A LEARNED TREATISE: In three parts, 

1 The Definition of Divinity.  
2 The Distribution of Divinity.  
3 The Happiness of Man:    
As it was Scholastically handled by JOHN STOUGHTON D.D. in Immanuell College Chapel in Cambridge, while he was fellow there:  
And now published according to the Copy left under his own hand.  
LONDON, Printed by Ric. Hodgkinson for John Bellamy, Daniel Frere and Ralph Smith. 1640.   

To the Reader.  
Christian Reader:  
THis ensuing discourse concerning the Definition and Distribution of Divinity, and the Happiness of Man, was left perfected by the Author, under his own hand, as you have it here presented to you.: The Author in the former Sermon laying down an exact Systeme of Divinity and entering upon the explication of it, it might have been expected according to the method of Art, that he should have begun with the Definition of it. But he did purposely omit it there, because it was an Argument too Scholastical, for a popular Auditory, but he having finished this in the University in an exercise appointed for the training up of the sons of the Prophets, I thought it fit not to conceal it, but to insert it in this place, that so the treatise might be the more comple at: If it do in some things exceed the capacity of the ordinary Reader, he must remember that the Argument itself is more Scholastical than popular, yet much of it may be useful to most, and all of it delightful and profitable to the ingenious Scholar, to whom it will be the more profitable if he do peruse the rest of the Treatises: Divinity is a practical Art, not only speculative, and so the end of it is operation: He is the best Scholar, and best understands what Divinity is, that hath learned to know and worship God so, that he may live well here and happily hereafter: If in this Treatise or those other Sermons, to which this is annexed, things do not fall out to thy mind, divide the blame betwixt the Printer and Transcriber, and rather lay it upon the publisher than the Author: So I rest,  
Thine in the Lord, A. B.   

THE DEFINITION OF DIVINITY.  

CHAP. I.  
Sect. 1 
preface to the Auditors concerning the scope.  IF Plutarch's discourse be reasonable, that a Philosopher should be so far from being shy and shunning the converse with great Men, that are in place and magistracy, that they should take most pleasure in taking pains to instruct them because their lives being exemplary, their labour with them might redound to the benefit of the whole common weal: as a Physician that hath any spark of ingenuous honesty will delight more in the cure of that eye which sees for many: and if that be recorded of that of the Jews in the Ecclesiastical history as an act of Barbarous inhumanity, that they poisoned the fountains in hatred of the Christians, or mankind rather: then will I labour to forget the difficulty of this employment, and rather think upon the public utility of such an exercise appointed for the training up of the Sons of the Prophets, the curing of the eyes (as they call the Universities) that see for many, the healing of the waters (by casting salt into them as the Prophet Elisha did) whose streams make glad the city of God, the Churches throughout the whole kingdom. Cast thy bread upon the waters, saith the Preacher, thy seed in fruitful ground in locis irriguis & propterea benedictionis feracibus, as Junius expounds it. Cast it as I observe, with a secure cheerfulness in hope of a rich and copious benediction.  
He that makes an harp would go more willingly about it, if he were assured, it were for one that would build the walls of Thebes with it as Amphion did: he that makes an helm if he knew it were to guide Themistocles his ship, in which he fought for the liberty of Greece, or Pompeyeses in which he overcame the Pirates, or the famous Argo, in which the ancient Heroes fetched the golden fleece, and I think saith Plutarch, the Artificer had rather hue and square that wood in which Solon's laws were to be written, then of which a plough or some such rustical instrument should be made: The accommodation is as easy for me, to encourage to this work in hand, in this seminary of Religion and learning: as it was for him to provoke Philosophers, to apply themselves to great persons: for students in Divinity are like tables in which not the Laws of Solon, but of God are to be written, and those that polish them with precepts, hue and square them, fit for that employment: like Pompey's ship in which God overcomes the enemy of mankind the Devil, the most dangerous Pirate, who is therefore styled in Scripture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: like Themistocles, that fights for the liberty not of Greece, but of the Gospel: like Argo that brings the golden fleece, the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who is the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the World, as John calls him: and they that furnish them with instructions, do as it were make an helm to guide them: they are like Amphion that build not the walls of Thebes but of the new Jerusalem, and he that explains the Principles of Religion, the Analogy of Faith, tunes an harp for them, by whose sweet harmony the living stones come together into the building: And these places of learning if any, are those waters of the preacher which are feraces benedictionis, like that good ground in the parable that yields increase a hundred fold, or like the land in Babylon, that with good husbandry as you have it in Pliny gives a hundred fifty increase.  
Artic. 2 Now that the grain may hold some proportion with the ground, the seed with the soil, and have some such multiplying virtue as they say the virginian wheat hath, every corn of which sends forth many stalks, and eevery stalk in the multiplicity of sides as it were in so many little granaries, stores up many scores of grain; I have made choice (according to the institution and nature of this exercise) to handle the fundamental points of Divinity, which though they may seem as they are few in number, yet are many in virtue, in sight small, but great in weight, like gold which being soiled is contracted into a narrow room, but may be drawn into so large an extent, that one Angel may cover an whole acre of ground as you know the naturalists have observed: And because it was the counsel of Polybius for history 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to frame a body of it, which is applied by a learned Divine by better right to Divinity. I purpose to follow that advice and contrive a body of Divinity: wherein if you find me vary for the form, yet you shall not for the substance: if weakness make me err, yet stubbornness shall not make me an heritick: I cannot hold it any shame after Austin to write Retractations professing my name among those, qui proficiendo scribunt, & scribendo proficiunt, as he speaks.  
I know it will be objected against this course that I shall not be able to make any great progress in it, muchless finish it, and therefore might more profitably propound some shorter project.  
But I answer first, though I should but make an entrance, yet I should meet with many matters of great importance & use (as you shall perceive) which have not been explained within the memory of the greatest part of this Auditory.  
Second, I hope to ride some way because I intent to point at only all petty passages and to prosecute them alone, which I shall judge fundamental and necessary.  
Third, that which shall remain I mean God willing to fill up at other opportunities.  
One thing more I desire you to remember, that as he said by way of Apology for himself, of the harsh & barbarous names of towns that are in the Catalogue of those things that will not be written in a florid stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Greek; elegantly: so may I say of some things in Divinity; that you may not look for ornament in my discourse, but emolument: Verba nostra non lenocinia esse volumus sed media, to speak with Salvian: The foundations of houses are laid under ground, and madness it were you know, to carve or paint them: and so it were to deck and trim the fundamental points of Divinity: they would be so fine (as we say of some effeminate gallants) that they would be the worse for it.  
Sect. 2 And thus without any more premised in commendation of this manner of proceeding, I begin with that which first offers itself in the consideration of any Art, the Definition of Divinity: which I will propound two ways.  

The first definition of Divinity according the rules of Art.  First according to the Method of Art; which as a straight garment to the body keeps close to the nature of the thing expressing it exactly, and cutting off all other things counting them but superfluities.  
Second, according to the Method of prudence, which gives a little more scope; which inclines and bows truths, without injurious violence, to the condition and satisfaction of the Auditors, in regard of some circumstances. The first I conceive thus.  
Divinity is a Doctrine of man's Happiness. Or in equivalent terms, of living well and happily: wherein you have according to the law of definitions, two portions.  
First, the general, containing the community, by which it agrees with other Arts and Sciences; it is as they are, a Doctrine.  
Second, the special, containing the Propriety, by which it is divided and differenced from all other and constituted that which it is in its own peculiar essence, which two if they be rightly taken the definition must needs be accurate; and therefore that this may better appear, I will endeavour to open them both severally and distinctly.  
Artic. 2 First of the general, that it is a Doctrine, by a Doctrine I understand a comprehension orderly of certain catholical precepts that are homogeneal one to another, and tend to one common scope as you know, for I do but borrow these from the ordinary notions without much scanning, because that suits not with this exercise and argument, in which a Divine must presuppose not prove those general principles: and the matter is not great whether you call it a Doctrine, or a Discipline, or a Science, or Art, or Prudence, or Sapience: all which words may be put upon, in the same signification, though in divers respects, as I might easily show, if I were not afraid I should be prevented by the time in more material things: but in this indifferency & choice of words I rather call it a Doctrine then otherwise.  
First, Because it is in more common use among the best Divines than any other (which is the best rule to follow in this case) and sounds most gravely and fitly in my ear.  
Second, Because it prevents an ambiguity, which lies hid in the other, for whereas an Art is properly, those Catholical precepts, and truths, which as I said it comprehends, whether a man be habituated in the knowledge of them or not, whether they be written in books, and delivered or not, as the Logicians you know teach you to distinguish those terms of Science, Art and Prudence and the like, signifying primarily habits of the understanding, have misled many (and all the Schoolmen) and made them misconceive the nature of them as though they were nothing else, but intellectual habits, which indeed they are considered as attained by us, but this respect is but accidental to them and separable, and no ways essential.  
Third, I might add that as those Arts which they call Mathematical, have their name from learning, because by reason of their difficulty they are not often attained without learning from others, or because it was one of the first and common things, which the Ancient were wont to learn: so this name of Doctrine attributed to Divinity may intimate (as some have observed) the impossibility of attaining to this skill without a teacher (How can I understand without a teacher, said the Eunuch in the Acts to Philip) and withal the excellency of the Doctor because all that come to it must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, taught of God as the Scripture speaks, we have one Doctor, saith our Saviour, Cathedram habet in coelo qui corda docet, according to the Father: and so there will be a great Emphasis in this word Doctrine: And for these reasons, though the matter be of small consequence, and though in the original of it, it import but an extrinsecall and adventitious relation of teaching, I rather prefer this, and call it a Doctrine: and this is the gneral part of the definition, though not a Genus in exact language and rigour of speech, because as I apprehend it, the distribution of Art is not generis in species, but adjuncti in subjecta, all the distinction of them being taken from the Objects as all agree, which in an Analogical sense are said to make a specifical difference between habits: and as in Method we call the precepts general or special, though the distribution be not of that kind, but integri in membra as in Logic, and the same may be said of others.  
Artic. 2 But it may be said that this seems not the full, and immediate Genus (for so we will call it) because it expresses only that agreement which every Art hath with another, whereas without doubt some have nearer affinity to some then to other, for example, Divinity to Ethics then to Geometry, and so are tied together in nearer references: In answer to this I say,  
First, the division of Arts is taken (as I noted even now) from the subjects by which the same thing in essence comes to be multiplied and diversified, so that the Generality of that word Doctrine seems to be sufficiently restrained and limited by the mention of the proper object without any further curiosity.  
Second, It being not agreed what is the best and most accurate distributions of Arts, I judge it more convenient to rest in that which is commonly received, and had rather that Generality too much should be taxed as insufficiency, than too much particularity should breed obscurity, especially considering that this is a place not to examine, but to set a work those grounds which Divinity must needs borrow from higher Arts.  
Third, to give some satisfaction I will inquire of these three things.  
First of the kind of this Doctrine (the thing now in question) out of the lawful subordination of Arts.  
Second, of the condition, whether it be Scientia or no.  
Third, of the end whether it be Practical or speculative; of all very briefly.  
For the kind I will mention but a double Series of Arts out of which you may fetch the primum genus of Divinity, the first is known to the most or many of you, where Arts are first divided into General and particular, then particular into Mathematical and Philosophical; Philosophical again into Natural and Moral; Moral into the root Theology, and the branches Ethics; Economics and Politics and the rest; so that if you would frame the next Genus of divinity you must call it a Particular Art the root of Moral doctrine etc. I might produce many other of ancient and modern authors if it were needful or profitable, but I will only suggest a second, and that in a word: as many precepts about a certain subject collected make one Art, so many Arts make one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, between every of which there is as lawful sequence and subordination as there is between the several parts of the same Art: so that all are truly one, though we divide them (and not amiss neither) for our commodity, as Suarez relates the opinion of Aegidius and Antonius Mirandula concerning metaphysics: now the hint of this division must be taken from the Objects as I noted before: Therefore if the object of Art in general, be ens, in general as is commonly said (and for aught that I know truly) the species of Art will accompany the Species of ens, and go hand in hand with them: Now ens is first divided into Increatum and Creatum (supposing this to be an Analogical division according to the most received opinion, though there can be no generical community between God and the Creature as the Schoolmen show) and so arse is either de ente increato, or de ente creato: Art de ente creato, is either of it in general or in particular: that in general shall treat of the nature and affections of it and the species, and so cut out that which the particulars shall make up, which borrow their subjects from it: for all being comprised there where any affection or species swells to too great a bulk, it will send forth a colony as it were, and erect a particular Art: For example, Reason is a general affection of ens creatum, which is so large that it deserves particular considerations, so speech, so quantity, whence Logic, Grammar, Mathematics are risen: so there is scarce any species of created nature, whence some particular Art is not budded: the last of which, man, more fruitful than the rest is branched into many: all which guide him in his operations towards his happiness and perfection, as the general Art (wherein he is handled as well as the rest) regulate him in his essence and constitution: and they consider man either single or in society, concerning man single, either in ordine ad Deum, which is Divinity, or in ordine ad hominem, which is Ethics: and out of this you may collect more strictly the proper genus of this Doctrine from the special habitude to the nearest object, which is the operations of man single, or every man as dirigible toward happiness: and this may something give light and limits to the generality of the word Doctrine which I used; But I will not insist upon these Metaphysical and general notions, which are little sought into by reason of the difficult abstraction from particulars, but for the same reason, are very scientifical; and he that should travail in them with diligence & dexterity, should do very good service to all studies: & so leaving the first inquiry concerning the kind of this Doctrine, I come to the second, concerning the quality, whether it be Scientia.  
