceit of him. Things subject to sense, are conceited in the mind, by a resemblance or similitude of them, which the sense doth draw from the things themselves. But as for things not subject to sense (of the which nature, all men confess God to be) how shall they convey and send to the imagination, their picture and resemblance? surely they cannot do it themselves, but must substitute in their rooms, that sensible thing, which is likest unto them, to represent their person, as if a man that is far absent, should will the Painter to draw his picture and counterfeit, by beholding the visage of his son or brother, being not much unlike unto him. But what creature shall ●it in God's chair of estate, and represent his person to our imaginations and minds?  
Whereunto shall we compare or liken Whereunto shall we compare or liken God? or how can we not think it to be unlawful, and flatly forbidden by the law of God, to resemble him to any thing, either in, or within heaven? or to frame any Image or similitude of him, either by outward action in deed, or by inward imaginationn in our minds? Thus God persuadeth the people of Israel from making any Image, wherein to worship him, because they had not seen him in any form, and therefore could not tell after what fashion the Image should be made: Deut. 4. 15.  
Besides, it may be doubted, whether it be lawful or not, to attempt the searching and finding out of the nature and essence of God, which we have not in the scriptures revealed unto us. We know that God in revealing himself to men, hath reserved some things secret to himself, the which it is his glory to conceal, Prou. 25. 2. and therefore his dishonour to have them known. Deuter. 29. 29. Let the hidden things be with the Lord our GOD, and the revealed things to us, and to our children for ever. But what can be hidden or secret in GOD, if his very form and essence be revealed?  
And therefore we ought to be rather sober and modest, then hot and hasty in pursuing the knowledge of the divine essence.  
It is sufficient for us, that we may enter into the Temple and Church of God, and there behold his mercy and goodness, yea his power and justice toward the wicked: what need we be so presumptuous, as with the mean of Bethsemes, to look into the a●ke of the Lord, 1. Sam. 6. 19 or to enter into the holy of holiest? or how dare we set either foot or face into that place, which the Lord hath enclosed with glory, and made several for his own abode, and there to behold, or rather to outface the Majesty of God, sitting in his Cherubin chair of estate, the which the Angels themselves neither can not yet dare behold, and therefore with their wings cover their faces, lest that they seeing it, should be confounded, as overwhelmed with the greatness of his glory? And therefore for this m●tter, I must desire you to hold me excused, if I do not take upon me to declare unto you the essence of God, the knowledge whereof I am sure it is impossible to attain, and I doubt whether it be lawful to attempt.  Gent. 
You put me into a strange maze and quandary, in that you would ma●e me believe, that I had committed some heinous offence in desiring to comprehend the infinite, and know the secret essence of God. But by your patience a little: is it now become a fault to seek the knowledge of God, in the knowledge and contemplation of whom not only the scripture and (as I have heard) all divines with one assent, but even Plato an heathen Philosopher, although somewhat smelling of the truth of religion, do make our whole happiness to consist? the infiniteness of the nature of God doth hinder the full comprehension, but not the true knowledge of itself to be in the mind of man: the sight of the eye, no not the whole eye, is able to contain the body of the Sun, and yet by it, we do plainly behold, and truly know the Sun, Moon, & Stars, yea the whole heaven. What though it be not lawful, euher to make any Image, or to imagine any similitude of God? yet we may consider of the nature of God, by comparing it to the nature of the creature, though there be never so great inequality betwixt them. Yea the infiniteness of God's nature, is most plainly seen, when it is compared to a finite and mean creature, as we know that the cheerful lightsomeness, and fairness of white, is best perceived, when a dark and sad back is laid by it: that the hugeness of an Elephant is most admired, when we think of he smallness of a fly: and a crooked building is best known by the strait line. The whole body and compass of the sun and moon may be beheld in a little dishfull of wate●, and why not God in his creatures, especially in those which he hath made according to his own image, and that as I am persuaded, for this very end and purpose? But although the nature of god might be by some means in some measure conceived and known, yet you doubt of the lawfulness of the attempt: but your doubting is without cause, or rather as I am persuaded, without truth, and in show only. The propitiatory is now removed, and the Ark uncovered, so that we may be bold to look into it: the vail of the Temple is rend a sunder, yea quite broken down, and therefore we need not any longer stand aloof, but may with confidence enter into the holy place, & approach unto the throne of grace. It is not with God as it is with mortal and sinful men, who of set purpose, and in good policy do (in many cases) withdraw themselves from the sight and view of others, lest that by bewraying their infirmities, they should bring their persons into contempt: but God is not ashamed of himself, neither afraid of being known, seen and censured. Men, the further they are off from us, the greater they seem, and the less they are known, th● more they are esteemed: the more familiarly that they are acquainted, the more likely to be contemned: but it is not so with God, who the more he is known, the more he is admired, the nearer he approacheth to us, the more he amazeth & astonieth with his surpassing glory and majesty: so that he may not unfitly be compared to the cloud, which the Prophet Elias, or rather God himself raised out of the sea, 1. King. 18. 14. which a far off seemed no bigger than the palm of a man's hand, but when it came near, it covered the whole face of heaven. I confess indeed, that the essence of God cannot be fully comprehended by any creature, and that if God should shine upon us with the bright beams of his glory, we could not but be confounded, as we see our eyes to be dazzled, and our sight dimmed by gazing on the bright shining sun. For this, the word of God is plain, Exod. 33. 20. where God saith to Moses, My face, that is, my full glory and majesty, no man can see and live, but as for my hinder parts, that is, some part or shadow of my glory, that I will show unto thee. Yet the doth not prove, that this great and greedy, yea insatiable desire, which this holy man of God had, of seeing and knowing still more and more of God, yea after that God had many ways revealed himself more fully to Moses, then ever he had done, or did since to any man living, should be condemned as rash and presumptuous, which rather is to be commended and imitated of us, by having a most earnest care and desire to know so much of God's essence as may be known, yea much more, and even the whole nature of God, if so it stood with his good pleasure. For this is the only happiness which we aspire unto, & hope for in the life to tome, that whereas now we see God but darkly in part, and as it were his image in a glass, then, we shall see him face to face, 1. Cor. 13. that is, in far more ample manner then now we do, although not so fully and amply as he is indeed, unto the which absolute perfection of the knowledge of God's essence, I do easily grant you, that neither the Saints nor the Angels in heaven can possibly attain. And therefore, seeing that my request is no other, then both I may well and lawfully make, and you easily perform, I pray you do not shift me off with this excuse, which I am persuaded you made, thinking as it is indeed, that you Scholars ●an by your logic and school-tricks, perswadeus simple people to think what you list, & make us believe that, as the proverb is. The moon is made of green cheese: but rather at my request take in hand the explication of this point, which of all other is most needful to be known, and most worthy to be sought out with all care and diligence, as being that whereunto all our knowledge, yea our whole life is to be referred.  Sch. 
I am glad sir, that I have by this means ferreted you out of this deep dissimulation, wheerin you have hitherto so closely lurked: although indeed I did think so much, when I first heard you speak, & did suspect you to be the man, whom now I find you to be. I am persuaded, that you who are so cunning in craving, could if you list be as bountiful in giving: but seeing the bargain is made, it is now no going back: neither will I look back unto the speech which you have made of the lawfulness of attempting, and the possibility of attaining the knowledge of God's nature in some sort: It was true, and therefore cannot be confuted, yet was full and sufficient, and therefore need not be enlarged. You do well to confess that the infinite essence of god cannot be fully comprehended, no not by the Angels in heaven, & yet that it may in some sort be known even by men here on earth. For even as when a traveler desirous to see strange countries and fashions, arriveth in some coast town of any foreign kingdom, he may even there gather some conjectures, and get some knowledge of the condition, state and power of that Prince: but when he cometh to the chief and mother-city of the land, where the king's Court is kept, and where there is greatest concourse of people, abundance of wealth, and store of all things, serving either for the necessity and use of war, or the pleasure of peace, than he saith thus unto himself: Surely now I see and know the very state and power of this Prince, as well as I do that man, whose face I do fully and steadfastly behold: and yet all this while, he neither is, nor can be admitted to see the very person of the Prince. Even so it fareth with us in respect of nod: for here on earth, as it were in Dan or Bersheba, or some other border-town of the land of Promise, the happy kingdom of Chanaan, we have a glimmering of the king. But when we come to the heavenly jerusalem, the City of the great king, there we see a thousand times moat then we did before, and yet all that we see, is but the riches, power, and glory of the king: as for his person and very essence, that is kept secret, and shut up in his privy chamber, or closet, into the which none may or can enter, for none but god knoweth God, 1. Tim. 6. 16. the king of kings, who only hath immortality and dwelleth in light, that none can have access unto, whom never man saw, neither can see: yet although the nature of god be unsearchable, & as a bottomless gulf, into the midst whereof whosoever plungeth himself, in hope of sounding the depth of it, will without question be soon swallowed up by it, and confounded in all his imaginations yea though he were endued with the wit of all the men and Angels in the world: yet I confess, that as you say, we may safely wade and swim in the shallow brink of this great Ocean: having the one hand on the shore or bank, as a sure anchor to hold us fast, that we be not carried too far into it, by the violent blasts of presumption and curiosity: and the other in the water, wherewith to move our minds up and down, in a sober and modest contemplation of it.   

Sect. 2.  
LEt us therefore let lose into this deep and bottomless sea of the nature of God, not in any fond hope of attaining the perfect knowledge of it, yet trusting in God, that we shall not lose our labour, and fish all night without catching any thing, (as on the other side, it were madness to think of catching all the fish in the sea) but rather return to land with our vessels not empty, although not so full lade, that they be ready to sink, by reason of the heaviness of their burden. The knowledge (therefore) of the the natures of things, is attained two ways, to wit, by sense, and by imagination: sense apprehendeth the qualities of things sensible, by the which the mind is led to thenature and substance of the thing. But as for those things which are not sensible, we must suppose & imagine them to be thus & thus, and so coin in our minds, a form and fantastical idea of them, resembling them to something, which we have sometime apprehended by sense, and especially to that which is likest, and cometh nearest unto them.  Soh. 
That to the searching out, and the knowing of the nature of any insencible thing, these three things belong & must concur. First, the observation of the effects or actions proceeding from it, the which being sensible, will give us some light to know the nature of the thing itself, from the which they did proceed, as we see the nature of the father to appear in the son, of the root in the fruit, and of the fountain in the streams issuing from it. Secondly, when as by this and whatsoever other means we have, we have gotten some knowledge of the nature of it, and to what kind of things it i● to be referred, we must then as it were, coming nearer to the purpose, and bringing forth into act the conceit of the mind, resemble it to that thing, the which of all other things in the world cometh nearest, and is likest unto it. Yet we have not attained to that which we desire, for we have not the thing itself, but only a pattern or example, a likeness or resemblance of it: and therefore in the third and last place, we must add to this example or pattern, that which is wanting: squaring it in all respects to the idea and conceit which we first had of the nature of the thing. For example, a man hearing much speech of the Angels, would gladly know, what, and of what nature and essence they are: to the effecting whereof, he is desirous to see, hear or feel one of them, hoping by thi● means to know what they are, as he useth to be by his senses taught the nature of other things. But in the trial he findeth, there can no good be done by this means, the Angel● being spiritual and insensible creatures, ●nd that therefore he must go some other way to work, and search out their nature, by the eyes not of his body, but of his mind, and guess at their natures, by that which he hath heard and read of their effects, functions and actions. As touching the which, he findeth in scripture that they are Gods servants, continually attending his pleasure, and praising him, and readily performing whatsoever he commandeth. Whereupon he inferreth, surely the Angels live, for they move: and they are not brute beasts, but reasonable creatures: yea, not simple idiots, but of great understanding and wisdom, without the which they could never dispatch those affairs aright, about the which God employeth them: and further, that they are not weaklings, but of great strength, for otherwise one of them could not have destroyed in one night, an hundredth fourscore and five thousand of the Assyrians, as we read 2. Ki. 19 35. and lastly, that they are not base or contemptible, but most glorious creatures, fit to stand and serve in the presence of God. Thus he conceiving and imagining them, to be most mighty, wise, and glorious creatures, to what thing in the world can he resemble them more fitly, then to the most excellent men in the world, endued with the greatest measure of power, glory, authority, knowledge and wisdom?  
Now we are come as near them as we can in any one thing, for there is nothing more like to an Angel, then is an excellent man, whereof it cometh, that the name of an Angel, is often given to men: yet we have not attained our purpose, for there is yet great difference and odds betwixt them, therefore to make them even, we must take from this excellent man, this gross body of clay and earth, and give unto him a pure and spiritual body, void of all mixture of elements and moisture, the which debaseth and keepeth him down beneath the Angels, who being not clogged and pressed down with such heavy lumppes of clay, nor having their clear understandings dimmed with soggy mists of moisture, excel him far in nimbleness, quickness of wit, and in all other respects. But what need we suppose this Angelical man, whom we have truly existing? for we know that in heaven the bodies of the Saints shall be pure and spiritual, free from all heavy lumpishness: yet the faithful being glorified, shall not become Angels, but still be men, for neither in subtility of body, nor yet in excellency of inward gifts, shall they be made equal to the Angels.  
Thus we have with much ado, make the human and the Angelical nature meet together, and used the one as a Glass, to represent and make known the other unto us.  
Now then to apply all this to our purpose, for the finding out of God's nature, we must do these three things: first, we must get an idea, or conceit of it into our minds, by searching what manner of thing God is, and so to what kind his nature doth belong, and is to be referred: in the second place, we must get a pattern, example, or resemblance of it in some thing really existing: and lastly, we must by adding and detracting, make them even or equal. For the first, seeing that the nature of God cannot be known, either by any essential causes or by sensible qualities, we must imagine it by the effects, actions and works, whether they be ordinary, or extraordinary: Rom. 1. 20. The invisible things of God, that is, his eternal power and Godhead, are seen by the creation of the world, being considered in his works. For so it hath pleased God (to the end he might make himself known to man, and man happy by knowing him) after a sort to take unto this his invisible and insensible nature, this visible and sensible shape, and to cover himself with the creatures, as with a garment, that so he might discover and reveal his hidden nature to man, as we know, that both he himself, as also his Angels, have showed themselves to men, by putting on the nature and shape of man. Not that we imagine, as some have done, that God is the soul or life of the world, and the world the body of God: for God is not in the creatures, either as their matter, or as their form, but only is to them the efficient: but because the creatures make Gods invisible nature to be known, therefore we call them, the shape or form of God. For by this means it is brought to pass, that although God jehova, as he existeth in himself, and as he did exist before the creation, be invisible, yet God the Creator of heaven and earth, is as visible, as are the Stars by night, or the Sun at midday in the heaven, and as palpable, as is the gross earth whereon we tread: as it is, Act. 17. 27. God hath made the world, that in it men might seek him, yea grope after him and feel him. Thus both the creatures, and also the extraordinary works of God, done both within and also without the Church, and recorded both in holy Scripture, as also in other true Records and Histories, teach us what God is: yea thus they preach to the whole world, as touching God their maker & Author, that he is a living and working, yea a mighty and wise nature, excellent, yea infinite in all goodness: to wit, in knowledge and wisdom, in truth and justice, in love and mercy, in power and strength, in glory and majesty. Thus having conceived in our minds an idea or imagination of God's nature, we are in the next place, to bring it forth into the world, by getting an example or resemblance of it, in some thing not unlike unto it. But against this pattern or resemblance it will be objected (the which you touched before) that both it is impossible to find any thing in the world, that is like to God, or fit to be a resemblance, and also, that if there could any such thing be found, yet it were Idolatry, to resemble God to any creature. Whereunto we answer, first to the former part of the objection, that although the unlikeness to God, be far greater in the creatures, than the likeness, yet that there is no creature, which is not more or less in one respect or other, like unto him: for whatsoever is good, commendable, or excellent in any creature (as all the creatures are good, yea every one of them endued with a proper and peculiar goodness) that cometh from God, who is the fountain of all goodness, and maketh the creature to be like to God. So then if the meanest and basest creatures have some likeness to God, without doubt the excellent creatures cannot but have a great likeness and resemblance unto him: the which we know, that GOD himself in the Scripture doth grant unto them, calling man his own similitude, God made man in the likeness of God. Genes. 5. 1. Yea, although there were no manner of likeness or resemblance betwixt GOD and the creatures, but rather all contrariety and flat repugnancy, yet they might profitably be used for the illustration of his nature, as we know that all contraries do argue and illustrate each other. The which way of teaching, although it be not the readiest to attain the truth: for that doctrine and knowledge are positive not privative, consisting not in the negation of that which is not, or is not true, but in the affirmation of that, which doth truly and really exist, yet it is always an help, and sometimes the only means.  
To the other part of the objection, we answer, confessing that it were flat Idolatry, and utterly unlawful, to make or suppose God to be simply like or equal to any creature, for that were to pull him down from his Throne of majesty, and to place him among the creatures: yet affirming it to be very lawful, to resemble him to any creature, the difference which is betwixt them, being observed and mentioned. Thus Act. 17. 29. the Apostle Paul resembleth the divine nature to the human, proving against the Idolatrons Athenians, that God is not like to those stocks and stones, wherein the heathen did worship him, because he is like unto man, who is of a contrary nature to senseless things. We men (saith he) being the kind of God, it cannot be, that God being like unto us, that he should be like to silver, gold, or to any senseless thing: where though he make these two natures of God & man like to each other, yet he maketh them not equal, but putteth the difference, in that he maketh man to come and flow from God, as a little arm or creak of the sea, from the great Ocean. Yea thus God hath throughout the whole Scripture revealed himself unto us in the form and shape of a man, ascribing to himself the parts of his body, as his eyes and ears, his hands and feet, yea all the faculties, affections and passions of his mind and will, and that both severally, sometimes one and sometimes an other, and also all together, assuming to himself, the whole shape and form of a man, as namely, Ezech. 1. 26. upon the similitude of the Throne, there was as it were a similitude of a man upon it: whereof is said, Vers. 26. This was the appearance of the similitude of the glory of the Lord: and when I saw it, I fell upon my face: so Dan. 7. 9 I beheld till the thrones were set, and the ancient of days did sit, whose garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like the pure will. Likewise, Es. 6. 1. the Prophet saith: I saw the Lord sitting upon a high throne. By the which sitting upon a Throne, although signifying royal glory and majesty, God doth not exalt or advance, but rather debase himself, and that for our sakes, that we by this means might get some conceit and knowledge of him into our minds: yet if we should continue and rest in these forms, without adding the difference unto them, we should not help, but hurt and hinder ourselves, and get not the knowledge, but the ignorance of God.   

Sect. 3.  
NOw let us go on, and see what creature in all the world is to be accounted likest unto God, and fittest to resemble his nature unto us, as we gathered it to be by the consideration of his works. The question is not hard to be answered: for this being taken for granted, that God having made all things, is far more excellent than any or all of them, it will follow, that that creature, which of all other, is most excellent, is the likest, and cometh nearest to the nature of God, and doth more fitly resemble him, than any of the other: as we know that among men, not any of the rascal sort, but some great Noble man or Prince of the blood, is most fit, in the absence or nonage of the king, to hold his place, and represent his person. For although every creature be good in his own kind, as (we read in Genes. 1. 31.) yet look how many divers kinds of creatures there are, so many divers degrees of goodness there are, the highest whereof are to be accounted excellent, as we see all the stars to be bright and glorious, yet the sun, moon, and some other, to be the most excellent in light & glory; as they were in the beginning, called by God himself by the name of great lights. Thus no man will deny but a common peeble stone, is better than a raw lump of clay, or a handful of earth: that a tree is more glorious than a stone, that a living beast excelleth a tree, that a reasonable man is better than a brute beast, an Angel than a man, and an Archangel than one of lower degree: and so will any man confess that God, whose infinite knowledge and wisdom, appeareth in the creation of the world, is not to be placed among the senseless and brutish creatures, but to be referred to the kind of reasonable things. And so indeed throughout the whole scripture, we see that God is content to take a place among his reasonable creatures, to be accounted to be of their nature and kind, as hath been showed out of Act. 17. 26. to call them, to wit, both men and Angels, his image and simililtude, and in that respect, his offspring, sons and children, yea to appear and show himself, in the form and shape, sometimes of the one, & sometimes of the other. But to come as near the mark, we aim at, as we can, although both the human & the angelical nature, be notable images, similitudes, and resemblances of God, yet as the Angels are far more excellent than men, so they are (in themselves) far more fit types and examples of the divine nature, than men are, for that they have many properties of the divine nature which man wanteth. For man is mortal and corruptible, but both the Angels and God are immortal and incorruptible: he consisteth of a medley of contrary qualities, continually iarting and fight together, until at length one destroy another: but their nature and substance is uniform, not wasting itself, or wearing away, but steadfast permanent, and the same for ever: he is visible, yea gross and palpable, but they are invisible, insensible, subtle, pure and spiritual: he hath little strength with much weakness, they have great power and might without impotency or infirmity: he hath knowledge with ignorance: truth with error: wisdom, with folly: will with perverseness and obstinacy: affection with passion and perturbation, love with lust: abundance with many wants, contentment with complaint: day with night: joy with sorrow: glory with shame: and happiness with misery: but they are perfectly wise, virtuous, mighty, glorious and happy.  
Yea, by this excellency above man, the Angelical nature is proved (against those who will not believe the word of God, unless their own senses say amen) to exist as a mean betwixt man and god, although far nearer the lower, than the upper extreme. For if there were no nature existing betwixt God and man, the distance and downfall would be greater than is meet, in respect of that dependence & coherence, which should be betwixt the creature & the creator, closely combined together without any such wide and abrupt gap, in order and due proportion. The which wide gap betwixt God and man, the angelical nature doth fill up, participating somewhat of each nature, as it were hanging and hovering in the middle region betwixt heaven and earth, having had a beginning with man, and n●w being immortal with God: void of all mixture as is God, and yet consisting of matter & form, as doth man: subsisting in some matter, subject and substance as doth man, yet being incorporeal as is God: able in a moment to be any where, as God always is every where, yet local, and circumscribed by place as is a man: being of wonderful capacity & knowledge, as is God, yet ignorant of some things, (as namely of the essence of God) as is man: & in one word, being every way finite as is man, yet perfect in all respects as is God. Thus we have by the degrees of the creatures, as it were by the stairs and steps of jacobs' ladder, climbed up to heaven, and leaving men with the rest of the earthly creatures, groveling here in the dust below, by the wings of Angels soared aloft to the divine nature, or rather (to speak more properly) toward it. Neither is it possible for us to go any higher, or to find more of God in any thing, than we have already found in the angelical nature. Whereupon our Saviour Christ doubteth not to put on God's back, this glorious rob of the angelical naure, having amongst all the forms and shapes in the world, none more excellent wherewith to invest him, and therefore he saith, Ioh 4. 24. God is a spirit, as he is elsewhere in scripture called an Angel, and an Archangel. But this saying is warily to be taken, and wisely understood, lest that in stead of true doctrine, we gather out of it a blasphemous heresy. For in truth, God is no more a spirit, or an angel, (the which two words, are in divinity to be accounted of the same signification and compass) than he is a soul or a body: what then may you say, is the signification of these words? Surely, they are not positive, but privative: they show not what God is, but what he is not, namely, that he is not a formal, visible, and sensible body. For so they contain in them, a refutation of that gross opinion of the carnal and hypocritical jews, who thought that an outward and bodily worship, void of the spiritual sincerity of the heart, would well enough fit and please God: as if a man having to deal with those heathenish idolaters, that think brute beasts or senseless stocks to be Gods, should say unto them, you are foully deceived in this point, for God is not a dead stock, or a brute beast, but rather to be resembled to a living man. So then, the meaning of Christ's words is this, God although in truth he be not a spirit or an angel, yet because that nature cometh nearer him, and doth more resemble him then any other, therefore he may fitly for your capacity be so called.   

