THE ART OF LOGIC, DELIVERED IN THE PRECEPTS OF ARISTOTLE AND RAMUS. WHEREIN 1. The agreement of both Authors is declared. 2. The defects in Ramus, are supplied, and his superfluities pared off, by the Precepts of Aristotle. 3. The precepts of both, are expounded and applied to use, by the assistance of the best Schoolmen. By THO: SPENCER. LONDON Printed by john Dawson for Nicholas Bourne, at the South entrance of the Royal Exchange. 1638. TO THE READER. REader; The publishing of this Treatise, submits it to thy judgement. It may be thou wilt judge it of little worth, because thou esteemest 1. the Author's credit to be small, 2. the Art itself to be obscure, and 3. of little use, and 4. the work to be imperfect, and 5. unfitly put forth in the English tongue. But this Preface shall make it clear, thou art mistaken in all these particulars. 1. Though my own credit be small: yet this need not hinder thy good liking, because my labour is but to collect out of other Authors. So that if the credit of Authors will please thee, I need not fear thy displeasure, for here thou hast Authors of all ages, and of the best account, yea Aristotle himself, the Prince of Philosophers (as the learned use to call him) leads thee the way, and guides the whole game. 2. Some account the art itself of Logic to be obscure, and therefore hard to be attained: but though this were true, yet is it worthy of all that honour that is due to any humane art whatsoever, because the difficulty ariseth not from the thing itself: (for it agrees to humane reason, being no more but a comprehension of precepts, directing the use of true reason) but from man's defect, as being either unable for want of natural parts, or unwilling through idleness to learn it. But grant this Art were in itself obscure, yet is it no less honourable for that, because silver, gold, and other precious metals are hard to obtain: yet are they highly esteemed of (as daily experience shows) for what labour will not men take, and what hazard will they not undergo to get and hold them? Nay I add further, that the difficulty of attaining unto this Art, makes it more honourable when it is attained; for things hardly gotten are rare, and rare things are precious, especially when they are of excellent use: and such is this Art of Logic, as my answer to the next will show. 3. Many are of opinion, that Logic is unprofitable, & of little use, as serving to exercise the wits of young Scholars, and that therefore when they grow unto years, they do wholly neglect it. This judgement is erroneous; for whatsoever tends to some good, is truly profitable: and this is the case with the precepts of Logic, because hereby (in some sort) is healed the wound we received in our reason by Adam's fall: and this daily trial teacheth, because by the precepts of Logic, things hidden and dark, are clearly objected to our judgement. Truth and falsehood is made to stand naked before our knowledge. It may be some will conceive that man's natural Logic will serve sufficiently for the foresaid ends, and that therefore there is no need of precepts. I answer. True it is, many man's natural parts are ripe and prompt, so as they are speedy and sound in judging. But this is not every man's case, therefore unto such the precepts of Art are needful. Yea, I say, that such precepts are needful to the promptest wits, for man hath not now so ample use of reason as Adam had at his first Creation, and therefore he needs the help o● artificial precepts. To conclude, since the Art of Logic is no more but a Director of true Reason: the more logical a man is, the more is he like a man, and the less logical, the less like a man who is a reasonable Creature. If this be true (as it is most true) then must it be granted that the precepts of this Art, are profitable for the use of man in the highest degree. 4. This work is not imperfect, because no precept, essential unto Logic, is wanting. I have indeed omitted the modality and conversion of propositions and Elenches: but this breeds no defect in the art, for these three appertain to the exposition of the precepts of this Art: they are no essential precepts thereof. 1. The modalitie of propositions doth explicate the subject or predicate of the proposition wherein it is. 2. The Conversion of a proposition is no more, but the right placing of things not rightly placed in a proposition. And 3. Elenches are the detections of falsehood in the form of syllogisms. 5. Our Mother Tongue doth not disgrace this Art of Logic to the English, no more than Greek did to the Grecians, or the Latin to the Romans: for if it had, then would not Aristotle have written his Logic in Greek, nor Tully his in Latin. We have the holy Scriptures in our mother tongue, without disgrace thereunto, why then should it be disgraceful to Logic? Besides, some men understand not Latin, & yet have they need of Logic, because they need the helps to the use of reason. Thus (I hope) full satisfaction is given to every doubt that might hinder thy profit by this art now offered unto thee: so as nothing more seems needful, or worthy thy labour and mine: therefore here I will end all that I have to say for this thing. THO: SPENCER. London the 24 of june. 1628. THE ART OF LOGIC CHAP. I. The Definition of Logic. LOGIC is an Art of discoursing well. Ramus. In this sense, it is called Dialectic. This sentence defineth, or setteth out the whole nature of Logic. Aristotle hath the same for substance. Top: lib. 1. Cap. 2. In these words; Dialectic is profitable unto Congresse, Excercitation, Philosophical science. Ramus confesseth in his Schools upon this place alleged, that, this sentence comprehendeth (well near) all the notable things of Logic: and therefore, (in his judgement,) it is a definition of it. The thing itself doth say no less: for, the three words attributed by him to Logic or Dialectic, do signify, discoursing well. Ramus makes discoursing the end of Logic: Aristotle doth the same, by the word profitable, for, as we learn by Thom: 1a. 2ae. q: 7. art. 2. incor. q. 8. art. 3. Sed. con. Every good, ordained to some end, is said to be profitable: That which tendeth to some end is called profitable. Logic is Natural. Artificial. Natural Logic is either the understanding itself, in that respect, that of its proper, and specifical difference, it hath a power of discoursing; or rather, the certain knowledge of the manner, or ways of discoursing, which the reason itself, bringeth forth, without the help of any order, or method. Thus fare the jesuites (in their preface before the Organon Colleg: Conimbr: q. 6. art. 2. col 62. Logic is here taken for artificial, not natural: so the same jesuites tell us in that preface. col: 67. Aristotle implies this distinction, in the first chapter, and first book of his Rhetoric: A man (saith he) is a Logician by nature, or art. [Logic Dialectic.] Both these names are used indifferently, to set out the thing defined: and, we have the frequent use of learned men to avow it: The jesuites do expressly teach it, in their Commentary upon Aristotle's Organon, Col: 26. near to the end, in these words, The whole art of discoursing, is set out, by, either the word Logic, or the word Dialectic. And, they do not barely avouch it; but, they confirm it with plenty of proofs, as the Reader may find, if he please to consult the place-alledged. Both the words do signify no more, but, a thing appertaining unto the use of reason; therefore, the jesuites in the same Preface, q. 4. art. 4. Col: 40. do conceive, that, Logic (in an universal apprehension) is no more, but, a director of the art of reason. And, Suarez hath the same thing, in his Metaphysics disp. 39 D. [Is:] This word, is the band, to tie both parts of the definition together. By it, the later part is affirmed of the former, and, it signifies an essential attribution (that is) that, the latter part of the definition doth give being unto the former; so as, the first doth consist in the second. [An art:] The word art, doth set out the general nature of Logic: (that is) it doth signify, that nature which Logic hath in common with diverse other things: as, Grammar, and Rhetoric etc. It is called an art, in the most common use of men; sometime it is called also a science, and, that we find in the jesuites Preface q. 4. art. 3. Aristotle doth use both the words indifferently, as signifying the same thing, in his Preface to the Metaphysics and first Chapter. The word art signifies, a multitude of Precepts, orderly digested and approved by use. And, thus the jesuites teach in their Preface, q. 6. art. 2. and Aristotle hath the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysics and first Chapter. Where, we have these words; Art is gotten by experience, experience makes art. Art is made, when as one universal thing, is framed out of many experimentalls: so as, to do by experience, differs nothing from art. He brings the same thing, and the reason of it, Poster lib 2. cap. 19 The word [An] is used to show, that Logic is one entire art, that cannot be divided, nor is subordinate to any other art, as Geometry, and many other arts be. Logic is usually called, the art of arts, the mistress and director of all other: and, there is good cause why, for, Logic disputeth of all things, and is common unto every being, as Aristotle hath taught us in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, cap. 2. text 4. Experience showeth, that Aristotle said true, for, there is no art, but by the help of Logic, all the precepts thereof are framed together, in a due order, and the parts of each singular precept, are so fitted together, that we may find truth from falsehood. [Of discoursing] These words, do assign the special nature of Logic, the very first, and intrinsecall being thereof, and contain the form, and the end: (I say) they contain them both, because the form is the fountain of the end, and the end is the continuation of the form; as we shall see hereafter. The end of Logic, is Next. Remote. The remote end of Logic, is the very act itself of discoursing: but, we speak not of this end of Logic in the present definition. The next end of Logic, is to prescribe a way, and rules of discoursing; so as the end of Logic, is a framing of the means of discoursing; so say the jesuites in their Comment upon Aristotle's Organon, and the Preface thereto, Col. 27.55. So, likewise saith Gillius, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. The art of Logic delivereth ways, and rules of discoursing. [To discourse] (As it is here used) is to declare one thing that is less known, by another thing that is more known. This we have in the jesuites Preface col. 27. and 62. As for example, He that knows not what a man is, is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature: the addition of rationality unto man, shows what man is. So likewise, when we say, God is a spirit, infinite in all perfection; we inform him that is ignorant, and knows not what God is. In this very thing, this art of Logic doth differ from all other arts whatsoever: for Logic ends in speculation, and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another: all other arts, be practical: they concern man's outward or transient actions, as their next end: as, Grammar, and Rhetoric tendeth unto man's speech, Geometry unto measuring, Arithmetic unto numbering, etc. That art (saith Okam) is practical, which directeth us unto the doing of a thing to be wrought, In 3. dist. q. 11. lit. V Yea, in this, man's knowledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels: in that they behold the things in themselves, as they are in themselves, distinct each from other: they do not know one thing less known, by the light and reflection of another thing, that is better known: wherefore their knowledge, is called intellection, ours is called rationality. [Well] This word, seems (unto some) to be superfluous; and, a man would think, that the jesuites were of that opinion, because they define Logic, to be no more, but an art of discoursing, coll. 27. so Gillius, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. yet, indeed, in other places, they have as much as this word comes to: for, thus they writein their Preface the last question, col. 70. He is a good Logician, which doth exercise himself in each thing well, and diligently: and, Suarez doth join with them, in his Metaphysics disp. 39 D. Logic (saith he) is an art, directing the operation of the understanding, to exercise itself artifically, and according to reason. And all these Authors do add, that word to very good purpose; for, thereby Logic is distinguished from Sophistry, which is only a deceiving science: A Sophister seems to know, but indeed, knows not, in the truth of the thing, as we learn from Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, lib. 4. cap. 2. text. 4. And thus much shall suffice, for the opening of the several parts of the definition of Logic. That we may put a final end, to the matter in hand, we must remember, that the word discoursing, implieth arguments, wherefore we must now see what an argument is. An argument is that, Ramus. which hath a force to argue. Altissidiorensis saith in his Preface, lit. F. an argument, is a reason, that giveth us knowledge of a thing that is doubtful: Aristotle saith, that, arguments are such, as whereby faith (Logically) may be made, of the thing that is spoken of. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur etc. [That] This word importeth, the general nature of an argument (that is) the thing which is common to arguments of every kind: and signifieth a notion, which our understanding doth apprehend, a resultancy or reflection, proceeding from a being, objected to our understanding. [Which hath a force to argue] That is, hath of its nature a power, aptitude, or fitness, to bring the thing, objected unto our understanding, into the knowledge, and intuition thereof. I omit to give instance of these things, because, that will better be done in setting out the nature of particular Arguments: Wherefore, now, we have fully done, with the first precept of Logic; I will proceed to the second. CHAP. II. The Distribution of Logic. LOGIC hath two parts, the Finding out of arguments. Ramus. Disposing of arguments. This precept must have the second place: for, the nature of the things themselves doth require it: because by this, we come to know, what particulars are wrapped up in the former precept, and, Aristotle in the 6. Book of his Topics, and latter end of the first Chapter, requires, that, the thing defined, be distributed into parts: Ramus took this precept out of the second Chapter of Aristotle's Categories, where we have these words: Those things, which are contained in Logic, be without complexion. with complexion. I said, Ramus followed Aristotle in this partition, and, the thing itself shows it; for, they both divide Logic, into two parts; The first part in Logic (according to Aristotle) are things without complexion: so are they, to Ramus, as his own words do witness, when he terms them, Several respects of things, considered alone, and by themselves. Aristotle gives, his incomplexed things no name: but, thereby he means arguments, as they are undisposed, as, his next precept doth show, and, Ramus gives them that name expressly. Ramus calls the first part of Logic invention: and, so doth Aristotle too, as we may gather from the 32. chapter, of the first book of his Priorums: Where, a little after the beginning, he requires, a faculty of inventing, in him, that makes a Syllogism: but, more plainly, and fully: we find the same thing, in the first Chapter of the eight book of his Topics; To find out (saith he) the place, from whence a man may argue, appertains to Logic: therefore, unto the first part of Logic, for it can have no other place. Ramus calls, the second part of Logic, disposition. So doth Aristotle also, in the place last alleged, where he requires of a Logician, to dispose singular things, by themselves: and, he saith, that, this disposition is proper to a Logician; and, therefore, belongs to Logic; and, consequently, it is a second part thereof: for, it cannot be the first: yea, that Aristotle meant thus, doth undoubtedly appear; because, he appoints his Logician, first, to find out the places, from whence t● argue; and then, in the second place, to dispose them, being so found out. [Two parts] That is, the precepts of Logic, tend unto two things, or ends: and, they be called parts, because, all those precepts be shared, or parted between these two ends: some of them appertain to the one, and the rest unto the other. [Finding out] To find out, sometime signifies, to discover a thing that is secret; but, here it is not so taken, but, the meaning is, that, the precepts of Logic, do assign the seats, and places of arguments, and describe, and set forth the nature of them: and so much for the general Distribution of Logic. CHAP. III. Of the seats of Arguments in general. Aristotle assigneth ten places, or seats of arguments, in the fourth Chapter of his Categories: in these words: Those things, which we find in Logic, without all conjunction, do signify: 1 Substance; as, a man, a beast, etc. 2 Quantity; as, two or three cubits. 3 Quality; as, white, etc. 4 Relation; as, double, half, etc. 5 Where; as, in the field, etc. 6 When; as, yesterday, the year past. 7 The place; as, he sitteth, etc. 8 To enjoy; as, to be armed, etc. 9 Todoe; as, to cut, etc. 10 To suffer; as, to be cut, etc. He repeats the same doctrine in the ninth Chapter of his first book of the Topics; and in both places, he doth explicate them by certain properties, that be common to them all jointly; viz. 1. They neither affirm, nor deny. 2. They be neither false, nor true. 3. A conjunction being added to them, they contain negation, or affirmation, truth, or falsehood. 4. All propositions are framed from them. In the fift Chapter of his Categories, and in his Prior. lib. 1. cap. 27. Eorum igitur. Post. lib. 1. cap. 22. he doth divide them thus. These ten, be Either, subjected only. Predicated only. Or, subjected, and predicated, also. This distribution, is fitly set out by Altisiodore, in his Preface A. and B. Where, he hath these words: An Argument, is that, which proveth: or is proved. This is all, that I find, touching arguments in general. Aristotle delivers the doctrine of Substance (which is the first seat of arguments) in the fift Chapter alleged, which containeth these four things: 1. A substance, is every thing, of which we may say, that, it is. We find the same thing in Thomas, Whatsoever (saith he) is essential to a thing, appertaineth unto substance, 1. p.q. 77. art. 1. ad 1m. 2. Substance is First: as every singular & individual thing. Second: as Genus and species. 3. Genus, and species, signify substances, by a figurative speech, not properly, they signify, rather, the manner, according to which, a thing is. 4. A singular thing, is most properly, a substance; because, all other things, be attributed thereunto, and that, attributed unto none. Thus, have I set down, all that I find in Aristotle, touching the nature of those arguments, which are contained in the first place, or seat of arguments: (for this time we must omit the consideration of the second substance; for, that hath the last place in this first part of Logic) The first substance comes now to be handled: Thomas doth wholly subscribe unto Aristotle, for this distinction, and explication of substance, reported out of Aristotle, and, he shows the same, in this short sentence: viz In the name of first substance, is intended the nature of universal and parts. 1. p.q. 29. art. 3. ad 2m. And, for further explication, he saith, 1. p. q 75. art. 2. ad 2m. A first, or individual substance, may be taken two ways: one way, for every thing that hath a substance; another way, for a complete subsistency, in the nature of any species: from whence, a man's hand may be called a first substance, or an individual thing, after the first sort: but not after the second: so also, a man's soul, may be called a first substance, or a singular thing in the first sort: because, it is (as it were) a thing, that subsisteth: but, that which is compounded of soul, and body, is called, a first substance, or an individual being, in the second sense. Unto this place, must be referred, every individual effect, as it consisteth by force of all the causes, and, every individual subject, that receiveth any outward change, whether it be by the substracting of something enjoyed, or the receiving of something that is added. The nature of these effects, and subjects, is delivered by Aristotle, in his tenth place, or seat of arguments, viz. of suffering. I say, they are contained there; for, in the judgement of Thomas. 1. p.q. 79. art. To suffer, is no more, but, to lose things enjoyed, whether appertaining to nature, or not appertaining thereto, or, to be brought from power to act: and therefore, Aristotle's tenth seat, of suffering, importeth the whole nature, of every individual effect, and subject, as it is an effect, and subject. Now, I conceive, that, this is wholly agreeable unto Aristotle's meaning; because, in his doctrine of predicated arguments, he speaks not a word, of effects, and subjects. This Doctrine is peculiar to Aristotle: Ramus doth not acknowledge it; for, he hath not a word of it: It may be, he conceived, that, 1. To set down all the seats of arguments in one place together, would breed a needle's repetition. 2. These single terms did not appertain to Logic. 3. The first substance, or thing subjected, in every sentence, hath not the nature of an argument. It is very likely, that, he thought thus; because, this doctrine of Aristotle hath been anciently received; therefore, he would not departed from it unless he had some reason for it: and I conceive, he had no reason, but these 3. I answer, these three arguments be insufficient: The first, because Aristotle doth never repeat; or handle these ten seats of arguments twice: but, in stead of them sometime he brings in the doctrine of a definition, Property, Genus, Accident, as the things, which are contained, in those ten seats of arguments: and, this we find in the 8. and 9 chapters of the first book of his Topics. Some other time, he sets out, the nature of other arguments: but, they are such, as are either, contained in these 4. or arise from them; and, (at most) he doth but explicate at large, the same things, that he had set down summarily, in the 10. places aforesaid. Neither, is the second reason good: for, those 10. things, are propounded, not as me●re and simple beings: but, in respect of that reflection, or relation which ariseth out of them, unto our understanding; for, he doth intent them, as they may be fit to argue, and serve unto the framing of disputations, either in single propositions, or in syllogisms, as himself expressly showeth, in the 8. and 9 chapters alleged: and, this is also evident, by the properties which he assigneth unto them: viz, They contain truth, or falsehood, affirmation, or negation, when one of them is attributed to the other. The third also is insufficient, for the first substance, or subject part of every sentence, hath truly, and properly, the nature of an argument, for, it hath a relation, or emanation unto many things, that may be added, or attributed to it: so as, we conceive it to be, a receptive thing, 1. of the causes whereof it is compounded, and constituted. 2. of the properties flowing from it, 3. and of outward additions, whereby it is beautified and made to differ, and descent from other, and whereby it is made equal, or unequal, like or unlike unto others: as we shall plainly see, when we come to the particulars; and, it is plain, that Aristotle understood that argument, which he calls the first substance, after this sort: for, in the said 5 chapter of his Categories, he saith, it is proper unto the first substance to receive contraries, as sickness, and health, blackness, and whiteness, and thereby to be changed, from well to ill, from white to black. The only doubt is, whether an individual effect, and subject be some ways predicated or not. Ramus saith yea; and brings them as predicated arguments. Aristotle doth not so, and no doubt, he hath the truth. No individual effect, is predicated. I have three reasons for it: first, we never find any such predication, in the formal writings in the schools, 2. No man can say, this individual thing consisting of soul, and body, is this man: for, the predicate is less known than the subject; The subject engendereth distinct and certain knowledge: because, it comprehendeth all the causes, but no man will say so, of the predicate, nor so much, 3. The authority of the schools is against it. I will allege Thomas for them all. An integral whole (saith he) 1. p. 1. 77. art. 1. ad 1m. is not predicated of all the parts together, unless improperly as when we say, these walls, this foundation, and roof, is this house. For the subject; the matter is yet more clear, we cannot say, this learning, is this man. Thomas saith truly 1. p. q. 29. art. 3. ad 3m m Accidents do man's est the subject: but he never said, nor any man else, that, the subject doth manifest the accident; and no marvel why: for, if the subject be predicated of the accident, than we must conceive, that, the accident is without, and before the subject: but no man will say so: therefore, we may conclude, the individual effect, and subject, are fitly comprehended under the name of a first substance. Thus, I have set down, and explicated, the general nature of arguments; and, the special nature of that argument, which is always subjected or argued. In the next place, I come to those arguments, which be always predicated. CHAP. FOUR The distribution of predicated Arguments. Arguments be Positive Consenting absolutely. Ramus. after a sort Dissenting. Comparative. A positive argument, is that which 〈◊〉 attributed simply, and absolutely considered in itself: not compared with others. A consenting argument is that, which is predicated of the subject affirmatively. I Find this doctrine of positive arguments, delivered by Aristotle also, and I will show it in his doctrine of consenting arguments; in the second chapter of his Categortes, he saith, some arguments be of the subject, and other some, in the subject: those I say be in the subject, which are no parts of it, nor can be without that thing in which they are. The same thing is taught by Thomas, yet more plainly, 1. p. q. 25. art. 6. In. cor. Some arguments (saith he) be of the essence, and other some, without the essence of the subtect, of which they are predicated. I say, this of Thomas, and that of Aristotle are the same, with the last two branches, of Ramus his division: or (at least) it is comprehended in them: for, those that be of the essence, do absolutely agree with the subject, of whose essence they be. They that be in the subject, but without the essence thereof do agree to the subject after a sort, seeing therefore, they agree in those two last branches, they must agree also in the former branches of the division: seeing, every argument that agrees absolutely, doth consent positively with the subject, of which they be predicated; and consequently, it is enough to the understanding of the whole, if we do explicate, and prosecute, those two last branches: and, because I suppose, that the terms of Aristotle, and Thomas, be more significant, and fit, I think it best to follow them. [Of the essence] By these words, are set out such arguments as be essential unto the thing, of which they are predicated: now, all the causes be of this kind, for as much, as the effect is constituted by all the causes, as Thomas hath taught us in 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad. 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes, (that is) each one in its kind, and manner of working; for, all of them, do concur, and bestow their force, unto the procuring of the thing to be. These arguments be all comprehended in the 9 place of arguments viz. To do. CHAP. V The Definition of a Cause. A Cause is that, by force whereof, Ramus. a thing is. THis argument, which we call a Cause, is sometimes taken for every thing whereupon another follows: and so saith Okam, 1. dist. 1. q. 3. lit. N. wherefore (as the same Okam saith) 1. dist. 41. lit. F. A Cause is taken two ways: Sometimes, for every thing that hath another thing, as an effect thereof; and, sometime also, for a proposition, whereof another doth follow: thus fare Okam. A Cause in this place, is taken, not so largely, as in Okam● first and third senses: but, in the second. A Cause in this notion, is also taken for the thing itself which doth cause; and sometimes also, for the nature of Causing, or, for the thing, as it doth exercise Causallitie in act, or, for the relation of Causing: A Cause, is taken in the second sense, in this definition; wherefore, A Cause is that, of which the effect, even by itself dependeth. Thus fare the jesuites in their Preface unto Porphyrte. By this it is manifest, that, Ramus, and Aristotle, do fully agree in the defining of a Cause, and in the explication of that definition: therefore, we need not say more for the opening thereof; a few examples will make it easily understood; but, we may not do that in this place, lest we be forced to repeat the same thing again, when we come to the particulars. CHAP. VI The Distribution of a Cause. There be foureCauses: Ramus. the Efficient, and Matter, Form, and End. THere is an universal agreement in this precept also. Aristotle makes them these four, as we may find, in the 11. chapter of the second book of his Postertorums; his words be these: There be 4. Causes 1. That which showeth what a thing is. 2. That which must be when the thing is. 3. That which moveth first. 4. That for which a thing is. He hath the same thing in the fift book of his Metaphysics and 23 chapter. Thomas doth follow him, and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art. 3. in cor. and no man thinks otherwise: therefore, I will descend, to unfold the nature of the particulars. CHAP. VII. Of the Efficient Cause. The Efficient Cause is that, Ramus. from which, the thing is. [Efficient] This word imports no more; but, to do, or to bring to pass: and, therefore, it signifieth, the office of all the Causes, and consequently, it seems not fit to be given unto any one Cause distinctly: yet notwithstanding, we must know, that there is good reason thus to call it; else, the learned of all ages would not have given it that name; yea, the very nature of it deserves we should call it so: as we shall see in the next passage. [From which] These words do set out the nature, or office of that Cause, which is called Efficient: and signify the original, or fountain, from whence the effect doth receive tts being. I say the effect, and I mean the whole effect: for, this Cause doth join together all the other Causes, whereof the effect is compounded: as namely, it bestoweth the form upon the matter, and doth destinate the matter form unto the producing of something that is good: and therefore, it deserves well to be called Efficient. The form doth make the effect to be of this, or that kind: the matter form, doth make the effect to be this, or that individual thing: the end makes it fit for this or that good: but, the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause only, doth give being unto the effect in the event. We have many examples of this Cause, and the operation thereof; we find one in the second of Genesis, the seaventh verse, where it is said, God form man, of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a living soul. In this example, the making of man is attributed unto God: therefore God is said to be the Efficient Cause of man: the office of this efficiency, is placed in joining the form unto the matter; he framed him of the dust, there is the matter, and breathed life into him, and thereby the form is imposed on the matter, and then, God did destinate him to an end, viz. The actions of life, thereby he made him a living soul. We have another the like example in the 11. of Genesis, the 3. and 4. ver. where it is reported; that, The men of the earth, did build a high tower of brick, and slime; for a memorial of their name. The men of the earth, are made the builders of the tower, and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole work: they take brick, and frame it into a tower; therefore, they join the matter and form together: they destinate the same unto an end; viz. the continuance of their name on earth. And, thus much shall suffice, to set out the nature of the efficient cause. We should now divide an efficient cause into the several kinds; but, that we cannot: for (as Ramus truly says) they are unknown unto us, therefore we will set down, the diverse, and various manner, wherein the efficient cause doth work: for that is well known, and doth help us much, in the understanding of the office of thus Cause. The efficient cause doth work, By itself. By accident. A Cause doth then work by itself, Ramus. when it worketh by force of, and according unto the inbred fitness thereof. We find this distinction, and the explication thereof, in the Schools of all ages. The efficient cause (saith Thomas) works, by itself, or by accident; the first is, when it month by its own proper virtue: The second, when something is removed therefrom, or that which remains, is hindered from working, 1a. 2●. q. 76. art. 1. in cor. If we join Okam unto Thomas, we shall find this matter fully opened; A Cause by accident (saith Okam. 1. dist. 2. q. 10. lit. B. H.) is that, which worketh by a thing different from itself, and a cause, which works by itself is that, which causeth the effect according to its proper nature, and not according to some other thing, which outwardly doth befall it. The efficient doth work by itself, in natural things, when it moves according unto the instinct, and inbred disposition of nature: as when the living Creature seethe, eateth, sleepeth, avoideth known danger. The plants grow upright, bring forth leaves, and fruit, in due season; So doth it work by itself in the intellectual creature, when man moves himself unto doing, by the direction of true reason, and the unrestrained, and free choice of the will. Natural things do work by accident, when the instinct of nature is suppressed, or diverted. The intellectual creature works by accident, when the judgement of reason is erroneous, and the choice of the will, carried by a previal overruling power, and all these do fall out, in case, where nature meets with defection. The understanding is possessed with ignorance, or the will haled by the naughtiness of corruption, and violence of temptation. Lastly, the secret providence of God (which the Heathen called fortune) makes the creature work by accident: in all Cases when he works against means, as he did, when he brought the people through the red Sea, Exodus the 14. and, as he doth in all miracles; or when man intendeth one thing, but another thing comes to pass: of this, we have an example in the 45. of Genesis, and 5. vers. & 37. & 27. verse. In this place, they are said to sell joseph, because they would be rid of him; and, in that, joseph saith, God sent him into Egypt, to preserve their lives. They were the efficient Cause of their own preserving, when they sold joseph; but, yet by accident, through God's secret providence, that wrought contrary to their intent. The jews, likewise, were the Cause of Christ's glory, and man's salvation, when they delivered him to death; but, yet by accident, because God himself did create light out of darkness, and made their evil intention, serve unto that good. There be many examples, wherein we find, that, the efficient cause doth work on this manner: but these are enough, for this present. The efficient doth work Physically, Morrally. This distinction, is received in all the Logic schools, and, is of frequent use, in the question touching sanctification, and the actual motion of grace, in man's conversion: the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc. 