THE PRACTICE, PROCEED, AND Laws of arms, described out of the doings of most valiant and expert Captains, and confirmed both by ancient, and modern examples, and praecedents,  
BY MATTHEW SUTCLIFFE.  Luke 14.31. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉?  
What king going to make war with a foreign prince, sitteth not down first, and taketh counsel, whether he be able with ten thousand, to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?  Cicer. office lib. 1. In rep. maximè conservanda sunt iura belli. Ibidem. Sunt qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audent dicere. 
IMPRINTED AT LONdon by the Deputies of CHRISTOPHER BARKER Printer to the Queen's most excellent Majesty. 1593.   

The excellency of military prowess.  REi militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus; haec nomen populo Romano, haec huic urbi aeternam gloriam peperit; haec orbem terrarum parere huic imperio coëgit. Omnes urbanae res, omnia haec nostra praeclara studia, & haec forensis laus, & industria latent in tutela, & praesidio bellicae virtutis. Cic. pro Murena. 
The necessity, & use of arms.  Magna imperia armis non ignavia tenentur. Tacit. Annal. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pericles. Thucid. 1. Without wars we cannot escape the malice of our enemies: and the more willing and ready we are to begin, the less courage will our enemies have to assail us, saith Pericles. Inermes provinciae cuicunque seruitio expositae, atque in pretium belli cessurae erant. Tacit. Annal. 17. Such countries as are disarmed are exposed to bondage, and given as a spoil into the hands of the Conqueror. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenophon. exped. Cyr. 3. They that by skill and practise of arms overcome their enemies, not only assure their own estate, but also purchase that which the vanquished possess. Vae victis, said Brennus to the vanquished Romans that went about to redeem themselves with money, for all calamities accompany those that are overcome. Plutarch. in Camillo. Omnia 
a Liu. 5. What account is to be made of valiant captains and soldiers.  virorum fortium sunt. All things yield to valiant men. Si omnes qui reip. consulunt, cari nobis esse debent: certè inprimis imperatores, quorum consilijs, virtute, periculis, retinemus & nostram salutem, & imperij dignitatem. Cic. de orat. lib. 2. If all those that care and have the charge of the common wealth ought to be dear unto us: then especially ought our noble Captains, by whose counsel, prowess and peril, we maintain the estate and honour of our country. Salus publica in militibus. Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Sever. The safety of the state is committed to the hands of Soldiers. 
Against such as for hope and desire of present peace, bring upon the state a dangerous war.  Si Barbarorum est in diem vivere: nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent. Cic. de orat. lib. 2. If barbarous nations only respect the time present, it behoveth us in our counsels to foresee, that by delays we incurie no danger in time to come.  

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF ESSEX.  
ALthough (my good Lord) discourses of arms in this time of peace and security may seem unseasonable to some kind of men, that mislike nothing more, then to have their ears grated with the sound of drums, & rumours of wars: yet to such as foresee those storms that hang over our heads, and see that there is no other sheltre, but in the practice of arms: I doubt not, but they will be both pleasant and acceptable. The beginning of all good success, is good counsel and direction: the accomplishment is expedition. in counsel nothing availeth more, then to follow good examples of expert and wise men. If then we would either reform the disorders of our proceed in wars, or settle the discipline of arms among our soldiers which is slenderly known, or practised by them; what course is better than to view, consider, and follow the doings of most famous warriors both of former, and late times? this argument therefore I have chosen as most worthy my labour, and most necessary, and profitable for this state; and as I could have finished the same.  
We hear of our enemy's preparatives against us, and know their pride and malice, nay we have seen and felt their attempts. admit the wars are not at our doors, yet we may easily perceive, that they are very near us: and how near we know not. why then do we not awake? nay why do we not provide and arm, seeing the Spaniard by sending over such swarms of traitorous and seditious priests and Jesuits among us, hath given us such cause of an alarm? already he is come into Britain, that confronteth all the western coast of England: and shall we doubt whether he meaneth to come nearer us? and not doubting, why are we so slow in taking arms?  
What provision is to be made, and how it is to be employed, how wars may be for causes enterprised, and how with honour and good success prosecuted and achieved, so that neither the enemy shall have cause to rejoice or hope, nor we cause to lament or fear: finally how we may reform disorders, and avoid future dangers, of compassion of my loving countrymen, and fellows, whereof some still follow the wars, and mere love to my dear country, and no respect of gain or glory (God is my witness) I have in this discourse ensuing done my best endeavour to declare: and I trust not altogether out of season. for if we have wars, what more convenient, then to reason and talk of wars? and if we are in expectation of wars, yet do I not see what reason we have to keep silence in such doubt and expectation of wars. but were it, that neither we had wars with the Spaniard, nor others, nor stood in doubt of their attempts or forces: yet can we not continue many years without wars. Great 
a Nulla magna civitas diu quiescere potest. si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit: saith Annibal Liu. 30.  countries and states cannot rest. if they have no enemies abroad, yet restless heads seek work at home. therefore can no time be thought unseasonable, for to discourse of these matters. if we enjoyed peace, yet can we not assure us of it without arms: if we doubt our enemy's practices, there is no safer course then to arm. He 
b qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum. Veget. lib. 3. cap. 1.  that desireth peace, he must prepare for wars. and long 
c longa belli praeparatio celerem facit victoriam. Publius.  preparatives of war made in time of peace, give speedy victory in time of wars. men do not easily provoke or attempt wars againct a Nemo 
a bello l●cessere, aut face●● audet iniuriam regnovel populo, quem expedicum, 〈◊〉 promptum ad resistendum, vindicandumque agnos. cit. Cassiod. va●. 3.  nation or country, that is ready to resist, & provided to prosecute injuries. contrariwise the peaceable and inconsiderative are a spoil, and pray to their neighbours. The careless and peaceable people of 
b Judges 18.  Laish were easily oppressed by the children of Dan. so silly fowls are a pray unto the eagles and ravening birds. suppose we should yield unto over enemies any thing, which in reason they can desire: yet is that no means for us to obtain peace. for those that 
c veterem s●rendo iniuriam invitas novam. Lin. l●b.  endure one injury, do but give courage unto their enemies to offer an other. and oftentimes the 
d hosts sibi aliquid dedi postulant, ut illud sit ad reliqua agenda gradus. Tacit. annal.  enemy desireth somewhat to be yelden to him, that the same may be a step to further matters. the bitch that desired of the shepherd (as it is in the apologue) a couch where to litter; when her whelps were grown great, began not only to defend that place as her own, but also to encroach more, and to offer divers injuries unto the shepherd. the best therefore is to resist betime, and though we do not resist, yet it is wisdom to be provided: for no time ought to be spent of wise governors in delights of peace, before that matters be settled for the execution of wars. It was one of the greatest commendations that Livy giveth to Philopoemen, that riding by the way, 
Livi. 35.  and in common talk, his most common argument was upon matters of war: which made him so skilful in those matters. much more therefore ought we to consult and provide for wars, being heretofore openly defied & invaded, & now very hardly threatened by the Spaniard. his navy came in hostile manner upon our coast; his commissions given to his captains declare, that he holdeth us for enemies: his subjects have exercised divers acts of hostility in taking our goods, imprisoning, and ransomming our persons. neither doth any Spaniard think, but that such, as are by the Pope's bull excommunicate for heretics, are open enemies, and may be invaded without other defiance. And if we did not likewise account the Spaniards to be our enemies, why have we sent our ships to spoil their country? why have we taken their persons and their goods? why do we assist the enemies of Spain, and withstand the Kings proceed wherein we may?  
That wars are not proclaimed, it skilleth not. For wars (saith 
a Bellum aut indicitur, aut geritur. Cic. offic. 1.  Tully) are either proclaimed, or made without proclamation. Neither can it pass for payment, that some distinguish assistance from confederacy, and colour all our doings at sea under the name of reprisals. if the king of Spain shall ever be able to requite us, he will well let us understand, how little our distinctions will help us, and will use us as enemies.  
Perdicca King of 
b Thucid. 2.  Macedonia, although associate with the Athenians, yet for that under hand he aided their enemies, bought it dear, as soon as his doubling came to be espied. neither do I think, that we shall escape better cheap, if (which God forbidden) the Spaniard should at any time be judge. Wherefore seeing there is no other way to escape his malice, but by force and arms, let us consider what course is best for the enterprising, and prosecuting of wars. which being held of the Romans at the first by 
c Disciplina militaris, iam inde ab initiis urbis tradita per manus, in artis perpetuis praeceptis ordinatae modum venerat. Liu. lib. 9  custom, at length grew to Art, & was administered by certain precepts: by which they grew victorious not only over their neighbours, but also over the greatest part of the world. by observance whereof divers ancient, and later Captains have won to themselves perpetual fame; and which if it might be recalled, would now also work the same effects.  
Some percase will mislike this treatise, as all other of like argument, for that they suppose, that skill in arms is rather to be learned by practice, than rule; and that all such discourses, are vain conceits and supposalles, of men more able to speak, then perform. and true it is, that as in all other things: so in this especially, speculation is nothing worth without practice. among the Romans, the 
a juventus in castris per laborem usu militia●●. discebat. Sallust. coniur. Catil.  youth did learn the Art of war by practice, and labour in the field. but what notorious folly is it to condemn Art and reason, because practise doth many things oft times without reason, or Art? and what man that liketh the effects, can justly condemn the causes? now then seeing as practise dependeth upon certain reasons, and rules, and is often uncertain, by reason that the same hath not the same grounds at all times: let no man condemn rules and the reasons of warlike proceed in respect of his own experience, and knowledge. for although a man should be trained up in wars from his infancy; yet can he not know all the reasons of war by his own experience.  
Wherefore admit a man's experience be never so great, yet shall he learn much by reading of Military discourses, more than ever his own experience could teach him. therefore did Scipio, and Caesar, and other famous captains spend much time in reading of ancient deeds of Arms. and Tully reporteth of 
b Cum totum iter & navigationem consumpsisset partim in percunctando à peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esse● Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Cic. Academ. 4.  Lucullus, that albeit his practice in Arms was not great, yet by reading and questioning with those that had skill, he grew in short time to be most skilful. if Xenophon had not learned more by reading then practise, he could never have performed so many duties of an excellent Captain, as he showed in leading of the Greeks so long a journey, and delivering them from so many assaults of their adversaries, in their return from their voyage with Cyrus.  
a Alphonsus a king of Spain confessed, 
de reb. Alph.  that by books he learned both the practice, and laws of arms. Yea Selim the barbarous Emperor of Turks (as their histories witness) was much conversant, and skilful in Caesar's commentaries translated into Arabic; and read diligently the histories containing the famous deeds of his ancestors. he must be very arrogant that would say, that the reading of Frontinus, Vegetius, Livy, Caesar, Xenophon, and other ancient histories and discourses of deeds of arms, both of Greeks and Romans could profit nothing, nor add any thing to his own experience. and mere folly it is, where men may have rules to follow, there to rush in at all adventures. La Nove his discourses are much esteemed of men well experimented in arms. but double commendation had he deserved, if as he hath set down certain points of his knowledge, so he had delivered all the orders and proceed of wars, and confirmed the same with examples of famous captains and reasons of art, rather than with such 〈◊〉 examples, as he useth.  
Neither is it reason, that the labours of all should be measured by the presumption of some, which writ of matters, of which they never had experience, as Nicholas Machiavelli, and Robert Valturius a certain Italian pedant, which never had seen the field; and some others, which spend whole books in talking of the divers forms of battles, some like stars, some like shears, some like saws, and some like windmill sails, which never have use but in mosters; and leave the most necessary points of war, in preparing for the wars, choice of soldiers, marching, encamping, fight, retiring, besieging, or defending of towns, ambuscades, stratagems, and such like necessary factions of arms. Wherefore, seeing I neither commend speculation, without practice; nor tread in the steps of others, but therein make supply where they are defective; I trust my labours shall have favourable reading. the rather for that they are not gathered by vain speculation, but proceed from him, that hath had but too much experience in the disorderly wars of our time: and hath no other respect, than the redress of disorders, and the honour of his country.  
It may be these rules should have had more weight, if they had proceeded from some great commander, or man of authority. for of all men they deserve most credit that are both writers, and doers themselves. in which respect I do above all honour Caesar among the Romans, and Xenophon among the Greeks; and of late writers Francis Guicciardin, a man employed in great matters. as for iovius, and Sabellicus, and some others, that I will not name, for that they were all ignorant of matters of war, they make many very improbable & ridiculous reports, which no man of judgement could allow. but what if men of authority have not, or will not, or percase for their manifold distractions, and business cannot: will not those that know not things themselves hear the same reported by others? great wise men in time past have not disdained to follow the advise of simple men. 
a Sallust. bell. jugurth.  Marius by the advertisement of a common soldier wan a strong castle in Numidia. 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 4.  Xenophon did not except the time of his refection, or when he took his rest, but admitted every man, that could give him any important intelligence, to his speech. Charles the last Duke of Burgundy refusing to hear a prisoner that craved audience, 
c Phil. Coming. lib. 7.  fell into the traps of Campobacho his treason; and doing all things upon his own head, without admitting any relation, or council of others, was defeated by the Swissers, and by them miserably slain at Nancy. And if the chambers of some great commanders in our time had not been so straightly kept; they could not have been so ignorant of the state of the enemy and of their own forces, and all addresses of wars, as they were. wherefore seeing I do neither speak by speculation or hearsay, nor rest upon mine own opinion, nor desire any thing of mine to be believed, further than the same is confirmed by the example of those, against whom no exception can justly be taken; I trust that these either rules or advertisements of mine, shall not lightly be regarded.  
But (may some reply) what do the examples of the ancient Romans, and Greeks, and their proceed in wars concern us, whose practice, & stile in wars is so far different? these men imagine by reason of the use of artillery lately invented, that the reasons & rules of arms are changed, and that the Romans if they lived in our times, would be new to seek. but they are much abused. for the general rules are always the same. there is, and always hath been but one order of providing, proceeding, marching, fighting, retiring, encamping, besieging and defending of places. and I do not think but if any could recall, or would practise the reasons, and rules which the ancient Romans used, he should greatly prevail. if there be any special difference, the same shall be noted in his proper place. if then the ancient 
a agitatum in concilio est, ut si quando severo imperio ullum bellum administratum esset: tunc uti disciplina militaris ad priscos redigeretur mores. Livi. 8.  Romans thought it their best course in their most dangerous wars, to return to their old discipline of arms; and if 
b Flor. 58.  Scipio could not overcome the Numantins; nor 
c Sallust. bell. jug.  Metellus jugurtha; nor 
d Tacit.  Corbulo the Parthians, before they had settled their government according to the ancient practice of arms: let us not disdain to follow the examples of such great captains, and wise men in reforming of present errors, and disorders according to the true and loyal practice of arms.  
Hard, I know, it will be to return back. for customs inveterate are not easily rooted out; and desire of money hath corrupted many men's minds. without pay & provision the soldier is starved, the war is slacked, and what hope have soldiers either of better provision, or pay? without these things how can the soldier march, fight, or keep other orders of war? who will adventure, without praise, or reward? who will serve his country when he seethe in most countries those advanced soonest, that spoil their country most to enrich themselves? for this cause some unworthy the name of Captains make gain of their places, and soldiers refuse all extraordinary labour, and valiant captains and soldiers are slenderly considered, and laws of arms lie silent, for that there is none to execute them, and few that know them. for this cause and such like, I had almost been discouraged from writing this discourse, and among others, that keep themselves for better times, and live an obscure life determined to settle myself. for what hope could I have of better, seeing in all places all things bend to worse? many seek to enjoy the pleasures of peace. none maketh any provision for war, soldiers neglect discipline of arms, no reckoning is made in any place of brave soldiers, captains are employed only for necessity, rewards come slowly, & only those are esteemed that have money.  
The only hope that sustaineth me, and hath thus far in these my endeavours advanced me, is grounded upon that expectation, which all this nation hath of your heroical actions. God hath placed your Lordship as it were on a high stage in this estate. never man had greater favour of the beholders, nor was more likely to obtain a singular applause of the people. all men's eyes are fixed upon you, to see what effects will follow those virtues, and noble parts, the which already have made your name honourable. as others choose ease, so your Lordship hath followed the wearisome travails of wars. by your own experience in the service of the Low Countries, of Portugal, and France, you both understand the practice of arms, and the wants of the soldiers. the general hope of all soldiers, nay of all that love their country is, that your Lordship which so well understandeth the common disorders of the wars, and the great importance of them, and hath so great favour and means by reason of your authority to correct them; will one day be a mean to see them in some part redressed. all those parts which are required of a sufficient general, do seem to flourish, and show forth themselves in your doings, and promise these things in your behalf.  
Through disorder of some, & ignorance in others, to speak nothing of pinching & false reckonings, hitherto her Majesty hath not been resolved to bring into the field a sufficient army: and those small forces, if I may so call such small troops, that have been employed in divers services, have wanted much of their necessary provisions: not that the charge is so great that it could not be borne, nor for that her care was less than is convenient. (for if the same order were abroad that is at home, why may not this country maintain thirty or forty thousand abroad, that maintaineth so many millions at home? men do not spend more, nor eat more abroad, then at home:) but the reason why a sufficient army is hardly maintained, is because there wanteth good directions, and orders, and punishment of bad dealing. some impute the fault to griedy men's insatiable covetousness, which like a gulf will never be filled: but that is not all, nor the greatest disorder. others think it impossible for this Realm to bear the infinite charge of an army. but why should not this whole kingdom be able to maintain 30. thousand in pay, when as the city of Rome, the territory being not past ten miles in breadth, in that war which the same had with the 
a Livi. lib. 8. & 9  Latins sent forth ten legions which being full at that time, amounted to 40000. foot beside horsemen? but what should I speak of Rome the mistress of the world for warlike discipline, when as the Cities of Athens, and Sparta, nay the towns of Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and divers other in Greece, & Italy, maintained great armies, both at home & abroad upon their own charges? who seethe not then, that the cause of these calamities and disorders is want of military knowledge, and not want of means; and that as disorder, want of reward, and punishment is cause, that our enterprises are so easily dissolved, and vanish of themselves; so order and government in ancient times were causes of their happy success, and would also make our affairs succeed the better? I need not seek far to find examples for proof of this matter: seeing the good government of Edward the first, that so long warred in Scotland, of Edward the third, and Henry the fift, and eight, that were so victorious in France, afford us such store. if then the greediness of some were restrained with sharp punishment, & men of heroical spirits, not tainted with the base desire of gain, were alured with honour, & preferment to take upon them the charge of matters; if such were chosen for commanders, as have nothing before their eyes, but honour and the enlargement of the commonwealth; and all men were resolved to bestow more in iron and steel, then in silks and velvets and golden coats: and most things were governed by law and order of war, and not by favour and partiality, or (which is worse) by money; in sum, if true and ancient discipline of arms were either restored, or settled among soldiers; I would not doubt but that this Country would be able not only to maintain a sufficient strength of men, but that we should also recover the ancient glory of the English nation spread far abroad in France, Spain, and other countries in time past, & now blemished only with some men's misgovernment.  
Wherefore seeing it hath pleased God, not only to make your Lordship acquainted, but also partaker of the common calamities of soldiers, and given you favour and access to her Majesty in whom it lieth to reform these abuses; as you have hitherto employed your person and goods in the service of her, and your country, so I beseech you cease not, until such time, as you have accomplished the redress of these disorders. these are they that without any one stroke of the enemy, have broken our enterprises. it is not the courage of the Spaniard, nor force of the Dutch, nor bravery of the French, that hath frustrated our late attempts; neither doth force so often overthrow armies in field, as dalliance, irresolution, and delay; then through nigardise, and good husbandry, want of pay, and necessary furniture; thirdly, presumption, and want of strength and sufficient force; and lastly, those abuses which through want have crept into armies of late time, & for pity could not be corrected. for what conscience is it to punish those that spoil and wander abroad, when if they should not thus do, they should starve for hunger? if a General have sufficient force and provision, it is his fault, if he do nothing: if he want either force, or pay, than it is their fault that should have sent him forth better provided. many do great wrong to our Generals in the Portugal expedition, when they impute the fault to them. God knoweth that with such slender provision, nothing could be done more. others that are more deeply to be charged for breaking that enterprise, yea and famishing of many poor souls lie hid, and I think mean not to answer, until such time as God shall call them before his tribunal seat, there to answer once for all.  
If any means could be devised, that abuses of imprests, and false musters and accounts taken away, loyal captains might be chosen, and poor soldiers be well furnished, and that matters might proceed with speed, and resolution, and more force be joined together: I would then hope, there would be some service done. without forces convenient, what reason hath any to hope for better? for as a little water sprinkled on the fire doth make the same more to flame, and sparkle; so small supplies do rather kindle, and nourish wars, then end them, or extinguish them. The only means to redress both these, and all other disorders consisteth in the restoring, and by sharp punishment maintaining of true military discipline, and orders. Without this, as a discrazied body is easily dissolved without outward force; so an army though never so great, without one blow of the enemy is broken, and scattered without doing any effect. With exercise of arms and observance of true discipline of war great enterprises most happily are achieved.  
The 
a Romani sibi orbem subegerunt armorum exercitatione, disciplina castrorum, usuque militiae. Veget. de re mil.  Romans did subdue the world by the exercise of arms, and their orders of encamping, and practise of war. Neither did they excel the 
b Quintilian, in milit. Mar.  Germans and Danes in multitude; nor the Carthaginians, nor kings of Macedonia and Asia in wealth, but in strict observance of the discipline of arms. Nor could the Spaniards have done such things as they have of late, but that they excel others in the observance of military discipline. Neither were it possible that the Turks should have prevailed so much against Christians; but that they reward virtue highly, and punish disorders severely, and keep a strict order in the government of their camp, & army. If then we either desire, or will hope for good success in martial affairs, nay if we mean to maintain our state, and our reputation; of force we must observe military and martial orders: Which if once by your Lordship's means, I might see restored, which I do hope; then would I not fear either the malice, or power, or riches of the Spaniard, or other foreign enemy of this state. This therefore is the thing which especially I commend to your care: which indeed is the cause of the whole country, and aught to be the care of all that love the honour, peace, and prosperity of the same.  
For confirmation of your Lordship's judgement, that well knoweth more than I can say, and for direction to such as be ignorant: I have, as near as I could, described the right course & true discipline of arms confirmed by ancient & later precedents of most expert warriors: and because it so pleased your Lordship, published the same: I have likewise set down not only the proceed, but also the causes and necessary provisions of wars, without which all order is vain, and all proceeding without effect. The same I have consecrated to my country's honour under the favour of your honourable name. Vouchsafe therefore (my good Lord) to accept this my simple goodwill, not worthy the name of a gift. Yet is it all which I have won not only by long observation, but also by dangerous experience both in France, Italy, Flanders, and Portugal. It grieved me not a little being in her majesties service, to see such confusion among us, but much more that our wants were such, that we could not execute laws. The causes I have declared before. The redress I have set down in the discourse following after. The which, for that your L. seemed to like the same, and for that I do think it may be profitable to my countrymen, and fellows in arms that still continue that profession; I thought it good under the shadow of your honourable favour to communicate to others.  
Partly delays and presumption, and partly disorder and misgovernment, and partly want of necessary provisions doth more hurt oftentimes, than the enemies open force. Of all disorders the only remedy and medicine is, as I have said, true discipline of arms, which I have here to my uttermost skill and endeavour declared, and with divers examples of most renowned Captains confirmed. against whose doings many may percase repugn, but none can take just exceptions.  
I would once I might see the same put in execution under your Lordship's governance: (for what availeth knowledge of law without execution & practice?) if not, yet shall I wish all honour and good to those that shall endeavour to put orders in execution. If any good come of my labours, the same is wholly to be ascribed to your Lordship, whose singular favour towards me both at home and abroad, gave me first occasion, leisure, and means to write these discourses; if none, yet I trust indifferent men will accept my good meaning. My purpose was, if my experience, having now almost ceased from all such wearisome travails, could do others good, to afford them all the help I could, and also to give my country advertisements, concerning such matters as are very important, & requisite to be generally known: that order may be taken in time.  
The success I commit to God, the care to your Lordship, and others whom it concerneth: beseeching the Almighty, that is Lord of armies, and govern our of all our actions, so to direct the affairs of state under the governance of our gracious Sovereign, & to give that favour to your endeavours, that the glory of the English nation by your noble deeds may be increased, the blemishes of our proceed in wars washed away, and all good orders restored.  
Your Lordship's most bounden and willing Matth. Sutcliffe.   

❧ To the Reader.  
MAny do wonder, some complain, and those that have least interest, if so be they have any love to their Country, they cannot choose but lament, that in those warlike actions which of late years have been attempted publicly, the success hath been so slender, the loss of men so great, the charge so burdensome, and the proceed and effects so contrary to antiquity: and as natural affection leadeth them, I doubt not, but many are inquisitive and desirous to know the causes. And to say truth, good it were that the true causes of disorders were publicly known, that not only those that are wrongfully charged may be cleared, but that those that laugh in others griefs, and rise out of the common ruins might be known, and rewarded: at least that the causes of former disorders may be removed, and that such provision and order as hath been hitherto wanting, may in time to come, and in time also be better supplied. For this cause I have framed this discourse. Wherein when thou shalt see what is required in the orderly proceeding and managing of wars; thou mayest easily see what we wanted, and (I fear me) shall want, unless it please God to touch men's hearts with a more zealous care of their country's honour hereafter. I do not mean any one special man more than others, God is my witness. What soever he is that by delays, irresolution, nigardise, rapine, cowardice, treachery, and other villainy abuseth his prince, and country: let him not think that I aim particularly at his person; but at delays, irresolution, nigardise, rapine, bribery, cowardice, treachery, want of skill, and such other abuses. I have no meaning to touch any thing that may sound to any man's hurt or disgrace. And therefore although I have store of domestical examples, yet have I chosen rather to exemplify abuses by foreign histories. My purpose is to do good to all without hurt to any particulars, unless percase those that live upon pillage, do account the common good to be their private hurt, when the means of their gain shall be taken from them. If then thou desirest to see the causes of former losses, or else wishest to know how breaches of former time may be repaired; behold but this treatise, wherein as thou shalt see the good success of all those that proceeded orderly, and like men of war: so thou mayest also see, that those that have neglected discipline of arms, and warlike proceeding, have had events and success according to their deserving.  
Now to the intent thou mayest the better both address thy affairs, if thou hast any charge in wars, and understand the proceeding and continuance of wars, and warlike actions; I have followed in this discourse the order of time, setting down those things first, which are first to be considered, provided, and executed; and so prosecuting every action of war severally by itself. Those that have done otherwise, I see they have trifled away many words without any small profit. They talk of ranks and arrays at large, others of building of fortresses: (that belonging to a good Sergeant properly, this to a good mason.) But how soldiers shallbe provided, and how they shall proceed, and how soldiers and fortresses are to be governed, they scarce mention; sure few of them know, or can declare. Besides these they omit many other necessary points of war, wherein the safety of an army, and a state consisteth. Wherefore omitting, or slenderly handling those sleight points; I have chosen other matters more important to dilate, beginning first with the causes of wars: then with the provision, that is made before wars be attempted. For although soldiers are the principal actors in these tragical matters: yet before we draw an army into the field, or make levy of soldiers, many things are to be considered, and provided. First we are to consider, that our cause be good, and just. For wars without cause are nothing, but robbery and violence contrary to humanity, and reason: secondly all things necessary for the wars are to be provided: them are soldiers to be levied, and exercised, and so brought into the field to prosecute all other necessary faits of arms.  
1 First therefore I will (God willing) declare, what causes make wars just, or unjust, and what are the effects of lawful wars, and therein also what solemnities, or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, or first attempts of war.  
2 Secondly, what provision is to be made of treasure, arms, munition, victuals, ships by sea, and carriages and tents by land.  
3 Thirdly, that we are to strengthen ourselves with the help of confederates, and associates, so much as we can, and to draw what friends, or strength we can from the enemy, both before we attempt wars, and after.  
4 Fourthly, what parts, and qualities are required in a General, and what counsel he is to adjoin to himself, and whether it is better to give sovereign authority in wars to one alone, or to more: likewise what authority and commission the General ought to have: further what is to be respected in the choice of Colonels, of Captains of companies, and other officers of the army: and what in the choice of common soldiers: what oath they are to take, and how much the soldiers of our own nation, are to be preferred before strangers: what inconveniences ensue of want of pay: what numbers of soldiers are required in wars, and finally, how soldiers are to be exercised, that they may be made ready for the wars.  
5 Fiftly, what things are to be considered of those that are to transport an army by sea, or by land into an other country: and whether it is better for the English nation to invade the Spaniard, or any other foreign enemy in his own country, then to receive his assault at home, or to stay until he come on our coast, or within our country: and lastly what cautions soldiers sent abroad in succour and aid of other nations are to use.  
6 Sixtly, what order and array an army is to observe in marching, and how the same may march safely in the enemy's country, surmounting all difficulties, whereby either in champion, or woody countries, or else in the passage of rivers, or hills, and straits it may be disordered, stopped, or hindered.  
7 And for that we are not only to offend, but also sometimes to defend, we are also to show what oppositions, and traverses the defendants are to make, thereby to stop the progression, and march of the enemy: and how to send our men safely forth on foraging, and how to stop, and cut off the enemy's foragers.  
8 For that oft times, time is vainly spent in deliberations, dalliances and delays, to the impoverishing of many states, and overthrow of many good actions; we will show by many proofs, that nothing is more advantageous than expedition, and celerity in preparing, marching, executing, fight, and all enterprises of war; nor any thing more hurtful or dangerous, than delays.  
9 What orders are to be observed, in the fortifying, defending and governing of our camp and lodging, that we be not either charged a l'improuista, or easily forced to fight.  
10 We will also show, that as the assailants in the enemy's country are to seek that the matter may be soon tried by battle: so the defendants without great advantage are to avoid it: and further by what means the enemy may be brought to fight, and how those that fear to fight, may avoid the encounter with least loss.  
11 Before the General doth bring forth his army into the field, many things are to be considered, all which shallbe declared in the eleventh Chapter.  
12 In the twelfth we are to discourse of the array, and charge of an army encountering the enemy in open field: and therein of the use of horsemen, of pikes, halberds, targets, small shot, archery, and great ordnance.  
13 In the thirteenth shall follow a brief treatise of stratagems, ambushes, and whatsoever devices serve for the more ready achieving of our purpose.  
14 After the victory once obtained, and the enemy vanquished, in the next Chapter we are to show, how the victory is to be used, and the conquest may best be maintained.  
15 And because the hazard of war is doubtful, in the fifteenth Chapter we purpose to declare, by what means an army that is foiled, or feareth to fight, may most safely, or with least danger, or loss retire, and how the enemy in following the course of his victory may be stopped.  
16 The sixteenth Chapter shall contain precepts, and orders for the government of a camp that besiegeth a city or fort, and what course is best in besieging, battering, assaulting, or entering the same.  
17 For the behoof of the defendants, the 17. shall declare what proceeding is best in the defence and government of a town or place assailed, besieged, battered, assaulted, or demyforced.  
18 And for that sea towns are not easily defended, nor besieged without a navy at sea; in the next place followeth a discourse concerning the use of ships of war, and how they are to be provided, ranged, and managed in sea-fightes.  
19 Next unto the execution of wars followeth the treaty of peace, truce, and confederacies, of which we are in the 19 Chapter to entreat, and also of the assurance of articles of peace, truce, and confederacy, and likewise of the privileges of ambassadors, and messengers by which such matters are treated and brought to pass.  
20 After wars ensue rewards of such, as have behaved themselves valiantly in the service of their country: and therefore in the 20. Chapter we are to entreat of the rewards of valiant soldiers, & punishment of cowards and disorderly persons.  
21 In the last Chapter, for that our soldiers are for the most part raw and ignorant, and would have things expressed and taught them plainly, I have gathered together certain military orders, some concerning religion & manners; others concerning & especially tending to the common safety of the state, army, or garrison, or else concerning the special duties of captains or common soldiers; others respecting the camp, or town of garrison; others specially belonging to sea causes, and adventures at sea; others to the Officers of the army, or fleet; others concerning booties, spoils, and prisoners; and some concerning the execution of laws and administration of justice. out of which I would have so many as are fitting for the service in hand to be chosen out, and put in writing, and proclaimed openly and delivered unto every captain or colonel, that every man may understand some part of his duty, and what punishment is due for his offences.  
These things I have for thy sake not without great labour brought together, and laid forth in this form which I have declared. Read them therefore with indifferency, and weigh them with judgement, and say not this can not be so, for I never saw it. the authority is drawn from those which have seen more than thyself; and standeth upon better reason, then without experience thou canst imagine. if thou allowest and likest my reasons, follow them, and use them: if not, yet proceed not against reason. my only desire was to profit my country, and to content and profit thee▪ other boon or reward I crave none, but that I do not receive at thy hands disgrace, for my diligence; nor reproof or scorn for my good will. which because common humanity forbiddeth me to fear, I will bid thee a dieu, and begin to address me to my purpose.   

¶ The right practice, proceed, and laws of Arms.  

CHAP. I. What causes make wars just or unjust, and what are the effects of lawful wars, and what solemnities or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, and first attempts of wars.  
IT is needless (as I suppose) to dispute, whether it be lawful, either for Christian Princes to make wars, or for christians to serve in wars. Those that think it unlawful, as men devoid of judgement in religion and state, are declared long since to be both heretical, and frenetical persons. The lawfulness there of is apparent, for that most godly and religious princes, as josuah, David, jehosaphat, judas Macabeus were great warriors, & their wars so allowed, that the spirit of God calleth them the wars, or battles of the Lord, neither was the same altered by Christ's coming, as the Anabaptists dream. The holy 
a Rom. 13.  Apostle showeth, that the Magistrate carrieth not the sword in vain. But he should carry it in vain, if he might not as lawfully repel public force, as he may punish therewith private wrongs. john Baptist when the soldiers came unto him, he exhorted them not to give over their manner of living, but to content themselves with their wages, & to do wrong to no mau, 
b Act. 9  Cornelius the Centurion notwithstanding his soldiers profession, hath a notable testimony of the holy Ghost, to be a man that feared God: and if he had not been such; he had not received the holy Ghost. The true servants of God (saith S. 
c Ad Bonifac.  Augustine) make wars, that the wicked may be restrained, and goodmen be relieved. Beside this, what state in this notable corruption, & malice of men's nature could endure any time, if wars against violent persons were unlawful? without wars who can warrant us against spoil and injury? it is the law of nature, and nations that putteth weapons in our hands for our defence; without wars civil laws against rebellious subjects cannot be executed; and so should remain without edge. S. 
a Ambr. de office  Ambrose saith, that it is the office and part of justice by war to defend our country from the enemy, our confederates, and such as by reason of their weakness need our aid, from spoilers, and oppressors. Wherefore taking this as granted, that some wars are lawful: let us proceed to examine, what those things are that give us just cause of wars, which is a matter much to be regarded, unless we will be accounted among those tyrants that rage and vex men without cause.  
If the cause of him that warreth be good, the issue cannot be evil, saith 
b Bern. de nou. mil.  Bernard. the 
c Frangit & attollit vires in milite causa. ovid.  cause, as it is good or evil, so either abateth and breaketh, or whetteth the soldiers courage. 
d causa jubet superos melior sperare secundos. Lucan.  and good and just causes make men hope ro receive favour of God in the issue, and trial. 
e eventus belli velut aequus judex, unde ius stabat, ei victoriam dabat. Livi. 21.  the event oftentimes is according to the justice, and quality of the cause; and 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eurip. Electr.  seldom do they return in safety, that go forth to draw their sword in evil quarrels. Dionysius of 
g Lib. 2. antiq.  Halicarnassus saith, that the Romans therefore prevailed for the most part, for that they enterprised no wars without just causes. contrariwise the 
h Ius in armis ferebant. Liu. 5.  Gauls which accounted that justly gotten, which they could win with their sword, though otherwise very valiant, received many great foils. for this cause (as saith Philip of 
i Phil. Com. li. 4.  Commines) Princes when they list to quarrel with their neighbours, pretend honest causes, although oft times untrue. The French that with some colour they might receive such as in Gascoigne, or Guienne rebelled against the kings of this realm, suborned certain Gascoignes, and Poicteuins to complain of unjust taxations made by the English in the days of Edward the third, and Richard the second. And Lewis the eleveuth of France instigated certain rebels to complain of 
k Philip of Commines.  Charles duke of Burgundy, that under colour of doing justice, he might with more reason invade his territories. These pretences & shows make great disputes betwixt princes, and states, while every man will seem to make his cause good, and to do nothing without just causes. Let us therefore now consider, what causes are sufficient to justify the taking of arms, what are counterfeit, and insufficient.  
First it is lawful to use ●orce, and take arms in defence of our country, true religion, our goods or liberty. 
a Hoc & ratiodoctis, & mos gentibus, & feris natura ipsa praescripsit, ut omnem semper vim a corpore, a capite, a vita iva propulsarent. Cic. pro Mil.  Reason teacheth the learned, and custom instructeth all nations thus much, which even the instinct of nature printeth in wild and savage beasts, that it is lawful to repel force offered to our life, to our person, and the state with force, and by what other means we can. Most just cause therefore had the Romans to make wars upon the Gauls, upon Annibal, upon the Danes, and other barbarous nations, that came to take away their country from them; & like cause had the Greeks to withstand the Persians, & other barbarous people, that by arms would have conquered them, and deprived them of their country and liberty. the same cause did the ancient Britons defend against the Romans, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, though not with like success. And seeing of late time the Spaniard came upon our coast with fire and sword, menacing the English nation with all the calamities that follow such invasions, I think no man will deny, but we have just cause to put on arms in defence of our country, religion, lives, liberties, and laws. in this case not only our cause is just, but the war is of necessity to be undertaken, which greatly helpeth the justice of our cause. for as the captain of 
b justum bellum quibus necessarium, & pia arma, quibus nulla, nisi in armis relinquitur salus. Liu. 9  Samnites said in like case, that war is just, whereto we are enforced, and with good cons●●nce may we take arms, when there is no safety for us, but in arms.  
It is likewise lawful to repress pirates, and public robbers by force of arms, if they will not yield themselves to be tried by order of common justice. They are enemies of peace, & civil government, and by the laws defied, and proclaimed as public enemies of states. their bodies may be taken, and their goods spoiled as in wars with other nations. The wars made by the Romans against Spartacus, who, assembling a mutinous rout of rebels and hindered all trade, was just and necessary. in this 
c ff. de just. & iure L. furens. & add L. Corn. de sicar. L. itaque.  case, because such do rise and assail us upon a sudden, the law of nature giveth warrant of defence without public commandment or commission. neither is it only lawful, to clear the sea of pirates, but also honourable. 
d Thucid.  Minos made his name famous, for that he cleared the sea of pirates, and opened the way for merchants. which fact also procured great commendation to Pompey the Great. Moreover, if our country be wasted and spoiled, and our goods taken away by foreigners: it is lawful by force and arms to seek for restitution, if otherwise it cannot be obtained. Tully 
a Quod rebus repetitis geritur. offic. 1.  accounteth that war just, that is made after demand of things wrongfully taken, & unjustly detained. these quarrels often fall out betwixt borderers, the 
b Romulus' Albanis bellum in tulit, quod eorum dictator nollet res raptas reddete. Dion. Hal. lib. antiq. 3.  Romans for this cause made divers roads upon the Sabins, Volscians, Albans and others their neighbours. Tullus Hostilius had no other causes of his wars against the same people. This hath been the beginning of many contentions betwixt us and the Scots. of the wars betwixt the 
c Liu. 1.  Romans and Sabins there was no other cause, but the spoil of the Roman merchants. among other causes of the third wars of the 
d Flor. Epir.  Romans against the Carthaginians, the taking of certain ships, and spoiling of certain Merchants is alleged as principal. The Swissers began their brawls with the Duke of 
e Phil. Commin.  Burgundy for a load of skins taken away by the County of Romont. likewise it is, where at a sudden road our goods are spoiled, or driven away, and detained from us. for which cause the Romans warred upon the 
f Tarquiniensibus rebus nequicquam repetitis, quod agrum Rom. populati essent, bellum indictum. Liu. 7.  Hetruscians & divers of their neighbours. Just cause therefore have we also in this respect to make wars upon the Spaniard, that without distance of war, stayed our ships, and our merchants, and spoiled their goods. were not men's minds ●●oled, and almost frozen with fear and age, these injuries would inflame them. howsoever it is, men ought not to stay until the flames of our country inflame them.  
In this case those that first offend do give just cause of wars, not those that seek restitution by arms; as is evident 
g Liu. 1.  by the example of the Romans, and Alban, where the first injury being offered by the Alban, made iust the cause of the Romans. Yet if things taken away be offered again, and satisfaction be promised to be made for wrongs done; it is not justice nor reason, further to prosecute the quarrel begun. it seemeth not reason (saith 
h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  Archidamus) to prosecute him by force, that submitteth himself to order of law. and commonly those that refuse reason when it is offered, come afterward to wish they had taken it, when they can not have it. The French disdaining and scorning the great offers made by the black Prince, were shamefully by him overthrown at the field of Poitiers. The 
i Non suae redditae res, non alienae accumulatae satis erant. Liu. 9  Romans refusing the satisfaction made by the Samnites, received a notable disgrace being by composition disarmed to save their lives at the straits of Caudium: and Philip of Commines conceiveth, that Charles duke of Burgundy prospered never the better, for that he refused the humble submission, and satisfaction of the Swissers, desiring peace at his hands.  
The injury that is done to the subjects redoundeth to the Prince, and reproaches and contumelies done to ambassadors, and messengers return upon those that send them. both these things minister lawful cause for Princes, & states to take arms in hand. The Romans with sharp wars prosecuted 
a Appian. Alexander.  Mithridates, for that by one general proclamation he had caused divers of their people to be massacred in Asia. the same cause armed them against the Latins and Volscians. The Volscians again invaded the Romans, for that reproachfully their people were commanded out of the City at the time of their 
b Livi. 3.  public games. The Heduans rebelled against Caesar upon 
c Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  conceit of some wrong offered to their people in the camp of the Romans. And among all causes of wars betwixt Princes, this is commonly inserted for one, that either their subjects are slain, or wronged: as appeareth both in the beginnings of the Roman wars against the kings of Macedonia, and also against the people of Carthage: and the same was the common pretence of the 
d Froissart.  French, to invade us when we held Gascoigne, Guienne, and Normandy.  
Yet more near doth it touch a Prince when his ambassadors are violated, forasmuch as that injury is thought to be offered to his own person. Therefore did David war upon the children of Ammon for the villainy they offered his ambassadors. The shameful reproach which the Corinthians offered the Roman ambassadors, was the cause of the war betwixt the Romans and them, and of the sack of Corinth. Friderick Barbarosse for a scorn offered him by them of Milan, besieged and took their City. the first quarrel between the 
e Liu.  Romans, and Veians grew upon a proud answer which the Veian Senate made. And dear it cost the Rhodians, that taking part with Perseus, they abused the Romans in their insolent terms. The slaughter of the Roman ambassadors, was the first cause that moved them to war upon Gentius-king of Illyrium, and aggravated the wrath of the Romans against the Veians: and caused Caesar to sack divers cities of the 
f Bel. Gal. 6.  Armoricans.  
The rebellion of subjects against their lawful Princes, is also a sufficient cause to arm the prince against them. he carrieth not the sword for other purpose, but to repress the wicked and rebellious. king David prosecuted not only the rebel Ziba, but also his own son Absalo● that rose against him. the Romans suppressed the seditious Gracchis, Saturninus and Catiline. and just cause had our Princes to subdue by arms the seditious rout, that under the leading of jacke Cade, jacke straw, Kette, and other rebels rose against their liege and sovereign Princes. for although rebels and pirates, and robbers are not accounted among the number of lawful enemies, which the Romans called hosts legitimos, nor did enjoy the 
a ff. De captiu. L. hosts.  right, nor were to be used as enemies in lawful wars; yet is the force used against them most lawful.  
Moreover it is a lawful, and just cause for a prince or nation to arm their people in defence of their associates, or such as fly unto them for secure being unjustly oppressed. Deliver those (saith the wise man) that are drawn to death. those that are wronged (saith 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. rhet. ad Alexander.  Aristotle) not only may, but aught for their honours sake, to arm in defence of themselves, their allies, and friends, and to help their associates being oppressed. Cicero in his books de rep.. alloweth those wars to be lawful that are made aut pro fide, aut pro salute. that is, either for our own defence, or for defence of our friends, whom we are bound by promise to help. and as well doth he 
c Offic. 1.  charge them with injustice, that repel not injury, when they are able; as those that do wrong themselves. And if we give credit to Saint 
d Fortitudo quae per bella tuetur à Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena justitia est. Ambros. de office  Ambrose, valiant men, that defend their country from barbarous people, and protect the weak, and shield their associates from such as would spoil them, do the office of true justice. for defence of their 
e Populus Rom. sociis defendendis terrarum omnium potitus est. Cic. de rep. 3.  confederates, the Romans received this reward, that they became the lords of the world. the Romans had no other cause to enterprise the war against the 
f Visum est Campanos deditos non prodi. Liu. 7.  Samnites, but for the defence of the Campanians, which were unjustly vexed, & had yielded themselves into their protection. The first Carthaginian wars had no other original, but for the defence of the Mamertines. for the same cause likewise did they send defiance to Philip 
g Romani infensi Philippo ob infidam erga socios pacem. Liu. 31. ob iniurias & arma illata sociis populi Rom. bellum indictum. Liu. 31.  king of Macedonia, for that he vexed, and injuried their confederates in Greece. josua protected the Gibeonites requiring his aid, from the conspiracy of the kings of the Canaanites. the forsaking of our associates & friends, 
h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  Sthenelaidas the Spartian calleth treason, and dissuadeth the Spartans from committing any such offence. the Romans were 
a Saguntinos crules us quam Poenus hostis prodidit, vos soci, prodidistis. L. 1.25.  accused of treason, for that they abandoned their confederates the Saguntines being besieged by Annibal. for which fault they endured the penance of sixteen years wars in Italy. neither was any thing more infamous in Charles of Burgundy his actions, than his cold defence of his associate the duke of Britain. Philip of Commines accuseth Lewes the 11. for abandoning his confederates of Liege. Caesar, 
b Verebarut (Caesar) ne Gall●●ota deliceret, (h Gergovia capta) nullum in annor praesid●m elle●. Caes. 7. bell. Gal.  lest all his associates in France should forsake him, was driven with great hazard to secure his friends besieged in Gergovia. the duke of Normandy, younger brother to Lewes the 11. overthrew his own estate departing from the association of Charles duke of Burgundy. wherefore we have not only just cause to warrant our proceed against the Spaniard in defence of our confederates of France, and the low Countries; but also necessary reasons to move us to prosecute matters more forcibly, unless we mean to engage our honour, and neglect our own estate. what wisdom or honour it was to refuse them, that yielded themselves before the surrender of Antwerp unto the duke of Parma, I report me to those that know those mysteries. sure now that we have begun to assist them of Holland and Zealand; it is neither honour, nor safety so to mince at the matter, or to go back. whatsoever we call our doings, it willbe as the king of Spain will take it, if ever be have power to be judge. the only means to mar and cross his sentence, is with great forces to withstand so mighty a Prince, and not longer to dally.  
Breach of covenants likewise is numbered among the just causes of wars. we put on arms (saith 
c Plat. in Alcibiad.  one) either being deceived by our enemies, that perform not promise, or being constrained. the Romans began their wars with Perseus' king of 
d Liu. 42.  Macedonia, upon occasion of breach of the articles of peace made before, betwixt his father, and them: and for the like cause also renewed their wars with them of Carthage. and for the same cause wars have been opened betwixt us, and the Scots, as at Muscleborough field upon the denial of the Scottish Queen promised to king Edward; and between the French, and us.  
Many wise princes have an eye to their neighbour's greatness, and perceiving how prejudicial their encroachments may prove unto them, have just cause to withstand them. Lewis the 11. sent aid to the Swissers, & Duke of Lorreine against Charles Duke of Burgundy having no other cause, than the suspicion and fear of his greatness. The true 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  cause of the Peloponesian war against them of Athens was the suspicion and fear, that their neighbours had of their power and greatness. And yet that cause was not once mentioned. The Princes and States of Italy of long time have had a secret league amongst them to moderate the excessive power of the king of Spain in that country, if at any time he should go about to encroach upon any one of them. Herein consisted the special 
b Guicciard. hist. lib. 1.  commendation of the great wisdom of Laurence Medici the elder, that during his time, he kept all the states of Italy, as it were in equal balance, not suffering any to pass their ancient limits. And I doubt not but our governors in the defence of the low Countries have a special regard, that the king of Spain settle not himself in the quiet possession of Holland, Zealand, and the rest: lest that enjoying so many commodious ports, ships, mariners, and commodities, he might percase afterward make that a step to stride over, or at least to look over into England. As 
c  quisque ab oppresso proximus sit, per omnes velut continens incendium pervadet. Liu. 37.  every nation is near to those that are subdued, so will the fire once inflamed embrace it, and so pass over to the rest, as Antiochus said to Prusias, persuading him in time to withstand the Romans. The Romans perceiving that the Samnites, after they had subdued the 
d Liu. 7.  Sidicins, intended to war upon their next neighbours the Campanians; they delayed the matter no longer, nor suffered them to proceed further. time it is therefore for Christian Princes to awake, and just cause they have to withstand the encroachments of the king of Spain, that under pretence of the Romish religion eniambeth upon all his neighbours, unless they will be swallowed up in the unsatiable gulf of the ambition's tyranny of the Spanish nation.  
Last of all, whosoever adhereth to our enemies, and aideth them with men, munitions, and victuals against us, they are also our enemies, and give us just cause of war against them. this cause moved the Romans to defy the 
e Latinis quod eorum juventus hostibus mixta populata esset Rom. agros, bellam indictum. Liu. lib. 6. & 7.  Latins, that aided their enemies; and the same is reckoned among the causes of their wars against Philip king 
f Liu. 31.  of Macedonia. for he did not only aid the Carthaginians with men, but also joined with Annibal in league against the Romans. No just cause therefore have our neighbours to complain, that we have stayed their ships, that carried victuals, munitions, and other commodities to the Spaniard. There is no fault but one, that as we have stayed some, so we have dismissed others, and have not made prize of all by Public authority, and that those of the low Countries do commonly trade into Spain, for whose sake the quarrel is undertaken with Spain. The Romans as in the treatise of peace they comprised their own confederates; so in denouncing of wars they defied their enemies, and their associates. as is evident in that form of defiance, which they published against 
a cum Antiocho rege, quique eiu, sectan secuti sunr, bellum initum. Livi. 36.  Antiochus. Which the greeks also observed in the Peloponnesian wars made not only against the principals, but also all their adherents. And it is the 
b Memoires de Fr.  common form of defiances used at this day.  
As for wars undertaken through 
c Libido dominandi causa belli. Sallust. coniur. Catil.  ambition, and anger, and such like affections, they are unjust, and the causes unlawful. neither are they to be excused, that forced by strong hand out of their own country, do seek by violence to possess that, which belongeth to others. For this cause the Romans resisted with such force the Gauls, Germans, Danes, Goths, and others that came to dwell in Italy. And although such wanderers have had good success in divers countries by reason of the sins of the inhabitants, as the Saxons, Picts, Danes, and Normans in this land, the Franks, Burguignions', and Normans in Gaul, the Lombard's, & Goths, in Italy, and Spain: yet was not the cause of their wars just. for every one is to hold him to his own lot, unless the country be waste, and dispeopled; which country God giveth to these that can possess it. and therefore did the Suevians injuriously forbid any to dwell in their waste borders: and the Spaniards have no reason by force and law to keep other nations out of the Indies, which notwithstanding themselves are not able to people.  
Yet to make just 
d What beside the cause is to be respected in lawful wars.  wars, it is not sufficient only, that the cause be just; but that they be enterprised first, by those that have sovereign authority; secondly, that they be not begun especially by those that invade others, without demand of restitution or satisfaction, or denunciation; and last of all, that they be not prosecuted with barbarous cruelty. The first point is expressly set down in terms in the Roman laws, & allowed by consent of all nations. The 
e C. quid culpatur. 23. qu. 1.  Canons do also confirm the same. And if it were in others power, great inconveniences would ensue. It is a special mark of sovereignty to have power of war & peace. In Livy these forms are very usual: Praenestinis ex S.C. populi jussu bellum indictum est. And again, ex auctoritate patrum populus Palaepolitanis bellum fieri jussit. The wars of the Romans against the 
a Liu. 21.31.41.  Carthaginians, Philip, Antiochus, Perseus, and others, were not enterprised but by authority of the people, which in that state had sovereign commandment in those times. Him that began any brawls, or made peace with foreign nations of his own private head, 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plato 12. delegib.  Plato in his common wealth adjudgeth worthy of death. And therefore did Hanno give counsel to the Carthaginians, that they should deliver up Annibal to the Romans, for that he had begun the wars against them without public authority. Those that offended in this case, by the 
c ff. Ad L. jul. mayest. & L. vnic. C. ut armorum usus.  laws of the Romans were in case of treason. Marcellus upon that ground building his reasons, would have persuaded the Senate to deliver 
d Caes. de bell. ciu. 1.  Caesar to the Gauls. And so scrupulous have some men been in this Realm in stirring without commission, that they doubted, whether without commandment they might levy forces to repress rebels. This percase might seem too scrupulous, but they thought it better to be too slow, then too forward. For they 
e Hosts sunt quibus publicè bellum indicitur, reliqui sunt latrunculi & praedones L. hosts. ff. de captiu.  are only to be accounted public enemies in war, who by those that have supreme authority, are declared enemies. If any upon private motion fall on spoiling, they are but thieves and robbers, saith Ulpian. And this (saith 
f count Faust. Manich.  Augustine) is the order of nature best agreeing with the peace of states, that the council and authority to make wars should rest in Princes. That wars are to be denounced on the assailants side, divers reasons persuade us. 
g Nullum bellum est justum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geritur, aut antè denunciarum est, & indictum. Cic. offic. 1.  There is a justice in wars to be observed, saith Tully, which justice requireth, that wars be either denounced, or made after denial of things demanded, that have been unjustly taken from us. He speaketh of wars made by those, that invade others. For to defend ourselves without more words, is lawful by the laws both of nature, and nations: and very ridiculous it were, to threaten those that have begun to strike us already. Those therefore that think we have no wars with the Spaniard, because they have not heard them proclaimed, are like to those that will not ward, or strike an enemy that cometh upon them without saying, beware. Caesar minding to assail Ariouistus, sent a 
h Caesar perlegatos bellum indixit Ariovisto. de bell. gall. L. 1.  defiance to him before hand. When Annibal came with an huge army into Italy, the Romans defended themselves, without spending time about denouncing, or threatening of wars. Otherwise those that first begin wars, do use first to speak before they strike, which was not only the course of antiquity, but also of later times. Only the king of Spain hath thought it lawful under colour of treaty of peace, without any defiance to cut our throats, if he could. It may be, he taketh the Pope's excommunication against that Prince & people of this land for a sufficient denunciation, or warrant to invade us without other circumstance. This he learned of Alphonsus a Castro, that determineth wars 
a Li. 2. de just haeret. puniend.  against heretics to be lawful, which he taketh to be defied by authority of the Canon. And in his determination 
b Aial, de iur, bell. lib. 1.  Balthasar Aiala, a great man among the Spaniards resteth: & no marvel, if they observe no solemnities in wars against us, whom they hold for heretics, having already determined, that faith 
c Concil. constant.  and promise is not to be performed unto heretics. I need not to describe the form & words used in defiances. He that will read the form in time passed used by the Romans, let him peruse 
d Lib. 16. c. 4.  Aulus Gellius. Later forms are reported in later histories, & much talked of by Heralds, that claim that to be part of their office. But little seemeth it material to know that forms of defiances, seeing in these times neither form, nor substance is strictly in this behalf observed. Only thus much Prince's messengers that go upon this errand of defiance are to take heed: first, that they pass not the words of their commission, secondly that they use no words of reproach, or scorn. It is reported that Francis the 1. king of France, would not hear the Herald sent him from Charles the 5. with defiance, before he had caused a gibbet to be erected to put him in mind what he should have, if he kept not himself within compass.  
In executing of wars, this precept must diligently be had in remembrance, that there be no cruelty used. There is moderation even in the execution of justice, not only in other actions of war. And Caesar in his victory against Pompey, commanded his soldiers to spare the Romans. to delight in blood, is sign of a savage nature. 
e Con. Faust.  The desire of doing hurt, and cruelty in execution: a mind also implacable and savage is justly blamed in wars saith S. Augustine. those that yield themselves, are not to be slain. Galba for that he slew the Lusitanians, after that he had taken them upon composition, was justly therefore accused by Cato. It is no victory to kill an enemy disarmed, nor justice to kill our prisoners in cold blood. The execution done in the General's chamber upon the prisoners after the battle of Cognac, an. 1569. did greatly blemish his honour. Who doth not detest the 
f Histoire de troubls. de Fr.  executions that have been done upon men disarmed after composition at Mailè, Mucidan, & divers other places during these late troubles of France? yet may not prisoners upon this liberty presume to abuse, or attempt any matter against those that have taken them. for than they deserve no favour. Caesar's soldiers at 
a Hirt de bell. Hisp.  Munda in Spain understanding, that if the Townsmen sallied out upon them, their prisoners would charge them upon their backs, were forced to massacre them. likewise were the English forced to kill their prisoners after the battle of Poitiers, fearing lest they should use some trechecie, when the enemy made show to assail them. 
b Que ningun soldado mate muger ninno vieio ni person inhabil aunque sea en la furia del vincer so pena de la vida, ni ponga la mano in tales personas. Sancho de Londono.  Women, children, and old folks, by the orders of war observed now in the Spanish camp are exempted from the soldiers fury, in the sack of Towns. The present French king deserveth great praise, for suffering the poor, and impotent people of Paris to pass through his army, although it were much to his prejudice, practice of arms required percase other rigour, as appeareth by the cruelty executed by Caesar's soldiers at Auaricum, and the Sea towns of France on such kind of people, thereby to make the besieged either sooner to yield, or to spend their victuals: but this best beseemed a Christian king. The Turks save such for slaves. Christians therefore ought to do that for conscience, which Turks do for gain.  
Of this discourse, this is the sum, that those 
c What wars are lawful.  wars are just and lawful, which are made by the sovereign Magistrate, for lawful and just causes, being both orderly denounced in cas● requisite, & moderately prosecuted, to the end that justice may be done, and an assured peace obtained. In which case it is lawful for any man with good conscience to serve in wars: but if the wars be notoriously unjust, let every man take heed how he imbrue his hands in innocent blood. The Christian soldiers that served julian the Apostate, would not draw their sword against Christians, although they willingly served him against all others. Yet do I not make private men judges of Princes facts. but what need any judgement where the fact is evident? and who shall answer for men that execute Princes wicked commandments, before Christ's tribunal seat? if the injustice of wars be not notorious, the subject is bound to pay and serve, and the guilt shall be laid to his charge that commandeth him to serve. A good man may serve (saith 
d August. lib. 22. con. Faust. Man. c. 7.  Saint Augustine) under a sacrilegious Prince, where the injustice of the commandment shall bind the Prince, as the duty of obedience doth make the soldier innocent.  
Just wars hath these effects. whatsoever § 
a Item ea, instia●de rerum division.  we take or win from the enemy, that is justly ours, and the same by the laws of nations is accounted lawful purchase. 
b Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut veteri occupatione, aut victoria. Cic. off. 3  nothing is proper by nature, but either by ancient possession, and seisin, or victory, saith Tully. Whatsoever City therefore, or territory is by us taken in just wars, the same is ours: likewise whatsoever movable goods cometh to our hands. Yet is there great difference in this case betwixt lands and goods. the lands come to the Prince, or State that beareth the charge, to dispose at their pleasures, either among 
c Dion. Halic. of't. lib. 2.  those soldiers by whose blood they were won, or else after they be rewarded, among others for the benefit of the State. Alexander 
d Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Sever.  Severus the Emperor divided the Country bordering on the enemy on the soldiers that best deserved, and their children also, so long as they should continue in service there. The spoils of the enemy are sometime given to the soldiers, certain things only excepted. 
e Livi. lib. 7. & 9  Valerius corvinus making a road into Samnium, gave all the pray to his soldiers; likewise did C. junius at the taking of Bovian. The whole Senate of Rome gave the sack of Veij to the soldiers. The Spanish soldiers use seldom to march to an assault, but they will covenant to have the spoil. But if it might be obtained, the best course is, that all the spoil brought to one place, the General should divide it all, or most part among his soldiers, having regard to the most valiant, and hurt men which cannot be partakers of the spoil, which they procured with their blood, and this was the most common practice of the Romans. And if there should be any other course taken, these inconveniences would fall out: the General should have no means to reward those that best deserve. for how can he, the spoil being not in his power to dispose: the hurt should be deprived of their part; for that they are not able to run about to spoil: nay the most valiant should have least part. for commonly 
f Ita signor est quisque praedator, ut laboris periculique praecipuam partem petere sole●. Livi. 5.  the most valiant soldier is the last that putteth up his sword to go to spoil. and contrariwise the most cowardly and disorderly companion, may percase light upon the greatest and richest spoils: for winning whereof he scarce drew out his sword. furthermore by greediness of spoil, many brave occasions are let slip out of our hands, and many disorders fall out. Alexamenes having slain 
g Livy.  Nabis, and being entered Sparta, while he minded nothing but spoil, suffered the enemies to gather head, and wax so strong, that they cut him and his company in pieces. Last of all, divers contentions and brawls fall out about the division of spoils, especially where there are divers nations in one army. All this cannot be remedied, unless there be some better order then usual in preserving the spoil.  
In time past the Romans disposed of their prisoners, as of the rest of the spoil, and he that was taken in lawful wars, was slave to him that took him. But now that captivity is abolished among Christians, ransoms succeed in am of slaves, so that a prisoner taken in wars, is not made a slave, but is ransommed according to that reasonable agreement which is made betwixt the prisoner, and his taker. The laws of Spain and France do yet more particularly divide the spoil taken in wars. Not only the country, but also ships of war taken from the enemy, belong to the Prince by the 
a Aial. lib. 1. Leg. Reg. 19 Tit. 26. Par. 2.  customs of Spain. By the same 
b Reg. 29. & 30.  customs the King hath the fifth, the captain the seventh part, the soldiers the rest. Sancho de Lond. compriseth their orders in certain rhymes:  Al'ausança de Francia & Castilia (saith he) el Reyno, la provincia, & sennorio, el rey captivo, la ciudad, o villa es del rey, que ha exoedido empoderio. Deal General que gana, es el que pierde, el puede rescatarle à su aluedrio. etc. 
The sum of his long rhymes is this: that by the customs of France and Castille, the Prince ought to have the Kingdom, Province, signory, or City, and the King likewise that is taken in wars. Other prisoners belong to them that take them, except the General, and men of mark and quality. which being taken by others, are notwithstanding to be used to the benefit of the Prince. provided always, that he that taketh them, be honourably rewarded. All the ensigns, great artillery, munitions of war, and treasure, are likewise the General's due. small pieces without wheels, and pieces of small bollet belong to the master of the Ordinance. all broken pieces fall to the Gunners share. the rest of the spoil is given to every one that taketh it. This is the use when a battle is joined, or a City is won. but in a road they that lose their horses in service, are first to be mounted either on horses taken, or on the common charge. the rest is to be divided among the soldiers; yet so, that consideration be always had of those that deserve best.  
If our goods be taken away by the enemy, and presently recovered again, than they return to the owner's property. The 
a Volseis ad de●●tionem compulsis castrisque captis praedae pars sua cognoscentibus Latinis, & Hernicis reddita sunt. Liu. 4.  Volscians being forced to yield, so soon as their camp was taken, so much of the spoils as belonged to the Latins, or Hernicans, was restored to them again by the Romans.  

b Sutrinis sociis urbs corum coden die Camillo duce recepta, integra reddita est. Liu. 6.  Camillus having recovered Sutrium out of the hands of the Hetruscians the same day that it was taken, restored the same again to the Citizens. The 
c Praeda militi concessa, pecus exceptum quod intra dies 30. domini cognovissent. Liu. 24.  goods belonging to their confederates, the Romans did commonly except out of the spoil. The Romans after divers years recovering the Territory of 
d Liu. 24.  Saguntum, restored the same to the ancient possessors thereof. And 
e Liu. 30.  Scipio restored divers things to the Sicilians, which he found in the sack of Carthage, and had been taken from them. This right by which things lost return to their owners, the Romans called ius postliminij. which belonged to 
f Postliminio redeunt haec, homo, navis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa. Cic. Topic. & ff. de capt. leg. 2.  prisoners in war, ships, mules, carriage horses, or mares. Slaves 
g ff. codem l. ab hostibus.  returning or recovered, are to be restored to their old masters. All 
h ff. eodem l. Postliminium.  captives returning from the enemy, recover their ancient liberty and right. 
i ff. Eodem. L. si captiws, §. expulsis.  Paulus the lawyer saith, that when a Territory is recovered from the enemy, the lands return to their proper owners: and so the Romans practised in the restoring of Verrugo, Sutrium, and divers other Towns to the Latins, Sabines, Campanians and others, having recovered them out of the enemy's hands. Yet lands lost by cowardice, or treachery of the owners, and recovered again without their help and charge, are without this case, unless the Prince restore them of favour. Those that run to the 
k Transsugae.  enemy, and traitors, were seldom received to mercy among the Romans. Arms and horses of service lost in wars by cowardice, return not to the owner.  
These rules although by covenants and some circumstances they receive alteration; yet for the most part they are observed: which men of judgement can easily discern. And therefore leaving of further to discourse of the causes, let us now descend to discourse what things are to be provided, before wars be opened, that in our necessity, we be not to seek for things needful.   

CHAP. II. That before we begin the wars, provision is first to be made of treasure, arms, munition, ships, carriages, victuals, and all necessary furniture, and instruments of war.  
THe sequel and effects of wars being so dangerous and pernicious, and the causes so many, and so easily offered: it behoveth all Princes and States to make sufficient provision for wars, and always to be ready; but especially then, when the enemy is at hand, and threateneth to invade us; which is now the case of England. He 
a ostendite bellum pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim ius ipsi remittent. Livi. 6.  that desireth peace, must be armed for the wars, and prepared, and those obtain their right soonest, that are provided to win it with force, as said a certain captain of the Latins. The 
b Diu apparandum est bellum, utvincas celeriùs. Publius.  provision of things necessary is to be made long before, if thou meanest to obtain the victory quickly. Vegetius 
c Antequam inchoetur bellum, de copiis expensisque solicitus fiat tractatus. Veget. lib. 3. c. 3.  exhorteth those that purpose to begin wars, carefully to weigh and consider their store and charges. When we are in action, and stand in need of such things, it will be then too late to wish, to stir, to send. Wars succeed not where such lose counsels go before.  
The things that are especially to be provided before the levy of men are these: first money, than arms, horses, carriages, ships, all munitions, and furniture of war, thirdly victuals and clothes, lastly the help of confederates and friends. With money brave captaives and soldiers are alured to serve, and maintained and paid in service: all necessary furniture of war is bought, victuals and clothes provided, intelligences with the enemy dressed, and maintained, & many commodities procured; which otherwise cannot be had. so that 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Demost.  wise men doubt not to call treasure the sinews of war, without which they neither proceed, nor move, unless it be backward. Tit. 
e Livi. 35.  Quintius merrily noted philopoemen's want of money, when he compared his army to a body, that had strong arms & legs, but no belly; much like unto Philopoemen himself, that was so made. for as the arms, legs, & outward parts receive nourishment from the belly, & pine away if the belly be evil affected & discrasied: so an 
f Immensa pecunia inter civiles discordias ferro validior. Tacit. 18  army that is not maintained with money, is easily broken, & dissolved of itself. Contrariwise (as Archidamus the Spartan king said) 〈◊〉 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  store doth as much oft times sustain the wars, as force. Pericles persuading the Athenians not to yield to the Lacedæmonians, whose army could not long keep the field, or continue together for want of money, showeth them, that the 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 2.  victory is furthered in wars, more by counsel and store of money, then violent invasion. Archidamus further saith, that 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  wars are as well administered by cost & expense, as by arms, and that arms by expenses are made more available. The Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war increasing the pay of their mariners a small trifle a day, drew from the Athenians their best men. What the Spanish ducats, & French crowns have wrought of late times, both Dutch, French, Italian, & English give testimony. Philip of Macedonia consulting with the Oracle by what means he might soon onercome a certain town in most men's opinions impregnable, received this answer; If he fought with 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  silver lances. Tacius the 
e Liu. 1.  Captain of the Sabins for gold bought the Capitol of Rome. 
f Liu. 25.  Asdrubal with money corrupted the Celtiberians, & made them shamefully abandon the Roman army, which first had hired them, and afterward was ruinated by them. With a little money the 
g Phil. Commi.  English army was persuaded by Lewis the eleventh to return back into England to our great disgrace. Money, saith 
h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Olynth. 1.  Demosthenes, must be provided, and without it nothing can be achieved in wars in order. The Spartans that used no money a long time, were at length taught, that war could not be managed without money. the manifold effects whereof our own experience teacheth us both at home, and abroad. for want whereof many disorders have fallen among our forces, which have endured much through the enemy's abundance.  
Yet do I not yield so much to treasure, as if treasure could do all things. We read that the naked 
i justin.  Scythian overcame Cyrus and Darius, notwithstanding all their riches, and the poor Greeks in the 
k Xenoph. exp. Cyr.  expedition of Cyrus prevailed against the rich Persians. The army of 
l Arr. Alexand.  Alexander well fenced with iron overcame the huge Persian army, that was so rich in gold and silver. and likewise the 
m Liu. 9 & 43.  Romans armed with iron & steel vanquished the armies of the Samnites, and of Antiochus, that glisteren in gold and silver. Neither could the Carthaginian or Macedonian kings that far surpassed the Romans in wealth, match them with force. The rich man is commonly a spoil to the well armed soldier, and Caesar's poor famished troops did drive the gallants of Pompey out of the field. The poor army of the English at the field of Poitiers, overcame the brave cavaliers of France, and a few poor naked 
a Philip. Com.  Swissers overthrew Charles Duke of Burgundy notwithstanding his riches and greatness. They confessed that all their wealth would not buy the spurs of Charles his horsemen. The Spaniard is rich in gold, yet doth not the English soldiers fear him in the field. It is iron, not gold, that killeth in the encounter. Gold can do much, but not all. and therefore were it to be wished, that we had more contended with the Spaniard with the sword, wherewith we are able to match him, then with gold, wherein though we spend all, we cannot come near him.  
Wherefore let money be provided before hand, if not in such abundance as others have it; yet so much as may provide arms, victuals, munition, horses, for a competent army. If any man ask how much, I answer with 
b Plutarch. Apopth.  Cleobulus, that wars in this case have no stint, nor set bounds: this only may suffice to show you, that if good orders were set down and executed, it would neither be infinite, nor the charge so burdensome, as now it is.  
The means whereby money may be raised are divers; either it riseth upon lands belonging to the crown, and that either by inheritance, or confiscation, or conquest; or upon rents, or penalties, or imposts, or other duties belonging to the Prince; or of subsidies, taxes, contributions and loans of subjects, or upon our confederates, and associates, or else upon ransoms of our enemy's persons, or countries. By which means seeing sum large revenues come unto the Princes of this realm, who seethe not that this realm wanteth nothing but good order in dispensing of the treasure, and sharp punishment against those that purloin it: Nay if vain expenses in apparel, jewels, silks, golden coats, and other vanities were cut off, or employed in arms, and necessary furniture of war: there would be not only sufficiency, but also abundance.  
The Romans for maintenance of their public stock had divers inventions and practices. Upon 
c Agripro pecunia dati, & in iugera ●sses vectigal●s impo●●ti. Li. 31.  every acre of ground of a country subdued, they imposed an annual rent. The same might have been done in Ireland, if it had pleased the governors, to convert it to public uses, rather than to serve private men's desires, which notwithstanding by reason of their great disorders reap small commodity.  
They looked strictly to their impostes. Annibal 
a Annibal vectigalia negligentia dilapsa restituit. Liu. 33.  after peace made with the Romans, to encounter with the covetousness of officers, restored the impostes at Carthage to their old order. Philip the King of Macedonia purposing to make wars upon the Romans, did not only increase his 
b Vec●igalia auxit & nova instituit. Liu. 39  customs, but devised new, for the maintenance of the wars. which is to be done only in case of necessity, lest these new devices of Italian impostes, make the Prince's odious to their subjects.  
Where the ordinary revenues were not sufficient, there wise governors have had recourse to equal contributions, taxes, and loans. Asdrubal 
c Pecunias imperat populis omnibus suae d●tionis. Liu. 23.  purposing to go into Italy with a supply to Hannibal's army, laid a tax upon all the people of his government. The Duke of Alva in his time, and of late years the Prince of Parma knew well how to put this in practice in the low Countries. When the city of Rome wanted money in the second war with them of Carthage, 
d Privatis in inopia aerarii pecunias conferentibus, ita ut Scribae non sufficerent, nec remige in supplementum, nec stipendio ●esp. egui●. Liu. 26.  private men voluntarily lent money so fast, that the deputies appointed to receive it, could not dispatch them▪ so that by this means the Romans neither wanted mariners, nor pay for soldiers. For continuance of the public treasury they had their lands and goods rated equally, and every man paid according▪ which equal proportion, if it were now observed; I dare say it would green no good subject to pay, albeit it were twice so much, as now they do. Every man brought in the quantity of his land, and the value of it upon his credit; likewise the sum of his rents and money. they that only lived upon traffic brought in the sum of their money, and clear gains yearly, with this promise, that what was left out was confiscate and forfeit, and every false sum given in, was punished with double. They that were not rated or at the least numbered, were banished, or sold for slaves. Such as had nothing, were only numbered in the roll. The most of this is expressly set down in their books of law. Forma censuali (saith 
e ff. de censibus.  Ulpian) cavetur, ut agri sic in censum referantur. nomen fundi cuiusque, & in qua civitate, & in quo pagosit, & quos duos vicinos proximos habeat, & aruum quod in decem annos proximos satum erit, quot esse iugera videatur. Vinea quot vites habeat, olivetum quot iugerum, & quot arbores habeat: pratum quoque quod intra decem annos proximos sectum erit, quot iugerum pascua esse videantur, item sylua caedua. omnia ipse qui defert aestimet. illam enim aequitatem debet admittere censitor, ut officio eius congruat relevare cum, qui & in publicis tabulis delato modo ex certis causis uti non possit. Likewise Livy where he mentioneth the taxing of the colonies by Nero and Salinator, hath these words: 
a Colonies were such towns as the citizens of Rome replenished with their own people, and depended on the mother city.  duodecim coloniarum, quod nunquam antea factum erat, deferentibus coloniarum censoribus, censum receperunt, ut quantum numero mil●●um, quantum pecuniâ valerent, in publicis tabulis monumenta extarent. If the like rate and proportion were observed among us, that every man might be rated according to his lands, farms, rents and goods equally: the burden would be more easily borne, & less complaint made, & more money would come to the payment of her majesties soldiers.  
So many countries as were under the protection of the Romans, or confederate with them, did contribute to the common charge. wherein such equal taxation, and good order was used, that the country where the army was maintained, did defray the most of the charge. & good reason, seeing it was for their defence. it would seem strange to those that know not their proceed, how Caesar did not only maintain his army 9 years in France at the charge of the country, but also enriched himself, and his army. The Athenians likewise after that the Greeks had driven out the 
b Thucid. 1.  Persians out of their country, for maintenance of their wars against them made an association, appointing what every Island or city, or territory should pay toward the charge.  
Sometimes the enemies being subdued or straited, were not only driven to pay the charge of the army, but also great sums of money into the treasury. the 
c S●ipendium exercitui Rom. ab hoste in cum annum pensum, & binae tunicae in militem exactae. Liu. 9  Hetruscians subdued by Decius did not only pay the soldiers stipend for one year; but were constrained to furnish every soldier with two suits of apparel. The same Livy testisteth to have been performed of the Samnites, and Aequians. The Volscians had truce given them with these conditions, that they should pay the 
d Liu. 9  Roman army for a year, & restore that which they had taken away. Cornificius in Illyrio (now a part of Sclavony) although the country was not able to maintain an army, yet kept the same in order by his prudence saith Hirtius. Beside all this the Romans after the wars ended brought infinite sums into the treasury.  