Artic. 3 I promise a distinction and answer it briefly; Scientia is taken two ways.  
First, for an Intellectual habit apprehending an infallible truth, and this is according to the notion of the word most proper, and then the question will be whether our knowledge of Theological truths be Scientia.  
Second, by a Metonymy of the Adjunct for the Subject, for the truths themselves apprehended, and this is most pertinent to our purpose, for you may remember I said that was the best meaning, when we speak of an Art or Science, and then the question is whether the precepts in Theology be such as are the Subject of such an habit, as we call a Science. viz. of infallible truth, Catholical and Scientifical.  
According to this latter sense I answer affirmatively to the question, that they are, and therefore it may justly challenge the name of a Science: the precepts in this being as in other, desinitions, distributions and consectaries that explain proprieties, all which make reciprocal and Catholical axioms: and if it be objected that many things in Divinity dependupon contingent fact, as the fall of our first parents, and the Incarnation of our Saviour, with the rest of his performances, for the Redemption of man kind, of which there cannot be a perpetual and unvariable rule: I say,  
First, these instances are but few (not many more I think than I have named) and therefore can bring no prejudice to an whole Art.  
Second, Divinity makes not a bare historical narration of the contingent fact; but supposing that explains a constant affection with which its proper Subject, man, in order to his happiness, is invested upon those occasions.  
Third, I distinguish the existence and essence, or rather the condition of the things, and the connexion in the Rule, the former is contingent and mutable, yet the latter may be notwithstanding immutable and constant: But these things shall appear more plainly afterward. If the question be put in the former sense, whether our knowledge of Theological truths be properly Science: I say,  
First, it is not much material what it be.  
First, because the consideration of an Art is extrinsecall to the nature of it, as I concluded before of an Art in general.  
Second, if that were regarded according to the divers habitudes, to divers apprehensions the form would be divers habits, yea contrary in one Scientia (as without question the knowledge that God hath of Divinity is Scientia, in another opinion which apprehends them not without doubting cum formidine oppositi, as the School speaks, in another Faith that assents to them only, because commended to him by divine authority; and so the same habit of Theology, would be all of these, and by consequence none of them, which were absurd to say: but to come up closer to the point I say,  
Second, that it may be more fully answered by this distinction of Scientia: Scientia may be taken three ways.  
First, for the knowledge of a Catholical axiom, or an immediate proposition as other Logicians call it, whatsoever the condition of that knowledge be: and according to this acception the resolution of this question, follows from the former affirmative, because there I determined that the precepts in this Doctrine are such.  
Second, for the certain knowledge of any axiom, whatsoever the condition of it be: which is the most common signification of scire in common phrase of speech: and thus also the resolution of the question is affirmative, because the certainty of faith by which we assent to divine truths upon a divine testimony is as great as of any demonstrative syllogism: and for this reason, saith Gregory de Valentia the nobility of this Doctrine deserves the name of a Science, and cannot well be styled by any other.  
Third, for the evident knowledge of a conclusion by a convincing reason, or demonstration, and in this sense it seems to be used by Aristotle; and after him the Schoolmen, and according to this strict acception the question is more doubtful: for this including that which was most restrained in both the former, that the object must be a Catholical axiom as the first required, and that the assent must be certain, as the second exacted, superads three qualifications.  
First, that the Object must be a Conclusion.  
Second, that the assent must be evident.  
Third, that the motive must be a eonvincing Reason or demonstration, as it were necessitating the understanding to assent: The first and last addition I pass over, as impertinent, because few precepts of any Art are such Conclusions, for neither definitions nor distributions (which make the greater part) are so demonstrated being most prime, and immediate, and therefore cannot be proved by any that are priora or magis immediata & pierce, than they are. Only it is said that passions may be so demonstrated of their proper subjects which may well be called in question by the same reason that I alleged for the other.  
Second, few Arts have such precepts except only the Mathematics as is observed, when it is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are grown almost into a Proverb.  
Third, if they were necessary, Divinity is in the like condition with the rest for the precepts of the Art, though not for other accessary: We will therefore inquire of the second condition, and propound the question a new; whether our knowledge of Theological truths be evident or not.  
To answer it then with as much circumspection of judgement, and yet with as little circumstance of words as may be.  
First, I lay this foundation, that Evidence is a metaphorical speech, from the eye to the understanding, and a relative thing importing a fair proportion of the object, to the faculty in both; so that there is a concurrence of three things to it.  
First, the aptitude of the object to be discerned.  
Second, the ability of the faculty to discern.  
Third, the disposition of the medium fit for conveyance, which is distinct in the vision, but included in the two former, in the action of the understanding.  
Second, I distinguish the three principal terms of the question.  
First, the knowledge of which must be considered according to his different condition either in natura integra or corrupta, for many things he did know then scientifically, which now he doth so much as opinio natively: and again as corrupted, he is either immersed in it, or elevated by the infusion of grace.  
Second, the precepts of Divinity are in a double difference, some be aeternijuris, some be liberae voluntatis, that I may speak so for distinction sake: for instance, in the state of innocency the promise of another life, to which Adam should have been exalted upon observance of the covenant, was liberae voluntatis, as the most agree, and the precept of that I call so, though it also be indeed aeternae veritatis, as all rules of an Art should.  
Third, Evidence is either in regard of the simple terms, the things themselves, which by reason of more or less abstraction or such like circumstances, may be evident or obscure, more or less.  
Or second, in regard of the connexion and cohaesion of them one with another:  
And now thirdly, I resolve the question in these Assertions.  
First, all Theological precepts areevident in themselves though not to us, as Thomas Distinguishes of propositions that are per se nota secundum se though not quoad nos, of which this he gives as one Deus est: the reason is because the terms are essential one to another as they must be in all Catholic axioms.  
Second, Man in his integrity had proper Science of all those precepts, which I called juris aeterni: though of the other, as a better state in another life, he had not without a double help.  
First, ex parte objecti, which was Divine Revelation to convey it.  
Second, ex parte facultatis, which was an oration of grace strengthening, and comforting it; the reason of the first part of this assertion, that man had Science of those which were juris aeterni is, because they were evident of themselves, and there was no impediment of his part, his faculty being proportionable to them: of the second, that the other he could not scire of himself, because they depended on the free liberal grace of God, which he could not penetrate, till it pleased him to signify his good pleasure by Revelation, and withal were supernatural to him, and above his Sphere: the reason of the third part that those helps supposed, he could, is because than nothing was deficient, either in object or faculty, as I said of the first three Assertions: Man fallen, can know neither the one kind nor other, scientifically and savingly, without Revelation of the object and elevation of the faculty, and then he may evidently: so that his knowledge may in truth and propriety be called Science, for the reasons hitherto intimated: I confess I seem in this to strive against the stream of the Schoolmen, who seem to make evidence of the nature of Faith, out of the Apostle, who saith faith is of things that are not seen, and make faith and science opposite habits; but they also may admit a good interpretation: for I think they mean of the condition of some things, not the connexion of the terms in the precepts, or of man considered with natural reason only, to which I grant they are not evident: But if there be any doubt of this last (to which I have without any necessity condescended) I think the former answers may suffice: And so I will pass from this, adding but this one observation, that when an Art or Doctrine is called Scientia, there is a Synecdoche in the word, for properly the knowledge of one scientifical axiom is a science, and in that sense, neither Divinity (as Durand and Ariminensis well dispute) are one Science, but so many conclusions (so they call them) as there are so many sciences, yet by this Synecdoche as I said the collection of many are called one, and are so unitate ordinis, which sufficeth saith Gregory of Valentia to the unity of a Science.  
Artic. 4 And now I come to the third inquisition of the end, whether this doctrine be Speculative or Practical: where I premise a few necessary observations for the better understanding of it, and then resolve it in a word.  
First observe Speculative and Practical are not specifical differences of Arts and essential, but accidental only, as Valentia rightly judges more probable, though I like not his reason, because saith he, they are taken from the objects as things, for Arts as I said are specifically distinguished by their objects in that large sense of specifical before mentioned, but because they are taken from the habitudes, which Art, have to us, who use to aim at Speculation, or operation in the purchase of them and end in those.  
Second, every Praxis doth not constitute and denominate a Practical Art, but you must note a threefold latitude in the use of this word.  
First, in the largest extent of the signification, it comprehends these three things under it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for all these are operation, the first of the understanding, the second of the will, the third of all the faculties.  
Second, in the narrowest it is opposed on one side to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the other to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and then imports nothing but the second, the elicitus actus voluntatis, as Scotus speaks, or an immanent act perfected within itself.  
Third, in the middle way it is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but includes the two latter: now in both these latter acceptions, it is taken when we speak of a practical discipline, but more principally and more particularly in this question, in the first of them the middle of the three:  
Third, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and character of a practical Science is not the end that any particular man makes to himself, for that is fallible, for in both kinds of practical, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they may propound to themselves Speculation as a Gentleman may study Architecture for delight in the contemplation, and do study both Divinity and Morality whose purpose if it be not bare Speculation I know not, but the issue we see is not practise; therefore the judgement of this must be from the nature of the object, and the end of the art itself: These observations being thus dispatched, I answer in a word affirmatively that Divinity is a Practical Doctrine, and conclude this truth in this one Reason: That Art is practical whose Subject is res operabilis à nobis, in the language of the School, and whose proper end is operation, for these make it practical, and it is saith Durand very well, practical, radicaliter à subjecto formaliter à fine, but Divinity is such as shall appear in the explication of the latter part of the Definition immediately succeeding; therefore Divinity is Practical.  
Second, things may be objected against the Assumption of this Syllogism.  
First, that God is the object of Divinity, who is not res operabilis à nobis, and therefore the first condition of a Practical Art is not found in this: I defer the full answer of this till I come to a particular decision of that question which shall be the next time, for the present I say God is not the subject of Divinity nor principally considered in it according to his nature for he that doth so saith Durand, sumit formam Philosophi, but in Relation to our works as they are terminated in him objectiuè, and in some sense that is true, which the same Author affirms, not qua Deus, as the Thomists would have it, but qua salvator, not qua cognoscendus, say I, but qua colendus.  
Second, it is objected that the last end of Divinity is the vision of God, which is speculative and therefore the second condition of a Practical Art agrees not to Divinity, to which I answer.  
First, the last end of Divinity is eternal happiness, but not the whole end, and in eternal happiness that vision is something, but not all, for without doubt there shall be many other operations, as praising of God etc. To which that is rather subordinate than otherwise.  
Second, the next end makes an Art Practical not the remote, but that vision is as Durand disputes: yet that is produced by an habit of glory, which is of another kind, than our habit of Divinity; but these things shall appear better in that which follows: Therefore I still hold that conclusion that it is Practical: and that Scripture gives good testimony to this truth, Evidenter apparet consideranti omni Scripturam a principio usque ad finem, quia semper pro una scripturae columna in qua agitur de his quae sunt pure speculabilia à nobis sunt plusquam quingenta folia in quibus agitur de pure practicis, as Durand writes: I will allege some few places to make this good in part. 1. Tim. 15. The end of the Commandment is charity. Out of which and such like places Alexander Hales made it a third, neither Speculative nor Practical; but Affective, which opinion is true though not in opposition to practic, for that affection is in order to action, that that is the last: more plainly. 2. Tim. 3.16.17. All the scripture is profitable for doctrine for instruction in righteousness that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to every good work: John 13.17. If you know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them, saith our Saviour. James 1.22. But be ye doers of the word and not hearers only deceiving yourselves. I shall not need to heap up more: for Scotus and many of the best Schoolmen concur in this opinion, and all our modern and orthodox Divines with one consent agree in it: and therefore I will conclude this in the words of Bernard, Is recte legit Scripturas divinas, and so Theologiam, qui verba vertit in opera: Blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it.  
