The Case of shipmoney Briefly Discoursed, ACCORDING TO THE Grounds of Law, policy, and Conscience.  
AND MOST humbly presented to the Censure and Correction of the High Court of PARLIAMENT, Nov. 3. 1640.  
Printed Ann. Dom. 1640.   

THE Case of SHIP-MONEY Briefly discoursed,  
GREAT ● Fires happening in towns or Cities, are sometimes the cause that other contiguous houses are spoilt and demolished, besides those which the flame itself ceazes: So now, in the case of shipmoney, not only the judgement itself which hath been given against the subject, doth make a great g●p and breach in the rights and Franchises of England, but the arguments and pleadings also, which conduced to that judgement, have extended the mischief further, and scarce left anything unviolated. Such strange contradiction there hath been amongst the pleaders, and dissent amongst the Judges, even in those laws which are most fundamental, that we are lef● in a more confused uncertainty of our highest privileges, and those customs which are most essential to freedom than we were before. To introduce the legality of the Ship-scot, such a Prerogative hath been maintained, as destroys all other Law, and is incompatible with popular liberty: and such art hath been used to deny, traverse, avoid, or frustrate the true force or meaning of all our laws and Charters, that if we grant Ship-money upon these grounds, with Ship-money we grant all besides. To remove therefore this uncertainty, which is the mother of all injustice, confusion, and public dissension, it is most requisite that this grand council and Tres●ault Court (of which none ought to think dishonourably) would take these Ard●a Regni, these weighty and dangerous difficulties, into serious debate, an solemnly end that strife, which no other place of Judicature can so effectually extinguish.  
That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger, is laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides, But about this aid there remain●s much variety and contrariety of opinion amongst the greatest Sages of our Law; and the principal points therein controverted are these four: First, by what Law the King may compel aid. Secondly, when it is to be levied. Thirdly, how it is to be levied. Fourthly, what kind of aid it must be.  
1 Some of the Judges argue from the Law of Nature, that since the King is head, and sound to protect, therefore he must have wherewithal to protect: but this proves only that which no man denies. The next Law insisted upon is Prerogative; but it is not punctually explained what Prerogative, whether the Prerogative natural of all Kings, or the Prerogative legal of the Kings of England. Some of the Judges urge, that by Law there is natural allegiance due to the King from the subject; and it doth not stand with that allygeance that the Princes cannot compel aid, but must require the common consent therein. Others press, that the Law hath ●etled a property of goods in the subject, and it doth not stand with that property, that the King may demand them without consent. Some take it for granted, that by royal Prerogative, as it is part of the laws of England, the King may charge the Nation without public consent, and therefore it being part of the Law, it is no invasion upon Law. Others take it for granted, that to levy money without consent is unjust, and that the King's prerogative cannot extend to any unjust thing: So many contrary points of war do our Trumpets sound at once, and in such confusion do our Judges leave us, whilst either side takes that for granted, which by the other is utterly denied. By these grounds royal prerogative, and popular liberty may seem things irreconciliable; though indeed they are not; neither doth either side in words affirm so much, though their proofs be so contradictory. King Charles his maxim is, that the people's liberty strenghteus the King's prerogative, and the King's prerogative is to maintain the people's liberty; and by this it seems that both are compatible, and that prerogative is the more subordinate of the two. The King's words also since have been upon another occasion, That he ever intended his people should enjoy property of good●, and liberty of persons, holding no King so great, as he that was King of a rich and free people: and if they had not property of goods, and liberty of persons, they could be neither rich nor free. Here we see, that the liberty of the subject is a thing which makes a King great; and that the King's prerogative hath only for its ends to maintain the people's liberty. Wherefore it is manifest, that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject, then to the Prerogative of the King, since the one is ordained only for the preservation of the other; and then to salve these knots, our dispute must be, what prerogative the people's good and profit will bear, not what liberty the King's absoluteness or prorogative may admit● and in this dispute it is more just that we appeal to written laws, than to the breasts of Kings themselves. For we know national laws are made by consent of Prince and people both, and so cannot be conceived to be prejudicial to either side; but where the mere will of the Prince is Law, or where some few Ministers of his may allege what they will for Law in his behalf, no mediocrity or justice is to be expected: we all know that no slave or villain can be subjected to more miserable bondage than to be left merely to his Lords absolute discretion▪ and we all see that the thraldom of such is most grievous, which have no bounds set to their Lord discretion. Let us then see what Fortescue writes, not regard what Court-dependants do interpret, and his words are, ●ol. 84. cap. 36. Rex Angliae nec per se, nec per suos Ministros Tollagia subsidia, aut quaevis onera alia impo●it l●gis suis, aut leges corum 〈◊〉, aut nova condit sine concessione vel asse●su totius regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso. These words are full and general, and plain, and in direct affirmance of the ancient Law and usage of England, and it is not sufficient for the King's counsel to say, that these words extend not to Ship-money: for if there were any doubt, the interpretation ought rather to favour liberty than Prerogative.  
