THE NATURE OF MAN. A learned and useful Tract▪ written in Greek by Nemesius, surnamed the Philosopher; sometime Bishop of a City in Phoenicia, and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church.  
ENGLISHED, And divided into Sections, with briefs of their principal CONTENTS: BY GEO: WITHER.  
LONDON: Printed by M. F. for Henry Taunton in St. Dunstan's Churchyard in Fleetstreet. 1636.   

TO HIS MOST LEARNED AND MUCH HONOURED Friend, john ●●den ESQUIRE.  
SIR,  
I Am not careful to annex your other Titles: for they are not so much honour to you, as they are honoured by you; and your bare Name sounds more honourably in my judgement, then that which the breath of others can add unto it.  
I have made bold therefore (though without your knowledge) to send abroad with your Name prefixed, this ancient Greek Father, newly taught to speak English; that he may receive your approbation where he well expresseth his meaning, and your correction hereafter where he proves defective; For, I presumed you might by this means be provoked to the perusal thereof, notwithstanding your many studies.  
Your Candour, and singular humanity, make me confident in this attempt; For though my Author be a stranger to most modern Students, you (from whom no such Worthy is obscured) are his familiar acquaintance; and in whose Name could I have more properly brought this Ancient among my Countrymen (to be entertained with respect) then in yours, who are the truest lover of Antiquities; and he, who hath best showed the right use of them to this Age?  
I think not you to be any whit honoured by this Dedication; but, ●hat I have rather magnified myself in making it an occasion to signify that I have so noble a Friend. Yet without all such respects, I have done this, merely to content myself, in that which I thought could not justly discontent you; and, to say truth, having a long time loved your person, and honoured your worth, it is now an ease, and a delight to me, to express it by this occasion.  
And, you have not been precious to me without cause: For, I being one of those, who preposterously, begin to write before they learn, you might justly enough have reputed me worthy of contempt only, when I was first presented to your acquaintance. Nevertheless, (perceiving, it may be that the affections of my heart were sound, though the fruits of my brain were defective) you vouchsafed me a friendly, and a frequent familiarity: whereby I got opportunities both to rectifiemy Judgement, and increase my Understanding in many things.  
Were the same humble affability in those, (whom a less degree of knowledge hath vainly puffed up, to the corrupting of them into that, which is worse than Ignorance) they might have been more beloved; and perhaps, more wise men than they are. To amend them & to encourage others to the like Virtue, I have testified this of you, and in that, shall perchance, add somewhat to your honour.  
I have lately confined myself to my rustic habitation, in that part of this Kingdom, which is famous for the best of those meats, wherewith the Poet Martial invited his friend: Pallens Faba, cum rubenti Lardo: yet it hath not made me so mere a Corydon, but that I relish the delicates of the MUSES; and retain some ambition to be continued in your esteem. And, SIR, wheresoever I am, you shall ever be remembered, and beloved of  
Your unfeigned friend, and true Honourer, GEO: WITHER. From my Cottage, under the Beacon hill near Farnham. May 23. 1636.   

A PREFACE to the Reader, concerning the Author of this Book; touching the Contents thereof, and the Translation of the same, etc.  
COnsidering how many profess Knowledge, few have attained the right way of it: and, those few are so much employed in labouring to keep the Truth from being smothered among the heaps of impertinent Volumes; and compelled to spend so much time in weeding out Heresies, and in discovering the fallacies of Error, that they cannot so improve themselves and others, as else they might.  
Upon the Foundations laid by the Prophets, and Apostles, many sacred Buildings, were with comely uniformity erected by the Primitive Doctors of the Church; and, in every future Generation somewhat was, now and then, added (by the Worthies of their times) according to the first Patterns; and upon such occasions or necessities, as required the same, to the continuing and enlarging of Divine knowledge.  
But, we in this last Age have blinded the same with confused Opinions; and heaped upon them so many tedious Commentaries, so many false Glosses, and needless Treatises; that Students half outrun their course, before they can pass through that Rubbish, which obscures from them the directest Paths, and fairest monuments of Truth. Yea, some of our later Paper-works are so plastered, glazed, painted, and sophisticated, according to the vanity of our newfangled-humours: and, othersome, are so dirtily slubbered over, suitably to the homeliness of our moderne-fancies: that the first insinuates a false belief, or a superstitious faith, to the disadvantage and dishonour of ancient simplicity: the later, a profane neglect of all Piety & good order.  
A good means (as I conceive) to prevent such inconveniences, is to bring into more frequent view, the Writings of these Ancients who lived so near to the Apostles, that they cannot be justly suspected, as favourers, or parties to the factions of these later Ages. For, many of them, are (if not altogether unknown) very rarely perused, by reason of the numberless Novelties, which have wearied the Presses, and filled the Libraries of Europe.  
Or, if an Ancient Piece, be accidentally discovered in this Wilderness of Inventions, (by our Students of the later Editions) they seldom bring it, honestly, to light: But, either mangle it, as they please; or steal as much of it, as is generally plausible to trim, and stuff out those Volumes, by which they purchase an undue opinion of being learned. The rest, they endeavour to rake up again in obscurity; that their Theft may be hidden: Or, (which is worse) that those Truths which they understand not, (or favour not) may be weakened.  
For this cause, it well became us to revive, now and then, those Ancients, whose wisdom is useful to moderate our controversies. Some, have already laboured happily in this way. And, I (who may well enough be reputed among such as have increased those Treatises, which keep more profitable Books from being frequently perused) do now desire to make some satisfaction for the same: and, to that end, have published in English this Tract of Nemesius. who was one of the Champions of the Christian faith, whose Labours have been famously profitable in former times.  
Though few are, now adays, acquainted with him, you shall find him among the most ancient Greek Fathers: And, this Tract of his (which is pertinent to every member of mankind capable of Book-knowledge) was heretofore so well esteemed, as to have been twice interpreted, out of Greek into Latin, (viz.) by Georgius Valla Placentinus, and Nacasius Ellebodius, of whose interpretations I have made use.  
This Author was as honourable in his generation, as those that are more voluminous, and more frequently named: for, he was not only so eminent for his Natural Philosophy, as to be called (by way of excellency) NEMESIUS the Philosopher; but, so good a Moralist also, and so expert in the Laws of the Roman Empire, that, the most Reverend, learned and devout Father GREGORY Nazian: (among whose Poems are Verses written to this NEMESIUS) hath highly magnified him, both for his Learning, and uprightness: and left it witnessed, likewise, that he was dignified with a Presidentship in Cappadocia.  
When those Verses were first written to our Author, he had not embraced the Christian Faith. For, he was by them invited thereunto: And their invitation seemed to have taken so good effect, that he became a happy Believer; an eminent Champion in the Christian Warfare; a Bishop of a City in Phoenicia, about the times of the Emperor's VALENS and THEODOSIUS.  
Some have doubted whether he were the same Nemesius mentioned by GREGORY; only, because he was a Lawyer & a Temporal Magistrate: But questionless he that was once an Infidel, and afterward a Believer, might aswell have been, also, a Divine, and a Bishop, after he had exercised the Functions of a Lawyer and a judge; seeing it is no new matter, that they should execute a double-calling, who have received a double portion of the Spirit.  
For, in all Ages, (since Princes became Nursing-fathers' of the Church) it hath been usual for Emperors, Kings, and other Free States, to make use of their Gifts, in Temporal judicatures, and in other public Affairs, of whose Wisdom, and Faithfulness, they had experience in Ecclesiastical Governments: yea, and it was no strange thing for men of say professions, to be called from common Affairs, to assume sacred Orders.  
And (though some are undiscreetly offended thereat) it is not only both convenient and comely, that Ecclesiastical persons (who neither desire, nor ambitiously affect such Employments) should be, sometime, invited and authorized by their Sovereigns, to join unto their spiritual charge, an industrious care of the temporal welfare. But it so happeneth otherwhile, also, that this double Authority, (though it double the employment) proveth so far from being over-burthensome, or a hindrance to the due execution of the first single calling, that he upon whom it is conferred, is thereby the better enabled to manage both for the general advantage: And we find this double calling, to have been so often, so commendably, and so successfully practised in the most flourishing times, both of jewish, and Christian Commonweals; that it may be still warrantably imitated, so often as Sovereign power shall be pleased therewithal.  
Our Nemesius (whose manifold employments, and gifts of the Spirit, have perhaps, occasioned this digression, to some good purpose) embraced the Christian Faith, and received his Episcopal dignity (as it seems by circumstances) long after his Presidentship: For, as by the words of GREGORY may be collected, he had given fair testimonies both of his Prudence and Uprightness in that Office, before his Conversion: and his faithfulness in the employment of that single talon; first vouchsafed, by the Common grace, was rewarded with a large increase, through the special favour of GOD, as the sequel hath declared.  
The Authors whom he nameth (none of them having lived since the Emperors aforementioned) are a probable argument of his Antiquity; and so likewise, is the scope of this Treatise, and his manner of handling the same: For, according to this command, When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren; the learned Converts of the Primitive Church, endeavoured to fortify their Profession (against the many heathen Philosophers who did then oppose it) by turning the weapons of those enemies of Christianity against themselves; even by fooling their carnal wisdom, in their own logical reasonings; and by the Principles of their own Philosophy. And in this performance, our Author was both faithful and painful; as will appear by the following Tract, worthy to be preserved and perused in all generations.  
For in what age, will the knowledge of the humane nature be impertinent, or to what person of that kind? nay, what knowledge, save the knowledge of GOD is more pertinent? Or, how can GOD be well known, by him, that knoweth not himself? It is that knowledge which this Book teacheth; and in my opinion the ignorance of rightly knowing our own nature is one main cause of the many absurdities, and unreasonable controversies which distract these times, yea, the ignorance thereof is a principal cause that so many wickedly blaspheme GOD, & unthankfully accuse him (without cause) of being niggardly towards them in the Talents of nature; and in requiring that of them, which he hath not given them ability to perform.  
Hence ariseth it also, that some consequently, and some directly make our good GOD the Author of all sin; and MAN, not properly an agent, but a patient only in committing evil. From this Ignorance, likewise it proceedeth, that we neither husband the gifts of nature (which is God's common grace) nor endeavour as we ought to do, according to that ability which we have received: whereas, if we knew what were given into our power, and what not; I think we should not so often, (as many of us do) foolishly deny our essential property; but believe and work, according to Sanctified reason.  
Though our original Nature were so depraved by our first parents fall, that we lost our Well-being; yet we lost not our Naturall-beeing, nor those Faculties, which made us capable of being renewed by special grace, when it should be tendered unto us. Though we fell very low, & were in a Downfall, in which we should never have left sinking; and from which we could never have raised ourselves, by any power remaining in ourselves; yet we were not at the lowest by our Grandfather's offence. For, the mercy of GOD, even JESUS CHRIST, stayed us from falling so low, as we had else tumbled; and from losing absolutely our Rationality, or any thing essential thereunto, by that Transgression.  
Yea, though the Will, and every other Pour of the SOUL were so maimed and bruised by the first Adam, that, like a broken Watch, their motions would have been still worse and worse, till they had utterly perished; and should never have moved rightly of themselves, (nor by any other means) unless the second Adam, had, at least, benefited us without our own righteousness, as much as the first Adam harmed us, without our personal sin: yet, no man lost by the first Transgression, so much, as he may lose by his own fault.  
By the first sin, we lost, indeed, our light, but not our eyes. And therefore, when GOD sent the light of MANKIND into the World, he reprobated those, only, who rejected it. And why? not because they saw it not; but because they loved it not. For, that they saw it, is manifest by that place, which said, It enlightens every one which cometh into the world. Yea, the reprobate Jews could not deny but that they saw it; for, our Saviour told them, that, if they could have truly denied to have seen this Light, they should not have had their sins imputed unto them: which, (under correction) I take to be the meaning of his words.  
Now, if they saw it, we may truly infer that they received of his fullness, that common grace, and the preservation of every natural faculty, so far forth, as might have enabled them, to become the sons of GOD; whereas, by the neglect of that single Talon, they became losers of more than Adam lost them; even to lose the right use of their natural faculties, and to be of a Reprobate sense; having eyes, that see not: ears, that hear not: and hearts as void of understanding, as the beast that perisheth. And, all this comes to pass through want of considering, what is taught in this Book, even for want of knowing what power we have given us, and how we are to exercise that power.  
Let no man, therefore, despise this means of Instruction, nor prejudicately conceive (because it may have some expressions unsuitable to their opinions) that NATURE is here magnified above GRACE., or in any measure equalled thereunto: or, that any power is thereto ascribed, derogating from the free mercy of GOD. Farneze is it from our Author's intention: and for ever, far be it from me, to become an instrument of publishing such Doctrines. There is not (in my judgement) one syllable in this Tract, which tendeth not to the glorifying of GOD's Grace to Mankind. For, whatsoever is ascribed to man, as being primarily in him by nature, is acknowledged to be the gracious gift of GOD: That which is affirmed to be left in him, since the fall, is confessed to have been justly forfeited, and yet preserved in him, by the free Grace of the same GOD: The good effects of all those Faculties, which are affirmed in man's power, were not (in my understanding) so much as thought, by this Author, (nor are they so conceived by me) to be wrought at any time without the continual assistance of the holy Spirit: neither is the natural power of man, or the excellency of his nature, here set forth for man's own glory, or that he should arrogate anything to himself: But, that GOD's first and second GRACE vouchsafed unto us, might the more manifestly appear. And that it might not be only said, but made evident, also, that the sin and unhappiness of every man, is of himself, and not of GOD: all which is employed (though not directly expressed) by the scope of this Book.  
They affirm in effect, this blasphemy, that every sin is GOD's, (though in word they profess never so violently against it) who will not allow that MAN (as this Treatise declareth) hath some things naturally in his own power. For, unless that be granted, he should have as little sin, as righteousness of his own: and beasts or blocks might as well be reputed righteous, or sinful, & as justly be termed Reasonable-creatures, as men: yea, and many other absurdities are believed and occasioned, by the ignorance of that, which is here taught.  
Besides that, which is the main scope of this Book, diverse brief testimonies of ancient Truths (lately suspected of novelty) are here and there, occasionally inserted; yea, and to some in these days, that which was the prime intention of this Discourse is, yet, as pertinent as when it was first written: For, there are not only as many still ignorant of their own Nature as heretofore; but, the same Stoical Divinity, here opposed, and confuted, is, in some branches, so largely sprouted up again, that, they are supposed to be ancient & orthodox principles of Christianity; and so are they cried up by a multitude of modern voices, that few believe, Antiquity ever mentioned aught in contradiction to what they fancy to be the Truth.  
To make it appear otherwise, this Father of the Church speaks now in English, what he spoke in Greek much above a thousand years past: And therefore, though it were true (which as yet, I believe not) that some of the later times have as learnedly handled the same subject; yet, because the nobleness of Truth, is other while suspected, when her Pedigree is obscured, I thought it not in vain, to help to discover her Antiquity, by the publication of this Author.  
You have him (if I am not much deceived) according to his Genuine sense, though not every where grammatically interpreted; for that were but to play the part of a Pedant. And because a show of tediousness, might make the same less profitable, I have not only caused him to speak as briefly and as plainly to the meanest capacities, as I possibly could, (which is not easy in a Subject of this nature) but to prevent wearisomenes, and render it the more useful, I have divided the longest Chapters, into equal Sections; & before every Chapter and Section, summed up the principal Contents of the same. Which will be easeful unto those who have not leisure to read out long continued Discourses; especially when they have some speedy occasion to collect the Testimonies of Antiquity.  
Now that I may every way (as much as in me lieth) keep my Nemesius from being either misconceived, or misreputed; I beseech my common Readers, to be very heedful in the perusal of him, lest through want of understanding in themselves, they censure him to be an Author not Intelligible, (as it hath pleased them to censure a learned writer now living) for such half witted people, as are neither capable of the mysteries of Nature, nor of such terms, as may properly express them, should learn to know, before they presume to censure: which will never be attained, without humility & some diligence.  
Let them please to be heedful also, when this Author speaks in his own person, and when in the person of others: for, sometime he bringeth in Arguments, and continued disputes, out of Ethnic Philosophers, (with all their circumstances, to confute their fellows; and if it be not well observed when he so doth, some heathenish proposition, (interlaced therewith) may be wrongfully taken for his opinion: And, perhaps also a well meaning expression may be misunderstood, contrary to the mind of the Author, by a little obscurity in the Text, or by want of heeding, how his intention may be discovered in other passages of the same Book.  
Nemesius hath heretofore suffered in this kind, even by no worse men, than his two Latin Interpreters; and one of them hath charged him with being of their opinion, who believed the Transmigration of Souls, whereof he was no way guilty, as may be made probable, not only by sundry expressions in this Tract; but by those words also, from whence this misconceit arose; they being interpreted, as I understand them.  
They are to be found about the beginning of the seaventh Section of the second Chapter, and speak to this effect. jamblicus (saith he) hath affirmed in his Book called MONOBIBLON, that the changing of Souls never happeneth from men to unreasonable creatures, nor from unreasonable creatures to men: but from Beasts, to Beasts, and from men, to men▪ and in so saying, he hath not only conjectured very well of Plato's opinion, but of the Truth itself.  
By these last words, Nemesius hath seemed to justify the opinion, both of jamblicus, & Plato, touching Transmigration of Souls. Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus, rather: And in so saying, he hath not only well guessed, but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion. Let the learned judge, whether the Greek words will not well enough bear this Version (though not in a strict Grammatical sense) especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soul to be the same which is generally believed among Christians, for my part, till I see more cause to suspect the contrary, I shall always so conceive of it.  
That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Souls preexistence before the Body, is not a matter of faith, or so precisely decided, as that he or we are (for aught I know) obliged, to be peremptorily for it, or against it; and therefore I myself have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to incline: or what to answer for him. If any man can assure me whether part is without error, that will I embrace; and I am persuaded so would Nemesius have done, if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous, in that point; which if others believe of him, (as they have no just cause to the contrary) no more needs to be spoken of this matter.  
If any be offended that he argues philosophically, rather than by proofs of Scripture, and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet, but a Wiseman; Let them consider, that he had such to contest withal, as neither believed the Scriptures, nor ascribed more unto Moses, or any other, than the Reasonableness of their affections seemed to deserve; The alleging of Scripture, therefore, to such men, had been to cast pearls to swine, and more to the derision, then to the honour of his cause. This course was practised by the Apostles themselves; To the jews and believing Gentiles, they brought the testimony of the Prophets: but to Unbelievers, they cited their own Poets, or convinced them by Reason.  
Had our Author argued with Christians, the holy Scriptures only, should have been Judges of their Controversies: For he himself saith, Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are all-sufficient, etc. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures (as we Christians do) we must prove by Demonstration, etc.  
In these times, there be many, who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures, yet they do as bad (or worse rather) for they deny the true sense of them, and make interpretations according to their own lusts and fancies. To these also, the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs, till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confess their true meaning: And some of these have so long, and so violently professed against Reason, as unuseful in the consideration of the Divine mysteries, that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rational dispute, or to convince them by divine Authority, till GOD shall forgive their denial and abuse of his common graces, upon true repentance for the same; and restore the Understanding which is worthily darkened by that sin: and for enlightening whereof, this Treatise, may perhaps become helpful.  
Other things might be here declared, to prevent prejudice, and to show forth the use and profitableness of this Book: but lest they make this Preface over-large, I will here conclude, and commit all to God's blessing.  
Geo: Wither.   

PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis, in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei, aut bonis moribus contrarium.  
THO: WEEKES, R. P. Episc. Lond. Cap. domest.   
NEMESIUS of the Nature of MAN.  

CAP. 1.  

SECT. 1.  
I. The Definition of MAN: A quaere touching the Understanding; and the opinions of Plotinus, Apollinarius, Aristotle & Plato concerning the SOLDIER & BODY of MAN. II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature, is a medium knitting together the whole Creation, & a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things. III. The Agreement, and comely order of GOD'S Works, of all which MAN is the true Epitome.  
GOod men, (and of those not a few) have defined Man to consist of an Understanding Soul and a Body; and so true is this Definition, that it may seem he could not otherwise be, well, defined. Yet, when we term him an Understanding soul, it may appear doubtful to some, whether the Understanding coming to the soul (as one distinct thing comes to another) did beget Understanding in the Soul; Or, whether the Soul doth naturally contain in itself this understanding, as the most excellent part thereof; and, as being the same to the Soul, which the Eye is to the Body.  
There be some, (and of this opinion is Plotinus) who thinking the Soul to be one thing, and the Body another, do therefore affirm, that MAN is composed of these three, a Soul, a Body, and Understanding. Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea: For, having laid this, as the Foundation of his own opinion, he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork.  
Others there are who divide not the Understanding from the Soul in this manner; but suppose rather, that the Understanding is a principal of the Souls essence. Aristotle conjectures that a certain potential understanding was made together with MAN, which might become actual in time; and that the understanding which cometh to us from without, (and whereby we acquire an actual knowledge) pertains not to the natural Essence of the Soul; but, assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things: By which means it comes to pass, that very few, or none, but men addicted to the study of wisdom, are thought capable of this Actual understanding.  
PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence; that is to say, jointly of a Soul and a Body: but rather, that he is a soul, using (as it were Instrumentally) such a Body: and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only, which is the most excellent part of Man, he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of ourselves (and of the divine nature) as might win us, the better, to pursue virtue, godliness, and such good things as are in the Soul: or else by persuading that we are (essentially) nothing else but soul, he would, peradventure, allure us to renounce the desires of the Body, as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN; but, chiefly belonging to him, as he is a living creature; and so, by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man, in regard Man is a living-creature.  
And it is indeed confessed (not much otherwise) of all men, that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body: and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul, as is evident in death. For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion, as a Workman's Tools when he hath cast them aside.  
This is manifest, that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life; and that he is partaker also of life, as those living-creatures be, which are unreasonable: and that he is endowed likewise with understanding, as are Creatures reasonable. With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this, that he hath a Body, and in his mixture of the four Elements. He agrees with Plants, not only in that which is aforementioned, but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power. His coherence with unreasonable Creatures (over and above all the former particulars) is, in having a certain voluntary motion, appetite, anger, and a power enabling him to feel and breathe: for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures. Furthermore, he communicates with Intelligent incorporeal Natures, in reasoning, understanding, judging, and in pursuing virtue and a good life, which is the chief end of all virtues.  
These things considered, MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature. In respect of his Bodily powers, and of his Bodily substance (which is subject unto sense) he agrees both with living-creatures, and with things void of life. In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodiless (or spiritual) as hath been said before: For, GOD the Creator of all things, hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures, that all created things should become ONE And indeed, it will be a manifest proof unto us, that there is but One Creator of all things, if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individual things by their particular parts; and all the several species (throughout the world) by an excellent sympathy.  
For, as in every living creature he hath joined the parts insensible with such as have sense in them (as bones, fat, hair, (and other insensible parts) to the flesh and sinews (which are sensible) compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions; and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature: Even so he hath joined one to another, every particular species which was created, by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures; In so much that things inanimate do not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life; neither are Plants wholly differing from sensible living creatures void of reason; nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures endowed with reason, as that they have no natural alliance or similitude, whereby they may be linked one to another.  
For even in stones (which are inanimate creatures, not having in them, for the most part, so much as a vegitative life) there is otherwise a certain power, making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties: but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and virtue of other stones, in that it both attracts Iron thereunto, and also detaineth it (being so attracted) as if it would be nourished thereby. Neither doth it exercise this virtue upon one piece of Iron alone; but, by that one piece, linketh fast another, and imparteth his own power to all other pieces which are contiguous thereunto: yea Iron draweth Iron, when it is touched by the Loadstone.  
Moreover, when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures, he rushed not (as we may say) all at once, into things whose nature is to remove from place to place; and, to such as are endowed with sense: but, he proceeded, rather, by degrees, and by a natural and most comely progression. For, the Shell-fish called Pinnae, and Vrticae, are so made as if they were certain Plants, having sense in them For, he fastened them in the Sea with roots, and covered them also with shells as with bark. And, as therein he made them to participate with Plants; so, he gave them likewise (in some measure) the feelingsense, which is common to living-creatures. They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed, and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge (though it be rooted in the Rocks) is of itself, opened and contracted, according as the passenger approacheth toward it, or departeth from it. And therefore, Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in English, Life-plants, if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature, and partly a Plant.  
After the Fishes called Pinnae, he proceeded unto those, which (being unable to pass far from their station) do move only to and fro within some certain space, such as are the most part of those, which have shells, and are called the bowels of the earth. He went further, and added (in the like manner,) something to every thing in particular (as to some things more senses; and to some other, more ability to remove themselves from place to place;) and, came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect. Those, I call more-perfect-creatures, which have obtained all the senses, and, can also remove themselves to places far distant.  
And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN (a Creature endowed with Reason) he did not perfect him in himself, (and, as it were, all at once;) but, first, ingraffed into some other living-creatures, certain natural wiles, sleights, and devises for the saving of themselves, which, make them seem to be almost reasonable-creatures: And, having done all this, he, then, brought forth MAN, which is, indeed, the true Reasonable-Creature.  
The same Order (if it be well considered) will appear in the Voice, which from the noise of Horses & Oxen is brought, by little and little, from one plain simple sound, unto the voices of Crows and Nightingales, (whose voices consisting of many notes, can imitate what they are taught) and, so, by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN, which is distinct and perfect.  
Furthermore he made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Mind, and upon Reason; ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Mind: And, in this wise, by a sweet Musical proportion, he (collecting all things together) incorporated all into ONE; aswell, things Intelligible, as things visible, and, made MAN as a means thereunto.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Why MAN was first made, and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures. II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectual things, and becomes either an Earthly or Spiritual MAN, according as he is inclined to Good or Evil. A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body; and between the life of MAN as he is Man, and as he is merely a living creature. III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN.  
THese things considered, Moses in expressing the Creation of the World, did very properly affirm that MAN was last made. Not only, because all things being made for MAN, it was most convenient, that all such things ought first to be provided, which were necessarily pertinent to his use; and that he who was to have the use of them, should afterward be created: But, in respect both intellectual and visible substances, were created, it seemed also convenient that One should be made, by whom those two Natures should be so united together, that the whole World might become ONE; and be in it own self so agreeable, that the same might not be at variance, or estranged from itself. Even to this end, was MAN made such a living-creature, as might join together both Natures, and (to sum up all in a word) therein was manifested the admirable wisdom of the universal CREATOR.  
Now MAN being placed (as it were) in the Bounds between the Reasonable-nature, and that which is Irrational; if he incline to the Body, settling the main part of his affection upon corporal things; he chooseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures; and, for that cause, shall be numbered among them, and be called (as Saint Paul terms him) An earthly MAN, to whom it shall be thus said, Earth thou art, and to Earth thou shalt return: yea by this means he becomes (as the Psalmist affirms) like the Beast which hath no understanding. But, if he incline rather to the Reasonable part, and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures, shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN, he shall, then, be accounted a Heavenly MAN, according to that saying; Such as the earth is, such are they that are earthly; such as the heavenly are, such are they that are heavenly: and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Nature, is to avoid and oppose Evil, and love and follow that which is Good.  
Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body (of which sort the Virtues are) and these have a relation unto the Soul, in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body, being joined thereunto.  
Some good things pertain to the soul only, by itself, (so that it should not need the help of the body) as godliness, and the Contemplation of the nature of things: and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN, (and not only in that he is a living creature) do apply themselves to Virtue and Piety. But we will anon show distinctly what things pertain to Virtue, and what to Piety, when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body: For, seeing we do not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof, it is not yet convenient for us to treat here, of those things that are wrought by it.  
The Hebrews affirm that MAN was made from the beginning, neither altogether mortal, neither wholly immortal, but, as it were, in a state between both those natures, to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body, he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the body; But if he did prefer such good things as pertain to the soul, he should then be honoured with Immortality For, if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortal from the beginning, he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended; because it had been a thing needless to make him mortal by condemnation, who was mortal before. And on the other side, if he had made Man absolutely immortal, he would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment; for, nothing that is immortal needeth bodily nourishment.  
Moreover, it is not to be believed, that God would so hastily have repent himself, and made Him to be forthwith mortal, who was created absolutely immortal: For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned, but (according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning) they remained immortal, undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death, but of some other punishment. It is better therefore, either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter; or, else, thus to think, that MAN was indeed created mortal, but, yet, in such wise that if he were perfected by a virtuous and pious progression, he might become immortal: that is to say, he was made such a One, as had in him a potential ability to become immortal.   

SECT. 3.  
I. Our Author showeth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil was forbidden; &, that it was, at first, expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his own Nature. II. MAN by the Transgression, attained that knowledge of himself, which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortality. III. The Elementary composition and nourishment of Man's body: The reasons also why it needed feeding, clothing, curing &c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible, and capable of Arts and Sciences, etc.  
IT being inexpedient, rather than any way helpful, for MAN to know his own nature, before he came to his perfection, GOD forbade him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil: For there were, and doubtless as yet there are very great virtues in Plants; but at the first, (in respect it was in the beginning of the world's Creation) their virtues being (before the curse) pure and void of all mixture, had in them a strong operation; and it is not therefore strange that there should be (by God's providence) the taste of a certain Tree, that should have a power given to engender in our first parents, the knowledge of their own nature.  
The cause why God would not have MAN to know his own nature, before he had attained to perfection, was this: lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things, should (as by the sequel we find it manifest) labour only to supply the wants of his Body, and utterly cast away the care of his Soul; and for this cause did God forbid him to taste of the fruit of knowledge of good and evil.  
By disobeying this Commandment, MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself, but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection, and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed: For (according to the words of Moses) as soon as he had eaten, He knew that he was naked, and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakedness: whereas, till then, God kept him as it were in a Trance, and in such case that he knew not himself.  
When he fell away from the state of growing to perfection, he fell also from his immortality, which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover again at the last. In the mean time it was granted him that he should eat flesh (whereas before his fall, God willed him to be content with such things only as grew out of the earth, all which he had provided for him in Paradise) yea the first means of growing to perfection being become desperate, it was permitted him to feed as he would.  
Now, seeing Man consisteth of a Body (as of one of his parts) and seeing every (inferior compound) body is composed of the four Elements, it is necessary that such things should happen unto him, as the Elements are subject unto; That is to say, Cutting, mutation and flowing. By mutation I mean mutation in Quality; and I term it Flowing when he is emptied or purged of such things as are in him. For a living creature hath always his evacuations, both by such pores as are manifestly seen, and by such also as we see not; whereof I shall speak hereafter.  
It is necessary therefore, that so much should be taken in again, as was evacuated; seeing else, the living creature would perish through defect of what should re-enter to supply the want: And (if the things evacuated be either dry, or moist, or spirits) it is as necessary that the living creature should have a continual supply of dry and moist nourishments, and of spirits.  
The meats and drinks which we receive, are made of those Elements, whereof we also are composed: for every thing is nourished with what is agreeable and like unto it, and (in diseases) we are cured with what is contrary (to the disease.)  
There he some of the Elements which we sometime receive into our Bodies immediately of themselves; and sometime use means unto the receiving of them; as for example, we sometime receive water of itself; sometime we use Wine and Oil, and all those that are called moist fruits, as means to the receiving of water. For wine is nothing else but a certain water coming from the Vine, and so or so qualified. In like manner we partake of Fire sometime immediately, as when we are warmed by it; sometime also by the means of such things as we eat and drink: for all things contain in them some portion of Fire, more or less. We are in like case partakers of Air: either immediately when we breathe it, and have it spread round about us, or draw it in by our eating and drinking; or else by means of such other things as we receive into us.  
But as for the Earth, we seldom or never receive it immediately, but by certain means. For, we eat the corn which cometh of the earth. Larks, Doves, and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth; but Man usually feedeth on the earth by the means of feeds, fruits, berries, and by the flesh which proceedeth from things nourished by the Earth.  
And forasmuch as God respecting not only a decency, but also the furnishing of us with a very quick sense of feeling, (in which man exceedeth all other living creatures) he hath clothed us neither with a tough skin as Oxen and other beasts, that have a thick hide; neither with large thick set hair, as goats, hares, and sheep; neither with scales, as fishes and serpents; neither with hard shells, as Tortoises and Oysters; neither with a more fleshy bark, as Lobsters; neither with feathers, as birds; and therefore (wanting these cover) it is necessary we should have Raiment, to supply that in us, which nature hath bestowed on other living creatures.  
These are the causes why we stand in need of nourishment and clothing: And not only for the same ends are our houses become necessary; but also that we may escape the violence of wild beasts, which is none of their least commodities.  
Moreover (by reason of the distemperature of qualities in the humane body) Physicians and their art are likewise needful, that thereby (as often as occasion requires) those things which are rend asunder, may be fastened again together for the preservation of health. And whereas the alteration consisteth in the quality, it is necessary that we bring the state of the body to a just temperature by the contrary Quality: For, it is not the Physician's purpose (as some think) to cool the Body which hath been in a heat, but to change it into a temperate estate; seeing if they should cool it, the disease turneth (not to health, but) to the contrary sickness.  
Now in regard of Arts and Sciences, (and by the necessary use which we have of such things as they accomplish) it so cometh to pass that we need the mutual assistance one of another, and by that need which we have each of other, many of us assembling together in common, do thereby the more conveniently bargain and contract for such things as may serve to supply the necessities of life.  
This meeting and dwelling together, was anciently termed by the name of a City; by the near neighbourhood whereof, men received aid and profit by each others arts & labours, without the discommodities of long and far Travail. For, Man was naturally made to be such a living creature, as should be sociable, & delighted in neighbourhood. And forasmuch as men could not otherwise be so conveniently provided of useful things; it is evident that the study of Arts, and the necessity of traffic were the first occasions of erecting Cities.   

