THE COUNSELLOR OF ESTATE CONTAINING THE Greatest and most Remarkable Considerations serving for the Managing of Public Affairs.  
Divided into three Parts.  
THE FIRST CONTAINS THE MEANS to settle an ESTATE. The second, the means to preserve it. And the third, the means to increase it.  
WRITTEN IN FRENCH BY ONE of the Ancient Counsellors to the most Christian Kings, HENRY the Fourth, and LEWIS the thirteenth.  
Translated by E. G.  
LONDON: Printed by Nicholas O●es 1634.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE RICHARD Lord WESTON, Lord High Treasurer of England, Earl of Portland, and one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.  
Right Honourable:  
THey were the words of the wisest King & best knowing man, Pro. 11: 14. That where no Counsest is, the people fall, and where many Counsellors are, there is health: Which words he almost reiterates to strengthen that position: Chap. 15.22. Without Counsel thoughts come to nought, but in the multitude of Counsellors there is steadfastness. And it was the saying of Cicero, the excellent Orator, and Statesman of Rome: Non viribus, aut velocitate, aut celeritate corporum, res magnae geruntur, sed confilio authoritate, & prudentia. Cermenatus lib reg. & rer. etc. cap. 18. telleth us, that it was observed by the most skilful Architectors of the ancient times▪ The broader and higher they proposed their buildings, the more solid and deep they laid their basses: so (saith he) since none are more eminent amongst men than Princes, or bear more weight upon their shoulders then Kings, meet it is they should have the best Counsellors, on whom to lean as upon a firm and steadfast foundation, to dispose as well of matters which belong unto State as Religion: And such Osorius tells us, lib. 7. de Reg. instit: Ought to be maximo ingenio praediti, bonis Artibus exculti, longo rerum usu periti: In Historijs diligentissime versati, neque praesentia tantum sagaciter odorantes, sea long in posterum, quod utile futurum reipub. sit, coniectura providentes. With a gracious King are we blessed: with such a Council is he furnished: who (as Rabanus in one of his Epistles informs us:) in plain things search what may be mystical and obscure. In small (seeming) matters what may be of moment, by what is near, to conjecture of things remote; and out of parts, to gather a whole, by which mature consideration they know as well readily to undertake them, as speedily to dispatch them: Now knowing your Lordship to be such an one, namely, a Counsellor and Statesman, every way accomplished; After transferring these Remarkable considerations, for the management of public Affairs; from the natural French into our modern English: And further being most assured, that your Greatness hath ever been accompanied with Goodness, and your Wisdom with Clemency, it hath been a great imboldning unto me, to make a dutiful presentment thereof to your Gracious perusal and Patronage, not to the purpose that these can be either your Direction or Instruction, (as being frequently conversant in all the passages of this Nature) but rather to express such things to your view in our Native Dialect, which I know you to be most expert in, in the Original. Needless it were to teach Typhis how to steer a Ship, or instruct Antomedon to guide a Chariot, should I apprehend any such ambition, I must necessarily incur the aspersion of impudence, or express such palpable Ignorance as might draw me into a just imputation of folly: But Right Honourable, such is my Modesty, that by studying to be free from either, I may evade the aspersion of both: only desiring your Lordship's best construction of these my weak and unpolished labours, which present themselves so rudely into your presence, whose more weighty employments can scarcely allow any retired Hour, to cast a second Eye upon that, (howsoever Naturalised) which (no doubt) you have formerly perused in the Native. Notwithstanding, Honourable Sir, presuming upon your known Gentleness and Generous Disposition, I humbly prostrate myself with these my imperfect labours to your most judicious Censure, whose least distaste is able to stifle the hope of the surviving thereof even in the Infancy, and whose favourable approbation hath power to give it life unto all posterity▪  
Your Honour's most humbly devoted Edward Grimeston.   

A Table of the Chapters, and the Contents therein contained.  

Chapter 1. OF the establishment and form of an Estate, and the diversity of the Governments thereof. 
divers sorts of Principalities, a Royal, Seignouriall, and Tyrannical; of the Command of a few, and of a popular Estate.   
Chapter 2. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a Popular Estate.  
Chapter 3. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a Seignoury or Command of a few. 
Of the Seignoury of Venice, and by what means it preserves and maintains itself.   
Chapter 4. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a principality or Royal Estate. 
That the Subject hath no cause to desire liberty in a principality.   
Chapter 5. A consideration of the settling of the form of an estate.  
Chapter 6. Of the dependency of Estates one of another. 
Wherein the dependency of Estates one of another do consist. The Marks of Sovereignty.   
Chapter 7. Of the form of Estates, according to the right of those which command.  
Chapter 8. Of advantages and disadvantages of Election in a Royalty. 
Inconveniences of an Election in a Royalty. Advantages of the said Election. A consideration of the Election.   
Chapter 9 Of Succession diversely practised in Successions. 
Succession of Women. Reason why they exclude Women from Government in some Estates. Diversity in the Succession of M●les.   
Chapter 10. Of Usurpation, or an unlawful Command. 
Of the miseries which it doth produce, and the difficulties which are found in it.   
Chapter 11. Of the diversity which is found among the Subjects of an Estate. 
The diverse conditions of Subjects, varies the form of an Estate. Of Slaves. Of privileged and simple Subjects. Of Strangers.   
Chapter 12. Of the diversity and distinction of Subjects, according to their Vocations and professions. 
The Cause of the establishment of Commonalties and Companies in an Estate. That the Prince aught not to cross them, nor suffer them to attempt any thing above their power.   
Chapter 13. Of Religion. 
Of the efficacy and necessity of Religion i● an Estate. Of the abuses in Religion.   
Chapter 14. Of the means held in the settling of Religion. 
Extraordinary means for the establishing of the true Religion.   
Chapter 15. Humane means for the establishing of Religion. 
The disposition of people to be considered for the establishing of Religion: Barbarous people Civilised. Who are properly called Barbarians: Barbarous in Religion. Of the Authors of most part of Religions at this present. Barbarians in their form of living; In their habits; In their habitations, and in their government. That the manner of proceeding for the establishing of Religion, aught to be diverse. Prophesy dispo●e●l● a people to the establishment of a new Religion: Charges and overcharges dispose the people to change Religion. Diversity of Religions. Indifferency of Religion makes way to a change. A Reuolde and Civil Wars dispose to a change of Religion; As likewise excessive liberty, and contempt of Religion. The reunion of a Country under the same Prince, facilitate the settling of Religion.   
Chapter 16. Of the parties necessary for those which will bring in a new Religion. 
Parts and qualities necessary for such as seek to bring in a new Religion. That instruction is a powerful means for the establishing of a Religion. That the zeal of Religion must be accompanied and guided by discretion. Of Spiritual and Temporal powers, and of their jurisdiction. That observing of the Ceremonies of an ancient Religion, facillitates the establishment of a new.   
Chapter 17. That diversity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate: How they ought to carry themselves, to preserve the ancient Belief, in the diversity of Religions which are crept into the Estate. 
Diversity of Religions in Egypt. There aught to be but one religion in an Estate. Diversity of religions which is dangerous in an Estate, aught to be avoided, yea in the lightest matters. How they ought to govern themselves to preserve the ancient belief, in the diversity of Religions which are crept into the State. Of the extirpation of Heresy, and a new Religion in its breeding, and how they ought to govern themselves. That it is not expedient nor fitting to seek to root out Heresy by Arms, when it hath taken footing in an Estate. The toleration of Religions in an Estate, is less prejudicial than a a Civil War. War against Heretics fortifies their party, and gives them great advantages. It is dangerous for a Prince to Arm against his Subjects, if he be not assured of the event. A good advice to weaken the party of a new Sector religion.   
Chapter 18. Of the disorders which happen in Religion: and of the means to prevent them.  
Chapter 19 Of the establishing of the Council of Estate: and of the Qualities and number of Counsellors. 
Of a Council of Estate. Qualities of Counsellors of Estate. The great difference betwixt an Old Counsellor and a Young, for that which concerns their advice: A mixture of Old and Young Counsellors of Estate. Obstinacy a wilful vice in a Counsellor. He ought to be without ambition, and not depending of any other. Irresolution, a dangerous vice, and to be avoided in a Counsellor of Estate. He ought not to be too confident. Of the change of Counsellors of Estate. Of the multitude of Counsellors: who are to be otherwise employed.   
Chapter 20. Of the plurality of Counsels of State: of the power of a Council, and of the order in delivering their opinions. 
The power of a Council. A Consultative voice. A Deliberative voice. Equality among Counsellors.   
Chapter 21. Considerations for a Prince who is to be Counselled. 
Sufficiency and capacity necessary for a Prince. Of the manner how to demand Council. To receive Council. To examine it. To resolve and execute it. Of the flattery of Councillors: and how the Prince ought to avoid it. Of the truth and liberty which ought to be in a Councillor of Estate. Of the chief Ministers of Estate. A good course for a Minister of Estate to free himself duly of his charge.   
Chapter 22. Of the form of commanding. 
Of the power. Of the Law. Diversity of Laws. The aim and end of the Law. Qualities considerable in the establishment thereof. Of the brevity of the Law. Of the Prince's absolute command.   
Chapter 23. What we must avoid in the making of Laws. 
Of the multiplicity of Laws: and the causes thereof. Of the observation of Laws. Of the severity. When the Prince may dispense in following the Laws. How they ought to govern themselves in the severity.   
Chapter 24. Of the particular Commanders of the Prince.  
Chapter 25. Of Magistrates. 
A distinction of the Officers and Ministers of an Estate.   
Chapter 26. Of the difference betwixt Officers and Commissaries. 
Considerations to be made upon a Commission. Of the person from whom it proceeds. Of the direction thereof. Of the charge of the Commission. Of the duty of a Commissary.   
Chapter 27. Considerations upon the establishing of Officers and Magistrates. 
Of the number of Officers: That it is more safe to commit a business to many, then to one: That the plurality of Officers is profitable to an Estate.   
Chapter 28. Of the Creation and Nomination of Magistrates. 
The Creation and choice of Officers must be made by the Sovereign, and not otherwise. That the charges must be distributed proportionally to the Nature and capacity of the person. Principal qualities required in an Officer and Magistrate. The Vices and Defects are as well to be considered, as the Virtues and Perfections, in the choice they will make of Magistrates and Officers.   
Chapter 29. Of the form and manner of Creating and making Magistrates and Officers: and of the time of their charges. 
Three kinds of Creating and making Magistrates. The time of their Charges either for life, then for a limited time. Reasons and Considerations to make Officers for a time. Other Considerations to the contrary. Change of Officers and Magistrates necessary in a Popular Estate. Means to hinder the usurpation of the State, by the continuance of Officers in great places. The practice of the Pope, and the Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of the great places of their Estates, to hinder the usurpation. The practice of Kings and Princes upon the same subject. That the change of Prime Officers and Magistrates, is necessary for the safety of the Prince, and the quiet of the Subject. Prudence required in this change. That they must not give great Commands to those that are borne in a Province.   
Chapter 30. Of the duty of principal Officers and Magistrates. 
In what the duty of Officers and Magistrates do consist. Of their duty towards the Laws, towards the examination and interpretation thereof. How a Magistrate ought to carry himself in the interpretation of the words of the Law. In the intention of the Law. Of the reason of the Law, and of the scope thereof. That he must hold himself unto the Authority of the Law, and not fly subtleties upon equity. Of the execution of the Laws or ordinances. Consideration for the said execution. From what time and when the Law or ordinance doth bind. What they are whom it binds. Of the force of Laws and Ordinances. Of Custom. Three things requisite to make a Custom;   
Chapter 31: Of the duty of the Magistrates towards their Sovereign. 
Wherein the duties of the Magistrates towards the Pr●nce do consist. Of the Prince's commands: and how the Magistrate ought to carry himself in the allowing and verifying thereof. The Magistrate ought to obey the will of the Prince, although it should be unjust. The Magistrate's disobedience unto the will of the Prince, is of most dangerous consequence. That the Magistrate is not allowed to leave his place, rather than to verify and publish the unjust Command of the Prince. Causes and reasons for the which hath been brought in the manner and Custom to verify the Edicts, ordinances, and Commandments of the Prince by the Magistrates. How the Magistrate ought to carry himself in the execution of Commandments, there happening a revocation.   
Chapter 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another. 
Three degrees of Magistrates, and of the power of either of them. The duty of the Superior or prime Magistrates. That it is fitting for the Prince to endure the judgement of the Magistrates. Of the King's proctor. The power of a Lieutenant is equal to that of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is of no force out of his jurisdiction. Of two Magistrates equal in power; and of the execution of their ordinances or judgements, upon one another's territories. Of the execution of sentence giu●n by the Officer of a Foreign Prince upon the jurisdiction of another. Of Magistrates equal in power. Of a body or College, and of their power and Command one over another. The difference betwixt opposition and Commandment. That they may hinder one another by opposition before the Act, or by appeal after the Act, but not to comm●nd.   
Chapter 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to private persons. 
divers powers of Magistrates: Of their duty to pri●ate men in giving judgement. Of the obedience and respect of private men to the Magistrate executing his office. Of the Magistrate wronged. When and how he may be judge in his own cause. Mildness and patience required in a Magistrate. Prudence and Gravity without passion. The duty of Magistrates.   
Chapter 34. Of the justice of Commandments. 
Rules and Considerations in the justice of Commandments: A mixture of the Law with the will of the Magistrate: Of the temper which the Magistrate ought to observe in the Law. Of the distribution of offices and dignities, distribution of rewards and punishments: Harmony in Marriages: Harmony in the division of goods.   
Chapter 35. Of the settling of the forces of an Estate. 
Provision of Arms and Shipping: Arms offensive and defensive. The quality of defensive Arms. That they must not be contemned: They augment courage. The quality of offensive Arms: Two sorts of offensive Arms. Of the beauty and ornament of Arms.   
Chapter 36. Of Forts; and of their profit for the preservation of an Estate. 
The situation of Forts, necessary and profitable. They must be far from the heart of the Estate. They must be strong by situation and fortification. Great, and in a place where they may be relieved. That they must not neglect the Fortification in places which are strong by situation.   
Chapter 37. Of Warfare. 
Of the advantages of Horse and Foot. Of the choice of Soldiers. That they may not use Strangers as little as may be.   
Chapter 38. Of the number of Soldiers in ordinary Train Bands. 
Two sorts of Soldiers. Of Subsidiaries. An order to practise them in the time of peace; and to prevent their Mutinies. Of their numbers. A means to draw the Subjects of an Estate, without charge to the Prince, and to hinder the Revolt and Mutiny.   
Chapter 39 Of the form how to make a Levy of Soldiers: of the Place: of the Age: of the Stature: and of their Vocation. 
The particular manner of the Romans. The danger of mutiny upon the change of Captains. Of the choice the Captain ought to make of his Soldiers. Of the place whence he should take his Soldiers. Of their Age, Stature, and Vocation.   
Chapter 40. Of the Forces at Sea.  
Chapter 41. Of the Riches of a● Estate. 
That the power of an Estate depends of its riches. What is necessary for the Wealth of an Estate. Wherein the Wealth of an Estate doth consist.   
Chapter 42. Of the causes of the abundance and wealth of an Estate: That is to say, in Tillage, handiworkes: and the commerce with Strangers. 
Whence the abundance of necessary things doth grow. Tillage well husbandred causeth abundance. The cause of the neglect thereof. That it is not unworthy of a Prince. Manufactures cause abundance in an Estate. An advice to multiply Workmen. Three considerations for Commerce. Of Merchandise which we may and ought carry to Strangers. Of the transport of Gold and Silver. Of raw materials. Of the bringing in and entry of foreign Coin into an Estate. That the course of foreign Coin ought not to be allowed. Merchandi●e whereof they should hinder the entry.   
Chapter 43. Of the facility of Commerce. 
Traffic at Sea profitable and honourable. Advantages which the public and private should receive, if the Nobility gave themselves to the Commerce at Sea. An order established by the Hollanders, for the continuance of the Trade at the East I●dies. The great reputation which they have gotten by the means of trade. A means to establish the trade at Sea in an Estate.   
Chapter 44. Of parsimony or sparing. 
That Parsimony preserves the wealth of an Estate. That it imports much for the safety of an Estate. Wherein excess doth consist. Of the excess in buildings. The orders which they observe in Flanders & the low Countries for their buildings in Towns. Of the excess in movables, Followers, Feasts, and Play.   
Chapter 45. Of the settling of the Treasure, and ordinary revenue of an Estate. 
Of the ordinary Revenue of demeans, and of the establishment thereof. That no alienation ought to be allowed; much less engagements. Entries and issues out of the Estate. Tributes, gifts, and pensions. Traffic in the name of the Public. To deliver money at interest to Merchants: and the advantages which grow thereby. Of the sale of Offices. The source and spring of their abuses. The inconveniences which grow by the sale of Offices.   
Chapter 46. Of Taxes; and of extraordinary Levies, Imposts, and Loans. 
divers forms of Taxes and Levies. Of such as are exempt from Taxes. Of the place where they ought to levy the Tax. The Introduction of Tolles, tributes, and imposts. Of the valuing of goods practised by the Romans: abolished by Tyrants. Imaginary inconveniences of the said valuation of goods, and without reason. Advantages which would grow thereby to the State. Of extraordinary Levies. Of the mildness, profits, and justice thereof. Of casual impositions. Of Tolles and impositions upon Suits. Of Loans.   
Chapter 47. Of the managing and good husbandry of the Treasure▪ That is to say of the regulating of the expense, and of the abatement thereof. 
Of the order of the Expense. Alms. The Charity of the King St. Lew●s. That Alms never impoverish. The discharge of necessary charges in the Estate. Of the wages of Officers and of Debts. Recompenses to the discharge of the Treasure. Gifts and gratifications. Establishment of public houses and Seminaries for the instruction of Youth, as well in the Liberal Arts, as in Mechannicke. Seminaries of Piety, Seminaries of Honour, for the instruction of the Nobility. The profit of the said Seminaries of Honour for the Estate. Expenses for the commodity and adorning of Towns and Provinces. Cutting off the Expenses. Of the justice and necessity for the abatement of Debts.   
Chapter 48. Of such as ought to be employed in the managing of the Treasure. 
Of the choice they ought to make of such they will employ to govern the Treasure. The commendable custom of the Romans. Youth is more fit to manage the Treasure then Age. That experience is not so necessary. The Duty of a Financier or Receiver. The form to rule Accomptants: and of those which ought to hear and examine their Accounts.   
Chapter 49. Of the Exchequer. 
Reasons & considerations which make the Exchequer hurtful to the Public. Reasons to the contrary. Necessary considerations to lay up Treasure. Prudence, Wisdom and discretion necessary concerning the Exchequer. A remedy why the Exchequer should not trouble or hinder the Commerce. Difficulties for the guard of Treasure in gold or sil●er.   
Chapter 50. Of treaties in general, be it by the interview and conference of Princes, or by their Deputies and Ambassadors. 
Of the care and managing of Foreign affairs. Estates are like unto great buildings, which should have supporters without. Of the care a Prince should have of the affairs of Strangers, ●nd●of his Neighbours. How ●ee should govern himself with his Neighbours. General Considerations touching the manner of treating. Of the interview and conference of Princes. That there is danger then of the breach of Friendship, and of the good intelligence which was formerly betwixt them. That a Prince before he confer with another, must have a care not to breed any jealousy or envy against him, nor to fall into any contempt. The consideration of the place of the interview must be great in regard of safety. Which of the two Princes unequal in quality, aught to come first to the place of conference. What Princes ought to do before their meeting, not to give cause of jealousy to their Neighbours. Of Deputies and Ambassadors to treat with a Prince, and of the choice he must m●ke. The qualities of a Deputy and Ambassador. Of secret treaties, and of the diverse intentions for the which they are made. That he must watch and stand upon his guard more than ever, when as they propound any treaty, and especially during the said treaty. That a treaty ought not to be held firm and assured, if it be not ratified, by the Prince with whom he treats. Of the place where treaties of Peace, or a League ought to be made. An Ambassador going to a Prince to treat with him, whether the Prince be bound to treat with him himself, or by Deputies. Of the sitting of Ambassadors: Of the power of Ambassadors of either side, of the clauses of treaties. That they must have a care the clause be not ambiguous. That general clauses are Captious.   
Chapter 51. Of Treaties of Peace and Truce. 
divers intentions for the which they make a truce. That they must have a great care to the Conditions of a truce.   
Chapter 52. Of Treaties of Alliance. 
Of Defensive Leagues. divers considerations for the treaty of a League. Ordinary Causes of Leagues. Of the time when a League should be made, and how long it should continue. That the joint Allies are bound to recover the Country of their Ally conquered by the Enemy. The contribution of a League. Of the place where the contribution in money should be deposited. Of the head of the League. Which of the Confederates should ratify and declare himself first. That an offensive League and foreign Enterprise doth seldom succeed according to the hope of the Allies. Of the causes of the breach of Leagues. Of Leagues betwixt mean Estates, and of the Defects which are often found. Of the succours of some against others among the Confederates. Of the Defence of one who is not allied against an Ally. Of the Alliance betwixt Princes and unequal Estates, that is to say, of protection. The difference betwixt a Pension and a Tribute. Of protection. Of the mutual Duty of the protector, and him that is protected.   
Chapter 53. Of the differences which grow betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the decision thereof. 
Of Hostages given for the assurance of the passage of a Prince, passing through another's Estate. The assurance of a treaty. That it is dangerous for one that is in protection to receive a strong Garrison from his protector, to make him Master of his Forts, and depositor of the Treasure of the Alliance. Appointing of judges for the dicision of differences betwixt the Allies. Of a Compromise betwixt Allies upon differences which may happen. Of a Compromise upon a possession. When and how a Prince ought to meddle to reconcile a difference betwixt his Neighbours.   
Chapter 54. Of the rupture of Treaties; and of th● constancy and assurance of the word of a Prince in his Treaties. 
The means how to fortify a Treaty, to the end they fall not to any breach, pretexts of a rupture. Of the obligation a Prince hath to keep his word. That force nor fear ought not to dispense a Prince of his word and promise. That the constancy and assurance of a Prince in his word is very beneficial v●to him.   
Chapter 55. Of Treaties of N●utrallities. 
Two sorts of neutrality. Advantages and disadvantages of a neutrality. That a powerful Prince ought not to leave a neutrality without great cause. That neutrality is more beneficial unto a weak Prince, then if he made himself ● party. A consideration to depart from a neutrality.   
Chapter 56. Considerations for a Prince, which desires to live in good intelligence with his Neighbours. 
How a Prince ought to carry himself upon the demand which is made unto him by one of his Neighbours of some difficult thing. He must not be too credulous of that which Princes say, he must favour the Commerce with his Neighbours: He must cunningly nourish distrusts and jealousies betwixt them; to gain credit with them; and to testify his good affection. Of the feeling he ought to have of iniu●ies received from his neighbours. To pierce into the designs of his Neighbour. Of the Introduction of Ambassadors.   
Chapter 57 Of the Charge of an Ambassador or Agent. 
Of the difference betwixt an Ambassador and an Agent. The qualities and perfections required in an Ambassador. Instructions for an Ambassador, how he should govern himself with Strangers, and in a Foreign Country. Of the privileges of Ambassadors. How Ambassadors ought to govern themselves towards their Masters. Of their dispatches.    

PART. 2.  
Chapter 1. Of the parts and conditions in general, necessary for a Prince and So●eraigne. 
The preservation of an Estate consists in the Authority of the Prince. The love of the Subiect● is the cause of the Authority of the Sovereign divers means to gain this love.   
Chapter 2. Of the parts and conditions necessary for a Prince, to purchase the love of the people. 
Effects of the mildness of a Prince. The mildness of a Prince consists in pardoning of offences. Of the clemency of a Prince. To cherish great men; and to show himself indulgent.   
Chapter 3. Of the liberality of a Prince. 
Two sorts of liberallities. The excess of a Prince's liberality most prejudicial to an Estate. Necessary considerations in liberality. An order to be observed in liberality. divers kinds of liberality. Of liberality which is given to acknowledge service and merit, or of free will. That the Prince ought to show himself liberal, by gifts and benefits unto those which may do him service against his enemy, yea to those of a contrary party. Of the liberality of a Prince to purchase Reputation. The manner of giving. Benefits ought to be proportionable to the time and persons. Recompenses of honour ought to be well husbandred. The Prince's liberality towards the public. The liberaility of a private man towards the public, ought not to be allowed. The Prince's bounty and liberality towards the public, consists in advancing virtue.   
Chapter 4. Of the Princes justice.. 
justice divided into two parts. Wherein the Prince should show himself a lover of justice, even in that which concerns private persons. divers kinds of fraud, against the which particularly, the Prince o●●ht to show himself affectionate for justice.. Two kinds of violence in an Estate, which the Prince ought to suppress. Of the grace and pardon of Princes towards offenders: and of the misfortune which many times befall. Cases wherein the Prince may give pardon. That the grace and favour of a Prince must extend to the violence which is done unto the Magistrate. Of the choice which the Prince should make of judges and Magistrates. divers means to make choice of those which ought to be established in the administration of justice.. That the Prince should have a care to to preserve Integrity of such as are to administer justice. divers means to preserve the Integrity of judges. Wages of Officers. Inquiries of their misdemeanours. Of compositions made with Officers, miscarrying themselves in their places, and of the inconveniences which follow. That a Prince having pardoned an Officer, ought not to leave him in his Charge. Of Spies in every Province, to inquire of the Carriage of Officers. Secret informations practised by King Lewes the twelfth, to contain the Officers in their Duty.   
Chapter 5. Of the administration of justice.. 
Considerations necessary to a Prince, for the administration of justice.. Of the order and speedy expedition. Of the expense of pleaders: being far distant from their houses and families. In the vacation of judges. In the tax of Registers, Ushers, and and such like Ministers of justice.. In the Charges of Solicitors, Proctors, and Advocates. Of the verification of Edicts by the course of Parliament.   
Chapter 6. Of the Reputation of the Prince. 
Of the means by the which a Prince doth purchase authority. Of the Prince's Wisdom and Valour. That a Prince ought to have an universal knowledge of all Sciences. The means to purchase this general knowledge. The practice of many great Princes. Of Experience. The knowledge of Histories necessary for a Prince.   
Chapter 7. Rules and necessary instructions for a Prince to be held wise.  
Chapter 8. Of Deceit and Cunning. 
That it is lawful for a Prince to use Fraud, Cunning and Deceit, and in what manner. divers kinds of Cunning. Of Distrust. Of Dissimulation. divers practices and intelligences of Princes in one another's Estates. Of Equivocations, good words, promises, Letters, Embassies, and Lies, to get some advantage. Proceedings of Princes, to warrant themselves, and their Estates from their enemies, unjust of themselves, but excusable through necessity.   
Chapter 9 Of the Reputation of a Prince, and of the means to get it. 
Means to get and entertain courage and valour Means to entertain himself in health. Means for a Prince to purchase reputation.   
Chapter 10. Of the causes of the ruin of an Estate: and of the remedies which may prevent it. 
Of the Remedies against that which may cause the ruin of an Estate. The cause of the ruin of an Estate. A Remedy against the violence and force of Strangers.   
Chapter 11. Of the interior causes of the ruin of an Estate. 
Of the nearest causes of the ruin of Estates: More remote causes of the ruin of Estates. Of the Defects of Sovereigns which purchase the hatred of Subjects. Remedies against the cruelty of a Prince. Remedies against Avarice of the Prince. Of the Defects of a Prince which breeds contempt; more dangerous than those which cause hatred. Defects in a Prince most prejudicial.   
Chapter 12. Of the defects of Magistrates, Officers and Ministers to a Prince. 
Corruption. Abuse and bad usage. That change in an Estate is dangerous. A Remedy against abuse and bad usage. Reformations. Necessary considerations for a reformation.   
Chapter 13. Of the defects in general: Causes of the ruin of an Estate. 
Defects and peccant humours in general of the people. Remedies to preserve the Estate from these defects and bad humours.   
Chapter 14. Of diverse sorts of hu●●●rs among the Subjects according to the diversity of their conditions. 
Three sorts of persons in all Estates. Means to contain great men in their Duties. Of great persons which are allied to the Prince. Of great men in Wealth and Revenues. Of great men which have force and credit among the people, by reason of their employment in great affairs, and in governments. Considerations to advance some one in Authority. Inconveniences which proceed by the continuation of one person in great Offices. Of the poor and needy. A means to contain the common people in their Duties. Excess and Usury the principal causes of want and poverty.   
Chapter 15. Means to contain Subjects conquered in their Duty. 
To give unto Subjects conquered, a share in the government of the Conqueror. Considerations to plant Colonies.   
Chapter 16. Of the nearest causes of the ruin of an Estate. Of conspiracy against the Prince's person. Of the discovery and pudent thereof. Of the causes, and of the means to prevent it.  
Chapter 17. Of Treason in places, Towns, and Armies, and other forces of an Estate: and of the Remedies to hinder the effects.  
Chapter 18. Of Rebellions, and of the means to suppress them.  
Chapter 19 Of factions, and how to stop the effects.   

PART. 3.  
Chapter 1. Of the increase of an Estate, and the enlarging of Tow●●s. 
To increase ours by our own. divers means to enlarge and increase Towns. Profit draws men to live in Towns. The principal cause of profits in a Town.   
Chapter 2. Of the increase of an Estate by the procreation of Children. 
Of Polygamy or many Wives. Of Celibate, or a single life.   
Chapter 3. Of the amplifying of an Estate by the union of another's to ours. 
divers means to unite another to ours. Protection of the weaker. Gifts and benefits. Purchases. Engagements. Alliances by Marriage. Adoption, and Election. Necessary considerations for a Prince who desires to make himself great by way of Election.   
Chapter 4. Of the increase of an Estate by Conquest. 
Of the Enterprise of a War. Just causes of a War. The undertaking of a War must be done with Discretion, and not rashly. Important and necessary Considerations before we undertake a War. Considerations for the making of War.    
FINIS.   

THE COUNSELLOR OF ESTATE. CONTAINING THE greatest and most Remarkable Considerations serving for the Managing of Public Affairs.  

PART. 1. OF THE NECESSARY MEANS to Establish an ESTATE.  

CHAPTER 1. Of the Establishing and form of an Estate; and of the diversity of the governments thereof.  
THe Considerations which may serve for the managing of public affairs, are of two sorts. Some are drawn from general Rules and Maxims, the which are usually followed and observed in the government of Estates; and the others from Circumstances, which fall out in particular occurrents. For as we may not so rely upon the first that we not examine and exactly weigh the particularities of a business which may be observed, be it in the Person which must assist; or in the causes, motives, means, place, time, and other circumstances: So we must not tie ourselves so confidently to these last, as we desist from the first. If necessity doth force us sometimes to dispe●ce, it must be in such sort, as we reserve a way to return again, and to repair the business.  
We cannot prescribe any thing certain for these la●t circumstances, all in particulars which are infinite, and depending principally upon the sufficiency and particular experience of him which examines such affairs. Many have written others, some of which suffering themselves to be transported with curiosity, have mingled Doubts and Queres more fitting for a School, then profitable to make use of. But my design in this Discourse is, to gather from the Ancients and Moderns, (who have treated upon this Subject) that which I have found most fitting for use and the present Estate.  

An Estate what it is.  That which they truly call an Estate, is no other thing but an order, by the means whereof many Families and Commonalties are governed, having for their end the good of all in general. But we may also call an Estate, t●ese Families and Commonalties drawn together under o●● government, and be it in the one or the other sense, we may say that all the general considerations, which may serve for the managing of public affairs, tend either to the establishing, or to the preservation, or to the increase of an Estate.  

Of the establishment o● an ●state.  For an establishment many things are necessary, whereof some must be settled among ourselves, and others with strangers; as alliances, intelligences, and correspondencies, wherein consists the care of affairs abroad. Among ourselves there must be established and regulated the form● of the Estate, Religion, Council, the manner of commanding the force, and the Treasure, or Revenues sufficient to satisfy the Charges, and supply the defence, of the Estate.  
The form of Estates is diverse, according to the number; the dependants and the right of those which Command, 
Of the form of an Estate.  & according to the diverse qualities & distinctions of those which obey. According to the number of those which command, Estates are distinguished principally into three sorts.  
The first is tha●, in the which one command● alone without Companion, the which we call Principality. The second is that where the most eminent and apparent Men (which make the least part of the Estate) have the Sovereignty, the which we call Seignoury. The third is that, whereas the people, or the greatest part of them under the Name of people command▪ and this may be called a popular Estate, or a Commonweal.  
But every form of Estate is governed diversely: so as of Principalities one is called Royal, 
divers sorts of principalities.  when as some one commands according to the laws of Nature, and the laws of the Country, leaving the natural liberty, and the property of goods to every one in particular, having for their principal end the public utility: 
Royal.  and in this manner most of the Western people of Europe are governed.  
The other is Seignouriall, 
Seignouriall.  in the which the Prince is made Lord of their goods and persons, by the right of Arms and a just War, or by the Custom of the Country, governing his Subjects as the Master doth his slaves; yet not straying from the laws of Nature: And this government (although it be rough and tedious) is held lawful, if the conquest be just. For where there is a subject to make War, they hold that the force is just betwixt two Sovereigns, which have no superior to decide their controversy; and that he may prescribe what Law he please to the weaker. In this manner are ruled and governed all the people of the East and West Indies, of Africa, and a good part of the Levant; and even in Europe the the Muscovites and the Turks govern in this manner.  

Tyrannical.  The third is unlawful and Tyrannical, in the which he that commands, hath no other aim but his own private profit, and hath no care of that of his Subjects; and for his greatness, revenge, or avarice violates all Divine and Humane laws: so as he lives in continual distrust of his Subjects, and entreats them with all rigour and severity against justice.. I say against justice, for that we may not censure a Prince to be a Tyrant ●y his severity, the which a good Prince is sometimes forced ●o practise against the custom of his Subjects; Neither by his guard of strangers, which they entertain not only for ●afety, but for the obedience, ornament, and attendance of his Majesty: Neither by his absolute commands, the which are more to be wi●ht for of a just Prince, than the flattering entreaties of Tyrants, who draw after them a fear of an inevitable revenge.  

O● a ●eignoury  A Seigncury which is governed according to the laws, is called lawful; as that of Venice▪ and of many Towns in Germany. But being governed by few men, we call it Factions; as that of Athens, under the Thirty Tyrants whom Lizander established: That of Rome under the Ten men, and afterwards under Caesar, Pompey and Cr●ssus, and lastly under the Triumuirat.  

〈◊〉 a popular ●s●ate.  A popular Estate is also governed diversely. For either the affairs ar● in the hands of the common people; and than it is rather a tumult and an Anarchy, than an Estate; as Athens was governed ', after that Pericles had taken from the Areopagites the power of judging: Or else the pe●p●e refer the government to the advice of some men whom they have chosen amongst them; whose power and charge is limited to a certain time, to the end that every man should have means to command in his turn; or else their Offices continue during life, to the end that by this continuation, they may make themselves the more capable of affairs. In certain places, and in certain affairs of importance, or of alliances, peace, or war, every one of the people gives his voice, being assembled altogether in Common; as in some Cantons of the Swisses; or divided by Parishes, Trades, Families, Companies, or Cominalties, as in old time at Athens and Rome.   

CHAP. 2. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a Popular Estate.  
EXperience hath taught us, that we may subsist in all these forms of Estate. But as there is nothing permanent in this World, through idleness and negligence the order is many times corrupted, and the State ruined, the which proceeds from the imperfections and defects which are found in all these Estates. Wherefore he that will settle an Estate, must consider carefully of the advantages and disadvantages which are found in either form.  
The advantages which they give to a popular Estate, 
Advantages of a popular estate  is justice and Equality, or without favour or respect of persons; reducing the civil constitution to the Laws of Nature, which makes us all Equal. Thus in cutting off the avarice of some, and the arrogancy of others, love and friendship is entertained amongst them, every man enjoys the public good; and all being employed in affairs, this kind of Estate is commonly most fertile in great personages: The handicraft's man by his employment in offices makes himself a great Orator and a great Captain▪ 
Disadvantages of a popul●● estate.  Yet many have held a popular Estate to be the worst, and most imperfect of all the forms of Government. For this equality which they so much esteem, is against nature, the which gives more graces to some and less to others: And if it be well observed, there should be neither Magistrate nor officer that should have supriority above the rest: and this inequality ruins friendship instead of maintaining it. As for the public, there is no Estate wo●se governed than a popular, there all things are sold as in a Fair (as Plato saith) being governed by men bred up and given to gain. Men most commonly furious, if they be not terrified, and in their fear irresolute in all their actions, nothing secret, and difficult to be drawn together at need; and whom in many Estates, they have been forced to invite them to assemble for the distribution of the public money amongst them.  
Their assemblies are always full of disorders, varieties and inconstancy: the ordinary defects of a multitude. Wise men dare not speak, fearing the fury of the people, who always lay their faults upon their Governors; and Fools crying out loudest carry it. If you do not hold the people in some fear of strangers, stirring up some War against them, they will forge a Civil; there being never any quarrel or envy so great, as amongst those which are equal; be it to supplant one another; or for that the one cannot live without the other. The need which they have one of another, being the principal bond of ordinary friendship: and they are inconstant, being of an humour which cannot continue long in quiet; vnl●sse there be some number of Citizens, who having credit ●nd agreeing together, stay the violence wherewith the people suffer themselves commonly to be transported. The Swisses, which are governed in this form o● Estate, 
O● the Swiss.  are assi●●ed by the Country, to the which no man hath any great desire, and which of itself is strong by the nature of the people, who are very gross and nothing ambitious; being diverted from dreaming of innovations by their drunkenness, wherein they spend more of their time, than they have remayri●g, and would be necessary to think of, for the most quarrelsome and bus●e: Besides going to the service of Princes, and by the union made among the Cantons, who being separated from the Sovereignty, one cannot attempt against all the rest, for want of intelligence; and one attempting against the Cantons he should have to deal with them all.   

CHAP. 3. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a Seignoury.  
THe Estate of many Lords, seems to hold a mean betwixt a principality and a popular Estate, 
Advantages of a Seignoury.  being neither subject to the tyranny of one alone, nor to the confusion of a multitude: And the Sovereignty being given to the wisest, many see more than one, and few resolving better than a multitude; it seems that this kind of Government should bemost desired. And if rich men have the Government, there is no doubt, but the Estate willbe better preserved: Having always been held profitable, that such as received most loss by the ruin of the Estate, should likewise have the greatest share in the government, as having the same interest with them of the Estate.  
Yet experience hath taught us, 
Disadvantages and inconveniences of a Seignoury.  that this form is not more assured than a popular Estate, for where there shall be many governors, there will always be diversity of opinions; And every one abounding in his own judgement, (especially such as have greatest authority) will find out occasions of Disputes in their deliberations, and breed factions in the Estate. Their resolutions will be many times discovered, and being profitable to give the government to one more worthy, if in a Principality they are many times troubled to find one that is capable, with more difficulty shall they pick out many, which may be capable and worthy of this Command.  
And if they will say that one may supply the defect of another, this would be difficult among equals; The voices being numbered and not weighed: And admit this might be done, yet it were not good for the Council, which must consist of a greater number th●n ordinarily the Lords are. But for the command which de●●nds upon a resolution of diverse opinions, of men equals in power and credit, it cannot well be but in one head.  
Likewise in a combustion and trouble, they have found that the Command of one alone was necessary, and that it was very unsafe in a time full of jealousies, Difficulties, and Distrusts to impart the government of affairs to many. The Lacedæmonians upon this occasion created their Armoste; The Thessalians him whom they called Ar●hoes; The Mitileniens their great Achimnete; At Rome they created the Dictator; At Venice their great Providator.  
Besides all these inconveniences, a Seignoury as well as other forms of Estates, is not only exposed to strangers, but more to the Enterprises of a multitude, whom they must content or keep them in awe by force. To content them without yielding unto them part of the Estate, were very difficult, and it were impossible to admit them to offices, without danger to change the Seignoury into a popular Estate, as it happened at Rome. To retain them by force, were no safe thing: and admit it might be done, yet the distrust they should have of them, would be a cause that in the least war attempted against strangers, they would make use of this occasion, to take Arms and to shake off the yoke.  
In this fear the Lords durst not train up their Soldiers to Arms; and entertaining strangers to manage the the war, it is to be feared they will get credit among the people. If they give the charge of this conduct to one of their Lords, upon the fi●st discontentment he shall have against the rest, or upon the least ambition that shall creep into his brain, he will disunite himself from them, and make himself the head of a party. So as this kind of government cannot safely undertake a War, without danger of ruin. So whether for the division which may grow among them, or for the weakness of power divided among many; or be it for the difficulty to agree and resolve; Or be it that the Subjects many times know not whom to obey; Or for that affairs which ought to be kept secret, are most commonly divulged: This kind of government is none of the safest.  
And that which hath caused the Seignoury of Venice to continue so long, 
Of the Seignoury of Venice, and by what means it maintains itself▪  and to preserve itself against the Enterprises of the people, hath not been this order so much, as the policy which the Magistrate hath used; imparting some petty offices to the people, yea, and some of the greatest, as that of the Chancellor; contracting alliances with them contrary to the ancient opinion of the Roman Aristocracy, which forbade such marriages; borrowing from them to oblige them to maintain the Estate; disarming them wholly; giving them liberty in all sorts of pleasure, to make them pliable; giving unto the rich the right of Burgoisie, and choosing some among the Citizens to be made Gentlemen, to the end they might live in hope one day to have an interest in the Estate. And thus satisfying the Nobility with honours, the People with rest and commodities, inuring their Subjects to war as little as may be, especially by Land; suppressing speedily all war with strangers, and factions among themselves, entertaining a neutrality with Princes, not wedding any quarrels; and changing party as their interest change, thus they maintain themselves.   

CHAP. 4. Of the advantages and disadvantages of a Principality.  

Advantages & disadvantages in a Principality.  A Principality hath its Defects as well as a Seignoury or popular Estate. The first is the change of Princes, which bring with them new Designs, new Laws, new Ministers, new Friends, new Enemies, a new manner of living, and new Alliances.  
The second is the danger of falling into Civil wars by the division of such as aspire to the Crown, especially if there be a right of election: and in the succession, if the Prince be an Infant, there will be a division for th● government betwixt the Mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselves. So as they have been often forced to avoid this inconvenience, to give t●● breeding of the Child to the Mother, and the government of the Estate to the nearest Kinsman. And if there be a Tutor, there is danger lest he make hi●selfe Master of the Estate, as hath been often see●● among the Macedonians: If there be many, th●● are reduced to the inconveniences of many Lords.  
If the Prince be young, and freed from a Governor, young men cause him to commit a thousand disorders, and to reject all sorts of good Council: And if he ●● warlike, he will hazard his Subjects, his Estate, a●● Person: If he be subtle and wicked, he will sett●● a Tyranny: If he be cruel, he will make a Butchery of his Subjects: If he be luxurious, he will troub●● the holiest Marriages of his Estate, which is a thing which doth most passionate the people: If he be covetous or prodigal, he will be an exacter; and if he be simple and ignorant, it will be much worse, suffering himself to be governed by men of no merit, who for their own private interest and greatness, will attempt all manner of villainies under his authority. Yet not withstanding these inconveniences, it is most certain, (as hath been said) that a sovereign command cannot subsist, (to speak properly) but in one person alone; as they say that many see better than one alone: But to resolve, to conclude, and to command, one will do it better than many. As for Alliances of Princes, they do not always dye with the Princes, there being treaties which are made from one Estate into another. And in regard of the Prince's minority, when it happens, the affairs are not always found disposed to innovation; and according to the occasions they may prevent the mischiefs which happen by this defect.  
The other inconveniences are rather particular vices of the Prince, than defects of the Government, and vices dye with the Prince's person, but●not the vices and abuses of Lords in a Seignoury, nor of a multitude in a popular Estate, for that Commonalties never dye: But chose as they are perpetuated by subrogation, so by contagion the abuses which enter into these companies, pass from one to another.  
And in regard of liberty, which is the foundation of other Estates, 
I hat the people have no cause to desire liberty i● a principality.  being only desired to hinder great men from oppressing their inferiors, this may be provided for by justice, the which being duly executed in a Principality, the people hath no Subject to desire liberty: for that this desire would only tend to an A●a●chicall licentiousness, which would make them mo●e miserable than a just and lawful subjection. But that w●ich m●kes the people unable to judge of the liberty which is in a just Principality, is that true liberty consisting in not to be wronged, no man doth acknowledge himself bound to him that doth not wrong him.   

CHAP. 5. A consideration of the settling of the form of an Estate.  
BY their defects and advantages which are found in these three kinds of governments, we may afterwards judge (adding thereunto the consideration of the inclination of the people) of the particular manner of living, and of the condition of the people and affairs, the which ought to be settled rather in one place then in another. Among men that are equal and impatient of Rule, as your Seafaring men be, and such as dwell in Mountains and Forest, by reason of the austerity and roughness of their manners and living, a popular Estate would be more proper than any other. Themistocles desiring to settle a popular Estate in Athens, advanced Seafaring men, and gave authority to Mariners. Cato said that the Macedonians deserved to be free, for that they could not be restrained under the rule of him that would command them.  
If there be an inequality, one part being richer than the other, and that wealth hath bred some dependence and respect of the meaner sort towards the great ones, a Seignoury and government of few may be well established amongst such men.  
If in this inequality there be a Division or Discord, some being unwilling to yield to others; and that there be found some one that hath more power and credit, they must of necessity settle a principality.  
After a Battle lost, or some other disgrace happened, a people being amazed, finding no Council in themselves, they willingly refer the disposition of their affairs to him or them which promise to preserve them. So as in such an encounter it is easy in steed of a popular Estate to settle a Seignoury or a principality. As chose, a multitude having had some good success, and growing insolent, it fa●s out that making no account of their Lords, they change the command of few into a popular Estate, or into a principality, if he by whose means, this good Fortune hath befallen them, hath credit, conduct, and courage sufficient to make use of his good Fortune.  
I will add, that a fearful and timorous people given to their pleasures, little careful and incapable of affairs, are better governed and more happily by a Prince, then by any other kind of government. Where as contrariwise, a people that is rough, avaricious, presumptuous, and hardy, do unwillingly yield themselves under a principality, if it be not very moderate, or altogether warlike, in the which absolute commands are supported by force.  
It may likewise be said, that a principality is maintained better in a great Estate, consisting of persons of diverse qualities; and a small Estate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Government: for that in a great Estate, being necessary to train up the Subjects to Arms to defend it, it falls out usually, that he which is master of the Forces, makes himself likewise master of the Estate; as it hath happened at Rome, and in many other Commonweals.  
chose, a Prince in a small Estate is many times for●ed to become a Tyrant; and so much the greater and severer Tyrant, as the extent of his Tyranny, that is to say of his Country, is the less, having no means to draw from his Subjects (without great oppression) so much money as he shall have need of for his defence, to the which all his Subjects would contribute willingly their persons and means, if they were reduced to a republic or popular Estate.   

CHAP. 6. Of the dependence of Estates one of another.  
THe form of Estates is diverse, according to the dependence of those which command. For although we treat only of Estates that have all sovereignty over their Subjects; yet there are which depend in some sort of another, and others which do not hold, as they say, but of God and their Swords, having no dependence of any man.  

Wherein consists the dependence of estates 〈◊〉 to another.  Estates depend of another by tribute, duty, honour, protection, or pension. By tribute, when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other Sovereigns, the other marks of Sovereignty remain. By duty, when according to some obligation they owe succours to some one, be it in money or men. By honour, when as some Sovereign owes fealty and homage to another, yet with out preiudizing the other rights of Sovereignty. By protection, when as some one hath put himself into the protection of another to defend him; whereby he is said to depend on his protector.  
As for a Pensioner, he seems to depend no more of him that gives the pension, nor to be inferior to him, than the other is to him. For although he seems inferior receiving the pension, yet the other in giving it, makes show that h● hath need of his succours: And when as H●norius treated with the Gets, and made them his pensioners. Lampadias' opposing himself, said, that it was a paction of Servitude, by the which they made the Emperor tributary to the Gets. Yet I hold that this aught to be judged by the quality and power of the Estates, and by the particular conventions. For the succours may be so great in regard of the pension, as we might easily discern who had the advantage in this treaty, and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one, to do▪ that which they had stipulated from him; and that what they desired of another, were left to his free will: whereupon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferior to the last.  
The marks of Sovereignty which remain, 
The marks of Sovereignty.  not withstanding these dependences are, to give a law to all in general, and to all in particular, without the consent of any that are greater, equal or inferior: To institute the principal Officers: to make levies of money and men: to dispose of the principal affairs, not yielding an account to any man: to give pardon to condemned persons above the rigour of the Law: To judge definitively and without appeal, to hold this power of himself, and from no superior: To declare War and treat of Peace; to dispose of the Treasure: to coin Money, to cast Artillery, to build Fortresses and such like.   

CHAP. 7. Of the form of Estates according to the right of those which command them.  
THe form of Estates is likewise diverse, in regard of the right of such as command: and accordingly their command is called lawful or unlawful, as well i● a Principality, Seignoury, as a popular Government. The lawful is that which belongs unto us, be it by the bounty of him which hath power to give it, or by a just conquest, or else that w●ich is deferred by the Laws, the which hath either followed Succession, Election, or Lots. The Lot is more proper for a popular Government, for that all things are equal; and they seldom make use of it in the Government of a principality or a Seig●oury. Yet Saul was made King by Lot: And Alexander's Successors after his death divided his Empire by Lot. At Venice they draw them by Lots which are to choose the principal Magistrates. But such establishments are not ordinary.  
Succession and Election are the most ordinary means to attain unto a principality and Seignoury, whereof it is necessary ●o know the advantages and inconveniences, which we may hope for, or fear.   

CHAP. 8. Advantages and disadvantages of an Election in a principality.  
THe Election in a Monarchy or principality is dangerous, 
Inconveniences o● election in a principality.  for the miseries which the interim or vacancy doth usually breed, whilst they are about to choose a King, the Estate remaining in an Anarchy, without Lord or Governor: Like unto a Ship without a Pilot, which owes his shipwreck to the first Wind. For in the meantime thieves and Robers, upon hope to obtain their pardon from the new King, commit a thousand Villainies: as is often seen the See being void at Rome, or, as in Poland, so as the punishment ought to be doubled, for the excess which is committed during that time.  
Besides this, in the pursuit of the Election, you see many factions, whereof the least is sufficient to ●uine the Estate: the which not able to be reconciled, they frame parties, which delay the Election, and continue the int●reigne, with the disorders which accompany it.  
But if either party choose whom they think good, then grows a Civil War, which continues long after. This hath been seen in the Election of Popes and Emperors: and the Empire hath been void eighteen years, after that William Earl of Holland had been slain. For although ●hat Alphonso the tenth King of Spain were chosen, yet he refused this quality, for t●e apparent danger, to take the charge of a● Estate, exposed to the will of Subjects, to the envy of Princes, and to the violence of the stranger: And in the mean time the wicked exceeded in all villainy. Moreover in the Election, an overture being made of many, if they fall to force, the most cunning and rash would carry it, and the most virtuous would not hazard themselves. If they make themselves Competitors, and will contain themselves within the ordinary bounds, he shall never be chosen against the hot pursuit of others, who at need know well how to free themselves. And be the Election made of one of the Country, or of a stranger; yet there are great inconveniences of either side.  
Among those of the same Country, there willbe always icalousie, and the one will never obey the other: And although they be not all equal in Wealth and Virtue: yet they will still presume themselves to be such. If they make choice of a Foreign Prince, his manners being different will not be pleasing: he will advance those of his Country, in whom he hath greatest confidence. If there fall unto him another Kingdom by Succession where he may command more absolutely, he will leave the Electife to some Lieutenant: Or if the two Estates be neighbours, with the one he will make the other subject. They will always be in distrust, that he will advance his Countrymen, and deprive them of the right of Election▪ and he on the other side, will grow jealous of his Subjects, if he hath that design: and to purchase their good wills, and reduce them to what he desires, he will give and engage unto them the demeans and Revenues of the Estate, as some Emperors and Popes have done. Behold the inconveniences of an Election.  

Advantages of 〈◊〉 ●●ecti●n.  The advantages consist more in imagination then in Effect: for to say, that they choose the better, it is a thing which indeed ought to be, but cannot be effected, by reason of practices, Factions, and jealousies: and withal I will add, that the people's aim, which hath followed this m●anes of Election, hath not been always to choose the most virtuous and wise: But some have had respected to Nobility only; others to age, as the Arabians: others to the greatness of the body, as in Aethiopia: and the Scythians (if we may believe Aristotle) made choice of him that drank best.  

A conside●a●so ●n th●●l●ction.  Notwithstanding what defects soever may be in an Election, yet if it be received into an Estate, it must be maintained: and they to whom the charge is given to make the Election must among other considerations adnise to make choice of a Successor, that is unlike in nature and disposition to his Predecessor, to the end that of two diverse dispositions, there may be a well tempered order in the Estate, there being no humour, how well compo●ed soever it be, which bends not towards some vicious Extremity, from the which by this means they retire the government of the Estate: and withal they grow wear● to see continually one manner of proceeding, the which is never so Exact, as all the Subjects can rest satisfied: So as by the society of one humour some grow distasted, and others are discontented, whereby a disorder may grow. It is therefore Expedient by this variety to retain the Estate. Yet it is a thing whereof they think least: and we usually see, that although the Election be free; yet they make choice of him who naturally should succeed, if he be of age capable to Command: And this they do to prevent the Envy's and partialities which the choice of o●e of another house may breed.   

CHAP. 9 Of Succession, diversely practised in Successions.  
THe other means to come unto the Government of an Estate received by the Laws, is Succession the which is diversely practised: For the Command is referred to men and women indifferently: or to men, to the exclusion of women.  
The Command which is referred inclusively to men and Women, hath for its Foundation the Law of Successions, and the Equality which is betwixt man and Woman; yet this is also diversely practised: For either the Command is deferred to Women, according to the order and degrees of Proximity, observed in ordinary Successions: Or only in defect of Males, aswell in the direct as the Colaterall Line, unto the fourth degree inclusively: As it was resolved by the Cardinals for the Realm of Naples, as it appears in the Inuestiture of Alphonso of Arragon, in the Year 1345. and of Ferdinand in the Year 1458:  
And although that this Succession of women to the government of Estates be received in a manner by all the Estates of Christendom: Yet some have rejected it; 
Reasons for the which they exclude women fró the government in some estates.  there being no question of the possession of an inheritance, but to command a Nation: the which seems to be against the staidness and modesty which ought to be in that Sex; against the Laws of nature, which hath given force and prudence to men; and against the Law of GOD, which hath made the Woman subject to man. They add hereunto Inconstancy, Fragillity, and looseness, vices much to be feared in this Sex, and▪ of great consequence in an Estate, their weakness exposed to the force of Strangers, and to the contempt of Subjects, who will not sail to calumniate the Princ●ss●●f ●he 〈◊〉 marry: And if she marries (the which is necessary to have an assured Successor) it must be either to one of the Country or to a Stranger. She will unwillingly ●arry to one of her Subjects, as well for that she will think she ●a●h dishonoured herself; as for f●a●e lest her other Subjects, either Equal or greater than he with whom she hath married, would grow into some jealousy; the which would breed contempt and afterwards disorder.  
If she marries a Stranger, he shallbe envied of his neighbours and suspected by his Subjects, neither can he hold his life assured to command in a strange Country, unless he hath Forces & Forts whereof he is the master. He will likewise command the Estate; and the better to assure himself, he will advance his own, and keep backet those of the Country: An insupportable thing to all Nations of the World. These are partly the Reasons for the which they Exclude Women from the Government in some Estates.  
There are also some diversities in Estates, where as the succession of men to the government is only received, 
Diversity ●n the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉.  aswell for the division, as for the order of succeeding. For the division some have allowed it: and in the first a●d second Race of the Kings of France, it was practised: But the division which grew thereby, taught the French, that the Command aught to be in one alone, and that it could not be divided without ruin of the Estate. The same is at this day observed in England, Scotland, Spain, and Hungary.  
For the order of Succession, some have received none but those that were legitimate; others for want of lawful i●sue, have admitted Bastards in the direct line, to the exclusion of Colaterals. And for the order of Succession amongst the Legitimate, they have also found di●●●●s opinions; aswell in the direct ●ine, to know if the s●nne of th● Elder should succeed his Grandfather to the Exclusion of his Uncle; as in a Colaterall Line, that is to say whether in the Succession of a Colaterall, very remote, he which is descended from the Eldest branch, aught to be preferred to others which are much nearer in degree. The which Baldus decided long since, for the Succession of this Realm, in favour of the Bourbo●s, who represented the Eldest branch, tha● of Vallois failing▪ God hath confirmed it, in blessing the Arms of K. Henry the 4. with a miraculous prosperity, to attain to this estate.   

CHAP. 10. Of usurpation, or an unlawful Command.  
AN unlawful Command is called Usurpation, the which is either made by onealone, or by few men, or by the Faction of a multitude. That which is done by one alone, is either practised upon a Prince, or upon a Seignoury, or against a Popular Estate: And he which attempts is a Stranger or a Subject. I will not lay open the manner of their proceedings, nor the means which an Usurper should hold. It is too common a Science, and too much practised in these days, the which deserves rather to be forgotten then taught, for the miseries which it doth procure, 
Of the miseries it doth procure, and the difficulties they encounter.  not only to the prejudice of those, whom they may overmaster; but likewise to those which are thrust on to such interprizes. For if there be difficulty to prepare the affairs, and bring them to an end, there is no less to maintain himself. And it is most certain, that there is more difficulty for a Prince which hath usurped the liberty of another, to preserve himself i● his usurpation, than it is for a multitude which have recovered their liberty, to maintain themselves. For if in a people custom to be guided makes most commonly the liberty where into they have been setv●profitable, not knowing what government meres, nor having any understanding of the Estate; like unto a savage Beast, which had been fed in a Serraile or Cage, being once escaped knows not whither to go, having not been accustomed to feed like others, and not knowing whither to retire, is made a prey to the first that will captivate him or enchain him: Yet it is more difficult to settle a Principality, for this new greatness is subject to the envy of Neighbours, and the hatred of Subjects; who joining together, chase the Usurper more easily away, than he entered into this new Estate. Whereas a multitude which hath recovered their liberty, hath no cause to fear the hatred of Subjects, seeing that all receive benefit by this Enterprise: And the envy of Neighbours is sometimes pacified by the hatred they bear to him whom the people have expelled in regard of his bad carriage.  
Moreover in a new Commonweal every man contributes freely, and thinks that what he pays is for his own particular profit: Yea the greatest contribute willingly, for the desire they have to attain unto some honour by their contribution. chose an Usurper hath difficulty to find money to maintain himself, and entertain his Estate, unless he use violence, which doub●e● the hatred of his Subjects against him. There are an infinite number of other difficulties proceeding from the new Command of a new Lord, with whom the people cannot so easily accommodate themselves. So as for the se●ling of this new Principality, it is necessary that he reside himself upon the place, to the end he may the better see the disorders, and prevent them speedily. For by this means the Subjects shall have more occasion to love him, or to fear him if they do ill; and he that would assail the Estate, will resolve with more difficulty.  
The usurpations which are made by many, or by the people upon their natural Prince, are no less unjust; for that they happen not most commonly, but after the bad government of the Prince. They are in some sort iustis●ed by the injustice of his actions. That is likewise as unjust, which is attempted against a Seignoury by the people, the which most commonly grows from the ●niury of the Lords against their Subjects: who being assisted by some one of the Lords, who separates himself from the rest to join with them, prevailing in their Erterprises, they commonly change the Seignoury into a tyrannous Principality.  
And it is necessary that in all these changes there should be Injustice, and likewise violence: unless the change were made as at Venice, the which in the beginning was governed by the people; and afterwards the gate being shut to those which had retired out of the City, and neglected the Offices of the Estate, unto those which had them, afterwards they made an Estate of many Lords, without any jealousy or violence. The same happens usually in all popular Estates, which insensibly change into a Seignoury, when as they receive Strangers, and impart no Offices unto them. For these by succession of time e●crease and multiply: and chose the Families of he ancient Inhabitants being only employed in the charges of the War and State, diminish, so as the government is found in the hands of the smaller number.  
It hath happened sometimes, that the greatest part of the Lords having been defeated in Battle, the people have changed the Seignoury into a popular Estate: as the Tarrentins did, after the Battle which was given against the lapiges, in the which in a manner all the Nobility of Tarrnetum died. Finally it is in him that will give a new form to an Estate, to accommodate himself according to the occurrents of affairs, and therein to follow that whereof the people may be most capable.   

CHAP. 11. Of the diversity which is found among Subjects in an Estate.  
But this will not be sufficient to give form to an Estate, 
The diu●●● condi●ions of ●●bi●●● d●ue●i●●●s ●he ●orce o●●he ●st●te.  to regulate and prescribe the number, with the right and dependence of those which ought to command: You must likewise have a care to the diversity which is found usually among those which must obey, according to the which they must many tunes carry themselves diversely. But for that it would be too long a s●arch to examine particularly the diverse qualities of Subjects, it shall suffice to make mention of those chiefly which serve in the government.  
The first distinction of Subjects is, that they are all free or Bondmen. 
Of Bond men.  The Bondman is he whom the right of War hath made subject, or that is borne of a Father that is a Bondman. In old time the Masters had power of life and death over them: but the cruelty they used, caused this power to be cut off. In the end Christianity hath abolished it amongst us, for the charity which ought to ●e among men, and by this means hath preserved Estates from an infinite number of dangers, whereunto they were subject; for that Bondmen being ill entreated, might fortify an alteration, or attempt themselves, as Spartacus did. Wherefore some of the Roman Senate desiring to diversify the habit of Bondmen from such as were free, one of the wisest Senators let them know the danger, if the Bondmen came to number themselves: For they will soon fre● themselves of their Masters, for the facility they should have to conspire by the sign of their habits:  
Yet some v●der colour ●f making private men to be better served, and to cut off the infinite number of Vagabonds, Idle persons, and Bankrupts, who after they have consumed their estates, pay the world with nothing; have held it fit to bring Bondmen into an Estate. But this is so far from hindering and cutting off the number, as it would augment that of thieves. For a Bondman having once escaped, will be always forced, (not daring to show himself) to retire among thieves: and he is no wife Politician that chaseth thieves out of an Estate, but he that keeps them from entering.  
In regard of free Subjects, some are privileged, simple Subjects and bound to all the Laws: 
Of privileged Subjects.  others are privileged and exempt from somè one: some for their Age, others for their sex; some by particular favour, or by the prerogative of their charge and vocation; and others are bound to some duties of honour or assistance more than the rest; as feudataries and vassals.  
Of simple Subjects, some are Originaries, 
Of simple Subjects.  the rest are Strangers. The Originaries are those which are borne in the Estate, enjoying all the Laws. As for Strangers, 
Of strangers.  they are entreated diversely in the world. For they draw some either to people the Country, or Towns newly built; or to weaken their neighbours, or to gain good wits, who may serve either for Traffic, or in the War, or for the instruction of Youth, and in this cas● they are most commonly privileged. Others come of themselves, either for that they are chased out of their Country, or with an intent to benefit their Estates. In this case they are so far from being privileged, as all liberty to dispose is taken from them; and dying, that which they have accrues to the Prince and State, if they have no Heir remaining there.  
Behold the diversity of their conditions which obey, diversifying the government. But the form of the Estate may be also considered by the division they mak● of Subjects, according to the diversity of their vocation or profession.   