It is not sufficient for Judge Jones to say, that it is proprium quarto modo to a King, and an inseparable natural Prerogative of the crown to raise moneys without assent, unless he first prove that such Prerogative be good and profitable for the people, and such as the people cannot subsist at all without it: nay, such as no Nation can subsist without it. This word Prerogative hath divers acceptions: sometimes it is taken for the altitude of Honour, sometimes for the latitude of Power. So we say the Prerogative of an Emperor is greater than that of a King; and that of a King greater than that of a Duke, or petty Poten●ate: and yet of Kings we say that the King of Denmark hath not so great a Prerogative as the King of England, nor the King of England as the King of France, &c. For here though their honour and title be the same, yet their power is not. Sometimes Prerogative signifies as much as sovereignty; and in this general consideration we say, that all supreme Commanders are equal: and that they all have this essential inseparable Prerogative, that their power ought to be ample enough for their perfection, and good of the people, and no ampler: because the supreme of all human laws is salus populi. so this Law all laws almost stoop; God dispenses with many of his laws, rather than salus populi shall be endangered; and that iron-law, which we call necessity itself, is but subservient to this Law: for rather than a Nation shall perish, any thing shall be held necessary, and legal by necessity: But to come to the Prerogative of England, and to spe●ke of it in general, and comparatively; we say it is a harmonious composure of policy, scarce to be paralleled in all the world, it is neither so boundless as to oppress the people in unjust things, nor so straight as to disable the King in just things; by the true fundamental constitutions of England, the beam hangs even between the King and the Subject: the King's power doth not tread ●nder foot the people's liberty, nor the people's liberty the King's power. All other Countries almost in Christendom, differ from us in this module of policy: some, but very few, allow a greater sphere of sovereignty to their Princes; but for the most part now adays the world is given to republistes, or to conditionate and restrained forms of government: howsoever we ought not to condemn any Nation as unjust herein, though differing from us; for though they seem perhaps very unpolitic, yet it is hard to be affirmed that God and Nature ever ordained the same method of rule, or scope of loyality to all States whatsoever: besides, what dislike soever we take at other regiments, yet except it be in very great excesses or defects, we must not think change always necessary, since custom in those great and general points obtains the force of another nature, & nature is not to be changed. Divines of late have been much to blame here in preaching one universal form of government, as necessary to all Nations, and that not the moderate & equal neither, but such as ascribes all to sovereignty, nothing at all to popular liberty: Some Lawyers also and Statesmen have deserved as ill of late, partly by suggesting that our English Laws are too in●urious to our King; and pa●●ly by informing, that this King is more limited by Law then his Progenitors were, and that till he be as the King of France is, Rex As●●orum, he is but a subject to his subjects, and as a Minor under the command of guardians: but what hath ensued out of the Kings jealously of his subject, and overstraining his Prerogative? nothing but irreparable loss and mischief both to King and Commonwealth: and indeed the often and great infections and insurrections which have happened of late, almost all over Europe, may suffice to warn all wise Princes, not to over-strain their Prerogatives too high; not to g●ve ear to such Counsellors as some of out Judges are, who affirm our King's Prerogative to be in all points unalterable, and by consequence not depending upon Law at all: by another exception of this word Prerogative in England, we mean such Law here established, as gives the King such and such preeminences and privileges before any subject; such as are not essential to royalty, but may be annulled by the same power by which they were created. That a King shall defend and maintain his subject's, is a duty belonging to the Office, not a privilege belonging to the crown of a King; this obligation nature lays upon him, and no other power can dissolve it. Also that subjects shall afford aid, and join with their Princes in common defence, is a duty arising from the allegiance of the people, and not an honour redounding only to the Prince; natures law hath made this a tie, not to be changed or infringed: for that which is annexed by an eternal superior power cannot be made severable by a temporal human power: but that such an Emperor, King or Potentate, shall have such or such aid, and compel it by such or such means, at such or such times, as to the particular modes and circumstances of his aid, particular municipal laws must direct, and these it would be as dangerous to alter, as it is absurd to hold unalterable. In a parliament held by King James, it was debated, whether or no Tenures in Capite, and allowance of Purveyor● might be repealed and divided from the crown, and it was held that by ●o Act or statute they could be taken away, because they were naturally inherent to the crown.  
This resolution seems very strange to me, since the Law of Tenures and Purveyors is not so natural and essential to Monarchy, that it cannot; or may not subsist without it. For if in other Countries it be held a mere political way, perhaps an inconvenient thing, then why may not the Prince's Royalty, and the people's safety 〈◊〉 preserved entire without it in England: And if so, then why shall not the same authority have vigour to rep●ale it, which wanted not vigour to info●● it. I cannot conceive that the Parliament herein reflected upon what was formal in Law to be done, but rather upon what was convenient: such i●signia supremae, Majejestatis as these; I did not hold it fit to be dismembered from the crown in policy, I only hold it a thing possible in law, nay though the King enjoys diverse such like prerogatives more, as I. Jones thinks, than any Prince in Christendom, yet should not I desire or advise to pl●●●ke away one the least Flower out of the regal Garland, nor would it be (perhaps) Profitable for the State, to suffer the least diminution thereof. We know also, that in England the Prerogative hath been bound in many cases, by Statute-law, and restrained of diverse such privileges, as were not essential, but merely political. Nullum tempus occurrit Regi: this was one of the English Royalties, and very beneficial many ways, yet we know this is in diverse cases limited by Act of Parliament, and that very justly, as I. Hutton argues, The great and ancient Tax of Dangelt, it was a Subsidue taken by the Kings of England▪ for the common defence of the Kingdo●e, yet this was first released by King Stephen, and after abolished for ever by the statutes of Edward the first: and there is no reason why an Act of Parliament should not be as valid in our case as it was in that. Wherefore it is to be admired, that J. Jones should account this way of a●d by ship-money, or any other, without public consent, to be Proprium quarto modo to the Kings of England▪ and since irrepe●lable, since our Kings have in all ages done such noble acts without it; and not only defended, but also enlarged their Dominions. The last kind of accept●●on of this word Prerogative is improper. Thus to pardon malefactors, to dispense with penal laws, to grant Non obstantes, to be free from attainders, to call or discontinue, to prorogue or dissolve Parliaments, &c. are not truly and properly called Prerogatives: these all in some sense may be called Munities, or indemnities belonging to the sacred person of the King, as he is inviolable, and subject to no force & compulsion of any other, And as he is the soul of Law, in whose power alone it is to execute Law, and yet not to be constrained thereto. To grant a pardon for some malefactors for some crimes, may perhaps be as heinous as to commit them; and that which draws a guilt upon the King, cannot be said to be his privilege. If it might be termed a Royalty, that the King is not questionable, or punishable, or to be forced to such acts as tend to the obstruction of justice, it might as well be so termed in acts tending to the transgression of Law: for in both he is alike free from any coercive or vindicative force. For it is out of necessity, not honour or benefit, that the King hath a freedom from constraint, or restraint in these cases; and that this freedom is inseparable, because no force can be used but by superiors or equals, and he which hath either superiors or equal, is no King. If a King should shut up the Courts of ordinary Justice, & prohibit all pleadings and proceedings between man and man, and refuse to authorise Judges for the determining of suits, he would be held to do a most unkingly thing: and yet this may be as truly called a Prerogative, as to diffuse and dissolve Parliaments. But it may be objected, that the King, besides such negative privilege and freedom from force, hath also a positive and siezing subjects lands, &c. in divers cases, as in making Bulwarks upon any man's land for common defence, &c. To this it may be answered, That to such power the King is not entitled by his Prerogative, nor is it any benefit to him, necessity herein is his only warrant: for either this private inconvenience must happen, or a public ruin follow; and in nature the less and private evil is to be chosen: and here the party trespassed enjoys safety by it, and shall after receive satisfaction for his detriment. Were there such apparent unavoidable necessity in the Ship-scop, that either that course must be taken, or the community inevitably pep●rish, or where the King wholly disinteressed in point of profit, or were there hope of restitution, it could not be without consent, and so not against Law. So then, for aught that is yet alleged, Prerogative, except that which is essential to all Kings, without which they cannot be Kings, is alterable, and it ought to be deducsed out of the written and known laws of the kingdom, and Law is not to be inferred out of that▪ we ought not to presume a Prerogative, & thence conclude it a Law, but we ought not to cite the Law, and thence prove it to be Prerogative. To descend then to our own laws, yet there our Judges vary too. What the Common Law was in this point is doubted by some▪ and some say if the Common Law did allow the King such a Prerogative, to lay a general charge without consent, than Statutes cannot alter it.  
