A TREATISE OF THE PASSIONS AND faculties of the soul of Man. With the several Dignities and Corruptions thereunto belonging.  
By Edward REYNOLDES, late Preacher to the honourable Society of Lincoln's inn: And now Rector of the Church of Braunston in Northamptonshire.  juvenal Sat. 1. 
Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ita, Voluptas, Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago Libelli.  
LONDON, Printed by R. H. for Robert Bostock, dwelling in Saint Paul's churchyard at the sign of the Kings Head. 1640.   

TO HER highness THE Princess ELIZABETH, Princess PALATINE OF THE RHINE, Duchesses OF BAVARIA, etc. AND ELDEST Daughter to Her majesty the Queen of BOHEMIA.  
May it please your highness;  
WHat the Great Philosopher 
Aristot. polit. lib. 7, cap. 16.  hath observed of men's Bodies, is, upon so much stronger Reasons, true of their minds, by how much our intellectual Maturity is more lingering, and sluggish than our natural, That the too Early Conceptions and Issues of them do usually prove but weak and unuseful. And we shall seldom find, but that those venturous Blossoms, whose overhasty obedience to the Early Spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do afterwards for their former boldness suffer from the injury of severer weather, except at least some happy shelter, or more benign influence redeem them from danger. The like Infelicity I find myself obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what disposition of mind, whether out of love of Learning (for 
* Amo●… dixit 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…l. R●…dig. l. 16. 〈◊〉. 15.  Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things easier than they are) or whether out of a Resolution to take some account from myself of those few years wherein I had then been planted in the happiest of all soils, the schools of Learning; whether upon these, or any other Inducements, so it hath happened, that I long since have taken boldness in the Minority of my Studies to write this ensuing Treatise: That before I adventured on the endeavour of knowing other things, I might first try whether I knew myself. Lest I should justly incur the Censure, which that 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…. 6.  sour Philosopher passed upon Grammarians. That they were better acquainted with the evils of Ulysses then with their own. This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, It happened by some accident to be like Moses in his Infancy exposed to the Seas. Where I made no other account, but that its own weakness would there have revenged my former boldness, and betrayed it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compassion of a very Gracious Princess. For so fare hath your highness vouchsafed (having happened on the sight of this Tractate) to express favour thereunto, as not only to spend hours in it, and require a Transcript of it, but further to recommend it by your Gracious judgement unto public view. In which particular I was not to advice with mine own Opinion, being to express my humblest acknowledgement to your highness.  
This only Petition I shall accompany it withal unto your highness' feet, That since it is a blossom which put forth so much too soon, It may therefore obtain the Gracious Influence of your highness' favour, to protect it from that severity abroad which it otherwise justly feareth.  
God Almighty make your highness as great a mirror of his continual Mercies, as he hath both of his Graces and of Learning.  
Your highness' most Humble Servant, Edward REYNOLDES.   

A PREFACE TO THE READER.  
HAving been moved to give way unto the Publication of this philosophical Miscellany, the Fruit of my younger Studies, I conceive it needful to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply seem undecent in me, having adventured to publish some few, though weak Discourses in Arguments Divine, that I should now suffer the blossoms of my youth to look abroad and run the ha●…rd of public Censure. Whereunto when I shall have ●…ven a short answer, I shall rest something the more confident of a C●…ndid construction.  
And here I might first allege the ●…our which God himself hath been pleased to give. Unto Ins●…ur, and natural knowledge. In the first Creation when he gave unto man the Do●…nion over other Creatures for his use, he gave him likewise the 〈◊〉, and knowledg●… of them, for his maker's Glory, and his own Delight. (For God bro●…ght them unto him to give them Names.) And as the Holy Scriptures are all over full of the Mysteries of God's wisdom in natural Things, so are there some special Passages thereof written 
a Job c●…p. 38, 39, 40, 41. Psa. 1●…4, 147.  as it were purposely on that Argument. And we find that Moses and Solomon have therein Testimony given unto them, not only of their Divine, but of their Humane, and natural Knowledge likewise.  
And if we look into the Ancient Christian Churches, or into these of later times, we shall find that very many ecclesiastical persons have not denied unto the world, their philosophical & poetical labours, either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to theological Ends, as we find in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Caesariensis, Saint Augustine's books, De Civitate Dei, and others, Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis, Synesius Sidonius Apollinaris, Honorius Augustodunensis, etc. In the Hexam●…rons of Saint Basil, Nyssen, Ambrose, and the books of those who have written more directly upon some parts of the Argument of this present Treatise, as Gregory Nyssen, Lactantius, Nemesius, Procopius, Gaz●…us, Damascen, and others. And in later times, besides the Schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side, in dialectical, physical and metaphysical writings we might in stance in very many of the R●…formed Churches abroad, some of whose younger labours have seen the Light▪ as also in the Oratory▪ logical, moral, historical, Mathe maticall, Miscell●…nious writings of many learned Diego vines of our own Church, under the Protection of which great Examples I shall use the apology which Quintilian 
b 〈◊〉. 1. cap. 6.  dictateth unto me, Vel Error honestus est Magnos Duces sequentibus. That it is no uncomely, but a pardonable error, which hath great Examples to excuse it. In which respect I find myself chiefly subject to this Infelicity, that I am constrained to follow such Examples, as little children do their Fathers, Non aequis passibus, at a very great Distance.  
And truly, when I again, consider the Excellent 
c Et q●…em de communibus sensibus ●…re in 〈◊〉, said in 〈◊〉 ●…um 〈◊〉, non i●… 〈◊〉 falsi. Tertul. de Resur. carn●…s. cap. 3. 〈◊〉. ●…iam Apol. cap. 47. & 〈◊〉. Alex. Screm. l●…. p. 203. ●…. 207. A.E. 214.  use and subordination, of humane learning unto learning Divine (It being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy Scripture, depending upon the propriety of Words and idioms, or upon the customs. Rites, Proverbes, forms, usages, laws▪ Offices, Antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman Monarchies, as might be showed in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able and learned pen:) when I consider that the 
d ●…, 218. 219 223▪ 227 233. 234 & lib. 6. p. 4●…5. 467. 499 500 justin. Martyr. Apol. 1. Aug. confess l. 1. c. 15. Christianu Domini sus esse intelligit, ubicunque invenerit ut ritatem. Aug. de D●…ctri. Chri. l. 2. c. 18, 39 40. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 justin. Apol. 1. V●…d. Aug. de ci●…. De●…. l. 18. c. 52. Greg. Nezian. Orat. ●…. ●… Ex●…cl. 12. 35.  spoils of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and 
a 1 Chron. 29.  the spoils of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the Temple: That a 
b Deut. 21. 12.  Gentile by legal Purification and Marriage, might become an Israelite, That the 
c 2 Sam. 12. 30 Vid. Pet. 〈◊〉 no●…. decret. l. 1. Tit. 8. ●…. 4.  crown of Rabbah was put upon the head of David, and the 
d 1 Sam. 17. 21.  Sword of Goliath used to stay himself: That the 
a Mat. 2 11.  Gold and Myr●…h, and Frankincense of the Wise men of the East, was offered unto Christ▪ when I find the 
b Act. 18▪ 4 17. 23▪. 29  Apostle convincing the jews, out of their Law, and the Philosophers out of their maxims. And that 
c jac. 1. 17▪ 1 Tim. 4 4.  every gift, as well as every Creature of God is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of Man; I then conclude with myself, That this moral and philosophical glass of the humane Soul may be of some service even unto the Tabernacle, as the 
d Ex. 38. 8.  Looking glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the Altar.  
N●…r 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of Saint 
c De 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Hierom, who conc●…iving himself in a v●…on beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
d 〈…〉  himself both justifying the 〈◊〉 at use of that kind of Learning, and acknowledg●… 〈◊〉 conce●…d vision of his to have been but a Drea●….  
It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the too great aptness in the minds of man to surfeit and be intemperate, in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading 
a Vi●…. Notas Conradi Rit●…sij i●… Isid. Pelus. Ep. 56. l. 1.  of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulness, in our studies, not for negligence, for the Apostle will tell us. That to the pure all things are pure. And even 
Tertul. 〈◊〉 script. c. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. c. 10. 〈◊〉, Marc. l. 2. c. 〈◊〉.  of harmful things when they are prepared, and their malignancy by Art corrected, doth the skilful physician make an excellent use. If then we be careful to Moderate and Regulate our affections, to take heed of the pride and inslation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel, salvation might be found, in the way of paganism; if we suffer not these lean K●…ne to devour the sat ones, nor the River Jordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I mean Piety to be swallowed up of profane Studies, and the knowledge of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kind of Learning with much greater Felicity, and success:) to be undervalved, and not rather, the more admired, is a Rich jewel compared with glass. In this case, and with such care as this, there is no doubt, but secular Studies prepared and corrected from Pride and profaneness, may be to the Church as the Gt●…eonites were to the Congregation of Israel, for H●…wers of Word, and Drawers of Water, otherwise we may say of them as Cato Major to his 〈◊〉, of the Grecian Art●… and Learning. 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ●…. 13.  Quandocunqu●… ista Gens suas literas dabit, omnia Cor●…umpet.  
Nor have I upon these Considerations only adventured on the publication of this Tract, but because withal, in the reviewing of it, I found very many Touches upon theological Arguments, and some Passages wholly of that Nature. Yea, all the material parts of the Treatise do so nearly concern the knowledge of ourselves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed Borderers upon that Profession.  
In the perusing and fashioning of it for the press, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building; That it is almost as chargeable to repair, and set right an Old house, as to Erect a New one. For I was willing in the most material parts of it, so to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to supply the Defects of Matter, as that with Candid, favourable, and ingenuous judgements, it might receive some toleralle acceptation. In hope whereof I rest,  
Thine in all Christian service, EDWARD REYNOLDS.   

Perlegi Tractatum hunc, cui Titulus (A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the soul, &c) in quo nihil reperio orthodoxae fidei, aut bonis moribus adversum, quo minus cum summa utilitate imprimatur.  
M●… 14. 1640. Tho. Wykes. R. P. Episc. Lond. Capell. domest.   

A Summary of the several Chapters contained in this book.  

Chap. 1. OF the dependence of the Soul in her operations upon the body. Pag. 1.  
Chap. 2. In what cases the dependence of the Soul on the body, is lessened by faith, custom, education, occasion. p. 8.  
Chap▪ 3. Of the Memory, and some few causes of the weakness thereof. p. 13.  
Chap. 4. Of the Fancy its offices to the will and reason, vol●…bility of thoughts fictions, errors, lev●…ty fixedness. p. 18.  
Chap. 5. Of Passions, their Nature and distribution, of the motions of natural creatures, guided by a knowledge without them: and of rational creatures guided by a knowledge within them: of Passions mental sensitive, and rational. p. 31.  
Chap. 6. Of humane Passions in general, th●…ir use, natural, moral, civil: their subordination 〈◊〉, or rebel on against right rea●…n. p▪ ●…1.  
Chap. 7. Of the exercise of Passion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Apathy: of 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cure thereof p. 4●….  
Chap. 8. Of 〈◊〉 ●…ls of Passions, 〈◊〉 th●…y 〈◊〉 virtue: of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, diverti●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, and of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 57  
Chap. 9 Of the affection of Love, of Love natural, of general Communion, of Love rational, the object and general cause thereof. p. 74.  
Chap. 10. Of the rule of true Love: the Love of God and ourselves: similitude to these, the cause of Love in other things: of Love of Concup●…ence: how love begetteth Love: and how pr●…sence with, and absence from the Object, doth upon different reflects exercise and increase Love, p. 81.  
Chap. 11. Of the effects of Love, union to the Object, stay and immoration of the mind upon it, rest in it, zeal●…, strength, and tend●…rnesse towards it, condescension unto it, lique●…ion and languishing for it. p. 98.  
Chap. 12. Of the Passion of ●…atred, the fundamental cause or object thereof, evil: How fare forth evils willed by God, may be declined by men, of God's se●…t and revealed will. p. 111.  
Chap. 13. Of the other causes of Hatred secret Antipathy▪ Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, 〈◊〉, base sears, disparity of Desires, a fixed jealous 〈◊〉. p. 119.  
Chap. 14. Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred▪ and how 〈◊〉 either respects it is to be regulated. p. 131.  
Chap. 15. Of the 〈◊〉 and evil Effects of Hatred, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wisdom to profit by that we hate, w●…th Confidence, Victory▪ Reformation. Hatred, in general against the whole kind, cunning ●…ss 〈◊〉, cruelty, running ●…ver to persons Innocent, vielating Religion. Envy, Rejoy●…ing at evil. Creeked suspicion, contempt, contumely. p. 137.  
Chap. 16. Of the affection of Desire, what it is. The several kinds of it, natural, rational, spiritual, intemperate, unnatural morbid Desires. The Object of the●…, good, pleasant, as possible, as absent, either in whole, or in degrees of perfection, or continuance. The most general internal cause vacuity, indigence other causes, admiration▪ greatness of mind, curio▪ sity. p. 161.  
Chap. 17. Of other causes of Desire, Infirmity, Temerity, Mutability of mind, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope, of the effects of it in general labour, languor. In special, of rational Desires, bounty, grief, weariness, indignation against that which withstands it. Of vicious Desires, deception, ingratitude, envy, greediness, baseness of Resolution. p. 177.  
Chap. 18. Rules touching our Desires. Desires of lower Objects, must not be either Hasty, or unbounded, such are unnatural, turbid, unfruitful, unthankful. Desires of heavenly objects fixed, permanent, industrious, connexion of virtues, sluggish desires. p. 190.  
Chap, 19 Of the affection of joy or delight, the several objects thereof, corporal, moral, intellectual, Divine. p. 197.  
Chap. 20. Of the causes of joy.. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, changes by accident a cause of Delight. p. 203.  
Chap. 21. Of other causes of Delight, unexpectedness of a good, strength of Desire. Imagination, Imitation. Fitness and accommodation. Of the effects of this Passion: Reparation of Nature, Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, satiety in base. Whetting of Industry. Atmorous unbelief. p. 211  
Chap▪ 22. Of the affection of sorrow the object of it, evil▪ sensitive, intellectual as present in itself, or to the mind, by memory, or suspicion, particular causes, effects of it, fear, Care, Experience, Erudition, Irresolution, despair, Execration, Distempers of body, p. 221.  
Chap. 23. Of the affection of Hope, the Object of it, Good, Future, Possible, Difficult. Of Regular and inordinate despair. p. 233.  
Chap. 24. Of the causes of Hope, Want, and weakness together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sense Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and know ledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more than Precept, provision of aides: the uncertainty of outward means to establish Hope, goodness of Nature, Faith, and Cred●…lity▪ wise Confidence. p. 240.  
Chap. 25. Of the effects of Hope: Stability of mind▪ weariness, arising not out of weakness, but out of want, Contention, and forthputting of the mind. Patience under the want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good desired, waiting upon aid expected. p. 254.  
Chap. 26. Of the affection of boldness, what it is, the causes of it, strong Desires, strong Hopes, aids, Supplies, real or in Opinion. Despair and extremities, experience, ignorance, Religion, immunity from danger, Dext●…rity of Wit, Strength of Love, Pride or greatness of mind and Abilities. The effects of it, Executi●…n of things advised, Temerity, etc. p. 258.  
Chap. 27. Of the Passion of fear: the causes of it, Impotency, Obno●…ousnesse, suddenness, nearness, newness, Conscience, Ignerance of an evil. p. 274.  
Chap. 28. Of the effects of fear, suspicion, Circumspection, Superstition, betraying the succours of Reason, fear generative, rest●…cting inward wea●…ning the Faculties of the mind, base Susp●…tion, wise Caution. p. 210.  
Chap. 29. Of that particular affection of fear▪ which is called shame, what it is. Whom we thus fear. The ground of it evil of Turpitude. Injustice, Intemperance, sordidness, So●…nesse, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vainglory, Misfortun●…, Ignorance pragmaticalness, Deformity, greatness of mind, unworthy Correspondencies, etc. Shame, v●…ous, and virtuous. p. 300.  
Chap. 30. Of the affection of Anger, the distinctions of it, The fundamental cause thereof contempt. Three kinds of Contempt, dis●…estimation disappointment, Calumny. p. 31●….  
Chap. 31. Of other causes of Anger: first in regard of him that suffers wrong: Excellency, weakness, strong d●…sires, sus●…ition, Next ●…regard of him who doth it; Rasenesse, Impudence, nearness, freedom of speech, Contention, Ability, the effects of Anger, the immutation of the Body▪ Impulsion of Reason, Exp●…dition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Passion. p. 322.  
Chap. 32, Of the original of the Reasonable soul whither it be immediately created and i●…sused, 〈◊〉 derived by seminal Traduction from the Parents. Of the derivation of original sin. p. 391.  
Chap. 33. Of the Image of God in the Reasonable soul in regard of its simplicity, and spirituality. p. 400.  
Chap. 34. Of the souls Immortality proved by its simplicity, independence, agreement. Of Nations in acknowledging a God and duties due to him, dignity above other creatures, power of understanding things immortal, unsatisfiableness by Objects mortal, freeness from all causes of corruption. p. 407.  
Chap. 35. Of the honour of humane bodies by creation, by resurrection, of the endowments of glorified bodies. p. 420.  
Chap. 36. Of that part of God's image in the soul, which answereth to his Power, wisdom, Knowledge, holiness. Of man's dominion over other Creatures. Of his love to Knowledge, what remainders we retain of original justice. p. 429.  
Chap. 37. Of the Faculty of understanding, it's operation outward upon the object. Inward upon the will. Of Knowledge, what it is. The natural desire and love of it. Apprehension, judgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Several kinds of Knowledge. The original Knowledge given unto man in his Creation. The benefits of Knowledge, of Ignorance natural, voluntary, penal, of Curiosity, of Opinion, the causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an acute versutilo●…snesse of conceits, the benefits of modest Hesitancy. p. 444.  
Chap. 38. Of errors: the causes thereof. The abuses of Principles, falsifying them: or transferring the truth of them out of their own bounds. Affectations of singularity, and novel courses. Credulity and thraldom of judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular objects corrupteth judgement. Curiosity in searching things secret. p. 483  
Chap▪ 39 The actions of the understanding, inventition, Wit, judgement: of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: Of Tradition by speech, Writing: Of the Dignities and Corruption of speech. p. 500  
Chap. 40. Of the Actions of the understanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and means. The power of the understanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks only at Good present. Two Acts of the understanding, Knowledge and Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happiness immortal. Ignorance and weakness in the understanding, in proposing the right means to the last End. p. 517.  
Chap. 41. Of the Conscience; its Offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, watchfulness, Memory, Impartiality. Of Consciences Ignorant, Superstitious, Sleeping▪ frightful, Tempestuous. p. 531.  
Chap. 42. Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chief Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and persuasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanical Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wills Operaation, Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion. p. 537.    

A TREATISE of the Passions and Faculties of the soul of MAN.  
CHAP. I. Of the dependence of the soul, in her operations upon the Body.  
IT hath been a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually we are more curious in our inquiries 
Cic. de diu. lib. 2.  after things New than excellent; 
Plin. lib. 2. ep. 20.  and that the very nearness of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknown. Thus like Children, with an idle diligence, and fruitless curiosity, we turn over this great book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary Characters, wherein is expressed the greatest power of the Worker, and excellency of the work; fixing our Admiration only on those Pictures and unusual Novelties, which though for their rareness they are more strange, yet for their nature are less worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder, 
Cic. d●… Nat. Deor. lib. 2.  than those glorious lamps of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowledged a divineness. Let a Child be borne but with six fingers, or have a part more than usual, we rather wonder at One supers●…uous, than at All natural. Sol spectatorem nisi cum desicit non habet, nemo observat Lunam 
Sen. qu. Nat. lib. 7. c. 1.  nisi laborantem, adeò naturale est magis nova, quàm magna mirari: None looketh with wonde●… on the sun, but in an Eclipse; no eye gazeth on the moon, but in her travel: so natural it is with men, to admire rather things N●…w than Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for study and observation, though never so common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and usefulness of their knowledge. In which respect, the plain counsel of the Oracle was one of the wi●…est which was ever given to man, To study and to know himself; because, by reason of his own nearness to himself, he is usually of himself most unknown and neglected. And yet if we consider, how in him it hath pleased God to stamp a more notable Character of his own Image, and to make him, amongst all his 
Sen. de 〈◊〉. lib. 6. c. 23.  works, one of the most perfect Models of created excellency, we cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the least, yet of the fittest Volumes, in this great variety of Nature to be acquainted withal. Intending therefore, according to my weakness, to take some view of the inside, and more noble Characters of this book, it will not be needful for me to gaze upon the Cover, to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his anatomy; though even in that respect the Psalmist tells us, that he is fearfully and wonderfully made: for we commonly see, that as most kind of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility; so, many sorts of 
Sen. Ep. 76.  beasts have a greater activity and exquisiteness in their senses than we. And the reason hereof is, because Nature aiming at a superior and more excellent end, is in those lower faculties less intent and elaborate. It shall suffice therefore, only to lay a groundwork in these lower faculties, for the better notice of man's greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependence on them. For whereas the principal acts of man's soul are either of Reason and Discourse, proceeding from his understanding; or of Action and morality, from his Will; both these, in the present condition of man's estate, have their dependence on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one precede, in the other follow: To the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey; to the other as Messengers, to perform and execute: To the one, the whole Body is as an Eye, through which it seethe; to the other a Hand, by which it worketh.  
Concerning the ministry therefore of the Body unto the soul, we shall thus resolve; That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinary and natural operations, upon 
Solirus de 〈◊〉 ●…esert quid accepto 〈◊〉 in ●…ccipitio ad tantam devenit ignorantiam ut ●…esciret se ha●…isse nomen. Honori●… 〈◊〉. de Philosoph. M●…di, lib. 4. c. 24.  the happy or disordered temperature of those vital Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these ministerial parts have not any overruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the soul▪ Whence we find, that sundry diseases of the Body do oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the mind. For, as wheresoever there is a locomotive faculty, though there be the principal cause of all motion and activity; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinews be dis-jointed, shrunk, or any other ways indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actual motion; Or as in the Body Politic▪ the Prince (whom Seneca calleth the soul of the commonwealth) 
Sen. de Clem. lib. 1. cap▪ 4.  receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelity or negligence of those instruments▪ whom Xenophon termeth the Eyes and ears of Kings: In 
Xenop▪ Cyrop. lib. 8. & Arist. Polit. lib. 3. c. 12.  like manner, the soul of man being not an absolute independent worker, but receiving all her objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which Cicero calleth the Messengers to the soul, if they out of any indisposition shall be weakened, the soul must continue like a Rasa Tabula, without any acquired or introduced habits. The soul hath not immediately from itself that strange weakness, which is observed in many men, but only▪ as it is disabled by earthy and sluggish Organs; which being out of order, are more burdensome than serviceable thereunto.  
There are observable in the souls of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequality of operation: the former of these I do not so ascribe to that bodily weakness, whereby the soul is any way oppressed, as if I conceived no internal darkness in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man working in him a general corruption, did amongst the rest infatuate the Mind, and as it were smother the soul with ignorance; so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments, is only a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of men's understandings in their several operations, notwithstanding it be questioned in the schools, Whether the souls of men have not originally, in their Nature, degrees of perfection and weakness, whence these several degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheless that being granted, I suppose, that principally it proceeds from the variety, tempers, and dispositions in the instrumental faculties of the Body▪ by the help whereof, the soul in this estate worketh: for I cannot perceive it possible, that there should have been, if man had continued in his innocence, (wherein our Bodies should have had an exact constitution, free from those distempers to which now by sin they are liable) such remarkable differences between men's apprehensions, as we now see there are: for there should have been in all men a great facility to apprehend the mysteries of Nature, and to acquire knowledge (as we see in Adam) which now we find in a large measure granted to some, and to others quite denied. And yet in that perfect estate (according to the opinion of those who now maintain it) there would have been found a substantial and internal inequality amongst the souls of men: and therefore principally this variety comes from the sundry constitutions of men's bodies; in some, yielding enablement, for quickness of Apprehension; in others, pr●…ssing down and intangling the understanding; in some, disposing the mind unto one object; in some, unto another; according as the impetus and force of their natural affections carrieth them. And therefore Aristotle in his politics ascribeth the inequality 
Arist. Polit. lib. 7.  which he observes between the Asiatic and European Wits, unto the several Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they lived; according whereunto, the Complexions and Constitutions of their Bodies only 
Arist. de Anim●…▪ lib. 3.  could be altered; the soul being in itself, according to the same Philosopher, impassable from any corporeal Agent. And to the same purpose again he saith, That if an old man had a young man's eye, his sight would be as sharp and as distinct as a young man's is; implying 〈◊〉 diversity of Perception to be grounded on●…ly on the diversity of bodily instruments, by which it is exercised. And therefore he elsewhere observes 
De Anima, lib. 2.  (I shall not trouble myself to examine upon what ground) that men of soft and tender skins have greatest quickness of wit; and on the contrary, Duri Carne, inepti●…mente: thereby intimating, that there is no more significant and lively expression of a vigorous or heavy soul, than a happy or ill-ordered Body; wherein we may sundry times read the abilities of the mind, and the inclinations of the Will: So than it is manifest, that this weakness of apprehension in the souls of men, doth not come from any immediate and proper darkness belonging unto them; but only from the coexistence which they have with a Body ill-disposed for assistance and information. For he who is carried in a Coach (as the Body is vehiculum animae) though he be of himself more nimble and active, must yet receive such motion as that affords; and Water, which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts, though its motion by itself would have been otherwise, must yet then be limited by the posture and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.   

CHAP. II. In what Cases the dependence of the soul on the Body, is lessened by Faith, custom, Education, Occasion.  
But yet this dependence on the Body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the soul be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the Body: And this first, in extraordinary; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the soul, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others▪ wherein the soul is carried beyond the Sphere of Sense, and transported unto more raised operations: For to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy endeavours those joys which eye hath not seen, nor care heard, and to have some glimpses and fore-taste of them, which Saint Paul calleth the Earnest, and first fruits of the Spirit; What is this, but to leave sense behind us, and to outrun our Bodies? And therefore it is, that Religion, I mean chiefly, the Principles, Foundations, Articles, and Mysteries Evangelicall, were always not to be urged by Disputes of Secular Learning, but to be sacredly and secretly infused; not so much persuading to the knowledge 
I v●…ngel. None in deget Sylle●…  of apparent Truths▪ as drawing to the beleese of true Mysteries. Divine Truths do as much transcend the Reason▪ as Divine goodness doth the Will of Man. That One Nature should be in Three Persons, and Two Natures in One Person: That the invisible God should be manifested in the flesh, and a pure Virgin bring forth a son; That Death should be conquered by dying, and not be able to digest and consume the Body which it had devoured: That dead bones should live, and they who dwell in the dust awake and sing: These are Mysteries, not only above the reach of Humane, but even of Evangelicall disquisition; in somuch, that even unto Principalities and Powers they were not otherwise made known, but by Divine Revelation delivered unto the Church. Sarah laughed, when Abraham believed; and the Philosophers mocked, when Paul disputed; and Reason expected, that the Apostle should have fallen down dead, when contrarily, Faith shaken the Viper into the fire. There is a great difference between the manner of yielding our assent unto God and Nature: For in philosophy, we never resign our beleese, nor suffer our judgements to be wholly carried to any Conclusion, till there be a demonstrative Argument grounded on Induction from the Sense, for the enforcement thereof. But divinity, on the other side, whe●… God speaks unto us, worketh Science by Faith▪ making us so much the more assured of thos●… Truths which it averreth, than of any Natural●… Conclusions, (notwithstanding they may seem●… sometimes to bear opposition to humane Reason) by how much Divine authority is more absolute and certain, than any natural demonstration. And this freedom from bodily restraint, have (according to the schoolmen) those Raptures and ecstasies, which raise and ravish the soul, with the sweetness of extraordinary Contemplations. And yet even Religion itself hath so much condescended to the senses of men, as to give them manner of room and service in this great mystery. And therefore generally, the Doctrine of Christ is set forth in Parables and Similitudes, and the Faith in Christ confirmed by Sacraments; things most agreeable to the perception and capacity of the Senses.  
Now, for the exemption of the more ordinary actions of the soul from any predominancy of the Body, it is chiefly wrought by these three means, Education, custom, and Occasion. For the Rule of Aristotle, though in Agents purely 
Vid. Arist. ●…ic. lib. 10. c. 9 ●…ic. l. 2. c. 1.  natural and peremptory (which are not directed by any degree of knowledge inherent) it held true; yet in Man it is not universal, That any thing which comes from Nature, is unalterable by custom: For we commonly observe, that the Culture of the mind, as of the Earth, doth many times deliver it from the barrenness of its own Nature.  
Exercetque frequens tellurem atque imperat arvis;  

As frequent Husbandry commands  
The emptiest and most barren Lands.   
Education then, and custom, do as it were revenge Nature; insomuch, that though the outward Humours and Complexions do work the Mind unto an unhappy temper, yet by a continual grappling with these difficulties, it getteth at the last some victory, though not without much reluctancy.  
And for Occasion; that altars the natural inclination of the Will and Affections, rather than of the understanding: for so we see, that the bias and force of men's desires are oftentimes turned, by reason of some sudden emergent occurrences, contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the Body. Thus we read some times of men in war; who notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet when the disadvantage of the place had taken away all possibility of flight, and the cruelty of the adversary all hope of mercy, if they should be conquered, have strangely gained by their own despairs, and gotten great and prosperous Victories, by a forced and unnatural fortitude.  una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem. 

The only weapon which did win the day,  
Was their despair, that they were cast away.   
An example whereof, we have in the Philistims: 
1 Sa●…. 4 6, 7, 8  When the Israelites brought forth the Ark of the Lord in the camp, they were sore afraid, and cried out, Woe unto us, woe unto us; who shall deliver us out of the hands of these mighty Gods? And thereupon resolved to quit themselves like men, and fight. And Caesar in his Commentaries telleth us of a people▪ who when 
Caesar Com. ●…1.  they went out to war, would burn their Houses; that having no Home of their own, to fly unto, they might by that despair, be urged to gain one by the Sword. The Historian reporteth of a Band of Scythians, who though they 
justin.  were of themselves bondslaves, did notwithstanding, upon occasion of their master's absence, endeavour to shake off their inbred civility; usurping to themselves a freedom, of which the baseness of their condition was uncapable: Nor could they be removed from this insolency, till the sight of Rods and Staves, and other the like instruments of fear, had driven them back into their Nature again.   

CHAP. III. Of the memory, and some few causes of the weakness thereof.  
NOw for these inward Senses, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themselves unto sundry operations of differing qualities) ●… take the two later, to wit, memory, and fancy, or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man; as being indeed the principal storehouses and Treasuries of the o●…●…ons of the soul. Where▪ by memory, I under stand not the faculty, as it is common to beas●…s with men, and importeth nothing but the simple retention, and conservation of some species, formerly treasured up by the conveyance of the outward sense: but as it is Censors & co-operatrix Rationis, ●…s Hugo speaks, a joynt-worker in the 
Lib. de spirit. & anima.  operations of Reason; which the Latins call Reminiscentia, or Recordatio; including some acts of the understanding▪ Which is a reviewing, or (as we speak) a calling to mind of former objects, by discourse, or rational searching for them; which is made by Aristotle to be the remote ground of all Arts: For (saith he) memory is the Ground of Experience, and Experience 
Metaph. lib. 1.  the Mother of Art: The dignity hereof in man, is seen, both by perfecting the understanding▪ in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity; as Seneca the elder confess 
Sen. Contr●…. l●…b. 1. ●…n 〈◊〉.  confesseth of himself, who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had been spoken before to him; and Cyrus, of 
〈◊〉. lib. 7. c. 24.  whom Zenophon testifieth, that he could salute all the soldiers in his army by their Names▪ and Mithridates, who being King over twenty 
Quintil. lib. 1●…. c. 2.  two countries▪ did speak so many Languages without an Interpreter; and Politian in his Epis●…les telleth of Fabius Vrsinus, a Child but of a 
Pol●…. Ep. l. 12. ad ●…ic. Mi●…d.  eleven years of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and memory, that ●…ee could unto five or six several persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many several Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be so close▪ proper, and coherent within i●… self, as if it alone had been intended:) As also by affording special assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in morality, or unto Principles of wisdom and public Prudence▪ gathered from historical observations; while the mind, by the help of memory, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with Examples for any service and employment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances, and passages of affairs together, enable itself with the more hope and resolution, to pass successfully through any enterprise or difficulty: for qui credit sp●…rat, he that believeth, and is acquainted with the happy issue of other men's resolutions, will with the less anxiety or discouragement go on in his own.  
The principal Corruptions which I conceive of the memory, are first, too much slightness and shallowness of observation; when out of an impatiency of staying long, or making any pro●…ound enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curiosity to seed on many, the greediness of the appetite weakeneth the digestion, (for so some have called the memory, the Belly of the soul) and an eagerness to take in, makes uncarefull to retain. And this is the reason, why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining real improvement, or solidity in any: They make not any solemn journey to a particular Coast, and Head of Learning, but view all as it were in Transitu; having no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such men as these (except endowed with an incredible and usual felicity of dispatch) are no more able to find the use, or search the bottom of any Learning, than he who rides Poast, is to make a description and Map of his journeys: who, though by much employment, he may toil and sweat more in travelling from place to place; yet is he fare less able to discover the nature of the countries, temperature of the air, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, than he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode: and though his haste be less eager, yet his observations are more serious. Omnis festinatio coeca est, saith Seneca; precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the Wit as of the Body, dazzleth and disableth the eyes: And it is true in the mind, as in the stomach; too quick digestion doth always more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning. Nor can I call that so much study, as agitation and restlessness of the mind; which is as impatient of true settled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of mind as this, is corruptive to the memory, is first, because memory is always joined with some measure of Love; and we most of all remember that, which we most respect: Omnia quae ●…urant meminerunt; There where the Treasure is, the mind will be also: There therefore, where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithful. So, that sudden vanishing, and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager Love for the present, of what we 
Arill. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 12.  pursue, and by consequence, ●… fastidium and disesteem of that which we soon forsake▪ so do they necessarily infer weakness on the memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as Seneca speaks, Cad●…ca memoria 
De Benef. lib. 3 c. 3.  futura iminentium; Men strongly bend upon things future, have but weak memories of things past.  
Secondly, the body of any one homogeneal Learning, hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it do by a mutual service relate to, and communicate strength and lustre each to other: so that he who goes through with any Science, doth from every new Branch and Conclusion which he meets with, receive a greater clearness and more strong impression of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatiency of that Restraint, cannot endure to go through an Art, to search into the Root, to observe the knit and dependencies of the parts amongst themselves, to see by what passages Truth is derived from the Principles, to this or to other Branches; must needs be so much the more forgetful of what he knows, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.  
Other causes there are of weakness in the 
Qui●…til. lib. 11. c. 2.  memory; as namely, a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon Plato telleth us, that the use of Letters, in gathering Adversaria and Collections, is a hindrance to the memory; because those things which we have deposited to our Desks, we are the more secure and careless to retain in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great Confidence in it, and thereupon an overburdening it with multitude of Notions; whereby as it sheds much over, so it is withal indisposed for the ready use of what it retains; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never so easily find out, or order and dispose what we desire to use▪ but are confounded in our own store. But I forbear to insist on these, because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of Man.   

CHAP. iu. Of the fancy: Its offices to the Will and Reason, Uolubilitie of Thoughts, Fictions, Errors, levity, fixedness.  
NOw for the Imagination, the dignity thereof consists, either in the office, or in the latitude of it: Its office, is to be assistant both to the understanding and the Will; its assistance to the understanding, is principally in matter of Invention, readily to supply it with variety of objects whereon to work, as also to quicken and raise the mind with a kind of heat and rapterie proportionable in the inferior part of the soul, to that which in the superior, Philosophers call Ext●…sie; whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its prope●… obje●…, as makes the motions thereof towards it, to be restless and impatient: And of this, is that of the Poet;  Est Deus in nobis agitante ealescimus ipso: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ar●…st. Prob●…. c. 30.  

By Divine Raptures we aspire,  
And are inflamed with noble fire.   
The office of the Imagination to the Will, is to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object: for it often cometh to pass, that some plausible fancy doth more prevail with tender Wills, than a severe and sullen Argument, and hath more powerful insi●…uations to persuade, than the peremptoriness of Reason hath to command. And the reason ●…ereof is, because liberty being natural unto man's Will, that course must needs most of all gain upon it, which doth offer least force unto its liberty: Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, than of constraint; and best of all, when a rational and convincing Argument is so sweetened and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he shall be content to entertain Truth, for the very beauty and attire of it; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reason that overruled, or the elegancy that enticed him. A man can be well pleased, to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilful and curious hand. And therefore, in that great work of men's conversion unto God, he is said to allure them, and to speak comfortably unto them, to beseech, 
Hosea ●…. 14. a Cor. 5. 17. ●…ant. 5. 10, 16. Hag. 2. 7. Rom. 11. 1●…. Ephes. 38. 1 Tim. 1. 15.  and to persuade them; to set forth Chris●… to the soul, as altogether lovely, as the fairest 〈◊〉 ten thousand, as the desire of the Nations, as th●… Riches of the World, that men might be inflame●… to love the beauty of holiness. That whic●… must persuade the Will, must not only have 〈◊〉 truth, but a worthiness in it: in which respect, the Principles of Knowledge are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy or honourable speeches: and the Gospe●… is not only called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a true saying; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a worthy saying; and in that respect▪ fitted for acceptation. It is true of the Will, which Seneca hath observed of Princes; Ap●… Reges etiam quae prosunt ita tamen ●…t delectent su●…denda sunt: That unto them even things profitable must be represented with the face rathe●… of delight than of necessity; even as Physicians, when they minister a very wholesome Potion:  — Prius or as pocula circum 
L●…t. lib. 4. Plut. de edu●… call. liberorum.  Contingunt d●…lci mellis flavoque liquore: 

That they their Patients may both please & cure,  
With mixed-sweets their palates they allure.   
And hence is that observation, that the first reformers and drawers of men into civil society▪ and the practice of virtue, wrought upon the Will by the ministry rather of the fancy, than of rigid Reason; not driving them thereunto by punctual Arguments, but alluring them by the sweetness of Eloquence; not pressing the necessi●…ie of morality, by naked inserences, but rather secretly instilling it into the Will, that it might at last find itself reform, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those musical, poetical, and mythological persuasions; whereby men in their discourses, did as it were paint virtues and Vices; giving unto spiritual things Bodies and Beauties, such as might best affect the Imagination: Yea, God himself hath been pleased to honour this way of setting out higher Notions, in that we find some room in the holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the Vine, the figtree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes, and poetical Numbers and 
judg. 18. 14. 12. Host 12. 10.  Raptures, whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth, and do condescend unto humane frailties. And another reason hereof is, because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects; so that those inducements must needs have most authority, which have that happy mixture of 〈◊〉 & dulce together; not only pressing necessity upon the understanding, but pointing as it were and deciphering delight to the fancy. And this reason Scaliger 
S●…. sub●…il. 307. 11.  gives in his Inquirie, how false Things, such as Plato his Elysium, Homer's Fictions, Orph●…us his music, should delight wise men: Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limites veritatis, saith he; because they are not exacted to the rigour and strictness of Reason, nor grounded on the severity of Truth, but are (as I may so speak) the Creation of the fancy, having a kind of delightful liberty in them, wherewith they refresh and do is it were open and unbind the Thoughts, which otherwise, by a continual pressure in exacter and more massy reasonings, would easily tire and despair.  
Concerning the Latitude of this faculty, it hath there in a double prerogative above others▪ one, in the multiplicity of Operations; another, in the framing of Objects. To the former of these, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reason of their quickness and volubility, and withal, their continual interchanges and successions, are the most numberless operations of the soul of man: where, by Thoughts, I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects; for when the Mind gins once to be fixed, and standing, I call that rather Meditation than Thought. This multiplicity of Thoughts is grounded first upon the abundance of their Objects; and next, upon the quickness and activity of Apprehension; that is the matter, this the form of those Thoughts which I now speak of. The abundance of Objects is seen in this, that it includes all the varieties of species belonging to other faculties; as that knowledge which the schools call Philosophia prima, doth within its own limits draw in, in some sort, all the several Objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will, flying and pursuing Thoughts, wish, and loathe; and there are Thoughts belonging to the understanding, assenting and dissenting Thoughts, belief and dis-opinion: There are Thoughts likewise proceeding from Anger, fiery and revengeful Thoughts; from envy, knowing and repining Thoughts; from joy, sweet and refreshing Thoughts; from Conscience, comforting and affrightful Thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quickness of Working, the motions of the Thoughts show it, in the concu●…rence of these two things, suddenness of journey, and vastness of way; while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the universe untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is ab extrinsec●…, and dispersed over things, (though they are not otherwise the Objects of Thought, than as the Mind reflecteth on the Phan●…asmata or images of them in this faculty) but the latter, which is the quickness of Apprehension, though it may seem to be the most peculiar work of Reason, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper work of the understanding, yet the form and quality of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in 
Vid. A. Gell. lib. 9 c. 1. Aug. de Civ. Dei, lib. 9 c. 4.  that strict sense, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightness, volubility, and suddenness thereof, proceeds from the immediate restlessness of the Imagination; as is plain, by the continual variety of dreams and other Fancies, wherein the faculty is the principal worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a property of boldness beyond other faculties: For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they always frame themselves to the truth of things, yielding assent to nothing but what they find: But the Imagination is a faculty boundless, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which itself maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of persuasion and insinuation, poetry, mythology, and Eloquence (the Arts of rational fancy) have ever (as was observed) been more forcible than those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason; it being (as Scaliger observes) the natural infiniteness of man's soul. Aspernari c●…rtorum sinium praescriptionem, to disdain any bounds and confines in her operations.  
Now, the liberty of the Imagination in this particular, is threefold; Creation, as I may so speak, and n●…w making of Objects; Composition, or new mixing them; and Translation, or new placing them: unto some of which three, will be reduced all poetical Fictions, fabulous Transmutations, high Metaphors, and rhetorical Allegories; things of excellent use, and ornament in speech.  
Now, for the Corruptions and Diseases of this faculty, I conceive the principal to be 
Aug. Epist. 72. ad N●…brid.  these three, Error, levity, and dull fixedness: The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it suffereth: That the fancy is fruitful in producing Error, is as manifest, as it is difficult to show the manner how it doth it. Hence, those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Mind of melancholy men (in whom this faculty hath the most deep and piercing operation) have been peremptorily possessed: Hence, those vanishing and sh●…dowie Assurances, Hopes, fears, joys, Visions, which the dreams of men (the immediate issues of this faculty) do produce: Hence those ghastly Apparitions, dreadful Sounds, black Thoughts, tremble, and Horrors, which the strong working of Imagination doth present unto, or produce in men; disquieted either with the ugliness of their sins, or heaviness of their Natures, making them to fear, where no fear is: which, whether it be done by affecting only the fancy, or by the impression of such forms and shapes upon the Spirits, which go unto the outward senses, as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest, not only by various relations, but by continual experience, what strong and strange effects those distempers have produced.  
Neither are we to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind 
A●…l ●… rob. Sect. 10. ●…. 12, 〈◊〉. ●…b. 7. c. 1●….  wrought by the same faculty, and, as is probable, by the same means; I mean, the impression o●… likeliness of an Infant in the womb, unto the Parents, or some other, who shall work a stronger conceit in the fancy: Or if this be not ascribed 
〈◊〉 d●… 〈◊〉. co●…a.  unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret real virtue intrinsecall unto the Seed of the Parents (as many do affirm) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the fancy, must needs be hereunto ascribed, As we see cometh often to pass, in the longing of Women; and in her, who having the picture of an Ethioplan in her Chamber, brought forth a black 
Aug. in Gen. 〈◊〉 93.  Child; and in the course which Jacob took, 〈◊〉 putting speckled Rods before the cattles, when they were to conceive, that the sancie of them might make their lambs to be ring-straked and speckled.  
The Errors which are in the fancy, are usually 
Vid. 〈◊〉, ●…n 〈◊〉. E●…th. l●…b. 7. c. 5. & w●…tn. de P●…▪ Q. g. D●…m. l. 2. c. 24, 25, 26. & l. 3. ●…. 21.  of the same nature with those that are wrought by it: Such was the Error of that man, which would not be persuaded, but that he had on his head a great pair of horns, and for that reason would not move forth nor uncover his face to any. And the causes of these Errors are 
Fran. Mi●…nd. ●…. de I●…g. c. 8. Aug. de Civ. De●…, ●… 18. c. 18 the divi●…. Daemon. c. 5, 6.  by Francis Mirandula ascribed first to the variety of tempers in the Body, with the predominancy of those humours which give complexion thereunto: secondly, to the imposture of the Senses: thirdly, to the government of the Will, (though that, as is granted, hath least power over this faculty) and last, to the ministry of evil Angels, who can easily cast into the fancy strange and false species, with such subtlety, as shall easily gain them plausible credit and admittance. And of this, we find an express example (as I conceive) in that evil spirit▪ who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahabs' Prophets. For the vision: of such men being for the most part imaginary, the impression of that lying and deceitful persuasion was, in all probability, made upon the Imagination. For, notwithstanding I confess, that Prophets had events by divers means revealed unto them, as by true Voices, by real access of Angels, and by immediate illapse of Truth into the understanding; yet because those two ways, by Visions and by 
Numb. 12. 6. Joel ●…. 28.  dreams, were (for aught can be observed) the most usual means of Revelation; it is not unlikely, that the Devil (who in such things strives, for the better advancement of his own ends, to imitate God's manner of working) did by this manner of imposture on the Imagination, seek to possess the false Prophets, and to delude the King.  
And here, by the way from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the misery of man's corrupted Nature; wherein those Faculties which were originally ordained for mutual assistance, do now exercise a mutual imposture: and as man did join with a fellow-creature to dishonour, and if it had been possible, to deceive his Maker; so in the Faculties of man, we may discover a joint conspiracy in the working of their own overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy, in one to be deluded by another.  
The next Corruption which I observed, is the levity and too much volubility of this Power, proceeding from the overhasty obtrusion of the species. For, notwithstanding I grant the quickness of its operations to be one principal part of the excellency thereof; yet I thereby understand the Power, not the infirmity; the Nature, not the Disease of that faculty; the ability of having speedy recourse unto variety of Objects, treasured up in the memory; or of apprehending new, with dexterity; not that floating and inconstant humour, whereby it makes many needless excursions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needful and present operations of the soul. For, since it may fall out, that unto the same faculty, from diversity of occasions, contrary operations may prove arguments of worth; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakness and defect, in that it straitneth and defraudeth the power of those advantages which it might receive, by a timely application of the other: There may be a time, when the fancy may have liberty to expatiate; but again, some objects will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore, to have a vanishing and lightning fancy, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but as an Hanging of divers Colours, shall in one view present unto the understanding an heap of species, and so distract its intention; argues not sufficiency, but weakness and distemper in this faculty.  
The last Corruption observed, is in the other 
Arist. Pro●…. Sect. 29.  extreme; I mean, that heaviness and sluggish fixedness, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the understanding, in those actions which require dispatch, variety, and suddenness of execution: from which peremptory adhesion and too violent intention of the fancy on some particular objects, doth many times arise not only a dulness of Mind, a Syncope, and kind of benumnednesse of the soul, but oftentimes madness, distraction, and torment: Many examples 
Lu●…ian. in ●…uciosive Asin●…. Apul. in Asin●…. ●… lin. lib. 7. c▪ 2●…. Ola●…. Magnus' de Region. 〈◊〉. l. 18. c▪ 45▪ 46, 47. 〈◊〉 de ●… 〈◊〉. l. 3. c. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad littus ●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, credidit ap●…d 〈◊〉.  of which kind of depravation of the fantasy in melancholy men, we every where meet withal; some, thinking themselves turned into Wolves, Horses, or other Beasts; others, pleasing themselves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principalities; some, framing to themselves fears, and other Hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreams of a dist●…mpered fancy.  

His ego saepè Lupum fieri & se condere Sylvis 
Virg. Eclog. 8.   
Moerim, saepè animas imis exire sepul●…ris,  
Atque salas alio vidi traducere messes:   

Here o●…en I have seen this Moeris work  
Himself into a wolf, and into Woods lurk;  
O●… have I seen him raise up ghosts from Hell,  
And growing corn translate by magic Spell.   
And upon this overstrong working and stay of the fancy on some one or other object, it hath of●…entimes come to pass, that some men, out of depth of contemplation on some difficulties of Learning, (as is reported of Aristotle, in his meditation on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea) others, out of some strong and predominant passion, as Love, fear, despair, drawing all the intention of the Mind unto them, have attempted such strange practices on themselves, and others, as could not proceed but from a smothered and entangled Reason. And thus much briefly shall suffice, touching the honour of man's common and inferior Faculties.   

CHAP. v Of Passions, their nature, and distribution; of the Motions of natural Creatures, guided by a knowledge without them; and of rational Croatures, guided by a knowledge within them: of Passions mental, Sensitive, and rational.  
Enough proceed unto the soul of Man: of which, I must speak in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within itself: under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of man's mind, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as fare as my weakness can discover) which the soul and Body contracted from them.  
Passions are nothing else, but those natural, perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the wisdom, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own several spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodness beareth a natural conveniency or vertu●… of satisfaction unto them; or by an antipathy and aversation from those, which bearing a contrariety to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures. This being the prop●…rtie of all unconstrained self▪ motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Passions, is principally the good; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evil of things: as one beareth with it rationem convenientiae, a quieting and satisfacto rye; the other, rationem disconvenienti●…, a disturbing and destroying nature.  
This being premised touching the nature and general essence of Passions, the division of them must be then grounded; because (as philosophy teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their essential distinctions from their objects, and those several respects wherewith they in order to the faculty are qualified. Now, since all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction of some Knowledge; from the diversity of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions.  
Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be considered, either as disjoined, and extrinsecall to the things moved, or 〈◊〉 intrinsical and united thereunto; both which serve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vain motions, ●…ut might ever work towards that fixed end, which God hath appointed them to move ●…nto.  
Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of merely natural Agents; which are guided to their general or particular ends, by the wisdom and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptory and uniform order, observed by these kind of Agents in their natural course, never either swarving or desisting therefrom, so fare as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they work permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variableness nor shadow of changing. And therefore we find those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law only, or at least principally in these inferior things; wherein partly from the deficiency and languishing of secondary Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutability, and the like exigences of matter, we find sundry times error and enormity in their several works and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beauty of regular operations (which by deformity and confusion will appear more beautiful; or whether the original thereof be divine mal●…diction, which for the sin of man he pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service, (which Saint Paul calleth the vanity of the Creature) it proceedeth certainly from the Will an●… Power of that lawgiver, who is only able, s●… Reasons best known to his own wisdom, t●… dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe: So that all the Miracles which ever God hath been pleased to work, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that general Law.  
But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are seen principally in inferior things. The Earth, being the principal Creature that did bear the Curse of Man●… Fall, which made (if we will believe that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation o●… that wonderful Eclipse of the sun at the Passion of our Saviour, to cry out, Aut Deus Natur●… patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvetur; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universal Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detain that virtue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observed, to note, that the more raised and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.  
Now, this natural Passion which I speak of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the Law, the equity, the Weight, the Instinct, the Bond, the Love, the Covenant and League of natural things in order, to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the universe, service of Man, and glory of the Creator; which are the alone ends of all natural Agents.  
By all which we are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinary course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a breach of a Law; or, as Aristotle calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an error, (which Saint James telleth us, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an iniquity of Nature) also a certain levity, unusefulnesse, and emptiness of true worth, which I call in Saint Paul's phrase, the vanity of the Creature: thirdly, looseness, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon, discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts, with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.  
These are the inconveniences that follow Natures; how much greater are those, which follow reason's disobedience: for all this, touching the Passions of Nature, I have observed only to give light unto those of Reason, there being the same proportion of government in them all; saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the lawgiver himself, is in the rest performed by a knowledge conjoined, and intrinsecall to the Worker▪ and this is either mental, or Sensitive, or Rational▪ from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions, or Passions: Mental Passions, are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the understanding, which Aristotle calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins, men's, or Apex animi; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy saculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an extraordinary Knowledge, either of Vision and Revelation, or of an exquisite natural Apprehension▪ both which are beyond the compass of usual industry, here to attain unto: The former of these, I call with the schoolmen, ecstasy and Rapture; such as Saint Paul's was (for so himself calleth it) Novi hominem 
2 Cor. 12. 2.  raptum; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the soul with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that joy unspeakable, and Peace past understanding, which the Apostle makes to be the fruits of the Spirit of God, in those hearts wherein he lodgeth; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the soul, the Mind, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light.  
And for the later Branch, Aristotle hath placed his greatest felicity in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the soul. And it was the speech of the Philosopher Heracl●…tus to the same purpose, that Animae sicca est 
Plutarch, de o●…, a●…llu, & de Esu ca●…nium, Orat. 1. Ar●…. Problem. §. 30. qu. 1.  sapientissima, (which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle, That Melancholy complexions are usually the wisest, for that Temper is the driest of all the rest) That a Mind not steeped in the humours of carnal and gross affections, nor drenched in the waves of a disquiet fancy, but more raised and soaring to its originally, by divine contemplations, is always endued with the greater wisdom.  
Another Knowledge from whence the Passions of this faculty are raised in Man, is that light of Natural Principles, which the schools call 
Aquin. part. 1. qu. ●…9. art. 12.  Synteresis; unto which, the custody of all practical Truths being committed, they there-hence work in the Conscience motions of joy, Love, Peace, fear, Horror, despair, and the like spiritual Passions, according as the soul, out of those general Principles, shall gather unto its own particulars, any either delightful or disquieting Conclusions.  
Sensitive Passions, are those motions of prosecution 
Arist. de Hist. Animal. lib. 1. ca●…. 1. l. 9 p●…r ●…otum Diogen. L●…rt. lib. 7. in Zenon.  or flight, which are grounded on the Fancy, Mentorie, and Apprehensions of the common Sense: which we see in brute beasts; as, in the fear of Hares or sheep, the fierceness of Wolves, the anger or flattery of Dogs, and the like: So Homer describeth the joy of Ulysses his Dog, which after his so long absence, remembered him at his return.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Odyss. s.  

For wanton joy to see his Master near,  
He waved his flattering tail, and tossed each ear.   
Now these motions in brute creatures, if we will believe Seneca, are not affections, but certain characters 
Ser. de I●…, ●…ib. 1. c. 3.  and impressions ad similitudinem passionum▪ like unto Passions in men▪ which he calleth Impetus, the rise, forces, and impulsions of Nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.  
I come therefore to those middle Passions, which I called rational; not formally, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immaterial 
Vid. Aristot. ●…ic. l. 2. ●…. 6. Mag. M●…r. l. 1. ●…. 7.  motions of the soul; but by way of participation and dependence, by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government 
Eadem, l, 2. c. 2. & Ethic. lib. 6. cap. 3.  of the Will and understanding, and not barely of the fancy, as in other creatures. And for calling Passion thus governed, Reasonable, I have the warrant of Aristotle: who, though the sensitive Appetite in man be of itself unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the rational powers of the soul) yet by 
〈◊〉. l. 1. c. 10.  reason of that obedience which it oweth to the Dictates of the understanding, whereunto Nature 
Aquin. part. 1. q. 81. art. 3.  hath ordained it to be subject and conformable (though Corruption have much slackened and unknit that Bond) he justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable faculty, not intrinsically in itself, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.  
Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the several references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good; and secondarily, the evil of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficulty and danger accompanying them. And both these again are to be determined with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the faculty, in virtue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object than may be considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including only the natural conveniency or disconveniencie which it beareth to the faculty: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of evil, Hatred▪ which are the two radical, fundamental, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi, the weight and force, and (as I may so speak) the first springings and out go of the soul. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of real union (though never without that which the schools call unio objectiva, union of Apprehension in the understanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if evil, ●…light, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a real contract or union with the faculty; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if evil, grief and Sorrow. Again, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficulty and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the natural strength of the power; which implieth, in respect of Good, an impossibility to be attained, and so it worketh despair; and in respect of evil, an improbability of being avoided, and so it worketh fear: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aides which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope; and evil is presented, either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh boldness to break through it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have we the nature and distribution of those several Passions which we are to inquire after; of all which, or at least, those which are most natural, and least coincident with one another, I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of man's Nature: But first, I shall speak something of the generality of Passions; and what dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.   

CHAP. vi Of Humane Passions in general: their use, natural, moral, civil: their subordination unto, or rebellion against right Reason.  
NOW Passions may be the subject of a threefold discourse; Natural, moral, and civil. In their natural consideration, we should observe in them, their essential Properties, their ebbs and flows, their Springings and decays, the manner of their several Impressions, the physical Effects which are wrought by them, and the like.  
In their moral consideration, we might likewise search, how the indifferency of them is altered into Good or evil, by virtue of the Dominion of right Reason, or of the violence of their own motions; what their Ministry is in virtuous, and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions; how they are raised, suppressed, slackened, and governed, according to the particular nature of those things, which require their motion.  
In their civil respects, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortify, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish, o●… alter, or mix them, as may be most advantageous; what use may be made of each man's particular Age, Nature, P●…opension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of these, whom we are to deal withal.  
And this civil use of Passion, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle, in the second book of his rhetorics; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth: because in matter of Action, and of I●…dicature, Affection in some sort is an Auditor, or judge, as he speaks. But it seemeth strange, that a man of so vast sufficiency and judgement; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other men's Labours lay broken and scattered; should yet in his books De Animâ overpass the discovery of their Nature, Essence, Operatio●… a●…d Properties; and in his books of moral philosophy, should not remember to acquaint us with the indifferency, irregularity, Subordination▪ Rebellion, conspiracy, Discords, Causes, Effects; consequences of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and daily use in our Life, and of necessary and singular benefit, to give light unto the government of right Reason.  
Touching Passions in order unto civil or judiciary affairs, I shall not make any observation; either of the other, I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and asunder, but in a brief and confused collection of some few particulars.  
The Order which I shall observe, in setting down the Honour and Corruption of them in general (which Method shall in part be kept in their Particulars) shall be this; first, according to the Antecedents of their Motion and Acts; secondly, according to the Acts themselves; and thirdly, according to the Consequents of them.  
First, touching the Antecedents to the Act of Passion, they are either the Outward Motives thereunto, as namely, the Objects, unto which it is carried; and the Causes, whereby it is produced: or the Inward Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.  
For the two former, Passion is then said commendable, when it is direct and natural. And the Corruption is, when it is carried to an undue Object, or proceedeth from an indirect Cause: but these are more observable in the particulars, and therefore thither I refer their distinct handling.  
For the third, the dignity of Passion chiefly consists in a consonancy and Obedience to the Prescription of Reason: for there is in man's Faculties a natural subordination, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now Appetite was in Beasts only made to be governed by a sensitive Knowledge: But in Man, Sense ought not t●… have any commanding or moving Power, but only instrumental, ministerial, and Conveying, in respect of the Object. The Action of Sense, was no●… from the first Institution, ordained to touch the Affection, but to present itself primarily to the understanding; upon whose determination and conduct, the Passions were to depend, to submit all 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Theador. ser. ●…. denatur. Hom.  their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties, as it should deem any way expedient for the benefit of man's Nature: so that herein consists a great part of man's infelicity, by the Fall; that albeit his understanding itself be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect Good to the inferior parts; yet that small portion of Light, which it yet retaineth for the government of our Actions, is become uneffectuall, as being able only to convince, but not to reform.  
The Corruption then of Passion in this respect, is the independence thereof upon its true Principle: when it stayeth not to look for, but anticipates and prevents the Discourses of Reason; relying only on the judgement of Sense, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet; 
●…sal. 49. ●…▪  Man, being in Honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Clem. Alex. Stro●…. l. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉▪ & Ta●…▪ orat. ad Grat. Libic. l. 1. c. ●…3.  Beasts that perish. For, as in the Body, (to use the similitude of Aristotle) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yield obedience unto the government of the Motive faculty; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another: So it is in the Mind of Man, when that natural continuity and union of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation dependant on another, 
Vid. Plutarch.  
lib. devir●…ute Morali.  is once dissolved; when Affections are disjointed from Reason, and cast off the reins whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmony in the motion thereof, which is required to the weal of man's Nature.  
It is prodigious to see an Instrument (such as all Appetite should be) to be the first and selfe-mover in its own actions; whence cannot in the Mind of Man but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a Waggoner should commit himself to the wild and unswayed fancy of his Horses; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his own feet, should be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no Guide to direct him. For as Fire (though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and useful, while it abides in the place ordained for it;) yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the housetop, it is most merciless and overrunning: So Passion (though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of virtue, for adding spirit and edge to all good undertake, and blessing them with an happier issue, than they could alone have attained unto) yet if once they fly out beyond their bounds, and become subject only to their own laws, and encroach upon Reasons right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannical. As Bias said of the Tongue, that it was the best and the 
Plutarch. de Audit.  worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; Nec meliores unquam Servos nec Dominos sent it Natura ●…eteriores; They are the best Servants, but the worst Masters, which our Nature can have. Like the Winds, which being moderate, carry the Ship; but drown it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in man's little commonwealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the public Good, than those who are best qualified for service and employment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon public ruins. And indeed it is universally true, Things most useful and excellent in their regularity, are most dangerous in their Abuse.   

CHAP. VII. Of the Exercise of Passion: of stoical apathy: of permanency, Defect, excess, with the Cure thereof.  
THe next consideration of Passions, was according to the Exercise of their Act: which we may consider, either according to the general Substance, or according to some particular Accidents, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good, as being nothing else but natural motion, ordained for the perfection or conservation of the Creature. For, notwithstanding natural Motion may haply argue some kind of imperfection in the state of the thing moving; as supposing it some way deprived of that, wherein it should rest itself (which makes Aristotle conclude, that the noblest Act of the understanding, Knowledge and clear Vision, is rather the 
* Intellectio qui●…s intellectu●…. Arist. Phy●…it. l. 7. c. 4. ●…bic. l. 10. c. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ etc.  Rest, than the Motion of that faculty) yet I say, it always implieth more natural Perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfectest of Elements; and Heaven, the perfectest of Bodies; 
Clem. Alex. Stro●…. lib. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Problem. §. 30. qu. 14.  so the soul of Man, the perfectest of forms, hath the most vehement motion.  
And in this consideration (so it be always Motion natural, governed and dependant on right Reason) I find not any Corruption, though I find an Error and abuse; that I mean, which maketh Passion in general to be Aegritudo Animi, a sickness 
Ani●… commo●…lo aversa ●… recta Ratione, & contra Naturam, cit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. ap●…d Lacr●…ium.  and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the Mind to a senseless apathy, condemning all Life of Passion, as Waves, which serve only to toss and trouble Reason. An Opinion, which, while it goeth about to give unto Man an absolute government over himself, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and govern.  
For, although there be in the Will over the Body an Imperium; yet in rigour, this is not so much to be termed Command, as employment; the Body being rather the Instrument, than the Servant of the soul, and the power which the Will hath over it, is not so much the command of a Master over his Workmen, as of the Workman over his tools: The chief subjects to the Will, are the Affections, in the right governing whereof, is manifested its greatest power.  
The strength of every thing, is exercised by Opposition: We see not the violence of a River, till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Wind showeth itself most, when it is most resisted: So the power of the Will is most seen, in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed Affections disquiet the peace of man's nature; since excess and disorder in things otherwise of so great use, requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make strait a crooked thing, we do not break it. And therefore, as he in Tacitus spoke well to Otho, when he was about 
Hist. lib. 2.  to kill himself, Majore animo t●…lerari adversaquam relinqui; That it was more valour to bear, than put off afflictions with courage: so there is more honour, in the having Affections subdued, than in having none at all; the business of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be above them. And therefore our 
* Heb. 2. 17. Heb. 4. 15. 5. 2. Mark. 10. 21. Luk. 10. 21. Io●…. 11. 35. Luk. 22. 15. Mark. 3. 5. Mat. 26, 37, 38.  Saviour himself sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, sometimes desired, sometimes mourned and grieved; but these were not Passions that violently and immoderately troubled him; but he, as he saw fit, did with them trouble himself. His Reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, according to the rule of perfect, clear, and undisturbed judgement. In which respect, the Passions of Christ are by Divines 
Hieron. in Math. 26. Magist. Sent. lib. 3. dist. 15. Aquin. part. 3. q. 15. art. 4.  called rather Propassions, that is to say, Beginnings of Passions, than Passions themselves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the Mind to undecency or excess; but had both their rising and original from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuance limited by Reason. The Passions of sinful men are many times like the toss of the Sea, which bringeth up mire and dirt; but the 
Isa. 57 20.  Passions of Christ were like the shaking of pure Water in a clean vessel, which though it be thereby troubled, yet is it not fouled at all.  
The Stoics themselves confessed, that wise men might be affected with 
a Lactant. l. 6. c. 14. Aug. de Clu. Dei, l. 9 c. 4. l. 14. c. 9: Aul. Gell. l. 19 c. 1. Cic. Tusc. qu. lib. 4. Sen. ●…p. 85. & de Ira. l. 2. c: 3.  sudden perturbations of fear or Sorrow, but did not like weak men yield unto them, nor sink under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgements, like Aeneas in Virgil:  Mens immotaman●…t, lacryma volvuntur inanes. 