CHAP. 12. Of the diversity and distinction of Subjects, according to their vocations and professions.  

divers orders of Subjects.  IN many Estates the Subjects are distinguished into three orders: As in France, into that of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the third estate which is the people. This distinction is followed in a manner throughout all Europe, and taken from that of the ancient Gauls, who were distinguished into Drindes, Horsemen, and the common people. In Egypt there were Labourers, Priests, Shepherds, men at Arms, and Artisans. The Arabians were divided into Priests, men at Arms, and Labourers; who made three distinct bodies. In some Commonweals they have been distinguished otherwise, as at Venice, into Gentlemen, Citizens, and common people: and the Gentlemen into ancients, new and last, or more new: Yet this last distinction makes but one body. At Florence they had the great, the popular, and the populace.  
But among all distinctions those are very considerable, which are reduced under certain bodies, Colleges, and Commonalties, whereof some are religious, as Conuents, Abbeys, and Chapters: Others are political and civil, ordained either for Commerce, or for the safety of a Town or Country, or for Council and justice.. Other Commonalties are composed of Trades and Artisans, divided by Brotherhoods or Companies; the which Numa brought first into Rome, to quench the faction of the Sabins and Romans, and to reunite these two people into one, taking away the first division by this second Distinction; which being reduced into many parts, mingled one with another, was much less dangerous. And afterwards Tarquin the proud, to take away all signs of this ancient Division, mingled their Ensigns.  
The like course hath been followed to reunite the Estate of Genoa, afflicted at one time by many Divisions: That is to say, by the Gnelphes and Gibelins; the Nobility and the people; and that of the Adorns and Fregoses. For to unite the people divided into so many factions, they made a mixture of the one with the other, in making a department of Twenty eight families, under the which they reduced the rest; although they carried not the name of the family, neither were formerly of the same party. In other Estates they have divided the people by Parishes or quarters: and in other by Families.  
The Subject for settling of such and the like Divisions of the people, 
The subject of the establishing of Commonalties and companies in an estate.  must be either to let them understand more easily the Sovereign's command, o● to retire from them their approbation or advice, upon some proposition that is made unto them: Or for that factious have already brought in such distinctions, as they are forced to countenance and allow them: Or else as Numa did, to take away the name of a distinction more prejudicial to the Estate: Or to ease the Prince of some part of his care: or to give assurance to the people of good usage, in making choice of a good number among them, for the managing of affairs which concern them in particular: And these divisions are very considerable, as also their power and authority with the people, and their dependence of the Prince their Sovereign, as making a part of the form of the Estate.  
For insome Estates the Sovereign cannot resolve any thing of importance, without these Commonalties, or some of them: as the King of Poland without the Senate. In others he resolves; but his resolution must be allowed by them, to the end it may be embraced by the people. In others he resolves in certain things in the which the Commonalties have but one voice: as likewise in certain things the Commonalty resolve without the Sovereign. But as the Sovereign ought to establish this temper in the Sovereignty, 
That the Prince ought not to cross the Commonalties, nor suffer them to attempt any thing above their power.  according to the disposition of affairs and persons: so being once settled, he must have a care not to cross it unseasonably; lest that in showing himself a concurrent in some things, he make himself by the same means equal to his Subjects, whereof this Commonalty is composed, which will be always supported by others. As in like manner he must have a care that they attempt not any thing that is above their power, hindering them upon the least occasion; and in the beginning: for it is the ordinary of such Companies, to usurp as much authority as they can, and to grow bold by sufferance.   

CHAP. 13. Of Religion.  

Of the ●s●icacy & necessity of Religion in on Estate.  AFter the establishing of the form of the Estate, the most considerable is that of Religion: For it is the cause of good order and good Fortune; And Fortune the Mother of good success: And so she is not only the foundation, but the cause of the preservation and greatness of the Estate.  
Although a people unable many times to be restrained but by fear, yet there is not any thing more natural, nor more just, nor of greater efficacy in the minds of men, then that which proceeds from the Reverence which we owe unto God. And whereas the fear of God is wanting, of necessity the Estate must run to ivine; or it mu●t be supported by the fear of a Prince, who supplies this defect: who although he were such a one, (the which is difficult) yet this Prince failing, the fear would likewise be wanting, and by consequence the obedience; for for that the Successor can seldom inherit this Authority which dies with the person.  
Moreover many things presenting themselves in an Estate, which he must do, or hinde●, and which cannot be persuaded by any reasons which may be alleged, men by their insufficiency not able to satisfy themselves; and force on the other side being a dangerous instrument handle, which doth harm as soon as good, the authority of man being not powerful enough, we must of necessity have recourse to the authority of Religion, which amongst people fearing God hath no reply. Wherefore most men which have desired to effect some great and extraordinary matter▪ have made use of this means, as the most powerful, were it for the settling of Estates, or for the reformation. Which is the reason that in most part of Religions they observe infinite acts of policy, the which the people would easily flight over, were they not restrained by the respect of Religion. This care then for the settling of Religion, is one of the chief in the Estate, for that it ought to be established with all purity, and without abuses: and where we shall find any brought in already, we ought to cut them off; 
Of abuses in Religion.  whereof the principal are diversity of opinions, blasphemy, carelessness, and superstition.  
We will first treat of the chief means which have been observed in the settling of Religions.   

CHAP. 14. Of the means held in the establishing of Religions.  
THe establishment of Religion is either made by extraordinary means, exceeding the discourse of man, or by humane courses. The first have not been employed but to settle the true Religion; and the latter have served as well to settle superstition and impiety as the truth.  
The extraordinary means are miracles and Martyrdom; 
Extraordinary means for the establishing of true Religion.  every man persuading himself that the Constancy they seein one that suffers, cannot proceed but from the particular assistance of God. For although that in Paganis●ne, they have seen many Murderers of Tyrants, and others of all conditions, which have endured unspeakable torments with great patience: Yet one age of Christianity would furnish many more examples, than all the time that Paganism continued. This constancy then which cannot be attributed but to a Divine assistance, every man thinks he hath reason to believe, that what they say that suffer so constantly, proceeds from God, and is true.  
As for Miracles, some are reputed such, for that they are contrary to the common order of Nature; and others for that they are against the common opinion, who judging one thing impossible or difficult, makes him to seek by prayers, vows, and promises, succours from above, the which succeeding according to our desire, we take the event for a testimony of his power, whom as God we have innocated to our succours, and begin to acknowledge him for such.  
Adad King of the Azimites, a people beyond Egypt, having promised to make himself a Christian, if he won the victory against the King of the Homerites, who for the most part were jews; having obtained it, he sent to demand Bishops and Doctors from the Emperor justi▪ nian, to instruct him and his people, who sent him Marcionarius from Alexandria. Clovis after the Battle won against the Germans near unto Cullen, made himself a Christian, with the remainders of the French, who had not yet embraced the Christian Faith; according to a vow which he had made before the Combat, the which he held very dangerous for him; and thus he established the Christian Religion among the French, disposed thereunto by this victory, the which being unexpected by them, considering the great number of their Enemies, they could not attribute it but to his power, to whom their King had made a vow.   

CHAP. 15. Humane means for the settling of Religion.  
AS for humane means they depend partly upon the disposition of the people, amongst▪ whom they mean to settle Religion, and partly of the quality of such as desire to establish it.  
For the disposition of the people, 
The disposition of people considerable for the settling of Religion.  the first consideration we must make, is of their disposition. For some are barbarous; others civilised. We call them commonly barbarous which govern not themselves as we do, and according to our opinion. So the Grecians, and afterwards the Romans, called all other Nations barbarous, although that Asia had civilised the Grecians, and the Grecians had taught the Laws and Sciences to the Romans. By the like fotly there are some Italian Writers, who speaking of the Germans, French, and Spaniards, call them by this name; although there be not any of these Nations that yields incivility or policy to Italy.  
Our meaning is not to extend Barber if me so fatre, 
who are properly called barbarians.  but to call those Barbarians, in whom is observed a Brutishness, Ignorance, Stupidity, and an insupportable rudeness of manners, bei●in Religion, or in their manner of living, and apparel, or in their habitation, or in the form of their government.  
Of Barbarians in Religion, 
Barbarians in Religion,  some acknowledge not any Divinity, and yet they are given to Enchantments and Sorceries: As some Historians write, that anciently the Huns were, when they came forth of their Country; and that many of those Northern people are yet. And in America the Brasilsens and Creimeques. Others have some kind of Religion or rather Superstition, but so far from Reason, as it is no difficult thing to confute it. Others worship a plurality of Gods, yet not acknowledging any one for the sovereign Creator. Others acknowledge a Creator, but they worship the Sun for a Creator, or some other Creature, as in Cusco and Mexico, and these two last kinds of Barbarians have their Ceremonies, Feasts, and Solemnities, better Regulated then the two first. There are others which adore Idols, whose sacrifices in like manner are ordered. Besides these we may hold for Barbarians, such as have another foundation of Religion than we have.  
There is a Rabbi, 
Of the Author's o● most part of Religion at this day.  which writes that there hath been four Lawgivers', which have divided the World by their opinions, from which most part of Regions at this day proceed. The first is Moses, the second jesus Christ, the third Mahomet, and the fourth Manes: And this man supposing two principles or beginnings, the one good and the other bad, and attributing the superior part of the World to the good, who can do no Evil, and therefore ought not to be prayed unto; and the lower part to the bad, to whom they must address themselves to preserve them from Evil, is held to be the Author of that abominable adoration of the Devil, received in a manner throughout all the Indies, where he hath sowed his poison. Of these four beliefs, the Christian Faith being the only true, we may call the rest Barbarous.  

〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉.  Barbarism in the form of living, is limited by us in those which line like bruit Beasts, without any manuring of the Land; and either seed upon wild Beasts or of Man's flesh: As the ‛ Popians in America, 
Barbar●●s in 〈◊〉 clothing  Barbarism in the manner of their appa●rel●, consists in the nakedness of the whole Body, or the greatest part thereof as is seen in the East and West Indies, and in part of Africa.  
We hold the habitation barbarous, not only of those which have no certain place of dwelling, 
Barbarou ●es in their habitation.  creeping into hollow Trees, or on the top of them, or into Caves, as they find commodity; whether they live separated or in Company: but also of such who like unto the Tartarians, dwell in the fields under Tents, or in their Wagons, changing place according to their pleasure. As for Barbarism in government, it is observed by the want of Heads, Order, and Policy, 
Barbarous in government.  where they choose no Commanders but in time of war, like some people of America.  
By this diversity of Barbarism, it is easy to judge that the manner of proceeding for the settling of Religion, 
That the manner of proceeding for the se●ling of religion aught to be diverse.  aught to be diverse. For it is certain, that they which by their manner of living are more like to Beasts than Men, aught to be made capable of Humanity; and that to such as by their nakedness, show that they know not what belongs to honesty and shame, they must first teach them to know it, before they seek to make them comprehend what Religion is. In like manner they which wander, scattered and dispersed one from another, must be drawn together into Commonalties and Policy, so far as their Nature will bear it: And they which wander sometimes in one place, and sometimes in another, must be stayed and settled in a certain abode, to have commodity to instruct them.  
Then coming to their superstitions, where they may confute the absurdities by serious Reasons, if they be capable; or by jests and scoffs they shall make them grow into contempt of their opinions, falling first upon those whose foundation is weakest. If there be any thing good in some point of their opinions, or that hath any conformity with the Religion they mean to establish, o● i● indifferent; they need not fear to allow of it: chose this may serve for the settling of true Religion. S. Paul at Athens took occasion to speak of jesus Christ upon the Altar, which was dedicated to the unknown God. The Apostles to gain credit among the pharisees (who made the greatest part of the jews) spoke daily of the dead: the which the pharisees heard the more willingly, for that in the beleese of this Article the Saddles were opposite unto them. It hath much availed for the settling of the Catholic Religion in America, to find amongst those Idolaters certain Ceremonies, which in the outward show do much resemble those of the Catholic.  
The Nu●nes of the Sun at Cusco, a Town of Peru, made certain Cakes of the flower of Mahis, mingled with the blood of white Sheep, which they offered in Sacrifice, and of this Cake they gave a piece to every Stranger that was present, who eat it in sign of Alliance, Confederation and Devotion to the Inga; and promised never to do or say any thing against the Sun or the Inga: And this solemnity was performed twice in the year, in September and December. Processions at Mexico were in use: and in Peru there were Priests, destinated to hear confessions after the manner of penite tiaries. They counterfeited the Mystery of the Trinity, worshipping three Statues of the Sun, the one they call, the ●ather Sun, the second the Son Sun, and the third the Brother Sun.  
In like manner they had three Images of Cu●que ●ig●a, which is the God of Thunder, the which they distinguished in like manner by Father, Son, and Brother. They likewise made use at Nicaraqua of a Cro●●e, which was there worshipped to obtain Rain. Finally, these exterior conformities, although applied to a bad use, have been great preparatives to employ them to better use.  
So must part of those which have sought to settle some new Religion, have desired rather to borrow the name of the establishment from the ancient, or from the reformation, then to term themselves Authors of a new opinion; which in a point importing the Salvation of Man, under this Name of Novilty had been suspected. And Mahomet himself, although far from the belief of Christians, yet ●not to discontent them, except the principal point which is the Divinity of JESUS CHRIST) hath spoken of h●m with great Reverence: And in regard of him, he saith, that he was come to reform that which his Disciples had innovated in the Law of JESUS CHRIST.  
Prophecies and predictions which may have some reference to the settling of Religion, 
Prophecies d●● pose a people to the settling of a new Religion.  doth likewise dispose the minds of those that are to receive it. The promise of sending of the Messias, stirred up the minds of the jews to acknowledge jesus Christ to be he which had been promised. And the Oracles of the Sibylles was a great means to make the Grecians and other Gentles acknowledge that he was the Son of God. Mahomet falsifying the passage by the which jesus Christ promised● to send the Paraclet or Comforter, saith, that it was of himself, that JESUS CHRIST meant to speak. In many parts of America they had many predictions and prodigies, which foreran the coming of the Spaniard, and prepared them to change Religion.  
Heavy burdens and rigours, 
Heavy cha●ges and burdens dispose a people to change Religion.  be it that they proceed from the government, or from Religion, may dispose a people to a milder Religion, if they think to be relieved by this means. Boni●a●●, Archbishop of Mentz, laboured much in preaching to them of Turnigia, to make them Christians▪ and in the end not able to win them by the hope of Eternal life; but having demanded of him if making themselves: Christians, they should be freed from the 〈◊〉 they paid the King of Hungary; he promised and under his leading having vanquished the Hungarians, they became Christians. The yoke of the Kings of Peru and Mexico, insupportable to their Subjects, made the conquest of those Countries more easy to the Spani●rds, and likewise the advancement of Christian Religion much more mild than the superstition, to the which the Devil had subjected those Nations.  
The Hebrews which were in Egypt, being miserably entreated, yielded easily to the Religion which Moses taught them, upon the promise he made to lead them into a Land abounding in all things: although that afterwards forgetting their misery, they returned sometimes to idolatry.  
The diversity of opinions in the Religion rece●ned, may open a Gate to another which they would establish; for that from this diversity grows incertainty in the minds of men; whereby if another be presented, better accompanied with show, it is more easily received. Nothing did so much favour the opinion of Mahomet in Asia and Africa, as the diverse heresies which were then crept in●o ●ll the Le●ant: especially those which concerned the Trinity, and the nature of jesus Christ; as that of N● Mahomet●●es, nestorians, and Ariens, and the doubts which grew of either side upon this Subject: But Mahomet ●o free himself from these, found no shorter come, then to deny the Deity of jesus Christ, and by 〈…〉 to overthrow the belief of the Trinity: But that which he●pt most to the advancement of this 〈◊〉 was, that he did accommodate the Rule he made for man●ers to sensuality, overruling whatsoever concerned Christian or jewish authority, and forbidding nothing 〈◊〉 that which the Arabians and Southern people, among whom he lived might well forbears; as Wine.  
Likewise to receive all sorts of of opinions indifferently, 
〈…〉.  as they do in China, may greatly help to the bringing in of a ●ew Religion, for the liberty there is to treat openly without fear of blame; the which is likewise fau●●red by the incertainty of men's minds, which is ordinary in this multiplicity of opinions.  
Revolts and Civil war do likewise dispose a people to receive a new Religion, 
Revolts and Civil War dispose to the change of Religion.  as well for that force helps the establishment, as for that the head of a party may countenance his Arms with this pretext, and by an opinion diverse to that of others, hold those of his party more firm unto him, and better united among themselves: which is a consideration which Tacitus (speaking like a Pagan) saith that Moses had in the settling of his Religion among the Hebrews.  
An unrestrayned liberty among a people somewhat Civil, and to open a contempt of Religion, 
As also excessive liberty and coute●pt o● Religion.  dispose them no less to receive a new, then too great rigour and austerity. For besides that man hath in him some certain seeds of piety, the which he cannot long suffer to lie vn●iuitfull, so as he degenerates sometime rather into superstition then Religion: The contempt of God brings with it so many other inconveniences in a society and civil connersation, to the which the Magistrate cannot prescribe a Remedy; as the first which presents itself with a show of Sanctity, and a desire of reformation, is well entertained and heard by a●l men: and his opinion is the better received, for that the contempt of the ancient gives him place in the minds of men. So the opinion of Homer in the Law of Mahomet, being grown into contempt among the Persians. Ishmael Sophy settled that of haly, filled with many austerities and ceremonies. And in the Christian Religion, God hath from time to time raised up great personages, to restore it by the holiness of their lives, and their good examples, 
The reunion of a Country under one Prince, makes the establishment Religion 〈◊〉.  when as it seemed most contemned and rejected.  
It is likewise no small advantage for the advancement of a Religion in a great extent of Country, to find it reunited under one Prince, as the Christians did the Roman Empire: For the Example of the Prince and the chief about him, which they may gain, draws all the rest suddenly after him: Whereas if the Country were divided into many Estates, there would be as much trouble in the one as in a great Empire. Moreover great Courts are more Civil, and more diversified with men of diverse sorts of Condition, of which they may draw a good number, fit to receive a new opinion. The facility they have had to convert the Mexicains, and Peruans', reduced under great Kings; and the difficulty there is yet to convert the Brasilians and Cicimeques, which have not any, witness it sufficiently.  
These are the principal Encounters which may dispose a people to receive a new establishment. But with this disposition the quality of those which seek to bring it in, and the course they mean to observe, must be proportionable.   

CHAP. 16. Of Parts necessary in those that will bring in a new Religion.  
MAny parts are necessary in such men: but the principal are authority and credit, 
Pa●ts and qualities necessary to the bridgers in of a new Religion.  courage, knowledge, or sufficiency of wisdom. The authority or credit, grows either from Dignity, Sanctity or force; for the dignity it is certain that the example of Princes and Great men, strikes a great stroke in such establishments; and the more if they themselves become Ministers and labourers in such actions by public exho●tations. Ysaphat, so●ne to Asa King of juda, sent Priests with some of the chief of his Court, throughout all the Provinces of his Estate, to make them receive the Law of God. Osuala King of Northumberland, desiring to bring the Christian faith into his Estate, demanded a Preacher from Douvald King of Scotland, who sent him Aydan: who being ignorant of the Saxon Tongue, this King served him for an Interpreter to his people. The like in the time of our Fathers did the King of Congo in Africa, serving as an Interpreter to certain Religious men, whom Emanuel King of Portugal had sent unto him to preach the Gospel. Godscald, Prince of the Vandals, who depended of Aldembung, delivered unto his people in the Country Language, that which the Priests and Bishops had preached in Latin. jagellon, great Duke of Lituania, having made himself a Christian to be King of Poland, in the year 1386. took such a liking to this Religion, as he himself preached to the Lituanians to convert them. Some have written, that Sicebueles King of the Visigots, converted by exhortations fourscore and ten thousand jews, for the which in the decretales he is called most religious.  
We must not doubt but the authority of Moses, who was a great Captain, and had made War long against the Aethiopians for the Kings of Egypt, did assist him much to free the Hebrews from Servitude, and to make them receive the true Religion.  
Holiness of life is so corrupt and licentious an age, 
Holiness of life.  gives credit to him that makes profession. This means is particular to jesus Christ and to his Apostles, who being borne of an abject condition according to the World, have advanced themselves by their holy and miraculous actions, above the greatest powers of that time. Ishmael Sophy was desirous in the establishing of his opinion, to make use of this voice: But force and other humane means, have contributed more than his exterior Devotion.  
They which could not imitate his Sanctity, have been forced to purchase to themselves authority, to suppose Miracles and Dreams, and after the manner of Min●s, Sertorius, and other Lawgivers' of times past, make the World believe that they had a particular communication with God, as Mahomet did, who had tamed a Pygeon, the which came picking in his Ear before the people, to the end he might persuade them by this show, that the Holy Ghost changed into a Dove, did suggest unto him the fooleries of his Alcoron. But among the demonstrations of a holy life, nothing doth so much draw the people as austerity, to the which the Commons will hardly believe, that any man will submit himself, for ambition, vanity, or lying. And yet ●here have been Philosophers in times past, which without any devotion have affected it, to give credit to their opinions; and many times the ambition of such men is greater, then of such which openly contend for Crowns and Kingdoms: The first doing like men that Row, which turn their backs to the Ports where they desire to arrive.  
As for force, it is of all the means by the which a man may purchase authority, the most powerful; the rest without its assistance succeeding seldom. Yet we have found by Experience, that it hath been of small use in the settling of Religion, if the force hath not been such as it can receive no tolerable opposition, and that the minds of men have not been formerly disposed to change: and yet withal this, we find not any example, unless it be in some petty Estates.  
Charlem●ine, who sought to employ it against the Saxon, without this preparation advanced little, although he joined Prudence with Instruction to force, for the settling of the Christian Religion among those people: And after he had attempted all means, for his last remedy, he was forced to transfer a great number of them, into Flanders and Brab●nt, and to draw from thence Christians to mingle amongst the Idolators, which remained in the Country, and continued there long after.  
The Turk ●ath done the like, having drawn many of his Religion which were in Asia, to plant them in Europe, and transported a great number of Christians which were in Europe into Asia. And yet we see that hitherto the Turk hath wholly expelled the Christian Religion out of his Estate, although he hath employed many other means.  
Hence we may conclude, that if with Force, which received no opposition, he could not prevail; it is a mere madness for certain men ignorant of the Affairs of the World, to propound to make use of Force against those, who fortified with intelligence among themselves, and good Conduct, may not only defend their opinion by Force; but also endanger the sum of the Estate. But reserving to treat more particularly of this Question hereafter, I will come to another kind of Force or constraint, which depends upon the Authority of the Magistrate, and concerne● the punishments and burdens, and the exclusion of Heretics and Infidels from honours.  
As for punishments, it works no greater effect than armed Force, which is usually joined unto it; and sometimes these punishments borne with Constancy, produce a contrary effect to that which was expected; as we will relate more particularly hereafter the Reasons. As for heavy burdens, although they seem more mild, yet we may well fear the inconvenience.  
From the example of Martyrdom, which is in punishments, if they convert not speedily, heavy burdens ruins them by little and little. St. Gregory writing to Bishop janvyer, for the Conversion of the Peasants of Sardinia, adviseth him to charge them with Taxes and Labour. In Spain they have done the like with the Moors, who not withstanding have multiplied. The Turk, besides the exclusion from honours, which is a means joined to that of heavy burdens, practiseth the like with the Christians, taking Tribute of their own children.  
Charlamaine used it against the Hungarians, after that he vanquished them, leaving the Idolators nothing but their Lives, and giving their goods to such as would become Christians. Sometimes the exclusion from honours, without any heany burden, hath prevailed much for the conversion of great men, and of a mean condition, among a people ambitious of honour. Ingo Prince of the Vmides, received none to his Table but such as made profession of the Christian Religion, preferring the meanest before the greatest of another Religion.  

Sufficiency.  Sufficiency consists in the Knowledge and ability to instruct and dispute. Instruction is made either by word or writing: 
Instruction.  And that which is done by word, is either public or private, in such places where they fear that the belief, which they seek● to establish be not allowed in the beginning; or when as they desire to win some great man, whose example may serve for the conversion of others. They use private Instructions, as a preparative to public, the which is done by Preaching, or by public Lectures of Books concerning the Divine Service: As the Law of God was anciently taught by the Reading thereof before the people. And as among the Christians they Read the Epistle and the Gospel, with the simbal of the Creed; simple means and without affectation; and of no less edification (if in this simplicity they cause them to be understood by the people) than the Preaching of some, who deliver many times their own Fancies more than the Gospel.  
In times past they found it not strange to Translate the Holy Scripture into the vulgar Tongue. Netgher, a Religious man of Saint Gal, under the Abbot Bernard, Translated the Psalter in the French tongue, which was then but rude. Alfred King of England did the like into his Language: Hestad, also King of England, caused the Holy and Sacred Scriptures to be converted and turned into English: And Beda, (called the Venerable.) Translated the Gospel of Saint john into English.  
In Preaching two things are necessary: 
Preaching:  the one to understand the vulgar tongue, in the place where they Preach perfectly: the other is to bring some exterior ornament to persuade. The first jesuits that went into jappon, for that they rashly under took this Enterprise, before they did well understand the Language, in steed of instructing they were laughed at, by reason of the many incongruities and errors they committed in this Language. Disputation requires an active Spirit, to satisfy all difficulties that may be encountered in such matters. But order is very necessary o● wherein two 〈◊〉 are especially to be considered. The one is, that it is more ease to oppose a Religion, whatsoever it be then to maintain and defend it, for all Religions having in them something which is above the capacity of man's understanding, it is no difficult thing ●o contradict such a belief by humane reason. Wherhfore they must first shake the opinion received, before they come to plant a new. The other point is, in such disputations to begin with things known, and confess of ●yt●e● side), to come unto those which are contradicted and not yet received.  
This means of Instruction is the mildest, and most proper to attain to the settling of Religion, 
Instruction a powerful means for the bringing in of a Religion.  how much soever it differs from the opinion received, and amongst what people soever: Especially if they, begin to teach young children, before they have been instructed in the old belief. The jesuits, seeing they could not prevail in the conversion of the Brastlians, a nation altogether brutish and in humane, they could find no other remedy, then to draw their children unto them by gifts; and kind usage, and this people suffered them to go the more willingly, for that they always brought back some thing, besides instruction which they received. In Peru, in the beginning they made use of poor blind men, who being received by them and well used, went afterwards up and down repeating that which they had learned: and seeing nothing they delivered it to all sorts of people indifferently, with more assurance then if they had been clear sighted.  
The opinion of Aly in the Law of Mahomet, which hath been embraced by the Persians, was divulged, (as the Histories of that Country relate) by thirty thousand slaves, which Tamburlaine had given to Tegel, predecessor to Ishmael Sophy, to cause them to be instructed in that belief. Charlemagne, erected many Colleges and Seminaries of piety among the idolaters whom he had Conquered, and reta●●ed twelve children of the Saxon Princes, as Hostages, to cause them to be instructed in the Christian Religion. The Turk takes the fifth of all the Christian children, and causeth them to be bred up in the Law of Mahomet. The Xerif seized upon Morocco and Fez, having by Pilgrimage, and the show of a holy life, gotten some credit among the Moors: He bought a thousand slaves, which he bred up in his opinion, grounded (as he pretended) upon a more pure interpretation of the Alcoran: and having instructed many with such Disciples; and his sons having some advantages against the Christians, turned their Arms against the Kings of Fez and Morocco, 
Prudence.  and settled themselves in their places with their Religion.  
Prudence, is next to Piety, the principal part which they should have, which undertake such an enterprise, and so much the more necessary, for that many times an indiscreet zeal hinders his function, 
That the zeal of Religion must be accompanied with conduct and Prudence.  and ruins that which he would Establish. And although that the counsels of these zealous persons succeed sometimes; which notwithstanding is but seldom, God having given prudence to men, to serve them for a guide; all having not deserved that God should daily employ his power to work miracles.  
Ananias having persuaded Isates King of the Adiabones, and his mother to receive the jewish-religion, held it fit that he should forbear to cause himself to be circumcised, until he had disposed his people. But Eliazar the galilean pressed him to do it, and not to prefer the fear of men to the grace of God. Which was the advice of a Divine more zealous than discreet; the which although it succeeded well at that time, their spirits being better prepared then the Prince expected; yet it were dangerous to follow it in all Encounters. For the Apostle commands that zeal should be guided by Knowledge. We know in our time, that this rash zeal hath done more harm to the Catholic Religion then good.  
I doubt, whether to this inconsiderate zeal we should not attribute that opinion, 
Of Spiritual and temporal powers, and their jurisdictions.  which some have of the greatness of the spiritual power, by the which and their Rules, they minister cause of jealousy to all temporal powers, the which they submit unto it, against the ancient belief and the custom of former ages. A proceeding quite contrary to that of jesus Christ; whom the jews desiring to surprise by this means in the crime of high treason, and to bandy the Magistrate against him, declared openly, that his Kingdom was not of this world; and commanded to yield unto Caesar that which was Caesar's, although he were a Tyrant, and an Usurper of another man's liberty.  
After him his Apostles have spoken of the civil Magistrate with honour and respect, commanding to obey him; and it cannot be found, that by virtue of the Spiritual power, they have advised to attempt any thing against the Magistrate. It is true, that among Christians, the Spiritual power hath been always much respected; but only when it hath bee●e practised in matters which are merely Spiritual, the which looseth the dignity and grace, which is due unto it, when it deals in matters which are temporal terrien.  
These be the bounds which have always been set in France, betwixt the Ecclesiastical lurisdiction and a Regal power: and with this distinction the Christian Religion, hath been preserved above a thousand years in France, without any blemish. But inconsideration or ambition, which is usually blind, hath proceeded further, to breed a jealousy among all Christian Princes. For by a consequence altogether absurd and foolish, they would make the World believe, that the obedience of the Subject towards his Prince, the which being a temporal thing, cannot be reputed but temporal, may be prohibited by the Spiritual power, the which notwithstanding hath no power nor jurisdiction over temporal things. The which is a means not only to hinder, that such Princes as are distracted from the ancient belief; do not reunite themselves, seeing they cannot do it without dimunition of their authority and power: but also makes others, which are not yet separated (to free themselves from this subjection) leave it, or favour all which oppose themselves to this Doctrine, never insisting upon the errors, which they may add thereunto.  
There is as little wisdom to ●rosse the Rules of a received policy, 
The obser●ntion of ceremonies of an ancient Religion, facilitates the settling of a new.  if they were not altogether impious: neither must they press to change the Religion of the conscience, if without impiety this appearance may be preserved. The ancient Christians, made no difficulty to apply unto the Divine Service, many of the jewish and Pagan ceremonies. In diverse changes of Religion happened in our time, Luther in Germany, and Peter Martyr in England, have carried themselves more discreetly, having retained the greatest part of the ceremonies of the Catholic Religion, approved therein; then they which have made their Religion bald, and destitute of all ornament; and to make it the more savage, and to seem more different from the common belief, they have changed the names and terms by an in●ise●ee● vanity.  
Behold part of the principal considerations which they must observe in the settling of a Religion. Let us now see how we are to carry ourselves to preserve the ancient belief; amidst the diversity of other Religions which are crept into the Estate.   

CHAP. 17. That the diversity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate: how they ought to carry themselves to preserve the ancient Belief, in the diversity of Religions crept into the Estate.  
IN old time the Kings of Egypt, entertained this diversity in Religion among their Subjects: Some worshipping a Dog, others a Bird, and some a Crocodile with other things according unto their fancies: which was a tyrannical practice; to the end their Subjects might not agree to control and reform their Actions.  
But it is certain that if in the Concord of an Estate, consists the good and quiet of the Subjects, 
There aught to be but one Religion in an Estate.  it is more expedient to reunite themselves all in one Religion when they may. For Religion is the cement which binds the Quicksilver, that draws together all the members of the Estate into one perfect union: And chose there is nothing that doth more disunite a people, than the diversity of opinions, or the use of diverse ceremonies in matter of Religion. Hence have proceeded the most violent and furious passions, that euer troubled an Estate, and the life of men: 
Diversity of Religion dangrous in an Estate.  And in this point all other interests are so employed, as it hath drawn with it all that, which makes a part of the honours, goods, and fortunes of men. For Religion the children have left the Father's cause; servants have denied their master's service, and subjects their fidelity to Princes. Finally all natural rights and offices of humanity have ceased, whereas Religion hath resisted: Every man esteeming that which he follows to be the most pure, and the true manner of worship, and condemning all that which is not conformable to his belief.  

It must be a●oyded even in light things.  Wherhfore we must fly this diversity, even in light things: for that a multitude being uncapable to judge of things by themselves, nor by reason or motion in Religion, suffering themselves to be carried away by chance and apparent shows, contrary to that which Faith should persuade them, above the perception of their understanding: when they have once shaken some opinion which he had in Reverence, he presently falls into the like uncertainty of the other pieces of his belief; which have no more authority nor ground with him, than those which they have already shaken.  

How they must govern themselves to preserve the ancient belief, in a diversity of Religions.  Finding then this diversity in an Estate we must consider whether it be little or great. If it be small, and the parties of the new opinion weaker than that of the ancient Religion, be it in number of men, or in retreats of intelligences, it willbe no difficult thing to suppress them: No more than if in a great Estate, this opinion had not taken footing but in one corner, or in one or two Provinces; as that of the Albygeois had done in France. For the rest of the Estate being secure, it is easy for the greater party to suppress the less, by the conquest of these Provinces. But if this opinion hath crept into all the parts of the Estate, although they that follow it make the lesser number, yet we must consider if we are in the beginning, 
Of the rooting out of Heresy and new Religion in the 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 they ought to carry them▪ 〈◊〉.  or in the strongest fit of the disease.  
In the beginning such weeds are to be pulled up as soon as they grow, the which must be done by secret Executions, and not as they ●aue usually practised by public punishments; if it be not of some opinion that is very difficult to persuade: For that the Example of Martyrdom moves many to pity, makes others obstinate, and draws some to be more curious to examine the reasons, for the which a new Preacher, who hath nothing in show but what is holy, suffers so constantly: and few will persuade themselves, that any man will for so small a matter lose his life with so much dishonour; and so by this gate many enter into that Commonalty: so as instead of retiring the people by the example of punishments, they invite them: as being certain that the terror thereof, works a contrary effect in a new opinion, which ha●● a show of sanctity, and of the truth and falsehood whereof they may doubt, then in other crimes, the which are generally condemned in all men. For to search the bottom of every man's conscience, were to kindle a fire in the Estate, add to discover a mischief, which were more expedient to hide, and whereof the scandal were dangerous. We have seen many Realms and Principalities preserve themselves in peace, 
The toleration of two Religions in an estate are less hurtful than a civil War.  with the exercise of two different Religions; but there was never any but hath been ruined by the course and continuance of Civil wars: and the conditions by the which they may make two Religions agree together, would not only be less hurtful to an Estate, but more supportable to private persons, than the lest civil war, which shall be attempted upon this subject. For although there may be some found amongst Heretics, who, either for want of Instruction in their new opivion, or for want of courage, think to be persuaded by Force, that they do meritoriously suffer the pains which they endure, and therefore were easy to reduce: yet I will say that in such affairs, for that a firm persuasion must precede the resolution which such men have taken to change their first manner of living, in a point which doth wholly import their salvation; it is dangerous to employ Arms. For some striking sail, and continuing amongst us, serve underhand to those of their party by many means; if it were but only in giving advice or dispersing of bruits, which may assist their affairs. Others which have more generosity, persuaded of the injustice of the harm which they cause them to suffer, continue resolute and obstinate: being the ordinary of the spirit of Man, to grow more resolute the more it is resisted, and gives way when there is least opposition. For the more that that man loves his liberty, and yet abuses it, the more he hates servitude and constraint, in the which notwithstanding he carries himself better than in the enjoying of his freedom.  
All men tend naturally to the contrary of that which is desired of them, 
War against Heretics 〈◊〉 then patty, and give, 〈◊〉 advantages.  and affect more willingly that which is forbidden. Fear and necessity maintain men best in their Duties. They force them to know themselves, to resume courage, to ally themselves together, and in the end to frame a party within the Estate; which upon the least good success which shall befall it, (Fortune not always assisting the greater number) it fortifies itself, as it proceeded from the justice of their cause, and that GOD fought for them, so as by this good success many being persuaded to follow it, they increase the number of their partisans: and it falls out most commonly, that the discontented, and such as desire to work their own ends, join with them. Moreover, this Sect, as I have said, being dispersed over all the Provinces of an Estate, and the Prince not able to have Armies in them all, whilst that he assails them on the one side, they attempt upon another, surprising some place of importance; or standing upon their defence, they cause an Army to ruin itself most commonly before some paltry place.  
I will add hereunto, that if they be the weaker in number, they will be found in effect the stronger by their vigilancy and intelligences which they have one of another: For that Union is most commonly stronger in a mean number, then in a greater; and in an opinion received by their own choice and election, then in that which is received by custom, in the which man shows himself usually more negligent. Besides this, the intelligence is better observed amongst man that are assailed, or that fear to be so, by reason of the necessity of the defence, then among the assailians. For to assail proceeding from a free will, they are sooner wearied then the defendants.  
Moreover, there is nothing more dangerons for a Prince, then to make trial of his forces against, his Subjects, 
It is dangerous for a Prince to arm against his Subjects, if he be not assuof the event.  if he be not well assured of the success. This were to arm and show the Lion his paws to fight against his Master, to make himself the Head of a party, making the head of the contrary faction equal to his power. And it hath been always held a Rule of State, that the most powerful should never make an Enterprise upon the weaker, without assurance of the event, For the weaker is always in fear, that the stronger can do any thing, until he hath made trial of the contrary; and when they find how far the forces of the stronger may extend, he falls in his reputation. Wherefore in this case the best advised Princes have done like wife Pilots, 
A go●d advice to weaken the party of a new Sector Religion.  who slip their tackle in a storm, knowing that the resistance they should make, would be the cause of a general shipwreck. But if he forced of necessity to go to Field upon this quarrel, and that their courages puffed up too much, cannot be humbled but by Arms; he must before they have gotten any advantage, grant them toleration of their Religion, in places where they may give the least scandal, to such as are opposite unto them, and in all other things make them inferior: The which they will yield the more easily unto, for that in this first beginning, there is nothing but the conscience that doth threaten them; and having found their own weakness, they will be content to have gotten this point, never refusing places out of the way for their exercise: for that by this means they shall be more assured, less exposed to the view of their Enemies, and by consequence less subject, to their surprises.  

To draw unto him the heads of a new Religion.  As for the ambition of Commanders, it will be easy to prevent, for that they will be usually few in number, in entertaining them by promises, presents, and hopes; having a watchful eye over them, and employing them abroad in honourable charges and affairs, yet where they may neither get credit, nor do much harm; and therest which desire to be advanced to honours, and yet have small power of themselves, they may feed them with hope, that in changing their opinions, they may attain to that which they desire. This being done, the rest will be easily maintained, in having a care that they which follow the Prince's Religion, and are favoured by the Prince, may not do them any wrong or injury in hatred of their opinion.  

Institution of Commanders.  They may by the same means, erect Seminaries, to breed and instruct a good number of persons in the true Religion; Out of which they shall choose such as are most sufficient and capable, and whose lives may serve for an example of well living, to place them in eclesiastical dignities.  

Orders of Knights his to de●end and maintain the ancient Religion.  In certain Realms they have used to make orders of Knighthood, whose chief profession was (when it was necessary to use force) to maintain their Religion by Arms, and they had for their recompense many benefices, which we affected unto them; which institution is not to be neglected, for that there are two sorts of those which stra●e from the true Religion. The one agree upon the foundations, but they contend upon the interpretation; and these may be instructed: The others do absolutely done the grounds, whereby the Doctrine of Religion is supported. These not able to be drawn by the instruction of the true Religion, there rem●n●th nothing but miracles, and a Divine Interpretation, which are Supernatural means, whereof God doth not make use to all persons: and force amongst humane means. Wherefore these Military orders of Knights, may profit much in an Estate, and may also invite those of a new opinion to submit themselves unto the old, to the end they may be partakers, or their children, of these honours and Recompenses.  
Moreover, it will not be inconvenient, that a Prince which reigns in an Estate divided in Religion, 
To draw unto them the most learned & cap●table of a new Religion.  should labour by presents and promises, to draw unto him the most learned and capable of such as are contrary unto his Religion: And in case they will return, to advance some of them to great dignities, to the end he may bind them the more by the preservation of their dignity to maintain the Religion, and to give experience to others, who willbe invited by this Example. For what ambition soever they shall discover in him that shallbe advanced, having gotten Authority, the Example of his advancement, will make others think of it. And if the Prince can, divide them in opinions, or otherwise he shall do well; for that the weaker the body of this Sect shallbe, the less cause the Estate shall have to fear; and there growing some diversity of opinions amongst them, he shall favour that which approacheth nearest to his Religion; or by this division he shall endeavour to make them weaker, and more resolute what they should follow.  
But when he shall see a Sect grow old, 
To bear down and ruin the temples least frequenced.  and that the abuses should begin to distaste most part of them which follow it: He may do like unto Theodosius, who seeing the Temples of the Pagans in a manner all abandoned, he caused some to be beaten down, and the rest to be applied unto the devotion and service of the Christian Religion.  
Mahomet had found a remedy to preserve his Religion 
Not to 〈…〉 Religion.  from these innovations, forbidding them to Preach or dispute: the which if it had been well observed, there had been such a diversity of Sects, in the Interpretation of his Alcoron.  
But a Duke of Muscovie, to keep his Religion entire and unfoyled, the which is grounded like to ●urs in the Administration of the Sacraments, and in the Preaching of the Gospel, caused all the Homilies and Sermons of the Holy Greek Fathers, to be turned into his Language, to be repeated publicly in the place of Preaching, and read particularly by the Subjects▪ freeing himself by this means from the ignorance of the multitude, and from the novelties which Preachers might have brought in, in publishing their inventions and dreams; and by this means confirming his Subjects in the belief of those holy Fathers. Wherefore the principal end must be, to keep the ancient Religion, to have but one, if it may be, to hi●der 〈◊〉 one from taking footing in an Estate, and in 〈…〉 not effect it without troubling the universal peace of the Subject, we must govern ourselves as I have formerly spoken.  
Let us come to other disorders which commonly 〈◊〉 in Religion, the which w●e must foresee in its esta●●●shm●nts, to prevent them when they shall happen.   

CHAP. 18. 〈◊〉 disorders which happen in Religion: and of the means to prevent them.  

〈…〉.  BL●tp●emy consists in perjury, and inscandall, or de●●●ction. Perjury is when we call God to witness of a lie, Scandal is when we mock at Religion.  
Carelessness regards chiefly the service of Religion, 
Carelessness in Divine service▪  and is the more to be feared, for that by this degree they mount to impiety. For Religion consisting more in affection and zeal, then in discourse; when as the heat of zeal if grown cold, Religion is lost by little and little.  
The third abuse is Superstition, 
Superstition.  withdrawing the belief made to the service of God, and bringing in scandalous things of no moment.  
As for the first, which is Blasphemy, 
Remedies against Blasphemy and negligence. , they must establish rigorous punishments: and to hinder the second, which concerns Divine service, it must be enjoined very strictly. But the remedy of the last, must come from the care of Prelates, who for this ●ffect ought to be chosen vigilant and Religious; 
Against Superstition.  and they must be prohibited from bringing in of any new thing, upon pretext of Deuotio● and Piety, neither in the belief nor in the Ceremonies of Religion, without exact knowledge of the cause. As for that which concerns the ground of private men's consciences, we must leave it to the duty of Ministers, who being chosen good men, there is no doubt but they whose consciences they govern, would be so in like manner.   

CHAP. 19 Of the settling of a Council of Estate, and of the qualities and number of Councillors.  
THe form of the Estate, and Religion being established, there follows the settling of a Council; 
Of a coun●●● o● estate.  wherein two sorts of persons are to be considered, that is to say, they which Counsel, and they which are Counselled. In those which Counsel, we must know the qualities which are necessary for them; in what number they ought to be; the power which is given them; and the order they are to observe in giving their opinions: For to examine affairs, it is done according to the ability and capacity of every one of them.  
The first quality of a Councillor of Estate, is to be old, 
Qualities of Coun●●llors of estate.  and to have experience. I join these two together, for that experience cannot be but in a man that is already ancient, and age without experience would be here unprofitable: 
Age and expe●ience.  for that in such affairs the knowledge of the particular humours of Princes, of people, and of great men is most necessary: the which cannot be obtained but by a long experience: the which although it be not repugnant unto reason, yet it hath a different means of understanding the affairs, whereof they cannot have a certain light, to make a conjecture of that, which with reason would be fitting to do upon the point which they will put in execution, if they have not first seen the trial in some other place.  
Moreover, age will add much more authority and credit to the resolutions of a Council, 
〈◊〉  consisting of ancient men, then if it were composed of young, how sufficient and capable soever they were, who cannot have the reputation of good Counsellors: For such as shall be as young as they, will think they are as well advised; and such as are more ancient, will hold themselves to be wiser. And in matter of Estate, opinion having no less force, but many times more effect than truth; there is nothing more dangerous, then that the Subjects should have an opinion, to be wiser than their Governors. So as the presumption being always, that the older are wiser than the young, there is no doubt, but they are more proper for Council, and more resolute for a long exercise, to hear, weigh, and resolve of great affairs.  

A●●●ent difference betwixt an 〈◊〉 Councillor of estate and young, for that which concerns▪ Council.  There is another difference betwixt ancient and young Councillors. These last having their blood hot, and having never been deceived by Fortune, insist commonly upon Counsels, which have more magnificence and show then safety. Whereas on the other side, old men as well by reason of their natural coldness, as of their experience, the which by the course of their life they have gotten, to have executed many things in vain the which they could not bring to a good effect, they, more willingly embrace the safest party, misfortune causing them to bandy their spirits, and to open their eyes to discover the danger. The which young men cannot, do so well, who have not had experience of the variety of Fortune, nor have observed the circumstances of such particular accidents. A most necessary thing in a man that will give Council; a small circumstance of more or less, doth many times cause a great variation in affairs. This experience being only found in ancient men, their advice ought to be esteemed the better. Yet I mean not to speak of such as are come to a decrepitage. Age fit for Council, must be strong and vigorous, to the end that the resolutions of a Council of such men may not be too dull and timorous.  
Wherefore with these ancient men that are cold and slow, it will bevery fit to mingle some of a middle age, 
A mixture of old and young Councillors of estate.  approaching to 50. years; and that both the one and the other past their time in many employments, in the which they have seen diverse sorts of affairs treated and negotiated, and have therein made known their discretion, fidelity, and industry; and by this means give assurance, that they are worthy and capable to hold this rank, 
Discretion, fidelity, and resolution in a Councillor.  without staggering or falling For a Councillor of Estate must be an honest man, faithful to the Estate, and firm in his resolutions; yet without wilfulness and obstinacy: a most dangerous plague in a Council, where it is necessary sometimes to obey the storm, to strike sail, 
Wilfulness a dangerous vice in a Council of estate.  to leave the ordinary course, and retire sometimes into the Haven, to the which in the end they will sail when they see the Wind prosperous. And although there be some one thing resolved, yet if it discover some apparent danger, it is not against custom to change opinions. For Prudence doth not consist in an obstinate will, to do a thing resolutely; bu● amongst many different parties which Fortune presents unto us, to choose the best and the most commodious, to attain unto our end. Wherefore some have been of opinion that they should propound that a little before, which was to be resolved upon; lest that doing otherwise, and some one having been of a bad advice, without due consideration, he should not grow obstinate unseasonably, and strive to maintain his opinion, rather than to leave it. Yet in affairs whereas they that have credit, are interessed, it is not fit to make the proposition, if they be not assured to be able to resolve it speedily: otherwise it would give them means to make parties and factions, and to prepare hindrances and lets.  
A Councillor of Estate must likewise be without favour ●o some, 
He must be without ambition and not depending of any.  or hatred to others, or ambition for himself; having no other aim but the public good, and that he depends not of any other Prince, be it by fealty or homage, or by obligation or by pension: but rather that he run the same fortune with the Prince whom he serves; to the end he may know, that it concerns him to suffer the evil, and enjoy the good, proceeding from the Council which he hath given. Marc. Anthony the Philosopher and Emperor, ordained that the Senators of Rome, which were not Italians, should at the least have the fourth part of their Estates in Italy, to make them more careful, to think of the preservation of the Province, where the seat of the Empire remained. And Pl●●● writes that Traian the Emperor had formerly decreed, that such as sued for any Benefices, should have the third part of their Lands in Italy; not holding it reasonable, that such men should make use of Rome and Italy, as of a retreat, and not as of their Country.  
Yet I would not herein set a general Rule, there having been many found, who although they had their retreat elsewhere then in the Estate of the Prince whom they served, have notwithstanding carried themselves faithfully, upon hope that if they should lose the goods which they enjoyed in the Estate, of their Master, yet they should always have means to live elsewhere.  
And chose we have seen some which had not any retreat but in the Estate of their Prince, whom the good fortune of the Enemy hath made careful to enter into treaty to save their Estates; the which happily they would not have done, if they had means to live elsewhere. It is likewise certain, that in affairs where we have no interest, we judge much better, then when as we put our interest in Balance with our opinions in Council.  
He that looks over Gamesters, and is not possessed neither with the hope of gain, nor the fear of loss, will give a better judgement of the carriage of the game than he that playe●: And he that in a Council hath not any fear to lose his Estate, and who brings neither affection nor passion, will always take the most honourable party: And he which hath any interest prevented by his own opinion and fear, will willingly incline to that side by the which he thinks to save himself.  
A Councillor of Estate must not be too sudden and rash, for that precipitation of its nature, 
A Councillor must not be rash and precipitate.  is blind and indiscreet; a good deliberation having need of time, to make a good resolution, being impossible in a short time to consider & weigh the inconveniences duly: and withal precipitation cannot come but with indiscretion, or little judgement; & both the one & the other hurtful in council. 
Irresolution a dangerous vice in a Councillor and to be aucid●d.   
Irresolution is another vice, into the which he must be very careful not to fall; for he must resolve upon 〈◊〉 party, and forget all the rest; lest that by remembering them, he doth not break and dull the vigour of the mind, necessary for the due execution of great Erterprises, and withal the constancy which he must bring in matters that are doubtful and difficult: neither must he think that there is less difficulty in the party which he hath left, then in that which he hath chosen.  

The causes thereof.  In some one-ignorance to be able to examine affairs causeth irresolution; and these aught to be rejected from Council. Others are Enemies to inconveniences: So as although that with reason they ought to embrace the thing which is propounded unto them; yet being amazed with the pains and difficulty, which do always accompany great affairs, they remain in suspense and doubt, whether they should endeavour to attempt it.  

Subtilty.  Other have such subtle spirits, that to all things that are propounded, they find contrary reasons; and being (as often it happens) of small courage, they never (unless it be upon necessity) resolve; And they never want reasons to cover their fearfulness, the which will ever have more power over them then reason, and experience to have many times trembled in vain. For resolution proceeds not from the spirit, but from the courage: And these men are so much the more dangerous, as they are more subtle and cunning, and have more dexterity to cover their difficulties. 
He must not be too confident.  But as he may not be resolute, so must he not be so confident of himself, as he stop his ears to the advice of others; or that relying upon our own forces, we do not draw into consideration those of our Enemies, yea sometimes hazard and fortune, which hath a good share in the greatest actions, to the end we may foresee that which may happen. For distrust is the Mother of foresight, 
Other qualities necessary for a Councel●● of Estate.  and foresight the Mother of safety.  
Patience is another quality, very necessary in a Council of Estate, not only to endure opinions contrary to his own, but also to have his reasons weighed, blamed, 
Patience.  and contradicted, and to hear many follies which grow amidst their discourses, even from great Personages. He must hear I say with patience, or without jealousy or desire to be followed in his opinions, and not to do as many which please themselves, to be the Authors of a new overture, who with a spirit of contradiction, full of bitterness, trouble themselves to reprehend the reasons of such of the Council as are their Enemies, be they never so good. A vice altogether insupportable. Yet notwithstanding it is not forbidden, to draw into agitation the reasons of another: but it must be done with respect; and thereby he shows that he doth not seek to divide or surprise the resolution, but it sufficeth him to have his reasons understood, and the inconveniences of a contrary opinion. 
Eloquence.  Besides these qualities which concern the judgement of integrity, a Councillor of Estate must know how to explicate himself, and to make his reasons be understood: and they which of purpose obscure their reasons and intention, for the uncertainty of the event, are bad Councillors, which understand not what belongs to Council: for that good Council is measured by the reasons, and not by the event, no man being answerable for that which happens against all discourse and reason.  
But above all things it is required to be secret: 
Secrecy.  for a Council divulged, profits no more than a Mine blown up. 
Of the number of Councillors of Estate.  Wherefore it is necessary that the number of Councillors of Estate, should not be great: for in a great number this inconvenience is ordinary.  
It is likewise good to charge Councillors often: 
Of the change of Councillors of Estate.  for that being necessary they should be instructed in affairs, it would fall out that their charge would end before they should be able to see those which were begun, finished, and before they should understand the course and proceedings; the which is necessary to settle a judgement: This course not able to be so well represented by the report which others might make, but they might fail in some particulars, whereon they might ground their opinions. But if for the quality of the Estate it be necessary to change them; at the least they must provide in such sort, as the Council be not changed all at an instant: but having ordained a certain time for every Councillor to assist, their charges must expire at several times, and the greatest part of the ancient must remain to instruct the new in affairs, who growing ancient in their turns, shall instruct others that shall enter.  

Of the great number of councillors of estate to be employed elsewhere.  And if through the ambition of some, the Council of Estate (which ought to consist of a small number) be too full: the which doth usually happen in sick and corrupted Estates, it shall not be unfitting to employ them elsewhere, attributing to the greatest part of these Councillors, some jurisdiction which may approach in some sort the affairs of Estate; as Philip the fair King of France did of his Parliament: Charles the Eight with his great Council, and as they do at this present with the Privy Council. This means is not new, but hath been anciently practised by Tiberius, Nero, and some other Emperors towards the Senate of Rome, making them to forget by little and little the knowledge of State affairs, by the attribution of a contentious jurisdiction, which was in the end established by Adrian in this Senate, in form of an ordinary jurisdiction.   

CHAP. 20 Of the plurality of Counsels of Estate. Of the power of Council, and of the order of giving their Opinions.  

O● many Counsels of Estate.  IN Spain there are many Counsels of Estate, distinguished according to the diversity of Realms and Provinces, which are united to that Crown. They may likewise in erecting many Counsels to facilitate the expedition of affairs in a great Realm, employ the more honest men profitably, and prevent surprises; distinguishing them according to the diverse parts of the Estate, which are, Religion, justice, War, Policy, the Treasure, the care of Government, and the intelligences as well without as within the Estate: This last ought to be annexed to the Sovereign's person; accompanied with few, lest that a great number should breed confusion, and discover the secret.  
As for that of Religion, it should have care to maintain Religion in Reverence: and if there were many which they were forced to tolerate, it should serve to cause them to live in peace one with another, and to decide their differences. That of justice should not be employed but to order the differences of jurisdictions, and to judge those, whereof justice should be forbidden to take knowledge.  
That of War should serve to regulate the Soldiers both Horse and Foot, providing for the Munitions, places of strength, Ships of War, Garrisons, and generally of all that which may depend of a Military order and care. That of Policy should order the Commerce and Trade with the manufactures, and should make all establishments necessary, for abundance, the safety, the beautifying of Towns, the assurance of ways, and the commodity of Rivers. That of the Treasure should regulate the levies of money, the assignations, and all that which concerns the dispensations of the Revenues of the Estate.  
Yet there being many affairs so united, 
The means to avoid the contrariety of Ordinances.  as they seem to belong as well to one Council as another; to avoid the contrarieties of Ordinances, if many Counsels should take notice of one business, the most expedient would be, that these Counsels should ●aue no other charge, but to examine that which should be propounded unto them, and to cause the diversity of their opinions to be reduced to writing, with the reasons of either side; the which should be read in a Council composed of the heads of all these Counsels, and of two other Councillors of either of them, chosen by the Council itself, according to the quality of the business; All which being assembled for the reading of the said opinions, they should have no more to do, but to resolve the business thus digested and examined.  
I know that in an Estate, whereas all things are overruled by the head of one or two, who desire to govern the Prince, he that should attempt any thing for the good of his Estate, they would presently persuade him, that these Counsels would be so many comptrollers which he should give unto himself: That he was sufficient to provide for all, and that all must depend upon his will, and not oblige nor subject himself to another man's Reason. But under pretext of maintaining the Prince's Authority, these people seek to continue their own to work their ends, never representing the Prince's affairs but by a cross means, which may serve their own designs: they engage him many times in Counsels, which prove very prejudicial to his honour, reputation, and Estate.  

The power of a Council.  In regard of the Counsels power, it ought only to consist in giving Council, and not to command, Commandment being inseparable with the Sovereignty: And in Estates, whereas Councillors command that which they Council, they may not only be termed Councillors but Sovereigns, and if the decree or sentence seems to have any command in it; yet it is certain that without the Soueraig●●s commission, no more than the sentence of the judge it cannot be executed.  

A 〈…〉  In some Counsels they have received two kind of Laws: and they have given power to some to make an overture of some affairs, the which having been propounded by them, they retired, and left others to deliberate; the which they call a consultative voice. 
A deliberative voice.  Others had power only to deliberate, and to resolve, but not to propound.  
Wherefore to take away this superiority in a Council, and to entertain an equality among Councillors, 
Equality among Councillors.  the which is of great force to maintain the liberty of opinions; it is fit that the Councillors should have a consultative and deliberative voice. Yet forasmuch as it is necessary to propound, and to bring some order in all sorts of Companies; it is fitting that he which hath something to propound, should impart it to him that holds the first place in the Council, provided always that he hath no interest.  
There is another diversity for the order of opening, 
Order in giving their opinions.  either beginning by the greatest, and of most authority in Council, to the end that the younger and least capable, might more easily choose the best party, and the soundest reasons: Or in beginning to take the voices of the youngest and inferiors, and causing them of most authority to give their opinions last; lest that the liberty of advice might not be cut off by the authority of great men, who are factious and ambitious, and admit no contradiction.  
Which two kinds of delivering their opinions may be practised according to the equality, that is among the Councillors. For if they be equal in power, it seems most fitting that the most sufficient should deliver their opinions first: Whereas contrariwise if the Council be mingled with great Lords, and men of a means condition; they which have least power, must deliver their opinions first; yet causing them which have only a consultative voice, to deliver their censures first, who prepare the way to such as have a deliberative voice, representing unto the Council all the reasons of either side, and propounding their own advice: In doing whereof if they err, they shall be reform by the others without jealousy; for that an ambition to speak, draws after it many times the envy of some, and the jealousy of others. Augustus' demanded their opinions without observing Rank, or Age, to the end that every man should be● attentive to the propositions that were made, and without staying for the advice of next neighbour, he might be always ready to deliver his own.  
I will add one thing, whereof we must have a special care in Council, which is to call into the deliberation of some business of hazard, they to whom we are to give the Execution. For it seems that calling t●em, it will make them more cunning and advised to avoid the dangers which may fall out in the Enterprise, the which they mean to recommend unto them. Yet it may be of such a nature, as the difficulties which they shall ●eare, will present themselves in the Execution, may discourage them and make them grow cold, in danger to give over the Enterprise. Behold that which ought to be principally considered in those which give counsel.   

CHAP. 21. Considerations for the Prince which is to be Counselled.  
AS for him that is to be Counselled, we must consider his sufficiency, the manner of demanding Counsel, to receive it, examine it, to resolve and Execute it.  

