THE LOGICIANS Schoolmaster: OR, A COMMENT UPON RAMUS Logic.  
By Mr. Alexander Richardson sometime of Queen's College in CAMBRIDGE.  
LONDON, Printed for john Bellamy, at the three golden Lions in Cornhill. 1629.   

The Preface or Entrance into the BOOK.  
I Suppose I am to dispute with a man, and be about to lay down every thing to his reason: if he grant that he have reason, I need no further proof of Ens: for if a man have an eye to see things, there must be an Ens, which must be the subject of it; for else it should be in vain: and as our outward eye were in vain, if there were not some things to be seen thereby; so were our inward eye of reason to no purpose, if there were not an ens to be seen. Now I will stand more upon ens, because I will ground my Rules of Art upon it, but that Reason is the proper adjunct of ens, we shall see more plainly hereafter. Yet let us know in the mean time, that if there be reason, it must either see something or nothing; now it cannot see nothing but per accidens, because it properly seethe ens, as I see a man not to be in such a place, because I see him not. True it is, that ens is the subject of all Arts, but more specially of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric, as they are general: for indeed Reason first seethe both itself, and the other Arts.  Ens est quod est. 
Now having found that ens is, it is requisite that we should know what it is; and I say ens est quod est. If we shall look at the Grammatical notation of ens, it is a participle of the present tense, and therefore is as much as quod est, even as legens and qui, or quae legis are the same: or as in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans, or qui verberat are all one, and that the very particle doth show. For if it be of the present tense, it is the same with the verb of the present tense, so that ens and quod est are the same. Again, if there be ens, as we have already proved, then vel est quod est, vel non quod est, vel quod non est at neque, non quod est, nec quod non tst, ergo quod est. For when I say non quod est, than I put ens fictum impossibile, ergo this can no way be ens no not in our fantasy; when I say quod non est, than I put ens sictum impossible, and to that I give a quod but non est, so that in the end I say, ens est, quod est, that is; neither ens fictum possibile, nor ens fictum impossibile; and therefore if we will define ens fictum impossibile, it is non quod est, if we define ens fictum possibile, it is quod non est. Now if neither ens fictum possibile, nor ens fictum impossibile be entia, then ens est quod est. And again, when I deny non quod est, I deny est, and when I deny quod non est, I deny est, ergo, ens est quod est. Again, ens and bonum are all one, therefore non ens and malum are all gone, therefore si ens non sit, than it is bonum and malum: ergo ens est quod est.  Ens est primum vel à primo. 
If ens be, it must be either first absolutely which is not from another, or it must be from a first, that is from another, which is not from another: again contradiction showeth it, for it is as if I should say, ens is non aliunde or aliunde; that is, it is of itself, or not of itself; and this is contradiction. But objection may be made, that in the continual generation of things, one thing is before another, as my father begot me, and another begot my father, and so in infinitum, ergo it is not necessary that ens should be absolutely first or from a first. Answ. This is nothing, for am I from my father. This than he was before I was, and I am after him, ergo here is prius and posterius, therefore here cannot be eternity, ergo this ens is not eternal. Again, is not my father's case as well as mine to be from another, and so all men till they come to ens primum: Yes, ergo all men are from others, till we come to this first absolute being, which is not from any other; for than he should not be primum: ergo ens est primum, vel à primo.  Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso. 
First if there be ens primum or à primo, there must be ens primum of necessity, for if there be ens primum, ye grant it me, if there be ens à primo, ye must also grant ens primum, therefore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum, and maximè intelligibile, therefore Atheists are here to be confuted, for they may sooner doubt whether they themselves be, then whether God be, for if they be entia à primo, they must first know him, that is primum, before they can know themselves, for the cause is before the effect. Quod est seipso, it must be being either seipso or aliunde, if aliunde, ne primum, for that from which it is, is prius unto it, ergo est seipso. Object. Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso, neither any creature whatsoever, for than he saith, the same thing would be the cause of itself, and the effect. Resp. It is a mere sophism, or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase. For when we say God is seipso, we do not mean that he hath causes, but we mean privatively that he is not aliunde, and est seipso, and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same, it is quod est, and so est seipso.  Ens primum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
If he be seipso, them he is without causes, that that is absolutely first must have no causes, for than it is not absolutely first, ergo there can be no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus. Again, first if he have no causes, he hath no end, ergo he is not made for an end, ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end. So that we find in this respect that ens primum cannot be the subject of Art; Every art is to guide the thing whereof it is an art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Again, it every art doth lay forth the causes, effects, subjects and the proper adjuncts of a thing, for if it have no causes it can have no qualities, and God hath none of these, ergo he is not the subject of Art. Hence again, as this ens is beyond our reason, so he is beyond our speech, either Grammar or Rhetoric, so that concerning this ens primum, whatsoever we think or speak it is imperfect. Now bring it to our Logic after another sort, and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art. Our Logic bringeth us first to a first efficient, & in the resolution of any thing we go so far, as in the end we find a first efficient. Now this first efficient hath nothing before it, ergo that is beyond our reason, therefore what that is we cannot tell, and therefore if we shall make him an effect to look out his causes, we shall not make him first, ergo he is beyond all art; then again there is no art but is an eternal rule in the Idea of God, as a precept of that thing whereof it is an art to guide it to its Eupraxie, therefore if there should be an art of him, there must be a former ens which must have the Idea of it, to show how this ens primum was made, and whereby it must be governed: so that he is not the subject of our reason; so that whereas I said before, that ens was the subject of our reason, here I recall it, and say that primum ens is beyond our Logic: and therefore he being beyond all art, we will go them over more briefly, till we come to ens à primo. First then, he is without efficient, for he is without causes, ergo he is uncreated: for the first matter, though it were without matter, and form, yet it had an efficient, and an end, ergo was created: then again, he is seipso, ergo he must be uncreated, hence also he cannot be annihilated, neither generated, nor corrupted: again, hence he is independens aliunde, and therefore supremum: again, hence he is without matter: Now if he be without matter, therefore he is without genus, ergo is not a species either subalterna, or specialissima. Again, if he be without form as without genus, than he cannot be defined, ergo he must be without limitation of essence, ergo without limitation of quantity, ergo without limitation of place, and because he is without beginning from any other thing, therefore he is without any duration, and because he is without any matter, ergo he is truly spiritual, for so we account things spiritual, according to the subtleness of their matter, but he hath no matter at all: again he being without matter and form, ergo can be no membrum, because every member containeth a portion of matter and form, neither can he be an integrum, because that consisteth of members, which contain part of matter, and form. Now in that he is absolutely first, therefore he can be but unum, for else there should be more: again if there should be more than one, than the one would say as well as the other, I am as forward as thee, and so none could be absolutely first. Again he is no genus, for that is an universal, or Synopsis of many together, whereas he is but one: so that now he is not properly an ens, but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and above our Logic: again, in that he is absolutely first he must needs be without accidents (to use their term) without adjuncts, for they are second things arising from their substances, and in absolutè primo ente there must be nothing, but that which is absolutè primum: so that here we see his most simple being, and that he is beyond our Logic. Now if he be without all potentia, both essentialis, and accidentalis, he is pure act; so that this act now of his must needs be his essae, because he is pure act, for if he be agere, than his esse, and agere are the same: so that if any one doth any thing, as every ens à primo doth by potentia, it is not pure act: some say the Angels do agere per essentiam, but it is false, unless they mean that they act first by potentia: now indeed there is nothing, but it doth act per facultatem essentiae. First the form, that is the beginner of act, and when it acts upon matter internal, that is habitual, or a faculty, when it acts by the matter upon some external object, that is an act; for first there is the essence, the matter, and the form, them the faculty, the forms act upon the matter internally; lastly, the act, which is of the form, by the matter externally: now these are not in God, but are his very essence. Now we find then, that this primum ens must be actus, & purus actus, because there is no potentia in him at all, ergo it must needs be, that he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus, for primus actus, and optimus actus are all one: Again hence it must needs follow, that if there be any act of other things, it must needs be from him, and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him: so then thus we have found him absolute in every thing.  Ens a primo. 
Now to return to the first Syllogism. If there be reason, there must be an adaequatum subiectum of it, ergo ens à primo, for we have heard that ens primum is beyond our reason, so that there must be ens à primo, which is adaequatum subiectum rationi,, and that now is liable to all our Logic, for it hath causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and thus we will go on, and see all the subjects of the arts in the concretion of ens à primo, which the Philosophers say, cannot be demonstrated.  
That we might dig deep, and lay our foundation of Arts sure, I have showed that there is a being, and that it is double, the one from whom art is, the other in whom it shines, now we heard that ens est quod est, which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolved by Grammar quod est. Now for the continual succession of things which some dream of, this it is, if all things be effects, there must be so many causes, ergo in the end we shall come to a first cause, that is not effectum: Further we heard that ens primum, was quod est seipso, that is without any other: so that in propriety he is neither essentia, nor ens but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hence he neither hath causes, neither is any argument that doth arise from causes, ergo is an individuum, but not a species: he is without end, ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: hence he therefore was never made, ergo he made all things: he is without definition, distribution, and properties, because he is without causes, ergo there can be no art of him, but he must be the Author of art, as we shall hear hereafter. He is merus actus, because he is without all potentia, both substantialis, and accidentalis, again he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus, ergo whatsoever is well done of any thing is first from him, again he is infinitus actus, ergo able to do any finite thing, yea, and infinite.  Ens à primo est, quod ut est à primo, sic est ex nihilo propter primum. 
First we proved before, that there is ens à primo, for proprium, & adaequatum subiectum rationis est, at ens à primo est proprium & adaequatum obiectum, rather than subiectum rationis, ergo, Est à primo, that we heard before, for it cannot be of itself, for than it should be absolutely first, ergo not the subject of our reason, ergo it is aliunde, ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde. Propter primum, every ens à primo is made, ergo for an end, ergo at last propter primum, as propter finem: Again optimus actus must do nothing in vain. It is a rule of nature in schools, that God, and nature nihil agunt frustra, which indeed is a general rule of Logic applied to two special arts, natural Philosophy, and Divinity. Now then at last we shall find every thing to be made, for that which was never made, ergo propter primum ens.  
Object. But some things might be made for things at are made.  
Answ. I suppose mediately, yet when all things are effects, ergo made for an end, at length we shall come to an end, that is not an effect, as all creatures are made for man, and man also being made, is therefore for an end, ergo for God: hence therefore we see that ens à prima is propter primum, ergo every ens à primo hath his vigour, or impulsus from his first efficient whereby it is set forth to his end, so that the Lord hath shot out every ens à primo as it were an arrow out of his bow to act his end: so that the vigour and impulsus of every ens à primo, which it receives from God, is that it may shoot at it end, ex nihilo, because there was only a first efficient before it, for if it were ex aliquo, then there should be more firsts.  
Ob. But how can something be made of nothing.  
Ans. God is infinite both à parte aute, and à parte post; ergo he can make things of nothing, which have an infinite distance à parte ante, though not à parte post, for so every creature is infinite.  Ens à primo est concretum. 
Ens à primo must be both like, and unlike primum: so the world is one, ergo like God, it is made of many simples, ergo unlike him: so every thing is one, ergo like God, but is concretum, ergo is unlike him: so that every creature must take a blow of God, as jacob when he wrestled with the Angel took a blow on the hip, though he overcame, whereby he was made lame. Again our Logic tells us first of simples, and then of the disposing of them, therefore ens à primo must be concretum of simples, because it must be liable to our reason; so that as before there was ens, because there was reason, so here this ens, which is the subject of our reason must be concretum, because I must see it with my eye of Logic. This concretum is of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reason of it is this, this ens though it be for God, yet it is mediately for man, as we may see through all the creatures of God, ergo we thus conclude, that every thing was made for man, and man for God; for we know that every thing consists of matter, and form, and the end of the matter and form of a thing is to make up the effect, and thus we say, every thing is it own end. Now then in every ente à primo, there must be an actus to carry it to man, and an actum, that is, that that is carried, that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the actum, or that which is carried. So we know that Logic caries from the thing to man, and speech from man to man, that which he hath to seen with his Logic. By actus I mean that which doth make the thing actually to be carried to mine eye: so that it cannot come to me, but actu, by act, and it must bring the actum: now this actus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for as colour acts the external thing to my external eye, and is about the thing, so this actus doth to my reason, and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, about every thing, and is an object of my eye of reason, though it ariseth from the thing, and flieth about it. Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth, concrescere both with itself, and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that Logic is concrescus with Logic, and with Grammar, and Rhetoric, etc. And hence it is called common, because it is concrescens with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and with every concretion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, So that it is concrescens cum seipso, & cum omnibus alijs concrescentibus. Now that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the Logismos of the thing, or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it, and these are the actus of the thing: for I see every thing by my Logic, and that sees nothing but arguments, axioms, syllogisms, and method; ergo, I can see nothing but that that it doth thus dictate to my reason; ergo, Logic doth act the actum, or that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to my reason. Now then there must be reason in every thing, because I am to see every thing by my Logic, which is the rule of reason, ergo all things must be liable to it, ergo it must apprehend the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing. Again, there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing, because though all things at the beginning were made for one man, yet by reason of sin since his fall, one cannot see all things, therefore there must be a carrier from one man to another, that which one man sees with his eye of Logic, he may utter it to another: so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ad hominem, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ab homine ad hominem.  
Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either loquentia or eloquentia: the reason of this distribution is this, we heard before that speech was a carrier from man to man; and because things that are reported, are not so easily received, as those which are seen by our eye of Logic, ergo it was requisite that there should not only be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereby things might be uttered, but also a fine sugering of them with Rhetoric, for the more easy receiving of them.  
Eloquentia is either more fine or more grave; that is, soluta, or ligata: the reason is this, argumentum is artificiale, or inartificiale: now because speech is an inartificial argument, and so not easily received, therefore Rhetoric serves to deliver the matter more soberly and gravely; and Poetry yet makes it more fine, where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds.  
So that now we see how these general Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and that they are not of so great necessity in respect of the thing, as in regard of us for our good: for, so as every thing is made for man, so he must see them for his good, by that rule that they are created.  
These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because they are circumstantial, yet they are ab ente primo, because there are causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and speech in ente à primo.  
Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either quantity or quality, the reason is this, every ens à primo is finite, ergo must needs have limits of quantity, if he have limits of essence.  
Quantity is either discreet, or continued, for if every thing be finite, than it must be discreet, or distinct from any other. Again, as it is discreet, so it is continued, so fare as the form extendeth the matter, whereby we may see how fare it reacheth, and where it reacheth not. Now as there is quantity, so also there must be quality in every thing, for there is no ens à primo that is pure act, ergo it hath a form acting upon a matter, & thence proceed all quantities. Again, it being made for an end, must therefore act unto its end.  
Qualitas est natura, & bonitas, every thing hath nature, because it hath a matter and a form, ergo there is nature in every thing. And therefore Ramus saith, Forma est praecipua rerum natura: and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis, and materia principium passionis.  
Now this ens being of this scantling for quantity, and of this nature for act, must be good for God's glory: so that every thing hath a goodness in it. Again, were all things made for man, and must he see them with his reason? Yes: ergo they are good for him: ergo he must have a will to embrace them as bona, as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera, and so man also is made for God, as his will acts goodness.  
Now for the order of these, actus is before actum: for the one is actio, the other is passio, and actio is before passio, and is more excellent than it. Again, actus doth concrescere with itself, and with the actum that is in the thing: ergo, actus is more general; ergo is before actum.  
Again, because we do not give names to things but with reason from some argument of Logic in the thing: and again, because there must be an actus from the thing to man, before there can be an actus from man to man, therefore the Logismes in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it; ergo Logic is the most general, and first in order of all arts.  
Of those things that are acta, quantity is first, because it ariseth nexly from the matter, and form of a thing: for first of all the matter, and form limit the thing, when they are put together, before they act any thing, and afterward they act one upon the other. Now quality, that is the act of the form upon the matter; ergo, it is after quantity, but before goodness, because that is the end of nature's act. For seeing quantity ariseth immediately from the matter and form of a thing, and nature from the act of the form upon the matter: therefore goodness must be the last, as being the end of all the former: and thus did the Lord make all things, first making the causes effects of things, then imposing speech on them, than number, then measuring them by Geometry, how fare their magnitude should reach, and where it should not reach, before it should act. Now this act of Nature was to go no further upon external objects, but only be acted by the form upon the matter; whereas the moral act of goodness was to go further, for that is for God. Again, Nature is the next inmost thing to quantity, and Goodness is last. And thus have we seen all that is in ente à primo, which is the ground of all Arts.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium. 
Now we are come to Arts, and first we are to begin with Encuclopaidia, and the definition of it. First for the name, it is Orbis ille, & Circulus Artium. The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through, as we use to say when there are many poor folk to be served, though they stand in a long row, Have you served them round? But there is a further reason of it, A circle we know is a round line, whose beginning and end meet together in a common point; therefore this learning in a Circle must be showed to have a common point, and that we shall easily find. The proper subject of Art is Ens à primo, because we heard, that was made for an end. Now then from whence Ens à primo had his beginning, from thence must Ars have his beginning: But from Ens primum it had his beginning, ergo. Again, as Ens à primo hath for his beginning Ens primum, so it must have Ens primum for his last end, because Ens primum is not made for any end, but is the last end of all things itself, ergo he must also be the last end of Art: Then here we find, as Ens primum is the beginning of Art, so also he is the end of Art; because he is the beginning, and end of those things that are the subjects of arts; therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end: ergo having the same beginning and end, here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now howsoever the phrase may seem otherwise, as we heard before, yet here we see the wisdom of God in this name, though the Grecians did not know the reason of it when they gave it. Now the Scripture seemeth to witness this truth. For the Lord saith, I am the beginning and the end: that is, of things. And again, I am Alpha and Omega: these belong to Grammar, ergo to Art, ergo he is both the beginning and end of things, and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts.  
That this wisdom is round, we may also see in regard of the subject; for the World is round, and that is the subject of Art: ergo Art is so, for Art is an adjunct to it, and every adjunct takes figure of his subject. Again, if we will take Art for Knowledge, Knowledge is in a man's head, and that is round, so Encuclopaidia is every way in circulo: and thus we see the reason, why this name should be given to a Chain, whose links are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia à primo, than he hath the Idea of them in him: for he made them by counsel, and not by necessity; for than he should have needed them, and they have a parelion of that wisdom that is in his Idea. Again, it must needs be that this wisdom is his, because he governs them by the rules of Art, for so every rule of Art is a Statute-law of God, by which he made the things, and whereby he governs the things, whose art it is. Now seeing it is so, therefore this Law hath God for the author, and look what Idea was in the making of the thing, the same Idea is in the governing of it: for if the Lord should make it by one rule, and govern it by another, it would not serve the turn to guide the thing to the eupraxie, whereunto it was made. So that hence it follows, that every rule of Art is eternal. Again our rule of Logic tells us, that every rule of Art is most true, and therefore is from God. For so every rule is true, as it answers to that Idea that is in him: and is most just, most wise; ergo is from God, who is most true, most just, and most wise. Now it is in God as in the fountain, & it is in the creature too, but there it is by a refraction: for this wisdom coming to the creature, according as the creature is, such is the Arts order and course. So that if ens à primo be divided into parts, this wisdom also will be divided into parts: and as in a Looking-glass that is broken, look how many pieces it is broken into, so many images shall you see: So for the Arts, look into how many parts the thing is divided, into so many parts will the Art be distributed.  
Q. What is the next subject of Ars in the thing?  
A. The Frame, as the term shows: for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek signifieth fabrica of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is seen in the frame of the thing: so that the frame of the thing is taught in the Art. So when I say Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, I do not define Logic, but I define the frame of reason: so that the parelion is the frame of the thing, and thence are the Arts written, and by the Art we see the frame: so than Encuclopaidia is the wisdom of God in the thing, ergo the subject of Encuclopaidia is Ars, that is the Frame of things.  Qua comprehenduntur, or, continentur. 
The Chain Encuclopaidia is not a genus to ars, no more than a Chain is a genus to the Links, but an integrum: for as a Chain is an integrum, and the Links membra; so Encuclopaidia is an integrum, and the Arts are the members that make up the whole. Now as the links must be linked together, before there be a Chain: so the Arts must be holden together, before there be Encuclopaidia: so that every Art is a link, and they must be linked together to make up the whole. Therefore I say, qua continentur, as parts, continentur à toto.  
For Arts may be holden together; for there is that community among the Arts, for Ars in genere is genus to them all: Therefore as Tully saith, they have a certain common kindred, as being species of one genus: but this holding together is after another manner than links in a Chain; namely, pro subordinatione finium: Therefore they are not holden together confusedly, and as they come to hand, but every one must have his rank according to the generality of the end thereof. So that if we link Grammar on the Chain before Logic, we do not right: and so in like sort for the other Arts.  
I say, qua omnes arts, because as a Chain that hath not all his links, is not perfect, because it wants some parts: so the Chain of Arts will not be perfect, if there be any wanting; the rule of Logic teacheth us so much: for Encuclopaidia is a totum, ergo if any membra be wanting, there will not be a totum made up. And thus we have heard the definition of Enculopaidia. Now the subject of it is Ars, as the notation of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 showeth: and this wisdom of God is one in him, but is made various in the thing.  Ars est quae constat praecaeptis primè verissiméque scientificis rei suae ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 continuatis. 
First for the word Ars. For the Latin term diverse have diversely sought for the notation of it. Some say it cometh of arctus a Sinew: some of arx a Tower. Now those that say it comes of arctus a Sinew, give this reason, Because the sinew is the strongest part in a man: for though the bones be stronger in some respect, yet because they will break, whereas the sinew will bend, ergo the sinews are stronger, so the arts in a thing serve to strengthen it for its Eupraxie. If it come of arx a Tower, we know that it is impregnable for the matter and building, and for the form also it is excellent, and so the strongest thing in the world: so the Arts are for matter invincible, for form most goodly.  
Ars in Greek is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth Fabrica, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fabrico, because it is seen in the frame of the thing. But, as we heard, the frame of the thing is the subject of Art: and when I say, Logica est ars bene disserendi, I do not define Logic, but the frame of reason, as it hath framed man: so when I say Grammatica est ars bene loquendi, I describe speech as it is to be framed. And therefore when we call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is a Metonymy of the Subject for the Adjunct. So that here we may see, that Art is the wisdom of God, but yet as it is energetic in the thing, so it is called Ars, So that mark this, that Art is the Law of God, whereunto he created things, whereby he governeth them, and whereunto they yield obedience: for by their obedience we come to see this frame; therefore this Art is God's wisdom, as it is resplendent in the things, which is but as a drop of water to the whole Ocean sea, in respect of the infinite wisdom that is in him. Mark this well, for the Schools run into many absurdities, whilst they have thought that Art is in a man's head, and not in the thing.  Quae constat. 
I make no genus of it, for it is genus summum in its kind, as Ens also is.  
Ob. But the Schools say Art is an intellectual virtue, ergo hath virtus for his genus.  
Ans. It is no genus of Art, neither is Ars quatenus it is Art in the thing a virtue; but as it is scientia in man's head, so indeed it belongs to the Ethics: for if virtus were a genus to Ars, virtue belongs to Ethics: and so by this reason, Ethics should be the most general Art, and also by that reason Ethics should be under Ethics: for virtus intellectualis is but a little part of them, therefore this is fallacia accidentis, as they call it.  
Again, to call it an habit as Aristotle saith it is, and as the Schools make it, that conceit is very simple, for habitus or quantitas habitualis belongeth to Logic, and is nothing but a special kind of adjunct: therefore Aristotle doth define homo to be genus rationale, whereas we know genus is but an adjunct animal, which is the genus of homo: so that it is not Art in the thing, but the knowledge he hath of it, which is adjoined to man. Now we have heard, that Art is the wisdom of God, in ente à primo, and the frame of the creature is in the antitype of this wisdom, and is a subject of Art. I say Ars est quae constat, though it be the frame of the thing. Now constare is to stand together in parts.  
Q. How come Arts to have parts, being but that one wisdom in God?  
Ans. Not in regard of God, but in respect of the frame of the thing where we see it. For even as God's Mercy and justice are one, but various in respect of the object: It is Mercy to him that comes before him in Christ; it is justice to him that appears before him without Christ: So Art is one in God, but is various in respect of the various work it hath wrought in the creation of things, and that it acteth in their government to their end. Again, those parts must constare, for in the frame of the thing the subjects of the Arts do constare, ergo this wisdom following them must constare in his parts: and as one thing hath his frame, and another his, differing from the other; hence the precepts of Arts must be various, and must constare one with another; hence it follows, that in Art we must have no rules but those that will constare, and are essential to it. So that if we bring a rule of Grammar into Logic, or è contrá: or if we leave out of Logic some essential rule to it, it will not constare: again if the rules of Art be disordered, they will not stand together: therefore when I say constare, I say two things, first that every Art must have all the rules, that are essential to it, and no more: & secondly, that every precept must be placed in his due order, and rank. For as a Painter that makes the picture of a man would make it very deformed, if he should set the head where the feet should be, or contra: so were it as absurd for an Artist to disorder his Art.  Constat praeceptis. 
Every thing hath his special acts before it can work that main act, for which it was made, as reason must have two parts, it must see the simple causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, etc. and Axioms, Syllogisms, and Method, that it may benè disserere, therefore there are many petty acts of reason to be performed, which though they all conspire in one main act, yet are they not one another: and here we see, that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing: so the precepts of Art are from the Acts of things: so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis, all is one, both are good, & regere is as large as regula, and praeceptum as praecipere. But my reason why I rather choose praeceptum is this, because regula is tropical, for it is often taken for a Square or ruler, whereby we rule any thing, and this is a grand Synecdoche. And again, because the Lord hath created, & governeth his creatures by the precepts of arts, as by so many statutes, or Commandments of the things act for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as at the Creation, when the Lord said, Let there be light, by this rule, as by a Precept did the Lord create light, and also governs it. It is a Law as God governs reason, speech, quantity, etc. by the rule of Logic, Grammar, Mathematics; and even as a King governeth his Dominions by his Laws: so the Lord governeth his Creatures by the rules of Arts: and because the Creation began with Commandments, therefore we still hold it, and they may be called Laws, Statutes or Commandments, etc. even as the Lord calleth his Laws for man Commandments. Again I rather call the rules of Arts praecepta, then regulae, because they being shortly delivered are as so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof.  Primè verissimèque scientificis. 
Every Precept of Art, must be scientificum, that is making knowledge: scientia (saith our Logic) is the judgement of a necessary Axiom, and therefore must be so true, so just, and so wise, as nothing can be more true, more just, more wise. Why? so are the Precepts of Art both in God, and in the Creature, for as for deductions the Lord hath shut them up in a brief rule of Art; for look how many uses there may be of a rule of Art in the thing whose rule it is, so many deductions will there arise from that rule. Now man not being able to take this wisdom from God, which is most simple, therefore it hath pleased the Lord to place it in the things, and as flowers do send out a scent, or odor that doth affect our sense of smelling, so every precept of Art doth spirare a sweet science to our glass of Understanding, which is indeed that irradiation, which we heard of in Divinity in the Creation of things: but it is called scientia by a Trope, for as the sent of a flower is not properly odor, but that that doth affect the sense; and as when we see a strange thing, we say, look what a sight is yonder, whereas sight is properly of the eye: so we call Art a scientia, or sweet savour in respect of our knowledge of it, which is a metonimy of the adjunct for the Subject.  
Quest. Now how do they scientificare? how are they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Answ. We have heard how they are in the things, and from thence they do come by an irradiation, to the Glass of our understanding, and as the Sun beams coming through a red or blue glass, etc. will bring the colour of the glass with them to our sense: so doth the irradiation of Art from the thing bring the colour of the thing with it to our understanding. I mean that this irradiation doth bring the frame of the thing with it, according to which we see it. Now than first it is called the wisdom of God, as it is one in him, then is it called arse, as it is in the thing, and when it is brought by an irradiation to our understanding, the first Act of it is to see the simples in the things, and this is called our intelligentia, for it is that perspicacy whereby we look at the invention that is in the thing: so that it is the first Act of our intellectus. As it is received in an axiom, we call it scientia. It is our sapientia as we can discourse with it syllogistically: & as we apply it rightly in time, and place, so it is prudentia. And it is Ars as we can execute it, and practise it in Analysi or Genesi, as Ars is rightly an intellectual virtue, as we teach it to another it is doctrina, and his learning is disciplina; last, as we set it down in writing or printing, it is liber.  
And every rule of Art is true, as when I say, Rosa est flos, Socrates est homo, though there be never a Rose or Socrates in the world, because the rule is eternal, for it is in the eternal Idea of God, though the thing be not. Now some Metaphisitians, not distinguishing aright hereof, say the thing is eternal, that is (say they) the thing was in God's eternal Idea; nay the Idea of God is eternal, but not the thing. I but Kickerman saith, the thing is eternal quoad essentiam, not quoad existentiam, but that is false, for existere belongs to effectum in Logic, and every effect must have all the causes, ergo matter, and form, and these are not eternal.  Primè, 
For there is no rule of Art, but is a necessary Axiom in its own place, and so is firstly true. Now deductions are true but at the first, second, third, or fourth hand, according as they are drawn from the first rule, at the second, third, or fourth hand, and are so far forth true, as the first rule is true; therefore when we dispute with any Adversaries, we bring our controversy to a rule of Art, and if they deny that, we say contra negantem principia, non est disputandum, though there is no rule of Art but may be demonstrated, and is first because it delivereth the first causes of the things.  verissimèque, 
Every rule of Art as it is prima scientia, so it is verissima: but for deductions, as they are secundae, or tertiae scientiae, according as they arise from the first rule, so they are secundo, or tertio true, to wit, so fare forth as the first is true.  concinnatis rei. 
Here is the subject of Ars, and as praecepta were the matter, and primè verissiméque scientificis were the qualities before: I do not say fabricae, for that is but one thing, whereas the rules of Arts are many. Again Art is the rule of the government of the thing, as well as of the frame of it, therefore here is ens, or res in general: I do not say concinnatis to any one thing, because as Ars in genere is to all the special Arts; so is ens in genere to all the special entia. Now if you ask me what res is, I told you before in the definition of ens, so that it was defined before, but here I take it as a subject of Art.  Concinnatis. 
I had not a better word, and therefore was fain to take this, though it doth not fit my purpose, as I would, for the thing indeed is made to the rule, and not the rule to the thing, though we first see the thing, and by the Act thereof observe the rule, Concinnatis to fit together, or to sing in parts, so that every thing must be placed in order, and fitted each to other, for nothing can be wisely done, if the precepts of Art be broken.  Ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
For every thing is made, and governed to an end, and Art is the rule of the making, and governing of things to their end, therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of every Art, and is not to be taught in any particular Art.  Artis est praxis & prattomenon. 
We have heard what encuclopaidia is, qua Artes comprehenduntur, pro subordinatione finium, and what Ars is. Now we come to the common affections belonging to Art, and they are praxis, and prattomenon. That Art hath his praxis, and prattomenon, I thus prove it: If the end of things be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then as there is that actio, or motus: so there must be a res motu facta, the prattomenon. But the end of every thing is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: therefore I prove it is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because laus rei est in actione, and if there should be any thing made, that had not an end, it were in vain. Again, every thing is God's work, and he is pure Act, therefore every thing must agree to him, and so agere. And if there be a praxis and a prattomenon of the thing, there must needs be a praxis and prattomenon of Art, because the thing is fitted to the rule of Art, and not Art to the thing. Now the reason why some have dreamt that every Art hath not his praxis and prattomenon is, that false distinction of Arts into theoretical, and practice, they call them theoretical which they do only contemplate; practice when we can by art agere. But there is no art but is both theoretical, and practice, for as we heard before, that we might both scire, sapere, and intelligere, etc. so we may contemplate, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ergo this distribution is fallacia accidentis, for they do not distinguish art as it is in the thing, but from their own knowledge of it.  
Object. But we cannot guide Astronomy neither can we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with natural Philosophy, but only contemplate them?  
Answ. It is arse as it is in fabrica rei, not as it is in homine, but there is Praxis, and prattomenon in every thing, as in the Sun we may see, his motion is praxis, his course that he makes is Prattomenon: again, man doth not contemplate only, but also work by the rule of Astronomy, and by nature, as in the sowing of corn, and planting of trees, etc. Now for practice they say they are such as do only practive, and leave no work behind them: or they are also poieticke, and leave a work behind them. Of the first sort they make Ethics, Oeconomickes, Politics, Music, Optickes, and others. Why? doth not the Ethician work a good moral action, or virtue, by his rule of Ethics? and hath not the good husbandman in working by the rule of Economics his prattomenon as well, as his praxis? and so of the rest. Is not the Commonwealth the prattomenon of a good Politician to be governed by him according to the rule of the Politickes? so for Music is there not a song sung, as well as the singing of it? and when they set their song we see it plain, that there is an opus as well as a motus. Now they had these from Aristotle, but they are false, and it is not commendable in the Creator, that every thing should have his praxis, and prattomenon. Again it doth not resemble the Creator, who is purus actus, unless there be a motus in it, and a res motu facta, as the rule of Logic teacheth in the doctrine of effectum, and not only Logic, but also Grammar teacheth so much, for there is scriptio, and scriptum; so in Arithmetic there is a numbering, and a thing numbered. So for Geometry there is a measuring, and a thing measured: and so for all other arts. And it cannot be otherwise by the rule of Grammar, for every verb is a transitive, and that is either active, or neuter, and both of them govern an accusative case, which is the subject into which they pass over, as amo patrem, Pater is the subject unto which amo passeth over: and sero a verb neuter hath his subject in himself, as when I say, I sow, it is as if I should say, I sow seed. therefore there is a prattomenon of every Art, as well as a praxis. For if a man smells, he smells something, and when he sees, he sees something, and drinking, he drinks drink.  Praxis est artis in agendo motus. 
There is nothing that can act sine motu, but only God: and hence it is that motus is general to every effect, and therefore is an effect by our rule of Logic.  Praxis is Genesis, and Analysis. 
These two belong to art in like sort, because they belong to the thing where Art is, for if you grant a motus of every thing, it must either be from principles to the making up of a thing, or to the resolving of it. Now if Art make up a thing, it can also undo it, for the way is the same, only there is a progress, and regress: so if I by my rule of Grammar join a nominative case, and a verb together, I can also by the same rule undo them again, and see whether it be true; and this we call construing of Latin, which indeed is distruing, for it is Analysis, for we pull that asunder, which Tully hath laid together, and indeed no ne can well undo a thing, but he that made it, or one that knows how to make it: and therefore we do not send for a joiner to pull down a house, but for a Carpenter, ergo if every thing have his Genesis and Analysis Art must also have them, which follow the thing.  Genesis est progressus artis a simplicibus ad composita. 
This Art hath his Genesis, which is a progress, for Genesis gins at the simples, and so goes to the composites, therefore must needs be a progress, now every thing but God is composed of simples, therefore there must needs be a Genesis of every Art which still follows the thing. So Logic first looks at the invention of things, then at the axioms, syllogisms, and method. So Grammar first gins with letters, then with syllables, then with words, then with sentences: and Arithmetic first considereth simple number, then comparative, etc. So Geometry first looks at lines, then at superficies, then at corpus: so natural Philosophy first gins with simple natures, then with composites, first with those that are without life, than those that live, first a simple life, secondly those that live a composite life.  Analysis est regressus a compositis ad simplicia. 
Analysis is an unwinding of a bottom of thread, which we wound up before: so we analyse that which was genised before, so that it is a regressio, etc. for that way that you took in genesi, the same way you take in analysi, only you begin at diverse ends. So in Logic we take an axiom, and resolve it into arguments, and so in Grammar we take a sentence, and resolve it into words, and so when I ask what a word signifies, he that telleth me the signification of it doth analyse it, and so for the other arts as we heard before in the doctrine of Genesis. Now the Schools thought that genesis and analysis belong to Method in Logic, which happily they might have from Aristotle; who entitleth his books Analytickes, and thence they make method to be double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but they belong to every art, therefore must be taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and again, there is genesis, and analysis of one and the same axiom, as when I seek for a cause, or any other argument to make an axiom, or when I resolve it into a cause, etc. so that when I ask, what is Latin for such a word, I genise it, and englishing it I analyse it, so that they belong not to method, which is a disposition, for they may be of one word; again, they may be as well of any other rule as of method. Now because they did observe the analysis and genesis in method more usually, then of art in general, therefore they thought them to belong only to it; now indeed if I take any rule of art from other rules of art, I practise method, therefore they may be special practices of method, for as I said before they may be in any other rule of Art, as well as in it. And method is not double because of them, no more than any rule of Art is double, because of the double use of it, and these are the life of Art, therefore those that will be expert for practice of any Art, let them practise these. Now for the general arts, I think none will doubt, but that they belong to them, but for the special arts there may be some doubt. If you draw any deduction from any first rule of any special Art, it is genesis; or if you draw deduction unto a first rule from it, it is analysis, etc. So when you examine the Sun's course by the rule of Astronomy, it is genesis, analysis contra. This analysis if it be imitated (for so it pleaseth the Lord to let us resolve his creatures) that we may work alike, that is called imitatio: so that those that have writ so much of imitatio, are to bring it hither, and imitatio is general, as we imitate some analysis of something that is genised. And indeed all our practice is nothing but genesis imitative of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so a child when he writes a copy by his master's example doth imitate him, for first he looks at the line, then at the sentences, then at the words, and lastly at the letters. So a prentice when he works according as his master teacheth him, doth imitate his example: and thus as we see God's wisdom making up the thing, so we see man's work in imitating God.  Vbi genesis desinit, ibi incipit analysis. 
For if genesis be progressus à simplicibus ad composita, and analysis regressus à compositis ad simplicia, then genesis desinit ubi incipit analysis: at, ergo; again it follows that analysis coniuncta is verè hermineutica, or interpretativa, for when I have an example, and do resolve the prattomenon, giving to every art his own, I tell you all that is to be seen in the thing, as in this example, homo est bulla, but this latter consecution will come in better in the doctrine of prattomenon.  Prattomenon est res motu artis facta. 
Prattomenon is that that the Art hath done by his praxis, for actio must go before passio, and praxis is before prattomenon, and there is nothing, but it is made for man, and therefore must have a prattomenon, for else the motion of it would be little worth: now to prattomenon there belongs two things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for when Art hath acted, and acted a work, it resteth not there, for it is for an use, therefore there must go with prattomenon, an use thereof. Now this use may be confused with the prattomena of other arts; so that this rule is here to be taught, that the arts for their precepts are distinct, but not for the use of their prattomena: for use holds the prattomena of arts together, as in this example, all flesh is grass, if it be examined. For in this there is the prattomenon of Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Natural Philosophy, and lastly the prattomenon of Divinity. Hence we say the use of arts is general, but we mean the use of the prattomenon of arts, for the precepts of art are not only distinct, but the praxis to, and the prattomenon also till we come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it: as we may see in a Shipwright, his rule of art is distinct, his motus is distinct, and his prattomenon is distinct, till you come to look at the manifold use of his prattomenon. So first the shepherd hath his prattomenon, than the grazier he useth the prattomenon of the shepherd, the butcher useth the prattomenon of the grazier, and the Cook useth the prattomenon of the butcher, and they that eat the meat the Cook hath dressed use his prattomenon. So that if the Philosopher will dispute as we say, he disputes as a Logician making axioms, or syllogisms, and so takes the prattomenon of Logic, and useth it in natural Philosophy. So the Tailor takes cloth made to his hand, and he useth it to this, or that end, to make such, or such a garment with it. There is also that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for as the prattomenon of every art may be joined with the prattomenon of other arts: so it must be provided that they be not so confused together, but that they may be severed again. So I can take magnitude from a body by the rule of Geometry, for whilst I take the prattomenon of any thing, and carry it to the art to which it belongeth, that is apharesis, it hath been taught in Schools to be peculiar only to Geometry, but it doth not take magnitude from the thing, but seethe it there distinct, and pulls it from another, and gives that prattomenon its proper use, and so looks at it by that art whose prattomenon it is, and so doth every art whatsoever, ergo it is general to them all.  Posterior ars prioris utitur opere. 
This is from the use, so we may see in manual arts, the shepherd hath his prattomenon, and the Grazier he takes, and useth it, and then the Butcher useth the graziers prattomenon, and the Cook he useth the Butchers, etc. and thus we have heard of art in general.  Ars est generalis, aut specialis. 
I shown you before, that in ente à primo there were certain concrescentia, and they were either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: now these that are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are more general, than the other, for they do concrescere with themselves, and with the rest. As Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric do concrescere between themselves, and cum omnibus aliis concrescentibus in the thing, ergo accordingly must the the Arts of them, namely, Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric be general: and because the other do not concroscere with the rest, but only in part, ergo they are more special, for though number, and magnitude may concrescere with nature, but not with all other Arts, as Logic, etc. therefore they are not so general. Now things are more general, or special in use, ergo the Art which still runs on with the thing must be distributed accordingly, not that I here distribute Art into genus and species, for in that sense they are all alike, yea the most special Art is as general, as that which is most general, therefore take heed of that, for I do not mean so, but I mean that some Arts are more general in respect of the general use of their prattomenon, and some are more special in regard of the special use of it, as one Art may be without another, and by nature is before it, as one is before two, for so Logic needeth not any other Art, but all the rest have need of it.  Ars generalis est, quae est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, circa ens. 
This general Art hath for his subject every thing, ergo I thus define it; It is the splendour or light that brings the thing to man from man: now in that it is of general use, it must needs be ubique. But is ens in genere the subject of the general Art? yes, but at the second hand, it is firstly the subject of arse in genere. Now there are general to ens in genere these two adjuncts, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore the Arts of them must be general, and in every thing: so that if you look at ens quatenus ens, it belongs to arse, quatenus ars, if you look at the reason or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the thing, it belongs to Logic, Grammar, or Rhetoric; so that look at ens: as the Metaphysitians teach it, and you shall find all their doctrine to be here, or in Logic, or in Divinity, about the efficiency of God. Now I say it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non ens by consequence, but non ens is more special, and belongs to contraria negantia in Logic, but ens fictum is more general. I say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or circa, not but that it is in the thing, for the Logicum artificium of God is in every thing: but it is in the outside of it, and flies out of it, and acts outwardly to me, and in that respect I call it circa, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: I say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also, for there can be no Art of non ens; for non ens is no creature, and Art is the wisdom of God, and therefore is of that that is something. Now the Poets fall into many figments, but they mean there by things, and so they belong to some special Arts: and all Esop's Fables, and other fables are but Allegories belonging to natural Philosophy, or to moral Philosophy, thought there may be fables of any Art, for fabula belongs to rhetoric, which is a general Art.  Ars generalis est rationis, or orationis. 
This general Art running according to the general thing, that is, which is of general use, is either the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more general, because the thing must first be carried to me, before I can deliver it to another. Again, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of absolute necessity in every thing, and therefore must needs be there, whereas the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is therefore general because it may be every where, but is not; For it is impossible for us to see any thing without there be reason in it, ergo Logic the Art that made it, is most general, and omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore by nature is first, for other arts cannot be without it, that may be without them. And thus now we are come to Logic.   

THE LOGICIANS SCHOOLMASTER. The first Book.  

CHAP. I. Dialectica est ars bene disserendi.  
WE have heard what Encuclopaidia is, and of Ars, and that the subject of it is Res, that hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: We have heard moreover the affections of Arts, and the Species of them, that they are general of the thing acting, or special of the thing acted. Now than the first thing in nature is reason, and here remember what we heard before, that we may see as God governed things in general by arts: so in special reason by Logic; and it is most general, because it is of most general use, not in regard of his Precepts, for so it is as special as any, but for use, because there can be nothing without Logic, yet Logic may be without speech, quantity, etc. ergo, this is most general. Now true it is, that this, as also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed from the thing in nature; yet Logic is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use, for it is in itself in speech, in quantity, etc. so that look where any art is, there Logic is; but it doth not follow, that where Logic is, there Arithmetic, Geometry etc. should be. Again, it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures, ergo, in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures, to the employment of the use of the principal Lord, therefore he must first see them, therefore must be prepared with such a faculty that he may see all things by it. Now this is omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That there is such an art, I show it thus.  
If there be reason, than there is an art of it, because reason is ens a primo, and it is for an end, therefore there must be that art, that is of reason's act. For the Proposition I proved it before, for reason was for an end; for the Assumption none will deny, but that there is reason, if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men. Our author call: this art Dialectica, which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifying secerno, separo, seligo; as for example, if there were many things together, I would severe them, and this name fitteth reason's act very well; for Logic is like a fire among the Chemists, for as fire will congregare homogenia, and segregare heterogenia: so Logic is the fire of all arts severing in the same act, that fire doth, Logic from Grammar, and Rhetoric from both, etc. and then it congregates to Logic that which is congreans to it, to Grammar that which is homogeny to it, etc. so that when it invents, it picks out homogenies, it disposeth them, and lays them in several places, therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art, that works this wonderful effect. Wonderful I may call it, for the Chemists can do great effects, but the Logicians can do greater, for they can see God's Logic in the things, and had not man fall'n, he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures. Now if Logic doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, congregare homogenia, and segregare heterogenia by the same effect, it may fitly be so called: now this art is so called, saith Diogenes Laertius, first by Plato, if he were the author, he was more ancient than Aristotle, and antiquity should have honour with good reason, if we have any reason: nay, Geometry is so called from its subject rather, not metiri from antiquity; but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith that Socrates was Plato's Schoolmaster, and he never writ any thing, but Plato always: so that Socrates might read it, and Zenophon hear it, for he was his Scholar, for Zenophon & Plato fuere aequales, and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato, as he had noted it from Socrates: and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wisest man in his time, and he was more wise than Aristotle; for Plato that was Socrates Scholar, was his Master; so that for this name we see how fitly it agrees to this art, and also the confirmation of it from antiquity. Now Aristotle calls it Logic, I do not deny but the name is good, but it is later, as Laertius witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first, but it is from the subject reason, as the names of most arts are. Arithmetic of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, numerus; Geometry of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, terra, etc. but it doth not so lively name this art, as Dialectica doth, which names the life, and delivers the quintessence of Logic: so that Logica, as it is coniugare of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, names it well, but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth: So thus we see the reason of the name.  Est ars. 
What art is we heard before, this it is, every thing hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is accomplished by many petty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto; so that Logicks main end is been disserere: bene invenire, and bene iudicare are the petty acts of it. Now if Logica, and Dialectica show the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and frame of man's reason, and direct it to the chief end, its happiness, where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, resteth, than it is arse: at, ergo.  Est ars bene disserendi. 
First disserendi, for the explanation of the word, dissero comes of dis and sero, sero signifies first to sow and does a sunder, or dissero, that makes disserui, to sow asunder; whether it be so used I find not, I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification, and that which I told you of concerning dilectica, is true of this, that as there was things to be sown, and a satio secernendorum, and a sowing them asunder: so there are first semina, which are arguments in invention: Secondly, a satio of them, that is, a disposing of them Axiomatically, and syllogistcally; and lastly, a dissetio, that is a disposing of them according to true method and order; so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through, as we had in Dialectica. So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logic; for as in man's body there is a soul or a form per quam res est, id quod est, & à caeteris rebus distinguitur; so there is of this art, or rather of the subject of it, reason: and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly that we cannot see their forms, but only the next acts to the forms: so here our author desireth to give to us the form of reason; which because he cannot do, therefore he delivers it by the final cause, the next act to the form: so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi, he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth been disserere, therefore I conclude thus: If this be the happiness, the act, and foul of reason, than it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi. at. ergo.  Bene. 
Here it is an adverb, for Grammar here doth declare some controversy, and an adverb is a part of speech joined to the verb to show his signification, therefore been is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere, ergo, bene disserere is not two things, but one thing, & this is a commendation in defining arts, to break the forms of them, as little as we can, because the form is but one argument; and if we put two, or more words into the form, we break it into so many pieces. Now for the reason of been in a Art, this it is, Art is the rule of the frame of Ens à primo: so Logic is the rule of reason, as it is God's creature, ergo, as it is good, ergo, bene is here put in well to show the Act of the goodness of this reason. Now since the fall of man, his reason is weakened, and darkened, and so there is a bona ratio, and a mala ratio, though mala ratio is not ratio indeed, but the error of ratio, and this act is to guide reason, as it doth been disserere, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 disserere, ergo, it is well put in to sever them. For if Dialectica be ars rationis bene agentis, than it is ars bene disserendi only, and not malè disserendi, at, ergo. So Grammar is the Art only been loquendi, though it descry malèe loqui: now here among the Logicians are many questions, and controversies against our Author. As some except against the name dialectica, and makes it more special than here Ramus takes it, and they distribute reason into three parts, Dialectica, Sophistica, and Apodictica, which was the distribution of the Aristotelians, not of Aristotle himself; but Simplicius that chief fellow, was the first man that brought it up, and afterward it was generally received in Schools from him. By Dialectica they understand all probable reason, and probality in Schools is taken in two significations, sometime it is taken for a contingent true axiom, ergo, it belongs to one little particle of the doctrine of axioma. Sometimes it is taken for axioma dubium, or quaestio, and then it belongs to the doctrine of Syllogisms; so that we shall find probability in these two places; but to make Dialectica so special, is to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle; is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no more general than so? doth it not go though all judgement, yea and invention too?  
Again, for Apodictica, which is de necessarijs, that belongs to a necessary axiom, for no syllogisms are are necessary, but the axioms which they consist of; but the syllogistical judgement is the same both of necessary and contingent axioms, and a syllogism of contingent propositions is necessary as well as that, which is of necessary axioms. Now for Sophistica, that is shut out, for if I see the truth, what need I look farther: and whereas they allege, that it is of the apparency of truth, what care I for that? yet it is counterfeit: so that they would have all Logic to consist in a necessary, and a contingent axiom, for no syllogisms are so: and that is the reason, that Ramus denies that demonstration; for their necessary that they speak of, is in axiom, not in syllogism. Again Sophistica is general to all arts, and not special to Logic, for all arts have their errors. Now the Schools distribute Logic into Dialectica, Grammatica, and Rhetorica, which savours of a notorious equivocation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indeed signifies ratio, and oratio, but this is only a distributing of the name, not of the thing, as if they should say Logica signifies ratio, or speech: many also there are that find fault with Ramus, for the reason of this name, some say it come of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, colloquor; but that is not because of their collocutio, but because of their reasoning in their speech together: but again, what hath Logic to do with words, and to name Logic from speech hath no reason at all, for it may be without it. There is also a great question, whether Dialectica be Ars, as Scaliger will have it; because saith he opus post se reliquit; or if it be facultas, as Craelius holds, or whether it be scientia, as others say. These are babbles, we have heard that the wisdom of God is Ars in the thing, it is called scientia by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, which is properly the judgement of a rule of art: so that here is a double trope, first a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, the knowledge of the art, for the art itself: then a synecdoche of the part for the whole, the rule for the whole art, for facultas, that is the subject ratio: ergo, Craelius speaks by metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for the faculty is reason itself; so that dialectica est ars: as for their distribution in Schools, that arse doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and scientia only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or contemplare, it is a babble, we see scientia is the knowledge of the art, and arse is rei, as Arithmetic is of number, Geometry of magnitude, etc. and Logic of reason, so that the scientia or Theory of art is fallacia accidentis, to take it for the art itself, and is as if we should say, a painted man is a true man, ergo, when we say a man is a good Logician, we mean a man hath that knowledge of reason, and so for other arts; so that our knowledge of an art is no more of the essence of it, than my knowledge of a man is of the essence of the man. Again, when I say the knowledge of an art, I say two things, knowledge, and art, which are subject and adjunct ergo, knowledge is but accidental to the art. For bene disserendi there are many adversaries, and one grand enemy, some say it is rather ars bene utendi ratione, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an adjunct to art, and it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not artis, as for example, we cannot say, the Merchant, or Mariner useth the shipwrights art, but his work, but this is the chief absurdity that it breaks the form into pieces.  
Kickerman cries out against Ramus for this definition, and says it is a trope, ergo, ought not to be in art, he forgets his rules, for Rhetoric is a general art, ergo, it may be every where, but saith he, is it not better to teach with proper words, then with tropical, they are fit for simple men, not for judicious; I will confess it, and Ramus too, for Grammar is before Rhetoric, ergo, should be preferred: yet Tropes may be as plain, and as significant as other words sometimes; but I make no doubt, but that disserere is ever used in other sense then this Logical signification: but if it be, let him give me a better word; but he cannot, because he doth not, but says, logica est ars dirigendi mentem in cognition rerum, and so breaks all in pieces. Again, what doth dirigere here? It belongs to art in general, for dirigere is as large as regere, and regere as regula, and regula as praeceptum; so that here he cannot be content to horse me up to art in general, for the genus only, but for the form too. Again for men's, he cannot abide Tropes; but what means he by mens? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth properly the divine part of the soul of man, and sometimes it is taken for the faculties of the soul, but here he must take it for reason, ergo, here are two Tropes, first a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct, the faculties for the soul itself. Secondly, a synecdoche of the part for the whole, reason for the soul. For cognitio it comes of con, and notio, to see things laid together, and it is the judgement of an axiom, and belongs to it, which is but a little particle of Logic.  
Lastly, for res, that is as general as ens, which is as general as arse, ergo, thus he hoists me up, and down, first to arse in general; then down again to natural Philosophy, for men's belongs thither, then to one piece of Logic: then again up to arse; and thus much for the explanation of the rule: the practice of it stands in this: God hath made all things for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them, and all of them must be liable to it, ergo, this rule tells us, first, if we would look at any thing we must take it with us, for it is ars bene disserendi, and so we shall see it: so that if we would do any thing with reason this pulls us by the ear and says it is the art to reason well: so that here we may see the commendation of this art, not only in respect of the general use of it, but in that it teacheth us how to work by it, as God hath done before us: so that it first teacheth us Gods will and pleasure in things; and than what he would have us to do in the managing and governing of them: and here we may see that all, things at the first were made for one man.  Eodemque sensu Logica dicta est. 
We have heard what Dialectica is, and have seen the reason of every word therein. Now Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and tells us that eodem sensu Logica dicta est: the reason of it is, because here he tells us of a controversy betwixt him and Aristotle, which I prevented before, when I spoke of their distribution of Logic into Dialectica, Apodictica, and Sophistica. Now Ramus only sets down the rule according to truth, for thus it stands, if Dialectica delivers the Art of reason, than Logic and it are all one, but this is the Art that appertains to reason, and that is but one, ergo, so than if Logica signify the same that Dialectica doth, therefore there is the same definition of them both, for they are one in individuo, as the Schools speak, ergo in form, ergo but two names signifying the same thing.  Dicta est. 
Meaning that that name of Aristoles is the same with that Socrates gave; and whilst Plato doth interpret Logica to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Aristotle saith it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: they grant it to be the same with Dialectica, and for the distinction of Logic into those three, they must needs hold that those parts contain as much as the whole, but they do not by their own confession; so that this distribution, was made by Simplicius, which did not understand Aristotle, or at leastwise Logic, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logic, that is not in Dialectica, according to our author's definition of it. For Ramus will not deny but Dialectica and Logica are taken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting special names calls things by general words: as an exhalation he calls a fume, whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politickes. Eodemque sensu, etc. that is, Logic is so define, ars bene disserendi, even as Dialectica is, and whatsoever other conceits men have had concerning Dialectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a probable, and a sophistical argument, as many do speak, that belongs to an axiom, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius, that is Apodicticus, contingens, and sophisticus, if we look at a necessary syllogism in Barbara, why there may be a contingent syllogism, that is a syllogism consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a false syllogism in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est lapis, omnis asinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative syllogism, as omne animal rationale est visibile, omnis homo est animal rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogism, for then a dialectical syllogism would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut contra, but these lie in the axiom: for why? whatsoever is necessary is true, and a contingent axiom doth pronunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom, neither doth a man say aliquid esse, aut non esse, when he means an argument alone, till there be a disposition, ergo those that make a distribution of syllogisms by their matter deceive us: so that here we see it is true that our author tells us, that eodem sensu Logica dicta est.   