Sect. 4.  
YOu remember I doubt not, that it was said, that there are three things required to the searching out of God's nature: first, a conceit of it in the mind, gathered by the effects of it: secondly a real example or pattern, wherein that conceit doth exist, and may be seen: and thirdly, the difference betwixt the conceit & the example the one being in abstracto, the other in concreto: the one existing only in the imagination of the mind, the other in some creature and real subject. The two first we have already gotten, the one out of the creatures, which have taught us the nature of God in general, the other we have found in the angels, who are a lively resemblance of the said divine nature: the third remaineth, to wit, the difference betwixt the pattern and the thing itself. For although we have already ascended, and come to the highest step of jacobs' ladder, for that it is impossible to find any more of the divine essence in any creature, than we ha●e already seen in the angelical nature, yet we are not at our journeys end, nor yet half way: for although there be as great difference betwixt Angels and men, as there is distance betwixt the heaven and the earth, yet there is ten times, yea ten thousand times greater odds betwixt the Angels and God, and the space is infinitely greater from the heaven of the Angels and saints, to the heaven of heavens, where God dwelleth. And therefore we are now in the last place, to seek out the difference, which exalteth the nature of God thus far, or rather thus infinitely above the Angels: this is the very true essential form of God, the which if it could be once named, the matter were at an end, the case clear, & much labour might be saved, which must be spent, or rather most profitably and happily bestowed, in guessing, conjecturing, & imagining that, by many properties, attributes, actions, and effects, which by this means might be fully known all at once. But it is not the will of God, neither were it profitable for us, that so inestimable a jewel should be so easily gotten: who would esteem the most precious pearls, if so be that they lay in the streets for the uptaking? and if the nature of God were once fully known, how could it afterwards be so earnestly sought and desired as is m●ete? Yet we are not to think that this impossibility of finding out the true form of God, cometh of God, as making dainty and dangerous of the knowledge of his nature, to make us eager & earnest in desiring to know it, although i● be true that hath been said, that it is better to have our appetite whetted and sharpened, by the hardness and impossibility of attaining it, than our stomachs cloyed with the full fruition of it: neither are we to think that God doth envy and grudge us so great a good, and so sweet a pleasure, or that in policy he keepeth himself close, not daring to show himself for fear of being censured or contemned by us: But this cometh of the shallowness of our brains, and the the weakness of out capacity, the which making it impossible for us to conceive it, maketh it impossible for God to reveal it.  Gent. 
I was in good hope to have heard at the next word, the very true essential form of God declared, and indeed that had been worth the hearing: but now I perceive you will reserve that for another time, or rather give it over for ever: wherein you deal wisely in my mind, for what folly were it for a man to beat his brains in pursuing that, which it were more than madness once to hope to attain. But I pray you, how will you do, to make your proud Lucifer a God.  Sch. 
We will do as we may sir: and if all should fail, I hope that you will help at a dead lift, according to your promise: but to proceed. Seeing that the true form of god's nature cannot be had, we must take in stead of it, some essential property flowing from the form, the which will make those things which are attributed to God, differ from the same things as they are in the Angels. For example, knowledge, wisdom, might and majesty, have place both in God, and also in the Angels, yet they are not alike in both: for in the Angels they are, although great and perfect, yet finite, but in god they are absolute and infinite. So then, if we add this difference of infiniteness to the Angelical nature, there will come forth a divine nature, which may not unfitly be described an angelical nature every way infinite: and so God be defined an infinite Angel, as an Angel may be said to be a spiritual man. For as surpassing excellency doth distinguish the Angelical nature from the human (for although they be both of one kind, to wit, reasonable, endued with wit, knowledge, wisdom, and will, yet they differ, in that the Angelical nature hath all these in far greater measure than hath the human) in like manner infiniteness doth distinguish the divine nature from the angelical, for they both being reasonable or understanding natures, endued with wit and will, and with all things belonging there unto, differ in this respect, that the one is excellent in understanding, knowledge, wisdom, will, power, purity, and glory, but the other is infinite in all these respects: the one hath all these things in an excellent measure, the other hath them without measure: the one hath much, the other hath all. And thus by gathering the nature of God out of his works and word, by finding out a pattern of it in the Angelical nature, and lastly, by adding unto this angelical nature that wherein it cometh short of God, we have in some sort made up the divine nature, or rather endeavoured to do that, which it is impossible to perform: for in this case, the least glimpse of the truth is to be esteemed knowledge.   

Sect. 5.  Gent. 
I Thank you for this pains which you have taken, in unfolding this deep and dark point of religion, the ground of all the rest: Indeed I confess, that as he that goeth up to the top of the highest mountain in the world, may far better see and consider the whole course and order of the stars and heavens, than he that lieth in the low valley, having his sight hindered by trees, hills, clouds, and other impediments: so he that hath his cogitations fixed on the celestial Angels, the highest and excellentest of all creatures, may in them behold the divine nature more clearly, than he that looketh only upon man, and other earthly creatures, in whom, although there be some resemblance of God, yet the grossness, corruption, and mortality of their bodies, being between our sight and the image of God in them, doth hinder us from the clear and plain beholding of it. Yet for so much as few can climb up to the top of this high hill, for that few off us that are unlearned, are so well acquainted with the angelical nature, as to have any certain idea or notion of it settled in our minds, I doubt that his demonstration of the divine nature by the angelical, which indeed, and to those that are learned, is the most fit and direct that can be imagined, will to us (who for the most part either doubt whether there be any such thing as an Angel in the world, or if we believe the scripture, telling us that there are such spiritual creatures, yet we know no further of them, than as we have seen them painted on signs with a pair of wings) will seem obscurum per obscurum, if not per obscurius: for that it will be as hard for them to suppose what an Angel is, as what God is. And therefore me thinks I could wish, that the divine nature could be declared and shadowed out unto us, by some other nature better known & more familiar unto us. Sch. It were dangerous, as that which might be an occasion of idolatry unto us, to take so great liberty in imagining the nature of God, as to resemble him to any visible thing: neither were it agreeable to the nature of God, who is invisible: & we know, that of all bodily creatures, there is none by nature invisible, save only the air. And surely if we must needs in respect of the vulgar capacity, or rather dullness & want of understanding have some familiar and easy example & resemblance of the divine nature, in my mind there is no elementary creature so fit for this purpose, as is this, which we have light on. For first, as no man doubteth but that this element of the air doth truly & substantially exist, although it cannot possibly be seen, no more are we to doubt, but that God doth most certainly exist, all though he cannot possibly be visibly seen. Thus doth Christ joh. 3. 8. by the invisibility of the wind, teach Nicodemus the secrecy of the spirit of God.  
The wind bloweth whither it listeth, thou hearest the sound of it, but knowest not whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth: even so is every one that is borne of the spirit, or so secret is the operation of God's spirit in reneving men. And without question, it is the safer and the better course, whensoever we think of God, and therefore must of necessity coin in our minds some idea or form of him, to resemble him to this invisible body, then to any beast or man, to the sun, moon, stars, or any other visible creature. Again, this element doth, (the which neither Angel, man, beast, nor any other creature can) very notably represent unto us the ubiquity of God? for it is every where, in every open place & secret corner, in the town, in the fields, and in the widest deserts: in the bowels of the earth, and in the bottom of the sea: within & without us, yea inseparably closing and compassing us about. So that if we do but stretch this element up to the heavens, supposing them to be made of this matter, (as sure the matter of them is not much unlike, neither can we more probably compare it to any thing, then to a pure and firm kind of air) & so in imagination above the highest heavens (although in truth, there be there neither air, body, nor place) we shall truly & plainly conceive of the ubiquity of god. A point of doctrine very needneedfull to be plainly declared & truly learned, for that most men do greatly and in truth very grossly err in it, by tying god to one certain place, and shutting him up in heaven, as it were a Bee in a Box, for that the Scripture doth often assign unto him that place: not meaning that he in essence is there, more than in this inferior world, but that there his glory and majesty do more clearly shine▪ From this foul error, another far worse doth spring, for by this means they exclude both God and his providence out of the world, & cast off all fear ●offending him, whom they think to be fa●●●●sent, & by the walls, doors, and windows of their closerts and chambers, kept from seeing or knowing their doings: whereas on the other side, if they were persuaded of his ubiquity & presence in all places, that he doth immediately compass them about, as doth the air, & sitteth as closely to them, as their shirts do to their backs: yea that he hath place even in their minds and hearts, as certainly as they do continually draw the air into their brains, and bodies, it could not be but that they should continually stand in awe of him.  
So then, (to let pass without any enlarging,) divers other respects, in the which this Element doth not unfitly represent unto us some properties and attributes of the divine nature, as that it is most mighty, making the very earth to shake, and rocking it too and fro like a little child in a cradle, that it is most subtle, piercing into every place, and passing through the least crack and narrowest cranny or chink: that it is the beginning of things, if we think as some Philosophers have done, that it is the first matter whereof being thickened and compacted together, the water and other things were made: that it is the preserver of our life, for that without it we cannot continue any space, but do presently perish: so that we may truly say of it, as the Apostle saith of the divine nature, Act. 17. 28. In it we live, we move, and have our being. But to let these things pass thus briefly▪ if we suppose a thousand worlds one above another, all of them replenished, with thi● primary, pure, simple, subtle, perching, invisible, yea insensible, (for of itself, not affected or distempered by any accidental quality, it is neither seen, heard, tasted, smelled, nor felt) this mighty, large, & universal creature, we shall have a pretty pattern and resemblance of the infiniteness, ubiquity, invisibility, pure simplicity, and piercing subtlety of the divine nature: for as I have often told you, we do not make any comparison between this or any other creature, and God the Creator, but only a resemblance, which may be, where there is no show of equality. As in this instance the air is to our sense and capacity, and in respect of other creatures, subtle, simple, perching, insensible, mighty, large, and universal: but in comparison of the divine nature, it is more gross, confused, blunt, palpable, weak, narrow, and wanting, then can be said. And therefore in resembling God in word or in imagination, either to Angels, or to the air, we must remember to add the difference, for otherwise we commit gross and heinous idolatry. For there is no creature in the world, which howsoever it be perfect in the own nature, yet if it be used as a resemblance of God, will not be found wanting in many respects. Man is indeed the image of God, yet he is too little and weak, to fill his chair of estate, yea indeed too gross for that purpose, how soever it hath pleased Gnd sometimes to reveal himself to Moses, Daniel, Esay, Exechiell, and other of his Prophets, in the likeness of a man, for some respect and signification. The Angels are not little, weak, and gross as man is, yet before we can make them a fit type of God, me must stretch them far beyond their own compass, even throughout the whole world. The air is large and universal, but it wanteth life, sense, and an internal beginning of motion: howsoever it move as nimbly as if it had a thousand lives: and therefore to make it a fit resemblance of God, we must inspire it with life, or rather (if we think that life is not properly attributed to God) with reason and understanding, the which without question doth most properly and essentially belong to God. And so we may for the weak capacity of the unlearned, describe God, supposing him to be a reasonable element of air, as before to the understanding of the learned, we made him to be an infinite Angel. Thus to make up and finish this pattern and picture of God, we are constrained to imitate Apelles that famous Painter, who going about and enterprising by the curiosity of his art and cunning, to counterfeit, yea to surpass the perfection of natural beauty, would not insist in any one particular, but out of diverse persons, made choice of that, which in each one of them seemed most excellent: taking from one the complexion and colour of the eye and hair, from an other the form and straightness of the nose: from the third the breadth and largeness of the forehead, & so forth, in all the other parts of the visage, until at length, with much ado, he got together into one face or countenance an exquisite and absolute, idea of beauty. In like manner we are not to think that any one creature is able to afford sufficient matter, whereof to make this infinite Image, that doth fill both heaven and earth, or that the shop of any creature (how excellent so ever) hath sufficient variety of colours, wherewith to set it forth, as the dignity of it doth require: it is well, if that all the perfections of all the creatures in the world, brought together into one picture, do make but a reasonable resemblance of him.  Gent. 
Indeed, I must needs confess, that you have now fitted me a penny worth, & served me in my kind: and as I cannot truly call myself either learned or altogithe unlearned (for I went long to the Grammar school and I was a year or two at the University, before I went to the Inns of Court) but rather a apparel betwixt both, so now I may choose, of whether side and sect I will be: and so worship, either the air with the common people, or with the learned your asspiring Lucifer, climbing up to the throne of god. Yet by your patience, as touching your airy god, although I confess that element to be fit than any other of these elementary bodies, yet me thinks, the the element of the fire would have served your turn better: considering that it is both far larger, as being higher, as also far more subtle and simple, more piercing and forcible, then is the misty and fogayre, as all men know and confess. Neither can you take exception against the visibility of it, as you make it very dangerous, and a great occasion of Idolatry, to resemble God to any visible thing: for although our fire here below, being composed of all the other elements, be visible and sensible, yet the element of fire as it is in the proper place and sphere, we see to be invisible.  Sch. 
The same reason that would not suffer you to rest contented in the similitude of the Angels, because as you say truly, their nature is greatly doubted of among the ignorant people, and in a manner unknown to the wisest, and therefore, it being dark and obscure in itself, is not fit to give light to any other thing: so I say of your fiery element, that although the Philosophers prove by good reasons, that howsoever it wete never seen, yet there is some such thing truly existing: for that otherwise there cannot be that perfect quaternity and correspondency of primary qualities, which is needful in the mixture of these inferior bodies: yet for as much as it is not so certain, but that some who thought themselves to be Philosophers, have doubted of it, and much more the common people, who do not weigh reasons, nor admit any other evidences for the proof of the true and lawful titles of assertions, save only their own senses, I thought, that I should fit your humour, and fulfil your request: which was, to have a plain and popular demonstration of the nature of God, not so well by this unknown and insensible element of fire, as with that other of the air, with the which, as with a daily companion and friend, that will not be kept out a doors, nor yet out from our hearts, we are so familiarly and so entirely acquainted.   

Sect. 6.  
THere I confess, you have answered me to the full, and given me as good as I brought: yet seeing I have begun to pick a quarrel with these discourses and definitions of the divine nature, so little learning as I have, I doubt not but that I could find a fault in them, that you should not wipe away so easily as you have done this, but I dare not be so bold with you.  Sch. 
I will be so far from thinking it boldness, that I shall think myself much beholden to you for so doing: yea it is a thing which both I may and do challenge of you, and you are bound by promise to perform: for I did not take upon me to deliver the whole truth of this doctrine as it were to speak undoubted oracles, but rather in hope that by our mutual helping one another, where either of us should chaunc● to go astray from the truth, to ●ifte out some part of the truth of this unsearchable mystery by our familiar reasoning too and fro of matters: and therefore, I can be well content, to be admonished, where I go astray.  Gent. 
Then to tell you plainly, me thinks that although these definitions which you bring, may have in them some substance of truth, and also some plausible show of popular facility, which I will not deny, yet they have no Art in the world in them, and for that cause are not only not curious, but even confused and obscure, and want that evidency, which you seemed in framing them wholly to affect.  
I have heard and read many discourses of this matter, yet never knew I any take such a course, as to define one thing by another, and to inmble up into one definition, things of divers natures, as you do in defining god, to be an infinite Angel, or a reasonable air: for thus you make a monster of him, as it were an Hermaphrodite, half of one nature, and half of another, half reasonable, and half unreasonable. You deal with me as men do with natural fools, when they cannot make them conceive that three and four make seven, but by a mathematical demonstration, setting seven leaven horse loans one upon another: so you heap up divers particulars in stead of one general. It had been a better course, if according to the old and ordinary manner of handling and defining, in the first place you had sought out the general kind or nature: (which you in the Schooler call the Genus in definition) to the which the divine nature doth belong, & is to be referred, & then to have added either the proper form, or (if that could not be found, as I think that in this case it cannot) some formal proopertie, pointing as it were with the finger at the unknown form. As in this example, you have found out of Act. 17. 29. the Genus or kind of God, to wit, that he is of the same kind and nature that man is, in respect not of his body, but of his soul: and indeed so he is, God is of a reasonable nature, for ●ee hath knowledge, wisdom, and will, 〈◊〉 which cannot have place but in a reasonable nature.  
Now thisis but the genus of the definition, for both men and Angels are reasonable natures, and therefore you must add the difference, which distinguisheth God from all other reasonable natures: but how can you make this infiniteness to contain in it, all the attributes of God's nature I see not as yet: and so you define God infinite reason, or the infinite reasoble nature. But I pray you proceed in declaring it, and pardon my boldness in telling you my foolish opinion thus plainly.  Sch. 
It is not so easy for a man to do right himself, as it is to find fault with an other, as it may be you will confess anon, when we change places, and you become the speaker, and I the censurer. I know that definitions should consist of one general notion, not of divers particular instances, yea I could have done thus much myself, for it is nothing: but upon yourmotion and request I took that other course, which if it be rude and void of art, blame yourself, who were the procurer of it: yea I did mean to bring at length, the proper and true definition, void of all metaphorical similitudes, as namely that God is as you say, infinite reason, or r●ther an infinite understanding, the which is t●● fittest definition of him, that I can now think of. Yet surely for my own part, I do not so much trust my own wit in conceiving aright of the nature of God, but that I should be glad in learning it, to have the help of a type or particular example to direct me. But in one thing, you do me manifest wrong, in that you say, that I make a monster of the divine nature, compounding it of the Angelical, human, and elementary natures. I dare warrant you, that the difference which was brought, to wit, infiniteness, being put to the definitions, or to the aforesaid natures, will so purge them, that there shall not be one dram of the dross of any created nature left in them. Yea, try it when you will, and you shall find it to be the right Philosopher's stone, which turneth all metals into gold, and that one dram of it being put, not only to an Angel, or to a whole element, but even to the least fly in the world, or the least mote in the Sun, is of force to make it true and very god.  
For first it maketh it to be the primary and authentical nature, or (if this word import generation to the ear of a curious grammatist) the first essence derived from none other, for than it was contained in that other, and then it was finite, for the thing containing, is the limit and bounds of that which is contained.  
Secondly, this infiniteness maketh it to be but one, because there cannot be two infinits: for where there are two, there is division of the one from the other: & where there is division, there is the end of the one, and the beginning of an other, and so no infinite. Thirdly, infiniteness maketh the subject to be immaterial, and incorporeal, for no matter or body can be infinite, for a body is of necessity contained and circumscribed by a place, but if it be contained, than it is not infinite: whereof it followeth, that the infinite thing being without matter, is also without passion, for sola materia patitur: and so it be cometh also immutable, for there can be no change without passion. Fourthly, infiniteness maketh a thing to be immovable, for whatsoever moveth, hath terminos, a quo & ad que●, that is, it moveth hither and thither, but in infinito non sunt termini. And lastly, the infinite thing is simple, void of all manner of composition: for in composition there is division and quality, and so by consequent, there are limits. And thus we are to think of the divine nature, that although it be of the kind of reasonable natures as some creatures are, yet in that it only is infinite, it is sufficiently distinguished from them all: and is made first primary or authentical, without cause or beginning, but existing absolutely in himself, and of himself. Yea as he is himself without cause, or beginning, so he is to all the other things, the cause and beginning: he is the root and fountain, from the which all natures and beings, do spring and proceed: coming from him, yet not diminishing him, having all their essence, but no part of his essence from him. For this also is a proper effect of the infinite, to be the original of all things, the which if they came from any finite thing, they should at length draw it dry, and so the nature or being of all the things in the world should perish, or being preserved by mutual transinutation, yet they want an omnipotent agent to begin them. For (by the confession of all men) the first creation of the world, requireth a power not limited, but infinite, for that it is impossible to any finite power, to create: that is, to make something of nothing: & if the power be infinite, the subject wherein it is, must be of the same nature. Again, God is one and but one, because he is God, to wit, that infint nature, which is sufficient of itself, to occupy, & fill ten thousand wordls: neither can abide to be justled by a pewfellow, but must sit and reign alone: this point of doctrine the whole world, even the jews and Turks do hold, abhorring all sound or show of any plurality of Gods.  
Again, God is immaterial and incorporeal, not existing as we do in earthly and corruptible bodies, or as the Angels do in some more pure, solid and firm subjects, which may in some sense be called bodies, or in the most subtle and pure matter that can be imagined, but as a pure actual and substantial form, subsisting of itself. And therefore we are (interpreting every doubtful thing, in the best sense) to think that Tertullian giving a body not only to the Angels, but even to God himself, meant him to be not a fantastical imagination, or an accidental quality of some other thing, but a true, real, substantial, and essential nature, subsisting as truly and really as doth a body which we see and feel. Otherwise, by giving God a body, we take from him his infiniteness, & so his divine nature, making him local, mutable and movable. The which are in no case to be admitted: for God is not contained in any place, but containeth in himself all places, bodies and natures whatsoever, 1, King. 8. 27. How shall God dwell in this house, when as the heaven of heavens cannot contain and comprehend him? Neither is he subject to mutation, passion or alteration, as he should of necessity be, if he were material, but is the same this day, and yesterday, now and for ever.  
Lastly, we are not to admit motion in the divine nature, for that in motion, there is a possibility of good, or some degree of perfection, which is not yet in act, nor attained unto, and so there would be imperfection in God: but the divine nature is not in any moving possibility tending to any other state, but is ever in complete act and in absolute perfection, and resteth and remaineth in itself without motion, far more firm, and steadfast, then is any Rock in the sea, or the earth or whatsoever can be imagined most immovable: moving all things, yet he himself resting, for all things tend to him, but he to nothing. Lastly, the divine nature is most simple and uniform, all alike throughout all: void of all mixture, composition, combination, division or dissimilitude.  
It is not compounded of matter and form, for it is a form needing no matter, wherewith to be upheld, or wherein to exist, but upholdeth itself, and subsisteth in itself: In it there is not cause and effect, for it is an efficient without an effect, and of that which is no effect, even of itself: It is a totum, a whole without parts, for it is every where the same, and like itself, or rather itself, and therefore cannot be diversely divided, or distinguished into parts: and if our finite cogitations must needs make him have parts, & conceive him by piecemeal and parts, because we cannot take the whole, then must we needs make every part to be the whole: and lastly, it is a substance without accidents, for nothing can either accidere or accedere to that which already is all and infinite, neither doth it, as other substances do, extenuate itself into accidental qualities, but whatsoever it sendeth forth from itself (or rather to itself, for from itself it cannot go) that is itself, not any way extenuated, but remaining in the same plight, which it had before.    

CHAP. III. Of the faculties of man's soul attributed to God.  