SECT. 4.  
I. Of the two Privileges which MAN hath obtained above all other Creatures, (viz.) to be capable of the Forgiveness of sins, and Immortality: the Justice and Mercy of GOD in vouchsafing the pardon of sin of MAN, and denying the same to Angels. TWO Man only is a creature capable of learning Arts and Sciences: A Definition of Man, and Reasons justifying every branch of that Definition. III. The World was not made for the Angels, nor for any other, but MAN only. To him was committed the government of the Universe, with a limitation to use, not abuse the Creatures.  
THere are also two Privileges which Man hath specially gotten above all other. One is, to obtain pardon by Repentance; the other is that his body being mortal should be brought to immortality. This (privilege) of the body, he getteth by means of the soul; and the privilege of the soul, by reason of the body: Yea, among Reasonable creatures, Man only hath obtained this Peculiar, that God vouchsafeth him the pardon of sin upon repentance; For neither the Devils nor the Angels are vouchsafed pardon, though they do repent.  
Hereby the most exact justice, and admirable mercy, of GOD is both fully proved and evidently declared: For, good cause is there why pardon should not be granted to Angels, though they do repent; because there is nothing in them, which naturally allures or draws them to sin; and in regard also that they (of their own nature) are free from all passions, wants, and pleasures of the body.  
But MAN, though he be endowed with Reason, yet he is also a bodily living creature, and therefore his wants (in that he is such a living creature) together with his passions, do often blind and captivate his reason. And therefore (when he returns again by repentance, and applies himself unto virtue) he obtaineth mercy and forgiveness: For as it is proper to the Essence of MAN to have the ability of laughing (because it agreeth to man only, to all men, and ever to man) so (in respect of those things, which proceed from the grace of God) it is proper unto Man above all Creatures endued with Reason, to be delivered, by Repentance, from the accusation and guiltiness of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed. Yea, this Grace is given to MAN only; to all men; and ever to man, during the continuance of his life in this world, and no longer: for after Death there is no more Forgiveness.  
Some there be who give a reason why the Angels could no more obtain pardon by repentance after they had fallen; and it is this that follows. The Fall of Angels, was (as they affirm) a kind of Death unto them; and God vouchsafed them the tender of a pardon before their utter falling away, when like account was to be made of them, as is made of Men during this life: But because they accepted not the grace offered, they received afterward (as a just reward) punishment everlasting without pardon. And hereby it plainly appears that such as refuse Repentance, do reject that which is a special good gift of God, and peculiar to MAN.  
This also is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN, that of all other living creatures only the body of MAN should arise again after Death, and aspire to Immortality. This privilege the body gaineth in respect of the immortality of the soul; as likewise the soul obtaineth the other (that is to say, pardon after Repentance) in respect that the Body, is weak and troubled with many passions.  
It is a thing proper also, to MAN only, to learn Arts and Sciences, and to work according unto such Arts: For which cause they who define him, say thus; MAN is a living Creature, induced with Reason, mortal, capable of Consideration and Science.  
He is termed a living-creature, in that he is a substance having life endued with sense: for, that is the definition of a living-creature.  
He is said to be endued with Reason, that he may be distinguished from unreasonable-creatures.  
He is called mortal, to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures, that are immortal.  
And, this clause [capable of Consideration & Science] is added thereunto, because we come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them; having in us naturally a certain potential ability to receive both understanding and Arts; but, not actually attaining them save by study and practise.  
There be some, who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition; and, that it had been good enough without the same, were it not, that some bring in their Nymphs, and other petty Deities of those kinds, who are said to live long, and yet not to be immortal; And to distinguish MAN from those, these words, Capable of consideration and science were judged needful; because, none of that sort are thought to learn any thing; but, to know naturally, whatsoever they are said to know.  
The jews are of opinion on that the whole World was made for MAN (even immediately for his sake) as Oxen with other beasts for tillage, or to bear burdens; and, as grass was made for the Beasts. For some things were made for their own sakes; and some for the sakes of others. All reasonable-creatures were made for their own sakes: Vnreasonable-creatures and things without life, were ordained for others, not for themselves.  
Now, if such things were made in respect of others, let us consider for whom they were, indeed, created. Shall we think they were made for the Angels? Doubtless, no wise man will say that they were made for their sakes; because, the things made for the respect or sake of another, must concern either the making, or the continuance, or the recreation of those things for which they were made: For, they are made either in respect of the propagation and succession of their kind; or of their nourishment; or to cover them; or to cure them, or for their better welfare and rest.  
Now the Angels need no such things; for, they neither have any succession of their kind, neither want clothing, bodily nourishment, nor any thing else: And, if Angels have no need of such things, it is then evident that no other nature having place above the Angels; can have need of them; because by how much higher the place of it is, so much the less need hath it of supply or assistance from another.  
This being so, we must seek out a Nature which is endued with Reason, and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned; and what other nature can be found of that sort, if MAN be passed over? Surely none: And if no other can be discovered, it followeth by good reason that both things void of life, and unreasonable-creatures, were made for the sake of MAN; and if they were ordained for him (as it is evident they were) then, that was likewise the cause why he was constituted the Governor also of those creatures.  
Now, it is the duty of a Governor, to use those things which are put under his government, in such manner and measure as need and conveniency shall require; and not to abuse them untemperately, or to serve voluptuously his own delicate Appetite. Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governs. For, they that so do (yea and they that use not mercifully, their unreasonable-cattells) are therein great Offenders; neither performing the part of a Governor, nor of a just man, according to that which is written, The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast.   

SECT. 5.  
I. It is here proved, that neither things without-life, nor the unreasonable. creatures, were made for themselves; First, by arguments taken from the consideration of the nature and use of things without life. II. It is proved also by considering those creatures, which are void of reason, and which are (for the most part) very serviceable to MAN. III. And lastly, it is proved by considering those things which seem to be rather harmful then profitable to Mankind.  
BUt some perhaps will say, that nothing was made in respect of another but every thing in respect of it self. Therefore, distinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life, let us observe whether things void of life are likely to have been created only for their own sake.  
For if those things were made in respect of themselves, how, or upon what should living-creatures feed? we see that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits, and of plants, to every living-creature, some few excepted, whose feeding is upon flesh; yea, and those creatures which are nourished by eating flesh, do feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth: For, Lions and Wolves, feed on Lambs, Goats, Hearts, and Swine. Aegle also, and all sorts of Hawks, devour Partridges, Doves, Hares, and such like; which are fed with what springeth out of the ground.  
Moreover, the nature of those Fishes which devour one another, doth not so extend itself to all fishes, that they do generally devour the flesh of one another; but it breaketh off in such as eat weeds and such other things as grow in the water. For, if all sorts of fishes had been inclined to eat the flesh of one another, so that no kinds of them could feed on any thing else, but on the flesh of themselves, verily they could not have long continued (no not for a small time) but would have been utterly destroyed, some of them each by other, and the rest for lack of meat.  
To the intent then, that it might not so happen, certain Fishes were so made, that they might abstain from the flesh of the rest, and feed (if I may so term it) on the grass of the Sea, that, by them, the other sorts of fishes might be preserved. These fishes feed upon weeds; other fishes feed upon them; Those, again, are food for other greater fishes. So, by the feeding on such fishes as last of all do eat the weeds of the Sea, (which come of the slimy waters) the substance of the rest of the fishes is successively continued.  
Having reasonably demonstrated, that the Plants were not created in respect of themselves, but in regard of the nonrishment and nature both of Men & of other living-creatures, it will be thereby manifest that such things also, were made in respect of Man and other living-creatures, which are means and causes of the increase and preservation of those interior things: And if that be so, it will be as apparent that the motions of the stars, the firmament, the seasons of the year, the showers, and all such like things, were made in respect of those things without life aforementioned, and to the end that nourishment being continually administered unto them, the nature of such fruits might be perpetuated, and that Men and living-creatures also (for whom those were ordained) might be preserved, by them.  
It resteth not to consider whether the nature of unreasonable creatures, was made in respect of itself, or for MAN's cause: and sure, it cannot but be very absurd, to affirm that things incapable of understanding, and living only by an instinct of Nature (yea, things grovelling toward the earth, and by their very shape declaring their bondage) should be brought into the world for their own sake. Much might be spoken to prove the contrary, even so much as would spin out this one point to the length of a Treatise, if I should handle the same at large, and therefore I will briefly mention in this place, those things only which are of greatest weight.  
By seriously considering (as it were in a glass or image) those things which are without us by such things as are within us, we should make a plain demonstration hereof; yea, and by considering the very substance of the things themselves, which are in question. For, if we ponder in our mind that part of ourselves, which is irrational, and the parts thereof (I mean appetite and anger, which are ordained to serve the Reasonable-part) we shall there see, that Reason ruleth, and that the unreasonable-parts, are ruled; that Reason commandeth, and that the other are commanded, and serviceable to such uses, as Reason will have them to be subject unto; if MAN preserve that condition which doth naturally appertain unto him.  
Now then, if our part which is reasonable doth bear rule over our unreasonable-parts, which are within us; seemeth it not much more probable, that our reasonable-part should have dominion over such unreasonable-things as are without us? and that such things were ordained to serve our necessities? especially seeing it is according to the law of Nature that the unreasonable should be subject to the reasonable, as hath been declared by those things which are in ourselves?  
This may be further manifested, by considering that diverse creatures are made even fit for the necessary services of MAN. For, Oxen and all bearing cattle are naturally fitted for the tillage of the earth, and for bearing of burdens. Sundry other beasts of the field also, and many fishes and souls, for dainty feeding, yea, and singing-birds for our delight and recreation.  
And albeit all things do not always serve to such pleasing uses, but that there are some which may seem rather to harm and destroy man; it is to be considered that when those things were created, the special end of whose creation was at first for man's service; all other things which might be otherwise useful were then created also, that in the Creation there might be no defect, or want of such things whereof there might be afterward any use.  
Neither were such things as are now accounted harmful, exempted utterly from the profitable fruition of man; but, he by reason, doth, or may, fruitfully employ to his advantage, even the most venomous things. For, he useth poisonous creatures to the curing of such harms as come by those, and other venomous beasts, and to the curing of many infirmities other ways occasioned. Such are the confections called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (whereof our treacle is one sort) which reason hath invented, that by their own power those things might be made to conquer themselves, and procure health and safety (as it were) from conquered enemies.  
Man hath also many other things of great virtue given unto him by his Creator, which being contrary to those mischievous things, have in them a power to withstand or qualify their virulent operations; to remedy their hurts; and to defend him from their secret assaults. One thing serveth to one use, other things to other uses, and God hath so provided that all things should be helpful for the benefit and preservation of Man, yea and some things there be which are serviceable no way else.   

SECT. 6.  
I. He showeth why the creatures are now harmful to MAN, seeing all things were at first created for his benefit: Exemplary demonstrations intimating how this mischief might be remedied. II. A brief Elogium in praise of the excellent nature and prerogatives of MAN. III. This chapter is concluded, with a short exhortation, that a thankful use be made of the high favours vouchsafed unto MAN.  
THat which hath been formerly said touching the harm which MAN receiveth sometimes from the unreasonable-creatures, hath respect only to the present condition of Mankind in this life; for, if we look back to the first time which was long ago, we shall find that none of the irratinall-creatures durst to be offensive unto MAN; but, that all of them were subject unto him, faithfully serving and obeying him, so long as he did master his own passions, and subjected his unreasonable-parts to the part-reasonable. And when he gave the reins to his own affections, not subduing them to reason, but suffered himself to be overmastered by the brute desires which were within him; it was very just, that (as it hath since happened) he should be overawed by the wilde-beasts, and by such other harmful things as are without him.  
For, after MAN had sinned, then began those beasts to be hurtful unto him, which had else been serviceable; as may yet appear true by those who have lived a supereminent life, and thereby prevented the mischievous assaults of such creatures. Of this, Daniel and Paul are exemplary witnesses: for, neither could the Lions find power to seife the one; nor the Viper to fasten upon the other.  
These things considered, who is able to commend sufficiently the nobility of this living-creature? Behold, he bindeth together in himself things mortal and immortal; and knitteth up in One, things reasonable and unreasonable. In his own nature, he beareth the image of all creatures, and from thence is rightly called A little world. He is a creature, of whom God hath vouchsafed to take so much regard, that all created-things both present and to come, were for him created. He is that creature also, for whose sake GOD became MAN, and who shaking off his corruption, finisheth it in a never-ending immortality.  
Yea, he is that creature, who being made after the image and likeness of GOD, reigneth above the heavens, living and becoming conversant with CHRIST the son of GOD, who sitteth above all power and authority; and no eloquence may worthily publish forth the manifold preeminences, and advantages which are bestowed on this creature.  
He passeth over the vast Seas; he rangeth about the wide heavens, by his contemplation, and conceives the motions and the magnitudes of the stars. He enjoys the commodities both of sea and land: He contemns the fury of wildbeasts, & the strength of the greatest fishes. He is learned in every science, and skilful in Artificial, workings. He communicates by writing, with whomsoever he pleaseth, though they be far distant; and is nothing hindered therein by the absence of his Body. He foretelleth things to come: he ruleth all, subdueth all, and enjoyeth all things.  
He talketh with Angels, yea, and with GOD himself. He hath all the Creatures within his Dominion; and keeps the Devils in subjection. He searcheth out the nature of every thing, and is diligently studious in the knowledge of GOD. He was borne to be the house and Temple of the Holyghost; and he acquires the fruition of all these privileges by Virtue and Piety.  
But lest it may be thought, of some, that we proceed unskilfully, in setting forth so largely the praises of Man; (whereas we should rather have contented ourselves to proceed with a Discourse touching the nature of MAN, according to our first purpose) we will break off our speech, in this place; though we are not ignorant, that by setting forth his pre-eminence and privileges, we have not improperly prosecuted our intention to declare the Nature of MAN.  
And, now, seeing it is manifested unto us, of how great nobility we are partakers, and that we are a heavenly plant; let us not deface or shame our Nature, neither let it be truly said that we are unworthy of such gifts: nor let us foolishly deprive ourselves of so great Power and Glory and Blessedness, by casting away the fruition of joys that shall be everlasting, for the seeming possession of imperfect pleasures, which will endure but a while: But, let us preserve, rather, this nobility of ours, by doing good, by abstaining from evil works, and by a good-zeal, intent or purpose; For to such endeavours, (if we seek it by prayer) God always dareth his assisting hand.  
Thus much concerning these matters: And now seeing it is the received opinion, that MAN consisteth of Body and Soul we will follow the same Division; treating first of the Soul, and therein pass by those questions which being over subtle, and difficultly understood, cannot be intelligibly expressed to many capacities.    

CAP. 2.  

SECT. 1.  
I. The several and different Opinions of the Ancients concerning the SOLDIER, as whether it be a Substance; whether corporeal, or incorporeal, whether mortal or immortal, etc. II. The confutation of those who affirm in general that the SOUL is a corporeall-substance. III. Confutations of their particular Arguments, who affirm that the SOUL is Blood, Water, or Aire.  
EXceeding great variance is discovered among the old Philosophers in their discourses of the SOUL; insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter. Democritus and Epicurus, and the whole sect of the Stoics do peremptorily affirm that the SOUL is a Body; and those very men who affirm the SOLDIER to be a Body, descent one from another in declaring the Essence of it.  
The Stoics affirm, that it is a certain Blast, hot and fiery. Critias holds, that it is blood. Hippon the Philosopher, will have it to be water, Democritus thinks it is fire; and his opinion is, that the round Forms of indivisible-bodies or Atoms being incorporated, by air and fire, do make up the Soul. Heraclitus conceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certain breathing out of the vapours, from moist things; and, that the Soul which is in living-creatures, doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves, and from exhalations, also, within them; and being of the same kind, of which they themselves are.  
Again (on the contrary part) there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body, or Bodily-substance. Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance and immortal; Some, that it is without a Body, and neither a substance nor immortal.  
Thales, who was the first of that opinion, held that the SOUL was always in motion, and had that motion from itself. Pythagoras' thought that it was a NUMBER moving itself. Plato affirmed that it was a substance (to be conceived in mind) that received motion from itself, according to NUMBER and HARMONY. Aristotle taught that it was the first continuall-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL, having in it those Instrumental parts, wherein was possibility of life. Dinarchus took it to be an Harmony of the four Elements; not a Harmony made of sounds, but as it were a tuneable temperature and agreement, of hot & cold, moist & dry things, in the Body. But, it is without doubt that all the best of these do agree in this, that the SOUL is a substance; Aristotle and Dinarchus excepted, who affirm that it is no substance at all.  
Besides all these, some were of opinion that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things; which was by small portions distributed to all particular things; and, then gathered into itself again: of which opinion were the Manichees and certain others. Some likewise imagined the Souls were many, and of differing sorts; Some affirmed that there was both one universal, and many particular SOULS; and therefore it cannot be, but that my Discourse must be drawn to a great length, seeing I am to disprove so many opinions.  
Therefore, to confute in general all those together, who affirm that the Soul is a corporeal essence, it shall be sufficient to allege that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist, and by Amonius the Master of Plotinus, who thus affirm:  
All Bodies, being by their proper nature mutable, and such as may be utterly dispersed and divided into innumerable parts (and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed) have need of something to close them in, to bring them together; to knit them into one; and (as it were) to hold them fast united: And, this we say is done by the SOUL.  
Now if the SOUL be corporeal, (let it be what Body you please) yea, though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtle parts, what will you say holds that together, as that knitteth the Body in One? For, as we declared before, every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together; yea the Body of this SOUL, that knits together our visible BODY, (if we should grant the same to be a corporeal SOUL) and the next to that also, infinitely, it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together, until an incorporeall-essence were found out.  
If they answer, as the Stoics do, that, there is a certain motion pertaining unto Bodies, extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body: That the motion tending outward, effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body; and, that the motion tending inward, is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof; we will then ask them (seeing every motion doth proceed from some power) what kind of power it is, which that motion hath? in what consisteth it? and what gives essence thereunto?  
If this power be a certain matter (which the greeks call Hylen) we will use the same reasons against them, which we objected before. If they say it is not matter, but a material thing, (for matter and material things thus differ; That which hath matter in it, is called a material thing) we then ask them, whether that which hath matter in it, be likewise matter, or void of matter? If they say it is matter, we demand how it can be both material and matter? If they answer, that it is not matter, than they must grant it to be void of matter, and if it be void of matter, we will easily prove it to be no Body; because, every body hath matter in it.  
If they allege that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them, and that the SOUL extending itself through the whole Body, hath in it also the three Dimensions, and therefore must necessarily be a Body; we will then thus answer them; It is true, that all BODIE'S have in them the three Dimensions, but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY. For place, and Quality which in themselves have no Body, have accidentally, a Quantity if they be in such things as have magnitude.  
In like manner the SOUL in respect of itself, is utterly void of the Dimensions; but, accidentally it hath Dimensions; because the Body (in which it is) having in it the three Dimensions, we so conceive it, together with the Body, as though the Soul also had in it the three Dimensions.  
We argue further, and say thus: Every Body hath his motion either from without itself, or from within. If the motion be from without itself, it must then be void of life: if it be from within itself, it must be endued with life: now, it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either endued with life, or without life (one of which must necessarily be affirmed, if the Soul be a corporeal substance) therefore the soul cannot be a corporeal Essence.  
Again, the SOUL, if it be nourished, it is nourished by that which is void of Body (for, knowledge is the nourishment thereof) but, no corporeal essence is nourished by things bodiless, therefore, the SOUL cannot be a Body. Xenocrates thus concluded this argument: If (said he) the SOUL be not nourished, it cannot be a corporeal-substance; because, the Body of every living-creature must be nourished.  
Thus much in general, in confutation of all those who generally affirm, that the SOUL is a bodily thing. Now, we will treat particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood, or Breath; because, when either Blood or Breath is taken away, the living-creature dyeth.  
We will not say (as some well accounted of have written) that, part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth, if the SOUL be the Blood: for, that were but a slender answer. In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole, the part remaining is the same with the whole: Whether the water be much or little, it is every way perfect water. In like manner, gold, silver, and every other thing, whose parts do not essentially differ from each other, are still the same, as is afore said: And even so, that part of blood which remaineth (of what quantity soever) may be called the SOUL (aswell as the whole quantity) if the blood be the SOUL.  
We, therefore, will rather answer them thus: If that be rightly accounted the SOUL, upon whose taking away, the death of the living creature ensues; then, should it needs be, that phlegm, and the two chollers must be also the SOUL, seeing, if any one of these faileth, it brings the living-creature to his death. The like falleth out in the Liver, in the Brain, in the Heart, in the Stomach, the Reins, the Entrails, and in many other parts, whereof if you bereave a living-creature, it will immediately perish.  
Moreover, there are many things without blood, which have life in them, nevertheless; as some smooth and gristly fishes; some also of a softer kind, to wit, Sepiae, Teuthides, and Smyli (as the greeks call them) and Lobsters, Crabs, Oysters, and all shellfish, whether they have hard or soft shells. Now if these things have a living-Soule in them (as we know they have) and yet are void of blood, than it plainly follows that blood cannot be the SOUL.  
Against those who say that water is the Soul, many things may be said to disprove their opinion, though water helps to quicken and nourish all things; and though it be (as they say) impossible to live without water.  
We cannot live without nourishment, and therefore if their assertion be true, we may aswell affirm that all nourishment in general, and every particular nourishment is the SOUL. And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water, we find the contrary to be probable; for it is written of some Aegle, and of Partridges, that they live without drink.  
And why should water be the SOUL rather than air? Seeing it is possible to abstain from water very long, whereas we can hardly live a moment without breathing the Air.  
And yet, neither is Aire the SOUL: For, there are many creatures which live without breathing the Air; as all Insectae (riveted creatures) such as Bees, Wasps, and Ants; as also all bloodless creatures, all those which live in the waters, and such as have no Lungs. For, none of those things that are without Lungs can breathe Air. The proposition is true also, if it be converted, There is no creature having Lungs, which doth not breath air.   

SECT. 2.  
I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoic (affirming the SOUL to be corporeal) are here confuted logically and by demonstration. II. Chrysippus (intending to maintain the like opinion) is here, likewise answered, and his Fallacies discovered. III. A confutation of their Tenet also, who affirm that the SOUL is an Harmony.  
SEeing certain reasons of some account, are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoic, and by Chrysippus (to prove the SOUL a corporeal. substance) we will here deliver somewhat in answer of them; and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replied heretofore.  
Cleanthes composeth a syllogism in this manner;  
There is (saith he) a likeness between us and our parents, not in respect of the Body only, but in regard also, of the SOLDIER, as in Passions, Manners, and Affections: now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likeness and unlikeness; and likeness and unlikeness cannot belong to things void of Body; Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing.  
It is here to be observed, first, that he proveth things universal by things particular (which is not allowable by the Rules of Logic.) Next, whereas he saith that likeness and unlikeness cannot pertain to any thing void of body, it is false. For we know that Numbers, which have their side-numbers answering in proportion, are like one to another, as the side-numbers to six and to four and twenty. The side-numbers to six are two, and three: The side numbers to four and twenty are four, and six. Now, there is like proportion of two in respect of four; and of three in respect of six: For they have a double proportion, each in respect of other; four being twice as much as two, and six twice as much as three. Thus it appears that Numbers are like unto Numbers, & yet Numbers are no bodily thing.  
Likewise, Figures (in Geometry) are like unto Figures, so many of them as have both their corners equal, & their sides which enclose their equall-corners, answering one another in proportion: and even the Platonists themselves will confess, that such Figures are no Bodily-things.  
Moreover, as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity, that a thing should be equal, or unequal; So, also, it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality, that things should be like, or unlike. Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeal thing; Therefore, a thing incorporeal may be like unto another thing, that is incorporeal.  
Cleanthes, thus frameth another Argument: No Incorporeal thing (saith he) can suffer together with a thing corporeal; neither can a bodily-thing, suffer with such a thing as hath no body; but, things corporeal, only, may suffer one with another. Now it is evident, that if the body be diseased, and wounded, the SOUL suffereth grief with it; The Body suffereth also with the SOLDIER; for, when the mind is afflicted by shame, the Body blusheth, and when the mind feareth, the body looketh pale. Therefore the SOUL is a corporeal thing.  
One of his Assumptions is false; and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth. For whereas he saith, that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a body; what if this be true only in the SOLDIER? This is as if we should argue thus; No living-creature moves the upper jaw; But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw; Therefore, a Crocodile is no living-creature. The major of this proposition is false; because, in saying, No living-creature moves the upper-jaw, he taketh as granted that which is denied: for, behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw, and is also a living-creature. The like arguing useth he, who saith, that Nothing, void of body, suffereth together with a bodily-thing; for, he taketh unto himself, in his negation, that which lieth in question.  
But, if we should grant (for argument sake) that no Incorporeall-thing, doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall; yet, that which is inferred thereupon, is not fully confessed, (to wit) that the Soul suffereth with the Body, if it be sick, or wounded: For, it is yet in controversy whether it be the Body only that suffereth pain; which having taken sense from the Soul, leaves the same insensible of sufferings; or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Body. The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men; and therefore, Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question; but, of such only as are quite out of doubt: for in doing otherwise he in vain laboureth to demonstrate that, for which he contendeth.  
And yet (to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident) it might be proved, that some things void of body, do suffer together with such things as have body: For, Qualities being things-incorporeall, do suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered: yea, both in the corruption of the body, and in the Generation of the same, the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith.  
Chrysippus' thus argueth. Death is a separation of the Soul from the Body: Now, nothing void of body is separated from a body; because, a thing incorporeal cannot be touched (or laid even along) by a corporeall-thing: But the Soul toucheth, and is equally touched by the body: and is also separated from the same: Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence.  
Among these propositions, this is true, that death is a separation of the soul from the body: But, this, that a thing void of body cannot touch a body, is false, if it be generally spoken; and true, if it be affirmed of the soul. It is false; because, a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence, and is also separated from the same; as also whiteness. Yet, in the Soul it is true; by reason the Soul doth not (so) touch the Body. For, if the Soul should (so) touch the body, it must needs follow that it must be laid (as it were) along by it. And if that be so, than it lieth along by the whole body (that is, by every part of the same) which is impossible. For, how can a wholebody, lie along by every part of another body?  
Or, if it should be that the Soul so touched the Body; then, the whole Creature should not have life: For, if it (so) touched the same, it would indeed consequently follow, that the Soul were a corporeall-essence; but, then, the thing made alive, should not have life in it, throughout every part of the same. And, chose, if the whole living-creature hath life in it, than the Soul neither touches the Body, neither is it a bodily-thing. But, the whole living-creature hath life in it; therefore, neither doth the Soul touch it; neither is the Soul a bodily-thing; and, being a thing void of body; is, nevertheless, separated from the body, (contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus.)  
It is manifest, by what hath been hitherto said, that the Soul is no corpreall-substance: it now remains that we prove the same to be a substance. And, because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmony; And Simmias, contradicting Socrates, affirms the same; comparing the Soul to an harmony, and the body to a Harp; we will here set down the same confutations of them, which we find in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon.  
One of them is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted: For, he had demonstrated that when we do learn, we do but call to mind things that were ingraffed formerly in us: And therefore, taking this unto him (as a thing granted) he thereupon confirms his Argument in this manner;  
If (saith he) the learning of things be nothing else, but the recalling of them to mind; then, our soul had a being, before it was in the form of MAN: Now, if it were a Harmony, it was not before the body, but came after it, when the body was harmoniously joined together. Such of necessity must the composition be, as the things are whereof the composition is made: For, composition is a certain common joining together of those things, which are compounded, having a harmony in the same: and, it cannot be otherwise, in reason, but that the Harmony must follow, and not precede those things whereof it is compounded.  
These matters considered, this saying, That the SOUL is an Harmony, is contrary to this other saying, That, the learning of things is the recordation of things: But the opinion concerning recordation (as is aforesaid) is true; even in their judgement who affirm the SOUL to be an HARMONY; therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony, according to their own Principle.  
Again, the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body; and is in stead of a Ruler, exercising a government over the same. But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body, neither is any way repugnant thereunto; therefore, the SOUL is not an Harmony.  
Moreover, one Harmony may be more or less Harmony than another, according as it is slackened or stretched forth, (we mean not to be understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony; seeing it is impossible there should be intention and remission, in the very nature thereof,) but we mean Harmony as it consisteth in joining together of the notes: For, if a shrill and a base-sound, being matched together, shall afterward be made more slack, there will be a diversity in the Harmony, by reason of joining together of the notes, more or less reached forth, though they retain the same nature in the greatness of the sounds: But one SOUL is not more or less SOUL than another; therefore, the SOUL cannot be a Harmony.  
furthermore, the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another, is a substance and a subject: But, Harmony is a Quality, and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing, and the predicament of Quality is another; therefore, the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things. It is indeed, no absurdity, to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it; howsoever, it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony: Because, though the SOUL hath virtues in the same, it cannot be thereupon inferred that the SOUL is virtue.   

SECT. 3.  
I. It is here declared, that the SOUL is not (as Galen implicitly affirmeth) a Temperature in general. II. It is here proved also, that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality. III. And it is likewise demonstrated, that the SOUL is rather governess of the temperatures of the Body, both ordering them, and subduing the Vices, which arise from the bodily-tempers.  
GAlen, hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL; yea, he himself affirmeth plainly, in his writings of demonstration, that he hath delivered nothing precisely of the same: But, it may be collected by some of his expressions, that he could be best pleased to affirm that the SOUL is a temperature.  
For, he saith, that the diversity of manners follows the temperature of the Body, and confirmeth his opinion by certain collections out of Hypocrates: Wherein, if he delivered that which he truly thinketh, then, doubtless, he believeth also, that the SOUL is mortal: not the whole SOUL, but that only which is irrational; for, he maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul, as his words declare.  
Now, that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL, it may be made evident by these reasons: First, every body, aswell that which hath life in it, as that which is void of life, is made of the temperature of the four Elements (for, the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies) And if the SOUL be the temperature of the body, there can be no body with out life: For, if the Soul be the temperature, then, every body hath life in it, because every body hath his temperatures. And if every Body hath life in it, than there is no body void of life: So, consequently, neither stone, nor timber, nor iron, nor any other thing can be without life.  
But he did not mean, perhaps, to affirm in general, that every temperature of the body was the SOUL; but rather, that some such, or such a temperature. We, then, demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature, and standeth instead of the SOUL? For, let him name what temperature soever he can devise, we will find him out the like in things without life.  
There are (as he himself hath declared in his Book entitled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS) nine temperatures; eight distempered; and one in good temper; by which (as he likewise affirmeth) every man is tempered, whose temperature keepeth a mean. But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed (every one according to the several kind thereof) with a certain intention and remission, to the more and to the less. Yea, and all the nine temperatures are found also more or less in things void of life; as he himself hath taught, in his book of simple-medicaments.  
Moreover, if the SOUL be a temperature, then is the SOUL subject to alteration; for, the temperatures are altered according to the diversity of Ages, Seasons, and Diets: And, if the SOUL be altered, than we have not at all times the same SOUL; but, a Soul varied according to our temperatures; sometime the soul of a Lion, sometime of a Sheep, and sometime of other creatures, which were absurdly affirmed.  
Again, our temperature doth not oppose itself against any lusts of our bodies, but rather helps to provoke them, or effect them, for, it is that which stirreth up the desires: But, the SOUL bendeth itself against those desires; therefore our temperature is not the SOUL.  
Furthermore, the temperature is a quality; and a quality may be in the subject, or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject: Now, if our temperature be our soul, it will then follow (by the reason aforementioned) that the soul may be separated from the body (which is the subject thereof) without the destruction of the same. But, this is universally known to be false; therefore, the SOUL can be neither temperature nor quality.  
None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature, into the contrary thereof, and yet preserve the living-creature, then, in fire to change the nature of heat into coldness, and yet still continue the fire. But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary; (& that such as Galen was are they, who change our temperatures, by their art of Physic. Therefore the soul (which is the essence of a living-creature) cannot be the temperature.  
Neither is the Soul a quality of the body: For, the qualities of every body are subject to sense; But the soul is not subject to sense, but to understanding only, and therefore it is not a Quality.  
We know that this good temper of blood and spirits, accompanied with flesh and sinews, and such other things, is strength. And, that the good temperature of hot and cold, dry and moist things, is health. And that the measurable proportion of the members, with a fresh colour, is cause of the beauty which is in the Body. Now, if the soul be a certain harmony, of health, and strength, and beauty; It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soul in him, can neither be sick, nor weak, nor deformed.  
But, we see by often experience, that even while the living-soule continueth in them, many men are deprived, not only of one, but of all these good temperatures; insomuch, that the very same man is deformed, and weak, and sick all at once. Therefore, the soul is not the good temperature of the Body.  
Some will ask, perhaps, how it comes to pass, (if the soul be not the temperature of the body) that men are vicious or virtuous, according to their natural constitutions and complexions▪ and they may demand also, whether these things proceed not from the temperature. We answer, that they do indeed proceed from the bodily temperature: For, as there be some naturally healthful, or sickly, by reason of their constitution; So, othersome, naturally abounding in bitter choler, are froward; and some other cowardly, or lecherous, (more or less according to their complexions.)  
But, there be some, who overcome these natural inclinations, and by getting the victory over them, do evidently manifest, that these temperatures may be suppressed. Now, that which overcommeth is one thing, and that which is overcome is another thing: Therefore, the temperature is also one thing, and the soul (which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature) is another thing, and not the same.  
The body being an instrument which the soul useth, if it be well fitted for the same, is a helper unto the soul; and she the better useth it to her own contentment. But, if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soul's use, it becometh her hindrance, and much ado hath she to strive against the unfitness of her instrument. Yea, so much, that if she be not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same, she herself is perverted aswell as the instrument; even as a musician misseth of true music, when his harp is out of tune.  
The soul therefore must be careful of the body, and make it a fit instrument for herself: which may be done by ordering it according to Reason, and by accustoming the same to good manners; as in Harmony, otherwhile slackening, and sometime winding up, according as necessity requires: By the neglect whereof, she herself, may else (as it often happeneth) become as faulty, and as perverse as her Instrument.   

