¶ How one may take profit of his enemies, translated out of plutarch.   

How one may take profit of his enemies.  
I perceive my friend/ that thou hast choose a right pleasant kind of lining/ void of businesses of the common wealth, wherein nevertheless thou dost to the common wealth moche profit: being unto all them that come unto thee, and eke to them that keep the company, both companable and pleasant.  
But sins it is so, that we may find some country, that wanteth wild and hurtful beasts, as it is said by Creta: But yet no common wealth hath been found, that hath not nourished within itself, envy, disdain, and strife: of which most commonly emnities do grow, ye and if there were nothing else, friendship itself turneth us to enmity, which the wise man Chion perceiving, asked one that vaunted himself to have none enemy, if he had also no friend. Me thinketh than it were meet for a man of authority/ and that meddleth in the rule of the common wealth/ that among other business he should have also consideration of his enemies, and to take good heed, that this was not spoken for nought of Xenophon: It is a substantial wise man's part, to take profit of his enemies. Therefore I have gathered together those things that came in my mind now of late, as I reasoned on this matter, And I have written them unto thee, in as few words, taking heed, as near as I could, that I touch nothing of those that I wrote afore, in the precepts of good manner, for I see that book oft in thy hand. ¶ Too men of the old world it sufficed, if they took no hurt of divers beasts, and in that time they fought with hurtful beasts only for that purpose. But they that are of later time, finding the way how to use wild beasts, are not only not hurt, but also they take profit of them, feeding them with their flesh, clothing them with their flecis, making of their milk and galls, medicines for diseases, and arming them & defending them with their skins: in so much that now it is to be doubted, that if beasts wanted unto man, man's life should be but beastly, wild, and needy. So like wise sins it sufficeth unto other, to take no hurt of their enemies: and that Xenophon saith, profit may be taken of enemies, belief is not to be taken from such an author, but rather the manner and way must be sought, whereby this profit may be gotten by them, that may not live without emnities.  
The husband man can not take from every tree the wild nature: nor the hunter can not make every wild beast gentle and tame: so that the way hath been found/ that for other uses, both unfruitful trees and wild beasts have been profitable.  
The see water is unmets to drink, and unpleasant, but it nourisheth fishes, it carrieth us from place to place/ and it serveth in bringing in and bearing out wares.  
But Satyrus the first time that he saw fire, when he would have taken it & kissed it: Ho, ꝙ Prometheus, thou rough knave, if thou take not heed, it will make thy syppes smart: for it burneth, if it be touched, it se●uethe not for that purpose: but it giveth light and heat, and is the instrument of all crafts, if one can use it.  
It must be seen therefore, if also an enemy, that else were hurtful and dangerous, may be touched any other way, and give some particular use of himself, and do us very great profit. For there are many things hateful and grievous unto them, to whom they happen: out of the which nevertheless some use may be taken. For thou seest many use some disease of the body, for occasion of quiet and rest. Again, labours and travails/ that have comen by chance/ have made many man's health more perfect by exercise. Besides this, there hath been many/ to whom outlawry and loss of money hath been forderance to study and learning/ as to Diogenes, and Crates. And Zenon when he heard that his ship was drowned: Thou dost very well Fortune, quoth he, in driving me to my studying mantle.  
For like as some live things/ that are good in digesting, and heleful for the body, if they eat serpents and scorpions, they digest them: yea and there are some, that are nourished with stones and shells, by reason of the force & heat of the spirits, that turn these things in to norysshement: where as these/ that been tender and sickelye, can not away with bread and wine. So fools mar and also lose frendshyppes, but they that are wise, can profitably use enmities.  