Sect. 1.  Gent. 
HItherto you had my company, and I was glad of yours, but since you entered into the handling of this infiniteness, which you make the difference of the divine nature, distinguishing it from other reasonable natures, you have flown so clean out of my sight, that I have no hope of ourtaking you. For if you thus exempt God's nature from all logical relation of substance and accident, of subject & adjunct, of essence and attributes, by the which distinction, it is (as you know) usually declared and laid open, you will take away all means, either of teaching, or of learning and conceiving it.  Sch. 
You mistake my meaning, which was not to exempt God from all logical relation, and the grounds and rules of reason, without the which, I confess, that neither the divine, nor any other nature, can be either declared or learned, or in truth exist in itself. For reason and logic, which is the act and operation of reason, stretch themselves over all things that exist, howsoever they exist whether finitely or infinitely, although (in us) it cannot fully comprehend, that which is infinite, yea and a little further too, even to those things, which do not exist. As for the divine nature, it is as hath been said, an essential and infinite reason, or understanding, even the foundation and fountain of all reason: and therefore, we cannot think that it should abolish or destroy reason, for so it should destroy itself: but rather are to acknowledge that it doth establish it, and agree unto it. Indeed the grounds and principles of natural Philosophy, as they have been laid down by heathen Philosophers (who having little or no knowledge of God, had the more leisure to look into natural things) do fight with the grounds of divinity, and by not admitting any actual infinite, do destroy the nature of god, as in other points we know, that the best Philosopher that ever was, was but a sorry divine, yet we may not in any wise think, that reason and divinity do jar or cross each one the other, the which indeed are both one in effect: and therefore neither I, nor any other (unless he be void both of natural & also of artificial logic) can doubt or deny that God hath substance, essence, nature, form, yea his proper attributes and effects: and the distinction of essence and attributes, which all Divines make in handling the nature of god, is good & true. They deny indeed, that there are any accidents in God, and say that whatsoever is in God, is the essence of God, but then they mean by accidents, separable and mutable qualities, and by essence, essential and inseparable properties.  
So there are no accidents in God, as in a man or an Angel are knowledge, wisdom, purity, holiness, strength, and happiness, which are no part of their nature or essence, nor yet essential properties, for they may be removed and separated from their subjects, as we know that many both men and angels are ignorant, foolish, wicked, vile, weak and miserable: but nothing that is in god, or doth belong unto him, can be augmented, diminished, or any way altered, for as he is once at any time, so is he always at all times. Yet it cannot be denied, but that god hath his essential properties or attributes, and that they are and may be truly and really distinguished from his substance, essence, or form, and some things (I confess) are attributed to God, in respect of our weakness, which are not proper, but rather contrary unto the nature of God, as namely, the parts and senses of man's body, as hands, eyes, feet, going, seeing, and likewise the passions and perturbations of men, as anger, fury, hatred, revenge, repenting, forgetfulness, and divers other: all which are as far discrepant from the nature of god, as darkness is from light: and therefore they are to be understood as improper, and metaphorical speeches, borrowed from our nature, to represent & make known unto us, the divers actions of God. Again, God is the Creator, Preserver and Redeemer of the world: these attributes and many others of the same kind, are truly given to him, yet they are not to be accounted his essential attributes, because they are not coeternal with God: therefore not inseparable, although creation import omnipotency, and so an essential attribute. Besides, there are divers other things attributed to God, but the true and essential attributes of God, are those which arise and spring from his essence and form, as naturally, necessarily, directly, continually, and immediately as the beams, light and heat issue from the sun, yea as do the streams from a fountain, & the twigs and branches, from the root and body of the tree: as namely, ubiquity, eternity, unity, simplicity, & omnipotency, these are y● essential attributes of god, arising necessarily from his essential form: to wit, from an infinite understanding and reason, (the which we are constrained to make the substitute and vicegerent of the essential form of God) the which must of necessity (as hath been said and showed) be eternal, illocall, one, simple and omnipotent, yea omniscient and infinite in many other respects: yet these attributes are not the essence and form of God, for they are divers one from each other, as ubiquity is not unity, nor unity eternity, but the essence of God is not divers.  Gent. 
The difference which you make betwixt the essence and essential properties of God, as I take it, is this: that the essence is as it were the foundation, fountain, substance, head, beginning, and root, and the attributes, the top, streams, existence, inferior members, end, fruit and in brief, they come from the essence of God: is not this your meaning?  Sch. 
You say true, and I thank you for explaining it more fully than I could have done: but what of that?  Gent. 
Then I pray you let me ask you this question, why may you not make some or all of the atttributes, the essence and form of God, as well as the infinite understanding of God, or at the least, why do you not make the understanding of God one of his attributes, as I am sure that usually Divines do, who put the knowledge and wisdom of God in the forefront of his attributes? I might trouble you with other objections, for by this distinction of God's essence from his attributes, you seem to make prius and posterius, one thing before an other in God: and also to take away the uniformity and equality of God's essence, for that the beginning, root, and head, is more essential, than the progress, fruits and members: but I know you would say, that I do but cavil and trifle with you: for that it is no absurdity to say, that in God one thing is before another, in order, though not in time, as the understanding is to the will: and to the other you may say, that the head is no more essential to a man then is the foot, nor the root, than a little twig, and therefore I pray you, resolve me for that other matter, and let these pass.  Sch. 
You might have let that pass too, for any great hardness that is in it: as will plainly appear, if you consider the same distinction in men, or rather in Angels, fo● they have essential attributes proportionable (though not comparable) to these in God: for they have successive ubiquity (for they can be any where in a small space of time: and for the eternity, or rather sempiternity of god, they have immortality: for his simplicity, they have great subtlety: and for his omnipotency, great power and might: yet the beginning and foundation of their essence is in none of these, but in their reason or understanding, the which only giveth the denomination of a person to the subject in the which it is, whether it be in the creatures or in god. Yea, it doth more properly make the subject excellent, then doth any other respect: as namely, a man endued with understanding, hath more of the image and similitude of God, and is in that respect more excellent than is the whole earth, being but a dead and senseless lump of clay, as it is said Eccles. 9 4. That a quick dog is better than a dead Lion, and as we know, that the least bird that flieth in the air, is more admired, & counted more excellent, than the hugest mountain in the world that standeth stone-sti●. So that living things excel those which want life, as reasonable men excel brute beasts, as wise men excel fools, as much as light doth darkness, Eccles. 2. 13. as Angels surpass men, as far as the heaven doth the earth, in purity and subtility, so doth the infiniteness of God's understanding, (not of his quantity, time or power) extol God above all things, and in the first place makes him God. As for the method which divers Divines use, in putting the knowledge and wisdom of God among his attributes, in that they put them in the forefront of them, as you say truly, it is plain that they make them the beginning and foundation of the rest: yea, I could show you some of the latest of them, which make the knowledge and wisdom of God to be his life: and by life we know that all things are said to exist. And therefore, howsoever it be impossible for us to sound the depth of the divine essence, and to show fully and plainly, wherein the form of it doth consist, yet forsomuch as we need not doubt, but that of all that is in scripture attributed to God, and said to be in him, his infinite understanding hath the first place, both in excellency, and also in order of nature, we may be bold to make it the root, fountain, and foundation of his essence, and the rest of his attributes the branches, streams, and progress of it. For in the first place God is a substance, nature or essence, truly subsisting: then he is to be accounted, not a dead and unreasonable, but a reasonable and understanding nature: thirdly, not a finite, but an infinite understanding, whereof it followeth, that he is eternal, illocall, simple, one and omnipotent.  Gent. 
Now I do perceive your meaning, neither will I gainsay it, or deny but that God is to be thought to be an understanding nature or essence, and that infinite, having the aforesaid attributes belonging unto it: But whether shall the understanding or the infiniteness of God have the first place assigned unto it?  Sch. 
These two can no more be severed, then can the fire and heat, neither is the one before the other in time, nature, or being, both existing together eternally: yet in the order of logical relations and respects, as god is an essence before he is an understanding essence, so is he an understanding or reasonable nature, before he is infinite. Neither are we to think, that the essence of God consisteth simply in infiniteness, but in an understanding, or (if any other thing can be named, which cometh nearer to the essence of God) in some other thing, that is infinite: for the essence of God is not privative only, but most truly and properly positive.   

Sect. 2.  Gent. 
YOu have satisfied me fully, and I thank you hearty for your pains, in explaining unto me that point of religion, which of all other I have always desired to havesom insight into: neither do I know what now to desire of you, unless it please you to go on in the particular explication of these attributes of the divine nature, and to begin with the understanding which you make not an attribute, burr rather the very essence of God, or at the least, that which cometh nearer unto it, than any other thing doth that we know.  Sch. 
Indeed the first place in the treatise of God's nature, is worthily assigned to his knowledge, or rather to his essential understanding, the which must either be made God's essence, or else we must confess that we know not what itis, or wherein it doth consist: but to declare the true nature & manner of it, is as far above my reach, as the heaven is above my head. Yet some little knowledge of it, the scripture doth afford us, to this effect, that the knowledge, reason, or understanding of god, is his infinite essence, knowing all things actually always.  Gent. 
Do you make the knowledge and the understanding of God, to be all one, or is there some difference betwixt them?  Sch. 
I do mean but one thing by them both, to wit, that part (for so I may speak tho improperly) of God's essence, which in order hath the first place: and I thought it best to use divers words, to signify one thing for plainness, and the greater evidence of the matter: for the one, to wit, knowledge, is the more usual term, and yet the other seemeth to be the more proper and significant. For as in a man or Angel, knowledge is one thing, even a separable or accidental quality, which is often wanting, as we see in many men, who are (in a manner) altogether destitute of knowledge: and the mind, understanding, or reasonable soul, another thing, to wit, the very essential form: so in God we may say that the same thing is both his understanding, as it subsisteth in itself, and also his knowledge, as it hath relation to other things, namely to the creatures: and so knowledge as it is in the creature a separable or accidental quality, so in God (in whom there is no mutation) it is an essential attribute arising from his understanding, which is his essence. For if the world had never been made, nor to have been made, we could not in proper speech have said that God had the knowledge of it, for so he should have known that which was not: but that cannot be: for things which never exist, are never known in particular, howsoever they might and should have been known in abstract and general notions. So that the knowledge of God properly taken, & precisely distinguished from his understanding, is his understanding actuated or brought into act, yet not so large as is his understanding, which is infinite, whereas gods knowledge of the world or of the creatures, neither is nor can be infinite, for that God neither hath already created infinite particulars, neither yet in truth can do it, because so there should be two infinits, one created or made, and the other the maker of it: for howsoever to our weak understanstandings, not only all the particulars which have happened or shall happen in the world, but even a asmall part or portion of them, seem infinite, yet to God, they altogether are finite and numerable.  Gent. 
You seem to make the knowledge of God to be his understanding, not as it is subsisteth in itself, but as it is actuated and hath relation to the things that are known.  
But by this means you incur two great inconveniences: first in making it finite, the which you confess, although in my mind it is not to be admitted, for all Divines make the knowledge of God infinite: and secondly, in making it to be accidental, and not of absolute necessit● in God. This will plainly follow, if the knowledge of God be limited to the things in the world which are known: for although it was necessary that the world should be created, God having so decreed, yet this necessity is not absolute, because God might have existed, though he had never made the world, and then he should have wanted this knowledge of things, because the things themselves were wanting.  
This supposal is not altogether vain and frivolous, for God as he did exist without the world, before the creation of it, so we cannot doubt, but that he might have done so still and for ever: otherwise we should fall into that gross absurdity of some Philosophers: who to make the world eternal, make it essential to God, and to follow him as necessarily, inseparably, and as we say, as hard at heels, as the shadow doth the body, the which I doubt not, but you condemn as most absurd.  
We are rather (in my mind) & so others also think and write) to acknowledge not one●y the understanding, but even the knowledge of God to be infinite, in that it stretcheth itself not only to the creatures, but even to God himself: whereof it will follow, that it is both infinite, (for whatsoever knoweth and comprehendeth that which is infinite, is itself infinite) and also essential to God, because it is not only eternal, as is the knowledge of the creatures in God (although it be not of absolute necessity) but also absolutely necessary, because it cannot be supposed, that God could exist without the knowledge of himself. Yet I will not wholly reject or deny this distinction which you make of the understanding of God from his knowledge: for although of all God's attributes, his knowledge doth most properly and immediately flow from his understanding, yet me thinks that there is a difference to be put betwixt God and his knowledge, as well as betwixt God and his power: yet for so much as through ignorance of God's true form, we are not able to declare the nature of his essential understanding, (the which we are constrained to put in the place of his form) hereof it cometh, that we are not able to distinguish this essential understanding of god from his actual knowledge. And therefore leaving the knowledge of god's form; essence, and (as we make it) of his essential understanding to himself, who only either doth or can know it, let us I pray you, proceed in considering this his actual knowledge.  Sch. 
I like well of that you have said, and do think you for showing me wherein I err: yet this I may say for myself, that unless you had in a manner compelled me to imagine or coin this or some such distinction, I should not have mentioned it: but to proceed. It was said of God, that he knoweth all things actuallly, always. For the first, it is plain and not greatly doubted of by any, that all the actions of the creatures, and whatsoever doth any way happen unto them, is as manifest unto God, as is the sun at noon: he doth see with eyes, which need no light, for darkness and light are all one to him: the heart of man is deep and deceitful above all things, yet he soundeth the depth of it, seeing and perceiving his most secret thoughts, as plainly as if they were things done in the sight of the whole world: the which thing, although it seem most impossible, and be incredible to many, yet we know assuredly 〈◊〉 ●r●●h of it, both by the word of God, and also by manifold experience: and no marvel, seeing that he hath framed and fashioned them, he hath made the eye and care, and therefore must of necessity both see & hear. Neither doth the infiniteness (as it seemeth to us) of the particulars which happen in the world, hinder this universal knowledge of God: for they all are to him, not only not infinite, but a few in comparison of those which he might & should know if they were to be known, that is, if they did exist. It hath be even admired in some great men, that they have been of such capacity & readiness of wit, as to be able at one instant to mind divers matters, and to indite to two or three Secretaries as fast as they could write: for why? as we, our outward senses and inward faculties, are not many, but one particular, so they cannot well stretch themselves at once to many divers objects, for then Pluribus intent us minor ad singula sensus.  
But it is not so with God, who although in truth he be but one particular nature and essence, not many or divers, yet he is more large & universal, than the whole, yea then a thousand worlds. And so if we consider the proportion of his infiniteness to all things existing, we shall find, that it is far easier for God to know and mind at once, all the particulars which either have been, are, or are to be, then for one of us to think on any one particular thing or matter. As if (that we may use the similitude of the divine essence which was brought before) we should suppose a man or an Angel to be of so large a brain and understanding as is the whole element of the air, the which we know to be every where, if it be not kept out by some more solid body, and that every part of it were of sufficient virtue to conceive and know: we than should not mavell, if at one instant he did know and consider of all the things in the world, and that without any confusion of wit: how much more than shall we graune this universal knowledge to God, who is far more universal than the air, he being not only about things, but even in the midst also of the most hard and solid stone, and not excluded by it, or by any body out of any place: yea he being wholly every where with every man, yea with every pi●e of grass on the earth, and with every corn of sand on the sea: and how then can we marvel, that he should be able to know all things at once? In the second place we are to consider, that God knoweth himself, and also the whole course of all things actually, that is, he doth not attain to the knowledge of it by doubtful reasoning, discourse and consequence of one thing from another, but seethe it existing as certainly as if it were actually existing and present with him. Otherwise, if God did attain to the knowledge of things, by way of uncertain discourse, it would follow, that his knowledge is sometimes potential and imperfect, not having as yet attained to the thing it aimeth, but being only in the way towards it: whereas we are to think, and hold for a most certain truth, that the whole course, order, beginning, progress and end of the world, is and h●th been always from everlasting, seen and known by him, and that without successive discourse, & by one perfect and comp●e●e act of knowledge: the which we say in the third place, to be eternal in God, not that he needed so long a time for premeditation, how to devise and dispose things, so as they should all agree together in tending to one & the same end for the which he decreed them: for in this respect, the whole frame and c●u●se of the world, may be said to be extemporal, & as we use to say, nasci sub stilo: that is, to be penned and made without any premeditation: ●or to him, the least time is as good as a thousand years for devise: yet we are to think, that the frame of the world was not devised when it was made, nor a little before, but that the idea and pattern of it, hath plainly & fully existed in God from all eternity, as the spitit of God witnesseth almost every where in the scripture, speaking of the eternal love and purpose of God toward his elect.  Gent. 
You say, that god knoweth all things actually always, and I think you say true: yet I am sure you know the old exception & objection, which hath been always made against this doctrine, not only by heathen Philosophers, but also by Christian Divines, who grant this to be true in all those actions which God worketh, either immediately by himself, or by the means of those creatures which are not endued with liberty of will: in all which they grant that there may be an appointed order & course, which shall certainly come to pass, because the things thus disposed are not at their own disposition, so as they might break the order set by God, but are wholly governed by God, who never changeth his purpose or determination in any thing which he hath apponted: but as for the will of man, the which they say, is in itself most free, yea as free as the will of God himself, because otherwise it is not will, that they say must be exempted from the foreknowledge, (at least from the necessary foreknowledge) & fore appointment of god, for that it is wholly at the own disposition, and not controlable by any other, howsoever it may be hindered by a superior power from bringing itself into perfect act, yea or from existing also: yet as long as it doth exist in his place and subject, that it cannot be barred of free choice in any thing that is propounded unto it. And that for this cause it will not stand, and therefore cannot be placed in any set and constant order, it being so slippery, uncertain, yea as it were altogether lawless, unruly and exorbitant: what think you of this point?  Sch. 
Surely I have always thought it to be very hard and intricate, and that it was no marvel to see many so troubled and graveled in it, that they could not possibly see how the will of man could be yoked by any necessity of God● decree, and yet left in the natural freedom. But that wh●ch is impossible with man, is possible with God, who hath taught us in his word, as touching the foreknowledge of things contingent, as are the issues and elections of man's free will, that not only the senseless, but even the reasonable creatures with all their actions are ordered by him: and that for that end and purpose, not only the persons, words, and deeds, but even the most secret thoughts of their minds and inclinations of their wills, are both seen and also foreseen of God, who doth accordingly direct and dispose of them, as seemeth best unto him: yet the freedom of the will remaineth (as indeed it cannot be taken away unless the will itself, yea the creature itself, wherein the will resteth, be abolished) not having any kind of violence offered unto it, but moving itself of itself, which way it pleaseth: even as we see a man sitting on his horse, doth not carry the horse, hither & thither, but is carried by the horse, who goeth on by his own free will, yet guided and ruled by the rider, and directed to that place which he hath appointed. As we plainly see in Adam, transgressing God's commandment given as touching the forbidden fruit: the action was voluntary and contingent in respect of Adam, who might have abstained if he had would, for GOD did no way compel him or impel his will to eat the forbidden fruit, but did both by promises and by threatenings dissuade him from it. Yet there is no question to be made of it, but that GOD had as certainly foreseen and foreappointed it, as if he had resolved to compel Adam by outward violence, or by inward compulsion of his mind and will, to eat it. And so we are to think of all other the like cases, that God doth plainly foresee, that this or that without fail will be the issue and effect, though the causes be ambiguous, contingent, and as like in our eyes to bring forth the contrary effect: for he seethe easily, what motives are in the mind to move the will, and what force each of them hath to sway it hither or thither.  Gent. 
Yet you have not so fully resolved this doubt, as I do desire. For even Cicero himself, or whosoever other is most peremptoric in exempting man's will from God's providence, will confess, that contingent things may be foreseen in the causes (though not in the effects themselves) when they do plainly prevail, and oversway the one side the other: yet they affirm, that the will of man, setting itself of purpose to the full use of the natural freedom & nimbleness, may dispose itself to a me●e contingency, which cannot possibly be foreseen, because it will choose and work, not by the means or inducement of any motive whatsoever, which would bewray the intent and issue, but freely of itself, and to no other intent, but to show the absolute sovereignty of it own power.  Sch. 
I have already told you, what I have gathered out of God's word, as touching this point of his foresight of contingent things. I for my part, do rest herein, and so I wish that you would do without any curious inquisition into their needless questions, whereof it is best to let them dispute, while they list, and to determine when they can: In the mean time we will proceed, and speak somewhat of the wisdom of God, the which is, besides his knowledge, usually attributed unto him.   