e Liu. 30.  Scipio after the victory obtained against Annibal, brought into it 123. thousand proved weight of silver. Quintius brought 18270. pound in silver bullion, 84000. pound in coined silver, 3714. pounds of gold, beside a shield all of gold. Aemilius Paulus after his victory against Perseus brought in much more. I forbear to rehearse lesser sums brought into the treasury by 
a Liu. 34. & 35.  Furius, Heluius, Minutius, Cato, and others. And the rather, for that it was an usual matter, after the wars in any country ended, to bring great sums of money into the public treasury. If then, beside the maintenance of the army, such store of money could be levied of the spoils; it is no such infinite matter, as is supposed to maintine an army, in case the same be orderly governed, and well employed.  
The reason that our small companies in France, and Flanders have cost so much is, for that the same not being able to encounter the enemy in open field, are shut up in some town, and live all upon charge, without doing good to themselves, or hurt to the enemy. If there be 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 1.  a mighty army in the field, what town or country is not willing to redeem the favour of it? or what is stirring, that such power will want? if the army be a sufficient body of itself, and well furnished, there is no doubt, but if wise men have the managing thereof, wars as 
c Redemptoribus vetitis frumentum parare, bellum (inquit Cato) scipsum alet. Liu. 34.  Cato said will maintain themselves, and if not all, yet sure defray the greatest part of the charge.  
The Romans in their extremities, to furnish their soldiers in wars, diminished and cut off a great part of their private charge. By the law 
d Ne qua mulie● plus semunica auri haberet, new vestimento versi colori uteretur. Liu. 34.  Oppia made in the second war with Carthage for this purpose, women were prohibited to wear divers coloured garments, or to possess more than half an ounce of gold. The 
e Liu 39  Censors caused the ornaments of women, their coaches, apparel & jewels to be valued in their tax books▪ afterward when disorders grew greater, the praetor 
f Ne vasa aurea ministrandis cibis, ne vestis serica v●ros foe daret. Tacir▪ annal. 2.  Fronto published a decree, that no man should use golden vessel about his meat, nor that men should be defiled (I use his word) with silken apparel. But now if gentlemen be not all berayed with silks, they think themselves defiled, & disgraced. If any such law were now enacted, who seethe not what abundance of money might be spared? if the accounts be justly taken, it will be found that the velvets, and silks, and foreign stuff that cometh yearly into England would richly maintain an army, and to spare, so that boldly I may say there wanteth rather order, than treasure for the maintenance of our soldiers, though the number were quadruple to that, which now is.  
To restrain the greediness of officers, both Romans and other nations have put divers laws in execution. Such 
a ff. Ad l. jul. repetund. lex Iu. lia.  fraudulent dealing the Romans punished with banishment. which in ancient time was the greatest penalty that they inflicted upon their citizens, certain heinous cases except. 
b ff. Ad l. jul. pecula●. leg. peculatus.  Afterward such faults were punished extraordinarily. and not only the principals were punished, but also their servants, and ministers. 
c Xenoph. exp. Cyr. lib. 5.  Philesius and Xanticles in the voyage of the Greeks with Cyrus were severely dealt withal for dealing fraudulently, and stealing the common money. Gylippus for the same cause was 
d Plutarch.  banished Sparta, notwithstanding his great service done to the commonwealth in the wars against the Athenians in Sicily. Only of late times, and in some places the most compendious & assured way to grow rich is for men boldly to steal, & falsely to account for such money as passeth through their fingers. Therefore had they 
e Aerarium opul●●tum ●enues res privatas. Plutar. in vit▪ Demosth.  a rich treasury in the greatest poverty of private men: whereas in our times while certain grow great and wealthy, the public estate seemeth to grow every day more than other poor and beggarly. When the tribute due to the Romans could not be found in the public treasury of Carthage, 
f Peculatum quorundam accusans Annibal, pecuniam ad stipendium Romanis invenit. Liu▪ 33.  Annibal by calling the fraudulent dealing of the officers in question, found more than sufficient to satisfy them. And if some odd fellows were in our time seized by the gorge, might they not think you be made to regorge that which they have fraudulently, and closely swallowed?  
It cannot be denied, but that these are compendious ways to find money for payment of soldiers. but I fear me, we shall ue●er find out, or at least never use these ways. and no marvel: seeing men do so much delight to walk in by-ways. If Cato in his time 
g avaritia & luxuria civitatem laborare conquestus est. Liu. 34.  complained that the commonwealth suffered much by the covetousness of some, & riotousness of others: much may princes of our time more justly complain when by covetise & extortion men only purchase, and by vanity brave it out in riot▪ 
h Impetrare ab animo non potuit Perseus, ut impensam in rem maximi monumenti saceret. Liu. 42.  Perseus (as Livy reporteth) for nigardise could not find in his heart to bestow any money upon his soldiers, though nothing imported him more. I pray God some in the end complain not, that all their riches and wealth is reserved for them that seek their ruin and overthrow.  
Money therefore howsoever it be, must be provided in time. for without it, as fire without matter, wars wax cold & cannot long be maintained▪ the same is to be delivered to the General before hand, & to be placed where it may best serve for the armies use. The Cartha ginians had treasure ready at new 
a hic pecunia hostium sine qua illi gerere beilum non possunt, quip qui mercenarios exercitus alant. Liu.  Carthage in Spain to serve them in their wars in Spain. Caesar had his store at 
b Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Noviodunum in the territory of the Heduans, to serve him in his wars in France.  
If so much cannot be provided, as is requisite, then must men that possess lands either serve upon their own charge, as the Romans did at the first, and the Spartans did always: or else those that stay at home must maintain those that serve abroad, and a rate be laid upon every shire and city, how many soldiers they shall maintain paid. (The 
c Sueui 100 millia armatorum bellandi causa suis ex finibus educunt, reliqui qui domi remanserunt, se atque illos alunt. Caes. bell. gal. 4.  Suevians by this means maintained a hundred thousand men which every year went out of the country to seek adventures.) Or else like slaves and peasants unworthy the name of English, must they serve strangers. I will not say more, for that it would be too great a shame, if this whole country could not maintain an army as well as Athens, Sparta, Argos, Thebes, Megara, Locri, Tarentum, Syracuse, and other cities, and small states in Greece, Italy, Sicily, & other places. Therefore leaving these supposals, let good orders be set down, & strictly observed; & if we be not so wise as to find the way ourselves, let us yet learn of our enemies among which men of value be advanced to honour, and fraudulent dealers be drawn up to the gibbet.  
The next care is to be had of 
d Of arms and furniture of war.  arms, & all manner of furniture for the war: of all sorts of weapons; as pikes, halberds, black bills, muskets, calivers, pedrinals, pistols, lances, bows & arrows, swords, and daggers: of all arms defensive, as corsalets of proof, & others, morions, targets of proof, and lighter, jackets of male, and plated doublets, and other necessary pieces: of great artillery both for battery, and for the field, of horses and their furniture; of ships, masts, tackle, artillery, and all provision necessary for the sea: of carriages both for ordnance, munition, and victuals, as also for other necessary uses: of tents for encamping: of powder and bullets and all things necessary both for great and small shot: of bridges, and boats: of spades, mattocks, axes, wimbles, baskets, & finally all other engines or provision for wars. all which is to be provided & laid up in places near to the enemy, & where we mean to go forth against him. Wherein we shall not much err, if we follow the precedents of such as have showed themselves most observant of the laws of Arms. The 
e Lily beum tentbatur ad apparatum belli. Liu. 21.  Romans intending to pass into Africa against them of Carthage, made their provision at Lilybeum, a port of Sicily, looking toward Africa. Before that 
a Cirea armamentatia & horrea, aliumque belli apparatum visendun praetor, legatique ducti. Liu. 29.  Scipio transported his army into Africa, he made exceeding great provision of arms, and all warlike furniture in Sicily, which the messengers that were sent to view his proceeding could not behold without admiration. landing in Africa he had there like wise his workhouses, & storehouses of provision. The town of New Carthage in Spain served the Carthaginians for a storehouse of all manner of provision of arms, & warlike furniture for their wars in Spain. Livy 
b Apparatus ingens belli opisices 2000 Liu. 26.  saith there was infinite provision, and 2000 workmen that wrought continually. The same town being taken from the Carthaginians, served Scipio for the same use, who 
c Vibs strepebat apparatu belli. ib.  employed them in making of arms, and engines of war most diligently. The Gauls revolting from Caesar used wonderful diligence in making of arms, & providing of horses, & furniture of war, in every 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 7. armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi, quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit.  city appointing what number of arms & weapons should be made. The kings of Macedonia had divers armouries both within & without their realm; so that although 
e Chalcis horteum & armamentarium Phi. lippi. Liu.  Chalcis Philip's storehouse for arms were burnt, yet did he not want. Philip & his son Perseus had infinite store hereof, so that they contemned the Romans in respect of themselves. Antiochus dressed his armoiries & workhouses in Lysimachia, in his expedition against the Romans. The Romans not only had public storehouses of arms, but 
f Arma habent Romani quae sibi quisque paraverit pauper miles. Liu. 42.  also private men had arms of their own. In this land, although I doubt not, but there is far more provision of arms, & munition then hath been in time past; yet might there be an amends made if monopolies of powder, & arms were taken away: and if that which is in one place too much, were placed in divers convenient storehouses, in every place sufficeint; and finally, if there were so much arms in private men's hands, as the mosters pretend.  
I need not speak much of the provision of shipping. it were sufficient, if that we have, were well ordered and employed. Of the use of ships I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. This may now suffice, that if the shipping of this land, and of our confederates were joined together, and well furnished and used, it would not be long ere peace should be offered by those, which now brave us with threats of war, because they see us desirous of peace.  
Carriages also & carriage horses would be provided, not only for the drawing of ordnance & arms, but also of victuals, munitions, spades, axes, mattocks, & all other neccessaries of an army. The further the army goeth from home, the more care the general ought to have of carriages to take things necessary with him. 
a Caesar bell. gal. 1.  The Helvetians before they began to march into France, provided store of carts, and horses, and draft oxen for the purpose. The Romans in their 
b Liu. 42.  expedition against Antiochus had carriages sufficient of the Macedonians. Without a 
c Comitabatur Corbulonē praeter assueta belli, magna vis camelorum onusta frumento, Tacit. annal. 15.  number of Camels that followed the army laden with all provision, and other carriages; Corbulo could not have prevailed against the Parthians. Beside other ordinary carts 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. Xenophon exp. Cyr. c.  Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, had 400. wagons laden with victuals, which were not to be distributed, but in time of necessity. What losses and travail our men have endured in Flanders, Portugal, France, for want hereof, without my report, it is sufficiently known to soldiers.  
There ought no less care to be had of tents, that soldiers may lie dry, and more warm then commonly they do. For villages are not every where to be found: nor is it fit that soldiers should be dispersed in villages, when the enemy is at hand: and cabins are not so soon built, nor is stuff in all places to be found to build them with.  
The Romans to every hundred, had both carriages, and tents assigned. For want whereof our soldiers are seldom well lodged, especially in marching; and yet are they long about it. And where they lie, by reason of their cutting down of woods, they leave marks of their being there many years after.  
Without spades, mattocks, axes, baskets, and such like instruments the soldier can neither enclose his enemy, nor fortify himself: and therefore as very necessary things, are such instruments to be provided, as also whatsoever is necessary for passing of rivers, assalting of towns, and other faites of arms.  
I need not make mention of horses of service, seeing every man knoweth what difficulties an army destitute of horsemen sustaineth. That which shallbe sufficient shallbe spoken, when we come to speak of horsemen. Only now I will admonish Gentlemen to have more care of keeping races of horses, because in case of present necessity they that have them not of their own, shall hardly obtain them of others.  
The last thing that I am here to speak of, is first to be thought of, I mean provision of victuals, without which men can neither live in wars, nor in peace. It is a faint fight that hunger-starved soldiers do make. In 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 1.  wars without things necessary, there is neither use of soldier, nor captain. He that 
b Qui frumentum neçessariumque cômeatum non parat, vincitur sine ferro. Veget. lib. 3. c. 26.  provideth not victuals beforehand is overcome without drawing of a sword. Against other mischiefs, there are remedies; but there is no wrestling against hunger. Want driveth men to their wits end. When the Lacedaemonian soldiers were straited, their General writ thus to the Magistrates: the 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1.  soldiers are starved for hunger, what shall we do? The two 
d Livi. 23.  Scipios writ to the Roman Senate, that without supply of victuals, their army must needs dissolve. And Caesar 
e Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  told his soldiers, that were determined to retreat, that without their carriages where their victuals were, they could no further do service against the enemy. And therefore victuals must be had ready. it is too late to seek for them in Villages, when the hungry soldier is ready to starve. Caesar 
f Re frumentaria comparata castra movet. bell. gal. 2.  would not once move toward the enemy, before he had his provision with him. 
g De obsessione non priùs agendum consticuit, quam rem frumentariam expedisset. Caes. come. bell. gall. lib. 7.  Nor would he resolve to besiege any town, before he had taken order for sufficient victuals for his army. His use 
h Vbi instabat dies quo die frumentum militibus metiri oporceret. Caes. come. 1. & 6. bell. gall.  was to divide victuals to every company for certain days beforehand. The garrison towns of the Romans were furnished with wheat, vinegar, bacon, barley, and straw, for a year beforehand, as Capitolinus showeth in the life of Gordian. The reason is laid down by Tacitus, that 
i Vtaduersus moras obsidionis annuis copiis firmentur. Tacit. annal.  they might be stored with provision against long sieges. The Colonies which were peopled with Romans, and placed as guards, and propugnacles against their enemies were stored with all things necessary. How our soldiers were furnished in Flanders and Portugal, I report me to their knowledge that endured those services. Being no better furnished, it is not to be marveled ●hough they kept no better order. 
k Disciplinam servare non potest ieiunus exercitus. Cassiod. 4. Var. lect. c. 13.  Hungry soldiers are hardly kept within the compass of laws. The belly (as is commonly said) in this case hath no ears. The cause of all such miseries, in wars are divers: first want of care, and good proceeding, than nigardise and misery, thirdly fraud and deceit; last of all impunity. Which are not to be redressed, but with contrary proceeding, and following the precedents of ancient warriors.  
The Romans gave to their General both treasure, and authority sufficient, to provide things necessary for the army. They brought victuals into the army sufficient, and for fear of want laid up abundance in garners, and storehouses in strong places near to the country, where their army sojourned. Opposing their forces against Annibal, they chose 
a Liu. 21.  Clastidium for their storehouse. Caesar in the wars against them of Auvergne brought all his provision to 
b Caes bell. gal. 7.  Noviodune, because it lay near. The Romans caused their ships of victuals to discharge at 
c Eo omnes ex Italia one●ariae naves dirigebant cursum. Liu. l. 37.  Chios in their wars against Antiochus: He chose Lysimachia for the place of his store. For the wars of 
d Liu. l. 44.  Macedonia they made their provision in Thessaly. 
e Caesar c●rtis locis horrea constituit, frumentum conquir● jussit. de bell. ciu. 3.  Caesar had his garners in convenient places to supply his army in his wars against Pompey. Pompey brought all his provision to Dyrrhachium.  
Asdrubal entering 
f Fines hostium ingrediens frumentum commeatusque in urbem Asenam convexit. Liu. 23.  Spain carried all the victuals, and store of the country into Asena: and Scipio likewise landing 
g Horrea nova aedificata vete●a á Scipione repleta & frumento expopulation: bus & commeatu Siculo. Livi. 29.  in Africa made new storehouses, and filled both new and old partly with victuals sent out of Sicily, and partly with those which he got by the spoil of the country. When a strong army cometh into any country, it is no mastery for the same to find 
h Formidine populationis obsides frumentum & aalia quae usui forent affatim praebita. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  victuals & forage either by fear, or force. But the companies sent into France and Flanders, being so weak, it was no marnell if they pined being penned up or confined within some garrison, the enemy being always stronger without. For the assurance of our victuals that come unto us, garrisons would be placed in convenient distances. Caesar in the wars with the 
i Peditum 10000 sibi celeriter mitti voluit, quò expeditiore re frumentaria uteretur. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Auuergnacs used 10. thousand Heduans to this purpose. Neither would he suffer any 
k Vellaunodunum ne quem post se hostem relinqueret, quo expeditiore refrumentaria uteretur, oppugnare instituit. ibidem.  town to remain untaken betwixt him and his victuals. For the fetching in of victuals, a convenient power of horsemen would be sent forth seconded with footmen, to forage, and range the country.  
Besides this the army would have divers carriages laden with victuals to be assigned to every regiment, and to follow the army; as it was in the expedition of Cyrus into Persia. Such as dwell near where our army goeth, would be summoned to bring victuals into the army, unless they would have their country ruinated. And as the Romans had aid of victuals in the wars of 
l Liu. 21.  Carthage out of Sicily, in the wars of 
m Liu. 31.  Macedonia out of Africa: and Caesar in his wars of Belgium was furnished from 
n Caes. bell. gal. 2.  Rheims, in his wars with the 
o Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Helvetians, from the Heduans: so our associates, such especially as dwell near, are to be prayed to aid us with corn, and other provision. But yet so that we do not altogether depend upon their pleasures, as we do in the low countries, where our soldiers receive from hand to mouth. Honest men 
a C. Cotta Genabi rei frumentariae jussu Caesaris praeerat. Caes. bell. gall 7.  would have commission and money given unto them to buy provision in places where it may be had. Finally, such as buy corrupt victuals, or use other fraud, would severely be punished.  
Further, order would be taken always before hand, that supplies of victuals may follow the army in time, lest that, as in the Portugal voyage, the army be forced to return for want, before the provision come at it. If this be not, then ought not the army to proceed further, than it may be assured of victuals.  
Lastly, both such victuals as may be found in the country, and such as are in the army, are to be dispensed warily, at least without waste. 
b Le soldat vinant a discretion en peu de iours affame tout un pais. Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 8.  Soldiers (as the French saying is) living, or rather spoiling at their own discretion, in few days do famish a country. The Romans used to give the soldiers certain days provision before hand, which they might not spend in fewer, as is evident both by example of Scipio sailing into Africa in the second wars with Carthage, end also of Caesar in his wars in France, and by examples of divers others.  
To conclude, all those that look for good success in wars, must provide both victuals, and arms, and all provision for the wars before hand, as the precedents of the preparations made by the 
c Thucid. 1.  Athenians, and Spartans before the Peloponesian war; of 
d Liu. 29.  Scipio, before his expedition into Africa; of 
e Xenoph. exp. Cy. 1.  Cyrus, into Persia; of 
f Sallust. bell. jug.  Metellus and Marius against jugurtha; of the Spaniards against us, when they came against us with their Navy; & in sum, of all wise people and states, that knew what pertained to the wars, do teach us. Charles of 
g Phil. Commin.  Burgundy sitting down before Nancy without sufficient munitions, was forced to rise with a scorn. The same happened to the French before 
h Hist. de troubls.  Sancerre anno 1569. and must needs happen to all, that without sufficient provision attempt matters rashly. Wise kings therefore do forecast before hand what force, or provision will be sufficient; fools say, Oh had I witted; or, I never thought upon it.   

CHAP. III. That before we begin wars, we are to procure what strength, or help we can of our neighbours, or others: and to draw the same, as much as is possible for us, from our enemies.  
AS in private affairs particulars receive mutual help each of other, of whom it is verified, that 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Homer.  two joining together do more easily achieve matters, than each man single by himself; so in public executions, where many are linked together, they more easily execute, and are hardlier broken. Insomuch as friends and 
b Non exerc●tus, neque thesauri praesidia regui sunt, verùm amici. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  confederates are no less the strength of states, than forces and treasure. Therefore did the 
c Circumspiciebant ipsi externa auxilia. Liu. 1.  Sabines hearing of the preparatives that Servius Tullius made against them, look out what foreign aid they mightadjoine unto themselves. The Athenians 
d Thucid. 2.  and Spartans in the Peloponesian war did not so much stand upon their own strength, as the aids, and succours of their confederates. The 
e Thucid. 5. & Diodor. Sicul.  Syracusans by the help of the Spartans withstood the invasion of the Athenians made upon them, and foiled them in divers encounters. I need not use any long discourse in this matter: it hath been the continual use of the Kings of this Island to use the help of the Burguygnions', and low Countries against France. And likewise have the French relied much upon the aid of the Scots against us.  
Neither ought any Prince, or nation so to presume of their own strength, as that they refuse the aid of friends. The Romans although after their victories against Annibal, at what time they began the Macedonian war, they were in their prime of strength, and most flourishing estate; yet required they aid of the Carthaginians, of Masinissa, and of the Aetolians, and others against Philip King of Macedonia. And dear it cost Perseus the King of Macedonia, that for sparing of money refused the aid of thirty thousand Gauls offering to serve him against the Romans. What hindrance it hath been to us, and what it may be that the Town of Antwerp, and other parts of the low Countries were not received when they were offered unto us in these brawls against Philip of Spain, I know not, some doubt. It may be said, they would not yield without conditions. But what purpose is it, to talk of conditions, seeing they would have yielded themselves into any prince's hands, if they might have been received?  
Further as we are to require aid of our friends; so we are to withdraw what aid we can from the enemy. Many reasons teach us so to do, which common practice doth teach us to be true. as the body in the distemper of the parts: so the state in the disagreement of the members, is greatly weakened, and easily dissolved. The Romans therefore as they were masters in other military documents, so did they diligently practise intelligence with the enemy's friends, and subjects. Before they transported their forces into Africa, they dealt with Syphax, and assured themselves of Masinissa kings of Numidia. Before they charged Philippe king of Macedonia, they caused most of his partisans in Greece to revolt from him. And Caesar by the help of part of the Gauls, which he drew to his side, did subdue the rest, and them also afterward.  
Pompey purposing to abase the power of Caesar, did first draw from him two legions or regiments, and afterward Labienus one of Caesar's chief friends, and commanders. Of this only practice great effects are wont to ensue. Caesar by disjoining and separating the forces and causes of the Gauls, overcame them all. By his intelligence with the ancient Britons, he understood the estate of the country, and had great help to achieve his purpose against it.  
While they of the city of 
a Phil. Coming.  Dinant suffered themselves to be disjoined from their associates of Liege, Charles Duke of Burgundy did easily overcome them. If Lewis the xi. of France had not separated, and broken the league, first between the Duke of Burgundy and the Dukes of Britain, and Normandy, and afterward betwixt king Edward the fourth, and the Duke of Burgundy: he could not have escaped with so little loss, nor vanquished his enemies with so great gain. We have also domestical examples of the same but too many, and which I cannot without some grief remember. not with dint of sword, nor open force, but with secret practices with our associates and friends in France, the French took not only Normandy, but also Gascoigne and Guienne from the English nation. And never omitting any opportunity to trouble us, they wrought much woe unto this land, in the days of King john, by furthering and procuring the revolt of the Nobility.  
Neither can any estate continue, that hath his parts divided. For (as one saith) it falleth out, that while every man looking to his own present safety 
a Dum pugnant singuli, vincuntur omnes. Tacit.  suffereth his friends to fight single, all are overcome. By this means the Spaniard hath so much prevailed in the Low countries, and the people have hurt themselves. For disjoining their counsels and forces, and refusing the 
b Resusans' le secours des estrangers. Hist de troubls. de Fran. lib. 1.  aid of strangers, they are for the most part a spoil unto the enemy. And if we would have used greater force, and more diligence in withdrawing from the Spaniard his associates, and subjects of Portugal, of the islands, and of the Low countries; he would have been long ere this very gentle to deal withal. But some wise men, as they say, have not only not sought to cause his subjects to revolt, but have refused, and still refuse to receive them, that hold out their hands, craving help of friends and long since are weary of the Spanish tyranny.  
As for those, that suppose the Spaniards to have such hold of all the countries which now they possess, and of the inhabitants thereof, that we should but lose labour in attempting their revolt, they seem to be ignorant not only of the state of his countries, and of the Spanish government, but also of the nature of things. It is well known with what discontentment, and grudge both the Portugals, and those of the Low countries do serve the Spaniard. The Portugals were ready to receive us at our last expedition thither, and would have declared themselves further, if they had perceived, that we had been able to defend them against the Spaniard.  
The state of Milan is holden more by force, then by love, or good title. They of Naples and Sicily have by many signs declared their great discontentment of the Spanish yoke. The Indians would revolt, if they knew which way. In all countries there are ever some, that either for hope; or hatred desire change of state.  
Annibal after that he had once, or twice beaten the Romans in Italy: did afterward maintain the wars for the most part with the aids of that country. And Caesar used the strength of the Gauls, against the rest of the nation. Upon the first overthrow which Scipio gave to the Carthaginians in Africa, he caused most of the country to turn enemy against them.  
Neither may we think that the state of Spain is in this point, better than other nations, especially seeing the stirs in Arragon, and Grenade beside many other offers in Castille, do declare, that there are among them many malcontents. The Spaniard doubteth not to find many such among us, but it were to be wished, that we would rather make trial first, whether there were any such to be found in Spain. When the French made their expeditions into 
a Guicciard. Hist.  Naples, they found great aids in the country, some also beside expectation. Why then should Spain differ from Italy?  
But while we seek to augment our forces with the succours of our associates and friends; we are not so to rely upon them, but that we prepare sufficient forces of our own nation, both to resist the enemy, and if need be to command our associates. therein following the wise proceed of the Romans, that never would admit a greater number of associates, than they had of their citizens in their army; and had always an eye, that they practised not with the enemy. In this as in 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Epicharm.  other points, to distrust, is a great point of wisdom. The Scipios did trust but too much to the aids of the Celtiberians in Spain. For being abandoned by them, they were exposed naked and unprovided to the mercy of their enemies. 
c Liu. 1.  Tullius Hostilius did deal more wisely. For although he had the succours of the Alban with him, yet had he force sufficient to vanquish his enemis without them. If not; he had far worse sped. For in the mids of the battle, he was forsaken by them. The 
d Guicciard. Hift.  Swissers that came in aid of Lewis Sforza sold him into the hands of Lewis the xij, at Novara, and did not only forsake him. And of late years, the Protestants that comed out of Germany under the guidance of the Dukes of Bovillion, were in their greatest need forsaken of the Lance-knights, that came to aid them. I need not labour inveh to prove this, seeing the great expenses, that by the French and others have been wasted upon the Almains of late time, do teach us how little use, or hope there is of the aid of that nation. Of all those that follow our ensigns, and join together with us those are least to be trusted, that are lately revolted. Good it were to try such, and then to trust them. Two 
a Guicciardio.  Spaniards feigning themselves fugitives in the wars betwixt the Spaniards and the Venetians attempted to kill Aluian the Venetian General. The like was attempted by certain Turks against Scanderbag. The Numidians that revolted to the Romans, a little before their battle with Annibal at Cannae, made a great slaughter among the Romans, after the battle ioyved. Maurevell that runagate pretending to forsake the enemy upon some displeasure, would have slain the Admiral: but when he saw how that could not be done without evident danger, he slew Movy a valiant gentleman, and so returned again to the enemy. Never any did wholly rely upon his associates, especially such as were newly come unto him, without loss, or danger. Good it had, been for us not to have looked for so much at the Portugals hands, as we did, it may be they would have assisted us, if we had been the stronger, but every one treadeth on those, that are thrown under foot, and thrusteth forward those that are falling.  
To assure us therefore of our associates, the safest way is to stand upon our own strength, and to trust more to ourselves then to them: the next is by hostages, such as are well accounted of: another means is by gauges of towns. King 
b Froissart.  Edward the third by seizing of Cherburg for pawn, assured himself of the king of Navarre's loyal dealing. The like course is taken in assuring the contract made between us and the low countries. I would we were in like sort assured of the towns we hold there, as he was. The reasons we have to fear are divers: but these in show open; that the town●● men of Vlishing and Briel, and the rest being armed, and in number passing our ●arrison, and giving them victuals and munitions from hand to mouth, may force the same either to yield, or de●●rs ●t pleasure. That they have not yet attempted it, the fear of the Spaniard 〈◊〉 cause. If that scruple were removed, I fear what will full●●●, without extraordinary diligence, and better order, and more force: but to assure ourselves of our associates there is no be●●●● course then to do them justice. The same 
c Amici officio & fide partuntur. Sallust. bell. jug.  both procureth friends, & ●●inreineth them in devotion. For who will adhere 〈◊〉 them, which wrong them, and oppress them? 
d Thucid. 1. & Cic. office lib. 1.  Pausanias and 〈◊〉 by ruling their associates with rigour, and extremity, caused them to ●●e part the Lacedaemonian army discontent. The like effect did the covetousness of the Athenians, that respected only their own profit, work in their partisans in the Peleponesian war. They must also be defended against their enemies, if we look to have their help against our enemies. This reason moved 
a Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Caesar to hazard himself in the succouring of the Boians at Gergovia: and josua to come in aid to the Gibeonites, although fraudulently they had caused him to enter into league with them. The Romans not sending aid to the Sag●ntines besieged by Annibal in time, lost not only them, but the favour of all Spain. And vainly did we look for the help of Portugal, being not provided to defend the Country against the Spaniard. To stand 
b Haec ratio nec amicos parit nec inimicos tollit. Liu.  aloof when our neighbours require aid, is a course neither to help our friends nor hurt our enemies. Besides the same is most dishonourable (for who doth not despise those, in whom they see no help) yea and unprofitable. for the enemy is thereby strengthened, and we weakened.  
Of the conditions and contracts of association, I shall have occasion to speak in the treatise of peace. For the ends of wars, are not only the beginning of peace, but also of associations, and friendships for the most part. Thus much only may serve in this place, that some are only offensive, some offensive, some with equal conditions on both sides, some with respect to one side. and as great diversities there are, as of divers states, and conditions of things. Hannibal and Philip of Macedonia, joined in league upon these conditions, that 
c Livi. 23.  Philip should waste the coast of Italy with his Na●i●●, and make war upon the Romans by sea and land, until such 〈◊〉 ●s they had brought Italy in subjection, which should then belong to the Carthaginians: that the wars being there ended, Annibal 〈◊〉 pass over with his army into Greece, and help him to subdue that Country, and the Lands adjoining, which should re●● 〈◊〉 ●o Philip. They of 
d Locrensibus jussu Annibalis data pax. Societas eo iure stabat, ut Poenus Locrensem, Poenum Locrensis pace, ac bello i●●●ret. Liu. 24.  Locres conditioned with Annibal, that 〈…〉 help other both in war, and peace. Many special m●●er●● know, 〈…〉 and comprised in articles con●●med on both ●●des by 〈…〉, and sometime by oath. And therefore whatsoever articles are agreed upon, they are diligently, and loyally to 〈◊〉 ●erforme●. It is a sure course to win us credit among our neighbours, and to link them in ●●●ine good wi●● toward us.   

CHAP. four  

Part 1. Of the General, and the parts and qualities required in him.  
HItherto we have spoken of such preparatives as are to be made oft times in time of peace, but always before the wars: now we are to speak of that which is the beginning, and first care, or at least act of wars. I mean the musters, and choice of captains and soldiers. This among the Romans belonged to the Generals, which upon the first 
a Prima belli cura agere delectus, revocare veteranos. Tacit. 18.  moving of wars, called all the people according to the tribes or divisions, into a place appointed, out of them to take such numbers, and such men, as were most fitting. And most reasonable it is, that the General that should lead men, should have the oversight, and chief, if not only direction in the choice of them. For who can better make choice of instruments, than such artificers as use them in their works? When the Generals themselves were otherwise busied, yet did 
b Coss. dum ipsi quaestionibus impedicbantur, T. Maenium delectui habendo praefecerunt. Liu. 39  they commit the matter to men of great authority and wisdom. Caesar 
c Caesar per legatos M. Silanum, C. Antistium, C, Sextium delectum habere instituit. Caes. come. bell. gall. 6  employed therein his counsel of wars, which also in his absence were his lieutenants. First therefore we are to speak of the General, then of inferior commanders, and thirdly of common soldiers. In the discourse concerning the General, we are to consider, first, what qualities and parts and sufficient General ought to have: secondly, what instructions or council he is to use: and lastly, with what commission and power he ought to be furnished wichall.  
The principal care that a Prince or State that entereth into wars is to have is, that there be choice made of a sufficient General. I know that the place is for the most part granted either for respect of Nobility, or kindred, or favour. The Kings of this land in time passed employed their children and uncles, which notwithstanding proved not the worst. Richard the 2. 
d Froissart.  in the wars against the Nobility, made the Duke of Ireland a favourite of his, General; but he was not followed. The French kings may impute most part of their had success in their wars to the insufficiency of their Generals. In the wars of Naples Charles the 8. named Montpensier 
a f●tto luego tonenge delre, piu stimato per la grandozza sua, & per esser del sangue real, che per proprio valour. Guicciard. lib. 1.  Montpensier his lieutenant in respect of nobility, rather than sufficiency: Lewis the 12. in his wars of 
b Guicciar. hist.  Lombardy, made Chaumont his minion General of his forces. But nothing did more hasten the overthrow of the French causes there, them their insufficiency. Lewis Sforza passing over divers men of account, reposed all his trust in 
c Guicciar. lib. 4.  Galeaz Sanseverin, a man of small desert. Leo the 10. for kindred sake would needs employ Lorence Medici in his wars with the Duke of Urbin, both which sped alike. Which examples with divers other of our time, which I will not mention, lest any man might think himself interessed thereby, may move us to have more care what Generals we do employ in such services. In other matters, albeit favour may take place: yet sure lest ought it to sway in choice of the General. Nothing is more dangerous, than the evil success of wars. What reason therefore have Princes to choose 
d Summo periculo summus quaerendus imperator, ut summo periculo summus gubernator. Liu. lib. 24.  weak men Governors of greatest matters in wars, seeing as in Sea causes men in greatest dangers are wont to make choice of most skilful Masters and Pilots? Or what impudency is it for a man to take charge of a Ship, that cannot see, but by others eyes, nor judge, but by others direction? And why not likewise may they be 
e Impudentem & gubernatorem & imperatorem esse, qui cum alienis oculis ei omnia agenda sint, postulet sibi aliorum capita ac fortunas committi. Liu. 26.  accounted shameless, that take upon them the charge of men's lives, and goods, which have no judgement, but by others report and direction? Of the weakness of Generals, proceed contentions betwixt the chief commanders, delays, needless expenses, disorders, disgraces, and the overthrow of Armies and States. And more shall an army of Hearts do, guided by a 
f Plutarch.  Lion, than an army of Lions led by a fearful Hart. Caesar's 
g Caes. comment. bell. gal. 5.  invincible old soldiers were overcome by the cowardice of Sabinus their leader. yet such was the skill of Caesar, that he could use young soldiers, and obtain great victories by small forces. Marcellus with the relics of the Roman army, overthrown at Can, gave unto Annibal a great repulse. The Romans under the leading of C. Martius Coriolanus 
h Volsci duce Martio Coriolano, vincentes ostenderunt ducibus potiùs, quàm exercitu rem Rom. supetiorem ●●sse. Liu.  overcame the Volscians, when the same man exiled upon displeasure against his Country, took on him to lead the Volscians, they divers times prevailed against the Romans. Which showeth what moment a skilful captain bringeth toward the obtaining of victory. And in the wars which the Romans had against the Latins, the forces being equal, yet the Romans prevailed by the good direction of their General Fabius, whose government was such, that all men confessed (as 
a Liu. 9  Livy reporteth) that what side soever should have had him for their leader, the same must needs have prevailed. In the battle of the Romans against 
b Pyrrhus, non Epirotae, tomanos vicit. Fabritius Plutar. apophth.  Pyrrhus' king of Epeirus (now Albany) Fabritius acknowledged, that they were overcome only by the skill of Pyrrhus, more than by the force of his army. And contrariwise, little account is to be made of an army, that wanteth direction. Caesar feared not, as himself 
c De bell. ciu. lib. 1.  reporteth, the old companies of Spain, although otherwise much to be esteemed, because he knew their General's Petreius & Afranius, to be men of no merit, nor skill. I have myself heard some Spaniards greatly complain of the defects of the Duke of Medina Sidonia the General of their Navy, when they came upon our coast. And although God was the author, yet I doubt not, but that was some good means of their evil success. Wherefore if Princes look for good success in their wars, let them without affection, and partiality, make choice of a sufficient General, religious, skilful, courageous, and adorned with such virtues, both for war and peace, as the importance of the matters which he manageth requireth.  
In a General, first I require religion: for if the Gentiles did suppose that those affairs succeeded best unto them, which they 
d Ab jove principium. Arat. Phaenom.  began in God's name; shame it were for Christians to have a worse conceit of that matter. And if all other matters, sure the hazards of war require religion in the chief directors. God he is Lord of Hosts, and giver of victories; and sure it is not probable, he will give it to those, that ask it not at his hands. God prescribed certain exercises of religion to his people in their wars; before them he would have the Priests to sound certain silver Trumpets. Constantine had all exercises of religion in his camp, and so proved most victorious. The Spaniards in their wars assign to every Tertio, or Regiment certain Priests. What should I speak of those that make profession of religion, seeing the 
e Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  Greeks did seldom attempt any dangerous service, but their captains first consulted with their gods? 
f Cic. de Natur. dear.  Cicero doth attribute the good success which the Romans had in their wars, to the religious care they had of the observance of holy ceremonies, and religion. Whatsoever mishap came unto their State, or Army, they ascribed the same likewise to the neglect, or contempt of religion. They esteemed that to be the cause of their overthrow at 
a Liu. 5.  Allia by the Gauls, at 
b Liu. 2.2.  Thrasimene by Annibal, and in divers other unfortunate encounters, Machiavel's divinity, that thinketh religion in men of war foolery, and proposeth that impious Atheist Caesar Borgia for a pattern to a Prince, that aspireth to be great to be followed, was detested even of the barbarous nations, which in wars attempted nothing, but with religious ceremonies, as Tacitus and Caesar declare in the Gauls and Germans, and Herodotus and Thucydides in the Thracians and barbarous people. Wherefore let the General be religious, and a maintainer of religion, and forbidden blasphemies, and other impieties too too common in the common sort, if he expect the favour of God, and good success in his affairs.  
The General ought further to have knowledge, and judgement in matters of war. The same is the special and most proper ornament of a General, in 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. polit. li. 5. c. 9  whom the same is more respected, than all other moral virtues. C. Fabritus in the dangerous wars the Romans had against Pyrrhus, in labouring that 
d Aul. gel. l. 4. c. 8.  Cornelius a man ravenous, but very expert in war, might be chosen Consul, or General, declareth that the skill and experience of a valiant Captain covereth other faults. This knowledge and judgement hath many branches: the General ought to understand as well the enemy's estate, as his own: he ought to know what forces, and what provision of arms, horses, carriages, victuals, and other furniture, and munition will be sufficient, and how he is to have the same: he ought to take heed of the enemy's traps; to know how to march, or 
e Imperatorij muneris est castris locum capere, commeatus expedire, ab insidijs praecanere, tempus pugnae eligere, aciem instruere, subsidijs firmare. Liu. 9  lodge safely; how to fight with advantage, where to employ horsemen, where shot, where other sorts of weapons, and to understand the advantages of all sorts of grounds: he hought to understand the times when to fight, and advantages of weather, and Sun: he ought not to be ignorant of any stratagem of war, nor of treaties and conditions of truce, or peace: lest as our ancestors in time past did, he lose by sleight that which before he had won by force: finally, in defending or besieging of Towns, in assaults, escaladaes, drawing of trenches, mines, making of batteries, forcing or defending of passages of rivers, or straits: he may not be ignorant of any point of war; proposing to himself the example of julius Caesar, a man in all faites of arms most skifull. Whose judgement was such, that 
a Hirt. de bell. African.  sitting still in his Tent in his camp at Ruspina, he knew what the enemy would do, or could do, and prescribed what was to be done against him: And deigned not to look out, when Scipio made show to assault his camp. This knowledge bringeth with it consideration, and foresight. Both which ought to be in the General: that, lest he want things necessary; this, lest he run into the snares laid for him by the enemy. Of Aemilus 
b Aemilius dies noctesque intentus ea sola quae adid bellum pertinerent animo agitabat. Liu. 4.4.  Paulus it is reported, that being chosen General for the wars in Macedonia, his mind was wholly bend on that service, so that he gave himself no rest, neither night nor day. Captains in 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Diodor. Si call.  wars must look both forward and backward, and every way whence any danger, or advantage is toward. For in wars 
d Non licetin bello bis peccare.  every error in mortal. Many do more matters by sleight, then by force. Charles the fifth 
e Froissart.  of France did more repress the force of the English nation by practice, then by force. The Lacedæmonians when their leaders prevailed 
f Plutarch.  'gainst their enemies by counsel and stratagems, sacrificed an ox; when by open force, a cock only.  
The next virtue required in a General, is 
g Virtutes imperatoris praecipuae, labour in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo. Cic. pro leg. Manil.  courage, and speed to execute that which is wisely determined. For vented counsels, and vented wine, do forthwith lose all good tasle. And cowardly captains discourage valiant men, that suppose the danger to be as great, as their leaders, take it. 
h Caes. bell. ciu. 1.  Domitius had no sooner determined with himself to fly away from Corfinium, but the soldiers lost courage. The cowardice of Crassus the 
i Appain. bell. Parth.  rich, gave occasion to the great overthrow, which the Romans had given them by the Parthians. The faint heart of Titurius Sabinus, charged by 
k Cas. bell. gal. 5.  Ambiorix, made his soldiers faint. Contrariwise, resolute men give courage to their soldiers, and restore battles almost lost. Caesar's courageous heart occasioned the victory against Pompey's sons at Munda. King Richard the third, had almost hazarded the matter at the journey of Bosworth: if he had but had three hundred men like himself, the field had been his. But because his cause was not good, it pleased not God to give him the means. 
l jugurtha & praelio strenuous erat, & bonus consilio, quod difficile est. nam alterum ex providentia t●morem, alt●rum ex audacia plerumque temeritatem efficit. Sallust. bell. Iugu●.  jugurtha is by Sallust commended both for prowess, and counsel. Nothing doth more avail in wars, than the example of the General. He is a cowardly companion, that dareth not to do, as he seethe his General do. Valerius corvinus used no other encouragement to his soldiers then this, that they should 
a Facta mea non dicta sequi volo, nec disciplinam, sed exemplum à me petere. Liu. 7.  imitate not his words, but his deeds, and do as they saw him to give them an example. Not that the General ought lightly to hazard his person, (for that were great temerity) or vex himself with labour, (for that were vain) but that he ought to show himself always courageous in dangers, and forward in labours. No laws, nor precepts can do herein more, than the General's example. The Romans followed 
b Lucan.  Cato through the dry and hot sands of Barbary, and shame made Xenophons' soldiers march up the hill, seeing him go before them. Neither hath any thing more animated the French Kings soldiers of late, than the example of so valiant a Prince leading them.  
They that have skill and resolution in matters of war, cannot choose (if God be pleased) but have good success, and authority. For what man wisely laying his plot, and resolutely executing the same, can fail of his expectation, or want an honourable reputation both with his own men, and with the enemy. 
c Foelicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus, & res adversae odium conciliant. Caes. de bell. ciu. lib. 7.  And therefore what need precepts of these matters, which is deed are rather in the power of others, then of ourselves, and follow of those virtues which before I have spoken of?  
There are also other virtues required in a General, which although they be not so necessary as the former; yet for the execution of matters, are very requisite and profitable; as namely justice, liberality, courtesy, clemency, temperance, and loyalty. justice is an ornament both in war and peace, well beseeming all Governors, but especially the Governors of armies. It is profitable to retain the good wills of our associates, necessary for the winning of the good will of our own soldiers. The same hath use as well in respect of enemies, as friends. The Faliscians besieged by Camillus, moved rather with the opinion of his justice, that sent back unto them the Schoolmaster, that delivered into his hands the youth of the City, then by force, yielded their City unto him. Pyrrhus did never offer to treat of peace, before the Romans had sent him back that traitor, that offered for a certain sum of money to empoison him. 
d justè non minus, quàm fortiter bella gerimus. Liu. lib. 5.  Wars are to be governed not by cruelty, but by justice. When 
a Cic. offic. 1.  Pausanias in the Peloponnesian war dealt rigorously with his associates, they all forsook him. Which also happened to the Athenians in the same war for like cause. And who doth not hate the Spaniard that seldom suffereth men of quality, that come in his power to escape, and hath devised a kind of proscription, by which he offereth wages and rewards to such as will kill or empoison princes, or others whom he maligneth and proscribeth? without justice the discipline of war cannot be maintained: neither hath the valiant reward without it, nor the coward punishment. Therefore had the Romans especial regard of justice. And justice had in their camps a special 
b That place was called Principia. Ius dicebat in principiis. Liu. 28.  place, where it was administered.  
Little needeth it, that I declare how necessary liberality is in wars, that both in peace, and at all times hath such efficacy to attract men's favours. The soldiers dare adventure any thing, where there is large reward. 
c Magni animi magnis honoribus fiunt. Liu. 4.  Nothing doth more stir up valiant minds, then great honours. 
d Eo impenditur labour & periculum, unde emolumentum & honos speratur. Liu. 4.  Every man bestoweth labour where he looketh for profit, and reward. Therefore had the Romans most valiant soldiers, for that they were most liberal in their rewards. Among them, as their General Decius said, the highest places and 
e Non generis, sed virtutis est praemium. Liu. 7.  honours were given to valiant men for their virtue and prowess, not to cowards for their nobility, or gentry. They 
f Militem iis artibus fecerat & periculi, & laboris avidum. viz. By liberality. Liu. 9  by their liberality made their soldiers forward in labour and danger. The Captains of the Romans although poor themselves, yet enriched their soldiers. Publicola, Valerius, and Menenius Agrippa were in their time great commanders, yet did they not leave behind them so much, as to discharge their funerals. But they enriched the state, and left behind them a fame of virtue, that will never decay. Caesar 
g Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  with his great liberality had his soldiers so obsequent, that in those civil wars, which he had against Pompey and others, few or none could be alured by any promises to forsake him, whereas infinite of the enemies did daily revolt, and fly unto him. The Turks in wars are most venturous, for that they know they shall have great recompense for well doing. He that first mounted the walls of Constantinople, was afterward made Bascha. And Ochiali of a poor mariner for his valiant service was made Admiral of the Turks navy, and one of his counsel.  
The hope that the Spaniards have of their increase of pay, which they call Ventaias, and of preferment to higher places doth much encourage them to adventure. And what is the reason, that so few do hazard themselves in these days but this, that the reward of hurts and long service is, for the most part, disgrace and beggary? the General hath no means to reward the valiant: pillars and spoilers wax rich, and purchase: valiant soldiers die naked, and are used as abjects. If a pot of gold were offered unto them, they would not refuse it, as did 
a Cic. offic. 1.  Fabritius the Roman captain, but some would rather sell their father, their country, yea and soul, rather than forego it.  
Nothing is more hurtful to the proceed of wars then miserable nigardise. Although a captain were endued with all other virtues, yet this one fault would either suppress them, or disgrace them. They would but 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 2.  serve him to make all things more saleable, as said Pericles. 
c Praeceps Annibalis in avaritiam animus ad spolianda inclinans quae non poterat tueri foedum consilium dedit cum inceptu, tum exitu. Liu. 26.  Annibal, for that through covetousness he fell to spoil his associates, did alienate all their good wills. Perseus' the king of Macedonia sparing of his money 
d Liu. 44.  lost himself, and his kingdom, where if he would have been at any charge, he might have had the aid of thirty thousand Gauls most valiant men to serve him against the Romans. 
e Phi. Commin. 5  Fredrick the emperor the last of that name was of every one contemned, and abused, for that they knew that he would rather incur any disgrace, then spend any money. 
f Constat potuisse conciliari animos militum quantulacunque parci senis liberalitate. Tacit. lib. Hist. 17.  Galba the emperor might have retained the good will of his soldiers with any small cost, or expense bestowed upon them: but it was a death to him to spend money. Therefore was he forsaken of his soldiers, and slain of his enemy. While men either have not money, or will not spend it upon necessary provision before hand: captains want soldiers, soldiers want arms, victuals, munitions of war, and all things necessary. Nay they want will, and courage. For what courage can men have when there is no hope of reward? By this 
g avaritia fidem, probitatem, ceterasque bonas artes subvertit, pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, does negligere, omnia venalia habere docuit. Sallust. coniur. Cat.  means all military discipline is disordered, soldiers famished, forward men impoverished, the honour of military profession stained, and unworthy persons and greedy gulls that lie fatting and purchasing at home, enriched with the spoils of their country. This was the first occasion of the ruin of Rome, that all things were there set to sale: it was the overthrow of the state of the 
h Largitionis, praedaeque & dulcedine privati commodi, sensus malorum publicorum adimebatur. Liu. 1. de Gabiis.  Gabians, and I fear will be the bane of England, if it be lawful here also to do as others did, without controlment.  
The General would likewise be courteous, clement, and gentle. Nothing doth more please the common soldier. This was a special commendation of Charles the fift, but borrowed from antiquity. Caesar 
a Cic. pro Marcel.  among other his virtues had this commendation singular of affability and courtesy to his soldiers, of clemency to ward his enemies. 
b vest habituque vix a gregario mili●e discrepans. Tacit. 18.  Vespasian by this means obtained the favour of his soldiers, and Titus 
c Tacit. 21.  his son was their special delight. 
d Germanicus circumire saucios, vulnera intuens, alium spe, asium gloria, cunctos alloquio, & cura sibique & praelio ●irmabat. Tacit. annal. 1.  Germanicus with his care for his soldiers, and his courteous speech bound them to love him. The savage minds of mutins are 
e Obsequio mitigantur animi. Liu.  oftentimes mitigated with fair words, when no rigour could otherwise tame, or pacify them. Contrariwise, nothing doth more hurt sometimes, than the untimely rigour, and austerity of the General. Charles Duke of Burgundy in his latter time grew so austere, and peremptory, that no man durst council him any thing, or contrary him. The same as Philip 
f Phil. Com. li. 7.  Commines testifieth was his utter ruin. 
g Liu. 4.  Posthumius for his rigour was stoned to death of his own soldiers: which also happened to Cinna, whose untimely austerity was the ruin of their affairs. Alexander if to his great valiantness he had joined affability and clemency, he had not in the end grown odious to his own soldiers. Who doth not detest Annibal for his great cruelty?  
Temperance is a virtue that shineth in peace especially, yet hath it no small use in the midst of wars, and being wanting in a captain doth make him want so much of perfection. For how is it like, that he can govern others well, that cannot rule himself, nor his affection? or who can look for modesty and sobriety in the soldiers, where the Captain is given to wine or women, and spendeth his time in riot, and excess? let this virtue therefore be added to the garland of an absolute captains perfections.  

h Liu. 25.  Scipio by restoring a fair woman to her husband Allucius, won to himself the heart not only of that man, but also of the woman's friends, and divers Spaniards. And 
i Xenoph. paed. Cyr.  Cyrus bound Abradata unto him, for sparing his wife Panthea. 
k Quint. Curt.  Alexander is renowned among posterity for his continency toward the wife, and daughters of Darius.  
Like commendation, though in another subject, doth 
l Plutarch. in Epaminond.  Epaminondas deserve, who when his citizens did feast, & riot, walked soberly about the wall of Thebes, to see that the enemy made no attempt against the city. Nothing doth more hurt or hinder the proceed of wars, than riot and intemperancy. Hannibal's soldiers were overcome with the delights of Capua, whom the Romans with force could not subdue. Antiochus in the midst of his preparatives falling in love, spent a winter in making of a match, & so lost time, and opportunity to transport his army into Italy, as Annibal advised him. The French grew odious to them of Sicilia by reason of their insolences, which gave them cause to rebel, and to murder them all in one evening. The intemperance of the enemy giveth many opportunities to those that be watchful. 
a Liu. 8.  Cales was taken while the citizens lay drunken in a solemn feast. The same was the destruction of Troy. Marcellus perceiving the negligent guard which the Syracusans made on a feast day at night, surprised the town by escalade. The 
b Alphons. de Vlloa.  Turks took Zeresana a strong town in Sclavony upon Shrove-tuesday at night, when the townsmen after their manner of their carnival being drunk, were careless and secure. Much more therefore behoveth it the General to watch, to be sober, temperate and careful. These virtues are singularly commended in a General; yet may I not forget desire of true honour, love of the country, and loyalty toward the Prince and Which unless a General have, all other excellencies do rather make him suspected, then commend him. For who can trust him that hath intelligence with the enemy, or receiveth pension from him: The French men do merrily scoff at some great men of our nation, that have been pensioners of the French Kings, 
c Philip Coming.  and whose acquittances are extant in their Exchequer. I would to God the guise were now every where left. C. Fabritius dwelling in a smoky house refused a great mass of gold presented unto him by the Samnites. How much more than ought they to have care of their honour, that dwell in the sight of the world in gorgeous houses? that great men for a paltry pension, should sell their honour, it is intolerable. For the love of their country divers in time past devoted themselves to death, as the two Decii, as Curtius, as Mutius Scevola, as Codrus, as Leonidas, and infinite others. Is the race of them now extinct, that so few of that sort are in our age and country to be found?  
If we consider ancient times, we shall find that those great men, whose memories continue unto our times, were endued both with these, and many other virtues. 
d Sueton. in vit. Caes. & Plutarch.  C. Caesar in his actions was most considerative, in hazard and danger most resolute, in executions speedy, oppressing his enemies oft times before the news of his coming were heard, painful in labour, in dangers watchful, in diet sober, a liberal rewarder of valiant men, a good justicer where need required: if all his virtues were in a General, what should be wanting beside religion? This General I propose to all those that desire honour to imitate, so near as they can. The honourable parts of Camillus, Valer. corvinus, 〈◊〉 Scipio, are no less to be set before the eyes of captains. Annibal among the Africans deserveth special price. He was in his time subtle, cautelous, skilful in all faits of arms. He was very skilful that could escape his snares. Laborious he was and watchful, and speedy, and a strict observer of military orders. Of 
a Cato parsimonia, & vigiliis & labour, cum ultimis militum certabat. Liu. 34.  Cato it is reported, that in parsimony, watching and labours he contended to pass the common soldiers. Of the younger Cato 
b Monstrabat tolerare labores. Lucan.  Lucan giveth this testimony, that in the painful march thorough the deserts of Africa he by his patience, and example showed what others were to do. These things were in the old Roman captains, and as I suppose in those that succeeded them. 
c Acer militae, anteire agmen, locum castris capere, noctu diuque consilio, ac si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti, etc. Tacit. annal. 18.  Vespasian is commended for a man of courage in fight, skill in encamping, and taking the advantage of the ground. Night and day he broke the enemy's purposes, oft by counsel, sometime by force, in diet & apparel he was moderate, & scarce could you know him from a common soldier, comparable with antiquity, if covetousness had not blemished or rather defaced his other virtues. By such men the Roman empire grew great: by wants, and vice of the Generals the same received many overthrows. Claudius, 
d Polyb.  who being captain the Romans were overcome at sea in the first wars with Carthage, was a contemner of religion, ignorant of matters of war, simple and cowardly. Flaminius' that was slain with his army by Annibal at the lake Thrasimene was irreligious, rash, unskilful, impetuous, unprovident. Varro that occasioned the great slaughter of the Romans at Cannae, was a man of no merit, nor judgement, wilful, and unexpert in matters of war. Crassus' the rich seeking too greedily after spoil, was not aware in what country he marched, before be see himself enclosed by the enemies. Look the latter emperors, you shall not find in many of them any thing worthy commendation. Maximinus a cruel tyrant, in matters of war and state was unskilful. Such were most of the rest. 
e E cubiculo & lectulo iubebat quicquid hosti conduceret. Tacit. 20. Such captains he calleth Ignava animalia.  Ordeonius that was overthrown by the Germans, being in danger, like a sluggish beast took his bed, and (as Tacitus saith) did thence give forth such direction, as made most for the enemy. Wherefore seeing so many virtues are required in a captain, and so small faults lay him open to the enemy: it is no marvel, if perfect Generals be so rare, and hard to find. Philip king of Macedonia wondered, that the Athenians changed their leaders so often, as having great choice, seeing that he in all his time, could not find any more than one that was excellent, or answerable to his mind; and that was Parmenio. The more rare they are, the more care all wise Princes, and states ought to have, that unto such as they commit their armies unto, they adjoin for a supply wise and experimented counsellors. Yea, though the General be never so wise, yet may he not want his counsel of wars. Of this the order of our discourse leadeth us now to speak.    

CHAP. four Part. 2. Of the generals counsel of wars.  
IT were a principal point of wisdom for Princes, and states, that take wars in hand, to make choice of such a General, as hath such parts and virtues, as before are described: if they will not be persuaded, but will needs for favour, or kindred, or nobility commit their affairs to men young in years, and green in experience, and destitute of merit, the next remedy is to join with them Captains wise, and experimented in matters of war. If they will do neither, then shall the woeful events of wars teach them, which no counsel nor reason could persuade them, that wars are managed by wisdom, value, and experience, and not by favour, nobility, nor great countenance. In the late troubles of France, 
a Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 3.  when Charles the ninth made his brother Henry de Valois his lieutenant general, to supply his want of years, and experience, he assigned unto him for his counsel the Dukes of Nemours, and Longueville, the Marshal Cossè, Tauanes, Martigues, Carnavalet, Losses, and others which were men of wisdom and value.  
King Edward the third sending his son governor of his army into France, joined with him divers experimented heads to assist him. Yea, 
a Consilio cum legatis, & quaestore communicato etc. Caesar omnes copias castris eduxit. Cas. bell. gal. 4.  although the Generals themselves were men of worth, and great experience: yet both among the Romans and other nations had they their counsels with them. Many eyes see more than one, and soldiers do more willingly execute that, which they see by wise counsel to have been determined wisely before. 
b Priùs quàm incipias consulto, & ubi consulueris maturè facto opus est. Sallust. de coniur. Catil.  Before any enterprise be begun, it is wisdom to consult, and after consultation speedily to execute. 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  It is never good to presume upon the enemy's disorders, as if they would take an evil course, but we ought to consider and foresee in counsel, all that may happen, as if they did all that which they ought to do, saith Archidamus. But this cannot be done sufficiently, nor orderly without a counsel of wars. Therefore had the Romans their 
d Legatos, i. bellici consilij auctores, & muneris provincialis ministros. Cic. in Vatin.  legates, lieutenants, or counsellor's assistant unto them, to give counsel and to speed such matters, as were committed unto them, more or less according to the importance of affairs in hand. L. Furius in his wars against the Gauls had five: Caesar in his wars in France had ten: Pompey in the wars against the pirates had fifteen legates. These served the General for counsel, in his absence they supplied his place: in any service they had the charge either of some part of the army, or some wing, or some regiment.  
The Lacedæmonians sent 
e Thucid.  Brasidas, and others to assist their admiral. Cnemus in the government of sea causes. When Commius, 
f jis delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur. Caes. bell. gall. li. 7.  Virdumarus, Eporedorix, and Vergasillaunus were made generals of that army which the Gauls sent against Caesar, they had also certain wise men assigned to them out of every state, by whose counsel they were to proceed in the administration of the wars. Where there is no set counsel, yet is it not good to do matters without counsel. The Romans used commonly to call a counsel of their chief officers, colonelles, and others about them. Camillus before 
g Omnia ibi summo consilio & ratione acta sunt. Fortuna etiam ut fit, secuta est. Liu. 5.  he charged the Gauls, he set down in counsel how every thing should be performed. And therefore no marvel (saith Livy) if good success ensued, seeing all thing were done by order, and deliberation. Ser. Galba being beset by the people coming down from the mountains on every side, called a counsel of his chief men, and 
h Concilio celeriter convocato, sententias exquirere caepit Galba. Caes bell. gal. 3.  asked advise, what every man thought best to be done in that case. The same did 
i Caes. bell. gal. 5.  Cotta and Titurius besieged by Ambiorix, though not with like success. Curio 
a Concilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare caepit. Caes. de bell. ciu. 2.  calling his counsel about him after his coming into Africa, deliberated how to proceed in his matters. Good it had been for him if he had used like deliberation in all his affairs. But if at any time, sure before the joining of battle counsel is necessary. Before that 
b Liu. 27.  Scipio brought forth his army to fight with Asdrubal, he called his chief men to counsel. 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr.  Cyrus before he began the battle with his brother Artaxerxes, called the colenels, and chief commanders of the Greeks to counsel. There they set down by common consent what course they were to take for the obtaining of the victory. And so precious a thing is good counsel, that not only chief commanders, & men of authority, but also every one that speaketh reason is to be heard. 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 3.  Xenophon, to hear those that brought good intelligence, gave order, that his familiars should awake him if he were on sleep. He refused not to hear the counsel of any private soldier.  
Let us now see into what calamities they have fallen, which refusing to hear counsel did all things rashly, and upon their own head. Charles the Duke of Burgundy deserveth the first place, who presuming of his own wisdom, and refusing to hear all counsel, overthrew himself and his state. He refused to hear one that came to discover unto him the treason of Campobacho. The presumption of 
e Guicciar. li. 19  Lautrecke that would hear no counsel, nor follow any devise but his own, brought the forces of France before Naples to ruin. It had been good if Richard the 2. would have followed the advise of his uncle. It is reported that Charles the 5. was opinionative and did many things of his own head; and the rather, for that he would seem to imitate Caesar. But the matter I think is mistaken. for neither did Caesar, nor Charles the 5. things without counsel, nor can any prosper, that do proceed without advise.  
Those things standing thus: yet I know not how it cometh to pass, that in great enterprises taken in hand in these times, there is seldom any sound, or set counsel appointed. If any be: yet are they the General's familiars, or men of no great merit, or judgement. And which is very odious, & greatly offendeth brave men, Princes & 
f Difficultà grandissima d'entrar' nelle camere & nudientie deal rè fe ce i Francesi odiosi. Guicciard. lib. 1.  General's chambers are close shut, & hard it is for a man to come to their speech whatsoever they have to say. Oft times the counsel is divided, which causeth slow resolution, weak expedition, and venteth all good counsels: a matter much to be avoided. 
g Lib. 16.  Guicciardin saith, that the contrariety of Clement the 7. his two counsellors made him ridiculous, slow, and unhappy in all his enterprises. yet was he otherwise subtle, and worldly wise. Where there is emulation, and contention betwixt those of the counsel, there is nothing agreed upon, until all opportunities be passed. Now and then the General, although good counsel be given, yet lest he 
a Ne alienae sententiae indigens videretur, in diversa ac deterioca transibat. Tac. 15.  might seem to want or need counsel, he will rather take a worse course. Which was the case of the Roman captain, through whose folly the Romans were overthrown by Vologeses. Some men also there are which mislike all counsels, but such as themselves devise: of which nature was 
b Consilii quamuis egregii, quod non ipse afferret inimicus. Tac. 17.  Laco the governor of Galba the emperors guard. which was his own overthrow, and the overthrow of his Prince. Such are to be excluded from all counsel. Some there are that in counsel resolve upon every light rumour, and report. which causeth them oft times ridiculously to revoke their decrees, and determinations. This lightness Caesar noteth in the 
c Rumoribus & auditionibus permoti, de summis saepè rebus consilia ineunt. Caes. bell. gal. 4.  Gauls; & the 
d Negavit senatus ad rumores à privatis consictos Senatusconsulta facienda. Liu. 35.  Senate of Rome with great gravity reproved, where they show, that the Senate might not determine matters upon rumours of private men, that lightly prove counterfeit. Of all others 
e Liu. 44.  Aemilius Paulus most hated those, that would talk and prate, and busy themselves with matters, which they understood not. And in deed it is an odious sort of men, that doth forge false rumours, and take upon them to prescribe the Generals what to do. But most dangerous counsellors are those, which are hired of the enemy. A matter not new nor rare, but sure very scandalous. Guicciardine noteth it in the counsel 
f Sono venali spesso i consigli di principi. Guicciard. lib. 1.  of Charles the 8. of France. The same man declareth what 
g In molti potevano assai i donativi & le promise de Francesi. Guicciar. lib. 16.  sway French Crowns did also bear among the counsellors of Charles the 5. Philip of Comines reporteth that Lewis the xj. of France bestowed 16. thousand Ducats in pension upon the English that followed Edward the 4. into France, which broke the force of that journey. When the treaty of association was made betwixt Spain and England, against France in the days of Henry the 8. the Cardinal and others would not agree, before that the Emperor Charles had given them caution for the 
h Guicciar. li. 15.  payment of 20. thousand Ducats pension, which they received of the French king, and were loath to lose, howsoever the common wealth might gain by it. These men call themselves Pensioners, but their true name is Traitors, hired for a little gold to betray their Prince and Country. These do ruinated all enterprises against those that hire them, and therefore deserve not only to be thrust out of the counsel of wars, but also out of their country. These do make many good counsels known to the enemy, and therefore are no way to be trusted. Last of all through fear, or delay of resolution, or execution, many occasions of service pass, which are not always offered unto us, and when they come, not easily to be pretermitted. It is not wisdom to resolve rashly, true: no more is it wisdom to consult so long, that the occasion passeth. rash men therefore, and slow proceeders are fit for other places, than places of counsel in wars.  
The remedy of these disorders is easy, where the General is a man of judgement, and execution; where otherwise, it is a matter difficult, and almost not possible. In which case it is necessary, that one be appointed with special authority next to the General. Men of judgement can soon discover treacherous counsels, and will easily correct their contentions, and whatsoever other faults are common in their proceeding.  
Wherefore seeing nothing availeth more in wars, than counfell: next unto the choice of the General, regard is to be had of the choice of a sufficient counsel of men of knowledge, experience, secrecy, loyalty and other good parts fit for that place; that, as it was among the Romans, may both advise, and help the General. And if by the law of arms, no soldier may reveal any counsel to the enemy, much less ought such abuse to proceed from the counsel. I need not declare how they should proceed, nor how they should cover their enterprises by contrary pretences, as 
a Exped. Cyr. 1.  Cyrus did going against his brother Artaxerxes, and as the Spaniards do daily; nor how they should speedily resolve, and presently execute. They do not deserve to be named counsellors, that in those points want counsel. Now lest contrariety of opinions which hindereth both counsel, and execution, should arise of the diversity of counsellors affections, I will show that the sovereign authority in wars, is to be committed to one alone.  

CHAP. four Part. 3. Wherein is declared, that the sovereign commandment in matters of wars, is to be committed to one alone.  
AS in a state well ordained, so in an army well governed there may not be any contrariety in the chief commanders. The army by Iphicrates the Athenian is compared to a body, whereof the General is the head. Wherefore, as it is unnatural and 
a Resp. benè constituta quod unum tantum est corpus plura capita habere non potest. Tiberius' apud Tacit.  monstrous for one body to have two heads, so it is inconvenient, for an army to be encumbered with divers heads of contrary disposition. Which mischief, seeing it can be no otherwise remedied, then by giving the sovereignty to one: the Prince is diligently to see, that the sovereignty in the army be not divided amongst many. The Romans albeit they had ordinarily two consuls: yet in their greatest dangers they appointed one Dictator, or General with absolute authority. The sovereign commandment of one is a help and means to dispatch matters quickly, to take opportunities, and use the time of war. 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Olinth. 1.  Demosthene doth plainly declare the same by the example of Philip king of Macedonia. While one commandeth, he both understandeth better what is wanting, and how it is to be had: his care is greater; his proceeding more formal, and equal: his counsel more speedy, and secret. Therefore did the Romans send but one Governor into their Provinces, and employed for the most part but one Consul in the goverument of their armies. If both: yet where they proceeded orderly, the one gave 
c In exercitu Rom. cum duo essent Coss. potestate pari, quod saluberrimum est in rerum magnarum administratione, summa imperii concedente Agrippa penes Quintium erat. Liu. 3.  place to the other. A matter most requisite for the dispatch of weighty matters; as it is evident in the fact of Agrippa yielding the chiefty to his fellow Quintius. The Athenians for that their state was popular used yearly to choose many captains, yet in their greatest dangers all the rest yielded to be governed by one. In the Marathonian field against Darius, the supreme commandment was in Miltiades, in the battle of Salamine against Xerxes in 
d Herodot.  Themistocles, all the rest submitting themselves to be commanded by him. Seldom hath any wise nation done otherwise: if they did they paid for the most part the full price of their folly. The Romans were ruinated by the Gauls at the encounter of Liu. 
a 5.  Allia, partly by the disorder of the chief commanders being diverse, and having equal authority. Those three 
b Tres duces delectu habito profecti sunt Veios, documentoque fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile esset. Tendendo enim ad sua quisque consilia, cum aliud alii videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti. Liu. 4.  captains that besieged Veij having all equal power may be a document unto us, how unprofitable the commandment of divers Generals is, for the government of wars. For every man driving all matters to his own ends, while one man thought one way, an other otherwise, they gave occasion to their enemies to hurt them. By the discord 
c Liu. lib. 5.  of the captains while one refused to secure an other, the Romans were foiled before Veij. The Aequians observing the disagreement between the 
d Liu. 4.  Roman captains, although in force inferior to the Romans, yet prevailed against them. Neither was there any greater cause of the ruin of the 
e Thucid. 6.  Athenian army in Sicily, than the contrariety of opinions, and discord of the three captains sent thither with sovereign commandment. The original of all the disorders that fell out in the army of the Protestants in Germany, and of the victory of 
f Sleidan.  Charles the fift, was the divers opinions of the Duke of Saxony, and Landgrave of Hesse. When the Landgrave would have fought, the Duke was of another mind, or percase was not ready. What the one did profitably determine, that the other did frustrate. From the time of this discord the affairs of the Protestants went to wrack. The French were driven out of the kingdom of 
g Discordia di capitanis fa perdere Napoli a Francesi. Guicciar. lib. 3.  Naples by a small force, by reason of the dissension of the captains Montpensier and Percy. The envy and contention, that fell out betwixt the French, and Hungarian captains gave an easy victory to Amurathes the Turk at Nicopolis. It had not been possible for Caesar 
h Guicciard. li. 5.  Borgia to escape the hands of so many Princes confederate against him, but that the captains of the adverse army did weaken their force by their own disagreement. The Venetians were overthrown at Ghiaradadda only by the plurality of commanders. For while 
i Guicciard. lib. 8.  Bartholomew Aluian which was one of their Generals determined to fight, and the Count Pittiglian which was the other, commanded the army to march, the enemy charging them in this instant of their irresolution, obtained a great victory.  
The sovereign authority both of matters by land, and by sea is to be given only to one. otherwise there can be no good correspondence in both places. While Lantreck 
k Guicciard.  commanded by land, and Philippin Doria by sea: the siege of Naples was discontinued, & the town victualled, which happened by reason of the dissension of the Generals. It hath been no small hindrance to our affairs in the Low countries, that those that have commanded at land, have not likewise had the government at sea. For by this means the enemy hath had greater store of victuals, and our own men greater want, when the ships and passages were in others keeping. Nay, where the commandment is part in the General, and part in the States, things are yet more confused. For the States oft times victual the enemy, yea and coutinually trade into Spain, while our soldiers fight against the Spaniard. I will not say what inconveniences come of this one point neglected otherways, for that it would couch some men more particularly, than my meaning is. For remedy of this mischief the Romans gave to their captain's power both in matters by land, and sea. Scipio as he had an army by land, so he had a Navy by sea both in the expedition of Spain, and Africa. Neither could Marcellus ever have prevailed against the city of Syracuse, if he had not besieged the town, both by sea, and land. Caesar was enforced to go to sea before he could subdue the sea towns of France. But what need I use more words in a matter so plain? both reason, and experience teacheth us that many 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  commanders in matters of war are not good. And therefore let there be but one sovereign commander both by land, and sea: with what authority he ought to be furnished, resteth now to be discussed.   

CHAP. four Part. 4. Of the authority, and Commission of the General.  
ACcording to that opinion which Princes and States have of their Captains, and sometimes respect had to the danger of the times: their use is to give unto them more ample, or more strait commission. But if they purpose, that their affairs shall succeed well, of two things one is necessary: to wit, that either they furnish them with means sufficient, or give them commission to furnish and help themselves: and that either they do direct them sufficiently, which is scarce possible: or else give them leave to take order according to the occasions offered upon present view, and variety of times, or things. For neither can he do service upon the enemy, that wanteth either convenient force or means; nor may he, or dare he take the advantage of time, and other circumstances, that is bridled and bound by his instructions. The Romans although most expert in deeds of arms, whose Senate consisted for the most part of such as in their time had been commanders, and altogether of men exercised in arms; yet did not at any time prescribe their Generals what to do; and what they should not do; much less how they should do, or when they should do it. Much more absurd therefore it is, that men that never saw enemy, nor know the train of wars, should take upon them to direct Generals what they should do at land, or sea: and very strange it seemeth to me, that Generals to whom armies are committed should like schooleboyes take forth such lessons, as these ignorant pedants and scrivanoes should prescribe. Wars are not made by indenture, neither can any covenant with his enemy to do this, or not to do it. Nor can any man conceive, what is best to be done, but such as are present. And therefore the ordinary limitations of some commissions, do nothing else, but bind the hands of our captains, that they shall not use opportunity, or percase further and help the enemy. Herein therefore it is good to imitate old warriors, at least to come so near them, as difference of times will permit. The Roman captains had authority most large, and means sufficient. Their forces were great, their furniture and provision plentiful. lest they should exact any thing of their associates, they were furnished with all things 
a Liu. 25.26.  necessary, even to their 
b Magistratus mulis tabernaculisque, & omni alio instrumento militari ornabantur, ne quid tale imperarent sociis. Liu. 42. & 44.  mules, tents, and carriages. That which was wanting, or might more easily be had otherwhere, they had authority to supply. All which consisted, & was given them in one word. Now captains have many words in their commission, & little scope, or authority. Under this one word imperium, they comprised all authority necessary for the government of the wars. By the same they had power to levy men, to lead them, to employ them, as appeareth by the 
c Demus imperium Caesari sine quo exercitus haberi, res militaris administrari non potest. Cic. Philip. Decrevi imperium exercitum habenti. Quid est enim sine imperio exercitus? Cic. Philip.  commission given to Octavius Caesar, that afterward was called Augustus In the Province where they made wars, they might beside the number they brought with them, levy other soldiers, & impose upon the people necessary charges for the defence of the coutry. Caesar 
d Provinciae quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat. Caes. bell. ●al. 8.  to resist the attempts of the Helvetians, which threatened to pass through the Province of France subject to the Romans, levied as many men, as he could, in his government. Fuluius understanding that the Fuluius 
a quia armare inventutem Celliberos andiret, & ipse quanta poterat a sociis auxilia contraxerat. Liu. 40.  Celtiberians gathered new forces, he also in his government, procured what help he could of his subjects, and associates. From their associates and subjects in their government, they had power to take victuals, carriages, ships, and necessary furniture of war, as is evident in the wars that Scipio made in Spain and Africa, Caesar in France, Sylla and Pompey in Asia, and other countries. They had also power to do justice as well to their associates, and subjects, as to their own soldiers: otherwise they could neither have encountered with treachery of men evil affected, nor defended their favourers, and friends. The defence of the Province, and their 
b M. Messala & L. Pisone Coss. Senatus censuit, uti quicunque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo reip. facere posset, Aeduos ecterósque amicos populi Rom. defenderet. Caes. bell. gal. 1.  friends both against seditious mutins, and foreign invasion was likewise committed unto them, and per consequent, power given them to levy power, and use all means for the maintenance of their associates, and for the government and execution of wars, without which they could not be defended.  
Good it had been for our Generals likewise in the Low countries, and other where, that their authority had been also enlarged. For while they had neither victuals, nor lodging, nor ships, nor carriages, nor artillery, nor munition, nor other furniture of war, but at the pleasure of the States, some whereof were too respective of their own profit, nor could execute any man of those Countries for treason, without their consent, it is no marvel, if their proceed were slow, their executions slender, their wants great.  
Further the Romans gave their General's power both to make wars by sea, and land. Do doubt they had also sufficient means, without which all power is frustratory. Our Captains in the Low countries, as they have been weak by land, so they depended on others pleasures, for matters at sea.  
In later times also the same course hath been taken. When 
c Corbuloni reges praefecti praetores parere iussi; potestas data qualis Pompelo bello Pyratico, Tacit. annal, 15.  Corbulo was sent by Nero against the Parthians, he had power equal to that which Pompey had granted unto him in the wars against the Pirates. Kings, Governors of Provinces, and the Officers of the Romans were enjoined to obey him. It is the use of all Nations both to furnish their Generals, and to authorize them sufficiently. What authority Annibal had, it is partly evident by his actions (for it is not to be presumed that he did matters without authority) and partly by the words of Fabius persuading the Romans to choose a captain equal to Annibal, a leader (saith he) of great authority by reason of his continuance, and not restrained by any limitation of times, or laws so, but that he might do all things, according as opportunites of war should require. Herein Demosthenes 
a Olynth. 1.  declareth, what great advantage Philip king of Macedonia had above the captains of the Athenians: for he was not limited by any Superiors commandment, nor restrained by terms, or time, as were they. Which thing (saith he) is very effectual for dispatch of matters. Those captains (saith 
b Duces summi liberi impedimentis omnibus, dominique rerum temporumque trahunt consilijs cuncta. Liu. 9  Livy) that have absolute authority, and are free from impediments, and have power over things and times, do work great effects with their counsels.  
Whosoever therefore for envy, or fear, or other cause goeth about to persuade Princes to pair their General's authority, and to bind them with straight conditions, hath an evil mind himself, and as much 〈◊〉 in him lieth, ruinateth the affairs of his Prince. For what service can they do that are not only pinched in their provisions, but also bound fast by their commissions? The 
c Le commissioni di Caesare, haveuane espressa o tacita conditione, di gonuernarhi secondo la varietà di tempi. Guicciard. lib. 17.  commissions which Charles the fift gave to his captains, had this condition either expressed, or implied, that they should proceed according to the variety of times, and occasions notwithstanding any thing in them contained. And some very expert, and wise men have not doubted, seeing a manifest advantage to go against their Prince's commission. 
d Il Triwltio anchora che la commessione del rèfusse che prima s' attendesse all cose de Genoa, press il Bosco nel contado d' Alexandria. Guicciard. lib. 3.  Triwltio although by his directions, he was first to have care of the affairs of Genoa: yet doubted not to take Bosco, a fit place in the territory of Alexandira. And albeit that Lewis the 12. gave his captains express charge, that they should not fight with the Spaniards: yet seeing their weakness, and their own manifest advantage, they fought with them, and foiled them at Cirignola. Where for their defence is alleged, that the commandments of the King being far off, and not seeing the state of things, were rather 
e I commandamenti delrè essendo lontano, erano più ricords, che precetti. Guicci. ard. lib. 5.  remembrances, than precepts to be followed. Trimoille seeing the danger of the state of France assaulted by divers enemies, and also by the Swissers, made 
f Accordà co i zuitzeri senza commessione, & salve la Francia. Guicciar. lib. 5.  peace & compounded with them, although he had no commission so to do. Of which act Guicciardin guieth this testimony, that by that accord he saved the realm of France out of a mavifest danger. And very absurd it were, if a man might not do his country service without commission. The 
a Salus reip. ●●prema lex.  safety of the state, and honour of the Prince are warrants, and exceptions of a most high nature. And for a man to doubt, to take the enemy at advantage for fear of violating his commission, as the Spaniards say that the Duke of Medina did in his voyage for England, is nothing but to spread a cloak to cover his own cowardice, or insufficiency.  
Yet may not the General do against his commission rashly, or without apparent cause, or sufficient order: neither may he do all things without commission. He may not proclaim wars, or invade any nation that is out of commission: only if his enemy fly into an other Country, he may follow him. For in that case 
b Livy.  Manlius avoweth his wars against the Gallogrecians, and 
c Livy.  Fabius his voyage through the wood Ciminia. Also all such as invade his government, or his friends, or associates, he may prosecute without his government. He may not make peace, or treat of peace with the enemy: for he is sent to make wars. He may not dimisse his army without commandment: nay he may not proceed against the laws of Arms. The 
d Dictator optima lege creatus, summum imperium belli, pacis, paenarum, sine prouocatione habebat. Pompon. in l. 2. §. popul. ff. de orig. juris.  Roman Dictator, although he had great authority, and could determine matters of life and death without appeal: yet did not he execute or judge any, but by the laws of Arms. That which in common terms some call executing by martial law, when innocent men are hanged without for me of law, or cause, may better be called martial force, then martial law. For this hath only place in wars, and redresseth disorders against military proceed. 
e Si quid fraudulenter dux secerit, de eo tenebitur. L. in personam. § generabile. ff. de reg. iur.  Finally the General, whatsoever his commission is, may not deal fraudulently in his charge, nor proceed contrary to military profession, and practise: in which case every General is subject 
f ff. ad leg. jul. mayest. l. 1. & 2.  to the law.  
Very necessary therefore it is, that Generals should have their commissions large, both in respect of their provision, which by this means may in some sort be supplied, and in respect of the expedition and 
g Imperator liberè ad summam imperri consulere debet. Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  execution of wars, which ought not to be hindered, nor can conveniently be prescribed. And without large authority, neither can our own soldiers, nor associates be well governed. The experience of the service in the Low Countries, and disorders at sea, which for want of power have not been redressed, do minister unto us sufficient proof of this matter. Some will say, that it is dangerous to commit so large power into any man's hands, especially if he should deal disloyally. But what a reason is this, because men may abuse their power, not to give them sufficient power for those matters which are committed to their charge? Those that mean disloyally toward the State, although they should have never so straight limitations in their commissions, would not stand upon terms, and words of law. And rather it giveth them occasion of discontentment, when they see themselves disinherited, then bridleth any evil purpose, if they should do against their allegiance. And why should any man without cause suspect any noble man, that he will deal against his Country, having so many pledges of his loyalty? but if any should be so evil disposed, yet may we not think, that all his army would follow him, rebelling against his Country. And if they should, yet is it not the force of one army, that can prevail against a whole kingdom that is well governed. And therefore for fear of disloyalty of some; let no man fear, or omit to make sufficient provision; and rather let loyal men be sought out with diligence, and disloyal men removed, then that the necessary provisions of war should be neglected, or the proceeding hindered for want of authority.   

