¶ A new book of purgatory which is a dialogue & disputation between one ¶ Comyngo an Almaigne a Christian man/ & one ¶ Gyngemyn a turk of Machomett law/ disputing by natural reason and good philosophy/ whether there be a purgatory or no purgatory. which book is divided into three dialogues.  

¶ The first dialogue showeth and treateth of the marvelous exystens of god.  
¶ The second dialogue treateth of the immortality of man's soul.  
¶ The third dialogue treateth of purgatory.    

¶ The prologue of the auctor.  
IT happened so but late that for divers business and other affairs concerning myself I took a viage out of this realm and passed over this narrow occian see, and traveled in to divers far countries in the east parties/ and at the last as it was my chance I came into a great city/ where I made mine abode and there tarried by the space of. xx. days or above/ in which city there useth continually to resort a great company of merchants/ which be borne in sundry and divers nations/ which be not only englishmen/ Frenchmen/ spaniards/ Almains/ and other divers 〈◊〉/ but also they that be Turks & Saraciens/ & other that be of Machametys' law. And because of interchaunging of merchandises/ the said merchants do daily meet together in divers places within the same city/ and when they have talked together of thing concerning their own business/ yet for a recreation among themself/ they be desirous each of other to know news & strange things of other countries. And as it happened to me on a season to be in the company of divers of those merchants/ among them all special there were. two. of them/ of the which one was a turk called ¶ Gyngemyn borne under Machometys' law/ and that other was a Christenman called ¶ Comyngo/ born in high 〈◊〉/ which were of old familiar accoyntaunce/ & both of th●m men of great wit and of good learning/ and specially the turk/ which was well learned both in moral philosophy and natural/ betwine whom I heard with good communication/ arguments and rea sons/ which liked me very well/ and so well pleased me that immediately after that I took pen & ●nke & titled it in writing/ & reported every argument & reason as nigh as my wit and remembrance would serve me/ after the manner as here after followeth in this little book. And in the beginning of their said communication Comyngo the almain asked of Gy●gemyn the Turk/ what tithings or news were in his country/ which Gyngemyn showed him of the great 〈◊〉 which the great Turk had lately had in divers places/ as well of the great siege of the Rhodes/ as of the great battles/ which he had lately had in ●ungarye. But yet the said Gyngemyn was not so glad to tell the tythyngys' & news in & about his country/ as he was desirous to know of some strange news in other placis in Christendom. And oft times required this Comyngo to show him some new tithings of his country. To the which Comyngo the All main answered and showed him that there was a new variance in Christendom and a scysme begun of late among the people there/ concerning their faith and believe/ and said that there was a new opinion sprung among the people/ that there is no purgatory/ nor that the soul of man after it is separate from the body/ shall never be purged nor purified of no sin that remaineth therein/ but that it shall immediately after it is separate from the body/ go to heaven to eternal joy and salvation/ or else to hell to eternal pain and damnation. To whom Gyngemyn answered/ and said that the opinion was but foolish and against all good natural reason/ because that all people in the world of what country so ever they have be or be/ or of what law & sect so ever they have be or be/ aswell the paynims/ the Jews/ and you that be of Christ'S faith/ & we that be of machomet's law/ and all other that ever lived or do live after the order of any good reason/ have ever believed and do believe that there is a purgatory/ where man's souls shall be purged after this mortal life. Therefore quoth he I marvel greatly that there should any such fond opinion begin among the people now in any country/ considering that there is no reason to maintain their opinion that ever I could here.  
¶ The reasons of them that hold opinion that there is no purgatory. To whom Comyngo the Almaigne answered & said that they had divers reasons to maintain their opinion therein/ whereof one is this. ¶ They say the contrition which some call repentance/ is that which is the very payment and satisfaction for sin/ and they say that when a man committeth a sin/ and after is repentant therefore/ that god of his goodness doth forgive him/ and that the repentance is the only satisfaction that god would have to be made and done for that sin. And than sith that a man which is a sinner/ by such repentance hath made such payment and satisfaction for his sin as god would have to be made therefore/ if than that man should go to purgatory/ and have a new punishment after his death/ that repentance that he had before should be but void.  
¶ Another reason/ they allege that man was ordained and made to have an infinite being/ therefore after this mortal death he must have infinite joy or infinite pain. So than he is not ordained to have pain in purgatory that hath an end.  
¶ Another reason they allege and that is this. God by the order of his justice hath ordained heaven/ where that good men shall be rewarded/ & hell where sinners shall be punished/ and in both those places orders and degrees/ that is to say/ that he which deserveth a great and an high reward shall have in heaven a great joy/ and he that deserveth a smaller reward/ shall have a smaller joy/ and also he that deserveth a great punishment/ shall have in hell great pain/ and he that deserveth a less punishment/ shall have in hell less pain. So that whether a man have deserved a great joy or a small joy/ a great pain or a small pain god may by his order of good justice reward or punish him according to his deserving so that there needeth no place of purgatory.  
¶ Another reason they allege/ that though a man be not clearly purged of his ●ynne when he dieth/ and though some spot & token thereof remain in his soul whereby he is some what deformed/ yet that soul may do some mean and low service or pleasure to god in heaven/ though it be not the highest and best service/ nor though it have not the greatest joy in heaven/ yet it may have some small joy/ and be in some low place in heaven/ & there have a ●oyous life/ wherewith it will be right well content/ and so rewa● d●d according to his desert/ though it be not purged and made so clean as other souls that be there/ and so needles to ordain for that soul any other place of purgatory.  
¶ Another reason they allege/ that god hath ordained heaven to be a place of 〈◊〉 ●oy/ and hell to be a place of infinite pain/ & earth where we be to be a place mixed/ sometime of ●oy/ sometime of pain/ which never endureth but for a time/ that shall have end. And than sith that the soul offendeth being here with the body/ it is convenient it should be purged here with the body. And because that god hath ordained this place in earth to be a place 〈◊〉 of ●oy & pain that shall have end/ it is most convenycnt that the place of purgatory should be here in earth/ because it is the place ordained for pain that shall have an end/ & ●o needeth to put none other place of purgatory/ & if the●e be any other place/ where is the place of purgatory.  
¶ Another they allege/ that because the mercy of god can not be without his 〈◊〉 and rem●ssyon is ever incident to repentance/ therefore as soon as repentance is taken god of his justice must give remission/ & therefore 〈◊〉 repentance and remission there ought to be no purgatory.  
¶ Another objection they allege/ that if thou do an offence to god and to thy neighbour/ wh●n god forgiveth it need none other satisfaction to thy neighbour because god is the very owner of all/ and thy neighbour hath no property/ but as a servant to god/ as but to make account to god  
¶ To whom this Gyngemyn the turk anon answered and sa●d/ that as for all those reasons they may be soon answered & avoided/ & if thou wilt give to me diligent hearing/ I shall give the sufficient soluc●ons to all those reasons & satisfy thy mind. And further I shall prove to the by other arguments & by natural reason & good philosophy/ that there must needs be a purgatory/ where the soul of man after that it is separat from the body/ shallbe purged and purified. To whom this Comyngo said/ that he would be marvelous glad to here his mind therein. To whom this Gyngem●n than said/ that he must immediately go in to the street to speak with a merchant/ to ask of him but one short question touching the business of his merchandise/ & said that he would return again incontinent/ which as he said/ he did/ & tarried not long but shortly camagayn. And as soon as ever they were meet there again/ they begun their communication/ & Co myngo y● 〈◊〉 begun first to speak/ & said as hereafter now followeth.  
¶ finis prologi.   

¶ The first d'aloge of the marvelous existens of god.  

¶ An introduction to the matter. Caput primum.  COmyngo the almain. 
¶ Now my friend Gyngem●n becaw●e thou say dost cre while that thou wouldest prove to me by natural reason and good philosophy/ that there is a purgatory: where the soul of man after that it is separate from the body shall be 〈◊〉 and puryfred: I pray the let me know thine opinion therein/ and let me here what reasons thou canst allege therefore.  ¶ Gyngemin the turk 
¶ I shall prove the that or thou go if thou wilt abide the argument thereof/ and patiently with good deliberation here me. Comyngo. ¶ I shall be content to give diligent hearing thereto/ but yet I pray the then to suffer me to answer the and to object and to reply against thee/ wh●n that I think in mine opinion that thy arguments and reasons be not sufficient to satisfy my mind.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Therewith I am well content/ and thy request is reasonable. For with reasons and arguments made pro et contra/ and on both parties answered/ replied/ and objected/ the truth of every proposition shlal sooner and better be known: but yet one thing I will warn thee/ considering that my only purpose is to prove the thing by reason/ that in thy reasons and objections against me/ that thou allege no manner text nor authority/ neither of the books of the old bible/ nor of the new testament: neither of no other book/ of that that thou callest the holy scripture of the devynrte of thy crrsten faith/ nor of the laws made therefore: which thou by thy faith art bound to believe. For thou mayst well know/ it will be but a thing in vain to allege such textrs or authorrtees to me/ for that that I and all other turkys of our laws and sect will utterly deny many of the principles and many of the textus and authorrtees of thy christian believe and forth.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Because thou 〈◊〉 so I shall not trouble the with aledging of any such textrs or authorrtees of our faith or law. And there fore I pray the likewise ●se the same manner unto me/ nor allege thou no text nor authorities of the book of thy law called the Alcoron/ nor of any other book of thy Machomett●s law/ for if thou do/ I will be as ready to deny those texts and authorities of thy faith and law/ as thou wilt be ready to deny those texts and authorities of my believe & faith.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ It is but ●eash thou shouldest so do therefore let us now both lay all texts and authorities of either of our belevys and laws appart: and see how we can prove by reason and good natural philosophy that there is a purgatory/ where that men's souls should be purged and purified.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ But I think it will be hard for the to prove it. Therefore I pray the begin and let me here thy reason.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ with right good will/ but yet then first or that I proceed to that matter concerning purgatory/ thou must first grant me two principles or conclusions. One is that there is a god above all/ which ruleth and governeth all/ and conserveth and kepepyth all/ and regardeth and taketh heed to all. Another is that the soul of man is immortal/ and shall never die/ but hath a life perpetual.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ As to those two points I must needs grant the.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ what moveth the to grant them so soon.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Marry because that our holy scripture showeth it and teacheth us so. And also all our laws bindeth us and compelleth us to believe it.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ ye but yet lay all the scry pture & laws apart and tell me what thinkest thou by those two point in natural reason.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ By my troth I think that no man only by reason can prove that there is a god that governeth all/ conserveth all/ and taketh heed to all/ nor that that the soul of man is immortal and doth never die.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ yes I shall prove to the both those points by reason/ so that thine only reason shall judge them to be true/ if thou wilt discretely scretly consider it and search it profoundly and put & give thy reason thereto delyberatly to discuss it.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ By what reason canst thou first prove that there is a god that governeth all.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ Hark and I shall show the.   

¶ That god was without beginning and the first cause of all thing. Cap. two.  
Hyrst I trust thou wilt grant me that there was evermore a thing or nothing/ somewhat or no what/ being or not being.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ As to that I must needs grant/ that there was ever a thing or no thing as the latin men call it/ res vel nihil/ somewhat or no what which they call aliquid vel non aliquid/ being or not being/ which they call esse vel non esse/ for as the philosopher saith omnium oppositorum alterum est vetum/ of two things opposite or contradictories evermore the one must needs be true.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ Then thus/ every thing is somewhat/ and every thing that is somewhat is being/ so that a thing/ somewhat/ and being/ signify one sense/ and also their contraries/ nothing/ no what/ and not being/ do signify all one sense.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That is true.  ¶ Gy●gemyn. 
¶ Then furthermore whether was there a thing before nothing/ or nothing before a thing.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Marry a thing must nediss be before nothing/ or else the world nor nothing therein now could be/ for of nothing nothing can proceed nor come.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ There in thou sayst truth for one contrary can never bring forth his contrary/ for if that once nothing was being then of that nothing can never come a thing or being/ for of nothing nought can be made/ therefore it followeth well that there was evermore a thing being. And than that thing which was ever before all other things must needs be without beginning for every thing that is made or create had a cause of his beginning/ ergo then it must follow that that thing which was first of all made/ must needs have a maker/ whyché was unmade for if any thing were before that thing which thou callest the first maker/ then that which thou callest the first maker/ can not be called the first maker and the first cause of all/ because it hath another maker or another cause before it/ so it must needs follow that there is one thing which was the first maker and first cause of all things/ which hath no maker nor no cause there/ ofout of whom as of the very fountain of all cawsys every thing is derived/ and taketh his being/ so that thing which was first being/ must needs be the cause and foundation of all thing/ b of all being/ and that first cause or first maker can have no beginning but was ever without beginning/ which first cause and first thing among all people is called god/ and that first cause is most worthy to be called god.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That conclusion followeth so re sonably that it can not be denied.   

¶ That god is and shall be without end. Capitulum. iii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Then sith that god is the first cause of every thing/ and the first and principal cause of the being of every thing/ it requireth that there be in him such a being so perfect/ that every thing not god/ have another being which must lack somewhat of the perfection of his being/ so that his being must be the most perfit most beonge/ & the most sure being that is or can by.  ¶ Comyngo 
¶ what than.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than further that thing hath the most perfit being/ the most substantial being and the most sure being/ which shall never have end/ for if it shall have an end/ it is not most perfit/ most substantial and most sure being/ but it must be such a being which excludyth every unperfection that soundeth or tendyth to not being/ for perfit being/ substantial being and sure being/ be all contraryaunt to not being/ so that the one is repugnant to the other/ and denieth the other clearly. And therefore it must then nedyl follow y●. god which is the most perfit being/ most substantial and most sure being/ must have a being that never shall have end. So there is no time passed in which he was not/ nor no time present in which he is not/ nor no time to come in which he shall not be: so of necessity it to loweth that his being was ever without beginning/ and is and shall be ever without end.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I must needs affirm the same.   

¶ That god is most of power and the most noble thing that can be. Cap. iiii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Then furthermore sith that god is without beginning or end and the cause of every thing that is which hath taken taketh or shall take any affect/ as I proved the before/ and the cause is ever the more strong than the effect. And also the cause is ever that/ which hath power to make the effect to be/ therefore sith that god causeth all/ therefore it must needs follow that god hath power to do all/ and because he may do all/ therefore conveniently god is called omnipotent/ and is most of power and might: and by the same reason also I may prove the nobility of god/ for the cause is always more noble than the effect/ and nobleness is that which hath lest need of foreign help/ that is to say of help of any other thing/ and than sith god is the cause of all thing/ and every other thing taketh his effect by god/ and cometh and proceedeth of god as of his first cause/ and the cause as I said before is more noble than the effect/ and every thing that taketh any effect/ hath need of the caw●e/ for that that without the cause the effect could never have been/ but the cause hath never no need of the effect/ for the cause may be without the effect/ but the effect can not be without that cause: Therefore sith that god is the first cause of all thing/ it must follow that every thing hath need of god/ and that god hath need of nothing/ and than sith that nobleness is that which hath no need of foreign help/ or help of any other thing/ it must of a necessary conclusion follow that god is the most noble thing that can be.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I agree.   

¶ That god is the very life/ and that he hath the most joyful and pleasant life that can be. Cap. v.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than moreover sith that I have proved to the heren before that being and not being be two contrariants and that being must needs be before not being: so likewise life and not life be two contrariants/ and it requireth that life proceed and go before not life/ for that thing which hath no life/ can not be the only cause that that thing which hath life. For that thing which hath no life nor never had life/ may not by his only power make a thing to have life.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ All that is reasonable.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ But we see many things in the world/ which have life as man & be'st/ ergo that life which is in those creatures/ is deryvyed and proceedeth & cam● first of that creator which is the very life/ and in whom first must needs be life. For as a fountain/ which is the very ground and cause of all the tyvets and brokies of water/ which come from that fountain/ of itself must nediss be the very water/ so god which is ground and cause of all life/ must need be ofhym self the very life. And than sith that god is first creator and causer of every thing which hath life/ it followeth than that in him there was ●uer a very life/ and that he is fountain of all life and that no life can be so very and perfit a life as his life/ because he is the first ground and cause of all l●fe. yet furthermore sith that god is the ve●y life and the ground of all/ and cause of every thing that hath life/ than that life and living which god hath/ must be a pleasant and joyful life/ or else a painful and sorrowful life. But if it should be a painful and a sorrowful life/ than it could not be a perfit & sure life/ but sith thou hast granted to me here before that god hath the most perfit and ●urest being that can be/ and that which shall never have end/ and sith that pain and sorrow is that/ which causeth the thing to perish which suf●eryth that pain and sorrow/ because it is contrary to the nature and desire of the thing which so suffereth. And case & pleasure doth consort the nature of that thing which suffereth that ease and pleasure/ and increaseth it/ and causeth it the longer to continue. So if that the being and living of god should be a life and being in pain and sorrow/ that painful and sorrowful life/ should be the cause that his being should not be perfit/ but should perish at the last/ and so not to have an eternal and an infinite being. But than sith his being is most perfit eternal/ and never shall have end/ it must needs follow that his life must needs be a joyful and pleasant life/ and the most joyful and most pleasant life that can be.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ All that is convenient to grant.   

¶ That god hath knowledge and understanding/ and knoweth every thing that ever was/ is/ or shallbe Caput. vi.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than by the same reason that pueth him to be the very life/ I may well prove his knowledge and understanding: for that thing which hath no knowledge nor understanding/ can not be only cause of that thing/ which hath knowledge and understanding And also as I said to the erewhile/ because the being of god/ is the first being and the cause of the being of every thing/ and the most perfit/ most substantial/ and most sure being/ It must then follow that he must have the most noble and most worthy buying that can be imagined or thought to be/ and than that thing which hath being & life also/ is more worthy and more noble/ than that thing which hath but being only/ as the tree and herb/ which have a quickness of a life whereby they grow & increase/ have a more noble and worthy being/ than a deed stok or a deed stone which grow not. And as the brute be'st which hath a life sensitive and power to move itself/ and memory/ hath a more noble and a more worthy being/ than the tree or the herb/ which hath but quickening and growing without power to move or memory. And also as the being of man/ which hath both life sensitive power to move memory/ and understanding/ hath a more noble and a more worthy being/ than the brute be'st/ which hath but life sensitive power to move and memory without understanding. So it must needs follow that understanding is the cause of the most noble and most worthy being/ & than sith that god hath the most noble being & most worthy being that can be/ it must nediss follow that in god there must be knowledge and understanding/ and that the same being of god must be with the same knowledge and understanding. And than if the being of god/ as I have proved to the here before/ be without beginning and ending/ eterne/ infyn●te and without measure/ his understanding must needs be without beginning and ending/ eterne and infinite without measure. And also sith his being is/ and hath be ever most perfit/ and as he himself may be himself/ so may he himself understand himself/ so his being can not be severed from his knowledge and understanding/ nor his knowledge & understanding severed from his being. So must it than follow/ that he understandeth all and knoweth every thing that was/ is/ or/ shallbe/ and every man's thought/ and every act done in the world or that shallbe done in the world/ so that every thing is present to his knowledge.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That conclusion pleaseth me well.   