first therefore that that in enmity is most hurtful/ seemeth unto me to do great profit/ if one take heed to it. What is that? sayst thou. Truly an enemy always watching/ marketh what thou dost/ and in seeking occasion of slander/ prieth and peryth alway on thy living, piercing with his sight like a Lynx, not only the timber, the covering, and the walls of thy house, but also thy friend, thy servant, and whom so ever keepeth the company/ that as near as he may, he will know what thou dost, piercing and trying all thy secrets. Where as our friend is by our delay and negligens, oft times are both sick/ and die without our knowledge. And of our enemies/ well near we mark their dreams. So that the disseasis/ the debts/ the scoldings with their wives/ shall rather be unknown of them/ whose they are, than of their enemies. So, chief doth he mark faults/ and above all thing, them he feketh. Even like as these Gripes, that fly unto the savour of stinking caryons, and them that are whole and clean they smell not: So if there be any thing foul/ or faulty/ or after appetite, in thy life, this provoketh thy enemy, the● to he leapeth/ who so ever hateth/ that he pulleth and twytcheth. Is it not therefore profitable to thee, to be constrained to that point/ that always thou live heedfully and warily, and that thou neither do nor say any thing rechelesslye, or unadvisedly? But always, as they that are afeard of some disease keep precise diet for surfeiting/ so to keep faultless and unblamable manners. For such heed breedeth in us a purpose and a study of faultless living, in restraining desires of the mind/ and in withdrawing and revoking the thought. For as these cities, that by their near enemies, and continual war, learn soberness and diligens/ and as they keep their laws better/ and govern better the common wealth: so they, whom enmity hath driven to this point/ that in their life they be sober and heedful, to avoid folly/ to do all thing compinablely without negligens of any thing/ are brought little and little ere they beware, in to a custom of not offending, and of redressing their manners, if reason help any thing.  
For who that have this always in remembrans, that Priam and his children might be glad to have had such enemies, whereby they took heed to themselves, and were renowned: truly it shall withdraw, restrain/ and lead them fro such things/ that should be pleasure and laughter for their emnyes.  
We see also these musiciens oft times slake and not very hedeful, as oft as they sing in audience alone: But if there happen any disdain/ and strife with other: than they do not only apply their minds better, but dress their instruments more diligently, choose their strings/ tune them more precisely/ in assaying often their accord: So who that perceiveth/ that he hath a disdayner, both of his name and of his living, taketh better heed to himself/ he examineth all his deeds, and redresseth all his life. For of truth naughtiness hath this property, that in offending, it feareth more enemies than friends. Therefore Scipio when some thought Rome to be in a surety, because Carthage was destroyed, and the Greeks overcomen: Ye but now, quoth he, we are in greatest peril, sins now we have none, whom we dread or fere.  
Take with this the answer of Diogenes very excellent and meet for a philosopher: To one that asked him/ which way he might be revenged on his enemy: If thou make, quoth he, thyself an honest and a good man.  
Most part of men are sorry/ when they see the fair horse/ or well praised dogs of their enemies: And again they are sorry, if they see their land well husbanded, or their garden fair and goodly. What trowest thou than they will do/ if thou show thyself an upright man, wise/ good/ & thrifty, excellent in well saying/ pure & uncorrupt in matters of charge: In temperance of thy syning, sober and measurable, using to plough a deep furrow in a wise breast, when● out do spring goodly and fair counsels? ¶ They that are overcomen, saith Pindarus, have their tongue tayde, that they dare not one's hysce. But that is not apliable properly in every one, that is overcomen of their enemies, But in them only, that see themself overcomen of their enemies/ in diligence, in wisdom/ in greatness of the mind, in gentleness, and liberality. These things do fold up a tongue, as saith Demosthenes, these do shut and close up the mouth, these do stop the throat, these cause silence, these cause thee, that, as saith Pyndarus/ thou dar'st not one's hisce. Therefore endeavour thou thyself/ sins thou mayst, to seem better than they that be nought.  