CHAP. four Part 5. Of the choice of Colonels, and Captains of companies, and other officers of the army, and their qualities and office.  
divers other points concerning the place, charge, and office of the General, deserve also to be particularly handled; as namely, who hath authority to appoint Generals, in what case the Prince himself is to come in person into the field, how far the General ought to hazard himself, and generally what belongeth to his office: but the same may partly be understood, by that which hath been spoken already, & shall more evidently be declared in this treatise, (for the execution of all these matters appertaineth especially to the direction of the General.) And now we haste to speak of such matters, as concern rather the managing of war, than questions of right.  
It is sufficiently known, that the power to make war or peace, is a mark of sovereignty, & belongeth to the sovereign magistrate, and to those to whom he shall 
a Quintio liberum arbitrium pacis, ac belli permissum, Liu. 32.  commit it. The nomination likewise of the General belongeth to those that have sovereign power in the State. As is evident by the histories of the Romans, Greeks, Persians, & all nations, L. Martius was chosen General by the relics of Scipio's army in Spain, but that was in case of necessity, & endured no longer, then unto such time, as they had other captains sent them from Rome. To take upon him a charge without commission, is within case of treason, & savoureth of rebellion. The Prince is not to hazard his person, nor his honour upon every light occasion. King Henry the 3. of France, returning out of Poland, received a scorn at the siege of Liuron, a paltry Hamlet in Dauphinè, for that being present in person, & that being his first attempt after his return into his kingdom, he could not achieve it. The French since their King was taken by the English, do not easily suffer their kings to come in person into the field. But if the 
a Si status imperij, aut salus provinciarum in discrimine vertatur, princeps debet in acie stare. Tacit. lib. 4.  state or crown come in question, as in the wars betwixt Henry the 7. and Richard the 3. betwixt Otho, and Vitellius: Vitellius and Vespasian, then is the Prince's presence required in the army.  
The third point, by that which hath been spoken already may be resolved. For in a General, wisdom & courage would be so tempered, that neither he hazard his person further than reason, nor doubt to execute good counsel for fear. The taking of Francis the French king by the Spaniards, & king john by the English, put the Realm of France in great hazard. The death of Gaston de Fois at Ravenna, of Cyrus in the expedition against Artaxerxes, who died by their rashness in the midst of their victories, turned to the loss of both their armies. Yet may not a General hide himself from danger, as did the coward 
b Tacitus.  Vitellius. The whole office of the General consisteth in the speeding, & direction of all matters of war; of which we have occasion to entreat in this whole discourse. And therefore for these points this may be sufficient.  
Now for that the General cannot do all himself, but must use colonels, captains, and officers, for the execution of his commandments; we are to show what pains, & care he is to have, that they be well chosen, & do their duty sufficiently. Colonel's would be chosen of such noblemen, knights, & gentlemen, as for their years, service, experience, discretion, manhood, and other virtues do best deserve those places. The place of a colonel doth very well answer unto the tribunes office in the Roman army. whose orders also we might do well to observe in ours. By an old custom saith 
c Veteri instituto ad tribunatum nemo admittebatur nisi qui alam duxisset. Veget.  Vegetius, none was made tribune, or colonel, but such as had lead a company of old soldiers before. Hadrian the Emperor expressly forbade 
d In vita Adriani Lamprid.  beardless youths to aspire to that charge. 
e Arian. Alex, exped.  Alexander in his expedition against Darius, made choice of such for captains of thousands, as for their continuance in his father's service, had their hair grey, and their judgement ripe. These are employed oft times in some special service, as in the keeping of a strait, or of a Fort, or conducting of victuals, or munition: and therefore would have great skill in all proceed of war; especially in the government of such things, as are committed unto their charge. Among the Romans the 
a Tribunorum munus fuit castrorum & exercitus curam gerere, ne sine munimento, aut custodiis sint, per vigiles excubias jubere, milites dicto audientes habere, ad exercitationes ducere, vigilias circumire, frumentationibus interest, querelas militum audire, frumentum probare, delicta leviora coërcere, valetudinariorum & sauciorum curam gerere, milites juramento adigere. L. officium §. officium ff. de re milit.  Tribune office was, in seeing to the defences of the camp, placing of guards, setting the watch, keeping the soldiers in order, exercising them, going the round, leading forth the soldiers to fetch in provision, seeing the soldiers victuals to be wholesome, hearing of the complaints of soldiers, correcting smaller faults, looking to th' sick & hurt, providing for them, & taking their oaths at their first entrance. Now these offices belong partly to the L. Marshal, or masters of the camp, partly to the sergeant mayor, partly to such inferior captains and officers, as have that special charge imposed upon them, and partly as other good orders, so these offices of colonels also are either omitted, or slenderly exercised. Now this only belongeth unto colonels, that they have their regiment and the captains and soldiers thereof in order, that they lead the same in service, and do such special services, as are committed unto them.  
Centurions, or captains of companies, would be chosen of the most strong, valiant, discreet, and active soldiers: such especially as both know the train of wars, & are of body able to endure labour. Their office is to lead, and govern their men, to look that their bodies, arms, and clothes be in order: that they have victuals, and things necessary, & execute such special commandments as are given them. There is no certain rule of their office to be prescribed. For as there are more or fewer companies together; so they do more or less. Where there are but 2. or 3. companies together, the captains do all, as chief commanders in an army: where an army standeth together, they should be the first men of their companies: out of array they are to attend the general officers commandments. One had custonie some have, that they finger their soldiers pay, & some of them hardly refinger it, or deliver it where it is due. But the worst of all is, that under colour of bad dealing of some, neither captains nor soldiers are well paid. The custom was borrowed first from the Italians: and is corrected by the Spaniards, as many things else in the captains office, which we might do well likewise to reform, especially the confusion of weapons, & marshalling of the captains, & their officers: which if it be not otherwise then now it is, in great armies would breed great confusion.  
These 
a Honoris augmentum non ambitione, said labour, ad unumquemque convenit pervenire. Ne debet quis ad dignitatem suffragio, sed laboribus atque ordine numerorum provehi. L. contra Pub. C. de re milit. lib. 12. & l. 1. & 2. Cod. de office magist. office  honours are to be departed according unto men's deserts, not won by ambitious suit; by labour, not by letters, & request: but this may rather seem a wish, than a precept in these times, when as places have been sold at the pleasure of barbers, & scrivenoes, and some given for the love of ladies. The abuse is but too ancient, yet never so far enured as now. Tully at the 
b Cic. ad Attic.  request of Brutus, bestowed a colonels place upon Scaptius which he refused. And writing to Caesar in the favour of 
c Huic ego neque tribunatum, neque praefecturam peto. Cic. ad Caes. ep. fam.  Trebatius, he showeth, the such places were sometimes granted of favour but seldom without desert. He objecteth against 
d Centuriatus palàm vendidit, ordines per servum assignavit. Cic. in Pison.  Piso as a great reproach, that he sold the places of captains, and other rooms, and inferior offices, at the request of his scribes, and slaves. Caesar in 
e Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Africa dismissed certain of his colonels & captains, with this speech to disgrace them, that they had gotten those places for favour without desert. Afterward when the centurion began to take money of the common soldier for absence, and redemption of other disorders, of which Tacitus 
f Per sordes & avaritiam Fonteius Capito adimebat, & assignabat militiae ordines. Tacit. 17.  complaineth; the centurions place began to be also set to sale: which was a great cause of the corruption of military discipline among the Romans, and cannot choose, but also work bad effects among us, if it be continued. There is none that buyeth his place, that willingly doth hazard his carcase, or hath other respect then of gain. And no marvel if the common soldiers be peeled, where the captains at their entrance are so pinched.  
The places of 
g Populus tribunos ad 4. primas legiones dixit, reliquos coss. Liu. 27.  colonels were sometime given by the people of Rome, but most commonly, & with greatest reason, by the Generals. For otherwise if it were, how could they reward those that best deserved? Therefore did Aemilius 
h Liu. 42.  Paulus make request, that he might bestow those places upon men of greatest worth and merit: which said he, is for the honour also, and profit of the common wealth.  
Centurions were always chosen by the Generals, and by them advanced for their 
i Virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti. Caes. bell. gal. 6.  virtue. Caesar preferred Scaeva to the highest centurions room in in the legion, for his noble service at Dyrrachium. Among 
k Exped. Cyr. 2.  the Greeks, those that were next in degree, succeeded in their places that were next about them, if any thing came at them.  
The officers of companies, namely lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants, corporals, are chosen by the captains of companies. But much better it were, if as some do, so all did choose them of their most able and valiant soldiers, without respect, or favour.  
Other officers, are chosen some for the government, others for the provision of the army. Of the sort are the campmasters or marshals with their sergeant mayor, & field coporals, colonel general, lieutenant general of the horse, scoutemasters, trenchmasters, quartermasters, and such like. Which all tend one way, & are but parts of the General's duty, which in time passed he executed by his legates, or lieutenants & tribunes. The master of the Ordnance, & captain of pioneers are likewise but of a late invention, since the use of artillery came in, and soldiers through sloth began to refuse the labours of war. The judge and provost marshal succeed also in a part of the General's care for deciding and executing matters of justice. The muster-master likewise is of a late stamp, namely since captains began to pay the soldiers, and Princes began to be defrauded of their numbers, and their treasure. Of the second sort are all Commissaries for the pay of soldiers, for victuals, arms, munition, carriages, and whatsoever other provision necessary. For good choice whereof there is but one general rule to be observed, to wit, that all partiality and affection laid aside, such be placed in government as be skilful, loyal, valiant, diligent, and have respect of honour, not of profit, and in offices of provision, such as have knowledge in such matters, & will deal faithfully. Such as ambitiously, or greedily sue for such places, are not lightly to be heard: and although they be once placed; yet if they be convicted of insufficiency, or negligence, or fraud, they are exemplarly to be punished, or at the least removed.   

CHAP. four Part 6. Of musters, and choice of common soldiers.  
THe General's chief care, is about the choice of his chief officers, colonels, & captains of companies: yet may he not neglect the choice even of common soldiers. A matter in our times either not at all, or very little regarded. For when occasion is offered of service: then for the most part order is given either to the officers of every Parish, to take up rogues, or masterless men, or inhabitants of prisons, such as if they had their deserts, they were to be sent rather to the gallows, then to the wars for the most part: or if a greater number must be taken; to the officers in the Country, men for the most part ignorant of warlike actions, and such as have no other respect most commonly, then to disburden the Parish of rogues, loiterers, pikars, & drunkards, and such as no other way can live. Among that which there is no honest man, but would be loath to be numbered. If any other be chosen, it is for some private respect or grudge. And of those that are chosen, if they have either friends, favour, or money, most of them are dismissed. And sure when I consider how in foreign nations men are sent to the slaughter, few in number, unprovided, unfurnished, unpaid, and peeled of their governors, contrary to all order of service; I must needs say, these men are the fittest to be sent. But if Princes mean to have their honour and country defended, or their estate maintained, or service done upon the enemy, they must have more regard to choose men of more strength, honesty, and ability; such as have reason to fight for their Country, and have care of their honest reputation, and are ashamed of villainy, and lewd doing. For how can captains encourage those to fight for their country, lands, goods, and honour, that have neither house nor home, nor respect of honesty or shame, nor care though all were fired, so they might hook somewhat? and yet forsooth the Generals & commanders, that of late time have been employed have been blamed, that they have not observed the rules of military discipline among these men. As if it were possible to keep famished men from snatching of victuals, or drunkards from drink, or to master men that are masterless, or to keep rogues in order, or to make loyterours to work, or pilferors to march in array and keep order, or to preserve them alive that have neither pay, nor provision in time, nor one penny to help themselves in their need. If they will therefore have order kept, let them choose out men capable of government, & soldiers, not rascals. With great care this abuse ought to be reform: for it is a point very material. 
a Lib. 1. de re milit. c. 7.  Vegetius doubted not to place both the strength of the Roman army, & the foundation of the Roman Empire, in the first choice and trial of their soldiers. Therefore were the Generals either present themselves at the musters, or else did they employ men of knowledge, gravity, and honesty, as hath been already declared. Those that through covetousness or favour did corrupt their orders for musters, were detested and punished. 
b Motus senatu Pedius Blaesus ob delectum militarem pretio & ambitione corruptum.  Pedius Blaesus for this cause was ignominiously put out of the Senate. Such as sought gain by this shameful practice, are taxed by 
c Delectum Batavorum onerabant ministri avaritia ac luxu, senes autinualidos conquirendo, quos pretio dimitterent. Tac. 20.  Tacitus, as doing a thing rare, and not tolerable.  
When this disorder grew great, they forbade by express law, all men to take money, either for 
a Neque ob militem legendum dimittendúmue aes accipiat. ff. ad leg. jul. repetund. l.  choosing, or dismissing of soldiers. They that answered not to their names at musters among the Romans, were taken and imprisoned, and their goods sold, as Livy witnesseth. In the time of 
b Val. Max. li. 6. ca 3.  Traianus the Emperor, one that made his son unable to serve in the wars, was banished his country. So were it to be wished, that men of honour and skill, deputed by the General, were present at the musters, and that all able men would offer themselves to do their country service: that such as choose men unable to excuse others, or else do dimisse sufficient men for money, were themselves dismissed and severely punished: and finally, that such were chosen that have somewhat in their country to lose, and to carry with them for maintenance of themselves, if need be. But this is only to be wished, in such service as for good order, and sufficient number is like to prove honourable, and when men shall be better provided and paid, and more account made of them. 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pericl. Thucid. 1.  Now some make account of money, & no account of men, like to the Athenians, that lamented the loss of their goods, and not of men's persons, which are infinitely more in value. In these disorders it is not fit, that others should be employed in wars, than such as now are. which some call pressed men, for that they go as willingly to service, as to hanging or pressing; and money imprested cometh either rarely, or is taken from them. My only hope is, that one day there willbe better provision, and proceeding in wars, at what time these rules may better be put in execution. In the mean time we may learn what hath been the practice of times passed in the choice of soldiers, and what rules aught now to be practised.  
In the choice of soldiers, we are especially to respect three things: first, the strength of the body: secondly, the vigour and virtues of the mind: and thirdly, the manner and trade of the parties living. Vegetius, and certain idle Italians, give precepts concerning the climate, country, and divers situations of regions, which they would have in the choice of soldiers to be respected: but experience teacheth us, that oft times valiant men are found in Cities, and fruitful Countries, yea under hot climates which they condemn, and cowards in hills and rocks, and Northern Regions, which they commend. True it is, that Northern people are commonly more valiant and venturous, than those of Asia & Africa, that are from us far East, and south. But what doth that consideration help us, that make our levies of soldiers not in Asia nor Africa; but here in England, and Ireland, and thereabout? whether therefore soldiers be brought up in the city or country, or bred in hills or valleys, or champain country, in the north or south of England, I respect not: but if they have strength of body to endure labours, and a mind vigorous and courageous, and an honest disposition, and have lived such a life, as hath been tried sometimes in labour, I refuse them not wheresoever they have been bred. Nay I wish to have such. Contrariwise cowards and weak persons, and men of lewd conditions, or which have been tenderly brought up, I would refuse although they come from the north or hilly countries.  
Pyrrhus gave orders to his commissioners for mosters to choose big and corpulent men. Marius' made choice of men of great stature. But if I might be heard, I would neither wish such men to be sought for: (for seldom are great and big men able to endure travel) nor men of a mean or short stature to be refused, if they have strong and active bodies. Men of mean stature are for the most part more vigorous and courageous; they do more easily endure labours, and commonly excel great bodied men in swiftness and running, which is a matter in a soldier very requisite and commendable. 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Achilles was much commended for that he was swift of foot, and 
b He was called Cursor.  Papirius took his name and commendation of running. 
c Vtilius est fortes esse milites, quàm grandes. Veget. lib. 1. c. 6.  Vegetius saith, it is bettet to have stout and strong, then huge and big soldiers. Such Caesar commonly did choose. and experience showeth us, that men burdened with flesh can neither endure labour, nor hurts, whereas the mean stature and habit of body endureth both.  
For trial of the strength of a man's body, we are not only to look upon the lineaments, and outward proportion of the parts, but rather what the party can do in running, leaping, wrestling, & such like exercises. For oftentimes an evill-favoured body may have a quick strength, and tall & big persons may prove weak, dainty, & sickly. By the outward appearance, we may notwithstanding make a probable conjecture of a man's strength. For they that have a likely body, and a sharp countenance, and hard flesh & sinewy arms and legs, rather than full or fleshy, are likely to prove strong men. Yet do not orders of war admit old men past 46. unless they be old soldiers, for that their strength is decaying, and their bodies less apt to labour: nor youths under 20. unless it be some that by trial declareth himself to have strength, for that as yet they are not come to their full pitch and strength.  
But that which specially commendeth soldiers, is the vigour of the mind, and good conditions, conjectured by the visage & outward behaviour, but known only by their conversation; which is to be learned of others. If the man be a known coward, or of a dull disposition, or mutinous, or given to drink, or thievery, or other disorders, howsoever his body seem answerable, yet for his lewd manners he proveth for the most part unprofitable: and is therefore to be repelled, or blotted out of the roll. In a soldier therefore I require first, 
a  audaces sint & animum habeant & considentiam militarem. Veget. lib. 1. c. 8.  a vigorous and present mind, and that he be not afraid of danger, nor drawn sword: nor that he despair in trouble, or think of death before it cometh, nor yield though cast down, so long as by any possibility he may hope to rise again.  
Constancy also and resolution is much by 
b De bell. ciu. 3.  Caesar commended, and the only thing that atchieveth great enterprises. For many are the hazards of war, and things succeed not always at the first. Without obedience and observance of military orders, all other virtues are without effect. Let the soldier therefore be obedient, and quiet. Those that 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plutar. in Agid. & Cleo.  are most obedient to laws, prove for the most part most valiant against the enemy. It is a principal mark of a valiant soldier, if he dare do what he is commanded by his superiors. Contrariwise they that are mutinous against their governors, and are ever bragging, as if wars consisted in words only, are seldom good soldiers, or brave men in trial. soldiers would likewise be of quiet behaviour, and temperate in their diet. There is no use said 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2.  Clearchus of an army that is riotous, and out of order.  
I would likewise wish that soldiers were religious, and think it very requisite, if it might be obtained. The very Pagans did nothing before they had consulted with oracles, or sought to know the pleasure of God by 
e Nil nisi auspicatò gerebant. Xenop. exp. Cyr. 2. Cic. de nature. deor. 3.  birds, or entrails of beasts (for that was their ignorance) and believed that all evil success in their wars came to them for neglect of religion, & God's worship. How much more than ought Christians to be religious? There is nothing that more confirmeth the soldiers mind, then when he is persuaded that God favoureth him, & the goodness of his cause. nor worketh more assured resolution to die, then when men understand they go to a better life. Contrariwise men of a bad conscience are always timorous and doubtful. I know blasphemers, swearers, and Atheists, will laugh at this rule. But what wonder when they laugh also at God and religion? these men will one day weep for their laughter. I pray God that others suffer not for their Atheism, and contempt of religion.  
Finally, soldiers would be more desirous of praise than of gain. Such doth Xenophon report Cyrus his 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenop. exped. Cyr. 1.  soldiers that followed him against Artaxerxes to have been. And no small commendation is it in soldiers, to be afraid of reproof, and desirous of honest report. Men of honest condition & shamefast, while they 
b Honestas idoneum reddit militem, & verecundia dum prohibet fugere, facit esse victorem. Veget. lib. 1.  are ashamed to fly, win the victory, & win to themselves the reputation of good soldiers. Swearers, the eves, rogues, whoremongers, drunkards, do better become the jail than the camp. And our 
c Non ca constantia gladiatoribus ad praelia, quae militibus. Tacit. 18.  great cutters & hackers, in the streets of London, are seldom great hackers of the enemy.  
The third point which we are to respect in the choice of soldiers, is the trade of their living, although not in equal degree with the other two. For many to win themselves a living, are oftentimes driven to follow base occupations, that otherwise are courageous, & of a liberal disposition, & have bodies fit for labour. So that although the Spartans and 
d Opificum vulgus & sellularii minimè militiae idoneum genus. Liu. 8.  Romans refused such for soldiers, as exercised manual occupations, and kept shops, yet do I not think they deserve generally to be refused, but only such of them as be weak, tender, and effeminate. All those that are hardened with labour; as 
e Ex agricolis viri fortissimi. Cato de re rust. Veget. lib. 1.  husbandmen for the most part, and those that can sufferraine, heat, and cold, and use to far hard, and lie hard, and sleep little prove brave men. Our young gentlemen & servingmen, are easily trained, & made fit for the wars. But of all others the old soldier, if such may be had, of what trade soever he is, deserveth the first place. They are so far to be praised above young soldiers, as artificers excel their apprentices. A handful of tried soldiers hath often put to flight multitudes of men not exercised in wars: & contrariwise seldom do young soldiers abide the chamaillis, & hammering of arms. Caesar's old soldiers were invincible. And Annibals tried soldiers of Africa, of which nation now no reckoning is made, did give divers foils to the Romans; these being unexercised, those having been long indurat in wars. It were therefore to be wished, that more account were made of valiant men, that have long served their prince, & country: in the choice of young soldiers it is sufficient, if the former rules be observed.   

CHAP. four Part. 7. Of the Oath of a soldier.  
Soldiers enroled, armed, and furnished, would in case orders of war were observed, be charged with an oath, that they should come to the place & at time assigned, and faithfully serve their Prince and country, living in obedience to their governors and superior officers, and those military laws which are by the General and his counsel, or the estates of the realm ordained for the good government of the army. This was used by the Romans, Athenians, and other warlike nations in time past, and is not now in our times thought inconvenient. The 
a Licurg. in orat. adversus Leocrit.  Athenians when they came to military years, and were enroled in the moster rolls, did swear that they would neither dishonour the profession of arms, nor forsake their array, but would defend their country and enlarge the honour of it to their uttermost power. The same is reported yet more particularly by 
b In Demost. ora. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Ulpian, who showeth the place, the manner, and effect of their oath, and that in the temple of Agraulos they came and swore having their arms on, that they would fight for their country. The words as Pollux hath them are in effect thus much: I will not (said he that swore) dishonour the profession of arms, I will not forsake my Captain, I will fight for the religion, and laws of my country, in array and alone: I will sail whither I shall be appointed; I will obey laws and not suffer them to be abrogated: I will observe the religion of my country, and so let God help me and defend me. Gellius out of Cincius his books of war describeth the form of the oath of the Roman soldiers in these words: Cum delectus fieret & milites scriberentur, in iusiurandum eos tribunus militaris adigebat hoc modo: in magistratu C. Laelij C. F. Cos. L. Cornelij C. F. Cos. in exercitu, decemque millia prope furtum non facies dolo malo, solus neque cum pluribus: pluris nummi argentei in dies singulos, extra hastam, hastile, ligna, pabulum, utrem, follem, faculam, si quid ibi inveneris, sustuleris quod tuum non erit, quod pluris nummi argentei erit, uti tu ad C. Laelium C. F. Cos. L. Cornelium. P. F. Cos. sive ad quem eorum alter iusserit proferas, aut profitebere in triduo proximo quicquid inveneris sustulerísue dolo malo, aut domino suo cuium id censebis esse, uti quòd rectè factum esse voles, etc. The sum and effect of which oath is, that no soldier should steal, or take any thing from any other soldier, & that whatsoever they found, except it were for the use of wars, as weapons, or provision for themselves, or their horses or such like, they should bring it to the General or to the officer thereto deputed if it were more worth 
a Nummus argenteus Rom. was a piece of coin somewhat more than our vi. pence.  them 6. d. Finally they swore that they should come at the day appointed, unless lawful causes did stay them, & not departed without licence. Livy also mentioneth a form of oath, which the Romans at first did voluntarily swear, afterward they were driven to do it of duty. The effect of it was, 
b Vbi ad decu●iatum aut centuriatum convenissent, sua voluntate ipsi inter se equites decuriau, centuriati pedites iurabant, sese fugae aut formidinis ergô non abituros, neque ex ordine recessuros, nisi teli sumendi aut petendi, aut hostis feriendi, aut civis seruandi causa. Liu. 22.  that they should not fly away for fear, nor go out of their array, unless it were to take up a weapon, or to strike the enemy, or to save their companion. Beside this oath which commonly they took when they were first enroled, they sometimes swore, that they would not return to their tents without victory. This oath Marc. Flavolenus took, as the Romans were to join battle with the 
c Liu. 2.  Hetruscians. And 
d Caes. de bell. ciu. 3.  Labienus, & Pompey's soldiers in the encounter betwixt Pompey and Caesar in the fields of Pharsalia swore likewise: but all did not perform it. Some fearing the revolt of their soldiers have used to bind them by special oath not to abandon their leaders, which as Caesar reporteth, was practised by Petreius, & Afranius 
e Caes. de bell. ciu. 3.  in Spain. 
f Samnitium milites adigebantur juramento, diro carmine in execrationem capitis familiae & stirpis composito, nisi issent in praelium, quo imperatores duxissent, & si aut ipse ex acie fugisset, aut si quem fugientem vi disset, non extemplo occidisset. Liu. lib. 10.  The Samnites being oftentimes foiled by the Romans, did swear, that they would follow wheresoever their captains did lead them, and that neither themselves would fly out of the field, nor suffer others to fly, but would kill them presently: if otherwise they did, they cursed themselves, their family, and lineage. The Romans placed such religion in the oath of a soldier, that some of them thought it not lawful for others to fight with the enemy, than such as had taken the solemn oath of a soldier. Cato desired Aemilius Paulus General of the Roman army in Macedonia, that either he would send away his son, which together with the regiment wherein he served was cassed, or else would minister a new oath unto him. 
g Negabat ius esse, qui miles non sit, pugnare cum host. Cic office 〈◊〉  For that he thought it not lawful for him that was no sworn soldier, to fight with the enemy. The effect of this oath howsoever men make now account of oaths, yet to them must needs be great, that esteemed 
h Famae ac sidei maiora sunt damna, quàm quae aestimari possunt.  the breach of promise, and loss of their good name irreparable. When the Duke of 
i Sancho de Lond,  Alva went about to reform divers disorders in the Spanish soldiers, among other points it was ordained that every soldier should at their entrance take a solemn oath, to serve the king faithfully, & to be obedient to their captains and officers, and not to departed the army nor from their colours without licence in writing. The words of the ordnance are these: Que todos los soldados despues de ser elegidos por sus capitanes, con las circumstantias que en tal'election se requiere all tiempo de ser admitidos por los officiales del sueldo con juramento solemn se obliguen a servingman bien y fielmente a su magd, y a sus capitanes generales, a obedescer a todos sus superiores, a no partir se del'exercito, ni de sus compannias sin licencia en escrito de quien se la pudiere dare. This oath is now also most necessary, when all bonds of military orders are little enough. But unless the soldier have his pay, and things be governed according to the due practice of war: to minister an oath to every poor soldier, were nothing else, but among other miseries, to bind poor men's consciences with plain perjury.   

CHAP. four Part. 8. Wherein is proved, that soldiers chosen of our own nation are far to be preferred before strangers, and hired men.  
THe great dangers that have befallen divers Princes, and states by foreign forces, that have come in their aid, have given me occasion, as before I have showed, what other qualities I thought requisite in soldiers; so now to declare of what nation I would have them chosen; lest using foreign forces, we might incur like danger. The soldiers therefore that are to be employed in defence of this realm, I would have chosen out of the natural subiectts of this realm. Be they English, or Welsh, or Irish, so they be subjects, it skilleth not. When I compare the people of this land with other nations, I see no reason, why I should prefer any before them. And although my testimony may seem partial: yet the steps of our ancestors prowess, as yet remaining in France, Flanders, Spain, Portugal, Scotland, and other countries cannot lie. If then those orders by which our ancestors obtained such glory, or else the rules of war were restored; who seethe not that this nation would match any other? neither aught any man to esteem the forces of this country, by that which hath passed of late in France, Portugal, or the Low countries, where our soldiers have been for the most part on the weakest side, destitute of horse, unprovided of carriages, & wanted victuals, and arms, and munitions, & many things necessary. But seeing they have done such things at such disadvantage, they may think, our men would have done much more, if the party had been equal, or our men better provided and furnished. Beside this, soldiers chosen of this nation, are bound with a straighter bond to their prince & country, than any stranger. They have more reason to fight, having not only the defence of their prince and country, but also their religion, laws, liberty, wives and children committed to their hands, they are more patiented in adversity, & have less cause to revolt. Wanting of pay or part of their pay (which God wots they may percase do oft times) they notwithstanding continue constant, and loyal. If they offend having their wives, children, lands, goods, and friends behind them, they are more easily corrected. Finally, less pay doth content our soldiers, than any foreign nation. I doubt not, but if that money which hath been cast away upon the Dutch, and French had been employed upon our poor country soldiers, the country had been better stored with money, and the people better provided for wars, and greater service done upon the enemy.  
Let us now compare strangers unto the subjects of this land. There is at all no trust in them. 
a Infidas ven●lésque manus, ibi fas ubi maxima merces.  Their hands are saleable, their hearts faithless. They account that cause best, where they may have most hire. It is folly (saith 
b Polyb. lib. 2.  Polybius) and want of judgement to put trust in strangers being more in number, and strength than our own nation. The first time that ever the Romans used mercenary soldiers was, when the two Scipios were governors of their forces in Spain. Those two being together with their army betrayed, and ruinated by the Celtiberians, that forsook them in their need, may be an evident 
c Liu. 24.  document never to trust strangers, unless we have force to command them, and constrain them. Annibal 
d Liu. 23.  abandoned by the Spanish and Numidian horsemen was greatly weakened. 
e Liu. 23.  Mutines forsaking the Carthaginians, in whose succour he came out of Numidia, disordered all their affairs in Sicily. The Romans giving themselves to pleasures and ease, and using foreign forces of Germans, and Gauls, ruinated that huge Empire, which was left them by their ancestors. Which (as Tacitus saith) were invincible so long as they used their own soldiers. The Gauls 
f Qua nihil in exercitu Rom. firmum nisi externum. Tacit. 3.  revolted from the Romans, because they saw no strength in the Roman army, but that which was of strangers. Of whom they presumed, that they would not join with the Romans against them. The Thessalian horsemen forsaking the Athenians in the battle of 
a Thucid. 1.  Tanagra, occasioned the victory to the Lacedæmonians their enemies. The same had happened to the 
b Thucid. 4.  Lacedæmonians by the treachery of the Macedonians, that forsook them when the Thracians charged them, had not the resolution of Brasidas remedied the disorder. The departure of 
c Guicciar. 15.  6000. Grisons, that left Francis the first of France before Pavy, was the beginning of his weakness. 2000 mercenary men leaving Maximilian the Emperor, broke his enterprise against the Venetians. 
d Guicciar. 2.  Fabritio & Prospero Colonna although highly advanced by Charles the 8. of France, yet in the end revolted to Ferdinand. In the days of Ed. the 3. Rich. the 2. Hen. the 5. and 6; the greatest 
e Froissart.  losses we had in France, happened by the revolt of the French, which our men without cause trusted. When all was lost, yet did we retain Caleis, until it was taken from us by force, for that it was kept, & peopled by the English nation. Yet the same was almost betrayed by an Italian, to whom Edw. the 3. gave it in guard. How the Germans that came into France of late in aid of the Protestants, under the Dukes of Bovillion, & the baron Donaw behaved themselves, I report me to the memory of those poor gentlemen, that by their disloyalty and treason, were left as a spoil to the enemy.  
Oft times strangers not only forsake their friends, but also join with the enemy, & oppugn them. The 
f Liu. 21.  Gauls in the 2. wars with Carthage, flew the watch of the Romans by night, & fled, & joined themselves with Annibal. The Dutchmen that Charles the 8. of France, left in the kingdom of 
g Guicciar. lib. 3.  Naples for the defence thereof, corrupted with money took part with the enemy. The 
b Tacit. 20.  Romans betrayed by their associates, at one time were slain both by them, & by the enemy. The ancient Britons using in time past the help of the Saxons, were by them driven out of their native country. The like happened to the 
i Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Sequanians long before. For requiring aid of the Germans against the Heduans their neighbours, they were driven out of their own possessions by those that came to secure them. 
k Sallust. bell. jugurth.  jugurtha by the treachery of certain Thracians, that served the Romans in Africa, entered the Roman camp in the night, and made a great slaughter therein. The Turks are now in possession of Constantinople, in aid whereof they first came out of Asia. Strangers are never satisfied with any pay, & yet seldom do they any service. The 
l Dimissi Galli pecuniam ingentem sine labore ac periculo partam retulerunt. Liu. 10.  Gauls hired by the Hetruscians, carried away their money without doing any service against the Romans. When the French had foiled the enemy, than the hired Swissers, and Dutchmen crying for money hindered their victory. They took money (saith 
a Guicciar. lib. 2. & 12.  Guicciardin) of all hands, & did service to none. It is not possible (saith he) to manage the 
b Impossible a manegiar li Suizzerisenza denari infiniti. Guicciar. lib 9  Swissers without infinite treasure. It is long to report all the discourses of their insatiable covetousness, & treasons. Of king Edw. the 3. purposing to recover his right in France Froissart saith, that with great sums of money he hired the Dutch to join with him, but he got no aid of them, nor other advancement, but a vain title of Lieutenant to the Emperor. Not long since the 
c Hie duitch, or Germans.  Dutch calling for money when they should fight, gave the victory to the Duke of Alva their enemy, and betrayed their General the Prince of Orange.  
There is nothing more cowardly than strangers, when they come to service. They are 
d Non fide, non affectu tenentur. Sine pudore flagitii fugiunt. Tacit. in vit. Agric.  not retained by affection nor regard promise, and shame not to fly to save their skins.  
Nothing can be devised more disorderly, nor ravenous. The Swissers took their own Captains prisoners in Lombardy, and kept them as pledges until they had money. They rebelde against Lewis Sforza, and sold the 
e Guicciar. li. 13.  poor Duke for Crowns. The mercenary soldiers of Laurence Medici, and Frances Maria did spoil the Marquisat of Ancona worse, then if they had been enemies. For these causes the French king 
f Guicciardin.  Lewis the xii. said, it was better to be without Swissers, then to have them. And in the end Francis the first training 7. legions, or regiments of his own people, determined to use no other soldiers, then of his own nation. the troubles of that kingdom, I think, are cause that the order was left off.  
Those therefore that would employ money upon French or Dutch, rather than upon their own soldiers, should but dishonour their nation, hurt the state, or affeeble their people, & bring 
g 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. polit.  the Prince in distrust with his subjects without cause. Such men in time past were thought to have tyrannical conceirs, & wish that neither the native soldier should rise in honour, nor wealth, nor any subject become better practised in wars: and all to the end that they may grow rich themselves and swallow down the spoils of their Country, without fear of accounts, or controlment. And many do think, that if the English had but had that treasure and favour, that the Hie Dutch have had, this State had been better assured, and the enemy better cooled, and more honourable service performed.   

CHAP. IIII Part. 9 Of the soldiers pay.  
But forasuiuch as neither strangers, nor subjects can be long maintained without pay, & because it will avail us nothing to levy soldiers, unless we pay them, & maintain them: therefore before we pass any further, let us put those, that have the government of wars committed unto them, in mind, that some order be taken for the payment of the soldiers. For want of pay many disorders be committed, many opportunities pretermitted. It is not possible, considering first the poverty of the common soldier, and then their small number, that either they can live of themselves, or win any thing from the enemy. For want of pay they spoil their friends, and associates, yea their companions, and commit many outrages. and who can execute justice upon them, that either must famish, or live upon spoil. For want of pay they sell their arms, their clothes, they grow sick, weak, and unprofitabe.  
Contrariwise, if they had their pay, justice might with more reason be executed, and their persons, arms, and clothes be kept in better estate, and many enterprises executed, that by weakness & want of the soldiers are broken. Lautreck riding post, came in good time himself to have settled the affairs of 
a Guicciar. li. 14.  Milan, if the 300. thousand Crowns, which were promised by the French king to be sent presently after him, had likewise come in post. For want of pay the soldiers disbanded▪ for want of pay, occasioned by I know not what frivolous delay, the Duchy of Milan was lost by the French. Soldiers are not paid with promises, nor words. The slow provision of money was the cause likewise of the rash enterprise, and overthrow of the French at the 
b Tardità di proveder denari, causa de larotta de Francesi à la Bic●cca. Guiccia. 14.  Bicock in Lombardy. The miserable nigardise, and slow dispatch of the Cardinal 
c Guicciar. 3.  San. Malo Treasurer to Charles the 8. of France, which deferred necessary payments beyond all reason, set all the affairs of the French in the kingdom of Naples in disorder, as Guicciardin testifieth, and the very things themselves declared. A very slow 
d Gente d'arme ●ardi di pagamenti caminauon● lentament. Guicciar. li. 3.  march it is, that soldiers without pay do make. Guicciardin speaking of the enterprise of Naples by Lautreck saith, that the same was hindered by nothing more, then by delays of pay; while such sums as should have been delivered before hand were paid him by piecemeal and out of time. A man cannot in this kind use too great expedition and diligence. nothing can be more hurtful herein then avarice and delay.  
Further many mutinies & disorders proceed of this only cause. I need not confirm it by examples, seeing there is none that hath followed the profession of arms any time, but knoweth it by his own experience. Contrariwise due pay doth bind the soldiers hearts to the General, as Livy declareth in the example 
a Annibal largè partiendo praedan, stipendia praeterita cum fide exoluendo, cunctos civium suorum, sociorumque animos in se sirmat. Liu. 21.  of Annibal.  
Without pay soldiers can neither do service, nor maintain themselves in strength, nor scarce live. With their 
b Hinc vestes, arma, tentoria. Tacit. 1. & in Polyb. 6.  pay they find themselves victuals, clothes, arms: with the same they secure themselves in sickness, and when they are hurt. This was the use in ancient time, and is now practised also.  
For this cause all warlike Nations have had due care that their soldiers might be orderly paid. 
c Liu. 2.  Porsena when the pay day came, sat by, while all his soldiers one by one received their pay. For that end they appointed 
d Tacit. annal. 11.  Treasurer's to attend on the General, and to pay the army. That Generals should then attend the pleasure of Treasurer's was as a thing monstrous in nature. When the Romans could not otherwise provide for their soldiers, the Senate decreed, that the 
e Aurea & argentea templotum ornamenta quae Numa consecraverat, ne militibus stipendium deesset, conflata sunt. Val. Max. l. 7. c. 6.  ornaments of gold, and silver which Numa Pompilius had consecrate, should be made into money, that they might be paid. This was in the time of Marius. When the common wealth of Rome had no money, the charge was laid upon rich men 
f Liu. 24.  proportionally. The Nobility and Gentry brought in, and lent sufficient. Some of the wealthiest in the need of the State served without pay. The 
g Hirt. de bell. Alexander.  Alexandrians in the wars against Caesar, by assigning to every man of ability certain soldiers to be kept, maintained the wars against him. And generally such order was taken among all nations for pay of the soldiers, that in all stories Greeke and Latin I scarce read of any one mutiny for want of pay.  
Some will percase reply and say, that there is no comparison betwixt the people of Rome, and us. And that it was an easy matter for that great Empire to pay their soldiers, which to us is so hard and grievous: some conceive that their soldiers were content with less pay, and others deem that the charge of wars is now greater than in those times: matters utterly mistaken. For not only the Romans, but also the Athenians, Thebans, Samnites, Aequians, Volscians, Hernicans, Sabines, and many other small States in comparison of this kingdom, maintained, and paid great armies many years. Yea when the 
a Liu. li. 9 & 10.  State and Territory of Rome was not the third part of England in bigness, yet did the same maintain one army against the Samnites, another in a contrary quarter against the Hetruscians, and the third at home against such of their neighbours, as were not perfectly to be trusted. The pay, all things considered, was then rather bigger then lesser in respect of our times. The 
b Decem in dies assibus anima & corpus aestimatur. Tacit. 1. It is a Roman soldiers speech there.  pay of the Romans was for every day a piece of money which they called Denarium, for that it contained decemasses. Although I confess that afterward the value of that Coin, was enhanced. that weigheth of our money seven. d. or thereabouts, as both Budey testifieth and I have tried, by weighing divers of the Coins, which I have seen in Italy, and otherwhere.  
The pay of the Athenian soldiers amounted to a piece of money which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for every day. So that both the pay of the Greeks and Romans came to one reckoning. for Denarius Romanus, and the Athenian Drachma, by 
c Alciat. de ponderib. & mensur.  account both of Merchants, and Physicians weighed alike, and was of one value. That the Athenian pay amounted to so much, as I have said, Thucydides shall witness, who saith, that the garrison of 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 3.88. Steph.  Potidaea had every man one Drachma for himself, and another for his esquire, that waited on him, daily. Consider the prices of things now, you shall find that their pay was greater than either ours which give commonly viii. d. a day, or the Spanish pay, which is iii ducats a month for a man, beside their Ventajas, as they call them.  
That the charge of wars is now greater, then in time past; is but an improbable surmise. For wherein ariseth the charge of an army now, but in victuals, arms, clothes, horses, carriages and such like, which were no less chargeable in time past, then now? powder we have now, and artillery, which in time past was not found out, but the charge of their engines, and the things about them, which now we need not, nor use, was no less chargeable to them. So that if we had that order and proceeding, which they had: there is no doubt but we are as well able to maintain an army, as they.  
Why a sufficient army should not be maintained and paid, I see no reason but want of military discipline. For seeing this land maintaineth so many millions at home, there is no reason, but the same should maintain 30. or 40. thousand of the same number abroad, if right discipline of arms were practised. The charge of an army is most in meat, and apperell. But in these things men spend no less at home, than abroad. I do think that albeit this land wanted money, yet if the army were well supplied with victuals and clothes by the Princes' Officers, that a great army might sufficiently be paid. For that money that should be delivered to the soldier, would most of it come back for victuals and clothes, of which this land (God be thanked) hath no want. The expenses of munitions, and arms, and other matters are in respect of this charge, nothing. But what should I talk of this course, when there wanteth neither money, nor other thing, but good orders well executed? The revenues of the Crown, the contributions of the subjects, and aid of our friends, are not so simple, but that there may be found maintenance sufficient, if men's good wills and loyal dealing were not wanting. Besides these if our army were sufficient to fight with the enemy, I would think, there were want of skill, or good order, if the same did not aswell live upon the enemy's spoils, as the Princes pay.  
Clearchus' 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  maintained his soldiers, by the contribution of the cities of Hellespont, where they lay. The Romans transporting an army into Asia, so wisely did the General proceed, that he maintained the same with the spoils of the Country, and writ back to the Senate, that for that year he needed neither 
b Liu. 40.  provision, nor pay. for the victory gave his army sufficient. But before Princes bring such a matter to pass, many disorders are to be redressed: men desirous of honour are to be appointed Officers: the rapines and filcheries of former times, and hereafter to, by strict Auditors and Commissioners are to be sifted out, and severely punished, as matters that disorder all armies. 
c avaritia di commessarij regij fraudando il re, ne pagamenti di soldati cagione della rotta di Garigliano. Guicciar. lib. 6.  Guicciardin shewerh it by the confusion that was in the French army at Gariglian, by the default and fraud of the king's Officers for pay. If those that kill a woman or a child of no great reckoning deserve death, what do they deserve that are the cause of the death of many valiant soldiers, and betray the Realm and their Prince into the hands of the enemy through their fraud, filcherie, and delays? the abuses in musters must also be redressed. Wherein I understand that Governors of late have been careful, and set down many good orders, but all cometh to this pass, that the Captains shall pay their soldiers: which doth promise no good effect in this matter. It is a notorious abuse to give the pay of the common soldier to the Centurion, or Captain of every band; never used by the Romans, nor other nation. It first came in among the Italians about two hundred and fifty, or two hundred years agone in their scambling wars among themselves. The reason was, for that the Prince that had wars hired the Captain out of some other State, and the Captain he hired such soldiers, as he could get. So that the Prince dealing with the Capatine must pay him, and the Captain must pay his soldiers. Which reason now ceasing, there is no cause why the abuse should continue. Further there are certain dead pays allowed to the captain, under colour whereof I doubt not but they will pass many dead men, or such as never were in mosters. It is as much as if he should be allowed to defraud a Prince a little, so it be but in six dead pays. But better it were and more honourable, if the Prince did allow the Captain an honourable and sufficient pay, and make others the paymasters. It is not possible now that matters should in these cases be redressed, seeing such as have interest in the gain, are made controllers of the offence.  
Were it not better to pay every soldier by the poll? better I say for the Prince. For if the soldiers acquittance, moster book, paymasters and controllers accounts agree, he cannot lightly be defrauded, either of his money, or of his numbers: better for the common soldier: for he shall have his due. Yea better for the Captains, for they should not be so condemned, as they are of the country, nor of their soldiers, and some very wrongfully: and who would for so small gain, incur the loss of his honour, or reputation? but thus they shall neither live themselves, nor be able to reward their soldiers: As if I wished them not larger pay, and with honester conditions. And as if they did use to reward their men, or that belonged to them. it is the General, that should do it upon their report, & not they.  
When 
a Citati milites nominatim, stipendium ad nomen singulis persolutum. Liu. 28.  Scipio paid his soldiers in Spain, every man received himself his due pay, man by man. Which was the continual practice of the 
b Stipendium praesens omnibus militibus dabatur. Liu. 23.  Romans. That I likewise confirmed by the example of Porsena the captain of the Hetruscians, who stood by 
c Liu. 2.  while every man received his stipend. Guicciardin disputing and weighing the causes why the Frenchmen in the expedition of Charles the 8. into the kingdom of Naples so easily prevailed, allegeth this for principal: that the King's soldiers were paid by the king's Officers, and not as the Italian use was, by the Captains. For which cause now at length also the Spaniard weary of this abuse, appointeth certain Officers to pay every soldier according to the 
a They call them Pagadores.  moster roll; and divers controllers of these paymasters.  
This I think to be the best means to remedy the want of pay, the fraud of Officers, the disorders of soldiers, and corruption of false mosters: whereby many Princes have been greatly abused, & are like to be further, if order be not taken. Before Pavy the 
b Guicciar. li. 15  French king Francis had not half the number of soldiers that were upon his moster books, which was the principal cause of the ruin of the army, and of the taking of the king, as Guicciardin affirmeth. The same was the ruin of the army of julio the 2. before 
c Guicciar. lib. 9  Gemuolo, and causeth many to presume further than reason, thinking their strength greater, & divers to detest wars; the disorders are so great. This I thought necessary to speak concerning pay: more perhaps then some will like. But the commiseration I have of poor soldiers, and detestation I had of disorders, that have happened upon this cause in the service where I have been, and fear of worse have extorted these complaints from me, yet not to hurt any particular (God is my witness) but generally to do my country good, if I could; & to admonish those whom it concerneth, to look better unto it hereafter.   

CHAP. four Part. 10. Wherein is declared, that there is no hope of good success in wars, without a full army, and force sufficient.  
THose that know with what difficulty, & misery Officers are wont to pay 4. or 5. M. men, have good cause to think it a matter very difficult to maintain 30. or 40. M. and many percase will wonder, what I mean, to persuade the levy of a full army, seeing the unwillingness, and unreadiness of this age in sending forth, and furnishing any small number of men. But notwithstanding the imagination of the first, or wonderment of the second; both the laws and practice of arms, doth teach us that to obtain victory, and to subdue our enemies a just and full army must be employed; and that small numbers of men do rather feed the wars, then end them, & rather anger the enemy, then hurt him. The Lacedæmonians before the Peloponnensian war consulting with the oracle, by what means they might best prevail against their enemies, received this answer, that the means to overcome, was to use 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  their full strength. For if an army be a perfect body, as the Athenian captain Iphicrates was wont to say, it must have the just proportion of parts, and just complement, or else it will be monstrous, and not able to do the actions expected of such a body. The Romans therefore as in other things, so in this excelled, that they never dealt with any enemy, but with a full army. If the power of the enemy were great, they employed a Consulare army consisting of 4. legions of citizens, beside the aid of their associates, if less they used but two legions, with the aid of their friends. The greatest force that they usually employed were two Consular armies joined together. The number was divers, as the legions were greater or lesser, full or imperfect: but their greatest force amounted not passed to 50. thousand, their middle to 24. thousand, their least to 12, or 15. thousand, or thereabouts. Less number I do not read that they used in any service, and therefore proceeding with sufficient force, I marvel not, if their success were according.  
It is the use of all nations, neither the French in their expeditious into Italy, nor the Spaniard into France, or Italy useth to send less than a just army. The Duke of Alva beside 12. or 13. M. Almains and those of the Low countries, brought with him 9000. Spaniards and Italians when first he came into that country. It is no good nor profitable course, to send 4. or 5. thousand against what soever enemy. If to famish, they are too many: if to fight, too few. Double that number is neither able to keep the field, nor to besiege any city, nor almost able to do any enterprise of war, unless it be to defend some place for some few days, & in the end to give it over being in despair of succour. Our proceed in France & Flanders, if mother reason will pes wade us, may teach us, that this number is too little the effects do declare my speech to be true. The 
b Thucid. 1.  Lacedæmonians so long as they sent small numbers of men against the Athenians, could do no good against them, but did hurt to themselves. Small force doth rather nourish and kindle the wars, then extinguish them; even as a few drops sprinkled on the fix, doth make the same to burn more bright. and as much water powered on the fire doth quench the same, so a sufficient army maketh an end of brawls, or at least bringeth them to trial. Nay further, a sufficient force doth not only work greater effect, but also is less chargeable, than wars made by these slender supplies. It may percase seem a paradox to some, but reason & experience doth prove it true.  
These wars of our times, they have no end; but where a sufficient army goeth, there is an end, either one way or other. There is no end of charge in lingering wars: in these, if the army prevail, the victory maintaineth the same; if it be overcome, then is there an end of that army and charge. The burden is only in the setting of the same out, and maintaining of it in the mean while. But will some say, the hazard were great. Let them therefore fight valiantly, and not suffer themselves to be skinned. They that forecast what winds will blow, seldom sow, or set sail in time.  
Further, a small force must needs lie in Towns, and hide their heads, where the enemy is stronger. Against the enemy they have neither strength to fight, nor means to enterprise, & still the Prince is at a continual charge: and without pay the soldiers famish: but where a full and sufficient force arriveth in any Country, they command the same, unless an army be presently opposed against them. They every themselves with spoils. the fruits they lay up for their own store. Many confederates, some for fear, others for other causes join with them, and either yield money, or victuals, or munitions. Whatsoever corn, forage, or other provision is without walled Towns, that is theirs. It must be a Town of some strength that dare resist them. When the army is great, the wars maintain themselves, as said Cato. Scipio with the profit that he drew out of the Country of Spain, maintained his army there divers years. Sixteen years did Annibal maintain wars in Italy, at the charge of that Country almost without supply of men, or money from Carthage. With the riches of France, Caesar maintained his army 9 years in France, & enriched himself, and his country. Besides the charge of the army defrayed, many Roman captains have brought in great sums of money into the public treasury. These are the fruits of victory: but victory cannot be obtained without an army.  
If therefore any man hope for the end of wars, or good success in France, Flanders, or other Country; let him wish that sufficient means were employed. There is neither honour, safety, profit, nor hope of good hap in the course of wars commonly taken. If you will not believe me: then examine the proceed of the small companies that have been employed in service of late time: examine the ancient and latter histories of foreign nations, that have had good success in their wars. If you see nothing but disorder in the one, and reason in the other: then let captains never for shame on this sort lose their men, expend their money, trifle the time, dally with the enemy, contrary to reason, and all good proceeding; but let them as in other points, so in this also return to the true discipline, and practice of war.   

CHAP. four Part. 11. Of the exercise and training of young soldiers, whereby they are made apt, and ready for the wars.  
A Wise General having once enroled his soldiers, will not lose any one hour of time, but will either exercise them, or employ them in service. There is nothing in wars more precious than time, which once passed, cannot be recalled. And whether the army be idle, or well employed, the pay and charge still runneth on. But because it is dangerous to bring young soldiers into the face of the enemy, before they be both fashioned by exercise, & also fleshed by light encounters with the enemy: he ought both diligently to exercise them at such times, as the enemy giveth him leisure, & also to harden them by skirmishes and other light enterprises against the enemy, before he hazard to fight with his full forces. Therein what example can I set before him better to follow then that of Scipio, that overcame Annibal, and in all deeds of arms showed himself most vigilant and skilful. He before he drew forth his army out of new Carthage into the field, when as yet the time of the year was not proper for service, did continually divers days exercise his men, aswell in fight at sea, as at land. The first day he caused all his regiments to run in array and order of battle 4. miles: the second day he appointed every man to make his arms clean and fit: the 
a Tertio die in modum iustae pugnae sudibus interse concurrerunt. Liu. 26.  third day he caused them to divide themselves into two parts, and in order of battle to fight the one against the other with cudgels, and blunt darts. The same course he took in Sicily, before he transported his 
b Liu. 29.  army into Africa. He caused his soldiers in order of battle to march and run armed, and set his ships in array within the harbour in such good order, as if he were presently to fight. The Intentior 
a quam unquam ●nte a muniendi, exercendique militem cura ducibus Volscorum erat. Liu. 4.  Volscians having been oftentimes foiled by the Romans, and determining to set up their rest, took great care in arming and exercising their men, as if that were the only means to hearten and harden their soldiers. And sure much good doth exercise and teaching, as well in war as other arts, where the leaders are skilful. Tit. 
b Liu. 23.  Sempronius by exercising his young soldiers, taught them to follow their ensigns, and keep ranks both standing, and fight in array of battle, and obtained by them divers victories against the enemy. 
c Liu. 34.  Cato likewise in his voyage into Spain, took no small pains in exercising of his men, before he brought them to see the enemy; whereby he so fashioned them, that he gave divers repulses to the enemy. Tullus Hostilius, when the minds of the Romans were mollified kine long peace, in the days of his predecessor Numa, yet by exercise obtained so much, that they durst encounter, and were not inferior to old soldiers.  
Epaminondas by framing and excercising the Thebans, made them of a base nation, the most warlike people of Greece, and with them overthrew the Lacedæmonians, which from their youth up were trained up in the exercise of arms. In the first wars with Carthage, the Romans perceiving that for want of skill in Sea causes, they were inferior to the Carthaginians, practised their men in imaginary Sea fights, and so long exercised them therein, that at length they overcame them aswell by sea, as by land. 
d Liu. 24.  Statorius the Roman teaching the soldiers of Syphax to follow their leaders, and to keeperankes, and other orders of wars, in short time made them of novices so expert, that after that Syphax doubted not to encounter the Carthaginians. This caused Tissaphernes the Persian, to make such reckoning of Phalinus, a Grecian, for that he was 
e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. exped. Cyr. 2. Xenoph.  skilful in ordering of men, and teaching them to fight in arms. Of English men Philip of Comines giveth this testimony, than although when they first come into France they have small skill, yet with exercise they first come into France they have small skill, yet with exercise they become good soldiers: and therefore seeing most of our soldiers are young, and of small experience in wars, by reason of our long peace, they are diligently to be exercised before that they see the enemy. 
f Cassius quantum sine bello dabatur, revocat priscum morem, exercet legiones. Tacit. 12,  Cassius the Roman according to the old guise of the Romans, exercised his soldiers at all idle times, albeit many of them were expert in wars.  
Much more therefore ought we to exercise our young soldiers, and that first in fatntes of activities, as running, leaping, throwing, wrestling; secondly in the use of their weapon, & that both singly by themselves every man, & also in company: thirdly in marching and keeping of ranks, and other exercises of war.  
By these exercises, the soldiers obtain three commidities: the body is first made active, and strong, and fit for labour; soldiers also learn to march in their arms, to carry some weight, to run, to work in trenches, and other necessary fortification; without which neither can the soldier rest safely in his camp, nor so easily prevail against the enemy in the field. Caesar did no less prevail against the Gauls with the mattock and spade, then with the sword. In a short time he made huge trenches and mounts, such as the 
a Cae. bell. gal. 2.  enemy wondered at. Now because we have forgotten the true practice of war, our soldiers refuse to work, and Princes use the help of pioneers, insomuch that hardly we see that brought to pass in a month, which Caesar could effect in few hours. The Romans from their youth exercised their bodies in running, leaping, wrestling, swimming. corvinus the Roman captain in his youth, in these exercises was 
b In ludo militari cum velocitatis & virium certamen esset, ceteris par. Liu. 7.  equal to the best. By this 
c Ferebant dimidiati mensis cibaria & vallum. Cic, Tuscul. qu. 2.  exercise they were made able to carry beside their arms, half a months victuals, and certain stakes.  
Secondly, every soldier is made acquainted and cunning with the weapon, wherewith he serveth. The shot learneth to charge and discharge readily, and at mark. The piquier how to use his pike, both against footmen and borsemen: the halberdier understandeth the use of his halberd both to defend, & to strike his enemy: the targetter how to manage his sword and target; and every one learneth the use of sword and dagger, for that they are common weapons. Without skill men oft times weary themselves, break their weapons hurt not their enemy. The 
d Discebant Romani tractarescutum, & obliquis ictibus venientia tela deflectere. Veget. l. 1. c. 4.  Roman youths learned first to use the target, or shield and sword, (for that was their most common arms,) and how with slent blows to break the force of their enemy's weapons, or darts.  
Afterward they practised the use of all other sorts of weapons. And as absurd it is for a soldier to take on him that name, not knowing the use of his arms, as for an ignorant person, to call himself an artificer, and yet not to know the use of the tools of his occupation.  
Lastly by learning & understanding the arrays, & just distances of horsemen, & footmen, & the standings of all sorts of weapons, and the differences in marching, fighting, retiring, according to divers sorts of grounds, & how to march to the assault or defence of a Town or place, (which may be showed them by those that are good leaders,) Soldiers may learn how to place themselves upon an instant, and not as I have seen done, run away, or run up & down like men amazed; they may also understand how to cake advantage of the enemy, how to rally themselves being disordered, and in what place every kind of weapon is to be sorted, & employed with most advantage. In sum, array & order may both better be kept, & more easily repaired; without which 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. polit.  arms have no use. And as well can an army march or fight being out of array, as a body do the functions of the body, having the parts out of frame. There is certainly nothing 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. oeconomic.  more beautiful in the eyes of friends, than an army set in order, neither is any thing more fearful to the enemy. But this cannot be done without instruction and exercise: of which I hope our governors will have more care hereafter. But (may some say) what need so many words in these matters: especially if we consider both the charge, & labour that hath been spent in training of soldiers within our Realm of late time? men able (as some think) to encounter the most flourishing army in Christendom? against whom I have no purpose to speak. Nay I wish with all my heart, they were so strong, and ready as is imagined. Only I thought good to show first the defects in our training, which I would wish were supplied, and our men better instructed; and next how little trust there is to be put in trained men, that never saw enemy, unless there be many old soldiers mingled among them. In training of soldiers therefore in places where I have been, these wants I have observed. First, the soldiers are not always best chosen: secondly, their bodies are not exercised as they should be: thirdly, they are not taught the use of their several weapons. Few teach soldiers the right use of the piece, and none the use of the pike, halberd, and sword, and target. Fourthly, the men are rather wearied in marching up and down, and wheeling in rings, and filing of ranks, which are to no use in fight, then instructed how to take their places in marching, in fight, assalting, retiring, or other deed of arms. Fifthly, there is seldom or never sufficient company brought together, so that men may conceive the reasons of the places of every sort of weapons: horsemen are seldom seen in trainings of soldiers. So that hardly can any conceive how things should stand, by any thing that is showed. Lastly such for the most part upon some commendation of some great man's letters, are employed in teaching our soldiers, as either never went to the school of arms, or know very little themselves. So that I see no other effect of training men, than expense of time & powder. And for mine own part, I wish rather to have men never exercised, then in this sort trained. But were they better trained than they are, yet are we not to put too great trust in them. The Venetians making reckoning of the trained men of their state (which are such like, as ours are) were abused (saith 
a Guicciar. lib. 8.  Guicciardin) and overthrown. And 
b Confidavano Piu Chenon si doveua, ne fanti d'ordonnanza del su● dominio i Fiorentini. Però non si provedevan di soldadi e sercitati. Guicciar. lib. 11.  evil were the Florentines paid, trusting in their trained soldiers. The same being appointed to the guard of Prato, a Town of their dominion, seeing but two Spaniards to mount upon a little breach, threw down their weapons, and ran as fast as they might out of the Town.  
Generally there is no trust in young soldiers. A small 
c Pluris facienda est parva veteranorum manus, quàm indocta, & expers belli multitudo. Veget. l. 1. c. 1.  company of old beaten soldiers, is better than a multitude of people without knowledge, and experience of wars. Young soldiers that have not heard the noise of battle, nor seen the slaughter of men, nor felt knocks, will hardly abide them at the first. If not in trained soldiers, much less in tumultuary forces ought we to put any confidence. The 
d Liu. 8 & 9  Latins and Hetruscians seeing the Romans range their country in no great number, came forth by multitudes against them, thinking to swallow them up. But the first were no sooner slain, than the rest fled. 500 old soldiers put all the rascal rout of 
e Tacit. 3.  Tacfarinas in Africa to flight. At 
Liu. 21.  Hannibal's first coming into Italy the country people seeing the spoils he made, had thought to have cut a certain out wing in pieces. But in be beginning the execution, 35. thousand were put to flight by a very sew. The Spaniards at Puente de Butgos in Galicia, assembled together in great numbers, fled from us upon the first approach of our men. And so it is commonly in all young soldiers. Wherefore the best is to use old soldiers, the next to mingle new, and old together, and diligently to teach them, and train them, before we hazard our whole state upon them. For albeit much is in man's natural courage, yet the same is much increased by skill and exercise, and that not feigned, but in fight with the enemy.    

CHAP. V.  

Part. 1. Wherein is declared, what things are especially to be considered of those, that lead an army by land, or by sea, into a foreign country.  
Uncertainty, and irresolution, as in other actions, so in the proceeding of wars, worketh no good effect. Time may not be spent, nor money wasted vainly. A wise captain therefore purposing a journey into an other country, will before hand resolve, first what time is fittest to set forward, secondly what things be necessary for his service, that he may have them ready against that time; and thirdly what place is fittest both to make his provision, and to assemble his troops in. The consideration of the time is very material: for neither is it convenient to enter in the depth of Winter, for that at that time forage for horses is very hard to come by; nor in the heat of Summer, for that the time is hurtful for men's bodies to travel in, Caesar entering into France in the midst of Winter, was driven to great extremities, and albeit he had good help of friends to relieve him with victuals, and other necessaries: yet were his soldiers and horses almost famished. Then it is hard to lie without doors: the ways then also are very troublesome. The duke of Lancaster's army arriving in 
a Froistart.  Portugal, in the days of king Richard the 2. in the heat of Summer, suffered no less through heat, than the other through cold. Much also did the 
b He himself in that journey took that sickness, whereof he died.  black Prince's army suffer in Spain through the heat of Summer. Neither did the heat of the Country in our late voyage of Portugal further our enterprise. The most convenient time to enter any Country with an army is, when the same may find greatest store of victuals for men, of forage for horses, and is most temperate: so that men may endure travail best, without endangering their health. Of this 
c Caes. bell. gall. 2. & 3.  Caesar had respect both in his wars in France, and Africa, and other places. And evil did it befall those, that without consideration of time rashly adventured to go in foreign services. He that considereth not the time, must make his provision the greater.  
The place also would be chosen, and certainly resolved upon, where both our provision is to be made, & our soldiers are to be appointed to meet. The Romans in their wars in Greece, assembled their forces at the port of 
d Vti omnes ●●uenirent Brundusium idibus Maijs, Liu. 36.  Brundisium, sailing into Africa against the Carthaginians, they made their provision & rendevouz at Lilibaeum, which say right over against Africa, as the other port was commodious for those that sailed into Greece. Cato in his journey into 
a Cato ad Lunae portum convenire justit. Liu. 34.  Spain chose the port of Luna, as lying directly against Spain. Annibal 
b Liu. 21.  purposing a voyage into Italy, assigned new Carthage for his men to meet at. When 
c Caes. bell. gall. 5.  Caesar intended the invasion of this Island, he appointed his men to meet, and his provision to be brought to Caleis and Bollein. For that neither the time, nor place of meeting, was appointed certain, I report me what hindrance it was to us, in the enterprise of Portugal. But greatest care would be had, first that we carry with us force of our own, sufficient: and secondly, that we have provision of arms, victuals, munitions, and all instruments of war with us. For in vain looketh he for help of others, or of the country where he goeth, that is not strong of himself. 
d Machiavelli. discors.  Banished men do make those that go in their succour believe, that they have great parties in the country, and that the enterprise is easy; but there is no wisdom to give them further credit, than such men deserve. In Portugal we may remember, how we were abused, or rather abused ourselves to think that the country would revolt before we had beaten the Spaniard, that kept the people in subjection: and too late it is to look for supply from home of men or victuals, when we are presently to use them. The Romans although they sent divers times succours to other nations, as to the Greeks oppressed by the kings of Macedonia: to the Sicilians invaded by the Carthaginians: yet never sent they less than a sufficient army, furnished with all things necessary. Caesar for that he was driven to leave a great part of his army, and provision behind him, both in his 
e De bell. ciu. 3.  voyage against Pompey, and against Scipio in 
f Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Africa, was driven to great extremities, and omitted many opportunities before the rest of his army came at him. He that hath his men, and all things ready with him, oppresseth the Country, before provision can be made against him.  
Yet may not the Prince that invadeth others, so provide against the enemy, that he forget to cover and defend his own Country and Coast, and frontier Towns against all sudden enterprises. Annibal marching towards Italy, before hand provided one 
g Partiens curas inferendi & arcendi belli. Liu. 2  army for the guard of Africa, another for the guard of Spain. And Caesar pursuing Pompey into Greece, committed the Caes 
a. bell. ciu. 3.  guard of Italy, and the port towns thereof unto Antony If 
b Liu. 29.  Syphax going out of his country to war against the Romans, had had like care, his country had not been taken from him in his absence by Masinissa and Laelius. He is not wise that seeking to strike his enemy, lieth open himself.  
But because wars spend both men, and victuals, and other provisions, especially where there is made great resistance: we must not only think to send sufficient at the first; but also cause the same to be supplied in time. Nothing did cause Hannibal to 
c Negando supplementum vos retraxistis; said Annibal to the Senate of Carthage. Liu. 30.  leave his hold in Italy, but want of succour, and supply. The slowness of 
d Hist. de bell. Afric.  Caesar's supplies after his army transported into Africa made him lose many advantages, and sustain divers losses. I will not say what hurt want of supply did us in the Portugal action, when it may be imputed rather to presumption, that we went forth unfurnished; then to want of care, that we had no supply in time. For where to could supply have served, where the whole was through want disordered before? for guard of ships of carriage, and assurance of the army, the whole navy where the passage is by sea, is to be furnished, and to sail in warlike sort. 
e Caes. de bell. ciu. lib. 3.  Caesar for that he was driven to pass his army in certain Merchant ships without guard of ships of war, lost divers of his soldiers sailing into Greece.  
King Edward the third passing his army into France sailed in that warlike sort, that encountering the French navy at Scluce he obtained a famous victory. If the passage be not cleared by ships of war keeping the seas, it is to be feared lest the enemy lying in wait intercept divers of our ships and men passing between; as hath often happened in the passage between England, and the Low countries within these few years. And as at sea, so by land likewise the way is to be cleared, that no enemy be left upon our backs.  
The Generrall being ready to set sail with all his company; either by ticket sealed, or else word of mouth, he is to declare to what port he will have his company to bend their course; to the end that such as by tempest are severed at sea, may yet afterward meet at a port. 
f Caesar tabellis signatis solebat dicere quem in lo●●m petiturus esset. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Caesar used tickets. 
g Liu. 29.  Scipio sailing into Africa calling two of every ship, declared what he would have them do, and whither to set their course. Cato having all his ships and men together, & being ready to set sail for Cato 
a navibus contractis edixit, ad portum Pyrenei sequerentur. Liu. 34.  Spain caused proclamation to be made, that all his ships should direct their course to the port near the Pyreneys which I suppose was Emporia. Because Caesar gave not like direction in his voyages into Albany against Pompey, and Africa against Scipio, he sustained divers losses. And in the voyage of Portugal such as lost sight of the fleet either returned, or went to Rochel, being uncertain whither to go. That the navy fail not of the port, every ship is to have a good pilot.  
The better and more certainly the General understandeth the state of the enemy's country, & the ports, and defences thereof, and proceed of the enemy: the more certain direction he shall be able to give. And therefore as at all times he ought by his espials to understand what the enemy doth, and what he prepareth: so in this time especially when he goeth about to transport an army into his country. For this cause 
b Caesar antequam in Britanniam traijceret, Volusenum qui omnia exploraret praemittit. Caes. bell. gal. 4.  Caesar sent Commius, and Volusenus into this Island, the one to understand the state of the people, the other to view the coast, and sound the Ports. Cato before he went against the enemy in Spain, sent his espials to understand the number, the place, and proceeding of his army.  
After the arrival of the navy in the enemy's country, the first care of the General ought to be, to seize upon some commodious port town, or harbour, and to fortify the same, that both his shipping may be safe there, and that both succours, and victuals may safely come thither: and last of all, that both from thence he may safely proceed in his action, and have a safe retreat in a storm. Caesar landing his men in Africa fortified 
c Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Ruspina, and by trenches and banks made it both a good harbour for ships, and a safe lodging for his army. The same was practised before of Scipio, who landing near a point of land in Africa, did first make fortifications in that place. But afterward perceiving that Utica thereby was more commodious, he took the town, and made that a 
d Eandem sedem ad cetera exequenda habitu●us erat. Liu. 29.  castle of retreat from the land, and an access for his ships from sea; and a place commodious for dispatch of other martyrs. The reasons that moved Scipio to take new Carthage in Spain were these, that he might have a conveient port for access of his ships, and a commodious storehouse for his provisions of war.  
Annibal made many attempts against Liu. 
a lib. 23.  Naples and Nola, that he might use them for the same purposes lying commodiously for those that come out of his country. Neither had Edward the third other respect in his long siege of Caleis, but that he might have a commodious port for his shipping on that side. These causes at this present have moved the Spaniards that lately have set foot in Britain, to fortify Hannebon and Bluet. Little did the Macedonians understand the practice of war, that taking 
b Liu. 31.  Chalcis a very opportune port for their wars in Greece, left the same without fortification, or garrison.  
That the navy be not idle, the General after he hath landed his men, is to employ the same in ranging the coast, fetching in of victuals, and annoying the enemy both by land and sea. Unless the same be at sea, the enemy will deprive him of succours, and victuals. Therein let him follow the precedent of Scipio in Spain, of Caesar in Africa.  
Those that invade the enemy by land, likewise are to seize some town near the enemy which may serve them for a fortress whither to retire, and whence to sally out. The 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  Persians invading Greece, used the town of Thebes as a retreat, and propugnacle against the Greeks.  
The Lacedæmonians to strait the Athenians fortified Eleusis a bourgh in the territory of the Athenians. 
d Oringis arx fuit Asdrubalis ad excursiones circa in mediterraneos populos faciendas. Liu.  Asdrubal used the town of Oringis in Spain, as a fortress, from whence he made roads into the midland country thereabout. Sulpitius the Roman Consul in the Macedonian war seizing a 
e Praesidium ibi imposuit. Nam erat oppidum opportunum ad impetus in Macedoniam faciendos. Liu. 31.  town that lay fitly against Macedonia, did put garrison in it, and from thence made divers attempts against the Macedonians. Antiochus 
f Liu. 45.  purposing to invade Egypt furnished Pelusium, which is the key of that country, with sufficient garrison.  
Yet before the army be brought in sight of the enemy, the same is to be refreshed certain days, whether it be of their travails by land in their march, or iactation and disease at sea. 
g Liu. 21.  Annibal before he brought forth his army to fight with the Romans in Italy caused the same to refresh, and rest itself divers days after his wearisome journey through the Alpes. And likewise returning out of Italy into Africa to defend his Country against Scipio, he 
h Paucos dies ad reficiendum militem ex iactatione maritima sumpsit. Liu. 30.  refreshed his men certain days of their travail at sea, before he marched against the enemy.  
Whether the country be known to the General or not, yet ought be not to march without diligent discoverers sent before, at any time: lest of all when he cometh into a strange country all enemy. Wherefore after he hath settled his matters in the town, or port which he hath seized, and refreshed his men, let him then send forth espials and discoverers, to understand the site of the country, and proceed of the enemy. 
a Annibal consulis consilia atque animum, & situm regionum, itineraque exploravit. Liu 22.  Annibal before he encountered with Flaminius the Roman General, sent before him certain men to espy his purposes, and to view the situation of the country, and the ways which he was to travail. It is the practice of all wise generals. The Romans neglecting to make this discovery were enclosed at Caudium by the Samnites, and shamefully overcome, and Annibal himself trusting an ignorant guide, was almost entrapped at Cales by Fabius. Curio 
b Caes. de bell. ciu. l. 2.  marching in the sands of Africa without knowledge of the enemy's power, or the disadvantage of the country being dry, and plain, was overthrown together with his whole army by the Numidian horsemen of juba. Appius 
c Appius Boiorum agros populans inexplorato, riullisque stationibus sirmatis, caesus cum legionibus. Liu. 31.  spoiling the country of the Boyans without espial sent before, & guards placed in convenient distances; was himself slain, together with his company. The means to escape these traps, and ambushes is viligent espial, and discovery.  
If our army do march far up into the country; then is diligent heed to be taken, that the enemy do not cut between us, and our succours or victuallers. For favour whereof we are to assure ourselves of the passages, and to place garrisons in convenient distances. Caesar distributed ten thousand 
d Caes. bell. gal. 7. quo expeditiore re frumen●●rià uteretur.  Heduans in divers towns, and forts upon the way, that his victuals might come to his army with safety. He took Vellaunodunum that lay upon the way, lest the enemy might stop the passage. The town of 
e Liu. 28.  Astapa in Spain was taken and ruinated by L. Martius, for that the garrison of the enemies there, did spoil the confederates of the Romans, and intercept the victuallers that came to the army. The same course did 
f Caes. de bell. ciu. lib. 3.  Caesar take for the bridling of the enemy, and assurance of his victuals in his wars against Pompey.  
But because nothing is more to be feared of an army transported into a strange country, then want of victuals: therefore must the General's mind be intentive, and careful, not only for the 
g 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 1.  present, but also for the future time. He may not think that he shall always find corn and provision in the country, especially if the enemy understand the train of wars. Caesar found the same by experience in his wars in France, when the enemy burned the country before him. When the Persian king understood the intention of Cyrus, to be to deprive him of his crown: he sent 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  horsemen before to burn all things, that might profitably serve the enemy. And in the invasion which Annibal made in Italy Fabius caused all the provision that might serve for an army to be either spoiled, or brought into strong towns in all places near where Annibal, and his company passed. Therefore is it requisite, that store of horses, and carriages go along with the army for carriage of victuals, munitions, and other necessaries.  
Cyrus 
b Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  had four hundred wagons laden with provision, beside those that belonged to particulars. When in the country nothing is to be found, then may this serve. Further for fetching in of victuals, the army ought to have a sufficient strength of horsemen seconded with troops of footmen for their retreat. Annibal at one road in Italy beside infinite cattle took four thousand horses, notwithstanding the strict commandment of the Romans, that all things should be brought into strong holds. Whatsoever provision may be found, the same is to be saved, and conveyed into those places, that best may be defended and serve fittest for the provision of our army. 
c Salapiarn frumentum ex agris Metapontino & Heracleens● comportat Annibal. Liu. 24.  Annibal brought all the corn and provision, which he found in the territory of Metapontus, and Heraclea into Salapia. After that 
d Liu. 29.  Scipio in his expedition in Africa, had taken Utica, he caused all the provision, and corn that could be found in the country to be carried thither, and to be laid up in store. The same course did Quintius take in his wars against Nabis the tyrant, and Caesar in his invasion of this 
e Caef. bell gal. 4. frumentum comportat.  Island.  
If the country where our army passeth do not furnish us with victuals, the same is utterly to be ruinated, and burned. Which if the country people do perceive, either for fear or for hope, they will secure us. 
f Liu 38.  Manlius invading the Gallogrecians, forced all those countries where he passed to compound for fear of spoil, For like dread the Frenchmen where the English army 
g Froissart.  passed in the days of Edward the third did supply the same with necessary provision. It is a shame (saith 
h Cyr. paed. 1.  Xenophon) for him that hath a sufficient army not to be able to get victuals, and things necessary for the same. If the enemy shall spoil one country as looking for our forces that way, yet shall it be hard for him to spoil the whole, unless he mean to famish his own people also. The Romans against the 
a Quò expeditiores commeatus essent, & incertior hostis quà venturum bellum foret, Fabius per Soranum agrum, Decius per Sidicinum legiones duxit. Liu. 10.  Samnites led forth their armies divers ways, whereby the enemy being made uncertain of their coming, could not prevent them, nor deprive them of provision.  
Finally, it is not possible for an army to enter any country, but the same shall find some weary of the present government, and desirous of innovation, which may be induced to help to furnish it with necessary provision. Caesar in his wars against the Helvetians, and Ariouistus, had his provision from the Heduans, in his journey into Belgium from those of Rheimes. Arriving here in Britain he found both partisans, and provision sufficient. Neither are the times now changed. In all estates there are some malcontents, and many desirous of alterations. If desire of innovation work nothing, yet if our army have good success, the same shall procure us friends and means. After Hannibal's victory at Cannae most of the subjects of the Romans revolted, and took part with him. When the Frenchmen invaded the 
b Guicciar. lib. ●. & 15.  kingdom of Naples, the country either followed them, or took against them, as they had prosperous or bad success. And if that our success in Portugalll had been good, there is no doubt, but that all the country would have revolted from the Spaniards.  
The General above all things is to have regard, that he spend no time vainly. Opportunity to do great matters seldom offereth itself the second time. By all means the enemy is to be provoked to fight, while our army is strong, and his soldiers young and unexercised. Annibal had more pain at the first to bring the Romans to fight, then to overcome them. If the enemy refuse to fight, he is to be pursued into some town or strait, or else by besieging of some strong place driven to come to secure the same. All the country doth follow the success of the chief city. yet forasmuch as it is not sufficient to take, unless we keep the same: there is no less care to be taken in fortifying and furnishing a town taken, then in taking the same. Unless we mean to lose our prize, as the 
c Guicciard.  French did Novara in the days of Lewis the twelfth for want of provision, and good order.  
Those that have followed this course, have done great matters, as is evident by the examples of Caesar, Scipio, Annibal: the rest either failed of victory, or could not maintain their conquest. I will not specify it by our expeditions into France, Portugal, Flanders. For that might be odious. Although those that are wise, by that which we wanted, may see what we ought to have had, and done. But I will rather use foreign examples. The enterprise of 
a Guicciard,  Lautrecke in the kingdom of Naples was broken by niggardly expenses, slender preparatives, slow proceeding, covetousness of officers, disorder, and want of care about victuals, and other provisions. The like disorder in the times of Charles the eight of France, made the French to lose the kingdom of Naples, which but lately before they had won. Some of the chief governors spent their time in pleasures, others minded nothing but spoil: they furnished not their towns with victuals, nor with soldiers, they pursued not the enemy so, but that they suffered him to gather strength again. Neither may we impute the loss of Normandy, Gascoigne, and Guienne to other causes, then to disorders in wars, want of succour and supply, and too much credulity in trusting the French, and presumption, in hoping for success without means.  
But, may some say, to what end tendeth all this discourse, seeing men now a days are so far from invading their enemies: that some can be content to leave their friends languishing for want of help, which are joined near unto them both by bond of religion, and covenant? and what hope is there that such shall give the charge on others, seeing they suffer the fire so near their own doors? true it is, that governors have not been so forward, as some would have wished, and percase as some think their honour and the profit of their state required: yet have not matters been so carelessly neglected, as is surmised. But suppose they had; yet I hope the same course will not always be continued, nor that the discipline of arms shall forever be neglected of commanders.  
There are yet a number left of the posterity of those, that have made the name of the English nation famous in France, Flanders, Spain, and other countries: and many do now begin to mislike, and condemn former disorders. If at any time such men may be heard, or followed, I doubt not, but that this discourse may be put in practice, and such advertisements heard, and accepted more gratefully. To annoy our enemies, and procure our own safety, there is no better course, then to translate wars from our own doors into the enemy's country. Whatsoever will be performed, I thought it myduety not to conceal, that which I thought not only profitable, but necessary for my country's honour: as, God willing, by many reasons I shall show unto you.   