¶ That god is the high good thing and most perfit goodness and the very truth. Caput. seven.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than further as being and not being be two contrariants and repugnauntes/ and some call them contradictories that is to say/ that the one always doth deny & with say the other/ and as life and not life be two contraryauntes/ and where such two contrariants be/ every thing in the world is verified upon one of them/ and nothing in the world can be verified upon them both/ for every thing in the world is god or not god/ and every thing is a man or not a man/ and every thing in the world that is/ hath life or no life. So I say that good and not good/ which we call evil/ be two contrary aunts. Than it must needs follow that sith god is being/ that god must needs be either a good thing or an evil thing. But if god should be of himself a● evil thing/ than there could no goodness proceed nor come of god/ for one contrary of itself only/ can not bring forth his contrary. But we see that there be many good things/ which come from god and be of the creation of god/ and also every good thing taketh his goodness of god/ for that god is the first cause of every good thing. Therefore god of whom every good thing cometh/ and of whom all goodness proceedeth/ must needs be himself the high good thing/ and the very and most high goodness/ and that in no wise god may be evil,  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ As for that no reasonable man may deny,   

¶ That virtue is evermore in god. Caput. viii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than likewise as good and evil be two contrariants/ so truth and falsehood be two contrariants: therefore god must then be either truth or falsehood/ but falsehood is of the kind of evil/ and truth is of the kind of goodness/ and than sith god is the very goodness and the high good thing himself/ and falsehood is of the kind of evil/ it must needs follow that god in no wise may be false/ but that he himself must be the very truth. And than sith I have proved unto the that god is a being and a thing without beginning or ending/ and the most perfit thing/ the most substantial thing/ and most sure thing/ the very truth and the best thing/ god must have in himself the best properties that can be.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I grant well.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than I pray the answer me to this/ is not virtue the best property that can be in god.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ If I should answer the thereto/ we must first agree what thing virtue is.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ I think that virtue is nothing else/ but the disposition of the mind well ordered/ so that virtue resteth ever in the mind/ as when the mind doth consent and agree to goodness. And I think that all clerks will agree to the same.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ And I think the same/ and that virtue is nothing else but a good mind: for always when the mind consenteth to goodness/ than there is virtue/ whether it be in god or in his creatures/ and this consent to goodness is evermore in god.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than sith the mind and will of god doth evermore consent to goodness/ it followeth well that virtue must evermore be in god.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I must needs affirm the same.   

¶ That justice must be evermore in god, and god is ever righteous and just. Caput. ix.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Then furthermore whither is justice belonging and incident to virtue or no.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ It must needs be so/ for all clerks have defined, that justice is a constant and a perpetual will giving to every thing his own, and therefore me thinketh it must needs follow, that justice must needs be a good thing and an high excellent virtue. ¶ Thou sayest truth, & by that high excellent virtue of justice god doth rule and govern all, and that same self justice is the constant well of god, whereby he governeth all the world and every thing therein, in a convenient and reasonable order, and so it must follow that god is ever righteous and just   

¶ That god is ever merciful. Caput. x.  
BUt now further I will demand of the whither mercy be a good property and incident to virtue or no.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Than let us first like as I said, before agree between us, what we call mercy.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ I think that mercy is nothing else, but a loving mind of a pitiful affect. And sith that mercy is incident to virtue/ than it must be ever in god, so that always god by his justice doth give punishment & reward to every one as he doth deserve, so by his mercy he doth remit punishment, and enlargeth the reward.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That conclusion is both proper and reasonable.   

¶ That the justice and mercy of god be correspondent and that the one can not be without the other. Caput. xi.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than further sith that justice and mercy be both incident and always belonging to virtue, it followeth of necessity that justice & mercy must always be in god, & that his justice can not be without his mercy/ nor his mercy without justice. And than it must need follow that god doth never punish no creature by his justice, but that by his mercy his punish meant must be less than he doth deserve: & also that god doth reward no creature by his justice/ but that by his mercy which is a loving pitiful mind/ he doth give him a greater reward than he doth deserve. For by his justice he giveth punishment condign & due/ & by his mercy he remytteth again part of the punishment, and also by his justice he giveth reward condign & due/ and by his mercy & goodness he enlargeth & giveth more reward thereto. So it followeth for a necessary conclusion/ that the justice of god & thy mercy of god/ be ever correspondent & correlative/ & that the one can not be without the other/ and that god is ever just & merciful.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ By my troth this is a marvelous goodly conclusion.   

¶ That god doth govern all/ & conserveth all/ and doth take heed to all. Cap. xii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than now to the purpose that I spoke of in the beginning/ Sith that god is infinite and seethe and knoweth all/ and is himself the high good thing and the excellent goodness/ and useth ever his justice and mercy which be ever correspondent together/ it must needs follow that he by his justice and mercy doth rule all and govern all/ and conserveth and keepeth all the world & every thing therein.  ¶ Co. 
¶ Thou hast driven that conclusion upon so many reasonable principles that I can not deny it.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than yet further I must ask of the an other question/ is not love a thing & property belonging to virtue.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ yes marry it must needs be so/ for in the love of god and thy neighbour for god's sake resteth all virtue.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ why than it must needs follow that love must be evermore in god and that god doth love the world/ or else he would not by his providence govern it and conserve it as he doth/ and than he can not govern it & conserve it/ except he regard it and take heed to it and to every thing contained in the world/ and to every act and deed which is done in the world.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ All that I grant well.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than sith that he regardeth and taketh heed to the world/ and to every one of his creatures/ he will of a congruens moste specially take heed to his creatures here in earth/ which be most worthy and noble/ but man is most worthy and noble of all his creatures in earth/ because he is most like unto god.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ why is man more like to god than any other creature in earth.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Because that man hath both knowledge and understanding as god hath/ and so hath no nother creature in earth/ and therefore of convenience it must than needs follow that god doth regard and take heed to man and to the acts and deeds of men. And than it must further follow that he must punish and reward every act and deed done by man after his deserving according to his justice and mercy.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ All reason will agree to the same.   

¶ That god is every where/ & always in every place of the world. Cap. xiii.  Gyngemyn. 
Than yet further as touching the marvelous exystens of god/ thou remember'st I she wed the ere while that every thing in the world is present to sight and knowledge of god. And than he must needs know every thing/ and every man's thought and will/ an● as I said to the before because his knowledge an● understanding extendeth so large that he knoweth every thing/ every where and in every place and because his knowledge can not be severed from his being nor his being from his knowledge/ it followeth well that he must be every where and in every place.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That conclusion will be marvelous hard to prove.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ yes that conclusion I can prove the by an other reason and argument.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I pray the how.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ Thou knowest well I showed and proved to the erewhile/ that god is the first cause of all thing and all being. And that there is no other first nor principal cause of the being of the world but only god: and that god is the only cause thereof/ and there is none other medyat cause thereof but only god. Than thus as the philosopher saith and where the cause ceaseth the effect ceaseth. As thus if there be one cause of the being of a thing/ if that cause be taken away and be absent from the thing/ than that thing can no longer have being/ nor can no longer continue but must cease for to be/ and because god is the first and only cause of the world and of every part of the world/ and no other cause but only god/ if god should be absent from the world/ or from any part of the world. The world from which he should be so absent/ or that part of the world/ from which he should be so absent/ could not be nor no longer continue/ but now because there can not be put an example like thereto in all points/ yet shall I put the a famyliare example/ that somewhat shall be resemble thereto: as the fire and the flame thereof/ for we see by experience that the fire is the cause of the flame/ therefore if the fire be clearly taken away the flame can not be/ nor no longer continue. And where so ever the flame is there the fire must needs be: and where so ever any part of the flame is there the fire must needs be: so I say of god and the world/ where so ever the world is there god must needs be/ and where so ever any part of the world is/ there must god needs be/ therefore it must needs follow that god is present every where/ in the world and in every part of the world/ and no where absent/ and therefore because that god is the first cause of the world/ and no nother cause of the world but only god/ if god should be absent from the hole world and not present in the hole world/ his absence should cause the hole world to perish. And also if god should be present every where and in every part of the world that part of the world from whence he is absent and not present/ cowde no longer remain in his being/ because as I said before/ god is the first and only cause of the hole world and of every part of the world/ and if the cause should seize/ the effect should seize/ wherefore as I said before it must follow for a necessary conclusion/ that god is every where and alway present in the world/ and in every part and place of the world.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Now I thank the for that conclusion ple●seth me well/ but yet there is one doubt therein/ wherein I would move the and that is thus/ if that god be every where in the world/ and in every place of the world/ it should s●me to some men's fantasies/ that god of himself should be divers things/ or else divers of his parties should be in divers places. As one part of god to occupy one place/ and another part of god to occupy another place  ¶ G●nge. 
¶ Nay not so it must needs follow by reason that god is but one thing and not gardeners things/ and that there be no more goddies but one. And also that the same one god may be hole in divers places.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ I pray the by what reason may I know and understand that.   

¶ That god is but one thing/ and not divers things. Cap. xiiii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ As touching the first that god is one thing and that there be no more goddies but one/ thus it may be proved/ unite must be before plurality/ or else plurality must be before unite/ so that god must needs be an unity or else a plurality/ and every consisteth of two things which be different in themself/ and two divers things. But between every two divers things is some discord and variance/ for where is no manner of discord of being there is but one thing/ but if god were several things and not one thing/ then should there be ever in him a discord and a variance/ and if he had such a being that ever varied in himself then had not he the noblest being/ and the joyfullest being/ but a being miserable and wretched/ therefore sith he hath the noblest being and most joyful that can be/ as I have pro u●d to the before/ it must needs follow that god is but one thing/ and not divers.   

¶ That there is but one god. Caput. xv.  
ANd also by the same reason it folowetth that there must needs be but one god and not many/ for if there were many God's/ other than those goddies agree among themself in every thing & every act/ or else they disagree and discord in every thing and every act/ or else thirdly they agree in some things and discord in some things/ but as to the first/ if they agree in every thing ynd every act/ then be they not many but one god/ as to the second if they discord in every thing and in every act/ then should there be no concord in all the world nor the world nor nothing else could never have been nor continued/ for the which the one should have conserved/ the other should have destroyed. As to the third point they agree in some things and in some things dies agree/ then in those things in which they discord must be between them variance/ then if they vary between themself/ neither of them can have the most noble and joyful being/ but each of them a being miserable And also if there be two gods/ there must be of every thing two first beginnings/ so neither of them should be by himself sufficient. Also in every kind of things that which is the highest of the same kind is but one thing/ for the multitude of all several men is reduced in to one mankind/ the multitude of every several horse in to one kind of horses/ and so of other/ and the multitude of several kinds in to one general beginning and head of all kinds/ so the universal order of things is referred to one hole & universal beginning. And likewise as every singular matter is reserryd in to one matter/ every member of the world in to one hole member & body/ so all several nature be referred to one hole nature/ all several lyfies to one life/ all several movers to one mover/ all several orders to one high hole ordener of all thing/ so it must needs follow that there is but one god and no more/ which is the first cause/ beginning/ ruler and ordener of all things/ and is but one in himself.   

¶ That god is hole in diverse places. Caput. xvi.  
ALso as to the other point it is not inconvenient y● that same self one god may be hole in divers places/ for thou seest by experience that the sown of a thing or a voice or a word spoken may be hole hard in divers places/ and of divers men at once & yet every man heareth the hole voice, sown, or word/ & it reboundyth hole in every man's ears. Also thy soul and life of thy body is hole in thy hole body/ and hold in every part of thy body/ or else if part of thy body (as thy hand or thy fot●) were cut away or destroyed part of thy soul were ●ynysshed & destroyed but of that thou seest at thine eye the contrary experience/ and so thou seest well that thy hole soul and life is hole in divers places/ wherefore sith thou seest well that these things which be but the creatures of god/ have such power of being that they may be hole in divers places/ it followeth well that god that is creator and cause of all/ hath such power & nobility of being that he may be hole in divers places.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Now that is one of the properyst conclusions for my learning that ever I hard.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ yet tarry a little while/ and I shall show the another conclusion touching the marvelous existens of god/ which peradventure shall please the as well as that.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That I would be glad to here/ therefore I pray the show me what it is.   

¶ That god is eternal. Cap. xvii.  Gyngemyn 
¶ By these foresaid conclusions I shall now prove to y● that god is eternal.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Thou haste me thinketh proved that to me substantially all ready/ for thou haste proved that god is infinite without beginning or ending/ and that I call eternal.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Nay now I see well thou perceivest not the perfit ground of this thing.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ why what callest thou eternal.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Forsooth Eternal/ is the very perfit possession of all together of life interminable/ that is to say without changing of time/ but all thing that is in the world living in time/ occupieth time present/ & proceedeth from time past unto time to come/ for it hath lost the time of yester day/ & yet occupieth not the time of to morrow. For no man liveth in this life but in this present movable & transitory moment. And every thing that liveth & is in this world/ occupieth at once but one little moment of time/ so the joy that any creature can have in this life is as no joy/ For I trow thou wilt grant that that joy/ which thou hadst yesterday/ which is now passed/ is now to the no joy/ and the joy which thou shalt have to morrow not yet comen is yet to the no joy/ for if the pleasure which thou hadst yesterday in tasting of delicate meats be now past/ them hast thou now no such pleasure in tasting/ or if thy body shall have after this time an case and pleasure in the avoiding of the pain which thou now ●du ryst/ yet hast thou no such pleasure now/ so all the being life pleasure & joy which any creature hath in this life/ is but during one little moment which is short/ and little worthy to be called any perfit being orlyfe/ or any perfit joy/ but the eterne existens of god which must excel all other beings/ hath in it self such a nobility that it comprehendeth all the hole plenty of life together/ and knitteth time passed & time to come with the time present. And nothing is to god past nor to come but all things be to him present. For if any thing were to him newly known/ than god had not all perfit knowledge in him at the beginning. And so than there should be in god some mutability/ and change & aug mentacron of knowledge/ and becawse he had eue● most perfit being/ and most perfit knowledge/ and his knowledge can not be separate from his being/ as I have proved to the before/ it must needs follow/ that god knew all thing ever/ & every thing was ever/ is/ & shallbe to him present.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ This is now one of the meruel●st conclusions that ever I herd/ but sith I now perceive that nothing is worthy to be called eterne but only god/ what shall I call those things/ which have such an existence/ in transitory moments that never shall have end nor finish.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Certes if I should give them a condign name I must call them perpetual/ and the existence of god eternal/ and sith that god is present every where/ and all thing is present unto him/ and the understanding of god is his very being/ it must needs follow that god understandeth seethe and knoweth every thing in the world/ ever present before him/ every man's thought/ every act that is passed/ and every thing that is present/ and every thing that is to come/ and knoweth what every creature hath done/ doth and shall do/ & what every man doth or thinketh or shall think or do/ so every thing that ever was/ is/ or shall be/ is now to him known/ and is now present before him.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Now doubtless that is one of the noblest conclusions that ever I hard sith I was borne/ and therefore I thank the with all my heart/ and not only for this/ but also for all thy other reasons which thou haste made to me here before/ where by thou hast so forced me that I must needs by reason grant/ that there is a god which by his high providence ruleth and governeth all/ and conserveth and keepeth all/ and regardeth and taketh heed to all the world/ and to every thing there in contained. But at the beginning of our communication thou showdest me that thou couldst prove to me by reason another conclusion & principle/ that is to say/ that the soul of man is immortal and shall never die.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ That conclusion I purpose and can prove to the with so good demonstrative reasons/ that I doubt not but I shall therein right well satisfy thy mind/ but yet now because I have a little business to do/ I pray the spare me for a little season. And within the space of an hour or little more/ I shall meet the here again & than we shall proceed in our argument.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ with right good will I am content/ & I shall not fail by God's grace to be here again within this hour/ and than diligently to attend upon thy return/ & therefore I pray the fail not to keep thy promise.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ I shall not fail to keep my promise by the help of the great god. And therefore for a season now far well.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ And far well again with all mine heart   
¶ Thus endeth the first dialogue/ declaring the marvelous exystens of god   

¶ The second dialogue of the immortality of man's soul.  

¶ That it is convenient and needful to prove the immortality of man's soul by reason. Caput. i.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Now by my troth well met for I thought as much that I should be sure to find the here at my return  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ And I made the more haste because I would be here before the. For I would be loath that thou shouldest prove in me any breach of covenant or 〈◊〉.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Therein thou art the more to be commended/ & therefore no we let us go to our matter that we did promise between us to dispute/ that is to say/ to prove by natural reason only that the soul of man is immortal and shall never die.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I wots well thou didst say to me/ that thou couldst prove it by natural reason: but I had liefer here tell of the other conclusion that thou spakest of/ that is to say/ that there is a purgatory/ where the soul of man shallbe punished after it it separate from the body/ which is more convenient and more need full to be proved/ than to prove the immortality of man's soul: for there is but few people but that they believe that the soul of man is immortal.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ And I think it is both convenient and needful/ to prove first the immortality of man's soul/ for as touching the first point/ I can not so conveniently prove to the by reason that there is a purgatory/ nor so well to satisfy thy mind therein/ except I should first prove to the by reason that the soul of man is immortal/ for that that other the same groundies & principles which serve for the first will conveniently serve for the other/ or else they will be antecedentes necessary to prove the said consequence. And as to the second point me thinketh it is now very needful/ and for a comen virtuous wealth to prove by reason that the soul of man should be immortal. For this I mark marvelously which I see by a comen experience used in the world/ and specially in my country/ that many which be called the great wise men of the world/ which have deep and high learning and also excellent wit/ do live abominably and viciously/ some in pomp and pride some so inordinate covetous that be never satiate/ some in rancour malice and dysdeyn/ and many of them do never convert from those vices/ during their lives/ neither by exhortation/ preaching/ teaching/ neither by pain/ punishment/ sickness/ nor other thing/ except it be for a very little season only while the pain endureth/ I say than if such wise men and great clerks so well studied and learned/ believed perfitly and surely that their souls were immortal/ & should have pain or joy in an other world/ according as they deserve here in earth/ I suppose verily they would never continue in their vicious living as they do/ wherefore it is a great conjectural argument unto me that they believe not their souls to be immortal. But that they labour and study to bring other to believe the immortality of man's soul/ because they would have them obedient unto them and thereby to maintain their own vices & voluptuous appetites.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Nay god forbid it should be so/ but I think rather it is the frailty of their nature/ and that they do but forget to do their duties to god for the time/ but yet if there be any such men as thou speakest of/ which will never be converted by exhortation/ preaching/ sickness/ nor other punishment/ me thinketh for than there is no remedy.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ yes forsooth this thing which I purpose now to show the may be a remedy and help therein. For there is nothing in the world shall alter and change a man's mind and believe so well and surely/ as shall the judgement of his own reason/ for when a man is set in the perfit believe of any thing/ though the prayer and opinion of other can not turn his mind/ yet when another reason cometh to his m●nd which destroyeth that first reason/ which causeth him to believe his first opinion to be true/ the same other reason so comen to his m●nde shall change his first believe and opinion. Therefore I say for such men as believe not the immortality of man's soul/ it is necessary to persuade them by reasons and arguments and such as they never herd before/ or else though they have before hard them/ yet they did never in their minds with deliberation deeply discuss them. And such reasons so moved unto them shall cause them to alter and change their believes and opinions. And where they believed before that the soul of man was mortal/ they shall by the persuasion of such reasons change their opinions/ and believe that it is immortal/ and that it shall never die.   