CHAP. 2. Dialecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, et dispositio.  
NOw we come to the second rule, having heard that Dialecticae est ars bene disserendi; this rule needs nothing to make it plain, but that which went before scilicet ars in general, to show this to be an Art, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of every ens à primo, to show that this Art's end is been disserere, both which we heard of in the doctrine of art, therefore this rule showing what is pictured in this book needs no more explanation, therefore it is the first rule of all, for it gives light to all the rules following, and taketh light of none: therefore doth this second rule give light to the former? no, it rather obscures it, for I must first know what Dialectica is before I hear it divided, for how can I divide I know not what? therefore this rule will give no light to the first, therefore never a rule following, and the first rule is a comment to this. Dialectica, that is, that which was ars bene disserendi, hath two parts, bene invenire argumenta, and bene disponere argumenta: why? because they are portions of this Art tending ad bene disserendi parts. Can Dialectica, this Art be parted? If it be that wisdom of God that is one most simple being, how comes it to be divided into branches? I have showed howsoever it is one in God, yet he hath made reason twisted in the thing, so that before it can been disserere, it must been invenire, and bene iudicare: so that now reason as it is the subject of Logic, namely as it doth act, and is for an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and reason according to his frame hath these two operations, invenire, and iudicare, therefore the Art being the Idea of this frame, that hath two parts, must have two parts, for Logic behold reason, not as it is a faculty belonging to natural Philosophy, but as it acts. Now thus I argue. If reasons frame run into two heads, or actions, that it may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than the Art must do so, now that reason is framed to run into these two heads, thus I shown it, All things were made for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them: now all things that God hath made are considered in themselves, or with others, for the world is one consisting of many parts, and they are considered alone or with others, therefore man's reason must run accordingly. God only is entire in himself having no respect to any other thing, he is simple, and hath no parts, therefore he is not liable to Logic: all other things are composed, that it might appear, that he is simple, so that every thing else is composed, or disposed with others, yet first it must be in itself, in use: for if I say a bricke-wall, there must needs first be bricks, and what use have we of words alone in Grammar, but in Syntax, and first we must see the Etymology of them: nay in every art except Rhetoric there is no use of the first part without the second, neither is invention ever without judgement, therefore when every thing hath his double consideration, there must be two parts of reason, for as things are, so must reasons act be, for every thing must be so administered as that it be liable to reason, and be considered alone before it be disposed: therefore invention is first, so that any man that hath reason will acknowledge the necessity of this distribution: now these two parts are called Invention and Disposition. First for the reason of the name Invention, man was to see all God's creatures, and so to see his order in them: now how should man see them? were they written in his understanding? no more than Paul's steeple is in my eye, for man came furnished into the world only with Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric and Divinity, neither with the knowledge of these Arts, but with the faculties of them, and therefore the Arts must needs be there, for we read the Arts in the things: so that for Arithmetic Geometry, and nature, man was to learn them by the creatures, as he was also to learn the knowledge of Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, and Divinity. The reason is this, the Genesis of every thing is Gods, and man must see the rules of Art, therefore man must see them from singulars, by analysis: now than if man must learn these, and know them by his senses observation, induction, and experience, than he must seek, and find out these, for they are not written in him: again, whereas every thing is in disposition, it is requisite that man find them out, and see them severally, therefore in this respect is this art of reason called Invention, namely as he is sent by God to find out these things in his creatures; now if man must find them out with this act of his eye of reason, then is it fitly called invention, at, ergo. And this teacheth man thus much, that he is to seek out, and find this wisdom of God in the world, and not to be idle; for the world, and the creatures therein are like a book wherein God's wisdom is written, and there must we seek it out. Why is not this first Art called Disposition, because that is more familiar, and easy to us, for all things are disposed; but we are by this Art to sever them, and to look at them simply, so that this name teacheth man what he is to do in this act of his reason, namely, invenire argumenta, as in mists to look at the elements, etc. Now Kickerman cannot away with this distribution, and yet says nothing to this purpose against it, for I suppose Invention to be an ambiguous name, and have equivocation with it, as I do not deny, but it is taken sometimes for judgement, but that is tropically, yet while my author tells me what it is, that is sufficient to know his meaning how here it is taken.  
Object. But Invention is never without judgement saith he, no inventions use is ever without judgements use: so he may say Etymology is never without Syntax. I, but saith he, you cannot invent without judgement, therefore they are no parts of Logic? as for example, a chest is made of wood, by this rule materia est causa ex qua res est, therefore here is syllogistical judgement, which is concluded a definitione, and this is Aristotle's demonstration, as if you should make a syllogism thus, That whereof the thing is, that is materia, But wood is that ex quo the Chest is, ergo. But here is only Logicks practise, and not any rule of Art taught us. The question betwixt Ramus and him is, whether any rule of invention belongs to judgement. This it is, the rules of invention give precepts of nothing at all concerning judgement, aut contra: therefore these are the true parts of Logic: and whilst he argues from the precept to the rule, it is fallacia accidentis, as if he should reason: Socrates est animal, animal est genus, ergo Socrates est genus; whereas we know the thing animal is not that Logical notion, neither Socrates, for they belong to natural Philosophy, but genus is no adjunct attributed unto them, so this invention is only of simple arguments, and of the simple consideration of them, and therefore our Art runs along according to God's order, and though we cannot practise any rule of invention, but by judgement, yet it doth not therefore follow that they are the same, for it is as if he should say this, homo, quae pars orationis? Nomen, here is the practice of Syntax, ergo Etymology, and Syntax, are all one.  Inuentio est prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis. 
We have heard of the reason of the name Invention, why it is given to the first part, and that with great reason, for we must find by much seeking before we can see things. Again, Logic being the first help to see God's wisdom in his creatures, and this use of invention being to be found in the thing, it is hard to find, therefore it is fitly called invention from the act of it: so again in dispute, a man is same to seek a third argument to prove his question. judgement the second part is properly the act of our understanding, when it looks at arguments disposed, therefore here it is a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject, when it is put for dispositio: and again it is properly the disposing of arguments together, which is of Axioms and Syllogisms.  
Method doth not look at the disposing of arguments, but at the placing of axioms: so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus, Dalecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, & dispositio: dispositio is iudicium, or Methodus, iudicium est axiomaticum, or syllogisticum: my reasons are these: the arts of reason are performed by the internal senses, the best fancy invents best, and that is performed by a hot brain: cogitation serves judgement axiomatical, and syllogistical, and that is dry, and the best memory is an airy moist brain: ergo, whilst I see from this reason in natural Philosophy, that axiomatical and syllogistical judgement are thus combined, and the other severed, I think this art should be thus divided according to their instruments, as nature hath severed them. Again, our Author distributeth the second part into axioma, and discursus, and under discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus: now these two cannot be joined together: for why? what hath method to do with syllogismus? Method doth not dispose syllogisms, but axioms. Again the use of a syllogism is to make clear that that is obscure, and to manifest truth; and the rule of truth belongs to axiomatical judgement if it be clear; if not, then to syllogsticall judgement: but we bring our question after again to an axiom to see the truth of it, ergo, these two work about one thing, namely about truth, therefore they should be combined together. So that syllogistical judgement is to make clear that, which axiomatical judgement could not, yet the doctrine of axioma is before, and syllogistical judgement hath for his subject axioma dubium. The exceptions against this rule are these: first, Kickerman saith, There is no invention, but there is judgement withal, that is confessed to be true in use, as in Grammar the use of Etymology is never without Syntax, but the use is one thing, and the rule another: there is no precept of invention, that belongs to judgement, aut contra: then he saith, Who can invent, but he must also judge? for (saith he) must not a man judge a cause before he find it? this is also a fallace of use: we cannot find a rule, but we use both invention and judgement, but by his argument, there should be no judgement, but syllogistical: then again he saith, invention was used for a third argument, and not as Ramus taketh it.  
True it is, the Schools thought it only to belongs to syllogisms, & that there was but the use of an argument, not the doctrine of it, but thus I argue: Is invention of a third argument, ergo, it is of an argument, ergo than it belongs not to judgement: for the doctrine of a simple conceit, as he calls it, is distinct from the doctrine of judgement. Again, if it be a third Argument, there was two before, ergo, there are Arguments disposed. Again, when a third Argument is found out, do we not dispose pars consequens quaestionis in propositione, and antecedens in assumptione,; and so make the proposition an axiom, and likewise the assumption: ergo, an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in a syllogism by their own confession: therefore we see evidently here, that the use of an Argument is common both to syllogistical and axiomatical judgement. And I would ask, whether causa est cuius vi res est, when it is disposed with the effect, be the same, and have the same definition in an axiom, that it hath in a syllologisme? If they say it is the same, ergo, common to both, ergo, the doctrine of causa, and effectum, etc. must go before the doctrine of an axiom, and a syllogism, and Method, and must be distinct from them all: for as method is distinct from axiomatical, and syllogistical judgement, and is before them, because an axiom may be without them, not contra: So is the doctrine of Arguments before the doctrine of axioms for the same reason: and Kickerman confesseth as much, whilst he distributes Logic into terminus simplex, complexus, and discursus: he saith Authors of arts are called inventors, as Hypocrates of Medicina, Aristotle of Logic, but did they not all judge them? yes, but doth it therefore follow, that invention and judgement are not diverse things, so that this distribution stands firm, and sure, and as for his conceit to have invention taught in a syllogism, we shall hear of it when we come there, for it is very silly. Now for his distribution into three parts, it comes to one with ours, for his first part terminus simplex, so much of it as is Logic belongs to invention, so terminus complexus belongs to axiomatical judgement, and discursus to syllogisms, and he would have it belong to method too. But first that absurdities are these, he does not follow reasons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Logic delivers, for conceptus simplex is properly the judgement of a thing, when we see the truth thereof: so that this is not so proper as invention. Now when I say inventio, I say that part that directs my reason to seek out things secretly wrapped up in nature, again whilst he makes a distribution of the precepts of Logic, by these precepts we must understand the systema of Logic by a Metonymy of the material cause, and when he says a systema of precepts, that is a far fetched trope: again we never have more parts than two in a distribution, but there is some thing left out, for to admit of his distribution: but is there not a community betwixt his terminus complexus, and discursus, namely dispositio? ergo, here he wants the rule of dispositio, and so makes his Art imperfect. Now he pleads for the antiquity of it, which we are not to admit of, but of truth: why? his Logic was not in ancient time, is it therefore nought now?  
The use of this rule is this, as we heard before, Logic took my reason, and told me the marks to shoot at, so here it tells me that I must first invent, and so I shall go orderly to work, and then dispose, for the Bricklayer must first have bricks before he can make a bricke-wall, and the Grammarian must have words before he can make a sentence, and (as before) arguments are more general than axioms, axioms than syllogisms, etc. for the one may be without the other, not contra, as one is more general than two, two then three, etc. because one may be without two, or three, etc. not contra: so first we must invenire, and then iudicare, that we may bene disserere, for there is nothing betwixt them, but when we have stones then we may build, and whilst we find in the creatures of God things considered, as they are in themselves, and then in respect of others, therefore so must reason be distributed into his two acts, and now we come to invention which is prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis, first we have heard the reason of the name inventio betokening actively: the reason inventing or finding out, and howsoever we may find it taken for the whole act of Logic, yet it is a Synecdoche, and though we cannot but use judgement in it, yet it is but inventio, ergo, est pars. He rather keeps this word, then membrum, though it be more general, because it is more in use: and again because in Schools membrum hath been usually taken for the members of a man, as head, arms, legs, or the like: so that not having told us what membrum, or pars is, he chooseth the more usual Dialectica; we heard concerning Dialectica before, therefore to hear it again were superfluous, it is Dialecticae, ergo, it is the integrum to it, as inventio is the membrum. Now indeed the Rhetoricians have taken invention to be a part of Rhetoric, and so judgement, but when they come to explain them, they teach Logic: and their disertus is not only the Rhetorician, but the Grammarian, and Logician, their Orator is omnium horarum homo, a man for every turn, so that he is a man in whom there is a confusion of all Arts: neither is Orator belonging to Rhetoric, but he is a general man, that hath all the Arts; and chief he is a Logician: now the Rhetoricians did imagine, because they used invention, and judgement, therefore they belonged to Rhetoric: so they might say of Law, Arithmetic, Geometry, natural Philosophy, or any other Art: now than those are the two parts of Dialectica only; and whereas men say commonly Ramus Logic serves for Rhetoric, not for natural Philosophy, as some do, they speak simply, for what use of Logic hath a Rhetorician in any other Art, as in Politickes, is it not to prove some Thesis? therefore if he dispute here as a Politician by the rule of Logic, so may a natural Philosopher do, so causa, effectum, subiectum, adiunctum, and all other arguments are the same in all Arts, ergo, to make a special invention to Rhetoric, and another to nature, or any other Art, is simple. Now it is pars Dialecticae, we do not mean to make pars a genus of invention here, for it is a Logical notion, and belongs to Logic: but the reason of this definition is to bring in Dialectica, so that when we will analyse this definition, we must not say pars is genus, but Dialectica est integrum.  Prima pars. 
Est prima pars, because it is more general than judgement, for it may be where judgement is not, for simple arguments are before the composition of arguments both in nature, and working. The Carpenter must have his timber in several pieces to square them before he can join them together. Quod praecedit natura in Dialectica, id prima pars est Dialec. at inventio: ergo.  De inveniendis argumentis. 
As if he should say, inventio, that act of reason doth invenire argumenta, de inveniendis, why? he means the precepts of this act, for in this part de inveniendis argumentis is the subject, but these precepts of invention are first concerning a seeking: but to find what? it teacheth me first to hunt, and then to find a Hare, as if he should say, take the rule of causa, that hound, and hunt, and you shall find a cause: as if he should say, would you seek a cause? first seek the artificiality, than the primative, then how it is simplex and consentaneum, etc. and so come to causa, so that invention is not taken for judgement here, but for the seeking, and finding out of arguments.  Argumentis. 
De argumentis inveniendis: arguments to be sought out: why? because the Lord hath so commanded man to seek out his reason in his creatures, so that we must seek an argument, which is a term in latin belonging to Law, as the Rhetoricians thought, but it is more general to Logic: but because they used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in Greek is to plead like an Orator, and so arguere in Latin, therefore they thought them proper to them, yet argumentum here signifies any thing of arguere, that can charge another thing, and so doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek: so here we see what invention seeks out, argumentum, and by it the thing, but at the second hand, quatenus there is Logismos in it: so that invention takes not the thing immediately, but by argumentum: so that argumentum is here as the Schools speak, concretum, that is, it is argumentum, as it doth arguere: so that when we hear argumentum, we must consider two things, first ens the subject of Art, and then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so by that the thing: as I see a Post with my outward eye by the colour, so that invention sees the thing mediante argumento: then observe again the argumentum is the subject of invention: now the Schools make a simple conceit, and so make a great ado about vox, as Kickerman, and Schaliger do to bring it into Logic, they say vox quatenus it consisteth of letters, belongs to Grammar, but quatenus it signifies a thing, it belongs to Logic: but as for example, homo, what arguments are homo, and the thing it signifies? subiectum, and adiunctum, why? but these are but examples thereof, shall these come into Logic, because Logicks use is here? So the wall is white, is subiectum, and adiunctum, doth that axiom therefore belong to Logic? but let them but go to the definition of vox, and they shall see it belongs to Grammar, quatenus it signifies a thing: but they may see it in the general rule of ars generalis: for as ens is the subject of Logic at the second hand, so also of Grammar. Now he prosecutes vox, and says it is to be looked at ad modum significationis, or iure significata, or the like: ad modum significationis is categorematica, or suncategorematica, as homo: because, saith he, it signifies that thing, which may be an argument: why homo doth not signify an argument, it belongs to natural Philosophy, and the argument is but an affection to the thing that homo signifies, but what reason is there that homo should come into Logic, because it names the thing that is categorematica? it is fallacia accidentis: that meat you bought on Saturday, you did eat on Sunday, but it was raw meat you bought on Saturday, ergo. But for vox therefore it comes not into Logic, only there are coniugata and notatio, which belong to Logic, not because they signify things, for there is not in them any respect of the thing, and the name, but in coniugates how one name is derived from another, and in notation the reason of the name from some argument. Then he says vox categorematica is primae, or secundae intentionis, which he knows not how to utter but by certain comparisons, as of a dial, the style is prima intentionis, and the shadow secundae: but this vox primae intentionis is the word that names the thing, vox secundae is the word of Art. Now true it is this distribution is an old said saw, but there is no such thing, it is the same fallace ab accident. Homo and genus do not signify the same thing, homo is primae intentionis at the first hand, genus of the second, but genus doth not signify the same that homo doth: again genus hath his proper signification, as well as homo, that appears thus, because it hath a distinct definition from homo, therefore they are distinct re: so that genus is primae intentionis, to the thing it names, as homo is primae to that thing it names. Again, are there not terms of Art as well in Grammar, etc. as in Logic? why then doth he bring it in here? as homo est nomen, here nomen is the name of the thing, not the thing itself, ergo, homo, and nomen, are not voces primae & secundae intentionis, for they are diverse things: so argumentum is concretum, that is, it is evermore with the thing not that it is the thing, as homo is argumentum, and it doth arguere, which is an adjunct to the thing, for so every Logical notion is an adjunct to the thing itself, but here it is, because we cannot sever the Logical notion from the thing, because it is never but in re, that is the reason why argumentum is always in the concrete, whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be severed from the thing, but this rule bids us only find, but tells us not what as yet: so that it runs most orderly.  
We have heard the first part of Logic to be called Invention, in respect we are set to seek out the simples in the work of God. De inveniendis argumentis, because there is never a rule here, but it is a bloodhound to find a Dear: again, we heard it was an argument that was to be hunted, not the thing, but the argument, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the thing, for the thing doth not belong to Logic, but to every Art, and Logic doth look at the thing, by the logismos, as the outward eye beholds bodies, by light and colour: and this is called argumentum, a concrete, because Logic is never severed from the thing, nor the thing from Logic, for we cannot see the thing but by reason, therefore because these are inseparably together, for that cause the subject of invention is argumentum: so that in argumentum we are to consider two things, first the thing as it is the subject of Art in genere, and of the general Arts: and then that same birdlime, that is, in the thing, whereby it may cleave to another thing, which birdlime is the Logical notion; as when I say a chest is made of wood: in Greek they have two names for it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the arguing, the abstract as it were, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the argument: but our author rather keeps the concrete, because it is always with the thing, and cannot be severed from it: then the subject of invention is ens at the first hand, but argumentum at the second. The term argumentum (as we heard) is from Law, as the Greek names also be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is concione concionare, and thus we see how fare Logic's rule reacheth, and this same argumentum was used at the first, for that which we call praedicatum a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a barbarous word made first by Boetius, but it is more general, as we may see by the third argument in a syllogism, which may be an antecedent in the proposition, or assumption, as well as the consequent.  
Kickerman saith vox is the subject of this first part, and he hath many distinctions of it, as it is abstracta, or concreta; this is nothing but a distribution of nomen into substantiwm, and adiectiwm, quatenus voces, and therefore the old Grammarians did so teach it: if they look at the thing they belong to coniugates in Logic, and there we shall see them to signify the same thing; one absolutely, the other as it hath respect to another, and they are there, not quatenus they are words, nor quatenus they signify, if we go no farther, but quatenus they contain, symbolise the nature of first arguments. Again, he saith vox is univoca, or aequivoca: alas there is vox univoca in the world, as homo his example is vox aequivoca: if we call a painted man a man, as we may call tropically, but this belongs to a distribution, and is but an example thereof, not a rule: as canis is sidus, or animal terrestre, or marinum, is a distribution, ex adiunctis: so that to make a precept of an example is great confusion: and the definition of a thing will take away the ambiguity of the word. More distinctions he hath, which all are nothing, but several sorts of aequivocation, as if he should say, there may be aequivocation of Grammar, and there may be aequivocation in Rhetoric, etc. he tells us further that a word must be certa, absoluta, etc. what hath Logic to do with this? let Grammar look to that, for it breaks the definition of vox est nota qua, etc. if it name not the thing fitly; as if vox should say vox est vota qua unumquodque vocatur; will you call a man a spade, than he bring in predicament, and predictables. The world of Logicians doth imagine, that Architas Tarentinus was the first inventor of them, and taught them to his Scholar Pythagoras, now the reason that brought them in was this, that they might be furnished with matter to work about Logic. So that they were storehouses for them to lay up things one way or other, either analogicè or a latere.  
Kickerman approves that purpose of them, for saith he, things do not belong to Logic, now the Logic in a predicament is this, the order of things being placed one before another, and so he saith the predicaments are of great use, for the finding of simples: Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus, because we see what may be a subject, and a predicate in a proposition: then another use of them (he says) is for discursus, for when we know what is above, and below, we may quickly know what is in the midst; and they are also of use for method.  
For the first Invention of them, they are not storehouses, for there is nothing but hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore belongs to some Art: so that the Arts are the true storehouses of things: so that his table of substantia is nothing but a draught of natural Philosophy, but I must tell you untowardly, and that of quantity nothing but a draught of the Mathematics, that of quality nothing but a draught of natural, and moral Philosophy. Other things he brings in, which are not so as he makes ubi to be a genus of intus and foras: ad aliquid comes under relates. Quando belongs to adiunctum, etc. but because Logic's use is there, they think they belongs to Logic, by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Logic: but saith he, the things themselves belong to the special Arts, but for the series they belong to Logic, that is, as if he should say, for their Logical notion they belong thither, but when he says series, he is presently in method: for his series is nothing but methods work; and if he reason that Arithmetic, Geometry, Nature, etc. belong to Logic, because methods use is there, that is fallacia accidentis, now the doctrine is one, and the use is another, the doctrine is distinct, the use confused: then again, whereas he says here you have genus summum, and subalternum, why we heard of them in the distribution ex effectis: but because substantia is corporea, or incorporea, here is a distribution as a genus into his species: therefore, saith he, this belongs to Logic: so let him bring in the daubers Art too; for Logicks use is there. Thus do they make a confusion, not seeing things distinct. Again, whereas they help to find out a subject, and predicate, they have shut out some, namely incompleta, as a man's hand, which may be a subject or a predicate, and when I say the world is made of the first matter, is not the first matter here a predicate? so they shut out transcendentia, as ens: but is not homo ens, therefore a predicate? Again, is not a predicate an argument, ergo, artificiale, aut inartificiale? if artificiale, then fetched out of some Art, therefore let me carry my subject to the Art whereunto it belongs; and there will I find any predicate: again for the help of a medium, is every medium a genus subalternum? Suppose we shall fetch a medium, that is, genus summum, or an individuum, but let me go to the Art of my subject, and if I will take that which is above it, or below it, there I shall have it done to my hand. Again, he says the doctrine of the predicaments serve for definitions, and differences, etc. Why let me go to the Art, and there I shall see every thing taught to my hand, so that the doctrine of predicaments quatenus they are adumbrations of the Arts, are to be seen in their Arts. But to reason, that because Logic's use is there, therefore they belong to Logic, is very absurd. Again, if there be this predicament, to show the summum and subalternum genus, and species subalterna, and infima, why is there not a predicament to know causa? for by the same reason, there should be a predicament to find out causas, and let them say what they can of the predicaments, we shall find all in the doctrine of distribution, and definition, as substantia is corporea, aut incorporea is a distribution, and belongs to natural Philosophy; and so the next distribution of substantia corporea, etc. so if we take quantity, we shall see we are in some special Arithmetic, or Geometry, etc. for the predicables, genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, these we know are special arguments, the two first belong to distributio ex effectis: differentia belongs to forma, for it is called forma, in respect of the thing form; and differentia, as it distinguisheth the thing from all other things. If they shall say, I, but here is distributio per formam, that is accidental to forma, and belongs to distributio, so that forma is the better word taken from the nature of it, for proprium is nothing but proprium adiunctum, and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subject, not as it is an act, and accidens is also a special kind of adjunct.  
Now the laws of Art require, that every precept deliver the principia thereof, and therefore be either definitions, distributions, or properties, which they after a sort seeing, made these to be helps to the predicaments; now for substantia quoad res it belongs to natural Philosophy, quoad seriem or ordinem to method: for quantity it belongs to Mathematics: quality to moral Philosophy, yea, and to natural too: for relates, they belong to Logic; but there can be no series or order of them, for they are but examples of relates, as causa, and effectum be relates; but only examples, ergo, infimae species: for actio it is nothing but motus; quando is nothing but the adjunct of time, passio a subject, ubi a special kind of subject also of place, fitus belongs to Geometry, otherwise it is an adjunct, and habitus is a special kind of adjunct, therefore there can be nothing beneath these, but examples: so that do but look at his table, and you shall see him presently go out, as he says qualitas is naturalis, and moralis: this is false, for naturalis, aut moralis are two examples of that adjunct qualitas, and justice is no more a quality because it is a virtue, than Socrates est genus, because animal is genus: so that argumentum is the true subject of Invention, and not the predicables, and predicaments, any further than they are arguments.  Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est. 
Now we come to the definition of argumentum; we heard that Dialectica is a general Art, and is conversant about every thing, and about non ens gratia entis, now then argumentum must be in every thing, therefore it is quod, any thing whatsoever, and thus it is demonstrated, because Logic is a general Art; so thus here we see argumentum est quod, which is as large as aliquid, quod affectum est: we know this is a borrowed word, affection is a disposition natural, as the eye is affected to see: but that we may see it the better, we will dig deeper, there is an efficient working, than his working, which is effectio, which as it is about it, so it is affectum, ad effectum: as if my hand be wounded with a sword, there is first an efficient, then there is wounding which is effectio, then there is a wound which is effectum, than my hand is the affectum to be wounded, so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing, by which nature can perform that action: so argumentum is affectum, as if he should say, that that is made, or factus ad, or effected to another thing, or which hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it to work with another thing.  
Why affectum? It is a property of an argument, as homo est risibilis, when he doth not ridere: so that he defines argumentum in invention, from that power, or faculty: for as a man may have an affection to that thing he never doth: so an argument may have an affection to argue, when it acteth not: so that he teacheth from that disposition of it to act, so that he delivereth it not from his act, for that is but the use of it, but from its true nature: as the common Logicians call it praedicabile, that which may predicate, and says it is not an argument, till it be disposed, but this is accidental to argmentum; then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu, which also is accidental to an axiom, for it may be subiectum as well, and both are accidental ad arguendum. Why ad arguendum? because the end of an argument is to argue, to play the argument, as the eye to see: ad arguendum, because evermore when we fetch an argument to show any thing that is the arguens, and doth agere, the aliquid is also an argument, but it doth pati: so that as quoth was general, that is arguens, or does argue, so it tells me that any thing may be argued: so homo est aliquid, here homo is the aliquid, and is argued by his genus, which chargeth homo, therefore there is nothing in the world, but is an argument, and may argue, or be argued: but remember that both quod, & the aliquid, that is both the arguens, and argutum doe arguere, but the one firstly, the other secondly; the one doth agere, the other doth pati, and so reagere. The aliquid tells me it is the first, & then quod comes, and argues it: now would you argue, than evermore look first, and that carefully, whether your quod will argue your aliquid: as will you build an house with sand? that will not serve the turn, for it is not affectum to it, neither hath it that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it: so that by any means let us keep close to our rule, and we shall not do wrong. The fallacian of the common Logicians of Coxismus, or petitio principij, or cuculi cantus, for they are all one. As the Cuckoo cries Cuckoo, the Cuckoo is Cuckoo, ergo the Cuckoo cries Cuckoo, for here is no third argument; and this is commonly the woman's reason, because it hath so little reason in it, as they will say it is so, because it is so. So that simplex conversio among Logicians is a breach of this rule: as omnis homo est animal, ergo, aliquod animal est homo: other Logicians as Polanus, calls argumentum Thema, which is too special, for thema is taken among schools for a question to be judged by way of oration: again every argument is not taken as thema, than he says thema est simplex, which is argumentum, or compositum, which is quaestio; and thus we see how our Logic goes most orderly, and that it looks at ens as it is simmonted with another thing.  Quales sunt singulae rationes solae, et per se consideratae. 
We have heard what argumentum is, and the first thing that we are to look at in simples is this, the glue to be affectioned: as if we would look for a cause, see whether it be affected to be so: we have heard the sallacians in part before; as first, where there is no argument, but petitio principij, and that either where there is no petitio at all, or where the same thing is uttered in a synonymy, or to the same purpose. Again, it is a breach of this rule, when that is brought for an argument, which is no argument, as baculus stat in angulo; or when the third Argument is more obscure, and doubtful, than the arguments of the question; these and all other petitiones principij are breaches of this rule in general, and not of any special ones. Again, it is a breach of the definition of an argument, when we mistake the aliquid, though the argument be good, and so that Heterozeteses is a fallace of argumentum in genere; as when I talk of Chalk, he talks of Cheese. Now we come to the commoration after argumentum, quales sunt singulae rationes solae, etc. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it; for the act is accidental, and may be wanting, for potentia (as we hear in nature) ariseth from the act of the form upon the matter. Now he saith, singulae, that is, argument by argument, the cause alone, the effect alone, and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end. He saith rationes rather then argumenta, first because there is an equivocation in that word, many have thought it to belong to a syllogism only; and so when we say, I deny your reason, there it is taken for an axiom. Now it is taken sometimes for the faculty of reason, sometimes for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in things. Here he shows that it is taken for the same with argumentum. Solae, that is as they are to be considered in invention without judgement, and that he explains further per se, that is, they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally, these are tales, that is such as I have defined unto you: so that he doth here commorari, because of difference with Aristotle, or rather with the Aristotelians, even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica, for they thought there was no argument but in judgement, and therefore have question with Ramus whether an argument be to be taught before we come to a syllogism. Ramus here propounds it, and determines it for his own part, that it may be without judgement, and look at others, and you shall see them define all arguments from their use in a syllogism, as we may see in all to pick places of Aristotle, so that it is not so straight as they take it, and Ramus would teach us here that to argue is accidental to an argument and disposition to: so that their mistaking makes him here to demur and stay upon it: Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple consideration of argumentum, for though things in nature are disposed together, yet they were severed at the first; and again we are to consider them to still, though they be together. Consideratae, he useth this word, because thought, invention, and judgement are joined together in nature, yet he would here tell us, that we are too sever them by our consideration, as thus, I can see heat without fire, cold without water, etc. So that singulae rationes are solae, et per se consideratae non in usu, for so they cannot be: but they are solae, et per se consideratae, in consideration, for so they be, he saith quails, because argumentum was defined, from his quality, or property of affection, and properties are qualities.  Argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale. 
This affection, or glue is artificiale, or inartificiale, as if he should say argumentum hath this affection ex sese, and it is in artificio rei, or it is not ex sese, but from some other thing: so that every argument is affected, but two ways, one as an artificial argument, the other as an inartificial: now the reason of this distribution is this:  
God hath made all things for man, and at the beginning for one man, and they are to conduce to one, but all things cannot come under one man's eye of reason: therefore that he may be better furnished herein, God hath provided these two; the one whereby he may see by himself, the other whereby he may see by another man's eye. Again, that which we are to see is either in artificio rei, or not in artificio rei: so that all things are seeable, but not to be seen with one man's eye, but by many. This word artificiale teacheth us these things: first there is no artificial argument, but you shall see it in fabricarei, therefore belongs to some Art, because Art delivers the frame of the thing, therefore there is no axiom that consisteth of artificial arguments, but it belongs to some Art. Now though we hear no arguments in Arts, but the causes, and properties, yet notwithstanding we have all arguments indeed; for there is no quality, but is proton in some general thing, as heat in fire, cold in water: now this gives us great light, yet effects must be there if they be proper: and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught, and dissentanies belong to art too; as nature is constans, or inconstans, argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale: so that there are no axioms affirmed, or denied, true, or false, but we shall find them in some Art, either as a first rule, or a deduct by consequence necessary: so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholar, to analyse all his example, and bring every thing to his Art, where he shall see it in causa: so that if one would make a common place book, let him make the Rules of Arts his heads, and let him take any example, and see whether argument is more special, and so carry the axiom to that Art, and to that rule of the art whither it belongs. As homo est iustus, homo belongs to nature, iustitia to moral Philosophy, ergo, this axiom belongs to the doctrine of justice: so that moral Philosophy borrows man from nature to deliver itself.  
The use of this is unspeakable, I cannot deliver it unto you, the use itself will better testify it; for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever, yea though it be a contingent axiom; as audentes fortuna iwat: audacia belongs to Ethics, fortuna to Logic; and in audacia we shall find this, for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately: and here we may see what a true predicament is, not the predicaments but the arts are the storehouses; for whatsoever is in artificio rei, we may see there, not only genus, species, etc. but all other argument, for they are too narrow and false too; for that distribution, substantia est creata, or increata, will not fail in any art, and the three first predicaments (as we heard before) are nothing but practices of method. Now if it be objected, we must not have those things before we see them: no, we must first see them, that we may lay them up in store. We have our eye first, and then things appointed for us to see.  Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit. 
Now here is that affection, that is in this kind of arguments, that glue that was before, is here quod ex se: so that this makes that more special, which before was more general: so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees: we heard before that we see the thing, as it is an argument; here we see it, as it is affectioned to argue ex se. Ex se, what is that? as if he should say, look into the artificium of the thing, there shall you see his artificial arguing, ex se, that is it argues natura, or it is causa natura of its arguing: so that these arguments concur for the being of the thing. So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se, that is, it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se: so than this artificial argument ariseth from nature, from a vis ingenita, that is, in artificio rei: so the efficient argues ex se, as if I should say, if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it, it would not be one. So that it is thus defined, quod ex sese arguit. Argumentum was the next genus, and he doth not express it, but understand it here, because we heard of it so lately before: then again he hath it here, but after another manner, because he could not deliver the form of it, without the genus: for arguit is not here taken for act, but for potentia: as we say animal vidit, though he doth not actually see, but have the faculty of it: so we say, Does he eat or drink? meaning, can he eat or drink. For if it were taken for the act of arguing, than it should not be no where but in judgement: so that quod arguit, is as much as argumentum, and ex se is the form: if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex seize, he had said the same that ex sese arguit: but it had not been so plain to a young Scholar, and he had also newly done with argumentum before: so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at, namely, an artificial argument, which can ex sese arguere. Now fallaces may be in every rule. In the first, as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason: for the second, if any go about to judge before he see the invention, it is a fallace, and a preposterous course. So argumentum is artificiale, or inartificiale; they break this rule that will give testimony of a thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen: so do the Papists in their implicit faith, when they believe as the Church believes, not knowing what the Church believeth. So scholars that take any thing that their authors deliver them, without any examination at all of the things they read. Kickerman saith, an inartificial argument may be received before an artificial. I do not deny it, but yet you must examine it afterward: Gods testimonies only are undeniable, because he cannot lie; but no man's.  Artificiale est primum aut ortum. 
We are farther to look at this glue, whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei, it is there firstly, or secondly: this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand, or at the second hand: now it is the same still, but is looked at, as it is originally, or as it is arising from the first: as to make up me, there goes a soul and a body, and of the forms of the four elements is the form of my body made, and of their matter the matter of my body made: now the elements are firstly there, as making my body, and secondly my body is in me, as a part in me: so a man is first consisting of body and soul, and then is animal: now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider, how he makes things first of causes, effects, &c, and then ranketh them under a general head. And if we go to the Creation, we shall see them evidently: first he made a first matter, than the first forms, and then mists that had their compliments, and did differ one from another, than they might be compared together, than they had names, and were ranked under general heads, as a part to a whole, etc. and then they might be defined, and their limits shown how fare they reach; for here our Author leads us to see every thing there, and to see how it is there, the reason of this distribution we shall see in every thing whatsoever: as in an inkhorn, there must be the matter of it, than itself, and it must have his adjuncts, etc. and then will it hold your ink; then when it is this, it is not a tree, or a stone, though it may be compared, and be equal, or unequal, like, or unlike: so that first we see what is in it firstly, than we may call it round, deep, made of horn, then range it under a head, then lay it out in it limits, and then give testimony of it.  Primum quod est suae originis. 
This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out, for it is a far fetched trope, and only one is suae originis, namely God: but he means this clamminess or glue that is suae originis, is first there, the ortum is not: as the son hath the nature of his father, but is another thing than his father: but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum, then artificiale est affectum ex sese; so primum is argumentum artificiale primitus: so that we must look at the argument, as it doth argue, not as it is suae originis, but quod originaliter arguit: he means that is there first, as we shall see by the nature of the thing: as homo iustus; hear iustitia is firstly in homine, as an adjunct, for he must first have that virtue before he can be denominated iustus; then secondly, it is in him as he is denominated from it: so a chest is made of wood; here is the cause and effect, and this is firstly; then from hence I may say a wooden chest, and this is secondly, arising from the first.  Quod est suae originis. 
As if he should have said, that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus: now than we may go wonderful deep, if we will go by these degrees, what may we not see? if we would make a brief: Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est: artificiale ex se, primum primitus. The fallacians are many, as they that think they are coniugates that are in name: as he hath virtue, ergo, he is studiosus: so homo dormit, quia somnit: here is nothing but causes, and effects, and so synonimies; for coniugata are nomina: so again when orta are taken for prima, or taught before, aut contra: so do the common Logicians in the predicables, when they teach genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens: First see the orta contain the prima, whence they arise symbolicè, as it were in a cognizance. Here we learn this, we must first look at the affection of an argument, than we must be ex se, then primitus: now ortum contains the same nature that primum doth; and some say the effect ariseth from the causes, and the subject and adjunct from the effect. But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa? it doth not: or doth the subject or adjunct argue with the affection of an effect? No.  Estque simplex aut comparatum. 
We have heard what the end of Logic is, and all shoots at this mark, to reason well, that is, that we may handle our reason well; now that we may do thus, we must have invention first, afterward judgement. Invention teacheth us to find out simples, judgement teacheth us how to lay them together: we may compare invention or arguments, to the hooks and nails in a thing; judgement to the fastening of them together. Now invention beholds arguments. Argumentum in Logic is a concrete, as the Schools call it, signifying the thing, together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing: as a Tailor is a Tailor quatenus, he hath that affection in him to make a garment: so that invention intends immediately the affection, and mediately the thing: for ens quatenus ens, is general to ars quatenus ars, but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum, so it belongs to Logic alone, and thus we go by degrees; for the Lord doth not let us see any thing immediately: now the very name invention tells us what we must do, namely, seek out: it tells us the Lord hath hid things secret in nature, and we must labour for the simples, and so find them: now we seek argumentum, which we heard to be of two sorts, artificiale, or inartificiale: artificiale is that which is in artificio rei; whereas the inartificiale doth but carry to us what other men have seen by the artificials; and because none can testify of a thing before he have seen it himself, ergo, artificiale is before inartificiale: and also because he that seethe inartificialiter, can but testify so fare forth as he sees the thing, which is not at all, ergo, they that give testimony of that thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen, are sophisters, and break this rule: and this is a sophism of the Papists in their implicit faith, which do believe as the Church believeth, neither knowing the artificial arguments of the thing, nor the thing itself that they believe. Now the artificial arguments are in the artificio of the thing, ergo, we must of necessity know all the artificial arguments in things, if we will know the things themselves wholly. And hereby the way artificiale tells me, that every thing must be in some predicament, that is, in some art, quod ex sese arguit: this affection is in the thing, and it is ex se, drawn out of the thing as it were: so that this hook whereby it lays hold on another thing, is natural to it, for so he means. Artificiale est primo, or secundo in artificio rei, as if the thing had a second kind of making, nature, or being: so a thing is made of matter and form, primitus: but when we consider how first singular parts are made of that matter, then organically are made of the singulars, and the whole made of the organical: here is the second invention, and here the matter is considered immediately in the parts, mediately in the whole. This is something subtle, but yet evident and plain: as first, imagine that thing justice in a man; here is subiectum, and adiunctum: and this is the first invention: then from that quality in him, I can denominate him a just man, and this is the second invention: so I look at a thing whose matter is made of wood, and can coniugate a name to it wooden: as a wooden chest, etc. so when I say a man is made ab humo, here is the material cause, and effect: but at the second hand, when I consider how man is made ab humo, and from thence denominate him homo, there it is that second Logic. So that the first invention only looks at the thing, without consideration of the names; the second invention looks both at the thing, and at the names. So when I denominate homo from that thing justice in him, to be iustus, I mean not the name, nor the thing, but the name and the thing together: for orta à primis perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur, ergo, there must be both the nature of the first arguments in them, and that affectio also. So in a distribution, if we shall speak of distributio ex effectis, as in navi, alij malos scandunt, alij per fores cursitant▪ etc. here malos scandere, per fores cursitare, sentinam exhaurire, are causes and effects firstly; but as these nautae are distributed by their effects, here is the orta categoria, the arising, arguing. So in a distribution ex causis of integrum into membra, the first invention is matter, and form, the second invention is then two together in the members making up the integrum. So in a distribution of the genus into the species; as in animali, there is essentia corporea plena vitae, & sensus, which are the causes of homo, and brutum: then there is a symbolum of them when we jumble them together: so in a distribution ex adiunctis, homo is aeger, homo is sanus, here is both subiectum, and adiunctum: but when I make a distribution, and say, homo est aeger, aut sanus, this is the second Logic: and this is nothing but the consideration of the community of a cause, an effect, a subject, an adjunct, for that causeth these distributions: so in a definition there is firstly genus, which ariseth from matter and form; then the second invention of them is the heaping of them together: so as they make but one argument, namely, definitio: so in a distribution, though there may be more arguments, yet are they also heaped together to make one argument, namely, descriptio, quod est suae originis: this is true in respect of ortum, which made Ramus so define it: but I had rather respect the definition of argumentum, quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est, and so say artificiale ex se, primum primitus: and so we shall deliver it as it acteth, which is best.  
Primum est simplex, seu absolutum, aut comparatum: I rather say absolutum, because absolutum and simplex are more opposed, and so, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are opposed, now these simple arguments do look at those that are in artificio rei, as they are in their own nature; for that is his meaning: as when I say the wall is white, here I look at the wall as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: and in like sort at whiteness as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: so that the absolute argument looks evermore at the things as they are absolute in themselves: as when I say a chest is made of wood, I look at both of them, as they are simple in their own nature: now the comparate doth not consider the thing absolutely, but with another. So in a chest if I consider the quantity of it, here the chest and its quantity are simple arguments: but when I say it is greater than a less Chest, or contra, than they are comparates: so that the comparison lieth as it is respected with some other thing: so that the comparative quantity, or quality is another thing the absolute greatness or littleness, likeness, or unlikeness, for that which is absolute greatness may be comparative littleness, aut contra.  Absolutum est consentaneum, aut dissentaneum. 
Object. But how are disagreers in artifition rei.  
Answ. True it is, that the one part of disagreers is not, but the other is: so that the absolute consideration hath respect either to the thing wherewith it agreeth, aut contra, as ratio in respect of itself, so it is argumentum simplex, seu absolutum, in respect of homo it is consentaneum, and goes to his constitution, consider it with irrationale, and there it tells me, it will not be that: so that which makes fire not to be water is in the artificio of fire: so that which causeth dissension is in the artificio of that thing that is dissentaneum: so that the same thing is consentaneum, and dissentaneum; consentaneum if we look at the thing wherein it is, dissentaneum if we look at another thing, that it is not: so in black, and white, there is that in black which makes it to be black; and there is moreover that in black which makes it not to be white: so that the same thing in diverse respects is consentanie, and dissentanie: so that white or black considered with the wall may be consentanie, consider it with that which dissents from it, so it is dissentaneum, and all these must we see if we will see any thing throughly: First we must see the affectio in artificio rei, then primitus, then absolutè, then consentanie; than absolutè, quod consentit cum re, therefore this is clearly in artificio rei, and so is dissentaneum too; that consentit, hence we see consideration to be general between things, and they are made so, for else they would never make up one whole, as all creatures make up the world, for it is concordia discors, and discordia concors, that makes all things. Now as there is consention in all things, so also there is dissension, for else all things should be one: thus the Lord made all things to show forth his wisdom, and mighty power, that all things should consent together, and yet be many.  Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam. 
For some things agree absolutely, others but after a sort, absolutum is absolutely required for the being of the thing, the other is but complemental: so that here he tells us if we would see any thing, first look what is in artificio rei, then look what is primitus there, than what is absolute, than what is consentanie, than what is simply required to the being of the thing. Absolute, that is, so agreeing to the thing, that if the one be not there, the other will not be there, et contra, as if any one cause be wanting, there will be no effect, if there be a concurring of all the causes, than an effect, if no cause no effect, et contra, if an effect then all the causes, if no effect no concurrence of causes: so that this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being: now absolute, and modo quodam are definitions of themselves, for he wanted words, and therefore delivered the definitum, by the definitio: so that to ask a definition of absolute, or modo quodam, is as if one should ask a definition of animal ratione.  Absolute ut causa et effectum. 
The causes give esse to the effect, therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere, ergo, they are absolutely required. In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses, of all the causes, therefore these are absolute consentanea: Hence we learn that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect. And again, if any effect, than there must be all the causes; so than we see how the ones being depends necessarily upon the other, ut causa et effectum, therefore the cause must first be looked at, as if I would look at ens, or any thing whatsoever, therefore our author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures. Can any man see any thing throughly, and not see the causes first? he cannot: and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes? there is not: therefore that is always first in nature, and therefore first also in reason. Now here are fallacians, as to think an effect may be from some causes, and to think the causes may be removed from the effect, which is a common fallace.  
Aristotle's organon, Tully's offices, etc. here is Aristotle's and Tully's causality still, though they be dead. Now we see how orderly we go to work, if we had not done so, we could not have come to causa, all the arguing of them before, as of artificiale, primum, absolutum, consentaneum, simplex, are here in causa and effectum. So that there are many clasps as it were, as the cause is in artificio of the effect, it is also there primitus, and absolutè, and consentanie, and simpliciter: so that this descent doth very much clear truth, we have our flesh, blood, bones from causa, then afterward we have our compliments from modo quodam consentanea, than we may see we are not this, or that. See an imperfect garment at the Tailors, and you may ask what it is, but let the Tailor make it up complete with all its cuts, and jags, than you may see it yourself, and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it.   