Sufficiency and Capacity 〈◊〉 for a 〈◊〉.  In regard of Sufficiency, they have always held that there are three sorts of persons. Some have such a vigour of Spirit, as they alo●e can better resolve their affairs, than a whole company would do; in the which besides the fear that the secret would be divulged, the number of good men would be so much the more rare, as they of whom it is composed are great. Others have not this vigour or Spirit, but a natural docility to hear the advice of others, and a judgement to discern good from Evil: And these, as they are inferior to the first, so are they Superior to the last; who not able to take advice in their own heads, and contemning the advice of others, know not how to make choice of the sounder party.  
And although it seems that the first have not any need to seek the counsel of another; yet aswell to free himself from presumption, as to give the more authority and credit unto their Erterprises, they must communicate them; and confess that Sufficiency is never so great in any one person, but that many may add something unto it. And although that this Sufficiency be very commendable, yet it is dangerous in a Prince, who easily falls into presumption; and it seems that the docility which is found in others, yielding an Ear to Counsel, is the more safe. Yet if these bring not judgement to discern good from evil, this mean Sufficiency would be as dangerous, as if he referred himself wholly to the Counsel of others: which is an Instrument, whereof they have sometimes made use to ruin many Estates; for that where the Council shall consist of incapable men, aswell as the Prince; a thing which usually falls out, when as the Counsellors are chosen by him, for that every man seeks his like; and we much acknowledge some Sufficiency to judge of that of another man, to make the Election: and in this case the Estate is the sooner drawn to its ruin, when as the number of Counsellors is greatest. But if they whom the Prince hath called to his Council, he worthy and fit to support the burden of the Estate; & that the Prince be not capable to make choice of good parties and occasions, and to add the conduct which shallbe necessary in the executions; this council willbe fruitless to him. Besides, the Counsellors of Princes are accompanied with jealousy one against another; and tending all to one end, they fi●de out many times public Counsels, and make them serve to their own private interests, striving by many cunning practices, to frustrate the Designs, and to hinder the increase of reputation one of another. Whereby it happens, that the Prince having not (for the little sufficiency that is in him) that authority among his Councillors which were necessary to keep them in awe, and to hinder the course of these Divisions; nor yet judgement to discover the particular Designs of every one; he remains among so many Councillors, rather confounded and irresolute, then counselled. Besides that in such a Council of Wise men, and full of valour, which serve a Prince of little understanding, there is never so much Friendship and Affection as were to be desired in Councillors. For that seeing their Prince more inwardly than other men, and knowing his imperfections and weakness better, the order of Nature bears it, t●at in the end they fall to contemn him, the which afterwards doth easily turn to hatred; for that the Minister which hath some merit in himself, scorns to obey a man incapable of his Greatness, and unworthy of his Fortune, long. After hatred and contempt follows the infidelity of Councillors; so as the Prince must either be sold, or turned up and down according to the occasions of the will of those which shall be about him, who in their Council will have more regard to their particular advancement, then to the greatness of their Master.  
A P●i●ce then that desires to reign in his Estate, must make himself capable to govern, and manage affairs: not that I would advise a Prince who hath sufficiency in himself to have no man about him to give him Counsel; bu● rather I believe that one of the greatest foundations of his reputation is, when they shall ha●e an opinion that his own judgement and proper intelligence of affairs, is assisted by a wise and faithful Council; which is the thing for the which he must most labour.  
But this Council how wise and adui●ed soever, must always be surmounted by the judgement and capacity of the Prince, so as they must rather serve for an accessary; then a principal in the government of the Estate: that in commaundments they acknowledge themselves inferior to the Prince, and not carry themselves as equals: that in occasions and affairs of importance, they may rather have power to alt●r, and to make known the difficulties and inconveniences, but not to resolve: And in a word, the Prince hath need of so much spirit, as his Council may assist him to govern, but not teach him to reign.  
We will therefore conclude, that as a Prince hath need of himself, to maintain himself in life, so harh he need of a good Council, to maintain the affairs of his Estate: and as without it he cannot be termed a man, so without Council he cannot be held a Prince.  
Wherefore having made choice of those which may Counsel him, 
Of the manner to demand Council.  he must carefully take occasion to demand their Council: tha● is to say, neither too long before the Enterprise, lest it should be discovered; nor too late, for fear that the Council should prove unprofitable. And if he doubts that the business will not be held secret, being propounded in a full Council, or that some of his Councillors for the interest of some great man, dare not deliver their opinions freely; and he may receive their advice separately and in secret, and reject the reasons contrary to the Council which they have given him, to the end he may the better judge what party he shall embrace; without tying himself to number the voices, but rather to weigh him; for affairs of Estate ought not to be governed according to the plurality of voices, if the reasons of either part be then so strong, as they are uncertain what party they should follow. But above all things a Prince mu●t have a care in affairs of greatest importance, nor to discover even unto his Councillors of what opinion he is: Lest that they which counsel him should rather se●ke to furnish him with reason's to confirm his opinion and to please him. For Councillors ought to declare freely what they hold in their consciences honourable for him, and safe for his Estate.  
Some one would oblige the Prince to assist himself at all manner of Counsels, aswell to take knowledge of all the affairs of his Estate, as to discover the capacity of his Councillors, to hinder factions which grow in Council, to moderate the passions and jealousies of his Ministers, to give more Authority to his Resolutions, and by his presence to cause the affairs to be treated of with the respect and gravity that is requisite and necessary.  
Yet there being many things which are treated of in the like Counsels, depending of justice, policy, or the Treasure; besides that this would overburthen the Prince, in making him to employ the greatest part of his time in these affairs; he cannot do it without abasing his Authority and Majesty too much, by this too frequent communication; and it will suffice, that he assist at most important affairs, or at those whose resolution may increase his Reputation, contenting himself to provide for that which concerns Peace or War, with the safety a●d quiet of his Estate.  
An● to prevent the inconveniences which happen daily in Counsels, where the Prince doth not assist, and to draw the same advantages without assisting, which he should have by his presence being there, the course observed by the Grand Seig●our is somewhat considerable. For in the place where they hold the Divan or Counsel, there is a window, by the which (without being seen) he may hear all that is spoken and passed in his Council: So as his Councillors uncertain whether their master hear them or not, observe the same respect, the same modesty, and t●e same manner of proceeding, which they will do in his presence: and after they have held the counsel, they go and make report unto him of what hath past; the which they dare not deliver falsely, not knowing whether the Prince have heard them. And thus he is informed of all that hath been propounded in his Council. and hears himself if he will, or by some other, the reasons of all sides; and then after the reports which is truly and certainly made unto him, he presently resolves without any demunition of his Majesty.  
The Prince having demanded the advice of his Councillors, 
To receive counsel.  he must receive it from them all with an equal countenance; without hating him, which hath given him bad counsel: unless he discover some malice. For Counsels having no force if they be not allowed by the Prince, he having found them good, it is a sign that he hath judged, and hath been moved by the same reasons, like to him that gave them: So as the error of judgement having been common to both, the blame and the fault ought not to be imputed unto the Councillor alone: And for that they have never in any Estate established recompenses or punishments for good or bad counsels; which are held such commonly not by the reasons, but by the events, whereof no man can be any way answerable.  
We must therefore diligently Examine, 
To examine.  an advice or counsel; consider the thing in its self, with all the circumstances and dependences; prefer the safety of the Estate to all other considerations; and then to seek the profit by honest courses, which consist in all the the parts which we represent in this treaty, very necessary for the establishment, preservation, and increase of the Estate.  
Afterwards the Prince must duly consider of the Execution of that which they counsel him; for the Council being of doubtful things, he must advise whether Fortune may have a greater share, in that which he means to undertake, than wisdom: and if he finds that he hath more need of Fortune, he must beware how he embark himself, especially if the contrary succeed to that which he desires, he incurs more loss, than he can hope for profit, succeeding after his desire.  
But if necessity reduceth him to this point, that he must either lose or hazard; it were better to tempt Fortune, the which although it did not succeed, yet at the least he should have this contentment, to have done what lay in him. Otherwise, he may not lightly embark himself in a dangerous Enterprise, although that at the first sight the peril be not so near. For besides the danger that every bad resolution carries with it, it draws after it likewise to maintain it, an infinite number of such like, for that things cannot remain alone, but are bound one unto another, and inchained together.  
Wherefore we may not have so much respect unto the present, as we forget the future. For although that the accidents of Fortune are in such variety, and so frequent, as they may hinder us from a certain foresight of the future: and that to have regard to an imaginary fear of a thing which may be or not be, it seems that this were to embrace the shadow, and to leave the body or substance.  
Yet the greatest part of Errors which are committed in deliberations proceeds from this, that men suffer themselves too much to be carried away with the affection of the present; the which how little soever it be assisted by Fortune, it seems that it hath always greater force and vigour, than the strongest respect we can imagine of the future. Wherefore he must show himself very stayed in such affections, and as for the affection of the present, he may not forget the consideration of the future: but he must accustom himself to set that which is to come before his Eyes, with such a resentment and apprehension, as if he saw it or touch it. So he may not for a fear a far off, forbear to remedy a present mischief.  
He may not likewise suffer himself to be carried away by any Example that is alleged, if all the particularities do not concur. For although that these comparisons may join at some corner, and that all things hold by some similitude or likeness: yet there are very few Examples which do not haut: And the relation which is drawn from Experience, is many times defective and imperfect, if it be not assisted by discourse and Reason.  
Then he must examine the quality of the person which gives the advice, especially his interest, and above all things he must refuse to counsel a flatterer, and invite him that counsels, to speak freely and with courage.  
If for the respect of the greatness of the Prince who is counselled, it be necessary to flatter him; 
Of the flattery of Councillors and how the Prince should avoid them.  the Prince shall consider, if the flattery of him that counsels him, (who must sometimes use, as they say, words of silk) proceeds from cunning and subtlety, which the Councillor doth use to persuade him to that which is for his good; or with a design to get credit by his pleasing, he enters into this flattery: For in this last case, the Prince must stop his Ears, and open them to him that speaks freely, there being no condition of men, that have so great need of true and free advertisements than Princes, who undergo a public life, and are to satisfy and content the opinion of so many people, which as they are accustomed to do any thing that may divert them from their course, they find themselves insensibly engaged in the hatred and detestation of their Subjects, for occasions many times which they might well avoid, without any interest of their pleasure, if they had been advised and directed in time.  
But the manner whereby most Princes live at this day, few men are found that will practise this Trade, being the office of true Friendship towards the Sovereign, in a rough and dangerous trial; So as they must not only have much affection and freedom, but also courage. Flattery is far more safe; for that by pleasing, it seems they draw nearer unto Friendship: and for that it is more agreeable to him whom they flatter, it is also more easy for him to practise that means to flatter.  
chose Truth and Liberty, as if they approached near to contempt, cannot be so safely practised with a Prince. 
Of the truth & liberty which ought to be in Councillors.  They have their circumscriptions and limits: and many times it falls out, that (as the World is) they leave truth in the ears of Princes, not only without fruit, but with prejudice to him that speaks it.  
If then the Prince will assure himself on that side, he must encourage one or two of those which approach nearest unto him, and whom he knows to be best affected, and freest from contempt of him, 
Of the prime Ministers of an estate.  to deliver freely unto him in what manner they receive his actions; and he must choose such men of a mean fortune, and are notwithstanding satisfied and content, to the end that on the one side they may have no fear to touch their Master's heart to the quick; lest they should thereby lose the course of their advancement; and on the other side being of a mean condition, they may have the more communication with all sorts of people. A Prince is not to be credited, when he brags of his courage, to attend the encounter of his Enemy, for the service of his glory; if for his profit & advancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words; having no other effect nor aim but to pinch him by the Ear, the rest of the operation being in his own hands.  
We read in the Turks History, that a Bassa called by his Master to the government of the Estate, 
A Wise act of the fir●t Minister of an estate to discharge his duty.  and made Vezir, which is the first charge of the Empire next to the Grand Siegnour, holding himself not very capable of this charge, he drew certain Persons secretly unto him, who had charge to collect whatsoever they heard spoken in the City of Constantinople touching the government of the Estate, to relate it unto him: And by this means being advertized of all that was found good or bad, and of that which they desired to be done or not done, he governed himself in such sort, and without the help of any other Council, all things succeeded to his desire, and accommodating his actions to the will of the people, he was admired by them, who before held him to be uncapable of this charge.  
This may be practi●ed by the Prince; but yet he may not forbear to make choice of a good Council, to examine the propositions of that which by this means they have discovered, to be desired of the people. In this manner it shall be easy for a Prince to resolve, be it that he take the advice of every one secretly and apart; or being assembled, he cause them to deliver their opinions openly, to the end that by the communication of their advisoes, the resolution may be more easy to take, either in following the greatest number of voices, or in making choice of his opinion that seems the best; and the resolution taken, the execution must follow with all possible speed; Celerity making all things easy, as well for that of itself, it is active and full of vigour, as for that it gives no leisure to cross a business in the execution, before they can oppose it.   

CHAP. 22. Of the form of Commanding.  
THe fourth establishment to be made in an Estate, is the form of Commanding, in the which we must consider two things; the power of the Commander, and the justice of the commandment. The power of him which commands is either sovereign or inferior. 
Of the power.  The commandment of the sovereign is, either general, or particular: The general consists in the laws which the sovereign establisheth, under which we comprehend the ordinary orders, customs and statutes.  
The law is as it were a pledge and a general safety, which Princes give unto their subjects, 
Of the law.  for the entertainment of contracts, and their course of living, which ought to be maintained and observed, especially amongst them for the general good of the Estate. For reason alone which God hath put into man, being unable to retain him within the bonds of his duty, and custom to live ill, having made so great an impression in him, as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him; it hath been needful to employ the authority of laws▪ and the force of the Prince, to reduce every man to reason, for fear of punishment, and by the Establishment of certain rules, to a sure order in the Estate, and to confirm judgements in justice.. In effect it were dangerous, to leave all to the judgement of men, in the multitude whereof will grow a confusion of opinions, if they had not some rule which they ought to follow, and they might more easily be carried away by hatred or favour: the which cannot happen to Lawgivers', who making Laws for the future, are not transported with any private passion but for the public. For although that the judges were wise and without passion, yet it is more easy to find a small number of wise men which establish the Laws, and the for me o●iudging, then to find such a number as is necessary to be judges. Moreover, the Laws are made with mature deliberation, and judgements are given suddenly according to the occurrents of affairs: so as the rule is more safe taken from the Law, then if the Prince gave it himself.  
The Laws are of diverse sorts, 
Diversity of laws.  according to the diversity of Subjects, for the government whereof they are made. For some rule the power of Offices and Magistrates, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil; and distinguish the function of their Charges, their jurisdiction, honour, and pre-eminence one upon another. Others rule the Treasure; others the military Discipline; others the general Policy; others justice, as well in regard of the quality of persons, of contracts, treaties, and commerce among men; as for the punishment of Crimes, the order and form of proceeding in judgements by the parties and judges. Some are made to contain the Subject in his duty towards the Prince and Magistrate, and to maintain Concord and Peace. Finally, the Law must have for his principal end the good of the Estate, and to provide for all the parts thereof, and for the inconveniences that may annoy it, and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it: 
The aim and end of the law.  Otherwise the Reverence which hath caused it to be received, would part and be separated f●om such commandments, and there would remain nothing but the sole authority and power. For although they say, that the will of the Prince is a La●, yet this must not be understood of all that comes into his fancy and will to do; but only of that which ●e may justly desire: for that the Laws ought to be made and published, to amend and correct the nature of things, for the which they mean to establish them, and not to second the appetite of him that makes them: We must therefore consider in making of Laws, the qualities which must concur in a Law. The first is, 
Qualities considerable in the establishing of laws.  that it be according to public honesty, observing the dignity of persons and things: that it be just as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend, which is the public good only, as for the authority of him that makes it, who in establishing it, ought not to exceed the power that is given him. There is another quality which concerns the form, to the end that Equality and proportion may be kept, as in the imposition of judges: for otherwise it were not a Law, but a violence, to the which in conscience we are not bound to obey, but only ●o avoid scandal and sedition. It must likewise be peaceable and quiet according unto Nature, and the condition of such as ought to obey, and are Subjects, grounded upon natural reason, and accommodated to the quality of affairs, and the customs of the Country. For there are laws which are good in one Country, but would not be so in another. The Laws in like manner must be fitting for the time, being necessary to govern the Estate, as a pilot doth his ship, according to the wind that blows, and not lightly established. Moreover, the Law must be profitable to all, or to the greatest part; plain, lest its obscurity breeds some error; brief, and according unto some without preface, with the commandment only.  

Of the shortness of the law.  Yet others are of a contrary opinion. For although that the principal intention of the Law ought not to be to teach the reason for the which it is made, no more than the Physician, who is not called by the sick Patient, to give him a reason of his prescriptions, but to cure him, having more need of health than Doctrine: yet for that they make Laws for men capable to understand that which is necessary for the public good, the Prince ought (as a common Father) not only to make known unto his people the end of the Law, but also the reason, that he may know that the Ordinances of his Prince are no less full of reason then command. It is true, 
Of the absolute command of the Prince.  that when as by such mildness and humanity the Prince prevails nothing with his Subjects; then he may with a sufficient excuse v●e his absolute command: For his duty binds him t● practise all means to move and induce his Subjects▪ to well doing, yea, to employ force, the which in itself is not bad, if it be well used. For although that the Laws ought not to be against men, yet they are made to command men; and for that pleasure doth many times deceive men, delighting in things which are pernicious and hurtful; the Prince in making a Law, must not have any regard to the pleasure or displeasure which his Subjects may take: but it shall suffice him, that those things which he ordains or commands, may be good and profitable to the public. Yet this is not to say, that he should not proceed in those courses which may breed a popular contentment; but chose he must have this principal object after the good of the Estate. Behold what we are to follow in the establishment of a Law, let us now see what we are to fly.   

CHAP. 23. What we are to to a●oyde in the establishing of L●wes.  
AMong other things we must have a special care not to establish any Laws but such as are very necessary. 
Of the great number of laws, and the cau●es thereof.  The multiplicity of Laws is ra●●●: then a testimony of confusion then good orders: For few Laws suffice to entertain good men in their Duties, and to punish the wicked if they be well observed. The number of Laws proceeds commonly from two causes, the one is the ambition and vanity of, those which command, who to gain the reputation of well ruling, will provide for all, yea for matters of small moment. The which is a cause that being of this quality, they are not observed, and the people accustoming themselves not to obey Laws of small importance, they afterward do easily dispense with themselves from doing that which Laws of greater importance commands. Wherefore it is better to leave the care of such great and weighty things to the Magistrate, who may provide according to occurrents.  
The other cause, from whence the multitude of Laws do usually proceed, is the bad inclination of the Prince, who having an intent to domineer over the Magistrates & public, in his particular appetites and affairs, makes what Laws he can to offend in particular, either those whom he fears or such as he hates: or of that, from whence he thinks he may draw some profit for his own particular.  
I come unto the observation of Laws, without the which, the establishment were fruitless. To this observation two things are necessary: the example of great men, and of those which command; and Severity. For as the Laws prescribe unto Subjects the rule of well living, 
Of the observation of laws.  so the Prince ought to give an Example for the observation and entertainment of the Laws: And the Prince is called the living Law of the Estate, not only for his intelligence and power to make a Law; but also for the observation of that, which they teach by way of commandment, the Prince by his Example commands it. When I say the Example of the Prince, I speak not of his person alone, but of those of his train, of his nearest Favourites, and of the greatest personages: For it would little avail him to observe the Laws, if he suffer the great men of his Court to break them. Wherefore he must have an Eye, for that the Subjects of a mean condition cannot receive a greater contentment then to see the actions of great persons conformable to the common rule, conceiving an opinion thereby to have some equality and participation with them, in acknowledging them equal in this obedience.  
As the example of the Prince serves to invite men to do well, 
Of severity.  so severity retires and hinders those (whom impunity might abandon) from doing evil. This severity notwithstanding doth not extend to search out and punish the most secret offences; but those which may be the cause of bad example. Likewise it is certain that the punishments or dayned by the Laws, are more in regard of the scandal then for the Crime, whereof God is the principal revenger, and not so much to punish the offence past, as to strike terror into the wicked for the future, by the rigour of punishment, not to commit the like fault. And although the intention of the Law be not to hinder any man, yet for that men sometimes commit errors, 
When the Prince may dispense wi●h ●h● laws.  which deserve (either in regard of the person which commits them, or for some other good respect) compassion and mercy: in this case the Prince may moderate the rigour of the Law by a favourable temper, or give him an absolute pardon, if the Subject deserves it; and that herein he cannot bri●g impunity in other things, or in equality which breeds scandal to good men to the prejudice of the Estate.  
For this effect pardons must not be too frequent, but for a Subject that is full of merit, 
How he ought to govern himself i● severity.  and they must be pleasing to the most part. But when he shall be forced to show himself severe, as it is necessary sometimes, that in the disobedience of the Subjects the Prince should be rigorous: if punishment may be called ●igour: this ●igour engendering usually fear, the which seldom accompanied with love, he must amidst his actious of severity, extend his bounty to good men: and then the fear which was full of hatred, will be converted in●o Reverence. This shall suffice for that which concerns the general commands of the Sovereign, which are made by Laws, Ordinances, and other such kind of commands.   

CHAP. 24. Of the Prince's particular Commands.  
AS for the particular Commands which are made upon occasions which happen daily, the form is in a manner equal: for that it ought to be constant in that which they have first undertaken to establish, and not to change upon every difficulty which may happen, but chose they should strive to surmount al● the crosses which may present themselves. This form of Command shallbe like unto the other accompanied with severity, being needful to prevent disobedience in small matters: for that this vice like unto others, grows by degrees. But above all, he which commands, must deal in such sort, as the Sovereign command may depend wholly on him, and be tied to his Person: not that the Prince should therefore draw unto himself all the government, and the whole managing of th● Estate: for besides that he should find himself ●uer-bu●thened, and that in the multitude of affairs th●re will be many ill cared for, and worse executed, ●e should cha●ge his Principality with euny; and his subjects seeing themselves deprived of the administration of Offices, would grow cold in the affections which they ought to bear him. But the Sovereign authority ought not to be imparted to any one, nor the distribution of Recompenses and Offices, nor the absolute command of forces; lest that he to whom the Prince hath given this power changing his affection and will, should take occasion to attempt against the Estate, having the commodity ●f such an advantage: whereof there are but too many examples Histories.  
We have treated of the Commandments of a Sovereign power: Let us now observe the form of their Command, whose power is inferior, and to whom the charges of the Estate are distributed, to have care and to watch over that part of the Estate which is committed unto them.   

CHAP. 25. Of Magistrates.  
IT being necessary that of all the parts of an Estate, there should not any remain without government; one alone being unable to embrace all; being likewise unfit, that the Sovereign should be troubled in matters which may be done better by those which are inferior unto him: it hath been held necessary to give order, that this supreme authority, yet without suffering any demuniti●n, should be dispersed into many parts; and that power should be given to a certain number of men, to hea●e, ordain, or provide particularly, for affairs of least importance, and the which are all so many branches of the Sovereignty, out of which they grow, and are supported as by their stem, and by the which reciprocally the Sovereignty beings forth flowers, leaves, and fruits.  
The distinction of these inferior powers is diverse, 
Distinction of Officers & Ministers of an Estate.  according to the diversity of the parts of the Estate. For some are ordained to free the Prince from the care and particular safety of the Provinces, and to watch over them; as that of Governors: Others have the care of Religion: Others of War●; Others of the Treasure; Others of Policy▪ others of justice; Others of judgements, which must be given upon the controversies of private persons, or fo● the punishments of crimes; Others must have an eye to the affairs abroad; as Ambassadors or Agents; Others are destinated to assist the greatness of the Prince, to d●spose of his house and train, and to s●rue him i● his Court.  
And as every one of their parts is subdivided into many others; so according to these subdivisions, the charges are in themselves distinguished into functions: and in this diversity there are some which have power to command, proceeding from the sole authority of the Prince, or from that of the Laws, the which have attributed this power to the Office. Others are erected for the service of the Estate; Others for the execution of commandments.  
Some having distinguished public Offices, according unto honour, jurisdiction, and command. For some are without honour, jurisdiction, or command; and in this rank they place all those which are destinated for the service or execution of the superiors commandments, as Registers, Notaries, Criers, Sergeants, Trumpets▪ and such like. Others are with honour, yet without power to command or to judge; as Ambassadors, Counsels, and Secretaries of Estate, Receivers of the Treasure, and most part of the Officers of the Prince's train. Others have honour and jurisdiction, but no power to command, as Prelates. Others have honour and power to command, but no jurisdiction, as the Consuls in old time at Rome, and at this present the governors of Provinces, and the King's Procurators. Others have honour, jurisdiction, and power to command, and these are properly called Magistrates.   

CHAP. 26. Of the differences betwixt Officers and Commissaries.  
IT were a fruitless thing to busy myself here, to Discourse particularly of the duties and power attributed to every public office: For that it is diversely practised, not only in several estates, but also in the same Estate, as it is held most expedient for the public good, to increase the power of the one, and to diminish that of another. And relating only that which is most generally observed, I will content myself to add unto these former distinctions one ot●er, which is drawn from the form in the which a power is given to those which are employed in public charges.  
For charges are gi●en either by Office or by the way ●f Commission: If in an Office, 
Of officers & Commissioners and of their difference.  he that hath the charge is called an Officer: If by Commission he is termed a Commissioner. The charge of an Officer is regulated by the Law, or by the Edict of the erection of the office: and by the letters of Commission the charge of a Commissioner is limited. This difference is betwixt an Officer and a Commissioner, that the charge of an Officer is ordinary, and hath a perpetual course, although that in regard of the person the Exercise be limited to a certain time▪ and the charge of a Commissioner is extraordinary, and revokable at the good pleasure of him that hath given the Commission.  
There are four things to be considered in a Commission: The person from whence it proceeds; 
Consideration to be made upon a Cō●ission  the Direction; the Charge; and the time when it is to expire. In regard of the first, Commissions proceed either from the Sovereign, or from his Officers, or from other Commissioners deputed by the Sovereign, 
Of the person from whence it proceeds.  who may commit, there happening some lawful let, unless it be forbidden, or there be a question of State, or of the life and honour of some persons: For in this case they cannot subdeligate.  

Of the directional a Commission.  For the direction, a commission is directed either to an Officer, or to a private person: If to an Officer, it is either a thing depending of his Office; and in this case, the the letters are neither executory of his duty, than letters of commission, if the time or place be not changed; and differs from that which is mentioned in the Edict of the Execution of the Office. In this concurrences the ordinary knowledge is to be preferred before the commission; even as the quality of the Officer is preferable to that of a Commissioner, and the acts of the Officers more assured than those of Commissioners. But if it be a matter which belongs not unto them, in regard of their Office, and that there be a difference in some circumstance; then he cannot get it as an Officer, but only in quality of a Commissioner.  

Of the charge of a Commission.  In the charge we must consider the end, for the which it is given us; and the power we have by it. The end concerns either the instruction, or the knowledge of some business: And the power regards the decision, judgement or resolution, and the commandment for the execution of that which we have resolved. I call instuction all that which is to be done, to bring a business to an Estate ready to be resolved and determined. The knowledge given unto a Commissioner, is either of factor of ●ight; or of both together, wherein he shall carry himself, as w●e will she● by and by, treating of the duty of the Magistrate towards the commandment of the Prince: the power to judge is gruen either definitively, & without an appeal, or without execution if there be an appeal; or else with power to 〈◊〉 in execution that which we have resolved, notwithstanding any opposition or appellation, and without prejudice thereof. For the power of Command, either it is given the Commissioner for the execution of that which he had ordained; or the Commissioner is commanded to execute that himself, which another had decreed, having no power to command a third: And this last kind of Commission, is directed to inferior Officers, who are simple executioners of the commandments of their superiors.  
From the consideration of that which I have said we may gather, 
The duty of a Commissioner.  that the duty of a Commissioner is to regulate himself, according to the terms of his Commission, the which he may in no sort exceed. For although that this general clause be inserted to carry himself according to the quality of persons, and as he shall see matters disposed, he may add or diminish to the instructions that are given him in writing, according to his wisdom and discretion: Yet this must be understood of the accessary of his charge, and of the smallest matters, for of those which are important he may not dispose without special command. For although they refer it to his wisdom and discretion; yet the ignorance of a Commissioner were not excusable, this clause being to be understood according to the examination of an honest and sufficient man, especially when it concerns the public good of the Estate.  
It remains now to know when the Commission expires. It ceaseth, if he which granted it comes to die: 
Of the time when a Commission should expire.  if the thing or person for the which the charge is given, be no more in being: If he which hath given the Commission revokes it; if the Commissioner during the Commission, obtains an Office or Magistracy, equal to him who granted the Commission, so as the business be entire▪ or that being begun it may be left, without prejudice to the public or to private persons.   

CHAP. 27. Considerations upon the Establishment of Officers and Magistrates.  
THese distinctions known, many other points are to be considered in the Establishment of those, to whom this power of Command under the Sovereign, or to manage other affairs concerning the Estate is attributed, be it by Office or Commission; but principally we must consider the number of those that are to be employed: The authority of him which hath established and employed them; the qualities of those whom they put into offices; the form of proceeding in these Establishments; the time they ought to remain in Authority; and finally the duty of principal Magistrates, aswell towards the Sovereign and the Laws, as to other Magistrates that are equal or inferior, and towards particular persons.  

● the number o●●ffi●e●.  The number of Officers or Ministers in one charge is b●an●ed by many; and yet it is more safe to commit a 〈◊〉 to many ●●en to one. First, for that they watch one another, 
Th● 〈…〉 a 〈…〉 then 〈…〉.  and as it were through jealousy, every m●nst●ies up i● compa●●●n to Execute his charge the better: And 〈◊〉 ●●uer it many times happens, that after they have made E●●●tion of some, they do not answer the opinion that was conceined of them; in which case there b●i●g many, one helps and relieves another. The more they are, the more difficulty they willbe corrupted; and if a●y be, their corruption shall have the less force to commit a bad 〈◊〉; o'er alone, or few having no power to 〈◊〉 many, and it is a difficult thing that all s●ould agree together to deceive.  
Moreover the ordinary inconveniences, as sickness or other natural hindrances, befalling a Minister, if he be alone, his charge (which it may be is necessary for the public) will remain in suspense and without exercise, and the public affairs by this means delayed, not without prejudice to the Estate.  
As for the plurality of Officers, which grows from the plurality of Charges, the charges being distinguished one from another, so as they cannot be confounded; so as this plurality is so far from being hurtful or prejudicial unto the Estate, as it is profitable. By this means no part of the Estate is neglected: you content and pacific the ambition of many, who living privately in idleness, would seek to employ themselves in some innovation: and you bind them to the preservation of the Estate, for that they would fear that an alteration would change the order, and by consequence impair their authority.  
But as in this diversity of charges, 
Inconveniences g●owing from the plurality of officers; and the means to avoid them.  we must provide that confusion may not trouble, neither the Officers in their charges, nor private men in their business: We must avoid irresolution which is ordinary in a multitude, and the tediousness of affairs, which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another. Irresolution willbe avoided, not in reducing the affairs to the Knowledge of one alone, or of two, but to a competent number, according to the quality of business, and those must be unequal, to the end that the plurality of voyles may decide the business, and that they may not be subject to be divided in opinion. The tediousness would be avoided in cutting off the degrees of those which are to take Knowledge one above another; and it seems that two degrees would suffice. But they must avoid in the one and the other, a plurality in the charge of the treasure of the Estate, where the people is oppressed, by the fees or rights attributed to Officers: the which may be done by two means. The first in giving more honour unto Offices, and less wages and fees: And the other in giving them hope to ascend by degrees unto greater dignities.  
This means likewise will serve to make the greatest affect and seek the meanest Offices, making them know that they cannot come to the greatest before they pass through the others; and there will always remain a place for the Prince's favour, making choice of one among many which are in the same charge, to raise him unto a greater dignity, and this order may also serve to cause the affairs to be managed with more Integrity. For they which desire to advance themselves, will fear that doing otherwise they shallbe rejected when they desire to rise. In like manner the Capacity willbe greater in such, as shallbe advanced to more eminent charges. For that having passed through many degrees, they will have more knowledge, both of the affairs and of the manner how to manage them.   

CHAP. 28. Of the creation and nomination of Magistrates, and Officers.  
THE Magistrate or Officers, even the principal aught to be made by the Sovereign, 
The creation and choice of officers, must be made by the Sovereign only.  being one of the greatest marks of Sovereignty. The which I mean not only for the creation and erection of offices, but for the choice of persons: there being no greater error (although ordinary in Princes) then to rely upon some other, for the choice of a man to advance him to so●e Office.  
And we must not wonder if they be ill served, although their intent be good; nor if the Laws be so ill executed: For that having no will to take the Pains, to search out and examine the merit of their principal subjects; they cannot dispose of Offices proportionably to their Natures and capacities. For besides that there is a difference, 
That the charges must be distributed proportionably, according to the nature and capacity of them.  in regard of the understanding betwixt affairs of importance, and those of less moment in the Execution: there must be more courage in the greater, and less subtlety in the less: which are two principal parts which seldom join together: no more then in Iron tools, where we see that a knife for that it hath the edge finer, will do an effect that a Hatchet cannot do; and he that will employ a Hatchet like unto that of a knife, he shall make it unprofitable to cut any hard substance, wherein they employ it usually: so as they must employ every tool to the use for which it is made.  
For although that affairs ought to be managed by discretion, and not by inclination: yet it behoves the wisdom of the Prince, to know that most part of the affairs of this world are governed more by inclination then otherwise. Wherefore he must cunningly make use of this defect. For Nature hath given to every man's condition some good thing in exchange of some defect which is found in him: if it hath given to some one a slowness to begin, it hath likewise imparted an obstinacy to continue and finish the work, balancing his negligence with perseverance. To those which by Nature shallbe sudden and hasty, and who in regard of their impatiency, strive to do things out of season; she hath given hardiness, by the means whereof they have effected great matters.  
These Defects being common among men, the Prince shall accommodate himself, and distribute the charges according to every man's humour and inclination; and to treat a business, it shall suffice to inform him whom he means to employ, of the grounds and substance of the business, and to leave the rest to him to manage according to his natural inclination, be it grave, modest, severe, or otherwise: for that they may use diverse means tending to the same end; and if it be forced, the business will not succeed. But in making choice, he must consider, that the humour and sufficiency may be proportionable to the business, and to the humour of those with whom he is to treat. The same must be observed for all those whom they employ in charges and public affairs.  
And although it were to be desired that in the managing of affairs, 
Principal qualities required in an officer & Magistrate.  they might have men that were discreet, and of great sufficiency▪ yet for that these two qualities do seldom mee●e together in so high a degree as were to be desired; it were better to choose them of a mean understanding, so as they be honest men: for that his sharp subtlety proceeds from choler, to the which such men are subject to suffer themselves to be transported for a small matter; And moreover having a good conceit of themselves, and a bad of others, they can hardly agree with any man. Besides they are usually of small foresight, for the little leisure their promptness gives them; and for the passion which blinds them, they are many times desirous of novelties. For never allowing those orders which are made with a mature deliberation and their quickness of spirit, furnishing them with others, which in their opinions seem better; they strive to purchase belief, and in this attempt they sometimes cause trouble.  
They which are of a mean understanding, support the accidents which happen more easily; and when as they find themselves in an Estate well ordered, and governed by good laws, they maintain themselves long. Such men most commonly are inclined to Phlegm. And if by a breeding contrary to their nature, they have not been stirred up to ambition, they obey more willingly than the rest; for that their humour being gross, the impression which nature hath bred, is more firm, and the desires and appetites stronger.  

The ulses and defects are as well to be considered as the virtues, in the election of Magistrates and Officers.  But in choosing Magistrates and Officers, they must not only consider the virtues of Men, but also the vices and natural defects, which they may have; and to observe if these defects be so powerful, as they may hinder him in the exercise wherein they mean to employ him. As for example, in a judge, there is no doubt but a just Man for his justice ought to be chosen; but if he be fearful, assure yourself, if he be to give sentence against some great man, he will leave justice to adhere to safety. Moreover a Magistrate must love and understand the Laws: For loving them he will observe them; and loving and understanding them, he will make others capable to observe them.  
But to make the choice of Officers easily, 
An easy means to make a good choice.  the means would be (as we have formerly said) to make many degrees, and to choose out of the last degree, him whom they mean to advance to the next, and so from degree to degree: For they should know by their actions what they would be before they make choice of them.  
This shall suffice for the principal qualities of Magistrates and Officers. Let us now come to the form of making them.   

CHAP. 29. Of the form and manner to Create and make Magistrates and Officers: And of the time of their Charges.  
THey are made either by election or by lot, 
Three kinds of creating and making Magistrates.  or by both together. The election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooseth whom he pleaseth, which is the ordinary manner in all principalities; or else it is referred to many; and is done either by voice, or in lifting up the hand and voice; 
By election. By lot.  or by billets or by beans. The Lot is cast, either upon certain Citizens, out of which they will choose some one to employ in some charge; or upon all those which are of the same age or the same condition, out of which they will likewise by Lot draw one or two to advance them to some Office. The Lot and choice concurres together diversely. For either they choose a certain number by voices, out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to be an Officer; or having drawn many by Lot, they give them power to choose one amongst them, 
By lot and election together.  which is held most capable.  
In this difference it is to be observed, that the discontent of those which are not chosen is the less, when the Lot proceeds the choice, then when the choice goes before the Lot. Wherefore in places whereas hatred is irreconcilliable, it were better to make use of this last kind, then of the first.  
Let us now see what time Officers ought to remain in the exercise of their charges. This is diversely observed. In some Estates they continue them during life: In others they are limited to a certain time. 
The continuance of Officers is either for life or a certain time.  In some for a year; in others for two; and in others, although they were continued in their places during life, yet being many in the same charge, they made them serve alternatively one after another.  
They which have been of opinion to make Officers temporary, 
Reasons and considerations to make Officers for a time.  and not to continue them during life, had for their principal consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it; as also to have means to call Officers to an Account, having given over their charges, fearing they should not be able to draw them so easily, being still in authority: In like manner to prevent the impunity of those, which had transgressed in their Offices. To make many partakers of the Estate, not only to satisfy the ambitious, to cut off discontments; but also to recompense many good men, & to make more capable of affairs, & to stir them up to the care of the public. Some also have been of this opinion, to hinder that the government might not be usurped by few men, who would make the rest subject: having been often seen by many examples, that the continuance of command hath made usurpations easy, not only upon popular estates, but also in principalities and seignouries; the Offices and charges for life having been made hereditary and patrimonicall in many estates.  
They which would perpetuate them, 
Reasons and considerations to perpetuate Offices during life.  have had other consideration: For that making the Magistrates Annual, or for a short time they leave their Offices before they are informed of their duties; so as the Estate falls always into the hands of uncapable men, and by these sudden and frequent changes, most part of affairs remain undecided, Wars begun left unperfit, Suits and differences laid by, and punishments and executions delayed. There is another consideration, which is, that the time being short, the Merchant's study to do their business speedily: and this change brings nothing, but new starved horseleeches, which must be filled; whereas they which are already full by their offices, might give more ease unto the people.  
And as from new servants grows the envy of Families, so from new Magistrates proceeds the fall of Estates, which bring new Counsels, new designs, new Laws, new Customs, new Edicts, new kinds of living, and new judgements. Tiberius to withdraw the great men of Rome from the knowledge of public affairs, and to assure those the more whom he employed in Offices, he continued them during life. Wherefore to avoid the greatest part of the inconveniences which are found in either party; you must consider the form of the Estate, and the humour of the subjects.  
Popular Estates are maintained by the continual change of Magistrates, 
The change of Offices and Magistrates necessary in a popular Estate,.  to the end that every one according to his quality may have his part, as they have in a sovereignty, and that equality (the nurse of a popular Estate) may be the better entertained by the annual succession of Magistrates; lest that the custom of commanding long, should cause some one to desire to seize upon the Sovereignty: the which is a consideration which they ought to have in Seignouries, and Estates governed by few persons.  
In Principalities it is not needful to teach Subjects to Command, but to obey. And being necessary to retain them in their duties, they cannot assure themselves but of few to maintain the rest. 
Means to prevent the usurpation of the Estate by the continuance of officers ingreat charges.  Yet to prevent that the continuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the usurpation of the Estate, they may in continuing other Officers in their places, balance the power of great men, in giving them companions as great as themselves: or after the expiration of some time, to cause them to pass from one charge to another, which hath more honour but less power. Wherefore some have held it fit, to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends, from those to whom they will give authority; and to make others above them, who shall have more honour than authority or power.  
This course is observed by the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice. 
The practice of the Pope and Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of great charges to prevent usurpation.  The governments depending on the Church, the authority is given to a Clergyman for the government, but the force is committed to another, who depends immediately on the Pope; yet having charge, in that which shall concern the government, to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority. In governments depending on the Seignoury of Venice, a Gentleman of the Commonweal commands: and for the Forces a Captain of the Seignoury, who hath charge to assist him. But in neither of these Estates, the Governor and he which commands the Forces, are not linked together, as the one would favour the usurpation of his Companion. For as the Governor would not allow of his usurpation that commands the Forces, for that it cannot be done but against his authority: so he cannot expect and assistance from him, fearing that having made this overture, and the other making show to yield unto it, being Master of the forces, the authority of the Estate and governor being weakened by this enterprise, he would chase him away, and make himself Master of the government. And these charges being not the most honourable in an Estate, but there being others more eminent, those which enjoy them, aiming at the honour of the others, study not to settle themselves there; but chose some affect to be made Cardinals, and to be drawn from those places, and the others to attain unto the chief Offices of the Seignoury.  
Kings who have but one sort of people to employ in governments, make use of other means, 
The practice of Kings & Princes upon the same subject.  some make governments triennall, and not only the governments of Provinces, but also of Citadels and Forts, causing that these depend not on the others: but in certain things, and accompany the Governor with forces; which are not particularly at their devotion, but only ●o far forth as the Governors shall contain themselves in the Prince's service. But if the Governors cannot be changed, they may change the forces which ought to assist them.  
But forasmuch as the Prince ought to be Master, 
That the change of principal Officers & Magistrates is necessary for the safety of the Prince & peace of the people.  and dispose freely of great places, it seems that he might give them for a certain time; and the affairs so requiring it, they might continue them to the same persons, if he thought it fit; if not he might take them into his hands, and deliver them to others, without any cause of discontentment to those from whom he had taken them. For this express limitation of time would work two effects: The one that they which are advanced to these places; entering into them, would resolve to leave them: the other, that being certain they must go forth, they will never think to become Masters, and settle themselves: whereas the time not being limited, every one will strive to continue in his place, and there to build his designs; but also will desire to bring in after him some one of his Children or Kinsmen. And if the Prince desires to retire him, he must buy his place of him, or cause it to be bought by some other; which is to bring in a venality, more shameful and dangerous in an Estate, than any other abuse that can be imagined. We will therefore conclude, that this change in the government of Provinces, and the command of great Troops or Companies, be it of Soldiers or others which have great authority in the Estate, is necessary for the safety of the Sovereign, and the peace of the Subject.  
But for that in doing this altogether, they which would desire to continue in their charges, 
Prudence required in this change.  might plot together and trouble the Estate, to maintain themselves; he must change them one after another, causing the time of their charges to expire at diverse terms.  

That you may not give great commands in a Province to those that were borne there.  There is another consideration which hath been discreetly and wisely made in great Estates, not to give great commands in a Province to those which are Natives, not only to avoid the Injustices which such persons may commit as well in favour of their Kinsfolks and Friends, as in hatred of their Enemies; but also to avoid the contempt of his Authority which gives these charges, which proceeds commonly from the jealousy of those of the Country, who hold themselves equal, and sometimes greater than he that is advanced. But if he that is made Governor be so great, as they need not fear this jealousy, yet the Prince must make use of this means, to avoid the swelling authority which he may get in the Province by his own means, or by that of his Kinsfolks and Friends, to the prejudice of his Master. Our ancient Ordinances conformable therein to those of the Romans, had therein very well provided, especially in regard of Bayleifes and Seneshals, who were the ancient Governors: But they have been and are yet very ill governed and observed.  
It avails not to say, that to facilitate the obedience of Subjects, they have been forced to take this course; the Subject obeying more willingly one of his Province, who he thinks would have the same affection like himself for that which concerns the good thereof, the which a Stranger and unknown unto him would not do, whom he imagines to be unlike in humour and will. For this were to make the Prince subject to his Officer, and to make the obedience of the people depend more on the credit which the Officer hath, then of the Authority which the Prince ought to have over his Subjects, who obey not the Prince, but so far forth as it shall please the Officer; and the Officer losing his credit, the Prince shall be no more obeyed.  
But if in a new Estate to settle himself, it is very fitting to make use of those which have most credit with his Subjects, the Prince's authority having not yet taken root in their minds; but I will not thereby infer that he must continue it: but chose this authority being acknowledged, to settle it absolutely, the obedience must immediately depend, and they must obey the Officer so far forth as he hath authority from the Prince, and not for the particular credit he hath among the people.   

CHAP. 30. Of the duty of the principal Officers and Magistrates.  
AS for the support of the body, it is not sufficient that the Head be in good Estate, but the other members in like manner must do their function: So in an Estate, it is not sufficient for the Prince to do his Duty, but the Officers, and especially the principal Magistrates of the Estate, should likewise do theirs.  
But I should be tedious, if I would relate here all the whole Duty of every Officer: only I will deliver in general terms that which concerns the Duty of such as have jurisdiction and command together, or the one and the other divided; as those which are more considerable and worthy of observation in the managing of the Estate. Their Duty is considered in four diverse Subjects: either towards the Laws, or towards the Sovereign's Commandments; 
Wherein the Duty of Officers and Magistrates do consist.  or towards the other Magistrates; or towards private persons. Under the Name of the Laws we comprehend the Ordinances and Customs, which oblige the general. For the regard of Ordinances, the Duty of the principal Magistrates is, 
Of the duty towards the laws.  to examine those which they will make, in that which belongs to justice, decency, and public profit and commodity; and from the consequence to make their remonstrance unto the Sovereign before they declare or publish them, if they find any thing to be reform and amended.  
As for those which are already received, they must cause them to be strictly observed, and restore the old abolished for want of use, before they put them in execution: otherwise it would be a very unjust thing, and resenting tyranny, after they had for a long season contemned an Ordinance, to proceed suddenly against those who having not observed it, had made a breach: The common error being not only excusable, but also held for a Law, if the Law of Nature doth not resist.  
But for that the Laws are not sufficient to govern an Estate, for that they ordain only in general, the Lawgiver, or Prince being unable to foresee an infinite number of particularities which happen in affairs: For this cause the Magistrate is established, to examine the particularities, and to accommodate the Law thereunto by a just and upright interpretation; the which is taken either from the words of the Law, or from the intention of him that made it, or by the induction or conclusion which may be drawn from it.  
In regard of the words of the Law, 
How the Magistrate ought to carry himself in the interpretation o● of the words of the law.  you must observe these Rules: First, not to take them nor interpret them contrary to the intention of the Lawgiver: Secondly, you must see if the other clauses of the Law do correspond and agree with the interpretations which we give. But if by reason of ambiguity, and the diverse significations of words, there be obscurity, they must seek the proper signification either from the common manner of speaking, or from that which was peculiar to him that drew the Law; if it did not plainly appear, that the intention of the Lawgiver had been wholly contrary to the proper signification of words.  
If there be found a double interpretation, taken from the propriety of words, and the common use of speaking; they shall follow the mildest; and if the words be obscure, they must have recourse to custom, and to that which is practised in that regard. But if the interpretation be notwithstanding doubtful, they must follow that which shallbe most proper for the matter, to the which it must be referred. And if notwithstanding all this they cannot draw any interpretation suitable to the business, or to reason; he must cause it to be interpreted by those who have made the Law; or cause a declaration to be made by the Sovereign. Thus the Magistrate must carry himself in the interpretation of the words of the Law. 
In the interpretation o● the int●n●ion of the law.  But in the interpretation of the intention of the Law, there are other Rules: either they restrain the Ordinances to certain ●ases, or they extend them to many others than those which are specified. They restrain the ordinances commonly, when as the reason which seem to have been the cause of the ordinance, doth not extend but to certain cases, and ceaseth in all the rest, in regard of certain circumstances; for the reason of the Law failing, the disposition can take no place.  
But to seek out the reason of the Law, we must consider, whether it be expressed by the Law itself, or gathered by the Interpreters; and to draw from thence the condition of things whereof the Law speaks, or if it be uncertain. For if it be expressed by the Law, either the Law is formal in the case that it is in question, and then without doubt the Law must be followed; Or if it be not altogether formal, you must consider whether there be not some contrary Circumstances which hinder the reason of the Law, that it takes not place in the business that is in question: And they shall do the like, if the reason be not expressed in the Law, of the execution whereof they treat, but in another fact upon another subject. But if the reason be gathered from Interpreters, you must see if they can yield no better: And then you must follow it, restraining it; if it be particular, and extending it if it be general. But if it be doubtful, and ordains generally, you may not in this doubt in any sort restrain the effect of the Law, unless it be in things that are odious and hurtful: And whereas the Law shall be limited in certain cases, they must not easily extend it to others upon pretext of equity, unless there were an Identite of reasons, especially in things which concern the rigour of the Law, whereas the case not expressed is held for omitted. But in such occurrents, they shall govern themselves according to the common Law, to the which all the Ordinances, if it may be, must be referred; to the end that in all the Laws of the estate, uniformity may be observed, and natural equity followed, whereby all the actions of men should be governed, and regulated.  
Wherefore the case not being expressed in the Law, 
Examination of the reason of the law.  but only the reason being known whereon the Law is grounded▪ It shall be easy to examine if this reason may take place, in that which presents itself, in concluding from the general to the particular, from the principal to the accessary, and by the other means of induction. Thus allowing one of the contraries which have no mean, we may induce that the other is forbidden: And in like manner, if the Law forbids one thing to avoid a mischief which may follow; we may induce that it likewise forbids all other things, which may breed the like mischief, although they be not expressed. And so many consequences may be drawn from the Laws, and referred to diverse examples, whereof the reason would be easy to apply from one to another.  
Wherefore to recollect myself, 
That we must stand to the authority of the law, and make no questions upon equity.  and to explain more at large what I have said, as long as the Law is certain, we must stand firm to its authority, and make no subtle distinctions upon equity: For that the Laws are published to be observed in their terms and tenor, and not to be disputed of: I say so far forth as it is plain and not obscure. But if it be obscure, they shall follow the interpretation that is most received by use; so as it be not altogether contrary to natural reason. But if use fails us, we must in the diversity of opinions, follow that which is supported by example: yet we must examine the example duly, to see if they agree in the cause, and principal circumstances.  
When as use and examples fail, they shall choose the opinion which shall approach nearer to natural equity then to rigour; and that which shall be more conformable to the intention of the Law, then that which shall be drawn from the subtle interpretation of words: And that which shall be taken from the true Interpretation of words, then from similitudes and conjectures: For that all similitudes halt; and conjectures never conclude directly: Or from that which shall be received, or most conformable to that which the ancients have held, for that we may not slightly leave the opinion of the ancient. But when we cannot judge which opinion is the most just, we must consider which is the safest, and that which is approved by most men, and by the wisest, more sortable to the business that is in question, and which hath in it less inconvenience.  
Behold how the Magistrate ought to carry himself, in the interpretation of the Laws. 
Of the execution of laws and ordinances.  The other part of the Magistrates duty is the execution, for the which he must enter into other considerations: And first from what time the Law or ordinance ought to take place; when they bind the Subject; and who they are that are bound. For the first, you must understand that the last ordinances, being contrary to the precedent, 
From what time the law o● ordinance doth bind.  derogate from them: But the last cannot take place, but for differences to come, and not for those which are decided, or hanging in judgement by appeal. And the ordinance is in force from the day of the publication, and from that time it binds every man for the future, which is for the second point.  

〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉  For the third, the Prince's law doth not bind the subjects which are gone to reside in the territory of another Prince. Yet if the ordinance be prohibitive, they must consider if the prohibition or defence be made in regard of something, which is in the territory of him which hath made the ordinance: For then a stranger or the subject of another Prince should be bound. But if it be in regard of persons, that the prohibition is made and in favour of the subjects; the Prince's subject is bound not to contradict it, although he remain in the territory of another Prince. But if it be in hatred of the subject, he that is out of the territory of the Sovereign, which hath made the ordinance, is not bound. If the prohibition be made for solemnity, which they desire to have observed in some act, it doth not oblige the subject out of the territory of his Prince, for that in the observation of solemnity, they regard the place where the act is made.  
As for other persons whom the ordinance may bind, they must distinguish whether they be named in the ordinance by their names, or specified by their quality and condition, or if there be no designation. The name or the condition being specified, the ordinance doth not extend to those which are of another name, and another quality. But if there be no quality specified, the ordinance binds not only all those which gave consent to the publication, but also such as remain in the place where it is observed, were they strangers: whence this distinction proceeds, that in things that are personal, proceeding from contracts, solemnities, and acts of voluntary jurisdiction; they must follow that which is observed in the place of their abiding, but in that which is of the reality of things; they shallbe bound to that which is received in the place where the thing is situated.  
Ordinances are in force, 
Of the ●●●ce of laws or ordinances.  not for that they are written or just, but in regard they are commanded and made by the Sovereign. For he that should obey the Law only for that it is just, should not obey it as he ought, this justice being subject to debate. So customs have the force of law, for that they are received and allowed by the judgement of the people: And although there may be some exception, so as it be not against the Law of Nature, the Magistrate is bound to observe them, and to cause them to be observed by others.  

Of Custom.  But it is lawful for the Magistrate to extend or restrain the Law with the reason in certain cases. Yet he hath not the same power with a custom, the which consisting more in fact then in Law, and in the particular use then in reason, he must observe it with the circumstances, with the which it hath been received. To make a custom to have the force of a Law, three things are required.  

Three things required to give force to a Custom.  The first, that it hath been brought in from the beginning to be observed for the future. For you cannot authorise by this name that which some, (aiming at another thing, or by the indulgence or connivency of the Magistrate) have sometimes done: For that a custom cannot take its beginning from a casual or rash use, but from an use continued by a common observation.  
The second point necessary to authorize a custom, is the reiteration of many the like acts; not so much to endure a plurality of examples, as a consent of opinion, by the frequency of these acts; and by this consent two Acts suffice to confirm a custom.  
The third and last thing required for the approbation of a custom, is the time of ten years at the least; some hold thirty years that the consent in this manner of living should continue: And that Custom shallbe of the more authority when it is fortified by the longer prescription of time.   

CHAP. 31 Of the duty of the Magistrate towards his Sovereign.  
THe Duty of the Magistrate towards his Soueraign●, consists in the respect and obedience he owes, 
Wherein the duty of the Magistrate to the Prince consists.  not only to the Prince's person, in whose presence all the power of Magistrates is held in suspense, as the Stars lose their light in the presence of the Sun, (the Magistrates being not brought in, what power soever they have, but to supply the presence of the Prince, their Sovereign) but also to the commandments of the Sovereign: the which as they are of diverse sorts, so the duty of the Magistrate's, is to carry himself diversely for the enrolling or verifying thereof.  
For either the commandment consists in the knowledge of the Cause, 
Of the commandments of the Prince, and how the Magistrate must carry himself in the verification.  and in this case the power of the Magistrate remains entire: Or the commandment gives him knowledge of the right, but not of the fact: and in this case the Officer ought notwithstanding to inquire of the fact, although the Prince had assured him to be well informed of the truth: unless he had expressly forbidden him to take notice: For then the Magistrate may not proceed: Only he may (the fact being notoriously false) acquaint his Sovereign with the truth, and yield to that which he should reply upon his remonstrances. But if the Letters did only give him knowledge of the fact, and not of the right and merit of the grant; the Officer ought to obey, so as it be nothing against the right of Nature: If notwithstanding if it be against the Laws and general ordinances, or that it may bring some inconvenience or prejudice to the Estate, or to a part thereof; he may make his remonstrances, not once only but twice or thrice.  

The Magistrate ●ught to obey the will of the Prince, although it were unjust.  But if notwithstanding the Prince will have the Officer proceed to th● verification, he must do it, although the matter were unlawful. For although it be certain, that the Prince may not command any thing that is unjust, nor that is subject to scandal or reprehension, or which may be rejected by his Officer: Yet for that by the constraint, which the Sovereign is forced to use, the ignorant multitude is moved to disobedience, and to contempt of his Edicts and commands, as being published and received by force: The duty of the Magistrate is, not to bandy himself against his Prince, what error soever he commits: For this were a Rebellion in the Estate, and to bandy the Feet against the Head. It were much better to yield under the Sovereign Majesty with obedience, then in refusing the commandment of the Sovereign, to give an example of Rebellion to the subjects.  
There are some which proceeded farther, and hold, that if the Prince commands the Magistrate to excuse some wicked act to his subjects, it were better to obey, and thereby to cover and bury the remembrance of a wickedness already done; then by refusing to irritate and incense him to do worse, 
The disobedience of the Magistrate to th● will of the 〈…〉 bad consequence.  and to cast, as they say, the helm after the hatchet: As Papinian did, who refusing to excuse the Parriside committed by Caracala, on the person of Geta, caused this Emperor to exceed in all sorts of cruelties; whereof he felt the first fury: This resistance having prevailed nothing, but brought an irreparable los●e to the affairs of the Emperor, as well by reason of his death, 
The Magistrate is not 〈…〉 the 〈…〉 of his Prince.  as of that which followed.  
The Magistrate is not allowed to leave his Office, rather than to publish the unjust will of the Sovereign, for that it would be a dangerous overture to all the subjects, to refuse and reject the edicts and will of the Prince, if every man in his charge might leave the Estate in danger, and expose it to a storm, like unto a Ship without a helm, under colour of an opinion of justice, which it may be would be affected by some fantastic brain, without reason, but to cross a contrary opinion. Wherefore in all Counsels, they hold this rule, to make the Councillors range themselves to the two greatest opinions. For although it seems strange, to force the conscience of those, to whose Wisdom and Religion they have referred a business, to be examined, and to give their advice: yet for that the variety of opinions might hinder the conclusion, it hath been held most reasonable, yea necessary, to use it in this manner: The rule of wise men which cannot fail, is, that of two unjust things they follow that which is most just, and of two inconveniences to avoid the greater: Otherwise there would never be an end of humane actions. If the command be so unjust, as without wronging their conscience, they cannot pass it; some Magistrates to avoid the disobedience, and not to charge their consciences in verifying it, have inserted; by the express commandment of the Prince, many times reiterated.  
The manner of verifying the Edicts, 
Reason's why the custom of verifying the Prince's Edicts hath been brought in by the Magistrate  ordinances, and commands of Princes by the Magistrates, hath been brought in, in some estates, to make the people more willing to obey them: Who having not capacity to judge of things by themselves, and being more inclined to distrust, and to calumniate the will of the Prince then approve it: And the Prince on the other side being i●●roned by importune Courtiers, who without any regard of duty, or of justice, nor to the good of the Estate, seek by new inventions to work their own ends, and to get them authorized by circumventing the Prince: It hath been held convenient for the Prince, to cause his will to pass by such solemnities, to the end they might be received by the people; and that being examined and found contrary, or prejudicial to the public good, they might be refused by humble remonstrances; which wipe away the disgrace of the denial: and serve the Prince for an excuse, to free himself from the importunity, and injustice of great men.  
It remains now to know, how an Officer ought to carry himself in executing a command, if there comes unto him a revocation, the business being begun. Some hold opinion, 
How the Mastrate aught to car●y himself in the execution of a commandment after a Revocation.  that if the execution be so much importing the Estate, as not being finished there would happen some inconvenience, that notwithstanding the revocation he ought to proceed: If not, he must leave the business as it is. But for the first, it is necessary that the danger of the Estate be evedent and known to all Men, and not to the Magistrate alone, who might be suspected to have proceeded lightly, or with spleen, passing on after the Revocation.   

CHAP. 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another.  
THe duty of Magistrates, and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another, is regulated according to the power which they have, whereof in most Estates they make three degrees.  
The highest is of those, who in some part of the Estate, have power to determine without appeal. 
Three degrees o● Magistrates and the power of either of them.  The Prince only may command them; the middle sort obeyed these, and commanding those which are of a lower degree, who have not any command over the Officers, but only over particular persons. We may call the first superiors or principals; the second middle or subaltern; and the last inferiors. The first have power to command all Magistrates and Officers, without exception; or only certain Officers subject to their jurisdiction. They which have power to command all in general without execution, ought not to be brought into the Estate, for the change that such a power might usually cause. For there being but one degree to climb, and to make themselves Masters, ambition doth teach it speedily; and every man doth the more easily endure it, for that all men are accustomed to obey them.  
The duty of a Superior or principal Magistrate is, 
The duty of a Superior or principal Magistrate.  to contain those that are under him in the terms and duties of their charges; of whom he may be judge, and not they of him in quality of a Magistrate; but as a private person. And as for the Sovereign, although they may judge in their own cause, to whom God hath given power to dispose without judgement, as Xenophon saith; yet it is much more fitting for the Sovereign, 
That it is fitting for a Prince to endure the judgement of the Magistrate  to suffer the judgement of his Magistrates, then to make himself judge in his own cause; provided always that the business doth not concern the Sovereignty, or his particular person; but to the end that Majesty may not suffer diminution of its greatness, or that the splendour of a Royal Name may not dazzle the eyes of the judges: It hath been wisely advised in some Estates, that the Sovereign should not plead but by his procurator, and would never assist in Person.  
And as in the power of the Prince, the power of Magistrates is held in suspense; so in the presence of superior Magistrates, 
The power of a Lieutenant equal to that of the Magistrate.  the power of Inferiors hath no effect. The which is understood, not only of superior heads and Magistrates, but also of their Lieutenants who are therein held the same thing, as being but one power distributed to two. Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot determine any thing, his chief being present. Yet the Magistrate may take notice of an injury or wrong done by his Lieutenant. 
The power of the Magistrate is of no effect out of his territory.   
But that which hath been spoken of the power of Superior Magistrates over their inferiors, must be understood in their territory, their seats, and in the limits of their jurisdiction, out of which they are but private men, without power or command.  
Magistrates which are equal in power, or have no dependence one of another, 
Of two Magistrates equal in power and of the execution of their decrees in one another's territory.  cannot be commanded nor corrected one of another. But if there be question to execute the decree or judgement of one in the territory of another, they must use honest entreaties and clauses of request. Yet where there shall be question of the interpretation of a decree made by one Magistrate, another that is his equal may not take knowledge: For every one ought to be the interpreter of his own will.  
And in regard of the sentence given by the Officer of a Foreign Prince, 
Of the execution of a ●entence given by the officer of a foreign Prince upon another's territory.  for the execution whereof in the territory of another, there should be a Commission of entreaty: The judges of this Prince to whom the Commission is directed, may not examine the judgement, lest the stranger be induced another time to do the like, an● to dissolve the judgements whereof they should demand the execution; the which would be done more through jealousy of the Estate, then for any injustice in them. Yet if there be question of honour, or life, they may not execute the judgements of foreign Magistrates, if they have not known the merit of the cause, and seen the informations. And Princes owe this respect one unto another, for the good of justice, not only to punish the wicked, which sly from one Estate into another; but also for the Exemplary punishment, which ought to be made upon the places, are bound to yield the natural subject to his natural Prince, unless the Prince to whom the fugitive is retired, ●indes that he is unjustly pursued; for in this case, he ought not to yield them: Yea he is forbidden by the Law of God, to restore a Bondman which is fled into another Man's house to avoid the fury of his Master.  
But although the Magistrate may not command his Equals, 
Of Magistrates equal in power in a body▪ or college, and of their command one over another.  yet in a body or college consisting of many equal in power, the greatest part may command the less. For in this case they that are superior in number, are likewise superior in power. So as the lesser part cannot command the greater, nor yet hinder it. Yet one Tribune at Rome opposing, might hinder the acts of all the rest: the Romans making a difference betwixt opposition and command; 
The difference betwixt ●pposi●ion and command.  for that hindrance and opposition is less than a command, and doth not induce any superi●●●●● like unto a command.  
But Colleges having no superiority one over another, they cannot have any command, 
That they may hinder one another by opposition before the act, or by appeal after the act, but not by command.  but they may well hinder one another; this hindrance growing rather from a contrariety in an equal concurrence, then from any superiority. This may be grounded upon the general Rule of all those which have any thing in Common, amongst which he that hinders, hath more force, and his condition in this case is better than his that seeks to proceed; and among many Laws, that which forbids, is of greatest force. But if before the Act, a Magistrate may hinder his Equal by opposition; yet after the Act he cannot do it by any other means, but by appeal to the Superior.   