¶ what is a definition/ and what is a description. Caput. two.  COmyngo. 
¶ By my truth thou sayest well unto me & therefore I pray the now show me some of those reasons/ which thou thinkest necessary to prove the immortality of man's soul/ for the contentation of my mind therein.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ with a right good will. But yet if I should satisfy thy mind in this matter by way of argument and reasoning/ we had need first to agree between us in the words and terms that we shall speak/ so that I may mean the same thing always that thou dost mean/ and that thou mean always/ the same thing that I mean. For if I speak a word/ and by that word that I speak I do mean fire/ & by the same self word thou dost mean water we shall never than agree in our arguments and reasons/ nor by our argument never bring forth/ nor prove no true nor good conclusion. Therefore if we should talk of the body and of the soul/ & of man/ it is first necessary to agree between us/ what thing we call a body/ & what thing we call a soul/ and what thing we call a man.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Thou sayst well therein/ therefore first I pray the tell me thine opinion theri/ & what thing thou callest a body/ & what thing thou callest a soul/ & what thing thou callest a man.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ I call a body as all the philosophers afore have defined it.  ¶ Co. 
¶ what meanest thou by this word defined.  Gyn. 
¶ Marry dyffinytion as the philosophers say is a rule which showeth and teacheth us the being of the thing/ & what the thing is/ only by terms and words essential. But a descryp●on is a rule/ which showeth and teacheth us the being of the thing and what the thing is by wordesaccidentall/ and words essential be those which signify such an essential thing/ which can not be taken a way from the same self thing/ which we would have defined & that thing still to remain. But accidental thing be those/ which may be taken a way from the thing who we would have described/ & yet that thing may still remain/ as white black/ hard/ soft/ good/ bad/ & such other be terms accidental for a horse or a man/ for whiteness or blackness/ hardness/ or softness/ goodness or badness may be changed in a horse or man/ & taken a way from those things & yet the same self horse or man may remain still in their substantial being/ & therefore they be called accidental things for a horse or a man but those terms a body and sensible/ be terms essential for a horse or a man/ for they may not be taken away from the substance of a horse or a man/ and the same self horse or man to remain/ and therefore they be called essential terms for a horse or a man.   

¶ what is a body/ what is a soul/ and what is a man. Caput. iii.  COmyngo. 
¶ All that I perceive well & am agreed with y● therein/ therefore I pray the proceed and tell me what thou callest a body/ and what thing thou callest a soul/ and what thou callest a man.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ I call that a body as I said before as the philosophers have defined it/ that is thus: A body is that which hath length/ breed/ & thickness. And a soul as the philosophers say/ is the act of a natural body having life in power And a man is a body with a soul sensytyf and reasonable. But yet me thinketh there is a better definition/ than that for the soul after mine opinion.  ¶ Comyn. 
what is that?  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Surely after mine mind a soul is no nother thing but a lifely power/ and ought not always to be called the act of the natural body having life/ for I think that thou wilt grant that the soul of man/ when it is separate from his corruptible body is a soul/ & yet it is not than the act of the body/ for than it doth nothing with the body/ nor that body doth no act/ nor hath no natural doing by reason of the soul/ and therefore it seemeth it is no good definition of the soul to call it the act of the body/ but the best definition of the soul is to call it the lifely power.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ if that be thine opinion/ than thou goest clean from the definition of the phylolophers and than I suppose that few clerks therein will take thy part.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ Nay it is not clear again the philosophers mind/ for peradventure when they gave that definition they meant that the soul being joined with the body/ is the act of the body.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ well than go forth with thy purpose.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ Then furthermore I say that of that soul there is three dye●rsytees/ that is to say/ a soul vegetatyf/ a soul sensytyf/ and a soul int●llectyf. A soul vegetative is that life that is in a plant/ tree grass/ herb/ or fruit which do grow. A soul sensitive is that life which is in a brute best/ which occupieth and useth the. v. wits and lacketh reason and understanding/ as is a horse/ a cow/ a bird or a fish. And y● v. w●ttys by the tasting/ the smelling/ the hearing/ the sight and the touching. And therefore every kind of beasts having these. v. wits have a soul sensitive. But a soul intellective is that which hath a live l● understanding to know good from ●ll/ and right from wrong. And therefore a man is that creature to whom god hath given this soul int●f/ which we call the reasonable soul. And because man hath growing as plants & herbs have/ he is therefore called lyfelv/ & because he hath the use of the. v. senses as brute beasts have/ therefore he is called ●nsyble. And because he hath reason and understanding/ therefore he is call●d reasonable. Therefore a man is nothing else but a lifely body sensible and reasonable/ so those two things joined together that is to say the body and the reasonable soul do make a man.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ This is a very good introduction to our matter and a reasonable/ therefore I am content to grant to the all these foresaid conclusions/ therefore I pray the go forth with thy argument/ & let me see how thou canst prove by rea son that the soul of man is immortal and shall never die.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ That I trust I shall prove thee/ but yet first or we go to the reasoning ●rof 〈◊〉 I shall prove to the that it is wisdom for a man to believe that the soul of man is immortal/ and shall never die/ and that it is great folly to b●ue the contrary that it is immortal.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ How canst thou prove that.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Forsooth thus.   

¶ That it is wisdom to believe that the soul of man is immortal. Caput. iiii.  
A Man must needs other believe that the soul of man is immortal and shall never die/ or else mortal and shall perish with the body/ but it is more wisdom and profit for a man to believe that it shall never die/ then the contrary. For in every doubtful thing the more surer way is to be chosen. But if thou believe that it is immortal & shall never die/ though it be not so/ yet that believe by no possibility can never hurt the nor disprofit thee/ for if it be immortal and shall have punishment after for his desert/ that believe may do the great good/ if thou live the more virtuously. And if it be mortal and shall die/ yet if thou believe that it is immortal/ that believe shall never after thy death do the hurt/ whither thou live in this world virtuously or viciously/ when thou hast no life nor being after thy soul is departed from thy body. But on the other side if thou believe that it is mortal and shall die with thy body/ that be leave peradventure may do the great hurt. For if thy soul live after thy body and be punished in an other world for thine offences done in this world/ if the boldness of that believe have caused y● to live the more viciously in this world/ for which thou art in an other world punished/ then that believe that thy soul is mortal is cause to the of great harm/ therefore to believe that the soul of man shall die with the body one way may be cause to man afterward of great hurt. But of this believe that the soul of man shall never die/ shall never by no possibylite be hurtful to man afterward nor there can not folo we thereof to man any harm/ wherefore I may well conclude that a man to believe that his soul is incorruptible and shall never die/ is great wisdom/ and to believe the contrary is great foolishness.  ¶ Co. 
¶ That reason proveth it more wisdom to believe the immortality of the soul/ but yet that reason proveth not the soul to be immortal.   

¶ if the soul of man should not be immortal/ than were man the most unhappiest of all other creatures and beasts. Caput. v.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ But yet if thou wilt give me diligent hearing/ I trust I shall prove the by reason that the soul of man is immortal/ and that it is infinite and shall never die nor utterly perish/ and that I shall prove that by diverse reasons.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I pray the by what reasons.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Doubtless by many good reasons/ wherefore my first reason is this. There is no creature of god in earth which doth to god so much honour nor praiseth god so much as man doth/ nor also there is no creature in earth that hath any knowledge and reason to know/ how to do honour to god save only man/ than sith that man is only that creature/ which doth honour to god here in earth/ it is convenient and standeth most with equity and rightful judgement and goodness of god/ that god should therefore reward man with a life and a being more pleasant and better/ than any other creature or best here in earth. But the life and being which man hath here in earth/ is more wretched sorrowful and worse/ than the life of any other brute best here in earth/ ergo it is convenient and necessary that man have an other life after the corruption of his body/ and that must needs be the life and being of his reasonable soul/ because his body after his mortal death hath by nature no manner of life.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ why is the life of man here in earth more wretched sorrowful and worse than the life of any other brute best.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ That I shall she we thee/ for thou knowest well enough & seest by experience that the body of man is more feeble and tender/ than the body of any other brute best/ for the body of man is all tender and naked and much more tender than any other brute best/ for the fishes have of their nature shell● or skalies to cover and defend their bodies/ the best● be full of here and have thick skins/ the fowls have feathers: but man is tender & naked/ that if he had not covering for him made of other best skin or here or other things/ he should perish for cold/ for which thing to be gotten man must labour and study/ where the beasts fish or foul need not to labour for the obtaining thereof/ because they have all such thing needful for them given them by nature/ so that the life of man is more needful & wretched/ than the life of any other brute best. Also man taketh & must take great labour for the obtaining of his necessary food & living as to till the ground with great labour to get him drink & food. where the beasts take no such pain for drink nor other food/ but find always the water ready for their drink/ and all other thing ordained by nature ready for their food without any study or labour therefore to be taken. So the life of man is more laborious & painful/ than the life of any other brute best. Also man idureth much vexation/ thought/ study & unquietness of mind/ which the brute beasts endure not/ for though that man knoweth surely that he shall die & oft taketh thought therefore/ yet the brute beasts have no knowledge of their death/ nor take no thought therefore. And also man doth take thought & care for loss of riches loss of honour or dignity/ & many a man taketh so great care for loss of such riches & honour/ that during his life therefore he can never be merry. And some man taketh so great thought and care therefore that oft times he dieth for sorrow/ men and women also desire and covet gay and fresh apparel to cover their bodies/ goodly garnished and fair houses/ & all beauteous sight pleasant to the eye/ as goodly pictures and images/ they desire and delight also in sweet smellies & savours/ and to here songs and armony & sweet sows pleasant to the ere/ and taketh great pain labour and study/ vexation and unquietness of mind for the obtaining of such things. But yet the brute best careth for no such things/ but regardeth nothing but only for his food/ his bodily lust ease & pleasure. Therefore it proveth well that man endureth much vexation thought study & unquietness of mind which the brute beasts endure not. Therefore as I said before/ if the soul of man should not have another life and being after it is separate from the body/ than were man in worse case than any other brute best/ which were not consonaunt to the justice nor goodness of god/ that man which of all creatures earthly giveth only honour and praise to god/ should be rewarded with a life more wretched & wore than any other best in earth. And therefore god of his justice and goodness must reward him with a better life/ than that which any brute best endureth/ which can not be except that his soul have a life and being/ after it is separate from this corruptible body. So of convenience it followeth that the soul of man must needs be immortal.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ That is a right proper reason which thou hast made/ but hast any other reason than that?  ¶ Ging. 
¶ ye forsooth that I have/ and therefore my second reason shall be this.   

¶ That the soul of man useth his operation & property without the body/ and so may have a being without the body. Caput. vi.  
THe very operation & property of the reasonable soul is to know and to understand/ then if the gross body of man be the cause of the being of the soul/ so that the soul take his perfection and corruption of the gross body/ then can the soul never use his operation & pro part without the body. But if the soul of man may use his operation and property without occupying of that gross body/ than is not the body the cause of the perfection and corruption of the soul/ but the soul may use his operation and property without occupying of the gross body/ for the less that the body or the. v. wits is moved or stirred/ the better and the more perfitly doth the soul use his operation & property. For when a man moveth not with the body nor seeth nothing nor heareth no noise/ nor tasteth nor smelleth nothing/ that should trouble the body/ than doth the soul of man use his operation and property of understanding most clearly and perfitly. And also it hath been oft times hard and known/ that divers men in their dreams have seen many vysyons/ some in their dream think themself/ in their living bodies to be in other places talking with other folks/ and doing divers things to their pleasure or displeasure: when in deed their bodies be not there/ but they lie in their beds still a sleep/ and these things and visions/ which they see in their dreams is the operation of their soul's/ for their bodies so dying a sleep do see nor do no such thing/ and therefore sith the soul of man doth see and doth such things without the body/ it foloweth well that the soul of man hath a being without the body/ and so may have his being when it is severed and separate from the body.  ¶ Co. 
¶ Me thinketh that reason proveth as well that the soul of a brute best may have his being when it is separate from the body of that best. For as I suppose a dog or a hog or any other brute best doth dream as well as a man doth/ for a dog in his sleep will bark and open like as he doth when he is waking/ a hog and divers other beasts will cry and make noise in their sleep like as they do being waking.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ As to that I say in mine opinion/ that no brute best in the world doth dream but only man nor all the world can not prove the contrary. And I say that though a dog or other best doth cry and make noise in his sleep/ yet it dreameth not nor seeth nothing. For this we see oft by experience that many a man in his sleep doth speak and move/ and yet he dreameth not/ nor seeth no thing/ nor when he is waking can neither tell nor remember that he dreamed of any thing/ all the while that he so spoke in his sleep/ nor saw no thing that while: & so that sometime a man speaketh and maketh noise in his sleep/ and seeth no thing nor dreameth not/ and yet sometime he speth and maketh moving or noise in his sleep/ and doth dream & see visions/ but that speaking and moving which a man hath in his sleep/ while he seeth nothing nor his mind occupied/ cometh only of the natural disposition and complexion of the body/ and it is only the opera cyon of the body/ and not the operation of the soul/ because that the mind is no thing occupied that while/ nor ●yueth nor seeth no thing that while. For proof whereof if ye will suddenly prick a man being a sleep/ he will move and stir/ and ●aduiture make cry or make noise or sown and yet dreameth not that while of no such hurt done to his body/ nor his soul saw no thing that while/ and if he be suddenly waked therewith he can neither tell nor show of no manner dream nor vision in his sleep that he had that while. which operation of the natural disposition and complexion of the body every brute be'st may have in his sleep/ & that natural disposition of the body/ doth cause that best to cry & move in his sleep as when it feeleth pain it will cry in token of that pain as it doth when it is waking/ and when it feeleth ease and pleasure/ it will make noise or sown/ or make some moving/ betokening the same ease and pleasure as it doth when it is waking. But yet there is no brute best in the world which is able to make any noise cry/ or sown in his sleep other wise, that it is able to do when it is waking/ but when it is waking/ it is not able to do any thing/ touching only the operation and property of the reasonable soul/ for it can not reckon nor count no numbers nor discuss what is right and wrong/ good nor bad/ nor make no arguments nor reasons/ which operation & properties of the reasonable soul no brute best can have nor use in his sleep/ because he can not have them nor use them when he is waking/ but a man hath those properties of the soul/ as well waking as sleeping. For waking he can reckon and count numbers and reason and discuss what is right and wrong/ good and bad/ and invent and find many sutell reasons and arguments/ which the brute best can not do/ a man can also use the same dying a sleep in his dreams/ for many man also being a sleep in his dream/ doth find divers reasons & arguments proving some conclusion of some science and faculty/ which reason came never to his mind before while he was wakig/ also many a man in his dream hath had divers visions/ & hath foreseen & had knowledge of things to come/ which hath afterward fallen plain lie and truly according to his vision/ some of promotion & winning/ and sometime of loss and bodily hurt/ which after hath fallen to him and many a man in his dream hath seen and known his own destruction and death. Thus the soul of man hath his knowledge/ and useth his property of understanding not occupying the body & without any help of the body/ or of any of his. v. senses/ or of any organ of the senses/ or of any member of the body. And yet furthermore many a man we says by experience being seek feeble and week/ and the soul nigh the point of departing from the body/ a little before the hour of his death hath for seen and foretold his own death/ and also the death of other folks and divers other things/ which afterward have truly come to pass. And also broad waking hath seen many sights & visions of divers strange things of spirit or devils & of divers persons/ which have been deed before/ and showed them that were than present/ that those visions did give him perfit knowledge that he must needs die. which strange visions other persons being there present with him could in no wise see nor perceive/ wherefore if the soul of man should die and corrupt with the body/ it seemeth against reason that it should be so perfit in his being to use his operation and property of knowledge & understanding so quickly truly & perfitly so nigh the time of his corruption/ but rather when it beginneth to die and corrupt/ it should begin to wax week & feeble in using his operation and property. wherefore upon these ●inissys I ma● well conclude/ that sith the soul of man useth his operation & property most perfitly without occupying of the body or help of the body/ that the most perfit being of the soul is without the body/ so the body can not be the cause of the corruption of the soul of man/ but that the soul may be without the body/ nor that the soul dieth not when the body dieth/ nor when it is separate from the body/ but liveth and hath his being after and is immortal and incorruptible.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That reason is right good and apparent.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ Nay I pray the take patience for a while and here me diligently/ for I have divers other reasons to prove the morality of man's soul.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ I pray the go to/ I shall be glad to give the hearing.   

¶ That god doth will the perpetual life wealth and preservation of man's soul/ and that his will must be performed. Cap. seven.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Another reason I shall show the which is this/ because the children be somewhat like unto the father/ and also because the father knoweth that they be of his nature/ therefore the father must & doth naturally love his children/ and ever willeth the wealth and prosperity of his children still to continue. So like wise because that man is like unto god for that that god hath made him to his similitude/ because he hath know lege & understanding somewhat resembling to god/ which most high knowledge and understanding is ever in god/ as I have proved that here before in our first dialogue and disputation. And also because the soul of man is of the nature of god/ and proceedeth and cometh only of god/ it must than consequently follow that god doth love the soul of man/ and doth greatly will the perpetual wealth and preservation of the soul of man st●ll to continue. And if god do will the perpetual wealth and preservation of that soul/ that great will of god must 〈◊〉 take effect/ for ●f god should have ever a great w●ll to a thing/ and that thing should never take 〈◊〉/ than god should never have his will fulfilled/ and than than that should be a great displeasure to god/ and so than god should have a dysple● life and being/ and no joyful life nor being/ which is contrary to that which I proved to the before in our first dialogue & that god must needs have the most joyful life and being that can be and therefore sith that the great will of god is to have the soul of m●n in perpetual wealth and preservation/ ●t must needs follow that the 〈◊〉 of man must have a perpetual life/ and must neoys be unmortall.  ¶ C●myn. 
¶ T●at reason me thinketh proveth not thy purpose/ for if ●od have a will that man's soul should be perpetually preserved/ & that of 〈◊〉 to that will of god must needs take effect/ or else god should have no ●full life nor being/ thereof should follow/ that god should suffer no 〈◊〉 soul to be dampened.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Nay that objection may be well assoiled by the similitude that I did show the before of the father and children. For though a father having many children/ have a natural will to the wealth and perpetual preservation of all his children/ yet if any one of his children do displease him/ and have ●yll concyc●ons or doth hurt or intend the displeasure and destruction of his father/ that father than will for such unkindness punish him/ till he can reconcile him again to goodness/ but if he will not be reconciled/ he will than utterly cast him to perpetual pain or prisonment/ and that is for the great love & 〈◊〉/ that such a father hath do to justice. So like wise god which o● his infinite goodness and mercy/ hath a will to the wealth and perpetual preservation of man's soul/ and also a good will ever to do justices hath ordained man's soul to have perpetual joy/ & also hath ordained punishment for every soul/ that doth offend according to his desert. So that the will of god doth ever take effect according to his mercy and justice/ sometime to reward by his goodness and mercy/ and sometime to punish by his justice. And also because god is loving to man and is merciful and just/ god can not minister his justice sufficient unto man except that his soul should be immortal/ and have another life after it is separate from the body.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ yet me thinketh thou hast not suff●ntly proved that conclusion/ that god can not minister his justice unto man/ except his soul should be immortal.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ yes that I trust I shall prove the incontinent by a good apparent rea son/ if thou wilt hear it.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ yes marry with all mine heart/ there fore I pray the say on.   