De efficient, procreante, et conseruante. CHAP. 3.  Causa est cuius vi res est. 
REmember the purpose of Logic is to direct man to see the wisdom of God, which that reason may do well it acts doubly, first by taking at simples, then by laying them together: that which we take with the first eye is argumentum, that is any thing so fare as it hath the affection to argue, first as it is in artificio rei, which therefore is in an Art, now it is firstly there or secondly: first it is there absolutely by way of consention, respecting the thing wherein it is, or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not, those that consent are absolutely consenting, or modo quodam, absolute as the causes, and effect, that proceeds from the causes; here we must begin, because the first thing that cometh to man's reason is the cause: so if we take the world, or any part thereof, let us resolve it, and in the end we shall come to the first causes, a first efficient, etc. So God is the first cause of all things, and himself without all causes, ergo, the cause is first of all things, than the first matter is first in his kind, the first form in his kind, and the first end in his kind.  
So Aristotle saith, God is primum intelligibile: so than if we will see the wisdom of God in the creatures, we shall see the cause, the beginner: then again Aristotle doth confess, that causa is primum motus. Again what is the initium of every thing, but his being, and that is from the causes, therefore they are first; again, the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto, as if we work any thing, now if we take causes, and look into them, than we make them effects not causes, as if I look at the causes of a garment I find the tailor to be the cause, but if I look at his causes, I make him an effect, yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect, etc.  
The Greeks' call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto, because it is that which is first granted or required, as the Geometricians require a petitum, or as our author should say there can be no demonstration of the first cause. Est argumentum absolutè consentaneum, etc. causa est: if a cause be absolutely required for the effect, than there is a cause: then again Logic serves us to behold the wisdom of God, and himself also through the creature: now all things but God are made, and are composed, ergo, they must have causes, est absolutè consentaneum, because they are essential to the effect. No shipwright no ship, no wood no ship, no form no effect, no end, no effect; and all these together an effect, et contra.  Cuius vi res est. 
First here he tells us of a vis, than he says it is vis essendi, then vis essendi rei: so that as there are four words, so four things, causa is here a concrete signifying the thing causing, as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing, for our Logic that brings us to the first cause, doth but show him as he argueth, not as he is in his being, causa is the thing arguing, cuius, that is, est res causans, cuius vi, this vis and virtue is of the thing, but Logic looks at it as it is in the thing, and then at the thing: for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect, it could not be a cause, as wood will not make a gown: so that it is here secondly required that the thing causans have vim causandi: and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa, as he that will lay to the charge of a child that which a man only can do: so when we ascribe to nature that it cannot do, as the making of a world, which is peculiar to God, est.  Est. 
Esse is a general term, and may signify the essence of a thing, or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence, as first when I say vir est, secondly, vir est doctus, where I do not respect homo from his causes, but as he hath this adjunct doctrina, and the reason why est is so general, is because this esse is from the causes, which are most general, for nothing can be said to be this, or that, before it be, which is from the causes: by this vis we must understand, that power, and faculty in the thing, that causeth another thing, as if he should say, the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly, for vis is here the sme that affectio is in argumentum. Esse indeed is general to all the causes, and existere is from them all, which appears by this, we say mundus est à Deo, est ex nihilo, est formata, etc. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause, to make the effect: so we shall see in a knife, there are all the four causes, to be in it, and the three former for the end, and therefore if we will not be deceived, here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause, res not effectum: for we have heard what res est, that is the subject of Art, but if we had said effectum it had been à posteriore, for we have not the effect wrought: Again we are but yet in causa in general: by res he means res efficienda, not yet effecta. Now another fallacy is of non causa pro causa, when we take that to be the cause, which hath the potentia efficiendi, but doth not efficere, but is causa, quatenus it hath an hand in that effect: so that if one bring a cause, that is not a cause, though it have vim efficiendi, yet is it not causa.  Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientia. 
This is a deduction out of the first rule, following this, if the thing be causae vi, than this is primus locus inventionis, for it is first in the cause, before it be in the effect: then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at. Locus. here Ramus tells us closely, that the Aristotelians to pick places are these arguments, the first whereof is causa.  Fons. 
We know the fountain is the first place where waters spring, so all things spring from the causes, yea subjects adjuncts, etc.  Fons scientiae. 
For if we know the causes, than we know the effects because they arise from them, and subjects, etc. and again that is the principal part of knowledge.  Scirique demum creditur, etc. 
For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing, and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing, but knowing the causes of a thing, we know it as it is, the things being arising from the causes, and thus knowing the thing, we know it intus, and in cute. Here Ramus doth commorari telling us what Aristotle meant by these words: And again too tells us that Aristotle's demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiom consisting of causa, and effectum, and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient, matter, form, and end.  
Now Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition, because that lays forth the essence of a thing, but it doth not tell us all the esse, ergo, not all the scientia, for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a definition.   merito dicatur a Poeta, etc. 
Here he prefers the Poet's authority before Aristotle, for Aristotle being more employed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man, but the Poet as a public man, foelix meaning a contemplative happiness, not a practice.  Causa est efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis. 
Every cause yields an esse, but all together make the effect, now it is of two sorts, efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis, for he cannot give it to us in two words, but makes a distinct axiom, and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative, by reason whereof they have a community, but where lies it, this it is I may call the two first potential causes, the other two acting causes: this the Schools tells us, when they call materia potentia, and the form actus, and this is Ramus meaning, as we shall see in many examples, as when a Tailor sets buttons on a doublet with thread, they are not done till all the causes are there: so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient, and matter, but when it hath also a form, and end. Now our author would not use potentia, and actus; first because they are barbarous words, secondly they are improper, because they cannot be called potentia, and actus, but potentiating, and acting: then again the form, and end are potentia, as well as efficiens and materia, & contra: therefore he makes two couple of causes, for so we see the efficient is the first mover, moving quite through with the matter singly, and the form and end move them inseparably together, therefore they are thus distinguished, efficiens est motus à quo in a line, the matter ex qua, and form per quem, finis ad quem: but because there is a scope at matter, therefore there is a distinction. For as the efficient, and end terminate the thing, so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same. So God made a matter, and gave it a form, and so an end, ergo reason must see them thus. The same order there is also in God's providence: so man also doth imitate God, when he doth any thing orderly; the first care is for a workman, than a matter, than a form, and then an end: though we may have cloth before a tailor, yet it is not a matter till it begin with the Tailor to bring an effect to pass. So then the efficient is in nature before the matter, and the matter before the form, for the form is an adjunct to the matter, and the form before the end, the end being an adjunct to the form; and again a thing must be form before it can have an end. The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him, the second forms are adjuncts to the matter. Now the first efficient is absolutely first, for it hath nothing before it: the first matter is not res prima, nor causa prima, but first for matter, ergo it is from the first efficient only, ergo never hath any existency in the world, but is ens incompletum: so the first form is from the first efficient, not of the first matter, but only in it, ergo it is ens also incompletum: hence our souls are not our forms, for then our forms should be res incompletae. Now the end is last, and the first end is the last end; it is first because it is most general, last because it is not made for another end, ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made: so that the end as it is last, as the thing is acted: so it is first as it is most general, for all the the former causes work to effect the end. As we say in Schools, finis est primus in intention, posterius in executione: so God made all things for his glory; here his glory is first in intention of him that works by counsel, but is acted last of all by all things that he made. And here Aristotle's bonum quo communius eo melius, is true of the last end of all things, which is God: for he is as we may say, finis communissimus, ergo, optimus.  Efficiens est causa à qua res est. 
We have heard of causa, and of his kinds, and that they are disjoined, by which means there is made two couple of causes, the two first working jointly, even is the other do. Efficiens, & materia, here is a second distribution, and here the efficient is first; for it is first cuius vi res est: again, by the rule of method it is first in nature, because it giveth light to that which followeth; and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing; he lays hold on the matter, which in respect of the efficient is moved, and by a natural appetite moves, and runs to make an effect of itself; and doth effect the effect, as well as the efficient, and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect: but the mover or efficient is before the thing moved, and before the effect also.  Efficiens. 
Efficiens, quasi exfaciens, moving quite through: for besides his first moving, as being the first cause, he moveth also together with the matter, form, and end; and his working with the rest is the cause of his name.  Est. 
Every cause is required to the effect, efficiens est causa, ergo: again, first there must needs be a mover to move the matter, before there can be a table wrought: this appears plainly by the creation of the world: and because every thing is an effect, therefore the efficient is the first cause: for take any thing, and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same: so look into the world, and every part thereof, and you shall see God's finger in every thing, without which they could not be: so that efficiens est causa, and because an effect cannot be without its esse, ergo it is of the esse of it, à qua, from whom it is: as if he should say, it is terminus à quo, etc. so as the world began with God: so in every thing in nature, the beginning of motion is first from the next cause: so that efficiens est causa à qua, telling us that this is the first being the effect hath.  Res. 
Here res is general as before to all the arts, and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is. Again, if he had said à qua est, we should have had reference to res: again, if he had named effectum, it had been à posteriore, not having learned what effectum est. Res est, this is general to every cause, ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general: but that he may not be so obscure, he borroweth some thing that went before, for else the perfect definition had been efficiens est à qua. Now this teacheth us to look first at the efficient in every thing: for Logic tells us not only of an esse in general, but of four several esses from which existere doth arise; as efficiens est causa à qua, materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cuius gratia: why doth he not say, causa est cuius vires sit? because something may be a cause, and yet is not; but if it do causare then it is a cause. So if I say I will do a thing, and yet do it not, yet am I an efficient; for est doth here commend to us the adsignification of time, but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move, so soon it is an efficient, though the effect be not till the matter, form, and end be there.  Cuius et si vera genera, etc. 
Here Ramus doth commorari, telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make, are not species, but modi efficientis, because more of them may be in one and the same efficient: as one man may be causa procreans and conseruans, sola, and cum aliis, per se, & per accidens, because they may be in the same efficient. Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing, but are diverse modi of the same thing. Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens, neither are there any of the other three; for the matter that is lowest, ergo it hath nothing under it, but examples: and so is the efficient, ergo he needed not say, Cuius etsi vera genera, etc. for how could that appear to him, that is not? we know the effect is single, ergo as the single matter, form, and end, make that, so the thing efficient makes it, neither hath it any species.  Vbertas tamen per magna, etc. 
There is great and plentiful use of the efficient, and as it is first of all, so is it most general of all, for matter cannot be a matter, till the efficient move it, and so of all other arguments: now these make cause the efficient to be commended, or discommended, and according to these modi is the effect more or less argued: as if a child kill his father, it is parricide: so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone, he is more to be commended, then if he had done it, cum aliis, aut contra. Again, if a thing be done well natura, is better than if it had been done necessitate; and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel then fortuna: now because these modi do urge and press the effect more or less, ergo there is reason in them, and therefore they belong to Logic: modi, that is, adjuncts not making these effects species, but only distinguished by accidents: that fallacian, non causa pro causa, is general to causa: and it is also particular to efficiens, making that causa efficiens which is not: as the Heretics in Divinity were deceived, which said that the Angels did make the world.  Primo quod procreate, aut tueatur. 
These are first because they are more general than the rest, and also they are more in use: for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi: so we respect God as causa procreans, and tueans, before we respect him alone: then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse, and the preserving cause is the keeper of the thing in his esse. Now in reason he that is the procreating cause, should also be the preserving cause: as God is not only causa procreans of the world, but also causa conseruans, and so should parents; as they procreant children, so should they in like sort preserve them. The procreant cause is first, because things must needs have a being, before they can be preserved: now they are distinguished, because when a thing is procreated it is not preserved, aut contra: and the modi are joined with the cause, not with the effect, because they are first in the efficient, as essential, for actio is before passio: so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi. As we are saved by faith alone; here is efficiens sola. Our Author brings in an example of Ovid's, the 4 remedii: and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples, and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity. But first Logic being a general Art, it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers, as out of Poets, and Historians, which the Gentiles and Turks may receive, these being more generally known to the world, then are the Scriptures: and again, Divinity is the most special Art of all. And so Ramus findeth fault (but justly) with Aristotle, for fetching his examples out of Geometry, which is too obscure: for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing, if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to ourselves. As they say in Geometry, A is not B, etc. for so they say in Geometry, angulus A, and angulus B, etc. Now Logic is a general Art, ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry, etc. which belongs to Rhetoric a general art, the example is this; first proper, otia are proper and conserving causes of love; then tropical, causa est procreans, cibus the cherisher.  Otia si tollas, etc. 
Thus he reasons, otia are the causes of love; for take them away, and love is gone: hence it appears they were of the essence of love: so that because causa is of the essence of the effect, ergo idleness, and you must put love, aut contra: for the essence will be wanting, and we have a rule sublata causa, tollitur effectum, and it is general to all causes, for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect: all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here, as posita causa ponitur effectum, yet not one cause but all the causes must concur: many other rules they have, all which are enwrapped in the definition of causa: now it holds contingently in every cause; for if we put one cause, we put all the causes, and so it holds in the special causes, that posita causa ponitur effectum, & contra: as take away otium from Aegisthus, and you take away love: so that sublata causa à tertio tollitur effectum: so in judgement it is also true; as give otium to Aegisthus, and you may give him love, which argues from the efficient.  Sic pater & matter procreant, nutrix tuetur. 
Before he shown us an example out of an Author, he wills us to look for the use of them out of Authors. The matter of the first belongs to Ethics, the matter of the second to History. Logic is a general Art, ergo his examples are best out of Poetry, and Oratory, wherein the use of all arts is. Now the aliquid before is love, which we should have heard of, against which Ovid makes a medicine. In this example Dido is the aliquid, for here the aliquid is the causa. Dardanus had two sons, Assaracus and Anchises, and of him came Aeneas: now here she takes away the true causes, and says Caucasus begot thee: so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans, and Hyrcaenetigres are preserving causes: but this is false, for here is non causa pro causa. Objection. But doth he well to bring fallaces? Answer. Yes out of Poets, for here non ens, or ens fictum, hath the nature of ens in it: neither are all fables lies, but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths: now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners, because he forsook her.  Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis, etc. 
He makes examples of his own, and there is genesis, teaching us that though genesis be before analysis, yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis. Again, our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes, and whereunto any other example may be brought: as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident, in the second he makes a substantial effect to be from substantial causes naturally, but feignedly: in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordinarily in artificial things: and here we may see who first shot the arrow, before we can see where it lights, or through what it flew, or whence.   

CAPUT 4. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit, aut cum aliis.  
WE are still in the efficient: the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing, is the efficient, and the modi of it: the most general modi was procreans and conseruans before. now we come to the second modi, sola, aut cum aliis, which are more general than per se, and per accidens in use, but not so general as the first. Secundo sola, etc. this is next, ergo next after the first: sola, that is where this modus efficiendi is considered, and the force and virtue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola: for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing: see which modus is brought with it, as in the example before; the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans, and with the modus of conseruans: as would you take away love, take away idleness, for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love. Now as God is the procreant and conserving cause of all things, so he is causa sola first, ergo that is before causa cum aliis: afterward he is causa cum aliis, working together with the creatures, and we finding this in the first efficient, we may also find it in the first, in the second, and in every one; because all things are simulacra of the first. Now these belong to Logic, for there is reason in them, and any thing deserveth more or less praise, or dispraise, as he doth good or evil sola, aut cum aliis.  Earumque omnium, saepe alia principalis, alia adiwans, & ministra. 
That is, earum omnium, quae cum alijs efficiunt, saepe alia principalis, alia adiwans, & ministra, for so saepe here is part of the axiom, and thus often it falls out, that one among the rest in doing of things is principal, and (as we say) ringleader to the rest, though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows. So that as the Lord did at the first, work all things alone, and then with others: so likewise do the creatures in nature, and here again as the Lord is principal when he worketh with others, so also when creatures work together, one for the most part is principal.  Alia adiwans, & ministra. 
That is, as it were a minister, and an instrument. Here we are to understand there is the principal cause, which is helped, and doth not help: causa adiwans is principally of living things, ministra is commonly of instruments, which have not life, though both of them may be of either. Virgil. 9 of his Aeneidos. Nisus avocat ab Euriolo, etc. Me me adsum qui feci, etc. Nisus alone did the deed, mea fraus omnis, there lies the argument, therefore he was sola causa, ergo, in me convertite ferrum, o Rutuli. Euriolus was taken, Nisus escaped, and he reasons not from the doing, of it, for so both might have deserved punishment, but from the manner of doing it, mea fraus omnis; and for Euriolus, thus he saith, nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit. The syllogism is this.  
He that hath done this murder, is to be punished.  
But I alone have done it.  
Ergo, I alone am to be punished.  
The Assumption is thus proved by denying audacia to Euriolus, whereby he might have done it, and potentia whereby he might have accomplished it. Slaughter is to punishment a subject.  Solitaria causa cum plerisque, & principalibus & sociis pro Marcello  adhibetur. 
In the former example we see sola causa delivered in a strange phrase, this is causa cum alijs, and here dux is causa principalis, militum virtus, locorum oportunitas, etc. are the helping causes: and fortune is another principal cause, quae maximam partem sibi vindicat, he reasons thus, thou art a valiant fellow Caesar, but thou hast helping causes, of which fortune is the chief. At verò huius gloriae Caesar, etc. here Caesar hath no companion: so that Caesar in pardoning Marcellus is sola causa. Nihil centurio, nihil praefectus, etc. here he removes the species of efficiens that should be cum alijs, and he removes also fortune, which is a chief help in war; this example belongs to Polemica.  Instrumenta etiam in causis adiwantibus connumerantur. 
That is whether they be cattle that have life, which are instruments for husbandry, or whether they be things without life, they are counted among helping causes: so a man writing with his pen, is principal, and his pen instrumental: but here we are to know, that we must always analyse, as our author lays that down, which is to be analysed, as when I say he did this alone, though he had an instrument: here he is causa sola in respect he had not another man to help him, he is causa cum alijs as he hath an instrument.  Quo argumento impius Epicurus, etc. 
The Epicure reasons thus, if God had no instruments to help him in making the world, than he made it not, but he had no instruments, etc. therefore this we know to be false, by a rule of Divinity, for to make the world was an infinite work, ergo nothing being finite could help him Now many times there are fallaces from all these, as when causa non procreans is put for causa procreans, non conseruans pro conseruans, non sola pro sola, non cum alijs pro cum alijs: all which we are to determine by this rule.   

CHAP. 5. Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit, aut per accidens.  
THe modi are of most special use, and indeed Ramus was long in determining about the doctrine of them, but this was his last determination. Now the former are more general than these, because these are more special in use; and again the other belong to these, these may be where the other are, but the other include these: these modi per se and per accidens are more particular than the other, for their reach. Now natura belongs to natural Philosophy, as it were, consilium to moral as it were. Tertio causa efficiens, etc. these we have heard before, efficit per se sua facultate, that is, not only having it own nature in itself, whereby it worketh, but the beginning of its motion from itself, causa per accidens hath it from another.  Sua facultate. 
By facultas here we are to understand the same that vis was generally in the definition of causa, but he means here, that which hath his principium of motus of itself: if one do a thing per accidens, he doth it vi, but not sua: so sua facultate, that is, whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in itself, ut quae natura vel consilio faciunt: these two names should seem to belong to natural and moral Philosophy, but we are to understand by Nature that thing whose nature is to work such an effect: yea any thing be it natural, or artificial, which hath that principium of motus in itself to work any thing.   quae natura vel consilio faciunt. 
Counsel is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly, and wittingly, as God, Angels, and men only work by counsel: causa natura is as a knife cutteth sua natura, so all things are subject to nature: and when I find that a thing worketh propria vi, and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it taught, not from it nature, that is causa natura, as when another man crowds me, and so I crowd another, and fling him down, I do it with my nature, not from it. So in a clock the lead goes down by a rule in nature, because it is heavy, and that pulls the rope, and the rope pulls the wheels, etc. all these move with their natures, though not from them.  Ventorum naturalis efficientia est. 
In this example; 
una Eurusque, Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis  
Affricus: & vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus.   
Here these three Eurus, Notus, and Affricus are natural causes of tempests on the Seas, they are also causae cum alijs, and each of them is as principal as the other.  Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio. 
Suscepto bello Caesar, gesto etiam magna ex parte, etc. those things that fall under Logic, them doth he define, as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit, but if he should define what nature, and counsel are, he should run into natural, and moral Philosophy, for counsel belongs to Policy, yet for the modus of it in working an effect, it belongs to Logic, for a man may take counsel of himself, without counsellors, as Kings have. Suscepto bello Caesar, etc. iudicio meo, ac voluntate: in these words lies the modus, which he proves à disparatis nulla vi coactus, etc. Fallaces here are very common, as when we take that for causa per se, which is causa per accidens, & contra: Now the reason why he gives these modi to the efficient, and not to the effect is, because they are modi movendi, and do not belong to the thing moved.  Per accidens efficit causa, quae externa facultate efficit: ut in his quae fiunt necessitate, vel fortuna. 
Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect, but non sua facultate, but is moved by some other thing, and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate, but not sua facultate if we respect the effect, as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moisture, and so leaves the cloth dry, which drought is in the cloth.   in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna. 
Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum. Here we see a necessity in invention, which is all one with coaction.  
By fortuna we are to understand the special providence of God, or ignorance of the next cause, for ignorance of the providence of God in all things, and of the next cause, hath caused that men say what fortune had I, when they are crossed in play, or such like.  
Now necessity answereth to nature, cum efficiens cogitur: so that this necessity here is a coaction, and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur, cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing: now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se, and in another respect causa per accidens, for they are but modi, vi externa ad effectum, so that it doth it not natura, or consilio. Objection. Why saith he effectum rather then res? Answer. All comes to one, for he means res, neither doth he define effectum here. Here he means violence, not that vis in causa; this vis doth not work the effect, but works upon the cause, and is that facultas whereof he spoke before.  Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio. 
At mihi quidem (ait Orator) si proprium & verum nomen, etc. Before he said he was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar, he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate, and hither belongs fatum Schools.  Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter, etc. 
Our author before did tell us of fortuna in the ablative case, here he puts it in the nominative, because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens: the arguing we ascribe it to fortune, and say fortune did it: so that our author would have us consider, first that it was fortune did it, secondly, that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it.  Per accidens. 
That is working externa facultate, now whereas he saith he doth it per accidens, he means fortune as it is commonly taken, when we make her blind not seeing what she doth, for hence it doth arise, when we do not a thing by counsel, but hab nab as they say, that causeth us to make fortune blind.  Quando aliquid accidit. 
That is, happeneth, for here it is principal, the improvidence as it were, he neither sees himself a cause, neither doth he see who is the cause, and therefore he saith accidit, not efficit, for he saith I did it not; so again ask him who did it, and he will say, know not: so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus.  Praeter scopum efficientis. 
Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel, which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels, now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum, it is fortuna we say. Now things in nature may have a scope, which is beyond their nature, and then it is fortuna: so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said, praeter scopum fortunae, if it be causa fortuna: or praeter scopum naturae, if it be causa natura.  
Sic Pheraeo jasoni profuit hostis, etc. here his enemy going about to kill him, healed him.  In hoc genere causarum imprudentia connumerari solet. 
Imprudentia is one modus of fortune, as here.  
Cur aliquid vidi, cur noxia lumina feci?  
Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est, etc.  
I unawares have seen that, which hath done me harm. Then Ovid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not. So Actaeon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing herself: and here Ovid reasons a simile, as Actaeon was torn in pieces of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares, so am I banished for seeing that I would.  
Scilicet insuperis etiam fortuna luenda est, etc.  
He means Augustus.  
So if a man go forth, and a tile fall from an house, and break his head, this is causa fortuna, it is natura as it broke his head being harder than his head, and fortuna as it hit him, and consilio it breaks his head if it be fling, for it hath a scope: true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment, yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh.  Hinc sumitur deprecatio, etc. 
For our author said before accidit, therefore we are causes, ergo, it ought to be pardoned, deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna: so they will say he is a proper man, but hath no luck.  Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit, etc. 
Here Ramus doth commorari in the name, lest he should be mistaken, it is an  word, it is ignorance not only as it is opposed to counsel, but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by fortune. Many other modi there are among other Logicians, all which may be brought hither, as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate, or efficiens in genere, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se, if he shall say, anger did it, than there is a trope in it, as when I say, he writes, I mean his pen writes: if I say he writes with his pen, than I make him causa cum alijs: if I say he writes, he is efficiens. Now for the order of causes, one efficient may be cause of another efficient, etc. and so causa causae be causa causati, but this will fail, as when I look at a child, and commend him from his granfather, not respecting the mean causes, there is not causa causae, but causa causati. So when I say he came of Scipio, etc. Hactenus de efficient, and this we must always look at first in artificio rei: moreover observe here in every thing the manner of working: for so God is said to do some thing necessitate, as when we say he doth that he would not, though he would it in an other sense, and fortuna, as man's fall was praeter scopum Legis.   

CHAP. 6. De materia.  Materia est causa ex qua res est. 
WE have heard of the efficient cause, and his manner of moving in that work of his: now these are essential to Logic, because in the very manner, there lieth the force of the argument, and whatsoever hath reason belongeth to Logic, many distinctions there are among the Logicians, all which may be brought to these, that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally; the Physicians call it causa evidens, and meat, and drink, is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally; the Physicians call it causa continens: but here is no distinction of cause, neither have these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect, but only quatenus efficiens, whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly: as Didst thou kill thy father? or didst thou it alone? etc. so also in causa per se, and per accidens, there is great difference in arguing a conclusion; if he did it natura, there is no rebuking of that, for it was from his nature: if he sinned by counsel, the punishment is so much the greater: if he did it well consilio, he deserves the more praise. Fortuna indeed is such a cause, as it is not a cause by Ramus definition, for fortune is but God's providence unknown: now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis.  
Now we come to materia, that (as we have heard) had a community with the efficient, which community was to move with it a great while before the form and end come: so soon as the efficient moves, presently the matter moves, but the form and end move not a good while after. Now because this difference (which causeth the distribution of causa) appears in greater things, ergo it is also in less things; but our Logic tells us, that the efficient must go before the matter, and how agreeable doth our Logic go to God's work in the creatures? if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes, and make them effects, and look at their causes, (for so when we look at their causes, we make them effects: so that absurd is that definition of causa, to be either going before, or concomitans to the effect) at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him, ergo he was not made, ergo he ever was, ergo all other things once were not, for they were made, ergo they now being were from the first, ergo the first matter was not eternal, as Aristotle dreamt; but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could; yet one may confute him by his own rules, for he grants there is a primus motor, ergo he is movens, but not moved, for than he should have some thing to move him, and so not be first, ergo it is easy to make Aristotle believe he is immoveable, because he is first, ergo he must move others only, for he is infinite, ergo, without limits of place, ergo in every place, ergo nusquam inclusus, or exclusus, ergo unmoveable.  
Now the first matter is first in his kind, namely, the first matter, but not the first thing: and we may conclude from this, that the first efficient was before the first matter: for if both were first, neither were first: for if the one should say he were first, the other would say nay, I am as forward as thee, and so there would be none absolutely first: and again, one is before two, ergo he that is absolutely first, can be but one.  Materia. 
For his name, as efficiens was extrafaciens, moving all the rest, and not moved of them, but as it were pater; so materia is quasi matter, out of which the thing springs, as out of a mother: so that we may see the name to be given à simili, but yet with very good reason; as the child is not à patre, but of the mother; so the effect is from the efficient, but springs out of the matter. Now that there is such a matter, thus it may appear; there is nothing composed, but its essence, and itself are distinct: for to make essentia and ens to be the same, is peculiar to God. Again, whatsoever is finite, that may be limited in his essence; now God only is infinite, and every other thing finite, ergo may be defined, ergo itself and its essence are distinct, ergo it must have a matter. Again, if every thing have not essence, as they speak of Angels, why are not they finite? ergo they may be defined, ergo their essence and themselves are distinct: again, if they have not a matter, what have they? nothing but an efficient, and an end? then they should be imperfect, and be either the first matter, or the first form: again, if they have a form, and no matter, than this form must be another thing from them, and how is that possible? for if the form and they be all one, than the cause and effect will be the same. But Logic is a general Art, and because every thing hath a matter, ergo materia belongs hither, and the first matter had not a matter, for than it should not have been first, but was incomplete.  Materia est. 
For it gives esse, and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing, so the matter much more, for not only its esse, but its nature and self couches in the effect, and makes a bulk: and if the vis of the efficient were essential, because there could be no essefication of the effect without it, much more must the matter be essential; for if we take away the matter, we take away both the force and the thing itself. Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logic: and as argumentum was concretum, and also causa, so when I say materia, I mean a thing that was made of a matter.  Ex qua. 
That is, out of which it is raised, it is the mother of every thing, as we often speak of the earth: because every thing indeed is made of the four elements, but more especially nourished of the earth. Now the matter doth not only by his virtue cause the effect, but is interessed in it, and the effect riseth out of it, as if it were a child springing out of the mother, only it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect: now though the essence be from matter and form, yet the ens itself is from all the causes.  Res est. 
That effect as we shall hear hereafter; for in this doctrine of causa, effectum is the aliquid, which we must call res, till we come to it.  Est. 
Every cause gives an esse to the effect, and this esse is the bulk of it, and from whence ariseth the greatness or littleness of the effect by the form; now it is a great question in Schools whether the matter doth any thing? indeed in respect of the efficient it is patience, but in respect of the effect it doth causare, and so doth agere. For if it be an effect in respect of every cause, than every cause is after a sort the efficient of that effect: and if you ask me what his action is, I answer it doth materiare, or substantiare the effect, as the efficient did efficere the effect: it is also passive in regard of the form, but both together co-worke to make the effect; though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter. Now this is the next thing to be inquired, after we see who made it, then whereof it was made: both which we see in every thing, & see them as they are done.  
Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia: As Kickerman saith, it is proxima, or remota: but he may say so of every argument, as well as of materia: he saith man is made of the first matter, then of the elements, which are more remote, but ex semine, that is nearer: alas we do not here consider priority, or posteriority, neither do these any more press the effect; here is no Logic still, but materia est causa ex qua, ergo this will not fall in Logic: and if you mark it, presently when he comes to materia prima, and to the elements, he is in natural Philosophy, ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logic, but of the particular thing, that belongs to a particular Art.  Hoc argumento ficto apud Ouid. 2. Metam. Solis domus auro, pyropo, ebore, argento componitur. 
Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis,  
Clara micante auro; flammasque imitante pyropo, etc.  
Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid, which is a common School book, and here a feigned cause argues a feigned effect: ens and non ens are the subject of Logic, but non ens gratia entis, for so Logic looks at them first, and gives entity to ens fictum, and therefore Grammar and Rhetoric must follow it, for they are attendants on it. The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts, and they are argued by their matter: it had his pillars of gold for their matter, and pyropus another matter of the columns, the covering or ceiling of ivory: the leaves of the doors made of silver. Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all, ergo he doth not teach them here; for whether they be made of one matter, or of more matters, all is one, ergo there is no Logic in that, ergo it doth not belong to Logic.  Caesar 1. belli civilis. Imperat militibus Caesar ut, etc. 
Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships; then he distributes the ship into his parts, keels, ribs. Carinae primùm, and statumina ex levi materia, the rest was viminibus contextum, lined within with leather: so that here is distributio integriin membra, and every part is argued by the material cause.   

CHAP. 7. Causae primum genus est in efficient & materia secundum sequitur.  
WE have heard of the efficient, and of the matter, and this is the conclusion of it: now we come to the second which is in forma, & fine: so that whilst he saith, Causae primum genus eiusmodi est, etc. he tells me it was a distribution before, where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis, & materiae, for so genus is totum partibus essentiale, and is never but in speciebus: so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts.  
Secundum sequitur in forma, & fine: he doth not say, Secundus est forma & fine: now as the efficient and matter were combined together, as moving together a while without the form and end: so the form and end, though the form be before, yet the end comes presently after, and is as it were the pedissequa to the form: and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing, we put the end, as being next to it, and best expressing it. So bene disserere, the end of Logic, is put for the form of Logic; now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in greater matters, so is it also in less: for there is a cooperation of the efficient and end together first, then of the form, and end together also, though not without the efficient, and matter. In forma & fine, for the form is before the final cause; for before the form be induced, or ingenerated in the matter, it cannot be good for his end, and the end is causa in respect of the effect, not of the efficient. So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end, for it may be a coat, and yet not fit to serve me: now then as the efficient began the motion, and the motion redounded out of the matter, so it runs per formam, & finem.  Forma est causa. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latin, there is but a transposition of the letters, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face; and fas and facies in Latin comes of facio, because when it is made it hath the face of a thing: so a thing when it hath its form, it hath a face, it will seem something: so that the efficients esse is not facies res, nor the matters esse, for they might be otherwhere, ergo the efficient and matter are common causes: this is a particular one, which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before, being more general: so that when once he hath the face of a man, then is he a man; this word forma both in Latin and Greek is taken abusive for the outward figure of a thing; it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for figuration is not forma; as we may see in water, put in a round glass, or in a square glass, the same water having the same form will have a round figure, or square figure, according to the glass wherein it is: now because the figure is adjoined to the form, ergo they say it is forma, and in Schools they call it forma accidentalis: now the figure follows the form, but it is not so essential, but it may be changed, and yet the water is the same, because the water is variable into diverse figures, as we heard before in water. The Schools say, that no artificial thing hath any other form, ergo ask them in what predicament any artificial thing is, and they will answer in quality: but thus they will make Geometry to give the forms of things. Figura is a quality, ergo to make quality a form is very absurd: again, as before one and the same thing had diverse figures, and only one form that makes the thing one: again, is the figure of a table the form of it? then the table belongs to Geometry, not to the joiners' Art: again, whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia? ergo the form too, or else it is in diverse predicaments: again, figura is an accident, but forma is a cause, and gives essence to the thing.  Est causa. 
We heard before that causa was cuius vi res est, now forma therefore gives vim esseficandi, it agrees with the matter in that their two essences constitute the effect; then again by how much the form yields his esse in a more special manner, than the matter, so much more the form is causa, the matter yields a portion of itself, but all the form is there, for the matter is common to both species, ergo must give matter to them both, ergo forma is a more inward cause then the matter: again, forma is principium actus, and therefore it is called actus, ergo, est causa.  Per quam. 
Through which, or by which the efficient was from the which, and the matter of the which, the form by which: so here we may see what the form doth; and if res be per formam, it must needs follow that the forms force is there in general, as the efficients, there is no more per quam, but all the form is there, ergo forma tota est in toto, and it is in qualibet parte partly, not wholly, and this is plain; as for example, by another rule of Logic, the members we know are essential to the whole, that is, containing a portion of the matter, and of the form of the whole, ergo, every member contains a part of the esse of the thing, ergo, it cannot contain the whole, ergo, those that make anima rationalis, sensitiva, and vegitativa, forms of men, beasts, and plants, and make it tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte, break this rule directly; for than they must be divided: but the truth is this, they are not forms, for if they be, whereof are they forms? vinentis: what is the matter of them? as in animali: is corpus the matter of them? that cannot be, for it is forma animalis, not corporis; why than what is he but composed of them, ergo, they are not the matter, and form, if there rise a third thing from them, than the thing hath another thing then either of them, ergo, they are not the form, but contain a portion of the matter and form. Again, the body hath a form itself, for it hath his particular members, ergo, they contain a portion of the matter, and of the form of the body, ergo, it is composed of a form besides the form of the whole, so that this it is, per quam, meaning it is quite through that portion of matter that makes that effect: so that there is not only matter, but also forma in every thing, et contra.  Res est, quod est. 
Therefore it essefies the thing, as well as the efficient, and the matter, id quod est: so that this esse from the form doth not only make it to be, but makes it to be that which it is: so that hereby we shall know the form, and as for the efficient and matter, for them a chest might have been a stool, or a table, but the form only makes it that which it is, and no other thing; again a body is the genus to a man, ergo, not the matter, because he is corpus.  
Now we hear what the form is, such a thing as is res superstrata materiae, the matter is substrata, and the form is laid upon it. Now question might be made what a thing forma is. The efficient, and matter we see what they are, the chestitie, or tabilitie, or these do deliver the form as well as they can, but the end delivers it better. The way to know this is only by the other rules of Logic, every member (as we heard before) contains a portion of the matter, and the form of the whole; how can that be? it is true, because membrum is essential to the whole. Indeed the doctrine of forma hath troubled the schools very much, and how to name it I cannot tell, only it is causa per quam res est, this it is. The first efficient in time made the first matter, than he did superstruere a form upon it, so that the matter is the foundation of the form, whereby it is retained. Now in the elements both the matter, and form are uniform, and therefore their parts are singular not making a mixture, but taking hold one of another, for so the matter is principium passionis, and the form actionis, and then again they both conspire, to make up the whole. The next things are mingled of the elements, where all the elements are in every part; by this means there is a matter made of the matter of the four elements, and a form made of the forms of the four elements, and this is the best way to see the forms of any thing: a man's arm contains a portion of the matter, and form of the whole: and again, it is made of singular parts which still contain a portion both of the matter, and of the form of it: so that in the end the forms of things arise from the elements by mistion; and this is that which Galen, and Hypocrates mean when they call forma crasis: so for artificial things their forms arise from the forms of their parts: so that to know the forms of things this is the right, forma est causa per quam, etc. Now if we take this course to see the forms of things we shall easily see the truth: look how many members there are in a body, so many portions of matter, and form there are, ergo, vita vegitativa, and sensitiva, are not the forms, but that is it that ariseth from the union of the elements forms: now by this means neither do we teach that the forms of things perish, and are annihilated, as the Philosophers say, neither are their forms diverse, but conspire together to make one; neither is life a form, so that a bone is a bone, and hath the form of a bone when life is gone.  Id quod est. 
This is peculiarr to the form, for let forma be done away from a thing, and presently it is another thing: id quod est, namely that whereby it comes to be ranged under a general head is from the form.  Ideoque hinc à caeteris rebus distinguitur. 
Because forma est causa, etc. it is not distinguished by the efficient, or matter, because all the force of them is not in the thing, as the forms force is: ideoque, etc. then we see evidently, that so fare forth as the form runs with the matter, so far forth the thing is, id quod est, and so far forth also is it distinguished from all other things, now this is a necessary consecution from the first rule.  
Objection. How can it be a first rule arising from a first rule?  
Answer. It is not simply, and absolutely first, but first in his kind. So Dialecticae partes duae sunt, is not the first rule of Logic, because the definition is before, yet notwithstanding it is first in his kind; now the reason of it is this, every consectary that makes a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be a rule of Art, for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and is a first property in his kind, though there be more of them together: now it is here proton, and agrees to the parts afterward, as risus first agrees to homo, and to Richard, William and john, etc. It is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it agrees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; so that all real distinction is from the form: and here is the doctrine of differentia with other Logicians, it is nothing but a property: and is here ideoque hinc à caeteris rebus distinguitur: so that that which is differentia constitutiva in regard of the effect, is differentia divisiva as it makes it differ from other things.  Et forma simul cum reipsa ingeneratur. 
Again, here is another property, he saith, forma simul, etc. here are two things adjoined to forma, as properties, the first is that forma ingeneratur, the second is that simul cum reipsa ingeneratur. For the first there is much question how the forms come to things, the Philosophers say it is an heavenly nature, and comes by influence of the Sun, Moon, and Stars, as if it were a quinta essentia from the elements, and must be extrinsice. Now these influences they know not what they are, if they be qualities of the Sun, Moon, and stars, than they cannot be forms, for the forms give essence, ergo, is no quality: if they be not qualities, than they are substances, what substance are they? If they be of their substance, than they are corruptible, shall it be from their matter? then it should be celestial, for they are not made of the elements, neither can matter make a form: and again, it cannot be of their matter, for than they should be diminished, neither can it be of their forms alone, for one thing cannot make a third distinct from it, ergo, it is not from them, but the Sun, Moon, and stars send down fire, which makes a mistion with the other elements, and so from their forms ariseth the forms of mists, for so mistio is alteratorum unio, ergo, it is made one, and it is evident that the forms of the four elements are all operative, that is, their qualities are in every thing. But they hold as it were a meeting of many stars together at the conception of things, but as for their work, it is not so to be respected, for we see Esau, and jacob borne at the same time, and yet of diverse manners.  Ingeneratur. 
Some are of opinion, that the form is in the thing before the thing be, but now it is educted, and brought out; true it is, it was before in the parts, but they were not membra: so that after that sort it was before, cum reipsa; how can this be whereas the end comes between the form, and the effect? Answer. This is a propriety, and every propriety is an adjunct to the thing, and the adjunct is after the subject, so that this comes after the form.  Cum re. 
As if he should tell us the form lies in the matter after an hidden manner, but this property is before the end; ingenerari is another thing, than the form, ergo, forma is before it, but it is together with the thing.  
We have made an entrance into the formal cause, and have heard how that it is after the efficient, and the matter: again whereas every cause gave an esse, the form did that, and more too, the efficient gave a bare being, the matter gave a being, and part of his essence, and the form gives his whole essence, and makes it that which it is, and that reason of that makes it differ from all other things, and this the common Logicians did consider when they made differentia to be divisiva, or constitutiva. Now here was their mistaking, that they called it differentia, which doth not arise from the essence of it, but from this property, that forma simul cum reipso ingeneratur.  
The theory of the form is hardest of all humane learning, for it cannot be seen with our senses, but only by the effects of it we come to grope at it, because it is principium agens of every thing strengthened by the matter; but the contemplation of that belongs to natural Philosophy; and thus we may seek the forms of things. When I know that membrum is essentiale toti, and that the matter, and form constitute the effect, it must needs be, that so many portions of matter, so many portions there are of forma, ergo, the Schools are deceived, which think the form may not be divided, for it may, because it is portionated from the members.  
The organical parts of a thing are made of simular parts, and the simular parts are made of the elements, both for matter, and form, the elements of the first forms; now if you ask me further what they are, I can only say they are the works of the first efficient incomplete in themselves; so that if you will penitùs introspicere, this is the way, and look what element is most predominant in the mist, so much more the nearer you shall come to see the form ingenerated: if we speak of the forms of the elements, they were extrinsice, and were ingenerated in the matter; again, if we shall speak of the soul of man, this is extrinsice infused, but the forms of other things are within, and are educed out of the matter, but there is nothing new in this, for the matter is so too.  
Ingeneratur. True thus fare as the form is not made but by composition of the elements, when the forms are not made, but in nature there is that misture, or in Art that composition, that there is a new form: as in a stone by the misture is made one form arising from the forms of the four elements, by their action, and passion. So in artificial things, the form is a compound form made of the forms of the parts, and because that thing is now that which it was not, ergo this form must needs be that now, which it was not, ergo, ingeneratum: and the whole work of the efficient whilst he doth dollar, or hue a thing, is nothing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing. Forma is diversely ingenerated, if it be by composition, than it is composed, if it be of simples, than it is made by shaving, or cutting it.  
Now whilst he saith simul at once, it may seem by this that the form, and effect are together; he means not together in nature, for the form must be before the effect, because it constitutes the effect, and the constituter is before the thing constituted, therefore how are they simul? he means forma simul ingenerat: thus, I suppose two go together, & yet one of them goeth before the other, here is a priority, and simul too, he that is before goeth first, the other followeth, yet both move together: and as two hands laid together, do move together, and yet one before the other, so is it with the formal cause, and effect, the formal cause moves, and the effect also, but the effect follows it in every step, and the final cause follows the form, as the shadow follows the body, and the effect comes last: again, this is a property, ergo, an adjunct, ergo, is after the subject, for the form is an effect before it be a subject: so that the efficient doth as it were make the form, and the effect still follows, as we may see in artificial things: so that so fare forth as the form is ingenerated, so far forth the effect is accomplished.  Anima rationalis est forma hominis, etc. 
Here our author doth commorari, and stay upon the doctrine of forma, for it is so deep, and subtle, as that it can hardly be perceived. This example is not true, because anima rationalis may subsist from the body; now as there can be no matter without a form, so there can be no form without a matter, therefore this example will not serve his turn, yet he brings that he could get; many in Schools have stumbled at this, and have gone about to mend it, but indeed they have marred it.  
Some say ratio belongs to Angels, ergo, it is not the proper form of homo, and therefore they have added mortale, and say homo is animal rationale mortale. Now if they join mortale to ratio, it is not mortalis. Again, animal ratione mortale doth detract from man, unless we speak of his body.  Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis. 
That is not so, for the Angels though they be animae, and so have not animam rationalem, yet they have rationem; again, doth not the body of man distinguish him from other things? so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A man's soul in a bird will not make it a man.  Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis, quadrangulis sua forma est. 
He brings such examples as he could find, and those whereof greatest question might be made; it hath been a question among Logicians, that this forma is peculiar to substances, not accidents; and hence have made a distincti- of forma to be substantialis, or accidentalis: but they are deceived, for Logic is a general Art, and every thing that is made hath causes, ergo, may be defined, ergo, hath matter, and form; for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar, Rhetoric, and Arithmetic, or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects: ergo, accidents behold a form as well as an efficient, ergo, he saith in Geometry, take a triangle, it consists of three lines with three angles, which by their unition in their angles, make up one form, as well as one matter.  Phisicarum rerum, coeli, terrae, arborum, piscium sua forma est. 
He doth commorari here long for two causes: first, in respect the form is deep, and needs illustration. Secondly to confute other Logicians, that say accidents have no forms, unde praecipua rerum ut natura est, etc. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est, than it is praecipua rerum natura. Nature properly is res nata, that is, that springeth principijs, that is matter, and form: so that the whole nature consisteth of them, and this is the proper signification of it, afterward it comes to signify the principia themselves; hence is materia, and forma called naturae: so that in natural Philosophy, when you read of nature, they tell you commonly some tale of materia, or forma: then again by a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth the qualities natural in things: all this shows forma to be praecipua rei natura. Praecipua, first because it makes the thing to be id quod est, so doth not the matter: again, forma, why it is principium actus, from whence the qualities principally arise: for as the Philosophers teach, though not truly in every point, materia is principium passionis: forma actionis, and actio, is better than passio, ergo the form more excellent than the matter, but both matter and form do agere, for they are causae; yet the forms begin, and the matter is but the sustentation of it, and the forms act is the stronger by the matter, not only as it acts internally, but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way. Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect, so it is praecipua rei natura, so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio, si possit inveniri.  Si possit inveniri. 
He saith it neither can be found out, nor that it cannot be found out. Si possit inveniri; sure it is findable; I prove it thus, it is liable to Logic, if it be objected to the eye, than the eye may see it; it may but hardly be found, because it doth not descry itself to the outward senses by qualities, as bodies do: again, the form in nature is so subtle that we can hardly find it, but see as it were the shadow of it, ergo diverse have thought the forms of things to be divine. Some have gone so fare as to think them to be influences: but subtle it is indeed, and harder to find out, then either the efficient or matter, ergo wee commonly call that the matter, which contains the form too, because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause, then as it hath a formal.   in artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit. 
That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom: as we may see in the elements, ergo no man can make a thing in nature; man may further nature, but he cannot make any thing: again, the parts are so fine in the mixture of things, as it is beyond the acies of man's eye to see them.  In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit. 
Why? because artificial things are the works of men, & one man may trace another, though every man cannot.  Caesar. 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici, etc. 
As for example, in artificial things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form, but we use to point at it by the matter, and by the position of it. There stood great beams all along, two foot asunder, put into the earth, and the distances between them were stuffed with great stones: when these were so fastened, then there was a new order begun, where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before, and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams: but what hath he told us now? why saith he, I am a Frenchman, and I will tell you the form of a French wall, where if you do but look at the forms of every part, and of them, you shall see a composed form: so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing, but at the inward essence: here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments, and indeed it is a description of forma.  Est in secessu longo locus: insula portum, etc. 
Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven, told us the form of it.   

CAPUT 8. De fine.  Finis est causa cuius gratia res est. 
WE have gone through the esse of a thing, we have but heard of three, when the fourth comes, that makes up the perfection of the thing, namely finis.  
Finis, for the name, it is borrowed from Geometry; for that that is terminus there, is here called finis, and it is brought hither to signify that final cause that serveth to make up the effect: so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if we keep the proportion of the esses, but it is not the last part and member thereof, as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole, as Method is the last member of Logic. Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing, not of the members of it. Now it is called finis, because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and for his essence, and it is the last thing that limits it, ergo it is called finis.  Est causa. 
Because with force thereof the thing is, and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect, by it own essence, yet by it virtue it doth efficere, as doth the efficient.  Cuius gratia. 
Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect, and thence hath the thing his commendation, cuius gratia, for whose grace; for gratia here signifieth not only for whose sake, but for whose grace, as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect, and so indeed it doth. For as bonum quo communius, eo melius, so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialior: for that cause, that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent, then that which is more remote. Hence man is more excellent than any other creature, because he is made immediately for God. So then the end graceth it evermore: and the more excellent the end is, the more excellent is that effect. This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect, namely, that which is good for that effect: so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect, that it hath from the end: As in a knife, the efficient may be a slave, the matter likewise naught, the form though that be something, yet were it not for the end, neither the efficient, matter, or form would move, ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing: so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made. A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient, and of good stuff for the matter, and fit for a garment, & so of a good form, yet not fitting him for whom it was made, it wanteth his end, or happiness, and so is not perfect: Again, this shows the difference between the formal cause and the end, for the form may be as we see, and not the end. Again, we know there are many things that have not their perfection but growth, and yet have all the causes, yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form: so man was made by God; here God is the efficient, earth the mat er, reason the form; yet here is not his end, namely, fitness to serve God. And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes, which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded.  Physicis rebus finis homo propositus est; homini Deus. 
Of natural things man is the end: the grace of man is God, and God makes him good, not as an efficient, but as an end.  Omnium artium est aliquod summum bonum & finis extremus. 
That is that end which they reach unto, but that is not the summum bonum of all things: for Logicks end is been disserere, Grammars bene loqui, etc. these are the furthest ends of Logic and Grammar, but not the furthest end of all: they are indeed the proper end of them, but not the summum bonum: so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them, and the end of Logic lies in the precepts of it, as they act bene disserere. This is the difference between the end and the effect, A house is made to dwell in, though it never be dwelled in: so for a garment, to be worn is one thing, and to be fit to wear another. So if I go forth to speak with one, and he be gone, yet I obtain my end: they commonly say he was frustrate of his end, but not frustrate of finis, quatenus finis, but quatenus effectum.  juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit, cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur, solatii scilicet prolisque gratia. Sunt mihi bis septem praestanti corpore Nymphae. etc. 
Here juno persuades Aeolus to let his wind out, and she would give him one of her Nymphs, which she presseth upon him by final causes: first, that she may spend all her years with him: and secondly, that she may make him the father of a fair offspring.  In defension Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget, etc. 
Et certe (ait) contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus, etc. As if he should say, Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio, thou didst strike his side: mark the variety of the phrases, and so of the ends. What meant thy sword? what was thy mind? here was the propositum. What meantst thou to have done? even to have killed Caesar. So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing, but even substantial; and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form, and that for this reason: because it is the next argument to it, and presupposeth the form: so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts.  
As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, here bene disserere is the end, and it is as if he should say, Dialectica hath such a soul, as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing, for which it was made. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts: I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general, why, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts? Answer. But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it, ergo if a man will do any Logicum opus, he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes.   

CAP. 9 De effectis.  Effectum est, quod è causis existit, sive igitur gignatur, sive etc. 
NOw we come to see a thing made up: it is worth the consideration, to see now we begin at the farthest thing, and at the first. There are four esses distinct, which we must look at distinctly and orderly, if we will see things aright. First the efficients, than the matters, etc. now then let us see effectum. Effectum: for the name it seems to be nominated only from the efficient; for it comes of efficior, which comes of efficio, whence efficiens comes: and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum, formatum, or finitum, yet he rather names it of the efficient; but we are to understand, that it hath reference to all the causes, even materiatum, formatum, finitum.  
Object. Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects, as there are of causes?  
Answer. Because no one cause alone can make an effect, for it is existent from them all: the causes are distinct in nature, and their forces are their own, ergo their doctrine must be distinct: but because effectum must he made of the composition of the four esses, ergo it can be but one: so that I cannot say, effectum efficientis, effectum materiae, effectum formae, or effectum finis, ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump, as it is in nature. Now because it hath all the esses of the causes, ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and worketh generally quite through with every other cause, matter, form, and end, should have the effect denominated from it, so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient.  Est. 
All things are effects, but God alone, ergo, effectum est: therefore whereas all things are made liable to our eye of reason, it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing, so the effect, which is a quinta essentia arising from them.  Quod. 
He means argumentum absolute consentaneum: now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect, but how is the effect absolutely agreeing to them? yes, for if the effect be from them, it will vouchsafe to acknowledge itself to be from them: and we see in nature, that if an effect be, than all the causes are, & contra: again, that we may see it plainly, if we take away the efficient, the effect will be imperfect: so put the effect, and we put the matter and form substantially, and the esses of the other: so take away the effect, and you take away them. Now if the efficient be rotten, yet it is an effect, as this Logic is Ramus his effect, though he be dead and rotten; for here we respect not time, but the esse. Again, he puts efficiens generally à qua, materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cuius gratia, and here effectum quod: the reason why he used quod so often, is, because he would tell us that Logic is general to every thing.  Existit. 
Esse is of any one cause; existere is a compound of them all, not that existere hath respect of time and place, as some teach: true it is, time and place attend every thing, when it doth existere, but they are not of the esse of the thing, but are only complemental; est is à qualibet, existere ex omnibus, subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis. Existere comes of ex and sto, now it doth stand upon its feet, and doth estare out from all the causes, being a fift thing from them.  E causis. 
Here è is as much as à, ex, per, and gratia: è causis, that is, ab efficient, ex materi, performan, gratia finis. Causis not causa, and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concur, or else the thing cannot existere, as the first matter did not: ergo, if Angels do existere, they must have all the causes: so the souls of men after they be out of the body, they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes, for if any one cause be wanting, they will be incomplete.  Sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur. 
Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum, because the common Aristotelians refer the doctrine of motus not to Logic but to natural Philosophy: but Ramus teacheth it here in Logic in the doctrine of effectum, sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur, etc. whether it be made or corrupted, sive modo quodam moveatur, quidlibet, that is, whether it be augmented, or diminished, etc. generatio, and corruptio are substantial motus, augmentatio, and diminutio quantitatis, alteratio, and loci mutatio qualitatis: and all these are effects: then again, whereas the Aristotelians teach, that distruens causa, is not causa, Ramus teacheth that it is, for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both, ergo, both of them are motus of his act to the opus, ergo, causa distruens is a motus, and a cause, as well as opus destructum is an effect, and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits, yet they are effects in respect of their causes, ergo, they are causes both alike: they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin, whereas he spoils the Image of God in him: ergo, whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish. If the Lord should bring to nothing, that which he hath done, it would be his effect, at least the corruption of nothing. Now the effect is double, motus, & res motu facta, every thing is made motu, God only is sine motu, and doth not move when he works, for else he should not be primus movens, but motus: but if we resolve all things, it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable: for so Aristotle found out most things by motus: now again, there are those that sever motus, and res motu facta, as the Aristotelians, which makes Ramus to commorari; they say, somethings rest motu only without a res motu facta, but that is not so, for there is nothing that God hath made, which doth movere, but there is a res motu facta of that motus: they conceit that some Art's motion hath no opus post se relictum, as when one plays on the Virginals, they say there is nothing left behind. Answer, what care I for that, Logic looks not to that, but as there is playing, so there is something played, which is res motu facta: and as there is writing, so there is something written. These, namely motus, and res motu facta, are never distinct asunder one without another, but only in that the one is not the other.  Huius loci sunt laudes, & vituperationes. 
As if Ramus should say, if you would commend a thing indeed, let it be from the effect, we may commend one from his fair building, but that is beggarly, as Tully saith, or a woman for her beauty, but this is childish, for the true commendation is from the effect: so man is here to be dispraised from his sin: so the Lord is to be praised from his effects.  Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri, & prophani. 
Why in Scripture? because Divinity stands in action, not in Theory, and therefore we have them so often commended that have done well, & contra.  Aenei. 6. facta variorum populorum, etc. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, etc. 
The Romans are commended from their effects; first, regere imperio populos: again parcere subiectis, etc. these are compared with the acts of other people, and they are made minora to the effects of the Romans. Excudent alij spirantia, &c, As the Corinthians will carve you any thing. Orabunt causas melius, as the Orators among the Athenians, Coelique meatus, etc. as the Chaldeans, and Egyptians will do.  Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt. 
That is, dicta, and scripta in respect of Authors, but if we look at the things written, or spoken, so they are testimonies. So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well. Demosthenes, and Tully for both.  Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia, & deliberationes, etc. 
Counsels, and deliberations are effects of them that consult, and deliberate, etiam si omnino ad exitum perductae non fuerint. And this appears evidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death, being suspected of conspiracy against Alexander. So also were Lentulus, and Cethegus, and other companions of Catiline.  Sunt etiam effecta virtutum & vitiorum. Quid non ebrietas designat? operta recludit, etc. 
Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an effect, but that which is substantial, but accidental causes as I may call them, may have accidental effects. As drunkenness first operta recludit, secondly, in praelia trudit inermem, it makes a man go to war leaving his weapons behind him, it will make a man think himself as good as my Lord Mayor. Faecundae calices, here are cups for drink, and drink for drunkenness, quem non fecere desertum, that is a dizzard, he means a Logician, contracta quem non, etc. it makes a man in poverty a brave minded fellow.   

