A TREATISE OF PARADISE. AND THE PRINCIPAL contents thereof: Especially Of the greatness, situation, beauty, and other properties of that place: of the trees of life, good and evil; of the Serpent, Cherubin, fiery Sword, Man's creation, immortality, propagation, stature, age, knowledge, temptation, fall, and exclusion out of Paradise; and consequently of his and our original sin: with many other difficulties touching these points. Collected out of the holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, and other both ancient and modern Writers. LONDON Printed by EDWARD GRIFFIN for NATHANIEL BUTTER. 1617. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, SIR FRANCIS BACON Knight, Lord Keeper of the great Seal of ENGLAND, and one of his majesties most honourable Privy Council. HIS Majesty having deigned to patronize the first fruits of my labours, to whom (if I may presume) ought I rather (for many titles) to second with the second, then to your Honour? Silverius in Augusto. who (as Silverius saith of Caesar) hath honoured learning by his own labours, so all the learned labour to honour you with their labours? Seeing therefore his Majesty vouchsafed to accept of my Treatise of Angels, deign likewise (most worthy Peer) to patronize this of Paradise; not for the worth of the work, that I deem it worthy so worthy a Patron; but that for want of its due lustre and worth, it may receive both by the reflecting beams of your Honour, which the Lord increase with all just titles of grace and honour, with our Prince on earth, with the King of Heaven, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that as your wisdom and other heroical virtues are justly admired here upon earth, so they may be with double poise rewarded in the kingdom of heaven: Which is faithfully prayed for by Your Honours humbly devoted, JOHN SALKELD. The Argument of the Treatise ensuing. AS knowledge is the perfection of our blessedness in the life, to come; Quamuis Aureolus apud Capreolum in 4. d. 49. q 1. et Scotus in d d 49. q. 1. teneant formalem beatitudinem in velatione, imo & Caiet. 1. p. q. 27. ar. 2. Fer. contragent. c. 53. cap. 1. d. 27. q. 2. javel. 9 met. q. 16. Torres de Trinitate, q. 27. ar. 7. Conimb. 3. de anima, c 8 teneant esse actionem formaliter. so I deem it to be the beginning, in this: there, of God, as it is in perfection; here, of ourselves, as in the first step to perfection: so that here we knowing ourselves to be nothing but sin and corruption, may come to the knowledge of him, who is all in all, goodness and perfection: here, only possessed in part; there, wholly enjoyed in full measure: but how here in part, there in full measure, hoc opus, hic labor est, this shall be the subject of our labour, and end of this present Treatise: by which we pretend to show what we lost by the disobedience of Adam, Dur quoque q. 4. sine distinctione affirmat beatitudinem esse in aggregatione omnium bonorum, in intellectu, voluntate & corpore, sicut & Hugo de S. Vict. in c. 7. l. de coelesti Hierarchiae. Ric. 4. dist. 49. & Gab. ib. & Cordub. lib. 1. quaestionarij q. 42. in fruitione. Mars. q vlt. & Argent. q 3 delectatione de Deo viso. Bonavent. similiter esse visionem fidei respondentem, dilectionem charitati viae, delectationem spei Communis autem opinio Aquinatis & aliorum in actu solo intellectus formulem nostram heatitudinem consistere autumat. and what we got by the obedience of Christ; how in Paradise we possessed God in part, and by what sin we fell from him wholly; what were our pleasures in Paradise, and what miseries did follow our fall: how we are raised again after our fall, and are to be placed in those glorious thrones, from which the wicked Angels fell. Lastly, what is our blessedness in the life to come, and by what means it is wrought in us here. In which points if I do err (as of myself I can no less) it shall be both with all subjection unto the learned, and with no less desire to be corrected. THE TABLE and order of the Chapters. CHAP. I. whether there was ever any such place as Paradise? or rather the description of Paradise is to be understood allegorically, and so to be referred unto the mind only? CHAP. II. The description and situation of Paradise. CHAP. III. The compass and greatness of Paradise, and why it was so beautified, seeing God foreknew for how short a time it was to serve the use of man? CHAP. IU. What may be the reason why Paradise was never found as yet? CHAP. V. Whether there be as yet any Paradise or no? or rather it was destroyed in noah's flood? CHAP. VI Of the trees of Paradise, whether all were fruitful, or rather some only beautiful, though unfruitful? CHAA. VII. Of the tree of life, why it was so called? and whether it was corporal, as other trees be, or rather spiritual and food of the soul, not of the body? or finally appertaining to both? CHAP. VIII. The allegorical interpretation of the tree of life. CHAP. IX. Why the tree of life was so called, and whether it had truly the property of making a man immortal. CHAP. X. Whether the virtue of the tree of life to preserve man immortal was natural unto it, or supernatural. CHAP. XI. Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, to wit, whether it was a true and natural tree, like unto others. And why it was so called. CHAP. XII. Of the creation of man. CHAP. XIII. Of the manner of man's creation. CHAP. XIIII. How man was made to the image and likeness of God. CHAP. XV. What is the difference between the image and the similitude of God, according to which man is said to he created. CHAP. XVI. Whether the woman be made to the image of God, or no. CHAP. XVII. Whether man be made like unto God according to his corporal substance, proportion, and lineaments; or doth in any wise represent the divine majesty? CHAP. XVIII. Whether the image of God way be wholly lost, and blotted out of the soul of man. CHAP. XIX. Why God made man to his image and similitude? CHAP. XX. Whether the dominion over all living creatures was given unto man, and what power that was? CHAP. XXI. Whether in the state of innocency one man should have been subject to another, or rather all should have been of equal authority and power? CHAP. XXII. Whether the Angels did concur to the production of man, or no? CHAP. XXIII. Whether Adam was created in his perfect stature and age? CHAP. XXIV. Whether the soul and the body were created in the same instant, or no? CHAP. XXV. Whether the immortality of the soul may be demonstrated out of the Scriptures, or no. CHAP. XXVI. Whether the soul of Adam was immortal by its own nature, or only by grace? CHAP. XXVII. That Adam was not created in Paradise, and why not, and by what means he came thither after his creation? CHAP. XXVIII. To what end was Adam placed in Paradise? CHAP. XXIX. Whether the commandment of not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, was given aswell to Eve, as to Adam, and how that was? CHAP. XXX. Why God commanded that Adam should not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil? CHAP. XXXI. In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed. CHAP. XXXII. What death that was which God threatened to inflict upon Adam for his transgression. CHAP. XXXIII. Of the creation of the woman, and to what end she was created. CHAP. XXXIV. What sleep that was which God caused to fall upon Adam for the creation of Eve, and whether it was a true sleep or no? CHAP. XXXV. Why Eve was created of Adam's rib, and not immediately of the earth, and how that could be without any grief to Adam? CHAP. XXXVI. Why and how Eve was made of the rib of Adam? CHAP. XXXVII. Whether the rib of which Eve was created, was requisite to the perfection of Adam's body or no. CHAP. XXXVIII. How mankind should have been multiplied if Adam had persisted in Paradise? CHAP. XXXIX. Whether there should have been more men or women in the state of innocency, or rather an equality of both sexes: and how there could have been any women, seeing they are said to proceed out of the defect of nature. CHAP. XL. Of the prerogatives and excent gifts wherewith Adam was endued in the state of innocency: and first as touching his knowledge and natural wisdom of natural things. CHAP. XLI. Of the knowledge which Adam had of things above nature. CHAP. XLII. Whether Adam was created in the grace of God, or no. CHAP. XLIII. Whether if Adam had not fallen, all his posterity should have been borne in the grace and favour of God, and confirmed in the same. CHAP. XLIV. Whether Adam before his sin was mortal or immortal. CHAP. XLV. What kind of Serpent that was which tempted Eue. CHAP. XLVI. Whether that which Moses saith, that the Serpent was craftier than all beasts of the earth, is to be understood of the true Serpent, or of the Devil? CHAP. XLVII. What was the reason why the woman was not afraid to speak with the Serpent. CHAP. XLVIII. Why the Devil took the shape of a serpent rather than of any other creature: and why Moses made no mention of the Devil, seeing he was the chief tempter. CHAP. XLIX. Whether when God cursed the serpent, it is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the Devil. CHAP. L. Whether Adam was cast out of Paradise the same day he was created. CHAP. LI. Of the Cherubin and Sword which were put at the entrance of Paradise. CHAP. LII. What was the cause why Adam and his posterity were banished Paradise: wherein two ancient errors are refuted as touching original sin. CHAP. LIII. In which divers other opinions touching original sin are refuted. CHAP LIV. Whether original sin consist in any privation, or no? CHAP. LV. In which the last opinion of the precedent Chapter is discussed and rejected, and the true doctrine of original sin set down. CHAP. LVI. In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed. CHAP. LVII. Wherein divers difficulties are solved against the former doctrine. CHAP. LVIII. Of the manner how original sin doth descend from Adam to his posterity. CHAP. LIX. Whether it was necessary there should be made any covenant between God and man, that so original sin might descend to the posterity of Adam. CHAP. LX. How the soul is said to be infected by the body in the posterity of Adam by his original sin. CHAP. LXI. Whether there should have been any original sin in us, if either Adam only, or Eve only had eaten of the forbidden tree. CHAP. LXII. What punishments be due to original sin in this life. CHAP. LXIII. What punishment is due to original sin in the other life. CHAP. LXIV. The objections of Simon Magus against the aforesaid doctrine of the creation of man, and his being in Paradise. CHAP. LXV. In which the objections of Manes are assoiled. CHAP. LXVI. The objections of Theodorus and Nestorius against original sin are solved. CHAP. I. Whether there was ever any such place as Paradise, or rather the description of Moses is to be understood allegorically, and so to be referred unto the mind only. AS there is nothing in nature so plain which may not be contradicted, neither any thing so pure which may not be defiled, so nothing so evident in Gods word, which hath not been opposed. Such is our nature after our fall, and such our daily most lamentable lapses, after our first lapse, and original Fall. Insomuch, that ignoring the cause of our infinite misery, we become desperately sick, and of ourselves and nature, without remedy. Wherefore my intent being chief to show us our end, and eternal felicity, I will first show the place, and demonstrate the grace from which we fell; that thereby knowing the infelicity of our fall, and place from which we fell, we may be more thankful unto God for that felicity, place, and grace, unto which we are exalted after our fall; and so come to a more perfect blessedness after our fall, then that which we possessed before we fell, or should have possessed in Paradise if we had not fallen. Now therefore as touching this place of our first happiness, and from whence our misery was first derived, I will begin with a worthy Prelate, who though he was one of the chiefest Doctors of the Church of God, yet being to explicate these very difficulties of Paradise, Ambrose de Paradyso, in principio capitis primi. was not ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance. De Paradiso adoriendus sermo, non mediocrem nobis oestum videtur incutere, quid nam sit Paradysus, et ubi sit, qualisue sit investigare & explanare cupientibus: maxim Apostolus sive in corpore, sive extra corpus nesciat, raptum se tamen dicat usque ad tertium coelum; 2 Cor. 12. idemque testetur se ibi audivisse arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Being to speak (saith this Father) of Paradise, it doth not a little trouble me to search out and explain what Paradise is; where it is; & what manner of place it is; especially seeing the Apostle saith, that he was rapt thither into the third heaven, where he heard such things as be not lawful for any mortal man to utter. By which words he signifieth two things; the first, that, that place was Paradise, unto which S. Paul was carried (the which opinion in what sense it may be verified, it shall afterward be explicated) the second thing there to be noted is, that it is impossible for man to declare, what kind of place that was, unto which the Apostle was carried, unless peradventure it might have been by him, who had that special privilege, to be carried thither. Hence peradventure it is that Origenes, Philo, the Hermetians and Seleucians were of opinion, that there was never any such place as Paradise, but rather that the scripture where it maketh mention of Paradise, is to be understood Metaphorically, Spiritually, or Allegorically. First, because in other places of Scripture, where there is mention of Paradise, that word cannot be understood of any terrene place: therefore if one place of Scripture must be the interpreter of the other, according to the common consent of the Fathers, it may not seem improbable, but that the like may be admitted in this history of Paradise. Secondly, because those things which are said to have been in Paradise, cannot be understood literally: as that in the midst of Paradise there was a tree of knowledge of good and evil (a property not due unto nature, much less agreeable or consequent to the nature of a tree). Secondly, that Adam heard the voice of GOD, where as spirits of their own nature have no voice, or sound, much less the purest of spirits. Thirdly, that he heard God walking towards the South, whereas indeed God neither walketh, nor moveth, but is always replenishing, working, and filling every place, yea in every place equally present, in essence equal, in power equal, in all his other infinite attributes equal. Again, how can it be understood literally, that after the transgression, and expulsion of Adam out of Paradise, there was placed a Cherub or Angel with a fiery sword, as necessary for the custody of the said place: as though either the commandment of God had not been sufficient, or his will resistible without the assistance of the Angelical power; or the Angel not sufficiently powerful for the restraining of Adam, without the use of a fiery sword; as though again God in power were not omnipotent, neither the Angel spiritual, but either that the creator had need of his creature, or that which is a pure spirit had need in his operation of an impure, imperfect and corruptible body. Moses Barsephas tractatu de Paradyso. Moses Barsephas in his Treatise of Paradise saith, that there be two parts of Paradise, one corporal, another spiritual, one created for the pleasure of the body, another for to delight the soul: so that, as man is composed of two parts, the one spiritual, the other corporal, and yet but one only man: so (saith he) was Paradise partly corporal, and partly spiritual, yet one only Paradise: his arguments be these. If Paradise were only corporal (saith he) than the body only of Adam was delighted there: because no corporal thing can delight the soul: wherefore if God had not created another part of Paradise spiritual, he might seem to have dealt fraudulently with man (which were blaspheamous) who promised a Paradise for the whole man; and yet created such a one as could not delight the whole man. Again, that Paradise is not only spiritual, he proveth with these arguments: For than it could not have delighted the body, but only the spirit. Yea all those things which Moses writeth as touching Paradise, might be deemed false; seeing that he so evidently insinuateth, that man was created in Paradise, as in some material place; and that God had planted Paradise in Eden from the beginning: that he put man there whom he had created, that he created for him there all trees, herbs, beasts, and all other things necessary, both for the delight and use of man: That our first Fathers fell from God's grace, by eating of the forbidden fruit; that they hide themselves amongst the trees of Paradise, after their fall; and many other things which cannot be understood, but of a real and corporal place. Thirdly, if Paradise were not a real and corporal place, how could there flow out of it those four rivers, which (as the Scripture witnesseth) compass the whole earth? How should Enoch and Elias be translated thither, and (as many writers affirm) be conserved there both in body and soul? yea otherwise how should Adam and Eve have lived there? Which things, though all of them be not so certain, yet most of them are so evidently expressed in the scripture, that they manifestly prove the Garden of Paradise to have been a real and corporal place, Chrysostom. hom. 13. in genesis. August. in gen. l. 8. c. 1. & sequenti bus. & lib. 13. de civit. dei c. 21. & q. 27. in gen. Basil. hom. exameron. hom. 11. Higher epist. ad Pamachium. Epiphanius. Damascen. Isiderus. Nicenus Cyrillus. Naz. and therefore S. Chrysostome in his 13. Homily upon Genesis saith, Ideo Mosen descipsisse Paradisum, That Moses did therefore so manifestly describe Paradise, the rivers, the trees, the fruits, And all other things thereto appertaining, that the simple and ignorant should not be deceived, by the fabulous Allegories, and doting dreams, which some would pretend to divulge for sole truth, hidden in the figurative and material description of Paradise. The like also may be seen in Saint Augustine in his eight book upon Genesis cap. 1. & seq. and the 13. book de civitate dei, cap. 21. & questione vigesima septima in Gen. Basil. Hom. 11. upon the Exameron. Likewise Hierome in his Epistle to Pamachius; Epiphanius epist. ad johannem Hieros. Damascenus in his fourth book, de Orthodoxa fide, cap. 13. Isodorus libro quarto Etymologiarum cap. 3. Gregorius Nicenus oratione quinta in orationem dominicam. Cyrill, Naz. Ephren, and others. Lastly, S. Augustine in his 27. Aug. quaest. 27. in Gen. question upon Genesis giveth this reason as an evident demonstration, that Paradise was a true corporal place; because the land of the Sodomites, and Gomorrhae ans before the destruction thereof, was compared in the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, Genes. c. 13. to this pleasant place of Paradise, in these words: Before the Lord destroyed Sodom, and Gomorrah, it was as the garden of the Lord, like the Land of Egypt, as thou goest unto Zoar, Wherefore saith Saint Augustine in the place above alleged) if by the fruitful trees described in Paradise, there were nothing else to be understood but only the virtues of the mind, as some do hold, and if there were no true corporal Paradise, beautified with all kind of trees, it would not have been said of that place, that it was as the Paradise of God. Conticescant igitur (as Saint Hierome commenteth upon Daniel, Hieronimus in Danielem cap. 10 cap. 10.) eorum deliramenta qui umbras & imagines in veritate sequentes ipsam conantur evertere veritatem: ut Paradysum & flumina & arbores putent Allegoriae legibus se debere subruere. Because the aforesaid Allegories rather seem deliramenta, dottages and dreams (as this Father termeth them) than expositions of learned Doctors, let them therefore in no wise be mentioned or uttered: not that there may not be good use of these and other the like Allegorical expositions, but that they are not so to be used, that they be a means to overthrow the truth, or that they be taken for the sole truth, which were no small injury unto the word of God, which oftentimes admitteth as well the true historical, as the literal sense, together with the spiritual interpretation, if it be rightly applied. CHAP. II. The description and situation of Paradise. THIS may seem as strange a title to some, as how to measure the latitude of the heavens, the depth of the Sea, or how to number the innumerable stars of the firmament, yea much more; seeing that of these we have some sight, some experience, some natural ground; but of this of Paradise, we have no view, no experience, nor any natural foundation sufficient to build such mighty machinas of conceits, as some do more boldly, then sound conceive of Paradise. But yet to this I answer; that as we ought, (according to prudence, and wisdom) to give credit unto such as are expert in any faculty, as long as we have no sufficient ground to contradict: So much more unto the Fathers and other learned Divines, in points appertaining unto Divinity: and in particular of these of Patadise, which though they be not altogether so evident in the Scripture; yet at least way, they are either evidently deduced, or prabably inferred out of the sacred text; such as isidor's description of Paradise is, who in the fourteenth book of his Aetimologies describeth it thus. Isidorus lib. 14. aetimologiarum. The description of Paradise. Paradyse is a place situated in the Oriental parts of the world, whose aetimology (the word being translated out of Greek into Latin,) signifieth hortum a Garden. In Hebrew it is called Heden, which interpreted in Latin is the same that deliciae, delights: wherefore both names being joined together, they signify a Garden of all manner of delights, and pleasures, a place beset with all kind of fruitful, and beautiful trees: where there is neither cold, nor heat, but a perpetual temper of air; furthermore out of this so pleasant a place there floweth in great abundance, a fair fountain, which watereth the whole Garden and trees thereof, which afterward is divided into four huge and great rivers, but the entrance of this place is always shut up, for the sin of our first Fathers: yea it is always environed and guarded on every side with a fiery sword; so that the very flames do always almost touch even the heavens themselves. In this place finally, are placed the Cherubins, to wit, a most vigilant custody, or sentinel of Angels, for the terror and expulsion of evil spirits. Insomuch that neither man nor evil spirit may have access thither, man being kept away by the fiery flame, the evil spirits by the watch of the Cherubins: thus far Isodorus. Which is the same in effect, which Alchinus expresseth in these few verses lib. 1. carminum de initio mundi. cap. 9 Alchinius his description of Paradise lib. 1.ᵒ carminun de initio mundi cap. 9 Ergo ubi transmissis mundi caput incipit Indis, Qua perhibent terram confinia iungere coelo. Lucus in accessa cunctis mortalibus arce Permanet. Hic ver assiduum coeli clementia servat. Turbidus anster abest, semperque sub aëre sudo Nubila diffugiunt iugi cessura sireno Nec poscit natura loci, quos non habet imbres Sed contenta suo dotantur germinarore. Sic cum desit hiems nec torrida ferreat aestas, Fructibus autumnus, ver floribus occupat annum. To which description I add that of Tertullian in his Apology against the Gentiles, Tertullianus apol. contragentiles. where he saith, that Paradise is a place of divine pleasure, destinated for the receiving of the blessed spirits; segregated from the notice of the world by a fiery circle or girdle, which compasseth it about. Basilius orat de Paradyso. Basil also in his oration of Paradise doth describe it thus. Paradise is a place flowing with all sorts of pleasure and delights, surpassing far the beauty of all sensible creatures, which by reason of the height it hath, admitteth no obscurity of night, or darkness by clouds, but rather is always resplendent with the shining of the oriental stars: to which place also there can come no immoderate force of winds, no storm, no tempest, no horror of winter, no inundation by waters, no burning of Summer, no drought of Autumn, but a continual and peaceable temperature of all times and seasons, insomuch that, that which may be justly thought the best and most pleasant of every several time of the year, that doth always here concur and abound, to wit, a continual pleasure of the spring, the abundance of harvest, the mirth and alacrity of Autumn, with the rest and quietness of the winter. To which Ephren (as he is alleged by Barsephas in his Treatise of Paradise) addeth, that it is beyond the Ocean, in another world. And S. Austin ad Orosium, that is a place situated in the East part of the world, reaching even up to the circle of the moon: and so as it was safe from the inundation of the flood; so also it is inaccessible to man after his first expulsion thence. Abulensis also seemeth in part to assent, saying, 2 Cap. in Gen q. 2 etc. 13. q. 107. that though Paradise toucheth not the Globe, or circle of the moon, yet (saith he) it far exceedeth the limits of our turbulent, and dark air; and that it is placed in the third region of the air, higher at least by twenty cubits, than all the mountains of the earth: so that the waters of Noah's flood, which transcended (according as the Scripture relateth) all the mountains of the earth, fifteen cubits, could cause no damage to so high a place, as that of Paradise. Bonavent. lib. 2 sent. dist. 17. Finally Bonaventure in the second book of the sentences, dist. 17. holdeth Paradyse to be under the equinoctial line; because (as he and many others have imagined) there is always a perpetual temper of the Heavens and time, by reason of the perpetual equality of the days and nights under that line. Eugubinus, Oleaster, & Vatablus in 2. cap. Gen. Eugubinus, Oleaster and Vatablus upon the second chapter of Genesis think that Paradise was placed in Mesopotamia, but that now it hath lost his beauty by the inundation of noah's flood: so that now being patent not only unto man, but also unto the beasts themselves, it needeth no Angelical custody, or fiery sword. These be the common opinions of the Fathers, & doctors in these points; to which every man may assent as he findeth most agreeable with reason and true Philosophy, for seeing that in these points there is nothing revealed or declared unto us in the holy Scriptures, nature must be the best guide and mistress, where supernatural authority is wanting. Out of which natural principles that of the huge height of Paradise, and reaching of it even unto the Sphere of the Moon, seemeth altogether improbable; for if Paradise was made for the habitation, yea for the delight of man, why should it be situated in so inconvenient a place, yea (speaking according to natural reason) naturally not inhabitable by reason of the nearness of the Sun, and other Planets, and stars. To which (I cannot deny) but some show of answer may be made as that neither Sun, nor any of the Planets, are (as the Philosophers say) formally but only virtually hot; that is, though they have the virtue to produce heat in these inferior things, yet that they be not in themselves hot, neither are they capable of heat: because, as they neither agree in matter, nor form (as many Philosophers hold) with these inferior creatures; so neither can they have the same kind of qualities that our Elements have. But this answer is easily confuted, because as the virtual heat of the sun is sufficient to make inhabitable some places of the world (as divers grave Writers affirm) by reason of the nearness unto it, why might it not also cause the like effect in Paradise? unless we will fly unto the omnipotence of God, and miracles, the only refuge of ill grounded Philosophy and ignorance. Or say (as some have fond feigned) that Paradise being of another kind of matter then the rest of the earth, or of the same Species, and purity, that the heavens are, as these be incorruptible by reason of their most pure matter, or incorruptible union, so likewise Paradise, and the things there: only man being of the same nature that now he is, was by the particular providence of the omnipotent power, kept from mortality or corruption as long as he preserved himself from the corruption of sin. But these and such like solutions, as they are forged without any ground, so they may easily be denied without any more reason, this only being added to the former proof, that so high a place as the Sphere of the Moon, was altogether unfit for the situation of Paradise, by reason of the perpetual agitation, and motion of that place, which is so continually rapt, and carried about with the most violent, and swift course of the heaven. Many other reasons (I confess) might be given, but which rather appertain unto Mathematics and longer discourses, than the brevity, which we have here taken upon us, will permit. Now therefore only remaineth that by the consideration of the excellencies of this place, wherein we were before our sin, we gather the hatred God beareth to sin; seeing that for the sin of one, yea and that but one only, God, who is so good, yea infinite goodness and mercy, would punish with so long a punishment, and with so great punishments, for so long a time, so infinite a number, as is, and shall be the whole posterity of Adam, even unto the world's end; And that sin, certainly, hath a kind of infinity of malice which could deserve so infinite a punishment, yea so much provoke the infinite goodness and mercy of him, who is infinitely good, and merciful. And lastly we may infer, what sin justly deserveth, if it should not be punished more according to the rule of mercy, then according to that, which the rigour of justice requireth; seeing that nothing was, or could be sufficient, to blot, or wash it away, but only the blood of the lamb of God, which only washeth away the sins of the world; by which, we are to be restored, not only into a more high participation of God, and his grace, than we possessed before our fall; but also into a more perfect Paradise, then that was, from which we were banished, for our first sin, and fall: And this only by his merits, blood, and passion, who could in no wise either slip, or fall: So that we may well exclaim with Saint Austin, August. in meditationibus. O strange judgement, o unspeakable disposition of the divine mysteries; the sinner offendeth, the just is punished: the guilty transgresseth, the innocent is beaten; the wicked sinneth, the godly is condemned; that which the evil deserveth, the good suffereth; the servant doth amiss, the master maketh amends: man committeth sin, God beareth the punishment. O Son of God how hast thou debased thyself? how hast thou burned in affection? How far is thy mercy stretched? whither is thy compassion come? Adam did wickedly, thou was punished; man sinned, thou wast afflicted; Eve offended, thou wast tormented; we were disobedient, but thou obediently bearest the punishment of our disobedience; we served our concupiscence, but thou enduredst hunger; the tree alured us unto an unlawful desire, but perfect charity led thee unto the Cross; we tasted presumptuously the forbidden fruit, but thou suffered'st torments for our presumption, and momentary delight. We enjoyed the pleasure, but thou wast pierced with nails; we delighted in the sweetness of the apple, but thou therefore didst taste the bitterness of the gall. Here astonished I know not what to say, nay I am so amazed I know not what to think, only I can exclaim with the Apostle, O altitudo sapientiae & scientiae Dei! O depth of the wisdom of God o mercy of the omnipotent without measure! quid retribuam Domino pro omnibus quae tribuit mihi? What shall I give unto God again, who hath given himself so often for me? unto hunger for my riot; unto nakedness for my pride; unto dishonour for my honour, unto humility for my ambition; unto mortality for my immortality: And finally unto the ignominious torments of a thorny crown, and other of his sacred passion, and vital death, for to crown me with an eternal crown of glory, in the life to come, in that everlasting Paradise, unto which no mutability, no mortality, and much less any impurity can ascend: ubi non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis adumbratio: whither not even the very shadow of change can approach. CHAP. III. Of the compass and greatness of Paradise, and why it was so beautified, seeing God foreknew, for how short a time it was to serve for the use of man. WHere there is less certainty in the conclusion, there I mean to spend less time in the resolution, as in this of the compass of Paradise: a question of more difficulty, than necessity: yet nevertheless because it is urged by some, I will endeavour to give some satisfaction in it, such as may be in so uncertain a point, at least way as far, as other principles of Philosophy, or Divinity, or finally as the grave expositors of the sacred text will give me any firm ground of discourse. Amongst whom Ephren above alleged answereth to this question, that Paradise was greater than all the earth now inhabited. Ephren lib de Paradiso. The reason may be, because as the inhabitants were to be more in number then the earthly, and more worthy; so their habitation, according to the wisdom, & bounty of their Creator, should have been more magnificent, and far more capable: of the beauty and magnificence no man can doubt, who doubteth not of the history of Genesis. Why then should we doubt of the other, seeing the same reason urgeth in both? yea if we may discourse according to reason, in these things which depend only upon the free disposition of the sole independent cause; certainly, as this cause of causes hath created all other things, pondere & mensura with due poise and measure of beauty, magnificence, and all other proprieties, according as the nature of the things required, and their final ends, for which they were created, à fortiori, or much more, it ought likewise to be inferred of the greatness and magnificence of Paradise; wherefore, seeing that the seed of man, if he had not sinned, had been more multiplied then now it is, because sin (as true Philosophy teacheth) is no small impediment unto generation; it must needs follow, that as the Inhabitants should have been more in number, & the place of their habitation more magnificent; so likewise the capacity of the same place where all should have dwelled, to wit, of Paradise, should have been greater than now the habitation of man is, in all the world now inhabited. I know well what is wont to be answered, to wit, that if Adam had not tasted of the forbidden fruit, there should have been none in Paradise, but only those, which should have supplied the seats of the lapsed Angels; and consequently they should have been but few in number: according to that of the Gospel, pauci electi, few be the chosen. To what end then should their habitation have been of so great compass, as is the worlds now inhabited? Again, if we acknowledge God to be conscious of all future events, and that this foreknowledge, is as it were (according to our base manner of conceiving so high mysteries) a direction unto the free disposition of his Divine will and providence, to what end should he create so mighty, huge, and so magnificent a place, for so few, and for so short a time, as he knew our forefathers should be there? The answer unto both is easy, but first unto the first. I grant that if we had not sinned, only the elect should have been created, and placed in paradise: whence without any subjection to mortality, or other things, now necessarily annexed thereunto, they should have been translated unto their supernatural felicity in heaven; but it followeth not hence that they could be so few in number, as might well be contained in so little a compass, as Paradise is imagined to be. Neither, because it is said, that small is the number of the elect, for though they be so in comparison of the reprobate (in which sense the fathers interpret that place) yet absolutely they be many, yea without question more, than ever there were men living in the world together. For so it is evidently gathered out of the Apocalypse, where the beloved Apostle after that he had made mention of twelve thousand in every Tribe, sealed, and signed, he concludeth with these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And after these things I saw, Apoc. 7.9. and behold a great multitude which none could number of all nations, and Tribes, and people, and tongues, standing before the throne, and in the sight of the Lamb: covered with white stoles, and with palms in their hands: Now if these be the elected (as without doubt they be) how could they all have dwelled together at one, and the same time in Paradise? how could they (I say) have been contained in so little a space or garden as Paradise is imagined to have been? True it is, that man was created to supply and replenish the seats of the fallen Angels: but hence, we are rather to infer the contrary of that which was pretended in the objection; because the bad Angels, as the Fathers say, and hath been proved in our Treatise of Angels, were almost innumerable, wherefore if the blessed men be to supply their places, as indeed they be, they must necessarily be more in number, than could conveniently inhabit so little a place as Paradise is imagined to have been: seeing that, if not all, yet infinite more should have concurred together, then now possibly can after our exile out of Paradise; whence all occasions of mortality should have been removed, and where the tree of life should have been sufficient for the preservation of man's life; if not for all eternity (as many have said) yet for many thousands of years, or at least for a far longer space, than now the life of man can naturally be prolonged, for besides the natural causes which then were more forcible, or of more virtue, for man's preservation, and none nocive to man, as long as he was not hurtful unto himself, the supernatural cause of causes did particularly concur in this, as well by his particular providence, as by the virtue of the tree of life. Now to the second objection, which presumeth to demand a reason of God's secret decrees, and judgements, to wit, why God foreseeing man's sin, and that from all eternity, would create for man's habitation, a place so spacious, excellent, and capable, which he knew was to be enjoyed for so short a time? I answer with the like objection, why also did he create so infinite a number of Angels, with so many excellent gifts, as well of grace, as nature, and both gratis, yea and heaven so beautiful and admirable a place for them, whom he knew would so soon prevaricate and fall from that felicity, into the other extreme of infelicity? yea the like I ask of Adam, why would God so adorn him with all kind of gifts both natural and supernatural, whom he knew ab aeterno from all eternity was presently to be so ungrateful, and wilfully to fall from his grace? if these things be not unbeseeming his goodness, neither contradict his providence and foreknowledge of future event, neither doth this other of creating Paradise so beautiful, spacious, and capable of so great a number, whereas God knew from all eternity that Adam by his fall was to lose that place both for himself, and all his posterity. The only reason of the question propounded may be (and the same may be applied with proportion unto the rest) because, as we find by ordinary experience, that God doth not ordinarily deal with man according to future events, and his divine prescience thereof, but according to his own science of things as present, Aquinas prima part quaest. 14. Molina, Suarius, Valentia, Vasquez & alij scholastici. which the Divines call scientiam visionis or intuitive knowledge. Hence it is, that God seeing man not unworthy of that place persisting in the grace, in which he was created, according to the present estate he had created him in, therefore (I say) not respecting man's future demerits, but his own present grace, as he bestowed original justice upon him, to be translated unto his posterity, so likewise he gave this so excellent and capable a place as a sufficient and apt habitation for him, and his posterity, if they had not fallen from his grace. These be the grounds of Ephrens' opinion, which to me is altogether improbable. Wherefore my judgement in this so uncertain a point, is, that though Paradise was not so ample, as the rest of the world inhabited, yet that it was of no small compass, which I infer of the greatness of the fountain which sprung there, out of which four mighty rivers were derived. Secondly because there was no need of any such extraordinary compass as Ephren imagined, seeing that it was but to contain the elect only, which should have been but few in comparison of the multitude which now possess the face of the earth. Neither was it necessary that all beasts should remain there; because man in that happy estate had no such need of their service, as now he hath. The length, breadth, and compass of Paradise according to Abulensis upon Genesis. Wherefore Abulensis is of opinion, that the length of Paradise was about twelve miles, and the compass 36 or 40. But these are but uncertain conjectures in things, which are not so manifest in Scripture. That which seemeth most probable in this matter, is, that seeing the Scripture calleth Paradise but a garden, that surely it cannot be of any such compass as some imagine. And secondly because it is said to be situated in the Region of Heden in the Eastern parts, which in no wise may be compared with the rest of the world for greatness. Now to the other difficulty above insinuated, whether man persisting in the state of innocency, should have dwelled in any other place, but only in Paradise: I answer, that without all doubt he should, because so small a circuit, as Paradise was, could not have been sufficient for the habitation of so great a multitude, as might very well in one man's age concur together, for if after the fall of Adam some men lived almost a thousand years, certainly if Adam had kept his original justice, he should in all likelihood have tripled the time (as Villalpandus affirmeth) or lived much longer than he did after he sinned in which space there must needs have been almost an infinite number of inhabitants, and consequently the place of their habitation must needs have been of correspondent space, and capacity, wherefore seeing that Paradise (as we have already shown) was of no such capacity, as was apt for the containing of such a multitude, it is not likely that man should have been confined there only, until the time of his translation into a more happy estate, which should have been after his sufficient trial in the terrene Paradise, according to the free disposition and decree of his Creator. CHAP. IU. What may be the reason why Paradise was never found as yet? Ephren de Paradiso. SOme with Ephren do hold the reason to be the high situation of the place. Others assign three great impediments of free access unto Paradise. First, the hugeness and insuperable height of the mountains, which are betwixt us and Paradise. Secondly, for that there be mighty wildernesses full of all kind of most venomous Serpents, and wild beasts. Thirdly, because there is no way but through large regions of most pestiferous air, in which no man can live. Others with Saint Chrysostome hold that at least, Chrysost. in Genes. before noah's flood the way unto Paradise was known, and where it was; but that men durst never adventure thither, for fear of the Cherubin, which did always guard it with a fiery sword. Wherefore I judge with Saint Chrysostome that though then that was the chief impediment of free access unto Paradise, yet that now at least way, that Paradise is not accessible, known, or seen as a Paradise, because it was destroyed with the Deluge, which passed all the highest places of the earth, and that many a cubit, which whether it be so or no shall be discussed more largely in the Chapter following, because the resolution of divers other curiosities depend thereupon. CHAP. V. Whether there be as yet any Paradise or no, or rather it was destroyed in noah's flood. SAint Basill, Abulensis, Basil. & Abul. supra cit. and others above alleged do seem to hold that Paradise was not destroyed by the deluge, and consequently that it remaineth as yet. Iren. lib. 1. contra baer. Tertullian and the Master of the Sentences, yea and Ireneus in his first book against Heretics addeth, that it was the Paradise into which Paul was carried when he saw such ineffable things which was not possible for man to utter. Moreover that this was the opinion of the ancient Asian priests the Apostles Disciples. justin. in respon. ad. quaest. orth. quaest 75. 