¶ if the soul of man should not be immortal/ than god doth not minister to every man equal justice. Caput. viii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Every reasonable man will grant/ that god which is the first cause of every thing/ & the fountain of all goodness/ that he must ever be righteous and tuste/ as I have proved to the in our first dialogue/ and by his justice he must reward and punish every man according to his desert. But we see that there be divers men/ and have been divers men in the world/ which have done divers and many good ded● with good mind/ & taken great pain and labour for the love of god/ & also suffered patiently many wrongs/ hurts/ and rebukes for the love of god/ and never had reward therefore in this world. And soon after such pain and labour taken/ and such good deeds done by them/ or such wrongs suffered for god's sake they have died/ and never reward in this world therefore. So on that other side divers men offend god in this world and do many evil deeds/ & never punished sufficiently in this world therefore. Therefore it is necessary that man have a living and a being after this bodily death/ that god may reward him and punish him by his justice/ for those good deeds and evil deeds/ that he did in this world/ for the which he was not fuffycyently rewarded no● punish while he was here. For else god doth not minister to him equal justice. And also a man to honour god in this world/ it were a thing but in vain/ if that he should die without any reward while he were living here/ nor never have therefore reward after his death in no place else where. And also it should comfort a man to live viciously/ and to satisfy his own voluptuous appetites/ and to the satisfying always of his inordinate desire and pleasure and froward mind and will/ and to do vicious & Abo●ynable deeds/ to the destruction and hurt of his neighbours/ if he should trust to avoid all punishment therefore to be had in this life/ nor never think to have punishment therefore/ nor make any satysfation after his death in no other place else where/ therefore I say by the conve justice of god/ it is necessary that man must have an other life and being after his soul is separate from his body where he may receive due reward or punishment for such acts/ for the which he was not suffi ciently rewarded nor punysched/ while he was here living in earth/ which life and being must needs be the life of his immortal soul.   

¶ The soul of man is made to be part taker of blysfulnes and joy that ever shall endure. Caput. ix.  Gyngemin. 
¶ Another reason to prove the immortality of man's soul is this. The soul of man which is made to the syimlitude & likeness of god/ because of the understanding/ is made to perceive and to have and to be partaker of blysfulnes & joy/ for if the reasonable soul/ which is form to the likeness of god/ should not be made to attain blissfulness and joy/ then no creature is made to attain and come to the blissfulness and joy/ them if it be made to attain blissfulness and joy/ either than that blissfulness and joy is for ever to endure/ or ell● to endure for a season/ but so to endure joy for a season and to have an end thereof/ is no blissfulness but heaviness/ for than should the soul ever be sad & heavy/ to think it should depart from that joy/ that it endureth for that season/ for like as we be sad of that sorrow that cometh to us against our will/ so be we sad for that joy that goth from us against our will/ then if the soul should be sure to depart from that joy that it hath/ it should have cause to morn & to be sad/ therefore it seemeth than that the soul is not made to 〈◊〉 that joy and blissfulness that endureth but for a season/ which is no joy but wretchedness. But it is made to perceive that very joy that endureth ever. Therefore it may be concluded that the soul of man is made to endure for ever and so must needs be immortal.   

¶ That the soul of man knoweth and perceyu●th many things without the body/ nor it dependeth not nor corrupteth not with the body. Cap. x.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Another reason is this: we perceive that to the body belongeth. v. wits/ that is to say/ the hearing/ saying/ feeling/ tasting/ and smelling/ and the organs and instruments of the. v. wits b●n the ●res for hearing/ the eyes for saying/ the nose for smelling/ the mouth with the tongue for tasting/ & the other members for touching/ but our soul we see perceiveth knoweth and understandeth many thing that be not perceived known nor understand by the body/ nor by no part of the body/ nor by none of the. v. wits. For the soul without occupying any of the. v. wits conceiveth things that have no bodies/ for it knoweth the goodness of god/ it knoweth right and wrong/ truth and falsehood/ the soul can reckon and tell numbers/ it knoweth proportions/ it perceiveth things passed and things to come/ all though they be insensible by means of the body/ or by the. v. wits/ & all those things that have no bodies/ can not be seen/ hard/ nor smelled/ tasted/ nor touched by none of the. v. wits/ nor by no instrument nor organ of them/ yet can the soul perceive all such incorporal and insensible things of his own kind and by himself/ and therefore it appeareth that the soul hath his operation beside the body/ and that the nature of the soul of man is not of necessity dependenge to the body/ nor to the. v. wits/ nor to no part of them/ nor corrupteth not/ when the body and the. v. wits been corrupt/ but hath his being without the body/ and so is immortal.   

¶ That the natural appetite of the soul of man is to come to the knowledge of the high cause/ which is god. Caput. xi.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Another reason yet I shall show thee/ which is this. The soul of man knoweth itself/ it knoweth every thing/ the being of every thing/ & the cause of the being of every thing/ it knoweth things fynyte and things infinite & the causes thereof/ and so further and further/ higher and higher/ and cause by cause/ & never cesyth till it hath attained the knowledge of the first cause of all thing/ which is god that is infinite/ and the near it doth attain the knowledge of that first cause the more vehemently it desireth to know that first cause tha● is infinite Therefore it appeareth that the soul of man hath ever a natural appetite & property to come to the perfit knowledge & sight of the infinite divinely substance & first cause/ and that god hath given that natural property to the soul to come to that perfit knowledge and sight. Then if that be the natural property given of god/ ergo the soul must once needs use his property/ that is to say to have the perfit knowledge and sight of that infinite divinely substance that is god. But sith the soul of man can not use his property/ as to have that true perfit knowledge and sight thereof here in this dark life/ but darkly as under a cloud or a mist/ therefore it is necessary that the soul of man have a being/ in the which he may have the true and perfit sight and knowledge of that divinely substance and first cause which is god. But that perfit sight and know lege can the soul never have/ while it is being joined with the gross body/ ergo it followeth/ it must have a knowledge and sight without the gross body/ and so it must needs have a being without that gross body/ and so it followeth that after the corruption of that gross body/ it hath a being and is incorruptible and immortal.   

¶ That the soul of man hath none other cause of his being but god/ which is infinite. Caput. xii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Another reason yet is this. Every thing that is made of nought and immediately create of god is infinite and shall never have end/ for the heaven/ earth/ hell and the hole ingynne of the world/ were immediately made of god and have no nother cause of their being but only god which is infinite. And because that cause is infymte their being be naturally infinite/ but that thing that hath another mean cause of his being than god/ is cortuptyble/ as the body of man & best/ or a house and such other/ which have another mean cause of their growing and being/ which is the moisture of the earth/ & the heat of the son/ and form & the fashion. Also the. v. wits as the sight/ the smelling/ the tasting/ hearing/ and touching have another mean cause of their being/ which is the eye for the sight/ and the nose for the smelling/ the tongue and mouth for tasting/ the ears for hearing/ the hands and other members of the body for touching/ which. v. wits have their cause & being of those members/ then if the understanding/ the which is the soul of man/ have none other mean cause of his being but god that is infinite/ ● is immediately create of god/ the soul conveniently must be infinite. But that the soul hath no nother incane cause of being but god/ and that it is a thing which is immediately create of god/ thus it may be well proved. The soul must needs be made of somewhat/ or ●lle of nought/ ●t there can be nothing named of the which it is made/ for if it be made of any other mean thing or things/ then must it be made of parts of it self/ which so gathered together maketh the hole soul/ or 〈◊〉 it is made of some matter with some form and fashion added thereto: but it is not made of his parts gathered/ for the soul hath no parts nor can not be deyuded. Nor it is not made of no nother matter/ for every thing that is made of any matter and be resolved unto the same matter whereof it was first made/ when the form or fashion is broken and destroyed/ as an image/ a house/ a cup of timber or metal/ and such other/ which may be resolved unto the same matter/ as unto the same timber or metal/ when the fashion and form thereof is broken and destroyed/ and therefore sith the soul of man can not be resolved to no such matter/ whereof it is made/ because it is but only a simple substance of itself/ ergo it is made of no matter then if it be neither made of parts of itself/ neither of no matter/ it hath no mean cause of his creation and being/ then must it ned●s be i●edyatly made of god/ ergo god is only the cause of his creation & being/ & where it hath no nother cause of his being: but that that it is infinite/ that immediately effect must needs be infinite So consequently it followeth that the soul of man must needs be infinite incorruptible and immortal.   

¶ That the material substance of no thing in the world can be corrupted/ no more can man's soul Caput. xiii.  
THere is nothing in the world that is made of any matter & form that clearly corrupteth and cometh to nought/ for though the form and ta●yon be corrupt and gone/ yet the matter ever remaineth/ for every corporal thing in the world is compound of the. iiii. elements/ & ever it is resolved again unto the. iiii. elements/ of the which it is compound/ that is to say either in to the fire/ air water/ or earth. So that those. iiii. eel mentes nor no part of them can never be corrupted/ because they were inmedyatly made and created of god/ for there is as much fire/ air/ water & earth at this day/ as ever was any time before this/ and neither more nor less. And every thing that is compound and made of these. iiii. elements though the form and fashion may be corrupt/ yet the matter ever remaineth. For take any corporal thing that is in the world/ be a stock/ a stone/ a plant or tree/ or the body of any best/ and break it or bren it/ and do what ye can to destroy it/ yet ye shall never destroy the matter thereof to cause it utterly to come to nought. For the earth which is in it/ will turn to earth or ashes/ the water & moisture therein will go to the eel meant of the water/ so that it will down to the hollow places of the earth/ and so at the last in to the see/ or else it will be vapoured up by the heat of the son or stars/ and so at the last turn to rain. The air and wind which is therein/ will to the air which is in his proper element. The fire therein will ascend to the proper place and spear of the element of the fire. So that every one of the elements will go to his own place and proper spear/ so that the material substance of every corporal thing doth never perish and come to nought but doth ever remain Then sith that god suffered no corporal thing naturally to corrupt and to come to nought/ it is likely that he will not suffer the soul of man/ which is so noble a thing and immediately made and created of god/ as I have proved to the before/ and also made to his similitude and likeness/ utterly to corrupt and come to nought. So it must follow that the soul of man must be immortal/ and can never perish and come to nought/ but must ever continue in his being.   

¶ That man's soul that is the most perfit and most noble thing that ever god did ordain & create must have most long time to continue/ & remain in his being. Cap. xiiii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Another reason is this. Every thing the more perfit and the more noble that it is/ the longer it is able to continue in his being. But the soul of man is the most perfit creature and most noble c●ature that ever god did ordain or create/ because it is made to the sy mylytude and likeness of god/ as I have proved to the in our first dialogue and disputation. Therefore it is most able to continue in his being/ but we see divers creatures of god/ which be perfit things and able to continue by nature/ and to have being infinite/ as the elements that is to say/ the fire/ the air/ the water/ the earth/ as I proved to the here before/ & also the bodies above as the son moan & stars by their proper tees have a being/ that naturally they shall never be utterly corrupt nor perished/ because there is no cause of their corruption/ ergo the soul of man/ which is the most perfit & most noble thing that ever god made and ordained/ must have such a being/ that shall be able to continue and to have a being infinite. Therefore it must follow that the soul of man is immortal/ and shall ever continue and remain in his being.   

¶ That the soul of man hath his full perfection as soon as it is annexed to the body/ and that it increasyth not successively. Caput. xv.  COmyngo. 
¶ Thy reasons so deeply enter in to my heart/ that I can not avoid it/ but I must needs grant the soul of man to be unmortall/ & to have a being/ after the corruption of the body. But yet one thing moveth me greatly whether the soul of man have his being & full perfection as soon as it is annexed to the body/ or if it increase his perfection successively.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ As to that it must needs be of f●med that the soul hath his full perfection and being/ as soon as ever it is annexed to the body.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That seemeth to me a strange thing/ for this I suppose must be granted that the soul intellectyf is nothing elle but the● understanding/ which being in the body of man is annexed to the sensitive life/ but we well perceive that the body of a child in the womb of the mother hath quickness of life/ & yet lacketh understanding long time both before the birth and after/ & long time after the birth so continueth/ nor hath no more ꝓ●yuvng nor understanding then a brute best/ but after by process of time/ by teaching and instruction the understanding increasyth/ wherefore it se●eth to me/ that his soul hath not his perfit being and perfection at the beginning/ but rather groweth and ●syth as the body doth.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ That doubt that thou movest may well be asso●d/ but because thou shall better perceive my solution/ I shall put the this similitude/ like wise as a harper useth his harp which is his instrument to make melody/ so doth the reasonable soul use the body for his instrument/ and like wise as the harper can not make nor she we no melody with his harp/ except it be stringed and in tewne/ no more can the reasonable soul use nor have his operation in the body nor show no reason with the body which is the instrument/ because it is not perfected nor tewnyd. And like wise as the harper hath his cunning and property of harping/ all though he lack his harp and though his in strument/ his harp be not perfected and tewnyd/ and though he can not show his cunning and property with his instrument that is unperfect/ so like wise the soul in the body of the young child hath his property of understanding though it can not be showed with that imperfect body which is his instrument.   

¶ The dyfferens between the memory and fantasy of a brute best and the soul of man/ and that all 〈◊〉 is in man's soul at the beginning. Caput. xvi.  COmyngo. 
¶ yet there is one thing wherein I am not fully satisfied/ if so be the soul of man have his perfection of understanding in the beginning being in the body of such an infant/ then when that the infant cometh to perfit age of discretion/ that reasonable soul being in him should have remembrance & memory of such things/ that he d●d in his infancy and childhood/ but of that we see the contrary by experience therefore it should seem that the soul hath no perfit perfection of understanding in the beginning.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ As touching that question thou must first consider that the memory and fantasy is not ever the same thing that the reasonable understanding is. For memory is the power of the soul/ by the which one doth remember things passed and done/ and the fantasy is the operation of the knowledge/ which is had by reason of the. v. senses or wits/ and the brute beasts have this fantasy and memory/ which is presented to them by the. v. wits/ yet have they no reasonable understanding.  ¶ Co. 
¶ All that I grant.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Than thus I wot well thou wilt grant/ that a man being of the age of. thirty. years hath than his perfit reasonable soul/ and yet that man may be so overcome by sickness or by drunkenness that he shall lose his memory/ neither can not use his understanding reasonable/ as he can do when his body is in temper. And yet thou wilt grant/ that as long as his sensitive life abideth in the body/ his reasonable soul is not departed away/ and when that man cometh again to health or to soberness/ he can not remember of that that he did in his sickness or drunkenness. Therefore all though that his perfit remembrance and memory was gone for a season/ yet the reasonable soul was not then departed and gone/ and the cause is that the soul that t●me had not a body disposed and his perfit instrument/ in the which he might show his property and use his operation of understanding/ for in such drunkenness a man useth but the operation of his fantasy/ and not his understanding that is the property of his soul/ therefore it standeth not against reason that the soul of man hath his perfectness and knowledge of science and cunning as well in the beginning as afterward.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That conclusion me thinketh not good/ that the soul of man hath as perfit scyens and knowledge of all thing in the beginning as a●ter/ for this we see by experience that many a man incresyth his understanding by reading/ studying/ and teaching of other.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ But yet take heed to this point that that thou supposest that the soul incresyth in understanding and learneth science and cunning by reading and teaching/ is no thing ●llys but the repetition and remembrance of such science and cunning that the soul had before/ which the memory had forgotten and could not rehearse/ for this I wot that thou and every other reasonable man can imagine and make many great reasons and findeth many subtle inventions of reasons/ which were to them never taught/ and which they never learned by reading nor instruction of other men/ but of their own minds & imaginations/ therefore because men have other understanding/ conscience/ knowledge/ that they have not by learning and teaching of other men. Therefore now it must needs follow that that science and knowledge was in the soul of man long time before. But yet it is not so of a brute best that hath but a memory and phan tasye/ for the best can remember nothing nor knoweth nothing/ but that that is presented and showed to him by reasons of the. v. wits nor no nother thing can know but sensible thing and corporal/ but the soul of man contrary wise remembreth and knoweth as well things insensible and incorporal as corporal/ as I have proved to the lately here before. Therefore between the understanding of man/ and the memory & fantasy of a brute best is a great difference/ & be of a contrary nature.   

¶ That the fantasy and memory of a brute best is corruptible and mortal/ and the soul of man unmortall. Caput. xvii.  COmyngo. 
¶ All that now I perceive/ but all though that there be some difference between the memory & fantasy of a brute best and the understanding and soul of man/ yet because the memory and fantasy of a brute best is a thing insensible and incorporal as well as the soul of man is/ therefore it seemeth it should be incorruptible as well as that other.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ if the memory or fantasy of a brute best be a thing insensible & incorporal/ that proveth it not to be incorruptible/ for the sight and hearing of a brute best be incorporal things/ yet they be not incorruptible/ & the cause is for those incorporal thing/ depend and have their being upon things corporal. For if the eye which is the cause of the sight and the organ of the sight be perished & corrupt/ the sight is perished and corrupt/ and yet is the sight a thing incorporal. And so of all the other. v. wits/ & of the instruments & organs of them. So like wise though the fantasy of a brute best be incorporal yet it dependeth and belongeth to the. v. wits/ and to the organs and instruments of the. v. wits/ which be things corruptible and corporal/ & also the fantasy of a brute best never worketh but in and upon such thing as be sensible and corporal/ and which may be perceived by the. v. wit nor no nother things can perceive nor know/ nor the fantasy of a brute best is never moved nor stirred but by such sensible things/ and corporal things which be corruptible & mortal/ wherefore sith it dependeth and belongeth and hath his being and operation upon such corruptible and mortal causes/ it followeth well that it must needs be corruptible and mortal. Also the memory or fantasy of a brute best judgeth every thing that it seeeh heareth or perceiveth by any of the. v. sensys all for the body and for the feeding/ pleasure/ or ease of the body/ and to the satisfaction of the bodily desire or appetite. And the brute best never moveth nor stirreth/ nor laboureth vountarily/ but only for the use of the body/ as for his feeding and conservation of the body. Also the brute best hath no natural inclination nor desire to any thing but that that is for the conservation of his body. Therefore sith the brute best judged all for the body/ naturally coveteth nor desireth nothing but for the body/ it followeth well that the principal perfection & exystens of the brute best is only the bodily life/ which bodily life is mortal and corruptible/ so the wits or senses and the organs of them/ & the fantasy and memory which is caused by them and so belongeth to the brute best must ned●s be corruptible and mortal/ nor it can not be proved that any brute best naturally and vountarily doth nor hath intended the destruction of his own body/ but contrary many a man hath willingly desired the destruction of his own body & vountarily suffered death/ & so naturally judgeth loveth coveteth and desireth the conservation of an other thing than the bodily life/ so it appeareth to be in man another life without the body and his principal perfection not to be the bodily life/ for he judgeth & knoweth insensible things/ and things that be incorruptible and infinite/ otherwise than the phanthasye and memore of a brute best judgeth or knoweth.   