Artic. 5 The last time I propounded the first definition of Theology containing so much, as I conceived necessary for the accurateness thereof: which was this that Theology is a Doctrine of man's happiness: and then I dispatched the former and general part of it, that it was a Doctrine, explaining four things for the clearing of it.  
First, how it was a doctrine and wherefore I called it so, rather than by any other name.  
Second, what kind of doctrine in particular that seeming large and general.  
Third, what manner of doctrine for the condition and quality whether scientia or not.  
Fourth, what was the end of it whether Speculation or Praxis.  
It remains now that I proceed to the second and particular part of that definition that this doctrine is of Man's happiness, that this same thing may be expressed in other equipollent terms I touched before, and mean not to trouble myself, or you with unnecessary scruples in that kind: whether you list to speak as I have done, or like  to call it, a doctrine of living well; with Ramus, or a Doctrine guiding man to his happiness; or such like, the sense being the same, the terms are indifferent: but thus much I wish to be observed in the words.  
First, that I call it happiness rather than Salvation, because this latter word in the common acception there of implies and presupposes a state of evil and misery from which man is to be saved, which is not general enough for our purpose, being but one parcel of that divinity doctrine as it is usually and rightly handled of all, and as you shall perceive by that short declination of the parts, which I shall make the next time.  
Second, I rather mention happiness in general then eternal happiness, as the most either express, or understand it; for the same reason: because though that be the highest and last and principal, to which all other things in Divinity are in their kind subordinate, yet it is not all: for both Adam in the state of integrity had actual felicity, and should still have had so long as he continued in integrity & so have the children of God in the state of Regeneration, though they be translated into the kingdom of heaven and glorified, though this be of a lower rank and order then that other: so that Eternal happiness is too narrow for the general end of this Art: except perhaps it be widened two ways.  
Either first, by extending the signification of the word eternal happiness (which is ordinarily taken for that estate which abides with the children of God in the kingdom of heaven; because that is to endure without alteration and change to all eternity) so that it may take that happiness of this life along with it, both together making but one context of Eternal happiness.  
Or secondly by changing the whole phrase, delivering the sense in these or the like terms that it is a Doctrine teaching to live well here, that we may live happily hereafter and that to all perpetuity, which will come to the same effect: thus much you may observe for the word  
Second, under the word Happiness, I comprehend both the end itself, to which that word is in a manner appropriated, and all those means that lead unto it which are either, those gracious acts of God such as are Redemption, Vocation, Justification, Sanctification & the rest, or those pious acts of man, which are necessary for the obtaining thereof, especially those that directly and immediately have God for their object, being his proper worship and service: whether these actions have a Relation of efficiency to that happiness, under which notion we conceive of means ordinarily, and perhaps not amiss in this case, if we speak of happiness as it signifies that future estate of glory; or whether rather those actions are parts of it, or happiness itself; which respect seems to agree better to it, as it is taken generally for the whole end of man, and makes the adequate subject of this Art: because as you know the Philosopher defines felicity to consist in the operation according to virtue: And according to this explication of the word, you may easily discern that those opinions would not stand in opposition one to the other, one of which saith that man's operations are the subject of this Doctrine: as Durand doth, expressing it in these words actus meritorius, (saith he in their Popish language) is the subject of Divinity, and better actus humanus ordinabilis in beatitudinem: as Arminius also in his private disputations makes, actio hominis quam Deo praestare tenetur, and in word Religio, which is the same with the former, only it omits the reference that those actions have to the end, happiness, which notwithstanding the same author adds expressly in his definition of Theology: But the other makes Happiness the subject of this doctrine: which hath no repugnancy to the former as I said but includes it as subordinate: And thus I judged it to suit better than the other: for these two reasons,  
First, because actus Religionis, is not large enough for the whole latitude of Theological precepts for there be some, as I noted of the Acts of God which are necessary to make man happy: it being as impossible in ordinary course, that man should be reduced to his perfection, his happiness, without the culture of God's grace, as it is that other inferior creatures should be reduced to their perfection, their last end; without intervention of man's care: there being the like proportion in the dependence of other creatures upon man, to be managed by him, that there is of man upon God, to be managed by him, and something more:  
Second, the acts of Religion, may be reduced to happiness by a more direct attribution then happiness can be reduced to them: and therefore seeing both are contained, and it is not needful to express both, I made choice as near as I could of the fittest: And so much also of the signification of these words.  
Third, therefore to dispatch the explication of this latter part of this definition, and show how these words of man's happiness, contain the specialties of divinity: they may sustain a threefold relation.  
First, of the subject, because this doctrine is conversant about the nature and affections and parts of happiness.  
Second, of the form, because Arts being distinguished by their objects the form is always included in them.  
Third, of the end, which indeed is primarily either of the artificer, or rather of the subject; and so secondarily may be considered as of the Art itself: the first therefore of the subject is the most principal and essential relation as you see, and requires a little further illustration.  
That is the subject of a Science or Art saith Gregory de Valentia, which is the subject of those conclusions (as he calls them) or precepts that are principally intended in that Science: and distinguishes nicely between this subjectum & objectum, which he makes the precepts themselves where you may note scientia, to be taken for the habit of our understanding: Durand also distinguishes between subjectum in quo, which he makes the understanding to be of all Arts, and subjectum de quo, of which the present question is, and that saith he must have these three conditions.  
First, it must be aliquid incomplexum scilicet terminus & non propositio.  
Second, it must be primo & principaliter consideratum in scientia, and all things there must have attributionem ad ipsum.  
Third, it must be such de quo aliqua praedicari possint denominatiuè: that third of these is obscure by reason of a Scholastical term, but included in the former, for any thing material: and the two former agree with that I brought out of Valentia: so that not to hold you longer in this, I conclude that in a word to be the subject of a Science, that is the subject of the Scientifical precepts therein contained: now I assume, But man's happiness so taken as I have explained it, including all the means unto it and the parts of it, is the subject of the precepts of divinity which are principally intended in it, as might appear by a particular enumeration now, and shall better afterward: for except the definition itself of Theology, wherein it is a part of the predicate it or some part or affection of it is the subject in all the rest: there being many precepts of this Art, because there be many particulars of this subject, as I shown the last time that Arts are multiplied because their subjects are multiplied: and the unity of a Science likewise depends upon the unity of of the subject: I conclude therefore that man's happiness is the Subject of Divinity: man is as it were the materiale and happiness the formalis ratio subjecti: And thus much of this first definition of Theology that it is a Doctrine of man's happiness.  
There may be divers things objected both against this latter part, which I have passed over more lightly and less distinctly than I purposed for some reasons, and against the whole: but I shall meet with them more conveniently in another place, and that by and by, and therefore will not meddle with them here, the rather also because I have detained you too long already in the entrance.  
Only give me leave to illustrate this definition out of the Scripture, for though the word of God aim not at the laying down of artificial and notional truths; but beats almost altogether upon fundamental in a method of divine wisdom and prudence: yet even those must have the ground and substantials, from thence, though Art may put a form and modification upon them: therefore it will not be amiss to give some light to this definition out of it: The places are infinite, which I might allege, but I will confine myself to afew, and that of two sorts.  
The first point at it, in general as for instance. John 6.68. Peter calls the doctrine of our Saviour, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for when our Saviour upon occasion of the going back of many of his disciples from him asked his Apostles, will ye also go away, this is Peter's answer; whether shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life: Luc. 1.77. It is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for in Zacharies' song this is said to be the scope, and employment of John the forerunner of Christ, to prepare the ways of the Lord to give knowledge of Salvation to his people in the forgiveness of their sins: Acts 13.26. Paul terms the preaching of the Gospel by himself, and the rest of the Apostles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as that evil spirit in the maid, Act. 16.17. to the same effect in a Scripture metaphor calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. the way of Salvation. I will content myself with these that I have already mentioned though many more offer themselves and perhaps more pregnant.  
The second sort of places seem more fully to comprehend the definition, of which it shall suffice to have produced but three, 1. Tim. 6.3. the Apostle Paul expresseth it in these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Doctrine of Religion or godliness, or according to godliness, which by some of our Divines is used in so many words to this purpose; and therefore I need not stand to explain it: only I observe that this defines it by the means to happiness rather than the end happiness itself, as you may remember I said some Divines did: the second place is more plain and full. Tit. 1.1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where you may have both expressly mentioned: the third and last place, is rather more accurate for, 2. Tim. 3.15. the Scriptures, and so the rule of Divinity contained in them are thus circumscribed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: I should enlarge these with explication and accommodation of them to my present scope, but they are perspicuous of themselves; and I have been too tedious in this matter: I will therefore observe this only in all together, that the Scripture instead of happiness useth rather to name eternal life and Salvation, the latter because it is directed all to man fallen, who must be raised from misery; so that his happiness is properly Salvation: the former, because the most noble member of our happiness is eternal life, and therefore by a familiar Synecdoche names that for all and insists in that: and both in a dispensation of heavenly wisdom, because they carry most majesty and divine authority with them, and are most powerful & efficacious to work upon the heart of man: And so I leave this first definition, and pass to the second.  
Sect. 2 Now the second, as you may remember I said in the beginning, is to bow the same truth a little to the common apprehension taking liberty to dispense with the strictness and severity of Art, by Prudence, and that I think may be fitly conceived in these or the like words; Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his word which teaches man how to know and worship God, so that he may live well here and happily hereafter: I intent not to spend any time about those parcels in this definition, wherein it agrees with the former: and for circumstantial differences, I will pass them over likewise; because I suppose there will not arise any difficulty, which may not tolerably be satisfied out of that which hath been said already.  
There be two additions only of moment, which must be expended.  
First, concerning the Scripture.  
Second, concerning the knowledge of God.  
The first, I shall clear in the opening of these three propositions.  
First, that divine Revelation is not the formalis Ratio of the subject of Theology.  
Second, that mention of the Scripture is not to be inserted into the definition of divinity, when we go about to lay down the nature of it accurately.  
Third, that for some circumstances of prudence it may be convenient to do it: the truth of which three I shall show in a word.  
For the first: Valentia distinguishing of formalis ratio quae & sub qua, makes divine Revelation the formal respect of the subject of Theology according to the latter, and the Thomists generally make ens divinum Revelabile: and make good the unity of this Doctrine by that, though it treat of many different things as God and the creatures etc. Yet it is one because all are considered in one formal respect as they are revealed, which is enough: and he goes so far that in answer to an argument of Aureolus, to the contrary, that if that were true, if God should reveal Mathematics and Metaphysics to one man they would be but one Science because there would be the same ratio formalis sub qua, viz. divine Revelation he thinks it no absurdity to grant so much.  
But, I take it, this cannot be: for if Revelation were the formalis, by which any thing were brought into the compass of Divinity; then,  
First, nothing should be handled there, but quatenus Revelatum, and so Divinity should have no proper subject of it own.  
And second, every thing quatenus Revelatum, should be handled there, upon which must needs follow this inconvenience that the truths of all Arts should belong to Divinity, because many of them are revealed in the Scripture (as for example, natural, moral, Political, Historical, architectonical, Mathematical, and almost of all kinds) at least all of them may be revealed, if God pleased, as well as Theological are.  
And second it would follow, that Theology should not be distinguished from other Arts by any essential difference; but only by this extrinsecall respect, of being revealed which may as I said be a common affection of all truths: 'tis true indeed that de facto, all truths necessary to Salvation are Revealed and de jure they had need to be revealed, and if that opinion aimed at no more I think it should offend not against the verity of the thing so much as the propriety of the language but they seem to say more, and in that sense I reject it.  
For the second, that mention of the Scripture is not to be made in the definition of Divinity, when we go about to lay down the nature of it accurately I show it thus.  