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places. A Physical operation, is a real influence into the effect, we have an example of this in man's creation: He form him, and that of the dust, and poured life into him, all these be real influences: of this kind, are the builders of the Tower of Babel, they made brick, and reared a building with brick, and stone: Of this sort, be all workmen that labour with their hands, and tools, the strength of nature, doth immediately flow into the thing that is wrought, making a real and sensible change in the matter where on they work. A moral work, is a motion offered to the understanding, and serves to allure, and draw it on with reasons, and persuasion. Of this kind, be be all such things, as be objected to the understanding, as namely, the testimony of God, and man, by commanding, forbidding, promising, threatening, persuading, therefore, so often as we find, any of these attributed to God, or man, we are to know, that then they are efficient causes, that work morally. Ramus doth call Testimonies, Exhortations, Commandments, etc. inartificial arguments, because, they argue, not of their own force, but, by the authority of him that doth testify: but, this is altogether unfitly spoken, for inartificial, and argument, implies a contradiction, if inartificial, than no argument; if an argument then artificial, for an argument is a member of Art. 2. These things themselves are no arguments, unless they be referred unto the Testator, but then they argue as properties or adjuncts, and otherways they are never attributed to any subject. In this place affirmation, persuasion, etc. are not brought as moral causes in themselves: but the causality is referred to him that affirmeth, persuadeth etc. which makes it very plain, that, they belong to this place or seat of arguments. God, and his servants, are the moral causes of man's holiness, when they command good, and forbidden ill, when they promise good, and threaten ill, when they persuade unto obedience, and dissuade from sin, thus our Saviour Christ is the moral cause of all supernatural things, when by his obedience, he deserved, that God should bestow them upon us, he by meriting (I say) is the moral cause of God's gifts, because by his merits he moveth God to bestow them: and so much shall suffice for this distinction. A Physical efficient is Principal first, second, Instrumental. This distinction is very ancient in the schools; and of great use, when we desire to know, how man's will is wrought upon, and worketh with the actual motion of God's grace; Alvarez received it from Thomas, and makes use of it. disp. 68 no. 5. etc. where, he doth thus describe each member of it. A principal efficient is that, which worketh out of its own power, or form, as Thomas saith, 1. p. q. 18. art. 3. in cor. A first principal efficient, is that which worketh only, out of its own power. Thus God only worketh, of whom it is said, he sitteth in Heaven, and doth what he will. He is the universal cause: for in him we live, and moan, and have our being. A second principal efficient is that, which is so moved by another, that it moveth itself, by a power of its own. Of this sort is man's mind, which is moved by God, yet neverth less it worketh out of an active beginning, remaining in itself, Of this sort, be all those sayings in the Scripture, which attribute man's good works, as his conversion, and the like, sometimes, unto God alone, and other sometimes, unto man alone. An instrument (properly taken, and so we speak of it here) is that, which worketh only out of a power received from the principal efficient, of this kind are all instruments without life, as namely the tools of a Carpenter, or Smith, &c: Thus hot water, heateth another thing that is cold, by the heat received from the fire. To conclude, the point touching the efficient cause, we are to know, that, the efficient, Ramus. always worketh after one of these ways, whether it works alone, or with others, whether it gins the work, or preserves it, being already made. CHAP. VIII. The matter, Ramus. is a Cause of which a thing is. [Matter.] This word is often times used to set out every bodily substance: but it is not so taken in this place, for (as Thomas saith, 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor.) The matter (as it is a matter) remaineth only in power, or capacity to receive many forms: and therefore, according to itself hath no being, nor can be objected to our understanding: 1. p. q. 15. art. 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed, or some intellectual thing answerable unto that. [A cause] These words do attribute an active power, and actual efficacy unto the matter, whereby the effect is produced. [Of which] These words show the nature of that efficacy, and the manner how the matter doth concur unto the effect: and importeth the thing that so receives the form, that it resteth and remaineth in it. This we see in an house, wherein the timber, stone etc. are framed, and fashioned together, and made fit for habitation: so doth a piece of timber receive the picture made upon it by a carver. [A thing is] By [thing] is meant the effect produced: by [Is] is meant essentially, so as, the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree, or notion. We conceive the timber etc. Of a house to be a part of it: but we know, that there is an other part thereof more principal before that: namely, the form & fashion thereof. A thing, signifies an individual effect, so as, the office of the matter is to bring the effect unto asingular, or individual being: thus all Philosophers do conceive of it. The matter is the principium of individuation, saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 86. art. 3. in cor. And again, the essence is restrained unto one individual thing by the matter. 1. p. q. 7. art. 3. in cor. We have an instance of this, in every singular creature. Peter, is a singular man by his body, every plant, is singular by the stem that groweth up; for they enjoy all other things in common with therest of their kinds. The soul of Peter hath the same rationality with all other men's souls: no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie. Sanctity makes men christians: Peter sanctity makes Peter a christian, because the holy Ghost dwells in his mortal body. This argument brings the subject to which it is attributed, unto our clear understanding, and it is of singular use, to make us know the nature and distinction of particular beings. Yea, of absolute necessity: for (that I may use the words, and reason of Aristotle. Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text. 11) It is not possible to know until we come unto individuals. It is impossible to know until we ataine unto those things which do not admit division: for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our understandings. We have a pregnant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 etc. Where, the Apostle doth describe, and distinguish diverse kinds of singular bodies, and saith, some be celestial, as the Sun, Moon, and stars. Other some be terrestrial, and those be spiritual, as man's body that is raised: other some be natural, viz the flesh of men, beasts and birds: and from hence he delivers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings do enjoy. Likewise, the holy Ghost Reuel. 21 18. etc. Makes us know, what the new jerusalem is, by the matter thereof. The examples of this kind are very frequent, and well known to every man; therefore, I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the material cause. CHAP. IX. Of the formal Cause. A form, is a Cause, Ramus. by which a thing is that, which it is. [Form.] As I said of the matter, so must I say of the form: If it be considered in itself, abstracted from all matter, and individualitie, it is a certain thing common unto many: so Thomas truly saith, 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor. 2. Under the name form, sometimes is comprehended a figure, which consisteth in the termination of a quantity. This also I have from Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. ad 2m. But we take not this word, at this time, in either of these senses. By form than we here understand, the intrinsical part of the compounded effect: so saith Suarez, meta. disp. 10. sect. 1. no. 7. that is, Received of the matter, informing the same: Thus saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor. A form (saith Thomas) is General. A form (saith Thomas) is Special. A special form is that which informs the subject, but itself is not informed by any other form of the same nature: as one colour is not informed by another colour, 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1m. Form in this place, is taken in the second sense, not in the first. We have an example of this, in the rationality of man, and vigiditie of plants: both of them are forms, and distinct beings, not receiving any thing from other forms of their kind. [Is a Cause] (That is) it hath actual exercised force to infer the effect. [By which] These words do show, that, the force of the form, is not receptive, nor retentive, nor restrictive, as the force of the matter is: but it is active: for (as Aristotle saith, Meta. lib. 9 cap. 6. text 17.) The form is an act; (that is) an actual, determinate, and active being: the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius. col. 467. [A thing is] By these words, the essence of every individual effect, is attributed to the formal cause: every thing that doth actually exist (saith Thomas, 1. p. q. 7. art. 2. in cor.) hath some form; and again, every being is caused by the form thereof. 1. p. q. 51. art. 4. in cor. [That which.] These words do attribute the whole effect unto the form: and this is agreed upon by the learned in all ages. Each thing is that which it is, by its form: thus Thomas thinketh, 1. p. q 5. art. 5. & add 3m. in cor. The whole compound is the effect of the form; in the judgement of Okam. 1. dist. 32. q. 1. & 2. lit. C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing: for, the matter doth finite, and contract the amplitude of the form, and thereby it becomes the determinate form of this, or that individual effect. The form, on the other side, doth perfect and determine the matter, and bring it, from power, to act, by giving an essence thereunto: in so much, that, by the form the essence is termined unto some special kind. And thus much we receive from Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. et 3 in cor. q. 14. art. 2. ad 1m. This argument is of necessary use, to instruct our understandings in the knowledge of the subject, to which it is attributed: for, how can we know a thing more clearly, and certainly, then when we find the intrinsical, primary, and proper nature, and being thereof. It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post. cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing, and to know the cause of its nature. We have examples of this kind of Cause, in the word of God, and the nature of the Creature: when God would show us what sin is, he doth set it out by the form thereof. Sin (saith the Apostle john 1. Epist. chap. 3. v. 4.) Is a varying from the Law: The Apostle Paul, when he would set out, what the righteousness of faith is, he doth describe it (in his Epistle to the Romans ch. 4. v. 6.7.8.) by forgiveness of sins. The holy Ghost doth yield us many of these examples, but these shall suffice. In man we have a full representation of every part of this Argument. We say, rationality is the formal cause of man. Now, 1. rationality is the intrinsical part of man, all other of his parts, are more overt, and better known. 2. rationality hath a force to bestow a being upon man: for, when God had drawn together the dust of the earth, man had not (as then) his being: but, he received that, when God breathed the breath of life into it: at that time (I say) and not before, man became a living soul. 3. rationality bestows upon man a being, that is actual, and determined unto one, and active; whereby he is fit to do the actions of life. 4. There is nothing essential unto man; but his rationality bestows it on him: The body (indeed) doth make him a singular man, by retaining, and contracting the soul unto one: but, in what respect he is a man, that he receives wholly from his soul, and from hence, the form is truly said to be the beginning of difference, that is hetweene one and another, and not the difference itself. Thom. 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2m. I say, the difference of things doth flow from the form: for, as unity in substance doth make two things to be the same, as Okam doth truly teach, 1. dist. 19 q. 1. lit. B. opinio 1a. and Aristotle, meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20. so difference in substance makes two things to differ. The form is not the difference itself: for, a form is a subsistence in an unity: but, a difference is a dissenting between the essence of two: and thus much for the explication of the formal Cause. CHAP. X. Of the final Cause. The end is a cause for which the thing is. Ramus. [End] By end is meant the last notion which we have of the effect: and importeth that whereunto the thing tendeth. So Aristotle telleth us, meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text. 9 An end is Externall. Internal, In The intent of the doer. The thing itself naturally Imposed. An external end, is the actual use of the thing, to which the effect is fitted. Thus the beatifical vision is man's end, to which he tends. An end in the intent of the doer, is no more but either the fitness (it self) of the effect thought upon, and purposed by the efficient; (this is the condition of every workman, that deviseth and resolveth upon the fashion, and form of the thing to be wrought) Or the commodity of the workman, and others, sought thereby. We have example of an end, thus understood, in those words of john 3.16. God so loved the world etc. Where the giving of Christ is an effect, wrought by God, wherein he intended the glory of himself, and his son, and the salvation of the predestinate. Thus the workman that makes an axe intends, that himself shall get reputation, and maintenance thereby. An end of a thing imposed upon it is, when the efficient enjoined that use of it, which the thing itself doth not yield, and this end we find in laws, and money; the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience, the other to set a price of wares. I say appointed by him that hath power to do it, the things themselves do not yield it; as all men do know by experience. But the word end in this place doth not signify either of these four things. The end (as it is in the intent and will of the doer) is a cause indeed metaphorically, not properly, and must be reduced unto the efficient not the final: for, in that sort it doth but move, and indu●●●ice principal efficient unto working: and consequently, it is an efficient that works morally. That and unto which the effect tendeth naturally, is here understood, and defined. I have received all these things from Thomas 2. dist. q. 1. art. 1 2. & 3. 1. p. q. 26. art. 3. ad 2m. Suarez de praedest lib. 2. cap. 3. nᵒ:: 2. vega in Concil. Trident lib. 7. cap. 2. [A cause] Therefore the end hath an active, and an exercised act, in the producing of the effect: for, that is the property of every cause, as hath been showed. [For which a thing is] These words set out the nature of that force: and they signify, a tendency, aptitude, and fitness which the effect hath naturally, unto something without itself. It is of the nature of a final cause (saith Okam) actually to intent: and whatsoever doth not so, is not truly, and properly a final cause in Prologo. 1. sent. q. 11. lit. F.G. In the same sort writes Aristotle meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text. 8. An end (saith he) is that for which a thing is made, that is, whose essence is not so for another, that it follows that other: but, the essence of another follows that. If any inquire how tendency etc. can have an actual exercise unto doing. First I answer it can, because that tendency flows from the form, in as much as the form doth determine the effect unto an end, according to its own proportion: as the form of steel is such, as best fitteth with cutting. Thomas. 1a. 2 e. q. 95 art. 3. in cor. Secondly, the end importeth some good so saith Thomas. 1. p. q 19 art. 1 ad. 1 and all men grant it: therefore it hath an exercised force to constitute, but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good & no more: this doth both constitute, and diffuse good: It doth constitute, in as much as, it is the perfection of the effect. I say the perfection of it, because, when the effect hath attained thy her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind. It is diffusively good, in as much as, it is fit, and apt to bestow good upon others. We have many examples that show us the nature of this argument. Fitness to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sun, and Moon Genesis. 1.14. As a thing that followed their nature by creation: thus also, fitness to accompany and help Adam is affirmed of Evah Genesis. 2.18.21. as the end of her creation. Man is apt, and fit to love the known good, and that is his end; this fitness floweth from his reasonable soul or formal being, whose property it is to judge truly, and choose freely. Now this fitness hath a main stroke in the constituting of man, not by the way of motion, for that belongs to the efficient, nor by the way of reception, and retention: for, that belongs to the matter: but, by the way of settled position as the form doth from whence it floweth. 2. By this fitness a man is made a perfect, and complete humane creature: for, when he attains unto that, he wants nothing requisite unto his being. Until he be so fitted, we cannot conceive him a humane creature: for, he would differ nothing from bruit beasts. The use of this argument is of exceeding worth, to inform our understandings in the knowledge of the subject: for, by it we know the formal cause, and consequently the nature of the thing. To conclude the doctrine of all the causes jointly; we must not forget, that, from this place, or seat of arguments is derived knowledge, simply so called. We are then thought to know a thing, when we understand the causes thereof, thus saith Ramus. And to the same effect speaks Aristotle, knowledge simply so called (saith he) poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. is necessary, that is, when the thing cannot be otherwise then as we know it: and we have that knowledge, when we understand the causes: so saith the same Aristotle. Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11. Thomas also hath the same thing: knowledge (saith he) opusc. de demonst. cap. 1. is to understand of certainty, and we do so when we understand the causes of the thing, and that, both as it is a cause, and also as it is a cause in act, of that thing: and he gives a reason hereof, Opusc. 48. de Syllog. cap. 1. viz. Then our reason doth resolve the thing caused into its causes: from whence knowledge doth flow. And thus much for the final cause, and all those arguments which are predicated of the essence of the subject, and which consequently do absolutely agree therewith. CHAP. XI. Of Properties. WE must now prosecute those arguments which import things without the subject, and consequently consent with it, after some sort: of this kind, be all adjuncts, as some do call them. An adjunct is that to which something is subjected, Ramus. and whatsoever doth externally belong, or happen to any subject. An adjunct is Proper. Common. A proper adjunct is that which belongs unto all, & alone, & always. A common adjunct is that which is not proper in that sort. Aristotle dissents from Ramus in these precepts: Thomas saith, 1. p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 5m. Not every thing that is without the essence, may be called an accident: Aristotle hath not the terms of proper and common adjunct; nor the thing comprehended under them; but the contrary; he saith Top. lb. 1. Cap. 5. An accident cannot be proper, otherwise then by relation; as when one sit●eth and others stand, then sitting is proper to him. Lastly, Aristotle and others with him do make a thing proper and an accident to differ formally, as we shall presently find. Aristotle teacheth, Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. that, Arguments which are without the subject, be properties and accidents. That is said to be proper, that is reciprecall with the thing, but yet doth not declare the essence, nor come into the definition thereof. And of these he saith also Top. lib. 5. cap. 1. They are properties by themselves always, and do separate, and distinguish from all other things. Porphyry also doth distinguish and describe these arguments as Aristotle doth. A property (saith he cap. 4.) is that which doth concur unto all only, and always. And again, cap. 9 A property is that which is in the whole kind to which it is proper, and only, and always, so as, if that special kind be taken away, presently the property thereof is taken away also. And Thomas doth so set out the nature of this argument, that he gives a reason of all this alleged out of Aristotle, and Porphyry. A thing proper, saith he. 1 p q 77. art. 1. ad 5m. is not of the essence, but is caused by the essential principles of the species. Aristotle, and Porphyry gives instance of properties, in this sentence. He that is apt ●nto laughing is a man. He that is apt to learn Grammar is a man. In this proposition, aptness unto laughing, and Grammar-learning, is predicated of man: This aptness floweth from his reasonable soul, and that is the principal thing in his nature. I say it floweth therefrom, not as a Contingent motion, but as a natural emanation; therefore, this aptness agrees unto all men, only, and always. No man wants it, none but man hath it, and all men have it always, and consequently it is proper unto man, and proper by itself, and the nature thereof, and not made proper by any outward efficient, so as in necessary consecution it is convertible with man: we may truly argue thus, If man, then apt unto Grammar skill. If apt unto Grammar skill, than man. An accident saith Aristotle, Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. is neither definition, Genus, nor a property, and is in the thing: but so as that it may be, and may not be, in one and the same thing: and Porphyry recites the same in his fift Chapter; Thomas also in the place last alleged, doth so set out the nature of an accident, that he gives also a reason of Aristotle's Doctrine: An accident (saith he) is only that, which is without the subject, and not caused by the essential principles thereof. Now, this doctrine of Aristotle is certainly true: therefore we ought to leave Ramus and follow him. I say it is certainly true, that there be some things proper, that be not accidents: namely, all natural actions, as the act of seeing, is proper to all living creatures: the act of discoursing to man: The bearing of leaves, and fruit to plants: and the outward works of holiness, unto him that hath the habit of holiness. These are proper, because they are necessary emanations, from nature in the one, and grace in the other: so as, when all requisite circumstances be present, man cannot but see, and work, the plants cannot but bring forth fruit, and leaves: wherefore, the holy Ghost doth thus reason; He that doth righteousness is righteous. 1. john. 3.7. Where the holy Ghost doth necessarily join righteous actions, unto a man that is habituated with righteousness, as proper unto him. Properties be not adjuncts: for, adjuncts do out wardly befall the subject: and so much the word importeth, and Ramus expressly affirmeth. Properties do not outwardly befall the subject: but, they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature: Heat, and light do not outwardly befall the Sun, and fire: neither doth swimming of timber in the water, outwardly befall the same: & such is the condition of properties. To this seat or place of arguments, the other seven, set down by Aristotle, must be referred: viz. Quantity, Quality, Relation, Where, When, The place, To enjoy. For, all of them do outwardly befall the subject, and are not caused by the principles of nature; as a little labour will show; for, Quantity imports no more, but Geometrical measure, or Arithmetical number. Quality signifies the manner, how a thing existeth, or worketh. Relation is no more, but the reference, or respect of one thing to another. Where importeth the general place, wherein the subject is, as in this, or that Country. When expresseth the time, and duration, as this year, this month, etc. The place signifies the particular place, as this stool, this chair, etc. To enjoy signifies all endowments, as Honour, Riches, Clothes, &c Some man (perhaps) will require me to set out the nature of quantity, and the rest: and allege Aristotle's authority for it. I answer, that ought not to be done in this place; for, that belongs to other Arts, as to Geometry, Arithmetic, natural and moral Philosophy. This place requires no more, but that I show, what force there is in them, to bring the knowledge of the subject, that receives them, into our understanding; and that I have done partly already, and will make it more plain, and full by that which follows. Porphyry, cap. 5. doth divide an accident into separable; as sleep to a man. inseparable; as blackness to a Crow. And Ramus follows him. Aristotle hath not this division; yet it may be allowed, because, it is true, and useful. Blacknes to a Crow is an accident: for, a white Crow, is no less a Crow then a black one, it is inseparable by God's appointment. We may truly say, this division is useful: for, the holy Ghost doth use it; from unseparable accidents he doth argue thus. jer. 13.23. The Aethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the Leopard his spots, no more can he leave his sin, that is accustomed to do evil. Separable accidents are always of singular use, and do abundantly serve, to lead our understandings into the knowledge of the subjects, unto which they are attributed. If we take them as they are in themselves, and in that conjunction which is between them and the subject, than they are but light, and of small force to set out the thing we know not: but because many of them do meet together in one subject, therefore their number together makes amends for their weakness severally: yet, none of them are so weak severally, but that they do certainly lead us to know the outward quality, and condition of their subject, for learning, Riches, beauty, etc. do undoubtedly argue their subjects to be learned, rich, and beautiful, and thereby we know the condition, which the subject that receiveth them doth enjoy, and how they differ from others, that want riches, learning, or beauty: therefore, the holy Ghost doth so often use this kind of argument, and then most chief, when he would set out his most beloved object. By this argument the spouse is described: Can. 5.10.11.12 My love is white, ruddy etc. By this argument also, Goliath is set out 1. Sam. 17.4.5.6. etc. Then came a man named Goliath of Gath. etc. To conclude, such force is in this argument, that we do certainly and distinctly know thereby, one man from another, and what reverence, honour, and respect ought to be given to this rather then to that: and thus Aristotle doth urge it Top. lib. 1. cap. 5 adiungantur autem. Thus are we come to an end of all the positive consenting arguments: and that we may conclude them all jointly, we are to know, that hitherto is to be referred all kind of unity or identity: Ramus. I shall not need to bestow much labour to show it: for the thing itself is evident, there is nothing wherein one man can be the same with another, unless it be in things essential, or without the essence. It is a ruled case in the Schools, Two things are the same Generally, Specially, Numerically, Top. lib. 1. cap. 7. but this differs nothing from that, and both of them contain an undoubted truth: Two men are the same generally, because both of them have a living soul, two men are the same specially, because they have a reasonable soul, both of them are one numerically, because each of them have a body, flesh, and bones. Two men are the same in riches, health, etc. because they are both rich, and in health. In the next place we come to dissenting arguments. CHAP. XII. Of Diversity. A dissenting argument is that which dissenteth from the thing it argueth. Ramus. RAMUS hath this sentence out of Aristotle, to Differ (saith Porphyry) in a common sense, is no more, but by a variety to be distant some ways or other: so as, a thing is said to differ after this sort from itself, or from another: and we find the substance here of delivered by Aristotle. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16. [Dissenting] This word importeth, the name of those arguments which belong to this place, and they may very fitly be so called, because the nature of them doth agree therun to. [Dissenteth] This word comprehends the general nature of all the arguments which belong to this place, (I say) the general nature, because arguments do descent more ways than one: and it signifieth a distancy, arising from a variety as Prophyrie hath fitly expressed it: for, we say those things are distant each from other, that are severed by a space, or some bodily substance that is between them: and this space is the variety, or variousnes that is between several, and distinct arguments: As riches is a bar, that comes between a rich man and poverty: by reason whereof poverty dissenteth from him that hath riches. [From the thing it argueth] This showeth the terms of this variation, namely, the subject and the predicate the argument arguing and the argument argued, as for example: Health is an argument arguing, and this dissenteth from a man that is sic'ke, by reason of that distance, or variation, which ariseth from sickness: Sickness doth make such a difference in a sick man from him that hath health, that, that health can no ways be affirmed of him, therefore saith Porphyry. chap. 3. Every difference makes a thing various, when it is joined thereunto. These kinds of arguments serve to refel error, and the use, is very needful. To know what a thing is, hath the first place, and to know what a thing is not, aught to have the second: for, by the one our knowledge is begun, and by the other our knowledge is confirmed: we are sure our knowledge is true, when we understand that the thing is no other than as we know it, from whence also it follows that these arguments belong to Logic, seeing we may be truly said to know what we knew not, when we are confirmed in our knowledge. To conclude, when we say these arguments do lead us to the knowledge of the subject, we mean, the quality not the essence thereof; They show what manner of thing it is: not of what nature it is: so saith Aristotle Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Every difference (saith he) declares after what manner a thing is. We shall see the truth hereof in the particulars following; and thus much shall suffice, touching dissenting arguments in general. Ramus. Dissenting arguments are diverse. opposites. This precept divideth dissenting arguments, into their several kinds. Ramus did not invent it; Porphyry, cap. 3. hath it plainly: Difference (saith he) is by accident, or by itself: and Aristotle hath the same thing plain enough, Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Considerare, etc. But more plainly, Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. where he makes the distancy of arguments to be some great, some small. We shall show the sense hereof, when we come to the particulars. Arguments that be diverse, Ramus. are such as disagree in some respect only. We have this precept (also) in Arist●●l●; a difference by accident (saith Porphyry) cap. 3. Is that which is not essential, nor makes the things that differ, to be another: but diverse. And Aristotle implies the same in both the places last alleged. In Top. 6. cap. 6. (he saith) a difference by accident is in, and is not in, the thing from which it differs: therefore (according to him) their difference standeth in some respect only. In Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. he showeth that difference which he saith is small, in the example of sense and science. Now all men know that the difference between these two, is respective only, not simply, and really. Aristotle gives instance of these arguments in justice and Fortitude, prudence and temperance, Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. Now, these do differ, because we conceive this man that hath the one, differs from him that hath not that, but another: they differ from the subject which they argue, but in some respect only, namely, through the present condition thereof, because the subject enjoyeth one of them: but not the rest. I make it manifest by this sentence: Socrates is temperate, but not just, nor prudent. Here, justice and prudence descent from Socrates, only, in respect of his present condition, and because he hath them not: this disagreement that is between the subject, and the predicate, viz. Man, and prudence, makes a diversity between them, and no more. For, a just man may also be prudent, and a prudent man is not another man, from him that is Just. We have examples of these arguments very often, we say in our English Proverb, This man is at odds with his wits; and we mean by it, his wit, and he differs, only, because he wants it. In the same sort it is said, Ulysses was fair, but not eloquent. Where, eloquence differs from Ulysses, only, in respect, that he had it not: for, otherwise it agreed with him no less than beauty; he might have been the one, as well as the other, notwithstanding the nature of himself, and that quality. The use of this kind of argument is very behooveful: for, hereby a man is showed his error, that thinks he hath much, when indeed he hath but little: Thus the holy Ghost argueth against the Church of Pergamus, Revel. 