¶ That the soul of man useth not always his operation and property. Caput. xviii.  COmyngo. 
¶ yet me thinketh by reason the soul of man which is the understanding should be corruptible/ because it seemeth though it depend not upon the hole body/ yet it dependeth upon the brain of y● hed●/ which is the principal part of the body/ for when a man is hurt in the brain anon his reason and understanding beginneth to faint and go away/ than anon that man loseth his understanding/ therefore it seemeth that fall the brain be clearly perished and corrupt/ that all the understanding/ which is the soul/ is clearly perished & corrupt.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ That is plainly untrue and must needs be denied/ that the dependeth upon the brain/ for though the brain be hurt/ yet is not the understanding perished/ but for that season the soul is occupied about the cur●nge and healing of that member/ for as long as the soul is joined with the body it is necessary that it have some occupation with the body/ and when any member of the body is is vehemently and hougly stirred/ moved/ or sore smerteth/ or acheth for hurt or pain or ache anon the soul because it is joined with the body/ it helpeth to conserve the body & it is turned from the contemplation of divinely things/ and is occu pied in such low things longing to the body/ & putteth his strength all in considering the vehement pain/ so that when the brain is hurt so that the humours and vapours stir and move the species and kinds of the fantasy/ than all the strength of the understanding of the soul intendeth to the fantasy/ and to the curing of those members/ & for the while runneth and is occupied with the fantasy/ and so at such time the soul loseth not his perfection/ but because his body with which it is joined/ is not perfit in his members/ therefore than it useth not his operations in contemplation of divinely things/ but useth other operations longing to the body & to the fantasy. As a harper when his harp is out of tune must be occupied about the wresting of his harp strings/ and so set them in tune before he shallbe able to show any melody or armony with his harp/ and so during the time that he is tuning his harp/ he can show no melody nor harmony. And so the soul of man while it is occupied in curing & tuning his body/ can not show his operation and property of his clear understanding. Therefore it appeareth that the understanding dependeth not upon the brain/ for than every brute best which hath the heed and the brain hole and perfit/ and not hurt nor troubled with superfluous humours/ should have understanding/ which is clearly false.   

¶ That every man's soul is of like perfection. Laput. nineteen.  COmyn. 
¶ Than sith thou affyrmest that the soul never loseth his nobleness nor 〈◊〉/ I would again know whether every man's soul be like perfit  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ I suppose ye.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Me thinketh thereof the contrary/ for we see ●uydētly that every man hath not like understanding nor wit. For many a man can perceive and learn that reason & science/ that another can not though it be never so plainly and well declared.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ As I said to the before the cause thereof is nought else but the undysposycyon of his body/ because of the humours in his heed or in his body/ which perturbeth it/ for when the heed and the body is full of humours by excessive eating or drinking/ than that man useth not his so perfit as he doth when the body is clear of such superfluous hu mours/ for when a man is fasting/ than he useth his understanding more perfit/ than when his body is so replete with superfluous humours and the meet or the drink undigested. Therefore because some men be of such complexion/ and be never without such humours/ & their heeds never clean but full of superfluous humours/ therefore they never use their understanding so perfit & clear/ as other men that be of purer complexion/ and their heeds less troubled with such superfluous humours. And also thou seest this oft by experience/ that many a man is apt to learn and to understand some science/ and to perceive the reasons thereof quickly & perfitly/ and to learn another science or cunning/ he is nothing apt but very dull/ as sometime if two men of like age be/ the one shallbe apt to learn or to understand the science of music and singing of dyscant/ but to learn the science of logic or philosophy he shall be but dull/ and the other man shall be apt to learn and also to understand the science of logic and philosophy: but to learn the science of music as dyscante or singing he shall be but dull. And some that be apt to learn both logic phylosop●/ and music as dyscant and singing/ shall never yet well perceive the mathematical science as geometry/ arithmetryk or as tronomye/ so it appeareth that it is the disposition and complexion of his body/ that causeth the aptenes thereof. Therefore though every man be not like in disposition of the body/ yet every man's soul is like perfit.   

¶ what knowledge man's soul hath after it is separate from the body/ and what manner of being it hath. Laput. xx.  COmyngo. 
¶ Than yet I pray the let me know thy mind in one question/ what manner of knowledge man's soul hath after it is separate from the body/ & what manner of being it hath.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ As touching that/ the soul of man being in the body/ as I have showed to the before doth understand and knoweth itself/ and it knoweth well that it hath that knowledge/ & hath a being in the body which body it useth as his instrument and being in this material body/ and by reason of material things it knoweth things which be unmateryall/ as things that be racyonal & incorporal/ as universal things & kinds of thing. It knoweth also vice and virtue/ good and bad/ right and wrong/ & all other things rational/ which be no corporal things/ nor be not perceived nor known by none of the. v. senses/ nor by no instrument nor organ of the senses/ which incorporal things be called rational thyng● as god/ angel man's soul/ vice/ virtue and all such other/ because they be known and perceived only by reason: for though a corporal thing which is good or bad/ may be seen or felt or by any organ of the senses perceived & known that it is such a corporal thing: yet the goodness or the badness thereof is known but by the reason/ for a brute best may by his eye or other member see or feel a man/ that is to say/ to see or feel the body of a man/ but yet that brute best can not by none of his senses know whether it be a good man or an evil man/ or whether he be vicious or virtuous/ nor know the qualities nor the conditions of the man/ but these properties and qualities be known only by reason/ and the reason only doth judge them whether they be good or bad.  
¶ Also the soul of man being in his natural body doth know both things material and unmateryall/ but yet the less that the body is moved & stirred/ and the more quiet that the body is/ the more perfit know league that soul hath/ for a man shall better study and bring to pass any hard and subtle conclusion when the body is quiet and at rest/ than when it is moved and stirred/ or hath any disease and unquietness. A man also when he is fasting hath more fresh and quick wit to study or to learn any science/ art or other conclusion/ than he hath when his body is replete with meet or drink or with superfluous humours. Also the reasonable soul of man doth know and discuss what is virtue and what is vice/ and doth reprove & despiseth that thing/ which the sensual appetite doth approve/ desire and follow. The honest men virtuous men/ and holy men do despise the sensual appetites and pleasures of the body and of the world/ and sometime willingly put themself to death/ where no brute best will never covet nor desire his own destruction/ and the cause thereof is/ for that that the soul doth know that it is ordained for to have an other being than the being/ which it hath when it is joined with the body. And this knowledge that the soul hath when it is joined with the body it doth never lose/ but it hath it also when it is separate from the body: for it is oft time seen also/ that many a man being deed to all men's knowledge and perceiving for the space of. x. or. xii. hours/ and some for the space of a day and more/ hath after that revived again/ which during that while (as the comen term is) hath lain in a trance/ and after he hath been then so revived hath told many wonderful things that he hath seen being so in a trance as deed/ which is an evident prove that man soul hath an other being without the body/ and hath knowledge and understanding after that it is separate from the body. Than sith the soul of man useth his property of understanding much better and more perfitly without the body/ as I have proved to thee/ when the body is lest moved & stirred/ and when it is most quiet/ & when the soul doth meddle lest with the body: it followeth therefore consequently that it hath most knowledge when it is clearly separate from the body. And further sith that the soul of man being joined with the body doth know that there is a god that go verneth all/ and hath some knowledge what is good and what is bad/ and also hath some knowledge what is right and what is wrong/ and that the perfit perfection as I have proved to thee/ is when it is separate from the body/ than after such separation/ that soul must have a more knowledge of god/ and a more knowledge what is good and what is bad/ and a more knowledge what is right & what is wrong/ and a more knowledge in every other cause and thing/ than it had when it was joined with this corruptible body.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That conclusion followeth right well/ but yet I pray the sith the soul of man hath such knowledge as thou sayest/ yet than I would know what manner of being the soul hath after it is sepa rate from the body/ and where doth that soul remain or become.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ As touching the being of the soul/ as I have showed thee/ the soul is but a spiritual substance/ and hath his being in no natural place.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ why what callest thou a natural place.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ I call a natural place as the philosophers have defined it/ that is thus. A place is the utter and extreme term or part & hollow superfycyes of a body containing another body within it.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ why what callest thou a super●ves?  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ A superfycyes is that which hath but length and breed & no manner of thickness/ for if it have length breed & thickness than it is a body/ so that every thing that I see/ which is the object of my sight and whereupon my sight doth rest/ not considering the thickness is called a superfycyes/ so that the utter part of every bodily thing that I do see is called the superfycyes/ because I do see the length & breed thereof/ and not the thickness thereof/ than as I said before/ as touching the definition of a natural place/ it is but the utter and extreme term or part & the hollow superfycyes of a body containing another body/ which is within it/ as by example a ton is called by the comen people the place of the wine/ because it containeth the wine within it/ and so that hollow superfycies of the ton is the very natural place of the wine. And than further to thy question I say/ that the soul hath his being in no natural place/ because it is but a spiritual substance and no corporal substance nor body. And such a natural place doth-conteyne within it alway a corporal substance and a bodily thing/ and therefore the soul can never be contained nor rest in no natural place/ for though that every thing which is in any such natural place hath a being/ yet every thing that hath being is not in a natural place/ therefore the soul of man hath h●s being in no natural place/ but is there where it doth please god to limit it to be/ which no man's wit nor capacity living in earth is able to comprehend. But by the justice of god/ as I showed the before/ if it have deserved in this world to have a joyful being/ it shall have a joyful being perpetual/ and if it have deserved to have a miserable & a sorrowful being/ it shall have a miserable & a sorrowful being perpetual/ so that the soul of man is ever a thing perpetual/ and hath an infinite being.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Now thy solutions be so m●lous and also so reasonable that they please me well/ and thou hast fully satisfied my mind in all my questions and demands/ that I must needs consent & agree by very reason that the soul of man is immortal & shall never die/ how be it I marvel much where thou hast learned and had all this cunning knowledge of all these things/ which thou hast declared unto me: for I here say that in thy country there is but a little learning or study of philosophy. And I here say that the comen people there shall not be suffered to study any manner of subtle s●s or arte/ nor that ye have no manner of places ordained by your heads & governors/ where the people shall resort to guider for the learning thereof/ nor no ways used that children & young men disposed to learning/ shall have any exhibition or finding or help or fortherans thereto/ as we see in Christendom to have divers places of studies & universities/ where such as be disposed to learn may resort & have good exhibition & help to the same.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ As touching that matter I assure thee/ the learning that I have gotten/ hath not been all in mine own country/ for in my youth I had good parents & friends that for the love they bore to me/ and because they would I should use the feet of merchandise among chrystenmen (because that great lucre cometh thereby) did put me forth to the intent I should learn some other strange languages/ by whose help and means I was in divers cities and universities in christendom long time abiding and suggerning where I learned part of my philosophy and of other science.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Than I marvel much the less/ and I thank the with all my heart for this that I have now learned of thee/ wherein as I said/ thou hast marvelously pleased me and satisfied my mind.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ I am very glad if I have done to the any pleasure. Therefore sith that thy mind is somewhat satisfied: I purpose now to depart from thee/ for a season somewhat to be occupied about mine own business.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Nay I pray the tarry yet a little while for my mind is not yet fully sa tysfyed in other things.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ I am content yet for thy pleasure to tarry with the still for a sea son & therefore I pray the now show me further thy mind/ & say on what thou wilt.   
¶ Thus endeth the second dialogue of the immortality of man's soul.   

¶ The third dialogue  

¶ That the soul doth suffer and noth the body/ and that by the justice of god there must be a purgatory/ because that sometime man dieth without making full satisfaction. Cap. i.  COmyngo. 
¶ As touching the mevelous existens of god/ and the immortality of man's soul/ thou hast made to me so many marvelous reasons/ that I must needs affirm both thy principles/ that is to say/ that there is one god which governeth all conserveth all/ and regardeth all/ and also that the soul of man is immortal and shall never die/ but that it shall receive joy or sorrow in another world after that it is sepa rate from this corruptible body. But yet me thinketh thou hast made a great digression from the matter that we first began/ which was that there is a purgatory/ where the soul of man after this mortal life Shallbe punished such offences done here in earth/ wherefore he made not here full satisfaction/ and so to be purified before that it come to the place of joy.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ Nay I have made not digression from the matter/ but I have made a preparation to the matter/ for the reasons which I have showed to the here before/ and the conclusions that I have proved touching the marvelous exystens of god/ & that immortality of man's soul/ be but the antecedens of the arguments/ which I purpose to make in proving that there is a purgatory.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ Than I pray the go briefly to the matter and let us spend no time in vain/ but yet first I pray the tell me one thing/ whether is it the soul of man alone that suffereth the pain and sorrow/ or whether is it the body of man alone that, suffereth pain and sorrow/ or both together.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ It is the soul that suffereth always pain & sorrow and not the body/ for there is nothing that can suffer pain or pleasure but that thing/ which at the lest hath sensitive soul and life/ for a stone/ a tree/ nor other thing/ which have no sensitive life can suffer neither pain nor pleasure/ but yet some time that soul doth suffer pain beyngewyth the body/ as when the body is perturbed and let from the natural course of his conservation/ as when the body is to much hot or to much cold/ or to much dry/ or to much moist/ or hath other impediment which l●teth the natural course of his conservation/ than that soul suffereth pain being with the body.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ That standeth as me seemeth with good reason/ therefore I pray the proceed to the matter.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ with right good will/ & therefore I pray the now take heed. Thou remember'st well that I have proved unto the in our second dialogue and disputation/ that god is of himself righteous and just/ and executyth evermore good and indifferent justice to every one of his creatures/ and doth reward and punish every creature according to his desert. And that man is the only creature/ whom he hath created here living upon earth/ to do him honour and service/ and that no nother creature here in earth doth service and honour to god but only man/ as I have proved unto the here before in our second dialog and disputation. And because that many a man here in earth doth not honour nor serve god as he ought to do/ but is negligent therein and br●keth the commandments of god/ & is unto god/ and is not therefore suffyc●ētly punished in this world but dieth before such punishment or satisfaction here upon earth by him made/ it must needs therefore follow that god of his righteousness must cause that man to be purged & purified in another place to make satisfaction for those offences/ before that he shallbe able to perceive the eternal joy/ or to be partner of the goodness of god/ for the which he was created and made. And so by the justice of god there must needs be a purgatory.   

¶ An objection/ because repentance is the only thing/ that clearly washeth & putteth away ●ll sin done by man/ and that god of his justice must then discharge him thereof/ therefore it needeth than no nother purgatory. Laput. two.  COmyngo. 
¶ That reason me thinketh taketh but small hold/ for thou knowest well and all clerks here to agree/ that repentance is the very only thing that wasshyth & putteth clearly a way all sin done by man against god: and that repentance is only that thing that god would have to be made and done for the satisfaction of the sin/ for which repentance so made and had/ god of his merciful goodness doth dies charge acquit and pardon the man for that sin and offence so done/ all though that man never took nor suffered any other penance or pain therefore here upon earth/ as by example if that I own to the an L. 〈◊〉. of true det/ and if that I humbly desire the to forgive me my det/ than if thou of thy gentleness only for that love that thou knoweth that I bear unto the wilt discharge and pardon to me that det/ and make a clear release unto me thereof. I am than clearly discharged of that det nor am never bound by order of no law nor justice to make any other payment or satisfaction to the therefore. So like wise when god of his goodness forgiveth me mine offence and sin for the repentance that I have taken therefore/ I am than clearly released and discharged of that offence and sin/ and ought never to have other punishment or to make other satisfaction therefore/ and so than it shall not stand with any convenient reason/ that there should be any purgatory/ or place of punishment for that offence and sin which is pardoned and released/ but that after such pardon and release made by god to me for mine offence and sin/ that god of his goodness should reward me/ and so to make me partyner of the eternal joy in heaven/ for the which I was create & made. And on the other side if I were never repentant for my offence/ but died unpenytent/ than god of hi● justices must give me eternal punishment therefore in hell/ and therefore to put any purgarye/ it should seem by the ryght●ousnes of god to be but in v●yne.   

¶ The solution if god should be compelled to forgive the sin immediately after repentance/ he should be restrained of his liberty/ and from the execution of his justice. Laput. iii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Thy answer methy●beth is not sufficient/ for in the case which thou ha● put/ if thou desire my forgiveness of thy. L. 〈◊〉. yet it it is at my liberty and of my gentleness/ whether I will will forgive the the hole. L. 〈◊〉. or else part thereof. And if I think in my mind that the forgynenes of the hole. L. li. is to great a reward to the for any louc or kindness that thou haste. she wed unto me/ or else if I th●nke that thy love and kindness showed to me is a suffyey●nt recompense for that L. 〈◊〉. but yet per adventure I think that it is not a suffy●nt satye ●cyon and recompense for the loss of time and damages/ hurt and hindrance that I have had for the none payment of the. L. 〈◊〉. which peradventure should have been paid to me long time before: than y● I of my gentleness do forgrue the the hole L. li. and yet for that gentleness that I she we to thee (because it is at my liberty/ whether I will forgive the or no) I will that thou should do me some other service/ and take some pa●n or 〈◊〉 for me by the space of two or 〈◊〉 daees. Than thou canst not say/ but than I do to the no 〈◊〉/ but show to the gentleness and great metcy. So like wise when thou takest repentauce and askest mercy of god for thy synnc: no man ought to be so foolish to think that god should be restrained and compelled/ but that he is at his liberty alway to execute hi●●ustyce or mercy at his pleasure/ and that evermore it is at his liberty whether he will forgive or no. For if god should be compelled to do the one or the other/ than god should have no noble being/ but a being and a life in a manner in bondage and servitude. But god must needs have the most noblest life and most pleasant life as I have proved before to the in our second dialogue/ than god must evermore be at his liberty to execute his justice or mercy at his pleasure. And than if that god upon the repentance will forgive thee/ & yet if he think that that repentance which thou hast taken for thy sin/ is not sufficient satysfaceyon therefore and than if thou dyc before any other satisfaction made/ than god of necessity if he, 〈◊〉 execute his justice/ must need (cause the to be punished in another place/ to make a full satisfaction for thine offence/ but yet in that case if he will execute his mercy/ he may than at his pleasure forgive the all thy hole offence and sin/ without any other satisfaction to be suffered or done by the therefore. But yet if god in that case should think that thy repentance here in earth were no full satisfaction for thy sin/ than if god should be so restrained/ that he should not ordain a place of purgation for thy soul/ where it should for a season remain and have punishment to make a full satisfaction for thine offence and sin: than thou wouldest exclude god both from his liberty and from the execution of his justice. Therefore it followeth by all convenient reason/ that there must needs be a purgatory/ where men's soul shallbe purged/ or else they that should hold that opinion that there is no such purgatory/ should offer to god a great wrong/ and should exclude God's power/ and put him both● from his liberty and execution of his justice.   

¶ An obi●yon because man is ordained to have an infinite being/ therefore after his death he must have infinite joy or infinite pain/ and so no pain in purgatory which hath an end. Caput. iiii.  COmyngo. 
¶ Though one should hold that opinion that there is no purgatory/ yet he should thereby neither minish the power of god neither restrain his liberty/ neither exclude the justice of god/ for man is made and ordained by god to have a being infinite/ and that there is but two things ordained for man's soul/ which is joy or sorrow. And sith the soul of man after that it is separate from this corruptible body must needs have an infinite being/ as thou hast proucd in thy second dialogue/ which must be than infinite sorrow or infinite joy/ and than as soon as it is separate from the corruptible body/ god must than of his justice judge that soul other to the place where is infinite joy/ or to that place where is infinite sorrow/ according as it hath deserved. So than it should se●e in vain to put any purgatory/ where the soul should have any sorrow that should have an end/ or to put any other place of joy/ where the soul should have joy/ which joy should have an end.   