SECT. 4.  
I. The SOUL is not a perpetual motion as Aristotle affirms: He shows what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is, and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOUL. II. The Body hath not in itself a possibility to live, before the SOUL cometh unto it, as Aristole hath also affirmed. III. The SOUL is neither unmovable of itself, nor accidentally moved, nor bred in the Body; as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered.  
ARistotle affirming that the Soul is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetual motion, is nevertheless to be accounted among them, who say that the SOUL is a quality. But, first, let me make it appear what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which is to say) a perpetual motion.  
He divideth a substance into three parts: The first is matter (which is as it were the subject) and this matter is in itself nothing, but a generating power, out of which another thing may be form.  
The second part of the Essence, is form, (or special kind) by which the matter is brought unto a certain form.  
The third part, consisteth both of matter and form united together, and endued with life: The matter being a thing in possibility only, and the form an actual thing considerable two ways. That is to say, either as you consider of a science, or of a contemplation according to the science; as a habit; or, as working by that habit.  
It is considerable as a science; because, in the very substance of the Soul there is a kind (as we may call it) both of sleep and of waking. This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation; and sleep represents the having of this habit, without any working thereby.  
The Science, is, before working according to that science; and Aristotle calls the form itself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, the first continued motion: The working according to this form, he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion. As for example:  
The eye consisteth of a material subject, and of a certain form. This material subject, is in the eye itself; even that which containeth the sight (I mean the matter of the eye) and this matter is equivocally called the eye. But the form and continual motion of the eye is the operation whereby it seeth: A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned, hath yet, an aptness to receive such a motion: Even in such manner we must conceive of it in the SOUL. When sight cometh to the whelp it perfects the eye; and when the SOUL cometh unto the Body, it perfects the living-creature.  
So then, in a perfect living-creature, neither can the SOUL be at any time without the Body, neither the Body without the Soul: For, the SOUL is not the Body itself; but, it is the SOUL of the BODY: and therefore, it is in the Body, yea, and in such a kind of body: for, it hath not an existence by itself.  
Aristotle first calls the possible (inferior) part of the soul, by the Name of the soul, severing the Reasonable-part from it, whereas he should have taken the whole soul of Man together, and not have given his judgement of the whole, by a part, much less by the weakest part there of.  
Aristotle hath affirmed also, that the body hath an aptness to live, even before the soul cometh unto it: For he saith, that the body hath in itself a possibility to live.  
Now, the body which hath in itself a possibility to live, must first be actually a body, before it receives that form: For, such a body is a matter void of all qualities. Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually itself, should have in it an aptness whereby another thing may be made of it.  
If it be a body, and hath in itself, no other being, but in possibility only; how can that which is a body but in possibility, have a possibility of life in itself? Though in other things, it is possible, that a man should have somewhat which he never useth; yet in the soul it is impossible: For, the soul doth not cease to work, even in them that are asleep; but, a man, even in sleeping, is nourished, & groweth. and seeth visions, and breathes, which is the chiefest symptom of life.  
It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live, but, it must needs have life actually in it: For, indeed, it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul, (it is planted together with the Soul) and it is in the body by participation.  
If therefore any man shall affirm, that Health answereth proportionably to Life; we will reply that in saying so, he tall talketh not of the life of the SOUL but of the body, and so useth a sophistical reasoning: For, the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another; but, in the substance, which is the form, that cannot be possible; Because, if the difference, which is the Form, should be altered, the living creature would be altered also.  
It is not therefore, the substantial form, which receiveth contraries; but the substance which is the subject; that is to say, the bodily-substance: And therefore also the Soul cannot be, by any means, the continued motion of the body; but must be a substance all perfect within itself, and incorporeal; for that it receiveth contraries one after another, (as vice and virtue) whereof the very Form, by itself, is not capable.  
Furthermore, Aristotle saith, that the Soul being a continued-motion, unmoveable of itself, is moved accidentally; and, that it is not unlikely we should be moved by an immovable thing; because we see by common experience, that beauty being a thing unmoveable doth nevertheless move us.  
But, though Beauty, which is unmoveable in it self, may move us, (as he saith) yet, the Beauty so moving us, is a thing by nature, apt enough to be moved, & not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable. Therefore, if the body had any selfe-motion, it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immovable: But, it is impossible that a thing of itself immovable, should be moved of that which is also immovable How then should the body attain unto motion, except it receive it from the soul? seeing it cannot have any motion from itself?  
It appears, therefore, that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion, he showed us not the first, but the second. For, if he had moved that which of itself is not moved, he had then made the first-motion. But, if (otherwise) he move that which is moved of itself, he discourseth how the second-motion cometh.  
From whence then is the first motion procured to the body? If he say the Elements are moved of themselves; in regard some of them are naturally light, & some heavy; It is not so: For, if levity & weightiness were kinds of motion; then, light and heavy things would never leave moving. But, they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place. Therefore, lightness and heaviness are not causes of the first-motion, but qualities of the Elements.  
If it were granted (that lightness and heaviness were causes of the first-motion) how can the Qualities of Reasoning, of Judging, and of holding Opinion, be wrought by heaviness and lightness? If they be not effects of these; neither are they effects of the Elements; and if not of the Elements, than also not of the Bodies.  
Beside, if the soul be moved accidentally, and the body of itself; then should the body be moved of itself, although it had no soul; and if that were possible, than it might be a living-creature without a soul. But, these things are absurd; and absurd therefore is the former opinion.  
Moreover, it is likewise untruly affirmed, that every thing which is moved naturally, is moved also violently; and that whatsoever is moved violently, is moved by nature. For, the World being moved naturally, is not moved violently. Neither is it true, that such things as are moved naturally, do rest naturally also: For, the World, and the Sun, and the Moon, are naturally moved, and yet cannot rest naturally: In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetual motion, they cannot rest naturally: For Rest is the destruction of the Soul, & of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion.  
It is herewith considerable also, that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter, (viz.) how the body (whose nature is to be easily dispersed) can be knit together, (if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance).   

SECT. 5.  
I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras; nor as Xenocrates understands it. II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul, these words, created (or engendered) in the Body; and the absurdity thereupon ensuing. III. The difference between the Works of Creation, & Providence, etc. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Souls.  
PYthagoras, whose custom it was, by a certain kind of Comparison to liken God, and all other things to NUMBERS, defined the soul, also, to be a number moving itself. Him, Xenocrates imitated; not as though the soul were number; but, for that it is in things numbered; and in such as are multiplied; and, for that it is the soul which discerns things; and, because, likewise it putteth (as it were) upon every thing, certain forms, and distinctions.  
(For, it is the SOUL that separates one form from another, and shows how they differ; both by the diversity of their Forms, and by the multitude of their number; thereby causing things to be contained in number: And, therefore, between the soul and numbers, there is some affinity.)  
He himself hath born witness of the soul that it is moved of itself: And, that it is not a number, we may thus prove; Number, is in the predicament of quantity; But, the soul is not in the predicament of quantity, but in the predicament of substance; Therefore, the soul is not a number. Yea though they would never so fain, that number should be a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding, it will be proved otherwise, as it shall hereafter be declared.  
Again, the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another; but, so hath not number; Therefore the SOUL is not a Number. Again, a number is increased by putting more and more unto it, but, the Soul taketh no such increase. Again, a number is either even or odd; but the SOUL can neither be termed even nor odd. Again, the SOUL hath motion of itself; but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable. Again, a number remaining one and the same in nature, is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers: But, the Soul remaining one and the same in substance, doth change his qualities, altering from ignorance to knowledge, and from vice to virtue; therefore (all these particulars considered) the SOUL is not a number.  
These were the ancient Philosopher's opinions concerning the SOUL. But Eunomius defined it to be a SUBSTANCE void of body, and created in the body, agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle. For, he took these words, a substance void of body, out of Plato; and these, created in the body, from Aristotle: not considering (though he was otherwise very quick witted) that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no means be united together.  
For, every thing that is engendered both bodily and in time, is corruptible and mortal. To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable. For, in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense, he did not therein deliver in express words, that the nature of things intelligible were then made. But, some (though othersome are not of their opinion) insisting upon conjectures, are of that mind.  
Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body; because it was put into the body, after the same was fashioned, he erreth wide from the truth. For, neither doth Moses say, that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body, neither doth any reason persuade thereunto.  
Eunomius therefore, might aswell have said that the Soul is mortal, as doth Aristotle, and the Stoics, as affirm it is engendered in the body. For, if he will say the soul is an incorporeal Essence; he should have refused to say that, it was created in the body; lest he give men occasion to think the soul mortal, and utterly void of Reason.  
Beside, it seems by his opinion, that the World is not yet replenished; but, is at this present (as it were) no more than half perfected, and stands every day in want of some additions. For, there are every day added unto it, at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances. And (which is most unreasonable) he seemeth to believe, that when the number of souls is finished, than the whole world shall be dissolved, and the last not come to light before the day of the general resurrection.  
What can be more contrary to reason, then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed, as soon as it is fully furnished? It were like the play-games of little children so to do. For when they have made any works or devises upon the sands, they usually tread them out again as soon as they have done them.  
Now if any shall hereunto reply, that the souls are now made by Providence and not by Creation; and that there is no new substance brought into the world (whensoever any body is replenished with a soul) nor any other Essence, but the same multiplied, by Providence, which was before; doubtless, they know not the difference between Creation and Providence.  
For it is the special work of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures, by breeding them one of another. I mean, here, all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation, and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter; for, the succession of such, is preserved, (by the same providence) by generating them of some other putrefaction.  
But the chief operation of Creation is, to make things of nothing. If, therefore, the SOULS be made one of another: It will also follow, that they are corruptible, like those other creatures, which are made successively one of another, according to their kinds. If chose, the SOULS be made of nothing; then their making cometh by Creation; and in so affirming, we deny that place of Moses: God ceased from all his works. But both of these opinions are absurd; Therefore, the Souls are not now made. For, that saving of the Scripture; My Father worketh, etc. by the judgement even of Eunomius himself, is to be understood not of the works of Creation, but of Providence.  
Apollinarius held opinion that Souls were engendered one of another, as Bodies are; and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man, unto all men descending from him, according to the bodily succession; therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have been from the beginning (as it were) stored up; and from those also who think they are daily created. For, in contradiction to these tenets, they affirm, that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children. And they further say that these words of Moses, God ceased from all his works, etc. should be untrue, if God continueth to create Souls.  
In answer hereunto, we have already showed, that all things are mortal which have a successive generation one of another: For, therefore only they generate and are generated, that the race of corruptible things might be preserved. And therefore, Apollinarius, must either deny the successive generation of Souls; or by holding such a generation, he must (consequently at least) necessarily affirm that the Soul is mortal. Whereas he mentions children borne in Adultery; let us leave that unto the Divine Providence, whereof we are ignorant. But, if we may presume to conjecture aught of the Divine Providence, it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable, permitteth such a body also to be furnished with a Soul, as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Urias.   

SECT. 6.  
I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL, and the absurdity and contradictions thereof. II. The judgement of Plato touching one general SOUL, and many particular SOULS; The office of the SOUL; and the difference between things that live, and Living-creatures, is here also declared. III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers.  
NOw, it follows that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL. For, they say truly, that the SOUL is a substance, both immortal and incorporeal: But, they add also, that there is but one only Soul for all things; and that it is parted, and (as it were) piecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies, as well to bodies inanimate, as to those which are endued with life.  
They affirm likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort, and some in a less measure. Things endued with life in a larger proportion; Things void of life, in the less; And, heavenly things in the most abundant manner; and that the particular souls, are portions of that soul which is universal.  
Now, if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided, as that it had not been divided into parts, but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the ears of many hearers, the error had been the more tolerable. But, their opinion is, that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts; and (which is most harsh) they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements, and to be distributed together with the Elements, in the making up of bodily-things; and for the collecting of them again into one, when they are dissolved, as water is divided into certain portions, and then mingled again all together.  
They are of opinion, likewise, that (after the dissolution of their bodies) the pure souls, being light, do ascend unto the light, and that souls which have been defiled by the material substance (in which they resided) do pass into the Elements, and from the Elements depart again into Plants, and living-creatures. And though they do thus mangle the substance of the soul, by their fancies making it in effect both corporeal and subject to perturbations, they say nevertheless, that it is immortal.  
But, in these things they contradict themselves: For, first, they say that the souls which have been defiled, do return back to the Elements, and are mingled and tempered one with another; and chose, in the passing of souls from body to body, they say that punishments are inflicted on them according to their offences, joining and separating again the nature of them, (as occasion serves.)  
They hold likewise, that when it is light, shadows are dispersed; and when all is covered with clouds, that the shadows are gathered together; which cannot possibly come to pass in an intelligible Nature. For, if a Man should grant that shadows are dispersed and gathered again; we must then count shadows among things subject unto sense.  
Plato is of opinion that there is both one general soul, and many particular souls. One soul for the whole world altogether, and other souls for particular things: In such manner, that the whole world is endued with a proper soul of its own, even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world; and so also, that particular things are endued with their proper souls, even with the soul, which is peculiar unto every one of them.  
The soul (saith he) which pertaineth to the Universe is stretched forth from the centre of the Earth to the uttermost limits of the Heavens, (not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is enclosed in Place, but such an extension rather as is conceived in our understanding.) And he saith, that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe, and which holdeth in, and bindeth together all such things as have bodily shape. For (as hath been already declared all corporeal substances have need of somewhat to hold them together; and that is done by the SOUL, which giveth unto every thing the form.  
For, every thing that liveth, hath a proper life of his own, and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption, (say the Platonists.) So long as it is held, and knit together, they term it a Body; and, when it is dissolved, they say it is corrupted or destroyed.  
They affirm, also, that all things live; but, say not that all things are living-creatures. For, they distinguish Plants from things inanimate, for that they increase and are nourished by a nourishing and vegitative power. They distinguish the living-creatures, void of reason, from plants, by sense; And the rational from the irrational, by reason.  
Thus, though they affirm generally, that all things live; yet they distinguish the nature of every living-thing. Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life, do live (say they) an habitual life, and are held together by the general Soul of the World, which keeps them in their proper Being, and undissolved. This, they hold also to be the Soul which governs the world; and, that, it sends into every particular thing such particular Souls, as were before, made for them by the CREATOR. Yea, and they say to, that the Creator gave unto it certain Laws, whereby it should order this whole world, (which Laws they call DESTINY) and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for Man: whereof we shall treat more at large in our discourse of Destiny.  
All the Greek Philosophers who affirm the Soul to be immortal, are of opinion that the SOUL passeth from body to body: But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they mean it.  
Some understand it of one sort only; that is to say, of the Reasonable-soul; affirming that it passeth into Plants, and into the bodies of irrationall-creatures: Some of these think this transmigration was but at certain appointed Revolutions of Time; and some of them imagined the time to be casual and uncertain. Some other understand it, not of one sort of souls only; but of the Irrational, as well as of the Rational: and some again, understand it of many sorts of souls, even of so many, as there are diverse kinds of living-creatures.  
The Scholars of Plato have been somewhat singular in this opinion. For, considering Plato said, that the souls of such as were furious, and angry, and given to rapine, were clothed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions; and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonness, took upon them the bodies of Asses and such like beasts: Some understand him as though he had meant Lions and Wolves & Asses as the bare words do signify. Some perceived that he spoke figuratively, and by the names of those beasts, understood the conditions or qualities of those creatures. For Cronius in his book entitled Of the renewed generation (for so he terms the transmigration of SOULS from Body to Body) will have it understood of none but reasonable-Soules: Yea and Theodorus (one professing the doctrines of Plato) in his book which affirmeth, that one SOUL comprehends all the species, is likewise of the same mind; And so is Porphyry.   

SECT. 7.  
I. The singular opinion of jamblicus, touching the Transmigration of Souls. II. Every BODY hath a SOUL convenient for the same. III. The brute creatures do nothing according to Reason, but by-naturall instinct▪ IU. The judgement of Galen concerning diversity of Souls, and a recapitulation of the several things proved and disproved in this Chapter, concluding the Soul to be both immortal, and incorporeal.  
BUt, jamblicus running a contrary race to these men, says that we must understand, that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is; and that there be diverse kinds of SOULS. He hath affirmed in his book called MONOBIBLON; that the changing of SOULS never happeneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures, neither from unreasonable-creatures to Men, but from beasts to beasts; and from Men to Men. And in so saying he hath not only well guessed, but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion: As by many other of his Arguments may be showed; but, especially by these that follow.  
No one of the motions of reason (saith he) manifests itself in unreasonable creatures: For, neither Arts, nor Learning, nor Consultations, nor Virtues, nor any other thing belonging to an intelligible nature, can be found in them. And, therefore it is plain that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul. Though in Infants, which are very young, there is altogether an unreasonable-motion; yet we say they have a Reasonable-Soule; because, when they come to years, they show forth the works of reason. But, in the unreasonable-creature, which, at no age, giveth any token of Reason, the Reasonable-soule would be superfluous; because, the force of Reason would be altogether, and at all times, useless unto him.  
All men have agreed unanimously, that God made no superfluous creature; which being true, it cannot be that a Reasonable-soule should be so superfluously bestowed, as to be placed in cattle, and wild beasts, which cannot exercise the same; lest it might be objected as a fault in the Creator, to give an unfit SOUL to the Body: For, it is not the part of a good workman (or of one who knows the order and method of working) so to do.  
Now, if any shall object, that there is in beasts, a certain hidden habit of reason, whereby they are moved; and that their shape makes them uncapable of artificial works, as the want of a man's fingers, depriveth him of means to practise many Arts, wherein he is experienced, it makes nothing to the matter: For, the same absurdity still remains; implying that God applieth SOULS unto some BODIES, which are so unfit, and superfluous, that they are hindered, throughout all the ages, of those creatures, from their operations.  
Beside, they confirm their propositions, by things unknown, and such as are not confessed: For, who allows this fancy, that, beasts have in them a motion, according to an hidden habit of Reason?  
It is therefore better to hold, that a SOUL convenient for every Body, is fitly applied thereunto: That beasts also have nothing more, according to any hidden habit of reason, then doth outwardly appear in their natural and simple actions; That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likewise according to a proper instinct of their own, to such uses, and to such works as they were ordained unto, from the beginning: and, that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accommodated for such purposes  
Moreover, the CREATOR, because he would not leave them utterly void of help in their necessities, hath placed in every one of them such an understanding as is natural, though not reasonable. In some he hath placed a wiliness representing Art, and having a shadow of Reason; partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers, which may betide them, and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another; as hath been said before.  
Now, that the brute-creatures have not the use of reason in doing these things is evident in this, that every living-creature of one kind, doth the same things, and all of them in one, and the same manner. Their practices differ not in multitude, but in this only, that some use them, perhaps more, and some less; for all the whole kind of them, practise the same wiles.  
Every Hare doth use the same subtleties, every Fox is alike crafty, and every Ape imitates alike. But, it is not so with Man; For, his actions are infinitely various, because, Reason being a certain thing which is free; and men having also many things in their power, their workings are not one and the same, as it is in every kind of irrational creature. For beasts have their motion only by nature; and such things as are in a creature naturally, are in all of the same kind. But, the actions proceeding from Reason, are after one sort in one man, after another sort in another, and not necessarily the same in all men.  
But, if they should say that man's SOUL is driven into the Bodies of beasts, for a punishment of those faults which i● had committed, when it was formerly in man while he lived: This demonstration of theirs (contrary to the rules of Logic) proveth former things, by such as come after: For, why should reasonable SOULS be cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man? can you say they had offended in the Body of man before they had entered at all into man's body?  
Galen, that admirable Physician seemeth to be of the former opinion, & to suppose that in every several kind of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul: For, in the beginning of the first book of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts; he says thus. Though there be many parts of a living-creature, some greater, some less, (and some that cannot be divided into any other kind) every one of them is useful some way to the SOUL: For, the Body, is the instrument of the soul, and the parts of living-creatures, differ much from one another, because there is difference in their SOULS.  
Again, somewhat after that in the same book, he adds these words, speaking of an Ape. Oh, thou that art so witty in finding faults I Nature can tell thee that it was convenient a ridiculous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous. By this it may sufficiently be declared, that Galen thought a diversity of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of diverse kinds. Thus much of these matters.  
Seeing we have now proved (even by their own arguments who have held the contrary) that the SOUL is neither a corporeal essence, nor a harmony, nor a Temperature, nor any other quality; it will necessarily follow, that it is a substance incorporeal. All confess there is a SOUL; and if it be neither a Body, nor an accident, it is mannest that it is a substance without a body; and no such thing as cannot stand by itself without a subject: For such things may without the destruction of the subject be either in the same, or absent; but if the SOUL be separated from the body, that body must of necessity be destroyed.  
We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortal: For, if it be neither a body, whose nature is subject to dissolution and destruction, as is aforesaid; nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor any thing subject to corruption; than it must needs be immortal.  
There be many other demonstrations, both in Plato, and others, illustrating the immortality of the SOUL, but they are full of obseurity, and can hardly be understood, or borne away by those who have been trained up in the same sciences.  
To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are all-sufficient, to prove the SOULS immortality; & bear a full credit in themselves, because they were inspired by God. But, against those who embrace not the Scriptures, as we Christians do, we must prove by demonstration, that the SOUL is no such thing, as is subject to corruption. If it be no corruptible thing, it must needs be incorruptible; and consequently immortal. And therefore, to that purpose let this be sufficient.    

CAP. 3.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY, and whether their Natures be altered, or confounded by their union. II. The mystery of the SOUL and BODIE'S union illustrated by considering things conceivable in understanding, and by a similitude taken from the Sun. III. Of the admirable proprieties of the SOUL; and how it is properly or improperly said to be in the BODY, or in Place, etc.  
OUr purpose is now to inquire, how between the SOUL and a lifelesse-body there may be a perfect union: For, the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtful; and, it is much the more doubtful, it Man consist not of these two parts only, but of understanding also (as a distinct thing) which is the opinion of some. But, the greatest doubt of all, ariseth in this respect, that all those things which concur unto the making of one essence, are joined all together in the making of that one; seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing, are (usually) so altered that they remain not the same they were before, as it shall plainly be declared in our Treaty of the four Elements.  
How then can the BODY being united unto the SOUL, remain still a Body? or, how can the SOUL being incorporeal, and having a substance of his own, be united with the BODY, and become a part of the Living-creature, preserving still his own proper substance, without corruption and confusion?  
It seems to be no way else possible, but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other, either become altered one with the other, or corrupted with each other, as the Elements are; or else, (to avoid those absurdities) that they should not be truly united; but, be so joined only as Dancers are in their dance, or lie one by the other as Counters in a sum, or at best be so mixed, as wine and water.  
But, we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL, that the Soul cannot be laid (as it were) along by the Body; because, if it should be so, that part only of the body should have life in it, which joineth near unto the soul; and that the part which the soul toucheth not, should be without life.  
Moreover, we cannot say, that two sundry things placed one beside the other, (as two pieces of timber, two iron wedges, or such like) are one and the same thing. And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water, we know it corrupts both the one and the other; for there doth remain neither pure water, nor pure wine, after such a mixture.  
Yet this mixture of wine and water, is but (as it were) a laying of them one beside another, though our senses be not able to apprehend the same, because they are hindered from perceiving it, by the thinness of the parts of those things which are mixed. For, the wine and water may be separated again the one from the other, by a sponge dipped in oil, or by paper, either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine. But, indeed, it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one from the other, those things which are exactly united.  
If therefore, the parts of MAN be neither united, nor placed one beside the other, nor mixed together, as aforesaid; what reason should move us to say, that one Living creature is made of these two parts, a Soul and a body?  
It was the consideration hereof, which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soul and Body; but, that he was a Soul having the use of the Body, and to whom the Body served as a garment. But, even in affirming that, he occasioned as much doubting; for, how can the Soul be one with what is but his garment, seeing a Coat, is not all one with him that wears it?  
But Amonius, who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question: even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both be united unto such things as are capable of them (and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting) and yet remain as truly without confusion or corruption, when they be united, as those things do, which are but laid along one by another.  
It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together, must of necessity suffer alterations by their union, and be changed in every one of those parts which concur thereunto; because, they are thereby changed into other Bodies, as are the Elements making compound bodies; or as nourishment, being changed into blood; or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh, and other parts of the Body.  
But things intelligible, may be united, and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue. For, it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things, to be altered in substance; but, either it departeth away, or is brought to nothing, and so can admit no alteration.  
The SOUL is immortal and therefore cannot be corrupted, or brought to nothing; for, than it could not be immortal. It is also life itself; and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture: For, if it should be changed in the union, it should be altered from being life any more; and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto? All these arguments considered, it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body.  
Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered; it follows necessarily thereupon, that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things; so likewise, the things whereunto they are united remain uncorrupted; and that in the union of the SOLDIER and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other.  
That they are nevertheless perfectly united, is manifested by this, that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature: For, the whole man grieveth as one creature, if any cause of grief happen to the one part or the other, (to the SOUL or to the Body.)  
And, it is as plain, that they remain united without confusion, in that the soul being separated (after a sort) from the Body when we be asleep (and leaving the body lying in manner of a dead Corpse, and only breathing into the same, as it were, certain vapours of life, lest it should utterly perish) doth work by itself, in dreams, whilst the Body sleepeth; foreseeing things to come, and exercising itself merely in things intelligible.  
The like happeneth when the mind is very seriously occupied in contemplation, & enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things. For, even than the soul endeavours by all possible means to be separated from the body, and to be alone by itself that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things.  
For, being without body, it separates itself from the whole body, as things which are therewithal corrupted; and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also do wherein there is no confusion: And keeping itself one and alone, changeth that wherein it abideth, by the life which is contained in itself; and yet is not changed by the same.  
For, as the Sun, so soon as it appeareth, changes the air into light; so making it light some, and so diffusing itself with the air, that it is united with the same, and yet not confounded therewith: Even so, the soul being united with the Body, remains without confusion therewith; differing in this only, that the Sun being a Body, and circumscribed within the compass of Place, is not himself in every place where his light is, but (as fire in the wood, or as the flame in a candle) is confined to a certain place.  
It is not so with the soul. For, being void of all Body, and not contained within the limits of any place, it passeth all and whole, through it own whole light, and through the whole Body, wherein it is; neither is any part of it illuminated thereby, wherein it is not fully and wholly present. Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessel, nor compassed in by the same; but the Body is rather in the soul, and is thereby held in and fastened together.  
For, intelligible things (such as the soul is) are not hindered by bodily things; but, enter, and pierce, and pass through every corporeal thing, and cannot possibly be contained within the circumference of a bodily-place. Things intellectual, have their being in places also intelligible; yea they are either in themselves, or else in such intellectual things, as are above themselves.  
The soul is otherwhile in it self; as, when it reasoneth or considereth of things; and otherwhile in the understanding; as, when it conceiveth any thing: And when it is said to be in the body, it is not said to be there, as in place; but, to be as it were in a certain relation to the body; and to be present with it in such a sense, as, God is said to be in us.  
For, we say that the soul is bound (as it were) by a certain disposition and inclination, as the lover is to his beloved: not bound in place, or as bodies are bound; but by the habitual bands of affection. And indeed, seeing it hath neither magnitude, nor massiness, nor parts, how can it be enclosed by a special place? Or within what place can that be contained, which hath no parts? Where place is, there must needs be a massiness; because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing; and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth.  
Now, if any man shall thereupon conclude, that his soul is in Alexandria, and in Rome, and in every place; let him know, that even in so saying, he includeth a Place. For, to be in Alexandria, or generally to be here, or there, or any where, pertaineth unto a place; whereas the soul is no where (no not in the body) as in a place; but habitually; because, (as is aforesaid) it cannot be contained within a place.  
For this cause, when things intellectual have any habitual inclination to a place, or to such things as are in place; we turn the word from his proper use, and say abusively, that such a thing is there, or there; by reason of the operation which it there hath; taking the name of place, for the inclination, or working in a place. And, whereas we should rather say, it there worketh, we say, There it is.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Manhood, how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soul and Body; and wherein it is unlike thereunto. II. Arguments taken from Porphyry, confuting himself, and others, who deny the possibility of an union between the Godhead and the Manhood, and a disproof of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union. III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soul and body; and shows that as it was merely, of God's good pleasure, to unite the Godhead to the Manhood; So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God, that this union should be without mixture or confusion.  
THat which is last aforesaid, agrees more plainly and in more special manner to that union, which is between GOD the WORD, and the Manhood; by which union, the two Natures being united, remained nevertheless without confusion; and so, also, that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity: And, yet, this uniting is not altogether such, as is between the soul and the body: For, the soul being in the number of multiplied things, suffers (after a sort) with the Body, in such things as happen thereunto, and by reason of their mutual necessities, and conversation together, both holds it in, and is also held in, by the same.  
But, GOD the Word being himself nothing altered, by that union, which unites the divinity and humanity together (nor by that communion which the soul and body have with each other) imparts his Godhead unto them, without participating of their frailties; and becometh one with them, still remaining in himself the same thing which he was, before such an uniting.  
This is a strange and mysterious temperature & uniting: For, He is tempered with them, and yet he himself continues utterly without mixion, without confusion, without corruption, and without change: Neither suffering any thing with them; but, only helping, and furthering them: nor being corrupted nor altered by them; but, greatly increasing them, without any diminution in himself; because, he is altogether without mutation, without confusion, and without possibility of changing.  
Hereof may Porphyry himself bear witness, who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST (for, the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofs which may be brought against themselves.) This Porphyry in the second Book of his mixed questions uses these words.  
It is not, then (saith he) to be judged a thing impossible, that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE, and be part of that ESSENCE, perfecting also the same, and yet remain still in it own NATURE, both being ONE with that other thing, and yet preserving the UNITY of itself: yea, and (which is more than this) changing those things wherein it is, by the presence thereof, and making it so to work as itself worketh, and yet nothing altered in itself.  
Now, Porphyry spoke these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body: and if his reason hold good, in the SOUL, in regard it is an incorporeal substance, it holds true much rather, in GOD the Word, who is verily without body, and also utterly void of composition. And this doth mafestly shut the mouths of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the Godhead and the Manhood, as many of the Grecians have done; Jesting, and deriding at it, as impossible, improbable, and absurd, that the Divine-nature should be joined in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature; for, it is here discovered, that they may be opposed in this argument, by the testimony of such as are in most esteem among themselves.  
The opinion of some (especially of the Eunomians) is this, that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance, but by the powers of either (Nature:) For it is not (say these) their substances which are united and tempered together; but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers.  
Now, they affirm (according to Aristotle) that the Senses are the powers of the body (meaning of all the body as it contains the instruments thereof) and therefore, in their judgement, the Divine powers being tempered with the Senses, is cause of that uniting: But, we shall never be persuaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certain powers of the body: For, we have already manifestly declared, what things belong properly to the Body, what things to the SOUL only; and what to the SOUL and body both together: And, we thereupon concluded, that the Senses, which work by the instruments of the Body, are to be reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and body joined in One.  
These things considered, it is most agreeable to reason, we should affirm (according to the nature of incorporeall-things) and as is aforesaid, that these Essences of the soul and Body are united without confusion; and in such manner, that the more Divine nature, is nothing impaired by the inferior nature; but that only the inferior nature is profited by that which is Divine.  
For a nature which is purely incorporeal, can pass without stop thorough all things, whereas nothing hath passage thorough that: By passing through all things, it is united; and in regard nothing passes through the same, it remains void of mixture, and without confusion.  
It is not rightly affirmed therefore (though many excellent men be of this opinion) that no reason else can be given, why the union, whereof we have treated, should be after such a manner, but, only, because it pleased God it should so be: For the very nature of the things is cause thereof.  
We may justly say, that it came to pass merely by GOD's good pleasure, and choice, that the SON should take a Body unto himself: But, it cometh not merely of the good pleasure of GOD (though it be also his good pleasure it should be so) but of the proper nature of the Godhead, that when it is united, it should not be confounded with the Manhood.  
We will speak nothing of the degrees of souls, nor of their ascending and descending, mentioned by Origen. For we find in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same; neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians.    

CAP. 4.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of the Body, and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof. II. Of those parts of a living-creature, every portion whereof taketh the name of the whole; and of those parts which take not the name of the whole. III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATURE whereas all others are defective in some of the parts; and many in the Situation of them.  
RIghtly may we affirm that every corporeal Essence is a composition proceeding from the four Elements, and made up of them. The bodies of living-creatures having blood in them, are compacted immediately of the four humours, Blood, phlegm, Choler, & Melancholy: But the Bodies of such as are without blood, are made of the other three humours, and of somewhat in them answering proportionably unto blood  
We call that immediately, when any thing is made of the selfsame things without any other thing coming between them: As the four humours are made of the four Elements; and those things are compounded of the four humours, which consist of like parts, and are parts also of the body (that is, things having such parts, every part of which parts, may be called by the same name which is given unto the whole; as when every part of the flesh, is called flesh.)  
Melancholy, is likened to Earth, Phlegm to water; Blood to Air; Choler to Fire; and, every thing which is compounded of the Elements, is either a Mass, or Moisture, or Spirits.  
Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-creatures were made immediately of Blood only; because the seed is engendered of blood, and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby.  
But, because it seemed somewhat absurd to imagine that both hardest bones, and the tenderest flesh and fatness, should proceed all of one thing; It pleased Hypocrates to affirm that the bodies of living-creatures, were immediately compacted of the four Elements; the thick and solid parts of the more earthly Elements, and the soft parts, of such Elements as are softest.  
Oftentimes, all the four humours are found in the blood; whereof we have experience in Phlebotomy: For, sometime a certain phlegm like whey doth abound in it; otherwhile Melancholy, and sometime, again, Choler. Whereupon, it cometh to pass that all men seem in some sort, to agree with one another.  
Now, of the parts of living-creatures; some parts there be, every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part: Othersome there are, which cannot be called by the same name whereby the whole is called. As for example; Every part of the Brain is called Brain; In like manner of the sinews, of the marrow, of the bones, of the teeth, of the grissels, of the nails, of the thin muscles that bind the joints together, of all the skins (throughout the body) of the strings (which are in the bloody flesh) of the hairs, of the flesh, of the veins, of the arteries, of the pores, of the fat, and of those four which are in manner of Elements, yielding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made, pure Blood, Phlegm, Melancholy, and Choler. Except from these, the Muscle, which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joints together, and of the strings which are of the nature of sinews.  
The parts of the body, consisting of portions, whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole; are these that follow; viz. the head, the breast, the hands, the feet, and such other members of Man's body. For, if you divide the head into several parts, every part of it is not called a Head: but if you divide a sinew into several portions, every portion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew; and so shall it be likewise, if you divide (or subdivide) a vein or flesh.  
Every whole thing, whose several parts have not the same name with the whole, is made of such things as impart the name of the whole to the parts, when they are compounded together; as the head is made of sinews, and flesh, and bone, and such like, which are called the instrumental parts.  
The definition therefore of such things as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, things which consist of like parts, is thus made; They are things whose parts are like both to the whole, and to each other; (as flesh, brain, etc.) and by the word like, in this place, we mean the same with the whole; for a piece of a man's flesh, is as truly flesh as the whole mass.  
Now, every living-creature, hath not all the parts of a body; but, some of them are defective in one part, and some in others; for, some lack feet, as fishes, and Serpents; Some have no head, as Crabs and Lobsters, and certain other water-creatures; and because they want a head, the seat of their sense is in the breast.  
Some living-creatures have no Lungs; namely, all such as breathe no Air; some are without a bladder, as birds, and all such as void not urine. And creatures which have thick shells, are destitute of so many members, that some of them, have but few appearances of being living-creatures.  
There be also some living-creatures, which although they have such things as are in our bodies, yet seem to want them. As the Stag which seems to have no choler, because he hath it not in one place, but so dispersed abroad in his entrailes, that it is no where apparent.  
But, MAN hath all the parts of a living-creature; every part also, perfect; and all in so goodly order, that it could not possibly have been better composed.  
Beside their want of some parts, there is likewise among other living-creatures, much difference in the situation of the parts. For, some have their dugs in the breast; some, on their bellies; and some under their thighs: Some again, have two dugs; some four; and some have more. Nature hath so provided (for the most part) that the number of dugs is answerable to the number of young-ones which every creature brings forth at a time. But let him that would be more exactly informed of these things, read the history which Aristotle hath written of living-creatures.  
For, it pertaineth not unto the discourse which I now purpose, to treat at large of such things; but, only to point at them, or, to speak briefly of them.    