2.12.13.14. and 15. Although thou holdest fast my Name in the time of persecution, yet thou hast many faults; for thou entertainest the doctrine of Balaam, and the Nicolaitans. So he argueth the Church of Thyatira, in the 19.20. and 21. Verses. And thus much shall suffice touching arguments that differ from the subject, of which they are predicated, after the manner of diversity, and in some respect only. CHAP. XIII. Of Opposites. Opposites are dissenting arguments, Ramus. which wholly disagree. WE have this sentence in Aristotle, Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16. The difference (saith he) which is in those arguments that be fare distant, or different is very conspicuous. This of Aristotle, and that of Ramus are the same: for, by fare distant, Aristotle can mean no other but opposition, and by conspicuity in difference, he can understand no less, than an opposition that is made wholly, and every way: for that opposition is indeed conspicuous: we may find it with little labour, and judge of it with great certainty. [Opposites] This word signifies such things, as are set against each other. [Wholly disagree] That is, both respectively, because the subject doth want the thing that dissenteth: and really, because the subject cannot receive the thing that dissenteth: When the subject, and the thing dissenting, doth abhor each other, and are (as we say) incompatible, then there is a total opposition between them: we have examples hereof in such sayings as these be: He that is rich, is not poor. He that is in health, is not sick. I say the nature of opposites is found in these, not in those wherein man barely, and simply is subjected: for dissent is in the quality not the quiddity, or being of the subject: as hath been showed. 2. Poverty and sickness agrees to man barely, and simply taken, and so they do not oppose him at all: the reason why poverty, and sickness are opposite unto a man that is rich, and in health, is because riches, and poverty are of that nature that they cannot befall the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time: therefore, whensoever one of them is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. Thus much of opposites in general; in the next place, I must set down the special kinds of them. CHAP. XIIII. Of the distribution of Opposities. Opposites are Ramus. Disparats, Contraries, Affirmatine, Relatives. Adversatives. Negatives, Contradictories. Privatives. ARistotle doth divide Opposites, Categor. cap. 10. Just in the same manner that Ramus doth; in these words; Opposites are Relatives. Contraries, Without mean. with mean without name. with name. Privatives. Contradictories. Thomas doth divide opposites, De veritate, q. 28. art. 6. in cor. agreeable unto them both: in these words, Opposites import a positive nature in both. in one, only, as Contradictories. Privatives. That they all agree in the nature of the thing, the explication of the particulars will show: their difference in manner of speaking, doth help (well) unto the understanding of the whole. [Opposites are] In this division, opposition is placed between arguments that be predicated: but that seems to be disagreeable unto the definition of dissenting arguments in general. cap. 12. I answer, opposition is so placed indeed: yet this division disagrees not from that definition: for, they may be understood two ways, and agreeable to that definition in both. If they speak of the predicates, in case where the one is affirmed, and the other denied of the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time, than they agree wholly with that definition; for, then that predicate which is denied, doth oppose the thing argued: and I think that these authors meant thus: for, they know that the predicates themselves contain neither truth, nor falsehood, and therefore no opposition. If they speak of the predicates themselves, not attributed to some subject, than they give them the foundation of opposition, and not formal, and actual opposition: and therefore, they agree fully with that definition, and truth: with that definition: for, it doth suppose, that the foundation of formal, and actual opposition is in the predicates themselves: and they agree with truth: for, it is most certain, that the predicates themselves are the foundation of formal, and actual opposition: by reason they are of that nature, that if one be attributed, the rest cannot, as is truly delivered by Ramus in this point of opposites: And Altaco. in 1. sent. q. 2. lit. H. even as the door when it is shut, debars all entrance: and an armour of proof repels the bullet. Now, I have cleared this doubt, I proceed to set out the nature of the particulars. CHAP. XV. Of Disparats. [Disparats] This word importeth inequality, and therefore it may seem unfit for this place: yet it is duly placed, for thereby we understand an inequality, not in the quantity, or force of opposition, as if these opposites did oppose, some more, and some less: but of number, and therefore, those opposites which bear this title, are thus defined. Disparates are opposites, Ramus. one of which is alike opposed, to many. Aristotle calls these opposites by the name of Contraries, and doth set them out by these properties: 1. They may be, and not be, in the subject. 2. A third thing comes in the mean, or middle between them. 3. This third, either partakes of both the opposites, or is of itself, and partakes of neither. Now it is plain both Aristotle, and Ramus do speak of one kind of opposites: for, both of them do instance the opposites they speak of in one and the same example: viz, black and white. If we apply that instance unto them both, we shall see that they disagree not 1. These colours are opposite 2. They may be, and not be, in the same subject. 3. They have a third thing that comes between them: as green, red, and all other colours. 4. These middle colours do partake of black, and white. 5. each one of them is alike, or equally opposed to the rest: a man may truly say, he that is black, is not red, nor green &c: and so of the rest. 6. many do oppose one: for, he that is any one of them is denied to be all the rest. Aristotle doth also instance these opposites in good, and bad: and thereby their nature is fitly resembled: for, experience tells us, that between good, and bad actions there be some, which be both good, and bad: and therefore, they partake of both the opposites. There is also, a cessation or omision of action, and that comes between them both, and partakes of neither. Thomas gives these opposites a seventh property, viz: They import a positive nature, sometimes in both, and sometimes but in one, and doth instance the first in black, and white; and we might instance the second, in good, and evil. Thus we see these authors conspire in one, every one of them brings a part, and all of them together do make a full, and complete exposition of the thing in hand. The use of this argument is very needful, and comes often, we find it in the word of God: The holy Ghost doth argue the Church of Laodicea, Revel. 3.17. with this argument, thou art (saith he) wretched, miserable, poor, blind, and naked: therefore, thou art not rich, nor increased with goods, nor needest nothing, as thou vainly braggest. Where, all the things denied, are opposed unto the wretched Laodiceans, in the next place we come to Relatives. CHAP. XVI. Of Relatives. Relatives are affirming Contraries, Ramus. the one whereof consists by the mutual relation to the other. We find this precept delivered by Aristotle in the 10. Chap. of his Categories: Those arguments (saith he) which are opposed as Relatives, the one opposite is referred to the other mutually: and Thomas delivers the same thing, when (saith he 1 p. q. 28. art. 2. in cor.) Things are spoken relatively, than a certain relation, or reference of one opposite, to another is signified. [Relatives] This word importeth things that are referred the one to the other. Relatives (saith Thomas 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. in cor.) do signify according to their proper nature, only, a respect of one thing to another. [Affirming] This word is brought to set out unto us, that both terms opposed, do comprehend positive beings: Aristotle agrees with Ramus in it, in the place alleged, when he saith, That, Relatives (even) in the thing that they are, be referred: so also, he gives instance of relative opposition in knowledge, and the thing to be known: and both of them do signify positive beings. And Thomas doth teach the same thing, as I have showed in the 14. Chapter. The only doubt is, what the terms in relative opposition do affirm, Thomas doth resolve this doubt, 1. p. q. 28. on this manner: In Relatives there is their Foundation. Relation. Relatives are founded upon either quantity, or action, and passion: art. 1 in cor. In this sense, Relation doth import an accidental being in the subject art. 2. in cor: or things assisting outwardly affixed art. 2. in cor. The proper nature of relation, consisteth in a respect of one thing to another, art. 1. ad 1m. which respect doth after a sort befall the thing related, in that it tendeth from itself into another art. 2. in cor. [Contraries] That is, one single term, doth oppose another single term. Aristotle teacheth the same thing, when he putteth knowledge, and the thing to be known, as an instance of Relative opposition. [The one etc.] In these words, the proper nature of Relative opposition is set out: and they import such an opposition, as wherein the terms opposed do mutually constitute each other. Aristotle teacheth the same, when he affirmeth, that the terms opposed be mutually referred each to other: and denies, that mutual reference to all other kind of opposites. Thomas also hath the same thing: Relatives (saith he 1. p. q. 42. ar. 3. ad 2m.) are together in nature, and our understanding; in as much as, the one is comprehended in the definition of the other, wherefore Ramus concludeth truly in these words. Because of this mutuull relation, Ramus. Relatives are said to be together in nature, so that, he which perfectly knows the one, knoweth the other also. To conclude this point of Relative opposition, it may be demanded, whether all Relatives be opposites? I answer first; The foundation of Relatives be Adjuncts, or Causes, and effects: therefore, in that respect, no relatives are opposites. Secondly, the proper nature of relation consisteth only in a respect, that one thing hath unto another without itself, and so also no relatives are opposites: for which cause, Aristotle makes Relatives to be consenting arguments, as I have showed Chap. 3. foregoing. Thirdly, The things comprehended in the terms related, or referred, be such, that, they agree not unto the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time: and thus all relatives be opposites. Fourthly, The opposition that is between the terms related, is made relatively, that is, each term opposed hath a respect, and relation, the one to the other: so as, we conceive the one is against the other, and the one doth constitute the other; neither of them can be in themselves, nor known to us, but by the one, and the other: yet when they are, they oppose one another; And thus, all relatives be opposites. This I gather from Tho. 1. p. q. 28. Relatives (saith he) signify a certain Relation of one term unto its opposite, art. 2. in cor. The nature of relation is a respect of one to another, according to which, one thing is opposed unto another relatively, art. 3. in cor. Thus (I hope) this doubt is fully cleared. We find the nature of these arguments fully laid open in this sentence. He that is Father to Socrates, is not son to Socrates in the same respect, and time. Here. I Father and Son are terms referred the one to the other, as things that respect one another. 2. This respect goeth out of the one to the other, the Father is a respect that tendeth unto the Son, and the Son a respect that extendeth to the Father. 3. The terms related do mutually constitute one another, in their own being, and our knowledge; the Father is, and is known to be, by the Son, and the Son is, & is known to be, by the Father. 4. The foundation of this relation is Paternity, and Filialitie: now, paternity being referred unto Filialitie, we find cause, and effect: but paternity being referred unto the Father, is an adjunct: and Filialitie is an adjunct to the Son. Thus fare they both consent with the subject which they argue. 5. The things comprehended under these two terms cannot agree to the same subject, in the same respect, and time: so as, now we find them opposites: no man can be Father, and Son in the same respect, and at the same time. 6. We find these terms of Father, and Son opposed relatively, (that is) in what sort the one doth respect the other, in that sort it is referred, as unto its opposite: but so as, one term makes the other to be in itself, and our knowledge. 7. These terms of Father and Son be contraries: for, as Thomas saith, Contrariety is a difference according to the form. 1a. 2ae. q. 35. art. 3. & 4. in cor. And such a difference there is between Father, and Son, paternity is formally one thing, and Filialitie is formally another. The same things are to be found in many other examples, as in Prince, and subject: Priest, and people: Master, and servant: Seller, and buyer etc. But this shall suffice, as sufficient to open the nature of relative opposition. In the next place we must come to adversatives. CHAP. XVII. Of Adversatives. Adversatives are affirming Contraries, Ramus. which are always directly opposite each to other. ARistotle teacheth the same thing touching the nature of these opposites, (though his words seem different) he saith of them thus; Those arguments which be so contrary, that one of them must of necessity be in the subject that can receive them, they neither are referred the one to the other, nor have any third to come between them. [Contraries] Adversatives be contraries, because one alone opposeth unto one alone: this opposition is taught by Aristotle, when he saith, One of these opposites is in the subject that is fit to receive the same, and doth instance them in health, and sickness. [Always] This word and therest which follow, do set out the special nature of these opposites: and by them we understand what these opposites be, and how they differ from all others. This word signifies the continuance, and perpetuity of opposition that is between these opposites, namely, that it ceaseth not at any time: because (as Aristotle saith) no subject that is capable hereof can possibly be without one of them: now, in this they differ from Disparates, and relatives: for, every subject that can be black, and white, may at some time be neither of them; so also, a man may be neither Father, nor Son. No Father, when he hath no child, and no child when he hath no Father. [Directly] This word importeth an opposition that is without mixture, interposition, or diversion; like unto a strait line that extendeth between two points, and this no doubt was intended by Aristotle, when he said, These opposites be without relation, or a third thing to come between them. Herein these opposites differ from Disparats, and relatives, the one receives the interposing of a third: and the other admits a mixture of consenting, and thereby a diversion from opposing: by that relation, and respect that the one hath to the other. We have all these particulars laid open to us, in that one instance which we find in Aristotle: namely, He that is in health, is not sick. In this example we find, 1. one side set against another. 2. one positive being is set against another; for, so we conceive of sickness. 3. One of these is true of a man always: he cannot be but sick, or well; because, the temper of his body requires it, and therefore this opposition is in man always, because when he is sick, he is not well: and when he is well, he is not sick. 4. There is no third thing to come between sickness, and health. 5. Sickness is never mixed with health, nor health with sickness. 6. This opposition is direct: he that falls from health becomes presently sick: when sickness is expelled, than health is presently recovered: the one devours the other, and contrariwise, the one overcomes the other: like unto two armies in the field, the last motion in fight on the one side, is the first motion in pursuit on the other side: this may suffice for all those opposites which do contain positive being in both terms. CHAP. XVIII. Of Privatives. IN this Chapter and that which follows, we must handle negative contraries. Privatives are negative Contraries, Ramus. the one whereof denies in that subject (only) wherein the affirmative is by nature. That which is affirmed is called the habit: that which is denied the privation, or privative. ARistotle teacheth the same things in the tenth Chapter of his Categories, Privation and habit universally taken (saith he) is said concerning one, and the same thing: namely, that wherein nature requires that the habit should be. In this we conceive the habit, and the privation; To have the habit, and to be deprived thereof, and these two are not the same: for, both of them cannot be attributed to the same thing. To be deprived, and to have the habit are opposed as privation, and habit: for, after what sort there is opposition between the privation, and habit, in the same sort to have the habit, and to be deprived of the habit are opposed. [Privatives] This is the name of these opposites: but it seems not very fitly given: for, it belongs unto one member only; Aristotle (as we see) calls this opposition a privation, and habit; and Thomas, an opposition according to privation, and habit: de veritate q. 28. art. 6. in cor. [Negative contraries] These opposites be unfitly called negative, because only one of them is negative. Thomas (in the place alleged) doth express the same thing more fitly: Some opposites (saith he) are such as one only imports a cetaine nature, and the rest no more but the removing, or negation of that nature affirmed. Contraries they may be called: because one is opposed to one, but not properly, for the negation of a form hath no form. [The one whereof, etc.] These words and the rest do set out the nature of these opposites, and placeth the same in these properties: 1. The one denies, the other affirms, (that is) the one hath a positive being, called a habit, the other the absence of that habit, called a privation, or privative. 2. This habit, and privation is opposed, not the one against the other, abstracted from their subject: but as the one is received by the subject, so the other is substracted therfrom. 3. This subject whereabouts they are exercised, is one and the same: even that subject, and no other is deprived that hath received the habit. 4. That subject whereabout these opposites are exercised, is not every one universally; but only that wherein the habit ought to be according to the course of nature. The reason why these opposites must be exercised about such a subject is; because nothing can truly be said to be deprived, unless the thing which is removed, be due thereto by nature. The reason why, to have the habit, and to be deprived thereof, are opposed, is because the habit and privation thereof, cannot befall the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time. All these particulars are declared in that one instance which Aristotle gives, viz. He that seethe, is not blind, or deprived of sight. In this sentence we find, 1. Two terms, viz. sight, and blindness. 2. The one imports a positive being, the other the absence of that being. 3. The one is affirmed, the other denied, therefore one is opposed to one. 4. The things themselves abstracted from the subject are not opposed, but their opposition is exercised about one subject. 5. One of the terms is due unto the subject wherein they oppose, viz. sight is due to man's nature: for God made him a seeing creature. 6. The foundation of that opposition is in sight, and blindness, in themselves abstracted from their subject: we deny blindness unto the same man that hath sight: because man's body is not capable of them both together, in the same respect, part, and time. And here I put an end, to the opposition of habit and privation. CHAP. XIX. Of Contradictories. Contradictories, Ramus. are negative Contraries, the one whereof denieth every where, or generally. A Contradiction (saith Aliaco 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M.) is the most manifest repugnancy that is, the affirmation of one, and negation of the same: and this is double, the one is of propositions, the other of terms: when as a fixite term is opposed unto an infinite term. This place speaks of the last not of the first. Some opposites (saith Thomas) deverit. q. 28. art. 6. in cor. do affirm a certain nature in one part, the other is a negation of the same, and these are opposites according to affirmation, and negation. Aristotle doth teach the same things most fully: A Contradiction (saith he) is an opposition which by itself wanteth a mean, or middle between them: Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. Principium antem etc. And he doth explicate this thing further; Categor. cap. 10. Id quoque. That opposition (saith he) that falleth under affirmation, and negation, is not affirmation, and negation belonging to this place: but the things which fall under affirmation, and negation, and these do oppose the one the other, as affirmation, and negation; for, there is the same manner of opposition in these, as in them, even as affirmation, and negation are opposed, when we say, he sitteth, he sitteth not. So also the things subjected in both those sentences are opposed, namely, to sit, not to sit. [Contradictories] This word is the name of this kind of opposition, and signifies properly two sentences which pronounce against each other, but in this place it is used to set out things which are subjected unto such sentences, or do fall under affiramtion and negation, and they may be so applied; because, such things d●e oppose each other no less naturally, and universally than sentences do: and thereby they are the foundation of the affirmation, and negation in sentences. [Negative Contraries] One part of the Contradiction is negative: they may be called Contraries, because one doth oppose unto one. [The one denieth every where.] These words do place the nature of Contradictories in these properties: 1. They contain a denial, that is, the absence of a positive nature, affirmed in the one, is employed, or virtually avouched in the other. 2. This denial is made by one only, the other always containing a positive nature. 3. This denial is made universally: for all times, and respects, and every where; and in all subjects, so as, these oppositions contain always a truth in them, whether Socrates be, or be not, one of them is always true, and the other false: wherefore it is proper to the opposition of this ksnde, that one of them is true, or false: as Aristotle hath truly observed in the tenth chapter of his Categories. And the reason of it is good, all things that have any being, must either continue, or discontinue in that being: from whence it is, that, Aristotle saith, that this opposition is made by itself, and wants the intermission of a third: for no power can put a third thing between being, and not being, nor cause that thing not to be which is in the same respect and time, when and as it is, nor make that to be which is not in that respect, and during that time wherein it is not. Aristotle and Aliaco guieus two examples in the places alleged, that do fully represent the nature of these opposites. He that sitteth, doth not, not sit. He that is a man, is not, a not man. We have in these two sentences, two terms, viz. To sit, not to sit. A man, a not man. The first of these terms comprehends a positive, and finite nature: in the second, a negation, or absence of that positive nature, (by a term infinite, and unlimited) is implied. The first is affirmed of a man, the second is denied of the same man. 3. This denial extends to all times, and respects, wherein that affirmation may be conceived. 4. This denial is not voluntary, nor imposed: but, ariseth simply, and absolutely from the nature of the things themselves: no power can make him that is a man, not to be a man, during the time while he is a man. Neither can any power make that a man which is not a man, during the time wherein he is not a man. 5. It is always true, or false of this, or that singular man, that either he is, or that he is not, there can be no third moment assigned, wherein he neither is, nor is not. So as with this I may put an end to Contradictory opposition, and the explication of all positive arguments, both Consenting, and Dissenting. CHAP. XX. Of Comparison in general. NOw we must come to comparative Arguments. Comparative arguments, Ramus. are those arguments that are compared together. Aristotle delivers the doctrine of these arguments, fully, and plainly enough, as we shall see anon. [Comparative] These Arguments are opposed unto positive, and therefore, they have a sense opposite to them. [Compared together] These words do set out the special nature of these arguments: they are called Comparative, because they are compared with other things; and this nature consisteth in two things: First, they are compared. Secondly, they are arguments, by means of that comparing. Things are compared together when the one is measured, weighed, or deciphered by the other; Thus timber is compared with the rule; wares are compared with the weights, and the picture with the thing pictured: and thus we understand the word Compared in this place. A single term becomes a compared argument, when it hath such a force to argue, or set out the subject, as is received from another thing, that it is compared withal: and herein, these arguments have an opposite nature unto positive: for, they borrow no force to argue from the quality, or quantity of any other arguments. These arguments have these four properties. 1. They are equally known] (that is) the two things compared, have in themselves no priority, or antecedency, to argue, and be argued: as we find in the effect, and causes thereof: In the subject, and the properties, and accidents annexed thereunto. 2. [Some men do know the one better than the other.] That is, in the event, by reason they are acquainted with the one, and not with the other. 3. [They are taken sometimes, from things feigned.] And so, they may well be; for, such things have a being in our understanding, and that is enough to make them rational beings; as we learn from Thomas, 1 part. q. 16. art. 3. ad 2m. That is enough also, to give them a place in Logic: for every being, as well rational, as real is objected thereunto. 4. [Comparisons taken from feigned things do argue, and set out the subject.] Because, the force that all comparisons have to argue, ariseth from the apprehension of our understanding; and not from any real relation, or consent that the one hath to the other. Now, because the Reader might know, how to find a Comparison in a Discourse, we must understand, that, sometimes they are set out by certain words, which are proper to them: and sometimes they lie open in sentences that are fit to express them: In this case the first sentence is called the proposition: the second the reddition: therefore, when he finds them, he needs no other direction; Sometimes also, they are set down without notes, or marks; and the parts are inverted, or contracted: then the matter itself must direct him. These are all, that belong to comparisons in common. CHAP. XXI. Of the Distribution of comparison. Comparison is in Quantity, Equal. Unequal, the Greater Lesser. Ramus. Quality, Like. Unlike. ARistotle hath every branch of this division; In his Categortes in the sixth Chapter, he placeth Comparison, In quantity, as proper thereto: and divides it into equal, and unequal. In the 8. Chapter, he placeth Comparison in quality, and doth divide it irto like, and unlike, and makes this kind of Comparison, to be found only in quality. Lastly, cap. 6. At horum etc. and cap. 7. Omnta vero, he divides unequal into greater and less: and the things themselves, that these two Authors bring, are received in the Schools of all ages; therefore, I will proceed to the particulars. CHAP. XXII. Of Equality. Quantity is that by which things compared are said to be so great, Ramus. or so little. ARistotle doth teach the same thing: Top. lib. 1. cap. 9 Ex his, etc. Quantity, saith he, importeth magnitude. [Quantity] In the first place, we ought to understand what quantity is, else we shall not understand, what is meant by a Comparison in quantity. [That which &c] These words set out the nature of quantity, and place it in a magnitude; for, according to magnitude, things are said to be greater, or lesser: now, magnitudeiss not taken here Geometrically, nor Arithmetically: but, in a larger sense: even, for every magnitude, by which a thing may be said to be thus, or so much: whether it be spoken of bodies, number, or virtues: of things real, or intellectual: for, this Logic requires; because it hath to do with all things, wherein our understanding hath any thing to do. Those things are equal, Ramus. that have the same quantity. One in quantity makes equal; so saith Okam 1. dist. 19 q 1. lit. B. opinio. 1a. I do not find this sentence in Aristotle expressly: yet he implies thus much, as we shall see when we come to the Comparison of likeness, chap. 25. And no man thinks otherways, therefore we must esteem this sentence to be a precept of Art. [Those things are equali] That is, two things laid together, be of equal quantity, or magnitude. [Which have the same quantity.] That is, which are adequate in magnitude: as when two lines be of the same length, the one is neither longer nor shorter than the other: when neither end of the scale weighs down the other: when two numbers agree together, as, two and two; four and four; for, thus every magnitude is one in quantity. Now, we have the nature of Equals defined, and set out unto us, we must know how to find and use them. The marks, Ramus. and signs of equality are these 5 viz. One Equal, As much, As and So, denial of inequality. As and So, be signs of this comparison; but not proper to them: for, many times they are found in comparison of likeness. I do not find that Aristotle, or other Schools, do thus punctually show us how to find out these comparisons, only, I find that Thomas saith 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. Then a thing is said to be equal, when it is denied, to be unequal, that is more or less: and I find the same thing in Aristotle Meta. lib. 10. text 15.16. from whence we may infer their agreement with Okam, that placeth the equality of things, in being one in quantity. We have examples wherein comparisons of equality are set out by these marks, or signs, namely; 1. Both the Cherubes were of one measure: 1 Kings. 6.25. 2. Thou hast made them equal to us: Mat. 20.12. 3. Sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again; Luke 6.34. 4. The length of the City is as large as the breadth: Revel. 21.16. 5. I cannot do less, or more than God's word commands: Numb. 21.18. 6. Ye are not inferior to other Churches: 2. Cor. 12.13. Sometime the Proposition and Reddition are distinctly set down. 7. As his part is, that goeth to the batile, so shall his part be, that tarrieth by the ●uffe: 1. Sam. 30.34. 8. How much she hath glorified herself, and lived delictously, so much torment, and sorrow give her: Revel. 