¶ The solution as there be degrees in sin/ as some sin is more and some less: so there be degrees in repentance/ as some may be more and some less: and also degrees of pardon & forgy venes/ therefore man for lak of sufficient repentance must be purged. Laput. v.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ To satisfy thy mind in that point thou must consider that god of his goodness hath create the world and all thing therein contained/ in a convenient order of degree. And thus/ of all the kind of things that ever god made/ some be more and some less/ some be small and some smaller. As of corporal things some be hard/ some more hard/ and some be soft and some be more soft/ some be hot & some be more hot/ and some be cold and some be more cold/ like wise of things incorporal some be great and some be greater. As of virtue/ some is good and some better and of vice some is evil & some is worse how sayest thou thinkest not thou that this principle/ is reasonable and true.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ I think it is true that thou sayest.  ¶ Gyngemyn. 
¶ Than thus is not some sin & offence that a man committeth sometime more and sometime less.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ I think so.  Gyn. 
¶ And doth not every offence deserve punishment.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ yes.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ Than is there no degrees in punishment/ as well as there is degrees in sin & offence/ so that some punishment/ is more and some is less/ and is there not also degrees in repentance/ and some repentance is great & some greater: and also degrees in forgiveness & pardon/ as some forgiveness and pardon great and some greater.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ what than.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ Than ought not every offence & sin be punished by the justice of god in order and degree according as it is/ so that if the offence & sin be great/ it aught to have a great punishment: and if it be small it ought to have small punishment.  ¶ Co. 
¶ just.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ Than I say/ when that a man here in earth hath committed a great sin and offence/ and taken repentance whereby the sin is forgiven/ and yet hath not taken such sufficient repentance therefore/ nor had any sufficient punishment/ which should make a full payment and satisfaction for that sin/ and dieth before any condygne or full satisfaction made/ god must needs than of his righteousness ordain a place of purgatory/ where his soul shall have a further punishment make a condygne and full satisfaction for that sin/ and so to be purged and purified before it shall be able & worthy to be admitted to receive the eternal joy in heaven. As by example/ if a man commit a treason against his prince/ wherefore he ought by order of the law to lose his goods/ and to have imprisonment/ and also to be put to detche and when he is convicted there upon/ than because he seeyth he can not avoid from the punishment of the law/ he is repentant and sorry for his offence and prayeth his prince of forgiveness/ yet this repentance & sorrow that he taketh for his offence 〈◊〉 can never be so great/ but that yet this prince by justice may take his good/ and inpryson his body/ and after that put him to death for the said offence by order of his laws/ & do him justice. And so at his pleasure execute the extremity of his law/ with out doing any wrong to him. But yet this prince may if he will by his mercy pardon his life/ & take his goods & imprison his body for a time and season/ or as long as he will at his pleasure/ and according to the degree and quality of the same offence/ till he have made a full satisfaction to his prince for that treason done to him/ but yet if the prince should punish every offender to thextremity of death without any mercy: it should seem a thing sounding to cruelty/ and also clearly against the prerogative of his merciful power and authority. And also if a prince in such case should forgive every such offender for such a great offence/ which hath taken but a small repentance and sorrow we therefore/ it should both be an example to all such offenders/ and to give them and all other comfort and boldness to do like offences/ which were a thing/ that should 〈◊〉 to the subversion of his law/ and derogation of iustyee. Therefore if such a prince would be reputed for a dyscret prince/ & a merciful prince he must sometime forgive the hole offence/ and sometime execute justice according to his laws/ and also sometime pardon part of the punishment condign for the offence/ and give but a temporal punishment for a time and season according to the degree and quality of the offence/ & of the repentance. And so like wise when that a man hath committed a sin & an offence/ and taketh some repentance therefore/ but not sufficient/ and than dieth: than god of his goodness by the order of his justice & mercy/ must sometime pardon that offence from the eternal death/ and yet give him some punishment/ which should not be to the extremity/ as to condemn his soul to eternal sorrow and pain/ but to have some 〈◊〉 for a time and season to purify & to purge the soul of that offence/ according to degree and quality of the offence/ for as I said before/ as there is degeees in repentance/ as some is more and some is 〈◊〉/ ●o god of h●s justice must use degrees in forgiveness and in pardon: so that though he forgive the eternal pain and sorrow/ which is condygne for the great offence and sin which the man did commit: yet it stone death with the great dyscreat wisdom of god to punish the soul for that offence for a season to purify and purge it that it may be able to be admitted to come to the eternal joy/ for the which he was made and create For if that men committing divers sins or offences against god/ in divers orders and degrees/ as some more & some less/ and divers of them take repentance diversly/ some more/ and some less/ and than if god should not use divers degrees of forgiveness and pardon/ but punish every of them eternally therefore/ it should swoon than to the subversion of his own law●/ and derogation of his justice/ and also against the prerogative if his merciful power and authority. Therefore it must needs be agreed by all reason/ that there must be a purgatory/ where the soul of man must be purified and purged for a season to make full satisfaction for such offences and sins/ for the which the man made not sufficient satisfaction here in earth/ and took not sufficient repentance therefore.   

¶ An objection/ that because there be degrees in heaven and hell of joy and pain/ that it is needles for god to put any purgatory/ for he may execute his full and indysferent justice in one of those two places. Laput. vi.  COmyngo. 
¶ Thou hast made to me a marvelous reason herein/ but yet me thinketh though that god by the marvelous order of his creation/ hath create every thing in order and degrees/ as some great and some greater/ so of offence and sin/ some is great & some is greater and of punishment therefore some to be great/ and some greater/ of meritorious deeds some great some greater/ and of repentance some great and some greater/ and of forgiveness and pardon some great and some greater: yet that proveth not that by the discrete wisdom and justice of god/ that there must needs be a purgatory/ for god may by the order of good justice punish every offence done by man/ in order and according to his degrees/ and reward every meritorious act in order and degree as they ought to be/ some more and some less/ though there be no purgatory but only heaven and hell/ for like wise as thou saidest erewhile/ as there is orders and degrees of every thing here in earth/ so I suppose and doubt not but there is degrees both in heaven and hell/ as some soul in heaven shall have a great joy/ and some shall have a greater joy/ and yet both these joys to be infinite/ and also in hell some soule there to have a great punishment and some a greater/ and yet both these punishments to be infinite. So that god by his justice may punish every soul in hell/ and reward every soul in heaven in convenient order and degree according to their deserts: and yet all those punishments and rewards to be infinite/ and so every thing in his order and degree. Therefore it should seem needles for god than to put or to ordain any purgatory.   

¶ The solution/ that as the appel which hath a vegetative soul/ and as the be'st which hath a sensitive soul/ may be purged after that they be severed from their natural growing and life/ of such tokens and spots which be a deformity to them/ so the soul intellcctyve must be purged of those tokens and spots of sin/ which was a deformity to it. Laput. seven.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ That is a very sore objection/ that thou hast now put and alleged. But yet not withstanding/ if thou wilt patiently here me/ I doubt not but I shall give the a good sufficient solution thereto and to satilfye thy mind therein Therefore I pray the take good heed to this that I shall now show to thee/ I trust it is not out of their membraunce that I showed thee/ but late that there be. three kinds of souls One is a soul vegetative/ which is in every plant/ tree/ grass/ herb/ and fruit. Another is a soul sensitive which is in every brute sensual best/ as well horse sheep and such other as go & creep upon the earth as in the birds that i'll in the air/ and fish which swim in the water which use and occupy their. v. senses/ that is to say/ tasting/ smelling/ hearing/ seeing/ & touching. And the third soul is the soul intellective which is in man/ which is nothing else but the lively understanding/ whereby man knoweth the good from the evil/ discussing the thing by arguments and reasons/ for the one part & for the other/ till at the last he thereby fyndith out the truth/ and so thereby knoweth which is good and which is evil.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ All that I am content to grant.  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ Sith this thing is now well by the perceived/ now will I proceed to the solution of thine objection. But first I will show the an example of things having soul vegetative as an apple which hath but soul vegetative if such an apple growing on the tree be hurt with some great stroke/ & thereby in some part somewhat rotten & perished/ & if that apple immediately after be pulled from the tree/ now that apple can never longer grow: and then if thou wouldst keep that same apple to the intent to serve the at thy table at some great dinner & feast that thou wouldest afterward make to thy friends & lovers/ this appel shall not be able than to do to the no good service/ because the longer thou keepest it/ it will be worse & worse/ and by reason of that stroke it will wax more rotten/ and at the last wax all to nought and not able to be eaten: and also if thou lay that appel among other apples/ it will infect all those apples/ which lie nigh it/ and make them rotten & nought. But yet if such an appel having such a stroke growing upon the tree/ be suffered still to grow & not pulled of the tree/ such an apple oft-times will naturally preserve and hele itself again/ and the radical natural humour of that appel will increase while it is growing/ and expulse those humours which were corrupt by reason of the said stroke/ and so make that appel a hole and a sound appel/ able to be kept to do thy service after at thy table/ when thou shalt make thy dinner and feast to thy friends and lovers. But yet if thou take an appel from that tree/ which is a sound appel but yet it is not fully ripe/ because there remaineth i it such a sour watery humour which maketh it not pleasant to be eaten/ yet if thou lay that appel in fair straw in some house where the temperate eyer may come to it/ than that eyer will purify & purge that appel from that sour humour and vapour out the tartness and sourness of that humour/ & so make it melowe & pleasant to be eaten. So like wise now I may say of a man which hath soul intellective/ if he be infect or corrupted with the stroke of doing some great mortal sin and offence against god/ and than the soul immediately pulled & separate from the body by natural death without repentance/ than the soul of that man shall never be able to be received of god/ & do him service in heaven/ because it hath such a mortal wound whereby it is infect & putryfyed not worthy to be admitted to accompany with the clean pure souls in heaven. And yet that man while his soul was joined with the corruptible body might have taken repentance which might have restored him again to health and to virtue. But after the natural death that man can take no such repentance/ whereby he should be healed of that mortal synnc and offence/ than god of his justice must clerkly expulse his soul from the eternal joy in heaven/ because it is putrified & corrupted. But yet if a man have committed such a great mortal sin & offence to god/ and hath taken repentance/ whereby that mortal stroke & wound is heeled before his death/ & before his soul is separate & pulled fro that body: but yet that man is not fully purged thereof/ or ●lle not clean of other small offences/ nor ready nor ripe to do pure & clean service to god in heaven/ but that there remaineth in him some tokens & spots of sin and offence god of his justice may not then condemn his soul to eternal punishment/ nor immediately to rec●yue that soul to the bliss ofheven/ to joy & to company with those glorified & pure souls in heaven/ till those tokens and spots of sin be clear washed away and purged/ and he made ready & 〈◊〉 to do to god pure and clean service in heaven. Therefore than by convenient justice of god/ there inuste needs be a place of purgation/ where his soul must be purged and made clean of those tokens & spots of sin/ or that it be able to be received to the eternal joy in heaven. And also a like resemblance I may make of things which have soul sensitive/ as if thou have a swine which is infected with pox or other sickness or an ox that is infected with any sickness/ which swine or ox if they should be than slain/ were not good nor wholesome for man's meet/ but the flesh putryfyed corrupt/ and yet by medicine and good keeping that swine or ox may be heeled/ and than while those 〈◊〉 be living/ nature shall ex pulse those infectuos humours/ & bring those beasts again to health & make them sound and their flesh good and wholesome for man's mete. But yet if those beasts which have ven infect with such corrupt sickness have taken medicine/ and that corrupt sickness thereby expelled/ & ever increasing to more health and the felsh wholesome enough to be eaten for man ●ys mete. But yet the flesh is so bare and leanly/ that it is not pleasant to eat as other flesh is. Or cllies if such beasts have taken some disease by excessive cold or heat/ & the flesh not putrified nor corrupt/ but bare and leanly/ and therefore not pleasant to be eaten for man's meet: yet if those best us be killed/ yet thou mayst make the flesh of those beasts/ though it be never so lean by seething or roasting it with butter or fat lard to be good man's meet/ and pleasant to be eaten able to serve the at thy dinner or feast for thy friends and lovers. So in the same manner it is/ when that a man is infect with a great mortal sin which he hath committed against god. And if his soul were than separate from his body/ yet than his soul ought not to be received of god in to heaven/ nor to do service there unto god because it is putrified and corrupted with that foul mortal sin/ but if that man had taken the medicine of full repentance in his life/ that medicine would have restored him again to his soul health and virtue. But yet if he have taken some repentance for that sin and of fence and not sufficient/ & not had sufficient time to make sufficient satisfaction therefore: yet by the taking of that medicine of repentance/ that sin is expelled and gone/ and the soul of that sikenes and sin is clearly hole: but yet the tokens and spots of that sin which is a deformity to the soul do still remanyn in that soul/ till that soul have a time to be washed and purged from those tokens and spots to make it pure and dene of that deformity.   

¶ An objection/ that the soul unpurged may do some mean and low service to god in h●uen/ though it be not the highest and best seruyc●/ so that it needeth not to be purged. Caput. viii.  COmyngo. 
¶ yet me thinketh that proveth not that of necessity there must be a purgatory/ to purge & to wash a way clean those spots and tokens which is but a deformity to the soul/ but considering that by that medicine of repentance/ that sickness of the soul is thereby put away and expelled/ and the soul so made hole again/ all though that there be spots and tokens remaining which is but a deformity to the soul and no mortal sickness/ those tokens & spots than need not to be washed away/ but if they remain still yet they do no hurt/ but that soul may do good and perfit service to god in heaven: for all though that god will not put such souls in the highest and most purest place in heaven because they be not so pure as other souls be/ but somewhat deformed which is but as an eye sore/ yet he will not clearly expel them out of heaven/ but put them in some other low place in heaven. As by example/ if that a man which keepeth an honourable house and useth to feast great lords and estates at his table/ and prepareth fine diaper table clothes and napkins/ where with to serve them at his table at his gardeners and feast/ if any of those table clothes or napkens be defouled with dust filth or other foul matter which is not sweet/ yet that man will not suffer those clothes to be occupied at his table/ till they be washed and made clean/ and the filth so clearly expelled/ that they may be sweet and clean & worthy to serve him at his table. But yet if they have been so defouled with some foul filth/ where by they be stained that though they be washed never so clean/ yet some spot and token will remain of that staining/ so that though they be pure clean and sweet enough to do service at his table/ yet the spots and tokens of the staining which remain be than a great deformity & ●ye sore: yet this man if he be wise will not cast away those clothes/ but will that they shall do him service in some other place and office of his house as in his buttery or ewery or his chamber/ where they shall do to him as good service/ as though they were not stained nor had no such spots nor tokens of deformity to the eye. And like resemblance also. I may make of a prince/ which must retain in his house to be his household servants such men as he can choose in his ream which be clean men & hole men of body some to be in his prive chamber/ some in his hall/ and some in his kychyn and some in other places of his house/ if any such servants/ which this prince hath chosen to be in his house/ have had any great sickness whereof he is by medicine thoroughly healed/ and yet there remaineth some deformity in his face or other part of his body/ as that his skin of his face is parched and shrunk by brennyge of fire/ or else bleryed/ or his nose rotted away and so his face utterly deformed/ or else any other member of his body deformed/ and yet the man is clear hole of all sickness and strong and able to do good service to his prince in diverse rooms and offices in his house/ all though it be not convenient for the honour of this prince to have this deformed person to be in his chamber of estate or in his hall/ yet this person so deformed & being hole may serve this prince in his kychen there to be his scollyon/ or in some other office to bear water/ wood/ or to cleanse gutters/ or other vile place in this pricis house/ & so in this prince house to have a joyful and merry life/ wherewith he willbe marvelously well content/ all though he never be admitted to do service in his chamber nor hall. So like wise in heaven god hath ordained for them that be the most pure and clean souls/ the most pure and clean places/ where they shall have most highest joy/ and for the other mean souls a mean place of joy. And for those souls that have been infected with some mortal sin/ and healed thereof by the medicine of repentance/ & yet the spots and tokens of that sin do still appear and remain in the soul/ which is but as an eye sore or a deformity to the soul/ yet because that mortal sickness by the medicine of repentance is clearly expelled and gone/ & destroyed/ god may not than of his justice cast that soul away out of heaven unto eternal punishment in hell/ but will suffer that soul to live and to joy with him in heaven in some low and mean place in heaven: all though that he will not suffer this soul to come to the highest places/ where most joy is in heaven/ because it is not convenient that this soul should possede the highest joys in heaven/ because that it is not worthy to be received and admitted thereto/ for that that it is somewhat deformed and not worthy to come to so high a place and roam: but yet in the low places & romys in heaven/ this soul not withstanding it be somewhat deformed/ may do to god there some service and pleasure/ and yet there have a joyous life/ wherewith this soul will be right well contented. And therefore sith that god by justice and equity may ordain this soul a convenient place in heaven/ according as it is worthy and hath deserved: it were than a thing frustrate and in vain for god to ordain any place of purgatory/ where that soul should be purged for a season/ and after that to be restored and received in to heaven/ because that god may reward that soul in heaven according to his deserving/ and so needless to ordain for it any place of purgation.   