CHAP. 10. De subiecto.  Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subiectum & adiunctum, etc. 
WE have heard of the essential parts of a thing, and so have seen the thing in his essence, and we see how Logic doth direct the eye of our reason, to see the most inmost thing in it. Now we come to see the complemental things, that belong to a thing, not belonging, or concurring to the existere of it: so that the causes were as it were the simular parts, these are as it were the blood in the sinews, etc. to make them full, and complemental: Modo quodam consentaneum, as if he should say, the causes were required ad esse rei, these are but required ad bene esse rei: so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing, and now we come to look at the outside of it.  Argumentum modo quodam, etc. 
This is an imperfect transition containing only the proposition of that which follows, modo quodam: as if he should say, if they be there it is well, notwithstanding if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the thing, for they are but circumstances, whereas argumenta absolutè consentanea are pentralia; again, argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing, for accidens inseparabilis, as homini risus aequo hinnitus, are but acts of the soul working in the bodies of their subjects.  Succedit. 
Why? because they are after those that agree absolutely: we have heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes, and cannot existere without them, ergo, it must be a thing of necessity before it be subject, or adjunct, or before it can have a subject, or adjunct, for that which hath adjuncts is a subject, & contra.   subiectum, & adiunctum. 
A subject is by nature before an adjunct, and a thing is first a subject before it be an adjunct, and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing can be adjoined to a subject: again the subject is more general than the adjunct, not that there are more subjects to one adjunct, for it is quite contrary; for there may be twenty adjuncts to one subject, but I mean it is more in use, and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth. As when I say the King is there, ergo, the Guard is there, is stronger than to say the Guard is there, therefore the King, and here we see as before, priority, and posteriority. Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God, for whatsoever we see it was first in God, and when he hath made a thing than it is a subject, and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them, ergo, subiectum is before adiunctum in the practice of God, and also of man. Now subiectum as it is first, so must it be taught first. The name subiectum tells me it is a thing laid undermost in regard of the adjunct, and it doth support it, and yet it is not of the essence of it, but only laid under it, and adiunctum is to ride on it as a packhorse: now as the efficient was most inmost, than the other three, or the effect, so is subiectum here, ergo it is by nature before adiunctum.  Subiectum est cui aliquid adiungitur. 
He omits the genus, and the reason why he doth not teach the genus, namely argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because, it is a definition itself, as absolutè consentaneum was, for there is no definition of a definition, but if he had defined it, he had brought a definition to a definition, he wanted a word to name the thing, and therefore gives me a description in stead thereof, cui aliquid, this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art; so that this aliquid is any thing, not simply, but quatenus it hath an affection to be joined. A thing being an effect, is fit to receive outward things; and subiectum is defined by his relate adiunctum, for it is cui aliquid adiungitur, and whatsoever is subjected to another thing is his adjunct, as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white.  Adiungitur. 
Adiungitur, so that subiectum is the argument, and adiunctum the aliquid, adiungitur, so that here he tells us that the adjunct is adjoined to the subject, that which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tied, ergo, subiectum is before adiunctum, he saith it is but adiunctio not entering into the essence of it, but that it may be taken away: so that as subiectum doth intimate a thing laid underneath, so the adjunct doth intimate a thing laid upon it: so that the adjunct doth depend, and hang upon the subject as upon a hook; or as one thing tied to another: thus have we heard the subject's argument to be so, as if his adjunct be removed from him, or he from his adjunct, yet he stands firm in his causes. Now for the manners.  Anima est subiectum scientiae, ignorantiae, virtutis, vitii, quia haec praeter essentiam accedunt. 
Anima is a spiritual thing, so are these adjuncts, scientia, ignorantia, etc. of the same kind too, now these take hold one of another quodam modo, ergo, if they be removed, yet the soul remains entire, ergo, it is but subiectum of them, scientia, etc. Now are but adjoined to it, the anima his esse is not of their esse, aut contra. Some are of opinion (as Scaliger) that the Angels, and men's souls esse, and agere, are the same, but then their actus should be perpetual: again than they have no adjuncts, than no causes, than God, ergo, they have their qualities. Again, it is a most sound, and sure argument that they are creatures, not God, because they are finite, ergo, have causes, ergo, are effects, ergo, have adjuncts.  
Objection. But how are these joined to the soul? it hath two faculties; reason, and will, now the faculties of the understanding are the intellectual virtues, when it can promptly, and readily perform its act, as when it is prompt and ready in inventing, than it is intelligentia, when it is prompt in seeking out truths, than it is scientia, when it is ready in discoursing, than it is sapientia, etc. so that these intellectual virtues are habits of the faculty of reason, and lie in the promptness of its act: so by virtues he means moral virtue, nor intellectual, and that is of the will. For when the will can promptly perform the act of bountifulness, or justice, than it is in like sort liberality, or justice, and so for the rest, and the contrary makes vice, ergo, these are but adjuncts, quia praeter essentiam accedunt, that is, these come over, and above the essence. The soul is tanquam tabula abrasa, and these virtues come afterward.  Corpus sanitatis, morbi; robori●, infirmitatis; pulchritudinis, deformitatis. 
The soul had his spiritual adjuncts, the body hath his proper adjuncts also, and this definition of his teacheth us to look at the proper adjuncts of things. So sanitas is a proper adjunct to the body, for there ariseth an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence comes sanitas, and morbus: robur ariseth principally from the bones and sinews, beauty ariseth from the freshness of blood, and the analogy, and proportion of the parts, for if there be comely visage, and not blood, it is not beauty, we call it good favour, but not fair, but here it is opposed to deformity, and contains not only well favour, which stands in the symmetry of the parts one to another, which belongs to Physic, but colour which belongs to blood.  Homo, subiectum est divitiarum, paupertatis, honoris, infamiae, vestitus, comitatus. 
Here homo hath his adjuncts general both to soul, and body; now here we see that subjects, and adjuncts are not as the common schools take them, namely, only substances to be subjects, and accidents adjuncts: for accidents may be subjects, & contra, ergo, that distribution of ens into substantia, and accidens, will not follow in any Art, but here, and they are special kinds of subjects, and adjuncts.  Locus est subiectum rei locatae. 
Locus is a modus of subiectum, the Schools both ancient and of latter time have maintained locus to belong to natural Philosophy, because (say they) it ariseth from every thing in nature. Now first true it is, that there is nothing, but it is res naturalis, even reason, speech, quantity, etc. are res naturales, and it doth not therefore follow because it is res naturalis, ergo it belongs to nature, for it is a mere affection, and it is taken away, if we take away the locatum: and as causa may be no causa, effectum no effectum; so may locus be no locus. Again, cannot things in Art be in place, as well as things in nature? are not Angels finite and terminated? and locus, if we take it properly is nothing but subiectum rei locatae: as in causa there was the thing causa, as it causeth: so there is locus as there is the thing receiving: as when I say such a one is in my chamber: here I consider my chamber not as it is in his building, but as it is receiving him. Again, if it should not be in Logic, it should rather be in Geometry then in Nature, for limitation of place is next and immediately from the limitation of quantity, and there we hear of locus, as there is repletio loci: locus here is put for the space in that place, by a metonimy of subject for the adjunct.  Est subiectum. 
Here that which we heard of in adjuncts is res locata: because it doth apply that special kind of adjunct that answers, to this subject locus. Now it is not essential to the thing, ergo is but complemental: again, that which is now in one place may remove to another place, ergo is not absolutely consenting to the thing: and thus we see it must needs belong to Logic, as being but in respect: they say only corpus is in loco descriptive, and not spirits, they are but in ubi, or in loco designatione: but what is this but a rule of Geometry? where we hear of completio loci by corpus: and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity. Then again they question whether the space that contains a thing be locus or no. Answ. Space belongs to nature, and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the place, and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum, or a pint will receive a pint; and therefore to receive is to measure the space. I confess you may name it in Nature, but not define it.  Sic Philosophi divinis entibus, licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus attribuunt locum. 
So the Philosophers give place to the intelligences, whereas he making them to move the heavens, saith they are on the superficies of them.  Licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus. 
Here he speaks according to the common conceits in Schools, but I marvel how he or any other can say so. Scaliger saith, they are in divine predicament of quantity, but not in this gross predicament of quantity, and they have a figure. In what figure were Angels first created? An. In what figure was water first made? they can take any figure as water can; but I think they were first made in the figure of roundness. So Arist: saith they were made as puncta. So is fire round, for that is figura capacissima, ergo, perfectissima. I have thought also that the Ark was made for all the world like a man, and there was the proportion of length proportionable to a man's breadth, and the height proportionable to a man's thickness. Now for the wanting of parts it is not so; for Angels may be divided, though their parts be similar: so are the elements parts; and as some writ, the wicked spirits may be struck, and so the Sun light, but it will too quickly return into itself: and as the light may be divided, so may they. And whereas they say, anima is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte, they wrong God, and the creature; for what is the reason? God can have no parts, ergo no causes; other things whatsoever must needs have causes, ergo must have membra, ergo we cannot say they are all in every part. Yes, the reasonable soul is in my little finger? Content, but is that very portion of it that is in my head, also in my little finger? There is a discontinuance, and the same thing should be here, and not there, which is flat contradiction: but God is not in this or that finger, but also between them. The Papists absurdity appears notably in this, in that they will have Christ's body to be really in the Sacrament in the bread, and in heaven also, and yet not in the air, but make a discontinuance: ergo it is in the bread, and not in the bread; in heaven, and not in heaven; for if it is in heaven, there it is shut up, and so in the bread.  Sic Geometrae locum, locique differentias in rebus geometricis. 
That is, above, and below, angle, and base, etc.  At prius ignotum ferro quum scindimus aequor, etc. 
Here he appoints several places to several things, and here locus is but subiectum, and they adiuncta.  Sensilia sensuum, & res virtutibus, ac vitiis propositae, subiecta vitiorum, & virtutum hoc modo nominantur. 
Here are obiecta, as the common Schools teach, because the sense is cast upon them: so virtues and vices, though they have their subjects themselves in one kind, yet here they are adjuncts, rebus vitutibus ac vitiis propositae. Now it is a fallace of non subiectum, when we give that to subiectum which is not subiectum. As Tully jested with Piso his little son, and said, Who hath hanged my son to yonder sword?  Eiusmodi subiecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat, inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse, qui nullus sit honour. Non gloriae cupiditate (ait) afferebantur, etc. 
Honour is the subject of ambition; the Campani had no honour among them, ergo no ambition: where there is no honour there is no ambition, but inter Campanos there is no honour, ergo no ambition. Here the proposition contains the subject, and adjunct, and by removing the subject, he removes the adjunct.  Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est. Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat Arator, etc. 
The Mariner he tells of the winds whereabout he is occupied, and vulnera are adjuncts to Soldiers; yet here as he talks of them he is adiunctum: and thus have we heard of the first compliment of a thing, namely, to be a subject, or to have a subject.   

CAP. 11. De adiuncto.  Adiunctum est, cui aliquid subiicitur: quod argumentum et si subiecto est levius, attamen est copiosius & frequentius. 
NOw we come to adjuncts, which are after subiectum, and because subiectum and adiunctum have diverse natures, ergo they must be taught distinctly, and in distinct Chapters; now therefore we come to adiunctum, which is the outmost thing, and it is called adiunctum, because it is adjoined to the thing, and it is put to another thing after it hath its being. Now there is nothing in the world, but may be a cause, an effect, a subject or adjunct; and therefore Logic is general of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but in that he tells us, that it is but adjoined, he tells us that it doth agree but quodam modo, that is, conditionally; but many adjuncts be removed from their subjects, sith their causes are in them. Answ. Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hindrance of the act of the form upon the matter, or the act externally. So the Adamant stone if we put but the juice of garlic upon it, it will not draw iron unto it. Again, the causes may be altered in the subject, ergo the adjunct may be removed, ergo it is but argumentum modo quodam consentaneum, and not absolutè requisitum.  Cui. 
Because any thing whatsoever may have the respect of an adjunct, as any thing may be a cause.  Aliquid. 
That is, that that is propounded, or that which we are to argue, or that that is argued, so that that which the adjunct is adjoined to, is subiectum.  Subiicitur. 
Adiunctum doth presently tell me, that there is some thing cui aliquid adiungitur: he rather says subiicitur then adiungitur, because adiunctum hath reference to subiectum, and it is better to define them from the relation between them, then à comparatis; because relats are mutual causes one of another. Now here he shows that the adjunct is that that is builded upon the subject: and as the subject did presuppose a thing already made, but must support another thing; so adiunctum tells me it is a thing already made, but must lie upon the subject: subiectum signifies a supporter, or a suppository as it were: adiunctum, that is more common than subiectum, and subiectum lies always under; but adiunctum it may either lie over, or under, or be tacked to either side, yet it will fall off, unless it be nailed, or adjoined to the subject. Now that which tacks it to the subject is that affection which it hath to subiectum, every thing will not be an adjunct to every thing, nor every thing a subject to every thing. Solomon saith, if we bray a fool in a mortar, as wheat is brayed, he will not be wise: the reason is, for that his spirits are so dry, dull, and earthy. Now wisdom hath so fine a hand, as that she cannot take hold of such hard things, but they will hurt it, so that it cannot be subiectum or adiunctum to any thing: and this shows that Logic is in the things in nature, and not in man's brain only. So this rule wills us to look how subiectum is able to support the adjunct, and when he sees how God hath done them for him, to use them to his turn. Again, this rule is of great use to see how things are tacked together in nature, so as the one being taken away the other will remain entire: then again, though the adjunct in nature cannot be severed from the subject, yet by my eye of Logic I can sever them.  Quod argumento etsi sub: est levius, attamen est copiosius, & frequentius. 
Our Author doth commorari, and tells us with very good reason, that the adjunct is more light to press the subject then contra. Object. But this might have been before if it be copiosius and frequentius; now he teacheth arguments according to their more strong manner of arguing; and subiectum is fortius, for because the causes of the adjuncts are in the subject, you may not therefore easily remove the subject, but you will destroy the adjunct, nor contra: yet some adjuncts may be taken away; and yet take away any adjunct, and there will be some imperfection in the thing: so that adiunctum will be levius, if we weigh them in a pair of balance: which appears many ways: as if Mr. Fanshaw be at London, his servants are there: this is more strong arguing then to say contra. Subiectum est fortius, because it is by nature before, and the adjunct is eatenus adiunctum, as it lies on the subject.  Attamen est copiosius, & frequentius. 
For one adjunct can have but possibly one subject, but one subject may have an hundred adjuncts: now such a kind of copiousness, or frequentity, doth not make the adjunct more general than the subject, in respect the subject is of more strength for the sustentation of the adjunct, then contra: and as it is more copious, so frequentius, that is, more often in common use, because it is of all arguments most familiar to men, even men unlearned: for the inmost thing is the efficient, than the matter, than the form, than the end, than the effect, than the subject, and lastly the adjunct, ergo because it is so plain as that a plain man may see, ergo it is frequentius.  Itaque de eiusmodi signis ait Ouidius 2. de remedio. 
He illustrates this by Ovid's testimony, which said as much, Forsitan haec aliquis, etc. meaning of signs: Sunt parua, because these are common qualities, which may be in diverse things: so that one will not argue so strongly: multa iwant, that is where there is a concourse of many together, there is as it were a description, which argues strongly.  Animi corporisque & totius hominis bona, & mala, quae dicuntur adiuncta sunt animi, corporis, hominis. 
As he hath showed before, anima, etc. to be subjects, so here he shows virtus, vitium, etc. to be adjuncts: now he takes them bona & mala, because there are tria genera bonorum, namely, of the soul, of the body, and of man. so contra, tria genera malorum.  Denique quicquam ulli subiecto extrinsecus accidit adiunctum eius est. 
Again, here is another modus of adiunctum quicquid extrinsecus accidit, that is, comes unto it not as causes, effects, or subjects, but as it were adjoined to it accidentally, ergo he saith extrinsecus: for it was not our Author's mind that qualities were from within, though of necessity they must be.   autem locus est in subiectis, sic tempus est in adiunctis. 
That locus we heard of before was subiectum, and because it was a general affection, ergo it belongeth to Logic, and it was nothing but the application of a continet, to a contained: so time is nothing but the application of one thing to another thing; as when I say he came on monday, or at three of the clock, that is not time, but the adjunct of time: and here is the application of the course of primum mobile, or of the Clock to his act: it is duratio, the meeting of a thing. Time may well be compared to a line; and as fluxus punctum is linea, so fluxus nunc is tempus: he went in the turning of a hand, that is, whilst one might have turned his hand: so that I measure it by the durance, not by his length, or Geometry.  Rei. 
For Logic is rei: and as causa is res, so tempus est res, or duratio rei, that is of the subject praesens, praeterita, & futura: here he doth distribute this time, to show that this distribution of time belongeth to Logic, and not to any other Art. Much descanting there is about time among other Logicians, which teach that it hath a double respect, one to the thing measured, and so it is properly time, another to the thing measuring, and that is not time, but as one is measuring it: now for the logical notion of time it is all one whether it be active, or passive, and it is one and the same thing diversely respected, and because active and passive go always together, ergo, the time must needs be general to both; praeterita, praesens and futura. So for things that are subject to our Logic are divided into past, present, and to come, for only God is not subject to time, because he is eternal, ergo is omne non esse ante post, neither can we say he is now if we respect time, for what should measure him, should primum mobile, or day & night? no, so that though he be at all times according to our Logic, yet he is without respect of time at all times, for time is not eternal, ergo, not omne non esse ante post. And Grammar which is the garment of Logic, doth speak by the verb of time past, present, and to come; now we give it in Grammar to verbs, not but that it may be given to every thing, as well as to actions, and passions, but that we deliver it actively or passively.  
Again, primum mobile which God hath made a common globe to all the world, and is measured according to praeterita, praesens, and futurae, ergo, time is in every thing, and Angels, and men's souls are without respect of primum mobile, and day and night: because they are beyond them, but they are not without duration passive, because they were made creatures by God: so that though their tempus be called awm, yet is it this tempus.  
Objection. May praeteritum being past be said to be: no, if we respect praesens, for they are as we see here distinct things, but if we respect the thing, it is, yet not in time, but in its essence: how in it essence? not as it doth existere in rerum natura, but as it is in a rule, that is eternal: so that though Socrates now be not, yet this axiom Socrates est homo is now, and will be to the world's end: so praeteritum, praesens, and futurum all of them are, for we do not respect the adsignification of time, but look at the argument as it is a being: so that time future is a true thing, though the time be not yet come: and that duratio past, present, and to come are, because the thing still is: so that time is an adjunct. But here as locus must be a thing with that affection of receiving, so time must be a thing with this affection of measuring.  Omninoque qualitates subiectis praeter causas adiunctae, etc. 
Again, another modus of adiunctum is called qualitates, which is adjoined to this, or that, not being causes, here comes in their predicament of qualitas, and qualitas is no genus of any thing, ergo, that distinction of qualitas to be naturalis, or moralis is not at all, but a special use of a thing that is taught in a general Art, for qualitas is but a logical term, and as adiunctum is genus to them, so is qualitas. Every example is infima species in Logic: so that calor is an adjunct to fire, and when I have said so, I have considered the logical respect, and no more.  Praeter causas. 
We have heard that there can be nothing but must have causes: and so the existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes give, and then the adjuncts come over, and above the thing. Now qualities are of two sorts, proper and common, these are but special modi of these qualities: they may be proper, because they argue at proper, common because they argue at common, or at random, as we say. Now whatsoever hath affection to argue, that belongs to Logic, ergo, these, because they have affection to argue, rather as modi, then as adjuncts; as modi efficientis before So therefore they are distinguished thus. So risus doth argue homo, not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its property. Now qualitates propriae have these properties with them, conveniunt they come together with the subject, and are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the whole, and afterward with the parts, ergo, he saith well conveniunt.  Omni. 
This is somewhat hard, for omni non dicitur de uno, aut de duobus, but tria simul omnia, that is, three will make an omne; and our author teacheth in judgement, that a special axiom is quando consequens non omni, and there it may be of one or two: but here it must be taken more general for one or two, etc. but because the schools thought properties convenire omni specici only, and thought that individua had no properties, as they also thought that forma was only speciebus, and individua were distinguished accidentibus. But our Logic teacheth that every thing hath a form, and therefore hath properties, for commonly properties arise from the form, ergo, he saith conveniunt omni, whether it be omni specici, or omni individuo.  Soli. 
Soli shuts out all others, else it is not a property.  Semper. 
So that if they agree omni, and non soli, or soli and non omni, or omni and soli, sed non semper, semper sed non omni & soli, they are no properties, ergo, a property doth argue with this virtue, that it argues omni, soli, and semper; and so it is meet, because they will come into Art, and will make a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for this it is, every Art ought to deliver the causes, qualities, and act of a thing; for so there is in nature first the thing, than the qualities, or faculties, than the act which points out the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that if one would make an Art of homo that part of natural Philosophy, he must speak of risus, because he doth something in nature by virtue of that quality: so heat, and cold, first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum, and afterwards to the species, not by the immediate acts of their forms upon their matter, but by the common acts of fire, and agree to produce heat, and water and earth to produce cold.   homini risus aequo hinnitus, cani latratus, etc. 
He means the faculty, not the act: so neighing to a horse: every beast hath his peculiar voice though we cannot discern it so well. Common adjuncts are such as agree to that which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but is first in the parts, and then in the general, as learning first agrees to Socrates, Plato, etc. and then to man, and this is the difference between proper, and common adjuncts, the proper adjuncts agree first to the generals, and then to the singulars. The common agree first to the singulars, and then to the generals.  Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam, Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cavillatur. Nun ipsum caput, & supercilia illa penitus abrasa, &c 
He had not an hair, for he shaved them off, ergo, he reasons from thence, that he was a knave, and it may be true, because they are hot headed that are bald, this is a new modus, and he reasons from signs, which are common qualities, tney do not agree omni, soli, and semper, and yet a knave doth omni, soli, and semper commonly.  Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit. Crine ruber, niger over, brevis pede, lumine luscus, etc. 
The cause of these not making a good man is this, the cause of a red head is colour, ergo, there is much heat, and where there is much heat there will be much fancy, and where there is much fancy, there will be much juggling. Niger over that comes from melancholy, that lies in the muscles about the mouth; brevis pede, that may have some reason with it, for such a one will go apace; lumine luscus, for when a man thinks he looks on him than he looks asquint, and when one would think he looks a squint, than he looks on him.  Sic vestitus, & comitatus res adiunctae sunt, quo circumstantiae genere Dido, etc. Oecanum interea surgens aurora relinquit, etc. 
So that not only accidents, but substances may be adjuncts, a man may be an adjunct, as he is a servant. So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time aurora, than the attendance of young men, than their hunting instruments, etc.  Est vero adiunctorum ad subiecta quibus occupantur usus item magnus. 
There is another kind of adjunct, which are occupantia, as we heard before of subiecta occupata. So Plato proves that those Cities are miserable, which want Physicians, and judges, quia multa quoque et intemperantiam, & iniustitiam in ea civitate versari necesse est.  Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est, unde quiduis alteri consentaneum vel idem, vel unum dici possit. 
We have now seen both what goes to the esse, and bene esse of a thing; now he calls it categoria the arguing, categoria signifies to plead against, and they that gave it that name first to argue, did discern truth by the contrary, which is borrowed from the Lawyers: and we know when we would see a thing, that if we take the contrary, it will make it magis illucescere: afterward it came to signify not not that gainsaying one of another, but one man's pleading alone for his client, than it came to signify the arguments that he used in his speech for his client: and lastly, it came to signify any argument, and thence comes argumentum, the predicaments are called so, namely categoria, and so Ramus would have us consider every argument to be a predicament.  Idem vel unum. 
Moreover he doth commorari a while telling us that idem, and unum, as the Aristotelians teach, are nothing but these consentanie arguments: so idem genere doth arise from idem causa: so gemelli are idem tempore, that is adiuncto: so all modi of theirs arise from hence tanquam à primis, & simplicibus fontibus. We shall hear of idem genere, and idem specie, and idem individuo, as if he should say, but all of them, huc sunt tanquam ad primos, et simplices fontes referendi.   

CHAP. 12. De diversis.  Argumentum primum consentaneum expositum est, etc. 
WE have heard of consentaneum, and why she should put in primum rather then simplex I see not, for if he meant to have repeated them, he should have put in all, ergo primum would be put out, now the use of a transition is to hang things together, when the one part is newly gone before, as it were half forgotten, than we must have an imperfect transition, otherwise a perfect one: this method observed for memories sake: now it remains that we consider what the thing is not, and thus we go orderly to work. Before, we saw what went to a thing, for the making of it up: now we cannot well see what a thing is not, till we see what it is, for non ens is seen gratia entis: now this respect ariseth not by way of argument: but by seeing what it was.  Dissentaneum sequitur. 
This is opposite to consentaneum: sentio is general to them both, sentire is taken for intelligere, consentire is said of things that have the same judgement, mind, and reason; dissentanies are of them that have not the same judgement, ergo, seem to have no reason in them in respect of consentanies, ergo, Aristotle denied dissentanie arguments and made them follow. Sequitur, ergo, it is by nature after, secondly, it is next to consentanies because they are simple arguments.  Quod à re dissentit. 
That differs from the thing it argues, à re still general: so that because the creatures of God are discreet, and many, ergo, there is dissension, and because reason was made to behold the creatures of God, ergo, it was necessary that they should be handled in Logic.  Sunt autem dissentanea. 
Here he calls them dissentanea in the plural number, for that which was res before, is become dissentaneum, as it hath a dissentanie to argue it, secondly, because here dissension agrees to them both as they are compared together.  Aeque manifesta. 
Here dissentanies are made paria, arguing equally for manifestation, quasi aequa manifesta, ergo, this property contains thus much, that one dissantanie is not before another, for the manifesting of it, as causa was before effectum, etc. Is not invention before judgement, and they are opposite? Answ. True for doctrine, but invention doth not clear judgement more, nor contra.  Alterumque ab altero aequaliter arguitur. 
As there was not a priority, and posterity, so they have equal force to argue, contrary to consentanies; so that manifestation is for the clearing of them, and arguing because they have the same doctrine, but then what use of them.  Tametsi sua dissensione, clarius elucescant. 
Here it is, why they come principally into Logic, as black is not so black till it be set by white, etc. magis carendo, quam fruendo, we see things, for when we have a thing, and see not the privation of it, we make not much reckoning of it, sua dissentione, this is a discretion from the other properties: so than we see why a contrary makes a contrary most clear, namely this, ergo, when we would show a thing that is obscure, we show it by a contrary, quia sua dissentione clarius elucescant.  
Hitherto of the properties, which would not be in consentanies, for one was more manifest, ergo, before another, and more strongly arguing. Dissentanea in the plural number, because one argument serves for them both, ergo, one name, and because they are equally manifest: again to set one before another is to say it is stronger than the other. Again they would not be aeque manifesta.  Sunt diversa, vel opposita. 
We are to look at the dissension of things, now there is a more weak and a more strong dissension, the one turn but a little aside, others turn clean back, and are foes, ergo, accordingly doth he divide these: now remember it is ens, as ens that Logic considers, and many times it falls out, that one thing might be taken for another, but for diversity, and commonly our distinctions are diversa. Diversa is a more light dissension, and opposites contain them: so that diversa will give great light to opposita, but not contra, ergo, diversa are before. Diversa à divertendo, of turning aside, because they agree one with another commonly in consention, only they divert a little the one from the other; and this is it that the name commends unto us: they may agree in nature, but are made to divert ratione, ratio we know belongs to Logic, and it is the same with argumentum: so that he means they differ but only in some logical respect: they are the subtlest of all arguments, because of their little dissension. Sola ratione, ergo, they do not of necessity make a denied axiom.  Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima. Non hoc sed illud: quanquam, tamen. 
This is not a rule of Art but a commoration, as if he should say, these arguments have not been in Schools before, but I have observed them by my experience, and then again they are subtle, ergo, I will help you, when you find, ergo these notes commonly commend unto you diversa: so forma, and facundia are made to disagree in their adiunctive nature in respect of Ulysses: so that they differ not in their nature, but only in logical respect, as if he should say they may both be adjuncts to one subject, but yet differ in Ulysses.  
Priamus was ready to perish, and yet withheld not his hands, a man perishing should hold his hands, but Priamus did not: so that causa, and effectum which might consent are here diversa not in respect of Priamus, but of themselues.  Paula secus in Eunucho. 
He means there is a difference of modus. Suppose I be worthy of this reproach, yet thou shouldst not tell me of it, here is subiectum, and adiunctum, the diversity is in respect of the cause, they are diversa in respect of him that offered it.  Item alia aliusmodi. 
Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero. Here is a little difference too, this fact was called scelus by Tubero, Tully tells him, others gave it other names, alij enim errorem appellant, alij timorem, etc. but no man besides thee call it scelus. Here these names are made diverse in respect of him that called it scelus: as if he should say, call it any of the rest, but call it not scelus, and thus we have heard diversa. If I say though he be rich or poor, yet he is honest, here is a diversity, for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed: they are diverse, because riches commonly make unhonest, and also poverty: so we may make diversity between the cause and effect, or in giving many causes to one effect, aut contra, or one subject to an adjunct, aut contra, or many subjects to one adjunct, aut contra, and according to these ways also, there may be several modi thereof.   

CAP. 13. De disperatis.  Opposita sunt dissentanea, quae ratione, & re dissentiunt. 
IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse, than the compliments, that give been esse to the thing, than we see what it is not, and easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse: and first we are to see the diversity, which though they be conformable, yet they do divert somewhat one from another, and they are first, because they give light to all the rest that follow. Now we come to see their opposition, that is, those things which have their causes, effects, subjects, and adjuncts, are not only dissenting in a logical respect, but are distinct reals. Opposita, gain sets, it cometh of ob and pono, as it were set against: ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another: so that their nature is to be barred, not only ratione, but it is principally in their realty, and herein do diversa differ from opposites. Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might agree, whereas opposites descent in their nature.  Sunt dissentanea. 
We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing, they do not sentire idem, but quot capita, tot sensus sunt among them, whereas consentanies are of the same judgement, and these names do well fit arguments, because they are as it were the senses of things. Dissentanea that is, such as think asunder, are severed, and distract our thoughts.  Quae ratione, & re dissentiunt. 
Ratione, that is, as diversa did, because they do not only disagree quatenus argumenta, that is, as they have logical respect in them, but quatenus they are res, as black is not white, they are opposites, and there is a bar that black cannot be white, & contra, which opposition is in their dissension, being clean of another judgement: so that there is dissension betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them.  Re. 
As if we say black is not white, we say not only, that black is not the cause, not the effect, subject, or adjunct of white, but that they are diverse things in nature, ergo, this must be observed, that the bar is not only the bar of rational respect, but of reality.  Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem, etc. 
Surely if they be bard from coming one at another, and that in nature, then non possunt eidem attribui. As first when I say blackness is not whiteness: and again when as I say blackness, and whiteness cannot be given to the same subject: here the one dissension is in essence, the other is in accident, ergo this idem must be understood of the essence itself, and likewise the subject. Non possunt takes away all possibility of joining in one, ergo, whatsoever makes them consent, breaks this rule, for whereas this rule saith, sunt dissentanea, they make them consentanea; and again, whereas this rule saith, non possunt eidem attribui, they say, they may.  Attribui. 
The attribute is always the consequent part of the axiom: so that if we give them to subjects, they cannot be given to one, and the same subject: they may be the consequent, but not the antecedent part: so that contraries must be attributed, for when I say homo est animal, aut brutum, I give them both to animal, but not eidem. Now antecedent contraries will have contrary consequents, est enim par ratio, now they do dissentire ratione, & re, ergo, cannot any ways be consentanies, ergo, cannot be made by any means to agree.  Secundum idem. 
According to the same, diverse think this is put in in respect of relates, because of the example that follows, pater & filius eiusdem: but it hath a more general respect of opposites in their whole nature: else it should have been taught more specially in the doctrine of relates. Now two contraries may be given eidem, but not secundum idem, & ad idem, & eodem tempore: eidem, that is, eidem genere, not eidem specie, as a man may be well, and a man may be sick, but not the same man: so that secundum idem hath respect to the same individuality as it were, or species: so homo may be ager and sanus, but not secundumidem, for that identity cannot be: now ratio is given homini secundum idem, for herein omnis homo est idem, & ad idem, still there is idem, for if we consider them not about idem, they are not opposites: then again there must be the same respect: and also ad idem, that is the very same point, for whiteness in the wall, and whiteness in my hand, are neither attributed eidem, nor secundum idem; eodem tempore; for if they be diversis temporibus, than they may both agree eidem, as homo nunc sedens potest deinceps ambulare: so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione, & re: so that all these must be respected: so that black and white in general are not opposites, but as they are considered in their dissenting, and opposite nature: so that this is the true nature of opposites. If ex indocto fit doctus, here is a difference of time, and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that are made: that fallation à division is from hence, therefore this is a consecution from the definition going before, and principally from the word re. Sic Socrates albus & after eadem parte esse non potest.  Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, & è contra. 
Et è contra follows from hence, for Ramus left it in his edition, & if è contra be not put in, the rule is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for if we have an example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur, that hath otherwise no rule here, ergo, we must say & è contra, for they that leave it out, as most have done since Ramus, here is their mistaking, because they think it is not a necessary consecution, but contingent. Now Ramus doth not teach us consecution that belongs to syllogisms, but arguments use, and if it be but contingently true, yet it may belong to Logic, as well, as if it were necessary: and it is very common in speech to say, it is not this, or that, but another thing: again the meaning of these two is this, ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, that is, they both cannot be affirmed, for he teacheth invention here, and not judgement, & è contra, that is, they cannot be both denied. They may be both denied, as a stone is not virtuous or vicious, are these opposites? yes by our rule, if & è contra be left out, but here they are neither of them attributed: so that I do not mean negation in an axiom, but the not giving of them to a thing, if both arguments be denied, they may be paria, as when I say, if it be not Thomas, it is not William, as if I should say it is as much reason it should not be Thomas, as not William: so also if both be affirmed they may be paria, as when I say it may be Thomas as well as William, for all is one for that, and thus we must look at all these consectaries, because most fallaces are from hence, and they are very subtle.  Opposita sunt disparata, aut contraria. 
They are of two sorts, that are barred disparates, that is unmatchable, or contraries such as are directly set one against the other, now the disparates are when the sides are not matching one another, for there is more against one, ne Hercules quidem contra duos, ergo, here the fight is not so violent, but the duellio is more strong, so that according to this opposition of things in nature must our Logic proceed.  Disparata sunt opposita. 
Disparata are first because they will give light to the stronger dissension, as being contained in it: these destroy one another, but not with that violence, and force, that contraries do, they are called disparata, because here is impar congressus, and they are unmatchable: but contraries are well matched striking down right blows, whereas disparates steal one behind another. Sunt opposita, that is, dissenting re & ratione.  Quorum unum multis pariter opponitur. 
Here first unum opponitur multis, and then par opponitur to every one of them, and not unum uni: now that we may see it more throughly, this it is, whereas a thing is said not to be another thing, with the same reason that it may be said not to be a third, or a fourth, etc. that is, unum multis, and again opposed together, and that we may see this more particularly, here is the reason disparates are always under some more remote genus, whereas contraries will come under one next head, be it genus or what it will be, and that is the reason why they are unum multis, and pariter.  
Objection. Why doth he say unum multis rather then multa multis? for sometimes there are multa multis.  
Answer. First, because when there are multa multis, there is one more especially opposed to all the rest, than any of the other, ergo, he saith unum multis: secondly, because where there are multa multis, there is unum multis: thirdly, because in use we find unum opposed multis more frequent than multa multis. Homo is opposed to brutum as unum uni, but to Leo, and equus, as unum multis, again, he is opposed to brutum as Leo, & equus, as unum multis, but not pariter. Pariter alike, that is, there is not another kind of argument, when homo is opposed to Leo, then when he is opposed to equus, and here we may see that if opposites be only of two branches, then are they not disparates: then again, if they be of two sides only then are they contraries, ergo, if there be any distribution in Art where the parts are not opposed one to one, there will be a genus lost.  Vnum multis. 
He doth not mean always in use, as if one disparate might not argue another, but he means as they are in nature, ut viridum, cinereum, rubrum, etc. are disparates.  Quae singula extremis, & inter se disparata sunt. 
Four colour is simplex, aut mistus, simplex is white and black, mistus the other colours, so that these come not under the next genus, sic liberalitas, & avaritia inter se disparantur: because prodigality may be where these are not, habit is virtue, or vice, virtue is this, or that, or liberality: vice is avaritia, or prodigalitas, so that these are unum multis, that is, not having one next genus, but a more remote genus of opposites, and avaritia, and prodigalitas are opposite in vice to liberality, and here is many to one, and alike.  Virgilius 1. Aeneidos. O quam te memorem virgo: namque haud tibi vultus, etc. 
She is a Goddess, or a Virgin, she might have been a third, but he looks not at that. Not a woman, for she had not the countenance of a woman: again not a woman, for nec vox hominem sonat: ergo, Dea, and thus we see how one thing is not another.   

CAP. 14. De relatis.  Contraria sunt opposita, quorum unum uni tantum opponitur. 
WE have heard of a thing in his essence, and in his compliments, and so also we have seen it is not, so that if it be declining but in a respect, it is a diverse; if it decline re, than it is an opposite: a diverse when it is considered with another thing in agreement, yet still severed in respect: and again when one thing is not another, by common opposition, that it makes with another, that is a disparate: then again it is a contrary by some peculiar nature in him directly against some other thing: so in a man we consider his causes, flesh, nerves, sinews, bones, etc. then his compliments, than we respect him as one diverting, or turning aside from another thing: then we look at his common nature whereby he is opposed to many things at once in the same nature, and so he is a disparate: a diverse he is, as when I say, though a man was there, yet his horse was there also: again there is that whereunto he is opposed directly, as he is not brutum: and so he is a contrary. Now though there was not in one thing any thing to make it more plain, yet set them together, and the one will make the other more manifest, therefore this opposition is either where one fighteth against many; and these are disparates, or where the fight is more strong, and those are called contraries.  
Contraria, by reason here is but one to one, ergo, these stand contra, that is face to face, when one did fight with many, some stood aside, some behind, but these face one another, so that if the one turn away, the other will turn to him again. Sunt opposita, that is, they have bars in their nature, namely ratio, and res.  Quorum unum uni tantum opponitur. 
So that this battle is a duellio, a battle of one against one, and so they fight, that the one things force is bend only against the force of the other thing. Vnum uni tantùm, for disparates may be unum uni, but not tantùm, unum uni because they come to communicate in one next nature, as homo and brutum in animal: or else the one so denies the other, that it takes away the entity of the thing affirmed. Vni; but we shall hear afterward that contraria negantia are nothing in themselves.  
Answer. They are something gratia entis, and our reason gives something to it, and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary; and here we may see the force of our reason that can make of nothing something. Now some thing is made of nothing diverse ways, first, by our reason, secondly, by our fancy, or by the hallusination of the eye. Logic makes only two kinds of nothings, the contradicent, and the privant. Homo is a contrary to brutum, but to Leo, and equus he is a disparate, because he is opposed to equus in the same nature that he is opposed to Leo.  Contraria sunt affirmantia, vel negantia. 
This distribution of contraries runs on, as the former did, for as the least dissension began first: so we still proceed to the greater: now by affirmantia, and negantia, he means things positive, or privative, for there is either a thing opposed to a thing, or a thing opposed to nothing, and the fight between something and nothing is stronger than the former: for when one thing fights with another thing, let them fight as long as they will, or can, yet they leave something behind them, but the other leaves nothing at all: so that contraries are where both are things in nature, or where the one is nothing, and are called negantia of the latter part: as the other are called of both parts affirmantia.  
Affirmantia, as if he should say, they are things in nature, or things positiuè, as a Father, a child, etc.  Affirmantia quorum utrumque affirmat, etc. 
He doth not say affirmatur, but affirmat, because he would willingly describe them from their act, for he would deliver the nature of the arguments, ut relata & adversa. There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety, for there are some affirmantia that may be reconciled, and made to agree, there be some also that will never agree, but perpetuo adversantur. The first if you set them face to face will be very good friends, but set them back to back, and they will be foes: but set them adversa how you will, and they will be foes: so than relates have not so strong a fight betwixt them as adversa. Now they are called relates by reason of a certain reference they have one to another continually, yea indeed they are by reason of their reference, for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate, for the cause of the father's relation is not in him, but he receives his whole relative being from the correlate: so that in Divinity we know there is nothing added to the Godhead by giving to it the persons mutually. Sunt contra, here is one to one, for though a father have many children, yet the relation is but one, namely, betwixt fatherhood, and sonhood; and though many stand on the one side, yet there is but one relation: so in the high mystery of the Trinity, there is a double relation, first between the Father, and the Son; secondly between the Father, and the Son on the one side, and the holy Ghost on the other side. So when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis, these are relates, yet when I say Aristotle est discipulus, this is subiectum and adiunctum: so cousin and cousin are relates, if we respect the relative quality, and not the men. Now that term of relates is used confusedly, as we say he is his father, meaning his procreant cause, quorum alterum constat.  Quorum alterum constat è mutua, etc. 
Constare is to stand together of causes, è mutua alterius affectione, so that these relates have not their causes from the thing in whom they are, but from their correlates: as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife, or a wife to be her that hath a husband; these are definitions è relatis, and so è causis. But what causes do relates contain? all the causes, both efficient, matter, form, and end. E mutua, è is a sign of the effect, quod è causis existit: so that this is their nature.  Atque inde nominanda sunt relata. 
They are called relates in regard of the reference they have one to another: so that we may here see what relates are, and how they belong hither: they that think all arguments are relates, why they are so, as the cause, and effect, etc. but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum, for here they are examples, ergo, lowest of all. Again, if I say argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale & so go on, thinking that all these are genera to causa, and effectum, I deceive myself as they are relates; but if all arguments should be relates, as the arguments are taught in Logic, than all the examples of all arguments should be relates, as God, and the world: but when I make them relates, I analise Logic even as I may make the definition of Dialectica an example of definitio, so that (as I say) if relation were a common affection to all arguments, all examples also should be relates, which they are not; again, if causa and effectum were relates, than they must be together, for relates must be simul natura, ergo, this is fallacia accidentis, they thought the words of Art (as they call them) were relates, ergo, the doctrine of relates must go generally with all arguments. We know again that the causes, efficient, matter, form, and end, and the effect are distinct things, and do not constare è mutua alterius affectione, ergo, are not relates: again, causa est cuius vi res est, and the effect quod è causis existit. Now each relate contains the efficient, matter, form, and end of his fellow, ergo, if they should be taught generally, then in the efficient alone, in the matter alone, in the form alone, and in the end alone there should be all the causes. Some would have relates taught as consentanie arguments, because they do agree; it is true, but they do disagree also, and if they should be taught in consentanies, their dissentio also should be taught there, or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing, and this kind of teaching had been à posteriore; again where should they have been taught? they are mutual causes, ergo, not causa and effectum, but both causes and effects: again, the doctrine of causa efficiens, materia, forma, and finis are distinct: here they are confounded together in one. Now the Aristotelians have a predicament of relates, and have also their series, but their gradus of them will not stand, for relates have no species, but are lowest save only examples: and they go clean out, and say relates are of this nature, or that nature, as if they should say relates whose species are in this Art, or in that Art. As in Oeconomie in a family they are free, or bound, free husband, and wife, bound children, and servants, etc. but now the husband and wife are not relates, because the bound, and free are relats: all these are special examples of relates containing nothing under them, so that relates cannot possibly be a predicament according to their own doctrine, no more than causa and effectum, and by that course that they take, I can prove that Socrates est genus in going backward, and saying he is substantia, he is genus, etc. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutual causation, for that cause they are called relates.   pater qui filium habet, etc. 
So we say, is he such a man's son? here is a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject; son put for man, when I say Paul is a servant of Christ, here I mean Paul's calling: servant hath a double respect in it, one as it is in Oeconomie, another as it hath logical relation, which we may see thus, for if he be Christ's servant, than Christ is his master.  Relata dicuntur simul esse natura. 
The reason stands in this, the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other, ergo, they are simul, for if they be mutual causes, they must be mutual effects, ergo, as one is the cause, so the other is the effect, & contra, ergo, they must be simul.  Natura. 
Because their nature springs from them mutually, for nature is arising from causes, here we may see in the Trinity, that one person is not before another, there is no respect of priority, or posteriority in the rest of contraries, because there is no force of arguing from thence, we heard before that all of them were aequè manifesta, that is, aeque intelligibilia, and not as consentanies, where the cause cleareth the effect more, then contra, because the causes are more simple, and single: so likewise the subject is not beholding to the adjunct, but contra; again the cause, and subject did more argue the effect, and adjunct, then contra. Again, from hence it is, that qui alierum perfectè norit, norit & reliquum, for they are mutual causes, and our scientia est è causis.  Pro Marcello. 
Ex quo profectò intelligis, quinta in dato beneficio sit laus, cum in accepto tanta sit gloria. Dare and accipere be relates, as if he should say, if it be glorious to receive, than it is much more glorious to give; now his principal drift of arguing is a minore, but yet the arguments are relates: so that a thing is not given till it be received; and again he that knows the one knows the other.  Tum seruum sis te genitum, blandéque fateris, Cum dicis dominum, Sosibiane, patrem. 
Sosibian is a servant to his father, because he is his master.  Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est, & Hermacreonti conducere. 
If it be honest to let out, than it is honest to hire, for they are mutual causes, and in usury I think both taking on usury, and letting out to usury are unlawful, by reason of this relation, as jeremy speaks. So discere, and docere be relates.  jam illa (inquit) matura uxor generi, noverca, filii, filia, pellex. 
Here he playeth with the names: and indeed all names of kindreds are relates.  
Ouidius 1. Metamorphosios.  
— Non hospes ab hospite tutus.  
Non socer à genero, fratrum quoque gratia rara est, etc.  Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium nihil habet, etc. 
Indeed here is no contrariety in these examples, neither consention in that respect, but they are paria: happily he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature, and so would here commend unto us their use to be more often in the consentanie affection, then in their dissentany nature, as when we say, how could that be, why he was his son.   

CHAP. 15. De adversis.  Aduersa sunt contraria affirmantia, quae inter se veluti è regione perpetuò adversantur. 
WE have heard what a thing is, that is, what goes to the being, and what to the well being of it: and how thereby it dissenteth from other things by a diversity, or opposition: diverse might consent between themselves, but they are made to divert one from another. Again, for opposition it is re & ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature, or by a contrary nature.  
Contraries are either of one thing to another thing, or of one thing to nothing, the former kind also is of things that might agree, or of them that will never be at peace: now therefore we come to adversa, and these have their name of turning not aside as diversa, or as one to many as disparats, neither as relates, which have a double aspect, a coniunct aspect being set face to face, and an opposite aspect being set back to back. But adversa are in an opposite aspect; hence a line drawn from the point of the one aspect through the centre, to the point of the other aspect will be a right line: so that here is no peace, they are overthwart neighbours continually. Sunt contraria, contraries were opposed one to one, so that a thing is not an adverse, but as it is opposed to some other thing.  Sunt affirmantia. 
That is, they are things positive, whereof the one thing is not nothing, but both are some thing.  
Contraria quorum utrumque affirmat sunt affirmantia, id est vere entia:  
At haec contraria huiusmodi sunt,  
Ergo, adversa sunt contraria affirmantia.  Aduersantur. 
That is, according to their nature set one against another, by a right line.  Perpetuo. 
2. Relats might be friends, though they would be foes, but adversa can never be reconciled: this dissension of adversa doth arise from a particular form; for homo is adverse to brutum, as brutum is animale irrationale, and as man is animal rationale, and these can never be reconciled, and every thing hath his contrary, though we cannot see by reason of the forms subtlety; for contrarieties arise from the forms.  Inter se. 
This showeth that contraries are not opposite but when they are set one against another, as blackness in a shoe is not opposite to whiteness in a band.  Veluti è regione. 
As if he should say, if one stand here or there, the other will face him, and if the one remove, the other also will remove: so that they are two overthwart neighbours directly opposed one to another continually. Disparats were behind one another, or on the one side one of another, never before one another. Relats also might be friends, but these will always be foes. In that he saith veluti è regione, he showeth that they differ from disparats, and perpetuo showeth that they differ from relats▪  Virgilius' Aeneidos 11. 
Nulla salus bello: pacem te poscimus omnes.  
Salus and bellum are adversa.  
Sic albor & niger, calidum & frigidum, virtus & vitium opponuntur. Indeed we make them things, though their original be defects, for vice is sin, and we consider it as it acteth, and so it is ens.  Paradox 2. contra Epicureos. 
Illud tamen arctè tenent, accuratéque defendunt, voluptatem esse summum bonum, etc.  
Here he reasons that pleasure cannot be the goodness of a man, because it is the goodness of a beast; and man and beast are contraries.  Sic libertas & seruitus, apud Tibullum 2. lib. 
Sic mihi seruitium video: dominamque paratam:  
Tu mihi libertas illa.  
Now I see bondage shall befall me, ergo, farewell liberty.  Pro Marcello. Nunquam enim temeritas cum sapientia commiscetur, nec ad consilium casus admittitur. 
He makes temeritas and sapientia, adversa; consilium and casus contraries, but indeed they are disperats, for temeritas is a special kind of modus efficiendi, namely necessitate, aut fortuna, and consilium belongs to causa naturae aut consilio, so that they are not under one next genus.   

CAP. 16. De contradicentibus.  Contraria negantia sunt, quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem, eáque sunt contradicentia, aut privantia: contradicentia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum negat ubique, etc. 
WE have heard what a thing is, we have also heard that a thing is not this or that, as a diverse, or as an opposite: as an opposite either by a general nature, which are disparats, or by a more particular nature, which are contraries: we have heard that one thing is opposed to one thing, or one thing is opposed to nothing; one thing is opposed to one thing, either as a relate, or in adversa: now we come to show how a thing being from his causes, is not a nothing.  Contraria. 
Where there was a fight of one to one.  Negantia. 
Here one of them is nothing, ergo it cannot properly be said that here is one to one; yet our Logic here makes nothing something, per oppositum ens, and in very deed it is requisite that ens being from his causes, that it should not be another thing, so it should not be nothing. Negantia, not that he speaks here of the negation, that we shall hear of afterward in an axiom, but he means a not being. Ramus had not a better word, ergo he keeps this delivering it in the active voice, desiring to commend to us the act, or arguing, or the faculty whereby arguments do act. Now nothing gives name to contradicentia, of contra, and dicens, because the affirmer: that that is a thing we have heard of before, it is common to affirmantia, ergo because that is it which is only special: here he means them by the negative part.  Sunt. 
For as there is a something so there must be a nothing; because every thing that is, (except ens primum) as it was not once, so may it not be again.  Quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem. 
That is, the one is a thing in rerum natura: alterum negat, that is, the other is not a thing in rerum natura. He hath not better words to utter them to the act of our understanding, ergo borrows these words, ait, negat, which are a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject; but remove the Rhetoric, and you shall see what he means.  Idem. 
For it is by oppositum ens, that non ens is ens: and it is by reason of nothings contradicent, that nothing is an argument. Here we see the force of reason, that maketh non ens to be ens, but it is by oppositum ens only: so that if there were not an idem, they were not contraries, no not opposites. Object. But might it not have been left out, being taught generally before? Answer. No: there must be a denial of the same thing, for the whole entity that we give to a negant, is per oppositum ens, ergo it must have reference to idem.  Sunt contradicentia, aut privantia. 
As the consentanies proceeded from causes to effects, and so to subjects and adjuncts: so do dissentanies disagree less or more. The less dissenting arguments must go before, because they are common to the other, and are contained in them: now opposites are not this or that, by a lesser or a more earnest opposition; contraries are of one thing to another, or of one thing to nothing; and here is a sharper contention: and again, among these the contradicent, though it take away the same thing ubique, yet it leaves something in room of it. Sunt contraria negantia, which we heard before.  Quorum alterum negat ubique. 
Quorum alterum, namely the denier; negat ubique, that is in every subject, and puts another thing in room thereof, as visus, non visus, non visus denies visus in my eye, hand, and foot, and in every part of my body, yet it doth not take away every thing, but there may be some thing that should be there.  Negat ubique. 
Good reason, for when it pursues the contrary in every part, it cannot be so strong a fight, as where the contrary fights with the other in the same subject; ut iustus non iustus, for the use of them, we seldom find them directly opposed, but in an axiom we chief find them: as when I say, it is so, it is not so: or we shall find them often by way of mocking, as when we cry at a thing, and say, If it be not, it is not: here is the antecedent negative, and the antecedent affirmative.  Sic in defension Murenae, etc. 
Nihil ignoveris, saith the Stoic, imo aliquid, non omnia. Here be contradicent axioms, making one axiom to consist of contradicent arguments. So that by this example we may see where they are used. They are called contradientia, because the contrariety is in the denial of the word affirmed, quasi contrarietas in dictione, but it is in re indeed: so that this is contradiction, when two talk together, and the one denies that which the other said, as Dives, non Dives, bella, non bella, puella, non puella.  
So Cicero counts Atticus an Epicure by profession, that mortui non sunt miseri, because non sunt: now when we find contradiction in a speech, we show it by the rule; we find many arguments among the Papists to be of this kind, and also among our own men. The fallaces are general to opposites, and there are non-contradicents, for contradicents, when men contend about nothing.   