CAP. 5.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of the four Elements: of their simple and mixed Nature; of their four qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, and Dryness; of their contrarieties, and of the means of uniting them into one body. II. Of the Circular motion, and changeableness of the Elements one into another; and a reason why God made them of such a nature. III. The opinion of Aristotle, concerning the nature of the Air, etc.  
Go we now on, to the Elements, which are consequently to be next handled in this Treatise. An Element of the world, is a most small part in the composition of bodies. They are these four; Earth, water, air, and fire, and if you begin at the lowest, and so pass to the highest body of them, they are placed in such order, as I have named them.  
The bodies of these Elements, are the first bodies, and simple bodies, in respect of other bodies: And every Element is of the same kind, with those things, whose Element it is. For, principles (as matter, form, and privation) are not of the same kind with the things which are made of them: But, an Element is necessarily of the same kind.  
Now, it is manifest that these four, Earth, water, air, and fire are the Elements; and it is as evident that the (four first) qualities (that is to say) Hot, cold, moist, and dry, be in those Elements, in the highest degree, both potentially and actually also. And, yet, there is not one of these Elements, which we can discern by our senses, to be altogether void of temperature, and mixture with some other Element: For indeed, all those which we are sensible of, are in a sort somewhat counterfeit, and participate each of other, more or less; even when in their mixture, their several natures continue most apparent.  
Moreover, every one of these Elements, hath two coupled qualities, which constitute the species, or nature of it. For, EARTH is dry and cold; WATER is cold and moist; AIR is hot and moist; and FIRE is hot and dry. Yet, these qualities, by themselves, cannot be Elements: For, qualities are void of body; and of things incorporeal, things corporeal cannot be made.  
Neither is it possible, that other bodies should be actually Elements, which have not actually each of these qualities in the highest degree: For, if those things which have these qualities, more or less, should be Elements, there would be an infinite number of Elements; and we should never be able to discern the Elements of each particular thing: because every thing hath some quality in it, more or less.  
It follows therefore necessarily, that every Element is a BODY and a simple-body; and such a one as hath actually in it, in the highest degree, these qualities, HEAT, COLD, MOISTURE, and DRYNESS: because, of all qualities, these only and no other do make a whole change in the whole substance. Whiteness coming near unto a Body cannot make it white thorough and thorough (as we say) neither can such a change be wrought by any other thing; whereas Heat or cold, can warm or cool a body, not only superficially, but quite throughout the same.  
Those Elements are accounted contraries, which are directly contrary to one another, in both their qualities. Thus WATER is contrary to FIRE: For, water is cold and moist; and Fire is hot and dry. In like manner, EARTH is contrary to AIR: For, Earth is cold and dry; and Air is hot and moist.  
And, forasmuch as things which are so repugnant, could not be fitly joined one unto another, without a middle-band ordained to knit them together: The wise Creator hath placed water as a mean between the Earth and the Air (which are contraries) induing it with her two qualities, cold and moist, that being the medium between those, which extremely differ, they might be united thereby: For, by reason of the cold, it agrees naturally with the earth; and by means of moisture, it is fitly joined unto the air.  
Again, in the middle between the water and the fire, (which are also contraries in themselves) he hath placed the air, which by his moist-qualitie doth very well accord with water, and with fire, by the quality of heat.  
Thus, God hath linked every one of them each to other (as in a chain) by placing between things contrary, such other things as may both unite the said contraries to themselves, and to such things also, as are bound one to another by them: Yea, (which is an excellent kind of band) he hath joined together every one of the Elements, by the one of his qualities to that which went before; and by the other to that which followed after.  
For example, the water, being cold and moist, is joined unto the earth (which if you begin at the lowest, and ascend, is next beneath it) by his coldness; and by his moisture, to the air which is next above it. The air likewise by the moistness of it, is joined to the water, which is next beneath it; and by heat, to the fire which is above it. The fire also by the heat thereof, is joined to the air which is beneath it; and by dryness to the earth; to which, being the lowest, it declineth itself (as it were in a circular motion.) The earth by coldness, is united to the water; and by dryness to the fire, which declineth towards it.  
For, that the Elements, should not have only an inclination to ascend and descend directly upward and downward; but incline also to a circular motion: God bowed them (as it were) and made the two extreme Elements, fire and earth to turn one toward the other. For, the fire if it lose heat, is no longer fire; but becometh earth, as is manifestly proved by thunderbolts, which being thrown down and cooled, are converted into stones: For, every thunderbolt consists of stone and brimstone, The stone is (as it were) the brimstone overbaked,) Brimstone is (as it were) fire cooled: and no more actually hot, but, having a near possibility of heat; and being also, actually dry: For, the Elements only, have the qualities actually; whereas, all other things have them but in possibility, except they come near unto some Elements.  
But, to the end, that neither the Elements should fail, nor the Bodies which are to be compounded of those Elements, the Creator did providently devise, that they should be convertible, both one into another; and also, into compound-bodies: and that the compound-bodies should be again resolved into their Elements. By which means, it cometh to pass, that they are continually engendered one of another, and perpetually preserved from being wasted.  
For, Earth being first dissolved into a miry moistness, becometh water. Water being thickened and congealed, becometh earth. Water also, being heated and resolved into vapours, vanisheth into air. Aire being collected and condensed, is turned into water. The same air being dried changeth into fire. Fire, if it be quenched, and water also if it be evaporated, become air: For, air is the quenchings of fire, and the moisture arising from water being heated; even by both of these is the air generated: For, experience doth show us, that whensoever fire is quenched, or water heated, air is increased thereby: Therefore air is naturally hot; and cooled by being situated so near unto the water, and the earth; which cool the lower parts thereof, as the fire heateth also the upper parts of the same. And this happeneth unto the air by reason of the softness thereof; and the easiness which it hath to receive impressions, makes it quickly depart from its proper nature, and very apt to be changed.  
But, Aristotle is of opinion that there be two sorts of air; one like unto vapours, and generated by the exhalations of waters: The other, smoky, and bred out of the fire, when it is quenched. The air which cometh of smoke, he conceiveth to be hot; and that also which proceedeth from vapours, when it is first bred; but, in continuance of time, that air (as he saith) cooleth, by little and little; until it is converted into water.  
This supposition of Aristotle's, that the air is of two sorts, was by him devised, that he might escape some absurdities which he knew not otherwise how to avoid; and that things which are somewhat high, and far distant from the earth, might seem hot, and that such as are very low might seem colder.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Of the uniting of the Elements into a natural body; what manner of composition it is, and why those bodies are again resolved into Elements. II. Plato's opinion concerning the Element of earth; as also, concerning the other three Elements. III. Of the division of the Elements according to the Stoics: The opinion of Aristotle, touching a fifth body, out of which he thinks the heavens were made; and of the contrary opinion of Plato.  
NOw, all Bodies are made by the conjunction of these four Elements, both the Bodies of Plants, and of living-creatures also: to the composition of which bodies, nature draws together the purest parts of those Elements. These are called by Aristotle, natural bodies; being compounded, not by heaping of the Elements one upon another; but by tempering all together (throughout the whole) so much of every Element, as is in the Body, in the uniting thereof; and by making of them one certain BODY, differing from what they were, before that composition.  
For, they are so united, that impossible it is to sever them, or to see Earth by itself, or Water alone, or Air, or Fire, distinctly from the rest; because, one entire thing, and a thing differing from the Elements, is made by the tempering of all four of them together; As a medicine, consisting of four Ingredients, being once made up, is a thing differing from those Ingredients.  
But, yet the composition of a natural body is not in all things like those artificial composures: For, the Elements do not make the bodies, by the situation of the thinnest parts, one by another, as it falleth out in a medicine, compounded of four ingredients; but, it is effected, rather, by altering themselves, and by uniting of all into One.  
All Bodies are again resolved, also, into these Elements; by which means it cometh to pass, that all the Elements remain continually unwasted, and are kept sufficient for the making of all things, in regard they neither are diminished, nor abound. And from hence arises this general proposition, That, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; And the corruption of one, the generation of another; not referring (this perpetuity) to the Soul, as is aforesaid, but to the Body only.  
Plato is of opinion that the three other Elements are changed one into each other, and that the Earth remains altogether without mutation; as may appear by his comparing of the firmness of figures, consisting of streight-lines, with every Element.  
To the Earth he compares the figure called a Cube; because of all other figures that is least movable. The figure Icosaedron, which is hardliest moved of all the rest, (and consisting of twenty bases) he likeneth unto water. The Pyramid, whose motion is easiest of all the rest, he resembleth to fire. And Octaedron, (the figure consisting of eight bases) he compareth unto the Air, whose motion is easier than that of the water, and more hard than fire.  
By these figures, he endeavours to prove demonstratively that the three other Elements are changed one into another, but that no change happeneth to the Earth: For, (saith he) three of these figures, that is to say, the Pyramid, the Octaedron and the Icosaedron, are made of Triangles, whose sides are unequal, whereas the cubical figure is made of Triangles, whose sides are equal: now things which are made of Triangles whose sides are unequal, being dissolved and meeting together again, may be changed into another; but, the Cubicall-figure being dissolved cannot be changed into any other; because it is made of equall-sided- Triangles, whereof none of the other three can be made.  
In like manner none of the other figures can be changed into a Cube. And, for these reasons it is necessary that the Bodies form of these species, and the species whereof they are form, should in respect of one another be such as they were.  
And, yet, the Earth remaineth not altogether impassable; but, is divided by bodies, having thinner parts than itself; being after a manner altered from Element to Element, and yet not changed into those things which do divide it: For, when it is recollected again unto itself, it recovereth the state which it formerly had, as appears by it, in the water.  
For, if you cast a little earth into the water, and stir it often up and down, that earth dissolves into water; but, if you leave stirring of the same, the water settles, and the earth sinks to a residence: The like is to be thought of the whole earth: and this is not a changing, but a dissevering of such things as were mingled together.  
Plato affirms that the earth is also severed by the sharpness of the fire, and being so dissolved is elevated and carried away in the fire: So likewise in the mass of the Air, when Air dissolves it; and, in the water, when it is dissolved, in the water.  
Moreover, Plato mentioneth another division of the Elements, affirming every one of them to have three Qualities. The fire to have sharpness, rareness, and motion; The Element which is directly in the extreme thereunto, (that is to say) the earth, to have dulness, thickness, and rest: So, in respect of these Qualities, the earth and the fire, be clean contrary to each other; whereas, they were not so, by those two qualities, whereof we had formerly spoken.  
He holdeth likewise, that, by qualities taken from the two extremes, those Elements were made which are in the middle between these two: For (saith he) two qualities (to wit) rareness and motion, being taken from the fire; and one (that is to say) dulness, being assumed from the Earth, Aire is thereof composed, whose effecting Qualities, are rareness, motion, and dulness. In like manner, two Qualities are taken from the earth, namely, dulness and thickness; and one from the fire, (to wit) motion, whereof proceeds water, which getteth also his form, by thickness, dulness, and motion.  
Therefore, the same that sharpness is in respect of dulness, the same is fire in respect of air: such as rareness is, in respect of thickness, such is air in respect of water. That which motion is, in respect of rest, that water is, in respect of earth. Look what fire is, in respect of air, the like is air in respect of water. And as air is in respect of water, so is water in respect of earth. For, it is the nature of things having a plain thin ground, to be held together by one medium; (that is to say) by a proportion between them; whereas, firm and solid Bodies are not kept fast together, but, by two mediums.  
There are, yet other qualities ascribed unto the Elements. Namely, to the earth and water, weightiness, whereby they do naturally incline downward; and to air, and fire, LIGHTNESS, whereby they are naturally given to mount upward.  
The Stoics have moreover, another way of dividing the Elements; for, some they affirm to be active, and some passive. By active they mean the more stirring Elements, such as are the fire and the air: By passive they understand the duller Elements, that is to say, the earth and water.  
But Aristotle, besides these Elements, bringeth in a Fifth BODY, which he terms Aethereal; and this be fancies to be a BODY having in it a circular motion; because, it pleaseth him not to say that the heavens are composed of the four Elements: And he calls the Fifth, a Body moved circularly; because, it is (as he imagines) carried circularly round about the earth.  
Plato is of another opinion; and affirms directly, that the heavens are made of fire, and of earth. His words are these: Every bodily shape which is made, must be visible and subject unto touching; but, nothing can be visible without some fire in it; not subject unto touching without some firmness; nor can any thing be firm, without earth: And thereupon in the beginning, God caused the body of the whole world to be composed of earth and fire. Now it is not possible that two things alone should be made to unite and agree well together, without a third, which must be as it were a band between them, to bring them both together; and of all bands, that is the chief which can most perfectly bring into an unity, both itself, and such things as are united by the same. And this, the nature of proportion doth best perform.  
By the band here mentioned, he intends the two middle-Elements, taken according to the proportion, whereof we spoke before.   

SECT. 3.  
I. The opinion of the Hebrews, and of Apollinarius touching the making of the heavens and of the earth. II. Arguments out of Hypocrates against Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, who say that there is but one only Element. III. The body being an instrument for the soul, is made fit for the operations thereof.  
THe Hebrews, in their opinions concerning the making of the heavens and the earth, differ so much from all others, that but few have conceived thereof as they do: For they affirm that they were created of no fore existing matter; according to Moses, who said, In the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth.  
But, Apollinarius thinks that God made the heaven and the earth, of the depth of waters. For, Moses in his description of the world's creation, doth not so make mention of the depth of waters, as if it had been created; but, in job these words are to be found; He made the depth of waters. Therefore, he affirmed, that all other things were made out of that, as out of a matter common to all.  
He doth not say that this depth of waters, was never made; but, that it was laid down by the Creator, as a foundation, before any other bodily-thing was made, that other things might be made thereof: For, the very name of depth, declares the infiniteness of the matter.  
And indeed, whether it be this or that way taken, it is not much material; For even by this opinion also, God is confessed the sole Creator of all things; and that he made every thing of nothing.  
Now, there be some who say, that there is but one only Element; either Fire, or Air, or Water, (For Thales affirms that fire only; Anaximenes that air only; and Heraclitus, with Hipparchus Metapontinus, that water only is an Element) against whom it shall be sufficient to allege what Hypocrates hath said in that behalf.  
If (saith he) MAN were composed but of one only thing he could never feel any grief; For, he being but One thing, nothing could procure pain unto him; or if he should feel any grief, there could be but one thing which might heal him: For, that which feeleth grief, must needs be in a mutation with some sense: And, if there be but one Element, there can then be nothing whereinto the living-creature should be changed: And if it were not altered, but continued settled in the same state, it could not possibly feel pain, though it were never so sensible.  
He saith further: It is necessary that the thing which any body suffereth should proceed from some other thing: but if there be but one only Element, there can be no quality, beside the quality of one Element, whereby the living-creature may be afflicted: And, if neither can be changed nor suffer any thing, how can it be grieved?  
After he had thus declared the impossibility thereof, he supposeth, nevertheless, the same to be granted; and thereupon thus inferreth. Grant (saith he) it could suffer grief, and then it will follow, that there is but one thing only which can cure the same; but experience hath taught us that there is not one thing only, but many things to cure every disease; and therefore Man cannot be one only entire thing.  
It may be further proved, that there are four Elements, by the reason wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirm his own opinion (who affirm that there is but one only Element.)  
For when Thales affirmed that water only was to be accounted an Element, he endeavoured to show that all the other three were made of it; saying that the faeces of it become earth, the thin parts become air, and that the thinnest parts of that air are turned into fire.  
Anaximenes, holding opinion that air only is an Element; goes about to prove likewise, that all the rest of the Elements are made of air.  
Heraclitus and Hipparchus Metapontinus affirming that there is no Element but fire, use likewise the very same demonstration, to make their argument seem reasonable.  
Now, it will become evident by the reasons which these men give to justify their assertion; that every one of them is an Element: For by some it is demonstrated, that all other Elements are made of the fire; by another, that all the rest are made of water; and by a third that they are all of air; which make it plain that all the Elements are changed one into another (by their general consent, who otherwise disagree.) And if they can all be changed one into another, it will necessarily follow that they must all be Elements; because which of the four soever shall be taken, it will appear that even that is made of some other.  
The Body (which is composed of these Elements) being an instrument for the SOUL, is divided together with the powers of the same: For, it was framed to be convenient and fit for them, in such manner, that no power of the SOUL should be hindered through the Body's defect. And therefore to every power of the SOUL, there are proper parts of the Body assigned, for his operation; as I will more particularly declare in the following Chapters.  
The SOUL exercises the part of an Artificer; the BODY is as it were his instrument: It is also the matter wherein the actions are conversant; and the effect which is wrought thereby, is the action itself. The matter is as the woman, the act is that which is conversant about her; either whoredom, incest, or lawful copulation.  
The powers of the Soul, are divided into these three; fantasy, judgement, and memory.    

CAP. 6.  
I. Of the fantasy, or imagination; what it is; by what Names expressed; and by what instruments it worketh. II. Of the seats and nature of the senses; and why being but four Elements, there are five senses. III. The definitions of sense, according to Plato and others; and distinctions between such faculties in the Soul, as are appointed to bear rule▪ and to obey.  
Express we will in the next place, such things as concern the fantasy or imagination. The faculty of imagining, is a power of that part of the soul which is void of Reason, and worketh by those instruments wherein the senses are placed.  
The thing subject to imagination, is that whereabout our imagination is conversant, and may be called imaginable, as that which is felt is termed sensible.  
Imagination itself (called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrational, procured by something which is subject to our imagination. A vain imagination (called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is a void passion in the parts of the soul which are destitute of reason, being procured of no certain thing whereof an imagination should arise.  
But, the Stoic Philosophers do set down those four in this manner; The imagination itself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; The thing whereby the imagination is moved, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; A void drawing away of our imagination, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; And that which moveth our imagination to be vainly drawn away, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Imagination is a passion representing unto us both itself, and the thing moving our Imagination; For, when we see some white thing, there is engendered some passion in the Soul by the reception thereof. Even as there is some passion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it feeleth any thing; So, there is then something engendered in the Soul when it conceiveth any thing; & it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood.  
The fancy or the thing whereby Imagination is moved, is, any sensible-thing, which hath caused the Imagination; as it may be some white thing, or any other object which may move the SOUL.  
The Fantastic or void drawing away of our Imagination, is a needles (or causual) seducing (or distracting) of the Imagination, without any certain thing which may move the same.  
The Fantasme or thing itself, whereby we are idly drawn away, is the very attraction whereby we are attracted, according to our vain Imagination; which falleth out in those that are Mad or Melancholy. Between these Opinions there is no difference, but only, in the alteration of some Names.  
The Instruments of the Imagination, are the former Panns of the brain; The Vital spirits, which are in them; The sinews proceeding from the brain; The nerves moistened by the Vital spirits, and the very frame of the places, wherein the Senses are seated.  
There are five seats for the senses; but all are properly but one sense, which is the SOUL itself, who, by the seats of the senses, discerns all such things as fall out in them. It discerns, or taketh knowledge of an Earthy nature. by that sense, which is most Earthy and Bodily, namely the Touching: It perceiveth perspicuous (or bright shining things) by that sense which is most perspicuous, that is to say, the sight: It judgeth such things as are pertinent to air by that seat which is ordained for the air; for the very substance of the voice is air, or the smiting of the air: and it receiveth every taste by a certain quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting; which attracts, by its waterish and spongy nature.  
For it is the nature of every sensible thing, to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it: and by this reason it should seem that there being only four Elements there should be no more but four senses.  
But, because there is a kind of vapour, and certain smells which have a middle-nature between air and water; the parts whereof are somewhat thicker than air, & thinner than water (which appears by them who are sick of a heaviness in the head, by rheums, and stops; for they drawing the air by respiration, have no feeling of the vapour, by reason the fatness of the odour is hindered by obstructions, from approaching the sense) therefore, a fifth-seat of the sense, namely, smelling, was provided by nature, that no such thing as may be brought unto our knowledge, should be hidden from the sense.  
Yet the sense is not an alteration, but the discerning of alterations: Indeed the seats of the sense are altered, and the sense discerns this alteration.  
Now, many times the name of the sense, and of the seats of the sense are confounded. But, sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense: Yet this seemeth not to be the definition of sense itself, but of the workings of the sense; And therefore some define it thus:  
Sense is a certain intellectual spirit extended from the principal part of the mind, unto the bodily instruments. It is thus also defined: Sense is a power of the soul, which taketh hold of sensible things; and the seat of the sense, is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible.  
Plato says thus; Sense is that wherein the Soul and the body communicate together concerning outward things: For, the very power itself belongs unto the soul; but, the instrument pertains to the body; and both together take hold of such outward things as may be offered to imagination.  
Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded; othersome to rule and bear sway. The part which hath in it understanding, and knowledge, was ordained to rule. Those which appertain to sense, and to the motions by appetite, as also, our ability of speaking, are made to serve and be at command: For, our voice, and our motion by appetite, are obedient to reaon, most speedily, and almost in a moment of time.  
For, we Will and are moved together, and at once; so that we need no time to come between our Will and our motion, as we may see in the moving of our fingers. Some natural things are placed under the command of Reason, as those which we call perturbations.   

CAP. 7.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of the sense of sight, and the opinions of Hipparchus, of the Geometricians, of Epicurus, and Aristotle concerning the same. II. The opinions of Plato, and of Galen, touching the same sense; and of the cause of seeing. III. The opinion of Porphyry also touching that sense.  
WE find that this word fight hath a diverse signification; for▪ sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight; and some time the power of the sense (it self.)  
Hipparchus affirms that the beams being shot forth from the eyes, take hold (as it were) of outward things with the farthest ends of them (even as if a man should lay his hand on them) and presents (or yields) those things, whereof they have so taken hold, to our sight.  
But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures (which are called Cones) broad at the first and growing to a narrow top, made by the meeting of the eye-beams▪ in one point. And they hold opinion that the beams of the right-eye, being darted forth to the left-side, and the beams of the left-eye toward the rightside, the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one; and that thereby it comes to pass that the sight comprehends many visible things together, at one view; and then more exactly perceives them, when the beams are met closely one with another.  
And this is the cause, that oftentimes, when we look upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon, though we settle our eyes upon the same with diligence: For, until it so fall out, that the beams meet in that very place, where the money lieth, we still overlook the same; but then, we presently attain the sight of it, as if that had been the beginning of our looking for it in that place.  
The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appear unto us, are brought to our eyes.  
Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appears, but a certain quality rather conveyed from things visible, unto the sight, by an alteration of the air which is round about.  
Plato says, that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the several brightnesses together (that is to say) partly by the light of the eyes, which flowing out some part of the way into the air, which is of like nature with itself; partly by that which is retorted back again from the bodies which are seen; and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye, affecting the air which comes between them; and easily spreading every way, or turning to any side.  
Galen agreeing with Plato, speaketh of the sight (here and there in some places of his seventh book of the agreement of parts) much to this purpose If (saith he) any part or power, or quality of bodies that are visible, should come unto the eye, we could not know the quantity of the thing seen. For, if a very great mountain were the object, it were quite contrary to reason, to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes: yea, and the spirit belonging to the sight, being darted forth could not be able to collect together so much vigour, as would be requisite to comprehend the whole visible object.  
It remains therefore that the air, wherewith we are encompassed, is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see, as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body; and some such thing seemeth to happen to the air, which encloseth us round: For, the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the air, distributes his power into the whole air: And the splendour which is carried through the sinews called the optic nerves which belong unto the sight, hath his essence of the nature of the spirits: This falling into the air which is dilated round about us, makes an alteration even at the very first injection, and shoots forth very far: yet so, that it contains itself undispersed, until it happen upon a reflecting body.  
For, the air is such an instrument unto the eye, to discern visible objects, as the sinew is unto the brain: and look in what case the brain is, in respect of his sinew; in like case is the eye in respect of the air, after it is quickened by the bright shining of the Sun.  
Now, that it is the nature of the air, to become like unto those things which enter into it, appears manifest by this, that whensoever any bright thing, (be it red or blue, or of the colour of silver) shall be conveyed through the air, when it is light, the colour of the air will be changed according to that thing which is carried through the same.  
But, Porphyry in his book which he wrote of the senses, affirms, that neither the making of the Figure Conos, neither any shape, nor any other thing, is cause of our seeing, but only this; that the soul herself meeting with such objects as are visible, doth perceive and know, that all those things which are seen, be contained in her self; because it is she only which holds them together, to their preservation. For, (as he saith) whatsoever is in the world, is nothing else, but the soul holding together diverse bodies.  
And it were not untruly said, that the soul cometh to the knowledge of it self, by the view of every thing which is in the world; if his opinion be allowed: for according to his tenet, there is but one soul for all things, even the reasonable-soul.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Of the proper object of sight, and of such other means and circumstances as are useful in seeing. II. Though colour and shape are only the proper objects of sight; yet by cogitation and memory, it cometh to the knowledge of other qualities in the thing seen. III. Of such senses as are conversant about things at a distance; and in what cases the sight errs, or needs the aid of other senses.  
THe sight seeth by strait lines; but it feeleth first & principally the colours of things; and together with them, discerneth also the body that is coloured, the magnitude, the shape, the place, wherein it is; the distance, the number, the motion, and the rest thereof; as like wise, whether it be rough, or smooth, or unequal, or even, or sharp, or dull, or what element is predominant therein; and whether it be waterish, or earthy; moist or dry.  
Yet that which is the proper object of this sense, is colour only; for we no way attain the knowledge of colours but by our sight: and as soon as we behold the colour, we therewithal do immediately perceive also the coloured body; the place wherein the visible object abideth; and the distance, which is between the se●r and the thing seen.  
Look in how many senses we receive the knowledge of bodily things; even in so many we come to the knowledge of a place, together with the body; as it is in touching, and tasting: but these two, feel them only when they are joined near unto the body (except in those things which we shall speak of anon) whereas the sight, beholds things at a great distance.  
Now in that the sight lays hold of such things, as are visible, when they be far off, it must necessarily follow that it receives a sight only of the distance of things: and it is then only capable of the magnitude of things, when it is able at one view to comprehend the thing which appeareth; but whensoever the visible body is too large to be apprehended at one aspect, than the sight needeth memory and cogitation to assist it.  
For, the sight beholding so great an object by piecemeal (and not at one whole view) must necessarily pass from one part thereof to another; and in that passage, so much only is apprehended by the proper faculty of the sight, as is present in view; the rest which was viewed before, is kept by the memory, until our understanding hath brought together, both that which was before seen and that which is present likewise, in our sight.  
Moreover, sight apprehends the magnitude of bodies two manner of ways; Sometime by itself alone; and sometime again by the aid of memory and cogitation: But by itself alone, it never taketh notice of the number of things visible if they exceed three or four; seeing the number of them cannot not be discerned at one attempt; neither can it lay hold on the motions of things; neither on Figures which have many corners, without it have the help of memory and cogitation to assist it.  
For sight is not able to bring together, five or six or seven, or more, without the help of memory; neither can it bring together figures that have six, eight, or many corners. The motion also that cometh by passing from one great thing, to another, hath in the same, some what preceding, and somewhat following after; and wheresoever things are found to be some first, some second, and some third; there memory only is the preserver of them together: But these qualities, high and low, equal and unequal, rough and smooth, sharp and dull, be communicable both to the touching, and to the sight; for that they only can discern of place; and yet they stand in some need also of our understanding.  
For, that thing only which moves the sense by one only attempt, is wrought by the sense alone (without the help of memory and cogitation:) but, such things as are felt at diverse times are not wrought by the sense only, but by the aid of memory and cogitation, as is aforesaid.  
Such is the nature of sight, that it can pierce even unto the bottom of transparent things; and first, and specially of the Air: For it can pass quite through it. Secondly, it can pass through water when it is clear; insomuch that we may see fishes swimming in the same: And; (though somewhat more hardly) it passes through earth, being of a glassy or such like transparent nature. Yet, this is always to be supposed, that these things must be enlightened, when they become the proper object of sight, without the aid of any other assistant.  
But let no man be so deceived, as to imagine that the sight may of itself discern hot things; because when we see fire, we know that it is hot; for if you refer that speech to the first function of sight, you shall find that when the sight first beheld the fire, it perceived nothing but the shape and colour thereof. After that, we coming to touch it, and thereby knowing the same to be hot, our memory preserves in us the knowledge which we first gained by the touch: and ever since; when we behold fire (though we see nothing in it but the shape and colour) our understanding by the help of memory, conceives the hear of the fire to be in the same, as well as the things which are properly seen.  
The like may be said of an apple; For seeing the whole form thereof consisteth not only in the colour and the shape, but in the smell also and in the taste; it follows not that it is the sight only, whereby we know the same to be an apple (because we saw the shape and colour of it) for, our memory had preserved in our understanding the experience which we had formerly collected from the smell and taste; and these being added unto that, whereof the eye took notice, perfited our knowledge.  
Therefore, when we think an apple made of wax to be a true apple, it is our understanding which erreth, and not our sight; for the sight failed not to inform rightly, so much as pertained unto her sense; when it perceived the true colour and shape of an apple.  
Now, these three senses, sight, hearing, and smelling, are conversant about things at a distance, and such as are not joined close unto them by means of the air coming between them. But the taste cannot possibly feel any thing but that whereunto it is nearly joined; and the touching taketh part of both: for sometime we touch things bodily, without any intermedium between us and them; sometime again, we touch them with a staff betwixt us, and the things touched.  
Moreover, the sight hath now and then, want of some other of the senses to witness unto it the certainty of that which it perceiveth, when things are artificially wrought to deceive the sight; as it falleth out in painting: For, it is the painters cunning to deceive the eye, with counterfeit shadowings, either of an Embossed or hollow▪ work, as the nature of the things requires: To the discerning whereof, the sense of touching is especially useful, and sometime of the taste and smell also; as appeared in the example of the apple made of wax. Yea, and otherwhile (at no great distance) the sight itself maketh some things appear unto us to be that which they are not: For, if a town which is fouresquare be but a pretty distance from us, it will seem unto the sight to be round.  
The sight errs likewise, when we look through a thick air, or through smoke, or some such things as otherwise trouble the sight by the thickness thereof. In like manner, when we see things in the water, being stirred; for in the Sea an Oar seemeth broken when it is whole.  
So is it also when we look in or through some transparent▪ body; as looking-glasses, or other glasses and the like things; or when the visible object is moved swiftly: For, a swift-motion so distempers the sight; that those things are thereby made appear to be round which are nothing so, and those to be fixed, which are moved.  
The same happeneth, when the mind is busied about other matters; as when a man (purposing to meet his friend) passeth by without heeding him whom he went to meet, (though he met him in the way) by reason he had his mind busied with other thoughts: But, indeed this is not properly an error of the sight, but of the mind: For, the sight beheld his friend, and gave warning; but the mind heeded not that which was brought unto it.  
Finally, the sight needeth four things for the clear discerning of all visible objects, namely; A whole and sound seat for that sense; a proportionable measure of motion; a fit distance; and the air to be pure and clear.    

CAP. 8.  
I. Of the sense of touching; why the seat of it is in all parts of the body, and why every living-creature enjoys that sense, whereas many are defective in other of the senses. II. Of the proper objects of this sense; and of such as it hath in common with other senses. III. In which of the senses Man excelleth; and in what senses, other creatures excel him.  
IT was by the Creator of the world, so ordered, that he made the seats of all the other senses twofold, and confined them to a certain circuit of place in some parts of the body; For example, he hath made two eyes, two ears, two passages for the sense situate in the nostril; yea, and he hath planted in every living-creature, as it were, two tongues. In some they are evidently parted, (as in serpents) and in some other, they are joined and united, as in men: And for this cause, he made only two former-pans of the brain, that the sinews which serve for the senses, being sent down from either of these braine-pans might make the seats of the senses to be twofold.  
Now, he made them twofold, in respect of that exceeding tender love which he bore unto us; that when the one of them took harm, the other which remained might preserve the sense. And yet, though most of the seats of the other senses perish, the living-creature may be alive: but as soon as the sense of touching is extinct, the living-creature doth instantly perish.  
For only the sense of touching, among all the rest of the senses is common to all livingcreatures; and every living-creature is endued therewith; whereas all of them have not every one of the other senses; but some have these, and some have others, (except those which we call the more perfect creatures, and they indeed have all the senses.)  
Now, seeing the living-creature loseth life by the loss of this sense; the Creator hath allotted unto the sense of touching, not one part of the body only; but almost the whole body of the living-creature: For, except the bones, and the horns, and the nails, and the binding-sinewes, and the hairs, and certain other such like things, each part of the body is partaker of the sense of touching  
Thereupon it hath so happened that the seat of every sense hath two senses in it; one of such things as are properly the object of every particular sense, and another in respect of the sense of touching: For the sight discerneth colours, and yet is partaker both of hot and cold things; participating of heat and cold as it is a body, and discerning of colours, as it is the sense of sight. The like may be thought also of the taste, of the smelling, and of the hearing.  
It may hereupon be questioned how the touching can be spread over the whole body, seeing that the senses proceed from the former braine-pans: for indeed the sinews come down from the brain, and being dispersed into every part of the body, do there occasion the sense of touching. And some were of opinion (because the hair stands up as it were, with a sudden horror, when the foot is casually pricked with a thorn) that the grief, or at least, the feeling of the grief, ascended up unto the brain, and was there felt. Which being true, it might then be concluded, that there could be no grief in any part of the body, that were wounded, but in the brain only.  
It were better therefore to make this answer, that the sinews (which be dispersed as aforesaid) are the brain itself. For, they are a certain portion of the brain, containing in them the vital spirits, and diffusing them throughout the whole body of the living-creature, in such manner as fire is contained in burning-iron: And wheresoever such a sensible-sinew is planted, it makes the part wherein it is ingraffed to be partaker of sense; and to be so qualified, that it may feel things. Neither were it improperly spoken, to say that not the passion, but rather a certain partaking of the grief, and a denunciation of the same is conveyed up to the brain, where all the sinews have their beginning.  
Now the proper objects of the sense of touching are hot, cold, soft, hard, slimy, stiff, heavy, and light: For, by touching only, we attain the knowledge of these things; whereas these next following are common both to the touching and the sight, (to wit) sharp, dull, rough, plain, dry, moist, thick, thin, high, low, yea, and place itself. So likewise is magnitude (when it can be comprised within one attempt of the touching) fogginess, clearness, roundness, (if it be but in small things) as also the shape of other figures; yea, and it fooleth likewis the motion of bodies coming near unto it, being assisted by memory, and understanding.  
Moreover, it is sensible of number, as far as two or three, but no farther; and those things must also be of no larger magnitude, then may easily be comprehended by the touch. And these are better discerned by sight then touching; as are also such things as be equal or unequal (they being of the same kind with smooth and rough things) for unequality being mingled with hardness, causeth a roughness; and equalness added unto thickness, maketh a smoothness.  
By that which we have here delivered, it is evident that the senses communicate each with other in many things: and that if one sense err, the error if it may be rectified by some other senses; As we perceive in Pictures: For, the sight beholdeth things as if they stood out from the rest of the piece, as the Nose and such other parts of the Picture; but, by the sense of touching, the error of the sight is discovered.  
As the sight useth at all times the air for a means to behold all things; So the sense of touching feeleth some things by a staff (or other instrument) as by a mean; (to wit) hard, soft, and moist things. being aided by understanding, and the discourse of reason.  
In the sense of touching as also in tasting, Man excelleth all other living-creatures; and the beasts excel him, in the other three senses: for there be diverse creatures that do surpass man in some one of the other three senses; but a Dog excelleth him in every one of these three, hearing, seeing, and smelling, as appeareth by hounds which hunt by foot.  
The whole body (as we said before) is the seat wherein the sense of touching is placed; but in man the inside of the hands, and the tops of the fingers, are the principal seats there of, and were appointed by our Creator, not only to lay hold on things; but to be exact instruments also, serviceable to the sense of touching. And the cause why the skin of them is somewhat thin; why certain muscles are laid under them throughout the inside; and why there groweth no hair on them (whereof the muscles are cause) is by reason they should the better feel and take hold on small things.  
Such hands as are hardest, are the more strong to hold things; and such as are softest are most apt for exact touching. In like manner, the sinews which are hard, be fittest for motion, and those which are soft, more convenient for feeling; for the sinews also are instruments of touching; yea and the chief instruments of that sense.   