Some do not accept against the force of Statute Law, but avoid our particular Statutes by divers several evasive answers. Some say our Great Charter was but a grant of the King, extorted by force; some except against the 25. of Ed. 1. because there is sal●o in it: some against the 34. of Ed. ●. as made in the King's absence; some object against the 14. of Ed. 3. as if it were temporary, and because it is not particularly re●ited in the Petition of Right: and the common evasion of all beneficial Statutes, & of the Petition of right, is, that they bind the King from imposing pecuniary charges for the replenishing of his own coffers, but not from imposing such personal services, as this Ship-scot is, in time of danger and necessity. J. Crawly maintains this Ship-scot to be good by Prerogative at the Common Law, and not to be altered by Statute. What the Common Law was, this Court can best determine; but it is obvious to all men, that no Prerogative can be at the Common Law, but it had some beginning, and that must be from either King or Subject, or both: and in this, it is not superior to our Statute Law, and by consequence not unalterable. The Medes and Persians had a Law, that no Law once past, should ever be repealed; but doubtless this Law being repealed first, all others might after suffer the same alteration, and it is most absurd to think that this Law might not be repealed by the same authority by which it was at first enacted. J. Jones says, our Statutes restrain tollages in general terms, and citys divers cases, that a special interest shall not pass from the King, but in special terms: but his cases are put of private grantees, over whom the King ought to retai●e a great pre-eminence: but the Law is, that where the whole state in grantee, that grant shall have the force of a Statute, because it is pro bono publico, and because the whole State is in value and dignity as much to be preferred before the King, as the King is before any private grantee. But J. Jones says further, if general words shall extend to these extraordinary public levies, than they may as well extend to his ordinary private rights & intradoes, & so cut off aid pur faire filz Chivalier, &c. The contrary hereof is manifest, for the intent of all our Statutes is to defend the subject against such public tollages and impositions, as every man is equally liable to, and as are not due in Law otherwise, or recoverable by ordinary action. Now these aids, &c. and the Kings ordinary revenues and services, are not such as are due from every man, but recoverable by ordinary action. Howsoever in all these doubts the Law would now be made clear, and not only the virtue of Statutes in general, but also the true meaning of our particular Charters would be vindicated from these exceptions.  
2 I come now to our second difficulty, when a public charge may be laid. Here the favourers of Ship-money yet agree, that the King may not charge the subject merely to fill his own coffers; or annually, or when he will invade a foreign enemy, or when Pirates rob, or burn towns and boroughs, for these ordinary defence is sufficient: and when there is imminent and eminent danger of public invasion, we agree that the subject may be charged.  
The quaere then is, whether the King be sole Judge of the danger, and of the remedy, or rather whether he be so sole Judge, that his mere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseen by him at a distance, or pretended only to be foreseen, shall be so unquestionable that he may charge the kingdom thereupon at his discretion, though they assent not, nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned. J. Crook proves the contrary thus: If danger, says he, be far distant, if it be in report only of French Armadoes, and Spanish preparations, &c. though it be certain, and not pretensive, yet Parliamentary aid may be speedy enough: and if it be imminent, than this way of Ship-scot will not be speedy enough; for either the design● is really to have new Ships built, and that will require longer time than a Parliament; or else money only is aimed at, whereby to arm other Ships, and for this the Law hath provided a more expedite way than by Ship-scot, in case of imminent danger.  
If then the King have power to press all men's persons and Ships, and all are bound exponere se, & sua, and to serve propriis sumpti●us, when imminent danger is, and this defence hath always been held effectual enough, it is consequent, that if he be not destitute of competent aid in present distresses, he cannot pretend a greater necessity in dangers more remote, when they are but suspected, or perhaps pretended only.  
My Lord Bramston says here, that there is a necessity of preventing a necessity: and that the Sea is part of the kingdom, and therefore of necessity to be guarded as the kingdom. The answer is, That the safety of the kingdom does not necessarily depend upon the Ship-scot, and so this necessity being removed, the necessity grounded upon this, falls off of itself. For if the kingdom may escape ruin at hand when it is a storm, without Ship-money, it may much more escape it afar off being but a cloud. But grant the Sea to be a part of the kingdom to some purposes, yet how is it a part essential, or equally valuable; or how does it appear that the fate of the Land depends wholly upon the dominion of the Sea? France subsists now without the regiment of the Sea, and why may not we as well want the same? If England quite spend itself, and pour out all its treasure to preserve the signiory of the Seas, it is not certain to exceed the naval force of France, Spain, Holland, &c. And if it content if self with its ancient strength of shipping, it may remain as safe as it hath formerly done. Nay, I cannot see that either necessity of ruin, or necessity of dishonour can be truly pretended out of this, that France, Spain, Holland, &c. are too potent at Sea for us.  