CAP. 17. De privantibus.  Privantia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum negat in eo tantum subiecto, in quo affirmatum suapte natura inest. 
NOw we come to see a thing in his being, and with his compliments, may not be that absence of a thing where it should be, for privans is nothing else; privans will neither let the habit of the thing that it denyeth be there, nor any other thing but itself, ergo there is the greatest contention that can be; and between something and nothing in the same place there is the greatest distance: and nothing pulls out something, as it were by the roots, and makes that something to be an absolute nothing.  Privantia. 
They are so called, because of the privant that pulls the habit out of his house, as it were.  In eo tantum subiecto. 
He doth not mean that privantia are always adjuncts to some subject, for they may be of the same thing: as when I say, sight is not blindness: but this he means, that the habit is denied, and the denier takes away the very same thing without leaving any deputy thereof: as cecity denies the very entity of visus, where it should be, and plucks up as it were the first causes of it.  Suapte natura inest. 
He doth not understand by nature, as if it were a thing considered in natural Philosophy, but in that thing whereunto it might be consentany, ergo by nature is to be considered that, that any way, or by any rule of Art should agree to the thing: so that simplex natura is as much as consentaneum, or that which is consentanie, as a cause, effect, etc. to the thing.  Atque hîc affirmatum, dicitur habitus negatum autem privatio. 
He keeps the common terms, it is called habitus because it should be habitual to the thing, whereunto it is given.  
Negatum autem privatio, because it pulls out the habit by the roots.  Sic motus & quies, sic ebrius & sobrius. 
Our Author brings such examples as are received in Schools, otherwise ebrietas is a vice: and indeed all vices are privantia. So sin is a habit, as it causeth the subject to act imperfectly; so non es ebrius, quia sobrius: he takes away the privant by putting the habit.  Sic caecum esse, & videre. 
Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis, ac potissimum caecus ille. Let blind Appius come, because whilst he cannot see, he will take the less grief at her.  
So pauper, and diues, mors, and vita, and indeed this shows what sin is, that brought death, a privant cause, a privant effect.  
Item tacere, & loqui: so mortalitas is the privation of immortality, though it seem to make it a privant.  Sde dissentaneorum categoria sic est. etc. 
Our Author told us before, that there was a category of consentanies, showing us where Aristotle's ten categories are: and here are categoremata of dissentanies also, and a categoria of them. Now because we cannot see the categoria, or arguing without we first see the arguments, ergo, we are here first taught the categoremata, for the categorias sake.  Vnde quiduis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest. 
Vnde quiduis, that is, any thing, as if he should say there is nothing that is not another thing, or nothing, but it is some of these ways.   

CAP. 18. De paribus.  Argumenta simplicia ita fuerunt in consentaneis & dissentaneis: comparata sunt, quae inter se comparantur, etc. 
WE have heard of a thing as it is in itself complete, & as it is first in the causes, and afterward with his compliments: and seeing it thus, we see how it is not another thing. Notwithstanding we come now to see that there may be a comparison betwixt it, and another thing, happily to match it, or to be unequal, like or unlike: now whilst we see things thus, we see the inside and outside of them. The arguments are called comparates, for this affection in them resteth as it were to argue so soon as they are sundered; as for example, lay one thing to another, it may be greater, though less to another, etc. so that these do not look at things, as they are absolute, but as they are laid together. The reason of these arguments in nature is this, there are more things in nature, than there are degrees of quantity, or resemblance of similitude, ergo, some of them must be matches: some greater, some less: and as the reason of that question, one being asked, whether there were any two men in the world that had an equal number of hairs on their head? he said yes: because there were more men in the world, than any man had hairs on his head: so it is here, there are more things in nature, than there are degrees of quantity, and they are finite, ergo, some have the same quantity, and some have not: and again because some things are like others, and some unlike, ergo, there must be a looking at that.  Argumenta simplicia, etc. 
Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before, and this is the conclusion.  Comparata sunt, etc. 
Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition, the name comes of con, and paro, to bring together, or lay together: so that howbeit the denomination of comparates may seem to rise principally from parity, yet we must take them more generally, because impartia, similia, and dissimilia are also compared, but are unmatches, for as our English word Matches may be taken for equal matches, or unequal, so may the latin word comparata be taken for paria, or imparia, etc.  Quae comparantur. 
So that this word delivereth the reference, that one thing not being another, hath to it by way of reference.  Inter se. 
That is, the one thing compared with the other, and the other with that, and both comparates, the cause was of the effect, the subject of the adjunct, & contra: dissentanies had one denomination too, but comparates though they have the same denomination, yet we do not consider them absolutely, as dissentanies are, but as they are laid one to another, and the other to it.  Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt, attamen alterum altero, etc. 
Here he tells us that comparats are like unto dissentanies in this, that they are aeque nota natura, as dissentanies are aeque manifesta, but though they be so, yet herein they descent from dissentanies, that the one in respect of one man may be more known, and more notable than the other: so that though they be aeque nota natura, yet quoad nos the one may be better known to a man then the other, ergo, here we must always take heed, that when we make comparisons (which do not conclude, but illustrate as they say) that we take our comparison from a thing, as well, or better known to him to whom it is made, than the thing we go about to prove, otherwise we teach sophistically and break this rule.  Saepeque notis brevius iudicantur, aliquando partibus plenius distinguntur. 
Again, this is general to all comparats, iudicantur, that is declared, showed, pointed, ergo, he saith rather iudicantur, then demonstrantur.  Notis. 
He means this, comparates use is double, they are either shorter with notes, or made full with parts.  Quae propositio, redditioque nominantur. 
The parts of a full comparison are these, where the proposition is the argument arguing, and the redditio the aliquid.  Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt, fidemque faciunt. 
Whereas a fainged cause cannot argue a true effect, aut contra, a feigned subject a true adjunct, and so in dissentanies, why in comparates we may feign one, and will argue another true one, and here is the ground of all fables, which are full comparisons, similia, hence we say comparates do magis illustrare, then concludere: so that these are the three properties belonging to comparates in general.  Comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate. 
He doth not say comparata, are quanta, or qualia, but comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate, looking at the categoria, or arguing; now it is not quantitas, or qualitas, but in quantitate, or qualitate, as if he should say, things that are compared, are laid together in their quantity, or quality, for we are not to understand any Arithmetical, or Geometrical quantity or quality here, which is always the same, but it is a logical quantity, and quality, that is, that quantity, and quality which we consider in one thing with another: so that if you would know what this logical quantity is, it is nothing but equality, or inequality.  In quantitate. 
That is, when things are compared in their equality, or inequality, for parity, and imparity, similitude, and dissimilitude belong to Logic, now comparatio in quantitate is first because quantity is by nature before quality, for this parity, and imparity must needs be considered in the thing arising from the nature thereof, before we consider the quality in nature arising from the quantity; as for example, I must first consider the greatness of a wall, than I shall see that quality whiteness to be extended according to the greatness of the wall.  Qua res comparatae, quantae dicuntur. 
Qua, that is, it is that affection of things that are laid together, for that he means when he saith qua.  Res comparatae, etc. 
Quantity is an affection logical to res: now in that he thus defines them, he doth not mean quantae in respect of the word, but in respect of the nature of the thing, for this it is, we know every thing hath this logismos or logical affection, whereby it may be called quanta, so qualities may be compared together, and be made greater, or less, by reason of the finite nature of them.  Estque parium vel imparium. 
Now because there are more things, than degrees of quantity, for that cause it comes to pass that some things are equally matched, and some unequally: so then when we compare things together, and they be matches, those be paria: this parity is of those things which chance to be equal.  Paria sunt quorum est una quantitas. 
First he calls them paria, as if he should say matches or fellows, or as we call them pairs, as a pair of gloves, or garters, etc. else it may be they are imparia, or dissimilia, for so sometimes that word imparia is used for dissimilia, quorum quantitas est una. He doth not mean that the things are one, but their quantity is parity, ergo, he saith quorum quantitas est una: he doth not mean that their quantity is one, but it is called parity.  Argumentum igitur paris est, cum par explicatur à pari. 
This follows from the definition: by explicatur he means arguitur, but he saith explicatur because it is the nature of those to unfold one another.  Eiusque notae sunt par, aequale, aequare, etc. 
Because others have not taught these kinds of arguments before, ergo, he pleaseth to stay a while upon them, and would teach us to judge of them by the phrase, as it were, but we must look at the matter.  Par levibus ventis. 
Here Crusa Aeneas first wife is compared to the winds.  Et nunc aequali. etc. 
Here the age of one is compared with the age of another.  
Again, the Empire of Rome shall be equal to the whole earth, and their courage to the height of heaven.  Cuius res gestae atque virtutes, etc. 
Now follows full comparisons, his gallant deeds are compared with the whole course of the Sun, the proposition is here with what limits the earth is confined, with them is the earth limited.  Littora quot conchas, quot amaena rosaria flores, etc. 
Here are many propositions to one reddition, as many shells as are on the sea shore, etc. so many are mine adversities: quae si comprendere coner, etc. again his repeating of them would be as if he should tell the drops of the Icarion sea.  Huius vero loci sunt consectaria illa è contrariis quidem orta, etc. 
These kinds of arguments though they seem to have in them contraries, yet by laying them together, and seeing their contrary consequence they come to be comparates. As Sosibian is a servant to his father because his father is his master.  Ex adversis sunt frequentiora. 
For the former examples were only true in relates, and privants, but ex adversis sunt frequentiora.  
If one accuse him whom I defend, than I may accuse him, whom he defends.  
Quod cùm fateantur satis magnam, etc. If vice make miserable: shall not virtue make happy.  Contraria enim contrariorum sunt consequentia, etc. 
This rule holds not when it is genus, but when it follows from it, than it will be true, as I cannot say the father is good, ergo, the son is evil, because goodness and evilness do not follow from fatherhood, and sonnehood, for consequentia is here as arising from contrary causes, or from causes in the thing, or as adjuncts.  Dic quibus in terris (& eris mihi magnus Apollo) etc. 
This is a common argument among the common sort. One propounds a riddle, and the other not being able to answer, propounds another, and this also is common when one says give me this, and I will give you that.  Paria vero ficta sunt illa, etc. 
Now we come to ficta paria. As Zenophons' wife would not rather have her neighbour's husband then her own: so she should not rather desire his garment, or gold, etc. and as Zenophon would not rather have his neighbour's wife then his own, so he should not rather desire his neighbour's horse, or ground, rather than his own: and here we see the use of the third property.   

CAP. 19 De maioribus.  Imparia sunt, quorum quantitas non est una. Impar est maius aut minus. Maius est, cuius quantitas excedit. 
WE have heard how things may be compared with things, and this comparison was either in quantity or quality, which quantity was a logical quantity, not a geometrical quantity, for it was of things where Geometry cannot be considered. Again, this is general to every thing, not special to Geometry: and the reason hereof we heard to be, because there are more things in nature, than there are degrees in quantity; it was parium, or imparium. Paria were pairs, matches and equals, and imparia are such as agree not in any one of these three: but the aliquid here as it is greater to one, so is it less to another. Imparia therefore are such as are not pairs, but the one is greater than the other.  Quorum quantitas non est una. 
We have heard concerning quantity, that paria were quorum una est quantitas, imparia sunt quorum non est una quantitas, that is, as parity was the quantity of paria, so imparity is the quantity of imparia.  Non est una. 
Because the one's quantity is called maius, and the others minus: so that as paria had but one quantity, so imparia have two, one maius, and another minus.  Impar est maius, aut minus. 
Having showed what imparia are, here he distributeth them into maius and minus, as if he should say, imparity is either in majority or minority, and here is all logical quantity, and they that will make a predicament of quantity should indeed bring in this quantity, and not the table of Arithmetic and Geometry: the reason why this quantity is general, is because all things whatsoever are finite in essence, ergo in quantity. Maius goes before minus, because it containeth in it the quantity of the minus, and exceedeth it: so that the maius gives light to the minus, not contra. Maius is so called, because it is evermore considered in comparison of one thing to another: and therefore is not called magnum aut paruum, maximum aut minimum.  Maius est, cuius quantitas excedit. 
Here majority is the quantity of maius, and this majority exceedeth, because that the maius is active in comparison of the minus, for the stronger acts upon the weaker, rather then contra.  Propriae notae sunt, etc. 
Our Author doth commorari upon this doctrine, because others have taught them confusedly, therefore to keep us in order, that we may not be mistaken, he pleaseth to set down these notes, for our further help.  Tollitur è medio. etc. 
Verbosa simulatio prudentiae, which is the third argument is argued à maiori, domina illa sapientiae.  
There is not only contempt of the babbling Orator, (which is the aliquid) but of the good Orator.  Hinc sumitur Logica quaedam gradatio, etc. 
That is, as a modus belonging hither is that logical gradation, etc. as the people and the Senate are compared, the Senate and the public garrisons, and they and the Generals, etc. so that here is a climbing up the maius, in one respect, being made the minus in another respect.  
It is better to be the son of Thirsites, and an Achilles, then contra: the maius is before, the reason is this, that that is of his progenitors is not his own, but that which he hath of himself.  
Aeneas persuades his fellows to stay and bear these, because they have borne greater.  
Thou openest thy fountain to thy enemies, give us leave to open our little springs to our friends.  
She gave thee great thankes, yea as big as great mountains. Now the maius is, quam abs te esse datum.  Ficta vero maiora etiam plurimum valent. 
As we heard before generally, that ficta comparata might argue vera: so here ficta maiora may argue ficta minora.  
If a Duke should love her, he could not keep her, much less canst thou.  
If jupiter should do it, I could not hope to do it, much less if Aeneas should bid me.   

CAP. 20. De minoribus.  Minus est, cuius quantitas exceditur. 
MInus is a logical quantity that may be in every thing, as I have said before of maius: and minority is the quantity of minus, ergo it is exceeded by the maius, because the maius contains the minus, and much more, double, triple etc.  Minus autem saepè indicatur, etc. 
As majority hath been abused by Authors, so hath minority, ergo he would help us by notes, lest we should be deceived. Saepe, not always, as we shall hear afterward.  Nemo non modo Romae, etc. 
Rome is compared with every corner of Italy, and the argument is drawn à minore. Catiline had sought out all the rascals in Rome, and all in every corner of Italy, which is the minus.  
Catiline would fain have been Consul to trouble the State, here Consul is the maius, and exul the minus.  Ouid. 1. Reme: amoris. 
Here the body and soul are compared, the body is minus, the soul maius. If thou wilt labour for the good of the body, much more for the good of the soul.  Atque huius eiusdem speciei sunt hae formulae, quae fiunt negatione parium. 
Hither we refer those manner of speeches, which are made by denial of equals.  Omnes ex omni aetate, etc. 
If all the Lawyers of the common wealth were here, they are not comparable to Seruitius Sulpitius: who is the maius.  Aliquando nota nulla est. 
He was so fare from finishing his work, which is the maius, that he had not laid so much as the foundation; which is the minus.  
We ought to be moved with the voice of Poets: why? stones, woods, and wide beasts, will be ordered by music, the minus.  Gradatio illa est à minoribus. 
As in maioribus there was a climbing up from the lesser to the greater: so here there is a falling down from the lesser to the greater.  
Facinus est, vincere civem Romanum, is less than verberare, and verberare less than necare, and necare less in crucem tollere.  Finguntur etiam minora. 
As we heard before of maiora that were feigned: so here we hear of feigned minora.  Ante leues ergo pascentur in aethere cerui, etc. 
The remembrance of kindness is compared with these feigned comparisons.  
O horrible thing, etc. that is the maius: to spew in thy own house at supper is a beastly thing, that is the minus: in caetu vero populi Romani, etc. that is the maius.   

CAP. 21. De similibus.  Adhuc comparatio in quantitate fuit, sequitur comparatio in qualitate, qua res comparatae quales dicuntur: nempe similes aut dissimiles. 
THis is not that quality in an adjunct which was absolutely considered: sequitur comparatio in qualitate, before he told us of comparata in quantitate, here he saith comparatio in qualitate, because all is one: but the categoria is that that Logic looks at rather, than the categorema, ergo he saith here comparatio. By comparata in qualitate, we are to consider the things compared; by comparatio in qualitate we are to understand the arguing or categoria of them, and categorema is more in use then categoria, because Logic is evermore concreate with the thing, ergo comparatio in qualitate is all one as if he had said comparata in qualitate.  Sequitur comparatio in qualitate. 
Or as I may say, comparativa qualitas, qua res comparatae quales dicuntur, as if he should say, by which res comparatae are comparata: so that whilst he saith res, he tells us we consider Logic together with the thing.  Quales dicuntur. 
Because he doth define by coniugates, ergo he saith dicuntur, for coniugata are nomina, and so dictiones are nomina: quales, that is, similes or dissimiles: so that by quails we do not consider any absolute quality in any thing, but that which hath reference to some other thing.  Nempe similes, aut dissimiles. 
As before we heard the ratio of comparata quantitate, so here we shall see the reason of similes, aut dissimiles in qualitate, which is because there are more things than qualities: and hence it comes to pass that some things are like to others, because they have the like quality: and some again are unlike, because they have not the like quality. Again, similia must go before dissimilia, as quantity went before quality, because it did arise immediately from the limits of the essence: now qualities are the acts of the form upon the matter, and there is no act till the essence be limited, ergo till the thing hath quantity, ergo quantity is first. Now similia are first, as the names show; for when we see unlikes, we know them to be dissimilia, by seeing them not to be similia: again, the dissimile is as it were the denial of simile.  Similia sunt, quorum est eadem qualitas. 
Here we may see whither similitude belongs, namely, to Logic, and they are fitly called similia, because they stand in comparison with a thing.  Quorum est eadem qualitas. 
From quality he doth define these qualia, and he saith eadem, not una as in quantity, which was quorum quantitas est una, yet the quality of these is one, and the same: but he saith here eadem, because as we know una belongs to quantity, and eadem to quality.  Similitudo proportio dicitur, etc. 
Here he doth commorari, because the Schools have abused this property, teaching that it doth belong to quantity: so we also abuse it in our common speech, as when we say he is a well proportioned man, when we mean that his members are correspondent, or like one to another.  similia proportionalia: this also follows, which also shows that proportio belongs hither.  Notae similitudinis, etc. 
There are no Topicke places of Logic wherein the Schools have been so mistaken as in these, therefore he sets down the notes to help us the better.  
Servius Sulpitius and his son are compared as similia.  
Augustus' cure of Ovid is compared with Achilles' cure of them only whom he wounded.  
The day of Tully's return to Rome from banishment, was like immortality.  
He was made Verres, my Lord boar-pig, (this shows that their original was from a base beginning, in that they gave themselves such names) as it were by drinking of Circe's cup, which turned Ulysses company into swine.  
They behold Pompey as a man comen from heaven: non ex hac urbe, etc. there is also a dissimilitude, the commandment, and doing are similia.  Similitudinis partes deinceps explicantur. 
Hitherto we have heard short and contract comparisons; now we shall hear them at the full, either where the parts are disjoined, or where they are linked one in another.  Disiuncta quando termini quatuor, etc. 
He calls them termini because they make as it were two axioms, in both which, there is a consequent, and an antecedent part: two termini go to the Protasis, and two to the Antapodosis.  
Here the sickman, and his meat, and the wicked man, and his tasting of praise are made similia.  
Nocte pluit tota rediunt spectacula mane  
Divisum imperium cum jove Caesar habet.  
These are the first verses that Virgil shown himself by, and set them on the gates where Augustus was to come out to be made Emperor, and verses than were rare, only one Ennius (as Tully witnesseth) had made some, which were no good ones, yet they were read for their matter. Virgil was at this time poor, and had not been thereabout long, being as it were a groom in Caesar's stable, and Augustus seeing them, demanded who made them, and none would challenge them, but one Batillus a simple fellow, praemiumque magnum erat adeptus. On the next morning Virgil seeing that, sets on the gates again. Hos ego versiculos feci, etc. and Sic vos non vobis, four times, then Augustus called Batillus to perfect them, and he could not, than Augustus promised a great reward to him that could: so Virgil perfected them, and hereby mocked Battillus: the quatuor termini are these, first Virgil's labour, and the reward that was given Batillus, the other two the ox's ploughing, and others reaping the corn, etc.  Aliquando nulla prorsus est nota. 
As we have heard before in minoribus, so here sometimes there are no notes at all, but they are understood: as when we use allegories. As white Daisies are not esteemed, and black violets gathered: so a white boy sometimes may not be esteemed of, and a black boy regarded. Remember that always in those full comparisons that the proposition is the third argument, and the reddition is the aliquid.  Continua est quando, est primus terminus, &. 
This only it hath special, first it hath only three terms, then only one of them, namely, the middlemost is used twice, ergo, this is more composite the disiuncta similitudo, for there was but one reference of two terms to two, but here is a reference of three terms, where the middlemost hath a double reference.  Ficta similitudo. 
As we heard before in general, that ficta comparata might argue true ones, so it is true especially, for indeed all fables for their matter are nothing but belong to Logic, and are full comparisons.  
If Horace be asked why he used to play on the fiddle in galleries, and why he came not into the city, he will answer by a feigned similitude of the Lion being sick, and the foxes excuse of not coming to him.   

CAP. 22. De Dissimilibus.  Dissimilia sunt comparata, quorum qualitas est diversa. 
THese have their names of does, and similia, because there is a dissimilitude with them, but a little difference, dissent, or rather a diversity; and as dissentanea of does, and sentio, contain diversa which might be consentanies, but for their little difference in logical respect: so dissimilia containe similia, but with a diversity.  Sunt comparata. 
He should say comparata in qualitate, for otherwise comparata is not their next genus, ergo, that should be put in.  Quorum qualitas est diversa. 
Therefore it cannot be said to be the same, now he saith it is but diversa, not opposite: showing that similia are very diversa, but by way of comparison: so that we shall find dissimilia to differ only ratione, but handled comparatione.  Dissimilitudinis propriae notae sunt. 
He still telleth us how to distinguish them.  Heu domus antiqua, etc. 
The house, and the master might be subiectum, and adiunctum, but here they are dissimilia: dispar here is not impar, but dissimile, but they that gave it to dissimilia at first mistook the matter: and use hath changed it.  
The three Countries of France were unlike in speech, in order, and in laws.  
It was all his labour to look with one countenance, to sound with another voice, to go with another pace, etc. these are effects handled with a diversity, & made comparats.  
Neoptolinus, and Achilles, father and son, causa and effectum are made diverse, & are handled with a comparison.  
Wit, and age adjuncts are handled by a dissimilitude.  
A day for sacrifice, and a day for counsel are Dissimilia.  
I thought o Melibeus that Rome had been like Mantua: here is an example of similia, if we look at both: but Virgil meant not so.  Nota plerumque nulla est. 
And yet there is a full comparison. Brutus the first consul of Rome put his son to death for betraying Tarqvinius. Manlius put his son to death for killing one who challenged him to fight.   

CAP. 23. De coniugatis.  Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, sequuntur orta de primis, quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur. 
HItherto we have heard of that that goeth to the being of a thing, and to the well being of the same, and how many ways it may not be another thing, and yet it may be compared with it, to see whether it be a greater, or less, like, or unlike, etc. and having seen things thus, now we come to consider how they may be named, and likewise how they may be ranged under some general head, and then be limited in their essence, and accordingly as we see good, may we give testimony thereof. And hitherto we have heard of those arguments that are firstly in the thing: now we come to consider how these first may argue, secondly by reason of the first.  Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, etc. 
This is an imperfect transition containing the conclusion of that which went before, and the proposition of that which followeth, this course that our author keeps is most natural, for when we see a thing in all the arguments before, than it is requisite that we give it a name.  Sequantur orta de primis. 
They are called orta because we shall see in the particulars every one to have a being from the first.  Quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur. 
And for their arguing they carry themselves ad id quod arguunt, that is, to the aliquid, sicut prima unde oriuntur: so that this is their definition, so that look with what affection the first argue, with the same affection also do these argue: so that the difference of the first, and orta argumenta is not so much in the force of the arguments: as in that these argue after a new manner. These orta are of two sorts, either such as arise more simply, or such as arise more compositely: more simply as coniugata and notatio, for they arise but from one argument alone: more compositely as distributio, and definitio, for they arise from more arguments at once, therefore coniugata, and notatio go before distribution, and definition, for a distribution doth arise from consentanies, and dissentanies: a definition may arise from orta which are after consentanea and dissentanea. The first kind of orta are coniugata, and notatio.  Coniugata, sunt nomina, etc. 
So that these lie principally in the name for their arguing, ergo, they have this in particular: as to spring simply from the first, so to denominate things Coniugata are before notatio because they arise only from consentanies, notatio from both consentanies, and dissentanies: now for coniugata, they are yoked words, sunt nomina, so that these lie in the name.  Variè deducta. 
Variè, not so much in respect of their ending, as in respect of their use.  Ab eodem principio. 
That is, proceeding from one and the same beginning, principium is the thing signified, as the thing justice, etc. as if he should say, coniugates are nomina variè deducta, that is, pulled in sunder, but have the same signification: signifying the same abstract as iustitia, the concrete as iustus, the act as iustè: so that he doth not mean variè deducta, as if they were derivatives, but in respect of the thing: so that here we may see how nomina belong to Logic, namely, as they are things.  In coniugatis symbolum est consentaneorum argumentorum. 
By coniugates he means a casting together: as if he should say you have consentanies only in coniugatis: so that in them is the symbolum, badge and token of consentanies only, and good reason, because these are denominations from one, and the same thing continually, ergo, cannot be possibly from dissentanies, for than they should be from diverse principia.  Libertas quoniam nulli iam restat amanti, etc. 
Liberty is not to him that is in love, ergo, a lover cannot be free, here the thing libertas is not the cause of liber, but cur tu sis liber, looking at the effect together with liber. Now coniugates arise only from argreeing arguments, ergo, there is nothing that goes to the causality, effectity, subiunctity, or adiunctity of a thing (as we may say) but we may denominate from it. As I may call a chest made of wood, a wooden chest: for indeed the reason of the name coniugata is from yoking the thing unto the man, or unto the act.  Cicero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno loquitur. jam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, etc. 
Dionysius coming into Greece, rob their Temples, they used to have fine things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thence came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accursed, because they dedicated them to their Idols: now he took these things, and there was engraven in them, bona Deorum, ergo, he said, he would be so bold as uti eorum bonitate.  
I will not use him as a Consul, because he used me not as a consular, that is, as one that hath been a Consul.  
The cause was consularis, and senatoria, ergo, he needed the help of the Consul, and the Senate, res consularis, and senatoria are the adjuncts to consul, and to senatus.   

CAP. 24. De Notatione.  Notatio est nominis interpretatio: nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum, etc. 
NOw we come to notatio, coniugata did nominate the thing from some thing that was in it, but did not name it properly, but so as it might agree to another thing that had the same consentanie argument in it, from which that name was fetched, but notatio is the name of a thing, that is proper to it, he called the first coniugata; for as we were taught by them to give the thing a name which may be common to some other thing: so here notatio teacheth us to give the thing a name arising from some property in it: so that it be not common to other things; neither is the name and the thing the same, as we heard in coniugates, justitia, iustus, & iustè, were the same, only they were delivered diversely.  Est nominis interpretatio. 
That is, not the laying out of the name, but the reason of the name: so that the arguments arguing are nomen and notatio nominis. Notatio is after coniugata, because it ariseth from dissentanies also, and comparats, whereas coniugates arise only from consentanies.  Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum. 
So saith our Grammar, vox est nota, qua unumquodque vocatur. Now as there are nomina, so ratio reddi potest, si vera notatione fiant. The denomination comes from something, as homo ab humo, for as humus signifieth the fi the earth, so homo names not man earthy, but it is a new name drawn from humus.  
So terra is called vesta à vi stando.  
And fire is called focus à fovendo.  Cicero 4. in Verrem. O Verrea praeclara! Quo enim accessisti, quo non attuleris tecum istum diem! Etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod fawm denique, quod non eversum, atque extersum reliquiriss? etc. 
They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boare-pig: now he was a sweepe-stake, ergo his holy day was named of his manners, Verres à verendo, because he swept all where he came.  Ouid. 1. Fastorum. Prima dies tibi Carna datur, dea cardinis haec est, etc. 
Carna was so called, quasi dea cardinis, because she was conversant about doors and hinges.  
Tuae coniugis, bonae faeminae, locupletis quidem certè, Bambalio quidem pater, etc. As Bambalio was so called because he used to stammer and stutter in his speech.  Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio. 
 Lucus quia umbra opacus, parum luceat, & ludus, qui est longissime à lusu, & This quia minime diues.  E comparatis autem est notatio. 
 Pyropus, quod flammam ignis imititur.  Est vero ut notationi ad suum nomen, sic nomini ad notationem sua affectio. 
Ramus doth commorari here, and shows how the name may argue the notation, as well as the notation may the name, though that be not so common, as animi plenus, ergo animosus, & contra. And thus we have heard how nomina belong to Logic.   

CAP. 25. De distributione.  Reliquum est ex ertis aliunde argumentis, argumentum distributionis & definitionis. 
NOw we come to second orta, which arise manifoldly from more arguments: and this he desired to deliver unto us, when he said distributio, and definitio. Now distributio must come after coniugata, and notatio, in respect of his double arising: then again it is requisite, that after we have seen the first arguments in things, that we next name them from some thing in them, and then that we see a thing as it is common with another: and again when we see the distribution of it into his parts, we may soon see the limits of it, and how fare it reacheth, and so give testimony thereof. Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany arguments, or common, because that a cause may be common to more effects, & contra; and a subject to more adjuncts, & contra: hence it comes to pass that a thing may be distributed, a common cause into special effects, aut contra, a common subject into special adjuncts, & contra. And this we see to be very true in nature by many examples: so that distributio is nothing but taking a common cause, or subject, and dividing it into special effects, or adjuncts, aut contra.  Reliquum est, etc. 
This is an imperfect transition, and indeed containeth a distribution; as if he should say, ortum is reliquum, or primum. A distribution is from common causes, and a special cause, and that is perfect: or from some conflux of other arguments, which the Schools call properties, and that is descriptio.  In qua utraque pars affectio reciprocationis est. 
That is, this is a property to them. Now he saith affectio, because argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum. As if he should say, these arguments are affected to argue with a mutual receiving of themselves, as the whole contains just as much as the parts, & contra, the definition, as the definite, & contra. So that this reciprocation for all the world is like unto two jugglers' pots, where the one will hold just as much water as the other, and neither more nor less: so than the whole is not the parts, nor the definitum the definitio, only there is this mutual affection of reciprocation betwixt them; that is, they have that affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further than the totum, aut contra; the definition, than the definite, aut contra: as when I say a man is sick, or well, here the parts may agree to other things then to man. Answer. True, but we must understand it, as if it were said, homo is either homo aeger, or homo sanus, now this reciprocation in a distribution is of all the parts together with the whole.  Distributio est cum totum in parts distribuitur. 
Having showed the general affection, he now comes to tell what distribution is: it is called distribution in the active signification in respect of the parts; now distribution is the categoria, and the parts and the whole are the categoremata.  Cum totum in parts distribuitur. 
Here is first a totum, which shows that it is always some common thing, and the parts are special things contained in the whole: so that that which is new here is common, as a common cause, a common effect, subject, or adjunct, etc. and here this common is called a totum, as it contains the parts, than again this distribution is as it were a pulling the parts in pieces, and not a joining or gathering of them together, though inductio be an inversa distributio: but he rather useth this word distributio, because it is more general, and more in use, and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in use, then contra.  Totum est, quod continet parts. 
It is that which holdeth together the parts: continet, because all the parts are in the whole, as in one, as being the common head wherein they are.  Pars est, quae continetur a toto. 
For the container is the totum, and the parts the contained: so that the doctrine of distributio is but to teach us how to range and carry every thing to his home. It is a great question among the Physicians, whether a wen be a part of a man's body, or no. Answer. It is morbus, ergo, no part: it is in toto, but not contained à toto, for the whole contains the members by reason of its form, if we speak of integrum, but the form reacheth not to this.  Atque ut distinctio totius in parts, distributio: sic collectio partium, etc. 
Many Logicians have made this to belong to argumentatio, but they are deceived, for they belong hither, and it is the same to do and undo, to divide the whole into parts, and to colligere the parts to make up the whole.  Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consentaneis, inter se autem dissentaneis. 
Here he showeth from whence distribution ariseth, namely, from consentanies, in respect of the parts with the whole, and also from dissentanies, either disparats or contraries, in respect of the parts between themselves.  Itaque tanto accuratior erit, quanto partium, etc. 
This is a deduction from that that went before; for if the former be true, than this also: now the greatest dissension is of contraries, and the greatest of all is between something and nothing, ergo to distribute into tricotomies, and quadricotomies, etc. is to skip over some thing that should be taught. And thus much for distribution in general.   

CAP. 26. De distributione ex causis.  Distributio prima est ex absolute consentancis, causis nempe, & effectis. 
COncerning this doctrine of distributio, we have heard the generality: the ground from whence a distribution doth arise, is for that the first arguments are common: as a common cause may be distributed by the effects, in like sort a common effect may be distributed into special causes: and so for the subject and adjunct: so that beside that community there is nothing new in this second invention. In a distribution we observed a whole, and a part: the whole contains the parts, and the parts are contained of the whole, ergo if either the whole contain not all the parts, or all the parts be not contained of the whole, there will be no distribution. Now these arguments did arise from consentanies, in respect of the whole, but from dissentanies inter se. Itaque tanto accuratior erit, etc. ergo a distribution into a dicotomy which is of contraries is the best; yet if it cannot be had, we must be fain to make a tricotomy: now we come to the species of distribution.  Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, & effectis. 
A distribution is a derivative argument from cause, or from modo quodam consentaneorum ut subiectorum, & adiunctorum. Now the use of distribution is this, that we may range every thing in his own order and place, for when we have seen a thing in his esse, and bene esse, and then that it is not this or that; and have also compared it with other things, to see whether it be equal or unequal, like or unlike, and likewise have given it a name; in the next place it is requisite, that we set it in his rank, for so the Lord hath ranged every thing in the world, as man under his genus animal, for the Lord hath made all things liable to our Logic, ergo they must be ranged under some head, that we may see how they agree, and how they disagree.  Distributio prima est, etc. 
Distributio is double (as I said before) ex absolute consentaneis, & modo quodam consentaneis: so that he calls that distribution which ariseth from a general cause, and a general effect. Distributio prima: It is prima in a double respect; first because causa and effectum are prima: secondly, as they are before subiectum and adiunctum. He takes distributio here in the active signification, and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted, for he doth define them from the parts dividing. For the notation of the word (which gives great light) it comes of tribuo, and dis, as if it signified that distribution that justice gives: it is a term belonging to Law, as many of our logical terms do: and here it signifieth a severing of the parts, and a giving to every part his due: as when a common cause is distributed, and then to every special effect his own cause is given: so that here is nothing in this new invention, but this distribution, the rest is the first invention: as when I say a man is sick, and a man is well, here are two subjects, and two adjuncts: but when I say of men, some are sick, & some are well, here is a distribution. Now the reason why he joineth both causa and effectum together, saying, ex absolute consentan●is, causis nempe, & effectis, is because that in a distribution as there are parts, so there is a whole; distributio being both active and passive, though it be principally denominated from the parts: so that where the cause is the whole, there the effects must be parts.  Distributio ex causis est, quando partes sunt causae totius. 
So that here the effect is the whole, and the causes are the parts: now he prosecutes the doctrine of distribution by the parts, because he goes according to the act of things, and the parts here constitute the whole: again, a whole, the very name doth deny a distribution; for if it be whole it is not distributed: but the parts show a whole, ergo we must apply distribution to the parts; hence distributio ex causis is not when the cause is a whole, but when the causes are parts: hence a distributio ex integro is before a distributio ex genere, because there the parts are effects.  
Distributio ex causis is here the first invention, in that he saith ex causis, the second invention in that he saith distributio. Again, there is the first invention, when he saith, quando partes sunt causae; the second invention when he saith, quando partes sunt causae totius; so that take the common effect, and make it a whole; the causes, and make them parts, and this is the second invention.  Hîc distributio integri in sua membra praecipuè laudatur. 
This now is a special modus of distributio ex causis, there may be a distribution of the effect, by the efficients, by the materials, by the formalls, and from the end: but he doth not stay upon them, but presently comes to the distributio integri in membra, because it is of greater use, and of more practice.  Hic. 
That is in the distributio ex causis: so that membra are parts, but all parts are not membra: and integrum is totum, but every totum is not integrum.  Praecipuè laudatur. 
Why? first because it is of so great use: secondly, because it is more secret, the other more familiar.  Integrum est totum, cui partes sunt essentiales. 
The integrum, the entire as we call it, is totum, that is, quod continet parts, ergo the membra must be contained of the integrum, giving thereunto both portion of matter, and portion of form: hence nails and hairs are not membra of a man's body, because they give not a portion of matter, and form to it.  Cui partes sunt essentiales. 
So than if the members be essential to the whole, they give essence to it, that is, they afford causa: now essentia stands principally in the matter, and form, ergo he means these parts give matter, and form to the whole.  Membrum est pars integri. 
Therefore it is contained of the whole, ergo, gives essence, but how gives it essence? thus, which few Logicians show, as for example, in a man's body, every member hath his own matter, and form, and all the members together make up a common matter, and a common form of the whole: so that a man is made of a soul, and a body, than the soul is made of matter & form: the body also is made of organical parts, and they give matter and form to it: then the simular parts contain the matter and form of the organical, and the simular parts are made of a portion of the matter, and of the forms of the elements: so that we may see the form of man's body ariseth from a manifold comparison, now the integrum is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hoc aliquid, yet is it totum, though it be always singular. Why is integrum before membrum, seeing it gives essence to it. Answer. Integrum is made of the parts, and is a totum, ergo, must go before. Again it is here before in this new invention, because it doth here continere parts, ergo, is the agent: again, when we consider distributio, because the whole doth distribute, & the parts are distributed, ergo, it is requisite, that we first see the whole; hence it is rather called distributio, then inductio, because it is more frequent to dispute from the whole to the parts, then from the parts to the whole. Now if integrum be cui partes sunt essentiales, and membrum be pars integri, than whatsoever is true of a part, is true of the whole, not contra, because membrum is essentiale toto, non contra. And by this rule it stands that Christ's sufferings are to be given to him, as he is whole Christ, both God, and man: then again, by this rule we see, that that which he hath felt being head, the whole hath felt: which if we consider well, we may see how Christ's righteousness is made ours, because he is the head, and that which the head suffers, the whole suffers, ergo, that is the wholes, that the head hath done.  Sic Grammatica in etymologiam & syntaxin, etc. 
For why? Grammatica is the whole Art, Etymology and Syntax are the parrs thereof. Dialectica in inventionem, & iudicium dividitur.  
Kickerman cannot away with this example, for (saith he) Dialectica is the habit, invention, and judgement are Arts: now the parts must be of the same nature with the whole, because they constitute the whole. Alas poor man, this it is, the rule of Logic is the rule of man's reason, ergo, the rule must run along not according to the nature of reason, for that belongs to natural Philosophy, but according to the act of it. Now by invention, and judgement, I do not mean the act, but the rule of the act that teacheth me invenire: invenire is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of this part of invention: now Dialectica is the whole, ergo, invention and judgement must consist of precepts containing the matter, and form of the whole. Bene disserere is the end of Logic, ergo, these two parts must shoot at this mark; then again the form of Dialectica bene disserere ariseth from the parts, so that as our author teacheth them, they contain a portion of the matter, and a portion of the form of Logic. This it is, Logic looks at the motus of reason, and invention and judgement contain the motus, ergo, they are the parts.  Haec distributio principalis est, cum rei longioris explicatio suscipitur. 
You have heard what is required in a perfect definition of the integrum into the members: and here are many, yea most fallaces of any arguments, as if we leave out any part in a distribution; again, in distributione ex integro, if the parts do not contain a portion of the matter, and form of the whole: again, when we distribute in Grammar, vox est litera aut syllaba, it is not a perfect distribution, because these parts are not dissentany inter se, for a letter contains portion of the matter, and form of a syllable, and so is essential to it. Haec distributio principalis est, si rei longioris, etc. if you mean to make any long discourse of any thing, divide it, for it gives great light, and help to your own memory, and to the people, hence distributions are the chief things in Art; hence many call their books partitions. Kickerman calls his systema, which belongs to distributio: and the respect of a distribution is but from a part of the Art, ergo, his name is to straight: ergo, remember this rule by any means, for it is of great use, both for the good of the teacher, and of the learner.  Virgilius 1. Georg. 
Quid faciat laetas segetes: quo sidere terram  
Vertere (Maecenas) ulnusque adiungere vites, etc.  
Here Virgil distributes his whole work; this is a distribution of the integrum into the members, not of the subject into his adjuncts (as some will have it) for it is a distribution of his book. First he will teach how to blow, then how to set vines, then how to order cattle, then how to order Bees.  Cicero pro Mureno. Intelligo (iudices) tres accusationis partes fuisse: & earum unam in reprehensione vitae, etc. 
His oration was divided into three parts, first the reproving of Murenus for his life; Secondly, his seeking of honour; Lastly, the accusing of him of ambition: so Preachers divide their speech, not their text.  
Quin etiam aliter tractatur hoc argumenti genus, vel à  
partibus ad totum, vel a toto ad parts. Catullus.  
Quintia formosa est multis: mihi candida, longa,  
Recta est: haec ego sic singula confiteor, etc.  
Again, he shows another modus, when we bring in an induction of the parts to make up the whole, or when we argue from the whole to prove all the parts. As Quintia was fair to many, here is the totum, to me she is candida, longa, & recta, but there other things wanting in her to make her beautiful, namely, venustas, & mica salis: wit to make merry jests without offence, and good carriage: so here we see how he by withdrawing a part, denies the whole.  
Lesbian formosa est: quae cum pulcherrima tota est,  
Tum omnibus una omnes surripuit Veneres.  
Here now contrary to the other example, he gathers all the parts of beauty in one, and so concludes the whole.   

CAP. 27. De distributione ex effectis, ubi de genere & specie.  Distributio ex effectis, est quando partes sunt effecta. 
THe original of a distribution is from firsts arguments coming to have a generality, because they are common to many, distributio ex effectis est, etc. that is, when special causes may be given to one common effect, for as integrum though it be singular, yet is it totum, because it is made of the portions of the matter and form of the members: so here the effects are made of their genus.  
Now he says distributio ex effectis, because it ariseth ex effectis, for there are the causes distributing, and the parts distributed: so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta: quando partes sunt effecta: so as the whole doth symbolicè contain the causes, so the parts do symbolicè contain the effect: as if he should say, effecta we heard of in the first inventio, but effecta here sunt parts, this is the second invention. God as he made all things, so hath he ranged, and ordered them one under another: so that in this definition, this is all, the parts are the effects, and the cause is the whole. Mariners are general causes, but they have special effects, for some climb the shroud, some run up and down, some pump, etc. here are the effects of the efficient cause: so we may distribute from the matter, as of wood is made a wooden chest, or table, or stool, etc. so from the form, as we may from the genus, but this always consider in general, that the parts be part of the whole, and that they be homogeny parts, for if we shall divide a whole into parts, and particles, there will be no distribution, as if a man's body be anatomised; because the particles will agree with the parts.  Distributio generis in species hic excellit. 
He doth here hasten to genus, as being the principal thing in this place: and it is as if he should say, that distribution which we usually hear of, and which we have so often in schools of genus and species, they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis: and it is true, and whilst the common Logicians see not this, they know not the truth of them, nor their original, and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logic: so they know them not in their cause, but only in their second nature.  Hic excellit. 
As if he should say, this is the chiefest modus in this distribution.  Genus. 
Genus signifieth firstly a stock, or kindred, now because all the species come from one root, as a family cometh from one stock, ergo, it is called genus, or as the parents are causes of their children, so is genus cause of the species: so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles.  Species. 
This signifieth in the original the countenance of a thing, now we come to see nothing but singulars, ergo, individua, and species infimae are properly species, it comes of an old verb specio, or spicio; species it is that which is looked on: excellit that is of principal use, and this is the reason thereof, the Lord hath ranged all things under his own general, but this kind of ranging is more general than the rest, and the genus giving essence to the species, it draweth the species with it wheresoever it goeth; hence it is that wheresoever the genus of any thing is taught, there also must the species be taught, and this was the father of predicaments, so that there is nothing, but is under a genus, but genus generalissimum.  Genus est, totum partibus essentiale. 
Totum est quod continet parts, for the parts we heard were holden together in the whole, for before whilst the members did contribute every one a portion of matter and form, they made up the whole, now genus is totum, but contrary to integrum, for there the integrum had his whole matter and form from the members: but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter, and in a common form.  Totum essentiale. 
By this we are to understand that which gives essence, that is, matter, and form: so that integrum did contain all that the members had, but the genus doth not contain all that the species have: so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species, yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus: when I say totum essentiale, I say two things, first, that genus is a totum: secondly, that there is nothing in the genus, but is also in the species.  
Objection. But how can it be said that genus gives essence to the species, whereas they have more in them then the genus.  
Answer. To contain is to hold together, now because the species agree in one common matter, and a common form, as in uno puncto, ergo, genus doth contain them: so that reciprocation here is to be understood so fare forth, as by their hypostatical union the species are made one in their genus; hence it is that whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with the genus must agree with the species: therefore if any in distributing shall make any part as large as the genus, as Logicians distribute genus into perfectum, and imperfectum, they make species totum and not genus: so ens is substantia, or accidens will not come into any Art, for the parts are consentanies inter se being subiectum, and adiunctum.  Partibus. 
Pars est quae continetur non in toto, sed à toto, totum est quod continet, as being the common punctum wherein the parts meet together, he saith also partibus non parti.  Species est pars generis. 
Pars we heard before: generis: so that as membrum was pars integri, not generis, so species est pars generis, not integri: so that they which divide parts into integral, or simular, understand not Logic, for a part simular is nothing but species, which is pars generis, as a pan of water, and a drop of water is genus and species: a bone, and a part of a bone, is also genus and species, now they call it simular because they have the same denomination, why so, genus doth predicarere, & nomine, as they say pars generis, here observe that species hath reference only to genus, and so genus to species: even as causa is effecti causa, and subiectum adiuncti subiectum, for they are relates, ergo, can repeat no other thing, but one another: so again genus is totum, not speciei, but specierum, ergo, when we give a double face to him, we make him like janus with a double forehead, for they make the same species to be species to two things: species therefore is generis species, as one son is but son of one father.  
Now this is their trouble, that they cannot distribute a species into individua, because (say they) individua do but differre numero: what is that? differre numero is properly to reckon up, or make an induction of the individua to make up the species: again when we distribute that species into all his individua, there is a distribution, for there is a totum, and parts distributed.  
Objection. But in a distribution we should have but two species.  
Answer. Why, is it not requisite that there should always be a dicotomie, for indeed if we could find it out, every thing is dicotomised, but the Lord hath not revealed it unto men, but hath kept it secret to himself.  
Objection, Singulars have no differences, but are distinct only by a conflux of common accidents.  
Answer. Then singulars should not differ in essence, ergo, I should be the same with you, and you with me, the first matter indeed was imperfect, but every thing else is an effect, ergo, hath all the causes, ergo, the form. If they ask me what it is, I answer them, that my soul is my form, as they hold: or else thus, as my members are not another's man's members; so my form arising from the parts of my body, is not another man's form, but is really distinct from it.  
Objection. But (say they) the reasonable soul is general to all men.  
Answer. There indeed may be some scruple, but when we consider that the forms of the body, and the soul make up the form of a man, we shall see every man to have a distinct form, by which we shall know them each from other.  Sic animal genus hominis & bestiae dicimus. 
He means that genus is a general totum, and comprehendeth the species under it: for as a hen covereth her chickens with her wings; so genus covereth the species with his essence: then again, make an axiom, as homo est animal, and you shall see the species to be the subject more often then the genus, ergo, he saith subiecta.  Genus est generalissimum, aut subalternum. 
Here he distributes genus unto us, showing us that there are two kinds thereof: the one is generalissimum, for so indeed every genus is general and hath his subsistency only in singularibus: and because all genera do subsist in singularibus: ergo, all but singularia are genera: hence it is that they say in Schools, ens, and unum confunduntur.  Species subalterna, aut specialissima. Genus generalissimum, cuius nullum est genus. 
Generalissimum is so called, because it is most genus, because that can be nothing but genus. Subalternum genus is genus, but not only genus, nor always genus.  Cuius nullum est genus. 
There must needs be an end: for as there is a lowest whereat we must begin, so there must be an highest above which we cannot go; for there cannot be an infinitus motus in creatures: so the Lord hath in great wisdom ranged things in their order. So the common Logicians have made ten predicaments, or genera generalissima: but the first four have Logicks use in them, the rest are arguments, but if we would know the genera generalissima, every Art will tell us them best: now we may ascend to ens too: so that ens is the definitum indeed.  
God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so in Logic argumentum is genus generalissimum; vox in Grammar, etc. and all these are species of ens.  Nullum genus. 
Here he denies any genus to stay our reason, that so we may not go too fare: for since genus ariseth from the matter, we shall at last come to that which is no genus, but a matter only, ergo, we must distribute this into his matter, and form.  Subalternum genus, ut subalterna item species, quoth species huius, illius autem genus est. 
Subalternum genus, may also be subalterna species: so that these being one and the same, only differing in respect, therefore one definition may serve for them both.  Species specialissima, quae est individua in species alias, ut materia & forma singulares. 
Species (as before) signifies firstly a singular thing, and other species are called species at the second hand, but individua are properly called species quae speciuntur. Now he saith specialissima, that is indeed, and properly, as generalissimum had no genus above it, so species specialissima hath no species under it: individua is here an adjunct to species specialissima: now he saith individua, because he speaks of division, ergo here he tells us, that we can go no further, to find any inferior species, we may only divide it into members, if we will.  Genus vero, & species notae sunt causarum & effectorum. 
He doth commorari here, because the Schools have not commonly received, that genus contains the matter and common form of the species: but we know a perfect definition lays out the quiddity of a thing, that is, the matter, and the form: now the form is there, but where is the matter? why, the genus contains the quiddity, the essence, the causes, ergo it is an argument unanswerable that the genus contains the matter.  Hinc universale est insigne, ac praestabile, quia causam declarat. 
The common Logicians never looked after any distribution, but of the integrum into the members, and of the genus into the species: now integrum is commonly a singular, ergo in opposition to it they called genus an universal: then again the integrum is made of the matter and form of the members, now they are singulars, ergo there can arise nothing from them, but that which is singular. Now the genus is common to the species, therefore by reason thereof it comes to be universal, and we must apprehend it in our minds. Objection. It is a great question whether universalia be realia, or only intentionalia. Answer. True it is, that every universal is subsistent in singularibus, so that there is truly animal: but we must look for him in individuis, for genus is totum partibus essentiale: but if we make an abstraction of it from the singulars, than it is not real: but here is a fallace, for the universal still remains a thing, though I thus consider it in my mind: for I would dispute with them thus, If it be but a phantasm, then can it give no essence. Again, when we define, do we not lay out the thing? ergo if genus were only mental, it could not give essence: so causa, effectum, and all other arguments are things real in nature, howsoever my Logic takes hold of them.  Insigne. 
True it is, that every whole is general, because it is totum, but genus is universale insigne, ac praestabile, and so it appears: for because it gives esse not only in a distribution, but also in a definition, ergo it is of great use even set in the forefront of the Aristotelians, quia causam declarat, and our knowledge is è causis.  Distributio generis in species valdè quidem excellit, sed difficilis est & rara inventu. 
Valde excellit, that is in use, sed difficilis est, & rara inventu, the reason is this, the genus is totum universale, and gives matter and form to the species: now the form is hard to be found: so that in common Authors we find this definition seldom, but in Arts it is more often: yet if we should examine it strictly, we might cavil; as when I say animal is homo, or brutum, here animal and homo have the same form, only homo and brutum do differ in form.  Ouidius 1. Metamor. 
Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,  
Astra tenent coeleste solum formaeque deorum, etc.  
Here animal is the genus; astra, pisces, bestiae, & volucres, are the species, being argued by their several subject of places, and man is argued à comparatis, and from his adjunct authority.  Cic. 1. Officiorum, virtutem dividit in species quatuor. 
So Tully distributes virtue into four parts, and gives the definitions of the species for the species themselves.  Distributio generis informas specierum eadem est, etc. 
The reason follows: ut animalium aliud loquens, aliud mutum: We may see our Author could not tell what to make the form of homo, for one while he saith animal is rationale aut irrationale, here he saith loquens, aut mutum.  
Objection. But how can this distribution of generis in formas be true, when as the forms of the species are not in genere?  
Answer. Because the genus contains the matter and form of the species, and the special form is a membrum of the species, ergo the genus being in individuis, and giving esse to them, may be said to contain their special form, even as I may be truly said to hold a stool in my hand, when as I have but a part of it in my hand.  Genus & species non solum tractantur hac simplici divisionis formula, sed etiam separatim alterum ex altero. 
You have not genus and species always used after this simple manner, but one to argue another: for when I say homo est animal, there is a distribution, though there be but one species.  Pro Archia. Ac ne quis a nobis hoc ita dici fortè miretur, etc. 
Because he was a Rhetorician, therefore he should speak for Poetry, for they are both Arts: here he reasons à genere ad species; for arse is the genus, and eloquentia and Poetica are species.  
Contra genus tractatur per species.  
Ouid. 4. Tristium.  
Materiamque tuis tristem virtutibus imple:  
Ardua per praeceps gloria vadit iter. etc.  
Glory goes through an headlong journey: why? if Troy had not been the cause of Hector's glory, he had not been glorious: so that the art of War, of a Pilot at Sea, of Physic, etc. had not been known but by adversity.  Exempla igitur specialia suo generi accommodata, sunt huius loci. 
That is, when examples are applied to their genera sunt huius loci, that is, they are species: now the very name commends a similitude to us, neither it there an example, but there is a similitude: as when one sets a child a copy to write by, it is a simile for him to make a simile by; and when one example is brought to argue an example, it is a simile, but when it is brought to argue a genus, than it is a species.  Ad Atticum 7. Vrbem tu relinquas? etc. 
The question is, whether the City is to be left: it is lawful, Themistocles did so: it is not lawful, for our people did not forsake Rome, neither did Pericles forsake the city.   