CHAP. V Part. 2. Wherein is proved, that it is far better for the English nation, things standing as now they do, to invade the Spaniard, or any other enemy in his own country, then to receive their assault, and invasion here at home, or to stay until we do see the enemy on our own coast.  
MAny there are, I doubt not, of a contrary mind; but especially those that enjoy honour, wealth, and ease. These commonly vesire peace, and detest wars, and against such enterprises allege these reasons: they say we have neither town, nor port in Spain to receive us: that the way thither is long, and uncertain by reason of contrariety of winds, and that it will be hard to remedy any disorder that shall fall out in our army by reason of the distance of the place: they allege further that we have no friends nor confederates in the country: and that it will be more difficult to subdue the Spaniard in his country, than abroad, for every man doth 
3 Ante ora patrum ante alta moenia Troiae, The Troyans' were most venturous. Virg.  fight most valiantly when his wife and children, and his own lands and goods are in his sight. Lastly, they suppose that the number of the enemies will be such, as that an army shall be wearied with killing them. On the other side, if we attend the Spaniards coming hither (say they) they shall have all obese things to make against them; and we all things favourable for us; men, municious, and victuals sufficient; our wines, children, & country in our sight, safe places to retreat unto. As Anteus wrestling with Hercules, so oft as he touched the earth received new strength after his fall: so they that in their own country do● fall, rise again very easily. A Tit. 
5 Quintius used this similitude to dissuade the Achaeans from foreign wars. Liu.  snail so long as he keepeth himself within his shell, is defensed; when he putteth out his head, he lieth open to danger. So they that in their own country may live safe, by making enterprises abroad oft times receive blows, and always lie open to danger. The 
6 Thucid.  Athenians were utterly overthrown in Sicily, that before that were well able to defend themselves at home. And divers great armies of Germans and Gauls, invincible if they had been in their own countries, were ruinated attempting to invade foreign countries.  
Which reasons howsoever they seem plausible in the ears of those that in matters of wars proceed like snails, and care not for any disgrace or future danger, so they may enjoy present ease; yet are built on false grounds, and matters mistaken. For if we might safely rest at home, I think him not wise, nor sober that would seek trouble abroad. But seeing we can not have peace the Spaniard having begun wars, and threatening the destruction of our state: the question is, whether is better for us to stay until he come upon us, or to begin with him and seek him in his own country? I say this is best: my reasons are these.  
He that first chargeth his enemy, hath many advantages, it is his great folly, if he be not well provided of soldiers, mariners, arms, ships, horses, and all provisions for the wars: he may make choice where to charge the enemy, and proceedeth simply if he do not there begin, where he findeth his enemy weakest, and most unprovided. He may make likewise choice of his times, & take opportunities. 
7 Con le preventioni & diversioni, si vincono le guerre. Guicciar. lib. 1.  Victory is obtained by prevention, and by the same wars are oft times diverted, as Alphonsus' king of Naples said, but practised not. For if he had not lingered matters, and had met the enemy in the way; he had not so easily been driven out of his state.  
No man obtaineth better conditions of peace, than he that first striketh. Contrariwise dangerous it is to let the enemy come upon us. as 
8 Malum nascens facilè opprimitur. Inuereratum fit plerunque robustius. Cic. Philip.  diseases, so the attempts and proceed of the enemy at the first are easily stopped, and both in time are strengthened and confirmed. And oft times of light beginnings as 
9 Tacit. annal. 4.  Tacitus saith, great troubles arise. If thou 
10 Veterem fe●ēdo iniuriam invitas novam, Liu.  suffer one injury, thou dost but give thy enemy courage to offer thee another. The enemy doth oft times try our patience, and seeing us patiently to endure injuries (as 
12 Liu. 1.  Ancus Martius said) doth contemn us. And to 
13 Latino's quasinihil non concedentibus Romanis ferociores fecit. Liu. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  yield in one thing doth give the enemy courage, to ask more. Nothing doth procure more enemies, than patience and 
14 Liu. 6.  contempt. War is like a fire: if it proceed, it embraceth whatsoever is near, as the Campamen said. If 
15 Liu. 7.  Alexander king of Epeirus coming in succour of the Lucanians, had had good success: the Romans should have felt his force, therefore did they use at the first to prevent matters. Vndestanding that Philip king of Macedonia made preparations to come over into Italy, they took pains to meet him in his own Country.  
Likewise did they prevent the attempts of Antiochus. Which course if they had taken when Annibal first besieged 
16 Cunctati Saguntinis opem far de Italia dimicavimus, said a certain Roman Senator.  Saguntum, they had derived the wars into Spain, and escaped the storm, which Annibals army brought into Italy. Those that fear to assail the enemy upon 
17 Cavete ne spe pacis perpetuam pacem amittatis. Cic. Philip. 7.  hope of peace, lose oft times peace for ever. Tully feared it seeing the Romans proceed so coldly against Antony; and the issue proved it true.  
The object on's that are made are of no moment. for admit we neither have Port, nor town, nor friend in the Spanish Dominions: yet arms and victory procure all these. The coast can never be so well guarded, but that an army may always have access to some Port, or landing place or other.  
The Romans landed divers times in Africa during the wars with Carthage, and spoiled their towns and country: nay Caesar landed his army in Epeirus, when the enemy with an army prepared held all the Port towns.  
The Athenians made divers descents into Peloponesus, notwithstanding the diligent guard, that the enemy made. Who seethe not then how easy it is to seize a Port, or to land in Spain the country being almost without guard of soldiers? if any man doubted before, yet since the voyage into Portugal, I think there is none will make question of that matter. Neither did Scipio doubt for want of Portes, or friends to sail into Africa, or the Persians into Greece, or other to invade his enemy. For arms procure friends, and win Ports. so that had we no friends in Spain, yet what resoluce man would refuse to go against such enemies? much more therefore now, seeing the Portugals are discontent with the Spanish government, and Spain is so stored with men of foreign nations, and divers malcontents.  
As for the distance, it is nothing, where there is no resistance by the way. And what reason have we to account Spain far, when the Romans doubted not to transport their armies not only into Africa and Spain, but also into Asia which is a far longer cut. If wind and weather serve, in three days and three dightes the voyage may be perforified.  
The difficulty of supplies may easily be helped with provision made beforehand. If the army go into Spain well stored, there is no such haste of supply, but that it may come in good time. Why not into Spain from England as well as from Rome into Spain, Africa, Asia, yea and Britein?  
But the Spaniards are valiant at home, and will not give ground fight for their Country, wives, and children. As if the Romans a more warlike and valiant people, did not give ground to Hannibal's army in Italy; and as if the Gauls were not vanquished in divers battles by Caesar, and the Spaniards in time passed by the Carthaginians, and Romans, and since that by the Goths and Moors, yea and by the Portugals also their neighbours. And not only our ancestors in the days of Edward the third, and Richard the second, but we ourselves also have had trial of that enemy both in Galicia, and Portugal. He that 
19 Maior spes est maiorque animus inferentis vim, quám arcencis. Liu. 21.  cometh to invade others fighteth with greater courage, than those that are invaded, by the testimony of Annibal, and proof of experience. 
20 Illis ignavis esselicet qui receptum habent, vobis necesse est fortibus viris esse. Liu. 21.  They that have no hope of life, nor escape but in victory, can not choose, but fight valiantly. Contrariwise they that have refuge, and hope another time to fight more happily, which is the case of every man in his own country, will not fight so resolutely.  
The Gauls in their own country gave ground, and fled before Caesar, and other Roman Captains, that in Italy had oft foiled the Romans. And those Africans that in Italy were victorious, could not withstand Scipio in Africa. Alexander entering into the midst of the Persian Empire, overthrew the same utterly.  
Further it standeth with the Spaniard now, as sometime it did with the Carthaginians, & doth with all that use mercenary soldiers. For so long as they may enjoy their country & revenues, & therewith hire most valiant soldiers of other nations, so long they are strong. but if they be invaded in their own country both their revenues will fail, and their own people not being exercised in wars, will make but slender resistance. So that suppose the Spanish army in the Low countries be strong, which notwithstanding hath been dealt withal by our people, yet are we not to look for such soldiers in Spain.  
The Athenians invading Sicily were overthrown by the disagreement and insufficiency of the Captains, the disorders of the soldiers, and want of things necessary. which may be remedied by diligent foresight, provision, and government. But suppose some did miscarry in foreign wars, shall we therefore condemn that course? there is no reason, seeing as wars at home are not condemned because many nations have been subdued and vanquished in their own country. Betwixt the Athenians or the Achaeans, & this kingdom there is no comparison in force or greatness. But if the city of Athens could subdue all Sicily except one only city: it is no such difficult matter to invade the Spaniard, as is supposed.  
Finally some in trembling manner demand, what if such an army so far carried away should miscarry? which is a very ridiculous point, for men to care more for those men's lives that dye willingly offer themselves to the adventure, than they do themselves: Seeing they dare venture nothing themselves, yet let them not envy, and hinder others that will. But suppose the army should miscarry: yet would the loss be far less, then if so many should be lost at home. For here the sequel would be great, there would be only loss of men: which God be thanked this country may well spare. But what simplicity is it to talk of losing, where men go with a resolution rather to win then lose? neither Annibal going in Italy, nor Scipio into Africa cast any such doubt.  
Suppose now on the other side, that the Spaniard should do, that which he once attempted, and God, more than our own force would not suffer him to do; and that an army of Spaniards were provided to invade us: these things would fall out: not knowing where the enemy will land, all the coast must be furnished with soldiers. For to think, that our trained men would be trained together in time to make resistance, is simplicity. And if any port be left open, as good all should be disarmed. But this would be double the charge of levying and furnishing an army for Spain. and the longer the enemy holdeth us in breath, the greater would the charge arise. and all this for any thing that I can see without effect, seeing it is neither possible to keep an army from landing, nor safety to fight without great advantage immediately upon the enemies landing.  
If the enemy should land, as well he may coming with great force, we neither have strong towns, nor many great rivers to stop his proceed, nor any way to resist, but by force of men in open field, and how dangerous it is to oppose young soldiers and almost tumultuary forces against a puissant army of old soldiers, the victories of Annibal in Italy, of Scipio in Africa, of the Greeks in Persia, of the English in Spain, and infinite Histories declare.  
If the enemy be suffered to take breath, who seethe not how he will fortify himself? if he be suffered to range without fight, who considereth not the wrack and spoils of the country that will follow?  
When the country is all in trouble, the revenues both of the Prince, and private men either will cease, or at least be greatly diminished. Ferdinando king of Naples in the invasion of his State made by the French, found it 
23 S'annihilauan, l'entrate. Guicciar. lib. 1.  true. And reason may teach us, that where the husbandmen part by the rapines of the enemy, and part by the spoils of our own soldiers can not enjoy the fruits of their ground, their rents can not be paid. and if rents be not paid, how will our soldiers be paid? suppose then, that the charge of an army in a foreign country be great: yet may it well be borne, being equally divided, so long as men enjoy their livings peaceably: if that may not be; how shall we maintain twice so many soldiers at home?  
If when the enemies invade us, malcontent persons should discover themselves, then as the number of our enemies, so the heap of our troubles would increase.  
But suppose (for what danger in such a case is not to be forecast?) that our army should receive some check: what towns have we, or straits to arrest the enemy? the country people being unacquainted with wars, what laws cankeepe them in order? help can we look for none, our friends being either not able, or not willing to help us, for some seem offended with the spoils of their ships, others bear us in hand, they will remember our slender help aforded to them, which notwithstanding is more than they deserved.  
Other secret wounds may not be opened, neither needeth it, seeing as every man may perceive by these reasons, which already I have brought, how easy, safe, profitable, and honourable it is to invade the Spaniard, and how disaduatageous it will be to this land, if either we stay with our hands folded together, or else defer to charge the Spaniard with full force until such time, as he shall come to cut our throats at home.  
Hiero 
25 Liu. 21.  king of Sicily, when the Romans were invaded by Annibal, gave them counsel to transport an army over into Africa, the happy success of Scipio doing the same fifteen years afterward, and by that means making an end of the wars, doth confirm that counsel to have been most excellent. If when Philip 
26 Liu. 24.  king of Macedonia joined in league with Annibal, they had not sent an army into Greece to find him occupied at home; hardly could they have made resistance against the force of two so mighty enemies united together. The experience of the wars with Annibal in Italy made them more wise afterward, and speedy. For hearing of Philip's of Macedonia, and Antiochus his preparatives to transport their armies into Italy: they eased them of the pain, and met them in more than half way. But what need examples of foreign nations, seeing it hath been the use of our ancestors to seek their enemies always abroad in their own countries? this course is most honourable, most safe, yea and (that which is now most accounted of by some) most profitable, and least chargeable for us also. Nothing can be more honourable then to defend our religion, laws, and country against those that seek to oppress us: no course more safe, then so to hazard, that the loss do not endanger our state: no way more profitable then by keeping the enemy far off, to maintain the revenues of the Crown, and every man's private living, and trade at home.  
Wherefore refusing the pernicious counsel of those, that babble of I know not what peace; let the Spaniard rather feel the effects of war in Spain, then be suffered be to draw his unsatiable sword in England. his malice is not less than it was. But hither. to God hath broken his purposes, and crossed his designments. But if he be suffered quietly to possess Britein; the longer we differre our wars, the more dangerous we shall find them, and ourselves more unable to resist. Now that he hath a strong party against him in France, and that the Low countries either stand against him, or are weary of his government, and that Portugal is malcontent with his new tyranny, is the time to hurt him, and prevail against him. If we suffer him to settle his own affairs, and this good opportunity to pass, I fear, we shall often wish for the like, and hardly find it.   

CHAP. V Part. 3. Wherein certain advertisements are given to our soldiers, that are sent in aid of foreign nations.  
THe best counsel that I can give my countrymen, is to assail the enemy in his own country: but seeing that I cannot (I fear) persuade them to that is best, and safest; the next good that I can do them, is to admonish them, that being sent in small numbers to secure our friends oppugned by our common enemy, they proceed not rashly.  
First therefore wisdom requireth, that they go strong. for that in foreign countries they are no less to fear the practices of double hearted friends, than the force of open enemies. The Romans when they sent aid to their friends, never sent less than a full army, sufficient to encounter the enemy. In sending less, either they should not have pleasured their friends, or else have endangered their own men. Besides this, it would have been dishonour to the name of the Romans, if either they had not been able to overcome the enemy, or willing to see their friends long languish in fear, or their soldiers overmatched, and not able to look out into the field. For this cause being required aid of the Campanians against the Samnites, of the Latins against the Volscians, they sent their Consuls & Generals forth with a mighty force, not only to drive the enemy from the towns, but also to fight with him in the field. And taking upon them the protection of the Sicilians against them of Carthage, they sent thither sufficient strength both by sea, and land.  
Caesar going in aid of the Heduans, and other the confederates of the Romans in France, oppressed by the Helvetians, & Germans led with him a most brave army furnished with all things necessary. Neither was it the use of the Romans only, but of all nations that understood the practice of arms, yea and of ours also.  
The Black Prince in the days of Edward the third going into Spain in succour of Don Pedro de Castille, led thither a most flourishing army, where with he overthrew the power of Spain, and restored the Ring to his seat. Likewise the Duke of Lancaster in his expedition into Portugal, did not rely upon the aid of that nation, but carried with him a gallant army of English men. And when Edward the fourth went into France to aid the Duke of Burgundy, be carried with him such a power, as the hearts of the French trembled to see it, and the king rather by money and rewards, then by force sought to cause them to return. If the Romans had sent three or four thousand in aid of their friends in Sicily, or Greece, or Asia, and so supplied them by little and little: the opinion of their wisdom and forces would never have grown so glorious. Neither could the Prince of Parma of late times, if he had gone into France with a small force have delivered his confederates from danger, or else broken the purposes of his enemies in that sort he hath. If then we will not follow the ancient rules of war, yet let us not show less judgement and value in our proceed, than our enemy.  
Whosoever therefore meaneth to win honour in succour of his friends abroad, let him as much as he can endeavour to carry with him a sufficient force. Small numbers are neither esteemed of enemies, nor friends. Into the field they dare not come, for they are too few and too weak, being penned up in cities they famish. If our friends be stronger than our aid, then are they commanded by them. If any of their leaders want government, our men that are put to all hard services, pay the prize of their folly. If any calamity happen to their army, our people first feel it. They shift for themselves being in their own country; ours are slain both of enemies and friends, and if victuals wax scant they starve first. I need not show this by other examples, then by our proceed in France, and the Low countries.  
But suppose that by our aid, our friends should be able to overcome, or make peace with the enemy, yet are not our people more assured then before. When the Protestants in the first civil wars by the means of our forces had obtained that they would, or at least tolerable conditions of peace, they joined with our enemies, to besiege us in Newhaven, and sent us away without reward or thanks. The Spaniards that had restored 
a Guicciar. li. 16.  Maximilian Sforza to the Duchy of Milan, the wars being ended for their reward, had like to have had their throats cut. But they stood so much upon their guard, that the practice of Hierome Moron, and the Marquis of Pescara could take no effect. In ancient time how often have our people been deluded by the Dukes of Britain, and Burgundy, in whose aid they went to venture their lives? and do we think that the people of the Low countries, if once they be delivered from the fear of the Spaniard, will not turn out our garrisons, and use us in like sort? they will be able to do it, and others have done so before. Why then should we think ourselves privileged?  
To assure ourselves therefore of our friends, the only means is to have a force sufficient to master them, and correct their disloyalty. The same is the only course to prevail against our enemies, to help our friends, and maintain ourselves.  
If that may not be obtained, I see not how our people can maintain their honour: but the next course to assure themselves, is to have cautionary towns, or hostages, or both delivered into their hands. towns, that they may assure themselves of retreat, in case of bad dealing; hostages, that they may be assured of their good dealing. Without towns their case is desperate, if the enemy prevail. The 
b Fro●ssart.  French that came to aid Galeazzo Duke of Milan, under the leading of the County of Armignac, being scattered in the siege of Alexandria, were slain by the Peasants of the Country. The like happened to those poor Lanceknights, that were defeated at 
c Anno 1569.  Moncontour. Neither were the Spaniards better used, that came in aid of the Leaguers, being defeated by the present french king near Dreux, anno 1589. This town that is given in caution, is to be guarded with a sufficient force of English, furnished with victuals and munitions, in the guard of the garrison, and not as in Vlissingen, in the keeping of the townsmen, unto whom whosoever trusteth, shall assuredly be deceived.  
Thirly, let those that have the government of our men, see that they both march, and lodge united, and strong, that they be not either disturbed in the night, nor betrayed under colour of friendship. Strangers that straggle are a spoil not only to the peasants, but to their secret evilwillers. And those that lodge without defence, or suffer any to come within them in the night, are open to every enterprise of their enemies.  
That they may both lodge, and march hard together, order is to be taken, that they may have victuals delivered them always before hand; and that they be not driven to seek abroad for them. To conclude, the only means of safety is, neither to trust enemy, nor friend: for none are abused, but they that trust disloyal people.  
If that our men can neither have towns, nor hostages, nor victuals, nor good usage, what should they be sent among such people? or why should they trust others, being not themselves trusted? or why should any succour be sent, but such as may command, and punish the disloyal, and have strength to stand upon themselves?  
Those therefore that are governors (I trust) they will maturely consider of this point. if not, let them look for this issue: if the enemy be stronger, then are our men either to be slain, or famished by the enemy: if by our forces our friends prevail, then for their reward shall they either be turned out of the country with disgrace, or be famished, or cut in pieces, by their friends.  
These things considered, let us now consequently proceed to declare, how an army, after that it is exercised and furnished, and that the Generals have all due considerations both therein, and in all other provision, and proceeding required before the march of the army, may march orderly, and safely.    

CHAP. VI  

Part. I. Of the order and array of an army marching toward the enemy.  
THe first care of him that meaneth to march safely in the enemy's country, or where an enemy is near, aught to be, that his troops observe good order, and array: and the nearer that he approacheth to the enemy, the greater ought his care to be. The neglect of this point only, hath been the overthrow of many armies. It giveth opportunity to the enemy to assail us, and confoundeth young soldiers, when they are ignorant how to come in order to defend themselves. easy it is to be observed of men that are willing, and understand reason: and sharp effects and correction it worketh on the stubborn, and wilful. That the General, or his officers may put the army in good order of march, first they are to understand what is the array of the whole army, considered together as one whole body. Secondly, the places of every part, as of horsemen, footmen, and of footmen, of the divers sorts of weapons. Thirdly, the just distances of soldier from soldier, according to every man's quality and weapon. Fourthly, the places of the General, and other chief Commanders. Fiftly, of the great Ordnance, and munition. Lastly, of the carriages and baggage, and boys and servants that attend upon it, and likewise of merchants, and victuallers, and others that follow the army for other causes, then to fight.  
The army consisteth of three parts commonly, considered especially as it marcheth. for in fight, the orders, and parts do much differ. The first part that marcheth we call vanguard; the second the battle; the third, the arier ward. Every one of these aught to be a perfect body of itself, having both his small shot, and great ordinance, and his horsemen, and his pikes, targets, and halberds placed in good order. Oft times, I know, it is otherwise, and that either horsemen, or pikes, or targets are wanting in some part, or other. But how much of these they want, so much they want of perfection, and due proportion in a just army. For we speak not of 6 or 7 thousand (which cannot observe this order, but had better to march united) but of a full army of 24 or 30 thousand, which number marching in this order, so that one part may secure an other, I account, doth march orderly, and strongly. If one part go far before an other, it may fall out, as it happened to the Protestants in the plains of S. Clere anno 1569, that one part shall be in rout, before the other can come to secure. The Romans marched distinguished by legions, whose numbers were divers, and which seldom were complete: but in effect the array was one; save that the Romans commonly made but two parts of their army, and placed their baggage in the midst, as did Caesar marching against the nervians. In the order of the parts, and placing of horsemen, and footmen, and sorting of weapons, the same reasons have place for the most part among all nations.  
Before the avantgard, light horsemen by ancient prescription may challenge the first place. If they be seconded with some shot and targetters lightly armed, they may be the bolder to come near the enemy, and to abide his charge. These are called avantcoureurs, and serve for discovery of the enemies proceed, and of the situation of the Country, and intercepting of the enemy's espials, and divers other uses. Upon the front of the avantgard march small shot and musketeers, after them follow the armed men with the ensigns in the midst, or rather somewhat toward the first ranks. On either hand, and behind the armed men, are other companies of shot to be ranged; and without the shot somewhat advanced forward argoletiers, and then lances take their place. If the enemy make countenance, as if he would charge some part of our army with his horse; they are to be drawn toward the side where the enemy threateneth to give the charge. but if the enemy do fly before us, and shun to fight, the horsemen of the whole army would be joined together, and sent to charge him on the sides or back, and to stay his march: as Caesar practised first against the 
a Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Helvetians, then against the 
b Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  Aduaticans, and lastly, against Petreius his 
c Caes. bell. ciu. 1.  army in Spain. By which means he overtook those that were far before him. But this hath use where we are stronger than the enemy in horse. How many horsemen, or shot, or pikes, or targets, and other weapons shall march in a rank, I refer to the judgement of a good Sergeant mayor, according to the breadth of the ways, and approaches of the enemy. The more do march in a rank, the less pain he shall have to set them in order, when he would place them in order of battle, and the stronger the array is. 
d Guicciar. lib. 9  Ten thousand Swissers in Lombardy, in the wars betwixt the Spaniards and French, marched four score in a rank hard by the French army, which seeing their resolution, durst not charge them.  
The same course is to be taken in the array of the battle, and arrearward marching, save that these two parts following without any great distance between, need not light horsemen or avantcoureurs, especially where the enemy is before. Neither have they such use of shot or horsemen, as the avantgard, where they are used for supplies, rather than to fight in front.  
In the placing of horsemen & footmen, & in sorting and employing of divers weapons, so that every sort may do best service, consisteth the special judgement of a wise leader. For therein are infinite differences, according to the divers strength of the enemy, and our own forces; and likewise according to the diversities of grounds, and times. Yet commonly in marching this order is observed: first the light-horse seconded if need be, with shot and targetters, especially where the country is rough and woody, serve for avantcoureurs. Calivers and musketeers are not only to march on the front, but also on the sides and back of the armed men. Lances and men of arms are ranged, the outmost on the sides for the most part. Next to the shot march the pikes of that part of the army; these would be ranged rather in battalions according to the fashion of the Romans, that the shot and other light armed men might save themselves, and again make head within the distances, than all in one front joined together. But this is where the plainness of the ground will give leave. In every battalion the ensigns are to be placed somewhat toward the first ranks, guarded with good store of targetters and halberds well armed.  
In placing and sorting of weapons, the General is to consider, that the charge of horsemen against shot and targetters is mortal, if they be not either guarded with pikes, or have the vantage of ditches, or hedges, or woods where they cannot reach them. In which case the shot gauleth the horse, if they come within the level of the piece. Shot and targetters against pikes work good effects: pikes joined close, and standing firm together, do break the career of horsemen: especially where they have their musketeers, placed near by them. Archers, where they have a defence before them, do good service in the field against horsemen. These things let the General have so in mind, that he may rather take the advantage of weapons in the encounter, then give it to the enemy.  
In marching, the distances of every rank from rank, and of every soldier from his companion by him, are greater than when they stand ranged in battle ready to fight. It skilleth not much what the distance be, so they may bear their weapons commodiously, & march seemly: yet that every man might know what distance is sufficient, & what is most seemly, it were good that one rule were observed. Shot, although in fight they observe rather a course than array, and are to stir up and down to espy where they may hit the enemy: yet that they may with more ease and speed be drawn to service, are to march in distance from rank to rank five or six foot, from shoulder to shoulder one foot, or a foot and a half. Argoletiers or Pistoliers, in march from horse to horse on the side, are distant two foot, from rank to rank a yard and a half, or thereabout. The lancer without bards rideth in the same distance.  
Pikemen from their fellows side by them, are distant a foot and a half, or two foot, from the pikemen behind and before, by reason of the length of their pikes twelve foot. Their march to their corpse de guard, when they hold their pikes upright, which the Italian calleth inalborar, is out of this rule. Of their distances in charging, or receiving the charge of horse or foot, we shall speak when we come to the place.  
Halberdiers march a foot and a half from shoulder to shoulder, and seven foot from rank to rank. The targetter may observe the same distance from shoulder to shoulder, but he needeth not such distance from rank to rank.  
The General, as he hath the commandment, so he ought to have the care of all, and therefore aught to be in all places. But because he cannot be in all places at one time, therefore doth the practice of war require, that he assign the guiding of his three battalions, to three of his chief officers and commanders, that are men of judgement and experience, to see and command in his absence all men in their battalion to march in order. Himself may march with the battle, unless for some cause it shall please him to march in the vanguard, or arrearward. The Romans over every legion or regiment of five or six thousand, placed a principal commander, they called him Legatum: the same was of the General's counsel, and in his absence one of his lieutenants. Every several troop of horsemen are to have their several commanders, and every company of shot likewise. All which ought to be obedient to the General of the horse, or Colonel of the footmen, which know the General's counsel. The several troops also of armed men, are to have their several commanders: provided always that no one company have more than one commander for avoiding of confusion, and that every of these hearken to their superiors, which under the General have the chief government of every battalion. The Sergeant mayor, and corporals of the field his officers are to acquaint every commander with the General's direction, which the same is to execute.  
These are therefore suffered to go up and down to see things in order. For others it is not good they should leave their array, unless it be for necessary causes, as sickness, the necessities of nature, and such like. The commanders of every troop are to march in the head of their troops, their lieutenants behind the same. All other colonels, captains, lieutenants and sergeant, are to keep their rank and array wherein they shall be placed. For although over their private companies when they are single they command; yet in the army united together, they are commanded, and only to see those that follow them where they march to do their duties. which consent unless it be observed, these inconveniences will ensue. By contrary commandments, there will fall out confusion and contention: and many captains, lieutenants, and sergeant will walk out of order, and much time will be spent in setting of men in their places, which every soldier ought to do of himself.  
The great ordnance being parted betwixt the vanguard, battle, and rearward, sometime is drawn in head of the 
a So was it at the battle of Moncontour, and in the battle betwixt the Conte Egmont and Thermes by graveling.  pikes of every battle: but for that it must needs trouble those that would march on to fight with the enemy, far better it were, if all the great ordnance were drawn on the sides of the vanguard, as oft as the enemy made show of charge, and then drawn upon some hill, or some other place of advantage. In the field it doth more trouble than service: the effects of it, is but noise and foolery, only that small towns should not make resistance, it is drawn along, and also for the use that it hath in sieges, and batteries.  
Concerning the baggage, and those servants and boys that attend upon the same, and such as follow the army, as merchants or victuallers, rather to gain then to fight: this rule is generally to be observed, that the same be placed between the bataillions, so that in a charge the same may best be defended, and yet not trouble the array of the army. The same is to be placed where there is least danger. The Greeks returning from the battle betwixt Cyrus 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2.  and Artaxerxes, being coasted and pursued by the enemy, placed their carriages near the river along which they marched, and their armed men toward the enemy. Caesar marching 
a Caes. bell. gal. 2.  against the nervians, after three parts of four of his whole forces placed his baggage, being guarded with the other fourth part following behind. At other times when there was less suspicion of the enemy, every legion marched by itself, and the baggage thereof after. 
b Praecedunt cohortes, sequitur prima legio, & medijs impedimentis sinistrum latus, 19 legio etc. Tacit. 2.  Germanicus after certain chosen troops, placed the first regiment or legion, and after that he caused the baggage to follow guarded on either side, and behind with the rest of the army. If our baggage and impediments be great, so much as may be spared is to be left in some strong town. Or if the enemy be behind, The 
c Caes. de bell. ciu. 3.  baggage together with our hurt men is to be sent before into some place of safety, as Caesar practised in his retreat from Dyrrhachium.  
This is the common course, which is I think also best, for an army to use in marching. But if the enemy make countenance, or rather do begin to charge any part of the same: then that part which is nearest him, is to be made the head or vanguard, the other two parts of the army are to be drawn, the one on the right hand, the other on the left. If the enemy come on front, than the ranks of the avantgard are to be doubled, or multiplied according to the capacity of the ground. The battle and rearward are to be drawn up, the one toward the left hand, the other toward the right, or else one part is to be drawn up until the same be equal of front with the avantgard, and the other being divided into battalions, to serve for supply where need is. The shot is to be placed part in front, and the rest on the sides, and without them ought horsemen to take their standing expecting their advantage, and the commandment of their leaders. But if our horsemen be few, and not able to match the enemy's cavalry; let them not be to far advanced, unless they be seconded, with shot and half pikes armed àle legiere: but rather let them be reserved to chase the enemy being foiled by the footmen, and placed between either ground of advantage, or battalions of pikes. And this if it be done of those that have skill, ye shall neither hear noise, nor see confusion, nor time spent about it. The soldiers of Caesar being suddenly charged by the 
d Caes. de bell. gal. 2.  nervians, as they were newly come to their lodging, did every man presently set himself in array to fight. And Annibal had so taught his soldiers, that every one issuing out of his lodging, could fall in array of himself, either being ready to fight or to march. And why might not our soldiers also be so instructed, and exercised, that they might do the like? but some want care, some skill, and some both.  
Some percase will ask, Who gave me authority to prescribe? which are very simple not to see, that I prescribe nothing of mine own, but only declare the ancient practice of war, and proceeding of most famous warriors. The Romans used this course, and so did the Greeks and Carthaginians. First marched the light horse, than the light armed, after them the armed men. The baggage was placed in the midst of the army. This order did Caesar oserue in his march against the 
a Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Helvetians, 
b Caes. Bel. gal. 2.  Belgians, and in 
c Caes. bell. Ciu. 1.  Spain against Afranius, and Petreius. The same did 
d Livi. 21.  Annibal practise in his marching all along Italy. The same course for the most part is observed of those that have skill in our times, but that the differences of grounds, and divers conditions of men's armies make them alter some circumstances. Metellus 
e Metellus cum expeditis cohortibus, item funditorum & sagitta●iorum lecta manu apud primos erat. in postremo C. Marius cum equitibus curabat. in utrumque latus auxiliarios equites, & permistos velites dispertiverat. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  marching against jugurtha, placed first certain choice companies of slingers and archers, and after them troops of armed men, without impediments or baggage: there himself commanded. C. Marius followed with the horsemen, upon both sides he placed horsemen, and light armed of his associates mingled among them, guided by certain captains of horse, the legions marched in the midst. Xenophon, for that a square battle in straits is easily disordered, did divide the square into 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph exped. Cyr. 3.  companies (which knowing their places in the square, marched few in a rank in straits: and in open ground, came into their array again.) His horse and slingers he cast out on the front, and sides. Corbulo so 
g Corbulo viae pariter & pugnae composuerat exercitum, latere dextro 3 legio, sinistro, 6 incedebat, medijs decumanorum delectis: recepta inter ordines impedimenta: te●gum mill equites tuebantur: in co●nibus pedes sagitta●ius & c●tera manus equitum ibat. Tacit. 13.  marched in his voyage against the Parthians, as was both for the march, and fight most safe and fit: in the right side marched the third Regiment, the sixth on the left, and the tenth in the midst, the carriages were placed between the Regiments, a thousand horse followed for guard of the Rierwarde, upon the wings were the rest of the horse placed, and by them the archers and light armed footmen, When the black 
h Froissart.  Prince marched into Spain, his army was divided into three parts, upon the wings marched the horse, the archery being then well armed made the body of the battalions.  
The weakness of the armies of our time proceed of contempt of military arrays, and orders. The French among their footmen, have few or none armed. Before the encounter at Rocheabeille Anno 1569, 
a Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 7.  the Protestants marched thus: the horsemen made the Auantgarde, on either side marched certain troops of shot, seconded by horsemen: after the vanguard followed a battalion of lansquenets, and in front of them were drawn eight field pieces: after them followed divers Regiments of shot representing the battle, and on the side thereof another battalion of lansquenets with some other pieces. That which was the strength of the army, that is pikes, and halberds, and targets armed was wanting, and shot placed, where if they had been charged, they could have done no service. Oft times the vanguard marcheth, and lodgeth so far from the rest of the parts of the army, that it is no hard matter for a vigilant man of war to cut one in pieces, before the other can come to secure. This 
b Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  was the death of the Prince of Condè, and overthrow of his vanguard at the battle of Cognac. And the same was the overthrow of 
c Appian. de bell. Parth.  Crassus by the Parthians, for his son was so far advanced before the rest of the army, that before he could be relieved, he and his troops were defeated. And in our times some great commanders, albeit they had but five or six thousand; yet would they needs make three parts forsooth, which is the cause of the weakness of the whole: the Captains, lieutenants, and sergeants, which are a good part of the strength of the army, stand for the most part out of rank, and will all take upon them to be leaders: because of contrary commandments no man can tell where to go: while commanders strive together, there is great contention and noise made. And finally a great matter made of nothing: and nothing made of all their service, and matters very easy made difficult. For if the army be a body, than every soldier ought to be taught, that he may know how to stand in his place, as every member is placed in the body. But we have said enough of the array, now therefore let us talk of the proceeding of an army.   

CHAP. VI Part. 2. Wherein is declared by what means an Army may march safely in the enemy's country, and overcome all difficulties, whereby either in champion, or woody grounds, or else in the passage of rivers, or hills and straits, the same may be disordered, or hindered.  
BEside the common array of the army in marching, which we are as near as we can to endeavour to understand, and keep: if we mean to march assured, we are also to learn the estate of the enemy, the site of the country, where we do march, and how the ordinary array is to be changed, according to the diversity of the grounds, to the end that we may both in champion, and in woody grounds, and also over rivers, and hills pass safely.  
Chabrias the Athenian captain, 
a Plutarch. Apopth.  said he deserved not the name of a General, that understood not the estate of the enemies. And of 
b Livy 22.  Annibal Livy giveth report, that he understood what was done in the enemy's camp, as well as themselves. The enemy's purposes and estate we understand partly by the examination of prisoners taken: partly by the report of such as fly from the enemy unto us: but most assuredly by our own espials, and discoverers, which either go disguised among the enemies, or else in warlike sort approach his lodging, or army to see what countenance he hath. The situation of the country is understood, partly by cards truly representing the hills, straits, and rivers, and partly by report of the country people examined severally, but most exactly, by men of judgement from some high place viewing it. 
c Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  Xenophon inquired, and learned of such prisoners as he had taken, both the estate of the enemies, and the divers ways whereby he might return into Greece: by the same also he understood the situation of the countries, and manners of the people, by which he was to pass with his company. Ring Edward the 
d Froisart.  third being in pain to pass the river of Some in France, by the instruction given him by one of his prisoners understood of a ford. The Romans by the examination of divers prisoners taken in Africa, understood all the proceed of the enemies. Yet must not we give too great credit to such: for subtle persons do often dissemble, and desperate villains will not stick to lead us into traps. divers of them therefore are to be examined severally & straightly, and not to be believed unless they consent, and speak probably. Caes 
a. de bell. ciu. 2.  Curio lightly examining a prisoner concerning the force of the enemy, was greatly abused, and pursuing the enemy upon his report, was himself, and his company overthrown.  
Many things are likewise understood by relation of those that fly unto us from the enemy. By such kind of men the 
b Per transfugas cognitum est, quos levitas ingeniorum ad cognoscendas hostium res in omnibus bellis praebet. Livi. 31.  Romans discovered the preparatives of the king of Macedonia against them. Annibal partly by such, and 
c Annibalem nihil eorum quae apud hostes gerebantur fallebat & perfugis multa indicantibus, & per suos explorantem. Livi. 22.  partly by his own diligence, searching out matters continually by his espials, understood whatsoever the Romans did. King Edward the 3. by Robert of Artois, that upon some displeasure was driven out of the Court of France, understood divers secrets of that state, as also by Godefry d'Harecourt, & the earl Momfort that fled to him out of Britain. Yet may we not give light credence to all their words. Percase they understand not matters well, or else deal doubly. 
d Transfugis non fidens Syllanus, speculatores ad hoftem misit.  Syllanus therefore in Spain beside the report of those that fled from the enemy, sent his espials to see what the enemy did. And Annibal used to keep them diligently that reported any thing, that if the reports were found untrue, they might be punished. The 
e Livi. 6.  Roman Consul having received news, that some of his company would be defeated without present succour, and not retaining the messenger, fell into an ambush laid for him.  
The most assured way of intelligence is by espials secretly sent, or discoverers approaching the enemy. Annibal 
f Livy. 30.  returning out of Italy to defend his own country against Scipio, sent divers espials into his camp. 
g Pro perfugis speculandi gratia in Caesaris castra mittit. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Scipio in the wars of Caesar in Africa, sent two Getulians to espy Caesar's camp disguised as fugitives. But because such persons cannot long stay there without being discovered: therefore sometimes under colour of parley, and sometime under colour of buying, or selling, or other business, soldiers disguised like merchants espy out the enemies proceeding. Scipio while the treaty of peace continued betwixt him and 
h Livi. 29.  Syphax, sent divers captains in slaves apparel, which wandering about the enemy's camp discovered the accesses, and issues of it, which being reported to Scipio, gave him the means to charge Syphax in the night, being quiet and safe (as he conceived) in his lodging. 
i Scipio cum equitatu iaculatoribúsque expeditis profectus ad castra hostium, exque propinquo copias quantae & cuius generis essent speculandas, obuius fit Annibali & ipsi cum equitibus ad exploranda circa loca progresso. Livi. 21.  Scipio, this man's father, before the battle with Annibal at Trebia, drew forth his horsemen and light armed, to view Hannibal's camp: Annibal for the same purpose came against him with other horsemen. But because this manner of discovery cannot be made without force, therefore did Equitatum 
a omnem ad numerum 4000 praemittit, qui videant, quas in parts hosts iter faciant. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Caesar pursuing the Helvetians, send all his horsemen in number 4000, to see what ways the enemies marched. The 
b Histoir. de trou. de Franc. lib. 9  Admiral of France having received some loss in the plains of S. Clere, anno 1569 for want of good espial, sent certain horsemen to the number of sixteen, which going near and taking some prisoners, might understand the enemy's resolution. but because they were so few, they were beaten back before they could see any thing, and returned without effect. Yet we think we do much when we send forth six or seven horsemen badly mounted. for some do rashly proceed without them: but both courses are contrary to the practice of war.  
The view of the country well described in cards both teach a wise General many things. for there he may see the tract of rivers, the distances of places, the rising of hills, and many such opportunities. The 
c Moverat senatum maximè maris terrarumque regionis eius situm demonstrando. Liu. 32.  Romans in ancient time used, when they consulted of any action, to view the situation of the country laid before them. The Count of Purlitia, in his advertisements to Ferdinand the Emperor, and Don Sancho de Londonno stand upon the same as a necessary point. for by view of regions described, many things appear, that otherwise cannot be conceived. But much better may the country be discovered, if men of judgement go before with the horsemen to view the same, and to follow the traces of the enemies. those that observe this course both go, & return safely. Marcellus 
d Exploratò cunfirmisque praesidijs tuto receptu praedatum ierat. Liu. 23.  searching out the lurking holes of the enemy, and placing strong guards in places convenient, returned safely from foraging the country.  
They that march forward blindly without either view of the country, or knowledge of the enemies proceedings, are subject to many mishaps. The Roman army at the straits of Caudium compassed in by the enemy on every side, complaineth, that like 
e Non ducem locorum fuisse, non exploratorem, belluarum modo caecos in foveam missos. Liu. 9  brute beasts, going on without guide or espial, they were carried headlong, as it were, into a pit. 
f Liu. 31.  Appius spoiling the country of the Boians, without either discovery, or stands of men well placed, was drawn into an ambush, and slain together with his army. This one point neglected, cost many of the Romans their lives, in the wars with Annibal. Marcus Marcellus going himself with a small company to view the country, was himself drawn into ambush, and slain. 
g Vocula nec adventum hostium exploravit, eoque simul egressus, victusque Tacit. 20.  Vocula charging the enemy without knowledge of his forces, was assoon slain, as he went fast out of his lodging to fight with him. The Count of Aremberge, by the bravery of the Spaniard forced to pass the 
Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 1.  river, before he knew the strength of the enemy which seemed not great, was defeated with his company by the Count Lodwick. The Admiral's vanguard was broken in the plains of S. Clere, an. 1569, 
b Ibidem lib. 9  for that the same did bluntly charge the enemy, of whose forces and number the same was ignorant. The careless march of Mouuans and Pierregourde, that were charged before they understood of the enemy's approach, was cause of their overthrow: and hath also both unto the enemy and to us wrought many calamities in the Low countries, which those that escaped narrowly may remember, and can report. Dangerous therefore it is to march by night, especially in countries unknown, and where the enemies proceedings are unknown. Asdrubal 
c Liu. 27.  in the night lost his guide, & his way, and wearied himself: and being the next day forced to fight, was overcome by the Romans at the river of Metaurus. Puygalliard in these late troubles of France, marching all night, most of his troops lost their way: the rest the day following were defeated at S. Gem, by a very few Protestants. Those that escape by policy out of straits as Annibal did at Cales, and Asdrubal in Spain, he driving away the corpse de guard by fear of fire, the other escaping during parley of yielding; and likewise they that have had good success charging the enemy at all adventures, have been more happy than wise.  
Those therefore that march against their enemies are to discover the country and affairs of the enemy diligently, and to shun night marches. but if necessity force them thereunto, yet wisdom admonisheth them to understand the enemies doings perfectly, to procure sure guides, and to keep them fast: to march close together, now and then to make alta, that those that lag, may come up, by sure marks to know friends from enemies, and to give certain & perfect directions. Which course while 
d Liu. 25.  Martius did hold in Spain, & Scipio in Africa, he overcame the Carthaginians, and dislodged them twice, 
e Liu. 29.  Scipio foiled Syphax and burnt his camp, and slew his people in the night.  
The country, and proceeding of the enemy discovered, let us next consider the differences of grounds. The plain champion country is to be chosen of those that desire to fight, and are stronger than the enemy. Those that are unwilling to fight, let them shun such ground, so much as they can. therein there is no fear of ambushes, nor impediment to break the array of the army, which in this ground is no less to be observed in marching, then in fight. The champion country being without hedges, or ditches, is advantageous for horsemen, whose force in that ground, without a hedge of resolute pikes, of no number of other arms can well be sustained. Two thousand 
a Cohortes 4 c●tratorum à Caesaris equitibus in planitie deprehensae, concisae sunt. Caes. bell. Ciu. 1.  targetters, overtaken by Caesar's horsemen upon a plain, were all cut in pieces; neither could Afranius their General succour them. 
b Curio ex locis superioribus copias deducens, à jubae equitatu circumfusus occiditur. Caes. de bell. Ciu. 2.  Curio Caesar's lieutenant in Africa, leaving the advantages of the hills, and descending down into the plains, being compassed about with juba's cavalero, was slain together with his army. Caesar having great advantage against Afranius and Petreius in his horsemen, did force them for their safeguard to forsake the plains. For how can can an army 
c Eques levisque armatura nunc ab tergo, nunc ab lateribus occurrendo fatigabat morabaturque. Liu. 28.  march in the plains, so long as the enemy with his horsemen, and light armed, chargeth the same now on the sides, and then on the back? Caesar marching in Africa where he was inferior to the enemy in horse, was much by their charges encumbered and hindered in his march. The Romans 
d Equitatu melior erat Poenus & ob id campi patentes quales sunt inter Padum Alpesque bello gerendo Romanis apti non erant. Liu. 21.  perceiving Annibals strength in horse, yielded to him the plains, and kept themselves upon the higher grounds.  
If therefore we desire to keep the plains, we must provide a competent force of horsemen to match the enemies: if we be weak in horse, let us keep our places of advantages. but if necessity force us to march through plain and open countries, then must we make head against the horsemen with our pikes, and mosquets, disposing our army so, that not only the footmen, but the horsemen also may have succour of. the battalions of pikes, and shot. Caesar by this means repulsed the enemy's horse in the plains of Africa, and charging them with some few horse seconded with half pikes, put them to the gallop. If our horsemen be not too much inferior to the enemy: then if we mingle some shot and half pikes lightly armed with doublets plated, or other light armour among them, and second them with some battalions of pikes, we need not greatly fear to encounter the enemy's horsemen. By this 
e Liu. 26.  mixture and array the Romans overthrew the Capuan horsemen in the siege of Capua, which before that they durst not upon even hand encounter. Afranius had no other means to break the charge of Caesar's 
f Caesaris equitatu Afranianos prement, expeditae cohortes extremum agmen claudebant. Caes. bell. Ciu. 1.  horsemen pursuing him in Spain, but by opposing against them in the rearward certain companies of half pikes lightly armed, and ready, not being laden with baggage. By this only device Caesar with 2000 horse all wearied and faint, put 7000 of 
a Caes. de bell. Civil. lib. 3.  Pompey's horsemen to flight. for no horsemen will endure the point of the halberd or half pike. The Prince 
b Histoire de troubls. de France.  of Condey in the encounter at S. Denis, in these late troubles of France, assigning to every company of horse a company of shot, which should discharge when the enemy came to charge the Prince's horse; by this device prevailed against the enemy, which otherwise he was not able to encounter.  
woody countries, and thick bushes are not to be passed either with our horse, or pikes before we have cleared them with our shot, and targetters, and short weapons. for as in those grounds, horse for that they cannot there fetch their carreire, and pikes by reason of their length are unserviceable: so they are exposed to the shot of the enemy, which in such places commonly lie hidden. The 
c Tacit. Annal.  Romans taking the Germans with their long pikes in a certain woody country, taught them that such grounds were not for them. Caesar pursuing his enemies into 
d Caes. bell. gal. 2.  the woods, would not follow them, before the ways were made, and the woods cut down.  
Hills and straits are yet more difficult to pass then woods: for in woods short weapons and shot may do service. in hills and straits possessed by the enemy, neither horsemen, nor pikes, nor any sort of weapons can do service, but with great disadvantage. In surmounting whereof, these cautions are to be used: first that we do not enter a strait, before we have assured ourselves of an issue either before, or behind, or at least on the sides. The 
e Liu. 9  Romans not using this caution, entering the straight at Caudium, were so compassed in by the enemy on every side, that they could neither go forward, nor backward, but must there compound for their lives. Cornelius the 
f Liu. 7.  consul had likewise been entrapped and compassed about in a valley by the Samnites, if that Decius a valiant man with certain troops had not taken the hill above their heads, and driven them from thence, by his own danger, opening a passage to the rest of the army. If we be not assured to force the enemy before us, yet let us assure ourselves of the highest grounds, both behind and upon the sides of the army, and keep them until the passage before be opened. Which course Annibal taught us by his example, passing the Alpes, and the Pyrenean mountains. Being 
g Liu. 22.  brought into a straight by the mistaking of his guide, he forced the passage in the night, and delivered his army safe out. Cyrus' perceiving the danger of his army in passing the straits and hills of Cilicia taken and kept by the enemy, removed him thence by sending certain troops far about another way to charge him on the back.  
In passing of mountains guarded by the enemy, we are further to take heed that our companies do not march up to the hill directly, before that our shot and light armed, have either taken the higher ground (if any be) or else some even ground either upon the sides, or the backs of the enemy. Annibal 
a Liu. 21.  perceiving that the inhabitants of the Alpes had seized the passages: in the night time marching up with the lustiest young men he had, took the ground above their heads, and so drove them from the places, which otherwise by rolling down of stones might have hurt his men, and stopped their passage. When Philip the king of Macedonia had lodged his army by the bank of the river Aous, and at the foot of certain mighty mountains; the Roman General by the direction of a shepherd, understanding the site of the 
b Deleri exercitus Philippi potuit, sed equitem angustiae▪ ●ocorúmque asperitas, peditem a●morum gravitas impedijt. Liu. 32.  ground, sent four thousand targetters about the hills, and coming upon his back drove him from his ground, and had utterly defeated his army, had not the roughness, and straightness of the ground hindered the career of his horsemen, and the weight of their arms, the speed of the footmen. The Persians did drive Leonidas from the straits of Thermopylae by coming upon his back, and taking the upper ground. which likewise was done by the Roman General Acilius, when Antiochus kept the same straits, to stop the proceeding of the Roman army. In all their expeditions through the mountains of 
c Liu. 32. & 46.  Thessaly, and Athamanie, the Romans passed without any loss into Macedon, for that they always took the tops of the hills with their light armed, before they suffered their army to descend into the valleys. Xenophon returning into his country through the hills of the Carduchians, to pass them safely took this course. 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 4.  His company he divided equally into two parts, whereof if the first were stopped, the second advancing itself forward another way wan the hill, and drove the enemies from their ground: if the enemy made head against the second, than did the first compass the hill while that part held the enemies in breath. The array of the army in passing of hills and straits, is divers from the common order of marching: for here not the horsemen, but shot and light armed targetters, and short weapons march first, and serve to discover the enemy: they also guard both the sides and back of the army: next them march the horsemen and pikes, with the baggage and great ordnance in the midst.  
divers are the dangers and difficulties, which an army is subject unto passing of great rivers where there is no bridge, nor easy ford, no less to be considered, than other impediments opposed against an army marching: for here the enemy commonly maketh head against us: here he lieth in wait either to charge us in front, or on the back, our forces being divided, and one part not able to secure the other. If we be driven to fight in the river, or as so●ne as we come on the other side, our arms and clothes being wet, do hinder us and tire us. If our army pass by boats, it is to be feared lest the enemy coming down the river with greater vessels and boats than we have, do divide our company likewise, and take away our means to pass: bridges are broken with great waters, yea with great barges, and pieces of timber sent down the river, and falling overthwart them. 
a Belgas nostri in flumine aggressi magnam corum partem conciderunt. Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  Caesar charging the Belgians as they passed a river, cut a number of them in pieces. The Spaniards that forced to pass a river in the pursuit of 
b Liu. 21.  Annibal, were likewise slain in the midst of it by his horsemen returning back upon them, and finding them in disorder. When the 
c Inopinantes & impeditos aggressus magnam eorum partem concidit. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Helvetians were all passed the river of Soane save a fourth part, Caesar setting upon them that remained, and looked for no such thing, discomfited and killed the most of them. 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Labienus suffering them of Trevers to pass the river betwixt him and them, before they were half passed, set upon them, and overthrew them, before the rest could pass. Those 
e Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 9  Protestants likewise, which for want of means could not pass so soon as their fellows, were defeated at the passage of Dordonne, anno 1569. Hard it is and dangerous to pass a river, where there is an army on the other side ready to debate, and deny the passage. The 
f Heluetij navibus iunctis, ratibúsque compluribus factis, alij vadis Rodani perrumpere conati, operis munitione, & militum concursu & ●elis repulsi. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Helvetians at fords, and by boats, often attempted to pass the river of Rone, but what with the height of the banks, and trenches made, and force of men, they were repulsed. Therefore in passing of great rivers, the Generals had need to proceed discreetly: and to look both forward and backward, that whether he pass by fords or by bridges made for the purpose, or by boats, or pieces of timber bound together, or skins blown full of wind, or howsoever, he lose none of his company, nor be troubled, as men are, that are taken unprovided. King Edward the third passed the river of Some at a ford, notwithstanding the resistance made by the French: but if withal he had passed over some thousand, or two thousand archers, which by appointment might have come upon the back of the enemy, the passage of the river had been more easy, and the defence of the enemy, and escape more difficult: for by that means Annibal defeated the Gauls in the passage of Rone. For making she we to pass by force, those companies that he had sent about an other way, came upon their backs, and cut many of them in pieces. The Admiral of France anno 1569, when he could not force the guard at Port de Pile, by reason of the Gabions, and Barriquadals, under which the enemies shot lay covered: sought, and found a passage a little above the place: which the enemy had no sooner espied, but he left his stand without any great entreaty. The Prince of Orange anno 1568, breaking the force of the stream of the river of Mosa, by placing horses overthwart, found means to pass his army over, before the enemy knew where he would pass. There is no river, but lightly higher or lower it may be forded. 
a Xenoph. exp. cyr. 3.  Xenophon with his company, not being able otherwise to pass the river of Tigris, yet marching up towards the head of it, found a ford. 
b Fossis Caesar Sycorim avertens vadum fecit. Caes. bell. ciu. l. 1.  Caesar by deep trenches deriving part of the river of Sycoris in Spain, made the rest so shallow, that the soldiers might wade over it. Where the enemy doth fortify the banks on the other side, and deny us passage; there some part of the army is to be sent about some other way, to come upon the enemy's backs, and to open the passage for the rest.  
Annibal, when the Gauls stopped him the passage of Rone, in the night sent Hanno away with part of his army, which marching that night five and twenty miles up the river, and finding no resistance, upon boats brought with him, and timber bound together passed his men; which making a sign to Annibal, that they were passed, came upon the backs of the enemy at such time, as Annibal was ready to pass in front. 
c Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Caesar when by force he could not pass the river of Allier in France, the enemy still coasting him on the other side: cunningly leaving two legions behind a wood, and marching away with the rest of his army, when the enemy followed him, those that remained behind, having boats, and things ready, passed suddenly and made a bridge over the river, so that the rest of Caesar's army returning, passed also at ease. Neither could the enemy remedy it, being drawn so far from the place. 
a Labienus magno tumultu adversa Sequana partem copiarum ducens, naves aliquot nactus in alio loco exercitum t●a luxit. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Labienus by like practice passed the river of Seyne, notwithstanding the enemy's guard, and opposition. part of his army he led up against the river of Seyne in the night with great noise: which the enemy hearing, followed, thinking that all his army had been there. In the mean while certain chosen companies left behind, passed the river in great silence in boats made of purpose, which taking the bank, gave passage to their fellows returning. Aemilius Paulus with a skirmish busying the minds of the Macedonians, at the same time sent certain companies about the hills to pass there the river of Enipeus, which coming on the enemy's backs, caused them speedily to dissodge, and leave the passage. Caesar at 
b Navibus ex levi materia & viminibus corio contextis 22. millia denectis legione traducta collem occupat & munit, pontémque facit. Caes. bell. ciu. 1.  another time when he could not pass the river of Sycoris at a ford, made certain boats of twigs and light timber, and covered them with leather. In those boats carried 22 miles off, in one night he passed a regiment, took a hill, and fortified it, and there made a bridge for the passing of the rest of the army. In the wars of Charles the 5, against the Protestants in Germany, the 
c Sleidan.  Spaniards pursuing the Duke of Saxony, passed with their horsemen at a ford, and divers of the rest swimming over the Elbe with their swords in their mouths, seized the boats that were tied on the other side, and by that means passed over their fellows. The 
d Lusitani sine utribus ad exercitus non eunt. Caes. bell. ciu 1.  Lusitanians in time past did seldom go into the wars without girdles of skins, which being blown full of wind, they easily passed any river. The Germans when no way they could force 
e Caes. bell. Gal. 4.  a passage over the river of Rhein, feigned as if they returned into their own country: but having marched three days journey, they rid back so far in one night, and coming back upon a sudden, found the country people's boats tied at the river side, in which they passed themselves, and sent back the boats to pass the rest of the company. Where the enemy maketh no resistance, there it is easy to pass by boat, yet the practice of war requireth, that either for quick dispatch a bridge be made, or else that trenches be made upon the river side both for defence of those that pass first, and for those that stay last, and also that boats may pass, and repass safely under the favour of some pieces placed on the banks. How a bridge may be made 
a Caes. Bel gal. 4.  Caesar hath taught us by the example of that, which he made over Rhein. Take two posts long or short according to the depth of the river, and couple them two foot asunder, and so drive them down with a rammer, leaning somewhat towards two other such posts so joined and driven down 30 or 40 foot above them in the river, which fastened together with other timber below, & covered with square beams are the foundation of the bridge. Upon divers such couples laying timber and covering the same, with planks, and hurdles, and straw the army hath means to pass. I think there is no carpenter, but he knoweth this kind of work. and therefore the rest I refer to his occupation, and workmanship. The bridge being made, great care is to be taken that the same be not broken; as it happened to the bridge made by the Protestants over Garonne Anno 1569, carried away by timber & wooden mills sent down against it. Which had not happened, if either defences had been made above, or else a broad place left in the bridge for such things to pass. Sometimes bridges are made of boats fastened with cables, and stayed with anchors. Such a bridge was made by the Prince of Parma over the river of Scald, and also by the Protestants over the river of Garronne 1569. At the siege of Poitiers the same year the Protestants made a bridge over the water upon empty pipes bound fast together with ropes. Mouuans to assure his passage over the river of Rone, dressed there a little fort on the bank; where some artillery being placed, beat the frigates that would have hindered the passage, and defended the fort against such as would have disturbed them in passing, from the land. The same course was also practised by Montbrune, and divers others.  
But as the General is to have care to pass toward the enemy, so he is to have care that he may repass again. Therefore did Caesar passing over Rhine build two forts, at either end of the bridge one, to assure himself a passage. The Roman Emperor Crassus' passing the river of Euphrates; if he had had the like care, more of his army percase might have returned, then did. It was likewise a great error in the Count Aremberge, that passing the river, he had no regard to assure himself of the bridge, which being taken from him by the enemy, he was slain with most of his company, and deprived of retreat.  
The array of an army passing of rivers, is much according to the opposition made by the enemy: if none be made, the common order is sufficient. If the enemy she we himself, the great ordnance is to be drawn to the bank on the sides of the army, & other shot likewise if they will reach so far, to the intent the enemy may be forced to give place. If the river be gueable, let the shot march on the sides, the targets in front seconded with pikes: the horsemen may follow in the midst. And when the other side is assured: then are the impediments, and great ordnance to be passed, the rest of the army following afterward, the back being armed, as the front. If the river be not to be passed at a ford, than a part of our army being sent about to win some more easy passage, when that is ready to come on the enemy's backs, certain boats with some small pieces in the noses of them, and furnished with shot, and targets are first to set forward with equal front, and after them other boats laden with piquiers, are to follow: the ordnance and impediments must come in the midst, and the rest of the army afterward.  
But in passing of plains, woods, straits, mountains, or rivers there is no course more effectual, then to use expedition & celerity. In all practices of war the same is most available. For by this means the danger is often passed, before the enemy be ready to withstand us. 
a Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Caesar by his expedition had wondered success in all his affairs. He passed the hills of Auvergne, before the enemy had any suspicion of his coming. He passed his army in one day over the river of Soan, which the Helvetians could not do in many. By the same he prevented 
b Caes. bell. ciu. 1.  all Pompeyeses preparatives, and drove his enemies out of Italy, before they had any respite given them to take breath. 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 3.  Xenophon taking the tops of the hills before the enemy looked for him, passed great dangers with great ease. Montgomery in his journey into Bearne used that speed, that before the enemies were assembled to resist him, he had passed all the rivers, straits, and mountains which were in his way. No marvel therefore, if they do nothing, that make such intolerable delays in all things. Loiterers are taken in trap, and made often to fly, because they will not run. The army of Afranius in Spain, being near to the hills, where they might have escaped Caesar's hands, and marched safely; delayed time, and suffered Caesar's army to come betwixt them, and their safety; which was the ruin of that company. Yet if the heavens should be ruinated, some as it should seem, would not mend their pace.    

CHAP. VII.  

Part. 1. Wherein is declared what traverses, and oppositions the defendants are to make, that thereby they may stop or hinder the progress, and march of the enemy.  
THis may be understood in part by that, which hath been said already. For seeing the difficulties that hinder the proceeding of an army, are either wants and weakness in itself, or oppositions made by the enemy, that taking the advantages of hills, or woods, or straits, or rivers, is always ready to hurt, or hinder it: who seethe not that the stronger our oppositions are, the slower will the army be able to proceed?  
The principal means to break the course of an army ranging up and down the country, is want of provision. This was the course that Fabius used against Annibal in Italy. To effect this, straight order is to be taken, that the 
a Edictum proponebatur, ut quious oppida, castellaque immunita essent, in loca tuta commigrarent, ex agris quoque uti demigrarent omnes regionis eius qua Annibal iturus esset, tectis priùs incensis, ac frugibus corruptis, ne cuius rei copia esset. Liu. 22.  people save themselves in places of strength, and that thither also they convey their corn, provision and cattle. whatsoever cannot be carried away, the same is to be burned, and spoiled all along where the enemy cometh. Which order Fabius caused to be proclaimed, and observed in the wars in Italy with Annibal. 
b Liu.  Philip king of Macedonia not being able to defend the towns, & country of Thessalia, transported the people into other places, the towns & villages he burned, the corn he laid up safe, the cattle he caused to be driven into places of strength. 
c Pabulatione & commeatu Vercing etorix equitatu abundans Caesarem prohibere conatus est. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Vercingetorix the captain of the Gauls seeing himself no way able to match Caesar's army in open field, yet by spoiling the country, & burning whatsoever might be commodious for the enemy, drove him to great extremities. and percase had done more, if that the necessity of poor people, & hope to defend towns of no strength had not spared much, that should have been spoiled. The Greeks that returned from the voyage of Cyrus into Persia, were by nothing hurt more, then by the wilfulness of the people through whose countries they passed, which burning their provision, which they could not save, made them go far about, & suffer great want. The duke of Alva had not been so easily rid of the army which the prince of Orange brought into the Low countries, if he had not without compassion spoiled the country, & forced him to return for fear of hunger. The duke of Aumale likewise did spoil the country where the Almains that came to aid the Protestauts anno 1569 passed. If pity of the poor, and favour of friends will permit us to execute this without respect, there is nothing more au●●lable against a strong enemy, for whatsoever provision the evemy bringeth with him; yet if he find no supply in the country, he cannot long continued there. 
a Adeoque inopia est coactus Annibal▪ ut nisi tum fug●● speciem abe●ndo tim●isset, Galliam repetitu●us suerit. Liu. 22.  Fabius by following this course brought Annibal with his victorious army into those straits; that had it not been for shame and danger, that would have followed him by flying, he would have returned back into France.  
Lest the enemy range too far abroad, he is to be restrained with strong garrisons placed in cownes defensible, and with a power of horsemen, these will intercept stragglers, and garrisons sallying upon outriders will keep them in order. It is not the point of a wise General to leave the enemy upon his back. 
b Repressus & remotus Lucterius quod intrare intra praesidia periculosum putabat. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.  Lucterius the French captain would willingly have spoiled the country of the Romans in France, but he stayed himself, fearing to enter among the garrison towns; which he could not do without apparent danger. Caesar 
c Vellaunodunum ne quem post se hostem relinqueret oppugnare instituit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.  besieged Vellaunodunum that lay in his way, for fear the garrison of the enemy left there, might do him some annoyance. The army of the Protestants, anno 1569, retiring out of Poitou into Gascoigne, & thence into Dauphinè, received many algarades of the enemy's garrisons in the country where they passed. but nothing doth keep the enemy straighter, nor more hinder his march, than a power of horsemen galling him continually on the sides, and watching all opportunities. By them 
d Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.  Vercingetorix kept Caesar's foragers very short. Cassivellanus with his 
e Pabulatores essedarijs aggressus, ne latiùs vagarentur, continuit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 5.  essedarians that fought in charets, kept the Romans from going far on foraging the country. and 
f Frumentatum exeunti Annibali diversis locis opportunè aderat. Liu. 22.  Fabius with his horsemen meeting at every turn with such as Annibal had sent out to fetch in corn, and other provision, made them return many times short home. So long as horsemen do hang upon the sides and tail of an army, they make but a slow march. Caesar sending his horsemen before to charge the enemies last troops, did so trouble them, that he overtook the 
g Caes. Bel. Gal. 1.  Heluetians and 
h Omnem equitatum qui novissimum agmen moraretur praemisit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 2.  Belgians in France, & Afranius his army in Spain, although they had gotten far before him. himself and his army were so molested by the horsemen of 
i Hirti. de bell. Afric.  Scipio in Africa, that in four hours he could not march much above an hundred paces, being driven to stay and receive every charge, and stir. as also befell the Romans an other time Ad 
a crebros ●quitum & velitum tumultus signa consistebant. Liu. 28.  encountering the enemy in his march. The French horsemen that coasted the Almains, that anno 1569. came in aid of the Protestants of France, kept them from straggling: but if they had been more, and durst have charged them; they had stayed them longer in their journey. For if the first march, while those that are behind fight, then are these left to the butchery, as it happened to the 
b Caes. de bell. gal. 2.  Belgians pursued by Caesar.  
Further, such straits and hills, as the enemy is to pass, if he mean to enter further into the Country are to be guarded, and the ways to be trenched, that both our men may have a cover, and the enemy more difficulty in forcing the passage. Leonidas to stop the Persian army, kept the straits of Thermopylae: which was also practised by Antiochus against the Romans. Philip 
c Liu. 32.  purposing to stop the Roman army at the strait of Aous trenched the passage, and on the higher ground placed archers, and slingers, and the rest of his army in convenient places. But it succeeded not, for that he suffered the enemy, not only to take the higher ground, but also to come on his back. Which also was the ruin of Leonidas, and Antiochus. Those therefore that keep hills, and passages, are to take heed of three dangers: the first, that they suffer not the enemy to take the higher ground: the second, that they do not so lie open, that the enemy may come on their backs: and thirdly, that their company be not unable to abide the enemy's force, or to defend the ground committed to their charge. For in this case those that seek to stop other, are often taken in trap themselves: especially if they lie not strong, nor look well to their guard.  
If the enemy enter into a straight, which hath but two or three issues, take those issues, and guard them strongly, and thou hast the enemy enclosed, as it were in a net. So were the Romans enclosed at Caudium, and compassed in before and behind, & on the sides. But take heed, that thy guard be strong, and watchful, least the same be forced, and all thy labour frustrated, as happened to Fabius having enclosed Annibal at Cales, by the weakness of the corpse de guard placed on the hill Calicula.  
If the king of Macedonia had placed strong garrisons in the straits of Athamany, and Thessaly, and showed himself in head of the Romans, they could 
d Ne Romani abnuunt se magna clade pugnaturos. Liu. 42.  never have issued thence without great slaughter, and loss. There is no greater trial of a captain, then in the taking of the advantage of grounds. And therefore let him proceed wisely; and cause his men to work diligently, that his trenches be sufficient and well furnished with stones and shot, and all things necessary. And especially that he be not enclosed, nor beaten from the higher ground.  
Woods are a good cover for any enterprise: and therefore wise captains therein do place such companies of soldiers, as may either charge the enemy passing through, or by them. Yet let them take heed that they have a place of retreat there, that going about to hurt others, they be not cut in pieces themselves.  
The surest defence against the enemies proceeding, is a river not to be forded over: but the bridges are to be broken, and the botes to be taken from the other side, and the banks where they are most low and easy to be raised with earth, and fenced with stakes, and the same to be guarded with a competent force both of horsemen, and footmen with their sconces in convenient places. By this means 
a Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Caesar kept the Helvetians at a bay, and stopped them from passing the river of Rone, notwithstanding their divers attempts both by night, & day: & the 
b Praesidia disponebant quibus locis videbatur pontesque rescindebant fluminun. Liu. 22.  Romans stopped the outcourses of Annibal. Which course if the French king had taken, the Protestants had not so easily retired from the battle of S. Dennis, 
c Hist. de troubls. ●e Fr. l. 3.  anno 1567., nor had they passed so many Rivers, nor taken so many Towns so easily. But neither were the Towns guarded with soldiers, nor the bridges broken, nor the banks guarded. In guarding of fords, great care is to be taken, first that the enemy pass not over some other way, and so come on our backs, secondly that he force not our guard. This is prevented by good fortification, and that by diligent watch, and sufficient number of men. He that looketh not to these things, is fit to keep goslings, than the passages of Rivers.  
By these means an army is slopped, or at least hurt, and hindered. But for that men are hardly induced to fire their own goods, and few men can endure the lamentable flames of his country: and without a sufficient force of men, all other means to stop an enemy are nothing; let there first be a sufficient army levied, and opposed against the enemy, not that I would have the same to hazard lightly, or come to the trial: but for that he that hath an army ready, may take all advantages of Hills, straits, Woods, and Rivers, and cut off such as wander abroad, and execute that which private men will not do in spoiling where the enemy is to pass, as the practice of Arms requireth. 
a L. Portius Licinius per loc● alta ducendo exercitum, cum modò insideret angustos saltus, ut transitum clauderet, modo ab latere aut tergo carperet agmen, ludificatus est Asdrubalem omnibus belli artibus. Liu. 27.  L. Licinius though inferior in force to Asdrubal in Spain, yet taking the advantage of hills and straits, and now charging the enemy on the sides, then on the backs, practised on him all the precepts of war: for which he deserved great commendation. The proceeding of Monsieur the French kings brother and lieutenant, that disbanded his soldiers, and sent them into garrison, when he should have resisted the Almains that came to secure the Protestants anno 1569. and kept the field, doth contrariwise deserve reproof, as contrary to the practice of war, and profit of his Prince. For if that Poitiers had not arrested the Protestants, and sustained the siege contrary to expectation, there had ensued great loss to his party. In the mean while what reason had he to suffer the enemy to spoil the country at his pleasure?   

CHAP. VII. Part. 2. Wherein he speaketh of foraging, and stopping the enemy's foragers.  
How the whole army may march assured, and what the same is to fear in marching; I have already spoken sufficient. The same rules may also serve for direction to those that are sent forth to spoil the Country, and to fetch in corn and forage. For whatsoever the General is either to observe, or to fear in his whole army: the same is he that leadeth a part thereof out to forage, to observe, and to fear. He must see, that his company keep good array, that they straggle not from the gross of his troops. He is further to have good intelligence, and espial upon the enemies proceeding. In passing of Plains, Woods, Hills, straits, and Rivers, he is to use more diligence, for that his strength is the less. Likewise he is to consider, that as he goeth safely forward; so he may also have a sure retreat, if necessity force him, to return backward.  
Further he is to make appointment where to meet with the rest of the army, that the same be not divided, when the enemy is ready to charge. 
b Caes. bell. gal. 4.  Caesar charging the Germans, while their horsemen, and some troops of footmen were gone abroad upon spoil, found them far more easy to be dealt withal. 
a Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  Domitius sent by Caesar upon forage, if he had not met with the rest of the army upon an instant could not so well have escaped out of a manifest danger, the whole enemy's power being at hand ready to charge him.  
That he may do that wherefore he goeth, he is to carry with him scythes, sickles, hooks, axes, and all necessary instruments, and to bring that he findeth safe away: he is also to have with him store of horses and carriages. For what availeth it to find corn and provision, unless the same be carried away to our uses? And little deserve they to have things necessary, that will not fetch them. The 
b Socordia & negligentia Campanorum in vehiculis contrahendis ad frumenrum comportandum, rem ab Hamnone compositam turbavit, famemque quae secuta est fecit. Liu. 25.  Capuans being in distress for want of victuals, and being willed by Annibal, to send carriages to fetch sufficient, did send so few, that it was nothing to relieve their need. Afterward they wished like opportunity to be offered again, but in vain. For within short time after, they were forced by famine to yield up their City.  
That his men be not disturbed in their work by the sudden assaults of the enemy, let him place guards in places convenient for befence of those that go abroad and work. In this respect the proceeding of 
c Marcellus explorato, cùm firmisque praesidijs tuto receptu praedatum ierat. Liu. 23.  Marcellus that wise leader deserveth well to be followed: For in no place did he go before he had diligently discovered the same, and assured his retreat, and those that wrought by stands of men fitly placed. Appius 
d Appius cum subitarijs legionibus ad popu●andum Boiorum agrum, nec explora●ò, nec stationibus firmis profectus cum legionibus caesus est. Liu. 31.  ruinated himself and his army, for that without search of the country, and order used in such cases, he suffered his men to wander up and down more mindful of spoil, then of their own safety. The 
e Liu. 42.  foragers of the Romans marching without suspicion, or order, or sufficient defence, were easily overthrown by Perseus' king of Macedonia. This hath been the ruin of many armies, not only of small companies, and will be, if better order be not taken. It is a common course of the enemy with hope of spoil, to bring the army into distress. Therefore let no man be so greedy of spoil, but that he see before into the danger; and albeit there appear no danger, yet let him keep most of his troops in arms, that he be not overwhelmed with sudden danger.  
The provision that is to be found, is diligently to be saved, and laid up in those Towns that we do hold; as in part before hath been declared. By this means Annibal maintained his army by others labours. And much more we might have done than we did, if in our journey into Portugal, we could have saved that we found in Galicia. The cattle may he driven along with the army, and aught to be distributed frugally, as our need requireth.  
But as he is to spoil his enemy, so he is diligently to take heed, that he couch not his friends, and associates; which wrought Annibal much woe. But what law against necessity?  
Seeing then that those that march in the enemy's country, if they proceed wisely, may not only hurt their enemies, but also maintain themselves at the country's charge: it behoveth the General to be watchful, to keep order, and never to say, had I witted. For he that is entrapped, hardly breaketh the snares. To avoid danger, nothing is better than celerity, and expedition: of which I will now speak more particularly.    