He wept indeed, but in his stable mind  
You could not shake or distempers find.   

b Aquin. 12. q. 24. art. 2, 3. Cic. de sin. l. 4.  And therefore indeed, this controversy between the peripatetics and Stoics, was rather a strife of Words, than a difference of judgements, because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question; the one, making Passions to be natural; the other, 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2. & vid. in P●…g. lib. 2. cap. 13. Vid. Sen. ●…p. 57, 85. & 116. Diog. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.  praeternatural, and disorderly motions. For the peripatetics confessed, That wise men ought to be fixed & immovable in their virtuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or fears 
a Carist. Ethic. lib. ●…. cap. 1.  deterred or diverted from them: but as a die, to be 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ethic. l. 1. c. 10. & Cl●…. Alex. Strom. lib. 6.  fouresquare; and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure & firm bottom. Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancy of Mind in virtue, in defence whereof the Stoics banished Affections from wise men: not intending thereby to make men like 
c Plutarch. contr. Stolc●…t.  Caeneus in the Poet, such as could not be violated with any source, (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion) but only to show, that they wisdom of virtue should so compose & consolidate the Mind, and settle it in such stability, that it should not all be bended from the Right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions. As they then who pull down houses adjoining unto Temples, 
Plutarch. lib. d●… vi●…loso p●…dort.  do yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are continued to the Temple: so in the demolishing of inordinate Passions, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them, as is contiguous unto Right Reason; whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, and improvement, and derivation of virtue on others, of any in man's Nature.  
Now concerning the Accidents or manner of these Acts which are from Passion, it may be considered either in regard of the Quantity & Extension, or of the Quality & Intention of the Act. And both these may be considered two manner of ways: for the quantity of Passions, we may consider that, as the quantity of Bodies, which is either Continued or Severed; by Quantity Continued, I understand the manner of a Passions permanency and durance▪ by Severed, I mean the manner of its multiplicity and reiteration; from both which, it hath the denomination of good or bad, as the object whereunto it is carried, hath a greater or less relation to the faculty. For some objects are simply, and without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards these, may be allowed both a more durable and a more multiplied Passion: others are good or evil only, with some circumstances of Time, Place, Person, Occasion, or the like; which therefore require both fewer and less habitual motions. The same maybe said of the quality of them; wherein they are sometimes too remiss, sometimes again too excessive and exorbitant, according to variety of conditions.  
Concerning all these, I shall observe this one general Rule; the permanency or vanishing, the multiplicity or rareness, the excess or defect of any Passion, is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its object, as it bears reference to such or such a person; but never by the private humour, prejudice, complexion, habit, custom, or other like qualifications of the Mind itself. To see a man of a soft and gentle nature overpass some small indignity, without notice or feeling; or to see a man of an hot and eager temper transported with an extremer and more during Passion, upon the sense of some greater injury, more notably touching him in his honesty or good Name; is not in either of these, any great matter of commendation: because, though the nature of the object did in both warrant the quality of the Passion; yet in those persons they both proceeded out of humour and complexion, and not out of serious consideration of the injuries themselves, by which only the Passion is to be regulated.  
Of these two extremes, the defect is not so commonly seen, as that which is in the excess: And therefore we will here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this vehemency of our Affections, whereby they disturb the quiet, and darken the serenity of man's Mind. And this is done, either by opposing contrary Passions to contrary; 
●…ble. l. 2. c. 9 lib. 10. c. 1.  which is Aristotle's rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of Passions from an extreme to a mediocrity, to incline & bend them towards the other extreme, as Husbandmen use to do those Trees which are crooked; or as dim and weak eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done, by scattering and distracting of them; and that not only by the power of Reason, but sometimes also by a cautelous admixture of Passions amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current: For, as usually the Affections of the Mind are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the barrel) as grief by Anger, (Circumspexit 〈◊〉 cum 〈◊〉 â condolescens, 
Mar●…. 3 3.  He looked on them with Anger, being grieved) and fear by Love;  Res est, solliciti, plena Timori●…, Amor: 

The things to which our heart Love bears,  
Are objects of our careful fears.   
and Desire by fear; as in him of whom Tacitus 
Hist. lib. 1.  speaks, ●…ingebat & m●…m, quò magis concupisceret▪ That to justify his Desires, he pretended his fears: So likewise are some Passions stopped, or at least bridled & moderated by others; Amor soràs mittit timorem, 
〈◊〉. 4. 18.  Perfect Love casteth out fear. It ●…aring in this, as Plutarch hath noted in the hunting of Beasts, that 
Plut. ●…rat. 1. de 〈◊〉. Alexandri.  they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beasts. As we see, the light and heat of the Sun shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it, & to put it out. And this was that which made Saul, when he was possessed with those strong sits of Melancholy, working in him Fury, grief, and Horror, to have recourse unto such a remedy, as is most forcible for the producing of other Passions of a lighter nature; and so by consequence, for expelling those. Thus, as we see in the Body military, (as Tacitus hath observed) Vnus tumultus est alterius remedium, 
●…st. lib. ●….  That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the Body natural, some Diseases are expelled by others: so likewise in the Mind, Passions, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one loss, is the prevention of a greater: as when a Merchant casteth out his ware, to prevent a shipwreck; and in a public Fire, men pull down some houses untouched, to prevent the spreading of the flame: Thus is it in the Passions of the Mind; when any of them are excessive, the way to remit them, is by admitting of some further perturbation from others, and so distracting the forces of the former: Whether the Passions we admit, be contrary; as when a dead palsy is cured with a burning fever, and soldiers suppress the fear of Death, by the shame of baseness;  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad. ●…. 121.  

O fearful Grecians, in your minds recount,  
To what great shame this baseness will amount:   
and the hatred of their general, by the love of their country; as Ulysses persuaded Achilles:  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Iliad. ●…. 300.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

Though Agamemnon and his gifts you hate,  
Yet look with pity on the doleful state  
Of all the other Grecians in the camp,  
Who on your Name will divine honour stamp,  
When you this glory shall to them afford,  
To save them from the rage of Hector's Sword.   
Or whether they be Passions of a different, but not of a repugnant nature; and then the effect is wrought, by revoking some of the spirits, which were otherwise all employed in the service of one Passion, to attend on them; and by that means also, by diverting the intention of the Mind from one deep channel into many cross and broken streams; as men are wont to 
a C●… cal●…ribus o●…erando deprimimus, & sanguinis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 v●… 〈◊〉, Tertull.  stop one flux of blood, by making of another; and 
b Cl●…. Alex. Padag. l. 2. c. 8.  to use frictions to the feet, to call away and divert the humours which pain the head.  
Which dissipation and scattering of Passion, as it is wrought principally by this mutual confounding of them amongst themselves, so in some particular cases likewise, two other ways; namely, by communion in divers subjects, and extension on divers objects. For the first, we see in matter of grief, the Mind doth receive (as it were) some lightness and comfort, when it finds itself generative unto others, and produceth sympathy in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburdened, and cannot but find that easier, to the sustaining whereof, it hath the assistance of another's shoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) observations:  

Cur●… leves loqu●…ntur, ingentes stupent: And,  
Ille dolet vere, qui sine teste dolet.   

Our tongues can lighter Cares repeat,  
When silence swallows up the great:  
He grieves indeed, who on his friend  
Vntestified tears doth spend.   
That grief commonly is the most heavy, which hath fewest vents, by which to diffuse itself: which, I take it, will be one occasion of the heaviness of infernal torment; because there, grief shall not be any whit transient, to work commiseration in any spectator, but altogether immanent and reflexive upon itself.  
Thus likewise we see (to instance in that other particular branch, of diffusing the Passions upon divers objects) how the multitude of these, if they be Hererogeneall and unsubordinate, doth oftentimes remit a Passion: for example, in Love; I take it, that that man who hath a more general Love, hath a less vehement Love; and the spreading of Affection, is the weakening of it, (I mean still in things not absolute subordinate; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, than without them, because they are the seals and Pledges of that Love) as a River, when it is cut into many lesser streams, runs weaker & shallower. And this, I conceive, is the reason, why Solomon, when he commendeth a strong Love, giveth it but a single object▪ There is a friend nearer than a Brother; one, in whom the rays of this affection, like the sunbeams in a glass, being more united, might withal be the more servant. I remember not, that I ever read of wonderful 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P●…. d●… A●…ic. multitude. An●…charsis apud Latr●…. l 1.  Love amongst men, which went beyond Couples; which also Aristotle and Plutarch have observed. And therefore we see, in that state there is or should be greater affection, wherein is the least community: conjugal Love, as it is most single, so it is usually the strongest; and in the Issues and Blessings thereof, there is scarce any more powerful epithet to win Love, than Vnigenitus, an only son.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Illad. 1. 479. Plutarch. de multie. A●…ic.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

He loved me as one loves the only son  
Of's old age, borne to great Possession.   
Insomuch, that even in God himself (to whom these Passions are but by an Anthropopathy attributed) that more general Love of his Providence and Preservation, (which is common to all his Creatures) is (if I may so speak) of a lower degree, (though not in respect of any intention or remission in his Will, but only the effects thereof towards the things themselves) than that more special Love of Adoption, which he extendeth only to those, whom he vouchsafeth to make One in him, who was Vnigenitus and Dilectus from everlasting.  
I do not then (by the way) condemn all strong and united Passions; but only I observe how those, which hereby grow exorbitant, & work prejudice to the soul, may by a seasonable distracting of them, be reduced unto a wholesome temper: for as it is noted, that amongst men, those who have bodies most obnoxious to daily maladies, are commonly more secure from any mortal danger, than those who though free from any general distempers, do yet find the surprise of one more violent; so is it with men's Passions: Those who have a nature ready, upon sundry occasions to break forth into them, do commonly find them less virulent and morose, than those who have not their Passions so voluble, and ready to spread themselves on divers objects, but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen virtue: Of vicious Concupiscence; of their blinding, diverting, distracting, and precipitating of Reason, and of their distempering the Body.  
THe last consideration of Passions, was according to the Consequents of their Act, which are the ends and effects thereof, both which I include in one; because the natural end of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their own, or a superior virtue to produce. Now, though in the particulars there be several perfections conferred both on the operations o●… the Will, and of the understanding, from Passions; yet I cannot think on any other general effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that only which Tully hath observed out of 
Acad. quest. lib. ●…. 〈◊〉. q●…. li. 4.  the peripatetics of Anger, that they are the sharpners (and to keep his phrase) the Whetstone●… of virtue, which make it more operative and fruitful: for Passion stirring up the Spirits, and quickening the fancy, hath thereby a direct influence 
Plutarch. lib. de vir. mo●….  upon the Habits and Manners of the Mind; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore Aristotle speaking of these two Elements and 
Ethic: lib. 2. cap. 3.  Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and grief, (one of which, all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retain their several portions of goodness. Thus Anger, zeal Shame, grief, Love, are in their several order●… the Whetstones, whereon true Fortitude sharpeneth its Sword: for men are never more neglect▪ full and prodigal of their blood, than when they are throughly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a loss of their own, or their country's honour: So the Poet saith of Mezentius, when Aenea●… had slain Lausus his son;  

— Aestuat ingens 
Aeneid. l●…b. 10.   
Imo in cord pudor mix●…oque insania luctu,  
Et furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia virtus.   

A noble shame boiled in his lowest breast,  
Rage mixed with grief suffered him not to rest;  
Love and a conscious Valour s●…t him on,  
And kindled furious Resolution.   
So, Love and Compassion are the inciters of bounty; Hope, the stay and anchor of Patience; keeping the Mind, amidst perils and casualties, from floating and sinking; fear, the sharpener of industry; and Caution an antidote in all our actions, against Violence, rashness, and Indiscretion: as Latinus said unto Turnus, when in rage he hastened to a combat with Aeneas;  

— quantum ipse feroc●… 
Aeneid. lib. 12.   
Virtute exuper as, tanto me impensius ●…quum est  
Consulere, atque omnes me●…uentem expendere casus.   

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,  
'Tis fit my serious fears show the more Love;  
In mature counsels, and in weighing all  
The various dangers and events may fall.   
Those imputations therefore which Tully and Seneca, and other stoical Philosophers make against Passions, are but light and empty, when they call them diseases and perturbations of the Mind; which requireth in all its actions both health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Passion: For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthful or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for what water more sweet than that of a Spring, or what more thick or loathsome, than that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting itself. As in the Wind o●… Seas, (to which two, Passions are commonly compared) a middle temper between a quiet calm and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage between countries; so the agitations of Passion, as long as they serve only to drive forward, but not to drown virtue; as long as they keep their dependence on Reason, and run only in that channel wherewith they are thereby bounded, are of excellent service, in all the travail of man's life, and such as without which, the growth, success, and dispatch of virtue would be much impaired.  
For the corrupt effects of Passion in general, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of evil as of Error, when there is but a unity of goodness or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect to themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the understanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other; as fear is wrought by Love, and Anger by grief, Dol●… excitat iras; as a lion when wounded, is most raging.  — fixumque latronis 
Aeneid. lib. 12.  Impavidus frangit telum, & fremit ore cruento. 

With bloody mouth, and an undaunted heart,  
Breaks & tears from his wound the fastened dart.   
Which effect of Passions, I have before touched upon; neither is it always a corrupt effect, but only then, when there is in the Passion generative some distemper. In which respect of the understanding and Will, (both which I comprise under one Name of Reason) I conceive the corruption to be principally these four; Imposture, or seduction; Alienation, or withdrawing; Distraction, or consounding; and precipitancy, or a headlong transporting of Reason.  
Now concerning these, we are first to remember, that there is in every man a native and original struggling between Apperite and Reason; which yet proceedeth from Corruption, and the Fall of Man, not from Nature entire, as the Papists contend; who affirm, That the strife and reluctancy between Sense and understanding, ariseth from physical and created constitution; and that therefore, that sweet harmony which was between all the Faculties of Man, animal and rational, in his Creation, proceeded from the government of a supernatural Grace added thereunto: because it being natural for Sense to desire sensible, and Spirit spiritual good things, and things sensitive and spiritual being amongst themselves opposite; those desites which are carried unto them, must needs be opposite likewise.  
An Argument as weak, as the Opinion which it defends, is dangerous and prejudicial to the honour of man's Creation; as tending to prove, that the first rise and rebellions of Appetite against Reason, and all inordinate desires of inferior Faculties, till they taint the Will, are not formally sins, as having been natural to Adam himself in innocence, though by infused and supernatural Grace bridled and suspended. An Opinion, which retaineth that odious scandal which they fasten upon us, more justly and truly on their own heads, touching making God the Author of sin; in that they affirm, that Concupiscence, whereby Sense is carried to its object inordinately, that is, without the government and assent of Reason, to have been natural to Adam; which yet Saint Paul hath so many 
Rom. 7.  times called by the express name of sin, in one Chapter.  
And for the Argument which they bring, we answer, That naturally, and from the Law of Creation, there was no formal opposition, but a subordination between Spirit and Sense. And therefore, notwithstanding the operations of Appetite are common unto Men and Beasts; yet we may not grant, that they have the same manner of being educed and governed in both these. For, as the operations of the vegetative soul, though common to Beasts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of these severally so restrained, as that they are truly said to be the proper and peculiar works of that specifical form, unto which they are annexed: So likewise, the sensitive Appetite, though generally it be common to Men and Beasts; yet in Men, it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of Reason, and therefore may properly be called a humane Appetite, as being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto man's Nature: so that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his Faculties, and such an happy subordination of them each to other, as that every motion of the inferior powers was directed and governed, and therefore might truly and properly be attributed to the superior; but when once Man had tasted of that murdering Fruit, which poisoned him and all his posterity, than began those swell, rebellions, and unjointing of Faculties, which made him as lame in his Nature, as it did dead in Grace; whence Passions are become now, in the state of corruption, beastly and sensual, which were before, by Creation, reasonable and humane: For man being in honour was without understanding, and is become as the beasts that perish.  
But to return, we are, as I said, to remember, that there is in Man, by reason of his general corruption, such a distemper wrought, as that there is not only crookedness in, but dissension also, and fight between his parts. And though the Light of our Reason be by man's Fall much dimmed and decayed, yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly Appetite, as that it laboureth against us, as the Philistims against Samson, (or rather indeed as Dalilah, for Samsons eyes were truly put out, before ever the Philistims were upon him) it laboureth, I say, to deprive us of those relics of Sight, which we yet retain.  
And this is that first corrupt effect, which I 
Aris●…. Rbe●…. l. 1 c. 3.  call Imposture, or occaecation, whereby Passion 
Quin●…l. lib. 6. cap. 2.  reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of resistance or control, laboureth to mask Reason, and to obliterate those Principles and original Truths, whereby their unruliness might be restrained, or at least convinced. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place to the violence of Appetite, laboureth next to incline and prepare his Mind for assent, and to get Reason on the same side with Passion. Disobedience is ever cavilling, and contentious; and he who will not work the righteousness of God, will be sure to dispute against it, and to stumble at it. And therefore the Apostles tell us, that Repentance, and putting away of 
Rom. 2. ●…. Prov. 10. 8. ●…ccles. 5. 2. ●… Tim. 2. 25. I●…m. 1. 19, 20, 21. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Io●…n 3. 20  Lusts, is the only preparation to acknowledge the Truth: for so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sin, he will ever re●…ct the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe Reason to say something for it.  

He made himself a lion, and anon  
Became a boar, a Panther, a Dragon.   
So likewise, the understanding being once 
Aegrotantes Medici al●…s Medicos ad se 〈◊〉, & Mag●… p●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ar●…. 〈◊〉. lib. 3. cap. 16.  invaded by Passion, is brought to change into divers shapes, and to judge of things, not according to their naked and natural truth, but according as it finds them bear in the fancy those impressions of Pleasure, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.  
And another Reason, why we seek to warrant and to maintain a Passion, when we have given way unto it, is the love of our Ease: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a Corrupt Passion; yet that part of it, which hath the sting in it, is unpleasant: and therefore there is required the hand of Reason, by Apologies, plead, and Blandishments, either to mollify the Passion, that it shall not then pierce, or to harden and arm the subject, that it may not be sensible of it.  
And, that this Deceit and Ex●…ation is a proper work of Passion, (besides our own daily experience) this one Argument might sufficiently prove; namely, the Practice of 
Tertull. contr. Valen●…. cap. 4.  heretics: who proposing to themselves either gain, or any other carnal and corrupt End; did thereupon presently (as the Apostle notes) vent the perverse Disputes of their own corrupt Minds, and make all Truth an handmaid and lackey to their own Lusts▪ 
●… Tim. 6. 5.  And proportionably thereunto, their custom hath been, Priùs persuadere quàm docere, to 
Tertu●…. de 〈◊〉. Isid. Pelut. l. 1. cp. 102.  creep upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines▪ And as it is said of God, that he first accepted Abel, and then his Sacrifice; so do they labour first, to work an approbation of their Persons in the hearts of Men; whence in the second place, their perverse Conceits do find the easier access to their understandings.  
For, when silly and unstable minds shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiration; when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a man that had wholly renounced the World; like Zopyrus or Sinon, clothed 
H●…rod▪ Th●…lia. Ae●…cid. lib. 2.  and deformed with seeming poverty and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, than sighs; pretending to bring nothing but the plentiful Promises of Salvation, tears in his Eyes, oil and Honey in his Mouth, and the most exquisite Picture of true holiness, which it is possible for the Art or hypocrisy of man's Invention to dr●…w out: How can the understanding of weak and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto belief, by those two Credulous Qualities, of Ignorance and fear) but be made inclinable to receive, not only willingly, but with greediness also, whatsoever poisonous Doctrine, under pretence of wholesome and saving physic, such a subtle Impostor shall administer unto them? Such a great force there is in voluntary humility, neglecting of the Body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to insinuate and take possession of weak and credulous Natures; with whom haply, more real, Serious, and spiritual Arguments, coming with less pomp and ostentation, would not prevail.  

— Captique dolis, lacrymisque coactis  
Quos neque Tydides nec Larissaeus Achilles  
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinae.   

They are surprised by frauds and forced tears,  
In whom their greatest foes could work no fears;  
Whom ten years war not won, nor thousand ships,  
Are snared and conquered by perjurious lips.   
The second manner of Corruption, which 
2.  Passion useth on the understanding and Will, was Alienating or withdrawing of Reason from the serious examination of those Pleasures, wherewith it desireth to possess the Mind, without control; that when it cannot so fare prevail, as to blind and seduce Reason, getting the allowance and Affirmative Consent thereof, it may yet at least so fare inveigle it, as to withhold it from any Negative Determination, and to keep off the Mind from a serious and impartial consideration of what Appetite desireth; for fear lest it should be convinced of sin, and so find the less sweetness in it.  
And this is the Reason of that affected and Voluntary Ignorance, which Saint Pet●… 
2 Pet. 3. 5.  speaks of; whereby Minds prepossessed with a love of inordinate courses, do withhold and divert Reason, and forbear to examine that Truth, which indeed they know; as fearing, lest thereby they should be deterred from those Vices, which they resolve to follow. Which is the same, with that excellent metaphor in Saint Paul; who saith▪ That the wrath of God was revealed from Heaven, on all ungodliness and unrighteousness of Men, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whic●… 
Rom. 1. 18.  hold or detain the Truth in unrighteousness: that is, which imprison and keep in that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Apostle interpreteth himself, in the next Verse; all those Notions of Divine Truth, touching the omnipotency and justice of God, which were by the singer of Nature written within them, to deter them from, or (if not) to make them inexcusable, in those unnatural pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus Medea in the Poet:  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Eurip. Medea. Vid. Clem. Alex. St●…m. l. 2. p. 284. Edi●…. He●….  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

I know 'tis wicked that I go about,  
But Passion hath put all my Reason out.   
And therefore, that maxim of the stoical 
A●…ria. 〈◊〉. lib. 1. cap. 28. Aristot. E●…hic. l. l. 3. ●…1▪  Philosopher, out of Plato, is false; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That all men are unwillingly 
Malunt nescire quta ●…am oderunt. Tertull. Ap●…l. c. 1.  deprived of Truth; since, as Aristotle hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of Saint Peter, there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Iusti●…. ●…ib. qu. & ●…sp. q. 140. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Clem. Alex.  an elected or Voluntary Ignorance, which for their Securities sake, men nourish themselves in.  
And that there should be such an Alienation of the Mind from Truth, when the fancy and Heart are hot with Passion, cannot be any great wonder: For, the soul is of a limited and determined activity in the Body; insomuch, that it cannot with perspi●…uitie and diligence give attendance unto divers Objects. And therefore, when a Passion in its fullness, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more clear and naked brightness of Truth is suspended and changed: So that, as the sun and moon, at their rising and setting, seem fare greater than at other times, by reason of thick Vapours, which are then interposed; so, the Mind looking upon things through the Mists and Troubles of Passion, cannot possibly judge of them, in their own proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and distemper.  
But then, thirdly, if Reason will neither be 
3.  deluded nor won over to the patronage of evil, nor diverted from the knowledge and notice of Good; then doth Passion strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof, that they may not with any firmness or efficacy of Discourse, interrupt the Current of such irregular and headstrong Motions. And this is a most inward and proper Effect of Passion: For, as things presented to the Mind, in the nakedness and simplicity of their own Truth, do gain a more firm Assent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; so, on the contrary side, those things which come mixed and troubled, dividing the intention of the Mind between Truth and Passion, cannot obtain any settled or satisfactory Resolution from the Discourses of Reason.  
And this is the Cause of that reluctancy between the Knowledge and Desires of Incontinent Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as Aristotle observes of them, they are 
Ethic. l. 7. c. 10. In consinio concupiscenti●… & poenitentia as●…ra & 〈◊〉 gand●…. P●…tarch. lib. Philosophand. cum princip.  but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Halfe-Evill, as not sinning with that full and plenary Consent of Will, but Prat●…r Electionem, as he speaks; so I may more truly say of them, that they have but an Halfe-Knowledge, not any distinct and applicative Apprehension of Truth, but a confused and broken Conceit of things in their generality: Not much unlike unto Nighttalkers, who cannot be said to be throughly asleep, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kind of inordinate temper between both; or (as Aristotle himself gives the similitude) 
Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 3.  it is like a Stage-Player, whose Knowledge is express and clear enough, but the things which it is conversant about, are not personal and particular to those men, but belonging unto others, whom they personate: So, the Principles of such men are in the general, Good and True; but they are never brought down so low, as if they did concern a man's own particular weal or Woe, nor thoroughly weighed, with an assuming, applying, concluding Conscience; but, like the notion of a Drunken or sleeping man, are choked and smothered with the Mists of Passion.  
And this third Corruption is that, which Aristotle, in the particular of incontinency, 
Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 7.  calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the weakness and disability of Reason, to keep close to her own Principles and Resolutions: Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet; How weak is 
Ezech. 16. 30.  thy heart, seeing thou dost all things, the works of an imperious Whorish Woman? And elsewhere, whoredom and Wine are said to take 
Host 4. 11.  away the Heart. So Hector describes lascivious Paris:  —— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Iliad. ●…. 45.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

Thy face hath beauty in't, but in thy breast  
There doth no strength nor resolution rest.   
The last Effect (which I shall but name) is 
4.  that which Aristotle calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rashness or precipitancy; which is the most tyrannical Violence which Passion useth; when, in spite of all the Dictates of Reason, it furiously over-ruleth the Will, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaseth to put in practice; and like a Torrent, carrieth all before it; or, as the Prophet speaks, rusheth 
jer. 50. 38. Psal. 102. 8. Eccles. 9 3. Luk. 6. 11.  like an Horse into the battle: So Lust and Anger are sometimes, in the Scripture, called madness; because it transporteth the soul beyond all bounds of wisdom or counsel, and by the Dictates of Reason takes occasion to become more outrageous, Ipsaque praesidia occupat, feeds like wildfire upon those Remedies, which should remove it: As she said in the Poet;  Levis est dolour, qui capere consilium potest, 
Senec. Medea.  Lib●… ire contra. 
That's but light grief, which counsel can abate; Mine swells, and all advice resolves to hate.  
The corrupt effects which Passion worketh in the last place on the Body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the Passions; sometimes too sudden and violent, sometimes too heavy oppression of the heart; the other, sudden perturbation of the spirits. Thus old Ely died, with sudden grief; Diodorsu, with shame; Sophocles, Chilo the Lacedaemonian, and others, with joy; Nature being not able to bear that great and sudden immutation, which these Passions made in the Body. The causes and manner of which cogitation, I reserre (as being inquiries not so directly pertinent to the present purpose) unto natural Philosophers and Physicians. And from the generality of Passions, I proceed unto the consideration of some particulars, according to the order of their former division: In all which, I shall forbear this long Method of the Antecedents, Concomitants, and Consequents of their Acts, (many particulars whereof, being of the same nature in all Passions, will require to be observed only in one or two, and so proportionally conceived in the rest) and shall insist principally in those particulars which I handle on the causes and effects of them; as being Considerations, wherein commonly they are most serviceable or prejudicial to our Nature.   

CHAP. IX. Of the affection of Love, of Love natural, of general communion, of Love rational, the object and general cause thereof.  
NOw the two first and fundamental Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the Passion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every moral object is a cause, thoug●… not every cause an object) will fall into one.  
Love then consists in a kind of expansion o●… egress of the heat and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawn and attracted whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and general●… cause of Love. Now, as in Nature, so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is tha●… natural or impressed sympathy of things, wher●… by one doth inwardly incline an union with the other, by reason of some secret virtues and occ●… qualities disposing either subject to that 〈◊〉 all friendship, as between Iron and the Loa●… stone: The other, is that common and mo●… discernible attraction which every thing receiv●… from those natures, or places, whereon they 〈◊〉 ordained and directed by the wisdom an●… Providence of the first Cause, to depend both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, so is He in his palace, (if I may so call it) the World, a God of Order, disposing every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, so sweetly, as that all is harmonious, (from which harmony, the Philosophers have concluded a 
Arrian. Epist. lib. 1. c. 6.  Divine Providence) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.  
And this Order and wisdom is seen chiefly in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and happy inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him who is the fountain, whence issue all their streams of their limited being, and the fullness of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though something too Poetically, seemeth to have expressed:  

Principio Coelum ac Terras camposque liquentes 
Aeneid. lib. 6. P●…. Crini●…. lib. 6. c. 12.   
Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque Astra  
Spiritus intus al●…, ●…otamque infusa per Artus  
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.   

Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all those glorious Lights,  
Which beautify the Day, and rule the Nights,  
A Divine inward Vigour, like a soul,  
Diffused through every joint of this great 
* Graeci eni●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant.  Whole,  
Doth vegetate, and with a constant force  
Guideth each Nature through its fixed course.   
And such is the natural motion of each thing to its own Sphere and centre; where is both the most proper place of its consisting, and withal, the greatest freedom from sorraine injury or violence.  
But we must here withal, take notice of the general care of the Creator; whereby he hath fastened on all creatures, not only his private desire to satisfy the demands of their own nature, but hath also stamped upon them a general charity and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the universe or common Body; wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessary mutual connexion between●… the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclined the nature of these necessary agents, so to work of their discords the perfect harmony of the whole, that i●… by any casualty it fall out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rapture, deformity, o●… any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniform and natural motions of th●… particulars; they then must prevent such damag●… and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their own natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whereunto considered i●… their own determinate qualities, they have a●… essential reluctancy. Which property and sense of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set down in 1 Cor. 12. where he renders this reason of all, that there might be 〈◊〉 Schism in the Body: which likewise he divinely applieth in the mystical sense, that all the several gifts of the Spirit to the Church, should drive 
1 Cor. 8. 1. Ephes. 4. 12.  to one common end, as they were all derived from one common fountain; and should never be used, without that knitting quality of Love, to which he elsewhere properly ascribeth the building, continuation, and perfecting of the Saints.  
Now, as it hath pleased the infinite wisdom of God to guide and moderate, by his own immediate direction, the motions of necessary agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the general end, (which motion may therefore, as I before observed, be called the natural Passion of things) so hath it given unto Man a reasonable soul, to be as it were his vicegerent in all the motions of man's little World.  
To apply then these proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we shall find first a Secret, which I will call natural; and next, a Manifest, which I call a moral and more discursive attraction. The first of these, is that natural sympathy wrought between the affection and the obj●…ct, in the first meeting of them, without any suspension of the person, ●…ll farther inquiry after the disposition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, natural, and sensitive virtues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beauty, motion, 〈◊〉, behaviour; all which coming under the sphere of Sense, I include under the name of judiciary physiognomy: Which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities, but a farther presumption of the judgement; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that soul, which animateth and quickeneth those outward Graces.  
And indeed, if it be true which Aristotle in 
Ethic. li●…. 8.  his ethics tells us, That similitude is the ground of Love; and if there be no natural Love stronger than that which is between the Body and the soul, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the soul with those lovely impressions of Nature which we find in the Body, and may by the same reason collect a mutual discovery, by which we acknowledge a mutual sympathy between them. And therefore it was no ill counsel (though not always to be heeded) Cave tibi ab iis quos natura signavit, to take heed of such, who like Cain have any mark of notorious deformity set upon them by Nature. And therefore Homer speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of Thersites, fits him with a Body answerable to such a Mind.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad. ●…. ●…17.    

The most ill-shapen man that to Troy came,  
With eye distorted, and in each foot lain,  
His shoulders crooked, to his breast shrunk down,  
A sharp wry head, here and there patched with down.   
But yet herein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much austerity of Mind, to reject the judgement of sense, and to quarrel with this natural instinct; yet it is fit, that in this case, considering the deceitfulness of things, and what a divers habit, Education or hypocrisy hath wrought in many, between the out and inside of their Natures; that we should, I say, bring a fearful judgement, like love of B●…as the Philosopher, which may easily, upon good warrant and assurance, altar itself: otherwise, when a thing is throughly known to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repose themselves in it.  
But here likewise we must observe that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot stand in private towards one particular, without damage and inconvenience to the public Body, Politic or ecclesiastical, whereof we are members, the general must ever be esteemed more dear and precious. A scandal to the Body, and a schism from the whole, is more dangerous and unnatural, than any private Divisions: for, if there be a wound or swelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoining will be content to submit themselves unto pain, for the recovery of that; and rather than it shall perish, 〈◊〉 any ●…ble which may conduce to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And this is the Love of fellow-members, amongst themselves. But then, if any part be so fare corrupted, as that it doth more easier derive its contagion upon others, than admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered; or, if the whole Body be ready to perish by Famine; then doth the Sense of community so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruel amongst themselves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the safety of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the Faction between the Belly and the Members, was wisely applied by Menenius Agrippa, in a Rebellion amongst the people of Rome; to show how unnatural a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their own private Discontents, when the weal public is together therewithal endangered.   

CHAP. X. Of the Rule of true Love: the Love of God and ourselves: similitude to these, the cause of Love in other things: of Love of Concupiscence: how Love begetteth Love; and how presence with, and absence from the object, doth upon different respects exercise and increase Love.  
FRom this general and fundamental cause of Love, proceed some others, special and particular; whereof, the first and principal is a similitude and resemblance between the thing loved, and that which is the natural Rule of Love.  
Now, the Rule of all Love, is by Divine Truth prescribed to be God, and a Man's self; so that, what beareth similitude to these, is the proper 
Arist. Probl. sell. 10. sect. 51.  and right Object of our Affection. To speak therefore a word or two of these.  
The master-wheel, or first Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Passion, is the Love of God, grounded on the right knowledge of Him; whereby the soul being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite goodness, is earnestly drawn and 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  called out, as it were, to desire an Union, Vision, and participation of his Glory and Presence; yielding up itself unto Him, (for by 
* Amor non nisi donum 〈◊〉 in Ama●…um. Guil●…el. Paris. de Legibus, c. 19  Love a man giveth himself to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its Affections and Actions to his Will.  
And this Love is then Regular, when it takes up all the kinds of Love, and all the degrees of Love. For we love God, Amore amicitiae, for the goodness and excellency which is in himself, as being most lovely; and Amore desiderii, with a desire of being united unto him, as the fountain of all our blessedness; and Amore complacentiae, with a love of joy and delight in him; when the soul goes to God, like Noah's Dove to the ark, and with infinite sweetness and security reposeth itself in him; and lastly, Amore Benevolentiae, with an endeavour (so fare as a poor Creature can to an infinite Creator; for our Good extendeth not unto him) to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.  
And thus we are to love him above all things; first, Appretiatiuè, setting an higher price upon his Glory and Command, than upon any other thing besides; all Dung, in comparison. Secondly, Intensiuè, with the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our Love of him: thirdly, Adaequatè, as the complete, perfect, and adequate object of all our Love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the wiseman speaking of the Love and fear of God, tells us, that it is Totum Hominis, the Whole of Man. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto several Faculties; beauty to the Eye, music to the ear, Meat to the Palate, Learning to the Mind; none of these can satisfy the faculty, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring vanity and Vexation with them: vanity, because they are empty, and do deceive; and because they are mortal, and will decay: Vexation, in the Getting; for that is with Labour; in the Keeping, for that is with fear; in the Multiplying, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfeit, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is Totum Hominis, fitted to all the wants of an immortal soul: fullness, to make us perfectly happy; immortality, to make us perpetually happy; after whom we hunger with desire, and are not gripped; on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be loved, not with a divided, 
Matth. 22. 37.  but a whole Heart. To love any Creature, either without God, or above God, is Cupiditas, Lust: 
Vid. August. de Doct. Christ. l. 1. c. 22. & l. 3. c. 10. & de Tr●…uitat. l. 8. c. 3. & l. 9 c. 8.  (which is the formale of every sin, whereby we turn from God to other things) but to love the Creatures under God, in their right order; and for God, to their right end, (for he made all things for himself) this is Charitas, true and regular Love.  
Now, the Image and likeness of God, (not to speak of that eternal and essential Character of his father's brightness) is in his Word, and in his works; the one, being the Manifestation of his Will; and the other, of his Power and wisdom. Our love to his Word, is our search of it; as being the only glass, wherein we see the Wonders and deep things of God: our belief of it, All, and only; acknowledging in it, the fullness of its Truth, and of its sufficiency: and our Obedience to it, submitting ourselves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.  
Touching the Works of God, there are two chief things, whereunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures attracted, and wherewith it desires an union, namely, the Truth and goodness of them; for by these only, may all the divers Faculties of man's soul be exercised and delighted: The love of both which, is then only Regular, when it is limited, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act; Humble, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity: and lastly, subordinate unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in the Creature, than as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.  
I come now unto that other Rule of Love, wherein Aristotle hath placed the Nature thereof, A man's self, or that unity and proportion which the thing loved beareth unto the party loving; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. lib. 9 cap. 9 Ethic. lib. 8. cap. 9 12. Lib. 9 cap. 3. 9  which in one place, he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, equality; in another, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ identity; in another, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Similitude; in another, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Communion; all Relative terms, which refer unto the party loving.  
The Root of every man's love unto himself, is that unity and identity which he hath with himself; it being natural to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of it own being: because the more simple and One it is, the more it is like the fountain of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this love of Man unto himself, if subordinate unto the love of God, and governed thereby, is Debitum Natura, a necessary 
Aristot. Ethic. lib. 9 c. 4. 8.  Debt; and such, as the neglect whereof, is a trespass against Nature.  
Now then, as we love our selves, for the unity which we have in ourselves; so, wheresoever we find any similitude to our selves, or character of our selves, either in Nature or Habits, upon that also do the beams of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may represent ourselves, first, in Substance; as the Husband and Wife are said to be one flesh, 
Arist. Mag●…r. Mo●…al. lib. 1. c. 34.  and Children are branches and portions of their Parents▪ Secondly, in Qualities or Accidents; as one man resembleth another in natural, and one friend another in habitual Qualities; as Face answereth to Face in Water, so the heart of Man to Man.  
With respect unto this double Similitude, there is a double Love; the one, natural; the other, acquired, or habitual: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in Aelian, Plutarch, and others, we read of the natural 
Aelian. lib. de Anim. 2. c. 40. Lib. 2. c. 25. Lib. 6. c. 9 Lib. 9 c. 8. Lib. 1●…. ●…. 38. Plu●…ch. de 〈◊〉. Anim●…l. & de Amore. Aristat. Hist. 〈◊〉. lib. 9 c. 4. ●….  affection of Elephants; which seeing their young fallen into a deep Pit, will leap down after them, though it be present death; and of the marvellous cunning and valour which many other Birds and Beasts use to provide for the safety of their B●…ood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered: Yea, the Pelican (if we believe the story) doth 
Sophocles in Electra, & ibl Sc●…oltast. p. 1 27  feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with Serpents, with her own blood to recover them again: which emblem John the second, 
Th●…loss. de Repub. lib. 8. c. 1. Sect. 19  king of Portugal is said to have chosen, whereby to express his Love to his Subjects: And Homer elegantly expresseth the care of a Bird seeding her young ones.  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad. 1. 324.  

She brings her young ones what mea●… she can find,  
When she herself with hunger's almost pined.   
And the like affection, another Poet hath expressed in the most cruel of all the Beasts, the tiger:  

—— Sic Aspera Tigris 
Statius. Theb. Lib. 10.   
Foetibus abreptis Scythico deserta sub Antro  
Accubat, & lepidi lambit vestigia lecti.   

— The tiger (which most thirsts for blood)  
Seeing herself robbed of her tender brood,  
Lies down lamenting in her Scythian Den,  
And licks the prints where her lost wholps had lion.   
And this kind of Piety we find reciprocal, 
Aelian. l. de animal. ●…. cap. 40. & lib.  returning from the young ones upward▪ so the young lions are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observed of Eagles, Sto●…kes and other creatures. And hence we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, laws, which receive their 
Aelian. lib. de Anim. 2. cap. 40 & lib. 3. cap. 23 & lib. 9 c. 1. & lib. 10. c. 16. Plutarch. de solert. animal. Aristoph. in Avibus. Plin. lib. 10. c. 23. & lib. 8. cap. 57  demomination from the Stork, providing that children should nourish and take care of their Parents in their distress. And for men, so great is the power of natural affection, that Parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vicious men (as Seneca somewhere speaketh) desire that their sons may be virtuous, and virtuous men that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves, as Hector prayed for his son.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad. ●…. 480.  

Let it be said, here's a brave son indeed,  
Who doth his noble Father fare exceed.   
And Aeneas to Ascanius.  Disce puer virtutem ex me, verosque labores, 
Aenead. lib. 12.  Fortunam ex aliis,— 

Virtue and Patience learn my son of me,  
But may thy fortunes better patterns see.   
And therefore unnaturalness of Affection is 
2 Tim. 3. 3.  reckoned up by the Apostle amongst the foulest of sins, when like Ishmael the nature of men groweth wild and brutish, as the Philosopher calleth such men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnatural man is called Onager homo, a wilde-asse man, Gen. 16. 1●…. Job 11. 12. but a meek and tender▪ spirited man is called Ovi●… homo, a sheep man, or a man of a sociable and calm disposition, Ezek 36. 37▪ 38. And amongst the Thebans there was a Law made, which appointed 
●…lian. v●…r. hist. l. 2. c. 7.  a capital penalty upon those unnatural men, who should cast out and expose their children unto ruin.  
And as this kind of Love ariseth from Propinquity of Nature, so another there is growing out of Similitude of Manners. All flesh, as Syracides 
Eccles. 13. 17.  speaks, will resort to their like, and every man will keep company with such, as he is himself; as we see learned men hold correspondency with those 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉▪ Thirsit is viti●…, 〈◊〉 al●…ter indicat Ho●… qu●…m quod esle●… viris praestantissim is Achilli & Vl●…ssi invis●…▪ I●…iad 2. Vid. Aristot. Prob. §. 10. q. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉. Id●…. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. S●… apud D●…og. Lat●…i. in Zenon. l. 7. M●…im▪ Tyriu●… 〈◊〉. 4.  that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want Friends; because every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or practice of any good things laboureth to commend himself to his own judgement, and to the love of others; he is engaged (unless he will be false to his own grounds) to love any other whom he observeth to study and practise the same thing: For how can I expect, that that in me should reap Love from other●…, which in others reapeth nothing but envy from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to love that, which he himself hateth; because we are too apt to make our judgements or Passions the rule of another man's, and to dislik●… that in him, which we do not allow in ourselves: Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently described in Achilles, when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and Agamemnon:  —— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad. 1. 610.  

It is not courteous, that where I hate, you  
Should love, except you'd have me hate you too:  
But take this rule, if you'll be thought my friend;  
The man that offends me, do you offend.   
So much naturally are men in love with their own likeness, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated: 
Plutarch. de Adulat. & A●…icis.  and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey.  
It is true, that in some cases, similitude is the cause of envy; but this is only then, when first the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality: in which case, the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough streams, which makes them run with the more noise ●… Therefore, a wise and a meek-tempered man shall sooner win and hold the love of an angry man, than he, who is like unto him in that distemper; because such a man (though indeed he be conqueror, in regard of his wisdom) yet by his Patience he seemeth to yield: and there is nothing which a man's Passion loves so much as victory. Whereas between Anger and Anger there must needs be fight of affections, which is the remotest temper from Love.  
Secondly, when by accident, the quality, wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them▪ either in point of credit, usefulness▪ or pro fit. For as the Sta●…res, though they agree in light, yet Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur, 
Pl●…●…gyr.  those that are small suffer loss by the brightness of others. So amongst men, agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth ●… prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Hesiod.  

The Potter's often angry with his mates,  
One ne●…ghbour▪ Architect the other hates.   
And therefore as the sun and moon agree best in their light when they are fa●…hest asunder, so in these Arts, which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the less damage or darken the other.  
Now this natural and Habitual Love is then regular, when Subordinate to that greater, our 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉. A. ●… 〈◊〉. ●…. b. ●…. c. 3.  Love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly informed Reason, which amongst many others are these three.  
First, That our Love carry its right respect, and no sinister, or by-●…nd with it; That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, only upon our own benefit: For, as 
b Rbe●…. l. ●…. c. 4  the Philosopher speaks, true Love is a benevolent Affection, willing good unto another for his own sake. Hominum charitas, saith Cicero, gratuita est. 
c De Nat▪ d●…or. lib. 1.  True love is free, and without self respects: whereas to shroud our own private aims under the name of friendship. Non est amicitia sed mercatura, 
S●…. Epi●… 9  is only to make a Trade and merchandise of one another.  
Secondly, that our love be s●…rene, not mudded with error, and prejudice: 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 106.  in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses, that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of Polydamas to Hector.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
●…iad. r. 720. vid. Plutarch. de Animi ●…ranquil. Ci●…r▪ ad A●…icum▪ lib. 14. ●…p. 〈◊〉.    

Because thou canst in war all men out do,  
Wilt thou presume thou canst in counsel to▪  
One breast's too narrow to contain all Arts,  
God distributes his gifts in several parts.   
In this case therefore our care must be to discern between the abilities and infirmities of men, that our Honour and Love of the Person render not his weaknesses beautiful us, nor work in us an unhappy diligence in the imitation of them. Vix enim dici potest, quantò libentiùs imitamur 
Quintil. lib. 2. cap. 2. & li. 10. c. ●….  eos, quibus favemus; Love is very apt to trans port us so fare as to make us imitate the errors of whom we love. Like unskilful Painters, who 
Plutarch. de Adulat.  not being able to reach the beauty of the face, express only the wrinkles and blemishes of it.  
Thirdly, that our love keep in all the kinds thereof its due proportion, both for the nature of them, being towards some a love of Reverence, towards others of friendship, towards others of Compassion, towards others of counsel and bounty; as also for their several degrees of intention, which are to be more or less according to the Natural, moral, or Divine obligations which we find in the persons loved. For though we must love All men as ourselves, yet that infers not an Equality, but a Fidelity and Sincerity of love; Since even within ourselves, there is no man but loves his Head and his Heart and other vital parts with a closer Affection than those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repayrable. And therefore the Apostle limiteth the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the greatest degree of our love upon two objects, those of our own house, and those of 
1 Tim. 5. 8. Gal. 6. 10.  the household of faith; not excluding others, but preferring these.  
I shall end this particular with naming one Species of Love more (for all this hitherto hath been Amor Amiciti●…, a Love of a Person for himself) and it is that which the schools call Amor Concupiscenti●…, a love of Concupiscence, or a Circular love, that which gins and ends in a Man's self, when his Affections having gone forth to some object, doth again return home, and loves it not directly for any absolute goodness which it hath in itself, but as it is conducible and bears a relation of Convenience to him that loves it. For though all affection of love (as Aristotle observed) be Circular, in as much as the Object first moves the Appetite, and then the Appetite moves to the Object, and so the motion ceaseth where it began (which is a circle;) (which also by the way shows us in an emblem the firmness and strength which love works amongst men; because of all forms and Fabriques, those which are Circular are the strongest; as we see in Arches, wherein every part doth mutually touch and clasp in that which is next it:) Yet in this love which I here speak of, there is a greater circle; in that, after all this, there is another regress from the Object to the Appetite, applying the goodness thereof unto the same, and loving it only for the commodity and benefit, which the mind is likely to receive from it.  
Another subordinate and less principal cause of love, may be love itself; I mean in another 
Ethic. l. 8. cap. ●… & Lib. 9 cap. 1  man: for as it is natural, according to Aristotle, to praise, so sure it is to love, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Men of loving and good natures: and so he maketh just, beneficent & pleasant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men that are true lovers of their own friends to be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that Love is strong as Death. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his enemies (it being unnatural to hate the dead, whom we cannot hurt: for the utmost harm, that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of Thebes, Aetcocles and Polynices;  Nec furiis post fata modus slammaeque rebels 
Statius The b●…id.  Seditione rogi.— 

Their furies were not bounded by their fate,  
Ones funeral flame the others flame did hate.)   
Even so likewise a man's love hath a power to bury his enemies, and to draw unto itself the most backward and differing affections; for being of a transient nature, and carrying forth itself into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other natural Agents) worketh semblable and alike affections unto itself. For besides that, hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved 
〈◊〉 causam meam hodie●… p●…tas s●…it▪ prorsus ●…cens, quicunque visus tam b●…no seatrie●… nocens. Senc●…. i●… 〈◊〉.  enmity; he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witness, his conscience telling him that it is odious and inhuman to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, Saul the pattern of raging and unreasonable envy, was sometimes brought to relent and accuse himself. And this is the occasion (as I take it) of that speech of Solomon; If 
〈◊〉. 25. 21.  thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shal●… heap coals of fire upon his head. Which, though perhaps, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…st 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, si 〈◊〉 imp●…ndere, 〈◊〉 re●…endere. Aug. de C●…te. b. ●…dib. c. 4.  with earthy and base minds, it hath a property of hardening and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with minds ingenuous and noble, it hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the Apostle telleth us, that we love God, because he loved us first; and Mary Magdalene 
1 ●…ol. 4. 19 Luke 7. 47.  having had much forgiven her, did therefore love Christ much. And therefore the poet's counsel is good:  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Theocri●….  

If for thy love thyself wouldst loved be, 
〈◊〉 ameris? am●…. Martial.   
Show love to those that do show love to thee.   
The next two Causes, which I conceive, of Love, I will join in one; namely, the absence from, and contrarily, the presence with the thing loved; both which, in a different respect, do exercise Love. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of Aristotle, that though distance of place 
〈◊〉. lib. 8. cap. 5.  do not dissolve the root and habit yet it doth the exercise and acts of Love; except he meant it (as I suppose he doth) of the transient acts thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of Love and ●…eneficence to another. For, as in natural bodies there is not only a Compl●…encie or Delight in their proper place, when they enjoy it; but an innate propension and motion thereunto, when they 
* An●…mus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sicu●… corpus ponde●…c. 〈◊〉. de Civi●…. 〈◊〉. lib. 11. c. 2●…. Pond●…um A●…or ●…eus, co 〈◊〉 quocu●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Confe●…. lib. 13. cap▪ 9 & Epist. 89.  are absent from it; so in the mind of man (whose ᵃ Love in his Weight) there is not only a Love of Delight in the fru●…tion, but a Love likewise of Desire, in the privation of a Good; which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth itself upon it: ᵇ as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresseth the Love of Dido to Aeneas: 
* 〈◊〉. sympos. l. 5. q. 7. Aen●…id. l. 4.   Illum absens absentem anditque videtque. 

When night had severed them apart,  
She heard and saw him in her heart.   
And it is the wonder of Love (as Saint chrusostom 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in 1 Cor. 10. 30.  speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things fair separated from each other: Wherein stands the mystery of the Communion of the Church on Earth, both with itself, in all the dispersed members of it, and with Christ the Head; and that other part of it, which triumpheth in Heaven. So that herein, Divine Love hath the same kind of virtue with Divine Faith; that as this is the being and subsisting of things to come, and distant in Time; so that is the union and knitting of things absent, and distant in place.  
But then, much more doth Presence to the goodness of an object loved, increase and exercise our Love; because it gives us a more complete sight of it, and union unto it. And therefore Saint John speaks of a Perfection, and Saint 
1 joh. 4. 18.  Paul of a perpetuity of our Love unto God, grounded 
1 Cor. 13. 8.  on the fullness of the Beatifical Vision, when we shall be for ever with the Lord; whereas now, seeing only in a glass darkly, as we know, so likewise we love but in part only. And Aristotle makes 
E●…hic. lib. 8. c. 5  mutual Conversation and society one of the greatest bonds of Love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise; and from thence, a greater increase of the Affection.  
As living 
* Plutareb. l. de Invidia & Od. Aristot. po●…it. lib. 1. c. 7.  Creatures, so Affections are nourished, after the same manner as they are produced: Now it is necessary, for the first working of Love, that the Object have some manner of Presence with the Affection, either by a Knowledge of Vision, or of Faith. And therefore Saint Paul saith, If they had known, they would not have crucified 
1 Cor. 2. 8.  the Lord of Glory; their Ignorance and Hatred of Him, went both together: Simul ut desin●…nt ignorare, 
Apolog. l. c. 1.  cessant & odisse; as soon, saith Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate Him: And usually, in the phrase of the Scripture, Knowledge and Love are identical. So 
2 Tim. ●…. 19 Matth. 7. 23▪ joh. 9 21. Psa. 1. 6. 3●…. ●…8. Rom. 8. 29.  then, all Love proceeding from Knowledge, and all Knowledge presupposing some Presence of the thing known, it appeareth, that the Presence of the Object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nourisheth this Affection.  
The last Cause or inducement to this Passion, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of divers beautiful and Amiable Qualities in the Object; as namely, Sympathy, justice, industry, Temperance, ingenuity, facility, pleasantness and innocence of Wit, Me●…knesse, Yeeldingnesse, Patience, sweetness of behaviour and disposition, without closeness, suspicion, intermeddling, inquisitive, morosity, Contempt, dissension; in all which, men are either Injusti or Pugnaces, 
Rhe●…or. l. 1. c. 4.  do either wrong us, or cross us: Which two, the Philosopher makes the general Opposites of Love: On which I shall forbear to insist, as also on the Circumstances of the Act of this Passion itself, in the quantity and quality thereof, and shall proceed in brief to the Consequents or Effects of this Passion.   

CHAP. XI. Of the Effects of Love, union to the Object, Stay and Immoration of the Mind upon it, Rest in it, zeal, Strength, and tenderness towards it, condescension unto it, Liquefaction and Languishing for it.  
THe first which I shall observe, is union, occasioned both by the Love which we have to a thing, for it●… own sake, and likewise, for the Love of ourselves, that there may be a greater mutual interest each in other. wherever Love is, it stirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it loveth▪ Where the Treasure is, there the heart will be. Hence, none are said to love God, but those that are some way united unto him. And therefore, as Gods first love to man, was in making man like himself; so his second great love, was in making himself like man. Hence, we read so often of that mystical inhabitation of Christ in his Church, of that more peculiar union and presence with his people, of a spiritual Implantation unto him by Faith, of those near relations of Filiation and fraternity, of mutual interest each in other, I am my beloved's, and my beloved is mine; importing an inseparable union of the Church to Christ. And this may be the reason of that order in Saint Paul's solemn Benediction, The Grace of Christ, the Love of God, and the Communion of the Spirit: for, as the Grace of Christ only taketh away that enmity which was between sinners and God, and is the only means of our reconciliation unto him; so the Love of God is the only Bond of that Communion, which we have with him and his holy Spirit.  
Union is of divers sorts. One, such whereby divers things are made simply one, either by the conversion of one into the other, or by the composition, or constitution of a third out of the things united, as of mixed bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole substance▪ out of the essential parts: Another, such whereby things united are made one after a sort, either by an accidental aggregation, as divers stones make one heap, or by an orderly and artificial distribution, as divers materials make one house. Or by either a natural or moral inclination and sympathy which one thing beareth 
Arist. Rh●…r. lib. 2. cap. 4. Di●…ger. La●…t. in Zenon. ●…7.  unto another. And of this sort is that union which ariseth out of love, tending first unto a mutual similitude and conformity in the same desires; and next unto a mutual possession, fruition, and propriety, whereby the mind loving, longeth to be seized of the thing which it loveth, and cannot endu●…e to be deprived of it. So Moses prayed, I beseech thee show me thy glory; for the vision of God is the possession of him; and so David, My soul thirsteth for God, when shall I come and appear before him? And this is the foundation of all sorrow, when the soul is dispossessed of that which it loved, and wherein it rested. And this desire of Possession is so great that Love contenteth itself not with the Presence, but even then putteth out its endeavours ●…nto a nearer, and more real union, as if it would become really One with the thing which it loveth; which is seen in embrace, 
Amor Hedera Plutarch. de Aud. Scalig. de subtititate. Arist. Polit. lib. 2. c. 4. Vel pr●…sentem desid●…mus. Pli●…. Pantg.  kisses, in the exiliency and egress of the spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplicity and natur●…lnesse of all mutual carriages, as if a present friend were not yet present enough. Which kind of expressions of love are thus elegantly described by Homer, when Eumaeus saw Telemachus safely returned home from Sea.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Odyss. II. 14.    

Eumaeus all amazed sprung to the door.  
The pots of wine which his hands mixed before  
Did both fall from them: he ran on to meet,  
And with full welcomes his young master greet.  
He kissed his head, hands, eyes; and his tears kept  
Time with his kisses, as he kissed he wept.   
The like elegant description we have of the love of Penelope, when Ulysses after his return was perfectly known unto her.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Odyss. x. 208.  

She wept and ran strait on, her hands she spread  
And clasped about his neck, and kissed his head.   
Love hath in moral and divine things the same effect which fire hath in natural, to congregate homogeneal, or things of the same kind, and to separate heterogeneal, or things differing: as we see in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the spiritual part of man collected together, and raised from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love shall be perfect, all things shall be harmonious and homogeneal, not in regard of natural properties, but in a pure and unmixed spiritualness of affections in a perfect unity of minds and motions.  
From the union of love proceeds another secret effect, namely, a resting of the mind in the thing loved. In which respect the Philosopher calleth knowledge the rest of the understanding. And this can only be total and perfect in the union of the soul with God, the chiefest good thereof. Whence some have made the threefold Appetite 
G●… 〈◊〉 Theol.  in man, Concupiscible, rational and Irascible, to have their final perfection and quiet by a distinct union to the Three Persons in the Trinity: for the Concupiscible power is carried ad bonum to good, which they say is the Attribute of the holy Spirit; the rational adverum, to that which is true, which is the Attribute of the son; and the Irascible ad Ard●…um, to Power, which is the Attribute of the Father. But to let that pass for a spider's web (curious, but thin) certaine it is that God only is that end, who can fully accomplish the perfection and terminate the desires of those creatures, whom he made after a peculiar manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there ariseth from the union unto any other Object of Love, a satiating and quieting of the faculty; which, in a word, is then only, in Objects of inferior order and goodness, regular, when the Object is natural, and the Action limited. Disproportions and enormity are the two Corruptions in this particular.  
A third Effect, which I shall observe of Love, is Stay, and immoration of the Mind upon the Object loved, and a diverting of it from all others: as we observed in Eumaeus, when he saw Telemachus, he threw away the business which he was about before: And the Woman of Samaria, being transported with the love of Christ, left her Pitcher, which she had brought to the Well, that she might go and call others unto his Doctrine: And Mary left the thoughts of entertaining Christ at the Table, out of an extraordinary desire to entertain him in her heart. And this effect the Poet hath excellently expressed in Dido; who having showed before a marvellous Princely wisdom and sedulity, in fortifying her new kingdom, and viewing the works herself, (as he had before described) as soon as she was once transported by the love of Aeneas, than all stood still on a sudden.  

Non capta assurgunt turres, non arma juventu●…  
Exercet; portusuè, aut propugnacula bello 
Aenead. l. 4.   
Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta—   

The Towers long since begun, risen up no more,  
And arms did rust, which ere▪ while brave youth wore.  
No Ports, no Sconces, no defence went on,  
But all their works hung broken, and half done.   
Thus, as Plutarch hath observed, the Images of things in the fancies of other men are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish; but the Impressions which love makes, ar●… as it were, written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the memory.  
Love and Knowledge have mutual sharpening and causality each on other: for as Knowledge doth generate Love, so Love doth nourish and exercise! Knowledge. The reason whereof is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the Truth and Good of them: for it being the property of Truth to unite and apply goodness (nothing being apprehended as Good, unless that goodness be apprehended as true) the more Appetite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more complete union doth it seek with that: the Heart and the Treasure can seldom be severed; the Eagles will always resort to the body; David's Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.  
And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion between the strength of Love and Death; for as in Death nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arm the heart in its greatest conflict; uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testify the natural love which each living creature beareth to its own conservation: so doth Love draw and unite those Spirits which administer either to the fancy or Appetite, to serve only for the nourishing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that treasure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and influence, do therefore with the same force, whereby they carry the mind to the consideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneal; no determined power of the soul being able to impart a sufficient activity unto divers independing operations, when the force of it is exhausted by one so strong; and there being a sympathy, and as it were, a league between the faculties of the soul, all covenanting not to obscure or hinder the Predominant Impressions of one another. And therefore as in Rome when a 
Plutarch. in Amatori●….  dictator was created, all other Authority was or that time suspended; so when any strong Love hath taken possession of the soul, it gives a Supersedeas and stop unto all other employments. It is therefore prescribed as a Remedy against inordinate Love.  —— Pabula Amoris 
●…ucret. apud P●…tr. 〈◊〉. lib. 16. cap. 4.  Absterrere sibi, atque aliò convertere mentem. 

To draw away the ●…ewell from this fire,  
And turn the mind upon some new desire.   
For Love is Otiosorum Negotium, as Diogenes 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diogenes apud Laert. lib. 6  spoke, the business oftentimes of men that want employments.  
Another effect of Love is jealousy or zeal. 
Laert. lib. 6.  Whereby is not meant that suspicious, inquisitive, quicksighted quality of finding out the ●…lemishes, and discovering the imperfections of one another (for it is the property of true Love ●…o think none evil) but only a provident and solicitous fear, lest some or other evil should either disturb the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of Job towards his sons; 
job 1. 5.  ●…nd of the Apostle towards his Corinthians, I am jealous over you with a godly jealousy: So Pen●… 
●… C●…r. 11. 2.  Penelope in the Poet was jealous of the safety of Ulysses.  

In t●… singebam violentos Troas ituros,  
Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram. 
O●…d. 〈◊〉.    

How oft my decree Ulysses did I see  
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rush on thee▪  
And when great Hector's name but touched mine-ears  
My cheeks drew paleness from my paler fears.   
Zeal is a compounded affection, or a mixture of Love and Anger; so that it ever putteth forth itself to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in Christ, whose zeal 
●…b. 2. 17.  or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it i●… said that the zeal of God's house did consume him. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪  As water when it boileth (from which metapho●… the word zeal is borrowed) doth in the boiling consume, or as the candle wasteth itself with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, that 
〈◊〉 ●….  much water cannot quench Love. It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it grows. And therefore the sin of Laodiee●… which was contrary unto zeal is compared unto 
〈◊〉 3. 〈◊〉.  luk●…warme water, which doth not boil, and so cannot work out the scum or corruption which is in it.  
And from hence it is that Love makes Weak things strong, and turneth Cowardice into Valou●… 
〈…〉.  and meekness into Anger, and Shame into boldness, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearful He●…, which hath nothing but flight to defend herself from the dog, or the Serpent, will venture with courage against the strongest creatures to defend her little chickens▪ Thus zeal and Love of God 
Nam. 12 11. Exod 3●… 19  made Moses forget his meekness; and his Anger was so strong▪ that it broke the Tables o●… the Law, and made the people drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wi●…lly expressed by Seneca, that Magnus' dolour iratus amor est, a great 
S●…nec. in Here O●….  grief is nothing else but Love displeased, and made angry. It transporteth Nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth such a force and vigour into it, as that it will adventure on any difficulties; as Mary Magdalen would in the strength 
Vid. Pluta●…. 〈◊〉.  of her Love undertake to carry away the dead body of Christ (as she conceived of him) not considering the weight of that, or her own weakness. It hath a constraining virtue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power; as the Corinthians, when they were poor in estate, were yet rich in Liberality. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the estate of an absent friend, whom we therefore suspect not sufficiently guarded from danger, because destitute of the help which our presence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and stains of the thing loved to redound to the grief 
No●…●…atiar me 〈◊〉 sc●…re de eo quem imem. Pl●…n. Epist.  and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, security, and honour of what he pretendeth affection to, loves nothing but himself in those pretences. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eur●…pid. Helen.   
Another Effect of Love is Condescension to things below us, that we may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his own judgement, and to do that which a looker on might happily esteem weakness o●… indecency; out of a fervent desire to express affection to the thing beloved. Thus David's great Love to the ark of God's presence did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy (for which Michall out of pride despised him in her heart) and was contented by that, which she esteemed baseness, to honour God: herein expressing the love of him unto Mankind, who was both his Lord and his son; who emptied, and humbled, and denied himself for our sakes, not considering his own worthiness, but our want; nor what was honourable for him to do, but what was necessary for us to be done. Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit, what ever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of Love to their children do lisp, and play, and fit their speeches and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore Themistocles being 
Plutarch. Apothegus. L●…con.  found playing and riding on a reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till he himself was a father of children.  
The last Effect which I shall observe of this 
Vid. Plutarch. symposiac. l. 5. ●…. 7.  Passion is that which we call Liquefaction or Laugnor, a melting, as it were, of the heart to receive the more easy impressions from the thing which 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 2.  it loveth, and a decay of the Spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painful and lingering expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most viscerall affection. And therefore called by the 
Gen. 43. 1 ●…g. 3. 26.  Apostle, Bowels of Love. And we read of the yearning of josephs' bowels over Benjamin his mother's son, and of the true Mother over her child. Incaluerunt viscera, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowels, which the more vehement it is, doth work the more sudden and sensible decay and languishing of Spirits. So Ammon out of wanton and incestuous Love is said to grow lean 
2 Sam. 13.  from day to day, and to have been sick with vexation for his sister Thamar.  
And in spiritual love we find the like expression of the Spouse; Stay me with flagons, comfort 
Cant. 2. 5.  me with apples, for I am sick of love: Wine to exhilerate, apples to refresh those Spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreme outlet of Love. And for this reason the Object of our Love is said to Overcome us, and to Burn the Heart, as with Coals of jumper; and 
Can. 6. 5. 8. 6.  the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth.  — Est mollis slamma medullas 
Aenead. 4.  Interea & tac●…um vivit sub pectore vulnus. 

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,  
And a close wound lived in her bleeding breast.   
Now the cause of this Languor, which love worketh, is in Sensitive Objects, an earnest desire to enjoy them; in spiritual Objects, an earnest desire to increase them. In the former, want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh weariness and satiety: In the other fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when we wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a distance promiseth much pleasure, but taste and experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the Appetite, and the greater the experience, the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance Moses had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountain and foundation of all the rest.   

CHAP. XII. Of the Passion of Hatred, the fundamental Cause or Object thereof evil, how fare forth evils are willed by God may be declined by men, of God's secret and revealed Will.  
THe next in order is Hatred: of which the schoolmen make two kinds; an Hatr●…d of Abomination or loathing; which consists in a pure aversion or flight of the Appetite from something apprehended as evil, arising from a dissonancy and repugnancy between their natures: and an Hatred of Enmity, which is not a flying, but rather a pursuing Hatred, and hath ever some Love joined with it, namely a Love of any evil which we desire may befall the person or thing which we hate.  
I shall not distinctly handle these asunder, but shall observe the Dignities and Corruptions of the Passion in general, as it implies a common disconvenience, and natural Vnconformitie between the Object and the Appetite.  
The Object then of all Hatred is evil; and all evil implying an opposition to Good admits of so many several respects as there are kinds of opposition.  
And there is first an evil of Contraricty, such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a wolf unto a sheep, occasioned by that Destructive Efficiency, which one hath upon the other.  
Secondly, an evil of Privation, which we hate formally and for itself, as implying nothing but a Defect and Absence of Good.  
Thirdly, an evil of Contradiction in the not being of any creature, opposed to its being. For Being and Immortality is that which Aristotle makes one of the principle objects of Love; Annihilation then, or Not being is the chiefest evil of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.  
Lastly, an evil of Relation; for as things in their own simple nature's evil, may have in them a Relative goodness, and so to be desired; as the kill of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security of men: so things in their absolute being Good may have in them a Relative, or Comparative evil, and in that sense be by consequence hated; as our Saviour intimates He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me: when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Christ, they are then to be undervalved in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the Law if a man's dearest brother or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from God unto Idolatry, he was not to conceal, pity, or spare him, but his own hand was to be first upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of Aeneas toward Dido, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition, unto which by divine guidance he supposed himself to be directed.  