CAP. 28. De distributione è subiectis.  Reliqua distributio est quodam modo consentaneorum, ut subiectorum & adiunctorum. Distributio è subiectis est, cum partes sunt subiecta. 
DIstributio hath his denomination from the parts, because it is active in respect of them, and passive in regard of the whole: then again, because of the consention of the whole with the parts, ergo it is ex consentaneis: now there may be a common subject to more adjuncts, & contra, ergo he saith, Reliqua distributio est quodam modo consentaneorum: and to use any more particular description of them is to no purpose, seeing we have heard what subiectum and adiunctum are.  Distributio è subiectis est, cum partes sunt subiectae. 
So that if we shall but sever them, we shall see nothing but subiectum and adiunctum: if we keep them together, we shall see the arising affection.   apud Catullum. Virginitas non tota tua est, ex parte parentum est, etc. 
The maid's virginity is divided into three subjects; not as an integrum into members, but three were owners of it, as three men may be owners of one ship.  Sic Cicero 5. Tusculanorum. Sunt enim tria genera bonorum, ut iam a laqueis Stoicorum, etc. 
So bonum: the totum is showed by his subjects: it is corporis the subject, or of external things belonging to the whole man, or animi.  
Some, as Kickerman and Doctor Downham, would have this distribution ex subiectis, and the next, to be imperfect, even as definitio is perfecta, aut imperfecta: but they are much deceived, for when a perfect definition may be had, we use no description, ergo it serves only where a perfect definition cannot be had: it is not so here; for if we have a perfect definition, either integri in membra, or generis in species, we must not therefore leave out these, if they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aut contra; as we see axioma is affirmatum, and negatum must come into Logic, though it have his species afterward. Again, these distributions cannot be reduced to the perfect ones, either of integrum, or genus.   

CAP. 29. De distributione ex adiunctis.  
DIstributio ex adiunctis est, quando partes sunt adiuncta: ergo, the whole is subiectum.  
 hominum alij sani, alij aegri, etc. This distribution will not be distributed (as I said before) into genus and species.  Sic Virgilius 1. Georg. 
Quinque tenent coelum zonae, quarum una corusco, etc.  
The heaven is distributed by his adjuncts: it is temperate or intemperate, to dicotomize it, intemperate is hot, or cold: hot is the middle zone, cold are them between the Tropickes: temperate are the other two.  Caesar. 1. belli Gallic. 
Gallia est omnis divisa in parts tres, etc.  
Caesar divides the Country of France into three parts, according to the inhabitants thereof.   

CAP. 30. De definitione.  Definitio est, cum explicatur quid res sit, eaque vicissim definitio argui potest. 
HItherto we have heard of a distribution; now we come to a definition: for having heard what a thing is, and how it differs from others, notwithstanding it may be compared with them, and be equal, or unequal, like, or unlike, and then be named: lastly, be ranged under some head: having I say seen all these things clapped close together in the thing, now it remains that we should lay out the limitation of it, and circumscribe it: This is the last of all, because it may arise from any of the arguments going before, and also from orta which follow.  Definitio est cum explicatur quid res sit. 
We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and definition: now definition ariseth as it shall fall out, either from agreers, or disagreers, comparates, or orta, ergo, it arising from more arguments than any of the rest, it is requisite that it should be after all the rest: though in laying down an Art it will have the first place, because if it be a perfect definition it lays out the essence of a thing immediately: if it be a description it lays down the quantity, etc. A definition is as it were a box, that lays up all the rules following in the Art, even as the body doth the members.  Definitio. 
For the name, we know finis is terminus, and belongs to Geometry: we heard it borrowed from thence into Logic to signify a cause, here it signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that definire is to set down the extreme, or utmost points of a thing, ergo it must be reciprocal with the thing defined, else can it not define it: for if the definitum be larger than the definitio, than it outreacheth the limits of the thing: if it be less, than it layeth not out the essence fully.  Cum explicatur. 
So that definitio doth lay abroad: explicatio is a laying abroad the quiddity of a thing. In that he saith definitio doth explicare, he means all the arguments before were clapped together in the thing confusedly, but the definition doth lay them abroad: as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Logic, but when I say, it is ars bene disserendi, here the definition lays out all more at large: the definite is like a Pedlar's pack, wherein his points, pins, knives, etc. are shut up altogether, and the definitio is like the laying of them out, or showing of them, to the end that he may sell them. The one may likewise be compared to a garment folded up, the other to a garment spread abroad at large.  Quid. 
That is, the essence: for as in a perfect definition we may gather the other arguments of a thing, from the causes: so in a description we may gather the causes from other arguments: this entity therefore or essence, the definition always looks at: another difference of the definitum, and the definitio is, that the definitum is ens, and the definitio is essentia.  Res. 
That is the ens the subject of the general Arts, that is Aliquid in the definition of argumentum.  Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest. 
As the definite called before res may be argued a definitione, so contra: though the definitio be more often brought to argue the definite, then contra: ergo, it hath the name definition, not from definitum, but from the definitio.  
Objection. Kickerman saith, Ramus will have definitio both an argument, and an axiom.  
Answer. No, we make it an argument when we speak properly, we make it an axiom when we speak Synecdochichos.  Definitio est perfecta, aut imperfecta. 
This distribution is now to good purpose, for the schools have not agreed at any time of any perfect definition, as they say homo est animal rationale, this is not a perfect definition, ergo, some do add mortale, some capax disciplinae: some both: so that indeed we cannot give a perfect definition of any thing, ergo, because it is so hard to find the special form, it is requisite to have an imperfect one to grope out the form thereby, else we should be undone, if we could no way look at the essence of things, and here by the way we see the quiddity laid out perfectly by a perfect definition, and imperfectly by an imperfect definition.  Illa, propriè definitio; haec, descriptio dicitur. 
Where we may see that perfecta definitio is properly the species of this definition, and that the definition before, was synecdochical; now that explicatio of the thing is perfect or imperfect: the one called definitio, the other descriptio; the one containing the limitation of the essence, the other the limitation of the quantity: so that whatsoever hath an essence distinct from itself must be limited, ergo, may be defined: ergo, have their perfect definition, though we cannot see what their form is.  Definitio perfecta est definitio constans è solis causis essentiam constituentibus. 
The reason is, because it stands of more parts, namely the genus, and form, laying out the composition of the thing.  E causis. 
As if he should say, they do give existere to the definite.  Solis. 
Because no other arguments come in a perfect definition.  Essentiam constituentibus. 
That is, materia, and forma, but materia is included in genere: so that definitio is ortum doubly, now there are four causes which give esse, but two of them only give essence, so that the effect hath his substance from the matter, and form, not from the other causes.  Quales causae genere, & forma comprehenduntur. 
Ramus doth commorari upon this doctrine, showing that a perfect definition doth lay out the substantial quiddity of a thing: now the reason why he saith genere, and not materia simply, but materia as it is in genere, is this, because the genus containeth not only the matter, but also a portion of the form, the general form: ergo, it must be the next genus that we must bring in a perfect definition, for if the genus be more remote, than the form of the next genus must be left out: but if we take the next genus, than we bring in all above it.  Et forma comprehenduntur. 
That is the special form: the reason in nature is this, we find that the totum is not subsistent but in singularibus: now we find moreover that singulars have that whereby they are singulars beside, for else one singular could not be distinct from another, ergo, every singular must have his peculiar form, and also his matter, not as it is a first argument, but as it is symbolicè in genere.   in animali, & pars formae. 
He means of the general form, for anima vegetativa, and sensitiva are the forms of vivens, and so of animal.  Totam formam hominis. 
As if the form of man did consist of these as of parts: but it is not so, the truth is this, there is in some things a simple life, in some things more lives, as anima vegetativa is firstly in planta: now animal hath that, and somewhat more, namely, sensitiva; and man hath both them and also reason, so that one of the species hath nothing, but that which the genus hath, namely, vivens and planta, for planta is vivens, quae vivit vitam tantùm vegetativam, and so is vivens, only tantùm makes the difference from others. Now from this discourse he gathers, that a definition is universale symbolum, not that singulars cannot be perfectly defined, as well as universals, but he means it is a symbolum containing universally the causes constituting the essence: so that the individuum hath the matter, and form of every genus above him, ergo, it is universale in this respect, having his peculiar form added to them.  Naturam. 
Here we may see what nature is in things properly: some make the form only to be nature, some the matter only, and some both form and matter: here we see the essence and nature are all one: in the first signification natura signifies res nata: secondly, it signifies res unde res nata est, that is, the causes: so that here know that the causes being put, all things attending them follow, for so natura is taken for the properties of a thing. E qui dat formam, dat formam consequentiam: so that a perfect definition doth deliver whatsoever comes within the name of nature.  Tales definitiones sunt artium. 
No not tales if we should exactly try them by this rule, but they are the best examples. Now arse is not the next genus to Grammar, neither is been loqui the form, but the end of Grammar, but he tells us hereby, that there is a soul of Grammar, which is in every rule, which is as it were the simular parts of the Art, tending to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bene loqui.   

CAP. 31. De Descriptione.  Descriptio est definitio ex aliis etiam argumentis rem definiens. 
THis we heard to be generally called definitio: so that it doth quodam modo definire: but as definitio in general before was a trope, so descriptio is not a definition, but as it doth explicate quid res sit, not definiendo from the essence, but describendo from the quantity: so that the definitio lays out the flesh, bones, etc. and descriptio lays out the compliments. The definition was internal, the description is but external, limiting the thing as it were with chauke. The description may be compared to the Carpenter's chaulking, the definition to the thing chaulked: and by how much the thing itself lays out the quiddity of it better than the chaulking doth, by so much is a perfect definition more excellent than a description: so that here remember that howbeit a description cannot see the arguments laying out the essence of the thing, yet the intendment of it is to do it.  Est definitio. 
That is, rem definiens, that is, quidditatem rei explicans.  Ex aliis etiam argumentis. 
That is, others beside the causis: so that a description must have a genus with it, if it be not a genus generalissimum, that hath no genus: again he saith, ex alijs, not telling us which, because any of the arguments aforegoing may go into it, even a distribution, yea a testimony also, as we may see in the description of fama: so that it may arise from inartificials, yet must it not be taught after them, because artificials must have nothing to do with inartificialls.  Atque haec succincta brevitas non est in hac specie perpetua, sed saepe illustriorem, & magnificentiorem explicationem desiderat. 
Our author doth commorari upon the use of a description, showing that it is not always so brief as before, but sometime we shall lay it out in all the simples in the thing.  Sed saepè illustriorem & magnificentiorem, etc. 
That is, when we deliver things that are magis illustriora, & magnificentiora, it is requisite we should lay them out more at large, than those that are of less moment.  Sic gloria describitur in Miloniaena. Sed tamen ex omnibus praemiis virtutis, si esset habenda ratio praemiorum, amplissimum esse praemium, gloriam, etc. 
Glory is argued from his genus praemium: praemium from his subject virtus, then à comparatis amplissimum; last ab effectis.  
Sic 4. Aeneid: fama describitur.  
Extemplo Libyae magnas ut fama per urbes,  
Fama malum, quo non aliud velocius ullum, etc.  
Fama is the aliquid argued by her effect of going, then by the subject of place, urbes, and magnas an adjunct to urbes, urbes Libyae the integrum, extemplo an adjunct of time: malum a genus, and malum is argued by an adjunct, swiftness à minore. Monstrum another genus, horrendum an adjunct, mirabile dictu a testimony, nec dulci declinat somne a disparate.  Tales sunt descriptiones plantarum, animalium in Pbysicis; item fluminum, etc. 
That is, when we lay out their whole quiddity at large: and thus have we seen all the artificial arguments, that are in any thing: and so have seen the thing both within and without: lastly, we shall hear that, having seen all in a thing, that we have heard of before, then may we safely give testimony of it, as we see occasion, and not before.   

CAP. 32. De testimonio Divino.  Exposito artificiali argumento, sequitur inartificiale. Argumentum inartificiale est, quod non sua natura, sed assumpta artificialis alicuius argumenti vi arguit. 
WE have heard of artificial arguments, and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing, but we have heard it: so that if we look at any of the creatures of God to see the root, the causes of it, and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof, we may by these arguments taught before, see it throughly. Now whereas one man cannot see all things, though at the first all things were made for one man, the Lord hath in wisdom ordained that we should receive some things by reports from others, for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures, it was impossil e that one man should see all things intus & in cute: so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man, and he afterwards could not see them, yet still it is so fare forth true whilst all men see all things. It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason, that artificiale was so called, namely of being in the thing, whereas this is not in the nature of the thing, but externè altogether: so that we may see his force by this, having no farther to do with the thing, then only by witnessing of it.  Exposito artificiali argumento, etc. 
This transition contains the conclusion of all that went before, and the proposition of that which follows: and here again we may see how artificial arguments go before inartificialls, because inartificial arguments have no ground, but as they are backed with artificials. And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practice of common people, for if a man give testimony of that he knows not, others will say he doth he knows not what: for as no man can give testimony of that he knows not; so no man ought to receive a testimony, but as it is backed with artificials, otherwise he knows not the thing sufficiently, as he should, and if he first hear a testimony of a thing, and afterward come to see the thing, he will then say he knows it, not because one testified so much, but because himself saw it to be so; it is called argumentum inartificiale, because it never comes into Art to make up a rule, though it may come in as a commoration to prove a rule syllogistically, but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogisms, now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art, to which the thing witnessed doth belong: as Aristotle's authority against the Creation of the world belongs to Divinity, there to be confuted in the doctrine of the Creation.  Argumentum inartificiale sequitur. 
It is an argument, for it is effected ad arguendum, but after a new manner, for it is externè: but as it is grounded upon the artificials: so is it affected to argue.  Argumentum inartificiale est, quod non sua natura, sed assumpta alicuius artificialis, argumenti vi arguit. 
It is of power to argue as we heard before, but not vi sua. For when a man beareth witness of a thing, we receive it, presuming that he is familiarly acquainted with the thing that he witnesseth: so that arguit, but not sua natura: for alas, what harmony is there between the witnesser considered in his own nature, and the thing witnessed, considered in its own nature? none at all: so that we must look at either of these for their natures.  Sed assumpta, etc. 
So that by the force of some artificial argument taken unto it, it doth argue, ergo, this teacheth us not easily to receive every testimony hand over head, but first to look whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed, otherwise as it may be an error in him to give testimony of a thing he knows not: so may it be no less error in us, that receive such a testimony: this we see reproved in common matters among men, and it teacheth us to receive the testimony of a man, not so much because ipse dixit: but because we are sure he knows the thing throughly.  Vi assumpta. 
Not that it is ortum argumentum, for orta did argue with the same force that the first did, from whence they did arise, but a testimony doth not argue with the force of an artificial, be it primum or ortum, though it be backed with artificial. The cause, effect should be in the witnesser, but they are not in the witness: if the testis have seen any one argument, we are so far to receive his testimony, and no farther: if he have seen more arguments, or all of them, then are we much more to receive his witness.  Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur, perexiguam vim probationis habet. 
This being the nature of an inartificial, it hath little force to argue of itself, for all his strength is aliunde.  Veritas. 
Truth belongs to an axiom, here he means, if we would see it to be ens, or the entity of it, surely this argument can stand us in no great stead: the testimony only swims in our brain, but we do not see the thing in its subtle parts: as if he should say the artificial arguments do argue subtly, the inartificial more grossly.  In civilibus autem & humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit, si prudentia, virtus, & benevolentia adfuerint. 
He stays upon the use of an inartificial argument. In the matters of the common wealth, or in matters concerning private men, this argument hath his special credit: because in this kind, they are most received, we know all the matters in our Courts pass by writings, or testimonies of men, and in these civil matters we look more after the men, then after the thing: there are artificials here in these matters, but we look not at them; still we are to understand that the witnesses know the artificials: the reason is because they are things done in time long before, which therefore cannot be desided but by writings or men's testimonies.  Praecipuam fidem habet. 
That is, it doth urge most in respect of the subject, whereto it is used.  E moribus arguentis, efficit, si prudentia, virtus, & benevolentia adfuerint. 
This inartificial argument hath not this praecipuam fidem from itself, but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent, virtuous, and benevolent. Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his rule, or any deduct from his rule to practise, that is, if he be not simple, and silly to tattle, and prattle he knows not what, then praecipuam fidem habet: so that prudentia doth require discretion, and judgement to know and deliver a truth. That Commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness is here taught.  
Again, if he have not virtue joined with his prudentia, that is, if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth, when he knoweth it, we ought not to receive it: so that as he must be able to judge of the truth, so must he have conscience to utter it. Lastly, because notwithstanding though he may be judicious, and virtuous, yet it may be that even the best man may be carried with an affection either of love, or anger, ergo he must have good will to speak the truth howsoever, ergo, it is left to a malefactor, that if any of the jury seem not to have these things, he may except against him.  Id uno nomine testimonium dicitur. 
Of the second part: for testis, and testimonium are the arguments arguing: it is so called in respect of the thing witnessed: because that is nearest. Now some Logicians as Kickerman, place testimonium in judgement, not in invention, for (saith he) it is an axiom, but he is deceived, for the testis, and the testimony are arguments, and make but one axiom: why, one argument may be an axiom, as a wise man is worthy respect: here a wise man is an axiom: but when it is a testimony, it is not an axiom: true it is, that the testis speaks rem testatam axiomatically most commonly, and that is the reason our author speaks so often of veritas, here in this chapter, but as it is a testimony, it is no axiom.  Est divinum vel humanum. 
Here is a distinction of testimonies, I dare not call it a distribution, for these parts belong not to a testimony, but as diverse modi, we know that divinum testimonium is given from him, from whom nothing is hid, but that he sees all things, the humane is not so: so that testimonium comes to be respected these two ways. Now if question be made, that divinum testimonium is beyond all controversy, surely if God say it, we are to receive it: for God is good, and knows all, and no evil dwells with him, neither doth he wish evil to his. Man may say with the Academics, hoc tantum scio, me nihil scire, ergo, if a divine, and humane testimony be compared together, the humane is to give place to the divine: neither is there any divine testimony, but if we look after it, we shall see it in the thing: so that a divine testimony is most absolute, not quatenus testimonium, but in respect of the testis: hence do we plead so much for the truth of the Scriptures: we say that we believe that which the Church delivereth: because God says it to our hearts by his holy Spirit, this is divinum, The Church of Rome says we are to believe it, because the Church saith it, but that is but humanum, ergo, not so excellent. Again, they are not content to make the Church a witness of the Scriptures, but most absurdly the cause of them, but God as he is the author of them, so he is the witnesser by his Spirit: and it is one thing to consider God as the cause of them, and another to consider him, as the testis thereof.  In divinis testimoniis numerantur non solum deorum oracula, sed etiam responsa vatum, & fatidiorum. 
Our Author brings devilish examples, not divine: and he might have done much better if he had brought testimonies out of Scripture, but the reason why he doth not is this, we know Logic is a general Art, of all things whatsoever, ergo the Scriptures not being received among all people, and he regarding that which was more common in use, as the Poet's fables, and such like, and that which was more generally received, ergo he omits the Scripture. Now here in the examples following, we shall see that these oracula were oracula diabolorum, and responsa vatum, were of liars. So that we must understand by divinum testimonium, that which is divinum in truth, and not only in name: for as there are many called gods, and yet but one true God: so there are many divine testimonies, and yet but one true divine testimony.  Cicero 3. Catiline. Nam ut illa omittam (ait Orator) visas nocturno tempore ab occidente faces, ardoremque coeli, ut fluminum iactus, etc. 
Strange signs were seen about the time of Catilins' conspiracy, burning heat, flashings appearing in the heaven, so that the gods did by them witness these things: So when God doth at any time show forth his justice, as he did in jerusalem by the sword hanging over it, and by the strange bringing forth of a lamb by an heifer standing at the Altar to be sacrificed, or by comets, and such like, they are testimonies of some judgements to come.  Deinde paulò post. Quo quidem tempore cum Aruspices ex tota Hetruria convenissent, etc. 
Here Tully makes many divine testimonies of Catilins' conspiracy, and of the state of Rome.  
Tandem cum dixisset, ut ex Aruspicum responsis ludi facti, & jovis signum maius factum conversumque ad orientem, tum ait:  
Nun illud vero ita praesens erat, ut nutu jovis optimi maximi, factum esse videatur?  
Tully makes this among the rest a sign of Catilins' conspiracy: they had made jupiters' image a very little one, and therefore they took it down, and made it bigger, and it was set upon the stool looking toward the Senate, even at that time when these fellows of Catiline went through the Town, and thereby it did as it were command the Senators to look after those wretched fellows.  
Brevis est illud Tibulli.  
Quod si vera canunt sacris oracula templis,  
Haec illi nostro nomine dicta refer:  
Hoc tibi coniugium promittit Delius ipse  
Faelix, ac alium desine velle virum.  
He would persuade her to marry, because Apollo had foretold that it should be fortunate with them.   

CAP. 33. De testimonio humano legis & sententiae.  Testimonium humanum est common, aut proprium. 
KNowing that a humane testimony doth rest upon the artificial arguments, it cannot be so strong as divinum is: yet it may be true. Est common, aut proprium, because the more witnesses it hath, the stronger it is: that which is testified by one man alone is weaker, because one man may sooner be deceived then many: he may see only one artificial argument, they may see more, yea all: so that as a divine testimony is to be preferred before an humane, so a humane that is common, is to be preferred and received before an humane that is proper.  Commune ut lex, & illustris sententia. 
Lex a law, a rule which is received either by the whole world, as the law of Nations; or of some peculiar Countries, as the laws of a private state: and this hath less force in it then the former, ergo if the witnesses stand of more together, and of one alone still holding all of them prudent, virtuous, and benevolent, we are to receive that which is witnessed by more men, sooner than the other. Now then where the Church of Rome reasons with us, is it not better to go to the Church, then to a private man? yes, but they must be prudent, virtuous, and benevolent: again, they must see the artificial arguments of that witness, for else if one man shall bring testimony from the word of God, we are rather to receive his: else we prefer an humane testimony before a divine. Again, if it be an humane testimony, and a humane testimony that we compare together, let not a private man stand up to stir with his mere testimony against a whole assembly.  
The reason of the Creed being generally received in all Churches, is this, because it hath a divine testimony, ergo next to the testimony of the Church, we are to prefer the common testimony, and then the private, as it doth not jar with the common one.  Illustris sententia. 
For though it be not a law, yet is it generally received, as notable for truth: now he calls it illustris, opposing it to obscura, which though it may have truth in it, yet is it not so famous to be received. We say vox populi is vox Dei, because all truth comes from him.  
Legis autem & non scriptae, & scriptae, testimonium est. Pro Milone.  
Est enim (iudices) non scripta, sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, etc.  
For there are some laws that are customs, and they are not written: indeed in civil affairs, it so comes to pass that we cannot see all, but are fain to leave some things to custom: yet there may be some laws written in our hearts, which we call natural.  
This is witnessed, that it is lawful for a man to defend himself by the law of Nature.  Et ibidem. Quod si duodecem tabulae nocturnem furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem si se telo defenderit interfici impunè voluerunt, etc. 
Why a man may slay his adversary by the Law of the twelve tables, which in the night time allows it.  Sententiae illustres sunt proverbia. 
That is, old says, as they call them, because they are generally received, are called proverbs: ut pares cum paribus facillime congregantur: birds of a feather will fly together.  
Spartam nactus es, you have an office, look to it. This was occasioned thus, when they had chosen their King at Sparta, they used this proverb to him, Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna. Illustres sententiae are genus to proverbia, and dicta sapientum.  Sunt item dicta sapientum. 
These were private testimonies at their original, but came to be general afterwards because of the common receipt of them. Nosce teipsum. Socrates was counted the wisest man that lived in his time: and whereas the Mathematics, and natural Philosophy then flourished, he was the first that taught civility: and the subject thereof is the knowledge of a man's self, ergo he taught his Scholars this lesson, Nosce teipsum. He means to know Moral Philosophy, Ethics, Economics, Politics, etc. Ne quid nimis: too much of any thing is good for nothing.  Proprium testimonium est, ut Platonis illud, 1. ad Quintum fratrem. Atque ille quidem princeps ingenij, & doctrinae, Plato, etc. 
That State is happy where Philosophers are Princes, or where Princes are Philosophers: Plato saith it, that is testimonium proprium.  
Talia sunt in Poetis. 6. Aeneid.  
Discite iustitiam moniti, & ne temnite divos.  Sic Homerico illo versu. Aiax autem ex Salamine duxit duodecim naves. 
The Athenians and the Megarenses had fought so long, that there was a law made at Athens, that none should speak of Salamis. Now Solon put a rope about his neck, and ran through the City, saying this verse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. by this means the Athenians rising together got Salamis from the Megarenses, and it was belonging to Athens, because of the King thereof.  Vivorum testimonia non sunt non tantum cum quaeritur de fundo, aut caede, etc. 
He doth not make a distinction of testimonies to be dead or alive, but he means by mortuorum those when they were alive, that are now dead: he makes many kinds of private testimonies, as obligations, confessiones, iusiurandi, &c,  Obligationis exemplum est, 5. Philip. Audebo etiam obligare fidem meam (P.C.) vobis populoque Romano, etc. 
Augustus Caesar was yet a young youth, who went to school when his father Caesar was slain, and Antony made great stirs, thinking he should be in Caesar's place. Now the Romans offer the soldiers this Augustus to be their Captain, that they might set him up against Antony, telling them that he would both overcome their enemies, and also that he would be a good governor.  
Pignus autem obligatio quaedam est, ut apud  
Virg. Elog. 1.  
Vis ergo inter nos quid possit uterque vicissim  
Experiamur? ego hanc vitulam (ne forte recuses, etc.  
So a pledge or a pawn is a special kind of obligation: they that put out money to usury can tell that a pawn is an obligation.  Confessio est libera, vel expressa tormentis, quae propriè quaestio dicitur. Tale fuit argumentum contra Milonem quod a Cicerone deridetur. Age vero, quae erat aut qualis quaestio? 
Confessio is when a man is a witness against himself, and it is either voluntary, or expressa tormentis, quae propriè quaestio dicitur, that is a commission. How did the commission go out? where is Ruscio, and Casca? did Clodius lay wait for Milo? he did. Then when it was answered that they should be hanged for saying so, they answered again, that Clodius did not lie in wait for Milo, hoping for liberty.  Hunc etiam referri potest argumentum, quo utimur, cum affirmationis nostrae approbationem, & experientiam proponimus. 
That is, this may be added to confession, when by experience we tell a thing. Would any body lend Volcatius twenty shillings, let him try, tecto recipiet nemo, no man will so much as receive him to house. If you were in my case, you would find it.  
jusiurandum etiam testimonium est, 6. Aeneid.  
Per superos, & si qua fides tellure sub ima est,  
Inuitus, regina, tuo de littore cessi.  
This is the last, and is humanum, because it is his witness that swears it.  
Object. But is not that Divinum, when God swears by himself.  
Ans. No, because it is in respect of our weakness. Secondly, because we here consider God as if he were man. If there be any faith under the earth: now there is none.  Reciprocatio hic obscurior est, ut quia testatum verum sit, testis sic etiam verax. 
Here is a reciprocation in a testimony, but it is more obscure, then that which we heard of before in the doctrine of a distribution, and definition, ut quia testatum, etc. the reason is here because that whatsoever the witnesser shall be, such shall the witness be: if he be prudent, virtuous, and benevolent, his witness will be prudent, virtuous, and benevolent, that is as if he should say, if the testis be true, then will the witness be true.  Obscurior est. 
Because a man may bear false witness when he speaks the truth, and likewise because the simple man may sometimes speak the truth as well as the prudent man.    

THE LOGICIANS SCHOOLMASTER. The second Book. De judicio.  

CAP. 1. Quid judicium.  Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, in Inuentione; pars altera sequitur in judicio. 
WE have hitherto heard of simples, which simples may be composites, but yet we respect them as one joined to another, as man is made of many arguments, but may be considered as a simple: now we come to consider how one thing is joined with another thing. The give which we heard of before, was that affection of one argument to another, which the common Logicians call categoria: but when they are put together in disposition, they belong to judgement: so that here we shall hear of nothing but laying of simples together, that is, of arguments with arguments; and that is either of two sides, of one argument to one, as in a simple axiom: or of three sides together, as in a syllogism: or lastly of axioms one after another for the help of memory, which is method: so that when we have seen this, we may see the reach of our reason, and the rule of it.  Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, etc. 
This is a perfect transition, for it is long since we heard this distribution: our author saith in Inuentione, and then sequitur judicium: so that he teacheth us that the first part of Logic is conversant about the invention of arguments, and shows us that the first part of Logic came to be called invention by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct: so iudicium came to name the second part of Logic by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct: or if you will Invention, and judgement came to be the parts of Logic by a metonymy of the effect for the cause, for so invenire and iudicare are acts performed by the first and second part of Logic, which if Kickerman had well considered he would not have reproved Ramus for this distribution.  Sequitur judicium. 
judicium is properly the act of our understanding, as it doth discern and determine truth and falsehood: for it comes of iudex a judge: and when an axiom is made, our judgement comes to judge it: so that the name will in the end hardly be found large enough for this part of Logic. I would rather distribute it thus, Dialecticae partes duae sunt, Inuentio, & Dispositio, and then Dispositio est iudicium, aut methodus: and iudicium est axiomaticum, aut syllogisticum. My reasons are these, first because in method I see no more judgement then in invention, but it is properly of the order of axioms. Again, judgement is for truth, and falsehood, and that is the drift of axiomatical, and syllogistical judgement, ergo, they two are to be coupled together. Again, I observe this in nature, that there are there internal senses, fancy, cogitation, and memory, for the common sense is all one with fancy. Now these serve reason, as the two affections love, and hatred serve will; for as there is the affection of love to embrace that which will willeth, and the affection of hatred to hate that which will nilleth: so there is to serve reason, first a fancy that serves invention; cogitation, and memory that serve disposition. Now these three are distinct in nature, because their organs and instruments by which they work are distinct, for the organ or instrument of fancy is heat, the instrument of cogitation is drith, and moisture of memory. Now the opposite to heat is cold, therefore cogitation, and memory communicate in cold: then cold is a dry or moist cold, the dry cold is the instrument of cogitation, the moist cold is the organ of memory, but this cold must be but in a degree, for if it be too cold all is marred. Now then cogitation, and memory communicating together in cold, there must be a genus, wherein judgement and method must also communicate, & that is dispositio: So that as these organs are by nature severed in man, so nature must sever our reason into invention, & disposition, & disposition into iudicium, and methodus: and that these are distinct in nature many reasons do show, for when a man is first borne, then is his invention best, his judgement is best when he is passed iwenis, he remembers best when he is a child, and then best for invention, because his head is then hottest; afterward best for judgement, because than his brain is driest: first of all best for memory, because his head then is moistest: again man in the morning remembers best, because than his brain is moist by reason of the fumes that ascend to the brain, when he sleepeth; at noon he is fittest for cogitation, because his brain is then driest: at night he invents best, because than his brain is cold: and as in the Sun's course, her heat is moistest in the morning, driest at noon, and coldest at night: so is it with man's reason: so that the internal senses are thus divided: yet here do we rather admit of a dicotomie, because else we should leave out a genus, namely dispositio. Again, because the ends of invention, and judgement are various: now it may seem strange, that Logic teacheth these parts thus divided: for if it be true, that a child hath his memory first best, than his cogitation, and then his fancy, why should not method be taught first, than judgement, and lastly invention? The reason is this indeed, if a child should have use of his disposition first, it would hinder his growth, for a child hath least use of his reasonable soul for a long time, because it is an hindrance of the acts of the vegetative, and sensitive soul, by reason hereof if he should be moistest, he could not grow to that stature which is fitting: or if he should be dry, it would not extend his moisture again afterward; that his fancy is moistest, it is for the bene esse of the body, for moisture is most predominant in him, till he come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his age, and then his moisture cannot extend itself by reason of his heat, and then he becomes most judicious: so that these are conararie to the order of method, for the good of man. Again, a child hath his faculty of memory principal, that then he may gather things into a storehouse, and afterward he must come to judge them: ergo, it is necessary that he should have the best memory first, not so much for the act of his reason, as for the growth of his body (he is for anima vegetativa a plant: for sensitiva an animal) and yet there is no one act of any of these faculties above, but all act together: yet so as one is predominant: ergo, we say old age brings wisdom. Now wisdom is sapientia, that is, syllogistical judgement; or prudentia, that is, the application thereof upon every occasion. Again, syllogistical judgement is for axiomatical judgement, for when an axiom is doubtful, we use the light of a third argument, and so going back to the rule of true and false axioms, we judge it to be true, or false: again axiomatical and syllogistical judgement communicate in the disposition of arguments, whereas method disposeth axioms immediately, arguments mediately; again, method hath nothing to do with syllogistical judgement no more than with axiomatical judgement, ergo, we hear how these should be distributed from the organs of them in natural Philosophy, and from the very act of reason. Now for Kickerman who makes a tricotomy, he desiring to make a perfect Art leaves out a genus.  Dispositio, est secunda pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis ad bene iudicandum. 
This term dispositio commendeth to us the whole drift of the second part of Logic, that is, a disposing, severing, or putting arguments asunder, it is pars Logicae, taking it for the doctrine of Logic, it contains a portion thereof, which hath nothing to do with invention, I mean for precept, but only for use, for invention, and judgement are as opposite as white, and black.  Pars Logicae. 
For indeed it belongs to no other Art, no not to Rhetoric for doctrine, but only for use, for as for their order of exordium, narratio, etc. it is nothing but method: ergo, it doth not follow, that because the Rhetorician useth disposition, ergo, it belongs to Rhetoric. The Orator, the Grammarian, etc. are general men, yet their Arts are distinct.  Logicae. 
Because Logic is the rule of reason's act, and there is also this second act of reason to let us see how God hath disposed all things in nature: for so all things but God are composite, yet there are simples too; yes, but not in use subsistent in themselves, but ever with others: ergo Gods simplicity is a property that cannot be communicated to any other thing.  Secunda. 
For there cannot be a disposition, till there be things to be put together, as a Bricklayer cannot lay bricks together, except he have bricks. Again, we know Grammar hath two parts, first Etymology of a word alone, and Syntax of more words together: so here there must be of things, first a simple consideration of arguments asunder, and then a disposing of them together.  De disponendis. 
Our author saith de disponendis: so that this it is, the whole of these rules following is to dispose things with things: or seeing God practise first in this rule, we imitate him: for if man be God's steward over his creatures, it is requisite he should know them, that he may take them to his comfort.  Argumentis. 
Surely it doth dispose arguments but mediately not immediately, first it disposeth axioms, than arguments under axioms, for else I do not see how method will come under this definition, ergo, we are to understand it thus de disponendis argumentis, that is, of disposing axioms immediately, arguments mediately, as they make up the axioms.  Ad bene iudicandum. 
This should be left out, for it belongs not to method, for it is ad memoriam recolendum rather, ergo, we may leave this out, yet he stays upon it, and gives the reason thereof certa enim dispositionis regula unumquodque iudicatur, this is true, but I deny that every rule of disposition tendeth ad bene iudicandum, therefore Aristotle in his problems saith that a man of great judgement hath no great good memory, and the reason is this, because their instruments are contrary: so that certa, but not omni dispositionis regula unumquodque iudicatur. Now from this effect judicium, & dispositio pro eodem dicitur: yea but not rightly, and as I take it here Ramus was mistaken: they that made this distribution of Logic first, as Tully, Aristotle, Plato, they knew not method, but shut it out of Logic, otherwise they would not have called this part judgement. And that they knew not method it is plain, because they never spoke of method.   

CAP. 2. De axiomatis affirmatione, & negatione.  judicium, est axiomaticum vel dianoeticum. 
DIsposition hath two parts, iudicium, and methodus, this is the true disposition: these do communicate in a disposition: for why? here in judgement we dispose arguments with arguments, in method we dispose axioms with axioms, ergo, both of them dispose. Again their instruments are consenting in cold, ergo, both of them are contrary to heat, for that will sever things. Drith and moisture cleaving together, ergo, these are the parts, iudicium of disposing arguments to judge them, method of placing axioms to remember them. judicium is first, because method disposeth only that which judgement frames, even as invention is before disposition: and this is wonderful to consider, for there can nothing be well and sound remembered, but that which is first judged, and nothing sound judged, but that which is throughly invented. And it is true with me, if I understand a thing rightly, I never forget it; else I never remember it: so that if a man forget any thing, he hath not judged it well, because he hath not invented it well: to see a thing in the cause, that is, the argument, for there causa is general, that is, our intelligentia, to make axioms is our scientia, to discourse is our sapientia, to apply every thing in time, and place is our prudentia, to work the like our Art, these are the things that make a man a scholar, and a wise man, ergo a man that shall take this course in his studies shall be an exquisite man every way, ergo, in the study of any Art this must be the way for him that desireth to be a scholar, first to see the rule of his Art, than the arguments, than the sapientia, than the prudentia, and so he shall remember it for ever.  
What Disposition is we have heard, and how there are two kinds of it; now iudicium est dispositio ad bene iudicandum; so that the use of this second part is of great use for the perfiting of judgement, for if we read things without judging them, we shall many times swallow that for truth, which we shall in the end find to be sophistry.  Axioma est dispositio argumenti cum argumento, qua esse aliquid, aut non esse iudicatur. 
Axioma, the word in his proper signification is worthiness, or dignity, and by a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth such a truth, as is worthy the receiving or believing: now axioma dubium is not worthy this worthy name axioma, because it is not per se manifestum, but we are fain to demur upon it, so that some axioms are not so plain as others: others also there are, which are so plain, as he that cannot see them, or doubteth of them deserveth the whip. Now because this first part of disposition is of a clear truth, ergo, he calls it axioma, as if he should say an honourable truth: putting us in mind thereby that though this name be common to all axioms, yet is it principally of them which are per se manifesta. Again, he rather takes this name, because others will not so well fit his purpose; again, the other names enunciatum, enunciatio, etc. belong rather to a syllogism.  Axioma est dispositio. 
That is acknowledged, that there is such an axiom, as is plain, palpable, and manifest: yet are there others also laid together with such a subtle band, as we cannot easily see them, the thread is so fine, as that we cannot see it without a candle, or torch. To see the cause in nature why iron goeth to a loadstone is hard: and axioma dubium, and subtillitas, in their tropical signification are all one: such are those argutiae arguing in a fine manner.  
Objection. If man had stood, should he not have needed syllogistical judgement, had there been no use of that?  
Answer. Yes, for he should have first invented before he had judged, and though his reason should have been so clear, as that he should have seen many things in nature, yet not all: for these rules are eternal.  
Again, some things lie upward, which are plain, some also lie downward, which are not easily perceived: again if we will acknowledge that in Art many deductions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be drawn from a first rule, and that we may apply a first rule a thousand ways, why then we must acknowledge syllogistical judgement. Before he told us that dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis: here he saith judicium is dispositio argumenti cum argumento, here there is dispositio argumenticum argumento, because iudicium is dispositio, but to dispose one argument with another is peculiar to an axiom.  
Here question may be made, whether it may not be dispositio argumentorum cum argumentis, or argumenti cum argumentis, or argumentorum cum argumento? Yes, but if it be argumentorum, it is argumenti, ergo, this is more general: so that he saith argumenti cum argumento, as in a simple axiom: or argumentorum cum argumentis, aut contra, as in a composite axiom: so here is the playing at two hand ruff, for here are but two sides in an axiom, ergo, in this respect he saith argumenti cum argumento, argumenti in general, because all the kinds of arguments may be disposed in an axiom.  Qua esse aliquid, aut non esse iudicatur. 
So that the drift of iudicium is to look at an aliquid, so doth invention; but yet it goes further, and judges it esse, aut non esse. Now aliquid, a thing, that is ens in genere, being an aliquid, is judged to be this or that: so that here we may see, that what the common Logicians teach, that in an axiom there is a subject, and a predicate; and the predicate is so called, because it is foretold in the subject, & contra: as when I say, homo est animal, animal tells me somewhat of homo, and homo tells me somewhat of animal: and the aliquid which is the subject is showed esse, aut non esse: hence it is that an axiom shows aliquid esse, aut non esse, because every thing that is, is composite, and the simples are imperfect: he doth not say, aliquid esse verum, aut falsum, for if I say, homo est lapis, I say a thing to be, though it be false, and when I say homo est animal, I say a thing to be, and it is true.  
Now diverse bring in here quaestio, and they say it is simplex, which is the same with an argument: or composite, which is the same with an axiom: as if there were no use of an axiom, but by way of question: but we know that a question belongs to a syllogism, and to make it as general as axioma, will not be either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Latinè enunciatum Enunciatio, Pronunciatum, Pronunciatio, effatum dicitur. 
Our Author stays upon the naming of axioma, because few Logicians besides himself have received this name, therefore lest his scholars should think it strange whereabout he goes, and whether he had forgotten himself, he tells them that he means by axioma that which others call Enunciatum, etc. Propositio properly belongs to a syllogism, and is the thesis, and the assumptio is the apotheosis. Why saith he Latinè? because axioma is grecè: as if he should say, I use this word as best fitting my turn, for no Latin term utters this thing so well. Again, the reason is (as if he should say) I rather use this term, because the Latins fetching the tongue from the Greeks', have not names so fitting the things as they, because enunciatum, enunciatio, etc. have an adherency of words, and they do name Logic by Grammar, whereas we know an axiom may be when it is not uttered.  Enunciatum, enunciatio, etc. 
Enunciatum signifies the thing concrete, and enunciatio signifies the axiomation (as we may say) of it, the disposition of it, and so of the rest.  Axioma est affirmatum, aut negatum: affirmatum, quando vinculum eius affirmatur: negatum quando negatur. 
We have heard that there are but two sides of an axiom, and to this end quaiudicatur aliquid esse, aut non esse. Now this axiom is distributed, first into his actiuncts, therefore affirmatum, and negatum attend upon the esse, and non esse, which the axiom doth deliver. Homo est animal, here aliquid esse dicitur, and it is affirmatum: homo non est animal, here aliquid non esse dicitur, and it is negatum: so homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur esse, & affirmatur: homo non est lapis, here aliquid dicitur non esse, & negatur: so that the affirmation, and negation of an axiom is not of the esse, & non esse of it. If he said affirmatum, qua esse aliquid, here he doth not mean esse, but esse, that is affirmatum: as when I say homo est lapis, Esse, and non esse are other things than affirmatum, and negatum: but when a thing is so, it ought to be affirmed, and when it is not so, it ought to be denied. Here I say he distributes an axiom into his proper adjuncts, ergo this distribution is not imperfect, as we said before: because then the species which follow should be left out, for some there are which say a distribution is perfect or imperfect, even as a definition is perfect, or descriptio: but that is false; for we use not a description, when we can have a perfect definition, but we use a distribution ex adiunctis, when we also have a distribution generis in species. Again, it is not imperfect, because it cannot be a distribution of genus into the species, or of integrum into the members imperfectly; for than affirmatum would signify a simple axiom, and negatum a composite axiom. Again, if this distribution were left out, there would want a rule of Art, which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Now before we heard of arguments that were affirmantia, and negantia, here he saith, axioma est affirmatum aut negatum, for the band is it that denies or affirms the arguments one of another, ergo the axiom is denied, aut contra: yea when there are arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiom, it is affirmatum, aut negatum: as when I say, darkness is not light, the band denies light of darkness.  Affirmatum quando vinculum eius affirmatur. 
Why have we not yet heard of vinculum? if here be his first place, why doth he not here describe it? Answ. Because we heard that dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis, and that iudicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse aliquid aut non esse iudicatur: and in disposition we have this band, for though there be a positio of arguments, does that is asunder: yet there is a composition too: so that we have it both in the general definition of disposition, and in the special description of judicium.  Vinculum. 
Now indeed vinculum is vox aequivoca, for it is the band of an axiom, of a syllogism, and of method: the band of method is called transitio, which ties two several doctrines together, as two banks that have water running between them are tied together by a bridge, ergo in this case it cannot be defined.  Vinculum affirmatur. 
Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band, and not from the arguments: and when we say homo est lapis, and homo non est lapis, we have a vinculum in both: though indeed where the arguments agree, there should be an est, and where they disagree, there should be a non est.  Negatum quando negatur. 
For if it be affirmatum, quando vinculum eius affirmatur, so negatum contra: so that here evermore look to the vinculum: now this distribution doth not require that we should always affirm, and deny too the same axiom, and so look at it, neither shall we always find it so, though it may be so; because these are but adjuncts to an axiom, and where the same axiom is affirmed or denied.  Hinc nascitur axiomatum contradictio, quando idem axioma affirmatur, & negatur. 
So that in contradiction there is this peculiar, that the same axiom must be affirmed and denied: so that the true place of contradiction is here: he saith, Hinc nascitur: whence? from the affirmation and negation of the same axiom. Now the reason why the same axiom may be affirmed and denied, is because these are not essential to an axiom, and the axiom is the same whether it be affirmed or denied: the same it is also for esse, and non esse, but not for affirmation and negation: it is the same man that was in the morning cold, and warm at noon. Now here in disputation we are carefully to observe, that there be a contradiction, where we make one.  Idem axioma. 
That is, the same arguments must be both affirmed and denied, one of another; and this we must carefully look unto, else may we contend de lana caprina. Again, he said idem. Object. Homo est doctus, and homo non est doctus, are these the same arguments? yes, and the same axiom, but differing only in quality: they are subiectum and adiunctum: but when I say homo est doctus, and understand it of homo, which is not doctus, as Thirsites, it is still the same argument, but the arguments are disparates.   