CHAP. VIII. Wherein is proved, that nothing in wars is more advantageous, than expedition; or any thing more hurtful, than delays.  
I Have showed this in part already. But the detestation that I have of the delays of our times, and dalliance commonly used in martial affairs by those that want skill, together with the exceeding losses and dangers, that Princes have incurred, and shall further incur thereby, it there be no redress, hath so affected me, that although I have spoken much, and often thereof, yet I suppose I can never say enough. To number all the commodities of expedition, or the hurts of delays in matters of war, it is not possible, though I should speak of them continually: those which come to my mind presently, I thought good to lay down in this place.  
Through expedition, the enemy is taken unprovided: those places that are opportune for us, are seized: where the enemy is most open, there have we commodity to charge him: the malice of the enemy is prevented, our speed giveth us all leisure to provide: our confederates and friends, that stand in fear of invasion are assured: matters are sped with little charge, and good success. Caesar 
a Caes. bell. gal. 2.  hearing of the conspiracy of the Belgians, by sudden coming upon them, disordered all their counsels, and remedied the mischief, before it was ripe. Another great conspiracy of all 
b Caes. bell. gal. 7.  France he dissolved, by his speed in taking the heads single, before their forces were joined. Neither the depth of Winter, nor height of the mountains, nor cold of the weather did stop him. Unless he had used incredible celerity, he could not so easily have driven Pompey & his faction out of Italy, having the power of the Roman Empire in his hands. But he took him all unprovided, & came upon him before he looked for him: and would not suffer him in any place to gather head. Annibal 
a Magnis itineribus ita ut famam praeveniret ad Herdoneam contendit. Liu. 26.  with great journeys, and speedy marching coming upon Flaccus, upon the sudden overthrew him at Herdonea. Claudius' Nero in 
b Liu. 27.  6. days marched from Canusium to Sena with 6000. footmen, which distance our armies march not in 16. By which expedition he holp his companion Livius to overthrow Asdrubal, & took from Annibal all hope of succour. 
c Celeritate sua hostem imparatum aggressus est. Liu. 28.  Syllanus by no other means vanquished his enemies in Spain, then by invading them unprovided, which opportunity his quick speed did yield him. If the Romans had succoured Saguntum in time, they had kept Annibal occupied in Spain & avoided the waste of Italy. The smart whereof made them more quick in the wars against Philip of Macedonia, against Antiochus & Perseus. For they no sooner heard of their preparatives, but they caused an army to be transported into their countries, to meet with them in the beginning. Wars, as 
d Guicciar. 1.  Alphonsus' king of Naples was wont to say, have good success where we prevent the enemy. In a small 
e Puncto saepè temporis maximarum rerum momenta vertuntur. Liu. 3.  time there happeneth great alteration of things, and therefore it is not safe to lose any moment of time. Oftentimes also 
f In co victoria vertitur, si & loca opportuna & socij praeoccuparentur. Liu. 35.  victories are made more easy, by seizing of opportune places, & joining of confederates unto us to help our cause. The Romans for their expedition in martial affairs, deserve eternal honour above all others. A certain Ptolomeus in Egypt was surnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or lightning, for his quick dispatch. Another was surnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or eagle, for his swiftness. But they were but words of vain flattery. This praise it was deserved in the Romans. Scripio in one year subduedal Africa to the walls of Carthage: Paulus Aemilius in a few months subverted the Empire of the Macedonians. 
g Quintius hostibus caesis 9 oppidis captis vicesimo die quam creatus erat dictatura se abdicavit. Liu 6.  Quintius levied an army, overcame his enemies in open field, took 9 walled towns, & all this in one 20. days. In the second wars of Carthage the Senators of Rome were continually in the Senate to hear the desires & reports of their Generals, & to grant dispatches. When Scipio heard the cowardly determination of Metellus, and his companions to forsake their country after their overthrow at Cannae, he drew his 
h Agendum, non consultandum esse dixit. Liu. 22.  sword, & entering among them, forced them to swear, that they would not forsake their country. Which quick resolution saved his country. And true it is, that 
a Consilium tutum celeritas, temerarium saepè mora facit. Liu. 27.  Claudius Nero said, that expedition doth make our counsels prove safe & sure, when as delays make them prove rash and dangerous. The 
b Maturavit Romanus ne praelio uno cum Latino, Volscoque contem. deret. Liu. 2.  Romans having divers enemies, making haste fought with them one after another singly, and so overcame them: and I would to God the longer we differre to fight with the Spaniard, we do not find him the stronger. A 
c Malum nascens facilê opprimitur, inveteratum sit plerunque robustius. Cic. Philip. 5.  mischief in the beginning is easily remedied; in time it getteth strength. That which commonly is objected, that speedy 
d Celer poenitentia sequitur praecipitata consilia. Liu. 31.  repentance followeth rash counsel, maketh nothing against our purpose. For great difference there is betwixt speed, and temerity. temerity is in counsel rashly followed, speed is in quick execution after mature counsel. My meaning therefore is not, that any should proceed without mature counsael: but that after resolution there should follow 
e Primùm consulto, posteà maturè facto opus est. Sallust.  speedy execution. Contrariwise both consultation without resolution, and 
f Tardae & lentoe deliberationes perniciosae. Tacit.  resolution without speedy execution are pernicious in martial causes. Counsels 
g Cunctando senescunt consilia, Liu. 35.  drawn in length by delay, wax nought in the end. And being vented are no better than (as I said before) wine that hath taken vent. 
h Belli necessitates non expectat humana consilia. Liu. 4.  Sometimes the necessities of war so urge us, that they will not suffer us to attend men's counsels. When the enemy is coming upon us, & the 
i Dilationem pati bellum vicinum non potest. Li. 1.  wars are at our doors, nothing is more pernicious than delay. The Romans delaying to meet with Annibal in Spain, were afterwards forced to fight for their own home, & country. The delay of 
k Mora eius diei satis creditur fuisse saluti urbi & imperio. Liu. 22.  Annibal that after his victory at Cannae brought not presently his army before Rome, was the ruin of his cause, & first beginning of his decay. Likewise the delays & slow proceeding of the Carthaginian Senate in sending money & supplies to 
l Post victoriam Cannensem cuncta segniter, & otiosè gerebat senatus Carthaginensis. Liu. 23.  Annibal after his victory at Cannae, gave heart & leisure to the Romans to repair their strength. 
m Flaccus primos hostis conatus per dissimulationem aluit. Tac. 20  Delays & dissembling after that once we understand the enemies practices, doth help them, & minister favour to their proceed, as Tacitus declareth by the example of Flaccus. 
n Bellum aluere quum si institissent, egregium titulum per se liberatae Graeciae habere potuere. Liu. 32.  Attalus and the Rhodians having some vantage against Philip of Macedonia followed it not: which delay gave him leisure to repair his forces, & made them to be accounted the nourishers of those wars, which if they had urged, they might have had the title of deliverers of Greece themselves. 
o Asdrubali quod celeritate intineris profectum erat, id mora ad Placentiam, dum frustra obsidet magis quàm oppugnat corrupit. Liu. 27.  Asdrubal by staying about Placentia, lost whatsoever commodity he had before won by his speedy march. I will not say what harm our stay both here in England, and at Coronna, did unto us in the voyage of Portugal.  
The Lauinians proceeding flowly in sending succours to their associates, were scarce out of their city gates, when they heard news that the Romans had overthrown them. For which small journey one of the company told them, that the 
a Pro paulula via magnam mercedem. Liu. 8.  Romans would make them pay dear. Delays of times used by Cecinna, Tacitus 
b Per varias moras prima prodidit hostibu● tempora belli. Tac. 18.  calleth becraying of opportunity. 
c Inutil i cunctatione agendi tempora consultando consumpsit. Tacit. 19  Fabius Valens going against Vespasians army, with hurtful delays spent times of service in unprofitable consultations. The Athenians not stopping the proceed of Philip of Macedonia at the first, suffered him to grow so strong, that all Greece could not in the end withstand his force. I pray God that delays of Christian Princes to resist Philip of Spain, do not work like effect in our times. Delays are not good in any time of service. The times of 
d Non expectant belli tempora moras & dilationes imperatorun. Liu. 31.  war do not attend upon the captains, or counsels pleasures. Occasion 
e Si in occasionis momento cuius praeteruolat opportunitas cunctatus fueris, nequicquam mox amissam queràris. Liu. 25.  presenteth itself unto them upon a sudden, but if thou embracest it not, it passeth without returning, though oft thou wish for it again. All which notwithstanding, in our times deliberations in matters of war are flow, the arrests uncertain, the executions vain. They are like the globe of Saturn that finisheth his course but once in 30. years. That which others in time passed called losing of time, some call winning of time: and that which proceedeth either from fear, or covetousness, that they begin nothing: that will they have to proceed from wisdom, and maturity. Fabius complained that the year passed, while the 
f Nobis in apparatu ipso, ac tantùm inchoantibus res annus circumagitur. Liu. 24.  Romans were in their preparatives against Annibal, what would he say now if he lived to see some men neither prepare, nor begin any thing? To excuse themselves they bear men in hand, that they stay to see how matters will fall out, and when the king of Spain will die. Unto whom I say for answer as one of the Athenians said sometime, that they that look for the 
g Qui eventus expectamus, praeda victoris erimus. Liu. 32.  events of war, are commonly a spoil to the conqueror. This course is that which as Pontius the Samnite said, neither winneth friendship, nor doth hurt to the enemy. Those that are slow to help others, must look for slow friendship at others hands in their need. But say they still, stay. It is not good to be too rash. 
h unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. Ennius.  Fabius by his stayed proceeding, restored the Roman Empire to the ancient estate, that was shaken by others hasty, & heady rashness. Then which example there is nothing can worse fit them. Fabius in his time was a wise, and resolute commander, ripe in counsel, speedy in execution. Annibal could turn nowhere, but he was by him, all his devices he speedily prevented. Only for this he was accounted flow, that he would not rashly venture the Roman Empire upon one battle. Yet when his colleague Minutius was in danger, he was ready to secure him. He differred not to provide an army, nor to furnish it, he would not suffer the enemy to do what he list. What these men are, and what they do; I list not to report: neither is it necessary being so well known. I pray God, that as in other things: so in this also, they be not unlike Fabius. For he restored that which was shaken; these are rather like to shake that which is sound by their cold delays.   

CHAP. IX. Of orders to be observed for the good government, and assurance of the camp or lodgings of the army.  
AS in divers other points, so in the lodging of our army we are far declined from the true practice of arms. The name of Camp remaineth, but the thing is quite decayed, and gone. Seldom doth the army lie in the field, unless it be in the sieges of towns. Wherein notwithstanding we bestow so many as we can in houses, and villages. In marching for the most part, the companies are distributed in divers villages, and that three or four miles asunder; if not more. The lodgings are seldom fenced, unless it be with a barriquade, or barrier, or small trench overthwart the ways. The watch is not so strong, nor so diligent as it should be: the confusion and noise is great: the provision of things necessary very small, and seldom other than the soldiers can find. The which disorders make the army to lie open to camisadoes, and many enterprises, if the enemy be strong and judicious. For avoiding whereof the practice of war requireth, that the army do rest in no place but united, nor without sufficient defence, and guard. Before that the practice of arms was brought to perfection, the army lodged, as now it doth, without trenches or defences. Pyrrhus seeing the default therein, began first to fortify his camp by entrenchment. Which the Romans receiving from him did in short time excel their master. Only barbarous people commonly lay as before, open and without defence: which gave the Romans such advantage against them. And I doubt not, but if the right order of encamping were recalled by any man of judgement, that he should have like advantage against these of our times. Many are the commondities that an army receiveth by their lodging well fortified. They fight not, but when they list, and see their advantage: they sleep sound without fear, and rest safely without danger, such 
a Casta victori receptaculum, victo persugium. multi exercitus victi eruptione pugnantes hostem pepulerunt, Liu. 44.  defences are a receipt to the conqueror, a refuge to the vanquished, and a port and harbour to return unto in a storm. Many armies (saith Paulus Aemilius, he that vanquished Perseus) being foiled in open field, have retired into their camp, and saved themselves, and afterward sallying out upon their enemies, have prevailed, and vanquished them. Therefore would he no: fight with the enemy before he had entrenched his camp. Caesar albeit the was charged upon the way by the Helvetians returning back upon him; yet had no less care to fortify his camp, then to sustain the enemy's charge. And therefore having set his army in order, 
b Sarcinas in unum locum conferri, & cum ab ijs qui in superiore acie constiterant, muniri jussit. Caes. bell. gal. 1.  he commanded the baggage to be brought into one place, and the same to be entrenched by those that stood last, and on the highest ground while the vanguard, and the rest fought with the enemy. And such was Caesar's care therein, that where the enemy was near, he would not suffer his chief 
c Ab opere singulisque legionibus, singulos legatos Caesar discedere, nisi muni●is castris vetuerat. bell. gal. 2.  commanders, and counsel to departed from legions or regiments before the work, & fortification of the camp was finished. Neither could the countenance of Afranius his army in Spain, making show as if the same would sight, deter him, but that he 
d Cas. bell. ciu. 1.  fortified his lodging, keeping the rest in arms to receive the enemy's charge. The barbarous Gauls by their many losses perceiving the advantages that the Romans had upon them in this point, at length by the counsel of Vercingetorix their leader, began to 
e Caes. bell. gal. 7.  fortify their camp, as they saw the Romandes do. He that doth not so lie entrenched, goeth oftentimes out of his may to seek ease for his soldiers, lodgeth with his army disjoined, looseth time and labour: and lastly may not, if he be wise, lodge near an enemy as strong as himself, that hath the vantage of ground and trenches. He that chargeth an army that lieth well entrenched, receiveth seldom honour of his rashness. The Frenchmen because they understood not so much before, were taught it of Prospero Colonna at the Bicocke in Lombardy. For adventuring rashly to fight with Guicelardin 
a.  Prospero and his company, that lay strongly fortified within certain banks made for the keeping of the river within the channel, they were tumbled into the ditch as fast as they came up the banks, and many of them slain. That such fortification may be made orderly, and strongly, divers rules are to be observed, and some provision like wise is to be made more than ordinary. First a convenient place in the way where the army marcheth is to be marked and staked out by the Quartermaster general, which would be a man of judgement: with him also may be sent other men of judgement. All these with a guard ought to go 
b Centuriones, exploratoresque praetermittit Caesar, qui locum castris idoneum deligant. Caes, bell. gall. 2.  before, that at the coming of the army to the place every man may know the gates, and the sides, and the places of the camp. Within that presently they may begin to work, & every man may know where to pitch his tent, or make his cabin, & to discharge the impediments and baggage, and where the ordnance is to be placed. This may seem intricat at the first, but with practice it may be made most easy.  
Further to the end, that our men be not disturbed when they are at their work; good espials, and discoverers would be sent before, to see that the enemy lie not in ambush near that place, where we mean to lodge. Which happening to Caesar in the expedition against the Belgians, did more endanger him, than the enemies, open force. For his men 
c Caes. bell. gal. 2.  having laid down their burdens, and being scarleted to fetch stakes, earth and stones, suddenly the enemy appeareth out from under a hill there by and chargeth him. The same was the ruin 
d Liu. 10.  of Fabius his lieutenant. For going to take a hill already possessed by the enemy without espial; he was there slain in the place with all his comany. For defence of those that work, one good part of the army would be kept in arms; especially where the enemy is near. And those that work are to have every man his sword and dagger girded to him, and his other arms fast by him. Which not only Caesar, a master in these matters, but all the Romans generally observed. There is no time, more proper for the enemy's assault, nor more dangerous for us, then when we are newly, come to our lodging. For than most are secure, and put off their arms, and either rest themselves or run about to seek things necessary.  
The 
e Castra ponentes Romanos Poeni aggressi sunt, turbassentque munientes, ni abditi post tumulum opportunè ad id positi à Scipione equites in effusos incurrissent. Liu. 28.  Romans as they were pitching their tents were charged by the Carthaginians in their wars in Spain: and had been soiled, had not Scipio fearing such a matter, run through them with his horsemen, which very opportunely he had covered under a hill in the way as they came to the charge. At that time also Caesar was set upon by the nervians, and lost divers brave men. The Venetians were no sooner arrived in their 
a Conte de Purlilia ad Ferdinand.  lodgings at Trent, and disarmed, but the enemy observing his time cometh upon them, and forced them to seek an other lodging. Yet not all: for many were left behind to take up their lodging in that place for ever.  
The place most commodious for lodging, is where our company may not only have wood, water, good air, and for horses forage, and if it may be some relief of victuals for our men: but also advantage of the ground fit to be wrought, and hardly to be taken from us by the enemy. Wood may not be wanting for fire, stakes, and labans; and less, water for our men and cattle. A river also doth oftentimes ease our men of travel. Especially if it be deep: For that the camp is well fenced on that quarter. Good air is necessary for the health our soldiers, especially when me lie long in a place. The advantage of ground, is requisite for the defending of our lodging. Which opportunities, those that have wanted have been driven to great extremities. 
b Caes. bell. ciu. 1.  Afranius his army was driven to yield to Caesar in Spain for want of water. And by like necessity Caesar forced the relics of Pompey's army which he 
c Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  besieged on a hill, and excluded by trenches from the water, to fly to his mercy. Himself in 
d Hirt. de bell. Alexander.  Alexandria had been driven to great extremity for want of fresh water, had he not by digging of pits found store.  
In high and dry country's water is hard to be found, unless it be in valle is and deep botcomes that show signs of moisture. Lautrecke in the siege of Naples lodging his army in the low grounds brought great contagion among his people: and of New haven and other places want of water, and the filthy keeping of our lodgings, which cannot be kept too clean, bred the pestilence among our men, and wrought the victory to out enemies. The disadvantage of the ground at Landresie not considered by the French, had sick to have taught them a lamentable lesson. For being lodged in the lower ground, they were continually amoyed by the artillery of the imperiall●s placed upon a hill, that comnt●●ed the French camp, and almost forced them to fight with great disadvantage. The Italians and Spaniards were by the French forced to fight against their wills at 
a Guicciard.  Ravenna, in Lewis the twelft his time, for that being lodged in the lower, and open ground they were beaten with the enemies great ordnance, that continually struck among their horsemen. Which inconvenience could not be remedied so, but that is was the occasion of their overthrow.  
But howsoever the place be chosen advantageous, yet there is always some part that lieth open, which is to be assured with trenches and palissadaes. The less advantage that the nature of the ground yieldeth: the more labour our soldiers are to take in working, and trenching the same. And that with a trench and bank sufficient, if not such as the Romans used, yet such as may cover the defendants, and hinder the ascent of the assailants without ladders. Caesar in the 
b Castra in altitudinem pedum 12. vallo, fossaque 18. pedum munivit. Caesar. bell. gal. 2.  wars against the Belgians environed his camp near Soissons, with a bank twelve foot high, and a ditch eighteen foot broad. If the danger were great the Romans used to make their banks higher, and trenches deeper. It would be incredible, if I should report, all those banks, trenches, and works which Caesar made about Alexia in France, and at Dyrrhachium in the wars against Pompey, and other places, and how he cast trenches of great depth ten or eleven mile's compass. Which was also the use of all the Romans: Whose works yet remaining in England in divers places, because it seemeth incredible they should be done by men, are called devils ditches, and supposed by them to be cast.  
That this fortification may be made with more ease, and greater speed: every man is to work either with mattock, or spade. I know our men will at first refuse it, and discharge themselves upon pionniers: but why should they disdain to do that which the Romans did, and why should any refuse to work to save his life, and the lives of their company: Let them consider how such idle fellows, that would not fortify their lodgings have been used.  

c Castra procos▪ habebat nee loco satis tuto posita, ne● praesidiis firmata. hac negligentia fretus cum incautum Annibal opressit. Liu. 27.  Fuluis the Roman Proconsul neither for place, nor defence, nor guard lay strongly enough with his army, which was no sooner brought to Annibal, but marching thither with his army, he took him at unawres, and overthrew him, and all his company. La Loüe and his company lying secure, and careless without trench, or barriquade, had their throats cut by the garrison of Montpellier in the night being asleep in their lodging, Anno one thousand five hundred sixty and nine. Neither did the company that under Napoleon Ursini 
a Guicciard.  came to the succour of Florence besieged by the Prince of Orange in the days of Charles the fift escape better cheap; to teach others percase to make better barriquades, and trenches, and to keep better watch. If the Protestants durst have charged Charles the fift before his camp was fortified at Englestat, they had 
b Natal. come. l. 1.  no doubt foiled him. Neither is it sufficient to trench the ways, if we lie open on the sides. Every way must have some defence. Strossi 
c Hist. de troubls. de Er. li. 7.  stiffly defending a certain valley by Rocheabeille Anno one thousand five hundred sixty and nine, fenced only in front with a weak palissade was invested on the sides, and forced by the Protestants. In which disaster himself was taken, and most of his troops distrouped, and slain. If his defence had been strong in all places, he had saved himself, and foiled his enemy.  
Q. Cicero 
d Caes. bell. gal. 5.  one of Caesar's lieutenants, by the fortifications of his camp, abode divers assaults of the whole power of France, and held out until such time as Caesar succoured him. And well befell it Prospero Colonna that his lodging was strong at the Bicocke. For otherwise he and his company had been drawn out thence not by the ears, but by the legs. There is none so small a fortification, but it may do us favour in such a case. The Spaniards making a trench between themselves and the French at 
e Guicciard. li. 5.  Cirignola, and bordering the same with their shot, made them to this day remember what danger it is to pass a trench resolutely defended.  
In these late brawls of France captain Granry 
f Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 6.  lodging in Esse a village upon the river of Vienne, gave the enemy a rude welcome coming to see him in his lodging in the night. His safety was in a double barrier, and trench made by him at the ends of the streets. Yet let every man take heed how he presume upon every small defence, and rather let him cause his men to take more pains.  
It is no base labour that is undertaken for the defence of our lives: and little doth he deserve his life, that will not dig a few turfs to save it.  
Ludouike of Nassau the brother to the Prince of Orange presumed too much upon a little bad ditch betwixt him, and the Duke of alva's army. If it had been but six foot deeper he had repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. 
a This happeved anno 1568.  For idleness and want of skill, he and his company were overthrown and driven to take Embden for their succour. And yet not warned herewith when he brought a supply out of Germany to aid his brother, 
b Mich. ab Islael●.  lying in a village without sufficient defence he was charged by the enemy, and there slain, and with him Christopher the Prince Palatins son, a Prince unworthy that disastrous death, and with them most of the company,  
That the camp may with more ease be trenched and fortified, the work is equally to be divided amongst the company. That equity the Romans taught us, and 
c Singula latera castrotum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda. Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Caesar practised, dividing the ground among his regiments to be wrought. And shame it is among us, seeing as the use of wars teacheth us the great profit of labour in banking and trenching, that we put it over to a sort of men called Pionniers, unknown among the Romans, whose works were always 
d They are commonly termed Opera militum.  done by soldiers. This is the cause of the great charge of Princes, and slow proceeding and slender effects of wars. Therefore they that will not work and take pains; rather than die shamefully: let them die. But let not the idleness of such prejudice the state or the safety of brave men. But let such defend themselves, as well with banks, as with weapons, and not follow the slothful pride of athers.  
The form of the camp is much according to the site and lying of the ground. Among the Romans it was made for the most part four square. But it skilleth not though it be three or five square. So the banks would be made ten 
e Less depth & breadth will serve, but this maketh the banks sufficient.  or twelve foot high, the ditch sixteen or eighteen foot broad. The deeper the ditch, and higher the bank is, the more assured is the defence. At every corner especially towards the enemy there would be made a little bulwark or platform somewhat advanced from the curtain of the camp for the placing of the great ordnance, for defence of the ditch and curtain, and clearing of the ground without the camp. In the sides there would be left two great passages, or issues for the army to enter and issue; and two lesser on the outsides for the necessary uses of the camp.  
The compass is according to the number of the army, allowing ten foot square for every horseman, and four foot square for every footman or thereabouts. There are to be left four broad streets in the place, for the passing and repassing of soldiers; and for the commodity of victuallers, and Merchants a market place.  
The General ought to pitch his tent in the midst of the camp, about him are his Gentlemen and guard to be placed, if there be not place sufficient for them in his tents. The horsemen are to be quartered in the midst of the camp, for that they are most unready if any sudden assault should happen; but in some convenient square for the beauty of the camp. The shot and archery are to have their tents next to the ring of the camp round about the same: within them are the halberdiers, targeteers, and other short weapons to have their quarter assigned: and betwixt them and the horsemen the pikes. So that every man may know both where to lodge directly, and what place to go unto, if the enemy do charge us. The waste places remaining are to be assigned to the carriages, and the boys, and servants that follow the camp. For slaughter of beasts and necessities of nature there are two places to be assigned, either in some out place of the camp, or without the camp. The whole distance and compass is rather with the judgement of the eye, then with Geometrical instruments to be cast out. Yet must the quartermaster take heed, both that his compass be not too great (for that is hardly defended) and that it be not too little. For in that case the army shall be straited.  
That soldiers may be commodioussy lodged in the field without going out of the way to find towns or villages, it is necessary, that every company have their 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 2.  tents assigned to them of public charge, and carried with them in carts. For to lodge without cover in cold, rain, or heat is very intolerable, and wood to make cabbanes sufficient in few places can be found: and if it could, yet were it a matter long, for one nights lodging to make a cabbane of boughs. Contrariwise tents are easily pitched, and not heavy to be carried, nor very chargeable to be bought.  
That the soldiers may finish their work with more speed, it were necessary likewise, that every company had their spades, mattocks, axes, and other tools carried along with their tents, and baggage, that every man presently upon view of his lodging staked out, might know where to work.  
For ease of the soldiers a judicious Quartermaster will choose some place near a wood or a river, or some hill, that with the natural situation of the place a small fortification may serve.  
If the Quartermaster do choose some Villages to lodge in, yet f●● greediness of cover for his men, let him take heed how he do divide separate the army far a sunder. And further let every part forti●● the quarter where they are lodged. The cause of the overthrow of the Prince of Conde at Cognac, in which encounter he lost also his life, was the distance of the lodging of the vanguard and battle: which was so great, that the one part being charged by the enemy the other could not come to secure it, before it was too late. 
a Histoir. de 〈◊〉 bl. lib. 4.  Dandelot dispersing his companies in Villages, was surprised on the sudden by Martigues and put to flight: himself hardly escaped, most of his company were defeated: which, if his troops had been together could not have happened. For his forces were four times greater than those that overcame them. La Louè might have been succoured when the enemy charged him, but that he 
b Hist. de troubls. lib. 12.  lodged so far from help, that before the same could come, he & his men were dispatched. The cause of the overthrow of the Baron Donaw, & his Almains was for that they lay dispersed, & without defence. 
c Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 3. & 4.  Xenophon, although necessity forced him in his return from the battle against Artaxerxes to lodge his company in divers Villages: yet whensoever the enemy made show to approach, he drew them all together into one place. If so be that necessity drive us likewise to lodge our army in Villages: let us know first how upon need we may bring them together; and next how every part may sustain the enemy's assault, until help come to it. This I say is wrought, first by traversing the ways, then by trenching places of easy access. The ways are to be traversed by deep ditches & banks for defence of our shot, next by palissadaes, & bars placed overthwart: the sides are to be viewed, and either with trenches, or walls to be fortified. Those ways that lead us into the Village on the backside are to be dammed up, & where there is greatest show that the enemy will assault us, there greatest store of shot are to be placed in the chambers looking that way. The carts & baggage conveniently placed, may break the force of the enemy's horse, & make the access for footmen also more difficult. The Helvetians 
a Caes. bell. gal. 1.  had no other defences of their lodging: neither do the Germans at this day use any other defence or encamping, unless the place naturally afford it. But nothing is more weak nor vain, where the enemy cometh resolutely to the charge. Scipio, his father that overcame Annibal, being foiled by the Carthaginians in Spain through the treachery of the Celtiberians that forsook him, thought to shroud himself and his 
b Liu. 25.  company under the carts, & packs, and such things as he could bring together to make a defence on. But it served for nothing, but to linger the enemy's victory a little. For in such defences there is no strength. If therefore we will neither fortify our camp, as did the Romans; nor bar the Villages where we lodge strongly, as is the use of wise Captains in these days: I will neither warrant our troops, nor by my will keep among them lying so open. The 
c Philip. Com.  French king & Duke of Burgundy lying in the suburbs of Liege without trench or barriquade, escaped very narrowly in a certain sally of the townsmen by them besieged. Besides the fortification of the camp, or lodging; it is requisite for the assurance of our company, that we place not only sentinels and scouts within, but also good guards at all the gates. For there is no defence nor fortification such, but it may be passed, where there is none to defend it, and guard it. Before our soldiers disarm and every man go to his lodging, both guards and sentinels would be placed, and not as some use afterward. those that offend in either of these points do for the most part receive sharp penance. The 
d Ardeates Camillo duce castra Gallor●m intuta neglectaque ab omni part nacti invadunt, nusquam praelium, ubique caedes. Liu. 5.  Ardeatians led by Camillus, & finding the camp of the Gauls, that a little before had sacked Rome, without either watch, or sufficient defence, slew them down right, without any resistance. Philip king of Macedonia lying before Apollonia, without either watch or good guard, was forced to raise his 
e Liu. 24.  siege, and had divers of his men slain by a very few sallying out of the town in the night. The negligent watch and guard of Syphax gave opportunity to 
f Liu. 29.  Scipio in the night to enter his camp and fire the same, and to make a great slaughter of his men. The like security in Nabis his camp gave entrance to Philopoemen captain of, the Achaeans, who fired the tents, and slew his men, before they could make head, or well understood their danger. The 
g Liu. 41.  Romans that lay in camp in Istria without fear, & therefore neither kept good watch, nor guard, were suddenly surprised by certain Gauls, and driven to run for their lives. The army of the Capuans resting in their lodgings quietly, were slain by the 
a Liu. 23.  Romans that invaded them in the night, and took them without trench, sentinel, or corpse de guard. The like advantage Curio using against the 
b Caes. bell. ciu. 2.  Numidians that lay dispersed without defence or watch, fell upon them in the night, and slew them. Neither is it now less dangerous than in time past. Don Pedro el cruel king of Spain was slain with his company by his base brother 
c Froissate.  Henriques taking him in the night unprovided, and lying without watch, or defence. The same negligence was the ruin of the Protestants at Donzerre An. 1569. and of the Spaniards at Corbueil An. 1590. and hath occasioned and brought to pass many surprises, which otherwise could never have taken effect. The 
d Guicciar. lib. ●.  Marquis of Mantova, and other gentlemen for want of good sentinels were taken by the Venetian stradiots at Scala, where they went to refresh themselves. It is an easy martyr to show this also by our own harms, but that I would we should rather reform our disorders by calamities of others, than shame to hear ourselves reproved, and therefore defend them. The 
e What is required in assuring our lodging  means to assure ourselves, and to deter our enemies from these enterprises, are these: first good banks, trenches, barriquades, palissadaes, and such like defences: secondly strong guards well placed, thirdly good sentinels in convenient distances within the ring of the camp, & good scouts on horseback & foot without, four good orders of the camp, that no stranger nor person unknown lurk in any lodging, or other place to discover our secrets: nor that our company lodge disjoined far asunder: the provision that is to be made, is of tents, and all instruments that serve us for such fortification. Where the Captain is careful to see these things done, and the soldiers willing to labour and take pains, & to do them: it is not possible to hurt the army especially ●●ere the same is strong and in good estate. But if the enemy be very ●●ong, and our company weak for number, or otherwise, and no help can come unto us: then if the enemy do assault us in our lodgings so violently, that we are not able long to defend them, our last remedy is to draw our men together toward the issues of our lodging, and so to sally out, and to charge the enemy upon the back, & in all places where he maketh resistance. The suddenness of this execution if it be done resolutely, cannot but work great effects.  
Ser. 
a Subitò cruptione omnibus portis facta, neque cognoscendi, neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. Caes. bell. gal. 3.  Sulpitius being not able to defend his camp any longer against the multitude of the mountain people, that assaulted it: sallied forth upon a sudden at all the gates thereof, and surprising his enemies on a sudden made a great carnage of them, & put the rest to flight. The same course did Caesar put in practice at the siege of Alexia. where not being able to defend his trenches and works against the multitude of the enemies, that in all parts assaulted him, at length 
b Caes. bell. gal. 7.  gathering his men together, sallied forth upon them, not giving them so much as any time to take breath, much less to gather their forces together, and slew infinite multitudes of them being every where dispersed, and seeking rather to enter in, then to defend themselves without. But this is not but in time of necessity to be executed, and when we have no other means of defence. otherwise it is good safe fight behind a bank, or other defence.  
Wherefore as at all times, so especially in the nights, and careless times of others, it behoveth the General to be 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Homer.  careful for his people. With care, watchfulness, and labour great enterprises may be achieved, if want hurt us not; and without care and labour, neither great nor little can be done with commendation, nor can any army either march safely, or rest safely.   

CHAP. X. Wherein is showed, that as the assailants being entered into the enemy's country, are to seek that the matter may be tried by battle in open field: so the defendants without great advantage, are to avoid the General trial: and by what means each of them, may effect their several purposes.  
HE that entereth the enemy's country without purpose to fight, and hazard, let him henceforth keep his head 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer. I●●ad.  warm at home, and entertain Ladies. Such adventures are for resolute and hardy men, as courage doth prick such valiant men forward: so their own profit requireth, and necessity forceth them, so soon as they can, to come to trial. The sooner, the better it will be for them, at the first their men are strong, their munitions, and arms whole and good: of victuals and all things necessary they have sufficient, if they have not; the greater is their error. Further their men are courageous, and full of stomach: and contrariwise the enemy is neither provided sufficiently of soldiers, nor furniture of war, especially if he look not for it: neither is he so resolute to fight. And what courage can he have, seeing his country flaming round about him? that this aught to be the purpose of such as invade others, not only the example of Annibal, who by all means provoked the Romans to come to fight with him, but also of the Romans invading the Macedonians, of Caesar warring in France, and following of Pompey into Epeirus, and of our Kings transporting their forces into France, and generally of all that ever knew the trade of war doth teach us.  
To force the enemy to accept that, which willingly he would shun, the means are these: first to pursue him, with all convenient speed. If thy horsemen do once overtake any part of his army, either he must stay to succour his men, or else must he leave them to thy mercy: if he have so many 
a Eques carpe●● do nouis●imos premendoque iniquis ad transitum locis agmen detinuit. Liu. 8.  stays, thou canst not choose, but overtake him. To departed far away from thee, is to yield the country into thy hands: than which it were better to hazard many men's lives. Caesar by 
b Caes. bell. gal. 1.  this means drew the Helvetians back to fight with him, which they would gladly have passed. and by the 
c Caes. bell. gal. 2.  same he so galled the Belgians, that they were constrained to fight with disadvantage. 
d Caes. bell. ●iu. ●.  Afranius would gladly have recovered the high countries with his army, but Caesar did so trouble his march with his horse men, that unless he meant to fly; he could not run from him without fight. He that flieth long before thee without fight, he abandoneth a great country without fight, to be spoiled of thee.  
Secondly, if the enemy hath any courage: by ranging, and spoiling, and firing whatsoever thou canst not save for thine own use, thou shalt either draw him forth into the field, or break his heart. By that means the 
e Cos. vastand●● maximè ag●is hostem ad conferonda propius castra, dimicandumque acie excivir. Liu. 2.  Romans forced the Volscians and others, to come down from the hills into even ground, and to defend their country from ravage and spoil. And although another time the force, and provision of the Roman army made the enemies to shut themselves up within their walls, as most safe for them: yet when they saw the spoils and 
f Populatione agrorum & incēd●js villarum coegit eos eg●edi v●be. Liu 5.  flames of their country; they could not continue their former deliberation, but were forced to come forth and fight. When Villages 
g populando atque urendo rec●● hostium sataque in aciem extra●●. Liu. 8.  are fired, and the corn, and the country spoiled, he must be either very cowardly, or very hard hearted, that is not drawn forth to fight. Flaminius' the Roman Consul could not endure to see the fires which Annibal kindled in Hetruria, but would needs secure the country, and fight with the enemy, whatsoever it cost him. Who can endure to see the enemy to rage, & spoil without restraint: or who can restrain him without fight: The Frenchmen although always unwilling to deal with the English nation upon even hand, yet have been divers times forced thereto by us, what with indignity to see their country spoiled, and what with fear of further loss, and what with necessity to defend their country. Albeit Fabius could in his time endure to see the ravage, and spoil of his country: yet all have not that singular patience.  
If neither by celerity thou canst overtake the enemy, nor by spoils of the country move him to defend the same: yet will he never endure, until thou hast taken some of his principal cities. Shame and necessity will in the end force him to come to their succour. When the 
a Post quam Romulum castra ponere, & ad urbem necedere Veientes accepere, egressi sunt obuiàm, ut potiùs acie decernerent, quàm inclusi de tectis moenibusque dimicarent. Liu. 1.  Veians being beaten before, refused to encounter the Romans in the field any more: yet when they perceived that the Romans made toward their city, they came forth choosing rather to try it in plain field, then to be penned up, and fight for their houses, and walls. 
b Metellus ubi se dolis fatigari videt, neque ab hoste copiam pugnandi fieri, Zamam statuit oppugnate, ratus Iugurtham subsidio suis venturum. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  Metellus forced jugurtha to come into the field by besieging Zama a city which he specially favoured, albeit he knew himself inferior in strength to the Romans. By like means Caesar in Africa forced 
c Scipio ad necessitatem adductus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus Thapsitanos rebus suis fidissimos, & Virgilium amitteret. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Scipio to bring his forces into even ground, least losing a city of importance that favoured him, and a Captain of name, he should dishonour himself. Philip de Valois to raise the siege of Calais brought with him the power of France. King Edward the third might have fought with him if he had would, but he would not fight with him, but upon advantage. The Protestants Anno 1567. by straiting the city of Paris of victuals forced the king to send a power against them to fight with them. Unwise were they, that not understanding this, had sent away a great part of their forces, which might in that battle which was fought at Saint Denys, had greatly aided them to obtain the victory. If the siege of Poitiers An. 1569. had continued any longer, than it did: the King should have been forced to fight with the Protestants that besieged it. But there was no need that a King's power should beat them, whom want, & so many disorders had beaten before.  
But if the General of the enemy's forces, be enforced to take a town for his safeguard: much more behoveth it them to come forth into the field, to relieve him if he be besieged. The whole power of France came before 
a Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Alexia to disengage Vercingetorix their General there besieged by Caesar. Whosoever he is that can be content to lose a city, and refuseth to come to fight with his enemy, cannot long endure. The reason that the Prince of Orange so long held out against the Spaniard, was the tyranny of the enemy, whom the people could not endure, certain small supplies that came out of England, and the Princes good will to help such towns as were distressed the best he could: and last of all the liberty of the sea, which the enemy could not take from him.  
On the other side the defendants taking a contrary course for the safety of themselves and their country, aught as much, as they can, to linger and weary the enemy, and not to fight without manifest advantage. This course the Romans took, and found to be best, not only against Annibal; but also against other Barbarous nations, that came to invade them. The same did experience teach the Gauls, and Briteins to be best against Caesar. And the general practice of war hath now confirmed it for a precept to be followed in such cases. When 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 2.  Sitacles King of Thracia invaded the Macedonians, the country people not being able to resist fled into strong cities, and holds: and as occasion, & advantage was offered, from thence issued to fight with him as they could. Many 
c Multa bella impetu valida pe● taedia & mo●as evanuerunt, praesertim ubi non est provisum frumentum, nec maiores expecta●a copiae. Tacit. annal. 18.  wars that have been violent at the first brunt, by delays and tedious linger have come to nothing, saith Tacitus. And therefore never is it good to fight with those that want provision, and look for no further supply. When the Gauls with great forces came into Italy, some would have had the Roman General to fight with them forthwith: but the 
d Dictatori neutiquam placebat cum nulla cogeret res, fortunae ●o committere adversus hostem quem tempus de●eriorem indies, & locus alien●s faceret, sine praeparato comm●atu, sine si●mo munimento morantem: ad hoc ●js animis corporibusque, quorum omnis in impet●vis esset parva eadem languesceret mora. his consiliis dictator bellum trahebat. Liu. 7.  General thought it more wisdom to protract time. His reasons were, for that he dealt with an enemy, which every day waxed weaker, & by reason he was in another country, had daily more and more hindrances coming upon him: further neither had he provision, nor town of retreat, & therefore must needs be wearied with delays, and decay of himself: and great folly, said he, were it to fight with men when they are strong, when they may deal with them, when they are weak & feeble. When Caesar sent Crassus into Aquitany with part of his army to subdue the country; the enemy being taught by experience would not come into open field, but Duces 
a consuetudine populi Romani, loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instit●unt, Romanos se rei frumentar●ae inopia recipientes, impeditos agmimine & sub sarcinis insirmiore animo adoriri cogitant Caes. bell. gal. 3.  began to take places of advantage, to fortify his camp, to keep Crassus from victuals; when the army for want should retire, than he meant to charge the same being laden with baggage, and out of array in the march. That which Livy saith of the 
b Boij gens ad morae taedium minimè patiens dilapsi sunt.  Boyans, we find it true in many Northern nations: they are impatient of delays, and if they be not fought withal, do scatter of themselves. Those that fight with such enemies, are like to those, that hope to quench fire by throwing on of wood; when as if the fire be not supplied with wood, it will go out of itself. And therefore our ancestors, that have fought with the Scots have done valiantly, but wisdom would have persuaded them, to let them dissolve of themselves. The Romans by their haste in fight with Annibal, received three great overthrows, and brought themselves within very little of their ruin. Pompey when he might have ruinated Caesar's army for want of victuals, adventuring to fight at the request of his army overthrew himself.  
The way to weary the enemy without fight is, first with an army consisting most of horsemen, shot, targets, and halberdiers lightly armed, to coast him a far off: next to spoil the country where he passeth, and to bring all the cattle, corn, and provision that may any way serve his turn into strong towns: thirdly to store the towns of war with provision, and assure them with strong garrisons; four to cut the bridges over great rivers, and to seize all narrow and strait passages. The army that coasteth the enemy, although it may not join battle with him in even ground, yet hath many necessary uses; and without it all other impediments are easily passed: the same doth bridle the enemies courses, that he dare not divide his army to send the same on foraging: It keepeth victuals from him, and him from victuals: it defendeth the straits, and passages of rivers: it succoureth such towns as are besieged: it is ready to charge the enemy upon all advantages. The Athenians 
c Thucid. 3.  not being able to fight with the army of the Lacedæmonians that came against them, took this course for their defence, they brought their people and all that they had into the city; placed guards at passages, and cut of the stragglers with their horsemen. Which course 
d Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Vercingetorix also used against Caesar in France. he burned the country, drove away all the cattle, kept the passages of rivers. The 
e Custodias ad ripas Ligeris disponere, equitatumque omnibus locis ostentare caeperunt. Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Heduans revolting from Caesar kept the banks of Loire with guards, and in all places where the Romans came, charged them with their horsemen. But of this matter I have spoken sufficient, where I showed what traverses made against the enemy are most effectual. Now I am to show how the enemy is to be wearied without fight: the means I have set down. But this caution thou must use further, that thou keep thyself, and thy company always on the higher ground, and take heed that the enemy do not entrap thee, nor compass thee about. Fabius in the wars of the Romans against Annibal in Italy, and Licinius in the wars against Asdrubal in Spain, have by their example showed thee what thou art to do, and how warily thou art to guard thyself, and to watch thy enemy.  
These precepts have use in all countries, with whatsoever enemy thou dealest: but especially where the country is full of hills, woods, straits, and great rivers; and also where by force is near equal to the enemy. But if thy power be slender, or if thy country be plain and open; then presume not to come near the enemy: for thou canst not avoid, but either thou must fly or fight. The 
a Fuga se longinqua ab hosse tutati sunt Galli. Liu. 6.  Gauls pursued by Camillus, seeing themselves unable to fight with him, had no other means to avoid fight, but to fly far from him. Neither could Asdrubal have escaped from 
b Liu. 27.  Scipio, but that he fled with his army from him into the utmost coast of Spain. After that 
c Vercingetorix ne contra suam voluntatem dimicare cogeretur, magnis i●ineribus antecessit. Caes. bell. Gal. 7  Caesar had once passed the river of Allier, which was between him & the enemy, Vercingetorix was constrained to go far before, lest he might be constrained to fight against his will. For where the armies come near each to other in even ground, it is hard for the one to avoid fight where the other seeketh it. Antony forced Cassius to fight at Philippi; albeit he avoided it what he could, and had the vantage both of ground and trenches. The 
d Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 9  Admiral at Moncontour would willingly have passed the day without fight: but being near the enemy, he could neither pass the river without disordering his army, nor retire without manifest danger of being utterly broken, and ruinated.  
Philip of Macedonia albeit he was encamped upon the bank of the river Aous very strongly, and had most high mountains for his defence upon his back: yet being charged suddenly from the upper ground, he was both driven to fight against his will, and foiled by Tit. Quintius.  
Wherefore considering the loss and calamities, that come of suffering the country to be burned and spoiled, the hazard that to wnes besieged by the enemy without hope of succour stand in: the discouragement of our people, that see and enemy in the country whom they dare not encounter: I hold it a rule most certain, that no country nor state can well be defended against a strong enemy any long time, unless the same either have, or can procure an army to come into the field able to encounter him, and not unwilling also, if the same may have any good advantage to fight with him. And therefore all valiant men that love their country, are rather to endeavour to overcome the enemy by force, then dull him and weary him by patience and delays, which bring with them contempt of those that want an edge and force. That we may fight with advantage, and proceed with reason; let us now examine and see what things are to be foreseen and considered before that the General do bring forth his army into the field to fight.   

CHAP. XI. Containing special matters to be well considered, before the General bring forth his army to fight with the enemy in open field.  
Many things in war are executed by force and strength of men; but seldom doth force prevail much without counsel and direction. Counsel in all deeds of arms challengeth a principal place, but especially in joining battle with the enemy. To refuse good counsel therefore in this case, is a brutish folly oftentimes severely punished. The Constable of France peevishly refusing the good counsel of Coucy, that dissuaded him at that time to fight with the Turks, was the cause of the miserable slaughter of Christians at Nicopolis.  
The Frenchmen detest in their histories the pride and insolency of a certain Duke of Bourbon, who 
a Froissart.  being General in a certain enterprise against the Saracens in Africa, overthrew the action by disdaining to hear any man speak, and refusing all counsel, but his own; A man wise enough to ruinated any enterprise. Wise captains therefore, as they will consider many things themselves: so I trust they will not disdain to understand the experience and advise of others. Before a General doth resolve to fight with the enemy with all his force, he is first diligently to understand both the strength of the enemy, and the numbers and strength of his own men, least presuming too much of his own power, or contemning the enemy, he do that which afterward he may repent. 
a Guicciandin.  Francis the first of France not knowing how much he was abused by his moster rolls, and supposing his strength to be greater than it was, accepted of the battle of Pavia, where himself was taken and his army discomfited. 
b Caes. bell. ciu. ●.  Curio not knowing the great strength of the enemy's horsemen, did rashly leave the advantage of the ground, and fight with him, that in the plains was to strong for him, which was his ruin.  
Cassius in the battle of Philippi not understanding the victory of Brutus his companion, desperately slew himself, and was the cause of the discouragement of his side, and the victory of the enemy. If therefore he shall understand that his enemy is too strong for him: let him keep his advantage of ground, and avoid fight: if his own power be greater, let him not delay it: for it is no less dishonour to let slip an opportunity, then to adventure rashly.  
Young soldiers are not rashly to be brought into the field against an army exercised and beaten with long practice of war. The Romans found this true by their own practice in the wars with their 
c Veterani exercitus tobore rex Rom. vicit. Liu. 1.  neighbours, and with Annibal. Where their army was well trained, they prevailed, their fresh soldiers could not endure the force of Annibals beaten men. Caesar's old soldiers were invincible.  
With the men that Philip of Macedonia had exercised in many wars, Alexander overthrew the Persian empire. For it is not 
d Veteres non tam numerosos exercitus habere volverunt, quàm eruditos. Veget. l. 3. c. 1.  number that prevaileth, but experience and skill. The 
e Philip. Coming.  gallants of Charles Duke of Burgundy, bragged that they would do and venture; but when they saw their enemy, they forgot their words, and ran away in the encounter with Lewis the eleventh at Mont le herie. Therefore did Caesar wisely, that carrying over with him divers young soldiers into Africa, 
f Noluit convulncrari exercitum tyronmen. Hirt, de bell. Afric.  would not put them to the trial, before he had made them better acquainted with wars.  
soldiers likewise when they are faint, weary, hungry, or thirsty, fight but faintly. And therefore as there is no trust in young soldiers, so there is no strength in soldiers that are faint with labour, or want of victuals. Do not therefore rashly encounter the enemy, when they men are either wearied with long marching or watching, or faint for want of meat or drink. The 
a Ind cibo corpora firmare iussi, ut si longior esset pugna, viribus sufficerent. Liu. 27.  Romans before they entered the battle, refreshed their men with victuals and rest, that if the same continued long, yet their strength might continue. 
b Syllanus ante pugnam militem cibum capere jubet. Liu. 28.  Syllanus being ready to charge the enemy, commanded his soldiers to dine first. The principal cause of the overthrow of the Romans at Trebia was, that Annibal brought forth his men to fight, fresh, having well dined, warmed themselves, and rested: where as the Roman 
c Liu. 21.  General brought forth his army fasting, and cold, by reason they passed a river; and weary, for that they stood many hours in arms before the battle began. Aemilius in the wars against Perseus in Macedonia, albeit his soldiers desired to fight with the 
d Statuit Aemilius lassitudinem & sitim sentientes milites integro hostinon obijcere. Liu. 44.214.  enemy so soon as they saw him, yet considering, that by their long march they were weary, thirsty and faint, would not fight with the enemy that was fresh and lusty; but deferred it to the next day. Yea, although advantage be offered: yet if our 
e Furius lassitudini militum timens, occasionem rei praeclarè gerendae omisit. Liu. 31.  soldiers be faint and weary, it is more safe to pass it. 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph.  Clearchus seeing his soldiers faint and hungry, would not charge the enemy, albeit good occasion was offered. The prince of Conde bringing his men that had watched for the most part all the night, into the field before Saint Denis, anno 1567. found what faintness watching worketh.  
Asdrubal being charged at Metaurus, when his own soldiers were weary and sleepy by the reason of his night's march, and his enemies fresh and lusty, was overthrown with a mighty slaughter. The 
g Sitis & calor hiantes caedendos capiendósque Gallos praebebat. Liu. 27.  Gauls gaping for thirst and heat, and being wearied with travel and watching, were slain or taken. Puigalliard in these late troubles of France, causing his troops to march continually two days and two nights, thinking by his speed to surprise the Protestants at S. 
h Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 13.  Gem, was himself the cause that his men were cut in pieces by lafoy None, not being able for want of sleep and rest, to do any service.  
But least cause hath he to venture, whose soldiers stand in fear of the enemy's forces. Caesar therefore would not begin his journey against Caes 
a. bell. Gal. ●.  Ariouistus, and the Germans, before he had resolved his men that stood in fear of them, to fight. And having had evil success in one or two encounters at Dyrrhachium, which much dismated his soldiers, he removed from thence, and would not fight until such time, as his soldiers were confirmed. He that doubteth any such thing in his men, is first to confirm them with hope, and report of their former valiant actions, and with declaration of the enemy's wants, and weakness, and disadvantages: he is to encourage them with promises, and hope of reward, to fear them with shame, and plainly to declare unto them, that there in no hope but in victory, and therefore, that if not for their honour, yet for 
b Virture pares, necessi●ate superiores. Liu. 21.  saving of themselves, they ought to fight valiantly. Necessity 
c Nusquam nisi in virtute spes est milites, Liu. 34.  enforceth men to fight, and the example of their Commanders ready to abide with them in all danger, maketh them ashamed to fly. Much did it encourage Caesar's soldiers, when they saw him in the battle against the Helvetians, put his horse from him, ready to take the common hazard with them: and a very coward he is, that neither with persuasion, nor example will be encouraged.  
The soldiers for their persons, strength, and courage being such as they should be, the next consideration of a General, that purposeth to fight, is, that they have their arms fitted, and all baggage and impediments, that may hinder them removed. Alexander before he fought with 
d Plutarch.  Darius, forgot not so much as to give order that the hair of his soldiers heads, and beards should be cut, lest the enemy might take hold by it. Small matters you will say: but in this, not the smallest matters are to be contemned.  
But yet nothing is more to be respected, than the ground, where thou purposest to abide the enemy. There is great advantages in hedges, ditches, and the higher ground. Caesar's 
e Milites e loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  soldiers throwing their javelins from the higher ground, and following the same, did easily break the ranks of their enemy's troops. 
f Pharnaces adversus collem subiens detruditur, & vincitur. Hirt. de bell. Alexander.  Pharnaces leading his men against the hill where Caesar's army stood ranged, was presently thrust down, and vanquished. Caesar wondered at his rashness. The enemy having seized a hill by Rome, the Consul 
g Temerè adverso janiculo servilius ad castra hostium aciem erexit, soedéque inde pulsus est. sed interuentu collegae ipse exercitusque seruatus est. Liu. 2.  Servilius moved with the indignity of it, did rashly cause his troops to march up the hill against him, which advantage the enemy taking, had overthrown him, and his army; had not his Colleague come in the instant, and favoured his retreat, Marius Plutarch 
a. in vita Marij.  overthrew the Germans and Danes more easily, taking them mounting up the higher ground. Certain of the Admiral of France his companies foolishly striving to win the hill, near the plains of S. 
b Hist de troubls. de Fr. l. 9  Clere, were driven back with loss, and had utterly been defeated, if the Almains below had not kept their ground, and arrested the foremost of the enemies, that pursued them. A small 
c Exiguum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum habet momentum. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  advantage in the uneavennes of the ground, is much (saith Caesar) in the furthering of the victory. At Auaricum, albeit he had the victory in his hands, and had foiled the enemy: yet would he not follow them up the hill for fear of the discommodity of the ground. At Gergovia he lost many brave soldiers, that contrary to his commandment would needs pursue the enemy up the hill. himself was never in greater danger to lose the field, then at Munda in Spain: which happened by the forwardness of his men, that needs would 
d Hirt. de bell. Hispanic.  charge the enemy, standing on the higher ground. That care that a General hath in the first charge of the enemy, the same he ought also to continue in the pursuit of his victory, that his men descend not down into the lower ground, nor be too eager following them up the hill. The 
e Romanus cedentem hostem effuse sequendo in locum iniquum pertractus acie fusus. Liu. 6.  Romans following the enemy without order, and being drawn into a low valley, were discomfited and slain, the enemy turning back upon them. The Corinthians not looking before them in their retreat, fell into a 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  hollow bottom of ground: which the Athenians perceiving, and that there was no issue out, compassed them round about with their light armed, and slingers, and stoned them all to death. The Romans entering the strait of Caudium, were entrapped by the Samnites. Annibal 
g Liu. 21.  sustained many losses by the people of the mountains, that took the tops of the hills, and rolled down stones upon his soldiers, marching along the sides of the hills. Which difficulties. 
h Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 4.  Xenophon also proved in passing the mountains of the Carduchians. All difficulties which hinder the army in marching, as woods, hills, straits, rivers, and such like, are far more dangerous, if they be objected against us in fight. And therefore let the General take heed, that he be not charged in passing of rivers, or straits, or at any like disadvantage.  
Further, let him diligently view, and search the Country, that the enemy have not bestowed some part of his army in some wood, or beyond some hill behind, or on the sides of the place, to charge him with advantage, when the battle is begun. By which means Annibal overthrew the Romans at Trebia, and the Thrasimene lake.  
Neither is it sufficient for him only to provide, that the enemy have no advantage, nor his own soldiers any disadvantage: but he must consider also, if he may take the enemy either in trap or at any disadvantage: and that either in uneven ground, or in straits, or passing of rivers, or any place where his army is disordered, either in lodging, or marching, or fight. If the enemy be beaten out of the field by force, it is in part the soldiers praise, if he be entrapped by the captains policy, that is his hondur.  
In the joining of the battle, the General is likewise to endeavour to take the wind, and to have the Sun (and Moon, if the fight be in the night) upon his back. The wind being favourable driveth our darts, arrows, and whatsoever we throw against the enemy with greater force forward; and being contrary doth diminish their force, and stoppeth the soldiers breath, and filleth their eyes full of dust. In the battle betwixt Theodosius, and Maximus the tyrant, nothing holp the 
a Histor. Ecclese ast. Theodoret.  side of Theodosius, more, than the wind that drove back the darts, arrows, and stones of Maximus his soldiers. The 
b Poeni aversiterga tantùm afflante vento, in occaecatum pulvere à Vulturno vento hostem pugnabant. Liu. 22.  Roman soldiers in the battle at Cannae, having the wind against them, had their eyes and throats filled with dust, which favoured the Carthaginians blowing upon their backs. The Sun with great heat frying the bodies of the Gauls, made them 
c Sol ingenti ardore torrebat minimè patientia aestus corpora Gallorum. Liu. 35.  very faint, fight on a certain time with the Romans. Vespasians soldiers having the 
d Tacit. l. 19  Moon on their back, when they fought in the night with Vitellius his army, seemed greater than they were, and did see to strike more directly. The same advantage had the Sicilians against the Athenians, in that night's encounter, wherein they overthrew them near Syracuse.  
The season of the year also, and the weather is to be considered, before we range our army to fight. Northern people endure cold better than heat. And therefore as they are to avoid fight in the heat of the day, and summer season, so they are to choose the cool morning or evening, and of the times of the year the Spring, or dry Winter, which Southern people can not brook. The Romans protracting time until the heat of the day, did then charge the 
e Liu. 9  Gauls, when with heat and thirst, they were of themselves ready to faint: which occasioned unto them a great victory. In rainy weather shot cannot do almost any service: that time therefore is fittest for armed men, targetters, and such like, to charge them.  
Finally, whatsoever maketh for the encouragement of our soldiers, or discouragement of the enemy, the same aught a wise General to devise, and practise. The strength of the enemy is in words to be diminished, the goodness of our cause, and strength of our army to be amplified. Whatsoever 
a Fama bellum conficit, & parva momenta in spem metúmque impellunt animos. Liu. 27.  reports may hurt the enemy, or help us, are to be spread abroad. Reports oft times prevail as much as truth, & small matters make men in that case both fear, and hope, as said Claudius Nero. The report of a succour coming did daunt 
b Tacit. 19  Vitellius his army, and confirmed the enemy. Which also happened in a certain encounter betwixt the Romans, and Samnites. Words also cast out in the time of the battle, as that their General is slain, or that part of the army flieth, and such like, profit much. Therefore if at any time, here especially the skill, and judgement of a captain is to show itself in taking advantages, avoiding disadvantages, preventing of mischiefs, laying ambushes for the enemy, and using all manner of stratagems, and devices of war.  
Now having spent thus much time in considerations, and preparatives of a battle, let us come to the ranging of our battles, and to the action itself, in encountering, and vanquishing the enemy.   

CHAP. XII.  

Wherein is discoursed what array, and course is best in charging the enemy.  
THe array of an army placed, and prepared to fight, is divers, according to the number and qualities both of the enemies, and our own forces; likewise according to our strength in horsemen, or footmen, in shot or armed men; and last of all, according to the difference of grounds, and places. To part a small number into so many parts, as we do a full army, were rather to break it, then orderly to part it; and a matter in show ridiculous. If the enemies force be greater on the corners then in the midst, we must have consideration of that in framing and ranging our army. Horsemen in rough ground, in woods, straits, and hills are unprofitable. If the enemy be stronger than we in horse, we are to change the place of our horsemen, & to advance our footmen. Where the ways are straight, we cannot spread our army, as in open field. This and other circumstances being referred to the judgement of the General; let us now consider what array is best in open field, our army being full, and having all the parts thereto required. This I have touched already where I showed before how an army marching is suddenly to be drawn into order; by what rules the same may be exactly performed, remaineth now to be declared.  
The whole army considered without horsemen, or shot, consisteth of three parts in the front: I call them the 
a That word cometh nearest to the sense, though not to the proper signification of the word.  right corner, the middle battle, and the left corner: (the Romans called them Dextrum cornu, mediam aciem, & sinistrum cornu) and of two or three parts from front to the back. The first I call the front, the second the supply: the third, if there be a third, the last hope. The Romans divided their array, as it was considered in depth, or from front to back in hastatos, principes, & triarios. The shot I would have placed both before, and on the sides, and behind every of these parts divided into several troops, and guided by several leaders. Without the shot, the horsemen would be placed on the wings, unless some special cause move us to the contrary.  
The three parts of the front may either stand joined together, or with some distance separated: and either may they be framed, as one body with ranks continued, or else every of these parts may consist of divers battalions or squares of armed men; very commodious for the several use of them, and also for the retreat of shot within the distances. The breadth and depth may be greater, or lesser according to our number, and the ground where they stand. As the front is divided: so likewise is the supply, and last hope in like sort. The supply would be near so many, as the front. but it is sufficient, if the last hope be half so many. The distances of the supply would be greater, then of the battalions in front, which charging the enemy, are to join close together, and being wearied may retire within the distances of the supply. which two parts joined together, do then make one front. if both be foiled, then are they to be received within the distances of the last hope, which are largest, and all the parts to unite their whole forces together. If any doubt of the confusion that may arise in the retiring of the first and second battle back to the third, then may the supply, and last hope be drawn up upon the sides: which will work the very same effects.  
In the midst of every battalion or square, somewhat toward the first ranks, would the ensigns be placed with their guarders well armed, and furnished with short weapons.  
Every battalion would have his several leader, which would be the first man of the right hand in the first rank of the square. for that the inferior leaders in a main battle should stand out of rank, is contrary to practise of wars. If in every battalion there were some part targetters contrary to the modern use, there might be good use made of them, when the armies come to join, both against shot and pikes.  

a Ante signa modico interuallo velites eunt. Liu. 38.  Before the front of the battle are certain troops of shot to take their standing, which may not only defend the head of our army: but also annoy whosoever offereth himself to the charge. If they be pressed with horsemen or targetters, their retreat is within the distances of the battalions, if the ground afford them no other defence. From thence they are to be drawn eftsoon again, and employed where their leaders shall perceive they may do most service. A rank of musketeers under the first rank of pikes may do good service, if they be drawn into the distances when the enemy cometh to the charge.  
The horsemen, if they be not strong enough to encounter the enemy's horse, would be seconded with certain troops of shot and half pikes. but diligently are they to take heed, that they go not directly before the front of their own footmen, lest retiring thence, they fall upon their own pikes. The great ordnance, if there be any hill in the place, either on the right hand or left hand of the army, is there best placed, both for seeing of the enemy, and for fear of disordering our men, either going to the charge, or retiring back. If the ground be even, it is placed in the head of our army a little before our troops of shot. which after the same is discharged, advance themselves, while that is drawn within the distances either of the battalions, or of the midbattell and corners. For defence of the artillery there are good guards to be appointed, wheresoever it standeth.  
If this order cannot be observed: yet this rule is generally to be respected, that every weapon, and soldier is there to be placed, where he may most annoy the enemy, and best defend himself. The parts are so to be placed, that one may secure another, and one retire to another. Horsemen may not come within the ground of the footmen, nor shot within the ranks of pikes, but both either on the sides, or behind the battalions. He is most judicious, that can bring most men to fight, and stop the way to the enemy, that he can not extend his men to hurt him. There is no company to be sent forth to join with the enemy, but with some to relieve them again, and again, and to receive them retiring, and stop the enemy's pursuit. Horsemen may not charge pikes, nor come in ground where they cannot fetch their career. Other rules in their special places shall be prescribed.  
Shot in marching and standing observe order. The distances before I have showed. In fight they observe no order, but every man marking his enemy right before him, and shooting at him taketh his best advantage. yet if they observe not a certain course where the shot are many, they soon fall in disorder. Archers for that they shoot and fight standing in rank, observe better array. their distance from shoulder to shoulder is one foot, from rank to rank four foot. Some now a days do little esteem this weapon: yet if our archers were armed with plated jacks as in time past, neither shot could abide them in even ground, nor pikes without shot. Against horsemen, where they may find defence of hedges, or ditches, or stakes, or rough ground they do very good service.  
Pikemen against a charge of horsemen ought to stand close with the blunt end of the pike in the ground, the point bend upon the horse breast. Rank from rank standeth not more than three foot asunder, that many ends of pikes may guard the first rank. That the pikes may be commodiously bend and crossed, the first ranks are to bow their bodies. that they may the better break the charge of the enemy's horse: before them they are to have a rank of musketeers, as hath been said already.  
Where the pikemen go to charge other pikes, between shoulder and shoulder, there would be a foot distance; betwixt rank and rank so much, as charging with the pikes above hand, and breaking the same they may use their sword, and daggers, and either in striking advance forward their right legs, or else receiving the enemy's blows draw back the same. Six foot I think for that purpose to be sufficient.  
The halberdieres, bilmen, and targetters would have likewise betwixt shoulder and shoulder one foot, betwixt rank and rank five foot. In pikes and short weapons this is generally to be observed, that they stand as close together as may be, so they may have room to manage themselves, and their weapons. the less room may serve, considering that I would have all soldiers to strike with the point of their weapon: and every man to secure his fellows before him, and on the sides.  
The horsemen go to the shock with equal front so near as they can, and run so close side by side as they may without hurt each to other. If horse be distant from horse two foot, and rank from rank seven foot, when horsemen go trotting to the charge, the proportion is good. The array of the Frenchmen that charge with single ranks is of no strength: neither the orders of the Reiters that go to the charge in a ring. for so soon as they are invested with lances, they are broken. and therefore I think the former array better, as used both by antiquity, and the Italian and English cavalero, which giveth ground at this day to no other.  
The ancient leaders of time past, which for their skill in arms are famous to posterity, howsoever in some circumstances they departed from these rules; yet never did they neglect the General reasons of them. neither ought they to be neglected of any, as I will make manifest by particulars.  
Scipio in the encounter betwixt him and Annibal in Africa according to the Roman guise divided his army from front to back into three parts placing first those which they called hastatos, next principes, last triarios. All these albeit at the first their arms were different, yet when the Roman empire was come to the height, were armed much after one sort with plated jacks, which they called Loricas, morions on their heads, a shield on their left arm, a sword well pointed, and sharp by their side, and a javelin which they called pilum in their right hand which they threw at the enemy when they joined battle, and then fought with their sword and target. Some had also defences for their thighs, and legs, and shoes plated in the soles, that they might not be pierced with nails. The light armed by them called Velites which stood not among the armed men had only a head piece and a target, and sword, or else if they were slingers only a head piece, a sting, and a sword. The Triarij that stood last were the oldest, and most tried, and best armed soldiers, and next them Principes that stood before them, the hastati were youngest and of least experience, first in place, but last in account. The front where the hastati were placed, Scipio made not of Regiments joined together and placed before the ensigns, but of companies of two hundred made into little battalions or squares distant one from another some space, that the Elephants of the enemy received within these distances might not disorder the array. He placed Laelius with the Italian horsemen without on the left corner, Masinissa and the Numidian horsemen on the right corner. The distances between the battalions, he filled with the first troops of the light armed which were arches and slingers, commanding them, when the Elephants came forward on them, either to retire behind the first battalions, or standing fast to the sides of them, to give the Elephant's way, and to throw their javelins at them as they passed. Livyes words I have set down for the satisfaction of those that understand the tongue: which course I have also in other examples out of him, and other authors observed. If my translation answer not word for word, yet doth it answer the Roman use of war. The words I could not translate precisely, if I meant that any should understand me. the terms of war then, and now being so different.  

a Liu. 30.  Instruit deinde primos hastatos, post eos principes, triarijs postremam aciem clausit. Non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quámque signa instruebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, ut esset spatium, quò Elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent: Laelium cum equitatu Italico ab sinistro cornu, Masinissam, Numidásque ab dextro opposuit. Vias patentes inter manipulos antesignanorum velitibus complevit, dato praecepto ut ad impetum Elephantorum, aut post rectos refugerent ordines, aut in dextram laeuámque discursu applicantes se antesignanis, viam qua irruerent in ancipitia tela belluis darent.  
Annibal placed first his Elephants: then the Ligurians, & Gauls hired to aid the Carthaginians. Among their troops and before them he placed slingers, and archers which were Mores, and of the islands of Maiorca, and Minorca. In the second battle he set the Carthaginians, and Africans, and Macedonian Regiment joined in one array. and after them a little way distant, he placed his last hope, or third battle consisting of Italians. The Carthaginian horsemen were placed on the right wing, the Numidians on the left. His error (if any error may be thought to have been in such an expert Captain, and not rather in the execution of his directions) was this, that not making any distances in his second battle, for the first to retreat into, the first battle being repulsed was for the most part slain, and returning back upon the Carthaginians standing in the second battle, had almost disordered them. Percase he thought that seeing no place of retreat, they would have fought more desperately. But what can wearied, and hurt men do? or who can animate men altogether discouraged? Scipio contrariwise drawing back the hurt, and wearied men of his first battalions, advanced the second battle where those stood which the Romans called Principes on the one hand, and the third battle, which they termed Triarios on the other hand, and so jointly charging the enemy on front with his footmen, and on the back with his horsemen, he foiled Annibal and his army, which before that had always been victorious.  

a Livi. 30.  Annibal primum Elephantos instruxit: deinde auxilia Ligurum, Gallorumque, Balearibus, Maurisque adiunctis: in 2 acie Carthaginenses, Afrósque, & Macedonum legionem: modico interuallo relecto subsidiariam aciem Italicorum militum instruxit: equitatum circumdedit cornibus, dextrum Carthaginenses, sinistrum Numidae tenuerunt.  
At Trebia Annibal brought into the field first his archery, and slingers of the islands of Maiorca, and Minorca, about 8000. men: then his armed men: ten thousand horsemen he disposed by the right, and left corners of the first battle, and without them his Elephants divided equally into two parts. When the Roman legions urged the light armed, he drew them back lightly into the spaces, betwixt the midbattell, and the right and left corner. Afterwards, having foiled and put to flight the Roman horsemen, the archers & slingers came forward, & charged the Romans upon the flanks of the armed men.  

b Livi. 21.  Annibal Baleares levem armaturam, 8 ferme millia hominum erant, locat ante signa, deinde graviorem armis peditem: in cornibus circumfundit decem millia equitum: ab cornibus in utrámque partem divisos Elephantos statuit: Balearibus cum maiore robore resisterent legiones, diductae properè in cornua leues armaturae sunt: Baleares pulso equite iaculabantur in latera.  
The army of the Romans and Carthaginians at the famous encounter of Cannae by Livy is thus described. On the right corner stood the Roman horsemen, and within them footmen: the horsemen of their associates were ranged on the left corner, & within them footmen: in the midst were placed the Roman legions divided after their usual manner into three parts: hard before them & joining with them were archers and slingers placed, and before them other archers, and slingers and other light armed soldiers, of which consisted the first range of the battle. Annibal set his slingers, archers, and light armed foremost on the front of the battle, the Spanish, and French horse he placed on the left wing against the Roman horsemen, the Numidian horsemen on the right. The midbattel he strengthened with footmen, placing the Africans equally divided in the right, and left corner, the Gauls and Spaniards with their array in form of a wedge advanced somewhat forward being in the midst. The charge was begun by the archery and light armed, afterward did the left wing of the Gauls and Spanish horsemen meet with the right wing of the Romans: then followed the encounter of the armed men.  

a Livi. 22.  In dextro cornu Romanos equites locavit, deinde pedites: laewm cornu extremi equites sociorum, intra pedites; ad medium iuncti legionibus Romanis tenuerunt iaculatores. Ex caeteris levium armorum auxilijs prima acies facta. Annibal Balearibus aliáque levi armatura praemissa, Gallos', Hispanosque equites laeva in cornu adversus Romanum equitatum, dextrum cornu Numidis equitibus datum media acie peditibus firmata, ita ut Afrorum, utraque cornua essent, interponerentur his cuneo aliquantum prominente medij Galli, atque Hispani. Pugna levibus primum armis commissa: deinde equitum Gallorum, Hispanorumque laewm cornu cum dextro Romano concurrit, deinde peditum coorta pugna.  
Scipio fight against Asdrubal in Spain, did thus dispose his army: he strengthened both the corners of his battle (divided from front to back after the usual manner) with Roman soldiers, his associates he bestowed in the midst, his horsemen and light armed he sent out against the corpse de guard of the Carthaginians placed in the gates of their camp, and in convenient places near. When the Carthaginians came forth against them, he received his horsemen and light armed within his battalions, and dividing them into two parts, placed them behind the corners of the battle. Perceiving where the enemy was weakest, he there began the charge, with that part of his army that was strongest. The first battle of the enemies being discomfited, he chargeth the midbattell with his Regiments of Romans on the sides, with his associates that were Spaniards in front, and on the backs with his horsemen, and so put the same to flight.  
Scipio cornua firmat 
a Liu. 28.  Romano milite, socijs in mediam aciem acceptis: equites & levem armaturam in stationes Punicas immisit: egredientibus Poenis equitatum, & levem armaturam in medium acceptam, divisamque in parts duas in subsidijs post cornua locat. Cum cornibus ubi firma eius erat acies, Poenorum infirma pugnam incipit, ea acie fugata mediam Poenorum aciem ipse a latere, equites à tergo, Hispani à fronte adorti fuderunt.  
Scipio's father encountering the same man, their armies were then thus ordered: the front of the Roman army stood upon three parts: the footmen after the manner of the Romans, were part before the ensigns and part behind: the horsemen stood beyond both the corners of the avant-garde or first battle: Asdrubal placed the Spaniards in the midst, in the right corner he ordered the Carthaginians, the Africans and other mercenary soldiers in the left, his Numidian horsemen he placed fast by the Carthaginians on that wing where they stood, the rest of his horsemen in the other corner.  
Triplex stetit 
b Liu. 23.  Romana acies, peditum pars ante signa locata, pars post signa accepta, equites cornua cinxere. Asdrubal mediam aciem Hispanis firmat, in cornibus dextro Poenos locat, laevo Afros mercenariorúmque auxilia: equitum Numidas Poenorum peditibus, caeteros Afros pro cornibus opponit.  
Scipio, he that subdued Annibal encountering with Syphax, used the usual array of the Romans making his army triple in breadth, and in length; the Italian horsemen he placed by the right corner of the first squadrons, the Numidians led by Masinissa by the left. Syphax and Asdrubal opposed the Numidian or Barbary horse against the Italian horse, the Carthaginians against Masinissa. The Celtiberian footmen they placed in the midst opposite against the squadrons of the Roman Regiments.  

c Liu. 30.  Romanus haste atorum prima signa, post principes, in subsidijs triarios constituit. Equitatum. Italicum ab dextro cornu, ab laevo Numidas, Masinissamque opposuit. Syphax Asdrubalque Numidis, adversus Italicum equitatum, Carthaginensibus contra Masinissam locatis, Celtiberos in mediam aciem in adversa signa legionum accepere.  
In a certain encounter in Spain the 
d Liu. 29.  Romans perceiving that the enemy had left spaces between the midbattel, & those squadrons that made the corners, purposing to send out his horsemen by those spaces, preventing him, filled those spaces first with their horsemen, which both made the enemy's horse unserviceable, and holp to disorder his footmen. Their other array was ordinary, save that the horsemen made not the outmost wings, but the footmen: as appeareth by these words of Livy following.  
Cornua, dextrum Ilergetes, laewm alij Hispani, mediam aciem Ausetani tenuere. Inter cornua, & mediam aciem interualla patentia fecerunt satis lata, qua equitatum ubi tempus esset, emitterent. Romani cùm inter cornua loca etiam patentia fecissent, hoc vicerunt, quod primi equites inter interualla miserint, quod hostium equites inutiles fecit, & turbavit hostium pedites.  
Yet was not the array of the Romans always the same, as appeareth by that encounter which the Roman Proconsul & Praetor had with Mago in Liguria. The praetors legions made the front of the army & first squadrons, the Proconsul placed his legions behind for supply. The twelfth legion being almost cut all in pieces, the thirteenth was advanced forward to relieve it. Mago against this legion opposed fresh men, reserved behind for supply: the Elephants coming overthwart, the first ranks of the eleventh legion being drawn forth, fought with them with their javelins.  

a Liu. 30.  Praetoris legiones in prima acie fuerunt: procos. suas in subsidij tenuit. Duodecima legione magna ex part caesa, decimatertia legio in primam aciem inducta, Mago ex subsidijs Gallos integros legioni opposuit. hastati legionis undecimae pila in Elephantos conijciunt.  
Furius fight with the Gauls in Liguria, placed his army in this sort. The soldiers of his associates, he divided into 
b Wings were so called, for that they were placed on the sides of the battle, yet were they not so always.  wings, and of them made the front of the battle. Two regiments he placed behind for a supply. When the right wing was almost oppressed, bringing up the two regiments on either side of it, he guarded the same, and with his horsemen he charged the enemy upon the side of his battle.  

c Liu. 31.  In alas Furius dividens socialem exercitum eum in prima acie locavit, in subsidijs duas legiones, oppressae dextrae posteà alae duas illas legiones circumduxit, equites in latus hostium emisit.  
When afterward the Roman Empire was enlarged, & that the Romans began to have divers nations in their armies, although the general order was still observed, yet there happened in their armies by reason of this mixture more variety. In the battle betwixt L. Scipio, and Antiochus in Asia, there were two legions of Romans, two other of Latins their associates. The Romans were ordered in the midst, the Latins in the corners of the battle. Those parts of the legions which they called hastatos, Principes, & Triarios, made the front, the supply, and last hope. On the right side of this army, the Consul ranged in squadrons 3000 footmen of other nations, that came to the aid of the Romans, and without them somewhat less than 3000 horsemen. Upon the left side which was guarded with a river running along, he placed only four troops of horsemen. Two thousand Macedonians & Thracians were left behind in the camp to guard the baggage. Antiochus his army stood in this order: first, 16000 of the kings ordinary soldiers, called 
a They were armed men, so called of their array, which was a squadron containing sometime 8000, sometime more, sometime less.  Phalangitae, divided into x squadrons, took their place: between every squadron two Elephants were placed. From the front backward, the battle contained 32 ranks of armed men. By the right side of these were placed first 1500 Gallograecians: next to them 3000 men completely armed, they call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: thirdly, a wing of a thousand horsemen, and certain Elephants behind to second them. In the fourth place, the king's Guard, and by the same 1200 archers on horseback Dahians: And fifthly, 3000 light armed men: in the uttermost corner were 4000 slingers, and archers placed. By the left side of the kings ordinary soldiers, were likewise 1500 Gallograecian footmen ranged, and 2000 Cappadocians, having like arms, and beyond them 2700 others, all sent in aid of the king. After them 3000 horsemen all armed, and one thousand other horsemen were ranged. Before these horsemen were placed charets with hooks, and Arabians upon Camels. And lastly, like number of horsemen, targetters, archers, and Elephants, as was on the right corner.  

b Liu. 37.  Romanorum duae legiones, duae sociûm & Latini nominis erant. Romani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuêre. hastatorum prima signa, deinde Principum erant, triarij postremos claudebant. extra hanc iustam aciem à part dextra auxiliarium tria millia peditum Consul instruxit. ulira eos equitum minùs 3000 opposuit: à laeva qua flumen claudebat, quatuor tantùm turmae oppositae: 2000 Macedonum & Thracum praesidio castris relinquebantur. regia acies erat primò 16000 phalangitaes in parts decem divisa, inter singulas partes bini erant elephanti, à fronte introrsus in 32 ordines armatorum acies patebat. ad latus dextrum phalangitarum 1500 pedites Gallograecoes posuit, his 3000 peditum loricatorum (cataphractos appelant) adiunxit: addita his ala mill equitum: continens his grex elephantorum positus est in subsidijs. ab eadem part paulùm producto cornu regia cohors erat: Dahae deinde equites sagittarij 1200: tum levis armatura 3000: extremum cornu claudebant 4000 funditores, & sagittarij. ab laevo cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant Gallograeci pedites 1500, & similiter his armati 2000 Cappadocum, inde auxiliares 2700, & 3000 cataphractorum equitum, & mill alij equites: ante hunc equitatum falcatae quadrigae, & cameli quibus Arabes insidebant sagittarij. inde alia multitudo par ei quae in dextro cornu erat equites, cetrati, sagittarij, elephanti.  
Cerealis in his array did somewhat digress from the ancient orders of the Romans. The squadrons which were sent from the associates in his aid, were placed in front, and by them on each side his horsemen: in the second battle he placed the legions: and last of all kept by himself certain choice men to supply where sudden need required.  

a Tacit. 21.  Cerealis equity & auxiliarijs cohortibus frontem explet: in secunda acie legiones locatae, dux sibi delectos retinuerat ad improvisa.  
The army of Caesar ranged ready to fight with Afranius, was divided into three battalions. The first consisted of 4 squadrons of the 5 legion, which was seconded by the other squadrons of the same legion, the three squadrons remaining were placed for the last hope in the third battalion. Other legions were ranged in like sort. The archers and slingers were placed before the front in the midst, the horsemen were placed in wings on the sides.  

b Caes. bell. Ciu. 1  Caesaris acies triplex, primo 4 cohortes ex 5 legione, has subsidiariae ternae, & rursus aliae totidem, suae cuiusque legionis sequebantur. sagittarij & funditores media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat.  
I may not forget the order of Caesar, and Pompey's armies in that famous encounter in the Pharsalian fields. In the left corner of Pompey's army were two legions placed: Scipio had the midst with his regiments that he brought out of Syria: the regiment of Cilicia and squadrons made of the relics of Afranius his army in Spain, were ranged together in the right corner: certain other squadrons he placed in the distances betwixt the corners and midbattell. All his horsemen, archers, and slingers he placed side by the left corner of his army. Seven 
c When the legion contained 6000 foot, every company consisted ordinarily of 600, but seldom were they complete.  companies he left to guard his camp. Caesar ordered his army in three battles, and according to the custom of the Romans; strengthened every battle with three supplies (the front accounted for one which is not properly a supply, but the front or first array.) He made a fourth battle of lusty young men well armed and furnished with half pikes against Pompey's horsemen. Finally, two companies he left behind for guard of the camp.  

a Caes. de bell. Ciu. 3.  Erant in sinistro cornu (Pompeij) legiones duae, mediam aciem Scipio tenebat cum legionibus Syriacis, Ciliciensis legio & cohortes Afranianae in dextro cornu erant. reliquas cohortes inter aciem mediam, & cornua interiecerat: cunctum equitatum, sagittarios, & funditores in sinistro cornu obiecerat, 7 cohortes castris praesidio reliquit. Caesar triplicem aciem instruit, & tribus promore Romano firmatam subsidijs: quartam aciem instituit contra equites Pompeij: duas cohortes castris praesidio reliquit.  
Neither is the victory of Caesar against Scipio in Africa, less famous, or the array of their armies less remarkable. Scipio in the front of his army, placed his legions, the Numidians he ranged behind them for supplies. On the right and left corner in equal distances be ordered his elephants, after which he marrialled the light armed, and aid sent him out of Numidia: all his horsemen he placed on the right corner of the battle, and beside them an infinite number of soldiers light armed (as archers, slingers, targetters without corselets) all this in the space of a mile: the left side of his army was close joined to the town of Vzita. Caesar in the left side of his army, set the 9 and 7 regiment: the 30, 29, 13, 14, 28, and 26. in the midbattell: certain companies of those legions together with certain regiments of young soldiers in the right corner: certain other regiments newly levied, he placed in squadrons behind for a supply. The last hope or third supply or battle, he translated into the left corner of his battle, where also he placed his horsemen, and the fift legion which seconded his horsemen. His light armed disposed in squadrons, he ranged among the troops of his horsemen.  

b Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Scipio collocabat in front legiones. Numidas in subsidiaria acie, elephantos dextro, sinistróque cornu aequalibus interuallis: post illos armaturas leaves, & Numidas auxiliares substituerat, equitatum universum in dextro cornu disposuit, & juxta levis armaturae infinitam multitudinem mill passuum spatio, sinistrum cornu oppido Vzita claudebatur. Caesar habuit legionem 9 & 7 in sinistro cornu, tricesimam, vicesimam nonam, decimam tertiam, 14, 28, 26, in media acie, aliquot cohortes earum legionum, & unà tyronum legiones in dextro cornu, tyronum legiones in subsidijs, tertiam aciem in sinistrum suum cornu transtulit, ibi equitatum collocaver at, & quintam legionem quae equitatui subsidio esset, levem armaturam inter equites interposuit.  
And thus enough of the Romans and perchance (as some will say) too much, seeing the orders of wars are now so divers (as they think) from antiquity. But these men must consider, that the reasons remain always the same, and that the use of horsemen, and footmen is now the same that was in times past, and that our shot answer to their light armed, and that always one part is to secure another, and that the army must take heed, that it be not compassed round. The Greeks, yea and barbarous nations moved with the same reasons have in effect kept the same array. When 
a Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  Clearchus was to fight with Artaxerxes, he placed his own soldiers in the right corner, and those of Meno in the left, the rest were ranged in the midst. Without the corners stood the light armed, and then the horsemen equally divided utmost.  
In the encounter of the Greeks 
b Arrian. exped. Alex. lib. 3.  and Persians at Arbela, Darius on the wings placed his horsemen of divers nations, and some pretty distance before them his charets with hooks: within them his archers and light armed: and in the midst the Greeks and Persians, which were the strength of the army. The same array did Alexander also observe in the front of his army: but fearing lest he should be compassed about by Darius his horsemen, he also provided another battalion, which if need be might make head that way also. I need not bring many examples, seeing in all these matters there is one general course. Let us therefore now compare the arrays of late time, and you shall then perceive, that either they are like to former proceed in former time, or else far worse.  
The 
c Frois●art.  black Prince in the fight with Henry the usurper of Castil, divided his army into three parts, himself led the battle, the duke of Lancaster the vanguard, and the king of Maiorca the rest, the horsemen were sorted on the sides: the same array was observed by the enemy.  
When the duke of Burgundy was to fight with Lewis the 11, at Montlehery, he placed his archers first: but because his cavalero was not placed on the sides, but behind: the same, going to the charge, overran his own men, and killed divers of them, and few or none of the enemies. In which disorder if Lewis had charged him, he could not have failed of the victory.  
The Prince of Condè Anno 1567. remaining at S. Denys, and understanding the King's determination to drive him thence: resolved in the fields between Paris and S. Denys to receive the charge in this order: he divided his horsemen into three parts, and did second every part with shot: with the rest of the shot jenlis began the charge. Footmen armed which are the strength of the army he had none. The parts were so far sundered, that one part could not secure another. So that if the armed men of the adverse party had come on: both the horsemen, and footmen of the Prince had been driven to a poor retreat. The Constable having 16000 footmen, brought few or none to the encounter. Of this number 6000 Suitzers were there planted in the field, like so many stakes, without giving any one blow that day.  
At Moncontour the Admiral placed first his 
a They are the most part Pistoleers on horseback.  Reyters, and side by them certain lances: both these he fenced on the sides with shot: behind these he placed a squadron of Lansquenets flanked likewise with shot, and seconded with some few horsemen, all which made the avant-garde. The battle consisted of shot which was likewise flanked, and seconded with shot. In the head both of the battle, and avant-garde were certain shot placed, as enfans perdus (we call them the forlorn hope) in which array there was neither order, beauty, nor strength. There wanted armed men in the battle. Horsemen could not, being so placed come to the charge, but they should run over their own men. In some they were so placed, that not the hundred person could come to fight. But percase the Admiral either could not do as he would, or else carried away with the error of the French, that put all in shot, had more of that weapon, then could do service.  
The enemy's avant-garde at the same time stood upon 4000 Suitzers, flanked with certain Regiments of shot: before the Suitzers were 8 field pieces placed, and before the pieces the forlorn hope: beyond the shot were ranged certain lances. The battle being drawn up, and ranged in equal front with the avant-garde, in fashion differed little, or nothing from the same. Much like course, sure no better hath been used in all the battles that have been fought since the invention of artillery. So that we see how all wise captains, do go about in their arrays to resemble the proceeding of ancient time, but there is not now the like union of the parts, nor the like strength of the whole body, nor that orderly proceeding, that every weapon may do his office, nor that proportion of the front, nor order of supplies, that were among ancient warriors. And by reason of uniformity in proceeding now wanting, hard it is to set men in order: hard to bring many to fight, and hardest of all to restore an array once broken. this is the cause of the weakness of the armies of ourtime: in disorder no army can fight, nor resist.  
Wherefore of two things in this point considerable, let us doubt neither. If the enemy be in disorder, neither let us doubt to charge him; nor if our army be in order, let us fear to sustain his charge. 
a Auxilia jubae impedita ac perturbata, quòd nullo ordine essent, & sine timore iter fecerant, in fugam se conjiciunt. Caes. bell. Ciu. 2.  juba's men being without order, were no sooner charged, but they fled. Cato in his expedition into 
b Dum Hispani trepidant acie instruenda: Cos. iam paratis, ordinatisque omnibus incompositos aggreditur. Liu. 34.  Spain taking the enemy at like advantage, and charging him as he ran up and down to set his forces in array, did easily drive him out of the field. If the 
c Liu. 22.  Romans as they passed the river before the battle of Trebia, had not been charged by Annibal, they could not so easily have received so great an overthrow. Annibal himself albeit a most expert leader, and of an army most expert in war, yet received loss being charged by Marcellus, in that instant when he drew his men out of the camp, to set them in order. and if by long practise his men could not have taken their standings themselves, they had that day quite been overthrown by their 
d Toto passim campo pecorum modo incompositos se fuderunt. Liu. 27.  disorder. The like had also happened unto Caesar's army charged by the 
e Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  nervians, when it was dispersed, and disordered about the fortification of the camp, but that the skill of the soldiers, that could every man fall in array of himself, remedied the disorder. The Germans a long time using to charge their enemies with more 
f Diriguntur acies pari utrinque; spe, nec ut olim apud Germanos vagis incursibus, aut disiectas per cateruas, quip longa adversus nos militia insueverant signa sequi, subsidijs firmari, dicta imperatorum accipeic. Tacit. annal. 2.  violence than order, & assailing them by squadrons severally, rather than with an ordered army; were overthrown by the Romans oft times: but when by long use they had learned the Roman array, and observed it, they prevailed against them. Those that come rather furiously then orderly to the charge, as did the French at Cressy, and Poitiers, and both French and Spaniards at Aliubarota in the confines of Portogall, where our ancestors of the English nation obtained great victories, are easily overthrown. Sustain the first brunt, and presently they are cooled.  
Those therefore that go to charge the enemy, let them observe this 
a What is to be especially considered and performed before our army begin the charge.  course: first let them set their men in order, that every man may know his place: secondly, let them give certain direction, that every commander may know both what to do, and in case he cannot perform so much, where to retire. Annibal not thinking of this, when he fought with Scipio in Africa, occasionned his own overthrow. for when his first battle being wearied, would have retired to the succour, there was no place left to retreat into: so that the same not being received into the second battle, began to fight with their own fellows, and what by the enemy and by friends was most part slain. The French horse at the battle of Poitiers, not knowing where to retire, fell among their footmen, and holp to set them in disorder.  
Thirdly in giving directions, let the General take heed, that he employ all sorts of weapons, where they may do most service (this I mean particularly to declare in the chapter following.) if he send horse against pikes standing fast, or against shot being fenced with a trench; he ruinateth his horse. if he send shot against horse in open field, or pikes against shot, he useth the matter with no judgement.  
Fourthly, let him never order either his whole army, or part of it without supply. Many casualties may at the first discourage our men; which being opportunely succoured, may take courage again, and begin a fresh charge upon the enemy. 
b Ex secunda acie subsidiarijs cohortibus in pugnam inductis suos accendit, hosten fudit. Liu. 34.  Cato in his wars against the Spaniards, relieving his wearied men with a few fresh companies encouraged them, and overthrew the enemies. When Caesar's men began to give ground in their battle against the Germans, 
c Crassus' tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio misit, ita praelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Crassus by supplying them with a fresh company, not only restored the battle, but made all the enemies to run. Where all the force of the army is employed at the first brunt, and no order is taken for supplies, as in a certain battle betwixt the Romans' and Volscians: the success 
d Primo praelio non subsidijs firmata acie etc. concursum est. ideò Romani à Volscis premuntur. Liu. 2.  seldom is good. Among other matters objected against Fuluius accused as principal causer of the overthrow of the Roman army by Annibal at Herdonea; this was chief, that he did not well order his army, nor strengthen the same with supplies, nor succours.  
Fiftly, look with what part of the army himself is strongest, let him there begin to charge the enemy, where either by good intelligence, or view of the array, or disadvantage of the ground, or quality of the weapons, he shall perceive that the enemy is weakest. Caesar in the 
a Caesar à dextro cornu, quod eam partem minimè firmam hostium esse animaduerterat, praelium commisit. Caes. bell. gal. 1.  encounter he had with the Germans, began to charge them with that part of his army, that was ordered in the right corner, for that he saw, that the enemies were there weakest. The same as Livy testifieth, was observed in a certain battle, which the Romans had with the Carthaginians in Spain. He is not wise, that when he may charge the enemy on the side, will go directly to the front, where his greatest force consisteth.  
Sixtly, after that he hath set his men in order, let him not stand long in arms, before he goeth to the charge, if he mean at all to fight. By long standing, the soldiers wax weary, faint, hungry, and a great part of their courage is thereby abated. 
b Liu. 27.  Asdrubal could not have done his men greater wrong, then to make them stand so long in arms before the battle begun at Metaurus. Thereof proceeded their faintness, and contrariwise the courage, and strength of the Romans: for those being faint, these came fresh to the battle. 
c Liu. 22.  Annibal at the battle of Trebia would not bring forth his men to fight, before he perceived the Romans to be hungry, and almost tired with long standing. Which increased his own force, and abated much of the courage, and force of the enemy.  
Further, by no means let him suffer the enemy to prevent him in giving the first charge. As in the beginning of wars, so in the 
d Verti in co res videbatur utri prius arma inferrent. Liu. 2.  beginning of the battle there is great advantage. And as Pinarius said to his men lying in garrison in Aenna a City of 
e Qui prior strinxerit ferrum, cius victoria erit. Liu. 24.  Sicily, so it falleth out very often, that he that draweth the sword soonest, first obtaineth the victory. They that first begin, seem to have greater courage than those that stand still, as it were to ward their blows. There is many advantages in beginning the battle. They may more easily take the advantage of the wind, and Sun, of the ground, and of the sort of weapons wherewith they fight, than those that stand still, which are forced to turn, which way soever the enemy cometh. They may there begin where the enemy is weakest, and themselves strongest, and therefore the use of the Romans was first to begin the charge, as appeareth both in the wars of Scipio in Spain, and Caesar in France. A certain 
f Lez consederez remanquet, qu'en touts lez combus passez, ils ont mieulx fait chargeans lez premiers, que quand ils, en● attendu la desmarcke catholic. Hist, de troubls, de Fr.  Frenchman, albeit he understood not the reason, yet by observation understood this point. For saith he, in the wars of France, it hath been noted, that the Protestants did always prevail more charging the enemies first, then attending the enemies demarche and charge. It appeareth both in the brawl at Moncontour, anno 1569. and divers other skirmishes which they call battles. Those that charge first, take the advantage of any disorder committed by the enemy, which others let slip.  
Whatsoever can be devised to encourage our own soldiers, or to discourage the enemy, as at all times: so especially in the hazard of battle, is to be practised by cries, reports, shows, words spoken in the hearing of the enemy, and whatsoever else can be imagined. If there lie any wood, or hollow ground near the enemy, the same is to be seized, that in the heat of the fight our men suddenly arising thence, may more amaze, and hurt the enemy. But of this point we shall have better occasion to speak at large in the treatise of stratagems, and ambushes.  
Lest by flying of some cowardly companions, the rest might be discouraged, order is to be taken, that whosoever in the fight beginneth to turn his back, be presently slain. The 
a Cohorti suae dictator dat signum, ut quem suorum fugientem viderint, pro hoste habeant. Liu. 2.  Roman General by this strict commandment and execution, appointing certain troops to execute it, made his army stand resolutely. Of Attilius it is reported, that when his army began to give ground by 
b Liu. 10.  killing the first with his own hands, he made the rest to make head against the enemy: which Annibal likewise practised in his battle with Scipio in Africa, albeit he had not like success. This is the case, wherein Clearchus the Lacedaemonian 
c Plutarch.  said, that soldiers ought more to fear their own General, than the enemy.  
Finally, when by his good direction, and the valiantness of his soldiers, the General shall perceive the enemy to begin to shrink, and give ground, then must he be most careful first, that he give him no time to recover himself, or to supply that which is broken: secondly, that he keep his souldirs from spoil, until such time as he hath assured himself of the victory. When the enemy beginneth to shrink, and to be dismayed, any little force more maketh him to run: in a small time he recovereth himself again. Therefore 
d Orant ut perculsos invadant, nec restitui aciem sinant. Liu. 29.  then is he to be urged with the rest of our strength that remaineth entire, and not to be suffered to escape. Scipio in the battle with Asdrubal in Spain, when the 
e Liu. 28.  Carthaginians disliking the party would have retired wholly together, did so press them on all sides, that before they could recover any place of safety, they were forced to change their pace, and every man to fly for his life.  
In the 
a Caes. de bell. ciu. 3.  battle betwixt Caesar and Pompey, when Pompey's horsemen were driven out of the field, by those half pikes that he had ordained for succour of his own horse, with the same men he cut in pieces Pompey's archers, and light armed men. That done, with the same troops he charged Pompey's battle, that yet stood firm, upon the back. And after he had driven the enemy out of the field, yet rested he not, until such time as he had taken his camp, and dispersed the relics of his army. Yet may some say, it is not good to press the enemy too far, and that a bridge of gold is to be made to those that fly away. Gaston de fois was overthrown and slain pursuing the Spaniards, that retired after the battle of Ravenna. And divers others driving the enemy to despair, that otherwise would have fled, have hurt themselves. But this is to be understood of an enemy that would so fly, as he would also yield the victory and contend no more, in which case Themistocles persuaded the Greeks that meant to dissolve Xerxes his bridge, to suffer the same to continue, that thereby he might run away. Others that mean to fight again, are to be pursued diligently with all our forces. Gaston de fois had not been slain, but that he was badly followed, and too far advanced. Neither could the Spaniards have escaped, if they had been charged with shot, or taken at advantage, and kept from victuals. The Romans had so certain an order in this point, that they doubt not to accuse their 
b Ex subsidiis quòd tardiùs successissent, & signum equitibus tardiùs datum, Cos. accusatus. Liu 35.  General of treachery, for that when the enemy staggered, he gave not the word to the horsemen to charge, nor advanced his footmen in time to supply those that were weary. 
c Victor equestri praelio rex parvo momento si adiwisset, debellare potuit. Liu. 42.  Perseus, for that having foiled the Romans with his horse, and having the victory in his hand, he did not pursue the rest of their troops, and break them, but suffered them to pass a River quietly; is condemned for a man of no judgement in wars.  
The same error was committed by the Carthaginians in Spain, who having slain the two Scipios & foiled their army gave themselves to rest, while the Romans gathering head again, were able afterward to match them, and foil them. Those that cannot thrust the enemy down that is already falling, will be less able to do it, when he standeth upright. And therefore let wise captains pursue their enemy to the utmost, and not suffer him when he once beginneth to look back, to turn head again, and take breath. And in any case let him take heed, that his soldiers run not to spoil, before the victory be assured, and the enemy wholly vanquished.  

a Turbasset utique novissimum agmen. Liu. 22.  Annibal pursuing the Romans after his victory at Trebia, had sure overtaken them, and disordered their rearward, had not the Numidian horsemen turned aside to spoil the camp of the Romans. And in the time of the Emperors of Rome, the Germans had given the 
b Obstitit vincentibus prawm inter ipsos certamen, host omisso spolia consectandi. Tacit. 20.  Romans a mighty overthrow, if leaving them, they had not contended among themselves who should first go to spoil. But how so ever it was in ancient time, the disorder of soldiers in this point is such, that with no laws, nor penalties they can be kept from following the spoil, which oftentimes maketh them a spoil to their enemies.  
The French at Guingast had put the Dutch to flight, and were almost in possession of the victory: but while they ran after the spoil, the enemy rallied himself, and charging them afresh, did extorce the victory out of their hands, and put them to flight. At 
c Guicciar. li. 2.  Taro the Italians had foiled the French, returning out of the kingdom of Naples, but that in the beginning of the victory they fell to spoil the baggage, which was the cause of their own spoil and ruin. The same was the cause of the escape of the 
d Guicciar. lib. 8.  French, and loss of the Venetians at Trevi. Gaston de fois at the taking of Brescia made proclamation, that upon pain of death, no man should fall to spoil before licence given: yet could he not keep his soldiers fingers in temper. The more dangerous effects do ensue of this disorder, the greater care ought the General to have, to prevent it.   

CHAP. XII. Part. 2. Wherein the use of horsemen, pikes, halberds, and other such weapons, also of targets, small shot, archers, and great ordnance is declared.  
THat which before I promised concerning the use of horsemen, and divers weapons, that is now to be performed. A matter of great importance, and advantage, if it be well considered: and therefore not to be omitted. You that know the train of arms, yield here the testimony of your experience to this discourse, and if you hear any cavil against it, yet let not such as never marched further, then out of the kitchen, or from the dresser into the hall, or parlour, censure that which they understand not.  
Horsemen among the Romans were all of one sort: barded horses with men all armed mounted on them they used not. If they used any archers on horseback, they were beholding to other nations for them. Now use of late times hath brought in divers sorts of them, which according to their arms and furniture have divers names. Some horse are barded, others without bards. The Frenchmen of arms in time passed used barded horses for fear of our arrows. Now since archery is not so much reckoned of, and bards are but a weak defence against shot, lancers leaving their bards, are armed much like to the Albanian stradiots. Upon the borders betwixt us, and the Scots, horsemen have staves for the purpose, and for their arms jacks of male. The Dutch Reitres although well armed for the most part, yet seldom use lances, or staves, or other weapon, than pistols, and mazes at their saddle bow. Beside these, there is an other sort of horsemen lately come in use. We call them carbines, pedrinals, or argoletiers, which use firelocke pieces on horseback, and are commonly armed to the proof of their piece.  
Horsemen in wars are most necessary in divers respects. With them we range and spoil the enemy's country: with them we fetch in victuals for ourselves: with them we discover the enemies proceed: with them we bridle his courses, and stop his foragers: with them we both help to foil him in open field, and pursue him flying from us. 
a Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Caesar by the enemy's horse always coasting him, and ready to charge his foragers, was driven to great extremity for want of victuals. In 
b Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Africa likewise being a plain country, he suffered many algaradaes by the enemy's horsemen, often charging him and cutting off his victuals. If Pompey had not rashly adventured to fight with Caesar: by his horsemen, wherein he far passed him, he had famished his army. The Greeks in their return from their voyage with Cyrus, by experience learned what incommodities follow them, that march without horse in the enemies country. And this is the use of horsemen out of fight, to wit, to cut off the enemy from victuals, to keep him short, to discover his proceed, to cut off stragglers; and to fetch in victuals, and provision for our own army. Which he that is strong in horsemen cannot want.  
In fight with the enemy, there are divers uses of horsemen. If we charge him on the sides, or back: we stop his march, as before I have showed. With a few horsemen any number of shot taken in open field may be disordered. The Protestants in the encounter at S. Gem in 
a Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 13.  Poitou, with a few horsemen, defeated divers old companies of shot led by Puigalliard. That was the ruin of the Prince of Parma's aid sent to the Duke of Maine, by the horsemen of the present French king by Dreux an. 1589. No number of short weapons can resist the career of horse in a plain ground. The Sabines, saith 
b Ab equitibus repentè invectis turbati sunt ordines Sabinorum. Liu. 1.  Livy, were put out of their array being suddenly charged by the Roman horsemen. The Volscians and 
c In media primùm acie vinci coepti, qua praemissus equitatus turbaverat ordines. Liu. 3.  Aequians after long fight, began to give ground after that the horesemen had broken their array by charging them in the midbattell. The force of horesemen for their violence is called a 
d Procella equestris. Liu. 30.  tempest. The Roman 
e Dictator immisso equitatu cùm antesignanos hostium turbaffet legionum signa properè inferri jussit. Liu. 4.  General perceiving the weakness of the enemy's battle, by charging them with his horsemen, did disorder all to the ensigns, after which entrance made, he cut the rest in pieces with his armed men. The Corinthians in a certain battle, having put the 
f Thucid. 3.  Athenian footmen to flight, were accoyled, and overthrown by a few horsemen. The reason that the horsemen prevailed so much in time past were two: first they seldom used any long weapons, but targets and javelins for the most part: secondly they did then use to charge with their horsemen, when they saw the footmen out of array, and not otherwise, if they did wisely, 
g Reliquos omnes equites nostri consecuti interfecerunt. Caes. bell. gal. 1.  This is therefore an other use of horsemen in the battle, to charge those that are already disordered. The fourth and last use of them is to execute, and 
h Maxima pars ab equitibus in flumen acti sunt. Liu. 1.  pursue those that are put to flight. But those that lead horsemen are to proceed with great caution: they may not charge pikemen standing resolutely together. The price of their folly that did otherwise, our men did somewhat understand at Muscleborough field. Neither may they charge shot, or archers that have a defence, either of a trench, or a hedge, or a wall, or certain ranks of pikes before them. For in the case they make themselves marks to the enemy, whom they cannot come at. Further, they had better charge the enemy disarrayed by shot, or other weapons, then when the army standeth close together. For against an army well empaled with pikes, yea with halberds close set, and well backed with shot, horse cannot prevail, whatsoever a certain 
a Histoire de troubls. de Fr. l. 2.  French man in his glorious stile vaunteth of the strength of the French men of arms. Against men out of order in open field horsemen work great effects, and so no doubt they have done in these late disorderly brawls of France, and did always among 
b Arist. polit.  barbarous nations, which fought out of order. But against an army well ordered, they can do but little. And any small impediment doth make them unserviceable. The Romans although their pikes were not half so long as ours: yet did they not fear any numbers of horse. Against the Macedonian pikes, the Persian horse could do no service. Neither will the French horsemen look upon our pikes well backed with muskets, if they be wise, notwithstanding their great cracks. Nay our archers at Agincourt field, found them not so rough in handling as they would seem. Horsemen therefore in all expeditions I account very requisite for the causes above rehearsed, and for that without them, albeit we could foil the enemy, yet we cannot kill many, nor prevail against him, that is swifter of foot than we, as 
c Xenoph. exped. Cy. 2.  Clearchus both said, and proved by experience in the wars against Artaxerxes. At the bridge of Burgos in Galicia, where the Spaniards ran so lightly before us, we felt what want we had of horse. Of horsemen I think it requisite also to have some part lances, some light armed like to our borderers, and some carbines. The barded horsemen both for their heaviness, & great charge, I think not very needful. When Lucullus his men were much afraid of Tygranes his barded 
d Plutarch. in Lucullo.  horses, he willed them to be of good cheer, for that there was more labour in spoiling them being so armed, then in foiling them: they were so unwieldy. And so it came to pass. For I never read that ever they did any service: but in divers places, that they were foiled. 
e Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.  Cyrus had divers barded horses in his journey against his brother, but there is not any mention of any service that they did. Darius had multitudes of them in the encounter betwixt him and Alexander 
a Arrian. exped. Alex. 3.  at Arbela, and Antiochus in the battle against 
b Liu.  Scipio: but scarce did they give one blow to hinder the course of the enemy's victory. The armour of the 
c Cataphracti inhabiles ad resurgendum humi dilabentes caduntur. Tac. annal. 17  man and the horse is so heavy, and so boisterous, that if they fall, there they lie, stopping the way to those that come after. Neither can they avoid it, but many shall lie upon the ground, especially if the pikes stand close, and be well flanked, or backed with musketeers shooting over their heads.  
If we have few horsemen, or not so many, that we may therewith match the enemy: we are then to follow the prudent devise of Caesar, both here in Briteine, and in Africa, and Greece, showed him by valiant men before him. Before Capua, the Romans not being able to match the enemy with horse, seconded their men with certain lusty young men armed lightly, and weaponed with short pikes. Which while their men were at the charge, did so gall the enemy with their pikes, that presently they turned visage. Caesar by reason that his ships wherein his horse were, held not their course, coming into this Island had only 30. horse, yet foiling the enemy with his footmen, with those few horses, and the lustiest of his young men he so pursued them, that many remained behind their company. In Africa likewise he sustained the charge of the enemy's horsemen with his footmen, and after that he had made them turn their backs, did so charge them with some few horsemen which he had, that they had no desire to return thither again. Seconding his horsemen with certain half pikes lightly armed, he not only repelled Pompey's horsemen in Albany, and Scipios in Africa; but also vanquished their forces. By the same 
d Caes. bell. gal. 7.  devise before time, he foiled 7000. Gauls well horsed, with a very few of his own aided and seconded by his footmen. 
e Xenoph. exped. Eyr. 3.  Xenophon charging the enemy that would have fled from him with a few carriage horses, showed unto us, that bad horses serve for a shift to follow the chase, and run better than good footmen. In the wars of Naples, 12. Italian horsemen fight in steccato, as they call it, with so many Frenchmen: the Italians 
f Guicciard. 1.  prevailed by this means: In the place where they met, the Italians let fall certain javelins, which those that were first unhorsed, by the French took up, & joining with their companions, & striking the French in the faces, prevailed against them. The Admiral of France, at the encounter of S. Denis by Paris, being overmatched by the enemy in horsemen, placed behind every company, a company of shot, which following the horsemen going an easy trot to the charge, upon the approach of the enemy advanced themselves forward, and discharged so thick and full upon him: that all his company came not to the charge, and those that came, were more gentle in handling, then otherwise they would have been. This may serve those that are inferior to the enemy, in horsemen. For this nation I trust this discourse is needless. For albeit we have hitherto had great want of horsemen in our expeditions in France, Flanders, and Portugal: yet there is no reason, that this land should want hereafter, having such means. There only wanteth liberal minds, and good order, that some part of that is now spent in surfeit, silks, golden laces, and other vanities, may be employed in keeping horses for service.  
Lances, and Carbines have like use in following the victory, and chase. But while the enemy standeth, lances are best employed against shot, and carbines against pikes. But yet must they take heed, how they do invest them. In discovering the enemy, and fetching in of victuals, and bridling the enemy's foragers, both lances, and carbins, and archebuziers on horseback would be joined together. But carbins, and argoletiers are to take heed that they come not near the lances of the enemy, lest they make holes in their horses sides, if no worse. Where the enemy is in disorder there all sorts of horsemen may do service. At Cerisoles after that the shot had made way in the enemy's battle, the French entered with their horse among them, and overthrew them.  
Pikes are the only defence of footmen against horsemen, if they be taken in plain ground. Yet do I not think it good, that there should be such numbers of pikes in our armies, as is used. For that use excepted, which I spoke of, I see no other great profit they have. For execution is seldom done by pikes. Sometime I grant pikes do charge other pikes, but it is not the piquier, that maketh the slaughter. In woods and shrubby or brushie grounds, these kind of long weapons are unprofitable, and unwieldy. The Germans by the disadvantage of their long pikes, ᵈ being taken in such ground were overthrown by Germanicus, and the Roman targeteers. In straits likewise when soldiers come to lay hands, and have prise each on other, long pikes cannot 
a Longae haste 〈◊〉 in syluis & inter virgulta, non tam aptae quam pila & haerentia corpori tegmina & gladij. Tacit. 2.  not be Nec 
a minor Germanis animus, sed genere pugnae, & armorum superabantur, cum ingens multitudo arctis locis praelongas hastas non protenderet, non colligeret. Tacit. annal. 2.  managed; as the experience of the Romans fight against the Germans, and Macedonians armed with long weapons teacheth us. Further the assailants in assaults of towns, and forts have small use of them. For there is no use of horsemen there greatly; against which pikes are good: neither do the defendants greatly use them, save in the breach. Pikemen are too heavy armed to pursue others, and without shot they cannot well guard themselves, either against shot, or targets. At Muscleborough field a few shot opened the Scottish squadrons of pikes, for those that following after invested them. And likewise did the French arquebuziers at Cerisoles deal with the lansquenets, among whose battles making lanes, they gave entrance to the horsemen, that presently charged them. And so little defence there is in that weapon, that not only the Biscaine bucklers entered within them at the battle of 
b In the days of Lewis the 12. of France.  Ravenna, where they made a foul tailliada and slaughter, but also the Count of Carmignola, dismounting himself and his company, entered among the squadrons of the Swissers pikes, and cut them in pieces in an other encounter in Lombardie. The Romans dealing with the 
c Sarissaes Macedonicae.  Macedonian pikes both in the wars with Philip, and Perseus kings of Macedonia, and of Antiochus king of a great part of Asia, never feared to enter upon them with their targets, nor made reckoning of that weapon. And not without cause. For who seethe not, the strength and effect of the pike being in the point, that as soon as targeteers, or other armed men enter among pikes; the piquiers throw down their pikes, and take them to their other weapons? the Portugals did perceive by the experience of that fight with the Moors where Sebastian their king was slain, that fewer pikes would have served, and other weapons done better effects.  
The Swissers that are for the most part piquiers, will not march any whither without their companies of shot attending on them, for their guard. At Moncontour the Almain piquiers abandoned of their shot, were miserably shot to death most of them. For this cause I would have only so many pikes as would serve for the defence of the army against the enemy's horse. The Frenchmen have but ten pikes to every company of shot, which is too little; yea and sometimes they have no pikes at all. But he is abused that maketh the French precedentes, and examples to follow in any practice of war.  
The first ranks of pikes would be armed with corsalets of caliver proof on the breast: from the twelfth rank backward and inward it is sufficient, if they have any arms or jacks of male. Brassats, and other pieces of arms, except the headpiece, gorgeron, and corsalet, I think to be more, than they can either well march with, or fight with. The Frenchmen in time past had some (called 
a Cruppellarii continuo ferri teg. mine inferendis ictibus inhabiles dolabtis & securibus à Romani● caeduntur. Tac. 3.  Cruppellarii by Tacitus) that were armed, as they say, de cap en pied. at which the Roman soldiers laughed. For that they were unable by reason of the weight of their arms, either to strike the enemy, or to defend themselves. Therefore did they hue them down with bills, and poleaxes. The pike I would have, if it might be, of Spanish Ash, and betwixt twenty and two and twenty foot long, and by his side every piquier would have sword and dagger, and a dag at his girdle, especially in the utmost ranks.  
The number of targeteers I would have increased. Not only of such as have targets of proof, which are used of those that stand in the first ranks, but also of those that have light targets. These would be made of wood either hooped, or barred with iron. It would be three foot and a half in length, (for that was the measure of the Roman shield) & two foot & a half in breadth, in form oval. A kind of arms now disused, but most excellent, in all services, save against horsemen in the plain field. Against archers targets are a sure defence, and dangerous to the enemy, after that men come to close.  

b Liu. 27.  Scipio with his targetters cut the Carthaginian archers, and slingars in pieces. 
c Romani tela densatis excipiunt scutis. Liu. 28.  Targets are a good defence against stones in an assault, and whatsoever is thrown from hand. The same are very effectual against shot. A small number of targetters if once they come to reach shot with their sword, put great numbers of them out of the field. Put case that some come short; yet sure not many, considering that only the first ranks of shot can discharge, and that all do not hit, and few mortally, especially if the first targets be of proof, and the men march resolutely to the charge. Neither can shot retire where many of them are in the field, nor save themselves in any place, but targetters will come to them. Targetters also are mortal to the pikemen, as not only the Romans dealing with the Macodonian and german pikes, but also the Biskaines with their bucklers in the battle of Ravenna, and Cirignola declared.  
Targeteers in execution are singular, and ready, and light, if their targets be light, in following the chase. They may be used in all services and all grounds. In assaults of towns, and in sallies: in fight in open field, and in straits, in woods and in hills: in retraites, and in chases there is use of them. Pikes and horsemen of which the French make such reckoning, are but for plain ground, and for some few uses: shot can do nothing in the crowd; for that they want defensive arms, only targeteers armed have this privilege, that in all places, and at all times they may be employed of judicious leaders. The Romans with their great targets, and sword, and javelins which they called Pila subdued the world. Other arms as corsalets, and jackets plated, and morions were common to others, these were proper to the Romans, and those that followed their use of wars. 
a Germani genere pugnae & armorum superabantur. Tac. 2.  The advantage of their arms experience proveth to have been great. The Germans excelled them in strength of body and stature, the 
b Britanni ingentibus gladiis, & brevibus cetris, à scutatis Agricolae caeduntur. Tacit. in vit. Agric.  Britons, Gauls and Spaniards, were superior to them in number, and equal in courage: but in their furniture, and arms, and manner of fight they were inferior. All Roman soldiers both on horse, and foot for the most part used a kind of targets. But the light armed wanted maled jackets, and had lighter targets; as not only appeareth by their images in marble yet to be seen at Rome: but also in their 
c Hic miles tripedalem parmam habet, & in dextra hastas, quibus eminus utitur, Hispaniensi gladio est cinctus, quod si pede collato pugnandum est, translatis in laevam hastis gladium stringit, Liu. 38. & 31.  histories. So would I have our targetters, some armed with light corsalets, and morions, & heavy targets, other only with light targets & plated doublets sufficient to bear the thrust of a sword. And if thereto some had short half pikes also, the same would be effectual to throw at footmen, and good to stand against horsemen.  
Halberds and black bills, pertisans, boarspears, and poleaxes, and all such like weapons to be used in hand, have one and the same use with sword and targets. But neither are the men that use them so well defended against shot and pikes, nor is that sort of weapon so effectual. If the enemy give ground they are proper for execution; and may be employed in open field, in straits, in woods, in assaults, sallies, and many services. Their arms are either corsalets, and gorgerons, or plated doublets, or jacks with skirts for defence of the thighs, and morrions on their heads. The Romans used few of these weapons. The Dutch place divers ranks of them among their pikes, and commonly they are planted by the ensigns.  
The shot is divided into mosquetters, calivers, and archers. The use of shot is divers. In open field therewith we defend our pikes, and with the same offend the enemy's pikes. Where the same hath a defence against the force of horsemen, it is very profitably employed against them. In the defence of a town, fort, or passage, it is excellent. Likewise for the assailants therewith to clear the walls while their armed men mount by breach, or by scale. But the same must take heed of the force of the horse, and charge of armed men, which without defence of pikes, or other natural wall, or bank, the same cannot sustain. The force of shot is greater in skirmish, then in set battles. For shot if they be driven to stand thick have no use. As the unprofitable number of shot at the battle of Moncontour, and Dreux: and other encounters in the late wars of France, declare sufficiently. As oft as the enemies shot make countenance to charge our armed men, so oft must our shot encounter them: and driving away the enemies shot, are mortal, if they strike right & thick, among the enemy's pikes. For pikes against shot & arrows, being heavy armed have no defence. As the disaster of the 
a Thucid. 4.  Lacedæmonians at Pylos, of the Romans at 
b Liu. 24.  Trebia, of the 
c Thucid. 3.  Athenians compassed by the light armed Aetolians, of Titurius Sabinus and his 
d Caes. bell. gal. 5.  company at Vatuca of the Almains at 
e Histoir. de troubls. de Fr.  Moncontour, where heavy armed men destitute of shot and light armed were compassed about and slain by shot, archers, and slingars, doth declare. In rainy weather they cannot do almost any service. Yet some say, that at Rocheabeille firelocks did I know not what service in the rain. But neither in rain nor out of rain are shot assured against horse, or targets, or armed men, but where they have a defence and retreat. So that I marvel what the French mean to bring into the field so many shot, and so few armed men. At the encounter of Rocheabeille the Protestants had 14000. shot, and 
f De long bois peu ou point. Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 7.  scarce any pikes. But percase they could not otherwise do.  
Archers in assaults, and defence of towns cannot do like service to musketeers, and calivers. For neither can they hit so right, nor so mortally. In pight fields I think them nothing inferior to them. For being armed with jacks, as they should be, when they come to gripes, they drive the shot to his feet: and shooting many ranks one over an others head twelve arrows shall fall before one boullet. For only the first ranks of shot discharge unless they mean to pierce their fellows. Now than that the shot are disarmed, and archers armed: who seethe not that two thousand archers in open field may prevail against three thousand shot? especially seeing as archers may keep rank, and not shot, and archers may fight standing thick, but shot cannot file their ranks, if they stand thick. Archers therefore in open field may be employed against shot, and likewise against horsemen, and pikes. But if against horsemen; they must have a defence of stakes, or trenches, or pikes. And likewise dealing against armed men, they had need to have a front of armed men.  
The archers at Agincourt field, and at many other battles have made the name of this nation famous for the service they did against the enemy. But then they had a defence of stakes and trenches. 
a Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 2.  Cyrus' in his array placed behind every dozen ranks of armed men certain archers: by which devise when his enemies came to join battle with him he prevailed against them, not being able to abide the arrows that coming over the foremost ranks light in their faces, and other bare places. And therefore whatsoever some say of the use of bows and arrows, which they have not seen tried, I would that among others, our generals that go in service into other countries would also employ some archers.  
Great artillery against troops standing thick and in even ground worketh great effects. But in other places, and against men ranged otherwise, the sound is greater than the hurt. At Moncontour the King's ordnance beating among the horsemen ranged hedge-wise, did not in twenty shot hit once. Neither did it any hurt to the footmen by reason of the unevenness of the ground. For either it fell low, or high. If the same be placed in the front of our army, yet can not the same be employed past one or two volies. For at the joining of the battle, it ceaseth. And if our men march forward it breaketh their arrays. If the same be placed upon some hill, yet lying out of level and shooting downward, it doth no great hurt.  
But let it do the utmost that it may, being employed by judicious gunner's: yet never was victory obtained by great ordnance in open field, nor the force of the enemy coming resolutely to the charge thereby stopped. 
a Guicciard. lib. 10.  Gaston de Fois sallying out of the Castle, took the town of Brescia notwithstanding the number of great pieces that in every street were bracked against him. And little did the Spaniards that sacked Antwerp Anno 1576. sallying out of the citadel esteem the pieces, that barked against them at their first sally. The Frenchmen although they had two and twenty pieces of ordnance in their camp at Novara, wherewith they thought themselves safely guarded, all the ways and accesses being by them flanked and beaten: yet 
b Guicciar. lib. 11.  were they broken and put out of their lodging by the Suitzers which came against them without either ordnance, of shot. If then in streets, and ways where artillery hath greatest force, the same notwithstanding cannot repel the force of a resolute enemy, much less use hath it in open field. The Admiral after the unhappy encounter at Moncontour with the relics of his army, 
c Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  traversed the greatest part of France, without any one piece of great ordnance. Neither did his company being divers times encountered by the way, therefore less service. Very troublesome it is in carriage, and no less chargeable. Guicciardin reporteth that the breach of the wheel of a canon did so long encumber the whole army, that it lost a good opportunity, by that delay. The use of great ordnance therefore is first in gardeing of towns, or passages: some little use it hath in flanking the sides of our camp, or defending the streets, if we lodge in villages: secondly in battering of walls, or opening of passages. For without ordnance sufficient every petit castle or town will scorn us, or brave us. In our battery at Coronna we felt the want of it, but more at Lisbon. The last use is in the field either in the front of the battle, or upon some hill upon the sides. Where if we can see the enemy's troops, & hit amongst them, we shall make them change the ground. The great artillery of the French beating among the Italian horse in their camp at Ravenna, made them come to fight with disadvantage. The which pain the French themselves suffered in their camp at Landresie being beaten by the imperials from a hill, where they had placed their great ordnance, as before I have showed.  
Thus you may see, how as all weapons may be profitably employed with good judgement: so without judgement they serve for nothing, but to make a show. Now forasmuch as Stratagems do work as much as weapons, and make weapons more effectual, and because the enemy maketh least resistance, when he is most suddenly surprised: let us speak of Stratagems, and ambushes, which tend also to the obtaining of victory.    

CHAP. XIII. Of Stratagems and Ambushes.  
STratagems I call those devices, whereby the General doth either hurt, or discourage the enemy, or help and encourage his own men: so called because they proceed from the generals head and policy, whom the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ambushes the Italians call emboscate, from whence both French and we borrow the word. The reason whereof is, for that in woods for the most part such traps are laid. The Romans do better term them insidias, and the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for that we do not only lay snares for our enemies in woods, but also in hollow grounds, and also beyond hills, and in valleys and villages, and towns, and behind walls, and wheresoever we can cover our men, in such sort that we be not espied until we come upon the enemy upon a sudden. Stratagems are infinite, and can not be comprised within any certain rules. For what can be so exactly said, but that the wit of man is able to devise more, and say more? some I will set down practised by famous captains in former time, that by them our generals of themselves may learn how to invent others, and not always kill the enemy with downright blows.  
One special and yet common Stratagem it is, to cover our counsels and enterprises by contrary pretences. For by this means the enemy looking, or warding one way, is often taken and stricken mortally in an other place, and by other means. Annibal taking his bed, and giving out, that he was very 
a Liu. 25.  sick, which rumour flying to the Romans made them secure, in the night time led out ten thousand men, and coming on a sudden surprised Tarentum. To the intent that his enterprise might not be discovered, before it took effect, he used divers other policies. First he sent out divers light horsemen to range the country, & to kill such as they met, lest any should escape, and give notice of his coming, and that the enemy seeing them might suppose, that they were only certain outriders. having an intention to surprise Puteoli, he gave out, that he went forth with his army to sacrifice at the lake of 
a Ad lacum A●uerni per specie●● sacrificandi, re●●sa ut tentaret Puteolos, quique ibi in praesid o erant descendit. Liu. 24  Aruerne. But in the night he turned toward Puteoli. 
b Consul in Lucanos ostendir iter cum peteret Gall. am. Liu. 27.  Claudius' Nero caused a fame to flee abroad, that he went to the country of the Lucanians, when in deed he went into the part of Gallia Togata, that is now called lafoy Marca.  
Under colour of treaty of peace, many practices of hostility are wrought. Scipio sending men to entreat with Syphax of peace, caused some to espy his camp. 
c Liu. 29.  Which gave entrance to that enterprise, which afterward he executed in the night upon the same. Metellus 
d Sallust. bell. jugurth.  treating of peace with jugurtha, did by fair promises corrupt most of his followers. Both which practices the Spaniards of late time have used against us. When they intend any dangerous enterprise, than it is bruited, that either the king of Spain or their chief Leader is dead, or sick. Under pretence of wars against the Turk, An. 1588. he gathered great forces against us, and now I understand that news is come of great preparatives in Spain against the Turk: that our eyes may be bleared, and not see his preparation against France, or us. By the same devise he surprised the realm of Portugal after the death of the Cardinal king. Under colour of parley of peace at Dunkirk he brought his Navy upon our coast before we looked for it; and I may say before some were well provided for it. These pretences though false, yet make show, and are believed of some, and take simple people, before they be prepared. For when Scipio had put men aboard, and provided many things, as for a siege: 
e  ab eo quod parabat, in alterius rei curam converteret animo●. Liu. 29.  Syphax believed, that as the brute went, he meant in deed to besiege Utica, but being in the night invaded, and seeing his camp all fired; he learned with the loss of his army one point of war, never to trust the enemy, when he giveth out such reports.  
Some under colour, and during the treaty of composition have wound themselves out of danger. Asdrubal being taken by the Romans at an advantage promised, that if he might be assured to departed out of that place, he would carry his army out of Spain: but while the Romans were secure, thinking that he would not stir during the treaty of composition, the man by little and little had gotten out of the snare into a safe ground. The king of Macedonia sending messengers to treat with the Romans for the burial of his soldiers, that lay slain by their camp, in the mean time of the parley removed his camp out of a straight, and so escaped. The Massilians besieged by Caesar's soldiers began to treat of composition. But when by divers days vain talk they perceived their negligence, and security, they sallied upon the sudden, and burned their engines, & works, which cost them much labour.  
Under colour of treaty of peace 
a Liu.  Marcellus espied the walls of Syracuse: and another time entered the town of Salapia, seizing a gate. Nothing is more commodious for dressing of enterprises against a town besieged. The L. 
b In the days of Q. Marie.  Grey by the treachery of the French entering the trenches, and ditches of Guines during the parley escaped narrowly a great danger.  
Rumours of succours coming encourage our soldiers, discourage the enemy. The 
c Liu. l. 9 & 10.  Roman Consul giving out a report at the time of the beginning of the battle, that another army was coming to charge the enemy upon the back, made the enemy hearing it to doubt, and his own soldiers to fight more courageously.  
Vain shows do often deceive the enemy. Caesar mounting certain slaves, and horse boys upon carriage horses, and mules at Gergovia, and causing them to show themselves a far off, made the 
d Caes. bell. gal. 7.  enemy fear lest a company of horsemen were coming upon them to charge them upon the back. Which being practised long before against the Samnites, 
e Sp. Nautius mulos detractis clitellis, alarijs impositis circumduxit, quod Samnitibus terrorem attulit. Liu.  made them fear, & look about. Annibal not being able to force the guard that kept the passage of Calicula, binding faggots on the heads of oxen & setting them on fire, driving them toward the place, what through wonderment, what through fear, made them to give way. Martigues seeing the inconvenience of his lodging near 
f Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 5.  Pampron An. 1568. at the shutting of the evening caused all his company to displace, & went away safely, abusing the enemy with fires made, and pieces of matches tied among bushes. which made the enemy suppose he had been there still. The which practice he seemeth to have learned of Annibal, who fearing lest he should be charged as he removed his camp, left divers tents standing toward the enemy, & some soldiers & arms, as if the rest had been still there, which long before had gained ground, & were gone.  
Words making for us coming to the enemy's ears do often strike a terror in them. Quintius the 
a Quintius dicens Volscotum alterum cornu fugere pepulit Volscos. Liu. 1.  Roman General crying out aloud, that the other corner of the battle of the Volscians fled, made that where he stood to fly in deed. Valerius Levinus speaking aloud, & saying that he had slain Pyrrhus with his own hands, holp to discourage the enemy. Annibal causing one of his own men in the Roman General's name to command the Romans to flee to the hills next adjoining, had done them some hurt, but that the guile was perceived. I have heard some say, that a certain voice raised in the ears of the Scots at Muscleborough field, how their company fled, made them both fear, and fly. False sounds also & signs do often abuse those that are credulous. Annibal having slain the Roman Consul, with his ring scaled divers forged letters, whereby he had deceived some, if the other Consul had not given the cities round about warning of it. Having taken Tarentum, he caused one to sound an alarm after the Roman note, which caused divers Romans to fall into his hands, and the Tarentines to imagine that the Romans meant to betray them. more harm it had done, but that the trumpet sounded unskilfully.  
Suborned messengers are dangerous, if credit be given unto them. A certain Lucanian while Annibal warred with the Romans in Italy, led Sempronius a famous leader among them into an ambush, promising him to bring him to the speech of his countrymen, of whom he feigned himself to be sent unto him. 
b Liu.  Annibal causing them of Metapontus to write letters to Fabius, as if they were purposed to deliver up their city into his hands, had almost drawn him into an ambush, where with his army he lay ready to welcome him to the town.  
Men disguised like women, or like country people, or 
c Danaûm insignia nobis aptemus. Chorabus apud Virgil.  armed like the enemies entering within their strength do now and then abuse them, and give their fellows means of entrance. In 
d Hist. de troubls, de Fr. l. 12.  these late troubles of France divers negligent Governors have by these practices been surprised.  
Enemies pretending friendship play many odious parts, & therefore not lightly to be credited. Before the battle of Cannae certain Numidians suborned by Annibal, pretending discontentment, and seeming to revolt from him, in the midst of the hurly burly charged the Romans upon the back, and greatly prejudiced them.  
Ambiorix under colour of friendly counsel trained Titurius Sabinus out of his strength, and taking him at advantage flew him, and most of his company. Such was 
a Metuo Danaos & dona ferentes. Virg.  Sinon's counsel, who as Poets feign betrayed Troy. To avoid these traps, these rules are to be observed: first no 
b Inimicorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  counsel is to be trusted that proceedeth from the enemy: for who can believe that he will counsel us well, that seeketh only to do us hurt? secondly if any revolt from the enemy, yet is he not to be trusted, nor suffered to remain among us armed, especially if he may hurt us.  
Sometime the enemy by a feigned retreat is drawn into blind trenches set with sharp stakes, and covered with earth, boughs, & hurdles, or under walls, or banks where our shot lieth ready for him, or else into any place of disadvantage, which was the ruin of Cyrus his army by Tomyris Queen of Scythia, and divers others, that like blind men follow where their enemies lead them.  
In sum, whatsoever tendeth to deceive, and abuse the enemy, or to encourage, & give advantage to our own soldiers; the same aught wise leaders to devise, & practice. Provided always, that they neither break oath, nor promise nor offend against piety, or the laws of nations. Let such vile facts be practised of Turks, & Spaniards, that hire wicked men to kill Princes, and maintain no oath or promise further than their profit requireth. Such, Histories do feign 
c Persidia plusquam Punica.  Annibal to have been; and divers of the Carthaginians; and 
d Plutarch. Lysander.  Lysander among the Greeks, that took pleasure in deceiving of men with great oaths, as some take joy to deceive children with small toys. The proceed of the Romans were far otherwise. They disallowed his fact, that would have betrayed Falisci, and sent him bound to Pyrrhus, that for money promised to empoison him. Neither did 
e Val. max. lib. 8. c. 9  Cepio the Roman win any credit, by hiring the Lusitanians to kill their Captain Viriat. This practice of killing, the Spaniards learn of certain bastardly Italians, a degenerate offspring and race issuing of the vagrant nations of Lombard's, Goths, & Vandals, and of 
f Liu. 41.  Perseus, that had murderers hired for wages to kill whom he should appoint, & would have practised his treachery upon the Romans: a man of a base disposition, and unworthy so noble a kingdom.  
Those stragegemes commonly take effect, that are practised in matters least feared. That which no man careth for, is neglected, and least can that be 
g Ad id quod ne timeatur fortuna facit, minimè turi sunt homines, quia quod neglexeris incautum, atque apertum habeas. Liu. 25.  avoided, which is least feared, as saith. Cyrus' by diverting the river, entered Babylon a way that no man looked for him: & Scipio passing the lake, took new Carthage.  
Great are the effects that are wrought by devices and surprises, but they are discreetly to be governed, least going about to deceive the enemy, we be ourselves abused, & entrapped by double practice, as the 
a Tratato dop. pio.  Italians call it. So was 
b Anno 1569.  Guerchy, and his company overtaken in the practice about the town of Bourges, where divers brave men lost their lives, while the enemy that knew the practice, was ready to receive them to their loss. King Edward the 3. understanding of a plot laid by the captain of S. 
c Froissart.  Omar, for the recovery of Calais newly by him won, turned the same upon the heads of those, that should have executed it, & surprised those that would have surprised others.  
Those therefore that in stratagems & politic surprises follow the example of others, let them see that their case be like, & their strength equal, & that the matter be handled cunningly, & executed presently. And that the times be well measured, that they come neither too soon, nor too late; in which case their enterprise vanisheth to nothing.  

d Of ambushes.  Ambushes likewise well placed, and managed work the enemy great displeasures, not only in cutting off stragglers, and such as go on foraging, but also in troubling an army marching or fight. Annibal in passing the Alpes lost divers of his soldiers by the incursions of the people of the Mountains rising out of their holes, & charging his army upon advantages. Sempronius as hath been showed drawn into an ambush was slain with his company. The like happened to Marcellus the Consul going to view the side of a hill not far off. But of this point I have already brought examples sufficient, where I discoursed of the danger of those that march in the enemy's country, without diligent discovery.  
Ambushes well laid, that our soldiers may rise out of them, & suddenly charge the enemy on the back, or sides as he is fight, are ye more dangerous, than those wherein he is charged marching, By the same Romulus overthrew the Fidenians: for placing part of his men in ambush in certain thickets, and under certain hills near the town, & provoking the enemy to come forth of the town; he drew him along after him until such time, as he was against the ambush: 
c Trahuntur ad locum insidiarun: inde subito exorti Romani transuersam invadunt bostium aciem. Liu. 7.  Where turning back upon him, and causing those that lay in ambush to charge him on the sides, he cut many of the Fidenians in pieces. Annibal before he encountered the Romans at Trebia, hid certain Mago 
a Numidaeque simul latebras eorum improvida provida praeterlata acies est, exorti à tergo, ingentem tumultum, ac terrorem fecere, Liu. 21.  horsemen in the marshes, and bushes near to the places where the armies were to join. Whence rising upon a sudden, as the army of the Romans passed by them, they made a great tumult, and slaughter, and were in part cause of the victory. With the like practice he entrapped the Roman army at the lake Thrasimene. Behind the hills upon the side of the place, where he saw the encounter would be, he placed divers light armed: and beyond the plain he caused his horsemen to lurk in the valleys. So that Flaminius was no sooner come to the charge, but he saw his enemy in front, on his sides, and on his back. 
b Liu. 35.  Philopoemen charging the enemy with his light armed, and afterward causing his men to fly back, while the enemyranne disorderly after the chase, he received his own men within the distances of his armed men, and with them cut in pieces those that followed. Demosthenes (not the Orator, but a Captain that lived during the Peloponnesian war) fearing lest the enemy, that in number far passed him would compass him round about, and charge him on the back; in a certain valley, and bushy ground near the place where the enemy made show to give the charge, ranged both armed men, and 
e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 3.  archers, which in the joining of the battle rising out of their places should charge the enemy upon the back. 
d Caes. bell. gal. 1.  Caesar by taking the top of the hill where the Helvetians lay encamped with part of his force, had given them a greater overthrow, than he did; but that the mistaking of his men, made him lose that advantage.  
It is the part of a wise leader when he pursueth, or coasteth the enemy to take the advantage of woods, valleys, hills, straits, rivers, and in all places to lay traps for him, that he may neither march, nor fight, nor lodge without danger.  
But yet in dressing of Ambushes he is to take great heed, first that the enemy have no notice of his purpose, & so provide against him. For by this means traps themselves are oft entrapped. 
c Caes. bell. gal. 8.  Corbey of Beavois lying in wait, where he supposed Caesar's soldiers would come to seek provision, was himself and his company cut in pieces by a greater number than he looked for, which Caesar sent thither having intelligence of the matter before hand.  
Secondly those that lie in ambush must rise suddenly, and execute speedily and courageously, lest the enemy putting himself in order, and gathering courage give them more than they came for. Labienus had placed certain fellows in ambush, that should have charged 
a Hi●t, de bell. Afric.  Caesar's army, as the same passed by: but they came forth so faintly, & irresolutely, that Caesar's horsemen before they could do any thing, had hewn them in pieces.  
Thirdly let them beware least while they think to do the feat, the rest of the enemies come on their backs, before they can dispatch. The 
b Liu. 41.  Dardanians had well hoped to have executed a part of the Macedonian army which they charged upon the back, as it passed through the country; but before they were aware, they were themselves charged by them that followed after, and were taken as they say between the hammer and anvil, and well beaten.  
Fourthly when a part of the army is sent to lie in ambush, the rest of the army ought to have correspondence with it: that as those that rise up in ambush do charge the enemy one way, so the rest of the army may charge him another way, and always be ready to secure their men. Which if they of 
c Caes. bell. gal. 8.  Beavois had considered; they had not suffered their best men to have been cut in pieces without relief.  
The reason that Ambushes do prevail so much are divers: first the terror that the same strike the enemy's mind withal, coming upon them upon the sudden: secondly the disorder, and confusion that is in the enemy's army surprised suddenly: and thirdly the vantage of ground, which they choose, and the weakness of the enemy where they charge him.  
Therefore let all valiant soldiers to whom such executions are committed beware, how they protract time, or lose their advantage, or by untimely noise, or stir give notice of their purpose to the enemy, or by stirring before the time cause the enemy to retire before he come within danger. By reason whereof I have seen some myself, but have heard of many more enterprises that have come to nothing.   

CHAP. XIIII. Wherein is showed, how the enemy being vanquished, the victory is to be used, and the conquest maintained.  
HI thereto we have declared, by what means the enemy may be vanquished in open field: a mark whereat all valiant captains aim, and whereunto they address all their actions, and ●ounsels. Yet all consisteth not so in victory, but that they deserve far more commendation, that can use it to purpose, and maintain that which they win. 
a Vincere scis Annibal victoria v●i nescis. sa●de Maherbal unto him. Liu. 22.  Annibal had the hap to overcome the Romans in divers battles, but he had not the wisdom, or hap to use the victory. And divers great victories hath God given to our nation against the Frenchmen, and many parts of France have our ancestors possessed, but we could not use our time, nor God's graces: nor at this day have we so much ground in France, as to build a fisher's cabin in. Therefore seeing it is a miserable thing to say we have had, when we have not, and 
b Non minor est virtus, quàm quaetere, parta tueri.  wise men no less consider how they may keep, them win: let us see, if God would so much favour us as to suffer us to win any thing hereafter, how the victory may be used, and our purchase assured. Lest as the Spaniard foiled by sea, An. 1588. escaped without pursuit, or memorable loss, save of some ships: so he or any other might escape again, so good cheap, and continually return to invade us with hope of victory; at the least without fear of pursuit, or great loss.  
Either the enemy's army is altogether vanquished and dispersed; or else some good part there of is retired entire, and whole. In both these cases what course the General is to take let us now consider, beginning with the latter. If the enemy be not so vanquished, but that some part of his army remaineth sound, or at least unbroken, then is the General to follow him, and urge him while the terror of the late affright is not yet out of his mind.  
Caesar having obtained a great victory against the Helvetians, 
c Caes. debel. gal. 1.  ceased not to pursue the remainder so long, until all yielded. And afterward having foiled Vercingetorix in the field, and caused him to retire with the rest of his army; he did not 
d Caes. debel. gal. 7.  leave him until he had forced him to take Alexia for his defence; nor then neither, until such time, as he had the town and all within it yielded to his mercy. 
e Caes. debel. ciu. ●.  Vanquishing Pompey in open field he would not suffer him to take Sanctuary in his camp, but drove him thence, and rested not, until he had taken his flight, nor before the relics of his army that fled to the hills thereby, had yielded, being cut from water. Gaston de Fois having foiled the Spaniards at Ravenna did like a man of judgement follow the relics of the enemy's army, the reason he had no success was, for that he charged the pikes with his horsemen, which should have been done with shot, and with small forces advanced himself too far forward, being so evil followed; which cost him his life. If he had charged them with shot, and taken the way before them with his horse, or stayed until he had taken them at advantage in some strait, where they could not have kept their ranks, or cut between them, and their victuals: without many blows they had been forced to yield. Scipio after he had vanquished Asdrubal in Spain, and driven him to retreat, he so followed him with his horsemen, that the man could find no rest, until he came unto the utmost coast of Spain. Those that after they have victory, give themselves, either to pleasures, or to rest; for a small rest purchase to themselves great labour, and sometime loss. If 
a Caes, de bell. cin. 3.  Pompey, after he had given Caesar two repulses at Dyrrhachium, had urged the relics of his army, not yet being recovered from their late affright, his success had been far better. The Carthaginians not pursuing their victory in 
b Liu. 24.  Spain, after the death of the two Scipios, but suffering the relics of their armies not only to breath, but also to gather head, were themselves overcome not long after by those, whom before they had vanquished. When such men erred, it is not marvel, if divers errors were committed in these late French brawls. After the battle of S. Denys, both Protestants, and the king's side departed quietly each from other: and at Moncontour, albeit the king's brother gave the Protestants a great overthrow, yet he suffered the Admiral to departed with a great part of his army, and to gather new forces to return again the next spring to fight again.  
But may some say, it is not good to drive the enemy to utter despair, for that constraineth men to adventure, and to try all means to escape. 
c Desperatio ultima audere & experiri cogebàt Aequos'. Liu. 3.  Desperation (saith Livy) caused the Aequians to adventure, and try their last refuge. The Hetruscians being entered the camp of the Romans, and being compassed about without way to wind out, fought so desperately, that they slew one of the Consuls, and many brave men, and had done much more 
d Maiorem cladem nisi data via fuisset dedissent. Liu. 2.  harm, had not some wiser than the rest, given them way to departed out of the camp quietly. Afterward of themselves they fell into disorder, and were easily vanquished by the horsemen, that pursued them. For this cause, Themistocles said, that a bridge of gold was to be made, for an enemy that flieth, that he might departed quietly. All which I yield to be true, in such an enemy as flieth without purpose to return, and which cannot be broken without great danger. But if he purpose to return, no danger is to be refused, nor labour to be shunned, that he may be broken: which in deed is no difficulty. For he that cannot resist whole, can evil resist broken. And therefore this is a controversy, without firm reason of the contrary cause. Yet in pursuing the enemy, I would not have him so stopped, but that he may fly, nor would I have desperate men fought withal: but I would have them with hunger, and disease, forced to accept of their lives, and so yielding their arms to departed. Which if the French had practised in the conquest of Naples, they had not so ignominiously been driven out thence, by 3 or 4 thousand Bisognos, that they suffered to nestle in 2 or 3 out towns of the Country.  
But if the enemy's forces be utterly dispersed, and dare not look upon us in the field, than the next labour is to besiege their chief cities, and that presently while the smart of their wounds is yet fresh. Aswell in 
a Tam secundis quàm adversis rebus non datur spatium ad cessandum, si se Laelius cum equitatu victóque Syphace Cirtham praecedere sinat, trepida omnia se metu oppressurum. Liu. 30.  good success, as in bad, a prudent captain may not give himself to rest. Masinissa by showing himself, and his victorious company, before Cirtha, so terrified the same, especially upon view of their king, that was taken prisoner, that the same yielded unto him presently. Great is the terror of a victorious army, and sufficient to make any town to yield. The Romans by the terror of their victorious troops led by Quintius Cincinnatus, obtained nine towns of the enemies in short space. The 
b Antium paucos dies circumfessum deditur nulla oppugnantium nova vi, sed quòd iam inde ab infoelici pugna, castrisque amissis ceciderant animi. Liu. 2.  courage of the Volscians was so cooled, after their overthrow by the Romans, that they yielded their city for fear, without any force. Therefore Scipio, after the overthrow of Hannibal's army, brought his forces presently before Carthage, which he drove to accept of composition. If Annibal upon his victory at Cannae, had brought his victorious army before Rome, he had proceeded with more judgement. The Rhodians 
c Stratoniceam recepissent Rhodij post victoriam, nisi tempus in castellis recipiendis trivissent. Liu. 33.  having vanquished the enemy in open field, spent time in taking of certain paltry hamlets, and castles: whereas if they had urged the enemy, as they might have done, they had taken Stratonicea the head city of the country. There is no town that dare hold out, without hope of succour.  
But may some say, it is a hard labour, to take towns well fortified, and manned, and stored with victuals. I grant, if armies that besiege them be such as ours, and so furnished, and the towns have hope of relief. otherwise, as 
d Scipio vidit dissipatum bellum: & circumferre ad singulas urbes arma, diutini magis quàm magni esse operis. Liu. 28.  Scipio said, it is a matter of more time, then labour. For where the Country is spoiled, no towns can long hold out. But that may be done easily, where an army goeth up and down victorious without stop, or encounter. The reason that the towns of Holland and Zealand, have so long holden out against the Spaniard is, that they have both the sea open, and many good friends and favours in England.  
A victorious army not only taketh whatsoever town it besiegeth, but also seizeth the whole country. Annibal after the victory at Cannae, possessed a good part of Italy. After the overthrow of their forces by Scipio in Africa, the Carthaginians could not say, that they had any one town remaining in obedience. After Caesar's victory at Alexia, almost all France yielded itself unto him: so well did he follow the victory against Pompey in Epeirus, against Scipio in Africa, against Afranius and Pompey's sons in Spain, that with one victory he assured himself of the whole Country, and with one enemy fought no more, but once. The French by one victory recovered all the kingdom of Naples, and by one overthrow at Gariglian, lost it again. Francis the first, by his victory at Marignan, came in possession of most of the Duchy of Milan, being overthrown and taken at Pavy, he lost the same again. The Earl of Warwick, after one victory in the days of Henry the sixth, assured all England to his Prince. Edward the fourth, by one victory recovered the same again: and if that our ancestors had well followed the victories at Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, the French had not so easily dispossessed them of their hold in France. But what cannot delays, want of supply, and division work in such cases? First therefore, the army that is victorious, ought not to suffer the enemy to gather head, but to scatter his forces. Secondly, the same aught to besiege the chief City, and to seize the Country into their hands, not suffering the enemy in any place to rest. The French king after his victory at Moncontour, besieging S. jean d'Angeli, lost there the vigour of his army, which might better have been employed about Rochel. Thirdly, the General's care ought to be, how to take away the enemies subjects from them, and to deprive them of the aid of their confederates. A matter not difficult, if he proceed wisely in war, and justly after the victory. for as good success procureth to the Conqueror friends, so every one abandoneth, and contemneth the vanquished. The Capuans, and a great part of Italy, revolted from the Romans after the infortunate encounter at Cannae. Philip king of Macedonia, being overcome by Titus Quintius, not only saw the departure of his confederates, and friends; but also the rebellion of his own subjects. After that the Carthaginians side began to decline in their wars with the Romans; all their friends forsook them. The same disloyal dealing of subjects and friends, Charles last Duke of Burgundy felt after his disastrous journey against the Swissers at Granson. Hereupon Philip of Comines taketh occasion to tell a long tale, how dangerous it is for a Prince to be overcome in a pight field: at which if he had known ancient histories, he would not have made such wonderment. For there never was, nor can be other success looked for in such cases. Wherefore after the victory, the General is to practise with the friends, and confederates of the vanquished, and with good conditions to unite them unto himself. Herein the opinion of the justice, and good dealing of the General shall greatly further his desire; as is evident by the example of Scipio, and Annibal. For Scipio sending unto every City in Spain, those pledges which the enemy had from them, and which he had taken from the enemy; he got himself much friendship: and Annibal after his victory, dismissing such of the associates of the Romans, as he had taken without ransom, and using them courteously, procured himself amongst them great credit of good dealing; so that many did adhere unto him, and forsake the Romans.  
Thus we see how the victory is to be pursued. Now therefore let us see how our conquest may be maintained, and assured. For want of which consideration, we see whereto the victories of this nation in France, and otherwhere are come, and how hardly and chargeably that which we have remaining in Ireland, is kept in devotion, and what is there to be feared, if ever any enemy with resolution and strength, do there assail us. To keep our conquest, there are two principal means both necessary; Force, and justice: for neither without force can those that are rebellious, and desirous of innovation be repressed, nor without justice can the peaceable be defended, or contented. That Empire (saith 
a Id firmissimum longèimperium est quo obedientes gaudent. Liu. 9  Camillus) is most firm and durable, which the subjects do willingly embrace, and gladly continue. And hard it is to keep men discontent long in subjection by force. A country Imp●rium 
a s●cilè●js artibus r●tinetur, quibus initio partum est. Sal●st. coniur. Catiline.  subdued, is kept by the same means that it was subdued; that is (saith Sallust) by fortitude, industry, justice. The use of force is divers: First, to repel the enemy if he come again, and to keep him down that he look not up. Caesar used this course in the subduing of France, being always ready to repress the disobedient, and the same was used both in the subduing of Spain and Africa, and other countries by the ancient Romans. The French not having force ready in Naples and Milan, to encounter the Spaniards that came to molest them in their possession, soon lost prize. Secondly, force is necessary to subdue rebels and mutinous persons, that may procure the trouble of the state. The Romans until the country was quiet which they had vanquished, and until every husbandman and other fell to labour, kept an army there continually: when the same was pacified, they brought away their main force, and placed some of their soldiers inhabitants in some strong places in the country, which lived upon the profits thereof, and yet kept the same in obedience. These towns they called Colonies. The Romans having divers times vanquished the 
b Ea called conterritis hostium animis, ut etiam ubi ea remisissee terrore aliquo tenerentur, & Velitris auxere numerum Colonorum Romani, & Norbae in montes novam Coloniam, quae arx in pomptino esset miserunt. Liu. 2.  Volscians and Sabines, and yet seeing them ready to rebel, for to keep them in order, placed Romans in the town of Velitri, and in the mountains in Norba, to serve as castles among them. Afterward when they had vanquished the 
c Tum de praesidio regionis depopulatae agitari coeptum. itaque placuit ut duae coloniae circa Vestinum & Falernum agrum deducerentur. Liu. 10.  Vestinians, and spoiled their country, consulting by what guards they might best keep the country in devotion: They resolved to send two Colonies into the country of the Vestinians, and the territory near the hill Falernum.  
These towns being peopled with Romans, and placed in countries of new conquest, Tully calleth propugnacles of the Roman empire. Tacitus calleth Cremona a fortress and 
d Propugnaculum adversus Gallos trans Padum agente●. Tacit. 9  propugnacle against the Gauls beyond Padus. This means also other nations have thought fittest to keep countries in subjection. And therefore nothing among them was more usual, then to translate inhabitants from one place into another. The kings of Syria having vanquished the Israelites, placed a Colony in Samaria. The Athenians taking the Island 
e Thucid. 4.  Cythera from the Lacedæmonians, removed the old inhabitants, and peopled it with their friends. And against the 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 1.  Thracians in defence of their conquest, they sent ten thousand inhabitants into Strymon.  
The kings of this realm peopling Caleis with English, kept the same long in their possession, which they lost not, but by force. If they had likewise peopled Rochel, Poitiers, Lymoges, Bordeaux, and other towns with this nation; they would not have been so hard to keep, nor ready to revolt. not doing that, they did soon lose the same by treason. And if Colonies had now of late been sent into Ireland, not as now scattering and disunited, and few in number, but in good strength and united by laws, and dwelling in towns as the Romans did, I doubt not, but the country would be better assured, and the charge far lesser than now it is. For the charge of garrisons is great, the insolency of garrison soldiers greater. And if an enemy come against them, their strength is nothing. If any man say, that it is hard to dispossess the ancient inhabitants of the country out of their dwellings: he considereth not that rebels, and enemies are so to be used; and that if they be placed other where, it is of mercy rather than desert, which notwithstanding in all cases may not be used. Hard it is, said 
a Plutarch. apopth.  Agesilaus, to be merciful and wise both together. Yet if inhabitants when the time was, had been sent into Ireland being void in some places, divers English might have been placed without injury to any.  
To maintain a force therefore without great charge, the mean is to send Colonies of the English nations into the country conquered. But forasmuch as both garrisons, and sometimes greater forces are required for defence of it; the rents of divers cities, countries and grounds are that way to be employed. And to this end the fruits of the royalties are to be converted, and corn and provision to be laid up in storehouses.  
The Romans taking that course, did in all places where they commanded, find means to maintain their armies without any great exactions, yea oftentimes the fruits of the country were so great, that beside that charge there came much to the public treasury.  
Charles 
b Guicciard. lib. 1.  the eight of France, having conquered the kingdom of Naples, and divided the royalties, yea and the public store among his Favourites: when need required, had almost nothing to maintain his army; and therefore as unworthy of so good hap, presently lost the same again. Xenophon in the consultation of 
c Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 2.  Cyrus and Cyaxaris, showeth that for maintenance of the wars, and of countries vanquish: an army must be maintained, and that an army cannot be maintained, unless the revenues that maintain it be certain, and continual.  
That less force may serve; such as give suspicion of revolt, are to be disarmed: so 
a Herodot.  Cyrus used the Lydians. The Romans likewise would not suffer such as were their subjects to 
b Liu. 8.  arm without their commandment. furthermore, those that are like to prove heads of factions, are to be removed out of the country: for seldom do the common people move, unless they be stirred by factious heads. The Romans having conquered the country of Macedonia, and converted it into a province, for more assurance of peace, brought away with them the last 
c Regis amicos. purpuratos, ducésque exe●cituu●● praefectósque navium. Liu. 45.  king's friends and Favourites, and all his captains, both of his army and navy, and likewise men of appearance and quality.  
If so be time or sickness do decay our forces; the same are to be supplied in time, that the rebellious take not occasion by our weakness to make stirs. For want of this consideration, in time passed we lost our conquest in France, and all that want it, cannot choose but lose.  
For the rest, if the governors of countries newly conquered, be careful and watchful, & trust no man without cause, & use equality in taxations, and do good justice against raveuours, bribetakers, and rebels, they need not fear rebellion: if they do not, all force that may be used, will not long serve to keep them in subjection. The 
d Liu.  Privernatians desiring peace of the Romans, and offering to yield themselves: being demanded how long they would keep it, answered plainly, that if the conditions were reasonable, long; if unreasonable and unjust, no longer than they were forced. For no people can long like of a government, wherein they are spoiled, vexed, injuried, and to say all in one word, peeled, and tyrannized.   