First, because it is but an extrinsecall relation as hath been said, and therefore as it were absurd to say of Logic, that it is an Art of Reason delivered in Aristotle's Organon, or in Ramus, and it were inconvenient to define any Art, that it was such an one attained to by natural reason and humane industry, (which have the same habitude, to the Sciences of humanity that Revelation hath to the Doctrine of Divinty) so in a like (I say not an equal) proportion, it would be at least unnecessary to interpose this in the definition of Theology that it is revealed by God in his word:  
Second, because it is not of so general consideration as to be placed in the title and frontispiece of the Art, as may if you do but remember,  
First, the finis cui, or the object of the Scripture, which is either only, or especially man fallen, in which estate it is absolutely necessary that he should have the word of God, to be his guide toward his true happiness.  
And second, if you remember the efficient cause of the Scripture which beside the principal, the holy Spirit, is instrumental, holy men inspired by God the penmen of the holy Ghost which were always extraordinary ministers of the Church having such immediate assistance of the Spirit: now both these the fall of man and extraordinary officers of the Church, without which the nature and use of the Scriptures cannot well be unfolded, are of later consideration and follow afterward in the body of this Art: and therefore the treating of the Scripture cannot be exalted so high as the definition without an obscure anticipation of exact order.  
For the third, that this notwithstanding, it may be convenient to define it, so for some circumstances of prudence, it will be no hard matter to demonstrate.  
First, because it contains all thing necessary to Salvation, and therefore is coextended with the object of Divinity; and in this sense also the Scripture may be called a Rule or Canon, because though it be not every way adequate, as that uses to be (containing many things in it which are not properly Theological, as I noted before) yet it hath all those things in it: but it is more aptly resembled to a Rule or Canon, as it respects faith and things to be believed, with which it is every way reciprocated, for every thing revealed in the Scripture is to be believed, and every truth to be believed is revealed in Scripture.  
Second, because all men now are in the state of corruption of the fall, so that it is absolutely necessary as the case stands for all men: and so it is well commended to all in in the very entrance as a principle and ground of all that follows, and is placed at the top as a candle upon a candlestick to give light better to all the room: And thus much of the first addition in this latter definition, that Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his Word.  
The second follows, which is, that this Doctrine teaches man to know God; concerning which, I shall deliver my mind what I think in so many propositions likewise.  
First, that God is not the subject of divinity.  
Second, that he is not (according to his nature) at all to be handled in divinity.  
Third, that there is just reason why he may and should according to the method of prudence.  
The first may appear by the same argument negatively concluded, by which I proved that man, as he is to be guided to his end or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which in a reasonable nature is called happiness) is the true subject about which all the precepts in this Art are conversant: but I pass over that.  
Second, it may appear by this reason, because divinity as hath been proved, is a practical Art not a Speculative: now a Practical Art is that whose end is operation and that immediate not mediatè, as Valentia well observes, for the remote and mediate end of any contemplative Science, may be operation; and a Practical Art hath always such an object, as is res operabilis à nobis: but if God be the subject, neither of these can agree to it, as it is more than manifest: therefore God is not the Subject.  
The second, that God is not at all to be handle in Divinity, though perhaps it be included in the former and might be proved by the same reasons; if he be neither the subject nor part of the subject, yet because it will seem more strange to some. I will rather prove it distinctly, and severally.  
First, because Divinity, as we for the most part generally conceive of it, is a particular Art one of the lowest and last: but God must be needs handled in the first, or very near the first: for if arse be ranked according to ens, God who is the first being, may justly challenge the first Art at least, next to that of Art in general if there be any such in the whole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
Second, because if there were any reason why God should be handled in this Art, it would be this, because he is the object of the operations of man which are here regulated namely (in which regard I deny not, but he may be called a remote object of it) but this is not sufficient, because by the same reason the nature of man should be handled here also, he being the object of some acts, as for example, of charity and the rest: which to say would be held absurd:  
Third, because supposing that to be, true that it is an Art Regulating man's actions and directing him to his happiness, which I think is out of question, I cannot see how things of so different nature can be homogeneal to the same scope, and beside the unity of a Science will not bear it, as Keckerman saith well, even in this respect, because it should be both practical and Speculative, which are indeed incomputible though some Schoolmen have attempted such a reconciliation: It may be objected,  
First, that it can be handled in no other Art: But I have prevented this objection when I reasoned that it must be in the first art, before we descend to the treatise of ens creatum: and Bradwardine confirms me in this, saying that Deus est that truth is the first of all, upon which all other verities have dependence.  
Second, the very name Theologia argues God the subject of it: I answer.  
First, I granted before that he is the remote object namely of man's operations performed to him, and that may salve the Etymology.  
Second, the name supposed, the reason may be drawn otherwise then from the subject, as from the author and efficient God, or from the end because it is to bring us to God, etc.  
Third, which Durands Arts (or habits as he speaks) are many times denominated not a formaliratione subjecti, but a digniori, & so it might well come to pass that Divinity, which is Scientia salutis humanae, might be denominated from God: where I observe that he falls upon the same definition that I have given.  
Fourth, the imposition of the name usually follows the common opinion (which was so, I confess) rather then the accurate truth of things, which perhaps would rather call this art Anthropologia, or some like name then Theologia: lastly the consent of all may be objected as a prejudice against this opinion: But I answer.  
First, it is no strange thing for many to err in such a matter of notion, artificial rather then substantial truth, and yet many give good hints of that which I have said.  
Second, the error hath been not so much pofitive in defending, as negative in not attending or expending this truth, not so much of judgement maintaining, as practise following this, which also they had good reason for, which I must show in the last proposition,  
Thirdly, therefore I say that the Doctrine of God is not unfitly handled in Divinity.  
First, because the nature of God and our actions tending to happiness are of so near affinity, for the former affords a firm ground to build the latter upon, so that the explication of that is necessary to this which indeed should be supposed out of an higher Art as I have often intimated; but seeing God communicates the knowledge of the one, to men of the common sort, it would not be expedient to distract them between two arts; but it is much better to comprise them in the same, by a dispensation of Prudence condescending to their capacity.  
Second, because they are conjoined in Scripture in which the knowledge of both is conveyed unto us jointly, therefore Divines finding them there together thought it not meet to separate them in their treatises.  
Third, this is a singular privilege and prerogative of the School of Christ, that in it all Christians besides the way to their own felicity, in which they are properly directed, do withal learn the knowledge of God in all his excellencyes, which must needs add much grace and majesty to the former: and thus much of this third proposition, and of both the definitions of Divinity in general, me thinks too much, and yet when I look to the particulars too little, too jejunely & nakedly.  
The uses may be,  
First, for instruction to teach us that this Art concerns all, every one must be of this trade, for it is of Man's felicity.  
Second for exhortation.  
First, to thankfulness, second to diligence, from the Certainty, Nobility and Necessity of this Doctrine.  
I will not trouble you with repetition of any thing that hath been formerly delivered, only because that which follows hath the rise and ground out of that which is gone before, Let me call to your mind the definitions of Theology, which I have hitherto propounded and in some homely manner expounded, and that in general only: the first was a Doctrine of man's Happiness, or of living well and happily, which I thought sufficient for accurateness: the second was this, that Divinity is a doctrine revealed by God in his word, which teacheth man to know and worship God so that he may live well here, and happily hereafter. Which perhaps as I said may give more popular satisfaction though according to the rules of Art, if it were examined, there may be some superfluityes in it to be cut off as I shown: and thus having only presented these a fresh to your consideration, that you may the more clearly understand the succeeding discourse, I begin with that where I left, then to draw some practical observations out of that which hath been taught, before I proceed any further: and they shall be but two.  
First for Instruction, we may learn from hence that this Art or Doctrine belongs not to some few, only, but concerns every man to know and practice.  
Second for Exhortation, and that twofold.  
First, to thankfulness, that God hath planted us like trees by the rivers of waters, and taking such care to guide us in the way of happiness.  
Second, to diligence, in the use of those means and golden oportunityes, which God hath afforded us, toward the gaining of our happiness in this seminary of Religion and learning, which we cannot let slip unless we will shamefully betray our own souls.  
The first appears out of the definition because it is a doctrine of man's happiness: where you see both the material subject man, and the formal happiness intimate unto us, and commend the consideration of the generality of this Art, that the use thereof extends itself indifferently unto all men: indeed if there be any that have drunk so deep of Circe's cup, that are so bewitched with the Siren's songs so besotted with the charms of pleasure, that they have put off the shape and name of men, and are turned into beasts, or if any that bear the name and shape of men are so degenerated from their nature that they are not ashamed to confess themselves altogether void of humanity; they may perhaps consequently to that hypothesis though not reasonably, reject this Art as nothing appertaining to them: but if they be men homo sum, humanitas nihil à me alley num puto, as you know he said, if they be men, this is the doctrine concerning man to guide and regulate him, of which therefore they may not only claim the use, but also challenge propriety in it: for it is a Doctrine of man's happiness: man may be conceived as the material object of it, and so that implies the generality of it reaching to every man: Again if there be any Art concerning man, which perhaps concerns not every man in particular, and so the former illustration be thought insufficient; yet that which is of man's Happiness, the general end of all, must needs belong to all: except there be any that have so far defaced the image of God in their Souls, that they have blotted out also even those common principles which nature hath left engraven and imprinted not only in men, that are endued with the highest perfection of reason, but also in all creatures (at least in a kind of Analogy) that have but the lowest degree of being; all which have a natural impetus or appetitus to their perfection, which in the reasonable nature is called properly Happiness: and though men be divided in their desires and inclinations toward particular good, some affecting one thing someanother according to the variety of their dispositions, yet all agree in this general, all hunt after happiness: Though bonum be not defined according to the proper essence accurately, quod omnia appetunt, yet with the emphatical article. I think it may be not absurdly described as the Philosopher hath done it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that good is that which every one desires, every one desires to be happy: and though all they miss their mark when they think to find it here below, beatam vitam quaerunt in regione mortis, as Austin speaks, yet in gross they aim at this: and therefore this Art, as this end, is general and concerns every man: And thus it appears that this observation is reduced out of the former definition, which I therefore mention least any here should think the study of this alienum opus, a matter that pertains little to him, and therefore behave himself as it is said of Gallio in the Acts, as if he cared not for these things: whosoever thou art if thou hast but the nature of a man, if thou hast but any propension un●o happiness, hoc ad te pertinet, the study of Divinity belongs unto thee: the wisdom of swaying sceptres and managing Kingdoms and Common wealths, which the Philosopher styles the architectonical art, may prescribe to every man a particular employment and vocation, according to their natural abilities in subordination to the public utility, but every one must take this along with him, this is the general calling of all men, which they must walk in directing all their actions to this end: this is one difference of this▪ from other Arts: The great Turk himself they say, you know though born to bear rule and inherit the Empire, yet beside is trained up to some trade of life, which he exerciseth perhaps in his Royal palace and chair of estate: I am sure the greatest Princes and Potentates must be skilled in this trade or else all their glory will be not only splendida servitus as he said, but also splendida miseria: the Rabbins had such a constitution that all their Doctors together with the profession of Divinity should join the practice of some handicraft: what the conveniency of that was I know not, but I see a necessity of the contrary, that every craftsman with the profession of his craft, should join the practice of Divinity; Some are employed in Magistracy, some in Merchandise, some in Agriculture, or otherwise, but from the highest Statesman to the lowest craftsman, all should be divines; all should be employed in this: Not so that every one should be, or labour to be a teacher of others, as we commonly take the name of a Divine, otherwise then that general obligation to the private duties of charity, as admonition and the like, that is not my meaning: but that he should be able at least to teach himself and guide his own actions to the last end of all his happiness: And thus far I say it stands every one in hand to be a Scholar in this School, lest any should be misled with that vulgar opinion which rejects all knowledge and study in this kind, as proper to Divines: But wherefore then hath God tempered the stile of his word, and bowed it to the capacity of all sorts of men; modus ipse dicendi sacrae Sripturae quo contexit? saith Austin, quamvis paucis penetrabils omnibus tamen accessibilis: that I may a little alter his words, Nam quae aperta continet ea quasi amicus familiaris sine fuco ad cor loquitur indoctorum ac doctorum: eaverò quae in mysteriis occultat, neceloquio ipso superbo erigit, quo non audeat accedere mens tardiuscula & inerudita quasi pauper ad divitem sed invitat omnes humili sermone quod non solum manifesta sed etiam secreta exerceat veritate etc. And wherefore hath God erected his oracles every where in his Church, and his Schools and the chair of Moses in every Congregation, to have them taught and expounded: whereas other Sciences are professed and practised in some places only of the Commonwealth: but that they belong to all, & must be part of the care of every man? but I need not urge this, neither did I purpose any more than to propound it when I first thought upon it: especially in this place and among you, who both by the general appellation that is given to Universityes, that are called the Schools of the Prophets, and by particular situation of this, compassed with hills as Jerusalem the valley of vision, and by proper dedication of this College, whose gates will scarce admit of any, but such as are at the least well-willers to Divinity, but as Plato's Auditory exacted Geometry 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so this seems to examine as it were and pose every one it receives in their purpose for Divinity Sacrae Theologiae studiosis posuit: All which do put you in mind that howsoever others may stand affected to this study, yet it behoves you to be in a singular measure addicted thereunto, and desire to be in the number of those that not only in the Apostles words, let the word of God dwell in them richly and plentifully, but also labour for it, and therefore as it were dwell continually in the study of it: and true it is of these places that Nazianzen speaks, I think of his mother at least a godly mother, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or to that purpose for I do not well remember his direct words: they are mothers in Israel to nurse and give suck; that same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sincere milk of the Word as Peter calls it to us that we may prove Nathaneels true Israelites in whom there is no guile: so doth she deserve that title of Alma mater, which you see written in her Arms: and we may well bear that devise which Domitian used where his word was this optimae matris: as you have it in Tacitus: And thus much of the first observation that the use of this Doctrine extends itself generally to all men, and to us in a more particular manner: wherein because I have been longer than I purposed, I will pass over the rest, though more material, the more briefly.  