Therefore if thou desire to grieve thine enemy, do it not this way, to call him lewd, or drunkard, knave, or niggard, or sluttish or sloven, but rather endeavour thou thyself to be an honest man/ endeavour thyself to be sober, & measurable, to be true, and to entreat them gently and indifferently/ that keep company and meddle with the. But if it so happen/ that thou fall to chiding and reviling/ take heed that thou be clean without those faults, for which thou rebukest an other. Return thyself in to thine own breast/ look in to thine own bosom, and mark well/ if there be any thing filthy or subject to vice: Lest peraventure some ill tongue have occasion to cast this in thy teeth: He salveth other/ and is himself full of botchiss.  
But if he call the unferned, apply thou thyself to study, and quicken thy endeavour, if he call the coward, stir thy courage and the readiness of thy mind/ if he call the unchaste and vicious, chase out of thy mind the desire of lust/ if any such print/ unware to thee, stick in the. For there is nothing fouler than such rebuke, that reboundeth to the rebuker. And there is nothing more grievous or sharper. For like as the reflection of light doth most hurt to sore eyes, so do ill words/ which truth returneth thither as they came fro.  
Truly like as the north-east wind draweth clouds toward it/ so doth ill living draw ill speaking unto it. Therefore Plato, as oft as he saw any do uncomely, to himself was wont to say: Am I such in any case?  
furthermore he that hath skolded with an other, if he forthwith behold his own life, and redress it, changing it in to the contrary/ and correcting it: truly he shall take great profit by scolding, and otherwise it is both taken and also is a very foolish thing. For so commonly men are wont to laugh at him, that is bald or crooked, and blameth an other for the same vicis. But it is most of all to be laughed at, one to cast a rebuke to an other/ which may have some rebuke turned to himself. As Leo of Byzantia, when a foul crooked fellow cast unto him the soreness of his eyes: It is natural, ꝙ he, But thou dost carry thine own rebuke upon thy back.  
Therefore beware that thou cast not adultery in ones teeth, if thou use a more filthy flesshelye lust: nor attwite not one of waist/ if thou be a niggard.  
Al●meon laid it to Adrastus/ that he was cousin to a woman/ that slew her mother. But what said he again? He laid to him again not an others fault/ but his own, saying: Thou slewest thy mother thine own hands.  
Domitius jested with Crassus on this wise: didst thou not weep, when thy Lampray was deed, which thou hadst kept in thy stew? But Crassus returned the check on this fashion: didst thou weep at all/ when thou buried three wives?  
He that should check an other/ may not be a jester, or a skolder, or a fool: But he must be such one/ on whom no check nor fault may cleave. For it seemeth that god command this, Know thyself, to no man more than to him, that should blame and check an other: Lest, if they say what they will, they here that that they would not. For it is wont to be as Sophocles saith: When thou hast powered out words foolishly/ & said them with thy good will, again thou shalt hear the same against thy will.  
And that is the profit and commodity/ that may be taken of chiding with enemies: and no less profit cometh of the t'other/ that is, if one be ill spoken of/ and rebuked of his enemies. Whereupon it was well and truly spoken of Antisthenes: It behoveth a man for the safeguard of his wealth and prosperity, either to have sure trusty friends/ or sharp enemies, because they in warning, other in rebuking, refrain him from vicis.  
But truly because that now adays friendship hath lost her speech to speak freely, and flattery hath tongue enough/ warning is dumb: it remaineth therefore, that we must here the truth of our enemies. For like as Telephus could not be heeled of his wound by no surgeon of his own fellows, and was heeled by an other wound, that Achilles his enemy gave him in the same place: so they that have no friendly warner, must suffer the words of an ill willing enemy, whereby they may correct & amend their faults. In which time the thing itself ought to be considered, and not the mind of the ill speaker. For like as he that thought to have slain Prometheus of Thessali, by chance struck so a wen that he had/ that he saved the man, and by breaking the wen rid him of the peril: so it is not selden seen, that a rebuke cast out by enmity and hatred, healeth a sore of the mind, that was peraventure unknown or else unregarded.  