CHAP. 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to private Persons.  
THe duty of Officers or Magistrates, 
Foundations of the duty of Magistrates to private p●r●●ns.  to particular person hath two principal foundations. The one is grounded on the power which is given to the Magistrate by the Edict or Letters of Commission: the other upon the seemliness which consists in the particular carriage of the Magistrates person, to be able to maintain himself in credit, reputation, and authority, with those over whom he is to command.  

divers powers of Magistrates▪  And although that the power of all Magistrates regards generally the execution of the Law, the which without the Magistrate were idle: Yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others. For some are bound by the Laws and Ordinances to command and use the power that is given them, in that form and manner that is prescribed them, without adding or diminishing any thing: And in this case they are but simple Executioners of Laws. To others they give more liberty, and leave many things to their discretion and judgement. Wherein notwithstanding they must so govern themselves, as they do not any thing that is extraordinary without a special command, or that may not be easily required, 
Of their duties to private persons in giving sentence.  that they are not forced by some strong and powerful necessity, or an apparent danger. But in these things where the diversity of circumstances is a hindrance that he cannot specify, or set down in particular the power, as in the arbitrament of Princes, the Magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a special command. But therein he shall avoid to affect the reputation of pitiful as well as of cruel: For cruelty although it be unblamable, yet it retains the Subjects in the obedience of the Laws: But too much Clemency causeth the Magistrate to be contemned, with the Laws and the Prince which hath made them. Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pity of the poor in judgement: But one of the things most requisite in a Magistrate, is to make the gravity of offence known, as well to make offender's understand what they have deserved, as to induce them to repentance: And in doing so the punishment will have less bitterness and more profit. Wherefore the principal Rule of the duty of a Magistrate to private persons, 
Of the 〈…〉 persons to the Magistrate, executing his charge.  is to use the power that is given him, well; and private Men, reciprically owe him all obedience, in executing his charge, be it right or wrong, so as he exceeds not the terms of his power or jurisdiction: For than they may contradict his ordinances by appeal or opposition; and if he proceeds, he must make a distintion, whether the grievance be irreparable or not. If it may be repaired, they shall not oppose by fact, but by course of law: but if it be irreparable, they may oppose by fact, yea with force; not to offend the Magistrate, but to defend the innocent.  
As for injuries which private men do unto Magistrates, it is certain that the Magistrate being wronged he cannot be judge in his own cause; 
Of the Magistrate wronged when and how he may be judge in his own cause.  unless it be for some unreverence or injury done unto him publicly, in executing his Office. For in this case it is lawful for the Magistrate being wronged to punish such Men, for the offence done unto the particular person of the Magistrate. For this reason if a Body or College of judges hath been wronged, they may censure and condemn those which have done the offence, not to revenge the injury done unto them, but to the Estate, whose Majesty is wronged by the contempt they have made of them.  
As for obedience, it seems requisite, 
Mildness and patience required in a Magistrate.  that the Magistrate should carry himself to private persons with all mildness and patience; yet in such sort, as the dignity of his place be not vilified; as it would be if he should endure any indiscreet words in his presence, and not take exception: Or a countenance of little respect. 
Discretion and gravity without passion.  But especially, as he ought not to show himself rough and difficult of excess: So he must not grow familiar, laugh, or jest with private men; but to speak little, with discretion, without making show of any passion of choler, Envy, jealousy, or such like, which may diminish the opinion which they have of him.  
Wherefore to collect in few words that which concerns the duty of Magistrates, 
The duty of Magistrates.  they must learn to obey the Sovereign, to bend under the power of their superiors, to honour their equals, to command the Subjects to defend the poor, to make head against great men, and to do justice to all.   

CHAP. 34. Of the justice of Commanding.  
AS the form of commanding is diverse, so is the Diversity of power, which according unto justice, observes diverse Rules to make the commandments just. For in certain things according to an Arithmetical proportion, it makes all the Subjects equal: 
Rules and considerations in in the justice of comandments.  In others it enters into consideration of the quality, and follows a Geometrical proportion: In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion, it neither follows an equality altogether, nor a similitude; but taking a consideration of other differences, it mingles the one with the other by a certain temper and accord.  

An harmoniacall proportion followed in many things.  And as that which they seek most in the settling of an Estate, is Concord, which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with another: This last proportion is followed in many things; as in the form of government, in the distribution of Offices, honours, dignities, and recompenses, in the establishment of punishments, and for the peace and greatness of families, in Marriages and divisions of successions.  

An Arithmetical proportion followed in others  But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man, and in that which concerns the performance of promises, which they make one unto another, or the judgement of that which belongs to every man, whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men, of what quality and condition soever they be; they must observe an Arithmetical proportion: and not to imitate Cyrus, who condemned a little man that had too long a Robe, to give it to a tall man, and to take the tall man's which was too short, insisting more upon seemliness then to justice..  
But in the imposition of charges which are burdensome, and necessary for the support of the Estate, 
A Geometrical proportion in the imposition of burdensome Offices for the support of the Estate.  they must observe a Geometrical proportion, charging the rich, who have more to lose by the ruin of the Estate, than the poor: the which in a manner is generally observed. For although that the Nobility seems therein to have more privilege in some Estates than the Countryman, by reason that he pays no Subsedies, and doth not contribute any thing by way of imposition: yet the personal service which he doth many times perform at his own charge, is much more than that which he should pay by way of Subsidy, if it were imposed upon him; besides his person which he doth employ, the which the Countryman doth not. And in this particular, a Geometrical proportion is observed, in that they leave unto the Gentlemen (who have honour more in recommendation then the Clown) honourable charges, the which gives them means to approach nearer unto the Prince, and have some honour in them: which is the reason which makes them more willing to endure the burden, discommodity, and charge, which is far greater than that which is imposed upon the Countryman. But as I have formerly said in other parts of the Estate, they must approach as near as may be to a harmoniacall proportion, from whence proceeds that mixture which they make in most parts of Estates, of the Law, with the will and opinion of the Magistrate. The Law is made for all in general, and all are equally bound to the observation thereof▪ 
A mixture of the law with the will of the Prince.  but the Law not able to foresee all the circumstances, the will of the Prince or Magistrate in its execution, must add such a temper, as there may not follow any inconvenience or absurdity; and to bend according to the Circumstances of the business, and to regulate it according unto natural Equity, which is the soul of the Law, the which in a Prince extends to declare and c●rrect the Law according unto reason; and in the Magistrate, to extend or restrain it as the case shall require. And he that would have the Law only take place in an Estate, he should fall into an infinite number of inconuenie●ces and absurdities. For either he must make a Law upon every particular Fact that may happen; the which is impossible, and admit it were Feasible, i● would breed a confusion of Laws: or else he must leave many things unprovided for, and in others commit many Injustices, never insisting upon the circumstances, which are sometimes contrary to the rea●on of the Law.  
There ●i be n●●esse inconvenience, if they suffered the will of the P●i●ce or Magistrate to wander uncertainly, 
Of the temper a magistrate shoul●●dde unto the law.  without any establishment of the Law, whereon as upon a Rule they might ground themselves. For besides the variety, diversity, or contrariety of ordinances, or judgements which might grow, the which in the end would make them to be contemned, they should open a Gate to all violences and Injustice. But as two Simples in extremity of cold and heat, are so many poisons; and yet composed and tempered one with the other, make a whitestone Medicine. So by the mixture of the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions, which separated would 〈◊〉 ●he Estate, grows a harmoniacall accord and prop●r●i 〈◊〉 which serves to maintain it.  
In the distribution of Offices and dignities, an equality cannot be observed, 
Of the distribution o● 〈◊〉 and dignities.  without Injustice and prejudice to the E●●ate; all being not of one quality and capacity: And it mig●● so ●a●l out, that the most important and difficult ch●ge might fall upon him that is least capable; and a● Office of no moment to him that is sufficient. Moreover if you will c●oo●● tho●e of one quality only, to give them the cha●g●s, ●e●old the rest that are excluded will be discontented; i● a●● would be well satisfied, if they see, that the Gate be n●t shut against them: and they would not take it ill, that as the Capable aught to be preferred before t●e incapable: so the Gentleman finding himself as capable as the Plebeian, should be preferred, and the rich before the poor, in Offices where there is more honour than gain: and the poor before the rich, in those where there is more profit than honour. And if the Offices be associated or doubled, to make a harmony of the one with the other, they must mingle those that have wherewithal to supply in one sort that which they want in the other, otherwise there willbe no more harmony then if they should separate the accords that are n time, the which would make no pleasing found if they were not together.  
Yet in this Subject we have a regard to merit, which is the bond, which may make the poor and Countryman equal, to the rich and Noble, being without merit. And therefore they must according to ●ue●y man's deserts, g●ue the purse to the most Loyal: Arms to the most Valiant: justice to the Honestest: Censure to the most Entire: Toil to the strongest; the Government to wisest; and the Prelateship to the most devout: notwithstanding preferring in the equality of merit, such as are best qualified to them that are less.  
We may say as much of Rewards and Punishments, weighing not only the merit of the Fact, 
Distribution of rewards & punishments.  and the qualities of persons; but also the circumstances of time and place, or such like. In regard of Peace of the marriages of Families, and the preservation of Houses, it is likewise very necessary to supply the defect which is in the one, with the Excess and abundance of the other. So there is no better Marriage (as the ancient said) then of Riches with Poverty: And among Merchants there is no society more safe, then of a rich idle man, with a poor man that is diligent. And in the inequality of the conditions of persons, if there be not some quality to supply the defect of the meaner, there can be no accord. The marriage of a rich Country Woman, with a poor Gentleman would hold firm, but of a poor country Woman with a poor Gentleman, they will easily disagree.  

Harmony in the division of goods.  In like manner in the division of successions, it seems this harmony ought to be kept. For as many inconveniences follow, leaving the disposition of goods to the will of the Man; who most commonly disinherits his Children upon the first motion of choler, or makes choice of the most incapable to prefer him before the rest: So the Law which requires that the succession should be equally divided, is unjust; for that the dignity of families is lost, and a great succession divided into many parts, comes to nothing. And the Law which hau●ng too much regard to the dignity of families, adjudgeth all to one, or little to the rest, without doubt is nothing just. But that which hath regard to the quality of goods, distinguishing those that a●e ●ropper and hereditary to the house, and those which are newly purchased, giving some advantage to the elder above the younger, and to the Males above the daughters, regulating this advatnage according to the number of his Children, and leaving something in the free disposition of the Father, seems to be more just, and more approaching to this harmoniacall proportion, which ought to be followed as much as may be, in all sorts of commands and Establishments. And this shall suffice for the form of Commanding, as well in that which depends of power, as of justice..   

CHAP. 35. Of the Establishing of the forces of an Estate.  
THe order which ought to be entertained in the settling of the forces, being more Military than politic, shall be treated here succinctly.  
The forces whereof we mean to speak, are those by the which we may repulse the attempts of our enemies; the which if the Estate be Maritive, would be of two sorts, to the end we may resist both by Sea and Land.  
The provision of arms and ships, 
Provision of Arms and Shipping.  is the first part of the force; some hold it the greatest treasure of a Prince; and justive writes that Philip of Macedony▪ made himself thereby fearful of his enemies. I know that many have held, that in a great Estate, there might inconveniences happen by this great provision of Arms; for that he that hath a will to mutiny, to arm those of his faction, and to deprive the Prince of the means to make use of this provision, will make a design to seize upon the place where it is kept. But by the same reason, we must not draw together any treasure, to supply us in an unexpected necessity; nor to fortify any places, lest that coming to lose our money and our places, our enemy should grow the stronger, and we the weaker.  
But Wisdom prevents these inconveniences, the which we must employ to keep these advantages, and to make use of them before the enemy comes to seize of them: And if he doth seize of them, we may not therefore conclude, that the provision ought not to have been made; but that it is his fault that hath made it, not to be able to keep it. It is certain, that a Sword or a Knife would cut him that knows not how to handleit, but we may not therefore say, that we must neither make Sword nor Knife. So in all sorts of parties, there are inconveniences: But those which by foresight may be prevented, should not hinder us from doing that, which may otherwise serve us.  
Under the name of Arms we do not only apprehend that which serves a Man to cover him, 
Arms offensive or defensive.  and to assail his enemy; but all carriages and necessary munitions for the War, be it Offensive or Defensive; as Engines, Artillery, Powder, Ladders, Bridges, Cordage, and such other things, whereof they have need in many military Exploits, and which it concerns the wisdom o● the Prince or Sovereign to provide, in such quantity, a● when he shallbe assailed, or would invade another, ther● may be nothing wanting, for not able to provide such things in a short time, it were to be feared, that before he should recover that which is necessary, his Enemy would get such an advantage over him, as he shall hardly afterwards recover it.  

Quality of desensive arms.  But laying aside the discourse of the diversity of Arms and Engines of War, I will only propound some general considerations for the Arms fit for men, whereof those which are defensive aught to be light of carriage, (those that be heavy or ponderous commonly hindering more than they serve) difficult to pierce, and proportioned in such sort, as they may not hinder the necessary motions for a Combat.  

That they ought not to be contemned.  Many relying too much upon their Valour, have contemned this kind of arms, as fit for men that were afraid. Yet the Roman Armies, in the time of Gratian, having demanded leave to abandon their Cuyrasses, and then their Headpieces; found themselves so weak when they came to fight with the Goths, as they were cut in pieces: whereby it appeared that arms make a part of the force, and I will add, of courage. For beside, that Iron is more hard to ' pierce then the flesh, he that finds himself covered, takes more courage to join with his Enemy, for that he is not so much exposed to blows. They reproached a Captain; who armed himself completely, that he seemed to be afraid: No saith he, but I arm myself that I may not fear.  
As for offensive Arms, they must be light, to the end they may not tire or weary those that use them, 
Quality of offensive arms.  and likewise easy to manage; sharp and well steeled, to pierce the better, 
O● the Pike,  and withal to continue the longer. Some demand them long to strike a far off. Philop●mon caused his men to use the Pike ●e o● And Iphicrates made his Soldiers to carry them twice as long than they had formerly done. They attribute the victory of Gosta●us against Christian King of Denmark, to the length of the Swedish pikes, which were three foot longer th●n those of the Danes. And Gui●hard●● writes, that Vitelosi Vrsi●o, with pikes a foot and a half longer than those which the Soldiers of Pope Alexander the sixth carried, won the battle against them betwixt Sarra and Bassan. Others have better allowed of short Arms, being of better use in a straight or a throng; as Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians.  
Besides this, there are two sorts of offensive arms: 
Two sorts of offensive arms  some to shoot, cast, or dart; and others which they hold continually in their hands; of both which kinds they must make good provision, being all necessary in an Army. The Parthians have many times vanquished the Romans with their Bows, fight ● far off: And the Romans as Vegetius writes, have many times gotten great victories, by the means of certain long darts, called Marciobarbaz.  
There is another quality, which some have desired in Arms, that they should be fair, gilt, and enriched, so as they may be pleasing unto the Eye, thinking that this gives courage to the Soldiers; the which Xenopho● and Caesar have allowed. Others holding that this was of no use, but to kindle the avarice and courage of the enemy, have thought it better to have the arms without any ornament and bare, as those which strike more terror.  
To resolve the most expedient in this quality and contrariety, we must know those whom we mean to arm, 
Of the beauty & ornament of Arms.  and those against whom we are to fight. If the first by this vanity of ornament, are to be the more encouraged, and that the same vanity may breed admiration and amazement in the Enemy; it shall be fit to use it. But if we have to deal with men which know what belongs to War, we must rather seek horror then ornament in our Arms. Wherefore a Prince making provision of Arms, he shall do better to choose those that are good then fair, and simple and plain, rather than enriched, as well to avoid the charge in so great a provision which it behoves him to make; as for that they are more durable, and no less profitable than the other.   

CHAP. 36. Of Fortresses, and of their profit for the preservation of an Estate.  
FOrtresses do also make a part of the force of an Estate: and they which have been of Opinion, that they should not build any, have been confuted both by reason and use: so as there have been few found, unless they were some petty popular Estate, that will follow their Council. The Grecians and Romans who had less need during their Empires, than any other Estate, for that all submitted themselves under their yoke, entertained Citadels at Corinth, Tarentum, and Rhegium: And if the Capitol had not been strong, the Empire of Rome had been smothered in the Cradle by the Gauls.  
The Estates in which are no strong places, are conquered by one Battle. England hath testified it; and the Persian, relying only in the great number of his Men, hath lost in one battle a great extent of his Country, the which the Turk hath since preserved by Forts. For although that Fortresses alone cannot much assist an Estate, yet being seconded by Arms, they make it invincible; and there being no Armies on foot, they give you leisure to raise them, and after a Rout, to Rally your Men together to ●enew the War. Yet this is not to say, that the estate which hath most sorts is the strongest: For it is impossible to guard many w●ll; and some being ill guarded, they prove more prejudicial to the Estate, then profitable for the defence. It must therefore have few, but well furnished with Men, Victuals, and Munition of Wa●re.  
They must likewise be in a necessary situation or at least profitable. 
The situation of Fortres●e● necessary and profitable.  Necessary situations are those which being unfortified, make the Country to lie open, and expose it to the invasion of Enemies. Profitable situations are those, by whose means they may guard a rich Town and well inhabited, and may serve for a retreat unto the people. They must likewise be remote from the heart of the Estate; 
They must be far from the heart of the Estate.  to keep the Enemy and danger far from it, to the end that whiles the Enemy bu●●es himself in assailing them, the rest of the Country may be in peace, and we may have means to prepare ourselves to resist him. And if the forts be not only far off, but at the entry of the Enemy's Country, they will be the more safe: For they will not only give us means to defend ourselves, but also to annoy our Enemy in his own Country.  
Besides this, 
Forts strong by situation and Art.  forts ought to be strong both by situation and by fortification. Forts strong by situation, are those which are built upon high and sharp Mountains, and of hard access, or which are ●uironed with La●es, the Se●, Pools, Ri●er●, and Marshes, and have all commodities necessary for the entertainment and succour of a Garrison. Those are strong by hand, which are flanked to purpose, with a good Wall, a large and sound rampire of Earth, with abroad and deep ditch, and they must make more account of the rampire then of the Wal●, and of the ditch than the rampire. A fort must likewise be great▪ to the end it may be capable of many M●● for the defence, and to annoy the Enemy the more▪ 〈◊〉 be able to entrench themselves within.  

They must be situated where they may be relieved.  It must in like manner be situated in such sort, as it may be relieved, for soon or late they take that place by force or obstinacy of a siege which is not relieved. Wherefore they have held those places strong, which have a Port of the Sea, hard to stop up, and is not commanded. For this back door makes them as it were impregnable, having means daily to receive refreshing of Victuals, Munition, and Men, and to discharge themselves of their wounded and unprofitable Mouths for defence.  
And although that the situation of a place be strong for defence; and such in some part as they hold it inaccessible; yet they may not forbear to add what they can to make it stronger: For we have seen that many places have been taken, by those parts which they had neglected to fortify, for that they held them inaccessible. So Carthage was taken by Scipio towards the Pool. Antiochu● the great, took Sardis, by that part which was the strongest, where he found there was not any Sentinel, s●ing birds to build their nests there without any disturbance.   

CHAP. 37. Of the Warlike Discipline.  
THe third part of the force of an Estate, consists in the warlike discipline, that is to say, in Soldiers of good experience and well disciplined. And herein we must observe that the force doth not always consist in the number, but in the resolution of the Soldier, and in the experience or conduct of the Commander. In all the battles which have been given, it is observed, that few men have fought; and those few, according to the resistance that was made, have won or lost the battle; and as the kinds of arms make the Soldier stronger or more feeble, so they have demanded what force is most beneficial; either that on Horseback or on Foot.  
Polybius saith, 
Of the advantages of Horse and Foot.  that it were better that our foot were a Moiety less than that of our Enemy, so as we be stronger in Cavallerie, then if we were equal in all: The which may be true in a Combat; having been often seen, that when as the horse are routed, the foot seeing themselves far from any retreat, hau● been forced to yield sometimes in gross, without striking stroke: But in all the course of the War, it is most certain that the Footmen do the greatest service, were it but at sieges and defences of places, and that they may fight in all places, which the horsemen cannot do.  
Those Nations which have made use of Horsemen only, have sometimes gotten great Victories; as the Partbyans have done: But when they were to besiege or defend a place, they advanced little. Also those people which put all their forces in horsemen, do● it, for that they cannot keep their ranks and order which is necessary for Footmen. And to recompense this defect, they make use of the violence of Horse in a Combat, and of their swiftness, and readiness in Erterprises of War, which are executed more speedily with Horse then Foot, who march heavily.  
But the better is, 
An Army must consist of hor●e and foot.  that the Armies of an Estate should consist both of the one and the other, that is to say, of Footmen to serve for the body of an Army; and Horsemen, for arms and legs. Wherefore the Prince besides the provision of Arms, and other necessaries for War, must be careful that the Cavalry may be well mounted, & provide that they may have horses in his own Country; for he cannot be termed strong and powerful in horse, if he be constrained to have recourse in that regard to his neighbour, who in time of war may fail him.  
I have said formerly that the force did not consist in the number, but in the bounty and courage of the soldiers; yet for that they are not all borne such, we must chooseas near as we can, those which promise so much; and by Discipline make them such, and endeavour to instruct and train up others. 
Of the choice of Soldiers.  For the choice many have made a question, whether we should draw them out of our Subjects, holding that the Prince, which innures the Subjects to War, thrust himself into danger to receive a Law from them, and have held an opinion, that it was more safe to employ Strangers. But there have been Princes which have not employed their Subjects indifferently, but only the Nobility of the Country, as the Kings of Poland and Persia: the which have made them strong in Cavalry, but weak in Foot. Some others having a distrust and jealousy of the Nobility, would make no use of their service; but to make head against them, have armed and put forces into the hands of some of the Common people. The Turk hath put his forces into the hands of Subjects of the Countries which he hath conquered; but this hath been in making them Turks by Education. For causing the Children of Christians to be taken in their younger years, and to be instructed timely in the Law of Mahomet, breeding them up to toil and labour, until that they come to an age fit to bear Arms, they continue as natural Turks, not knowing other Fathers than the Grand Seignour, who have caused them to be said and brought up; nor other Country then that, for the guard whereof they are entertained.  

We must employ Strangers as little as may be.  To decide this question, we must understand that every Estate is weak which cannot subsist of itself, and whose force depends of another: And he that supports himself wholly upon foreign forces of a Sovereign and independent, he makes himself as it were a Subject and dependant of another; and exposeth his Estate, not only to the invasion of the Stranger of whom he depends, (being often seen that most part of those which have called Strangers to their Succours, have been a prey to those which succoured them:) But also the stranger failing him either for that he is troubled to defend himself, or for some other occasion, he remains at the mercy of his Enemy.  
Besides this, the stranger fights more for gain and his own private interest, then for any good will he bears him. As gain draws him, the same gain may divert him, and draw him to the Enemy. The Celtiberians subborned first by the Romans, abandoned the Carthaginians; and afterwards corrupted by the Carthaginians, left the Romans. Employing none but Strangers, the Enemy not able to hinder the levy, may slack and stay it in the greatest necessity of the Prince: The which hath fallen out too often in Suisserland, to the prejudice of France. And the Enemy invading the Nation, from whence you draw your Soldiers, many times in your greatest necessity, these Strangers are forced to abandon you, to go and serve their Country; as the Grisons did, who were in the service of King Francis, when as jean jaques do Medici's invaded their Country. Finally, the treason the Mutiny, ruin, and as I have said, the usurpation of an Estate is more to be feared by the succours of Strangers, than we can expect any advantage.  
Add to all these considerations, that they are in fight, their Companies ill filled, fearful, rude, and oppressors of the Subjects; to the great charge of the Prince, consuming in the Levy, and before they can join with us, much time and much money. But I do not hereby infer that we should altogether reject Strangers: For they may serve with our own Soldiers; whom by this means we shall spare, and upon whom we may settle our chief force; and not as some Estates do, cause them to undergo all the toil, expose them to assaults, and to all dangerous exploits, and dispense with the Strangers.   

CHAP. 38. Of the number of Soldiers in their ordinary trained Bands.  
IT rests to know what number of Souldiersought to be entertained in an Estate. This cannot be truly regulated. For we must have regard to that which the Estate may bear, and to his forces that may assail us. Only I will say, 
Two sorts of train Bands.  that in many Estates they have established two sorts of train bands. The one ordinary, consisting of men raised and bred up to the War, having no other vocation or profession. The other is subsidiary, composed of Men which have sometimes followed that profession, or are capable to do it, with the which at need they may fill the Companies, or raise new, and who in time of peace shall employ themselves in their particular affairs, being sometimes practised in Military exercises, when as the Commanders shall draw them together.  
Returning then to the first, they must not be in great numbers; but the number must be such, as they may resist, as well to avoid the charge of their entertainment, 
Of the number ●of Soldier's ●o● the trayn●●nd.  as the mutinies and revolts, which happen among such men, when they feel themselves strong and in great numbers. And in a mean Estate sow have ruled it to 6000. Foot, and 1200. Horse; in a greater, double the number. But if they must diminish any thing, it were better to do it in the Foot, which may be easily filled again, then in the Horse, which cannot be so soon raised, being necessary to spend money for their furniture, and time for the exercise both of Man and Horse.  

Of Subsidiaries  As for Subsidiaries, some have thought that they ought rather to be retained under some privileges, not prejudicial to the public, then entertained with pay whilst they do dot serve. But it would seem more expedient, to make them serve one after another three Months in the year, 
Order for their exercise in time of peace: and to hinder their Mutiny.  near unto the Governor of the Province where they shall live, in giving them pay for that time: During the which they shallbe practised in all sorts of exercises, serving to their profession: and going out of service after their Quarter is ended, they shall leave their Arms in the Town where the Governor remains, every man returning to his own home, leaving the place to such as are to succeed them. Being thus practised three Months yearly, you shall keep them still in Alarm, and they will be always ready to march. And making them to leave their Arms after the service, you shall have no cause to fear any Mutiny: The which they may make more feeble in dividing these Subsidiaries into no greater troops then of four and twenty Soldiers, which troops shall not depend of any Commander but the Governor, or of him whom the Sovereign shall at times commit: yet every one having his Captain apart, to train the Soldiers; and when as they mean to employ them, they may reduce them into Companies of hundreds or two hundred men, as they shall think good; and may give them a Captain to command them, 
Of the number of Subsidiaries.  during the expedition. By this means for the full pay of a year of 6000. men, you may entertain in your Estate 24000. Subsidiaries, trained, practised, and ready to march, and assure your Provinces against all sorts of Mutinies. And if you will train up more without any charge, 
Means to train the subjects of an Estate to War without any charge to the Prince.  they may give commandment unto the Youth of the Town where they shall practise, and thereabouts, unto a certain age, to come at the time, and to the place of the said Exercises, where they may give them Arms to practise with the rest.  
This were, some one would say, to make too many Soldiers in an Estate, which might fau●●ur a revolt. But being disarmed and reduced into small troops, 
And to hinder a revolt and mutiny.  their Captains having taken an Oath to the Sovereign only, and the Soldiers not depending on them but for the Disciplin●, and not for the pay: And moreover, being disarmed, but when as they enter into service, there being but one fourth part that enters at a time in the Provinces, the other three parts may serve to oppose against such as being armed, would attempt any thing. So as with a little foresight which they may use in this conduct, it will be easy to divert the inconveniences which they may conceive of this order. There remains now the form which they ought to hold in levies.   

CHAP. 39 Of the form how to make levies es Soldiers: Of the Place, Age, Stature, & Vocation.  

The particular ●o●●e of the Romans.  THe Romans who could not have their Soldiers depend wholly upon the Captains, observed a particular form; which was that of a great number w●ich were enroled, the Captains did choose one after another in th●ir turns: And in this manner the Companies were as it were equal both in force and valour of Soldiers. But the Captains having little credit amongst them, they saw many mutinies fall out among the Legions. The which was the cause that they found it expedient that every Captain should make choice of those whom he was to command; being likely that they which present themselves to be enroled under a Captain, would be more obedient unto him, than they whom they shall enrol against the●● will.  
The same inconvenience of a mutiny happens, when to a troop consisting of o●d Soldiers, 
〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 upon 〈…〉 captain.  they give another Captain, t●en him under whom the Soldiers have been accustomed to fight: For t●●s ●ew Captain having no means to get credit suddaiuly, the least subject that presents itself to the Soldiers to mutiny, they embrace it, being not restrained neither by the respect nor fear of their Captain. Yet an exact Discipline will easily help and remedy this.  
Wherefore it seems more safe, that every Captain make choice of those whom he is to command. 
Of the choice which the Captain ought to make of his Soldiers.  I say choice, to make a difference from the greatest part of the levies which are made at this day, into the which they receive all sorts of men. The which ought not to be; and no man ought to be admitted without an attestation from the place of his dwelling, 
A good order if it were well observed.  of his quality and how he hath lived; to the end they may exclude all thieves and Robbers, which creep into the Troops; and that the Soldier offending, they may punish him in his person or in his goods, when he returns into his Country. And to this effect the choice being made, the Soldiers ought to be presented to the Officer, or Commissary of the War, to see if they be of the quality required.  
And, although we may find good Soldiers every where; yet it seems that not only the ordinary, 
Of the place whence they must take the Soldiers.  but also the subsidiary aught to be chosen and taken rather out of the Country then in Towns; for that in the Fields they find them stronger and more rough, be it to strike, or to endure the discommodities of the War: And the Subsidiaries which are not in continual practice of the War, being dispersed here and there, they cannot so easily draw together to make a mutiny; as they might do if there were many in one Town.  
As for the Age, they must choose them young, 
Of the Age o● the Soldiers.  above Seventeen or Eighteen years, and unto Thirty or Forty, as well to have the more agility, force, and courage, as to be more venturous, pliable, and obedient to the Commandments that shall be given them. For the stature, 
Of the statu●e.  the greatest and most manlike make the greatest show: But if in a little body they find a strong complexion and courage, they may not reject him.  

Of his vocation.  But for that by their manner of living, they may settle a judgement of the complexion and force both of body and mind: They must have a care not to choose Soldiers (but as little as may be) which are accustomed to some sitting Trade, that is soft and effeminate; but rather to choose them out of Trades, in the which they must be exposed to heat, and cold, to rain, wind, Sun; Or which are accustomed to blood, to strike, to march, and to labour. The Levies of men of War thus made, they must be trained and governed. And thus much for the forces at Land.   

CHAP. 40. Of the forces at Sea.  
THe like shall be also followed in the forces at Sea; In the which besides the order they must observe for the building of ships, they must also have a care to provide a good number of Pilots and Mariners; and for the Galleys, to furnish and exercise their Rowers, whether they consist of Galley-slaves or voluntaries. For the which they must provide in good time to accustom the Slaves to do their duties, and to make the Soldier get firm footing at Sea.  
These forces at Sea are so necessary in an Estate that is Maritine, as without them the Prince cannot be termed strong nor powerful. For besides that in a short time they may seize upon his Ports, before he shall have any advice of the Enterprise; and these being seized, this Port being hard to stop up the Enemy will keep it long: He must make an account not to recover any thing by the Commerce at Sea, but from the hands of his Neighbours, who will prescribe him a Law, and entreat his Merchants ill. Let us now come to that which is necessary for the settling of the Re●enewes of the Estate.   

CHAP. 41. Of the Riches of an Estate.  
EVery one agrees that to make an Estate powerful, it must be rich; 
That the power of an Estate depends of its riches.  Riches being the principal sinews that supports it. For although that many poor Estates have made themselves to be redoubted: Yet this hath rather happened by the division of their Neighbours, and the fault of some others, then for any advantage there is in the poverty of an Estate.  
The Lacedæmonians in their poverty, 
Of the Lacedæmonians.  during the division of the Grecians, have been for a time Masters of all Greece. But when as this division ceased, their greatness (which could not long subsist with this defect) decayed presently.  
The Venetians and Genois, although poor in the beginning, have sometimes held a part of Greece; 
Of the Venetians and Genoi●  even that which was near to the Archipelagus: But this happened, during the division which was in the Levant for the Empire of Constantinople.  
The Romans themselves in their poverty, had no other advantage; 
Of the Romans  then the weakness and division of their Neighbours, whereof they could make better use than any other, receiving some into their City, ruining others; sending Colonies to neighbour Provinces; allying themselves to those whom they could not easily vanquish, and making use of their Succours and means; and finally establishing in conquered Countries, affairs, tolls, and tributes, for the pay of their Soldiers, and for to supply the other charges of the Estate. And they have been so careful to enrich their City, as many times this care hath made them shut their eyes to an infinite number of thefts and spoils, which were practised against their Ministers, whom they employed in the Provinces. It is then most certain that an Estate cannot be termed powerful, vn●esse it be rich. Yet every Man doth not agree, wherein the wealth of an Estate doth consist. Some have measured it by the great treasures; others by the revenues; and others by the fertility of the Country. But as there is no treasure so great, but a long War may exhaust; nor any revenues so abundant, but in a long and tedious enterprise, they may be forced to engage them: so the fertility alone of an Estate would be unprofitable, if the public had not means to make use of it, and by gentle levies to draw succours from private persons.  
Wherefore besides the abundance of all things fit for the life and service of Man; 
What is necesary for the riches of an Estate.  the parsimony or sparing of private persons, is necessary to make an Estate rich: As also the facility to make use of their means. For as we do not call a Prodigal man rich, who spends all he hath: So what abundance soever there be in an Estate, we will not term the Subjects rich, who by their ●ot and excess consume all this great abundance, taking from the public the means to draw any succours from them.  

〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 an 〈…〉.  We will therefore conclude, that the riches of an Estate consists in all things necessary for the life and service of Man; in the parsimony of Subjects; in the greatness of Lands and ordinary revenues; in the facility of ordinary levies; in the government of the Treasure, and in the Exchequer.   

CHAP. 42. Of the causes of the abundance of the wealth of an Estate: That is to say Tillage: Manufactures and Commerce with Strangers.  
Abundance in an Estate proceeds from three necessary things: 
Whence the abundance of necessary things proceed  From the Earth; from Manufactures, which comprehends all Manual and Mechanic Arts; and from the Commerce we have with Strangers, under the name of Earth I comprehend the labour of the Land; the entertainment of Woods, Forests, and Trees, which may by their fruitfulness contribute something to the use of Man; The digging of Mines for mettle, stones, and mineral drugs.  
As this point is the fountain of all the riches of the world, 
Tillage w●ll husbaded causeth abundance.  so it ought to be more carefully husbanded by the public: And yet it is that which is most neglected, having left a liberty to every Man to do with his own what he pleaseth, under a false proposition, that every Man being careful to find out that which will be profitable unto him, knows how to husband his ground, so as nothing well be unprofitable: And yet experience teaches us the contrary. For most part of Lands being possessed by the Nobility, Clergy, or others employed in public affairs, few reside upon the Lands; 
The cau●e of the negligence thereof.  so as they are occupied by Farms, who enter like unto glearers, which draw what they can, having no interest in the future. And of those which reside upon their Lands, some through ignorance, others by negligence or bad husbandry content themselves with the revenues of their predecessors, being loath to take the pains, or complaining to advance that, that should be necessary to plant or cleanse a piece of Land that lieth waste to dry up a Marish, to settle a Race for breeding, or to do such like things as may better their Demesus.  
Some one it may be of little judgement will say, that this care is unworthy of a Prince and of the public. But to this we may answer, that all Princes have not so held it, 
That it is not unworthy of a Prince.  Massisusa cleansed the greatest part of Babary. And in our time we know the improvements which the Venetians have made in Polesene of Rovigo: That of the great Duke of Tuseany towards Pysa and Areso, and that of the Duke of Ferrara, in the Valley of Comachy●, and that which the Hollanders do daily. Wherefore some have held it fit, that the public should take upon them this care to quicken the diligence of some, by the orders which might be made, according to the places; and to punish the negligence of others, by Fines, Amercements, and Seizures of the Lands neglected.  

Manufactures cause abundance in an Estate.  As for Manufactures, the number of workmen gives the abundance; but the good give credit to the Merchandise. The great number would not be unprofitable, but also hurtful, if they were not good. To have them such, you must seek for them: And if we have them not among ourselves, we may draw strangers by Privileges, in giving unto some according to their industry, some honest entertainment. To multiply the workmen, they may erect public houses of all sorts of Manufactures, as hath been propounded, in the which they may instruct the poor. And as this Establishment should be chiefly made in their favour, so the revenue of these houses may be taken upon that which is affected by the Cannon●, and ancient Ordinances for their Entertainment.  
Some one, to the end they may banish idleness, which is at this present in Monasteries, (many persons unfit for contemplation and study being therein, and many against their will) have propounded to restore the ancient Monastique discipline, which was to employ in certain works and manual Arts, at hovers of leisure: those that were not fit for study and preaching. The which did also multiply manufactures. Others have likewise been of opinion, to bind the Masters, who serve themselves with young Boys to cause them to pass a certain Age in learning of a Trade: And so by these means an Estate in less than twenty years, would be furnished with more workmen than were needful.  
The Comme●ce and Traffic which is made with the stranger, 
Commerce with the stranger causeth abundance in an Estate.  is the third point which produceth abundance in an Estate, for the settling whereof there are three considerations to be made. The first is of things which we are to carry, and not to carry to the stranger, The second is of things which we must receive from strangers, and their entry into our Estate; 
Three considerations for the Commerce.  or not to receive them and to banish the Commerce, The third is the facility and ease of Commerce accompanied with safety.  
The Merchandise which we ought to carry to strangers, 
Of Merchandise which we may and aught to carry to strangers. , with whom we have Comme●ce, are those whereof we have abundance: Of which after the Estate is sufficiently furnished, we may allow the trade. As contrariwise, those whereof we have want may in no sort be transported; nor in like manner those, whereof our Neighbours may make use to our prejudice; as Arms, Horses, Sails, and other things destinated to the●se of the Sea or War.  
The transport of Gold and Silver is likewise forbidden in all Estates; 
Of the transport of Gold and Silver.  but these prohibitions are very ill observed. And as they are necessary, to hinder the want of these metals, which are fought after by all Nations, deprive us not of the means to make use of them, for that they are hunted after by our Friends and Allies: So we must have a care, that it may not trouble nor altar the Commerce. And to speak truth, these defences thus general which they have made, are impossible in the execution, seekeing to maintain the Commerce with our Neighbour: Unless it be, that we forbid to Negotiate otherwise then by exchange, and permutation of Merchandise. The which may be practised, in regard of the Merchandise, which is not very necessary, and not in regard of those which are necessary for us, and whereof we cannot pass. We are forced to have recourse to our Neighbours, and to take a law from them, in either giving them other Marchandizes which may be a● necessary for them as theirs for us, or in paying them ready money.  
And in this last case many have held, that the safety which might be added, was, to allow of the transport of Gold and Silver, in giving caution to bring back within a certain time the quantity in Marchandizes, for the which the transport hath been allowed, the public having no interest therein; presupposing the necessity of this Merchandise, and that it cannot be recovered by exchange from another.  

Of raw stuffs.  Among those things which ought not to be transported out of an Estate, are raw stuffs; but not manufactures, for that you take the means from your workmen, to employ themselves and to live; and from your Estate the means to enrich itself by the means of manufactures, the which in certain works exceed the price of the substance. And they are so far from suffering these stuffs thus raw to go unto strangers: as the Estate which knows what belongs to husbandry, not satisfied with those which grow amongst them, draw them from their Neighbours, to put them in work, and by this means to enrich themselves, selling them thus wrought even to those who many times have sold them the said raw stuffs.  
Behold the things which we ought not to carry to strangers, by the which it is easy to judge of those, which we ought to desire they should bring unto us. For if we retain those things for the liberty which may come unto us, by the same reason, if we want them, we must seek the means to draw them from our Neighbours.  
And in regard of Gold and Silver, 
Of the beginning of strage Gold and Silver into an Estate.  the entire aught to be allowed: ut not the course of Foreign Coin among the people, for that there is not any assurance among Princes touching coins, every one seeking to deceive his companion, and to draw the Gold and Silver out of one another's Estate, 
That the course of foreign Coin ought not to be allowed in an Estate.  in raising the price of coins more than they are worth in their Neighbour's Estate, or in weakening the allay of their coins, the stamp, greatness, thickness, and weight, remaineing still the same. So as giving them entry, upon an opinion they have, that they are still according to the ancient standard, the people find themselves full, before the trial can be made, and the abuse discovered: The which if you think to remedy in decrying them, and causing them to be carried to the Mint, for the price of their bounty, your Subjects shall sustain a great loss. On the otherside if you suffer this abuse to continue, they will by little and little draw all the good coin out of your Estate, to reduce it to the weak Alloy of your Neighbours, and then return it unto you again thus satisfied. Wherefore to hinder this exchange of coin, they shall hinder the course of foreign coins among the people, to the end that they which have any, may carry them to the exchangers apppointed for that effect, who shall give them the value esteemed according to their interior bounty: And they carring them to the Mint, as they shall be charged: They shall also clip in pieces the foreign coin which they shall receive, in the presence of those that bring them, and they shall be converted into currant coin. So they need not to fear the falsifications of strange Coins, nor the raising of the Prince: And they shall not be able to draw your currant money out of your Estate, but in bringing Merchandise to the value.  

Merchandise whbreof we ought to s●op the entry.  The things whereof we must stop the Entry, and the Commerce in our Estate, are those which serve for ●yot and excess, the which is the chief means to impoverish an Estate; as precious stones, exquisite perfumes, spices, not much necessary, and stuffs, the which serve only for Pomp and show. But if the abuse be so inveterate, as we cannot hinder them by a prohibition, we must charge them with such great customs and imposts, as the stranger may have no desire to bring them, fearing he shall not retire his Silver, and the subject to buy it, in regard of the dearness. For although that some times this consideration doth not restrain the subject, from buying such Merchandizes; yet by this means he grows poor, the public shall be the more rich by the great imposts, the which shall supply the place of punishments for excess in private persons.   

CHAP. 41. Of the facility of Commerce.  
AS for the facility and ease of Commerce, it depends of many things, for the which it is needful to provide: And first for the commodity of the carriage of Merchandizes by Water▪ Land, Cart, or otherwise; 
The carriage of Merchandise.  They must provide to make the Rivers Navigable: The Ports safe, to keep the ways and passages in good Estate, and due reparation, and free from Pirates and thieves. Not to suffer any Monopole which may hinder the liberty of traffic: 
Monopolis forbidden.  And if it be discovered to punish it rigorously; to invite Strangers to bring us the Merchandise which we cannot want, 
Of the discharge of customs.  by the discharge of Customs and imposts, as much as the necessity of the Estate will bear.  
To Establish such Laws for affairs, 
Faith and assurance in affairs-Speedy justice..  as there may be faith and assurance amongst negotiators; and in case of difference, speedy and summary justice, especially in that which concerns strangers, who forbear to traffic in a place, no less in regard of the tediousness of Suits, as for the treachery of those of the Country. And for that a permutation cannot be made without a certain price set down upon Merchandizes, and that they cannot Negotiate with all sorts of people by exchange, but it is needful to make use of Money: The price and estimation thereof must be certain and firm; otherwise they should bring a confusion into the Commerce. But besides this, the interior bounty and value of this Coin must be easy to judge of, 
That Silver & Gold are sufficient for all sorts of Coin.  not only by the weight, but by the eye and sound if it may be. The which may be done, if they resolve to make use of the mixture of metals, no farther than it is necessary for a remedy; gold and silver sufficing to make all sorts of Coin.  
For in regard of the Coin, if they will not divide the mark of Silver into eight thousand pieces, as they have sometimes done in Lorraine, for the Angevines, which Rene Duke of Anjou and Lorraine caused to be coined, whereof the two hundred were worth but six pence, and forty a sauce of base French Money; they may reduce them to a third part thereof, to make the pieces more solid; which may be stamped with a bodkin; making no use of the Copper, whose price is unequal and variable in all Countries, and moreover is subject to rust.  
Contratiwise the price of gold & silver, 
The prize of Gold & Silver in proportion one of another  hath changed little, & they have inmpt'vsually in proportion, as one or two, little more or little less; & the mark of gold valued at twelve marks of silver. Herodotus writes, that in his time a pound of gold was worth thirteen pound of silver. I do not say, but there hath been some Ages and some Provinces, in the which Gold hath been dearer: But this hath not been general, nor of long continuance. Wherefore making the coins of one Mettle, and of a certain weight, greatness, thickness, and well coined in the form of a medaille that is cast; as the Grecians, Latins, Hebrews, Persians and Egyptians, in old time did: It would be a hard thing to be deceived.  
There is another thing, the which doth greatly decay trading, 
To bring Merchant's into credit.  which is, the contempt they make in many Estates of those which deal in it, holding this vocation to be sordid and base. So as they which have gotten a little wealth, retire themselves speedily, to embrace an other vocation, to the which the people carry more respect and honour, then to this.  
In truth we must confess, that there are certain affairs which should be left to the poor and common people, 
Trading at Sea profitable and honourable.  to enrich them. But there are others which they only can execute that are rich; as that at Sea, which is the most profitable in an Estate, and to the which they should attribute more honour than they do here: For i● in all Estates they have thought it fitting to invite the Subjects by honour to the most painful and dangerous Actions, the which might be profitable to the public; This being of that quality, they should propound and attribute more honours to those that shall deal in it. And if Nobility hath taken its foundation from the courage of Men, and from their valour; there is no vocation in the which there is so much required as in this. They are not only to encounter and strive amongst men, but sometimes against the four Elements together; which is the strongest proof that can be of the resolution of a Man. This hath been the occasion, that some hath been of opinion, that they should open this door to Merchants to attain to Nobility, so as the Father and the Son hath continued in the same trade; and to suffer Noblemen who are commonly the richest in an Estate, to practise themselves (without prejudice to their condition) in this commerce at Sea, which would be more honourable unto them, then to be usurers, or Banckers, as in Italy; or to impoverish themselves, in doing nothing but spend, and never gather. Hence will grow many advantages both to the public and private. To the public, 
Advantages which the public and private should receive if the Nobility gave themselves to the Commerce at Sea.  For that they that should deal in the commerce, having means, courage, and sufficiency for this conduct, it would be far greater, putting more Ships to Sea and better armed, whereof the Estate at need might might make use for its safety, and would carry the reputation of their Nation far. The which they cannot do, who being poor, and having no stock but from others, have not the courage to hazard themselves in a great enterprise. And for the particular, this commerce being wisely managed, what hazard soever they run, there is more to be gotten then lost: And if the Gentlemen apply themselves, without ruining themselves in expenses, or importuning the Prince with demands, they shall do more in one year at Sea, then in ten at Court. It avails not to say, That a Gentleman will sooner turn Pirate then Merchant. For holding that order which may be prescribed in their Embarking, they may so mingle them one with another, as it would be a difficult thing that all should agree to commit a villainy. Finally experience hath taught, and doth daily, that where the richest have dealt in this Commerce, it hath enrich both them, and the Estate under which they lived: And at this day the examples of the Venetians, portugals, Spaniards, and Hollanders have made it known unto us.  
These last being less rich than the others, 
And order settled by the Hollanders for the continuance of the●●r 〈◊〉 to the East Indies.  but not less courageous and hardy, have settled an order for the continuance of this commerce to the East Indies, which deserves to be known, which is, that after they have found by many voyages, which some private Men have made, that they ruined one another by this concurrence; they advised in the year 1602. to crave leave of the general Estates, to traffic into those parts before all others, during the space of one and twenty years. The which was granted them, in regard of five and twenty thousand Florins, which they promised to pay unto the Estate during the first ten years. Thus reduced all into one Company, Amsterdam had a Moiety, Middleburg in Zealand a fourth part; Delphe, Rotterdam, Horn, and Enehusen had either of them a sixth parth: And the whole stock of this union amounted to six Million of Livers, or six hundred thousand pounds sterling.  
For the direction of this trade, and the interest of the Associates, they have established in either of these Towns a certain number of Administratours: At Amsterdam twenty, at Miadleburg twelve, and in either of the rest s●auen. And if any one dies, the Chamber of the place names three, of which either the Estates general, or the Magistrate of the Town chooseth one.  
These Chambers, choose seventeen among the administratours: that is to say, Amsterdam eight, Midleburg four, Delphe, and Rotterdam two, Horn and Enchusen two; and the seventeenth is chosen alternatively, sometimes at Middleburg, and sometimes at North Holland: The which are called together to resolve jointly, of how many Ships, and with what Equipage and furniture, they shall make the fleet which they mean to send, and to what Fort or Coast they should go. This assembly is held six years together at Amsterdam, and afterwards two years at Middleburg, and then again at Amsterdam. By the conditions of the accord, the Ships must return to the same Port from which they parted; and the spices which are left at Middleburg, and other Chambers, is distributed amongst them by the weight of Amsterdam; and the Chamber which hath sold her spices, may buy from other Chambers.  
By this order they have hither to continued this Commerce with reputation, not as simple Merchants only; 
The great reputation which th●y h●ue gotten by the means of this Trade.  but as if they were Sovereigns, they have made in the name of the Estates an alliance with many Princes of those parts; As with the King of Sian, Quadaen, Patam, johor, the Heir of Malaca, Bornean, Achim, Sinnatra, Baretan, jocotra, and other Kings of jatta. They have made themselves absolute Masters of the Island of Amboyne, where they have settled a precedent which governs in their name. At Banda they have a Fort for a retreat, where they must deliver them the Spices at a certain price. In Ternate they have another, a Mile distant from that of the Portugals. At Magnien● they have three: At Motire one: At Gilolo they have taken that which the Portugels had built.  
From this example we will conclude, 
Means to settle the commerce at Sea in an Estate.  that the only means to settle the commerce at Sea in a Nation, in the which the best purses will not hazard themselves in these Erterprises; is to force the Merchants which trade at Sea in certain places, to join one with another, and not to make their traffic a part. For although that negotiating a part the gain would be the greater, when the Enterprise succeeds happily: yet we must consider, that the loss which may happen, would wholly ruin him that attempts alone: And if in making a Company the gain be the less, yet it is more assured; and the loss being borne by many, it is less to every one that is interessed.  
Thus dividing the Trade according to the Coast and places where it is made, they may make diverse Companies; that is to say, one for the Trade of Ginnee; Another for the Levant by the Mediterranean Sea; One for the East Indies; Another for the West Indies beyond the line; Another for that on this side the line; And one for England, Noruage, Sweden, and other Northern Countries: forbidding them to attempt one vpo● another, and to all other private Subjects which shall not be of the company, to negotiate in those places upon great penalties.   

CHAP. 44. Of Parsimony or sparing,  

That parsimony preserves the ●iches of an Estate.  AS abundance is the source and fountain of the riches of an Estate, so parsimony is that which preserves it, consisting in the cutting off of superfluous and unnecessary things, part whereof come from abroad: so as hindering the Entry of those, they shall provide in that regard for sparing. Eor if excess creep not in among the Subjects, the Stranger shall not grow fat, to the prejudice of the Estate, but the other Subjects shall taste of the advantage. Yet this is not to say, that excess is tolerable, although that nothing go out of the Estate, to the which the extreme poverty of some, and the great wealth of others may breed much trouble. But if some growing poor by excess, that which is lost, is divided into so many purses, as the public shall not be able to make use of the increase of their means, which ●eceiu● the advantage by this excess; this would be likewise worse: For the others remaining poor, it would be so much advantage lost for the Estate. Whereas if he that spends, retained his expenses within the bounds of necessity, and convenience without excess, he should be always found to have means to succour the public a●●eed. 
Parsimony imports ●uch ●or the ●a●ety of an Estate.  But this moderation doth likewise import much for the safety of the Estate. For great men being they which usually run into these expenses after they have ruined themselves, they are either a charge to the public to be maintained and entertained by it: or receiving nothing from the public, they abandon themselves most commonly to many innovations and erterprises prejudicial to the Estate. And therein some Princes are deceived, who hold it a greatness to entertain this excess in their Courts. 
Against excess  It is only mere vanity which ruins those which follow it, and deprives them of the means to continue the Service, which the Estate might expect from them, if they governed themselves otherwise: For that at the end of ten years at the most, a Gentleman grows so poor, as he is forced to retire, and to hide himself in his house, and most commonly much indebted, being no more able to show himself in the Equipage of others of his condition. Whereas if Princes restrained them, so as no man might spend more than his Revenues will bear, they should be served longer by their Nobility, and should not be so often importuned with demands, recompenses, and reproaches, that they are ruined in their service. Wherefore be it in regard of Strangers, or inconsideration of the Estate, they must cut off excess, but especially that which brings with it the ruin of people and of great families. 
When rei● excess death consist.  This Excess is principally in great and sumptuous buildings; in movables, apparel, and ornaments of the person; In the train of servants and attendants, in shows; in Banquets and Feasts, in Plays of show and hazard. For the first, it seems that the greatness and sumptuousness of buildings, 
O● excess in buildings.  turns in some sort to the benefit of the public, and that they ought not to forbid it, but rather invite every man to build for the ornament of Cities and Towns. But as a general prohibition would be something prejudicial to the public; so the free and indifferent toleration of this expense, is hurtful not only to the public but to the particular. It ought to be allowed to a great man, and a rich Subject, who hath few or no Children, to spare his Crowns, to employ them in the Ornament of the public. This cannot be termed Excess. Neither would I hinder many Treasurers and partisans, who have done their business with the public, and profited largely, to make the like expenses. But if in stead of building of private houses, they will raise some public Edifices, I would esteem them the more: But yet I would desire to add two restrictions; the one, that they should not build with any Materials, but such as are found in the Estate where they live: The other to forbid them guilding and enriching with Gold or Silver, which ought not to be allowed, yea, rather in public buildings, there being nothing that doth so much decay Gold and Silver in an Estate, as the like works.  
As for the common and private buildings, they may without this great expense provide in building for the ornament of the public, 
An order in the low Countries for buildings in Towns.  after the manner which they observe in many Towns of Flanders and the jowe Countries: where the order is such, that he which means to build, takes not only the plot from those which are deputed to that end by the Magistrate, but also the project of the front, or face of the building, the which must answer upon the street: The beauty whereof consists more in a certain proportion, then in any enriching either of stuff or workmanship: And it shallbe most commonly made according to the front of some near house, of small charge, according to the which they shall rule themselves for the height and fashion of the Doors, and other exterior parts. So as in succession of time all the houses of a Street (building according to this project,) are found alike, and by this resemblance and proportion, they are very pleasing unto the eye.  
From this policy there redounds unto them another advantage, which is, that the workmen by the establishing of this order, being advertised of the form how they are to make the Doors and other parts which must answer upon the Street; they have them ready long before: So as private men that will build, they have presently raised their houses, which are for the most part of brick, finding that little stone that shall be necessary ready cut. It is therefore easy to cut off this excess, and to provide for the ornament of Town●s, in restraining every man in his buildings according to his means, that the front may be answerable to the nearest houses, if there be observed in them any proportion or pleasing prospective: Making the public places spacious, the Streets large, strait, and long; yet in such sort as neither the great heat, nor cold may annoy passengers: for therein chiefly consists the beauty of a Town.  
The excess of movables, Apparel, and other Ornaments of the person, must in like manner be cut off; 
Of the excess of movables.  as precious Stones, Enamel, Embroideries, Stuffs of Gold and Silver, and all strange Manufactures of great price. If they will adorn themselves with Gold, they may allow it in chains without Enamel; in the which the loss cannot be great: For the which the Ordinances of France have well provided, and the Magistrates very ill.  
That excess which consists in a great train of attendants, is excused upon two considerations: 
Excess in a great train.  The one which regards the commodity of those that will be attended, the other upon the feeding and employing of many men, the which being poor, and having no employment, would be forced to steal or to dye for hunger, if they had not this retreat. In regard of the first consideration, if the number of Servants were regulated according unto the commodity, it were no excess: But to feed many unprofitable Mouths, which we might well spare without any want, it is vanity that makes us do it. As for the second, which is to employ many profitable persons to all other things, this is so●farre from doing good to the public, as by this retreat they invite many to be idle: which if they wanted, they would fall to learn some trade, or thrust themselves into the War and serve the public The Venetians, 
A g●od order made by the Venetians.  have better than any other provided for this point. For not able to regulate the number, which was necessary for the commodity of private persons, they have cut off that which served only for show, which is the atendants in public: Not suffering a Gentleman, how great and rich soever he be, to be followed with above two servants, giving him liberty to have as many in his house as he shall think good. The which is the cause, that not able to make use of this vain train in public, every man keeps but wh● he▪ needs in his house.  
But as the ordinance is more easy to execute in a Town, then in a Prince's Court, whore, for that the discommodities are greater, they have need to be served by a greater number, and must likewise satisfy the vanity of the Court: The Italians and Spaniards, who are in this regard good husbands, seeing themselves forced to this train for a time, make use of Men whom they retain with them, for daily wages; and knowing how much they are to give them by the day, they are not tied to seed them, nor to keep open house for them, as they do in France and Germany: And going from Court, this troop is dismissed, there remaining none but the ordinary train; and thus they satisfy vanity and good husbandry altogether. I confess that this point would be hard to reform in France, every Man desiring to eat his means in good Company. Yet there might be some course taken that might diminish their disorder.  
The excess of Banquets and Feasts, is that which is most esteemed, 
excess in Fe●st●.  especially among the Northern Nations: But in effect it is the most superfluous and beastly. I do not say but upon some occasion, as in public rejoicing & marriages, it is fit to make more expenses than we do in our ordinary cour●e of living; but yet we must fly superfluity, & provide principally for neatness, order, and seemliness, which must be regulated according to the number and quality of persons whom you treat. Wherefore it imports the Estate and private Men much, that this should be reform.  
In regard of Plays, those of hazard are forbidden in all Estates: But the defences are so ill observed, 
Excess of Play.  as many great families ruin themselves thereby. As for Plays of show, as Tilting, Attorneys, and Masques; those that may quicken the courage to Virtue, as the two first, ought not only to be allowed, but the Nobility should be invited unto it; yet so, as the expense may not seem greater than the valour; carrying such a moderation, as it may not ruin any Man; and in regard of those which have no other ground than vanity or love, and being apish followers, whereof most part of those which have employed themselves therein, have been afterwards ashamed; they deserve not only to b●e forbidden, but scorned at as ridiculous. Wherefore these doors being shut, by the which the faculties and means of private Men flow away incensably, there is no doubt, but those streams which run from this abundance, whereof we have spoken, will so swell, that when the public will make use, they may well do it without drawing private Men into necessity.  
These two foundations being laid, of the abundance of all things necessary, and of the parsimony of Subjects, we must now speak of the settling of the Finances, or ordinary Revenues, the which have been diverse according to the diversity of Estates.   

CHAP. 45. Of the Establishment of the Finances, or ordinary Revenues of an Estate.  
MAny have Established the principal revenue of an Estate, or public demesus, which is the most honest, 
Of the ordinary revenue of the Demesus and of its Estblishment.  the most just, and the most safe, there having been certain Lands and Demesus reserved, to be let out to farm, and given to particular men for a time or in perpetuity, in paying the Rents and Revenues, wherewith they had been charged towards the Prince. In some Estates this reservation hath been of a Moiety, in others of the third part of the territory, and in others of less.  
This Establishment is hard to make● unless it be by the means of a full and absolute conquest, by the which it is lawful for the Victor to prescribe what Law he pleaseth to the vanquished; but being once made, he must be maintained without any alienation; But likewise an engagement and no alienation, 
That an alienationis not to be allowed much l●sse an engagement.  for that the engagement in the end grows to be an alienation, by means of the necessity which the Prince hath always to be relieved upon new affairs which happen. So as he is so far from being able to redeem it, as he is pressed to make new engagements, the which being made for a far less value, than the alienation would be, the Prince finds himself deprived of his Revenues for a small release; and it may be said, that it had been profitable to sell, then to engage. But to do better, we must not allow neither to one nor the other: And if he cannot find money otherwise, he must not engage but the use of it for a certain time, the which expired, the Prince may re-enter into his Demesus.  
The second means, which they make use of to raise a stock of Treasure, are the entries, 
Entries and going forth o● the Estate.  and going forth to Merchandise, Havens and Ports, aswell upon strangers as the Subjects: An ancient and general course, iu●t, lawful and most profitable, with the conditions which we have mentioned speaking of Commerce; which are not to suffer the tra●ique of things which are necessary for life, until the subject be furnished, nor of raw stuffs, to the end the subject working them, they may draw profit from the manufactures: To suffer the traffic of those which are wrought, and the bringing in of that which is raw by strangers: But they must moderate the imposts, of necessary things, which are brought unto us from abode.  
Some likewise have esteemed Tributes, Gifts, 
Tributes, Gifts, and Pensions.  and Pensions, which they receive from strangers, for an ordinary Revenue. But this being not sufficient for the entertainment of charges, it cannot be called a stock of Treasury; although it may serve to increase the stock.  
The fourth means is in traffic which they may make in the name of the public or Prince. 
Traffic in the name of the public.  As there are many trades unworthy of a Prince or public, so there are some which require a great stock, the which may well be allowed them. Yet it would seem more profitable, in regard of the theft which Factors do commit, to give the money which they have in reserve, to those which traffic, 
To deliver mon●y at ●nterest to merchants.  upon good cautions and sufficient assurance, with a mean interest (as they say Augustus did) then to traffic. Hence would grow three or four advantages. The first it would increase the public money. The second, it would give means to private men to profit and gain: And the third, that they should save by this means the public money out of the hands of importune beggars, flatterers, and favourites; 
Of the ●ale o● Offices.  and prevent the facility of a prodigal Prince. There is another kind of traffic which is used in some Estates, the which is the sale of offices and public charges, which is not only dishonest, but most pernicious: And yet this abuse is gone so far, as this traffic Is not only received but carefully handled, as an ordinary stock of the Treasure.  