The second follows for Exhortation,  
And first to thankfulness upon a double ground.  
First, that God hath set us in so honourable a station, a calling so worthy as you see that of a Divine must needs be, whose employment is about that knowledge, a small portion of which to have attained is the happiness of other men: what though the tribe of Levi hath no inheritance among their brethrens, shall not we think this a Royal recompense of that want, since the Lord is their inheritance, the Lord is their portion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Lucian speaks of his Priests, not their revenues are their, God as some profane person might invert the words & pervert the meaning, like them whom the Apostle Paul reproves that would have gain to be godliness, which he corrects affirming that godliness is great gain, so here God is their revenues: let other professsions please themselves in the gain or glory that they procure, Dat Galenus opes, that Justinianus honores, I envy them not: but let my Soul delight in the law of the Lord and meditate therein day and night, and let me always account that the chief part of my blessedness: Praise the Lord ye house of Israel, for in Jury is the Lord known, he hath given his statutes to Israel: great is the privilege of the Jew, for them did the Lord betrust with his Oracles: but especially praise the Lord ye house of Aaron, praise the Lord ye house of Levi, whom he hath entertained into nearer service: though your condition be full of difficulties and your vocation obnoxious to the obloquys of the world, say with the Psalmist, The lots have fallen to me in pleasant places, yea I have a fair heritage: and this may be the first ground of thankfulness, in a word plainly, that God hath honoured us with such a calling in which we have liberty and means to study for that which all desire, the Art of Happiness:  
The second is from this, that God affords so many means unto us to furnish us for the discharge of this calling, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the name of God may be even and square and perfect to all due performances, you all know and have heard often how Plato thanked the Gods that he was borne a Grecian, an Athenian, and especially in the time of Socrates: and you can all make the application without my help, that you have greater cause to thank God that you are born Christians in the womb of the true Church, that you are brought up Athenians in the bosom of a most famous University, and that in this flourishing estate of Religion, and time of the gospel, when God hath poured forth of his Spirit so plentifully among us especially in these places, that as Plutarch saith of the neighbour villages of Rome in Numa's time, that sucking in the air of that City they breathed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, righteousness; so from the overflow of this place, all parts of the kingdom are full of knowledge, I wish I could say of Religion and Piety: Behold a greater than Socrates is here: even God himself in his ordinances; we are wet with the influence and dew of heaven, as Gedeons' fleece, though all the region about be dry in comparison; and again when all about us are wet with the waters of affliction, we are dry and free: we are in the land that floweth with milk and honey: and though it were but a wilderness otherwise, yet God raining Mannah from heaven the food of Angels, in that respect it were a map of heaven: we sit under our vines every man, and under our figtrees: and are planted in Paradise near the tree of life, plainly, we enjoy all blessed means for the knowledge of the way to Salvation in the practical study of Divinity: and of that knowledge which was so dainty heretofore we have God's plenty: Silver is like dust, and gold like stones in our streets, the most precious treasures of divine wisdom and understanding are open unto us: And have we not as good cause to thank God as Plato had? The Queen of Sheba came from the South to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and accounted his men happy, and those his servants happy that stood ever before him and heard it: Behold a greater than Solomon is here even the Spirit of God, teaching us in the doctrine of Divinity, the way of life and happiness: Blessed are your eyes that see and your ears that hear these things: Yea blessed be God that hath given us these means and opportunities: Deus nobis haec otia fecit.  
But I pass to the second exhortation which shall be to the diligent study of this Doctrine and use of the means thereunto: because there I shall lay open better the grounds of our thankfulness, and withal keep myself closer to the matter in hand: Now we may be provoked to alacrity and diligence in this study from some considerations out of the definitions: the sum of all which is the excellency of this doctrine above others which may appear in three particulars.  
First, the Certainty of the truths contained in it from the manner of the conveyance of them to us which I told you was by Divine Revelation.  
Second, the Nobility of the object which as this Art is usually and wisely handled, is God and divine things.  
Third, the necessity of the end, which is man's happiness, or Salvation: a word of each of these and so I will conclude.  
First, of the Certainty of the truths: whereas all other Arts, the skill of which we are to attain unto by natural reason upon observation and experience are so uncertain for the most part that a man when he hath done his best may remain a Sceptic or Academic: by reason of the weakness of our understanding, proceeding from the wound of original sin; it is not so with this where we receive all our light and information from God himself, who being the fountain of wisdom not subject to the least ignorance, and the Ocean of goodness far from all malice can neither deceive nor be deceived; and therefore the light of our knowledge being derived from his light in lumine illius videmus lumen, is pure from all darkness and eclipse of error: and as among all the delight that Mathematics afford to the students of them, the evidence and certainty of the truths, is one great part of the witchcraft, which makes them dote with love upon them: so I do see no reason why in this the same convenience should not be an effectual argument to encourage us to digest the labours of our calling with much alacrity and cheerfulness,  
Second, for the Nobility of the object, God and divine things, if the Poets thought so highly of the study of Astronomy, because it is occupied about the Spheres and stars and celestial bodies, that he pronounceth the first authors thereof and professors happy: 
Felice's animae quibus haec cognoscere primum,  
Inque domos superas scandere cura fuit.  Then how happy are those that are busied in the contemplation of God himself, who made the heaven and stars and all, for it is not only true which the father said, facilius invenit syderum conditorem humilis pietas, quam syderum conditionem superba curiositas, not only facilius, but I am sure much more felicius: this is the chief happiness (in an higher degree than here we do) which we look for in heaven as all the Schoolmen determine, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith Nazianzen: this is an Angelical office, for I say unto you, their Angels behold the face of their heavenly father continually saith our Saviour.  
Third, for the necessity of the end which is that one thing that is necessary eternal life and happiness: we read in the 19 Acts. That of those that believed many which used curious Arts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, brought their books and burned them before all men, and they counted the price of them, and found it fifty thousand pieces of silver, all other Arts and books in comparison of this are but superfluous and curious: this is that one thing that is necessary: and if all were either burnt as they did, or banished as Lycurgus did all unnecessary trades out of Sparta, that they might be the more unnecessary, that we might more excel in this, the matter would not be so great.  
Fourth, I might add to this the Antiquity, and use no other probation for it then the last commendation: for as Peter Martyr hath well observed, as the Athenians proved themselves the most ancient people, because the invention of corn, that most necessary help for the life of man proceeded from them, so that Doctrine must needs be most ancient, which hath the bread of life, and is therefore most necessary.  
Fifth, I might commend it from the Author which I touched in the 1 condition, God himself: which makes much to inflame our affections toward it: for who would be ashamed to be God's Scholar? Or who would not rather think himself highly honoured? When Moses had talked with God in the mount, his face shined: and shall not the Doctrine of Gods own mouth, make their face shine whom God vouchsafeth to instruct in it.  
Wherefore o ye Prophets sons, cast off all impediments, and let no other employment hinder your alacrity in this study: consider the excellency of this Science, and know the time of your visitation: while the Sun of prosperity shineth, labour whiles the harvest of the Gospel lasteth, gather the sheaves unto the barn that winter find not you unprovided: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  When the Emperor passing through Jury, beheld the Land a goodly land, but without culture and tillage through the lazines of the people, he cried out; O marcomanni, o Sarmatae, o Qua di etc. O lazy Germans, I have found a people more lazy than you: take heed this be not said of you, that Themistocles said of them; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that fool hath a price in his hand, but he hath no heart to use it.  
First, be diligent therefore in reading the word of God, say with David, thy word O Lord is more sweet unto me than honey, and more precious than gold; Desiderabilia super aurum pretiosum multum, as the old translation hath it in the 19 Psal. aut multum aurum aut multum pretiosum, aut multum desiderabilia tum multum hoc haeretico parum, as Austin glosses upon the variety of the construction.  
Second, Be diligent in hearing the word of God: let every word be precious unto thee, and let not one of them fall to the ground. O how rich, how soon would this divine husbandry make us:  
Third, Be diligent in prayer: the father said he got more by Prayer than by study, 'tis most true in this Art: if thou want wisdom, faith James, ask it of God: the secret of the Lord is with them that fear him, saith the Psalmist: this knowledge is better gotten by praying to God, then prying into Schoolmen:  
And to conclude, always remember that this is a Practical Art, and requires not knowing but doing: bare and naked speculation is the tree of knowledge, that bears nothing but the apple of strife between us, and God, and death: Practise, Practice is the tree of Life.   

CHAP. II. The Distribution of Divinity.  
HAving already dispatched the definition of Divinity, with such incident observations as I thought fittest to raise from thence, the thread of method leads me by the hand to the distribution thereof, to which I think I may not unfitly accommodate that common Maxim of Machiavellian policy, Divide & Regna, divide and rule and say to the best Divines not abusing it, but alluding to it, Divide & Regna, divide Divinity, and be King of Divines: divide it and I will warrant you Master of your. Art: these knots of divisions, are nodi Gordianis, that portend an Empire, as you heard in another case: this Argument of Distribution is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Royal Argument as Plato calls it, professing also that if he could meet with such a Captain or leader that had the skill of dividing aright, he would follow him as some God: and for this Art especially I would think myself happy to be his companion: my purpose was to have represented unto you a view, a Synopsis of Theology and to have taken some more than common pains in the contriving thereof by reason of the excellent use it might have yielded, and the great variety which you shall find among authors: and withal to have examined some of the most received forms, where I judge them defective: for the main I continue still in the same mind, but I shall not do it so fully as I thought.  
First, because of the difficulty, it being the highest pitch and last point of all in an art, to digest the precepts and parts into method, and supposing an exact inquisition and certain determination of all particular truths, as you know out of Logic: but for myself I confess I am but a Scholar to search, not a Doctor to teach authentically: viator, not comprehensor that I may allude to the School distinction:  
Second, because of the inconvenience: for if I did so, I should be forced to hold you too long in a Scholastical and artificial discourse of notions, which I have done too much already, and desire now to proceed to things rather substantial and more profitable, if not for instruction of knowledge at least for direction of practice. And therefore I will contract my meditations and draw them into as narrow a compass as I can: propounding only two of the most usual manner of proceeding out of infinite variety, and only propounding them without any strict search made into them; and then commending a third and new (for mine own exercise and yours in this inquiry) to your better consideration: because being now in the entrance of this Art, and so in the highest and most general, I think this the fittest place for such a prospect, which may subject to your eyes the particulars: but very brieflly because I would not seem to lodge you like strangers over the porch or entry, but like the household of Faith, Domesticifidei, as the Apostle calls them, and of Divinity likewise, in the inner and more remote rooms, according to the custom of the Ancient, which you shall observe in Homer were strangers, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but the householders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
The first that I mention shall be that of M. Perkins, and Tilenus, and Soh nius, and other learned Divines, who divide Theolgoy into two parts:  
The first of which treats de Deo,  
The second, de actionibus Dei, which they prosecute proportionably in the particulars, Which I will pass over that I may keep my promised brevity, and the rather because it is easy for you to be fully informed of them: and that I may not stand to examine this accurately; I think you may know my judgement concerning it sufficiently, out of that which I said in the definition, explaining whether and by what right God may come to be handled in Divinity: where I shown that in the method of Art he was not, but in the method of Prudence he might profitably, which ground there laid being now granted, this Distribution will fall to the ground of itself without any more a do.  