CAP. 3. De vero, & falso.  Axioma deinde est verum, aut falsum: verum quando pronunciat uti res est; falsum contra. 
IVdicium was either axiomaticum, or syllogisticum: the axiomaticum was that which shown a thing to be, or not to be, and it was first distributed into affirmatum and negatum: now again, an axiom is distributed secondly into verum and falsum, which is by nature after the other, because an axiom is not true, or false, till it be affirmed or denied: as when I say homo and animal, I do not say that any thing is true or false, till I affirm that homo est animal, or deny him to be animal: so that truth and falsehood do arise from affirmation and negation: therefore verum and falsum are but adjuncts to an axiom, because they arise from adjuncts, and therefore secondly they are after affirmatum and negatum, because they arise from them. Now we are in our rule of judgement, which must guide our reason: to what end? to see the truth and falsehood of things, ergo axioma is verum or falsum: and after our reason sees a thing to be verum, then may our will as bonum embrace it; for ens verum, and bonum, are all one, and here we may see whither verum belongs properly: sometimes indeed it is taken tropically for a like, as when I say this is a true picture: but I mean that this picture is like such an one; here are similia: but the axiom is this, that this is the picture of such a one, it is true, so that in the end it will come to be proper: another signification we find of verum, as when it is opposed to fictum, but this is not proper, and the meaning is, that ens est is a true axiom: so that every signification at the last will fall out to be the same with this that is here taught. Aut falsum. If there be verum, it must have his contrary, which is falsum. Now though there is not falsum in nature, yet because God so created the things so vera, as they might be otherwise, ergo there is falsum. The same axiom might be true and false, as we shall see in contingents, ergo there is both verum and falsum. Object. Why may there not be the doctrine of a false syllogism, as well as of a false axiom? Answ. The axiom is not a false axiom, quatenus an axiom in Logic, but quatenus we look at the matter of it, for its truth or falsehood in natural Philosophy: so for a syllogism, if it break the rule of a syllogism for form, than it breaks the rule of Logic: but if it do peccare for his matter, than it breaks some rule of some other Art: so that Kickerman is much deceived, for a false syllogism is a false syllogism as it breaks the rule of a syllogism, but the doctrine of a false axiom doth not break the rule of an axiom, ergo this is fallacia accidentis, and there is an equivocation in the word axiom, and in the word syllogism.  Verum quando pronunciat uti res est. 
Because verum and falsum are but adjuncts, why we handle them together with their subjects, and we define them also by their subjects: so that truth indeed belongs hither, ergo it is not the end of Logic, as some would have it, for then all the parts of Logic should conspire in this: neither is it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Logic, for that is method. Now in a true axiom there is required first a pronunciatio, that is, an axiomatical disposition: secondly, it must be v●i res est. Pronunciatio properly signifies an uttering or showing forth in words, but here he takes it for the same that axioma is, as he told us before: ergo he means by pronunciat, quando axiomatur, or axiomat: so that we must not dream, that he meaneth, as if an axiom could not be if it be uttered.  Vti res est. 
Here mark that the truth ariseth from res radically: now he tells us, verum axioma est quando dispositio fit uti res est: so that this refers us to the reality or essence of the thing. What difference is there between the res and the axiom? Much, for axiom is an adjunct to the thing; truth is first in God, than secondly all things are so fare forth true, as they answer to the idaeae in God, for so God created all things, and lo they were very good, that is, they answered to his idea of them in himself: so that res is true at the second hand; and because Logic is concrete evermore with the thing, therefore he refers us to the res: so that here we may see what truth is properly, when the axioms do pronounce as the things are; so that first look at the truth in things, which hath it from God, then at the truth of the axiom which hath it from the thing: he saith quando pronunciat, because the same axiom may pronounce one way, and another way, but when it pronounceth uti res est, then is it verum. Scaliger thinks he hath found out a great subtlety, who saith there is veritas in oratione, and that is when it answers not to the Idea in God, but to the apprehension in man: now truth lies not in the speech, but in the thing: he makes this comparison, there is Cardan, and his picture made in wax by a signet: he saith the picture is so fare forth true, as it answers to the signet, so speech is so fare forth true, as it answers man's apprehension Now the picture is not true, for we must look at truth, as it is in Logic, which doth pronunciat uti res est. But whereas he says speech is true as it answers the thought, that is to say, they are similia: but the axiom here is, whether this picture be like Cardan, neither are we to look at man's thought, but at the thing indeed, speech is the very image of the thing, and so when I say the thing is as a man speaks it, I mean they are similia.  Falsa contra. 
Why did he not say falsum quando pronunciat non uti res est. He shall not need, for it had been a vain repetition of the words going before, because falsum is contrary to verum, and contraria contrariorum sunt consequentia: so that falsum being contrary, whatsoever we hear of afterward affirmed of verum, we must understand the contrary of falsum, therefore whilst some ask why Ramus did distribute verum into contingens, and necessarium, whereas falsum is also so: it is sufficient that he saith falsum contra. Again, he prosecutes it no farther: because when we find an axiom false, we are not to look at it any farther, but there let our reason rest, ergo, he goes according to the act of our reason: but for verum our reason goes further, to see whether it be contingens, or necessarium, so fare as our reason is to look after it.  Axioma verum est contingens, aut necessarium. 
These follow upon truth, not upon the thing immediately: and good reason, for as verum, and falsum hanged upon affirmation, and negation, so do these hang upon verum, so that it is contingens verum, and necessarium verum, and not contingens or necessarium axioma next and immediately, and such axioms there are in nature, for the Lord hath so joined somethings together in nature, as they may be severed, others he hath so coupled, as that they cannot be disjoined.  Contingens. 
It is therefore called contingens, because the truth thereof is but tactu, the arguments do but attingere one another, not fasten one in another, as subiectum, and adiunctum are but touching one another.  Contingens quando sic verum est, ut aliquando falsum esse possit. 
This shows that truth, and falsehood are but adjuncts to an axiom, because they do but contingere to it; so that a contingent axiom is of such a thing as may be true at one time, that is, pronunciare uti res est, and at another time falsum, that is, pronunciare uti res non est. We find in common Logicians the term probabile, which they often use for axioma contingens, but it hath equivocation with it, for sometimes it is taken for a doubtful axiom, which may be general both to contingens, and necessarium, and there it is properly, ergo, when they use it for a contingent axiom, it is a hard metaphor, for who would go about to prove that I sit here, which is contingens, so that probabile belongs to a syllogism: therefore how simply do some define Logic, Ars probabiliter disserendi: by probabiliter disserendi, they mean thema probabile, that is, axioma dubium, and so they join probabile with a syllogism, which properly belongs to the question.  Quando sic verum est, etc. 
Here mark how contingens is defined by time: we heard of time before in the doctrine of adiunctum, ergo, it hath nothing to do here, ergo, aliquando hath not so much to do with time, as it looks after contingens, which may be verum, and falsum at several times: for when a thing is once true, it cannot also be false, but diversis temporibus. Again, when we hear of contingens falsum, there let us leave it; and now falsum is contra, but because every thing is first true before it be false, ergo contingens must be defined quando sic, first verum est, and falsum afterward.   aliquando. 
He saith falsum esse possit, non est: for when it is true, it must not of necessity afterward be false, yet he gives the potentia, and says falsum esse possit, though it never be false. As audentes fortuna iwat: the arguments are causa per accidens and the effect.  Fac enim id hodie esse verum; cras falsum esse poterit. 
He stays upon the doctrine of a contingent axiom, because it is a question in Aristotle, whether futurum contingens be true or false? this we shall answer by and by: only take this, that he doth not tie us to the present time, but it may be future, or to come: it will rain to morrow, this is a contingent axiom.  Itaque veritatis huius contingentis iudicium, opinio dicitur. 
Truth was an adjunct to the thing, and judgement was the subject to truth: contingency is an adjunct to the truth: and the judgement of the truth of a contingent axiom is but opinio: so that opinio is the judgement of that axiom that is contingent: that I sit here is but opinio, for I may not sit here, so that if one tell it to another, he may be deceived of it. So that if a man teach contingent true axioms in any Art, he shall be deceived: such are many of Aristotle's rules, and of the Aristotelians, as when they say genus is praedicabile, why it may be subijcibile too.  Quae praeteritorum, & praesentium homini certa esse potest, futurorum per naturam non admodum potest. 
See here that the opinio, and judgement of this axiom praeteritorum, & praesentium may be certa: here we learn what our opinio may be of things past, present, and to come; so that opinio is here distributed into certa and incerta: certa is duplex, praesentium, and praeteritorum. Incerta only futurorum.  Quamuis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt. 
It is altogether certa to him: so that in a word we may see all Aristotle's dispute, that all truth is certa, but not to all; and here we see that notwithstanding the certainty of a thing, yet it may be contingent, and not necessary, so God's decree of man's fall was certa, but not necessary, either by the necessity in an axiom, or by coaction in invention. Quamuis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt, here this would be put in, & cui ipse revelavit: for the opinio of truth belongs hither, and not to Divinity.  Itaque Martialis Priscum meritò cavillatur. 
Saepe rogare soles, qualis sim, Prisce, futurus,  
Si fiam locuples, simque repente potens:  
Quenquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?  
Dic mihi, si fias tu Leo, qualis eris.  
Priscus would often ask of Marshal, what he would do, if he were made rich and mighty suddenly. And Marshal would ask him, what a one he would be, if he were a Lion: he cannot tell.  Necessarium, quando semper verum est, nec falsum esse potest: & illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni. 
We have done with verum contingens, verum as it should happen: now we come to necessarium; necessarium in Logic hath many significations: we heard of it before in Invention, where it signified violence, force, coaction: but here it is more proper, and it is not opposed to nature as that before, but is that which concurres with nature, and commonly is true by nature.  Necessarium quando semper verum est, nec falsum potest esse. 
Here we observe first that the axioma necessarium is verum: secondly, it is semper verum: thirdly, it is without all possibility of being falsum: now contingens and necessarium arise firstly from the arguments, which when they are but modo quodam necessarium, are so joined together as they may be severed, they make but a contingent axiom: but when they are absolutely agreeing, and so as they cannot be severed in nature, than they make a necessary axiom.  Quando semper est, erit, aut fuit. 
For by est we are to consider not so much the adsignification, but the connexion of the arguments: again, here is a perpetuity of truth required, so that it must be without all possibility of falsehood, a contingent axiom, though it never be false, yet it may be, but a necessary cannot be; so that by potentia we are to understand the habit, not the act. Now this potentia is in the arguments, as it cannot be that homo should not be animal, it is not in potentia naturae, that this should be false: so that a necessary axiom requiring a potentia, and that potentia is in the things, we must be careful to discern it. It is a common opinion that whatsoever God decreed is necessary. Ans. Though it be true that God's decree shall most surely come to pass, yet doth it not put a necessity, for then this necessity must lie in the things, not in the author of the things: so when we say his decree must come to pass, we mean it must be of necessity, that is, by coaction, and this also is false, for the Lord doth all things by counsel: so that here we are to look at the potentia in the arguments, and not to any external potentia. The not discerning of this necessity ex hypothesi, as they call it, and certainty, makes them take many things for necessary, which are not. So that to imagine such a thing, is to say, that God doth not things consilio: again, to say so, is to make the Stoics fatum, for their fatum was this, because jupiter said so: so that if they say it cannot be otherwise, it is the Stoics fatum directly.  Et illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni. 
Aristotle doth in his demonstrations labour much to show that the rules of Art must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, first saith he, they must be concluded from the prima, and proxima causa, so that he did dream of a demonstration in a syllogism, as when we conclude a property of a subject by the definition: his meaning was that the rules of Art should be most true, and arising from their immediate causes, but there is no syllogistical Art for demonstrations, but as we may dispose many arguments, cause, and effect, subject, and adjunct, etc. in a simple axiom, having one and the same doctrine: so we may dispose a syllogism, either of contingent axioms, or of necessary axioms in Barbara, as he would have, and yet the doctrine of an explicate is the same: ergo, the doctrine of demonstration is vain. Again he saith we conclude from the cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereas indeed all our concluding is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Objection. But it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect of the third argument. Answer. True, so also I will conclude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from any other arguments as well as the cause: so that all the doctrine of Aristotle's demonstrations is here in a necessary axiom, and in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now an axiom is necessary here, not that there is any necessity in respect of the rule of Logic, but in respect of the matter of it.  
Objection. A contingent axiom may deceive, ergo, his doctrine should not be in Art; as also an inartificial argument is not in Art.  
Answer. The doctrine of them is belonging to Art, as well as any other rules, for they are eternal: so that an axiom is contingent, or necessary in respect of the matter of it, ergo, we shall not need to speak of them in a syllogism: ergo, to distribute a syllogism according to the matter, or form of it (as Kickerman doth) is very absurd. Syllogismus dialecticus is nothing but a syllogism of contingent axioms: syllogismus apodicticus is nothing but a syllogism consisting of necessary axioms: and syllogismus sophisticus is so called from the form of it; and here observe evermore, that if the sophistry lie in any of the arguments alone that are disposed syllogistically, than it is a fallace of the arguments in invention, as non causa pro causa, non effectum pro effecto, etc. If the sophistry lie in form of the syllogism disposed, than it breaks some rule in the doctrine of syllogisms: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a necessary axiom affirmed: so that this is the difference in general of a necessary axiom, and an axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is always affirmed: so that an axiom necessary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath three things in it, first, it must be semper verum, secondly, it must be without all potentia of being false, which are general both to contingens, and necessarium: Lastly, it must be affirmatum, which is peculiar to itself. He calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is omnino verum: and the, which includes not only a necessary truth, but also affirmation: for if we predicate an adjunct upon his subject negatively, it will not be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies omnino, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies affirmed: so that it doth not require that an axiom should be general, for a proper axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as if we would define the Sun, Moon, and Stars, so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requires that it be verum, that is verum necessarium, and that it be de, that is, affirmatum.  Impossibile contra, quod de nullo unquam verum esse potest. 
This axiom is opposed to necessarium, and also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and it is contrary to that quoth de nullo, etc. so that because he saith the, therefore it is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither is it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are contrary.  Impossibile. 
Impossibile is a false axiom, and here we may see how falsum still runs along with verum. Possibile and impossibile be not species of falsum axioma, for both contingens and necessarium are possibilia, and it is general to them both: so that this is quod verum esse potest unquam, & de nullo: not that this axiom is always denied as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is affirmed, but it is contrary to an axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because that is always affirmed; and contrary to it, mark the contrariety, it is nunquam verum, opposed to semper verum: again, nunquam verum esse potest, is opposed to nec falsum esse potest, here it is contrary to a necessary one: lastly, it is the nullo opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni, here it is contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now affirmatum, and negatum, verum, falsum, contingens, necessarium, possibile, and impossibile, etc. are (as they call them) words of Art, for indeed they belong to Logic: but these when any thing is brought as an example to them, it is nothing but an application of the species to the genus: now they call these modalls, because the modus is the genus, and the axiom is the axiom. When I say homo est animal, est necessarium: why here are two axioms, which they are not ware of; and in this syllogism, Qui dicit te esse animal; dicit verum, qui dicit te esse asinum dicit te esse animal: ergo, etc. both the proposition and assumption may be denied, for in the proposition he disputes from a species to the genus: in the assumption he will prove hic homo est asinus, because that homo est animal, verum est: here again the assumption is false, for he disputes â specie ad genus.  Axioma artium sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse debent, sed praeterea homogenia, & catholica. 
Here he makes a special application of homogeny, and catholic axioms, unto the axioms of Art, as if they did belong only to them: and it is true, for though the doctrine of axioms be general to every thing, as Logic is, yet these laws are peculiar to the axioms of art: and they are general, because they belong to all axioms of Art: and there is no rule of Art, but it must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & contra: if it be all of these, then is it a very rule of Art; if it be only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than it is in a rule of Art, and is but a piece of axiomata artium, therefore every rule of Art must first be true, because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the rule of truth, ergo a contingent axiom cannot be a rule of Art, for it may deceive us, as often as teach truth: and it must be affirmed, because it must teach, for a negative axiom tells us only what a thing is not: for though this axiom, lapis non est animal, will never fail, yet not teaching me what lapis is, I may take it for a stick, or any other thing.  Axioma homogenium est, quando partes sunt essentiales inter se; ut forma formato, subiectum proprio adiuncto, genus speciei. 
Axioma a rule of Art, which must be worthy credit above all other rules: homogenium, that is, belonging to that Art, yea and to that particular part of that Art, and to that particular point of that Art; as invention is not homogeny to judgement, ergo homogeny here must be considered, not as it is in the same Art, but as it is in the same rule.  Quando partes sunt essentiales inter se. 
That is, when the arguments are essential inter se: so that here is required an essentiality, as the causes are essential to the effect: what, all of them? no, only the material and the formal; so that integrum, and membra, genus, and species, the subject, and proper adjunct, because the causes of it are to be found in the causes of the subject: why these? because they arise from matter and form, are essential, both as it is active, namely, as the causes give essence to the effect, and also as it is passive, namely, as the effect is essentiated of the causes.   forma formato, subiectum proprio adiuncto, genus speciei. 
He saith, forma formato, not materia materiato, because though the matter give his essence, yet the form is but one, which makes the thing one, whereas there may be many matters. Genus species: mark how that the genus, and form, make a definition, ergo the definitio and definitum are essential inter se, ergo that makes a rule of Art; here he leaves out integrum, and membra, which I much marvel at, for had he put in them, than we had had all the arguments that could make these rules of Art.  Id appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, per se. 
The rule of justice that we give to every thing, that which is per se true, and homogeny, as longitude is in the superficies, but not per se, but per aliud, for so per se here is not opposed to per accidens, but to per aliud.  Axioma catholicum est, quando consequens semper verum est de antecedente, non solum omni & per se, sed etiam reciprocè: ut homo est animal rationale. 
A catholic axiom: this name is somewhat improper, for it doth not contain all that is in a catholic axiom, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is primum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de toto: so that this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 first true of the whole, and afterward of the parts. Kickerman saith that Aristotle takes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same: but he neither saith so, nor means so.  Quando consequens semper verum est, etc. 
By consequens he means an argument; now can an argument be true? here he takes verum in a more large sense then before: he means when the parts do so truly predicate one of another, as that they make a true axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Non solum omni & per se, sed etiam reciprocè. 
That is, when one part contains the other: so that one would think reciprocation might be an affection of subiectum, and proprium adiunctum in invention: it is true that one contains as much as the other, but the subject and proper adjunct are not the same thing, as the definitio, and definitum are. For homo and risus are not all one, but here reciprocation is between subiectum and adiunctum, because notwithstanding they be diverse things, yet the one contains as much as the other: so that this reciprocation is more general then that before: so that the rules of Art are these three, namely, definitions, distributions, and properties: and every rule of Art must be most true, most just, and most wise, because the axiom must stay up the thing to guide it to his end.  Tres hae sunt leges documentorum artis propriorum: prima 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex veritas; secunda 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex iustitiae; tertia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lex sapientiae dicatur. 
So that these three properties are required in every rule of Art.  Atque eiusmodi axiomatum ita catholicorum iudicium verissima & prima scientia est. 
So that the judgement of such catholic axioms, is prima verissimaque scientia, and all others are but second or third truths, as they are deducted from the first, second, or third, and are per se so fare forth true, as their first rule is true: hence whatsoever we read, we shall find it, if we mark it, to be either a rule of Art, or some deduct: so that the heads of Arts should be the heads of common place books, and so might we bring all that we read unto them, and try them. Now some say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contains 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ergo they might be left out. Ans. It doth not follow, for these three are distinct things, for as it is reciprocum, it is not in the same respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. again, an axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so also an axiom may break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet not break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so that if they were left out, we should have no rule to show such axioms to be false.   

CAP. 4. De axiomate simplici.  Atque haec de communibus axiomatis affectionibus, species sequuntur. 
WE have hitherto heard of whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to an axiom in general: for though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belong only to the rules of Art, yet because they may be simple or composite axioms, ergo they are generally to be taught to them both: the judgement moreover of such axioms was prima verissimaque scientia. Prima, because that was first, and per se true, and most true, because all other deducts do so fare forth approve themselves true, as they agree to the first, and these first rules are few, therefore they come nearest to God who is but one, and are next to his wisdom: others, which are deducts may be many: and they come next to the first rules: we have among us a distinction of doctrine, and use, doctrina is properly the first rule of Art, and use is the application thereof, or the special deducts gathered from the first. Others I find take doctrina for the first part of Divinity, and Use for the special practice of a rule of Art, but they are deceived, and speak improperly: and all the rules that Kickerman saith are wanting in Ramus, are nothing but the practice of a rule, that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and they are infinite. As posita causa ponitur effectum, this ariseth from the definition of causa, and it is only true, where the cause is brought as a third argument in a syllogism, and otherwise we have no use of it, and having handled all that is general to an axiom, now we come to the species, Atque haec de communibus, etc. This is a transition not from one part of an axiom to another, for those things that we heard of before touching an axiom, are but adjuncts to an axiom, therefore must not be severed from their subject: but because these have taken up two Chapters, and so continued the doctrine of axioma long, why we may have forgotten ourselves, thinking we have heard of the species already? no, saith Ramus, we come but now to the species.  Axioma est simplex, aut compositum. 
Disposition we heard did dispose arguments either firstly, or at the second hand, in an axiom they are disposed either one with one, or one with more, or more with more; if one be disposed with one, so that there be but two sides, as it were playing at two hand ruff, than it is a simple axiom: and from this simple disposition of the arguments, it is called simplex, compositum contra: so that this double disposition of arguments makes this distribution, whereas affirmatum, negatum, and the other adjuncts before, rather looked at the band, then at the disposition of the arguments: so that axiomatica dispositio is simplex in respect of the simple disposition of the arguments, that are disposed therein.  Simplex quod verbi vinculo continetur. 
Simplex is first, because there cannot be a composite axiom, but there will be a simple axiom, and the composite is as it were a manifold simple.  Verbi vinculo. 
He defines it from the band, not that it ariseth from thence, but because a verb falls out to tie one axiom to one.  Continetur. 
For Invention did handle arguments severally, but in axioms they are laid together with a cement or verb. Ob. Why doth he call it a verb? we have not heard of Grammar yet, doth he mean that verb which is taught there? Answ. No: but his meaning is, that the parts of this axiom are tied together by that which if it be uttered is a verb: so that verbum here is a metonimy of the adjunct from the subject, verb being put for that whose name will be a verb. If a man would lay bricks with bricks, to have them hold together, he must have mortar; and if he would fasten two pieces of wood together he must have a nail, or a pin of wood: for as the mortar is to the bricks, and the nail or pin to the wood, such is this vinculum here spoken of to the arguments.  Vinculo. 
He calls it vinculum, because the vinculum holdeth the arguments together in a kind of composition: imitating God therein, who hath tied things in nature with an affection: and indeed to speak the truth it springs from the affection that is between the two arguments disposed.  Itaque affirmato vel negato verbo, affirmatur, vel negatur. 
Before we heard in an axiom, that affirmatum was quando vinculum eius affirmatur, negatum contra: why then a simple axiom having the band affirmed must be affirmed, & contra: so that this is nothing but a special application to this kind of axiom, of that which was before taught generally to all axioms: and that which is special here is that it is the verbum that is denied or affirmed, which was vinculum before: and this commendation indeed is chief for contradiction: for if there be contradiction here, the verb must be affirmed, and denied: ut ignis urit: ignis est antecedens, urit consequens: here he calls the argument going before the verb antecedens, and the argument following the verb, consequens: others call them subiectum, and praedicatum, but he is not pleased with their names, because subiectum is properly an argument in invention, therefore if it should be used here, it would breed confusion: and not only subjects and predicates are disposed here, but all other arguments, therefore he rather keepeth the general terms showing so much: again, they are fit, because here we are in disposition, ergo there must be an argument to go before the vinculum, and another to follow. Now we use these terms also in a composite axiom, but they are more proper here. The Aristotelians used their terms subiectum, and predicatum only in a simple axiom, for they had no composite axioms, but a connex, as we shall hear afterward.  Atque hic prima est inventarum rerum dispositio causae cum effecto, ut in primo exemplo, etc. 
Prima by nature, not otherwise, because we cannot make a composite axiom of more arguments with more, but there will be more lines: here in a simple axiom there is but one line, and in a syllogism there will be a triangle, the demonstration may be this.  

A simple axiom.  
A composite of one to more.  
A composite of more to more.  
▵ A Syllogism.   Quomodo argumentum quodlibet enunciari potest (exceptis plenis comparationibus & distributionibus) consentanea quidem affirmando, dissentanea negando, 
Ramus doth commorari in telling us the use of a simple axiom, and he tells us all arguments may be disposed therein, but plenae comparationes, and plenae distributiones, for so he means, else homo est animal is a distribution, and yet a simple axiom: but otherwise these will evermore be a composite axiom.  Consentanea quidem affirmando, dissentanea negando. 
Not but that consentanea may be denied, and dissentanea affirmed, for we heard before that the same axiom might be affirmed, and denied, but thus they ought to be disposed, consentanea affirmando, dissentanea negando: now here by consentanea he doth not mean only causa, effectum, subiectum, and adiunctum, but also those that do arise from them, even all that may any way agree: as in like sort by dissentanea he means also all them that do arise from them, or that do any way disagree: but here we are to know that this is not any rule of Art, but only a commoration, applying that here in special, which he taught before. Now this disposition is easy: but here sometime the band, and the consequent part grammatically uttered will be the same, as ignis urit: now we come to the affections of a simple axiom, which belong not to a composite.  Axioma simplex est generale, aut speciale. 
This is a distribution of the subject into the adjuncts, and though a composite axiom may be general, or special, yet there we do not look after it: so that composite axioms in a syllogism may make a simple syllogism, being considered not as composite, but as the arguments are simply disposed.  Generale. 
This term comes of genus, not that this axiom consists always of those arguments genus, and species; but he means that common which we hear of in Grammar, and yet notwithstanding the antecedent part may be common, and the axiom may be proper, ergo, he rather keeps that term generale, then common, though it be a hard trope. Now in a general axiom we are to observe these three things, first an antecedent that is common, secondly, a common consequent, thirdly, a general attribution of them, for else it might be a special axiom: so that generality, and speciality belong to an axiom, and are not to be sought for in the doctrine of arguments.  Atque hic contradictio non semper dividit verum & falsum, sed contingentium utraque pars falsa potest esse. 
He is careful to teach us contradiction, because there is a mean matter, because there is no dispute where there is no contradiction, ergo he teacheth us the contradiction of a simple axiom, and now of a general axiom which will not always divide truth and falsehood, sed contingentium utraque pars, etc. that is, when we contradict a general by a general.  Item non contingentium. 
Why saith he non contingentium? because these non contingentia are such as fall out, peradventure impossibilia, as in this example. Omne animal est rationale, nullum animal est rationale, he could not well call them necessaria, nor possibilia, because they may be denied, whereas an impossible axiom should be affirmed.  Axioma speciale est, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur: & hic contradictio semper dividit verum à falso. 
It is called axioma speciale, not in respect it hath a species always disposed in it with a genus, but in respect it is more special than the general quando consequens, &c, consequens indeed is the chiefest part in an axiom, and is commonly the argument that is brought to argue: not the antecedens, he doth not say consequens common: because it may be either common, or proper, it is no matter whether of them it be.  Non omni antecedenti. 
Omni, and non omni are contradictory, now omnis dicitur de tribus ad minimum saith the schools, ergo, if omnis be given generally to all in a general axiom, then non omnis may be given to one, as it is a special axiom: omnis indeed is the sign of a general axiom, but where it cannot be had, there the axiom is special: non omni, that is to the antecedent that cannot have omnis put before it.  Attribuitur. 
Attribuitur, in an affirmed axiom, it may seem that there is attributio: but in a denied axiom rather abnegation: but attribuitur both here and in a general axiom must be taken more generally for the same that disponitur is, whether it be by way of affirmation, or negation.  Et hic contradictio semper dividit verum à falso. 
So that if our contradiction with any body be a special axiom, than we may be assured that the one part is false, and that there is contradiction in it.  Speciale est particular, aut proprium. 
Particular doth intimate a common, for nothing can be parted but a common, and it is so called, because though the antecedent be common, yet it takes but part of it.  Particular, quando consequens communi antecedenti particulariter attribuitur. 
Here is a fault in the print, for it should be communi, because the consequent (as we heard before) may be common or proper: but the antecedent must be common; but here is a particularis attributio. Now a general axiom is before a special, because it is more large. Homo est doctus is a particular axiom, for antecedens is common, now it differs from a general, first in that a general must have a common consequens, this may have a common, or proper; secondly, a general must have a general attribution, this is a particular one.  Huic autem axiomati generaliter contradicitur. 
Therefore in like sort generali axiomati specialiter contradicitur, and then dividit verum à falso, for contradict a general by a particular, and it will divide truth and falsehood: so that a general axiom hath a double contradiction, one when we contradict a general by a general, and another when we contradict a general by a particular.  Axioma proprium est, quando consequens antecedenti proprio attribuitur. 
This axiom doth require first a consequent be it proper, or common: secondly a proper antecedent: thirdly an attributio. Now he means by proprium, not that the antecedent should always be a proper name, for an axiom of genus, and species may make a proper axiom.   

CAP. 5. De axiomate copulato.  Axioma compositum est, quod vinculo coniunctionis continctur. 
axiomatical disposition was where there were two sides arguing: and they were either one argument to one, or more to one, & contra: but we have already heard of a simple axiom: now we come to a disposition, where there is one to more, aut contra, and it is called a composite axiom of this composite disposition. Axioma compositum est, quod vinculo coniunctionis continetur. This axiom contains more simples in it, though we consider but one side with one.  Quod vinculo, etc. 
That is, whose parts are tied together with a conjunction, so that the trial of the axiom lies in the conjunction, not that it ties the arguments firstly, yet it doth tie them too, as when I say a man is just, and true, for the principal tying lies not in Is, but in And: so that though there be a verb, yet that is not here considered as the band. Now if a simple syllogism stand of composite axioms, then Is, is the band.  Vinculo coniunctionis continetur. 
So that the parts are held together by this vinculum, yet here he doth not mean a grammatical conjunction, but the thing that is signified by the conjunction: vox est nota in Grammar: so that metonimically he means that thing whereof the conjunction is a note, for he hath not a fit word, and therefore though Grammar be after Logic, yet because it is commonly taught in schools first, therefore Ramus borroweth from that. Now then by vinculum coniunctionis we are to understand, that which the conjunction signifies, and that is nothing but the glue, or affection that knits things together.  Itaque è coniunctione affirmata vel negata, affirmatur vel negatur. 
Here he doth deduct this consecution helped from a former rule: affirmation and negation were, where the band was affirmed, or denied, ergo, if a conjunction be the copula of a composite axiom, then that being affirmed makes the axiom affirmed, & contra: this he stayed upon to teach us to discern of contradiction, which is of use especially in common talk, for if there be no contradiction in controversies, there will be no dispute.  Contradictionisque pars vera, pars falsa. 
Here evermore contradiction divides truth from falsehood: so that if one part be true, the other will always be false, & contra.  Enunciatum compositum est pro sua coniunctione congregatiwm, aut segregatiwm. 
The axiom stands upon the band, for we have heard of the arguments before, and that which is here new is the disposing, or banding them together. Now according to the nature of a conjunction that ties two sides together, are axioms to be divided, for there are some conjunctions that belong to a syllogism tying three sides together.  
Congregatiwm, that is, where the parts are gathered together to argue one side: segregatiwm, that is, where the parts that make one side are severed, to argue the other side. Now the reason of this is plain, for some things there are that may agree in nature, and some things that must be severed, ergo, as God hath ordered his creatures, so must our Logic behold them.  Congregatiwm enunciat omnia consentanea affirmando, omnia etiam dissentanea negando. 
Enunciat, that is, it doth dispose omnia consentanea affirmando, he means by consentanea, not only causa, and effectum, subiectum and adiunctum, but paria, or comparata, or orta, otherwise it should enunciare none but consentanea, & dissentanea, dissentanea negando, by dissentanea he means all argument wherein there may seem to be any dissension.  Est vero copulatum aut connexum. 
Things disposed together where there is two sides are either disposed, that is, yoked together, as oxen go together one by another, or as horses are tied tail to tail one following another in a team. So that if the arguments be disposed, that is, yoked together as oxen, than it is a copulate axiom, and if one argument go before another, and the latter follow upon the former, than it is a connex: so that as one thing in nature is disposed together with another, or as one thing followeth upon another, so must our reason see them. A copulate is first, because there is not such a precedency, and consequency of the arguments as in a connex, but both go together, ergo, a copulate is next to a simple, and thence it is that a copulate axiom is so often in a simple syllogism.  Copulatum, cuius coniunctio est copulativa. 
The axiom is delivered altogether passively, the arguments were active, because the vinculum is affirmed, or denied, and doth not affirm or deny, cuius coniunctio est copulativa, whose vinculum is a conjunction if it be uttered: copulativa, that is, coupling the arguments together, as, 
una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis  
Affricus—   Hic igitur negatio erit & contradictio. 
Non una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis, Affricus. Non doth not here deny that Eurus did blow, or that Notus did not blow, or that Affricus did not blow: but that all of them did not blow; for if one or two of them had blown, and not the third also, it had been false.  Verum enunciati copulati iudicium pendet ex omnium partium veritate: falsum, saltem ex una parte falsa. 
That we may therefore judge aright whether a copulate axiom be true or false, why, that it may be true, it must have all the parts true together: falsum may be of one part false: hence in bonds, and obligations where there are many conditions, if we break one we break all.  Huic generi affine est enunciatum relatae qualitatis, cuius coniunctio est ipsa relatio. 
Here Ramus doth commorari, for he could not well tell what to say, for whereas he told us before that a conjunction was the band, here he saith what shall we do with those axioms where there is no conjunction, but relata qualitas. Why, saith he, you must understand here that there is a conjunction: so that a species of a copulate is that axiom where there is a relation of quality, for though there be not a conjunction, yet here is the same in effect with a conjunction: as if it were thus; sopor est fessis gratus: sic tuum carmen est nobis gratum.  
Relatae qualitatis: he means also relatae quantitatis, for so there are examples: as, how many fishes are in the sea? so many, saith Ovid, are my miseries: Now I have marvelled that he left out quantitatis, I had rather have said enunciatum relationis: not relatae comparationis, for dissentanea come not in here. Relatae qualitatis, where there are similia: he doth not mean that relation in arguments, but a pronoun.   

CAP. 6. De Axiomate connexo.  Axioma connexum, est congregatiwm, cuius coniunctio est connexiva. 
AXioma connexum, is where the parts are knit one to the tail of another, as in a trace of Horses: and that there is such an axiom, it appears because of the tacking of one thing to follow another in nature.  
Est congregatiwm: As gathering things one upon the tail of another.  Cuius coniunctio est connexiva. 
Not that it is always so, but relation of time may be here also: as misery draws a lie, and vanity, and falsehood follow after, cuius negatio non si, saying the consequent doth not follow upon the antecedent.  Coniunctio etiam haec interdum negatur apertius negangando consequentiam. 
Our author doth commorari in these composite axioms, because other Logicians have either taught nothing at all of them, or very little: this conjunction is sometime denied more openly, negando consequentiam, that is, not by denying the consequent part, but by denying the consequent part to follow upon the antecedent, as si est homo, non est brutum, this is not a connex: so that we must look always that the consequent follow upon the antecedent, as si est miser, non est ideo vanus, this is a connex.  Pro Amer. Non continuo si me in sicariorum gregem contuli sicarius sum. 
I am not presently a cutter, if I betake myself into the company of cutters: here the connex must be, non ideo sicarius sum, for he must have some time to learn to be a cutter.  De Fato. Nec si omne enunciatum verum est aut falsum, sequitur illico causas esse immutabiles. 
So that the denial is non sequitur illico causas esse immutabiles: the reason follows;  Affirmatio enim significat si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse. 
That is, it followeth from the antecedent, as if he be a man he hath reason, for the consequent is affirmed, because the band is affirmed.  Negatio itaque & contradictio statuit, si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse. Quare cum, etc. 
It may be a true axiom, though never a part be true. As, si homo est Leo, est etiam quadrupes, that is a necessary true connex: but it is neither true that homo est lo, nor that he is quadrupes, and so neither part is true: so that the truth of the consequent part of a connex axiom hangeth on the antecedent conditionaliter.  At si connexio sit contingens, & pro sua tantùm probabilitate ponatur, iudicium eius tantùm opinio fuerit. 
So that he doth declare unto us how to judge of necessity, and contingency, which lie in the necessary, or contingent following of the consequent upon the antecedent.  Pamphile, si id facis, hodie postremum me vides.  Connexo axiomati affinis est ista consequentiae relatio. 
A cousin connex, or a cousin to connex axiom, is that axiom which is uttered by cum, etiam, or tum, etc. so that these have the reference of the former: as appeareth in the example, ut,  
Cum Tullius sit Orator, est etiam peritus bene dicendi.   

CAP. 7. De axiomate discreto.  Axioma segregatiwm, est cuius coniunctio est segregativa: ideoque argumenta dissentanea enunciat. 
A Composite axiom was so called because it had a joiner to his band, that is, a conjunction: now the band may join the words, not the matter, ergo a conjunction in a copulate axiom may couple the words, though it sever the matter, and if the band be not uttered, than that thing that the word doth notify is the logical band. Now as axioma was congregatiwm, which gathered the parts, either yoking them like oxen, as in a copulate, or tying them as horses one after another, as in a connex: so segregatiwm doth sever and sunder the parts of the axiom, and therefore his conjunction is segregativa: so that where things are severed in nature, there must our Logic see them distinct.  Ideoque argumenta dissentanea enunciat. 
Axioma segregatiwm cannot enunciare consentanea, but dissentanea: here he means all arguments where there is consention, and dissension; for dissimilia may be disposed in a discrete axiom, though they be not dissentanies: so again, though it doth enunciare dissentanea, yet it doth not follow, but that it may enunciare consentanea, as animal est homo, aut brutum: so that they are dissentanea quatenus, the parts disjoined do dissentire inter se, and they are consentanea quatenus, the parts together argue the whole: so that the parts are not disjoined from the whole, but inter se.  Enunciatum segregatiwm, est discretum aut disiunctum. 
This segregation of things is either a more easy discerning of them, whereas they might otherwise agree, which may appear to our eye, though it be not so palpable in the things: or it is disjunct where the parts are severed re & ratione, so that these axioms do serve for the deliverance of diversa and opposita.  Discretum, cuius coniunctio est discretiva. 
Discretum of discerno: so that when things are so severed in nature, as we may see them disjunct with our eye, though not so plainly in the things themselves, they make a discrete axiom.  Itaque è dissentaneis praecipuè diversa enunciat. 
This axiom doth enunciare dissimilia too, therefore if he had said dissimilia, he had included diversa: as though there be matters which might be judged by the outward senses, yet are they to be referred to the mind too.  Cuius negatio, & contradictio est. 
So that the denial doth take away that discretion, which was laid down before.  Discretum enunciatum iudicatur esse verum & legitimum, si partes non solùm verae, sed etiam discretae sint; falsum vel ridiculum contra. 
Now for the judgement of this axiom, it is verum & legitimum: so that two things are required in judging a discrete axiom: first that the parts be true, else it will be a false axiom; secondly, that they be lawful, else they will be ridiculous, because the parts will not be diverse. As to say, though he be a man, yet he is a living creature: here both parts are true, but here is no discretion, and therefore it is ridiculous.   

CAP. 8. De axiomate disiuncto.  Axioma disiunctum, est axioma segregatiwm, cuius coniunctio est disiuncta. 
THE discrete and disjunct sever things, but the former doth it only ratione: now the disiunct looks at an opposition between the things disjoined: it is called a disiunct axiom, as disjoining or pulling the parts out of joint: so than the former may be compared to the laying of two things that are distinct, but not pulled out of joint.  Est segregatiwm. 
Therefore severing the matter, for the parts are so divided, that they cannot agree, or be united, because they are opposite sine ullo medio.  Cuius coniunctio est disiunctiva. 
Disjoining, or pulling in pieces the things disposed, as there is either day or night, these are privantia, ergo contraries, ergo opposites.  De Fato. Omnis enunciatio est vera, aut falsa. 
This 〈◊〉 a disiunct in like sort, where veritas and falsitas are disjoined: now for the judgement of this axiom, here one part only is true, and not both, which ariseth from the nature of opposites. Itaque eidem attribui, etc. but if we consider the affection between the whole, and the parts, there both will be true: as argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale, but because the whole with the form make up the species, therefore we say in effect, argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale: and if these composite axioms be disposed in a simple syllogism, than the verb will be the band: for we have nothing to do with the dissension of the parts, but to see how the parts of the question are disposed with the third argument.  Hic significatur è disiunctis unicum verum esse. 
In a distinct axiom, one part only is true, because they are dissentanea: as homo est bonus, aut non bonus, these parts are but contingent separated, but the disjunction is necessary.  Cuius negatio. Non omnis enunciatio est vera, aut falsa. 
So that the denial taketh away the contradiction.  Et contradictione significatur, non necessario alterum verum esse. 
So that though the parts may be contingently true, ye the axiom may be necessary.  Veruntamen quamuis absolute vera disiunctio necessaria quoque sit: tamen nihil necesse est partes separatim necessarias esse. 
Therefore est is not the band, for it doth tie but contingent truth, but the conjunction is it, because it ties necessary truth.  Itaque si disiunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera, & tantum opinabilis est: qualis est frequenter in hominum usu. 
So that this disiunct contingent is not usual in common speech, ut si quaeratur, etc. whereas both, or neither of them might come.  Tantum opinabilis. 
Because opinio is the judgement of a contingent axiom: and thus we have heard all the kinds of disposition on two sides.   

CAP. 9 De Syllogismo, & eius partibus.  Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum, axiomatic per se manifesti, sequitur dianoeticum. 
NOw we come to a disposition, where there are three sides, so that they play as it were at three hand ruff: Now mark the reason of this distribution of dispositio into axioma, and syllogismus: some things there are that are laid together in nature without a mean, ergo we may see them at the first hand uno intuitu: some things also have a mean, which we must use before we can see them, ergo, according to the things in nature, and according to the act of our reason in beholding these things, so must our Logic proceed, and as the medium shall either combine, or sever them, so we may conclude them affirmatively, or negatively, and herein stands the force of those rules, though they be not always true, quae conveniunt in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter se, & contra, because that medium is the holder of them two together, aut contra, for there the medium will be a bar to sever them; as otiosus est amator, Aegisthus est otiosus, ergo, est amator, because otium is as glue to pull on amor, for it argues love as causa, and it pulls on Aegisthus as an adjunct. So this rule sublata causa tollitur effectum, et contra: and all these rules of consecution are because the effect brings the cause with it: and any other argument as well as causa may be a mean whereby two things may be glued together: for this third argument is not so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it, but in respect of our seeing them, and we may see as well by any other arguments as by causa.  Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum, etc. 
An axiom is such a thing as appears to be true at the first sight, or at the second hand: now our reason is to be so glued, as that it may be able to see any truth, ergo, if the truth appear at the first sight, an axiom will serve us, else we must have a candle to make it clear: so that here we may see, the purpose of syllogistical judgement is not to make things more true, or more false in themselves, but to make the truth, or falsehood more manifest unto us: so that clear per se belongs to an axiom; but perspicuity in regard of us, belongs to a syllogism: and here we may also see, that axioma probabile, as they call it, and axioma subtle belong hither: so that all third arguments are not used to make the things more true in themselves, but to make the truth more manifest to us, ergo, Cardan, whilst he argued against Scaliger that he that disputed of subtlety, might dispute of all things, was in the right, but when he would go about to prove, that all things were to be taught in subtlety, there he was out, for after we have discoursed a point syllogistically, we are fain to go back again to the rule of an axiom to judge the truth, or falsehood thereof, ergo, here we may see that axioms and syllogisms are confederate, and not syllogism and method. Now the same axiom may be manifest to one man, but dark to another, ergo, syllogistical judgement waits upon man, and if the truth or falsehood be nice or fine, that it cannot be seen with one act of our eye, than we must use a third argument: and subtle, if we define it aright, is axioma non adeo manifestum.  Sequitur dianoeticum. 
Dianoia signifies reason's discourse, the laying about by our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for when at first she doth not see a truth, than she commands cogitation to coagitare, that is, to look after it: so that dianoia is nothing, but the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth. Some Logicians have compared axomaticall judgement to a calm sea, for there our reason is quiet, being satisfied with the truth, and syllogistical judgement to a troubled sea, that is, full of storms, winds, and tempests, for there our reason beats every corner to conclude that which is doubtful, and from this act it is called dianoia; and the judgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum, it running after this, or that: but our author divides it afterward into syllogismus and methodus, which how it should be true I see not, namely, how method should be dianoia: for the three internal senses in nature are distinct, ergo, these parts ought to be distinct according to them, as we heard before. Now method makes all things one, and so we remember all things as one, and the things be judged before I come here, here I only lay things together to remember them.  Dianoia est, cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus, aut methodus. 
This very definition tells me that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus, and they are both one: so that here are deductions of axioms out of axioms, which surely belong to syllogistical judgement only, for I do not mean that it is ordering of one axiom before another, but a drawing of deductions from their first rules: true it is that a former axiom gives light to that which follows, but that light is by virtue of syllogistical judgement, so that method placing axioms, doth indeed need axiomatical judgement, as that also needs invention before it can place them, but it doth not therefore follow, that the doctrine of axioms should be in method.  Syllogismus est dianoia; qua quaestio cum argumento ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente, necessario concludatur. 
Syllogismus signifies properly the sum of an account in the species of numeration, especially in Addition: and summa, and syllogismus are the same; and the Logicians have borrowed it of the Arithmeticians, because though Logic be the first Art in order, and nature, yet Arithmetic was observed by men before Logic, ergo, Plato set over his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught among them as Grammar is now taught among us: for as for Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric, they had them by nature, ergo, they studied the Mathematics first, ergo, they called them Mathematics, for the word is general to all Arts, and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logic brings demonstrations out of the Mathematics: so that this metaphor syllogismus was à priore to them. This syllogismus est dianoia, qua quaestio cum argumento, etc. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse, and here in this rule observe first a question, secondly, an argument, thirdly, a disposing of them together, fourthly, a set or constant position of the arguments and the question: Lastly, a necessary conclusion from them, first if it be a clear truth that ought not to be a question, else it should.  Qua quaestio. 
What question? shall he go ask any body? yes a third argument if he will, but quaestio here is a law term, signifying a commission: so that if he doubted he might see at the Law for the truth: so that this judgement is a Courtly kind of seeking out truth with two arguments before the judgement seat of a third argument, and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation, which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in love with quaestio, as that they made it the subject of Logic, and divided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum, and compositum which is the same with axioma. Then there must be an argument, he doth not call it tertium argumentum here, as he doth afterward, but only argumentum: though there are always three arguments, because here he considers it in respect of the whole question, not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Invention: and argumentum must be brought indeed as an evidence, or witness, rather than as a judge, for I myself am the judge thereof.  Cum argumento. 
Therefore here saith Kickerman must argumentum come in: yea here indeed it must come in, but it must, ergo, be taught before, for it must be before it can come in, ergo, to say it must be here taught, because it comes in here, is fallacia accidentis, so that an argument belongs to judgement, as it may be disposed, not as it may be in itself. But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument, ergo, the doctrine of a question must go before the doctrine of an argument, indeed it so falls out here, but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make pigs fly with their tails forward.  Disponitur. 
He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument, that he might know how to use them; but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution, ergo, those maxims as they call them, are consecutions from the rules of invention, and are prosyllogismes. Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not ware, whilst he would distribute Logic into a simple conceit, a double conceit, and into discursus: for if disposition be general both to his double conceit, and to his discursus, than he leaves out two rules, the definition, and distribution of disposition, ergo, let us hold the right. Ita disponitur, because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument, consequens in propositione, antecedens in assumptione, and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed with the third argument alone in the proposition, ergo the question as the better man must have the third argument for his companion, for he is the gentleman, ergo, he saith, quaestio cum argumento, and not argumentum cum quaestione. Again the third argument is for the questions sake, ergo, it is he that is the more lofty, but this is not quaevis quaestio, but that quaestio quae ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur. He calls it an antecedent, ergo, a syllogism consisteth of two parts, an antecedent, and a consequent. An antecedent is so called, because it goes before, and a consequent because it comes after: again, an antecedent and a consequent, are not yoked together as two oxen, as in a copulate axiom, but one before another as horses trace, as in a connex hanging upon the former by a necessity of consequence. Now this question is so posita cum argumento, as that the question doth follow on them two, for the third argument never comes into the consequent part. Here positum is as it were put case, as put case there be an antecedent, tum necessario concludatur.  
Objection. Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth? yes, not but that it may be contingent, but he means necessario, that is, that this consequent will follow necessarily upon the antecedent, for the Art or rule of a syllogism: as otiosus est amator is contingent, Aegisthus est otiosus, is contingent, ergo, est amator, this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent: so that necessario goes not with the conclusion, but with the inference of the conclusion.  Nam cum axioma dubium sit, quaestio efficitur, & ad eius fidem tertio argumento opus est cum quaestione collocato. 
That is, when a matter is to be demurred, and stayed upon, quaestio efficitur, as before, & ad eius fidem, etc. what is that? that is, ad eius fiat dictum, that is, that you may build upon this truth tertio argumento opus est: so that fides properly belongs to the will, and to the resolution of the will, which is the extremity of reason, so that fides is in the will, ergo, belongs to Divinity; for when the Lord assures man by his Spirit, that he is reconciled unto him, his will saith presently fiat dictum; so that the third argument must give testimony of the honesty of the parts of the question, which two parts entering into the band, the controversy is ended. Collocato: here he tells us in general of the placing of the argument, but when it is to be placed, and where, we shall hear hereafter.  Syllogismi antecedens partes duas habet, propositionem, & assumptionem. 
He doth not define antecedence, and consequence, for there is antecedence & consequence in an argument, as the cause is before the effect, etc. and in an axiom, and also here, ergo, they are voces ambiguae, ergo, are not to be defined here.  Propositio, & assumptio. 
Propositio is oftentimes used generally for axioma, but it names an axiom only as it is used in a syllogism: and to use it more generally, is to abuse it, or are least to use a catachristicall synecdoche: assumptio belongs hither only.  Propositio est prima pars antecedentis qua quaestionis saltem consequens cum argumento disponitur. 
We have heard of a question, and an argument, which is a third in respect of the two in the question; but he calls it not a third before, because in a composite it is disposed with the whole question, not with the parts, than the dispositio of the argument cum quaestione is not at random, but so as there will be an antecedent, and a consequent, which antecedent being put, the consequent will follow of necessity; that is, the inference of the conclusion will follow of necessity, so that necessity here follows upon the inference of the conclusion, not upon the conclusion. Now the parts of the antecedent are the proposition, & assumption, for so it is requisite, that every syllogism stand of three parts, because they play at three hands: and there must be two parts of the antecedent, because the argument being but one can play but twice, namely, with the two parts of the question, and therefore if it should play the third time, it must play with itself, and thence it is, that it never comes into the conclusion: now in a composite syllogism there is silently contained the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, though it be not expressed. Now the common Logicians call the proposition the maior propositio, and the assumption the minor propositio, and the reason of it is this, because the maius extremum, namely, the consequent part of the question was put in proposition, and the minus extremum in the assumption: for as touching a composit syllogism, Aristotle did not teach one word of it. Now Ramus keeps these terms propositio, and assumptio, and he had reason, for use hath taken up these words in good authors for these things, as in Tully, Cornelius Agricola, and other Logicians that follow the more pure latin, and there is reason for it, for that which they call propositio there is a thing propounded to him with whom we dispute, and then the former being granted, I do assume as it were out of the bowels of the proposition, the assumption: so the Greeks' call propositio, Prothesis, and assumptio, Hypothesis: though I find some of them that call the proposition thesis, whereas the question is the thesis. Now propositio is that which is propounded, and carrieth a show of truth with it, ergo, we seldom deny the proposition, but rather the assumption, or else distinguish of it, ergo, our chiefest care must be of the assumption, to discern truth and falsehood in that.  Est prima pars antecedentis. 
As if he should say, that the disposition of the question with the argument, must have a proposition, and that must be placed first: so that that which we shall hear of more particularly hereafter, here we hear it more generally, namely, that it must be prima pars.  Qua quaestionis saltem consequens, etc. 
In this proposition there is a disposition of the question with the argument, saltem consequens, he speaks this, because whether our syllogism be simple or composite, the consequent part of the question is in the proposition. He saith saltem, because the whole question is in the proposition of a composite syllogism: ergo the consequent part, therefore observe this generally in every proposition, there is the consequens quaestionis disposed with the antecedent; therefore whereas we heard before that a syllogism was qua quaestio cum argumento, etc. here we hear that propositio est qua quaestionis saltem consequens cum argumento disponitur.  Assumptio est secunda pars antecedentis, quae assumitur è propositione. 
Assumptio, the second part of the antecedent part, ●s called assumptio, because adsumitur, it is taken to the proposition, for the proposition being settled, we take the assumption out of it being more general: I was wont to compare the proposition to a cow, and the assumption to her calf, that is taken out of her, and goeth by her side.  Est secunda pars antecedentis. 
Propositio is before, for in the question the consequent part is more general, or at least equal to the antecedent, quatenus it is an axiom, by reason whereof the proposition that contains the consequent part of the question with the third argument, is more general than the assumption: and it is the principal, namely, the third argument: as, si Socrates est animal, est substantia: at si Socrates est homo est animal, ergo: again, here lies another reason, quae assumitur è propositione, ergo the proposition must be more capacious, or at least equal, as where the proposition and assumption shall be reciprocal, for we cannot take two out of one.  Assumitur. 
Because when the proposition shall be granted, than I will take my assumption out of it: so that this is generally to be observed, that the assumption is taken out of the proposition; this is the diancia of it, qua aliud axioma ex alio deducitur: it is as a case of boxes where one is taken out of another: now if the assumption be not taken out of the proposition, than it is not ad idem, ergo, baculus stat in angulo.  Syllogismi autem pars consequens est, quae complectitur partes quaestionis, eamque concludit: unde complexio & conclusio dicitur. 
So that we must take heed that we have not more in the conclusion than the parts of the question: for as it was a fallace if the assumption were not taken out of the proposition: so is it also here, if any thing come into the conclusion beside the question. If there should be any other thing, it would be either an heterozeteses, when the question is not concluded, as the Schools say, it is not ad rem; or else apoluzeteses, i. concluding many questions in one, ergo an heterozeteses, and apoluzeteses err against this rule.  Eamque concludit. 
The third argument can never come into the conclusion: in a simple syllogism the third argument is brought as a candle, to see how it plays with the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and with the antecedent in the assumption, and then the question is concluded: in a composite syllogism we repeat the third argument in the assumption, as if he should say, mark this, this is it that shows the truth of the question. Concludit: that is, shuts them together in the axiom: but if they descent it severs things.  Vnde complexio, & conclusio dicitur. 
These are logical terms, which he brings to show us how the same thing may have diverse names: and hitherto we have heard generally de Syllogismo, & eius partibus. Now there are certain properties that belong to a syllogism, which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hidings, for many times in our dispute we hide some parts; now the reason of that is indeed the distraction of our understanding, for many times we hasten to be at the conclusion without any reason: sometimes we touch the reason without the conclusion: and again, many times we touch all the parts, but disorderly, therefore this being in use we must have a doctrine thereof.  Si qua pars syllogismi defuerit, enthymema dicitur. 
This by the common Logicians is made a special kind of argumentation, but they mistake it, for it is nothing but a syllogism wanting a leg, as if a man wanting a leg were not a man, so is this a syllogism, though it be lame. Again, in Grammar we say, quod subintelligitur non deest: ergo here though a part be not expressed, yet is it not wanting: and the very name tells me as much. It comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in ment, because I keep a part of it in my mind: and even as in Arithmetic syllogismus is the totum: so enthumema is the reservation, or keeping of one in my mind, and setting down a cipher: so that that retention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, doth not make a distinct species of argumentatio.  Si quid praeter illas tres partes accesserit, prosyllogismus. 
Many times we shall see the proposition backed, the assumption backed, and the conclusion backed with a third argument, than it is prosyllogismus: so that sometimes as we are too straight, so here we are too large: diverse Ramists have also thought there should be proaxioma; as Tully that famous Orator of Rome declaimed against Verres: here they say that famous Orator of Rome is a proaxioma, and it is so; for if any thing be added in an axiom beside the antecedent, and consequent part, it is but for illustration of that part whereunto it is joined: but in a prosyllogisme there is a third argument that proves something backing either the assumption, or the conclusion: as Paul an Apostle writes to the Romans: for here Apostle is part of the axiom, and from that name he is enjoined to write: that they call Sorites is nothing but many prosyllogismes one backing another, and one backing the principal.  Partium etiam or do saepe confunditur. 
Whereas the parts should be in order, the proposition first, than the assumption, and lastly the conclusion; sometimes we shall have the assumption first, than the proposition, than the conclusion, & contra, & alternè, & inuerse: as Socrates est homo quia animal, etc. As for dilemma it is nothing but syllogismus disiunctus, and inductio is nothing but a collectio, or a reasoning from the parts to the whole.  Attamen, si qua dubitatio propterea fuerit, explenda, quae desunt: amputanda, quae supersunt: & pars quaelibet in locum redigenda est. 
If any parts be wanting, so that some scruple may arise thereof, set it down: if there be more than needs, take them away for the time; if any parts be disordered, set them at rights, first the proposition, than the assumption, and lastly the conclusion.   