18.7. In these examples, we find two Cherubes to be one in dimension. Two Labourers, one in wages. A lender, and a borrower one in quantity of money. The length and breadth of the City one in measure. The Corinth's and other Churches one in grace, etc. They that went to war, and they that guarded the stuff, one in the quantity of prey. The Whore of Babylon's delights, and sorrows one in extent. By this we see how to find out such comparisons, as are marked out unto us. I will also set down some comparisons that want those signs, or marks, viz. What force virtue hath to happiness, that force vice hath to cursedness. The jews answered, we can not tell, Christ answered neither tell I you. Mat. 21.23. In the first, Vice and virtue, are one in efficacy. In the second, Christ and the jews, are one in silence. By this we may know how to find out these comparisons. Now I will show how we should use them, for, hitherto we find them comparisons, but no arguments, because thus fare they are wholly destitute of relation to any subject, in this quantity, the one sets out the other, and no more: but every argument leads us to know some subject, which we knew not. I will show their use, by one of the examples, (and I think that will suffice) on this manner. The Whore of Babylon hath sorrows. In this sentence, the word sorrow doth lead us to understand what the Whore of Babylon is: viz: in her estate or condition. Now, because some man doth not know the quantity of this sorrow: but doth know the quantity of her delight: therefore, her sorrow is laid to her delight, and thereby he comes to know what is the quantity of her sorrow, in as much, as, she is one in the quantity of both. By this I hope the Reader will find the way how to make use of all comparative arguments, so as, I shall not need to do the like in any of the rest which follow. CHAP. XXIII. Of Vnequales. Unequal things are those which have not the same quantity. Ramus. TO the same effect speaks Thomas 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. Vnequals (saith he) cannot be one in numerical quantity: and thus much Aristotle and Okam speak: because, they make those things equal, which be one in quantity. This definition hath nothing in it to be expounded: for, that is done already in the definition of quantity. Cap. 22. The greater is that, Ramus. the quantity whereof doth exceed. The terms of this definition, may be understood by that which is past, in the last Chapter. The proper marks of this Comparison, are such as these: Not only, but also. Rather this, then that: More then: Much more. Examples of these Comparisons, are these which follow. I am ready, not to be bound only: but also, to dye for the name of the Lord jesus. Act 21.13. I had rather be a doorkeeper in God's house, then dwell in the tents of wickedness. Psal. 84.10. The Lord loveth the gates of Zion, more than all the dwellings of jacob. Psal. 82.2. If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God, by the death of his son: much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. Rom. 5.6.7. In these examples, we have these Comparisons. To be bound, and to dye, do differ in the quantity of bitterness, & this is esteemed to exceed that. To keep a door, and to dwell in the tents etc. are laid together, and this preferred before that, in man's judgement, as exceeding in the quantity of excellency. The gates of Zion, are compared with the other dwellings of Israel, in the quantity of glory, and loveliness, and these preferred before that. The reconciling of an enemy, and the saving of a friend, are compared in the quantity of difficulty, and that is judged to excel this. In these Comparisons, the greater is brought to set out the lesser, to the end, that the less may set out and declare the subject, or thing argued: and the holy Ghost himself hath showed us how to do it, for in the last of the examples, he doth reason thus; If Christ's death reconciled an enemy, than his life will save the reconciled. The reason of this consequence is this, viz. (In the judgement of man) the first is more difficult than the second. It is a hard thing to reconcile an enemy; for, than the whole work is to do: But not so hard to save a friend; for, such a one is next door to salvation. In the same sort, David argues: If I love to dwell in God's house, rather than in man's tents; then my affection is exceeding fervent thereto: for, man's tents (in the judgement of man) exceed God's house for outward pleasure, and profit: and after this sort we may argue from the rest. CHAP. XXIIII. Of the Less. The less, Ramus. is that, the quantity whereof is exceeded. I Shall not need to explicate, and avow this definition: for, that is done enough already, in the two former Chapters: therefore, I proceed to set down examples of it. A stone is heavy, and the sand weighty, but a fool's wrath more heavy than them both. Pro. 27.3. I laboured more abundantly than they all. 1 Cor. 15.10. It is easier for a Camel to go through the eye of a needle, then for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. Luk. 18.25. The Ox knoweth his owner, and the Ass his Master's crib: But I sraell doth not know, etc. Isa. 1.3. In these Instances, the Comparison we seek for, is very apparent: A stone and a fool's wrath is Compared, in the quantity of weight: and that is said to be less than this. Paul and others are laid together in the quantity of labour, and he exceeds them. The passing of a Camel through a needle's eye, and a rich man's going to heaven, are compared together in the quantity of difficulty: and that is inferior to this. The Ox, and Israel are set together, in the quantity of ignorance: and these are more blamed than they. These Comparisons do argue the greater, by the less, and they must be framed thus: A fool's wrath abounds in weight: for, the stones and sand are not so heavy as it. If Israel be ignorant of me, than their ignorance is excessive: for, the Ox in his kind is not so ignorant: because, he knows who owes him, and feeds him, so do not they. And thus much for Comparison in quantity. CHAP. XXV. Of Likeness. Now followeth Comparison in quality, Ramus. whereby things are said to be such or such. I Call a quality (saith Aristotle, Categor. Cap. 8.) that, of which, things are said to be of this or that manner: and a quality must be reckoned amongst them which are said to be manifold, or of many sorts. Ramus. Those things are like which have the same quality. Those are like (saith Aristotle, meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20.) whose quality is one. One in quality makes things to be like, so saith Okam. 1. dist. 19 q. 1. lit. B. opinio 1. I will end with Gillius, A likeness (saith he) is an agreement in quality. lib. 2. tract. 5. cap. 1. no. 1. From hence we may conclude, that (in the judgement of Aristotle) those things be equal, which are one in quantity: because, he makes them to be like, which be one in quality: and consequently, he placeth comparison in quality in the same thing that Okam doth, whose judgement is alleged. Chap. 22. Aristotle doth explicate the nature of these Comparisons: Top. lib. 1. cap. 17. Similitudes (saith he) must be considered either in things which are of diverse kinds; Or in those which are of the same kind. The first is after this manner: as one thing is to one, so another is to another: as for example, as knowledge is to the thing known, so sense is to the thing sersible. Again, as one is in one, so another is in another: as for example, as sight is in the eye, so the mind is in the soul: as, calmness is in the Sea, so cleernes is in the air: and both of them are quietness. We have examples of the second kind, when the same quality is in many: as smelling, seeing, etc. in a man, a horse, a dog: for, how fare forth the same thing is in them, so fare forth they are alike. I will content myself with the bare allegation of Aristotle's words: I shall not need to compare them with Ramus, nor seek for their sense: because, all that Ramus brings in this Comparison, is but an explication, and Comment of the words alleged: what Aristotle delivers in brief, Ramus opens at large; therefore, I will set down what he saith. The marks of likeness be these, Ramus. viz. As, like, After the manner. I will show examples of this Comparison, where the marks are observed: as followeth, Let them that love him, be as the Sun, judg. 5.21. They saw his face as it had been the face of an Angel. Act. 6.15. The form of the fourth is like the son of God. Dan. 3.25. Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses: Act. 15.1. Ramus. Sometime the mark is left out. As in this example, My sister is a garden enclosed, my spouse a spring shut up, a fountain sealed, Cant. 4.12. Of this kind are all metaphors, or borrowed words, they (I say) contain similitudes, as when Christ is called a rock, a shepherd, a vine; and God the Father an husbandman. For in them, Christ, and God the Father, are likened unto those things which be usually signified in those words. The parts of a similitude are sometime laid out at large: either severed, Ramus. or joined; as when there are four terms distinctly set down. Four terms are then found in a full Comparison, when there be two in the Proposition, and two other in the Reddition. These examples will show it. As the wax melteth at the fire, so let the perish, at the presence of God. Psal. 68.2. The terms in the Proposition are Wax, Fire: in the Reddition , God's presence. As the Hart brayeth after the Rivers of Water, so panteth my soul after thee, O God, Psal. 42.1. The terms in this full Comparison, are these four: The Hart, River, Soul, God. Sometime one of the marks is left out and the parts displaced. Ramus. And this we find in this example: Husbands love your wives, even as Christ loved the Church. Ephes. 5.29. The terms in this Comparison are, Christ, Church; Husbands, Wives. The Reddition is set first, the Proposition last. If we place it orderly, this is the frame of it: As Christ loved the Church, so must men love their wives. Sometime both marks are left out. Ramus. And this instance shows it. Silver, dross, overlaid upon a potsherd: burning lips, and an evil heart. Pro. 26.23. The Comparison lies thus; as is a potsherd, and dross covered with silver; so are burning lips, and a wicked ked heart: fair without, and foul within. The four terms are distinct: Dross, Silver; burning lips, a wicked heart. A Continued similitude, Ramus. is when the second term, is to the third, as the first is to the second. This example will make it familiar. As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you. john 15.9. In this similitude, there are but three terms: viz. Father, Christ, Disciples; Christ, the second term, is referred to the third term, Disciples; so the first term Father, is referred to the second term Christ. Here also one mark sometimes is omitted. Ramus. The words of our Saviour will manifest this sentence. Oughtest not thou to have had pity on thy fellow servant, as I had pity on thee. Mat. 18.33. The three terms in this similitude are these, Lord, Servant, Fellow: and it ought to have this form: As the Lord had pity on thee: so thou shouldest have had pity on thy fellow. Feigned similitudet are of as much force to argue as true. Ramus. And so much we find in Scripture: for, Christ spoke much in parables, and all parables be similitudes taken from feigned things. I should now (according to my former course) apply the examples unto their several rules; but I will spare that labour: for, the similitudes do lie so plain in them, that much labour will not make them plainer. I may not show how these similitudes do argue the subject, and engender truth: for, that is not their office, but Comparisons in quality, do only make our knowledge more easy, and familiar. This example will show it. The wicked are destroyed. In this sentence, destruction is attributed to wicked men: and thereby we understand what condition befalls them. To make this knowledge more easy, and sensible, the holy Ghost doth compare them to the meling of Wax, and thereby we find, that, this condition befalls them secretly, certainly, unrecoverably: for, such is the quality of melting wax, that cannot be discerned how it melteth, nor prevented from melting, nor recovered again when it is melted. Aristotle seems to differ from Ramus, because he maketh similitudes useful to the framing of Reasons. Syllogisms. Definitions. To the first, because by the induction of many particular likenesses, we conclude the universal. To the second, because we take as confessed as it is in such and such, so it is in the thing in question. To the third, because in Similitudes, the terms are Compared together in one thing, that is, common unto them: such a thing, is a Genus, and a Genus is required to a definition. Top lib. 1. cap. 18. I answer, I must not (now) decide this doubt, because the point itself doth not fit this place: for, the first branch speaks of things Compared. The third, of the quality wherein they are compared; and both of them belong to the matter of a Comparison, not to the formal nature thereof. The second is a Comparison of equality (if any at all) no Comparison of likeness: and this I take as certain, therefore here I will end Comparisons of likeness. CHAP. XXVI. Of Unlike. Unlike things, Ramus. are those, which have a divers quality. We have little to say touching this comparison: for, the explication of comparison in likeness, doth sufficiently set out, the nature of a comparison of unlikeness. I will therefore add examples of it, and that shall suffice; and in that also I will content myself with these which follow. The fourth beast, was unlike to all the beasts before it: Dan. 7.19. There is one glory of the Sun, another of the Moon, and another of the Stars, for one Star differeth from another in glory: 1. Cor. 15.41. There is none like me in all the earth: Exod. 9.14. But not as the offence, so is the gift: Rom. 5.15. The Sun doth set, and rise, Man dies, and life's no more. The things compared, and the quality wherein they are unlike: are so easy to be found in these examples, that, I should seem to lose my labour, if I should attempt to show them The last is the most difficult, because it wanteth the signs of this comparison, yet every man may see, that, the Sun and Man, are compared together, in the quality of dying: the Sun dies by setting, and revives by rising, man dies, but revives no more. The use of these dissimilitudes, is also found in this last instance, where every singular man is set out by his subjection to death; as a quality of his being: now, although this predication be truly made in the judgement of all men: (for none will deny that man is subject to death) yet our knowledge hereof is furthered when the truth is unfolded, and made more easy: for that end, these comparisons of likeness, and unlikeness are brought: we do then more readily conceive what death is to man, when we see it is unlike the death of the sun, that revives, so doth not man. This that I have said (I hope) is sufficient to show the nature, and use of similitudes, and dissimilitudes: and therefore here I will end the matter of comparative arguments; and all those which be predicated only. CHAP XXVII. Of the Genus and Species. IN this place we must set down, those arguments which be sometimes predicated, and sometimes subjected: for, that is the last thing contained in this part of Logic; as I have showed in the third Chapter foregoing. The arguments of this kind, are called the second substance: consisting in the Genus and Species: as is also declared in the place alleged. In the handling hereof, we must first set down their nature. Secondly, how they be predicated, and how subjected. Thirdly, we must show that they be a second substance. The Genus is that whole, Ramus. that is essential to the parts. And thus saith Aristotle too. The Genus (saith Porphyry, Cap. 2.) Is a certain whole: yea (as Okam saith 1. dist. 8. q. 4. lit. D. & E.) The Genus importeth the whole thing: not, because it doth partake of all the specifical differences: for then; one and the same thing should partake of contraries; which may not be granted, in the judgement of Aristotle. Meta. lib. 2. Cap. 12. text. 42. But because it is an essence common unto many: as the same Aristotle teacheth; Top. lib. 1. Cap. 18. ad definitiones, Cap. 5. Proprium verò & Porphyry, Cap. 2. Quod etiam. And a whole not designed as Thomas thinketh: 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2m. The Species is a part of the Genus. Ramus. Porphyry, and Aristotle do speak to the same purpose; A Species (saith Porphyry) is placed under the Genus, as a thing that is essential thereto. cap. 2. Explicant igatur. And yet more plainly, in the same Chapter. Continetur igitur. The Species is both a whole, and a part: a part unto another (that is) unto the Genus, saith Aristotle, meta. lib. 5. cap 24. text. 30. A whole not unto another, but in others: because it is a whole in the parts. The general is either supreme, Ramus. or inferior. The special is either middlemost, or lowest. The supreme Genus, is that which hath no Genus above it. The inferior Genus, is that which is inferior to one, and superior to another. The lowest species, is that which cannot be divided into other specials. We have all this in Porphyry, and thus he writeth in the second Chapter alleged. In every Category there be some things that be most general, and others that are most special; and between these, there be some that are both general, and special. That is most general, unto which there can be no superior Genus. That is most special, unto which there can be no other Species inferior. Between the most general, and the most special; There be others, which the self same thing, is both Genus and Species, being referred some while to one thing, and otherwhile to another: as for example; a Substance is a Genus, and under that, there is a body: and under a body, an animated body: and under an animated body, a living Creature: and under a living Creature, a rational living Creature: under that a singular man. Of all these, a substance is most general, because it is a Genus only. A man is the most special, because it is a Species only: but a body, is a Species of substance, and a Genus unto an animated body. An animated body, is a Species of a body: Again, a living Creature, is a Species unto an animated body: and Genus unto a reasonable living Creature: but a reasonable living Creature, is the Genus of a man. And so much for the nature of the Genus and Species. We must now show, how the Genus, and Species, is subjected, and predicated: for, that is the second thing we undertook. Aristotle doth that, partly in the fourth book of his Topickes, the first and second Chapters: and partly, but more fully, in the fifth Chapter of his Categories, where he proceedeth thus: The Genus is attributed unto all, and every the Species, that are contained under the same. The Species is subjected to the Genus, the Genus is predicated both of the Species, and the individual: the Species is predicated of the individual. Thus fare Aristotle. We may make this familiar to our understanding, by these examples: A man is a living Creature. Peter is a man. In the first, living Creature is a Genus, viz. of reasonable, and unreasonable Creatures. A man, is a species: because it is one kind of living Creature. Living Creature, is attributed to man: the Genus to the Species. In the second, Peter is an individual: Man is a species, and thereby we see that the species is predicated of the individual; and consequently, the Genus is predicated of the individual also: for, the Genus hath no being but in some species, as Thomas hath truly observed. 1. p. q. 15. art. 3. ad 4m. And the things themselves do say no less. If a man, than a living Creature: seeing every man is a living Creature. By this (I hope) it is plain, that the species is subjected, and both species, and Genus are predicated. Some man may doubt, whether the Genus be not always predicated, and consequently belongs to those arguments, that are always predicated. I answer, the Genus (as it is a Genus) is always predicated, and so must be, unless we will divert nature: but that Genus that is sometimes a species, is subjected: and may be so, when it is a species, and that is enough to bring the Genus unto this place; for, it makes it sometime predicated, sometime subjected. This example will show that I answer truly. A living Creature, is a living body, able to moon itself. A living Creature, is a Genus of a man: but a species of a living body, and it is subjected in the fore said proposition. A living body, is a Genus to a living Creature: for, under that is comprehended, the growing plants, that increase: but cannot move themselves: as a living Creature that can both wax bigger, and move themselves also: now, this Genus is predicated of a living Creature: therefore, we may rest assured, that a Genus is sometimes predicated, and other some time subjected. The third thing that we seek for is, whether the Genus, and Species be a second substance. Aristotle Categor. cap. 5. proues that they are: on this manner: They are a substance, because 1. We may truly say they be something. 2. They appertain to the essence of every particular being. 3. They are subjected unto others, and others are predicated of them which is proper unto a substance. They are a second substance: because. 1. They are Communicated to many. 2. They are predicated sometimes, and consequently, they have not the proper nature of a substance: for, that is always subjected, in so much, as nothing could exist, but by reason of substance properly so called. The species comes nearer to a first substance than the Genus: because, 1. The species is in nature, and predication nearer to the individual, than the Genus; as a man is nearer unto Peter, than a living Creature. 2. The Genus, is Communicated to more than the species. 3. The species, as it is a species, is subjected always to the Genus: and itself never predicated; but of the individual. These things are evident in themselves: therefore, I need not add any proofs to confirm them, they are easy, and open to our understanding: therefore, I will not stand to unfold them. If any require me to show, how the Genus, and species do argue, and set out the first substance. I answer, that, that request is not in vain: because (as Aristotle truly saith, in the fift Chapter of his Categories.) All other things are predicated of the first substance: therefore, if the first substance were not, none of the rest could be. Yet notwithstanding, this place doth not require me to show it: because the instances given already, have done that in part, and the precepts of a definition will show it yet more, but they belong to the second part of Logic, and may not be brought hither, without in●urie to nature, and our understanding. I will satisfy the demand so fare as this place permits, and this one sentence will do it. Peter is a man. Here, man is a species, because it is but one kind of thing, comprehended under the name of living Creature. The lowest species, because no Creatures that have different formal beings, are contained under it. Peter, signifies a first substance, because it importeth a thing that cannot be divided, otherwise then into matter, and form; viz. his soul and body: and they be in Peter, as in a whole, not as in a subject; as we learn by Aristotle, Categor. cap. 5. Porròue nos etc. Man is attributed unto this first substance, and thereby every superior Genus is attributed to it also: for, if a man then 1. a living Creature. 2. A lively body. 3. A body. 4. A substance, and consequently, when we attribute man unto Peter, that goes not alone, all the rest go with it I have now (I hope) satisfied the demand, and shown the force that these arguments have to argue the first substance; and therefore, I am come to an end, of all that belongs unto those arguments, which be sometimes predicated, and sometimes subrected: and therewithal, I have finished all that belongs, to the first part of Logic, in the judgement of Aristotle, and the nature of the things themselves. Ramus doth extend this first part of Logic further than thus: but undoubtedly, he follows his own apprehension, against the authority of all Logic Schools before him: and the nature of the things themselves. In the next Chapter, I will set down, what he saith, and why I descent from him, and thereby give a full Conclusion to this part of Logic. CHAP. XXVIII. Of Coniugates, etc. Arguments that arise of the first, are Coniugates. Notation. Distribution. Ramus. Definition. These arguments have the same force to argue, that the primitives have, from which they are derived. THis precept, sets out four other seats of arguments, more than Aristotle hath, and giveth them place in the first part of Logic. They belong to Logic, and so fare this precept is true; but not to this place, and so fair it is false. I say, not to this place; for, even in the judgement of Ramus himself, they belong to other seats of arguments, namely, to them that he calls by the name of privative Arguments; for, (according to him) they have the same force to argue that the primitives have, from which they are derived; therefore, they are the same with them, seeing the nature of every argument ariseth from its force to argue: but the precepts of them are already dispatched, and ought not to be repeated again. If any say, the force that these have to argue ariseth not first, and originally out of themselves: but by reflection, (as the Moon is conceived to have her light) and that therefore they ought to have their own proper seats in this Art. I answer first, they do not argue by reflection, or any force received from others, as the particulars will show. Secondly, although they did so, yet can they challenge no new places: for, if we should multiply the seats of arguments, according to the variety that our understanding doth apprehend to be in them, than we must have an endless (at least) a fruitless number: seeing it is in vain to set ten men to do the labour of one. The foresaid seats of arguments, belong not to this place (in the judgement of Aristotle) therefore common use hath not given it them, and consequently, they ought not to have it; because Art is approved by use: and so much for them all jointly. Coniugates are names diversely derived from the same beginning. Ramus. Aristotle doth give the name of Coniugates unto some arguments; namely, unto all those that are of the same root, Case, Conjugation, or rank: as, justice, Just, justly, Strength, Strong, Strongly, Top. lib. 2. cap. 9 therefore, there is no difference touching the name. In their nature they are no more, but either formal qualities, accidents, or properties. justice in the abstract, is nothing; if we refer it to man, it is an accident: because he may have it, and be without it, or a formal quality, being denominated, and constituted just by it. justly, importeth an action done according to law; and therefore, what justice is to man, that justly is to an action: Conformity to Law may be, and not be in an action, and being there it doth denominate, and constitute the action just. Aristotle (in the place last alleged) calls them Coniugates: because when one of them is proved good, and landable, all the rest are so too: therefore, he never meant to make them a seat of arguments distinct from his ten. Notation is the interpretation of a name. Ramus. Aristotle doth acknowledge, that some words do interpret the nature of things, and denominate the things themselves: for, thus he writeth; Those are called denominates, which have the appellation of a name from some other: but so, as, they differ in case, as from Grammar, man is called a Grammarian: from strength he is called Strong. Categor. Cap. 1. These are the same arguments with the former; for Grammarian, imports the skill of Grammar, and is an accident, because it may be, and not be in man: It is a formal quality, seeing it doth constitute, and denominate a man a Grammarian: Grammar is an abstract, and signifies nothing Logically; being no more but a comprehension of precepts. If we refer it to man, it is the same with Grammarian: namely, the same precepts literally, and habitually. Distribution is when the whole is divided into parts. Ramus. Distribution is called, the dividing of the whole. The gathering of the parts together, to make up the whole, is called Induction. When we say, a man hath two parts, soul and body: Living Creatures are reasonable, and unreasonable, than we make a distribution: and Aristotle doth acknowledge these distributions. Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. but in a different sense. Although it is very probable, that a distribution doth formally consist in an axiom, and therefore it belongs to the second part of Logic: yet I will not now insist thereupon: because the arguments predicated in a distribution, are merely the Causes themselves; and we cannot find a compounded effect more clearly resolved into its Causes, then in a distribution. In the first example of distribution before going, we find the matter informed, arguing the whole effect constituted by that matter In the second, we have the specifical form, informing each several kind, and arguing that whole effect, which comprehendeth both kinds. The Reader shall find this answer fully explicated, and proved, Chap. 38. etc. in the matter of a distribution. Aristotle doth acknowledge a division belongs to Logic: Prior. cap. 31. but he makes it a Syllogism; because something is always concluded therfrom: though a weak one; because it pre●umes what it ought to prove. He doth acknowledge induction also. Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. lib. 1. cap. 12. Prior lib. 2. cap. 23. and by an induction he understands, a collection of all the singulars, to make the total: therefore he doth acknowledge it in the present sense: but (according to him) it is one species, kind, or form of disputing, little differing from a Syllogism: for thus he saith of it: A Syllogism, is for Logicians, an Induction for the multitude: Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. Secondly, It is an instrument more apt to persuade, more open, better known to sense: and is common amongst the multitude: but a Syllogism hath greater force to urge, and is more effectual against them that are apt to gain say: Top. lib. 1. cap. 12. Therefore (according to him) division, and induction belong to the second part of Logic; not to the first: and consequently, a distribution must be referred thither also: for both division and induction are comprehended, or employed, in a distribution, according to Ramus. A definition is, Ramus. when we declare what a thing is. Therefore a perfect definition, is nothing else, but a general mark, or badge of the causes, which make the essence, or nature of the thing. I have a little to say touching this fourth seat; for, I have done enough in the last, to satisfy this: for, what appertains to that, may be applied to this. Aristotle doth acknowledge definitions, and that in the present sense too: but gives them a place in the second part, as we shall see, cap. 35. etc. The arguments disposed in a definition, belong to the first part of Logic: because as Thomas saith 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2m. a definition, according to the intent thereof. doth l●a● to the knowledge of the thing definea: and this is the case with all axioms whatsoever. The predicate in a definition belongs to the seat of causes, even in the judgement of Ramus himself? for the predicate doth set out what the subject, or thing defined is, and nothing can do that, but the causes: therefore a definition deserves no other place in Logic, but the seat of the causes. Upon these premises, we may well conclude; these four seats of arguments in question are superfluous; because Art hath given them place already in the precepts fore going, therefore we must not seek it here. The second part of Logic comes in the next rank: THE SECOND PART. CHAP. XXIX. Of disposition, or judgement. Either to we have handled the first part of Logic; called Invention. Ramus. We come now to the second, termed judgement: judgement is a part of Logic, teaching the manner of disposing arguments, that we may judge well: for every thing is to be judged according to certain rules of disposition. Hence this part of Logic, is called, both judgement, and disposition: the same thing being signified by both terms. THE substance of all this matter, is already set down in the second chapter, and repeated here, for the benefit of the Reader. There is no great difficulty in the parts, nor difference in the whole, from Aristotle: I have showed the consent of both Authors in the place aleadged, and I will now give my opinion of the sense, of every thing that seems not clear enough. [judgement Disposition] These words are used for the same thing, and that fitly; for they are the same thing variously considered, the second intends the first, and the first proceeds from the second. The second is the fountain: the first is the stream: and they make one continued thing. The first is the supreme, the second the subordinate end, and means unto the supreme, in that respect they vary; and not otherwise. [Apart] Logic hath parts, even by itself: for the precepts thereof are of distinct natures, as members in the whole, and therefore we must so conceive of them. The precepts that are contained under this name, make a second part: for, the disposing of things doth suppose, that, the things themselves have a being already. [Disposing] These words, and the rest that follow, do contain the whole shot, or general sum that ariseth from all the precepts, belonging to this part of Logic: and it signifieth, a joining together of distinct things in an orderly frame. [Arguments] viz. Those single, or incomplexed terms whereof we spoke in the former part. [judge] judgement, is an act of the understanding, whereby we determine in ourselves, that this or that is true, or false. This word sets out the end of those precepts which belong to this part of Logic; namely, the thing they are fit for; and the profit we receive by them. [Well] That is, not doubtfully: but even as the things are in themselves: and this is the perfection of judgement. This first and universal precept, may fitly be expressed in these terms. 1. Some precepts of Logic, do teach us to dispose arguments fitly, that thereby we might judge of truth, and falsehood clearly, and certainly. 