¶ The solution that nothing unpurged and unpure may remain and abide in heaven. Caput. ix.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ That objection and similitude which thou hast made me thinketh is nothing to purpose/ for thou must consider that god in whom is all goodness/ justice/ wisdom/ virtue and perfection in his marvelous works of creation of things hath create and ordered every thing in so good and perfit an order/ that can not be amended. And hath ordained some places of joy/ and some places of punishment convenient for every creature/ which doth deserve other y● one or the other: and that he hath ordained heaven to be the place of felicity/ where is all joy and pleasure without pain or disease/ & that this place where we & other beasts live here upon earth/ is the place mixed with joy & pain & that all creatures living here sometime suffer joy and sometime pain. And the low place which we call hell/ is the place of eternal punishment and pain without any joy or pleasure: and that the place of heaven where his pleasure is to be eternally glorified with the company of his angels and holy saints/ is a place of eternal joy/ and by all convenient reason worthy to be so clean/ so pure/ so fair/ so pleasant/ so full of joy and felicity/ that there can be no place more pure/ more clear/ more pleasant nor of more joy/ nor of more pleasure/ but that place must be so clean of nature/ that it must expel all manner of impuryte & uncleanness/ nor suffer any thing therein/ that is of any manner of uncleanness or evil/ or other thing unpleasant. For as ye see by experience as the eyer/ which of it self is much more pure and clean than the element of the earth/ if there be any corrupt stinking water or other humour upon earth/ that water or humour by the heat of the son vapored up in to the high regyone of the eyer/ is there so purified that when it descendeth it is without any corruption stink or salt taste/ but fresh/ sweet & clear/ that it can never be purer/ so that the high region of the element of the pure eyer will suffer no water nor other humour to abide there/ which is not clean and pure. And like wise we may behold this pure region ethereal/ where the son & that other stars run in their spears we see them so lyghtsom/ so pure and clean/ that it is unpossible any corporal thing to be clener or more pure. Than sith that god by his wonderful power great wisdom and goodness hath created those visible thing/ which appear to us of such purity and cleanness that no filthy nor foul thing nor other thing unpure can remain in them or nigh them/ it seemeth than that by all convenience of reason it must needs follow that that glorious place of heaven/ which is a place more higher and excellent than those other places/ which be the regions elemental and regions ethereal/ and where his majesty is glorified/ and eternally honoured by his angels and saints/ must be clean & pure fair/ and above all other places/ and that there can be no thing suffered to be there/ but that which is all clean and pure without any manner spot or token of uncleanness/ so that it followeth that no soul can be suffered to be there that should have any spot or token of sin in it/ or any manner of deformity which should be in any wise unpleasant. For all though that there be places in heaven some pure and clean/ and some more pure & some more clean. And that there be joys/ as some great joy/ & some greater joy: yet there can be no places there/ whereof one should be pure and another foul/ nor whereof one should be sweet and another should be stinking/ nor no life whereof one should be a joyful life/ and another a painful life/ nor that no soul can be there/ whereof one should be a pure and clean soul/ and another unpure and unclean/ nor that one soul should be fair pleasant and goodly to behold/ and another to be foul and deformed and ugly/ nor that one soul there should suffer joy/ and another to suffer sorrow. So now it followeth that when that a man hath committed a mortal sin and after taken repentance/ and dieth by the which he is heeled of that foul infirmity: but yet the spots and tokens thereof do remain/ for lack of full satisfaction/ god of his justice may not condemn his soul to eternal pain in hell for that offence/ which is purged & put away/ and the soul thereof clearly discharged and made hole: and yet god by his justice nor by his discrete wisdom & goodness ought not immediately to receive that soul in to that clean and most pure place in heaven to accompany with those pure angels and saints that be there in that place/ where there can be no thing but that which is all purified & clean until such time/ that that soul be cleansed and purified of those tokens and spots of sin/ which remain in that soul/ which tokens and spots is ever a great deformity to the soul as long as they do therein remain/ Therefore by all convenient reason it must needs follow/ that beside that glorious and joyful place of heaven/ and also beside that miserable & sorrowful place of hell/ there must needs be a third place of purgation/ where the soul must be purified and made clean of such spots and tokens of sin/ which remain in it/ before that it shallbe able to be received in to that glorious place in heaven/ in which place there can be nothing suffered to be/ but that which is all pure and clean without any tokens or spots of sin or uncleanness.   

¶ An objection/ that if there should be any place of purgation/ than that place should be here in earth/ or else if there be any other place/ where is that place of purgatory. Caput x.  COmyngo. 
¶ This is a marvelous sore & high reason that thou haste made/ but yet me thinketh/ though that beside heaven and hell there should be a third place of purgation/ it should seem convenient that that place should be here in earth/ and that man which hath so offended/ whom god would have to be purged therefore/ and after that to be received and admitted to joy with him in heaven/ may be most convenient lie purged thereof here in earth/ and while his soul is joined with his body/ because that the soul offendeth being with the body/ therefore it were most convenient that that soul should be purged and punished with the body. And also because that god hath ordained heaven to be a place of infinite joy/ & hell to be a place of infinite pain/ and earth to be a place mixed sometime of joy/ and sometime of pain/ which never endureth but for a time that shall have an end. Therefore it is most convenient that the place of purgatory should be here in earth/ because it is the place ordained for pain which shall have an end. And also that purgatory & punishment here in earth should be a great good example to all other men here living/ to put them in fere to do any like offence/ and should cause many men the rather to abstain from the doing and committing of any such like offence and sin.   

¶ The solution/ that if god should be compelled to make purgatory here in earth/ that than god/ that is the high judge should be restrained from his liberty and authority more than any other earthly judge/ and also that it is a foolish question to ask where purgatory is. Caput xi.  Ging. 
¶ That saying me seemeth is not to be allowed/ for thy first reason/ proved not only that there should be no purgatory but only here in earth/ but that reason proveth as well that there should be no there heaven nor hell but only here in earth. For if a man have lived so virtuously in earth/ whereby he ought to be saved and go to the joys of heaven/ because he did never meritorious act/ but only when his soul was joined here with the body/ then he should never be rewarded therefore but only here in earth while his soul was joined with the body. And also every sinew which a man committeth/ is done while the soul is joined with the body/ ergo than he should never have any punishment therefore but only here in earth while the soul is joined with the body/ & so that first reason that thou hast made should prove that there is neither heaven nor hell prepared for man but here in earth/ which is clear contrary to all the ground and principles which thou hast granted to me before. And also where thou sayest that of convenience that y● if there should be any purgatory/ the place should be no where else but here in earth while the soul is being with the body: me se●eth that therein thou wouldest clearly take away the liberty prerogative and authority of god/ and bind god to be in more bondage and servitude than any temporal judge/ which hath power to give sentence here in earth in any civil or temporal causes. For a judge here in earth/ which by the order of the law may give sentence & judgement upon any traitor or fellow/ is not so bound nor restrained but that he may judge him to be put in execution in what place that this judge shall think convenient/ and also in what day and time that he will. Than god much more by his prerogative and authority ought to have liberty to give his judgement and sentence/ that the punishment which is condygne for the sin and offence/ which a man here in earth committeth/ shallbe had in such place where god himself shall think most conve nyent/ other in earth or in some other place at his pleasure & liberty/ and in what time and season that he shall think convenient therefore.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Than I demand of the if purgatory be not here in earth in what place should it be?  ¶ Gyng. 
¶ As to that I say that purgatory is/ that that is ordained to purge men's souls/ when they be separate from the body. And a soul which is no corporal substance/ but a spiritual doth occupy no place/ no more than thy thought or mind doth/ which occupieth no place. And as touching that question/ where and in what place purgatory is/ me thinketh it is great foolishness to demand that question. For I may ask the again where is heaven/ whether over thy head as thou standest/ or else under thy foot/ or else before thy face/ or else behind thy back/ or else upon thy right hand or upon thy left hand or else if I ask where is the place where the glorious throne of god is/ or I ask that where is the highest part of hen●/ & what thing is above the highest place or part of heaven/ or if I ask y●/ of what matter is the heaven made/ or the firmament/ or the son moan & stars/ or what doth cause them to move so marvelous swiftly/ which go & move about the earth more than C. M. mile in every. xxiiii. hours/ or if I ask that what thing god is & to what thing is god like/ or what thing the devil is/ or what thing the devil is like/ or to what thing a soul or angel is like/ or if I should ask y● how many mile it is to the firmament/ or how far it is to the highest part of heaven. As for all those high questions and many other that may be demanded all the men in the world be not able to assoil them/ thou mayst see well that this little prick the earth/ which is no more in comparison to the firmament/ than a little peses is in comparison to a great town or castle: It is ꝑued by a good true & apparent conclusions of astronomy/ that the son and many other of the stars in the fyrma●t/ be every of them much bigger than the hole earth. There is no man in the world able to imagine the greatness of the firmament/ much less is he able to imagine the greatness of the heaven and of the hole world/ which containeth all thing with in it: for if man should be able to imagine or give a plain solution to these and all other such high questions/ than man should have knowledge as god. Thou mayst well by thy reason perceive that god which hath made this little prick and spot the earth with so many creatures living there in/ hath not made all the other places of the world beside to be destitute and vacant of creatures. But if I should ask thee/ what other creatures be there in every other place of the world/ thou art not able to give me any solution thereto. Therefore though god have given to man here in earth some little understanding/ reason and knowledge of some causes and things/ yet he hath reserved the knowledge of all such high causes and questions to himself. For though that man being in earth here by his reason may perceive and know that there is a god that is the cause of all/ and governeth all/ yet he shall not be able to imagine nor know what thing god is/ nor to what thing he is like/ and all though man here in earth by his reason may perceive that there is a heaven/ where god of his justice shall reward the good souls with eternal joy: yet he shall never be able to imagine nor to know by his reason what manner joy it is/ nor what thing they shall do/ nor what pastime they shall have And also all though that man here in earth by his reason is able to perceive & know/ that god by his justice hath ordained a purgatory/ where that man nies soul shallbe purged of his sin after it is separate from the body/ yet he shallbe never able while he is here/ to perceive nor to know where and in what place that purgatory is/ nor what certain/ nor what kind of pain they shall suffer and have/ nor how/ nor in what manner that soule is able to suffer that pain/ but god hath reserved the knowledge of these things unto himself: therefore thou man what so ever thou art/ art very foolish/ that desirest the knowledge of such things while thou art here in earth/ for thou nor all the men in earth be not able to imagine a solution for these questions. But yet this is undoubted/ that god hath or deigned a place of joy/ and a place of pain/ where every man's soul shall be rewarded according to his desert/ but where the place is or what joy or what pain it shallbe/ or in what manner or how/ no man in the world can tell/ but only god alone.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Than I am as far from the solution of my question as I was before.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ well than because thou art not yet fully satisfied/ I shall yet therein peradventure ease thy mind another way/ if thy wit be able to perceive the reasons that I shall show the but the matter is somewhat hard/ therefore as the latin men say/ capiat qui capere potest/ let him perceive the matter that can perceive it/ for every man is not of like capacity.  ¶ Com. 
¶ Than yet I pray the show it me to see whether I can perceive it or no.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ with right good will/ there fore I pray the now take good heed/ thou must understand first/ that there be two kinds of things which have being/ the one is a real thing the other is a rational thing. A real thing is that which is perceived by the organs & instruments of the. v. wits/ as the thing which may be seen hard tasted/ felt or smelled/ be called real things. But rational things be those which be not perceived by the. v. wits/ but only be perceived by reason/ and they be things incorporal/ as love/ charity/ meekness/ abstynens/ pride/ malice/ sloth and such other. Further thou must consider that of places there be three diversities. One is a place/ another is a place limitative/ and the third is a place operative. A place continentive is that/ wherein real things as bodies/ images & figures be contained/ as the ton wherein the wine is contained/ is the place continentive of the wine. A place symytatyve is/ where things rational and incorporal be limited to be/ as the place limitative for love/ is that thing which is loved/ & that thing which is so loved/ is the place limitative for that love/ and there the love is in his place limitative/ which place limitative of love can not be ever certain but mutable/ & because love may be at once in divers things/ therefore love may be in divers places limitative at one tyme. A place operative is the place where the operation of the thing is/ as because we see that the marvelous ●eration of god is the marvelous swift moving of the heavenly spears and bodies above/ which do appear to us/ therefore we say that the place where god is/ is heaven: so that where so ever the operation of god appeareth/ there is the place operative of god/ and there god is. Therefore as touching thy question where purgatory is/ I say to the it is no place certain con tynentyve/ for that that a place continentive is that which containeth with in it things that be corporal. But because purgatory is a place by god limited and ordained/ for the purging of souls/ which be things rational and incorporal/ therefore purgatory can be no place continentive but purgatory may be a place limitative/ and also a place operative. For where so ever that god doth limit the soul of man after it is separate from the body to be purged/ there is the place limitative of the soul/ and there is the purgatory of that soul. For there can be no purgatory/ but there where the soul is purged/ and where so ever god doth limit the soul to be purged/ there is the limitative place of purgatory. Also where the virtuous operation of god is/ and where his virtuous work doth appear/ there is the operative place of god/ and there god himself is in his place operative: and therefore because the marvelous operation and work of god appeareth in every place of the world: therefore god is in every place and part of the world according as I have proved to the here before in our first dialogue. And also because that purgatory where mennies souls be purged is that/ where god worketh his virtuous operation in execution of his justice: therefore that purgatory is the very place operative of god/ which is in no certain place continentive/ but there where pleaseth god/ and there & in such time/ or times/ where & when and how his pleasure is that it shall be. Therefore to thy question I say/ that pur gatory is no place continentive of itself/ because it containeth no real nor corporal things within it/ because it is ordained only for purging of souls/ which be things rational and incorporal. Nor also purgatory is within no place continentive/ because it is no such real thing of itself/ that may be perceived by any of our five senses and wits.   

¶ An objection because the mercy of god can not be with out his justice/ and remission is incident to repentance: therefore as soon as repentance is taken/ god of his justice must give remission/ and therefore there ought to be no purgatory. Caput xii.  COmyngo. 
¶ Thou art so subtle in thy solution/ that I wot not well how to reply unto thee/ but yet I pray the let me see how thou canst satisfy my mind in one point. Thou didst prove to me but late in our first dialogue and disputation/ that two things of neces site be belonging and be incident to the goodness of god/ that was justice and mercy/ and that the one can not be without the other.  ¶ Gyng 
¶ That is truth  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ And the very definition of justice is thus: justice is a constant and a perpetual will/ giving to every thing his own. And mercy is no more but the mind of a pitiful affect/ and merit is the execution of justice/ and remission is the execution of mercy: and merit is alway incident to justice/ so that god by the order of justice must give to every creature his own merit according as it doth deserve to have/ that is to say for sin and offence to give punishment of pain or sorrow/ and for virtue to give reward of joy or pleasure. And that as merit is of necessity incident to the justice of god/ so is remission incident to the mercy of god: so that god can not minister his mercy to no creature without remission. And every sin that is committed/ by the justice of god it must have punishment/ and by the mercy of god remission. And as thou didst grant me ere while/ the sin is always put away expelled and destroyed by the only medicine of repentance: and than as punishment by the justice of god is incident to the repentance which taketh a way the sin/ so as god by the order of justice ought to give punishment for the sin which remaineth/ so like wise he ought by the order of justice to give remission for that medicine of repentance/ which hath taken away the sin. And because the justice of god and the mercy of god be so correlative/ that the one can not be without the other/ than god can never minister his justice with his mercy/ except that he grew remission as soon as the repentance is taken. Therefore it standeth not only with the mercy of god/ but also w●th the justice of god/ y● as soon as repentance is taken/ that god must give remission/ and than when god hath remitted that sin/ god hath than fully executed both his justice & his mercy/ but if he should after that give a further punishment for that sin so remitted other in purgatory or else where/ it should follow then that god d●de not execute his justice before/ and so than the mercy of god and the justice of god could not be correlative/ but that his mercy might be without his justice/ which is contrary to that principle that we both first agreed/ that his justice & mercy can not be the one without the other/ therefore it seemeth there aught to be no purgatory.   

¶ The solution/ if god should give full remission for every sin without other satisfaction/ than god should my ●ster his mercy without justice. And as a man may offend to god alone/ and also to god & to his neighbour: therefore satisfaction must be made both to god & to his neighbour/ or else his neighbour is not restored to his own. Caput. xiii.  Gyngemyn. 
¶ Thou dost imagine so many subtle obtections in this matter/ that I can not well tell how to satys●ye thy mind/ but yet this reason that thou haste last made/ doth make against the as me seemeth/ for we both agree that the justice of god and the mercy of god be evermore correlative and concurrant together/ and that god doth never punish any sin/ but that the punishment is less than it doth deserve and therein he showeth his mercy. And also god doth never reward no creature for any virtue/ but that his reward is greater than he doth dedeserue to have: and therein also god doth execute his mercy/ and doth give remission: for his remission is nothing else but a gift of his grace and goodness/ but he never giveth his remission but for a convenient cause/ which is according to his justice/ because his justice and mercy must evermore go together/ and therefore forgofen in your Dutch tongue is a very proper word for remission/ because it is a gift for a cause. But than to answer thine objection/ I say if that god should give remission for every sin that is committed/ as soon as he hath taken repentance therefore without any other satisfaction/ or further punishment to be had therefore/ than god should minister his mercy without justice/ for by his justice he must give to every thing his own/ which own is the thing which it deserveth to have/ so that if the repentance/ which a man hath taken here for his sin be not sufficient sorrow to counterpeyle the pleasure which he took in doing that sin/ god must by his justice give him a further punishment/ which must be to suffer pain or sorrow sufficient to purge him of the sin/ or else the remission which god doth give for the only repentance of sin/ should be an execution of his mercy/ and lacking execution of his justice which can not be/ for as we have both agreed/ the mercy of god and the justice of god be ever correlative and must needs be alway concurrant together. And yet to satisfy thy mind further in this point/ thou wilt grant me that the justice of god must give to every creature his own/ and not to take away fro●e no creature that thing which is his: as by example if so be that I do beat thy servant which is thine apprentyse or retained servant/ and do 〈◊〉 him as cut of his hand/ or hurt some other member of him/ where by thou dost lose his service/ and also that this servant thereby is not abl● well during his life to get his living/ if so be that thou do forgive and release to me that offence that I have done to the for hurting of thy 〈◊〉 whereby thou haste lost his service: yet not withstanding thy ●uenes & thy release made to me/ yet I am bound to make another 〈◊〉 to thy servant for the hurt that I have done to him/ which is the cause of the hindrance of his living. But yet if I do the a trespass so that no man is hurted by that trespass/ but only thou thyself/ in that case if thou forgive me that trespass/ I am never bound to make other satisfaction to no nother man for that trespass done only to the. So say I like wise a man may commit here in earth divers sins/ some against god alone/ and some both against god and his neighbour/ as when a man is negligent to serve god/ or proud dysdeynous/ and useth sloth or gluttony & yet hurteth not his neighbour. Also a man may do some sin/ which is both against god and yet so hurteth his neighbour/ as when I take mine neighbours good wrongfully/ or hurt his body. In that case if I take repentance for that sin so done by me against god & my neighbour/ though god pardon me for that offence/ whrche I have committed both against god and also my neighbour: yet god by his justice may not clearly release and discharge me without recompense & satisfaction made to my neighbour therefore/ for justice must give to every man his own/ ergo than that wrong done to my neighbour/ or that thing by wrong take in from my neighbour/ must be restored or some recompense made therefore/ but if that repentance which I have taken for that sin done to god and my neighbour/ should be a clear discharge to me without any satisfaction made/ than my neighbour in that case should not have his own/ and so justice not ministered to him: wherefore in that case though god forgive me/ yet I am bound to make restitution to my neighbour.  ¶ Co. 
¶ Than I put cause I have no goods jest nor other thing/ wherewith all to make restitution or satisfaction to my neighbour/ but that I d●e be fore any such satisfaction made/ or I put case I have enough to make sa tyssaction to my neighbour. But when I am repentant therefore & ask forgiveness of god/ and yet I am not in will to make satisfaction to mine neighbour/ what shall be than done now to me by the justice of god.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ In that last case which thou hast put/ where thou art not willing to make satisfaction to thy neighbour in that case it appeareth thou art not repentant/ for as a payment or redelyvere of the goods is a satisfaction for the goods wrongfully taken/ so repentance is a satisfaction in the mind & will/ for the sin which thou didst: for the sin is ever done with thy will/ & than the repentance for thy sin to put the sin away must be a contrary will/ for as thou hadst a wyllwrongfully to take thy neighbours goods/ so in the repentance thou most have a will to restore them/ which is a good mind & will contrary to that other evil mind and will which thou hadst in the wrongful taking of them: so I say it is impossible for the to have repentance/ except thou have a will to restore & to make satisfaction of the thing wrongfully taken. So then as I said to the before/ sith that god by his justice can not grant the his mercy & forgiveness for the sin except thou be repentant/ it followeth than that thou canst never be forgiven of god/ except thou have a will to make restitution and satisfaction for these wrongs done by the to thy neighbour. But to consider further in the other case which thou didst put/ if thou be repentant and askest mercy of god and willing to make satisfaction/ and hast not wherewith all/ yet than there is a satisfaction be hind which thou oughtest to do to thy neighbour/ and than if thou die & because thou canst not make a satisfaction to him in earth/ by the conve nyent justice of god thou must make a satisfaction to him in another place/ which must needs be in purgatory by some punishment which thou must suffer therefore.  ¶ Comyngo. 
¶ why what is my neighbour the better for that punishment that I have in purgatory/ or what restitution or satisfaction hath he thereby.  ¶ Gyn. 
¶ That punishment which thou shalt have in purgatory therefore/ shall be to the releasing of other pains and punishments that thy neighbour ought to have for other offences which he hath done against god/ or else it shallbe to the augmenting of the ● ●oy that he ought to have for other meritorious deeds/ which he hath done for the love of god: and this doth stand with convenient reason/ for when thou dost an offence to thy neighbour there is not only a will to do evil/ but there is also an evil act/ & though that evil will were discharged by an other contrary will/ which was that other good will which thou hadst in the time of thy repentance & contrition/ yet that ●uyll act is not discharged till there be an other act done that is contrary to that act. And all this standeth with the justice of god/ that in the foresaid case that thy neighbour to whom the wrong was so done must be restored & satisfied/ because as I showed the before/ the justice of god is alway to give every thing his own/ and than if thy neighbour be not satisfied & restored for that wrong done unto him/ than he hath not yet his own/ and therefore by the order of justice he ought to be restored.   