76. 85. Moreover the famous Martyr justine in responsione ad Orthodoxorum quaestiones quaest. 75. 76. 85. Averreth, that Paradise is extant as yet, and is to be even to the world's end, as the habitation of the two patriarchs Enoch and Elias, who shall come thence, to fight against Antichrist, not long before the end of the world. Finally he concludeth as a thing undoubtable, that this is the place, whither the good and converted Thief was carried, to whom Christ said upon the Cross, this day shalt thou be with me in Paradise, to wit this earthly, the first habitation of mankind. Lastly Saint Austin seemeth more peremptory for this opinion in his second book against Pelagius and Celestius where he saith, Aug. lib. 2. contra Pelagium & Caelestiam. that there be some questions in which we may be ignorant without any prejudice unto our Christian faith, and the definitive sentence may be suspended, or in which all human conjectures may easily be deceived, as when it is inquired what manner of place is Paradise? or where that region is, where God created the first man of the dust of the earth? whereas notwithstanding our Christian faith doth not permit us to doubt, but that there is such a place as Paradise, cum tamen esse illum Paradisum fides Christiana non dubitet. Wherefore, though we may be ignorant of the manner, qualities, situation, and the like circumstances of Paradise, yet if we will not be Infidels we cannot be ignorant that there is such a place: And of this he giveth this example: Cum quaeritur ubi sit nunc Helias vel Henoch, an ibi vel alibi, quos tamen non dubitamus in quibus nati sunt corporibus vivere. As for example touching that question where Henoch or Helias be? whether they be there in Paradise, or rather in some other place allotted them to live in, as yet? without all doubt we may doubt about these particular curiosities, which are not plainly expressed in the holy Scriptures, but we neither can nor may doubt but that they live, not according to the spirit only, but corporally also, their souls being really united unto their bodies, as ours are: after the same manner we may doubt of the circumstances of Paradise, not of the real existence or being of it. And this the rather because in the 44 Chapter of Eccles. it is said that Enoch was translated into Paradise that he might be a pattern of penance unto the Gentiles. Therefore if Henoch be there as yet, yea as a pattern of penance unto the Gentiles, there must not only be an earthly Paradise, but also it seemeth that it must be a place habitable, or to which men may have some access, in such sort, that they may see their pattern of repentance, for if either the place be destroyed, inaccessible, or invisible, how can it be true that Henoch is there detained as a pattern of repentance? therefore if Henoch be as yet preserved alive (as many do hold) it followeth consequently, that there is yet a terrene Paradise, not as yet destroyed by noah's flood. These be the arguments of this opinion, and for which many do not think it improbable: never the less (all the places of Scriptures and fathers, together with their reasons well pondered) it seemeth much more probable, that Paradise, in which Adam was created is not now to be found, but rather that it was destroyed by the general deluge. First, because the Scripture Gen. 7. Chap: saith, that all mountains were covered with the waters of the flood, à fortiori therefore this pleasant Region or Garden was thereby overflown. But peradventure, this was a whole Region higher than any Mountain, and consequently though all Mountains were covered, yet this place might be safe, as which was the habitation of that blessed man Henoch: or peradventure though it was not so high, yet was it reserved for the said reason by God's particular providence. I answer that neither, not the first, because as it is in the same place above alleged, the waters of the flood overflowed the highest mountains seven cubits: neither the second, because such a great miracle was not necessary for the preserving of Enoch; who whether he be yet alive, or how he is, it shall be more at large discussed in an other place. But supposing that the contrary opinion is probable, to wit, that Paradise is as yet extant, not only according to the place itself, but also to the beauty and pleasure which the Scripture testifieth it had, at the first creation; it may well be inquired, what should be the reason why it hath never been discovered of any amongst so many as have compassed the world. Some as I have already touched, answer, that the reason is, because Almighty God offended with Adam's transgression, hath environed it with huge Hills, mighty mountains, swelling seas, fearful rocks, and great wildernesses full of all kind of terrible beasts, and venomous Serpents, so that it is impossible for any mortal man to pass thither. Others again answer that Paradise hath not been discovered, neither sought for by Infidels, because they thought it to be but a fable, neither by the faithful or Christians; because they know it to be inaccessible. But if I may interpose my opinion and freely speak what I judge in this matter, I think that none of these reasons are so concludent and certain as that the place of Paradise is as yet unknown by the particular disposition and providence of God; as part of our punishment, for that sin, for which we were banished thence, as not only unworthy to inhabit the place itself, but also of the notice where it was. Or secondly because it is not in any wise necessary to be known, either as belonging to the furtherance of our felicity in this mortal life, or to the obtaining of the eternal happiness in the other immortal. As in like manner this also was the reason, why though our Saviour knew at least way by supernatural means, and as he was the eternal wisdom of God, the time of the end of this world, and of his second coming to judgement, yet because this was not necessary for man to know, therefore he denied the revelation thereof even unto his Apostles: insomuch that our Saviour said Act. 1. cap. vers. 7. unto his Apostles, that it was not for them to know the times or seasons which the Father hath put in his own power. So neither is it for us, too curiously to inquire after this place of Paradise, which God hath either destroyed, or hidden from us, as part of our punishment for our first and original offence in that place. CHAP. VI Of the trees of Paradise, whether all were fruitful, or rather some only beautiful, though unfruitful. Certain it is, as we read in the beginning of Genesis, that in the beginning of the world God produced omne lignum pulchrum visu, & ad vescendum suave, Every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the Garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Now the difficulty is, how these words are to be understood? whether conjunctively, or disiunctively? to wit, whether all the trees of Paradise were as well beautiful to the sight, as sweet in taste: or rather some were only delightful to the sight, some pleasant only in taste, others both, as well beautiful in sight, as pleasant in taste? Many (I know) answer, that all the trees of Paradise had both proprities, so that there was no one tree there unfruitful, neither any fruitful, which was not also beautiful: insomuch that those unfruitful trees, which now, after our miserable exile out of Paradise, are necessary, were not planted in Paradise: Because Moses saith that God planted every tree beautiful in sight, and sweet in taste, to wit, conjunctively: which could not be true, if any tree wanted either sweetness, or beauty, or was not both beautiful, and fruitful. Yea, which is more, God himself also commanded Adam that he should eat of every tree of Paradise, Gen. 2.16. excepting the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: consequently every tree of Paradise was fruitful, if fruitful, questionless then pleasant both to taste and sight. I dare not condemn this opinion, because it hath authors of no small authority, nevertheless to me it is altogether unprobable: seeing there be many fruitful trees not very beautiful: and many most beautiful, though not fruitful. It is therefore more conformable both to reason and the sacred text also, that it be understood disiunctively: to wit, that there was trees of both sorts, some beautiful, some fruitful, some both. Yea, this is plain out of Ezekiel 31, the 8. verse. where both the Cedar and Fir trees altogether unfruitful, are named as trees of Paradise, to whom the glory of the Assyrian was thus compared, the Cedars in the Garden of God could not hide him, the Fir trees were not like his boughs, and the Chestnut trees were not like his branches, nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him in his beauty. I have made him fair, by the multitude of his branches; So that all the trees of Eden, that were in the Garden of God, envied him. CHAP. VII. Of the tree of life, to wit, why it was so called, and whether it was corporal as other trees be, or rather spiritual and food of the soul, not of the body, or rather appertaining unto both. Such was the bounty of God towards man in the happy estate of Paradise, that he did not only give unto him what was necessary or convenient for his natural estate there, but also added other most extraordinary means and helps both natural and supernatural, convenient and necessary for both his estates of nature and grace; such was this of the tree of life, which (as some well note) according to the original text, was called the tree or wood, not of life only, in the singular, but in the plural, of lives, because it was so to lengthen the life of every man, that every singular and particular man's life, might well seam the life, not of one only man, but of many. Whereby we may first admire the power of Almighty God, secondly his goodness towards man: his power in the creating of such a fruit: his goodness, in bestowing it upon him, whom he knew was in so short a time after, to be so ungrateful for that, and many other most excellent, as well natural, as supernatural gifts. The second reason, why it is termed the tree of lives, is, because as a man hath three lives, virtually: if not really distinct, the sensitive, vegetative, and rational; so this fruit of the tree of lives should have had virtue to fortified all three, in which also we may note the wisdom of God, but more again his mercy: his wisdom in that he knew to produce incorruption, at least way for many years if not eternal (as many hold) by a continual repairing of nature by the eating of the said apple; but more again (I say) may we admire his mercy, and bounty, by which he sought means to eternize him, whom he knew by his fall was to be his own death, yea the death of his most dear and eternal son which was the true tree of life, prefigured by this tree of life or lives, so also called because it was not to give, or prolong the life of Adam only, but also the lives of his posterity; until such time, as it should please their Maker to translate them from that earthly beatitude, unto a more perfect and supernatural estate; man.. 17. where (as Saint Austin saith) they were to possess in a more perfect measure, and that through all eternity joy without sorrow, rest without labour, honour without fear, wealth without damage; health without sickness; abundance without care; life with all security; immortality without corruption; all happiness with no misery at all. Where all perfection is in the highest degree, and all imperfections remote; where sight is face unto face, where perfect knowledge, and nothing unrevealed of which human nature can be capable; where Gods sovereign goodness reigneth super omnia above all things, and the light enlightening is glorified of the Saints; where the present majesty of the Almighty is perpetually beholden, and the mind of the beholders eternally filled with this fruit of life. Fourthly, it was called the tree of life, or lives; because it did after a double manner sustain and renew the life of man: first in restoring our natural moisture, by which we live, which consumeth every day more and more by our natural heat, which was a propriety common also to all other fruits of Paradise. Secondly, in that which was proper to this tree only, and for which it was particularly termed the tree of life, because it was of such qualities and excellent proprieties, that being eaten, it did renew our humidum radical, our natural humidity and moisture, whereby we should have lived with the like or equal purity and perfection, which had been in man at his first creation; yea it should have so fortified our natural heat, that although it did naturally suffer some detriment and loss by continual action, yet should it have been so strengthened by that fruit of life, that it could never have decayed or perished, and consequently man could never die corporally in that happy estate, unless he had first killed himself spiritually by being partaker of the forbidden fruit, insomuch that the disobedience of one brought in by concupiscence was the cause of all our misery and mortality, that so God of his mere goodness through his infinite wisdom might thereby take occasion of showing his mercy upon those who after Adam's fall were nothing but misery, and by the obedience of his dearest Son might repair and redeem the disobedience of us most accursed caitiffs: so that we participating of the fruit of the tree of life communicated unto us in the sacred communion by virtue of that tree of life prefigured in this Paradise, might thereby be revived from a temporal death to an eternity of blessedness, and perpetuity of a most blessed life; yea so by occasion of our first sin, gain more than ever we had obtained if we had not sinned: seeing hereby we obtained that fruit of life to be prepared for us upon the tree of the cross, yea and thence communicated unto us in the sacred communion, and bread of life, which doubtless we should not have obtained, at leastway after that manner and measure, if we had not transgressed. Or at leastway Christ prefigured in this tree of life, should not have appeared passable as one of us, if we by our sin had not needed his passion. Wherefore we being astonished at so great mercy shown unto us in so infinite misery, and that so lamentable a loss should be an occasion of so joyful and infinite gain, we may well exclaim with Gregory the great, O foelix culpa, quae talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem, O happy fall, and happy unhappiness, which was occasion of so great happiness. Lastly, the aforesaid tree was worthily called the tree of life, or lives; because it did not only preserve our natural being, by the repairing of our natural forces, but also did so renew them by a supernatural virtue proceeding thence, that thereby we might have lived a life free from all kind of fears of death, or of any griefs, vexations, or torments, now necessarily annexed to both deaths, corporal and spiritual, temporal and eternal: now I say annexed to both deaths, unless we have applied unto us the virtue of another tree of life, by whole life all things being have their being, and by whose influence all things living have their life. Hence it is that the former was a most perfect pattern or representation of the latter, but the latter a more perfect form then could be fully represented by the former, or by any other possible. Nevertheless the tree of life was created in the terrestrial Paradise, to the end that it might be a type, and in some sort represent that which should be fully represented or seen in the celestial kingdom by the eternal light of glory, according to the divine oracle, In lumine tuo videbimus lumen, in thy light we shall see light; that is, by and through thy light of glory (which is a supernatural habit infused into our understandings) we shall see the glorious light of thy essence, not comprehensively, which is impossible, but most perfectly and essentially, which is common to all the blessed Spirits and Saints of heaven, to every one according to their degree of glory, correspondent unto the measure of their faith heard here in earth, or while they were in the way to this supernatural blessedness. CHAP. VIII. Whether there was ever any such tree in Paradise as the tree of life, or rather that which is written of it in the Scripture is only to be understood spiritually or figuratively. AS now in this deluge of miseries, which have overflown the world, there be many which in outward show and words pretend so much spirit, that they leave nothing for the inward but acts of carnality: so there wanted not these kinds of monsters in former ages, who though they were never so far plunged in the depth of hell, as ours be, yet were they not far inferior in the fictitious morallizing of Scripture, or rather wresting from the true sense the word of God; such were Origines and his fellows Allegorici, so termed because they wrested the Scripture beyond all truth and sense, only to a spiritual and allegorical sense, especially those places which speak of Paradise and the tree of life: some thinking it to be our Saviour Christ, or word of God incarnate, others the sole attribute of the eternal wisdom of God: some again our everlasting happiness in the kingdom of heaven, according to that of S. john: Reu cha 2. vers. 2. To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of my God: that is, as Eugobinus in his Cosmopoeia holdeth, not our essential blessedness in the sight of God, as the former opinion is, but a propriety necessarily annexed thereunto, to wit immortality, which God had promised to Adam and his posterity, if they had persisted in their first state of innocency wherein Adam was first created. Here be many fictitious propositions ill grounded, and which of themselves are sufficient to overthrow themselves: the truth and the common opinion, as well of School Divines, as of Expositors of the holy Scriptures and Fathers is, that as the history of the tree of life, and the rest of Paradise may well be interpreted in an Allegorical sense, without any contradiction to the true meaning of the history; so to understand it only thus, excluding the history, is a manifest injury done to the Scripture. So S. Austin in his 13. book of the city of God, chap. 21. saith, that we may understand by Paradise the blessed life of the Saints of God: likewise by the four rivers of Paradise the four cardinal virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, & justice: by the trees all profitable Arts and disciplines; by the fruit of the tree, the good works of the godly; by the tree of life, wisdom the mother of all goodness; finally by the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the experience of the commandment transgressed. These things likewise may be understood of the Church, as prophecies proper unto her future estate. So that by Paradise we may understand the Church according to that which we read of her in the Canticles. Moreover, by the four floods, the four Gospels; by the fruitful trees, the Saints, whose fruits be their works; by the tree of life, the Saint of Saints, Christ our Saviour; lastly, by the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, our own moral and civil actions, not the supernatural, in which we are more passive than active. These and the like of Origenes and others of the Fathers are questionless most excellent Allegories, yet not such as may be taken for sole verities, excluding the plain history of Moses, and literal sense, which is the second part of my assertion, deduced also out of S. Austin in the place above alleged, where he concludeth thus: Haec & siquae alia, These and the like may be spiritually applied unto Paradise, so that the truth of the history be faithfully kept, and no injury offered to the word of God: for if once we give a sole and general passage to this kind of Allegorical exposition, we shall soon be brought to many fond definitions in matters of faith. CHAP. IX. Why the tree of life was so called, and whether it had truly the property of making a man immortal. AS it is truly said of the bread of life, the Sacrament (I mean) of the Lords Supper, that it doth not concur physically with any real influence unto the grace of God inherent in our souls in this life, or to the eternity of blessedness in the life to come, but that it is only a sign of the one, and a pawn and pledge of the other, to wit, of grace in this life, of an eternal poys of glory in the other: so many holding the tree of life to be a figure or type of the bread of life, have with proportion held of them both, to wit, that neither of them were physical and real causes of their effects, but only moral. Hence it is that Eugubinus above alleged in his Cosmopoeia thinketh that it was called the tree of life, non effectiuè quòd vitam faceret immortalem, not because it did really cause or should have caused immortality in man; said significative tantùm, because it should have been a sign and token only of immortality, if he had not transgressed the commandment of his Creator: a probable opinion certainly, or which cannot easily be refuted; for although all almost Writers and Fathers both of the Greek and Latin Church do agree, that the effect of this fruit was immortality, yet in the manner how, they do not agree. So therefore if we agree of the thing, it is not material how we hold of the manner of concourse. As in like manner we doubt not to say of the bread of life, the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, that certainly it containeth the cause of life Christ, but how it containeth him, who can express? This exceedeth the natural capacity of Angels, the other of the type also the reach of man. Agreeing therefore about the things, why should we so contend to express the manner, which in no wise can be expressed, because it is not expressed in the book of life, and therefore cannot be necessary to eternal life. Nevertheless (if I may conjecture in things so hidden) I deem the contrary much more probable, to wit, that this tree of life was not only a type or token of immortality, but that really it was a cause sufficient to have produced immortality: my reason, or rather congruence (because no concludent reason can be given in this point) is, because it was the most perfect figure (as the Fathers affirm) of that most excellent tree, which for all eternity is planted in the celestial Paradise, to wit, of Christ, who saith of himself, Apoc. 2. cap. Vincenti dabo edere, to him that overcometh (to wit himself) I will give to eat, what will he give? himself, to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of the eternal God, not carnally, as carnal men dream, but spiritually in the bread of life, as he himself doth affirm of himself. As therefore he who is the tree of life, or rather the author of life, or to speak more properly, life itself, even as he is in the Sacrament of life, doth here truly in this miserable life produce in us the life of grace, as a present pawn of our future glory: so it seemeth most probable that the other tree of life (as a most perfect figure of this) planted in the terrene Paradise, had the like inherent virtue, for to perpetuate, or at least to prolong the lives of Adam and his posterity, as long as they were to live in that terrene Paradise. But whether this fruit of the tree of life was sufficient to perpetuate our life, or only to prolong it for some determinate time, Abulensis super Genes. c. 13. quaest. 175. Scotus li. 2. sent. dist. 19 quaest. 1. Aquinas 1 p. q. 9.7. art 4 & Caiet. ibid. many dispute probably for both opinions. Tostatus upon the 13. chapter of Genesis, q. 175. is most peremptory for this perpetuity; Scotus, Thomas, Caietan and Durand, for a very long time, but not for eternity, because that is the natural measure of nature, this the supernatural of him who is above all nature. Secondly, seeing the power of the tree of life was a natural power and cause, the effect could not be supernatural: for though effects be often inferior to their causes, yet never the causes unto the effects; the reason, because no cause can give that which it hath not, neither any effect have any excellency or perfection not proceeding from the cause: wherefore if the tree of life was (as without question it was) a natural tree, as the Laurel, Cypress, and other trees be, it could not have as connatural, the supernatural effect of making eternal the life of man. Moreover it is a principle even in natural philosophy, that omne agens physicum in agendo patitur & debilitatur, that every natural cause doth suffer some detriment even in and by his own action: consequently therefore, though our natural heat and vigour might be very long conserved by the virtue of this excellent fruit, yet at length it should have failed, and thence finally mortality should have followed, as a necessary effect of so forcible a cause. Lastly, it is not likely that God, who is the author and first rule of nature, doth produce any thing frustrate in nature: seeing therefore the fall of man was patent unto him even from all eternity, to what end should he provide an eternal cause for a temporary effect? But if this argument had any force, it should force also our adversaries to the like, if not a greater inconvenience; for who doubteth but that God knew also the little time that man was to persist in his grace? and yet nevertheless he gave him that fruit, which was sufficient for the preservation of his life for many a year, as our adversaries hold, why then might he not likewise for all eternity? is it because of the impossibility? at non impossibile Deo omne verbum, to God nothing is impossible, which doth not imply contradiction, but what contradiction is in this? is it, that here natural philosophy is contradicted? omne agens in agendo patitur & debilitatur, every agent doth decay even by his own action; but seeing the author of nature is above nature, why might he not here work that which is above nature? or though in the compass of nature, yet beyond our natural capacity, which is so small, that we scarcely or very imperfectly understand things of far inferior degree, yea such as are within ourselves: why therefore shall we deny unto God that which we do not understand in ourselves? My resolution therefore is that of Abulensis, Propterea dictam esse arborem vitae, quòd fructus eius vim haberet seruandi hominem à morte in omne tempus, & faciendi eum immortalem, that this tree was therefore called the tree of life, because it had virtue to perpetuate our natural life, and the union of the body and soul for ever, if we had not lost the supernatural grace, which was the union of our souls with God; but seeing we wilfully separated ourselves from our supernatural life, it was most just that we should also be deprived of the natural: hence therefore is that which Paul so often preacheth, mortem in mundum intrasse propter peccatum, that death entered into the world by the door of sin, which door if we had debarred to sin, the grace of God should have been a perpetual union between God and us, and the tree of life should have caused the like between our bodies and souls; and this of his own nature eternally, though de facto we needed it but only temporally, both supposing our fall, as likewise not supposing any at all; for if we had not fallen or sinned in our first father, we should certainly after some number of years have been translated from that terrene Paradise, which was our first though temporary habitation, unto a more excellent and perpetual in the kingdom of heaven; and this should have been without any assault of death, because we had always lived in God, who as he would then have preserved us by his grace from the corruption of sin, would also have preserved us from this corruption, which was only the effect of sin, according to that of the Apostle, The wages of sin is death: the wager being the devil, our souls are bought and sold; sold away for nothing (sin being nothing but a privation of being) but bought again by the death of the most precious of mortal lives, which in no wise should have been necessary, if we had not been lost, or fallen from our first grace and innocency. But as that poetical fiction of the Nectar and Ambrosia seemed to Aristotle of small ground, so this for the like reason may seem to be as fabulous: for as Aristotle argueth against the former, either the Gods used this Ambrosia and Nectar for pleasure only, or also for necessity; if only for pleasure, how then could Ambrosia and Nectar be any necessary cause of their immortality? again, if for necessity, certainly the Gods than had not been immortal by nature, and consequently no Gods, seeing that, that which hath need of any thing for his preservation must necessarily be mortal. After the same manner we may argue against this fruit of this tree of life, which is said to be sufficient to cause an eternity of life, à part post, as the Philosophers speak: for if our immortality was only to be from the tree of life, then questionless without it we had been mortal, and subject to death; contrary to that of the Apostle, Stipendium peccati mors, the wages of sin is death: for whether we had sinned, or persisted in our primitive grace, all had been one, we should naturally have tasted of death, if we had not eaten of the tree of life. Again, if it was only ad melius esse, for a better preservation of our immortality due unto that estate, and not absolutely necessary for that effect; then consequently it was not the tree of life in the sense which the Scripture insinuateth, but an antidote only against death, and not a necessary cause of eternal life. I answer, that though the argument of Nectar and Ambrosia doth evidently overthrow the deity and immortality of the heathen gods, yet doth not the simile or comparison any thing impeach the immortality and deity of the true God, as neither the immortality of our first parents, due only unto them in their estate of innocency, and which did principally proceed from the true and only immortal God; because that immortality of life proceeding from the fruit of life, was to endure no longer with man then man persevered in the grace of God, which was given him as a pawn of eternal life. Neither doth this contradict that of the Apostle, the wages of sin is death: for though death be due unto man even without sin according to nature, yet this debt was to be remitted by original grace, and the natural proneness thereunto to be redressed by the fruit of life. Wherefore though the immediate cause of our immortality in Paradise should have been the tree of life, yet the primary and principal of all, to which the other was consequent, was original grace, whose immediate effect was our spiritual life, and thereto secondarily followed the freedom from any corporal harm, or death; yea and this for ever of his own nature, though we had not been translated thence to a better life: for so it is said of Adam, that therefore he was banished out of Paradise, and interdicted the entrance unto the tree of life, lest eating of it he should live for ever, Genes. 3. chap. 22. v. And the Lord God said, behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil; and now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken. Hence I conclude with Abulensis and others, esum illius arboris sufficientem habuisse virtutem, ut vitam homini praestaret aeternam: that this tree of life had sufficient virtue to prolong a man's life for all eternity. The which also is the opinion of S. Austin, Aug. li. 13. de ●iuitate Dei, cap. 20. & 23. Chrys. hom. ●3. in Gen. Rupertus ●ib. 3. de Trinitate, cap. 30. Chrysostome, and Rupertus lib. 3. de Trinitate cap. 30. where he addeth this more than other Doctors, quòd semel sumptus vitam praestitisset immortalem, that this fruit of life had been sufficient to have caused immortality of its own nature, though it had been but once received; the which though it may seem improbable to human reason, yet considering the omnipotence of God, and his infinite love to man in that estate, it cannot at leastway appear impossible. CHAP. X. Whether the virtue of the tree of life to preserve man immortal was natural unto it, or supernatural. Jest we err in the resolution of this question by any equivocation of words, as it falleth out often in the like difficulties of natural and supernatural objects; I will first declare how the Divines use this distinction, and then how it is to be taken here. Natural (as far forth as is necessary for our present purpose) is that which floweth from the principles of nature, to wit, matter and form, of which, as of their only compacts, all natural and corporal substances are composed. Supernatural is that which is above all nature, or rather cannot in any wise proceed from the principles of nature: but as it is above all nature, so it floweth from that sole principle which is above all nature, if not only, yet principally. Secondly, natural oftentimes is taken pro congenito, for that which is originally produced with any other thing, though it flow not in any wise from the principles of nature, or be not due thereunto; so no doubt but if an Angel were created with the light of glory, or beatifical vision of God's essence, both the light of glory and the vision of God should be in that sense natural, or rather connatural unto the Angel, because it was produced together with his natural substance or essence. And the same oftentimes is averred by the Fathers, of man, in regard of his original justice, in which he was created: for though this original justice did not flow from the principles of nature, yet nevertheless, because it was produced with nature by Almighty God, and infused into man's nature, as due unto it in that happy estate, therefore it is, and may well be termed natural, though in its own essence it was supernatural. Now by these two distinctions of things natural, we may evidently infer what is supernatural, namely that which is above both these kinds of acceptions, or distinctions of natural objects; that is, which neither floweth from the principles of nature, neither is any way due unto nature: as original justice was due unto us in Adam before our fall and corruption of nature. This distinction presupposed, the difficulty consisteth in this, whether the virtue of the tree of life for to preserve man from corruption, may be called natural, or rather is to be deemed supernatural? Strabo answereth, Strab● in Gen. Lignum vitae hanc naturaliter habuisse virtutem, that the tree of life had naturally this virtue, that he who did eat of that fruit should be endued with perpetual health, neither should be touched with any infirmity, weariness, or irksomeness, which are wont to be the companions of age. Hugo de Sancto Victore addeth, Lignum vitae habuisse in se naturam, ut perpetuaret homini vitam, si competentèr ederetur, that the tree of life had that virtue in it to perpetuate our life, if it were taken competently. For man (saith he) was made mortal and immortal: immortal because he could not die by reason of that immortal food: mortal, because he might have died by outward violence. But God had so inwardly fortified him by the tree of life, and outwardly by his divine power, that he could not die. Again, because he had shut up within him the gate of negligence by the vigilance of human reason, outwardly also the gate of violence by the divine protection, insomuch that unless man abusing his reason should open the gate of negligence, never any harm should enter into him by the gate of violence. But because he was not careful to keep the charge committed unto him, God therefore forsook the custody and care he had over him. S. Austin on the contrary side thinketh that the virtue of this tree of life was supernatural, for so he saith in his 8 book de Gen: ad literam cap. 5. That though that meat was corporal, yet was it of such virtue, and nature that it did confirm man in perfect health: not as other meats, but by an occult virtue, proceeding from above. And this he confirmeth by two examples, the first of Elias his cake, the second of the flower and oil of the widow of Sarepta, which without all question were effected by supernatural power. Beda likewise affirmeth, that therefore it was called the tree of life, because it hath received from the divine power, that whosoever should eat thereof should be confirmed in perpetual health. Neither ought we to marvel, Bonauen●ure 2. lib. sent. dist. 17 as Bonaventure well noteth, that a man might be disposed unto immortality by the fruit of this tree, seeing there be many other things, as Myrrh, and Balm, which do preserve from corruption for a long time: therefore as our Sacraments do not really concur unto grace; but the divine power which always is assistant unto them: so the fruit of that tree did not of his own nature produce immortality, but rather the divine power did communicate it by the eating of that fruit. Here we may see these so opposite opinions with their reasons and authorities, in which it may be free for every one to follow as he liketh, seeing there is nothing in this point plainly expressed in the Scripture; with me, both the authority of S. Austin and reason doth sway most for this latter opinion; because it seemeth not so probable, that a natural tree or fruit, should have of his own virtue and substance so supernatural a virtue, and quality, as to cause immortality. But to conclude, whether the virtue of this tree was natural or supernatural, all is one in regard of our loss, ingratitude, and sin; our loss of both lives spiritual and corporal, our ingratitude towards God, to us wards so infinitely good, our sin also being the same: seeing that though it had been only a natural virtue which was in that fruit of life, yet it deprived us not only of our own lives, but also of the author of life. What therefore remaineth, but that now being redeemed from this sin, and raised again from this death, we bless him perpetually, with all the powers of our souls, and all the days of our lives, who is the only giver of life, and sole redeemer of our souls. CHAP. XI. Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, to wit, whether it was a true and natural tree, like unto others. And why it was so called. NOthing can be so plainly set down in the holy scripture, but there will be some idle brain or other, who will so moralise, or so wrist it to a spiritual sense, though oftentimes without sense, that they will not stick to deny the truth of the history, as it happeneth here in the first point of our question, in which some have not feared that name before, but afterwards of the event: so that when God commanded our forefathers, that they should not eat of that tree, either he called it by some other name, or he demonstrated it unto them, as it were with his finger. Many other reasons do the Rabbins give, of the name of this tree, but so far from reason, that they be not worthy the repeating, I will only touch one as most fabulous, by which we may conjecture of the rest. They say that our first Parents were created as infants in sense, and reason, though men in body, strength, and stature. Now because this tree had a virtue of ripening man's judgement, wit, and discretion of good from evil; it was therefore called the tree of knowledge, of good and evil: because, to know good and evil, according to the Hebrew and scripture phrase is as much as to have the use of reason. But this is not only contrary to the text, but also to reason: for certain it is, that as man was created perfect in all the parts of his body; so was he no less in the powers of his soul. Yea how is it likely that he was without reason, who was created lord of all unreasonable creatures? who gave them their names proper to their natures, and was to govern all things according to their nature, by his own rule of reason: yea with whom God the author of nature and chief rule of reason, had made this covenant most conformable to reason: that if he lived according to the law of nature, and instinct of reason, his reward should be above all nature, and exceed the capacity of human reason: wherefore who was both culpable in this pact, and punishable for his transgression, must in all reason, have then had the use of reason. josephus in his first book of his Antiquities, perceiving well the absurdity of this opinion, fell into another, which Lyra deemeth not much less absurd: to wit, that this tree was therefore called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, because it had virtue to sharpen the wit, ripen the judgement, and to give prudence, and understanding to all human affairs. Lyra his refutation is this, because the fruit of that tree being corporal, how could it (saith he) have any spiritual effect? wherefore the mind, wit, and judgement of man being spiritual, how could they be helped by any corporal cause? For though the superior cause, and more perfect than his effect may have influence into the inferior and imperfect, yet never the inferior into the superior. Therefore though the spiritual causes be of such excellent perfection, that they have influence into our bodies: yet never any corporal creature (saith he) is so perfect, that it can inflow in the spiritual. For what is that which any corporal thing may produce in the spirit? not any thing corporal, seeing that all, that is in the spirit, is spiritual: neither again can it be spiritual, because nothing spiritual can be contained in the virtue of a material or corporal cause. It cannot be denied, but that this discourse of Lyra might have some force in those causes, which (as the Philosophers speak) do work directè & per se by themselves directly, yet in those, whose causaltie is altogether indirect, true philosophy teacheth the contrary. wherefore though it be most certain that the body cannot directly have any influence into the soul or spirit, yet because the spirit, whiles it is in this life dependeth in her operations of the body, and the dispositions thereof (according to the generally received philosophical axiom) the manner of the working followeth the manner of being, it must necessarily follow, that accordingly as the dispositions of the body are better or worse, so may the operations of the mind be also more or less perfect. Yea Aristotle teacheth us in his 7. book of his politics, that though those men, who are borne, and brought up in the Northern parts of the world, be stronger than others in corporal forces; yet that they be of a much more slow, and duller capacity: contrariwise, those who are borne in hotter climates of Africa, Spain, and Mauritania, and other more Southern parts of the world, though they be weaker in body, and more debil of complexion, yet that ordinarily they be more quick of apprehension, and more subtle in judgement, than the other of the Northern parts of the world be. Finally, that those who live neither in the extremity of heat, nor piercing cold, do commonly excel both the other. A fortiori therefore may the qualities, and dispositions of our food, especially that of the tree of good and evil, have had no small operation in the inward dispositions, and powers of our souls, for to make us of a more ripe judgement, and quicker apprehension. yea finally make us more apt to discern both good and evil, at least way in moral and civil matters, if not in supernatural, and things belonging unto grace, for so it was said of the Messiah, butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum & eligere bonum, Isa 7.15. butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good, the which though it be spoken more peradventure for the mystical meaning, then for the literal or material, yet no doubt but that the mystical sense hath some ground even in the material comparison of butter and honey. But because it seemeth not so probable, that God would hinder our spiritual good (such as this was, of the knowledge of good and evil) who hath made us perfect in all corporal powers, and perfections; therefore I deem most probable in this point either the opinion of Rupertus above alleged; Aug. lib. 14 de civit. Dei cap. 17. & lib. 8. de Gen. ad literam cap. 6. & 15. Lombardus cum scholasticis 2. lib. sen. dist. 17. or if that seem to have some inconvenience, then that of S. Austin may be rather followed, which now also is the common opinion of the schools, with the master of the sentences, to wit, that this tree was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, ab eventu, from the event, for that which presently followed in the eating thereof: which was, that Adam then knew by woeful experience the difference between good and evil. CHAP. XII. Of the creation of man. NOw all things being created, and this inferior world perfectly replenished, there wanted only one, who should be governor and lord over all other creatures, Gen. 1.26. 5.1. 9.6. 1. Cor. 11.7. Eph. 4.14. Col. 3.10. Faciamus therefore saith God hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram, 1. cap. Gen. 26. let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing, that creepeth upon the earth. But peradventure some may demand why man was created last of all creatures? seeing that he being the most perfect and model of the rest, he should consequently have been created as prototypon and first type of the rest, and therefore as he was the first in perfection, he should also have been first in his being and production. I answer, that even for the very same reason, he was created last, because in a certain manner he was the end and perfection of the rest: and thus beside other interpretations, this also may be admitted of the philosophical axiom, quod est primum in intention, est ultimum in executione: that which is first or chiefest in the intention, is last in the execution, or production. Secondly, man being to be lord of all the main Machina of this world, it belonged unto the divine providence, first to provide the habitation, and then to create him that was to inhabit. Or thirdly, because man had need of all these things, either for his corporal sustenance, or for his spiritual exercise. Or four, because it was convenient, first to create the great world, containing every thing in his due and distinct order; then afterwards to consummate, perfect, and as it were to crown the end of all his works, with one, who was to be the crown, end, and perfection of all corporal creatures, yea containing in a more perfect manner and degree, the perfection of all, whatsoever he had created before. Finally, having created both corporal, and spiritual things each separate, and distinct in their proper natures, it remained only to conjoin them both in one: insomuch that, as in all things, whatsoever is composed of matter & form, the parts have their being, prioritate naturae, by priority of nature (as the Philosophers say) before the conjoining of both together, because the parts are for the whole, and not the whole ordained for the parts. In like manner it was no less convenient, that man being composed of both corporal and spiritual substance, he should also be created after them both, as who was to be the secondary end of all other inferior creatures. CHAP. XIII. Of the manner of the creation of man.. THE manner of man's creation is described unto us in the aforesaid words. Gen. 1.16. Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. Now therefore it remaineth we explicate, what divine deliberation is this, what image is this, and in what likeness, and similitude of God, was man created. And first of the first. This word faciamus, let us make, may be taken in three senses, or significations: for first, it may signify, how the eternal wisdom of God, proceeding with a certain deliberation and counsel with himself, the most holy Trinity, did go about such an excellent work, as was the creation of man: to the end, that by that manner of proceeding, he might manifest the excellency of man, above all these inferior creatures, partaker of reason, beautified with prudence, perfect in wisdom, and created to his own image, and likeness. Secondly▪ God is said to use this manner of deliberation in the creation of man, to manifest the weight of the business, and worth of the work which he then intended; to show (I say) what a work it was to create man, with so great sanctity, grace, and felicity, to conserve him in the same, and being lost to restore him again. For God in his eternal wisdom, foreseeing the frailty of man, did likewise foresee the act of his fall, and finally that he would perish, he did likewise know before the difficulty in conserving, and restoring of man after his fall; and finally how to bring him to the end, for which he was created before his fall. Wherefore, if all these difficulties be duly considered in human reason, it might justly be doubted, according to our capacity, whether it were convenient, to create man, or no? wherefore the Scripture accommodating itself to human sense and capacity, doth describe unto us God the Father, as it were consulting with the Son and the holy Ghost, of the creation of man. Then how it was concluded in that divine Consistory, how it was most convenient to create such a creature, without which all the rest had been imperfect, and as a body without a head, a commonwealth without a ruler, or kingdom without a King, confsed, imperfect, without order or beauty. But seeing that to bring man to this final perfection and end, many things were necessary, each person of the blessed Trinity did assume to himself divers functions; the Father to create, because power and might doth especially appear in the Father; the Son did assume the reparation of man after his fall (a work of infinite wisdom) and therefore it is particularly ascribed to this person, and infinite wisdom: finally, the holy Ghost did particularly work man's sanctification, this therefore is likewise accommodated to this person, together with all spiritual graces and final glorification. Nevertheless these offices, operations, and works, are so attributed to the three holy persons, not that any one of them was effected alone by any one person, for whatsoever is wrought out of the sacred Trinity, in or by any creature whatsoever, is equally effected and wrought by all and every person of the blessed Trinity, but because something doth appear in every of these works, which doth especially manifest the Father, the Son, or the holy Ghost, the Father's power, the sons wisdom, the grace and sanctification of the holy Ghost, therefore these and other the like attributes are particularly applied and attributed to each person of the blessed Trinity. Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate & operibus ●ius. This is the ground of Rupertus his discourse, and reason why God created man to his likeness and image, why he changed his voice, and altered his manner of speaking: for whereas he said in the creation of other creatures, Fiat, & factum est; Let it be done, and it was done; now, as though he had been weary with going about the earth, compassing the seas, and measuring the amplitude of the heavens, he sat him down, and as it were taking his breath, he called to mind that there was one thing as yet wanting, which was no less necessary than fitting to be made; then said he, let us make man to our own image and likeness. Thus dost thou then think that a small matter, which was intended by these words? A great mystery without doubt it was, in that counsel of wisdom, in that counsel of such persons, the Father, the Son, and the holy Ghost. Canst thou judge that there was any thing wanting, any thing superfluous, either done or to be done in us, or about us, in that sacred Senate? There doubtless was all our cause considered, there our fall foreseen, there our death and perdition foreknown, and determined upon, to wit, that every person should undertake some part of the work, that as it is said before, the Father should create, the Son should redeem, and finally the holy Ghost should work the remission of sins, and the resurrection of the flesh. But what should be the reason why God deliberating about the creation of man, should say, Faciamus, let us make? To whom did he speak, speaking in the plural, let us make? Shall we say to the earth, as to a compart of man? or to the Angels, as the fellow-workers with God, as though God had need either of the cooperation of the Angels, or were so senseless, as thus to confer with that his creature void of all reason and sense? Ambrose in his seventh chapter of the sixth book of the Exameron, answereth, that God spoke not to himself, because he speaketh not in the singular, but in the plural, let us make, neither yet to the Angels, as who are but his servants; therefore though the jews and Arrians do never so much repugn, these words without all question are spoken to his Son, as who is the true and lively similitude and likeness of God the Father. And this I deem to be the truest opinion, seeing that the eternal Son of God, even as he is the Word and Son of God, is a lively and express similitude and likeness, not only of his eternal Father, but also a most perfect Idea and exemplar, according to which man was created. Others not improbably do interpret, that God therefore spoke in the plural, Faciamus, let us make, as Princes and great persons are wont to do, to show their authority and majesty, saying, We will, We command, We decree, etc. yet of the two I deem the first exposition to be best, and that the text may admit them both. CHAP. XIIII. How man was made to the image and likeness of God. FOr the understanding of this, Saints Pagnines in the sauro linguae Hebraae. we must note the original Hebrew words, Selem and Demuth; by Selem is properly signified a shadow or transitory similitude, Psalm 33. In imagine pertransit homo, man passeth away like unto a shadow. Likewise Psalm 101. My days have declined as a shadow. The other word Demuth signifieth to cut down, to fail, to fade, to be silent, to recogitate, and to expect; but most properly to assimilate or liken: wherefore seeing every similitude or likeness is transitory, vanishing, and quickly passing away, the same word doth also signify to vanish, to pass away, to fail, and to fade. Now therefore, when God said that man was made to his image and likeness, it was to give us to understand, that such was the likeness, and so perfect the representation, as could be between an inferior creature and his Creator: but because God is of infinite perfection, it must necessarily follow, that his similitude should be infinitely inferior and of less perfection than the prototypon or first type of his perfection. Like as though the shadow be in some sort the similitude and representation of the body, yet is it obscure, and imperfect, yea nothing in itself, and in comparison of the body nothing. Hence consequently we may infer a twofold interpretation of the said words, adimaginem & similitudinem nostram, to our image and likeness, to wit, of that image or similitude which is in God his divine nature, essence, being, or understanding: insomuch that the nature of God, and his Ideall representation of his understanding be the exemplar and first type, unto whose similitude man was made. Or again that ●his be the meaning of God's words, let us make man such a one as we are, or so like unto us, that he may be such an image, form, and similitude, as he may represent our nature, power, wisdom, and providence, yea and immortality in a body of its own nature mortal. For as S. Austin well noteth, Aug. li. 83. quaest. q. 51. divers things do diversly represent Almighty God: some do participate of virtue and wisdom, others only of life, others of existence and being, insomuch that those things which only have existence, and neither live, nor breath, are counted an imperfect similitude of God, because they are good according to their kind, and flow from that infinite Ocean of goodness, from whence all other goodness doth proceed. Again, those things which do live, and yet do not understand, do more perfectly participate the likeness of God: but those things last which do understand, do come so near unto the likeness of God, that nothing created can come more near. Wherefore seeing that man may participate of the wisdom of the divine nature, yea even according to hi● own nature, hence it is, that he is so framed to the image of God, that nothing can be more like in his being and nature unto God: he liveth, he breatheth, he understandeth, he hath existence and being, and is in all these, as a perfect pattern of his Creator and God. CHAP. XV. What is the difference between the image and the similitude of God, according to which man is said to be created. SAint Austin in his questions upon Deuteronomie thinketh it no less than blasphemy, to aver any thing to be superfluous in the sacred text: wherefore lest we be enforced to contradict this so received a principle, Orig. lib. 3. Peri●rchon, cap. 6. Basil. hom 6. in Gen. in hunc locum Ambros. li. 6. Exameron. c. 6. & 8 Nicenus homil. de create. hom. Eucher. li. 1. comen. in Gen. in hunc locum. Victorin. in dispit. quam scripsit adversus Arrium. Theodoret. in quaest in Gen. q. 20. Rupert. li. 2. de Trinitate & operibus eius, c. 3. et 5 Aquin. prima part quaest. 93. Magister scent. lib. 2. distinct 26. & ibidem Scholastici. and manifest truth, we are to search what difference is between the image and likeness of God, according to which man was created. Origenes, Basil, Nicenus, Eucherius, Victorinus, Theodoretus, Rupertus, Aquinas, the master of the sentences, with many others, both modern and ancient Writers, are of opinion, that man is said to be made to the image of God, according to his nature and properties consequent unto nature, as understanding, memory, and free will, which he exerciseth in his natural actions, and in which he exceedeth all other inferior creatures; the which image, though it may be, and is in some sort defaced by sin, yet is it in no wise fully lost and blotted out, because as it is wholly of God, so it dependeth only of God, and therefore can be taken away only by God himself; nay not even by God himself, man remaining a reasonable creature or man. For though he may have his senses and other spiritual powers depraved, yea though he may also be deprived of the exercise of them all, yet in no wise can they be utterly extinguished, man (as I said) remaining man. Now as touching the similitude of God according unto which man was created, we are to consider him, not according unto the natural gifts which are necessarily consequent unto nature, but according unto justice, sanctity, and innocency, and grace, which are gifts infused into nature, though above nature, the which as they are independent of nature, so also may they be and are separate from nature, according to the free disposition and order of God, the Author of nature: but this certainly is always for some sin, which in this sense may be said to be a depravation of nature, seeing it depriveth nature not only of these supernatural gifts, which are the chief ornaments and helps of nature, but also because it depraveth nature herself even in herself, and hindereth the due exercise of her natural powers. Rupertus in his second book of the Trinity, and second chapter, discourseth very acutely of this point, of the difference between the image and similitude, unto which man was created, giving also the reason why the word image is prefixed before the word similitude: in a word, his resolution is this, that the Son of God is signified by the word image, and the holy Ghost by the word similitude: for (saith he) the difference between similitude and image is this, that the image is in regard of one only, but a similitude is at least of two: now the eternal Son of the eternal Father is the image of God, according to that of the Apostle, 1. Coloss. who is the image of the invisible God. The Son (I say) is the image of the invisible God, equally invisible. For the understanding of which, we must presuppose that there be many kinds of images, as the image of man, of a horse, a picture in the wall, an image graven in stone or wood, yea we see even the images of the Sun and Moon in the water, yet we may not think that the Son of God is so to be called the image of God, but rather, as the Apostle writeth in another place, Heb. 2. the figure of his substance; because as every substance is known by his figure or shape, so God the Father by his word. Again, the image of man is said to be a property of his substance, in which sense the sacred text saith, that Adam begat his son to his image and likeness, Gen. 5. and called his name Seth. Hence we may understand how the eternal Son is the image of his eternal Father, and the holy Ghost the similitude and likeness of the Father and Son, seeing the goodness and love of the Father and Son is common to both Father, and Son. Hence it is, that it could not rightly be said in regard of the Son only, let us make man to our image and likeness; for as the Son is Son in regard only of the Father, not of the Father and the holy Ghost jointly, so also is he not the image of the Father and of the holy Ghost jointly, but of the Father only. But it is rightly said in regard of the holy Ghost, to our image and likeness, because as the holy Ghost is the infinite goodness of the Father and Son, so is he likewise the infinite similitude and likeness common to both Father and Son. But this not by the force of his particular proceeding, as is the Son. Others are of opinion, that this word ad imaginem, to our image, doth signify unto us the second person of the blessed Trinity, as he was to be incarnate, or to take our nature upon him. But if we mark the phrase of the sacred text, we shall easily find that the Son of God was incarnate rather according to the similitude of man, than that man was created according to his similitude, Rom. 8. Philip. 1. Heb. 2. Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia, and Oleaster upon the first of Genesis, are of opinion, that God therefore said, let us make man to our image and likeness, because when he created man, he took upon him the shape and form of man, to the end that he might the better converse with man. But this seemeth rather to be an invention of their own, then grounded in Scripture, because it is most probable (that which the Schoolmen do commonly hold with Dionysius) that all those apparitions, which we read in the old Testament, were not immediately of God, or by God himself, but by the mediation of Angels, who taking upon them airy or other apparent bodies, appeared unto men in the shape and form of men; but so nevertheless, that they so appearing and speaking, did always represent the majesty of their maker, repeating for the most part Gods own words, which he had immediately infused into their understanding. Again, if the aforesaid opinion of the assuming of our human nature is to be understood by a personal union between God and man, then questionless God hath been twice incarnate, and twice united to our human nature, which is contrary to the holy Scriptures. Or if there was no real union, or assumption of our human nature, but only a shade or similitude of the same, as we read that Angels have oftentimes assumed human bodies, how then was it truly said, let us make man to our image and likeness, seeing that similitude of human nature could not in any wise be the image of God? neither could it be truly said, that Adam was made to the image of God, if so be that we understand by the image of God not any true human nature, but the shade only and similitude of man's nature. Hence I conclude the first opinion to be the best, as which is most grounded in the sacred text, and most followed of the holy Fathers and other expositors. CHAP. XVI. Whether the woman be made to the image of God, or no. IT might seem rashness to doubt of this, if S. Paul did not give us some ground, denying (as some think) that woman was made to the image and likeness of God, averring her only to be the image of man, in that he contraposeth woman, as the glory of man, to man as the image and glory of God. His words be these: 1. Cor. 11. & 6. Man ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man; for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. The woman therefore is not the image and glory of God, but immediately only the glory of the man, otherwise there could be no difference in this, between the man and the woman, contrary to the inference which S. Paul maketh in the precedent verse. Nevertheless, even the text itself doth clearly confute this opinion: for after that it had been said, let us make man to our own image and likeness, presently it is added, he made them, both man and woman. Wherefore as man was made to the image of God, so likewise was the woman made to the same. Aug li. 12. de trinitate cap 7. S. Austin is very large in giving the reason of this conclusion; but briefly this is the answer: If we consider the principal reason, why man is said to be the image of God, to wit, as he is an intellectual creature, and as he is endued with the properties thereunto annexed; so is it evident, that this word image doth equally signify, and may be equally attributed both to man, and woman: seeing that they both participate of reason, and understanding, both be endued with an immortal soul, both partakers of free will, both capable of supernatural gifts, both of grace and glory. But again, if this word image be taken in a more large, and improper signification (as hath been already explicated) we may well say, that man was made to the image of God, & woman framed to the image of man. Because, as God is the end to whom man is immediately referred: so likewise man in some sort is in regard of the woman, because man is the head of the woman, by whom she ought to be directed unto God. This explication seemeth to be grounded in the aforesaid place of Paul, 1. to the Corin. 11. chap. for when he had said, that man was the image of God, and woman the glory of the man, he presently giveth the reason. ver. 8. For man (saith he) is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. ver. 9 for the man was not created for the woman's sake, but the woman for the man's sake. Nevertheless, if the similitude of God in man and woman be considered, not according to their natural gifts, but to the supernatural of grace and glory, then questionless it happeneth oftentimes, that some women are more adorned with these supernatural graces, and gifts, and consequently are more like unto God than many men. As we piously believe of the blessed Virgin, who as she was pronounced by the Angel of God to be blessed amongst all women, so no doubt, but she hath received an eternal blessing above all Angels and men, our Saviour only excepted both God and man. CHAP. XVII. Whether man be made to the image of God even according to his body and corporal proportion, shape, and lineaments; or doth in any wise represent the divine majesty. THE subject of this question is so certain of itself, and without all controversy, that for the resolution thereof, we have more need of the subtlety of distinction, then of any profound divinity, or learning. For seeing that the divine majesty is a most pure spirit, as infinite in essence, as in all and every of his divine attributes infinite, how is it possible that there should be any comparison, similitude, or likeness with him, in that, which is altogether corporal, limited, and most base, such as is our human natute according to the body. Nevertheless seeing the body doth in some sort represent the soul, like as the soul also is the image of God; hence peradventure it may be inferred, that the body may in some sort be said to be a representation or similitude of God; in as much as the body (if we consider it in his full perfection) is an immediate glass, similitude, or representation of the soul, the which most perfectly representeth Almighty God. Wherefore though in regard of our corporal substance, considered immediately in itself, without any relation unto the soul, we be no better than bruit beasts: yet if we consider it, in regard of our soul, and as it is the receptacle of the most excellent image of God, it may after a remote manner, and mediately be said to represent even God himself. Wherefore S. Austin propounding this question, August. lib. 6. de Gen. ad literam cap. 12. in what doth a man exceed the brute beasts, seeing they are both made of earth? he answereth, in nothing, but because he is made to the image of God, not in body, or corporal substance, but according to his soul, and spiritual powers. Though true it is also, that he hath even in his body, a certain property, which doth in some sort demonstrate the rectitude of his soul; as that he is made upright, to the end, that he might understand how he ought not to abase himself to the terrene, vile, and base trash of the world, like unto the bruit beasts, and other most base creatures, who as they are framed prone, and have their bodies inclined towards the earth, can never erect themselves to any spiritual, or heavenly thing. Hence Bernard well noteth, that God made man upright in stature, and erected towards heaven, to the end that his corporal rectitude and uprightness of his shape, might stir him up to preserve the spiritual rectitude, and righteousness of the inward man, who was made to the image of God; and that the beauty of our corporal substance, and outward proportion, and right disposition of the lineaments of our body might correct the inward deformity of our souls, and the powers thereof. For what can be more ugly, deformed, and abominable in the eye of that allseeing God, than a sinful, and defiled soul in a beautiful body? Is it not a shameful, and detestable thing, that an earthly and corrupt vessel, such as the body is, should contemplate the heavens, view the Planets, and be delighted with the aspect of the incorruptible spheres, and motions of the stars; and that on the contrary side, the spiritual and celestial creature, far more perfect, than all the celestial globes, and heavens, the soul (I mean) of man, should always have her eyes, that is her inward powers, and affections debased, and cast down to the terrene trash, and basest creatures of this world. Consider therefore (o man) thy dignity of nature, the perfection of thy powers, thy privileges of grace, the immortality of thy soul, the excellency of thy creation, the nothing of thyself, and lastly the infinite price of thy redemption, by the most precious blood and death of the Lamb, thy Creator, and Redeemer, and let not this so base, and transitory trash of this world, so alienate thy mind, and bewitch thy understanding, that thou prefer the filthy and base pleasures of the body, before the spiritual and eternal of thy spiritual and immortal soul. CHAP. XVIII. Whether the image of God may be wholly lost, and blotted out of the soul of man. ORigenes, Epiphanius ep. ad johannem Hierosel: Aug: lib. 2. contra Adamantiam Manich. & l. 83. quaest. q. 66. & lib. 6. de Gen. ad literam. cap. 27.28. and S. Austin do seem to affirm that man lost the image of God, Epiphanius, and divers other of the Fathers do peremptorily deny it out of Gen: the Psalms, and S. Paul: but I think this controversy rather to arise, by reason of the divers understanding of the image of God, which is in man, then of any true difference in their opinions; for who can doubt, but if we consider man according to the supernatural gifts first infused into the soul of Adam, but that he lost the divine similitude or likeness of God, and that wholly, nothing remaining but only the deformity of sin, Gen. c 9 Psal. 38. 1. ad Cor. cap. 11. in the deformed, and sinful soul; but if we consider him again according to the natural substance of the soul, and her natural faculties consequent thereunto, it is equally indubitable, that she retained this likeness of God, though not in the same perfection, which she possessed before, but rather much defaced, blemished, and deformed. My reason is, because there proceeded a more excellent beauty, and perfection unto this natural substance, by reason of the supernatural quality of original justice; and consequently the deprivation of this supernatural gift, which was also a sufficient cause of nature's greater perfection, and more admirable beauty, was a deprivation and defacing of the said beauty of nature, which otherwise had been a perfect type, and portraiture of the divine nature, and being. CHAP. XIX. Why God made man to his image, and similitude. MAny and most excellent reasons may be given of this, but which I must needs confess, are rather moral congruencies, grounded in the infinite goodness of God, then in any other forcible convincing reason, plainly deduced out of the sacred Text. The first whereof may be this, that God therefore made man like unto himself, that thence it might be manifest how much the infinite goodness of God exceedeth the malignity, envy, and malice of man: for God being infinite in his goodness, yea in all other his attributes infinite; yet doth he not disdain our of his infinite goodness, that, that, which in us is limited and finite should be compared and likened to that, which in him is infinite, and beyond all comparison: he envieth not the perfection of our nature, he maketh it more perfect by grace, and by a sacred league, and union, he combineth both, that by both we may be like unto him in both, who is the author of both. And this with such a degree of participated perfection, that man doth not only become like unto God, but also may be called, and is truly the adopted Son of God. So that all men may now participate of the grace, which one only possessed by nature: insomuch that as he being the natural Son of God, is a perfect pattern of his eternal Father by nature, so we also be a participated likeness, and similitude in some degree by nature, but most perfectly by grace. The second reason may be this (if so be that we may compare these inferior things of this world to those supreme, and infinite of God) like as a temporal Prince (having for to show his power, magnificence, and majesty) built, furnished, beautified, adorned, and decked some excellent City, in which he himself doth mean to remain, doth there erect, in some principal part thereof his own image, or statue, in some precious porphire, marble, or other more excellent matter: even so Almighty God, having out of his infinite wisdom made this main Machina, and beautiful City of the world, for the manifestation of his glory, to the end that it might be known, and acknowledged, who was the only author and architect of all, he was pleased to place in the midst thereof, in the garden of paradise his own image, and similitude, man (I mean) who by his soul, and the three principal powers thereof should represent the unity and trinity of his maker: yea and by his outward shape and form in some sort likewise represent the inward, and consequently, though not immediately, even God himself. Insomuch that, as it is said of the portraiture of Venus painted by Apelles, that none could perfect it, but only Apelles who first began it: so likewise was it not possible that any should bring our soul to her first perfection, but only God, who was her first Creator. Hence it is that like as he, who defaceth the image or statue of an earthly Prince, is justly condemned of high treason; so, a fortiori, who depraveth his own nature, and by offending his maker depriveth it of grace, (the which is the seal, sign, and similitude of the divine power, nature, and majesty) is worthily condemned of high treason against the same power, and majesty. The third motive, why God created man to his image and similitude, may be this, to the end that all corporal things might be subject, and each after their manner serviceable to man, as who of all other creatures, was the express similitude of their lord and maker, unto which it seemeth that God did allude, when he said unto Noah, the fear of you and the dread of you shall be over every beast of the earth, Gen: cap. 9 ver. 2. and over every fowl in the heaven, and upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes in the sea, etc. And lest those incorruptible creatures, the heavens, the planets, the stars, yea most of all the Angelical powers, Cherubins or Seraphins should disdain the service of man, or lest any other creature should rebel against him, who as yet had not rebelled against his God: or finally, lest the devils should of envy dare against him, as who with his posterity was to replenish those glorious thrones, from which those wicked spirits fell, it pleased therefore the divine majesty to beautify, adorn, and fortify man, with his own likeness and similitude. So that as it is said of Cain, Gen. 4. vers. 15. the Lord set a mark upon Cain, lest any man finding him should kill him, so of the contrary side, it pleased our Creator, to impress his similitude, and likeness, not only in our first father, but also in every man, lest any man finding any other man, in whatsoever offence, not having the authority, more than of man, should lay his hands upon any other man. Not (I say) having the authority more than of man, such as I deem to be in lawful Magistrates, and such as are deputed by them for the execution of justice. Because this is not only by the instinct of nature, but also proceedeth from the author of nature, and is lastly confirmed by the giver of grace. Insomuch that he himself doth say to all his lawful ministers of justice, and governors as well spiritual, as temporal, Luk. 10. ver. 16. who heareth you, heareth me, who despiseth you, despiseth me. Because as it is one and the same law, so likewise the contempt of the law is one, and the same; and consequently the punishment answerable thereunto must be one, and the same: But this not only as the law is only from man, but as it participateth of the law of God, man being the immediate lawgiver, God's law, and eternal wisdom being the first fountain and rule, from whence all human laws are not only derived, but also firmly established, and to be conformed: for otherwise they be no laws, but tyrannies or deprivation of laws, but as they be conformable to that divine, and eternal law. The fourth reason, or motive that moved God Almighty to make man to his image, was, because he having created all these inferior creatures, and subjecteth them to the rule, use, and government of man, as to the most noble creature: so also he was pleased to ordain him to a most noble end, the enjoying of his Maker, that so man might be a mean to reduce other inferior creatures, to their Creator, and end. Wherefore to the end that this excellent union of man with his Maker, might appear more manifestly, he imprinted in him, his divine image, with so lively and firmly an impressed similitude, and character, that while man should remain in his own being, so long likewise, should he remain, the type and image of the divine nature and being. As it is said of the famous Phydias, that he did, with such rare Art and cunning, engrave his own image in Minerva's shield, that while the shield remained entire, his image likewise must remain entire and undefaced. Another reason of the impression of this most excellent & beautiful image of God, in man, may be, that man should be incited and moved thereby, to the knowledge, and love of his Creator. Wherefore as by the contemplation of other more imperfect creatures, he is brought in some sort to the knowledge of God; so with much more perfection by the knowledge of himself. Hence it is, that to the end, that he might be inexcusable, and not overcharged, in the curious searching of God in external things, it pleased his Creator, to imprint in his soul, a most beautiful image, and clear similitude of the divine nature and being, the which should be a more perfect representation unto him, of the divine properties, than he should find in all other inferior creatures. Man therefore, reflecting upon himself, and viewing his own nature, may ascend unto God, and perfectly view the divine nature: Seeing the image, he may also the prototypon: seeing himself, he may ascend by contemplation unto God: for seeing his own soul, he ought to conceive it as the image of God; and whatsoever perfection or shade of perfection he findeth in himself, that doubtless he ought and may conceive to be in God, though in a more infinite degree of perfection. The soul understandeth, God infinitely more; the soul freely disposeth, willeth, and determineth, much more God: the soul is capable of the divine virtue, wisdom and grace, God is even virtue, wisdom and grace itself, yea that infinite ocean of graces and gifts, from whence all other graces and gifts do proceed: according to that of james chap. 1. vers. 17. Every good giving and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights. CHAP. XX. Whether the dominion over all other living creatures was given unto man, and what manner of power that was. AS nothing doth more declare the love of God towards man in this life, then that he made him Lord and ruler over all his creatures: so nothing doth more declare the excellency of man's nature, especially in the estate of his innocency, then that he had power and dominion over all creatures, the which as they were made for his service, so were they always ready at his beck in due obedience. No Lion so terrible, no Elephant so mighty, no Tiger so fierce, no Fowl so ravening, no Whale so monstrous, no not any creature so indomite, but that it was subject unto man's dominion, while man was subject to his, Lord and Maker. So God commanded, nature obeyed, (though now in some sort that be contrary to nature) yea, all creatures did concur unto this subjection, while man was subject unto his Creator, who clothed him (as the Preacher speaketh) with strength, and made him according to his own image: yea made all flesh to fear him, so that he had dominion over the beasts and fowls. Or as the Psalmist speaketh, Psal 8. v. 5. 6. 