CAP. 9  
I. Of the Tasting; by what ways, on what matter, and with what instrument it worketh. II. The names of the simple qualities pertaining to the taste. III. Of the compound qualities belonging to the same sense, etc.  
THat the sight beholds things by direct lines; that the senses of hearing and smelling attain the knowledge of their objects, as well diverse other ways, as by direct lines; and that touching and tasting do nei-neither by direct lines, nor by any other means become sensible of their proper objects, but then only, when they come near to such things as are subject to their sense (except in such cases as are before expressed,) we have already declared.  
The matter whereupon the taste worketh is the humours, or juices which are tasted. The instruments of tasting, are the tongue (chiefly the very tip of the tongue) and the roof of the mouth: For in these are dispersed the sinews descending from the brain, and they denounce to the principal part of the soul, what that taste is which they have received.  
The name of the qualities pertaining to the taste, and which are found in the juices, are these. Sweetness, sharpness, tartness, a binding bitterness, a bitterness less binding, a quality bringing a bitterness by drought and heat; saltness▪ fatness: For these are the qualities which taste discerneth; and it is in respect of these qualities that the water is said to be void of qualities; because if you taste water, it offers none of these qualities to your sense; whereas, if you have respect to other qualities, as cold and moisture, they are ingraffed therein. The two bitternesses differ from each other in their being more or less astringent.  
These aforenamed are in a manner all the simple-qualities which belong unto the sense of tasting; but the compound-qualities, are infinite; in regard there is a proper taste belonging to every living-creature, and to every plant. There is one taste in swine's flesh, another in Goat's flesh, and when we would know what flesh it is which cometh to be tasted, we distinguish the same by the quality of the taste, which could not be done except there were a diverse quality in every thing that is tasted.  
Now because those things are infinite, and utterly diverse one from another, we cannot comprise or distinguish them under particular terms: For even in those things, wherein some one of the simple qualities beareth rule, there is a plain difference of that which is the object of taste. For, though in dry figs, and in grapes, and in the fruit of the Palm, there is one predominant quality, to wit, sweetness, yet in every one of them the taste discerns a difference.   

CAP. 10.  
I. Of the Hearing; of the object of that sense; of the instruments thereof; and of such living-creatures as move not their ears.  
HItherto of the taste. The sense of Hearing is employed about voices and sounds; and in them it discerns the shrillness, the baseness, the softness, the harshness, and the loudness.  
The instruments thereof are a soft kind of sinews which proceed from the brain; the form of the ears; and chiefly that part of them which is grisly: for the grisles are fitted for sounds and noises.  
Only Man and the Ape, are thought to have ears unmoveable, and all other living-creatures to have movable ears.   

CAP. 11.  
Of the Smelling; of the instruments thereof; of the matter whereupon it lays hold; and of the difference which is between the vapours, or fumes, from whence the Smell ariseth.  
EVery one of those places which are seats of the senses (as we have said before) takes hold of such things as are the proper objects of their senses, by means of a certain likeness and agreeableness which is between them and their sensible objects; and therefore the Smelling (though it be first begun by the nostrils) is perfected at the bounds of the former-braine-pans, which having a natural affinity with vapours, do the more easily take hold of them.  
And yet, whereas the brain in all other senses, sends down sinews into the seat of each sense to be serviceable unto the sense therein placed; it so dealeth not with our sense of Smelling; for the bounds of the brain itself, are in stead of the sinews, and the brain receives immediately such vapours, and fumes, as are yielded up unto it. Of which vapours, the most general difference is in this, that some of them have a good smell, some an evil sent, and some, that which is neither very good, nor very evil, but in a mean betwixt both.  
The good smell ariseth from humours exactly concocted: The evil sent, is when they are ill concocted, or not at all; and the middle smell, is when they are concocted after a middling manner.   

CAP. 12.  
Of the Cogitation; of the things thereunto pertaining; and of the instrument whereby it worketh, etc.  
RIght briefly, and according to our ability, we have spoken of the imagining faculty of the soul; of the instruments thereof, and of those things wherein they agree or differ.  
To the cogitation these particulars are generally pertinent; the judgement of things, a consent unto them, a refusal of them, and a desire unto them; But, those which are specially pertinent, are consideration, virtues, knowledges, the reason of arts, deliberation, and choice.  
This is that part whereby we attain the foresight of things to come, in visions or dreams; and therein only, the Pythagorean Philosophers (following the jewish opinions) think true prophesying consisteth.  
The instruments of cogitation, are the middle-pan of the brain, and the vital spirits, which are in it.   

CAP. 13.  
I. Of the memorative part of the Soul, and the definition of memory according to Origen and Plato. II. The difference betwixt remembering of things contained in sense and of things contained in understanding; as also what recordation is. III. Of the instruments of the memory; and demonstrations evidently showing where the fountains of the senses, of the cogitation, and memory are to be found.  
THe seat of memory, which the greeks call Mnemoneuticon, is the cause and storehouse both of memory and recordation, or remembrance.  
Memory (as Origen saith) is a certain appearance left in the mind, by some sense which had wrought actually before. Plato taketh it to be a preservation of things both felt and considered: For, the mind takes hold of things which are subject unto sense, by the seats of the sense, and thereof is opinion begotten. But, it layeth hold on things intelligible by understanding; and thence ariseth consideration. And when the mind retains the Prints both of things in opinion, and of those also which are in consideration, we then say, that it remembers them.  
It is likely that Plato doth herein mean, by the name of consideration, not the principal consideration; but a certain cogitation: For things contained in sense, are remembered by themselves; but, things contained in understanding, are accidentally remembered. The remembrance of things thought upon by us, doth remain in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagination: And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding, in respect that we have learned them, and heard them; but as for their substance, we have no memory thereof.  
For indeed, the apprehending of things contained in understanding, proceeds not from any preceding imagination; but cometh to us by learning, and by a natural notion.  
If we be said to remember such things as we saw, or heard, or knew heretofore, by some occasion or means: This word heretofore (having relation to the time passed) makes it plain, that such things as are made and destroyed again, and such as have their being in time, are comprehended in memory; and that our memory consisteth of things absent, but is not procured (or moved) by those absent things.  
Recordation (or remembrance) called by the greeks Anamnesis; is when forgetfulness hath interrupted our memory; for it is a recovering of memory, which was lost, when it failed by forgetfulness.  
Memory is lost, either altogether (and for ever) or else, for a space only; and when it faileth but for a space, we call the recovery thereof remembrance.  
But there is another kind of recordation, which is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding; but from the forgetfulness of those things which we have even by natural notions. By natural notions (or things naturally conceived) I mean such as every man hath in him without any teacher; as that there is a God. This Plato calleth a recordation of Ideas; and what is meant by Ideas I will hereafter show.  
Such things as appear unto the imagining part, are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation; and the cogitation, or discoursing part (when it hath once apprehended such things & judged of them) sends them to be stored up in that part of the soul, wherein memory is resident.  
The instruments used by the memory, are the hinder brainpan, called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the vital spirit there placed.  
But seeing we have affirmed, that the beginnings and roots of the senses, are the former pans of the brain; The seat of the cogitation, the middle pan; And of the memory, the hinder-pan; it will be necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so. Lest we seem to give credit to that which hath been spoken, without any reason to be rendered for the same.  
A plain demonstration thereof may be taken from the parts themselves; for, if by any means the former brainpan be hurt, the senses are much hindered; but the cogitation remaineth sound. If only the middle-pan be harmed, the cogitation is maimed; but the seat of sense keeps the senses whole. If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan, both sense and cogitation decay. If the hinder-pan be only disordered, the memory alone perisheth, and neither sense nor cogitation receive harm. But if the former, the middle, and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of order, the party so disturbed is maimed, in sense, in cogitation, and memory, all at once; and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction.  
This is made evident also by many diseases, and accidents which are symptoms of diseases, and especially in frantic men. For in some of them their cogitation only is hurt, and their senses are preserved whole.  
Such a frantic man, is mentioned by Galen, who being in a place wherein a woolwinder was at work by him, rose up, and taking certain glass vessels which he found in the room, ran to the window, and asked such as passed by, whether they would have such or such glasses cast down unto them, calling every vessel by the right name: And when they who stood below said they would have it so, he threw them all down, one after another.  
Then he asked them whether they would have the woolwinder thrown down also; they (thinking he had but jested) replied yea: whereupon he took up the woolwinder and hurled him headlong from a high place.  
This man had his senses whole enough; for he knew which were the glasse-vessels, and which was the woolwinder; but his cogitation was diseased.  
Others there be, who deluded by a vain imagination, suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seen; whereas in other things, they are not without the direction of reason. In such as these, the former braine-pans are only diseased, and the middle-pan uncrased; For, by those diseases which follow every part, the course of their operation is accordingly hindered; and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operation, to the working whereof the part diseased is naturally serviceable. As for example, if the feet be hurt, our walking is hindered; for that is the work whereunto the foot serveth.   

CAP. 14.  
I. Of the Reason, from whence we have the denomination of reasonable-creatures. II. Of our speech, and of the several instruments thereof.  
HEre is one division of the powers of the soul, (together with which, there are some parts of the body likewise divided) whereunto is added another division, and after another manner▪ For the reasonable-part of the soul is divided into reason which is unexpressed in us, and that which is uttered by our speech.  
The reason unexpressed (or settled in us) is a motion of the soul engendered in that part of the mind, wherein consisteth our discourse of reason, without any utterance by voice: Thereby oftentimes (although we say nothing) we throughly resolve, and set down with ourselves, the whole reason of a thing; and otherwhile discourse in our dreams: And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-creatures; yea much rather in this respect, then for that which is uttered by our speech.  
For albeit some are deaf and dumb from their births, or lose their voices by sickness and diseases, yet reasonable-creatures they are, nevertheless.  
The utterance of reason is by the voice in the variety of tongues; and the instruments used in the voice are many; namely, the muscles which are in the middle of the sides, the breast itself, the lungs, the windpipe, the throat, (and in all these, those parts especially which are grisly) the returning sinews, the cover of the windpipe; yea, and all the muscles which move these parts, are instruments of our speech.  
The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth: (for therein the speech is moulded and fashioned) and the tongue and the wesil-pipe (which are there in stead of that wherewith we smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument) the roof of the mouth also, which is as the belly of the Lute, that receives and gives back the sound. The teeth, and the various openings of the mouth, do stand in stead of strings: yea, and the nose also doth somewhat further the plainness, and the pleasingness of speech, as appears in those that sing.   

CAP. 15.  
I. Another division of the soul, being threefold. II. An eightfold division thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold, and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle.  
Unto those aforegoing, there is added yet another division of the soul, into the powers, the kinds, and parts thereof; namely, into a vegitative power, which is the same whereby plants (and such like) do grow; and this is called also a nourishing, or passive power, secondly into a sensible power; and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason.  
Zeno the Stoic assigns unto the soul eight parts; the reasonable part is the first and principal: the five senses make up six, the faculty of speech the seaventh, and the eighth he affirms to be that power whereby things are engendered one of another. But Panetine the philosopher (contradicting this opinion) affirms that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite; and that the power of engendering is a part of nature, not of the soul, wherein he hath said very truly.  
Aristotle in his Physics hath divided the Soul into to five parts; namely, that which is vegitative, sensitive, movable in place, that which belongs to appetite, and that which is intellective.  
He calls that vegitative, which nourisheth, increaseth, breedeth, maketh, and formeth bodies; for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the entire faculty of growing; calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein, and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence.  
This is Aristotle's opinion in his Physics; but in his Ethics he makes but a twofold division of the Soul; that is to say, into parts rational, and irrational. Of the reasonable-part I have already treated; now therefore I will speak of that which is unreasonable.   

CAP. 16.  
I. Of that unreasonable part of the soul which contains the appetite: of concupiscence also; of anger, and of their several instruments. II. Of the diverse acceptations of this word affection, and the definition of an affection, and of an operation or act. III. The difference between an operation, and an affection or passion, etc.  
SOme hold opinion that irrationality, or to be void of reason is an entire thing by itself, as though there were a soul void of reason, which were not a part of the rational soul: and for these causes they think so;  
First, for that it is found alone by itself in unreasonable living creatures; For thereby it seems unto them to be perfect of itself, and no part of the reasonable soul. Secondly, they so imagine, because it appears unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be, to affirm that a power void of reason should be part of a Soul endued with reason.  
However, Aristotle affirms it to be both a part, and a faculty of the reasonable soul, dividing it in to two parts, (as I said before) and calls those two by this one common name, the appetitive-faculty: To which belongs also the motion of our appetite; for appetite is the beginning of motion, as appears in every living creature having a desire to something; for their desire causes them to move forward, according to their appetite.  
This unreasonable part of the soul doth either disobey, or obey reason: And that part which is obedient unto reason, is divided into two parts, concupiscence, and anger.  
The instrument of the concupiscence by which it cometh into sense, is the Liver. But the instrument of anger is the heart, which being a hard part receives a strong motion, and is ordained for a hard service, and for great resistances; whereas the Liver being a tender entrail, is made the instrument of tender concupiscence.  
These things are said to be obedient unto reason, because nature hath ordained them to obey reason, and to be moved, as reason commandeth, in all such men as live answerable to that which nature (originally) requires. And these are certain affections, which constitute our Essence, as it hath life in it; For life cannot be maintained without these.  
But whereas this word affection hath diverse acceptations, we must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath: for either it pertaineth to the body, as when it is sick or ulcerated, in which cases we say it is so or so affected, or else it belongs to the soul, of which we now speak, and whereunto concupiscence and anger do pertain. But universally and generally, in respect of the entire living creature consisting of both parts, it is called an affection, and followeth either, in grief or pleasure.  
For grief doth follow our affection, but the very passion or affection itself, is not grief: for if that were true, then wheresoever passion were found, there should be grief also: but things void of life may be patients and suffer, yet feel no grief. Therefore it is not necessarily consequent, that whensoever we are affected unto a thing, we should also be grieved, but then only when we feel the thing which happeneth unto us. Yea, and that which falleth unto us must be a thing of such moment likewise, as may be perceived by our sense.  
But this is the definition of such affections as are in the soul. An affection is the motion of our power of appetite, subject unto sense, provoked by the appearance of some good or evil. Or else it may be defined thus: An affection is a motion of the soul, void of reason, supposing either some good or some evil thing.  
Affection in general is by some thus defined; Affection is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another. The operation (or action) is a motion working that which is wrought. And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soul wherein anger is; but it is an affection of both parts of the soul; and beside that, of all our body, when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act: for this motion chanced in one thing, by the commotion of another thing, which was the definition of an affection.  
An operation (or action) after another sort, is called an affection; when it disagreeth from nature; for the operation is a motion according to nature, but the affection is repugnant unto nature: And therefore, an operation when it is not moved according to nature, is called an affection, whether it be moved of itself, or of some other: As for example, the motion which is from the heart in the pulses, is an operation; but that unseasonable appetite, subject unto sense, provoked by the appearance of some good or evil. Or else it may be defined thus: An affection is a motion of the soul, void of reason, supposing either some good or some evil thing.  
Affection in general is by some thus defined; Affection is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another. The operation (or action) is a motion working that which is wrought. And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soul wherein anger is; but it is an affection of both parts of the soul; and beside that, of all our body, when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act: for this motion chanced in one thing, by the commotion of another thing, which was the definition of an affection.  
An operation (or action) after another sort, is called an affection; when it disagreeth from nature; for the operation is a motion according to nature, but the affection is repugnant unto nature: And therefore, an operation when it is not moved according to nature, is called an affection, whether it be moved of itself, or of some other: As for example, the motion which is from the heart in the pulses, is an operation; but that unseasonable motion which cometh by fears or fevers, is an affection or passion. For that great panting proceedeth from the heart itself unnaturally; and from thence also cometh naturally the moderate beating of the pulses. Therefore it is no marvel if one and the same thing be called both an affection and an operation. For in respect they be certain motions proceeding from the passable part of the soul, they be a kind of operations; but in this respect, that they pass measure, and are not agreeable to nature, they are not operations, but affections.  
Thus you see the motion of that part of the soul which is irrational, to be an affection in both significations; and that nevertheless, every motion of the passable part is not called a passion (or affection) but those which are most vehement, or which (at least) proceed so far, that they may be felt. For, those which are small, and which cannot be felt, are not to be called affections (or passions) while they are in that degree; because there must be a convenient quantity (or magnitude) to make it a passion.  
And for this reason, that clause; whose motion is perceived by sense, is annexed to the definition of an affection; even because small motions, whereunto the sense is not privy, do not make an affection, as I said before.   

CAP. 17.  
I. Of the concupiscence, and of pleasure and grief, which are the two parts, whereinto the same is divided; and of another fourfold division thereof. II. Of the means whereby evil affections are engendered, and the means also how they might be cured.  
THat part of the soul, which (as we have said before) is irrational, and yet obeyeth reason, is divided into these two; namely, the concupiscible, and irascible part. The coNcupiscence is again divided into pleasure and grief: For if our concupiscence attains to that which is desired, it breedeth a pleasure, and if it misseth of the same, it engendereth grief.  
This desire may another way be divided into four parts, the concupiscence itself being one of the four. For of those things which are; some be good, some evil, some present, and some expected; and after this manner, if two be multiplied, the parts in the division of the concupiscence will be four: For you shall there find things good, things bad, things present, and things expected.  
Now good expected, is this desire: Good when it is present, is pleasure. Evil when it is looked for, begetteth fear; when it is present, it bringeth grief. If therefore you have respect to good things, therein consisteth pleasure and desire; but if you respect evil things, of them proceed fear and grief. And for these considerations, some have divided affection into these four parts; desire, pleasure, fear, grief. We call those things good and bad, that are either so indeed, or else reputed to be such.  
Evil affections are engendered in our mind, by these three things; Evil education, unskilfulness (or ignorance,) and by an evil constitution of Body.  
For, if we be not well educated, even from our childhood, so that we may learn to master our passions in the beginning, we soon fall into an immoderation almost incurable. By reason of ignorance also, a certain perverse judgement is fostered in the reasonable part of our soul, which makes us think evil things to be good; and good things to be evil. And by means of an ill complexion (or constitution) of body, somewhat is likewise occasioned to our harm; For they in whom choler abound are inclined to fretfulness; and they who exceed in heat and moisture, are prone to lasciviousness.  
We must endeavour therefore, to cure an evil custom by enuring ourselves to good customs; we must remove ignorance by learning knowledge; & we must labour to rectify the evil constitution of our bodies, by such bodily things, as may so much as is possible help to bring it into a mean temperature; which may be effected by a good diet, by exercise, and by physic, if need be.   

CAP. 18.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of the pleasures both of mind and body; their variety, and different natures. II. Of such pleasures as are to be pursued by good men, and which are properly accounted pleasures. III. What pleasures (according to the opinion of Plato) are true or false pleasures: how good pleasures are named; how defined by some Philosophers; and what defects are in their definition.  
RIghtwell may pleasure be divided into corpereall and mentall-pleasures: For, some belong only to the mind, as to be delighted in knowledge; or in the contemplation of things. Others are called corporeall-pleasures, because they proceed from the conjunction of soul and body, and they are the pleasures which we have in eating, drinking, carnall-copulation, and the like.  
There is no pleasure proper to the body alone: For they that seem to be such, are passions rather than pleasures; as certain cuttings, and flawing, qualities pertinent to the temperature of the body: For, all pleasure hath sense joined with it, and (as we have showed before) all sense belongeth to the soul.  
There be diverse kinds of pleasure: Some are good, some naught; some false, some true; some pertain to the mind only; some depend upon knowledge; some belong to the body, and are judged by the sense.  
Among pleasures tried by sense, some be natural, and some not so. To that pleasure which is in drinking, the grief which cometh by thirst, is opposed; but to the pleasure which ariseth from contemplation, there is nothing opposite; And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations.  
Among those which we call bodily or corporeal pleasures, some are both necessary and natural; and without them it is impossible to live; such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent, and in necessary clothing. Some are natural, but not necessary pleasures, as natural and legitimate copulation: For though this be necessary for the preservation of the whole kind; yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man, but that he may live in his virginity without it; but some pleasures are neither necessary nor natural; as drunkenness, lasciviousness, and feeding in excess.  
For these neither assist in propagating the succession of our kind, as lawful copulation, neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life; but are (on the contrary) harmful unto us.  
He therefore that would live according to the law of God, must pursue those pleasures only which are both necessary and natural. But he that will content himself in the second order of virtues, may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures, and therewith such also as are natural but not necessary; observing a conveniency in measure, manner, time, and place, the rest he must by all means eschew.  
Those pleasures are generally to be accounted good, which are neither entangled with grief, nor occasion repentance, nor procure other harm, nor depart from the mean, nor draw us from good works, nor bring us into bondage. But those are properly pleasures, which are in some sort exercised in the consideration of God, and of knowledge and virtue: And these are to be placed among those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pursued, above all the rest which are profitable unto us; not because they are pertinent unto our being (or for the continuation of our kind) but for that they constitute our well-being, and make us to be honest, to be lovers, and beloved of God, and to have the utmost perfection of man; which perfection consisteth in the soul and Understanding.  
These pleasures are neither the remedies to avoid diseases, as eating, drinking, and those other which do supply our wants; neither have they any grief at all, preceding them, following them, or contrary unto them; but are pure, immixed, and free from every material composition, because they pertain only to the soul.  
For according to platoes opinion of pleasures, there be some of them false, and some true. Those are false, unto the procuring whereof, sense and a false opinion is needful; and such also as have grief annexed unto them. True pleasure is that which pertains to the soul only, even the soul by itself, together with science, understanding, and prudence; and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of grief, or subsequent repentance at any time.  
Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplation, and good actions, not passions, but sweetnesses; and others call them joy, as by a proper name.  
They define pleasure to be a generation into a nature subject unto sense. But this definition seemeth to agree only to corporeal pleasure: Seeing by that pleasure, the wants of our body are supplied and cured, together with such griefs as we sustained by those wants. For when we be cold or thirsty, we are delighted in the warmth, and in the drink, whereby that grief is cured, which proceeded from cold and thirst.  
Therefore these pleasures are not good naturally or of themselves, but accidentally: for, as to be in health, is good naturally and by itself, whereas to be healed, is but an accidental good, so these pleasures are only accidentally good; because they are but remedies for the curing of other things. But the pleasure taken in contemplation is good naturally, and of itself; because it is not used in respect of any want.  
Hereby it is plain, that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants; and if this be true, that cannot be a good definition, which defines pleasure to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense; for it comprehendeth not all pleasure; but leaveth out the best, even the pleasure that is in contemplation.   

SECT. 2.  
I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus, and another definition equivolent thereunto. II. A definition of pleasure according to Aristotle. III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures; of their operations; of such as are proper to man as he is man; and of such as are common to him, with other living-creatures.  
EPicurus the Philosopher defines pleasure to be The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man: and in so defining it he says the same thing with him, who affirms it to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense. For he says that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleasure: But seeing no generation consists of the same proprieties, with those things which proceed thereof, we must not think that the generation of pleasure, is pleasure; but, some other thing beside pleasure. For the generation itself is conversant about engendering; but of all things which are begotten, there is nothing which is at once in begetting, and perfectly begotten; seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act, are distinct things, perfected by degrees. But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation.  
Furthermore, every generation is a making of things which are not formerly in being; but pleasure concerneth such things as have their being already; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation. Again, generation may be said to be speedy or slow; but so is not pleasure said to be.  
Moreover, of good things, some be the habit, some the operation, and some the instruments. The habit, as virtues; the operation, as the action agreeable to virtue. Again, the habit is as the faculty of seeing; the operation, as the seeing itself; and the instruments whereby we work, as the eye, riches, and such like.  
Now all the powers of the soul which are conversant about good or evil things, are the faculties of some habits or other. Therefore, if pleasure be a good thing, and not an evil thing; these are the only things in which it can be conversant. But it cannot be a habit; neither is it as a virtue; for than it could not be so easily changed into grief, which is contrary thereunto: neither as it is contrary to privation; seeing it is impossible that a habit, and a privation, should meet in the same subject; as pleasure and grief may. For there be some who take pleasure, and are grieved both at once; as they who are gently scratched when they itch; therefore pleasure is not a habit.  
Neither is pleasure an instrument; For instruments are ordained in respect of other things, not in respect of themselves, now pleasure is not for any other thing, but for itself only, and therefore it cannot be an instrument.  
Pleasure must be therefore an operation; & indeed Aristotle defines the same to be an operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature: but by this definition, felicity should be pleasure, (seeing felicity is such an operation as he defineth;) and so his definition is false.  
Therefore Aristotle thus correcteth his definition; pleasure (saith he) is the end of the operations of a living-creature, which are void of encumbrance, and agreeable to nature: So pleasure may be, as it were, wrapped up, and coexist, together with felicity; but felicity cannot be pleasure.  
Now every operation is not a motion; for some operation is practised without motion, such was the operation which God used in the first creation; for the first mover of all things is unmoveable; such also is the operation of contemplation, which man useth; for it is exercised without motion; because the subject of contemplation is always one and the same; and the mind of him that contemplates, always firmly settled upon that object of contemplation.  
If then, the pleasure that is in contemplation (and which is the greatest, the principal, and the only true pleasure) be exercised without motion; it is plain that such pleasures as have the fewest motions, are by so much the better, and the greater, as their motions are the fewer.  
Pleasures, together with their operations are diversely distinguished; for there be so many pleasures, as of their operations: when the operations are good, the pleasures are good also; and if the operations be naught, such are the pleasures.  
That there be sundry sorts of pleasure in respect of every sense, it is very manifest; for there be many pleasures both in touching and tasting; and great diversity also in the pleasures of the sight, of the hearing, and of the smell: and the purer senses are they which keep the farthest distance from their objects, which delight them, as the slight, the hearing, and the smell.  
There be two sorts of the operations of the mind, the one in practice, the other in contemplation; and therefore it is evident, that there are two sorts of pleasure which follow these operations; and that those which follow the contemplation are more pure, than those which follow the practice.  
The pleasures of the mind (or understanding) are proper to man as he is man; but they which pertain to the sense, are common to him with other living-creatures, in respect of his being a living-creature.  
Now seeing it is thus, and that some are delighted with such pleasures, as pertain to sense, and others with some other pleasures; those pleasures only are to be accounted good of their own nature, which are judged good, not of evil men, but of good men: For in doubtful matters, every common fellow is not a competent judge; but he that is both skilful, and regulateth himself according to the rule of (undepraved) nature.    

CAP. 19  
I. Of Grief, and the several kinds thereof; and how far a good man may be subject thereunto II. Excess chanceth only in bodily pleasures, not in those which are mental.  
ALL Grief is of one of these kinds; namely, astonishing grief, called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, care; termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, envy and pity.  
Astonishing grief, is that which bereaveth us of the use of our voice; care is a grief burdenous unto us. Envy is a grief, springing from the welfare of other men; and pity is a grief arising from the adversity of others.  
Every grief is evil in respect of it own nature▪ for albeit a good man be sometime grieved, when he seeth good men oppressed, or his children or his country spoiled, he grieveth not for the sorrow's sake, as if it were good in itself to grieve; but for a respect unto other circumstances: He that is a delighted in contemplation is not moved with such things, because he hath altogether estranged his mind from earthly affairs, and devoted himself wholly unto God. And he that is otherwise a good man, is moved by the circumstance of grief in such a mean, as never brings him into subjection thereunto; but rather subdues them unto himself.  
If you make the comparison between an evil thing, and a good thing, grief is then contrary unto pleasure, which is used measurably; but if the comparison be between evil and evil, grief is the contrary to an immoderate pleasure.  
But these Excesses happen only in the pleasures of the body: For the pleasure which is taken in contemplation, (even when it is in the highest degree, and hath attained unto perfection) admits no excess; neither is there any grief set in a contrariety thereunto; nor doth it serve to cure any preceding grief.   

CAP. 20.  
I. Of Fear, and the six parts thereof; with their definitions and differences. II. The cause of fear, and the instrument of that grief.  
NExt grief (in general) we will describe Fear, which is divided into six parts; Sloth, Bashfulness, Shame, Amazedness, Carefulness, and Terror.  
Sloth is when we fear lest we should be compelled to work. Amazedness is a fear which ariseth in us when some huge and unusual thing appeareth Terror is a trembling, or shuddering, occasioned by some dreadful object. Carefulness is when we fear losing that which we have, or of missing that which we desire; for by the fear▪ of these things, we are brought into a careful agony. Bashfulness is the fear of some rebuke or disgrace; and is a very honest passion. Shame is a fear begotten in us upon the remembrance of some evil which we have committed: And where this is found there is remaining some hope of goodness and amendment.  
And this is the difference betwixt bashfulness, and shame, he that is ashamed is troubled through fear of such things as he hath done; but he that is abashed fears lest some reproach may befall him: But the old writers use the words indifferently, calling shame bashfulness; and bashfulness shame.  
The cause of fear is a cold that generally surpriseth us, by reason our whole heat (by the sudden apprehension of some thing) is driven unto the heart, as to the principal part; even as the people fly to their Governors, when they are frighted.  
The instrument which this grief useth, is the belly (or mouth of the stomach) For there the biting is first felt: And Galen in his third book of Demonstrations, writeth to this purpose;  
When men are grieved (saith he) choler flows plentifully into the stomach, which causeth a biting; and that grief, and biting never ceaseth until they have vomited out the choler. They feel this biting underneath the gristle which is in the middle of the breast; which gristle is like a sword, and thereof is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but the heart lieth much higher. For the Stomach is placed under the midriff, and the heart above it.  
The old writers did use also to give the name of the heart to the mouth of the stomach; as namely, Hypocrates; & Thucydides, when he talketh of the plague. His words be these, And when it came with some strength unto the heart, (meaning the stomach) it made it give up; and there came from it as many purgations of choler, as have been named of the Physicians. For, that which is turned up, and forced to vomit, is the mouth of the stomach, and not that bowel which we call the heart.   

CAP. 21.  
I. Of Anger, and of the names and nature of the three several parts thereof Choler, Wrath, and Fury. II. The true office and use of anger.  
SUch a heating of the blood, about the heart, as is caused by an exhalation of choler troubling the same, is termed Anger, and therefore it is named also choler, and wrath: And sometime it is a desire of revenge; for if we have been injured, or but suppose ourselves injured, we are then angry; and that passion is usually mixed, both of anger, and of a desire which we have to be revenged.  
Anger is of three sorts or species. The first is called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for it is but the first heat, or beginning, (as it were) of anger, and may be named in English choler, or an angry displeasure. The second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so called of the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which implies a delaying. or tarrying, or a thing-laid up in memory, and meaneth a continuing, or inverterate anger. The last is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, derived of a word signifiing to lie in wait; and is a revenging anger, waiting opportunities of revenge.  
Anger, is appointed to wait upon reason; and when any thing is done wherewithal reason may justly be displeased, anger immediately taketh hold thereof (as she ought to do) if reason, and anger keep their limits and natural course.   

CAP. 22.  
Of that irrational part of the Soul, which is not obedient unto reason.  
LEt us now speak of that part of the soul, which is not subject unto reason: For having declared that part which is obedient unto reason, we shall in good order proceed to those faculties which are disobedient thereunto; namely the faculty of nourishing, of engendering, and of the pulses.  
The faculties of nourishing, and engendering are termed natural; and the faculty of the pulses, is called vital.   