The source and beginning of this a●use.  To prevent it, it is necessary to know upon what pretext this abuse is crept in. As all new inventions are grounded upon public necessities; so this hath been advanced under this pretext. Seeing that in regard of the multitude, of those which might aspire to charges, Princes refer themselves to courtiers, and to such as were about them, to make choice of Officers; And Courtiers having no other aim, then to work their own ends, propounded unto Princes, those which promise them most money underhand, to be preferred before their Competitors: So as although the Prince did not sell the Offices, yet they were venal, the profit going to particular men that were about them: They found it more reasonable, seeing the abuse was such, and that growing from the ordinary carelessness of the Prince, it would be difficult to reform; that the public should the traffic, by the means whereof it might be eased in some other charges, then to suffer it to be done by private persons.  
In truth this mischief is less than it was, seeing the public profits something thereby; but yet not withstanding it is evil, and most prejudicial to the Estate: For the which there is more remedy, but to quicken the vigilancy of the Prince, or of those which have charge of the public, to make choice of those which are to be advanced: being more fit (for the Officers) to leave unto them the choice and the Election, to the end that gratifying him whom they hold most fit to serve, he should be more bound unto them, and show himself more obedient than he would be, if he had obtained it by his own merit, or for money. But for that it is impossible that the choice could be made in the confusion of so many Competitors, which might pretend to one Office: the Princes seeming to have some excuse therein, the means above propounded might serve for a Remedy, Establishing many degrees in the Offices of every profession, aswell in Arms, justice, the Treasure; as Religion; and prescribing a certaives time, that every one ought to remain in every degree, before he can pretend to mount higher; For that it would be more easy for the Prince, to choose out of the number of those which had served their time, him whom he pleaseth, to advance him to the next degree, there being some place void; than it is after the manner they now live. And for all this they should cut off nothing of the Prince's favour. 
Inconveniences which grow by the venallity of Offices.  For he that is thus advanced, should be only bound to him and not to any other. Whereas having no means to be known unto the Prince but by the mediation of other persons, whose knowledge he hath bought for ready money; he is many times more obliged to the Groom then to the Master, for the favour he receiveth; but much more to his purse: And by little and little the affection of Officers, towards the Prince, is lost by these courses, there being none of all those which practise these means, but blames them, and esteems the Prince less which suffers them, then if they proceeded another way.  
The Prince should be better served, not only with more affection and fidelity; but also with more diligence and sufficiency. For the Officers coming to the highest and supreme degrees, they would be much more capable, as hath been said; And every Man desiring to make himself known to his Prince, to be preferred before his Companion, would serve with envy, and endeavour to make himself to be observed by some service. Whereas the Officer in this venallity, having no other hope to advance himself then by his purse, seeks what he can to profit, be it by right or wrong, to have means to purchase some greater Office, wherein he may benefit himself better. But we will leave this reformation to another time, when they shall be more capable.   

CHAP. 46. Of Subsedies, of Extraordinary Levies, Imports, and Loane●.  
THe fist means to make a stock for the Treasure, is taken wholly from the subjects; whom they have shorn after diverse manners in many Estates, and in some they have flayed them. This means cannot be excused but upon necessity: But if it be necessary it is likewise just; the safety of the people and the preservation of the Estate being the Supreme Law.  

Of Subsedie●.  The most ordinary manner to levy upon the Subject, is by way of Subsidy, for the goods which he enjoys; the which also hath been diversely practised, according to the diversity and condition of subjects and goods. Clergy M●n and the Nobility in some places, are exempted with their goods, 
divers forms of Subsedies and Leu●es.  of what condition soever they were. In other places they made the Subsedies real, exempting the Feodall, or noble-lands; the persons aswell of Nobles as ecclesiastics, having submitted themselves to contribute for their rural goods which they possess▪ In some Estates and other places they have exempted the Nobles and ecclesiastics, & the lands which they held in their own hands; but they have not exemptted their Farmers.  
To dispute which is the most just of all these forms of Levies, were unprofitable. For this Establishment hath not been made according to the rules of judgement; but according to the facility and disposition which they have found in people, to receive one form more th●n another. Yet if any aught to enjoy an exemption, it seems that Gentlemen, 
Of those which ought to be exempted from Subsedies.  who are bound to a personal service, and to contribute for the defence of the Estate, not only their goods but also their lives, may with justice be exempted from this kind of imposition; seeing that the burden which is imposed upon them, is much more grievous and heavy then that of the Cannons.  
In regard of Clergy men, the respect and reverence of Religion hath held them long exempt: But in the end in those places especially, whereas the Subsedies are personal, justice hath wrested out of their hands, some succours for the public, whereof they make a great part; which succours, although they be not called Subsidy, but a chautative grant; Yet vnder● a milder name it hath the same effect. As for others, some have been exempted, partly to preserve the respect due unto the Offices which they hold of the Prince; and partly to authorise and maintain the Levies, and to punish the disobediences. Others have been exempt, for the fear of some sedition and Rebellion, and for the good of peace only: So as they use the like policy with them, as they do with the Clergy; and draw Succours from them under the Names of Loans and borrowing.  
As for the place where the Subsidy is to be levied, either at the Man's dwelling house, 
Of the place wh●re they are to make the levy of the Subsedies.  or at the place where his Lands and Goods lie: Many hold opinion, that the most just were, to levy the Subsidy in every place, where the man that is subject to the Subsidy hath goods, by reason of the frauds which are committed usually by such as have goods in many places who se●ing themselves charged at the place of their abode wi●h a great Subsidy, proportionable to the estimation of their goods, retire themselves either to a Town that is freed from Subsedies, or into some place where they pay not so much; whereby their Subsidy is laid upon others. But if the Subsidy were laid upon their goods, they should cut off this abuse, which doth much import the poor people.  
These difficulties are found in the laying of the Subsidy, as well in regard of the exemptions pretended by many conditions of men, 
Introduction of tolles, tributes, and imposts.  as for the inequality and disproportion in the laying thereof among such as are subject: and the faculties of every one upon whom it should take hold, being unknown, it had ministered occasion to seek many other courses, and to impose many duties sometime upon proprieties, sometime upon Legacies, and testamentory successions, left to strangers; upon carriages as well by water as land; upon Wine, Meal, Salt, and other Merchandise; upon Contract, Seales, Weights, and Measures: Of which tolls every man insensibly pays his part; the Merchant making the advance of those which are levied upon the Merchandise, the which he retires afterwards from particular persons which they buy of him.  
Yet some which disallow of this diversity of poling and tributes in an Estate, holding a Subsidy the most just, if it were well ordered, 
Introduction for the numbering of goods.  have thought to bring in a certain and settled order, whereby they might regulate themselves in drawing from every man the number of his goods. This order hath been practised in many Commonweals; but never more happily, nor with more advantage to the Estate, then in that of Rome.  
To say that this expedient is more proper for a Commonweal, 
Practised by the Romans.  then for a principality, there is little colour, seeing that when it was established at Rome, the Estate was governed by King Servius Tulliu●; and continued under all the Emperors which sought to govern justly. 
Abolished by Ty●ants.  And chose the Tyrants which sought by the means of a small number to govern, tread under foot, and oppress others, to enrich some, and to impoverish others; Finally, to turn all topsy turvey, for that they would not discover their Injustices, violences, and tyrannies; have neglected this order, laying their exactions with more impunity upon the weak, then if they were divided among them all with a just proportion.  
To say likewise, 
Imaginary inconveniences of the numbering of goods.  that it were a hard matter to expose the poverty of some to scorn and contempt, and the wealth of others to envy; it is a very bad reason to hinder a good establishment: For never man of understanding, in that which concerns his good, made any account of envy or scorn. But besides this we may say, that on the other side envy would cease against such whom they held rich, and have nothing; and the scorn against such as have some wealth, who notwithstanding were held poor. It is certain that the deceitful Merchant, who hath a design to steal the goods of another by playing bankrupt, will say, that it is not good they should know the course, traffic, and negotiations of Merchants, which consist many times in papers and credit; nor that they should discover the secrets of Houses and Families. But he that is an honest man, and will be known for such, for a good husband, and not a deceiver, will ground his credit upon his Discretion, and not upon the uncertainty of his affairs; and will always take delight, they should know his estate and manner of living: And there is no man which doth not more willingly lend an ear to a poor man, who shall be known for an honest man, and a good husband, then to a rich, which shall be held for a bad husband, and of little faith.  
But in recompense of these imaginary inconveniences, 
Advantages which will come unto the ●st●●●▪  an infinite number of advantages redound to the Estate, by the establishment of this order. For thereby they should know who are prodigal, bankrupts, cozeners, and Usurers; how some gain so much, and others spend: And moreover, the penalties of judgements and condemnations, would be easy to regulate by the judges, according to the ability of every man's estate. The deceits which are practised in Marriages, Sales, Bargains, and in all public and private negotiations, would be discovered and known: An infinite number of frauds which are used touching Successions and portions, would be averred, without inquiery, or rather charges of Law; and they should prevent falsehoods and false Witnesses, which are practised daily. But besides these advantages, to return where we left, the facility wou●d be great in a necessity to draw succours from the Subjects without injustice, not oppressing one more than another; as it falls out usually, some bearing the whole burden, and others being discharged.  
This facility of extraordinary levies is the fourth point; which may cause an Estate to be held rich. 
Of extraordinary levies.  For we shall in vain brag of the abundance of an Estate, and of the ordinary stock of the treasure: the which as we have ●ayd, how great soever it be, may be exhausted, and sometime engaged, if the public in an urgent necessity may not be relieved by some extraordinary levy, which may be done without Injustice, discontent, or insupportable oppression of any part of the Subjects, which would draw after it revolts, seditions, and intelligences with the Enemies.  
T●is numbering of their goods being unable to be brought in, to equal every man in such sort of contributions, they must have a recourse to other means, the most just and plausible that can be devised, according to the quality of Estates, and the condition of times, the which being unable to set down now in particular, it shall suffice to say general, that the imposition which extends itself universally o●e● all the Subjects, of what condition soever they be, is the most gentle, the most profitable, and the most just: For that every man paying, every man pays the less, then if it were levied of a less number; and yet it is far greater; wherein it is more profitable to the Estate: And it is more just, for that every man having an interest in the preservation of the Estate, every one is likewise bound to contribute. But the principal part of justice would be● if it be proportioned and laid equally among them that contribute, according to the proportion of every man's estate; If the levy be made without rigorous executions, especially against the person. The contrary whereof doth usually happen upon levy of the Subsedies, the which being imposed upon view of the Country, as they say, and without any certain ground, the goods of every man being unknown to direct them, and levying it upon the poorest, they cause them many times to dye in Prison, which is a poverty resenting Barbarism: Or to get some delay of payment, the poor man must satisfy the Avarice of Receivers, and Sergeants, which ruin him by such concussions, the which many times exceed the principal of the Subsidy.  
But if some considerations be just, to exempt certain conditions of persons, 
Of casual impositions.  or that making the imposition general, some trouble is to be feared▪; they must have recourse to those that are casual As after the Civil Wars at Rome, they settled the twentieth part of Successions and Legacies, which were left to Strangers or Collaterals. And before in the time of War likewise, at the request of the Consul Manlius, they ordained the twentieth part of enfranchised men.  
In Scotland Malcolana having sold all the Kings Demesus, the Estates of the Country agreed, that the Fees changing hand, should pay unto the King a certain right of redemption.  
Impositions likewise and customs may be justly 
Of customs & impo●itions.  laid upon all that which may corrupt the manners of the Subjects, either to contain them, or to han●sh th●m away. This re●son was the cause that in some Estates they have charged suits with diverse duties; and in others they have only punished them that fled from them, imposing great amercements upon them that sailed; and in others they have punished rash pleaders, which lost their causes; as at Athens and Rome. Those likewise which may be established without opposition, which come from some Body united and of authority, may be received for the facility of their establishment, to the which they have many times more regard in such things, then unto justice.. But if the necessity be such, as they must provide a speedy remedy, and that they cannot attend the time, which would be necessary for the establiment, and the levy of an imposition: there is no other means, then to make use of voluntary borrowing●, upon those that are best able, 
Of voluntary borrowing.  whom they shall pay at a prefixed time without sailing, to the end they may maintain the credit of the public, and that whensoever the like necessity should happen, they might find the purses of private men open to succour him. But if he cannot find money without interest, he must to the end to stay the course, provide for the payment both of principal and interest by the same assignation, the which shall be delivered into the hands of such as lend, as well being assured by this means of their due, they might lend another time more freely: As for fear, that this assignation remaining in the hands of those which manage the business, it should be otherwise disposed of, whereby the the Prince should not only ●oose his credit, but should find himself at the end of the time charged with great interest.   

CHAP. 47. Of the managing and good husbandry of the Treasure: That is to say, of the ordering of the expenses, and the cutting it off.  
THe ground of the Finances being found, we must order the managing, which consists in two principal points. The one concerns the husbanding of it, the other the quality of the persons which are to be admitted to this managing. The husbanding hath two parts, that is to say, the order and governing of the expenses, or if it exceeds the receipt, the cutting off part of the charges.  
Touching the order of the expense, if in all things that which concerns God, is to be preferred, 
Of the order of the expenses.  the same must likewise be observed in the Treasure. Wherefore the first Chapter of the expense, must be of Alms, wherein he may not be sparing. 
Alms.  The Kings of France have had goodly examples in St. Lewis, who founded and endowed Twenty eight Bodies or Colleges, as the Signior of I●inuille saith; And had daily in his train one hundred and twenty poor, 
Charities of the King St. Lewis:  and in Lent two hundred and forty, feeding them with meat from his Table. So he lived in great honour, feared of his Enemies, reverenced by his Friends, adored by his Subjects, and after he had Reigned Forty four Years, he left two Sons, whose posterity have Reigned, and do yet over the French; and his Realm exceeding rich, and flourishing to his Successor, recommending especially unto him, that he should be devout towards Almighty God, and charitable unto those who are poor and miserable. Alms do never impoverish an Estate, 
Alms do never impoverish  nor a family, but chose they every them with all sorts of blessings.  
The second Chapter of the expense must be the freeing of the charges of the Estate, 
The freeing of charges necessary for the Estate.  but first of those which are necessary for its safety; as the pay of Soldiers, Munitions, Artillery, Ships and Vessels of War, Repayrations and Fortifications of Towns and important places, entertainment of Spies, and finally all the Expenses, aswell ordinary as extraordinary, necessary to warrant the Estate, against the invasion of strangers, or the revolt of Subjects. 
Of the Fees of officers and debts.  Next must follow the Fees of Officers, especially of those, by whose means they hold the rest in their duty and obedience, these making a part of the safety. Then follow the debts, which I place next to the necessary charges for the safety: For that if by the means of these charges, the Estate be not secure, the debts cannot be assured.  

Recompenses to the discharge of the Treasure.  After these come Recompenses; with which they shall not charge the Treasure as little as may be, for the which the King must bestow Offices and Dignities, and accustom all the great Men not to seek any other kind of Recompense, which is of most share and more durable, then that which is made by money. For a Prince which advanceth some one to hon●r that hath done him service, 
Th●●e which are made by offices and dig● ni●es are to be p●●erre● before that which is done by ●oney.  he publisheth the merit of him whom he recompenseth, and his favour withal, the which remains continually in the mind of him that receives it; And it lasts as long in the minds of the people, as they see him, who hath received it in this degree: And moreover the remembrance which they have, to have seen a Man gratified for his merit, many by this means are invited to serve, seeing services so honourably rewarded▪ whereas to recompense in money, few know it, and the grace many times continues no longer than the money lasteth.  
The Prince may likewise recompense his servants, to the discharge of his Treasure, in procuring either for them or theirs, marriages and alliances of advantage; Not thereby to force his Subjects, for that were tyranny: But he that sees himself debarred of the Prince's favour, is glad sometimes to approach by the means of the alliance of one, that is in grace with his Master, though otherwise inferior in means, and family; Especially when the inequality is not such, as he may receive some dishonour by the alliance. Knowing then how to husband these kind of recompenses, the greatest part of great services will be rewarded; and recompenses of small services will be of so little moment, as they will not greatly charge the Treasure.  
After recompenses follow gifts, the which must not be done at pleasure: 
Gifts and gratifications.  But as recompenses are made for services done, gifts must likewise be for services, according to the quality and importance thereof, as also to the quality, sufficiency, and power of the person, the Prince must moderate his bounty, 
A Prince must give to many little and often.  and give not to one alone, but to many, little, and often. I say to many, for that in giving to one alone, the envy is great, the grace little, and the ingratitude of him that rece●ues, may one day be hurtful. I say little and often, especially in money, which is soon consumed, for that the great expense in gifts waste the Treasure, and accustom those that receive them, to moderate demands. Small bounties often reitterated, are as it were insensible; the grace is the more durable in the minds of those which receive them, and the desire and hope in continuing the service to receive daily, bind Men the more. I except the gifts that are made to Ambassadors and Foreign Princes, the which are done for reputation, and to show the magnificence of him that gives them, or of his Estate, and may in no sort be omitted where they have been accustomed.  

* Election of public houses and Seminaries for instruction of youth, aswell in the liberal Arts as Mechanic.  The expense which follows, is that which hath been propounded by some, for the breeding up and instructing of youth, to that whereunto they shall be found fit, (especially the poor) as we have formerly said, by the Erecting of public houses, for manual Arts, and all sorts of manufactures: Whereunto may be added the building of Seminaries for piety, and the study of Divinity, 
Seminaries of piety.  and other learned vocations; and some for the exercises of honour and virtue of the Nobility. In many Estates they have provided a great number of Seminaries, for piety and the sciences; but the greatest are so ill governed, as they are become unprofitable, by the disorder which is found in them.  

Seminaries of honour for the instruction of Gentlemen.  As for Seminaries of honour and virtue, I mean those places which are destinated for the instruction of the Nobility, which are to be employed in Arms; in long and dangerous voyages; and in the managing of public affairs: Whereof hitherto they have made small account. And yet the safety and reputation of an Estate, especially of a principality, consists in those of this condition: Who, if with that greatness of courage, which is not natural unto them, they join industry and prudence, which may be gotten by exercises and instructions, fit for their profession; there is no doubt but many would have been more capable to serve the public, than they are.  

The profit of th● said Seminaries of honour ●or the Estate.  It were a great Art both of policy and wisdom, if the Prince should cause the young Gentlemen of his Estate to be bred up in those places, whose Fathers have not the means to undergo the charge of such an instruction, as is necessary for them of this condition: And there to entertain them at the charge of the public, unto a certain Age, to ●e distributed & do service in the troops and garissons, affecting centaine places of honour unto them, with suffi●●●●●●●terta●ment, to the which they may be advanced a●●r they have se●ued some time. For besides that these M●n, governing all the affairs of the Prince, they would be more faithful unto him: The Gentlemen who find themselves burdened with many children, and who for fear to leave them miserable, become house-doves, to husband both their lives and goods, would hazard the one and the other freely for the Prince's service, and not be diverted for the care of their Children, whom they knew could not one day fail of preferment, aswell by reason of the institution, as for the beginning of employment for the Prince's service, which should be assured unto them. And the charge which should be made in these Seminaries, would be recompensed by the service, which the whole Nobility, would be thereby invited to do, willingly and freely to the public: And the troops, especially those of Foot, would be found with more order, discipline, fidelity, and courage, being filled with young Men of good houses, bred up with honour and obedience, than they now are, being for the most part Men of no moment, Riotous, and drawn together from all parts.  
After all these expenses, come those which may serve either for the commodity, 
Expenses for the commodity and decoration of Town and Provinces.  or the decoration of Towns and Provinces; as conduits of Water, structure of Bridges, reparation of ways, Churches, Royal Palaces, Pyramids, Tombs, Statues, Colosses, and other public buildings: But with this restraint, never to enter into those expenses, until the sparing of the some which is necessry, be first made. For to multiply the Subsedies, to make Palaces, more stately than necessary, were to leave a remembrance of his tyranny, and a perpetual testimony to posterity, that they have built with the blood of the Subjects.  
Behold the principal husbandry which consists in the order of the expense. 
Cutting off Expenses.  But the stock of the Treasure being not sufficient, to bear all these charges, most part of which seem necessary; they must seek the means to raise the Farms, and fall to the cutting off of debts, especially of interests, of Fees, and of excessive gifts, rather than to come (as they have done in many Estates) to make new impositions. In an Estate where the Prince finds himself ill assured of the will of his prime Men, they have observed the course which Eumenes used, to borrow of those that were ill affected, to the end that interessing them in the Estate, and the loss thereof, for fear of losing their debt they help to maintain it. But if they find some hindrance to assure themselves elsewhere, this means would be but weak. Wherefore a Prince must never borrow, unless it be in an urgent necessity: For there is nothing that doth so much harm to a bad husband, (as the public is many times) than credit.  

Of the justice and necessity of cutting off of debts.  I know that many hold, that this cutting off of debts or wages is unjust: as in truth it is, if the Estate hath wherewithal to pay: But if the sparing of the ordinary Revenue be not sufficient to satisfy, the necessity makes this cutting off necessary and just. For to satisfy it by a new imposition, were to repair one injustice by another more general, & to draw most commonly from the poor to give unto the rich; in which cutting off part of the interest of debts, will not prejudice so much, although it be great, as a subsicy would do the Poor. I do not say, that among those to whom the Prince is indebted, there may be some one found, to whom this cutting off would be hurtful: But for one of that quality among the Prince's creditors, there would be five hundred of the poor reduced to beggary, if they should by that means pay the debts due by the Estate: the which I understand of Estates which are already overcharged with great impositions, and likewise with great debts.   

CHAP. 48. Of those which ought to be employed in the government of the Treasure.  
AS for the quality of those to whom the managing of the Treasure ought to be committed, 
Of the choice they ought to make of those which are to manage the Treasure.  if Men could be known, there is not any one, but would make choice to deliver it into the hands of the most loyal: But making this choice most commonly by hazard, I say that although we suppose him to be an honest Man, to whom we will give this charge; yet we must not take neither a poor Man nor a needy, nor one that is too powerful, nor of too great authority. The first for fear that through necessity he be not invited to rob us; and the other least that he steal from us too boldly, and having robbed us, we are not able to call him to an account, and to punish his thefts.  
There is beside this an ordinary fault which is committed in this subject in many Estates, which is, that they make a trade of it apart, and profession of the managing of the Prince's purse. So as he that enters into it, instructs himself as to an Art to do his own business; the which he cannot do but with the prejudice of the public: Thus the elder they grow, the more learned they are, that is to say prejudicial to the Estate. I do much commend that ancient custom of the Romans, 
A commendable custom of the Romans.  to employ young Men in the managing of the Treasure, before they advanced them to any other Offices: For this is to give them occasion to show their discretion, and for the hope to be one day something more, to encourage them to do their duties well, and to manage the public Revenues. Besides, this youth is less avaricious than another Age, and more innocent, and less hardy in deceits, easy to be discovered: 
Youth more fit for the mamnaging of the Treasure then Age.  So as the Romans leaving them but a short time in these charges, to be advanced to other honours, they came forth more innocent than they entered.  
To say that a long experience is necessary in these places, to manage them well, 
That experience is not so much necessary.  this were to endear the trade. The greatest policy in the Treasure to serve the public, is to have no other but discretion; and to know how to write down that which he receives and pays; to recover that which he receives not, having charge to make the recovery, and to follow exactly the commandments and ordinances of those which have power to ordain. There is no factor in a shop but understands this. But I will confess, that to know how to steal from the public cunningly, and to cover and disguise his thefts, he must have a long experience of ill doing, be it to defend the falsehood of an acquittance, of the omission of a receipt, of a false reprisal, of a disguising of parties, and a secret composition with those that are to receive; with other courses ordinary to those which deal in this trade; Not meaning to tax honest Men.  
Some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts, and to hinder them that they may not maliciously (as it often happens) make reprizes, 
A form to regulate Accomptants.  or to ease some more than others, or to use it for their own particular, or for some other design; have held it fit to regulate their Fees proportionably to that which they are to receive, and to diminish them, according unto that which they shall leave in reprizes, to the end that being interessed in their own particular, they would be more exact to make their receipts. Others have given their receipt to make the abatments, with charge to make it good, and not to bring in any not soluable: The which would seem more just.  
As for those which ought to hear and examine the accounts, besides the choice that they are to make, of the honestest men for this ●ffect; it is necessary to bind them, to judges according to certain forms and orders, which have been held fit to hinder the abus●s which accomptants, or themselves might commit: And especially to draw particular Notes of the distribution of the Treasure, which they shall enjoin the accountant to verify, upon those of the receipt and expense, without any means of dispencing, for any occasion whatsoever; but afterwards he may address himself unto the Prince, if there be any reason to ●ase him.  
But as the Prince is not always at leisure, 
Of Accounts and of those which are to hear and examine the Accounts.  nor sometimes of experience to regulate & direct his own affairs; and that moreover, he is importuned by an infinite number of beggars, whom if he should satisfy, his Treasure would be found too short: To free himself of the hatred, which the denial of so many demands might purchase him, and to discharge himself of the importunity; the custom is to send such suitors to a Council consisting of rough and severe men, more inclined to refuse then to grant; and who know how to moderate the denials which they make, as they do not deprive those which are refused of all hope, to be satisfied in some other thing: For rough and contumelious denials, may distaste many, from employing themselves in the Prince's service, although the Prince make not the denial: For that as they love the dog for the Master's sake, it falls out often, that when the dog bites too sharply, in the end they take exceptions at the Master.   

CHAP. 49. Of the Exchequer or sparing of Treasure.  

Considerations which makes the ●eaping up of Treasure hurtful to a Public.  THere remains to speak of the Exchequer, the which some have held hurtful to the public, even that which is made to heap up Treasure, drawing apart great sums of Gold and Silver, God forbidding it Deutr●nomy. This many times hath caused some to attempt against Estates: As the son of Tygranes, who besieged Sop●one, a Town in Armenia, which Pompey's Army, to have his Father's Treasure. Moreover this gathering together ruins the Commerce and traffic of the Subjects; and doth not hinder the ruin of the Estate, when as the affairs are thereunto disposed. Sardinapalus l●ft forty Millions of Gold to those which slew him. Darius' left fourscore to Alexander who vanquished him. And many times the Father, who leaves much Gold and Silver to the Son, leaves him withal a speedy means to ruin him. For a young Man relying upon his Treasure, thrusts himself into impossible erterprises, which are above his fo●ces; hates peace; contemns the friendship of his Neighbours; Enters into War not only unnecessary ●nd of little profit, but also hurtful.  
Yet custom is contrary, as also reason, if we had the consideration of heaping up of Treasure: For that to gather together money when as necessity doth press, that were too late: For that the bruit of Arms, causing traffic to ●●ase, Tillage, and the gathering in of fruits, the customs and imposts by consequence would decay; and the Subjects (impoverished by the lodging of soldiers, ●●d the holding of the Fields) will be unable to p●y.  
But there must be two considerations added for the gathering in of Treasure. 
Considerations necessary for the gathering of Treasure.  The one to make it equal to the other forces of the Estate, that is to say, of persons, whom we may employ, and of Munition of Victuals and War, which are necessary for us; whereof we must make a Magazine or store-house before we gather Treasure. For to hope that without it, the Treasure alone which we gather will preserve us from ruin, were a vain thing; and the examples above mentioned show it sufficiently. The other considerations is, not to draw together so much Gold and Silver, as it may incommodate the commerce and traffic of the Subjects: For this were to dry up the spring of the Treasure. If the Sea should retain all the waters of the Rivers which disgorge themselves into it, and not return them to their fountains, by conduits under ground; it would dry up the Rivers, and in the end grow dry itself. Wherefore they which will show any discretion in heaping of Treasure, 
Prudence and discretion necesary for the gathering ●f Treasure.  have considered in gross the quantity of money, which goes forth and enters yearly into an Estate: And if there enters more than goes forth, they have held that a Prince might lawfully, and without any interest of the commerce, lay up yearly in his Exchequer, as much Gold and Silver, as the entry exceeded the going forth. But if the entry hath not exceeded the going forth, they have held and with reason, that the Prince ought not to lay up any Treasure.  
But in this case there is another Remedy, of which we have formerly made mention▪ which is, that af●er necessary charges are paid, 
A remedy to the end that sparing m●y not hinder the Commerce.  the Prince having means to spare something for his need, he may distribute it upon moderate in●erest to the Merchants of his Estate, taking necessary security, (as we have said Augustus did) to yield it at a c●rtaine time. For in this manner, the assuranc●s being good, this supply would be as ready as if it were in his Coffers: And the interest being such as the Marchan● may gain thereby, the commerce is no way diminished by this sparing, but rather augmented, and the Subjects and Prince enriched by this means.  
But men have been much troubled for the guard of Treasures of Gold and Silver. 
Difficulties for the keeping of th● Trea●ure of Gold and Silver.  The Kings of Peru, kept it in great Massies, of Gold and Silver: The Romans in Lingotis in the form of Tiles; The Kings of Morocco caused Massy Bowls to be made, which set upon the top of their Mosques or Temples; Some (to be guarded more religiously) have put them into Churches. As the guard in a Commonwealth is not uneasy, so in a Principality or Monarchy it is most difficult. For they have not so much cause to guard it from thieves, as from their own Princes, who for their private pleasures, or by the importunity of some flatterers, scatter that in one year, which their predecessors have gathered in many. So Caligula spent in one year, seventy and seven Millions of Gold, which Tyb●rius (as they write) had drawn together: And Carcalla consumed in one day, that which Severus his Father had spared in Nineteen years.  
Wherefore as it is most fitting, that few men should know what is laid up in the Treasure, lest that being too much, it should provoke some through Envy to se●ke to get it; or being too little, it should make us to be contemned of our Enemies: So many have held it fit▪ to ordain not to touch the Treasure, but in the great necessity of the Prince and State, and by the Council of the Magistrates, of greatest authority.   

CHAP. 50. Of treaties in general, be it for the interview and parley of Princes, or by their Deputies and Ambassadors.  
EStates are like unto buildings raised high, 
O● the car● & ●●●●ging of 〈…〉.  the which although they be built of good materials, and strong Walls, yet to subsist long, they have need to be supported and underpropt without with Buttresses, Pillars, and Arches; For that being threatened as well without as within, they must be rampired against all forces. Wherefore the care of the affairs of Strangers, especially of his Neighbours, is most necessary for a Prince, and for any man that shall be called to the Rule or Government of the Estate.  
This Care consists in three principal points. 
How a Prince should governs himself with his neighbour's.  The first is how he shall govern himself with his Neighbours. The second consists in gaining some credit among them, to have a part in their deliberations. The third and last, being unable to pass without them, to get means to pierce into their Designs. The manner how to govern himself with his Neighbours, depends of the manner of treating with them, and of the observation of treaties, according unto the which he must govern himself. The manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of persons and of affairs. Yet there are some general considerations which deserve to be known.  
The first is in the overture, which is made to treat, it many times happening, 
Ge●●●●ll considerations 〈◊〉 th● manner 〈…〉.  that of two Princes which are Enemies, the one will not seek unto the other for an Accord, so as the overture must be made either by some greater Prince, or by some Neighbour that is a Friend to both: and sometimes the Ministers of two Princes meeting accidentally together, if they be employed. Argenion, and a Steward to the Duke of Mantova, meeting at Creal Carragio, to condole in their Master's names for the death of marquis of Montferrat, made an overture for the treaty of peace, betwixt Charles the eight and Lewis Sforse. King Ferdinand of Arragon hath employed Monks to that effect, Religion giving a free access to those of this condition, and liberty to speak and propound what they will. The Overture to enter into treaty being made, the Princes resolve to parley themselves, to the end the treaty may be more secret; or they depute Ambassadors to that effect.  
Many have not allowed of this Interview of Princes, although they were Friends: 
Of the interview o● Princes, where th●y may be a●●pt●●e o● the ●●●●ndship and good 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 ●●m●●●y 〈◊〉.  And particularly Philip de Comives, observes many examples of the meeting of Princes, who being formerly good Friends, have become enemy's after this Interview. Yet I hold that in such affairs we cannot prescribe a certain and general Rule; Histories teaching us, that other Princes have parled; and yet no hatred hath ensued: So this depends rather of the Estate of affairs, and of the conformity and diversity of humours, and manner of li●i●g, of the Princes and their people, then of the Interview. That of Lewis the twelfth of France, and of Ferdinand of Arragon at Savonne, passed fairly: As also that of the Emperor Charles the fifth, with Pope Clement the seventh at Bolonia; and that of the same Pope with Francis the first. 
A Prince be●●●chc p●●he●●ust h●ue a c●r● not to procure E●●y or ●●alous●● ag●●● h●m, no● 〈…〉.   
But it shall be discretion in a Prince, before he comes to that, to consider, if at this parley there may not something fall out that may breed jealousy or envy against him, or that may draw him into contempt of him with whom he treats. The Emperor Maximilian the first, having appointed a place and Day to parley with King Lewis the twelfth, came to the assignation. But fearing that he should not appear so well accompanied as Lewis the twelfth, whose train was in better order than the Germans, he anoyded this Interview, which might have bred some contempt of him and his with the French; and sought a pretext before he parted, or the King arrived, excusing himself upon the War which the Venetians made in Friuly, whether it was necessary for him to transport himself speedily. The place of parley is likewise v●ry considerable, as well for the safety, as for the honour which he receives, whom they go to find in his own Palace.  
The consideration of the safety is commonly the principal. And the distrust which King Francis the first had, 
Of safety.  that under pretext of a parley with the Emperor Charles and the Pope, whereunto he was invited during the hostage of his two Sons in Spain) they would retain him, made him refuse to come. The same consideration hath sometimes been the cause, that two Princes being Enemies, have parlyed upon a Bridge, made to that end upon a common River, with bars and shutting betwixt them; lest that the Princes which parley, or those which follow them, falling into contestation for something, should not attempt one against the other: As it happened at the parley betwixt Charles the seventh, than Dolphin, and the Duke of Burgundy, who was slain by Tann●quin Du Cha●tel: which was the cause that this manner of parling was observed between King Edward of England and Lewis the Eleventh. But Lewis Sforse having demanded to have the same▪ form observed and kept, being to parley with Charles the Eighth in his return from Naples, they refused him, as to one who ought not to treat with the King as an Equal, to whose fidelity he did wrong, to demand such assurances. Yet this hath no certain Rules: But they govern themselves in such things according to the confidence which they may take one of another.  
The ordinary course is to choose for these Interviews, either a neuterall place belonging to some common Friend; or a place upon the frontier, or an Island; to regulate the number of those which shall accompany the Princes: And if the jealousy be great, they may specify the Arms, which every one may carry in these Interviews.  
But if of two Princes, the one goes home unto the other, he is bound to do him the honour of his House: And if the Prince be inferior unto him, he must send forth the Chief of his Court to receive him: But if he be his equal in quality, as being both Kings, although there be some debate betwixt them for precedence, if he come first to the place where the treaty is to be ●ade, he must go himself.  
In the Enter view which was betwixt King Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Arragon at Savona, which then belonged unto the French King, Lewis the twelfth at the approach of Ferdinand's Galley, (before he could land) entered into it, accompanied only with his Guard; to ●estifie his confidence, and thereby to assure King ferdinand of that which he should find in h●m: And at their going to land, King Lewis left the right hand to Ferdinand, who lodged in the Castle, as the most honourable place; and himself went to the Bishopric.  
When two Prince's unequal in quality, parley, some hold that it is for the inferior to come first unto the p●ace of meeting, 
〈…〉.  there to attend the greater. Yet the contrary hath been most commonly observed upon this rea●on, that the less ought to go unto the greater. So as ●e is to go first unto the place where the parley ●s to ●ee made: And this was particularly practised, at the interview of Pope Clement the seventh, and King Francis the first, although that Marseilles were in the King's sub●ection.  
It is presumed that two Princes do not meet for small matters, 
What Princes ought to, do before their Interviews, not to put their Neighbours in jealousy.  the which doth many times put their Neighbours in jealousy of these Interviews: they must find out some apparent and important pretext, the which may be published to free their Neighbours from all jealousy, under which they may treat what else they please. When Pope Cl●m●●t the seventh came to Marseilles, to treat the Marriage of his Niece, with him that was afterward King Henry the second; this treaty might have been crossed, if they had known the Design; he borrowed the pretezt of a general peace, and an Enterprise against Infidels, the which could not put the Neighbours in Alarm, carrying a fair show, and having in it many particularities, which deserved to be treated by mouth, be it for the taking away of all difficulties the more easily, or for the holding the business the more secret.  
If they hold it fit to treat by Deputies and Ambassadors, as it is the ordinary, 
Of Deputies & Ambassadors to treat with a Prince, and of the choice they are to make.  the more safe will be to choose a man of a mean condition, experience in Negotiations, and who understands no less the Estate, affairs, and dependencies of him with whom he treats, than the Estate and affairs of his own Master: 
Qualities of a Deputy or Ambassador.  Neither must he be interessed in the business whereof he treats. This was an Error, to commit the soliciting of the difference of the Duke of Ferraria, to Alberto Pio, Ambassador for France with Pope julio the second, 
Not to be interested in the business he treats of.  who in steed of pacifying the said Pope against the Duke, he incensed and urged him the more; fearing that if the said Duke were reconciled to the Pope, he would get the other Moiety of Carpy, which the said Alberto Pio enjoyed.  
I have said of a mean condition, 
Of a ●●ane condition.  for that the great Men of an Estate are not fit, as well for the just fear they may conceive of them, that under colour of treating, they should suffer themselves to be practised by the other side; as for that they have sometimes interests and reasons, which concern them in their particular, to the which they do willingly accommodate the affairs of their Master, and to his disadvantage: Besides there is seldom found so much patience and sufficiency in Men of this condition, as is needful in such Negotiations. Neither may they choose men of a base condition, as Lewis the Eleventh did who employed his Barber; lest that he with whom we treat, or his Deputies, do not find themselves contemned by this choice. Yet in secret treaties, they stand not much upon the choice, and these last are commonly most proper, as those of whom they have least distrust: Unless they hold it more fit to make use of Ambassadors, which reside with the Prince, with whom they mean to treat; of some Prisoner take● in the War, as the treaty of the League, made betwixt King Lewis the twelfth and the Venetians, by Andrew Gritty then Prisoner to the King.  

〈◊〉 ●cre: 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 ●●●enti 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 made.  These secret Treaties are usually made when there is question to make a League one with another. They are made for diverse intentions: But most commonly to entertain and deceive him with whom they treat, or to surprise his enemy, or to assure himself of two enemies which make War, treating with one secretly, and the other openly. Pope Alexander the sixth, promised King Ferdinand by a brief, to assist him for the defence of Naples, in case that Ferdinand should promise to do the like for the Estate of the Church. The League which was treated betwixt Lewis the twelfth and the Venetians, was so secret, as neither Lewis Sforse, nor the Pope, did ever know what had been treated, until the Army was ready to march. The treaty of the same French King, which Ferdinand King of Spain, was no less secret, to break the League betwixt Spain and England, the King of England having sent a Herald to the King of Spain, to summon him to perform their League, who arrived at the same time when as the peace betwixt France and Spain was proclaimed.  
Pope Lee the tenth. Having made a League with the Emperor and the King of Spain, treated with Lewis the twelfth, not by a Public instrument, but by a schedule under his own hand, to the end the business might be carried more secretly, and that he might assure himself of all sides. The same Pope treated afterwards secretly with the King of Spain, for the defence of Italy: Yet meaning to entertain King Francis the first, to slacken the preparations continued to treat with him, sometimes demanding one thing and sometimes another, to the end that the one being denied him, he might have a Subject to break when he should see his time; and to make the French King believe, that necessity more than his own free will, had induced him to treat with the Spaniard, with whom he had long before made a secret treaty. And distrusting that the King would not yield to that which he should demand, he made dluers ambiguous and irresolute answers. The same Pope made another secret League, with the Emperor Charles the fifth against King Francis the first, and when he was forced to declare himself, made show to treat a new with the Ambassador of Spain.  
It is one of the ordinary policies among Princes, and wherewith the best advised do sometimes suffer themselves to be abused, 
I hat they must stand most upon their guards when they propound a treaty, and especially during the treaty.  to propound a treaty to betray his companion, Pope julio the second, to win time to make his preparations against the Duke of Ferrara, he entertained King Lewis the twelfth, making show that he would agree. The proposition of peace made by Lewis the twelfth upon the difference for the Du'chie of ●ill●●, was a means to chase the F●●●ch out of that Duchy, the general of N●●ma●dy, having 〈◊〉 upon that Subject to make a ●●uy of Grysons, and thinking to spare the King's money lost that Estate. The same Pope julio the second, to the end nee might busy the same King, sent his Nuncios to treat a peace, with power to conclude it, but with certain limitations, which might breed a doubt of his intention. And having recovered his health, he continued the same treaty, and at the same time made another offensive League with the Venetians and the King of Arragon, against the said King. After these practices, the King of Arragon, and the King of England, kept the French King in doubt, of the League made by them, to the end they might hinder his preparations. The Emperor Maximilian the first, to have means to revenge himself of the French King, by a fraudulent reconciliation interrupted the treaty which was made betwixt the said King and the Venetians, and hindered the preparations of War which the said King might make, making show that he would treat a peace with him.  
The Spaniards, to interrupt the League which was ready to be made, betwixt the Princes of Italy and Pope Clement's the seaventh, after the battle of Pavia, propounded unto the said Pope to treat an accord. The which not only hindered the League, and stayed the preparations of War which he might make; but also caused him to discharge the troops which he had drawn unto him for his safety. Hugo de Moncada, made other prepositions of an accord to the same Pope, to make him the more negligent to think of his defence.  
Bourb●n, leader of the Emperor's troops, entertained the Pope with an accord, whilst the Army marched towards Rome. The Goufalonier of Florence, to keep Pope Clement from attempting any thing openly against the City, entertained him with hope of some secret practices. The Spaniard (who in matter of State make no great difficulty to break their faith,) do more usually practise this policy than any other Nation.  
Alexander the sixth, (as Guichardin saith,) to busy his enemies excused those things that he could not deny, and devised those were doubtful, pacifiing some with promises and good looks, and assuring others by diverse means, treating with them a part, to the end he might breed a iealousiy among them, and disunite them.  
Gonsalue in the treaty which he made with the Duke of Calabria, swore upon the holy Host, that he would send him into France to his Father Frederick. But the interest of State prevailed more with him, than the opinion of Men, or the fear of God; so as he sent them into Spain. He makes the like reckoning of the faith which he had given to Duke Valentine by his safe conduct; Notwithstanding the which he sent him Prisoner into Spain; But Ferdinand of Arragon his Master sent him back. For having sent Philip Archduke of Austria into France to treat an agreement upon the difference, for the division made of the Realm of Naples, betwixt him and King Lewis the twelfth, in regard of the limits and bounds: Notwithstanding that the said treaty had been sworn by the French King on the one side, and the said Archduke on the other, as procurator for the Kings of Spain, And that they themselves had likewise sworn, upon the holy Evangelist, and the Crucifix to confirm whatsoever he should do; yet under diverse precepts, forbore to ratify it, to the end that the longer the French King should remain in this sum pence, the longer he would stay to make his preparations to succour his Men: who for want of relief, having been forced to abandon the country, the said Kings of Spain, Notwithstanding their solemn Oath, would hear no more speech of ratifying the treaty made by his Son in law.  
From all these examples we may gather, that during a treaty, we must watch more carefully, and make ourselves the stronger, not only to frustrate our Enemies of all hope to surprise us, but to the end that the consideration of our forces may make us obtain conditions of more advantage: And we must not hold a treaty firm and concluded, unless it be ratified by the Prince with whom we treat; especially if the treaty be made with a Prince whom they detain Prisoner. 
That a treaty ought not to be held firm and assured, if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom they treat,  For the force by the which he hath been constrained to promise, will always dispense him to readuise himself. Pope Clement the Seventh, refused to ratify the Conditions which the Duke of Ferrara, when the said Pope was a Prisoner; saying, that it was an unworthy thing, that a man in life should approve of that which had been done in his Name, whilst he was dead. And King Francis the first excused himself to accomplish the treaty of Madrid, upon the inhumanity which Charles the fifth used towards him, to extort from him the Cessions which he made: All which took not place, although the King had given his Children in hostage. As in the parleys of Princes, the place where the interview is to be made, 
Of the plate where the treaties of a peace ●ra league is to be made.  is very considerable; So is it in treaties of peace, which are made by Deputies. If it be to choose a League, there must be a convenient place, not too far from the confederates, to the end they may have a more speedier answer of the difficulties that may happen. When as the Kings of France and England were to treat a League with the Princes of Italy, they resolved to treat in France, to be the nearer to England. Pope julio the second, meaning to treat with the Emperor and the French King, desired that the Ambassadors should come to Rome, to the end he might gain the Emperor's Minister by kind usage, promises, and benefits, to persuade his Master to disunite himself from the French King. The which he of Franc● refused to do, being neither reasonable nor honourable to treat a peace in the house of his Enemy, how great soever he were. So as the usual course is to choose a neuter place.  
But the question is, 
An Ambassador going unto a Prince to treat whether he is bound to treat himself with him, or by Deputies.  if an Ambassador having agreed to go unto the Prince, with whom he is to treat, whether the Prince be bound to treat with the Ambassador himself; Or depute some of his Council for that effect. This last manner of proceeding is the most usual, as well to preserve the dignity of the Prince, which cannot be maintained amidst the contestations which happen in conferences; as for that Princes are usually little practised in such negotiations. And the example of the Bishop of Gurgia is not therein to be followed; who going to Pope julio the second upon his request to treat with him; and the said Pope having deputed three Cardinals to that effect, he deputed three Gentlemen to confer with them, excusing himself upon other affairs: For therein the said Bishop carried, himself, not as a simple Ambassador, but as Lieutenant to the Emperor, to the which quality he had been received at Rome by the Pope.  
The Deputies being assembled, 
Of the sitting of Ambassadors  their seats are considerable, they having no power to quit any thing of the rank which their Masters ought to hold. The first place is at the head or end of the Table, if there be one: The second is the first on the right-hand; and the third is the first on the left hand of him that is at the end. And if there be many Deputies to one Prince, they usually sit all on one side, to have the more facility to confer together, if it be needful.  
The seats being resolved, the Deputies are to see the Commissions of either side, and to consider of them: 
Of the power of Ambassadors on either side.  For that from thence doth grow the assurance which they may have of the proceeding of the treaty; there being Commissions so general, and so ambiguous, as thereby they may easily judge, that he which hath given such to his Deputies, hath no will to conclude any thing: for that under these ambiguous and general terms, he hath a desire afterwards to ground a new breach. Some desiring to defer the conclusion of a treaty, whereof the motion seemed reasonable on either side, they have concluded in requiring the Prince of the contrary pa●ty to consent unto them before they ratify it. The which Pope Iuli● the second did, seeing himself pressed by the Cardinals, to make a peace with Lewis the twelfth, who propounded certain Articles of an Accord unto him: whereupon the gave Commission to the Cardinal of Final, and to the Bishop of Tivolly, to transport themselves to the French Court, and there to treat; promising to ratify the said Articles which had been propounded unto him, if the King consented. But he neither gave them Commission, nor power to conclude them, having no will but to gain time, and to frustrate the instance which the Consistory made unto him for this pacification.  
As for the clauses of treaties, there can be nothing certain prescribed, 
O● the clauses of treaties.  this depending of the differences, for the which the treaties are made, the which are infinite, be it for peace or truce, for the restitution of that which they pretend to have been unjustly taken from them, or for the Session of rights, or else for limits and bounds; the which if they cannot regulate, they put them in sequestration or suspense, or they make some Act which may interrupt the prescription of him that holds them; or else for a passage, with consignation of hostages, or of Forts for the assurance; Or else for an offensive or defensive league, or for neutrality, whereof I will treat hereafter. 
Principal considerations▪   
But the principal considerations we must have, are not to use, nor to speak for a person which is odious to them with whom we treat; not to yield to the first demands though just, but to resist them stoutly: And yet if the danger be emment, we must not study so much to Negotiate with advantage, as to provide for safety: And especially to have a care, 
They must have a care th●t there be no equivocation in the clauses.  that the clauses may not be Equivocal and of a double understanding, or so general and indefinite, as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty. The Spaniards are Masters in such practices. Isabelle of Castille, and Ferdinand of Arragon, circumvented Charles the eight when he restored unto them the County of Roussillon, upon condition they should not hinder him in the conquest of Naples, they adding by another clause, that they meant not to be bound to any thing that might prejudice the Church: Reserving unto themselves thereby a liberty to take Arms, if they were required by the Pope; as Lord of the Fee of the Realm of Naples. And in truth after the restitution of the County of Roussillon, they began to exhort the King rather to turn his Arms against Infidels, then to make War against Christian Princes; giving hope under hand to the King of Naples and to the Pope, to be relieved by them; and preparing by these e●hortations, to break with King Cha●les, when the occasion should be ready, and the Pope declare himself.  
The same Spaniards deceived the French in the treaty for the division of the Realm of Naples, betwixt King Lewis the twelfth of France and Ferdinand of Arragon, upon the equivocation of the denomination of the Provinces, made diversely and in diverse times; the French thinking the confines should be regulated according to the ancient denomination, and the Spaniards according to the new, which they caused to be expressed in the treaty: They which treated on the French party, never considering, that in the diversity of Names, they are governed according to the present use. The protection taken by King Lewis the twelfth, of Bentineth, with Bolonia, upon condition he should not prejudice the rites of the Church, the which was interpreted with no better faith. For whilst the King was an enemy to the Pope, he interpreted the rites of the Church, for that which the Church enjoyed when he took the protection: And afterwards being united to the Pope, he restrained this protection to the person and goods of Bentineth.  

That general clauses are captions.  General clauses are always captions; as those for the defence of Duke Sforse in the Duchy of Milan, which did not free him, but that they made his process, for that he had had a part in the practices of Morove with the marquis of Pesquiere, against the Emperor Charles the fifth; who in the treaty he desired to make with the Pope against the French, propounded some general clauses, to the end that upon the difficulties the Pope should make, he might have time to provide for his affairs. These are the most general considerations, which they may have in treaties.   

CHAP. 51. Of treaties of Peace and Truce.  
THe treaties which they make with Neighbours, are either with enemies, or with friends; or with persons which desire to continue Neuters with us, 
Treaties of Peace.  or we with them. The treaties which are made with our enemies, are either for a time or perpetuallPerpetuall, as the peace which is made to compose all differences, and the War that is undertaken for conquest or for reparation of injuries, or to restore the Commerce and Hospitality.  

O● T●uc●  Treaties which are made for a time with our enemies, are called truces, the which are either general for all the Estates of the one or the other Prince, for all persons, and for all sorts of Commerce: Or else they are particular, for certain places, for certain persons, and for the Commerce; and sometimes they do not extend it but of a suspension of Arms. And when any one is bound by alliance, not to make peace or truce without the consent of his Ally, and that they doubt of his consent; they add in the treaty, that it shall take place for all those which the contracters shall name, and they set down no prefixed time, but that it shall continue until he shall refuse, and some Months after: As that which was made betwixt King Charles the eight, and the King of Spain, and that betwixt Pope Clement the seaventh, and Don Hugo de Moncada, Ambassador to the Emperor.  
Sometimes a general truce holds the place of a peace, as that of a hundred years, betwixt the Acarnaves, and the Ambracoltes; and that betwixt Castille and Portugal: And these are commonly made betwixt Princes that are equal in power, and will not quit any thing of their rights by a peace; and yet desire to live quietly in the Estate wherein they are, satisfying by this means the point of honour.  
Such treaties are many times less Subject to rupture, 
That treaties of trece are less Subject to rupture then th●se of a peac●.  than a peace which is made perpetual, for that he which finds himself grieved with a treaty that is perpetual, seems to have some reason to leave it, seeing the grievance cannot be otherwise repaired. But if the time be limited, he hath no cause to complain, for that he may (the time being expired,) pursue that which he thinks aught to be granted him: And if they have a will to continue the truce, there is nothing so easy as to renew it. And admit they were well assured of the friendship, yet time causing friendship to grow cold, they have also need to be renewed by new treaties. Seeing that treaties being grounded upon the interest of Princes, which change with the time, it is needful to change them at the end of the time, or to break them off wholly, and it would bee● means to avoid the treacheries and perjuries, which are committed usually in the ruptures of treaties.  
A truce is likewise made to advance a peace and to treat it. 
Diu●rs intentions for t●e which they make a truce.  It is in like manner sometimes for the more honest discharge of a league which they have made with some other Prince, whom they have accustomed to comprehend therein: so as a peace following it, or the truce being not accepted by him, they take occasion to leave the l●ague, it being not his fault that leaves it, that the war was not ended. And although it seems that a truce cannot by its condition prejudice the pretensions in the principal, yet it is most certain, that if he which is chased out of a contentious Estate, consents that during the truce, the commerce shall be forbidden to his subjects, he doth wholly stop that gate; as Lewis the twelfth did in the truce which he made with G●nsalu● after the conquest of the Realm of Naples.   

CHAP. 52. Of treaties of Alliance.  
THe treaties which are made with our neighbours as friends, are treaties of Alliance, equal or unequal: the equal is either of simple friendship only, for the entertainment of traffic, or for aid and succour, that of succours is for the defensive or offensive, and sometimes for both together with or against all men, or against certain Princes and Estates, and their Alliances are contracted, either from Estate to Estate, and for the preservation of the Estates one of another; in which case by the death of the Prince they may not be interrupted: or else they are contracted betwixt Prince and Prince; and then, after the death of one of the Princes, they must enter into a new treaty to continue it, if there be not a certain time prescribed by the treaty, to the which the alliance must continue after the death of the Prince, or else they are made from an Estate and Prince to an Estate, and from an Estate to a Prince; where after the death of the Prince, it is necessary, if not of a new treaty, at the least of some confirmation of the precedents: Sometimes Alliances are contracted for an Enterprise, and for one effect only, in the which the Allies are interested, and it may be called by the name of a league.  
These leagues are commonly defensive, 
Of defensive leagues.  but in effect they tend to attempt against some one; and there are secret Articles for it, as in that of Cambray against the Venetians, in the which they borrowed the pretext of Religion and the peace of Christendom. In the league which was made before against Charles the Eight, betwixt the Pope, the King of Romans, the King of Spain, the Venetians and the Duke of Milan, they borrowed the pretext for the defence of on● another's Estate, reserving a place for such as would enter, and in the secret Articles it was agreed, that the Spaniards which were in Sicily, should help Ferdinand of Arragon to recover Naples; the Venetians by Sea should invade the Maritine places; the Duke of Milan should hinder the succours that came from France, and possess himself of Asti, where the Duke of Orleans was; and that the Kings of Romans and Spain, should either of them in their parts invade France, when as Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Arragon united themselves for the conquest of Naples, they likewise took a pretext that they would afterwards make war against the Turks. 
divers considerations for the treating or making of a league.   
But besides the pretext, there are many things to be considered in the treaty of a league that is to say, the cause why they join in league, belt for offence or defence: The particular interest of every one of the Leaguers, and his intention which seeks to unite himself: With what Princes or Estates they make it their courage, constancy, faith, and means; the commodities of their Estates to assist the League: and how they shall hinder those which present themselves to enter, which are not fit for our Design: against whom it is made. If he be a powerful Prince of himself, assisted by Friends, having facility to invade the confederates, either by himself, or by the means of his Friends, and his courage, when they are to make the League, and how they may excuse it, and whether the time of the League be precisely limited to a certain number of years, or whilst the Enterprise shall last. The contribution of Allies how it should be ordered, as well in the levy of Soldiers, as in munitions of War and Victuals, who must first ratify the treaty among the confederates, if there be many heads, or one alone, for the execution and ordinary causes of the Commonweal of the League.  
The ordinary causes for the which they make a league, are either to facilitate a conquest; 
ordinary cau●●s o●●●a●ue●.  as that which was made betwixt Lewis the twelfth, and Ferdinand of Arragon for the Realm of Naples: Or to balance the forces of one that is more mighty, in hindering him that he grow not greater, or diminishing his power. The Athenians undertook to succour the Egyptians, not o●ely to diminish the power of the Persian, as Diodorus writes, but to increase their own by the alliance of the Egyptians.  
A defensive League which hath no other benefit but a necessary def●nce, and in the which mean Estates are in a man●er equally interested, last usually longer than an offensive L●agu●, which is voluntary, and from the which either of the Confederates will easily part when he hath no more interest. So as in balancing the interest of the one and the other, he that shall find himself accompanied with distrust, and an opinion to be irreconciliable to the common Enemy, would prove the most firm in the League.  
But with all this we must consider the wisdom, courage, and means of him with home we join in League. 
Other considerations for the treaty of a league.  And as we may not choose him so powerful, as having prevailed over our common Enemy, he may make no subject unto him: So we must not choose one that is light and inconstant, and of small means. They write that inconstancy, irresolution, and the timorousness of Pope Clement the Seventh, ruined all the affairs of his Colleagues. The Venetians would not join in League with Pope Alexander the sixth, having had ill success, being joined in League with Sixtus and Innocent, for that Pope's coming to dye, they leave Successors which have other intentions and designs.  
But the commodity or discommodity of Estates near or far off, is very considerable, as well in regard of those which unite themselves, as of those against whom they make the League. And upon this consideration all the Leagues which they have propounded in Christendom against the Turk, have gone to smoke: The danger of the Turk being held by Christian Princes uncertain and far off, and regarding more the Estates of some, then of others: Being unable but with much time and labour to possess their minds with this necessary ardour to attempt against him.  
By the like reason a League with the Turk is of small profit to a Christian Prince, who hath his Estate remote from him, unless it be for the trade of the Subject; as well for the great distance, as for that the manner of living of the one differs so much from that of the other, as there can grow no confidence betwixt them.  
But if some one seeks unto us to be received into our league, whom we hold not fit for our design; they may propound such hard conditions unto him, as he would lose his desire. In like sort, if we be sought unto to enter, either we excuse ourselves upon the fear of some Enemy, against whom we must reserve our forees; as the Venetians did for fear of the Turk, when as they were sought unto by Charles the Eight, or else we will demand conditions of such advantage for ourselves, as he which seeks unto us may not yield unto.  
To say when we are to make a League, it cannot be precisely done▪ this depending upon the condition of affairs: 
Of the time w●en we are to make a L●●gue.  But we may well say, that some have held that we must not make a League, but after that the greatest Prince had imposed hard conditions upon those with whom they made account to join in League, and had by this means prepared to unite themselves for their discharge. This was a Consideration which Pope Clement the Seventh had, to defer the conclusion of the League which was treated against the Governor of France, and the Princes of Italy, during the Imprisonment of King Francis the first; thinking (as it happened) that the Emperor (seeing the uncertainty of this League) was likely to impose harder conditions upon the King; the which the King would never observe, and so he should be forced to continue in the League of Ital●, to free himself: Whereas if the League had been made before his Enlargement, it would have made the King's Conditions more mild, and more easy for the Emperor, in freeing the King to draw him from the other Confederates. Behold how every man doth husband the necessity of his Neighbour, the which being wisely examined, may serve to judge of the time when a League is to be made.  

O● 〈◊〉 ti●e of the continuance ●o a league.  Fo● the time of its continuance, the League betwixt the Florentines and Luquois, against the Pisans was limited by the treaty at three years. And the first Leagues which were treated among the Suizes, 
That the Colleagues are bound to the recovery of the Country of their Ally conquered by the Enemy.  were also limited to a certain time. Others have no other limitation but the ●nd of the Enterprise for the which it was made. But the question is, if the Enemy taking the Country, for the defence whereof the League was made, whether the Confederates be bound by the League, to assist him who hath lost it in the recovery. Some have held that the defensive did not extend so far. Notwithstanding if there were no treaty which had concerned this conquest, yet it would seem more reasonable to comprehend the recovery in the defensive, if it be general. For as it hath for its end to preserve the Ally in his Estate, and that to attain unto it, the forces must not only remain in the Country of the Ally, to attend the Enemy, but after denunciation of the Wa●, and other acts of hostility done by the Enemy, they must enter into his Country, to the end to prevent him or to divert him, from attempting any thing against the Ally; the offensive being judged by the agression, and not by that which follows: By a stronger reason they ought to enter into the Country conquered from the Ally for the recovery thereof. So most commonly these excuses are not pretended, but by such as either fail in their faith, courage, or means to make the recovery.  
Contribution is one of the points of a League most difficult to regulate. 
Of the contribution of a league.  It is made either in men or money. The men are entertained by all; or by him only that hath need. The defensive League betwixt the Kings of France and England against the Emperor, contained a reciprocal Succours of ten thousand men, if the War were made by Land; and of six thousand if it were made by Sea: And in all other occasions the French King was bound to assist the King of England with twelve thousand Lances, and the King of England him of France with ten thousand Foot, at his charge that had the need.  
In the League which was made betwixt the Emperor Charles the fist, Pope Clement the seaventh with the other Princes of Italy (except the Venetians) for the defence of Italy against the French King, the Emperor was to contribute monthly thirty thousand Ducats; the Pope with the Florentines twenty thousand; the Duke of ●illan fifty thousand; Ferrara ten thousand; Genova six thousand; Sienna two thousand; and Luques a thousand; And it was concluded, that besides this, there should be a stock of the like sum, which might not be employed until they saw the preparatives made to invade Italy. In the League of the Cities of Greece against the Persians, the contribution whereof Aristides made the tax, mounted to eight hundred thousand Talents. In the league which some Cities of Greece made with the Lacedæmonians against Athenians, the contribution came yearly to a thousand Talents: And the order for the levy of soldiers was, that two lightly Armed should pass for a Man Armed at all pieces; and four Men Armed at all pe●ces for a Horseman.  
The contribution concluded in money, there are difficulties sometimes found, 
〈…〉 place 〈…〉 dy● or 〈…〉 m●n●y.  for the place of keeping it. The Cities of Greece thought that the custody of their contributions was safe in the Temple of Dele. But the consideration of Religion could not prevent it, but that under the pretext that Deal was not strong enough, the Athenian: found means to carry it away, and to employ it to the particular use of the City. That which may be spoken hereuppon, is not to deliver the money into the hands of the strongest, for fear they shall not be able to call him to account, nor to lay it in so weak a place, as it may be exposed to the force and violence of the strongest, or to him that shall first take Arms.  
The contribution being settled by the confederates they must name a head of the League, if they will not assail the enemy but of one side: If of diverse, they must name many. And herein they do many times find themselves troubled for that the most powerful of the confederates, desires commonly to have it referred to him, or to some one of his, who governs the conduct of the War, according to his Master's affairs, and not those of the other Allies. The other head of the League of the Princes of Italy, with King Francis the first, would not assail Milan after the taking of Pavia, for fear that Milan being taken with the Duke, and the Venetians, assured from the Imperialists, they should retire from the League, or contribute more negligently: And therefore he took a pretext to go and free the Pope who was a Prisoner. Antonio De Leva, in the League which was made by all the Princes of Italy, except the Venetians, with Charles the fifth against the French, was made general, with charge to stay in the Duchy of Milan, which depended of the Emperor.  
A League concluded by the Deputies of the confederates, there sometimes falls out a difficulty, 
Which of the confederates ought to verify and declare himselve first.  who shall ratify and declare himself first. In the League which was made betwixt King Francis the first, the Pope, and the Princes of Italy, the King refused to ratify, until the Pope and the Venetians had ratified before him; and wrought so that he drove the Colleagues to declare themselves, and to begin the War, whilst that he treated secretly for himself, to the end he might make his conditions with more advantage: And for fear lest his Colleagues on their side should show him the like prank, he prevented them.  
That kind of League which is made for an enterprise, 
That an offensive league, and for an ●n●erpriz●●ucc●●d● seldom acc●●ding to ●he hope of the Allies.  succeeds seldom, according to the hope of the Allies, if the enterprise be long. For besides that the preparations be long, the opinions diverse in the pursuit, the resolutions inconstant, the interests of Princes or Estates in League, may change with time, or by the practices of him, against whom they are in League, in withdrawing some one of them, or making him to suffer more loss than the rest. For seeing himself ill defended by his confederates, as he did hope, and that he was in more danger to lose then his companions, he studies to retire himself, and to make his accord apart▪ As the Venetians did with the Turk after the loss of Cypress.  