7. he made him a little lower than himself, crowned him with glory, and made him to have dominion over the works of his hands: and finally put all things under man's feet: all sheep and oxen, yea and the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fish of the sea, and over all things which pass thorough the paths of the seas. And hence it was, that Adam as Lord of all gave names unto all creatures, and Eve though by nature timorous and fearful, was not in any wise daunted at the presence and speech of the Serpent. So that as we partly find as yet by experience, and was much more in that happy state of Paradise, all creatures should have been subject to man, while man was not disobedient to God: yea as all inferior creatures are subject to their superior, according to their nature, order, perfection, and God's decree, the imperfect to the more perfect, the matter for the forms, the corporal for the spiritual, the accidents for the substances, the elements for the mixts, yea even the heavens, stars, and planets for man, man only for God, as subject only to God, while he did not infringe this sacred order and chain, where by him all things were to be reduced and linked to God. Furthermore, this power and dominion of man over all other living creatures, proceeding from the excellency of his nature, did remain in him even after his sin, though not in the same act, or actual exercise of his power and dominion. For albeit whatsoever was due unto nature, was blemished, defaced, and corrupted by sin; yet nothing substantially belonging unto nature, or necessarily consequent unto the same, was wholly taken away. Wherefore this divine image of God being engraven in man's nature, man's nature remaining after sin, the same image of God must needs remain, at least way as much as was due unto nature, or not above the sphere of nature; and consequently the aforesaid dominion must also continue, as having his beginning from this image: it must (I say) continue (as the Philosopher speaketh) non actu, sed potentia, not always according to the exercise of the act in all particulars, but according to the extent of the power in general, as may be manifestly proved out of the 9 of Genesis: Gen. 9 v. 2. The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the heaven, upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; unto your hand are they delivered. Thus God said to Noah after the general deluge, and consequently this dominion over all creatures doth remain even after sin. CHAP. XXI. Whether in the state of innocency one man should have been subject to another, or rather all of equal dominion, power, and authority. SAint Augustine answereth, that seeing God had made man a reasonable creature, Aug. lib. de Ciu. c. 15. he would not have him to domineer, but only over the unreasonable. So that man should not have had power over man, but only over beasts, & other unreasonable creatures. Hence it was, that our first Fathers and Patriarches of the world were rather keepers of sheep, and feeders of oxen, than governors of men; that thence we might understand, both what the right order of creatures did require, and what followed the disorder of man, and desert of sin: seeing base bondage, vile slavery, and ignominious subjection proceedeth of sin, as rooted in sin not springing from nature. Wherefore before the just Noah revenged the sin, of his son, we never read in the Scripture the names of bondage, servitude, or slavish subjection, which therefore must necessarily be rather the desert of sin then the effect of nature. Yea this may be confirmed, in that God giving power unto man over all inferior creatures, he maketh no mention of the power of man over man, because all men were equally made to the image of God, as likewise because in that estate all were equally to be borne both in perfection of nature, and adorned with grace, and consequently all were to be equal in power and dominion, as consequent to the perfection of nature and height of grace, seeing this is equally grounded in nature, and with no less equality was to be confirmed by grace. Now as it cannot be denied, but that this opinion of S. Augustine hath some probable reasons; yet I deem the contrary to be much more probable: to wit, that though there should have been no such dominion in Paradise, as which should then have been burdensome unto nature, and is now necessarily following our lapse and fall: yet questionless there should have been a kind of order, subjection and subordination, of children, inferiors, and subjects, to their parents, superiors, and political governors: not by way of an imperious command and absolute authority, but by a voluntary and sweet subjection flowing from nature, and confirmed by grace. My reason is this, for as all should not have been equal in the gifts of nature, wisdom, knowledge, skill, magnanimity, and prudence; neither could they have been all equally apt for political government: such as I suppose should have been in that most perfect place of Paradise, though in most perfect manner. Neither may it be thought contrary to the happiness of that estate of Paradise, that man should have some kind of subjection or subordination to man, seeing we must necessarily admit the like in the blessed spirits and holy Angels: who as they are distinct in nature, individual, and specifical perfections; so are they no less in their subordination, offices, and degrees. So Jerome saith, if there be principalities, powers and virtues, it is necessary that they have some subject unto them; who fearing and serving them, are confirmed with their virtue and valour: which distribution of offices are not only in this wicked world, but also are to be in the world to come. A fortiori then, there might have been the like subordination and order of government amongst men even in the state of innocency. So that as we find in Daniel and Zacharias, Daniel 8. Zachar. 2 that one Angel doth command another, notwithstanding the perfect blessedness of both: so likewise it seemeth most certain, that there might have been the like subordination amongst men, the like command and power over others, though we had all remained in that pleasant place of Paradise. The wife should have been subject to her husband, the children to their parents, the youth to their elders, and finally all inferiors to their superiors. But how then (may some say) was the subjection of the wife unto her husband inflicted as a punishment due unto her sin, according unto the sentence of God, Genes. 4. vers. 16. thy desire shall be subject to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee? How could this be inflicted for sin, if so be it was consequent to nature? I answer briefly, that there is a twofold subjection of the wife to her husband; the one voluntary, the other involuntary; the one of nature, the other of sin; the one burdensome, the other grateful; the one confirmed by grace, the other repugnant to nature: finally the one nothing repugnant to the state of innocency, the other inflicted for original sin. For certainly, though Eve had not fallen, and transgressed the commandment of God by tasting the forbidden fruit; yet because she was the weaker vessel, therefore even her own nature would have required subjection unto her husband; subjection (I mean) voluntary, not constrained; natural, not forced; yea free, and without any contradiction, which now even the best of eves descendants do sometimes experiment in regard of their husbands, so that though the one subjection be a property of nature, yet the other is a punishment of sin, signified by these words, and he shall rule over thee. CHAP. XXII. Whether the Angels did concur to the production of man, or no? THis doubt may be understood of the several parts of man, the body or the soul: first therefore as touching the soul, which as it was altogether of nothing, so it was not possible that it should be brought out of that nothing, but by the immediate power and particular concourse of the Almighty: for as S. Austin saith lib. 9 de Gen. ad lit. cap. 15. as it is impossible for any Angel or creature to create itself, so is it no less that any other thing should be produced of nothing, but by him only which is above all things. Wherefore the doubt only is, whether the Angels did in some sort concur to the creation of the body of man, seeing that (as S. Austin saith in his 8. book de Gen. ad lit. cap. 24.) all material and corporal creatures are subject to the Angelical powers: seeing also that their ordinary apparitions unto men are by corporal shapes and forms, which they assume unto themselves, it may seem not improbable, that in like manner they may frame and depute unto every soul her material substance, and corporal shape, yea and unite the matter and form together, and consequently that they may in some sense be said to create man. Nevertheless, though I cannot deny, but that the Angels might in some sort concur unto the disposition of the material substance of man, and thereby instrumentally to the introducing of the form; yet they may not in any wise be said to have created either matter or form, seeing both were immediately from Almighty God, as which were both produced of nothing. Aug lib. 9 de Gen. ad lib. cap. 15. So (as S. Austin most fitly compareth) though the husbandman do dig, plough, plant, manure and till the ground; and the Physician by his medicines, potions and physic doth prolong the life: yet nevertheless neither of them may be said to create: even so though the Angels might in some sort dispose to the creation or generation of man, yet may they not absolutely be said to create, because this is a production of nothing presupposed, which only belongeth to an infinite power. CHAP. XXIII. Whether Adam was created in his perfect corporal stature and age. SAint Austin answereth, Aug. lib. 6. de Gen. ad lib. cap. 13. that as it was proper only to Adam, not to be borne of parents, but framed immediately of the earth; so also was it peculiar unto him alone, that he was created in perfect age. Neither may this kind of production (saith the master of the sentences) be said to be against nature, Magist. scent lib. 2. distinct. 17. unless it be in regard of us, to whom it may seem to be beyond nature; for whatsoever God worketh, that in regard of God may be counted nature: yea this seemeth to have some ground in the sacred text, seeing that God having newly created our first Fathers, he presently commanded them to increase and multiply: wherefore as he created other things perfect, Gen. 1. ver. 22. & 24. and apt for to multiply each one in their several kinds; so also did he create our first parents in the like perfection both of stature and age, (as some say) as between 30. and 40. years of age, or (as others do assign) about 50. Now as concerning the dimension or greatness of his body, though some aver that he was the greatest of all men and Giants that ever were, deducing it out of the 14. of joshua, joshua 14. Numb. 13. and the 13. of the Numbers; nevertheless this seemeth altogether unprobable: if those places be understood of Adam, they are rather to be interpreted so, that he was the greatest of all men, not in quantity, but in qualities; not in dimension of body, but in beauty both of body and soul; not in corporal extension, but in dignity, prerogatives, and all other excellencies, both corporal and spiritual; because otherwise he might rather seem a monster in regard of us, than a man. My opinion therefore in this point is, that as he was created perfect in all other respects; so likewise in this of perfect corporal stature, greatness, and all other dimensions; and consequently that he was created of the best stature, and proportion of all lineaments and members of his body, that ever man was, or shall be, our Saviour only excepted. CHAP. XXIIII. Whether the soul and the body were created in the same instant, or no. Chrysost. in Gen. hom. 12. & 13. Eugub. in Cosmopaeia, & in Pentateu hum. Castro lib. 2. contra haereticos, ubi disputat de anima. Ferus in cap 2. Gen. Tostat. ibid. sicut & Genadius ibid. CHrysostome, Eugubinus, Alphonsus de Castro, Ferus and Genadius deny, that the soul and the body were created in one and the same instant: yea this opinion seemeth to be grounded in the word of God, Gen. 2. vers. 7. where Moses saith, that the Lord God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, and the man was a living soul. Wherefore man (as these Doctors say) was first made according to his material part, afterward this matter was disposed by God by the contemperating of convenient qualities; and lastly, after all this, was the soul infused, and united to the body thus disposed. Gregorius Nicenus, Damascenus, Aquinas, and S. Austin are of the contrary opinion, to wit, that the soul of man was made and infused into the body in the very same instant and indivisible point of time, in which the body was created by God. Aquinas his reason is this, because such is the nature of parts, that while they are separate the one from the other, they are reputed to be in an imperfect estate: for why, the part being ordained for the whole, it cannot in any wise obtain its due perfection, while it is a part from the whole: wherefore seeing all things were created in their perfect estate, in their first production: it is not likely, that either the soul was created without the body, or the body produced separate from the soul, as powerful (I mean) and in potentia proxima (as the Philosophers speak) fully disposed for the receiving of the soul. CHAP. XXV. Whether the immortality of the soul may be demonstrated out of the Scriptures, or no. EVsebius writeth of certain Arabians, who held, that though the souls of men should revive in the general resurrection unto immortality, yet that now at the separation of the body, and soul, the soul perisheth with the body. Yea Tertullian also (as S. Austin writeth) doth seem to hold no less. Augustin. de haer. nu: 86. Nevertheless, the contrary is most certainly deduced, out of those places of Scripture, which do signify that man was made to the image, and likeness of God. First, in his infinite capacity of mind, and will, which are satisfied by no created object. Secondly, in the liberty, which he hath unto whatsoever particular good. Thirdly, in his natural propension unto eternity, and immortality, Plato in Alcib. & in Phaedone. Porph. l. 1. ad Boet. vide Euseb. lib. 11. de praepar: evangelica. the which even Plato and Porphirius thought to be sufficient arguments of the soul's immortality. Yea the immortality of the soul is evidently proved, in that as Moses saith, God constituted man supreme Lord over all inferior creatures, yea in that he breathed into him a reasonable soul with full liberty over all his natural actions, according unto that of the fourth of Genesis, the 7. verse, where GOD saith thus unto Cain, that his desire shall be subject unto him, and he shall rule over it, but more particularly this is demonstrated out of the third of Exodus; where God saith unto Moses, that he is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of jacob, and this not of the dead, but of the living, as our Saviour added in the gospel. Finally, this may be deduced out of Deuteron: 4, where it is said, that God made the Sun, the Moon, the stars, and the planets for the service of man, as for a more perfect creature, and consequently participating a more perfect immortality, then is the incorruption of those eternal globes, and stars. CHAP. XXVI. Whether the soul of Adam was immortal by its own nature, or only by grace. SOphronius, Jerome, Sophronius in his 11. ep. in the 6. Synod. Hierom. l. 2. con●● Pae. lag. Damas'. l. 2. de fide orthod. c. 3. & 12. and Damascene are of opinion that the Angels and human souls are not immortal of their own nature, but only by God's grace. To this also S. Paul in his first Epistle to Timothy, and his last chapter may seem to incline, where he saith, that God only hath immortality. Plato plainly insinuateth the same of Angels, much more than of human spirits. Nevertheless it is most certain, that man's soul is immortal even of its own nature, for which reason our Saviour commandeth us Math: 10. not to fear them that kill the body, Math. 10. ver. 28. but are not able to kill the soul. Wherefore as the body is mortal, and corruptible, it followeth by the antithesis, that the soul is immortal, and incorruptible. Again this is most plain out of divers other places of scripture, Psalm 29, & 16. Ecclesiasticus 12, and the 9 Matth. 10. 2. Sam. 23. & 32. Phil. 1.23. 1. Pet. 3. & 19 Apoc. 9.6. & 7.9. CHAP. XXVII. That Adam was not created in Paradise, and why not, and by what means was he placed there after his creation. AS touching the first point, that he was not created in Paradise, it is manifest, that though the woman was created in paradise, yet the man was not, for so it is said of him. Gen: 2. the 15. verse. Then the Lord took the man, and put him in the garden of Eden, that he might dress it, and keep it, therefore he was not there before, at his first creation, though Eve was; for so it was convenient, that she should be produced of Adam in his most perfect state, and being, according to both body, soul, and habitation, which is the opinion of Basil, Aquinas, Basil. homil. de paradyso. Aquinas 1. part q. 102 ar. 4 & plures in 2. sententiarum distinct. 18. and the most of the ancient Divines against Tertullian, josephus, and Rupertus. As touching the second point, that God took man, and put him into the garden of Eden. This may be understood three ways; first by inward inspiration, by which God might show him, that it was his pleasure, that he should have that for his habitation, in which sense many understand that of Math. 4. that our Saviour was carried of the spirit into the wilderness, to wit, by the inward inspiration of the Holy Ghost, though he went also voluntarily of himself. Secondly, we may understand it, that he was carried by the spirit of God, or rather conveyed by the immediate power of the Almighty, as we read of Henoch, Habacuck, and Philip. Or lastly, that he was transported by some Angel, in the shape and form of man, who showing him the way, did lead him into paradise, as we read of the Angel Raphael, how he lead Tobias, and to this last I incline the rather, because it is the opinion of S. Austin. But now it may be demanded, why God would not create man in paradise? the reason may be, to the end that he might more manifestly understand his goodness, and liberality towards him, and that, that place was rather given unto him of mere grace, than any wise due by nature. But why then (may some say) were the Angels created in heaven, yea all other living creatures created each in their own place? I answer, that neither the purity of the empyreal heaven, did exceed the Angelical purity, neither the grossness of this inferior globe of the earth, did exceed the nature of corporal creatures there living, and therefore these two places were most apt for the creation and habitation of Angels, and these inferior creatures. But such was the perfection of paradise, that it was in no wise to be deemed a convenient place for human habitation, man's nature (I mean) only considered, not the grace, and bounty of God thereby manifested. CHAP. XXVIII. To what end was Adam placed in Paradise. Moyses' answereth, Gen: 2. ver: 15. that the Lord took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, that he might dress it, and keep it; or as the vulgar hath, that he might work in it, to give us to understand how much God abhorreth idleness, seeing that even in that place, where there was no need of labour, God would not have man idle: not an ill item for our lazy gallants, who think their gentility to consist in idleness, and a point of honour to live of other men's labour: but even in this (I am of opinion) that God doth punish them, that they have more griefs, and more discontent in their idle pleasures, than others in their most wearisome toils, and labours, which though it be a most voluntary bondage, yet is it likewise the most base, and cruel slavery to the base appetites; a tyranny of Satan, a double bondage to a double tyrant, to Satan, to sin; for as S. Paul saith, who committeth sin, is the slave to sin; so who subjecteth himself to the suggestions of Satan is a slave to Satan; an intolerable slavery, and an infinite misery; the beginning miserable, the proceed damnable, the end, as which hath no end, intolerable. Now therefore lest Adam or his posterity should by alluring idleness, come to this endless pain; God of his mercy placed Adam in paradise, ut operaretur, & custodiret illum, that he might work and keep it, to wit, that he working might keep paradise, and paradise by the same work might keep him from idleness, from sin: because that is the ordinary cause of sin, for as it is true, that which the Poet saith, that labour blunteth the arrows of Cupid, so doth it no less other darts of the devil. But hence peradventure some patron of idleness may infer, that labour was contrary to that blessed state of Paradise, as which required all quiet, rest, and content; no, rather I say that it was consequent, or necessarily pertaining to that blessed state, seeing that labour was not any toil, or pain, but rather a pleasure, and a voluntary effect of his well disposed mind, as it is now likewise to men not so ill affected, quorum otium, as Seneca said, maximum negotium, so as S. Austin saith l. 8. de Gen: ad lit: cap. 8. non esset laboris afflictio, sed voluntatis exhilaratio, cùm ea, quae Deus creaverat humani generis adiutorium, laetius seraciúque provenirent, that it should not be a toil or affliction of the body, but a recreation, and rejoicing of the will and mind. CHAP. XXIX. Whether the precept of not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, was given aswell to Eve, as to Adam, and how that was. THe difficulty of this question proceedeth of the divers readings of the precept, because some with Greg. l. 35. moral. cap. 10. do read it according to the Greek in the plural; the Hebrew, & Caldaean, with the vulgar Latin, and English are in the singular. Gen. 21.16. and the Lord God commanded the man, saying, thou shalt eat freely of every tree of the garden, but of the tree of knowledge of good & evil, thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death. Whereby we see that this commandment was directed to the man only, not to the woman, seeing she as yet was not created, as is apparent out of the 18 verse, the 21, 22, & 23, where the creation of Eve is described. Nevertheless it is manifest that the same commandment was extended to Eve also, for so she answered the serpent according to the vulgar edition, de ligno quod est in medio paradysi, praecepit nobis deus ne comederemus, but of the tree, which is in the midst of Paradise, God commanded us, we should not eat; wherefore though this precept was principally given to Adam, yet was it also to be observed of Eve, for as they were conjoined in nature, so were they not to be separated in regard of their precept and grace. But why then (may some say) was the name only of Adam expressed? I answer with Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate, & operibus eius c. 32. because the precept was principally given unto him, as upon whose obedience or breach, his, and his posterities happiness did solely depend, not upon eves. CHAP. XXX. Why God commanded Adam that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. TErtullian, in the beginning of his book against the jews, saith, that this commandment was given to Adam, as the first principal foundation and ground from whence all other laws were derived, and in which all the ten Commandments be virtually included: so that as Adam was the first beginning of mankind, so this was the first ground of all other laws. But though this cannot be rejected, as an improbable speculation, yet certainly it is not so firmly grounded in the sacred text, as Tertullian imagined. The reasons therefore in my opinion why God so strictly prohibited the eating of the aforesaid fruit, was, first, that thereby, as God had declared unto us, his power over us: so we should show our obedience towards him: not that (as S. Austin noteth) God hath need of our service; Augustin. l. 8. de Gen. ad literam cap. 11. but that we have need of his power, protection, rule, and dominion over us; according to that of the Psalmist, who speaking in the person of God, saith, constitue super eos legislatorem, ut sciant gentes quoniam homines sunt, Constitute a ruler over them, (as the vulgar translateth) that the heathen may know that they are but men: so that as it is a token of vassalage, and subjection to receive laws, so is it of power, dominion, and authority to command, constitute, ordain, and set down laws to be observed. Yea secondly, God gave this law unto man, that thereby he might exercise his obedience towards God, a virtue as necessary to man, as acceptable in the sight of God, Aug. lib. 8. de Gen ad literam cap. 8. and therefore (as S. Austin well noteth) God gave not this law in any object of itself otherwise evil, or of its own nature good: to the end that the virtue of his obedience might be the more illustrious; because it deriveth not his excellency, from the material object, but from the formal, the sole subjection to Almighty God. It may seem peradventure not improbable to some, that the law of nature, which God had infused into the nature of man, might have sufficed to lay open, try, and manifest man's obedience towards God: to what end then should the second law of abstaining from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil be added, as a second trial of that which otherwise might sufficiently be manifest by the law of nature, and obedience thereunto? I answer, that the law of nature would not have been a sufficient trial of Adam's obedience: because it is not altogether manifest by the law of nature, that God is sole and supreme Lord over all mankind: for some do imagine that the law of nature is a property only due unto a reasonable creature, as every species, or kind of living creatures hath their particular property agreeing to their nature. Again some are of opinion, that those things which are contained in the law of nature, are to be embraced, or rejected in as much as they agree, or disagree with natural reason: not as they are commanded, or forbidden by God, as supernatural agent. So that although it be prescribed by God unto all men, yet doth it not sufficiently manifest his most ample & absolute power over all mankind: seeing that by this law there is not any thing commanded, or forbidden, but only that which is according to human reason, either good, or evil, of its own nature. Wherefore Gods absolute dominion, and extent of his divine power, were not sufficiently known only by this law of nature, but only as it is agreeable to the instinct of nature: the which as it was but only in things within the sphere of nature, could not possible show the extent of the absolute power of God in things both with in the compass of nature, and above nature. Hence Gregory well noteth, Lib. 33 moralium cap. 10. that the forbidden fruit was not evil of its own nature, but was forbidden, to the end, that man being created upright by nature, might increase in righteousness by the subjection of his nature, and perfection of his obedience to the author of nature. CHAP. XXXI. Why God commanded Adam that he should not touch the tree of knowledge of good and evil, especially seeing he foreknew his fall. THe answer is easy, to wit, that by the trial of his obedience, in this one commandment, he might subject the whole man unto himself in all things, and that man by the breach, or keeping of the said commandment, might know by woeful experience (as he truly did in his woeful fall) the difference, between good and evil; so that whereas before he knew it only by contemplation, now he should find it by a lamentable experience: yea, in this, his sin was the greater, in that the object of his obedience was so facile, and the commandment so easy to be kept. Aug. li. 14. de ciu. Dei, cap. 15. For (as S. Austin saith) like as the obedience of Abraham is highly extolled, because the slaying of his son with his own hands was of such difficulty; even so the disobedience of Adam in Paradise was the more heinous, by how much the precept which he had imposed was the more facile to have been fulfilled. Again, as the obedience of the second Adam was so much the more admirable, because he was obedient even unto death; so the disobedience of the first Adam was the more detestable, by which he became disobedient even unto death: for where the punishment of the disobedience is great, and the thing commanded easy, who can express how great an evil it is, not to obey, and how great an injury to so great a power, especially threatening so great punishments? Now as touching the second point, I answer, that therefore God as absolute in his will, science, and power, would create Adam, and give him the aforesaid precept, which he knew nevertheless he would so presently violate; to the end that his unhappy fall might be an occasion of our most happy Redeemer: for as the Schools commonly hold, if Adam had not sinned, the Son of God had not been incarnated: so that (as Gregory saith) in regard of this it was a happy fall, which deserved, or rather required to have such a Redeemer: O foelix culpa, quae talem ac tantum habere meruit Redemptorem: in which I know not whether I should more admire the goodness of God in the creation and restoration of man, or the ingratitude of man towards God, in and after both his creation, redemption, and infinite offences and falls; but that as it is the nature of that infinite goodness to effectuate the greatest good, of the greatest evil, so is it no less consequent to man's natural propension, and of himself, as it were an infinite of evil, of the greatest good to work the greatest evil: a thing not easily believed, if our daily and woeful experience did not so manifestly prove it: for as God by our greatest and original evil, did work our greatest and original good, and this only out of his infinite goodness (the incarnation I mean of his eternal Son) so man out of his infinite malice, did by occasion of this so infinite a benefit, work the most wicked outrage that could be imagined, against his benefactor, by seeking his dishonour and death, who so abased himself, to give him life: so that I know not whether I should more admire God shedding his blood for man, or man spilling the blood of God; man's ingratitude towards God, or Gods infinite bounty towards man. And hence it is, that as faith teacheth us, this evil and sin of Adam was foreseen and permitted of God, so is it no less a blasphemous heresy, to aver, that this or any other sin is wrought by God, wrought I mean by his particular command or concourse; not by his universal, which is due unto all entity and being, yet in some sense neither due unto this of sin, as which in itself hath neither entity nor being: but rather (if we speak formally) is a privation of all rectitude, goodness, and being. CHAP. XXXII. What death that was which God threatened to inflict upon Adam for his transgression. AS it is certain that the mortality of Adam, and consequently of all mankind, did proceed of sin; so it hath no small difficulty to declare what instant death that was, which God so instantly threatened should follow man's sin, for so saith the text, Gen. 2. the 17. verse: In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death. What day is this? what death is this? seeing that he neither first sinned the last day of his life, nor yet died the first day of his sin: true it is, that as death was due at his last day, for his first sin, so was it not inflicted in the first hour, for his first days sin. Was this death peradventure the privation of grace, by which his soul supernaturally lived? for as the body liveth by the soul, so Adam's soul lived by grace, consequently as the body is said to die by the absence of the soul, so the soul spiritually by the privation of grace: but yet though this be true, yet it cannot be the sole meaning of the aforesaid words; so that then no other death should have been due unto man, but only the death of the soul, the separation from God, who as he had sinned both in body and soul, was justly to be punished in body and soul; which the effect afterward showed, that God had before accordingly decreed: so that the sentence of his death, as it was executed both in body and soul, so it is to be understood to have been decreed as well in regard of the body, as of the soul; because the corporal death is a necessary consequent of the spiritual; now than the spiritual being inflicted in the very instant of man's sin, how chanced it that the corporal also did not befall him in the day of his sin? especially seeing that though God threatened not death in the instant of his sin, for the instant of his sin, yet at least God saith, that man shall die in the day of his sin. Is it peradventure threatened, and not truly decreed? or if really decreed, how is it not absolutely performed? God threatened his death in the day of his eating; Adam eateth, and yet liveth long after his eating. Can Adam change the decree of God, or could God decree that he meant not to perform? He performed not, therefore he decreed not; if he decreed not, how then was it said, In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die the death; not of the soul only, for that was instantly, but of the body principally, seeing that is said to be in tempore, in the day, not in instanti, or momentarily. Was it a threat only, as we read of the Ninivites? but they changed their mind, they repent their sin; therefore as the sentence was conditional, the condition being changed, the sentence of God (though eternal) is said to be revoked, not changed in act, but immuted in object, the act being immutable, the object mutable, according to the decree of the immutable act. But here in this of Adam, the cause is altered; God threateneth, the sin is committed, why then is not the sentence presently executed? In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die the death. justinus the Martyr, justinus in dialogo cum Triphone Iren. lib. 5. adversus haereticos. in this more acute than Catholic, answereth, that even the very same day that Adam was deprived of the spiritual life of his soul, he was no less also of the other of his body: for though he died not the same day, according to the natural revolution of the heaven, yet seeing that a thousand years (as David and Peter speak) are but as one day in regard of God's eternity, Adam's death being within the compass of the thousand years, may well be said according to Gods and the Scriptures phrase, to have died even the same day that he was created. But seeing true histories do seldom admit any such subtleties, I rather incline to the interpretation of Jerome and S. Austin, who understand that sentence of death, not of death then instantly inflicted, but of the necessity of death then forthwith contracted. Jerome therefore commendeth Symmacus, who for that which our translation hath, morieris, thou shalt die, translateth mortalis eris, thou shalt become mortal: so that whereas he had been created to an eternity of life, now he is made subject to the penalty of death; or as our interpretation seemeth to insinuate, even to death itself, seeing that even from thenceforth he began to be mortal, who by grace before was altogether immortal. So that, as according to true Philosophy, we may say, that the alteration of qualities, or the dispositions unto generation, are in some sort generation; so likewise by this phrase of Scripture, that Adam should die in the day of his sin, we may well understand that he began to die, dispositiuè, by way of disposition, in the day of his sin, seeing sin was the immediate disposition or cause of his mortality and death, sin (I say) being the cause of his mortality, his mortality consequently prepared forthwith the way unto death. For so it is said in the second book of the Kings; We all die, and slide away as water: for though at the present, while we live, we be not jointly dead, yet because we slide away towards death, as the floods towards the Ocean, we are all said to die instantly, because our life, even from the first instant thereof, is nothing else but a swift sliding towards death: yea our temporal life (as Gregory the great well noteth) compared to the eternal, is rather to be called a present death, than a continued life; seeing that our continual corruption and declining towards death, may rather be termed a long or continual death, than even a very momentary life. CHAP. XXXIII. Of the creation of the woman, and to what end she was created. AS it is most certain that the principal end of the creation of Adam was to serve, love, honour and obey his Lord and maker; so the same likewise was the woman's principal end. Again, as Adam's secondary end was to be the father of mankind, so was it also eves to be the mother of all, and to be a comfort and help unto her husband, Gen. 2. vers. 18. It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an helper meet for him: good neither in regard of God, of man, nor of the world; of God for his service, of man for his help, of the world for procreation: for though this was not absolutely necessary, neither in regard of God, man, or the world; yet supposing the decree of God, that he would be preserved by the beautiful disposition and order of this world, it was not only most convenient, but in some sort necessary, that he should make man a helper, and a helper meet for him: for though he could otherwise have disposed of things by immediate creation, yet was it more agreeable to the nature of things, and for the sweeter disposition of the course of nature, that mankind should rather be multiplied by natural course of generation, then by supernatural power and immediate creation. Hence peradventure it may be inferred, that seeing God saith, it is not good that the man should be himself alone, that consequently it must be evil if he be alone; and therefore as by this sentence lawful matrimony is confirmed, so virginity by the contrary consequence is condemned: for whatsoever is opposite to that which is good, must necessarily be condemned as bad, as which is nothing else but the privation of good. To this I answer, (as our Saviour did to the Sadduces, in their objection touching marriage) Matth. the 22.29. verse, Ye are deceived, not knowing the Scriptures: for as Christ is not against Moses, neither the new Testament contrary to the old, neither the greater perfection to the less; so neither is virginity contrary to matrimony; both are laudable, both in their degree excellent, but virginity more laudable, more excellent, most admirable, as by which we rather imitate the angelical state and perfection, then follow our own depraved nature and corruption. This is the definition of Paul, not any human invention; for thus doth Paul determine this controversy, the 1. to the Corinthians, ch. 7. vers. 25. Now concerning virgins I have no command of the Lord; but I give mine advice, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful. Lo here, virginity is not commanded, but commended; not exacted by force, but commended through grace; neither counseled to all, because it cannot be performed of all; counseled therefore only to some, and those but few, seeing few can attain to this perfection. 1. Cor. c 7. vers. 27. My counsel therefore is that of Saint Paul, Art thou bound unto a wife? seek not to be loosed, lest losing the knot, which God hath knit, thou lose thyself. Art thou loosed from a wife? seek not a wife: here Paul counseleth, he commandeth not, neither is his counsel extended to all, seeing all cannot be capable of this counsel; not only by nature, because this is not any gift of nature, but also even by a lesser measure of grace: for though the Sun of justice doth shine over the just and unjust, and send down the dew of his grace unto all, yet not with equality unto all, but according unto his good pleasure and will. Wherefore as S. Paul prosecuteth, If thou takest a wife, thou sinnest not; and if a Virgin marry, she sinneth not: verse 37. He that standeth firm in his heart, that he hath not need, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart, that he will keep his virgin, he doth well: so than he that giveth her to marriage doth well, but he that giveth her not to marriage doth better: the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to marry with whom she will, only in the Lord: but she is more blessed if she abide, in my judgement; and I think that I have also the spirit of God. Neither is this the mind only of S. Paul, but even of his master our Lord and Saviour: Matth. 10. Some there be, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: not that this is contrary to the first institution of matrimony, but only a greater perfection, supposing a sufficient or superabundant multiplication of mankind; so that (as Cyprian saith) the first decree of God was concerning generation, the second persuaded continency; when the world was as yet void and rude, we multiplied by generation; now that the world is filled, and fully replenished, those that can contain, spadonum more viventes, castrantur ad regnum, by purity of life do dedicate themselves to the kingdom of heaven. Now as touching the time and place of eves creation, and first as concerning the time, it is evident out of the sacred text, that Adam was first created. Paul in the first of Timothy, chap. 2. saith, that Adam was first created, and then Eue. Furthermore, it is evidently deduced out of Moses, when he saith, Gen. 2. that after Adam was created, all the living creatures were brought before him, among all which no help meet for him being found, the Lord God caused an heavy sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept, and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in stead thereof, and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman. Hence it is evident, that there was some time between the creation of the man, and the woman's production: but it is not so easy to determine, how much that was, though certain it be, that this time did not exceed the compass of the first six days: for in the seventh day God ended his work which he made, and the seventh day he rested from all his work which he had made. Wherefore the creation of Eve could not be the seventh, as Catharinus and others presume to aver. As concerning the place, where Eve was created, though josephus, and Tertullian do think, that she was created out of Paradise: nevertheless the contrary seemeth more agreeable to the written word: for there it is evident, that after Adam was brought into Paradise, all living creatures were set before him: where God seeing the necessity of the woman's creation, to wit, that Adam might have an help meet for him, he framed her out of the side of Adam, for so saith the text, and the Lord God said, it is not good for man to be alone, I will make him an help meet for him. And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he steeped; and he took one of his ribs, Gen. 2.18.21. & 22. and closed up the flesh in stead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from him, made he a woman. Wherefore it is not in any wise probable (as some have conjectured) that after Adam had been in Paradise, he was carried out again, and Eve then created. CHAP. XXXIV. What sleep that was, which God caused to fall upon Adam for the creation of Eve, and whether it was a true sleep or no. THis difficulty doth principally arise out of the divers translations of the fore-alleadged text. Gen: 2.21, where it is said, that the Lord caused an heavy sleep to fall upon man, and he slept, where in place of the Hebrew word Tardemah, Aquila translateth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Simachus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a profound sleep. But most of the Father's following the translation of the scutcheon two Interpreters, translate an extasis, or an excess of mind. My opinion is, that seeing the translation permitteth both, that it is to give us to understand, how it was both a sleep, and an extasis, or an ecstatical sleep, or a sleepy extasis: a sleep, because the text in rigour doth signify a sleep: an extasis, or rapt, because he had then his mind supernaturally illuminated, and filled with a prophetical spirit, insomuch that presently awaking, he said forth with, this now is bone of my bones, Gen. 2.23. and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. CHAP. XXXV. Why Eve was created out of the rib of Adam sleeping, and how that could be without any grief unto Adam, and finally why the woman was not created immediately of the earth as well as man. THe master of the sentences, and divers other school Divines say, that Eve was framed out of the side of Adam sleeping, for to signify the mystical production of the Church, out of the sacred side of the second Adam dying; but with this difference of productions, that the first sleep was joyful to the first Adam, because he had not transgressed as yet; the second, most ignominions and painful unto the second, because he had taken upon him the sins of the first. The first was deprived of pain, by particular dispensation of the author of nature; the second was full of ignominy, and pain, by a supernatural, and gracious dispensation of God, as author both of nature, and grace: to the end that nature being now depraved by sin, might be raised again, and restored to her former estate by an omnipotent grace. But now could this be, the Adam should have a rib taken from him without any grief? For the understanding of this we must necessarily praesuppose that no grief was agreeable to Adam's estate before his fall. Now than I answer, that as God could, and de facto, did suspend, or withdraw his concourse, and action from the Babylonian fire, for the preservation of the three children, Sidrach, Misach, and Abednego: so likewise here, for to show the like power, did God withdraw his concourse from all natural passion, which naturally should have followed the extracting of the rib. Now to the last, why the woman was not created immediately of the earth, as well as the man, but of the man's side and rib? I answer, it was, to the end, that Adam acknowledging her to be a part of his substance, and she also knowing that she proceeded thence, it might be an occasion of a more perfect love: for that otherwise, he considering how she was the cause of his misery, it might be an occasion of a perpetual, and implacable hatred between them: or principally this was to signify the mystical union between the second Adam Christ, and his Church; according to that of Paul, Ephes. 