But many that are touched with a rebuke, do not consider this, whether they be guilty of the shame that is laid to them, but they look rather, if he that laid it, have any thing in him, that may be cast against him. And like as wrestlers in the wrestling place/ do not brusshe away the dust/ but one arayethe an other: so with rebukes when they meet together, one of them shameth an other. But it were more according, that he that hath had a check of his enemy, shall take that away that is laid against him, rather than a spot that one showeth him in his gown.  
Ye and also if one lay to thy charge a fault, that thou art not guilty in/ yet it is to be sought, upon what causes that ill speaking did grow: and than it ought to be taken heed of and feared/ lest that unware we do any thing like that, that is laid against us. As Lacides king of Argyne, for his trim bush, and a little more piked apparel/ was sklaunderde among the common sort/ as tender and womanish.  
The same happened to Pompey/ because he skratched his heed with one finger, although he was far enough from tenderness and wantonness.  
So also it did happen unto Crassus, which to die a proper firm, oft times resorted to a woman of religion, for to win her good will.  
Truly Posthumia by reason of her liberal laughing and talking with men, was so sklaunderde, that she was accused of adultery, although it was found, that the fault was not true: Yet the bishop Spurius Minutius at her departing warned her/ that she should talk with as great dread of shame, as she did live.  
And Themistocles when he offended nothing, yet he got by Pausanias to be suspect of treason/ by cause he used him so familiarly/ and sent him daily letters and messengers. Therefore when there is any thing said against thee, that is not true, thou oughtest not therefore/ because it i● false/ to let it pass. But try with thyself, if thou have said or done any thing, or assayed any thing, or if among thy familiars there hath any thing been, that hath given him provable occasion: and if thou find it, take heed and avoid it.  
Truly if hard hap, that cometh by chance, teacheth some, what is best to do, as Merope speaketh in a play: Fortune in taking away that, that was most dear unto me, hath made me wise, to my cost. Why should we not aswell use our enemy for a teacher less costly/ that may profit us, and teacheth us some thing, that we knew not afore? For truly many things an enemy perceiveth better than a friend, because that love blindeth in the thing that is loved, as saith Plato. But unto hate is joined both busy search and babbling.  
When Hieron had his stinking breathe cast against him of his enemy/ he came home and chode his wife, saying: Why didst not thou show me this fault? But she that was chaste and simple, answered: I had went, quoth she, that all men had savoured on the same fashion. So that that, which may be sensiblely perceived, & those things that be in the body seen of every man, thou shalt sooner know them of thine enemies, than of thy friends or fellows.  
Put to this, that where it is no small part of virtue to have a sober tongue/ always obedient to reason: that thou canst not have, without thou by moche exercise, heed, and study, subdue the ill motions of thy mind, of which sort anger is one. For as from fools words do scape out, and as Homer saith: The fleing voice forsaketh the closure of the mouth, So is it most wont to happen to unexercised minds, that slip and slide, by unmoderate anger, by untemperateness of mind, and by small heed of living.  
More over, as saith the godly Plato/ the lightest thing that is, both god and man punish with greatest pain. But a other side/ silence where as it is alway guiltless/ and not only not hurtful, it hath besides in chiding/ a savour of Socrates constance, or of Hercules force rather/ for he also took less heed of grievous words, than he did of flies.  
Surely where as there is nothing more grave or fairer/ than when thy enemy chideth, to hold thy peace, as one that saileth by a great rock, so also doth such an exercise spread farther. For if thou use to suffer thine enemies chiding, holding thy peace, thou shalt very easily suffer thy wives scolding, when she is angry, & bear without trouble the crying of thy friend, and the cumber of thy brother. For of thy father & thy mother thou wilt suffer knocks and strokes, and be not moved with anger.  
And Socrates did suffer Xantippa his wife at home to chide and cumber him, the more easily to keep company with other/ if he used to forbear her. But it is moche better in being exercised with checks, rebukes/ & hatreds of enemies, to use to subdue anger/ and not to chaff when thou art ill spoken to. Therefore on this wise one ought to use soberness and sufferance, in enmytes. But simpleness, great mind, and gentleness is more according in frendshyppes. For it is not so honest to deserve well of a friend, as it is shame not to do it, as oft as need requireth. But yet it is taken for gentleness, when chance giveth occasion/ to let pass and not to be revenged on thine enemy.  