CAP. 23.  
I. Of the nourishing power of the soul, and the four faculties thereof. II. Of the several evacuations. III. Of the several instruments, of nourishment, and of the particular offices of those instruments.  
ALL the natural faculties of the nourishing power, are these four; an attractive appetite, a retentive power, a distributing, and an expulsive (or avoiding faculty: for every part of the living-creature, doth naturally draw unto itself such nourishment, as is convenient for the same: when it is attracted, it preserveth it: when the same is kept a due time, it changeth the same into itself; and then expelleth whatsoever proveth to be superfluous.  
These are the faculties which order the nourishment of the parts of the body; and by these it groweth to an augmentation both in breadth and height.  
The ways or passages, by which all superfluities be avoided, are, by the belly, by urine, by vomits, by sweats, by the mouth, by the nostrils, by the ears, by the eyes, by breathe out, and by invisible pores, and unknown passages.  
All the first evacuations are manifestly preceived, as that excrement called the earwax, by the ears; the tears and the gum (which we call the spethyme) by the eyes; and that moisture also which maketh blear-eyed: the outbreathing likewise, by which a sowltry heat is evaporated from the heart. But by those which we call unknown passages, there breathes out (insensibly) a moisture over all the body, wherewith many humours are evacuated, from the very depth and drawing together of the arteries; and they are conveyed through the skin where it is rarified.  
The instruments of the nourishing faculty, are the mouth, the stomach, the belly, the liver, all the veins, the entrails, both sorts of choler, and the reins.  
The mouth prepares the food beforehand for the belly, dividing it into small parts, by the teeth and tongue: for in chewing the tongue is very helpful in gathering the meat together, and in applying it unto the teeth; and as the women which grind corn, thrust the grains unto the millstone with their hands; so the tongue is as it were a hand to assist in the chewing of our meat.  
The food being thus wrought beforehand, is conveyed into the belly by the stomach; which is a place not only ordained to feel what we want, but to be a passage-way also, to convey the meat unto our bellies: for the stomach riseth up when we eat or drink, and (drawing unto it that which we swallow down) sendeth it into the belly.  
When the belly hath received the same; it severs that which is profitable for nourishment, from that which is woody, stony, or unfit for nutriment. That which is good, is there changed into humours; which are thence carried up to the liver by veins ordained for that purpose, and which are as it were certain rivulets to convey it thither.  
These veins are in the liver, in the manner of roots, drawing thither from the belly, the juice of our food, even as the roots of plants draw nourishment from the earth: And the belly may be resembled unto the earth, which ministereth nourishment unto the plants: The veins like roots, carry the humour from the belly, from the entrails, and from the great doubleskin, which fasteneth our bowels, unto the back, unto the gates and to the bunches of the liver.  
The liver itself may be compared unto the stem or body of the plant. The veins which issue by diverse ways from the hollow vein, springing from the flat parts of the liver; are like springs, and boughts. After the liver hath received the humour from the belly, it both concocts it, and makes it also like unto itself: for the liver consisting of such flesh as hath a near alliance unto blood, easily converts that humour into blood.  
This blood is cleansed by the spleen, by that bladder which receives the gall; and by the reins: for the spleen attracts unto it all the dregs of the blood, and is nourished thereby. The bladder (called the gall) which receives the choler, draws unto itself, the sharpness which remained in the juice of our food. The reins, do as it were strain out that thin humour which is like whey, and the sharpness also which temaineth in that humour: After all which, the blood becoming pure and good, is distributed for a nourishment unto all other parts of the body, by such veins as are dispersed abroad into every member.  
By this means every part of the body drawing blood unto it, retaineth and converteth so much thereof as is proportionable, into it own substance; the rest it sendeth to the next part, and so to the next, that it may yield nourishment unto them.  
Thus, all the body is in every part nourished, and hath growth and continuance by the blood, which is distributed from the liver: And this part is termed irrational, and said not to be obedient unto reason; because that which it performeth, is not executed according to our choice (or as we ourselves will) but naturally; and according to it own nature.   

CAP. 24.  
I. Of the pulses, and of their offices. II. Of the excellent and useful disposition of the sinews, the veins, and arteries; and of the several fountains of these. III. Of the mutual benefit and assistance also, which these three are to each other.  
THe motion of the Pulses is called a vital power: For, having beginning from the heart (and especially from the left portion thereof, which is called the place of the spirits) it distributes unto every part of the body, an ingraffed and a vitall-heat, by means of the arteries; even as the liver distributes food by the veins.  
If therefore the heart be inflamed above the due measure which nature doth require; the entire living-creature is forthwith brought into an unnatural heat: and is in like manner cooled, if the heart be cooled beyond a just proportion; because the vitall-spirit is dispersed from the heart by the arteries, into every part of the body.  
For it is ordered in such manner, that (for the most part) these three; the vein, the artery, and the sinew, be so divided, that they go all together, proceeding from the three principal parts, which govern the entire living-creature.  
From the brain, which is the fountain both of motion and of sense, proceeds the sinew. From the liver, which yieldeth a beginning to the blood, and the nourishing-faculty, comes the vein, which is the vessel wherein the blood is carried. And from the heart, which is the root of our vitall-faculty, comes the artery, which is that vessel wherein the spirits are conveyed.  
These three accompany one another, and receive profit and assistance each from other. For the vein administers a certain nourishment of blood to the sinew, and to the artery. The artery imparts natural heat, and vitallspirits to the vein, and therefore it is not possible to find either an artery altogether void of a thin kind of blood: or a vein without spirits, of a vapoury nature.  
The artery is forcibly opened and contracted again, with a certain harmony and proportion; having the beginning of that motion from the heart. And when it is opened, it sucks and draws a thin kind of blood, from the veins that are near unto it; which blood being resolved into exhalations, becometh a nourishment to the vitallspirits: when it is closed again, it empties the sowltry heat which is in it, by certain invisible pores, throughout the body; even as the heart sends from itself, the sowltry heat which oppresseth it, by evaporations, both at the nostrils, and the mouth.   

CAP. 25.  
I. Of the propagating, or generating faculty, and how far the same is in man's power. II. The instruments of propagation, and their offices. III. The opinions of Aristotle, Democritus, and Galen; concerning the seed of the Woman.  
EVen the faculty of generation pertaineth also to that part of the soul, which is not obedient unto reason. For we yield seed in our dream (or sleep) whether we will or no; and our desire of copulation is so natural, that the desire is moved in us, even against our wills. But the act itself is indeed, and without question, in our own power, and pertaineth to the mind; for it is brought to pass by those instruments which are serviceable to the naturall-appetite; and to abstain from our appetite, or to master the same, was (by God) naturally placed in our power, (and may be so continued, if timely endeavour hath not been omitted.)  
The instruments of a potential generation, are first the veins and arteries: For in these the first humour (that is not fully perfected into seed) is engendered, and the blood there changed, even as milk in the dugs. And forasmuch as they were first made of seed, this humour is a nourishment unto those vessels; and the veins and arteries, do concoct the blood into a moisture, like unto seed, that they might be nourished thereby: And when they have due nourishment, that serveth for generation which remaineth.  
For it is first carried up into the head by a large circuit, and from thence brought down again, by two veins and two arteries. Therefore, if a man cut the veins which are about, or near the ears, it makes the living-creature unfit for generation.  
Of these veins and arteries, is compacted that folded skin, which riseth like a swollen vein, in the Cod, and where this moisture (coming near unto the nature of seed) falleth into either of the Testicles.  
There is one vein, and one artery full of seed: In these it is perfected, and is driven forth by the folded seminal vein, which is behind the Testicles, by a wind.  
That wind proves that an artery sends it forth; and that it is carried by a vein, may appear by those who are overmuch addicted unto Venery: For they that use carnall-copulation overmuch, thereby wasting their seed, and that seminal humour, which cometh near unto the nature of seed, (if they further provoke themselves) pure blood is then strained from them.  
Women have the same parts which men have: this only is the difference, men have them outwardly, and they inwardly. But Aristotle and Democritus were of opinion that the seed of the woman, is no way useful in the generation of children. For they conceive that which proceeds from the woman to be a sweeting of the place, rather than any seed of generation.  
But Galen condemning Aristotle's opinion, affirms that women have their seed also, and that the mingling of both seeds together is the cause of conception; and thereupon (saith he) their accompanying together in that act is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a copulation.  
Yet he judgeth not the seed of the woman to be so perfect as the man's; but to be moister, and somewhat less concocted, and as it were a nourishment unto the seed of the man. Of that seed, those parts are composed which are about the utmost places of the womb, and which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (skin wrapped about the skin wherein the infant lieth) and ordained for a vessel to receive the superfluities of the child.  
In all sorts of living-creatures, the Female takes the male when she may conceive; and such as are able to conceive at all times (as hens, doves, and women) are at all times desirous to accompany the male: But women only accept of the males company when they have conceived; for all other creatures usually reject the male after conception. As for hens, they are daily trodden, because they do lay almost every day.  
Women, as they be at their own liberty in other things; so they are at liberty also to accompany with men after conception; whereas living-creatures void of reason, are governed not of themselves, but by nature; admitting such a measure, and such times, as are dictated unto them, by a natural instinct.   

CAP. 26.  
This Chapter mentioneth other divisions of the faculties belonging to a living-creature.  
DIvision is made of those faculties which pertain unto a living-creature in another manner: For it is affirmed that some faculties are mental, some natural, and some vital.  
They which are mental are in our own choice and election; they which are not in our election, are natural, and vital. The faculties belonging unto the mind are two, the motion of appetite, and of sense.  
To the motion of our appetite, these faculties are appertaining; Progression from place to place, the motion of the whole body, speech and respiration: For it is in our power to do, or to omit these things. But the natural, and vital faculties are not in our power; for they go forward, nill we will we; as the faculty of nourishing, of growing, and of propagation: all which are natural faculties, and so doth likewise the faculty of the pulses, which is vital.  
As for the instruments (of these faculties) mentioned by others, we have already treated of them, we will therefore speak of the instruments of those things which belong unto our appetite (or choice)   

CAP. 27.  
I. Of the motion proceeding voluntarily from us: of the place where it assumeth beginning; and the instruments which it useth. II. The wise providence of the Creator, in uniting together things natural & mental, etc.  
THe motion which belongeth to our assent (or choice) and proceedeth voluntarily from us, taketh beginning from the brain, and from the marrow of the chine, which is itself a part of the brain.  
The instruments thereof are the sinews that spring from these, the ligaments, and muscles. The composure of these muscles, is flesh, and the strings in the blood; which are like sinews and grisles wrapped up together, with sinewie-strings. And some are of opinion, that they are sensible; because that sense proceedeth from the sinews, where withal they are folded up.  
The grisly-end of the muscle is compounded both of a ligament, and of certain small sinews; yet this grisly-end differs from a sinew in this, that every sinew hath sense in it, and is round, and somewhat tender, and assumeth also his beginning from the brain: whereas this grisly end, is more hard, sometime also flat, having likewise his original from the bone, and is in itself void of sense.  
The hands are an instrument, ordained to lay hold of things, and so convenient for the exercise of arts, above other members, that if the hands, or but the fingers only should be taken away, we are made unapt for almost every art. And therefore man only received hands from his Creator, because he only is endued with reason, which makes him capable of arts.  
The feet are instruments ordained for going; for by them we remove and pass from place to place. And man can sit firmly without a prop, because he only makes two rightangles by the bowing of his legs; the one inward, the other outward.  
Whatsoever things therefore (in man) are moved by sinews, and muscles, belong to the mind; and he hath a free liberty in the use of them; Among these (as we have already showed) the senses and the voice are to be accounted; and therefore this hath been hitherto a discourse, probably setting forth, as well those things which are mental, as those which are natural.  
For the Creator according to his exceeding wise foresight, hath folded up things mental with such as are natural; and things natural, with such as appertain unto the mind. And whereas the avoiding of superfluities belongs to the expulsive faculty (which is counted one of those that is natural) that we might not behave ourselves filthily in avoiding our excrements, without regarding the time, the place, and such other circumstances as are comely; he hath appointed the muscles to be as it were Porters, to order our evacuations; and of things which were of themselves merely natural, he hath made them to be mental, and such as depend upon the rule of the mind. And thereupon, when we are provoked unto any evacuations, we are able (if cause be) to contain them very often, and very long.  
Certain sinews which be soft and sensible, are sent down both from the middle-pan, and also from the two former pans of the brain: Other sinews which are harder, and serve us for motion, proceed from that brainpan, which is in the hinder part of the head, and from the marrow of the back.  
Among these, those are the harder which come from the spinall-marrow: and of them, those are the hardest of all, which proceed from the lowest parts of the marrow of the back: For by how much farther the marrow of the chine descendeth from the brain; so much the more hard is the chine-marrow of itself, and the sinews also which do spring from the same.  
And as we have received the senses double; so the sinews have a twofold springing also from us. For every joint of the chine sends forth a couple of sinews; one issuing toward the rightside, and another toward the left; yea, and almost our whole body is divided also into two parts, the one on the right, and the other on the left side. Thus likewise are our feet, our hands, the seats of our senses, and other parts divided.   

CAP. 28.  
I. Of respiration; of the instrument, of the use, and of the causes of that faculty. II. Of the composure and use of the Lungs, and of such other parts as are assisting to respiration. III. Of those parts of a living-creature, which are made for themselves alone; for others, and for themselves; or altogether for others.  
HERE we will treat of respiration, which is also a work belonging to the mind: For by the muscles the breast is opened, which is the principal instrument of respiration. Our sighing also, and our thick drawing of breath, when any great sorrow happeneth unto us, is an evidence, that the operation hereof belongeth unto the mind.  
Moreover, the variations, and alterings of our breathing, whensoever need requires, are in our power: For if we be grieved in any part serviceable to respiration, or in such parts as are moved by the motion of any of these; as the midriff, the liver, the spleen, the stomach, the small-guts, or the lowest-gut, we then breathe short and thick. We breathe short, that we may not over-vehemently smite the grieved part; we breathe also thick, that the often breathing may supply what is wanting in the length of our blast.  
When our leg is wounded, we set it forth very leisurely in our going; which is done to the same end, for which we breathe short; and therefore as to go from place to place belongs unto the mind, so doth also this operation of respiration. But although we should rest and not go at all it were possible for us to live a long time, whereas it were impossible for us to hold our breath the tenth part of an hour, without death; because the natural heat which is in us, would be choked up and quite extinct by a sowltry fume. For it is as if a man should cover a fire within a small vessel, having no vent; which would be immediately stifled and quenched by it own fume.  
For this cause it is very necessary that when we are asleep, our soul should work nevertheless in this part; because if it should be idle therein (though for a very small time) the living-creature would perish: And in this it is again manifested, how the endeavour of the mind and of nature are knit together.  
For the mind exerciseth respiration, by an artery which is a natural instrument; and it is always in motion, that neither it own work, nor the work of the other arteries may be intermitted. This not being perceived by some, (to wit, how the mind and nature join together in this work) they supposed respiration to be only a natural faculty.  
Three things cause respiration, the use, the power, and the instruments. The use is twofold: one for the preservation of our natural heat, and the other for the nourishment of the vitallspirits.  
The preservation of our natural heat consisteth both of drawing in, and breathing out of air, For the drawing of the breath doth not only cool, but (in a mediocrity) stirreth up heat also. The breathing out of the air, drives away the foggy heat which is about the heart (whereas nourishment of the vitallspirits, is respiration only) for the heart is dilated abroad, and a certain portion of air is attracted thereunto.  
The power (which is a cause also of respiration) is that which it hath from the soul: for it is the mind which moves the instruments of respiration, by means of the muscles (and especially by the breast) wherewith our lungs, and the sharp arteries (which are also a part of the lungs) are moved.  
For that part of the sharp artery, which is gristly, is the instrument of the voice; the ligaments thereof which are like skins, are instruments of respiration: and that which is composed of both together (which is the forementioned artery) is the instrument both of respiration, and of the voice.  
The lungs therefore are a composition folded up together, and consisting of these four, a sharp artery, a smooth artery, a vein, and of a spumie flesh; which flesh doth fill up all the void places of the folded skin, as it were a moist bed, (or the herb Sleve) both of the two arteries and of the vein; so that it becometh both a seat for them, and a band keeping them together.  
The flesh of the lungs, doth naturally concoct the spirits; as the liver concocts the humour which cometh from the belly: And as the liver, with his utmost edges or skirts, spreads itself about the belly, because it needeth heat, so the lungs enclose even the very middle of the heart; because it needeth some cooling by respiration.  
To the sharp artery the gristle of the windpipe is immediately joined, being compounded of three great gristles, whereunto the throat is annexed, and which are continued unto the mouth and nostrils, by both which, we draw the air that is without us. From the mouth it ascendeth by a bone like unto a sieve, or like a sponge, which is full of holes, that the brain may not be harmed, if there be any excess in the qualities of the air, or if too much wind should enter into it at once.  
Here hath also the Creator placed the nose both for smelling and respiration, according as he hath ordained the tongue, for the voice, for the tasting, and for chewing.  
Thus the most principal parts, serving both for the very being of the living-creature, and for the necessary uses of this life, are divided together with the powers of the mind: and if any thing hath been formerly omitted, it may be understood by that which is now expressed.  
Now as it falls out in all other created things, that some are made only for their own sakes; some for themselves and others also; some only for the sakes of others; and that some things fall out accidentally, together with such things as are made; Even thus you shall find it to be also in the parts of a living-creature.  
For all the forenamed instruments, of those three principal things which govern the living-creature, are made for their own sakes: For those things are especially and principally made which are named according to their proper nature; and are engendered in the womb even of the seed itself, as the bones are.  
But the yellow choler is made both in respect of itself, & some other thing; For it helpeth concoction, stirreth up to the avoiding of excrements, and (in that respect) is in some sort, one of the parts that serveth for nourishment. Moreover, it ministereth unto the body a certain heat, as doth our vitall-faculty; and in respect of all these things, it seemeth to be made for it own sake: But in that it purgeth our blood, it seemeth after a sort, to be made in respect of the blood.  
The spleen also helpeth concoction; and that not a little: For being tart, and of a sharp astringent nature; it bindeth the belly by pouring out into the same, the avoidance of a black moisture; Yea, it strengtheneth it also; assisteth concoction, and purgeth the liver: For which causes, that part also seemeth to have been ordained in respect of the blood.  
The reins likewise are a purgation for the blood, and a cause of the desire which we have to carnal copulation: For the veins, which (as we have declared before) do fall down into the cod, pass along by the reins; and from thence carry with them a certain sharpness, which provoketh lust, even as a certain sharp moisture which is under the skin, procureth an itch. And look how much the flesh of the stones, is tenderer than the other skin of the body; by so much the more, (being tickled by that sharpness) are they stirred up to the ejaculation of seed.  
These things therefore and such like, are made both for their own sakes, and also in respect of other things. But the kernels, and the flesh are only ordained in respect of other things. For the kernels do serve to carry up and underprop the vessels, that they may not be broken when they are lifted up, or stretched forth with any violent motions. And the flesh was made to be a covering to the other parts; that it might cool the living-creature in the summer, by being as it were, a morning dew thereunto, and that it might in the winter be as it were a quilt of wool to the parts of the body.  
The skin was ordained as a covering, both for the tender flesh, and all those parts that are inward. The flesh is of a nature hardened like a scar, by reason of the air which compasseth it about, and by means of those other bodies wherewithal it is conversant.  
The bones are an undersetting to the whole body, and especially the chine of the back, which is termed the foundation of a living creature.  
The nails are most commonly used to scratch withal, by every living-creature (which hath nails) and they are also for sundry particular uses, to diverse living-creatures. For they are given to many for a defence; as to those which have crooked talons; and they be as it were an instrument to execute anger.  
Many have them both for a weapon of defence, and also for a strengthening to their feet, as horses; and all such as divide not the hoof. But nails are bestowed on men, not only to scratch themselves withal, and that they might by so doing, disperse the sharp moisture which is under the skin: but that they might also take the firmer hold of small things. For by help of them a very small thing may be taken up; because their meeting one against another at the very ends of the fingers, enables to the taking of firm hold.  
The hairs grow out accidentally with other things, by the meeting together of such fumy vapours as ascend out of the body; and yet the Creator made not their accidental generation, without some profitable use; for they serve both to cover and beautify living-creatures: They are a covering for goats and sheep; they are an ornament unto men; and they are both a covering, and an ornament to Lions.   

CAP. 29.  
I. Of things done voluntarily, and against our will. II. Of the definition of an action; and of the circumstances which accompany, and follow an action. III. Of the marks both of a voluntary, and involuntary action.  
I Have often made mention of things done voluntarily, and by constraint, of which somewhat must be now expressed, lest errors may be occasioned through want of an exact knowledge of these.  
But he that undertaketh to discourse of things done voluntarily and against our will, must in the first place set down some assured rules, and certain tokens, whereby it may be well discerned whether the thing done, be (unquestionably) voluntary, or against our will.  
Seeing therefore that every voluntary thing consisteth in some action; seeing moreover, that all those things which are said to be done against our will, consist in action also (as shall be anon declared) and seeing likewise, some think that the thing which is done against our will, consisteth both in action & passion; we will (before we proceed further) define what an action is.  
An action is the actual doing of any thing with the use of reason.  
After all actions, there followeth either praise or dispraise. Some actions are exercised with pleasure, and some with grief. Some are to be chosen by the doer, and some are to be avoided. Of them which are to be chosen, some are at all times to be made choice of; some at one time rather than at another. The same circumstances are considerable in such actions as are to be eschewed also; and this moreover is observable, that some actions are pitied, some pardoned, some hated, and some punished.  
Now then, let these be the marks to discern the things which are willingly done; namely, that praise or dispraise always follow them; that they are done with pleasure; and that the actions are to be chosen by the doers of them, either at all times, or at those times in which they are done. The notes of involuntary actions are these; They are vouchsafed pardon; or they are pitied, or they are done with grief, and they are not done by our own choice. These things being thus defined and ordered; we will first speak of such things as are done against our will.   

CAP. 30.  
I. The definition of an involuntary act. II. The solution of certain questions concerning mixed actions, and an advise what is to be done, when we know not what action to choose. III. Things done by inconstancy, by intemperancy, or anger, are not to be reputed things done against our will.  
SUch things as are done against our will, are either done by constraint, or of ignorance. The beginning of those actions which are done against our will, by force, is without ourselves; that is, some other thing, and not we ourselves is the cause thereof: and therefore this is the definition of that thing which is done against our will, by force. It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it; and he which is forced thereunto doth nothing to further the same of his own will. We mean, in this place, by the beginning, the cause-effecting the thing done.  
Hereupon it may be questioned, when Shipmen cast their lading into the sea, when they are endangered by a tempest; (or when a man is contented to suffer or do some dishonest thing to save his friend or his country) whether these actions may be said to be done against their will, or no. And according to this clause added to the definition (He that is forced, doth nothing to further the matter of his own will) these actions do seem to be voluntary; because to the executing of such things, the actors do of themselves move their instrumental parts, even of their own accord.  
Such is their case who cast their lading into the Sea; and theirs who offer themselves to abide any shame or danger to bring to pass a greater good, as did Zeno, who bit off his own tongue, and spit it out into the face of Dionysius the tyrant, because he would not utter unto him what was to be kept secret; or as did Anaxarchus the Philosopher, who chose to be tormented unto death, by being rolled up together like a wheel, rather than he would disclose the secret of his friend unto Nicareon the Tyrant.  
Therefore, generally, when a man either chooseth a less evil, through fear of some greater evil; or, when a man accepts the less Good, in hope of a greater Good, (which he cannot otherwise attain according as he would) that thing which in such cases he doth or suffereth, is not utterly against his will: for he doth or suffers by his own advice, and choice; and such things are to be made choice of at that time, though they be not to be chosen of their own nature.  
These are mixed actions, partly voluntary, and partly against our will: For, they are voluntary in respect of the circumstances; but they are involuntary, in regard of the actions themselves; and were it not for the circumstances, no man would make choice of doing such things.  
Moreover the praise or dispraise which follows such actions, declare them to be voluntary: for neither praise nor dispraise follow such things as are done absolutely by constraint.  
It is not easy to discern what things are to be chosen before others, in some difficult cases: But for the most part, we must choose rather to abide grief, then commit any shameful act; as did both joseph, and Susanna; and yet this holds not always. For doubtless Origen fell grossly when he chose to sacrifice unto Idols, rather than to undergo that dishonesty which the Aethiopians would have put upon him.  
We see therefore, that the discerning of such things is not easy; and we find also, that it is very hard for them that have chosen, to continue in that which they have resolved upon; because perils to come do not so amaze or discourage us, as those torments which are presently inflicted.  
It so happeneth oftentimes, that they who have chosen well, do depart from their own choice by persecution; as it hath happened unto some, who when they should have suffered martyrdom, fell back from their stout and resolute beginnings, by being through tenderness unable to endure the trials, and the torments of adversity, when they were inflicted upon them.  
Let no man imagine therefore, that either an inconstant falling away from a well chosen resolution, or an intemperate lust, or an angry rage, are to be accounted among such offences as are to be judged things done against our will; by reason there is an efficient cause of those actions without ourselves: For though the beauty of an harlot made them that saw her to rush into the execution of an intemperate lust; and though such as are furiously angry, were so provoked thereunto by another man, that the first beginnings thereof may be truly affirmed to have been without themselves; yet the actors of such things do work by themselves, and by their instrumental parts: for which cause their actions come not within the definition of things done by constraint; even in regard they offered unto themselves the occasions, and beginnings of those actions; and suffered themselves to be easily incaptivated by passions, through an evil conversation.  
Therefore all they who do such things, are worthily reprehended, as men voluntarily given to evil: and the evil is manifested to be voluntary, when they delight also in the deed; because every thing done by constraint, hath grief annexed thereunto.  
Thus much of things done against our will, by force; we will now treat of such involuntary actions, as are done through ignorance.   

CAP. 31.  
I. Of things done against our will, through ignorance; and of those actions which are, or are not altogether involuntary. II. The definition and marks of things done quite against our will; and the difference between things done thorough ignorance, and those which we do being ignorant. III. A catalogue of such particulars, the ignorance whereof makes an action to be involuntary.  
BY ignorance many things are done by us, whereof we rejoice after the deed: As when a man killeth his enemy at unawares (or against his will) and yet is glad that he is slain. These, & such like things, are neither accounted voluntary, nor altogether involuntary.  
Some things also are done through ignorance, for which we grieve after they are done: And those are usually called things done against our will, after the doing whereof we become grieved for the act. And by this it appears that there be two sorts of things done by ignorance; the one not voluntary, & the other quite against our will.  
It is our purpose therefore, to treat at this time of such things as are altogether against our will: because that which we call not voluntary (as aforesaid) may rather be reduced to those things which are voluntary in regard it is mixed of both.  
For though it hath a beginning by constraint, yet the end is voluntary; because by the event, that becomes voluntary, which was first against our will.  
Therefore a thing done against our will, is defined in this manner; That is an involuntary act, which is not only against our will, but hath also grief & repentance annexed thereunto. Moreover, it is one thing to do an act through ignorance, and another thing to do it, being ignorant: For if that thing which caused the ignorance be in our power, we do it being ignorant; but not by ignorance.  
For example, he that is accustomed unto drunkenness, or to anger, and in his wrath or drunkenness, committeth an evil; he hath (indeed) drunkenness, or anger, as a cause of those things which are done by him: But nevertheless those things were voluntary (for it was in his power not to have been drunk (or so enraged) and therefore in not suppressing those inordinate appetites, he himself was cause of his own ignorance; and may in that regard be said to have done that evil being ignorant; but cannot be truly said to have done it through ignorance: Neither is his act to be accounted as done, by constraint, but voluntarily; for that cause he who doth commit such things is justly reprehended by good men: Even because his drunkenness (which occasioned that act) being voluntary, makes the act which was thereby occasioned, to be voluntary also.  
But we are said to do things through ignorance, when we ourselves gave no cause of that ignorance; and when the deed was by chance. As if a man should shoot in an usual shooting place, & happen to hit and slay his father walking thereabout.  
It is plain by that which is aforesaid, that the actions of such a man are not to be accounted as done against his will, who is ignorant of such things as it behooveth him to know; or which reputes evil things to be go: For this ignorance proceeds from his own wickedness; and as his actions are vicious, so his ignorance also is to be accounted as a vice, for which he is worthy of reprehension. And reprehension is due only to those things which are voluntarily done.  
For the ignorance of general (or universal) things; or of such as are in choice, is not accounted to be a thing involuntary; but the ignorance of particular things only, is esteemed such: For we may be ignorant of particular things against our will. But of universal things, our ignorance is accounted voluntary; because such an ignorance cannot be in us without our own fault; except we are madmen, or Idiots.  
This being thus determined, it now resteth to be declared, what those particulars are of which we speak; and they are the same which the Rhetoricians call the parts or circumstances of things done. (To wit) WHO, WHOM, WHAT, WITH WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, in WHAT MANNER, for WHAT CAUSE, (To which may be added according to our English game used for an exercise of wit, WHAT FOLLOWED, or the event of that which was done.)  
The persons are either he who did it, or he to whom the thing was done; as if the Son should smite his Father at unawares. The thing done, is the action itself; as if I intended to to give one a little blow on the ear, and thereby struck out his eye. The instrument; as when one flings a very stone, and thinks it but a pommy stone. The place; as when at the turning of a lane two meet, and one unexpectedly overthrows the other. The time; as if in the night a man should kill his friend, supposing him his enemy. The manner; as if he should give one a small blow, without any great violence, and yet thereby slay him (for he knew not that one could have died by so small a stroke.) The cause; as if one should minister a medicine for a cure, which might prove deadly and kill his patient.  
Of all these particulars together, no man can be ignorant, except he that is mad (or a very Idiot.) But whosoever is ignorant of the most of these, or in the principal of them, is accounted to do things through ignorance. And the principal among such circumstances, are; Wherefore it was done; and What was done. That is to say; the cause, and the matter itself.   

CAP. 32.  
I. Of things done voluntarily; and the definition of such actions. II. Whether things which have a natural course, as concoction, and the like, may be termed voluntary, etc. III. They who acknowledge not those actions to be voluntary, which proceed from the passions, do thereby take away the morall-vertues, etc.  
OF those things which are done by constraint, there being two sorts; the one done through ignorance, and the other by compulsion; the thing which is voluntary, doth on the contrary answer unto these two, and is neither done by compulsion, nor through ignorance.  
That action is done without compulsion, whereof the beginning was in the doers; and an action is void of ignorance, when none of those particular circumstances, are unknown, in which, and by which, the deed consisteth: And therefore we join both together, and thus define it;  
That is voluntary, whereof the beginning is in the doer, who knoweth all those particular circumstances, wherein the deed consisteth.  
It may now be questioned whether natural things (as our concoction, and our growth) be to be accounted voluntury: but, we answer (as is before showed) that such things are neither voluntary, nor of constraint▪ because both voluntary things, and such as are by constraint, are esteemed among such things as are in our power; but our concoction, and our growth are not in our power: therefore though we are ignorant of the particular circumstances; yet for that they are not in our power, they are neither to be accounted things voluntary, nor of constraint.  
But it hath been declared before, that things done of wrath or concupiscence, are voluntary; For when these passions are moderated, they are commended who so govern them; and such as offend in them, are for the same reproved, or hated. Moreover, pleasure or grief ensue upon the doing of them; and the beginnings of these actions also, was in the doers themselves, because they were made able so to have governed their appetites, that they might not have been lightly transported by them, if they had endeavoured according to their power.  
By practice and custom such passions may be corrected; for if it were true, that they were absolutely by constraint, then doubtless neither unreasonable-creatures, nor infants, do any thing voluntarily, (but by constraint; because they are moved by their appetite.)  
But that is not so, for we see them go to their food of their own accord without any compulsion thereunto. It is they themselves which make speed unto it of themselves; yea, and not of ignorance, aswell as not of compulsion: For, they know their food; they are glad of it, when they see it; they presently hast toward it upon sight thereof, as unto a thing known; and are grieved if they miss of the same.  
By this, a voluntary thing is assuredly known from that which is involantary; even by the delight which follows the obtaining that which is desired; and by the grief which follows, if the desire be made frustrate: for even beasts do voluntarily covet; yea, and are voluntarily angry also, in regard anger hath some pleasure annexed thereunto.  
He that will not acknowledge those things to be voluntary, whereunto we are moved by anger, and a vehement appetite; even he taketh away the morall-vertues; seeing they consist in a mediocrity in respect of passions. If our passions be of constraint; then they also are forced actions which are done according to virtue; because the doing of them belongeth to our passions. But no man will account that to be of constraint, which is done by reason, by choice, by our own motion, by our own desire, with a knowledge also of the particular circumstances and by having the very beginning of the action in ourselves, which are evident proofs that the thing done is voluntary, as hath been formerly declared.  
And now seeing we have in many places made mention of our choice, and of such things as are in our power, we will next discourse of such things as are in our choice.   

CAP. 33.  
I. Of such things as are in our choice, and what difference there is beewixt them, and things voluntary. II. Choice is neither the concupiscible, nor the irascible appetite, nor will, nor opinion, nor consultation. III. The definition of choice, and about what it is conversant.  
OF our Choice, the question may perhaps be asked whether it be not all one with that which we call voluntary; because every thing done by choice is voluntary. To which we answer, It is not so; for they are not termini convertibiles, which they should be, if a thing done by our choice, and a thing voluntary were all one.  
The thing that is voluntary, is larger than that which is by choice; for all choice is voluntary; but every thing that is voluntary, is not done by choice; as appears in children, and in unreasonable-creatures, who do many things voluntarily, but not by choice.  
Though our friend cometh upon us unexpectedly, and so well contenteth us with his coming, that we are glad of it, yet we cannot say that it came to pass by our choice: and though he that casually finds treasure, did willingly enough hit upon it, because it was a profitable booty; yet he did not deliberately think upon such a thing before, therefore it may be from these things concluded, that a thing voluntary, and our choice is not all one.  
Neither is our appetite and our choice all one. For our appetite is divided into these three, desire, anger, and will. Now, that our choice is neither anger, nor the desire of a thing, it is made evident by this, that man doth therein not agree with irrationall-creatures; whereas he doth agree with beasts in coveting, and in anger: And if in these last mentioned he agree with beasts, and differs from them in having a choice of things; than it is manifest, that our choice is one thing, and that our desire and our anger are other distinct things.  
The same is proved by incontinent men, who are overcome by their lust, and prosecute the same contrary to their own choice and judgements; For even the incontinent man's judgement disliketh his lust (& maketh choice of better things) whereas if his choice and appetite were all one, neither of them would be contrary unto the other.  
That choice and will are not all one, may be proved by this; that our Will doth not agree unto all things, whereunto our choice (or judgement) doth assent. For we have a will to be in health, or to be rich; but to be in health, or to be rich is not in our choice.  
Our will hath place even in things impossible; but our choice consists in those only which are in our power. We may say that we would be immortal, but we cannot say, that to be immortal is at our choice. For our will extendeth unto the end itself; but our choice can reach no further then to the means which are in possibility to attain that end: and there is between them the same proportion which there is between the thing subject unto our will, and that thing wherabout we enter into consultation; for the subject of our will is the end of that which we would have, and our consultation, is about the means, whereby we may accomplish that end.  
We choose those things only which may be effected by us; but our will extendeth unto such things as are not in our power to accomplish; as when would that such or such a Commander should obtain the victory.  
It is then well enough proved that our choice is neither the concupiscible, nor the irascible appetite, nor our will; and aswell by the same arguments, as by other also, it may be made manifest; that it is not opinion. For opinion extendeth not only to things which are in our power, but to things eternal.  
Moreover, we say that an opinion is either true or false; but to say our choice is either true or false, is an absurd saying.  
Opinion concerneth likewise universal things; but our choice is conversant in particulars: For, our choice is of things to be undergone, (enjoyed or done) which are particular things.  
Neither is our choice all one with our consultation: For consultation is an advising about such things as are to be done (suffered or enjoyed) and that thing is to be chosen which in consultation is preferred: yea, our consultation debates of things yet in question, whereas our choice reacheth to that which is already concluded most worthy.  
We have hitherto declared what this choice is not; and we will now show you what it is.  
Doubtless choice is a thing mixed of consultation, judgement, and appetite; being neither the one nor the other, but a certain compound of these. For as we say that a living-creature, is a compound of soul and body; and neither a body by itself, nor a soul alone; but a thing made up of both together; even so say we also of this our choice.  
It is plain by the very Etymology thereof, that it is a certain counselling, or consultation, with an approbation of some one thing before the rest; and that it is not altogether the same with consultation: For we are then only accounted to have made choice, when one thing is taken before another. And no man preferreth any thing in choice, before he hath consulted, neither accepteth before he hath judged.  
And seeing we are not willing to execute or admit of all these things, which we well approve of; then that which is preferred after consultation, is in choice; and contained under our choice, when it taketh an appetite thereunto. Hereupon it necessarily follows also, that our choice is conversant in the same thing about which our consultation is employed.  
Out of all which it may be concluded, that our Choice is an appetite, consulting of such things as are in our power; or a Consultation with an appetite unto those things which are in our power. For, when we choose, we desire that which was preferred, after our consultation.  
But seeing we have said that choice and consultation, are conversant about the selfsame things; we will declare next, what it is, about which this consultation is occupied; and about what things we consult.   