Sect. 3.  Gent. 
INdeed, I have often heard, that in men knowledge and wisdom may be not only distinguished, but even quite separated the one from the other, as it is usually said of you scholars, that the greatest Clerks are not the wisest men: yet I thought that in God, knowledge and wisdom were all one, and not to be distinguished.  Sch. 
I have heard as much myself, but I never thought him of whom I heard it, eythe more learned, or the more wise for saying so if he spoke as he thought: and yet I know that they are diverse, and different things, as are speculation and practice. But (to come to the matter) in God they are not two diverse things, but one and the same thing diversely considered: for knowledge is a general notion and speculation, which when it cometh to be put in practice in the making, ordering and disposing of the creatures, is called wisdom, to the which the counsels and decrees of God (whereof hereafter) are to be referred: and so knowledge is of simple, but wisdom of compound things, joining together in perfect order and agreement those things, the natures whereof, were before fully known. Gent. You fall again into the same error you did before, in limiting and restraining the knowledge of God to the creatures, which doth infinitely stretch itself abroad even to God himself, and so showeth it self to be infinite: so now also you tie his wisdom, which in my mind, you may more rightly extend, so as it may belong also to God himself. For howsoever as he existeth eternally himself alone, he needeth not to be ordered by any wisdom, neither can properly be said to be ordered by his own wisdom: for that order hath place, not in one simple nature existing in itself, both immutably and also immovably, without any possibility of variance, discord, or confusion, but rather in diverse things, whose natures being different, are by wisdom conjoined together in good agreement: yet in that it pleaseth God of his goodness so to debase himself, as to have any dealings with hi● creatures, in this respect even God himself and his actions are to be ordered disposed and guided: that as the creatures are made to agree among themselves, so they may agree with God also their Creator, to their own happiness and his glory.  Sch. 
You are too curious to be pleased, & too cunning to be taught: I speak of things after the common and usual manner, according to the which, the object of God's wisdom, are his creatures, and not himself: yet I confess that this distinction which you bring, is true and not to be rejected. But as touching this wisdom of God, shining every where in the world, it is highly extolled in the scripture, as being most wonderful and pleasant to behold. And no doubt, but that it is a great happiness, that a man hath this grace given him of God, and his eyes opened to consider and acknowledge it in any measure. For if the Queen of Saba were so ravished with the report, and much more with the sight of salomon's wisdom, appearing in his fit & sound answers, sayings, sentences, and proverbs, containing in them great depth of knowledge, and also in the practice of his life (whereby he turned his speculative knowledge into practical wisdom) in the orderly constitution of his house and kingdom, and the right contriving of all matters belonging thereunto, that she thought her travel in coming to hear, see and behold it, well bestowed, and the servants of Solomon, most happy men, for that they making their daily attendance in his Court and presence, had singular opportunity of knowing and considering it: how much more happy a thing are we to esteem it to have the wisdom of God revealed unto us: from the which, as from the sun shining in the firmament, this dim candle of salomon's wisdom received light. If salomon's house and kingdom were so well appointed and so wisely ordered, that it wrought in the beholder's admiration, yea astonishment and unspeakable pleasure, how much more excellent shall we think the orders of God's house to be, whether we consider the world in general, which is the outward court, into the which, all both holy & profane are admitted: but much more, if we consider the Temple itself, to wit, his Church, wherein he is served and worshipped, and wherein he doth reveal his glory in Christ & his Gospel, after a special manner: but most of all, if we consider his glory in the holy of holiest, to wit, in the heavens, & in the heaven of heavens, where the Apostle heard, and we may imagine, things not to be uttered. First then, when as we come into the outward Court of his Palace, and consider either the whole frame of the world, or the particular creatures therein contained: how every thing is so curiously contrived in itself, so correspondent to the rest, we shall see how truly wise Solomon doth acknowledge the incomparable wisdom of God, in the creation of the world. Prou. 3. jy. 20. The Lord through wisdom, hath laid the foundations of the earth, and hath established the heavens through understanding: by his knowledge the depths are broken up, and the Clouds drop down the dew. If we should enter into particulars where should we begin, or how should we ever make an end? what profession is there in the world, which would not think it great madness, not to mention that about the which it is convetsant, as a most pregnant witness of the infinite wisdom of God? how doth the Astronomer with endlesseadmiration and astonishment, gaze upon the stars, and is never satisfied with beholding their brightness, counting their number, demonstrating their greatness, observing their virtues and influence not to speak of those, as not worthy to be mentioned, who with the heathen worship the Sun, Moon and Stars, by ascribing all operations and effects unto them: neither yet to rove abroad in these large fields, which yield as many arguments of God's wisdom, as the earth doth piles of grass, but to keep at home in our own houses: how infinitely, and yet how worthily do Physicians extol the frame of man's body, how every part is so wisely and warily devised to avoid all harms and inconveniences, which might happen: neither do our bodies, alone that, but even the lowest flower, that groweth out of the earth, (the which if it can be but rudely counterfeited in wood, stone or colour, workmen think their cunning, and Princes their Palaces highly advanced) yea the silliest worm that creepeth on the ground and the least fly that floateth in the air,, declare the same. For the which purpose the study of natural Philosophy is to be accounted, as pleasant so also very profitable, and worthy to be followed by Christians, as their gifts and callings do permit: for without question, they that go down into the depth of it, see the wonderful wisdom of God. But if we enter into the inner Court of God's Palace, to wit, into his Church, and there consider his dealings with it from time to time, the small beginnings, the slow progress, the mean knowledge which it had in the first ages, as it were in the infancy of it, and how in these latter ages, it hath so mightily prevailed & so stretched itself so far abroad into the world, still fleeting and moving as doth the Sun in the outward Court) from the Eastern to the Western countries and kingdoms: But if we step a little further into it, and there consisider the deep mysteries of knowledge, and wisdom, contained in the bowels of the scripture, the unsearchable obscurity of enigmatical Oracles mocking the sharpness of all human wit, the agreement of ceremonies with the body, of the types, with the things signified, of punishments with sins: but especially, if we consider in the three fold state of man himself, first the stately building of this Palace, begun in Adam, than the miserable ruin of it in his fall and lastly, the glorious repairing of it'm Christ the second Adam●, it cannot be but that we shall burst forth with the Apostle into admiration of it, and say O the depth of the knowledge and wisdom of God, how unsearchable are his judgements, and his ways past finding out? and agree to the truth of that, Eph. 3. 10. that the wisdom of god, showed in the church is so great, that the Angels in heaven do & may well admire it: and as it is Col. 1. 3. that in Christ and in the matter and mystery of the Gospel, the very treasures of God's wisdom are both hid and revealed. Lastly, if we should draw a little nearer, and with confidence enter into the glorious presence of God in heaven, where there are no clouds or mists, to keep from us the clear sunshine of his wisdom, all his counsels, decrees, devices and dealings, being unfolded, and fully accomplished, we should then say as the Queen of Saba said of salomon's wisdom, and the unspeakable pleasure conceived by the beholding it, that the report which goeth on earth and in the church of the wisdom of God, yea the conceit which we have in our minds of it, how great soever it be, is as nothing to the thing itself. But I will not be so presumptuous, as to take in hand this argument, or to attempt to set forth the wisdom of God, as it shineth in the world, and in the Church, and much more fully, (although as yet not so plainly to us) in heaven: It were an argument fit for the tongues or pens of Angels then of men, and whereof we may say, that if all should be written, that might be brought to that purpose, the whole world would scarce suffice to hold the books which would be written.   

Sect. 4.  Gent. 
WHat followeth to be considered in the nature of God?  Sch. 
Surely even that, that followeth the understanding in the nature of man, from the which we borrow all these attributes, as types and similitudes of the nature of God, and so we do after a sort put our own coat on God's back, or rather put our whole nature both the body and especially the soul upon his divine nature, as he himself did in the incarnation of Christ, that so we may see & know that, which otherwise and of itself, is invisible, and not to be known, and therefore as in the human, so also in the divine nature, we must to the understanding, join the faculty of will, the which cannot possibly be severed from an understanding, for that there is no understanding, which if it be not actual, or in complete act of it own nature and eternally, as is the understanding of God, yet it is potentially actual, that is, it tendeth to action, whereof this faculty of will is the fountain and beginning.  Gent. 
Nay surely, you need go no further in declaring what is the will, or any other thing in the essence of God, if it be so as you say, that these attributes are not truly in God, but only resemblances and shadows of his nature. Belike we have all this while been conserring about moonshine in water, & striving about shadows, altogether void of the substance of truth. I did verily think, that the understanding, knowledge and wisdom, whereof you have spoken, had been truly & really in god, and not only shadows of his unknown nature. I may well use the similitude of the Prophet, and compare myself to a man, who being hungry and thirsty, dreameth that he eateth and drinketh according to his own appetite, but awaking on a sudden, he findeth himself dry and empty: so I did all this while imagine that you did feed, and in truth even fill my hungry and thirsty soul with the knowledge of God, the which I do far more earnestly and greedily desire than ever I did meat or drink, and behold, on a sudden you awaken me out of this pleasant dream, and tell me that all is nothing but mere imaginations.  Sch. 
You take me at the worst, and far worse than you should do: I have not fed you with wind or vain dreams, as you infer of my words, but the truth is this. The nature of God is so unsearchable, and so faare above the reach of any created wit, that when we have come as near it as we can, and have to our thinking, gotten some hold of it, yet the very remembrance of ourowne weakness in comparison of the infiniteness of it makes to us to distrust and suspect ourselves as being deceived with a false conceit of that which cannot possibly be truly conceived & comprehended: here of it cometh, that although we be verily persuaded that understanding, knowledge & wisdom are in God, not only truly and really, but also most properly as in the natural subject or rather substantially without any subject, but being to themselves an upholding subject, yet we doubting the worst, and thinking that the divine nature, is something more, and more excellent than an infinite understanding, although in truth there cannot be any nature more excellent than an understanding, or a reasonable nature, nor any thing more than that which is infinite: and also thinking that for so much as these things to wit, understanding, knowledge and wisdom have place in the nature of man, whom we see and feel to be a most weak and silly creature, that therefore they cannot be truly in the nature of God, hereof it cometh, that we rather call them the attributes or resemblances of his nature, than his very essence or nature itself, the which in truth they are.  Gent. 
That is an other matter, but then we must not foster in ourselves this vain fear and doubting to affirmi him to be that which we learn and know out of his word, that he is indeed, but rather boldly without any wavering or doubting, affirm him to be that he is, knowing most certainly that we are not deceived: and if we be deceived, that then God himself hath deceived us, with whom it is better to err, then to hold the truth in our own conceits. But I cannot but laugh to myself, when I think of one thing that you said, that we doubted, lest that understanding, knowledge and wisdom, were not truly in God, because they are truly in the nature of man, whereas you should have inferred the clean contrary: to wit, that we know assuredly, that God is an understanding or reasonable nature, because man who is reasonable, is the image of similitude of God, yea, and made for this end, to show & represent to us the nature of god: but how I pray you, can a reasonable nature be an image or similitude of that which is not reasonable? Now proceed I pray you, and show me, how and what you make will to be in God?  Sch. 
Will is very fitly and truly, yea essentially given to God: for as in the soul of man, will is not an accidental quality, which may be spared without the diminishing or abolishing of the subject, as may knowledge or wisdom, but an essential faculty issuing properly and immediately out of the understanding, and cleaning inseparably unto it (for that it is impossible that the conceits received into the mind, should rest ydly there, and not tebound back again into action, even as the beams of the sun lighting upon a solid body, cannot but reflect, and so make heat): so we are to think, that the essential understanding of God doth naturally, necessarily and eternally, bring forth the essential will of God, the which may be defined, the essential act of his understanding, the fountain and beginning of all his actions which are simply good.   

Sect. 5.  Gent. 
HOw do you make the will of God to be the beginning of all the actions of God?  Sch. 
Even as it is in all other things which have will, the which is of this nature, that in what subject soever it be, it will there domineer, and have the sole and supreme authority of doing all things: and therefore may truly be called Primus motor, the first mover and beginning of all actions, for every thing that hath will, doth that only (or at the least tendeth to the doing of it, which it willeth. As for the understanding, although it be in order & nature before that will, yet it is not said to be the beginning of action, because it only moveth, persuadeth, and directeth, but doth not enforce or compel: for as we usually say, counsel is no command: whereof it cometh, that although in God there be no such disagreement, yet in the creatures it doth of●ē come to pass. that the will rejecteth the counsel and direction which the mind giveth, and worketh without or against reason, according to the own inclination. But the will is followed and obeyed by the actions in all things possible, even as the commandments of a sovereign Monarch within the compass of his kingdom, are put in execution by loyal subjects, without any resistance. And indeed will may very fitly be it compared to an absolute & mighty Monarch, for that it cannot either be controlled, commanded, or compelled by any superior power without itself, or yet resisted by any inferior within his own dominions: it being impossible even to God himself, to enforce or constrain the will of the least of his creatures. He may indeed abolish & destroy all the wills and all the creatures in the world, or enforce them by outward violence to whatsoever pleaseth him: yea he may (as he doth in regeneration) by changing & enlightening the mind, make that the will shall incline itself to that which it did before abhor: yet he cannot compel any thing to be willing, it being of itself unwilling. Whereof it cometh, that this sovereign monarch hath place in those creatures only, which are entire & absolute in themselves, not depending upon any other without it self-whatsoever, for ability of motion & action. And therefore trees, which have not in themselves sufficient power of natural heat, whereby to move themselves at their own pleasure, but do depend upon the sun, by whose heat they are helped, cannot be said to have will. But as for those things which do perfectly live and move, as do all things which have life and soul, for they do as freely move or rest, and perform any natural action, as any man or gell.  Gent. 
I like well, that youmake the will of god the first beginning of all his actios: but to make this common unto the creatures, as if they were so absolute, that they did not, nor needed to depend on god, me thinks it is harsh, and soundeth somewhat to the disgrace of God, to whom (me thinks) you should not deny this royal prerogative, that his will should be the first mover and beginning, not only of his own actions, but also of all the actions of all the creatures, rather than to make every living creature, as it were a privileged place, exempted from his jurisdiction.  Sch. 
We are rather to account it to be a great praise and glory to God, that as he himself is most perfect, so he is able to make other things also, not only imperfect (as some of the creatures, to wit, those which want sense, may be called, although they also be perfect in their kinds) but also perfect and absolute in themselves, able to move themselves (within the compass of their natural power) when and as it pleaseth themselves, without any outward help whatsoever. Let us suppose (for we may read of such a matter) that some cunning Mathematican made a dove of wood, or some such matter, which could fly out, and return to him home again: should he think it a disgrace unto him, that this dove needed not his help, or that he should carry it abroad, when as it could fly of itself: and not rather think it a matter of incomparable praise, that he could make such an absolute and admirable piece of work? yes surely, for the perfection and absoluteness of the work, doth not detract, but addeth to the praise of the workman: as no doubt but that it is a great glory to God, that all the creatures in the world move, preserve, and increase themselves, by the sole means of that virtue & strength which he put into them in the beginning, without any other supply or strength, although without question, they do many ways both need & feel his helping hand. Yet hath not the creature hence any matter of boasting against god, for that all that absoluteness and perfection, which it hath, came not of itself, but from God: who as he gave it, so he is able to take it way, and as he made all the creatures of nothing, so also to consume them all to nothing, if it were his will. Besides, if we did make the will of God the beginning and fountain, not only of his own actions, but also of the actions of the creatures, we should admit many inconveniences and absurdities: for then all the enormities, monstrous confusions & sins, which are in the world, should be ascribed and referred to God, as to the fountain from the which they sprang. Yea, we should fall into their heresy, or rather extreme madness, who imagine the whole world, and all the creatures contained in it, to be the body of god, & god to be the soul of every living thing, them the which nothing can be imagined more gross and impious. So then in this comparison of the will of God with the will of the creature, we see in the first place, that as God, so also the perfect, that is, all living and moving creatures, have their proper wills, not only distinct and divers from the will of God, but also free and absolute in themselves, and exempted from being constrained or enforced by the authority or power of God, yea it may be said truly, if it can be so ●aken and understood, that the will of the creature is no less free in the own kind, then is the will of God, for nothing can be added to that which is in the highest degree. Whereof it cometh, that this freedom of will is alike in all things, in the brute beast as in the reasonable man, in men as in angels, in the creature as in the creator, yea (si parvis componero magna liceret) in the least fly or weakest worm, as in the mighty God of heaven and earth. Not that any creature hath so effectual a will as God hath for there is no comparison between the power of God, and of all the creatures in the world joined together in one: as a poor man is not of so great ability as is a great Lord, yet his freedom may be as great, The creature can do nothing, but it may will any thing against the will of god: the mightiest creature is not free to do what it list yet the weakest is free to do whatit list, as can be imagined, even as the prisoner that lieth bound in chains in the corner of a strait prison, is as free in will, as the king that sitteth on his throne. Freedom therefore is so inseparable and essential a property of the will, that it cannot possibly by any means or power whatso-soever, be taken away either from the brutish, the reasonable, or the divine will. Will may be taken from the creature, & the creature out of the nature of things; yet cannot freedom be taken from the will, for it will follow it, either existing or at the least desisting with it. Lastly herein agree the wills of the creature with the will of God, that all of them, whither created or uncreated, tend & incline to good, not all to that which is in truth good, yet all to y● which is in appearance good. For as it is the nature of every thing to preserve, & to delight itself, so for that purpose it escheweth whatsoever seemeth evil, and inclineth itself towards y● which it judgeth good & pleasant. And as every nature is divers from all other, so every one hath a particular good to the attaining whereof itmoveth itself, and also the subject which it hath in subjection, and in the fruition whereof, it resteth and pleaseth itself, as in happiness & the chief good. Thus the nature of God hath a proper kind of good belonging to it, the which is simply and chief good: to wit, his own glory, whereunto the will of God in all the actions of God doth aim and incline: for in it, rising out of itself before the creation, & since gotten, or rather continued by means of the creatures, it doth rest and please itself for ever.   

Sect. 5.  
THus far the will of God agreeth with the will of the creature: now followeth the difference, the which cannot but be great. First they differ in that respect, which hath already been named, to wit, that the will of God is always effectual and actual, always bringing itself into act without fail, or any difficulty, and therefore is never in vain, whereas the creature doth often incline and move itself inwardly toward some object, but cannot go forward in accomplishing and bringing forth into act that inward motion: being hindered either by the impotency of the subject wherein it is, or by some greater power, but nothing can resist the will of God, or make his purpose frustate. This is the first difference, and yet to speak properly, and to say the truth, this is not a difference of the wills, but of the persons and their power: For the will being hindered from putting itself into execution, may be as strong, yea usually is more strong than when it hath outward power joined unto it. Secondly, the will of God is immutable and the same for ever, that which he willeth once, he willeth always, but the will of the creature is more variable than is the wind never constant, but continually altering itself from one object to another, yea often to that which is clean contrary to the other: & that not only in particular objects, but even in regard of the general kinds of good, rejecting the true good for a false appearance, & with all true happiness, for a vain and transitory shadow of pleasure. Neither is it any marvel, that the will of the creature is so variable, when as it is so easily deceived, and led out of the way by error and ignorance, or else overruled by headstrong affections, from both which the nature of God being free, admitteth no manner of alteration in will. The reasons which may seem to infer alteration of will in God, are drawn out of those places of scripture in the which it is said, that God hath not performed, that which he hath spoken and purposed: as when he being moved either with the sins and unthankfulness of the wicked, or by the prayers and repentance of the godly, doth confess himself to repent of that good which he hath done to the one, or of those afflictions which he had threatened to the other. But the truth is, that God never repenteth himself either of the one or of the other but taketh to himself the person and manner of men, who not foreseeing what will follow, do often repent themselves, and are sorry both for benefits bestowed on unthankful & unworthy persons, and also for too great severity and rash anger upon those whom they love.  Gent. 
You have made one objection against the immutability of the will of God, & have also fully satisfied it: I pray you do as much to one that I will make.  Sch. 
I know not whither I can or no, but I will do my endeavour.  Gent. 
You need not fear it, for I know you have often both moved and answered it ere now: it is this. If the will of god cannot be altered in any thing that he hath determined, and that he hath determined all things whatsoever, what need we use any means for the attaining of any good, or what will it avail to labour to eschew evil, when the determinate will and purpose of God, cannot be by prayer, or by any other means avoided, but must of necessity stand and take place.  Sch. 
The answer is as you say, easy & ordinary, for God willeth and worketh (ordinarily) nothing but by the ordinary means effectual for that purpose, the which he hath commanded us to use: and therefore we are to think & hope that our endeavours are the means which he hath appointed for our good. If our endeavours take not effect, we are to acknowledge those wants & harms to be sent from God, the which (otherwise) we could not have denied to have happened through our own default: and therefore we are to be careful in using all good means effectual for any good purpose, and especially of prayer, which you bring for an instance: for to imagine that God hath so tied himself to a stoical fate and necessary course of things that he can not, though he would, grant our desires, is most fond & foolish, contrary to the whole course of scripture, and in truth, the utter subversion of all godliness. You might in like manner object, that it must needs be granted, that God doth sometimes change his will, seeing that he willeth contrary things, which cannot come to pass: for example, God would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of his truth. This is true, for it is the word, yea the very words of god, 1. Tim. 3. 4. Again, it is his will that some should perish, for it is certain that some do perish, and that neither without nor against the will of God, but by his will & purpose, as the scripture doth plainly teach us every where. Likewise it was the will of God, that Adam should not either taste or touch the forbidden fruit, for he forebad him: and yet we cannot doubt, but that God had foreappoynted, that Adam should fall by eating the forbidden fruit, and so in infinite other instances: for answer of all which, we are to distinguish the commandments of God given to us from his will, which he keepeth, to himself: he commands things impossible, to show us what we ought to do and to endeavour, as is the fulfilling of the law, and the converting of all men, as far as we can, to the obedience of the Gospel: both which are good, and to be endeavoured by us, and therefore commanded by him, but both of them impossible, and therefore not to be thought to be willed by him. Again, God commandeth sometimes to this end, to give occasion of sin, for the which end he forebad Adam to eat of the fruit of the tree of good and evil, and so the Apostle saith, that the law was given to make sin abound: yea God sometimes commandeth that he would not have done, to make trial of our faith, as he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. But these commandments are not to be accounted the will of God: yea if he command any thing contrary to his written word, this argueth no change or contrariety in his will, but only, that God is not nor will be bound to any law. Lastly, the will of God differeth from the will of the creature, in that it only inclineth itself naturally and necessarily to that only that is good: whereas the wills of the creatures although they do incline to good only as we see in the elect angels, yet it is not of nature & necessity, but of grace, & so of contingency. For naturally their will is free as well to evil as to good, neither is it possible, that the will of any creature should be otherwise, howsoever by grace & the assistance of God it continue, in affecting only that which is good. But the will of God doth necessarily move to good only, because whatsoever God willeth, it is therefore good, because he willeth it, his will being the square & rule of good, so that whatsoever agreeth to it, that is good as contrariwise, if it descent from it, it is to be accounted evil. Hence it cometh that God when he willeth and commandeth any thing contrary to the moral law, as when he did bid Abraham kill his son, the Prophet Hose to company with a harlot, and the Hebrews to spoil the Egyptians, or in that he decreeth that their shall be sin in the world, yet in so doing, he willeth nothing but that which is good, for by willing it, he maketh it good. Yet in proper speech, these actions of men, although commanded by God, are not to be accounted the proper object of the will of God, the which we must needs think to have a larger scope and object, yea a more excellent object then are a few particular actions of men. For the proper object of gods will, is that whereunto it doth totally, eternally, and naturally incline and tend as we know the object of man's will, to be apparent good and pleasure, this being the scope whereat our nature doth wholly aim, to preserve itself in a good and pleasant estate. In like manner the good whereat Gods will doth wholly aim, is his own glory, the maintaining, advancing and enlarging of it is that which he doth desire above all things, to this end and purpose are all his counsels, creatures and actions to be referred, & in this being obtained, as in his chief good, pleasure & happiness he doth delight and rest contented.    

CHAP. FOUR Of the attributes of God called his affections.  