But he that receiveth not his good will, & praiseth not his gentleness, that sorroweth the offence of his enemy, & helpeth him, if he desire it/ & taketh some heed to his children, or to his house/ that is in peril, truly he hath an heart of a dyamant, or else of iron.  
When Cesar had commanded the images of Pompey, that were cast down, to be set up again: Thou hast, quod M. Tullius, set up Pompey's images, and stablished thine own. Wherefore an enemy is not to be dispraised, nor to be deceived of his honour, which is to be praised, & worthy, for because a greater praise thereon cometh unto them that so do praise. Beside that, he that praiseth one/ that deserveth it, is better believed, when he blameth, as one that hateth not the man, but that alloweth not his deed.  
And that that is most goodly of all and most profitable, he shall in no wise envy his fortunate friends/ nor his familiars, when they do any thing praise worthy, who so ever useth to praise his enemies/ and not to gnaw nor bite at their good fortunes. Is there any thing that breedeth such profit in us, or that engendereth in our minds a better use, than that that taketh from us disdain and envy? For as in a common wealth there are many things necessary and yet nought, which sins they be comen in custom, & gotten the strengths of a law, yet shall they, to whom they be hurtful or grievous/ not lightly do them away: So enmity bringeth with it many vicis/ as anger, suspection, rejoicing of others harm, remembrance of wrongs, and leaveth the prints of these in the mind.  
Besides that many things, which if thou do them to thine enemy, seem neither ill nor wrongful, so remain they in us/ that scant they can be put away/ as is craftiness, deceit, and subtylties. Whereby oft times by the custom, we shall use them to our friends, if we be not aware how we use them to our emmies. Therefore Pythagoras commanded very well, when he moved men from taking of fowl, and of fish/ and forbade the killing of all gentle beasts/ to th'end that in beasts we should use to temper ourselves from cruelty and ravening. But it is much more goodly/ in being a gentle, a just/ and a simple enemy, in debates and strifes against men, to chastise the foul and deceitful affections of the mind/ and to subdue them/ to th'end that in meddling with friends men may utterly forbear them.  
Scaurus was at debate with Domitius, and sewed him: so a servant of Domitius afore the matter was pleaded, came unto Scaurus, and advertised him, that he had a secret thing to tell him: but he would not suffer the fellow to speak, but took him and sent him to his master.  
Cato when Murena did sew him, and sought to gather arguments of the accusation/ there followed him (as was the custom) they that awaited, what should be done, and they oft times would ask him, if that day he would do any thing/ that might pertain to his accusing: and if he denied it, they believed him and went their way. And truly that was a great token, that they had a good opinion of Cato.  
But this is yet fairest of all, that one when we are accustomed to do uprightly and justly with our enemies, we shall never meddle deceytefully or falsely with our friends and familiars. But by cause it must needs be, that every kocke have his comb, and every mind of man of himself breedeth strife, suspect, & envy: it were not unprofitable, among friends that have but hollow minds, as saith Pyndarus, if a man pour out the purging of such faults upon his enemies, and to let it run as in to a sink/ far of from his friends or familiars. Which me thinketh Onomademus an honest man perceived, which was in Chio/ when there was a mutening there/ on that part that had the better, and warned them of his side/ not to chase them all out, that were of the contrary side, lest, quoth he, that we begin to fall out with our friends, if we want emnyes. And if those vicis on this wise should be consumed on enemies/ they shall the less grieve friends.  