This observation only I will now add, that though that division be not according to the rule of Art, yet many actions of God indeed come to be considered in this Doctrine, namely, such as, without which man cannot attain to his last end and happiness, to which this rule guides: for there are some immediate actions of God, as for example Redemption, and all the actions even of man, are in some sort actions of God being performed by the help of his Spirit and assistance of his grace, without which they cannot be performed: insomuch that Durands puts this for an objection that Divinity is not a practical Art because these actions are not wholly ours, nor in our power alone to perform: and in this sense I deny not, but the actions of God are handled in Divinity so far as they tend to man's happiness: but this helps that distribution but a little.  
First, because that comprehends under it the nature of God and attributes, which make the first part, not only his actions.  
Secondly, because it extends itself to other actions beside those that confer to the fornamed scope of man's happiness, both which respects show it to be of too much generality,  
And thirdly, therefore that which belongs properly to this doctrine is but a small portion in that distribution, and those actions of God which are necessary may well be ranked under another order: many other exceptions I might bring against that division if it would stand with my purpose, but I omit them both for that reason, and because they shall better appear out of that which follows.  
The second that I will name, shall be that which Ramus, as I think, first observed, and Polanus after him hath much confirmed, and many modern divines approve and follow, which makes two parts of Theology,  
First, of Faith de fide.  
Second, de fidei operibus of good works, the first de credendis, the second de faciendis, and so forward in all the subdivisions: and this I confess I thought absolute a long time both for the commendation of good authors, as also for the consanguinity with the Scripture and congruity with Reason, till that upon better consideration I found it did not satisfy me.  
For first, beside the ambiguity of the word fides which cannot be avoided if it be taken in that infinite extent to comprehend so much and so divers things in it as it must of necessity according to that distribution, all which cannot possibly be conceived to agree in one univocal praedication or formal respect, as I might easily demonstrate: but are brought under it, not without apparent force and violence.  
And secondly, beside the seeming agreement of the parts one with another against the nature and rule of a distribution which requires they should be opposite; which though it may be well answered, yet in my opininon were better avoided: for it sounds harsh and seems unreasonable that one part should treat of the habit another of the act of faith: and whereas it may be said for that, that the meaning of it is not to oppose and sever the habit of faith from the formal effects of it, for that would be absurd indeed: but by opera fidei you must understand other graces and virtues, so that the opposition stands between the habit of faith, and the habit of them graces and virtues which are therefore called the works of faith, or effects; because beside their own proper habits from whence they proceed formalitèr, they must and do also in some sort flow from faith, and from it they have all their commendation and acceptation with God, being without it but splendida peccata, as you all have heard out of Austin often: for without faith it is impossible to please God, saith the Apostle Paul: but this is not enough if to excuse it, yet not to justify it.  
First, because the terms are so ambiguous that they give too much occasion to mistakes and stumbling, as I said before.  
Secondly, because in sanctification, which they that propound this distribution range under faith, the habits of all other graces and virtues are infused, and so included as well as of Faith.  
Thirdly, because in the Decalogue, the rule of obedience and good works, and consequently a principal portion of the second part, faith is also included or else other worse inconveniences will follow: and so there is a mutual 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and immeation in these parts, as Divines speak in another case, which cannot be without a strange and wonderful confusion: in which regard I cannot see that these parts are artificially and accurately cut out: but beside that which hath been alleged I could produce many more exceptions which I omit rather: and in both these I would be thus understood, not as rejecting either as unprofitable: for I approve them both as very good though not exact: and stand not much upon formalities of Art, so as they comprehend in them the substance of Theological truths: preferring this before the other as I would prefer a piece of gold for weight rather than for workmanship, for value rather than for elegancy, like that French coin in the historian that in qua plus formae quam ponderis. And now give me leave to commend a third a new form of this Art to your consideration with two cautions.  
First, I do not think that I can see further, or go beyond those ancient Heroes in Divinity, who were so richly furnished with understanding, which they so thriftily improved by incomparable pains and industry: that is far from my meaning, but only as I said, to exercise myself and you in this inquiry: and yet ye know what the Philosopher saith, that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an increase and growth in all Arts: And the common saying is discipulus est prioris posterior dies: Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge, saith the Psalmist: and though a Giant be taller than a Pygme, yet a Pygme upon his shoulders hath advantage of him, though ancient surpass modern times, yet we ploughing with their heifer may understand their secrets, and with their help may outstrip them: in a word it is with the light of knowledge, as with the lamps at the games in Athens, one generation caries it as far as it can, and after it, doth tradere lampada, to the succeeding generation, which runs along further with it.  
Secondly, I do not imagine that which I am to propound absolute, though comparatively I prefer it, or produce it rather either to give some further light to these dark passages, or at least some illustration to that which hath been said already by others:  
Thirdly, though for the general I hope I shall insist in the right way, yet for the particulars I do not intent them, as full or accurate, neither much less will I contend they are so: for I could not hope to satisfy myself in them on the sudden, and therefore content myself to propound them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Philosopher speaks.  
Now that I may proceed according to the nature of method, which deduceth one axiom one precept out of another: for it is there as you see it in spinning, the lock of wool is first fastened upon the spindle, and out of that the thread is drawn in a long series, and then an hint of that is left to which the next is fastened, till all be done in like manner: so in an Art, first, the Definition is laid down, out of which must be spun, and drawn all the succeeding precepts: and thus I will do with this: the Definition than you may remember to have been this.  
Divinity is a Doctrine of man's happiness: there be two words which note the subjectum formale, Happiness; and the subjectum materiale, Man; and according to these two, I frame the Distribution thus:  
First, of Happiness simply considered.  
Secondly, of Happiness in the Subject.  
First, of Happiness in general.  
Secondly, of Happiness in particular, according to the divers states of it in relation to the Subject: to illustrate this I will put you in mind of three other distributions which harp upon this, though they do not fully agree.  
The first is of some that considering Divinity to be medicina animarum, borrow terms from the Physic of the body which they accommodate to this, and part it proportion ably into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of man's misery by nature, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of his recovery by Christ, from which the common method in Vrfin differs but little: this supposeth man's fall or gins with it, and therefore I think either omitteth something necessary, or else incurreth a necessary confusion of those things which would better be more distinctly handled.  
The second I find in a learned Author Estius in his preface upon the sentences, who divides it into Theologia prima, that treats of man in his first estate of integrity, and Theologia secunda, that considers him after his fall, as to be guided to his happiness; and this comes a degree nearer to that I propounded than the former, because it mentions both estates and handles them, and yet it seems short by one degree.  
The third comes up yet closer, and you shall find it in Trelcatius, who divides Divinity thus: there be two parts.  
First, de causis Salutis nostrae eoque de Dei operibus.  
Secondly, de Subjecto illius id est Homine, varioque Hominis statu: and explaining the ground of this distribution in the next words, he speaks for my purpose more directly: Salus enim (saith he) quae Theologiae finis proximus est, duobus modis consideratur, tum in se & causis suis simpliciter, tum Relate ad Subjectum ad quod ordinata est, qua ratione variè modificatur, pro conditione Subjecti multiplici in quo est: where ye see ye have the same distribution of that I gave, and in the same formality of terms almost: and this superads a degree to the former which I think is necessary.  
The first takes man as he is now fallen, and so applies means for recovery of his happiness:  
The second considers, both of his standing first, and then his fall.  
This third abstracts, what is common to both estates, what is the common nature of his happiness, and so descends to the particular accommodation thereof, according to the difference of his condition: and this I think is full enough and large in extent, to comprehend all things that this Doctrine is to meddle with: and I will use no other reason to prove it, because I think it carries some evidence of truth or at least probability with it, especially supposing the grounds formerly laid, but only that it is drawn out of the definition with such facility, that it appears to be a natural distribution: the doctrine of man's happiness hath two parts.  
First of Happiness in itself in general.  
Secondly, of man's happiness, in reference to the proper subject: and now I proceed to some few principal subdivisions to give you a view and Synopsis of the whole Art.  
Happiness in general hath two things in it to be considered.  
First, the parts or degrees, or affections, for I desire you to remember that I am not curious for terms.  
Secondly, the kinds of happiness: the parts or degrees are two.  
First, the Constitution of it, or Habitual happiness.  
Secondly, the Continuation of it, or Actual happiness: the former I briefly touched the last time; the latter I conceive to consist in two things especially.  
First, the gracious Administration of all things without a man by God, in ordine ad felicitatem: for it is impossible that man should natare sine cortice, and attain to his own suo marti, by his own endeavours, without God's providence supporting him, and suggesting all necessaries to him, there being the same proportion between him and God in this case that there is between inferior creatures and man: and therefore as it is in architecture and such like Arts, which in regard of the natural aptitude of the subject may be speculative, but in regard of the Artificer, whose actions must pass upon it to bring their potentia to actus, their possibilities to perfection, are Practical: so or not much unlike in divinity, it is Practical most in regard of God: as I noted in part before:  
The second thing, for the continuation of Happiness, the virtuous and religious operation of man; which by the help of the former the grace of God: he is able to produce, in which respect Divinity is also properly Practical on man's part, as hath been said; these are the two things which I call the continuation or the fluxus of happiness, the Operation of God's grace toward man, and the grace of man's Operation toward God: for habitual happiness standing most, as I said, in the relation reciprocal of God to man being his God, and man to God being his servant, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and act of it must needs be placed in the reflection of mutual offices of love, according to the peculiar condition of either: And now follow the kinds of happiness, which are two.  
First, of this life;  
Second, of the life to come: in the former according to that which hath been said there be two things.  
First Constitution, which is in a certain degree of our union with God, and consequently fruition of all good, far inferior to the second estate which is future:  
Secondly, the Continuation, which is,  
First by the gracious providence of God, supplying all things necessary for such an estate, and enabling us to action agreeing to his will.  
Secondly, our Religious action being thus enabled, which is of two sorts.  
First, our general worship of God.  
Secondly, our special: the general worship of God is in the observation and of his will and gracious covenant which he pleases to make with man: where two things are to be noted.  
First, Substance of the Covenant.  
Secondly, the Seals: the Substance in two things.  
First, to love and honour God above all things for himself.  
Secondly, to love other things respectively in subordination to God: and in these three are divers particulars, but I must leave them here.  
The Seals of the Covenant are sensible things, applied according to the condition of man's nature, who is both intellectual and sensitive; the use of which according to God's institution should both confirm the promises on God's part, and as it were engage him to performance, and confirm man in his duty, and as it were oblige him more to the performance of it: the special worship of God is in prayer, thanksgiving, praising of his glorious name, and the like: and this is the happiness of this life: the happiness of the life to come is that state which God is pleased voluntarily and freely to promise to man; where be two things likewise.  
First, the Constitution, which far surpasseth the former, man being to be elevated above himself in supernatural perfections.  
Secondly, the Continuation, first, in God's singular and immutable Grace, secondly, by the operations of man, more noble and proportionable to such a glorious estate: and (which I should have mentioned before) these two are subordinate, the former to the latter: insomuch that this is called happiness by appropriation and excellency; the other, but the way and means to this Happiness among the most of our Divines. And all these come to be handled in the first part of Divinity concerning Happiness in general, because they belong indifferently to man in all estates: out of which the second part with some inflexion, may be easily conceived: and therefore I come to that:  
The second part of Divinity is concerning Happiness in special, in reference to the subject, Man; who must be considered.  
First, in the state of integrity.  
Secondly, in the state of the fall and corruption: in integrity,  
First, the constitution of his happiness, was (in one word) the Image of God.  
Secondly, the continuation.  
First, in God's grace giving all things meet, for upholding that estate.  
Secondly, man's observance in the worship of God, first general, secondly special.  
First, General for the covenant, first the Substance as it was.  
First, Moral in these two things, first to love God above all as a creator, secondly, all other subordinately.  
Secondly, Ceremonial, abstaining from the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, secondly for the Seal of the Covenant, which was then the tree of life.  
Secondly, for special worship it was prayer &c, the propiety of which was, that it might be, without a mediator:  
Secondly, the Future life was an elevation above that natural estate to a better, but inferior to that we look for in Christ: and this for the first estate of integrity:  
The second for the Fall, in regard of the present life is mixed and worse than the former: and first for substance is the same always, secondly, for circumstance different:  
The substance first for constitution must be bestowed wholly by God, and that by a double act, first of Redemption by the Son, secondly of Sanctification by the Spirit.  