Sect. 1:  Gent. 
WHat is therebesides in the faculties of the soul attributed to God, fit to express & resemble his nature unto us, or what other faculties of the soul have we in common with God? for so you will needs have understanding, knowledge, wisdom and will, to be not typically attributed, but truly and essentially belonging to God.  Sch. 
I am so persuaded, and I hope you are so too by this: there is not any thing in our souls, that is so truly in God, as are the understanding and will, which make the substance of them: but there remain yet many things to be considered in the nature of god, the types whereof we fetch from ourselves, as namely from our affections, the which are divers motions of the will, arising of the diversity of particular objects, making an impression into the will according to their several natures, and stirring it up to desire.  
Secondly, our moral virtues arising of the duke moderation of the said affections: and lastly, divers moral duties, coming from these virtues as from their roots are attributed to God.  Gent. 
Have all these things place in the nature of God?  Sch. 
Some of them are truly in God, the rest are only attributed to him, as types and similitudes borrowed from our human nature, fit to declare the manner of Gods working, and the diversity of his actions, by the which we must ascend to his nature, as near as we can.  Gent. 
What affections are attributed to God?  Sch. 
Love, hatred, lenity, anger, pleasance, joy, sorrow and pity: all which, the scripture doth usually give unto him.  Gent. 
What moral virtues or duties?  Sch. 
justice, bounty, magnificence, care of credit and honour, truth, fidelity, thankfulness, friendship, indulgence, patience and such other, even whatsoever is good, and commendable in the nature, manners, behaviour, life and actions of men.  Gent. 
I pray you think it not irk some to make a particular declaration of them: for I do not see, how these things & especially the affections that you speak of, will either be truly found in God, or can fitly be attributed to him.  Sch. 
If you mean by affections, sudden and vehement perturbations, such as we see usually in men rising and ceasing as occasions and objects are offered, then there are no affections in God, for there's is nothing in him at any time, that is not always in him, and that hath not been in him from all eternity. But if (as we may) we mean by affections, constant continual yea eternal acts, motions, and inclinations (for even these two latter terms (although improper) must for want of better be used) of his will, not stirred up on a sudden like a tempest, by this or that particular object, but settled & permament, arising of the diverse natures of things and agreeable thereunto, in this sense we may truly ' say, that there are affections in GOD, for he doth truly love and embrace good and likewise hate and abhor whatsoever is evil.  Gent. 
You make a strange distinction of affections, some sudden and momentany, others permanent and eternal: thus you make them no affections but habitual dispositions, and moral virtues.  Sch. 
You need not marvel so much at this distinction, for it hath place even in human affections, as we know that hatred is an habitual and inveterate anger, and love also may be settled and fixed for ever: but it must of necessity be admitted in GOD, for that his will being eternal and immutable, sendeth forth affections of the same nature, as the little twigs and branches of a Tree are of the same nature with the great boughs and body of it, and the streams with the fountain from whence they flow: yea, in truth they are so settled and constant in God, that we cannot distinguish them from his will, moving itself without any alteration, too or fro the object, as the nature of it is good or evil.  
In men they are like to the flames of fire, blown up by the impression of the objects, as by a great blast of wind, and make such strange alterations in them that you would scarce say, they were the same men which they seemed before. But no object of what nature or force so ever it be can make the least alteration or impression into the will of GOD, whose nature is immutable, yea impassable. For he is not material as are the creatures, yea even the Angels themselves who must needs be granted to consist of, and in some matter, which may suffer and be altered, whereof it cometh that not only men, but even the spiritual Angels, are subject to affection, passion and perturbation: but God is a pure and mere form, and therefore altogether actual, he is immaterial, and therefore impassable.  Gent. 
Belike you make all affections to be acts, motions and inclinations of the will, but with this difference, that in God they are eternal, general, constant and quiet (and indeed, acts of the will, but neither motions nor inclinations) but in man, momentany, variable, evident, raging & particular, stirred up not by the general consideration of the diverse natures of things as they are in God, (whose affections in that respect must needs be constant, because the general natures and notions of things, are eternal, and immutable) but with this or that particular object, and therefore variable and uncertain.  Gent. 
I perceive your meaning, save only that I do not see, why Gods will should be said to be moved with general objects only, and not also with particular persons & actions: for we know, that he is diversely affected towards particular men and hateth evil not only in abstracto and in the universal idea of it, but also in particular men, in whom soever he findeth it.  Sch. 
Affections and will in God are not blind, nor yet perverse and rebellious to reason, as they are in men, but wholly agreeing unto it, and therefore they follow the general grounds of it ever in particular objects, whereas in men they follow the impression of the particular object without, yea contrary to the grounds of reason.   

Sect. 2.  Gen. 
WEll, I pray you show me the particular points of doctrine in the love of God: for as I remember, you put that first of the affections which you say are attributed to God.  Sch. 
Love is most fitly and truly attributed to God, who for that he excelleth in this affection, is defined by it as if it were his very essential form, for so we read, 1. john. 4. 16. God is love.  
But that we may know the particulars of this love of God, it is needful that we first search out, and consider the nature of love in general, the which may thus after a sort be described. Love is an inclination of the will to a pleasant object for the fruition of the pleasure of it: the which breedeth a desire of doing good unto it, if it be capable of it.  
This description is to be explained by alleging the several objects of love, or of those things which men do usually love, in all which it will appear that the cause why they are loved and sought unto, is some sweetness or pleasure, which may be sucked out of them, & that nothing is loved, which doth not bring with it some delight and pleasure: thus john reasoneth, 1. joh. 4. 20. How can he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, that is, with whom he hath conversed, and so might have taken delight & pleasure by him, love God whom he hath not seen? and we read Gen. 25. 28. that Isaac loved Esau because his venison tasted sweet in his mouth, and Leah saith, Gen. 29 32. Now my husband will love me, having borne him a son. By these and infinite other examples it appeareth, that all men incline to that wherein they find and feel some pleasure and sweetness, and this inclination is called the love of that thing. Yet this is not all in love, and therefore we must add the second part of the description, which saith, that the pleasure in true love procureth a desire in him that loveth, and enjoyeth the pleasure, to return pleasure, delight and any good whatsoever can be done unto it, to the thing loved. For without this mutual relation of pleasure, it is not to be called love but rather lust: as the inclination which men have to those meats, drinks, and such other things, the which they love, is not true love but rather lust, and those things are properly said to be loved, to the which we may return that pleasure and delight, which we received from and by them, and procure their good, as well as they procured our pleasure. For example, the inclination which a man hath to an harlot, and to the pleasure that may be had by her, is not true love, but only lust, because herein a man hath respect only to himself, and to his own pleasure, not caring what become of her, when his lust is satisfied. But the affection which a man beareth to his wife, is of an other kind, and is true love, because he doth not rest in that pleasure which he enjoyeth by her means, bu● addeth thereunto an earnest desire and endeavour, by all means possible to procure her good, being far more desirous to please and profit her, then to please himself by her: otherwise it is not true love, but self love, for true love hath a hand to give, as ready yea more ready than one for to take.  
And therefore meats and drinks, and such other pleasant things, although they do greatly delight us, yet they cannot be said to be loved, because they perish with the use, and though they did ●emaine, they are not capable of any pleasure or good to be done in way of requital, which is the chief part of love. But men are truly said to love their friends, wives and children because as they do many ways receive pleasure, comfort, joy, delight and profit by them, so their whole desire is, to return all that good back again into their bosoms with double interest.  Gent. 
You say that it is not true love, but lust to take pleasure in any thing, without returning, and as it were repaying the said pleasure to him from whom it was taken, and, as it were, borrowed.  
Indeed this is good honest dealing, and to be commended, but if I be not deceived, I can show you a more true and excellent love, than this which you have propounded, to wit that which Christ preferreth far before this your love, the which may be called a kind of trafficking and exchanging of one good turn, or benefit for an other. But the love which he commendeth unto us, is not procured, and as it were bought or hired by precedent pleasure, but cometh from a mere desire of doing good unto them which have not only not deserved it at our hands, by loving us, but contrarily, have by hating and harming us, provoked us to requite and repay them with the like hard measure: Math. 6. 43. You have heard that it hath been said, love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you love your enemies: for if you love your friends only, what great matter is that? do not the Publicans so? And as this love is far more excellent than yours, so it doth far better agree to your purpose and serve for the explication of the love of God: for if we should make the ground of his love towards us to be the fruition of some pleasure in us, or by our means, we should make a fair piece of work of it, or rather mar all the ground of our salvation, which relieth itself upon the mere love of God, not procured by any desert, or any occasion whatsoever on our own behalf.  Sch. 
If you think that our Saviour Christ meaneth, that we should bear as great love to strangers & to our enemies, as to our friends, you are far deceived: for so he should destroy nature itself, which hath with her own fingerwritten in our hearts this description of love, which I have brought: to wit, that our love should be greater towards them, at whose hands we have received pleasure and comfort, then to them who are strangers or enemies unto us. But his meaning is, that to our enemies we should not be full of anger and revenge, but patiented, gentle, yea loving and helpful, labouring by good to overcome their ill: and that by doing good to strangers, from whom, or from any in their name, we are never like to receive any retribution, we should show the faith and love which we bear unto God, in obedience of whose commandment we do that, which of itself is hurtful unto us. But that a man should love a malicious enemy as earnestly as a loving and faithful friend, a strange and unknown woman as well as his own wife, other men's children as well as his own, it is not only not commendable, but even monstrous, and contrary both to the light of nature, & to the law of God. For so we should be unjust and injurious to our own friends, to whom our love and the duties of it do belong, in bestowing it upon others, and in suffering them to to reap the crop where they did not sow any seed. yea then Christians should endeavour to procure to themselves, the good will of their brethren, not by duties of love, but by injuries, than the which what can be said or supposed more absurd. Now as touching the love of God towards us, the which you affirm to come of the free motion of his will, not proucked, caused, or occasioned by any good or pleasure, which he getteth by us, I confess that GOD electeth to salvation without any motive of goodness foreseen in us, even of hi● mere will and good pleasure: and that it were mere madness to imagine, that there is any thing in us or in any creature, by the which we might either pleasure or profit God: yet I answer you, first that we are to distinguish betwixt the election, and the love of God, for God chooseth and predestinanateth to love of his own mere will, but he loveth not, but for some cause. For as his love is in the general notion inclined to good, & not to evil, so he loveth nothing but that which is good, yea and he loveth it because it is good, and for the goodness sake. If you say what is our goodness to God, that he should love us for it, what doth it profit or pleasure him: indeed he standeth in no need of it: yet he taketh pleasure in it, the Lord delighteth in the righteousness of his Saints, their sins are as eyesores, & unpleasant sights unto him. For why God delighteth in himself, and every thing in that which is like itself: he taketh pleasure to behold his own Image in us even as the greatest joy & pleasure that a man can have in any worldly thing, is to behold his own favour and fashions, his own countenance and conditions, in his son. And therefore the more that a man in holiness resembleth god, the more he is beloved of him, as being so much, liker to him, as it is said of David, that he was a man according to the heart of God.  Gent. 
This doctrine soundeth very harsh to me, and so I think it would do to others, if they should hear it, as that which giveth a great blow to God's free election: I am sure you have read, that Christ loved us being his enemies. Rom. 5. and that you do not doubt, but that God loved the Apostle Paul, even in his infidelity, and when he in great fury did persecute the Church.  Sch. 
It may be, that it would seem strange to them that have not considered of it: but the doctrine is, as I think, good and sound, that God neither hateth any but for sin, neither loveth any but as they are holy. Yet our foreseen holiness is not the cause why God doth elect us to salvation: for first he electeth us to love & to life, & then afterward by sanctifying us, he maketh us capable of his love and of eternal life. The proper object of God's love, is the holiness of the reasonable creature, unto the which, as being agreeable to his own nature, God doth incline himself by doing good unto it, as he receiveth a kind of contentation in it, and from it. As for the estate of the elect before they be called and sanctified, we know that whom God loveth once, he loveth always: and Paul even in the heat of his fury against Christ, was beloved of God, as one whom he had chosen and predestinate to bear at the appointed time his own Image of holiness, and so the foresight of holiness in him may be said to be the the cause of God's love, though not of his election, For God may choose to love whom he list, but he cannot love, but according to his own nature, neither any thing, but that which is in some sort agreeable to his nature: for he cannot love or like, but must of necessity hate and abhor evil, as well in concreto, as in abstracto: in parricular subjects, as well as in general notions: that so he may be always like himself.   

Sect. 3.  Gent. 
I Will not contend with you about it at this time, because I will not hinder you from other matters: now that you have laid the foundation of the description of God's love, I pray you go on with the rest of the building.  Sch. 
We will: and first, we may out of that, that hath been said to this purpose, define the love of God to be, the motion, or rather the act of his will, inclining itself by doing good, to good prevailing in the reasonable creature. In this description we are to observe these three things: first, that the love of God belongeth only to the reasonable creature: secondly, that the motive or inducement stirring up in God this love, is goodness prevailing in the creature: and lastly, that the manner, or rather a proper and necessary effect of this love or inclination of God to the creature, is by doing good unto it.  
The first point being plain enough of itself, needeth no further explanation: for although all the creatures in their several kinds and degrees, have in them a special goodness, in respect whereof, God may be said to love, and favour them, as we read. Gen. 1. 31. that God having finished all the creatures, looked upon them: and seeing them all to be good, blessed them: and still to extend his gracious providence over them all, preserving and upholding them, not only by the ordinary force of their natures, but even by extraordinary means unknown to us, as he is said to feed the young ravens, when they call upon him (although this may be ascribed to natural means) yet in proper speech he is said to love the reasonable creatures only, whom he hath picked out of the whole bunch, whereon to set his heart, wherein to delight and take pleasure.  
This choice of his love, it hath pleased God to make for two causes: first in respect of the excellent goodness, as it were the surpassing beauty of the reasonable creature, the which being framed according to the likeness of God, maketh a kind of sympathy and natural agreement betwixt God and it: whereof it cometh, that God taketh exceeding delight and pleasure in the soul of man, the faculties of it being orderly disposed and endued with that beauty of holiness, which God created in it, and therefore may justly require of it) as in a most pleasant garden and paradise, shining with all variety of the most fair flowers and colours. The other respect, which appropriateth the love of God to the reasonable creature, is, for that as it only hath in it matter of exceeding pleasure and delight to God, so it only is capable of the rebound, recourse, and reciprocation of the said pleasure from God, in the which as hath been said the chief part of love doth consist. For howsoever God may do, and doth many ways good to the other creatures, in that he feedeth and preserveth them in their several kinds, yet they not knowing GOD, cannot acknowledge those good things, which they receive from him, to come from him, and to proceed of that favour which he beareth unto them: whereas the soul of the reasonable creature, being as it were filled with the sweet blessings of God, taketh greater pleasure in the giver then in the gift, and rejoiceth yea glorieth more herein, that God the great King of heaven and earth, vouchsafeth to set his heart upon it, and to take pleasure in doing it good, then in any other thing whatsoever. This sense of the goodness of GOD, as it is to them the most sweet happiness that can be imagined, so it stirs up in them a mutual love towards God, whom although they cannot by any means either profit or pleasure, yet they endeavour with all care to glorify him by their holy obedience, and so to testify that unfeigned love which they bear unto him. But the unreasonable creatures wanting this sense of the love and goodness of GOD, and so the reciprocation of love which should be in them, wherein the force of love consisteth, are for this cause not to be admitted into the participation of the love of God.  
Besides, the love of God as it is eternal, so it hath this virtue, that on what subject soever it seizeth, it maketh it eternal, preserving it from perishing: but this cannot be done in the other creatures, the which must be dissolved and come to nought: only the reasonable soul, being possessed and as it were filled with the love of GOD, i● by preserved for ever. For these causes it hath pleased GOD of his goodness to make choice of the reasonable nature of man, whereunto to join himself in the bond of perfect love: and in this respect to compare himself to a carnal lover, enamoured of the beauty of some fair young woman, delighting himself exceedingly in the fruition of her, and desiring nothing more than to please & pleasure her, yea by all means possible to procure her good: as we may see in the song of songs, in the Prophet Ez●chiel, & in divers other places of scripture. In the second place we are to consider, that not any measure of goodness in the reasonable creature, will serve to procure the love of God, for then God should love the wicked, in whom we know that there are divers relics of his image, yea even the devil himself and all his wicked spirits, whose nature and natural faculties are good, and not corrupted with sin in respect of their substance, but God doth not love and embrace these with this affection of love: for what fellowship or agreement, much less entire love, can God have with Beliall, or light with darkness? Nay rather we know, that God doth most justly hate and abhor them, for that their persons are not in regard of these relics of goodness to be accounted good, because it doth not prevail in them, but is overcome and captivated, or rather abolished by the contrary corruption of sin, the which having the possession and command of them, ought of right to have the title and name of them. But God loveth the godly and their persons, yea though they be in part defiled with sin, because not sin and evil, but holiness and good prevaileth and beareth sway in them, sin being captivated and kept under. So that in man good and evil do in a manner contend for God, the one labouring to procure his love, and the other his hatred, in the which conflict the stronger and the predominant quality prevaileth, and pulleth to the person in the which it is, the affection of God, either of love, or else of hatred.  Gent. 
I had thought that one, and that the least corruption or sin in a man, had been of sufficient force to make the whole person hateful & abominable in the sight of God, as a little leaven soureth the whole lump, according to that of the Apostle james, he that breaketh any one point of the law, is guilty of transgressing the whole, notwithstanding there be in him many good parts of holiness: even as we see in civil judgements, that one single crime condemneth a man, yea though in other respects his life be never so just and unreprovable.  Sch. 
That is true you say, according to the exact rule of God's justice, the which requireth the full perfection of holiness without any exception, and rejecteth the whole, if never so little of it be wanting: but the love of God taketh another course, for it looketh on men with an amiable and favourable countenance, and (what marvel is it that the love of God doth that which the love of men is enjoined to perform) covereth the multitude of sins. Lastly, the love of God never cometh empty, but as God is the fountain and full treasure of all pleasure, so he bringeth with him whither soever he cometh, all good, pleasure and happiness, by the which his love and affection towards any person is known and felt. Yea hereof it followeth, that as any nature or person is endued with a less or greater measure of this goodness which is so pleasing to the will, and so agreeable to the nature of God, so it procureth to itself a less or greater measure of the love of God, and so consequently of that pleasant and happy good which doth continually accompany it: yea that as God himself is the best and most excellent nature of all other, without any comparison, so he loveth himself far more than he doth any other thing whatsoever, and procureth to himself more pleasure & happiness, than he doth to any creature. Yea it is his will, that according to this rule, this affection of love in the godly be squared, to wit, that they love those most, in whom they see a greater measure of goodness and godliness, and be more inclined towards them, to do any manner of good unto them, then to any other, as it is Psal. 16. 3. All my delight is in the saints on earth, even to those that are excellent. And so Gal. 6. 10.   

Sect. 4.  
BY this doctrine of the love of God, we may easily gather, what hatred the contrary affection is, to wit, a motion or act of Gods will, declining and abhorring the person wherein evil doth prevail. And first, for the cause or ground of God's hatred, we must hold, that God doth not hate or abhor any creature, upon the mere motion of his own will, for his will neither doth nor can move either towards or from any creature, but upon good and just cause taken even from his own nature. We know that God of himself loveth all his creatures, even because they are his own workmanship, and therefore good and worthy to be both liked and loved, as immediately after the creation, he beheld them, and seeing them to be good and excellent, every one in his proper kind, he powered down his favourable blessing upon them, even as the dew and rain falleth upon the herbs and flowers of the field, whereby they wax fair and flourish. Neither did God either play the dissembler, in pretending love to all his creatures, whereas he hated many of them, or yet is he a changeling, to turn his love into hatred, but as once he did, so always he doth both love and bless the creature which he seethe to be good. Yet if the creature at any time become evil, and be not as it was made by him, but as it hath been marred by itself, not bearing any longer his excellent and glorious image, but some other monstrous shape, than it cannot be loved any longer, but must incontinently be hated of God. Yet God is the same that he was, and not a whit altered, but the creature hath changed his place and condition, and is removed, and as it were transplanted out of God's pleasant paradise, in the which it did flourish amidst the four rivers of the blessings of God, into a wide & wild desert, where it being scorched with the burning beams of gods curse, withereth for want of water, and being clean dried up, is become most deformed.  Gent. 
I could well agree, that love should have place in God, both in his nature and in his actions, for as he is the chief, and the very fountain of all goodness, so it seemeth very meet, that he should extend his goodness to all his creatures, by doing good unto them all according to their several kinds: but for this affection of hatred, I do not see how it can so well agree to the nature of God, it being by nature evil, and contrary to the lou● of God, for the which he is so renowm●d. And therefore me thinks it were better for you, to pass over in 〈◊〉 this head of doctrine, & as it were to 〈◊〉 it cut as a foul blemish, which in my 〈◊〉 disgraceth this fair picture of God's nature, which you have so carefully drawn.  Sch. 
If you grant the one, you cannot deny the other, for as God is good, so he must maintain and uphold his goodness against evil, by hating and abhorring it, yea by confounding all the maintainers and upholders of it. For it is as necessary & natural to God, to abhor evil general, and to hate it in the particular subjects, as it is to him to inclin to good, and to love it in his creatures.  Gent. 
You will have much ado to persuade me, that God hateth any, although I confess you make a show of argument to prove it: but before we argue the matter, I would know whom, and how God hateth.  Sch. 
Indeed the state of the question would be agreed upon before disputation, and it may easily be known if you call to mind that which hath been said of the love of God: for first the reasonable creature only is the subject, as of the love, so also of the hatred of God, for of all the creatures in the world, the reasonable only can be and is evil. The reason hereof is, because all other things as they were created good, so they continue in that state of goodness (and in respect of it, are in some sort loved of God) although not in that degree of perfection and excellency, God having (for the sin of man) withdrawn from them some part of it: But man hath clean forsaken that state and standing wherein he was placed by God, and lost that goodness for the which he was so beloved of God. Yea not only so, but also he hath made an exchange of the said goodness, for the contrary naughtiness, of knowledge & obedience, for ignorance, error, rebellion and contempt, yea of the whole image of God, for the ugly shape of Satan, and so is justly become odious to God, to whom before he was dearly beloved.  Gent. 
Belike man was created in a worse estate than the rest of the creatures, for they were sure to continue in the state of the love of God, and in happiness) from the which we see that man is most miserably fallen, and that into the hatred of god, as you would have it.  
I confess, y● (as now the case standeth with him) man is in a far worse estate, than any unreasonable creature. And that it were far better to be a brute beast, or a senseless stone, than a man out of the favour of God: for who had not rather (without any comparison) with than want the sweet sense of the love of God (as all the reasonable creatures do, which either have no sense at all, or at the lest no sense of God) then to feel the hea●ie burden of the wrath of God, and would not choose, not to be happy with them, rather than to be miserable with man. Yet if we compare their first estates together, we shall find that man's estate was far more excellent than theirs, in that he was created in the fruition of all pleasure and happiness, of the which their nature is not capable. And what though he were created in the possibility of being miserable, from the which the other creatures are exempted? Who would refuse the offer of riches, honour, favour and love, made by his Prince upon this condition, that if he were found to be traitorous, rebellious and disloyal, he should not only be deprived of all the aforesaid benefits, but also be most shamefully and miserably tortured and tormented to death?  Gent. 
That is it I looked for, you have mad● a very good reason against yourself: for protest unto you, I have always carried this mind, that I had rather live in a mean and low estate, from the which one cannot fall, then in the highest top of flattering Fortune's wheel, in the which there is no likelihood that I should continue. And this I may be bold to say, being so well backed with the authority of wise Solomon himself, saying: That a dinner of herbs with quietness, is better than a stal-fat ox with fear and trouble.  Sch. 
I am of your mind for that, that he is unwise, that will adventure where he is like to miscarry, or that will accept an offer of all the pleasure and happiness that can be imagined, with a forfeiture of extreme pains and misery, if he break such and such con●itions, which he knoweth himself unlike to keep. But I pray you, were the conditions of man's felicity so many to be remembered, or so hard to be performed, that in respect of the great danger of falling into eternal misery (which was the forfeiture if he failed) you would refuse the fruition of God's presence, (& in it of eternal happiness) and choose to be a dead and senseless stone, which hath neither the possession of pleasure, nor the possibility of pain, rather than an happy man in so tickle an estate? who is so weak or intemperate, that would not for a small commodity adventure the suffering of a thousand deaths and pains, upon the abstaining from any one kind of fruit, he having plenty beside, both for necessity, and also for pleasure?  Gent. 
Indeed I must needs confess that the condition of man's happiness in the beginning was so easy to be kept, that his conditional estate of happiness may be accounted as good & sure, as if it had been absolute without any condition: and therefore I will yield unto you, that the impossibility of happiness in the unreasonable creatures, was a far worse estate than the possibility of misery in man, the which (but that we see & fee●e it to be already come to pass) might well have been accounted impossible. Bu● now to bring you back again to the matter in hand, from the which I have made you by my doubting, or rather by objecting those doubts which came into my mind, somewhat to digress: I do easily grant that no senseless thing can be the subject of God's hatred, for that they wanting the power of moving or changing themselves, do persist (for they could not leave it) in their natural estate of goodness and of the love of God: yet me thinks that the brute beasts (the which, as I noted before, you grant to have free-will in their kinds) are as deep in naughtiness and perverseness of nature, and so in the hatred of God, as man himself. For I cannot think that they were created so violent, ravenous and bloodthirsty as we see & feel them, being more like hellish fiends, then earthly creatures. Yea, we read Gen. 9 5. that God will require the blood of man at the hands of the beasts which shed it, as we know that in many cases beasts were by the judicial law of Moses condemned and put to death.  Sch. 
Sometimes you object in good earnest, as I easily perceive by you, but now I see you sport and dally: for I am sure you do not think that brute beasts do sin against God, whom they cannot know. I do not think but that ravenous beasts were created with the same weapons, both for offence and defence, the which now they use in pursuing their prey, and also in the same complexions and conditions which now they have: but man in his innocency was protected from them, not by the tameness of their natures, but by a majesty inherent in his person, the which was of sufficient force to amaze and control the unruliest of them. But we will leave the brute beasts to their preys, & come to men, whom this doctrine of god's hatred doth concern in respect of the sinfulness of their natures, into the which they have transformed themselves from that image of God's holiness, wherein they were created. Yet not any measure of evil is sufficient to procure this personal hatred, for then God should hate the godly, in whom there are relics of evil, as there are in the wicked of good, but only reigning and prevailing evil. It is true indeed, that God hateth the least sin that can be committed or imagined, yea almost the show of it, and even the garment spotted with the flesh, yet he hateth not the person in regard of it, it being suppressed and kept under, for godliness is stronger in them that are sanctified (though imperfectly) & having overcome sin, hath won the full interest of God and his love. The other thing which you desired to know before you would come to the question itself, was the manner of God's hatred, the which is two fold, inward, and outward. The first is the true manner of it: the other is the sensible declaration of the inward, & is indeed the effect of it, as amongst men, outward harm is asigne and also an effect of inward hatred. Now for this inward manner of favour in God, we are not to imagine any boiling affections of anger, or any inveterate ill will towards any creature, but must know it to be the general and eternal antipathy and contrariety of his nature, which is absolute purity, goodness and holiness, to the pollution and naughtiness of sin prevailing in man: for as God doth approve, love and embrace his own nature, as the absolute perfection of goodness, yea and the very image or likeness of the said goodness, either created or restored in man, so he cannot but mislike and abhor whatsoever is contrary unto it. Then followeth the outward manner, which is the effect and declaration of the inward hatred by bringing or doing evil to the person thus polluted with sin, from whom God having once turned away his face and favour, it cannot be, but that all manner of evils, as it were whole legions of devils should invade him, as finding him not only out of God's protection, as a traitor & rebel, but also by gods just judgement appointed to many kinds of most fearful judgements.  Gent. 
Now I pray you let me ask you a question: are we according to God's example, to hate wicked persons, or rather (if it be unmeet to make ourselves precedents for god to follow) is it not most true, the he doth not hate the wicked, but doth rather as he willeth us to do, love their persons, and hate only the sins of men. For although our duties do not belong to God, yet by that which he commandeth, we may gather what his nature is, for that all his commandments are just, pure and agreeable to his nature. Yea to urge this reason a little further, we have the express commandment of Christ, Math. 5. 44. 45, To love and to do good to our enemies, even as God doth both to the just and to the unjust.  Sch. 
We are not yet come to speak of human affections, yet this I say, that by this question you do plainly show, what maketh this doctrine of God's hatred seem so strange and be so harsh in your ears, namely because hatred amongst men is so corrupt a thing, bringing with it so many evils & mischiefs. But we must not measure God by man, nor the one kind of hatred by the other: for God hateth first by detesting sin, and then by punishing the rebellion of him that hath committed it.  Gent. 
Belike you make this hatred only the execution of justice done by God, as by a righteous judge upon malefactors, or as by a sovereign king upon open rebels, and so a supposed hatred, for that he that inflicteth punishment, seemeth to hate, as it is 1. Cor. 4. 21. Shall I come to you with a rod, or in love? and if it be so, me thinks it were better to call it justice then hatred, the one word signifying a most corrupt, the other a most commendable thing.  Sch. 
The outward and actual manner of God's hatred, which is by doing evil to the sinful person, being in nothing disagreeing from the rule of justice, may not unfitly be so called, yet we need not fear to ascribe hatred and detestation both of sin in general, and also of the particular persons polluted with it, unto God, he having so often in scripture taken them unto himself. Otherwise if we take hatred as it is usually in and among men, than man is freed from all hatred of God, both by the goodness of God's nature, the which can neither will nor do evil to his creatures, but only so far forth as is needful for the satisfying of his justice, and manifesting of his glory, and also by the baseness of his own nature and estate, for what is man (a worm rather than a man) that god should hate: the least spark of whose anger is of force to consume to nothing a thousand worlds?   