2. These precepts make up a second part of Logic. Now we understand the gross sum, we shall the better know the particulars. CHAP. XXX. Of the Division of Disposition. IN this Chapter we must divide a sunder, what we found together in the former; and so proceed, till we have veiwed every several precept. judgement is axiomatical. Ramus. dianoetical. By this sentence the precepts belonging to this part, are divided into their several kinds: and it is as much as to say: These precepts teach us to frame arguments in an Axiom, & in a discourse, that thereby we may judge of truth, and falsehood contained in them both. These (I say) are several kinds, because they be distinct manners of disposing. The first branch supposeth, that some speech may be called an Axiom, and that is true. In this place, the word Axiom signifieth no more, but a declarative, or pronouncing sentence. This kind of speech deserves that name, because it is (in the nature thereof) more excellent than any other speech of Man. An Axiom is thus defined. An Enunciative speech, is that, Ramus. that containeth truth or falsehood. We have this precept from Aristotle, de interpre. cap. 4. He assigns it the first place, and well worthy; for truth and falsehood is the first object of our judgement, and belongs to all Axioms whatsoever, and nothing but an Axiom contains truth and falsehood. [Speech] This word contains the essence or nature belonging to all Axioms, and other speeches which are not Axioms. In this place it signifies, the inward sentence of the mind, and the written sentence, as well as the sentence pronounced in words. [Enunciative.] This word, importeth a species, or one kind of speech: & restrains that word which is common to many, unto that one kind which belongs to this place. Enunciating, or Pronouncing implieth, that speech is the Herald, and proclaimer of man's mind, and so it is indeed, by institution, not of itself. The signification of words, follows the intent of the speaker, and not otherwise: so saith Aristotle in the fourth Chapter alleged. [Truth and falsehood] These words, contain the proper, and formal being of every Axiom in common. Ramus makes truth and falsehood a property belonging to every axiom: but Aristotle doth more, he placeth the primary nature of an axiom therein; and so he may well do; for thereby all axioms are made to differ from all other kinds of speech: If there be any other thing, that gives being to an axiom, from whence this property doth flow: either we are not able to apprehend it, or want words to express it. I say, truth, or falsehood doth make axioms to differ from all other kinds of speech: for single terms, as Man, Peter, to run, to sit, etc. and all commanding, and entreating speeches, contain neither truth, nor falsehood: as Aristotle hath well observed, De interpre. Cap. 2.3.4. Truth (in the judgement of all Philosophers) signifies, the adequation of the thing, and our understanding. Wherefore truth, is radically in the thing, and formally in the understanding, and declaratively in a proposition. We must conceive of falsehood according hereunto. A proposition is then true, Ramus. when it pronounceth of a thing, as the thing is indeed. Aristoile saith thus too; Speeches are then true, when they pronounce as a thing is in itself: De interpre. Cap. 9 Quare cum orationes & meta lib. 4. cap. 7. text 27. Cum enim convenit, etc. Thus Tho. 1. p. q. 21. art. 2. in cor. 1. dist. 46. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1m. And so all Philosophers speak; I will give you the words of Albertinus (a learned Schooleman) in stead of them all. That proposition (saith he) is true, which is conformable to the thing pronounced of, and false if it be inconformable. fol. 265. col. 1. A true axiom is Ramus. Contingent. Necessary. Contingent, when it is in such sort true, that it may also at sometime be false. This is called opinion. A necessary axiom, Ramus. is when it is always true, and cannot be false. An axiom necessarily false, is called impossible. Aristotle speaks wholly after this sort; Every proposition (saith he) doth signify something to be, either necessarily, or contingently. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. And further, he saith Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 33. That is necessary, that cannot be otherwise. Some things are true, and are, but may be otherwise. Opinion is concerning that, that is true, or false, but may be otherwise. For the full explication of this point, we must first understand, that axioms are necessary, and contingent, by reason that the things whereof they pronounce are necessary, and contingent. Now, that is said to be necessary, that is so, and cannot be otherwise. This is simply, and after a sort. Simply, when the being of a thing is of, and by itself, and the causes thereof, so necessary, that the thing that is, hath its being wholly without relation to any other thing without itself. A thing is necessary by supposition, and after a sort, when it is by force of another, the first, is called necessary, simply, and properly: because it is wholly impossible it should be otherwise then it is, thus fare Aristotle meta. lib. 5. cap. 8. In the first sense, all Axioms that pronounce of God, are necessary, either in their truth, or falsehood. In the second sense, some propositions that pronounce of the creature be necessary, and some contingent in their truth, and falsehood. I will show you how or when. Created effects, (upon supposition) are Necessary 1. In their present being. 2. When the next cause is determined to one Naturally, Efficiently Contingent, when the next cause 1. Is indeterminate unto doing, 2. Wants power for doing. And a proposition, when it pronounceth of created effects, is true, or falseaccording hereunto; as we shall more plainly see when we come to show the several natures of Axioms: Every thing (saith Aristotle) is necessary when it is, and every thing necessarily is not, when it is not: but this necessity, to not a necessity simply. de interpre. cap. 9 Ergo. Quod. I shall show the truth, and use of these precepts when I come to the special kind of Axioms in the next Chapter: therefore I forbear it in this place, lest I should hale in something before the time, or repeat what I have said sufficiently already: therefore here I will end those things which belong to all Axioms in common. CHAP. XXXI. Of a simple Axiom. An Axiom is Simple. Ramus. Compound. A simple Axiom is that, the band whereof is a Verb. ARistotle speaks wholly after this sort: An enuntiative speech is either simple, or compounded of those that be simple. A simple Enunciation, is a voice that signifieth that something is, or is not, according to the diversity of times: and he calleth these Axioms one speech, because one thing only is predicated of another. de interpre. Cap. 5. & 10. Now we have the definition of a simple axiom, we must unfold it: It containeth three things. 1. The terms of it. 2. The extension of one term to another. 3. The framing of those terms together. I call that a term (saith Aristotle) Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. into which the proposition is resolved, and they be three: viz. The predicate, The subject predicated of, and the Verb that comes between them: now the Verb of itself signifies nothing: but serveth to compound those things that cannot be understood, till they be compounded: and therefore it is a perpetual sign of things predicated, and subjected. Thus Aristotle hath taught us De interpre. Cap. 3. The Verb (in the common language of the Schools) is called the band, or couple: and that term agrees well with this doctrine of Aristotle: for a band doth compose diverse things together. Ramus doth call the subject, and the predicate, by the name of antecedent, & consequent: but very unduely: for, the predicate doth not follow upon the subject; neither in the thing, nor in our apprehension. Those terms belong to some compound axioms, as I shall show in due place. For further illustration, it is needful for us to know: that, Predication is Natural, identical. Direct. Notnaturall Contrary to nature. Besides nature. identical predication, is that which nature says must be: Direct is that which according to rature may be Contrary to nature, is when the subject, and predicate are incompatible: when they abhor one another (as we say.) Besides nature, when the predicate is undecent for the subject: or the subject undecent for the predicate. Thus the jesuites have taught us in their Preface to Porphyry. q. 1. art. 4. and that to very good purpose. Now predication, is taken in this place for natural predication, not for that which is against nature: for predication against nature is a defection, no perfection in art: and consequently, when we meet with it in any discourse, we must reject it, or reform it by art. By verb, is meant a voice or name that signifies a time, either present, past, or to come: whose office it is to compound the predicate, and subject: or to severe them, each from other. And this is so necessary, that no speech can be enunciative till that be added: as Aristotle hath duly remembered: Interpre. Cap. 3. & 5. We may make try all of these precepts in this example: Man is reasonable. This sentence is an Axiom: be cause it contains truth or falsehood. 2. It is a simple Axiom: because one thing barely, and uncompoundedly, is referred to another. 3. It hath three terms, viz. 1. Man. 2. Reasonable. 3. Is. Rationalitte is the predicate: because it is referred unto man. Man is the subject, because it receiveth rationality. Is serves as a band to tie them both together: from whence they receive signification, and truth, or falsehood. 4. This predication is natural: because it agrees to both these terms to be thus joined together. 5. It is identical: because rationality belongs to man's essence. When we say Socrates is prudent, we have the like proposition, and a direct predication: be cause prudence sets out Socrates direstly, even as a strait line that is extended between two points. And so much for the first thing contained in the definition of a simple Axiom. CHAP. XXXII. Of the several kinds of simple Axioms. A simple Axiom is General. Ramus. Special. General, when the common consequent is generally attributed to the common antecedent. A special Axiom is Particular. Proper. A proper Axiom, is when the consequent is at tributed to a proper antecedent. Particular, when the common consequent is particularly attributed to the antecedent. ALl these precepts agree well with Aristotle: for he teacheth us on this manner. A proposition is either universal, or particular, and in part. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1.2. interpre. Cap. 7. Top. lib. 2. Cap. 1. lib. 3. cap. 6. An universal is that, where the predicate is referred unto all the subject. A particular, is that wherein the predicate is referred unto some part, not unto all that is contained in the subsect. Thus saith he Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. but more plainly at the end of that Chapter. Then (saith he) the Predicate is referred unto all, or the whole subject, when as there is nothing in the subject, unto which the predicate is not referred. The same thing is taught by Atiaro. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. B. We do then affir me umversally, when there is nothing contained under the subject, of which the predicate is not affirmed. That is an universal negation, when as there is nothing comprehended under the subject, from whence the predicate is not removed. [Common] This word doth suppose, that, predicated and subjected arguments import things vniversall, and singular, and in that it doth well. Aristotle hath the same thing, and that very plainly opened, de interpre. Cap. 7. These are his words, Some things are universal, other some singular. I call that universal which of the nature thereof is apt to be attributed to many: that is singular which is not so. [Generally] A thing is predicated generally, when the total being thereof is referred unto all, or the whole subject; Thus no common predicate can truly be attributed unto the subject. We cannot truly say all men is all living Creatures, as Aristotle hath well observed. De interpre. Cap. 7. A common thing is predicated of the subject generally, when it is referred to all, or the whole subject, so fare as the subject can receive it, and thus a common thing may truly be predicated of the subject. Now in this case the axiom is general, when the subject importeth a thing common. It is singular, when the subject importeth a thing singular, or particular; therefore in this sense, the definitions of a general, and special Axiom are certainly true, and taught by Aliaco. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M. in these words: When the subject is sufficiently distributed by this word All, or some other that is equal thereto: then that proposition is sufficiently universal. A proposition is then sufficiently singular, when the subject is a term truly singular. I call that a singular term (in proper speech) which cannot be affirmed of subject; importing real distinct things. That we may fully understand the nature of predications, we must obferue (with Aristotle de interpre. cap. 7 & 10.) That, this word All when we find it in a proposition, it doth not signify the universal predication itself: but is only a note of predication: And further, these words All, or None, do signify no more, but an affirmation, and negation universally made. Accordingly hereunto, Thomas saith, The predication itself is no more, but an absolute referring of a thing signified, unto the subject: as when we refer whiteness to a man This word All, or None, doth but go with the predication, and importeth an order of the predicate unto the subject. 1. p. q. 31. art. 3. in cor. In the like manner, he saith; This word some, that makes a proposition to be particular, doth design an universal, or common term indeterminately; from whence it doth not determine the same, unto this or that singular thing. Opusc. 48. De interpre. Cap. 8. By this (I hope) the nature of every predication is sufficiently cleared, and made easy to our understanding. It may be doubted, whether Ramus and Aristotle do agree in these precepts, and that for three reasons. 1. Aristotle makes some propositions indefinite. 2. He makes no proposition proper. 3. He doth not require any common term unto an universal predication. I answer, notwithstanding all this, yet they do agree. And I do so answer, because the opening of these three things, doth give evident light unto the nature of predications: a thing worthy our knowledge, for predication is the very Centre, and life of Logic: all that goes before, descends hither, and all that follows, flows from hence. To the first, Arristotle doth not conceive that an indefinite proposition, doth really differ from an universal, and particular. I show it two ways, first, He names it but once in all his writings (so fair as I can find.) Secondly, He makes a proper proposition to be indefinite, only, because it wants the signs of universal, and particular predication. Prior lib. 1. Cap. 1. now the want of them doth not make a real difference, as we have already heard by his own words: again, they may well be referred unto universal, or particular: because the extension of predication, follows the intent of predicating: and it is not hard to show, where himself makes a proposition to be general, that wanteth the terms of all, & none. To the second, It is true, he makes no proposition to be proper (in express words) yet he doth it in the thing: for, that proposition is contained under those, which he calls particular, for a particular proposition (formally) hath an unlimmited subject: but virtually it hath a singular thing for the subject: when we say, some man is learned, we assign no man of certainty, until we descend to a particular, as Plato, or Aristotle & ce. and this is a proper proposition according to Ramus: moreover, if he meant not to comprehend a proper proposition, under his particular proposition, than he hath omitted one precept, essential to this Art: I say the doctrine of a proper proposition is essential to this Art: and I avow it even by the judgement of Aristotle himself: for he doth use them often, and must use them oftener than any other: for, he makes an individual thing, a subject that receives all other arguments whatsoever; without which they cannot have being, nor we any certain knowledge: but we may not think, that he hath omitted it: for that is to charge him undecently: (seeing he hath deserved so well) and against reason: because of the allegations already made: to conclude, he doth give instance of a contradiction in singular, or proper Axioms de interpre. cap. 10. To the third, Aristotle doth require a common thing in universal predications, and a singular in singular predications, and thinks it must be so: because the common, and singular nature of things, is the very first ground, and original reason from whence predications must be universal, and singular: as we find by his own words: de interpre. cap. 7. Here I will put an end to the second thing contained in the definition of a simple Axiom. Cap. 31. CHAP. XXXIII. Of an affirmed Axiom. IN this Chapter we must discuss the manner how arguments are framed in a simple Axiom: and then we shall have dispatched all that is contained in the foresaid definition. Now, that point is resolved in these words An Axiom is Affirmed. Ramus. Denied. Affirmed when the band of it is affirmed Denied when it is denied. Aristotle teacheth the same thing (for substance) the interpre cap. 5. & 6. Prior lib 1. cap. 2. An Enunciative speech, is either affirmation, or negation. It affirms when the predicate is affirmed of, or joined unto the subject. It denyeth, when the predicate is denied of, or removed from the subject. We have the same thing in Aliaco. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. BB. Every affirmation, and negation, consisteth of a Noun, and a Verb: without a verb there is no affirmation, nor negation: and this I say: because the verb [is] is referred unto the subject, as in this example, Socrates is lust. Socrates is not Iust. Here, the word is, and is not, is referred in the one, to him that is Just: in the other to him that is not Just. Thus fare Aristotle de interpre. cap. 10. Omnis affirmatio etc.— Hoc dico etc. Ramus applies this precept to all Axioms whatsoever. Aristotle makes affirmation, and negation proper to simple Axioms: both say true, in the sense they intended, and both those senses do agree well enough together: but Aristotle's judgement is more accurate, and Logical, as we shall see when we come to compound Axioms: therefore, for this time we will proceed. From hence ariseth the contradiction of Axioms. Ramus. [From hence] These words, do refer us to the ground or reason from whence propositions are contradictory: namely, from their universal, and particular affirmation, and negation. Of them I say, if Ramus meant to refer us to the next, and formal reason of contradiction; then this reference is true: but if they refer us to the first, and original ground of contradiction, than it is not true. Aristotle de interpre. cap. 6. doth refer us to the things themselves which are subjected, and predicated, as to the first fountain, and original of contradiction, in propositions: Because (saith he) A thing that is, is pronounced not to be, and that which is not, as if it were, so also, something is affirmed to be after this, or that manner: and is not after that manner. At other times, some things are pronounced to be present, which are not present: therefore some thing that is affirmed, is denied, and some thing that is denied is affirmed, and thereby affirmation is opposed to negation, and negation to affirmation: which opposition makes contradiction. Thus fare he. If we take both these Authors together, we shall see the whole reason of Contradiction. A Contradiction is when the same Axiom is affirmed, and denied. Ramus. We have this sentence in Aliaco. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M. A Contradiction (saith he) is an affirmation of one thing, and the negation of the same: and this is as well of propositions, as of single terms. Aristotle doth fully agree with them both, When (saith he) the affirmation of one thing, and the negation of the same, are opposed, then there is a Contradiction. De interpre. Cap. 6. Atque hoc esto, etc. Now we see what a Contradiction is, we must inquire further after the manner how one, and the same proposition is affirmed and denied. A Contradiction is General. Ramus. Special. General, when a general negation, is opposed to a general affirmation. Special, when a particular negation is opposed to an universal affirmation, and contrariwise. A proper proposition, is contradicted by a proper proposition. Aristotle teacheth the same things, but in different words. Propositions (according to him) are opposed as contraries, or contradictories. When a general affirmative, is opposed by a general negative, than they are opposed as contraries: but when the same predicate, is universally affirmed, in the one: and not universally, in the other, of the same subject; then they are opposed as contradictories: de interpre. Cap. 7. A singular proposition is contradicted by a singular: as, Socrates is wise. Socrates is not wise, cap. 10. Perspicuum autem est. A general contradiction may be false in both parts. Ramus. A special Contradiction cannot be true and false together, in both parts. Aristotle hath the same precept, word for word; in the places last alleged. These examples following, will set out the precepts of an Axiom, contained in this, and the former Chapter. 1. All men are learned. 2. No man is learned. 3. Some man is not learned. 4. Some man is learned. 5. Socrates is learned. 6. Socrates is not learned. The first, is an universal affirmative. The third, is a particular negative; and the one doth contradict the other. The second, is an universal negative. The fourth, a particular affirmative: and they are opposed as Contradictories. The fift, is an affirmative proper. The sixth, is a negative proper; therefore, they also are Contradictories. The first, and second are opposed as Contraries. Ramus calls their opposition, a general Contradiction. Now I have finished all that is contained in the definition of a simple Axiom, touching the disposing of Arguments. In the next place we must see, how truth is contained in an Axiom. CHAP. XXXIIII. Of simple Axioms necessarily true in common. IN the 30. Chapter before going, all Axioms are said to contain necessary, or contingent truth, or falsehood: and thereby is employed, that truth is contained in them variously, even according unto the different kind of Axioms In the 31. Chapter, we have divided Axioms into simple and compound: therefore, we must (now) set down, after what manner truth is in simple Axioms; and thereby finish the precepts touching simple Axioms. I think it sufficient to show how, and in what case, a simple Axiom is necessarily true: for, thereby we shall know, how they contain a contingent truth: and when we see how they contain truth, we shall be able to judge how they contain falsehood. In a necessary Axiom the Consequent is attributed to the Antecedent. 1. To all of it, Ramus. and always. 2. By itself, and essentially. 3. Not only to all, alwates, & essentially But al●o first, of the whole, and enterchangably. We find this precept taken out of Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. In which place he saith thus. In a necessary Axiom, the predicate is attributed to the subject. 1. To all, that is To all of it, not to some only. At all times, not at some only. 2. By itself, that is, 1. As essential thereto. 2. the predicate is in the subject, et contra 3. It is not said of any other. 4. Even for itself, not by accident. 3. universally, that is Of all by itself, & as it is in itself. It doth demonstrate the subject first. In every part. Now, we have the nature of a necessary simple Axiom fully laid out, we should unfold such terms as seem doubtful: but we cannot do that in this place: for, here we speak of them, in an universal notion, abstracted from all special kinds of simple Axioms. We shall come to them in the six next Chapters; and then, we shall see the meaning, and use of this general precept. CHAP. XXXV. Of simple Axioms, necessarily true in special. Necessary simple Axioms, are Definitions. Distributions. I Do not find this precept, either in Ramus, or Aristotle expressly, yet I bring it by the authority of them both. According to Ramus, every precept of Art, is a necessary axiom: but (according to him also) a Definition, and Distribution, are precepts of art; therefore, he must confess they be necessary Axioms. The principles, and foundation of a demonstration, are necessary axioms: in the judgement of Aristotle. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 2. But a Definition is a principle, and foundation of a Demonstration, even in the sentence of the same Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 33. lib. 2. cap. 3. Therefore, according to him, every Definition is a necessary Axiom. We may argue the like from his authority, for a Distribution: for he inioynes him that makes a Definition, to distribute the thing defined into parts. Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. and in framing his art of Logic, he makes Distributions to be precepts, no less than Definitions. Lastly, though I had not their authority to avow this precept, yet I might bring it: because a Definition, and a Distribution have the nature of a necessary Axiom, as we shall see when we examine them. CHAP. XXXVI. Of a Definition. IN this Chapter, we must see what a Definition is. A Definition, is a simple Axiom, Ramus. wherein we declare what a thing is. A definition is perfect. This contains the constituting causes only. imperfect. This sets out the thing by other arguments also. The first, is a Definition properly, the second, is called a Description. THis precept is avowed by Aristotle. He makes a Definition to be double, in the thing, though not in words. He sets out the nature of a definition, as Ramus doth. A definition (saith he) is a sentence that signifies what the thing is. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 5. A notification of the essence, and doth explicate what a thing is. Poster. lib. 2. Cap. 3. A Definition thus set out, must needs be a perfect one. In the first book of his Topickes, and 4. Chapter, he hath these words; There is something that is proper, that signifies what a thing is: and some other, that doth not so signify. The first is called a definition, the other is commonly called a thing proper: when it is attributed to the same subject with the other. Now, in this latter place he speaks of a Definition that differs from the former. I say it differs. 1. In the name, he saith, this name is but commonly given, he says not so of the former. 2. In this definition, the nature of the thing defined is set out, and more too: it is explicated by properties, that do not declare the essence: and therefore, in all these places together, he makes one kind of definition, that sets out the nature of the thing only; and another that doth so, and more too: and consequently (according to him) a definition is perfect, and imperfect: and that in the sense and meaning of Ramus. Thomas teacheth the same thing expressly: A definition (saith he) is either perfect, or imperfect, that comprehends the total being of the thing, as it is constituted by all the causes. This expresseth some of these, and diverse conditions also: and is called a description. 2. dist. 27 q. 1. art. 2. ad 9m. In this place we speak of a perfect definition; and therefore unto Thomas, I will join. Aliaco: in him I find cheese words; A good description may be converted with the thing defined: not only for one difference of time; but for all times whatsoever: so as, the predicate cannot possibly be severed from the thing defined. Quest de Resumpta. lit. Q. unto them two, I will join Richardus de Sancto victore: for, he is most full in explicating of a definition: De trinitate. lib. 4. Cap. 21. fol. 108. That a definition may be perfect, it ought to comprehend the total; and only essence of the thing defined: for, as it borrows its name from the thing, so it ought to extend itself unto the uttermost limits of the thing defined. Neither must it exceed it, it ought to agree unto all, and only unto the thing defined, and so fare, that it may be converted into itself: Thus fare he. I might show the same out of later Authors; but I spare that labour, because these, for their judgement, may go in stead of all; such is their learning, and antiquity. Others say the same, and none do descent from them. By these authorities we find what a definition is, and thereby we are resolved, that a definition is a necessary Axiom, in the sense laid down Cap. 34. and consequently, we see how to find out a definition from other sentences: and to judge of the truth of it when we have found it; But because all this doth show us the very secrets of nature, (as I may say) and they cannot be understood, neither speedily, nor easily: therefore it will be very profitable; if I set out a definition by other notes, or marks that are better known to us: that, when we have them altogether, the one will lead to the other: and both together will give us certain knowledge of this root, and original of all knowledge: yea of that knowledge, whereby we know single terms in themselves, as Aristotle cales it: Poster lib. 1. cap. 3. Nos vero: and that knowledge is no less than Angelical. Aristotle hath done so much in the thing we seek for, that the assistance of any other authors may seem needles, he shows us, positively how to know a perfect definition: and lest we should sorget, he shows us also, the naughtiness, and faults in a definition, he doth the first in these terms. 1. A definition is constituted of the Genus and the differences: Top lib 1. cap. 8. namely the specifical differences whose office it is to make a definition complete: and to design that which is more general unto one special kind: and this it doth, by reason that they are taken from the proper form of the things differenced, as the root, and original from whence they flow: in ●●e judgement of Thomas. 1. p. q 29 a●. 3. ad 4m. 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2m. 2. In a definition, the end whereto the thing defined is referred, is not to be omitted. Top. lib 6 cap. 8. 3. A definition must be universal, and affirmative: Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. 4. He that defineth must use words (so fare as he can) that shall be of clearest sense: because, a definition is made for the getting of knowledge. Top. lib. 6. cap. 1. He abounds in skoring up the faults of an evil definition: I will bring some of them to further our understanding. I will not bring all, lest I be tedious. He refers them unto two heads: viz. Obscurity, and Superfluity. The Obscurities are set down Top. lib. 6 cap. 2. and they are 4 in number. First, when the thing defined (that admits diverse senses) is not distinguished. Secondly, when it is expressed by a borrowed speech. Thirdly, when any words are used that be rude, and unproper. Fourthly, when the definition is so made, that we cannot find: how it differs from another that is contrary to it, or what the thing is, that is defined: for than it is like a picture that cannot be known whose it is, unless it be showed by writing. The superfluities of a definition are 6. He sets them down in the third chapter of the same book, and these they are. First, when one thing is repeated often. Secondly, when a definition is made of arguments that in nature do follow, and in our knowledge are less known than the thing defined. Thirdly, when in the definition the thing defined is brought: cap. 4. Fourthly, if a superior be defined by an inferior. Fiftly, when more is brought in the definition than aught: cap 1. Sixtly, Every thing is superfluous, that may be taken away, yet the rest that remain doth make the thing defined to be evident; and declare the essence thereof. I will conclude in Aristotle's words; by these things we may sufficiently know when a definition, is rightly made, and when it is not. Top. lib. 6. cap. 3. and therefore I shall need to say no more to set out the nature of a definition: or what manner of truth is contained in it. Perhaps some man will require me to set forth, when a definition contains untruth: but, I think that request needles: because every definition contains a necessary truth that follows these rules: and that is untrue, which doth not observe them: but, commits the faults against them. Although these things may seem sufficient to give us knowledge of a definition, and the necessary truth thereof: yet, I think it very needful to set down a definition, and apply it to the rules alleged. A man is a living creature endued with reason. This is a definition in all men's judgement. That it agrees to the former rules, is very manifest; for herein first, Life, and rationality are attributed to all men; and at all times. Secondly, They are attributed, not by accident, or the application of a third: but, by themselves, in as much as the essence of Life, and rationality (even of itself) hath a relation unto man: and we apprehend the one, by apprehending the other. Thirdly, Life and rationality, are attributed unto man universally: that is, not only unto all men, and at all times: but, adaequatly: so as, all that is in Life, and rationality, is said to belong to man: and all that is in man, is denoted, and set out by life, and rationality: the one is as large, and no larger than the other. Fourthly, They are attributed unto man first: that is, they have no reflection, or relation to any thing before man: neither is man receptive of any thing before life, and rationality: but, the first act that they do, is to give being to man: and the first being that man receives is from life, and rationality. 