The dominion of the Seas may be considered as a mere right, or as an honour, or as a profit to us. As a right, it is a theme fitter for scholars to whet their wits upon, then for Christians to fight and spill blood about: and since it doth not manifestly appear how or when it was first purchased, or by what Law conveyed to us, we take notice of it only as matter of wit and disputation. As it is an honour to be masters of the Sea, and to make others strike sail to us as they pass; it's a glory fitter for women and children to wonder at, then for statesmen to contend about. It may be compared to a chaplet of flowers, not to a diadem of gold: but as it is a profit to us to fence and enclose the Sea, that our neighbours ●hall not surprise us unawares; its matter of moment, yet it concerns us but as it doth other Nations: by too insolent contestations hereupon, we may provoke God, and dishonour ourselves: we may more probably incense our friend●, then quell our enemies, we may make the land a slave to the sea, rather than the sea a servant to the land; but I pray Master Selden to pardon me for this transition, and I return my matter▪ if the kingdom could not possibly subsist without Ship-money in such a danger, yet there is no necessity that the King should be so sole Judge of that danger, as that he may judge therein contrary to the opinion, and perhaps, knowledge of other men. I allow the King to be supreme, and consequently sole Judge in all cases whatsoever, as to the right, and as to the diffusion of Judgement; but as to the exercise and restraint of judgement, he is not, nor ought not to be accounted sole Judge. In matters of Law the King must create Judges, and swear them to judge uprightly and impartially, and for the sub●ect against himself, if Law so require, yea, though he be of contrary judgement himself, and by his Letters solicit the contrary. The King's power is as the disgestive faculty in nature, all parts of the body contribute heat to it for their own benefit, that they may receive back again from it a better concocted and prepared supply of nourishment, as it is their office to contribute, so it is the stomachs to distribute.  
And questionless sole judgement in matters of State, does no otherwise belong to the King, then in matters of Law, or points of theology. Besides as sole judgement is here ascr●bed to the King, he may affirm dangers to be foresee●e when he will, and of what nature he will: if ●e say only, Datum est nobis intelli●i, as he does in his Writ, &c. To his sole indisputable judgement it is left to lay charges as often and as great as ●e pleases. And by this means if he regard not his word more than his profit, he may in one year drain all the kingdom of all its treasure, and leave us the most despicable slaves in the whole world.  
It is ridiculous also to allege, as J. Jones does, that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King: for if Law presume that the King will not falsely pretend danger to vex his subjects, of his own mere motion, yet no Law, nor reason, nor policy will presume, that the King may not be induced by misinformation to grieve the people without cause. The sun is not more visible than this truth, our best Kings, King Charles, King James, Queen Elizabeth, and all the whole ascending line, have done undue illegal things sometimes, contrary to the rights and Franchises of England, being misinformed, but having consulted with the Judges or States in Parliament, they have all retracted and confessed their error. Nay, there is nothing more known, or universally assented to than this, that Kings may be bad; and it is more probable and natural, that evil may be expected from good Princes, than good from bad. Wherefore, since it is all one to the State, whether evil proceed from the King mediately or immediately, out of malice or ignorance: and since we know that of all kinds of government monarchical is the worst, when the sceptre is wielded by an unjust and unskilful Prince, though it be the best, when such Princes as are not seduceable (a thing most rate) reign, it will be great discretion in us not to desert our right in those laws which regulate and confine monarchy, merely out of Law-presumption; if we must presume well of our Princes, to what purpose are laws made: and if laws are frustrate and absurd, where in do we differ in condition from the most abject of all bondslaves?  
There is no Tyranny more abhorred than that which hath a controlling power over all Law, and knows no bounds but its own will: if this be not the utmost of Tyranny, the Turks are not more servile than we are: and if this be Tyranny, this invention of ship-money makes us as servile as the Turks. We must of necessity admit, that our Princes are not to be misled, and then our laws are needless; or that they may be misled, and then our laws are useless. For if they will listen to ill council, they may be moved to pretend danger causelessly; and by this pretence defeat all our laws and liberties, and those being defeated, what doth the English hold, but at the King's mere discretion, wherein doth the excel the Captives condition? if we shall examine why the Mahometan slaves are more miserably treated, than the Germans, or why the French peasants are so beggarly, wretched, and bestially used more than the Hollanders, or why the people of Milan, Naples, Sicily are more oppressed, trampled upon, and enthralled then the Natives of Spain? there is no other reason will appear but that they are subject to more immoderate power, and have less benefit of law to relieve them.  
In nature there is no reason, why the meanest wretches should not enjoy freedom, and demand justice in as ample measure, as those whom law hath provided for: or why Lords which are above law should be more cruel than those which are more conditionate: yet we see it is a fatal kind of necessity only incident to immoderate power, that it must be immoderately used: and certainly this was well known to our incestors, or else they would not have purchased their charters of freedom with so great an expense of blood as they did, and have endured so much so many years rather than to be betrayed to immoderate power, and prerogative: let us therefore not be too careless of that, which they were so jealous of, but let us look narrowly into the true consequence of this ship-scot, whatsoever the face of it appear to be. It is vain to stop twenty leaks in a ship, and then to leave one open, or to make laws for the restraint of loyalty all other ways, that it may not overflow the estates of the commonalty at pleasure, and yet to leave one great breach for its irruption.  