CAP. 34.  
I. Of consultation, and wherein it differs from a question. II. The definition of consultation, and as illustration thereof, by showing what things are not proper subjects of consultation. III. Of the proper objects of consultation; and of such other things as are pertinent thereunto.  
KEeping close unto our chief purpose, we think it best (before we declare about what things we consult) to determine wherein a consultation differs from a question. For a consultation and a question is not all one; though he that consults calls things into question by his consultation; but they differ very much. For we seek and ask, whether or no the Sun be greater than the earth: but no man saith I consult whether the Sun be greater than the Earth.  
A question is more general, and as it were genus to consultation; and the nature of it extends further; For, every consultation is a kind of questioning; but every question is not a consultation, as hath been formerly declared.  
Our consideration is conversant sometime in consultation; as when I consider whether I should go to Sea, or not: and sometime it is conversant in debating things in the mind: as when I consider the liberal sciences; for it is not proper to say we consult of the Sciences. But the use of these words without distinction, hath made many to ●●re, and to conceive tho● things to be the same, which are very different. Which difference being now discovered, we will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we consult.  
We consult then of those things which are in our power; even of such as may be brought to pass by us; and whose event is not manifest: That is, such as may fall out diverse ways.  
We define it to be of those things which are in our power, because our consultation is only of those things which are to be undertaken by us; which things are in our power: For we do not consult of that kind of Philosophy, which is called contemplative; neither of GOD; nor of things which fall out of necessity (by necessity I mean those things which fall out always after one manner, as the Circuit of the year.)  
Neither do we consult of those things which are not always permanent, and yet fall out to be always alike, as of the rising and setting of the Sun. Neither of those things which fall out naturally; yet not always alike, but so for the most part only; as; that a man of sixty should have grey hairs; or that a man of twenty should begin to have a beard.  
Neither consult we of those things which chance naturally, but sometimes thus, and sometimes otherways, and not after any certain time or measure; as of showers, and droughts, and hail: Neither is consultation of those things which do fall out by chance, and seldom, one while more, and another while less: For in respect of these things, this clause was added, that the thing (consulted of) should be in our power.  
The definition saith further, that it must be of things which may be done by US. Because we do not consult of all men; neither of every thing, but of those which are in our power to consult of: For we consult not how the common wealth of our enemies may be governed; nor of them who dwell very far from us, (albeit this be a thing which may be consulted of among themselves.)  
Neither do we consult of all things that may be done by us; nor of all things that are in our power. And therefore these words, which have an uncertain end were added to the definition: for if the thing be manifest, and confessed, we deliberate no more thereof.  
Neither is there any consultation of such works or actions as are according to Science, and Art: For, all their principles are determinately known, except a few Arts which are termed conjectural, as Physic, and the art of Exorcising, and of governing.  
For, we do not only consult of these things; but of such also as are under our hand, and may be executed by us; they having such an uncertain end, that the success may be as well that, as this.  
But it hath been declared that our consultation is not of the end; but of things which tend unto the end: For our consultation is not of being rich, but of the means how to be rich.  
To speak all in brief; we do consult of those things only which are doubtful, and may be either so, or not so: and of those things we must also treat, that in our discourse nothing be wanting which may make things evident.  
Those qualities are called faculties, whereby we are enabled to the performance of any thing. For, whatsoever we do, we have the faculty of it; and those things we cannot perform, whereof the faculty is not in us. Therefore our action dependeth upon our faculty, and our faculty upon our essence: yea the action proceedeth from our faculty, and our faculty from our substance, and is in our substance And as I said before, these are three things depending one upon another. The thing able; the faculty by which it hath ability; and the thing which is to be done.  
The thing able to do it is a substance. The faculty is that whereby we have ability to do it. The thing to be done, is that, whose nature may be practised upon, by our faculty.  
Of things that may be done, some are necessary, & some contingent. Those are termed necessary which cannot possibly be hindered; or those, the contrary whereof is impossible: And that is contingent, which may be hindered, or whose contrary may possibly fall out.  
For example; It is necessary that a man should breathe as long as he liveth; for it is impossible a man should live and not breath. It is contingent that there should be rain to day; for it is possible that this day it should not rain, which is contrary to the other.  
Again, things contingent are said to fall out sometimes often, sometime seldom, and sometimes indifferently, in this manner or in that. They are frequent, as to have grey hairs at three score; they are seldom, as not to have grey hairs at that age: And they are indifferent; as it is equally in our choice to walk, or not to walk; or simply to do any act, or not to do it.  
Now our consultation is of those things only which may indifferently come to pass, or not come to pass; and a thing is said to fall out equally or indifferently, when we may in like sort, do as well the contrary thereof as the thing itself: For, if we could not do both equally, we should not consult thereof. Because no man consults either of things confessed, or impossible. For if we were able to do but one of those things which are contrary; that should be received without ambiguity; and the contrary should not, because impossible.   

CAP. 35.  
I. of destiny, and of the absurdities, impieties, and blasphemies which follow their opinion, who ascribe the cause of all things to the motion of the Stars, or fatal necessity. II. Of them who affirm that some things are both necessitated by destiny, and yet in man's power. III. An examination of the opinion afore mentioned.  
OUr opinion is that they who ascribe all things which are done, to the motions and constellations of the Stars, do not only oppose the vulgar notions of humane reason; but teach also (in effect) that all governance in commonweals, are to no purpose. For indeed, laws are in vain, and judgements superfluous, because they punish innocent men, without cause.  
If their opinion be true, it is also a thing unreasonable to reprehend or praise any man: yea, if every thing come to pass by destiny (or by an inavoidable decree) our prayers are foolish, and ineffectual babble; and there is neither place nor use for providence or piety.  
Moreover (if this were true) what account is to be made of man? or what is he more than an instrument serviceable to the motions of the superior bodies? Seeing, as they affirm, he is moved by the celestial influences not only to the performance of all bodily actions; but to every thought also which is in his mind.  
They that are of this opinion do generally take away (together with such things, as should be left in our power) the nature likewise, of all contingent things; and in a manner subvert and destroy the whole world; making the Stars injurious homicides, and cuckold-makers, or at least the causers of all adulteries and murders.  
Nay God who is the Creator of the stars, is (by this blasphemous opinion) made to bear the blame of all which is ill done, rather than the stars; because he made them such as should necessarily, and inavoidably, bring, and lay evils upon us.  
Thus, their absurdity extends not only to the subversion of commonweals; but maketh God also to be the author of all sin; and the cause of all mischiefs: Which absurdity & blasphemy is both impossible for them to and intolerable for us to hear.  
Some there be who affirm, that things may be in our power, and that there may be destiny also. For, some things (say these) is given by destiny to every thing that is made, as to the water to cool; to every plant to bear such fruit as is according to its kind; to a stone to sink downward; to fire to mount upwards; and to living-creatures to accept or to be desirous of things agreeable unto them. And when nothing (without us, or belonging to destiny) opposeth itself against that which we endeavour; than it becomes perfectly in our power to proceed; yea and then (say these) we shall assuredly effect it.  
They who affirm this are Chrysippus, Philopater, and many other men of great sufficiency and esteem among the Stoics, and all which they have said (what show soever it makes of somewhat else) proves nothing but this; that all things are done by destiny.  
For though they have said that our attempts are given unto us by destiny; and that they are sometimes hindered by destiny, and sometime left at liberty; yet (the matter being well observed) it is plain that all things are done by destiny; even those things (for aught they have yet said) which they would pretend to be in our own power. And we will use against them no other arguments, to declare the absurdity of their opinion, than such as they themselves have made use of.  
As long as the same causes continue, it is necessary (as they themselves have said) that the selfsame events should always fall out; and it is impossible that a thing should chance sometimes in one manner, and sometimes in another fashion, when that thing is decreed from eternity how it shall come to pass.  
If this be so, as they have said, it is inavoidably necessary, but that the endeavour of a living-creature, should in all respects and altogether fall out in that one manner, which is agreeable to the unchangeable course of destiny; because the selfsame causes (do continue and) bear rule in it. And if our appetite and our endeavour, doth follow fatal necessity; where then is that thing which (they say) is in our power; seeing the thing that should be in our power, must be free?  
It is free; if (notwithstanding the continuance of the same causes) it be still in our power, to endeavour, or not to endeavour. But if our very endeavouring of a thing, be subject unto a fatal necessity; it is plain, that even those things which belong to our desire and appetite do fall out by destiny, although they be done by us, according to our nature, our desire, and our judgement.  
For if it were possible that the same thing should not come to pass which did come to pass (by the course of destiny) than that proposition of theirs would be false, which affirms that, as long as the same causes do continue about any thing, it is necessary that the self same effects should ensue.  
The like shall happen also to unreasonable-creatures, and to things without life: For, if they say our appetite is in our power; because we have it of nature, (and for not other respect) why should they not say aswell that fire hath burning in its own power (seeing fire burneth naturally) according as Philopater hath in some sort affirmed in his book of destiny.  
These arguments considered, we may affirm, that those things which we do (being compelled thereunto) by destiny, are not things in our own power. For we may as truly say, that the harp, the flute, and all other creatures that are unreasonable, or void of life, have in themselves a power to do some things that we do by the use of them; which were absurdly affirmed.   

CAP. 36.  
I. Of their opinion, who say that all was fore-appointed by destiny; and yet that the effects of destiny are prevented by prayers. II. A quaere, how prayer only, should be in our power, when all other things are foredecreed. III. Of the inequality, and injustice, of this feigned destiny.  
FRom these, we will proceed to examine the opinion of the Egyptian wise men, who say that the destiny proceeding from the constellations hath true effects; and yet may be prevented by prayers made for the averting thereof.  
For they teach that there be certain means ordained whereby men may pacify the Stars, and mitigate their force: and that there are other powers, superiors to them, which are able to change or govern them: and that prayers, and supplications unto the gods for pacification, were devised to that purpose.  
We will show you, that in saying thus, they place destiny among contingent things: Now contingent things are indefinite; and indefinite things are unknown: therefore by these men's opinion, all divination is overthrown: and that especially which is by casting nativities, whereof they make most account of all other, as of a thing forceably and infallibly true.  
If they tells us that the events of the figures (which they set) are very manifest, and well known to those who are skilful; and that God hath hindered the same, when the figure hath not effect according to his proper virtue; we will reply, that it is absurd to account prayer, and the service of the gods only, to be in our power; and no other thing.  
For we will make this quare, and ask them how it come to pass, that all other things (which are to be done or accepted by men) should depend upon such or such a constellation, or affection of the stars; and that prayer only should be in our power? For it is not only doubtful whether this thing itself be so; but as doubtful also, for what cause, and upon what necessity it should be.  
If there be an art, and an orderly way whereby men may attain to those pacifications, which may hinder such things as are effected by destiny: It may be questioned, whether all men may attain this method, or some few only. If all may aspire unto it, than there is a possibility, by that means to give their destiny an utter overthrow, as soon as all have learned that art, which prevents and hinders the effects thereof.  
If some only may attain this means, and not others; we would willingly know what manner of man, and who he is, that shall determine of this thing. For if destiny itself be the cause, that some serve GOD, and some do not so; even that will be another proof, that all things are done by destiny, whereas it appeared by their opinion before mentioned, that our praying, and honouring of the Gods, is in our power, not only no less than destiny; but much more also.  
Now if it be not destiny but some other thing which is cause thereof, than that thing shall rather be destiny: For all the force of destiny consisteth in this, that we either may or may not obtain that which we petition for in our prayers. If we may, then is destiny of no force; and if we may not prevail by prayer, than all is subject unto destiny: and it will so fall out, that in some, all things are done by destiny, and that in some other, destiny effecteth nothing at all (because prayer is prevalent for some and not for others.) And this is evident, that whosoever determines hereof, he is the chief destiny: and so it will be another way declared, that all things are done by destiny (mediately or immediately)  
Moreover, (if truth were in this opinion) he which doth distribute things shall be unjust, whether it be destiny or some other divine power: Seeing the way of serving the gods is not equally and worthily distributed. For why should one be judged worthier than another? Seeing all are the instruments of destiny; and seeing no man doth any thing by a foreintended purpose of his own: or, rather, seeing there is no man which hath any thing left unto his own choice (according to their doctrine.)  
For in things which are so done, none is either just or unjust; and therefore neither worthy, nor unworthy of favour: and whosoever maketh his division unequally (in things of such nature as these) to them, whose case is alone, he (even whosoever he be) is unjust.   

CAP. 37.  
I. Of those who affirm we have power to choose what is to be done; and that the event of our choice depends on destiny. II. Providence and not destiny order the event of things. III. The strife between reason, and lust is made void, if all things be done by destiny  
NOw they who affirm, that the choice of those things which are to be done, is in our power, and that the event of the things chosen depends on destiny (which is the opinion even of the wisest of the Grecians) their judgement, is partly right, and in some part erroneous: For, whereas they place in our power the choice of things to be done, and yet allow not the events of the same things, to be altogether at our dispose, they do very rightly: but in that they attribute them unto destiny, they do not well▪ and their error shall easily be discovered.  
For first they impute imperfection unto destiny, in saying it hath some part, but not all power: And secondly, they err in making it a sequel to our judgement, in saying, that the work of destiny follows our choice. For, if that be so, then destiny seemeth not to move us; but rather to be moved by us: And then, Man is to be preferred, as having a greater power than destiny; because he maketh it, by his choice.  
It is better therefore to say, that Providence is causer of the event of things; because it is wrought rather by providence then destiny; and seeing it is the property of Providence, to distribute unto every one, that which for every one is most expedient. By this means also, the event of the things which are chosen, do fall out sometime in one manner, and sometime in another, according to that which is most expedient.  
If destiny be (as the Stoics define it) A certain concatenation of causes which may not be avoided; or a fast knitting together of causes which may not be altered, and brings to every thing (& conveys to and fro) such effects only, as are according to the motions, and necessity of destiny itself; and not such effects rather, as are most expedient: What will they say then, of such as are blockish, and so foolish that they cannot direct their own choice? whether cometh it of destiny or no, that they are such?  
If it proceed not of destiny; then fools, and blockheads, are without the compass of destiny; and if they have their blockishness by destiny, then doth it necessarily follow that our choice also is not in our power: for if the lack of choice be contained under destiny; than it must needs be, that the faculty of choosing, and the thing to be chosen, must be contained under destiny. And so they run back again to them who affirm, that all things are done by destiny.  
The strife likewise, which is between reason, and lust in the continent, and incontinent man, is to no purpose, if all things be subject unto destiny: For, if it be determined by a fatal necessity, that such a thing must be done and that such a thing must not be done, what use is there of that strife in us (which is aforementioned?)  
But if it be not only fatally determined, that we shall do such a thing; but so ordered also, that we shall do it thus, or thus; what else do they affirm, who are of this opinion, from this, that even our choice is in the number of those things which are subject unto destiny? For, it is our will and our choice which opposeth our lust, getting the victory in the continent, and which is overcome in the incontinent. And so, that which they first proposed, as their opinion, is overthrown; and by that means our choice shall in no case be in our own power.   

CAP. 38.  
I. Of Plato's opinion concerning destiny; and how he agrees or dissents from the truth. II. Of the force of prayer, and of the power which the Godhead hath over destiny. III. The opinion of the Stoics touching the destruction, and restauration of the world, when the planets return to the point, in which they stood at the Creation.  
EXamine we will in this Chapter, the opinion of Plato concerning destiny; for he speaks of a twofold destiny; one in substance, and another in operation.  
He calleth destiny in substance, a certain life, or soul, belonging to the whole world together; and destiny in operation, a certain divine law, by an inevitable decree, which he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a holy decree, that cannot be escaped; & he saith it was given by the first & highest God, unto the soul of the world, for the universal garnishing of all things; and for the governing of all things which are made.  
That which he calleth destiny in operation, he termeth also Providence. For whatsoever is done by destiny, is done also by Providence; though (on the contrary) all things which are done by Providence, are not effected also by destiny.  
For, this divine law (which he saith is both Providence and destiny) comprehends all things in itself; some of purpose, and othersome not of set purpose. It comprehends the chief, or antecedent causes (which are as it were principles) even of purpose; as our condescending unto any thing; our judgement, and our appetite, of desire. But whatsoever followeth like things of necessity, is beside purpose; and that choice of things, to be done, which is in our power, is of purpose.  
Now after those things be determined, which are in our power; upon the selfsame things (as it were beside purpose) follow, saith he, the works of destiny. As for example; It is in our power to set sail; and we have purposed so to do; but saith he, when it is determined that we will put to sea, other things may follow thereupon, namely, the suffering of shipwreck; which was not purposed at all.  
Therefore, he calleth those things beside purpose, which follow, and are consequent to those things (that is to say) to those beginnings, and actions which are purposed by us. So then the principal things, and such as are in our power, be done of purpose: whereas the things that follow upon them, are beside our purpose; and not in our power; but such as necessarily follow.  
For the affirms not that things effected by destiny, are determined from eternity; but they happen afterward, when things which are in our power have gone before. And hereunto agree those common sayings; That the fault is in the chooser, and God is blameless: that, there is none to overmaster virtue; and, that there be divinations. For all this intends nothing else, but to show, that our choice, and some actions according to our choice, are in our power; and that their events, with such things as happen afterward upon them, should necessarily pertain to destiny.  
That this is not truly affirmed, appears by what is formerly expressed. And yet when he calleth destiny the Ordinance and will of GOD, making all things to be subject unto Providence, he differs not much from the divine Scriptures, which teach that Providence alone, is the governess of all things.  
But he dissenteth far from them, when he says that the events do necessarily ensue upon those things which are in our power. For we say that things wrought by Providence are effected, not as necessary, but as contingent: because, if they followed of necessity, than the greatest part of our prayers would be in vain; and according to his opinion our prayers would be available for nothing, but to procure prosperous beginnings to our actions, or to petition that we may choose what is best. For after we have preferred one thing before another, all our praying should be fruitless, because all things by his opinion ensue of necessity, which do afterwards follow.  
But we affirm, that prayer is forcible even in respect of those events. And we say, that it is in the choice of Providence, whether we shall suffer shipwreck or no (when we have purposed to set sail) and that nothing falleth out so necessarily, but that it may either be so, or not so, as GOD pleaseth. For, he is not concluded under any necessity; neither is it lawful to say, that his Will is confined by fatal necessity; seeing he is the Creator of necessity itself.  
It is he who laid that necessity upon the stars, by which they are constrained to keep the same course. It is he that set bounds unto the Sea, and who hath appointed a necessary limitation to universal▪ and general things; which if they will call destiny, because in all respects, and altogether it so falleth out of necessity; as that in succession all things which are made should also be destroyed (and the like) we will not much contend about the same; because we will not contest for the bare names.  
But GOD himself is not only without the compass of all necessity; but he is also the Lord and maker thereof: For, in that he himself is the absolute power of all things; and a nature wherein all power is comprehended; he doth nothing as one subjected either to the necessity of nature, or decree of Law. But all things are in his hand, to do, or not to do; even those things which were otherwise necessary.  
And that this might plainly be declared, he stayed once the courses of the Sun, and of the Moon, which are moved of necessity, and keep always one constant motion: thereby showing, that nothing done by necessity doth confine him; but that according to his power all things are contingent.  
Yet he made such a day but once (as we find it in holy Scripture) that he might only set forth his power, and not dissolve that strong law which was made by him at the first, that the motion of the Stars should be necessary.  
So likewise, he did preserve some from death, as Enoch, and Elias, who were naturally mortal, and liable to corruption; that by all these things we might perceive his power and his will to be irresistible.  
But the Stoics have taught, that when the Planets have wheeled about unto the same point, both in longitude, and latitude, wherein every one of them stood at the Creation, they shall within a certain limitation of time cause all to be set on fire, and destroyed. And then (as they also affirm) the world beginning anew, shall be restored unto the state wherein it was before.  
Yea, they say further, that forasmuch as the stars shall have again the same course; every thing that was in the former circuit shall come to pass again without any alteration. Socrates shall be as he was again, and Plato, and every particular man; having the same friends, and the same Citizens; and that the like things shall befall every one; yea, that every man shall take in hand the same work which he formerly wrought; and that every City, Village, and field shall be brought to the like state again: And that the whole Universe shall be restored unto the former condition again; not one time only, but as often as the revolutions of the Planets do come about to the same point, which revolutions they think shall be infinite and without number.  
They say also, that the gods are not subject to this corruption; and that when they have observed one whole revolution, they know by that circuit, all things that shall come to pass in every succeeding round. For, there shall be (as they dream) no new thing; but every thing which was before, shall be reacted after one and the same sort, without any alteration in the least thing.  
And some have said, that from this restauration, the Christians took occasion to conceive the resurrection: but the were much mistaken; for the Christian verity doth assure us, that the Resurrection shall be perfected but once, and not according to the revolutions of the Stars.   

CAP. 39  
I. Of freewill. II. Of those who deny freewill; To what causes they must of necessity ascribe all things; and what may be inferred thereupon. III. The many absurdities which will follow, if it be denied that man hath freewill.  
MAny are of opinion, that there is nothing at all in our power; and therefore the discourse of freewill; namely of that which is in our power, doth first occasion this question; Whether any thing be in our power or no: Then a second question, to wit, What those things be which are in our power; or wherein freewill consisteth: and thirdly, it gives occasion to inquire, Why God our maker, made us with freewill.  
That we may discourse orderly of these things, we will speak first to the first question; and prove that there is something in our power, even by the confessions of those who have denied the same.  
They affirm, that of things which are made or done, either GOD, or necessity, or destiny, or nature, or fortune, or chance is the cause.  
But the proper work of GOD, is either substance or Providence. The work of necessity is in the motion of those things which are always of one sort. The work of destiny, is in those things which are to be perfected by it of necessity; for in it, things are effected of necessity. The works of nature are generation, augmentation, corruption, plants, and living-creatures. The work of fortune is in things that are very rare, and unexpected.  
For they define fortune to be the concurrence, and meeting of two causes, which had their beginning from our will and choice, and yet produce in the end somewhat else then was intended by the thing done. As when he that is digging of a ditch, finds treasure: For neither he who there laid the treasure, had any purpose it should be so found; neither had the finder any intent to dig for treasure; but the purpose of the one was to take it thence when he himself thought fit; and the intention of the other was to make a ditch; and there fell out another thing beside those which were purposed by them.  
The works of chance are such as befall unreasonable, and inanimate creatures, without nature, or art.  
Now if a man be neither the cause, nor beginning of his own actions, under which of these may we contain the things which are done by him?  
It is not lawful, nor comely to ascribe unto GOD those actions of men which are unclean, or unjust. Neither may we ascribe them to necessity; because they cannot be truly accounted among those things which continue always after one manner. Nor may we impute them to nature; for the works of nature, are living-creatures and plants. Nor to fortune, for the actions of men are not rare or unlooked for. Nor belong they to chance; because things casual belong to inanimate and irrational creatures.  
Therefore it remaineth undeniable, that the man himself which worketh, & accomplisheth such, or such things, is the beginner of his own actions, and hath freewill.  
Moreover, if man be the beginner of no action of his own, all consultation is superfluous in him; for to what end is deliberation, if he have no action in his own power? But it must needs be a very absurd thing to affirm that to be superflous in man, which is best, and most honourable in him.  
If then he do consult, he consults about the doing of some thing; for all deliberation doth concern the execution of some action.  
Moreover, of whatsoever things the faculty of doing the same, is in our power; the acting also of those things, and the exercising of that faculty is in our power. But, a faculty to work according to the virtues, is in our power; therefore the virtues also, are in our power.  
Now that the faculties to work according to virtue are in our power, it is very elegantly declared by Aristotle where he treateth of the moral virtues. That saith he; which we learn by practice, we practise when we have learned it: For while we learn to master our pleasures, we become temperate; and when we are temperate, we become the masters of our pleasures.  
We may argue also in this manner: It is confessed of all, that practice and the exercise of things are in our power: But practice beareth sway in habits; for custom is as it were a purchased nature. If then practise rule the habit, and if practise be in our power, than the habit also must be in our power: yea, and the actions also, whose habits are in our power, (and which are effected according to those habits) must be in our power also; because the actions are conformable to the habits.  
He than which hath the habit of justice, will do just things; and he that hath a habit of injury, will do injurious things. Therefore God hath given us a power to be just or unjust.  
Our counselling also, and our exhorting of one another, do declare that there be some things in our power; for no man doth exhort us not to be hungry, or not to thirst, or to fly in the air; because these things are not in our power. Therefore it is manifest, that those things whereunto our exhortations do serve, are in our power.  
Moreover, if nothing be in our power, than our laws are superfluous; but every nation useth some laws naturally, as knowing, that they have power to do such things as their laws enjoin: And many nations have ascribed the making of their laws to the gods (as the inhabitants of Crete, to jupiter; and the Lacedæmonians to Apollo) therefore the knowledge that such things are in our power is naturally dispersed among all men.  
The like may be inferred upon the praises, or dispraises which follow those things of which we make choice of; and of all those other circumstances (aforementioned) which disprove that all things are done by destiny.   

CAP. 40.  
I. Of such things as are in our power; and wherein our freewill consisteth. II. A reproof aswell of them who conceive that man's freewill extendeth to every thing; as of those who deny him to have any freewill at all. III. The beginnings, or choice both of good and evil things, are in our power, but not their events: that so, neither divine Providence, nor humane faculties, might be superfluous.  
EVidently enough appears it, that some things are in our power, and that we have some actions at our dispose. It now remains that we declare, What things they are which be in our power.  
We say in general, that all things which we do voluntarily be in our power; because it could not else be truly verified that the things were done voluntarily, which were not in our power: and because generally all those things whereupon ensueth praise or dispraise; and those also wherein we use exhortation, or law, are in our power; as is afore declared.  
But things which are properly in our power; are all such things as belong unto the mind; and those whereof we may consult. For our consulting of them doth imply, that it is in our power to execute that which is proposed and consulted of. And we have declared in the former part of this treatise, that consultation, and deliberation, fall out in such things only as are contingent: and that such things only are contingent, which may fall out either this way, or that way, or in a contrary manner.  
It is our mind which maketh choice thereof; & it is the beginning of our action; & those are contingent things, which are in our power: To be moved, or not to be moved; To attempt, or not to attempt; To desire things unnecessary, or not desire them; To lie, or speak truth; To give, or not to give; To rejoice in such things as we ought, or not to rejoice; and all such other things like unto these, wherein consist the works of vice and virtue: For herein consisteth our freewill.  
The Arts also are accounted among such things as may alike fall out, or not fall out: For, every Art brings forth such things as may both be done, and left undone; and such things also, as have the beginning in the doer, and not in the things themselves, which are done: But neither those things which are eternal (and in that respect, things of necessity) neither any other things which are done of necessity, can be said to be done by Art.  
Nor is any of those things said to be done by Art, which are contingent, and may be done otherwise, if they have their efficient cause in themselves; as in living-creatures, and in plants, which are made by nature, not by Art. If therefore the efficient cause of things made by Art, is without themselves; than who is cause of the things made by Art, but the Artificer which made them? And if the making of them belong unto him, then is he the beginning, and cause of his own actions. And therefore also, the working according, to Art, and virtue, and all actions of man's mind, and of reason, are in man's power: and what actions they are, I have declared already.  
Now the most part of men, supposing that we are said to have this freewill in every thing which we do or possess, are therefore offended at this opinion; and not without cause. But, some there be, having more acuteness, who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us (namely, The ways of man are not in his own hand) say thus unto us.  
Good friends, how is the will of man free, seeing his way is not in his own hands? and seeing the thoughts of men are so vain, that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised?  
Many such like things they object, not knowing in what sense, we speak of freewill. For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich, or poor, or always in health, or of a strong constitution of nature; or to rule; or generally to have those good things, which we count as instruments to work things by; or such as are called the gifts of fortune; neither do we account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence: But we affirm those actions only to be in our power, which are according to vice, or virtue; as also, our motions or choice of things; or else such things whereof we may do the contrary, aswell as the things themselves.  
For a certain will or choice goeth before every action▪ and not only the deed, but the affection also is condemned; as may plainly appear in that place of the Gospel, which saith, He who looks upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already with her in his heart. And we read that job sacrificed unto God, for such offences as his children might commit in thought. For indeed the beginning, either of sin, or of doing uprightly is in our will; whereas the doing of the thing itself, is otherwhile permitted by Providence, and otherwhile hindered.  
For, seeing there are some things in our power, and a Providence beside; it is necessary that such things as are done should be done by them both: Because, if they were done by either of them alone, the other should be to no purpose. Therefore in regard all actions are mixed, it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power; another while, that they shall be as providence alone directeth; and sometimes again, both according to Providence, and as we would also.  
And whereas likewise there is sometimes a general, and sometimes a particular Providence; it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things, as it doth in things general. For if the air about us be dry, our bodies are dried also, though not all alike. And if a mother be given to riotous fare, or a distempered diet; even thereby shall her children become distempered in body, and perverse in such things as they attempt.  
It is plain therefore, by what hath been said, that men may fall into a distempered estate of body, either by the general distemperature of the air; or by the diet of parents; or when they spoil themselves by their own voluptuousness; and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves; in such manner, that Providence shall not altogether be the cause of such things.  
If then, the Soul shall yield herself to be overswayed by the temperature of the body, and give place to wrath, or lust; or be pressed down by outward things, as poverty; or lifted up, by riches, or the like: if any evil cometh to the same thereby; it so happened thereunto by the self-will of that Soul. Seeing, if she had not voluntarily yielded herself to those distemperatures, she might have overcome them, and been in good case. For through well ordering the affections of the mind, by a convenient diet, and a good conversation, she might have altered that temperature, rather than have been perverted thereby.  
This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition, and that all such as are not in a good estate, do sin voluntarily (and not by constraint:) And that it is in our power, either to consent, and yield ourselves unto our bodily distemperatures, or to resist, and overcome them.  
Nevertheless, there be many who pretend these distemperatures to be the cause why we do such or such things; and so impute their wickedness, not unto their own will, but to necessity. And therefore they conclude (though very absurdly) that the virtues also, are not in our power.   

CAP. 41.  
I. Of the cause why man was made with free will; and that if it had been otherwise, he had neither been capable of the contemplative, nor practic faculty, nor been a reasonable creature. II. Of the mutability of men and Angels: and of the causes thereof; and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill. III. It is not through any natural defect that men are vicious, but by their own will: And it is here shown also, that man without freewill, could neither have any vice nor virtue.  
SOmewhat remains to be declared, whereby it may be manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him.  
We affirm, that immediately, together with reason this freewill entered into us; and that together with nature, there is ingraffed into created things a mutability, and alteration; especially in those things which are a subject made of matter. For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made; and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the material subject.  
This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants, and living-creatures, which have their abiding either in the earth, in the water, or in the air: For there is in all those a continual mutability.  
Moreover, that our freewill enters into us, together with reason, hath been made plain enough by those things which we have said, to prove that some thing is in our power; as will appear to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose. But because the sequel of this treatise, doth for some respects require the same; perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared.  
Our reason is divided into contemplation, and practise▪ Contemplative reason, is that which concerneth (universally) the nature of things, as they be really; and active reason, is that whereby we deliberate of things, and sets down the right way of putting them into execution.  
The contemplative part is called the mind (or the principal part of the soul) and the active part is termed reason. The one is likewise called wisdom, and the other prudence.  
Now every one that deliberates, doth for this cause deliberate, even for that the choice of such things as are to be done, is in his power; and to the intent that he might by deliberation, make choice of that which is most worthy; and that after he hath so chosen, he might execute the same.  
It is therefore necessary, that he which deliberates should have power over his own deeds: for if he have not power over his own actions; his consultation will be fruitless also unto him. And if these things be so; it will follow, by a necessary consequence, that wheresoever reason is planted, there is likewise freewill. For either he is no reasonable-creature; or else, if he be a reasonable-creature, he hath power over the beginnings of his own actions; and in having that power, hath also freewill.  
It hath been declared also, that things composed of a material subject, have a mutability in them; out of which (together with what hath been said before) it may be inferred, that there must, of necessity, be in man both freewill, and mutability. Mutability, because he is made of matter; and freewill, because he is endued with reason.  
Whosoever therefore finds fault with God, for that he did not so make man at the first, that he might not fall unto vice, but gave him his own choice: Surely, those men are not aware, that they reprove GOD for making man reasonable, and not rather an unreasonable-creature.  
For one of these two is unavoidably necessary. Either man should have been made void of reason; or else being endued with reason, and exercised in action, he must have in him freewill. Yea, and thereupon it follows also of necessity, that every nature endued with reason, hath freewill, and is mutable of his own nature.  
But those natures have especially a mutability in them which are made of a material subject; aswell in respect that they were made, as in regard they were made of matter: whereas those natures which were not made of matter (as the subject) have mutability in them, but in one respect only; namely, in that they were made.  
Moreover, so many of those immaterial natures as were conversant in earthly matters, and intermeddled with such inferior things, as are to be done, by reason of communicating with men; by so much they became more mutable than others (of that immaterial nature) And so many of them as directed the excellency of their nature, to approach near unto God, with an inclination to love him; and to enjoy a blessed estate in the minding and fruition of him; so bending themselves inward, and unto GOD only, that they wholly estranged themselves from outward, and material things. Those (by that means) became so familiar with contemplation, and with GOD, that they still remain without mutation. Having a freewill, in that they are endued with reason; and yet are not now subject unto alteration, for the forementioned causes.  
And this need not be wondered at. For even those men also, which give themselves to contemplation, and sequester themselves from the inordinate love, and meddling in worldly affairs, do and may attain unto an immutable condition, (and unto an estate of grace, from which there is no falling away.)  
Now I do suppose, that this (with what was formerly said) hath sufficiently proved, that in the beginning, all the reasonable creatures were created in so excellent a condition, that if they had remained such as they were made, they should have been void of all vice, and that their viciousness (who have been corrupted) came unto them by their own will. For it so falleth out, that they who remain in the condition wherein they were placed by their creation, are settled in a most blessed estate.  
Of incorporeal natures, Angels alone have been altered: yet not all of them: but some part; even so many only, as creeping doneward departed from that inclination which they had to supreme things, and the contemplation of GOD.  
It is made plain by the things afore proved, that the powers of our will are mutable; because we are of a mutable nature: And yet no man can blame GOD, as if he were the cause that we are evil, in regard the faculties are mutable, which he gave unto us.  
For vices consist not in our faculties▪ but in habits; and our habits depend upon our will▪ and it is therefore the fault of our will, that we are evil, and not (originally) of our nature. But our meaning shall be more plainly understood by this that follows.  
We have said hereto fore, that a faculty is a power whereby we are able to put in execution whatsoever we do. And in all the faculties belonging to our choice, the selfsame concerneth both the contraries (as for example) there is the same faculty of lying, and of speaking truth; one and the same faculty of temperance, and wantonness.  
But it cannot be, that in contrary things there should be the same habit; as in wantonness and temperance; or in lying, and speaking truth; because of contrary things, the habits are contrary. For the habit which concerns temperance, belongeth to virtue: but all intemperance is of vice; and therefore the vices do not depend upon the faculties, which are in us; but upon our habits, and our will: And it is not a faculty, which maketh us wantoness, or liars, but our will. For if we would, we might speak the truth, and not lie.  
Seeing then, vice is not a faculty, but a habit; God is not cause of our naughtiness, which giveth us the faculty; but a habit (is cause thereof) which being in us, proceedeth from ourselves, and by ourselves, & for ourselves. For if we would endeavour thereafter, we might instead of an evill-habit, attain unto the contrary thereof.  
Now a faculty doth herein differ from a habit; all faculties are natural, but habits are procured by use. Yea; and here also they differ; our faculties are in us without teaching, and our habits are gotten by learning, and custom. If therefore the faculties that are in us, be natural, and without teaching; and the habits gotten by use and learning; than it cannot be that our (original) nature should be the cause our wickedness; but rather our evil education, whereby we have gotten an evil habit.  
For that our habits come unto us by custom, it hath been already declared; and that our faculties are in us by nature, it is evident by this; that all men have the same faculties (except those which are someway maimed or lame.) And that the habits are not natural, is as evident by this, that all have not the same habits; but some of them habits of one sort, and some of another: whereas things that are natural, are found in all.   