Sect. 5  
LIke unto the aforesaid affections, are pleasance & anger, the which also are often in scripture attributed to god, yet in truth thee they have no place in his nature, but only are as resemblances borrowed from man to declare the actions of God. The former doth better agree, and may more fitly be attributed to God than the other, for it is an essential thing in God, to like or mislike as things are good or evil. But as it is usually taken for a sudden & temporary contentment or rest of God's will, having been before stirred up and moved to anger, in this sense, God cannot be properly said to be either pleased or appeased, for he was never displeased, it being impossible that any thing proceeding from any creature (or indeed from himself) should work any change or alteration in him. Likewise for anger, though it be in infinite places of scripture attributed to God, yet that he cannot by any means be provoked unto it. Only hereby is meant, first, for the nature of God, that as he liketh and approveth the obedience and purity of the godly, so he misliketh the impurity of the wicked as greatly, as men do those things whereat they are inflamed to anger, which is a certain sign of discontentment. And secondly, for the outward and sensible actions of God, that he useth as great severity (yet not passing the limits of justice) as men do being angry, who usually are rather too rigorous, and pass the bounds of moderation in this behalf: yea if we suppose (the which we need not, it being so common a thing) the most outrageous blasphemies and horrible villainies which can be imagined, to be committed by men, yet God is not thereby provoked to anger, or any whit changed otherwise then he was before. He doth indeed abhor sin, and punish sinners as they do deserve, but not in choler, or any violent passion, but by the essential and eternal motion, or rather immovable act of his will, so affected to these objects, as they do either agree or disagree from his divine nature: and therefore this affection in God may more fitly be termed hatred, it being so constant and inveterate: to wit, eternal, not a sudden and momentany anger. Thus God saith, Exod. 23. 10. Let me alone and I will be angry at this people and consume them: that is, I will consume them as if I were angry: but if this affection of anger had been truly stirred up in God, he would have said I am angry, not, I will be angry. Likewise for joy & sorrow these affections also are attributed to God in scripture: yet no man is so simple, as to think that they do belong to God in truth: for nothing can happen to him either profitable or unprofitable, nothing either pleasant or unpleasant: or rather nothing, but that which is not pleasant unto him, because nothing can be done against his will. But as for pity and compassion, which is a sorrow and grievous sense of the misery of an other, that the scripture doth so earnestly ascribe to God, and God in scripture so carefully challenge to himself, as that wherein his chief glory doth consist, that it may seem very hard and not to be admitted, that such great matters should be turned into shadows and resemblances. For so we read, Exod. 33. 19 That when as God would at the earnest suit of Moses set forth himself and his nature in his greatest glory, he desineth himself by thi● one attribute, saying, I will make all my good to go before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee, to wit, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show compassion, to whom I will show compassion. And without question, if any human affection may be truly said to be in God, it is this of pity, the which of all other is most excellent and commendable, proper to gentle, noble and royal minds, as nothing is so base and savage, as is unmercifulness and cruelty.  
But the truth is, that there are no manner of passions in God, his nature being impassable: only by the pity of God in scripture is meant, that God as he is infinitely and only good, yea the fountain of all goodness, so he is most prone and ready to impart and extend the same to all his creatures, especially unto those which being miserable, do stand in greatest need of his help and comfort.  
This may be plainly seen in those judicial laws, which he gave to his people by Moses, wherein it may worthily be noted how careful the Lord is for the helping and relieving of all those which are any way distressed, as namely the poor, the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, that men should not only take heed of injurying them any way, (for saith he, Exod. 22. 27 although thou be cruel in oppressing thy poor brother, yet I am pitiful and cannot abide it, but will punish thee for it) but also be careful to relieve them with the crop and vintage of the seventh year, and by leaving them some glean in the yearly harvest, by setting them free out of bondage at the seventh year. Yea this compassion of the Lord extendeth itself even to the brute beast, and therefore he commanded, that they should not be overwrought, but be suffered to rest the 7 day, that the seventh years crop should be left for them in part, that the young Kid should not be sod in the mother's milk, nor the dam taken in the nest with the young birds: and so in many other particulars, we cannot but see in reading these laws, what great care and compassion God had over all his creatures, which were in misery, or any way distressed.    

CHAP. V Of the attributes of God, called his virtues.  

Sect. 1.  Gent. 
YOu will not, me thinks, admit into the nature of God any sudden and momentany motions, & therefore no affections: but what say you to constant habits of good, as justice, goodness, and such other excellent virtues? will you exclude these also out of the nature of God, or admit them only in name and in show as you do the affections?  Sch. 
These things, and whatsoever else, is not only indifferent as are the affections, but even simply good, have place in the nature of god, not only truly, but also primarely, as in their root and first fountain, from the which, they are derived to the creatures.  Gent. 
I pray you declare them in particular.  Sch. 
It is more meet if not needful, to break off our conference for this time: I dare say, I have wearied you with speaking so long of one matter.  Gent. 
Of one matter? call you this one matter? nay it is all in all. Alas god help us if one afternoons conference of God do make us weary: this being the only lesson, in the learning whereof, all that hope to be in God's kingdom, must make account to spend, not hours, days, years or ages, but eternities, that is, time which is endless, and will never be spent.  Sch. 
It is true that you say, yet you see our weakness to be such, that we are soon wearied and cloyed with hearing still of one matter, although it concern us never so much, especially if it be thus rudely and rawly handled.  Gent. 
Well, well, I can assure you, there is no such matter, and (but that I hope to have your company to morrow and the next day also) I should wish (the which I think few travelers do) to have the way lengthened, and that we had many hours riding to our lodging, as now we have not above one. But if yourself be weary of speaking and of my unskilful questioning with you of this, and that, you may be the shorter: and I will promise you not to trouble you with any more questions, but to suffer you to speak and to hold your peace at your own pleasure,  Sch. 
Your questioning hath been no trouble but a great ease and profit to me. I will (if there be no remedy) show you briefly the nature of someof this kind of attributes, which may not unfitly be called the virtues of God. You may by them gather the nature of the rest.  Gent. 
I pray you do so: I would be loath we should leave this days conference imperfect: but make an end of it once in, & then I will say, that we have made, a good days work of it.  Sch. 
I wish we had many Gentlemen of your mind, so desirous of knowledge, especially of the knowledge of God: we may well wish it, but it were folly to think it, and in vain to hope it: but to the matter.  
You know that those good and commendable dispositions of the mind, which are commonly called moral virtues, are of two sorts, whereof the one looketh inwardly toward ourselves, the other outwardly toward others.  
The first kind consisteth in the moderation of the desire and use of worldly pleasures, as of meat, drink, ease, pastime, riches, honour, and whatsoever else is pleasant in the life of man.  
These virtues are not to be attributed to GOD, because his nature is not capable of these pleasures. He indeed liveth or rather existeth in the perfection of pleasure, for he doth continually and eternally delight and rejoice in himself and in no other thing (in comparison, as no other thing is to be compared to him in goodness) for although he take pleasure in the goodness of his creatures, whereby they resemble him, as in their knowledge wisdom, purity, beauty, and whatsoever else is good in them, yet all this is nothing to that infinite goodness which is resident in himself, affording unto him matter of unspeakable pleasure, the whieth is not to be limited within the bounds of any virtues, for it cannot have either defect, moderation or excess, and all, for that it is infinite. And what marvel is it, if God be exempted from these virtues, and the pleasures which are the objects of them, when as the Angels, which are creatures, are not subject unto them? for they cannot be said to be either temperate in regard of meat and drink, or continent in respect of bodily pleasures, for that their nature is not capable of those pleasures, no more than are trees or senseless stones. Yet their nature is capable both of virtue and also of vice: for as by virtue some of them stand in happiness, so by vice many of them fell into misery: to wit, through ambition, as it is thought, for desiring to be higher, they became lower than they were created. This vice (as also the virtue of it, which being but the moderation of it, must needs be of the same kind with the vice) is incident into all excellent natures: as we know that every nature doth desire to increase in that good, wherewith it is already endued: yea the more it hath of it, the more it doth desire, because it feeleth so much the more the sweetness of it, and so we see it to come to pass, that none are so desirous of riches, as is the richest, of knowledge, as are the best learned: and of excellency: as those that are already most excellent, even as the fire, the purest of all the elements, doth never rest, till it be above all the rest, and in the highest place of dignity Yea as the virtue which is care of credit and honour, and also the exceeding extreme, which is ambition, so also humility (which may seem to be the lower extreme, but is in truth, the highest and most excellent virtue) may be most plainly showed, and fully exercised in that nature which is most excellent. For as none can have so great a fall, as he that hath the highest place, so none can show so great humility, as he that is most excellent, because none can debase himself so far, as he that is highest in excellency. Whereby it may be gathered, that although God cannot be said to be ambitious in desiring greater honour than is due unto him for that he hath by right, all honour that can be either had or desired, yet we may truly say that he may have both the greatest humility in laying aside the greatest excellency, and also a due care of credit and of maintaining his just honour against all unjust usurpers whatsoever.  
Thus the scripture teacheth us, that God is not only careful, but even curious, as we may say, and as itself saith, jealous of his honour, the which he cannot abide that it should be any touched or impaired, as he doth openly profess of himself, Es. 48. 11. My glory I will not give to any other. Neither indeed will he suffer any to take it, or any portion of it, but doth straightway confound them all with all their devices, whosoever do any way obscure it, much more such as have most impiously, yet more foolishly sought to usurp or participate it.  
Thus were the aspiring spiri●s thrown from heaven into the place and pit of darkness to the which man also (treading in the same steps of sacrilegious pride) was sent out of paradise to bear them company. Thus were the vainglorious builders of the Tower of Babel confounded in all their devices, and thus the Lord slew 50000. of the presumptuous Bethsemites, who by looking into the A●ke brought the name and presence of God into contempt. Thus he made proud Nabuchadnesar, who thought that he might with the majesty of his person and Palace outface the sun in heaven, yea God himself, whose glory filleth both heaven & earth, to become as a silly and miserable beast: and thus he confounded Herode by a filthy disease that took to himself the glorious title of God, which the flattering people ascribed unto him. Neither need we marvel, that God is so careful in maintaining his honour and glory, it being the last and chief end of the creation of all things, all which tend to this one end, and even bend their whole forces to maintain & uphold the glory of God as of the highest and greatest good, even as we see loyal subjects to endeavour nothing so much as to maintain the majesty and honour of their Prince: as we read, Rom. 11. 36. Of him, by him and for him are all things, to him be praise for ever. For if God should suffer any false or feigned God, any man or Angel to usurp any royal prerogative belonging to the godhead, and so himself to be disgraced, and his majesty diminished, the confusion of all things (as of the streams the fountain being troubled) must of necessity follow. And yet god is not so desirous of advancing his name and glory, but that he can on the other side debase himself, when he thinketh meet as being endued with humility in as great, or rather in greater measure.  Gent. 
me thinks, that humility doth not well agree with the nature of God, and that there is small use of humiliation in his doings.  Sch. 
As God doth advance others being humble, so he doth by his humility, not debase, but honour and magnify himself: for as we see it to come to pass in Princes and other great personages, that nothing doth make them to be loved, honoured and extolled, so much as doth their gentle and familiar behaviour with their subjects and inferiors: so God is exalted in his humility, and made most glorious in it. Psal. 113. The Lord is above all Nations, and his glory above the heavens, who is like unto our God, that having his habitation in the highest heaven, doth debase himself to behold things on earth? Yea not only to behold them a far off, but also to have a hand and a part in them. Princes do not use to converse much with their subjects, but that any of them should so far debase himself, as to take upon him the condition of a subject, and to suffer his own subjects, to rule and insult over him, yea to use him despightefully and contumeliously, that is a thing never heard of neither supposed to be possible to be brought to pass, but that they would rather lose both their kingdoms and their lives, then suffer such a disgrace especially at the hands of their subjects. But God the King of Kings did leave his Throne of majesty in heaven, and made one little Cave or hole of the earth (all which before was but his footstool) his chair of estate: yea he took to himself the form of weak and frail man, not of a Lord or King, but of a base servant, yea of a vile and loathsome sinner: he suffered himself to be taunted and reviled, yea which is the greatest disgrace in the world) to be spit on, as a most vile and filthy thing: who can imagine, must less allege an example of so great humility? yet herein God is most glorious.  
This one instance of his extreme humiliation, maketh it needless to allege his familiar conversing with men here one earth, his familiar conferring with Moses face to face, as one friend doth with another: his answering them to all their demands, as it were coming at their call, whereof we have many examples in the scripture, as namely in Abraham, pleading so hard for Sodom and in the story of David, 1. Sam. 29. 8, who there asketh one question after an other of God about his worldly affairs, as if he had been advising with some familiar friend: but that one example of his unspeakable humility showed in his incarnation, and in suffering all the miseries of our life, and in the end, that most shameful death, is so notable, that it can never be sufficiently admired.   

Sect. 2.  
THese two only which have been declared, of all those virtues which concern ourselves, are attributed to god: but of those which tend and reach to others, many may very fitly and truly be ascribed unto him, to show the manner of his dealing with men, as namely justice in recompensing, indulgence in forbearing, faithfulness in performing promises, and goodness in doing good to men. For the first, namely justice, it doth belong unto God, in respect of that sovereign authority, which he hath over all the creatures in the world, as well Princes as subjects, as well men as Angels, he being by virtue of the creation, wherein he made them all of nought, their most natural King, and the only absolute Monarch of the world: all other Kings and Rulers whatsoever, being but his substitutes and vicegerents, holding their Crowns and Kingdoms of him, as vassals of their liege Lord and master: and ruling by him, from him, and in his name and steed, yea and by his laws. For howsoever God have permitted the ordering of their subjects in great part to their will and discretion, yet he hath given and published to the whole world, his own supreme and universal laws, to the observing whereof, all without any exception are bound by his commandment and the violating whereof he doth most severely punish. But as no state or Commonwealth can stand by penal laws only, which restrain vice by threatenings, and punish offences committed by due pains, because it is needful that there should also be rewards appointed, whereby the virtuous endeavours of good subjects may be recompensed and encouraged, in the right disposing and distributing whereof justice hath place as well as in inflicting the deserved punishment upon offenders: so is the justice of God, whereby he administereth the Kingdom or Commonwealth of the world, of two sorts, the one in Paenâ, the other in Praemio, the one in due punishment, the other in meet rewards. For the first kind, the laws which concern the punishing of sin are not many, for they are but one, given to all mankind in the person of Adam, Gen. 2. 17. In the day that thou shalt eat, thou shalt die: And Rom. 6. 23. The wages of sin is death: The which is the only punishment (yet diversly inflicted according to the diversity of sins) appointed for all sins and offences committed against God, as well for the least, as for the greatest,  
This death beginneth with our life, during the which God layeth upon the sinner, many evils and miseries, all which are forerunners of that eternal death and misery, which abideth in the world to come. And that men should know and acknowledge, that these temporal evils come from God as punishments of their sins, he doth usually punish them in the same kind wherein they have sinned, that so the likeness which the punishment hath unto the sin, may show it to be the son of that father, and the fruit of that tree, Gen. 2 17. Because thou hast eaten of the forbidden fruit, thou shalt all the days of thy life eat in toil, and in the sweat of thy brows. And Gen. 20. 8. The Lord had shut up all the wombs in the house of Abimelec, because of Sarah Abraham's wife. And jud. 1. 7. And Adombezek said, seventy Kings having the thumbs of their hands and of their feet cut off, gathered under my table, as I have done so God hath rewarded me. And 1. Cor. 1. 21. After that the world would not by the wisdom of God know God, it pleased God (as a just punishment) by the foolishness of preaching, to save the believers. All which actions of God, as well in his temporal, as in eternal punishments we are not to doubt, but that they are squared according to that rules of justice, from the which it is impossible that God would serve.  Gent. 
It were impiety to think and blasphemy to speak the contrary: and yet to tell you plainly, I have been more troubled with doubts about this point of God's justice, then in any other: and but for troubling and hindering you in your course, I would declare them unto you, in hope to be more fully resolved in this.  Sch. 
You shall not hinder but further me, I will willingly do my best to satisfy you.  Gent. 
I have often thought upon occasion of heating this doctrine, that the punishment due unto the least sin, is by the justice of god eternal death, that some Atheists might say of God's laws, as it was said of Dracoes laws given to the Athenians, that they were written with blood, & would accuse God of cruelty, for infflicting so great or rather so endless and infinite a punishmen upon small sins, yea upon those which may be doubted whither they be sins or no, as namely to let pass the inward thoughts and desires, (the which although they be actual, yet they are in the lowest degree of act that can be) original sin in infants, the which is either alienum, another man's, and therefore not justly imputed to them, or if you take it as it is inherent in themselves, it is but an inclination to sin, not sin indeed and in act. Besides how should we think that so grievous a punishment as is eternal death, can without extreme rigour be inflicted upon many thousands of men, that did never hear tell of god or of his word, either in the law or in the gospel, as are those poor Indians, which have in this last age been discovered, whom in all reason inevitable ignorance should excuse, howsoever wilful ignorance be made damnable. These doubts and divers other, wherewith I will not trouble you, have often run in my mind, yet I doubt not but that God is just in all actions, or rather I doubt whither God can be said to be vuiust, whatsoever he doth to his creatures, yea though he should inflict extreme punishment upon the most righteous man in the world, for he hath absolute power over them all, as the potter hath of his clay to dispose of it as he list himself, and we know, that it is lawful for a man to do to his own what he will.  Sch. 
I am not of your opinion, or rather that opinion which you name, that it were not injustice in God, to punish a righteous man altogether void of sin: for not to allege the promise and covenant of life, which god hath made to man being righteous, but to suppose that God had not bound himself by any such promise, the absolute power of God over his creatures, will indeed be a warrant unto him, not only to dispose of them according to his own pleasure, but even to consume them all to nought, as in the beginning he made them all of nought, but yet not to inflict extreme punishments where there is no sin: for so God should do that which is contrary to his own nature, the which doth necessarily incline itself towards the goodness of the creature, by doing to it not evil but good, and therefore he should do evil and that which is unjust, or rather he should do that, which it is impossible for him to do. But as touching your objections against the justice of God, I answer, that we must not think sins committed against God to be so small, as they seem in themselves and when they are committed against men: for the greatness of the majesty of god makes the least sin to be most heinous, even as we know that the least indecent behaviour towards a Prince, is thought worthy to be punished with death: and not only outward & actual rebellions, but also the very thoughts and purposes of the mind tending to treason, are accounted most heinous crimes, yea so heinous, as for them not only the offendant himself, but also all his posterity for ever are thought worthy to be deprived of all those dignities and commodities, whatsoever they did enjoy by the liberality of the Prince, or yet within his dominions. Yet we need not say, that God doth punish infants for Adam's sin, for they have in themselves sufficient matter of damnation, their whole nature being actually corrupted in respect of y● image of God, for the which cause it is worthily loathed and abhorred of God. As for the infidels which have not the word of God, whereby to learn and know God, you may remember how the Apostle Rom. 1. in the latter part or half of the chapter, doth plainly prove that they do wilfully sin against the light of nature shining in the creatures, yea that they do obstinately contemn god, whom they might learn out of the creatutes, to be most majestical & worthy, to whom all obedience, honour and thankfulness should be performed. And lastly, I say that as none in this world can charge God with cruelty, so in the world to come, the wicked themselves shall confess all their punishments to be most just.  Gent. 
What say you then, to them that accuse god of injustice, in respect of his partial dealing with men, in that he rejecteth and condemneth some to eternal death, and yet electeth and spareth others, who are every way as sinful, and as unworthy of favour?  Sch. 
I am sure you will not call that Prince partial or unjust, that showeth favour and giveth life to some malefactors, for a testimony of his goodness and clemency, although he suffer others to be put to death for the same offence: no more is God unjust in saving some from eternal death, the which the rest are to suffer, and which all of us do most justly deserve. Yea if we do consider the manner and the means, by the which God doth save these his elect from the death which they deserve, we shall be far enough off, from imagining any partial dealing in him. For howsoever he did fully determine, and most earnestly desire, to save some from eternal death, yet his justice would not in any case suffer that to be done, unless and until the death and punishment due unto their sins, were fully suffered by some other in their behalf. Whereof it came, that (no creature being able to sustain it) God himself was feign to do it, and so did debase himself to a shameful death, the which what was it else but the confusion of all things, that God should lay aside his glory & majesty, to suffer shame & ignon inie? and yet all this he did because his infinite justice would admit no partial dealing. Yea so great is the justice of God, that it cannot be perverted by that most tender love which he beareth to his elect, being now both redeemed by the death of Christ, & also sanctified by his own spirit, but that he doth still lay upon them grievous punishments for those sins, whereby they do displease and dishonour him. 1. Pet. 4. 17. The time is come that judgement shall begin at the house of God, and if it do begin with us, where shall the wicked appear, that is, he will be far less partial and more severe with them. For sin is as seed cast into the ground, which multiplieth itself, and cometh forth with advantage to the sour, yea although he be otherwise a godly and just man. Thus God dealt with David, a man according to his own heart, repaying him the injuries done to Vriah, from whom he took both his wife, and also his life, in full yea in overrunning measure, making his own son to take from him his wives, crown, kingdom, children, and well nigh his life also. Yea this advantage or overplus, which David received at the hands of Godbesides the principal, is noted 2. Sam. 12. 12. Thou didst sin secretly, but I will pay the before all Israel, even in the face of the sun.  Gent. 
Do you call this justice, or is it not rather injustice, to make the faithful bear in their own persons the punishment of their sins, which Christ hath already borne to the full.  Sch. 
It is without question that God bringeth even upon the godly, for those sins whereby they dishonour him, most bitter and fearful evils, yea (as I have heard that a godly man useth to say) that God never suffereth any great sin committed by any of them, to scape unpunished: and that not only for their chastisement and amendment, which is the usual end of their afflictions, but also even for this end, to make them testimonies and examples of his severity, justice, and unpartial dealing, for he doth often punish them in their posterity after their death, as he did Eli his negligence in not correcting the misdemeanour of his sons, & the idolatry of Solomon, by taking away ten of the twelve tribes from his successors. Yet there is a difference betwixt their suffering, and the suffering of Christ, who did suffer for this end, to satisfy God's justice for the sins of the elect, the which they cannot do either in whole or in part: for if they were put to satisfy God's justice but for the least of their sins, they should suffer not only temporally, but also eternally, and so should perish: but Christ only suffereth for the satisfaction, and they for the declaration of God's justice.   