5. Life, and rationality, even such as they are in themselves, such reference they have unto man: in so much that man is no more but an effect compounded of life and reason: and they no more but an effect resolved into all the causes: I say all the causes, for animality joined to rationality, comprehends all the causes in it. Whereupon the thing defined, exceeds not the definition; nor the definition is larger than the thing defined: but, they are convertible, we may truly say, If man then a living Creature endued with reason; If a living Creature endued with reason, than a man; and both of them contain one, and the same truth. Thus have we done with the definition, we must come to a description next. CHAP. XXXVII. Of a Description. A description is a sentence which setteth out a thing, Ramus. even by other arguments. THis precept is agreed on by all parties, as the Reader may find in the foregoing Chapter: therefore, we need not make doubt, whether it belongs to this art or no; It is reasonable clear: therefore, a few words will prevent all doubtfulness in it. [A thing] That is, the thing described. Now, the thing described seems to be of shorter scantling, than the thing defined. A singular, or individual substance may be described: but not defined: for, so we heard from Aristotle in the foregoing Chapter: and he made it a law, that every definition must be universal, but that proposition where an individual thing is subjected, is not universal. [Other Arguments] These words do contain the formal nature of an imperfect definition. The word argument, importeth an affirmative predication in a description: for dissenting arguments cannot describe, nor define: no not in the most unperfect manner: for defining, how imperfect so ever it is, must needs import, that the thing is in some sort or other: but, dissenting arguments do not serve in the least sort to set out what a thing is. They have force to show what a thing is not, and no more. The word other, doth signify, that the arguments whereby a thing is described, are mixed: and are partly essential, partly without the essence. Where we must know, that, the more near arguments be unto the essence, the more force they have to set out the thing described: and the more truly that sentence wherein they are predicated, may be called by the name of a Definition. Here it may be doubted, whether a Description may be made in any part by accidents? I answer: No accident (as it is an accident) hath place in a Definition: and I think so; because, Aristotle doth perpetually forbid accidents to come within the doors of any Definition. An accident (according to Aristotle) may in some respects, and at some time become proper: and in that case, they may serve to describe an individual subject: as this, or that singular man may be made known to us, and differenced from all others, by riches, learning, etc. which he enjoys and none other. Now we see what arguments are disposed in a description: and how they are referred the one to the other; it remaineth, that, I declare what truth there is in it. In a Description there is a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, not of constitution (for that is proper to a perfect definition, where the thing defined, and the definition do Constitute each other, and is adaquatly the same thing: according to the sentence of Thomas, 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2m.) But, of emanation, effluence, and consecution in as much as, the arguments describing, are (at least) so proper unto the thing described, that they come convertible therewith: and it cannot but be so; for, if the properties do belong to the species, or the whole kind, than they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature, belonging to that kind: and therefore, they stand, and fall together. If the properties appertain to an individual, than they have a necessary connexion therewith, through a peculiar right, and possession. I will add an instance or two, and thereby the nature, and truth of this precept will be made evident, and clear. A man is a living Creature, mortal, and capable of learning. In this sentence, man abstracted from individualitie, (that is, not considered as this or that particular man) is described: all the words that follow the Verb [is] contain the description; These two terms, viz. mortal, and capable of learning, are joined together by that Verb, and thereby the description is affirmative. The word living Creature is essential to man: for, it is the whole shot, (as I may say) or comprehension of all the parts of his nature in general. The words capable of learning, import a thing proper unto mankind, that is, as he is formally this kind of Creature, which we call man: and therefore, that attribute bordreth next of all to man's particular essence. The word mortal, importeth an accident, now made proper to man. I say it is an accident, and no more; because, it flows not from the principles of his nature. Man's reasonable soul, is the chief thing in his being: but mortality flows not from that: for, the soul is living, so saith the Lord: He breathed in his face the breath of life, and he became a living soul, Genesis. 2.7. Mortality is now proper to all men, because they all, are subjected to death; I say, it is proper to them all, not because they do, and must dye: but because all of them, and none but them must dye after that sort (that is) by accident. All other Creatures are subject to dissolution by that nature which they had from God by Creation: but man is subject to death by imposition: he incurred his mortality when he sinned. God threatened it before man sinned. Genesis 2.17. and inflicted it when man had sinned. Rom. 5.12. But that had never been, if the principles of man's nature had inclined, and fitted him to mortality. This being so, we may well conclude; man's mortality is very little distant from man's nature. And consequently, this proposition is a definition somewhat unperfect. There is a necessary truth in this Description: for, the thing defined, and that wherewith it is defined, are convertible: the sentence is equally true, which ways soever you take it, if it be read as it lieth, all men will grant it; if we invert the parts, and say thus, Every living Creature that is mortal, and capable of learning is man: no man will deny it. But this truth is not constitutive: for, mortality and capacity unto learning (as they are conceived by themselves, and as they are in themselves) have no share in man's essence; but is a thing flowing therefrom: and were it not for a third thing that comes between them, they might, and might not, belong to man any ways. This truth is necessary by emanation, and consecution: for, take man as he is a man, he must needs be reasonable, as he is reasonable, he cannot but be capable of learning: take him as he is now a man, and he must needs be mortal: for, he sinned, and God imposed mortality upon him. We have another example of a Description, in the 2 Epistle to the Thessalonians, the 2. Chapter, and 3. verse, etc. which fitteth this place well. Antichrist (an individual) is said to be a man of sin, the son of perdition, an outlaw, etc. Now, all these be accidents, yet they become proper unto him, in that sense wherein the holy Ghost meant them: and that description contains a truth so necessary, that we may certainly know, that he is Antichrist who is a man of sin, etc. in that sense which the holy Ghost intended in that place. This shall suffice to set out the nature of a description: and thus have we finished the whole matter touching a Definition. CHAP. XXXVIII. Of a Distribution. THe next thing that comes to be handled, is a distribution: that is defined, or set out in this one general apprehension. A distribution, Ramus. is a simple proposition, wherein the whole is divided into parts. The whole, is that which containeth the parts. A part, is that, which is contained of the whole. Aristotle and other Logic Schools have left us these precepts also: as we shall see by the particulars: Aristotle requires, that the thing defined, be distributed into parts: Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1 Rursus utrumque, etc. cap. 2. Idem Contingit, etc. Therefore (according to him) a distribution is then made, when the whole is divided into parts. He saith further; a whole is no more but a gathering together of the parts. Physicor. lib. 1. text. 17. lib. 4 text 43. And again, That is said to be a whole, that wants no part of that of which it is said to be a whole: either by nature, or as a thing containing that which is contained: so as, they all do make one certain thing: meta. lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31. According to Thomas, that is a whole, which is divided into parts. 1. p. q. 76. art. 8. in cor. These Authors do not tell us, what a part is conceived apart or abstracted from specialties: neither need they, for that is done sufficiently already when they tell us what a whole is; and the same thing will better appear, when we come to the particulars: therefore I proceed. A distribution, is of the Genus into the Species. integral into the members. The integral, Ramus. is a whole to which the parts are essential. The Genus, is a whole that is essential to the parts. I find no dissent between any parties touching this precept, that the Genus, and the integral, be wholes, (and in that sense which is now given) is confessed on all hands. I will allege Aristotle: A whole, saith he, is twofold, viz. Universal; or a total existeney. meta. lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31. And Thomas goes along with him: A whole (saith he) is either an universal, or an integral. 1. p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 1m. According to Aristotle, An universal whole, is also Equivocal, or univocal. The first, when the name only is common, but the things named be diverse: so a man himself, and a picture is called a living Creature. The second, when the name is common, and the things named are the same. Categor. Cap. 1. We take an universal whole in this last sense. Now, Aristotle in the place of his Metaphysics last alleged, doth call that such a whole, as is one to every part; as a living creature is to a man and a beast: in the like sort speaks Thomas in the place last alleged; these are his words: An universal whole, is present to every part, according to the whole essence, and power thereof as a living Creature, is to a man, and a beast; and therefore it is predicated properly of the singular parts: but an integral whole is not in each part, neither according to their whole essence, nor virtue, and therefore it is no ways predicated of the singular parts; no not of them all together, unless it be very improperly. Thus fare he: Aristotle in the place alleged calls this whole, one thing that ariseth of the parts; and thereby agrees with Thomas: By these allegations we have this precept agreed upon, and made plain; therefore we may proceed to the several kinds of Distributions. CHAP. XXXIX. Of the kinds of Distribution, and first of the General into the Specialls. IN handling the several Distributions, it is not greatly material, either to art, or the things themselves; that we begin with the one rather than with the other: but in my opinion, the distribution of the Genus into the Species ought to have the first place; because it is first in nature, and objected first to our understanding, being a comprehension of the particular kinds; therefore, I will begin with that. The Genus, is distributed into the species, when the general nature is divided, into several kinds. Neither of our Authors hath this precept expressly: yet this place, doth require it, and their doctrine, and practice avows it, therefore, without further labour, I will proceed to the unfolding thereof. [Divided] This word is made proper to this distribution, by the common phrase of Logicians. The meaning of it is, The general is divided into the specials, if we inquire how it is divided to them? it may be answered, It is divided two ways. First, In itself, being applied unto, or (as I may say) bestowed upon, each kind: (not in the total latitude thereof; but so fare, as one can receive it). Secondly, Each special kind contains no more than is included in the general, what is explicitly in any one of the kinds, is implicitly in the whole: what is dilated in that, is thrust together in this. [Several kinds] The parts divided are called several: because they be severed by distinct forms. They are called kinds; because both of these distinct forms are one, and the same thing in the general, or universal, we shall see the truth, and evidence of this precept (thus understood) in this instance. A living Creature, is either reasonable, or unreasonable. This sentence, is a simple axiom; because, one thing, is joined to another, by a verb. I say one; for though the branches of the predicate, be two, being referred to themselves; yet they are but one, when they are referred to the subject. [Living Creature.] Is the whole that is divided. 2. It is an universal whole. 3. The parts into which it is divided, are reasonable, & unreasonable Creatures. 4. This whole, is bestowed upon both parts; because the reasonable, and unreasonable Creatures, (each of them apart) are truly said to be living Creatures. 5. Neither the unreasonable, nor reasonable Creatures have any thing essential to them more than is contained in animality: for, that word importeth no more, but such a thing, made by God, as hath life, and motion in itself. Now, that includeth a corporal substance, and a spirituality, called life: This as the form, informing the matter: That as the matter informed. The reasonable Creature hath no more: thus he hath a body made lively by his soul, and that is the matter informed. He hath a soul, or life, and that is the form informing. We find the like in the unreasonable Creatures, they have a body, wherein their life remains: this corporal substance is the matter informed, and that life is the form informing. 6. These do differ in their kinds, (I say) in their kinds, and not numerically; because, they have different kinds of corporeal substances: so the holy Ghost pronounceth of them. 1. Cor. 15. and so we find by experience. The flesh of man and beasts do differ in their proper being, and God's destination: for, the one is made to perish finally, the other to rise again. These Creatures do differ also in their life or liveliness: the life of beasts is no more, but as breathe that doth vanish at their dissolution: Man's life is more: for, his soul is life; being a living, continuing, and spiritual substance: and no doubt, but that spiritual substance, is informed by a livelihood, differing therefrom (though our understandings cannot but guess at it) 1. because we find a secret motion of man's understanding, and will in his soul, differing from the spiritual substance thereof. 2. Because man's soul life's when it is parted from the body. It may be some will object on this sort; If the species contains no more than is in the Genus, than the specifical difference is also contained in the Genus: but this last is not true: therefore, the first is untrue also. I answer: I grant the assumption; upon Aristotle's authority, and proof alleged before in the point of the Genus. But I deny the consequence; because it doth suppose, that the specifical difference, is a real being, constituting the species: but that is utterly untrue. If that were so, than it is a cause different from the matter, form, and end. But the last is not true: and this I take as granted: therefore, the first is untrue also; and consequently, the argument is so too, that is founded thereupon. The specifical difference, is a rational entity and no more; namely, our understandings do apprehend this kind, to differ from another, when they are both laid together. Now, this apprehension is a verity, no fiction: for, it hath a foundation in the thing: namely, the specifical form, our understanding doth thus argue: This hath one kind of form, that hath another, therefore this doth specifically differ from that. And thus the specifical difference doth flow from the form, it is not the specifical form itself. Hitherto we have showed what arguments are disposed in this kind of Distribution: and the manner how they are disposed; now I will declare that it contains a necessary truth: and I may easily do that, for it fully agrees with the rules of necessary truth, set down Chap. 34. as will appear by laying them hereunto. 1. The parts do belong to the whole, even to all of it, and at all times; there is no animality more than is comprehended in the Creatures, reasonable, and unreasonable. We cannot conceive a time, wherein the Creatures reasonable, and unreasonable are not living Creatures: and therefore the first Rule agrees with this Distribution. 2. The Creatures, reasonable, and unreasonable, are living Creatures, even by themselves, and their own nature: there is no third thing that comes between their nature, and the nature of a living creature, that makes the one belong to the other: but, they are so living creatures by themselves, that the one is essential to the other: therefore, this Distribution agrees with the second Rule. 3. The Creatures, reasonable, and unreasonable, even in that thing wherein they are, they are living creatures; so also, even in that nature wherein their being doth consist universally, they are living Creatures: yea, and this their nature, wherein they are, they are the first thing in living creatures; we cannot conceive any thing in the essence of the Creatures, reasonable, and unreasonable, that exceeds the essence of a living Creature. Neither can we imagine, in any sign, or moment of reason, that there is any thing in the essence of a living Creature, which hath the priority, or is before the essence of the creature reasonable, and unreasonable. I say before, either in nature, or time: but in the first moment wherein you conceive a living Creature to be: you conceive a creature, either reasonable, or unreasonable: Whereupon animality and these creatures are convertible. All living creatures, conceived as making one total sum, is no larger in number, than the Creatures reasonable, and unreasonable; and contrariwise. So also we may say; If a Creature reasonable or unreasonable, than a living Creature: If a living Creature, then reasonable or unreasonable. And consequently, all the laws of necessary truth agree unto this Distribution. If any desire to know, when a Distribution of this kind, is false: let him lay it to these rules, and by them he shall know. If it agrees not with these rules, but comes short, in any part; than it is false. And the more it disagrees from them, the less truth there is in it. Here I will end the distribution of the Genus, into the species. CHAP. XL. Of the distribution of the whole into the members. IN this Chapter we must see, what a Distribution of the integral into the members, is. The integral is distributed into the members, when the comprehensive whole, is parted between the things comprehended therein. I must say of this precept, as I did of the last; The doctrine, and practice of Aristotle, and Ramus doth patronise it; therefore, we may take it for a precept of art, though they have it not in so many words; the opening thereof, will say, it came from them. In this Distribution: 1. The whole is an individual. 2. That whole is severed into pieces, as the timber is by the saw, or wedges. 3. The parts have different, and individual natures. 4. The whole is made by their meeting together; therefore this second kind of Distribution differs really from the former. This one example will make the sense plain, and easy. A man hath two parts, Soul. Body. This proposition is a simple axiom: for, one thing is, attributed to another. I say one; because, both members, viz. soul and body be one in reference to man: though they be distinct in themselves. 1. Man is the whole divided, (to wit) an individual man. 2. This whole is shared, one piece to the body, another to the soul. 3. The body and soul have distinct individual natures, the one corporeal, the other spiritual. 4. The meeting of these two parts together, doth make man, as he is an individual whole: the soul in forming the body, and the body being informed by the soul. This shall suffice to show, what arguments be in this distribution: and the manner how they are framed together. This kind of distribution contains a necessary truth: because the laws of necessary truth agree to it. 1. Soul and body are affirmed of all men severally, and at all times, without exception. 2. Body, and soul are referred unto a singular man, by themselves, and their own essence: not by the force of any third. 3. The soul, and body, in what respect they are, and in the very essence, as they are: they are affirmed of a singular man. I say affirmed, both universally according to the total nature of themselves: and according to the essence of a singular man. So as the essence of a singular man, and the essence of soul, and body, are of equal extent: the one is as large, and no less large than the other: so also, this their nature, is affirmed of man in the first instant, and moment of his being; and our apprehension. Whereupon this whole, and parts, are in their nature convertible. Thus we may say, If a man, than soul, and body. If soul, and body, than a man. These things being so, we may undoubtedly say, this kind of distribution contains a necessary truth: and therewithal put an end unto this precept in hand. To conclude, I have this to say jointly, of these precepts touching a Definition and Distribution: their use is not known to the negligent, nor esteemed of the ignorant: but, he that knows them, and hath found the benefit of them, will say, they are worth the having: for, by them a man may know when a Definition, and Distribution contain a necessary truth; and an artificial form: and consequently, he hath a good guide to lead his reason in the right way unto true knowledge, and the avoiding of error. CHAP. XLI. Of contingent simple Axioms. THat I may put a final Conclusion, to all the precepts that belong unto simple Axioms, I must show what arguments are disposed in them, how they are disposed, and what truth is contained in such simple Axioms; as are neither definitions, nor distributions; and touching them we say, In a simple axiom every argument may be disposed, Ramus. except full Comparisons, those that consent, are disposed affirmatinely: and they that descent negatively. Full Comparisons are justly excepted, out of simple axioms, because they contain four terms distinctly laid, the one to the other, no ways made one by any Conjunction. By arguments, is meant single arguments, for all the four causes together, and essential properties, belong not to simple axioms of this sort; they are proper to definitions and distributions. We shall find necessary truth or falsehood in all such axioms as pronounce of a thing either as it is in present being; or as it is past. I say necessary truth, not simply; but after a sort; because, the thing that is, or is not, that was, or was not, cannot but be, when it is; nor but not be, when it is not: as Aristotle hath truly observed, De interpre. Cap. 9 Simple axioms that pronounce of a thing to come, contain a certain truth, or falsehood; in respect of God: for, he foreknows all things possible by his simple intelligence: and all things that shall be, by his intuition or knowledge of vision. In respect of man's knowledge, none of those Axioms do contain a certain truth; for unto man, all future things are contingent, and consequently man's knowledge of them must needs also be contingent: unto Man (I say) they are contingent: for as much as, their next causes whereupon they depend, are contingent. All humane actions depend upon man's will, as their next cause, and man's will is a faculty free, and indetermined unto one: and therefore contingent All other things, not humane, are also contingent: because, their next cause may be hindered in their execution. Man is at God's dispose, and all the other Creatures are at Gods, and man's. These axioms may contain a contingent truth, in respect of man, and that is all he can have of them. And here a final end for simple axioms. CHAP. XLII. Of compound Axioms in general. COmpound Axioms come now to be handled; their general nature may be expressed in this proposition: A compound axiom is that, Ramus. the band whereof is a conjunction. So Ramus, and thus Aristotle. A speech compounded of simple Axioms, is made one, by a Conjunction, de interpre. In which words he doth acknowledge. 1. Some axioms are compounded axioms. 2. Such axioms are compounded of simple Axioms. 3. They are made one by that composition. 4. Their parts are tied together by a Conjunction: therefore, he delivers the same precept with Ramus, and unfolds the meaning of it. Thus fare Aristotle went: but never further (for any thing that I can find:) yet may we not say therefore, that his Logic is an imperfect art: because it may be all his writings are not come to our hands; If that be so, then time hath done injury both to him and us. I think rather, he omitted compound axioms of purpose. If he did so, he had good reason for it: for, the precepts of simple axioms give light enough to show us how to judge of these: for these being compounded of them, they must needs be the foundation of these: and consequently, he that can judge truly of them, cannot be ignorant of these. Neither may we accuse Ramus of a superfluity in art; for, reason avows his deed also; because, these precepts are convenient, and make the knowledge, and use of this art more easy. 2. Learned men of all ages have used such axioms as he calls compound: therefore, he might make the precept; of them to be parcel of this art, seeing use, and experience is the mistress of art. The one did well in omitting; because, he tied himself to exactness. The other did well to bring them in, because, he regarded precedent custom, and future ease. We will go with Ramus alone; because, we cannot have Aristotle's company. [Axiom] This word doth put us in mind, that, these propositions 1. Have arguments framed in them. 2. They are framed in these, in a fashion differing from simple axioms, from whence they are called compound. 3. They contain truth, or falsehood: for such is the condition of all axioms whatsoever. [That] This word implieth, that, a compound axiom, is but one proposition, or enuntiation, as Aristotle calls it. [Band] This word gives us to vndestand, that, in compound axioms we shall find two distinct things tied together: and in this, they join with simple axioms. [Conjunction] By this word we know, the band of a connext axiom is, a conjunction: and herein stands a main, and principal difference between simple, & compound axioms; they had a verb; these have a conjunction, to tie their parts together. In a simple axiom, we found a predicate, and subject: in these, we find parts tied together, but no name for them: we must seek for that in the particular axioms themselves. This is another real difference between simple, and compound axioms: thus fare, for their general nature. This general is thus divided. CHAP. XLIII. Of a Copulative Axiom. A compound Axiom is Congregative, Copulatine. Connexive. Ramus. Segregative, discrete. disjunct. A Copulative is that, the conjunction whereof, is Copulative. THis Definition, doth send us to seek an enuntiative sentence, whose parts are tied together by this word And. But a little labour will not find it; yea, it seems impossible ever to be found: for, this word, is very unfit so to tie the parts of a sentence together, that thereby one argument should set out another: and truth, or falsehood be pronounced: seeing it doth neither affirm, nor infer, nor any ways serve for those ends. It may be, his Copulative axioms be contained in such sentences as these be; Christ died, and rose again. Without, shall be dogs, and sercerers, and murderers, and whoremongers, and Idolaters, etc. Both these propositions be compound, according to Aristotle; for, each of them is made one by a Conjunction: they may be called Copulative, because that Conjunction is Copulative. The forenamed axioms are compounded of simple axioms. The first, of two axioms; the other of five. But (according to Ramus) both of them be simple, because their band is a verb. Neither of them a compound; for their Conjunction ties not the parts of the proposition together; for, it neither affirms, nor infers truth, or falsehood. It tieth one part of the Axiom together, and makes it one by the knitting together of diverse parts, and no more. If we take a view of them as they lie, we shall see all these things plainly. In the first instance, Christ is the subject, death, and resurrection, are made the predicate: both of these are joined together by the word And: and thereby they are made one; that is, not one thing: but one truth together. This one predicate, is referred unto that subject, by the verb that is included in them both, in the truth of the thing, the first contains two axioms. Christ died, Christ did rise from death, and we find the same truth in them both, being taken apart, that we do, when both the predicates are put together into one axiom. The same is the case with the second, when it stands in due form, thus: Whoremongers, I dolaters, Liars, etc. have no right to heaven. In the truth of the thing, this is a simple axiom, as the former was: the predicate damnation, is referred to the subject Whoremongers, etc. by a verb: the subject consisteth of diverse parts, distinct between themselves, Whoremongers, I delaters, etc. all those parts are made one by the word And. I say one, not in themselves: but in the truth of this proposition, so as, if we refer damnation to them all jointly, it contains a certain truth. If that predicate be referred unto Whoremongers alone, Liars alone, etc. each one of them do contain a truth, no less certain, and undoubted. A Contradiction is made to this kind of axiom, by denying the word And: for, thereby we say, all the parts united together, do not agree unto the other part, to which they are referred. This precept is made evident, by either of the examples alleged. If I say damnation belongs not to whoremongers, Christ suffered not death; I put an express Contradiction to them both, if these be true, those be false. If they be true, these be false: but, this Contradiction is the same with simple axioms: for, one, and the same predicate, is denied of one, and the same singular subject: therefore we may conclude, these sentences are compound Copulative propositions in their present form; but simple propositions in the truth of the thing. If you take them, as men do speak them, than they are compound: if you take them as men ought to speak, than they are simple. And this shall suffice for Copulative axioms. CHAP. XLIIII. Of connexe Axioms. A Connext axiom comes next: the nature whereof may be thus set out. An axiom, Ramus. is then Connex when a Connexive Conjunction is the band thereof. This kind of Compound axiom, is easy to be found, and fitly thus named: It is in frequent use amongst men, and the nature of it consisteth in composition. There are precedents of it that seem much to differ, I will propound examples of them both, that the matter may be fully opened. 1. If in this life we enjoy all our happiness, than we only are miserable. 2. If righteousness be by the law, than Christ died in vain. These propositions are compound (according to Aristole and Ramus too) for, each of them are made one by a conjunction, that so ties both the parts together, that, they contain such truth, as the parts do not, when they are taken in sunder, and each one by itself. Secondly, They are compounded of simple Axioms. In the first, we have these two: first, All our happiness is in this life. Secondly, We only are miserable. In the second we have the like. First, justice is by the Law. Secondly, Christ died in vain. Lastly, these 2 simple Axioms are made one proposition, by the conjunction; If, and Then, I say they are one, not by mixture but by voice: that pronounceth the latter certainly to be, where the former is. These compound axioms, are called Conditional, in the common phrase of the Schools; because, the first part is put Conditionally, not absolutely: but (I think) the term of Connex, is more fit: because, the latter part is inferred from the former, and therefore it is made to have a being together with the former: and consequently, it is annexed, and knit unto the former. The parts knit together in this kind of axioms, are named Antecedent, and Consequent: and they are so in themselves: for, the first in place, is the first in nature, and our apprehension: else it could have no force to infer the second. The second follows the first, and receives its being therefrom: All arguments may be disposed in this axiom, that have place in a simple axiom: because, this serveth to conclude all questions, that may be concluded by a simple axiom: so also they may be disposed in the same manner in this, that they may in a simple, (that is) Consenting arguments affirmatively, and Disenting negatively. The truth of this axiom dependeth upon the Connexion of the parts; so as, if the one doth follow upon the other, than the axiom is true; otherwise it is false, therefore, if the one doth necessarily infer the other, than the truth of it is also necessary. If the one doth infer the other Contingently, than it contains but opinion only: or a Contingent truth. The inference, that this rule contains, is most certain, and undoubted: The antecedent part of it, is agreed upon in the Schools. I will avow it by two Authors of Credit, and they shall be in stead of all. The first of them is Gregory de Arim lib. 1. dist. 42 q. 2. art. 1. in aecisio questionis. Conditional speeches may be true, and their parts false. These are his words, and they imply, that, the truth of Condition all speeches, depends upon their connexion, not their parts. The second is Alvarez. de Auxilijs, disp. 72. no. 5. ad 3m m, There is required unto the truth of a Conditional proposition, that the Consequent follow upon the Autecedent. Whether the Antecedent be the adequate Cause of the Consequent, or an effect thereof, or a Condition presupposing another Cause. It is enough, if the Consequent follows by virtue of that Condition. Thus fare his words; and they are so plain, and so full, that, we can require no more authority for this question: yet that I may conceal nothing, that may give light unto this main, and important rule, I will proceed a little further. We must understand: The Illation or Consequence of a Connexe, or Condstionall proposition, is either formal, or material. The sentences alleged out of Gregory and Alvarez, are understood of formal Illation. Now, in such there is always a necessary truth, and no contingency. A material Illation is, when the consequent goes with the Antecedent: yet so as it follows the same, not by force thereof. We find these propositions in conditional promises, and in the judgements that we give of future things, that depend upon the liberty of man's will. These Illations being pronounced by God, have always a necessary verity: for, he cannot deny himself: therefore he keeps his word justly. Man's will is subjected to God's dominion, therefore he will determine it to one. His power is infinite, therefore he cannot be defeated: but these propositions being pronounced by man, do contain (at the best) but opinion, contingent, and conjectural knowledge. Thus much out of Alvarez de Auxilijs disp. 7. no. 7. etc. And Suarez, opusc. 