— Quanquam lenire dolorem  
Soland●… cupi●…, & dictis avertere curas,  
(Multag●…ens magnoque animum labefactus amore)  
jussa tamen Div●…m exequitur.—   

Though he desired with solace to appease,  
And on her pensive soul to breathe some ease,  
(Himself with mutual love made saint) yet still  
His purposes were fixed t'obey God's will.   
So then we see what qualification is required in the Object of a just Hatred, that it be evil, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature: and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.  
But here, in as much as it is evident that the being of some evil comes under the Will of God; (Is there any evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done 〈◊〉) and our will is to be conformable unto his; it may seem that it ought to fall under our Will too, and by consequence to be rather loved than hated by us, since we pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will.  
For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those Evils which he thus willeth, as formally, and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe how fare the Will of God is to be the rule of our will; whence will arise the clear apprehension of that truth which is now set down, that the unalterable Object of man's Hatred is all manner of evil, not only that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and misery.  
First then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himself hath sworn, that he will not the death or destruction of a sinner: and by consequence neither any other evil of his Creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy; he is not delighted in the ruin, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groans of any thing which himself created: But he is said to will those evils as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious Power over all the Creatures, and of his glorious justice on those, who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left only to the wisdom of God himself to know and ordain the best means for glorifying of himself in and by his creatures, we are not here hence to assume any warrant for willing evil unto ourselves or others, but then only when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evil unto himself, if thereby the glory of God's mercy towards his countrymen the Jews might be the more advanced.  
Secondly, it is no good Argument, God willeth the inflicting of such an evil, therefore it is unlawful for my will to decline it: for first the Will of God, whereby he determineth to work this or that evil on particular Subjects, is a part of his secret counsel. Now the Revealed, and not the Hidden Will of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions: whence it cometh to pass, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or aversations to go a cross way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure in my sick bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to second the Will of God by an execution thereof upon myself, or by a neglect of those Ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his mercy, that I might fulfil his Will. Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake me, yet I have the warrant of my saviour's example and precept to turn my back rather than my conscience in persecution: always reserved, that though I will that, which God willeth, yet my will be ever subordinated unto his. We own submission to the will of God's purpose and counsel, and we own conformity to the will of his Precept and Command; we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to work himself, and we must conform to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore  
Secondly, though the Will of God were in this case known, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it be to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the wisdom and purpose of God hath made inevitable; for as the promises and decrees of Good things from God do not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our profaneness in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableness of a future evil (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny itself, or to love its own distresses.  
Of which that we may be the more sure, we may observe it in him, who as he was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same natural inclinations and aversations with us; so was he of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by the hand and counsel of God before determined) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree. He knew it was not his father's Will; and yet, Father, if thou be willing, l●…t this cup pass from me: he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an Oporte●…, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time again, Father, if it be possible, let this Cup pass from me. Consider it as the Destruction of his Temple, and Anguish of nature, which he could not (being in all things like unto us) but love; and then Transeat, Let it pass: but consider it as the necessary means of procuring precious blessings for mankind, and of fulfilling the eternal Decree of his father's Love, and then, Not as I, but as thou wilt.  
The same may be applied in any manner of humane evils, notwithstanding we are with an armed patience to sustain them, or with an obedient submission unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that pressure of nature, which they bring with them (on which the God of Nature hath imprinted a natural desire of its own quiet and integrity) so fare forth all evil, not only may, but must be Hated by every Regular will, upon pain of violating the Law of its Creation.  
And indeed in all this there is not any deviation from the Will of God, intending that which we abhor: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himself, or any good thing of his own making; so neither doth it stand with the goodness of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but only in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousness, whereunto he in the dispensation of his wisdom and justice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the wisdom of God in thus ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertain those natural desires of a straightened mind after deliverance from those evils, were to be in solomon's▪ phrase too Righteous, and out of a purpose to answer the ends of God's wisdom, to cross the Law of his Creation.  
So than it is evident that the Object and fundamental cause of Hatred, is all and only evil: which (however in respect of the Existence of it, it be in some cases Good; for as it is in the power of God to educe out of confusion order, light out of darkness, his own honour out of man's shame; so is it his providence likewise to turn unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves do only hurt them) Yet I say this notwithstanding, as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created law and inbred love, which each thing beareth to its own perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.  
As on the other side, those ordinary and commong goods, which we call, in respect of God, blessings, as health, peace, prosperity, good success, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should be moderated, occasions of much evil and dangers; so that their Table is become their snare (as the experience of those latter Roman Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men hath made them in luxury and vileness so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt war with God.) Notwithstanding I say all this; yet for as much as these things are such as do quiet, satisfy, and bear convenience unto man's nature, they are therefore justly with thankfulness by ourselves received, and out of love desired unto our friends.  
I now proceed from the object or general fundamental cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which do arise from it.   

CHAP. XIII. Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injury, Base fears, Disparity of Desires, a Fixed jealous Fancy.  
THe first which I shall note is 
Arist. Hist. Anim. l 9 c. 44. See Plan. N●…t. Hist. l. 8. c. 4. 9 10. lib. 9 c 6●…. l 10. c. 37. 74. lib. 16. c. 13. l. 20. ●…n pro●…m. lib. 2●…. c 20. lib. 24 c. 1. Aelian. de Animal l. 3. c. 7. l. 4. c ●…. l. 5. ●…. 48. 50. l. 6. c. 22. 45, 4●…. Plutarch S●…mpos. lib. 2. 47.  a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smells, and horseflies with ointments; the Locust will die at the sight of the Polypus, and the Serpent will rather fly into the fire, than come near the boughs of a wild Ash: some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mix with the feathers of other fowls. So Homer noteth of the lion, that he feareth fire, and the Elephant nauseates his meat, if a Mouse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kind: from which natural Antipathy it cometh, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, do yet at the very first sight fly from it, as from an enemy to 
Plutarch. de Odio & ●…vid.  their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.  

— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad. ●…. 22.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

Lions with men will ne'er make faithful truce,  
Nor can you any way the wolf induce  
To Love the Lamb: they study with fixed hate,  
The one the other how to violate.   
And the like kind of strange Hatred we may sometimes find amongst men; one man's disposition so much disagreeing from another's, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have minds averse from one another; which the Epigrammatist hath wittily expressed.  

Non amo te Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; 
Marshal.   
Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te.   

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what;  
This only I can say, I love thee not.   
Another cause working Hatred of a thing in the minds of men, is the difficulty and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it be a good thing which we either do or aught to desire, which the Casuists call Acedia, being a grief of the appetite looking on a Difficult Good, as if it were evil because difficult; from whence ariseth a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the means, which might help us to it. Thus wicked and resolved sinners, conceiving happiness as unacquirable by them, do grow to the Hating of it, to entertain rancorous affections against those, which persuade them to seek it, to envy and malign all such they find careful to obtain it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes of thoughts of it, & to divert their minds towards such more obvious and easy delight, as 
Vid. Arist. Ethic. lib. 9 c. 4.  will be gotten with less labour; thus Difficulty rendereth Good things Hateful; as Israel in the wilderness despised the pleasant Land, because there were sons of Anak in it.  
And this is one great cause of the different affections of men towards several courses of life; one man being of dull and sluggish apprehensions, hateth Learning: another by nature quick and of noble intellectuals wholly applieth himself unto it, the difficulty persuading the one to despise the goodness, and the goodness inducing the other to conquer the difficulties of it: so one man looking unto the pain of a virtuous life, contemns the reward; and another looking unto the Reward, endures the pain. And we shall usually find it true, that either laziness, fearing disappointment, or Love being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kind of Hatred and dislike of that which did either deter them from seeking it, or deceive them when they sought it. As she, who while there was any Hope, did solicit Aeneas with her tears and importunities; when he 
Aenead. 4.  was quite gone did follow him with her imprecations.  
There is no Malice grows ranker than that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darkness is more formidable, than that of an 
Arist. Politic. lib. 7. c. 7. Frat●…rno pri mi maduerunt sanguine muris L●…an. lib. 1.  Eclipse, which assaults the very vessels of Light; nor any taste more unsavoury than of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more natural the union, the more impossible the reunion. Things joined with glue, being broken asunder may be glued again; but if a man's arm be broken off, it can never be joined on again: So those Hatreds 
Plutarch. de amore frat.  are most incurable, which arise out of the greatest and most natural Love.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Eurip. Medea.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:   

When Love of friends is turned to Wrath, besure  
That Wrath is deep, and scarce admits a Cure.   
Another very usual, but most evil cause of Hatred, is Injury, when a man because he hath done wrong, doth from thence resolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both sacred and profane: Ioseph●… mistress first wronged him in assaulting his chastity, and then Hated him and caused him to be cast into prison. Ammon first abused his sister Tamar, and then Hated her worse than before he loved her. Phadra having solicited Hippolytus her husband's son unto incest; being denied, did after accuse him to his father, and procure his ruin. And Aristotle proposeth it as a problem, 
Probl. Sect. 4. Sect. 11.  Why they, who corrupt and violate the chastity of any, do after hate them? and gives this reason of it, because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadness, which in the sin they contracted. This cause of Hatred Seneca and Tacitus have both observed as a thing 
Proprium humani inge●…ii odisse quos laser●…. ●…acit. vit. Agri. & Senec. de Ird l. 2. c. 33.  usual with proud and insolent men, first to Hurt then to Hate.  
And the reason is first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; & the proper affection, which respecteth an enemy is Hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equal or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared: and Oderunt quos metuunt, it is usual to hate those whom we fear: if inferior, yet the memory and sight of him doth upbraid with guilt, & affect with an unwilling & unwelcome review of the sin, whereby he was wronged; and Pride scorns reproof, and loves not to be under him in gild, whom it overtops in Power: for Innocence doth always give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged; besides, Hatred is a kind of apology for wrong: For if a man can persuade himself to hate him whom he hath injured, he will begin to believe that he deserved the injury which was offered unto him; every man being naturally willing to find the first inducement unto his sin, rather in another than himself.  
The next cause (which I shall observe) is fear, I mean slavish fear: for as Love excludeth fear; so fear begetteth Hatred; and it is ever seen: Qui terribiles sunt, timent: they that terrify others do fear them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated: for as Aristotle speaketh, Nemoquem metuit, amat; no man loves him whom he fears: which is the same with that of Saint john, Love casteth out fear: not a Reverend, submissive, awsull fear; not a cautelous, vigilant and obedient fear; not a fear of Admiration, nor a fear of Subjection; but a fear of slavery and of Rebellion, all flashes of horror, all the toss and shipwrecks of a torn mind, all the tremble of a tormented spirit; briefly all evil and hurtful fear. And this I believe is one principal reason of that malice and contempt of godliness, which shows itself in the lives of atheistical and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature, so is it marveilously enraged by the fearful expectation of that fiery vengeance, which their pale and guilty consciences do already preoccupate; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God; so their stubborness and malice concludes that they will hate him again; Let us eat and drink, for toomorrow we shall die.  
There may be a double root of this fear outward and inward. The outward is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the potent, and thereupon the less avoidable malice of the person hated (as it was the speech of Caligula, Oderint dum metuant) And here in our Aversation (if it observe that general rule of goodness in passions, Subordination to Reason and Piety) is, not only allowable, but natural, while it extends itself no further than the Evil which we wrongfully suffer. For I cannot but think that the spittle and scourges, the thorns and buffets, the reed and knees of those mocking and blasphemous Jews were so many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no sin, was so deeply desirous to have pass from him.  
But than next, the inward root of fear is the guilt and burden of an unclean and uncovered Conscience, for Pollution and weakness is naked, must needs be fearful. And therefore that inference of Adam had truth in it, I was afraid, because I was naked: for having disrobed himself of original righteousness, he was thereupon afraid of the curse and summons of an offended justice. Now from this fear may arise a double hatred; an hatred of a man's own Conscience: for an evil man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the 
Ethic. lib. 9 cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Scholiast. in ●…ophecl. ●… dip. Ty●….  Philosopher speaks, is not a friend unto himself, but flies and labours to run away from himself, and is never in so bad company, as when he is alone, because than he keeps company with his own Conscience.  
Which is the reason why some men's hatred of themselves hath proceeded so far, as to make themselves the Instruments of that small measure of Annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherein notwithstanding they discover, how fare their fury should extend against themselves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it: for he that hates a thing, would if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a natural hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venomous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them most, if his Conscience be naked and let lose to fly upon him, if that worm that never dies (unless killed with our saviour's blood) begin thoroughly to sting and gnaw him, would think himself a wise Merchant, if he could exchange beings with the worst of these. The worm▪ and Viper of Conscience is of all the Creatures the most ugly and hateful. A wicked man, when he doth distinctly know himself, doth love every thing, save God, better than himself.  

— Diri conscia facti 
juvenal.   
Mens habet attonitos & surdo verbere cadit  
Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum.   

The mind being conscious of some dire offence,  
Fills them with fears; a Torturer from thence  
Shaketh, and with redoubled blows doth urge  
The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.   
Nor can I esteem this a corrupt, though it be a miserable passion; for as a bad man is to himself the worst, so is he by consequence the hatefullest of all Creatures.  
The second Hatred, which may arise from that fear which is caused by a secret guilt of mind, is of all others most corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Authors or Executioners of justice; of the equity and justness of whose proceed, we are from within convinced; such as is the malice and blasphemy of malefactors against the judge, and of Devils and damned men against God and his righteous judgements, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily do endure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborn creatures (as was before observed) Odisse quos laserint, first to wrong God, and then to hate him.  
Another particular cause of this passion may be a Disparity of Affections and Desires: for notwithstanding there be many times Hatred where there is Similitude (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the Philosopher observeth) 
Hist. Animal.  and sundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sin enough to themselves, except they got a Monopoly, and might engross it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences which are likely to follow therefrom, as hath been formerly noted: So that in that very similitude of Natures, there is a disagreement of ends, each one respecting his own private benefit.  
Now the Corruptions herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that disparity whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is moral, wherein it is laudable to hate the vitious courses, in which any man differres from us, or we ourselves from the right rule of Life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruin, except it be in such a case, when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unless prevented by such a speedy Remedy. Sometimes this Disparity may be in actions civil, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition, which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things; Opposition of a man's Hopes, and of his Parts and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervalewing the other: So corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, Ambition and self-love; the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced, that Hatred, whichariseth out of a Parity of Desire, as amongst Competitors for the same dignity, or corrivals for the same Love, or professors of the same art, either by reason of covetousness, or Envy, or ambition, a greedy desire of their own, or a discontented sight of another's good. 
Mallem bic primus esse, quàm Rom●… secundu●…. Caesar de 〈◊〉 quodam dum Alpes transi●…t Pluiarc●….   

Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Caservè priorem  
Pompeiusve, parem—   

Thus two great Rulers do each other hate,  
Caesar no Better brooks, Pompey no mate.   
And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they own unto their Country. 
Plutarch. de g●…rund: Rep.  More noble was the behaviour of Themistocles, and Aristides, who when they were ever employed in the public service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not resume them till they returned, and became private menagaine.  
The last cause which I shall observe of Hatred may be a settled and permament Intuition of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kind of habitual detestation; it being the nature of evil commonly to show worse at the second or third view. And that first, because the former Act doth work a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked, but with a forestalled resolution of finding evil therein: and next, because from a serious and fastoned search into the Object the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being a master and light unto the latter. But light and wand'ring fancies (though they may be more sudden in the apprehensive of evil, and by consequence liable to an oftener Anger, yet by reason of the volubility of the mind joined with an infirmity and unexercise of memory, they are for this cause the less subject to deep and rooted hatred.  
Unto this Head may be referred that Hatred which ariseth from excessive Melancholy, which maketh men sullen morose, solitary, averse from all society, and Haters of the light, delighting only like the 
a Zeph. 2. 14. If. 34. 11 14, 15  Shrieke▪ owl or the Bitterne in desolate places, and 
b Matt●… 8. 28.  monuments of the dead▪ This is that which is called 
c 〈◊〉 de Neur●… in M●… 〈◊〉▪ Pl●…. lib. 8 c. 2●…. 〈◊〉 Eclog 8. 〈◊〉. M●…la de situ orb●… l. 2 ●…erus de prae●…g. d●…mon. l. 3. c. 2●…. 〈◊〉. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 17. Olaus' 〈◊〉 de Reg. Septen●…r. lib. 18. c. 45. 46. 47. Lu●…. in Asine.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of 
d Dan. 5. 21.  N●…buchadnezar, when he was ●…hrust out from men, and did eat grass with the beasts. 
e Ci●…r. de Ami●…. & lib. 4. Tuscul. quaest. Suidas in Timon. ●… lutarch 〈◊〉 in Al●…ibiade & A●…tonie. La●…t. in Timone. 〈◊〉. Adve●…. l. 24. cap. 33.  Timon the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Man. Hater, because he kept company with no man, but only with Alcibiades, whereof he gave this only account, because he thought that man was borne to do a great deal of mischief. And we read even in the 
f So●…. l. 4. c. 18. 〈◊〉. l▪ 4. cap. 26. 〈◊〉. lib. 5. c. 29.  Histories of the Church, of men so marvellously averse from all converse or correspondence with men; that they have for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety years, immured themselves in cells and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they traveled fare to visit them. So fare can the opinion of the mind, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even ou●… of humane disposi●…on, which the 
g 〈◊〉. polit. lib. 1. cap. 2.  Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society, and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention, the sign and the fruit of hatred.   

CHAP. XIIII. Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred, and how in either respects it is to be regulated.  
I Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the Quantity and Quality of its Acts: which must be observed according to the evil of the Object: for if that be unchangeable, there is required a continual Permanency of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the Mind: or if it be Importuna●…e and Affaulting, there is required a more frequent repetition of the Act. The same likewise is to be said of the Quality of it; for if the evil be of an Intense and more Invincible nature, our Hatred must arm us the more: if more Low and remiss, the Passion may be the more negligent.  
Hero then is a fourefould direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First the unalterableness of the evil, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the Reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred. We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of Goods.  
First then sin is in its own formal and abstracted nature, Vnchangeable, though not in respect of the subject, in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God be repaired and restored again; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of evil, by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another frame. Sin then remaineth in its own Nature unchangeable and always evil, and the reason is because it is a Transgression of a perpetual Law, and a Remotion from an unalterable Will: sin then is to be hated with a continual and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditional and more flexible dislike, they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore we see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evil of them, and so makes the passions thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in Morality likewise much damage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the public by nourishing such private enmities and being peremptory in continuing those former differences, which, though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmful, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a grown and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.  
Secondly, again as no evil altogether so unchangeable as sin, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a Multiplicity and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its importunity and insinuation, that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it: Some Evils there may be, which require only a present and not a customary exercise of this passion. Present I say when the Object is offensive and not customary; because as the Object, so the Passion likewise may be unusual. Sin only is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of st●…atagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures (though best armed against such assaults; and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keep us ever on our guard, that we be not unprepared for a surprise.  
Thirdly, Then for the Quantity of an evil, because that is not in any thing so intense as in sin whither we consider it in its own Nature, as a Rebellion against the highest good, or in its effects; either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution, or of the vastness of it, both in gild and Punishment: In these respects our Hatred of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their Extension, nor so Destructive in their Consequents; and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.  
And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first when a man shall apply his Hatred of prosecution, or ill willing against that evil, which is the proper object only of Aversation: for some things there are only of conditional evils, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive only in their application requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.  
Secondly, a Corruption in regard of intention 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophoc. A●…ax.  is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against only relative evils. There is not any man betwixt whose natural faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion (it being the Providence of divine dispensation so variously to frame and order men's fancies, as that no man shall have an Independance or self sufficiency, no●… say unto the other members I have no need of you; but there should be such a mutual Ministry and assistance amongst men, as whereby might be ever upheld those essential virtues of humane society, unity and Charity, no man being able to live without the aid of others; nor to upbraid others with his own service. Now in this case, if any man, who either out of the narrowness and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his own mind, is indisposed for some courses of life or study, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them, or to an undervalewing of Persons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a desire of the not being of them, as things utterly unuseful, because he sees not what use himself can have of them, he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike as a blind man should do in wishing the sun put out, not considering that he himself receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withal.  
For as too excessively to dote on the fancy of any particular thing may prove harmful, as appeareth in the poetical fable of Midas, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what he out of too excessive love made his idol, became his ruin; (as many men need none other enemy to undo them than their own desires.) So on the other side, the extreme Hatred of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we see intimated in that other fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extreme malice against the poor Cock, at whose early crow, their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their laziness, were every day by the vigilancy of their master, whose covetousness now began to crow earlier than his Cock, called from their sleep sooner than they are before; till at length they began to wish for that, which the rashness and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when we go about any thing out of the dictates of Passion, it is a great point of wisdom, first to consider whither we ourselves may not afterwards be the first men, who shall wish it undone again.   

CHAP. XV. Of the Good and evil Effects of Hatred. cautelousness and wisdom to profit by that we hate, with Confidence, Victory, Reformation. Hatred is general against the whole kind, Cunning, Dissimulation, Cruelty, running over to Persons Innocent, violating Religion. Envy, rejoicing at evil. Crooked suspicion. Contempt. Contumely.  
I Now proceed to the Consequents or Effects of this Passion: And first for the useful and profitable Effects thereof, which may be these.  
First, a cautelousness and fruit full wisdom for our own welfare to prevent danger, and to reap benefit from that, which is at enmity with us. For we shall observe in many evils that no man is brought within the danger, who ●…s not first drawn into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions then most desperately wound the soul, when they beguile and entangle it. But the greatest use of this Caution is to 
Quod de 〈◊〉 obs ●…vavit. Plutar●… lib. de será nu minis▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliq●…n lo pro remedi ●…uit. Sen de Bene●…. l. 2. c. 18.  learn how to benefit by the Hatred of others, and ●…s learned physicians do, to make an Antidote of poison. For as many venomous creatures are by art used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries, which themselves had made (natural Attraction, as it were, calling home that poison which injury and violence had misplaced:) So the malice and venom of an Enemy may by wisdom be converted into a Medicine, and by managing become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent similitude 
Plutarch. de Capiend. ex hostibus ut●… lit. Coel. Khodigin. Antiq. lect. l. 5. cap. 17.  of Plutarch, As healthy and strong beasts do eat and concoct Serpents, whereas weak stomaches do nauseate at delicates: so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends; and an injury doth one man more good, than a courtesy doth another. As Wind and Thunder when they trouble the air, do withal purge it; whereas a long calm doth dispose it to putrefaction: or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it; so a Wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when 〈◊〉 advised that Carthage should be utterly destroyed, Scipio Nascica persuaded the contrary upon these reasons, that it was needful for Rome to have always some enemies, which by a kind of antipe 
Florus. lib. 2.  ristasis might strengthen & keep alive its virtue, which otherwise by security might be in dange●… of languishing and degenerate into luxury. Fo●… 
1 Sam. 13. ●…0.  as the Israelites, when there was no Smith amongst them did sharpen their instruments with the Philistines; so indeed an enemy doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those virtues, which by lying unexercised might contract rust and dullness, and many times when the reasons of the thing itself will not persuade, the fear of giving advantage to an Enemy, or of gratifying him, will overrule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of Insultation.  Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atridae. 

This makes our foes rejoice, they would have bought  
With a great price those crimes we do for nought.   
Thus as a Sink by an house makes all the house the cleaner, because the Sordes are cast into that: Or as they observe that Roses and Violets are sweetest, which grow near unto garlic and other strong scented herbs, because these draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nourishment: so the eye and nearness of an enemy serveth by exciting Caution and diligence to make a man's life more fruitful and orderly, then otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus Hector sharply reproving the Cowardice of his brother Paris (who had been the only cause of the war and calamity) when he fled from Menelaus, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him that he was,  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 51.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc.   

To Father, City, People, loss and blame;  
joy to his foes, and to himself a shame.   
Secondly, Hatred worketh Confidence and some Presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former: for Cau●…lousnesse or Furniture against the onset of evil cannot but make the mind more resolute in its own defence, than if it were left naked without Assistance. Again, of all others, this is one of the most confident Passions, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backed with Reason, as the Philosopher observes; 
Rb●…r. l. 2. c. 4.  and ever the more counsel, the more Confidence. Besides, being a deep and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion, that intendeth so much evil to another, as Hatred; anger would only bring Trouble; but Hatred, mischief; Anger would only Punish and Retaliate, but Hatred would Destroy; for as the Philosophe●… notes, it seeketh the not being of what it Hates. A man may be Angry with his friend, but he hates none but an enemy; and no man can will so much hurt to his friend, as to his enemy. Now the more hurt a passion doth intent, the more strength it must call out to execute that intention; and ever the more strength the more Confidence.  
Thirdly it worketh some manner of Victory over the evil hated: for Odium semper sequitur 〈◊〉 animi elatione, as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed, It ever ariseth out of pride and height of mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kind of Victory. For so fare forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in moral and practic courses; wherein I think it is a general Rule: he in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the Will, which never chooseth an object till it love it. There only we can have perfect conquest of sin, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incomplete restauration of God's Image: the body of nature and the body of fin are borne, and must die together.  
Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in reasonable Creatures, namely the Reformation of the person, in whom that evil was. For as countenance and encouragement is the fosterer; so Hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as physic to purge out an evil. And the reason is because a great part of that goodness, which is apprehended to be in sin, by those that pursue it, is other men's approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrent coins, which pass rather because they are received, than because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of credit see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himself, as still to to feed on those vanities, which he seethe do provoke others unto loathing, though I confess, it is not a persuasions of men's, but of God's hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorough Resormation.  
I now proceed to observe those Effects, which are corrupt and hurtful: and here we may observe,  
First, the rule of Aristotle, whose maxim it is, that Hatred is always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against the whole kind of its object▪ so than all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not general, but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences. For since though nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, Sin. In which, though there is no man, which finds not himself more obnoxious and open to one kind than another (it being the long experienced policy of the devil to observe the divers conditions of men's natures, constitutions, callings, and employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will;) insomuch that a man may here in happily deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices persuade to a casual dislike thereof, yet I say it is certain, that if a man's Hatred of sin be not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an universal and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his persuasions to himself what they will, this is rather a personated than a true hatred a meteor of the brain, than an affection of the soul. For as in the good, so in the ill of things; notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes (as Seneca saith) Scelera dissident, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God (as in Herod and Pilate against Christ) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united passion. And hence is that of Saint james, he that offendeth in one is guilty of all; because in that one he contemneth that original Authority which forbade all. There are no terms of consistence between love and hatred divided upon the same uniform Object. It is not the material and blind performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue, either our true love to the Precept, or our hatred to the sin, than a voluntary patience under the hand of a chirurgeon can prove, either that we delight in our own pain, o●… abhor our own flesh. It is not Gods witness within us, but his Word without us; not the tyranny of Conscience, but the goodness of the Law that doth kindly and genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the Eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sin. A Lacedaemonian endeavouring to make a 
Plutarch. 〈◊〉. La●…on.  dead carcase stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward means would avail little except there were something Within to support it. It is certainly so in actions as it is in bodies. Fear as an outward prop may help a while to keep them up, but Love is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.  
Secondly, Another evil effect of hatred is a close and cunning Dissimulation in suppressing of it, 
Vide Sen●…. Epist. 103.  and palliating it with pretences of fairness and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth itself. For by this means is the passion strengthened, and the Person, whom it respects, weakened: this by incautelousnesse and Credulity; (for common Charity, when it sees no signs of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by Restraint and Suppression; for any thing the more united, the more weighty it is: and as wind, so Passions, the closer it is penned, the more strength it gathereth▪ Plutarch compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the Historian hath often observed in Tiberius (whose principal virtue was Dissimulation) who being offended in the Senate with some words spoken by Hatevius and Scaurus; the Historians observation upon it is this. In Hat●…vium statim invectus; Scaurum, cui implacabilius irascebatur, 
Tacit. A●…al. lib. 1.  silentio tramisit. The one he rebuked; but the other whom he more implacably hated, he passed by with silence. And elsewhere upon occasion, Quae in praesens civiliter habuit, sed in animo revolvente it as, etiamsi impetus affectionis langu●…rat▪ memoria val●…bat. Though he seemed to 
Anal. lib. 4. Sta●…it 〈◊〉 odium donet impetus 〈◊〉 ●… savour 〈◊〉 langueret d●… Do●…n▪ in vita. Agric.  take what was spoken courteously, yet he laid it up in his mind, and though the heat of Passion, by being suppressed, did languish, the memory and grudge remained strong still. In which words the Historian hath expressed that excellent description of the same quality in Homer.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad x. 81. Dieg. La●…. l. 7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…ripid. Med●…a. 119.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

L●…w men with a King's wrath are quite oppressed,  
For though he seem the same day to digest  
The ●…eate of's Passion, yet he still reserves  
Close Anger in his breast, till fit time serves.   
Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragedian,  

Ira quaetegitur, n●… 
Senec. Traged. Med●….   
Professa perdunt odia vindictae locum.   

Anger that's hid gives surer blows. 
A●…erta Odia pal●… de pell●…, 〈◊〉 & do●…um Obscu●…, ●…eque in●…vita bi●…ia. Tacit. Hist. lib. 4. Plutarch. A. pop●…ib. & in Fabi●….   
But professed hate doth revenge lose.   
And therefore Hannibal was wont to say that he was more afraid of Fabius when he did nothing, than of Marcellus when he did fight, of the one man's closeness, than of the others boldness▪  
And the reason why of all the Passions this o●… hatred can thus smother and suppress itself is, because it doth not affect the heart with troubl●… or sadness (which affection the soul loves no●… 
Aristotle, & ●…venal. V●…ndicta mal●…m quo non 〈◊〉 ull●….  long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight in pondering the contrivances of Revenge (which the Philosopher and the Poet have place●… among the Objects of Delight.)  
Now of all the ways whereby this passion i●… suppressed, the most hateful to God and man i●… when men do palliare and shroud their mali●… under pretences of Love, and praise men unto ●…ine. 
Aelian. de A●…imal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 40.  Like the Panther which with his swe●… breath allureth other Creatures to come un●… him, and when they are come, devoureth the●… Pessimum inimicoru●… genus la●…dantes, of all kind 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophoc. in Aiai.  of enemies those are the worst, which as the Pr●…phet speaks, do break●… men's heads with oil, a●… make a poison of their own merits to kill the●… with praises, as Achilles spoke in the Poet.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad. ●…. 313. Sallust. in ●…il.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

That man's as odious to me as hell gates,  
Who with his mouth speaks fair, with his heart hates.   
And it was wicked counsel which Theog nis gave to his Cyrnus, amongst so many sage and moral precepts, like a dead fly in a pot of ointment.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

Fawn on thy Foe, till he be in thy will,  
Then, without Reasons give revenge her fill.   
It is a quality of all others most distant from 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Soph●…. ●…bid.  nobleness and ingenuity of mind, for generous spirits will acknowledge with honour and love the virtues of their enemies; as Fabritius Lucinus, 
A. Gilli●…. lib. 4 cap. 8.  when many were competitors for the Consulship gave his suffrage to Cornelius Ruff●…nus, the worthiest of the Company, though he were his bitter enemy: and Caesar caused the demollished statues of Pompey to be erected again, not suffe●…ing 
Plutarch, de capium ex h●…st▪ bu●… 〈◊〉. Hom●…●… a. 48. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 T●…ogn.  the honour of so brave a Commander (though his enemy) to bleed and languish under his eye. Whereupon Cicero told him that in restoring the Statues of Pompey▪ he had fastened and made sure his own. And Publius Scipio made none other use of his Enmity with Tiberius Gracchus, than to dispose his daughter unto him in marriage, because 
Au●… G●…ll. l. 12. c. 8. Liv. li●…. 38.  at that time when he was sure to judge with least favour and partiality, he found him to be a virtuous and deserving man. And the Emperor Adrian, to show that he esteemed Hatred retained a base and un-princely disposition, as soon as he came to the Empire, he laid aside all his former enmities, in so much as then meeting one, who had been his capital enemy, he said unto him, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉. in Hadrian.  Evasisti, thou art now escaped from my displeasure.  
Thirdly, Another evil effect of Hatred is cruelty; for it 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  seeketh (as I noted out of the Philosopher) the Not-being of that which it hates▪ and therefore among the Egyptians, a 
* D●…g. 〈◊〉. lib. 7. Clem. Alex. Padag. l. 1. c. 8. Cle●…. Alex. Strom. lib. 5. & lib. 1.  Fish was the hieroglyphic of Hatred, because of all Creatures they do most devour one another. And thus Achilles in the Poet expresseth his hatred of Hector, when he befought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable burial.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 345.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw  
Thy Flesh in morsels and to eat it raw.   
And the like like expressions we find of the cruelty of Tiberius, a man full of rancour.  

Fastidit vinum, quia jam sitit iste Cruore, 
〈◊〉 Tiber. c. 19   
Tam bibit hunc avidè, quàm bibit antè merum.   

He loathes all Wine for Blood, & now with mo●…  
Greedy delight drinks this than that before.   
Hatred contenteth not itself with the death of an enemy, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after outlives that which it hateth, insulting with pride and indignities over the dead body which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loath someness revenge 
〈◊〉▪ de Ca lig. & in 〈◊〉. ●…. ●…1.  itself. Caligula, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, It a feri ut se m●…ri sentiat, that he should perish with such lingering blows, as that he might feel himself to die. And he often commanded 
Ib. in Calig.  aged men to stand by and look upon the slaughter of their children, and after would force them 
Senec. de Ir●…. lib. 2. c. 33.  unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their others which were left alive; for to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Aiax. Taci●…. hist. lib. 1  offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing, which more frequently occurreth. The Philistines cut off the head of Saul and sent it in Triumph up and down their Country. And the Historian notes of Otho that he never looked with 
Capita hostiu●… in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Apud I●…st. lib. 14. Vir●…. 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ &. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, than the head of Piso his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of Hector, every man (as the Poet describes it) did bestow a stab, and a contempt upon it. But above all most hateful was the cruelty of Marc. Antonius and his wife Fulvia, showed on the dead body of Cicero the glory of the Roman eloquence, they cut off his head and his hands, setting them in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent Orations; from whence they took it to their Table, and Fulvia cursing it and spitting upon it, pulled out 
Pe●…. Cri●…it. lib. 1. cap. 8. Pl●…tarch. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and pricked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin; to show that malice would ever do mischief to a man in his noblest and highest treasure▪ as we see in that desperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, first made him (in hope to escape) to renounce his religion and salvation, and then presently slew him▪ that as fare, as was in his power, he might kill his soul, as well as his body.  
But yet further Hatred doth not content itself 
Se●…t. Titi●…s quod habuit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 d●…mi s●…a▪ 〈◊〉. ci●…. pro Rabini●….  to be cruel to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others, that have any relation to him, though never so innocent: As we see in Haman, who though only displeased with the neglect of Mordecai, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruin of all the Jews. And it is noted by Historians, that when Sejanus fell, the storm lighted on his Family 
Tacit. Ana●…. lib. 5. 6. Su●…▪ Tib ●…. ●…1. Anal. lib. 15. Plutarc●…. de cap. ex ●…st. 〈◊〉. Q. Curt. lib. 7.  and friends as well as on himself: as is also observed in the punishment of the conspiracy against Nero detected by Millichus. And Themist●…cles (though innocent) was like to have suffered in a crimination of Treason, only for being a friend unto Pausanias. Yea so over flowing is this Quality, that it will sometimes strike a friend rather than not reach an enemy. It was a wicked 
I 〈◊〉 de Adul●…t. & Ami●…. 〈◊〉. In 〈◊〉.  pro●…ession of Darius, Pereat cum inimico 〈◊〉, Let my friend rather perish with mine Enemy, than mine Enemy escape by my friend. And hence it is observed of Aristides, that he was wont to propose such advices as he knew did conduce unto public weal by some other men and not from himself, lest Themistocles out of hatred of his person, should have withstood and impedimented a general good. But Ajax in the Poet went yet higher.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— 
Sop●…oc. in Aiac.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

So I may slay mine Enemy,  
Let the same ruin swallow me.   
And the principal reasons of this over flowing 
Forsan ●…uturus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 patris. Senec. 〈◊〉.  of hatred are fear and Cowardice; for he, who hateth the Father, and sheweth cruelty unto him, doth usually fear the son, lest he rise up in his father's quarrel: and hence is that maxim of cruel policy,  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
S●…asinus apud Clem. Alex. Str●…m. 6. Hom. Odyss.. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 307. Odium etiam Ti●…or sp. rat. Tertul. Ap●…l. cap. 26. Vlc●… 〈◊〉 ●…x 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consu●…um. Am. Marc. l. 27. & A●…ist. 〈◊〉▪ lib. 2.  

That man's unwise who doth the father slay,  
And leaves the sons his quarrel to repay.   
For we know Orestes revenged his father's quarrel and blood upon Aegisthus.  
And besides cruelty doth usually proceed from cowardice, as Amianus Marcellinus hath observed, and fearful men, when they have any advantage to be cruel, do seldom hold any measure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any Emperors, which were more cruel, than those who were most fearful and effeminate, as 
〈◊〉. de I●…a lib. 1. c. 13.  Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Commodus, etc. As they say that wounded beasts, when they die, by't hardest; 
Maximè 〈◊〉 esse sotent morsus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Flor●… lib. 2. c. 15.  their fear and despair making them furious: So there is no wrath or Cruelty to that which proceeds from weakness, when it hath either jealousy, or advantage, or despair to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto profaneness, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As we see in the cruelty of Tiberius towards the family of Sejanus, who, because 
Su●…t. Tiber c. 6●…  it was an unheard and prodigious thing for 
Tacit. Anal. i. 5  a little tender virgin to be strangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, should first be deflowered, that so she might be the fit to be slain. And Boniface the eighth 
Pet. C●…init. lib. 7. c. 13.  Pope of that name being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Ash-wednesday to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such Bishops, as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to mind them of their mortalities; when Prochetus Bishop of Genua, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himself at his fees to receive this Ceremony, he threw the Ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, A Gebelline thou art, and as a Gibelline thou shalt die: so powerful was his malice to profane the rites of his religion! Yea, so fare will hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a villainy, it hath sometimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a Cup of poison: as it is reported of Pope Victor the third, that he was poisoned in the 
Martin. apud 〈◊〉. in vit. P●…nt. 3.  Chalice at the Communion. Nether have there been wanting Examples of desperate men, who have made the most holy parts of Religion, vows, and Sacraments, the seals and Pledges of their conspiracies in Malice: as once Catiline 
Sallust. in Cat. Florus lib. 4. Dion. lib. 37. Plut. in lice●…. & in Poplico ●…d.  and his associates did animate themselves in their bloody purposes, with drinking the blood of a slain child.  
Now of all Hatreds, there are none more furious and unnatural than those which arise out of contrarieties in Religion; because as a Stone, the higher the place is from whence it falls, doth give the more dangerous blow: no wound's so mortal, as that of a thunderbolt: so of all other those Hatreds which make pretences unto Heaven, and which arise from motives of the highest Nature, are ever most desperate and mortal. And therefore our Saviour tells us, that in this case men would forget all the bonds of natural Obligation; insomuch that the Father would deliver his own child, and the Children their Parents unto death. As we find that the bloody Hatred of Cain against Abel arose from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow excessive, which hath zeal to kindle it, and pretence of Religion to warrant it: For when that which should restrain and set limits to a Passion, is made a party to engage it, and sewell to foment it, no wonder if a Passion which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose 
〈◊〉 t●…nere in ●…o dissi●…ile est quod b●…num esse 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Ep. 23. Plut. de Isi●…. & O●…od. 〈◊〉.  none upon itself. And this occasion of mutual Hatred, we find observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one town would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeal to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.  

— Summus utrinque  
Ind furor vulgo qùod Numina vicinorum,  
Odit uterque locus.   

This caused their rage, this made their great debate:  
One town did worship what the next did hate▪   
Another dangerous effect of Hatred is Envy and malignity at the sight of another's happiness; 
A●…ist. Rbe●…or. lib. 2. cap. 10. Plut. de Odi●… & I●…vidia.  and therefore Envy is called an Evil Eye, because all the diseases of the Eye make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth; as Vermine do ever devour the purest corn, and moths eat into the finest cloth, and the cantharideses blast the sweetest flowers. So doth Envy ever gnaw that which is most beautiful in another whom it hateth; and as the Vulture, draweth 
Aelian. de Animal. lib. 3 c. 7. lib. 4 c. 18.  sickness from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature; as of a raw and angry wound, which feels as great pain in the good of a chirurgeons, as in the ill offices of an enemy's hand, it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates; yea and commonly greater too from the good than from the ill: For, Odiorum 〈◊〉 causa quand●… iniquae: When Hatred is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiseth itself the higher. And the reason is, because in Passions of this Nature, the less we have from the Object, the more we have from ourselves, and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is supplied by the rising of our own stomach: as we see in the body that thin and empty nourishment will more often swell it than that which is substantial.  
And therefore I think there are not any Examples of more implacable Hatred, than those that are by Envy grounded on Merit. As Tacitus 
Tacitus.  observes between the passages of Domitian and Agricola, that nothing did so much▪ strengthen the Emperor's hatred against that worthy Man, as the general report of his honourable behaviour and actions in those military services, wherein he had been employed. And the same likewise he intimates in the affections of Tiberius and Piso towards Germanicus. 
Plutar. lib. de R●…p. Gerendâ.   
It is wisely therefore observed by the Historian, That men of vast and various employments, have usually the unhappiness of Envy attending them, which therefore they have sometimes declined by retiring and withdrawing themselves from continual addresses, as a wise mariner, who (as he spoke) doth aliquantulum remittere Clavum 〈◊〉 magnam fluctus vim. And thus we find the honour which david's merits procured him, which was the foundation of that implacable Hatred of Saul towards him. For as in natural motions, that which comes from the faithest extreme, is most swift and violentiso in the motions of the mind, the further off we fetch the reason of our Hatred, the more venomous and implacable it is.  
And here we may observe the mutual and interchangable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves: For as Philosophy observes in the generation of those cold Meteors which are drawn to the middle region of the air, they are first by the coldness of the place congealed, and afterward do by the like impressions fortify and intent the same quality in the Region: so here Hatred first generates Envy; and this again doth reciprocally increase Hatred, and both join in mischief. So much the more hurtful to the soul, wherein they are, than to the Enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more near and inward thereunto: for certainly a malignant humour doth most hurt where it harboureth.  
From this followeth another evil Effect, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L●…er. l●… Zen. lib. 7. Plutarch. de C●…riosit. Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 7. Mag. Mor. cap. 2●…. Prov. 17. 5. ●…4. 17.  which I will but name, being of the same Nature with Envy; and it is that which Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a rejoicing at the calamity of him whom we hate, a quality like that of those who are reported to have 
* Culi●… Rhod. Antiq. lect. lib. 6. cap. 35.  been nourished with poison. For as in Love there is a mutual partaking of the same joys and sorrows (for where the will and affections are one, the senses are in some sort likewise) so Hatred ever worketh contrariety of affections: That which worketh grief unto the one, doth work joy unto the 
Di●…g. L●…rt. l. ●….  other. And therefore Thales being asked how a Man might be cheerful and bear up in afflictions, answered: If he can see his enemies in worse case than himself. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kind of Men:  

Pectora selle virent, Lingua est suff●…sa ve●…eno:  
Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere Dol●…res.   

Their breasts with gall, their tongues with venom flow:  
They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.   
And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw only the vicious humours of the body unto them, and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those worms which receive their Life from the corruption of the Dead. And surely, the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from 
* Ecclz●…. Math. 12. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 v●…rtunt 70. 2. Reg. 1. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a●…d Pa●…san. lib. 5. & Clem. Alex. in Protreps. Myiode●… v●…cat Plin. l. 29. cap. 6.  Flies, because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of Men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.  
Another corrupt Effect of Hatred is a sinister and crooked suspicion, whereby with an envious and critical Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpness of our own wits, or the course of our own behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our own brains: evil men being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a foul Sent. It is attributed amongst one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it Thinketh none evil: and certainly, there is not a fouler quality against Brotherly Love, than that which (for the satisfying of itself in (but the Imaginary evil of him whom it disliketh) will venture to find out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the Philosopher, who thought where ever he went, that he saw his own Picture walk before him. And there fore we see how Agrippina when she would not discover any show of fear or Hatred towards her son Ner●…, who had at the first plotted her death on the Sea; and that failing, sent the second time Anicaetus the Centurion to make sure work, did in both these practices decline all show of suspicion, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the murder to be directed by him. Solum Insidiar●…m remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur. 
Tacit. A●…al. lib ●…4.  Supposing the only remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them. For ill meanings do not love to be found out. As the same Historian telleth us of Tiberius, Acrius accepit recludi quae premeret: he hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked suspicion which is not rooted in Hatred. For as to think the worst of our own Actions, is a sign of Hatred to our sins (for I think no man loves his sins who dares search them:) so contr●…riwise to have an humour of casting the worst glosses upon the Actions of another Man, where there is not palpable dissimulation, argues as great a want of Love. we search for evil in ourselves to expel it; but we search for evil in another to find it. There is scarce a more hateful quality in the eyes of God or Man, than that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.  
Another Effect which proceedeth from corrupt Hatred, is proud and insolent carriage, whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilify the Merit of a person. For though the Apostle hath in this respect of Pride and Swelling, opposed Knowledge unto Love: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth; yet the opposition holdeth not there only: For there is Tumour Cordis, as well as Tumour Cerebri; as well a stubborn as a learned Pride, a Pride against the Person, as against the weakness of our Brother, a Pride whereby we will not stoop to a yielding and reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoop to the capacity and Edification of him; that is, the swelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that Hatred (as Aristotle hath excellently observed) 
Rbet. l●…. 2. ●…. 4.  when it is simple and alone (though that seldom fall out) is without the admixtion of any grief. And the reason I take it is, because grief is either for the evil of another, and so it is ever the Effect of Love; or for the evil which lieth upon ourselves, and so is the cause of humility; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in itself some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a Contempt and Insolence towards another Man. And therefore as it was Pride in Men and Angels, which wrought the first Hatred between God and them; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is Pride.  
The last Corruption of this Passion is Impatience, Contention and Fury, as the wise Man telleth us, Hatred stirreth up strife. And therefore 
Prov. 10. 12.  that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. and Longanimitas. Long suffering to signify some length, distance, and remotion between a man's mind and his Passion. But Hatred, being of a fierce Nature, is so fare from admitting any Peace, or yielding to conditions of parley, that as hath been observed out of Aristotle) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.   

CHAP. XVI. Of the Affection of Desire. What it is. The several kinds of it, natural, rational, spiritual. Intemperate, unnatural, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continunance. The most general internal cause Vacuity, Indigence. Other Causes, Admiration, greatness of mind, Curiosity.  
THe next Passions in order of Nature to these two are Desire and Abomination, which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and hatred, than the Act from the Habit, or then a man sitting from himself walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more briefly pass it over. Desire is the wing of the soul whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the Eagle to the Car●…ise 
I●…b 39 30. Math. 24. 28. ●…abac. 1. 8.  in the Scripture proves, to feed itself upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the Appetite of the Eagle is attended with sharpness of fight to discover its prey, with swiftness of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon it: So according to the proportion of the Soule●… love unto its object doth it command and call together both the wisdom and Powers of the whole man to direct unto, and to promote the procuring of it. And the very best characters and truest lineaments which can be drawn of the minds of men, are to be taken from their Desires, 
〈◊〉. Nat. Qu●…st. ●…p. 26.  rather than from their practices. As Physitia●… often judge of the Diseases of sick men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not do so much evil as they desire, for fear of shame or punishment▪ Good men cannot do so much good as they desire fo●… want of Power and Provisions of virtue. Besides practices may be overruled by ends, but Desires are always genuine and natural, for no man can be constrained to will that which ●…ee doth not love; And therefore in the Scriptu●… good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections and the inward long of their souls after him as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of Love▪ and such as have least Proximity and Danger of infection from foreign and secular ends. Sai●… 
Rom. 7. 18, 19 I●…. 21. 17.  Paul himself was much better at willing than 〈◊〉 performing; and Saint Peter who failed in his promise of D●…ing, dares appeal to Christ's ow●… Omniscience for the truth of his Loving. Wha●… ever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soul, that ●… 
〈◊〉. 1. 11. Is●…. 26. 8. Phil. 3. 20.  desires to fear God's name, and according to th●… prevalency of that affection, hath its conversation in heaven too. In which regard Christ is called the Desire of all Nations, both because where 
H●…g. 2. 6. John ●…2 32. Ps●…l. 1●…7. 9  he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfy all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman Emperors Neminem unquam dimisit Tristem, he never sends any discontented out of his presence.  
The desires of the soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, Natural, rational, spiritual.  
Natural desires respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things of 
Arist. 〈◊〉. lib. 7. cap. 6.  simple Necessity to the Being, Preservation, and integrity of Nature, as the desires which things have to their proper nourishment and place ad conservationem individui, for preserving themselves and to propagation, & increase ad conservationem speciei, for preserving of their kind.  
Rational Desires are such as respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such things as are eligible in themselves, and the proper objects of right Reason, such as Felic●…y the common End of all rational Appetitions, virtue the way, and external good things, as Health, Strength, Credit, dignity, Prosperity, the Ornaments of humane life.  
Spiritual Desires respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Heb. 9 ●…3. 1. Cor. 3. 13. Col. 3. 1.  Heavenly, and spiritual things, the things of God, Things which are above, The knowledge whereof we have not by philosophical, but by apostolical discovery, by the Spirit of God who ●…ely searcheth the deep things of God.  
The Cor●…pt Desires contrary unto these are either vicious or Morbid. Vicious are again of two sorts: First, Intemperate and incontinent Desires, which err not in the substance or nature of the thing desired; but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Philosopher speaks in the measure and manner of desiring 
Prov. 31. 6. 1. Tim. ●…. 23. Ps●…. 1●…4. 15.  them. It is lawful to drink Wine, and a Man may err (as Timothy did) in an over 
* Vid. Soc●…at. lib 4. cap. 1●…. Euseb. lib. 4. c. 38. l. 5. c. 17. ●…ren. l. 1. c. 34. Tertul. adv. Psy●… c. c. 15. Epiph. T●…. 2. l. ●…. Vid. G●…l. St●…. A●…iq. Comm. lib. ●…. cap. 7, 8. Clem. Al. pad. lib. 2. cap. 1, 2. 〈◊〉. lib. ●…. adv. 〈◊〉  rigorous severity to Nature, when health or needful refreshment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued to reason, not to infirmities, that it may be a servant to the soul, but not a burden. But if we let Wine be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Heathen called it, to take a freedom against us, like Cham to mock us, and discover our nakedness, and make us servants unto it. If we do not only eat honey, but surfeit on it; If we must have meat like▪ Israel in the wilderness, not only for our Need, but for our Lust; If we eat and drink so long that we are good for nothing, but either to lie down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to day and to die tomorrow▪ If we make our belly the grave of our soul, and the dungeon of our Reason, and let our Intestina as 
Megarens●… obsonan●…, quasi crasti●…d die ●…rituri. Tert. Apol. cap. 39  well morally as naturally fare exceed the length of the whole Man besides. This is in the Apostles phrase to be lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, and it is an intemperate excess against natural desires which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of A●…acharsis the Philosopher, 
Diog. L●…ert. l. 1.  that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes: The first of Delight: The second of excess: The third of Sorrow. If we let our Delight steal us into excess, and become a mocker, our excess will quickly betray us unto Sorrow (as Dalilah did Samson to the Philistines) and let us know that 
Prov 20. 1. Pl●…. de Audi●…one.  after Wine hath mocked it can rage's too. Like the head of the Polypus, which is sweet to the Palate, but after causeth troublesome sleeps and frightful dreams.  
Secondly there are brutish and unnatural Desires, which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ferine 
〈◊〉. l. 7. c. 6.  and inhuman, instancing in those barbarous Countries, where they use to eat men's flesh and raw meat; and in the Woman who ●…ipped up Women with child that she might eat their young ones: unto which head I refer those which the Apostle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ 
Rom. 1. 26. 1. Thess. 4. 5. ●…de ve●…. 7. Vid. Eus●…. de pr●…p. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 4. Hierom. lib. 2. Contr. Iov●….  vile and dishonourable, Affections and Passions of Lust wherein forsaking the guidance of Nature, they dishonoured their bodies amongst themselves, and gave themselves over, as S. Jude speaketh unto strange flesh; also incestuous and promiscuous Lusts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as the ancient Brit●…aines offering of men and children in sacrifices, eating of the bodies of Friends that died, burning of the living with the dead, and other like savage and barbarous practices, 
The●…d. Serm. 9 the l●…b. C●…l Rodingin. Antiq. lib. 10. cap. 21. 28. P●…n. lib. 5. cap. 17. 30. & lib. 7. cap. 2.  wherein we find how fare natural corruption improved with ignorance and want of Education or Religion, can embrace the Manners of Men.  
Lastly, there are morbid Desires, growing out of some distemper of Mind or Body, called by the Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as those of children, which eat co●…les or dirt, and the strange and depraved 
Ethic. l. 7. c. 6.  long of women with child, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Pi●…a from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant 
C●…l. R●…dig. lib. 3. cap. 15. Uid. Stephan. & 〈◊〉 ●…n voce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  and various appetences of nature, so misguided by vicious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers in that Bird.  
Having considered the several kinds both of Regular and corrupt Desires. I shall content myself with a very brief inquiry into the causes, and effects of this Passion.  
The causes moving it are Externall ex parte objecti, in the object, or ●…ternall ex parte subjecti in 
Deb●… & Iucund●… vid. Philosoph. R●…e. cor. lib. 1.  the mind. The Object is any thing apprehended sub ratione Boni & jucundi, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stir the desire of Eve towards the forbidden fruit. 
Ge●…. 3. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dam ●…seen de 〈◊〉. s●…d. l. 2. ●…. 22.  She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.  
Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formal reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are Objects of our love, is first that they be Possible: For Desire being the motion and endeavour of the soul towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be motus in Vac●…, like that of Noah's Dove that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whetstone, and wheel of industry, if that sail, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty Velleities and imaginary wishes, he ca●… ever put forth nor address his endeavours towards an impossible 
〈◊〉 etiam & qu●… non poss●… Sen. de l. à▪ lib. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 4. Vid. de volitione & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 13. 〈◊〉 5. & Valen●…. To. 2. disp. 2. q●…st. 8 p. 2  good. Though an old man may wish himself young again, yet no man was ever so besotted as to endeavour it. And this distinction between vanishing wishes and serious desires is of great consequence to be attended in all th●… motions of the soul moral or sacred, in as much as those Desires only which are Active and Industrious, purposely addressing themselves to the prosecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, do commend the soul from whence they issue for virtuous and pious.  
Secondly, the object of the Desires quatale is apprehended as Absent and distant, in as much as presence worketh delight rather than desire. The things we have, we enjoy, we do not covet, we rest in them we do not move towards them. Yet not always Absent quoad t●…m, but quoad gradus, not in the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the presence of a good thing doth in some sort quicken the Desires towards the same thing 
Crescit A●…or nu●…i quantum ipsa pecu nia cresc●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 qui 〈◊〉 ●…abet 〈◊〉. S●…. 14. Aristot. lib 1. Politic. c. ●…▪ Plutarch. lib. de Cupidi●…. diviti●…. See 〈◊〉. ●…p. 73. M●…. 9 ●…4.  so fare forth as it is capable of improvement and augmentation.  
As we see in external riches of the body, none desire them more eagerly than those that possess them; and the more virtuous the soul of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the Appetition of a greater measure▪ as the putting in of some water into a Pump, doth draw forth more. No man is so importunate in praying, Lord help mine unbelief, as he that can say Lord I believe. Thus even present things may be desired in order to improvement, and further degrees of them: as many times a man hath a better stomach to his meat after he hath begun to eat, than when he first sat down unto it. Again, things present may be the Object of our Desires unto continuance, as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore Life, even while it is possessed it is desired, because the possession of it doth not cause the Appetite to nauseate or surfeit upon it. Few men there are who desire not old Age, not as it is old Age, and importeth decay, decrepidnesse, and defects of Nature: For a young man doth not desire to be old now; but as it implieth the longer and fuller possession of Life: For a man being conscious to himself, first of his own insufficiency to make himself happy, from and within himself; and next of the immortality of his Nature: as upon the former reason, he is busied in sending abroad his Desires (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the soul) to bring in such things as may promote perfection: so those very Desires having succeeded, do farther endeavour the satisfaction of Nature, 
Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 13. Eadem lib. 3. c. 3. problem. ¶ 28. quast. 7. sujd●…s in 〈◊〉. Aelian. var. Hist. l. 10. 6. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. Latri. in 〈◊〉: l. 6.  by moving towards the Perpetuity of what they have procured. It was a fordid and brutish wish of Philoenus in the Philosopher, who wished that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer (it being the wisdom of Nature, intending the chief Perfections of Man to his soul, to make his Bodily Pleasures the shorter.) But surely the soul of Man having a reach as fare as Immortality, may justly desire as well the Perpetuity as the Presence of those good things wherein standeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counsel of Antisthenes' the Philosopher, That a man should lay up such provisions, as in a shipwreck might swim out with him such treasure as will pass and be currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apostle speaks, is to lay up a good foundation against the time to come  
The Internal Causes moving Desire, in regard of the subject or mind of man, may be different according to the different kinds of Desires spoken of before. The most general which respecteth 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. cap 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cl●…m. Alex. Str. l. 7.  them all is a Vacuity, Indigence, and selfe-insufficiency of the soul: For having not within itself enough either to preserve it or to content it, it is forced to go out of itself for supplies; for wheresoever God hath implanted sensitive and rational affections, he hath been pleased to carry them from themselves, and to direct them abroad for their satisfaction: by that means preserving the soul in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himself. Every creature though it have its life in its own possession; yet the preservation of it, it fetcheth from some things without. The excellentest creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nourishment, and for their knowledge. And therefore of all Graces, God hath chosen Faith & Repentance, as the chief means of carrying us to him, because these two do most carry us out of ourselves, and most acquaint us with our insufficiencies, Repentance teaching a man to abhor himself, & Faith to deny himself.  
Now because emptiness is the cause of Appetence, 
Si q●…id deterit ida nobis petierimus. Sen. Epist. 119. Vid. Plutarch. de Curiosit. Cae ius ●…oodig. lib. 14. cap. 7.  we shall hereupon find, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vast desires. The more the mind of any man is in weight, the more it is in rest too. As they say that in Rivers, ships go slower in the Winter, but withal they carry the greater burdens: So many times men of less urgent and importunate Appetitions, and motions of mind, are more furnished and better balanced within. In Jothams' 
judg. 9 9 15.  Parable the Bramble was more ambitious than the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other Arbour Desiderii, the Tree of Desire, is weakest and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore we shall find that men's Desires are strongest when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as we see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and miscellany of Desires. Thus we see little children will reach at every 
I●… 7 1, 2 3.  thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internal furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavy things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. de G●…netatio An ma, lib. 4. cap 4.  signs either of a childish or a sick Temper of mind; as the naturalists observe that the least creatures are the greatest breeders, a Mouse bringeth more young ones than an Elephant. 
Vivunt, non quomodo volunt; sed quomodo Cap●…runt. Sen. de Tran. cap. 2. Plut. Sympos. lib. 5. quast. 9   
Only here we must distinguish both of contentment and of Desires. There may be a double Contentment, the one arising out of sluggishness and narrowness of mind; when men out of an unwillingness to put themselves to the pains of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have, and had rather have a poor quiet, than a Treasure with labour. As they say of the figtree, though it be least beautiful of other Trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withal it is free from Thunder. And as the Historian said of some men that they are solà socordià Innocentes. 
Tacit.  do men no hurt only because it would cost them pains to do it: so may we of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they profess to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but only lay them asleep, as even an hungry man when he sleepeth, hath his hunger sleep with him.  
Another contentment there is arising out of 
Phil. 4. 11, 12. Heb. 13. 9 Namque lab●…nt cur●… 〈◊〉 sint ponder●… navet. Perq, mare instab les nimi●… levitate seruntur. Ou. Met. lib. 2. I●…ven. Sat 14. Pli●…. l 7. c. 56. Stuck. l. 2. c. 8 ●…ol 165.  wisdom and practical learning (as the Apostle tells us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented) when the heart being established and made steady with grace, and solid materials within, as a ship with ballast▪ is the less tossed with lower affections, as Saul cared not for his Asses when he heard of a kingdom.  

— Grata post munus arista  
Contingunt homines veteris fastidia quercus.   

When men had once discovered better corn,  
They loathed their mast & oaken bread did scorn   
And this kind of contentment doth not stupefy lose Desires, but change them, as the Cats Vnum magnum was more worth to her than all the 
●… Plat. de Solart. 〈◊〉.  variety of shifts which the fox did boast of, and one sun doth more comfort us in the day than many thousand stars in the night.  
Again, Desires are either of things excellent, 
Sapien●… est divi●…iarum naturalium qu●…sitor acerri●… Sen Epist. 119  as the virtuous and spiritual desires of the soul whereby men move towards God; and these do neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well acquainted with God as Moses, who yet was the more importunate to know him better, I beseech thee show me thy glory, nor any man more 
Exod 33. 18.  acquainted with Christ than Saint Paul, who yet desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ nearer. 
Phil. 1. 23.   
Other Desires are of middle things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Arist. Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6.  the Philosopher calls them; such as Wealth, Profit, Victory, Honour, which are not good in themselves, but as they are managed. And these Desires though not extinguished, yet are very much assuaged, and moderated by the weight and wisdom, of solid contentment. He was the wisest man then alive, and who knew all the quintessence, and what ever was desirable in the Creature, who said Da mihi panem Statutim●… 
●…rv. 30. 8.  Give me the Bread of my Allowance; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
●…heophylact.  so much as the quality of my place and state requireth, which is that which our Saviour 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Luke 12 42. I●…me 12. 15. Job 23. 12. ●…. Reg. 4. 22. Vide 〈◊〉. d●… mensuri●…, lib. 2. cap. 3. & A●…g ●…●…ani ●…ium de pane quot●…d. ad 〈◊〉 I●…stit. ●…yria▪ S●…uck. Convival. lib. 1. cap. 22.  limiteth our desires unto, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our portion and dimensum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Saint james, daily food, and was pleased to answer that wise King in that his request, and to give us a record and Catalogue of his daily bread.  
Another cause of Desire may be Admiration; A strange thing though monstrous and deformed calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marvellous Lenocinium, and enticer of Desire, ●…. stiv●… nives, hybern●… rosae as the Panegyrist spoke, Snow in the Summer and Roses in Winter; the Birds of this country, and the Roots of anothor; dai●…ties hardly procured without the shipwrecks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly; these are the delights of the curiosities of men. The same fruits when they are worse but rarer, have a fare greater value set upon them, than when exposed by their commons unto every man's purchase And it was 
Pl●…t. Apop●….  a wise complaint of old Cato; That it went ill with the City when a Fish was sold for more than an ox. We see Desires do not put forth themselves more freely in any then in children, I think the chief Reason of it is the same which the Philosopher giveth of their memories, because 
Rbet lib. 2.  every thing to them is new and strange▪ for st●…ange things as they make stronger impressions upon the Retentive, so they do upon the Appeti●…ive saculties. And therefore we find Herod who 
Luk●… 23 8.  cared nothing at all ●…or the Doctrine of Christ, because it was holy and divine, had yet a great Desire to have seen his miracles, because they 
〈◊〉 Acbin●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 invis●…rus Plut de Curio●…it. 1. Reg. 10. Plat●… Aegypt●… Italia●…, 〈◊〉 pe●…jt Philosophiae c●…sd▪ Vid. Throd. Oral. 1: De ●…ide. Zeph. 1. 8. Greci●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist●…. Tom. 2. 〈◊〉 de pace p●…ster.. Graciae, Graecia. ●…hycidides Uide Coel. ●…bod. l. 10. c. 25. Acts 17. 21.  were wonderful. And Men have traveled fare to see those persons and things, the fame whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange flowers and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strange sins too (which is the curiosity and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation amongst Men. Nero gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even Solomon's Ships, besides substantial Treasure, did bring home Apes and peacocks. Athens which was the eye, the flower, and Epitome of Greece (to show that this curiosity is the disease as well of Wits, as of childhood) spent all their time and study in enquiring after new things. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made laws to interdict the transporting of their country fruits into other places, lest the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to be Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and figs of Canaan were used as Incentives unto the expedition of Israel●… and hence Plutarch telleth us that the Word Sycophant 
Plut. in Solon, & de Curiosit. & lib. 1. Cod. quares export●…ri non debeant.  is derived to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figge●… into other Countries. As on the other side we read that the Athenians set up a Pillar▪ wherein they published him to be an Enemy of the City, who should bring Gold out of 
Aristid. To. 3. Ora●…. 2. Aelius Sparta. in Piscen. N g.  Media, as an Instrument to corrupt them▪ And the Roman governor commanded hi●… soldiers that they should not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them, lest there▪ by they should be looked on by the Adv●…rsary, as the Persians by Alexander, rather as a prey than a foe.  
A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires, is height and greatness of mind▪ which cannot well set bounds of measure unto itself, as Seneca said in another sense, Magnitud●… non 
Epist. 43.  habet certum modum. Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various Desires. A great Ship will not be carried with the sail of a Lyter. Nor can an Eagle fly with the wings of a Sparrow. Alexander was 
〈◊〉 infaelix angust●…i mite mundi. Vt Gy●…ae inclusus sco●…ulu, & ●…. ●…uv. 〈◊〉. 10. Sen. de ●… n●…fic. l. 7. c 2. p. 54. & 119. Ecclet. 6 9 P●…ov 17. 24.  not so great in his Victories as in his Desires, whom one World could not satisfy: nor Pompey in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greatest.  
Another cause of Desires may be curiosity, which is nothing else but a desire of prying into, and listening after the businesses of other Men, which is▪ called by Solomon, Ambulatio Anim●…: The walking up and down of the soul, as he elsewhere telleth us, that the Eyes of a fool are in the Ends of the Earth: Such a Man being like the witches which Plutarch 
●… l●…t. de Cu●….  speaks of, that wear Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home ●… Or like the Falckoners hawks that are 
〈◊〉 qu●…q, m●…o semper sugi●…. Luc●…t. ●…pud S●…a. de▪ trauq l. c. 2.  hooded in the House, and never suffered to use their Eyes but to the hurt of other Birds: like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing 
Non horam ●…ecum esse potes, ●… non etia re●… 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉.  where he is; but can see a great deal of light abroad at a little passage. So these kind of Men have vast desires of foreign Knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that he looks every way but upward: so we may of Pragma tists, that their eyes look always save only inward. Whereas the Minds of prudent Men are like the windows of Solomon's Temple, broader inward than outward. As the Pillar 
1. Reg. 6. 4.  that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the dark towards Pharaoh: Or as the sun in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkened. A wise man's eyes are in his head, whereas a fool hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Proverbs, his mind in his heels only to wander and g●…d abroad.   

CHAP. XVII. Of other causes of Desire, Infirmity, Temerity, Mutability of mind, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope. Of the effects of it in general, Labour, Languor. In special, of rational Desires, Bounty, grief, weariness, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of vicious Desires, Deception, Ingratitude, Envy, greediness, baseness of Resolution.  
Other causes of Desires are Infirmity, rashness, and Mutability of Mind, Which three 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. E●…hic lib. 7. c. 8.  I put in one, as having a near Relation and dependence within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons, are both Temerarious in ●…recipitating the mind, and anticipating the ●…ictates of Reason which should regulate or re●…raine them: as also mutable and wand'ring like ●…e Bee from one flower unto another; Infirmity 〈◊〉 suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees, and ●…rity not suffering him to resolve on any; and ●…stly▪ mutability making him weary of those ●…ings which weakness and rashness had unadvisedly transported him unto. Omnium Imperitorum 
Maximum in dicium est m●… la mentis fluct●…atio. Sen. Ep. 120. vid. ep. 10. & de Tranq. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Aristid. Tom. 2 O●…at. 1. Vid. etiam Plutarch▪ de 〈◊〉. Iliad▪-▪  animus in lubric●… est: weak minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like fickle and nauseating stomaches, which long for many things and can eat none. Like sick bodies, qu●… mutationi ●…us ut remedys utuntur, as Seneca speaks, which toss from side to side, and think by changing of their place they can leave their pain behind them. Like Achilles in the Poet:  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

Now he leans on his side, now supine lies,  
Then grov'leth on his face, and straight doth rise.   
This sickness and Inconstancy of Desires is thus elegantly described by the old Poet L●…cretius: 
Lucret. lib. 3. lactor, Crucior, agitor, ●…lor, versor in amoris 〈…〉 animi habe●…. Ibi sum, ibi non sum, ●…b non sum ibi est Animus. I●…a mihi ingenia sunt, quod lubet non lubet iam id continuo, etc. Plaut. Cistellar.   