Secondly, the continuation, first by the grace of God, in Christ, secondly by the actions of man guided by the Spirit: which are,  
First, Observation of the new covenant in a mediator, whereof first, the substance is in two things, first to love God above all things in Christ, 2. all other things for Christ, secondly the Seals are all representative of Christ: and secondly Prayer to be put up in the name of Christ our mediator: and this is the substance, the sum.  
But secondly, this is varied in circumstance, of Christ; first promised, secondly performed, where the chief difference is in regard of the outward parts of the Sacraments, and the ceremonies: and this is the state of this present life: the future life is not only passing the present, but also that future which Adam should have been exalted to in the state of integrity, as Divines think, because in it concur both the free gift of God, willing to advance us, and the merit of Christ purchasing it, and a congruity that the humane nature being advanced to the incomparable dignity of the hypostatical union in Christ the head, should be proportionably dignified in the whole kind.  
I know I must look for many objections which I should encounter withal concerning the order of the general, and the insufficiency of the particulars: but I will not encumber myself and you with a long answer; only in brief I say,  
First, if the general mould and frame be convenient, that is as much as I aim at, the particular passages I stand not much upon.  
Secondly, it is no wonder if many Theological things may seem to be wanting; for my purpose was to touch only summa rerum fastigia, not to descend to all inferior parts.  
Thirdly, you must remember there may be a great difference between Divinity, as it is usually handled, and as it should be exactly; between the method of prudence and the method of Art: the latter I would willingly find, because it keepeth closest to the nature of the Object to be regulated: the former notwithstanding I will be content to follow, and I think is best absolutely, all things considered, as I am sure it is more usual and more useful: and among all those methods, as I easily dislike none especially those two that I mentioned in the beginning: so I most approve that of Trelcatius which premiseth two principles.  
First, Cognitionis, the Scriptures.  
Secondly, Re● which is God: and then proceeds to the parts, because it comes nearest to the accurate method in general: though in many particulars I prefer either of the other two before it. I will now in a word commend unto you the use of that which ye have heard, from whence you shall perceive my scope in this delineation: I confess I have done it so rudely and rawly, that it may be rather a means to breed a loathing, than a liking of Divinity: as Socrates to beat down the pride of Alcibiades (as Aelian tells the story) which the opinion of his great possessions had bred in him, showing him a map of Greece, bid him find out his land if he could, but when he could not, said thus to him, and are not you ashamed then, to be proud of those lands, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so may some man think the worse of the rich possession of Divinity, because in the little map that I have drawn many parcels are not to be found, and as Tully saith of hang, or such like, so long as they are folded together and wraped, there is no sight of them, nothing that may draw liking or wonder: so long as these Divine truths are folded and plighted together in these few divisions, there is no lustre or light sparkles from them, that may inflame the beholder with love towards them; but if they were opened and displayed mirabiles amores excitarent sui: yet my purpose was, because I cannot go through all, at least to give you a light a far off; as the tempter led our Saviour into an high mountain whence he shown him all the Kingdoms of the earth, the glory of which might entice him; so have I presented you a view of all divinity to incite you to a love and study of them: But why do I use such a comparison: rather as the Lord carried Moses into mount Nebo, whence he saw the holy land though he could not enter into it: so because I cannot lead you into the possession of this holy land, I have at least lent you a prospect of it: I might out of all the particulars single out some more excellent pieces to kindle your affections, but I must omit it: and end with this counsel; that every one that intends the study of Divinity, would endeavour to get and hold 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Paul advertiseth Timothy, a form of wholesome words, for the singular utility that it will bring to him: first in regard of his memory, which is wonderfully helped by this, as you all know, though I spare to tell you: both out of your first principles of Art, as also by experience: And he that carries about with him in his head a frame of Divinity, shall have a safe treasury, where to repose all scattered and lose notions that he hears or reads, the several branches of it shall be like so many borders of herbs, so many beds of flowers, so many boxes of spices, in which he may meet with them again upon all occasions.  
Secondly, in regard of Judgement which is much strengthened and backed by this: for this will furnish him with the most principal things of the Art, which he shall behold under one, so that he may compare them together and examine them at his pleasure: and as in a map a man may see places how they are situate for North and South or the like, and what distance there is from place to place, may easily be measured: so in such a frame, or type, a man may behold what agreement or distance there is between one thing and another in Divinity: how one thing borders upon another etc. without any difficulty, and this reduced to use will appear better either in a controversy, which will receive much light, the doubtful truth being reduced to his proper seat, and there examined and decided by some infallible truths: and so in the explication of a place of Scripture according as a man hath made a plat form of Divinity familiar to him; so will he expedite himself better or worse according as it is: for it will direct him how to conceive of a trope or proper signfication of a word; and so in other cases.  
Thirdly, and lastly for invention, this will furnish him with an inexhaust treasury of matter springing from the conference of one portion with another; but will be most beneficial, for the discovery of two arguments most necessary, the Genera I mean, which will appear out of the Series, and the Definitions which will be as succinct and perspicuous in such an order, as you see they are obscure and tedions without it: a Divine without this cannot choose but have all his knowledge snared and entangled, as if he were in a labyrinth without a clue.   

Of the Happiness of MAN. CHAP. III.  
MY purpose was, according to the method that is commonly received and practised among the best Artists in the delivery of Arts, immediately after the definition of Divinity explained, to have proceeded to the distribution: because I desire to make haste out of these Scholastical and notional truths, to such things as may be more practical and profitable: but the time approaching, and the duties to be then performed by us, putting me in mind, I will alter my course a little, and direct my speech so, that if it be not every way suitable, which my general project would not permit, yet I hope it shall not be altogether unseasonable: though it concern not the receiving of the Sacrament in particular, yet it shall in general concern matters of practice and use: though it direct not receivers in a peculiar manner, yet it shall not stand Sholars only in hand (as perhaps the other doth) but every Christian in their measure to know and do: for I mean to speak of the Happiness of man, wherein it consists: and though I intended to have interposed the distribution and Synopsis of Divinity between the definition and this, as I said, yet as he in Plutarch said more prettily then piously; when he threw at a dog, but hit his stepmother, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so I may say: for if I had continued in my first resolution for my method, I should have gone forth by the footsteps of the stock, and fed my kids, by the tents of other shepherds, as our Saviour counsels his Spouse, in the first of the Canticles, I should not have strayed a whit out of the common road: but as I have now altered it, I think I shall gain this advantage, to go the nearest way, according to the exact prescript of Art; for by the same reason that I thought it probable, before that the distribution of art in general arises from the Object, it being in itself specially indivisible, & the multiplication of precepts in the same Art arises from the multiplicity and variety of the several branches of some particular object: I think it will follow by good consequence, that the Distribution of an Art will follow the distribution of his object: the Art itself being divided, but by accident in reference to the object, with which it goes along: even as Logic would be perhaps not more truly, because the matter is the same, but more truly (as we say) in formality, be ordered thus, if it were defined Dialectica est Ars rationis: Ratio est simplex vel Composita, so that you should understand the object primarily to bear the division, which should notwithstanding secondarily redound to the Art itself, with which that is linked in so near a conjunction: but thus much by the way, only upon occasion of the alteration of that method, which I first propounded to myself: I come now to the point, I mean to prosecute, namely concerning the Happiness of man: wherein, that I may proceed with least offence and most expedition,  
I will first premise some few observations unfolding the ambiguities of some terms, that occur in this argument, and may otherwise breed some obscurity in the matter:  
And then secondly, I will deliver the principal things to be known, in two conclusions or assertions: for the first I will name three only, and that very briefly.  
First, Summum bonum, may be taken two ways.  
First, for Bonum praestantissimum and singular, which excels and surpasses all other in comparison, and that is some one particular good, which is exalted above his fellows, to the highest degree of eminency.  
Secondly, for Bonum integrum or universale which is a collection of all the particulars, comprehended under the Sphere or latitude of bonum, and therefore called summum, because all being ranked according to methods heraldry, that sits in the highest place, that justly challenges the precedency: to accommodate this to our present purpose, in the first acception, God is said, and most truly to be summum bonum, for to whom will ye liken me, saith the Lord in the Prophet, or what may compare with God, as it is in the Psalm: but in the second meaning it is not so, neither is it any one particular that can claim that name, but it is a confluence and concurrence of all together that makes summum bonum: the use of this distinction shall appear by and by.  
Secondly, you must distinguish between Summum Bonum taken in either of the former senses, and Beatitudo, as Polanus doth: the former consideration is of good things, barely & absolutely, as so in themselves, the latter beside that, is respective and includes an habitude in which they stand to man, who injoies them: or as the Schoolmen have it, in other words there is a double beatitude, objectiva, the same that summum, and that is God, as it is taken for praestantissimum, or a collection of all, in a word, humanum bonum, according to the other signification, and secondly formalis, the same that I called beatitudo in propriety, as distinct from summum bonum, and that is, either that operation by which we have union with the summum bonum and enjoy it, as they say commonly, or that habit or state as I rather think from whence a man hath the denomination of Happiness, or both, for both of necessity must be conceived.  
Thirdly, you must observe a triple latitude in the signification of this word Happiness.  
First, in the largest sense, the fruition of any good, being a portion of it, doth also get the name of happiness, and he is at large an happy man, who enjoys any such particular good, and so we use to say occasionally, hearing of any good befalls any man, he is an happy man, so far namely as that will extend, for otherwise the same man may want many things, and be simply to say, very miserable.  
Secondly, in the strictest sense that is happiness only that arises from a confluence of all humane good, and he only deserves the name in whom they all meet and are married; and thus no man upon earth, is or shall be happy.  
Thirdly, in a middle sense, that is happiness where the fruition of good, though not free from all mixture of evil; yet is so prevalent & predominant, that it may justly denominate a man happy simply, though not simply happy in all respect, and that man is happy where this is to be found: this last you may call out of the Schoolmen essential happiness and true, the second integral and complete happiness, the third for distinctions sake if you will, partial and incomplete Happiness: I might add something also of true and false happiness, sound and supposed, but the homonymy is so palpable that I shall not need, and therefore will content myself with that which hath been said already of the first point, reserving other things that may seem to be of moment and consequence to their proper opportunities: and pass now to the second part I promised, which was to show, what happiness is, and wherein it consists in two conclusions, and that according to the two stricter acceptions of the word even now mentioned.  
The first shall declare what integral and complete happiness is, and wherein it consists.  
The second what true and essential happiness is, and wherein it consists: the first I will dispatch briefly meaning to insist most upon the latter.  
Complete happiness, I call that where nothing is defective, and you may conceive it, I think tolerably, by such a description or a like. Happiness is a perfect estate of a reasonable nature wherein it enjoys all good that is due unto it.  
I describe it by estate rather than Operation, because no operation doth denominate the efficient, but happiness doth the subject: again every operation is transient, and in a continual flux, but happiness seems to be something permanent: and thirdly operation doth never perfectly exist: but happiness doth: otherwise, that of Solon should be true which the Philosopher rejects, Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera foelix: and a man should not be happy till he were not at all.  
Secondly I add a perfect state, which needs no further explication.  
Thirdly, I say of a reasonable creature: because as Scaliger well taxes Cardan, for attributing vitam beatam muscae quae sane ex optimo purissimoque loquendi genere soli debetur homini: and if the meaning be, because nothing is wanting to it, non improbè sentit sed plusquam improbè loquitur: for that reason is no sufficient appellation or warrant for that, for if we would deglubere significationem, as he speaks in that manner, by the same ambitious superstition we might call an element happy, because it is in his own place, which would be nugae sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, though we read in Xenophon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by a trope improperly so styled: but whereas, as Scaliger seems to appropriate happiness to a man, I think that is not right, neither is it his purpose so to restrain it, for an Angel may be happy even in propriety of language: and therefore speaking in general I extend it as far as it goes to all reasonable creatures, though I intent the particular application and use to man only now follows the other part of the description which saith it is such an estate of the reasonable creature, wherein it enjoys all that good which is due unto it. And this perhaps might have sufficed alone to have described Happiness to have been the fruition of all good due to man, though the other make it more plain and full; where,  
First, by good that is due, I mean not by any necessary bond or obligation in which God is tied to the creature to give it, but that which hath proportion unto and congruity with the nature of man, and to which therefore man hath a natural aptitude and appetite or propension.  