All our Kings hitherto have been so circumscribed by law, that they could not command the goods of their subjects at pleasure without common consent: but now if the King be but persuaded to pretend danger, he is uncontrollable Master of all we have, one datum est intelligi, shall make our English Statutes like the politic hedge of Go●e●ham, and no better: I do not say that this King will falsify, it is enough that we all, and all that we have are at his discretion if he will falsify; though vast power be not abused, yet it is a great mischief that it may, and therefore vast power itself is justly odious, for divers reasons. First, because it may fall into the hands of ill disposed Princes, such as were K. John, Henry the third, Edward the second, Richard the second. These all in their times made England miserable, and certainly had their power been more unconsineable they had made it more miserable. The alterations of times do not depend upon the alteration of the people, but of Princes: when Princes are good it fares well with the people when bad ill.  
Prince's often vary, but the people is always the same in all ages, an● capable of small, or no variations: If Princes would endure to hear this truth it would be profitable for them, for flatterers always raise jealousies against the people; but the truth is, the people as the sea, have no turbulent motion of their own, if Princes like the winds do not raise them into rage. Secondly, vast power if it find not bad Princes it often makes Princes bad: It hath often charged Princes, as it did Nero from good to bad, from bad to worse: but Vespasian is the only noted man which by the Empire was in melius mutatus: daily experience teaches this. Dangelt in England within 20. years increased unto a fourfold proportion.  
Subsidies were in former times seldom granted, and few at a time, now Parliaments are held by some to be of no other use then to grant them.  
The Fox, in Aesop, observed that of all the Beasts which had gone to visit the lion, few of their footsteps were to be seen retrorsum, they were all printed adversum. And we find at this day, that it is far more easy for a King to gain undue things from the people, than it is for the people to regain its due from a King: This King hath larger Dominions, and hath reigned yet fewer years, and enjoyed qu●●ter times than Queen Elizabeth: And yet his taxations hath been far greater, and his Exploits less honourable, and the yet people is still held in more jealousy.  
To deny soap-money which sweeps all, is ●eld and accounted a rejection of natural Allegiance. I speak not this to render odious the King's blessed government, God forbid, I hold him one of the mildest, and most gracious of our Kings: And I instance in him the rather, that we may see, what a bewitching thing flattery is, when it touches upon this string of unlimitable power: if this ambition and desire of vast power were not the most natural, and forcible of all sins, Angels in Heaven, and man in paradise had not fall'n by it; but since it is, Princes themselves ought to be the more cautious and cautilous of it.  
Thirdly, vast power if it neither find nor make bad Princes, yet it makes the good government of good Princes the less pleasing, and the less effectual, for the common and public good: And therefore it is a rule both in Law, and Policy, and Nature, Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria, in jis quae fieri possunt perordinaria: All extraordinary aids are horrid to the people, but most especially such as the Ship-scot is, whereby all liberty is overthrown, and all Law subjected unto the King's mere discretion.  
Queen Elizabeth in eighty eight was victorious without this Taxation, and I am fully persuaded she was therefore Victorious the rather, because she used it not. Her art was to account her subjects hearts as her unfailing Exchequer, and to purchase them by doing legal just things, and this art never failed nor deceived her, and in that dismal gust of danger, it was good for her and the whole State, both that she did not rely upon forced aids of money, or the Swords of grieved soldiers; For this Ship-money, nothing can be pretended but necessity, and certainly necessity is ill pretended; when the mere doing of the thing, is as dangerous as that for which it is done: did not this Ship-scot overthrow all p●polar Liberty, and so threaten as great a mischief as any Conquest can? And were not the people justly averse from it? Yet merely for the people's 〈◊〉 to it, it is dangerous to be relied upon in case of great danger.  
we know Nature teacheth us all, Of two Evils to choose that which we think the least, though it be not so; therefore if the people apprehend this Remedy as a Thing worse than the Disease, though they be mistaken therein, yet that very mistake may prove fatal.  
The Roman Army being harshly treated by the Senators, and their proud general, did refuse to charge upon the Enemy, or to resist the charge of the Enemy, they chose rather to be slaughtered by Strangers, then Enthralled by their countrymen. The English also in the late Scotch invasion, by reason of this and many other causes of Discontent, made so ●aint resistance, that they did almost in a manner confess, That they held themselves as miserable already, as the Scots could make them.  
Thus we see there is no necessity of levying Ship-money, there is rather necessity of Repealing it: And we see that presumption of Law doth no●●bet this Necessity, but rather cross it. And whereas I. Jones further saith, That the King's Majesty hath no benefit by Ship-money, and therefore presumption is the str●nger, that the King will not take it causelessly. We may answer: the Ship money is a ●ery great benefit unto the King: For i● not immediately, yet 〈◊〉 it is become a revenue, inasmuch as by this 〈◊〉 all other Re●enues of the crown, nay▪ and Tunnage and 〈◊〉, which were not designed only for ordinary expenses, but for extraordinary employments, and public Charges also, are now become d●scharged of that tie, and the commonwealth hath quite lest all its interest and property in them. In point of benefit therefore it is all one to the King's Majesty, and in point of burden, it is all one to the Subject, whether Ship-money be acc●unted of as part of the King's annual Rents, or no, since by it his rents are enlarged: And as to the Subject there is no obligation, that this 〈◊〉 shall not hereafter incorporate with the rest of the King's majesty's Intradoe●, and be swallowed up as tonnage and Poundage now are. Thus we see what the Necessity is, and presumption of Law, which was so much insisted upon; and yet for a further confutation of both, Time, the mother of Truth, hath now given us more light Now that great danger which was pretended so many years together for the necessity of raising so great supplies of treasure, is a small cloud blown over, making it apparent that Kings may be misinformed; and by misinformation take molehills for mountains, and cast heavy burthen● upon their subjects. 
3.   