For truly the potter should not envy the potter, nor the singer the singer, as Hesiodus saith: and it is not meet, that a man should disdain his neighbour/ or his cousin/ or his brother, if he wax rich, and have good fortune. But if there be none other way to rid thyself from strife, envy, & disdain, than use thyself to be sorry for thine enemies good fortune, and sharpen the edge of anger against them. For as these cunning gardiner's think to make rosis and violettis the better, if they sow onions and garlic near by them, that what so ever sour savour be in them, it may be purged in to the t'other: so an enemy receiving in to him our envy and waywardness, shall make us better and less grievous to our friends, that have good fortune. Wherefore against them must be exercised the strife of glory/ of rule/ and of good gaining, but not so moche, that we should torment ourself, though they have more than we: But to mark all things by what means they pass us, and let us endeavour us to pass them in diligence/ endevonr/ sobrenes, and wareness: As Themistocles was wont to say/ that he could not sleep for Myltiades victory at Maratho.  
For he that is brought to so low mind, and fainting for envy, by cause he thinketh himself passed of his enemy, in governance, or in obtaining of causis, or in favour, or authority with friends/ or with noble men, and not rather endeavoureth and assayeth some thing in despite of him/ truly he is holden with a foolish and a vain envy. But he whom hate blindeth not so, but that he may judge him, whom he hateth/ & also may look with indifferent eyes, both upon his life/ and his manners/ his words, and his deeds: of a surety he shall perceive many of those things, that he envieth/ to come unto the t'other by diligence, provision/ and of deeds well done. And therewithal by exercise sharping the taking heed of passing him, and the study of honour/ he shall shake of all idleness and false heart. So that if we see that they have gotten in the court or in the common wealth, any unhonest or undeserved power, either by flattery/ or by deceit, or by false judgement, or by meed/ it shall not be grievous unto us/ but rather pleasure, in laying together our upright living with their naughtiness. For truly all the gold that is either above the earth or under the earth, is not to be compared with virtue, as saith Plato. It is meet also to have always in remembrance that word of Solon: We will not saith he, change the riches of virtue, neither for the largesse that is cried by a great number/ hired for meet, nor for honours, nor for the chief place among the wives & concubines of dukes & princes. For there is nothing to be wondered at/ or notable/ that groweth of dishonest. But the lover is blind in that that he loveth, as saith Plato/ and better we perceive if our enemies do any thing uncomely. Yet may we not though they do noughtilye take an unprofitable gladness/ or and if they do well/ be moved with an idle grief, but in each of this is to be thought/ that in being ware of the tone we may be better than they/ and following the t'other that we be no worse.  
¶ Thus endeth plutarch to take profit of enemies.   

To choose ¶ The manner to choose and cherish a friend.  
TO fill up the padges, that else would have been void, I thought it should neither hurt nor displease, to add hereunto a few sayings/ how a man should choose and cherish a friend.  
Cicero saith, that Scipio complained greatly/ that men were more diligent in all things/ than in friendship: every man knoweth how many goats and sheep he hath, but no man can tell how many friends he hath: And in the getting of other things men use great care and diligence/ but in choosing of friends they be very negligent, nor they have not as it were marks and tokens/ by the which they may dame those that are feet to be received in to friendship. The book saith/ have not friendship with an ireful man/ nor with a fool: but as Cicero saith, men firm, and stable, and constant/ should be taken in to friendship. Of the which sort is great scarsite and lack/ and to judge which they be, is a very hard thing, except we make a proof, and we can not make a proof thereof till we be entered in to friendship. So, friendship goth before judgement.  
Some there be, that a small sum of money shall show how sure friends they be. Some there are/ which a little thing can not remove, & yet they be known in a great need.  
And if we hap to find a friend/ that deemeth it a foul and a shameful thing to set more by money than by friendship: yet where shall we find them/ that will not more esteem honours, rooms, lordships, powers, and abundance of riches, than friendship? But as the same Cicero saith, neither profits, honours, riches, pleasures/ nor none other such like things, should be more set by than friendships. But yet he that is a good man, shall do nothing for his friends sake, that is either against the common wealth, or else against his oath or fidelity. For the offence is not excusable, to say, thou didst it for thy friends sake. And yet the same Cicero, as Gellius doth recite his words, saith, that where our friend standeth in jeopardy either of his life or of his good renown/ we may some what serve a side out of the way. But what so ever Gellius saith, Cicero teacheth plainly, that we should require nothing of our friend/ but that that is honest.  