¶ An objection/ that when god forgiveth it need no satisfaction to thy neighbour/ because god is very owner of all/ & thy neyghbonr hath no property but as a servant to god/ as but to make ● count to god. Caput. xiiii.  COmyngo. 
¶ That reason me thinketh maketh not against myn● opinion/ nor proveth not that if god have once forgiven me/ that I ought to make any further satisfaction/ as I shall prove it to the by an evident example which is this: I put case thou have a servant/ whom thou dost put in trust to have the use and occupy●ge of thy goods and merchandises/ and givest him authority to make bargayns thereof/ and to change them and sell them to thy use/ and to make aquitaunc●s & relesis in his name/ and to take bonds made to him to thy use/ and to make account thereof/ if thy servant sell part of thy ware/ and take an obligation for the payment of. xx. 〈◊〉. of money for the same/ if thou after ward knowing of this/ for the love which thou hast to the same debtor or adventure for some other cause wilt make to him a release & a clear acquittance of the same. xx. 〈◊〉. I suppose thou wilt not deny/ but that this debtor is clearly discharged for ever of this. xx 〈◊〉. nor is not bound by any justice to make any other satisfaction/ neither to thy servant nor to no nother person in the world/ because thou art only the very owner thereof & no nother person/ and thy servant had never but the occupation thereof as to give to the an account thereof. So I say/ because god is the very owner of all goods & of all things/ thou hast but the occupation thereof as to give to god but account thereof: therefore if god do release and forgive thee/ thou needest never to make any other satisfaction to thy neighbour nor to have no nother punishment therefore.   

¶ The solution that god hath an absolute power and an ordinary power/ and that by his ordinary power he can not discharge the if thy repentance be not sufficient. And also that thou canst not compel god to forgive the by his absolute power at thy pleasure. Caput. xv.  Gyng. 
¶ As touching y● objection thou must consider that god of himself hath. 〈◊〉. powers. One is an absolute power/ & an other is an ordinary power. The absolute power is that authority that god hath over all thing in the world/ whereby that he may do with every thing his own plea sure/ because he is the very & the first & the principal cause of every thing/ & by that power he may give to every creature what pleaseth him/ & also remit & forgive every offence done by any creature at his pleasure without any cause. But by his ordinary power he doth every thing by order of justice and equity/ as to reward & to punish every creature according to his desert/ but when he will execute and use his absolute power/ and when he will use his ordinary power/ it is always at his pleasure. But in the case which thou hast put/ when that thou dost an offence to god & also to thy neighbour/ as to take thy neighbours goods from him by vio lence and wrong/ or to hurt his body/ and than if thou ask god forgiveness therefore/ & art not willing to make satisfaction to thy neighbour/ in that point thou art not repentant/ because as I say to the here before/ thou hast not a contrary will to that will/ which thou hadst when thou hadst a pleasure to do to thy neighbour that wrong & hurt which thou didst to him. And than if god should clearly forgive the without any satisfaction or restitution to thy neighbour/ than therein god should not use his ordinary power according to his justice/ because thy neighbour is not restored to his own/ which was by wrong taken from him: and also thou shouldest be remitted & forgiven of god without repentance/ which is also contrary to the ordinary power of god's justice/ so that if god in that case should forgive that without any will of satisfaction to thy neighbour/ god should not use his ordinary power according to his justice/ so I say in that case by the ordinary power of god/ thou canst not be clearly forgiven. But furthermore if thou wilt say/ that in that case god by his absolute power doth forgive y●/ than thou wouldest ●de god to execute his absolute power at thy pleasure/ which is contrary to the nature of the absolute power of god/ for his absolute power is to give and to remit at his own only pleasure without any cause.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ But than I put case that if I be repentant and ask forgiveness of god & do make satisfaction to my neighbour for that wrong that I did to him/ or else if I have not where with to make to him satisfaction/ but a will to do satisfaction/ and that I die/ if than because of my repentance god by his ordinary power of his justice must forgive me/ because that repentance is that thing only which god would have to be done for the satisfaction of that sin/ and if that sin be clearly thereby discharged/ than ●t were but vain to put any purgatory/ to put away or to wash away the sin/ which was so by god clearly discharged  ¶ Ging. 
¶ if thou think thyself by repentance to be clearly dies charged of that sin without any other punishment to be had in purgatory therefore/ it seemeth that there in thou art very foolish so to think/ for if thou shouldest be clearly discharged/ either than it should be by the or dynary power of god/ or else by the absolute power of god/ but thou canst not judge thyself/ & be sure that thou art discharged by the ordinary power of god/ because that there is degrees in repentance/ as some repentance is more and some is less. And than thou canst not tell how that god will accept thy repentance/ nor whether that he will judge it to be condygne & sufficient to wash away that sin or no/ for if it be but a small repentance so that the sorrow that thou takest in that repentance/ do not conterpeyse the pleasure/ which thou hadst in doing of that sin and the continuance thereof/ than by his ordinary power he may not clearly forgive the● but must by the order of his justice give the a further punyshmet in purgatory/ that that punishment may be a full recompense to conterpayse the plea sure/ which thou hadst in doing of that sin & continuance of the ● ●ame so that that pain & sorrow suffered afterward must be as great as the pleasure which thou hadst before. Therefore thou art a fool to think thyself clearly discharged by gods ordinary power/ because thou knowest not whether thy repentance be sufficient or no. But yet further if thou wilt say that in ca● where thy repentance is not sufficient to wash away ●erely and fully the sin/ that yet god by his absolute power doth forgive thee: than as I said before/ thou wilt compel god to execute his ab solute power at thy pleasure/ & at such time as thou hast any repentance though it be never so little a repentance/ which as I said to thee is contrary to the nature of his absolute power. And yet in that case thou wilt bind god to be in a manner in bondage/ & to have less liberty & authority than princes and kings have in this world: for thou knowest well that a prince or a king may by his power remit & pardon any traitor/ murderer ●rer fellow ●in his realm/ though he have deserved therefore to die/ 〈◊〉 yet there is no such traitor/ in●rderer nor fellow/ that can compel that prince to pardon him/ all though that he ask him forgiveness/ but that that prince may execute his ordinary power upon him/ & at his liberty to put him to death by the order of his laws/ or else to ydone him of death ●ue him some other punishment for his offence/ as prisonment or some other pain by his dyscr●yō/ so thy repentance may be such & so great that god by his or●ynary power may and will forgive the clearly both the sin ● the satisfaction therefore/ & it may be so small a repentance/ that god will forgive the the sin and not clearly expulse the out of his favour/ but yet will that thou shalt have a further punishment to make the as pure and clear as thou wast before/ and so than able to be received in to his favour/ and to be partner of his glory/ so these things considered/ it must follow necessarily that there must needs be a purgatory.  
¶ Another reason for a conclusion of this matter I shall show thee (because I can not tarry much longer with thee) if thou or any other should hold this opinion/ chat god for a little repentance had be thy for thine offences and sins/ should so pardon and forgive thee/ so that thou shouldest not need to make any other satisfaction or restitution to thy neighbour whom thou hast so wronged/ and after thy death thou shouldest have no nother punishment in purgatory therefore: and to believe that there is no purgatory ordained therefore/ this thing should put away the dread of god from the most part of the people in the world/ and give them boldness to do and commit offences and sins/ and if the people should believe that they never needed to make any satisfaction/ nor restitution to their neighbours for the wrongs that they have done to their neighbours/ and that such a light repentance should be sufficient for any other satisfaction to be made/ it should give to the people such boldness that they would never force nor care what wrongs/ emons/ thefts/ roberyes● nor murders that they did/ and so in conclusion should destroy all virtue and increase vice and sin and also utterly destroy the comen wealth & quiet living of the people.  ¶ ●go. 
¶ Thy reasons and solution to all my questions and objections be so good that thou hast marvelous well satisfied my mind in every thing/ & it should seem a great marvel how thou shouldest come to so high learning & knowledge/ save that I marvel much the less/ because I heard the say/ that thou hast be brought up some part of thy youth in christendom/ and been a student in divers ●rsytes in cristendom/ where thou saidest thou didst ierne and read ●ych philosophy: whereby as I said thou hastnow satisfied my mind right well/ and that now I must needs consent unto the that there must ned● be a purgatory for the purging of men's souls/ after that they be separat from the body/ and also by the same last reason which thou hast showed/ it proveth well that it should be a great foolishness for the people to believe the contrary thereof/ that is to say/ that there should be no purgatory/ for that foolish believe should be marvelous hurtful to the people/ for first as thou saidest it should bring them from the dread of god/ which dread of god is the beginning of all wisdom. And we know well that the frailty of mankind is such/ that it is evermore more prone & ready to vice than to virtue: wherefore man hath need to have both a bridal of law/ which is to punish vice in this world/ & also a bridle of the dread of god/ which is a dread to offend for the love of god/ and a dread to be punished in an other world for offence done here in this transitory life. But if men should believe that there is no purgatory/ but that immediately the soul of man for a little small repentance taken should go straight to heaven: it should as thou saidest/ give them such a boldness that many men would little regard what hurt or wrong they did to their neighbours: and so should be the cause to bring the people to live together continually in trouble/ vexation/ unquietness of mind & to the destruction of their own comen wealth in this world. It should also cause the utter loss and damnation in hell of many thousand souls/ be cause they would ever trust/ that if they lived never so vyciously/ that yet they would or they died take some repentance/ wherein peradventure many should be deceived. For we see by experience/ that there be many people in the world which die suddenly/ some be suddenly drowned/ some suddenly slayn● and some die suddenly of some other sickness/ & peradventure have no time to remember god or think of any repentance/ and than if such people that so die have offended god and committed some great mortal sin/ for the which god by his justice must condemn him to eternal damnation in hell: this boldness of trust to take repentance or there die where they be deceived for lack of time/ should ca● many thousands of people to be eternally dampened in hell. And an other thing yet there is to be considered/ which I have gederd upon thy re● sons & arguments/ that if a man offend and commit some small venial sin/ for the which god will that by his justice he must have some punishment therefore/ but yet not eternal damnation/ if such a synnet die suddenly/ and before he have had any time to take any repentaunce● his soul as it is proved by all thy foresaid arguments & reasons/ aught neither immediately to come in to the glorious place of heaven/ because it is somewhat defouled with sin: nor also ought not to go to hell to eternal dampnacy on but by all good order of justice must go to a place to be purged & there to be made clean/ that it may be received after that in to the glorious place of heaven. Therefore upon these reasons which thou hast showed/ & these premisses considered/ he shall be proved a very stark fool/ that will believe that there is no purgatory.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ I am very glad now that thy mind is satisfied in this matter/ and therefore now be cause I have a little business to do touching the feet of my merchandise/ I will depart & bid the farewell.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ Now I thank the with all ●yn heart/ and I shall love the while I live/ and would to god that thou were of our holy sect and christian believe/ and so I will counsel the and require the to be.  ¶ Ging. 
¶ I thank you for your good counsel/ but as to that request I will not she we the my mind at this time/ because I have now no time nor space/ how be it I know well that Cryst of whom ye christian men believe/ was a very holy man & a good & hath taught you so many good lessons of virtue/ that there can be no better/ which I will advise that to obst & keep. And another time peradventure I shall meet with the again/ and show to the my mind/ but now I pray y● pardon me for I must needs depart from thee: therefore yet again I say now farewell.  ¶ Comyn. 
¶ well then sith thou wilt ned● begun/ I pray god give the grace that thou mayst do well/ and to become one of our holy sect & believe/ & I pray god be thy guide.  
Amen   
¶ Thus endeth this little treatise/ gedered and compiled by Iohn Rastell. And also by the same Iohn imprinted and fully finished/ the. x. day of October/ the year of our lord god. M. CCCCC. XXX.  
¶ Cum privilegio Regali.   

Tabula.  

The chapters of the first dialogue.  
An introduction to the matter. Caput primum.  
That god was without beginning & the first cause of all thing Ca two.  
That god is and shall be without end Caput. iii.  
That god is most of power and the most noble thing that can be. Caput. iiii.  
That god is the very life/ and that he hath the most joyful and pleasant life that can be Caput v.  
That god hath knowledge and understanding/ and knoweth every thing that ever was/ is/ or shall be Caput. vi  
That god is the high good thing/ and most perfit goodness and the very truth Caput seven.  
That virtue is evermore in god. Caput viii.  
That justice must evermore be in god/ and is ever righteous and just. Caput ix.  
That god is ever merciful Caput x.  
That the justice and mercy of god be correspondent/ and that the one can not be without the other Caput xi.  
That god doth govern all/ and conserveth all/ and doth take heed to all. Caput xii.  
That god is every where/ & always in every place of the world. Cap. xiii.  
That god is but one thing/ and not dyvets things. Caput xiiii.  
That there is but one god. Caput. xv  
That god is hole in divers places. Caput xvi.  
That god is eternal. Caput xvii.   

The chapters of the second dialogue.  
That it is convenient and nedesull to prove the immortality of man's soul by reason. Caput. i.  
what is a definition and what is a description Caput two.  
what is a body/ what is a soul/ and what is a man Caput iii.  
That it is wisdom to believe that the soul of man is immortal. Ca iiii.  
if the soul of man should not be immortal/ than were man the unhappiest of all other creatures and besles Caput. v.  
That the soul of man useth his operation and property without the body/ and may so have a being without the body. Caput vi.  
That god doth will the perpetual life wealth and preservation of man's soul/ and his will must be performed. Caput seven.  
if the soul of man should not be immortal/ than god doth not minister to every man equal justice. Caput viii.  
That the soul of man is made to be partaker of blysfulnes and joy that ever shall endure. Caput ix.  
That the soul of man knoweth and perceiveth many things without the body/ nor it dependeth not nor corrupteth not with the body. Ca x.  
That the natural appetite of the soul of man is to come to the knowledge of the high cause/ which is god. Caput. xi.  
That the soul of man hath no nother cause of his being but god/ which is infinite. Caput. xii.  
That the material substance of no thing in the world can be corrupted/ no more can man's soul. Cap. xiii.  
That man's soul that is the most perfit and most noble thing that ever god did ordain and create/ must have most long time to continue/ and remain in his being. Cap. xiiii.  
That the soul of man hath his full perfection as soon as it is annexed to the body/ and that increasyth not successively. Caput. xv.  
The dyfferens between the memory and fantasy of a brute best and the soul of a man/ and that all science is in man's soul at the beginning. Caput. xvi.  
That the fantasy and memory of a brute be'st is corruptible and mortal/ and the soul of man immortal. Caput. xvii.  
¶ that the soul of man useth not always his operation & property. Ca xviii  
¶ that every man's soul is of like perfection. Cap. nineteen.  
¶ what knowledge man's soul hath after it is separate from the body/ & what manner of being it hath. Caput. xx.   

The chapters of the third dialogue.  
¶ that the soul doth suffer and not the body/ and that by the justice of god there must be a purgatory/ because that sometime man dieth without making full satisfaction. Caput pr●um.  
An obie●yō/ because repentance is that only thing clearly that wass●eth & putteth away all sin done by man/ & the god of his justice must then discharge him thereof/ therefore it needeth than no nother purgatory. Cap. two.  
¶ the solution/ if god should be compelled to forgive the sin immediately after repentance/ he should be restrained of his liberty/ and from the execution of his justice. Caput. iii.  
An objection/ because man is ordained to have an infinite being/ there fore after his death he must have infinite joy or infinite pain/ & so no pain in purgatory which hath an end. Caput. iiii.  
¶ the solution/ as there be degrees in sin/ as some sin is more and some less: so there be degrees in repentance/ as some may be more & some less/ and also degrees of pardon and forgiveness/ therefore man for lack of sufficient repentance must be purged. Caput. v.  
An objection/ that because there be degrees in heaven & hell of joy & pain/ that it is needles for god to put any purgatory/ for he may execute his full and indifferent justice in one of those two places. Ca vi.  
The solution/ that as the appel which hath a vegetative soul/ and as the best which hath a sensitive soul/ may be purged after that they be severed from their natural growing & life/ of such tokens & spot which be a deformity to them/ so the soul intellectyfe must be purged of those tokens & spott● of sin/ which was a d●formyte to it. Ca seven.  
An objection/ that the soul unpurged may do some mean & low service to god in heaven/ though it be not the highest and best service/ so that it needeth not to be purged. Ca viii.  
The solution/ that nothing unpurged and unpure may remain or abide in heaven. Cap. ix.  
An objection/ that if there should be any place of purgatory/ than that place should be here in earth/ or else if there be any other place/ where is that place of purgatory. Cap. x.  
The solution/ that if god should be compelled to make purgatory here in earth/ that than god/ that is the high judge/ should be restrained from his liberty and authority more than any other earthly judge/ and also that it is a foolish question to ask where purgatory is. Cap. xi.  
An objection/ because the mercy of god can not be without his justice/ & remission is ●ydent to repentance: therefore as soon as repentance is taken/ god of his justice must give re●yssyon/ and therefore there ought to be no purgatory. Cap. xii.  
The solution/ if god should give full remission for every sin without other satisfaction/ than god should minister his mercy without justice. And as a man may offend to god alone/ & also to god & to his neighbour: therefore satisfaction must be made both to god & to his neigh bower/ or else his neighbour is not restored to his own. Cap xiii.  
¶ An objection/ that when god forgiveth it need no satisfaction to thy neighbour/ because god is the very owner of all/ and thy neighbour hath no property but as a servant to god/ as but to make account to god therefore. Cap. xiiii.  
The solution/ that god hath an absolute power and an ordinary power and that by his ordinary power he can not discharge the if thy repentance be not sufficient. And also that thou canst not compel god to forgive the by his absolute power at thy pleasure. Cap. xv.   
¶ Finis calendari●   


Johannes Rastell