But I come now to my third D●fficulty, how a public charge is to be laid upon the kingdom. The law runs generally, that in England no Tollage or pecuniary charge may be imposed Forsque per common assent de tout la realm, or Si non per common consent de parliament. Some precedents, or matters of fact appear, wherein some Kings have divers times invaded this right of the subject, but upon conference had with the judges, or petition in Parliament, redress was ever made, and the subjects right re-established. All the colour which can be brought to answer the Law in our case, is, that the words of the law are general Taxes and Tollages, but do not by special mention restrain extraordinary impositions, in time of extraordinary danger. But we know the Petition of Right, 3. Car. is grounded upon former Statutes, and recites divers of them, and is a clear affirmance of the common right of England; and yet by that the commissions for loans were damned: and it is evident that those loans were demanded for the general defence of the kingdom in time of imminent danger; and by the same Statute, not only loans, but all other levies of money upon what pretence of danger soever, Si non per common consent, are condemned as illegal, and contrary to the laws and Rights of England. Two things therefore are objected against Parliaments: First, that they are of slow motion, and so most of the judges allege. Secondly, that they may be perverse, and refuse due aid to the King, and so I. Crawley boldly suggests. For answer we say in general: First, that it is the wisdom of Kings to be always vigilant, and to have their eyes so open upon foreign Princes, and to maintain such intelligence that no preparation from abroad may surprise them before recourse had to Parliament; and this is very easy to insular Princes, who have a competent strength of shipping, Secondly, to have always in readiness against all sudden surprises, a sufficient store of ammunition and arms both for sea and land-service: and the revenues of the crown of England are sufficient for this purpose, and have been held more than sufficient in former times, when hostility was greater, and the kingdom smaller. Thirdly, to seek advise and assistance from Parliaments, frequently in times of quiet, as well as of danger, as well when war is b●t smoking, or kindling, as when it is blown into a flame. Before the conquest this was held policy, and since in Edward the thirds time, a statute past to this purpose; and if parliaments of late be grown into dislike, it is not because their virtue is decayed, it is because the corruption of the times cannot endure such sharp remedies. Fourthly, to speak particularly of this case of ship-money, we say that it is a course more slow than by parliament: there was more expedition used in parliament to supply King Ch●rles, since he came to the crown, then can this way. And we say moreover, that as the extremity of the kingdom was when ship-money was demanded, whatsoever was pretended to the contrary, a parliament might have been timely enough called, and seasonably enough supplied the King. As to the second objection of I. Crawly, too unfit to come out of any honest wise man's mouth, but much more for a judges, judge Crook replies, that as there is nullum iniquum in Lege, so neither in parliamento. The three noted factions which are adverse to Parliaments, are the papists, the prelates, and Court parasites; and these may be therefore supposed to hate parliaments, because they know themselves hateful to parliaments. It is scarce possible for the King to find out any other that thinks ill of Parliaments, or is ill thought of by Parliaments. Of Papists little need to be said, their enmity is confessed, they have little to pretend for themselves, but that parliaments are grown puritannical. The prelates think themselves not to have jurisdiction and power enough▪ and they know that Parliaments think they have too much, and abuse that which they have much more: therefore to uphold themselves, and to crush their ill-willers, they not only tax Parliaments of Puritanism, but all puritans of sedition: as much as in them lies, they wed the King to their quarrel, persuading him that Parliaments out of Puritanism, do not so much aim at the fall of episcopacy, as Monarchy, and that episcopacy is the support of Monarchy, so that both must stand and fall together. Howbeit because they cannot upbraid Parliaments of attempting any thing against Monarchy further than to maintain due liberty, therefore they preach an unlimitable prerogative, and condemn all law of liberty as injurious to Kings and incompatible with Monarchy. M●n●arring denies Parliamentary power and honour, C●well denies propriety of goods, further than it the King's discretion, and Harrison accuses judge Hutton of delivering law against G●ds Law, in the case of Ship-money. And the common Court doctrine is, that Kings are boundless in authority, and that they only are Caesar's friends which justify that doctrine; and from this doctrine hath grown all the jealousies of late between the King and his best subjects; and this is that venomous matter which hath lain burning, and ulcerating inwardly in the bowels of the commonwealth so long. The other enemies of Parliaments, are Court dependants, and projectors, which have taken advantage of this unnatural dissension betwixt the King and his Subjects; and have found out means to live upon the spoil of both, by siding with the King, and being instruments to extend his prerogative to the purchasing of preferment to themselves, disaffection to the King, and vexation to the commonwealth. These three factions excepted, and some few Courtiers which are carried with the current of example, or are left to speak unpleasing truths, there is scarce any man in all the King's dominions, which doth not wish for parliaments, as the States best physic, nay almost as its natural necessary food: but I will instance in three things wherein parliaments excel all other counsels whatsoever.  
1. For wisdom, no advice can be given so prudent, so profound, so universally comprehending, from any other author; it is truly said by Sir Robert Cotten, that all private single persons may deceive and be deceived; but all cannot deceive one, nor one all.  
That an inconsiderable number of Privadoes should see or know more than whole kingdoms, is incredible: v●x populi was ever reverenced as vox Dei, and Parliaments are infallble, and their acts indisputable to all but Parliaments. It is a just law, that no private man must be wiser than Law publicly made. Our wis●st Kings in England, have ever most relied upon the wisdom of Parliaments.  
Secondly, no advice can be so faithful, so loyal, so religious and sincere, as that which proceeds from parliaments, where so many are gathered together for God's service i● such a devout manner, we cannot but expect that G●d should be amongst them: and as they have a more especial blessing promised them; so their ends cannot be so sinister: private men may thrive by alterations: and common calamities, but the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else can be commodious for them.  
Sir Robert Cotton in the life of Henry the third, according to the Court Doctrine at this present, says, that in Parliament Kings are ever less than they should be, and the people more. If this be spoken of irregular Kings, which will endure to hear of nothing but prerogative government, it may carry some semblance of truth: but sure i● is, good and wise Kings are ever greatest when they sit immured, as it were, in that honourable Assembly: as the history of Queen Elizabeth and many of her progenitors testifies. 'tis true, K. Henry the third, met with divers oppositions in Parliament: he was there upbraided, and called dilapidator regni; it was true that he was ●o, and the most unworthy of rule that ever sat sat in this Throne; yet those words became not subjects: I do not justify, but in some part extenuate such misdemeanours; for the chief blame of those times is not to be thrown upon the 〈◊〉 and commons, but upon the King and his out-landi●● parasites. It is without all question also that in those bloody unjust ●imes, had it not been for frequent parliaments, and that sovereign remedy which thereby was applied to the bleeding wounds of the kingdom, no other help could have staunched them.  