CAP. 10. De syllogismo simplici contracto.  Syllogismus est simplex aut compositus. 
WE have heard of a syllogism, and what it serves for, namely, to manifest a doubtful axiom: now we come to the species of a syllogism, est simplex aut compositus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: we have heard the reason of the name, that it is a brief of that which is more largely delivered: now for this cause the Stoics called it a fist, for it is not generally of Logic, but belongs to a syllogism. These names simplex and compositus we have heard of more often in Logic; we have heard of argumentum simplex, aut comparatum: and we have heard that axioma est simplex, aut compositum, and now that syllogismus est simplex, aut compositus: but it is the community of name, not the community of the thing: and for want of fit names, we may borrow the same often, if so be the definitions show the difference of them: in a simple axiom there is one argument simply disposed with one; in a simple syllogism there is also a simple disposition, but of the consequent part of the question in the proposition, of the antecedent in the assumption, ergo from the breaking of this question thus, as there is a simple disposition, it is called simple, but in a composite syllogism the whole question, and the third argument are disposed together, ergo according to these two kinds of disposition there are these parts of a syllogism; now the reason why there is this disposition in nature is this, the third argument which is well called so here, because here the parts of the question are broken, the truth must either be such, as is so doubtful, as we must be fain to pull the parts of the question in sunder to see it, and then we make a simple syllogism: or if the question be not so doubtful but that we may soon perceive it, than we make but a composite syllogism: hence it is that the common Logicians never dreamt of a composit syllogism, but only of a simple, desiring to make all things more clear, but there are often more fallaces lie lurking under a composite syllogism, then under a simple one: hence in schools we say, dispute catagorice, for in a composite the third argument being disposed with the whole question, doth not so clear it, as in a simple it doth; yet none is to except against it, the composite syllogism clears the whole question, the simple clears both the parts of the question.  Simplex, ubi pars consequens quaestionis disponitur in propositione: pars antecedens in assumptione. 
This then is particular first in a simple syllogism, that the consequent part of the question is disposed with the third argument in the proposition, now whether before or after, we shall hear hereafter, for that is more particular; before in the definition of a syllogism it was quaestio cum argumento, then quaestionis saltem consequens, here it is pars consequens in propositione, pars antecedens in assumptione: and whether this be before or after, we shall hear hereafter: so that is general to every simple syllogism. Consequens in propositione, because that evermore is the more general part of the question, as we heard before, and the continent should hold more than the contentum, and the assumption assumitur è propositione, ergo the consequent must be there, and the antecedent, therefore in the assumption he doth not say, consequens disponitur cum argumento, for that is general before in the definition of a syllogism.  Estque affirmatus è partibus omnibus affirmatis. 
Ramus now teacheth us the common properties of a simple syllogism, which agree not to a composite, but quatenus the proposition thereof may be simple: affirmation, and negation we heard of in an axiom, but here the syllogism is not so nominated from the band as before, but from the propositions affirmed, or denied, general, special, or proper: so that affirmation is here when every part, proposition, assumption, and conclusion are affirmed.  Negatus, è negata antecedentium partium altera cum complexione. 
Now we are here to observe, that in these general properties come in all those modi, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, etc. for they are nothing but generalis affirmatus, negatus, etc. so that if we observe but these rules, we shall swallow up many rules, & such words or modi, as would make a man afraid to read them, lest there should be some charming in them.  
Negatus è negata, etc. for ex omnibus negativis nihil concluditur: for if the third argument disagree from both parts, it will never glue them together; but here in general this is a certain truth, that the conclusion will follow the worse part, particularity cannot indeed hold in a contract, but for negation it will: now followeth another property.  Generalis, è propositione & assumptione generalibus. 
This is not as the generality of an axiom, quando commune consequens attribuitur generaliter communi antecedenti: but here it is when the proposition and assumption are general.  Specialis, ex altera tantùm generali. 
Because the other part may be either particular or proper; if he had said, ex altera tantum speciale, it had not been so convenient: again, whilst he saith, ex altera tantum generali, he tells us there cannot be a concluding ex meris particularibus, because the conclusion would not follow, for in the particular axiom there may be a separation, as aliquis homo est doctus, aliquis homo non est doctus: here would be four termini.  Proprius, ex utraque propria. 
Here mark, that as in the special syllogism, so in the proper, he makes no mention of the conclusion, because howsoever the parts be general, etc. the conclusion will be particular: now by the rules following I will presently know in what mood any syllogism will be concluded.  Simplex syllogismus, est contractus partibus vel explicatus. 
Our Author brings in a distribution here, that hath not any warranty from any other but himself, he thought long how he might make a dicotomy, which he might have done thus: a simple syllogism is more single, or more composite, this he thought of, but if he should have brought it in, then there would have been confusion, for than he had severed the explicates: because there the third argument follows twice: whereas there are certain properties agreeing to them both, which have nothing to do with a contract, Again, I have seen in some of his additions a tricotomy into contractus, explicatus, primus, and secundus: but this also would breed confusion; for by this means those properties that are general to both the explicates would be left out: but in the end he settled in this, though Machelmeneus a french man, who saith he was his master, reports that Ramus desired him to mend this distribution: and I am sure though he were his master, the scholar was better than the master. Ramus saith it is contractus, or explicatus: which we are to justify thus; he follows use, and use contracts this kind of Syllogism more often than it explicates it: not that it is always contracted, but sometime it is explicated, as Ramus tells us: yet this is always true, that when it is explicated it may be contracted. Paul contracts it, hath God forsaken all Israel? God forbidden, I am an Israelite: this is it: Paul is not forsaken, Paul is an Israelite, ergo, all Israel is not forsaken: so that contractus is a species of syllogismus, because use doth most commonly contract this kind of syllogism: therefore because it is true more often, than it is false, therefore let the truth be taught generally, and the exception come more afterward, because that is more special in use, the explicate is never contracted, ergo, this opposition of them may seem to make them opposite species.  Contractus, quando argumentum pro exemplo ita subiicitur particulari quaestioni, etc. 
Here these things are to be considered: for the argument is brought as an example always, than secondly the question is particular, thirdly, it is subjected to the particular question as an example thereof, and here lies the contradiction, here the third argument is brought as an instance as we call it.  Subiicitur. 
That is subjected as inferior to both the parts of the question: it must be subiectum of the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and subiectum of the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, if we explicate it: so that remember that before in the definition of syllogismus simplex, and apply it unto this: so that that which is here required is first a particular question, than a third argument as a question is subjected, and this is when it is contracted.   utramque partem antecedens, & assumptione affirmatum intelligatur. 
For that is understood, intelligatur, that is, even when it is contracted: so that here is the reason why this syllogism is first. Aristotle, and all his sect that follow him make this figure last: but a syllogism is a disposition, and according to the disposition of the third argument, such is the syllogism, if therefore it go before in both the parts of the antecedent, why to go before is before to go behind, ergo, this must be the first. Kickerman saith Aristotle's order is best, because the last figure is most general for use, he hath reason for it, for it is more large for his reach, but not so simple for disposition, and how can we conclude, till we know where to place the third argument.  Hic enim argumentum quaestionis, etc. 
Ramus doth here commorari.  Nec aliter explicatur. 
Ramus was here deceived, for sometime it is explicated, yet for one that is explicated, we shall have it contracted.   

CAP. 11. De prima specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.  In syllogismo explicati propositio est generalis, aut propria, & conclusio similis antecedenti, aut parti debiliori. 
WE have heard that a simple syllogism did break the question, and the third argument was laid to each part, that is, to the consequent part in the proposition, and looked into that by the light of the third argument, and to the antecedent in the assumption. Now simplex was by use contracted, or laid out more at large. Use is artium magister saith the Schools, and because it was more often in use contracted, then explicated, ergo, it was requisite that he should teach us the use of contracting it. This is in nature first, if we shall look at placing the third argument, for to come before is before to come behind, and to come behind is before to come before, and behind. Now in a contract the question is always particular, and the antecedent part of the question in like sort doth always agree with the third argument, because the assumption must always be affirmed, so that do but consider those two things, and you shall presently know any contract syllogism, and thus much of a contract, now we come to an explicate.  In syllogismo explicato propositio est generalis, aut propria, & conclusio similis antecedenti, aut parti debiliori. 
The things here to be considered are first in the proposition, then in the conclusion: the proposition must be general, or proper, not particular, for than it is a breach of this rule, and this fallace is very common even in common talk, as for example.  
That that ties us unto Christ is the act of our faith.  
The imputation of Christ's righteousness is not our act of faith saith one.  
Therefore it doth not tie us unto Christ.  
Here the proposition is not general, for we are made righteous, not for our faith alone, but for that we are in Christ by faith: faith ties us as an instrument, but we must take heed that we give not that to the instrument, which is due to the principal cause, for even as my arm is tied not to my sinews, or nerves, but is tied to the whole body, and is a member of the whole, being tied unto them by the whole: so we are as members of Christ's body tied to his Church, and are part of the matter, and form of the whole, the matter is quatenus, we are spiritually made of the semen of the word: the form is the union of the spirit holding all the members in semine, in that word unto Christ, now there is no fallace more common than this, for if we have a reason we bring it, never looking after the conclusion how it will follow, ergo, let us now well consider it, that we be no more deceived, for thus one saith.  
We are adopted to be the Sons of God by the act of faith without Christ.  
But the imputation of Christ's righteousness doth not make us to be adopted sons of God.  
Therefore this is as if I should say, that whereby I am nourished or live is my hands, ergo, this is true, but yet I do not live only by my hands, for than I should feed on them; and so if we look at the invention we make that causa sola, which is causa cum alijs.  Et conclusio similis antecedenti aut parti debiliori. 
That is, if that be strong, that is general, it will be like it, aut parti debiliori, that is particular, negative, or proper. Now for negation we heard of that generally before, that is, ex meris negativis nihil concluditur: so that it is generally true, that if the syllogism be negative, the conclusion thereof must be negative: but particularity, and property are here to be understood: so that whether in a contract, or explicate, negation is general, and by pars debilior we are to understand both negation, particularity, and property, but more especially particularity, and property; particularity is debilior, then generality, because there we cannot so fully determine of a thing. Now negation is more weak than affirmation, because it is more general, as when I say a man is not a stone, for here I go far from the point of telling you what a man is, for yet he may be any thing but a stone.  Species duae sunt: prima, ubi argumentum semper sequitur, negatum in altera parte. 
For whilst a syllogism stands in the disposition of the question with a third argument; and a simple syllogism is from breaking the parts of the question, disposing the consequent in the proposition, the antecedent in the assumption, ergo, the species must be by reason of the disposition of the third argument going before only, or going behind only, or going both before, and behind, ergo, they are very species of disposition. Now there are species duae, for there are no more places for the third argument: it cannot go after, and come before, as it may come before, and go after, the reason is this, the consequent part of the question is the maius extremum, ergo, if that should be in the assumption, then how could the assumption be taken out of the proposition, whereas the minus extremum was there, for so the assumption would be bigger than the proposition: and by this means the third argument in the proposition should be greater if it came after, than the maius extremum that should there go before it, whereas we heard before that the consequent part of the question is either more general, or at least equal to the third argument: and again, it should go before in the assumption, though it be greater than the minus extremum: so that there are no more places, it must either go before both, and so be less than both the parts of the question: or follow both, and so be greater than both: or else it must be a mean betwixt both.  Prima, ubi argumentum semper sequitur, etc. 
For here is a more simple disposition then in the second explicate, secondly, it is denied in altera parte, meaning in the one part of the antecedent part, either proposition, or assumption: they must never both be denied, nor both affirmed. The rule of negatus told us that one of the antecedents, and the conclusion must be denied but not all.  Semper sequitur. 
That is, the consequent in the proposition, and the antecedent in the assumption: so that if the question be negative we may conclude it here, or in all the rest: but particulars where the third argument agrees with the antecedent may be only concluded in a contract, as, Turbatus non bene utitur ratione.  
Turbatus is a man addicted to his affections, and the Stoics held that sapiens, and turbatus were disparates, and the reason is, because sapientia is not turbatio. Sapientia is properly the readiness, or promptness in syllogistical judgement: now where will rules without reason, that is not good: for the affections that attend upon will do trouble the reason, as love heats fancy, and hatred cools, both which are enemies to reason. Vsus rationis, the third argument is a genus of sapientia, for it is general of all Logic: and the intellectual virtues are the habitual promptnesses of reasons act: and this syllogism may also be concluded in the second kind of an explicate.  
Qui bene utitur ratione non est turbatus.  
Sapiens bene utitur ratione.  
Sapiens igitur non est turbatus.  
Hoc iudicium ita fit à Cic. 3. Tus.  
Quemadmodum (ait) oculus conturbatus non est probè  
affectus ad suum munus fungendum, etc.  
The proposition is here adorned with a prosyllogisme à simili: & sapientis animus ita semper affectus est, ut ratione optimè utatur: there is the assumption: nunquam igitur est perturbatus, there is the conclusion: and this is called a general of the first kind, because here are only negative syllogisms, and therefore the conclusion is always negative, ergo, that is the first kind of generals, when the conclusion is like to the proposition, for here general is an affection of simplex syllogismus explicatus: but when I say generalis est primus, aut secundus, here is a distribution of the genus into the species: now it is general, because the third argument is given to the parts of the question generally.  Res mortalis est composita. 
This is a general of the second sort, because here the assumption is denied: here composita agrees to res mortalis as a cause, ergo the proposition is affirmed: and because it will not agree with the antecedent anima, ergo, the assumption is denied.  Cicero 1. Tusc. 
In animi autem cognition (inquit.)  
Here the assumption is first, being backed with a prosyllogisme, à testimonio nisi enim in Physicis plumbei sumus, and here Tully's eloquence is showed in the variety of words signifying the same thing, and this belongs to natural Philosophy, where we hear that elementum is composed ex elementis. Quod cum ita sit, etc. here is the conclusion. Est enim interitus, etc. that is, res mortalis here is the proposition, and these are both general, for here compositio is general to the consequent part, and the conclusion is so too. Now we come to the species of specialis prima, aut secunda.  Lividus non est magnanimus. 
This is special, because the proposition only is general; it is primus because it is negative in the proposition like unto the conclusion, the question is whether maximus be a snake, or a slow worm, for a snake is very slow: and lividus is properly that which is black, and blue, and metaphorically it signifies poison: it signifies also one that will not do good himself, and yet envieth at others that do well: magnanimus, that is courageous: these are disparates. Maximus Ovid's friend is magnanimus: so that lividus non est magnanimus belongs to natural Philosophy.  Quid. 3. de pont. Eleg. 3. 
Livors iners vitium, mores non exit in altos, etc.  
Here is the proposition utque latens ima, etc. there is a prosyllogisme to it, à simili. Mens tua sublimis, here is the assumption, and here are prosyllogismes to that; Maximi were so called first of Fabius Maximus who was more than Alexander Magnus, supra genus eminet ipsum à comparatis: ingenium for magnanimity, a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, then à minore. Ergo alij noceant miseris, here is a dissimilitude. At tua supplicibus, etc. here are prosyllogismes for the conclusion which is wanting.  Specialis secundus. Saltator est luxuriosus. 
Specialis because one only part is general, secundus because the assumption is denied, as the conclusion is. The question is whether Muraena be a dancer.  Cicero pro Muraena. Nemo enim fere salta sobrius, nisi forte insanit, etc. 
Here the proposition is first with a prosyllogisme, neque in solitudine, etc. here is a distinction into the specials: intempestivi convivij, etc. to mihi, etc. here is the assumption, and there is a distribution of the integrum into the members: lastly the conclusion, & cum ea non reperiantur, here is again a repetition of the assumption with the conclusion.  Ouid. 1. Trist. Eleg. 2. 
Carmina proveniunt animo deducta sereno.  
Ovid excuses his verses tripliciter, my verses cannot be good: why? from the cause, carmina proveniunt, etc. nubila sunt subitis, here is a prosyllogisme of the proposition ab adversis: secondly, carmina secessum, etc. the proposition, the assumption is me mare, etc. Again, all fear should be removed from good verses: the assumption followeth enwrapped with a contrary, ego perditus ensem, etc. haec quoque quae facio, etc. here is a deprecatio in stead of the conclusion, which is general to all the three syllogisms.  Proprius primus. Agesilaus non est pictus ab Appelle, etc. 
Here the third argument disagrees with the consequent part, for Apelles lived not in Agesilaus time.  Proprius secundus. Caesar oppressit patriam. 
Here we see our Author doth not bring examples of proper syllogisms out of Authors, because Authors commonly slide away in generals; but yet he might have brought some out of History, for there commonly we have proper syllogisms.   

CAP. 12. De secunda specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.  Secunda species, explicati syllogis: est quando argumentum antecedit in propositione, sequitur affirmatum in assumptione. 
WE have heard the reason of the disposition of a simple syllogism, and the reason why the contract must go first, because it placeth the third argument and that before, whereas the first explicate placeth it after; now the second explicate is the second, because it placeth the third argument both before and after, ergo here is a more composite disposition then before, ergo Ramus placeth this last, whereas Kickerman would have it first, because it is more general for use, but quatenus it is a syllogism it is more special: but he meant it was more general, because it concludeth more questions, but that is no reason, for so adiunctum in Invention should be taught before subiectum, for adiunctum est frequentius, & copiosius: but we cannot know what to place before, and after, till first we know what it is to place before, and what it is to place after.  Secunda species syllogismi explicati est, etc. 
There are two things to be considered in this definition: first, that the argument doth antecedere in propositione: secondly, that it be affirmed in the assumption: for the placing of the third argument, we must know, that the place of it is double: first, it must be the antecedent in the proposition; secondly, it must be the consequent in the assumption, and it had his name medium from this syllogism principally, for in a contract it was placed before the parts of the question, in the first explicate after them: here it comes between them both, and because this kind was most common, and a figure best known in Schools, ergo hence came the third argument to be called medium: Secondly, the assumption must be affirmed, and herein it agreeth with a contract; and here we see what syllogism may be concluded in an explicate: first, an affirmed of all sorts, whether generalis, particularis, or proprius: secondly, a denied of all sorts, but not every denied; for if the antecedent part disagree with the third argument, than it will be concluded in the first kind of an explicate, and therefore argumentum antecedit the consequent part of the question, sequitur affirmatum, the antecedent in the assumption, as we heard generally in a simple syllogism; as for example, the question is whether profit attend honesty, the third argument is iustum: for the proposition, if it be not well gotten it will not thrive: for the assumption, the truth of that appears because iustiria generalis, or virtus and honestas are all one.  Affirmatum generale. 
Omne iustum est utile.  
Cicero 2. officiorum, ita concludit,  
Summa quidem authoritas Philosophi, etc.  
Here the proposition is first, being backed with a prosyllogisme à testimonio; then the assumption, and then the conclusion: and this is generalis, quia est ex propositione, & assumptione generalibus, quia ex omnibus partibus affirmatis, and the rest following are so for the reason out of their definitions.  Neg: gone. 
Timidus non est liber.  Hoc ita concluditur, & iudicatur ab Horatio 1. Epist. Quo melior seruo, quo liberior sit avarus, etc. 
The question is, whether a covetous man be free: no, for he will make himself a slave for a farthing: the proposition is argued in the example with a prosyllogisme, and that is argued by another prosyllogisme from his effects, nam qui cupit, etc. there is the assumption: porro qui metuens vivit, etc. there is the conclusion backed with a prosyllogism.  
Consilsi expers, consilio regi non potest.  
Terentius in Eunucho.  
Here, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum  
Habet ullum.—  
Love cannot be governed by counsel: why? because it is expers consilii: any affection whatsoever if it be in excess it will hear no reason, love especially, for it is hot, and that intoxicate the head, and sets fancy on work, and will hear no judgement: the proposition is first, here quae res. In amore haec omnia insunt vitia, here in stead of the assumption the causes of love are reckoned up. Incerta haec situ, etc. there is the conclusion backed with a prosyllogisme à contrario.  Affir: spec. consuls virtute facti, study se rempub. tueri debent. 
The question is, whether Cicero was to be causa quae tucatur Rempublicam: yes, because he is made Consul for his virtue.  Sic Orator diligentiam suam, etc. 
The proposition is first, being argued with a prosyllogisme à minore, qui non in incunabilis, that is, not by being borne of them who have been Consuls; said in campo, that is, when they go to the fields, not to their progenitors, and that he shows by a contrary to himself; then the assumption, nulli populo, and with a prosyllogisme the conclusion, me ipsum, etc. he doth commorari upon the assumption by a digression: and upon the occasion of the prosyllogisme he repeats again the conclusion.  Quod optatum redierit, gratum est. 
The question is whether Lesbian be welcome to Catullus, yes, because she is the subject of his desire, it is a connex axiom; but we are to look at it as it is a simple axiom, as the verb is the band that ties it.  Catullus sic concludit: Si quicquam cupidoque optanti obtigit unquam. 
The proposition is first, than the assumptio argued à minore carius auro: lastly, he doth commorari upon the conclusion, Lesbi animi cupido: where there is also a comparison added à minore.  
Neg: spec.  
Deceptor amantis puellae non est laudandus.  
Phillis apud Ouidium.  
Fallere credentem non est operosa puellam.  
Now followeth a negative special, Demophoon non est laudandus, from his effects: the proposition is first, fallere with a prosyllogisme, simplicitas, etc. then the assumption, sum decepta, than the conclusion with an execration by a testimony of the gods: and now in these kinds of simple syllogisms, the question is made much more clear and evident then in composite syllogisms, because here we sever the question into his parts, and lay the third argument with each part, to see the truth thereof: whereas in a composite syllogism we dispose the third argument with the whole question, and do not sever it at all. Now then, that we may know readily where any question may be concluded, it is but this, look at the question, whether it be affirmed, or denied, general, special, or proper: if it be a general affirmed, it can be concluded only in the second kind of an explicate, not in the first explicate, not in a contract: if it be a general denied it may only be concluded in the first explicate, and also in the second explicate, if the third argument agree with the antecedent part of the question: if it be a particular affirmed it may be concluded in a contract, not in the first explicate, but in the second explicate, if the third argument agree with the antecedent: if it be a particular denied it may be concluded in a contract, and in the first explicate, if the third argument disagree with the antecedent part of the question, and in the second explicate: so that this is the most general: if it be a proper affirmed, it can only be concluded in the second explicate, not in the first explicate, nor in a contract: if it be a proper denied, than it can be concluded only in the first explicate, or in the second explicate, if the third argument doth agree with the antecedent part of the question, not in a contract.   

CAP. 13. De Syllogismo connexo primo.  Adhuc syllogismus simplex fuit: syllogismus compositus, est syllogismus ubi tota quaestio est pars altera propositionis affirmatae, & compositae: argumentum est pars reliqua. 
WE have heard of a simple syllogism, and how it came to be simple: now it is called a composite, by reason the whole question is placed in the proposition with the third argument, now which goes first, and which goes last, we shall hear in the specials. Again, this proposition must be affirmed, meaning the parts affirmed, and also composite, the assumption and conclusion are always or at least may always be simple, and it is called composite, not so much in respect of the proposition, but of the disposing of the whole question with the third argument. Here we must not bring any part of the question into the assumption, for if we bring in one part, we wrong the other part: and if we bring in the whole question, we commit a tautology, making the proposition and assumption the same; but the third argument must come into the assumption, because it is the light to clear the question, ergo it is first placed in the proposition with the whole question, then alone in the assumption: as if I should say, this is it that is two foot long, do you mark it: or as if I should show you corn, and a bushel together in the proposition, and then afterward show you a bushel alone, and tell you that it is a lawful one.  Tollere autem in composito syllogismo, est specialem contradictionem ponere. 
That is, wheresoever we shall hear of this term of art, tollere, we mean to put a special contradiction: why doth he say specialem contradictionem? because that if the third argument be a general in the proposition, we must put the special contradiction to it in the assumption.  Syllo: compositus, est connexus, aut disiunctus. 
That is a composite either where the proposition is a connex axiom, or where the third argument and the question are disiunct. Our copulate axiom will come into a simple syllogism, but not into a composite, our discrete axiom making but a discretion between the arguments, comes seldom into a syllogism, so that these only conclude, because in a connex axiom the arguments hang one upon another, following one the other: so that there we look at the two arguments simply agreeing: so in a disiunct the parts there argue as contraries, and one contrary will conclude another, because there the band severs the arguments contrary to a copulate axiom: now connexus is first, because a connex axiom comes before a disiunct.  Syllogismus connexus, est syllogismus compositus propositionis connexae. 
So that here is nothing to be considered, but only the proposition, that it be a connex.  Est que duorum modorum. 
Because here are 20. places, the third argument may go before the question, or it may go after the question.  Primus modus syllogismi connexi est, qui assumit antecedens, & consequens concludit. 
Here we may conclude affirmed questions in the first modus as in a contract the third argument was placed before, ergo, it was set first: so here in a connex that must be first where the argument goes before. As, Si dii sunt, divinatio est.  Cicero 3. officiorum. Atque si etiam hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, etc. 
If a man must wish well to a man quia homo, he must seek the profit of a man, but prius, ergo, the proposition is obscured with a prosyllogisme.  Sic Aeneidos 4. Dido iudicat Aeneae remanendum esse. Mene fugis? per ego has lacrymas dextramque tuam te. 
If I have well deserved of thee, go not from me: first the proposition is backed with a prosyllogisme: te propter, etc. the assumption: cui me, etc. the conclusion.  Frequenter hic non assumitur idem, sed maius ut 1. Catil. Si te parents timerent, atque odissent tui, etc. 
You shall often have in this kind of syllogism the assumption omitted, and a prosyllogisme in room of it. If Catilius parents could not away with him, he should go from them: at nunc te patria, etc. à maiore.  Concludendi modus hic idem est, quando propositio est lata temporis: quo genere nympha, etc. Cum Paris Oenone poterit spirare relicta. 
We heard before that such axioms, where there is cum, and tum, that is his meaning by relation of time, that it is a connex axiom: and so here a connex syllogism.  
When Paris hath left Oenone, then let Xanthus run back to his spring, at, ergo. Here the proposition is first, than the assumption, than the conclusion.   

CAP. 14. De syllogismo connexo secundo.  Secundus modus connexi tollit consequens, ut tollat antecedens. 
HEre is a connex, and here the third argument must come after, and the question must go before, ergo, it is secundus, and here we see there is a double taking away, tollit antecedens, ut tollat consequens.  Si ulli rei sapiens assentietur usquam; aliquando etiam opinabitur, etc. Nunquam autem opinabitur; Nulli igitur rei assentietur. 
The Academics thought that a man should not have an opinion of any thing, and therefore should not assent to any thing, and from them came the Skeptics. Nunquam opinabitur, is a general negative, and aliquando opinabitur is a special affirmed.  Ouidius 2. Trist. Si saperem, doctas odissem iure sorores, etc. 
There is the proposition with a prosyllogism from their effects. At nunc (tanta meo comes est insania morbo, etc.) there is the assumption; the conclusion is wanting. As the first kind of a connex did conclude affirmative questions; so this second kind concludes denied questions.  Hae duae syllogismi species sunt omnium usitatissimae. 
That is, these two kinds of syllogisms are so plain that every fool as we say may make them.   

CAP. 15. De syllogismo disiuncto primo.  Syllogismus disiunctus est syllogismus compositus propositionis disiunctae. Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum concludit. 
WE have heard that a simple syllogism is better for the clearing of a doubtful axiom than a composite, because there the question is broken in pieces, and the third argument which is the candle or light, is laid to each part. In a composite the third argument is laid to the whole question: so that there the question cannot be so clear: and there in the proposition we say in effect, this is the third argument, and then repeat it again in the assumption, and say this is it, mark it well. Now it is connexus aut disiunctus; and connexus we heard of before, and now it remaineth that we speak of syllogismus disiunctus.  Syllogismus disiunctus, etc. 
We have heard the reason of the name syllogismus, it is an Arithmetical term signifying the sum in Addition, because we gather in it as in a sum, that which hath been more fully delivered, it is called disiunctus, even as a disiunct axiom was so called, because the matter was severed though the words of Grammar were not: so a disiunct syllogism is where the third argument is a thing disjoined from the question. It is composite because the proposition is composite, yet not every composite proposition maketh a disiunct syllogism, but where there is disjunction between the question, and the third argument, ergo, in these kinds of syllogisms we evermore conclude from opposites, as in a connex we conclude commonly from consentanies.  Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum concludit. 
In adisiunct syllogism it skilleth not where we place our question, whether before or after the third argument, secondly, observe in this first modus of a disiunct syllogism, that we take away the third argument in th● assumption, and conclude the rest, thirdly, that in this first kind we conclude affirmatively, and lastly, that here we conclude simple questions, ut, Aut dies est, aut nox est, etc.  
Ciceronis pro Cluentio iudicium tale est;  
Sed cum esset haec illi proposita conditio, etc.  Sic idem 2. Philip. ratiocinatur. Nunquam ne intelliges tibi statuendum esse utrum illi, qui istam rem gesserunt, homicidae sint, an vindices libertatis? etc. 
The question is this, either Brutus and Caius were freeers of the Country, or traitors to the Country, the proposition is first with a prosyllogisme. Attendite enim paulisper, etc. first be thine own judge, for Antony would be drunk; again, there is another prosyllogisme to the proposition, plusquam homicidae, etc. and that he proves with another prosyllogisme, they killed Caesar a father of the Country. Tu homo sapiens & considerate, quid dicis? this is the assumption, being backed with a prosyllogisme, non homicidae, which he proves from a testimony, from the effects of Antony. The conclusion is last. Sequitur ut liberatores tuo iudicio sint quandoquidem tertium nihil esse potest. So that all the parts are here laid down orderly, only they are obscured with prosyllogismes.  Si parts disiunctae propositionis sint duabus plures, iudicandi, concludendique ars erit eadem. 
That is, it may so fall out that there may be more third arguments brought to conclude the question: as in disparates before can conclude truth, we must bring all the disparates together, and we must take away all but our question.  Sic Cicero iudicat, Rabirium cum consulibus esse oportere. Atque vidimus (ait) hac in rerum natura tria fuisse, etc. 
The question is whether Rabirius was to be with the Consuls, the proposition is first: the assumption follows with a prosyllogisme. Latere with a prosyllogisme à simili, cum Saturnio esse, etc. with a prosyllogisme also: then the conclusion backed with a prosyllogisme, virtus, & honestus, etc.   

CAP. 16. De syllogismo disiuncto secundo.  Disiunctus secundus è propositione partibus omnibus affirmata assumit unum, & reliquum tollit. 
THe second disiunct is called secundus in respect that it concludes negatively, as the first concluded affirmatively, and as before the third argument was first taken away, and the rest concluded: so here contra we assume the third argument, and take away the rest: and further we are to consider that the proposition must be affirmed partibus omnibus, yet we may say it is, or it is not arguing from a contradicent.  Sic Iuno cum Ioue de Turno concludit 10. Aenei. Quid si quod voce gravaris, Mente dares, atque haec Turno rata vita maneret; 
O husband that you would grant but in mind that Turnus might not be slain: either he must dye, or I am deceived. The proposition is in those words, quod ut O potius, etc. the assumption taking away the Irony. Et in melius tua, quod potes, or sa reflectas, there is the conclusion.  Eiusmodi syllogysmus efficitur è propositione copulata negata, quae negata complexio dicitur: quaeque disiunctionis affirmatae vim obtinet. 
A syllogism whose proposition shall be a copulate axiom denied, because it is the same with a disiunct affirmed in value, ergo, it may make a disiunct syllogism, this is seldom found in use, but because other Logicians teach it, ergo, our author would not leave out any thing, that belongs to the Art of reason, as, 
Non & dies est, & nox est;  
At dies est:  
Non igitur nox est.   
Here non denies the one, and puts the other, for in a copulate axiom we heard that none denied the coupling of the parts, and this is called negata complexio, because here the proposition may be denied, whereas before he said generally è propositione partibus omnibus affirmata.  Complexio dicitur. 
By complexio he means the whole syllogism, by a Senecdoche of the part for the whole, and now we have heard of the kinds of disposing arguments immediately: so fare as the act of reason reacheth: now we come to method which is but one rule, yet indeed it is the golden rule of all Arts.   

CAP. 17. De methodo secundum Aristotelem.  Methodus est dianoia variorum axiomatum homogeniorum pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum. 
MEthodus, for the name it signifies with the way, or order, when any thing is done the right way, order, or manner, than it is with the way: so that it doth by name commend unto us the nearest and right way of performing any thing, ergo, it is fitly so called, for a right line is but one, and it is most short inter eosdem terminos.  Est dianoia. 
That is, a discourse of the mind, for axiomatical judgement is said to be of the mind quiet, and calm, and dianoia is said to be of the mind troubled, for there is an agitation of the brain to and fro, that we may come to see the truth more plainly. Now I do not see in method how aliud axioma ex alio deducitur, if he mean that one axiom is here more general, and another more special; there may be a fallace in that, for the more general doth not contain in it the more special. In a man's body of all the members the head is first, yet none will say that it contains the rest of the members in it: notwithstanding there is some thing in this I must confess, for the former rule in an Art gives some light to the rule following, as Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, gives light to the second rule of Logic, for I must first know the whole, before I can distribute it into its parts, but how this is any discourse I do not see: Again, I have showed that among ancient Logicians dianoia is only given to syllogisms, and not to method, and in truth I hold dianoia and syllogismus to be all one. Again, method is for memory, not for the judging of things: and that argument before concerning the distinct organs of the parts of Logic, is instar omnium to prove it. It may be said fitly, that it is dispositio axiomatum, for in axiomatical and syllogistical judgement there were arguments disposed, by which indeed axioms did arise, but method doth not dispose any arguments, but axioms, ergo this in like sort is a mean argument to show that axiomatical and syllogistical judgement should go together, disposing arguments immediately, and method should be above, for it meddles not with arguments, but with axioms immediately.  Axiomatum. 
Axioma signifies properly such a truth as is worthy credit without any discourse, ergo it agrees to that which is per se manifestum, and therefore axioma dubium is not worthy that name axioma: but method is dispositio axiomatum: first of them that are clear without any light of a third argument: and doubtful axioms are not disposed by method, but as they are cleared before the tribunal seat of a third argument: and indeed method is principally a disposition of the axioms of Arts. Axiomatum, not of things: Object. Is there not order in things? Answ. True it is, that method as the rest of Logic is an adjunct of the things, yet it disposeth them gratia axiomatum, for as invention is immediately of arguments, and they are of things: and as judgement is of axioms, and syllogisms, and they likewise are of things: so method is of axioms immediately, and of things immediately: so that we must lay up nothing by the rule of method but axioms, and this must be our care in reading any thing to take the axioms, and to carry them to their places in Arts. Object. Are not syllogisms to be remembered, ergo is there not method of them? Ans. Yes, but we take the parts asunder, and make them axioms first, for the proposition, assumption, and conclusion are axioms, and belong to some Art, therefore look whither the more special argument in the axiom belongeth, and thither the axiom belongeth: and if we would remember the reason why such a thing is so, or not so, see where your rule is, and look at the former axioms, and you shall find arguments for the proof of any thing, and may so keep them: as for example, otiosus est amator, Aegisthus est otiosus, ergo Egistus est amator. The proposition belongs to moral Philosophy, for vitium is a vice, love is concupiscence the sin, and it is the affection of love disordered, ergo this breaks the seventh Commandment, ergo this axiom belongs hither, for love is the more special. Aegisthus est otiosus: this indeed belongs to the history of Aegisthus, but because we have it not, therefore we may carry it to otium: so the conclusion belongs to moral Philosophy, to concupiscence. Again, syllogisms serve but for the clearing of the truth of axioms, and then afterward we return again to the rule of an axiom to judge whether it be true or false, and this is all that is required for disposing arguments, ergo method is dispositio axiomatum only. Again, we never remember any thing, but we make an axiom of it. Object. But we remember words. Answ. though it be true that some remember words very strangely, yet they remember them as axioms, for the word, and the thing signified by the word make an axiom. Object. But I suppose they know not the meaning of the words. Answ. Yet the sound or echo of the word in his head, which is an adjunct unto the word, and the word itself makes an axiom still: so that method is only of axioms: and commonly they that so remember words have little judgement, and if all the axioms of all things were laid down methodically, we should remember all things methodically.  Variorum. 
For method is not in one axiom, therefore here take heed that we be not deceived, taking that to break the rule of method, which is a breach of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as if this term invention be made a part of Rhetoric, it is against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but if the doctrine of this rule, Inuentio est prima pars Dialecticae, etc. be taught in Rhetoric, that is a breach of method: contra, the definition of Logic placed in Grammar or Rhetoric, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but a breach of method. Again, he saith they are various, not such as shall be contrary one to another, for the difference of the axioms of Art, is but in a diversity as it were, not in opposition, because in respect of the object they all tend to one thing.  Homogeniorum. 
That is of the same kindred: this homogenia is not that in an axiom, for that is between the arguments in an axiom, this is between the axioms themselves: so that let us beware that we put not heterogeny axioms in an art: for they that have done so, may be compared to ignorant painters, that paint a horses head upon a man's body. Again, when we are to make a speech of any thing, we must be careful to speak within our compass, and not to bring in things that are heterogeny to the subject we speak of.  Pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum. 
For method is the rule of order, ergo there must be a praepositio and a postpositio of axioms here: ergo if we will draw any Art out according to his true feature, we must set every thing in his own place, nature observes this course in every thing, as we see whilst the earth would rather ascend then there should be vacuum: and whilst the Spirit of God his mighty power that governs all things, doth place every thing in order, we see he doth it by the rule of method continually: as he placeth the fire in the highest place above the other elements, than the air, etc. dulce natale solum, etc. to every man, and to every thing, because by the rule of method that is his place: and if things be displaced, they will sooner perish. The reason in nature why the loadstone desires to stand North and South, is because of the rule of method, it being most agreeable to the nature thereof so to stand: so that every thing desires by this rule not only its proper place, but its proper situs also in that place.  
Pro naturae suae claritate: this proposition must be guided by this rule, namely, the clearness of their nature, and good reason, for the former axiom doth descry some light to the following. Again he saith, pro naturae suae, so that clarius natura must go first, not that which is simply clarius, because that that is by nature clarius, is clarius, and notius than any other: and whereas we have a distinction of notius natura, and notius nobis, they are the same. Notius natura is in Genesi, notius nobis is in Analysi: for howbeit in analysi we begin at the lowest, which is notius nobis, yet in the end we come to notius natura, and then that which is notius natura, is notius nobis: and we know in genere, before we know in specie, as we know homo, before we know Thomas, or William, etc. Hence it is that many of our great Doctors know the rules of Art, but know not how to practise them: so that indeed they know them not. Again, because prius natura commonly containeth some thing in it that we must know, before we can understand the next rule; so Arts teach us: as Logic first teacheth Invention, than judgement. In invention it first teacheth an argument in general, then in specie: now if we would know which is natura prius in every thing, that we may do thus, if one rule give light to another, or if one rule may be without the other to clear the truth of it, then that is first: otherwise it needs the help of another, it must come after that other: as one is before two, for I cannot know two, before I know one: secondly, too cannot be but there must be one, whereas one may be without two.  Vnde omnium inter se convenientia iudicantur, memoriaque comprehendentur. 
Here he tells us a double fruit or end that ariseth thereof: for the first end, unde omnium inter se convenientia iudicantur, true it is thus fare, if an Art be set in order, we do there judge of the parts, but this is by axiomatical judgement, not by methodical, for I make but one axiom of two, as if I judge the definition of Logic to be before the distribution, here the distribution is an adjunct to the definition, and here I make of these two one axiom of a subject, and an adjunct, and judge them by the rule of axiomatical judgement. The second end memoria comprehenditur, is true: so than the judgement of all the parts of an Art for their conveniency, is nothing but the seeing of their consention: for one axiom laid to another is subiectum and adiunctum, and so we make but one axiom of them: now method makes all things one, and we remember all things as one: & therefore it is that the world is one, namely, by method; and the reason why we forget any thing, is because we make one thing more things, for every sense is of one thing indeed. The reason why we remember a man whom we have seen before, is because we remember the disposition of the parts of his body, nose, mouth, eyes, etc. and so turning the glass of our understanding unto him again, we know him, and if we would remember any thing, for our own present use, let us carry them home to their places, and we shall not forget them: and here we may see that we do not remember by taking the species of things into our brain, and there lay them up as in a chest, or let them hang as birds in a lime-twig, and are received by fancy first, as if it did fashion them, than cogitation considers of them, and memory keeps them. Answ. There is no reason to show that these should be true, for these outward species that come to my external eye, vanish away quickly, for the species of the understanding they being made of the animal spirit must also soon vanish: but by the rule of method we place the things in their order, as God hath done, and when our eye hath seen them once in their place, she knows where to go to find them again: so that as my outward eye being once turned from the thing it beheld before, doth not receive any species from it: so my eye of reason hath not any species of any thing any longer than it looks at it, so that I may fitly compare our inward eye of reason, to our outward eye, or to a glass.  Atque ut spectatur in axiomate veritas, & falsitas, in syllogismo consequentia, & inconsequentia: sic in methodo consideratur, ut per se clarius praecedat, obscurius sequatur; omninoque or do & confusio iudicatur. 
Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and shows it by comparing it with other rules, for as the drift of an axiom is truth and falsehood, and of a syllogism consequence and inconsequence: so that syllogistical judgement is but to clear things to us, and we must go to axiomatical judgement, to see the truth and falsehood: so that rules of consecution are here, and maxims as they call them, rules of consequents, as sublata causa tollitur effectum, etc. these are but uses of the arguments of invention, and they follow by syllogistical judgement, we making the first rule to be the third argument: as here, if causa be cuius vi res est, then sublata causa tollitur effectum. At. Ergo. Sic in methodo, etc.  Omninoque ordo & confusio iudicatur. 
By judgement here we are to understand axiomatical judgement, as I said before: but order is here, which we judge by the application of the rule of method to any thing, and so we syllogise.  Sic disponitur ex homogeneis axiomatis primo loco absoluta notione primum, secundo secundum, tertio tertium, & ita deinceps. 
According to this rule of method shall be disposed homogeny axioms, first that which is absolute, that is, that which takes not light from any other: then of them that take light from others, secundo secundum, tertio tertium: so that the definitions of things in Arts are absolute prima: but in truth there is not any definition of any Art absolutely first, but that of Encyclopaedia: there are also magis and minus nota compared with others, which are in the second and third places.  Ideoque methodus ab universalibus ad singularia perpetuo progreditur. 
So that here we must know that that which was before natura prius, is here universalius, not genus, species, or any such thing, but he means that method proceeds à natura notioribus ad natura ignotiora, and this is the genesis of method. Now Kickerman not seeing this well, and seeing Aristotle say in his Ethics that he must proceed à generalioribus ad specialiora, did imagine that every Art must have his praecognita: but Aristotle means, that having spoken de summo bono, which was the most general end, he was to speak of things more special tending to that end; and alas what is absolute primum in an Art, but the first rule? ergo can there be any thing to be praecognitum? Again, his praecognita are either the Art itself confusedly taught, or the exposition of some special rules thereof, and for postcognita, why the examples are infimae species, ergo lowest, ergo we cannot go further than examples for postcognita.  Hac enim sola, & unica via proceditur ab antecedentibus omnino, & absolute notioribus ad consequentia ignota declarandum, camque solam methodum Aristoteles docuit. 
So that things are to go before or after by their nature: and this Aristotle and every one doth consider, for when a man clotheth himself, first he is to cover his head, then to put on his doublet, hose, etc. and it is preposterous if a man should first put on his shoes, than his stockings, or breeches; and in making himself unready he must analyse, that is, first put off his shoes, than his stockings, etc.   

CAP. 18. De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium.  Sed methodi unitatem exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demonstrant, praecipueque vindicant. 
Our Author stays long upon method, his reasons are, because all Logicians are very silent in the doctrine of method: and they that have spoken of it are mistaken therein, for they make method to be nothing but genesis, and analysis, whereas they are the practice of a rule, or of as many rules as are in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a thing, ergo they are not method, though there may be a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method, as well as of any other rules of Logic, or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this, they have run into many questions about the multiplicity of method, whereas it is but one: as may easily be showed by reason. For if all things are made one by the rule of method, though there are many things in the world, than there cannot be more methods, for then there should be more worlds.  Exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demonstrant, praecipueque vindicant. 
Ramus saith that method (as it is true) is not better seen to be one, then in the rules of Arts, for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are only belonging to rules of Art: so method is almost, and principally of the rules of Arts, though their order may be in many other things.  Quibus quamuis omnes regulae generales sint & universales, etc. 
In the rules of Art all are universals, not that there may not be proper axioms in an Art, but he means such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: otherwise if he should not mean thus, this generality would be only true of the rules of the general Arts, not of the special Arts: but though all be general, earum tamen gradus distinguntur, as they are compared one with another, as the definition of Logic is before the distribution being more general than it, and so the distribution is more general than the next, and so for the rest.  
Again, the most general rule in disposition is more special, than the last rule of invention, because inventions use is more general, than judgements, though the rule of disposition may contain more in it, than the rule of invention containeth in it.  Quantoque unaquaeque genelarior erit, tanto magis praecedet. 
That is, as it is pro naturae suae claritate praeponendum, so must it be placed.  Generalissima loco, & ordine prima erit, quia lumine & notitia prima est. 
This being the course of nature to proceed from the highest to the lowest, for so we must place things: the reason followeth: now indeed Ramus himself took no great pain about Art in general, and therefore imagined that every definition in Art was absolutely first, whereas in very truth, none of them are absolutely first, but only that rule of Encyclopaedia.  Subalternae consequentiae sequentur, quia claritate sunt proximae: atque ex his natura notiores praeponentur, minus notae substituentur, tandemque specialissimae constituentur. 
Among subalterns some are more general, and some are more special, Ramus here speaks Allegorically, alluding to genus and species subalternae, and specialissimae in Invention: and here special rules are all one with others in themselves, though not in comparison with them.  Definitio itaque generalissima prima erit. 
Ramus means the definitio, and the definitum, not definitio the argument: now this must be first, why? one would think it should rather be last; because a perfect definition intendeth to lay down the whole essence of a thing: and before a man can know a piece of a thing, he must know it in the whole as it is comprised in a brief, from the nearest causes thereof.  Distributio sequitur: quae si multiplex fuerit, etc. 
For so we heard that a definition was manifold integri in membra, generis in species, etc. because as the definition laid out the whole in one lump at once from the causes, which are the utmost things: so in a distribution there is the whole, but laid out distributively in his parts: so that this is the difference of them: and the following rules do prosecute every part according to their place.  Praecedit in parts integras partitio, &c 
The reason of this is, because the membra make up the whole, and are causes thereof, as the definition was of the thing defined. Again the distributio of generis in species is from the effects, and they are after the causes, ergo, distributio ex causis must go before them; again a distribution of the integrum into the members in an Art is common to a distribution of the genus into the species: as for example, in Grammar vox is divided as integrum into litera, and syllaba, and both letters, and syllables are general to vox numeri, and sine numero, which are the species of vox.  Sequitur divisio in species, etc. 
But if there be a distribution of the subject into the adjuncts, they must go before distributio generis in species, as affirmatum, and negatum axioma, must go before simplex and compositum, because the adjuncts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an axiom in general. Again, if we set a distribution of the genus into the species before a distribution ex adiunctis, we must handle the species distinctly, ergo there would be no room for distributio ex adiunctis to come in: but we must know that we seldom have these distributions of the same Art, for where there is distributio integri in membra, there is seldom distributio generis in species, though there may be either of these, and likewise a distribution ex adiunctis.  Et transitionum vinculis, si longior inter eas intersit explicatio, colligandae sunt, etc. 
He gives us here a note by the way, that if the distribution went long before, that then we should use a transition from one part to another: so that here we see the use of a transition, and that it belongs to method, and it is as it were a bridge to go from one thing to another: and it serveth auditorem reficere, ac recreare.  Omnes definitiones, distributiones, regulae Grammaticae repertae sint, atque unaquaeque sigillatim iudicata, etc. 
Ramus supposeth every rule of Art already invented, and judged, how shall we dispose them? not by any rules before, but only by method which is behind, for we speak of order: as first the definition of Grammar, than the distribution, because parts simul sumptae are equivolent to the whole: and let an Art be laid down thus; and we shall see every thing plainly, and evidently.   

CAP. 19 De secunda methodi illustratione per exempla Poetarum, Oratorum, Historicorum.  Atqui methodus, non solum in materia artium & doctrinarum adhibetur; sed in omnibus rebus, quas facile & perspicuè docere volumus, etc. 
AS Aristotle saith in the first of his Ethics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. so every thing may orderly be laid down, quas facile, etc. therefore Poets, Orators, etc. observe this rule, howbeit they do not usquequaque ingredi, and insistere as Art requireth.  
Virgilius in Georgicis, etc.  
Hactenus avorum cultus & sidera coeli,  
Nunc te, Bacche canam:  
Poetry is a general Art, ergo, a Poet is a general Author, therefore Ramus brings examples out of Poetry to show this general Art of Logic, Virgil for example handles Georgickes', that is, husbandry, and divides it into four parts, in his first book he handles that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with husbandry: but his distribution is not so good as it should be if it were an Art; for Virgil doth as Kickerman useth to do, namely divides it into its common properties, and into its special properties: common as Astrologia, Meteorologia, than he comes by a transition to trees: then by a more imperfect transition in the beginning of his third booked de bobus, etc. for a transition is perfect or imperfect; a perfect one consists of a conclusion of that which went before, and of a proposition of that that followeth: an imperfect transition consisteth of either of these severally and alone.  Sic igitur Poeta generalissimum primo loco, etc. 
That is, this must be our care when we do any thing especially if it be of importance, that we miss not this method: but that we place every thing in his due order and method according to nature.  Sic Ouidius in Fastis, etc. 
So Ovid in his Calendar first sets down the general definition of his work, and then he distributes it into twelve parts, according to the twelve months of the year: reprehending Romulus for making but ten months, but it should seem that the Romans had their time divided, as well in the time of Romulus, as afterward, ergo, he did invent all the twelve months, ergo, Ovid was deceived, in thinking that Numa Pompilius did make januarie, and june: now he calls june janus, because that month was dedicated to janus, whom some think was javan, some No: and the first day of this month was his holy day.  Oratores in prooemio, etc. 
So that here we may see this one method that as it is used in Arts, so is it used in Poets, and Orators: now the exordium is nothing but a commoration: the narration a description of that thing whereof he is to speak, the confirmation a distribution, etc.  Sic Livius summam, etc. 
This example is for History.   

CAP. 20. De Crypticis methodi.  Haec igitur in variis axiomatis homogeneis, etc. 
RAmus hath showed us what method is, and that it is but one: now this exact order thereof is then, when we desire to teach any thing plainly.  At cum delectatione motuve aliquo, etc. 
If a man be to deliver an Art, he must exactly observe this method in every point: but many times it falls out in discourses that disorder must be used, not for the doctrines sake, but because of the perversity of the hearers, for they often go out of their way by reason of their weakness; now this way is especially when we reject homogenies, as Orators use much to do, and draw in heterogenies, knowing that variety doth delight.  Sed praecipue rerum or do initio invertitur, etc. 
So as we shall see a rule come in like a morris-dancer, as Aristotle placeth many out of order.  Itaque ad illam perfectae methodi, etc. 
So then, as we heard in a syllogism, that there was an inversion of the parts, a superfluity, and a defect: so here in method, haec imperfectior forma non solum detractis rebus mutila est, vel superaditis rebus redundat, sed ordinis sui quibusdam gradibus inversis praepostera est.  Quod Poeta facit, etc. 
This crypsis is more often in Poets then in Orators, or History though it be used much in History: now populum docendum sibi proponit, i. belluam multorum capitum, but indeed he deceives them, yet it is only for delight. This order is very usual in Poetry, and very pleasant in a tale, or fables, because when we read them we cannot rest quiet till we come to an end of them.  
Sic (ut Homerus ait) Homerus Iliada disposuit.  
Nec gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ano, etc.  
He doth not begin the Trojan war from 20. eggs, in one of which eggs Helena was, and Castor and Pollux in another: Semper ad eventum festinat, etc. for in the first book of his Iliads one would think that he brought in the history of the ten years, but indeed thereby he takes occasion to bring in the history of the years before. So Virgil fetcheth Aeneas from Sicily, which is a little from Carthage, etc.  Sic commici Poetae, etc. 
For there every thing must seem to come by chance, not of purpose. Oratores vero, etc. they refer all to victory: they are like Lawyers, and therefore think they may lie at pleasure: therefore they will place their strongest arguments first, that their auditors may chew the cud upon them: and then they put out their mean arguments in the middle, whilst their auditors are meditating on the first; and then at last by that time the auditors have well thought of the first, they bring out one or two strong ones more, to make their auditors believe that they in the middle were like to the first, and last.   
FINIS.