— Vt nunc plerumque videmus,  
Quid sibi quisque velit nescire & quarere semper.  
Commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit.  
Exit sape foras magnis ex adibus ille,  
Esse domi quam pertasum est subit●…, rever●….  
Currit agens mann●…s advillam praci●…itanter  
Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instet.  
Oscitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villae,  
Aut abit in somnum gravis, atque oblivia quarit:  
Aut etiam properans Vrbem petit, atque●…evisit▪  
Hoc se quisque modo fugit. At, quod scilicet ut 〈◊〉▪  
Effugere haud potis est, ingratis haret & ange●….   

We see how troubled Mortals still inquire, 
Nihil tam occupatum ●…am multiforme t●…t ac tam variis motibus concisum ac la●…ratum, quàm mala ment. Quin●…il. lib. 12. c. 1. Non horam ●…cum esse potes, non ●…tia recte Pon●…re ●…que ipsum 〈◊〉 fugitivus & err●…. Horat. Uid. Plutarch. de Tranquillit.   
Yet ne'er can find what 'tis which they desire.  
One changeth place, as if he could unload  
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,  
Weary of a great Palace; straight turns back,  
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.  
Wearied both here & there, he mounts his steed,  
And runs to th' neighbour town with swister speed  
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set,  
He gapes and sleeps, and studies to forget  
Why he came thither, haply turn his rain,  
And to the City po●…teth bacl again.  
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shun,  
And scape himself, but ne'er can get it done.  
He bears the thing he flies. What he would leave  
Unwelcome self unto itself doth cleave,  
And cleaving doth torment.—   
The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. ●…bic. lib. 7. c. ult.  (as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more it delighteth in one and the same uniform operation. Mutability is not pleasant in itself; but ●…he delight of it ariseth out of the pr●…vitie and ●…efect of Nature.  
I might here insist on other more obvious causes of desire: As,  
1 Knowledge and experience of the goodness of that which we desire: as the Apostle also ●…elleth us, That Experience worketh Hope: And ●…e use to say, Ignoti n●…lla Cupido. A man cannot ●…esire that of which he hath no Apprehension. ●…nowledge is Appetites Taster.  
2 〈◊〉 and Repentance for the Evils we 
〈…〉.  feel, the contrary whereunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire Health so eagerly as when sickness teacheth us to value 
Q●…m q●… in p●… estate ba●…u. it me●…t ●…a a 〈◊〉. Plant. cop. iv. c. 7. 1. ●…  it: For as in Colours, so in Actions or Affections, contraries do set forth and sharpe●… one another. And as Labour natural makes a Man earnestly desire the Shadow, as Job speak●… so Sorrow which is Labour mental, doth make a Man earnestly. thirst after that which can remove the thing which 〈◊〉 that sonow. The Apostle telleth us, That Desire and zeal are the 
2 Cor. 7. 11.  fruits of godly Sorrow. David never panted so earnestly after God's favour and presence, as when he felt what a grief it was to be without it●… For in this case there is an Apprehension of 〈◊〉 double goodness in the thing we desire, both as perfective unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinal unto Naturewronged.  
Lastly Hope of speeding in our Desires: For the stronger any man's persuasions are, the more cheerful and vigorous will be his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content myself with the intimation of these things. And in the next, very briefly to run over some Effects and Consequents of this Affection: Which are,  
1 In regard of Desires at large, Labour and pains: For they are only Velleities and not Volitions: half and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious; but 〈◊〉 away in sluggish and empty speculations. 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. apud 〈◊〉. lib. 2.  Th●… Fisherman that will take the Fish, must be contented to be dashed with the Water. 
b 〈◊〉. E●…ectra. Plata●…ch. Justit. l. ●…con. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rb●…s.  And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them:  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no pain,  
By devout sloth shall never gather gain.   
It was the just reproose of him in the Poet 
c Homer. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 341. 348. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 325  who was upbraided with coming to the feasts, but withdrew himself from the labour of other Men. Nature hath often made the roots of those 
d Aristot. apud La●…rt. lib. 5.  Plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to reach us that Delight is the fruit of Labour. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that Desire is usually accompanied with Sorrow.  
Again, Desires do commonly work a Lang●…or 
c Arist. E●…demi lib. 2 cap. 10. ●… Prou 13. 12.  and sainting towards the thing desired, if they be either strong or hasty: For 
† Reg. 21. 4. 〈◊〉. 119. 20. 8●… Vsqu●… ad agri●…m decide 〈◊〉. El. Lam. p●…id. in Co●…. Rom. 8. 22. 2 Cor. 5 ●…  Hope deferred maketh the heart sick. As Ahabs' eager desire of Naboths' Vineyard, cast him upon his bed. And David expresseth his long towards god's Law, by the breaking and fainting of his soul. Cum expectatio longior est consenescit animus, & debilitatur mens.: delayed expectation weakeneth and withereth the minds of Men. And therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of Desire by groaning, which is the Language of sickness.  
2 In regard of Reasonable and spiritual Desires. The effects of this affection are:  
1 Large. Heartedness and Liberality. That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for, 
Pb●…l. 3. 8. 9 10. Matth. 13. 45. Mag. 2. 6. 7. Matth. 2. 11. Isa. 60. 5. 17. Psal. 68 29.  and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations, they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him, as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and trophies of his merciful triumph over them. One man adorns the gospel with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisdom.  
Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before the armour of sin, are then become the spoils of Christ. Antonius out of 
Pl●…tarch. in Anton.  the strength of his desires towards Cleop●…ra, bestowed many countries upon her.  
2 grief for any loss or hazard of the thing desired. As the seaman's needle which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving till it find the North point again. Flagrantia sunt 
Nazar. Orat. Pan●…gyr.  animorum desideria cum solatia perdiderun●…, as the Orator spoke. Desires burn hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.  
3 weariness and Indignation against any thing which standeth between Desire and the fruition 
Senec. Epist. 75. Abo●…ice savi●…r ib●…. Plutarc●…. Sympos. l. 4. ●…. Gr●…l. l 3. c. 6.  of that which is desired. Vehementior per me●…us & pericula exibit: That which resisteth increaseth it. As a River goes with more strength where it is hindered and withstood. The Church did venture blows when she sought her Love, and like the palm Tree risen up above her pressures: 
Tertul. Ap●…log. cap. 〈◊〉.  plures efficimur quóties metimur a vobis, as Tertullian speaks to the Heathen. The more you mow us down, the thicker we grow; the more we suffer for him, the more we love and desire him. Saint Paul careth not for a dissolution▪ that he may go to Christ, as a stone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to its place.  
Thirdly, For Corrupt and v●…tious Desires; their 
〈◊〉 1. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. l 7. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib cap. 7 u●…. Host 4. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 3. vid. c. 5. 9 Vid. Plaut. Asinar. Act 1. ●…cen. 3. Cicer. de Senectut.  Effects are first, Deception, and haling of Reason as it were captive from determining, advising, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knows in thesi, and at large, in hypothesi; and as to his own parti cular interest or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can say them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knows the things which he speaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the Philosopher giveth the reason of it, the very same with S. James, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
〈◊〉. 1. ●…1. Heb. 4. 2. 〈◊〉  That Reason which overcomes Lust must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Reason engrafted; or to use the phrase of another Apostle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immixed and contempered with the soul, and not only extrinsically irradiating it. And these kind of men are 
〈◊〉. lib. 3. cap. 7.  elegantly called by julius Pollux, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men willingly slavish, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subdued and brought under by their own affections. As Pl●…tarch saith of Agiselaus, that he was ruled by Lysander his servant, 
Pl●…tarch. in Lysander.  he having only the name, but the other the execution of his power. This slavery of men's minds under the tyranny of lustful desires is thus described by the satirist.  

Mane piger stertis? surge, inquit Avaritia, eja 
Persi●… Sat. 5. vid. Arria●…. Epict. l. 3. ●…. 24.   
Surge▪ negas? Instat, surge inquit, non queo surge.  
Ecquid agam rogitas? En saperdam adv●…ho ponto,  
Castoreum, stupas, h●…benum, thus, lubrica Co●….   

What sluggard snore so long? Says lust, up rise,  
Awake, get out. Dar'st thou say nay? it cries  
The same again, up, rise; I cannot. No?  
Rise though you cannot, when I'll have it so.  
What must I do? what do? up, wipe your eyes  
See, here's a goodly Ship of merchandise;  
Shell▪ fish, Castoreum, Flax, black Indian woods,  
Frankincense, Wines of Coos and other goods.   
Thus sordidly do vain men sell themselves, and as it were render up their Reason into the hands of vicious and greedy Affections, giving leave to their souls to suffer a ship wrack in that vessel which bringeth goods into their Cellars, and traffiquing their own judgement in exchange for a ship of wares.  
Secondly, These kind of Desires make men 
Se●…▪ de Benef. lib. 3. c●…p. 3 & l. 2. c. 27.  ungrateful and forgetful of any kindness which hath already been done them. Memoria minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum. As in bucket●… at a well, the longer the line of the one is which moves downward, the shorter is the line of the other which riseth upward; so the larger our Desires are towards the future, the narrower our memories are of things past. And usually men's valuations of things are more in the performance, then when they are performed. And the reason, 
Na●… serae maxuma par●… movem hunc homines babent, quod sibi volunt, Dum id impetran●… Boni sunt, sedid ubi jam p●…es sese habeant, ex bonis pessumis & 〈◊〉 Pl●…ut. Captiv. nihil ●…què est gratum adeptis & concupiscentibus Plix. lib. 2. Ep. 15.  is because as nature hath set our eyes forward, and not behind us: so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principal factors, look naturally before them, not to what they Have, but to what they Hope. The eye whereby we look backward into our lives is the eye of Repentance, we there either see ourselves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himself in both these Relations. But the eye whereby we look forward, is an eye of Hope, and Desire, and by that we are represented to ourselves better and greater than we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadstone be very near it; But it moveth downward, though the centre be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of Desire, than those of acknowledgement and retribution.  
Besides the apprehensions of goodness in a thing are much other in the Desire then in the Review: as usually the sun and the moon look bigger at their rising, then when they are come over our heads. Desire looks on nothing in them but that which pleaseth, Review finds that in them which displeaseth. When we desire Wine we think only on the sweetness, when we review it, we remember the headache. Besides what we desire is apprehended as the matter of our life, what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. Quickquid retro est mors tenet. As 
Senec▪ de Brevi●…, vi●…ae & Ep. 120.  ●…n our life, so in our delights, so much of them ●…s dead as is over and gone. We love our food when it is meat, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth through us we despise it. And the secret work of concoction, (which is as it were the Review of ou●… meat) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite took in ●… lump, and together.  
And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever find that they are like the Apples of Sodom, Qu●… contacta cin●…rescunt, 
〈◊〉. Apol. cap. 40.  which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and doath l●…king under them. All the matter of ou●… secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meats we ●…ate, which go much more into excrement, then into nonrishment and substance. Like the Cyptus tree which they say is very 
〈◊〉 cp●…d Plutarch. A-Apopth. Cl●…m. Alex. Paed. lib. 3. cap. 3.  fair, but bears no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautiful in frontispicio, b●… ridiculous in penetrali. And if we look well on them, we shall find, that as they are mortal themselves, so they come to us through mortality. it was a bold, but true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Seneca.. 〈◊〉 vivinous. We live by the deaths of other things. Our fullest Tables furnished with death nothing but feretra, the buyers of birds and 〈◊〉▪ Our richest garments the bowels and skins ●… other creatures, which work out their own 〈◊〉 to preserve ours. Silk is a grave to the 〈◊〉 that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. O●… Offices and Honours seldom come to us but b●… the mortality of those that prepossessed them▪ And our mortality makes them the ●…itter obje●… of other men's Desires.  
3 These Desires as they are forgetful, so they 
Vid Senec. de troth. lib. 3. c. 31. Allen is gem●…tibus liben●…er ●…olumenta conquir●…▪ Ammian: Marcell. lib. 31. Egreeium Ex●…mplum in vidi●… etiam Ecclestas●…icae ex cupidi●…atibus 〈◊〉 apud ●…un. dem Marcell●… num inter Damasum, & Vrcisiaum. lib. 27.  are envious, and look with an evil eye upon others competion, accounting their success our own damage. If a man should draw the genealogy of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we should find the root of that great Tree to be nothing but lust. It was Desire and inordinate appetite by which the devil persuaded our first parents to pick a quarrel with their Maker. Whence come wars and fightings, saith Saint james, but from lusts which war in your members? When a man hath war within, no wonder▪ if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himself, will disagree with all the world besides. The sea tosseth every thing which comes into it, not because it is wronged, but because it is unquiet. And a lustful man will contend with every innocent man that prospers, not because this man doth him injury, but because he grudgeth this man's prosperity. As the sea representeth every straight thing that is put into it crooked, so lust every harmless thing perverse, and as Seneca speaks, hath 
●…pist. 105.  Odium sine inimico, hatred without an enemy. Greedy Desires are like a swollen and envious spleen, which sucks away substance from all the rest of the body.  
4 These Desires are Hidropticall, and like a 
* Caelius Phodig. lib. c, 39 lib. 14. cap. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the stomach which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it. Unnatural Desires being herein very like unto natural ●…ions, the further they proceed, the stronger and swifter they are. Like wind in a bladder they never fill the heart, but enlarge it. The Grecians 
〈◊〉. in Anacharsi. lib. 1. 〈◊〉 de Ben. lib. 2. c. ●…7. Ni●…il 〈◊〉 ma●…i. uris, Imo ●…bus ●…p. cap. 120. P●…n. lib. ●…5. c. 22.  began their drink in little Cups, but proceeded unto Flagons: and many times those Appetitions which begin in modesty go on unto impudence, and the more our lives hastens to leave the world, the more our lust hastens to possess it. As it is noted of the Parthians, that the more they drink, the more they thirst. And, which is a marvellous illogicall stupidity, the more continual experience men have of the vanity of the world, the more greedy experiments they make to find out solidity in it. Like your melancholy searchers after the Philosophes Stone, that never dote so much upon their project as then when it hath deluded them, and never flatter themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched by their Art, then when it hath brought them unto beggary.  
Lastly, from hence it comes to pass that these kinds of Desires are Base, and diject the mind unto ●…ordid and ignoble Resolutions. For 〈◊〉 nihil satis, nihil ●…urpe. He that hath never enough will count nothing base whereby he may ge●… more. As the Historian saith of Otho, that he di●… Adorare vulgus, jacere oscula, & omnia serviliter 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉. Hist. l. 1.  Imperio. Adore the people, dispense and scatte●… abroad his courtesies, crouch unto any servil●… expressions, to advance his Ambitious designs Like Antaeus in the Poets, fall to the earth, 〈◊〉 
Hor●…dot. Th●…lia. Plutarch. in Solon●….  he may grow the stronger by it. As 〈◊〉 and Pisistratus who wounded, mangled, deformed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate, 
〈◊〉. Marcel▪ lib. 25.  and gain their ends. As the Scripture noteth of Absolom, and the Historian of Julian, that out of affectation of popularity, they stooped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather sordidness of Ambition, Me●…elous in the Tragedian, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto Agame●…non.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Eurip. 〈◊〉.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

You know how you the Rule o'er Grecians got,  
In show declining what in truth you sough●…:  
How low, how plausible you apprehended  
The hands of meanest men: How then you bended  
To all you met: How your gates open flew,  
And spoke large welcome to the popular Crew:  
What sweetened words you gave even unto those  
Who did decline, and hate to see you gloze.  
Ho●… thus with Serpentine and guileful Arts  
You screwed and wound yourself into the hearts  
O'th'vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now  
Makes you forget how then you used to bow.    

CHAP. XVIII. Rules touching our Desires. Desires of lower Objects must not be either hasty, or unbounded; such are unnatural, turbid, unfruitful, unthankful: Desires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, industrious: Connexion of virtues, sluggish Desires.  
Unto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here add two or three Rules pertaining to the moral use, and managing of it. And they are, First, concerning Objects of an inferior and Transitory nature, that our Desires be neither hasty and precipitate, nor vast, and unlimited. And in matters more High and Noble, that they be not either wavering and interrupted Desires, or lazy and negligent Desires.  
1 For the first of these, we have a rule in Solomon, concerning Riches, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate desire: He that 
Prov. 28. 20. 20. 21.  maketh haste to be rich, shall not be without sin; I may add, Not without cares neither: for we know the nature of all Earthly things, they have something of the Serpent in them, to Deceive. The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the way of Honour and Ambition, a slippery and giddy way; the way of carnal Pleasures, a deep and a fowl way, the way of learning itself (the noblest of all sublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certainly he had need have better eyes then a blind Passion, who in so ill ground will make good haste and good speed together. In 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. C●…ilo ●…pud 〈◊〉. lib. 1.  labyrintho properantes ipsa velocitas implicat. He is the likeliest man to get first out of a Maze, who runs fastest. An over nimble Desire is like the stomach of a sick man newly recovered, more greedy, then strong, and fuller of Appetit●… then Digestion. Whence arise immature and unconcocted counsels, blind and ungoverned Resolutions: like those monstrous people, which Pliny speaks of, whose feet go backward, and behind their eyes. For when the mind of man is once possessed with conceit of Contentment to be found in worldly glories, when the insinuations and sweet enchantments of Honour, Profit, Pleasure, Power, and Satan's Hac omnia, hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reason asleep; it is then sufficient that we know the end, which we desire; we have not the patience to inquire after the right way unto it: because it is the suspicion of our greedy Desires, that the true means are commonly the most tedious, and that honesty for the most part goes the fa●…thest way about. And hence withal it usually cometh to pass that these hasty and preproperous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which slowness with maturity might have made use of. As the Roman soldiers by their greediness 
Plutarch. in Lacull●….  on their prey, miss of taking Mithridates, who otherwise could not have escaped them. And therefore it was wise counsel of Nest●…r in the Poet.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
●… liad. ●…. 70.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

Let none go lingering after spoil, and stay  
To load himself with a too hasty prey.  
But first let's kill: weare sure after such fight▪  
Carcases being risled cannot by't.   
2 The next Rule to keep this Passion in 
Senec. de Tranq. l. ●…. Arian. Epict. lib. 1. ●…. 26.  order with reference unto inferior Objects is, that it be not an infinite and unlimited Desire. Appetite should answer our power to procure, and our strength to bear and to digest. We should not go about to swallow a camel, when a G●…at doth make us strain, Immoderate Desires can neither be satisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundednesse of Desires we are to take heed off▪ for these reasons.  
1 First, for the unnaturalness of it: for all 
Arist. Po●…it. lib. c. cap. 6. 〈◊〉. Ep. 16. 39 de ben●…fit. lib. 2. c. 27.  unnatural and unnecessary Desires are infinite, as the Philosopher hath observed▪ As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited Desire is only there requisite, where the Object thereof is Infinite, and ordained to perfect man's Nature; but not where it is only a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein 
Extrani●… non augent bonum, sed condi●…nt. Senec. Epi●…. 66.  he ought therefore then to enjoy his Contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his mind which is immortal; and therefore not able to be replenished with any perishing happiness) nor to outreach the vastness of his opinion, which which being erroneous is likewise Infinite (For Omnis Error immensus, as Seneca speaks▪ but than 
Nurquam 〈◊〉 invenit ●…ibide. Cic●…r. ●…usc. Malum ●…nitum. Arist. ●…thi▪ lib. 2. cap. 6. P●…it. l. 2. c. 5. Exig●…um natu●… opinio imm●…nsarium ●…pic. apud Sen.  only when it affords such conveniences, as wherewithal the seasonable and virtuous employments of Nature may with content be exercised. It is then a corrupt Desire which proceeds not from our Want, but from our Vice. As that is not a natural thirst, but a disease and distemper of the Body, which can never be satisfied.  
Now the miseries of unnatural Desires are first, 
1.  that they corrupt and expel those which are 
Plutarch. in Gry●…▪ & de 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉▪  natural: as multitudes of strangers in a City do eat out the Natives; thus in luxurious Men, strange Love doth extinguish that which is conjugal.  
Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the 
2.  mind with them. As immoderate laughter, so immoderate Lusts are never without pain and 
〈…〉▪  convulsions of Nature. Morbid desires of the Mind are like an Itch or Vicer in the Body, 
〈…〉.  which is with the same nails both angered and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.  
Thirdly, they are ever attended with Repentance, 
3.  both because in promises they disappoint, 
〈…〉.  and in performances they deceive; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains; as those delicates which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomach; and after they have pleased the palate do torment the bowels. The mind surfeits on nothing sooner than on unnatural Desires.  
Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing 
4.  and making new experiments; as weak 
S●…n de 〈◊〉 ●…. ●…. 1. 3. c. 3.  and wanton stomaches which are presently cloyed with an uniform diet, and must have not only a painful but a witty cook, whose inventions 
Quod Ministe●… suera●…, Ars haberi Capt●…. 〈◊〉 l. 39 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ethi. ●…. 3. c. 12.  may be able with new varieties to gratify and humour the niceness of their appetite. As Nero had an officer who was called Elegantiae Arbiter, the inventor of new Lusts for him.  
Lastly, unlimited Desires are for the most part 
5.  Envious and Malignant: For he who desires every 
●…. Annal. 〈◊〉. 16.  thing, cannot choose but repine to see another have that which himself wanteth. And therefore Dionysius the Tyrant did punish Philoxenus the musician, 
Plut. de Tranq  because he could sing, and Plato the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himself. In which respect he did wisely, who 
〈…〉.  was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions.  
Secondly, unbounded Desires do work Anxiety and Perturbation of mind; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good; whereas those Desires which are in their executions Turbid, or in their continuance Permanent, are no more likely to lead unto some farther end, than either a misty and dark, or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at last unto his journeys end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vain. And together with this they do distract our noble Cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. Martha her Many things, and Mary's One thing will very hardly consist together.  
Lastly, there is one Corruption more in these unlimited Desires, they make a man unthankful for 
Sen. de Bene●…. lib. 3.  former benefits: as first, because Caduca memoria f●…turo imminentium. It is a strong presumption that he seldom looks bacl upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing some thing to come. It is S. Paul's Profession and Argument in a matter of greater consequence, I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before. And secondly, though a man should look bacl; yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but sleight and vanishing, because the Mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving Desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature, which likewise (were they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankful▪ fullness: every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, than to acknowledge the vice and vastness of his own Desires.  
The next rule which I observed for the government of these Passions, do respect those Higher and more glorious Objects of man's Felicity: And herein,  
1 Our Desires are not to be Wavering and In constant, but Resolute and full of quickness and Perseverance: First, because though we be poor and shallow vessels; yet so narrow and almost shut▪ up are those passages, by which we should give admittance unto the matter of our true happiness▪ yea so full are we already of contrary qualities, as that our greatest vehemency will not be enough, either to empty ourselves of the one, or to fill ourselves with the other. And therefore the true Desires of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most pathetical and strong similitudes of Hunger and Thirst; and those not common neither; but by the pant●…ng of a tired▪ Hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable shower. Secondly, overy desirable Object the higher it goes, is ever the more united within itself, and drives the faster unto an unity: It is the property of errors to be at variance; whereas Truth is One, and all the parts thereof do mutually strengthen and give light unto each other: So likewise in things Good▪ the more noble, the more knit they are▪ Scelera disi●…dent: It is for sins to be at variance amongst themselves. And 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. l. 7. c. 14.  those lower Goods of Riches, Pleasure, Nobility, Beauty, though they are not Incomparable; yet they have no natural Connexion to each other; & have therefore the less power to draw a consla●… and continued Desire. But for nobler and immaterial goods we see how the Philosopher hath 
〈◊〉. l. 6. c. 12.  observed a connextion between all his moral virtues, whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawn to a desire of all the rest: for the mind being once acquainted with the sweetness of one, doth not only apprehend the same sweetness in the others, but besides findeth itself not sufficiently possessed of that which it hath, unless it be thereby drawn to procure the rest: all whose properties it is by an excellent mutual service to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and in some sort greater unity unto each other.  
And lastly for the highest and divinest good; the truth of Religion, that is in itself most of all other One, as being a beam of that Light and Revelation of that Will, which is unity itself. And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles, yet Saint Paul calleth them all but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one Faith, as having but one Lord 
Eph. 4. 5.  for the Object and End of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifestly required united desire to carry the soul thereunto.  
II. The last Rule which I observed was that our Desires ought not to be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painful, both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withal in the pursuit of our happiness; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the several furtherances requisite thereunto. And indeed that is no True, which is not an Operative Desire: a Velleity it may be, but a Will it is not. For what ever a man will have, he will seek in the use of such means, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for mountains of gold, and Balaam may wish for an happy death, and an A theist may wish for a soul as earthly in substance as in Affection; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancy, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any pains, which stand like the Carman in the Fable, crying to Hercules when his Wuine fluck in the mud to help it out, without stretching out his own hands to touch it, are first unnatural desires, it being the formal property of this Passion to put the soul upon some motion or other. And therefore we see wheresoever Nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And secondly they are by consequence undutiful and disobedient Desires, in that they submit not themselves unto that Law, which requireth that we manifest the life and strength of our Love by the quickness and operation of it in our Desires. And lastly, such Desires are unuseful and fruitless: for how can an object▪ which standeth in a fixed distance from the Nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections? The desires of the sluggard (saith Solomon) slay him, because his 
Pro. 21. 25: 13. 4.  hands refuse to labour. These affections must have life in them, which bring life after them: Dead desires are deadly desires.   

CHAP. XIX. Of the Affection of ●…y Delight. The several Objects thereof, Corporall, moral, intellectual, Divine.  
THe next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscible Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the Presence of, and union to an Object; and that is, when either we by our desires have reached the Object, which worketh joy and Delight: or when in our flight the Object hath overtaken 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E●…hic. l. 2. c. 3.  us, which worketh grief and Sorrow. And these two do bear the most inward relation unto and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon Aristotle in his ethics hath made them the foundation of our virtues, and rules of our working. And the reason is natural, because the end of our motion is to attain rest, and avoid perturbation. 
Cicer. Tusc. l. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Zeno apud Lae●…. l. 7. Cum. Alex. storm. lib▪ 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rbe●…o. l. 1. c. 11▪  Now Delight is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquillity of mind, which we receive from the Presence and Fruition of that good, whereunto our Desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher in one place call it a motion of the soul with a sensible and felt instauration of Nature, yet elsewhere he as truly telleth us that it standeth rather in 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ei●…▪ l. 7. c. ul●….  rest than motion; as on the other side Grief is the straightening and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sense and burden of some present evil oppressing our Nature. Now 
Gaudere in Sinu. Ci●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Iliad. ●….  these Passions are divers, according to the diversity of the Objects: which are either Sensitive and Bodily; and then Delight is called Voluptas 
Qui sapit in tactio gaudeat ille Sin●…. Tibul. Vid. 〈◊〉 de Orthodox. side lib 2. cap. 13. & Nemes. de Anima. c. 18  Pleasure, being a medicine and supply against bodily indigence and defects: or intellectual and Divine, and then it is called Gaudium joy, being a sweet and delightful tranquillity of mind, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other Passion of sadness considered; which in respect of the Body is called a Sense of pain; in respect of the soul, a Sense of grief.  
First then for the Object of our Delight; it is only that which can yield some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an Empty and perfectible nature. Whatsoever then is either medicinal for the Repairing, or natural for the Conserving, or any way helpful for the advancing of a Creature, is the only true and allowable object of its Delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little & little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth, or as 
* A●…bores vecat omnem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lo, etc. 〈◊〉 l. 16. c 34.  ●…vie which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap thereof, may haply yield some measure of vanishing content to minds, which taste every thing with a corrupted palate; but certainly such sophistical premises can never infer in the conclusion any other than a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore 
Epist. 59 Aug. de ciult. De●…, l. 14. c. 8.  Seneca is bold to find an impropriety in Virgil's epithet, Mala Gaudia, joys which issue from a polluted fountain; as not having in them that inseparable attribute of absolute Delight; which is to be unvariable. For how can a mind (unless blinded with its own impostures, and entangled in the errors of a misled affection) receive any nourishing and solid content in that, which is in itself vanishing, and unto its Subject destructive? Whatsoever then may be delighted in, must have some one of the forenamed conditions, tending either to the Restitution of decayed nature, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Nemes. c. 18.  to the preservation of entire nature, or to the Perfection of Empty nature. And to the former and ●…mperfecter sort of t●…ese, Aristotle referreth all ●…orporeall and sensitive Pleasures (unto which he 
Ethic l. 7. c. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  ●…herefore granteth a secondary and accidental goodness) which he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Medi●…ines of an indigent nature; whereby the defects ●…hereof are made up, and itself disburdened of ●…hose cares, which for the most part use to follow ●…he want of them.  
Herein than I observe a double corruption; an ●…nnaturall and unlimited Delight. Unnatural, I ●…eane those accursed pleasures, which were exer●…ised by men given over to vile affections and 〈◊〉 in the pursuing of lusts, whose very names abhor the light. Unlimited Delights are those, which exceed the bounds of Nature, and the prime Institution of lawful and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repair not, and strengthen nature, 
* Undes●…ctum ut qu●… ad funera per●…erent in Templ●… ventris venderentur. vid. Plutarch. qu●… Rom. q. 23.  they weaken and disinable it; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the mind Curiosity breeds errors.  
Other Objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concern the Body; and they are both the moral and Contemplative Actions of the Mind; To both which Aristotle hath attributed 
Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.  principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts less laborious, as residing in that part of the soul, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest simplest and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent; spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choicest perfections, whereby the soul may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both grief and Anxiety; but this is never natural to the act of knowledge, which is always in its own virtue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weakness and doubtings of the understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof; or out of the admixtion and sleeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men minister unto themselves desperate thoughts or weak fears, or guilty griefs, or unlimited Desires, according as is the property of the Object joined with their own private distempers: Thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is natural unto it, to produce, but Doubtings, 
joh. 3. 20. Job 21. 14. Isa. 30. 11. 2 Pet. 3. 5.  terrors and Disquietings of Conscience; it being the property of the works of darkness to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all these former objects of man's Delight (because they are amongst salomon's Catalogue of things under the 
Eccles. 2. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  sun) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let pass the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madness and not joy.. For 
Soph●…c Alex. Senec. Epist. ●… 3  Seneca telleth us that true joy is a serious and severe thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular Delights, which have wings to fly from us and thorns to prick us, even that highest natural Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the sun, and therefore not obnoxious to salomon's vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yielding rather a windy Pleasure than a true Delight. The properties whereof is not to puff up, but to replenish. And therefore it is the prayer of Saint Paul, The God of Peace fill 
〈◊〉. 15. 13.  you with all joy.. True heavenly joy is a filling, a satiating joy: a joy unspeakable, with Saint Peter; a Peace past understanding, with Saint Paul. Nor doth this property of overflowing and swallowing the Mind add any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weakness of the soul, as it is of the body to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in, nor doth the mind desire to subdue or conquer, but only to be united with its object.  
And here the only corruption of our Delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it. For though this blessed Light leaves not any man in the shadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the shadow of sin, by the darkness whereof he is without much of that lustre and glory, which he shall then have, when the righteous shall shine like the sun in the Firmament. Yet at the least our endeavours must be, that though our joys cannot be here a Repl●…nishing joy, yet it may be an Operative joy, and so work out the measure of its own fullness. I have done with the several Objects of man's delight, Corporall, moral, intellectual and Divine.   

CHAP. XX. Of the Causes of joy.. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Changes by accident a cause of Delight.  
I Now proceed to speak of the more particular causes and 
Arist. Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6.  effects of this Passion. Touching the former, not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid (which the Philosopher hath given some instances of) The general cause is the natural goodness of the Object, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to unite and make present the Object with the Faculty. And that is done (to speak only of intellectual Powers) 
Arist. 〈◊〉. lib. 1. cap. 1.  three manner of ways; by Contemplation, by Confidence, and by Fruition, by thinking of it in the mind, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.  
Contemplation adds unto the soul a double Delight: First, from its own property, it being the proper and natural agitation of man's mind, insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curlous and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively. And therefore the Devils first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evil as good, for he knew that the mind of Man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in its own nature had no perfection in it.  
But than secondly, in the Object of true Delight, Contemplation ministereth a farther joy, in that it doth in some sort pre-unite our souls and our blessedness together: and this is partly the reason why Aristotle so much advanceth his Contemplative before his practic Felicity: For though this in regard of its immediate reference unto Communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive Nature; yet certainly, in that sweetness of content, that serenity of soul, that exaltation of thoughts which we receive from those noble motions of the higher Mind, the other doth fare in pleasure and satisfaction surpass all active happiness. And hence we see in the parts of man's Body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practic. The parts of Vision are before the parts of Action; the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself (notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession nor intermission of Delight) yet by way of expression to us ward, he did not in the creation of the World so much joy in his fiat, as in his vidit; not so much when he gave his creatures their Nature, as when he saw their goodness: Nature being the Object of Power; but goodness the Object of Delight; and therefore the day of his rest was more holy than the days of his working, that being appointed for the Contemplation, as these were for the production of his creatures.  
And as Contemplation by way of Prescience, when it looketh forward on good things hoped: So also by way of Memory, when it looketh backward and receiveth evil things escaped, doth minister matter of renewed joy.. No Man looketh 
Arist. Rbet. l. 1. c. 10.  on the Sea with more comfort, than he who hath escaped a shipwreck. And therefore when Israel saw the Egyptians dead on the Sea shore, the fear of whom had so much affrighted them before, they then sang a Song of Triumph. Past troubles do season, and as it were ballast present Comforts, as the Snow in Winter increaseth the beauty of the Spring.  
But in this particular of Contemplation, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be Corruption in the excess (For in those matters of Delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I mean divine things, we seldom err in the other extreme.) And that is, when we do not divide ourselves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, so to attend upon mere mental notions, as to neglect the practical part of our Life, and withdraw ourselves from the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monstrous to see a fire burn without light, or shine without heat (aberrations from the supreme Law being in divine things impious as they are in natural prodigious.)  
And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation, and a fore-enjoying of the Light of God, is towards him as un●… pleasing, as it is in itself uncomfortable, for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own Comforts to the refreshing of others.  
A second cause of Delight is the sure Confidence of the Mind. Whereby upon strong and un●…ring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires: so that what ever doth encourage our Hope, doth therewithal strengthen▪ and enlarge our Delight▪ Spe gaudent faith S. Paul, and 
Rom. 12. 12.  Sperantes gaudent saith the Philosopher, Hope and 
Ar●…. 〈◊〉. ●…. ●…. ●…▪ 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉.  joy go both together: For where Hope is strong▪ it doth first divert and take off the Mind from poring upon our present wants, and withal ministereth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.  
But here we must take heed of a deep Corruption: For though I incline not to that opinion which denyeth Hope, all asswaging and mitigating source, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating Mind; yet to have an ungrounded Confisidence, and either out of Presumption or Security to resolve upon uncertain and casual events, there-hence to deduce Arguments of Comfort ' works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like his in the Poet:  — Petit ille dapes sub imagini somni, 
Ovid. Met. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 21.  Oraque vana movet, dentemque indente fatigat. 

Who dreaming that he was a Guest  
At his Imaginary Feast,  
Did vainly glut upon a Thought,  
Tiring each jaw and Tooth for naught:  
And when he fancied dainty meat,  
Had nothing but a dream to eat:   
Or like the musician in Plutarch, who having 
Plut de Audit.  pleased Dionysius with a little vanishing music, was rewarded with a short and deceived Hope of a great Reward. A presumptuous Delight though it seem for the time to minister as good content as that which is raised on a sounder bottom; yet in the end will work such inconveniences as shall altogether countervail and overweigh the de●…ipt of its former joys▪. For the Mind being mollified and puffed up with a windy and unnourishing comfort, is quite disabled to bear the 〈◊〉 of some sudden evil, as having its forces scattered by Security, which caution and ●…eare would have collected. For we know in Bodies, union strengtheneth natural motion, and weakeneth violent; and in the Mind the collecting and uniting of it doth both enable it for prosecution of its own ends, and for resisting all opposite force. It is therefore not comforting but a weakening Confidence, which is not provident and ope●…ative.  
The third and most effectual cause of Delight is the Fruition of Good, and the real union thereof unto the Mind●… for all other things work delight no farther, than either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of Pleasure and joy, the more the union is, the more is the Delight (And union is the highest degree of Fruition that can be) thus we see the presence of a Friend, yields more content than the absence, and the embraces, more than the presence: so in other outward Delights, those of Incorporation, are greater than those of Adhesion. As it is more natural to delight in our meats than in our garments; the one being for an union inward to increase our strength; the other outward only to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most clear, are most pleasant, and perspecuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have Speculum & 〈◊〉 put together by S. Paul, We see as in aglasse darkly, where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the glass of Nature and of Faith (both which are in their kind evidences of things not seen) we shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union, in his presence only is the fullness of joy..  
Now three things there are which belong unto 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. P●…l. l. ●…. ●…. 3. 〈◊〉. l. ●…. c. 〈◊〉.  a perfect fruition of a good thing: First, Propriety unto it, for a sick man doth not feel the joy of a sound man's health, nor a poor man of a rich man's money. Propriety is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongst men, one man being aggrieved to see another to have that which he either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, Possession: For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own, if it be any way detained and withheld from him, which was the cause of that great contention between Agamemnon & Achilles, 
Arrian. Epict. l. 1. ●…. 2●….  & between the Greeks & Trojans, because the one took away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly, Accommodation, to the end for which a thing was appointed▪ For a man may have any thing in his custody, and yet receive no comfort nor real delight from it, except he apply it unto those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good but the using of it which makes it beneficial.  
Now besides those natural causes of Delight, there is by accident one more; to wit, the Change 
Ethic. lib. 7. ●…. vl. l. 10▪ ●…. 4.  and Variety of good things, which the diversity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptiness of such things as we seek Delight from, doth occasion, where Nature is simple and uncompounded, there one, and the same operation is always pleasant; but where there is a mixed and various Nature, and diversity of Faculties, unto which do belong diversity of inclinations, there changes do minister Delight: as amongst learned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.  
And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments, which bring not a * Satiety 
Gustata magis quam Potata 〈◊〉. Cic. 〈◊〉 ●…. 2. 〈◊〉 ●…ll. 5. quaest. 1. Vid. Senec. de Tranq. c. 2, 3.  along with them, as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body, when he enquireth the reason why in a journey the inequality of the ways do less weary a man than when they are all plain and alike. We may give for the walking and wand'ring of the Desire (as Solomon calls it) to wit, that change and variety do refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto it. 
* Quod etiam de Tibe●…io notavit Su●…ton. cap. 43.  And therefore as I have before observed of Nero, the same hath Tully observed of Xerxes, that he propounded rewards to the inventors of new 
Qu●… hoc officio s●…ngtbantur dicti (ut videtur) ab Aelio l-amp●…idio Volup●…arij in Alex. Sever.  and changeable pleasures.  
Hereunto may be added as a further cause of Pleasure. Whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen grief, as Words, 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph. ●…nic lib. 7.  Tears, Anger, Revenge, because all these are a kind of victory, than which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore Homer saith of Revenge, that it is sweeter than the dropping honey. 
Est quadam etiam vol●…ndi voluptas. Plin. & Cic. de sint, l. 1. Arist. Rbet. l. 1. ●…. 1●….    

CHAP. XXI. Of other Causes of Delight. Unexpectedness of a God. Strength of Desire. Imagination. Imitation. Fitness and Accommodation. Of the effects of this Passion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, satiety in base. Whetting of industry. Atimorous unbelief.  
Unto these more principal 
Vix sum apud me ita animu●… commotus est m●…tu spe, ●…audio, m●…rando hoc tanto tanque repentin●…●…ono Ter●…ent. Andr. Act. 5. 4. 〈◊〉 bar●…lam, animo m●…o 〈◊〉 repenti●…um ●…amquè magnum non concipien●…e Gaudium Apul. A●…n. Aur. lib. 11.  Causes of this Affection I shall briefly add these few which follow.  
1 The suddenness and unexpectedness of a good thing causeth the greater Delight in it. For Expectation of a thing makes the mind feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that means make them the less when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choice and delicate stomaches. That the sight and smell of their meat doth half cloy and satiate them before they have at all tasted any of it: so the long gazing upon that which we Desire by Expectation doth as it were deflower the Delight of it before fruition. Whereas on the other side, as the Poet expresseth it.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Sophocl. A●…tig.  

No joy in greatness can compare with that,  
Which doth our Hopes and thoughts anticipate.   
So strong and violent hath been the immutation which sudden joy hath wrought in the Body, 
a Multis mortem attulit gaudium ingens, Insperatum interclu●…d animd, & vim magni novis que mo●… non 〈◊〉. A. G●…ll. lib. 3. c. 1. lib. 3. c. 1. & cap. 15.  that many (as I have formerly noted) have been quite overwhelmed by it, and been made partakers of Augustus his wish to enjoy an 
b 〈◊〉 in Aug. cap. 99  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to die pleasantly. And for this Reason it is that 
c Arist. Etbect. 1004.  new things, and such as we 
d Del●…ct at quicquid est Admirabile Cic. partic. Orat.  admire, and were 
a Proximorum incuriosi longinq●…●…mur & 〈◊〉. lib ●…. Epist. 20.  not before acquainted withal do usually Delight us, because they surprise us, representing a kind of strangeness unto the mind, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For strange and New things have ever the greatest price set upon them. As I noted before of the Roman Luxury, That it gloryed in no Delicates but those which were brought out of 
b Vid. Clem. Alex. ●…aedag. ●…. 2. c. 1. Plin. l. 9 c. 34. & lib. 2206. 2. Plutarcb. De 〈◊〉 sanita●…e.  strange Countries, and did first pose Nature, before either feed or adorn it.  
2 Strength of Desire, doth on the other side enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature ever delighteth most in those things which cost us dearest, and strong desires are ever painful. When 
c Vid. Citeron. Tusc. qu. l. 5.  Darius in his flight drank muddy water, & Ptolemy did eat dry bread, they both professed that they never felt greater pleasure: strength of Appetite marveilously increasing the Delight in that which satisfied it. For want and Difficulty are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition, 
a Plutarch. de Tranquill.  as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bitterest herbs. And as we say, Nulla sunt firmiora quàm quae ex dubijs facta sunt 
c Quintil. lib. 11. cap. 2, Si mibi tranquilla & placa●… omnia suisseun, incredibili qua nunc 〈◊〉 latitia voluptat●… Caruissem Cic. Orat post Reditum. Mix. Tyrius Dissert. 33. Plutarch. de pro●…ct. viri●…tem.  certa. Those evidences are surest which were made clear out of doubtful. So those pleasures are sweetest, Qu●…suaves fiunt ex tristibus, which have had wants and fears and Difficulties to provide a welcome for them. And therefore 
b Quintil. lib. 5. cap. 12.  Wrestlers and Fencers, and such like Masters of Game, were wont to use their hands unto heavy weights, that when in their Games they were to use them empty and naked, they might do it with the more expeditenesse and pleasure.  
3 Imagination and fancy, either in ourselves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. Diogenes his sullen and melancholy fancy took as much pleasure in his tub and staff, and water, as other men in their Palaces, and ampliest provisions, And he in the Poet.  

Qui se credebat miros a●…dire tragadoes  
In vacuo latus sessor Plausorquè Theatr●….— 
Horat. Epist. lib. 2. Ep.   
Cum redit adsese pol. me occidist is Amici  
Non servastis ait, cui sic extorta voluptas,  
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.   

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,  
And in an empty theatre did sit  
And give Applauses: but being healed complains  
Friends I'm not saved by this your love, but slain,  
Robbed of that sweet Delight I then did find,  
In the so grateful error of my mind.   
Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted 
Ficta●… sabulas cum volup. a●…em ●…gimus Cl●…. de si●…. lib. 5.  with Mythologies and Po●…icall Fables, with Elegancies, jests, urbanity, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants pomps, triumphs, and public Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.  
4 upon the same Reason we are marveilously Delighted with lively Imitation, as with those 
Vid. Plutar●…. de Aud. P●…et▪ & Quintil. lib. 2. ap. 13.  Arts which do curiously express the works and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things do wonderfully content us whose natural Deformities we abhor. We are well pleased with Homer's Description 
Hinc ●…coml stu●…tia. pedic●…li, feb●…um, etc.  of Thirsites, and with Sophocles his expression of the ulcer of Philoctetes▪ with Parmeno his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and Theodor●…u 
Plaut in Au●…. Hora●…. l. 1. Sa●…. 9  his of the rattling of wheels, with Plautus his description of a chargeable Wise, and Horace his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.  
5 Those things Delight every man which 
〈◊〉▪ lib. 10. cap. 7.  are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ as the Philosopher speaks, suitable 
Plutarch. de A●…d. Poc●….  fitted▪ and accommodated to his Genius and frame▪ of Nature, as in the same Plant, the Bee seedeth on the flower, the Bird on the Seed, the sheep on the Blade, the Swine on the root. So in the same Author one man observeth the rational▪ another the historical, a third the Elegant and more rhetorical passages, with special Delight, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each mind. And I 
C●…l. Rhod●…g. lib. 5. cap. 34. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  find it observed out of Hipocrates, that even in the Body many times that kind of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a 
Names. ex Arist. c. 18.  more particular Delight, though in itself it may be ●…orse▪ yet proveth better nourishment unto that Body than such, as though better in itself, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardness of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay▪ nor the same employments of mind for Men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I believe any thing which would more conduce to the general advancement of Arts and Learning, than if every man's Abilities were fixed and limited to that proper course, which his natural sufficiences did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement (for every thing grows most when it is best pleased) The one from Nature, the other from custom and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties 
Ethic. l. 10. ●…. 9  of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more natural unto us. And therefore 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…. l. 1. c. 11.  the Philosopher reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place. Those things that are natural, and those that we are accustomed unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.  
Touching the Effects of this Passion, I shall name but these few: First, the effects of corporal Delights are only (as I observed o●…t of Aristotle) medicinal; for repairing the breaches and ruins of our decayed Natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preserving ourselves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greediness of mortality would in short time devour. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgress these bounds, they begin to 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪  oppress Nature, weaken and distempe●… the Body, clog the mind, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carried 
Sophoc. 〈◊〉.  away with them, are presently over●…loyed with one kind, and must have variety to keep out loathing: which Tacitus observes in that monster of 
●…lut. in Gryllo. Annal. l. 11.  women Messalina, facilitate adulterorum in fastidiu●… versa ad incognit as libidin●…s pr●…stuebat, that loathing more easy and common sins, she betook h●… self to unnatural lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by S. Paul, Rom. 1. 26.  
A second effect of joy is Opening and Dil●…tion of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the mind, whence it hath the name 〈◊〉 Laetitia, as it were a broad and spreading Passio●…▪ 
Laetitia 〈◊〉 latitudin●….  Now the reason of▪ this motion occasioned 〈◊〉 joy, is the natural desire, which man hath to 〈◊〉 united to the thing wherein he delights to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we find in this Passion an exultation and egress of the spirits, discovering a kind of looseness of Nature in her security, doing many things not out of resolution, but instinct and power transporting both mind and body to sudden and unpremeditated expressions of its own content: For of all Passions, joy can be the least dissembled or suppressed, nam ga●…dio Cogendi vis inest, 
Pa●…igir. ad Tr●…jan.  saith Pliny▪ it exerciseth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man, as we see in David's dancing before the ark▪ and the lame man's walking, and leaping, and praising God, after he had been cured of his lameness. And this diffusion of the spirits showeth both the haste and forwardness of Nature, in striving as it were to meet her Object, and make large room for its entertainment, as also to dispel and scatter all adverse humours that would hinder the ingress of it, and lastly to send forth news as it were through the whole province of nature, that all the parts might bear a share in the common Comfort.  
Thirdly, those noble Delights which arise from heavenly causes, do withal cause a sweet thirst and longing in the soul after more, as some colours 
●… Plu●… in P●…ric.  do both delight the sight and strengthen it: For while God is the Object, there cannot be either the satiety to cloy the Soul, nor such a full comprehension as will leave no room for more.  
Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by Grace, do desire a more plentiful fruition of him in glory; and they that delight in the sight of Gods▪ Glory▪ do still desire to be forever so delighted. So that their Desire is without Anxiety▪ because they are s●…tiated with the thing which they do●… desire, ●… and their 〈◊〉 is without lo●…▪ thing; because still they desire the thing wherewith they are s●…tiated; they desire without grief, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without weariness, because they desire still; they see God and still they desire to see him: they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and praise God, and make it their immortal business still to love and praise him:  Et quem semper habent, semper haberevolunt. 

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher  
To have for ever, they do still desire.   

* Aristid. Tom. 1. Orat. in Pute●…. Aesc●…l.  Divine joy is like the water of Aesculapius his Well, which they say is notcapable of put●…ifaction.  
Fourthly, Delight whettoth and intendeth the actions of the soul towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactness in the doing of them, because it 〈◊〉 the mind of all those dulling Indisposition●… 
Arist. Ethic. l. 10. c. 5. Poli●…. l. 8. c. 5.  which unfit it for Action. And for this reason h●…ppily it i●…, that the 〈◊〉 used 
* Pl●…t. de ●…om. A. G●…ll. l. 1. c. 11.  music in their wars to refresh and delight Nature: For joy is in stead of recreation to the soul, it wonderfully disposeth for business. And those Actions which Nature hath made ne●…, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby Men might be quickened ●…nd excited unto them; 
* 〈◊〉. lib. ●…. Clem. A●…ex. ●…trom. l. 2. Pla●…t. Casi●…. Act. 2. 5●… 4. 〈◊〉. lib. 5. c●…p. 14.  and therefore Wisemen have told us that pleasure is, Sal & 〈◊〉 vit●…. The sauce which seasoneth the Actions of men.  
Lastly, because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrows, then with pleasures, therefore whither out of Conscience of guilt, which deserves no joy, or out of experience, which useth to find but little joy in the world, or out of fear of our own aptness to mistake, or out of a provident care, not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our Possession of it, and because usually the mind after shaking is more settled, whether for these or any other reasons, we see it usually come to pass, that vehement joy doth breed a kind of jealousy and unbelief, that sure ●…he thing we have is too good to be true 〈◊〉 and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they do but 〈◊〉 and deceive us, as Quod nimi●… volumu●…●…aud facile credimus:  

The things which we desire should be,  
We scarce believe when we do see.   
So I●…cob when he heard that his son Joseph 
Gen. 45, 26. Psal. 126, 1.  was alive, fainted▪ being astonished at so good news, and could not believe it. And when God restored the Jews out of captivity, they could think no otherwise of it then a●… a dream. And 
Act. 129. Luke 24. 41.  Peter when he was by the Angel delivered out of prison, took it for a vision only, and an apparition, and not for a truth.  
And lastly, of the Disciples after Christ's resurrection, when he manifested himself to them, it is said, That for very joy they believed not, their fears keeping bacl, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joys, Omnia tuta timens, not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see.  
As in the Sea when a storm is over, there remains still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth,  

Vt si quando ruit, debell at asque reliquit  
Eurus aquas, pax ipsa tumet, pontumque jacentem,  
Exanimis jam voluit hyem●….—   

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,  
To toss the roaring billows, even that peace  
Doth swell and murmurre, and the dying Wind  
On the calmed Sea leaves his own prints behind.   
Even so in the mind of man, when its fears are blown over, and there is a calm▪ upon it, there is still á motus trepidationis, and a kind of solicitous jealousy of what it enjoys. 
Aenead. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod ●…sum homines 〈◊〉▪ ●…ix satis credere se quisque andiss●… 〈◊〉 somni vanam 〈◊〉, Liv. lib. 33. 〈◊〉. ●…. 213.   
And this unbelief of joy is admirably s●…t forth in the Carriages of Penelope, when her Nurse and her son endeavoured to assure her of the truth of Ulysses his return after so many year's absence by the Poet, in which doubting she still persisted, till by certain signs Ulysses himself made it appear unto her, whereupon she ex●…used it after this manner.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

My dear Vlysses let it not offend,  
That when I saw you first, I did suspend  
My love with my belief, since my faint breast  
When first with those glad tidings it was blest,  
Trembled with doubts, lest by such forged lies  
Some crafty, false pretender might devise  
To have ensna●…'d me, and with these false sounds,  
Defieled my love, and multiplied my wounds.    

CHAP. XXII. Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it evil, sensitive, intellectual, as present in it s●…lfe, or to the mind, by memory, or suspicion, particular causes, effects of it. Fear, Care, Experience, Erudition▪ Irresolution, despair, Execration, Distempers of Body.  
THe opposite Passion to this of Delight, is grief and Sorrow, which is nothing but a perturbation and nnquietnesse wrought by the pr●…ssure of some present ●…vill, which the mind in vain struggleth with, as finding itself alone too impotent for the conflict. evil I say either formally, as in sin, or pain, present, or feared: or privatively, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we do despair, or have been disappointed. And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion, either Sensitive or intellectual. Sensitive is that anguish and distress of Nature which lyet●… upon the body. A Passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being always joined with some measure of its decay, but only as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils, it being the condition as of corporeal delights, by custom to grow burdensome and distasteful, so of pains to become easy and familiar.  
The other and greater grief is intellectual, which in Solom●…us phrase is, A wounded spirit; so much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a spirit is more vital than a body, besides the anguish of the soul, finds always, or works the same sympathy in the body, but outward sorrows reach not ever so fare, as the spiritual and higher part of the soul. And therefore we see many men out of a mistake, that the distress of their souls hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.  
The causes of this Passion, are as in the former, whatsoever hath in it power to disturb the mind by its union thereunto. There are then two Conditions in respect of the Object, that it be evil and Present. Evil first, and that not only formally in it self; but apprehensively to the understanding. And therefore we see that many things which are in their Nature evil; yet out of the particular distemper of the Mind, and deceitfulness in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chief Corruption of this Passion, I mean the misplacing, or the undue suspending of it: For although strictly in its own property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor adds any perfection; but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it bears either to a superior Law, as testifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our grief for the breach thereof: or to our consequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater wisdom and Providence, it may be said to add much perfection to the mind of man, because it serves as an inducement to more cautelous living.  
The next Condition in respect of the Object, is, that it be Present, which may fall out either by Memory, and then our grief is called Repentance: or Fancy and suspicion, and so it may be called Anx●… of Mind: or by Sense and present union, which is the principal kind, and so I call it Anguish.  
For the first, nothing can properly and truly work grief, by ministry of Memory, when the Object or evil is long since past; but those things which do withal stain our Nature, and work impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after in their operations offensive and burden some: so on the other side many things which for the time of their continuance are irksome and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater 
H●…b. 12. 11.  joy.. Whether they be means used for the procuring of further good.  

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum  
〈◊〉 in Latium, sedes ubi; etc.   

Through various great mishaps & dangers store, 
Antad. l. 1. Iliad. ●…4.   
We hasten to our home and wished 〈◊〉▪  
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,  
Only reserve yourselves for better lives.   
Or whether they b●… Evils which by our wisdom we have broken th●…ough and avoided;  — sed & 〈◊〉 olim 〈◊〉 i●…vabit. 

When we are arrived at ease,  
Remembrance of a strome doth please.   
The Objects then of Repentance are not our passive, but our active Evils: not the Evils of suffering, but the Evils of doing▪ for the memory of afflictions past, represent●… unto us Nature loosed and delivered, and should so much the more increase our joy, by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity▪ but the memory of sins past represents Nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned. And so leaves a double ground for grief, ●…he stain or pollution, and the guilt or malediction a deformity to the Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here to wander into a digression touching Repentance, only in a word it is then a Godly Sorrow, when it proceeds from the memory of evil; not so much in respect of the punishment as of the stain. When we grieve more because our sin hath made us unholy, then because it hath made us unhappy; and not only because we are run into the danger of the Law, but because we are run out of the way of the Law. When it teacheth us to cry, not only with Pharaoh, take away this Plague; but with Israel in the Prophet, take away Iniquity.  
Concerning grief of Preoccupation, arising out of a suspicious fear and expectation of evil, I know not what worth it can have in it, unless haply thus, that by fore-accustoming the Mind 
Pracogliati m●…li m●…llis ictus. 〈◊〉▪ Epist. 77. Uid. Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 3.  to evil, it is the better strengthened to stand under it: For Evils by praemeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Mind gathering strength and wisdom together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advice of Plutarch, that we should 
Pl●…t. de 〈◊〉.  have a prepared mind, which when any evil falleth out, might not be surprised by it. To say as Anaxagoras did when he heard of the death of his son, sciome genuisse mortalem, I know that I be▪ got a mortal son. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. preparedness composeth the mind to patience. Ulysses' wept when he saw his dog, which he did not when he saw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was surprised by the other.  

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,  
Et perferre soror potero.   

Had I foreseen this grief, or could but fear it,  
I then should have composed myself to bear it.   
Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of a man's Life, to be only a meditation upon Death; because that being so great an evil in itself, and so sure to us, it ought to be so expected, as that it may not come sudden, and find us unprepared to meet the King of terror. For it is in the property of custom and acquaintance, not only to alleviate and assuage evil (to which purpose Seneca speaks, perdidisti tot 
Consolatio ad Helviam.  mala si nondum misera esse didicisti, thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable) but further as Aristotle notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesome and tedious; and therefore he reckoneth 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. l. 1.  mourning amongst pleasant things, and tears are by Nature made the witnesses as well of joy as of grief.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Odiss. l▪ ●…. 2.  

He kissed the shore, fast tears ran from his eyes,  
When he his native country first espies.   
And Seneca (whither Philosophically or Rhetorically) observes, that obstinacy and resolvedness in grief, doth so alter the nature of it, ut fiat tandem infelicis animi prava voluptas dolour. That at 
Et quadam etiam dolend, volup●…. Plin. l. 8. ep. c. 6.  length it turns into a kind of pleasant pain, sure I am the Apostle biddeth us count it joy, when we fall into temptations.  
The last presence of Grief was real, when some ponderous evil either of Affliction or of sin, the loss of some good wherein we delighted, the disappointment of some hope whereon we relied meeting with impotency in ourselves, to remove what we suffer, to recover what we lose, to supply what we want, doth bruise and lie with a heavy weight upon the tenderest part of Man, his soul and Spirit. And in this I cannot find considered merely in itself any worth at all (it being nothing else but the violation and wounding of Nature) but in order to the effects which it produceth, it may have sundry denominations, either of a serviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I shall but briefly name them, and pass over to the next.  
The profitable effects are principally these: First, as it is an instrument of public administration & discipline. It is as it were both a Schoolmaster 
Clem. Alex. Paedag. l. 1. c. 8.  and a physician, to teach and to cure: so the Philosopher telleth us, that by pleasure and pain, 
Ethic. l. 10. c. 1. Calamitates remedia. Sen de Tranq. l. 1 c. 9 Psal. 94. 12. Psal. 119. 71. Jer. 22. 21.  Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences, the Rod being unto the Mind, as a Rudder unto a Ship: so the Prophet David putteth chastisement and instruction together: Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, and teacheth out of thy law, and again, ●…t is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy commandments. Therefore God the Law in the wilderness, where the people were 
Grande 〈◊〉 ●…genium mis●…r sq, ve●…it soler●… reb●….  in want and under discipline: to note that grief is a good instrument unto learning; for after in their prosperity they would not hear.  
And as it is a means to teach, so it is a means to cure too; for therefore pain is usually made the matter of punishment, that as Men offend by sinful 
Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.  pleasure, so they may be amended by wholesome sorrow. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cures are usually wrought by contraries.  
Again, it doth by Experience strengthen and 
Sen. de ●…tio, Sapient. c. 4.  harden, making both wise and able, for enduring further calamities, quos Deus a●…at, indurat & exercet. 
Epist. 67.  God exerciseth and traineth those whom he loves, bringing them up none in delicijs sed in castris, not in Paradise, but in a wilderness. Now as the Philosopher speaketh, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Ethic. l 3. c. 8.  Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour, whereby a man contemneth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many things which are indeed, but terriculamenta, skar-crowes to ignorant and weak minds. Whereas when pains have wrought patience, and patience experience of an issue and escape, that experience arms the soul unto more patience in new assaults. For if Gold were a rational creature, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ etc. 〈◊〉. Hec. Vid. Plut. l. de Adul●…. & 〈◊〉 Co●…sol. ad Apo●…onium Plut. de A●…d.  having passed through the fire and kept its own Nature unviolate, it would never after be the less afraid of the fire. And as Plutarch excellently speaketh, A wise Man should be like gold, to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers dislike many things in a place, which those, that are home-born, and used unto, do easily digest: thus the Apostle argueth, God hath delivered, and doth deliver; 
2 Cor. 1. 9 10.  therefore he will deliver. So Ulysses in Homer.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Odyss.. ●… 222.  

I'll bear with a firm mind, what ere comes more,  
Having endured so many griefs before.   
And elsewhere on the same manner he encouraged his companions on the Sea.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 
Odyss.. 〈◊〉 208.  

Sirs, w' are not now to learn what sorrows are,  
Having felt so many; and this now by fare  
Comes short of that which we endured then,  
When the proud Cyclops shut us in his den:  
Yet that we scap't, he of his prey did miss,  
Hereafter we shall joy to think of this.   

* Plut. de Ad. & A●…ic. & de Sa●…it. 〈◊〉. V●… Crudum adhuc vul●…s medentium manu●… reformidat, deinde patitur, a●…que ultro requirit. Sic Recens animi dolour Consolatione●… rejici●… atque refugit, mox 〈◊〉 & clementer admoti●… acquiescit. Plin. Ep. l 5 c. 16. Vid Plut. Cons. ad Apoll.  Thus as Iron which hath passed through the fire, being quenched, is harder than it was before: so the Mind having passed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them again. And therefore it is wise advice which learned Men give, to let griefs have a time to breath, and not to endeavour the stopping of them, while they are in Impetu, and in their first rising. As physicians suffer humours to ripen, and gather to some head, before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concoted grief, and experience hardened and instructed Nature to under it. It doth then willingly admit of those remedies, which being unseasonably applied it rejecteth and resisteth. 
Ovid de Remed. Amor. l 1.   

Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati  
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophoc. ●…dip. Ty●….   
Cum dederit lachrymas animumque expleverit aegrum,  
Ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit.   

Who would forbid a Mother then to mourn,  
When her Sons ashes are warm in his urn?  
But when she's cloyed with tears, & sorrow's rage  
Is over, counsel then may grief assuage.   
Whereas before it doth rather exasperate than allay it. For of all Passions, this of grief doth lest admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. etc. Alexis.  new Wine, defervescere, slack, and come to its just temper again.  
The last profitable effect is fear and suspicion, care or solicitousness to avoid those evils which oppress our Nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils which Experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt child the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the minds of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion 
Of this medicine we read in Homer.  of right reason alone, grounded on and guided by Religion, are only that Nepenthes and medicine against grief, which who so mixeth and applieth aright, shall not spend not load 
〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 211. Plin. l. 21. c. 21. 〈◊〉. Sympos. l. ●…. c. 1. Macr●…. l. 7. c. 1 Clem. Ale●…. in 〈◊〉. Nazion. Car●…in. 〈◊〉 patris ad ●…ium.  himself with unuseful sorrow. Thuy as Bee●… do poise themselves with little gravel stones, that they may not be carried away with the wind, which the Poet hath elegantly expressed:  

—— saepe Lapillos,  
Vt Cyr●…ba instabiles fluctu jactante saburra●… 
Geo●…g. ●… 4. 〈◊〉. lib. de sol●…t. 〈◊〉.   
Tollunt, his ses●…per inania ●…bila librant.   

As Ships with ballast, so the little Bee  
With gravel's poised, that he may steady flee.   
So patience and wisdom in the bearing of one sorrow, doth keep the mind in a stable condition against any other. A man doth never over-grieve, 
Iliud ●… 65.  that keeps his 〈◊〉 open to counsel, and his reason to judgement above his Passion.  
The evil effects of grief commonly follows 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Eurip. H●…cub.  the excess of it, and they respect the Reason, the Will, and the Body, in the Reason, it worketh distractions, irresolution, and weakness 〈◊〉 by drawing the main strain of it, rather to a fearful contemplation of its own misery, then to a fruitful Discourse how to avoid it, for as the motions of a wounded Body, so the Discourses of a wounded mind are faint, uncertain and tottering.  
Secondly, in the Will, it wo●…keth first despair, for it being the propertic of grief to condensate and as it were on all sides besiege the mind, the more violent the Passion is, the less apparent are the Passages out of it. So that in an extremity of anguish where the Passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out, the mind is constrained having no Object but it's own pai●…e to re flect upon, to fall into a dark and fearful contemplation of its own sad estate, and marvellous high and pathetical aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feels it's own sorrow, but knows not the weight of other men's. Whereas if all the calamities of mortal men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equal portion. S●…crates was wont to say that each man would rather choose to go away with his own pain.  
And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinful wishes and ex●…rations both against itself and any thing, that concurred to its being in misery, as we see in Israel in the wilderness & that mirror of Patience Job himself; 
〈◊〉. 14. 2. Job 3. 1. and jer. 20. 14. Is●…i. 8. 21.  and thus Homer bringeth in Ulysses in des pair under a sore tempest bewailing himself.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
O●…iss. ●… 306.  

Thrice four times happy Grecians who did fall  
To gratify their friends under Troy wall.  
Oh that I there had rendered my last breath,  
When Trojan darts made me a mark for Death,  
Then glorious Rites my Funerals had attended,  
But now my life will be ignobly ended.   
Another evil effect is to indispose and disable for duty, both because grief doth refrigerate 
Arist. Prob. Se●…. 11. Quest. 13. 〈◊〉 ●… 130. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  (as the Pilosopher telleth us) and that is the worst temper for action; and also diverts the mind, from any thing, but that which feeds it, and therefore David in his sorrow forgot to eat his bread, because eating and refreshing of Nature is a mitigating of grief, as Pliny telleth us. And lastly, because it weakeneth, distracteth and discourageth the mind, making it soft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto itself.  — Crudelis ubique luctus ubique pa●…or. 
Dolour Cib●…. 〈◊〉 Pl●…n. l. 22. c. 14.  Grief and fear go usually together. 
And therefore when Aeneas was to encourage his friends unto Patience and action, he was forced to dissemble his own sorrow.  — Curisque ingentibus ager 
〈◊〉. 2.  Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem. 

Although with heavy cares and doubts distressed,  
His looks feigned hopes and his heart griefs suppressed.   
And it is an excellent description in Homer of the fidelity of Antilochus when he was commanded to relate unto Achilles, the sad news of Patroclus death. 
〈◊〉. 1. C●…nfilium 〈◊〉 ●…egit & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. 

When Menelaus gave him this command,  
Antilochus astonished did stand. 
Aen●…ad. 4.   
Smitten with dumbness through his grief and fears, 
〈…〉.   
His voice was stopped, and his eyes swam inteares.  
Yet none of all this grief did duty stay,  
He left his arms whose weight might cause delay.  
And went, and wept and ran, with doleful word,  
That great Patroelus fell by Hector's sword.   

* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉  In a tempest saith Seneca, that Pilot is to be 
〈…〉.  commended, whom the shipwreck swalloweth up at the stern, with the Rudd●…r in his hand.  
And it was the greatest honour of Mary Mag. dalene, that when above all other, she wept for the loss of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent to seek him.  
Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, dryness of bones, exhausting of Nature. Grief in the heart, is like a moth in a garment, which biteth asunder, as it were the strings and the strength thereof, stoppeth the voice, looseth the joints, withereth the flesh, shrivelleth the skin, dimmeth the eyes, cloudeth the countenance, defloureth the beauty, troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth the whole frame.  
Now this Passion of grief is distributed into many inferior kinds, as grief of Sympathy for the evils and calamities of other men, * as if they were our own, considering that they may likewise be fall us or ours which is called mercy, grief of 
a 〈…〉.  repining at the good of another man, as if his happiness were our misery: As that Pillar which was light unto Israel to guide them, was darkness unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them, which is called envy. Grief of 
b 〈…〉.  fretfulness at the prosperity of evil and unworthy men, which is called Indignation, grief of Indigence when we find ourselves want those good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but desire to enjoy them ourselves too, which is called Emulation, grief of gild for evil committed, which is called Repentance, and grief of fear for evil expected, which is called despair, of which to discourse would be over-tedious, and many of them are most learnedly handled by Aristotle in his rhetorics. And therefore I wall here put an end to this Passion.   

CHAP. XXIII. Of the affection of Hope, the Object of it, Good Future, Possible, Difficult, of Regular and Inordinate despair.  
THe next Ranks and Series, is of Irascible Passions, namely those which respect their Object, as annexed unto some degree of Difficulty, in the obtaining, o●… avoiding of it, the first of which is Hope, whereby I understand an earnest and strong inclination and expectation of some great good apprehended as possible to be obtained, though not by our own strength, nor without some intervenient Difficulties. I shall not collect those 
Iliad. ●… 794. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Suida●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉.  praises which are commonly bestowed upon it, nor examine the contrary extremes of those who declaim against it, making it a means either of augmenting an unexpected evil, before not sufficiently prevented, or of deflowering a future good too hastily preoccupated, but shall only touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with reference to its Objects, Causes, and Effects.  
Concerning the Object or fundamental cause of Hope, It hath these three conditions in it, That it be a Future, a Possible, a Difficult Good.  
First, Future, for good present is the Object of 
〈…〉.  our sense, but Hope is of things not seen, for herein is one principal difference between divine Faith, and divine Hope, that Faith being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The substance of things hoped f●…r, 〈◊〉 ever respect to its Object, as in some manner present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it, so that the first effect of Faith is a present Interest and Title; but the 
Hebr. 11.  operation of Hope is waiting and expectation, but yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the presence of an Object, the less he hath of Hope towards it, for though Hope be swallowed up in the complete presence of its Object, yet it is not at all diminished but increased rather by a partial presence, and as in massy bodies though violent motions be in the weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them, yet natural are ever swiftest towards the centre, as nearest approaching unto the place that draws them: so in the Hope●… of men, though such as are violent and groundle●…sse prove weaker and weaker, and so break out at last into emptiness and vapour. In which respect 
〈…〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Pet. 3. 12.  * philosopher's have called Hope the dreams of waking men; like that of the musician whom Dionissiu●… deceived with an empty promise, of which I spoke before: yet those that are stayed and natural, are evermore strong, when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their Object, Qu●… propius accedimus ad spem fruendi eò impatientius caremus. The nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.  
And the reason is because goodness is better known, when it is in an nearer view of the understanding, and more unite thereunto. And the more we have of the knowledge of goodness, the more we have of the Desire of it, if any part be absent. Besides all greediness is attractive, and therefore the more we know of it, the faster we hasten to it. And it is the nature of good to increase the sense of the remainders of evil. So that, though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good we have obtained unto, yet the burden and molestation of them is increased, and therefore the more possession we have of good, the greater is our wearine●… of evil, and the more Nature sceleth her defects, the more doth she desire her restauration.  
The next condition in the Object of our Hope is possibility, for though the will sometimes being inordinate may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicit●… condition, if they were not so, yet no hope whither regular or corrupt can respect its object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, hatred and despair, the one being a proud opposition, the other a dreadful flight, from that good, in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true means unto an end hoped, and the strength of those powers which are to work or bestow them; or if they be such ends as are wrought without any such means, by the bare and immediate hand of the worker ', it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the will and power of him that bestoweth it.  
Here then because I find not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion, (unless we would pass sró natural or moral unto theological handling thereof) we may observe what manner of despair is only regular & allowable, I mèan that which in matters of importance drives us out of ourselves, or any presumption and opinion of our own sufficiency. But that despair which riseth out of a groundless unbelief of the Power, or distrust of the goodness of a superior Agent (especially in those things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruins Nature: defiles, in that it conceives basely of God himself, in making our guilt more omnipotent than his Power, and sin more hurtful than he is good: ruins, in that the mind is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.  
Of this kind of despair, there are three sorts: The one Sensual, arising out of an excessive love of Good, Carnal, and Present; and out of a secure contempt of Good, Spiritual, and Future. Like that of the Epicures, Let us eat and drink while we 
1 Co. 15.  may, To morrow we shall die: The other Sluggish, 
Desperatione●… 〈◊〉, experiri nolunt quod se ass●…qui possed ffidunt. Cic. in Oral. ad B●…utum.  which dishearteneth and indisposeth for Action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude before hand that they shall not succeed: The third sorrowful, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of fear, which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which Hope should be sustained: as in the great Tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwreck; when the sun and stars were hid, and nothing but terror to be scene: All Hope that they 
Act. 27. 20.  should be saved, was taken away.  
The last condition in the object of Hope, was Difficulty, I mean in respect of our own abilities, for the procuring of the Good we hope for; and therefore Hope hath not only an eye to Bonu●…, 
Spe▪ 〈◊〉, si vi●…es, pecu●…, con●…lum, se entiá, apparatió. Cic. de Invent. ad H●…an.  the good desired; but to Auxilium too, the help which confers it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow upon himself; Omnis expectati●… est ab extrinseco, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the Will and Power of some superior causes, by dependence whereupon it hath some good warrant to attain its desires.  
And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the Object of it, both per modum Boni, as the Good Desired, & per modum Auxilii, as the aid whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt & foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the Power to help in some assistants; or concerning the Will in others (as indeed generally a blind and misled judgement doth nourish Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base & degenerous minds in their dependence upon second and subordinate means, without 
job 31. 24. ●…r. 17. 5. Psal. 62. 9 Rom. 3. 4. Job 6. 15, 16.  having recourse to the first supreme Cause; which is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a liar, either by Impotency, whereby he may fail us; or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.  
Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground & warrant of such a confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly reposing itself upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them unto ourselves.  
And this is the difference between despair and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, a●… possible indeed in itself; but with all as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by Industry and labour. Now despair leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh only on the hardness: on the other side, Presumption neve●… regardeth the hardness, but buildeth only upon the possibility. And this is spes m●…rtua, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by S. Peter: For a lifely Hope worketh such a tranquillity of mind; as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is 〈◊〉 Luminosa, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest grounded only on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senselessness than Peace●… and this is Ten●…brosa ●…ax, a Peace springing out of darkness; for a true Peace is quiet ex fide, a believing rest; but counterfeit is only quies ex somno, a sleeping or dreaming rest. The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serennity: otherwise it is but like the rest of mare mortuum, whose unmovablenesse is not Nature, but a curse.   

CHAP. XXIV. Of the causes of Hope, Want, and weakness together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sense Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more than Precept. Provision of aids: the uncertainty of outward means to establish Hope, goodness of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.  
THe next things to be considered, are the causes of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of Hope is our Want, & our weakness put together, the one driving us ad Bonum, to the Object; the other ad Auxilium, to the Aid (and wheresoever there is Indigence, there is Impotence likewise.) Now in what man soever we find these two unsupplyed, there is the root and fundamental ground of Hope; notwithstanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite Passion▪ out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection unto evil, and utter banishment from the fountain of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of Fruition, which is their Sabbath and rest; the estate of travel, which is the day of work, and the estate of damnation, which is the night of despair: In the first we have the accomplishment; in the third the final overthrow; in the second the exercise of our Hopes:) because in that alone our Indigence may by God's fullness be filled, and our Impotence by his Will and Power supplied. In which respect, all men have room for Hope to enjoy God their last Good; though not a hope of Confidence, assurance, and Expectation, which is peculiar only unto the godly (who alone have a present interest in his promises;) yet such a general Hope as may well suffice to s●…op the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingness of God to help us.  
The next cause of Hope is Experience and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conducing to the attain meant thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not trial of our strength or others opposition, or of the difficulties of the Object, may with hot and eager minds, work presumptions of success, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by Aristotle to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men of strong 
〈◊〉. l. 2 c. 12. E. bi●…. l. 3. c. 8.  Hopes) being naturally or by distemper bold and opinionative: even as on the other side, strength and acuteness of understanding; because it sees so fare into the Object, works often diffidence, 
Li●…. 4. ep. 7. 〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 13.  slowness and irresolution in our Hopes: as Pliny out of Thucydides observes; and the Philosopher likewise of old m●…n, that they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men slow in th●…ir Hopes; because of great experience;) yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the later doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, Aristotle saith, they are therefore confident▪ quia seputant superiores, because they believe much in their own strength. And of young men he faith in the same place of his rhetorics, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are peremptory in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas, on the other side, as a ●…ame man placed upon some high Tower, can overview with his eye more ground, than he hath hope to overrun with his feet in a whole day▪ so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, & are withal not insensible of their own weakness, out of the vastness of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame unto themselves as narrow Hopes, as they do large desires; but then thi●… proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly▪ but only as it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.  
So then properly knowledge and experience is the cause of Hope; experience I say, either of the conquerablenesse of the Object by our own means: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readiness of the Will of him from whom we expect further assistance: For a●… there is less casualty, and by consequence, more presumption to be had of an event of art th●…n of fortune (the one proceeding 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Chilo apud La●…. l. 1.  from a governed, the other from a blind and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater hope & confidence to be given to the success of an enterprise, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. Experience 〈◊〉 as the Philosopher observeth, the Root 
Me●…. l. 1. c. 1.  of Art▪ 〈◊〉 unexperience 〈◊〉 of sort 〈◊〉.  
Now this Experience may be such, either as ourselves have had, or such as we have observed other 〈◊〉 to have▪ 〈◊〉 which we have from ourselves is the most forcible to 〈◊〉 this affection, because every man is the best 〈◊〉 of his own abilities. And it is that which 〈◊〉 forth influence and force into all our actions; nothing could more assure the hopes of David in his encounter with G●…liah, than an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a lion and a bear, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of Jesse, and not of God that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprises: For though in some cases it be requisite with Saint Paul to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloth, weariness, and distrust; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successful resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish Hopes. O passi graviora, was the best Argument which he could have used to put his fellows in confidence of that which he added:  — Dabit De●… his quoque●…inem. 

Since other greater griefs you have found ease,  
Doubt not, but God will put an end to these,   
And in that great battle between Scipio and Hannibal, ad a●…nem Ticinam; though the victory by reason of the excellency of the general, fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman general could not have used a more effectual persuasion unto Hope, than when he told his soldiers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome, Cum ijs est vobis pugnandum quos priore bell●… terrâ▪ marique vicistis. You are to join battle with those whom in the former war you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the fear of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the hope of a second victory persuade the other to courage and resolution▪ As we see in the hot battle between the Greeks' and the Trojans, when Hector had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by Homer:  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
●…liad: ●…04.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

These were the mutual motions did engage 
〈…〉.   
The minds of Greeks and Trojans on this rage.  
The Grecians all despaired to escape the blow,  
Deeming themselves near to an overthrow.  
But former victory in those of Troy, 
〈…〉.   
Kindled a Hope another to enjoy.  
They boldly promised to themselves the day,  
The Grecians ships to burne, and then to slay,  
Thus hope of victory inflamed the one,  
Th' other were more inflamed, 'cause they had none.   
That Experience from others, which may enliven and perfect our Hope, in the applying their examples and successes to our own encouragements. For since the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one another's steps (Precidents having the same precedence to reason in vulgar judgements, which a living and accompanying guide hath to a Mercuryes finger in a traveller's conceit; the one only pointing too, but the other leading in the way. And as I find it observed, that running mettle will sooner melt other of its own kind, than fire alone: So the examples of virtue will sooner allure and prevail with the minds of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, than a naked and empty speculation of Precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man, not only a moral, but a sociable creature, that so when his Hopes towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the reason of Precepts, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious and common sense of examples.  Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures, 
Horace.  
〈…〉.  Quam quae sunt oculis Commissa fidelibus— 

Those things more sluggishly our minds excite,  
Which enter at the ears, than at the sight.   
Sight which is the sense of Example, is oftener employed in the government of our Passions, than Hearing, which is the sense of Precept. And therefore when the Poet would sit an advice for the person of Ascanius, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.  — Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum, Et Pater Aen●…, & Avanculus excitet Hector. 

Recont the brave examples of thy blood,  
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,  
Let be thy pattern, that the World may see  
Father and uncle both alive in thee.   
For though an Argument from Example, to prop a sainting Hope be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect of moral and persuasive insinuation, as inferring greater descredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were 
〈…〉.  brave instructions which Agamemnon gave unto Menelaus, when he commanded him to go into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the battle.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Run through the Army, cry, encourage all,  
Mind them of their Progenitors, and call  
Each by his Name, praise them, and let us too  
What we command to others, ourselves do.   
It is true indeed that some men are blessed with a greater e●…cellency of gifts than others; yet we are not to think that any man was ever made, as Seneca speaks of Cato, In convitium humani generis, for a reproach of men's weakness, rather than for an example and encouragement of their actions: or for astonishment rather than emulation unto others. This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great virtues, not only that we might wonder and believe, and know that the same things which for the greatness of them, are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their possibility be the objects of our Hope; and the encouragements of our industry.  
The third cause of Hope, may be large furniture with, or strong dependence upon the assistant mean●… of what is hoped for Helps in any enterprise are in stead of head and hands, to advance a man●… design, which likewise is elegantly expressed by Diomedes and S●…rpedon in Homer:  

— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad▪ 222, etc.    

If any second would accompany, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 410.   
My hopes and courage would the greater●…e:  
For when two join, the one may haply note  
What the other everpassed▪ or if he kn●…w it,  
His counsel would be weak, and his mind slow,  
When he should execute what he does kn●…w.   
And according as these means, which we rely upon, have more or less power or certainty in them; they are foundations of a more Regular o●… Corrupt Hope such are wealth▪ friends, wit, policy, power, or the like. All which can be causes only of a hope of probability, but not of certainty; because they are all means which are sub●…ect to 〈◊〉 age, and are also subject to the Providence of God, who only can establish and give final security to our hopes, as being such an Assistant, in whom there is neither weakness nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.  
All other aids have two ill qualities in them; they have wings, and therefore can easily forsake us▪ and they have thorns, and therefore if we lean 
2. Chron. 28. ●…0. 21. 〈◊〉. 29. 6, 7.  too hard on them, they may chance in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which earthly aids can make, are bounded by adouble condition.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Iliad.▪ 391.  

If the thing ly●… within my power to do,  
And divine Providence permits it too.   
Here than we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the mind ready upon every present approhension to play the Proph●…t in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it hath, so build unto itself peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in itself light & opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermixtion of fear and caution might have been retained.  
And as there is an error in the ●…rust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those means: For though divine Hope hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet these lower Hopes, of which I speak, do always depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdom of combining their Ayd●…s, and of fitting them unto casual occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightness and uncertainties, Leves spes & cer●…aminas, 
Hora●….  as the Poet calleth them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timeing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our means to the variety of of occasions; the miscarrying in some one compliment or ceremony; the having of our minds, either too light and voluble; or too fixed and constant▪ or too spread and wand'ring; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspicious; or too peremptory, resolute, or hasty; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious▪ or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often notwithstanding the good store of other aids, endanger and shipwreck the success of our endeavours: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry, to be used as in the trial of mathematical conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so touched and dependant upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and have all to do again.  
A fourth cause of Hope, may be Goodness and facility 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Alex. 〈◊〉. l. 2.  of Nature, whereby we find a disposition in ourselves of readiness, to further any man's purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others; for it is the observation of Aristotle, touching young men, sud ipsorum innocentiâ cateroes 
〈◊〉. l. 2. ●…. 1●….  metiuntur. Their own goodness makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every man's prejudice loves to find his own will and opinion▪ so doth his charity to find his own goodness in another man. They therefore who are soft and facile to yield, are likewise to believe, and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure. And this indeed is the Rule of Nature, which makes a man's self the pattern of what it makes his Neighbour the Object.  
Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of Hope; to wit, Faith and Credulity, in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof: For promises are obligations, and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate: so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of Hope, which according as the Authority whereon it relles, is more or less sufficient and constant, is likewise more or less evident and certain.  
And in these two, the Corruption chief is not to let judgement come between them and our Hopes.  
For as he said of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes sibi somnia fing●…nt, they build more upon Imagination than Reality. And then if what Tacitus speaks in another sense, fingunt, creduntque if our facility feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will issue no other than Ixious Hope, a Cloud for Inno. And therefore 
〈◊〉. l. 2.  Aristotle out of an easiness to Hope, collects in young men, an easiness to be deceived, credulity very often m●…ets with Impostures. And he elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and 
Rhet. l. 1.  friendly men amongst those who are obnoxious to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and misled the ingenuity of others: and as once Apelles, to deceive the expectation of another with a curtain for a Picture.  
The last cause (which I shall but name) of Hope, is wise confidence, or a happy mixture of boldness, Constancy, and Prudence together; the one to put on upon an enterprise; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occur; and the third, to guide and manage ourselves amidst those difficulties: For as he said in studies, so we may in actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) Altiús ●…unt, qui ad sum●…a ●…ituntur. The 
Quintil. l. 1. in Pr●…am. Mag●…a indoli●… signum est sperare semper. ●…lor. l. 4.  further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get, and then,  — Possunt quia posse videntur▪ 

When a man thinks, this I can do,  
By thinking, he gets power too.   
And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the success of Alexander's great victories, Nihil aliud quam benè ausu●… vana contemnere, his confidence 
Liv. l 19  judging them feacible, did by that means get through them. And though it was vehterous; yet as the case might be, it was wise counsel which we find in the same Historian, 
* Liv. l. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eur. p Hec.  Audeamus quod credi, non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur, facillimum erit. Let us show our courage in 
Difficiliora debent ess●… quae exercent, quò sit levius ips●… illud in quod exercent, Quintil. l. 11. cap. 2. Arist. Ethic. l. 3. c. 7. Ae●…ad. 10.  adventuring on some difficult enterprise, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easy: For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more than they discover when they see our attempts greater than they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dunce in heavy shoes, that they may begin to conquer the difficult in the learning of the Art. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bold men, are men of Hope; for boldness suffers not a man to be wanting to himself: and there are two Principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, audentes fortuna invat. That resolution is usually favoured with success; or if it miss of that 
* Ovid. Met. l. 2 Tutius certe per plana, sed humilius & depressius itur, 〈◊〉 currentibus, quam reptansibus 〈◊〉, said his non labentibus nulla laves, illis nonnulla laves etiansi laban. ●…r. Plin. l. 9 ep. 26.  Magnis tamen exidit ausis; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more than discredit of miscarriage in it.   

CHAP. XXV. Of the Effects of Hope: Stability of Mind: weariness, arising not out of weakness, Impatience, suspicion, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good desires, Waiting upon aid expected.  
THe Effects of Hope follow, which I will but name: The first is to free the Mind from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and fearfulness thereof: For as the Philosopher telleth us, 
Philosophi quidom erant, qui a sp●… di●…▪ sunt, Elp●…icisti qui nihil sse pronunciarunt quod vitam Sympos. l. 4 q. 4 mag●… 〈◊〉 atque 〈◊〉, Vid. Plut.  fearful men are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hard of Hope: and in this property, Hope is well compared unto an Anchor; because it keeps the Mind in a firm and constant temper, without tottering and instability: for though there be but one Hope joined with Certainty as depending upon an immutable promise all other having ground of fear in them; yet this should be only a fear of Caution, not of jealousy and Distrust; because where there is Distrust in the means, there is for the most part weakness in the use of them; and he who suspects the aid which he relies on, gives it just reason to fail and to neglect him. And therefore Aristotle hath set Hope and Confidence together, as was before noted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Good Hope is grounded on a belief, and always worketh some measure of Affiance in the means unto it.  
A second Effect of Hope, is to work some kind of Distaste and weariness in our present condition, which according as it is good or evil, doth qualify the Hope from whence it ariseth: for there is a distaste that ariseth out of weakness; like 
job 10. ●…. c. 7. 20  that of job, My soul is weary of my life; I am a burden unto myself. Another that ariseth out of Want, That which ariseth upon weakness is a fickle and unconstant mutability of the Mind, whereby it desireth a continual change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of Impatiency of opposition; whence the Mind upon the first difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and discouraged; or out of a Sharpness of Apprehension, discovering Insufficiency in that wherein it desired content; or out of an error, and too high 
Spe●… inane●… quae in medio spa●…io ●…rangūtur & cor●…ūt & an●…e in ipso curs●… obr●…tur quam po●…tum conspi●…e possu●…. 〈◊〉▪ d●… Orat. l. 3.  Estimation fore conceived, which in the trial disappointing our Hopes, and not answering that Opinion, gins to be neglected as weak and deceitful: or lastly, out of Curiosity and Search, when we suppose that those things which cannot in their nature, may at least in their varieties, number, yield some content: and as Sands, which are the smallest things asunder; yet being united, grow great & heavy: so these pleasures, which are alone light and worthless, may by their multitude bring weight & satisfaction with them. Although herein the mind is likely most of all to find Solomon's Vanity; the union of things subordinate, and which have no Cognation each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction than Tranquillity in the Mind; this weariness then which springeth from the Vnstaydnesse and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the Effect of a proper Hope (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of Mind, a virtue established, and not overthrown by Hope) the weariness then, which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a mind possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptiness and wants, which therefore we long to 
Psal. 120. 5.  have removed: like that of David, W●… is me that I am constrained to dwell in Mese●…h; whereupon followeth, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Max. Tyr. disser●…. 33.   
The third Effect of Hope, which is an earnest contention of the mind, in the pursuit of that Good, which should perfect our Natures, and supply our Wants. And this desire Saint Paul calleth Gemitus Creatura, the Groaning of the Creature: which is set down as a Consequence of the Earnest Expectation of the Creature: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much employ, and so little violate Reason, as this of Hope doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the Mind so earnestly breathes after; & the want whereof doth work such weakness in it.  
The last Effect of Hope, is a Contented Repose and Patience of the Mind, resting itself in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this Patience is threefold; a Patience under the Want; a Patience under the Distance; and a Patience under the difficulties of our desired Good; which holds especially in these Hopes (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, than by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint ourselves. Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vain and empty in their success. He that believes, and must by Faith depend upon Externall help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectations regulated, not by his own greediness, but by another's will.   

CHAP. XXVI. Of the Affection of boldness. What it is. The Causes of it, strong Desires, strong Hopes, aids, supplies, real, or in Opinion. Despair and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudenc●…, Shame, Immunity from danger, Dexterity of Wit, strength of Love, Pride or greatness of Mind and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things advised, Temerity, etc.  
SO little in love hav●… I e●…er been with this affection of 〈◊〉 (as I find it managed by many, who make no other use of it, than children do of straw, with which they stuff empty clothes, that they may look like men) as that when first I writ this Tractate, I passed it over rather as a Vice, than an Affection of the soul, and said nothing of it. And being no more friends with it now then I was then, I should be contented to have left it out still. But that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member, whereof 
Plut. in Ni●…ia. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer.  there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience showeth us there is of this. For as * Plutarch notes of Egypt, that it bringeth forth multa vene●…a, & multa salubria, many Good things, and many Bad: like those Creatures, some parts whereof are poison, and others restorative: so may we say of the Men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are usually Instruments either of much Good, or of much evil to the places 
Plut. in Themistoc. In Honnibale plurimum au●… ad capess●…da pericula plurim 〈◊〉 Consi●… inter ipsa pericula erat. Liv. l. 21.  that nourish them: as once Thomistocles his Tutor said of him. The best mixture that I can call to mind of this Passion, was in Hannibal, of whom the Historian tells us, That he was marvellous 〈◊〉 to put upon Dangers; and yet marvellous Wise in managing of them: His courage not working Temerity, nor precipitating his resolutions: And his counsel not working slowness, nor retarding his courage.  
Boldness then or Confidence, is (as the Philosopher describes it) a Hope joined with fancy and 
〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 5.  opinion, that those things which are safe for us, are near at hand; and those which are hurtful, either are not at all, or are a fare off, and cannot suddenly reach us: Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect Danger for the procuring of some difficult and Good thing, which we earnestly desire and hope for, in Confidence to overcome and break through that danger: For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldy to prosecute the Danger which opposeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto 
Vid. Aque. 12 ●… quast, 45. art. 3  the formality of this Passion. 1. Vehemency of Hope, whatsoever strengtheneth that, causeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, nearness of aids, and the like. 2. Exclusion of fear, whatsoever removeth that, increaseth this: As Distance from Danger, freeness from Enemies, Cleernes from Injuries, etc.  
The Object of this Passion is twofold. The Primary and principal Object is some difficult work under the Relation of a needful Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Desired and hoped for. The secondary Object, is some evil and Danger, which standing between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the v●…hemency of our Hope, as it were removed and despised in our Eyes, Good earnestly desired, and evil confidently despised, are the things about which this Affection is conversant.  
The Causes of this Affection are so many the more, because it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reasons.  
The fundamental and principal Cause of it, is strength of Desire, working vehemency of Hope, and impatiency of Resistance, or Restraint from 
I●…. 1. 14, 15.  the thing desired: For Lust when it hath once conceived, will at last bring forth and finish, and rush forward to that after which it longeth, 
Arist. Eib. l. 7. c. ●…. 1. Pet. 4. 4. See my treatise on the Sin●…ulnesse of Sin. p. 167. Host 4 2. Jer. 6. 7. 8. 6. Eth. l. 3. c. 11.  which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Saint Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a pouring out of Passion, and the Prophet a Breaking forth and violent Eruption, a rash and Head. strong praecipitancy, which like a Torrent venter's upon any thing that withstands it. The Philosopher instanceth for this particular in adulterers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Who adventure on many bold Attempts for the satisfaction of their Lust.  
But because where there are strong Desires, there may be weak Hopes, and great fears, The one Discouraging, the other Deterring from the Prosecution of them, therefore to the emboldening of those Desires, other particular Causes do usually concur. Some whereof I shall inquire after.  
1 Then strong Hopes, and Ready, Present aids and supplies proper to the End, which we would advance are Excellent means to generate 
Aux 〈◊〉 

mag●…a.  
〈◊〉.  
vi●…ina.    boldness. Great aids as the cats Vnum magnum, or many aids, that if one fail another may Hold. As greatness of wealth, friends, power, strength. And these in a readiness and ●…re at hand.▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ as the philosopher expresseth 
〈◊〉. l. ●…. ●…. 5.  it, as the Trojans being besieged when 〈◊〉 with his army drew near, gathered cou●…ge above their fears.  

— Clam●…rēm ad sydera tollunt, 
A●…cid. 10.   
Darda●…idae muris; spes addita suscitat Iras  
Tela ma●… jaciunt.   

They all climbed up the walls, thence filled with▪ joys,  
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noise  
Should wake the Stars, hopes added stirred up Ire  
And their Dar●…s flew as swift as any fire.   
And in Scriptures we are often quickened unto 
1 Io●…. 4. 4. 〈◊〉. 10, 36, 37. ●…am. 5. 8. ●…ve. 22. 12.  courage against the Difficulties of our Christian Warfare by the greatness and the nearness of the aids, and the Reward which we Hope for. Yea, so strong a power hath Hope over the 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. l. 3. c. 11. ●… r●…v. 23. 34.  Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dream, and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth marvellous venturous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to fear. Solomon tells us of a Drunkard lying on the Top of a Mast, and I have myself seen a Drunken man climb to the Top of a Steeple. Which boldness proceedeth in such men from weakness and wilfulness of self-conceit, and Opinion, for come monly 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. l. 7. ●…. 10.  that strength, which a Drunken man looseth in his Reason, he gathers in his fancy, and as his judgement weakens, his Opinion increaseth. And we shall never find men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirm.  
Now upon this Ground, that Hope is the great quickener unto Courage, It was, that Alexander used it as an Argument to his soldiers against the Persian, when he saw them come into the field clothed so richly, that their arms were 
Prad●… 〈◊〉 quam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Liv. lib. 9 Iliad. ●… 873. Plutarch lib. de Homero. Quàm minimum 〈◊〉 incorpore 〈◊〉 spoliorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quàm operunt. 〈◊〉. Epist. 14.  much rather a Prey to the Greeks', than a Defence unto themselves, in which respect Homer thus derides Amphimachus.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

In glitering Gold, like a fair damsel, clad  
He came to fight: vain man why art so mad  
To think that Iron is kept bacl by gold?  
Thou bring'st the price, for which thyself art sold. 
Sue●…on. in Iuli●… 67.    
And yet upon a contrary Reason, I find one of the greatest and wisest Commanders of the world julius Caesar, requiring of his soldiers to carry Gold about them that the fear of losing that, might make them the more constant to their Resolutions.  
Contrary unto this we shall often observe, that despair and Extramities do put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more desperately than Cowards when they cannot fly, as the Historian noteth 
a Summ●… Audaci●… 〈◊〉, factlosus que●… adperturband●…m remp. In opia, a●… mali 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉.  of Cu. Pis●… a Confederate of 〈◊〉▪ that by poverty he became desperate, and thereby emboldened unto that attempt, wherein he might either rise by the ruin of others (having neither merit nor Hope to rise by their favours) or at least not be ruined without company. 
b 〈◊〉. i●… Num●….  As that which shakes a Tree, doth often serve to settle and fasten it: So many times dangers and 
c 
Saepè 〈◊〉 h●…st is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ●…didit. Liv. lib. 21. Spe●… desperati▪ one quaesita 〈◊〉. lib. 1. Ig●…aviam necessi●…as acuit, & spei saepè desp●…ratio causa est Q. 〈◊〉. l. 5.  
D●…nt animun●… ad loque●…dum liberè ul●…imae miseriae Liv. lib. ●…9.   extremities do excite strength, as in the height of a Fever or frenzy, men show more strength and agility of body, then in their per●…ectest Health. And as they say of 
d Maximè 〈◊〉 esse solent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Animalium. Flor●… Iul●… Capitol. in Max imino.  Beasts, they by't with more venom and indignation when they are wounded, and ready to die. And therefore Homer expresseth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; so utmost extremities of miseries make men put out the more boldness in either Revenge o●… new Attempts, because they may be better, but they cannot be worse. 
a Impunit●… ge●… est non ●…bere p●… locu●… St●….  And it is a kind of Impunity to be so low as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.  
b 〈…〉.  M●…riensque recepit. Quas n●…llet victur●…s aqu●…s. 
In a famine a man will eat and drink that which in plenty he could not have the courage to look on. And this cause of boldness is thus expressed by the Poet when he showeth how the Youth of Troy, seeing their city burnt and sacked, grow unto a Desperate Resolution.  

Si●… Animi●… juvenum fur●…r addit●…▪ ●…de 〈◊〉  
R●…ptores atra in Nebula qu●…s impr●…ba ventris  
Exeg●… 〈◊〉 rabbiss, cat●…que 〈◊〉  
Faucib●… e●…pectant siccis, per Telaper hosts  
Vad●…mus hand dubi●… in 〈◊〉—   

Thus youth did rage despairing of their lives,  
Like Wolves of Prey whom extreme hunger drives  
From their young thirsty whelps, through darkest sterms; 
●…ide v●…grt de ●… mili●…ar. l. 3. c. 21.   
Through darts and foes we rush an our own harms  
And being sure to die dare that, which fear  
With Hope of Life would force us to forbe●…e.   
Another cause of boldness is Experience, when 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E. ●…s. t. 3. ●…. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eur●…p. R●…s▪  a man hath often done a thing with success, often seen Dangers and escaped them. As mariners at sea, found other men, upon as small hopes as he himself hath▪ to go through the like matters without doubt or hesitation. For examples do put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are encouraged sometimes rather to 
a Vel err●…r honestus est magnos duces sequentibus Qui●…t. lib 1. cap. 6.  err in good company, then to go right alone, and this Argument Aentas used in the Poet.  

V●…s & scylla●…m rabie●…, penitusque sonantes  
accestis sc●…pulos, V●…s & Cyclopea saxa,  
Exper●…: revocate A●…mos, mastumque tim●…rem  
M●…tite—   

You by Charybdis, and by S●…ylla say●…'d,  
Where waves through r●…ks did sound, nor hath prevailed.  
‛ Gatust you, that w●…rser rock the Cyclops den,  
Then cast off fears, and show yourselves brave men.   
And a●… Experience, so on the contrary side Ignorance 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. L●…●…t i●… 〈◊〉. Ethic. l. 3. 6. 8▪ & 10. P●…. l. 4. Ep. 7. Q●… m●…sture 〈◊〉, ●…ajoraque v●…ribus a●…? 〈◊〉 ●… inca●…tum 〈◊〉 ●…a ●…. 10. ●…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vi●…. Va●…. M●…. l. 3. c 1.  is as usual ●… cause of Confidence, as we see Children will put their finger in the fire, and play with Serpents, as not acquainted with any hurt they can do for them. We may too often meet with men like waters or vessels, which the shallower and emptier they be, do make the louder noise, and make use of other men's Ignorance to gain boldness and Credit to their own. To which purpose it is a grave expression of the Poet.  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
E●…rip. My●…pol.  

Th●…se whom wise men know for D●…ll  
With vulgar ●…ares are wondrous musical.   
And as Flies are esteemed very Bold Creatures, 
〈◊〉 638.  because they often return to the same place: so the boldness of these kind of Speakers is usually discovered in vain and empty Tautologies, which is the reason why (as the Orator noteth) they are usually more copious than far Learnedner men, Quia doct is est Electi●… & modus, 
Qui●…til.  because able Speakers use choice and judgement in what they produce.  
Another Cause of boldness in attempts may 
R●…et. l. ●…. c. 5.  be Religion, and a Confidence of Divine Direction unto what we do. Ithu his pretence unto zeal, was that which caused him to walk furiously. And in this case as the Historian speaks, 
Q. curt. lib. 4. De I●…tu Animorum divin●…us excitat●… vid Plutare●…. in Co●…. I●…dg. 6. 36. Isai. 7. 11. 12▪ 2 Reg. 19 29. ●… Sam. 5. 24. Psal. 74. 9 Exod. 17. 11. 1 Sam. 4. 7, 8.  Melius vatibus quam Ducibus parent. Men are ap●…er to be led by their Prophets then by their captains. And we find when God would encourage his People in their wars, he gave them signs and assurances for their faith to rely upon above their fears that where Reason saw cause of Doubting, Faith might see all Defects supplied in God, so to Gideon▪ to Ahaz, to Hezekiah, and others, and the Church complains of the want of them in their times of Calamity. We see not our signs, neither is there amongst us any Prophet, or any one that knoweth how long. When I●…suah did fight, Moses did pray, and Israel was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, then by the valour of the other. And the Philistines were never more affrighted, then when Israel brought forth the ark of God against them, for as Ajax said in the Poet,  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Sopho●…l. Aj●…x vid. Ez●…k. 21. 21. 21.  — If God will fight, He can make weak men put the strong to flight. 
And therefore Tolumnius the Soothsayer having received happy Auguria, doth thereupon grow to Resolutions of courage.  

Hoc erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod saepè petivi, 
Aencid. 1●….— Priscum de more Lati●…is Auspi●…um; 〈◊〉 bell●… parant mentesqu●… deorum Explorant super Eventu, etc. Silius▪ Ital. lib. 5.   
Accipio, agnocosque Deos; me, me duce, ferrum  
Corripite ò Rutili.   

This, This is that which in my chiefest thought  
I still desired, and now find what I sought;  
The Divine Tokens ●…embrace and see▪  
Come soldiers, Take your swords and follow me. 
Prov. ●…1. 1. Isai. 31 4. Vid. Iliad. ●… 23. Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.    
Unto this Head of Religion belongeth Innocency, as a most excellent cause of boldness; for the Righteous is bold as a lion, which careth not though a multitude of shepherds come out against him. And the Philosopher tells us that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of success in their Attempts, believing that they shall find no Enemies, because they have provoked none. A notable Example, 
Val. Max. l. 3. c. 7. vid. haud dissimile Exemplum 〈◊〉. Plutarch. de ●…il. ex Hosti●…. capi●…nd.  whereof we have in M. Publius Furius the Roman Consul, who was so confident of his own Integrity in public Administration, that being deputed by lot to govern the Province of Spain, he chose the two bitterest Enemies that he had in the City to be Coadjutors with him in that Dispensation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which Drusus gave to him who would have contrived his house for secrecy, when he told him that he could wish his house were pervious and transparent that his privatest Actions might be seen in public.  
And as Religion and innocence, so on the 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apud H●…merum sapè. Jer. 3. 3. Isai. 〈◊〉. 4. Ezek. 16. 30. O●… ferreum. Cic. in 〈◊〉. Jul. 〈◊〉. l. 3. c. 28. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 Alcib. vid. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Ethic. l. 3. cap. 9  other side Deboishnesse and desperateness of living doth implant a marvellous boldness in the minds and faces of men, when they have no Modesty or shame to restrain them. As we see in Gypsies, Parasites, Jugglers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neurospastae, and such like. And therefore such kind of men both in Scripture and in other writings, are said to have faces of brass and necks of Iron, whorish and impudent foreheads that cannot blush or be ashamed; and these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we shall find for synonymies and of equal signification, whereof the former signify despair, Impudence, and the other boldness.  
Again, as Impudence, so Shame and fear of 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Silentium illud obstinatum, ●…ixi in terram oculi— & pudor 〈◊〉 i●…dicia 〈◊〉 ingentem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex al●…o 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…iv. lib. 9  Disgrace is a great Cause of boldness, in virtuous and honourable Attempts; for there is no Man of generous principles, but will much rather choose an honourable danger than a sordid safety, and adventure his Person before he will shipwreck his honesty or good name, choosing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a moral than a natural fear, to give an account of himself rather to those that love his virtues, than to those who love his fortunes. In one word standing more in awe of men's Hearts than of their Hands, and shunning more a Just Reprehension than an unjust Injury. And to this purpose it is gravely observed by the Historian, that the dishonour which the Romans suffered, ad furcas Ca●…dinas, was that which procured their adversaries a bloody overthrow afterwards, quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat, nec Inimicos t●…llit. Their saving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being esteemed not a benefit, but a scorn: a very like example 
2. Sam. 10. Mixtus dolour & pudor armat in Hostes. Aenead. 10. Tunc ●…ide mal●…, sed contra 〈◊〉 it●…. Aenead. l. 5. Arist. ●…ib. l. 3. c▪ ●… 1.  we have hereunto in the servants of David, abused and put to shame by Ha●…un the son of Ammon. And thus the Poet expresseth the courage of Dares revived by the fall which he had from Entellus:  

At non tardatus casu, nec territus heros,  
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim suscitat ira,  
Tum pudor incendit vires & Conscia Virtus.   

Dares no whit dismayed, renewe●… the fight  
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite  
The stouter courage, Shame with Valour met,  
Inflamed his mind, and did his weapon whet.   
Another cause of boldness, is Immunity from 
Qui ad 〈◊〉 callidi sunt, ●… tantum audent quantum excogitant. Cic. pro 〈◊〉.  Danger, or at least a Versatilousnesse and Dexterity of wit to evade it, or shift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not always second their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand go in Equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are so far in love with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same 〈◊〉 to bring them 
Plut. Apopb.  out of Danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as Dariu●… was wont to say of himself, that in a pinch and extremity of peril, he 〈◊〉 ever wisest: and Sylla gave the same judgement 
Pl●…t in Sylla. ●…nsilium in 〈◊〉 S●…n ca 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Soph. Autig.  of himself, that he came off best in those businesses, which he was the most suddenly put upon, which also I find observed in the Character of our Henry the seventh (who hath had the felicity above all his Praedecessor●…, to have his ●…ineamenti drawn by the ablest pen that hath êmployed itself in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater Denterity to evade, than Providence to prevent them.  
Another cause of boldness (as I have formerly 
〈◊〉 facichat A●…or. Ovid Met. 4.  noted on that Passion) is strength of Love, as we see weak Creatures, indefence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong, and the Tribune in A. Gellius, out of Love either of his country, 
A. Gell. l 3. c. 7.  or of Glory, did not only advice, but himself undertake the executing of a service, where in he was beforehand certain to perish. And the same Author telleth us of Euclid, a Desciple of Socrates, 
A. Gell. 6. c. ●…. Vile est corpus 〈◊〉 qui 〈◊〉 gloriam qua●…. ●…iv. l. 2.  who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his Life to enjoy the Discourses and Counsels of his Master.  
Lastly Pride, greatness of mind or Parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentedness and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and now Attempts: For it is a very hard thing when great Abilities and vast Hopes meet together, to govern them with moderation. Private Ends being in that case very apt to engage a man's parts, and to take them off from public service unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it, there is no temper of mind that will with that evenness and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of success, promote public and honourable Ends, as Height of Abilities, with moderation of Desires; because in that case a man can never stand in his own light, no●… have any mist or obstacle between his Eye and his End.  
Now from this ground I believe did arise that 
Cic. Tusc. q. l. 5. Arist. Polit. l. 3. c. 13. Plut. in Alcib. & Arist id. ex Nicia. Eande virtuten & oderant & mirabantur. Liv. l. 5.  maxim of some of the States of Greece noted by Tully, and at large debated by the Philosopher, Nem●… de nobis unui excellat, that they would not have any one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest, and thereupon instituted ostracism, or an honourable banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men: or to satisfy and assuage the Envy which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the virtues which they can only admire: or lastly, to prevent the dangers which greatness of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Ephe sians expelled Hermodorus; and the Athenians, Aristides, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one Voice in a Consort, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn, but disturb the Harmony; and therefore usually m●…n of great parts, have lain either under Envy or jealousy. men's minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto evil, which Tacitus noteth to have been the quality 
〈…〉.  of Domitian, and Ammianus Marcellinus of Constantius towards men of the greatest worth.  
Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 170. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉.  Effects.  
1 There is a Happy and Discree●… boldness, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the mind, and doth first call out and stir up itself by wisdom, before it proceed unto Action▪ or Execution▪ like the boldness of the lion, which is Slow, but at last prospers in what it undertakes. For after counsel hath ripened Resolutions, boldness is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, quo minus timoris, minus fermè perituli, as the Historian speaks. The less fears are, the less also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their success:  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy  
Their ten year's wish, and gained Troy,   
2 There is a 
a 〈…〉.  hasty and rash boldness, which beginning too speedily without counsel doth usually end too Cowardly, without Courage; for rash men whom the Philosopher calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men made up of confidence and fear, are bold and boasting before a Danger; but in it very timorous▪ or at least inconstant. Lions in peace, but hearts in war, as Tertullians' Proverb hath it. 
a 〈…〉.  Like those of whom Livy and Florus tell us, That they were more than men in the onset, and less than women in the issue, melting away from their Resolutions like Snow.  
And another ill property of the rashness of this Passion is, That it will expose a man to more danger than the success which it aims at can compensate●…as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hook: or as Ulysses who went bacl to the Cyclop●… his den to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.  
Another is, that it makes men Overvalue themselves, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like 
b 〈…〉.  Menelaus in the Poet, who would venture to fight with Hector or Ari●…ioxenus in Tully, who being a musician, would needs determine in questions of Philosophy.  
Lastly it hath a property as we say, to break the Ice, and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perilous consequence, not only to the Author, but many times 
d 〈…〉.  to the public Peace too, ᶜ forward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits, being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.   

CHAP. XXI. Of the Passion of fear: the Causes of it; Impotency, obnoxiousness, suddenness, nearness, newness, Conscience, Ignorance of an evil.  
THe opposite Passion to this of 
Vide Laert. in 〈◊〉. l. 7.  of Hope is fear: which being an equivocal Passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can sca●…se have any whole and simple definition to explain it. There is a virtuous fear; a fear of sin and Shame; an intellectual fear of Admiration, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye; a fear of Reverence; an Astonishing fear, by reason of the newness; and an Oppressing fear, by reason of the nearness and Inavoydablenesse of the evil sea red. It is a grief, Trouble, Flight, Aversation of some approaching evil apprehended, either as destructive, or as burdensome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength: For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope (save in the evil of it) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall only in brief consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.  
Fear is an humbling & debasing Passion, which always importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth; So then as in the former Passion of Hope I noted the fundamental cause thereof to be weakness and W●…nt: so likewise in this of fear, the Root and first Principle is Weakness●… and Subjection; whereof the one implies a disability in us to resist, the other a necessity to undergo an evil.  
Hence it is that we fear the displeasure of Great men; or the Power of unjust men; or the Competition of Popular and Plausible men; or 
●…bet. l. 2. 6. 5.  the Cunning of Close and malicious men; or the Revenge of Provoked men; or the gild of Injurious men that have wronged us already: because in all these cases there is some notice of weakness and Subjection in us: so that fear is of all other a naked Passion: For as nakedness hath three evil properties; to disable for Defence; to expose to Injury; and from both to work shame in the consciousness of our dejected condition: So likewise fear hath three properties; to make us Impotent and Obnoxious; and from both these to beget Shame. For though his speech was true, 
Diogenes apud l. a●…rt. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Menander.  Rubor est virtutis colour, that Shame and virtue have the same colour (which makes it seem a companion rather of Perfection than of weakness; yet indeed it is rather a sign of a mind virtuously disposed in testifying the quick apprehensivenesse of its own defects, than any Adjunct of virtue itself.  
So then the Roots of this Passion are weakness and Subjection both together; so that where either condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of fear, and therefore we see sundry times strength takes off the yoke of Obedience, not only in the civil government of men, but in the natural government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they were all made subject; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to ferget their original Subjection, and in stead of Fearing, to terrify man their lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition: this is not so much an act of our Dominion, whereby we awe them, as of our Reason, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholding more therein to the working of our Wit, than to the prerogative of our Nature; and usually every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its own abilities; the more it hath of Strength, the less it hath of fear; that which Solomon makes the strongest, the Apostle makes the fittest to expel pear, to wit, Love.  
So likewise on the other side, Immunity from Subjection in the midst of weakness removes fear. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their weakness; yet when once by the privilege of their Sanctuary or mercy of their judge they are freed from the obligation of the Law, though not from the Offence; their former fears do presently turn into joy and Gratulations: and that is the reason why Good men have such boldness, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death; because though they be not quite delivered from the Corruption; yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of sin, though by reason of their weakness they are not delivered from the mouth; yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave; yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from sin; ye●… from the Strength and Malediction of sin▪ the Law ou●… Adversary must be strong, as well as ourselves weak, if he look for fear.  
The Corruption then of this Passion, as it depen●…eth upon these Causes is, when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our own, or too high of another's strength; the one proceeding from an error of Humility, in undervaluing ourselves; the other from an error of judgement or suspicion in mistaking of others. There are some men who as the Or●…our speaks of despairing Wits, De 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…rentur, who are too unthankful unto Nature in a sl●…ight esteem of the abilities she ●…ath given them, and deserve that weakness which they unjustly complain of: The sight of whose judgement is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses▪ the two ends whereof have a double representation; the one fuller and nearer the truth; the other smaller and at a fare greater distance: So it is with men of this temper, they look on themselves and others with a double prejudice; on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing judgement, which presents every thing remote and small; on Others with on Overvaluing and Admiring judgement, which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect. And by this means between a selfe-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever falls to the ground, and for revenge of herself, leaves the party thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Timorous. For as error hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because error itself is a kind of Formido Intellectus, a fear of the understanding: and it is no great wonder for one fear to beget another. And▪ therefore when Christ would take away the fear of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: fear not those that can kill the Body only, and can do no more. Where the overflowing of their fears seems to have been grounded on the overiudging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and essential cause of fear: these which follow, are more casual and upon occasion.  
Whereof the first may be the Suddenness of a●… evil, when it ceiseth upon (as it were) in the Dark: 
Prae c●…ris Hostibu●…●…imentur R●…ē●…iui. Ammian. Ma●…c. l. 28.  for all darkness is comfortless; and therefore the last terrible judgement is described unto us by the blackness and unexpectedness of it, by the darkness of Night, and the suddenness of Lightning. All Vnacquaintaince then and Igno▪ rance of an approaching evil, must needs work 
Mala praeviso siunt 〈◊〉. Ci●… Tusc. q. l. 3. Annal. l▪ 1.  Amazement and terror: as contrarily a foresight the●… of worketh Patience to undergo, and boldness to encounter it: as Tacitus speaks of Caecina, Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoque intrepidus, that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore not fearful of them. And there is good reason for this, because in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evil, the spirits which were before orderly carried by their several due motions unto their natural works, are upon this strange appearance and instant Oppression of danger so disordered, mixed, and sti●…lled, that there is no power left either in the soul for counsel, or in the Body for Execution: For as it is in the wars of men, so of Passions, those are more terrible, which are by way of Invasion, then of battle, which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed; then those which find them prepared for resistance: and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the suddenness of the one side, and the Ignorance of the other:  Invadunt urbe●… somno vin●…que sepultam. 
Dum ed parte qua mu●…us dir●…tus 〈◊〉 stationes arma●…as opponunt: Quintiu●… 〈◊〉 ab edpar●…e, quae minimè ●…uspecta er●…▪ ●…mpetu ●…cto scal●… cepi●…●… L●…v. l. 32.  

They do invade a City all at rest,  
Which riot had with sleep and Wine oppressed.   
And this is one reason why men inclinable to this Passion, are commonly more fearful in the Night than at other times; because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the spirits which should strengthen, are more retired, and Reason less guarded.  
And yet there are Evils too, which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and train, than if they were more contracted and speedy. Som●… set upon us by sleath, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze others 
S●…n. Ep. 14.  with a train and pomp like a Comet, which is ushered in with a stream of fire, and like Thunder, which hurts not only with its danger, but with its noise: and therefore Aristotle reckoneth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. the signs of an approaching evil amongst the Objects of fear.  
Another cause of fear may be the Nearness of an evil, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For a●… it is with Objects of sense in a distance of place▪ so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a Distance of Time; Remotion in either, the greater it is, the less present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression therefrom upon the faculty: and this reason Aristotle gives why Death, which else where he makes the most terrible evil unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, work such terror and amazement: nor so stiff Reason and the Spirits, as Objects fare less in themselves injurious to Nature; but yet presented with a determined nearness. And the reason is plain, because no evil h●…ts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its union: and all Propinquity is a degr●…e of union. For although Futurition be a necessary condition required in the Object, which must infer fear; yet all evil, the less it hath d●… Future, the more it hath de Terribili: which is the reason, why that carnal Security, which is opposed to the fear of God, is described in the Scripture, by putting the evil Day fare from us, viewing as in a landscape and at a great distance the terror of that Day. And if here the Atheists Argument be objected, Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die: Where the propinquity of ruin is made an Inducement unto riot. We must answer, that an Atheist is here in both right and vain, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be the best close of a wicked life; and therefore most earnestly (though most vainly) desireth that it may be the issue of his Epicur●…sme and Sensuality. And here briefly the Corruption of fear in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of evil, to swell so high as to sink Reason, and to grow bigger than the evil which it is afraid of.  —— propiusque pericl●… 
Aenead. 8. I●… 〈◊〉 & pe●…iculo plura & ma●… viden●… me●…ē●…s cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ●…um sin●…r 〈◊〉 C●…c. d●… Divi●…. 1. 2  It Timor, & major Martis jam apparet imago▪ 

Their fear gets closer than the thing it fears,  
War's Image bigger than itself appears.   
For as it is a sign of distemper in the Body, when the unequal distribution of nourishment and humours causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatness: so is it likewise in the saculties of the mind, when the inferior grow high and strong; if Reason raise not itself to such a proportion, as still to maintain and manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed only of the Rising and Strength, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason: For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep itself up above rebellion; yet is it not necessary that it should stoop and sink according to the lowness or sordidness of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have all parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing▪ yea indeed in both cases, where the inferior part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortify the higher; because in a superior there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppress and keep under that which rebelleth.  
Another cause of fear may be 
* Ne fam●… aut rem in maju●… 〈◊〉 aut 〈◊〉 animo●… rer●… novitate 〈◊〉. justin. l. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Clem. Alex. Cl●…m. l. 2. 〈◊〉. l. 3. c. 7. Arrian Epict. l. 2. c. 1. N●…m velu●… 〈◊〉, atque omnia Caecu in tenebr●… 〈◊〉: ita n●…s i●… luce time●…us. L●…r.  Newness of evil: When it is such, wherewith neither the mind itself hath had any preceding encounter, whereby to judge of its own Strength; nor any example of some other man's prosperous issue to confirm its hopes in the like success: For as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is in stead of Armour, and is a kind of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to bear troubles: for there are some things which he elegantly calleth them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Empty Dangers: Epictetus calleth them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Scarecrows, and Vizors, which children fear only out of Ignorance: as soon as they are known, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast into the pond, did with the first noise exceedingly affright the frogs, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they securely swum about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cause that a man can set no bounds to his fear. I grieve for so much evil as hath befallen me; but I fear so much as may befall me; and the 
Pli●…. l. 8 ep. 18. Ver●…or omnia, imagin●… omnia quaeque natura 〈◊〉 est, ●…a maximè mitui quae maximè abomi●…or, fingo,. Plin l. 6. ep 4. Vid. Sen. ep. 13. Prob. § 14. ●…. 15.  more strong and working my Fancy, the greater my fear; because what I cannot measure by Knowledge, I measure by Imagination▪ the figments of Fancy do usually exceed Truth.  
And from this Ignorance likewise it is, that Timorous men are usually Inquisitive, as the Philosopher notes; and so the Prophet expresseth the fear of the Idumeans in the war, Watchman! What of the Night? Watchman! What of the Night? fear usually doubleth the same questions, as grief doth the same Complaints. Therefore men in a fright and amazement, look one another in the face; one man's countenance, as it were ask counsel of another▪ and once more 
Is●…. 13. 8. 21. 11. 〈◊〉. 51 31. Gen. 42. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Schol▪ ●…n S●…. Deut. 28. 25. In mag●… 〈◊〉 s●… per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tanquam maximè 〈◊〉. Pl●…. 〈◊〉 Mario▪ Deut. 28. 28. 95.  from hence grow the Irresolutions of Timorous men, because they know not what to do, no●… which way to fly the things they fear: in which respect they are said to fly from an Enemy seven ways, as ever suspecting they are in the worst. Pavidei semper Consilia in incer●…o, they never can have fixed and composed Counsels: and it is the usual voice of Men in their fears, I know not what to do, I know not which way to turn myself; Trembling of Heart, and Failing of Eyes, blindness and Astonishment: Ignorance and fear, do thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoics make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 
Laert. in Ze●…. l. 7.  sluggish Affection of mind, whereby a man shrinketh bacl, and declineth business, because of difficulty of danger which he observeth in it; and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Mind, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kinds of this Passion of fear. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for Wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of fear.  

Vt fugiunt aquilat timidissima turba Columbae, 
Ovid. de Arte Amandi. l. 1.   
Vtque fugit visos agna novella lupos:  
Sic illa simuere viros sine lege mentes,  
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color.  
Nam Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris  
Pars laniat Crines, pars fine ment sedet.  
Altera maesta filet, frustra vocat altera matrem,  
Haec queritur, stupet hac, hac fugit, illa manet.   

As weak and fearful Doves the Eagle fly,  
And tender Lambs when they the wolf espy:  
So the affrighted Sabine Virgins run  
Pale and discoloured, Roman youth to shun.  
Their fear was One, but fear had not One look,  
Part here sit reaved of sense, part there doth pluck,  
And tear their hairs, One silent mourns, another  
With a successelesse Outcry calls her Mother.  
One moans, the fright another doth amaze:  
One flies for fear, for fear another stays.   
Now the reasons why newness of evil doth thus work fear, may be many. For first, all Admiration is ●… kind of fear: it being the property of man, not only to fear that which is Against, but that also which is above our Nature, either in regard of natural and civil dignity, which worketh a fear of Reverence; as to parents, governor's, masters; or in regard of Moral Excellency and Excesses above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a Fear of 
Advancement of Learning.  Admiration. Now than it is the property of every thing, that brings novelty with it to work more 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7. Pl●…tarch. de A●…d. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. ph. l. 1. ●…. 2  or less, some manner of admiration, which, (as the Honour of this age's learning calls it) is a broken knowledge, and commonly the first step, which we make in each particular Science: & therefore children are most given to wonder, because every thing appeareth New unto them. Now then when any evil shall at onc●… fright our nature, & pose our understanding, the more our Ignorance doth weaken our Reason, the more doth it str●…ngthen our Passion.  
Again, though such evils may happily be in 
Nat. Qu●…st. l. 7. c, 1.  themselves but sleight, yet the very strangeness of them will work an opinion of their greatness: for as that of Seneca is true, Magnitudinem rerum 〈◊〉 sub duci●…: that use makes small esteem of great things: so it will follow on the contrary side, that Novelty makes evil appear greater, as the way which a man is least acquainted with s●…emes the longest. 
* I●…l. Capit●…l. in Max m●… & 〈◊〉. Vid. 〈◊〉 S●…turn.  And therefore the Romans did use themselves unto their gladiatory fights and bloody spectacles that acquaintance with wounds and blood might make them the less fear it in the wars.  
And lastly, such is the imbred cautelousness of Nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the mind, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make ex periment of any, and thereby it is made naturally fearful even of harmless and inoffenssive thing●… (Omniatutatimens, much more than of those which bring with them the noise and face of evil.  
Now the corruption of this passion herein i●…, when it falleth too soon upon the Object, and snatcheth it from the understanding before that it hath duly weighed the nature of it; when ●…s Aristotle speaks of Anger) that it runs away from reason with an half message, so the Object shall be plucked away from the understanding with an half judgemen●…. For when a man hath but an half and broken sight, like him in the Gospel, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as trees, and to pass a false sentence upon any thing which he fears.  
Another cause of fear may be Conscience of evil and guiltiness of mind, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more soul 
●…isd. 17. 11.  and thicken: For wickedness, when it is condemned of its own witness is exceeding timorous, and being 
〈◊〉. Anal. lib. 6.  pressed with conscience, always forecasteth terrible things; and as the Historian speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus, their minds with lust, cruelly and unclean resolution, being no less torn and made raw, than the body flight with scourges: Every vicious man hath a double flight from God, a flight from the holiness, and a flight from the justice of his will. Adam first eats, and next he hides: as soon as he hath transgressed the Covenant, he expects the Curse, and therefore we shall still observe that men are afraid of those whom they have injured. 
* Aelian. Var. Hist. l. 13. c. 38.  All biciades having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to trust them, saying, It is a foolish thing for a man when he may fly, to betray himself into their hands from whom he cannot fly. And therefore they who would have us fear them, desire nothing more than to be privy to our guilts, and to know such crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamy or loss upon us. 
Inven. S●…tyr. 〈◊〉 erit verri qui verrem tempore qu●… vault. Accusare p●… test, etc.   Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde Timeri. 

Into our secret crimes they pry, that so  
We may fear them, when they our vices know.   
And therefore innocency is the best Armour that any man can put or against other men's malice 
Prov. 28. 1.  or his own fears: For the righteous are bold as a Lion. 
Minus time●…ant Epaminondem. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pl●…tarch. de 〈◊〉.   
Other causes of fear might here be observed which I shall but intimate. As we fear active and busy men, because if they be provoked, they will stir and look about to revenge themselves.  
We fear likewise Delators, because they are inquisitive and pry into the secrets of others. Plutarch compares them unto cupping glasses which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates through which none passed but condemned and piacular per sons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort only to the raw and corrupt parts of the body, or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrefaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make others appear worse than they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appear so.  
We fear also abusive and satirical wits, which make use of other men's names, as of Whetstones to sharpen themselves upon.  

Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas,  
Fanum habet in corn●…, long suge; dummodo risum 
●…orac. ●…. 1. S●…. 4.   
Excut●…at sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico.  
Et, quodcunque semel Chartley is illeverit, omnes  
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacuque,  
Et pueros, & anu●…——   

These all hate Poets, fear to suffer seorne  
From those cursed wits, which carry hay in horn.  
Eat them, they will not spare their dearest friend  
to make themselves sport. Then what they have penned  
theyare big with, till old wives & boys that go  
From Ovens and from washpooles know it too.   
Lasty, we fear, close, cunning; and suppressed 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A●…tst. Rb●…. l. 2.  malice, which like a skinned wound doth wrankle inwardly: Crafty, insinuative, plausible men, that can shroud and palliate their revengeful purposes, under pretexts of love. I formerly noted it of Tiberius, and 
a 〈…〉.  Aelius Spartianu●… observeth it of Antoninus Geta, that men were more afraid of his kindness then of his anger, because his use was to show much courtesy there where he intended mischief.  
And 
b 〈…〉.  Caesar was wont to say that he was not afraid of Antony and Dolabella, bold adversaries, but of Brutus and Cassius, his pale and lean enemies, who were able to smother there passion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they say) have a Proverb wherein they promise to take heed themselves of their enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this as it is of all other the most dangerous and the most unchristian, so is it the most unworthy and sordid disposition of mind, (I cannot find words bad enough to character it 
c 〈…〉.  by) which at the same time can both flatter and hate, and with the same breath praise a man, and undo him. And therefore the 
d Arist. ●…th c. lib. 4. cap. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Philosopher telleth us that a magnanimous man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Such an one as doth boldly profess as well his displeasure as his love, esteeming it timorousness to stifle and conceal his affections.  
Of all Christ's enemies, Judas when he kissed him, the Herodians when they praised him, and the devil when he confessed him were the worst and ill-favouredest. A leprosy was ever uncleanest when it was whitest, and Satan is never more wicked or more ugly than when he puts on samuel's Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the most misshapen monster. Like those poisons which kill men with laughing; or like the Philistines trespasse-offering, Mice, and Emerauds made of gold.   

CHAP. XXVIII. Of the Effects of fear, suspicion, Circumspection, Superstition, ' Betraying the succours of Reason, fear Generative, Reflecting, Inward, weakening the faculties of the mind, Base suspicion, wise Caution.  
I Proced to consider some of the Effects of this Passion, whereof the first may be suspicion and Credulity, which either other men's rumours, or our own working Imagination frameth untoit self. Which effect of fear the Historian hath wisely observed, Retineri comeatus 
Tac●…. lib. 4.  dum Timet, Credit, what he feared that he believed. And in another place speaking of the strange relations, which had been made of Monsters, his judgement on the report is, Visa, sive ex metu credita. 
A●…al. lib. 2▪  It was uncertain whether they had been really seen or believed out of fear. For as timorous men are by their own suspicion ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to fear where no fear is, which the Poet hath observed.  Quae finxêre Timent. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 M●…and.  — they are afraid, Of fancies which themselves have made. 
So are they ready likewise to believe the apparition of their own brain for real terrors: For Tacitus his speech is here likewise true: Fingunt Creduntque, first they feign, and then they believe.  
Now the Reason hereof may be, First, the general 
Quorum in al●…orius m●…nu vita posita est, saepius ill●…d cogitant quid p●…ssit is cujus in diliou: sunt quà●… q●…id de 〈◊〉 facere. Cic. pro q●…inctio.  Impression of Nature, which being subject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdom of providence, and circumspection to foresee those evils, which cannot by dexterity be so easily shifted off, as they may at a distance be prevented; so that we find even in the most clear and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing (though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our Nature) until it be better understood, a secret drawing back and fear least it should prove hurtful unto us; how much more than when it is once prepossessed with passion: For as clothe once died from its natural white, will take no other but a darker colour: So minds once steeped in the bitter 
a De Timore is ●…o me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de q●…ae d●…m apud all▪ ●…odig.. 9 cap. 26.  humours of this melancholic passion, will seldom admit of any, but more black and fearful conceits. 
b Quod de 〈◊〉 observani●… Ammian Marcell. lib. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l'lutar●…bus de Medea R●…ipid. in Medea. De Domitian●… 〈◊〉 quidam 〈◊〉 magu quam cum 〈◊〉 sunt Timend●… sunt. Sen●…. Ep. 11.  And from this suspicion of fear it is that timorous men are usually cruel when they gain any advantage. Their jealousy teaching them to do that unto others which they fear from them.  
A second Reason may be, because in fear the mind of man is drawn to a nearer sense of its weakness, and to a more prejudicated apprehension of the adverse power: and therefore it is a true observation, 
c Tacit. Annal. lib. ●…. Vid. Plutarch. de superstitione Et lib. contra Epicur. Max. Tyrius 〈◊〉. 4. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 7. p. 51●…. Nist. lib. 2.  Prona ad Religionem p●…rculsa semel mentes, etc. minds once possessed with fearful conceits, are most forward in sacrifices, and Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils, which they expect. So that as Tacitus on another occasion speaks, Inclinatis ad credendum. So I may say, Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, etiam Fortuna, When the mind is once drooping, things which before passed away as matters of course and casualty, are now drawn within the compass of presages and emphatical evils.  
But here by the way we are to remember that this credulity of fear is to be understood with respect to it's own suspicion, otherwise in regard of those strengthening helps which are given against it, it is ever Incredulous: O thou of little faith! why dost thou fear?  
Now this effect of fear is generally in itself a corruption of it: For though I would have a man's dangers make him provident and solicitous in the forecasting future evils out of a sound and sober conjecture, according as are the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himself in a careless security, nor divert his mind from such unwelcome and pensive thoughts, like Vitellius in Tacitus, who in the near approach of his fatal ●…ine, was Trepidus dein Temulentus, one hour fearful, and the next Drunken, smothering in himself every thought of ensuing danger, and enduring nothing but I●…cundum & L●…surum; that which was pleasing, though harmful to him; yet I would not have the mind tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and preoccupate Evils to be no further effected than in our brain, because hereby it is made soft and irresolute, tumultuary and confused, and both ways much indisposed and disabled for Action.  
Another ill Effect of fear, is a Dislike of whatever means Reason presents for the freeing of us, whence issue Inconstancy and continual Change of Resolutions, hating all Counsels when they are present, and recalling them when they are too fare passed▪ which Effect is elegantly described by the Author of the book of wisdom, who saith that Fear is a betraying of the Succours which Reason offereth: a submitting of them to the false interpretations of a crooked and prejudicated suspicion, which overcuriously discovering weakness in all means, and making use of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger. 
* Themistocles apud l'lut. Apo 〈◊〉.  They say of a certain Fish, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect emblem of fear, which though you put into armour, yet you cannot give it Courage. And 
† C●…abrias ib. & O●…t. a de 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Alex. Arist. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. ●…. 〈◊〉. ●…dip. ●…yr. ●…ac. A●…. ●…. 3. 〈◊〉. Omnia tuta imens. Non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suum quam boste●…m tu crun●… 〈◊〉 tanto. Liv. l 1. 〈◊〉. l. 3.  therefore as he said, an army of lions led by a Hart, would do less service than an army of hearts led by a lion, because in that case fear would betray her own succours. And this I find a frequent observation, that Pavidis consiliain incerto. Fear ever dazleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and Timor etiam auxilia reformidat. It is afraid of the very succours that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of Ulysses over his fears, that he could think and wisely advise what to do.  — Nec talia passus Ulysses, Oblitusq, sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. 