Sect. 3.  
But we may not stay any longer in this part of his justice, we must now briefly consider the other, to wit, the remuner ative justice, by the which he rewardeth the goodness of his reasonable creatures.  Gent. 
You need not be long in this point, for I think there is small use of it: not but that God is most bountiful in rewarding those that do deserve, but for that none (except the Angels) do or can deserve any reward at the hands of god, for their obedience and good, being imperfect and polluted with sin, are so far from deserving rewards, that they cannot possibly stand before the seat of God's justice and judgement, but are rejected as filthy menstruous clou●es, as the scripture speaketh.  Sch. 
You say true, that according to the strict rigour of God's law and justice, our best works are so far from deserving reward, that they deserve eternal death. But there is a time and use as for the rigour, so also ●or the mitigation of God's justice, in the which it pleaseth God of his mercy and goodness to pass over & over see the imperfections and sinfulness of man's obedience and works, and both to promise in word, & to perform in deed competent rewards, as he seethe most meet, and that not only to the godly, but even to the wicked. For the first, the retribution of good to the godly, hath place both in this life and also in the life to come. Not that God doth always reward the godly with temporal benefits, for that is not always good for them for their eternal salvation, in respect whereof god seethe it often to be needful that they should live, yea and end their days also under the cross in grievous afflictions: yet this temporal retribution is never wholly wanting, but is found if not at one time, yet at another: if not in their life time, and in their own persons, yet in their graves, and in their childers' children, even to the thousant generation: if not so fully as flesh and blood desire, yet so that they may plainly acknowledge the goodness & rewarding hand of God. Thus God promiseth at large, Deut. 29. that they which fear and obey him, shall even be compassed about with all manner of blessings, that every thing y● belongeth unto them, and that they take in hand, shall prosper and have good success, as the Apostle witnesseth, 1. Tim. 4. 1. That godliness is profitable in all respects, having the promise both of this life, and of the life to come: and Christ himself Math. 19 29. He that forsaketh any worldly thing for my sake and the gospels, shall both inherit eternal life, and also receive an hundred fold even in this life. Thus God did from one generation to another, & thus he will do even unto the end of the world, both remember and also recompense the godliness of his servants, Abraham, David and others: and thus he made a covenant with Phinees, in regard of that hi● zealous love of his glory, to bless and honour both him and his posterity from age to age. Thus God hath done, and thus he will do in all ages: yet with this difference, that the greater measure of spiritual graces the godly have, the less need they have of temporal blessings to confirm and cherish their faith: and the nearer they come to the fruition of eternal glory the more they may & aught to contemn worldly pleasures: whence it is that this temporal retribution is not so plentiful, and so apparent in these ages of the gospel, which flow in abundance of spiritual graces, as it was before when they were scant.  
But that which is wanting and doubtful in this life, shall without doubt be fully performed in the life to come, where the obedience and good works, the afflictions and patience of the godly, shall be rewarded, not only with just praise & commendation, (the which reward is deserved, and agreeable to the nature of their works, and is mentioned 1. Cor. 3. 14. 15. If any man's work stand, he shall have wages or recompense, but if it fail, he shall want that recompense, and yet be saved) but also with eternal happiness: the which although it pass by a thousand degrees, the desert, or rather although it cannot in any part or respect be deserved by any obedience of the faithful in this life, because all their obedience is imperfect, yet it pleaseth God in mercy to call it a reward, yea to be content that they look for it in that name, as we see that the Apostle doth, 2. Tim. 4. 7. 8. I have fought a good fight, and have kept the faith: from hence forth I am to expect that crown of righteousness, which the Lord that righteous judge shall give me. And so Rom. 8. 8. although the afflictions of this life be not worthy to have such a reward, as is the glory of the life to come, yet he maketh the one to depend on the other.  Gent. 
Me thought you said, that the rewarding justice of God is so great, that it extendeth itself even to the reprobate, recompensing their good deeds (if they may be called good) with blessings: but what fruit can be looked for from the root of infidelity, but corrupt, the which if God should reward, what should he do else, but bolster and maintain them in their sin?  Sch. 
God doth reward with good, not the wicked deeds of ungodly and unjust men, but the honest & upright actions of such as are civilly and morally virtuous, yea & perhaps affected with some blind zeal of religion: the which although they cannot merit before God's judgement seat, being not only imperfect and in part sinful, as are the actions of the godly, but also wholly sinful, in that they come from an evil root, yet they have respects of good, the which God rewardeth with temporal blessings, as he did Achabs' outward repentance and humiliation, with immunity from those temporal plagues, which belonged to his sins. And thus did God reward jehu Achabs' successor, for executing his anger & vengenace upon Achabs' house, with the honour of the kingdom to the fourth generation. Thus you have heard somewhat of God's justice, the which although it shall without doubt have the full sway at length in punishing and confounding the wicked, yet for the time of this life, it is suspended and kept from executing the full force upon them, that so there may be place, use, and declaration for another virtue of God, called patience and long suffering, the which who cannot but admire, that considereth the horrible outrages, blasphemies, cursings, and all manner of contemptuous and spiteful impiety, which the ungodly do daily spew out against God & his holy truth, and yet they go not only unpunished, but also prosper and flourish as if they were blessed of God, who doth by this patience only harden them to their eternal destruction.   

Sect. 4.  
THere remaineth now to be considered in a word or two, the last knot of divine virtues consisting in Gods natural inclination to do good unto his creatures: they may be called by the general name of goodness, to the which his general favour to all, his particular friendship with some few and his fidelity or faithfulness both to the one and to the other, may be referred. For as he is only good, that is, the first fountain and full treasure of all good things, so he doth not enviously keep it wholly to himself, but doth graciously impart it to others, even to all living things, base and excellent, good and evil, reasonable and unreasonable, one and other, all of them do either drink or taste of this sweet cup of God's goodness and blessings. He suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and upon the unjust, he feedeth and filleth all things living with a plentiful hand, there is no end or measure of his goodness. For why, he hath a favour unto them, as a father hath to his children, and as a skilful workman to the works of his own hands, wherein his nature and Image, or his skill and cunning do plainly appear.  
Yea, so great is his goodness towards them, that he vouchsafeth to enter into bonds and covenants with them, binding himself to them by promises and oaths, for the performance of that good unto them, which cometh from him, not as of necessity and by constraint, or yet by their desert, but only of mere favour and his natural goodness. In the performance whereof he is so sure, yea so careful as we see honest men to be in keeping their promises, that the whole world shall sooner fail, than any jot of that which he hath promised. Whereof we may gather, how odious to God is the impiety of those men or rather blasphemous monsters, that are not ashamed to call into question, if not flatly to deny, the truth of that which God hath from time to time promised to his Church, as touching eternal happiness in the world to come: yea, and that the faithful themselves, while they often doubt within themselves of the truth and fidelity of GOD, in making good whatsoever he hath spoken, do no doubt greatly both displease and dishonour God.  
But most of all in this kind, we are to admire the friendship and familiarity which it pleaseth God to have with men, yea with sinful and mortal men, to some of whom he vouchsafeth not only this general favour, whereof all the creatures in the world are partakers, and that eternal love which bringeth with it eternal salvation, but also a more special favour, admitting them into his secret counsel and acquaintance, as men do some special and approved friends.  
Thus we read that Enoch walked with GOD, that Moses did ordinarily talk and confer with him face to face, as one friend doth with an other: thus he did (as it were in sport) familiarly wrestle with jacob, and continually both accompany and assist him: thus he was to David as a Counsellor, to direct him in all his affairs, and thus he took Paul up to heaven, and showed him things not to be uttered. But of all other, most notable in this respect was Abraham, called often in Scripture by the name or rather by the most honourable and glorious title of God's friend, as 2: Chro. 20. 7. Es. 41. 8. james 2. 23. And in truth so might he well be called, for God did both make and keep with him very solemnly, all the laws of true friendship. For first he made a covenant of perpetuallove, with him and with his seed for ever, calling Abraham God's friend. and himself abraham's God. Secondly, he did bestow upon him all his blessings both temporal and spiritual, yea the greatest honour that could be, namely to be as it were the foundation of his Church and chosen people, and the first of the progenitors of Christ. And lastly, he did impart to him his purposes and counsels in all things that did any way concern him, or might make for his good.  
Yea, we read that God was so careful in the performance of this duty (for so it pleaseth God to bind himself in duties to men) of friendship, that being about to destroy those wicked Cities of Sodom and Gomorra, he thought it needful to impart the matter to his friend Abraham, yea to have his assent for the doing of it. Thus it pleaseth God of his mercy and goodness to exalt wretched men to this highest degree of honour, which indeed is so high, as that the Angels in heaven do seldom attain unto it. So that in this respect, and in many other heretofore mentioned, we may well burst forth with the Prophet. Psal. 8. 5. And say, what is man that thou that art the great God of heaven and earth shouldest remember him, or the son of man that thou shouldest thus visit him.   

Sect. 5.  Gent. 
I Am thinking with myself, what faculty there is in the soul of man not yet mentioned: for if there be any, I doubt not (considering the great likeness betwixt the soul of man & the nature of God, in those faculties common to them both, which you have already handled) but that it is either truly belonging to God, or at the least, will give occasion to consider something in his nature. You know that men conceive things by imagination and retain them by memory, are these faculties in God? likewise, conscience in man is a distinct faculty, or rather an act of the mind, and there are in him divers affections, as joy and grief, and divers virtues not as yet mentioned, what are we to think of these things?  Sch. 
I hope you do not look to hear at this time, whatsoever might be said of the nature of God: you are not now so desirous, but if that were taken in hand, you would be as weary of hearing, ere it were half done: if the chief matters be declared, they will give sufficient light, whereby the rest may be perceived, and so by those which have been handled, you may easily understand the nature of the rest of those good affections, and virtuous dispositions, which are in scripture attributed to God. So for the essential faculties of the soul, you say very truly, that they are most like to the divine nature, and even a plain and express Image of it: yet this difference must be noted, that whatsoever thing is in them that argueth weakness or suture possibility, that hath not truly place in the divine nature, which is a perfect and complete act. As in these particulars which you have named, imagination is but a possibility or means of knowledge, but the knowledge of God hath been said to be eternal and actual.  
It is hard, I confess, and even impossible for us to see or imagine how all the particulars in the world should exist actually in any understanding from all eternity, but we must not measure the infiniteness of God's understanding by our shallow brains. But as touching the question which you move of imagination and the means and manner of knowledge in God, how the ideae or notions of things enter into his mind, or rather how they exist eternally in it without any entering in or beginning, first it must be held, that although they exist eternally in GOD, yet they are not essential to him, that is, so natural and necessary as that without them he could nor exist, as is the knowledge of himself and the idea of his own nature, yea all the rest of God's essential attributes, of all which if we should detract but one from God, we should quite destroy and overthrow his whole nature and essence.  
But the knowledge of the creatures is not of that kind, for God being in himself absolute and all sufficient, might have (if it had so seemed good unto him) existed without ever either making or knowing any creature, and therefore the knowledge of them in God, must be thought to arise not from the absolute necessity of his nature, but from the free liberty of his will, moving (yet eternally) his understanding to this actual knowledge of the creatures. Yea that as the knowledge oridea of his own nature is (according to y● order of nature, not any difference of time) first in the essential understanding of God, and then in his will, so the knowledge or idea of the creatures hath his beginning not in the understanding but in the will of God. This difference we have and see more plainly in ourselves, for as we have some general notions engraven in our minds by nature itself, and so in a manner both bred and borne with us without any help of our wills, so the knowledge of other things hath the beginning in the will, disposing and inclining the mind to this or that knowledge, as it seemeth best unto it. Secondly as touching this (in a manner accidental) knowledge of God, it must be held that God hath it of himself and not by the means, or from the creatures, as we have, that by sense and imagination get the resemblances of things into our minds, the which way of knowledge if it were admitted to be in God, it would follow, that his knowledge of the creature doth not go before, but followeth after it and so is not the cause but rather an effect of it, and not eternal but temporal, whereas we hold that the will and eternal foreknowledge of God are the cause of all things.  Gent. 
I have heard it said, that the divine nature is as it were a Glass, wherein all things that do at any time exist in the world, may be seen and known, and that by the Saints and Angels in heaven, much more than by God himself, who knoweth all things by his own essence, it being the similitude of all things.  Sch. 
Some have thought as you say, but it is a mere fable to say that either the Saints or the Angels do or can see the essence of God, much less all things in it. It is true that God knoweth all things, and that by his essence, if thereby we mean his essential understanding, and that by the similitude which his essential understanding hath to the creatures, if thereby we mean the similitude which is betwixt the general idea or notion and the particular instance. For as it is essential and natural to God to know himself, so it is essential and natural to him to know the general differences of things, without the knowledge whereof he could not know himself. As namely it is essential to God to know what is reasonable, infinite, knowledge, wisdom, good and eternal, for otherwise he could not know his own nature, which consistesh in these differences. By the same means also he knoweth what is unreasonable, finite, error, folly, evil and time, which are contrary to the other, for one contrary cannot be known without the knowledge of the other.  
This is the essential knowledge engraven in the very nature of GOD, and as we say of our natural notions, both borne and bred with him, but it doth not extend itself any further or descend into particulars: for it is not essential to GOD, to know Peter, Paul, or any other man, nor yet to know the nature of man, nor yet to know this world wherein we live, for GOD might have existed though none of these had ever been. But the knowledge of these particulars, is by the free will of GOD deducted from those general notions, which are essential to God: who hath thought good to make by the creation a particular instance, example, and as it were an experiment of his essential and universal knowledge.  Gent. 
You seem to be of their opinion, that think that God knoweth no particulars, because there is no medium, no means or way by the which the similitudes of them should be carried from the things to the nature of God, for that there must be a convenience betwixt the things known and the mind: which is not betwixt the creatures and the understanding of God.  Sch. 
I am far from that absurd error, and I hope from any such: I do not doubt but that God knoweth every particular thing in the world severally and distinctly from all other, yea, that he hath in his eternal counsel distinguished them, as namely men, of whom he hath appointed some to glory and others to confusion: yea, that he knoweth every particular thing far more distinctly and truly than we do, that see and feel them: for he knoweth them in their causes, and essential forms, the which only is the true knowledge, whereas we do but guess at their natures by their qualities and effects.  Gent. 
Yet perhaps you do think that God knoweth the particulars of this world which now existeth, more than he doth a 1000 other worlds, which never did nor shall exist indeed, although they exist in the universal notions of God's understanding, and so may be as well known to God as this particular world, which is brought forth into act.  Sch. 
We cannot say, if we speak properly, that God knoweth any particulars, but those which do sometime exist. He knoweth himself able to make such particulars, if it were his will, but they are not particulars, until his will do bring them into act: for as universal notions are in God's understanstanding as in their first fountain, or rather in their proper place, so particulars come from the will of God: And therefore we must needs think that God knoweth those particulars which do or shall exist, or have existed otherwise then those which do never exist, for he knoweth the one and not the other.  Gent. 
Let me trouble you once more, and no more, for this is a point that I could never understand, to wit how God getteth the knowledge of these things: do you think that he knoweth those things which he hath decreed to exist no otherwise, when and while they do exist, than he doth before, and after: or that the existence of them maketh some kind of impression, or alteration in his mind, which was not before?  Sch. 
No surely, the existence of things doth no way alter or affect God: objects do work upon our senses and mind, but God's understanding is merely active not passive: yet we cannot doubt, but that as God maketh us to perceive things by sense, and the Angels by some other means, so he is able by means to make himself capable of the qualities of particular objects, but of himself and in his own nature, he is altogether uncapable of them, or of any knowledge by them.  Gent. 
You have no list to answer me directly to the question: I do not think that God doth suffer from the objects, but that is all one, I would know whether that he doth not know and see us, as we go here otherwise then he did, when we were in the loins of our first father Adam, and whether that he do not plainly see us too particularly and distinctly, whether he do it intromittendo, as we do, or which is more agreeable to his nature being impassable) extramittendo, that is not the question: but I cannot be persuaded but that although he knoweth us fully and certainly before we exist, yet when once we do exist in nature, he than doth see & behold us after an other manner.  Sch. 
You say true, I have no mind to wade far into this matter, for it is very hard, yea impossible for us to know the manner of the actual knowledge of God: and therefore I did pass it over in the proper place, neither would I have mentioned it but that you urge me so hard: for I think it sufficient for us to know that God knoweth all things, even the most secret thoughts of our minds, although we be ignorant how he cometh to that knowledge. But for your question I have told you my opinion, that howsoever you seem to think that God knoweth things not existing and seethe them as it were with eyes, when they do exist, yet it seemeth more consonant to the truth to say, y● the creatures whither existing or desisting, are all alike known to God, and I pray you rest in this answer, for this time. Now as touching memory, as God hath no use of imagination, because he hath nothing to learn, so he hath no need of memory, for that he cannot lose any thing by forgetfulness, all things being present unto him both past & future. Likewise for conscience, which is the testimony given by the mind in the presence of God of the innocency and integrity or of the guiltiness of this or that reasonable creature, and so either of the want or of the desert of blame, it may in some sort be attributed to God, and that in respect both of himself as also of the creature: for first, God as he is in all respects most pure and innocent, yea most holy and good, so before himself and in his own presence, he both knoweth and acknowledgeth himself so to be, and for that cause not only to be free fion all desert of blame, but also to deserve most worthily all praise and glory. But more plainly this faculty hath use in respect of men, who do often charge God with evil, injury, injustice, cruelty, and many other grievous crimes, in the which plea this faculty of conscience doth clear and absolve God, from all those blasphemous reproaches which wretched men spew out against him. Rom. 3. 4. Let God be true and every man a liar that thou mayest be justified in thy sayings, and overcome when thou art judged. Thus much of the faculties of the mind, which you thought omitted in the former discourse: as for the affections and virtues, as joy grief, and divers other, which in scripture ate often attributed to God, their nature may be known by those which have been handled.    