Even then, when Parliaments were most prevalent, and when they had so much provocation from so variable an uncapable a Prince, they did not seek to conditionate prerogative, or to depress Monarchy for the future, though they were a little to injurious to him in person for the present.  
Since that time also many Parliaments h●ve had to struggle for due liberty with insolent princes, and have had power to clip the wings of Royalty; and the custom of all Europe almost besides hath seemed to give such countenance to such attempts; but the deep wisdom, & inviolable loyalty of Parliaments to this composure of government hath been such, that they never made any invasion upon it. As it was in all former ages, so it now remains entire with all its glorious ensigns of honour, and all the compliments of power; and may he be as odious which seeks too alter or diminish monarchical government for the future, as he which seeks to make it infinite, and slanders Parliaments as enemies to it, or endeavours to blow such jealousies into the King's ears.  
3. No advice can be so sit, so forcible, so effectual for the public welfare, as that which is given in Parliament: if any Cabinet counsellors could give as wise sincere advice as Parliaments, yet it could not be so profitable, because the hearts of the people do not go along with any other, as with that.  
That King which is potent in Parliament, as any good King may, is as it were so inskonsed in the hearts of his subjects, that he is almost beyond the trains or aims of treason and rebellion at home, nay foreign hostility cannot pei●ce him, but through the sides of all his people.  
It ought to be noted also, that the English have ever been the most devoted servants coequal, sweetly-moderate sovereignty; so in our English Parliaments, where the Nobility is not too prevalent, as in Denmark, nor the commonalty, as in the Netherlands, nor the King, as in France, justice and policy kiss and embrace more lovingly then elsewhere. And as all the three States have always more harmoniously born their just proportionable parts in England then elsewhere, so now in these times, in these learned, knowing, religious times, we may expect more blessed counsel from Parliaments then ever we received heretofore. May it therefore sink into the heart of our King to adhere to Parliaments, and to abhor the gross delusive suggestions of such as disparage that kind of council. May lie rather con●ide in that Community which can have no other end but their own happiness in his greatness, thè● in Papists, Prelates, and Projectors, to whom the public disunion is advantageous. May he affect that gentle Prerogative which stands with the happiness, freedom, and riches of his people, and 〈◊〉 that terrible Scopter which does as much avert the hearts, as it doth deb●lita●e the hands, and exhaust the purses of his Subjects. May he at last learned by 〈◊〉; that the grievance of all 〈◊〉, that that mischief which makes all mischief's 〈◊〉, and almost hopeless in England at this day, is that Parliaments are clouded, and disused, and suffered to be 〈◊〉 by the ill boding incendi●ries of our State. May it lustily enter into his belief, that it is impossible for any kingdom to deny public assent for their 〈…〉 when public danger is 〈…〉, and when it is fairly required, and not by projects extorted: that no Nation can unnaturally seek its own 〈…〉 may make their Subjects purses their own private coffers, if they will demand due things, at due times, and by due means.  
4. I come now to the last difficulty, about the condition and nature of such aids as are due by Law from the Subject to the King, Though much have been argued both at the bar and on the Bench, for the King, that he may raise moneys from his Subjects, without consent by Law, Prerogative, and necessity. Yet at last, because the Petition of Right absolutely crosses this tenet, it is restored to us back again, and yielded, that the King may not impose a pecuniary charge by way of Tollage, but only a personal one by way of service. And now all our controversy ends in this, that we must contest, whether the Ship-scot be a ●ecuniary, or a personal charge: For though the intent of the Writ, and the office of the Sh●●iffe be to raise moneys only, yet the words of the Writ, and the pretence of State, is to build and prepare Ships of war. The kingdom generally takes this to be a 〈◊〉 delusion and imposture, and doubtless it is but a pick lock trick, to overthrow all liberty and propriety of goods, and it is a great shame that so many Judges should be abetters to such fraudulent practice contrived against the State. It is not lawful for the King to demand moneys as moneys, but it is lawful to demand moneys under another wrong name, and under this wrong name all former laws and Liberties shall be as absolutely canceled, as if they had been mere cobwebs, or enacted only out of mere derision. If former laws made to guard propriety of goods were just, and grounded upon good reason, why are they by this gross fallacy, or childish abuse defeated. If they were not just, or reasonable, what needs such a fond subtlety as this? why should they not be fairly avoided by Law? Why were they made at all? But be this invention what it will, yet we see it is new; if it be quashed, the State is but where it was, we are still as our Ancestors left us; and since our preceding Kings never heretofore put it in use in the most necessitous calamitous times, we may from hence infer●e, that the plea of State necessity falls off of itself; if we admit not of this innovation, than the State suffers not; but if we admit it, no necessity being of it, we can frame no other reason for our so doing, but that our former franchises and privileges were unjust, and therefore this way they must be annulled. Some of our Judges do prove, that if this were a personal service, yet it were void; and they cite the case of Barges, and Ballingers' vessels, built truly for war in time of Imminent danger, and yet these charges upon complaint made by the Subject, were revoked, and disclaimed. But here in this case many other enormities and defects in Law Lare, for if ships be intended to be built in Inland Countries, a thing impossible is enjoined; and if moneys be aimed at, that very aim is against Law: and if the kingdom were to be disfranchised, it were not to be done by all illegal way.  
Besides, in the Writ, in the assessment, in the sheriff's remedy against Recusants of it, in the execution of Law, by, or after judgement, many inconveniences, errors, and mischiefs arise many ways: and sure take the whole case as it is, and since the Creation no whole kingdom was ever cast in such a cause before.  
Besides, though the judges ought wholly to have be●● themselves upon this, to have proved this a personal service, and no pecuniary charge, they have roved after necessity, presumption of Law, and Prerogative, and fierce said any thing at all hereof.  