CHAP. XV. Containing a discourse concerning the means, whereby an army that is foiled, or feareth to fight may most safely retire: and how the enemy in following the course of his victory, may be stopped.  
HOw an army that is strong in the field, may safely march, fight with advantage, and use the victory, I have spoken sufficient. But because the success of 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  wars is doubtful, and Mars (as Poets feign) favoureth 
b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  now one, than an another: To perfit this discourse, it remaineth that jalso declare, how when blasts of wind blow contrary, we may either retire from the enemy, that seemeth to have prize, and fast hold on us in marching or fight; or else stop his course that he proceed no further, or else ourselves gather new forces.  
It is a matter very difficult for an army that is broken to rally itself, and departed without utter discomfiture where the enemy knoweth it, and useth his advantage. For nothing can be more hardly remedied, then fear and disorder of the multitude, if once it enter thoroughly, or the enemy followeth speedily. If the enemy giveth us respite, or our forces be not altogether broken, the means to save the rest, and secure those that retire, are these. First, if there be any ground of advantage in the place, the same is to be taken with that part of the army that remaineth entire, which divided into squabrons, may receive their own people flying within the distances, and repel the enemy from the higher ground. In the mean while, those that are in disorder, are to be brought into order again behind those squadrons.  
The 
c Vulneribus defesti, & pedem refer, & quod mons suberat circiter mill passuum eò serecipere coeperunt. Caes. bell. Gal. 1.  Helvetians being wearried and foiled in the fight with Caesar, retired to a hill hath by, and there making head, saved the rest. The foragers sent out by Cicero at Vatuca, being charged by the Germans retired, and defended themselves well, as long as they kept on the higher ground. At 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Gergovia when Caesar's men pressed by the enemy, and briven from the higher ground began to fly, he succoured them, and stayed the enemy's pursuit by placing other squadrous at the foot at the hill, with whom they had no courage to encounter. Neither did Antonius 
a cum cohortibus 12 descendens exloco superiore cernebatur, cuius adventus Pompeianos compiessit, nostróque firmavit. Cael de bell. Ciu. 3.  Pompey's men that chased Caesar's soldiers at Dyrrhachium pursue them, after that they once saw Antony coming with succour from the higher ground. If there be no higher ground near to retreat unto; the next course is for those companies that are pressed, to retire within the distances of those squadrons, that stand firm. For this cause the Romans did always so range their battles, that the squadrons of the first battle might retire within the squadrons of the next, and both be relieved within the squadrons of their last. In the encounter at S. Clere Anno 1569, where the King's avant-garde fled, the same was succoured by the battle that followed, which so charged the Protestants, that pursued it, and drove them down the hill, that if the Lansquenets that stood at the foot of the hill had not stood firm, many of them had there been cut in pieces.  
That advantage which the higher ground giveth, the same a deep trench, or thick hedge, or a strait like wise affordeth: so that if our squadrons, that stand firm be there placed, the rest that are discouraged may run behind them, and take breath. The Romans retiring oft times within the fortifications of their camp, have there again made head against the enemy, and saved themselves.  
If neither the place where the army is ordered, nor the ranging of our battles do admit any such retreat: the last remedy is to advance forward either our horsemen, or some firm squadron of footmen, especially shot and targetters, upon the flank of the enemy that chaseth our men: and if he stay not, then resolutely to charge him. In the mean time those that fly are to be rallied again. Annibal in that last battle which he fought with the Romans in Africa, thrice rallied his forces, and so many fresh charges gave he unto them. If his soldiers had been answerable unto him, or else if the Romans had not followed very orderly, he might percase have broken them. 
b Livi. 35.  Philopoemen charging the enemy, that followed the chase of his men too eagerly; did overthrow him. At Ravenna the 
c Guicciat●.  Spaniards that remained after the battle unbroken, retiring in good order, and using the advantage of the ground, did so receive the enemy that charged them, that they slew the General, and divers of his company.  
Those therefore that retire, jet them march resolutely, and orderly: the shot let them approach near to the flanks of the squadrons of pikes. There also is the defence of targetters against horse. The pikes let them not disdain the help of shot, and short weapons. The horse are to be ranged behind the squadrons, or on the flanks. Which if they be united in one body are not easily broken, nor rashly to be charged.  
If being near the enemy thou desirest to departed without fight, at least without josse, thy best course is to make him uncertain of thy purpose, by pretending that which thou meanest not. By making of fires, hauging of matches in bushes, and standing of tents, the enemy is oftentimes abused, especially in the night. That thy companies may make more speed, thou art before thou beginnest to dislodge, to send thy hurt and sick, together with the baggage and great ordnance before thee, and then to follow with the rest. 
a Sauciorum & aegrorum habita ratione impedimenta omnia silentio prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemittit, Ac conquiescere ante iter confectum vetuit, his una legio praesidio missa est. Caes. de bell. Ciu. 3.  Caesar departing from Pompey at Dyrrhachium, that he might not be charged at disadvantage in his march, took this course. The sick, hurt, and baggage of the camp he sent away first guarded with one Regiment. Other Regiments he caused to march after them some good distance: with two legions that remained he followed last. And having marched so much as he meant to do that day, and making show to lodge there, when the enemy, that followed was not aware, and unreaby, he departed presently, and that day got so much ground, that after ward he old never be overtaken, before he came whither he meant to go. If the enemy be ready in arms to follow, it is hard to go from him, unless the nearness of hills, or straits do favour thy retreat.  
Lest thou be charged in retiring, with the enemy's horse or shot, or disordered in some strait; great care must be uses. To repress the force of horsemen, use either thy horsemen intermingled with some shot, or squadrons of pikes flanked with musketeers: against shot, use horsemen in the plain, and shot and targetters in straits. If thou fearest to be charged in some strait, take the upper ground with thy shot, and targets, and seek those advantages which before I have showed thee in the discourse of the use of divers weapons, and advantages of ground.  
To stop the enemy's pursuit, where he must pass a strait before be come at thee, it is a good course to cut down trees and woods, and to set them on fire. For horse will hardly pass through the fire, nor can lightly pass, but in high ways or made ways. By this means Xenophon retired safe with his men from 
b Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 5.  Dryla, and the 〈…〉 
a.  Bellovacians escaped the hands of Caesar, in the warr●s of France.  
Pompey being to take ship at Brundisium, and fearing lest if he abandoned the walls, Caesar would enter the town, and charge his men, as they went on board, 
b Pottas' obstruit, vias platealque inaedificat, s●s●ar transuersas vijs perducir, ibique sodes, stipiésque praeacutos defigir, haec ciatibus teriaque ina quat, aditus ad portus maximis trabibus praesepit. Milites silentio naves conscendunt. expediti ex euocati● & sagittarijs in muro collocantur, quibus certo loco actuarias naves relinquens signo dato renocat. Caes. de bell. Ciu. 1.  stopped and dammed up all the gates and ways save one, and in the streets made blind trenches, staked them, and covered them; on the walls he placed his archery, and light armed for defence of them, until the rest were all shipped: when all the rest were on board, than did these run toward the port, where there were boats and frigates ready to receive them.  
That there may be some end of flying, either thou art to direct thy course to the hills, and there to make head, as advantage is offered unto thee, or else to take some strong town for thy safeguard. The Romans keeping with their army in the higher ground, wearied Annibals victorious army, and cut between the same, and provision, So long as the 
c Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Gauls kept on the higher ground, and straited Caesar's victuals, he could not hurt them. D. Brutus in taking of Mutina arrested Antony's army, that was going into France. The retreat of Vercingetorix into Alexia, stayed Caesar a great time in that siege, in which mean time the Gauls levied new forces. The siege of towns do oftentimes, break the force of an army. The Protestants finding no resistance in open field, were harassed, and tired out in the siege of 
d Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  Poitiers: and like hap had the adverse party. For being victorious at Moncontour, they lost all vigour, and strength at the siege of S. jean d'Angeli.  
That thou do not receive dishonour by retiring; two things thou art especially to have regard unto: first, that thou do not leave behind thee, thy sick and hurt men; secondly, that thou do not lose thy carriages, and baggage, nor leave them. For without them, thou canst neither commodiously carry arms, nor victuals with thee, nor maintain thy company.  
To do whatsoever in this case is requisite, nothing is more available, than expedition. By that thou dispatchest all impediments, thou winnest ground, thou preventest the enemy, thou sanest thyself, and thy friends. And therefore if in good success: much more in calamity, ought we to use all celerity. Afranius being almost past all danger, yet for idleness suffered the enemy to come between him, and his retreat, which 
e Caes. de Bel. Civil. lib. 1.  was his ruin.  
These things they hinder and stop the enemies proceeding for sometime. But if thou meanest to drive him out of the country, or to hinder him for winning any more ground; new forces must be levied, and an army sent into the field, if not to fight with him upon even ground: yet to watch all advantages, and to secure where need shall require. Further thou must fortify all towns near, where the enemy lieth. This was the proceeding of the Romans against Annibal, and of the Gauls against Caesar. Philip the King 
a Philippus intra Tempe stativis positis, ut quisque locus ab hoste tentabatur, praesidia per occasiones summittebat. Livi. 31.  of Macedonia after his overthrow by the River of Aous, encamped with his forces in tempe a place of very hard access; put guards in the cities round about; and as any city or castle was assailed by the enemy; so he succoured the same with men, and other necessary provision. But in this course two things we are to take heed of, first that we do not take upon us to defend towns either weak by situation, or want of defence, or else that want things necessary for to sustain a siege. Secondly that we do not suffer the towns that are besieged to languish without hope of supply, or secure.  
For maintaining of our credit with our friends and confederates, which commonly yield to follow the current of good, or bad success: if in the field we receive some check, yet are we as much as we can to cover our hurts, and diminish the credit of the enemy's victory. Caesar having received some losses at 
b Caes. de bell. Ciu. 3.  Dyrrachium, yet would he not acknowledge them to his soldiers, but ascribed the slender success of his enterprise to error, rather than to the enemy's force. Vercingetorix after the loss of Auaricum, where a few only of many escaped, and that in pitiful plight; 
c Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  appareled them, and hid their deformity, and diminished with the best words he could the loss of the town. The Helvetians likewise being foiled by Caesar at the passage of the river of Sone, did diminish the number of those, that were overthrown, and assigned it rather to casualty, than virtue. Nothing doth more 
d Charles duke of Burgundy by ambassadors sent to Lewis the 11 of France, covered the loss received at Morat. Phil. comm.  discourage soldiers, then when they see the General himself by the greatness of the calamity discouraged. This caused the soldiers of Domitius to forsake him at Corfinium, and to yield the town to Caesar. 
e Liu. 23.  Varro the Roman Consul, discovering unto the Capuans the wants of the Romans, and the great calamity they had received at Cannae, thereby thinking to move pity, moved them rather to revolt, as despairing that the Romans could ever recover themselves after such an overthrow. The Liu. 
a 31.  ugly sight of the Macedonians slain and mangled by the Romans, which in wisdom the king should have covered, did greatly terrify the army, when to praise them, he showed them openly.  
Finally, as all calamities, overthrows, and mishaps do proceed from contempt of religion, justice, and military discipline; so there is no hope to repair our losses, but by restoring the worship of God, by administering of good justice, and strict observance of military orders. The Romans as they lost their city, and were overthrown by the Gauls at Allia for their contempt of these things; so restoring matters to their ancient form recovered the same again, and afterward had great good success in all their enterprises. Again, when in the times of the latter emperors, that state was given over to all impiety, and injustice, and utterly neglected the laws of arms, by which that empire had grown so great; the same fell into utter ruin. For who can expect good success in wars, that neglect the worship of the Lord of hosts the supreme moderator of all wars? As long therefore as religion and justice is trodden under foot, and hypocrisy, and shows of ceremonial reformation, and jewish toys go for good religion, and the goods destinate to the service of God, maintenance of virtue, and learning, and relief of the poor, are made a spoil of harpies and raviners, and Gods ministers made a scorn of every lewd railing companion, and honours are sold for money, and disloyalty, and treason, and all villeiny redeemed with bribery, and glory is placed in stones, silks, and strange fashions; and men of value contemned for poverty, and virtue despised as dust, and wealth esteemed as felicity, and learning rewarded with alms, and valiant soldiers cast of with proud and disdainful words, and base rascals command, and overrule virtue, and law with wealth and favour; and men's skins are not valued at the price of dogs skins; and no man may do his country service, but he shall therein endanger his honour, state, and life, and no man careth for the common cause; but every man abuseth his honour, and authority, either to enrich himself and his brats, or to win money, and wealth, to spend the same again in surfeit, lechery, and excess: so long neither can any nation have victory, nor losing can ever recover their loss   

CHAP. XVI. Wherein is showed how martial men proceed in the sieges of cities or forts.  
THus having declared what practice of arms requireth in accoiling the enemy that hasteth forward to the obtaining of a full victory: I am now to return to speak of him, that having driven his enemy out of the field, maketh him to take sanctuary within some fort or city. for that is rather the beginning of victory, than the end of wars, and therefore may he not so suffer him to escape, nor lay down arms, before he command as well in the towns, as in open field. Wherein that he may proceed orderly, and lose no labour, nor cost, which of all other actions of war is greatest in sieges: (Thucydides reporteth that the Athenians in the siege of Potideaa spent above 
a Thucid. 2. Two thousand talents of Athens pass that sum.  350000 pounds sterling) first he is to consider what towns are first to be besieged, and assaulted: secondly by what means he may prevail against them, and win them.  
Of towns therefore that do make resistance against us, those are first to be besieged, where the General of the enemies is retired with his forces: if he be gone far away: then we are next to beset those towns, which for their authority, or convenient situation do carry with them the rest of the country: and if wars be so managed, that our forces will not serve both to besiege the capital city of the country, and to repress the courses of our enemy's intercepting our victuals, then are we to go on forward orderly in the country, and to leave no town behind us, that may stop the conveyance of our victuals. Caesar pursuing Vercingetorix made him take Alexia for his retreat, and there besieged him. Annibal to terrify the Spaniards, and to enforce them to submit themselves to the empire of the Carthaginians, assaulted, took, and sacked 
b Carteiam urben opulentam caput gentis eius expugnat, diripitque. quo metu perculsae minores civitates stipendio imposito imperium accepere. Liu. 21.  Carteia the principal city of the country, wherewith other small cities were so dismayed, that they submitted themselves, & paid such tribute, as he imposed on them. and translating the wars into Italy, he beset, and took 
c Taurinum caput gentis expugnat. Liu. 21.  Taurinum the head city of all the country at the foot of the Alpes, which made all the towns thereabout to yield themselves. The Athenians invading the Island of Sicily, made the attempt against Syracuse, being the head city of the country, first: which course both the Carthaginians, and Romans in the Sicilian wars pursued. The prince of Parma in the siege of of Antwerp had like respect, and reasons to make him begin there. for commonly all the country doth follow the condition and proceeding of the capital city. Lautrec in the enterprise of Naples, spending time in taking paltry towns by the way, when his purpose was to go directly to the siege of Naples, did tyre his army, spend his men, and lose time, which the enemy spent better in arming himself. In our journey to Portugal, many do likewise mislike, that setting our course for Lisbon, we turned aside to Coronna, which was no small hindrance to us, and help to the enemy. In besieging of small towns, there is often as much labour and cost, as in greater; and little or no gain. Those therefore, that when they may go to the head, are paltering about small towns, or castles, are like unskilful soldiers, that when the heart lieth open without defence, are still striking at the hand or foot. but if our force serve not to besiege the strongest town of the enemy's country, yet before we sit down before any town, let us see what commodity we may get by taking it. Scipio considering that new Carthage in Spain was a fit port for ships, and the store house of the enemy, and a place where his treasure and hostages lay, did begin the wars with the siege of that town. Annibal made many attempts against Nola, and Naples, for the desire he had to have a port in Italy, that lay commodiously against Africa. failing of these, at length he got Tarentum, and Locri. For the same cause he made reckoning of Salapia. for it lay conveniently in the midst of the country, and was very commodious for the conveyance of victuals to his army. King Edward the third, after his victory at Cressi, sat down before Caleis, for that it was a commodious port for his enterprises against France. Those that spend great labour in winning paltry hamlets, as did the French king that was also king of Poland, in the winning of Liuron in Dauphinè, although they win the place, yet win nothing but repentance: and if they fail; scorn and loss.  
Towns are taken divers ways: viz. either by siege, or by assault, or surprise, or by all, or two of these joined together. in every of which, the proceeding is divers, as the ends are divers. The end of a siege is to strait the town, so that either for want of victuals, water, munition, soldiers, hope of succour, health, or other commodity, the same be driven to yield. The end of a surprise is slily to enter the town without knowledge of the enemy. The end of an assault, is to force the enemy to give us entrance. This diversity of ends may teach us both what to do, and what to avoid.  
The end of sieges being to force the enemy to yield for want: we are to use all devices and means to make him spend his store, and to increase his want. Alexander king of 
a Liu. 7.  Epeirus, having a purpose to besiege Leucadia, suffered all the country people that would, to enter the town, that they within might sooner spend their victuals. When they of 
b Caes. de bell. Gal. 7.  Alexia besieged by Caesar began to send out women, and children, and aged persons, such as only served to spend victuals; they could not be suffered to pass. The French king that now is, did otherwise in the siege of Paris, an. 1590., moved with Christianity, and pity. but the practice of war required rather rigour in that case. In 
c Non facile est simul misereri, & sapere.  which hard it is, both to show mercy, and wisdom together. Where the defendants are not more politic than ordinary; there the assailants may also by false shows, and feigned escaladaes make them spend their powder in vain. In these late troubles of France, while the brave soldiers within a certain place, shot all the night at certain matches conveyed from place to place, and at an ass, or two, that made a stir in the town ditch, in the morning they began to yield for want of powder. Caesar by a 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 8.  mine coming to the veins of the spring that served Vxellodunum, took away the water from the town, and so forced the same to yield. 
e Thucid. 1.  Megabazus besieging the Athenians in the Island Prosopis in Egypt, by a device turning away the water that ran into the haven, where their ships lay, set their ships dry, and gave entrance to his men, & took away all escape from the enemy, whose ships were on ground. The town of Chartres in France had likewise for want of water, and other necessities been driven to great straits in the siege, an. 1568, the Protestants turning away the river out of the channel; but that by conclusion of peace, the siege was broken up shortly after. Caesar by keeping Pompey in a short compass of ground, by his entrenchments had almost famished all his horse, in which consisted his special strength. Which guard and diligence if the Protestants, anno 1569, had used in the siege of Poitiers, they had not only famished all the horse of the enemy, but otherwise hurt him. but they did not so much as bar the ways, much less other ground so, but that he sallied at pleasure.  
There are two means principal to stop the town besieged from victuals, and things necessary, the one of which must necessarily be used, if we mean to achieve our purpose: the first is to entrench the town round about, if it be a land town; if it stand upon the water, then to cast a bank about it on that part that is toward the land, and with ships or boats, to guard and stop the way to the sea, or water. The second is to bar the ways, and upon all places of easy access to make in convenient distances, sconces or forts. The first is more laborious, but very effectual: the second is easy, but seldom taketh effect, unless time & the weakness of the enemy do help us. Therefore was that course always used of antiquity, this seldom, unless it were of such as either knew not what to do, or had not means to do more. The Lacedæmonians besieging 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. Thucid. 2.  Platea, cast up a bank round about the town, the same they guarded with turrets built upon it in equal distances, and lest any might climb over it, they made a strong Palissade upon it, and did stick it full of stakes. The 
b Thucid. 1.  Athenians used the same circumuallation about Potidaea, which they compassed round with a strong bank & deep ditch. Besieging 
c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  Miletum, that part that was toward the land, they compassed with three banks and so many ditches, and with their ships so crossed the haven that none could enter or issue that way. Caesar used yet more labour in besieging of towns in France. Before Alexia first he made a trench 20 foot broad round about the town. This trench was nearer to the town than his camp by 400 paces. Beside that he made two other trenches without that, each of them was 15 foot broad, and behind the utmost of the two, 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  a bank of 12 foot high with a parapet, and crenels upon it. For guard whereof he caused sharp forked stakes to be made fast in them. Upon the bank he built turrets round about, one of them in distance from an other 80 foot: in the ditches he pitched sharp stakes, and them covered with hurdles, and earth. The ground betwixt the trenches he set full of sharp stakes, and boards full of sharp nails with the points upward: and all this from his camp inward to the town. The like trenches and banks, and turrets, he made round about his camp without, for defence against those that should come to relieve the townsmen without. Things now incredible to be reported but then commonly used. In few days he compassed the city 
e Vallo pe●um 12 in circuitu 15 millium, crebriscum castellis circummuniti erant Aduatici. Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  of the Aduaticans, with a bank in circuit 15 miles, in height 12 foot: upon the same he made turrets, & without it a deep trench. The same proceeding he used in the siege of Utica in Africa, & long before him Scipio, besieging the same town. 
a Fossa & vallo urbem circumdat, castella excitat modicis interuallis. Liu. 25.  Fuluius in the siege of Capua, toward the town did make a ditch of a great breadth, and upon it he raised an high bank with turrets upon the same round about the town, and the like defences he made against the enemy without, so that not so much as a messenger could go out, nor any succour come in for to help the townsmen. The same course another Fuluius used in the siege of Ambracia, as Livy testifieth. The Gauls at length perceiving the great commodity that these works brought with them in effecting their purposes in sieges, albeit unacquainted with labour, yet besieging 
b Caes. bell. Gal. 5.  Quintus Cicero his camp, compassed him in with high banks, and deep trenches, imitating all such works, as they had seen the Romans to make before them. Annibal perceiving that the castle of Tarentum which he besieged, had the sea open, persuaded the Tarentines to go to sea, and to stop the passage that way, which if they could have done, in the end percase they might have prevailed. But the Romans were too vigilant, and sent them within succour in time. If Lautrecke likewise had compassed them of Naples round about with banks and trenches, and stopped the haven so, that no victuals had been brought into the town by sea or by land, he had not failed of his enterprise in taking the city. But now adays our great commanders think every little thing much, and our soldiers are so idle and proud, that they will not work. If with certain pioneers they cut the high ways, and make certain Barriquades upon them, and erect five or six weak sconces which are evil termed forts being of no strength nor value, they think they have done much, yea more than ordinary, either by water or by land they leave the town open, so that seldom they come to the end of their desires.  
The French kings brother that was afterward king of Poland besieging Rochel, an. 1573. did not so much as cut the ways so, but that the townsmen divers times sallied out upon him both with horse, and foot. Long was it ere his ships were come to bar the haven, and when they were come, yet did they not so well guard it, but that both ships with munitions & victuals, and messengers entered & issued divers times. At Poitiers besieged by the Protestants, an. 1569. matters passed far worse. They neither barred the plain, nor the ways with any sufficient trenches: succours entered, horsemen and footmen sallied divers times. To this pass idleness hath brought sieges, that few take effect. But let not our soldiers be ashamed to do that which the Romans did, and practise of war requireth. Nay that valiant prince R. Edward the 3, hath showed them by his example, what they should do. for besieging Caleis, he compassed it with a sufficient ditch, and bank, so that none could sally out, and for defence of himself, against such as should come with succour from without, he made the like works outward, and in the end prevailed. So likewise towns besieged are to be environed with banks, and trenches, and with the same our camp is likewise to be fenced. The use of the sea is to be taken from them with ships, as Marcellus did in the siege of Syracuse, and Scipio in the siege of new Carthage, and Utica. If the same stand upon rivers, the same are to be barred with bridges, as 
a Liu. 2.  Porsena practised in the siege of Rome, and not long since the Prince of Parma in the siege of Antwerp.  
If men will not take the pains to environ the town with banks and trenches round about, yet must all high ways and streets, and easy accesses, at the least, be well trenched and defended with banks; and sconces built in divers places for the hindrance of succours, and stopping of sallies. The Duke of Alva did so in the siege of Arlem, The Prince of Parma in the siege of Maestricht, and in divers other places. Those which take divers castles, or else new build them two or three leagues distant from the Town which they besiege, thinking thereby to famish the Townsmen besieged, seldom effect their purpose. The Protestants, anno 1567., seizing Pont Charenton, Pont S. Clou, Busenual, S. Denis, & other places near Paris, thought to keep it from victuals, but the distances from Paris, and of one place to another, were so great, that even the Country people passed out and in between, almost at pleasure. The practice of the Earl of 
b Froissart.  Flanders, that took like course in famishing of Gant, in the days of Edward the third, was likewise made frustrate.  
First therefore the towns besieged are to be environed either with a bank, and trenches, or else with sconces very near to the walls. Secondly, the same are to be kept with strong guards, and diligent watches, that none enter in, or pass out: for defence whereof, the banks are to be made high, and well flanked; & the ditches deep, that they be not easily filled. Duae 
a legiones semper pro castris excubabant. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Caesar lying before Auaricum, kept two legions always ready in arms to defend his works against the sudden sallies of the Townsmen. And such was his guard and watchfulness in his sieges, that albeit the 
b Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  Aduaticans that were another time by him besieged, presuming upon his security, had thought, during the treaty of peace, to force him to break up his siege by a sally: yet he had men sufficient ready to repel them. The Romans neither in time of war, nor truce, day nor night, were so secure or negligent, but that always they kept good guard, and watch. Those that there in proceeded weakly, or negligently, have endangered themselves, & been oft times forced to rise without doing any thing. Lewis the 
c Philip Comines.  11 of France, and Charles of Burgundy, lying in the suburbs of Liege, a town by them besieged, without either good watch, or strong guard, or defence, escaped very narrowly taking, by them that sallied in the night out of the town. Amilcar 
d Polyb.  besieging a town in Sicily, was taken in his camp by those that sallied out upon him in the night: which if his fortification had been good, or his watch diligent, could not have happened. The 
e Thucid. 5.  Athenians besieging Amphipolis, & lying without sufficient defence, or watch, were defeated by Brasidas the Spartan. By like negligence, succour, & victuals entered into Naples besieged by Lautreck; into Poitiers besieged by the Protestant's; into Rochel, besieged by the French king after the massacre, anno 1573. Philip of Macedonia, lying before Apollonia without suspicion, or defence, against the enemy's sallies, was forced to rise, yea and to run, forced by the Townsmen aided by certain Romans. Francis the French king was taken, and his army defeated before Pavy, by those that came to the succour of the town, which could not have happened, if he had lain within any sufficient trenches, or had but well guarded the ways, and passages. Trebonius lying before Massilia, having his works and engines almost destroyed and fired by the Townsmen, during the treaty of composition, teacheth us not so to trust the enemy at any time, but that we have a sure guard, and diligent watch. That is the only remedy against sallies from within, and succours from without.  
Further, as we are by this means to proceed against the enemy besieged, so are we to take heed that by want, or disorder among ourselves, we be not forced to departed with scorn. Caesar sat down before no town, but he knew how, and where to have victuals, and all provision necessary for a siege. The Capua 
a obsideri caepta, quaequeve in eam rem opus erant, comportabantur. Casilinum frumentum convectum, ad vulturni ostium castellum communitum, ut & mare, & flumen in potestate essent. Livi 25.  Romans going to besiege Capua, provided corn and all things necessary, and took such order that both by sea and land they had supplies coming to them. Caesar at the siege of Massilia, caused all stuff necessary to be brought into his camp: neither victuals nor engines, nor instruments to work withal, nor any thing was wanting. In all sieges the Romans proceeded very orderly both in their provision and government. Their men lay dry in tents, strong within defences, they had meat and victuals, the sick and hurt had relief. But in our times, and also in ancient time for want of government in these cases, many calamities have happened, and many sieges have been broken. In the late siege of Rochel the king's soldiers for want of victuals were famished, for want of things necessary, and good government, sickness grew among them. The same was the cause of the ruin of the army of Protestants before Poitiers, of Lautrecks enterprise against Naples. Charles duke of Burgundy lying before Nancey, discontinued his battery for want of powder: in the mean while succours came that raised his siege. The siege of Charitè Anno 1569, was raised because the King's soldiers sat down before it, before they had sufficient provision with them. 
b Qu. Cur. lib. 4.  Amyntas lying before Memphis was discomfited, and driven to raise his siege, for that his men were ranging about the country, when they should have been ready to defend their camp, and repel the enemy. The same error was committed by Francis the first of France before Pavy, who suffering his men to disband and straggle abroad, diminished his forces, so that he was not able to resist the enemy that came upon him. In winter if that soldiers do not lie dry in their trenches, and lodgings, and have fire: the weather and season forceth them to raise their siege. This broke the enterprise of the English against Zutphan anno 1567. The same incommodities forced 
c Guicciard. lib. 5.  Caesar Borgia to rise from before Faenza well beaten with winter, rain, and foul weather.  
Therefore ought wise Generals before they sit down to besiege any town, to consider the time, and to examine whether he hath sufficient force and provision to effect such a matter. 
d Multa magnis ducibus, ut non aggredienda, sic non deserenda. Livi. 24.  Many things are not to be attempted of wise leaders, yet being once begun are not lightly to be given over, as Marcellus said. The town of Secca in the kingdom of Naples being besieged and not taken by the French, assured that whole state unto Consaluo, as saith 
e Guicciard. lib. 6.  Guicciardine. The check we had at Coronna in our voyage of Portugal did not a little discourage us. 
a Perseverantia in omni genere militiae maximè tamen in obsidendis urbibus necessaria est, quatum plerasque munitionibus ac naturali situ inexpugnabiles, fame sitique ipsum tempus vincit, expugnatque. Veget.  Perseverance, and constancy in every action of war prevaileth much, but most in the sieges of cities, as is evident by the great patience, and constancy of Caesar's soldiers in the siege of Auaricum, and Alexia. For many towns that by natural situation are inexpugnable, by hunger and thirst, and want of things necessary, are taken in continuance of time.  
That the General may both provide sufficiently, and know perfectly how to encounter the enemy; it is requisite that he not only have intelligence of his proceed within the town, but also of his succours coming without. For that cause he is not only to have his espials and discoverers abroad, but also (if he can) his intelligences within. The 
b Guicciard.  succours that came to Florence were by this means defeated, or ever they came near. The General ought always to be watchful, yet shall these intelligences hurt him nothing.  
That his victuals and provision may come to him safely, the General that besiegeth any place, is to place garrisons in convenient distances from his camp, and to have his horsemen to encounter such as lie at receipt in the way. Thus by labour, and foresight he shall be able not only to keep the enemy short; but also to provide sufficient for his own people, so that he may maintain them in heath, strength, and good order.  
Those that have no firm hope to obtain the city besieged but by famine, and want, ought notwithstanding, as occasion shall be offered, to attempt the same by surprise also, yea and by assault. By surprise towns may be taken divers ways, sometime by means of intelligence with some friends within the towns, sometime by Mine, sometime by escalade, and sometime by some privy entrance. Intelligence is sometime procured by money, sometime by friendship. Philip of Spain hath no less of late time prevailed by money, then by force. Belike he hath learned of Philip king of Macedonia, that no castle is impregnable, where an ass laden with gold can be admitted to enter. Tarentum was taken by Annibal in the night, and again recovered by Fabius by means of intelligence, which either of them had within the town. The castle of Rome was bought by the Sabins in the time of Romulus. Byzantium was bought of certain traitors by Philip king of Macedonia, But what need I bring examples of this, seeing now adays the the practice of buying and selling of towns is a matter so common?  
But let those that buy and sell, and likewise those that go about to surprise others, take heed first of 
a Trattato Do●pio.  double dealing, next that the enemy be not made of the party, and get notice of our enterprise. By double dealing many thinking to surprise others, have themselves been surprised, as before I have declared by the example of the captain of S. Omar, that would have bought Caleis of the Italian, to whom King Edward the third had committed it to be guarded, and by the enterprise against Bourges, anno 1569, and divers enterprises against Rochel, and Montauban, in these late wars of France. The surprise that Annibal intended against Salapia, was vented, and his men slain that went about to execute it. 
b Liu. 43.  Appius Claudius thinking to surprise Vscana a town in Illyrium (now Sclavony, while he neither kept pledges of the men that offered the town, nor scut any espials before, to understand how matters went) fell into a trap laid for him by the way, and lost 8000 soldiers. The 
c Guicciard. lib. 3.  Spaniards that thought to surprise Gifona a town in the kingdom of Naples, were no sooner entered, than they were cut in pieces 500 of them: so were some of the prince of Parma's soldiers used not long since at Berghenopsome.  
The way to avoid double dealing, is first to assure ourselves by pledges of the wives, or children, or friends of those that deal with us; secondly by examining those straightly, that seem to make offer to give us entrance; thirdly by fending espials before both into the place, and about the place, to consider if they can see, or hear any thing, that is suspicious. Fabius by strict examination of the messenger, understood the treachery of them of Metapontus, that under colour of delivering up the town, would have drawn him into a trap.  
That our enterprise be not discovered, great celerity, and caution is to be used, when we go about to take a town by surprise. Matters long in hammering, seldom take effect. While Marcellus lingered in making his preparatives to surprise Syracuse, in the mean time his partisans were discovered and slain, which also happened in a certain enterprise of the Protestants against Lion; and of the kings side against Rochel in these late brabbles of France. Further we are to choose such a time of the night, and such weather, as may best cover our designs. Those that take our part within the town are to be admonished, that they do not bewray themselves by meetings, or words, or signs, that may be suspicious. we must also take heed, that our company that are employed in the enterprise, do not give any sign, or make any untimely noise, whereby the enemy may have notice of our purpose. The 
a Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 5.  town of deep had been surprised by the Protestants, an. 1569, had not one witless companion discharged a pistol, the sound whereof gave the alarm in the town before things were ready. Another time by firing a chapel, the Protestants going to surprise a place, gave the enemy notice of their coming, and leisure to provide to entertain them. Finally, appointment is justly to be kept with our partisans in the town: we may neither come too soon, lest we be espied; nor stay too long, lest the matter be marred for want of correspondence. At Lusignen, an. 1569, the faction of the Protestants discovering themselves before their companions without were come, lost themselves, and marred the matter, that otherwise could not, but have taken effect. Those that surprised the castle of Sancerre presently after the massacre of the Protestants in France, not being succoured at the time appointed, were glad to lay off hold, and to run away.  
The town of 
b Liu. 5.  Veijs was surprised by Camillus conveying his soldiers into the town under the ground through a mine. 
c Liu. 4.  Servilius likewise by a mine entered the castle of Fidene. Chelar a town in Vivaretz, in these late troubles of France, was taken by a cave that went out of the town under ground to a place a pretty way off. How we make mines for the most part to ruinated walls by force of powder: yet may mines be well employed to enter the town by surprise, for conducting whereof, those that are skilful are to be employed, that it may be digged deep enough to go under the ditch, and foundation of the wall, that it be opened in the town where there is least suspect, that the same be well underpropped, that the earth fall not, that the earth be conveyed away within some trench or hollow place, and that by some other work the work in the mine may be concealed & covered. Mines made to overthrow the walls ought to be made crooked, but this may be made straight, and either with one or two entrances▪ but if it be well made, if it serve not to enter the town, it may yet serve to overthrow the walls. Before thou beginnest to mine, consider whether the ground be such as may be wrought. if it be a rock, it cannot be wrought for hardness; if it be full of springs, than water will mar thy work. In both these cases, thou losest thy labour. But more shallbe said of mines, when we shall come to entreat of ruins of walls, and breaches.  
Where the enemy is secure, or negligent, the Town may percase be surprised by Escalade. Which, that it may take effect, divers things before hand are to be provided, and considered. Ladders are to be first provided both for number, length, form and strength sufficient: the want of ladders, cost the present French King, the loss of an opportunity in taking Paris. Next, such places as seem to give most easy access, are to be viewed, & chosen: the ditch also is to be sounded, if there be water in it, lest it be too deep: against that time of the night, when men are most quiet, our things are to be made ready: the season that is most troublesome, and dark, is fittest for our enterprise: sometime the state of the Townsmen giveth us opportunity to enter. Syracuse was taken by Marcellus, while the soldiers and Citizens lay drunk in one of their solemn feasts. The Town of Cales likewise was surprised by 
a Liu 8.  Escalade upon a feast day at night, when the Citizens were most secure. The Turks understanding the disorder of Christians in their carnival (we call it shrofetide) chose that time to 
b Alphonso d' ●●loa.  scale a strong Town in Sclavony, and while the Citizens lay sleepy, and drunk, entered the same. Of all the times of the night, and hour before the dawning of the day, is most fit for surprises. At that time of the night Fabius scaled 
c Liu. 24.  Arpi. Argentueil a Town in France, a little before the dawning of the day, was scaled, and entered by the Protestants anno 1568. and by like surprise, and about the same time they took also Vezelay. For when men have watched a great part of the night, and look presently to be relieved, then are they most sleepy, and negligent: and after that the Town is seized in the night, the day presently appearing, giveth us means to assure it, and settle matters.  
divers not measuring of times, nor duly considering these matters, have lost great opportunities. Charles Duke of Burgundy by the 
d Philip. Com.  shortness of his ladders failed of the taking of Beawois. The like oversight, as some say, hurt our men in the scaling of Lieth, in the beginning of the Queen's reign. The 
e Thucid.  Thebans entering Platea in the night, not being succoured according to their appointment, were cut in pieces by the Townsmen in the morning. Whether a man come too soon, or too late, all is one; for if that in such cases there be not good direction, execution, and correspondence; such enterprises commonly come to nothing. A small error in this matter, was the cause of the death of that valiant knight sir Martin Skinke, and of the breaking of the enterprise against Neumegen.  
Some have had good hap to enter Towns by ways not suspect, as Cyrus entered Babylon by the river, Scipio entered new Carthage by the lake; which the Townsmen thought a matter impossible. The Venetians took 
a Guicciar. li. 10.  Brescia from the French, entering by a grate through which the river issued. The protestāns by a grate 
b Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 10.  likewise entered Nismes an. 1569. But they that follow their examples, had need to use like diligence & speed. They chose a blustering season, & a dark night: those that entered by the grate, slew the watch, and received their companions in at the gate: other companies were ready to assure the Town, which they had seized. There was good correspondence between all parties, secrecy in proceeding, resolution in executing. Of late time postern gates have been broken open, some by gunpowder, conveyed between boards and the gate; others by petards; and so divers Towns have been entered, and surprised: but the Townsmen must be very weak, and negligent, and the execution very speedy, and secret: or else such executions seldom take effect.  
After that the Town is entered by surprise; let them that are entered use diligence, and good order, that they be not themselves either presently driven out, or soon after surprised. Their course is first to assure themselves of the gates, walls, and ramparts by placing sufficient guards there, and next to seize the market place, and other open places with strong squadrons: the rest of the companies are to beat the streets, and to seize such as can make resistance against them. Having beaten the Townsmen, that themselves be not beaten out, they are to provide both men, victuals, and munitions; that which is in the Town they are to save, and make store of it; and lastly, to set good order for the defence and government of the place surprised. Whosoever faileth in any one of these points, incurreth oft times no small danger.  
The Thebans entering into Plataea, and not assuring themselves of the gates, or of the principal Townsmen before their weakness was espied, were most of them slain, and the rest forced to leap the walls. Alexamenus 
c Liu. 35.  having slain the tyrant Nabis, and taken the Town of Sparta, while he should have seized the walls and chief places, and set order for the defence of the Town, himself spent time in searching out the tyrant's treasures, his soldiers in seeking pillage, in which mean time the enemy gathering together some force, charged him in this disorder, and in a short space cut him and his company in pieces. In the late brawls of France, 
a Histoire de troubls. de Fr. l. 5.  Colombel having surprised Esscilles, a strong Castle in the frontiers of Dauphinè, lost the same within few days after, for that he had no care to furnish it with soldiers, and victuals. Bouley 
b Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 10.  having after a long cavalcade, spoiled the Town and Fair of Milly, stayed too long in his return, which gave the enemy leisure to seize upon him, and make him pay his life for that he had taken. The Duke of Orleans having surprised 
c Guicciar. li. 2.  Novara, soon lost the same again, for that he neither provided more victuals, nor saved those that he found in the Town, nor set order for the government of the place. Which oversight was the cause of the loss of Naples unto the French king Charles 
d Guicciar. lib. 1.  the 8. for giving away all the victuals that were in the new Castle, unto one of his courtly beggars, afterward when the Town was besieged by the enemy, his soldiers albeit they begged apace, could not tell where to have a biscuit cake, or other victuals.  
By divers other means Towns may be surprised, as by men disguised in women's apparel, or by soldiers disguised like clowns, or by men hid under straw in carts. Demetrias was surprised under colour of bringing home of a chief Citizen 
e Liu. 35.  from banishment. For while his friends welcomed him home, some of his train seized the gate, which he together with his company defended, until certain troops of horse placed not far off, came to them. But he that knoweth these, and how to proceed therein, can devise more, and may therein see how to proceed.  
If the Town be strong, and hard to be forced, the safest way is to proceed by siege, and surprise: if in judgement of men experiemented the Town be weak, and easy to be forced, he looseth time that sitteth about it, that by force may enter it. Those Towns I account hard to be forced, whereunto either for height, or for water, or other inconvenience the soldier can hardly come. A Town situate upon a rock which is well walled, and flanked, can hardly be assaulted. For such ground can neither be mined, nor trenched.  
Other Towns that are placed in even ground and good soil, although they be strongly fortified, yet either by breach, or scale, or mine may be entered, especially where the soldiers are neither many, nor skilful, nor resolute. Of such Towns that are neither well flanked, nor well manned, there is no doubt to be made, but that by a resolute charge they may be won.  
The course that is commonly and best to be used in assaulting of Towns is this: after that the General cometh in view of the Town, that he determineth to assault, let him send his camp-master, or some other special mea of judgement before with his horsemen, seconded with shot, and targets, to view the walls of the Town, and the ground without the Town, where the battery may most commodiously be made, by reason of the weakness of the walls, or eavennes of the ground. If he cannot approach with his horse, he may then use his shot, and targets, to beat those that will offer themselves to hinder the discovery. That he fail not in judgement, he is to understand, that where the walls are high, or weak, or destitute of bulwark, or flankers, and the ditch is narrow, and dry, and the ground within and without plain and even; there is a good place to make a battery. Yea albeit the wall be strong and well flanked, yet if there be no weaker place, I would not have him doubt to choose that place to plant his artillery in. If by espials we understand where the ground, and the defences of the Town give us best commodity to make a breach, than there needeth no great view, but only to see whether it be as is reported. The quality of the ground would also be considered, whether it be hard, or soft; plain, or hilly; dry, or miry; and such like, that after the battery once begun, we be not driven to remove our pieces.  
This being reported to the General, he is to cause the great ordnance to be drawn toward the place; so that about the shutting of the evening the same may be within mosquet shot, yet covered from the townsmen's view, if it may be. With the same are two strong squadrons of shot to march, seconded with halberds, and targets, and supplied with some horsemen. The rest of the arm divided into four parts, are to take their lodgings in four parts round about the Town. Somewhat far from the walls, unless they may cover themselves with some hill, from their shot, or that there be Suburbs about the Town. That night every part is to fortify their lodgings with trenches, palissadaes, barriquades, or such means as they have.  
When the day is gone, let all the soldiers that may be spared, and for default of them, let pioneers carry baskets and earth to the place chosen to plant the artillery in, that may not be above sixty, or seventy paces from the wall. There dividing their baskets into so many parts as the master of the Ordnance purposeth to divide his piecies into: let them begin to fill their baskets ranged in order as fast as they can. That they be not molested in their work, the squadrons of shot sliding along by their sides, and shooting against such as show themselves from the walls, are to provide: against sallies the targetters, and halberds, are to defend them. When the baskets are filled: then they may range their pieces behind them. But if the baskets be not defence sufficient, as seldom they are against great shot: then under cover of the baskets they are to begin a trench, casting the earth inward toward the pieces to serve for a bank. The same trench would be made along the curtain of the wall, the ends of the bank bending inward, that there the artillery may be placed, that shooteth on slope to the curtain, and direct against the bulwark, or flankers.  
For defence of the artillery, and those that are placed there to guard it on both sides, reason requireth, that the bank be made with divers corners, and that the whole compass of ground where the artillery standeth, be entrenched: but so, that there be issues left for those within to go within the trenches, and without them. Upon the bank, there would a sufficient parapet be made all alongst where the canon is ranged: fifteen or sixteen foot in new earth is little enough: in that the holes for the canons are to be left. In other places if the parapet be three or four foot thick, it is sufficient. All along this bank, and along the trench, are musketeers, and other shot to be ranged. The broader the trench is, the better it will serve to cover our men.  
To effect this speedily, many hands are to be employed. If there be convenient speed used, the ordnance would be ready to speak the next morning. But for that it is not possible, that men should work all the night, neither conveniently watch all night: therefore both shot, and targetters, and such as work the first part of the night, would be relieved at midnight, and others sent in their places both to work, and to watch.  
The artillery is to be ranged in three places. Two fourth parts would be placed direct before the curtain of the wall; of the other two parts, one would be ranged some pretty distance off, with the noses of the pieces pointed toward the flankers, if any be of the one hand, the other toward the bulwarks, or flankers on the other hand. Yet sometimes they may hit slope wise in the curtain of the wall, and those that are pointed against the curtain nay be discharged against the shoulders of the flankers.  
If with thy pieces thou canst not see the foot of the wall, then before thou beginnest the battery, thou must cause the counterscarp, or ground betwixt thee and the wall to be opened, and the earth cast into the ditch of the Town. That is to be done both before the curtain, and before the flankers. If thou dost not hit within two foot of the bottom of the wall, thou dost but waste time, and powder. That the canon may be managed with more ease: if the soil be soft, thou art to make a sole of planks, somewhat encliving toward the wall, for the same to run upon.  
This being done, which is principal, we are to dress a mount, or cavalier, as they call it, some hundred paces from the wall, or nearer, directly looking along the wall where the breach is to be made, there placing four or five pieces of artillery, we may beat those that present themselves to the breach to defend it, or repair it. By the same we may discover those that are upon the bulwarks, or go in the streets, or within work about the breach. And therefore where the ground afoordeth us commodity we may not forget to raise such a mount, and make it formal for height, breadth, and length, with his stairs, parapets, and places for the corpse de guard, that defendeth it.  
So soon as the artillery is placed, and fitted, so soon the same aught to begin to speak, and that without intermission day, or night, until the breach be made reasonable, and the defences and flankers be broken. The continuance of the battery, and the artillery that beateth in flank together, with the musketeers being placed where they may discover the breach, doth hinder not only the repairing of the breach, but also the retrenchement behind. If thy battery once cease, thy labour and charge increaseth. Nothing hurt Monluc more in the siege of Nyort, nor lafoy Chatre in the siege of Sancerre, than the discontinuance of the battery which happened by reason of want of powder. Sausar removing his battery at Vezelay, confirmed the Townsmen to hold out, whose hearts before fainted. Nothing did more help them of Rochel in the last siege, than the frequent intermission of the battery. By which means they made defences stronger, than the walls were before.  
The more artillery is employed, the more speedy and forcible, and less chargeable will the battery be. The Turk in the battery of Vienna, employed above threescore canons, culverins, and other pieces. At Rochel the king had forty, and the prince of Parma little less in the siege of Scluse. He that employeth less than twenty cannons, and other pieces, cannot look for any good effect. That some hoped with four small pieces to batter the walls of Coronna, was without reason. Yet I will not deny, that in these late troubles of France, the Protestants with three or four pieces took divers Towns. For where the walls are bad, and within them no defendants; it is not hard to take Towns either with a few pieces, or without pieces. But where there are men within, and walls sufficient, it is better to make no battery, than a battery not sufficient.  
The great artillery being placed: the canoneers are to place their powder in safe places, and to make their bollets, rammers, wads, charges, matches, and all these instruments fit, and ready before they begin their work. What is the level, random, charge, and effect of every piece, every canonier either knoweth, or aught to know. And therefore I need not spend time about the declaring thereof.  
While the canon is in placing, and the battery in making, all those soldiers that are not employed about that work, are to fortify their quarters with banks, trenches, and barriquades, and to bar and trench the ways, and to keep good guard, or watch, that none enter, or sally out: that if not with assault, yet for fear of want, the Town may be forced to come to reason.  
That against the breach be made, all things may proceed orderly, ladders, mantelets, and targets, and all things requisite for the assault are to be made ready; and to be delivered to the companies, that are to use them.  
If there be any time remaining, the same is to be employed in making of trenches, and parapets, along the enemies counterscarp, likewise in stopping all the avenues, and ways, whereby any may come to the succour of the Town.  
The horsemen and footmen, that may be spared from the camp, are to range the country, to discover, to repress the enemy, to convey victuals to the camp. All which may be done easily, if there be no time lost, nor any disorder in proceeding.  
If the ground be fit to be wrought; from the trench behind the counterscarp, it is no hard matter to carry a mine into the Town, or under the walls. The earth, that cometh out of the mine, being cast into the ditch, or up to the bank, shall seem to come out of the trench, especially where there is continual working. In making of mines, observe these rules: first work not, if the ground be full of springs, or rocks. The 
a Liu. 36.  Macedonians going about to undermine Lamia, were frustrated of their purpose, encountering with rocks. Secondly beginning to dig, make the mine crooked, that the force of the powder be not broken having vent backward. Thirdly see that the distance from the entrance to the wall be well measured, lest the powder be placed either short of the wall, or beyond it. Arriving to the foundation of the wall, the miners are first to make a broad place along the foundation of it, and to underprop the earth well, that it fall not: secondly they are to place their barrels of powder, with their heads knocked of, and bored through with divers holes, and to straw powder upon the boards where the barrels stand. Thirdly they are to convey a match well boiled in gunpowder in a pipe of wood, or between boards, and therein also to make a train of gunpowder from the place where fire is to be given to the barrels: their next care is to see the mine well stopped and rammed, that the fire break not out backward. Lastly, when men stand ready to go to the assault, yet without danger of the mine, and when the defendants approach the breach, the fire is to be given. Any of these points neglected, doth frustrate or hinder the effects of the mine. At Rochel the place where the powder was placed being too narrow, and the entrance not well stopped, the mine did no great effect. In the same siege the soldiers not being retired, when fire was given, many men lost their lives by their own mine. At Coronna the mine being direct, & not well stopped, the force of it broke out backward.  
Before the assault be given, the breach is to be viewed, whether it be reasonable; likewise some men of judgement are to consider, whether the flankers be ruinated sufficiently. These things appearing, and the ditch made passable; the assailants are to march to the breach in this sort: first certain targetters, well armed, and with them the ensigns: after them halberds, and pikes. On the flanks of the targetters, and somewhat before them all along the counterscarp are shot to be placed, to beat them that offer themselves to the defence of the breach and wall. These are to be seconded with other targetters, halberds, and pikes; with shot likewise on their flanks. At the same time, if there be other breaches in the bulwark some are to march to them also ranged in like sort. The distances of men marching to the breach are small, for they are to march so thick, as they can one by an other, being first to enter, & then to fight. The thinner they go, the more open they are to the enemy's force. In these late wars of France commonly shot hath been placed in the first ranks of those that went to the assault, and therefore no marvel, if they never prevailed, where there was any resistance. But they could not do otherwise having so few armed men. At that instant when the assault is to be given at the breach, other companies are to be appointed to scale in all places of easy access. The same will trouble the enemy much, and divert his forces. In scaling this rule is to be observed, that while the targeteers go to the walls, the shot beat them that stand upon the walls.  
That there may be supply where need is, the whole army at the time of the assault is to be brought into arms, and every man to have his charge assigned. Some to defend the lodgings, against any sudden stirs: some to discover: others to stand in their places appointed, either to pursue the victory, or to favour the retreat of their fellows, or to go where they shallbe appointed. The more force is employed, the weaker will be the enemy's resistance.  
Those that purpose to prevail by assault, are to consider further both time, & place, & other circumstances. To give the assault, that time is most proper, when the enemy is least provided, which commonly is at the dawning of the day, or at noon time. In the 
a Liu.  siege of Heraclea the assailants making feigned shows 2. or 3. days of coming to the assault, & yet doing nothing, made the defendants so secure, that when they came indeed with all their forces, they found them unready, & so entered. In the place where we purpose to show out utmost force, there lest noise and show is to be made, and contrariwise greatest stir where we mean to do least. 
a Hirt. de bell. Alexand.  Caesar making show to enter at the place of easiest access, took the camp of the Alexandrians, scaling it where they lest looked for any such matter.  
That the enemy have no time to consider, our men are to go resolutely to the assault, not as Monlucs men did at the siege of 
b Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  Niort, who going to the breach, paused being entered the ditch. Likewise there ought to be good correspondence, that the town may be scaled, and assaulted at the breach, both together, and that every part may be well seconded, and supplied. If either the breach or walls be won, there let them that enter stay, until so many be entered as may serve to force the town; and so placing others to guard the entrance, and to receive the rest of their company let them march in good order, some to the market place, others to the bulwark, and not sever themselves before their whole company, or so many as is requisite, be within the town. 
c Caes. de bell. gal. 7.  Caesar taking Auaricum by scale would not suffer his men to descend into the town before he had filled the walls with men.  
If the enemy make resistance in the streets, the houses are to be fired near them. By this means 
d Liu. 2.  Coriolanus made way for his men in the taking of Corioli, and the Spaniards cleared the streets in the sack of Antwerp. If they show themselves obstinate, they are to be compassed round about, and so dealt withal upon advantage. 
e Liu.  Camillus making proclamation that no man should be slain, that laid down his arms, took a certain town which he had entered quietly: which otherwise without great slaughter he could not have obtained.  
Before that every man in the town hath laid down his arms, & the town be possessed quietly, no man is to be suffered to disband, or enter houses, or to seek pillage.  
The last care of the General is, how to make use of the town, that is won. If he mean to keep it: then ought he diligently to repair the breaches, and to save the victuals, & lay them up in store, & with the rest of the spoil to reward those, that best deserve. If he mean not to keep it, yet ought he to save that which may be for the use of the army, & to ruinated the walls, & to fire the town, that the fame serve no more for a nest for the enemy to rest in. The 
f Guicciar. hist.  Duke of Orleans neglecting this care, no sooner had taken Novara, but he lost it again for want of victuals. Corbueil in France of late taken by the Prince of Parma, not having the breach repaired was shortly after recovered by surprise by the king's side.  
Small towns, such especially as have no great ordnance, or no places where to employ it, are taken by zapping, or digging down the walls, especially if they be high and without terraces behind. By this 
a Sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium convellunt. Caes. de bell. ciu. 2.  means Caesar's soldiers ruinated the walls of Massilia: and 
b Annibal 500 Afros cum dolabris ad subruendum ab imo murum mittit. Liu. 21.  Annibal made a way into Saguntum. But before they approach the walls lest the enemy dig their sides with shot, or throw down stones upon them, the enemy is to be beaten from the wall with shot, and the soldiers to be covered with mantelets of wood, on the sides, & over the head. Then with crows of iron they are all along the wall to pull out the lowest stones, & lest the same fall on them to underprop it with wood. The same when all is finished, is by gunpowder to be fired. By this means the townsmen of Sancerre An. 1572. recovered the castle from certain traitors that were there entered: & 
c Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  Bordet in the siege of Chartres, An. 1568. wan a corner of a raveline. That the breach be not repaired by them within, the assailants are to make themselves ready to go to the assault in that order, which before I have prescribed. That this course in sieges, surprises, and assaults, is according to the true practice of arms, although in part hath been showed, yet now shall it further be confirmed, and those that have done otherwise by their evil success, and evil proceeding refuted, and their course reproved.  

d Liu. 24.  Annibal pretending to go to sacrifice at the lake of Avernus, did presently go to assault Puteoli: and in our times the Prince of Parma, making a fair show as if he meant to besiege Ostend, did suddenly sit down before Scluse. This practice is good in this and in all enterprises of war. For thereby the enemy being made uncertain, his forces are derived an other way, and his care diverted from that which should principally be cared for.  
The Protestants of France, Anno 1568. purposing to besiege 
e Hist. de troubls. de Fr.  An golesme scent Montgomery before with certain troops of horsemen to hinder the access of victuals to the town. But far better they had done, if before they came with their whole forces, they had not discovered their purpose. For in the mean time the townsmen prepared, and strengthened themselves.  
in the siege, and taking of Saguntum Annibal proceeded in this sort. 
a Liu. 21.  He environed the town round with trenches: by zapping and divers engines he made a breach: in the assault fresh men succeeded them that were hurt and wearied, until such time as his men forced the breach. From the breach his men marched and took a place of advantage: others scoured the streets, and having assured himself of the town, in the end he took the castle.  
Scipio having environed the town of new ᵇ Carthage in Spain, 
Liu. 25.  and shaken the walls, at noon time when the enemy was at rest, sent part of his men by the lake, and scaling the town at one instant in divers places both from the water, and the land, entered with part of his men, which gave access to their fellows: which marching in order cut in pieces such as resisted, and in the end took the castle.  
The 
c Corona cinxit urbem omnibus copiis admotis. Liu. 10.  Roman Consul besieging and assaulting the town of Comimium, first compassed the same round with all his forces: against the gates he opposed certain troops to repel those that should offer to sally out. Covering his men with mantelets of wood, he broke open the gates, with others he scaled the walls, marching into the town with his men in order, beat those that had seized the market place: and assured himself of the walls, and streets. In the assault of 
d Romani signo dato pars eminùs glande aut lapidibus pugnare, alii succedere aut murum suffodere, & scalis aggredi. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  Zama; the Romans having a sign given them by the general at one instant some presented the scale, others with slings, & stones beat the defendants, others zapped the walls. In the assault given to 
e Liu. 32.  ●latia a town in Greece they made show to make all their force to enter in at the breach. But when they perceived the townsmen to drawthither, they scaled the walls in an other place, and so entered the town.  
The common course which antiquity used in sieges and assaults, as I have declared, was to compass the town besieged, with banks and trenches. The havens or rivers they dammed with ships filled full of stones, and sunken. If the same were broad, they guarded the issues with 
f Caes. de bell. ciu. 1.  towers built in the straightest places, upon which they placed their engines: which Caesar practised at Brundisium. Sometimes they crossed the river with boats, as 
g Liu. 29.  Scipio did the haven when he besieged Utica: and as 
h Liu. 2.  Porsena did in the river of Tiber when he besieged Rome. Before they went to assault the 
i Agger ab universis coniectus, & ascensum dat Gallis, & quae in terram occultanerant Romani, contegit. Caes. bell. gal. 7.  walls, they filled the ditches with earth. The men that laboured, they covered with mantelets made of square timber, and fenced with occum made of old ropes; these planed the earth, these began the trenches and banks. In working at their trenches, banks, and mounts, no man was exempted. They never assaulted town but with their whole forces, and that in all places together. Taking the town, first they assured themselves of the walls, and gates, and from thence in good order they went to take the open 
a  quisque intraverat eques, ad forum occupandum citato equo pergebat, additum erat & triariorum equiti praesidium. Liu.  places of the town. No man might departed from his 
b Ind signo dato milites discurrunt ad praedam. Liu. 25.  ensign, nor run to spoil, but after a sign given. And therefore no marvel if they prevailed for the most part, as now men fail of their purpose for the most part, being so far departed from the laws of arms. What is now the common proceeding in sieges, batteries, and assaults, shall now appear by the examples following.  
The Protestants going about to besiege and win Poitiers, 1569. first made their approaches, & quartered their soldiers in the suburbs which they took at their first arrival, for the most part. Next they made their trenches, mounts, & gabions for to accommodate their great ordnance. Part was placed to batter the walls, & part to beat the enemy in flank behind the curtain. Certain small pieces they leveled against the parapet and certain defences made by the enemy upon the walls. Of these pieces some were placed in houses near the walls, others were ranged on the plain behind gabions, or baskets of earth, which they filled there in the night. The breach being made 20 paces wide, and very plain, the Admiral disposed his men to go to the assault in this order: first 700. shot marched, after them 300. gentlemen marched with targets on their arms: after them followed halberds, & pikes: the rest of the army was ready in arms to succour where need should be. But their errors were so many, that these good orders availed little: first they spent time about Lusignen, and other small matters, and made not their approach, so soon as they might. In which mean time, the D. of Guise entered with his troops, fortified divers weak places, and provided divers things necessary: secondly, their avantgard going before the town without direction, did nothing, but give the enemy warning, & so returned: thirdly, they neither trenched, nor barred the ways, nor kept such ward, or guard, but that both succours entered guided by Onoux, and divers times the enemy sallied both on horseback, and on foot: four, they did not take the suburbs, nor bridge of Rocherevill, but suffered the enemy to possess it: yet by reason that it flanked the breach, & stopped the water, was it most necessary to be taken. For the water being there stopped regorged upward, & the enemy being there lodged had a full mark at those that went along to the breach: fifthly they made their breach beyond the river, which by reason of the depth of it made them, to their great prejudice, differ the assault all other things being ready, and broke their arrays as they went over the bridge. They might have done better to have passed their troops before & had them on the other side before they went to the breach: further they considered not that the ground behind the breach being high was not to be mounted, albeit there had been no wall. And therefore a place evil chosen to make breach in. For albeit they won the breach yet could they not go forward up the hill: lastly, they did neither divert the enemy's forces by escalades, nor went to the assault with all their forces. Of the simple provision of victuals, and bad government in matters of justice, & discipline of arms. I will say nothing, because such disorders are inseparable companions of civil wars. Yet was there not much better proceeding in the King's camp besieging Rochel, Anno 1573. which was in this sort.  
The king before he sent his forces before the town, caused two engineers to go thither about other matters, but their purpose was to sound the haven, & harbour, and to mark the walls, & places of the town, & to draw a plot of it. Not long after he sent Byron thither with some forces, which he lodged in villages round about Rochel. Who first fortified his lodgings with trenches, terraces, & barriquades: nearer to the town he built certain sorts at divers corners of it. His artillery being about 40. pieces he ranged in 3. places crossing one an other. A fourth rank he planted upon a mount to beat the curtain in flank. For the guard of the pieces, and canoneers he caused not only gabions of earth, but also deep trenches, and good banks to be made, with two pieces brought into the ditches he beat the casemates. To deprive the townsmen of fresh water he caused the condu it pipes to be cut. Monsieur with his ships that ankored in the harbour went about to deprive them of the commodity of the sea. Having with battery, and mines made a breach: the king's lieutenant caused divers assaults to be made, in the order used commonly. Beside that which is common, he made divers mantelets to cover his men, and for their easier approach, framed a bridge of wood, which from the counterscarp reached to the bulwark near the breach, But all this in vain. For neither were the townsmen so straited by sea or land, but that some entered and issued both the ways. Yea sometimes they entered the trenches, and cut divers men in pieces: the mine was evil conducted. For most of the force broke out backward upon the assailants. The assault was not general, nor did the companies march with one consent at one time: the escalade was but at one place, and that weakly performed. What for want of victuals, and good order, and what by reason of winter season the soldiers grew sick and weak: and for want of justice many bad examples escaped unpunished: finally things were long delayed, and disorderly executed.  
The siege, battery, and assault of Sancerre Anno 1573. passed in this sort. The enemy making his approaches first planted his artillery some part about 60. paces off, and some part nearer: 6. pieces beat them in flank being placed on a hill half a mile off. On the counterscarp he placed divers shot in a trench which he made there. From that trench he entered the ground coming under the walls with a mine: Under a frame of wood he brought some to zappe the point of the raveline. When the breach was made almost 80. paces wide, and the defences every where beaten down, he caused his men to march to the assault in this order: first marched the ensign colonel of Sarrieu guarded with targetters, and others well armed; behind them and upon their flanks marched certain companies of shot: these being repulsed the second charge was given by the gentlemen of the country thereabout, which were likewise seconded by divers troops of shot: the escalade at the time of the assault was likewise attempted: but nothing succeeded. The causes were divers. First the shot dragging behind left the armed men almost naked on the front, and sides, to the shot of the townsmen, which they should have kept occupied. Secondly the escalade was faintly executed by one poor company, that went naked to the walls. What might have been done by divers companies well armed, if they hoped to prevail with one alone? Thirdly, those that marched to the breach went thin, & dispersed, which was the cause that the shot so marked them, that all returned not to complain. Fourthly, the breach was repaired by reason of the discontinuance of the battery, for want of powder. Finally, the mine could not work any effect, by reason the train took not fire, as it should have done.  
In no place do I hear of more resolution and expedition then in the siege and assault of Chateleraud, Anno 1569. The first day that the enemy approached under colour of a skirmish he caused the walls, ditches, and defences of the town to be viewed. The artillery arriving about midnight, he had placed, and gabionned the same in the night in two divers ranks, and so fitted it, that by seven of the clock the next morning the same began to batter the foot of the wall. Wherein such was the diligence of the canoneers, and force of the pieces, the bullets entercrossing one another in the breach, that by two of the clock in the afternoon in the same day the breach was 60. paces wide, and the soldiers ready to march to the assault. Wherein if the soldiers within had not been very resolute, and the Frenchmen without very slack in seconding the Italians that had the point of the assault, or if the escalade had withal been presented at two or three other places: they had percase prevailed. At Xaintes, Scipio the engineer purposing to make a breach discharged a piece where he meant not to batter. Which caused the townsmen to spend their earth, labour, and provision, where no need was. Then 
a Histoir. de troubls. de Fr. l. 13.  changing the place of his pieces brought them hard to the ditch of the town, where he made a breach threescore paces wide. To hinder the reparation thereof, he had placed four culverins, and divers small pieces upon a mount to beat them in flank behind the breach. After that there marched to the assault first certain shot, than forty cuyraces of proof, and last of all certain other shot.  
The county of Lude did thus dress the preparatives to the assault of Niort, Anno a thousand five hundred sixty and eight. after he had with his canons placed in two houses near the walls, made a breach thirty paces wide, and had raised two culverins so high, that they might beat the defendants in flank all along the curtain of the wall: three ensigns marched to the breach, others presented the escalade. These being easily repulsed, to the second charge marched first one principal commander, and after him twenty targeteers: then certain shot: after them followed the ensign colonel, and after it divers other ensigns with a strong guard of halberds and pikes. The rest of the army stood ready in squadrons. The horsemen were also in arms to repress the townsmen, if they should dare to sally. But all this served not. For in the first charge there wanted courage, and resolution: in the second, execution. For having wet themselves in passing a little river, most stayed, the rest went faintly forward: in sum all the bravery which they showed at the first, in the end proved nothing but a brag.  
If the Protestants had not proceeded more resolutely in the battery and assault of Brovage Anno 1570. they had not so soon prevailed. Scipio by trenches made his approaches, and within thirteen paces of the ditch placed his pieces within a certain defence for the canoneers made of sacks of wool, and earth. With the canon he beat the curtain, and bastion towards Oleron. With the artillery, and shot of the Venetian Carrake which he caused to be brought along the Haven, and to be placed hard to the Fort or Castle of the town, he so beat them that were within, that none could come to the walls or look out without danger. Which expedition, and resolution of the assailants did so amaze the townsmen, that presently they began to fall to composition.  
Thus we see how those that proceed carefully, diligently, resolutely, and according to the practice of war do seldom fail of their purpose, but either by siege, surprise, or assault they take the towns, which they beset. Towns that cannot be taken neither by sleight, nor force at the first; yet by continuance and perseverance, may be taken at the last by one means, or other, especially if they be weakened in one or two sallies. Annibal by a devise causing the Locrians to sally out of their town, cut between them and their safety, and by taking them, made the rest to yield. He would have trained out those that guarded the Castle of Tarentum, by laying a bait for them, but they were too wise. Romulus by a feigned retreat drawing the Fidenians some pretty distance from the town, cut most of them in pieces, and pursuing the rest entered Pelle Melle with them into the town.  
Many other stratagems may be devised, whereby towns may be forced, or surprised: but seeing the general reasons are apparent by this which I have said, now I will turn my speech to those that adverse events drive to defend themselves within towns. For practise of war doth teach us not only to force others, but also where the enemy pursueth us, to defend ourselves.   