And now concerning the trust that we ought to have in our friend, Seneca saith: He that esteemeth any man his friend, the which he can not trust so moche as himself, doth deceive himself. And he that maketh and proveth his friend feasting at the table doth fail. It is virtue, say the Cicero, the which both winneth and entertaynethe friends. A man should reason and debate all things with his friend, but first he should debate and reason with him, whether he be a friend or no. No man needeth to mistrust friendship/ but first let him examine and dame, whether it be friendship or not.  
They do against the precepts of Theophraste, the which love before they judge, and not after they have deemed. Thou shuldeste a long time consider, whether thou shouldest take any in to thy friendship. and when it liketh the so to do, than receive him with all thy very heart, and talk as boldly with him, as though thou were alone. But yet live thou after such fachion, that thou commit nothing to him/ but that that thou wouldest commit to an enemy. But for because there be certain businesses/ the which custom maketh secret, make thy friend privy to all thy cares and thoughts. Thou shalt do thus, if thou suppose him to be sure and faithful. For many show the manner and way to deceive, while they fear to be deceived. And some tell them that they meet by the way, & blow in every man's ear, it that should only be opened & showed to friends. Again some also dread so much the conscience of their most dear friends, that if they may, they will keep close within them all their secretness, because they will not put them in trust therewith. None of these two ways is to be taken/ for each of them both is nought, to trust every body/ and to trust no man. Of which two faults the first is the more honest/ and the other the more sure. And though the wise man be content with himself/ yet will he have a friend, and it be for none other cause, but to exercise friendship/ lest so great a virtue should lie aside. Not for that that Epicure saith/ that he may have one to tend him when he is sick, or else that may succour him, if he be cast in prison/ or be pour and needy, but that he may have one/ whom sick and diseased he may tend upon, and whom he may deliver out of ward/ if he hap to come in his enemies hands. He that regardeth himself/ and for his own sake seeketh friendship, he intendeth evil: and like as he beginneth, so shall he end. He thinketh he hath got a friend to help him out of prison, which, when he heareth the chains rattle, goth his way. These friendships, as the people saith, dure for a tyme. He that is received into friendship for love of profit, as long as he is profitable, he pleaseth. It is needful that the beginning and ending of friendship, should agree. He that beginneth to be a friend, by cause it is expedient for him, some price shall please him against friendship, if there be any price in it/ that may please him above friendship. Thou sayst, To what intent should I prepare a friend? I answer, that thou mayst have one, whom thou mayst accompany, when he is banished/ for whom thou mayst put thyself in danger of death. For the t'other is rather a shapmanshyp than a friendship, which hath a respect to profit, and considereth, what avail he may get thereby. There is nothing, that so moche delighteth the mind, as faithful friendship. And he is well happy/ that findeth a true friend, saith the book. O how great is the goodness/ when the breastis be prepared ready, in to the which all secretness may surely descend, whose conscience thou dreadest less than thine own, whose talking easeth the grief and heaviness of thy heart/ the sentence giveth ready and quick counsel/ the cheer dasheth the inward sorrow, and the very regard and beholding delighteth? And because the use of friendship is variable and manifold, and there be many causes given of suspicion and offence, the which is a wise man's part to eschew, to help/ and to suffer. Friends must oft be monished, and rebuked, and that must be taken friendly/ when it is done of good will. But for so moche as Terence saith, Truth breedeth hate/ which is as a poison to friendship/ we must take heed, that our monition be not sour, and that the rebuke be without vile words. For vile rebukes, as the book saith, for doth friendship.  
Thus endeth the manner to choose and cherish a friend, Imprinted at London in Fleetstreet by Thom Berthelet, printer to the kings most noble grace. Cum privilegio.