3.32. this is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ, and concerning the Church, because the divine union between Christ, and his spouse, was signified by the union of Adam, and Eve: so that as Eve was framed out of the first Adam's rib, so was the Church out of the side of the second. CHAP. XXXVI. Why, and how Eve was made of the rib of Adam. IT was not without the particular providence of the wisdom of God, that the woman was not made neither of the most principal, nor of the most base parts of man: not of the principal, lest she should be too impudent; neither of the base, lest she should be too much debased; she was therefore created of the rib, and of that rib, which was next to the heart; the one to signify the mediocrity of her condition; the other to insinuate the esteem, and respect, which both she should have towards Adam, and Adam towards her; as also to signify the heart, love, and fidelity, which he should bear unto her, who had her being from so near his heart. Now the difficulty is, how Eve being of so perfect stature, as she was created, could be created out of a rib of so little quantity, seeing either she was equal in stature with the man, or not far inferior in greatness unto him, was there any matter added unto the rib? or was the same matter of the rib multiplied? surely it might be, as Lombard, and Gabriel said, by the multiplication of the same matter, or by rarefaction of the same rib; or rather, which I deem more probable, by addition of new matter, as the Divines hold it happened in the multiplication of the five barley loaves (of which we read in the gospel). Neither may it be inferred hence, that then it should rather have been said, that the woman was framed of other matter, then of the rib of Adam, because the more principal part beareth the name, not always the greater; especially, when the principal part, is not only the principal, but also the first of the whole compound or work. Wherefore, seeing the rib of Adam was the first, and principal matter, of which the woman was created, and unto the which the other was but an addition: it is therefore rightly, and absolutely said, that Eve was made of the rib of Adam, without the expressing of any other matter; because, though the new assumed matter was the greater in quantity, yet less in perfection: so likewise in the muitiplication of the five loaves, though that which was added was much more, than the precedent quantity of bread; yet because it was but an addition unto the former, therefore the name was derived of the more principal part, according to the common axiom of the Philosophers, denominatio sequitur principaliorem partem, the name must follow the more principal part. CHAP. XXXVII. Whether the rib of which Eve was created, was requisite to the perfection of Adam's body or no. BOth the Physicians, and Philosophers do agree in this, that every man according to his natural constitution, and perfection hath 24 ribs, twelve of each side; wherefore if our first father had thirteen on the left, it may be thought that this was rather monstrous, then agreeable to nature, which neither admitteth want, nor superfluity; either therefore this rib was superabundant in him, and so he monstrous by super-abundance, or it is wanting in us, and so we monstrous by defect. I answer, that though it were monstrous in any of us to have 13 ribs, yet was it in no wise in respect of Adam: it were in regard of us, because none is to be created of us; but in regard of him the defect were rather monstrous, because Eve was to be created of it; so that neither was Adam a monster, when he had that, which we have not, neither yet deficient, when he wanted that of which Eve was created: because the name of monster is not so much in regard of superabundance or want, as in regard of the ends, and purposes intended by the author of nature, grounded in that, which is most connatural. Wherefore, though in regard of the particular nature of Adam, as he was but one particular man, this rib was superfluous, and so consequently in an other person might be thought monstrous, yet in regard of him, of whom the rest of mankind was to proceed, it was most natural. Neither do these two sorts of considerations imply contradiction: seeing that even in nature we have infinite examples of this: for so the heaviest dross, and massiest matter, hath a natural, and particular inclination to descend to the centre, which nevertheless will ascend for the preservation of the course of nature: ne detur vacuum, when there is any danger of vacuity of air, or want of any other body, which naturally should fill all places; so that, as to descend is proper to heavy things, considering their particular inclination, and nature; so to ascend is no less agreeable unto their nature considering their universal propension for the preservation of the universal good of nature. In like manner if we consider Adam, as one particular man, not as first parent of our human nature, it were monstrous, that he should have more ribs on the left side, then on the right, or more than any of his posterity have: but if we consider him, as he was to be the first father of mankind, after that particular manner that God hath determined, it was most necessary, and agreeable to his nature, that he should have more ribs than any other of the same specifical nature, seeing, that our first mother Eve was to have her being of this rib of his, and we all ours, by her. CHAP. XXXVIII. How mankind should have been multiplied if Adam had not sinned. GRegory Nisene, Damascene, Chrysostome, Procopius Gazeus, and divers others were of opinion, that if Adam had not sinned, there should have been no such natural generation of mankind, as is now, but rather an immediate multiplication, and production of men by the immediate power of God. So that as we shall be like unto the Angels in the celestial Paradise through our union unto Christ; so we should not have been unlike unto them in the terrestrial by the immediate production of God: wherefore as sin was the cause of our dissimilitude from the Angelical life, so was it (according to these Fathers) the cause also of the dissimilitude of our production; the Angels being by creation immediately from God, we not immediately, but by mediate generation: and hence it is that Austin saith, that consanguinities, and affinities proceed of sin, not of nature. The ground peradventure of these Doctors may be the impure, and corrupt manner of our generation, and the deformity of lust together with the immoderate pleasure thereof proceeding, the which our first fathers (as S. Austin saith) presently upon their sin experimented, and thence were ashamed and covered themselves. Nevertheless, I cannot but deem it most certain, but that so long, as man's superior powers were subject to God, so long also should man's inferior powers have been obedient to man; wherefore whiles there was no deformity by sin in the will, neither should there have been any filthiness or abomination in the actions of nature: But as our eyes, and other senses be as yet subject to our will, so also, all other now rebelling inferior powers, should have been subject to their superior: lastly, as all deformities and disorder should have been taken away; so all conformity and order should have been left. The sensitive appetite should have been subject to the reasonable, the reasonable to the spirit, the spirit to God. And as no disorder in nature could proceed from the author of nature; so no disorder in the acts of nature, could have been found in the course of nature; and this, though even in the very estate of innocency there had been generation of mankind, as now it is: as now (I mean) in the substance of the act, not in the manner of reigning, and raging lust. And this certainly was God's intent in the creating of our first father's male, and female; because, if it had not been for generations sake, they might have been both created males: because all things at their first creation were created in their greatest perfection: if therefore the man be more perfect than the woman, why should they not both have been created male, if it had not been for their multiplication, by the ordinary course of generation, especially seeing God blessed them with these words, which signify no less; increase, or (as the Hebrew hath) fructify, and multiply, especially seeing (as the Philosopher saith) generation is the most natural action of life; Aristotiles lib. 2. de anima, & lib. 4. meteor. yea then every thing is in his perfect estate, when it is powerful to bring forth another like to itself. CHAP. XXXIX. Whether there should have been more men, or women in the state of innocency: or rather an equality of both sexes: and how there could have been any women, seeing they are said to proceed out of the defect of nature. AS touching the first point, I think it most probable, that there should have been more men, than women, if so be that we had persisted in the state of innocency: my reason is, because nature then being in a full perfection, would for the most part have produced the most perfect, which questionless is the male, for the most part I say, not always, because the female also was necessary for the natural propagation of mankind. Again it was necessary for the most part, not altogether necessary, but only most perfect, and therefore most agreeable to that most perfect estate. As touching the second point of the multiplication of the female sex, and how that could be connatural and agreeable to that perfect estate of paradise, seeing it belongeth to the perfection of nature, to bring forth the most perfect, and consequently male not female, as which is rather a declining from perfection, and argueth some weakness in nature, or imperfection in the Parents; Aristotelis de generatione animalium lib. 4 cap. 2. & 6. yea as Aristotle saith is praeter intentionem agentis, and therefore seemeth rather a monstrous act of generation, than a perfect issue, or pattern of the Parents, or nature. And lest this may seem improbable, even nature herself (as the Philosopher writeth) giveth sufficient tokens and signs of this, seeing that the female sex is begotten rather in tender and old age, then in the flourishing, and vigorous time of man's age: for as natural heat hath not attained unto his perfection in the one, so hath it lost his former vigour in the other. It is also ordinarily seen that the moistest, and most feeble bodies do beget females, by reason of the want of natural heat. Furthermore the same philosopher saith, that the female kind being of their own nature feeble, and cold, are to be deemed as a defect, error, default, or declination of nature. Nevertheless I answer briefly, (because this matter more belongeth to Philosophy then to Divinity) that the production of the female, doth not proceed only, or rather not always of the defect of nature; but oftentimes also of the more remiss manner of concourse of the power of generation, as also of the imagination thereto inclining, and other like natural defects: whence it is, that though the generation of the female be in us a sign of less vigour of nature; yet was it not so in Adam, but rather it proceeded of the aforesaid causes of the imaginative apprehension, or particular disposition of the author of nature, for the multiplication of mankind. CHAP. XL. Of the prerogatives and excellent gifts with which Adam was endued in the state of innocency, and first as touching his knowledge and natural wisdom of natural things. IT is the common opinion of the Fathers, and other Divines, that Adam had infused into his soul a most perfect knowledge of all natural objects, according to that of the Preacher, the 17. chapter, where thus he describeth the creation of man, together with the prerogatives wherewith he was first endued, vers. 3. Ecclesiasticus cap. 17. v. 3.4 5.6.7 8 9.10.11. He endued them with strength by themselves, and made them according to his image, and put the fear of man upon all flesh, and gave them dominion over beasts and fowls. They received the use of the five operations of the Lord, and in the sixth place he imparted them understanding, and in the seventh speech an interpreter of the cogitations thereof. Counsel, and a tongue, and eyes, ears, and a heart gave he them to understand Withal he filled them with the knowledge of understanding, and showed them good and evil. He set his eye upon their hearts, that he might show them the greatness of his works. He gave them to glory in his marvelous acts for ever, that they might declare his works with understanding. Besides this, he gave them knowledge, and the law of life, for an heritage. And hence it was that Adam perfectly understanding the nature of other inferior creatures, gave each of them their names according to their natures; for so saith the text, Gen. 2.19. And out of the ground the Lord God form every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam, to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof, and Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowls of the air, and to every beast in the field. Now if Adam gave to each living creature his name according to his nature, as questionless he did, it can be no less certain, but that he had a perfect notice (if not comprehension) of their natures, according to which he had given them their names. But now the difficulitie is, how this is to be understood, that God brought the beasts and fowls unto man; whether only by an intellectual representation, bringing them or representing them as objects of his mind and cogitation, as Caietan holdeth or corporally, truly, and really, in their own nature, essence and being: and if thus, by what means? whether by natural instinct, guiding them to perform this will of the author of nature, or that God himself immediately by himself, or by the ministery of his Angels did present them before Adam? Though I find no constant resolution of this point, either in the Scripture, Fathers, or reason; nevertheless that which seemeth to me most probable, is, that as every living creature hath his natural, peculiar, and proper instinct unto divers things, according unto the diversity of their natures, variety of dispositions and qualities; so likewise I think it most certain, that they had in regard or this, a particular instinct by the extraordinary concourse of God: to the end that as they were all to acknowledge, Adam for their Lord and master, he might according to his absolute power and dominion over them, give them their names as a token both of their subjection, and of his absolute power and dominion. And this may also be the reason, why God presenting all other creatures to the presence of man, he did not likewise bring him the fishes as well as the beasts of all species and kinds, because the beasts being domable, and easy to be tamed by man (at leastway whiles man was subject to God) might serve for the use of man, while man was not disobedient to God: or peradventure this was, because the fishes could not naturally live out of the water, as man cannot in any wise persist without God. Moreover, as touching his knowledge and perfect comprehension of the natures of these inferior creatures, I doubt not, but that I may be bold to pronounce that of him, which was said of Solomon in the book of wisdom, 7. chap. vers. 15. to wit, that he granted him to speak as he would, and to conceive as was meet for the things that were given him: because it is he that leadeth unto wisdom, and directeth the wise. He gave him certain knowledge of the things that are, namely to know how the world was made, and the operation of the elements: the beginning, ending, and midst of the times: the alterations of the turning of the Sun, and the change of seasons: the circuits of years, and the positions of the stars: the natures of living creatures, and the furies of wild beasts: the violence of winds, and the reasonings of men: the diversities of plants, and the virtues of roots: and all such things, as are either secret, or manifest them he knew. For if this be indubitable in respect of Solomon, it seemeth much more in regard of Adam: wherefore doubtless he was the wisest of all men, our Saviour only excepted, the author of his and of all other wisdom. Neither doth my position in any wise contradict that which is said unto Solomon in the first book of Kings, chap. 3. vers. 12. Lo I have given thee a wife and understanding heart, so that there hath been none like thee before thee, neither after thee shall arise the like unto thee. For though the proposition be universal, yet such like oftentimes are not to be understood universally, as S. Hierome well noteth, exemplifying in that of the Psalm, Hieron in comment, in cap. primum ad Ephesios'. Every man is a liar: again if he who speaketh it, lieth, neither can it be true which he speaketh, that every man is a liar: wherefore if it be a true saying, that all men are liars, we must take this word all, not that absolutely and universally all be liars, but that a great many are liars. So likewise although it be said that Solomon exceeded all men in wisdom, yet this word all may be understood not absolutely all, but with some exception. For so argueth the same Father in another place: Hieron. in comment. in caput quintum ad Romanos. Scribit & alibi Apostolus; The Apostle writeth also in another place, how we taught all men, and warned every man, not that he taught all, for how many be there even to this day, which never heard of the Apostolical doctrine or name? Or peradventure this universal proposition, that Solomon was the wisest of all men, is to be understood in respect of those, who had not their science, wisdom, and knowledge infused: for who can think (who thinketh so divinely, and judgeth so supernaturally as he ought of our Saviour) that the wisdom of Solomon was in any wise to be compared even with the accidental wisdom infused into the soul of our Saviour? Wherefore if that universal proposition be not universal in all, and do not conclude in regard of all, as questionless it doth not in regard of our Saviour, I do not see why Adam may not also be exempted, especially seeing he was to have been our head, from whence all natural and supernatural gifts should have been derived, if so be that he had persisted in his original grace. CHAP. XLI. Of the knowledge which Adam had of the things above nature. AS it is most certain that our first fathers were created perfect according to nature; so is it no less in regard of grace, and all other supernatural acts and habits thereto annexed: wherefore as he was endued with the perfection of all natural knowledge, so was he no less perfect in the supernatural; not in so high a degree as the soul of our Saviour, nor yet as the least of the angelical spirits, yet certainly more perfect than all other men, not only in regard of his faith, which was most perfect, but also in regard of other objects more clearly revealed. And first as touching faith, it cannot be denied, but that he had this supernatural gift infused into his soul, because this, Ad Heb. c. 11 v. 1. as S. Paul testifieth, is the substance or argument of things hoped for, the evidence, ground, or confidence of things not seen. Again, seeing he was created not so much for the obtaining of any natural thing, as for the enjoying of supernatural blessedness; it must needs follow, that as his nature and natural end did necessarily infer and bring with it the knowledge of the natural means, by which it was to be obtained: so likewise the decree of God, by which he was predestinated unto a supernatural object and end, did necessarily infer and bring with it by a connatural consequence, the notice of the supernatural means necessary for the obtaining of that end, object, and felicity, which was above nature. Insomuch that as the substance of the matter and form of things either corruptible or incorruptible, is in regard of the accidents: so likewise is Faith a necessary argument, of things not appearing; necessary (I say) in regard of the inference, not evident in regard of the conclusion, or that which is inferred. For, though the objects be sufficiently patent, and most clear in themselves, and unto those blessed spirits who have the eyes of their understanding already illuminated with the light of glory: yet is it obscure unto us, who as Paul speaketh, as yet see only in speculo & in enigmate, in a glass, and by species, obscure enigmas, and other imperfect representations of inferior creatures. Hence the difficulty is, what things in particular were revealed to Adam? I answer, that as the objects of this supernatural science may be reduced to four kinds: so likewise the sciences, and knowledge, may be said to have been fourfold. The first, of his reward, for though the perfectest love be not mercenary, and so base, that it do principally respect the reward: yet nevertheless, the allseeing and infinite good God doth never leave the least love of man without his reward. It is necessary (saith Paul) that he who doth come unto God, should believe, and especially believe that he is a rewarder. Wherefore as the first act of a regenerate person is faith, so the first object of this act is touching our end: for (as the Philosopher saith) quod est primum in intention, est ultimum in executione; that which is first in intention or speculation, is last in practice or execution: and contrariwise, that which is first in practice and execution, is last in intention and speculation. Wherefore as our supernatural end and felicity is the last thing which we are to enjoy; so is it the first and principal which we ought to seek and intend: and if this be true in all our actions, it must needs be much more in this of faith, which is (as Paul said) the substance, ground, or confidence of things hoped for, and of all our supernatural actions. By this it is manifest, that the measure of the knowledge of the means of this supernatural felicity, was according to the perfection of the apprehension and notice of this end, insomuch that as this end may be attained unto by a threefold mean, so was man ordained thereunto by the same means, to wit, faith, hope, and love: faith for the discovery of the object of our felicity; hope, for the effectuating of the means of our happiness; love, for the combining of both the means; a triple cord, with a triple knot, which not even the power of Satan shall be able ever to dissolve. Again, it seemeth most certain, that he knew the fall of the damned spirits, because he might by the knowledge of this be much helped in the obtaining of his end; as thereby inferring the severity of the divine judgement towards the Angels, and his infinite mercy towards men, by the one he might be moved to fear the like severity, if himself should fall, and hope to replenish the places of the fallen Angels if he should stand. The third object revealed unto Adam was the mystery of the blessed Trinity, how God (I mean) was three in one, and one in three; three in distinction of persons, one in the indivisibility of nature, being, and essence, and all his other infinite attributes: the which though distinguished for our capacity according to their objects, yet he well understood them to be one and the same in nature, reality, and simplicity of essence. My reason why I think the revelation of this object unto Adam to be certain, is, seeing that the sight of it is to be the perfection of our blessedness in the life to come, it must needs be also a beginning of it here: wherefore as it is there by a perfect sight face to face; so it must be likewise here in speculo & in enigmate, with imperfection and obscurity. Yea seeing Adam knew himself to be made to the image of God, three in one, and one in three, in his simple essence, and his three spiritual powers: so he must needs infer the same of his prototypon and Creator. Lastly, he had revealed unto him the incarnation of the Son of God, not as passable for his sin (which certainly he did not foresee) but as to be united to our nature for the excellency of the mystery, and because he was to be the head of mankind. CHAP. XLII. Whether Adam was created in the grace of God, or no. THough it be out of all controversy, that Adam was before his fall in the state of grace; yet many be of opinion, that he was not created so: this was the opinion of Alex. Hales, Scotus, Bonan, Marsilius, and Altisiodorensis, who though they grant that he was created in original justice, yet distinguishing these two, they deny that he was created in state of grace; their reason is, because by grace there is contracted a spiritual kind of wedlock, league, and union, between God and our souls. Now then as matrimonial union requireth the consent of both the parts; so likewise here, and the rather, that Adam thereby might the better know himself, and the weakness of his own nature, by an after infusion of grace. Nevertheless it seemeth much more probable, that though we distinguish grace from original justice, or howsoever, that Adam was created in grace; for (as S. Austin saith) God created the first man in that estate, in which if he would have kept himself, he should have been transposed at his due time, without any death, unto a better estate, and where, as he could have committed no sin, so could he have had no will unto sin: so that it was with Adam as the same Father saith in another place of the Angels, God did simul condere naturam, & largiri gratiam, jointly create his nature, and give him grace: yea this, according to the opinion of Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostome, Augustine, Beda, and Rupertus, is signified by these words, let us make man according to our image and likeness; image, to wit, in nature, and her proprieties, similitude, according to grace, and her ever following virtues; yea this is insinuated by Paul himself, in his epistle to the Colossians, 3. chap. 9 and 10. verses, where he saith, that we should not lie one to another, seeing that we have put off the old man with his works, & have put on the new man, which is renewed with knowledge after the image that created him. CHAP. XLIII. Whether if Adam had not fallen, all his posterity should have been borne in the grace and favour of God, and confirmed in the same. HVgo de sancto Victore answereth, that though Adam had begot children in his innocency, yet that his children should not have been borne inheritors of their father's righteousness, because righteousness proceedeth not of flesh and blood, but of the mere grace of God: so though they had not been borne in sin, yet neither should they have been endued with original justice. Nevertheless the common tenant of Divines doth persuade the contrary: to wit, that as Adam by his sin did transfuse into his posterity the imputation of sin together with the crime itself: so likewise if he had kept the same original justice, in which he was created, he should also have derived the same unto all his posterity. And this in effect is the meaning of the Arauficane Counsel, where it defineth Adamum peccando sanctitatem & justitiam perdidisse, non sibi tantum, sed omnibus etiam posteris suis, that Adam lost both his sanctity, and righteousness, by his original sin and transgression, not only in regard of himself, but also to all his posterity. Neither may it be inferred hence, that then grace were no grace (as Paul speaketh) seeing that it should be connatural in the aforesaid cause: for though in some sense it should have been connatural, that is, having her being together with nature; yet seeing it was not of nature, neither due unto nature, it cannot be denied, but that it was grace, as which was not consequent unto nature, but above all nature. Wherefore as now in the law of grace, all that are regenerated by baptism in Christ, do in and by baptism (according to the opinion of many Divines) receive the grace of Christ: so likewise in the state of innocency all that should have been borne of the loins of Adam, should in, and at the very instant of their natural conception, and first moment of natural life, have received the first influence of their spiritual birth, and supernatural life. Now the difficulty is, whether if Adam had persisted in the state of innocency, all we his posterity should then have been confirmed in grace: insomuch, that as we should have been borne in the grace, and favour of God; so we should never have fallen from the same. Anselmus lib. 1. Cur Deus home. cap. 38. Gregorius lib. 4. Moralium. c. 36. Anselmus, and Gregory the great answer, that if Adam had not sinned, than all his posterity should have been confirmed in the grace, and favour of God: for who (saith Anselmus) dare presume to affirm plus valere iniustitiam? that injustice should have been of more force to bind unto bondage: in man's first persuasion: then his justice to confirm him in liberty if he had persisted in his first temptation: for even as all human nature was overcome by Adam's sin; so by him all should have overcome, if he had not sinned. Nevertheless I resolve with S. Austin, that the posterity of Adam should not, at least way in the instant of their generation, been confirmed in grace, though Adam had persisted in his original justice: for how is it credible, that they should have received more abundant grace, than their first head, and father, at his first creation. Wherefore like as Adam, though created in grace, could fall from that happy estate of grace; so it seemeth most probable, that his posterity might also, seeing that we read of no particular providence & grace promised to them, which was not proffered to their first father. For though Adam could (as many Divines hold) have increased in grace; yet none but Paelagians hold, that he could merit unto himself the infusion of the first grace, much less unto others. CHAP. XLIV. Whether Adam before his sin was mortal, or immortal. SAint Austin in his 7. book de Gen. ad lit. cap. 25. answereth most excellently that the body of Adam before his sin was both mortal, and immortal; mortal because he could die; immortal because he could not have died. For it is one thing not to be able to die; another to be able not to die: that belongeth only to the Angels, this is agreeable even unto man; not by the constitution of his nature; but by the benefit of the tree of life; from which tree he was banished, as soon as he sinned, that he might die; who if he had not sinned, might not have died. wherefore he was mortal by the nature of his corruptible body: but yet immortal by the benefit of his Creator, for if the body was mortal because it could die, by the like reason it was immortal, because it could not have died: for, that is not immortal only, which cannot die at all, unless it be spiritual, which is promised to us in our resurrection. Now therefore the difficulty is, whether this gift of immortality due to the perfect state of Paradise, was due also and connatural unto man persisting there. Many of the best learned of this age are of opinion, that this original justice, which did bring with it a power of immortality, and a perfect subjection of the flesh, and senses unto the rule of reason, was a gift due even unto nature, granted unto man, as not only agreeable, but likewise belonging, and consequent unto his natural integrity, and perfection: insomuch, that man's nature being now deprived thereof, may justly be deemed in a manner maimed, imperfect, and monstrous, especially seeing it was to proceed of natural causes, such as was the eating of the tree of life. Again even natural reason doth require, that the mind, and reason should rule and govern the whole man, and consequently, that the flesh, and senses should be ruled by reason, and obey the superior power: wherefore as it is without all question, that the rebellion of the flesh against reason is contrary to man's nature; so original justice, which did restrain the rebellion, did questionless pertain to the natural state, integrity and perfection of man; yea, how were it otherwise agreeable to the divine wisdom to make a creature partly immortal, and incorruptible; partly again mortal and corruptible. Nevertheless unless the question be more de nomine, then dear, I deem it most certain, and out of all question, that, that gift of immortality was supernatural, as which was in no wise due or consequent to nature, for neither this immortality could proceed of the qualities proportionate to the body, seeing these tend rather to corruption, than immortality, as which are each contrary to other, and after a sort consuming one another, and these tending to the disvniting of the body and soul: neither could this immortality be ab externo agente, from some outward principle, and cause; for then, if it were so, it were rather to be deemed in some sort opposite to the inclination of nature, the which of itself, as we have already said, tendeth to corruption; yet, as that which is congenitum, or produced jointly with nature, may in some sort be said to be natural, or rather connatural, so I will not deny of this quality of immortality (though of itself it be altogether above nature) yet respectively, and in regard of the first infusion into nature, I will not (I say) deny, but that it may be deemed natural. CHAP. XLV. What kind of serpent that was, which tempted Eue. Josephus in his first book of Antiq. & chap. 1, holdeth that, as it was a true, and natural serpent, which tempted our first fathers: so it was natural unto it to speak, understand, yea, and to go upright like unto man: and that understanding man's felicity, moved with envy, he sought his overthrow; maliciose persuadens mulieri, ut de arbore scientiae gustaret, maliciously persuading the woman, that she should taste of the tree of knowledge. Ephraim the Syrian (as Barsalas relateth in his book of Paradise the 27. chap.) held that the serpent which spoke with Eve was a true corporal serpent, and that Satan had obtained of God the faculty of speech to be given unto the serpent for a time; so that as in Balaams' reprehension God gave the use of speech unto the Ass, for his just reprehension and punishment; so likewise here, saith Ephraim, God gave not only speech, but even intellectual power, and understanding, unto the serpent for a trial of our first father's obedience. Cyrillus in his third book against julian the apostata, and Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia, are of opinion that this was not a true serpent, but that it was the devil in the shape and likeness of a serpent, and therefore he was cursed under the name of a serpent. Nevertheless this opinion seemeth not true, for if it had been a devil, then would he have left the likeness of a serpent after the temptation: as when any Angel doth assume for any time a human shape, presently after he hath performed his purpose, he putteth of that corporal shape: but this serpent, even after the temptation remained in his former shape, for after that Eve had been so severely reprehended for eating the forbidden fruit, presently she excused herself, and said, the serpent deceived me, than the Lord God said unto the serpent, because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field, upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat, all the days of thy life. So that the serpent retained his former shape, even after Eve had eaten of the forbidden fruit, neither could this curse be fitly applied to a feigned serpent. Caietan in his Commentaries upon Gen. thinketh that here by this word serpent, is neither signified a true serpent, nor yet any thing that hath the resemblance of a serpent, but only the devil in his own likeness, who by reason of his subtlety, and vehement desire of man's destruction, is often in the scripture termed a serpent, and therefore he saith that this temptation was not externally, by proposing the forbidden fruit in outward speech, and persuasion, but by the inward suggestion, moving, and inclining her appetite. Nevertheless, as this opinion is most improbable, so is it contrary to the common opinion of the Fathers, interpreters of the Scriptures, and common sense of all Christians; who generally hold, that Eve was tempted of the devil in a corporal, and true serpent, who alured her by external persuasion, and present view of the forbidden fruit. Furthermore the whole text in this place is perverted by this, and such like allegorical expositions. Neither can there any sound reason be alleged, why this place may not be understood historically, as the text soundeth, and is propounded unto us: or if not, why may not the same be said, and the like allegorical exposition be only admitted of Paradise, the trees of life, of good and evil, of the four rivers, of the creation of Adam, and lastly of the framing of Eve out of Adam's side. The fift, and last opinion, Damascen. lib. 2 de fide Orthodoxa cap. 10. Augustinus de civit. Dei lib. 14 cap. 11. & lib. 11. de Gen. ad lit. c. 27. and which I hold to be the most true, is, that it was a true and natural serpent, by which the devil tempted and overcame Eve, speaking with her in the shape and substance of a serpent, not in his own voice, as who hath none, neither by the hissing of a serpent, which was not sufficient for that purpose, but with human voice, sounding as some think like unto a woman, as most accommodate for to deceive the woman; and this is the opinion of Basil, Austin, Damascene, Chrysostome, Theodoretus, Beda, and Rupertus. The devil (saith S. Austin) spoke in the serpent, using him as his instrument, after that manner that the Devil could move, and be moved, to express the sound of the words, and corporal signs, by which the woman might understand the will and intent of the tempter: though not so that the serpent could understand the sound of the words, which were spoken unto the woman: neither is it to be thought, that the soul of the serpent was transformed into a reasonable soul, seeing that neither those men, who are possessed do not know what they say, when the Devil speaketh in them. For although it be the opinion of the unlearned, that the serpents hear and understand the words of the enchanters, insomuch, that they leap out of their holes, and caves by the force, and virtue of the enchantments, yet that also is by cooperation with the Devil. Yea it seemeth to proceed by the particular providence and permission of God, that serpents are moved more by verses, and enchantments, than any other living creature, which is no small sign and token of our first seduction by the serpent: yea even the devils rejoice, that as yet they have this power permitted unto them, by which they move serpents by men's enchantments: that after some sort they may deceive, and overcome man, who in some sort was occasion of their fall: the which is permitted unto them, for a memory of the first fact, by which the devil seduced mankind, using the serpent as an instrument of their seduction, and utter overthrow, unless it had pleased God to have redeemed us by the blood of the Lamb. CHAP. XLVI. Whether that which Moses saith, that the serpent was craftier than all beasts of the earth, is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the Devil. SAint Austin answereth, Augustin. lib. 11. de Gen. ad lit. cap. 29. that the serpent is said to be craftiest of all kind of beasts, by reason of the craftiness of the devil, who used him as his instrument to deceive mankind: like as the tongue is said to be prudent, subtle, wise, cunning, or crafty, moved by a subtle, prudent, or crafty man. Nevertheless, this seemeth not probable, that the serpent is called the craftiest of all beasts, by reason of the craftiness of the devil, for that either this was for the subtlety, which the serpent had of himself; or for that which he was to receive of the devil: not the first, because the craftiness of the devil was not inherent in him, neither could the devil impart any such craftiness unto him, seeing the Serpent is not capable of any such craftiness either rational, or sensitive remaining a serpent. That therefore which seemeth more probable is, that the reason, why the Serpent is called the craftiest of all beasts, was not so much to signify his natural craftiness, as to show the order and conformity of the divine providence in taking so apt an instrument for the fulfilling of his permissive, will about the fall of Adam, for if we mark it, we shall find, that such is the providence of him qui attingit à fine usque ad finem fortiter (as the Wiseman saith) disponens omnia suavitèr, that even in works most miraculous, and above nature, he useth those instruments for the most part, which are most accommodate by their own nature: for although we admit that Wolves, Foxes and Elephants be more subtle, wise and crafty in their kind, yet nevertheless we shall find no creature so naturally bend by a malicious craftiness to hurt man, as the serpent is: this therefore was the reason why God cursing the serpent, said, Gen. 3.15. verse: I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: she shall break thine head, and thou shalt bruise his heel. Yea questionless this natural instinct of the serpent is signified in that prophesy of the Patriarch jacob, of the tribe of Dan, Goe 39 ver. 17. Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder by the path, biting the horse heels, so that the rider shall fall backward. CHAP. XLVII. What was the reason why the woman was not afraid of the speech and communication with the serpent. Petr. Comester in historia l. Gen. cap. 21. Bonan. in 2. l senten. dist. 21. Dionysius Carth. in Gen. allegans Bedam authorem huius opinionis. Bonaventure, Dionysius Carthusianus, Bede, and Peter Comestor do answer (though not altogether approving the opinion) that the reason why our first mother was not afraid to approach and talk with the serpent, was, because the devil had chosen such a serpent, as which (in face at leastway) represented a woman, yea and one most beautiful like unto herself: for as ordinarily in all his temptations he doth craftily accommodate himself unto the nature, complexions, and dispositions of the persons tempted; so here he deemed it most fit for the accomplishing of his desire in the temptation and fall of the woman, to accommodate himself, as much as possibly he could, to the feature and natural disposition of the woman. Yea Basil in his Treatise of Paradise, and joseph in his first book of Antiquities, and first chapter, do not much disagree; for so saith the first, the serpent than was not horrible to man, but gentle and tame; neither did he creep upon the superficies of the earth, but did go upright upon his feet, insomuch that, as Damascene saith, he was more familiar unto man then any other creature, fawning often upon him with pleasant circumuolutions of his body: and this was the reason why the devil took him for his instrument in the fall of our first parents. Nevertheless it seemeth most agreeable to reason, that which Chrysostome saith in his 16. homily on Genesis, to wit, that therefore Eve did not fear to see and converse with the serpent, because before the fall of our first Fathers, all serpents and beasts were gentle, meek, and subject to man's command and government, so that as they had no power to do any harm to man, so neither did they appear horrible in their aspect. Hence ariseth a new difficulty, for which though we have no authority out of the Scripture, yet somewhat we may say out of natural reason, and discourse, to wit, what kind of serpent that was, that deceived Eve; to which Eugubinus answereth, that it was the Basilisk, who as he is the most venomous, and king as it were of Serpents, so therefore he may be deemed to have been the most fit instrument of the Prince of darkness, for the overthrow of our first fathers. But this seemeth not likely, seeing that this serpent is so deformed, pestiferous, and noisome even in the very aspect. If therefore I may conjecture in a thing so doubtful, it seemeth more probable, that because Eve was so delighted with the company of the serpent, that it was that most beautiful serpent Scytile, the which (as Solinus in his 39 chapter saith) is so glistering with variety of spots upon her back, that it maketh men stay to behold her beauty, insomuch that whom she cannot overtake by reason of her slow creeping, she taketh them as amazed at her wonderful beauty; not unlike unto the common and powerful temptation of women, to whom nature hath denied the force of the body, yet hath permitted her to overcome by her beauty, those who are most powerful and vigorous in body: whereby we may see that which God doth so ordinarily execute by most just providence; in quo quisque m●●nè excellit, & excellentia praesumit, praesumptione peccans, punitur maximè. CHAP. XLVIII. Why the devil took the shape of a serpent, rather than of any other creature, and why Moses made no mention of the devil, seeing he was the chief author of the temptation. SAint Austin in his 11. book super Gen. ad lit. cap. 3. answereth, that we are not to think that it was in the devils choice, to choose the instrument of the temptation, but that it was by God's particular permission and designment, that he made choice of the serpent. Yet in his 4. book the ciu. Dei, 11. chap. he answereth more probably, that the reason was, because this is animal lubricum, & tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum; because the serpent was a most deceitful, cunning, and crafty creature: for though, as the master of the sentences saith, l. 2 sent. dist. 21 ●he devil would have come in the shape of a dove, that by her innocency and simplicity he might more easily cover his own craftiness and subtlety; yet God would not permit this, to the end that his malice might be detected with more facility, and eves sin be less excusable. Neither again was it convenient, that this shape and type of purity should be depraved by the impurity of the devil, seeing the holy Ghost was afterwards to appear unto the Apostles in the form of a dove. Now as touching the second point, why Moses made no mention of the devil; I answer, that he relateth only that which was done, not interpreting the meaning of the fact, and therefore described that which did appear outwardly to Eue. Like as in the 18. of Gen. the Scripture making mention of those three which Abraham did entertain, he called them men, although they were not men, but Angels. As also in the 32. chapter, the Angel which wrestled with jacob is called a man, because he appeared in the likeness of man. Yea Paul in the 11. chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, imputeth this deceit of the devil to the serpent, and not to the devil: But I fear (saith he) lest as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupt from the simplicity that is in Christ. CHAP. XLIX. Whether when God cursed the serpent, it is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the devil. MOses Barcephas, Ephren, with divers other, think that this curse is laid upon the serpent, although he did not commit any crime at all: his reason is, because this narration of Moses being historical, it is to be understood simply, as the words do sound. Now if it be demanded how this standeth with natural reason, and the justice of God, which is never contrary to reason, but is rather the rule of all reason, that the serpent being innocent, and not capable of reason, neither consequently of sin, that he should have inflicted so great a punishment and curse, as is denounced against him, Gen. 3. vers. 14. where God said to the serpent, because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and shalt eat dust all the days of thy life: I answer with Barcephas and others above alleged, that God did this principally as a punishment, and in hatred of the principal agent, the old serpent the devil; thereby to punish him not only in himself, but even in his instrument, by which he had committed that heinous offence against his God: like as he who breaketh the instrument in hatred of the physician who played upon it. So likewise in the 20. chapter of Leviticus, God commanded that the beast shall be stoned to death, with which any man hath offended; thereby to signify how great the offence is in the sight of God, who doth punish it, not only in the principal actor thereof, but even in his instrument; thereby to signify unto us how hateful sin is, seeing often he doth punish it in his unreasonable and insensible creatures, who are not capable of the sin itself. Again, he cursed the serpent for Satan's sake, as he did the earth for Adam's sin: yea and that which is most dreadful, he drowned the world with an universal deluge, not sparing the beasts, for their owner's sins. The like also we find in Princes and other Potentates of this world, who take vengeance of the innocent for the nocents sake, of the sons for their father's offences, of their subjects for their Prince's outrages. So the Poet, not as a Poet saith: quicksands quid delirant Reges, plectuntur Achivi. The Chastillians blood in France spilled at the massacre, was long after required of the Guisian race. The Thracians did beat their wives, because their forefathers had killed Orpheus. And Agathocles wasted the Island Corsyra, because in ancient times it gave entertainment to Ulysses. But now the difficulty may be about these words above alleged: Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and shalt eat dust all the days of thy life. For if it were a serpent before, even the very name doth signify, that it crept upon its belly: if then it was the serpent's nature, how was it a curse? or if a curse, how was it his natural property? I answer with Ephren and Barcephas in his book of Paradise, that creeping rather proceeded of God's curse, then of the serpent's nature, who as we read of other serpents, went upon his feet, yea more upright than any other serpent, but as Lucifer his principal mover became by his sin a most ugly devil of a most beautiful Angel; so the serpent, who was the instrument of Lucifer in this action, became a most filthy, venomous, and detestable creeping beast or worm, of a beautiful and upright going creature. Nevertheless, as I have already before insinuated, the curse pronounced against the serpent, is principally to be understood against the principal author of the temptation, and mover of the serpent, to wit, the devil, according to the opinion of S. Austin, Beda, Rupertus, Hugo de sancto Victore, Caietan, and many others: so that the devil (as hath been touched already) is called a serpent, for his subtlety and craft in deceiving of mankind. Again, he is said to be cursed amongst all the beasts of the earth, because he is condemned to eternal punishment: and whatsoever is said to be obscene, filthy and abominable in any whatsoever beast, or other most filthy creature; that spiritually is found in the devil in a higher degree, and more detestable measure: he goeth likewise upon his breast and belly, because he tempteth principally in pride and lechery: and therefore most fit to tempt, attempt, and overcome the woman, as most inclinable to these kind of vices: he especially (I say) tempteth in pride, signified by the breast; in lust, by the belly. Or finally, he goeth upon his breast, which is the seat of the irascible power, anger, and wrath; and upon his belly, because this is the fountain of all filthy lust and concupiscences. CHAP. L. Whether Adam was cast out of Paradise the same day that he was created. Moses Barcephas supra citatus. Philoxinus' oratione de arbore vitae Ephren comment in Gen. Sabugensis oratione de passione Domini. Irenaeus, Cyrii●us, & Diodorus Tharsensis. SOme think that Adam was created the first hour of the sixth artificial day, without the compass of Paradise, and was brought in thither at the third hour: afterwards about the sixth hour he eat of the forbidden fruit; and finally about the ninth being reprehended by God, he was cast out about Sun setting. The reason of this opinion is taken from the words of the serpent unto Eve: Why did God command you, that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise? by which words we may infer that Adam and Eve had not eaten any thing till that time, and consequently that they were but newly brought into Paradise, yea that they were created but a little before. Nevertheless I think it more probable, Basil. homil. de Paradiso Damascen. l. 2. de fide Orthodexa, cap. 10. August. li. 11. de gen. ad lit. cap. 21. & l. 20 de civitate Dei, cap 26. Gregorius lib. 4. dial cap. 1. Tostatus Abulensis super 13. ca p●t Gen. joseph lib. 1. antiquitat. that our first parents persisted more than one day in Paradise, and that this was done by the particular providence of God, to the end that they might the better perceive the misery into which they fell by sin, by the knowledge and experience which they had of their former felicity in Paradise. And this is the opinion of S. Basil, Damascene, Austin, Gregory, Abulensis, and josephus. Yea it seemeth most probable, that our first parents were not one only day in Paradise, for otherwise the serpent would not have asked them, why they did not eat of every tree of Paradise: for than it might easily be answered, because their necessity did not require it as yet. Wherefore though many have defined the time of their abode in Paradise to have been so many years as our Saviour lived in this mortal life, others forty days, according to the time of our saviours fast; yet if it be lawful to conjecture in this matter so doubtful and uncertain, I would think that they were only eight days in Paradise, because this was sufficient for the experience of that happy estate: so that as our Saviour was conceived (as many think) on the Friday, and died on the same day; so likewise (as some conjecture) was the fall of Adam the cause of his death the same day: so that Adam's fall, his creation, and redemption, was by the particular providence of Almighty God, wrought (as some contemplate) upon one and the same day. The which, though it be no convincing reason, neither sufficiently grounded in the sacred text, yet can it not be denied but that it hath some congruity and conveniency in reason, that the wound and the remedy should be in one and the same day appointed to be by God, who from eternity foreseeth the end, together with the means, and decreeth of the end together with the means, to the end that the common course of time, and remembrance of the day, might put us in mind both of our miserable fall by Adam, and our more happy redemption by Christ: that so we might continually bewail our sins, proceeding from adam's, and give humble and hearty thanks for the infinite mercies received by Christ. CHAP. LI. Of the Cherubin and sword which were put at the entrance of Paradise. THe Originists do understand this allegorically, so that by this kind of custody is meant nothing else but the particular providence of God, by which our first parents were deprived of all hope of returning to Paradise. Others think that by the Cherubin and fiery sword is mystically understood a twofold impediment or means, by which we be now debarred from the celestial Paradise: the first invisible, of the invisible spirits and devils, according to that of Paul to the Ephesians, the last chapter, verse 12. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, and against the governors of this world, the Princes of darkness, against spiritual wickednesses, which are in high places. The second impediment (as these Authors say) mystically signified by the fiery sword, is the perpetual fight of flesh and blood in our spiritual battle, as well in prosperity as adversity, according to our saviours words, Matth. 11. chap. 12. verse: The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force: and that of job; Militia est vita hominis super terram. Or rather (as other do interpret) we may understand by these lets of access to Paradise, three principal hindrances of access to the celestial Paradise: by the Cherubin, which is interpreted the fullness of science, wisdom and knowledge, may be understood too much curiosity of science, and spiritual pride oftentimes contained therein, much repugnant to the simplicity and purity of Christian faith. By the fiery sword may be understood (as some Authors do allegorize) all inflaming lusts and vices proceeding from the sensitive appetite; the which as it is twofold, concupiscible and irascible, so is it signified by the fire and sword, or fiery sword: the which being voluble, or as it were wheeling about, and always in a perpetual motion, doth plainly express the perpetual inconstancy, volubility, and motion of human matters. Aquinas and Tertullian think, Aquinas 2. 2 ae quaest. 165. ar. vlt. that by the Cherubin and fiery sword, is understood the place and situation of Paradise, under the equinoctial line, or Torrida Zona, the firest Climate of the world. But certainly, the heat of this place is natural unto it, and proceeding from the nearness of the Sun (as the Mathematicians do demonstrate) and therefore could not be occasioned by the sin of man, much less proceed thereof, as a natural effect of sin, which in itself hath no real being, but is rather the privation of goodness, according to its formal essence and being. Lyra. in Genesim. Lyranus thinketh, that by the Cherubin and fiery sword, is understood a mighty and flaming fire, issuing out of the mountain of Paradise, defending and compassing it round about, in the manner of a wall. Ambros of in Psalm. 118. Ambrose upon the Psalm 118. thinketh the foresaid flaming sword to be the fire of Purgatory, by which the souls that depart our of the world not altogether purified, are cleansed before their entrance into Heaven. But (to omit the controversy of Purgatory) this cannot be, seeing that the sword and Cherubin were placed at the entrance of Paradise (as is manifest in the Text) lest Adam should enter into Paradise, and participate of the tree of life; for so saith the Text, Gen. 3, ver. 24. Thus he cast out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and the blade of a sword shaken, to keep the way of the tree of life. That therefore which seemeth most probable in this point, is, that the words of the aforesaid text are to be understood literally, of a true Angelical custody of Paradise and fiery swords; the first against the infernal spirits, the second for to terrify man. The Devils were repelled and kept from this place of Paradise, lest they should deceive man by the tree of life, promising him thereby a perpetuity of life, such as he should have enjoyed, if he had not fallen; man also was banished out of the same place, not only by the just judgement of Almighty God executed upon him for his disobedience, but also by a fatherly divine providence and tender love towards mankind, lest eating of the forbidden fruit, which was of immortality (a sufficient cause I mean to make him immortal) he should live an immortal life in this vale of misery, and so become miserably immortal, and immortally miserable. CHAP. LII. What was the cause, why Adam and his posterity were banished out of Paradise? wherein two ancient errors are refuted as touching original sin. TVrrianus in his Epistle to the Bishop of Towers allegeth as an ancient opinion of divers Doctors, that original sin was that, which the soul had committed before it was infused into the body: which opinion seemeth first to have been taken from Origenes, who held that the souls of men being first created altogether in heaven, were cast down thence, into this vale of misery, and joined unto these material, and gross substances of our bodies, in punishment of their sin committed in heaven, before their union to their bodies. But this is evidently convinced as false, out of many places of Scripture: for if original sin was contracted in heaven, how was it contracted by Adam in Paradise, and if we did all contract it by one, how did we all contract it in ourselves, by ourselves, according to that of Paul, Rom. 5. chap. vers. 12. By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, so death went over all men, forasmuch as all men have sinned. vers. 16. Neither is the gift so, as that, which entered in by one, that sinned; for the fault came of one offence unto condemnation, but the gift is of many offences to justification. vers. 18, & 19 As by the offence of one the fault came on all men to condemnation; so by the justifying of one, the benefit abounded toward all men, to the justification of life. Where we may manifestly see contraposed, death, and life; justice, and injustice; condemnation, and justification; these as proceeding from the obedience of Christ; those as flowing from the disobedience of Adam. The second opinion in this point, is, that our original sin doth not consist in any quality, or accident inherent in the substance of our bodies, or souls, or in any privation of any excellency, or good quality, which we ought to have retained in our souls, but even in the substance of our corporal, and spiritual nature: the reason is, for whatsoever is not conformable to the law of God is sin; but all our nature is corrupt, and averse from the law of God, therefore the whole nature of man both body and soul being thus corrupt, and become abominable in the sight of God, is sin. But thus it would follow, as S. Austin well urgeth against the Manichees, (who held some things to be evil, even of their own nature) it would follow (I say) that God were the author of sin, seeing he is the author of nature. Therefore as S. Austin saith of the Angel, so I of man: Diabolus natura est Angelus, sed quod natura est, Dei opus est: quod verò diabolus est, vitio suo est, utendo male naturae suae bono: opera verò eius mala, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res. The Devil by nature is an Angel, and this is God's work: but that he is a Devil, cometh of his own sin, by the evil use of his good nature: so that his evil works which are called vices, are the actions of his nature, not nature itself or his Angelical substance. After the same manner, God of his infinite goodness created man good in substance, in nature excellent, in his powers perfect, and in essence of all inferior creatures the most eminent: but he by his will abusing Gods gifts, depraved his powers, and deprived his nature of these supernatural gifts, which were made connatural unto his first creation: not that either his nature became formally sin; or that his sin was transformed in substance, and nature: lest that he, who is the author of nature, should also be judged the author of sin: but that man freely subjecting himself, unto the breach of God's commandment, voluntarily deprived himself of those supernatural graces, which according to the former decree of God, were due unto his happy estate of innocency. Insomuch that all the goodness, beauty, and graces, which before were connatural unto him, were bestowed by God: and all the evil which was preternatural unto him, and accidentary unto his nature, was derived from himself, according to that of the Prophet Hosea chap. 13. vers. 9 Thy perdition is of thyself, but in me is thy help. Hence it is most evident, that our nature depraved with sin, must needs be distinguished from that sin, which depraveth nature, as the man infected with any malady, or sickness, is distinguished from the quality, or malady infecting the man. CHAP. LIII. In which divers other opinions of many Divines touching the essence of original sin are declared, and refuted. Lombard. 2. dist. 33. LOmbard the master of the sentences, Driedo, Ariminensis, Parisiensis, and Altisiodorensis, Greg. 2 dist. 30. q. 2. art. Gabr q. 2. ar: 1. & 2. Hen: quod l. 2. q. 11. Guliel. Paris. tract. de vitijs & peccatis cap 2. & 4. Altisiod. lib. 2. tract. 27. cap. 1. & 2. Driedo lib. 1. de gratia, & libero arbitrio. p. 3 consider. 4. Holcottus q. de imputabilitato peccati ad primum principale. with divers other school Divines, are of opinion, that the essence of original sin consisteth in morbida quadam qualitate, in a certain infectious quality, not of the body, but of the soul, derived from the corruption of the carnal appetite; yea S. Austin may seem to allude unto this in his first book de nuptijs & concupiscentijs cap. 25 where he saith, that original sin doth not remain substantially in us as a body or spirit: but that it is a certain affection of an ill quality, as a disease or languishing. and in his 13 chap. he calleth it morbidum affectum, a sickly quality, affection, or disposition, though more spiritual, then corporal. Again in his sixth book against julian chap. 7. he explicateth himself more plainly, oppugning others in this wise, some Philosophers said that it was the vicious part of the mind, by which the mind or any part of it becometh vicious, that so all being healed, the whole substance may be conserved; so as it seemeth, the Philosophers by a figurative kind of speech called that vicious part of the mind, libidinem, lust, in which the vice, which is called lust, is inherent after the manner that those who are contained in the house, are called the house. Ambrose in cap. 7. ad Romano●. M●gister scent: lib. 2. distinct. 31. cap. 8. S. Ambrose likewise, seemeth to be of the same opinion, in the 7. chap. of the epistle of S. Paul to the Romans, where propounding this question, how sin doth dwell in the flesh, seeing it is not any substance, but the privation of goodness? he answereth, ecce primi hominis corpus corruptum est per peccatum, etc. Behold (saith this Father) the body of the first man was corrupted by sin; and the corruption by reason of the offence, remaineth in the body, retaining the force of God's sentence, denounced against Adam; by whose fellowship, and society the soul is spotted with sin. But certainly, if we duly ponder the aforesaid places, we shall easily find, that neither Austin, nor any other of the Fathers is of this opinion; wherefore the meaning of S. Austin in the places above alleged, is, that concupiscence is not any substance, or part of substance; but rather a quality, or affection, or effect of an ill quality: and therefore it is most fitly compared to a disease, not because it is distinguished from the sensitive appetite; but because it is the very appetite, and power itself now depraved, which is a quality, and (as the Divines term it) affectio morbida, a sickly, corrupt, or infected affection, or inclination. First, because it doth prevent, or oversway reason, which ought to be the governess, and rule over all human actions. Secondly, because it is deprived of original justice, which in our first Parents, was a power above nature, yet connaturalized (if I may so term it) unto their nature, as well for their direction in matter of nature, as for their help, and furtherance in actions of grace: insomuch that while their wills were ruled by reason, they were always subject to their Creator: and likewise directed in all things belonging both to nature, and grace. True it is (as St. Austin doth often repeat) that the soul is corrupted by the flesh, as the liquor, by the corrupt and unclean vessel: not because that there was any such quality, as the forementioned, derived into the soul by the sin of Adam: but rather because the soul is infused into the body, which descended of the defiled seed of Adam, and therefore doth contract this sin, by which it is truly said to be polluted. And according to this interpretation, we are also to understand, that which the Master of the Sentences above alleged, doth falsely cite out of St. Ambrose, being rather the words of the ordinary gloss upon that of Rom. chap. 7. But that sin which dwelleth in me: for the Author of the gloss addeth unto the rest of Ambrose his word, cuius consortio anima maculatur peccato: by whose society the soul is defiled with sin: which by no wise can be understood, by reason of any infectious quality derived from the body, and thence transfused into the soul, but accordingly, as hath been partly explicated already, and shall be hereafter more declared. And this may be further demonstrated, even by reason, for first, either this morbida qualitas, this infectious quality was naturally produced in our appetite, and thence transfused into our wills, or supernaturally: the first is impossible, because sin had no such natural force or power in Adam, otherwise it should have had the same effect likewise in all the posterity of Adam: which even our adversaries do deny, seeing there is no reason, why it should be so averred of one more than of all. Or peradventure this quality was not produced by natural means, but by supernatural, not by any natural power of man, but by the supernatural of Almighty God, and as some hath adventured to pronounce, ex sola Dëi voluntate, merely by the will of him, to whom nothing is impossible, cui non est impossibile omne verbum, to whose will all do obey. But certainly if we weigh this answer, either in the natural principles of true philosophy, or supernatural of grace, we shall find the aforesaid position and solution to be most dissonant to both, seeing that both do evidently demonstrate unto us the repugnance and contradiction of this; that he who is the fountain of all goodness, or rather goodness itself, should be the particular and natural efficient, or moral cause of that which is summum malum, the greatest evil, nothing more distant than summum bonum and summum malum, nothing so unlike in their being, so nothing so improportionate in their causalities and effects. Wherefore, as it is impossible for goodness itself not to be good, so is it no less contradiction to the particular cause of evil, and consequently seeing that sin is summum malum, the greatest evil possible, and seeing likewise of all sins, this in some sort is the greatest, as which is the original and fountain of all other actual sins, as it doth imply contradiction, that God should be the particular cause of other actual sins, so it doth à fortiori imply the same, that he should be in any wise of this original; yea, even natural reason was a sufficient light of this unto the very Heathen Philosophers. So Plato in his second book De Republica saith, Omnibus modis pugnandum est, ne Deus qui bonus est, dicatur esse malorum causa, alioqui secum Deus pugnaret, qui suis legibus contrarium fieri mandavit. We must by all means endeavour (saith this divine Philosopher) lest God, who is altogether good, be said to be the cause of evil, otherwise God should be contrary and repugnant unto himself, seeing that he hath commanded the contrary in his laws: whose eyes (as Abacuc saith) are so dim, Abacuc. 1. that they cannot see evil, neither can they behold any iniquity. Not that really, he doth not perfectly view, and comprehend with his all-knowing science, the secretest and most hidden, and abominable action, or most inward cogitation, and that from all eternity, even before it be conceived or thought of by the sinner himself: but he is said not to see it, or not to know it, scientia approbationis, that is, he doth not approve it, but reprove it: not allow it, but condemn it: and in this sense that is to be understood, which the Gospel saith, shall be pronounced unto the vnrepenting sinners, nescio vos, I know you not, not that our Saviour either according to his humanity, much less in his divinity, was, or is ignorant of any good or bad action, according to which he is to reward in his judgement: but that he did not see or know them so, as that he did deem them as worthy of the divine knowledge and approbation, or of any reward, but only of eternal fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels. Albertus, Pighius, & Catharinus de originali peccato. Albertus, Pighius, and Catharinus flying the inconveniences of the aforesaid opinions, fell into another extreme: to wit, that there was no other original sin in Adam's posterity, than the sin of Adam, by which he first of all, than all his discendence were reputed sinners; he inwardly, they outwardly; and as the Schools term it, by an outward denomination, to wit, by Adam's sin inward to Adam, imputed only to them, as though it had been really their own, and actually committed by them, whereas in very deed they had none proper, or inherent, but Adam's only by imputation, not by real appropriation. Which opinion may fitly be declared by the example of a man, who being adopted by a King, as his son and heir apparent to the Crown, should have granted unto him and to his posterity, all the privileges annexed unto his adoption and principality: but yet with this condition, that if this Prince so adopted should commit any treason against his father, both he and his posterity should not only lose the aforesaid titles and privileges, but also should be accounted traitors unto the Crown. In which cause, although the posterity of this man had not committed any fault in themselves; yet were they to be reputed morally as traitors, and to have committed high treason in their head and pregenitor. After the same manner (as the Doctors of this opinion aver) was the compact made between God, and our first father Adam; so that if he had not transgressed the commandment of his Creator, eating of the forbidden fruit, he and his, should have been translated out of the terrene Paradise, unto the kingdom of heaven. But this compact being broken by our first father, both he, and we lost our right unto the blessedness, for which we were created; he in himself, and we in him: Not that as he had inherent in him the spot and blemish of original sin, we also should have it: but only by an extern denomination (as the Divines term it) because we had really the effects thereof, & our first father, in whom we were all contained, had really both the cause & effect, the sin (I mean) of disobedience and the privation of original justice, together with all other effects thereupon ensuing. This opinion is gathered out of Paul, Rom. 5. In whom (to wit) in Adam all have sinned, as who would say, we had not sinned originally, but only in Adam: we have not therefore originally sinned in ourselves, & consequently if we have not sinned in ourselves, but only in Adam, our sin only is in Adam, as it is only by Adam, not in ourselves, as it was not committed by ourselves: in so much, that it may only be termed ours by imputation from our forefathers, not by real inhesion in ourselves, seeing we never gave any consent by our own wills unto the foresaid disobedience, but as we were included in Adam, as in our head; we are therefore said to be spotted with original sin, in as much only, as he who was our head, and in whose loins we were contained, did really commit the said sin, and consequently (as the foresaid Doctors infer) original sin in us, neither consisteth in any actual or habitual transgression, neither in concupiscence, or in the privation of original justice: not in the first, Vide Augustinum li. 1. retract. cap. 15. & in epistola 3. ad Hillarium quae est 80. & in Encherridio. cap. 36. seeing that was not ours, but adam's; not in the habit, because this should proceed only from the precedent act; and finally, neither in the two last, because these are rather effects, proceeding from our original justice, than the crime and sin itself. This may also seem the opinion of S. Austin in his 3. book de libero arbitrio cap. 20. where he saith that we are all inquinati peccato primi parentis, defiled with the sin of our first father, the which sin could neither be inherent in us as actually proceeding from him, neither as habitually inherent in his soul, or privatively adherent to his form. It was therefore in us by an extern denomination, inwardly affecting him, but outwardly only denominating us. But if it be so as Austin saith, that we were all originally defiled with the sin of our first father, if we had also besides this some other inherent original sin, we should have two kinds of original sins, the one by imputation, the other by inhesion; the one inherent in Adam only, the other in us derived from Adam, which is to speak without ground of Scripture, which only maketh mention of one original sin, by which all be truly called sinners, according to that of the Apostle, Omnes peccaverunt in Adamo, all have sinned in Adam, in Adam he saith, not in themselves, and consequently none such did truly possess them. By this we may see what colour of truth may be given to falsity, yea even unto heresy, such as this seemeth to be; for if original sin be nothing else in our posterity, but the punishment and sin of our first father Adam, for which all his posterity is punished, certainly after the same manner, the sons also of any other of his posterity, who as the Scripture witnesseth, are justly punished for their father's offences, might rightly be said to have contracted so many original sins, as be sins punishable in them by reason of their father's transgressions: which without all question were most absurd, and yet the consequence seemeth most evident. For if original sin (according to this last opinion) Bee nothing else but the sin of our first father Adam, as it is punishable in us; no question, but by the same reason, as many sins of our forefathers as are punishable in us, even unto the third or fourth generation, may as well be called original sins in us, though they be not really inherent in our souls, or powers thereof, but only are said to be in us by an extern denomination, or name proceeding from our parents. Moreover, if our sin be nothing else but the sin of our first parent, as it is imputed unto us from him as our head; certainly as that is blotted in him by his repentance, so it should also be blotted in us by the same repentance: for if his sin could be sufficient for the condemnation of all, why should not his repentance be sufficient for all? especially it being nothing in us but an extern denomination, or bare name taken from his sin, which now being washed away in him. should of necessity be likewise blotted in us, nulla siquidem forma, sive interna sive externa, potest denominare, nisi eo modo quo est: for questionless no form, being taken away, can denominate as when it was present. This form therefore being an extern form, which never had any union in our souls, or powers thereof, could never, even when it was present, denominate our souls inwardly sinful, much less now, when it is altogether blotted out of the first subject, wherein it was really inherent, but rather now it should give no denomination at all, and consequently none of the sons of Adam should truly be said to be borne in original sin, seeing that form, from which they were said to be borne in sin, is quite abolished and blotted out even in the first subject, from whence it should proceed unto all. Finally, as David witnesseth, we are all borne in iniquity, and our mother conceived us in sin; and S. Paul, All have sinned in Adam: but this could not be true, if so be that we were only to be termed originally sinners, in that our first father Adam sinned; for his sin being blotted out, the denomination also proceeding from it, should be taken away, seeing that no form can any longer denominate, then whiles it is present, and after the manner that it is so. Therefore as it could not really and intrinsically denominate the posterity of Adam, sinners, even when it was present, according to the foresaid doctrine; so now when it is altogether taken away in his root and first origine, it cannot in any wise denominate us sinners, which is evidently against the Scriptures, which repeat so often, that all mankind was conceived in sin, and to have sinned in Adam, he only excepted, who as goodness itself, in no wise could be subject to this so great evil; and as man, was hypostatically united with the second person of the blessed Trinity, and predestinated to be the general redemption of the world, from this general deluge of sin, and therefore could not be defiled with any sin. CHAP. liv. Whether original sin consisteth in any privation, or no. MAny seeing the inconveniences of the former opinions, not finding in what positive act or habit they might constitute the essence of our original injustice, at length have been driven to say, that it was not essentially and formally in any positive act or habit, but that it consisted rather in some privation. The reason of this may be, because the essence of sin according to his nature, common to all sins, both actual, habitual, and original, is (as the Fathers do often insinuate) non natura aliqua, sed negatio; not any nature, but a negation of nature, and consequently the same must be here in original sin. So Dionysius 4. cap. de divinis nominibus, speaking of the evil and malice of sin, saith, neither this evil of sin is the appetite itself, but the declination of the appetite from good to evil, and more plainly afterward calleth it a privation, atque ut summatim dicam, malum quemadmodum saepe diximus, infirmitas imbecillitásque, ac privatio est aut scientiae, aut fidei, aut appetitus, aut actionis bonae: Evil or sin, as I have often said, is a certain infirmity, and imbecility, and a privation either of knowledge, or of faith, or of the appetite, or of the doing of that which is good. justine also in his book of the questions which were proposed by the Gentiles unto the Christians, amongst other things, resolveth this difficulty, 46. q. & 73. that evil or sin is nothing else but the corruption of goodness: so that it is not any positive entity or being, but rather a privation of entity or being; or as Basil describeth it, Basil. hom. 9 privatio boni, the privation of good: and Athanasius more plainly saith, Atha. oratione contra idola. that it is an ethnical and heretical opinion, to say, that sin or evil hath any entity or essence, seeing it is rather the privation of entity or essence. And this is the reason why Nazianzene compareth sin unto darkness, Naz. oratione 9 n. 39 not only because darkness and obscurity in matters of salvation, and the mysteries of our faith, is the effect of sin; but also, or rather, because as darkness is opposite unto light, and is nothing else but the privation of light; so sin is nothing else but the privation of goodness: wherefore in his 40. oration in sanctum baptisma, he concludeth, that which Nisenus, Damascenus, and Nizetas took from him, nullam esse mali essentiam, that evil or sin hath no essence; to wit, no real or positive essence or being, Augustin. l. 11. de civ. Dei. or as St. Austin describeth it, natura nulla, sed boni amissio, no positive nature, but the loss of goodness, which position Fulgentius in his book of faith, the 21. chap. deemeth so certain, that it ought, saith he, to be holden as a matter of faith, because all things that have real being or nature, are good: his words be these: Quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est, sed quia & in ea bonum & augeri, & minui potest, in tantum mala dicitur, in quantum bonum eius minuitur: malum enim nihil aliud est, nisi boni privatio; unde geminum constat esse rationalis creaturae malum; unum quo voluntariè ipsa defecit à summo bono creatore suo; alterum quo in vita punietur: Evil (saith this Father) is nothing else but the privation of good, and hence it is manifest, that the creatures endued with reason are subject to two kinds of evils: one, by which they voluntarily fall from their chiefest good, the other, by which they are punished in this life. Likewise St. Austin in his first Treatise upon St. john giveth this reason, why God being the Creator of all things, may not be said to be the author of sin, to wit, because sin in his own being, hath no entity or being, but rather is a privation of entity and being. Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, ut manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, & nihil fiunt homines, cùm peccant: Sin (saith he) was not made by God, because sin of itself is no thing, but nothing, and men become nothing becoming sinners. Now than if the essence of sin in common, or of all sin whatsoever be nothing, but that nothing which is the privation of good, Turrianus in epistola ad Iacob●m Ami●tum episcopum Antisiodorensem. Corduba lib. 1. q. 10. opinion 6. qu●s etiam sequuntur plures recentiores. hence it must needs follow, that the essence of original sin must also consist in some particular privation of some particular good, the which we are now particularly to search out. In which point Turrian and Corduba are of opinion, that this privation is subiectionis & coniunctionis cum Deo, in qua nati fuissemus, si primus parens non peccasset: of the subjection and conjunction with God, in which we should have been borne, if our first father Adam had not fallen. This they prove by impugning of the other opinions, for that as hath been already proved, it cannot consist in any positive and real thing, because God otherwise might in some sort have been said to concur unto it, and consequently after that manner to be the cause of it, which were blasphemous: neither can it consist in any other privation of any other supernatural gift, because all such privations or deprivations, are rather effects consequent, as punishment due unto the sin itself; therefore as the heat cannot be said to be the cause of the fire, from whence it doth proceed, nor the light cause of the Sun: so neither the privation of original justice, or of any other virtue or supernatural gift, can be said to be the essence of original sin: for certainly if we understand aright, we shall find that all such privations are rather consequent unto sin, and so the effects, than the sin itself, yea, rather the punishments inflicted by Almighty God upon man for his transgression, than the transgression itself. And hereby also we may easily demonstrate the absurdities of that common opinion of the Papists, that the essence of original sin in us consisteth formally in the deprivation of original justice, which had been due unto us all, if we had not transgressed in our first father; which is the common opinion of the schools and Papists, of Aquinas, Caietan, Conradus, Scotus, Taperus, Sotus, Marsilius, Ocamus, Buderius, Alexander, Bonaventure, Richardus de Medianilla, Maior: Vasquez, Zuares, Sumel, and almost all other Papists of this age. Anselm: lib. de conceptu virginali cap. 26. Yea Anselmus saith that he cannot conceive that original sin is any other, then that which was committed by the inobedience of Adam, to wit, the deprivation of the justice in infants, which was otherwise due unto them. Arasicanun concilium 2. Can. 2. Finally the Arausican Council 2. Can. 2. defineth it to be the death of the soul, wherefore if death (as is plain out of Philosophy) be nothing else but the privation of the life of the soul: seeing nothing else can be understood to be the life of the soul, but only the inward grace of God, by which only the soul did live that supernatural life, which is possessed in Paradise: consequently the privation of this original grace, or justice, wherewith the soul was adorned, and lived in Paradise, must needs be the privation of the same gift. As if our natural life, here in this vale of misery doth consist in the presence of our soul, or union thereof with the body, consequently our death must necessarily consist in the absence of the same soul, which gave it life, or in the disunion or separation of these two comparts, the soul, and the body: after the same manner, if the supernatural life of our soul, consist in the presence of God dwelling in our souls by his grace, then certainly our spiritual death, whether it be considered here after our expulsion out of Paradise, or in the fall from that first happiness, must necessarily consist in the departing of God from our souls, or (which is all one) in the absence or deprivation of his grace. Neither can this want of original justice be rightly deemed a punishment of our original sin (as hath been before objected) because no defect or want worthy of an other punishment, can be inflicted as a punishment: wherefore seeing that this maketh our soul's worthy to be deprived of eternal bliss, which is the greatest punishment imaginable, that could be inflicted for original sin; Aquin. 2. 2. q. 21. it can in no wise be the punishment due unto the fault, but rather it must be the sin itself, because as the school Divines well note, the fault as it is a fault deserveth punishment, so that the worthiness or debt of the punishment doth follow the fault, as a proper passion thereof, as intense hear followeth the fire, and light necessarily proceedeth from the Sun. CHAP. LV. In which the last opinion of the precedent Chapter is refuted, and the truth set down in what consisted the sin of our first father, and ours contracted from him. WE may easily perceive by the opinions refuted in the precedent Chapters, how easy it is, even for the greatest wits to err in supernatural matters, without the assistance of God's supernatural grace, and illumination, seeing that those who were accounted the very mirrors of wisdom in their time, have been so hoodwinked and blinded in the cause and first fountain of their felicity, insomuch that though they knew, that they were conceived, as David saith, in iniquity and sin, yet they were not able to declare sufficiently in what consisted that iniquity, and original sin, much less to demonstrate with any certainty, that which S. Austin almost in one word doth declare so evidently, libro q ᵒ: de nuptijs, & concupiscentijs cap. 23, & 26. where he expressly holdeth that our original sin consisteth in concupiscence, which though it remain in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed to them, in ijs ergo qui regenerantur in Christo, in those therefore who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive the remission of all their sins, it is necessary that the guiltiness of this as yet remaining concupiscence, be remitted; So that (as I have already said) it be not imputed to sin for as the guiltiness of those sins, which cannot remain, because they pass, when they are committed, remaineth nevertheless; which if it be not remitted, will remain for ever: so the guiltiness of the foresaid concupiscence, when it is remitted, is quite taken away. Calvin. lib. 2. Instit. c. 1. Melancth. in colloq●io Wormatien. & apologia confessionis A gustanae. So that here we see averred and proved, that which many learned late writers do avouch as a matter of faith, evidently deducing it out of the 6, 7, & 8. chap. of the Apostle to the Romans, and the 11 to the Hebrues, to wit, that our original injustice consisteth in concupiscence, the which though it doth remain in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed unto them; so that as divers learned men do declare themselves in this matter, tegitur, non tollitur; raditur, non eradicatur: it is covered, not rooted out; it remaineth, but is not imputed. For proof of which, Rom. 7. verse 14. 15 16. 17. 18. 19 20. & sequentibus. I will only ponder the example of Paul, who no doubt was regenerate, at least after he was called an Apostle; and yet he could find this sin of concupiscence within himself, striving against the spirit, yea he did acknowledge it to be his original sin, the fountain of all actual sins, and therefore he addeth, We know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for I allow not that which I do; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I: now than it is no more I that doth it, but sin that dwelleth in me. Now what sin is this the Apostle speaketh of, but original, or concupiscence, remaining as yet even after his regeneration, drawing him unto that which he would not, and therefore afterward in the same chapter, opposing it to the right inclination of the mind, he calleth it another law in his members, rebelling against the law of his mind, and leading him captive unto the law of sin, which was in his members: and hence he concludeth, O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? that is, from original sin, the which as it is the death of the soul, so likewise it causeth the death of the body. CHAP. LVI. In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed. THe first heretics, who after the preaching of the Gospel denied original sin, were Pelagius and Coelestius, as S. Austin writeth lib. de peccatorum meritis & remissione, cap. 1. 2. 3. 9 & 19 whom julian the Pelagian followed in his fourth book which he wrote against original sin; yea this is attributed unto the Armenians, to Faber Stapulensis, and others. The first argument of this heresy is that which julian the Pelagian used against S. Austin; because it is essential to all sins, to be voluntary; but nothing can be voluntary unto infants, before the use of reason, seeing that as the Philosophers say, and prove, nihil concupitum quin praecognitum, nothing is willed, desired, or sought after, which is not first known; infants therefore who have no use of reason, can have no abuse of will by consent unto a foreknown evil; and where there can be no sufficient foreknowledge or distinction of good from evil, there questionless can be no sin. Yea this seemeth to be confirmed by S. Austin himself, lib. 3. de libero arbitrio, cap. 13. where he confesseth that sin is so voluntary an evil, that nothing can be sin, which is not voluntary: and in another place he avoucheth, that neither any of the small number of the learned, nor of the multitude of the unlearned, do hold that a man can sin without his consent. Wherefore Doctor Bishop against M. Perkins out of those words doubteth not to upbraid the Church of England's doctrine about this point, saying, What unlearned learned men are start up in our miserable age, that make no bones to deny this, and greater matters too? To this argument of julian peradventure some will say, that original sin is voluntary in the infants, not by their own proper actual will, as who can have none such, but by the will of their first father Adam, which after a sort may be said to be the will of all his posterity, seeing he was the head of them all, and therefore that by his voluntary transgression all Adam's posterity may be said to have sinned in him. But this seemeth not to satisfy for original sin, if we will consider well the nature of it: and as all the adverse part doth hold, verè avertit à Deo parvuli voluntatem, & came convertit ad bonum mutabile; it doth truly avert the will of the infants from God, unto an apparent and mutable good, yea even to the devil; therefore the will of our parent, and his sin, is in no wise to cause original sin in us. Secondly (as true Philosophy teacheth) no cause can produce that which it hath not in itself, either virtually, or formally, neither doth any cause produce any thing, but after the manner that it containeth the thing which is to be produced, either formally, if so be that it hath the same form, species, or kind, which the effect hath; or virtually, if it contain it in a more perfect degree and measure. But certainly, neither our first parent Adam, neither our immediate parents now regenerated in Christ, have in any wise the guiltiness of original sin at the time of our generation; how can it therefore possibly come to pass, that any such guilt of original sin should proceed from them unto us? Certainly this could not proceed from any matrimonial act, seeing that was and is lawful in all laws, both of nature, Moses, and grace: how therefore could that which is a sin, and consequently unlawful, proceed from that which is altogether lawful? Thirdly, the actions of our external powers, as of seeing, smelling, tasting, and the like, are in no wise voluntary, or so termed, but outwardly only, or (as the Philosopher's term is) by an extrinsical denomination, or name derived from our will; and this, because they have no freedom or liberty in themselves inwardly, but only as they are directed from the inward faculty of the will: and therefore as they have no liberty or free will, but only by an extern denomination; so neither have they any sin inwardly inherent, but only as they are commanded, or proceed from the will. Therefore after the same manner, seeing the souls and wills of the infants have no liberty, or freedom of choice, but only by an extern denomination, outwardly derived from the will of Adam, now altogether past, and of his sin, now forgiven; it must needs follow, that they cannot in any wise be said to have contracted any sin, but only by an extern denomination, proceeding from the sin of Adam. Fourthly, that which in itself is according to God's law, neither in any wise contradicting the same, cannot be the cause of that which is against the law of God: wherefore seeing that matrimony, or the matrimonial act, is according to God's law, it cannot be the cause or occasion of original sin in the infant, which is against God's law. Fiftly, original sin cannot proceed from Adam unto his posterity, neither as from the moral cause thereof, neither as from a physical, natural, or real cause: not morally, because as death did proceed from sin; so life, if he had persevered, should have proceeded from grace, and original justice, which was a gift given unto all our nature in Adam, not per modum meriti, by way of merit, (as some have dreamt) but gratis: otherwise (as the Apostle argueth, Romans the 11. chapter) grace should have been no grace. Now therefore consequently, neither doth original sin pass unto us his posterity by way of demerit, or as a moral effect of sin, seeing that the same reason which doth urge for the transfusion of this demerit or sin unto us, doth also urge for the transfusion of grace. Wherefore seeing he could not be the meritorious cause of our grace, because it doth imply contradiction, to be deserved, and yet to be grace, a free gift, and graciously given; neither can he be consequently the moral cause of our original sin. Neither finally can the sin of Adam be the real or physical cause of our sin, seeing that his sin, whereof ours should proceed, is now neither actual, nor virtual; not actual, because it is forgiven; not virtual, for that then it should be latent in the generative power or seed; which cannot possibly be, because than it should be attributed to God, who is cause of the generative power; seeing (as the Philosophers say) causa causae est causa effectus illius secundae causae, the cause of any second cause is the cause of the effect proceeding from the second cause. Lastly, there cannot be assigned any time or moment, in which the sons of Adam do or can contract this original sin: therefore both according to true Divinity and Philosophy, it cannot be that we do really and inwardly in our soul's contract any such sin, but rather we are called sinners in Adam, and are said by the Apostle to have sinned in Adam, by reason only of his fall, who was our head. The antecedent seemeth certain, because this sin can neither infect our souls in the first instant of their creation or infusion, otherwise the soul should have it from her creation, and consequently it might be attributed to Almighty God, as to the author thereof, seeing that as true Philosophy teacheth, operatio quae simul incipit cum esse rei, est illi ab agente, à quo habet esse; the action which beginneth jointly with the being of the effect, is from that cause, from which it hath being. And hence Aquinas holdeth as impossible, Aquinas 1 part q. 63. art. 15 in corpore. Angelum in primo instant creationis suae peccasse, quoniam peccatum illud tribueretur Deo: that Lucifer sinned in the first instant of his creation, because that sin should have been attributed to God, which were blasphemous. Neither could this sin be contracted by us in the instant, in which our souls were infused into our bodies, seeing that the immediate subject of sin is not the body, but the soul, or some of the powers of the soul: seeing therefore no instant can be assigned, in which the sons of Adam are infected with this original crime, it followeth necessarily, both according to the grounds of reason, and Scripture, that there is no such infection or corruption inherent in our souls. For the better understanding of this fundamental point, so controverted in all ages, we must note, first, that original sin is called peccatum naturae, the sin of nature, according to that of Paul, Ephesians 2. We were by nature the sons of wrath: because sin did spot, defile, or rather corrupt the whole mass of human nature in our first father Adam, from whom, as first head and fountain, it hath been and is derived. Secondly, this sin is called the sin of the world, john chap. 1. Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world; because all men were defiled with this, one only excepted, God and man, by whom all others were redeemed. Thirdly, it is also termed peccatum humanae conditionis, the sin common to all human nature; because there is not any (Christ only excepted) which doth not undergo this yoke. So Jerome explicating that of the 50. Psalm, Behold I am conceived in iniquities, saith, Hieron. super cap. 4. Ezechiel. not in the iniquities of my mother, but in the iniquities of human nature, which are general to all human nature, or which hath defiled all mankind. Fourthly, the sin of Adam is called peccatum radical, the radical sin, or root of sin; because we being now deprived by it of original justice, which as it was in Adam, so should it also have been in us, an antidote against all inordinate desires: but now our inordinate appetite and concupiscence (which is the root of all evil) is let lose, to the overthrow of all true liberty. Lastly, we must note this difference between the original and the actual sin of every particular man besides Adam, that the actual sin is committed by the actual will and consent of every sinner, but the original cometh only by Adam's sin and transgression, and thereby is transfused and passed into us. Wherefore God speaking not of the former, but of the latter, Ezechiel chap. 18. saith, The soul that hath sinned shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither the father the sons iniquity: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the impiety of the wicked upon him. On the contrary side, original sin being the sin of nature, requireth only the free liberty of the first and principal head of nature, because his will is reputed as the universal will of all: whence it is, that we must not think, that when the child is first conceived, and the soul first infused into the body, that then (I say) it may be deemed to sin, but rather that then it is conceived in sin: so David saith, that he was conceived in sin, not that he sinned in his conception. For though both insinuate a true sin in us, yet the one, that is, original sin, is thereby signified to be derived from Adam unto us, yea also to be inherent in us: the other, that is, actual sin, is from ourselves, and of ourselves; whence it is, that the person of Adam was first infected with this original contagion, and then his nature: but in us contrariwise, first the nature is infected, than the person depraved. These things presupposed, my first conclusion is, that it is a point of catholic faith, that all those who descend of the seed of Adam by ordinary means, are infected with this general malady of original sin. Wherefore God threateneth, Gen. 13. that he whose flesh is not circumcised, shall be blotted out of the book of God, Aug. lib. 3 de peccato originali, cap. 30. & 35. & li. ● d● nupt ijs ● concupiscentijs, cap. 17 because he hath made frustrate his covenant: out of which testimony S. Austin thus argueth against the Pelagians; The infants did not frustrate this covenant made with God by any actual sin, seeing they could not commit any actually; therefore they contracted originally by original sin derived from Adam. The second testimony, which proveth this point, is out of the 51. Psalm, where David saith, Behold I am conceived in iniquities, and my mother conceived me in sin. Out of which place almost all the Greek and Latin Fathers do infer the foresaid conclusion, especially Origenes, Basil, and Chrysostome, who in his 3. book in Leviticum cap. 12. noteth, that David doth not by these words accuse any sin of his mothers, but that he calleth nature his mother, signifying thereby, that the filth and impurity of Adam's sin hath descended upon all his posterity. Yea this is also the exposition of Eutimius, Hilarius, Ruffinus, Innocentius tertius, Beda, Gregory, Ambrose, and Hierome, who also allege for the same conclusion Eccles. cap. 4. a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their birth unto the day of their death: which place S. Austin thus explicateth; Quid est grave jugum, nisi peccatum? What is this heavy yoke, but sin? And why is it called a yoke, but because it proceedeth from two, the male and the female, of the good, and of the bad; and because it is a yoke in both the sexes, therefore it is said to be a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam: therefore in that he said upon the sons of Adam, he made no difference of ages, no distinction of sexes, and by the comparing of sin unto a yoke, he made all men equal, Christ only excepted, who was not borne as others were of corruption and sin. Many of the Fathers, August lib. 6 contra Donatistas', cap. 12. & lib. 1 de piccatorum me ritis & remissione, cap. 17. & 20. 29. 30. & lib. 2. cap. 27. and principally S. Austin doth deduce this our conclusion out of the 3. of john, where our Saviour saith, that unless a man be borne again of water and of the holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven: out of which place, though Bellarmine with most of the Doctors of the church of Rome, do infer an absolute necessity of baptism, by reason of the general exception made by our Saviour, that unless a man be borne of water he cannot be saved; yet nevertheless this is not so to be understood of the material water, but of the grace of God purging and cleansing us as water doth, as a reverend Author of this age doth well expound: Attersol in his 2 book of the sacrament of baptism, chap. 5. which interpretation may be gathered by conference of a like place, Matth. 3. vers. 11. he shall baptize with the holy Ghost, and with fire, that is, by the spirit of God, which is as it were fire, lightning our hearts with the knowledge of God, inflaming them with his love, and purging them from all evil affections. So when we are said to be borne again by water and the spirit, he meaneth by the spirit showing forth in us the force, power, and property of water; as if he should say, we are borne of water, which is the spirit, as john 7.38.39. and 4.21. Again, if it were meant of water in baptism, it must be understood according to a like sentence john 6.53. Unless you eat the flesh of the son of man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you: which must be understood of such as are of years, according to the exposition of Innocentius 3. Decret. Gregor. lib. 3. tit. 42. cap. 3 Lumbardus lib 4. sent. distinct. 4. and Peter Lombard the master of the sentences. But to leave the confirmation of this point as touching the salvation of infants unbaptised, S. Chrysostome, Theodoretus, S. Austin, with many other Doctors do evidently deduce the foresaid conclusion out of the 5. to the Romans, Rom. 5. where Paul saith, that by one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death passed unto all men, in which all have sinned. Irencus l. 5. cap. 17. & 19 Athan. de i●carnatione verbi. B●si●. super Psalmos 32. & 50. Concilium Milevitanun & Araust●anum. J●stinus Martyr. Greg Nazian, oratione 42. in sanctum Pascha, & oratione 38 in Christi nattuttate. Chrys●stomus de Adamo & Eua. Cyrillus Alexandrinus lib. 1. in Gen. Theodoretus in Psalmum 50. Damascenus lib 2 f●le● Orthodoxae. Origines super epistolam ad Romanos c. 6. Cyprian. epistola 59 Hilarius Pictariensis ad Psalmum 18. Ambros. l. de Tobia c. 9 & ad Psal. 48. & l. 1. de poenitentia c. 2. Hierom ad cap. 42. Zech: Fulgentius de gratia Jesu Chrsti, cap. 31. Bernard seria 4. hebdomadae paenosae de passione Domini. Yea this is plainly the opinion of the Milevitan and Arausican Counsels; of justine Martyr, Ireneus, Athanasius, Cirillus, Nazianzen, Chrysostome, Cirillus Alexandrinus, Theodoretus, Damascenus, Origenes, Cyprianus, Hilarius Pictaviensis, Ambrose, Jerome, Fulgentius, Bernard, and many others. Now it remained, that I should have answered to all and every of the arguments of the contrary opinion, but seeing they may be easily answered with one and the same distinction, I will only express that, and so conclude this question, which hath so troubled the Church of God in former ages. The distinction is this, that we must understand the difference, and distinction of a twofold sin: the first is actual, the second original: the first from ourselves, the second from Adam, though in ourselves: the first we grant could never be in the aforesaid infants, as which never came to the use of reason, and consequently neither could ever abuse it: the second, which is original sin, might be and was in them, as is manifest by the authorities and reasons above alleged both of Scripture, and Fathers: and by this distinction we may understand all those authorities which seem in any sort to favour the Pelagians in this point; which therefore I conclude with S. Austin serm: 7. de verbis Apostoli circa finem: Ecce infants in suis utique operibus innocentes sunt, nihil secum, nisi quod de primo homine traxerunt habentes, quibus propterea est Christi gratia necessaria, ut in Christo vivificentur, qui in Adamo mortui sunt, ut quia inquinati sunt generatione, purgentur regeneratione: behold (saith he) the infants be innocent in their own works, having no sin, but that which they have by descent from their first father, to whom notwithstanding the grace of Christ is therefore necessary, that they may be received in Christ, who died in Adam, to the end that being defiled by generation, they might be purged by regeneration, in his blood, who died for all. CHAP. LVII. Wherein are solved divers difficulties against the former doctrine. MAny objections are wont to be made against the doctrine of the precedent Chapters, of which these following are the principal, yea all may be reduced unto them. First, that if the concupiscence, or foams peccati, which is left after our baptism in us, were sin, it would follow, that God were the author of sin, seeing he is the author of our nature, and therefore he must needs be the author of that, which necessarily followeth nature; as who is the cause of the fire, is also of the heat proceeding from the fire: wherefore seeing that God was the author of nature, he must also be the author of this foams peccati, and concupiscence, which necessarily floweth from the same nature, if therefore our original sin consist in this concupiscence, which floweth from nature, he who is the author and cause of nature, must also be of the sin, which floweth from nature, which both seem no less blasphemous than absurd. I answer, that this foams peccati or concupiscence (with which Adam was created, and we all borne) was first in him, and should also have been in us, though we had persisted in original justice, yet had it not been any sin in any of us, if Adam had not sinned, and we in him: because this was as it were extinguished and overcome by original justice in Adam, and should have been in us also, by reason that the like grace and justice which was infused into Adam, should also have been derived unto us by Adam. But seeing Adam lost this grace both for us, and himself: both this privation of grace is attributed unto us, as also the concupiscence revived in us by reason of Adam's sin: true it is that the guilt thereof is taken away in the regenerate by baptism, and so it is not imputed by reason of our regeneration. But hence peradventure it may be further urged, that though God be not the author of this concupiscence, as it hath the force, and malice of sin, yet that he is the author of the same thing, that is original sin, to wit, of that foams peccati, fuel of sin, concupiscence or inclination unto sin, which also is no small absurdity. I answer that this is no absurdity, but necessary, no heresy, but catholic doctrine; so that it be not granted that he is author of it, as it is sin, but of that material, or thing which by man's wickedness is made sin, yea which is good as proceeding from God; though evil and wicked, as flowing from man, God's concourse being altogether good, man's determination evil, as detorting it to evil; as the light of the Sun of itself pure and good, is oftentimes used and abused to evil, yea of this we have infinite examples, in which our adversaries are driven to aver the like. For who doubteth, but that Almighty God, (qui operatur omnia in omnibus, who worketh all real actions in all things whatsoever) is also the universal cause of every real action, and habit of sin? and yet nevertheless no man will be so blind, and blasphemous, therefore to attribute to his infinite goodness, that which hath infinite malice in it, as it is against that infinite goodness. The reason therefore, why it is rather to be attributed unto man, as second cause of it, then unto God, who is the universal cause of all, is, because man having the universal concourse of God unto good, determineth it, according to his evil inclination unto nought, and so committeth that nothing which in itself is sin, and privation of good. Secondly, it may be objected against original sin, that if that privation of original justice which ought to have been in us, and of which we were deprived by Adam's fall, were in any wise to be termed original sin, it would follow, that there were not one only original sin in every one of us, but many: for seeing that there is not one only culpable privation of that original justice, which Adam had in Paradise, but also of faith, hope, charity, and of all other graces, consequent unto the foresaid original justice, why should there not be by the like reason as many original sins, as there be privations of supernatural gifts, and graces? The answer is easy, for that all these deprivations of graces are derived of one, which is of our original justice, which should have been the root, and fountain of them all. The third objection may be, that seeing that it is not in the power of any to attain to the grace of God, being in original sin, consequently the formal of original sin cannot be any privation of grace, but rather a negation. I answer, that because once it was in the power of Adam, supposing the covenant made by Almighty God with him, that the said supernatural form of original justice should have been by his perseverance passed unto his posterity; hence it is that this absence of original justice in Adam and his posterity, is rather a privation, than negation. Fourthly, it may be objected, that as in the opinion of Scotus, whensoever the act of sin is past, the sinner may truly be called a sinner only by reason of the relation of the act past, which is not as yet forgiven; so it seemeth, that the same might be said in original sin, that though the act of Adam be past, yet that this might be imputed unto us his posterity, only by reason of the relation which we might have from his act, and this without any other privation, negation, or concupiscence remaining in us. I answer, that although this be the opinion of Albertus and Catharinus, yet that in no wise it may be admitted, for so we are not really, and internally sinners in Adam, but only by an extern denomination of his sin, which (as we have already shown) is most erroneous. CHAP. LVIII. Of the manner how original sin doth descend from Adam to his posterity. THere hath been three distinct heresies about this point: the first, which making no difference between the souls of men, and other living creatures, held, that as the souls of all other creatures compounded of matter and form are produced with dependency of their subject, and material substance: so likewise, the souls of men. And that therefore they were infected and polluted by the conjunction with the body. The second opinion, no less absurd in Philosophy, then erroneous in Divinity, is that one soul doth concur unto the generation of another, as the whole man, wholly to the production of another. The third, and worst opinion of all doth attribute the production of original sin in our souls unto the absolute power of God, spotting thereby his infinite goodness by the too much extending of his omnipotence, even unto that, which rather argueth impotency, than omnipotency. Now therefore the true cause of original sin in us (as the Scripture often witnesseth) was our first father Adam, by reason of his transgression of the commandment of God, but this not by real influx and concourse, but by moral: first because he could not of himself, and by his own nature pass unto his posterity any such effect, especially, seeing that, that sin now is altogether past; yea, at least way according to the guiltiness thereof, it is washed away by the blood of Christ, but according to the decree of Almighty God, he was the moral cause, insomuch as the infusion of original justice into us depended upon his will, by not sinning, according to the compact made between him and God: he therefore eating of the forbidden fruit, there followed necessarily privation of original justice in our souls, and consequently original sin in itself. CHAP. LIX. Whether it was necessary that there should be made a covenant between God and man, that so original sin might descend to the posterity of Adam. CAtharinus above alleged thinketh it altogether necessary, that there should be such a pact between God and man, ut in posteros peccatum derivari possit, that so Adam's sin might be derived unto his posterity, and that the said pact was included in these words, in quacunque hora comederis, morte morieris, in what hour soever thou shalt eat, thou shalt die. Gen. 2. & 3. Sotus, on the contrary side in his first book de natura & gratia cap. 10. thinketh it frivolous to admit any such pact: which opinion many more modern writers do the rather follow, because the law of nature did oblige man to the preserving of justice. But certainly, no man can deny, but that original grace and justice should have been transfused to Adam's posterity, if he who was our head, and had received it for us all, had persevered, and this by the sole will and ordinance of God; for certainly, this was not required by the nature of original justice, and consequently it only required the decree of God about this matter, which might have been otherwise. But that there was the said pact between God and Adam himself for himself, it seemeth evident, out of the aforesaid text of Gen. as Athanasius well noteth. CHAP. LX. How the soul is said to be infected by the flesh. I Answer, that this infection is not because the soul receiveth any real influx from the body, for without question the body can in no wise as an efficient cause maculate or spot the soul, but this is because as soon as ever the soul is created, and in the very same instant that she is infused into the body, she wanteth that gift of original justice, which she ought to have had, and therefore concupiscence is imputed unto her, as sin, which should have been healed, or not imputed by original justice, if Adam had not lost it for us all; and this is the meaning of venerable Bede tomo 8. in lib. quaestionum 4. 14, a little before the end, where he saith, animam ex unione cum carne peccato maculatam esse, that our souls are maculated by the union with the body. CHAP. LXI. Whether there should have been any original sin in 〈◊〉, if either Adam, or Eve only had eaten of the forbidden tree. THe reason of this doubt, is because (as the preacher saith) a muliere initium peccati, sin had his beginning from the woman, and through her all do die, it seemeth therefore that though she only had sinned, the same sin should have been imputed unto us all; yea all should have contracted that sin in her and by hers. Secondly, S. Hierome & S. Ambrose explicating these words add Rom: 5. per unum hominem etc. through one man sin entered into the world, in whom all have sinned, do understand that one to be Eve, if therefore she was the first cause of this sin, it seemeth that though she only had sinned, nevertheless sin should have been derived unto her posterity, though Adam had not sinned, seeing that these words, in whom all have sinned, according to the interpretation of S. Hierome, and S. Ambrose, are to be applied unto the woman, as who was the first cause of man's woe. Although I can gather nothing altogether certain about this point, either out of the holy Scriptures or Fathers, yet nevertheless it seemeth more probable, that the whole cause of original sin in us aught to be reduced unto Adam, so that by Adam's consent only, and not by eves we were to be borne in original injustice. The reason is, for that all the Fathers (S. Hierome, and S. Ambrose only excepted) who do interpret the aforesaid place, do understand it of Adam, and not of Eve; yea it seemeth that this may be gathered out of the words of S. Paul 1. Corinth. 15. As in Adam all do die, so all shall be revived in Christ, wherefore venerable Bede is plainly of this opinion in the 14 of his questions tomo 8, where he saith, originale peccatum trahere originem ex Adamo non ex diabolo, quia ex diabolo non propagamur, non ab Eva, quia vir, id est Adam, non est à muliere, sed mulier a viro; ex quo sequitur, Adamo non peccante, etiamsi eva peccasset, non futurum in nobis peccatum. That original sin hath his beginning from Adam only, not from the Devil, because we are not begot by the Devil, neither of Eve, because the man, to wit, Adam is not of the woman, but the woman of the man; whereupon it followeth, that though Eve had sinned, if Adam had not, we should not have been borne in sin. Aquinas giveth another reason, quia mulier passive se habet ad generationem prolis, because the woman doth only concur passively unto generation, but whether this be true or no, quod medicorum est curent medici, tractent fabrilia fabri; one thing seemeth most certain that this dependeth more on the secret will of Almighty God, then of any natural reason and consequence, which may be deduced out of the principles of nature. CHAP. LXII. What punishments be due unto original sin in this life. I Answer briefly, that the first punishment due unto original sin, and which was first of all inflicted upon man, was the privation of original justice, as proceeding from God, and as it did subdue the inferior portion of the soul unto the superior, and the superior unto God. The second punishment proceeding from the first, was in the soul and her powers, both understanding and will: not that any thing essential either to the soul or her powers, is taken away, but that they are not so able to exercise their functions, as they should have been being endued with original justice. The third punishment of original sin, was, that both Adam and his posterity became thereby subject to all corporal infirmities, yea even unto death itself, and many other expressed in the third chapter of Genesis, vers. 16. I will greatly increase thy sorrows and thy conceptions: in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall have the rule over thee. Verse 17. Unto Adam he said, because thou hast harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, concerning the which I commanded, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Verse 18. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth unto thee, and thou shalt eat of the herbs of the field Verse 19 In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou be turned again to the ground; for out of it was thou taken, for dust thou art, and into dust shalt thou be turned again. Now seeing this natural death could not naturally be effectuated so long as Adam was in Paradise, because the tree of life retained his virtue, wherewith man might renew his age: therefore Almighty God addeth in the same chapter, verse 22. 23. and 24. And now lest peradventure he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden to dress the ground, whence he was taken. And so he drove out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and a flaming sword, which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life. CHAP. LXIII. What punishment is due unto original sin in the other life. ALL the difficulty of this point is wholly as concerning those who depart out of this world without baptism, whereby the guilt of original sin (as many hold) should have been taken away: wherefore the question is, what becometh of these, or what punishment is due unto them for this sin, supposing that it be not taken away, as certainly it is not, at leastway in those that are not comprehended in the covenant of grace. The common opinion of the schoole-divines in this point, is, that the innocents unbaptised, either baptismo sanguinis, fluminis, or flaminis, either with the baptism of blood, to wit, of martyrdom; or of the holy Ghost, by some supernatural act or habit, sufficient to justification; or finally by the ordinary baptism of water, that such (I say) are punished with the loss of their supernatural blessedness, though not with any other sensible punishment. This is expressly the opinion of S. Ambrose upon that of the 5. chapter to the Romans, as by one man, where thus he declareth his mind in this point: Death is the resolution of the body, when the soul is separated from the body: there is also another death, which is called the second death unto hell; which we do not suffer through Adam's sin, but this is gotten by our own proper actual sin, though by the occasion of the other. Yea if we only attend unto the nature of original sin, contracted by the aforesaid innocents; we shall find that they are altogether uncapable of the punishment of hell fire: for who will say that a man might justly be cast in prison, or beaten for his original sin, seeing it was never in his power to avoid it? much less therefore were it just, Lumbar. 2. dist. 33. Bonau. ibid. ar. 3. q. 1. Rich. ar. 3. q. 1. Dur. q. 3. Scotus q. unica. Gal r. q. 1. ar. 2. concla. 