Although with fears oppressed▪ yet he had not  
The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.   
Now the reason of this may be first, because fear is a Multiplying and Generative Passion, ever producing motions of its own Nature. He●… which fears danger from another's power, will easily 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In q●…m sed usu receptum, quod honesta confilia, ●…ei 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 mala aut pros. pere 〈◊〉 ita velp b●…n tur, vil●…▪ pre●…. 〈◊〉. l. 5. ep. 21. 〈◊〉. Epict. l. 2. c. 1.  fear errors or Impotency in his own aids▪ and it is * common with men to think themselves unwise, when they feel themselves Unhappy▪ & this very thought that they are so, doth I know not by what Fascination make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flies from the dogs, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him: so when our fears drive us from one mischief, the often hamper and entangle us in another.  
Again it is the property of fear, to make us ever reflect upon our own weakness, & (as I said) not only to present it, but to work it: as the Sun when it discloseth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly itself hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it shineth on the Earth, it hides the stars: so it is in those two Offices of Reason▪ the Transient and Reflexive act, that whereby we look Outward on others; or Inward on ourselves, specially where there is Passion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker: which is true most of all in this Passion of fear, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the less we see of inward strength for resistance. Insomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered, as the Po●…t intimates, when Ajax came forth to battle:  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Illad. ●…●…62.  

Fear had the other Trojans all oppressed;  
Yea Hector's heart panted within his breast.   
A third Effect may be a weakness of the Fa culties of the mind, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or counsel; the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as Plutarch noteth) it imports in the 
Plut. de ●…up.  Greek, a Binding or Shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the soul for Action. And such Actions, as fear forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weak and unnatural, that it is a maxim in the Law, Per metumgesta, pr●… non ratis habentur: Those things which we do in fear, are void and invalide to bind, when the fear which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the civil State, so it is in the moral commonwealth of the soul, there are three principal ways to infer weakness, foreign Incursions, Intestine Tumults, and an Emptying of the Parts, all which are to be seen in an Extremity of fear. Where first two things are to be granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the Mind. The first is, that the Spirits being of the most strong, subtle, and quick motion, are the principal Instruments of intercourse, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reason: the other, that the Mind being of a spiritual and Elevating Nature, retains then the perfectest power of Operation, when it least of all suffers the Incursion of grosser Passions, which yet I understand not of all manner of Ministry and Admixtion of Appetite, with Reason (as if the Regular motions of inferior powers did not serve to sharpen the Counsels of the higher) but only of Invasion and Tyranny.  
Which granted, we may observe all the three former causes of Weaknesses in an Extremity of fear. For first there is a Confused and unserviceable mixture of Passion and Reason: The Passion with too much outrage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of Reason, which is Foreign Incursion: For, though these two are not parts of a different Regiment; yet they are of a different Nation (if I may so speak) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower parts or region of the soul. Secondly, there is Tumult and Disorder amongst the Spirits, which is Civil dissension. Thirdly, there is a retiring of them to the principal Castle or Fort, the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and vngarrisoned; which though it be a strengthening of the Better, yet it is a weakening of the Major part, and this answereth unto Emptying or Vacuity. By all which, both Reason is made unfit for counsel (all the conceits thereof being choked and stifled with a disorderly throng of Spirits and Passions) ●…nd the Body likewise is so benumbed, that though our discourse were entire, yet it could not be there seconded with any successful service. And hence are those 
〈…〉.  many ill Effects of fear upon the Body, whiteness of hair, Trembling, Silence, Thirst, paleness. Horror, Gnashing of Teeth, Emission of Excrements. The Outward parts being over-cooled, and the Inward melted by the strength of the Spirits retiring thither. Which Homer hath thus described, speaking of a Coward.  

His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he set 
〈…〉.   
Long in one place; he croucheth to his feet;  
His Heart pants strong, and intercepts his breath,  
His Teeth do gnash with, but the thoughts of Death.  
Brave men are still the same, not much aghast,  
When the first brunt of their Attempts is past.   
Where by the way we may observe what Seneca also tells us, that fear doth usually attend the 
† 〈…〉.  beginnings of great erterprises, even in the worthiest men. Which mindeth me of one more, (and that an useful and profitable) Effect of this Passion, I mean 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉.  Care, wisdom, and Caution, which ever proceeds from a Moderate fear, which is a Dictate of Nature. And therefore the weakest Fishes swim together in shoals, and the weakest Birds build in the smallest and outermost boughs, which are hardest to come unto. And we may observe that Nature hath made the weakest Creatures swiftest: as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and the 
† 〈…〉.  say that the Hare is very quick at hearing, and sleepeth with his Eyes open, every way sitted to discover danger before it surprise him. For as in Religion, a fear that is governed by the Word of God, so proportionably in Morality: a fear grounded by the Word of Reason, is the Principle of wisdom. As Security and supineness is the Root of Folly, which Tiberius replied to the petition of Hortulu●…, wherein he requested of the Senate a Contribution from the public Treasury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was sunk and began to whither. Industry saith he will languish, idleness will increase, if no man have fear or Hope in himself: but all will securely expect a supply from others; in themselves l●…zy and burdensome unto us: and it is the judgement of Tacitus upon one of the wisest Policies, which ever that Emperor practised, I mean his writing to the Legions abroad, Tanquam adepto principatu, as if he were already Emperor, when at home in the Senate he used only Modesty and Refusals, That he did it out of fear, so wise a Counsellor was his 
〈…〉.  Passion unto him. And we find that some * great Commanders have caused their Skout-watches to be unarmed, that fear might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Passion is the 
〈…〉.  Instrument of Discipline, seasoning the mind, as ground Colours do a Table, to receive those beauties and perfections, which are to be superinduced.   

CHAP. XXIX. Of that particular Affection of fear, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus fear. The ground of it, evil of Turpitude, Injustice, Intemperance, sordidness, softness, Pufillanimity, Flattery, vainglory, Misfortune, Ignorance, pragmaticalness, Deformity, greatness of mind, unworthy Correspondencies, etc. Shame, vicious and virtuous.  
BEsides this general Consideration 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Eth. l. ●…. c. 1●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Arist. R●…et. l. 2. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dama●…ce▪ de Orthod. sid. l, 2. c. 15. A. Gell. l. 9 c. 6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Iliad. ●… 214.  of the Passion of fear, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation; namely, Shame, which is a Fear of just Disgrace, and Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion we do or aught to value, as he said in the Poet, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Now those whom we thus fear, are wise men, (for so Polydamas is said to look behind and before him.) Aged men, and all whose presence we reverence as Parents, Rulers, counsellors, Friends: Any whom we ourselves Admire, or who Admire us. We fear disgrace with those whom we Admire, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kind of Touchstone, which is we cannot suffer the trial off, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Mettail. And we fear it with those who Admire us, because as every man it willing to see his face when it is clean, in that glass which represents it fairest: so when it is soul, of all others he shuneth that most. In the former case we are in danger to miss of what we desired; in the other, we are in danger to shipwreck what we before enjoyed.  
We are apt to be ashamed with our Friends, because their opinion we value, and with our Enemies, because theirs we fear; with our Friends, because they are Grieved; with our Enemies, because they are delighted with that which shames us.  
Again we fear in this Regard, Rigid and Severe Men, who are not ready to forgive, not to put candid and Charitable Constructions upon what we do. Therefore when Cat●… was present (who was virrigida Innocentia, a stern and severe 
Liv. l. 3●…. val. Max. lib. 2. ●…. 10 Vid. e●…am lib. 4 cap. 5.  Censor of the manners of Men) none durst call for the obscene spectacles of their Floralia, being more awed by the Authority of the man, than all lured by the pleasure of the plays.  
Likewise Busy and Garrulous men, because they inquire into our Crimes, and having disclosed, do divulge them. For which cause we fear in this case the Multitude, because an ill name is like an 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…dosed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…. ●…p 〈◊〉. l 7. c. 1.  ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appears the more deformed. As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves: a little Water drawn into a thin steam and vapour, seems wider than it was at first: so even lesser Crimes being multiplied through the mouths of many, do grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a man's name. For he is presumed to be void either of wisdom or modesty, that doth not fear many Eyes. We fear Innocent and virtuous Men, their presence aweth us from Liberty of Sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, because Examples have a proportionable Authority over the Heart of Man, as laws have, which we do not trespass without fear. And therefore the Philosopher adviseth to live always so, as if some grave, and serious and severe person were ever before us, to behave ourselves sub Custode, & 
Seu. ●…p. 11. & 25. Cydias ●…rator Atheniensi●… a●…d Aristotele●…. R●…et. l. 2. cap. 6. Et Persae adu●…co 〈◊〉 praeài●…. 〈◊〉 ●…bent quod Cy●… 〈◊〉 ●…sset Pl●…tarch. Apoth. Aristid. ●…rat. de 〈◊〉  Paedagoge, as under the Eye of a Keeper, because such a man's conversation will either regulate ours, or disgrace it. Vicious men do the less fear one another, by how much they stand in need of mutual pardon, as we find Stertorius (if I forget nor) giving those soldiers of the enemy's army their lives, who had but one Eye, he being himself Mon●…phthalmos.  
Again we fear Envious and malevolent persons, because such look upon our Actions with prejudice; and as Momu●… when he could not find fault with the face in the Picture of Venus, picked a quarrel at her Slipper: so these men will ever have something either in Substance or Circumstances of our Actions, to misreport and expose to scandal.  
Lastly we fear those in this respect, whose Company we shall most be used unto; because that leaves us not time wherein to forget our errors, or to fortify ourselves against them. It makes a man live ever under the sense of his gild. In which respect Cat●…major was wont to say, That a man should most of all reverence himself, because 
Plutarch Apoph.  he is ever in his own sight and Company.  
The fundamental Ground of this Affection, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  is any evil that hath either gild, or any kind of Turpitude in it, or any signs and suspicions thereof, reflecting either on ourselves, or any of ours, whose reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apostle telleth us, that all sin is the matter of Shame, when it is revived with a right judgement. What fruit had you then in those things whereof you are now ashamed. That which hath emptiness in the Beginning, and Death in the End, must needs have Shame in the middle. But though all sin with respect to God's Eye and judgement doth cause Shame yet in the Eye of men, those cause it most which have any notable & more odious Turpitude adhering unto them. As either obscene or subdolous, and dishonest Actions when they are detected, forging of Deeds defacing Records, counterfeiting of names or seals, suborning of Witnesses, making use of ingenious Professions, as cloaks to palliate, and instruments to provoke Abusive and illiberal practices.  
Such are all kind of Sordid Actions or Behaviours, as gain raised out of despicable Commodities, (as 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Ve●…p. c. 23 v●…d. 〈◊〉 apud 〈◊〉 lib. 〈◊〉  Vespasian set a vectigal or excise upon piss) and the Philosopher tells us of some that made a 
b oo●…r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 V●…d. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. pu●… 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 V●…d. de ca Theophrast.  gain of the dead. Such are also the live which by sordid ministers, Panders, bawds, courtesans, 
a Vid. Desid. Herald. digres. l 1 c. 21.  Parasites, jugglers, 
b Vid. l Ti●…. ●…aneg. Taci▪ Annal. l. 4.  Delators, Cheaters, sharks, and shifting Companions make unto themselves, such the poet's miser●….  — 
c Hera●…. l. 1. Sat. 1. Vid. Pl●…ut. Aut. l. ●…ll. 2, 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Populus me sibilat at mihi plaudo Ipse do, si mul ac nummos contemplor in arcâ. 

The people hisse me all abroad,  
But I at home myself applaud.  
When in my Coffers I behold,  
That which none hisse at, heaps of Gold.   
Many particular Causes there are which are apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall briefly name as.  
First Sloth, and shrinking from such labour, which those that are better, older, weaker, more delicate than ourselves do willingly undergo. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Thus Menelaus in the Poet seeing the Grecians as fearful to undertake a single combat with Hector, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid their cowardice.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Illl●…d▪. 97.  

What Grecian soldiers turned to Grecian dames? 
O verè 〈◊〉▪ eui●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 9   
That can digest so great, so many shames?  
What not a man of Greece (O fowl disgrace)  
Dare meet or look proud Hector in the face?  
Well, sit you down Inglorious, heartless men,  
Turned to your first water and earth: yet then:  
I'll take up arms; for Victories last End,  
Doth not on Our, But Divine will depend.   
In like manner Hector rebuketh the baseness of Paris in flying from Menelaus.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

Trim warrior, tell me what thy Lute can do, 
●…iad. ●…. 55. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vocal lapides quibus ●…dul. 〈◊〉 ex Anti●… more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Quam ●…niquè 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ij qui minu●… habent, 〈◊〉 s●…mper 〈◊〉 ●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. lho●…m.   
What Venus Graces, comely heir, sweet hue,  
When thou shalt wallow in the dust? Thou'rt far,  
Fit to wear Stone-coat, than Coat of War.   
Again, any thing which argueth pusillanimity or littleness of mind is a just ground of shame, as to recount courtesies & upbraid them, & therefore he said in Seneca, Non tanti est vixisse. That his life was less worth, then to be so valued to him, in daily Exprobrations, and that his blood with less trouble to him might have been let out at his veins, then to be every day disordered, and called up into his face. To receive continual Gifts, and be ever craving from our inseriours, burden some to those who can less bear it.  
Hereunto refer all Light ludicrous and ridiculous behaviour, wherein if a Grave or serious 
Plutarch. A. ●…opi l. ●…con. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plutarch. & 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Eun ●…. 〈◊〉 Act 2. 〈◊〉. 2. A●…l. 1. 〈◊〉 7. & ●… la●…ti Ar●… in mil. 1, Glor.  man be deprehended, it rendereth him suspected of a mind that can flag and lessen, and therefore Agesilaus being so taken playing with his child made his apology for it, and desired his friend not to think light of him, till he had children of his own, for love will teach greatness of Mind to descend.  
Also all sordid Arts of a Flattery, which praiseth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complieth, transformeth itself to all shapes to get a living, and like crows pulleth out men's eyes, with praises that it may after more securely make a prey of them, Fadum crimen servitutis, as the Historian well calls it, A servile and filthy Crime.  
Any thing which argueth vanity, and windiness of mind, as 
a Vid. Theoph. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pla●…ti mil●… Glor Arist. Eth c. l 4. c. 13. Val. Max. ●…. 9 c. 15.  Arrogance, and vain glorious Ostentation, ascribing to ourselves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning Lands, ●…cheiements of other men, as he who called all the ships in the harbour at Athens 
Plutarch. l. De 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  his own. Labour alien●… magnam partam gloriam verbis sapè in se trans●…ovet. Whereunto belong Absurd, and unusual Affectations in words or fashions, mimical and fantastical gesticulations srothy and superficial compliments, Strange and exotic Habits, which are usually the seum of Light, and unsettled minds, and ever expose them to contempt. In so much that Alexander himself escaped not the Imputation of Lenity, when he followed the fashions of those Countries which he had subdued.  
Misfortune and decay in the outward Ornaments of Life, for it is not in men's fortunes, as in their monuments wherein 
b Carios jam 〈◊〉 ●…asumq▪ minorem 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 viculu, 〈◊〉. q 〈◊〉 Invenal.  ruin doth many times conciliate Reverence.  Nil habet Infelix Paupertas durius inse Quam quod ridiculos homines facit— 

Unhappy Poverty hath nothing worse,  
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.   
And therefore men of sunk and broken estates are ashamed to live there, where they have been formerly in Credit and Estimation, as Hecuba complaining in the tragedy.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Eu●…ipid. in Hec.  
M●…gnum do●…oren habet unde cum hono●…e dec●…sseris codem 〈◊〉 ignominia reverti. Cic. pro l. Muran●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Iliad. ●….  

In this my broken and dejected case,  
Pardon me, if I shame to show my face.  
To Polymestor, whose Eyes once have seen,  
Me, a now spoilt Captive, than a Queen.   
Again, Ignorance and Ineptitude in our own proper functions and miscarriage in our own Arts and professions, is an Exprobration, either 
Ar●…ium peccata artificibus pu●…ori sunt etc.— Sen. Ep. 97.  of indiligence, or of weakness. As want of proficiancy in a Student, of Elocution in an Orator, of Military wisdom in a soldier, etc. And therefore a Physician will seldom stay to see his Patient buried, he usually departs before the sick man, because Funerals are Convicia Medi corum. Yet all Ignorance is not matter of disgrace, for some things there are below the inquiry, or Studies of some men. And therefore though Tully tells us that when Themistocles declined 
Cic. Tusc. qu. lib. 1.  the Lute▪ he was esteemed more Ignorant than became a person of quality, yet it was a brave apology which he made for himself, That though he knew not to handle a Lute, yet 
〈…〉.  he knew to conquer a city. And Gel●… when others after a Feast sang to an Instrument, called for his great Horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautelous Answer which Favorinus gave touching Adrian the Emperor, who had censured him in his own profession of 
Spa●…tian in Adrian●….  grammar. That he durst not be learnedner than he who commanded thirty legions; so it was a ruer answer which another Artificer gave in the like case unto a Prince. God forbidden Sir that you 
Plutarch.  should know things of so mean a quality, better than I who own my subsistence unto them. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
And as Ignorance in our own, so Intrusion and usurpation of other men's offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein we descend the below the Dignity of our places or 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ●…rnamentum in 〈◊〉 Sal●… la●…. de 〈◊〉. lib. 4.  professions, as when men of liberal condition apply themselves unto the business of fordid persons. For every man is entrusted with the Dignity of his place, he is to be not only the possessor, but the Protector of it, which when he betrays, it doth justly Revenge itself upon him with contempt and disgrace.  
Again, any notorious external Deformities, 
Siden. 〈◊〉. l. 3 〈◊〉. 13. 〈◊〉. ●…. Vid. Vo●…▪ 〈◊〉. part. 1. p. 78. 79 O 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lib 3. c. 17. ●…9.  and Dehonestament a corporis, especially if there be any thing of our own, either guilt or servility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill shape and worse conditions of Thirsiti●…, are said to look on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadness. And when Ulysses his Companions were by Circe transformed into shape of Swine, they wept and were ashamed of their own deformities. And the Poet describeth Delophebus whom Menelaus had dismembered,  — Pavitantem & dira tegentem Supplicia. 
Aen●…id. 6.  

Afraid of being known, careful to hid  
His mangled wounds, that they might not be spied.   
And we find how careful men were to cover 
Vid. ●…um lib. 6. Val. Max. l. 6. c. ●…. §. 7.  any of these notes and prints of Infamy, or servility, which persons either extremely vicious, or in 
〈◊〉. Calig. c. 27.  bondage were marked withal, for infamous or servile persons were wont so to be branded. 
Lips. l. 2. Elect. c. 15.   
Many times Greatness of mind is a cause of Shame, either for something which such a man suffereth in himself, or in those that are near unto him, such was that of the Romans, Ad fur●… Caudina's, of which the Historian giveth this observation. 
〈◊〉 ob 〈◊〉 fixi in terram oculi 〈◊〉 ad omnia 〈◊〉 a●…res & p●…dor 〈◊〉 lu●…, ingentem 〈◊〉 ●…rarum ex alto anim●… 〈◊〉 j●…dicia tran●…. Liv. l. 9 Capitol. in M●…x.   
Their obstinate silence, Eyes fastened to the Earth, ears refusing all comfort, Faces ashamed to behold the light, were certain Evidences of a mind deeply resolved upon Revenge. And of Maximinus, of whom the Historian telleth us, that out of a Desire to conceal his Ignoble birth, he slew all, even the best of his friends, which were Conscious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often suffer conflicts with this Passion of shame, when penury denies that which Luxury and Pride demands.  — Quid enim majore Cachi●…no. 
juvenal.  Excipitur vulgi quam pauper Apicius? 

Who without much irrision can endure,  
To see a Beggar a proud Epicure?   
Again, Acqual●…tance and Intimacy with Infamous 
Pet. Victor in Ar●…ic. Rhet. l. 2.  persons is noted by the Philosopher amongst the Grounds of shame, and therefore it was upbraided unto Plato that Calippus, the murderer of his host had been bred in his school. 
Plutarch. l. de capiend. ex 〈◊〉. utilitate.  And to Secrates, that he was resorted unto by Alcib●…ades, a factious and turbulent Citizen, and to Themist●…cles that he held correspondence, and intelligence with Pausanius a traitor; and we 
Taci●…. 〈◊〉. l. 5. c. 6.  find how fatal the favour of 〈◊〉 after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man not only out of Indignation, but out of fear too cried out.  — Nunquam si quid mihi credis amavi 
juvenal. 〈◊〉. 1●….  Hunc hominem. 
Such being the impotent and immoderate Passions of many men to trample on the sam●… persons in their calamity, whom in their grea●…nesse they almost adored, as he said,  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

When the oak is fallen that stood, 
Torent. A. delft.   
Then every man will gather wood.   
Lastly, not only things shameful to themselves, but such as are signs, and Intimations of them do usually beget this Affection. As Aeschinus in the comedian, blushed when he saw his Father knock at the door of an infamous woman, because it was a token of a vicious intention. 
〈◊〉. lu Caesar.  And therefore Caesar was wont to say. That he would have those that belonged unto him free, as well from Suspicion, as from Crime, for we shall never find that a man who is tender of his Conscience will be prodigal of his Credit, and he who is truly fearful of incurring Censure from himself by the gild of a Crime, will in some proportion be fearful of incurring censure from others by the show and suspicion of it; for as a Good Conscience is a Feast to give a man a cheerful heart; so a good name is an ointment to give him a cheerful Countenance.  
There is a Twofold shame, The one virtuous, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. in Diogene.  as Diogenes was wont to say, That Blushing was the colour of virtue, The other Vicious, and that 
〈◊〉 ille vul●… & rubo●… quost contra p●…dorem mu●…. 〈◊〉. in Agric.  either out of Cruelty, as Tacitus and Seneca observe of Domitian, that he was never more to be feared then when he blushed. Or else out of cowardice, when a man hath not strength enough of Countenance, to outface and withstand a Vicious solicitation, as it was said of the men of Asia, that they had out of tenderness of face, exposed themselves to much inconvenience, because they 
Quidam nua●… magis 〈◊〉 ●…uri eru●… Timendi sint. quasi omnem v. recundiem essude in't. Sylla tu●…e erat violentissimu●…●…uen faciem ejus sanguis o●… viser●…t. Sen●…e Epist.  could not pronounce that one Syllable, Noe. It was a better Resolution, that of Zenophanes, who being provoked unto some vicious practice, confessed himself a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to do dishonestly.  
I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherewith Plutarch beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same Argu meant. That as Thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signs of an Excellent 
11. Plutarch. de vil. Puda●…e  Ground wherein they Grow, so shamefastness thought many times a weakness, and betrayer of the mind, is yet generally an Argument of a soul, ingenuously and verttuously disposed.   

CHAP. XXX. Of the Affection of Anger. The Distinctions of it. The fundamental Cause thereof, Contempt. Three kinds of Contempt, Dis-estimation, Disappointment, calumny.  
I Now proceed to the last of the Passions, Anger, whereof, in itself a subject of large Discourse, yet being every where obvious, I shall not speak much. I intent not therefore distinctly to handle the several kinds of this Passion, which Aristotle in his ethics hath given us, 
a Ethic. lib. 4. cap. 11.  which are a sharp Anger, and an Hard or Knotty Anger. And Saint Paul who likewise gives us Three kinds of it. Whereof the first I may call a 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vid Domas●… de O●…thod. fid. lib. 2. ●…. 16. ●…ale Rhodes. lib. 12. ●…. 57 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Inveterata plun. bea, alta ment reposta vindictae occasimem 〈◊〉 expec●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  close and buried anger, which he names bitterness, the other a violent 
c No●… tulin 〈◊〉 non verbis commotion, adeo Ivam condiderat. Yacit. de libe. Annol. l. 2.  burning Anger, which he calls Wrath, and the last a Desiring and pursuing Anger, which seemeth to have its 
d 〈…〉  derivation from a word which signifies to Desire, and therefore is defined by Aristotle to ᵃ be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. & by the ᵇ Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, words of prosecution and pursuit. For these differ not Essentially or formerly amongst themselves, but only in diversity of Degrees, and in order to the divers constitutions of the Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits 
Iliad. ●…. 259. unde Crabr●…net irritare apud Plaut. Ampbit. Nunc in Fermento to●…a est, ita t●…rget mib●…. Plant. Casi●….  wherewith they are joined.  
In which respects we might observe several other shapes of this Affection. For there is the ᵃ Anger of a wasp, which is an Hasty, Pettish, and fretful Anger, proceeding from a nature ᵇ Leavened and habituated with Choler, which is presently stirred and provoked. And there is the Anger of a 
c Pectora qui 〈◊〉 ple vumque gementes nec copere I●…arum fluctus in pectore possunt. ●… ver. l. 3. 〈◊〉. ●…. 167.  Lion, which is slow, but strong & severe, thus Elegantly described by ᵈ Homer.  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

He first walks by with sk●…rne, but when swift youth,  
Urge him with Darts, then with devouring mo●…th  
He turns again, and at his lips is seen  
A boiling f●…ame, while his stout heart within  
Rouseth itself with 
a dolour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ●…. Immani●…●…lot insecerat Ivd Claud. Multa in Ira 〈◊〉 & Ridicula. Pl●…t.  groans: and round about  
His tail, beating his sides and loins, calls out  
And wakeneth proud Revenge. Thus stirred he flies  
Right on with red and fiery sparkling eyes  
To kill or to be killed—   
There is further a Cowardly verbal and ridiculous Anger, like that of Whelps, which bark aloud, but run away from the thing which Angers them. Which spendeth itself only in storms of empty Expressions, rather pleasing then punishing those whom they light on, and rendering the person that useth it a very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Skarre▪ Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like Geta in the Comedian.  Ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, prosternerem. 
Terent. Adelph. Act. 3. Scen. 2.  
There is a grave and serious Anger, like that of Agamemnon. An insolent and boasting Anger, 
Iliad. ●….  like that of Achilles. A sullen and stubborn Anger like that of the Romanc army disgracefully used by the Samnitians. A cruel and raging 
●…lv. lib 9 Val. Max. l. 9 cap 3. Act. 9 1. 26. 11.  Anger, like that of Scylla, who in an excess of fury, vomited up blood, & died. And thus Saul is said to 
b Herodot. Tholi●…. Val. 〈◊〉. l. 9  have breathed out threaten, and been 
〈◊〉 spirat sa●…guinem Sener. Thyest. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom. v. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Theocrit. Idyl. ●…. Ira Cadat naso vugosque Sanna Perseus 〈◊〉. 5.  exceeding mad against the Church. A revengeful and impatient Anger, as that of 
c 3. § 3 Plin lib. 33. cop. 1. Horay. Epo. l. O●…. 4.  Cambyses, who being reproved by Prexaspes for his drunkenness, con●…uted the reproof with this act of Cruelty, he shot the son of his Reproover thorough the heart, to prove the steaddinesse of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who seeing Cu. Flavius, a man of mean Condition, advanced to the Praetorship, threw away their golden Rings, (the signs of their honour) to testify their just Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expresseth the like against Menas, made of a Slave a Freeman by Pompey.  

Videsne Sacram metiente te via●…  
Cum bis ter ●…lnarum tog â  
Vt or a vertal ●…uc & huc euntium  
Liberrima Indignatio?  
Sectus flagellis hic trium viralibus  
Praconis ad fastidium,  
Arat falernimille fundi jugera  
Et appiam mannis terit.   

When thou pacest up and down  
In thy long gown,  
Seest thou how the people fret  
To see thee jet?  
How with Indignation bold,  
They cannot hold  
To see a man, so lately ploughed  
With scourges lowed,  
Until at length the weary crier,  
Began to Tyre,  
Dressing a thousand Acres now  
With Horse and blow?   
Lastly, an Anger of Emulation, or a displeasure against ourselves for coming short by our negligence of the perfections of other men whom haply by industry we might have equalled. As Themistocles professed that the trophy 
Plutarch. 〈◊〉.  of Miltiades would not suffer him to sleep. And Caesar wept wh●… he read the atchiements of Alexander, as having not at his age done any memorable 
Plutarch. in caesare.  thing. And Thucydides hearing Herodotus recite a History which he had written, broke forth into a strange passion of weeping which the Historian espying thus comforted his Father you are a happy man to be the Father of such a Son, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Who is carried 
Suidas in 〈◊〉.  with such a vehement affection unto Learning.  
But to pass over these particulars, I shall in the general content myself with a brief Consideration of the Causes and Effects of this Passion.  
The fundamental and essential Cause of 
Despect●… 〈◊〉 sum, 〈◊〉 qu●… s●…m qu●…ru Alexi. A●… Ego qu●… D●…t ùm 〈◊〉 Regina, jovuque E●… S●… & Conjux und ●…umgente 〈◊〉 annot. Bellagero, & quisquam nu men Junonu adore●…. Praeterea Aentad. 1.  Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of ourselves. Whether it be disestimation and undervaluing of a man's person, or disappointment of his purposes, or slandering his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him. or any of these particulars being impaired (if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) do work not only Anxiety and grief (which is a motion of slight) but hope also and desire to ease itself, if not in the recovery of its own loss, yet in the comfort of another man's: For Calamity 
Q. Curt. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So●…. Ajex, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉.  (as the Historian speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant, Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit dien●…. When it feels itself wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by justice or revenge to please itself in † retaliation.  
For the former of these, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himself: so it is his particular desire also, being Animal Sociale & Politicum, to be Loved by others; because hereby that Love of himself, which proceedeth from judgement and Reason, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly believe that, whereunto he hath farther authority to persuade him. And therefore though Love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a man's own, or a friends actions and beha●…iour; yet that Love, which is not blind and furious, will be ever ready to submit itself unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to itself, how easily it may miscarry, if it r●…ly upon its own censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.  
Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friend's person or parts, shall find either of them by others slighted and despised; from whose joynt-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement▪ there hence ariseth not only a 
† 〈◊〉▪ I●… d●… dolour ossibu●… a●…. Aeu●…ad. 9 Affectus nunquam sine torment●… sul violentm, qui●… dolorem cum infer 〈◊〉, pa●…, etc. Val. Max. l 9 c. 3. Dolour addidi●… Iram. Ovid. Met. 12.  grief to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalved▪ but withal a 
* ●…pes addita suscitat Iras. Aenead. 10.  Desire to make known unto the persons, who thus contemn him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, Revenge, (for all these may be the instruments of our Anger) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits itself to the government of Reason, is then always allowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemn us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and Ambition in ourselves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements or our own worth suffers them to afford us.  
To this branch of Contempt may be referred Forget fullness of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection: For Omnia quae curant, meminerunt, saith Tully: and Aristotle to the same purpose. Those things which we do respect, do not lie hid and out of our sight.  
Next hither may be referred all ungrateful persons, who sleight those favours which they have 
Ejectum, li●…tore ●…gentem. Except, & regni dem●…us in par●…e lecavi. Amissam classem 〈◊〉 a morte ●…duxi. Heu su●…●…ncensaseror, etc. Ae●…ad. 4.  received from other men's bounties, and out of a swelling and height of stomach, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations; but desire to receive benefits, as Corrupt men take Bribes in the dark, and behind their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their own eyes might be witnesses unto it: For as Tacitus speaks, Gratia oneri habetur,: such is the pride of some men, that they disdain not to be overcome in any thing▪ though it be in kindness. And therefore Vbi multum beneficiâ antevenêre, pro gratia odium redditur, saith the same Author: When they find themselves overloaden with Love, the best requi●…all which their high minds can afford, is hatred: which cannot but work a double Anger; an Anger against ourselves and our own weakness in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which so basely entertained them.  
Hither also we may refer those Locked and Close men, who even to their friends are so referred, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose judgement or Trust they might commit themselves.  
Hitherto likewise are referred Acceptation of persons in equality of merit with unequal respect, negligence of outward ceremony and beha viour▪ and generally what ever else may work an opinion that we are undervalved.  
The second branch of this first fundamental Cause was an Hindering of the projects and purposes of another, which is not only a Privative (as the former) but a Positive and real Injury, which includes that other, and adds unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; no●… an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to insenc●… nature, and make it swell, by how much violent and opposition, is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I think I may well compare to a bank, and to a Bridge, or some other stops to a River in his course: Whereof the former doth Confine the River, and not Open pose it, as not hindering it in its direct and natural motion (which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion lateral and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Latter resisting the natural course of the stream in its own channel, and standing directly cross, where the Nature should pass, makes it, not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the mean time works in it great tumult & noise.  Sp●…mens, & fervens, & ab Obice Savior ibit. 

It foams and boyles, and with a raging force,  
Fights with all Obstacles, that stop its course.   
So of these two Degrees of Contempt in Anger▪ the former as being only a Confining and Limiting Contempt, which shuts up a man's worth within too narrow and straight a judgement, works indeed a secret swelling of the Heart with Indignation at the conceit of such disesteem; but this breaks not out into that clamour (as S. Paul calls it) that noise of Anger, as the other doth, which a●…iseth out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.  
Unto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceeding, which tends to the prejudice and disappointing of any man's 
Quem ego credo manibus. pedibu●…q, 〈◊〉 omnia 〈◊〉 ma●…is i●… ad●…o nisi ut inc●…mmodet quam, etc. 〈◊〉. A●…d. Act. 1 S●…. 1.  ends; whether it be by closeness and undermining, as cheats and couzenages in the preventing of lawful, or by other politic wisdom in hindering unlawful ends; or whether by open and processed Opposition, as in matters of Emulation, Competition, Commodity, and the like; or lastly, whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desired to be undiscerned. And therefore Tacitus reckoning the ambiguous and close 
Annal l. 1.  speeches of the Emperor Tiberius, says that it was Vnicus Patrum metus si intelligere viderentar, the Senate seared nothing more than to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after: Eò acriùs accepit recludi quae premeret, nothing did more exasperate him than to see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in Scaur●…s; one of the senators, who adventuring to collect Tiberius his willingness of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his tribunitial Authority the relation thereof by the Consuls, did thereby procure his utter and jmplacable hatred.  
But of all Contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that I mean, which immediately violates our Reputation and Good name; because it is a derivative and spreading injury; not only dishonouring a man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and ears of the World; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Desire▪ the one of Perfecting; the other of Perpetuating himself: which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first Father; the honour of Integrity in goodness; and the honour of Immunity from Corruption: So there may be from the violation of these sundry degrees of Anger, or any other burdensome Passion wrought in us. But when in injury we find them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalved; but our name and memory (which belong to our prepreservation) tainted likewise, we cannot but be so much the more insenced, by how much perpetuity accumelates, either to weakness or perfection: But of this fundamental cause of anger enough.   

CHAP. XXXI. Of other Causes of Anger: first in regard of him that suffers wrong: Excellency, weakness, strong Desires, suspicion. Next in regard of him who doth it; baseness, Impudence, nearness, freedom of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effects of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulsion of Reason, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Passion.  
THose which follow, are more accidental: whereof some may be considered ex parte Patientis, on the part of him that suffers; and some ex parte Inferentis Injuriam, on the part of him that doth the Injury. Touching the patiented or subject of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to Anger, upon supposition of the fundamental Cause, Contempt: and the 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  first of these is Excellency, whether Inward from Nature, or accidental from Fortune: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuse, as well perceiving that all Injury implies some degree both of Impotency in the Patient, and of Excellency (at least conceited) in the Agent. As Aristotle speaks, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Rhet. l. 2, ●…. ●…▪  that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their own Excellency, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that mind which is possessed with his own good opinion▪ and this cause the Poet intimates in those words▪  — Manet altâ ment repôstum, 
Anead. 1.  judicium Paridis, Spretaeque injuria formae. 

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred  
To see their Beauties undervalved  
By a weak wanton judgement.   
It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of Power and wisdom to see a weak and wanton judgement give Beauty the precedence in their Emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possess a man with grief and Fury: the one example of Achitophel alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsel, when he was too low to revenge himself on Absalon, executed his Anger on his own neck.  
The second Qualification of the subject is weakness and De●…ect, when the mind finds itself assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which Aristotle hath observed, when he tells us, that 
† 〈◊〉. R●…. l 2. ●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 l 22. c 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. D●… 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Idyll. 1.  sick men, poor men and Lovers are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a pain, and a greater contempt to ●…ub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new. That injury which proceeds against men of 
Omnes quibus res lunt, minus secundae, magis 〈◊〉, ne●…cio quo modo 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 omnia accipi●… 〈◊〉 prop●… s●… 〈◊〉 impo●… 〈◊〉 se s●…per credunt n●…gligi. T●…r▪ Adolph. Act. 4. S●…. 3. 〈◊〉 inter se quam pro levibus noxij●… i●…a 〈◊〉? qua propt●…r? quia caim qui eos guberuat 〈◊〉 insirmum 〈◊〉. Ide. Hecyr. Act. 3 5 c. 1.—. Minuti semper, & in●… est animi exiguique voluptas ultio. Inu. n. Sat. 13. Iracundiores sunt Incolumibus languidi saemina maribus, etc. A●…m. Mar. lib. 27. Vi●…. Causia. de 〈◊〉. l. 8. 〈◊〉 29. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sophoc. Ajax. Sen de 〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 21.  high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep as that which is exercised upon open and naked weakness: because the former proceeds only from strife and emulation; but the other from insultation and pride: the one is only a disesteem; but the other a contumely and exprobration: the one is a conflict of judgements, but the other a conflict of passions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unless, as sometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from baseness and Ignorance) is an injury from Worth also: but a Neglect, and despising men already down, is an injury from stomach and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour so much to clear itself from the Imputation, as to revenge itself for it.  
Another reason why weakness the better disposeth a man to Anger, may be, because such men are most Tender to feel an injury, most suspicious to fear it, and most Interpreting to over-judge it. All which being circumstances of aggravation to increase a wrong, are likewise good means to add degrees and heat unto our Passion.  
Lastly, to give a reason of both these two former causes together, it may be a Disappointment and Frustrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weak and defective, expect Compassion to cover, and not Pride to mock, and so double their wounds: and both these are in some sort debts of Nature, it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover nakedness: and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in ourselves: so neither to rejoice or think evil of another: and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks itself lawful.  
Unto this particular of weakness we may also reduce that which the Grammatian hath observed on Virgil, Plus Irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui irascimur. Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therefore the chaining up of Woolves and mastiffs enrageth them, because it restraineth them; which the Poet hath excellently described. 
〈◊〉. 〈◊〉.   

Ac veluti pleno Lupus iusidiatis evili,  
Cum fremit ad caulos, ventos perpessus & imbres  
Nocte super media: tuti sub matribus agni  
Balatum exercent. Ille asper & improbus irâ  
Savit in absentes, collecta fatig at edendi  
Ex longo rabbiss, & siccae sanguine fauces.  
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castra tuenti  
Ignescunt Ira, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.   

As a fierce wolf with winds, storms, midnight, whet  
When in close solds the secure lambs do bleat,  
Barks at his absent prey with the more Ire:  
When raged and deceived Hunger doth him tire.  
So Rutilus seeing his foes all safe,  
Doth vex and boil with the more burning chase.   
For it is a great torment to an Enemy, when he 
Vid. Pl●…t. d●… capiend. ex host. utilitat.  can find no inlet nor advantage against him, whom he hates.  
Another cause of Anger may be strong Desires: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lucian.  For always vaster and more exact our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therefore as the Philosopher notes, Luxurious men are usually transported with Anger, 
R●…et. l. 10.  because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures: and hence as Plutarch observes, men are 
De Ira. lib.  usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant: as a countryman with his bailiff; or an Epicure with his cook; or a Lover with his corrival, because all these cross men in that which they most love. Now strength when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excess; as we see in Winds or Rivers, when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.  
The last Qualification of the Subject, whereby he is made more Inclinable to this Passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out injury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its Anger may be employed) to frame occasions unto itself. And therefore 'tis wise advise of Seneca, Non vis esse Iracundus? ne sis 
S●…n. de Ir●…. l. 3. c. 11.  Curiosus. He which is too wise in his judgement on other men's errors, will be easily too foolish in the nourishing of his own Passion: and it's commonly seen in matters of censure and suspicion, the more sight and reason goes out, the less useth to abide within. Now is it hard for a man, if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find out, either in defects of Nature, or rudeness of custom, habit, education, temper, humour or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, will prove rather strangeness than injury.  
And this is generally a Corruption of Anger▪ First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastening itself there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that suspicion proceeds from gild, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it: as it is observed of some reproachful speeches, which a senator was accused to have uttered against the honour of Tiberius: Quia ver a erant dicta credebantur. His suspicious mind was persuaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custom under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgement; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisdom. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasly, being led by a half judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.  
The next degree of causes is of those which qualify the Agent, or him that worketh the injury, and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these general ones.  
First baseness, which works a double cause of Anger: One for an injury of Omission, in neglecting those respects which are required in men of mean and inferior rank towards their superiors: Another for a positive enquiry in the evil exercised against them. And many times the former alone is a cause of Anger, without the later: For this distance of persons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, insomuch that those demeanours, which are commendable and plausible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend toward those that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to be set out so terrible unto us: because of the infinite distance between the unmeasurable Glory of the Maker of the World, and the baseness of sinners; and therefore the comparison which useth to be made for the defence of venial sins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more merciful than men, should yet be offended at that which a man's neighbour would pardon him for, as a foolish angry word, or the stealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reason: because between man and man there is a Community both in nature and weakness; and therefore,  Ha●…c veniam, petimu●…que damusque vicissim. 

Because we both our errors have,  
We pardon give, and pardon crave.   
But it is an Argument of infinite Insolence in a vile Creature for feeding it own Corruption and self-love in a matter of no value to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.  
The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raise this Passion is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons hereof may be:  
First, because as Aristotle observes, all Impudence is joined with some Contempt, which is the fundamental and essential Cause of Anger.  
Secondly, because all Impudence is bold, stiff and contentious, which are all incitements to this Passion. For as Shame being a Degree of fear works an acknowledgement of our own weakness; and therefore a submission to the power 
〈◊〉. l. 2 c. 3. Corpora mag●… satis est prostrare Leo●…l. 〈◊〉 num ●…inem, cum jac●… host is ●…al▪ 〈◊〉 Ovid. Trist. li●…. 3. Eleg. 5.  we have provoked, which as Aristotle observes) procureth from beasts themselves lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary Effect.  
Thirdly, those things which we Impudently do, we do willingly likewise. And therefore we shall observe in the Scripture how reigning sins that is, those which are done with greedine●…se of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of stubbornness, Rebellion, whorish forehead, brass, and iron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reasons are,  
First, because a man's Power is in his Will▪ but Passions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the easier borne withal.  
Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (such as I take most of Impudence to be) there are required Antecedenter, Deliberation, Approbation, and Assent▪ and Consequenter▪ Resolution, Perseverance, and Constancy. All which, as they take away the two principal conditions required unto Lenity; confession and Repentance: so likewise do they add much to the weight of an injury, because an actition which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole Man, and employs a perfect consent thereunto: so a perfect and complete en mity toward the person offendeth thereby. Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are of those of the will, led by an ignorant; or those of Passion, led by a traduced understanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an Vnjointed and Paralyticke part, which follows not the motion of a stayed reason; and therefore as they proceed from more disorder in ourselves, so do they work less in the party offended.  
Another thing which may raise and nourish this Passion, is any degree of near Relation between the parties; whether it be natural by Consanguinity; or moral, by Society, Liberality, or any 
〈◊〉. de 〈◊〉. l. 2 c. 31.  other friendship. For as it is prodigious in the Body natural to see one member wrong and provoke another: so in unions civil or moral, it is strangely offensive to make a divulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or 
† job. 19 19 Z ●…b. 13. 6. Psal. 41. 9 55. 12.  strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.  
And the reason why this difference between men nearly referring each other should work a greater Anger between them, is: First, because herein we may find that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of Expectation: For in this case, we expect Sympathy & not Division. Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of disjoining or Divulsion of things before joined: there therefore, where is the greatest union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation; as in the Body, the Divulsion of soul is more horrible than of an arm, or some other member; because the one is an essential, the other only an integral union: and so it is with those who are by blood or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.  
Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great freedom and indiscreet use of speech; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke: For as Solomon's speech is true, Mollis responsio frangit Iram, a soft answer pacifies wrath: so on the contrary it is true likewise, Dura Correptio unit Iram; that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourished than by much speaking, though not in the par●…y that speaketh; because Speech is to Anger, like tears to grief, a spending and venting of it, yet always in another, unto whom we minister farther matter of offence. To which purpose, is that speech of Syracides. Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.  
Another Cause, which I shall observe is contention and Difference, whether it be in Opinions or in Inclinations: because this must needs be ever joined with some undervaluing of another man's choice and judgement; which if it be not seasoned with much sobriety, will easily induce a man to believe, that it proceeds not from zeal to Truth, but from a humour of Opposition. Wherewith many men are so fare possessed, that one must hardly dare to speak the truth in their company for fear of endangering it and them. Like Chry●…ippus in Laertius, who used to boast that he often wanted Opinions, but those once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and sophisms to defend them.  
The last cause which I shall note of this Passion is in him, who offends us, his very Abilities, when we see them neglected: for this provokes to more displeasure, then naked impotency. Weakness, when it miscarries, is the object of pity: but strength, when it miscarries, is the object of Anger.  

—— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Illiad. 117.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

I should not blame unworthy and base spirits  
To sl●…g and shrink from Battle: but for merits  
So to forget themselves, for you to be  
Unlike the men you are, What man can see  
Such weakness, and not wonder, chide, debate;  
Till you yourselves do your own errors hate.   
Unto all these we might add some others which the Philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our Calamities, or rejoyeing at them, or divulging 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Vid. quae de hac 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nun●…ius apud 〈◊〉. An●…g.  them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the signs which may bring into mind the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite sent the parts of his Abused Concubine up and down unto the Tribes of Israel to move them unto Indignation. So 
〈◊〉. lib 44.  Antony in the funeral Oration upon julius Caesar produced his robe stained with the blood which Brutus and Cassius had shed, to work ad●…testation of that fault in the people.  
Now concerning all these causes together (because it would be two tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it ariseth from any of them, is then only Regular and just, when it keeps these conditions.  
I First, that it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of Love: otherwise it i●… not Ira in Delictum, but Ira in fratrem not agains●… the Crime but the person of my brother: 〈◊〉 kn●…w the nature of this passion is to be Transient to go out from us on our brother and reform him: not Immanent to work upon ourselves and deform us: I mean by soiling the habit of Charity, which ought always to remain inviolate.  
2 Secondly, that it keep likewise due proportion unto judgement, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not only to be Angry with our brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement then must be true first, that is, clear, settled, and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the Act of Direction or Government, which reacheth unto the Passion.  
3 And next it must be a whole judgement: and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives it degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the Act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joined thereunto.  
Secondly, it must judge fully of the Act of Passion, not only in Informing, quod sit, that Reparation of ourselves is lawful; but 〈◊〉 too, in the manner and form how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in 
Ira de Causa 〈◊〉 Iracundia de vitio. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  itself, wants the tongue of judgement to inform it what to do; So, being blind, it wants the hand of judgement to lead it in the doing of it: and this I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by Athenodorus the Philosopher, unto Augustus to repeat 
D●…d m●…●… 〈◊〉 Lit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a lu●…andi 〈◊〉 cobibentes p●…ius dom●… ex●…. Jubebant, ut esset deliberandi spatium. Vid. ●… lut. qu. Rom. q. 28. Vid. l'lutarch. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  over the Alphabet between the Passion and the Revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the mind from the occasion to some other trifle, which is only to cousin and not to conquer ou●… distemper; and therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of empirics, which give present ease, but search not into the root, nor leave such ●…n habit within, as shall in after occasions limit the unruliness of such distempers, like those odours which use to raise men out of a fit of the falling sickness, but do not all cure them of the disease.  
Now to speak a word or two of the Effects of this Passion: they are such as are wrought, either in ourselves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which ●…each to our bodies, or inward, which reflect upon Reason.  
Those on the body are clamour (as Saint Paul calls it) in the Tongue, Tumour and Inflammation in the Heart▪ Fire in the Eyes, and fierceness and paleness in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be Governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of these alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely the testification of our just displeasures at an offence received, and the inlivening or sharpening of us (if occasion require to the prosecution of further lawful redress; for 
Vid. ene●…. de ●…ra lib. 2. c. 35. Vos qu●… si ●…edia specul●…m spectetis in Irá. Cognoscat saciem vix satis 〈◊〉 ●…uam O ●…id. de art Amandl. lib. 3. Vid. Plutarch. Plumbea●… iras 〈◊〉 Plaut. Ethic. lib. 7.  though I would not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turn his face into a torment punishing himself as much with Deformity, as his adversary with fear, yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politic and stomach Anger, which cunningly shrowds itself under a calm and serene countenance; which being unnatural to this passion (whose property it is, Non insidiari sed palàm agere, not to work by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.  
The Inward Effect of this Passion, is an Excitation of Reason; to judge of the wrong and means of redress, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministereally and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous, when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason; which is to make it a party rather than a judge.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 

Which makes sometimes a Wise man break  
Into Distempers wild and weak.   
In which ill office there is not any Passion more busy and fruitful than this of Anger by reason of its suddenness, and of its violence: both which are strong means to smother or divert Reason, as we see in Tiberius himself, who though a man of a close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions (insomuch as he lived in them and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by Agrippina, to a more violent Anger then usual, his Passion we see for the time altered his nature. Et veram occulti pectoris voc●…m elicuit, Num ide●… l●…deretur, quia non regnaret. He broke forth into words, strange and unusual from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not reign? which is Tacitus his observation upon the Anger of that man.  
The last Effect is expedition and Dexterity inexecuting those means which Reason judgeth needful for satisfying ourselves against the person 
Vires inijcit ad pericula 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. lib. 3. ●… 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vid. Cal. Rh●…d. l. 1●…. c. 5 3. l. 7  that hath offended us, wherein it's assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in man's actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one main corruption is to be avoided, Precipitancy and impatience of Delay or Attendance on the determination of right reason▪ which makes it commonly run away with an half or a broken judgement. In which respect Aristle in his ethics very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away posting with half his errand and to Dogs, which, as soon as ever they hear a noise, bark presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the door, or no●… so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justness of seeking redress, & then suddenly hastens away without any further listening to the rules of Decorum and justice, which it should always observe in the prosecution thereof: Lest while it is too intent on his own right, it fall in that extreme which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.  
There is not any Passion which standeth more in need of Moderation than this doth, both because it is one of the frequentest which we are troubled with, and the most unruly, as that which can overbeare the rest, and, of all other, hath the least recourse to 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucyd. lib. 2.  Reason, being hasty, Impetuous, full of Desires, grief, self-love, Impatience, which spareth no 
b Plutarch. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sen. de Ira lib. 3. cap. 〈◊〉. & 〈◊〉.  persons, friends or ●…oes, no things, animate or 
c Ip●… 〈◊〉 qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…m. 〈◊〉 S●…t. 10. Pl●…. de Ira.  in animate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore 
d Donat & Coel. Rhod. l. 12 c. 53.  Grammarians tell us that it hath its name Ira from Ire, because a man in his Anger usually goeth away from his Reason, and as his Anger slackens, he is said, ad se redire, to return again unto himself. And therefore those men in whom Reason is most predominant, are least transported by this Affection, and most often displeased with themselves for it. It was a strange commendation given to 
a So crat. lib. 7. c. 22.  Theodosius junior, that never any man saw him Angry; And such a power had 
b Plutarch. in Lyc.  Lycurg●… over himself, that when an insolent young ●…n had done him no less injury than the striking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and mansu●…tude he convinced and gained him. 
c Plut. ●…n Pericle.  And Pericles that great Statesman and orator of Greece, being all the day reviled by a●… Impure companion, commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house 
* 
Senec. de Ira lib. 3. c. 12 & 38.  
Plut. de serd num: vidi●…at.   nothing more obvious than Examples of this kind.  
That we may therefore so ma●…nage this Passion as to be Angry but not sin, it will be requisite▪  
1 To let it have an Eye upward, as Moses did, whonever expressed any other Anger that we read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.  
2 To convert it Inward into a selfe-displicency 

Sicut aquil●… es 〈◊〉 inter a●… bulandum ungu●… intro 〈◊〉.  
Vid. Plu. de ●…u 〈◊〉 S●…n. de. ●…ra, l●…b. 2. cap. 2●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ir●… l. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   and severity towards our own errors, for the more acquainted any man is with himself, the less matter he will find of Anger with other men, as having so much both to do, and to blame at home. Anger ever ●…riseth from the Value which we set upon ourselves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.  
3 fellow it not too Close, join not too soon, not too hastily with it, though it may be used sometimes, it must never be encouraged, being overbold and forward of itself. And therefore as many drugs must be prepared before we may 〈◊〉 to use them; so we must take heed of disp●…ing this affection without its due corrective●… 
Plutarch de And. poe●…u.  must first be schooled before it be employed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soon as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.  
4 keep it not long, it is the spawn of Malice and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a Corroding thing which will fret and stain the vessel in which it is kept. Let not the sun go down upon it, 'tis ill being in the dark with so bad a Leader. It may pass through the heart of a wise man, but it Resteth only in the b●…some of fools.  
5 Remove the Occasions of it, withdraw fuel from so catching a Flame. They say of Turpentine, and some other like things. That they will draw and suck Fire unto them. Certainly of all Fire there is none so ductile, so sequacious and obsequious, as this of Wr●…th. It was not ill done therefore of 
Pl●…, A●…opt. S●…. de ●…ra lib. 3. c. 40. C●…. ●…od. l. 12▪ ●…. 52.  C●…tys and Augustus, To cause those curious Vessels to be broken of purpose, which having been accidentally broken might have made ●… breach likewise upon the dis●…retion of their owners.  
6 Give not an easy ear to Reports▪ nor 
〈◊〉 d●… I●…a 〈◊〉 ●…. 22 23, 2●…  an easy entertainment to suspicio●…s, be not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wronged thee. That which we are desirous to know, or apt to believe, we shall be the more ready to revenge. Curiosity and ●…dulity, 
Plu●…. in Alex. & l. curiosit. ●… Dion. C●…ss. l. 41.  are the handmaids unto Passion. Alexander would not see the woman after ●…hom he might have Lusted▪ Nor Caesar search Pompey's Cabinet, l●…st he should find new matters of Revenge. He chose rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. Inju●…ies unknown do many times the less hurt; when I have found them, I then begin to feel them, and suffer more from mine own discovery then from mine enemy's attempt.  
7 Bee Candid in Interpreting the thing●… wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glass through which I look, makes that seem formidable, and the wave, that crooked, which in itself was beautiful and strait. Haply thou art Angry with that which could not intent to hurt thee, Thy book, thy pen, the stone at which thou stumblest, the wind 
S●…. d●… Ira lib. 2. c, 26.  or rain that beats upon thee: be Angry gain, but with thyself, who art either so bold as to be Angry with GOD, or so foolish, as to be Angry with nothing. Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage, Call it not Injury but Imprudence, and then pity it. Thou art Angry with counsel, reproof, Discipline; why dost thou not as well break the glass in which thy physician ministereth a potion unto thee. Be Angry with thy sin, and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is he that adviseth thee thy superior? Thine Anger is undutiful, is he thy friend, thine Anger is ungrateful.  
8 Give Injuries a New Name, and that will work a new Affection. In blind Agents call it Chance▪ in weak Persons, Infirmity, In simple, Ignorance, in wise counsel, in superiors, Discipline, In equals, Familiarity ' in inferiors, Confidence, where there is no other construction to be made, do as Joseph and David did, call it Providence, and see what God says to thee by it. Get a mind 
Minimas rerum discordia turbat pac●…m su●…●…●…enent Lucan Vid. Sen. l. 4. c. 33. S●…n. de Ira l. 2. c. 25. 26.  conversant with high and noble things, the more heavenly, the less Tempestuous.  
9 Be not Idle, Sluggish, Luxurious, we are never more apt to be Angry, then when we are sleepy or greedy. Weak resolutions and strong Desires are sensible of the least exa●…peration, as an empty ship of the smallest Tempest.  
Again be not ●…ver-busie neither▪ That man can hardly be master of his Passion that is not master of his employments. A mind ever burdened, like a Bow always bend must needs grow impotent, and weary, the fittest preparations to this distemper. When a man's business doth not poise, but press him, there will ever be something either undone or ill-done, and so still matter of Vexation. And therefore our minds as our Vessels 

Plutarch. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sen●…. l. 3. c. 6. Sen. de Ira l. 3. cap. 16.  
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sopb. Autig. Plut. Sympos. ●…. 4. q●…, 2.   must be unloaded, if they would not have a Tempest hurt them.  
Lastly, wrestle not with that which pincheth thee. If it be strong it will hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. He that strives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempest breaks not the stalks of corn, which rends asunder the arms of an oak, the one yields, the other withstands it. An humble weakness is safer from injury, than a stubborn strength.  
I have now done with the Passions of the mind. And briefly proceed to those Honours and Dignities of the soul of Man which belong unto it in a more abstracted Consideration.   

CHAP. XXXII. Of the original of the Reasonable soul, whether it be immediately Created and Infused, or derived by seminal Traduction from the Parents. Of the Derivation of original sin.  
THe dignity of Man in respect of his soul alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the whole, or of the par●…s thereof. Concerning the whole, we shall consider two things; It's original, and its Nature. Concerning the original of the soul, divers men have diversely thought; for, to let pass the Opinion of 
a Phila●…ri de Haeres. Sel●…uci, etc.  Seleucus, who affirmed that it was educed out of the Earth, and that 
b 〈◊〉 Tract. ad Menam contra Orig. Hieron. Epist. ad M●…cell. & 〈◊〉 Theophyl. Alex. Ep. Pasc. ●…. Anasta●…. 〈◊〉 Anagog. Contempt. lib. 11.  of Origin and the Plato●…ists who say that the souls of men were long ago created, and after detruded into the Body as into a Prison: There are three Opinions touching this question. The first of those who affirm the Traduction of the soul by genera●…, some of which so affirm because they judged 〈◊〉 a corporeal substance, as did 
c Aug. de 〈◊〉. 86. cp. 157 de Gen. ad lit. l. 10. c. 25. Tertull. de 〈◊〉 c. 5. 6. 7. 22. 25. 27.  Tertullian. Others because they believed that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as 
d Hieron. Epist. ad Marcelli●…um. 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. Juciferian apud Aug. 〈◊〉. 81.  Apollinarius, Nemesi●…, and divers in the Western Churches, as St. Jerome witnesseth. The second, of those who deby the natural Traduction, and say that the soul is 〈◊〉 ●…ion infused into Bodies, organised and praedisposed to receive them; of which Opinion among the Ancients were 
e Hieron. cp. ●…d ●…am. contra Joan▪ Hi●…us.  St. Hierom, 
f Hilar. de Trin. l. 10.  Hilary, 
g Ambros. de Noah & Arc●…. c. 4.  Ambrose, 
h Lactant. de 〈◊〉. Hom. c. ●….  Lactantius, 
i Theod. de curand ●…gr. affect. ser. 4.  Theodoret. 
k Aeneas Gaz. in su●… 〈◊〉.  Aeneas Gaz●…us, and of the modern Writers the major part. The third is of those who do haesitare, stick between both, and dare affirm nothing certain on either side, which is the moderation of 
l Aug ●…p. 7. 18. 157. & 〈◊〉. l. 1 c. 1. de Gen. ad li●…. 10. & de 〈◊〉.  St. Augustine and Gregory 
m Greg. l. 7. cp. 53.  the great, who affirm that this is a question incomprehensible, and unsolvable in this life. Now the only reason which caused St. Austin herein to haesitate, seemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing Original sin from the Parents to the Children. For saith he (writing unto St. Jerome touching the Creation of the soul) If this Opinion do not oppugn that most fundamental faith of Original sin, let it then be mine, but if it do oppugn it, let it not be thine.  
Now since that Opinion which denieth the Traduction, seemeth most agreeable to the spiritual substance of the soul, I shall here produce some few reasons for the Creation, and solve an argument or two alleged for the Traduction of the soul, reserving notwithstanding unto myself, and others, the liberty and modesty of St. Augustine's haesitation, which also I find allowed 
Eccles. 11. 5.  by the Holy Ghost himself.  
Two things there are of certainty in this point. 1. That the soul is not any corporeal mass or substance measurable by quantity, or capable of substantial augmentation. 2. That the Traduction of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things, That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle; & that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but Ratione semi●…ali, & per modum decisionis, by a seminal way, and the decision, separation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, The Arguments against Traduction are these.  
First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the Father of spirits, as our natural Parent the Father of our bodies, Job 33. 4. Eccles. 12. 7. Esa 57 16. Num. 16. 22. 27. 16. Heb. 12. 9 Zach. 12. 1. which though they do not according to the judgement of St. Aug. conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet do they much favour the probability of this Opinion.  
2. To have Being by Traduction, is, when the soul of the Child is derived from the soul of the Parent, by the means of Seed: but the Seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soul, both because the one is a corporeal, the other a spiritual substance, uncapable of Augmentation, or Detriment. Now that which is spiritual, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeal: neither can any Seed be discinded or issue out from the soul, being substantia sim●…lex, & impartibilis, a substance simple, and indivisible.  
3. That which is separable from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its Being or making upon it; for if by the Generation of the Body the soul be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted; for every thing that is generable, is corruptible. But the soul can subsist and work without the Body; therefore it doth not from corporeal generation derive its Being.  
4. If the soul be seminally traduced, it must he either from the body, or from the soul of the Parents▪ not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its own sphere, and more noble than itself; not from the soul, because that being a spiritual and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substantial seed unto the constitution of another soul.  
5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the soul is form, than it is not traduced by natural generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soul is form; for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seed of the soul would perish, and by consequence the soul itself would be corruptible, as having its original from corruptible seed. These and divers 
H●…eron. ad Pammach. & in l. 32. Eccles. 12. Co●…tr. Ruffiaum l. 2. c. 1. 2. & dialog▪ de Orig●…n. Anim▪ inter ●…peracjus Tom.  other the like arguments are used to confirm the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable soul. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the forecited Fathers. St. Jerome telleth us that the original of the soul in mankind is not as in other living creatures. Since as our Saviour speaketh, The Father worketh hitherto. And the Prophet Esat telleth us, That he formeth the spirit of m●…n within him, and fram●…th the hearts of all men; as it is in the psalms. And so Lactamius (whom I do wonder to find numbered amongst the Authors that affirm the Traduction of the soul, by Ruffinus, and the Author of the Dialogue amongst the works of Jerome). It may be questioned (saith he) whether the soul be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true; Because the seed of the soul is not put into the Body by either, or both of these. A Body may be borne out of their Bodies, because something may be out of both contributed; but a soul cannot be borne out of their souls, in as much as from so spiritual and incomprehensible a substance nothing can issue forth or be severed for that use. So also St. Hilary, The soul of 
Hilar. de T●…in. l▪ 10. & in p. 62▪  man is the work of God; the generation of the flesh is always of the flesh. And again, It is inbred and an impressed belief in all; that our souls have a divine original: And in like manner Theodoret, God (saith he) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of Bodies subsisting before; but the souls, not of all creatures, but of Men only he worketh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of nothing that had been before.  
Against this Doctrine of the souls original, 
At ●…ag. d●… Res●…r. G●…d. de Eccles. dog. ●…. 23.  The principal argument is drawn from the consideration of Original sin, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled and staggered S. Augustine in this point. For if the 
Aug. cp. 28.  soul be not naturally traduced, how should original sin be derived from Adam unto it? And if it were not in the loins of Adam, than neither did it sin in his loins; whereas the Apostle expressly telleth us, that by one Man sin came into the world, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by natural Propagation, deriving an inhaerent habitual pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soul of every man that entereth into the world, and is the fruit of Adam's loins.  
Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the soul by the immediate contact of the flesh, and the Parents attinging the ultimate disposition of the Body, upon which naturally followeth the Union of the soul, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence, which he in the virtue of a first and supreme cause is to contribute unto them.) I shall set down what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.  
First then, it is most certain that God did not implant Original sin, not take away Original righteousness from Man, but man by his prevarication 
Aug. de ●…ivit. De●…. l. 13. ●…. 14.  and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a defiled nature to his posterity. For as Ma●…arius excellently speaketh, Adam having 
Ma●…ar. Ho. 1●….  transgressed, did lo●… the pure pos●…esion of his Nature.  
Secondly, original injustice as it is a sin, by the default and contraction of Man, so it is also a punishment by the ordination, and disposition of Divine Justice. It was man's sin to cast away 
Aug. contr. Jul. l▪ 5. c▪ 3.  the Image of God; but it is Gods just judgement (as he hath that free dispensation of his own Gifts) not to restore it again in such manner as at first he gave it unto that nature which had so rejected and trampled on it.  
Thirdly, In this Original sin, there are two things considerable, The Privation of that righteousness, which ought to be in us; and the lust or Habitual concupiscence, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The Privation and want of original justice is meritoriously from Adam, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that original rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his most righteous and free disposition is pleased not to restore unto his Nature in his posterity again. In the habitual lust are considerable these two things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The sinful disorder of it, And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Punishment of sin by it. Consider it is as a Punishment of Adam's first prevarication; and so, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Justice, who did most righteously forsake Adam, after his wilful fall, and leave him in the Hand of his own counsel, to transmit unto us that Seminary of sin which himself had contracted.  
But if we consider it as a sin, we then say that the immediate and proper cause of it, is lapsed nature whole and entire by Generation and seminal Traduction derived upon us. But the Re●…ter cause is that, from which we receive and derive this Nature. Nature I say first fallen; for unto Nature Innocent belonged original righteousness, and not original sin.  
2. Nature derived by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loins, and of the womb. For though Christ had our Nature, yet he had not our sin.  
3. Nature whole and entire. For neither part (as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sin. For it is improbable that any stain should be transfused from the Body to the Soul, as from the foul vessel to the clean water put into it. The Body itself being not solely and alone in itself corrupt and sinful; else, all Abortions and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sin.  
Original sin therefore most probably seemeth to arise by Emanation, partial in the parts, total in the whole; from man's Nature as guilty, forsaken, and accursed by God for the sin of Adam. And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by virtue of their concurrence and union, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the soul be a partial subject or seat of original sin; yet we have not our sin and our soul from one Author; because sin follows not the part, but the Nature whole and entire. And though we have not from our Parents Totum naturae, yet we have totam naturam, we have our whole nature, though not every part of our nature. Even as whole Christ was the Son of Mary, who therefore by virtue of the Communication of properties in Christ, is justly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Mother of God, against the Nestorians in the council of Chalcedon. Though in regard of his divine Nature, he was without beginning; & the reason is, because the integrity of Nature ariseth from the union of the two parts together, which is perfected by Generation; so than we say that Adam is the original, and meritorious cause. Our next Parents, the instrumental and immediate cause of this sin in us, not by way of physical Emission or Transmigration of sin from them to us, but by secret contagion, as S. Augustine speaks. 
Contr. julian. l. 5. c. 14.  For having in the Manner aforesaid from Adam by our Parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the gild and Curse of the first prevarication, from this Nature thus derived, as guilty and accursed doth immediately and intimately flow habitual pollution. So then habitual Concupiscence is from Adam alone meritoriously by reason of his first prevarication. From Adam by the mediation of our Parents seminally by natural generation. And from Nature generated not as Nature, but as in Adam guilty, forsaken and accursed, by secret and ineffable Resultancy and Emanation. This is that which I conceive of this Great difficulty, not unmindful in the mean time of that speech of 
Nihil peccato originals ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Au●…. de morb. Eccles. cap. 22.  S. Augustine, That there is nothing more certain to be known, and yet nothing more secret to be understood than Original sin. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soul, they are not of such moment; And therefore I pass them by, and proceed to the consideration of the soul in its Nature.   