CAP. 42.  

SECT. 1.  
I. Of Providence; and first, that there is a providence, and for what good causes, both Jew and Christian ought to believe it. II. The same is illustrated to heathen men, by arguments and demonstrations agreeable to their knowledges. III. Proofs thereof, by things also generally confessed.  
IT is already sufficiently proved, that man hath freewill; as also wherein his freewill consisteth, and for what cause he was created with freewill.  
Now forasmuch as every one who purposeth to murder a man, doth not always put the same in execution; but sometime fulfilleth his murderous intent, and sometime not, because his purpose being hindered, hath not effect according thereunto: And whereas we have said that providence is cause thereof, & not destiny; It followeth consequently, after the Tract of things which are in our power, that we speak next of Providence.  
We will divide our discourse into three parts; the first, proving that there is a Providence; the second, showing what Providence is; and the third, What things belong unto Providence.  
As for the jews, unless they be mad, they cannot be ignorant that there is a Providence, knowing the wonders which GOD wrought in Egypt; and hearing of those things which happened unto their Fathers in the wilderness; wherein most manifest visions of Providence appeared more clearly unto them, than by those things which we now see with our eyes. And they had also many evident proofs that things were done by Providence, both in their Prophets, and in their Babylonish captivity, which leave not any just occasion for them, to be doubtful of the same. As for the Christians; they have not only all those things which happened unto the jews, to preach unto them that there is a Providence; but also that admirable work of Providence, above all other most divine, which containeth in it that exceeding great favour towards man, which passeth common belief; I mean, that GOD should take unto him a Body for our sakes.  
But seeing we must reason the matter, not with such only, but also with heathen men. We will therefore endeavour to prove there is a Providence by such other things as are also in credit with them. And that there is a Providence, may be proved by those arguments whereby we prove that there is a God.  
For concerning the continuance of things▪ and especially such as are subject to generation, and corruption; and the situation, and order of all things that are, being always preserved after one manner; and the course of the Stars nothing altering at any time; and the circuit of the year, and the return of the season of the year; and the equality both of the night and of the days of the year, so that either of them is both increased and diminished in the same proportion of time: how might all this continue under so conformable a government, if it had none to rule it by his Providence?  
Moreover, the punishments which follow sin; or (which is of more import) the detecting of murders, and offences themselves, which are often bewrayed (when there is no witness of the deed) by some circumstances; do show that there is a Providence.  
Both the Scriptures of the Hebrews, and the writings of the Heathen, are full of stories to this purpose. Of this nature is that which is written of Susanna: and in profane books, there is a story to the same purpose of Ibicus the Poet.  
For, when this Poet was murther●d by certain ruffians, where none were in presence, either to assist him, or bear witness of the assault which they made upon him; he seeing Cranes not far from him, cried out and said, oh ye Cranes, be you revengers of this murder.  
And so it fell out, that when the Magistrates of the City where he lived, endeavoured to seek out the committers of that murder, and could not find them: The people being assembled together into a common place for that intent; the Cranes flew over them; whereupon the murderers espying them, laughed outright, and said, lo, where they fly that should revenge the death of Ibicus: which being overheard by one that sat next unto them, and declared to the Magistrates, the said murderers were thereupon examined, and confessed the fact.  
There be very many of such like things, recorded by ancient writers, which if a man should collect together, would enlarge this Treatise to an infinite length.  
And though all offenders be not descried; but, that some do quite escape the public stroke of justice; yet let no man for that cause deny that there is a Providence. For the Providence of GOD, taketh care of men, (and brings them to repentance) not one way alone; but after diverse and sundry manners.  
Furthermore, the composure, and proportionable knitting together of those bodies, which are subject unto generation, and corruption, and there being kept always alike (according to their several kinds) is not the least argument proving that there is a Providence, seeing the great care (and wisdom) of divine Providence is very manifest in every part of the body; as they who will take pains to peruse them, may learn out of those many Treatises, which are made upon that subject. Yea, the varieties which are in the colours of living-creatures, and their keeping always the same comely mixture and proportion, are proofs of a Providence.  
And among such things as are generally confessed by all men, one evident proof declaring there is a Providence, is that universal consent of men in all times, and of all nations, that we ought to serve GOD, both by Prayers, and Oblations. For if there were not a Providence to govern the affairs of this world, who would pray? or to whom should we make our petitions?  
Moreover, that earnest desire which is in us, to do good unto others (and which they naturally, and very diligently endeavour, whose minds are not perverted) is a plain demonstration that there is a Providence. For having received a benefit which we are not able to recompense, we are the more desirous to be somway helpful to them, who are not able to requite us for the same.  
If Providence were taken away, than every man should be permitted to be injurious, according to the power he hath to do wrong. There would also be no giving of alms, nor any fear of GOD among men; and therewithal virtue and piety would be quite rooted out. For if GOD had not a provident care of every thing; neither did punish evil-doers; nor encourage those that were well-disposed nor defended innocents from oppression; Who would worship GOD? or who would serve him, that could be no way profitable unto them?  
If there be no Providence, all prophecies, and the foreknowledge of things, are likewise overthrown. But even those things which happen out before our eyes, almost every day, are manifestations of the same: For, GOD often appeareth unto us in our necessities (by supplying our wants in an unexpected manner) many have been cured of their infirmities, by that which hath been revealed unto them in dreams; many predictions of things to come have been truly uttered in all ages. And many who have embrued their hands in innocent blood, or committed such like heinous offences, have been horribly terrified night and day.  
From the goodness of God, his Providence may also be inferred; for he is the most excellent Good; and as he is good, he is inclined to be good and beneficial to others; and if he be inclined to be beneficial to others, he is inclinable also, to have a Providence over others.  
What need I speak here of those works which belong unto the Creation? of their proportion? of their harmony? of their situation? of their order? or of the use whereunto every thing serveth in the whole world? seeing all things may evidently appear to have been perfected in such manner, that nothing should have been in good plight, if it had been otherwise then it is now: and that nothing can well be added, nor any thing be conveniently wanting in any of those things which were made throughout the world: For, both by wisdom, and providence, all things therein were created in a comely and perfect manner.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Of the difference between Providence, and Creation; and of their distinct works. II. Of the wonderful Providence of GOD, in the manifold, and unlike visages of men. III. The same Providence is illustrated by the great diversity of colours whereby the several species of every kind of living-creatures are distinguished.  
BUt we will defer the full explanation hereof, until we shall have occasion to speak of the Creation, lest we should fall into that oversight whereinto those writers have slipped; who extol GOD's creation instead of his Providence; when his Providence was their Theme. For though indeed Creation gives us an occasion to treat of Providence; yet so great is the difference betwixt them, that they are far from being one.  
It is the work of Creation to make well those things which are made; but it is the part of Providence to conserve and take care for such things. And these two are not always altogether in one; as we may perceive by those men who are coversant in arts and mysteries. For, some when they have made a thing well, give over there, and take no more care for the thing which they have made; as Carpenters, and Painters, and the makers of other handicraft works: and some other, do no more but provide, and take care for the preservation of those things which are under their charge; as herdsmen, and shepherds.  
These things considered, it will become us, when we treat of Creation, to show that all the things which were made, were exceeding well-made: and to declare when we come to speak of Providence, that God was diligent in the preservation of those things which he had well created.  
By this providence it comes to pass, that men beget men, that beasts are engendered of beasts; and that every thing springs from his own, and not from any strange seed. And whosoever shall aver, that every thing (after it is once made) proceeds forward as in a certain race; he cannot choose but confess also, that after a thing is created, there must be always a providence to govern the same. For in that the thing created proceedeth on in a course, it is even thereby manifested, that together with creation, there was laid a foundation of providence, to whom belongs the governing of all things after they are created: and he saith (in effect) that he which first made all things, and he which governs them by his providence, when they are made, is but one, and the same GOD.  
Whosoever beholds the visages of men, to be so many thousands, and yet to differ so much from each other, as that no one is like any of the other in all respects; he cannot choose but admire the work; and if he well consider the cause of it, shall easily find that it is divine providence by whom so many different, and distinct features and countenances, were brought forth.  
For if our visages should be all of the same form and moulding without any alteration, how great a confusion would there follow? In how much darkness and ignorance should man be kept? None should know his familiar acquaintance, from a stranger, nor be able to discern a wicked enemy from an honest friend; but all things would be confounded together in one mass, according to the opinion of Anaxagoras.  
Moreover, if this had been so, there had not been any cause why men should have been forbidden to company with sisters or mothers: neither would many have refrained from theft, rapine, or from offering any open violence or injury to others, if they could but contrive their present escape: For though afterward they were seen, none should be able to distinguish them from other men.  
Neither could any law be executed; nor any common wealth well ordered; neither could fathers or children know each other; neither could any thing pertaining to humane affairs be well, or orderly affected; because men should be as it were blind, not discerning between man and man; and be no way helped by their eyes, except it were in discerning the age or quantity.  
This benefit we gain by providence, that it prevents these inconveniences and confusions, by making a variety in the visages of men, always, in all places, and at all times. And it is a strong argument also to prove that this providence extendeth unto every particular; in that every particular man is known one from another, by his portraiture, by his proportion, by his visage, and by his voice.  
For man's visage is not the only mark whereby we may discern him; but (as if that were not enough) providence hath added another distinction for our more advantage; even the diversity of colours also, to the intent that the weakness of our nature might be assisted diverse ways: And I suppose likewise, that many of those living-creatures, which in their general kind, have in appearance but one shape (and colour) as Daws and Crows; yet there may be certain visible differences, whereby they might be distinguished by good heed; and whereby they discern each other when they should couple together. For though many Daws and Crows be gathered together in one place; yet in their coupling, they discern each other; and every male and female know their own mate.  
But how could they know each other, if every one of them had not some proper distinction in the shape; which (though not easily perceived by us) might be well enough discerned by them, through a natural instinct; they being creatures of one kind?  
Lastly, the signs, and oracles, and sooth-saying, and wonders, which are from above (for now I direct their discourse to heathen philosophers) and which (as they affirm) do by their own force make good the events of such things as are declared by them, have (no doubt) their significations, by the virtue of providence; and have thereby also, a true effect, according to the same significations.    

CAP. 43.  
This Chapter declares, what Providence is; and that it is necessary & convenient the Creator, and ruler of all things should be One.  
VEry plainly may it be manifested that there is a providence; both by arguments already produced, and by others which we shall have occasion to mention hereafter: we will now therefore, declare what providence is.  
Providence is a heedful provision for all things, proceeding from GOD. Some thus define it. Providence is the will of GOD, whereby all created things receive a government fit for them.  
Now if Providence be the will of GOD, it is necessary that all things should be ordered as reasonably, as excellently, and as decently as the nature of the Godhead requires; which is after so good and perfect a manner as that nothing may possibly receive a better order: For neither is it a thing of good consequence nor agreeable to decency, that one should make things, and another take the care of their preservation and government; seeing it were but an argument of weakness to have it so.  
Many types and expressions of that which we have said, are ingraffed in living-creatures: For every thing which breedeth aught, provides food also for the thing bred thereby; and man provides for all other things also, belonging to the life of him whom he hath begotten, so far forth as his ability doth extend. And all creatures which make not provision for their young, do therefore not make it, because their weakness is a hindrance thereunto.  
Therefore it is truly declared, that GOD is he whose Providence concerneth all: and that Providence is the will of GOD.   

CAP. 44.  

SECT. 1.  
I. It is here showed wherein providence consisteth; Plato's opinion concerning the same, and how far his tenet is allowable. II. The opinions of the Stoics, of Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, touching Providence, and the absurdities ensuing. III. The opinions also of Aristotle, Euripides, and Menander; and the refutation of them.  
SInce we have showed that there is a Providence, and also what it is; we will now declare, in what things, that providence beareth sway; whether in things universal, or things particular, or in both.  
Plato affirms that it hath government both of universal, and particular things; and he divideth his discourse of providence into three parts. The first he calls the providence of the first and supremest GOD, and that this providence is especially over the IDEAE (that is, the most beautiful forms of things:) and in the next place, over the whole world in general, as, over the heavens, the stars, and all general things; even over the predicaments of substance, quantity, and quality, with such like: yea, and over all things which are especially contained under those predicaments.  
His opinion likewise is, that the providence of a second degree of gods, which (as he conceiveth) turn about the Spheres; hath rule over the engendering of all the base living-creatures, & of plants, and of all things which are subject unto generation, and corruption. Yea, and Aristotle himself ascribes the engendering of such things, to the Sun, and unto the Zodiac circle.  
That which according to Plato's opinion, is the third providence, hath predominancie over the events and ends of those things which are begun or perfected by us; as also over the course and condition of man's life; and over all those natural and material things; and over such as are called instrument all things, whether they be good or evil. And the principal agents in this providence, he supposed to be certain Angels (or spirits) ordained to be always conversant upon the earth, and to have the charge over those things which men do.  
But he affirms that the second and the third providence also, have their whole essence from the first; so that all things are in effect, governed by the power of the chiefest God, who ordained the first, the second, and the third, to be employed in the well-ordering, and governing of things.  
Now this is praise worthy in Plato, that he referreth all unto GOD, and affirms all providence to depend upon his will. But whereas he says there is a second providence, committed unto those which turn the heavens about (as he hath said) we commend him not in so affirming. For (if any such were) that which they performed, is not a work of providence; but rather, a work of necessity, whereunto they were destinated. For, let them be figured how they will, it must necessarily follow, that things must both be done as they were done; and that they might not be in any other manner than they are. And I have already showed, that nothing done by providence, is subject unto necessity.  
Now the Stoic Philosophers (who defend as an undeniable truth, that there is a destiny, necessitating all things, and that some things are also in our power) do leave no place at all for providence; and indeed they overthrew (as is before declared) by affirming there is destiny, so much of their own opinion, as averrs that things are in our power.  
Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, are of opinion that there is no providence either of universal, or of particular things. And Epicurus hath expressed his meaning to this purpose.  
The nature (saith he) which is blessed and incorruptible; neither is of itself troubled with any business; neither occasioneth any other to be troublesomely employed: and therefore, neither is angry for any thing; nor favoureth any thing; because all such like things, do betoken weakness. Yea the gods cannot be angry, in regard anger never chanceth unto any, but when something succeedeth contrary unto their will, which thing cannot at any time happen unto the gods.  
The opinion of these men is conformable to the principles which are devised by themselves. For, it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no providence to govern any thing, who affirm that the world was made by hap-hazzard. For how should those things which had no Creator, have any providence to preserve or govern them? Seeing it is plain that such things must be confusedly carried to & fro, by hap-hazzard, which were made by chance, and at adventure, in the beginning.  
We must therefore withstand them in their first opinion, as we have done already (and so disprove the same) that it may be well manifested there is a providence. And for that cause we will refer the confutation of these men, unto a fitter opportunity; and proceed to examine the opinion of Aristotle; and others, who say that particular things are not governed by any providence.  
For Aristotle in the sixth book of his Ethics to Nichomachus, hath covertly delivered that particular things are governed by nature only. For, nature being (saith he) divine, and ingraffed in all things which are engendered, doth naturally administer a way unto each, to choose which is most expedient for it, and to avoid such things as are hurtful thereunto. And (indeed) every living-creature (as we have showed heretofore) maketh choice of such nourishment, as is agreeable unto it; earnestly pursuing what is convenient for it; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diseases thereof.  
Euripides, and Menander, have in some places affirmed, that the principal parts of the mind, which is in every man, doth by providence govern each man, and no GOD at all. But the mind is conversant in those things only which are in our power; and they are either in actions which may be done, or in the arts, or in contemplation: Whereas providence is busied in things which are not in our power; as to be rich, or to be poor; to be in health, or to be sick; wherewith neither the mind, nor nature, (as Aristotle himself holdeth opinion) have any thing to do, in that sense.  
For the works of nature are evident: and if a murderer be sometime punished, and sometime let go without punishment, here is that pertinent either to the mind, or unto nature (as it is unto providence?) except some will affirm that things belonging to nature, and unto the mind, are pertinent unto providence; and that things which follow upon the choice of the mind, and operations of nature, do afterward belong unto destiny; which being granted, all that should be in our power, would be quite overthrown.  
But the matter is not at that point. For (as hath been already declared) every thing belonging unto the mind (whether it be for practise or contemplation) is all in our power. Neither do all things which are contained under providence, belong to nature; though every thing belonging to nature, is governed by providence. For many things wrought by providence, are not the works of nature; as I have declared in discovering the murderer; neither is nature in all points, the same with providence, though it be (as indeed it is) a part of providence. And therefore these men do ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature, and unto the mind.   

SECT. 2.  
I. Of their absurd opinion, who affirm that GOD hath care of universal, but not of particular things. II. The error of the vulgar, concerning blessedness; and of their causeless, and impious reprehension of GOD'S Providence. III. Of the blasphemies which must consequently follow the denial of GOD'S Providence, over particular things.  
THere be some who affirm, that God so provides for the continuance of all things which he hath created, that nothing shall fail which he hath made; and that his providence extends to this thing alone, without regarding particulars, which are left by him to succeed as mere casualty shall bring them about.  
Hereupon (as they conceive) it cometh to pass, that so many injuries, so many murders, and (in brief) that so much wickedness, and oppression is increased among men: yea, thereupon it cometh (say they) to pass, that some of them are punished, some unpunished, and that little or nothing is performed, either according to right reason, or the Canons of Law.  
For, how (as they think) can it be possible that God hath care of any thing, when as neither law, nor true judgement beareth sway? but where the contrary hath rather the chief rule? and where the best men are for the most part wronged, oppressed, and plunged into innumerable afflictions; while Tyrants and wicked men are advanced to offices, to powerful dignities, to riches, and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life?  
But they who speak in this manner, are not only ignorant of many other things, that are expressed in our discourse of providence; but estranged also to the immortality of the soul: For, supposing the soul to be mortal they shut up all things belonging unto man within the compass of this life; and (judging perversely of those things which are good) they imagine that such as abound in riches, and bear great sway by the places of authority, and vaunt of other such like temporal (or material) commodities, are the only blessed and happy men.  
But of the virtues of the mind (which exceed by many degrees all bodily and external things) they make no account at all. Howsoever those commodities are the best, which belong unto the best things. And in that respect, virtue as far surpasseth riches and health, and such like, as the soul is more excellent than the body: And therefore also, virtue aswell alone, as together with other things, makes a man to be blessed.  
Virtue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude, as a thing of two else, or the like; but alone, and by itself, it is considerable according to an indefinite circumscription, as a heap. For if from a heap (which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription) you may take away two bushels (which is a finite quantity) two bushels is indeed taken from the heap: yet that which is left continueth still to be an an heap.  
In like manner, if from virtue (considered in its own indefinite amplitude) you take away all the good things that are bodily or external (which are but finite things) and leave the virtue only, (which is an indefinite good) the blessedness remaineth still entire; because virtue, even of itself, is perfectly sufficient to blessedness. And therefore every good man is blessed (though no external good be left him) and every wicked man is miserable, though he hath all those things happened together, which are called the goods of Fortune.  
The multitude not knowing thus much, do think that they only are blessed, who have all things at will, for their bodily delight, and abound in riches; and they can oft find fault with providence which governeth our affairs, not with respect unto those things only which are apparent unto us, but with regard unto those also, which are according to the foreknowledge of GOD.  
For GOD foreseeing, that it would be expedient for him to be poor, who is now honest and good, (and that riches coming fast upon him, would corrupt his mind) doth keep him in that poverty, which is most convenient for the chief good of that man. And in regard God foresaw also, that the rich, man would be grievous to others in the want of riches (by committing robberies, murders, and other great outrages) he suffered him to enjoy riches.  
Poverty hath been many times profitable also, in making us to bear the loss of our children with more contentedness; and in preventing the vexations which might happen by wicked servants; and perhaps their lives would have been more bitter to us then their deaths, if our children had lived to be wicked; or if we should have had false and thievish servants. We foreseeing nothing that is to come; but beholding only the things present, cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present.  
Thus much we have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GOD'S providence; and against whom this part of Scripture may well be applied, Shall the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus? For it is an arrogance to be abhorred, that he who dares not find fault with an earthly Lawgiver, should prescribe laws to GOD, and object against the works of his providence.  
But we will forbear to meddle further with such extravagancies, (or to speak more properly, with such impieties) and proceed in disproving them, who say, that particular things are not governed by any providence, and yet allow that universal, and general things, are governed by a providence. For no man can allege more than these three causes, to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things.  
Either it must be because GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things; or because he will not; or because he cannot. But nothing is more estranged from that blessed Essence, than ignorance, and unskilfulness: For It is knowledge, and science, and wisdom itself. Nay, there is none among men, so ignorant (if he be in his wits) but knows, that if all particular things should be destroyed, the general things could not possibly consist; seeing universal things, are made up of particulars. Yea, all the particular things, and the general things are equal, and converted, & destroyed, and preserved together. If therefore particular things perish, the universal will also perish. And there is no reason why we should imagine that all singular things could escape destruction, if no care were taken of them from above.  
Now whereas to avoid this objection, they grant that GOD'S providence extendeth to this only; that individuals shall be providently preserved, so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of general things; they have said enough (though they be not aware thereof) to prove that there is, also, some providence over individuals. For (as they themselves have said in effect) GOD by preserving the species, preserveth also the kinds.   

SECT. 3.  
I. Of the unreasonableness of their opinion, who think that God despiseth to take care of particular things. II. Of God's undeniable ableness to govern individuals; and of the capableness which particulars have of the divine providence. III. Man's readiness to call upon God in sudden extremities (as it were by natural instinct) is an argument of providence.  
SOme there be who (although they confess that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for particular things) do affirm, that he will not assume the care of them. Now every one that will not do a thing; either will not do it, because of sloth, or else for that it is not comely for him so to do.  
No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD; For sloth is bred of these two; pleasure, and fear; and every one that is slothful, is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease (or pleasure) or else discouraged by fear: and to conceive either of these to be in GOD, were an impious absurdity.  
If they that will not be so profane to lay slothfulness to GOD'S charge, shall say it is undecent for GOD, and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessedness, to descend so low and unto such vile & small things (or to be as it were profaned by the absurdities, and obscenities of those material things which depend upon the will of man; and that therefore he will not take upon himself the government of such matters) they (not heeding it) impute unto GOD, in so saying, two very faulty things, pride, and impurity.  
For either the Creator despiseth to take on himself the government and administration of individuals through haughtiness: (which is most absurd to affirm) or else through fear of being defiled, as they speak. And that is no less absurd than the other. For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such, that they can exhale naturally all moisture, even from dunghills when they shine upon them, and that neither the Sun, nor his beams are any whit contaminated, or defiled thereby, but keep nevertheless their own purity: how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted, by those things which are below? Surely these cannot be the conjectures of men, that have any knowledge of what is pertinent unto the nature of GOD.  
For the Godhead is untouchable, uncorruptible, not possibly to be contaminated, and above all alteration: But pollution and such like things are the works of change, and betoken alteration.  
And how can it be counted other then most absurd, that an artificer (of what art soever) and especially a Physician, taking care of general things, should heedlessly pass over things particular? without caring to show his art in them (though things of the least consequence) seeing he cannot choose but know that every part standeth in some stead unto the whole? much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion; that God who is the Creator of all, should be more unskilful than an artificer; and what else can be alleged, if he be willing, but that he cannot take the care of particulars? And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD, then to say he is weak, and lacketh ability to do well?  
For two other causes, GOD'S providence is by some judged not to be exercised in particular things. The one is, because the nature of God (as they think) serveth not thereunto; the other is, for that they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence.  
But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to govern by his providence, they themselves (who have denied it) do implicitly confess, when they affirm that his providence ruleth universal things; especially seeing the inferior things are not able to mount up, unto such as are much above them; whereas the power of those which are superior, descendeth even unto the lowest, (even to things insensible) for their preservation: yea, all things depend upon the will of GOD, and draw from thence, their continuance, and well-being.  
And that the nature of individuals (though infinitely multiplied) is capable of being governed by Providence; it is plain by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority. For, some of them, as Bees and Ants, and diverse others, which being assembled together, are continued under certain Captains (or guides) whom they obediently follow: But this is best perceived if we look into the government of commonwealths▪ and the conversation that is amongst men: For it is plain, that it admits the administration and care, both of Lawgivers, and also of subordinate magistrates; and how can that which is capable of such things, be unfit, to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator?  
This also is no small argument, that there is providence over particular things, even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in men: which is evident, when we are brought to any great extremity; for we then sly immediately unto GOD by prayer, as if without teaching, it were naturally written in our hearts, that help were to be sought of GOD.  
Nature except it have been taught, cannot of itself lead us unto that, the doing whereof is not according to nature: neither doth it move us to fly thither for assistance, where none is to be had: yet when any great affliction, or fear suddenly oppresseth us; we cry out unto GOD before we be aware; and before we have had time to bethink ourselves what we have to do. Now, every natural consequence, is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction.   

SECT. 4.  
I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error, who thought there was no Providence ruling individuals. II. How men ought to behave themselves in the search of God's providence, which is beyond their comprehension. III. Of Divine permission, and the manifold species thereof.  
THe occasions & ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things, are these. First, they conceived the soul to be mortal, and that it perished with the body. And secondly, because these men could not comprehend by their understanding and reason, how there should be any providence ruling individuals.  
But that the soul is not mortal, and that all things pertaining unto man, are not shut up within the compass of this life, it appeareth (even to heathen men) both by the opinions of the wisest among the Grecians, who taught the transmigration of souls from body to body; as also by the places which they affirmed to be allotted out, unto the Souls departed, according to their good or evil course in this life; and by those punishments wherewith souls are (as they hold) punished by themselves, for the offences they have committed.  
For these things, although they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects; yet in this they are true, and their authors do all agree therein, that the soul remaineth after this life, and shall come to judgement.  
But if we cannot attain unto the reason of that governance which providence hath over particular things; which indeed we cannot, as is employed by this text: How unsearchable are thy judgements, and thy ways past finding out! Let us not thereupon conclude, there is no such providence: For no man ought to affirm there is neither sea, not sand, because he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea, and of the number of the sands: seeing by the same rule, they might aswell say that there is neither man, nor any other living-creature, because they know not the number either of the men, or of the living-creatures.  
Particular things are to us infinite: Things which are unto us infinite, and also unknown unto us; and therefore, though universals may be (oftentimes) comprehended by our understanding, yet individuals are not possibly comprehensible thereby.  
There is in every man a double difference; one in respect of other men; and another in respect of himself: yea, there is in every man great differences, and alterations even in respect of himself. Every day; as, in the manner of his life; in his actions, (or affairs) in his necessities, in his desires; and in all things which do happen, or pertain unto him.  
It is not much otherwise with an irrationall-creature; for according to the manifold necessities, and occasions thereof, it is very speedily carried hither and thither; and soon altered again as other opportunities require.  
These things considered, that Providence which is able to keep a continual course with every one of those infinite and incomprehensible particulars (which are so differing also, so changeable, and of so many fashions) must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all, and every one of those individuals: and extended more infinitely than those things are, whereunto it should reach.  
And if this Providence must be so fit, and so infinite in regard of the infinite difference of individuals: no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite; and if it be infinite, it cannot possibly be comprehended by us. And it becomes not us to deny that gracious providence which governs all things, because our ignorance is unable to comprehend it. For those things which we suppose to be amiss, are known well enough unto the wisdom of the Creator, to be well ordered.  
Because we are ignorant of their occasions, we causelessly judge many things to be imprudently done; and that which chanceth unto us in other things, by reason of our ignorance, falleth out also in the works of providence; for we do after the same sort conceive of those things which belong to providence; receiving by obscure likelihoods, and by conjectures, certain forms or shadows of the works thereof, by such things as we have seen.  
We say therefore, that some things are done by God's permission; and this permission is of many sorts: For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery, to declare unto others, that virtue which is concealed as in job.  
He doth also permit some absurd things; that by the act which appeareth to be absurd, some great and wonderful matter may be brought to pass, as the salvation of men by the Cross.  
He permits likewise the blessed Saints to be afflicted for another end; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience, and that the loftiness of the mind might be abated; as when St. Paul was buffeted by Satan.  
Sometimes also, one man is rejected, and left as desolate for a time; that others considering his case, might be instructed, and amended thereby. As in the example of Lazarus and the rich man; for, when we see any man afflicted, our hearts are naturally touched therewith, according as Menander hath very well expressed: 
By seeing others feel the Rod,  
We tremble with a fear of GOD.   
Otherwhile, again, one man is afflicted for the glory of another; and neither for his own sin, nor the sin of his Parents: as, he that was blind from his birth, for the glorifying of the Son of man.  
It is permitted also that some should be persecuted, to be a pattern of constancy unto others; and that when their glory is exalted, others might be encouraged to suffer in the like case, in hope of the glory to come; and for the blessedness which is expected after this life; as in the Martyrs, and in those who have yielded up their lives for their Country, for their kindred, or for their masters.   

SECT. 5.  
I. One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another, without infringing the Justice of divine Providence. Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions. II. Death, or sufferings are no disadvantages to good men; neither are the unlawful actions of the wicked, justifiable, though Providence convert them to good ends.  
NOw, if any one think it against reason, that one man should be afflicted for the amendment of another; let him know that this life, is (not the perfection of man's happiness) but a place of wrestle, and of striving for mastery, in respect of Virtue: And the greater the labours and sufferings are, the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtained: because the recompense of Rewards, is according to the measure of Patience.  
Saint Paul was contented to undergo the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he suffered, that he might obtain the greater, and more perfect Crown of a Conqueror: (which he himself confesseth to be more than all our sufferings can merit) and therefore the works of Providence are justly and very decently performed.  
A man may the better allow this to be so, (and conceive that GOD governs all things, so well and so fitly, that the nature of each thing cannot more desire) if he do but propose unto himself the believing of these two things which are generally confessed among men: namely, that GOD, only, is good and wise: For, in that he is Good, it is agreeable unto his goodness to employ his providence over all things; and in that he is wise, he hath a regard to perform them wisely and exactly: because, if he used not his Providence, he could not be good: and if he did not use it well, he could not be wise.  
He therefore, that gives his mind to consider discreetly of these matters, will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence; neither speak evil thereof without due examination: but rather accept of all things, as exceeding well performed: and marvel at their admirable decency and perfection, though the ignorant multitude judge according to a false appearance: For in conceiving otherwise, we bring upon our heads (besides the guilt of blasphemy) great blame for our sottish presumption.  
Now, in that we say, all things are done well, we justify not the naughtiness of men, or of such evil works as are in our power to do, or leave undone; but, we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our power. For, if any man object and say, How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert? why, if they were unjustly condemned, did not God's just providence hinder those murders? and if they deserved to be so put to death, why are not they without blame who caused them to be slain?  
To this we answer, that the murderers of such men were injurious in slaying them; and that they which were so slain, were slain either for their desert, or their profit Sometime deservingly, for evils committed by them in secret: and sometimes for their profit: God's providence, thereby preventing either future sins, or worse mischiefs to come; and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortened. Thus was it with Socrates, and the Saints.  
But, they who slew these men, did not slay them for any such cause; neither was it lawfully done; but out of the corruption of their own minds, and for gain and robbery: For, the Act is in man's power; but what shall follow upon the Act, (as whether we shall be slain or no) is not as he will: neither is any death evil, except for sin only, as is manifest by the death of the Saints.  
But, wicked men, although they die in their beds on a sudden, and without pain, do nevertheless die an evil death, which brings them unto an evil burial: I mean, to be buried in their sin; yet whosoever killeth any man murtherously, doth wickedly in so doing.  
If he killeth any one for that which deserveth death; he is then to be accounted among hangmen and executioners. If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slain, he is to be reputed among cruel and wicked murderers.  
The like may be said of them who murder their enemies, or oppress them by extreme servitude, or use any manner of inhuman cruelty, against them whom they have overcome.  
They also are as little to be justified, who seek the enriching of themselves, by extorting other men's goods: for, though it may be expedient for those, from whom they were extorted, that they should be deprived of them; yet, they which wrested away more than their own, were unjust, in so so doing. For, they take them out of a covetous desire of those good, and not for that it was expedient for them, whom they dispossessed of such things.  
Glory be to God.  
FINIS.