1. & seq. Marsil. in 2 q. 19 ar. 5. post 2. conclusionem. Alex. 1. par. q. 39 mem. 3 ar. 4. Dom. Sotus l. 1. de natura & gratia, ar. 4. cap. 14. Cath. in opusc. peculiari de hac re. that any man should suffer the eternal torments of hell fire, for that sin which he never committed, neither was ever in his power to avoid it. wherefore this is the most common opinion of the Schools, that the infants, or others who die with original sin only, shall not suffer any sensible torment of hell fire, though they be eternally excluded from the company of the blessed in heaven, and the glorious sight of Almighty God: and this in particular is the opinion of the master of the sentences, Bonaventure, Richardus Durand, Scotus, Marsilius, Gabriel, Alexander, Sotus, and lastly of the Council of Florence in the last session, in literis unionis. The second opinion of other schoole-divines is, that the said unbaptised innocents are to be punished in the other world, not only with the loss of the sight of God, their essential bliss, but also with other sensible torments, even with hell fire itself. This is plainly the opinion of S. Austin, l. 5. hypognosticon post medium, and in his book de fide ad Petrum, c. 27. & 44. But if these be not so certainly Austin's works, the second at least is of the learned Bishop Fulgentius, and the other of some learned Author: yea whosoever be the authors of those, it is most certain that Austin was of this opinion in his 14. sermon of the words of the Apostle, where he saith, infants in peccato originali discedentes ex hac vita, deputandos esse ad sinistram, ad ignem aeternum: that the infants that depart out of this world in original sin, are to be deputed to the left hand unto everlasting fire. Again, in his fift book against julian, the 8. chapter, a little after the midst, he averreth, hanc poenamignis seruatam esse infantibus, quanta verò futura sit, non audet definire: that this punishment of fire is reserved for infants, though (as he saith) he dare not define how great this punishment of fire shall be, in regard of them who depart with the guilt only of original sin. The like also is not improbably gathered out of Gregory the great, in his 9 book of his morals, the 12. chapter, upon those words, in turbine conteret me, where he seemeth plainly to insinuate the said sensible punishment of the infants by fire; ac si apertè humani generis damna considerans dicat, as if considering the losses of mankind he should plainly say, with what punishment will that most just and rigorous judge punish those who are condemned for their own fault, if he also eternally smite those whom the guiltiness of their own will doth not condemn? by which word of smiting he seemeth to insinuate the punishment of sense, which is by fire. Again he declareth his mind himself touching this sensible punishment, upon those words of the same chap. multiplicabit vulnera mea, he shall multiply my wounds; where speaking of the foresaid infants, he saith, that perpetua tormenta percipiunt, qui nihil ex propria voluntate peecarunt; that those who have sinned in nothing by their own proper will, receive perpetual torments: which words of perpetual torments must needs import a sensible punishment. Yea this was the opinion of the Bishops of Africa in Fulgentius his time, as is plainly out of him above alleged, and more plainly in his book of the incarnation, which book he wrote not only by the approbation of all the Bishops of Africa, but also in their names, as may be evidently seen by the beginning of the first chapter of that book. Finally, this seemeth to be the sense of the Scripture, Matth. the third chapter, verse 12. and Mark also the third chapter, verse 14. where S. john Baptist speaking of our Saviour, saith, that he will come with his fan in his hand, and will make clean the floor, and gather his wheat into his garner, but will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire: where (as we see) all mankind is but only of two sorts, the good and the bad, the wheat and the chaff, whereof the wheat only is for the garner, that is, the good for heaven, the chaff for the fire, the bad for those intolerable torments of hell: here is no mean; all is either good, or bad; all either for eternal bless, both sensible and spiritual, or eternal curse and punishment, both sensible and spiritual; and consequently, there is no other place or manner of punishment, for those who die with original sin, innocent in their own actions, though eternally sequestered from the sight of God, for Adam's sin and corruption. Secondly, it is said in the same chapter, that every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be hewn down, and cast in the fire. Wherefore seeing those that depart out of this world with the guilt only of original sin, are unfruitful trees, consequently they are to be cast into everlasting fire. Thirdly, when our blessed Saviour shall come to give every man according to his deeds, he will only separate two sorts of people, one of the right hand, another of the left, the good of the right, the bad of the left, those for eternal bless in the kingdom of heaven, these for an eternal curse in the unquenchable fire of hell. Matth. 25. chap. vers. 31. And when the son of man cometh in his glory, and all the holy Angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate one from another, as a shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats, and he shall set the sheep on the right hand, and the goats on the left. Lo here be two sorts of people signified by those two kinds of beasts, the sheep and the goats, the good and the bad, the sheep on the right hand, the goats on the left, according unto the two sorts of sentences pronounced, verse 34. and 41. Then shall the King say to them on his right hand, come ye blessed of my Father, possess the inheritance of the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. Again to the cursed he saith, vers. 41. Depart from me ye cursed unto everlasting fire, which is prepared for the Devil and his angels. Hence therefore it must needs follow, that seeing those who died in original sin imputed unto them, as who were not in any wise engraffed in the body of Christ, that these (I say) must needs according unto the opinion of the aforesaid Fathers be condemned unto unquenchable fire, though certain it is (as God willing shall be demonstrated in another place) that those who are in any wise engraffed in Christ, either by the baptism of water, of blood, or of the holy Ghost, by reason of original sin only, shall never taste of those eternal torments prepared for the devil and his angels. CHAP. LXIIII The objections of Simon Magus against the aforesaid doctrine of the creation of man, and his placing in Paradise. AS there is nothing so manifest unto reason, but hath been oppugned by reason; so neither hath there been any thing so evident in Scripture, but hath been oppugned with Scripture. So the Pharisees resisted the Messiah, and Simon Magus the doctrine of Moses, especially about the creation. For either (saith he) the God which created man was omnipotent, or not; if omnipotent, how is it that he would that Adam should not fall, who nevertheless did fall? if he was not omnipotent, how can he be God? To this we answer, that though Adam sinned, and by his sin did contrary to the will of God; nevertheless he remained in some sort conformable to the will of God: for as he created him, endued with understanding, that thereby he might discern good from evil; so was he also created with free will, whereby he might embrace the good, and eschew the evil, obey or disobey his Lord and maker: this was the perfection in which he excelled the beasts of the earth, paulò minor factus Angelis, in this he resembled the purest Angels, yea in this he is said to be made to the image of God himself. But God (saith Simon Magus) would not that Adam should have eaten of the forbidden fruit, who nevertheless did eat of that fruit; it followeth therefore that he remained not as his Creator would have had him to have remained; how then can God be omnipotent, or his will always fulfilled? It were necessary, if we should fully satisfy this argument, to entreat more largely of the will of God, then were convenient for this place: wherefore, that we may briefly answer this objection, we must presuppose with the school-divines a threefold distinction of the will of God, Aquinas 1. n.i. te quaestione 19 Ibidem Molina, VasqueZ, Suarius, Sumel, Bannesius, & alij plures. according to the diversity of their proper objects: the first they call his efficient, effectual, or working will, by which God doth so effectually intend any thing, that he performeth it actually by some external operation and work, either actually produced, or to be produced. The other kind of will, which the Divines distinguish in God, in regard of some objects which he doth not really produce, is called inefficax voluntas, a kind of propension or inclination of his divine will to the effectuating of any good effect, which might redound to the felicity of man: yet for the attaining of the end, which out of his unsearchable wisdom he hath prefixed, he oftentimes permitteth the contrary to this his divine inclination and will; the which therefore is called Gods permissive will. As for example, God would that all men should be saved, according to that of the Apostle, Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri; to wit, in his universal grace, calling, and inspirations, and other general means, offered to all, so that out of his infinite goodness he wisheth and willeth in this sort all to be saved, and that he might the more manifest his infinite mercy by the efficacy of his working will, he actually saveth some, even so to manifest his justice by his other permissive decree, he permitteth others to work their own ruin and eternal damnation. So that according to this distinction, it may truly be said, that the transgression of Adam was in some sort contrary to the will of God, in some again agreeable to the same: for first, in that it was permitted by God, it was for the further benefit unto mankind, and the greater glory of God, by which he wrought that miraculous effect of the hypostatical union between the second person of the blessed Trinity, and our nature, taking occasion of the greatest evil to work our greatest good: insomuch that it may well be deemed (as Gregory termeth it) foelix culpa, quae talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem; a happy fall in regard of the issue, not as it was a sin, but as an occasion of a more perfect abolishing of sin; neither as willed by God, but permitted; foreseen by God's wisdom, effected by man's wickedness, yea in some sort effected by God, to wit, by God's universal concourse, but determined by man's depraved will, God's action being indifferent, or rather of its own nature, and as Gods, ordained to good, but by man's depraved will determined to evil; which yet again by the infinite goodness of God is made an occasion of our greatest good. So that, if it be demanded, whether God would that Adam should eat of the forbidden tree, or no? and if he would, why did he forbidden it? if he would not, why did he not hinder it? The answer is, that in some sort he would it, and again after some sort he would it not: he would it not, as a sin; he would it nevertheless as a mean, or rather as an occasion of a greater good. Wherefore he forbade it as a sin: he concurred with it, as universal cause of all things being, not as a particular cause, or agent in sin, as it was sin, though in some sense he would it (as hath been said) as a mean of an infinite greater good: and as the greatest occasion of showing his infinite wisdom, and goodness; of his wisdom, because he knew to produce such an excellent effect, of so infinite an evil; of his goodness likewise, in that being moved only by it, and for it, he was pleased to effect our greatest good, of the greatest evil: a work so excellent and admirable, as which could only proceed and flow from that only infinite ocean of goodness. Yea adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was an evident argument, that he remained free to sin, even after his sin: according to the pleasure and will of God: for such was his divine will, that Adam should be endued with free will, that it might be in his power to choose the good, and eschew the evil, not of himself, but by grace: so that thus sinning he showed his power, and consequently by the same sin he showed in some sort himself to remain according to God's divine will and pleasure with freedom to sin: for seeing that no sin can be committed without some actual exercise of free will, and that by the same exercise the precedent power is manifested, it followeth, that by this exercise, and action of Adam's free will, I mean his transgression, it was made manifest, that he was created, and always preserved according to his divine will, in that he was endued, and afterward remained with free will sufficient to sin, though insufficient in itself to the actions of grace. In this sense than we see that although Adam sinned, yet remained he according to Gods will, because he remained always endued with free will. Likewise, we may understand in an other sense, how Adam remained according to Gods will, yea and this even in regard of his sin; I mean, according to his permissive will: for Almighty God (as we have said before) out of his incomprehensible wisdom foreseeing the infinite good, which might proceed from thence, to wit, the hypostatical union, and being determined by his absolute and secret will, to effectuate the same, he permitted this sin of Adam, as a negative means, or rather occasion, of so excellent an end. But God (saith this heretic) would have had man to have persisted in that blessed estate, from which nevertheless he fell: how then was not Gods will more than his power, seeing he obtained not, that which he would? But here we may see both the malice and ignorance of this heretic, which both are the roots and springs of all heresies: his malice, in that he presumed against God himself; his ignorance, in that he taxeth that he understandeth not: for if he had understood either what belongeth to the free will of man, or rightly apprehended the power & wisdom of the omnipotent, he might easily have perceived, that the fall of our first father, did rather demonstrate the wisdom of God, then contradict his omnipotence, and will: for seeing it pleased his divine majesty to give us free will, and to place us in such estate, in which by his grace we might persist, and which being rejected, we might fall of ourselves: what can be more evident, but as that our perseverance should have been attributed to God, and to the right use of his grace, so our fall only unto ourselves, and the want of our concourse with his grace, the which in that estate was not only sufficient, but very abundant. Seeing therefore it was once in the power of our first father, to have withstood the temptation of Satan; and not to have cast off so easy a yoke, as was imposed him, with so abundant grace; he deserved no doubt to be deprived of that grace, thrust out of Paradise, yea finally to be disrobed of the beautiful rob of immortality. In the combination of which we may magnify, and admire the omnipotent wisdom, and infinite wise power of God, in that he knew and could so excellently combine justice, with mercy; the which two attributes, as they are to be found in all his works, so without all question most admirable in this: his justice, in not leaving unpunished so foul a fact as original sin; his mercy, in the merciful manner of the punishment: his justice again, in that he deprived man of the vesture of immortality; his mercy, even in the same penalty and deprivation of immortality, lest as Moses Barsephas doth most excellently answer in this point, ne ipsius pravitas foret immortalis, qualis est diaboli: lest his wickedness should become immortal, such as the Devils is, following the nature of the subject, to which it is adherent. Furthermore God therefore punisheth man with this merciful punishment of death, that thereby he considering the effect, might eschew the cause: or lastly, because out of this mortality of man he would produce a more perfect immortality in the same man: for God foreseeing that out of Adam's posterity should come an infinite multitude of martyrs, the sentence of death was pronounced against Adam, to the end that many of his posterity suffering death for the Redeemers sake, might supply the places of fallen spirits. But that we may return from whence we digressed, if God were therefore to be counted deficient in power, because he created Adam with such liberty, that he could contradict the commandment of his Creator: after the same manner might likewise be inferred, that now also he hath the like defect, or impotency; seeing that now also man hath the like liberty to transgress: because as he commanded Adam, that he should not touch the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: so likewise hath he commanded us his posterity, that we should follow the good, and eschew the contrary evil: now therefore if we do transgress this law, it must needs be God either allowing or contradicting this transgression: if it be by God's approbation, why doth he prohibit it? if contrary to his will, why doth he permit it? or if he permit that which is against his will, how can such a God be called omnipotent? or lastly, if he can hinder that which is evil, and doth not; how is he good, who consenteth, and concurreth so evil? To these I answer out of the former principles, that even this permission of sin doth most manifestly demonstrate the infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of God; his wisdom, in that out of this in a manner so infinite evil, he did work such an infinite good, as is the manifestation of his glory, and the incarnation of his Son; his power, in that he could, his goodness in that he would. But why (saith the adversary) did God prohibit Adam the eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil? what else could be his meaning, but lest he should be able to judge between good and evil, and consequently lest he should eschew the evil, and prosecute the good? how then is not God envious, or how can he be God, who envieth and prohibiteth that which is good? I answer, that God did neither absolutely decree that Adam should eat of this fruit, neither that he should not eat, though he did command him, that he should not eat, but left him to his own free will to eat, or not eat: he did forbid him to eat, not because the fruit was morally, or of itself good or evil, but in the issue; good, if he had abstained; evil, if he abstained not: good by obedience, evil by disobedience: where fore God did intend in this prohibition to try his obedience, and that only was respected in this commandment: so that if Adam had obeyed God, accordingly as was in his power by the grace of God, he should for a time have enjoyed that terrene Paradise, in which he was created, and afterward have been partaker of the celestial eternally with his Creator. Hence we see how impiously God is accused of wickedness, and envy in the forbidding of our first fathers the eating of the tree of good and evil; seeing that the eating of this fruit was indifferent of its own nature, as out of which neither good nor evil could proceed: but that which God did regard in this commandment, was our obedience or disobedience: in respect of which he was after a manner indifferent, neither absolutely decreeing the one, neither effectually willing the other: only this we may add, that God did desire and will our first father's abstinence, and therein required his obedience; but as this his divine will had not his efficacy, so did he and might permit the contrary for other respects worthy his divine providence and infinite wisdom, which have been already touched. Not of envy (as some have blasphemously imagined) lest Adam become immortal, for if this blasphemy, were consequent to the foresaid prohibition; certainly, God, who foresaw all future events, either would not have created man, or having created him, would not have placed him in Paradise so near unto the tree of life; or at least way, he might either have hidden, or not have created the tree of life. Wherefore the true reason, why he forbade him the tree of life, was (as Moses Barsephas well noteth) ne perpetuò viveret in peccato, lest he should live in perpetual death of sin, as the Devil doth, ever living, ever dying. Lastly, the adversary objecteth against the curse of the Serpent: for why (saith he) did God curse the Serpent? if he cursed him as the author of the evil committed, why did he not hinder it, lest it should be committed? but if he cursed him as author of that good, which was consequent unto the evil, how is that God called good, and not rather envious and wicked, who punisheth, yea envieth the author of such an excellent effect? Again, if neither of these was the cause of the Serpent's curse, how may God be excused of wilful maliciousness, or malicious foolishness? The answer to this blasphemy is patent out of that, which hath been already said out of the former objections, to wit, that God did therefore curse the Serpent as author of evil, neither did hinder him pretending the evil to the intent, that he might out of so infinite an evil, as was the transgression of the first Adam, work that infinite good of the incarnation of his Son, and birth of the second Adam: for though it be an argument both of his power, and goodness; ex bono efficere melius, of good to make better: yet it seemeth much more excellent, and convincing even our natural capacity, that he is infinitely potent, and good: who can ex nihilo perfectissimum producere effectum: vel ex pessimo efficere optimum; who can (I say) produce the most perfect, good, and most excellent effect, yea far exceeding all other created perfection and excellency, of nothing; yea even of that nothing which is most remote from any goodness, yea is the very privation of all goodness and excellency. CHAP. LXV. In which the objections of Manes are assoiled. MAnes that wicked heretic, with the rest of his sect do most blasphemously accuse the wisdom of God, as touching the foresaid commandment of abstaining from the tree of good and evil: for (saith he) doubtless when God did give this law, unto our first fathers, he thought, that they would obey it; which seeing they did not, God (as Manes objecteth) was deceived. Secondly, he accuseth God of unjust wrath and indignation: in that he condemned man for so small a matter, as the eating of an apple. Finally, he accuseth him of ignorance, mutability, and contradiction to himself; in that ignoring his future compassion towards man, he did frustrate the law, which he himself had made, yea and contradicted the sentence of death, as rashly pronounced by himself against Adam. Here we may see, how (as Tertullian saith) God of his infinite goodness and mercy suffereth himself to be dishonoured in his other infinite attributes, and deity: but that it may be apparent, that these blasphemies have not any ground, even in natural reason: we answer, that though all things, and consequently the disobedience of Adam was perfectly foreknown by God Almighty, yet nevertheless it was conformable to reason, that Adam being a reasonable creature should have this law of obedience prescribed unto him, so conformable to reason: first, for to manifest the absolute power, dominion, and authority of God the Creator over his creature; and the due subjection of the creature towards his Creator. Secondly, this law of obedience was most profitable unto man (though foreknown that it was to be violated by man) most profitable (I say) it was, both in regard of the manifestation of God's justice, and mercy: as also for the exercise and trial of the good, and bad; righteous, and unrighteous, a necessary object of the aforesaid attributes. Now if this law should therefore have been omitted, because God foreknew the transgression thereof; by the same reason, or rather no reason, no other law should have been prescribed unto man; seeing there is no law, either of nature or grace, which God in his foreknowledge did not foresee would be oftentimes violated by man. Furthermore, as touching the blasphemy against the wrath of God, I answer, that it is not to be attributed to God, as signifying any passion, or mutation in the immutable or impassable God; but that this shadow of change, or show of mutability, is attributed unto him, who in his nature is altogether immutable, because he seeing the wickedness of man, he worketh those effects, which in us be evident tokens, and signs of mutability and change. Nay secondly, I add, that after Adam had transgressed the commandment of God, God pronounced against him the aforesaid sentence of death, more moved by mercy, then of any anger or wrath: which we may evidently see in that he did not die the same day of his transgression, according as the sentence, which God pronounced against him, seemed to threaten; so that whether we respect the sentence given before Adam's disobedience, or the execution of the same after his sin, we may admire the infinite mercy of the Almighty in both, both in regard of Adam, and his posterity; as also in regard of the sentence threatened to be inflicted so immediately after their sin: so that even in his justice we may magnify his mercy, and say with the Psalmist, misericordia eius super omnia opera eius, that his mercy aboundeth in all his works, yea and is above all his works: because (as the Divines say) remunerat ultra condignum, punit citra condignum, he rewardeth our works far beyond their worth, which is none at all, unless it be in Christ; and punisheth our sins much less, than they deserve. To the other blasphemy, which Manes useth against the Almighty God, in accusing him of repentance, and mutability, I answer, that we must first suppose, what it is to repent, or to be sorry for any thing, which we have done: For repentance or sorrow supposeth ignorance in us, of future events, yea of such as are noxious or hurtful to those who are affected with the aforesaid passion; both which are far unfitting the allseeing science, and omnipotent power of God: who did not remit the rigour of this sentence, moved by sorrow or repentance, as it happeneth in us, but rather, as we have said before, by his infinite mercy and clemency, to the end that his infinite goodness and mercy might be the more manifest unto us. In like manner we may say, that when any sinner doth turn from his former being in sin, God Almighty in some sort may be said to remit the rigour of his sentence pronounced against him; and this not by reason of any ignorance, or mutable repenting himself of the former fact, or threatening (as Manes blasphemously objecteth) but rather he remitteth out of his infinite clemency, the sentence of damnation, which conditionally he had decreed, to wit, if the sinner had not repent himself of his sin: an example of which we find in the commination of doom and utter destruction threatened not absolutely, but conditionally against the Niuiuites, jonae 3. that they should utterly be destroyed within forty days, 4. Reg. 20. likewise against Ezechias, that he should die for his sins, whom nevertheless God pardoned upon their repentance: and the like also we find in others, most heinous offenders, against whom God having denounced his wrath, nevertheless pardoned upon their sorrow, contristation, and humiliation. Now as touching the lie, which this heretic objecteth against God, in that he threatened death unto man in the day of his transgression, which nevertheless was not inflicted: I answer, that as man is composed of body and spirit, so likewise the death threatened against him was both corporal and spiritual; which both were in some sort inflicted even in the very instant of his transgression: the spiritual in the separation of his spirit from God and his grace, wherein consisted his spiritual and supernatural life: the corporal in the perturbation of his affections and powers both spiritual and corporal, which was a kind of beginning of a never dying death, beginning in this life, and which according to the present justice of God, if it had been executed, was to have been consummated in the other life, or rather eternal death, if so be that this first lapse and fall had not been remitted, not of man's merit, but by God's mercy. CHAP. LXVI. The objections of Theodorus and Nestorius. THeodorus Bishop of Laodicea, and Nestorius' Patriarch of Constantinople, with divers others of the Greek Church, were of opinion, that sin was not the occasion of death, but that man should have died though he had not sinned: because mortality is consequent to nature, as immortality proceedeth only of grace. How then is it possible, unless God can contradict and deny himself, or that one of the divine decrees can be opposite to another, that God should first decree the immortality of man, then presently upon his transgression, the object being changed, God also should be changed in his decree: for either God foreknew man's fall, and his perseverance in grace for so small a space, or he foreknew it not: if not, how was he God? if he foreknew it, how is he so presently changed, and consequently also no God? Again, if we were deprived of the gift of immortality bestowed upon Adam, and in him upon all his posterity, how may it stand with the justice of God, and much more with his infinite mercy, that we should be punished for Adam's injustice, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust? Yea how standeth this even with the word of God, and his complaint by Ezechiel, chapter 18. verse 2. where God complaineth of this, as it seemeth, blasphemy of his people: What mean you, that you use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? which is as much, as to say, our forefathers have sinned, and we are punished for their sins. How may this stand with the justice of God, seeing God himself taxeth this as unjust, and as unjustly objected against him, in the third verse of the same chapter, where contesting against man's unrighteousness, he protesteth and proveth his own righteousness and just dealing, insinuating thereby, yea detesting the contrary as injustice, verse 3. As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, to wit, that the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; that is, that their fathers have sinned, and they were punished: against which he contesteth, and that by an oath, even by himself, in the latter end of the fourth verse, The soul that sinneth, it shall die, that is, all that sin shall die, and none shall die but those which sin: he giveth the reason in the beginning of the verse, and that with an ecce, behold, because he would have all to acknowledge his justice with man, and how he useth equality with all men; the father as the son, and the son as the father, every one according to his deeds in Christ, because all are equally his, who saith, Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth, it shall die: as who would say, and none else shall die, but who sinneth; which may be proved by the opposite justice, and is exemplified even by the Prophet, as that none shall be rewarded for another's righteousness, so none shall be punished for another's unrighteousness: for so the Prophet prosecuteth in the fift verse: But if a man be just, and do that which is lawful and right, and hath not eaten upon the mountains, neither lift up his eyes unto idols of the house of Israel, neither hath defiled his neighbour's wife, neither hath come near a menstruous woman, and hath not oppressed any, but hath restored to the debtor his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath given his bread to the hungry, and hath covered the naked with a garment; he that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, that hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgement between man and man, hath walked in my statutes, and kept my judgements to deal truly, he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord God. How then can it be true that Adam's posterity should be punished for his sin, or deprived of immortality, which God had decreed unto them for Adam's transgression? Or otherwise how can that be true which the same Prophet prosecuteth in the twentieth verse? The soul that sinneth, it shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. Where he prosecuteth throughout all the chapter, proving and approving the justice of God, together with the reproof of man's unrighteousness and injustice, especially from the 29. verse to the end, where he propoundeth and answereth the objections of his people: Yet (saith the house of Israel) the way of the Lord is not equal: O house of Israel, are not my ways equal? are not your ways unequal? Therefore I will judge you, O house of Israel, every one according to his ways, saith the Lord God: repent and turn yourselves from all your transgression, so iniquity shall not be your ruin; cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby you have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit: for why will you die, O house of Israel? for I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turn yourselves, and live. Now than if God have no pleasure in the death of a sinner, how hath he pleasure in his mortality, having created him immortal? or how hath he not pleasure in his death, whom for so small a matter as the eating of an apple, or some other such like fruit, he depriveth of immortality, yea contradicteth his own decree for the fulfilling of the aforesaid revenge of sin? Again, though we grant that Adam died for his sin and injustice, why should we not likewise say, that No, Melchisedech, Abraham, and others of the patriarchs and Prophets were restored unto immortality for their justice and righteousness? We know that God is always more prone to show his mercy, then to execute his justice: how then may it be said, that here he so withdraweth his mercy, and extendeth his justice? He often pardoneth the wicked for the godly men's sake, and never punisheth the just for the wickeds sin: from whence then is this his cruelty and unjust dealing against those which never committed any injustice? Moreover, the son of God was incarnate for Adam's sin: we ought to be thankful even to the devil, to ourselves, and to sin itself, as occasion of so great good, as was the restoring of mankind to a more blessed estate. Lastly, if Adam's sin was cause of his death, why did not the devils also die, seeing they sinned much more grievously? If you say they died spiritually, in that they were deprived of the grace of God, why might not the like death suffice also for Adam's sin? the death (I mean) of the soul, his body remaining as it was created, not subject to death? How did God justly execute his justice, inflicting a greater punishment upon Adam for a smaller offence, then upon the devils for a greater, depriving them only of their spiritual life, but Adam both of spiritual and corporal? These are the arguments of these heretics, against the just punishment which God did inflict upon our first father for his first offence of disobedience; by which they would conclude, that whether Adam had sinned, or remained in his former righteousness, whether he had eaten of the forbidden fruit, or abstained from it, he had nevertheless been subject to death, because he was created of his own nature mortal, which nature neither the eating of the forbidden fruit could make mortal, nor the abstinence from it immortal. Hence therefore they are emboldened to affirm, that wheresoever the Scripture maketh mention of Adam's sin, as cause of his corporal death, that it is to be understood figuratively, not that Adam's sin was properly the cause or the occasion of his death, but that the Scripture useth this phrase, to the end, that when Adam should hear of so severe a punishment, as the death of both body and soul, he might be terrified thereby from the committing of sin. The Scripture useth the like manner of speech in divers occasions, as in the 22. chapter of Genesis, God tempted or tried Abraham, which place must needs be understood figuratively; for God who seethe all things, as well future, as present, or past, hath no need of any trial or experience. The like kind of threatening we have in the fourth chapter of Exodus, where it is said, that God would have slain Moses, which places are not to be interpreted literally as they sound, but figuratively, as all other places of Scripture (according to the rule of S. Austin) when otherwise they signify any absurdity, as this of the death of Adam doth, because it contradicteth the decree of God concerning his immortality. Nevertheless the contrary exposition is most firmly to be holden as concerning the immortality of man before his fall, and mortality after and by his transgression: not that there was any mutation in God, but transgression in man: God predetermined according to his foresight, man sinned according to that foresight, not that the foresight was cause of man's fall, but rather man's fall was the object of God's foresight: insomuch that God had not foreseen man's fall, if man had not been to fall; neither man had fallen, if God had not foreseen his fall: so that though it be necessary that God foresee that which is future, yet that is not necessarily future, which God doth foresee; for so seethe he things future as they are future, not imposing any necessity in things not necessarily future by his foresight: which as it is necessary in regard of things necessary, so is it contingent in regard of things contingent: contingent (I say) in respect of the object, though necessary in respect of his own entity and being; or as the school-divines do explicate it, ad intra necessary, ad extra contingent: insomuch that all the mutation is in the outward and created objects, nothing at all can reflect or redound unto God. Wherefore though Almighty God had eternally decreed the immortality of man in his first creation; yet was there no mutation in God, because upon his transgression he made him mortal, and subject to death: for as both the degrees were eternal, so the foresight of the event of both was likewise eternal; the mutation issued only from the object, and remained in the same: immutability was always, and remaineth in God, because as he had foreseen, so he determined; and as he determined, so likewise he foresaw. Lege ad Rom. cap. 5. & 7. Hence it is is, that seeing the Scripture so often witnesseth, that death was the effect of sin, and that if sin had not reigned in our souls, neither should death have destroyed our mortal bodies; questionless, though man was created immortal by grace, yet is he justly deprived of that immortality, and become subject to death through his transgression. Now as touching the absurdities so ignorantly (if not blasphemously) inferred upon the foresaid doctrine, I answer, that though God do reprove that ancient proverb of the jews, and their comparison of the sour grape, with other the like contestations of silly worms with their Creator, that these (I say) are principally to be understood in regard of actual sin, as is plain out of the text itself, and not habitual or original, of which the text speaketh not. But if it be referred (as some have done) even unto original sin, yet neither can the justice of God be any whit impeached thereby: for though we eat not the sour grape, neither taste the forbidden fruit in ourselves, yet did we both taste and eat in Adam, who was our head: yea though we tasted not the fruit itself in ourselves, yet we contracted the sourness thereof, and the effect of the sin, yea the sin itself in our souls: for though the action was only in our head, yet the passion, and effect was in all the members; as is more largely explicated above in the question of the manner, nature, and essence of this sin, in which all the difficulties concerning this and the like points are answered. Neither can it be inferred hence, that God doth punish the just for the unjust, or revenge the father's wickedness in the sons: (which nevertheless were no injustice, seeing the sons are in some sort deemed as parts of the fathers, and consequently may justly be punished for their father's offences) but rather that every man is punished for his own original sin; which though it be contracted from Adam, yet it is inherent in every man's own nature. Again, seeing Adam of his own nature was created mortal, and by grace only was to be preserved immortal, there was no injustice in God towards Adam's posterity in that they were deprived of original justice, but this proceeded from Adam's demerit for himself, and his posterity. Especially seeing that the covenant was so concluded between GOD and Adam, that qua die comederet, moriretur, that his eating should be his death; his abstinence, life: with this difference that death should be only from himself, as sin had been only from his will, but life should have been only from God, and the preservation from sin, from God's grace only. Hence we may understand how there is no injustice or unrighteousness in God, that although Adam was created immortal, yet we should be borne of Adam mortal, and subject to death: seeing he was justly deprived of immortality by his sin, and we by him. Lastly, if we read the sacred text, we shall find it neither to be injustice, or any novelty that the sons be punished for their father's offences; for so it is in the 1. of Samuel the 15. because I remember that which Amalech did unto Israel, going out of Egypt, go thou Saul, and fight against Agag, and his people: and the 2. of Samuel 18, it is said, that the wives of David should be defiled for David's sin. again in the 2 of Samuel the 21 it is written, how David hanged the sons of Resphe for the Gabaonites sake. Moreover, if it were true that which the Poet sang unto his friend; delicta maiorum immeritus lues: thou shalt bear the offences of thy forefathers without thine own deservings, then certainly the question, B. King upon jonas, cap. 1. v. 7. as a reverend and learned Prelate well noteth, were more difficult, but who is able to say, my heart is clean, though I came from an unclean seed? though I were borne of a Morian, I have not his sin: though an Amorite were my father, and my mother a Hittite, I have not their nature: though I have touched pitch, I am not defiled: I can wash my hands in innocency, and say with a clear conscience, I have not sinned? but if this be the cause of all, that there is not a soul in the whole cluster of mankind, that hath not offended, though not as principal as Achan in taking the cursed thing, Choran in rebelling, David in numbering the people, yet as accessary in consenting and concealing; if neither principal nor accessary in that one sin, yet culpable in a thousand others committed in our life time, (perhaps not open to the world, but in the eyes of God as bright as the Sun in the firmament; for the Scorpion hath a sting, though he hath not thrust it out to wound us, and man hath malice, though he hath not outwardly showed it) it may be some sins to come which God foreseeth; and some past, which he recounteth, shall we stand in argument with God, as man would plead with man, and charge the judge of the quick and the dead with injurious exactions? I have paid the things, that I never took, I have borne the price of sin, which I never committed? You see already the ground of mine answer. We have all sinned father and son, rush and branch, and deservedly are to expect that wages from the hands of God, which to our sin appertaineth. Besides it cannot be denied, but those things, which we part in our conceits, by reason that distance of time and place have sundered them, some being done of old, some of late, some in one quarter of the world, some in another; those doth the God of knowledge unite, and view them at once, as if they were done together; out of all which conceived together (as the allunderstanding wisdom of God doth conceive and unite them) we may well infer that the judgements of God be as just, and his ways as right as his mercy, and goodness, and providence extended to all, that as there is no work of man, not fully recompensed, or rewarded with overplus; so there is no sin, whether actual, or original, not justly punished, citra, as the Divines hold, but never ultra condignum, less, I mean, than the sin doth deserve, never more than the fact doth require, God's mercy being (as the Scripture witnesseth) over all his works; and always in some sort more extended than his justice: for though it be true, that as his justice is included in his mercy, even formally (as most Divines hold) so like wise his mercy is included in his justice, and so both equal in nature and being: yet such is the goodness of our infinite good God, that in the execution, & ad extra, (as the Divines term it) his mercy should always be extended further than his justice, and his just judgements always in somewhat at least, detained, or after a sort restrained by his mercy. Wherefore as we are wont to say, of famous, worthy, and excellent men, in caeteris vicit omnes, in hoc seipsum, in other things he exceeded all men; in this, he overcame himself; The like we may affirm of God; that he is incomparable, in all attributes, and works, but in this he exceedeth himself. To him therefore, as infinite, merciful, and everliving God, three persons and one indivisible deity, be ascribed all honour, power, majesty, and dominion, now and for evermore. AMEN. FINIS.