O● the causes of the rupture of Leagues.  The most ordinary causes of the rupture of Leagues, are distrust, and jealousy; as if one of ●he confederates had had conference with the enemy without the consent of the rest; If that which serveth for the safety of one diminisheth the safety of another; If they find inconstancy, variety, or cowardice, in any one of the confederates; If one of the confederates increaseth, and makes some usurpation, without the consent of the rest; if he treats with the enemy, not comprehending the other Allies, but as adherents. King Lewis the twelfth left the League of the Venetians, for that they had made a truce with him, and had presumed to name him only as their adherent. Sometimes to break a League, they invent some occasion, which puts the Leaguers in division one against another. In which case as long as he hath hope that this division may make them disunite themselves, he must have a care not to assail them.  

O●●eagu●s ●etwi●● mean ●●tate●, and of the de●●cts w●●ch a●●●ften 〈◊〉.  I have said that Leagues which are made betwixt mean Estates for their necessary defences, are usually most durable. Yet they are not without great defects. For they have not any authority among them, be it Council or otherwise, which may command them all, and reconcile t●em in case of diversity of opinions, or a division; For that holding themselues all to be Sovereigns, they will Establish nothing above them: And to fall by degrees to an accord, in all their differences which may happen, it is a difficult thing yea impossible. On the otherside lea●ing their differences to grow old, they may be of such a condition as they draw after them an irreconcilliabl● hatred,  
Another defect is, that to the greatest part of their Assemblies and Dyettes, they send men new in affairs, fearing to give authority to any one among them above the rest. So as most part of those which come to these assemblies, having little or no knowledge of affairs, their opinions are to make report to their Superiors, and not to resolve any thing; this power being seldom given them. Hence grow many delays, which in certain encounters may be very prejudicial to the Estate. There is another ordinary defect among them, that they seldom agree upon the some of the contributions necessary for their defence, nor of the keeping of the common Treasure: So as when there happens any need, they find themselves troubled to provide in time.  
But behold how Princes allied, 
Of Succours one against another among confederates.  do sometimes find themselves troubled to govern themselves; which is when as three Princes allied, the one makes War against another, and demands succours from the third: In this case if the treaties of alliance be only for friendship, it is certain he is not bound to give any succours. But if the treaties carry an offensive League, he must succour the most ancient, allied by a precedent alliance. If the precedent alliances have been made both at one time, he must succour him that is allied in an offensive and defensive League. But if the League be offensive and defensive of either side, he may not succour any of them: but he may mediate a peace, and cause the difference to be judged by the common Allies, as it is usually observed: And let him know that will not enter into arbitrement, or being entered will not yield to judgement, that he will succour the other. Notwithstanding most commonly in such occasions, they balance their Estate: And looking more to safety then to justice, they secure him who being succoured may weaken the powerful, who is more to be feared.  
They may aid particular Allies, and common Allies, if they be wronged by one of the Allies. 
Of the defence of one that is no● allied against an Ally.  But he which is not comprehended in the treaty of alliance, cannot be defended against him that is allied without breach of the alliance: That which they may do for to suppress it, is to write unto the Ally: and to entreat him to use him courteously: which is the offer which the Romans made unto the Capuans, who complained and demanded Succours against the oppression of the Samnites, allied to the Romans. But if the oppressed yield himself a Subject, as the Capuans did; then the Prince being obliged to the defence of his Subjects against all men, he then may and aught to succour them against his Allies.  
An unequal alliance is that, which is contracted betwixt Princes or Estates, unequal in honour or in power, 
Of the unequal alliance betwixt Princes and Estates ● that is to say of protection.  and with unequal conditions; the one acknowledging the other not for Master or Lord, but by honour, as the more powerful and the better qualified; And some for Protector: And these treaties are made with those Estates which take or give pension, or which put themselves into protection.  
We have formerly said, that a pension differs from tribute. For tribute is paid by the Subject, or by him who to enjoy his liberty, 
Difference betwixt pension and tribute.  pays that which is agreed upon to him that hath forced him to do it. A pension is ●eld voluntary, from him that is in our protection, or from him that is in all other things equal to the treaty of alliance, to hinder the pensioner that he join not with the Enemy, or to have aid and succours from him.  
The true protection is that, whereas one takes upon him the defence of another freely without reward. 
Of protection.  Yet some have balanced honour with profit; and have received a pension from those whom they have taken into their protection: And these men have thought that by a pecuniary interest, they did bind the protectors more to succo●● them, then if he were o●ely bound by Oath.  
By the Law of protection, he that is protected, owes all respect and honour to his protector: 
Of the mutual duty of the protector and he that is protected.  Against whom if he attempt, or stays from his Duty, it is lawful for the protector to assure himself, yea, to make himself Master. They of Genova having submitted themselves under the protection of the French King, upon certain conditions; and being afterwards revolted, the King changed the conditions into pri●iledges, to the end it might be in his will to deprive them when he should think good. But if the Protector for the good of his Estate, finds it convenient to leave the protection of him, over whom another Estate hath some pretensions; he may consent that the difference may be referred to justice, and to judges to determine it: As Lewis the twelfth would do in the difference which the Pope had with the Duke of Ferrara, whom he had taken into his protection, and whereof by this means he sought to free himself. In like manner the protector ought to defend and succour the protected, and use him well: Otherwise if he entreat him ill, he may withdraw himself from protection, and seek another protector.   

CHAP. 53. Of the differences which happen betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the decision thereof.  
ANd for that the Alliances not only of protection, but also those which are equal, made it with more powerful Estates, draw after them the subjection of the weaker; And that there may betwixt Equals (be it upon this Subject or some other) happen many differences, which may breed occasion of breach: they must in treating provide for the safety and the decision of differences. Some have assured themselves of the mutual faith simply, the which at this day is but weak in many. Others have demanded hostages: the which ought to be of such consideration, as the Prince or Estate which gives them, may not be long deprived of them, without prejudice by their absence. King Francis the first, being freed from Prison, and after many inhumanities' showed him by Charles the fifth, who let him go not through courtesy, but for fear of the League of Italy; yielded to give his children in hostage, hoping he might recover them, either by accord, or by some other means, the delay of the recovery being the less troublesome unto him, for that they were in their courage: And so being at his choice either to give his children, or twelve of of his principal Men of his Realm, he desired rather to give his children, whom he might spare, than the others, which were more necessary for his service and erterprises.  
Sometimes they demand hostages of either part, when as either of them that treats, 
Of Hostages.  promiseth to put something in execution, which they doubt they would not do without hostages: And this aught to be done according to the distrust they may have one of another. But if the question be, that the one executes before the other, it is for him that is to execute last to give hostages. There was a memorable dispute betwixt the Ambassadors of the Emperor Charles the fifth, and those of King Francis the first, after his discharge from Prison, whether that the French King should retire his Army our of Italy, before that the Emperor had delivered him his children. They promised on the King's behalf to put hostages into the hands of the King of England, for the penalty which should be imposed for want of retiring his Army, after he had received his children: And the Emperor made the like offers, to restore his children, when the Army should be retired; and to give Hostages for the sure payment of the penalty, which should be degreed for want of satisfying; Saying that there was no colour he should trust the King, who had once decived him. Whereunto the French Ambassadors replied, that the more he pretended to have been deceived, the less the King ought to trust him, for that this opinion might induce him to fail the King: And besides the offers were not alike; for that it imported the King more to have his Children, then for the Emperor to see the retreat of the King's Army out of Italy; and therefore the assurance were not alike.  
It hath happened that without any precedent treaty, 
Hostages for the assurance of a Prince's passage, through another's Estate,  than the demand of a passage, they have willingly given hostages to a Prince, which desired to pass through the Estate of another Prince, which was an enemy or suspected unto him. The Archduke Philip, to pass from Spain into Flaunders; the King sent him many of the greatest Men of his Kingdom, for hostages and assurance of his passage through France, the which the Archduke caused to be sent back again, as soon as he entered into the Realm. Many have demanded strong places, to assure the victors. And others for the safety of a passage, for a conquest which they meant to make. As Charles the Eight did going to Naples, to many Princes and Potentates of Italy. Others have ratified the treaties by marriage.  
But the greatest security, 
The assurance of a treaty.  that the condition inserted in the treaty may be pleasing to both parties, and fitting for the Subjects of the affairs which presents itself, 
It is dangerous for an ally to receive a strong Ga●●ison from his protector, or make him Master of his Forts, etc.  balancing the interest of the one with the interest of the other.  
And to prevent that the alliance or protection change not into Subjection, we must be very careful not to receive a Garrisson, from the ally or protector stronger than our own; and much less to make him Master of our Forts, or to make him Guardion and depositary of the Treasure of all the alliance; as the Grecians did the Athenians, who consented, the money which should be every year levied of the General, should be put in Apollo's Temple, and afterwards carried to Athens, there to be kept. So as the Athenians, being seized of their Allies purse, they made themselves protectors, and of protector's Mai●ers; And so they not only became Masters of the Treasure, but they caused the appellations of all the other Cities to come before them, at whose charge they trained up their Citizens and made them Soldiers.  

establishment of judges, for the deciding o● differences betwixt allies.  As for the dicision of differences, the ordinary course is to constitute by the treat a certain number of judges, with power of either side, in case they should be divided in opinions, to name an Umpire, to decide differences, and to cause the contraventions which they should pretend to be made of either side to cease; Or else to agree upon some great person, to whom they might refer themselves. A thing which I confess is very difficult, but yet if'it might be done would be more convenient. For his authority would mediate an accord more easily betwixt them, who being equals, cannot directly refuse War nor demand peace.  
They have likewise usually had recourse unto compromise, 
Of compromise betwixt Allies, upon differences which may grow betwixt them.  when as judges are not appointed by the treaties, or when as they are suspect to one of the parties. For although the compromise doth seldom succeed, and comes to be effected, yet it works this effect, to cause all force to cease, and holds the difference in suspense for a time, and most commonly the intention of the party is no other, who sometimes before the compromise draws a secret promise from the Arbitrator, not to pronounce sentence without their consent: as in the compromise which was made betwixt the Emperor Maximilian, and the Venetians, in the Pope's person, who was not limited neither for time nor power, by the publque Act which was drawn; the like secret promise having been formerly made by the Pope to either party. Yet in the end the Pope, seeing they could not agree, and that this delay was imputed to him, he gave sentence, notwithstanding his promise: Yet with this proviso, that if the parties did not ratify that which he had decreed by his sentence should be of no effect.  
In this compromise made in the person of the Emperor Charles the fifth, for the difference which was betwixt the Pope and the Duke of Ferrara, as well for the right as for the fact, the Emperor promised the Pope, not to pronounce unless he were pressed by him; and to the Duke of Ferrara, that finding that he had right to Modena and Reggium, he would give sentence; and that finding otherwise, he would suffer the time of the compromise to expire. And for assurance it was agreed, that the Duke should deliver Modena into the Emperor's hands, as sequestered. Afterwards judgement to the benefit of the Duke, whereof the Pope complained much, for that the Emperor had not proceeded according to his secret promise: But the Emperor excused himself upon the pursuit which his Nuntio had made unto him to pronounce.  
They seldom compromit upon the possessory: 
Of a●compromise upon the possessory.  For he that is spoilt aught before all things to be restored. This was the answer which the Florentines made to the Emperor Maximilian, whom he invited to compromit to his person the difference they had with the Pysans, neither relying upon his will, nor upon his authority. Yet they may compromit upon the possessory, with charge to pronounce, without adding unto it the petitory; this being chiefly ruled, by the confidence which they conceive in the arbitrator, chosen by the compromise, who in a difference of State, is not always found such, as they may wholly rely upon him.  
And as peace is generally to be desired, yet if there be betwixt Neighbours some Subject which trouble their intelligence, 
When and how a Prince should deal to reconcile a difference betwixt his Neighbours.  as it would be a policy to show himself displeasing; so it were wisdom not to grow passionate to reconcile them. They observe a notable indiscretion in the Cardinal of Amboise, and very prejudicial of France, to have mediated an accord betwixt Maximilian and Ferdinand of Arragon, touching the government of Castille, this accord having been the cause that afterwards they joined together against Lewis the twelfth: And n●thing but the vanity and ambition which this Cardinal had to attain unto the Popedom (in making these two Princes favourable unto him) made him to enter into this mediation.  
The cause wherein we must labour effectually to reconcile our Neighbours, is, when we have need to be succoured by them. So Lewis the eleventh treated a peace betwixt Sigismond of Austria, and the Swisses, to use their service against the Duke of Burgundy: And Lewis Sforse dealt in the accord betwixt Maximilian and the same Swisses, to be succoured by them. But let us returns to treaties.   

CHAP. 54. Of the breach of Treaties: and of the constancy and assurance of the word of a Prince, in the Treaties.  
TO the end we enter not into the rupture for a small business, 
Means to assure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture.  they practise in those which great Men make among them, to draw in all the rest that be less to be therein comprehended, as well for the assurance of their Estates, as to entertain the greatest in an equal balance, lest that the one should rise and oppress the other. But to make use in such treaties, the oppression must be special and particular: otherwise they may have just cause to be ignorant, that under this name of Allies, they which are not named are comprehended:  
And although that the breach of faith be to much practised in such affairs, 
Pretext of rupture.  yet there are few Princes found, which have not sought some pretext before they break: Some have pretended to be circumvented by error. Others have excused themselves by the charge of the Estate of affairs, great wrongs, or inevitable loss, and apparent danger of the ruin of their Estates. Which are the causes, wherein some say that an oath is not obligatory; the condition by reason of the oath being impossible or unjust. To these limitations they add, 
Of the obligation a Prince hath to hold his word.  that they must not keep their faith with an Enemy of the faith, nor with him that hath broken his, nor with a Subject, nor with a Thief. But if it be not lawful to keep a man's faith in all these cases, it is not likewise lawful to give it. If it be lawful to capitulate with such men, it is necessary to hold that we promise. The which I understand, when the word is given by him that may give it; and that they selye upon it. For if they take hostages, he that gives them, is freed from his Faith; for that in receiving hostages, he that receives them, hath relinquished the assurance which he had in the faith of him that gives them: And if the promise be made by a Captain for his Prince without special Warrant, this word given binds not the Prince.  

That force nor fear cannot dispense a Prince of his word or promise.  Some Lawyers would judge of Treaties, as of particular Contracts, and more enlarge the conscience of Princes. For as a private man is not bound to that which he hath promised by force or fear, they have thought (but foolishly and maliciously) that this Maxim should take place in Treaties, which are made betwixt Sovereigns: which is in effect to banish faith from all such public Negotiations. For there is no Treaty but is usually made in Arms, by force, or through fear to lose either life, or goods, or liberty, or the Estate; which are causes of just fear, and may shake the most constant.  

〈◊〉 pre●●xts o● 〈◊〉.  Some Princes desirous to show themselves more religious in these ruptures, have taken subject upon the ambignity of some clauses in the Treaty, or upon equivocaon, as Charles the fist did upon these words, Ev●ig and Euig, to retain the Landgrave the Hesse: Or they seek some other occasions, attempting against those whom their Ally is bound to defend: To the end that drawing him to Field, he may lay the Envy of the ●rupture upon him.  

That the constancy and assistance of a Prince ●● his w●rd is of great 〈◊〉.  But the most beneficial course for a Prince or State is, to make himself to be known constant and firm in his word. For although such an occasion may happen, as he might get advantage b● h●bre●ch of his faith: yet the opinion which they may conceive of him by this action (which he must not trust ●nto) will make him lose many advantages, which a loyal Prince may have, finding himself discharged of many securities, which they demand usually and justly from one of whose faith they doubt.   

CHAP. 55. Of Treaties of Neutrality.  
LEt us come to Treaties of Neutrality, the which seems natural to Princes, who neither love nor hate anything absolutely; but govern themselves in their Friendships according to their interests. And in effect Reason of State is no other thing but Reason of interest.  
Neutrality may be of two sorts. 
Two sorts● of Neutrality.  The one with Alliance of either part: The other without Alliance, and without any tie to the one or the other; which is that, that may properly be called Neutrality. The first Rules subscribed by the conditions of the Treaty. The second hath no Rule, but the discretion of the neuter Prince, who must carry himself in such sort, as he may not make show that he inclines more to one side then to another. And for that the Affairs of Princes are not always in one Estate, the Difficulty is to know when the Prince should leave this Neutrality, and when he should maintain it.  
The advantages of Neutrality are, 
The advantages of a Neutrality.  that he which is Neuter, is honoured and respected of both parties, for the fear that either of them hath, should declare himself against him: He remains Arbitrator of others and Ma●ter of himself: He enjoys the present, and according unto occasions prevents the future. A Neuter is without any professed Enemy, and offends or Wrongs no man openly; so as giving no advantage over him, they are troubled to find a pretext to do him harm,  

Disadvantages of Neutrality.  The disadvantages are, that a Neuter satisfies neither the one nor the other; and so remains: He doth neither purchase Friends, nor free himself from any Enemies; and in the end is made a prey to the Victor. And many have held it more advantage to hazard himself to vanquish with a companion, then to remain in an Estate, where he is assured to be ruined by the one or the other.  

That a powerful Prince should not leave a Neutrality without cau●●.  To resolve this point, a powerful Prince hath no need of Council. For in what fashion soever he remains, he may maintain himself, and prescribe a Law to others. Yet I hold that without great occasion he should not declare himself. For that whilst others ruin themselves by War, he fortifies himself with means; he may in the end make himself judge of their differences, and compounding them mildly with honour, he preserves their Friendship, and maintains their Estate.  
But in a weak Prince, what part soever he takes, it will be hurtful unto him; especially if he be in the midst of two more powerful Estates than himself. 
That a Neutrality is more beneficial to a weak a Prince then to embrace a 〈◊〉.  Yet I will say, that speaking generally, a Neutrality is more beneficial to a weak Prince; so as they which make War one against another, be not altogether barbarous and inhuman. For although a Neutrality doth not please either party; yet in effect it wrongs no man; and as he which is a Neuter, doth not serve, so he doth not hurt. And then the event of the declaration which he should make, rather for the one than the other, depending upon the uncertain issue of the War, he should have no cause to say, that this part is more safe than a Neutrality. And to change his resolution without an assurance to better his affairs, were not to carry himself wisely.  
But if the Neuter be pressed by necessity to declare himself, 
Considerations to leave a neutrality.  he must do it for the most powerful of the two parties, following the Council of that Roman; that either he must make himself the strongest, or be a friend to the strongest: Unless he saw that joining to the weaker, he might balance the power of the stronger, and by this counterpeze reduce them to reason. The safety of Estates consisting chiefly in an equal counterpeze of power in the one and the other, and the greatness of a Prince drawing after it the ruin of his Neighbours; it is wisdom to prevent.  
But power is considered in this subject diversely: Either absolute or conditional; Absolute power is that which we measure by the concurrence of the greatness of Forces, Treasure: Munitions, and other Military preparations. A conditional power is that, the which although it be less than an absolute, yet it is more fit to succour us, or to do us harm. In this the Neighbourhood is of very great consideration; for that a Neighbour Prince of mean forces, may more easily or sooner hurt or succour us, than a great Prince which lies far off. near succours are always sooner ready and with less charge: For we may discharge a part when as time and occasions shall serve: If he be remote, he arrives too late after the occasions to defend us, and too soon to oppress us. The greatest part perish by the way; and when he is arrived he hath more need of rest then to battle; and being unable to send them back so far, we must still bear the charge and oppression.  
Hi●ron King of Syracuza, could well observe these considerations, the Carthaginians being Masters of a part of Sicily, he allied himself with them against the Romans: But the Romans being grown the stronger in the Country, he fell to their side, and continued the War with them against the Carthaginians, who were then more remote from the Island than the Roman 〈◊〉 ●ter we have made consideration of the force, we must likewise consider of the courage and constancy of the Prince, with whom we are to join. But if he be light and hath no stay, how powerful soever he be, it is dangerous to engage himself with him: But if with these advantages he knows how to prosecute his designs with resolution, they may boldly engage themselves with him.   

CHAP. 56. Considerations for a Prince that will live in good intelligence with his Neighbours.  
THe Prince that would live in good terms with his Neighbours, must first consider what Treaty and Capitulation he hath with him, and govern himself accordingly, always showing himself a Lover of Peace and Concord; desirous to live in Amity, and a great observer of Treaties; not enduring that any breach should be made, how small soever; and being done to cause it to be repaired.  
If any difficult thing be required of him, he shall neither grant it, 
How a Prince ought to 〈◊〉 himself in a demand made unto him by one of his Neighbour's o●●ome difficult thing▪  nor refuse it, but in balancing their business, he shall labour to have his goodwill allowed for the effect: And if he which seeks hath sent an express Ambassador, they shall send him back with Presents, and promise to dispatch other Ambassadors to make answer, And to the end he may avoid the discontentment, they shall balance this delay with some benefit, if may be of more importance then that which they have demanded: For that the Injury doth not move so much as the benefit is pleasing.  
If the Prince treating with his Neighbours, hath need to demand or use any thing from them, 
To demand something of his Neighbours.  he must have a care to maintain his Dignity, and therefore he may not be too hasty: for that we show ourselves to be too resolute for something; and they seeing the instance which we make, will hold our necessity to be greater than it is: The which will make them more holding, and make them believe, that ● we shall be the more bound unto them, if they grant it, although they reap the like benefit themselves. But if a more powerful man requires something of us, 
We must not refuse that which is demanded, if it doth not much prejudice.  which being granted doth not much prejudice us, and being denied, may draw a war against us, which he had prepared against another; We must not deny it. This was an Error which the Florentines committed, seeking in the beginning to oppose the passage of Charles the Eight, having not therein followed the Counsel which had been given to Cosmo De Medicis, not to oppose himself against john of Anio●; notwithstanding that the Pope and Duke of Milan were in League with Ferdinand King of Naples, against whom john of Anjou made War.  
We must not lightly believe that which Princes say, 
We must n●t be too credulous in that which Princes say.  and whereof they make show; but consider, that their own interest will make them forget it, and to some their faith, if they have any colour to break it. The Prince must likewise favour the traffic and commerce with his Neighbours, for the good and profit which may redound to the one and the other.  
He must consider of the means how he may with dexterity nourish the distrusts and jealousies which are, 
Politicly to nourish distrusts & jealousies betwixt them.  or may be betwixt them; But he must be wary▪ he be not known to be the Author. And chose if they have a conceit, he must be the first that must seek to take it away; and in all that which may breed some jealousy of him, he must prevent it in time: And he must excuse the fault which is discovered, and deny that, whereof the Neighbours are not, nor cannot be hereafter assured: He must seek with all diligence to mollify the most powerful, by fair deportuments and promises, and sometimes to pacify the one, and sometimes the other, as well to make them the more negligent, as to labour in seeking them severally to cast them into some distrust one of another.  

To testify his good will unto them.  The Priuce shall offer unto his Neighbours that which he cannot well refuse, before they demand it, to the end they may acknowledge his good will. Especially if there be need of succours, he shall show himself ready; yet without giving cause of jealousy to others, in making them know the justice of these succours, and of his intention, raising those whom he succours from the shame, the which doth usually accompany him that demands. This is the first precept to make them have confidence in us.  

O● the resentment he must h●ue of Iniu●ties ●eceiued by his neighbour  The second, to breed confidence, is not to enter into any resentment of injuries against those, whom we desire to make confident of us, unless it be a matter of great importance: And we must suffer courage to sleep, and awake prudence: But if our honour constrains us to make some demonstration of an injury received, we must lay the fault upon the Minister, and complain of him; so as they may not think we hold ourselves wronged by the Master. For by the very opinion which a neighbour Prince might have to have wronged us, he would enter into distrust of us, from distrust into hatred; and hatred it may be, would draw after it another wrong, and an alliance with our Enemies, not only to assure himself, but to an●oy us: The remembrance of an injury being many times stronger in him that doth it, then in him that receives it; especially betwixt Princes, whose spirits are very uncapable to take confidence one of another. Above all we must be wary how we enter into threats. For although our Neighbour be weaker than we are, and that his timorousness might give us cause to hope for some advantage by our threats: Yet it might so fall out, that from fear he might pass to despair, the which doth usually guide timorous spirits, as well into desperate resolutions, as inconsiderations doth the rash. But Misfortune carrying us to a rupture, and having the Ambassadors of our Enemies near us, who then may be suspect unto us, we must consider of the means to dismiss them. Some have therein proceeded mildly, and others ●or● roughly. Some to discharge an Enemy's Ambassador, have given leave to all other Ambassadors which did reside with him; and then calling back those of his friends, suffered his enemy's Ambassador to depart.  
The Emperor Charles the fifth, advertised of the League which was made against him, would not dismiss the Ambassadors of France, England, and Venice, until his own were in safety▪ But he set Guards upon them of France, Venice, and Florence, causing them to be conducted thirty Miles from his Court, with a prohibition not to speak unto them, nor for them to Write: To him of Milan as his Subject, he was enjoined not to part from Court; And as for him of England, there was no alteration.  
Let us come to the third point. 
To pierce into the designs of his Neighbours.  It is a great advantage to pierce into the designs of his Neighbours, and to have gained some confidence with them: For the entire is seldom found. But not able to prevail by this means, he must do it by Discourse, by Wisdom, and by the Knowledge a Prince ought to have of the quality of their Estates, of the defects and advantages which are in them, of the humours, design, and inclination of the people, of great Men, and of the Prince; and principally of this last, whose principal motions and manner of living he must seek to discover, to judge of his wisdom and courage; then the discontentments, divisions, and the heads of parties which are in the Estate, their pretexts, credit, of whom they depend, and how far it may extend, the Council, Treasure, justice how it is managed, and with what satisfaction of the people or great Men: Moreover what the forces be, and the number of Soldiers and Captains, with the sufficiency of the chief among them: The strong Towns and Fortresses; and to know the defects there are to defend them, and the advantages to assail them: The Munitions of War and Victuals: wherein the commerce and traffic doth consist, and how it may be incommodated: The commodity or discommodity of the Entries of the Country: The fertility baroness, extents or smallness of the Estate: and of other Neighbours, his alliances and dependences with other Princes, as well near as remote: Their actions and deportments past, as well towards us as others: Their present Estate, and whereunto they seem most to incline. In which search, we must use diligence, wisdom, and secrecy, lest we give them cause to distrust us. All this may be learned from friends, which the Prince may have in the Estates of his Neighbours; or by spies, whose intelligences he must duly examine before he believe them; And by reason, interest, or appearance, sound if they be true.  

Of the introduction of Ambassadors or Agents.  But for that all these courses are full of suspicion among Princes, and are dangerous for such as employ themselves to give these intelligences; every Prince having the like interest, to know what is done with his Neighbour, and desiring to show the confidence he hath in him: Princes have agreed to receive Ambassadors or Agents; who in effect (under pretext to entertain the good intelligence betwixt their Masters) serve many times to discover the ground of Estates, and the designs of Princes. Wherefore seeing that by this means Prinentertaine one another, it is fitting to know the quality, the charge, and the privileges of an Ambassador or Agent, the which we will set down here, as they have been gathered by some of this Age.   

CHAP. 57 Of the charge of an Ambassador or Agent.  
AN Ambassador and Agent is the same thing, if we consider only the function of their Charges: 
The difference betwixt an Ambassador and Agent.  But they differ for the honour and respect they bear more to an Ambassador then to an Agent. An Agent hath charge to represent the affairs only: But an Ambassador ought to represent the greatness of his Master, and his affairs. Wherefore for sufficiency, the A●●nt ought to have as much as the Ambassador: But for wealth and that which concerns show, it is not so necessary for him as for the other.  
Neither the one nor the other, for that which concerns the Body, 
Qualities and perfections required in an Ambassador.  ought (if it may be) to have any imperfection, as to have one eye, to be purblind, squint-eyed, lame, crooked-backe, or extremely foul and deformed: But chose he must be of a pleasing Encounter, and not counterfeit, left he be ridiculous or contemned. He must not likewise be sickly nor dainty, lest the discommodity of the ways, or the change of the Air make him unprofitable for his Master's affairs. His Countenance must be grave and serious, yet mingled with mildness and a pleasing aspect. For his Age, he must neither be too young, nor too old, as well for the force and disposition of the body, as for that of the mind. For the conditions of Fortune, he ought to be chosen of an honest condition, and Noble if it may be: Princes holding themselves contemned, when they send Men of little worth unto them; as Lewis the Eleventh did, who employed his Barber to execute this charge.  
As for the profession whereon he ought to be chosen, that depends of the quality of the affairs whereon he is to treat, or of the Prince to whom he is sent. For if they treated of means to make War, it would be no more proper to send a Churchman or a Lawyer, then if they treated of some right of bounds, or made some conference of Religion, to send a man making profession of Arms. For his goods, an Ambassador ought to have in a mean proportion. A poor or needy man how sufficient soever, is nothing fit for charges of expense and show. But of all things they must have a care not to send a poor Ambassador, after one that was rich, and who had made an excess of expense; For the first having accustomed those of the Province to this expense and charge, the other coming after, and not doing the like, he will be much less honoured and respected; And by consequen●s do his Master less service. He must not likewise be distasteful to the Prince to whom he is sent, but rather they must choose one that may be pleasing unto him: Yet for all this he must not be a subject, nor dependant, nor tied by oath, nor any other bond, to him with whom he is to reside. The example of that which Duke Sforse did to the Esquire Merueilles teacheth us, not to choose another man's Subject for this charge. For the sufficiency, he must have a quick apprehension and natural judgement. He must be practised in the affairs of the world, and especially in those of his own Country, and of that where he is Ambassador.  
And for that the life of man is too short, to attend a fit experience for the sufficiency which is necessary: he ought to be conversant with all sorts of Histories, which he ought to have read with judgement, weighing all the Circumstances of Actions which are there represented: To know the diversity of the establishment of Estates, and the reasons, if it may be, of this diversity; to understand the right of limits, and represailes, the genalogies of Princes, and the pretensions of Kings upon the Estates of other men. Their forces, means, alliances, and manner of living, he must likewise be resolute & courageous in that which he hath wisely deliberated; but above all he must be secret in affairs of importance, and discreet in his speech▪ He must not detract, nor speak evil, especially of any Master, nor of the Prince where he remains: He must speak freely of his Master's pretensions, if there be question to maintain them.  
An Ambassador chosen with these qualities may serve worthily and profitably. Yet I will add hereunto the manner, how some of our time have held he should govern himself, but more succinctly. 
Instructions for an Ambassador, how to govern himself in a strange Country.  First he must furnish his Family with modest and respective Men, not insolent, quarrellers, or scandalous: Otherwise he is in danger to receive an affront, either in abandoning his servants, or not being able to stay them from punishment. This done, he must make an ample instruction, lest he be disavowed, the which shall follow word by word, especially in affairs whereas terms strike the stroke; not promising any more, although he knew he should not bedisavowed: But before the promise, he shall hold the business in suspense until he hath power. Moreover he shall instruct himself, from the Mouth of him which had gone before him in the said charge, and shall retire from him the Treaties, instructions, and papers of importance: And parting he shall give to have some one in the Prince's Court, which may Negotiate his business, and give him advice of all that passeth; for many times the Secretaries of Estate are so employed, as they have not leisure to satisfy all.  
If he goes for some particular affair, he must stay as little as may be upon the way, as well to prevent the advice, which might be given of the particular subject of his Embassy; the answer whereof he should find ready, having by his stay given them leisure, either to illude it, or to cross it: As for that according to the quality of the business, he might arrive so late, as they would mock at him. As Tiberius did of the Ambassadors which arrived to condole the death of his Children se●uen Months after: And he in mocking lamented the death of Hector, who was dead many hundred years before. The same reason requires, that they should demand audience as soon as they can, unless he finds the Court in mourning, or in open War, or some other accident of importance which serves for an excuse. He shall from the beginning show his gravity, ostentation or pride in his Countenance or train his courtesy and affability, accompanied with an honest carriage and modesty; hisexpence according to the places where he is. The Northern people desire a Table well garnished: Spain, and Italy, look more to followers and attendants, and to that which serves for show; In the Levant the greatest expense is in presents: But above all he must regulate his expenses according to his entertainment, and the means he hath to spend. For it is unseemly to live of borrowing in a strange Country.  
The manner of treating is also diverse. In Germany & Suizerland, they must have more money than words, more good cheer there then Art: In other Estates honour, compliments, and Orations, are better received; and in others the consideration of Religion hath more force. An Ambassador ought to be wary, least by too much diligence and affection, he do not augment the suspicion, which they may have of the sub●ect of his coming, and discover it by too much Art & talk; all things disguised affected and amplified, naturally breeds suspicion. They which demand succours do many times make their affairs so weak, (thinking to move pity,) as they are so far from moving those, from whom they crave succours, as they make them afraid to embark themselves with miserable persons. In such occasions he must march himself discreetly, and weigh his words: And the countenane in this doth sometime impart more than the thing itself.  
Above all things he must not treat with any other Prince, of that which concerns his Commission, but with him to whom he is sent. This was the answer of the Ambassadors of Florence, to the Emperor Maximilian, to whom they had been sent, he having appointed them to confer with the Duke of Milan, who should give them an answer for him: But they refused to do it, as a thing exceeding their Commission. And although his instructions ought to be as ample as may be: Yet affairs being subject to change, in a shorter time, then there is betwixt his parting & arrival, the Ambassador must, as they say, make War by the eye: as if he had been commanded to use mild words, and yet finds it more convenient to speak boldly or to change, or omit something mentioned in his Commission, he must govern himself with great circumspection. But he may not stray from his intention, unless he see that in leaving it, he may prevail in that which he hath undertaken. If he be constrained not to do some things contained in his instructions, and that the business is not subject to delay, he shall import it to two or three of the most understanding Servants, that his Master hath. (if happily there be any in the Country where he resides) to the end that the business succeeding ill, he may avoid the reproach, to have done it alone and without Cou●cell.  
There are certain things that are subject to disavow; as proud & insolent words, which an Ambassador might have used; or threats and practices which he attempts in the Estate where he resides, if it be without command: And therefore he must contain hinselfe, within the terms of his charge and the modesty that is required. It is fitting he should maintain the Dignity of his Master: But it must be without contempt, or offence to him towards whom he issent, And to the end he may discover all the passages in an Estate, he must be frequent and daily in Court, but when as the Prince retires himself privately for his pleasures: For than he should make himself suspect or importune. And in popular Estates, he must assist all diets meetings and assemblies: Or if he sees that this may breed some contempt, he should send some one of his. Besides money, which discovers the secrets of Princes, the entertainment of his Table is ofsome force. And although that all the intelligences which come from this sort of people which follow Tables, be not always current; Yet sometimes he shall meet with good ones. Wherefore he must weigh them, and attend the progress and issue before he judge of them; and observe not only what is said, but what is done. He must for this effect write often, and to many parts, to the end he may be the better advertised; and never respect the charge which cannot be better employed.  
He must visit the principal Councillors, the Secretaries of Estate, and amongst others him, who hath the division of Foreign affairs; he shall do the like to those which are in credit and favour with the Prince, although but of mean condition; applying himself in some sort to the custom, and manners of the Country, and how others have done before him. He shall inform himself discreetly of the present Estate of the Court; and how every Man stands in authority; wherein this authority consists, either in reputation and honour, or in effect and contention, every one according to his rank and degree, winning unto him if he may, the domestics and favorities of those which have authority. Having news from all parts, he shall still find occasions to discourse and parley with the Princes and great men, with pleasing subjects, to be merry with them; or if they be otherwise, and concern them, to condole, or to advise them to prevent it.  
He must visit the Ambassadors and Agents of other Princes and Commonweals, which reside in the same Court; but soberly, lest he give them occasion of jealousy. He must be wary not to discover himself wholly unto them, whatsoever they be; but rather seek to draw from them, then to leave any thing of his own, to the end he may always be the first to send the advice and pleasing news. And if the affairs which he pursues, succeeds not according to his desire, he shall make no show of it, nor seem to have any distrust or bad opinion of the Prince and others, with whom he negotiates. When he shall be entreated to do them any courtesy, he shall study to value it at as high a rate as may be; yet he must do it speedily and freely, letting them know, that he desires above all things to give them contentment and satisfaction. He shall commend and magnify the persons, the means, the greatness, the Country, the Laws, the manner of living, and whatsoever concerns the Nation; yet with such modesty and discretion, as there may be no show of flattery. He shall likewise extol the affairs of his Master with the like modesty and dexterity, to the end they may not grow jealous of him. When he shall find some stop in that which he desires to do, he shall not insist too eagerly upon it, although he had an apparent reason: But he shall with dexterity approve the reasons in part, and by other means seek to attain his Design. When it shall be needful to do or say any thing contrary to their will or liking, he shall excuse it in such sort, as they shall conceive that it proceeds not from the Ambassador, but from such as command him, and that he is sor●y t● do it, considering it doth not please him; yet ●ustifying the business by the best reasons he may, and giving them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing unto them. If they charge him to carry bad and distasteful words, he shall do better to cause them to give them in writing, rather than to pronounce the words.  
And if he finds that by one means he cannot obtain what he desires, he shall leave the business for a time, and refer it to some other occasion, which he shall find they desire of him, or shall have need of something; and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand, and so persuade them with grace and mildness. When he into obtain any thing of importance, he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatched, but shall solicit the expedition, yet with mildness and modesty: And if it con●sts in a promise for the future, he shall cause them to set it down in writing, and chose he shall be careful not to oblige himself nor his Master, but as late as seldom as may be. Entreating and contracting, he must cause the treaty to be set down in plain terms, not ambiguous nor captious, according to the terms and clauses of precedent treaties. It is certain that refusing flatly, or making a business full of difficulties, they offend him whom they refuse: Therefore an Ambassador not able to grant that which they demand of him, he must either give them other Counsel and direction, to attain to that which they desire; or he shall testify his goodwill by other gracious effects, and honest speeches which may palliate the denial. An honest man, (such as he ought to be that executes this charge,) must not be found a Liar, especially in matters of importance; for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more. He must therefore be wary not to deliver doubtful things for certain, nor trust wholly to the word and report of others: But he must allege his Author, or else say, that he had learned it from a good place, when he shall not dare to name the person. He shall do the like for things which concern his Master, the which he must deliver on his behalf. When they are such as there is no great certainty, or else may receive a change, he must deliver them with all discretion and staidness, lest he be reproached that they are circumvented by this means. And if it should happen that he could not well excuse a contrariety, yet he must cover and disguise it with some pretext, in regard of his Master by all means possible; and for himself likewise, purging and justifying himself, that he had never any intent to do a bad office, nor to make a bad report, nor to be author and instrument of deceit. The which must take place, when he is constrained either through the necessity of affairs, or by the commandment of his Master, to deliver one thing for another. The which he may not do often, lest he lose all his credit. But it sometimes falls out, an Ambassador lies without thinking of it: For that when one Prince means to deceive another, he first deceives the Ambassador whom he sends, to the end that delivering that which he holds to be his Master's intention, his reasons may be more forcible, assuring that which he speaks more boldly, having less intention and assurance of that which is dissembled. Wherein the Ambassador is not only excusable, but worthy of pity, in that they are distrustful of him, and mean to make him carry the Babble, and to serve as an instrument of deceit. Moreover he must not rely too much on those with whom he negotiates, neither yet wholly despair for those things which happen; for that affairs change easily, and affections likewise according to occurrents: And many times that which seemed impossible at one time, grows easy afterwards; and so the contrary.  
But one of the principal points whereof and Ambassador takes care, is to maintain the rank and dignity of his Master, especially with the Ambassadors of other Princes. For Princes do not subsist, but by the greatness and opinion they have of them: It argues a contempt if their rank be contested, and an Ambassador must must rather lose himself, then quit any things: And if the Prince with whom he remains, favours him that makes the attempt, after that he hath made instance to be maintained in his rank, he ought to retire. And for this point, it is usually observed in many places among Ambassadors, that they which come first, go to visit those which came last, although that the first comer go before them in rank.  

O● the privileges of Ambassadors.  Let us come to the privileges which the Ambassadors have in a strange Country. The principal is, that by the Law of Nations, they are inviolable, that is to say, in all freedom and safety: But it is in their Country to whom they are sent. For that if they pass through the Country of one that is Enemy to their Master, although allied to the Prince to whom they are sent, yet it would be necessary to take this passport, being not in that regard respected as an Ambassador, if he practiseth any thing against the Estate, or the Prince's person with whom he resides: For he cannot defend himself by the Law of Nations. And we must not doubt but having violated his Faith first, wherein the Law of Nations doth chiefly consist, but the Prince near whom he remains, and against whom he hath attempted, may cause him to be punished. Yet for that it may be that the commandment to attempt, proceeds from the Master, and that punishing the Ambassador, it were to fall upon the stone, and not on the Arm that cast it. Some Princes have used it more discreetly, contenting themselves to seize upon these undertakers expecting ●he avow or disavow of the Master: And being unable to draw either of them from him, to presuppose a confession, and then send them to their Master. Moreover, if the Ambassador commits any private outrage against one of the Prince's Subjects with whom he resides, unless it be to defend the dignity of his charge, or of his Master, many have held him justifiable before the Prince where he lives. For there is a great difference betwixt the Dignity and Authority of a Prince, in the Country of another Sovereign. He may well retain his Dignity, but not his Authority. But the most safe and the more seemly were before he do reason to the party, to demand it from his Master, who in that case would not deny it him so soon as in matters of Estate, and it is a means to free the Prince from slander of Injustice towards the Ministers of another Prince.  
As for his Domestickes, there is no doubt but they may be punished if they do ill. And if they or any other having sailed, retire into the Ambassadors house, he may be summoned to yield them, and to suffer justice to search his house: Otherwise after this denial the justice may do it, for that the house of an Ambassador ought not to serve for a retreat and Sanctuary to the wicked. Yet this search may not be done by simple Sergeant's, no more than the Summons: But it must be executed by the judge of greatest Authority in the place, accompanied with men of honour, with excuses, entreaties, and courteous words, as well to testify the respect which they bear to the Dignity of the Ambassador's Master, as to prevent the insolency and indiscretion which doeusually accompany Archers, Sergeants, and such other sorts of Ministers. But in stead of punishing the Domestickes of an Ambassador, after they have made their process unto condemnation, and caused the Civil party to be satisfied, some have pardoned them in his favour whose Subjects they are, sending them back with the process. Or if there be no such intelligence betwixt the two Princes, as the one will not be beholding to his cópanion, they may procure some common Ally underhand, to make the demand: To whom the Prisoners being delivered, he may send them to the Prince whose Subjects they are.  
Some Ambassadors have persuaded themselves, that they had all jurisdiction over their Domestickes, even to put some to death. But this is not grounded upon a reason, if the Prince with whom he resides doth not give him leave; as they say the Turk tolerates it with the Ambassadors of Christian Princes. Yet they may detain those Prisoners in their house, which practise against the service of their Master, until they have advertised him, and receive an answer; provided that they whom they detain, be not admitted as Ambassadors by the Prince, or Estate where they are: For in that case they are in freedom and safety. Behold how Ambassadors ought to govern themselves with strangers in a strange Country. We must now see being in those charges, how they ought to carry themselues to their Masters, to whom they serve as eyes and ears.  

How Ambassadors ought to carry themselves toward their Master.  Some have held that an Ambassador ought to give advice to his Master, of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him, for that the advertisement may come from some other, then from his Ambassador, who in such things ought to be careful not to be prevented, wherein we cannot give any certain Rules. Yet if the word hath escaped either in ●ho●ler, or from a passionate spirit, were it the Prince himself; being not spoken publicly, it were more discreetly done to conceal it from his Master, then to deliver it. For the Master that neither would nor could break, would seem offended at such a report, if the Estate of his affairs will not suffer him to demand satisfaction: And on the other side sometimes, in taking exception at an injury, he seems to confess it. But if the Ambassador finds it more expedient to conceal the words spoken by the Prince with whom he resides; he shall let him know, how much his Master would hold himself wronged, if they were related unto him: But that knowing the good which grows to both the Estates, by the Friendship in which the two Princes have lived, he had rather therein fail of his duty, in not making this report, then to be the occasion of trouble, and breach for a word spoken in choler.  
It is to no purpose to say, that in doing this, it were to show himself wiser than his Master; or that he must deliver all, and conceal nothing. For that which offends Princes, and invites them to resentment, is not so much the offence in itself, as the opinion they have, that the world knows they have been wronged; and if they do not seek some revenge, they should make a breach in their reputations, and invite others to affront and contemn them. So as the wrong being not published and known to all Men, and the Ambassador making it known that for the good of peace, he would conceal it from his Master, it doth no way touch the reputation of the Prince, who otherwise being held to be courageous, they would always believe, that if the report had been made unto him, he would not have endured it without revenge: There are many things which Princes are glad to have concealed; but those principally, for the which they cannot provide, without greatly incommadating their affairs, these aught to be dissembled and concealed from them.  
As for dispatches, 
Of their dispatches.  it is certain that they seldom know what an Ambassador doth in his charge●, but by that which he writes. He must therefore show himself by his dispatches, which must be grave, short, close couched, and mingled sometimes according to the Subjects, with passages of Sentences, yet seldom: And to be the more intelligible, some hold it fit that he should articulate every private action apart, not troubling himself with a continuance, and bond of clauses in diverse affairs, and he must acknowledge in all his letters, the reception of those to the which he makes answer. If he enforced to write many letters upon the same subject, and to the same place, as it happens usually, he shall do well to diversify the terms and style as much as may be, to the end they may not be like unto a Notary's Indenture, and that they which have received the like letters, coming to confer them together, may not think that he hath entreated them equally; every man esteeming of himself not only better than he is, but also more than his companion.  
He must have a care not to write any thing to his Master for true, concerning those with whom he negotiates, if he hath no testimony by Letters, or that he knoweth it from those in whom his master hath confidence, the which he ought to name: For that the change which may happen in a business, might cause a reproach and bad conceit of the minister, with his Master, either of lightness, or of little foresight. He shall be always esteemed to do more then to write, and to give them good hope when he shall see day, before he give them assurance and certainty of the business. As for the particular of the Ambassador, as we have said before, besides the Secretary of Estate, who is to receive his Dispatches, he must have some one which may give him advice of that which passeth. He with some other friends, must do him all sorts of good offices, in commending and praising his Services and dexterity. And the Ambassador on the other side, shall labour to have others write; especially men unknown to commend his industry and labour, absence causing a decay of opinion, and makes them sometimes forget the worth of a man, if by these practices they be not revived.    

THE COUNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greatest and most Remarkable Considerations serving for the Managing of Public Affairs. PART. II. CONTAINING THE MEANS how to preserve an ESTATE.  

CHAPTER I. Of the parts and conditions in general, necessary for a Prince and Sovereign.  
Having treated of that which is necessary for the settling of an Estate, we must consider of the means how to preserve it. It is not sufficient to build a strong ship to make a long and tedious Voyage; but we must withal provide a good Pilot to govern it, and to seek means to calk it, and trim it when it takes water, and to be able to resist the waves of the Sea, and the violence of the Winds and storms without shipwreck.  

The preservation of the Estate consists in the authority of a Prince.  That which serves for the Establishment, doth likewise serve for the preservation of an Estate; but we must likewise have other means to preserve this order, the which consists either in the authority of him that commands or in the remedy which they must find, against that which might ruin the Estate. The Authority of him which commands, proceeds either from the love of the people, or from his own reputation.  

The Love of the people cause the authority of the Sovereign.  Love alone would suffice him that hath once gotten it, were it not that he cannot promise any thing to himself from the inconstancy of Men, who love to day and hate to morrow, without any subject or occasion. Wherefore he which commands, must assure himself of Men long before, and not attend until he be reduced to the point of necessity. For then the danger being eminent, it is no more time, for that their faith is then shaken, and by this search he gives a testimony that he fears: the which many times doth hasten the Prince's ruin, and makes them fly from all reconcilment with him.  

divers means to gain his goodwill.  This Love is gotten by many means. The Beauty, Behaviour, Carriage, pleasing Countenance, and Courtesy, are sometimes of great force. With others Nobility, and reputation of their predecessors hath been of great use, although that they had not any other part that was recommendable. Among the Inhabitants of a City or Town, riches may likewise do something, if they use it as they ought.   

CHAP. 2. Of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase the Love of the People.  
But to treat in general of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase this goodwill, we will reduce them to three, Mildness, Bounty, and justice..  
From Mildness grows the peace of the Estate, the fidelity of the Subjects, and the Establishment of affairs, 
Effects of mildness in a Prince.  there being nothing that doth more force the people to honour their Lord, than the natural mildness which he shows, and practiseth to their good. Rigour makes him to be feared, and consequently not beloved, and this fear and cold Friendship lasts no longer, than the occasion of fear continues. But mildness governed with discretion, remains in the heart, and produceth its effect, whilst that Men which have received pleasure and profit live. This mildness is practised by the Prince principally, in three points. The first, is to pardon offences, but not those of the Estate; and to pardon those, who being discovered can hurt no more, and by using clemency unto them, may get some reputation; but not to those who may mutiny, and who by no means cannot be persuaded to submit themselves to reason: Mildness to such is cruelty to all others. It is cruelty I say to pardon a wicked Man, if by the impunity which doth follow, we be forced afterwards to dipp our hands deeper in blood.  
It is a stupid bounty, and a simplicity without discretion, to pardon all, and to suffer all. The excess of clemency, converts itself into a soft and effeminate nature: And if this bounty be not mingled with rigour, and facility with authority; it is mere carelessness blamable in a Prince, for that in suffering one fault, it soon draws after it another. Clemency is commendable towards an Enemy dejected and humbled: But whilst he wavers and stands in terms against us; it is weakness, amazement and fear, not to dare to resent it, he must therefore use mildness with discretion, yet in such sort, as they may always find the Prince more inclined to mildness then severity.  

To cherish great Men.  The second point, when they discover mildness, is chiefly to cherish great Men, and the chief of the Estate, and according to occasions, others: For that every Man esteeming himself of more worth than he is, they grow easily discontented if they make no reckoning of them. The third point, by the which he which commands may testify his mildness, is in showing himself indulgent in things, wherein the people take delight; Provided always that they fly excess and disorder. For by this means they mollisie the savageness of the Subject, they divert him from undertaking; and make every one more joyful in his vocation. Yet he must not suffer himself to be carried away with this indulgence, as through negligence, and the little care he had to provide for his Estate; but with a design and discretion restr●tiue in his time. For this effect he must also provide, (as we will show hereafter) for the abundance of Victuals and commodities, to the end that he may thereby testify the care he hath of his people, and by this care the affection he bears them. For if the people should fall into necessity, or into a dearth of Victuals, this mildness and indulgence would prove unprofitable; and the Prince would lose much of the Love of his Subjects: there being nothing that doth so much discontent them, as such discommodities; especially when it grows either through the Monopoles of the Prince, or the excess of custom.   

CHAP. 3. Of the liberality of the Prince.  
Liberality is of two sorts, 
Two sorts of liberality.  the one practised to the benefit of private persons; and the other to the profit and advantage of the Public. The one and the other well husbanded, serves to purchase Love to the Prince. For although he cannot extend his bounty to all in particular, for that it would be impossible his revenues should suffice: Yet a liberal Prince is beloved of every man; For that every man hopes to taste of his bounty according to his degree, making him his Friend; although that the facility of giving ruins the Estate sooner, than too great sparing. But no Man enters into consideration, how much sparing is necessary for a Prince, for the general good of his Estate: For that the number of those is small which doth in particular to hinder that which belongs in general to all. And yet as excess is unblamable in all actions, so it is most prejudicial to the Estate in this: And we have seen in our time, 
The excess of liberality in a Prince most hurtful to the Estate.  that moderate giving hath been a weak means to purchase the Subjects love to the Prince: For it rejects more than it gains; and if it be employed without respect of merit, it proves a shame to him that receives it, and is received without grace.  
The Subjects of a Prince excessive in gifts, makes them excessive in expenses, and importune in demands. They govern themselves not according unto reason but to custom: That which is received is no more accounted of: They love not liberality but for the future. Wherefore the more a Prince doth exhausted himself in giving, the poorer he grows in Friends; and from excessive prodigality, doth usually g●ow the poverty of a Prince: From poverty exactions and hatred in like manner. For the number of those from whom he takes by exaction, being greater than the Friendship of those to whom he gives; the Prince is in danger not to command long. If then he be reduced to one of these extremities, it were more expedient for the Prince to be poor and not hated of his Subjects, then to be hated and rich. For although that for a time he may force obedience, yet i● cannot be durable: And although that he which spares, seems in outward show to do good to few, yet not exacting from the Subject he doth good to all, whereas a prodigal Prince doth usually good but to few.  
We must therefore be careful to use this virtue well, thereby to purchase love. For although that the gifts and benefits, be in some sort in the liberty and freewill of him that gives: yet it hath certain distinctions and laws which restrain it, and especially in that which concerns the Prince; 
Considerations necessary in liberality.  who being but a simple dispenser of the Public Treasure, he ought not to employ it without hope of some profit to the Public. Wherefore he must consider what he gives, to whom, and when. For it is not needful to give to all that demands; as if the demander and deserver were one and the same thing: Likewise betwixt those which have deserved, he may not give to all that beg, for it would be found that they which have least deserved, have tasted of his liberality, and not the rest.  
And as the payment of a Bond ought to go before liberality; otherwise it would be injustice to give, at the charges of those to whom we are indebted: So Merit must be recompensed, before we do good to him that hath not deserved: And before Merits, services ought to march; and before services, debts and Bonds ought to be discharged. It is the Law of justice, not to do wrong to one, to gratify another, The which is very ill observed by the most part of Princes, who therein follow the nature of other Princes, which is, rather to do that which proceeds from their own will, than what is commanded them by justice, or that whereunto they are bound: For that in the first they acknowledged themselves Superiors, and in the second Inferiors; the recompense showing the merit and valour of him to whom it is given.  
Wherefore the benefit or liberality of the Prince, proceeds either from the acknowledgement of service, 
Diuer● kinds of liberality.  or of merit, or of his own freewill; or to invite and draw some one to love him, or to corrupt him, or to purchase the reputation to be liberal. Concerning the first two sorts of bounty, they are necessary, as well for the satisfaction of those which receive them, 
Of the liberality which is used for the acknowledgement of service and merit.  as for the contentment of the General, who by the example would be invited to conform their actions to the good of the Estate. For the acknowledgement of a benefit is no less esteemed, then if the liberality proceeded from a free will: For that the good and pleasure which they do, proceeds many times from the abundance of wealth, and the great power which he hath that gives, as well as from goodwill: But acknowledgement cannot come but from the desire he had to do good, so as although to give and do good, be more to be desired, yet the content which they feel, is peradventure more commendable, as proceeding only from a frank & free courage.  
And it is that whereof among private persons we have experience, that the benefit which comes from a bond or debt, is more pleasing than that which comes unto us from the freewill of another: For that in this consists the content of the giver, who chargeth ys with a bond which binds us; and which in some doth rather engender hatred then Friendship; especially if the benefit exceeds all Satisfaction. In the other, besides the pleasure to receive the benefit, we receive content to see that we acknowledge the former good which we have done them.  
And although that they which love us, deserve to be requited for their goodwill towards us, as being the principal part of the benefit: Yet it deserves rather to be recompensed by a Prince, with kind usage and good words, then by effects; the which he must keep to recompense effects, otherwise his Revenues would not ●ustice. Yet if he finds that some for want of this, withdraw themselves from him, although unjustly and with out cause, it shall be necessary that he retain them by the mildest means he can, and rather in doing them good, then in employing threats, who according to their natural disposition, might be the more incensed.  

That a Prince 〈◊〉 show him 〈◊〉 liberal to those which may se●ue him against ●is enemy, be th●y o● a contrary pa●●y.  The Prince may also bestow gifts and benefits of those, which may serve him against his Enemy; I say to those which are of a contrary party, to draw them unto him. For as it is a vice in them to suffer themselves to be corrupted, so it is a virtue and wisdom in the Prince to corrupt and gain them. And as some have not allowed of this expense, for that the advantage which we expect is doubtful, having to deal with traitors, who may as well betray the Prince which gives them, as him they serve: Yet the general experience is contrary; being most certain that the Minister which takes, sells himself, be it that the money binds him, or that the shame to have received, stays him from failing of his promise; Or that the fear to be discovered makes him to be suspected of him he serves, and to him that gives him, which were a means to ruin him with the one and the other, forcing him of necessity to keep his word with him that hath corrupted him; being in his heart grown irreconciliable to him whom he hath resolved to betray. Besides few men of quality suffer themselves to be corrupted, unless they be transported, by some hatred, contempt, or desire of Revenge, which they have conceived against him whom they serve: Or they are not disposed in heart and affection, to love him w●ich corrupts them, there being nor● but base spirits, or needy persons, which suffer themselu●s to be corrupted for mere avarice.  
The liberality which is used to particular persons, to purchase re●utation, 
Of the liberality of the Prince to purchase reputation.  extends commonly either to strangers, or to Subjects, which do not know nor frequent the Prince's Court, who ought to have in no ●●sse recommendation tho●e which a●● remote from his Court, then others which are daily in his eye: For that the greatness and majesty of the Prince doth not take its foundation and increase to know, but to be known of many: And the honour and reno●n● to aid and do good to another, should b● too ●uc●●●strained, if his succours and benefits s●ould proceed no farther, then to such persons whom they see and know. Behold wherein usually the bounty of Princes to private p●rsons is employed,  
In their manner of giving they must observe three things. The first, 
The manner of giving.  not to g●ue at the request of a third person, to the ●nd that he which receives may be bound unto him, and not to the other, by who●e importunity he gives. The ma●n●rof giving must be in such sort, that although it be for an acknowledgement or recompense, yet they to whom it is given, receive the benefit with an obligation; otherwise the gift were fruitless, and is held for a payment, and not a liberality; so as they encourage him that receives, to demand g●ine, rather than to acknowledge that which they hau● given him.  
The t●i●d is, to give in the view of all men, to purchase reputation. For although that in a private lib●tality this were not commendable; yet this manner is necessary in the Estate, where the Actions of Princes must be apparent and visible, neither must they be unfruitful; And it sufficeth not to do a pleasure; but you must make him that receives it, acknowledge that it is done to such an intention. As for the measure of benefits, they must be proportionable to the time, and to the persons, 
Benefits must be proportionable t● the time.  as well of him that receives, as of him that gives. And for the time, sometimes a small succour given in necessity, obligeth not only more than a great gift would do at another time; but sometimes causeth an Enemy to forget all the wrongs he had received, there being two things in concurrence in this benefit, either of which may do much for a reconciliation, and by consequence for love. The one is, for the benefit and pleasure he doth him, in the best time that could be; I mean at need. The other is the assurance that he which receives the benefit, takes of his good will that succours him so opportunely. Thus he must observe the time to give esteem to his benefits, to the end the Debt may be the greater. As for persons, the humours being diverse, the Prince must observe the humours of his Ministers, not only as I have said, to impart their Offices unto them, but also▪ for his recompenses: For that some demand honours, others ●iches, according to the which he must govern himself.  
And for that there are more men found which affect Riches, 
recompenses 〈◊〉 li●n●ur m●●t ●ee well 〈◊〉.  than honour; and that being willing to satisfy every man's desire, he should be forced to exhaust his treasure: He must (as much as may be) encourage his Subjects to seek for Honours, as recompenses which can not impoverish him; and yet use it in such sort, as it may seem that he doth not give them without discretion and election. For when as Honour is imparted to unworthy men, it gins to be contemned, and to lose this Title of Honour, as likewise he may not mingle it with profit, for that many would make more esteem of profit, then of Honour.  
If the liberalities of Princes towards private persons, doth get them goodwill, not only from those which taste the fruit, 
Liberality of the 〈◊〉 towards ●h● Publ●qu●.  but also from all others which participate in hope: That which the Sovereign practiseth towards the Public, as being more profitable, and ex●nding to more persons, should purchase unto him more generally the affection of the people: As the Succours which the Prince gives in public calamities, in famine, plague, dearth, burning of Towns, War, invasion of Enemies, Earthquakes, inundations, and such accidents. For that the Prince alone may give this relief, being necessary to have means wh●ch exceed the ordinary: The reason of Estate will not allow that any private person, although he were able to do it, 
The Liberality of a private person towards the Public is not to be allowed.  should enter into this kind of liberality, which it may be would advance him in the love of the people before the Prince. And in Commonweals and popular Estates, ●ome private person having attempted to show their bounty, have been punished, as men which sought by this means ●o seduce the people, and to usurp the Estate.  
Seeing then that this liberality is fitting only for the Prince, he must practise it as much as may be, and not suffer occasion to be lost. There is another sort of liberality, which the Prince may practise to the benefit of the Public, 
Liberality of the Prince towards the Public, which consists in advancing virtue  no less importing then the other: which is to advance to virtue, by the establishment and foundation of Seminaries of Piety and Religion, of Schools and Colleges for all sorts of Sciences which may serve the Public: Of Houses of Honour and Virtue, for the practices and exercises which may serve in War; and of other places for all sorts of Workmen and Artisans, for the bringing in of Manufactures, whereof I have formerly treated.   