CHAP. VI Of the external attributes of God.  
THus I have declared unto you, those things which for the present I could call to my remembrance as touching the nature of God, his existence, essence, and attributes, either truly taken or typically borrowed from the faculties of a reasonable soul. To the which if you add the external attributes which are borrowed from the body or outward person of man, as is the eternity of GOD from the age or continuance of man, his ubiquity from the greatness or stature of man, his omnipotency from the strength of man, with others of the same kind, you have a perfect picture of the nature of God shadowed out, though rudely and imperfectly, under the shape of man.  
This last kind of attributes hath been touched already in speaking of the infiniteness of God, the general and essential difference of his nature, from the which they do necessarily flow, and therefore we are here to make an end of this conference: and so we may of our journey also, if you think good to light and lead along this long causey: it will be a great ease both to ourselves and to our horses, and we may (now that we are in sight of the Town) talk of our lodging, for it is meet that we have some care of our bodies, that so we may be able afterward to serve God by meditation, conference, and such other Christian exercises.  Gent. 
Nay by your favour sir, I must needs desire you to make an end of the task, which upon agreement, though unwillingly you took in hand: It would be a great grief (I will not say a shame) for a man that had toiled all the day long many a long mile through thick and thin, to give over at the last cast, in the sight of the place whither he goeth: if you have perhaps touched these attributes by the way upon some occasion, it follows not, that they should be denied their proper and due place in this work, the which without them would be maimed and imperfect.  
I like well that we light and lead, for so we shall have the more time for conference but for our lodging we will not trouble ourselves as yet, but rather take it as we find it, and therefore I pray you let me hear and know somewhat of these also in particular, and first why you call them external attributes.  Sch. 
I hope your meaning is not that we shall go reasoning into the town, for so we should have moderators enough to cut us off: but to shut up these things briefly: They are called external, not as if there were any such difference of external & internal in god as in man, consisting of an outward body and an inward soul, for in God there is neither without nor within, but all alike: but they are so called in GOD because they are so in truth in man from whose nature the resemblance is taken. Yea further they may be so called, howsoever they be as essential as the other: for that they do not come so immediately from the root of God's essence, which is an infinite understanding, neither so properly belong to the nature of it, but are as it were, begotten by the conjunction of the difference which is infiniteness to the essential understanding of GOD: the which bringeth forth knowledge, wisdom, will and the rest of the aforesaid attributes, more naturally and properly than it doth eternity and ubiquity, the which are found only in this one understanding, whereas the other are common to all understandings, both finite and infinite. And therefore we may truly say that the infinite knowledge of God is more inward and near the understanding which is the root of God's essence, then is his infinite continuance, although not more essential: even as we see that those parts of a tree, which are nearer the root, may be said to be the inner parts, and the small twigs the utter parts, although the one be no more essential to the tree then the other. Now for the particulars: and to begin with the eternity of God which is his everlasting age or continuance, represented to us, Dan. 7. 9 by an old aged man, whose head and hair are as white as snow, or the whitest wool, the which testifieth that he is no babe of yesterdays birth, but that he hath lived and continued in the world many years: even so it is with god, or rather so it is not with god, for the oldest man that is had a time of birth and beginning, though long since, and shall have a time of end even hard at hand but god is without father or mother, and hath neither beginning of days nor end of life, but is the same this day, yesterday & for ever. He is not by the grey or white hairs of old age summoned to the court of death, for he is always in his fresh and flourishing youth: his substance doth not wear and waste away, for it is not as are the bodies of men, as a Kingdom divided in itself, which therefore cannot stand but is simple without mixture or diversity, and therefore without jarring, yea all peril and peradventure of ruin.  
So then this eternity of God is to be defined, the everlasting existence of his essence without either beginning or end. For if it had beginning, than it did not always exist, for it could not exist before it had a beginning: And if it did not always exist, than sometime there was nothing, but that cannot be, for if there were time, there was distinction of motion which made that time, but where there is nothing, there is no motion, for nothing cannot move.  
Besides, if the time ever were, wherein there was no thing nor nature existing (for if God were not existing there was nothing, for whatsoever did then exist was god, because it did primarely exist) nothing should ever have existed: for if the Philosopher could not see how the most mighty and omnipotent God could make the first matter of the world, for that he had nothing whereof to make it, and just nothing saith he, (though falsely) is made of nothing, what would he say to this paradox, that nothing did of nothing make something, yea all things, not only material bodies, but even the most pure and operative forms? But we know that God is eternal, that is, he ever was, and never was not, he was not made by nothing, for nothing makes nothing, nor by any thing, for that which could make God, was before god and greater than God, and therefore only God: but God made himself, not by giving or rather by taking a beginning to himself, but by being himself, as he doth still, and shall for ever make himself. He was always, as he will be evermore, never beginning, nor ever ending, but always being. He existeth not of nothing, but of himself, not by another, but by himself, in no other but in himself, and for no other but for himself, and so he is to himself all in all. Yea as God is eternal, so every eternal is God, for no creature can be eternal, because with the creature there comes in generation and motion, & with motion time, and so eternity is abandoned: for time and eternity are contraries, as are finite and infinite,. the measure and that which is unmeasurable. But (you may say) how could God exist without the creature, for how could he exist without working and doing something, he being a most actual and operative form, and how could he work, if he had no matter to work on? how could God extend his goodness, there being nothing to receive it, or how could he have glory and honour, there being none to give it, for honour is in the giver, not in the taker? or what disparagement would it have been to God, if he had made the creature to exist from all eternity, more than it is that he will make it to exist to all eternity, as we know that he hath promised in holy scripture? yes surely, God is not pinned upon the sleeve of the creature, that he could not exist and that in perfect happiness and glory, without the help or company of any creature, the which howsoever it do set forth the glory of God after another manner, then that whereby God was glorious in and to himself from all eternity, yet it addeth nothing to the perfection of God's glory, which before was absolute, although not in the same manner. Neither can we doubt but that this eternity of the creature would be a great blot to the glory of God, whereof his eternity is now a notable part, but should not be if that the creature were eternal as well as God. And therefore it must be content to be a degree beneath him, rather than to strive in vain to fetch the pedigree from so ancient a stock: eternity must be left to God as a royal prerogative proper to his house and crown, for the antiquity of a few thousand years may serve to make the creature noble. Now that objection which saith, that God could not exist without the creatures, because without them he could not work, is easily answered: for before the creation, God did no way move or work: yet he was not idle, for he did as he doth still, give himself to the contemplation of himself, even of his own infinite essence and glory.  

Sect. 4.  
NExt to the eternity of GOD, cometh to be considered his ubiquity which concerneth the stature and greatness of GOD, as the other did his age and continuance. For as in time, so also in greatness God must be known and acknowledged to be infinite, not enclosed or comprehended within any creature or place either in heaven or in earth, but shilling all creatures, and all places both in heaven and earth, yea stretching and extending himself beyond the compass of the world by infinite degrees, and that not only by his power (his essence being in some set particular place) as we know that Princes sitting and being contained in a little chair, stretch their power & authority over whole countries and kingdoms far distant from them: but it is not so with God, who as in power, so also in his substance and essence is every where, in all things and in all places, for he is not by any thing either kept or put and as it were iusled out and dispossessed of his place, but is in all places even where the grossest bodies are, as well as where is neither place nor body. We see how the air (to the which we have before compared the ubiquity of God) is desirous to enlarge his dominions, and therefore assoon as ever it findeth any place empty, it straightway taketh possession: but if there be any body in it to keep possession, it is kept out a doors, and can have no title to it: and so in all other bodies we see that the weaker giveth place to the stronger, for it is impossible that two bodies should be together in one place. But it is not so with God, for no creature is able to put him out of any place: he doth suffer the creatures to have their several places, but not to usurp his place, the which is every place, as well where the creatures are, as where nothing is. For their being in place doth not hinder him from being there, for he is there as well as they, and even where they are. He is where the earth is, for he is in the earth, and both heaven and earth are in him, and subsist in him as in their subject and foundation, upholding and containing them. And therefore his title is better to that place which they have, then is theirs, for he was there in peaceable possession of it, before they were any where existing, and so he will be there when they are consumed to ashes and gone.  Gent. 
I do easily believe that God is every where, and that his exceeding greatness is more than sufficient to fill a thousand worlds: but I pray you show me how God is present every where, whither he be partly in one place, and partly in another, or rather as I have heard them say, wholly in every place, as it is said of the soul, that it is tota in toto corpore, and tota in qualibet part, wholly both in the whole body, and also in every part or member of it.  Sch. 
That is indeed the usual saying and similitude, according to the which god is to be thought to be wholly in every Church & house, yea in the least thing that is, as well as in the greatest. It is sure, that the essence of God is most simple and uniform without any distinction of parts, but the very same every where: yet that common saying is hard to be understood, and therefore may easily by the simple be perverted to their own destruction: who hearing God to be wholly in every place, will readily suppose him to be contained in that place, and so to be finite, yea to be divided into infinite Gods, as the Heathen imagined every house and person to have his proper god attending on him. And therefore we may more ●asely and truly imagine God to be one whole undivided and uniform essence, containing and enclosing in itself all bodies as doth the air, yet not excluded out of any place where any body is, as the air is out of all such places, and that God is not in this or that place, Church, or house, but that all places, houses, churches, yea the earth, air, & heaven itself be in God, & that in quantity even as a pin's point is in respect of the whole compass of heaven, and that in him the whole world moveth and hath his being. Yea, his essence extendeth itself infinitely without the compass of the world, and above the highest heavens, and so is to be thought to be totally or wholly in any one place, and that equally, as much in one place as in another.  Gent. 
I pray you show me that, for I have always thought God to be after a special manner there, where he professed himself to be, as namely to be present with the Ark and the propitiatory seat, more than in the Idols of the heathen, in the temple of jerusalem, more than in any other: so likewise to be in the godly more than in the wicked, in heaven, the which the scripture doth usually make the place of God's dwelling and residency, more than in hell, or on the earth: and most of all, to be in the humanity of Christ, wherein the Apostle saith. Col. 2. 9 That the fullness of the Godhead doth dwell bodily.  Sch. 
If you think the essence of God to be in any one place more than in another, you are greatly deceived: it is every where alike, neither can it possibly be otherwise, for it cannot be gathered or compacted together into any other form, then is that infinite greatness, which filleth all places,  
God may indeed show his presence by outward actions, more in one place then in another, and so say and profess himself to be there only, and no where else, speaking according to the erroneous conceit of men, that think him to be no where present in essence, but where he showeth himself and his power by some outward sign. Thus God was present in the Temple of jerusalem, and more specially in the holy of holiest, and in the propitiatory seat more than in other places, not by his essence but by his mercy and goodness, the which he did there reveal and show to the jews more than to any other people. Thus God is present in his spirit in the faithful, more than in the carnal man, not by the essence, but by the effectual operation of it, reneving in them his own image of holiness and truth, the which thing he doth not in the other. Thus God is present in heaven more than in hell or here on earth not in essence, but in glory and majesty, the which shineth more in heaven, than any where else. For even as a man having been kept all his life in a dark dungeon from the light of the sun, and the sight of the creatures in the world, if he were on a sudden brought up into the open air, and suffered to behold all these glorious creatures, would not stick to say and affirm, this world to be the very dwelling place and palace of God: so doth heaven seem in respect of this inferior world wherein we live. But the greatest doubt is of the humanity of Christ, with the which (without doubt) the godhead is present far otherwise, yea far more excellently than ever it was with any creature, or in any place either in heaven or earth: yea so, that if it were possible for the divine essence to be in any one thing or place more than in another, it would without question be more in the humanity of Christ, then ever it was any where. For God did never before vouchsafe such unspeakable honour to any creature, as to take it into his own person and to himself, yea to be himself. Yet for all this, the essence of God is no more in the humanity of Christ, then in other places and creatures, and yet it is joined, yea united to it, so as it never was to any creature.  Gent. 
How is that strange conjunction of the humanity of Christ to the divine essence?  Sch. 
For that I must crave pardon of you, it is not so soon done as desired: it is well if I can get done the task which you exact of me, though I do not meddle with other matters, especially with such as being very hard and intricate, require several and large treatreatises: it is better that we hold ourselves to the matter in hand, and so seeing in part the truth of this point, to proceed to the rest of the external attributes of god, as namely to the omnipotency of God.   

Sect. 3.  Gent. 
I did not think it to have been a matter requiring either long time, or any great labour, and then I am sure you would not have stuck with me, but I pray you hold on your course, seeing you will not be entreated to digress.  Sch. 
The omnipotency of God is resembled in man by the strength of his body, or the power of his person, yet there is as great difference, as is betwixt the age of man and the eternity of God, or the stature of man, and the incomprehensible greatness of god. For as God is, so is his power, by the which he is able and sufficient to do whatsoever pleaseth him, as it is defined Psal. 135. 6. The Lord is great above all Gods, and hath done whatsoever he would in heaven and in the earth, in the sea and in the deeps: & what need there to be more power than will, or to what purpose is that power, which is without the will. So that the object of God's power, is the whole world, in the which, and over the which, God hath so ample and absolute authority, that neither the greatness, strength, nor multitude of the creature is able to resist his will and power, who is able (if he were willing) to turn all things upside down, to make the heaven & the earth change places the one with the other, so that the heaven should rest in the midst, & the earth turn about in the circle.  
Yea as he made both heaven and earth, and all things in them contained of nothing, so he is able to turn them all to nothing, and that without any labour or difficulty, even by the breath of his mouth, and the mere inclination of his will.  
But howsoever this power of God cannot be matched by any creature, yet it doth both match and overmatch itself, restraining itself so, that it is not able to do any thing against itself, for that which God by his power doth at any time, he cannot by his power make it to be not done or undone at the same time, for so the power of God should be contrary to itself. And therefore if God by his power make the sun to shine at any time, he cannot by his power make that it shall not shine at the very same time.  
If he make man free, he cannot make him bound, if he give him will, he cannot compel him to be willing, for so he should not give, but take away will from him: and so in all other instances, it is impossible to God to make contradictories to be true, because he being perfect unity, cannot be contrary to himself. And if God cannot make any repugnancy in the nature of the creatures, much less can he do it in his own nature, and therefore he cannot do any thing contrary unto it, as namely to justify a wicked man, or to condemn the righteous, to love one that is sinful, or to hate him that is endued with his own image of holiness, to diminish, destroy, or any way to alter himself, who is unchangeable. These things God cannot do, being hindered not by any creature but by himself, and therefore the impossibility of doing them, is not to be accounted weakness or impotency, but strength and power: otherwise nothing is impossible to be done by God, that can possibly be imagined by man. How then can we sufficiently wonder at the gross error and sottish ignorance of those men, who in respect of the difficulty or rather impossibility (as they think) of performing them, call into question the truth of those promises which God hath made to his Church of the resurrection of the body, although consumed to nothing, and of eternal glory. But as they err, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God, so we seeing these things to be most easy to God, are to be confirmed in faith and in the resolute persuasion of the truth of them.  Gent. 
I am I thank God fully persuaded, that God both can easily, and will undoubttedly restore us to life, though we were consumed to nothing, by burning a thousand years in the hottest fire that can be made or imagined. Yet I pray you tell me one thing, do you think it possible that the very same individuum, and as you say in the Schools, idem numero, having been consumed to nothing, can be restored, as namely the same candle after that it is consumed?  Sch. 
I perceive you meaning: it is certain that God both can and will raise us to life again, not in any other, but in these very same persons, which now we are: but what the Schoolmen mean by that quiddity of idem numero, & many other of the same kind, as I never did, so I do not now mean to trouble myself with them.   

Sect. 4.  
We will rather come to the rest of these external attributes, the which (as I am of myself not unwilling) so you see that we must of necessity knit up in very few words. First for the similitude of the divine essence, the which must be granted to be a most simple and pure form, altogether void not only of all mixsture of divers matters or contrary qualities, as we know the elements to be, but even of all manner of composition whatsoever, even of that which is the simplest, to wit, of matter and form, whereof all creatures do necessarily subsist, for that neither matter nor form can in them exist the one without the other. But there can no kind of matter be admitted into the divine essence, no not that whereof as being most pure, subtle and simple, the heavens, or the Angels themselves (more subtle than the heavens, if more may be) do consist. For so we should pull down all that we have built up, and gainsay all that hath hitherto been affirmed of the nature of God. For we cannot make him both eternal, and also compounded of matter and form, for in composition there is motion, & in motion time, and time taketh away eternity, yea we must grant the matter whereof he is compounded, to have been before him, the which must subsist in simple, before it be brought into composition. Again if he be material, he is local, for all matter is in place, and so he is not infinite, but finite and circumscribed. Yea thus we shall take from him his omnipotency, which ariseth of the purity of his simple form being mere actual, because it is inmateriall, whereas if it were compounded of matter and form, it should be compounded of impotency and of power, of passion as well as of action, for it must participate the nature of both the parents, taking from the one operative power, and from the other passable impotency, and so be not a pure act, but clogged and blunted with the grossness of matter, and by it made unable to work, yea as like and ready to suffer itself, as to work in others. And therefore in the building of this palace for the great God of heaven, we must reject all corruptible matter, yea all matter whatsoever, because all matter is corruptible, and so make the divine nature to be a pure form, wholly active and in no respect or part passive.  Goe 
I have oft heard men speak, & have red men's writings of these pure abstract forms, of the which kind many do hold not only god, but even the angels, which are mere creatures to be: yet it cou●d never sink into my head, how a form should subsist of itself without some matter to uphold it: and as I remember, you said before, that some ancient divines (I think you named Tertullian) were of the same opinion, or rather dullness of conceit, and did therefore allow bodies wherein to subsist, not only to the Angels, but even to God himself.  Sch. 
It is ha●d for us, who consisting of gross bodies and brains, esteem other natures by our own, to imagine how any form should subsist without some material subject to uphold it. As touching the Angels, if you cannot think, or will not believe them to be pure and abstract forms, altogether void of material composition, you shall (for me) continue in your error or opinion: but if you will not admit God to subsist in this manner, to wit, as a substantial form upholding both itself, and also all things whatsoever do any way exist, you will mar all. Neither ought the difficulty of supposing it, breed in us any doubting of the truth of it, it having been often already said, that the manner of Gods subsisting in his essential form, is altogether unsearchable and incomprehensible. Let it be sufficient that we have it proved by most necessary demonstrations, that God is a most pure, substantial, immaterial & active form without any composition of matter & form or distinction of parts, but every where alike and the very same. Yea I do not see but that this prerogative of being a mere and pure form must be reserved to God, and in no case communicated to any creature as the grossness of matter must be left to the creature and in no wise ascribed to God. And so matter, or material subsisting (the which bringeth with it motion and time, passion, alteration, limitation and impotency) shall be the badge or cognizance, which the creature shall wear that so it may appear, that he is not his own man, or maker, but that he serveth and dependeth on an other, by whom he was made and is maintained. And on the other side, mere simplicity and pure formality (to the which eternity, rest, identity, operation, infiniteness and omnipotency are annexed) is to be accounted the royal diadem, which advanceth God in his Throne of glory above all creatures whatsoever. With this simplicity of the divine essence we may join the unity of it, for as it is simple without parts, so it is one without kinds, neither can we imagine it to be more than one for many causes. For if we suppose two infinits, we make no insinit, for each of the two is the limit of the other, for it keepeth the other from coming into itself (otherwise it becometh one with it, and is no longer two but only one) and so from extending itself into infinite. Besides, we know that the divine essence being the first fountain from the which all things flow, and the last end to the which they tend, must be the absolute perfection of rest altogether void of motion: for otherwise things should move not to rest but to motion, and the termini à quo and ad quem, should be not fixed, but movable, and so uncertain: but if the divine essence be many or more than one, there is not absolute perfection, which is only in unity as motion is in number.  
So that as it is in civil states, the which are never counted sure and settled in the absolute perfection of government, till the whole authority be devolved from the people to many, from many to a few, from a few to one, because where there are more than one in authority, there is matter of continual discord and disorder, but in unity there is perfect concord, for no man disagreeth with himself: so much more we are to think that the sovereign Monarchy of the world is not in motion or possibility tending to perfection, but already and even for ever established in perfect unity: but we need not insist any longer in proving the unity of the godhead, which of itself is manifest, and therefore we will now shut up this conference, with the last of these external attributes, which is the immoveabilitie, if we may so speak, of God.   

Sect. 5.  
THis attribute giveth us to understand, that god is not subject to motion, which is the mutation of state or place, but is in all respects immutable and immovable: he doth not shift his dwelling place, wandering up and down like a Pilgrim, this day in one country and to morrow in an other, at one time in heaven, and at an other time on earth, but continueth where he is and where he hath been always, more firm and steadfast than the hugest mountain, or the whole earth, like to a Rock in the sea, against the which though the waves do beat, and so break themselves, yet they cannot either move it in or remove it out of the place where it is: even so it is with the creatures in the world, the which do continually toss and tumble themselves from one estate to an other, but the Lord remaineth the same for ever.  
For why, as we ourselves must not sit down, but go on till we come to the end of our journey, even so the creatures, when they are in their best estate, are not there to rest in themselves, as if they had made themselves for themselves, but they must move and go on towards God and his glory by performing those duties, which do naturally belong unto them, and so continually better their estate. But it is not so with God, whose perfection is and ever was in complete act, not in hope & possibility, and therefore having all the perfection, that he can have, he need not stir for the obtaining of any more, or move for any man's pleasure: his last end and chief good is in himself, and in no other thing whatsoever, and therefore he need not by motion pursue that, which he enjoyeth already in rest, or seek that from an other which he hath in himself. Yea it is needful that God should be immovable, he being the foundation, whereon all things whatsoever do any way exist, do stand and rely: so that if it did move and were fickle and wavering, there must necessarily ensue universal confusion & disorder in nature: in the which respect (as was noted in the former attribute) God being both terminus a quo, and terminus ad quem, all natural motion motion is made, must needs be supposed to be unmovable. for otherwise both disorder would ensue, and also motion should be made to motion, as it were in an endless journey, and with bootless labour.  
Lastly how should we suppose God to move, whom we know to have no place whither to move: for he himself is every where and therefore whither soever he moveth, he moveth to himself, or rather he moveth not at all, because he is still where he was, even in himself. Now sir, I have as I could, endeavoured to satisfy your request, neither can you require any more of me, save only thanks for your gentleness and courtesy in attending so patiently these simple and rude discourses: your wisdom is such, that I am persuaded, you did not expect any perfect declaration of the nature of God, especially at my hands, and at this time: in the which respect I hope that you will take in good part, that which hath been said, how rudely and rawly soever.  Gent. 
If I should tell you how much I think myself beholden to you for this days work, you would think that I did but flatter you: I know not when I learned so much good divinity in one day, but I hope to have ere we part, better occasion and cause too of thanking you.  Sch. 
There is no such cause sir, these are but ordinary matters.  Gent. 
Well I would give any good I might have had your company up to London: I would think to be by your means a good divine ere I came thither.  Sch. 
So you are already, otherwise it were strange, that I should make you a good divine in half a score of days, that could not make myself one in a whole score of years: but to deal plainly with you, my purpose is to travel as far as London, though I told you not so much at first: but I doubt that my little weak nag will not hold out, and I am sure, that he cannot hold foot with your strong gelding.  Gent. 
I am right glad of it, take no thought for your nag, I will assure him to London for the pains that you have already taken in instructing me: and when we come to our journeys end, if I might entreat you to go with me to my house, which is not far off, you should be as weleome as yourself could wish, and command any thing I have.  Sch. 
You may soon have a bold guest of me, but we will talk of that six or seven days hence. In the mean time for that I perceive the you are a stranger in this country, I will be so bold, as to bid you welcome to this Northern Town.  Gent. 
I thank you heartily, but do you know of any good lodging in it?  Sch. 
No doubt sir, but that we may in many places here in Newcastle be both heartily welcome, and honestly used for our money: but you know that the country is plain and rude, and therefore your entertainment will be but course and homely in respect of that curious civility that is besouth: yet their meaning is good and better than it seemeth.  Gent. 
You speak worse of your country, than there is cause, I like plain dealing best, let us get on, and I pray you lead us to some honest house where you are known or acquainted.    
FINIS.