Secondly, by all good I say, because man being a compound creature must have a compound happiness of many ingredients, because the perfection of the whole must result from the perfection of every part; and you may digest them thus: the good is either Summum which is God, as I said; or Subordinatum, and this again is either internum within the essence of a man; or externum without him: Internum is either Bonum Corporis or Bonum Animae: bonum Animae is either Intellectus or Voluntatis: or if you had rather take them without this curiosity of Art, they are five.  
First, God and his favour, as the supreme Lord.  
Secondly, Reason, right and conformable to God.  
Thirdly, a will in tune and conformable to right reason.  
Fourthly, a body in good temper and disposition serviceable to a will tuned.  
Fiftly, outward blessings answerable to all the rest: these make the sphere and circle of good; which, upon whose head soever they fall, do crown him with complete and perfect happiness: which, because of my propounded brevity, it shall suffice to have made an enumeration of, without illustration.  
Thirdly, for fruition I may conveniently and proportionably name five degrees of it: though perhaps every one of them shall not be judged exactly necessary.  
First, possession and usurpation or use of those good (for I join those two together) because perhaps they cannot always be well distinguished in that respect (they have to happiness) which is for the most part by the action of virtue, secondly, knowledge of that possession, and a consideration reflected upon our riches and happiness, Thirdly delight springing from that knowledge, fourthly quiet of all parts filled with that delight and satisfied, fifthly, security of that quiet upon assurance reasonable of the continuance and perpetuity of that estate and those good: All these where they meet are enough to milk out all the good that can be in them; to suck out all the juice and sweetness, all the marrow and fatness that they have: and the name of felicity sometimes imports some one of these, sometime two or more, and the opinions of Philosophers and divines accordingly pitch upon them: but where there is a concourse of all, I cannot see what should be wanting: for he that hath such a fruition of all good eternal, internal, external, in body Soul and whole man, as brings with it a perfect quietation of the natural appetite joined with unspeakable delight, and unmoved security (that I may contract all into a narrow room) Quis non illum beatum dixerit & non potius beatissimum: I might enlarge these things with illustrations and probations if the matter required, but I think it so perspicuous and evident to any that will consider it, that it would be but lost labour to dwell any longer upon it: especially this being agreeable with that definition which you know is common out of Boetius, that Beatitudo est status bonorum omnium aggregatione perfectus, and that of Anselm Sufficientia commodorum omnium, and that of Austin, Beatus est qui habet quicquid vult & nihil mali vult as they are alleged by Gregory de Valentia: and I think it is the common notion that presents itself to all men, when they hear that word Happiness, to think presently upon some universal good: and he that would make an emblem or picture of happiness, must set it forth like that of Peace among the Ancients with a cornucopia an horn of plenty in the hand, or like the picture of Pan, with all shapes and infinite variety: and therefore according to my promise and desire I will now proceed to the second assertion which shall explain what essential happiness is, and wherein it consists: wherein I may be more punctual, because it will be more properly Theological as you shall perceive:  
Essential Happiness I understand, which though it want many particulars, which are de integritate felicitatis, yet it hath all things that are de essentia, and hath enough to salve the name and title of happiness in truth and propriety: as a man that wants his arms or legs is not integer homo; but so long as the Soul is united to the body is a man: or, as the name being given according to the predominant part; wine doth not lose the name of wine for a little water mingled with it: so here, though there be some wants and consequently some misery mingled with this happiness, yet taking more of happiness than misery, it hath the name and nature of happiness; and this I call essential Happiness: and this I say must be placed in God alone and our fruition of him or union with him. But to handle this point more fully, as I purpose in the rest hereafter to take some place of Scripture for a ground and foundation to build upon (where it may be done conveniently) so I will do here: and that you shall find in the last verse of the 144 Psalm, where ye have these words Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: which as you see, speaks of blessedness, and as I conceive, couch as much of that argument, and for our present scope, as any that I could meet withal: and I am only sorry the time is so short that I shall be forced but to name the things I have to deliver, because I resolve to go through with this point and dispatch it at this time.  
The Psalm as may seem, was composed in time of war, and is partly spent in a laudatory thanksgiving for success and victory; Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight: and partly is petitory, containing a suit to God for further safety and deliverance from the proud enemy and war, that the Church might enjoy the blessings of peace Bow thy heavens o Lord and come down, touch the mountains and they shall smoke: that our sons may be as plants grown up in their youth; that our daughters may be as corner stones polished after the similitude of a palace: and there having made a Catalogue of the benefits of peace, the Psalmist concludes all with this Epilogue, this sweet and pathetical Epiphonema; Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: which hath two parts, as ye see, like the portion of Acsah that Caleb gave her, the Springs above and the Springs beneath; like the blessing of Isaak divided among his two sons: the blessing of Esau, the fatness of the earth and the dew of heaven shall be thy portion; and the blessing of Jacob, the dew of heaven and the fatness of the earth: the blessings of the left hand, Blessed are the people that are in such a case; and the blessings of the right hand, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: I must speak something of either; and principally, as appliable to any man single; yet so, that I will sprinkle something as they concern a nation or people, for which the letter of the text is most direct.  
Doctrine. The first point is this, that outward prosperity and peace is a blessing of God, and confers to our happiness, whether you consider one person or an whole people: you must understand this according to the ordinary distinction in this case, of per se & per accidens; it is so per se, in his own nature, though we through our sin may interpolare naturam, that I may use Tertullians' phrase of the Devil, in a sense not much different, we may alternature and make that which is of itself helpful unto us, hurtful: and thus that truth is evident and clear.  
Reason First, because those outward things have an aptitude in them to satisfy man's natural appetite: for in every man (being a compound nature, the vinculum of heaven and earth in which both are, as it were, married by the conjunction of his soul and body) there is a double man, inward and outward: now this homo externus, agrees with that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as well as his inward with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Platonics speak: and therefore stands in need of outward things both for necessity to sustain and preserve him, as also for lawful delight to cheer and refresh him.  
Secondly, outward good things are to him both the subject and instruments of many virtues, and so great advantages in his course of godliness, both to furnish himself, and to help and further his brethren, and in both to promote the honour of God in his true worship, and therefore David, who was a man of war, could not build the house of God, and that Solomon his son might, God gave him rest round about from all his enemies, and riches in such abundance that gold in his time was like stones in the street, and silver like the dust of the earth, and hence it is,  
Thirdly that God is said to give these blessings to his children as testimonies of his love and favour, and as rewards of their faithful obedience: he brought the children of Israel out of Egypt the land of bondage into Canaan the land of promise, out of the land where they were fed with onions and garlic, into the land that flowed with milk and honey: and wishes pathetically in the 81. Psalm, O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways, I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries; He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat, and with honey out of the rock, I should have satisfied them: But why do I go about to prove this since all the world almost is more prone to dote upon these external blessings, as the only happiness, rather than to doubt, whether they confer to it at all or no! it was well said that he that called Riches bona goods first, was a better husband then divine, but it may be thought that the most are such husbands that inquire who will show us any goods, as though they were the only good: and therefore I had more need to improve it by making use, then prove it by reason, and a threefold use, offers itself to our consideration.  
Application. First, not to fasten our eyes upon the things themselves, but to look up to heaven and acknowledge God the author of all the good we enjoy, with humble thankfulness, and thankful humility: Thou crownest the year with thy goodness o Lord and thy steps drop fatness, 65. Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of my enemies. Thou anointest my head with oil my cup runneth over: the Lord hath given us that health and prosperity, and peace and plenty of all things that we enjoy, Blessed be the name of the Lord: But this not enough but therefore.  
2. Let us labour to employ and improve all these blessings, that he hath so liberally bestowed on us, to the best advantage of his glory: lest God complain of us, as of the Jews once in the Prophet, That we abuse his corn, and his wine, and his oil, I may say, his time and his wit, and his learning, to our unlawful lusts and lovers: O that now when God hath given us peace from our enemies round about us, while we have means, we had also minds to build the Temple of the Lord, to advance the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ: let us make these external favours, but looking glasses through which we may behold the beauty of God that gave them; but as ladders Scala creaturarum, and stairs to climb up to heaven: though they have a natural goodness in themselves, yet they have no moral to us, but in ordine to this end without which they are vanity.  
Thirdly, if these be good blessings and confer to happiness, then let us sympathise with the Saints that want them; Let us pray for the peace of Jerusalem: Peace be within thy walls, and prosperity with in thy palaces:  
And now I come to the second and more principal point, which I thought to have stood most upon, but the time hath prevented me: and therefore I will delineate only the particulars, and perfect them at some other opportunity; for the former is not enough: he is not an happy man, whose bones are full of marrow, and his eyes stand out with fatness: that swims in pleasure and riches, and shines in purple and scarlet and fares deliciously every day: that lives in a land that flows with milk and honey, and washes his paths in butter: but who then? Blessed is the man, the people whose God is the Lord: the point than is this:  
Doctrine. Our chief happiness consists in our union, with God and fruition of him: the phrase I think whose; God is the Lord imports thus much, they who are in covenant with God, when God accepts some for his people and servants and testifies so much especially by acquainting them with his ordinances, and when reciprocally they acknowledge and embrace him for their God walking in humble obedience to his commandments, so that happiness stands.  
First, in that relation between us and God.  
Secondly, is maintained by those actions mutual on either part: and thus the truth may be clear for these reasons.  
Reason. First, because God is the most eminent good of all, imcomparably beyond all other, both severally and jointly; and therefore the fruition of him is essential happiness though others be wanting, because there will be more good than evil in such an estate, as that man is rich that hath a pearl suppose of infinite value, worth many thousands though he want many things.  
Secondly, because God contains all other things virtually in himself, so that he that hath God hath all, for he alone can and will give all.  
Thirdly, because God alone can supply the want of all the rest, in the proper effect of Happiness by himself, and all that we would desire to find in them, we may have in him; for a full content and quiet of the mind and satisfying of the whole appetite, is that which we hunt for, and would feign distil, and milk out all the particulars we desire, but this is richly and royally afforded us by God alone: How excellent is thy loving kindness o God when the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wing, they shall be abundantly satisfied with the fatness of thy house; and thou shalt make them drink of the river of thy pleasure; for with thee is the fountain of life, in thy light shall we see light.  
The uses of this point may be these,  
Application. First, for confutation of all those fond, and vain opinions of the vulgar, or of the learned Philosophers about happiness, some placing it in pleasure, some in honour, some in riches, the most reasonable in virtue, which well interpreted hath some truth, we have better learned to place it in the fruition of God.  
Secondly, for reprehension of the practice of carnal and worldly men, that even in the bosom of the Church and School of Christ, are such non proficients, that they seek no further, neglecting the communion with God, and following those things with great greediness, tanquam haec sint nostri medicina doloris.  
Thirdly, for instruction of all, Many say who will show us any good: but come hither, and as God said to Moses, Ostendam tibi omne bonum, when he gave him but a glimpse of himself, & his glory, god is all good god is perfect happiness.  
4. For Exhortation, there is no man but desires happiness: when the juggler undertook to tell every man what he wished for, and desired, and much company was met to see the issue of his promise with great expectation, out comes the mountebank and bids them be attentive, and then said, Hoc omnes vultis, vili emere & caro vendere: and another said Omnes laudari se exoptant, this Austin finds fault withal. At si dixissent inquit omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixissent aeliquid, autem nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate: Behold then this happiness to enjoy the favour of God to have communion with him, labour therefore for this, use all means that God hath appointed, particularly this Sacrament to which God invites us now at this time; wherein God offers himself to every believer in a most near communion: the Sybarites, when they invited to a feast were wont to give their women a years warning to deck and trim and prepare themselves: this is an anniversary solemnity with some, and it were to be wished it were not so seldom with us: let us prepare ourselves accordingly to be fit guests, for this table, not without the wedding garment: that we may present ourselves before our God adorned with lively faith in Christ, and a resolute purpose of denying ourselves and our lusts and yielding sincere obedience to all his Commandments, and so he may dwell with us, and we may walk with him: we may be incorporated into him, he may live in us, & we in him: we may be assimilated to him in all holiness and righteousness and conformed to his image, which near union is liuly set forth in this Sacrament, in a word we may be so nourished with this heavenly mannah that we may go on from strength to strength till we see God in Zion:  
Fifthly and lastly, for Consolation for those that enjoy God a mid all other wants: Excellently the Prophet Habakuck, Although the figtree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines: the labour of the Olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat, the flesh shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no heard in the stalls: though all earthly comforts forsake us, yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.   
FINIS.   

Novemb. 26 1639.  
Imprimat.  
Tho. Wykes.