CHAP. XXXIII. Of the Image of God in the Reasonable soul, in regard of its simplicity, and spirituality.  
COncerning the dignity of the soul in its nature and essence, Reason hath adventured thus fare, to confess that 
Macrobius de s●…mno Scip. p 1. c. 14 divine particula 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Philo.  the soul of man, is in some sort a spark and beam of divine brightness. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath warranted that it was breathed into him by God himself, and was made after his Image and likeness, not substantially, as if there 
a Vid. contra 〈◊〉 impietatem d●…cretum con●…il, ●…racar. cap. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Da●…se. de orth. fid. lib 2. cap. 12.  were a Real Emanation and Traduction of the soul out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Resemblance, and imitation of God properties in man's original created nature which is more notable in him, than in the othe●… parts of the world; there is indeed in all God 
〈◊〉 est ollis vigour & c●…lestis Origo.  works some kind of image, and lineaments, an●… footsteps of his glory.  Deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque Tractusque maris Coelumque profundum, etc. 

For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky,  
Are filled with divine immensity.   
The whole world is a great 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Orig. apud Euseb. de praepar. Evang. lib. 6. c. 11. F●…nxit i●… essigie●… mod●…tum c●…ncta Deorum. Ovid. Met. 1. In alii●… creature 〈◊〉 est simili●…udo dei tantùm per m●…dum Vest●…i; in Sola Rationali Creatura per modum imaginis. Vid. Aquin. part. 1. qu. 93. art. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo. apud Euseb. de praepar. Eva●…g. lib. ●…. cap. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Gieg. Nyssen. Serm 〈◊〉 in verb●… illa s●…amus 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. Ethic lib. ●…0 c 7. Deorum cognatione ●…enetur. 〈◊〉. de Divin. lib. 1. & lib. de A●…icit. Porphyr. apud Euseb. de pr●…p. Ev●…g lib. 11. cap. 28 lib. 1. Clem. Alex. in s●… lib. 4 Strom●…. Ipse etiam C●…c. in somnio Scipio.  book, wherein we read the praise, glory, power, and infiniteness of him that made it, but man is after a more peculiar manner called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the image and glory of God; the greater world is only God's workmanship, wherein is represented the wisdom and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the workman; but man (in the original purity of nature) is besides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impressed by that divine spirit (whose work it is to seal) a spiritual resemblance of his own goodness and sanctity. Again, the greater world was never other than an Orator to set forth the power and praises of God; but he made the soul of man, in the beginning as it were his Oracle, wherein he fastened a perfect knowledge of his law and will, from the very glimpses and corrupted relics of which Knowledge of his Law, some have been bold to call men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ the kindred of God, And Senec. Liber Animus & Diis cognatus; which is the same with that of Aratus cited by S. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for we are his offspring, yea Euripides (as Tully in his * Tusculans observes,) was bold to call the soul of man, by the name of God; and Seneca will venture so fare too. Quid aliud vocas animum quàm deum in humano corpore 
S●…cc. cp. 31. & 41.  hospitantem. But to forbear such boldness, as (it may be) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry: certain it is, that there are (as Tully many times divinely observes) sundry similitudes between God and the mind of man. There are indeed some Attributes of God, not only incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in man's soul, as immensity, infiniteness, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility, and the like; but whatsoever spiritual, and rational perfections the power & bounty of God, conferred upon the soul in its first Creation, are all of them so many shadows and representations 
Vid. Aug. de Gen. ad li●…. lib. 6. c. 12.  of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.  
The Properties then and Attributes of God, 
A●…bros. Hexam. lib. 6. c. 8. Tertull. lib. ●…. contra Marci●…. cap, q. 9 16. Clem. Alex. in Protreptic p. 30. Basil. Hexam. Hom●…. 10.  wherein this Image chiefly consists, are first these three. Spirituality with the two immediate consequents thereof, Simplicity and Immortality, in which the soul hath partaked without any after corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vast, and needless, to confute those 
* Vid. Theodored. Serm. 5. de Natura Hom & Nemes. cap. ●…. S●…u, Nyssen. lib. de Ani●…i. Platarch de placitis Philosoph. l. 4. c. 2. Tertul. de Anim. Senec. Nat. qu. l. 7. c. ●…4  sundry opinions of ancient Philosophers, concerning the substance of the soul; many where of Tully in the first of his Tusculans hath reported; And Aristotle confuted in his first de Anima. Some conceived it to be blood, others the brain, some fire, others air; some that it consists in Harmony and Number; and the Philosopher Dicaearchus, that it was nothing at all but the body disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these pass as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.  
There are sundry natural reasons to prove the 
* Vid. Nem●…s. de Anim. cap. 2. Cl●…udi ●…n. Mamercum de statu An●…me. lib 2. Plotin, a●…d ●…u. sib. de praeparat. Evang. l. 25 c 21 Damisc de Orthod. fi. le. l. 2. c 12 Plutarch. lib. de placitis Philosoph. lib. ●…. c. 2. 3. Aug. lib. de quan●…itate Anime.  Spirituality of the soul; as first, the manner of its working, which is immaterial by conceiving objects, as universal, or otherwise purified from all grossness of matter, by the Abstraction of the Active understanding, whereby they are made in some sort proportional to the nature of the Intellect Passive, into which the species are impressed.  
Secondly, it's in dependence on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soul require the concurrence of the commonsense and imagination, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the object, not by way of assistance to the elicit and immediate act. They only present the species, they do not qualify the perception. Phantasmata are only objecta operation is; the objects they are, not instrumenta operandi, the instruments of the souls working. The Act of understanding is immediately from the soul, without any the least concurrences of the body there▪ unto, although the things whereon that act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily organs to represent them unto the soul; as light doth not at all concur to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the visive faculty, but only serves as an extrinsecall assistance for qualification of the Medium and object that must be seen. And this reason Aristotle 
lib. 3. de Ani●…a. cap. 5.  hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soul, is not mixed with any body, but hath a nature altogether divers therefrom, because it hath no bodily organ, as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the Soul immaterial, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within itself, as is more manifest in the reflection of the soul, upon its own nature, being an operation (as he expressly 
Ibid. cap. 6.  speaketh) separable therefrom, the soul being not only actus informans, a form informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but actus subsistens too, a form subsisting; And that per se, without any necessary dependence upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.  
Another reason of Aristotle in the same place, is the difference between material and Immaterial powers. For (saith he) all bodily cognoscitive faculties do suffer offence and damage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightness of the sun, the ear from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the lik●…. But the understanding on the contrary side is perfected by the worthiest contemplations, and the better enabled for lower inquiries. And therefore Aristotle in his ethics, placeth the most complete happiness of man, in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastened on the divinest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatifical vision (which, as fare as Nature goes, is called the contemplation of the first cause) and an eternal satiating the soul with beholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.  
Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the Understandings Objects, which have so much the greater conformity to the soul, by how much the more they are divine and abstracted. Hoc habet animus argumentum suae divinitatis, (saith Seneca) quòd illum divina delectam. This argument of its divineness hath the mind of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the soul were corporeal, it could not possibly reach to the knowledge of any, but material substances, and those that were of its own Nature; otherwise we might as well see Angels with our eyes, as understand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reason is, that axiom in Philosophy, that all reception is ad modum recipientis, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are spiritual and divine, have greatest proportion to the soul of man, is evident in his Understanding and his will, both which are in regard of truth or good unsatisfiable, by any material or worldly objects, the one never resting in enquiry, till it attain the perfect knowledge, the other never replenished in desire till it be admitted unto the perfect possession of the most divine and spiritual good: to wit, of him who is the first of Causes, and the last of Ends.  
From this Attribute of Spirituality flows immediately that next of Simplicity, unity, or Actuality; 
Aris●…t. d●… Ani●…a lib 3. cap. 6.  for Matter is the root of all perfect composition, every Compound consisting of two essential parts, matter and form. I exclude not from the soul all manner of composition; for it is proper to God only to be absolutely and perfectly simple: But I exclude all Essential composition, in respect whereof the soul is merely actual; And so I understand that of Tully, Nihil est Animus admixtum, 
Tuscul. q l. 1. & lib. de Senectut.  nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex.   

CHAP. XXXIV. Of the souls immortality proved by its simplicity, independence, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God and duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of understanding things immortal, unsatiableness by objects mortal, freeness from all causes of corruption.  
ANd from this Simplicity follows by a necessary & unavoidable consequence, the third property spoken of, 
* V●…d Plutarch. lib. d●… placit. Philosoph 4 c. 7 quae ex Sen●…a 〈◊〉 u●…um co●…legit Dionys. Gotho●…td. in lo●…x ipso 〈◊〉. Ti●…l de An more. Cicer. Tusc. qu. lib. 1. Ca●…o major, sive de senect. & de Ami●…t. ●…●…am ●…riam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 1. Euseb. de praepar. Evang. lib. 11. ex P●…one porpher. etc. N●…mes Ae●…rs Gaz●…us in 〈◊〉. Erast 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉.  Immortality, it being absolutely impossible (as Tully excellently observes, & it is the argument of jul. Scaliger on this very occasion) for any simple and uncompounded Nature to be subject to death and corruption; For (saith Tully) Interitus est discessus & secretio ac direptus earum partium quae conjunctione ●…liqua tenebantur. It is a separation (and as it were) a divulsion of parts, before united each to other, so that where there is 
* Ni●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse quod 〈◊〉 a●…um 〈◊〉 quem est: Iste 〈◊〉 for●… [v●…z. Sim●…] n●… possunt perd●…e actum per quem sunt, quia sibi i●… s●… sunt Actus. Nihil au 〈◊〉 ●…otest se●… perdere. Contarenu●…. lib. 1 de Immort. Animae.  no Union, there can be no separation, and by consequence no death nor mortality.  
Another reason may be the same which was alleged for the spirituality of the soul, namely independence in operation, and therefore consequently in Being upon the body. And that Independance is manifest, First, because the acts of the soul are educed immediately in itself, without the Intercedence of any organ whereby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soul can perceive and have the knowledge of truth of universals, of itself, of Angels, of God, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any ways be produced by the intrinsical concurrence of any material faculty. Thirdly, because in Raptures and ecstasies, the soul is (as it were) drawn up above and from the body, though not from informing it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soul is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortal as the body.  
Another reason may be taken from the universal agreement of all Nations in the Earth in 
* Cum de Animarum at●… nitate 〈◊〉, non ●…ve momentun apud no●… habet const●…sus H●…minum aut timentium infer●…▪ aut colen●…ium. 〈◊〉. c. ●…p 117.  Religion and the worship of some Deity, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. Nulla gens adeo extra leges est project●… ut non aliquos deos credat, saith Seneca; whence those fictious of the Poets touching Elysium and fields of happiness for men of honest and well ordered lives; and▪ places of Torment for those that do any way neglect the bonds of their Religion.  Ergo exercentur poenis, veterumque malorum Supplicia expendunt. 

Therefore they exercised are with pain,  
And punishments of former crimes sustain.   
For in this life it is many times in all places seen, that those which have given themselves most liberty in contempt of God's laws, and have suffered themselves to be carried by the swinge of their own rebellious Passions, unto all injurious, ambitious, unruly practices, have commonly raised themselves and their fortunes more than others, who out of tenderness and fear have followed no courses but those which are allowed them. And yet these men who suffer so many indignities out of regard to Religion, do still observe their duties, and in the midst of all contempt and reproach, fly into the bosom of their God: And as Lucretius himself that Arch-Atheist confesseth of them:  — Multò in rebus acerbis Acri●…s advertunt animos ad religionem. 

Their hearts in greatest bitterness of mind,  
Unto Religion are the more inclined.   
Their very terrors and troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging some Deity and in the worship of it. Hic Pietatis h●…s? would not this easily have melted their Religion into nothing, and quite diverted their minds from so fruitless a severity, had they not had a strong and indelible persuasion fastened in their souls, that a state would come, where in both their Patience should be rewarded, and the insolency of their Adversaries repaid with the just Vengeance they had deserved?  
As for that atheistical conceit, that Religion is only grounded on policy, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and settledness of their States, making it to be only Imperiorum Vinculum, a Bond of Government, that the commonweal might not suffer from the fury of minds secure from all Religion, it is a fancy no less absurd, than it is impious. For that which hath not only been observed and honoured by those who have scarce had any form of a civil Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practice of the whole world, is not a Law of policy and civil Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane imposition. Nor else is it possible for legal institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves enclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby only to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for fear of such a God, to whose infiniteness, Power and majesty they Assent by none but a civil Tradition. It must be a visible character of a deity acknowledged in the soul, an irresistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witness of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (observed among all Nations) wherein even in places of Idolatry, were some so irksome and repugnant to Nature, and others so void of Reason, as that nothing but a firm and deep Assurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their own Immortality, could ever have imposed them upon their consciences. And besides this consent of men unto Religion in general, we find it also unto this one part hereof touching the souls immortality. All the wisest and best reputed Philosophes for Learning and staidness of life, and, besides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and savage people have discerned it. Adeò nescio quo mod●… inhaeret in menibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum, saith Tully. The soul hath a kind of presage of a future world; And therefore he saith, that it is in man's Body a Tenant, 
Tus●… qu●…l 1.  tanquam in doom al●…enâ, as in another's house: And is only in Heaven as a Lord tanquam in domo suâ, as in its own.  
Though in the former of these, the ignorance of the Resurrection made him err touching the future condition of the Body, wherein indeed consists a main dignity of Man above other creatures. And this Opinion it is which he saith was the ground of all that care men had for posterity, to sow and plant commonwealths, to ordain laws, to establish forms of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their Blood for the good of their Country; all which could not have been done with such freedom of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unless there were withal a conceit that the good thereof would some way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themselves after this life: for it was a speech savouring of infinite atheism.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 

When I am dead, and in mine V●…ne;  
What care I though the World burns?   
Now although against this present Reason 
Tull. Tus●…. qu. lib 1.  drawn from the consent of men (which yet Heathens 
Sen●… 〈◊〉 117.  themselves have used) It may be alleged that there hath been a consent likewise of some, That the soul is nothing else but the eucrasy or good Temperature of the Body, and that it is therefore subject to those Maladies, Distempers, Age, sickness, and at last Death, which the Body is; as amongst the rest Lucretius takes much pains to prove: yet the Truth is, that is Votum magic quàm judicium, never any firm opinion grounded on Judgement and Reason, but rather a desire of the heart, and a persuasion of the Will enticing the Understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd Epicures and sensual minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of Immortality, which often times pursues them, and obtrudes itself upon them against their wills, shining like lightning through the chinks & crevices (as I may so speak) of their souls, which are of set purpose closed against all such light, sets the Reason on work to invent arguments for the contrary side, that s●… their staggering and fearful impiety may b●… something emboldened, and the Eye of their conscience blinded, and the Mouth mustled from breathing forth those secret clamours and shrieks of fear. The denial then of the Immortality of the soul is rather a Wish than an Opinion, a corruption of the Heart and Will, than any natural Assertion of the understanding, which cannot but out of the footsteps and relics of those first sacred Impressions, acknowledge a spiritual resemblance in the soul of Man unto some supreme Deity, whom the conscience in 
●…acon Essay of Athe●…sme.  all its Enormities doth displease: And therefore it is observed that the Mind of an Atheist is continually wavering and unsatisfied, never able so to smother the inbred consciousness of its immortality, as not to have continual suggestions of fear and scruple. Wheresoever there is an impious Heart, there is always a shivering judgement.  
Another Reason of the souls immortality may be drawn from the dignity and pre-eminence of Man above other Creatures: for he is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be serviceable to him, and Ministers for his contentments: which dignity cannot possibly stand with the Mortality of the soul. For should not many other Creatures fare exceed Man in 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…ad. ●…. 446.  the Durance of their being? And even in their time of living together, how subject to weaknesses, sickness, languishing, cares, fear, jealousies, discontents, and all other miseries of Mind and Body, is the whole Nature of Man, of all which, other creatures feel the least disturbance? Are not Men here, beyond the rest, the very proper 
Diogenc●… vocare shl●…b it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lac. l. lib. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Solon ad ●…oesum. vid. Theodoret. ●…om. 5. de n●…ura Hom. & Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 3. p. 316. 317. Edit. Hi●…ns.  subjects and receptacles of misery? Is not our heart made the natural centre of fears and sorrows? and our Minds, as it were, Hives to entertain numberless swarms of stinging and thorny Cares? Are we not Vassals and Slaves to many distempered passions? Have not our very Contents their terror, and our Peace disturbance? Are not all our Comforts, wherewith we strive to glut and stuff ourselves here, the glorious Vanities, and golden delusions and cozenages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happiness is unhappy? And for Reason, what comfort could we find in it, when it would always be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternal loss of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation? Mortality and Corruption makes unreasonableness a privilege; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy than Man, by how much the less they know their own wretchedness. An Atheist would be in this life fare happier than he is, if he could bring himself to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.  
Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of man's reasonable Faculties. To every Power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it Objects of equal extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its natural desires, whereby it fasteneth on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Objects, we easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Essence; for from the Essence flows naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally educed the Operation, which requires naturally Objects proportional, convenient, satisfactory, and of equal extent. Where therefore no mortal object bears full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty, there it and the Essence, from which it flows, are both immortal. Now we see sensitive Powers find in this life full satisfaction, as the Sight from all the Variety of Colours, the ear of sounds, and the like: only the Reasonable Parts, the Understanding, and the Will can never be replenished in this estate of Mortality. Have they as great and wide contentments, 
Fecisti no●… ad ●…e, & n●…equietum est cor nostrum 〈◊〉 requiescat in ●…e Aug. Conses. l. 1. c. 1. vid. Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 10. 12. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap 8. Omni●… mihi Copia quae Deu●… me●… no●… est, E●…esta est▪ confess. lib. 13. c. 8. Vid. ●…iam de Civ. Dei. lib. 8. cap. 8. lib. 11. c. 13. l 12. c 1.  as the whole frame of Nature can here afford them; still their pursuites are restless, still they find an absence and want of something, which they cannot find. Orbis Alexandro angustus; In this case every man is like Alexander. This world wherein we now converse, is too strait and empty to fill the vastness, and limit the desires of the soul of Man. Only the sight and possession of God, the most infinite good, can satisfy our Understandings and our Wills. For both these Faculties (as all others in suo Ge●…re) aim at summum. The Understanding is carried ad summam Causam to the first of Truths; the Will ad summum Bonum to the last of Ends; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last, can satisfy these two searching and unquiet faculties. Hi motus Animorum a●…que haec certa●…ina.  

These are the Motions, this the strife  
Of souls, aspiring unto life.   
All the Knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a mirror wherein to view our ignorance, and we have only light enough to discover that we are in the dark. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be throughly proportioned to the Heart of man, The labour of getting the Knowledge we have, and the vexation for the want of what we have not, and the grief of parting so soon with it, would render the vexation of it fare greater than the content.  Hoc est quòd palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est? 

Is this the fruit, for which we fast?  
And by pale studies sooner waste?   
Do we toil and sweat, and even melt ourselves away for that which we sooner forsake than find? Do we deny ourselves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeal condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? It is natural for gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we lose both it and ourselves? and to labour for such a purchase, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed sooner lost than gotten? Certainly were man not conscious of his own immortality, there could be no stronger inducement to sottishness, luxury, riot, sensuality, and all other unbridled practices. It is registered for the impiety of Atheists; Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall die.  
Another Reason may be framed after the same manner, as was that to prove the Spirituality of the soul from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on those two ordinary axioms in Philosophy, That every thing is received according to the quality of the Receiver, and that every thing hath the same manner of ●…ssence, as it hath of operation. Now the soul of Man can easily receive impressions and conceits of immortality, and discourse thereupon: therefore also it is in its own Essence and nature immortal. We see even between things merely corporeal, as the Object and the sensitive Organ, how small a disproportion works incapacity. Much more must it be found in so great a difference as would be between immortality of Objects and corruption of the soul that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angel or Spirit, nor make any im●…ateriall stamp in a piece of wax, since a corporeal substance is capable of none but corporeal impressions. And therefore we see that even amongst Bodies, the more pure and subtle they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickest and most spiritual sense, the sight. Now the mind of man in Understanding, is but as wax to the seal, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it represents: which is the ground of that Paradox in Aristotle, that in understanding the soul is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax, after it is stamped, is in some sort the very seal itself that stamped it, namely Representative, by way of Image and resemblance; so the soul, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the picture and image of the thing itself. Now the understanding, being able to apprehend immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeal substance, as if it were immortal, I mean by purging it from all gross material and corruptible qualities) must therefore needs of itself be of an immortal Nature. And from the latter of those two Principles, which I spoke of, namely, that the quality of the Being may be gathered from the Nature of the Operation, Aristotle infers the separability and independence of the understanding on the Body, in the third de Animâ afore-named: For the soul being able to work without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act itself (as was before showed) must needs also be able to subsist by its own nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustain it. And therefore he saith in the same place, that the understanding is separable, uncompounded, impassable; all arguments of immortality. Other reasons are produced for the proof hereof, taken from the causes of corruption, which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence of the sun; or thirdly by corruption of the subject whereon it depends. None whereof can be verified in the soul. For first, how can any thing be contrary to the soul, which receiveth perfection from all things? for Intellectus omnia intelligit, saith Aristotle, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put off their Opposition? For (as a great man excellently speaketh) 
Mornay of Christian Religion. Chap. 14.  those things, which destroy one another in the World, maintain and perfect one another in the mind; one being a means for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the soul (being else in itself simple and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation) doth never fail, and hath himself promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the soul depends not, as do other forms, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only Actus informans, but subsistens too, by its own absolute virtue.   

CHAP. XXXV. Of the Honour of Humane Bodies by Creation, by Resurrection; of the Endowments of Glorified Bodies.  
ANd now, that this particular of immortality may farther redound both 
Vid. Cal. Rhodig. lib. 2. cap. 9 10. 11. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12 etc. Platonic. ●… sententi●… Ca●…cer, Apostolic. i Templum. Tertul. de An●…m. Tertull. de Carne Christi. Vid. Aug. lib. 7. de Trinit. cap. 6.  to the Honour and comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching man's Body: wherein I intent not to meddle with the Question, How man's Body may be said to be made after the Image of God (which sure is not any otherwise, than as it is a sanctified and shall be a Blessed vessel, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus: As if Christ had been the pattern of our Honour, and not we of his Infirmity, since the Scripture saith, he was made like unto us in all things, and that he Assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him) not, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of immortality, both in the first structure, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle calls it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be Secundum Imaginem, after his Image, who was Primitiae the First fruits of them that rise. That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, so in our Exaltation our Mortality shall be swallowed up of his Glory. And for the first estate of man's Body, we conclude in a word: that it was partly mortal, and partly immortal: mortal in regard of possibility of Dying, because it was affected with the mutual Action and Passion of corruptible elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery of itself by food, as being still Corpus Animale, and not Spirituale, as St. Paul distinguisheth, a natural, but not a spiritual Body. But it was immortal, that is, Exempted from the Law of Death and Dissolution of the Elements, in virtue of God's Covenant with man, upon condition 
Aug. de Gen ad lit. lib. 6. cap. 25. de Civ. dei. l. 13. c. 19 Vide quae fuse & erudite disscrit Georg. Zeem●…n▪ Tract. de I 〈◊〉. Dei. cap. ●… sect. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 ●….  of his Obedience. It was mortal Conditione Corporis, by the Condition of a Body; but immortal Beneficio Conditoris, by the Benefit of its Creation; else God had planted in the soul such natural desires of a Body wherein to work as could not be naturally attained; For the soul did naturally desire to remain still in the body. In the natural Body of Adam there was no sin, and therefore no death, which is the wages of sin.  
I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in Pignore & in Primi●…its, In our Head, & in some few of his Members, Enoch, Ellas, and (as is probable) in those dead Bodies which arose to testify the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished at that day of Redemption, as the same Apostle 
Eph. 4 30.  calls the Last day: that day of a full and final Redemption, when Death, the last enemy, shall 
Luk. 21. 28.  be overcome. And well may it be called a day of Redemption, not only in regard of the Creature, which yet groaneth under the Malediction and tyranny of sinful Man: nor yet only in respect of Man's soul, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the Glorifying Vision, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fullness thereof, as being the day of the Manifestation and plenary discovery both of the Punishing Glory of God in the Wicked, and of his Merciful and Admirable Glory in the Saints: but also and (as I think) most especially in respect of the Body. For there is, by virtue of that Omnipotent Sacrifice, a double kind of Redemption wrought for us: The one Vindicative, giving us Immunity from all spiritual dangers, delivering 
Luk. 1. 68  us from the tyranny of our Enemies, from 
Heb. 9 1●….  the Severity, Justice, and Curse of the Law; 
Luk. 21. 28.  
Rom. 8. 23.  which is commonly in the New Testament called 
Eph. 1. 7.  simply 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Deliverance from evil; The other Purchasing, or Munificent, by not only freeing us from our own wretchedness, but farther conferring upon us a Positive and a Glorious Honour, which St. John calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Power, privilege, Prerogative, and 
joh. 1. 12.  Title unto all the Glorious Promises of Immortality: which like wise St. Paul calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Eph. 1. 14.  the Redemption of a purchased Possession, and a Redemption unto the Adoption of sons. Now than the Last day is not Totally and Perfectly a day of Redemption unto our souls in either of these senses, since they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the Wrath of the Judge, from the tyranny of the enemy, from the reign of sin, and by Death freed not only from the Dominion, but from the Possession, or Assault of the enemy; not only from the kingdom, but from the Body of sin; and is withal in good part possessed of that bliss, which it shall more fully enjoy at last. But our Bodies, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here sanctified vessels, freed from the Authority and Power of the devil, World, Flesh, and from the Curse of Death too, wherein they part not only with life, but with sin; yet after all this do they want some part of either Redemption: as namely to be raised and delivered from that dishonour and corruption, which the last enemy hath brought upon them: and to be Admitted into those Mansions, and invested with that Glory, whereby they shall be Totally possessed of their Redemption. In a word, the soul is in its separation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the first; and in a great measure enjoyeth the Vision of God, which is the second part or degree of man's Redemption. But the Body is not till its Resurrection, either quite freed from its enemy, or at all possessed of its Glory. I mean in its self, though it be in its Head, who is Primitiae & P●…gnus Resurrectionis, the first fruits and earnest of our Conquest over Death.  
Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, than Curiosity in the enquiry after it; yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be Raised a whole entire and perfect Body, with all the parts best fitted to be Receptacles of Glory; freed from all either the Usherers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmity, sickness, Corruption, ignominy, and Dishonour: And shall rise a true, whole, strong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body shall not have those peculiar uses, which here they have, since they neither eat, nor drink, marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God: yet shall not any part be lost: Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis re●…inentur: 
T●…ull.  Though they are freed from their temporal service, for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgement, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Dishonour.  
The second Dignity is that Change and Alteration 
Vid. Aug. de C●…v. Dei. lib. 13. cap. 20. & 23. & Epist. 146.  of our Body from a natural to a Spiritual Body, whereby is not meant any Transubstantiation from a corporeal to a spiritual substance: For our Bodies shall, after the Resurrection, be conformable unto Christ's body, which, though glorious, was not yet a Spirit, but had flesh and bone, as we have. Nor is it to be understood of a thin, aereal, Invisible Body (as some have collected) since Christ saith of his Body, after he was risen, Videte, Palpate. Wheresoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all sensible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a strong Argument, that it is not there, where it is not sensible; And therefore the Doctrines of ubiquity, and Transubstantiation, as they give Christ more than he is pleased to own, an Immensity of Body; so do they spoil him of that, which he hath been pleased for our sakes to assume; Extension, Compacture, massiness, Visibility, and other the like sensible Properties, which cannot stand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Christ's Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in substance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmity, ignominy, Animality) to be truly invested with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Christ hath an efficacy and operation in all parts of the world, it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by Intercession; amongst the blessed Angels by Confirmation; in Earth, and that in all ages, and in all places amongst Men, by Justification, and Comfort; in Hell amongst the Devils and Damned, by the tremble and fears of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requireth only a presence of virtue, not of Substance. For doth not the sun work wonderful effects in the bowels of the Earth, itself notwithstanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven? And why should not the sun of righteousness work as much at the like distance, as the sun of Nature? Why should he not be as powerful Absent, as he was Hoped? Or why should the Not presence of his Body make that uneffectuall now, which the Not existing could not before his Incarnation? Why should we mistrust the Eyes of Stephen, that saw him in Heaven, at such a Distance of place, when Abraham could see him in his own bowels through so great a Distance of Time?  
That Speech then, that the Body shall be a spiritual Body, is not to be understood in either of those former senses: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate Union and full Inhabitation of the virtue and vigour of God's Spirit in our Bodies, quickening and for ever sustaining them without any Assistance of natural or animal qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompense of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the natural opposition of the Elements, is daily diminished. Secondly, it shall be so called in regard of its Obedience & Totall Subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those Spiritual qualities, those Prerogatives of the Flesh, with which it shall be adorned, which are  
First, a Shining and Glorious Light, wherewithal it shall be clothed as with a Garment: for the justice shall shine as the sun in the Firmament. Now, this shall be wrought first by virtue of that Communion, which we have with Christ our Head, whose Body, even in its Mortality, did shine like the sun, and had his clothes white as light. And secondly, by diffusion and redundancy from 
De m●…i 〈◊〉 Anim●… in Corpus, vide C●…l Rhodig. lib. 1●…. cap. 15. 16.  our soul upon our Body, which by the beatifical Vision, filled with a spiritual and unconceivable brightness, shall work upon the Body, as on a Subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.  
The second spiritual Property shall be Impassibility, not in respect of Perfective, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or destructive Passion. There shall not be any war in the members, any fight and mutual languishing of the Elements; but they shall all be sustained in their full strength by virtue of Christ's Communion, of the Inhabitation of the Spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified soul. There shall be no need of rest, or sleep, or meat, all which are here requisite for the supply of our Infirmities and daily defects, and are only the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the blessedness of Possession. For although Christ after his Resurrection did eat before his Disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, than that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was only for our sakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without these visible and inferior Witnesses, by which he was pleased to make his very Glorified flesh a proportioned Object to our frail sense and faith, that so we might thence learn confidently to rely for ourselves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or it was done (as St. Augustine speaks) Non ex Necessitate, 
De C●…i. Dei. lib. 14.  sed ex Potestate: as the sun is said to draw and suck up standing waters: Non Pabuli Egestate, sed Virtutis Magni●…adine, Not to Nourish, but to Manifest its virtue.  
Thirdly, the Body shall be a strong and beautiful Body, throughly able to minister unto the soul any service, wherein it shall employ it, and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clog and luggage thereof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity (which ever ariseth out of the distemper & discord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced 
Ita 〈◊〉 p●…rum de Corpor●… ut nihil deform mantal in Corpore. Vid. Aug. Enchirid. c 91. & de Civ▪ Dei. lib. 2●…. cap. 19▪ 20. Tertul de Resu●…vitia de●…entur, Natura ●…rvabitur. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 22. cap. 17.  unto a full, comely and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their Death contemptible, Infants, lame, dismembered, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption; Naturae, non injuriae reddimur, we shall be restored to our Nature, but not to our shame; the Dust shall still retain and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.  
The last quality of our Bodies, which I shall observe, is a perfect subtlety and agility, best befitting their service for the soul in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, than here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and spacious Country. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the souls glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, add the sweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquisite Operation of the senses, the Bodily communion and fellowship of the Saints, and, above all, the eternal corporeal vision of that most sacred Body, whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whose presence were truly and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell itself a Place of Glory: how much more that Country, and those Mansions, where the soul likewise shall be swallowed up with the immediate vision and fruition of Divine Glory. Our souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our Bodies shall be there.   

CHAP. XXXVI. Of that part of God's Image in the soul, which answereth to his Power, wisdom, Knowledge, holiness. Of man's Dominion over other Creatures. Of his Love to Knowledge. What remainders we retain of original justice..  
THe other Properties or Attributes of God, of which man's soul beareth an Image & dark resemblance, are those, which according to our Apprehension seem not so Intrinsecall and essential as the former. And they are such as may be either generally collected from the Manifestation of his Works, or more particularly from his Word. These, which refer unto his Works, are his Power in Making and Ruling them; his wisdom in Ordering and Preserving them; his Knowledge in the Contemplation of them: and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon man's soul.  
Concerning the Attribute of Power, most certain it is that those great parts of God's workmanship, Creation, and Redemption, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his own Prerogative royal. Insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto ourselves the least resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceed of god's works, there is some analogy and Resemblance in the Works of Men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of Nature, but the Ordinary works of God? All forms and intrinsecall Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments; for by him we live, and move, and have our being. And of all other works, man's only imitate Nature: as Aristotle observes of the Works of Art, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that natural instinct, which is intrinsically belonging to their condition, without any manner of Art or variety.) The Resemblances of Nature in the Works of Art are chief seen in these two Proportions: First, as Nature doth nothing in vain, but in all her Works aims at some End, the Perfection, or the Ornament, or the Conservation of the Universe (for those are the three ends of Nature subordinate to the Maine, which is, the Glory of the Maker) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the Understanding to some one of those ends; either to the perfection of Men, such are all those, which inform the understanding, and govern the life: or to his Conservation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decays, or sheltering the weaknesses of Nature: or lastly to his Ornament, such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Invention, which, though not necessary to his Being, yet are special instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or intellectual.  
The second Resemblance, is between the Manner and progress of their works: for as the Method of nature is to proceed, ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora, and per determinata Media ad 〈◊〉 Finem; So Art likewise as is plain in those which are manual) by certain fixed rules, which altar not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more tough and unformed beginnings, by the help of Instruments, appropriated to particular services. But this, because ●…t limits man's dignity, as well as commends it, I for bear to speak of. Though even herein also we do seem to imitate God, who in his great work of Creation did proceed both by successi●… of Time, and degrees of Perfection; only it is Necessity in us which was in him his Will.  
To come therefore nearer, it is observable, that in the first Act of God's power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was No thing here below created properly, immediately, and totally, but the Chaos and mass, or the Earth without form, and void, out of the Obedience whereof, his Power did farther educe and extract those wonderful, Va●…ious, and Beauti▪ full forms, which do evidently set forth unto the soul of Man, the Glory and majesty of him that made them. By a small Resemblance of this manner of Working, Man also in those works of Art, peculiar to him from other Creatures, doth ex Potentia obediential (as the schools call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection 
●… v d. T●…rtul. de 〈◊〉. c. 26. Ambros. 〈◊〉 l. 6. c. 6. 〈◊〉. O a●…. 1. 〈◊〉. muchminem▪ etc. Aug. 〈◊〉 Gen. ad li●…. lib. 3. c 20. 〈◊〉. de O th●…d. 〈◊〉. ●…. 2. cap 30. 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alta▪ De 〈◊〉 adhuc, & quod Dimina 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 posse●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 es●… Ovid Me●…. ●…. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ vit eum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 debuis s●…b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. qu●… esse 〈◊〉. Aug. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 8. in ●… 〈◊〉.  of any proposed mass produce, Non per Naturam, sed per Imperium, not out of the Nature of the Subject, but by the command of Reason sundry forms of Art full of Decency and Beauty.  
And for Government, I mean Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdued unto Man; and, next unto the Glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit *. And therefore, when ever we find any of them hurtful and Rebellious, we cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our own disloyalty; they do but Revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a faithful care and jealousy to Preserve his Honour, Renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitom *. And indeed how can we look to have our Dominion entire over Beasts and inferior Creatures, when by continual Enormities we make ourselves as one of them? Continued by the general Providence of God, whereby he is pleased to preserve things in that course of Subordination wherein first he made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the use of his Creatures, even then when he is a prisoner unto his Justice. Renewed, by the Promise and Grant made again unto Noah. And there is a Double Promise under which we may enjoy the Creatures, the one a Moral Promise made unto Industry, as, The Diligent hand maketh Rich; and, he that Ploweth his Land, shall have Plenty of corn: the other an Evangelicall Promise made unto Piety, and Faith in Christ, whereby is given unto Christian men both a freer use of the Creatures than the Jews had, and a purer use than the wicked have. For, unto the clean all things are clean.  
And this Grant of God doth sometimes show itself extraordinarily, as in the Obedience of the crows to Eliah, the Viper to Paul, the lions to Daniel, the Whale to Jonah, the Fire to the three Children, and the trembling and fear of wild Beasts towards 
Eus●…b. lib. 8. c. 7. Ignis Polycarpum n●…u 〈◊〉. Eus●…b. l. ●…. c. 14.  many of the Martyrs: always Ordinarily, in ordering and dispensing the course of Nature so, as that Humane Society may be preserved, both by power in subduing the Creatures which he must use, and by wisdom in escaping the Creatures which he doth fear.  
Now for the second Attribute, 
* Gen 1. v. ●…lt. Eccles. 7. 30.  wisdom, there is also a remainder of the Image thereof 
Col. 3. 10.  in Man: for albeit, the fall and corruption 
Gen 2. 19 23.  
* joh. 1. 5.  of Nature hath darkened his eyes, so that he is inclined to work Confusedly, or to 
Eph. 4. 17. 18.  
Rom. 3 13▪  walk as in a Maze, without Method or Order 
Col. 1. 21.  (as in a storm the Guide of a vessel 
Prov. 22. 15.  is oftentimes to seek of his Art, and forced to yield to the winds and waves) yet certain it is that in the mind of Man there still remains a Pilot, or Light of Nature; many Principles of practical prudence, whereby (though for their faintings a man does often miscarry and walk awry) the course of our Actions may be directed with success and issue unto civil and Honest ends. And this is evident, not only by the continual practice of Grave and Wise men, in all States, Times, and Nations; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Politicians, and Philosophers have by their natural Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a man's just ends, and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.  
Lastly, for the Attribute of Knowledge, It was doubtless after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man, when he was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their several Properties and Natures; and in them to show himself, as well a Philosopher, as a lord He●… filled them, saith Siracides, with the Knowledge of understanding. And herein, if we will believe Aristotle, the soul is most nearly like unto God, whose infinite Delight is the eternal Knowledge and Contemplation of himself, and his Works. Hereby, saith he, the soul of man is made most Beloved of God, 
Ethic. l. 10  and his mind, which is Allied unto God, is itself Divine, and, of all other parts of Man, most Divine. And this made the Serpent use that Insinuation only, as most likely to prevail, for compassing that Cursed and miserable project of man's ruin. By means of which Fall, though Man blinded his understanding, and ●…obd himself of this, as of all other blessed habits, I mean of those excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet still the Desire remains Vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often praejudiciall to the estate both of the Body and mind. So that it is as true now, as eyer, that Man is by Nature a Curious and enquiring Creature, of an Active and restless Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding itself into all the paths of Nature; and continually traversing the World of Knowledge. There are two main Desires naturally stamped in each Creature; a Desire of Perfecting, and a Desire of Perpetuating himself. Of these Aristotle attributeth in the highest degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he saith, that of all the works of living Creatures, the most natural is to Generate the like: and his 
Lib. 2. de Anim. c. 4.  Reason is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Because hereby that Immortality (the principal end (as he there supposeth) of all natural Agents) which in their own Individuals they cannot obtain, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued offspring and succession. But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himself that other desire of Perfection, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principal advancements of the soul) should not only in a Positive sense, as Aristotle hath determined in the Entrance to his metaphysics, but in a Superlative degree be verified, that He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the principal thing (to use Aristotle his own reason) whereby Man doth▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Partake of Divinity, as I observed before out of Aristotle himself. And the reason of the difference between Man and other Creatures in this particular is: First, Because Man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his own Immortality, which takes away the Necessity of Propagation to sustain his Nature. And secondly, because Knowledge, the Perfection of the soul, is to Man (as I may so speak) a kind of generation, being of sufficiency to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injury of Time, and making him to survive and outlive his own Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendered unto each Region of the World those Elements and Principles, whereof it was composed, and hath not so much as Dust and Cinders left to testify that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowledge, beyond the reach of Fate and Corruption.  
The Attributes of God, which are manifested more especially in his Word, though sundry, yet (as fare forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprised in this more general one of holiness. Whereby I understand that Absolute and Infinite goodness of his Nature, which is in him most Perfect, Pure, and eternal. Of which, though Man according to that measure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly robbed and spoiled, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retain any the least Prints of those Pure and Divine Impressions of original righteousness▪ yet still there remains, even in depraved and Polluted Nature foam shadows thereof: There is still the Opus Operatum in many Actions of Mortality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true end, whether it should be directed, take away the goodness and the Sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of Nature toucheth the hem and lowest of Grace. We have in us the Testimonies, though not the goodness of our first estate; the ruins of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be Inhabited. It is true indeed those great endowments of the most severe and enlightened Heathen, were indeed but glorious miseries and withered virtues, in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aimed at sinister and false ends: yet withal both the corruption of them proves their praecedent loss (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times:) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an original Aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universal Purity. Now in this Rectitude and Perfect Regularity of the soul in this divine Habit of original Justice did man most eminently bear the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still immortal, spiritual, Reasonable▪ yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary Pollution. And he always recovereth most thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruins, and vindicateth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime original Purity, wherein he was Created.  
These are the Dignities of the soul considered wholly in itself. In all which it fare surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withal▪ And yet such is the preposterous and unnatural baseness of many men, that they are content to make their souls vassals to their own Servant. How do they force their Understandings, which in their own worthiest objects, those deep and Divine Contemplations, are as drowsy as Endymion, to spend and waste themselves in proud, luxurious, vanishing Inventions? How do they enthrall that supreme and architectonical Power in man's little World, his Will, to the tyranny of slavish appetite, and sensual desires? as if they served here but as cooks to dress their own Bodies for the worms? Strange is it that Man, conscious to himself of Immortality and of an heroical and Heavenly complexion, that hath received such immediate Impressions of God, and is the very model of all nature's Perfections, should so much degrade himself, as to dote only on that part, which is the vassal and slave of Death. If there were no other mischief which sin did the soul but to debase it, even that were argument sufficient for noble spirits to have it in detestation. For man being in honour, and which understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish.   

CHAP. XXXVII. Of the Faculty of understanding. Its operations outward upon the Object, Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The natural Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, judgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Several kinds of Knowledge. The original Knowledge given unto Man in his Creation. The Benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance natural, Voluntary, penal. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatilousnesse of Conceits. The benefit of Modest hesitancy.  
NOw it follows to speak of the parts or principal powers of the soul, which are the understanding, and the Will. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the Latitude and excellent Variety of its Objects, being the whole world of things (for Ens & Intelligibile are reciprocal, 
Arist. de Anim. lib. 3.  & omnia intelligit, saith Aristotle of the understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the Operations of it both Ad extra in respect of the Objects, and ad intra in respect of the Will. The one is a Contemplative, the other a more practic office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either moral or civil Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Active Operations. Passive I call those first Perceptions and apprehensions of the soul, whereby it receiveth the simple species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the soul; as when I understand one Object to be a Man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.  
Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are mixed Operations of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which we call Discourse. Of all which to speak according to their logical Nature, would be impertinent. Their excellency chief stands in the End whereunto they move and serve, which is Knowledge; of the which, I shall therefore here speak a few things.  
Knowledge is the Assimilation of the Understanding 
Aquin. part. 1. q. 14. a. 2.  unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which do Irr●…diate it, and put the power of it into Act. For as the beams of the sun shining on a glass, do there work the Image of the sun: so the species and resemblances of things being conveyed on the Understanding, do there work their own Image. In which respect the 
Aristot. de Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4. & 5.  Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becometh All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a painter's Table, we call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the eye.  
There is not any Desire more noble, nor more natural unto a Man (who hath not like Saul hid himself amongst the stuff, and lost himself in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) than is this Desire of Knowledge. Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its specifical than upon its generical perfection. And hence it is that though Man be perfectest of all Creatures, yet many do excel him in sensitive Perfection. 
Vid. 〈◊〉. lib. 7. i●… 〈◊〉. Et Lact●…nt. de Opis●…. Dei. c. 2. 3. Et C●…l. Rhod●…g. lib. ●…. cap. ●….  Some in exquisiteness of Sight; others of Hearing; others of taste, Touch, and Smell; others of swiftness and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when we have made the best Provision we can, many Beasts will surpass us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our own specifical and rational perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tired, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfeit on their Objects. But Knowledge as knowledge, doth never either burden or cloy the mind, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist▪ Physit. l. 7. c. 3. Text ●…0. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Clem. Alex. Str●…m lib. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Clem. Alex. prad. lib. 1 c. ●….  Rest of the understanding, wherein it taketh delight as a Thing in its natural Place.  
And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much Trouble to procure it. 
* Vid. Valer. Max. l. 8▪ c▪ 7. Th●…odoret. Serm. de fide. Clem. Alex Strom. lib. 1. p. 222. 223.  As Pythagoras, Plat●…, Democritus, traveled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as Solomon sent to Ophir for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to bear them. A true lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distress, if it do not violate, and restrain that particular appetite. If he may enjoy the Delights of Learning, he will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. Archimedes was not sensible of the loss of Syracuse, being wholly intent upon a mathematical Demonstration. And Demetrius 
Cicero de sinibus lib. 5.  Phaler●…us deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetness of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the Quick, but when he is punished in his most delightful Affections, of all which the most predominant in rational men is this of Knowledge.  
And therefore as the first Creature God form was Light (to show that all his Works were made in wisdom, that they might set forth and manifest his Glory) so the first motion of Adam after his Creation was towards Knowledge. By his Exercise of Knowledge he shown God's Image in him, and by the Ambition after more he l●…st it: As no Man sins easier than in the Thing which he best loves. And for this cause we may observe that Christ's frequentest Miracles were showed in opening the Eyes of the blind, and the ears of the deaf and Dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chief Instruments of Knowledge in Men which they most love.  
And this love of Knowledge is seen evidently 
〈◊〉 homines ment lamentari qu●…m la●…ari in Amentiâ. Aug. Civ. Dei. l 11. c. 27.  in this, that men had rather have sober Calamities, than mad pleasures, and more freely choose clear Intellectuals with misery, than disturbed with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazy body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the loss of Learning.  
But the principal excellency of Knowledge is this, That it guideth the soul to God; and so doth all kind of Right Knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any Science properly so called, which hath not its Ar●…ana to pose and amaze the Understanding, as well as its more easy Conclusions to satisfy it. Such as are in philosophy, those Occult Sympathies and Antipathies, of which natural Reason can render no Account at all: which overcoming the utmost Vigour of humane Disquisition, must needs enforce us to believe that there is an Admirable wisdom that disposeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth those secrets which we are not able to fathom.  
Again, since the Knowledge of Things is either of their being's, or of their Properties and Operations: And Nature abhorreth the Motion of proceeding 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist▪ de generate. Animal. lib. 1. cap▪ 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. Physic. lib. 7. cap. 1. Text. 3.  In Infinitum: in either of these, necessary it is, that the mind of man 
b ●…id. Jussin. Martyr. qu. ad Grac. qu. 3. Tertull. Apol. cap. 17. 18. De Res●…arect. carnis cap. 12. Contra Martion▪ lib. 1.  tracing the footsteps of natural things, must by the Act of Logical Resolution at last arise to him who is the fountain of all Being, the First of all Causes, the supreme over all Movers, in whom all the rest have their being's and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us 
c p. 17. 18. R●…sil▪ Hexam. Homi●…. 1. Aug. Confess. lib. 10. cap. 6. 〈◊〉. lib. 2. cap. 9 Theophil. Ad Antel. lib. 1. c host 2. 21. 2●…. . I will hear the Heavens, and the Heavens shall ●…eare the Earth, and the Earth the corn and Wine, and they Jezreel. Jezreel cannot subsist without corn and Wine, she cries to them to help it. These cannot help without the Earth to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitful. The Earth can bring forth nothing of itself without Influence, benignity, and comfortable showers from the Heavens, it cries to them for aid. 
d jer. 14. 22. Job▪ 38. ●….- 37.  The Heavens cannot give rain nor Warmth of themselves, without him who is the Father of rain, and the fountain of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The Connexion and Concatenation of All second Causes to one another; The Cooperation of them together for the good of the Church; and the Subordination of them all to God, unto whom at length the more accurate Inquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this Subordination standeth in four things: 1. All things are Subordinate unto God in 
a Vid. Plutarch. l●…b. de 〈◊〉 Exod. 3. 14. Isai. 40. 17. Act. 17. 28. Rom. 11. 36. 1 Cor. 8. 6. Col. 1. 16. 17. Heb. 1. ●….  Being. He only hath Being per Essentiam, By Absolute, and original Essence; all other things per participationem, by derivation and dependence on him. 2. 
b Nehem. 9 6. Job 1●…. 10. Psal. 104. 29. Isal. 40. 24.  In Conservation. For God doth not make his Creatures as a Carpenter doth his House, which can after stand by itself alone: but having our very Being from him, that Being cannot Be or Continue without His supportance, as light in the house dependeth both in Being and in Continuance upon the sun. 3. In regard 
c ●…at. 10. 29. Prov. 16. 4. Gen. 4●…. 28. Act 4. 27. 28.  of Gubernation and providence; for All things are by his wisdom guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which fly out of the Order of his Precepts, do fall into the Order of his Providence. Lastly, in Regard of 
d Act 17. 28. Isai. 26. 12. Job 10. 8. Psal. 139. 15. 16. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Isai. 10. 5.  Operation. For in him we live and move, he worketh Our works for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any Causality till he be pleased to concur with them.  
Again, since we find that all other Creatures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which Nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equal Latitude in goodness to the Faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest do enjoy. Since then the supreme Appetite of the Reasonable soul is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfy this Desire; But that still there is both room for more Knowledge and Inquirie after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with unquietness, and labour (as the Beast first stirs the mud in the water with his feet before he drink it with his Mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the soul be carried at the last to God, The Adequate and 
* Vid. Aug. Confess. lib. 1. cap. 1. & lib. 4. cap. 10. 1●…▪ & lib. 13. cap. ●… De Trin. lib. 8. cap. 3. Dr. F●…ild of the Church. lib. 1. cap. 1. Hooker. Ecclesiastical Pol. l. 1. sect. 11.  ultimate End and Object of all our Desires, as Noah's Dove was carried back to the Ark, when she found no place for the sole of her foot to rest on.  
Again, when we see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to go, we must needs conclude they are guided by a Mighty wisdom, and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flieth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skilful Archer that directed it.  
Unto the Perfection of Knowledge, after due and proper Representation of Objects in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the mind; There are in the Subject three things requisite.  
First, clearness of Apprehension, to receive 
Representatio reru●…. Judicium de Rebus Represental ●…. Aquin 22●…. qu. 173. Art. 21.  the right and distinct Notion of the Things represented, as the clearness of a glass serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it be soiled or dimmed, it rendereth either none, or an imperfect shape.  
Secondly, Solidity of judgement to try and weigh the particulars, which we apprehend. That out of them we may sever for our use the precious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as corn in the Straw; when by diligent inquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire, and fan, to give it us purified from dross and levity. And this in Speculation answereth unto the general virtue of practical prudence in Morality, whereby we weigh the several Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.  
Thirdly, Fidelity of Retention; for he is not 
Mus●… itaque dicta Io●…is & M●…cmosynes filia. C●…l. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.  likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a 
* Hag. ●…. ●….  bag with holes. For as Nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporeal strength, and nutriment, a Retentive power to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, until a through concoction be wrought; so proportionably is the Faculty of Memory given to Reason, as a means to consolidate and enrich it. And fluxes, as in the Body, so in the mind too, are ever Arguments and Authors of weakness. Whence it comes to pass that in matter of Learning many of us are feign to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto Learning, we should take a like course as wise Architects do in choice of fit timber for Building. They choose first the straitest and that which hath fewest knots, and flaws in it; which in the mind answereth unto clearness, and evenness of Apprehension. For a clear mind, like straight and smooth timber, will work easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap: because that is best able to bear the weight that shall be laid upon it: And this answers unto Maturity and firmness of Judgement. Lastly, they do not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and such other materials as are quickly apt to putrify and wear away, but such Timber as is lasting and Retentive of its Nature, as oak and elm, which may make the Superstruction of the nature of the Foundation, strong and lasting: and this answereth to that excellent Faculty of the mind, a rational memory: from which one particular (I think more than any other) do arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the minds of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappiness of Calvisius Sabinus 
Se●…. Ep. 27. Vid. etiam Coel. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.  in Seneca, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retain fast the Names of Achilles, or, Ulysses: But, as his Parasite 
Vt Grammatico●… haberet An●…lectas.  was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a grammatical Attendant to gather up the fragments which his Memory let fall. And Curio 
Cicero in B●…uto & in Orator●….  the Orator in Tully, was wont when he had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to add a fourth; 
Pl●… l. 7. cap. 24.  yea Messala Corvinus forgot his own name, as Pliny telleth us. And as wonderful on the other side hath been the felicity of some others. 
a M▪ Senec. Controvers. lib. 1 ●…n prologue.  Seneca the father could repeat two thousand words together in their Order. 
b Plin. l. 7. c. 24. Qui●…il. lib. 11. cap. 2. Val. Max. lib. 8. cap. 7. sect. 15.  Cyrus and Themistocles could call all their soldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of courtesy 
c Alex. ab Alex. lib 6. cap. 18.  Otho aspired unto the Empire) 
d Ali. Sp●…rtian. in 〈◊〉.  Adrian could read a Book which he never saw before, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperor 
e Ammian. Marcell. lib 〈◊〉.  Julian it is said, that he had drunk Totum memoriae dolium, the whole vessel of memory. To say nothing of 
f Plin. Supr●…. Suidas in Apoll. Voss. Instit. Orat. 16 c 6. sect. 2.  Simonides, and Apollonius Tyanlus, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 years 
g De quibus mentio apud Plin●…um & M. Senecam & Quintil. ut supra.  old, were very famous for the exquisiteness of their memories; nor of Cyneas, Charmidas, Portius Latro, and divers others, who have been admired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a methodical and orderly Disposition of mind, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for Cyrus to remember men in an Army than in a Throng. And hence hath proceeded the Art of Memory invented as Pliny tells us by Simonides, and perfected by Me●…rodorus Sceptius, consisting in the committing of several Heads of matter unto distinct places, whereof Quintilian discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.  
Of Knowledge there are several sorts, according to several considerations, with respect to the Ends of it. Some is Speculative for the improving of the mind, as physical, metaphysical, and mathematical Knowledge. Others practical for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of Men, as ethical, political, historical, Military Knowledge. Some mixed of both, as theological Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine Verities, and in the direction of Divine Duties. Some justrumentall, being only subservient unto others, as grammatical, rhetorical, dialectical learning. In regard of Order, some superior, others Subalternate, as music to arithmetic, optics to Geometry. In regard of their original, some engrafted, as the supreme Principles of Verity, and implanted notions of Morality, which is called the Law of Nature, and written in the Heart of all men, Rom. 2. 14. 15. Other Acquired, and by search and industry laboured out of those Principles, and the others which are taught us. Other Revealed and Divinely manifested to the Faith of Men, whereof the supreme Principles are these two. 1. That God in his Authority is infallible, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be believed, and therefore that every supernatural Truth there plainly set down in termini●…, is an unquestionable Principle; and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in theological and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the manner of Acquiring, some is experimental, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some habitual, a general knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by Invention from a man's Industry, or by A●…scultation and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of Objects, some supre●…me, as the Knowledge of Principles and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are known by evidence of their own terms. Others derived and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of Conclusions. In regard of Perfection, Intuitive Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know things by the View; and Discursive, as that of Men, whereby we know things by Ratiocination. In regard of Order and Method, synthetical, when we proceed in Knowledge by a way of Composition from the Causes to the Effects; and analytical, when we rise up from Effects unto their Causes, in a Way of Resolution.  
With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, 
De ist●… Materi. ●… sufi●…is d●…sputant Schol●…tici ad l. 2. dist. 23. & ad part 1. Tho qu. 94. & Perer. in Gen. 2 19 20. l. 5. disput. 1. the Amplitud. & Excellent. Sci-cut. Adami.  was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its first Creation: So fare forth as the Necessity of a happy and honourable life, of the Worship and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himself, and of the Instruction of his Posterity, did require Knowledge in him. For we may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect stature of Body, did give him but an Infant stature of mind. God made all things exceeding Good, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the soul of Man, was doubtless given unto it, in its first Creation. He made Man right and strait; and the Rectitude of the mind is in Knowledge and light; and therefore the Apostle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is after the Image of him that Created us, Coloss. 3. 10. Without Knowledge he could not have given fit Names, and suitable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpose were brought unto him. He could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. He could not have given such an account of the substance and original of Eve. Of the End of her Creation to to be the Mother of all living men as he did. Experimental Knowledge he had not but by the Exercise of his original light upon particular Objects, as they should occur. Knowledge of future Events he had not, it being not natural, nor Investigable by imbred light, but prophetical, and therefore not seen till Revealed. Secret Knowledge of the Thoughts of Men, or of the counsels of God he could not have, because secret things belong unto the Lord. But so much light of Divine Knowledge as should fit him to have Communion with God, and to serve him, and obtain a blessed life; so much of Moral Knowledge as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in wisdom as a Father, with other men; so much of Natural Knowledge as should dispose him for the Admiring of God's Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which he had received Dominion; so much we may not without notable injury to the perfection of God's Workmanship, and to the Beauty and rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have been conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits of which singular Ornament of Knowledge, are exceeding Great. Hereby we recover 
〈…〉.  a largeness of Heart, for which Solomon is commended, 1 Reg. 4. 29: Able to dispatch many Businesses, to digest and order Multitudes of Motions, to have minds seasoned with generous and noble resolutions; for that disposition is by the Philosopher called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, greatness of mind. Hereby we 
V●…d. Aqu. 22 ●…. qu. 188. Art. 6. i●… C.  are brought to a Just Contempt of sordid and wormie Affections. It is darkness which makes Men grope, and poor, and look only on the things before them, as the Apostle intimates, 2 Pet. 1. 9 Enlightened minds see a greater lustre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Pro. 3. 14. 15. The excellency of Evangelicall Knowledge made Saint Paul esteem every thing in the World besides as D●…ng, Phil. 3. 8. As the light of the sun swallows up all the petty light of the stars: so the more noble and spacious the Knowledge of men's minds is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of those various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It disposeth Men for mutual Communion, and helpful society: for without Knowledge every Man is ferae Naturae, like Birds of prey, that fly always alone. Neither is it possible for a man to be sociable, or a member of any public Body, any further than he hath a proportion and measure of Knowledge: Since Humane Society standeth in the communicating of mutual notions unto one another. Two men that are deaf, and Dumb, and blind, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought nearer unto God, to admire him for his wisdom, and Power; to Adore him for his greatness, and majesty; to Desire him, and work towards the fruition of him, for his light and Glory; because in the Vision of Him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.  
This Knowledge is corrupted four manner of ways. First, By the Contempt of it in Ignorance. Secondly, By the luxuriousness and wantonness of it in Curiosity. Thirdly, By the Defect and uncertainty of it in Opinion. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Opposition unto it in Error.  
There is a threefold Ignorance wherewith the Minds of men may be blinded and defaced. The one is a Natural Ignorance, which of Divine 
Deum 〈◊〉 ●…nemo potest nisi Deo d●…ceute. vid. Ir●…n l. 4. c. 14. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1. & 5. In tantum v debimus in quantum 〈◊〉 crimu●…. Aug. Ep. 6. V●…i ad profunditatem 〈◊〉 perventum est, 〈◊〉 Platonicorum caligavit 〈◊〉▪ Cypr. de Sp. Sanct. Aug. de Pr●…dest. cap. 8. & de Doctr. Christian. l. 2 c. 6.  Things, so fare forth as those things are spiritual, is in all men by Nature; for the Natural Man neither Receiveth with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration discerneth the things of the Spirit of God; And the Reason the Apostle gives, because they are spiritually discerned. For as the Eye is fitted to discern light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of sounds: so the mind cannot otherwise receive spiritual Objects, than as it hath a similitude to those Objects in a spiritual disposition itself; whence that Expression of St. john, we shall be like unto him, for we shall see him as he is. spiritual Things do exceed the weakness of Reason, because they are above it, and so cannot be discerned; And they do oppose the corruption of Reason, because they are against it, and so cannot be Received.  
There is likewise in many Men much natural 
Vid. Hieron. adve●…s. ●…ov ●… l. 2.  Ignorance, even in moral and Natural things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituals were lost, so were our Naturals weakened too, as we find in the Great dullness of many men in matters of learning, in so much that some 
Coel. R●…d l. 11. cap 10.  have not been able to learn the Names of the first Letters or Elements.  
Again, there is a Voluntary Ignorance (of which we have before spoken) whereby Men do wilfully close their Eyes against Knowledge, and refuse it; and of this there may be a double ground, The one Guile, in Knowledge that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chooseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobrations of contemning it. The other out of sluggishness and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the Obtaining of Knowledge. When of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.  
Thirdly, there is a 
* Math. 13. 13. Act. 28. 26▪ 27. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess. 2▪ 10▪ 11▪ N●… 〈◊〉 g●…rent 〈◊〉 de▪ ●…ctorum. 〈◊〉. Apol. cap. 21. contr. Marc. lib. 3. cap. 6. Cyprian. lib. 1. ●…p. 3. Percussi sunt Caeci●…ate ut n●…c 〈◊〉 Delicta n●…c plangant Indignan●…is Dei major ●…aecira. 〈◊〉. de lapsis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. Ex Math. & 〈◊〉 contra Julion. lib▪ 5.  Poenall Ignorance of which I shall not speak, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of spiritual things, save only in the relation that it hath to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their blindness, that the thing which with respect to their own choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto God's Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectual Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.  
In others it is abused by Curiosity, which may 
Clem. Alex. 〈◊〉. lib. 1. sta●…im ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 5. cap. 28. Vid. quaedam contra 〈◊〉 scicutiae 〈◊〉 apud Ter●…ull. de Anim l. cap. 1. contr. Martion. lib. ●…. cap. 1. Aug. Ep. 29 & 56. & 78. & 157. 〈◊〉. lib. 11. cap. 12▪ de Gen. ad li●…. lib. 2. cap. 9 & lib. 10. cap. 23. 〈◊〉.  well be called the Pride, and the wantonness of Knowledge, because it looketh after high things that are above us, and after hidden things that are denied us. And I may well put these two together, Pride and luxury of Learning. For I believe we shall seldom find the Pride of Knowledge more predominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectural inquiries of Wit, and not out of scientifical and demonstrative Grounds. And I find the Apostle joining them together, when he telleth us of some, who intruded themselves into Things which they had not seen, and were vainly puffed up by a fleshly mind. And he himself complaineth of Others, who were Proud, and languished about needless Questions; as it is ever a sign of a sick and ill-affected stomach to quarrel with usual and wholesome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which we cannot reach too. When Manna will not go down without quails, you may be sure the stomach is cloyed, and wants physic to Purge it. I will not here 
In my Sermon of the Peace of the Church. pag. 24.— 26.  add more of this point, having lately touched it on a fit Occasion.  
A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of Assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were in Aequilibrio, that it cannot tell which way to incline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to Science, is called Opinion: For Science is ever cum certitudine, with Evidence and Unquestionable Consequence of Conclusions from necessary Principles: but Opinion is cum Formidine Oppositi, 
Aqui●…. 22 ●…. qu. ●…. Ar●…. 4. C.  with a fear least the contrary of what we assent unto should be true: And so it importeth a Tender, doubtful, and infirm Conclusion.  
The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion between the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazzles the Power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem, as light unto a bat; which rather astonish than inform; and things too Material and immersed, are like a Mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath Truth in it, be the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the soul with the Body, in this present Estate, restrains and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not only the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those Vespertiliones, to which Aristotle hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence with the Body) there is required a mixture of Contraries in the air; it must not be too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must be a kind of middle Temper; clearness of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degrees of darkness for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of man's understanding must participate of the two contr●…ries, Abstraction and Materiality. Abstraction first, in proportion to the 〈◊〉 of the understanding, which is spiritual. And Materiality too, in respect of the Sense, on which the understanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is corporal. So that where ever there is Difficulty and uncertainty of Operation in the understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first in the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plain by a familiar similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction seem greater. Where first we may descry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as clear and well-disposed as a young man's, he would be able by his natural Power, without Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiency in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and fitness in themselves, which they seem to have by Refraction through the glass, the weakness of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that always the Uncertainty of Opinion is grounded on the insufficiency of the understanding to receive an Object, and on the Disproportion of the Object to the Nature of the understanding.  
The next Cause of Opinion and uncertainty in Assents, may be acuteness and subtlety of wit, when Men out of Ability, like 
* Null●…m unquam in d●…sputationibus re●… de●…endit quam non probarit, null●…m oppugnavi●… quam non everterit. Cic. de Oratore. lib 2. Non min●…ibus viribu●… contra justitiam dicitur disser visse, quam pridie pro justitia dixe●…at▪ Qui●…til. de 〈◊〉. lib: 12. cap. 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap. 30.  Carneades, to discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements between an equal weight of Arguments, are forced to suspend their Assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoid Neutrality, they make choice of some thing to aver (and that is properly Opinion) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion, as being accompanied with fear, floating and inconstancy.  
And this indeed, although it be in itself a defect of Learning; yet considering the Estate of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the understanding by continual Inquiry (man being ●…ound in this also to recover that measure of his ●…irst fullness, which is attainable in this Corrup●…ed Estate, by sweat of brain, by labour and degrees, Paulatim extundere arts) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in judgement (so it be not universal in all conclusions; for that argues more 
Vid. qu●… adve. su●… 〈◊〉 disputat Aristocles apud E●…seb. de p●…aepar. Evang. l 14. c 18.  weakness, than choice of conceit; nor Particular in things of Faith and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and useful. Commendable, because it prevent●… all temper of heresy (whose nature is to 
† Ad quam cu●…que sunt di●… 〈◊〉, qu●…st ●…empestate de lapsi ad 〈◊〉. ●…nquam ad Saxum ad haerescunt. Ci●…. Acad▪ q. l. 4. Pli●…. ●…. ●…. ●…p. 22.  be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softness of judgement, which will not suffer itself to be captivated, either to its own conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to descry weakness. And this is▪ that which Pliny commends in his friend Titus Ariston, whose hesitancy and slowness of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptiness or unfurniture; but ex diversitate Rationun qua●… acrimagnoque judicio ab origine Caus●…que primis repetit, discernit, expendit: out of a learned cautelousn●…sse of judgement, which made him so long so spend his Assent, till he had weighed the several repugnancies of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same Pliny elsewhere out of Thucydides observes) It is rawness & deficiency of learning that makes bold and peremptory: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Demurs 
Lib. 4. ep. 7.  and fearfulness of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings▪ First, they lessen, the number of heresies, which are (as I said) always obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But heresy coming under the shape of Science, with shows of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the understanding, and possess it with false Assents, than yield occasion of deeper search, unless it meet with a more piercing judgement, which can through confidence descry weakness. For questionless the errors of Great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldness of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgement with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the error; or if a more impartial eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deters from the opposing of his conceit. Whereas when men's assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty: the understanding is incited both to inquire after the reasons of Diffidence▪ as also to find out means for a more settled Confirmation and clearing of the Truth.   