CHAP. 4. Of the Princes justice..  
Justice is generally bel●ued and desired: But when they will practise it against private persons, the commiseration they hau● o● a con●emned man, or the colour of some contrary reasons, joined to interest and obstinacy, make the rigour and severity odious to many. Wherefore in a manner in all Estates, the exercise of justice hath been divided into two parts. That which concerns the punishment of crimes, 
justice divided into two parts.  and the deciding of controversies betwixt man & man, hath been left to the Magistrates and inferior Officers to the Prince, to free him from the envy and hatred which condemnations draw after them: And that which concerns the distribution of Dignities; honours, charges, recompenses, pardons, and rewards, hath been retained by the Prince, to gain the love of the Subjects. Yet the Prince, even in that which concerns private men, 
wherein the prince ought to show himself a 〈◊〉 of justice in ●●gard of private men.  may show himself a lover of justice, and by this means win the affection of his people, not incurring any envy by the establishment he shall make of Laws, necessary to suppress the fraud and violence of his Age by the choice he shall make of good men to administer justice: And by the care he shall take to keep them in awe, in prescribing the form of the administration o● justice.. The fraud's most usually practised in an Estate by private persons, are disloyalty, usury, falsehood, frauds, and Monopolies; by the which some grow suddenly rich, & some extremely poor; whence many times grow the despair of those whom they thrust into innovations; & the insolency of the others which makes them insupportable: and from the one and the other grows trouble, and in the end the ruin of the Estate follows. Against this kind of disorder and abuse, the Prince must show himself affectionate for justice, by the ordaining of ●igorous punishments against such as shall be surprised; as also in blaming them in his discourses, according to the occasions which shallbe offered, and by admonitions and exhortations to judges in general, not touching any one in particular, and of persons otherwise odious.  
And particularly usury or interest, 
Against usury.  (which cannot be defended) ought to be regulated at much less than the ordinary gain of those which borrow, (be they Merchants or Laborers) may mount unto; to the end that the poor in borrowing of the rich, may lay, and pay that which they are forced to borrow; and thereby avoid the ruin of the poor by usury, and that of the rich by banquerupts whereof they are the cause. As for violence which is committed in an Estate, it is of two sorts, 
Two sorts of violence in an Estate which the Prince ought to suppress.  the one is of thieves and Robbers, who by open force and Arms, trouble the safety of private persons: against the which the Prince hath a double reason to oppose himself, as well for that all force ought to be in his hands, as for that he is Established to maintain the peace and safety of his subjects, not only against strangers, but also among themselves, and the Prince which comes and doth not give order, looseth the love of his Subjects, and exposeth his reputation to contempt, which makes him in the end lose all his authority; and is in danger that these thieves seeing themselves strong, will trouble him in his Estate: But this is easily prevented in lending a strong hand to justice, and causing those to assist, which are appointed for the apprehension of such persons.  
The other so●t of violence contrary to justice, is the oppression of the poor by great Men, 
Of the oppression of the poor●.  be it that it is made by the unlawful exactions of money, or of day works, beating, or other riots, to prevent the which, the Prince must n●t only in his ordinary discourses condemn this ma●●er of proceeding, threatening them to be punished, without taking notice of any person in particular; but also that whic● shall concern the punishment of private men, he must l●aue free to the ordinary justice, to dispose according to the Laws, without assisting the delinquents with any favour or pardon; as many Princes usually do, who trouble the order of justice by such impunities, and ruin their Estates by maintaining such people. And we have often seen, that a Prince hath saved the life of some such man, 
〈◊〉 Princes 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, ●n 〈…〉.  who in a combustion hath been the first to raise the Subjects, and to draw his sword against him. This is the recompense which such Princ●● deserve. They come by degrees to pride and disobedience, as to all other vices. He that hath dared this day to coa●●●ne the Law and the Magistrates, to morrow will co●t●●ne the Prince who hath made the Law, and ha●h established the Magistrate; and if occasion be offered will attempt against him.  
I mean not for all this to tie the Prince's hands, so as he may not give a pardon: 
〈◊〉 wherein 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉.  There are cases in which justice doth allow it: But besides when as some great and public profit requires it; as if it be for a man, from whom the Public hath drawn great and famous Services; or if by the punishment there will follow some trouble in the Estate: The Prince in this case for a gre●t●r good, or to avoid a great mischief, may dispeace a●d pardon him. But before he resolve, he must examine duly what he intends ●o do, and he must not flatter himself in his considerations, to favour some one ●g●inst justice, which considerations he shall keep secret, l●●t they draw unto a consequence: And moreover, before he comes to that, if there be any particular interest, it must be satisfied with such contentment, as there may be nothing to be desired, nei●her from him which hath offended, nor ●●om the Prince's ●ustice.  
Among all the violences and oppressions which great Men commit, the most dangerous to an Estate, and which ought to be less supported by the Prince, is that which is done against the Magistrate, 
That the grace and savour of the Prince not extend to have violence done against the Magistrate.  either in executing his charge, ●or in hatred thereof. For this is to attempt directly against the Public, and to overthrow the order of justice, making (by the impunity of such violences) the Magistrate fearful in t●e execution of the Princes will. He that endures these violences, not only seems to love justice and the public good but little, but also makes them think that he fears to punish them by the ordinary course of justice; and in such connivences he loseth both the love of his people and his reputation.  
The second point wherein a Prince may show his ●ffection towards justice, 
Of the choice a Prince ought to make of judges & Magistrates.  is the choice which he shall make of those which shall administer it for him: As contrariwise, the indifferency which he shall show, to make use of the first commer●, will discover his carelessness. I mean to speak here not only of those which are destinated to judge the controversies of private persons, but also of all such as under the Prince's Authority, have any power or command, according unto which they may do something justly or unjustly. For justice is mingled and practised in all actions, be they private or public. Every man is a judge in his charge. And we must not say, that there being good justice, we may not punish those who under the Prince's Authority shall offend in other Offices. For besides the Difficulty which is sometimes found, the same may they say of judges. But the Prince's foresight may pass farther, and hinder the mischief and injustice as much as may be. It is the last remedy to punish; and we must do what possibly we may not to come unto it. To prevent all this, we must use choice; whereof few Prince's dream, and the contempt of this choice in some Estate● is proceeded so far as Offices are given to them that wil● o●fer mo●t. An apparent sign that these Estates are near unto their ruane.  

I 〈◊〉 m●anes 〈…〉 t●o●e which ●re to be established in the administration o● justice.  Some Princes have had this care, to propound in public the names of those whom they meant to send into Provinces, to see what might be objected before they sent them. Others have made Rolls, of those that were to be employed in Offices, causing themselves to be informed secretly by good men: And others have chosen them according to the opinion of the people. But the safest means is that whereof we have spo●en, to cause them to execute the meanest Offices from degree to degree, before they were advanced to others of great importance. For then more men are able to testify of their Experience and Discretion; and their Actions being as it were public, and apparent to all the World, it is more easy to judge 〈◊〉 petty charges they will accustom themselves to do well, for the desire they have to be advanced to greater: And admit they would transgress, besides that the evil cannot be great, it may be easily corrected.  

〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 must 〈◊〉 ca●e to 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 to do● 〈◊〉.  But this is not all, to have chosen such as must attend justice (although that it would be more than half the work, to have chosen them good and capable men) but man changeth; and many times amidst the malice of men which are reported unto him to judge, he learns to be malicious. Wherefore the Prince must always have an open eye to maintain them in Integrity: And this demonstration which he shall make, in reproaching them for some fault which they have committed, will in a manner suffice in an Age that is not too much corrupted: But in another, he must according to occurrents add to his helping hand, to prevent the mischief. 
〈◊〉 means 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉.   
One of the means to avoid the evil, and to preserve the integrity of I●dges, is, after that h●e hath made choice of honest men, to give them means to enentertaine themselves in serving the Public: To the end he may draw them from the thought, which necessity might force them to, to gather goods by unlawful means. Others have held Officers in awe by inquieries made from time to time. But the Commissioners of these searches being as well subject to corruption as the rest, this cou●se hath not been long observed.  
Moreover, 
Of the compositions with officers, misbehaving▪ themselves in their charges, ●and of the inconveniences which follow.  Princes thrust on by the harpies of the Court, have many times made use of these means, rather to gather together money, then to reform disorders: I here having been (under the like pretext) a public concussion drawn into many Estates, the which hath equalled (by the means of general and particular compositions which have been made) good men with the wicked; No man how good soever, being desirous after a long vexation of imp●isonment, and proceeding to run the hazard of a judgement of Commissioners; whereof some are many times partisans, or depending of partisans for such compositions, or rewarded by the Fines and Confiscations which they make; and for a small matter would hang a man to have his clothes.  
Another mischief which is committed in such compositions, is, that by the means thereof the wicked remaining still in his Office, under hope to be freed another time at the same rate, do worse than they did before: And he which is an honest man, seeing himself compelled and forced to pay a Fine for an oftence which he hath not committed, resolves to do it, as well to re-embource himself, as to have means another time to satisfy the avarice of the Authors of such searches. 
That a Prince having pardoned an Officer, may not suffer him in his charge.   
Wherefore they must either make no enquieries, or else they must finish them by the course of justice.. But if in such things the Prince will show savour, and pardon some one man's life: At the least after he is reprehended, he may not suffer him to continue in his place, as well to take from him the means of ill doing, as not to make the charge contemptible, and himself odious, in maintaining a person therein, who hath been held of a bad life. 
Of Spies in cuery Province to inquire of the carriage of Officers.  There are Princes which have made use of spies, w●om they sent throughout the Provinces, to inquire of the actions of officers: And these for that they were unknown, might easily enter into all places, and observe the actions of one and another, and sometimes do bad offices unseasonable for the honestest men, yet the Prince being wise and not relying upon the report, but tying them to a secret proof, and without any brute, may make use of it, and ought not to neglect this means.  

Secret delations practised by King L●wis the ●w●lfth to contain his Officers in their du●y.  Lewis the twelfth who was called the Father of the People, for that he held a strict hand over ●ustice, making his ordinary abode in Blois, examining himself secretly, those which come to Court from all parts of his Realm, and sometimes passengers of that which was done, as they had heard spoken in the place from whence they came, and especially of great Men, and of his Officers; and finding by report of many, some advisoes conformable, against some one, he caused him to be put into the hands of justice, to inform of his life, and to punish him: And in this manner he contained every man in his duty. Secret delations have been brought into Scotland, by an ancient Edict of Conan King of Scotland, the which they say is yet practised at this day, and is called Indict: But better by the ordinance of Milan, by the which in all their Towns there must be a hollow Trunk in the chief Church, whereof the Governor hath the Key, into the which it is Lawful for any man, to cast the libel of accusation secretly, containing the crime committed, the time, the p●ace, the offenders, & the witnesses; and this ordinance gives a moiety of the confiscation to the dilator: which is a great means to facilitate the punishment of crimes.   

CHAP. 5. Of the administration of justice..  
IN the form of the administration of justice, 
Considerations necessary for a Prince, for the administration of justice..  among private persons, the Prince ought to have an eye of the order, to the speedy expedition, and to the putting off of charges, and ordinary expenses, which they consume in pleading, the which many times exceed the principal. Order is as it were an essential part of justice: For where there is confusion, there can be no justice: and to avoid this confusion, they must provide that no jurisdiction attempt not against another. For the which they must have a care, not only among those which are of equal power, distinguished by places, or by certain kinds of causes: But also betwixt inferiors and superiors. Contrariwise they must strictly bind the parties upon great penalties, to follow their suits by those degrees, and in that place which is appointed for them by the Law: And the Prince must hinder, that by Euocations either to himself, or to some other of his Subjects, there may be ●o contravention without great cause.  
In the speedy expedition, the Prince shall testify his affection to the good of ●ustice, in taking away the power of judge's 〈◊〉 prolong delays, and favour those that fly from tryal●, i● shortening as much as he may, by the adnice of the m●st judicious of his Estate, the style, and form of their ordinary proceeding, as well in Establishing Fines and Amercements against those that fail and de●ay, as in diminishing the degrees of juridiction, 
The expense of pleaders.  and other tediousness in p●ediang. As for the expense, the pleader suffers in three or four sorts. The one, when he is forced ●o go far from his house and family: For besides that he is not able to attend his domestic affairs during his absence, they perish most commonly in regard thereof; the charges as well of his voyage as of his return, are much greater than in his house. The remedy hereof is, to settle in a great Estate judges in every Province, and if it may be, in the midst, to the end that the extremities may not be too remote. I mean not only of judges, which may judge in the first instance, but also of those to whom they will give power to judge definitively, for ordinary causes, and which dese●ue not the cha●ge of a journey of a hundred, or six score leagues.  
Another expense is for the vocations of judges, who as we have said, 
Of the vocations of judges  aught to be honestly entertained by the public, and private men freed of that charge. But if they fear that their vocations being reduced to ordinary wages, many amongst them would neg'ect to labour: They may conclude that the sum appointed by the public for the payment of their vocation, shall be divided amongst them according to their labour, which shall be taxed by the whole company. There being nothing so unseemly for a seat of justice, then to take money from the hands of one of the parties, yea his just Fee; and yet there is nothing so ordinary in this age, in a manner in all Estates.  
Another expense is of Registers, Ushers, and such other ministers of justice, whose taxes they must not only Regulate, 
Of tax of Registers, Ushers, and such other Ministers' o● justice..  but also limit the time, in the which they ought to deliver the expeditions to the parties, and that vpo● great penalties. For a party which sees that he may spend much, will be willing to give unto a Register halfe that which it would cost him, besides his tax, then to grow obstinate, to pay nothing but the tax, set down by the orders, and to be constrained to consume twice as much in s●aying to attend his expedition. 
Of the expense o● 〈…〉, a●d 〈◊〉.   
But the greatest and most excessive expense, is that of Solicitors, Proctors, and Advocates, which is a very difficult thing to order: And some have held, that we must leave this means to those of this quality, to enrich themselves in serving others, there being Grooms as they say of all prizes. Yet if they cou●d set down an order, which might be easily executed, it would be a great benefit for justice: But having not been hitherto found, at the least it would require the fore-●●g tanned justice of the Prince. to provide in such sort, as poor Men desiring to recover their own, might be● freed from this cha●ge.  
For this effect it hath been sometimes propounded, to oblige those, which desire to come in time to great offices of this profession, before they should attain unto any, they should undertake the pursuit of causes freely, and that it should not be lawful for them to take any Fee; upon pain of concussion, and to be made uncapable ever to enter into any office for the future. These being commonly Men of means, desirous to win honour and in an Age when desire is most ardent: will strive in Envy one of another to protect the poor, when as for their recompense they should propound unto them, some place being void of those whereunto they aspired, to prefer●e him which had defended the greatest number. Besides the benefit which the poor should reap, the Public should have advantage; in that they which should enter into these charges, had given some testimony of their integrity and sufficiency: Whereas the custom is at this day, to place Scholars coming from School, in the companies of judges, with little Learning and less experience, and having given no proo●es of their discretion.  
There is another point wherein the Prince may likewise testify his affection to the good of justice, 
Of the verificaion of Edicts by the ●ourse of Parliament.  when he submits his Laws and Edicts to the judgement of those, to whom he hath referred the last appea●es of his justice, before he ●auseth him to be executed. The Kings of France, above all others, have been curious to be held justicers: And although that otherwise, they have made profession of Arms and War, more than any other Princes, yet they would be in all places, in their Seal, and in their throne of justice.. But above all others they of the last race, have affected this Name to be great justicers; having brought in the verification of their Edicts, by their Courts of Parliament, before they will cause them to be executed; stopping the mouths of such by this formality, as would impugn their commandments with injustice, in giving more authority to the execution, and preserving themselves from surprise and importunity.   

CHAP. 6. Of the Reputation of the Prince.  

Of the meanus how a Prince may purchase reputation.  THe reputation of a Prince, is the other part which gives him authority. It is gotten by many means. But we will begin with the principail, which are Prupences, and Valour. Prudence serves him as an eye to see, 
Of Prudence and Valour in a Prince.  and to consider all things. Valour serves him as a hand. Without the one he should be like a blind Man, and without the other weak and unable. Prudence gives him Counsel, and Valour force. The one commands and the other executes. The one discovers the difficulties of erterprises; and Valour breaks them. The one designs affairs; and this finisheth them. The one sharpens the judgement; and this fortifies the courage.  

That a Prince mu●t have a general knowledge of all Sciences.  Prudence to be such as it ought to be in a Prince must be accompanied, with a general knowledge of all sorts of Sciences, not exactly, as to make a trade and profession; but he must know as much as is necessary for him, to distinguish truth from falsehood, and to understand those which discourse according to occurrents. His profession is not to be an Engineer, to build houses, to make a Bridge, or to be a good Cano●neere: But to know those that are most fit; and judiciously to make use of Men of all sorts of professions. Neither must the Prince be amazed at this knowledge, which is required in him as of a thing impossible, amidst the variety of affairs and occupations, which they of this quality have usually; nor to distrust his understanding and capacity: For there is nothing therein but is most easy.  
And among other means to get this general knowledge, the principal is to have about him a good number of Men, great in all sorts of Sciences, as D●uines, Philosophers, Mathematicians, and Captains, for whom (be it attable or else where,) he may in few words learn that which cannot be apprehended in many months at school: To give them a subject of discourse, in walking, be it on foot or horsbacke, going a hunting, and in all other occasions; to keep them prepared, so as presenting themselves before him, they may be ready to deliver something that is rare and excellent. Yet he must remember, if he means to have them discourse before the world in his presence, to advertise them secretly sometime before, of that which he means to propound, to the end they may be prepared; for the most sufficient may be surprised: And not to reprehend him before the world; the which would do wrong to his reputation, and that of the Prince would likewise suffer, for that they would conceive he had made a bad choice. Thus the Prince employing the time only, which others spend in the encounters of jesters, he will in a short time be as learned as shall be necessary for him.  
Alexander, julius Caesar, Charlemaigne, 
The practice of many great Princes.  Charles the wise King of France, and Alphonso the tenth King of Castille, had not want of affairs and employments: And yet they found l●isure to read, and ●ome to write. Alphonso the first King of Naples, who in his time had as many affairs and closes as any other of his quality, said, that a Prince without Learning was an Ass Crow●ed.  
Experience is the Mother of Prudence, for that many things seem grounded vpo● re●son, 
Of experience.  and easy in familiar discourse; the which being put in execution, succeed not, as they conceive: but chose they have found some impossible. 
Two sorts of experience.  Experience is of two sorts. For either we get it of ourselves, by that which we observe, and whereof we are eye witnesses: O● by the report of others. The report of others, is either of the living, or such as are dead. In regard of the first, although it extends not far, by reason of time; Yet it may embrace many places, for that Ambassadors, Spies, Merchants, Soldiers, and such like persons, who (either for pleasure, or for affairs, or for some other subject,) have been in many places, and have found themselves in diverse Encounters, may teach us many things for our conduct.  

The knowledge o● history necessary for a Prince.  But History passeth much farther, and with much more profit: For there is seen the life of the world, the manner▪ and fashions of Nations; the diverse Establishment of Estates; the beginning, progress, midst, and end, and the causes of the increase, and ruin of Empires. There may be learned the causes, for the which some Prince's reign peaceably, and others in troubles and conbustion; Some in making war, and others in being prodigal; And some stayed in their expenses with dignity. But to relate here all that is necessary to Prudence, we must make a repetition of all that is formerly spoken, this treaty tending only to this point, we will content ourselves to propound some rules, which concern only the Prudence of the Prince.   

CHAP. 7. Rules and necessary instructions for a Prince to be held wise.  
A Prince may easily judge by himself what may be the deliberations of all others of his condition. Interest is the part and reason which prevails, and makes the resolutions, bend to that side where it shows itself: And therefore he must neither trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest.  
A Prince must oppose himself against a mischief in its breeding, and resolutely: For that disorders grow, and fortify the●selues in such manner with time, as they surpass our forces. But when the mischief exceeds the forces of the Prince, than he shall do well to defer it, for that with time matters may change: & he that hath time, as they say hath life. He may not consent t●at they put any thing in deliberation, which may cause cha●ge or innovation in the Estate: For that the propositions which are made in the Prince's Council, give him credit, how strange and pernicious soever they be It is a sign that there is some difficulty to discover the good and evil that is in this subject, seeing they bring it into consultation.  
He must not think in his resolutions to be able to avoid all inconveniences: For that cannot be. There is no generation of things in this world, how good soever, but a corruption hath gone before it. But he must weigh the inconveniences, and choose the party wherein there are least, and most easy to prevent. He may not embrace many Erterprises at once: For he that embraces too much, gripes not fast: But he must assure his Estate before he attempts a War of a long continuance.  
He may not quarrel with one more powerful than himself, but dissemble the injuries of the mighty, and the offences which cannot be punished. To yield sometimes to time, and rough encounters is Wisdom: And in a strong storm to strike fail, and to accommodate himself ●ith the strongest, yea with disadvantage, to prevail over the weaker. And thus the Prince shall increase the courage of his Men, and make himself fearful to his Enemies: It being not Wisdom to commit himself to hazard and Fortune, for a light matter.  
The Prince may not make any sudden change, for that it cannot be done without violence; and violence doth seldom producean effect that is durable. Being ready for the execution of an Enterprise, he may ●ot defer it, unless he finds an apparrant danger in the execution: For time may breed more harm then good. He must likewise prefer old things before new, rest before trouble, the centaine before the uncertain, and safety before hazard.  
He may not break nor attempt against powerful commonweals, unless it be with great advantage, and in a manner a certain hope to prevail. For the love of liberty to such as have it, is so strong; as it is a difficult thing, yea impossible to root it out: And moreover the Enterprises and designs of Princes, die with them; but the resolutions of such free Estates are immortal. He may not likewise break with the Church for a small matter. For that many other Princes, who would be glad to work their own ends, under pretext of Religion, and of succouring the Church, will be glad to join w●th it: And the Wars of Princes against Popes, are of great expenses and little profit.  
We have spoken formerly of the election of Ministers; we will add here, that he must have a ●are they may be equal to the affairs, not superiors, nor inferiors. For that they which esteem themselves capable of a greater matter, then that which is committed unto them, neglect it, and contemn it; and they which are uncapable, and cannot discharge the place, disgrace and are prejudicial to those that employ them.  
If his Estate be great, to discharge himself of some humours, he may entertain a War with some of his Neighbours: Yet he may not continue it so long, as he shall make his Enemy too Warlike: But shall make a peace with him, although he himself were the stronger. For by this means he shall give a Law to the treaty, and may preserve his advantages, and then begin War with another: He shall make himself powerful and fearful to all, being still Armed, and having Men enured to War. This is the Turks use with his Neighbours, who hath settled himself in his conquests by this means: It being a great indiscretion in a Prince, to forbear to make a peace, until he can make no more resistance. For then all the conditions are to his disadvantage: And admit he would not continue the War against some one of his Neighbours; Yet he may not wholly relinquish Arms; for that a disarmed peace is weak.  
But he must have a special care not to attempt a War against his subjects; and if he be pressed to it, let it be with great advantage, and end it speedily: For the more the War continues, the more his subjects are incensed and estranged from him; so as they can neither obey him, nor afterwards trust in their Prince. Wherefore he must not oppose himself directly against a multitude: For admit he should prevail (the which notwithstanding would be difficult) it cannot be without loss of the love which they bear him. But like unto good Mariners, he shall take aside wind, when as that in the Pope is contrary; and shall make show to give that, which he cannot hinder nor take from them. But above all he must be wary in divisions of his Estate, not to r●maine partial; and in the place of Prince to make himself head of a party. The Erterprises wherein courage is necessary, must be performed with Celerity, the which will give us the advantage which we want, and which we cannot have by our own forces. Celerity strikes suddenly; and against force if we have time, we may fortify ourselves with that which is necessary to resist.  
The one puts an Enemy in disorder, and the other breaks him: And it is more easy to disorder him and then break him; then to break those at the first charge, that are in order. Yet there are certain erterprises, in the which we must use time and patience, not rash violence; for that delay weakens with time and occasion; and it is more easy to weaken then quite overthrow a business, then to force it suddenly.  
Above all things the Prince must study to know the opportunity of occasions, for his erterprises and affairs; which is no other thing but an encounter of many circumstances, which makes that easy which before seemed eifficult. He may not commit the execution of a● Enterprise to him, which is not of advice, it should be attempted; For that the will cannot be followed by the effect, if the understanding doth not incline thereunto, and serve him for a guide: And he which hath not held a business easy before the Execution wi● find more difficulty in the Execution. He must consult naturally of Enterprises: But, as I have said elsewhere, he must leave the means of the Execution, to the discretion of him to whom he commits it. For the Execution depending for the ●ost pa●t, upon opportunity and present occasions which vary continnally, to limit it is no other thing, then to entangle the Minister, and to spoil the business.  
A Prince must not think in flying to preserve himself in mischief and danger; but he must oppose against it: For that in flying, he not only follows, and fa●ls upon us; but withal many other da●g●rs grow: Whereas in making head we stay him, and then we repulse him in time; and the danger most commonly dissolves to nothing. In consulting of an Enterprise, he must avoid sharp Counceil and full of subtlety; for they seldom succeed, and a few crosses make them unprofitable: As also those which have mo●e show and vanity than a good foundation. In the Estate he must build upon that which is solid and firm: As likewise he m●st fly th●se which are full of expenses, and above his forces and means. But he must fo●low Council grounded in reason upon safety, and little subject to be crossed by accidents. Yet he that assails, must hazard sometimes: But when the question is to preserve, he must commit nothing to Fortune. Wherefore slow Counsels are more fitting for great Princes, which have more need to preserve, then to get, and those which are sudden will be more proper for conquerors.  
But in doubtful occasions which are urgent and precipitate, there is nothing worse than slow and middle Counsels. Courage will be always more profitable, and less prejudicial, unless they be resolved wholly to yield. In affairs where the reasons are strong on all parts, and where it is in a manner impossible to see and choose that which is most commodious and profitable, (the which breeds in us doubts and perplexities) the best is to incline to that party, where there is more honesty and justice.. For although it miscarries; yet we shall always have a satisfaction remaining in us, and a glory outwardly, and to have chosen the best: Besides, no man knows what might have happened, if we had chosen t●e contrary party. Finally if we doubt which is the best, or shortest way: We must hold the straightest.  
We must not in difficult affairs, dive into all sorts of inconveniences, not in accords and treaties, trouble ourselves wi●h nice points, which grow usually in treating: But we must look to the main, and to assurances. I m●ght add here●n●o an infinite number of other rules, the which might ●e●ue a Prince to make him to be held Prudent in practising them. Yet I do not hold that in matter of State, he should so tie himself to rules and maxims, as he should not pe●ze and weigh the circumstances, and particularities of affairs: For he may encounter with such a circumstance, as he shall be forced to take a resolution contrary to maxims. But the greatest sig●e of prudence in a Prince, is to be secret: Otherwise he should betray himself; and none of his resolution's would succeed.   

CHAP. 8. Of Cunning or Policy.  
ANd for that they make two sorts of prudence; the one which is guided by the ordinary maxims of honesty and Iusti●e, and the other which consists mo●e in surprises and deceit, which they call cunning: Many have doubted, whether it were expedient for a Prince's reputation, to make use of this last. Wherein I will speak my opinion here; but I will deliver that of one of our time, who hath written upon this subject: Who holds that Fraud, Cunning and Deceit, if they be without vice or wickedness, may be allowed v●to a Prince for the Public good, and for his defence and preservation; but not to offend any man. It is his duty, to procure the Public good, and the health of the people. ●his is the foveraigne Law, by the which the Prince ought to govern all his actio●s.  
Wicked men should have too much advantage, if by cunning they might not repel their cunning. It is lawful to ●●●e●d a● Estate with the same Arms, with the which they anmaile it. It is not tolerable to turn the back to honesty and ●ustice, but sometimes to g●e about it and coast it. But the more distinctly to explicate this, we will borrow the distinction which he makes, of diverse sorts of cunning and deceits: Some are light; others great; 
divers sorts of cunning.  and some ●eane and indifferent. T●e light he not only allows to Princes but commands them. The mean he tolerates. The greater he fo●bidd●.  
Among the light, he puts distrust and dissimulation. Distrust is as necessary in a Prince, as credulity is hurtful. So it hath been called the strength of prudence; that is to say, to wa●ch, to believe nothing lightly, and to have an eye to all things. He must therefore trust few Men, and ●hose lo●g known and often tried. And yet he may not so slip the line in such sort, as he doth not always hold it by one end, and have an eye to it: But he must cover and disguise his distrust, yea, in di●r●●●i●g he must make a show to have some confidence. For open distrust offends, and invites another as well to deceive us, as too much indiscreet confidence. They have many times had a desire to deceive him, whom they have found fearful to b●e deceived: And on the other side, an open confidence binds some to guard loyalty. From distrust they come to dissimulation, 
Of dissimulation.  ●hich smother the forehead, and covers the thoughts, no less necessary for a Prince than the first. But he must learn how to play this part cunningly, without excess or foolery, making open profession of simplicity, cherishing those that are free and open, as enemies to dissimulation; and that in small matters the Prince proceed openly, to the end they may hold him for such in greater.  
Another sort of deceit, and ordinary among Princes, are the practices and intelligences which they have in the Estates one of another; 
O● the practices and intelligences ●● Prince's in the Estates one of another.  drawing cunningly the hearts of their Neighbours, officers, servants, and confidents, to discover their secrets, and to cross the designs of their Masters, and sometimes to lead a hand to some Enterprise against th●ir Master's person. This hath proceeded so far, as it hath sometimes corrupted even the Wives of Princes. This is done by two means: Either by persuasion, making use of the discontentments which great men have of their Masters: Or by money which is the most usual course. And many have held this manner of proceeding allowed against an Enemy, a rebellious or suspected Subject, yea, against any stranger with whom they have no alliance: But against his Friend's; Allies and Confederates, it is treachery, which ought not to be practised as they do at this day.  

Of Equivocation, fair words, promises, letters, Embassies, & lies, to obtain ●o●c 〈◊〉.  There are Princes to whom all sorts of means are just to gain some advantage, and to attain to their design: who have made use to deceive by Equivocations, fair words, promises, Letters, Embassies, yea, and by lies, to obtain that which they could not otherwise do, by reason of the difficulty of time and affairs. Plato allows this deceit, so as it be for the good of the Subjects. Yet to make this proceeding just, 
The proceeding of Princ●● to defend themselves and their Estates f●om their Enemy's, ●●i●st in themselves, but ●●●●●bl● by 〈◊〉.  there must be a necessity; and it must be in a troublesome and confused time; and not only to advance the good, but to divert some great mischief, and against the wicked.  
There are other kinds of proceeding, frequent enough in Princes, to preserve themselves and their Estate f●om their E●em●●s; the which cannot be excused but by necessity: And the Prince which is reduced to this point, m●st know that it is a misery for him to ●ee him●elfe forced to leave the ordinary course of justice, for the safety of his Estate, and he may not proceed but with some feeling of grief; but he must carry himself therein like a Father, when he is forced to cauterise, or cu● off a member of his Child to save ●is life. I will set down here some examples: As to put those secretly to death, and without form of justice, which cannot be punished without trouble and danger to ●he Estate. If they deserve death, the Prince who may dispense with the other forms, may likewise dispense for the safety of his Estate. To clip the wings, and shorten the means of some one which mutines and fortifies too much in the Estate, and makes himself fearful before he hath a commodity to attempt. T● dive by authority into the purses of his rich Subjects, in some necessity and poverty of the Estate. To revoke the privileges given to some one, or to some Commonalties, or particular men, to the prejudice of the Sovereign and the Estate. To seize upon some neighbour place, for fear that another holding it, he should make War against us and ruin us.  
All these things are in themselves unjust; but this injustice is balanced by necessity and public profit. Necessity as they say, hath no Law: And the Prince reduced to these terms, must know not only how to command according to the Laws, but also how to command the Laws themselves. All is, that the Prince doth not forge this necessity and constraint himself, for to satisfy his covetousness or ambition: For in stead of purchasing the reputation to be wise, he will cause himself to be esteemed an unjust and inhuman Tyrant.   

CHAP. 9 Of the reputation of a Prince; and the means how to get it.  
Valour is another part which serves to reputation, and it is of such importance, 
Valour the cause of a Prince's reputation.  as power is much inferior unto it. Valour procures power; and without valour power is lost. This is seen in many Estates, 
How important and necessary i● is in a Prince.  the which with small forces have been conquered by valour; and others ●or want of valour have lo●t themselu●s with their power.  
And although that va●our consists chiefly in the interior and courage: Yet to maintain this courage, he must have care of the exterior. A Prince may well be courageous, if he be sickly and incommodated of his health, and that as they say, his legs fai●e him: his cou●age may be commendable, but very unprofitable for him and his Estate. Wherefore he must have a care of two things. 
Means to get and entertain this courage and valour.  The one to entertain this v●g●ur of spirit, and to keep it in action, by a desire of honour and glory, be it by the reading of valiant exploits of War, performed by great Princes and Captains, or by the conversation of courageous and wise men, putting them often upon the Discourse of great Erterprises, which they or others have done; or be it by the consideration of that which concerns the Duty of a Prince, and the shame and contempt which they of his quality ●un into, which have been b●se and Cowards.  
The other care which a Prince ought to have, is to entertain himself in health, and to get an able and strong complexion. Sobriety and moderation in Meats, serve greatly to preserve ●ealth, as gluttony and drunkenness altereth much. And from thence proceed indigestions, crudities, gouts, and a●● other diseases. Continency is likewise of great force; there being nothing that doth more weaken chaste men, nor that debilitates the spirit and body more, than an excessive lasciviousness. The forces likewise increase with exercise, as that of Hunting, or others which consume the humours of the body. And to frame a strong and able complexion, he must in good time accustom himself to cold, heat, watching, hunger, to water, wine, and to all courses of life: The encounters being so diverse, to the which a Prince must accommodate himself, that one failing, sometimes this defect makes ma●y things impossible unto him.  
There are yet many things to be done, 
divers other means for a Prince to get reputation.  which may serve a Prince to get reputation: As to cover his defects and weakness cunningly, is a great means to to preserve his credit: To make show (yet without ostentation) of his fo●ces to those that are more weak: To fly, and show himself an Enemy to vanity and much talking, but to do more than he speaks. To talk gravely, and with a solid judgement: to maintain his word, the testimony of courage and a firm judgement: To be constant in adversity, and moderate in prosperity. Not to hazard himself in enterprises, unless he be assured to prevail; and ●auing attempted one, not to give it over, lest he show himself to have had little judgement in the beginning, and of as little courage to end it. Not to busy himself in petty Enterprises, but to seek occasions of great ones, especially in the beginning of his Reign: For that thereby they settle a judgement of that which will follow. He must not seem to depend on the council and will of another; for that were to establish a Superior and companion, and to make his insufficiency known.  
He may not employ himself in things which are under the dignity of a Prince; as Nero busied himself in Singing, to make Verses, and to be a good Coachman; D●mitian spent his time in Shooting and in taking of Flies; and Aropas' King of the Macedonians, employed himself in making of Lanterns; Valentinian to make Images of Wax; Rene Duke of Anion, and Earl of Provence to paint, Chilperic King of France, and Thibant King of Navarre, to time; and Alphonso King of Cast●lle in Astrology: But he shall employ himself to know his Estate, and that which may serve for the good government. The uniformity of life in a Prince, and the constancy in his commands doth also breed him reputation.  
He must likewise treat his affairs with dignity, and not by men which are of a base and vi●d condition. The baseness of Ministers doth vilify h●s affairs, and the weakness ruins them; and both the one and the other makes the world believe that the Prince distrusts great men, or that he fears to be discovered, inferior in affairs, by those which shall have more understanding, or that he hath ●o judgement in making such a choice. But he may not suffer great talkers to approach near unto him, nor admit them to his secret affairs, for fear lest they should discover his actions and designs, by an itching desire which such Monkeys have commonly to babble.  
He must not grow familiar with all sorts of persons, nor show himself to often but upon great occasions, and with a countenance and bell aviour full of Majesty: And in his extraordinary joy heaviness or choler, he shall not show himself at all; but shall pass his first motion in his Cabinet, and out of the sight of his followers: His habit must be grave and modest without extravagancy, he s●all avoid extremities in all his courses, showing himself neither slow nor rash, but he shall rather incline to the first then to the last; for the first hath a dependence of Prudence and ●rauity, and the other of lightness and rashness; he must make more account of truth than opinion, and have a care that all that proceeds from him may be great, accomplished, excellent and admirable, finally that he do less and do it well, that he suffer not any disobedience which may be drawn into example.  
That the affairs of importance may depend upon him alone, without imparting it to any man what favour soever he bear him, as the authority to make Laws, to give privileges, to make peace or war, to give pardons, to make choice of his principal Ministers, to impose Taxes, Subsidies, and other levies of Money, to fortify places, to cast Orduance, to recompense others out of his Treasure, to advance to Dignities or such other things as he ought to reserve.  
By Magnificence he may likewise get reputation, as by the structure of public Buildings, Palaces, Churches, Fountains, Fortifications of Towns and such like places, which redound to the benefit of the public. Religion likewise known to be in a Prince, imports him much for his reputation, for showing himself to be full of Piety, the people will conceive that he will be likewise just, and that he will not undertake any thing but with the assistance of God: Wherefore it imports him much to make esteem of Churchmen, which are known to have probity and sufficiency in them, to retain some about him, to procure a good reformation in the Church by mild and lawful means, without Trouble, Schism, or Division, to dispose of Benefices to capable men, to have care of the poor, and finally to employ himself in all works of Piety.  
By these last means a Prince may in time of Peace maintain his reputation, having no need in time of War to seek for other particularities than his own valour: The which showing itself in occasions which shall present themselves, will maintain▪ them always in credit and reputation. But if in the time of Peace they desire something more of him, there being people to whom he must give a subject of discourse, and busy them in the consideration of their Prince's actions, otherwise they contemn them: The Prince must employ himself sometimes to reform justice, sometimes the Treasure, sometimes the discipline of War, and always to make some new Establishment which may serve the Estate. Augustus' having brought all his affairs to an end, and finding no more subjects to entertain the people of Rome with his actions, he employed himself to reform the Callander.  
So in the like encounters, the Prince must seek all means to quicken his reputation in the spirits of the subjects, and to make them believe that he is not idle, giving them occasions to speak well of him, and hinder them from detracting and speaking ill.  
Having discoursed of the means, by the which a Prince might get or maintain his authority; Let us see the means and remedies, which may be found for that which may cause the ruin of the E●ate. To know if the remedies be proper, we must likewise know the disease.   

CHAP. 10. Of the causes of the ruins of Estates: and of the remedies which may be found.  

The cause of the ruin of Estates.  THe works of nature fail by two kinds of causes: whereof some are exterior, and others interior. The exterior are Fi●e, Sword, and such other violences. The interior are the excess and corruptions of the first qualities. In like manner States are ruined either by foreign force and violence, or by the corruption and disorder that is with it; but more rarely by the first alone then by the last: And we have seldeme seen any Estate ruined by foreign force, which was not first corrupted within it.  
Yet let us speak something of the ordinary means, by the which we may prevent a foreign force. 
A remedy against the violence of strangers.  Either the Prince that is assailed by this force, is equal in power to him that assails him, and in all means and necessary advantages for his defence: Or else he is weaker either in means or for that he hath not his forces ready to oppose. If he be equal, he may foresee his enemy's design: And if he hath any just and tolerable pretext to make an offensive War, he must not stand upon his defence. Among Princes which make War, he that lays the cloth (as the proverb says) pays the reckoning. For, beside that his country is ruined as welby his own Army, as by that of his Enemies, the amazement is greater among his Subjects; And he will not dare to hazard a Battle, which would endanger his whole Fortune, for that losing it, he shall not only lose his men but also his Country: Whereas his Enemy may adventure it with far more advantage, his Estate beiug secure, and whatsoever happens he can lose but men.  
But if the Prince be weaker than his Enemy which innades him, he must procure him some greater Enemy, or many which may effect that which he cannot do alone. He must likewise practise factions and divisions with his Enemy, and get intelligence with some one of his prime Councillors or great Men, and with those that have most authority and credit with his Enemy; to the end they may dissuade him from this War, or divert it, or make it unprofitable, in slackening the executions, or giving advice of his designs, to the end he may oppose himself in time.  
But if the practices be such, as they may breed a fear in his Enemy of a revolt, Treason, Sedition, or a civil war; they will be much better and of greater force. Defensive Leagues with his Neighbours, or with the Neighbours of his Enemy, may be of great use, who may grow jealous of his power. For the fear which his Enemy might have, that invading one, all the rest may go to Arms, would retain him.  
Besides this, the Prince must keep good guards upon all the principal passages of his Estate, and place strong Garrissonss in his Forts, who may stay the Enemy, and by a long siege cause him to lose much time, and many men; and by this means consume his provisions, and waste his Army, whereby he may be the better able to encounter him; And if he be able to raise an Army, he must choose a strong place at the entry of his Country, and lodge it in such sort, as he may be neither forced to fight nor to dislodge, to the end he may hinder his Enemy from passing on. But having neither forces ' nor forts upon the passage of this quality; or the Enemy's forces being such, as they are not to be stayed by this means: Some in this case have themselves wasted their own Country, on that side where the Enemy was to enter, causing all to retire into the heart of the Estate, depriving him not only of all provision of Victuals, but also of other commodities, Mills, Ovens, Lodgings, and other employments, whereof an Army is seldom wholly furnished. The first against the Polonians, and the second against the Turks forces, have assured their Countries for a time, in laying a great part of the confines waste. And the Muscovite being in a Country which doth abound in Wood, shut himself up in a short time; So as Steven King of Poland, meaning to pass into Muscovie, was forced to spend much time in cutting down the Woods to make a passage for his Army.  
And although that he which is assailed be the weaker, yet there hath been some, which have carried the War into their Enemy's Country, to make a diversion as Ag●th●cles did, who being besieged by the Carthaginians in Siracusa, resolved to leave a sufficient troop to maintain the Siege, and to embark with the rest, to transport the War into Africa. Boniface, Earl of Corsegus, did the like, in the year 822. to retire the Saracens out of Sicily. The which succeeded the more happily, for that the Carthaginians, the Africans, who were the invaders, having not foreseen this policy, had not provided for their Countries. And it is a general rule, that we must assail an Enemy where he lest suspects.  
But if the Enemy be so powerful, and hath such an advantage over us, as there is no means to resist him, rather than to lose all, it were better to yield something: And if he may be freed for ready money, in making as they say a Bridge of Gold to his Enemy, he shall escape good cheap. The which hath been happily practised by the Florentines, Venetians, and Genois, or else he must seek the protection of some Prince that is near or far off, yet so as he may be relieved in time, or the Enemy's Estate annoyed. So the Capovans finding themselves pressed by the Samnites, put themselves under the protection of the Romans. The Genois were sometimes protected by the French, and sometimes by the Dukes of Milan. Pope julio the second, made use of another policy, to divert the French from the Siege of Ferrara, selling it to the Emperor, with hope after the War to redeem it again for money: So as the French having no will to break with the Emperor, gave over their Enterprise.  
There have been some Princes, who finding no means to resist, have made choice rather to yield to Fortune, and to abandon their Country, then to see it ruined; hoping that the affairs changing, their Subjects not wholly ruined, would call them back more willingly than if they had been chased away by an open rebellion, or that growing obstinate to maintain themselves, they had been punished by the Enemy: This succeeded happily to Ferd●nand of Arragon, chased from Naples by Charles the Eight: To the Venetians when they abandoned their Towns upon the firm land, to the league of Cambrag: To the Duke of Urbin, who seeing himself▪ unable to make head against Caesar Borgia, abandoned his Country, having first ruined all the Forts of his Estate; hoping that being well beloved of his Subjects, upon the first alteration they will call him back, as they did.  
But for that they seek to surprise him whom they mean to assai'e by force, and to attain unto it, they device other pretexts to arm, to the end they may circumvent their Neighbour: And in like manner, when as two powerful Neighbours make War together, and afterwards come to conclude a Peace, either of them seeks to free himself of his Soldiers, at the cost of some one of his Neighbours: The Prince which shall find himself to have such bad Neighbours, must presently arm, and stand continually upon his guard whilst his Neighboursare in Arms.  
These are the most general and ordinary Remedies against foreign force, the exterior cause of the ruin of Estates.   

CHAP. II. Of the interior Causes of the ruin of Estates.  
THe interior Causes from whence the ruin of an Estate may grow, are of two kinds: Some are near, others are remote. 
The near causes of the ruin o● an Estate.  The nearest are conspiracies against the Prince, or against the chief Magistrate, under whole authority the Estate is governed: The treason of Towns, strong places. or Armies: The Rebellion of Subjects against the Prince; and the Division into factions and parties. But for that these causes grow from a precedent corruption in the Estate, being but the effects of remote causes; we must seek the mischief farther off to provide a Remedy. The causes which produce these effects, 
Of the remote causes which ruin Estates.  proceed either from the defect of the Sovereign, or of the Magistrates, and others which have the chief charges in the government of the Estate; or through the defect of other Subjects, which are considered either in general under the name of people, or relatively by the reason of their subjection; Some being borne subjects to the Prince to whom they obey; others are subjects by conquest, that is to say, borne under another Prince, but have been since conquered by him to whom they obey, or else they are considered according to their condition, quality, and power, which they have to trouble the Estate.  
Among the defects which may be found in the Sovereign Person, 
Of the Sovereign de●ects which engender the Subject's hatred.  those which may breed the Subject's hatred and contempt against him, are most prejudicial. Those which engender hatred, are cruelty and covetousness. Cruelty shows itself in the executions of such which he causeth to be punished. Avarice in the levying of money and exactions upon his Subjects. To remedy the first, 
A remedy ●gainst-t●e Prince's cruelty.  he must deal as little as may be with the punishments of his Subjects: but refer the judgement of such things to the ordinary course of justice.. But if for the good of the Estate, and for the little assurance there is in judges, he be forced to interpose himself, he must do it seldom, and make it known that he doth it unwillingly, and only in consideration of the public good, to the end he may retain good men in their duties, and divert the wicked from their bad intentions: Neither must he show any choler, and above all things he must forbear to be present at Executions; That the punishments must be ordinary, and not unusual, and that in punishing diverse for one fact, there must be an equality of punishments observed. But if by the death of one alone he may preserve the rest, he ought to do it. And if there be many ●hat be put to death, he shall cause them to suffer altogether, to the end that by the continuance of execution it may not renew the hatred.  
Some have held it fit to sweeten the hatred of an Execution, to punish the Minister which hath done it, if he be of that quality that he hath deserved it. Yet I hold this manner of proceeding unjust and tyranuous; especially if it tends to death, whereof they ought not to make so flight an account. Yet a Prince may in necessity, having no other means to free himself from Envy, chase him away, laying the fault upon him, and making show that ●he hates him for the same Subject, for the which he is odious unto the people: But wholly to abandon, him were baseness. Moreover he must sweeten rigorous Executions by benefits, yea, by gifts out of the confiscation of the party's goods which is executed, to such as be discontented with the Execution, to the end it may appear that not covetousness but only justice hath brought the Prince unto it. To remedy the second, 
A remedy against the Prince's avarice.  he must make it appear, that the levies which he raiseth, are grounded upon the necessity of the Estate▪ there being no Estates without tributs, customs or Subsedies, the which are necessary to satisfy the expenses, without the which the Estate cannot subsist and be maintained. Impositions must be made with equality, according to every man's goods and faculties, without hatred or favour, and with moderation; not insupportable nor sordid; not too frequent nor new, nor under unusual names; They must be levied with modesty, without covetousness, cruelty, or violence, and by honest men; and he must punish those severely that mis-●ehaue themselves.  
Finally, he must make it appear by the expenses, that the money is employed for the necessity, good, and preservation of the Estate, and not for the Prince's riot or prodigality, to advance men of no worth, and to satisfy their pleasures.  
As for the defects which engender the Subject's contempt of their Prince, there are diverse sorts. 
Of the Prince's defects which cause contempt.  Some grow from weakness of age; as Minority or a decrepit age. Others from nature; as deformity, or a bad aspect, the natural dulness of the mind, deafness, and other indispositions of the body. Others proceed from Fortune; as to be unfortunate and without support; with such other defects, which can be hardly remedied.  
The principal remedy is, not to show himself upon all occasions, whereas these defects may be more visible. Tiberius' finding himself not so affable as Augustus, would never come among the people to Plays and theatres, as Augustus did: but kept himself close and retired, and never showed himself but in great actions, for the which he had prepared himself long before. So the Prince must as much as may be hide his imperfections; and not show himself in public, but well prepared according to his dignity, and if it may be, recompense the defect of nature by some advantage of the mind.  
There are other defects, which breed a contempt of the Prince in the Subject's minds, 
Other defects of a Prince which breed contempt.  the which proceeds only by his own fault, and may be easily avoided: As irresolution in his Counsels; lightness, inconstancy, and injustice in his commands, negligence in his affairs, and seeming to depend of another, or tying himself so strictly to some private person, as he trusts him with all the affairs of the Estate; an ordinary indiscretion in many Princes. The only remedy to prevent all this, is to do the contrary, and to follow that which we say must be done to purchase reputation. 
The Prince's defects wh●●h breed contempt are more de●●gerous than tho●e which cause hatred.   
These are the defects which engender hatred▪ whereof they which procure contempt are most dangerous. For contempt gives courage to those that desire to undertake whereas cruelty and aprice, although they breed hatred; y●t such as a●e fearful: And moreover by cruelty you diminish the number of your Enemies, and amaze the rest▪ and by avarice and exactions you make them v●●ble. But the most prejudicial defects are those which breed hatred and contempt both together: As lasciviousness and drunkenness; the one for its beastliness, and the other for the scandal and trouble of Families, which it doth usually draw after it. Wherefore the Prince must not only fly from them, but avoid the suspicion.   

CHAP. 12. Of the defects of Magistrates, Officers, and Ministers to the Prince.  
THe defects, abuses, and disorders of those which have any charge and government in the Estate, the which may further its ruin, are of two sorts. For either these abuses proceed from corruption which is found in particular persons, of whom they have made a bad choice, or have been corrupted with time; or else it proceeds from some bad custom, the which under pretext of good, and by a bad interpretation of the Law, or of an order made in the establishment, hath been brought in.  
To remedy the first, the best course will be, that seeing the choice w●s bad, to make another. But therein he must use his discretion: For that all changes are dangerous, and that sometimes seeking to prevent a misch●efe, the remedy is found worse than the disease. Lewis the Eleventh meaning to reform France, 
A change ●n●n Estate is dangerous.  changed all his predecessors Officers, whom in the end he was forced to restore, to avoid a general revolt.  
If this corruption may be easily punished without trouble in some of the principal, and that the example of punishment may reduce the rest unto their duties; he must do it with severity. But if he cannot effect it, he must draw those which nourish these abuses from their acquaintance and familiars; And employ them in some other places with honest men, who may serve as comptrollers and examples to do well, and to keep them in awe.  
No man is willingly bad for nothing, either it is to do pleasure to some one, from whom he hopes for support; or to revenge his own injuries, or those of his Friends; or for covetousness, the which he cannot well practise without confident mediators. Take him therefore from his acquaintance, and out of the hands of his Enemies; maintain him against the greatest, to the end he may not fear any future wrong: There is no doubt that there being no man to whom he may intrust his corruptions, nor whom he may distrust, he will be indifferent in that regard, and will have no thought but to do well: But retire him before he may enter into strict familiarity with any man. And so of a man how corrupt soever, you may make good use of him for your service; if he be not altogether impudent and depraved: In which case being easy to discover his practices, it will be as easy for the Prince to cause him to be punished.  
But if the abuse be in the bad administration of Laws, 
A remedy against the abuse of Laws.  or of the establishment which hath been made of some order; he must either by interpretation, or by change, or by abrogation of the Law or order, provide for it. But for that it would be a difficult thing, that they which made their profit by the abuse, should willingly yield unto it, if they be many in number, he must make himself the stronger, as Lycurgus did. For in such affairs they are commonly ill assisted; the partisans of the reformation being cold, and they which profit in the abuse, (who have the pretext of Custom and the Laws for them) are more violent to preserve that which brings them profit.  

Considerations necessary for a reformation.  But the Prince must first consider duly, if that which he means to establish, will hold: For that abuses which have taken a deep root, are hardly pulled up; and sometime it is mo●e fit to live with these abuses quietly in an Estate, then seeking to take them away, to put all into confusion. It is a body which hath an infirmity, the which you must strive to cure, yet in such sort, as you put not the patient in da●ger of death. It is a Philme in the eye; yet the eye hath not ●wholy lost its sight: If you cannot clear it without loss of the sight, it were better to leave it there.  
Above all in a reformation you may not make a Law that looks too far backward, and makes us enter into the search of that which is passed long since; Neither must they establish an order altogether new: But you must gently and by little and little reduce them to their first institution, and not pull up the Tree to plant another in its place; but set it by. The string which makes an Instrument out of tune, must be gently strained, until it be in tune, and not broken. We know the defects and inconveniences of an ancient establishment; but we are ignorant of the inconveniences of a new.  
But if t●e order were so perverted, as it were impossible to make use of it; yet in the establishment of a new, you must retain the same terms, names, and qualities of the ancient● for that the people feeding themselves more with the show of truth, the face of antiquity in such establishments hath more authority with them; and novelties a●e suspected unto them, and less esteemed. But if you cannot retain the ground of this antiquity, you must colour the innovation with the names of the ancient establishments, to give it credit, and to make the people think that the●e is ●it●le alteration. An advice which hath been practised by all such as under pretext of reformation have sought to usurp an Estate: But this may be more justly put in use by a lawful Prince, for the good of his Subjects, and to facilitate the reformation which he intends to make: In the which he hath great reason not to engage himself, if he do not confidently believe to bring it to effect. Besides the disgrace which he shall receive, he should by his weakness countenance the mischief, and despair of the remedy: Whereof I say that he ought to make himself the stronger. The which I mean not only of an armed force, but also of the inclination of the greatest part of his Subjects. And if it may be he must so work underhand, as he may be required and solicited to provide for it; besides that it will make his design easy, all the honour will be due to him. And if there be any envy, he may easily discharge himself upon those which have required him. But if the Prince doubting the event of a necessary reformation, desires to make it rather by some one of his Ministers, then to engage himself: In this case some have advised rather to take but one, to whom he may give all authority, than many. For although it seems more convenient, that this reformation should be countenanced by many, to the end it might carry the greater weight, and be the better received: yet the diversity of opinions that is in many heads diversely interessed, be it for themselves, or for their Friends and Kinsfolks, in this reformation; the length there will be in making them resolve; the difficulty in this plurality to make them keep secret, many small surprises, policies, and cunning, which they must sometimes use, to attain unto this good; and in case the business doth not succeed, being more difficult to dismiss many, for to free himself of the envy and shame to have attempted this reformation without success, than they may do in one person: Wherefore it seems more safe for the Prince to employ but one. But the preservation of the order established, must be left to the care of many; For that many having once found the benefit, will not willingly yield to leave it: And a multitude being irresolute among themselves, tend rather to leave affairs in the Estate they are in, then to change them, v●lesse they be thrust on by some apparent profit, or by some Man of credit and authority. Hence it comes, that the companies of greatest authority in an Estate, oppose themselves more willingly to all innovations, how good soever; And consent not to the change of the ancient ordinances, although they be accompanied with abuses.  
But for that the same men, which made their profit of the abuse before the reformation, continuing still in those places where the abuse was committed, will find means sufficient to frustrate ●●: Some have been of advice to change them, and to employ them else where: and others to attribute the knowledge of the contraventions which have been committed to the prejudice of this reformation, to other judges, than those of that body which they mean to reform. Yet therein they must govern themselves, according to the facility or difficulties which are found in such Establishments,  
These are the principal considerations, which ought to be observed in a reformation; besides those which private occasions, and the quality of disorders may breed in our minds. Let us now come to the disorders which proceed from the Subjects, and may advance the ruin of an Estate, if they be embraced by the Enemy.   

CHAP. 13. Of the Subject's defects in general, which cause the ruins of an Estates  
ALthough that natural Subjects owe all obedience to their Prince, 
The most general defects and pecant humours of a multitude.  and it is their good so to maintain themselves: Yet the nature of a multitude is so inconstant, as it cannot long subsist in one Estate. Having no employment, they invent some themselves, and forge a thousand designs to their own disadvantage.  
Peace and abundance, are the things which should give a people the greatest subject of content, and contain them, for that they cannot change this condition without impairing. But the one in the end makes them idle; and idleness being tedious unto them, they employ their spirits to think ill; and which is worse, to do mischief. The other makes them stately, proud, and untractable; who like unto pampered jades, kick many times at their Masters that have fed them. But in danger and fear, they are tractable and easy to manage, loving after their own pleasure, and fearing at the discretion of another, and never judging but by passion. For although▪ that some one have done evil, yet if the people love him, they persuade themselues that the action had some good ground: And if they hate him, although he hath done well and virtuously, yet they interpret all to a bad sense, and attribute a good action to a sinister intention, and a bad design.  
In all that which they affect, they look rather to an apparent profit, then to that which is just and honourable; And if in show there be any thing to hazard, or to lose, although the end may be happy and successful, yet they will always be of opinion to abandon that party. They never embrace affairs but by the show, without examining the importance, if it be any thing remote; They hate the present affairs, as those whereof they are most sensible; they forget a mischief past, although it be far greater than the present; They love those which are turbulent in their actions and of sudden execution. They usually slander the actions of the Prince and his Governors, and complain; Yet they are easy to reduce, when they see themselves forced to obey, and that they have no head nor any seeds of division. They hope more than they ought, and endure less than they should. They attribute to want of will and judgement, that which proceeds from the want of power and means.  
They are desirous of innovations, and easy to move upon the first wind; Credulous, increasing reports and news, and publishing usually that which is most forbidden; they follow the multitude, not knowing why; full of Envy, Suspicion, and distrust: ingrateful for the benefits they have received, and revengeful of injuries, yea of another man's; little careful of the Estate, and loving nothing but an unrestrayned liberty, whereof they are soon weary: finally doing nothing by election, but all by hazard.  
Behold a part of the blemishes and defects of a people considered in general: Whereon most part of those which have attempted against another man's Estate, have grounded their designs, making use of them by many practices, according to occasion and the condition of affairs. And although there be many among a multitude free from these imperfections: yet being drawn together with the rest, the greatest number carries it, and most commonly they howl (as they say) with the Wolves. One fool or rash man is sufficient to stop the mouths of many wise, and to make them all loose the course of reason. And most commonly that which they condemn in particular, being in a throng, and with the rest they like of, and allow; be it that we are restrained through fear to oppose ourselves to the common way, which is usually the worst, and sometimes composed of the most fools, the most impudent, and the most mutinous; or be it that by this contagion, we feel the like passions which transport the rest, and with the like heat we suffer ourselves to be carried to the same resolutions.  
The Ancients finding all these pecant humours in the people's minds, to entertain and busy them, 
Remedies to cure the Estate of these defects and bad humours.  and by this means to divert them from doing evil, have sought out diverse means. The Grecians entertained them with sports, Comedies, Tragedies, Wrestle, and Olimpique Games. The Romans added thereunto Swo●d-players, representation of Navel Battles, and the combats of wild Beasts. The Kings of Egypt busied their Subjects in the construction of Pyramids and buildings, although for the most part unprofitable. The Christians in some places, when as they fear the people's disposition to mutiny, have employed them in Processions, Prayers, in the visitation of Oratories and Churches, with other extraordinary devotions, as Cardinal Borromeo did often at Milan, and others in other places. But when as all these means have not been forcible enough to retain them, they have stirred up a foreign War, not only to divert the people's minds by this object; but also to entertain them a little with the fear of a common Enemy, and to free the Estate from those pecant humours, which being still retained might ruin it.  
But sometimes the Estate is so composed as it would be dangerous to entertain a continual War, either for that they are weak of Men and means, or for fear that giving the commandment to some one, he should get unto himself the authority of Arms. The which cannot be but prejudicial in all Estates: The Prince being unable to be still conductor of his Armies, without hazarding of his person too much, and leaving a great part of his Country ill provided for. In a Commonweal this would be of more dangerous consequence; if they do not govern themselves in that respect like unto the S●iffes, who desiring rather to make War for another, then for themselves, send forth their most busy and turbulent Men to serve Princes, to purge the Country.  
Behold the most ordinary remedies which are practised, to preserve themselves from these bad humours of the people, considered in general. But there are others which are particular, according to the diverse conditions of persons, whereof the people consists; and others which must be practised with a people Conquered.   

CHAP. 14. Of diverse sorts of humours among the Subjects, according to the diversity of their Conditions.  