My Lord Brainston argues very eagerly, that personal services by Sea and Land are due to the King in cases of extremity, and all their records, case, and precedents prove no more, and that men may be arrayed, and ships pressed, and that sumptibus populi; but there is nothing proved that the mere raising of moneys in this case, is a personal service. I. Jones indeed argues to this purpose: If the Law intrust the King with so great a power over men's persons, why not over their estates? There is clear reason for the contrary: because the King, if he should abuse men's personal aids, could not enrich or profit himself thereby, and we know it is gain and profit, it is Auri sacra fames which hath power over the breasts of men. It is not ordinary for Tyrants to imbattaile hosts of men, and make them charge upon the Sea-billowes, and then to gather up Cockles and Piwinckle shells in lieu of spoil, as one did once: but the World abounds with stories of such Princes, as have offended in abusing their power over men's estates, and have violated all right divine and human, to attain to such a boundless power.  
Good Kings are sometimes weak in coveting boundless power; some affect rivality with God himself in power, and yet places that power in doing evil, not good: for few King's want power to do good, and therefore it misbecomes not sometimes good Subjects to be jealous in some things of good Kings. But J. Jones farther says, that Ships must be built, and without money that cannot be done: ergo. This necessity hath been answered, and disproved already: and I now add, that for the good of the kingdom there is more necessity that Ship-money be damned then maintained. Such unnatural slavery seems to me to be attendant upon this all-devouring project, and such in●amy to our Ancestors, our laws, and ourselves, nay, and such danger to the King and his posterity, that I cannot imagine how any foreign conquest should induce any thing more to be detested and abhorred.  
Those Kings which have been most covetous of unconfined immoderate power, have been the weakest in judgement, and commonly their lives have been poor and toilsome, and their ends miserable, and violent: so that if Kings did rightly understand their own good, none would more shun uncontrollable absoluteness than themselves.  
How is the King of France happy in his great Prerogative? or in that terrible stile of the King of Asses? ●ee see that his immoderate power makes him oppress his poor peasants, for their condition is most deplorable, and yet set his power aside, and there is no reason why he should not be as a Father to cherish them, as a God to comfort them, not as an enemy to impoverish them, as a tormentor to afflict them.  
2. His oppression makes him culpable before God: he must one day render a sad account for all the evil which he hath imposed, for all the good which he hath not procured to them. That the Vicegerent of God should do the office of a tyrant, will be no light thing one day.  
3. His sin makes him poor: for were his peasants suffered to get wealth and enjoy it, the whole Land would be his treasury, and that treasury would contain twice as much as now it doth.  
4. His poverty makes him impotent, for money being the sinews of war, how strong would his joints be, if all his subjects were abounding in money, as doubtless they would, if they wanted not liberty, and propriety? besides, poverty depresses the spirit of a Nation: and were the King of France, King of an infantry, as he is only of a cavalry, were he a King of men, as he is only of beasts, had he a power over hearts as he hath over hands, that Country would be twice as puissant as it is.  
5. His impotence, together with all other irregularities, and abuses is like to make his Monarchy the less durable. Civil wars have ever hitherto infected and macerated that goodly country, and many times it hath been near its ruin: it now enjoys inward peace, but it doth no great exploits abroad, nor is ever likely to do, unless by practising upon the distemper of other Nations: should some other Prince practise in the like manner upon that, and propose liberty to the grieved people, much advantage might be taken: but these avisoes would better proceed from that most heroic, most terrible, most armipatent Churchman, which effects such great wonders here: we see hence that Princes by some gain lose, as the whole body pines by the swelling of the spleen: we see that Reh●●oam catched an immoderate power, as the Dog in the fable at a shadow, but in stead of an uncertain nothing, he let fall and lost a certain substance; and yet flatterers have scarce any other bai●e than this shadow of immoderate power, whereby to poison the fantasies of weak humours, undiscerning rash Princes.  
My humble motion therefore is: First, that the judgement given in the Chequ●r Chamber for Ship-money, may be reversed, and damned, as contrary to the right of the Subject.  
Secondly, that those judges which adhered to equity and integrity in this case, might have some honourable guerdon designed them.  
Thirdly, that some dishonourable penalty may be imposed upon those judges which ill advised the King herein, and then argued as Pleaders, not as judges; especially if any shall appear to have solicited the betraying of the kingdom.  
Fourthly, that the meaning of our laws & Charters, may be fully and expressly declared, and the force and virtue of Statutes and public Grants, may be vindicated from all such exceptions and objections as have been particularly or generally made against them.  
Fifthly, that a clearer solution may be given in the four main points stirred, how far prerogative is arbitrary and above Law; and how far natural allegiance binds to yield to all demands not of Parliament: next, how the King is sole Judge of danger, as that his mere cognizance thereof shall be sufficient, though there be no appearance or probability thereof. Next, how a necessity of public ●●ine must be concluded now, if Ship-money be not levied, when no such ruin hath been formerly, when this new plot was not devised. Lastly, how this Ship-scot pretending ships, but intending money, and really raising the same, can be said to be no pecuniary tollage within our Statutes, but a mere personal service.  
Sixthly, that any Officers, or Ministers of State, which shall attempt to lay the like taxes hereafter upon the Subject, by virtue of the like void warrants, may be held and taken as Felons, or traitors, or forcible Intruders.  
Seventhly, that something may be enacted against foreign and domestical Forces also, if they shall be congregated for the like purposes; and that the subject may be enabled by some fit and timely remedy to be given against a military kind of government.  
Eighthly, that the due way of public defence, in case of imminent and eminent danger, or actual necessary war, for the pressing of men, and other charges of war, such as Cote and Conduct money, and all doubts thereabouts, may be made more certain and settled for the time to come.  
Ninthly, that if the King's ordinary 〈◊〉 now taken for the crown, be not sufficient to maintain him, as our great Master, some legal order may be taken therefore, and that he may be sensible of his Subjects loyalty, and his Subjects live safe under him, that his enemies may find him considerable, and his true friends useful.  
FINIS.