CHAP. XXXVIII. Of errors: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Palsifying them: or Transferring the Truth of them out of their own bounds. Affections of Singularity, and novel courses. Credulity and thraldom of judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects, corrupteth judgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.  
THe other main Corruption of Knowledge was error, whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falsehood under the show of truth. It is Aristotle's assertion in his ethics, that one man may conceive himself as certain of his error, as another man of his Knowledge: and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seems most ●…erly to resemble it.  
If we inquire after the prime fundamental Cause, the Gate by which error came first into the World. Syracides will tell us in a word, that error and darkness had their beginning together with Sinners: And the reason is, because sin being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is P●…ter Luminum, the Father and fountain of all Knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principal way by Knowledge resemble, cannot choose but bring with it darkness and confusion into the soul. But I shall inquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:  
1 A first and most special one is the Abuse of Principles: For the understanding must have ever something to rest itself upon: and from the conformity of other things, thereunto to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of man's mind, since it had at first itself a beginning to abhor all manner of Infinity, á Parte-Ante (I mean in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the understanding is not quieted in philosophical inquiries about created things, till it have according to their several differences ranged them severally within the compass of some Finite Line, and subordinated the Inferiors of every kind, Sub an●… Summ●… Genere, under one 
Arist. phys. l. 7.  chief; and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to Aliquid primum, in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and essential dependence: so likewise it is in Knowledge & Truth, notwithstanding a Parte Post, downward, our pursuits of them seem Infinite and unlimited, by reason of our own Infinities, and Aeviternity that way; yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the understanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in Infinitum, and never rests till it finds a Non ●…ltra, an utmost link in the chain of any Science, and such a Prime, universal, unquestionable, Vnprovable Truth, from whence all inferior Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of Principles: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrest of any private conceit, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streams have their proportionable corruptions.  
Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by Falsifying and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their own limits; as when philosophical errors are falsely grounded upon philosophical axioms, which is Error Consequentia, or Illationis, an error in the Consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their own bounds, into the Territories (as I may so speak) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject; which is Error Dependentia, or Subordinationis, an error in the dependence of one on the other. For the former, it hath been always either the subtlety or modesty of error to shroud itself under truth; & that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undeniable grounds, & by a strange kind of chemistry, to extract darkness out of light. 
† Liv. l. 28.  Fraus sibi ex parvis, (said Fabius Maximus in Livy upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, Error sibi ex principlijs fidem prastruit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat. 
* Ex bis ea●… impugnat, ex quibus constat. Tertull. de Baptis. c. ●…. Uid 〈◊〉 pras●…r. c. 36. 39 Sententias per primas come 〈◊〉 Argumentis 〈◊〉▪ de 〈◊〉. c. ●…. Ind sumentes prasidia, quò pugnant. c. 50. Omnia advers●… 〈◊〉, de ipsà Veritate construct●… sunt. Apolog. c. 47.  unreasonable and groundless fancies always shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. 
† 〈◊〉. Alex. in 〈◊〉.  As Praxitiles the Painter drew the Picture of Venus by the face of his Minion Cratina, that so by an honourable pretext he might procure Adoration to a Harlot. 
* Cic. Orat. l. 1. I●… Ir●…idendu Oratoribus O 〈◊〉 Summu●….  Thus as Plat●… is said, when he inveighed chief against Orators, most of all to have played the Oratou●… (making a Sword of ●…loquence to wound itself:) So they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custom of that Scipio, honoured afterward by the name of his Punic Conquest, always before he set upon any business, as Livy reports of him) to enter the Capitol alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justness, issue, and success of his intended designs; and then, Apud multitudinem, plerumque 
Liv. l. 26. N●… aliter N●…ma Simul●…ns sibi cum dea 〈◊〉 no●…nes congressus esse, apud 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. l. 1. Vid. V●…. Max. l. 1. c. 2. Plut. in Num●….  velut ment divinitus monitâ agebat: he bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits he persuaded them to attempt, had all the Approbation and Vnerring judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whither an Ambitious hope of fastening an Opinion of his own divineness in the midst of the people, or an happy and politic imposture, the better to press those people (always more inclinable to the persuasions of Superstitions than Reason) to a free Execution of his designs, it is not here necessary to inquire. Sure I am▪ even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like Impostors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as Jacob in Esa●…'s clothes, rob Esau of the Blessing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the oak, doth withal weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertain Corrupt Conceits, and then to 
* Scriptura●…li esse volumus quae nostra 〈◊〉. Aug. vid. qua advers●…●…nc Curioscitatis 〈◊〉 p●…ssim occ●…rrunt apud Tertull Apol. c. 46▪ 47. co●…tr. Hermog. c. 1. ac praescr. c. 17. 38, 39, 40 De R●…surrect c. 40. De sug. in per●…t. c. 6. De ●…dic. c. 16. Simplicitatem s●… 〈◊〉 Ec 〈◊〉, ●…d v●…lunt significare, quod ipsi senti●…▪ Epiph. ad Joan. Hier●…sol. 〈◊〉 Martyr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Alex. Stro●…. l. 7. p. 54●…. D. 〈◊〉. g. c. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 ●…oe lest. l. 1. c. 42. De Grate Christi.  wrest and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errors of the mind, as in the distempers of the palate usual with men to find their own relish in every thing they read.  
Concerning the other Abuse, it is an often observation of Aristotle, that Principles and Con clusions must be within the sphere of the same Science; and that a man of Learning aught all ways to be faithful unto his own Subject, and make no Excursions from it into another Science. And therefore he saith that it is an equal absurdity for a Mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on rhetorical probabilities, as it were for a Rhe●…oritian, whose Arguments should be more plausible and insinuative, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping a Genere ad Genus, and confounding the dependencies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Clem. Alex. ●…erom. 6.  Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudicial to Knowledge; and error hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop & bow to Reason▪ and when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on mere humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with 
† Viderint qui Si●…lcum, & Plato●…icum, & dial●…cticum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. de pr●…script. c. 7.  Nature, and no farther. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denied those two main Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (
* cit lib. de Univers●…. Plat. in Tim●…o ●…seb. de 〈◊〉. ●…van. l. 11. c. ●…9. Theod. ser. 4. C●…m. Alex▪ Str●…m. l. 5. Q●… & Re●… 〈◊〉 Philosophis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 ●…e▪ 〈◊〉 doctrin●…) affirmat. E●…b lib. 11. c. 33. 36. Tertull. de Resu●…rect. 〈◊〉. c. 1. Niscio an bu●… etiam per●… illa. S●…n. 〈◊〉. q●…. l. 3. c. 30  although in some of them the very sight of Nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those main Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that ex nihilo nihil fit; Nothing can be made of nothing. And a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus; That there is no regress from a Totall Privation to the Habit l●…st. And this reason was evidently employed in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the Root of all error, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: Erratis nescientes Scripturas, neque Potentiam Dei. Where are intimated two main Principles of that Mystery of the Resurrection; the Word, and the Power of God. This later commanding our Assent that it May be: that other, our Assurance, that it Will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance of these two, and we go about to examine this or any other Mystery, rather by a disputing, than an Obeying Reason, the immediate consequent of such peremptory and preposterous course, is error and Depravation of the understanding. Pythagoras and his scholars, out of a 
Plut. de pl●…cit. Philos. l. 1. c. 3. Laert. in 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. ●…stic. l. 10. c. 10.  strong conceit that they had of the Efficacy of music, or Numbers, examining all the passages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous error, that Number was the first and most essential Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured glass, have all Objects, how different soever represented in the same colour: So they examining all Conclusions by Principles forestalled for that purpose, thinking every thing of what nature soever to be died in the colour of their own conceits, and to carry some proportion unto those Principles: Like Antiph●…ron▪ Orites and others in Aristotle, who did confidently affirm 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Lib de 〈◊〉 & Reminis. c. 1  every thing for real, which their Imagination faneied to itself. But Tully hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that satirical reprehension which he gives to Aristoxenus the musician, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceit the soul of man to consist of Harmony▪ H●…c magistr●… concedat Aristoteli; canere ipse doceat. Let him leave these things to Aristotle, and content himself with teaching men how to sing: intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its own bounds.  
2 Another Cause of error may be Affectation of Singularity, and a disdain of being but an accession unto other men's Inventions▪ or of Tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walk in ways of their own making, than in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented Errors, than content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the Purchasers of heresy, than the heirs of Truth, Quase nihil fuisse●… rectum, quod primum est; melius existiman●… quicquid est aliud, as Quintilian spoke elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteem every thing therefore better, because new.  
3 Another Cause may be the other Extreme 
Non tam A●…thoritas in disputando, quam rationis momenta quarenda s●…t, etc. Ci●…. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.  (for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. Et credere, quàm scire, videtur 〈◊〉, we rather believe, than know what we assent unto. 'tis indeed a wrong to the labours of Learned men to read them always with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withal, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resign our judgements into another man's. hand. Belief, without evidence of Reason, must be only there absolute, where the Authority is Vnquestion●…ble, and where it is impossible to 〈◊〉, there only it is Impious to Distrust. As for men's Assertions, Quibus possibile est subesse falsum, what he said of Friendship, Sic ama tanquam Os●…s, Love with that wisdom as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantageous in Knowledge: Sic▪ crede tanquam dissensurus, so to believe, as to be ready, when cause requires, to descent. It is a too much 
Vid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Vn●…tat. Eccli●…. cap. 19 C●…tra Crescon. Gramat. l. 2. c. 32. & 〈◊〉. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cacilium.  straightening of a man's own understanding, to enthral it unto any: or to esteem the dissent from some particular Authorities, Presumption and self-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, than Factions and Sidings. When as Seneca said of Cato, that he would rather esteem drunkenness a virtue, than Cato vicious: So peripatetics and Platonists, Scotists, & Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of mortal men) shall rather count error, Truth, than their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reins of his own fancy: or to a presumptuous dependence only on his own judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned; Inchoation and progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning judgement, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, Aristotl's speech is true, Oportet discentem credere, Beginners 
Vid. Theodor. serm. 1. d●…●…ide & Plat●…n. apud ●…seb. l. 12. c. 1.  must believe. For as in the Generation of man, he receiveth his first life and nourishment from one womb, and after takes only those things, which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is grown unto strength and years, he than receiveth nourishment not from milk only, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choice or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the joints and Members of it into one Body is best effected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, Gate being a child, was wont to require a reason) 
Plut. lib. de Audiend. Po●…tit. Vid. Sen. p. 64.  but being grown thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the Liberty of its own judgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speak not this therefore to the dishonour of Aristotle, or any other, stom whose Learning, much of ours, as from fountains, hath been derived. Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration. And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation 
Hooke●… lib. 1 ●…. 6.  which hath been given Aristotle by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of nature's Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, than the whole Series of age's since hath in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning do well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yetnotwithstanding 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Orat. 1. d●… R●….  there is difference between Reverence and Superstition; we may Assent unto them as ancients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easy and inclinable; they may not have them captivated and fettered to their Opinions As I will not distrust all, which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of error: So likewise will I suspend my belief upon probability of their mistakes: and where I find express Reason of Dissenting, I will ●…ather speak Truth with my mistress Nature, than 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. Bible. l. 1. c. 4. Tacit. U●…ritas nec mt●… est, 〈◊〉 illi 〈◊〉. ●…ut illi 〈◊〉. Aug. Confess. l. 12. c. 25.  maintain an error with my Master Aristotle. As there may be Friendship, so there may be Honour with diversity of Opinions: nor are we bound therefore to defy men, because we reverence them. Plura s●…pe peccantur dum demeremur, quam dum off endimus; we wrong our ancestors more by admiring than opposing them in their errors; and our Opinion of them is foul and without Honour, if we think they had rather have us followers of them then of Truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in Plutarch did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing. I will do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me. For good men are ever willing to have Truth preferred above them. Aristotle his Commendation 
R●…. l. 2.  of his middle Aged men, should be a rule of our Assent to him, and all the rest of those first Planters of Knowledge. We ought neither to overprize all their Writings by an absolute Credulity; because they being Men, and subject to error; may make us thereby liable to Delusion; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being Great men, and so well deserving of all Posterity, they may challenge from us an easiness of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it be only without and not against Reason) as T●…lly professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of man's soul, as Immortality: Vt ration●…m nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangeret: Though Plato had given no reason for it; yet his Authority should have swayed Assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose a l●…vaies to be swayed by Truth, more than by the thousand years of Plato and Aristotle.  
4 Another Cause of error, may be a fastening 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉.  too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the mind conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: As if Truth w●…re the handmaid to Passion: or chameleon like could alter itself to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be unquestionable and authentical, when we have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of man's Nature (which amounted 
Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 19 c. 1.  to the number of two hundred eighty eight, ●…s ●…as long ago observed by Varro) which could not ●…ut be out of every particular Philosophers con ●…ipt, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his own crooked Nature: so that every man sought happiness, not where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the Rule of his own distempered and entangled judgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous errors, according as the Minds of men were any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, pomp, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensual Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnatural course; like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the soul and Deity: For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the understanding concerning happiness should precede the pursuit of the Will: they on the contrary side, first love their error, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because ●…e conceiveth it would go fare better with him in the end, than otherwise it is like to do) and then this Desire allures the understanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may persuade to the belief thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: Qu●…d nimis volumus facile credimu●…, we easily believe what we will willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by Nature he love sin) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereof; either from others, or himself; and therefore be his errors never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his mind never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily persuade himself to think he is in the right course, and make his judgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vicious Suggestions, Viti a nostra, quia amamus, defendimus. When once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resign itself to be perverted, and the discourse of the understanding will quickly be drawn to the maintaining of either; So easy it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.  
And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vital ones, which diffuse their virtue into the whole, the weakness spreads, and over-runnes all the other, though remotest from it▪ So likewise the violent motion of partial and unruly Appetites▪ which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher pa●…s of man's soul▪ out of the natural Harmony & consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially do they labour to win over the judgement unto their side, and there hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the understanding is regular, the chief Dominion thereof, is overaffection. And therefore we see always, that men of the most stayed and even judgements, have the most unresisted power in the government of Passions: So on the other side; when the Affections are strongly inclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality; or Object in Nature, the first Faculty whereon they strive to transfer their prejudice in the Reason▪ since without the Assent and Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedom from distractions and fear, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophistry and Disputes of that Power. Thus as it is usual with men of deceitful palates (as before I touched) to conceive in every thing they taste the same disagreeing relish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered: So it is with men's Minds prepossessed with any particular fancy: Intus Existens prohibet alienum. They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their conceits are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in natural Philosophy sprang that Opinion of Aristoxenus the musician (which I spoke of before) that the soul of Man consisted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, Velut in Cantu & Fidibiu, between the parts; and Tully intimates the reason I speak of very prettily: Hic ab artificio suo non recessit: this man knew not how to leave his own Art; & more expressly of the same in another place: Ita delactatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre con●…tur. he was so affected with music, that he transferred it upon the soul.  
5 Another reason, which I conceive of Corruption of the understanding by error, is Curiosity and Pushing it forward to the Search of things clasped up and reserved from its Inquiry. 'tis the natural disease of mankind to desire the Knowledge of nothing more than what is lest attainable. It a Naturâ comparatum est (saith Pliny) ut proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo ani 〈◊〉 rerum Cupid●… Languescit, cum f●…ili occasio est. It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowledge, as in other things▪ ●…o esteem that which is far fetched (as we say) and dear bought most precious; as if Danger and R●…rity were the only Argument of worth. The enquiry after the Estates of Spiri●…, and separated souls, the Hierarchies of Angels; and (which is more) the secret Counsels of God, with other the like hidden Mysteries, do so wholly possess the Minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries, and so become not only hurtful, in regard of their own vanity and fruitlessness; but also in that they hinder more wholesome and useful Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto man's soul, that though it be Holy, it pleaseth not; if there be but evil (the worst of all Objects) unknown. The devil persuades Adam rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.  
But we are to remember that in many things, our search and bold speculations must be content with those Silencing, more than Satisfying Reasons. Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est mund●…: Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We own unto nature's works, a●… well our wonder, as our inquiry; and in many things it be●…ooves us more to magnify than to search. There are as in the countries of the World, so in the Travels of men's wits; as well Praecipitia▪ as Via; as well gulfs and Quicksands, as common Seas. He that will be climbing too high, or sailing to fare, is likely in the end to gain no other Knowledge, but only what it is to have a shipwreck, and to suffer ruin. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly moral and Earthly▪ and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy▪ disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the school unto no higher Contemplations, than Base and Worldly is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurn and disdain these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soar after Inscrutable Secrets; to unlock and break open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deep and impenetrable Counsels of Heaven, 
Aug. de Gen. ad li●…▪ l. 11. c. 14. ●…t lib. de ve●…. Relig. c. 13. De C●…v. Dei. l. 12. c. 6. Hier. Ep. 44. ad Anton. de Modestia, & i●… c. 14. Isai●…▪ Greg. Moral. l. 14. c. 17. Damas. de Orth●…d. sid l. 2. c. 4.  which we should with a holy, fearful, and astonished Ignorance only adore, is too bold and arrogant sacrilege, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell▪ For Ero similis Altissimo, I will be like the most high, was (as i●… believed) the Devils first sin: and Eriti tanquam Dij, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obey or with darkness; in the one, with the darkness of Tophet; in the other, with the darkness of error.   

CHAP. XXXIX. The Actions of the understanding, Invention, Wit, judgement; of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: of Tradition, by Speech, Writing: of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech.  
HItherto of the more Passive Operation of the understanding, which I called Reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active; which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in its Apprehension▪ And they are the Actions of Invention, of Wit, and of judgement. The former of these hath two principal parts; the Discovering of Truth; and the Communicating of it. The former only is properly Invention; the other a Consequent thereof, Tradition: but both much making to the honour of the Faculty. For the former, I shall forbear any large discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, practices, dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of laws, government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprise a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.  
The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,  
First, a despair and Distrust of a man's own Abilities: For as Corruption and self Opinion is a main Cause of error: so Dissidence and fear is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enquiry, with sloth and dullness. Multis rebus inest Magnitudo (saith Seneca) non ex naturâ suâ, sed ex debilitate nostrâ: and so likewise, Multie rebus inest difficultas; non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostrâ▪ Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so, but because our suspicion so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill disposed Body, ●…very light weakness is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the Constitution is stronger. So with fearful and despairing wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Disopinion & slender conceit which they have of their own Abilities. Non calcant spina●…, sed habent. It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the air, but in the Eye.  
Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us. For when men shall so magnify the Gifts of others, that they slight and neglect their own; when out of a prejudicated conceit that the ancients have sufficiently perfected the Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exercise their Wits (capable of greater employments) in degenerate and unuseful Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindered from attaining that Maturity, to which by their own Inventions it might be raised. Thus as it falls out amongst men of thirstlesse Minds in their Fortunes: Divitiarum abundantia inter Causa●… paupertat is est. Their profuseness out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, draws them quickly beyond their Fortunes▪ or as it was in the like case amongst the Romans in those times of public Luxury, and effeminateness, the valour of their ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from foreign hostility, did also by the means of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their weakness was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we spend our time only in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our own Inventions, the Large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, where in their Labours offer greater Assistance, than discouragement. There was not I persuade myself amongst the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the freedom of their own Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was coun●…vailed with many fruitful and good lie iss●…; all which might haply have been undi scovered, had men laboured only in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more errors being still examined, were less pernicious than fewer believed. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few errors that have not some way or other Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an error in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turn it up for no other end, but to find his Imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softening of the Ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may be made even of errors, when discovered in the In nulls after Truth, that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a Negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as he is sooner likely to find out a place, who knows which is not the way, than he that only knows not the way.  
The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Vnfurniture for want of acquainting a man's self with the Body of Learning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued Frame, brancheth itself into sundry members: So that there is not only in the Object of the Will: which is the Good of things; but in the Object of the understanding also, which is their Truth, a certain mutual Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other.▪ insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doc necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of Tully is generally true, Difficile est pauca esse e●… nota, Cui non sint, 
Tus●…▪ q. l. 2▪  aut pleraque aut omnia. All that address themselves either to the Invention of Arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.  
For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech. Wherein I consider a double ministerial reference; the one to the eye; the other to the ear: that is Vox scripta, a Visible Voice; this Vox viva, an Audible Voice. To which purpose Scaliger acutely: Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus. The Dignities which this particular 〈◊〉 on man, and wherein it gives him a pre-eminence above other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every service able or ministerial Instrument is to be gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.  
The end whereunto Living and organical Speech was principally ordained, is to maintain 
Arist. Polit. l. 1. c. 2.  mutual Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tully well calls it, Humana Societatis Vinculum, the Ligament and Sinnew, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.  
It would be a long and large labour to speak of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Poet calleth it, The 
〈◊〉.  Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the mind which clotheth our Conceits with Characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I shall not engage myself on so great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of so many learned men, who have written some rhetorical, others moral Institutions and Precepts touching Speech. I shall therefore content myself with but naming some few particulars, by Consideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.  
●… For the Dignity hereof it appears in this, That whereas in other less Considerable Perfections, other Creatures have an exquisiteness above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reason clothed in sensible Characters unto others of his own kind. For though some melancholy men have believed that 
〈◊〉. Aug. lib. Qu●…●…. ●…x Ve●…. 〈◊〉. ●…. 3.  Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a Language whereby they discourse with one another; yet we know that those narrow and poor Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed only from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive Appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth only upon Reason. And as by this the soul of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. de part▪ 〈◊〉 l. 4 c. 10. Vi●… 〈◊〉. Anatom. ●…. 1. c. 2, 4. 〈◊〉 in G 〈◊〉 2. 7. disp. de 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Corp▪ q. 1.  Body excel them too. First, in the uprightness of his Stature, whereby he is made to look up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth, the Impression of that Light which dwell●…th within him. For the Face is the Window of the soul▪  

Pronáque cum spectent Animalia caetera terram,  
Os homini sublime dedi●…, Caelumque tueri  
jussit▪ & erectos, ad Sydera tollere Vultus.   

Whilst other creatures downward fix their sight,  
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:  
To man he gave a lofty Face; might look  
Up to the Heavens; and in that spacious book,  
So full of shining Characters, descry 
Quint. Instit. l. 2. c. 16. 〈◊〉. ●…hodig. l. 2. c. 30. l. 16 ●…. 1●…. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. de Interpre●…. c. 1. Greg. N●…ss. de Hom opisicio. c. 9   
Why he was made, and whether he should fly.   
Next in the Faculty of Speech, which is the Gare of the soul, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits, and Cogitations of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks. The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the Conceptions of the Mind (and by that means to preserve humane Society) to derive knowledge to maintain mutual love and supplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrows; but above all to Honour God, and to edify one another, in which respect our Tongue is called our Glory. Psal. 16. 2. Act. 2. 26. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eu. ●…pid. Hec. Sutton▪ ●…n C●…s. cap. 70. L●…c. l ●…. ●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 S●…phocl. Elec. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid. 〈◊〉. de Eloq. l. 1. ●…. 4. V●…l. 〈◊〉. l. 8. c. 9 Pluta●…. l●…b. de precept. gerend. Reip.   
The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to express, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry captive the Affections of men. Caesar with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. Menenius Agrippa with one Apologue, the sedition of a people. Flavianus the Bishop of Antioch with one Oration; the fury of an Emperor. Anaximenes' with one Artifice, the indignation of Alexander; Abigail with one Supplication, the Revenge of David; Pericles and Pisistratus even then when they spoke against the people's liberty, over ruled them by their Eloquence, to believe and embrace what they spoke, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with clean different success. The one in advancing the same business pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other Reason but this, the one had the Art of persuasion which the other wanted.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

One spoke the Right with a slow Tongue,  
Another fluently spoke wrong.  
He lost, this stole the Cause, and got  
To make you think, what you think not.   
And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that known passage of his thus elegantly described:  

— Magn●… in popule cum sapè Coorta est 
Virg. 〈◊〉.   
Seditio, savitque Animus Ignobile vulgus  
Ian●…que faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.  
Tum pietate gravem, ac merit is si fortè virunquem  
Conspêxere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant:  
Ille regit dictis Anim●…s & pectora ●…ulcet.   

When in a Multitude Seditions grow,  
And Vicerated Minds do overflow  
With swelling Ire▪ when stones & firebrands fly,  
(As Rage doth every where weapons supply)  
Then if some Aged man, in honour held  
For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,  
And moderate this Tumult: straight ways all  
Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall  
Their Angry clamours; His grave words do sway  
Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.   
The virtues of Speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the mind) are many, which therefore I will but name, some grammatical, as Property, and fitness, and Congruity, without 
Vid 〈◊〉 Orat. 〈◊〉 l. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eliq. 〈◊〉. 2. Quint. l. 1. c. 5. & possim alibi. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Laer●…. 〈◊〉 Zen. ●…. 7.  Solaecismes and barbarousness, some rhetorical, as choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspecuity, Gravity, pleasantness, Vigo●…, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some logical, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting of all the aids of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Poverbs, Apologues, emblems, Histories, laws, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some moral, as Gravity, Truth, seriousness, Integrity, Authority; When words receive weight from manners, and a man's Speech is better believed for his Life than for his Learning. When it appears, That they arise esulce pectoris, and have their foundation 
v d. A. Gell. l. 1. c. ●…. 5.  in virtue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the self same Wine with pleasure in a pure and clean vessel, which he lo●…ths to put unto his mouth, from one that is soul and soiled: so the self same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.  — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Eurip. Hecub.  

A Speech from Base men, and men of Respect,  
Though't be the same, works not the same Effect.   
And therefore the Spartan Princes when they 
Plut. lib. de Audit. A. Gell. l. 18. c. 13.  heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life, an Opinion which they approved, They required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his judgement. For we are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill cook did dress it. And therefore it is a very true Character which Tully and Quintilian 
Quint. l. 12. c. 1.  give of a right orator. That he must be Vir bonus dicendi Peritus, as well a Good man as a Good speaker. Otherwise though he may speak with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their Affections. Like a fire made of green wood, which is fed with it as it is fuel, but quencheed as it is green.  
Lastly, some are civil in Causes Deliberative, or juridical, as wisdom, pertinency and fitness to the Nature and Exigence of the End or 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophot. Aj●…x.  Matter whereupon we speak. For in that case we are to ponder and measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. Paul amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their Poets, and from confessed maxims of Reason, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and lending them to Repentance. But amongst the Jews he disputed out of Scripture. With Felix that looked for money, he disputed of righteousness and judgement to come, but amongst the Pharisees and Sadduces, of the Resurrection, that a dissension amongst themselves might 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 S●…phocl. Aj●…x.  procure a party for him. It is not wisdom for a man in misery to speak with a high stile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be excellent in an umbratile Exercitation, which would be too pedantical, and smelling of the lamp in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat i●… one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thin for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth like 
Petulanti●… verborum co●… 〈◊〉 esse opposite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 15.  a double Hedge, that we might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.  
These are the principal virtues. And in Opposition unto these, we may easily collect the principal Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content myself with but the naming.  
The Vices in grammar, are Solaecismes, Barbarismes, Obsoletenesse, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In rhetoric, sordidness, tediousness, Obscurity, flatness of Conceit, Argutenesse, and Minutiae, gaudiness, Wordinesse, and Empty Ostentation. In Morals, the Vices 
Vid. Plut. de 〈◊〉. & 〈◊〉. Cl●…m. Alex. Padag. l. 2 c. 7 S●…uck. Con●…iv. l. 4. c. 17. & 19 Coel. Rhodig. l. 7. c. 26.  may be comprised under these two Generals, Multiloquium and Turpiloquium, Garrulous and Rotten Communication. Lastly in civil Respects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of Thersites, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Many and to little purpose.  
But besides all these, there is one thing which 
De 〈◊〉. Cle●…. Al●…x Padag. l. 2. c. 9 〈◊〉 spec●…es qu●… plurima extra justitu 〈◊〉 nostrum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perjuria, 〈◊〉 dicta, 〈◊〉, Dicteria, Ob●…, &c  seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a Lye. For a●… every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, cracked, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it bears, be express and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitful resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) we still account it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great weakness and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping itself to the conceits of the Mind, and make level and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not a good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its original office: and indeed, other moral Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speak of, without which they are but hypocrisy, and come within the compass of the noted Corruption, a lie: for every hypocrite is a liar. I confess there are sins of Speech greater than a lie, in the intention and degrees of their own gild: But herein is the difference: the Tongue may in it (whether Morally religiously considered) bear a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)  
First it may be Vnconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavoury Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurs, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion between evil Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the thoughts.  
And then secondly it may be disproportioned to the conceits of the Mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly 〈◊〉, and this is properly a Lye. Which I therefore call the principal Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousness and gild, than in any other Speeches (because all gild follows the Incomformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater measure of wickedness) but because in a lie I find both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the conceits of the Mind; but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.  
The next kind of Active Operations were those of Wit. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the wrest and Abuse of it is the more dangerous▪ I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by showing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common Acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of conceit, whether in style or Conference, which like ●…otten wood in the dark, have more Shine than Substance; whose use and Ornament are like themselves Swift and Vanishing; at once both Admired and Forgotten: but I understand a settled, constant, habitual sufficiency of the understanding, whereby it is enabled in any kind of Learning, Theory, or Practise, both to sharpness in Search, subtlety in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kind seen in panegyrics, Declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministeries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation than use: and are only the Remission of the Mind and Vnbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather Exercise than travel, although by the violence of the motion, or length of the way there may ensue Sweat and weariness.  
Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be divers; yet none so immediate and certain as itself, if alone: For Wit, though it be Swift, yet is often Blind. And therefore the faster it hastens in error, the more dangerous it is to itself. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been emment in this Faculty, if they swayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of Truth, than men best furnished with acuteness, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their own Fancies, and not submitted it to judgement and Examination. As the fattest soils in Greece caused the greatest troubles; and the Beauty of Helena, the ruin of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poison of the mind; but being itself poisoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be●… for the right disposing of our Inventions, a mutual reference and service between Wit and judgement. It is a vexation of Mind to discern what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attain it: and that is judgement without Wit. And to have a facility of compassing an End, and a working and restless fancy, without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the only course to multiply error, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continual toil, without any proficience or gain of Way; and this is Wit without judgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutual Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the spur to stir up and quicken the understanding: and judgement is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot▪ for Execution and Motion; but judgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Lastly, Wit is the sail and oar to further the progress in any Inquiry; but judgement is the ballast to Poise, and the steer to guide the course to it's intended End.  
Now the manner of the judgements Operation in directing either our practice or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it ●…educeth them to certain Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chief to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating Wits seem oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any Examination; but apud Sapientes est ●…lectio & Modus: They first weigh things before they utter th●…m.  
The main Corruption of judgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of judgement is to discern between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore 'tis true in this, as in the course of public judgements: That respect of persons, or things, blind the Eyes, and maketh the understanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hoodwink than distemper or hurt the judgement▪ so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a Mistake, but a lie: Of which kind flattery is the principal, when the Affections of Hope and fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.   

CHAP. XL. Of the Actions of the understanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and Means. The Power of the understanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks only at Good present. Two Acts of the understanding, Knowledge and Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happiness immortal. Ignorance and weakness in the Understanding, in proposing the right means to the last End.  
HItherto of the Actions of the Understanding, Ad extra, in regard of an Object. Those Ad Intra, in regard of the Will: Wherein the understanding is a Minister o●… Counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an End, whereon to fasten its desires: or to direct it in the means conducible to that end. For the Will alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the Assistance of an Informing Power. So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction of a Conducting power. As it hath not judgement to discover an End: So neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right Means, whereby that may be attained. So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the understanding, whereby they are pro portioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the understanding is usually by the schoolmen called Imperium, or Mandatum, a Mandate or Command; because it is a Precept, to which the will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well, are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will; though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the understanding over the Will, is only a Regulating and Directing, it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will always is Domina s●…orum actuum: The mistress of her own Operation: For Intellectus non imperat, sed solumm●…dò significat voluntatem imperantis. It doth only intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God: some seeds whereof remain in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of Man date; but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our understanding; but to sin against our Law giver. As in civil Policy, the offences of men are not against inferior Officers; but against that sovereign Power, which is the fountain of Law, and under whose Authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of government. Besides, Ejus est imperare, Cujus est punire: For Law and Punishment being Relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only canbe an imposition of law, from which may be an Infliction of Punishment.  
Now the Condition under which the understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them Goodness, Possibility; and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) Immortality too. Every true Object of any Power, is that which beareth such a perfect Relation of convenience & fitness thereunto, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since Malum is Destruct●…vum all evil is Destructive. It is impossible that by itself, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, it should ever have any Attractive Power over the Desires of the Will. And on the other side, since Omne bonum, is Perfectivum; since Good is perfective, and apt to bring real satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the Will, were it not that our understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions; and the Will itself corrupted in its own Inelinations.  
But yet though all man's Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good▪ yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all natural Agents aim still at their own Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or evil pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appear therefore how the understanding doth always propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own Nature, but in the Apprehension of the understanding itself known to be evil. And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its own Knowledge, as evil. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and evil: For first, all evil of Sin, (though it have Disconvenience to man's Nature, as it is Destructive; yet) on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and corrupt. As continual drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would die, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, only that he may thereby come to Destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise goodness, though it have the most absolute Convenience to man, as it is Perseclive, & in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet 〈◊〉 hath as great a disconvenience toward men's corrupt Faculties, as it is a straight rule to s●…uare them by, & in respect of its R●…ctitude. As light, thou●…h it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes, it works more trouble than delight, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A●…st ●…thic. l. 3. ●…. 7.  because as in Philosophy▪ Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis so, Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetenti●…. So that if the 〈◊〉 itself be by inherent pollution depraved and evil, it cannot but desire every thing that bears proportion & conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the main reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten Delight on those Objects which they know to be evil, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.  
To which I may add another, namely, the Resolution of a Corrupt Will to yield unto itself all Present Satisfaction, and not to suffer itself to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a Future Estate: Insomuch that the small content which man's Nature receiveth from the actual fru●…ion of some instant-conceited Good, prevails more to draw on Appetite, than the fearful Expectation of ensuing Misery, can to deter from it. And the present irksomeness of Pious Duties, have more power to divert the corrupt mind from them; then the Fore-conceipt of eternal bliss can have to allure the Mind unto a Delight in them. Hence than it appears, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith Reason is to propose any End or Means to the Will, that it may be desired; namely, Sub Ratione Boni, under the Condition of Good, not always True and moral; but sometimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved understanding, Sub conceptu Convenientia: as it bears Conformity to the present Crooked Estate of man's Will: a Deprâved understanding I say, and not always properly and precisely a Darkened understanding; Depraved by Neglect and inconsiderableness; not darkened by Ignorance and blindness. For there may be an Irregular Will with a judgement rightly informed by Truth. Otherwise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider that there is in a Well-stayed Reason, a double Act in the directing of the Will. The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the Object: the other, more peculiarly the Circumstance of Time: the one is properly Knowledge; the other Circumspection, arising out of Meditation, and more close pressing of the Object, which is known as Good to the Will, against Insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aim only a●… the Fruition of pleasure present. First, the understanding proposeth to the Will Felicity, as an Absolute and eternal Good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth means for the attaining of it; namely, the practice of these Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The Will being, besides its own Corruption, transported by the Sensitive Appetite, finds great irksomeness in those means. A re●…raint of all those present joys, Delights, Satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to be expected, many Prejudices and Difficulties to be grappled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraint to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the mind, fewer inablements for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment; which withdraw the Will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the Liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of the understanding, Efficacy and Weight of Consideration, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the small time, they shall continue; with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue there from, and also with the unsufferable Torments that follow the vileness of present Pleasures. Whence the Will is made more inclinable (by the Assistance of greater Power than its own) to go along rather through thorns with virtue, than with adulterate and painted pleasures to dance towards ruin.  
Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a Blinded understanding; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Insufficiency and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the endless Consequence of Good or evil, works properly a Depraved understanding, in regard of practical or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch; though his Eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it; not out of blindness, but out of inconsiderateness, as not fixing his conceit thereon; but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the understanding being taken up by the Imposture of the Affections, with the conceit of present Good, or present Ill in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry, after the true Rectitude and Obliquity thereof, suffers the Will fearfully to plunge itself in danger and misery.  
Another Condition, under which and End or Means are to be proposed by the Will, is Sub rationo Eossibilis, as a good Possible. For if once the understanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replennish and satiate the Power. Now all Satisfaction is by Fruition; all Fruition necessarily presupposeth a Possibility of Acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left hopeless, and therefore Desirelesse; and therefore we see that the nearer any things comes to Impossibility, the more averse is the Will of most men from it: as is plain in these things that are perplexed and difficult to ateaine. And if here the wish of him in the Poet be objected:  O mihi praeteritos refer at fi Iupiter ann●…s? 

O that Jove would me restore,  
The years that I have lived before.   
It may be answered that this was a Wish only, and not a Will. Since that which a man willeth, he doth really endeavour to obtain.  
The last Condition (which is restrained only to the utmost end of man's desire) is that it be proposed, Sub ratione Immortalis, as an Immortal Good. The endlessness of happiness is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the Mind of man naturally is carried to an Immortality of Being; and therefore also consequently to an Immortality of Happinesss; it being a necessary Desire of all natural Agents, to attain a Perfection proportionate to the measure of their Continuance. So than man's End must not be only Good, but for ever Good, Totally and Eternally: not only a fullness of joy in the nature of it; but a fullness of Perpetuity in the Continuance. Most perfect in proportion in the Spirituality; most infinite in proportion to the Immortality of man's soul. The Frailty and Languishing of any Good, and a Foresight of the loss thereof, with the ablest Mi●…ds doth much weaken the Desire of it. And the reason is, because Providence and Forecast is a certain companion of the humane Nature; and he which is most a man, is most careful to contrive the advancement of his Future Estate. It is bestial to fasten only upon Present Good; this being a main difference between the understanding, and the sensual Appetite, that this respecteth only the present joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its own Immortality, fastens itself upon the remotest times, yea outruns all time, and suffers itself to be ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an endless happiness. And therefore 
Ethic. l. 1.  the reason that Aristotle brings against his master's Ideas, argues an understanding less Divine in this particular than Plato's was, when he saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, than Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any essential part of goodness in itself; yet it is a necessary and principal condition to make goodness, happiness; that is, an Adequate object to man's Desires; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether extrinsical and Irrelative in respect of White; but the happiness of man hath an intrinsical Connection with Immortality, because man's utmost and Adequate Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his mind (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way replennish and leave nothing behind it that may be desired) So that man himself being endless, can have none End able to limit his desires, but an Infinite and immortal Good; which he may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an A theist in the world, who hath in his Life be-beasted himself by setting his Desires only on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his deathbed count it the best bargain he ever made to change Souls, with one of those whose Diligence in providing for a Future happiness, he hath often in his beastly Sensuality impiously derided.  
Now of these two Directions of the understanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more gross and palpable in Assistance to the Means, than in the Discovery of the End; and fare oftener fails the Will herein than in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and immortal happiness, the beatifical Vision; Every Balaam fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any Agreement in an End, where is such notable Discord in the ways to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the several Proportion, which the true End and the true Means thereunto bear unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one general hindrance or error about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion between man and the right means of a true End is fare Greater. For there is not only error in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practic Faculties, proceeding from their general Corruption in this Estate, and nailing the Affection on the present Delight of sensual Objects. First, for the understanding, I observe therein a double hindrance concerning these Means: Ignorance 
Ignorantia & Difficultas. Aug.  and weakness; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or enforcement upon the wil For the former of these, there seems to be an equal difficulty between the End and the Means, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is fare more preventable (considering the Helps we have to know it) than of the Means. Not but that there are as powerful Directions for the Knowledge of the Means, as of the End; but because they are in their Number many, and in their Nature repugnant to man's Corrupt Minds. There is therefore more weariness, and by consequence▪ more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, than after the End, because that is in itself but One; and besides, bears with it (under the general Notion of happiness) such an absolute Conformity to man's Nature, as admits of no refusal or Opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.  
Now besides this Ignorance, when the Knowledge of the means is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exercise of them. For (as Aristotle observes) amongst all the Conditions required to moral practice, Knowledge hath the least sway. It hath the lowest place in virtue, though the highest in Learning.  
There is secondly in the understanding weakness, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular Motion of the Will, & with draws it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye, with an impartial and bribeless judgement, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the several Passages of all our Actions, with all the present and consequent Inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vast labour to run over all the Oppositions, which virtuous means, leading to an Happy End, do always find in the several Faculties of man: how the Will itself is stubborn and froward; the Passions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppression; the Senses and Sensitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping always like those under-Coelestiall orbs into another motion, quite contrary to that which the Primum Mobile: enlightened Reason should confer upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Disproportion between the means of happiness, and the general Nature of Corrupt man. For all goodness is necessarily adjoined with Rectitude and straightness (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a Good man, is called an upright man; one that is every where Even and straight. To which Aristotle perhaps had one Eye, when he called his Happyman, a fouresquare man, which is every where smooth, stable, and like himself. But now on the other side, man's Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a Distorted and Crooked Nature; and therefore altogether unconformable to the goodness which should as a Cannon, direct it to the true and principal End it aimeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are Impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling Movers necessarily require more Liberty of way, more broad courses to exerise themselves in: as we see in natural Bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow bounds as that, which is straight.   

CHAP. XLI. Of the Conscience; its Offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, watchfulness, Memory, Impartiality. Of Consciences Ignorant, Superstitious, Licentious, Sleeping, frightful, Tempestuous.  
THere remains yet one higher and diviner Act of the practical understanding, of most absolute power in man, and that is Conscience. Which is not any distinct Faculty of the soul, but only a Compounded Act of Reason, consisting in Argumentation: or a practic syllogism, inferring always some Applicative and personal Conclusion, Accusing or Excusing.  
The Dignities whereof are to be gathered from the Offices of it, and from the Properties of it.  
The main Offices are three; Direction, Conviction, Consolation, whereof the two last always presuppose the first with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Observance.  
The Direction of Conscience consists in a Simple Discourse: or (as I may so speak) in a Direct Ray of understanding, gathering moral or Divine Conclusions from a presupposed habit of Principles, either from the relics of our original Knowledge naturally impressed, or by concurrence of Religion and theological Precepts spiritually iuspired into the practic judgement or hearts of men. The observance of which Conclusions it imposeth upon all those Executive Powers, which each particular Conclusion doth most immediately concern upon pain of hazarding our own Inward Peace, with that sweet repose and security of mind which follows it; and also (as the Heathen●… themselves have observed) upon fear of i●…curring the displeasure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his Penetrating and S●…arching Eye is able to read our most retired Thoughts: so his impartial and unpreventable justice hath thunder and fire in store for the Rebellions against this Faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and herald in all men's hearts.  
The two latter of those Offices consist in a Reflection of that former discourse upon men's Actions, and according as is discovered in them, either an observance or neglect of those imposed Duties: the heat of that Reflection is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of these two; that of Conviction is nothing else but a performance of that equivocal kill promise made by the Serpent to our seduced Parents; I mean an Opening of their Eyes, to know with desperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregone; and with fear, shame and horror, the evil which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into. This one Act it is which hath so often confuted that Opinion of Aristotl●… touching Death, that it is of all things most Terrible; in that it hath it pursued many so fare, as that it hath forced them to leap out of them self, and to prefer the terror of Death and darkness of the Grave, before the grisly Face of a Convicting Conscience.  
The chief Dignity hereof consisteth in Consolation, whereby it diffuseth into the whole man, from a secret assurance of divine favour (for nothing can throughly calm the Conscience, but 〈◊〉) a sweet Tranquillity, silent Peace, settled staidness, and (which is highest of all, a ravishing Contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-fruition of bliss and Immortality.  
The prop●…rties of the Conscience (whereby I understand the Ministeries, which it never fails to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; Watchfulness, Memory, Impartiality. It keeps always Centin●…ll in a man's Soule●…and like a Register, records all our good and ill actions. Though the darkness of the Night may hid us from others, and the darkness of the Mind seem to hid us from ourselves; yet still hath Conscience an Eye to look in secret on whatsoever we●… do, whether in regard of Ignorance or hardness. Though in many men it sleep in regard of Motion; yet it never sleeps in regard of Observation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which seems Invisible and Illegible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of God's judgement, will be most clear. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastened in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indelible Charact●…rs, never to be blotted out. All or most of our Knowledge forsakes us in our Deaths; Wit, acuteness, variety of Language, habits of Sciences; our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: only those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate & raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest; whether they be impressions of Peace or horror. The Testimoni●…s of Comfort (if true) are fastened in the Heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so Hard, and they so Deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or m●…lting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.  
Then thirdly it is a most bribeless Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our w●…yes. It is (if I may so speak) God Historion, that writes not Annals, but journals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of hours and moment's▪ never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares speak truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperor shall feel as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in to light him to his Lust. There is scarce one part in man, but may be seduced, save his Conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawn by persuasion contrary to their own propensions; this only deals faithfully with him, whose witness it is, though it be to the confusion of itself and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know err sometimes and mistake; but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its own judgement, and register White for black.  
The Corruption of Conscience arises principally from two Extremes; the one occasioned by Ignorance; the other by sin (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner) The o●…e is when the want of due Knowledge draws the Conscience, to sinister determinations, either in practice or Forbearance. The other when evil Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these contain under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.  
From Ignorance▪ First, comes a ●…ettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding itself to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving freedom to its self in such course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting itself from either.  
Then from the other Root there comes: First, a Dead, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary sins. A Pale, sweeting, and Affrighted Conscience by atheistical and unnatural sins:  — Tum frigida mens est Criminibus; tacitâ s●…dant prac●…rdia culpa. 

The gild which from unseen pollution springs,  
Cold-sweating horror on their bosom brings.   
A Desperate, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from Blasphemous and Open sins. Not but that any of these may come from any sin; but that the Quality of some sins doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered Conscience. But because all these, as also this whole discourse pertains to a highe●… Science, I shall here forbear to speak more of it.   

CHAP. XLII. Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chief Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and persuasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanical Suggestions. Of the manner of the wills Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.  
I Proceed to the last Faculty of men's Soul, his Will. Which doth alone govern, moderate, and overrule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; Appetite, Liberty, Domination. The former respecteth an End; the two Latter, the Means thereunto conducing. 
Arist. 〈◊〉. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. cap. 5.  The Desires are fixed on some Good thoroughly proportion to the wideness of the Heart: then the Liberty of the Will grounded on the Direction of the judgement, makes choice of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that Good: and lastly, the Dominion employs all inferior Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.  
Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditional occasions: but the true Vltimate, utmost and Absolute Good is God. All other Ends are ministering and Subordinate; 
Ethic. l. 1. c. 2.  he only is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. as Aristotle calls his Felicity, the supreme & overruling End; the fountain of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that soantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they bear unto man's Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him Bonum & Bonum Superessentiale the only Self. Sustaining, and self. Depending Good, that is only able throughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.  
The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of excess and Defect. The Extremes of excess are Supers●…itlon and Idolatry; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of original blindness, with the relics of natural Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and general, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the Circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the soul by occasion of the latter in a maze of of darkness and unavoidable Doubting and uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the Necessity of a Duty; but not to clear the Means of Execution. Light enough to enjoin a walking; but the way being a narrow way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Desect, is either atheism, in not acknowledging, or Ignorance in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if Affected and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from gild; or a consciousness of fearful Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted Spirits in the persuasion that no judge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a Desire and purpose to give Indulgence to themselves in their evil courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to entrap them, if their Eyes be but seiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their own darkness: Though herein both the Atheists discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their own Consciences, and condemn themselves.  
The Dignity of man's Will in regard of Liberty, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Zeno▪ apud 〈◊〉. l. 6. Vnde Stolel Sapientes; Reges appellahant.  consisteth in the freedom, which it hath to choose or reject Means ordained for the Compassing some proposed End, according as the understanding shall find them more or less Conducible 
Ibid.  for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a choosing 
Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.  of the Means: For Election (as Aristotle determines) is never of the End. we do not choose, but necessarily Desire to be Happy. The matter of our happiness being proposed without appearance of present inconvenience: because every thing is naturally prone to its own Perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities to affright it. And yet neither is the freedom of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So we may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty▪ Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and V●…naturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, been quite Depraved, being now in Corruption, without the Assistance of spiritual or new Infused Grace, throughly disenabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly cap●…ivated and inthr●…lled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, only in natural, moral and in civil Actions▪ Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the relics and indelible Foot prints of man's first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its own and others temporal Good.  
The Dominion and Supreme Command of the Will is only over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its 〈◊〉▪ Authority concur as an Absolut●… Efficient, or a least, as a Moving Agent. It reacheth not therefore so fare as to the Command of the Vegetative Power: For we cannot command our stomaches to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an universal Command of the Senses; but only by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more sovereign Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the Locomotive Power, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the Sensitive Appetite, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy▪ Irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will and the Law of the Members, carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and sovereign over those Apprehensions of the understanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly persuasive. The one is Absolute, working on mere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more conditional, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an economical Government in respect of the Body, 
〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. l. ●…. c. ●….  and the Moving Organs thereof, as over Servants: and it hath a politic or civil Government towards the Understanding, Affections, and Sensitive Appetite, as Subjects, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it happeneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditiou●… and rebellious Subjects. So that the Corruption of this Power in the Will, is either Tyranny in itself, or usurpation in another; an Abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The Abuse, when the Will absolutely gainsays the Counsels, laws, and Directions of the understanding, which is wrought by the Allection, enticing & Insinuation of the Sensitive Appetite, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of those courses, which are most delightful to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the soul become themselves sensual and carnal. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny overbeares the soul, and leads it captive to the Law of sin, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and entangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to fly, yet falleth down again.  
Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion▪ there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to natural and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, ab Extrinseco, and that Necessarily. The Stoics, they framed a supreme swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternal secret connexion & flux of causes, which they call Fate. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing 
L●…ert. i●… Zen. Pi●…t. de placit. 〈◊〉. l. ●…. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. G●…ll. l. 6. c. 2.  but the uniform and Vncha●…gable working of those beautiful Bodies, the Heavenly orbs, and their influences upon inferiors, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly overruling the practices of men. Inquire the reason, why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses?  Anne aliud, quàm—— 〈◊〉, & occulti miranda potentia Fati? 

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,  
And wondrous power of secret Destiny.   
It is not to be denied, but that the Heavens 
Vid. ●…useb. C●…sariens. de pr●…parat 〈◊〉. lib. 6. & Max. Tyrium dis●…. 3. Plut. advers. 〈◊〉. Tertul. Apol. ●…. 1. & ●…bi no●… Herald. Aug. de ●…iv. 〈◊〉. l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8.  having strong and powerful Operations on all Sublunary corporal Substances may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kind of Influence (if it may be so called, upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding, the Actions of man's Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, etc. We do not only impiously take away the gild of sin, in that we make all men's Lapses to be wrought without free Principle in himself (and so d●…rogate from the justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were by other of his Creatures avoidable determined) nor only rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those virtuous dispositions of the Mind (which are his immediate breathe into man) unto the Happy Aspect of the Heavens) but withal we deny to the soul both natural Motion and Spirituality. Natural Motion first; since that always flows from an Inward Principle, that is essential to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression made by some extrinsical Worker. And then Spirituality likewise; since the Heavens, being corporal Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther than over Bodily Substances. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom●…r. Odyss.. ●….   
Others there have been yet more Impious, which seek to fasten all the Corruptions of their wills on something above the Heavens, even the eternal Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the sun will rise; or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause working Necessity of the next Day, or the last judgement. It is true indeed, God's Prescience employs a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknows: but this is Necessitas onely Infallibilitatis, in regard of his Vndeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to pass by the free or natural workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not Necessitas Coactionis, or Determinationis, whereby the Will of man is without any other disposition or propension in itself, enforced or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore necessarily executed, because they were foreknown, but therefore they were foreknown, because our Will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and Election. And for Providence notwithstanding there be Providentia Permissiva, whereby 
Aug. de ●…iv. 〈◊〉. l. 11. c. 17, 18 l. 14. c. ●…6▪  God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sin; and moreover a Disposing Providence in Ordering 
●…ab. de 〈◊〉. c. 6. de Co●…rept. & G●…at. c. 10. Epist. 120.  all things in the World unto his own Glorious Ends, yet we may not presume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impel, and 
Cap. 2. de Gen. Co●…tr. Mani●…l▪ l. 2. c 28.  overrule the wills of men to evil. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all respects 
De 〈◊〉. ad 〈◊〉. l. 11. c. 4.  dothwill, shall not be done with the secret Will 
De Trin. l. 3. c. 4 Octoginta criumque. q. 2●….  of his good pleasure (for who can withstand his Will) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet he doth not so work his Will out of men's, as thereby to constrain and take away theirs (for indeed the constraint of a liberal and free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof) This were an Argument of weakness, as if he were not able to bring his own Ends about, but by chaining and 〈◊〉 his Oppugners from exercising the freedom which he first gave them; nor do his own 
Uid. E●…seb. de praepara●….  Will, but by taking away his own Gifts. But 
Evang. l. 6. c. ●….  herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, 
〈◊〉. Alex. contra jul. l. ●….  and the great wisdom of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according 
Hin●… et●…am quod saci●…nt contra voluntat●…m D●…i, non 〈◊〉, visi voluntas De●…. Aug. de Prad. Sanct. l. ●…. c 16.  to the inclination of his own heart, and that even Rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his own Glory (the▪ End whether we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerful to fulfil it. For as sundry times Gods Revealed Will is broken, even by those, whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it: so always his Secret Will is performed. Eve●… by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubbo●…nly to oppose it. There is not▪ then any supreme Destiny, Extri●…sically moving, or Necessarily binding any inferiors to particular Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casual Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the intrinsical Operation of all inferior Agents (which we call Nature) produce one main and supreme End, without straining or violating the proper Motions of any.  
Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their sins upon the motions of Satan, as if he brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and 
Rom. 7. 17.  as Saint Paul said in Faith, Not I, but sin in me: So they in hypocrisy, Not I▪ but evil motions cast into 
Math 4. 3.  me; and because the devil is in a special manner called the Tempter, such men therefore▪ think to persuade themselves, that their evil cometh not from any willingness in themselves, but from the violence of the enemy's Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the devil hath a strong Operation on the wills of Corrupt men  
1 First, because of the subtlety of his Substance whereby he can wind himself and his suggestions most Inwardly on the Affections and understanding.  
2 Secondly, because of the Height of his natural understanding and Policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himself into an Angel of Light, and so to method and contrive his devices, that they shall not miss of the best advantage to make them speed.  
3 Thirdly, because of the vastness of his Experience, whereby he is the better enabled to use such plots as have formerly had the best success.  
4 Fourthly, because of his manner of Working, 
Luke 11. 21. 1. Peter 5. 8. Rev. 12. 3. ●… 〈◊〉. 27. Heb. 3. 13. Rom. 7. 11.  grounded on all these, which is Violent and Furious for the Strength; and therefore he is called a Strong Man, a Roaring lion, a Red Dragon. And Deep for the subtlety of it; and therefore his working is called a Mystery of Iniquity, and deceivableness of Iniquity. Which is seen: First in his Accommodating himself to our particular Humours and Natures, and so following the tide of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our Vocations and personal employments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing, or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances. But yet we do not find in any of these any violation of man's Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the Arts that are used to the inveigling of it. The 
Ep●…. ●…. 11. Eph●…s. 7. 2. 2. 〈◊〉. 2. 26. Ep●…▪ 6. 11. 2. Co●…. 2. 11. 2. Tim. 2▪ 26.  working then of evil Angels, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of evil men, they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects; or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may w●…ll stand with the freedom of man's Will, And therefore his temptations are in some place called the Methods, in others, the Devices; in others, the S●…ares of S●…tan: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  All words of Circum●…ention, and presu●…pose the working of our own▪ Wi●…s: Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempt●…r▪ belonging to him; yet we are told in another place, that▪ Every man is tempted when he 
Vi●…ij A●…thor 〈◊〉 decipientis Callidita●… & Homini●… Consentient is 〈◊〉. Au●…. de p●…ccat. Orig. l. 2. ●…. 〈◊〉.  is drawn away of his own Conc●…piscence, a●…d intic●…d▪ So that the devil hath never an 〈◊〉 Temptation (such an one as carries and overcomes the Will) but it is always joined with an Inward Temptation of our own, proceeding from the decei●…fulnesse of our own lusts. So that in this 
Li●…. de 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 vin. 〈◊〉.  case every man may say to himself as Apollodoru●… in Plutarch dreamt of himself, when he thought he was boiled alive in a vessel, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to myself.  
Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I will but name. As first for the manner of its Operations. In some cases it worketh Naturally and Necessarily, as in its Inclination unto Good in the whole latitude, and general apprehension thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the gener●…ll and formal notion of evil In others Voluntarily, from itself, and with 
〈◊〉▪ l. 3. c. 1.  a distinct view and knowledge of an End whe●…unto it work●…th. In others freely, with a Liberty to one thing or another, with a power to elicit, or to suspend and suppress its own Operation. In all Spontaneously, without violence or compulsion. For though in some respects the Will be not free from Necessity, yet it is in all free from Coacl●…on. And therefore though Ignorance & Eeare may take away the complete 〈◊〉 of an Action proceeding from the Will (because without such feat or Ignorance it would not have been done. A●… when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a sh●…pwracke. And when Oedipus slew Laius his Father, nor knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the Will to do that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of Good thereunto.  
Secondly for the Motives of the Will. They are first natural and internal. Amongst which, the understanding is the principal, which doth pass judgement upon the goodness and Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater or lesser excellency ther●…of, represent it to the Will, with either a Mandatory, or a Monitory, or a permissive Sentence. The Will likewise doth move itself. For by an Antecedent willing of the E●…d, she setteth herself on work to will the Means requisite unto the obtaining of that End.  
And the Sensitive 〈◊〉 doth Indirectly move it too. By suppressing or bewitching and enticing the judgement to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensual things. And then, as the sun seemeth red through a red glass: so such a●… a man's own Affection is, such will the End seem unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.  
Next Supernaturally God moveth the Wil●… of men. Not only in regard of the Matter of the Motion▪ For in him we live, and move, and have our being; but in regard of the Rectitude and goodness of it in Actions supernatural, both by the Manifestation of Heavenly Light. They shall be ●…ll taught of God; and by the Infusion and Impression of spiritual Grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to do of his own good pleasure.  
Lastly, for the Acts of the Will, They are such as respect either the End, or the Means for att●…ining of it. The Acts respecting the End are these three. 1. A Loving and Desiring of it in regard of its Beauty and goodness. 2. A serious Intention and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its distance from us. 3. A Fr●…ition or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two thing●…. In Assec●…tion or possession, whereby we are Actually joined unto it: and in Delectation or Rest, whereby we take special pleasure in it.  
The Acts of the Will respecting the Means, are these: 1. An Act of using or employing the practical judgement. An Application and Exercising of it to consult & debate the proper means conducible unto that End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practical Iudgem●…nt, a Representation being made of the Means discovered, there next followeth an ●…mbracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double Act. The one an Act of Consent, whereby we approve the means dictated, as proper and possible: the other, an Act of Election, whereby, according to the different weight of Reasons, we adhere unto one Medium more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more seasible. Thirdly, because the Means do not bring us unto the End by being Chosen, but by being Executed. Hereupon followeth another Act of Mandate to all the Faculties interested in the Execution of those Means, to apply and put forth their forces with vigour and constancy, till the End be at the last by the due Execution of those Means attained and enjoyed.  
Now whereas the Philosopher doth often distribute 
〈◊〉. l. 2 c. 6. 〈◊〉 l. 2. c. 2.  the things belonging unto the soul, into Affections, Faculties and Habits. For the Faculties are moved by the Passions, and the Passions are regulated and managed by the Habits. The Habits procured for Facility and Constancy of Action, and the Actions directed to the obtaining of an End. This Method of the Philosopher would now lead us to speak further.  
First of the Habits of the Reasonable soul, and they are either rational only, and in the mind, as the Habits of wisdom, of Principles, of Conclusions, of Art and Prudence; or besides that virtuous and vicious, conversant about Good or evil moral. Which are first the Habits of Practical Principles, called Synteresis; and next the Habits of particular virtues, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Unto the felicity of all which are required these four conditions.  
1 justice and Rectitude disposing the Will to render unto God, unto ourselves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right we own unto them.  
2 Prudence, discovering that which is in this manner Right, judging of it, and directing unto it.  
3 Fortitude, enabling the Will firmly to persist in her virtuous purposes, according to the Instructions of practical Prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergo, the delays it must sustain before it can obtain the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withal.  
4 Temperance, suppressing and subduing those sensual Appetites, which would stagger, inter rupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.  
Next, because all Habits, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of Actions, we should thereby be led on to the consideration of Humane Actions, Fortuitous, Violent, natural, Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed. As also, to the grounds of the goodness or illness of Actions, taken first from the Rule of them unto which they are to conform. Secondly, from the Principles of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, Knowledge and Faith to see, Will to purpose, Love to do, subjection, to obey strength, to finish and fulfil what virtue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed.  
By which consideration, we should be led to take a view of the right end, and ultimate felicity, unto which all these actions should lead and carry us; not as the causes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.  
But these pertaining to a nobler science, and being without the limits of the subject which I proposed to speak of, I shall follow Pliny's counsel, and look bacl to the title of my book: Which having (as well as my weakness was able) endeavoured to go through, It now calls upon me to go no further.   
FINIS.  

 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

   

Faults escaped by reason of the author's absence.  
PAg. 17. l 1. read, sut●…ro imminentium, p. 23. l. 6. r. g●…wing, ●…. 24. l. 4 r. this, ●…. 26. l. 5. r. likeness, p. 29. l. 19 r. dep●…avation, l. 29. r. 〈◊〉 re, p. 30. l. 2. r. in, ●…. 31. l. 19 r. contracteth, p. 32. l. 16. r. the con, ●…. ●…4. 〈◊〉 r. lucation, p. 40. l. 6. r. contact, p. 56. l 15. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? 65. l. 19 〈◊〉 the●…, p. 71. l. 28 r. all these things, p. 73. l. 5. r, or other, l. 12 r, concita●…ion, p. 74. l. 13. r, heart, l. 21. r, to an union, p. 75 l. 16. ●…, the, ●…. 76. l. 8. r, this, l. 18. r. work out of, p. 77. l. 8. r, con●…innation, l. ●…7. r, passion, p 96. l 3. ●… in, r, is, p. 100 l. 29. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 103. l. 14. r, 〈◊〉, p. 112. l. 12. r, principal, 〈◊〉 18. l. 21. r. had, p. 122. l. 22. r, done another wrong, 9 125 l. 14. r, wh●… it is naked, p. 129. l. 27. r. apprehension, p. 132. l. 26. r. seasonable p. 136, l. 8. r, were, p. 145. l. 1, 2, Ha●…rius, l. 6. r, alike occasion, p. 147. l. 8. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 148. l. 24. ●…. 〈◊〉, p. 15 5. ●…. l. 30. deal which, p. 158. l 2, r, numbered, l. 6. r. with but, p. ●…61. l. 21. r, proverb, ●…. 165. l. 28. r, 〈◊〉. p. 16 8. l. 26. r. Philozen●…, p. 172. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ ●…. 178. l. 10. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 179. l. 2. 14 r, ne'er, p▪ 181. l. 6. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ p. 191. l. 9 ●…. i●…, ●…. is not, p. 197. l. vl●…. r, though the philosopher, p. 199. l. 23. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 2 ●… 5. l. 8. r, revieweth, p. 222. l. 26. r. diformity, p. 2●…4. l. 11 〈◊〉 in, p. 216. l. 27. ●…. never, r, ever, p. 229. l. ●…. r. 〈◊〉. l. 20. r. 〈◊〉, p. 233 l. 16. r, will, p. 234. l. 21. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, l. 25 deal, 〈◊〉, p. 235. l. 2. r. the end. p. 242. l. 12. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 244. l. 5. ●…, other, r, after, l. 8. r. Ti●…inum. p 245. l. 15. ●…, in, is. p. 246. l. 5. deal and common, p. 247. l. 8. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. ●…. and, r, but, p 248. l. 7. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ p. 249. l 3. r, 〈◊〉, p. 250. l. 1. r, ●…na, l. 21. r, couched, l 17. ex●…idit, p. 255. l. 28. r, and number, p. ●…56. l. 3, 4. r, unsubordinate. p. 261. l. 16. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. ●…62. l. 26 r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 2●…4. 2. 4 aquas, p. 265. l. 18. del●… fo●…, p. ●…68. r. desperate, 272. l. 23. r, the ●…, p. l. 73. l. 27. r, frowa●…d, l. 8. end the pe●…od at the word, Law, p. 2●…2. l. ●…●… deal them, p. 283. l. 27, r. 〈◊〉, p. 284. l. 5. r, 〈◊〉 danger, ●…. 286. ●… 6. ●…. and, r, as, p. 292 l 17, ●…, ominum, p. 295. l. 20. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p 296. l. 19 r, ●…vated, p. 300. l. 18. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 302. l. 19 r, 〈◊〉, ●…. 303 l. 〈◊〉, reviewed, p. 304. l. 1. M●…nisteries, p. 306. l. 22. 〈◊〉, p. 308. l. 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 l. 17 deal the, p. 310. l. v●…. r, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 311. ●…. 3. ●…, to r, in,. 313. l ●…. ●…. th●…ugh l. 15. after sharp Anger, put in these words, A bitte●… Anger, l. 25. r, formally, 317. l. 10. ●…, or, r, for, p. 319. l. 15 deal no●…, p. 320. l 27. ●…, wa●… p. 326. l. 16. ●…, insidia●…, l. 17. r, 〈◊〉▪ p. 327. l. 5. r, the va●…, ●…. 〈◊〉. ●…. now, r, no●…. p. 328. l. 2. ●…, yet, r, th●…t 329. l. 5 ●…, inquiry, r, inju●…y. p. 3●…2 l. 6. r, each to other, p. 339. l. ●…. r, into p. 397. l. 6. ●…. the p. 4 16. l. 24. 〈◊〉 is, r. ●…s it, p, 441. r, morality p. 483. l. 4. A●…ectation. p. 493. l. 1●…. ●…. de●…ie, r. deify p. 495. l. 21. deal will p. 498. l. 1, 2 ●… 〈◊〉, ●…, 〈◊〉 p 49●…. l. 5. r, mortal p. 501. l. 6. ●… corruption, r confidence p. ●…02. l. 7. ●…lesse l. 23 r measu●…. p. 537. l 2●…. r. proportionate.   

Errata in the Margin.