Three sorts of persons in all Estates.  IN all Estates there are three sorts of persons. Great Men who have power, credit, and wealth: The poor and miserable who want all, and the meaner sort. These last are usually more quiet and easy to govern: The rest are more difficult, for that great Men by the commodity which riches brings with it, do hardly abstain from doing Evil. The miserable for the necessities wherein they find themselves, are commonly vicious and capable of all parties.  
The Credit, alliances, and wealth of great Men, makes them untractable, little obedient, and sometimes insupportable; and pride and presumption gives them courage to undertake: chose the miserable, are easily moved to any insolency. The actions of great Men are accompanied with violence: Those of the poor and needy with fraud and malice. But the meaner sort, having neither so great means which might make them grow proud, nor power to attempt; Neither being in such necessity, as they should be thrust into extraordinary actions, they desire rather to preserve the certain, then to run after the uncertain: and so they are neither transported with ambition, nor oppressed with necessity. Presupposing then that this sort of Men continue in their duties, let us examine the two others.  
There are several sorts of great Men: 
Means to contain great Men in their duties.  Some are so near unto the Prince by alliance or kindred, as they may in time pretend unto the Estate. Others, who being Lords of great possessions, enjoy in the Prince's Estate, Lordships, and Revenues of great consequence. The third kind is of those, who by their valour or wisdom in the government of important affairs of the Estate, have purchased credit and reputation with the people, or among the Men of War. The fourth are they, to whom the Prince hath committed his forces, his governments, and his chief places.  
Many Princes before they had any subject of suspicion of an Enterprise, 
Of great Men allied to the Prince.  have grown jealous of their near kinsmen. Alexander meaning to pass into Asi●, put all his nearest kinsmen to death, except one of his base brethren, whom he had no cause to fear. This villainous and barbarous course hath passed for a rule of State among the Turks. The Kings of Ormus, before they were expelled by the portugals, put out the eyes of all their nearest kinsmen. The which it may be they learned from some Emperors of Constantinople. The Kings of China, & those of Aethiopia, shut them all up into one place, from whence not any one comes forth, but he that is to succeed in the Estate.  
Christendom is more happy: For although we have seen that Philip the second King of Spain hath been forced to put his Son to death, for some jealousy he had conceived of him; yet this is not ordinary. And the Kings entertain themselves with their kinsmen, making much of them, and entreating them courteously, yet not trusting them with all their forces, which may give them means to attempt, nor yet crushing nor disgracing them, to the end they may not despair: And by this honest and courteous course, they take from them both the means and desire to do evil.  
They which are great in means and Revenues, are the sinews and strength of an Estate, whom they may not in any case ruin, as some Ministers of Tyranny have conceived, but they must be preserved to maintain the Estate. And those Estates where there be not any, are exposed in Prey to the first loss of a Battle: For that having no Man that hath credit to draw them again together, being unfurnished of support and council, they presently resolve to yield upon the first amazement. The which hath been often seen in Egypt. chose those Estates which have been powerful in Nobility, although they have been often overthrown, yet they have easily recovered themselves. France and Persia, the English and Spaniards, with those of Tartary and the Turks, have sometimes been oppressed and brought low: But by the means of the Nobility, who have more courage and conduct to maintain the Estate than the people, they have always recovered themselves.  
And to say that such kind of people may trouble the Prince, this may sometimes happen, if the Prince be a Tyrant, which seeks to oppress them, or wants council & courage: As they whom the Carliens, and Capets, caused to retire from the government of the Estate. But never an able and sufficient Prince, who knew how to make use of Men of this condition, ran any bad fortune with them. The means to make profitable use of them, is to countenance them with Majesty, to do for them in occasions which may be offered; to employ them near his person with honour and magnificence, rather than to commit his forces and all his authority into their hands: And they which shall be suspected of lightness and inconstancy, to cause them to be accompanied by men which may watch and observe their actions. This is the Council (as they write) which the Emperor Charles the fifth gave unto the deceased Philip King of Spline, to employ great men, and to retain them near unto his person in the most honourable places, and give those of Command to men of a meaner condition: But his Son neglecting this advice, in the person of Don john of Austria, drew himself into danger of an inconvenience.  
As for the two other sorts of great men, they cannot be such but by the Prince's means. 
Of great me● which have force and credit with the people by reason of his employments in great affairs.  Wherefore it is easy for him to prevent the inconveniences which this greatness may cause; and the fault must be imputed to himself, seeing it was in his power to hinder it. The means which may be used herein, are common to either. For some have been made great, and have gotten credit, for that they had the force and authority in their hands; And the others are great by reason of their birth. The principal means then to prevent the inconveniences which may grow, is in the choice, wherein the Prince must observe four considerations.  
The first is, that he commit not his forces and authority to any that are borne great; 
Considerations to advance some one in authority.  as they of whom we have formerly spoken: For that he cannot add so little to the greatness of such men, but he shall equal them unto himself. The other considerations are, that he make not choice for a great command, or to lead a great Army, of a man that is audacious and undertaking, or of one that is too cunning and subtle: Much less of a person that is inconstant and light, inclined to flare and hope, and subject to follow the Erterprises of another, or to be surprised by someone.  
The second means is, not to continue great Charges, as the governments of Provinces, of strong places, and of a great troop of Soldiers long in one and the same person, to the end he may avoid three inconveniences. The first, lest that governments by little and little be not made hereditary and patrim●nicall, 
〈…〉 o●●●eat places in one 〈◊〉.  as they have done in all places of Fees; and in France of the ancient E●rle ●o●nes, Duchess, and Marquesats. The other inconvenience is, that the Prince deprives himself v●adu●●●ly of the means to make use of a better subject, who may i● time discover himself unto him. The third is, t●at i● may be he to whom he hath given this charge, may through indisposition grow unable, or by Age unfit, or through passion or some particular design, be prejudicial to the Estate. The fourth means is, never to give the great command of a Province to any one that is borne there; lest that by the means of his Kindred, Alliances, and Friends, with the favour he may have from the Prince, which will purchase him many servants, he finds not means to perpetuate himself.  
But if either by a bad establishment, or some bad custom, the Prince finds his Estate otherwise disposed, he may gently provide for it, in suppressing and drawing to himself this great authority and power; or dismembering it into diverse charges, which may depend immediately of himself. And if he cannot reduce the Governors to such terms as he holds it fit for his safety, some have he●d opinion, that he should strip them by little and little of his forces, in providing for his places of strength, and causing the Garrissonss to be changed every three years; and in like manner to have the Governor assisted by one or two of his chief Councillors, without whose advice he might not resolve any thing: Thinking that by this means they should not only prevent the Governors' Erterprises, but also make them more careful to do that which concerns the Prince's service, seeing their actions observed.  
The poor and needy are no less dangerous to the quiet of the Estate then great men, 
Of the poor and needy.  and great men which have had a will to mutiny, h●ue made use of them: For that the present Estate being contrary unto them, they desire a change, hoping to change their condition; and a. midst the disorder and violence to free themselves from the necessity wherein they live. 
Means to contain the common people in their duties.  The means to shelter himself on that side, is to hinder this necessity in an Estate; but principally excess and usury; for that excess begins poverty, and usury brings it to extremity. Necessity may likewise be prevented, 
Excess and Usury the chief causes of poverty.  bringing in abundance; And especially by employing the common people in all sorts of Manufactures, as Vopiscus writes they did in Alexandria, where the gouty and blind found means to get their living.  
Solon in Athens bound the Fathers to teach their Children a Trade, upon a penalty to be deprived of all succours and respect which the Children owe unto their Fathers. In China the Children are bound to follow their Father's Trade, and for such as had not any, they employed them about their public buildings; as Augustus and the Kings of Egypt did. To conclude, they must employ such men, and not leave the Estate in the hands of the needy, and of men which have nothing to lose. And thus much concerning the restraint of natural Subjects.   

CHAP. 15. Means to contain conquered Subjects in their duty.  
THe Subjects which have been conquered either by force, or by treaty, are usually more difficult to govern then the natural. Wherefore besides t●a● whic● we have spoken concerning the Natural, we must observe with these more discretion and precaution. 
To gi●e 〈◊〉 ●●●iects in 〈◊〉 an the 〈…〉.  The principal and most general means to contain the Subjects by conquest, in the obedience of the Prince which hath conquered them, is to give them such interest in his government, as they may have a fear to change, left they should impair their condition: Otherwise the people's inclination being contrary to the C●nqu●rour, the Principality will be like unto a Tree without roots, which owes his fall to the first wind.  
The meres which we have said are necessary for a Prince to purchase love and reputation, 
Mildness and 〈…〉  will much import him with this kind of Subjects: And amongst others mildness and clemency. 
〈…〉  He must likewise favour Religious men, and such as be learned and virtuous, which shall be found in the Country, for that the people do commonly govern themselves to g●od or evi●●, according to the consciences of ●uch kind of men. He must in-like manner make much of great men, and employ them in honourable charges; Y●t out of the Country of conquest: 
〈…〉.  And in like manner to give them Estates and S●ignouri●s elsewhere: He must observe the contracts, conventions, & privileges under which the Country was yellowed; for th●t one breach made by the Prince, makes them to fear the less of the rest. He must breed up ●●ny Y●u●g men of their conquered Country, 
He 〈…〉.  after the manner of his natural Subjects: As Alexander did thirty thou●and young Persians, of whom he m●de choice, to be instructed after the Macedonian manner.  
The Romans erected Colleges and Seminaries, upon pretext to civillize the Nations which they conquered; but in effect it was to employ them otherwise then in the War, an● to train them up after the Romans manner. And they which were best conceited of their intentions, said, that it made a part of the Servitude, under which they reduced the Provinces which they conquered. The Turk holds another course in the b●eeding up of his janissaries, the which although it seems violent, yet it is grounded upon reason and judgement. For choosing them among the Christians Children, he fortifies his power, in weakening his Subjects which are most suspected unto him. 
You must make Marriages betwixt them and his natural Subjects.  Marriages and Alliances help much to join and unite a conquered Province with the natural Subjects. Alexander purchased much love of the Persians, having married a Persian Lady. And as Titus Linius saith, there was nothing did so much hinder the Cap●uans from accommodating themselves with Hannibal, than the private alliances they had contracted with the Romans.  
The Romans also made use of another means, having interessed in the preservation of their Estate, the greatest part of the neighbour Provinces conquered by them, receiving them into their City, giving sometimes to private persons, and sometimes to a whole Province the right of Burgeois●e, and making them sharers in the honours of the City. But to reduce them wholly to the form of natural Subjects, 
The Conqueror must bring his own Language into the conquered Country.  by little and little they brought in their own Language; as since the Arabians have done in all their conquest. And William the Conqueror, and before him the Saxons in the greatest part of England, not suffering the Laws to be written or published but in their languages, nor the audiences for the dispatch of affairs and Commissions for Letters patents; The contracts of private men were passed in the same language, to the end they might force them mildly to learn it.  

He may not c●ange the Law●s and Relig●●● o● t●e conquered country but with great judgement.  As for t●e Customs and ancient Laws of the Country, w●ich co●c●rne only the ordering of private men's goods, and not the Estate, nor the obedience due unto the Prince, he may not change them: Or if he doth, it must be done by degrees. For what justice soever there be in a new Law, the people being not accustomed unto it, will suspect it. But if the change of Laws be prejudicial to a Conqueror, the change of Religion is much more, there being nothing wherein the people grow more obstinate, then to retain their ancient Religion. Yet this will be no hindrance, but by the erecting of Colleges and Seminaries of Piety, the Conqueror may bring in Learning and Knowledge, by means whereof g●●ning daily someone, he may by little ro●te out t●at of the Country without force. And if he cannot speedily attain to his design, at the least he shall have this advantage, that those of the conquered Subjects which adhere to his Religion, will be confident unto him, and making show to favour them, the rest will be soon reclaimed.  
But whatsoever the Conqueror be to bring in newly among a conquered people, be it Religion, Customs, Tributes, or Laws: the establishments must be made whilst the amazement of the conquest last; and that the people are in fear of worse. For if you suffer them to know themselves, and to grow assured; besides the difficulty you shall find to make them taste these Innovations, it is to be feared they will make use of it for a pretext of revolt.  

Forc● is a powerful meanus to contain conquered 〈◊〉 ●●●heir duty.  But if all these means prove too weak, (as they will be with an untamed multitude) to keep such people in awe and obedience, there is no other means to contain them, then to make use of the same force which conquered them. The Romans have employed whole Armies: yet mutinies being too ordinary, and of a dangerous consequence in these great Bodies, this example hath not been followed by the ●i●est Conquerors: But instead thereof they have made use of strong Forts and good Garrisons, well commanded and governed. And some have therein imitated the Romans in planting of Colonies, the which are of less expense, and seem more mild; 
The planting of Colonies more unjust & difficult.  but in effect they are more unjust in their establishments▪ For that you must ruin many people to settle them with commodity; and moreover, they are difficult to settle, as well for the choice of men which you are to send, as for the planting of any good order amongst them, to make them, live in p●ace. If you send of the chief men of your Estate, y●u unfurnish it, if they be many in number; if few, they will make themselves Masters of the rest. If you take them all poor, as the Romans did, disorders will easily grow amongst them; and to live at their own pleasures, they will at need join with them of the Country against you; as many Roman Colonies have done against the Romans. But if you gather them out of diverse parts of your Estate, they will hardly agree.  
Yet if the conquest were of so great an extent, 
Considerations for the ●etling of Colony.  as the expense would prove excessive, to maintain them in their duties by force, you may make use of this means with these considerations; First your Estate must be such, as sending a good number of your Subjects to that end, you may not unfurnish yourself: That the War had so unpeopled the conquered Country, as after the conquest you should not be forced to commit so open an injustice, as to ruin part of the Inhabitants for the planting of Colonies. These spoils and unpeoplings are excusable during the time you are in Arms: But afterwards they can admit no excuse, what considerations soever are brought to the contrary, and this unpeopling made during the War, gives place and excuse to a Colony.  
The third consideration is, that you must send Soldiers which have been accustomed to live in discipline and order: The which must not be so old, as they cannot accustom themselves to the place where they shall be planted; nor yet so young, as they shall be incapable of Discipline; but being mingled one with another, they may live together with some good order and equality.  

〈…〉 conquered subjects' 〈◊〉 ●● duties.  Besides this means they have added three others to contain untamed Subjects. The first is, to abate and mollify their courages: The second to weaken them of forces, and to take from them all means to do evil, when you cannot make them lose the desire. And the third to keep them from assembling together, or from joining with their Neighbours. To attain unto the first, some as the Turk hath ruined the Nobility and the Princes, to take from the people all means to assemble, 
To mollitie the 〈◊〉 of a conquered 〈…〉  and make a head under some Commander of courage. Others have suffered them to abandon themselves to drunkenness, and to all sorts of incontinency and pleasure. But these means are tyrannical and filthy. Numa who was wis●r and more moderate, to mollify this barbarousness, which Romulus had entertained among the people of Rome, made use of Religion, to the end he might retain by the fear of the Gods, those whom the fear of men could not contain; and for this effect he caused Statues and Altars to be erected at the Corners of Streets, to the end that the people might generally be retained by the presence of Religion which they had before their eyes. In the Christian Religion diverse sorts of Orders and Rules have been instituted, the which besides the good which concerns Religion, pu●ge the World o● many savage humours, which happily wou●d do much m●●chiefe. Others have invited people to give themselves to all Mechannicke Arts. For beside that the mind is diverted from evil by this employment▪ most commonly they which are bred up in shops, have no desire of troubles, nor War: And admit they should affect it, they should find themselves unfit, neither would it be successful there being more loss for them then ga●ne. Others under pretext of privileges, exempt a conquered people from going to the War, and by little and little make them unprofitable by this exemption.  
Some have held that embarking them in the study of Sciences and Learning, it was a good means to make them desire rest. Yet in bringing in the study of Sciences, you must distinguish them: For those which may serve for the War, must in no sort be imparted to the people, nor those which teach to command: But only such as are fitting studies, as Divinity, Physic, Astrology, or such like, the which so entertain their minds, as t●ey joy in no other thing when they know them, and make their spirits melancholy, depriving them of that vivacity which is necessary for military actions. Some others have held that busying, a riotous and contentious people in suits, was necessary, not only to employ their minds, but also to give them means to vomit out this bitterness and bad humour, whereof every one hath a part, without troubling the Public: And in regard thereof they have filled Estates with diverse Offices, in some sort to content the most ambitious; and by the jealousy of the maintaining of their authority, to bind them to the preservation of the Public. But in the practice of all these means, they must first observe the humour of the people with whom you are to deal; and make use of that whereunto you shall see them inclined, and accommodate yourself accordingly, as occasion and time will give you leave. As for the disarming of a conquered people of their forces and means, they proceed after diverse manners. 
To weaken a conquered people.  The first is, to take from them all sorts of Arms: And not only the use, but also the matter and making of them; for in a mutiny and combustion, they may make use of it: As also the use of Horses and of Ships of War. To keep their commanders about you, either fo● Council or under colour of some charge: To employ the Youth which have been already trained up to Arms, out of the Country: as Caesar did, meaning to pass into England, who carried with him all the Young Men, assuring himself by this means of the Gauls, and making use of them against those of great Britain. He likewise under the colour of hostages, unfurnished the Towns of their principal Men, and of such as might either serve for conduct or Council. The Emperor Heraclius to weaken the Saracens, entertained four thousa●d Arabians, which were their principal force. We have said that the Turk weakened the Christians, in taking their Children to be instructed in his Religion, and by this means fortifies himself. The Desmaneling of Towns a●d strong places, which a Prince will not or cannot keep, is also necessary; For fortresses in Towns have many times encouraged the Inhabitants to a revolt, as Tacitus writes of jerusalem.  
There remains the third means, which is to hinder these people from uniting themselves, 
To hinder the v●ion of a conquered people.  and making a head; for their union will hold the place of force. Some Kings, or rather Tyrants of Egypt, have made use of the diversity of Religions, to keep their Subjects in division; Others have entertained jealousies and distrusts among them, and sometimes hatred betwixt Neighbour Provinces. Others have kept their Subjects in fear: by certain secrets and hidden searches, causing him to be punished speedily, which was found to have any will to Mu●ine: And some have written that the inquisition in Spain, although in show it were Established for Religion, yet they have sometimes made it serve for an instrument of Estate.  
Some have of a Conquered Province made three or four; as the Romans did of Macedony, which t●ey divided into four, that is to say, Amphipolis, S●lorica, Pella, a●● P●ll●gonia. And besides this Paulus Aemillius, commanded ●he great Men to pass into Italy with their Children, and after this division, the Provinces were forbidden to contract any alliances one with another. Others have forbidden a conquered people all sorts of assemblies, allowing them neither public Council, nor Commonalty, nor Brotherhood; as the Romans did at Capova, leaving them no form of public command. The Turks in like manner hath forbidden Bells, not only to the Christians, but through his whole Empire, fearing (as some hold) that at the sound thereof, the people should gather together for some design then for devotion. The Souldan's of Egypt fearing the multitude of the Inhabitants at Cairo, crossed the City in many places with trenches, and broad and deep ditches, to take all means from the people in a Mutiny to assemble suddenly together.  
But to hinder a new conquered people, from uniting themselves with others, besides these means they have restrained them from all commerce with strangers, forbidding them to go out of the Country without le●ue, as some write of England, Muscovie, and China, and not suffering any strangers to enter without passport, keeping guards and secret spies upon the Ports and passages. But if you cannot prevail by these means, some have been of opinion to transport them to other places, as they of the mountains of Genova, were drawn into the plain by the Romans. Aurelian transplanted the Daces on this side the Danowe; Charlemaigne the Saxons into Flanders, and the Turk many people of Asia into Greece.  
These are the means, whereof they have made use to prevent a future mischief, that is to say, the effects of th●se first causes of the ruin of an Estate. But if they have been forgotten, or prove too weak to stay the Subject's minds, and to keep them from running to nearer courses to ruin the Estate: th●n you must of necessity, use remedies fit for every one of these causes, to preserve it.   

CHAP. 16. Of the nearest causes of the ruin of an Estate▪ Of a Conspiracy against the Prince's person. Of the Causes thereof: Of the means to avoid it: Of the discovery and Punishment.  

Conspiracy against th● Prince's person.  AS the Prince is the Axletree whereon the Estate turns; so a conspiracy against his person succeeds according to the desire of the conspirators, or draws after it many times the ruin of the Estate, to prevent the which they make use of four means, the first is, not to do any thing that doth usually invite the Subjects to such conspiracies, 
Means to preuen●.  the second to cause himself to be guarded, and not to suffer any unknown person to approach near unto him, the third is to observe the actions of his guards and of his familiars and great men, the fourth to cause such as shallbe surprised, to be duly published. 
Causes of a conspiracy.   
In regard of the first, the causes which draw men usually to such wicked designs are these: an injury received from the Prince or a fear to receive one; the ambition of great men and of favourites, the desire of liberty, and the zeal of Religion. 
The injury which they 〈◊〉 to receive from the Prince   
An Injury is of three sorts, for either it concerns life, honour or goods; and they which have been thrust on through fear of their lives, have most commonly prevailed in their enterprise: for the despair wherein they are, makes them to hazard their lives more freely, to save it by the loss of the Princes, who seeks to take away theirs, running no worse fortune in this hazard then to lose that which could not otherwise preserve: and therefore a Prince should not reduce any man, be he great or small in that extremity. And injury done to the honour is great in a person of courage, and Bodille testified it, who flew Childeric which had caused him to be whipped: But of all iniu●ies, that which concerns the honour of Women and the Bed, is one of the most powerful in such enterprises, whereof there are many examples; An injury which concerns men's Estates is not so violent, and few men to recover their goods, or in revenge of that which hath been taken from him, will hazard their lives: and yet in a great courage, the revenge of any injury whatsoever is much to be feared.  
As for the ambition of great men and favourites, it doth produce more conspiracies than injuries, for that the weak although they have received an injury from the Prince, they cannot hurt him for want of commodity and support; But great men who have both the one and the other, and ambition withal, which is sometimes no less violent than revenge, gives them more means to prevail in such designs: yet there are seldom such enterprises, but when as the Prince hath suffered some one to grow to that power, that he wants nothing but the Crown.  
Wherefore the first means to avoid this danger, is to humble such men by degrees; as if he cannot suffer them to live without hazard to make them away speedily: As Tiberius did of Scianus, the Second is to appoint successors after him, if he hath no Childerens: be it by Adoption or Election, provided always that the Laws of State allow it: But these successors must not be so great and powerful, as they may have a● will to make the like enterprises, desiring rather to make themselves Masters of the Estate, then attend the succession; For the which Augustus knew well how to provide by the Adoption of successors in many degrees, supporting and strengthening his Government even by this means.  

The desire of liberty.  The desire of Liberty doth likewise produce a powerful and strong effect in the minds of Men, who are otherwise ill affected to the Prince, and he must have a very strong bridle to restrain them, when it is once entered into the minds of a multitude, who have the more courage, when they constantly believe that all means are lawful to dispossess an usurper, or a Prince whom they hold unlawful: This it is which hath produced in former time, so many Murderers of Tyrants, and with the like desire they were thrust on, which conspired against the Dukes of Florence. 
The inconsiderate zeal of Religion.   
I am ashamed to put Religion in this number, and to make it the cause of so many wicked enterprises, as hath been practised against Princes; there being nothing so impious, nor so contrary to Religion, as such Murders. Yet the jews Books are full of such examples: And in truth it is contrary to Religion, to believe that God would punish wicked Princes, and free his people by this means, and that the Divine justice make use of such instruments, as Men do of Hangmen, to execute his decrees: But if for this reason the end have been sometimes good, and the event to the honour of God; yet the action in itself is bad: They be Rods, which after the punishment are good for nothing but the fire, so the jews to hinder the consequence of such actions, have represented them as done by the express commandeme●t of God: And yet certain Divines, fuller of malice then Piety, have sought to draw consequences from thence: and of a Religion full of Piety and mildness, have made an Altar of impiety, pouring for the blood of Kings and Princes, upon pretext of a contrary Religion, wherein they have followed the proceeding of the old man of the Mountain, who bred up many young Men to such erterprises, promising them another life full of unspeakable pleasures and joys: who being transported with the hope thereof, exposed themselves freely to death: And without any other Army, his Estate (although of a small extent) kept all other Monarches and Potentates in fear to be murdered, forcing them to seek his Friendship, and some to pay him a Tribute to live in safety: So as in the end the Kings of Armenia were forced to root out this Race of Assassins.  
To preserve himself from all these sorts of undertakers, you must understand, 
Ordinary defects in conspiracies.  that all conspiracies do not always succeed, by reason of some defects, whereof some one doth usually fall out in such attempts. The first is, for that having resolved to observe a certain order in the execution, most commonly the particularities which they have foreseen, do not imp, and will do less, if the Prince doth not impart to any man, whether he means to go, or what he intends to do long before; but doth so vary in his actions, as none but himself is able to divine of the time when he means to part, nor of the place whither he intends to go, nor where he means to stay, nor how he will be accompanied. The second defect is, that many times the Executioners heart fails him, either by an amazement which seizeth on him▪ seeing the Prince to look on him, and to observe his countenance; or his courage fails him and grows mild by the good countenance he shows him.  
Wherefore many Princes suffering all men to approach near unto them, do not forbear to observe such as are unknown unto them: So as he which hath a will to attempt, is easily discovered in lifting up his Arms, or in approaching too near unto him; and his constant look would be sufficient to make him grow into distrust that he was discovered, and divert him from his Enterprise.  
Other Princes having suspicion of some, have purposely cast forth word● of distrust, which notwithstanding might be interpreted in a double sense, and speaking them they have observed the countenance of those whom they disinherited, to the end they might discover their hearts. The third error is the little discretion of him that attempts, as he that meant to kill Commodus, entering into the Ampitheater; before he gave the blow began to cry out, behold what the Senate sends thee. For these words advertized Commodus, and gave his guard means to prevent him, wherefore Guards are necessary for a Prince, not only for a sign of his greatness, or that being accompanied with force he may have the more authority: But likewise to preserve him, and to observe the countenance of such as approach near unto him.  
The manner of passing before Princes, although it seems to be practised only for honour, yet it was beneficial to Pandolpho Tyrant of Syenna, against whom julio Belanty, his Son in-law, had laid an ambush in his house, by the which Pandolph● was accustomed to pass, to go and visit a Friend of his which lay sick; But Pandolpho staying in his lodging, to speak to some one, it gave time to them of his train to go before; who by this means without thinking of it, discovered the Enterprise: Whereas if after his accustomed manner, he had gone first, he had been in danger to have been surprised.  
The fourth Error is a false imagination, or an accident not foreseen. They which had resolved to kill Caesar, seeing Popilius one of their companions to discourse long with him, they had a conceit that he spoke of the Enterprise; which made them resolve to advance their design, feareing that in staying longer they should be discovered. A word may sometimes divert such Men. An accident not foreseen discovered the Treason intended against james King of great Britain; and a letter sent by one to a friend of his, not to be p●e●ent at the assembly of the Estates, not giving him any other reason, made them careful to visit all places about 〈◊〉 House at Westmi●ster, where the Prince and Peers were to assemble: Where in a Cellor under the great Hall, in the which the Peers were to sit, (where the King with the Queen and their Children, were to assist in person) they found a great quantity of Gunpowder, and Faggots, to blow up the Chamber and the whole assembly.  
Some Princes have gone priui●y armed when they went in public; as they say, Cosmo de Medicis did. The Turkish Princes after that Batazet had been in danger to be slain by a Der●is, have not suffered any unknown person to approach near unto them, which is not accompanied by two Capigies, or Ushers, who hold those that go unto him by the Arms: And this custom is practised with the Ambassadors of Princes. There are many other means which are diversely practised, according to the persons, time, and place. Yet the most general is, to have a good eye to the Enterprises which may be attempted openly. But that which is most to be feared in Princes, is poisoning: the essay which is taken of his Mere and Drink, cannot warrant a Prince. Some have accustomed themselves to take Counter-poison, as Mitridates did. But the safest way is to have faithful and vigilant persons about him, to have a care of it, besides the ordinary Officers, which are appointed to prepare the Prince's Meat and Drink: And these must not be known if it may be, lest they should corrupt them, as they may do the ordinary Officers. He must likewise have confident persons, to watch and observe the actions of such as they may distrust, (which is the third remedy to frustrate the effect of a conspiracy) And if they be such as they ought to be, it will be a difficult thing but they will discover what is practised. 
The discou●● of 〈◊〉.   
Conspiracies are discovered by two means; either by the report of another, or by conjecture. Report proceeds either from the little fidelity, or from the little discretion of those to whom the Treason is imparted. This little faith is usually found among men: For such a business cannot be communicated but to him that is a dear friend to the undertaker, or to one that is discontented with the Prince, against whom they conspire. To find such a Friend that will willingly expose his life to an apparent danger, it is very difficult: And admit you find him, yet you cannot be assured of his Courage, although you have tried him in other affairs. Moreover to measure a man's fidelity in this subject, by the discontentment he hath of the Prince, were great indiscretion. For the undertaker having discovered his intentions to this discontented person, he gives him means to recover the Prince's favour. Wherefore the hatred he bears unto the Prince, must be exceeding great, or the undertakers must have much authority and credit with him, to make him to keep his Faith: For the malcontent desiring nothing more than the Prince's grace and favour, he shall have a good occasion to hope for it by the discovery of the enterprise.  
By the little indiscretion which is likewise in such men, conspiracies are commonly discovered, either in speaking too much, or before such as he ought not: like unto Brutus' Sons, who having conferred with the Tarqui●s Ambassadors before one of their Servants, they were discovered by him, to have conspired against their Country. Catiline acquainted Fulvia with his design, who discovered it to Cicero; Divis discovered the Treason which he had plotted against Alexander, to a young youth named. N●●homachus, who revealed it to C●balinius, and ●e to Alexander.  
The Treason of Sceninus against Nero, was discovered by conjecture; Sceninus having the day before the Execution of the Enterprise, made his will and commanded Milichus his freed man to sharpen his Dagger; he enfranchised all his Bondmen, and caused many Rulers to be made for the binding up of wounds: So as this freed man doubting that these preparations were for some such Enterprise, advertised Nero, who by his means discovered the other conspirators. In like manner Spies prying up and down, may by the indiscretion, lightness, or malice of another, or by conjecture, have some light of that which passeth; and they must especially observe the actions of discontented persons, and of such as may better their condition by the Prince's death.  
It remains now to know, 
Of the punishment of conspiracies.  (after the discovery of such Erterprises) how to punish them fitly and seasonably. For many times it may be done unsitly: And instead of amazing the confederates which are not yet discovered, you shall thrust them on to effect their design. Sometimes they shall incense and invite others to make attempts, in stead of diverting them by the punishment of the first. The Prince being advertised of some Enterprise against his person, before he publish it or seek to punish it, he must seek to discover it with all the particularities and circumstances, if it be possible, measuring the condition of the conspirators with his own. If the Conspirators be strong, he must resolve upon some other pretext to make himself the stronger; and in the mean time he must dissemble, bestowing favours and gifts upon the Conspirators, left that finding themselves discovered, they attempt not openly.  
In the conspiracy of the two Legions (which the Romans had left for the guard of Capona against the Samnites) who had resolved to sack the Caponans, the Senate having given charge to Rutilius the new Consul to prevent it; to kill them asleep, he caused and commanded it to be proclaimed, that the Senate had decreed they should continue there still in Gar●isson: So as hoping they should always have time to execute their designs, they deferred it. But when they saw that they separated them, sending some one way, some another, they resolved to put it in execution as they did: The which they would not have done, i● after this first policy they had taken order to have been the stronger before they had divided them. Wherefore a Prince that will have time to discover or punish a Treason, he must cause the conspirators to have an opinion to find a more fit occasion to execute their designs: And he must not be rash in such things, if the danger be not apparent in staying. For the punishment is made for two principal ends. The first is to free himself of such dangerous persons; and the second to terrife others by the example of punishment, from attempting the like. Whereas by haste the Prince not only loses the fruits of the punishment; but also he hazards his person.  
And although that punishments seem necessary; yet if the subject or the condition of the business be such, as mildness and clemency may bring more reputation and safety to the Prince, than the impunity of the danger, he shall do well to show it in such an action. Augustus' pardoned Cunia three times, and by the last assured his life more than he had done by the punishment of all others, whom he had caused to be executed for the like attempts. The unexpected Clemency of a Prince to some one, the which proceeds not from fear and cowardice, doth not only bind him to be faithful, but doth mollify the bitterness of his Enemy, who grow the more incensed by punishments; the which being held unjust, by such as hold the same opinion of the Prince with the undertakers, they think ●t lawful to be revenged, as they would be of an injury or some violence done to the Public, or to some private person.   

CHAP. 17. Of the treason of Places, Towns, and Armies, and other forces of the Estate: and of the remedies to prevent the effect.  
BY the Treasons which are practised upon strong places, or upon Towns of importance, or upon Armies or principal forces, Estates are brought to their ruin. The only remedy is in the foresight, by means of the choice which they shall make of those to whom they shall give the command: And he must have a special care to choose men that are not covetous, ambitious, cunning, or dissemblers, light, or inconstant; or easily subject to discontentments; or men that have great support and credit, and are undertakers.  
Having thus provided for the Election you must not so join the authority of command with the forces in one man, as when you would you shall not be able to sep●rate them: And not only he which hath the Authority, but also they which command the particular forces, must depend immediately of the Prince, with charge notwithstanding to obey him, to whom the Prince hath given the authority of command, unless he receive a Counter command. And it is of no force to say, that if they which are to depend not wholly upon him that is to command them, he cannot answer for that which they give him incharge. For if the Prince trusts him, he must likewise trust; and watching over the forces, advertise him if they do not as they ought, and do not obey that which is commanded them according to the duty of his charge.  
Some in like manner (as I have formerly said) have held it fit, not to continue great commands in own man, especially in one place, whereby the custom of obeying him, the Subjects may tie themselves too strictly to him, and give him means to dispose of the Province where he commands. These are the remedies to prevent the greatest treasons: For the rest which are made by intelligences with petty companions, as in corrupting a Sentinel or a Corporal that shall be in guard to seize upon a Port, they may easily avoid it, in drawing the guards by lot, and by the care and diligence of the Captains. And if they be advertized of some practice which the Enemy makes with the Soldiers and Inhabitants of a Town, they may cause some to make show to be of the intelligence, who addressing themselves to those whom they have reason to distrust, they may easily discover the truth.   

CHAP. 18. Of Rebellions, and of the means to prevent them.  
COnspiracies and Treasons are most commonly secret and hidden, and are plotted by few men, the which makes them more difficult to discover, and more easy to punish. chose Rebellions and Factions are made more openly; but as they cannot be attempted without great numbers, so they are with more difficulty pacified and punished; and do more usually draw after them the ruin of the Estate than the former. But to know how a Prince ought to govern himself in a Rebellion, he must consider whether he be stronger or weaker than the Rebels; and he must hold himself the weaker, although they were equal in forces; for that he may not hazard his authority upon a doubtful event, as it is ordinary among equals. If he be the stronger, he must prevent it in the beginning speedily and secretly; cutting off the Heads and chief Commanders, before they know they are taken; and then present himself with courage to suppress it, to the end he may amaze the Rebels: And if he be far from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must approach; as the Emperor Charles the fifth did, who passed from Spain into Flanders, to suppress the rebellion of the Gantois, the which succeeded happily. For to abandon the place where the Rebellion begins, or to retire far from it is held a fear, the which blemish and impair the credit & authority of the Prince, and encourage the heads of the party, and makes the People more bold and insolent. But if he finds not himself the stronger, and to have some great advantage; without retiring himself too far from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must make show to have a will to yield to that which the people desire of him, to give them time to grow cold; especially if they have no Commanders of credit and authority.  
Sometime a small matter may be able to reduce a people to their duty: And in such Encounters subtle and in tentive spirits are fit, as likewise those which are popular and eloquent, to entertain and to draw a mutinous multitude to their duty, by fear, distrust, and hope. That familiar and popular course which Menenius Agrippa observed with the people of Rome, by a Comparison of the division of the members from a humane body, succeeded better to pacify them, then if he had fall'n upon more serious reasons. The invention which Calaminus the Capovan made use of, to save the Senators of Capova from the hands of the people, was no less witty: For joining himself to their party, and applauding them in all things, seeing them resolute to put their Senators to death, he propounded unto them that they should begin first with him that was most odious unto them, but withal he let them know that the Estate must not remain without government, & that before they put him to death, they must make choice of some other in his place. So not able to agree, and passing from one to another, they found that they whom they mean● to put to death, were much better than the others whom they intended to choose in their places: And to the people were pacified.  
Sometimes i● such mutinies and combustions, they have made use of the occasion of an Eclipse, or of some extraordinary sign from Heaven, or of some unexpected misfortune; where with the people being touched and amazed, suffer themselves to be persuaded to return to their duties. A Ma● of authority and credit with the people, may prevail much in such occasions. Soderin Archbishop of Florence, coming f●●th in public with his Pontifical Robes and his Clergy pacified the Florentines, who were in combustion one against another. And as in some places Preachers have been the Firebrands of sedition, and the trumpets of War, in others they have served to pacify them, and they have made good use of them. But if the people cannot be suddenly reclaimed, and that the popular mutiny passeth into Rebellion and a settled revolt: you must then seek to reduce them by degrees, disuniting them, and gaining some of the commanders underhand, by promises and benefits; or putting them in distrust of the people, and in jealousy one of another.  
If nei●her of these remedies will prevail, he must yield to that which the people demand, either in all, or in part: For that love and reputation being the foundation of the Prince's Authority, if the Prince in yielding seems to diminish his reputation in some sort, yet thereby he shall preserve the affection of the people, who being pacified, he may by other means recover his reputation. And yet in such occurrents he may so carry himself, and use such dexterity, that accommodating himself mildly to the people's inclination, he shall seem to grant that willingly which they extort from him by force; being necessary that the Prince to maintain his authority, make show to will and desire that which he cannot hinder, and so to apply his will to his power. And to the end he may make it known that it is a thing which he desires, he must seek to draw some apparent advantage for his greatness: There being few actions in the Estate, from which the Prince either in effect or in show may not draw some advantage; although in another thing he be damnified: And it shall be a part of Wisdom to show himself more joyful of the advantage which he receives, then discontented for the disadvantage which his Enemies sought to procure him.  
The Turkish Emperors although they be powerful, have been many times constrained to yield some of their Ministers to the janissaries to be put to death: The which a well advised Prince should never do, if his Ministers had not otherwise highly offended; but seeing himself reduced to this extremity, he should give them means to escape, yet dissembling that it is with his consent. For besides that it were a cruel Injustice, to deliver an innocent man into the hands of a furious multitude, the shame will redound upon him, with a disdain, and a distrust of all others, whom he should call to serve him, who will rather govern themselves, according to the will of those which had credit with the people, then to his desire. But if the Ministers are found to have carried themselves ill, the Prince may take this occasion to cause them to be punished by justice, to pacify a popular mutiny: Although it were more discreetly done to prevent it, then to stay until he were urged to do that by force, which for his own good he should have formerly done.   

CHAP. 19 Of Factions and of the means to hinder the effects.  
THere remaineth now to speak of Factions, for the last and most ordinary causes for the ruin of Estates. They are seldom framed among the people, unless great men be of the party: For they grow either from the private quarrels of great men, who embark the people on their sides; or from the subject of some reformation; or for the government of public affairs. If they grow from particular quarrels, the Prince must speedily force them to refer the cause to his judges, or to Arbitrators, without making show to favour the one more than the other. This was that which King Francis the first did, in the suit depending betwixt Madam Lonyse his Mother and Charles Duke of Bourbon, who revolted upon this subject.  
But if the controversy cannot be reconciled, for that the proofs fail on the one side, although that by strong presumptions, the fact be in some sort apparent; or if it concerns the honour of one of the parties in the decision of the business: the Prince must separate them, employing them out of his Estate in some honourable charges, the one far from the other; And he must Entertain them thus divided, until that either their credit be diminished with the people, or that time hath made them forget, or at the least temper their hatred. If (as it happens often) to the private quarrels of great Men, they add some public pretext, as of reformation, Liberty or Religion: The Prince not able to hinder the course of these factions, he must join with the stronger to ruin the weaker: Wherein having once prevailed, he must free himself by diverse means (yet lawful) of the chief Commanders with whom he had joined, either employing them out of the Estate, or causing them to be punished for their private offences.  
But if the Prince comes not in time to ruin the one nor the other, for that they are equal, and that his Counterpoise cannot weigh down the balance; he must attend, that by the Event of some misfortune to the one, they may find the weakness of that side, to ruin him wholly. Yet if in this case the heads of the Factions, and not the Prince, be to reap the Honour and fruits of the Victory of one of the two parties; the Prince shall do more wisely to balance the one with the other, and to make himself rather an Arbitrator or a judge of their pretensions, than a party: For that he should make himself to those, against whom he should declare himself: and should not thereby gain any Authority or credit amongst those, whose party he should embrace, into the which he should not be received by the partisans, but to countenance their designs, and not for any affection they bear him, having already engaged themselves to him, who had first advanced his standard, and had presented himself unto them to be their Leader, and to assist them in their designs; And they will attribute to the credit of their Commander, that which the Prince should afterwards do for them.  
The principal Remedy must be used in the beginning: For that when as the parties are once framed, the Prince must rather study how he may live in this corruption of State, then to think of the means how to take it away. For if either of the parties have an advantage, he will not abandon his Arms, until he have ruined his opposite: wherein the Prince shall have a double loss; the one is he shall lose a great part of his Subjects; the other is, that the head of the faction being fortified with credit, he may cause him to lose the rest, and usurp his Estate. But if both parties be equal, they will contain themselves through the fear they have one of another. And the Prince hath no other remedy, then to breed a jealousy and distrust among the Commanders of one and the same party, making many equal in in honour and dignity, to the end they may not agree to obey any other Head then the Prince; or advancing some of those which obey the Heads of parties, to greater dignities than their Generals, to the end they may disdain to obey them. This must be practised with such as have many followers.    

THE COUNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greatest and most Remarkable Considerations serving for the Managing of Public Affairs. PART. III. CONTAINING THE MEANS to increase an ESTATE.  

CHAPTER I. Of the increasing of an Estate by the enlarging of Towns.  
AN Estate is increased either by multiplying or husbanding that which is our own, or by adding unto it, 
To increase our own by our own.  and drawing unto us that which is another man's, by lawful means. Our own is multiplied either by manuring the land; or by enlarging of Towns, especially those which may serve for defence, and to make head against an enemy; or in taking care of the procreation, breeding up, and education of Children: In regard of the manuring of the Land and that which depends thereon, it hath been recommended formerly, in treating of the wealth and the revenues of the Estate.  

divers means to enlarge and amplify Towns.  As for the enlarging and amplifying of Towns, it is done after diverse manners, either in drawing together people dispersed here and there in the Fields, in many scattered Houses and Villages, and reducing them into one place, as Theseus did at Athens, and as they say it is practised at Brazeele, as well to Civillize that people, as to have the better means to instruct them in the Christian Faith: Or else people fearing the invasion of some strange Nation, have reduced themselves into some place that was strong of Situation. By this means Veni●e was amplified and built. The ancient Spaniards retired themselves to the Mountains of Bi●●ay and Arragon, when as the Moors held Spain▪ The Persians flying before Tamburlaine, some retired themselves to Mount Taurus▪ others to Anti-Taurus, and some to the Lands of the Caspian Sea, where they peopled many Towns. Pisa was enlarged by the Ruins of Genova, when it was sacks by the Sarrasins. The coming of Attilla was the cause of the beginning and foundation of Venice, the greatest part of the best families of Italy being retired into the Towns of the Adriatic Sea, to avoid the fury of so powerful an Enemy. London and many Towns in England have been peopled by French and Flemings, being chased out of their Countries in regard of their Religion.  
The pleasantness and beauty of some Towns, for their Situation or their buildings, 
●he pleasant●●●●● of towns.  have drawn many to frequent them. The structure of the Pyramids in Alexandria, the bounty of the Air of Mitilene, Smirna, and Rho●es, made many Romans resolve to leave Rome, and to make their abode there: The which hath been the cause of the increase and amplifying of those places. 
Profit draws Men wonderfully to live in towns.  But profit is that which draws most Men to live in a place: The which although it be of diverse sorts, yet it proceeds from three principal caus●s, the which must concur for the enlarging of a Town; The commodity of the situation, 
Principal causes of profit in a town.  the fertility of the Country; and the facility of commerce.  
The commodity of the Situation consists in two things; 
The commodity of the Situation.  the one to send forth that whereof we have abundance; and the other to receive that from others which we want, which two must concur together in one place, to people it and make it great. Otherwise if it were but a simple passage, it would not be enlarged no more than the ●●ands of the Terceres, the which although they serve the portugals for a passage to the Indies, yet are they nothing the better peopled: And Flushing, although it be a great Haven, where many Ships arrive; Yet it is but a very small Town. Whereas Venice, Lisbon, Genova, and Antwerp, having both Commodities joined together, have made themselves great.  
The fertility of the Neighbour Country, 
The fertility of the Country.  makes not a Town to be the better peopled, but helps to maintain it being peopled from other places: For we have seen and see daily, many Towns Situated in a barren soil, as Genova, who have made and maintained themselves great: Necessity sharpening and quickening the Inhabitants spirits to labour and industry.  
The facility of commerce proceeds from the easy transportation of Merchandise, be it by water or by land, 
Of the facility o● commerce.  in a plain Country or a hilly, they having the commodity of carriages: Yet the conduct by water is more easy & of less charge. A navigable water is either by Sea, or rivers, or la●es, or channels, made with men's hands with some stops; or Pools, as that of Miree in Egypt, which they write, had fify Mi●es in compass. But of all the transportation by water, that by Sea is much more commodious and profitable: And the Town which hath it, and is accompanied with a good Port, whereas Ships may ride safely from winds and the violence of storms, may make itself great with little industry.  

Religion a means to enlarge a Town.  Religion hath sometimes served to enlarge the City of Ierus●lem: For the jews sacrifice being Celebrated only there, every Man ran thither, and many made choice of it for their abode: And many Villages have of late been made Towns, in regard of the Religion which they have tied unto them by Pilgrimage●.  
The erecting of Schools and Universities, of all sorts of Sciences, 
The Establishment of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉.  have served ot●ers to amplify them, being a means which Princes have p●act●●●d, not only to stay their Subjects, who going to study ●ut of their Estate, carry forth the money, and bring home strong manners, most commonly pernicious to their Country; but also to people those places where their Elections were made, by the ●ucc●●●s of their Subjects and strangers.  

The 〈…〉.  The Election in like manner of some Seats of justice, whose jurisdiction hath a great extent, and is well peopled, may also serve: Especially in that sort as it is used in most of the Estates of Christendom, where they must spend much time, and disburse much money to recover their own. For the frequentation of those which come from abroad, with their long stay, cannot but bring g●●at means which remains there. 
〈…〉.  The Erecting also of Manufactures, if there be any, or of stuffs, which are particular to a Town, and sought for by others, may also increase it. Some Towns have been peopled by the exemptions and privileges of Princes, who have drawn Inhabitants from all parts: They used this meres to people New-haven; and the Duke of Tuscany doth the like for Livery. The residence and the abode of the Nobility & Gentry in Towns, 
Residence of the Nobility.  serves likewise to enlarge and amplify them. For besides that such Towns are commonly better built; the Nobility are more curious to have policy entertained, then when it is composed only of Merchants, who dreaming only of their gain, and to do their business, have most commonly little care of the Public, unless there be many rich men which have theigovernment: For then the wealth and commodity which they enjoy, gives them the same courage with the gentry, and they govern themselves after the same manner. But besides this, the Prince must assist them with some public Revenues to that effect. The comparison of the Towns of Italy with those of France, shows what difference there is betwixt Towns inhabited by Gentlemen, and those which are not. And the Towns of Flanders and Germany, which are in the hands of rich Merchants, yield nothing in beauty to those of Italy.  
The residence and abode of the Prince for a long time in one Town, doth much increase and amplify it; 
The residence of the Prince.  whereof the example is but too familiar in all Estates: And the reason is for that the affairs and the treasure are brought thither as to its Centre; the which doth not only draw those which are necessary for the Prince's service, but also Merchants and Artisans, who go where there is commodity and gain.   

CHAP. 2. Of the increase of an Estate by the Procreation of Children.  
But they strive in vain to increase an Estate by the manuring of the Land, and peopling of Towns, if they do not provide to husband it, and to favour the generation, breeding up, and education of Children; being the only means we have of our own, to people both Countries and Towns. Augustus after the Civil war, found this care not only worthy of himself, but necessary for the Estate, propounding great privileges to such as had three Children, and yet to favour a single life as much as might be.  

Of Polygamy.  Some people have thought they had provided well by Polygamy, allowing one man to have many Wives; as well not to tie the fruitfulness of a man, to the barrenness of one Wife, as to multiply generation: Yet experience hath taught us, that whether that a man being employed in many places, cannot commonly get Children which live long; or not able to extend the care of a Father to so many Children through necessity, or otherwise they cannot attain to ripe age; the Country which make use of polygamy, find not themselves better peopled than others. The Turks raise greater Armies than the Christians, but this grows from the extent of the Country which they possess, for that they make ●o other profession but Arms. For he that shall compare the people which is now in Greece, with that which it was before the Turk entered, shall find it much less peoled than it hath been.  

Of Celibate.  It is true that Celibate or a single life indifferently allowed to all sorts of men, is many times the cause of the decay of people in an Estate. Charlemaigne being borne in an Age full of devotion, in the which the greatest Men made themselves Monckes or Clergy Men, although that otherwise he was much respective to that which concerns Religion, he held it not fit to suffer any one that would, to make himself a Monk. For besides that you may not allow good Men to abandon the Estate, it is a means in making profession of a single life to lose the race. Good Men come from good, and the valiant as they say produce their like; and therefore they must make use of them for the good of the Estate. But as a single life is seemly for men of the Church, and that there must be some: it seems necessary to cut off, or at the least to hinder hereafter this infinite number, which unfurnish the State of Men which would be very convenient and fit for other places, and who for the most part become a scandal and reproach to the Church; Experience showing sufficiently, that such an excessive multitude, is not capable to be reduced to its first order and institution: And whereas a small number well entertained may edify by their example, this great number incapable of discipline ruins all, and are a shame to their Mother which hath brought them forth and entertained them.  
But for that many times they make use of their retreats, rather to discharge Families which are poor, then for any devotion, for the which they were chiefly instituted; and likewise that an infinite company of poor are kept from marrying, lest they should leave their children miserable: It seems that the erecting of Seminaries in all professions, (which we have formerly mentioned) should prevent this fear & the inconveniences which it breeds; ●etling them in such sort, as no one should want a retreat nor entertainment in serving the Public: whence would grow its increase, and the peace of Families. These are the means to increase and multiply our own, by our own.   

CHAP. 3. Of the increase of an Estate by the ●nion of another Mans to ours.  

divers 〈◊〉 to unite another man's to ours.  THe lawful means to draw another man's, and to unite it to our own, are of many sorts▪ The Romans knew how to manage them with great wisdom and dexterity. The first whereof they made use, was to draw and unite unto them the people whom they had conquered; as they did them of Alba and the Sabins. The second was to ruin the Neighbour Cities, and by this means force the Inhabitants to retire to Rome. The third, to grant the right of Roman Burgesses, to the greatest and most powerful of their Neighbours, uniting them by this meres to their Estate, and binding them to the defence thereof. The fourth to treat equal alliances under the name of Society, as with the Latins; or under the name of Friendship; as with the Kings of Egypt and Asia. 
Protection of the weake●.  They have also made use to increase their Estate by the protection of the weaker; as they did taking that of Capova against the Samnites, and of Messina against Hieron and the Carthaginians.  
Some Princes of our time have made good use of this means, having changed the protection into an absolute Seignoury, some under colour of the disloyalty of the Anones; others by the consent of the Auories themselves; Some upon pretext, that they had not been satisfied, certain sums of money which they had employed for the Defence thereof: And some for the only consideration of conveniency, and to serve for a defence to their Estate.  
The Romans have also made use for their increase, of the benefits of Kings, their Friends, and Allies, 
Gifts and benefits.  who have made them heirs of their Kingdom by Testament, as A●talus King of Asia did; and Anichomede King of Bythinia. The Genois had Pera in gift from Michael Paleologue Emperor of Constantinople. Cabo joanin, likewise Emperor of Constantinople, gave Metillin to Francis Cataguse, a Genois. The Venetians had Veggia from john Phano; Francis Forse had Savonne from Lewis the Eleventh. The Emperor Frederick the third, gave Modena and Rhegium to Borso Duke of Ferrara: The French Kings have had Dauphinie by the Donation of Humbert the last Dauphin; and Prouenc● by the Testament of Charles of Anjou the last Earl of Provence.  
Other Princes have enlarged their Estate in purchasing from their Neighbours that which lay convenient for them, there being no Traffic more beneficial, nor more honourable to a Prince, then to purchase that which cannot be valued. Pope Clement the sixth, took Auignon and the County of Venice, in payment of the arrearages due by joan the first, Queen of Naples, and Countess of Provence, in regard of the pension which she ought for Sicily; Others have written for the Realm of Tunis. Sforse Attendulo had Catigola from Pope john the thirteenth. The Florentines had Arrezo from the Seignour of C●sse, for forty thousand Florins of Gold; and Livorne from Thomas Fregose for one hundred and twenty thousand Ducats. They have also purchased Cortona for Ladislaus King of Naples, and Pisa from Gabriel Visconte.  
Some have taken their Neighbour's Estate in Mortgage, 
〈…〉  the which lying conveniently for them, they have 〈◊〉 restored, t●e engagement being passed into a mere alienation. The Electors of the Empire, sold their voices to the Emperor Charles the fourth, to choose his Son ●e●eselaus King of the Romans, for one hundred thousand Crowns a piece, the which the Emperor being unable to pay, he engaged unto them sixteen imperial Towns, the which they have ever since enjoyed with the Title of Sovereignty. Lewes the Eleaventh of France, held in Mortgage the County of Ro●sillo●, from john King of Arragon for four hundred thousand Crowns, the which King Charles the Eight yielded up afterwards for nothing: whereby he lost an occasion to enlarge his Territories: But he had a better conscience than the Florentines, who retained Borgo Di San Sepulchro, which Pope Eugenius the Fourth had pawned unto them for five and twenty thousand Crowns. The Polonians retain Livenia by engagement, for six hundred thousand Crowns, which they disbursed in the War made for the Tenton Order, against the Duke of Musco●ie, in the Year 1558. But since the War was ended, they neither speak of re-embur●ment nor restitution.  
By Marriages and Alliances the Prince may likewise enlarge his Estate, the house of Austria, which comes from the Earls of Asourge in Suisserland, who were about four hundred years since of little account, ha●e by this means increased in Estate, as we see at this day: That is to say, by the Marriage of Itha, Heir to Raoul of P●ulendorfe; of Bergantia, with Albert of A●burge Surnamed the Rich; of Het●ngis Heir to ●lrich Liburg, Landgrave of Alsacie, with 〈◊〉 called the Wise, Son to Albert the Rich; of Elizabeth Heir of Aus●rea, Carnithia, Tirol, and 〈◊〉 with the Emperor Albert the ●irst; of Mary the Heir of Burgo●dy, Flanders, Brabant, and other Provinces of the Netherlands, with the Emperor Maximillion the first; Of joan the Heir of Castille, Arragon, Sicily, and Naples, with Philip Archduke of Austria; Of Anne, the Heir of Hungary and Bohemia, with the Emperor Ferdinand, Brother to Charles' the fifth: And of Isabel of Portugal, Mother to Philip the Second, King of Spain, with Charles the fifth. This example shall suffice to verify the increase of Estates in a Prince by this means. Adoption is another kind of portion, by means whereof they of Anjou, 
Adoption.  and afterwards they of Arragon have been made Kings of Naples and Sicily, having been adopted by joan.  
The Polonians have enlarged their Estate by the election of their Kings, 
Election.  choosing them among the neighbour Princes who had their Estate near unto them: and so they of the house of jagellon being called to govern their Estate, they have wrought so as they have joined Livonia unto it, whereof they of jagellon were Dukes, and in making the Nobility of Prusia, and Podolia, equal to that of Polonia, they have increased and assured their Estate with these two Provinces; But to return to the Election, if it be a Prince which seeks by this means to increase himself, 
Considerations necessary for a Prince which desires to make himself great by Election.  he must not so much rely upon the inclination of the people, and the considerations which they may have for their private advantage; but he must bring that which may assist and help him in this pursuit, as Money, Force, and Intelligences: Especially if there be Competitors, who are to make use of the like means, and that the affairs and persons are thereunto disposed.  
The ordinary course in the Election of Popes, is to give their voice to that Cardinal which is most in credit, joining thereunto the consideration of private Interest, of Friendship, and the remembrance of Bonds for benefits received, with hope to be favoured for the same election by him to whom he gives his voice, if he happens to fa●●e of it. But as they which run a Race, many times hinder one another, and whilst they strive, ● third man gets to the Mark before them; so commonly we see, that they whom they think should be preferred before the rest, stick fast by the way: Wherefore they must not only rely upon credit. Charles of Austria, who after was chosen Emperor, to attain unto this Dignity, he not only distributed two hundred thousand Crowns among the Electors, (as King Francis had done for his part) but he caused Levies of Soldiers to be made in Germany, and his Army being ready, he made it approach to Frankford, under colour to keep the Election from being forced; whereby he encouraged his own party, and caused them to yield unto him which wavered, and he terrified Brandeburge, who held the party of France, so as he durst not discover his intentions. As for practices, Charles carried himself more cunningly than Francis the first, for having first of all laboured for the exclusion of Francis, he had thereby assured himself of the Electors, who he knew would never agree to choose one amongst themselves, by reason of their emulatio●s and dissensions; and that opposing one against another, the● which should be excluded, would more willingly give their voices to a third man, then to him that had ●pposed against them. chose the French Ambassadors labouring not for the exclusion of Charles, but feeding themselves with the hope which the Archbishop of Mentz, and the marquis of Brandeburge gave them, that this election would succeed to the benefit of King Francis, remained abused, wherein Pope Lee did in some sort help, yet contrary to his intention: For although he desired not that King Francis should be made Emperor, no more than the King of Spline, but some third person, he entertained the first with hope, to the end that when he should see himself wholly excluded, despite should make him employ his practices against the King of Spain in favour of some Germans, and that having purchased no credit with him, he might not grow distasted, but might then favour this design openly.  
We will therefore conclude, that in every Election the first consideration must be, to labour for the exclusion of Competitors; being certain that many will sooner agree for the exclusion of one, than they will for the Election of another; and yet engaging them by this means to offend the Competitors, you bind them to think no more of them. But if many agree to reject you, you must have recourse to time, and delay the Election as much as may be, to the end they may grow weary and separate themselves.   

CHAP. 4. Of the increase of an Estate by Conquest.  
But the most ordinary means to enlarge an Estate, is by Conquest: And to attain unto it you must know how to attempt it, to make war and to avoid it. 
Of the enterprise of War.  For the Enterprise of war, you must fly two things: Injustice and rashness. To the end the War may be just, he that undertakes it must be a Sovereign, and the cause and end must be just. The just causes to make War are our own defence, and that of our Friends: 
The just causes of a War.  the revenge of our injuries and theirs: The just pretensions we may have to an Estate, and our Divines add not only the defence of our Religion, but its advancement and propagation by the way of Arms, and some the extirpation and rooting out of a contrary: But others hold that War is a bad means to plant piety.  
As for rashness he must likewise avoid it: and for this effect before he resolve to war, 
A War must be undertaken with discretion, and not ●ashly.  he must see either some apparent profit, or that he is forced by some great necessity, but above all things before he undertakes it, he must assure his Estate both within and without. Within, in giving contentment to his subjects, justifying his taking Arms, and making them to allow of it, to the end that if need be, they may assist him: without in renewing the Leagues with such as may assist us, or annoy our Enemies, or with those that may succour them, diverting them from their Friendship. They must also resolve, whether is most profitable, either to make war by Sea, or by Land, or by both, and in what place. Wherein although there be no general Rule, yet it would be of great advantage to strike rather at the head, then at the arms or legs; and at the place where the Head of the State remains, then at any part more remote. As likewise he must consider the place where the Enemy fears most to be invaded. The which the French unto this day, (in the Wars which they have had with the Spaniards) have little observed. For by many examples it may be verified, that the thing which the Spaniards have feared most, was left the French should invade him by Spain. King Ferdinand of Arragon, although he were invaded by the County of Rou●illon, and was then stronger than the French, yet he would not entertain the War upon this frontier, as Guschardin saith. And the same Author writes, that the said King having taken Navarre, more by the amazement which the English forces gave, then by his own, he would proceed no farther; holding it no discretion to begin a War on the other side of the Mountains with the French King, lest he should remain in the subjection of the people and great men of Spain, who being armed within the Country, might have sought to advance their own Estate: And therefore seeing the forces of France turn towards Italy, ●ee dismissed his Army which was upon the frontier of Navarre, without invading France as he had promised to his Colleagues, being united for the defence of Italy against King Francis the first.  
It serves for no purpose to pretend to the contrary, the bad success of the voyages of Perpignean and Navarre by the French: For in effect there is no History which doth not attribute that misfortune to the want of foresight and negligence of our Kings, and to the bad conduct of their Ministers: For admit they should not find victuals sufficient in Spain to entertain their Army, yet France which joins to this Frontier, is not so needy, nor so far off, but by Sea or Land they might be easily relieved, and Spain on that side being more barren, it is certain that the want will be greater for the Spaniard then for the French.  
But to return to general considerations, they must foresee and provide for all the inconveniences which may happen in such an Enterprise, weighing exactly, and comparing our forces with those of the Enemy. And for that a Prince doth seldom conquer by force only, he must observe if there be in the Estate which he means to invade, any of those defects which is said might serve for the ruin of Estates, to the end he may make use of them.  
To make Warr●, 
A consideration to avoid War.  he must have recourse to Military wisdom and ●udgement, which deserves a more ample discourse, and therefore I will now leave it. But to avoid War, one of the principal considerations is, to embrace a fit time to treat a Peace to his advantage: And therefore he must not have an obstinate desire wholly to conquer a Province, what hope soever good Fortune hath given him, but he must study how to make profit of his advantages, and to assu●● that by peace which he hath conquered: In imitation of the Turk who holding this Maxim hath never restored any thing of Importance which he hath gotten; but all remaining in his possession, in less than three hundred years he hath built an Empire fearful to all his Neighbours.  
But the consideration a Prince ought to have in his increase, is that he make his profit of it; it many times falling out, that if an Estate newly conquered, be not governed with great discretion and judgement, it doth rather weaken, then make the new conqueror more powerful, especially if this increase, ministers matter of jealousy to the Neighbour Princes: For thence grow many designs and Leagues against him. Thus drawing into consideration the advantages of a conquest, he must likewise have a care of the means to maintain and preserve it, whereof we have formerly spoken.    
FINIS.