2. lib. 2. cap. 5. no. 8. etc. Where the Reader shall find these things proved, and unfolded to the full. A contradiction is then made to this axiom, when the Illation, or consequence is denied: and we do that, by saying, although the first be true, yet the later is not true: but more plainly, and directly, when we say, the later follows not upon the former. This precept is very needful, for thereby we know how to apply an answer for the refutation, and disproof of such a proposition. By this also, we know what we must prove, when we would avow a connext axiom: namely, not the parts themselves; but the following of the later upon the former. If this opposition to a connex axiom may with reason be called a contradiction in any sense, then in this art it may go for a Contradiction indeed: but I doubt whether in reason it may be so called or no: because, the whole band that ties the parts of this axiom together, is not denied: and Consequently, there is not an opposition made of one proposition unto the same proposition: for one thing is not severed from that subject, unto which it was joined: but only the same thing is denied to follow, which was once affirmed to follow: and these things may suffice to set out the nature of a connext axiom. Before I make a full end of this precept, I must show what affinity, or rather foundation, a connexe axiom hath with a simple. I may truly say, a simple axiom, and this compound differ nothing but in the manner of pronouncing. Men usually speak in a connexe form, because the manner is more familiar in many things: but they should speak in the form of a simple axiom, in the exactness of art: therefore, we may resolve these into them: as I will show by the instances alleged. The first example of a connexe axiom, viz. If in this life only etc. may be reduced unto a simple axiom in every man's judgement: because, it hath but three terms in it: but in truth, it is somewhat difficult whether it may be so reduced or no: because, it pronounceth of some kind of men, not universally of all: yet it may be done truly, and plainly, if we first know, that the antecedent part aught to be set down in these words: They that have no happiness but in this life, and here they have 〈◊〉. I say, these last words must be added: because, the Connext axiom doth suppose them, and thereupon infers the Consequent: which otherwise it could not do. Those words being added, we may bring this Connext axiom, and the Apostles whole disputation therefrom, into this simple form. They that have no happiness but in this life, and here, they have name, they only are miserable. But we only are not miserable. Therefore we have some happiness which is not in this life. The other Connext proposition, viz. If righteousness be by the etc. is yet more difficult: yea so difficult, that, if we take it as it lies, it is not to be reduced unto a simple for me: for it contains two propositions every way distinct: and therefore, it hath four terms, viz. 1. Righteousness. 2. Law. 3. Christ. 4. Vain: but if we take the Apostles whole disputation together, and frame it according to art, it will easily make a simple form: for thus the Apostle disputeth. They that maintain this sentence, justice comes by the Law, they must maintain this sentence also, Christ died in vain. But no man may say, Christ died in vain. Therefore no man may say, justice comes by the Law. To conclude this point of Connext axioms; I hope it doth now appear, that, they are fundamentally, and indeed no other but simple. Therefore whatsoever belongs unto them, it is due first unto simple axioms, and Consequently, they derive the same from them. They differ only in manner of pronouncing, and not otherways. It is now time that I proceed to a Discrete Axiom. CHAP. XLV. Of a discrete Axiom. THe nature of a discrete Axiom is opened in these words. That Axiom is discrete, that hath a discrete Conjunction for the band thereof. The Axiom now defined, is of no less frequent use then the former, nor is it less useful, in the common converse of man: therefore it is well worth our knowing, and consequent lie this precept doth well deserve a place in Art. We shall understand it the better, if we put an instance or two. There be different kinds of this also; I will propound one of each, that we may be the better able to judge of them, as occasion serves. 1 Though I walk in the vale of death, yet I will not fear ill. Psal. 23.4. 2. Although thou heldest fast my name in the time of persecution, yet thou art guilty of many faults. Revel. 2.13.14. These are compound Axioms in the judgement, both of Ramus and Aristotle: for in them, two simple Axioms are joined together by a conjunction; and thereby each of them is one entire sentence. I say one sentence, in their voice of pronouncing, though the conjunction doth thrust the parts one from another: for these propositions do say, he that hath the first may be with out the second: and thereby pronounce but one thing. In these Axioms, dissenting arguments only are disposed: and dissentingly in the same manner as they are disposed in simple Axioms: for what can be severed from the subject, but those arguments that descent from it. The parts of this Axiom can have no name: because, it contains nothing that doth antecede, or follow; unless we will give it those names which belong to a simple Axiom. The conjunction which ties the parts together, is called discrete: and in this place it imports no more but a thing that keeps two asunder, for the present, that, at another time may meet together. If we examine these two examples, we shall easily understand the rule. In the first, not fearing of ill; is denied to him that walks in the vale of death: not simply and absolutely, as if no man could so walk, and fear ill; but as a thing which was severed for that time only; or that did arise upon that occasion. In the second example, there seems some difficulty: because it consisteth only of consenting arguments: for a constant profession of faith, and guiltiness of a fault, are attributed to one subject: The second example, is like the first, if we frame it exactly according to Art, it will have these words. Although thou didst well in these, yet thou didst not well in some other things. In this proposition; ill doing in some things, is attributed unto a well doer in some other things: but these two differ only in respect of the present time, and those parties, they differ not of their own nature. For these that did ill in some things, might have done well in all. A discrete Axiom is judged to be true, Ramus. if both parts be true; and good, if both parts be diverse. [Good] That is in respect of the form. A discrete Axiom is then framed according to Art, when the parts of it do descent by diversity, not as opposites. This rule must be understood of such Axioms, as are most agreeable to Art, and in that sense it is most true. If it be understood universally, it is not true. If I shall say, although I am rich yet I am not poor. I shall frame my discretive Axiom according to Art: for I sever poverty from riches, not simply, and every way: but only as proceeding from, or bearing company with riches: and that is enough to make it a formal discrete Axiom: because this serves for no other end, but to take away an illation, and to sever a thing falsely inferred, from the thing that did infer the same. Such an Axiom is ridiculous I grant, but in him that would have riches, and poverty go together, not in him that denies their going together. [Both parts true] This rule holds in every discretive Axiom whatsoever. The Axiom is false, unless both parts be true some ways or other: for in every Axiom of this kind, the first part is let pass as true. In some Axioms it is so indeed, and in the thing: but in some other it is so in courtesy only: not in the thing. The second part must always be true, otherwise it denies not the inference opposed thereby: and therefore it pronounceth not as the thing is. The examples formerly aleadged, will make the matter plain. In the first, David presumes, that, he did walk through the vale of death; and so he did indeed: yet he denies, that thereby he was made to fear ill. If he had feared ill, than he had pronounced falsely. If neither himself, nor any other had presumed, that, he did walk in the vale of death; then (for that also) he had pronounced falsely, for in both these cases, he had pronounced otherwise then the thing was indeed. The Apostle Paul 2. Cor. 11 6. is content to yield his accusers, that, he was rude in speech: yet he denies that he is so in knowledge. The first is true by concession only; not in the thing: for his speech was excellent, both for Logic, and Rhetoric, as his disputation and exhortations do witness. The second is true indeed, otherwise he had made no answer to them that argued him slender in knowledge: because he was rude in speech. Hitherto I have opened the nature of discretive Axioms, it remains that I show how they be supported by a simple Axiom. Touching that I say, In the thing it is no more but a simple Axiom, as the ice is no more but water: for Art will resolve these Axioms into simple, as heat, and rain doth dissolve the ice. The first example is no more but as if David had said, walking through the vale of death, and the fear of ill, do not always go together. In the same sort, Paul answers to his accusers: Rude speech and slender knowledge, are not companions. Hereupon we may conclude: discretive Axioms, are compounded as they are pronounced: but they are simple as they ought to be resolved: therefore whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiom, appertains to them also. CHAP. XLVI. Of Disiunct Axioms. IN the last place we must come to the precepts of a disjunct axiom: and that may be thus defined. That axiom is disiunct, Ramus. whose band is a disiunctive Conjunction. These axioms are seldom in use, and when we find them, they are rather disputations by Syllogism, then single sentences by themselves, pronouncing truth or falsehood: yet notwithstanding, I will unfold their nature, that we may have a true judgement of them. We may see that, in this instance; Either Saul shall live for ever, or dye by God's hand, or the enemy's sword, or the course of nature. 1. Sam. 26.10. This sentence is a compound axiom, both according to Ramus, and Aristotle: for diverse single propositions are tied together, and made one by a Conjunction. This sentence alleged, is a disjunct axiom: for the band that ties the parts together, is disjunctive. Perpetual life, and death at last, are attributed to Saul: one of them certainly, neither of them distinctly, but both disjoynedly. Opposites only have place in this axiom: for none may be disjoined, or thrust the one from the other, but such only as in their nature cannot agree to the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time. The truth of these propositions, is measured according to the opposites disposed in them; if they contain such as one of them must be in the subject, (and are also) without a third thing to come between them, than the proposition is necessary, through the opposition of the parts: the example now alleged is of this kind; Perpetual life, or death at l●st; one of them (I say) must needs befall Saul, these two have no third to come between them, therefore it cannot be avoided: but he must either live perpetually, or dye at last. If we will Contradict this proposition, we must say; Saul shall neither live for ever, nor dye once: this is necessarily false: because, the other is necessarily true. If a disjunctive proposition contain such opposites, as one whereof must be in the subject, and the said opposites have a mean between them, than the disjunction is necessary; when as all that comes between them be sufficiently reckoned up (as for example) This action is either supernaturally good, or supernaturally evil, or naturally good, or naturally evil. Here we have a necessary truth, because every action of man is either good, or evil: and there is no other thing comes between supernatural good, and supernatural evil, but natural good, or natural evil. The Contradiction of this disjunction is made, when we say, there is some other thing that comes between supernatural good, and supernatural evil: besides natural good, and natural evil. If I make a disiunctive proposition thus: Socrates, is either, a Father, or a Child: then this proposition contains a conjecture, or opinion, no necessary truth: for it might come to pass, that he was no father, because he hath no child; nor no child, because he hath no father. Thus (I hope) the nature of disjunct axioms, is made plain enough. These axioms do savour no less of them that be simple, than all the former compound axioms have done. These are compound in the words wherein they are uttered: but they are simple, in the sense wherein they are understood. The examples alleged, may be thus reduced; He that must once dye, shall not live for ever. That action, that is supernaturally good, is neither naturally good, nor naturally evil, nor supernaturally evil. Whereupon we may conclude, whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiom, containing these arguments, the same belongs to disjunct axioms. Now at the last, we are come to an end of all Logical precepts, that concern the making of axioms. CHAP. XLVII. Of a Syllegisme. IN this place we must come to the precepts, which teach us, to dispose arguments in a Syllogism, and to judge of them, when they are disposed: A Syllogism is a discourse, Ramus. wherein the question, is so disposed with the Argument, that if the Antecedent be granted, it must necessarily be concluded. This definition is set down by Aristotle, almost word for word: for thus saith he; A Syllogism is a speech, wherein some things being placed, another thing differing from them, doth necessarity follow, from them that are so placed. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. Prior lib. 1. cap. 1. Elench. cap. 1. [A Syllogism] This term is borrowed, either from accounts, wherein many particular sums are added together, and thereby made one total, or else, from many sentences being disorderly placed, or brought into one brief, or breviate; therefore it serveth well for this place: because, the nature of this discourse may truly be resembled unto either of them. [Discourse] This word sets out the general nature of the thing defined. Aristotle calls it a speech: and both of them do mean the same thing: namely, many axioms so placed together, that one is drawn out of another. I say Aristotle meant thus; because, the rest of his definition sorts with it. And he calls the precepts of a Syllogism, dianoetical Doctrine. Post. lib. 1. cap. 1. [Question] A question (then) is always disposed in a Syllogism. By question is meant, a doubtful axiom: so as, the office of a Syllogism is to determine a doubtful sentence. Aristotle doth afford us the same precept: for (according to him) every proposition ought not to be called into question: but those only, that may be doubted of. Top. lib. 1. cap. 11. yea he accounts them mad that take that for a principle, that no man grants, or put that for a question that all men grants: seeing this is without doubt, and that is confessed by none. Top. lib. 1. cap. 10. [Disposed] Aristotle saith, placed or put: but both of them mean one thing, namely, ordered, framed, or fitted. [Argument] By argument is meant (here) a third argument: by it we understand, that, the office of a Syllogism is, to prove one thing by another: and so much we have from Aristotle. A Syllogism proves one thing, of another, by a medium. Post. lib. 2. cap. 4. There can be no Syllogism to prove one thing of another, unless some medium be brought, which is referred by a certain attribution to both extremes. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. From whence it follows, that, in every Syllogism there are three terms, and no more. If there be any other part besides these three, it is called a prosyllogisme. Aristotle teacheth the something. It is manifest (in his judgement) that, every Syllogism is made by three terms, and no more: if there be more third arguments than one, there are more Syllogisms than one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25. Post. lib. 1. cap. 19 [Antecedent] This signifies the two first propositions in a Syllogism, from whence the third is concluded: so saith Aristotle also: It is plain that a Syllogism consists of two propositions, and not of more: for, the three terms do make those two propositions. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25. The first, is called the proposition, because, it contains at least the predicate, or Consequent part of the question. The second, is called the assumption; because, it is taken out of the first. According to Aristotle, the first, hath the name of Mayor, because, it contains the predicate part of the question: the second, the title of Minor, because, the subject part of the question is disposed in it. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 14. They vary in words, but not in the thing. Only Ramus speaks of all Syllogisms in general, as well compound, as simple. Aristotle of simple only, but we shall resolve this difficulty, when we come to compound Syllogisms. [Granted] The inferring of the conclusion followeth the granting of the antecedent, and Aristotle meaneth the same, when he saith in his definition: A different thing doth follow from those that are put. By put he can mean no other but granted. [Necessarily concluded] Aristotle saith, doth necessarily follow from them that are put (that is) there is nothing required more to infer the Conclusion, than the terms themselves that are disposed. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 1. Now the definition is unfolded, we will enter upon the particular things contained under it. CHAP. XLVIII. Of a simple Syllogism. A Syllogism, is Simple. Ramus. Compound. Simple, where the consequent part of the question, is placed in the proposition; the antecedent in the assumption. THus a Syllogism is divided, and the first kind thereof is defined. Aristotle doth divide a Syllogism into Ostensive, and hypothetical: and therefore heagrees with Ramus wholly. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. I do not find, that he defines a simple or ostensive Syllogism in any one sentence: yet, this definition is wholly taken out of him, as we shall see when we unfold the parts of it. [Simplo] This word is given to a Syllogism, after the same sort, that it was given to an axiom, even because, the third argument is disposed with the question without conjunction, or composition. [Consequent part, etc.] These words show wherein a Syllogism is simple, and how the same aught to be framed. It is simple, because one term of the question, and the third argument makes each proposition: and these two propositions infer a third, which is a simple axiom also. The predicate part of the question, must be framed with the third argument, in the proposition: and the subject part with the third argument in the assumption; not so much because, men have said so: but because nature will have it so: this example will show it. One saith, Socrates is virtuous: another doubts of it: if I would prove it to be true, a third argument must be brought, that shall tie the predicate and subject of that proposition together. Now then, for that end I bring the term juflice. If this term be disposed in a Syllogism, it must be framed after this sort; He that is Just, is virtuous: but Socrates is Just. Therefore he is virtuous. I say nature appoints this frame; because, justice is a special virtue, therefore where justice is, virtue needs must be. Therefore Aristotle was a true follower of nature, when he appointed to dispose arguments on this manner. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4. To conclude, from hence it is manifest, that, the Conclusion inferred, by every true simple Syllogism, must be gathered out of the proposition, and assumption after this manner, viz. The antecedent, or subject part of the conclusion, out of the assumption; and the consequent, or predicate part, out of the proposition: and where this is not found, the Syllogism is false, and concludes nothing. As we found in a simple axiom, so shall we find in a simple Syllogism: affirmation, and negation: generality, and speciality. Affirmative, Ramus. when all the parts are affirmative. Negative, when either part of the Antecedent, and the Conclusion are negative. Gener all, when the proposition, and assumption are general. Special when either of them is special. Proper, when both are proper. Every Syllogism (saith Aristotle) is either affirmative, or negative, universal, or in part. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. Universal is that which consisteth of all universal terms; particular consisteth of terms, as well particular as universal. Wherefore, if the Conclusion be universal, the terms must be universal. But the terms may be universal, and yet the conclusion not universal. In every Syllogism, either both or one of the propolitions must be like the conclusion. Affirmative, or negative, necessary, or Contingent. And thus always the terms in a Syllogism must be affected: otherwise it is not simply a true one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 24. From hence Aristotle inferreth further (in the place last alleged) that, In every Syllogism there must be one term universal, and one affirmative: because, without a universal it is not a Syllogism, or belongs not to the thing in hand, or begs the question. Thus far he. We may say the like of that Syllogism, that consists of all negatives. It may seem by this, that Aristotle doth not acknowledge any Syllogism that consisteth of proper propositions. And indeed, it is doubtful what his judgement is in the matter: yet, in all likelihood he doth acknowledge them no less than Ramus, as shall appear when I come unto the particular kind's; where this whole precept will be made more certain, and clear to our understanding. CHAP. XLIX. Of Aristotle's three figures. ARistotle delivers the form of Syllogisms: Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4.5. & 6. & cap. 32. and divides them into three figures, or assigns the making of them three manner of ways. In the first place alleged, he speaks of them so universally, that he comprehends false or unprofitable Syllogisms, as well as true: but in the latter, he speaks of true Syllogisms precisely, on this manner. 1. If the last extreme be affirmed of the middle term, and the muddle term of the first extreme, or the last extreme be denied of the middle term, and the middle term affirmed of the first extreme; than it is the first figure. 2. If the middle term be both affirmed, and denied of both the extremes: than it is the second figure. 3. If the last extreme be affirmed, or denied of the middle term and the first extreme be affirmed of the middle term: then, it is the third figure. And after this manner, the middle term ought to be disposed in each figure. So fare he. cap. 32. Every universal affirmative question, is proved by the first figure only: and that after one manner of way. Every negatine universal question is proved, both by the first, and second figure: by the first one way, by the second two ways. Every particular affirmative question is proved, by the first, and third figures: one way, by the first; three ways by the third. A negative particular, is proved in all the figures, one way in the first, two ways in the second, and three ways in the third. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 26. Thus fare Aristotle doth give us rules for the framing of a Syllogism, and the manner of concluding all kind of questions by them. I esteemed it the best way to set down all his precepts together; because they are the easier to be remembered. In the next place, I will set down what Ramus hath delivered, and compare them together, that we may the better see their agreement, and thereby we shall the better understand, then by either of them apart. CHAP. L. Of Ramus contract Syllogism. Ramus doth dispose his precepts, for the framing of Syllogisms, in a different manner from Aristotle; I will report them as I find them in him, and apply Aristotle to him. Thus than he beginneth: A simple Syllogism hath the parts contracted, Ramus. or explicated. A contract Syllogism, is when the argument, brought as an example, is so applied to the particular question, that it is the antecedent in both parts: and the assumption affirmed. This form of Syllogism is Aristotle's third figure, reported in the Chapter going before: and contains nothing more than we find in him, only they differ in the name. [Contract] This word gives the name unto this form. In common speech it signifies a thing crushed together: or drawn into a narrow room: the reason of the name ariseth from the nature of the thing; namely, the short, & brief disposing of the third argument with the question, in this figure. Wherein it differs from the rest: and it must be so contract, because we find it so in the common use of men, and not otherwise unfolded. [Argument brought etc.] By these words, and the rest which follow, the different kind of this form is set out by four properties, whereof this is the first namely, that the third argument, (or middle term which is used to prove, that the latter part of the question is rightly joined unto, or severed from the former part) is put for an example, or an instance assigning the thing wherein the question concluded is true: as we shall see anon in the Syllogism itself. In this all the Logic Schools do agree. First they call this form an Expository Syllogism only, because the third argument is as it were an exposition, or commentary to unfold the truth of the question concluded: or else, because the argument doth expose the indeterminate subject part of the question, unto one certain, and singular thing: as we shall see when we come to give instance of this precept. Secondly; The Authors of best credit do expressly teach the same thing with Ramus, An expositery Syllogism (saith Aliaco 1 sent. q. 5. lit. Z.) is then good, when the middle term importeth one thing, and no more. If it comprebend many distinct things, it is naught. According to Aristotle, this form concludes particular questions only, as hath been showed, cap. 49. therefore in his judgement the third argument must be put for an example, for such questions cannot be proved by any other. [Particular question] This is the second property of this form, no questions are concluded here, but particular: and so saith Aristotle in the chapter going before, and he adds, that, they are concluded three ways by it. If therefore any question that is general, or proper; be concluded in this figure, than the Syllogism is false, and proves nothing. [Antecedent in both parts] This is the third property of this form, the third argument hath the first place, or is subjected both in the proposition, and assumption. Aristotle hath the same thing expressly in the 49. Chapter: The middle term (say the jesuites, in their commentary upon Aristotle: Prior. lib. 1. cap. 6.) is subjected to both parts of the extreme in the third figure. [Assumption affirmed] This is the last property of this figure. Aristotle requires the same thing too: namely, that, the first extreme be affirmed of the middle term, therefore the assumption is affirmed: for (according to him) the first extreme is always disposed in the assumption: and the jesuites in the place last alleged do expressly teach, that, in the third figure the Minor must always be affirmative. We have an instance of this figure in this brief Discourse. Some confidence is a virtue: as constancy. Here we find a particular question concluded. Some confidence, etc. This I say is particular; because, virtue is attributed to confidence, but in some part, not to all kind of confidence universally. The third argument is a singular thing, viz. Constancy, and this is put as an example, or singular instance; reducing the indeterminate subject part of the question unto one determinate thing: and thereby expounding, or unfolding that which was dark, by that which is clear, and exposing uncertainty to a certainty. This form is contracted, because it contains no more expressly but the question, and the third argument: The affirmative assumption, and conclusion are both wanting: if they be supplied it will stand in this form. Constancy is a virtue. Constancy is a Confidence. Therefore some Confidence is a virtue. By Aristotle's rule the proposition of this figure may be negative, and Ramus agrees with him when he debars the assumption only from negation. In a Contract form we have this figure, in this example. Some confidence is not a virtue: as audaciousness. If we do explicate this contracted form, we shall have it stand thus. No audaciousness is a virtue. All audaciousness is confidence. Therefore some confidence is not a virtue. We learn from ARistotle. cap. 48. that, the proposition and assumption may be universal, yet the conclusion not universal: here we see it avowd. More examples are requisite to illustrate this precept, wherefore I will add some others. Some man is prudent: as Socrates. Some man is not fortunate: as Hector. Both these examples may be thus unfolded. Socrates is prudent. Socrates is a man. Therefore some man is prudent. Hector is not fortunate. Hector is a man. Therefore some man is not fortunate. Aristotle requires (as we have set down cap. 48.) that every Syllogism must have one proposition universal. It seems, either that rule holds not always, or else he doth not acknowledge that such Syllogisms as these be, to be true: but (if I may say what I think) I believe neither of them; for, the nature of the things themselves will avow this kind of disputing. No conclusion can be inferred, unless there be one proposition universal: for nothing can be deduced out of mere singulars. If any demand which proposition in these two last arguments are universal? I answer, the assumption of them both be universal: for that is a universal, where the predicate is attributed unto all, or the whole subject; so as, to attribute unto all, and unto the whole subject, is one and the same thing (in the judgement of Aristotle) Prior. lib. 1. cap. 1. Now, the term man, is attributed to Socrates, and Hector wholly: so as, there is no part of Socrates, unto which that term doth not belong. If any object, that Socrates is an individual, and therefore that term cannot be subjected in a universal proposition. I answer, If that term did import no more but an individual, than I grant the argument to be good, but in this place it doth not import a mere individual: for than we must say: This Socrates, etc. which we may not, yea although we might say so, yet that term imports more than an individual; for he is spoken of as a man, and therefore as a species, not as this, or that individual body, or numerical subsistency. If this be true, than Aristotle's rule is universal; else it comes too short; and he hath omitted one kind of Syllogism out of his Logic, which I dare not grant. I suppose, that, this precept is made clear enough, therefore I pass to the next. CHAP. LI. Of an explicate Syllogism in general. A Syllogism is then explicate, Ramus. when the proposition, assumption, and conclusion, are orderly framed together. In this kind the proposition is always general, or proper, and the conclusion like the proposition, and assumption, or the weaker of them. ARistotle hath not showed us the difference of explicate and contracted Syllogisms expressly; and in the thing: but (according to him) we must follow nature in every precept of Logic, and that is as much as if he had said so: for nature commands, that, some Syllogisms be explicate, and not contract: because no third argument, that serves to prove a question that is universal or proper, can be put as an example of either of them; therefore there must be some Syllogisms explicate, that cannot be contracted: and there may be some contracted, that need not be explicated; and consequently (according to nature) some Syllogisms may be explicate, and some contract. The presence of the two propositions, and conclusion is a sufficient reason why we should call a Syllogism explicate: for thereby it is unfolded to the full. The first property, that belongs unto the Syllogisms of this kind, is this, viz. The proposition is always general, if the conclusion be universal, or particular, if the conclusion be proper, than the proposition is proper also. Now, this law follows the disposing of the third argument, with the question: not the will or device of man (as we shall see by the particular instances;) The conclusion must be like the proposition, and assumption, when both of them are universal, and affirmative, or proper, and affirmative, than the conclusion must be so too, when the assumptionis particular, and negative, or proper and negative, or the proposition negative, than the conclusion must be accordingly; therefore, whensoever an explicate Syllogism varies from any of these rules, it is false, and concludes nothing: nature says it must be thus, therefore when it is otherwise, nature is perverted, and we err from truth. These rules, and no more but these, belong to an explicate Syllogism in common. CHAP. LII. Of the first kind of an explicate Syllogism. There are two kinds of an explicate Syllogism: Ramus. The first is where the argument always follows, and one part is denied. THis kind of Syllogism hath two properties: The one, that the third argument always follows (that is) it is the predicate, or consequent part, in the proposition, and assumption. The second property is, that either the proposition, or assumption, is always denied. I say, either; because sometime the proposition is denied, and sometimes the assumption indifferently; as the question and third argument require. If one be negative, it is enough. Therefore, in this figure negative questions (only) are concluded. I say negative, either universal, particular, or proper. We have this whole precept contained in Aristotle's second figure: as the Reader may see, reported cap. 49. therefore I need not repeat it here. I will allege some instances to show the practice of this rule. 1. Every wise man doth use his reason well. He that is overcome with passion, doth not use his reason well. Therefore he that is overcome with passion, is not a wise man. In this argument the proposition is an universal affirmative, the assumption, and conclusion is universal negative. 2. They that knew the wisdom of God, did not crucify Christ. The princes of the world crucified Christ. Therefore the princes of the world knew not the wisdom of God. This frame contains a proposition negative universal, an assumption affirmative special, and a conclusion negative special. 3. judas that writ the Epistle, was the brother of james. judas Iscariot, was not the brother of james. Therefore judas Iscariot, writ not the Epistle. In this example, the proposition is affirmative proper; the assumption and conclusion is negative proper These three are sufficient to show us the use of this rule; therefore I will content myself with them, and pass to the next. CHAP. LIII. Of the second kind of an Explicate Syllogism. The second kind is, Ramus. when the argument goeth before, in the proposition: and followeth affirmed, in the assumption. THis figure hath also two properties. The first: the argument goeth before in the proposition (that is) it is subjected and thereby it hath the first place. In the second property, the argument followeth in the assumption. (that is) it is predicated in the assumption; and the assumption is affirmed, or affirmative: as if it were said, the argument is predicated affirmatively in the assumption. Aristotle made this law, and calls it his first figure: as his own words do show, related Cap. 49. It may be doubted, whether Aristotle or Ramus hath kept best order in placing the figures of a Syllogism. I answer, it is not material, whether of them be first, or last: for, no one of them doth give light, or knowledge to the other: neither doth it further our use of them, when this is set before that, or that before this: Aristotle preferred the one, because all questions might be concluded in it: Ramus preferred another, because the argument is disposed with the question after a more single, or simple manner: therefore both did well so fare as they had reason, neither of them did better, because (as I said) their order doth neither profit, nor hinder their use, therefore I have said enough to satisfy the doubt, and will go on to show how this rule may be used. Whosoever is borne of God, overcommeth the World. He that believes on Christ, is borne of God. Therefore he that believes on Christ hath overcome the World. In this example, all the parts are universally affirmative, wherefore I will show another. He that is a murderer, hath not eternal life abiding in him. He that hateth his brother, is a murderer. Therefore he that hateth his brother, hath not eternal life abiding in him. Here we have the proposition, and conclusion universally negative, and the assumption universally affirmative. In the like sort, this rule is useful, in all other questions that are concluded. Aristotle, is of opinion, that this only is the form or figure of a perfect Syllogism: because, every question may be proved by this, and both the other may be referred unto this, therefore they are made perfect by it. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 4. Thus much must be granted, and so fare it is perfect; yea and the only perfect figure. The second, and third figures, are no less agreeable to Aristotle's definition of a Syllogism, than the first; as he shall see that will examine them thereby: therefore they want nothing of that essential perfection, that is in the first, what can have greater perfection than that, which every way agrees to the definition thereof; and consequently, they infer their conclusions as necessarily as the first. The first figure only hath perfection, essential, and accidental. The second, and third have perfection essential, but not accidental, and this is the difference between them. By these things that are past, we have finished all those precepts, which teach us, how to frame arguments together in a simple Syllogism. In the next place, we must come to a compound Syllogism, if we look no further than Ramus, but we must look further; else we shall make our art defective: for Logic doth teach us to judge, as well as to dispose. If we must judge, than we must look for truth, or falsehood, and consequently for precepts that shall teach us how to find out truth, and the several kinds of it: For this, we must consult with Aristotle, therefore in the next Chapter, I will report his precepts, with as much brevity as I can. CHAP. LIIII. Of a Demonstrative Syllogism. IN the first place, we must set down the precepts which concern necessary truth; which usually is called Science: for, that is first in nature, time, excellency, and our apprehension, of that Aristotle saith thus. Science is Indemonstrable. Demonstrative. Post. lib. 1. Cap. 3. We have delivered the precepts of Indemonstrable Science, in the matter of a definition, and distribution, we must now come to the precepts of Demonstrative science: and first to the definition thereof. But for as much as, to know is double viz: To understand what, or wherefore a thing is, and secondly, That a thing is, Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 13. therefore, both of them are defined by this one sentence. Demonstrative science, is that, which we have by a demonstration. Poster. lib. 1. Cap 4. lib. 2. cap. 3. Huius etc. This sentence is obscure in itself, therefore he doth unfold it in these words. A demonstration, is a syllogism, that consisteth of things necessary: that is to say, of propositions, and conclusion, that are necessary; and this is proper to a demonstration. I say both, because the conclusion may be necessary, when the medium is not necessary: but when the medium is necessary, the conclusion cannot be but necessary: even as truth, is always collected from truth. Wherefore whatsoever a man knows by Demonstration, both, it must be necessary, and the medium also of the Demonstration must be necessary; Otherwise we neither know what a thing is, nor that a thing is necessarily: but either we think we know, and do not, or think we know not at all. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 6. Quoniam igitur etc. Thus fare the nature of demonstrative science, is set out in common. The proper nature of that science whereby we understand what or wherefore a thing is; is set out in these words. The medium is then necessary, when it consisteth of things true, first, immediate, better known, preceding, and cause of the conclusion. Those are first, and true, which have force to argue, not from others, but of themselves. They ought to be true, because that which is not, cannot be known: they must be first, because they ought to be indemonstrable, and consist of their own proper principles, we must not inquire of the principles of Science, wherefore they are so: but every one of them, even by itself, aught to be worthy of credit. The medium must contain the causes of the conclusion, seeing we know nothing unless we understand the causes. The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion; both in nature, and our knowledge: therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition, viz. that hath none before it. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. & 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. whereupon, demonstrations are made by definitions. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 33. and, they are the principles thereof. Poster. lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no ways be proved Poster. lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. & 7. lib. 1. cap 9 By this whole discourse we have rules to know, what Syllogisine contains a truth simply necessary, and we are sent unto them only, whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion, and such causes also, as are better known unto us then the conclusion itself. Wherefore, for further explication hereof, Aristotle doth show us what causes these be, and how they concur; In these words: For as much as, we do then know, when we understand the causes, and these be four. 1. the form. 2. the matter. 3. the efficient: and 4. the end. Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth, when one of these causes is taken, and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion. And by Causes is meant, not only the causes of those things that are, but also of those things that have been, or shall be hereafter. Post. lib. 2. cap. 11. & 12. Now we do fully understand, where to find necessary truth in a Syllogism. Our next labour must be, to set out these scientifical Syllogisms by other properties; that we may know them the more easily, and certainly; for that cause, Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner. A demonstration, is Universal. Particular. Affirmative. Negative. Poster. lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration universal, excels a particular: and an affirmative is better than a negative. cap. 24.25. This distribution follows the nature of a Syllogism, for every demonstration is a syllogism, though every syllogism be not a demonstration. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very useful to give us knowledge where to find this necessary truth, and the degrees of it. To conclude, this matter of demonstrative science, he saith: The first figure is fittest for a demonstration, yea, chief proper unto this science, and it is to be sought out, only by that. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will look, that I should give instances, to open the use of these precepts: and it may seem the more needful, because some are of opinion, that, no example can be given answerable to this rule. I answer; this conceit is very vain: for, cannot any of the causes, or all of them together, serve to prove a sentence that is called into question? or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions? Without doubt they may. Also, it is most certain, that, every proposition comprehends a necessary truth, wherein the effect is argued by the causes; for the effect is no more, but a comprehension of all the causes: and when the causes do argue the effect, the effect is resolved into the causes; therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect. And consequently, such propositions are necessary; and what they are, such the conclusion must be, that is lawfully inferred from them. If there may be premises, and conclusion answerable to this rule, than no doubt, there be examples of it, and we may show them if need were, but I will save that labour for this time, for diverse reasons. 1. Aristotle hath done that already, Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11. so as, he that will, may make use of them. 2. This kind of knowledge cannot easily be discerned, seeing it is very hard for us to understand those principles of a thing that are true, first, and of the same kind: as Aristotle doth admonish, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 9 Difficile autem etc. 3. By a man's own practice, and observation, he shall find them, and their use in natural things: and in them only: for in matters divine, and spiritual, such arguments can have no place. In them we understand by faith, not by sense, and faith hath God's authority for the principle thereof, not the nature or causes of the things themselves. I say, a man may find them by practice, because by sense we get memory, by the remembering the doing of the same thing often, we get experience, by our many times remembering, our experience is one: amongst all these that we do remember, there is one thing wherein man's mind doth rest satisfied above many: that which is one, and the same amongst the rest, becomes a principium of science, if it belong unto a thing that is. Thus much we learn from Aristotle, Poster. lib. 2. cap. 19 Exsensu, etc. The medium of a demonstration, whereby we know that a thing is, consists in some of these that follow. 1. Of the causes, but not the first, or immediate. 2. Of things mediate, and no cause: but such as are reciprocated, or mutually referred to each other. 3. Of a demonstration that shows what a thing is. 4. Of things that are not reciprocated, yet it is better known, and yet no cause. 5. Of a superior science; as Geometry is to the Optics, and Arithmoticke to music. 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed under another, as Surgery, is unto Geometry; To know that a wound is healed sooner, or later, belongs to the Surgeon: but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter, belongs to Geometry. 7. In a demonstration that showeth what a thing is, sometimes also the medium is placed without the extremes, as when we say, why doth not the wall breath? We answer, because it is not a living creature: and these Syllogisms are always made in the second figure; after this sort: whatsoever doth breath, is a living creature: But a wall is not a living creature. Therefore a wall doth not breath. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus fare go Aristotle's precepts, to show us what Syllogisms contain necessary truth; and the degrees thereof. If any expect examples of these last: I answer, they may be given; because we may have examples of the former, as I have already proved. They may be given with more ease than the former; because the things contained in them are nearer to our understanding: but I will save that labour, lest I make my discourse over long, and the Reader too idle. We use that rule with most profit, which we understand and practise together. CHAP. LV. Of Syllogisms containing conjectural truth. IN the former Chapter, I have dispatched all the precepts that concern a Demonstration. In this, I must set down those, which teach us how to find out Syllogisms, that contain probable, and conjectural truth. Aristotle's precepts that concern this kind of truth, are these under-written. That Axiom is probable which seems so to all, to many, or them that are wise, by certain frequent notes, and clearness. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. Those Accidents which agree to the subject by themselves, in the wanner aforesaid: but in such fort as they may be, and not be attributed thereunto, they (I say) cannot be a medium in a Demonstration: because they cannot infer a conclusion that contains a necessary truth. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 6. These two precepts are all that I can find in Aristotle, touching these Syllogisms: and I think, they are full and plain enough, so as, we need not seek for more, either precepts, or examples to set out their nature, and make us understand them, therefore, they shall pass without further search or explication. From hence we may infer that thing we seek for on this manner: If Adjuncts or Accidents make a conjectural truth, and no more, than a Syllogism consisting of Adjuncts or Accidents, doth contain a conjectural truth only. But we have the first from Aristotle, in the places alleged, for he excludes Accidents from a Demonstration, and esteems them no more, but clear notes, making an Axiom seem probable, therefore (according to him) Syllogisms consisting of accidents infer but conjectural truth. To conclude this point, we ought not to forget, that Aristotle gives us rules of such Syllogisms, as he calls Contentions, and a Paralogism: his deed was good, because it doth some ways serve to give us understanding, in the precepts of Syllogisms aforesaid: but I will omit the said rules, because they tend to show us precepts by privation or negation only. Aristotle did well, because from him we have the first formal Art of Logic. I must omit them, in as much as all things that might explicate a precept, fit not my present purpose, therefore here I will put a final end to this matter. CHAP. LVI. Of the first kind of connex Syllogisms. HItherto I have supplied the oversight of Ramus, thereupon the nature of Art requires, that, I enter upon the rules of a compound Syllogism, Ramus doth define them all in this one short sentence. A Syllogism, is then compound, Ramus. when the whole question makes one part of the proposition, affirmed, and compounded, and the argument makes the other part. Aristotle doth acknowledge compound Syllogisms, as I have showed Cap. 48. But he doth not define them at all, (for any thing that I find) neither is it greatly needful, for their nature will appear well enough, when we come to each special kind. In simple Syllogisms, the argument, and the question made two distinct propositions: in these, they make but one. In them, one thing was simply attributed to another: here the whole question, and argument is compounded together, which properties do make them really to differ, in their manner or kind of disposing. These compound Syllogisms are thus divided. A compound Syllogism, Ramus. is Connexe. Dsiunct. A Syllogism is then Connexe, when the proposition thereof is connexe, and it is of two sorts. The first sort of connex Syllogisms, assumeth the untecedent, and concludeth the consequent. Aristotle doth call all compound Syllogisms by the name of hypothetical, because they infer the conclusion upon the supposition of some part thereof: & doth divide them into such as conclude according unto transumption: and quality, (that is as Pacius understands it) when the minor is taken out of the mayor; as in this example. If a man, than a living creature. But a man, therefore a living creature. And when it concludes by force of the quality of things disjoined: as in this example; It is either day, or night. But it is day. Therefore it is not night. He brings this at large Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. & 29. If we understand Aristotle thus, he agrees wholly with Ramus, and in all reason we should so understand him. In the last place alleged, he doth promise to explicate how many ways a Syllogism is made Hypothetically: but (as Pacius truly says) the place where he doth it, is not to be found. And I am of opinion, that, he did willingly neglect it, because he doth suppose, that, every question, and argument may be framed, and concluded in a simple Syllogism: and thus himself teacheth, prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. The parts of the proposition, in a connexe Syllogism are called by the name of antecedent, and consequent; and that very fitly: for the one goes before, in place, and nature, the other follows accordingly; the one infers, and the other is inferred. The antecedent is assumed, when the words of it are barely repeated in the second proposition, or assumption. If affirmative, or negative there, than they are affirmative, or negative here. The consequent is concluded, when the latter part of the proposition, is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We have examples of this kind very frequent. If God spared not the natural branches, he will not spare thee. But God spared not the naturalibranches. Therefore he will not spare thee. In this example, the former part of the proposition, is barely repeated in the assumption: and the latter part, in the conclusion. And thus the question, and the third argument, is always disposed in this kind of Connexe Syllogisms: sometimes the proof of the antecedent is assumed, not the antecedent itself: In that case, it must be reduced unto this form; an example of this is laid out in Moses words, Numb. 12.14. If her Father had spit in her face, she must be shut out. But she is leprous. Therefore she must be shut out. This example assumes not the antecedent, but the proof thereof, arguing the same from the greater to the less, thus. Her Father did it, because God did it. Her face is defiled with spittle: for it is Leprous. This sort of Connexe Syllogisms, may easily be reduced unto a simple, for it doth change the manner of disposing very little: We may frame it thus; He that spared not the natural branches, hath no reason to spare thee. But God spared not the natural branches. Therefore he hath no reason to spare thee. In the 1 Cor. 15.12. we have an example of this kind of Connexe, that seems to be somewhat more difficult; Where the Apostle reasons thus: If Christ be risen, than other men shall rise. But Christ is risen: so I have preached, and you believe. Therefore the bodies of men shall rise. I say, this example is more difficult than the former: for, the proposition hath two entire, and distinct simple axioms in it: but it may be reduced, and brought into this form. They that say, that Christ is risen, must say, that men shall rise. But you believe, and say, that Christ is risen: because I have preached it. Therefore you must say also, that men shall rise. And this is wholly agreeable to the Apostles disputation: for he argueth against them that denied the last: but in his judgement they might not do so; because they did confess the first. I hope I have made this clear enough to our understandings: therefore I will pass to the next. CHAP. LVII. Of the second kind of Connexe Syllogisms. The second sort of a connex Syllogism taketh away the consequent, Ramus. that it may take away the antecedent. TO take away (in this place) importeth, the putting of a Contradiction: so as, the Contradictory to the latter part of the proposition, makes the assumption, and the Contradictory unto the former part of the proposition, makes the Conclusion. The Apostle Gal. 3.18. gives us an instance of this precept. If the inheritance be of the Law, it is not of promise. But it is of promise. Therefore it is not of the Law. The assumption in this argument, is Contradictory, to the latter part of the proposition, That saith, the inheritance is not of promise. The assumption saith, the inheritance i● of promise. In the like sort, the Conclusion is contradictory to the first part of the proposition. The one saith, the inheritance is of the Law. The other saith, the inheritance is not of the Law. This kind, is easily (also) brought into a simple, thus: Whatsoever is by the Law, is not of promise. But the inheritance is of promise. Therefore the inheritance is not of the Law. This kind of Conn●xe hath but three terms in it, viz. 1 Inheritance. 2. Promise. 3. Law. And the first is repeated, or twice subjected in the proposition, whereupon this kind is easily turned from compound to simple. We have an example Gal. 2.21. that is not so easily converted. If justice be by the Law, Christ is dead in vain. But Christ is not dead in vain. Therefore justice is not by the Law. I have propounded this Syllogism cap. 44 and have there showed, how it may be made into a simple form: therefore it is needless to repeat it here. The truth contained in these Syllogisms, is to be judged of, according to the precepts of a connexe axiom: if we take them as they are Connex. But if we take them as simple syllogisms, than their truth must be judged of, according to the precepts of a simple syllogism. Therefore we have said enough touching their natural use. CHAP. LVIII. Of the first kind of a Disjunct Syllogism. A compound Syllogism is then disjunct, Ramus. when the proposition thereof is a disiunct axiom. There are two sorts: The first doth take away the one, and conclude the other. BY taking away, and concluding, is here understood Contradicting and repeating, in the same sort as I have showed, cap. 56. & 57 Aristotle calls these hypothetical; and so he well may: for the principal all foundation of them, is a supposition: for one thing is taken for granted, and that must be granted, or else they can conclude nothing. By the word [one] is meant, not one term; but one part of the opposition: for, we must remember, that, no arguments but opposites come into the Syllogisms of this kind; now opposites are sometimes one, against one, and some other times many against one: so as, those many make one part, and the other one, makes the other part: therefore, it is truly said, one is taken away, when all those are contradicted that make one part of the opposition: and one is assumed, when those many are barely repeated. Again, that word one, is not understood indifferently of either part of the opposition: for then, the contradicting of any one single term, must infer the concluding of all others that oppose that one: but that may not be: for only one of them at once, can agree to the same subject, in the same respect, part, and time. Therefore it is understood of all the single terms that are disjoined, except one: because from thence, that one that is not Contradicted, may well be Concluded: but where one single term is opposed unto another single term, there the Contradicting of either of them indifferently, doth infer the Concluding of the other. By this precept the proposition may be negative in some part, and therefore those arguments that are opposed as Contradictories, have place in this kind of arguing. I will bring instances of all sorts to make these things plain. 1. You must say, he is or he is not. But you may not say, he is not. Therefore you must say he is. The second term opposed in the proposition is negative, and that is Contradicted in the assumption: the first term in the proposition is affirmative, and that is concluded or repeated in the Conclusion. We have another instance of this. 2 Sam. 24.13. I must sustain, either seven year's famine, or three months pursuit, or three days pestilence But I will not sustain, seven year's famine, nor three months pursuit. Therefore I will sustain three days pestilence. This argument doth presume, that David must undergo one of these three, and no more, but that one. If that be granted, it doth infer the Conclusion necessarily. If that be denied, it hath no force to Conclude. In the assumption, two branches of the disjunction (comprehended in the proposition) are Contradicted: The third branch (untouched in the assumption) is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We may bring this argument into a simple Syllogism, in this sort. He that may escape the famine, and sword, must endure the pestilence. But David hath liberty to escape the famine and sword. Therefore David must endure the pestilence. The proposition presumes, that one of the three must be endured, and no more but one of them. If that be granted, the whole argument is good, if that be denied, it hath no force to prove. I will add one example more, that I may make this precept clear to the uttermost. Socrates, is either just, or unjust. But he is not just. Therefore he is unjust. Here is supposed, that every man hath one of these two, and but one of these: and thereupon, it infers the conclusion necessarily: otherwise not. Wherein it agrees with the two former; It hath two single terms only, opposed each to other; and it is indifferent whether of them two had been Contradicted in the assumption, and concluded, or barely repeated in the Conclusion: for the form of Syllogism, and force of truth, is the same in both: and this doth make it differ from the two former. If we desire to see it made a simple syllogism, we must frame it thus. He that is not just, is unjust. Socrates is not just. Therefore he is unjust. This precept is now made plain enough, therefore I proceed to the second sort of a disjunct Syllogism. CHAP. LIX. Of the second kind of Disjunct Syllogisms. A disjunct Syllogism of the second sort, is, Ramus. when the proposition is affirmative in all the parts: one is assumed in the assumption, and the rest taken away in the Conclusion. BY assuming, is understood a bare repeating, and taking away, is a contradicting: in the same sort as hath been before set down. In this second kind of disjunct Syllogism: there are three properties. First, The proposition is who●y affirmative. Secondly, One single term only of the opposition, is repeated in the assumption. Thirdly, The other part is contradicted in the conclusion therefore this form doth really differ from the former. That concludes affirmatives, and no negatives: this concludes negatives, and no affirmatives. Gal. Cap: 3 ver: 2.3. doth yield us an argument of this kind. Ye received the spirit, either by the Law, or the Gospel. But ye received it by the Gospel. Therefore ye received it not by the Law. This disputation doth suppose two things: first, They had the spirit. Secondly, one of these two, the law, or the Gospel gave it them (not both together.) Those two things being granted the argument cannot be denied. If either of them might be denied, the argument may not be granted. The assumption doth barely repeat the second term opposed: and the conclusion doth contradict the first, I will add this second instance. This action, is either supernaturally good, or supernaturally evil, or naturally good, or naturally evil. But it is supernaturally good. Therefore it is, neither supernaturally evil, nor naturally good, nor naturally evil. Here we find first, diverse terms opposed in the proposition, one against many; and many against one. Secondly; They are all affirmative. Thirdly; The first term is barely repeated in the assumption. Fourthly; The other three, are contradicted in the conclusion; Fiftly, A supposition that every action hath one of these properties, and no more but one of them. The reason why one opposite term only, is assumed; and the rest contradicted, is: because but one opposite, can be in the subject at once, and the presence of that, doth enforce the absence of the rest. We may bring these into simple Syllogisms, after this sort. That act which is supernaturally good, is not supernaturally evil; nor naturally good, nor naturally evil. But this act is supernaturally good. Therefore it is, neither supernaturally evil, nor naturally good, nor naturally evil. I doubt not, but this will suffice to show the truth, and use of this precept. It is needles for me to set forth what truth is contained in these Syllogisms; for if we take them as disjunctive, than they contain truth no otherwise then as disiunctive axioms do. If we take them as simple, than they must be referred unto simple Syllogisms: therefore in the precepts of them, we shall know what truth is contained in these. I might also allege the reason why Ramus doth prosecute all the precepts of Compound Syllogisms; and thereby justify him. And for what cause Aristotle did but name them, & not prosecute them; and so justify him also; but (I think) I have done that sufficiently in the matter of Compound Axioms. Cap. 42. they, and these, draw in one, and the same line: therefore I refer the Reader unto that place. Repetitions are but lost labour. Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of Logic: so as, there is no more required, to make a Logician, than what hath been said already. But that seems not enough to Ramus, for he brings another member of this art, and calls it Method: but I omit the same of purpose; for diverse reasons. 1. No precepts of Logic can teach it, because even (according to him) Method is no more, but the orderly placing of sentences together. But the precepts of Logic cannot teach that, it being no more, but the general nature of art, as we have already found Cap. 1. (I say of art simply, abstracted from all particulars, and not applied to Rhetoric, Logic, or any other; as we do when we say Rhetoric is an art etc.) 2. If any precepts of Logic, have power to teach the orderly framing of sentences together, than they must be, either some that are past, or some that are yet to come: if we must have recourse to these, than their Authors, and places must be named. But that is impossible. If the precedent precepts do teach it, than we have done enough already, and can do no more, except we will repeat the same things again. 3. If we define, and distribute according to the precepts of a definition and distribution, Cap. 34. etc. We cannot place definitions, and distributions, nor any other sentences that depend upon them, unduly and out of order; for then the most general will come first, and the most special will come last: and this is all the Method Ramus required. 4. He alleges Aristotle's authority for method; but altogether without cause; for he allegeth no place, nor words, and I am sure he cannot. Aristotle calls all the precepts of Logic a Method, whereby we come to know, how to discuss. Top. lib. 1. cap. 2. lib 8. cap. 12. prior. lib. 1. cap. 31. therefore he did never mean to make Method, one member of his Art, distinct from the rest: seeing therefore we have nothing to say touching Method, I must here put an end to the whole Worke. FINIS.