CHAP. XVII. Wherein certain observations are set down good to be practised for the defence, and good government of a town or place besieged, battered, or assaulted.  
SEeing as places are taken either by want through long siege, or by intelligence, and treachery, or else by force: those to whom Princes commit their guard, are diligently to encounter these things with provision of things necessary first, then with watchfulness & care, and lastly by strength of men, & walls. They that take on them to defend towns neither well provided nor fenced, howsoever they show therein courage, yet do they show no jot of wisdom in it; for oft times they cast away themselves, and hurt their Prince, and country both in the loss of so many men, & in giving courage to the enemy. And better it were for them to convey themselves into some place of safety, or to yield; then to hold out without reason. In which case the Prince cannot blame them, if they provide for themselves. The Romans not being able to defend certain towns of Apulia, and Lucania against Annibal, gave them licence to provide for themselves by composition. Which also the French kings in the victories of the English nation in France permitted to their people. 
a Cas. de bell. ciu. 1.  Domitius was blamed by Pompey for that he rashly engaged himself and his company in Corfinium, without his commandment. It was the loss of many brave men, and a great prejudice to the cause. Dandelot hanged up a certain companion, that refused to deliver up a paltry castle without view of the canon, albeit he saw the army of the Protestants. And in deed less favour doth the practice of arms yield to those, that unable to defend themselves will notwithstanding hold out, until they be forced. 
b Se ipsos conseruaturum dixit Caesar, si priusquam aries murum tetigisset, se dedissent. Caes. de bell. gal. 2.  Caesar did not easily spare them that held out until he had shaken their walls: those that otherwise yielded, he used with all clemency.  
The first consideration therefore of him that hath a town committed to his government ought to be, whether the same may possibly be defended against the force that cometh against it or no. For 
c Nec temerè suscipienda eotum defensio est, quae tueri non potes, nec temerè deserenda, quae tueri potes. Liu. 34.  as we are not rashly to abandon a town that may be defended: so we are not ignorantly to take upon us the defence of towns not tenable. The Romans while Annibal ranged up & down Italy, burned those towns which they could not defend: the like did Philip of Macedonia. The 
a Cetera pra●ldiis firmâ●unt. Liu. 34.  rest they kept with strong garrisons. 
b Liu.  Antiochus did foolishly in abandoning Lysimachia which for the provision, & strength that was in the place, might have holden the army of the Romans at bay one whole year. The like error did 
c Trans●untib●● Romanis claustra à front & tergo deseruit. Liu. 44. & 45.  Perseus' king of Macedonia commit, who seeing the Romans approach forsook those straits which if he had kept he might have shut them in both behind & before. Likewise are the Gauls taxed by 
d Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Vercingetorix, for that contrary to his opinion & commandment, they would needs defend Auaricum against Caesar. Some do commend the French that in the defence of paltry towns of late years have willingly hazarded themselves; as they did in the defence of Dorat in Limages, Lusignen in Poitou, Bray upon Seyne, Nogent & such like, which have been taken divers of them by assault only of shot: but they had deserved more commendation, if they had not lost themselves in the end. Let those therefore that purpose to win honour by their actions consider what towns may be guarded, what not, what are difficult to guard, before they take on them to guard them.  
Great cities are hardly defended against a great force, that is able to straight them, & keep them from victuals, & other necessaries. That Paris hath holden out of late time, the weakness of their adversaries, & their great succours are cause. Gant likewise in the days of Edward the 3. held out against the Earls of Flanders a long time. But the reason was because he could not besiege so great a city: but if that such cities may be kept from victuals, they can not long endure it. When the Protestants in An. 1567. did but hinder the repair of the country people to Paris, the city was in extremity, & far greater it was in being besieged by this King. For such infinite numbers of people no provision can serve any long time. The 
e Caes. bell. gal. 7.  Gauls and 
f Caes. bell. gall. ●.  Belgians thought to oppress Caesar with multitude. But when they were come together, they saw that such numbers could not be maintained with victuals, & therefore not being fought withal were forced to scatter of themselves. But against a small force, great cities are most strong. For neither can they be straited of victuals by reason of their multitude of men, nor can they be taken by assault, being so well able to defend the breach and repair it. So that to a great force great cities are easy to be taken, to a small army that can not without danger compass the same about, they are impregnable.  
Contrariwise small piles or castles hardly resist a great force. First for that there is no room within to make retrenchments, or defences against the enemy's canons; secondly for that a small number of men cannot continue their resistance against a great army, where one company succeed another: lastly for that the men being kept within a short compass, the air must needs be corrupted, & their health impaired. Q. Cicero albeit his camp was of good compass & well fenced, and had in it 4000 men & upward, yet he had not been able to resist the multitude of Gauls that assaulted the same, any long time, had not Caesar succoured him. The Spaniards, presuming of the strength of La goleta besieged by the Turks were notwithstanding by the force of the canon, and multitude of men oppressed, about sixteen years agone.  
Furthermore towns that are commanded by hills, or whose Territory may be drowned with water, or which have no water within them, or which lie so situate, that the enemy may come between them and succours, are hardly defended against great forces.  
Other towns that are neither too great, nor too little, nor evil situate, may be defended, so that the walls be strong & well flanked, & the provision of victuals, munitions, arms, soldiers and whatsoever is necessary, be sufficient. Provided always, that the Governor be a man of judgement and courage, and proceed orderly. Without which all other provision is nothing: and with which he may do much, although his other means be slender. But because no man can see all things himself, let him first adjoin unto him a counsel of men experimented, of whose loyal dealing he may assure himself. With them let him consult both of the fortifications of the town, & of all things necessary, and see that all things be in good state before the coming of the enemy before the town. And first that there be victuals provided sufficient for the company, for a long siege. for whatsoever strong places yield to hunger. The 
a Liu. lib. 2.  Romans understanding of the coming of Porsena to besiege their city, sent round about among their neighbours to provide corn, & victuals. In their 
b Tacit.  Castles, & garrisons they had always a years provision before hand. The 
c Thucid. 1.  Athenians understanding the designs of their enemies to besiege them, stored their city with provision for many years, & so furnished themselves at sea, that what they could not have from the land, they might have abundantly from the sea. Besides provision of victuals to be made, order must be set, that they be well kept in storehouses, & orderly dispensed by measure. Caes 
a. bell. gall. ●.  Vercingetorix practising this at Alexia, did cause his victuals to serve him long. At 
b Caes. bell. ciu. 8.  Massilia understanding, that the town would be besieged, they provided corn & laid it up in garners. In free towns in High Dutchland the citizens have always a years provision of victuals beforehand laid up in public storehouses, and a strict order for the dispensing of them. Without 
c Paucis diebuper licentiam absumpta sunt, quae adversus necessitates in longa suffecissient. Tacit. annal. 20.  which that which otherwise might have served for many months, will be spent in few days.  
The town ought to be discharged before hand of aged persons, women, & children, such except as have for their company sufficient: when the enemy cometh before the town, it willbe too late to do it, as the Gauls tried in the siege of Alexia, & the florentines also besieged by the Prince of Orange at the request of Clement the 7.  
All the victuals that are in the country near about are to be brought into the city. for thereby the townsmen may be relieved, and the enemy deprived of help of the country.  
Further because corn without cornemils cannot conveniently be used: handmils are to be provided where the enemy may take other mills from us. Lignieres in the siege of Chartres without his hand-mils, had been driven to eat corn evil ground.  
Last of all provision is to be made of water where the town is dry, and of whatsoever either for nourishment, or health is necessary.  
With provision of victuals, the Governor ought also to join a care, that he have arms, munitions, & all instruments requisite for wars ready in the town: and stuff also to make more. Workehouses are to be erected of arms, of powder, of weapons, & other engines: artillery is to be mounted ready; bullets, & all instruments about it are to be provided. Neither may he forget store of mattocks, spades, axes, baskets, crows of iron, ropes, timber, nor such like stuff: nor saltpetre, brimstone, or coals to make powder withal, nor in sum, any thing necessary. want of small things may hinder great matters.  
But principally ought he to have care, that he have with him sufficient numbers of valiant soldiers, without which all other provision is vain. Walls reared to the skies are easily taken, where there are not valiant defendants within to guard them.  
As other things are doing, & providing, he ought also to have consideration, that his walls be good, that his ditches be deep, & broad, that his bulwarks, and defences be sufficient to flank the walls, and defend both ditches and conterscarpe. In which works let him not spare his friends, nor himself. It is a shameful matter when men refuse to labour to defend their country, themselves, and their lives. When Themistocles walled 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. ●.  Athens, so willing the people were, that men, women, & children laboured, & every man was content that the stones of his own house, yea of public houses should go to the walling and fortifying of the town. Among the Romans every soldier did as well set hand to his work, as to his weapons. we forsooth are so dainty fingered, and our soldiers so perverse, that so soon as they are enroled, yea long before they are good soldiers, they think they ought to work no more, and therefore they must have Pionniers to do their work: A kind of men which the Romans knew not, nor can be expressed in the Latin tongue. Hereupon it cometh, that our proceed are so slow, and so unsufficient. Neither can it otherwise be, where so few men set hand to the work. Likewise so sparing some are in their expenses, that their Port towns for the most part lie open without defence to the spoil of any enemy that shall come suddenly upon them with any force. And no man will ruinated the corner of his garden wall to save himself, and his company, and friends. But if we knew how necessary such labours were, and how as many brave actions are done with work as with weapon, and that nothing doth more appertain to soldiers, then to work fortheir own defence, & safety; men would never show themselves so niggardly and illiberal in their expenses, nor so dainty in labouring, and thereby fortifying themselves.  
Further the Governor ought to have a watchful eye, that he be neither entrapped in the practices of dissembling friends, nor surprises of the open enemy. his best course is to trust neither. If he doubt of the townsmen, he is not only to assure himself by pledges, but by strong guard, having the gates & walls in his possession. Popilius was no sooner placed in garrison at 
b Popilius Strati positus in praesidio claves portarum, custodiamque murorum suae extemplo potestatis fecit. Liu. 43.  Stratus a town of the Aetolians, but he seized the custody of the gates, and walls into his own hands. He is like wise to see, that he have the victuals of the town in his own custody. The Garrison of 
c Thucid. 4.  Megara that kept in the castle having victuals from day to day out of the town, when the same revolted were driven also to yield to the enemy. I need not exemplify this by antiquity. for it is the case of Vlissing, & some other places where our men lie in garrison. Where if the townsmen at any time quarrel with them, they shallbe constrained to yield for want of victuals, and other provisions, which are in the power of others. There can be no good assurance, where the to wnsmen are able to master thee, specially if the enemy be without, as treacherous friends are within. And therefore a wise Governor will provide that such 
a In eo spem pone nihil moturos Hetruscos, si ne quid movere possint praecaveris. Liu. 27.  can not hurt him, though they would. So a certain Roman persuaded his friend to deal with the Hetruscians. Against such, a provident Governor must always keep one eye waking, and appoint strong guards, and continual rounds, both on horseback and foot, and no less without the town, then within. Which are to see that every sentinel do his duty. He that doubteth that cownsmen must not suffer them to come near the gates, not to talk with the enemy. 
b Nolani muros portasque adire vetiti. Liu. 23.  Marcellus would not suffer them of Nola to come near the walls, or gates, the enemy being without. Neither would the 
c Transfugae ne● adire muros, nee alloqui quemquam passi sunt. Liu. 25.  garrison of Syracuse, that consisted of fugitives suffer the men of the town to come to the walls, or talk with the enemy that besieged them, or whisper together. All whisperings & secret meetings in such cases are suspicious. The Governor must further take heed how he come in place, where the townsmen may lay hands on him. The 
d Sallust. bell. jugurth.  Vaccians in Africa inviting the Governor of the town, and certain of his chief commanders, and Captains to banquets, did there first cut their throats & afterward setting upon the common soldiers destitute of heads did kill them also, & so yielded themselves to the enemy. They of Rochel did not so evilentreat the English that were there in garrison in the castle: but inviting Captain Mancell then Governor there to a banquet, first laid hands on him, then drawing out the soldiers under colour to moster them, did fair turn them and their simple Captain with scorn out of the town. All parleys with the enemy, are dangerous, unless they be managed by those that have skill, and be loyal, and in such place where the enemy may not come near the walls. While they of Syracuse did parley about the redemption of certain prisovers, a certain Roman marked the height and accesses of the walls, which gave the Romans means to enter the city by surprise. Eretria was taken by L. 
e Liu. 32.  Quintius while during the parley of peace, his soldiers espying the negligent guard of the townsmen scaled the walls. 
f Casilinum inter colloquia cunctationemque petentium fidem per occasionem captum est Marcello portam occupante. Liu. 24.  Casilinum was likewise taken by Marcellus his soldiers during the parley seizing a gate, and so giving entrance to their companions.  
The like happened to the town of Charitè in France Ann. 1569. where the Protestants in the time of parley espying their opportunity entered the town through the breach, that was evil guarded. In time of parleys therefore, & of feasts, & of times of greatest security, than the Governor is to have greatest care. 
a Liu. 25.  Syracuse was taken on a night when the soldiers had kept Holiday before, and lay drunk without fear or care. Nismes was surprised in a stormy night, when a man would have thought that none would have looked abroad.  
And if no wise Governor will commit any man of worth into the hands of his enemies, lest if they should break promise they might prejudice him; much less ought he to parley with the enemy where he may come in danger himself. 
b Caes. bell. gal. 5.  Titurius Sabinus going to parley with Ambrorix was by him perfidiously slain. Paches the 
c Thucid. 3.  Athenian detained Hippias the Governor of Notium that came upon assurance of his word to treat with him of peace, & forced him to deliver up the town. This was also the ruin of 
d Guicciardin.  Liverotto da Fermo & the Duke of Gravina & others, whom Caesar Borgia inducing by fair words to come to treat with him of peace, put to death at Senogallia.  
Those that have divers nations together in defence of one town, must also take heed, that there arise no grudge or discontentment among them, to make them revolt to the enemy. 
e Liu. 26.  Mutines the Numidian upon some discontentment offered him by the Carthaginians whom he served, by the help of his countrymen seized a gate of Agrigentum, & gave entrance to the Romans. The like cause together with some corruption in the soldiers caused some English to deliver up Alost to the enemy. Which practices he that meaneth to avoid, must never trust men that are suspect, nor suffer strangers to watch united without some of such as he dare trust joined with them, nor let any man know his quarter before he goeth to the watch. During the siege he may not suffer bell to ring or clock to strike, and further must keep good watch, & make rounds diligently, & at times uncertain.  
To content all men the Governor is to administer justice equally: that God may be pleased, he is to see that God be served religiously: and that laws concerning religion, justice, and military matters be strictly executed.  
Sallies are not to be made upon the enemy rashly, nor without good cause, especially, where the townsmen are not to be trusted. They of Rochel served our countrymen an odious touch upon such an occasion in the days of Richard the 2. Charles duke of 
a Phil. Comines.  Burgundy defeating 500 archers that sallied upon him out of Piquigni, made the town to yield unto him soon after for want of men. They of Liege sallying out upon the same Duke, lost their best men, which after ward they sore rued. And such was the wisdom and direction of some in the government of Caleis besieged by the duke of Guise, that albeit they had very few men to defend such a town, yet they would needs lose some of them going out to skirmish with the enemy. Oftentimes subtle enemies drawing out the townsmen by devices, do make them come short home, as I declared by the practice of Romulus against the Fidenians, of Annibal against the Locrians. At Nola 
b Liu. 23.  drawing out the townsmen, he circumvented a brave troop of horsemen in an ambush laid for them. Sallies therefore are to be made only when we have men sufficient, and do see the enemy's negligence, or other advantage. 
c Diaphanes Achaeus stationem Antiochi regis ad Pergamum invadens semisomnem nullis stratis equis aut peditibus paratis fudit. Liu. 37.  Diaphanes sallying out of Pergamus upon a corpse de guard placed by Antiochus before the town, at such time as the same was negligent, cut the same in pieces. By opportune sallies many sieges have been raised, as I declared by the example of Philip lying before Apollonia. Soldiers that sally upon advantage, do hinder the approaches of the enemy, so that he is to win inch after inch. but when they sally, let them take heed first that they go not too far, lest they be drawn into ambush; and secondly, that they have some behind to favour their retreat, as Aluarus Sandze observed in his sallies upon the Moors, in defending a fort in Zerbe.  
Before that the enemy approacheth, the Governor is to cause all houses and villages near the town to be ruinated and fired, and all the wood and timber as near as may be, either to be brought into the town, or spoiled. Lamentable (I confess) it will be to the country, but who would not rather spoil such things, then suffer the enemy to use them against himself?  
In stopping of the enemy's approaches, let him use this course: first if there be any narrow ways which the enemy must pass, before he can come before the town, let them be well trenched and guarded: when the same cannot longer be guarded for fear lest the enemy cut betwixt the corpse de guard and the town, let them then retire & make head in the 
d The Italians call it Via coperta.  covert way behind the counterscarp, not only for the defence thereof, but also for defence of the plain before the town, especially of that place, where the enemy meaneth to range his pieces for the battery. For defence whereof likewise, both the great ordnance from the bulwarks, and other shot from the walls are to be employed. In case the enemy by his negligence give occasion, either in the evening, or in the night, he may make a sally upon those that labour about the planting of the ordnance, & the gabions. If the enemy be so strong that he is able to take away the 
a The counterscarp is the bank that is made all along without the ditch of the fortress.  counterscarp, then by trains and 
b Casemates are defences of earth within ditches or trenches, where the soldiers lie covered, to shoot at those that present themselves unto them.  casemates in the ditch, by sallies and shot from the bulwarks and walls, he is to defend his ditch so long as he can. And last of all being beaten out of the ditch, his last hope is in the defence of his walls and bulwarks, sustaining them with good terraces of earth, and when they are beaten down, repairing them, and when no longer they can be defended by making retrenchments behind them.  
For defence of a breach, this course is good, and commonly used. First all along where the enemy maketh his battery, let there be presently upon the first shot a retrenchment made; the deeper the ditch is, and the higher the bank is raised, the better the work proveth: upon the bank, or else behind the bank, let some pieces be placed in counterbatterie. In houses near adjoining, and upon the bank, let the small shot be disposed chick. Against the enemy's artillery that beateth in flank, let there be an high terrace of earth raised. On both sides of the breach in places convenient, the armed men are to be placed to repel such as escape the shot. If the place have bulwarks or towers that look along the ditch, from thence the enemy is to be galled upon the flanks as they enter the ditch: if there be none, then mounts or terraces are to be raised in such places, as most commodiously we may look into the ditch, and toward the breach. Walls or banks are to be cast up beneath the breach in the ditch. Lastly, if store of men will permit it, a sally of targetters and other armed men is to be made out of the town upon the sides of those that are upon the counterscarp, or within the ditch: which no doubt will make the enemy make more speed to return.  
This or the like proceeding, both ancient and later practice of war hath taught us in the defence of towns besieged, and assaulted. The Plataeans besieged, having set order for their provision and the government of their people, to repel the enemy's force, raised their walls higher in that part where the enemy made show to assail them. All along the mount which the enemy built without, they made a new wall within their old. When the 
a Thucid. 2.  enemy went about to smother them, and to burn their engines upon the wall, they defended themselves with their archery and slingers, and quenched the fire with water and earth, and when they could no longer defend the town, in a tempestuous night they passed over the bank which the enemy raised against them.  
The Massilians when they perceived Caesar's intention to besiege them: 
b Frumenti quod inventum est in publicum conferunt. Caes. bell. Ciu. 1.  provided soldiers, brought corn out of the country into the city, erected workehouses for arms, brought their provision into the public store, repaired their walls, trimmed up their ships. When the enemy began to force them, they defended themselves by divers sallies, and engines fitted on the walls.  
The like diligence did the Gauls use against Caesar besieging Auaricum: they frustrated his engines with hooks 
c Laqueis falces avet tebant. Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  and other engines, they caused his mount to sink by undermining. Upon the walls they made divers towers; by divers sallies they hindered his works, his mines they opened with cross mines, and filled with great stones. The like did the Prenestins 
d Transuersis cuniculis hostium cuniculos excipiebant. Liu. 23.  against Annibal.  
Against escalades the 
e Caes. bell. Gal. 2.  Aduaticans besieged by Caesar, placed great stones and pieces of timber upon the walls, and likewise they of 
f Zamenses saxa volvere, sudes, pila, picem, & sulphur taedam mixtamardenti mittebant. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  Zama to resist the enemy's assault, Upon those that set the ladders to the walls tumbled down stones, and pieces of timber, and cast upon them pitch & brimstone, and shot and cast darts at them.  
In the defence of new Carthage in Spain assailed by Scipio, all things being provided, Mago assigned to every man his quarter & his charge, and both with engines from the wall beat the scalers, and with archery and armed men defended the breach. The Romans hearing of the approach of Porsena to besiege their city, sent into other countries to buy victuals, fortified their city, assigned to every man his several charge, dealt well with the common sort. The same reasons always continuing, the same course for the most part hath been used also of late time.  
Lignieres deputed governor of Chartres, an. 1568. which then was threatened by the Protestants to be besieged, first encouraged the people with good words, than together with the principal men of the town going about to mark the weakest places of the walls, caused rampires and trenches to be made presently. In that work he caused all the inhabitants to labour. Afterward being bet in flank, he raised up a terrace near the breach, spreading sheets and clothes before it for to cover the workmen: for grinding of corn he caused handmils to be made, and finally set good order for the administering of matters of war, and justice. But if he had burnt the suburbs, and beaten down the houses near the walls, and defended the Ravelin by the gate Drovaize more carefully and strongly, he had done far better. These things being neglected, the enemy placed his ordnance near to the wall in houses, from whence he discovered the breach, and divers places of the town, and hurt divers. He lodged his men very commodiously in the suburbs, and taking that Ravelin, had entered the city, if he had followed his good hap, or kept the place.  
The duke of Guise Governor of Poitiers, entering a little before the siege which the Protestants laid before the town, anno 1569. spent first one day in viewing the walls, and appointing fortifications and defences to be made, which was also executed with great expedition. He took the next day the moster of all the soldiers, and inhabitants able to bear arms, to see what strength he had. Afterward he appointed officers, & orders for the storehouses of victuals. Further he set some on work to make powder, others to burn the houses near the gates. The light horsemen he sent out to take some prisoners, & of them to understand the disseins of the enemy, & for avoiding of surprises, would not suffer bell to ring, nor clock to strike during the siege. For defence of the breach he caused a retrenchment to be made behind the wall: against the pieces that bet his men in flank, he opposed a traverse of earth: and directly against the breach placed certain pieces in countrebatterie. For sustaining the assault, he assigned to every man his quarter, disposed his shot upon the walls, & in certain houses near to beat the enemy approaching both in front, & in flank. near the walls he had his armed men ready, his horsemen he sent about the streets to keep men in order, and to send those that were there to the breach; only this was omitted, he burned not the suburbs, nor spoilt the country round about, nor provided cornemils, nor discharged the town of such as were unfit for service, nor of asses and jades that spent the hay so fast, that in the end there wanted for the maintenance of his horse of service.  
They of Rochel against the siege that followed an. 1573. first fortified their town, and then set order for their government: withal they made the best provision of victuals and munitions, they could: they sent to their friends for succour: they hindered the approaches of the enemy by divers sallies: for defence of the breach, they made a retrenchment behind, and filled the breach up with sacks of earth, and other things. For covering those that wrought, they made a thick smoke before the breach. Against the breach they ranged divers pieces in contrebatterie. To sustain the assault, they placed the shot on the flanks, and walls, placed squadrons of armed men both by the breach, and in other places: with trains of powder in the ditch, they scorched the enemy that came to the breach. Upon the foremost they cast stones, fire, scalding water, hot tar, and pitch: yet might they have done better, if they had made better provision of things necessary: next, if they had not made so many vain and weak sallies. If in one sally those that went out first, had been well seconded, they had surely raised the siege: while they spared the houses, and villages, and woods near the Town, they ministered many commodities to the enemy, without which he could not as he did, have continued his siege the whole winter long.  
In the siege of S. jean d'Angeli, anno 1569, captain Piles won to himself great commendation. The town was not strong, yet did he hold it long. The enemy wan no ground upon him, but it cost him dear. Upon his first approach he made so courageous a sally, that he made the enemy to give ground. In the place of the breach, he made a wall in the ditch before it, and a retrenchment within behind it, and casting the earth inward, raised a bank upon it, whereupon he placed divers pipes of earth, for defence of his soldiers. Upon the side of the breach, he raised up a platform of earth, with a parapet, for saving his men. By this means he sustained divers assaults, and at divers sallies cut divers of the enemies in pieces, and cloyed and dismounted divers Canons. If his provision of victuals and munitions, and the strength of men had been greater, he had no doubt kept the Town still: but wanting all things, and his platform being new, and but fifteen foot thick, and pierced by every Canon shot, and not able long to stand; force it was for him to accept of an honourable composition offered him by the king.  
And although the Town of Sancerre was yielded in the end to the enemy, yet do the defendants deserve to be remembered for their resolute defence, and reasonable good government. When they heard that the enemy determined to besiege them, they chose a Governor, and joined with him a Counsel of Captains, and the most apparent Citizens. Next, they mostred their people, enroled them in bands, and assigned to every man his charge and quarter, & appointed orders such as the time required. For defence of the breach, they made a retrenchment, and defended the same with gabions on the front, and sides, where they placed their shot, to serve at the time of the assault. To sustain the assault, they ranged their shot there, and on the walls, and in a certain gallery, and other houses near the breach. Upon the sides of the breach, and in other places convenient, they placed their halberds, pikes, and armed men: but wanting victuals, munitions, and men requisite for defence of such a place, they were driven to accept of a hard composition. Whereunto, if they had not spared their money in the beginning, or had sent out such as for age, and impotency were not fit for service, they could not have been so easily forced.  
The assault of Chateleraud, anno 1569, as it was forcible, so was it valiantly sustained by divers brave men directed by Scipio the Engineer. The breach being 80 paces wide, was so great, and the enemies coming so speedy, that they could not make any retrenchment behind it. Therefore leaving that course, upon each side of the breach they made gabions and barriquadaes, behind which they placed divers valiant men, armed with cuyraces, and targets. The front before the breach, was sufficiently fenced with houses. In the windows of the houses, and in certain holes made for the purpose, they placed their best shot, other shot they placed upon the walls behind the parapet, and in a certain gallery that overlooked the breach. When the Italians that had the point, came to the assault, and had entered the breach; they that were covered under the gabions, sallied upon the first, the shot from the houses, gallery, and walls, dispatched a number of the rest.  
In defence of towns besieged by the enemy, no time is to be lost, no cost, nor labour to be spared. By negligence, delays, sparing, and want of skill of the Governors, many towns are lost. It grieveth me to think how Caleis, Bullein, Rochel, and other Towns, which sometime this nation possessed in France, were lost by negligence, and misgovernment. But that it is the lot of all towns that that are committed to such weak persons, as beside the name have nothing of nobility. Alcida 
a Thueyd. 1.  that was sent to succour Miletum, by forslowing the time, suffered the Athenians to take the Town. Montegue a strong castle in Poitou, was lost by the negligence, ignorance, and covetousness of the 
b Histor. de troubls. de Fr. li. 5.  captain, that for two hundred soldiers which he should have maintained there, kept but twenty, and sought nothing, but spoil without regard, or knowledge of the keeping of the place. The Protestants lost Bronage, a town of great importance, for want of garrison, munitions, and victuals sent in time. What we have lost, and are like to lose by this means, I had rather we should learn by others examples, and reform it, then to blush to hear it reported, and confirmed by the examples of those that were actors.  
Thus we see what is to be done in the defence b government of a place assaulted or besieged, and also what is to be avoided. But because all this serveth to small purpose, unless the siege in time be raised, let us now show how that may be effected.  
The siege is raised sometime through want, or missgovernment in the camp, when for want of victuals, or other disorder the enemy of his own accord departeth. Sometime through sickness, sometime through the distemper of the weather, sometime through dissension of soldiers; sometime he removeth to secure his own people, straited in some other place: sometime by sallies of the townsmen, or secure of their friends, he is driven away. All those wants therefore that may move him to departed, are to be increased, and all those means that may hasten his departure, to be used. He is to be streited for victuals by our friends without. Some Town which he favoureth is to be besieged, his waters are to be corrupted, the place where he lieth, if it may be, is to be drowned. If he may be taken in disorder, with all our force he is to be charged, and all means used to call him home, or to tire him lying before us. The Prince of Orange succoured Leyden, and annoyed the Spaniards, by cutting of the banks of the rivers.  
Fabius 
c Hetruscos castra circumdantes vigilia quarta erumpens in stratis sternit, reliquos fudit, Liu. 9  being besieged in his camp by the Hetruscians, invading them upon a sudden a little before day, killed many, & put the rest to flight. The French kings brother anno 1569, besieging Chateleraud, caused the Protestants to raise their siege from before Poitiers, to secure their friends there. The Aetolians entering into the City of the 
a Liu.  Thaumacians besieged by Philip king of Macedonia, by their often sallies caused him to raise his siege. 
b Liu. 24.  Crispus Naevius sallying out of Apollonia in the night, put all the Macedonian army that lay before the town in disarray, and caused the same to dislodge. Scipio 
c Liu. 24.  going to secure his friends besieged, passed through the enemy's camp in the night, and presently sallying out upon them, forced them to relinquish their hold. The rumour of 
d Liu. 34.  Cato's approaches with succours, caused the Celtiberians to departed from a town which they besieged. Likewise in the year of our Lord, 1569, the town of Charitè in France was disengaged, the enemy departing for fear of a bruit of great succours coming to the town, both of horse and foot, which God wots was nothing so.  
At such time as the army riseth, the defendants have commonly good opportunity to cut those that lag behind in pieces. When Appius 
e Liu. 43.  departed from the siege of Phanotis, the captain of the town following after him, and charging him in straight & troublesome ways, at the foot of certain hills, cut a thousand of his men in pieces. Therefore as at other times, so then also the General ought to have care, that the sick, and hurt be sent before with a good guard, and with them the baggage of the army. then may he follow safely with the rest. By this course Caesar departed safely from before Dyrrachium, and in our times the Admiral from the siege of Poitiers. The French kings brother rising from Chateleraud, when his men were at the assault, as soon as he saw they could not prevail, he began to send away his great ordnance before, and at midnight followed with all his army.  
Resteth now for the finishing of this discourse, concerning the defence of places, that I show how any place may with labour be fortified, and what rules are to be observed in the making of bulwark, walls, ditches, banks, and all sorts of fortification, not in such curious sort, as do the Italians, which can neither be well understood of soldiers unacquainted with Geometrical terms, nor practised in time of wars, by reason of the time required in the raising of them: which notwithstanding may serve them in time of necessity, as well as the artificial workmanship of Italians that costeth millions, and always helpeth not. Yet would I not have things made either rudely without proportion, nor hastily without perfection, nor niggardly without things convenient.  
In ancient time, before the use of guns was found out, the danger of walled towns was, lest they might be taken with scaling, or their walls ruinated with shaking or zapping, their defence against scaling, was the height of the walls; against shaking, the mixture of wood, and stone, and thickness. Caesar showeth that the Gauls in his time fashioned their walls chequer wise, filling a frame of timber with square stones. so that for every piece of timbers head there was a square stone of that bigness laid in the wall. To increase the height of their walls, they made high towers upon them, in distance fourscore, or an hundred paces one from another. Their defence was stones, pieces of timber, iavelines, darts, arrows, and whatsoever could hurt the enemy thrown from the wall. These things for that their force was increased by the height of the walls, therefore did they build them high, as also to hinder the escaladaes of the enemy. Now for that great ordnance doth hurt more in flank then forward, and shaketh any wall though never so thick, and those most easily that are highest; therefore the use is to build walls low, that they may the better be sustained by the terrace behind, and more hardly discovered by reason of the counterscarp. for defence whereof, there are bulwarks builded out from the wall into the ditch, that the great ordnance being there placed, may not only shoot forward into the field, but in flank along the ditch, and the wall.  
Those towns therefore, and castles, I account to be well fortifield, that first are strongly walled, or banked round, with bulwarks in convenient distances to flank the walls, or bank; secondly, that behind the walls have a good rampire or terrace, and before them a deep and broad ditch: and last of all a sufficient counterscarp, with his covert way, with all the parts, and measures of the wall, terrace, bulwarks, ditch, and counterscarp proportionable. Where there is either part or proportion wanting, there wanteth so much of the perfection, and strength, that is in such works required. Whosoever therefore purposeth to fortify a place, must have respect first to the wall, and rampare, or to the bank, next to the bulwarks, thirdly, to the ditch, and lastly, to the counterscarp.  
The parts of the wall are these, first the foundation, than the wall to the cordon, and lastly, that above the cordon. Cordon I call that row of stones that divideth that part of the wall that is lowest, and covered with the counterscarp from the enemy's shot, and leaneth much inward to the town, from that which is for the most part open, and higher than the counterscarp, and leaneth less inward than the lower part of the wall.  
The whole height of the wall from the ditch to the top, is more or less according to the judgement of the Engineer, and means, and time he hath to build it in. Provided that it be not easily reached with ladders. it is sufficient if it be betwixt five and forty or forty foot high. of which albeit the parapet be beaten down, yet few scaling ladders will reach so high.  
The foundation of the wall would be made firm, and even, leaning a little inward. if the soil be soft and moist, it must be helped with piles of wood driven down thick into the ground, and stones rammed fast between them. if the soil be rocky, then must the same be made plain, or at least with degrees be aten out with the pick, and made level, that the stones may lie orderly, save that toward the town as the rest of the foundation it ought to be a little lower.  
The foundation of the 
a The curtain of the wall is that distance or part of the wall that is betwixt bulwark and bulwark, turret & turret, for that it is spread for the covering of the town.  curtain of the wall being laid, the first stone of the wall would be laid one foot from the board of the foundation, if no more. That part of the foundation that is without the wall the Italians call relasciato, which is nothing else in English, then that which is left of the foundation.  
The wall the Italians would have made so thick at the foot, that in the midst there may be left a space for a man to go along in round about the walls. this they call contramina. But it is cost to no purpose: for to vent a mine, the countermine is to be made as low as the foundation of the wall and lower, and rather in the ditch, if it be dry, then in the wall. The wall would be made so thick at the foundation, that albeit in every five foot of height it lean inward, and lose one foot of breadth or thickness, yet at the cordon it may be twelve or fifteen foot thick. From the cordon upward the wall is to lean inward, and to lose of his thickness in every five one half foot.  
The rampart or terrace behind the walls would be raised until you come within four or five foot of the top of the wall. This uppermost part for that it guardeth the soldiers that are behind it, when they turn their breasts to shoot, or strike the enemy is called parapet. If the same be not raised so high, but that the wall is seven or eight foot higher, as it is at Luca in Italy, & in the bourg at Rome, and diverse places, which I have seen: then must there be made a bank or way upon the inside of the wall four foot within the top of it, and degrees to mount from the rampart unto it, in divers places.  
The rampart cannot be too broad, but nine or ten paces it would be, if it be made sufficient. if it be less, hardly can you fit the cannon or coluerin upon it. The height is proportionable to the wall, as before I have showed. Toward the town the rampart would be made somewhat stoup and pendant, that the soldiers may go up and down the same in all places, when need requires; in the same like wise are stairs to be made in divers places, that those that have occasion may go up unto it with carriages. The side of it would be set with trees, for thereby the earth will be holden up more firm, and the same may in time serve to many good uses.  
Within every two hundred paces or thereabout, there would be a bulwark erected, the outward walls made in the same sort, that the walls of the curtain are made, but more thick and high by two or three foot. These are made for guard both of the great ordnance that beat along the ditch and curtain, and that which is pointed into the fields. These are sometime made with two stages, or places for the ordnance, the one above, the other beneath; sometime with one only place, sometimes all  without any places at all, as in Holland and Zealand, for the most part. the which are rather to be called terraces than bulwarks, for that they only serve to place great ordnance upon them to flank the walls or banks somewhat, but especially to scour the plains without.  
The form of them cometh nearest to five square, the base whereof is the rampart behind that part of the walls that goeth to the making of the bulwark, and is behind it. If thou wouldst make a bulwark at any corner of a wall, measure out from the point thereof forty paces, and draw a line of that length equally distant from the curtain of the wall on either hand. From the curtain take of each hand 25 paces, and from that point that is 25 paces from the corner, draw a line Ad 
a aequales angulos, or ad perpendiculum.  direct from the wall long two & twenty paces. From this line of two and twenty paces take ten to serve for the ditch between the town wall and the 
b The Italians call it Orecchion or Spalla deal Belnardio.  shoulder of the bulwark. the rest serveth to make the shoulder itself. From this point draw a line to to that point that is forty paces from the corner of the wall. and so thou hast the delineation of the one part or face of the bulwark. do the like on the other hand, and so thou hast thy bulwark delineated in good proportion. which not being observed in the bulwarks of Berwick, maketh them show crooked and deformed: but that is one of their least faults.  
From the line that is five and twenty paces long take twelve paces on either side toward the point of the corner of the wall, and thence drawing a direct line directly to the shoulder of the bulwark, upon that line work a wall all of massive stone, and when thou art come ten or twelve foot high, make there four loop holes for the cannon, and within the wall a sole for the ordnance to run on, well planed, but somewhat inclining to the ditch. The loop holes would be a yard broad, and four foot high. The first loop hole that is nearest to the curtain, would be made four foot distant from the said curtain, that the connon placed there may serve to scour the front of the next bulwark that is unto it, and the ditch and counterscarp thereof, being more than two hundred paces off. The other three loop holes would be made in equal distance one from another, and so far asunder, that both the cannon may recoil without touching any thing, and that in the midst there may be made a pillar to bear the flower of the place above. The use of the three pieces placed in these three loop holes, is to defend the curtain of the wall, and the ditch. and therefore the sole where they run, is to be made so high, that with their noses they may look somewhat downward into the ditch. In the midst of the lower place thou art to make a pillar all of massive stone, neither so big that it hinder the recoiling of the cannon, nor so little, but that it may bear the vault, and the cannon there placed above. In this upper place thou art likewise to make four loop holes, as in the place beneath: but if the same be uncovered, a good parapet well crenelled will serve for the loop holes. Within the bulwark also there would be a place made for the keeping dry of the munition, and instruments occupied about the ordnance, and also for keeping of arms for the soldiers. The entrance into this place and unto the places of the canon would be from within. And that the soldiers or canoneers may sally or go out into the ditch there would be made a door in the curtain of the wall near to the first loop hole. The like places, loop holes, and door is to be made on the other hand of the bulwark.  
All the bulwark save the places for the artillery, and munition, and except, if you will, the countermine going to the point of the bulwark, would be filled with earth beaten small, and well rammed together. The wall of the bulwark would be made like the wall of the town unless it please them that bestow the charge to have it thicker: and either may it be made with cordon, or without. The parapet of the bulwark would be more firm, then that of the wall. And in divers places would there be made soles for the canon to run upon above the bulwark. The shoulder of the bulwark being made for defence of the canon placed in the loop holes would be made strong. And likewise would the point of the bulwark be for that the enemy useth there to make entrance with his mattock, or zappe.  
I know few bulwarks are so large, or half so large as this that I have described, but the lesser they are the more they want of strength and of perfection; and deserve in deed to be called rather terraces, than otherwise. Those therefore that do mean to make them strong, let them make them also large, and if they make not their terraces with such places as I have described, yet let them leave some places, where to bestow the canon for defence of the ditch and curtain.  
Where the wall is round, or crooked, or so long that one bulwark cannot secure another, or that the same is so uneven, that the curtain cannot be made proportionable for distance: there the remedy is in the midst of the curtain to make platforms, and cavaliers, or mounts. The platform is made of the same matter, and almost in the same form that the bulwark hath; likewise it cometh out from the wall as doth the bulwark. But the difference is, that it is placed in the midst of the plain curtain, and is nothing so large as the bulwark, nor hath those places, and loop holes that the bulwark hath, and serveth only to place the ordnance upon it above.  
Sometimes that which platforms do being joined to the wall, that do ravelins, or terraces divided from the wall, which form la Nouè commendeth, and I do not mystic: For both the charge and labour is less, and well they may serve to strengthen some weak place, that otherwise is not fortified. And the same being beaten, yet the wall remaineth safe.  

a These Cavaliers are terraces of earth built without, or within the walls. So called because they look over the walls.  Cavaliers or mounts are made within the walls some two or three paces, & are employed to the same purpose that platforms are. From them they differ, that the platforms are raised in the ditch, and join to the wall, where as mounts are made within. They are to be made higher than the walls to look into the ditch to scour the plain or uppermost superficies of the bulwarks on either hand, and to discover the plain. The form is four square, yet oft times broader, then long. The stuff is earth, and faggots for the most part, holden up with boards and pieces of timber. The length is more or less according to the necessity of the place, and time that is given us to make it in. Some make them 180 foot broad, and long 150 the parapet would be 20 foot thick on front and on the sides. The stairs that are made to ascend the cavalier, are made behind.  
The place being thus walled round with walls direct, and well flanked with bulwarks at every corner, either in convenient distances, or else succorde with platforms or mounts in the midst of the curtain, cannot easily beforced, if it be well defended.  
Whether it be better to have five, or six, or more bulwarks, about one town, or fortress it is hard to determine: for if the curtain be made right, and of a reasonable length, and the bulwarks be so placed that one may entresuccour another, how many corners soever the fortress is, the same is good. Only fortresses of four corners and bulwarks, and much more those of three, because the bulwarks cannot one defend another unless they be made very sharp & weak, of men of experience have been found defective. The fortress of Porto Hercole in the territory of Sienna is of three corners, but it was so built either by reason of the ground that would admit no other form, or for that the insufficiency of those small bulwarks with three corners was not known when that was made.  
Those that either have not time or means to make walls, and bulwarks of stone, if they will observe the same measures and proportions, may make the same very well and strongly of earth, clay and small double mingled together, and either made in mortar stiffened with straw, or else borne up with small and strait sticks laid thin in the works. In Holland, Zealand, and other places of the low Country, there are divers good fortifications made only of turfs of earth well laid and fastened together on the out sides, and within stuffed with earth and double. Only the places for the canon which are made in bulwarks of stone, in these kinds of fortifications are wanting, and the points of the bulwarks made very weak and subject to zapping. Yet with timber I would not doubt to make one sufficient place on either side of the bulwark to range the canon in to beat low along the ditch and curtain; and with faggots also to make both the shoulder and point of the bulwark as stiff, as if were made with stone.  
Those that fortify their places only with turfs, or earth of which both the walls and bulwarks are to consist, are thus to proceed in their work. First the ground is to be plained so broad as they mean to make their bank, or rampart, or bulwark, and that would I not have less than 14 paces at the bottom. Some what lower in the midst then in the outsides. The ground being plained, a rank of turfs is to be laid outward, every one a yard or three quarters long if the earth be tough, and likewise a rank of turfs of a worse sort inward to the town. They are to be made thin to the inside and thick to the outside: upon the ends of these turfs, are other worse turfs to be laid, and the space within to be filled with small earth well rammed together. Upon these ranks of turfs other ranks of turfs are to be laid and to be fastened together, and to be filled in the midst until the same come to a sufficient height. The bank is to be made leaning inward, the better to hold up the earth. The earth must be digged out of the ditch all along the bank, leaning a yard or more from the foundation of the bank, which the work being finished, may be plained and fashioned to the bank, and may serve to make the bank seem high.  
To make a bank of earth and hazel rods, or other brush mingled together, this is the course. First the earth is to be plained, where the foundation is to be made, then small earth well sifted and rammed to be laid half a foot thick, and above that small rods with their heads laid as even as may be: and to the ends of those, other rods are to be laid, and earth over them, this is to be done both on the outside, and inside, and so to be mingled and rammed together until the bank come to the full height. The bank is to be made slope for the better lying of the earth, and to be filled with earth digged out of the ditch for ease of the labourers.  
If neither turfs of earth, nor sticks may be had sufficient, than the outward crust on both sides of the rampart, would be made of mortar well mingled with hay and straw, or else if the ground be stony, of stones laid in mortar. The inmost part, if it be filled with earth and double, and well rammed; will stand when the stones ruse down, and bear many canon shot, if it be of sufficient thickness. This manner of fortification requiring no great cost, and being perfected only with labour: greatly were it to be wished, that Plymouth, Falmouth, and other Port towns in England were so banked, and fortified. For albeit in continuance of time such banks are beaten flat, yet would they bear off any sudden force.  
When the work is come to the height, then is the parapet to be made 4 paces broad, if thy bank will bear it. And to mount up the rampart, stairs would be cast out in divers places. The broader the bank is, the better the earth will lie, and the better resistance it will make. But if the same be weak in any place, then is the same to be defended with mounts from within, and ravelins without.  
The measures of the bulwarks of earth with all their parts would be either equal to those that are made of stone, or larger, because otherwise the ditch would soon be filled with the rusing down of the earth.  
In making the walls and bulwarks, the breadth also and fashion of the ditch is to be cast: for if they be done both together, the earth that is digged out of the ditch may serve to make the rampart. The ditch where it is narrowest would be 15 paces broad. If it be made narrower, it may the more easily be filled up by the enemy, and by the ruins of the banks and walls. In France the ditches made in old time are either a does de l'asue, that is, deep and narrow in the midst, and rising on both sides, as the ditches about Amiens, and Paris; or else a fond de cwe, that is, equally deep in the bottom, and steep upon the sides. In both which the foot of the wall is open to the view, and easily battered. Neither do the defences made upon the rampart on which the wall is built, which they call fausses brays help the matter. Now the wall being raised out of the ditch, the bottom of the same would be level, but broad and deep; And in the midst of it a deep trench, which in dry ditches serveth to discover the enemy's Mines, in watery places to convey away the water. Some for defence of their ditch have built a wall in the midst of it, as in the ditches of Caleis: but it is to no purpose, seeing for the lowness of it, either with the ruins of the wall, or with earth and faggots cast into the ditches, it is soon covered.  
Whether the ditch be dry or full of water, it skilleth not greatly. For as both have their discommodities; so they have also their commodities. A fortress environed with a deep water, is less subject to sudden enterprises, except it be in time of hard frost. The same is more incommodious to pass, or to fill to the enemy: but the same is hurtful to the retreat of the soldiers that sally, and keepeth them up as it were in mue, and seldom is any ground so level, but that in some place or other, the water may be let out of the ditches: contrariwise dry ditches make fortresses more subject to surprises, but yet they are more commodious for soldiers to sally out, and to favour the retreat of those that come back. If there be heaps of stones in them, the canon doth more hurt to the enemy beating among them. Finally, the dry ditch giveth the soldiers means to defend their contrescarpe, which those that are environed with water, do as it were yield up to the enemy. Therefore where the fortress is strong, and well flanked, and manned, it is better to have a dry ditch: where it is weak, and evil furnished with soldiers, it is better to have ditches deep, and full of water.  
The last defence which is thought of, but first lost, or won, is the coutrescarpe, or bank without the ditch. The same is to be fashioned according to the ditch. In the making of it, we are to respect three points, according to the three parts of it. First, that the same be made so plain on the top, that the enemy do not hide himself behind it, and use it for a parapet. Secondly, that toward the ditch there be made a covert or close way, four foot broad, and four foot and a half high. Wherein the soldiers lying, may hinder the approaches of those, that come to view the walls, or full the ditch, or place their artillery; and sallying, may retire thither safely, being pursued by the enemy. Thirdly, that the pendant or bank of the contrescarpe be made so slope, that the soldiers may go down in all places without breaking their arms or their legs, although they cannot come up upon it, but at the stairs.  
These are the common defences of Towns or Castles, according to which, by the same rules others may be devised. Of late there is an Italian, that hath devised by certain terraces of earth before the walls, to keep the enemy from battering the curtain of the wall: and therefore he calleth them contraguardie. the same are thus to be fashioned.  
The curtain of the wall is to be made bending inward some eight or ten paces from the right line in the midst. eight paces from this is a rampart of earth to be raised all along the curtain between bulwark, and bulwark, higher than the contrescarpe, but lower than the parapet of the wall. this rampart is to have a covert way like to the contrescarpe inward, & being made low towards the ditch is there likewise to have a parapet. the same at the ends is to be made small, so that it do not hinder the artillery of the bulwark to scour the ditch. the artillery of the town that is placed at the inward angle of the curtain is to beat all along the ditch, and flank of this contregard.  
This manner of fortification having so many parapets and flankers, and such a thickness of earth, he supposeth that no battery shall be able to force: but on the otherside he considereth not, that the forces of the castle or town being not great are not sufficient to furnish so many places, nor convenient that they should into so many parts be divided: neither doth he think, that it is more easy to fortify two towns or castles, then to build these double defences: nor that the charge would be infinite.  
It is reported, that the Castle of And warp cost a hundredth thousand ducats building. what then would a citadel cost, that hath double the defences, and works, and requireth twice so many men, and twice so much ordnance? if few go to the cost of fortification with stone, and content themselves with banks of earth, it is not likely that any beside the work of stone will make so many terraces of earth, as by the rules of this kind of Italian fortification is required.  
The Prince of Orange in his time traced divers banks about such places as he thought necessary to be defended; as about William stat, and others, where there is scarce any bulwark, cavalier, or good platform. but the walls being made in and out, the inward angle of one part is made with great ordnance and mosquets to flank the other. besides this, the rampart is so large, that the artillery placed thereon, may be made to serve to many purposes.  
He that understandeth these rules, and withal the use of the canon, and all lesser pieces together with their effects: in what ground soever he is, may understand how to defend himself and his company so long as his victuals and munitions last. For example, if he be taken in plain ground, and would there lie safely; let him trace his banks and trenches either five square, or six square with bulwarks or terraces at every corner like unto a castle or town fortified: he may make it big, or less according to his number. If he be appointed to guard the passage of a river, he may understand how to cover his company, that he be neither forced in front, nor on the bank. Such places as are advantageous by nature as hills and straits, he knoweth how to make stronger by labour. The 
a Guicciard.  Bicocke in Lombardie resolutely defended by Prospero Colonna against the French, teacheth us how hard it is to pass a bank, that is well defended.  
The Spaniards in their wars in the kingdom of Naples against the French having made betwixt themselves and the enemy a bank and ditch of no great strength, yet by that small advantage obtained a great victory.  
These rules may also teach us how to strengthen such towns as are already walled and ditched, though weekly, and for the use of the canon unprofitably. The defences of walls made inartificiallie, are divers. First, rampires cast up behind the walls. secondly, retrenchments with banks made toward the town with a strong parapet, such as before I have described. Thirdly, platforms made at the corners or on the curtain of the walls, made in such places, as our artillery may best serve to flank our walls and ditches.  
The like effect have mounts, raised behind the wall upon the rampart. fourthly, ravelins placed from the wall forward, where the same is most strait, and the ground most even. The same are to be made five square, or at least three square, and raised of earth and rods mingled and rammed close together, about the which a broad and deep ditch is to be wrought. The last defence is in the depth of the ditches, and strength of the counterscarp, which is to be wrought artificially all along where we think the enemy will assail us.  
When the governor of the town hath used all possible means for defence of himself and his company, and yet through either long siege, or want of supply, or succour can hold the place no longer, let him before he attempt extremities, declare his estate to those that gave him the place to guard. After that, if he neither receive succour, nor answer, let him call the colonels, captains and chief citizens to counsel, and resolve in time what to do. The first point to be resolved, is, whether by any possibility the place may be defended any longer, consideration had of the number of serviceable men, of the want of victuals and munitions, and weakness of the place that lieth almost open to the enemy; likewise of the resolution of the enemy, and despair of succour. And if it appear that the same cannot longer be defended, the next point to be considered is, whether the same be to be yielded upon honourable composition, or to be destroyed and forsaken. In this case the qualities of the enemy are to be respected. For better it is, to run into any hazard, yea and to die fight, then to yield to him that performeth no promise, and killeth and massacreth men after yielding. If it be resolved, that it is best to attempt to escape by breaking through the camp, the next point to be considered is, by what means, and at what time and place the same is to be performed. The 
a Ala equitum Numidarum prae sidio Salapiae relicta eruptionem tentavit. Liu. 26.  Numidians that were left in garrison at Salapia, when the town was betrayed, and entered by the enemy, attempted to break through the enemy. A course commendable although it succeeded not. They of Plataea driven to great extremity by the 
b Thucid. 3.  Lacedæmonians that besieged them, when they could do no more for want of victuals, in a dark and tempestuous night went over the enemy's trenches and banks, and so escaped. They of 
c Acerrani desperata tutela urbis, ubi circumuallari urbis moenia viderunt, priusquam continuarentur hostium opera, per inte●missa munimenta, neglectásque custodias silentio noctis dilapsi sunt. Liu. 23  Acerrae despairing the defence of their city, when they saw the enemy to begin to compass them round about, before that his works were continued and perfected, in the silent night passing through where least resistance was made, escaped. The same was likewise attempted by the 
d Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  Gauls besieged by Caesar in Auaricum. The people near the sea coast of France, defended themselves so long as they were able against Caesar, & when they saw the case desperate, conveyed themselves and their goods into their ships, and so fled away. Attilius when he could no longer defend the town of Locri against Annibal, counseling the townsmen to compound with the enemy, conveyed himself and the garrison away by water. Such as had means to escape, & chose rather to compound with the enemy, the Romans in time past did so utterly mislike, that they refused to redeem those that had yielded themselves after the overthrow of Cannae, albeit they might have ransomed them with very little money. Yet those that purpose to break through the enemy's camp, are to resolve upon many things before they put it in execution: first of the time, secondly of the place where they purpose to pass, that they may fill the ditch of his camp if any be, and provide things necessary for that purpose, thirdly of the place where to retreat. Lastly in what order, that both they may force those that resist, and escape them that follow after.  
When there appeareth no hope either to hold out, or to escape by flight, then are we to try what composition we can have, and that in 
a Publius Sitius civitatum obsessarum quae conditiones oblatas recusarant cives interficit. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  time. So did the Romans besieged by the Samnites in the straight at Caudium. Neither did the Romans dislike with the garrison at Casilinum that compounded with Annibal. Nay they 
b Livi. 23.  rewarded them for holding out so long having no other victuals but nuts and roots. Nicolas Serin refusing necessary conditions of peace offered him by Soliman that besieged him in Sigeth, lost himself and many other brave men that were with him. The fact of 
c Livi. 32.  Aenesidemus governor of Argos, who when he might have escaped, the city being surrendered, chose rather to die armed himself alone in the place, then to departed, is rather to be lamented, then commended, or followed.  
Necessary composition therefore, so it be in extremity, is not to be refused. But yet while we talk of composition, we are to use great circumspection and care; first that the garrison be not discouraged; secondly that the same grow not more secure, and careless; thirdly that under colour of parley the enemy do not view the walls, or ditches or breach, or attempt to seize the breach or the gate, or else entertain some intelligence with some within: which things how dangerous they are, I have heretofore declared. To avoid these dangers this course is best; the necessity of the town, and other secrets are to be kept from the knowledge of the soldiers, who by good words are to be encouraged, and made acquainted with so much only, as is necessary: secondly such men only are to be deputed to parley, as are well known for their sufficiency, and loyalty: thirdly the place of parley is to be appointed far from the town, that the soldiers within hear nothing. Which was practised in divers parleyes during the last siege of Rochel.  
In capitulations two things are especially to be respected, first that the conditions be honourable, and favourable: secondly that the same be performed. The most reasonable composition that may be, is when they within keep the place still, paying only certain money, or losing only some other commodity. So Rome was redeemed from Porsena that besieged it; and so they that were besieged by the Gauls in the Capitol redeemed themselves. And Rochel escaped the more easily the hands of them that beesiegd the town, by compounding for money. Contrariwise of all points it is most extreme, to yield up the place to the enemy. If the Saguntins would have yielded up their town to Annibal, and consented to have dwelled some other where: they might have saved themselves, and their goods; but they would not. There is yet a mean betwixt these two, when those that yield to the enemy do promise him to become his subjects, and to pay him certain tribute, and so keep the place under his dominion.  
If then by any sum of money we may redeem ourselves, and our city driven to such extremity, let us not prize gold above safety: on the other side if we be not in extremity, let us not sell our advantages for money. When I read former histories, I cannot but wonder at the baseness of many of our nation, that in times past have been bought out of their places for money: and lament, that some accounted of, well otherwise, should therein deal more dishonourably, & foolishly then other nations. For what could be more dishonourable, than the surrender of Terwin, Torney, Bollein, & other places, or the loss of Caleis? and what more ridiculous, then that our army going to fight, should with a few French crowns be bought out, and persuaded to return?  
But if the enemy will hear of no composition without surrender of the place, the next consideration is, that we may be assured of our lives, and departed with our horses, and arms without disgrace. By the capitulation of S. 
a Hist. de troubls. lib. 10.  jean d'Angeli the captains and soldiers departed with their arms, horses, and baggage. Only they were driven to roll up their ensigns, and to make promise that they would not bear arms in the cause of Religion for the space of four months. The garrison of Somieres surrendering the town to the enemy were suffered to departed with their arms and goods, and had seven days respite given them to convey away their goods in. Like honourable composition had our men in the late surrender of Scluce. The more resolute the garrison showeth itself in standing upon points, the more honourable their composition doth commonly prove. And contrariwise those that will needs compound, lose both life and honour. The Romans for the most part would not compound without surrender made of the defendants arms: but the ancient faith and loyalty of the Romans being now lost and gone, let it be judged, what wisdom it is for men to put themselves into disloyal men's hands all naked.  
The greatest difficulty is in procuring of good assurance of the capitulation of surrender made. which is most of all to be stood upon. For what availeth it to have good words without performance? In these late brabbles of France the garrisons of Mucidam, and Mailè, and divers other places have been cut in pieces contrary to composition. And howsoever the prince of Parma dealt with our men, yet the poor townsmen of Scluce, and some of the Dutch complain, that all points were not performed. The Protestants of France, contrary to the articles of peace, were shamefully massacred during the mirth and solemnities of the kings sister's marriage. And now it beginneth to be a rule, that no faith, nor laws of war are to be observed to heretics. In which roll, seeing the Romanists do moster all that are not of the Papal faction, it behoveth us to look about, how we do trust them. especially giving us such warning by the feigned treaty of Dunkirk. Beside all this, a certain Spaniard, a great man of law in the Low countries, affirmeth, that all 
a Balthasar Ayala de iure belli.  capitulations wherein any thing that belongeth to the state is alienated, are void and of no force. Which if it were true, then could hardly any composition of surrender be good, further than they that have the same surrendered, keep the same by force.  
Wherefore, that we be not herein abused by treacherous enemies, let us see by what means we may assure ourselves. In times past we might trust men's words. if they performed not words, yet had they regard to writings and seals. 
b Hist de troubls. de Franc.  Captain Piles for the assurance of the composition of S. jean d' Angeli, required only the kings hand and seal. But now such disloyalty is entered into the world, that neither with words, nor writings, nor seals, nor yet oaths men can stand assured. And therefore beside words and writing, wise men now require sureties, pledges, and hostages. The house of 
a Guicciard.  Bentivogli in Bologna would not capitulate with Caesar Borgia, unless the French king, and Florentines would give their words, and bind themselves for performance. The 
b Phil. Comines.  constable of France would not trust Lewis the eleventh his oath without pledge. Both of Lysander in old time, and of Lewis the eleventh in latter times, stories affirm, that they had small regard of promise, or oath, further than their profit required. Therefore both in time past the Romans, and of late time others have required, and had other assurance. The garrison of Brovage 
c Anno 1577.  capitulating with the enemy about the surrender of Brovage, doubting of the performance of covenants; demanded, and obtained hostages, which were conveyed to Rochel before they gave up the place. they of Somieres had likewise hostages delivered unto them, such as they did nominate, before they did deliver up the town. Without this assurance, it is not safe for any to commit their heads into their enemy's hands. and far more honourable it is to die like brave men in the field with our arms in our hands, then like sheep to have our throats cut in the hands of perfidious butchers. Tit. 
d Liu. 24.  Sempronius seeing himself betrayed, and that he must needs die, exhorted his men to die rather fight and doing somewhat, in which case men have less apprehension of death, then under the knives of executioners.  
To avoid all cavilles about words, the sentence is to be conceived plainly, and all circumstances to be expressed, as near as may be. and the redress of all contraventions, if it may be, either by some means to be kept in our own hands, or in the determination of honourable persons. The 
e Sleidan.  Landgrave that yielded himself, and came to the presence of Charles the fift, Maurice of Saxony being mediator betwixt them, upon cavil about one word, was contrary to his meaning, detained prisoner, and had been longer, if that Maurice had not conceived indignation, that upon his word the good prince should be abused. All we can do in this case, is too little. For when princes will quarrel, they can pick occasion, and ground themselves upon every small point, and make many fair pretences: as in the dealings that passed betwixt 
f Guicciard.  Lewis Sforza, and the house of Medici; betwixt pope julio the second, and Lewis the twelft of France, and betwixt them and Ferdinand king of Spain is evident. Of more than we have in our own power, we can never assure ourselves, when we deal with perfidious enemies. And therefore let all brave soldiers consider before hand and provide, that they come not into these straits, and if necessity enforce them to compound, let them deal wisely.   

CHAP. XVIII. Of the use of the Navy in wars, and of divers points to be considered of those that command at Sea.  
THose Nations and Cities, that have the commandment of the Sea, howsoever they are foiled at land: yet can never be thoroughly vanquished, before they be beaten from the Sea. A matter apparent by divers examples. The Athenians, although their country was all wasted, and the people driven by the Lacedæmonians their enemies, to hide themselves within the walls of the City; yet so long as they were 
a Thucid. 1. Exorat. Periclis.  strong at Sea, not only had all things necessary for themselves, but also deprived their enemies of many commodities, and spoiled their coasts by divers sudden incursions. And albeit they had no dominion in firm land: yet kept they the islands in subjection, so long as they kept the Sea. The same people before that, being invaded by the Persians coming upon them with huge array, in so much that they thought themselves unable to resist at land, abandoned their City, and made themselves strong at Sea. By which means, in the end they vanquished their enemies, and recovered their losses with great advantage both of wealth, and honour. The Cities likewise on the coast of 
c Caes. bell. gal. 6.  France, which is now called Briteine, although they could not defend themselves against Caesar's forces at land, yet suffered no great loss, as long as they had ships to command at Sea. Their ships furnished them with things necessary being besieged, the same conveyed the men & their goods away being distressed. Contrariwise how strong soever a Nation is by land, yet cannot the same maintain itself long, nor continue in reputation without a sufficient power at Sea. The Romans were driven to great straits by the Pirates, that kept the rule of the Sea a great time, and continued it until such time, as they were driven thence by the victory of Pompey the great. Sext. Pompeius keeping the Seas with his ships, drove Augustus, and Antony to a hard composition. The Lacedæmonians could not remedy the spoils of their country made by the incursions of the Athenian ships, nor could Caesar have reason of the coast Towns of France, before he had provided a Navy, & vanquished them at Sea. Neither shall ever the Spaniard obtain his purpose of the Low-countries so long as they can keep the sea: but if they fail of that, it would go hard with them. This was the cause that made the Romans, albeit before that unacquainted with sea causes to arm to sea. Without their navy they could neither have defended their Empire against the Carthaginians first, nor afterward against the pirates, nor without strength at sea could either Caesar have subdued the coast towns of France, or entered this Island. Nor could Augustus have vanquished Pompey, nor the Lacedæmonians prevailed against the Athenians. The experience of these nations, and great warriors, doth teach us this conclusion, that if we mean either to maintain the honour, & reputation of our country, or to defend ourselves against the enemy, the pursueth us, or to prosecute injuries done unto us, or to aid our friends that crave our help, we must have diligent regard to our seafaring men, & shipping, that both may be maintained, & kept in order. Our own experience, & divers reasons may teach us the same. Before that this Nation did use the sea, first the Romans, than the Saxons, after them the Danes, & now last of all the Normans, have taken & possessed divers parts of this country. Neither could we wanting sufficient force at sea, resist them. Sithence that the kings of England have had the government at sea, neither have foreign nations had like courage to invade us, nor have we wanted means to defend ourselves, or aid our friends. If that our ships had not had the vantage of sailing, when the Spaniard came to invade us, or that we had wanted shipping, God knoweth what would have been the issue. How much then is it better now, then when our ancestors had neither navy to defend their coasts, nor to transport their armies to pursue their right, or help their friends? in the days of king Edward the 3. and Edward the 4. our nation for want of shipping, was beholding to the Flemings and Hollanders for shipping, to transport the English army into France. The use of the navy is great in peace, greater in wars. Thereby traffic, & intercourse betwixt friends is maintained: victuals that go to the enemies are stopped, our wants of victuals, arms, munition, & other necessaries are supplied: the enemy's coast is spoiled, our own defended: the coast towns of the enemy's country, that live upon the sea are brought to great extremities, our own maintained. Without the same neither can the trade of merchandise be maintained, nor the sea towns of the enemy be besieged, nor their country spoiled, nor can we understand the enemies proceed, nor help, or well defend our friends, or ourselves. For three causes especially as 
a Classem trium rerum causa paravimus, ut Africae oram popularetur, ut tuta nobis Italiae litota eslent: ante omnia ne supplementum cum stipendio, commeatuque a Carthagine Annibali transportaretur. Liu. 24.  Fabius witnesseth did the Romans furnish, & set out their navy: First to spoil the coast of Africa, next to guard the coast of Italy, but chief to hinder that no supply of men, victuals, or money should come from Carthage to Annibal, with whom then they had great wars. Octacilius sailing from Sicily toward Africa, & coming upon the coast upon a sudden, first took Utica a rich town, and then spoiled the country, & returned with 130. ships laden with spoil. And all this within 3. or 4. days. Caius Laelius coming with his navy to 
b C. Laelius nocte ad Hipponē Regium cùm accessistet, luce prima ad populandum agrum sub signis milites sociosque navales duxit. Omnibus pacis modo incuriosè agentibus magna clades illata. Liu. 29.  Hippo on the coast of Africa landed his men on the sudden, and at the break of day led forth his soldiers, & mariners in warlike manner under their colours, and made a great spoil, for that as in time of peace, the people of the country were without care. M. Valerius 
c Liu. 25.  Messala sailed into Africa, aswell to spoil the country, as to understand the proceed, and purposes of the enemy: which he learned by the examinations of divers prisoners of good account, which he took there. 
d Liu. 27.  The Romans understanding what spoils were done upon their coasts by Pirates, and others, sent two captains, each of them with 10. ships to defend the coasts, and to keep the seas. These uses of shipping, although experience hath taught us, yet many will not admit nor believe. For by reason of their want of skill, they think that neither the enemy can land here, nor we land in the enemy's country. And if the enemy should attempt any such matter they verily believe, that the country people with their forks, and the women with their rocks and spits will kill them down. But little do they know how small trust there is in such defence, nor what great actions may be performed, when resolute men land in the enemy's country upon a sudden. Which in part I have showed by the examples of Octacilius, Laelius, and Messala. Neither will any trained men, or small garrison, help the matter as now I shall show. The king of 
e Vrbem tenebat regium praesidium, agrum circa depopulati sunt Romani exscēsione ex navibus facta Liu. 37.  Macedonia did place garrisons in all the coast towns, yet was he not able to guard the country from spoil of the Romans, that out of their navy landed here, and there. The Athenians notwithstanding that the 
f Thucid. 3. & 4.  country was well guarded both with horsemen and footmen, yet landed divers times, and sacked and spoiled divers towns in Peloponnesus. Neither may we think, that Africa that so was spoiled by the Romans, was all that while without guard. But the suddenness of the invasion prevented the gathering together of those, that were to make resistance.  

a Caes. de bell. ciu. 2.  Nasidius coming upon a sudden into the haven of Messana took out a ship thence in the sight of the Townsmen & other ships. Neither could the Athenians keep so diligent 
b Thucid. 1.  watch at their beacons, but that the enemy coming on the sudden took 3. ships out of the haven of Salamine, & set the town in an uproar. As for those that think it a hard matter to land quietly in the enemies country: they seem to be ignorant not only how easily we landed our men in the voyage of Portugal, both at Coronna & Penicha: but also of the easy landing of the Athenians in Peloponnesus, of the Romans in Africa, & in the coast of Spain, & Greece. All the forces of this Island being assembled together, & seeing Caesar's coming, could not hinder his landing. Nay when Pompey held all the port towns of the coast of 
e Caesar inter saxa quietam nactus stationem, milites exposuit Pompeianis omnia tenentibus. Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  Epeirus with strong garrisons, & had a most puissant army ready, yet could he not forbid Caesar to land his army that came against him, & in a calm landed his men among rocks. Sarlabous minding to stop the landing of Minguetiere in the isle of Oleron an. 1569. charged him in the landing, but with such disadvantage, the others men being covered in their botes & shalups, & he being on the open shore, that he & divers men lost their lives in the place, the rest had no way to escape but by running. Those that land against those that resist them have many advantages, they come upon the sudden, they have great number of resolute soldiers, they comeprepared to fight, They stand close in their botes covered with their targets: their small shot, & their falcons or other small pieces placed in the noses of their botes doth make them way. Contrariwise soldiers are not gathered upon a sudden, & tumultuary forces of the country come rather to gaze, than to fight. Seldom do they endure blows, & sometime they fear at the sound of pieces. Those that present themselves upon the shore, lie open to the enemies shot. Neither captain nor soldier can come in warlike sort, being taken upon such a sudden. The only danger of those that land in a foreign country is, least the tempest arising, suffer them not to be shipped again. Which happened to the 
d Thucid.  Athenians landing in Peloponnesus. And yet going to the next harbour, they took the place, and stayed there, until such time as their ships could come unto them. In all which time the country was not yet come together in such numbers, that they durst fight with them.  
By the navy the victuals that go to the enemy are intercepted. Nabis the 
e Liu. 34.  Lacedaemonian with a few ships so watched the coast, that no victuals could come to the Romans, that then warred against the Macedonians in Greece. By the same Classem 
a paratam, instructamque ad commeatus intercipiendos habebant. Liu. 30.  course the Carthaginians lying incertain islands at the receipt hindered the repair of ships that brought victuals to the Romans. Neither could they redress this disordered before they had taken all the 
b Toto mari pulsis hostium navibus magni commeatus frumenti Romam subvecti sunt. Liu. 28.  islands from them, and driven their 
c Liu. 21.  ships out of the sea. Those that would defend the coast from the enemy's spoils, are to proceed in this sort. In 
d Carthaginenses speculas per singular promontoria ponebant. Liu. 29.  Promontories they are to keep diligent watch at beacons. To understand the enemies proceeding, they are to send forth their espials in ships of good fail. Upon the coast they are to maintain 
e Omnia oppida maritima praesidiis firmavit. Liu 35.  forces both on horseback & foot, & to place in port towns good garrisons. This did the Carthaginians practise in their wars against the Romans, and long before them the Lacedæmonians against the Athenians, & other nations proceeded in like force. and all little enough. For where there is not a navy ready furnished to seek out, & to fight with the enemy, either in one place or other coming with great forces, he will land, & may for any resistance that can be made from the land upon a sudden against such force, do the same without danger.  
But if (as in deed it is far better) we purpose ourselves to invade the enemies, & to land our men in the country, yet let us proceed more wisely, & orderly, then heretofore some men have done, and let us not always presume upon the enemies weakness. If former examples can not instruct us, yet may the smart of their losses having lost both many good friends, and brave men make men more resolute & more wary. First therefore let us consider the time when the enemy is most secure, and the season that best serveth for us, that we then go not when either heat, or cold will beat us, & the country is least provided to maintain us with victuals or forage. Secondly let us consider the place where the enemy is most open, & where there is most commodity for us: further let those that attempt such enterprises provide themselves of all things necessary for such a journey. Alas why should men be sent to sea to be famished, or among the enemies to be dishonoured? Before things be ready, let us not discover our purpose. Neither let the Spaniard hear of our enterprises, before that men be levied that should execute them. If the 
f Thucid. 1.  Lacedæmonians had repressed their anger, until such time as they had provided themselves both by land & sea, as Archidamus counseled them; they had done more hurt than they did to the Athenians. But what if such as go in such services cannot have things necessary? then let them quiet themselves, & let those that are the hindrances of all good service go themselves, & fight themselves first: for by going in that sort, they do hazard their lives, and lose their honour.  
The provision is to be made at a place certain, which being made, all the soldiers are to have their rendezvous given them at that place, & both they & the provision is to be shipped, & to departed with the next fair wind that bloweth after that time. When we are 
a Vbi omnes iam in navibus erant, scaphas circummisit, ut ex omnibus navibus gubernatores & magistri navium & bini milites, in forûm convenirent ad mandata accipienda. Li. 29  ready to departed then is direction to be given unto the chief of every ship either by word of mouth, or in writing sealed, & to be opened at the sea. That the enemy do not meet us, or cross us at sea, we are to understand by our espials where his shipping lieth, & what it is, & in what readiness.  
To come upon the sudden, the best course is, as soon as we descry land, and see where we are, to stay until the shutting of the evening, and then to make toward the haven, or harbour. If the weather be fair, there is no danger. Neither did the Romans ever doubt to come on the coast in the night. Laelius landed at 
b Liu. 29.  Hippo in the night. 
c Liu. 31.  Claudius' lurking behind a promontory so long as it was light, landed his men in the evening, and took Chalcis before day. And some think we might have sped better at Coronna, if we had either entered in the evening, or not discovered ourselves so long before we entered. Neither are brave 
d Formidolosum dictitans imperatori quo prohibentur plerunque conatus honesti. Tacit. annal.  actions hindered by anything more, then by pretence of fear. The more expedition that is used in landing, the greater execution is commonly done; and the longer it is delayed, the more time the enemy hath to resist, or rather to run away, and convey away his goods. If we mean to do any great execution, our force must be the greater. The Romans employed not in such enterprises less than an army: but if we might land but 4000 foot, and 200. horse, leaving guard sufficient for our ships, I would think to do some great matter with them.  
Yet that we may speed the better, it were good to resolve and give direction before we depart from our country, who should land first, and what every man should do presently upon landing. Being landed, we are to proceed in order, according to the practice of war, sending our espials before, & placing corpse de guard in convenient places, to defend those that are ranging about to fetching spoil. The 
e Romani palati, & praeda graves interficiuntur, & add naves compelluntur. Liu. 27.  Romans marching dissolutely after their landing in Africa, and thinking their coming thither was only to spoil, and not to fight, were discharged of their burdens, & driven to their ships with loss. Another time wandering up and down without 
f Cum multa caede & foeda fugaretrò ad naves compulsisunt. Liu. 22.  care or fear, they were drawn into an ambush, and driven back to their ships with great slaughter, and shameful flight. Which mischief cannot happen to those that forecast dangers, and go strong, and dispatch quickly, and provide for their retreat. As did Laelius and others, whose examples I have propounded to be imitated in like enterprises.  
Those that do not aswell provide that their men may retire safely, and be orderly shipped, as that they may go forth orderly seldom escape danger or loss. Therefore is there a defence to be made at the landing, and certain banks & trenches to be cast, that our men may safely retire within them, & from them quietly, & without tumult take shipping, repelling those the come to charge them. At 
a Alexandrinis imminentibus, nullus dabatur in naves receptus. Hirt. de bell. Alex.  Alexandria when Caesar's men being driven from their ground, would have fled to their ships, they came so fast, that they sunk the botes that were ready to receive them, so that few escaped, save such as could swim: the enemy pressed so fast upon them, and so little order there was to favour their retreat, that was not looked for. The like disorder 
b Caes. bell. ciu. 2.  happened to the remnant of curio's soldiers in Africa. If they would have gone orderly, and quietly, every man might have been shipped: because they strived, the boatmen were afraid to set their botes to the shore. Although no enemy urge us, yet great loss happeneth by such tumults, as is evident by the tumultuous 
c Liu. 41.  retreat of Appius his soldiers, that ran to their ships, and were drowned many of them by their haste, when the enemy whom they feared, followed not. Further, we are to appoint a time, when every man is to retire to his ships, that no company stay to long. And above allthings we are to provide, that our ships stand safely both against the attempts of the enemy, & the force of the weather, and to give order in case they be forced before our return to weigh ancre, where to meet us. If the enemy can either burn our ships or botes, or if there be not correspondence betwixt those at land, and those at sea, they both incur a manifest danger, & therefore we are to choose a safe place of landing, & to keep a diligent & strong guard. The Carthaginians being charged by the Romans, while their men were at shore, were over thrown at sea. Neither did it help them, that their men were in the port. For while they hasted to get on board, & to provide themselves to fight 
d Omnia praeproperè agendo militum apparatu nautica ministeria impediuntur: trepidatione nautarum capere & aptare arm● miles prohibetur. Liu. 22.  the soldiers hindered the mariners, the mariners crossed the soldiers, & all was out of order. Never therefore ought the ships to be left without sufficient defence. The 
e Liu. 10.  Greeks that went up the river of Pò to seek spoil, were defeated by the peasants of the country, for that going on land, they left their botes in the river without defence or guard, which being seized, they were cut from their retreat.  
Didius 
a Hirt. de bell. Hispanico.  Caesar's admiral in Spain, burnt Pompey's ships left without guard, while he & his men were gone on shore to feteh in water, & other provision. So he that escaped Caesar's hands in the overthrow at Munda, was here overtaken by his own negligence. The same 
b Ibidem.  happened to Didius himself also. For fearing no enemy at sea, & coming himself & his company on land, his ships were suddenly fired by certain Lusitanians that before had served Pompey, by whom also himself, and his company was slain. Neither ought we to enter any haven or harbour, where the enemy may bar us in, or take us single as we go out. The 
c Thucid. 3.  Athenians taking the mouth of the harbour at Pylos, shut in the navy of the Lacedæmonians so, that it did them no service. The same stratagem the Lacedæmonians put in practice against the Athenians in Sicily. For taking the 
d Thucid. 5.  mouth of the haven of Syracuse, where all their navy did lie, they drove them in the end to forsake their ships, which was the beginning of that calamity that happened to them in Sicily. The English in the days of 
e Froissart.  Edward the 3. finding certain Spanish ships in a certain haven in Briteine, seizing the mouth of the haven at flowing water, sending certain boats and barks on fire among them fired them al. Polyxenidas 
f Liu.  admiral unto Antiochus, taking the Rhodians with their ships in a straight, kept them within; and when they forced to come out, which they could not do, but two or three on front, he took the foremost before the rest could come to secure, and so destroyed the Rhodian navy. Therefore ought we to have no less care, that we may lie safely within the harbour, and go out easily at pleasure, then to win the harbour.  
Thus we see the manifold uses of shipping, and how it is to be guarded and governed in foreign enterprises in countries abroad. Let us now therefore consider how it is to be fashioned, furnished, and governed, that the same may be vantageous in fight at Sea, and fit for service. Wherein a principal point is, that they be made swift of sail, & sharp to go near the wind. This only one vantage next unto the power of God gave the victory to the navy of England, and the foil to the supposed invincible navy of Spain of late time. D. Brutus 
g Caes. de bell. ciu. 2.  although in all points else he were superior to the Massilians, yet by reason their ships were lighter and swifter, could he not overthrow them, although many times he foiled them. If they be too weak, those that are swift of sail may safely departed, if they prevail, no ship can escape them by sailing. They ought likewise to be made strong, both to abide the force of the Sea in a storm, & to bear the shaking of our own ordnance, and the blows of the enemies. How that is to be wrought, I refer myself to the masters of the occupation.  
Further, ships may not want victuals while they are at sea, lest either having the advantage, they be driven to give it over, or being taken at advantage, they be not able to abide it out. And most absurd it were if ships that go to fight should want ordnance, munition, and arms to fight with. First therefore there ought to be good ordnance mounted on their carriages, and fitted with their rings & tackle, and all instruments necessary. Of all pieces the demi culverin in the nose and poop is most effectual, both for the long reach, and for that it giveth the fire all out of the ship. There would be store of cross bars, chain shot, and other bullets. How many pieces there ought to be in every ship, it cannot be determined, considering the divers make and burdens of ships. Much less can it be resolved what munitions, victuals, and furniture for great ordnance must be provided further than in general, that there must be sufficient. Beside the great ordnance there ought to be provision made of mosquets, calivers, and pistols, swords & daggers, half pikes, halberds, glaives, blackbils, and other sorts of weapons, & for the defence of the soldiers good cuyraces and morions, and targets both of proof & lighter. Likewise there would be ramparts made of wool, and for the defence of the waste and the deck a strong netting. Beside castles made in the poop, and foredecke for guard of the ship. For which there would be made also mantelets of planks filled with occum stuffed between, and movable, that they may be employed where need is. The castles would also be made to take down, that in sailing the ship be not hindered by them. There would also turrets, bridges or frames of wood be made leaning over board, that our men might more easily board the enemy. The tops would be fenced with some frame of boards lined with occum & furnished with stone & shot. But that need not be before we come to join. The yard arms would have sharp hooks in them to cut the tackle of the enemy's ships.  
To fire the enemy's ships there would be balls of wildfire, and other fire works and engines devised, and to quench the enemy's fire store of clay, vinegar, and water set ready. Besides all this, axes, hammers, wimbles, & all instruments to work withal, and in sum whatsoever may serve to annoy the enemy or defend ourselves, the same is to be provided.  
Caesar albeit his ships were lower than those of the enemies, yet did he raise up turrets and 
a Turres excitabant in navibus, unde in hostium naves altiores transcendebant. Caes. de bell. gal. 3.  frames of boards in them, by means whereof, his men when they came to boarding did easily enter the enemy's ships, and foiled them. By which means he vanquished the power of the Gauls at sea. If that we have to do with the Spaniard at sea; either must we use some such devise, or else shall we hardly enter their ships being so high, in respect of ours. With 
b una erat magno usui res praeparata à nostris falces praeacutae insertae, affixaeque longuriis, quibus funes abrumpebant. Caes. bell. gal. 3.  hooks in the yard arms he cut the tackle of the enemy's ships in the same fight. But above all things there ought to be in every ship store of valiant soldiers, and mariners, without which neither the ship, nor the furniture can be employed to purpose. I would only content me with mariners, if they were soldiers also. The Romans and Greeks that well knew the difference betwixt them, for every mariner put in their ships two soldiers, which proportion the Spaniards observe now, making great difference betwixt mariners and soldiers, although we do not therein make that difference, that we should.  
The 
c Poenus ut sociis navalibus affatim instructam classem, ita inopem milite habebat. Extemplò 7. punicae naves circumuentae, fugam ceterae coeperunt. Liu. 20.  Carthaginian ships encountering with the Romans were not able to make any fight for want of soldiers, albeit they had store of mariners. And in the encounters that Caesar had at sea against divers enemies, it was not the mariner, but the legionary soldier that gave him the victory. Howsoever it is either with mariners, or soldiers, or both, our ships are to be furnished so, that both the great ordnance may be employed in the rooms below, and divers be placed to do all services necessary in the howl of the ship, and also all the decks and parts above be well manned and guarded: not forgetting the tops and other places.  
If men set out their ships neither well manned, nor well victualled, nor well furnished with arms and munition of war; what hope is there for them to vanquish the Spaniard or any other their enemies at sea?  
Some, I doubt not, do think to make them duck at sea with great shot. And therefore as they provide somewhat slenderly for that, so for other matters they go to sea altogether unprovided. Besides that I understand that in some places the Princes shipping have for the most part special instructions not to grapple. Matters very ridiculous to those that have but any small skill at sea. For it is not always in their power to take and leave, as the lamentable experience of some of late hath declared. Where the enemies ships are swifter than thine, he may if he find thee at sea, and list to fight, force thee against thy will to fight, or to yield. Yea admit he hath only some ships swifter than thine, yet will it suffice to force thee to a general fight, unless thou meanest shamefully to abandon to the enemy's courtesy such ships, as are slower of sail, than the rest. For we may not think that always we shall meet with such a General, as the duke of Medina Sidonia that always fled, and never made head again, or with those that have commission to fly, and not to fight. Which if we do, then beware those that are hindermost. Besides this our ships may be taken sometimes in harbour, or at some advantage when they cannot fly from the enemy. Were it not expedient in this case, that thy ships were well provided forgrapling, & all manner of defence? unless they be so furnished, how can they abide a brunt, or stay a time until they be succoured? or how can they be succoured, unless the succours be provided for grappling? Finally suppose all thy navy were swifter than the best ships of the enemy (which cannot be) and that thou hadst always sea-room, which cannot be hoped: yet all this maketh little to fight, but rather to flying. The Parthians that shot backward flying, yet did not always fly, but now and then charge the enemy, if advantage were offered. Sure in this kind of fight of ships there is altogether no honour, no nor profit. For how can they that fly subdue the enemy that cometh to spoil their coasts? How can they hinder him, but that he may go whither he listeth, and return when he listeth, the wind and weather serving him? Suppose that by shot thou shouldest sink a ship, yet the men may still be saved. Those therefore that thus fight shooting, and never come near, are like unto those that strike the enemy down, but dare not set their feet upon him, and dispatch him.  
As for those that think to work wonders with great shot, they do only feed themselves with imaginations, that the enemy is like to women or children, that fear the noise of great pieces. For other great hurt it doth not, unless it be to merchants ships heavy laden, and where the men within cannot come to stop leaks. if the sea move never so little, twenty to one but the shot falleth either high, or low, unless the ships come very near, which in fight with a navy of ships, I suppose, no one ship will, and many cannot for fear of grappling, which they forswear. I would gladly know of these men how many ships they have known to have been taken with this manner of fight. Don pedroe's ship, although abandoned of all her fellows, yet would never have yielded, but that they within imagined they should be boarded of all the fleet. Those ships that fell among the flats before Vlishingen being a remainder of the Spanish fleet, yet abode a charge, and would not yield, but upon fear they should have been invested. Did not our men at Coronna beat a great Biskaine ship from the land within mosquet shot a whole day with divers great pieces? yet could they neither sink the ship, nor force the men to yield before that with their boats they made countenance either to fire her, or to board her. They of Rochel An. 1569. besieging Brovage brought the great Venetian carrake hard to the side of the castle: whence a man might have spit into her, not only hit her, and shot into her. Yet could not they of the castle with all their canon shot either sink her, or greatly hurt her, but she hurt them much more. By grappling I have heard of many overcome at sea, both in ancient time, and also of late days, as in the gulf of Lepanto where the christians over came the Turks; and in the encounter betwixt the 
a Guicciard. hist.  Spaniards and Philip Doria, where Hugh Moncada and many Spaniards died of the sword, not of the bullet. But if great ordnance could do so much as is supposed, yet where should we have shot, and powder to furnish the continual shot of our ships: when in the encounter betwixt the Spaniard and us at sea, in one two days most of the ships had spent all their powder, without any sensible loss to the enemy?  
How shall we drive the Spaniard out of our ports without grappling, if he come once again as he threateneth? How can we secure any town by him besieged by sea without fight? Caesar's ships were heavy of sail, yet lying before Massilia, they could not be removed, nor could any victuals enter into the town by them. Neither had the Spaniard been so easily removed from before Caleis, but that God struck them with fear without evident cause.  
Those that are afraid to venture their ships of war (a goodly colour for such cowards) they may also be afraid to venture in the defence of their country. For without adventuring not only of timber, but also of men's lives, which (howsoever some now in our time do not value thousands of men at the price of one rotten ship) are far more precious, our country cannot be defended, nor the prince served. These men therefore, let them keep their decayed wits, and joints warm, and let them not henceforth tell us of things impossible, ridiculous, yea and very dangerous. For the way to hazard our ships, is not by boarding, but by sparing of money, when they are not, as they should be furnished for fight, but must needs fall into the enemy's hands, if ever they be taken at any disadvantage, by the breaking of their masts, tearing, or burning of their sails, or cutting of their tackle. This is a fear that neither the Romans, nor Athenians, nor other nation ever feared; and yet fire was then as dangerous as now. Neither the Spaniards, French, nor Dutch fear any such matter, neither do our men of war that go to sea forecast it. Wherefore then should our best ships, and such as should be best furnished fear, more than others, this course especially being so fit to make the navy of England unprofitable, & to give the enemy the victory? if this be not so, let it be showed where the Queen's ships have taken any ship of war by canonades: but of merchants ships, & other men of war we have heard of divers, that by boarding have prevailed.  
Let us therefore so provide, that we need not to fear any such danger, and that we may not only overcome the enemy with flying, but with fight, as our ancestors did in the days of Edward the third, and Henry the 8. famous kings of this land, and as our soldiers and mariners would now do, if men's hands were not bound, and their hearts broken, whereas men should endeavour to encourage them, and whet them, to go forward.  
In fight at sea the Admiral, that hath his ships well trimmed, and all things ready must have care also further, that his company may have the advantage of the wind, and keep good order in the sailing of the ships, that one go not before an other, that he range his navy with supplies, and finally that he provide, whatsoever else is necessary or requisite for the obtaining of victory.  
Those that have the wind on their backs, have thereby many advantages: their shot doth more hurt the side of the enemy's ship lying up, than the enemy's shot can hurt their ships: their fire is easily carried into the enemy's vessels; the smoke of the ordnance doth blind the enemies. Among other things, the vantage of the wind did greatly further the victory of the Christians against the Turks in the gulf of Lepanto. The array and good order of the navy doth bring with it this help; that one ship is not lightly environed by many other, and further, that one ship is ready to secure another. And therefore as in fight at land, so at sea likewise an order, and array is to be kept of ships sailing to fight. The most common array is that the front of the battle be divided into three parts, into the right corner or wing, into the mid battle, and into the left corner. Every one of these are to have other ships appointed not only to secure those that fight, but also to fight with those that offer themselves to charge the navy behind.  
The manner of sea fight is the same with the whole navy, that ships meeting single do use. First they assail the enemy with their great shot: which would be done only when the ships come very near: then they charge him with the small shot. Those that suppose themselves to be the stronger do lay hold upon their enemy's ship, & force themselves to enter the same. In the mean while neither do they, that are in the tops of the ships, nor others that have the charge of fire works cease to do their endeavour. And that with great care lest they hurt themselves, or their fellows. The 
a Liu.  Rhodians in their fight against Antiochus hanging pots of fire flaming at the end of their bowsprits, by a devise they had, shaked the same so, that when each boarded other, it fell into the enemy's ships.  
In fight disorder is greatly to be feared. Which is when our ships are entangled one in another's tackle, or fall aboard, one upon an other, or are singled from the rest of the company. 
b Thucid. 3.  Eleven ships of the Athenians discomfited seventy ships of the Lacedæmonians being in disorder, and fallen aboard one of an other. Therefore in ancient time did they keep a curious order in their sea-fights.  
The Athenians coming in aid of them of Corcyra (now Corfu) against the Corinthians ranged their own ships in the right corner, the ships of Corcyra were divided into three parts, every one of which had his several commander. After a sign given they charged the enemy. Both sides had many armed men aboard beside archers and slingars: and fought so eagerly that after they were once grappled, they hardly fell off again. The words of Thucydides, which I have here set under, do describe the same most lively.  

a Thucid. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
In the encounter betwixt the Romans, and Antiochus his Admiral Polyxenidas, as soon as he perceived the approach of the enemy, Polyxenidas extended the left wing of his navy into the sea, in the right wing he ranged his ships, so that the uttermost of them were near the land: after that with equal front he sailed forward. The Roman Admiral Livius staying for those ships that were not come up, ranged his ships in order, and set all things in order to fight. Himself grappling with two of the enemy's ships, that came on each side of his ship, caused his men to enter them.  
Polyxenidas ubi appropinquare hostes cernit, 
b Liu. 36.  sinistrum cornu in altum extendit, dextrum ad terram applicat, & aequa fronte ad pugnam procedebat. Romanus armamenta componens opperitur insequentes naves. Livius in duas hostium naves ex utroque latere praetoriae venientes ferreas iniecit manus. Romam in hostium naves transcendunt.  
In the battle of Lepanto, first were 
c Natal. Come●.  ranged certain great galliass of the Venetians, some pretty distance one from an other. Then followed the rest of the navy ranged in three parts, and supplied with others following after them. The galiasses having put the Turks in some disorder, the rest of the galleys grappled every one with those they encountered, & the men strived to board them.  
But that every man may know his place and charge before the navies join, good direction is to be given forth. And every man to be ranged in order, and to be exercised, that they may know out of what place to board the enemy, and what company is to perform it, and how, that when men should execute, they do not stand gazing one upon another. Nabis 
d Remigem militemque; simulachris navalis pugnae exercebat. Liu. 35.  providing for the sea, did exercise his soldiers and mariners with feigned sea-fights. They that observe not good order commit many faults, and hurt one another in boarding. They of Rochel, An. a thousand five hundred seventy two boarding a galley in the night disorderly, some fell over board, other killed their fellows being entered. Wherefore seeing without provision, and order nothing can be done, either at sea or land, let all things be provided that are requisite for the strength and employment of the navy: and let the practice of war in maritime causes be diligently followed, that abuses being reform, we may vanquish those, that now scorn us, and contemn us.   

CHAP. XIX. Wherein special matters concerning treaties of peace, truce, and confederacies, and likewise concerning the privileges of ambassadors and messengers, which ordinarily are mediators of peace, truce & such like treaties are handled.  
ALL though the joy and triumph that is made in victory be exceeding great, yet I account him not wise, that when all things hang in equal balance refuseth a reasonable peace with equal conditions, upon hope of a doubtful victory. All that we take 
a Omnia quae agimus subiecta mill casibus Scipio apud Liu. 30.  in hand is subject to infinite chances, and 
b Mars belli communis, utrinque ferrum, utrinque humana corpora crunt. Nusquam minus quàm in bello eventus respondet. Annibal apud Liu. 30.  success of battle is common to both parties. Both sides have arms, and the strength of war consisteth but in frail human bodies. Neither do events less answer our expectation in any thing, then in wars. Wherefore seeing that peace is the end of wars, and seeing that we take arms in hand, not to do wrong, but that we may recover or obtain our own right: let no man refuse reason that may have it. But because many that seem to offer peace, have nothing, but wars in their hearts: let us, now that we have showed the practice & train of war whose end is peace, declare also how we may assure ourselves, that we be not abused either with coloured treaties, or unequal conditions, or bad assurance of peace, which is more dangerous, than any war. Metellus in 
c Verbis pax nunciabatur ceterùm re asperrimum bellum erat. Sallust. bell. Ingurth.  words and pretence made semblant, that he would make peace with jugurtha, but his doings were the effects of most sharp wars. Maximilian the emperor being demanded what he meant to treat so much of peace with his enemy whom he deadly hated, answered, that thereby he hoped to give him a 
d Per darli colpo mortale. Guicciar.  mortal wound when least he looked for it. 
e Pompeius' ab Augusto imagine pacis deceptus; Lepidus amicitiae specie. Tacit. annal. 1.  Sextus Pompeius by a feigned show of peace was abused by Augustus, and Lepidus was ensnared under colour of friendship. What the Spaniard meant by the treaty of Dunkirk, his navy at the same time coming in hostile manner upon our coast declareth. The very motion and mention of peace doth slake the preparatives of war, and while men do either hope or desire peace, they 
f Ex mentione & spe pacis negligentia, ut fit, apud Paenos orta crat. Liu. 29.  stand more negligently upon their guard. Sometime under colour of seeking Philippus 
a de pace agendo nihil aliud nisi moram & dilation● ad vires colligendas qu●●rebat. Liu. 32.  peace the enemy seeketh delays, until such time as he himself is ready. Philip of Macedonia being foiled by the Romans seemed very desirous of peace, that in the mean time, he might again repair his forces. For this cause 
b Thucid. 1.  Archidamus counseled the Lacedæmonians rather to treat of peace, then to denounce war unto the Athenians, until such time as they were better provided. The Ambassadors of the 
c Caes. bell. gal. 4.  Tencterians and other Germans desired peace of Caesar that came against them, because a great part of their forces was from them. Sometimes treachery is wrought under colour of treaty of peace. Metellus 
d Sallust. bell. jugurth.  during the treaty of peace with jugurtha corrupted most of his friends. Scipio 
e Liu. 29.  to the intent his men might have access into Syphax his camp, pretended the continuance of the treaty of peace, albeit he misliked the conditions, and meant nothing but to espy his camp, and to surprise him at un wares. The messengers of the 
f Legati per speciem pacis petendae speculatum ad L. Aemilium venerunt. Liu 40  Ligurians under colour of treaty of peace espied what Aemilius did in his camp. Cotys 
g Tacit. annal. 2.  king of Thrace under colour of confirming a league was drawn to a banquet, and there slain by his enemy Rhecuporis. Caesar Borgia having made a solemn league with the Duke of 
h Guicciard.  Gravina & other Princes of Italy, contrary to his oath slew them having them once in his hands.  
Therefore in treating of peace we must first see that we slack not our preparatives of war, nor defer to take any advantage that is offered. 
i Perseus ni vana spes pacis occaecasset consilia, omnia praeparata, atque instructa habens, cùm nihil haberent Romani, & suo maximè tempore, atque alieno hostibus incipere bellum potuit. Liu. 42.  Perseus' king of Macedonia, if a vain hope of peace had not blinded his eyes, might then with advantage have begun the wars when himself was most ready, and the Romans most unready, and unprovided.  

k 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  Archidamus albeit he persuaded the Lacedæmonians to talk of peace, yet would he not have them neglect to provide for war. For peace is not obtained with parley, or entreaty, unless we also make ready our forces.  
Secondly heed must be taken, that we trust not the enemy. None are more easily abused, than those that are light of credit. we may not therefore let the enemy see our weakness, or any thing that may prejudice us; nor commit ourselves into our enemy's hands either during the treaty, or after the conclusion of peace. Philip of Comines noteth it as a great simplicity in our nation, that having concluded peace with Lewis the French King, did so familiarly come into Amiens, and converse with the French, that meant them no good. Seeing peace is so easily violated upon light occasions; he is not wise, that will trust the enemy too far. That which certain Italians persuaded Lewis Sforza, that faith is rather to be violated, than we suffer 
a Guicciar. li. 4.  any part of our State to be taken from us, that some do now put in practice. And yet breach of promise is oft times 
b Cosa facile a Principi di iustificar imprese con titoli Ch'appariscon● honesti. Guicciar. 16.  justified with glorious pretences. Wherefore seeing as experience teacheth us that Princes 
c Principi si riconciliono piu tosto conle dimostrationi che con li effetti. Guiciar. lib. 1.  are rather made friends in show, then in effect, those that deal wisely do so condition with the enemy, that if he break, they may have the staff in their own hands to chastise him.  
Thirdly great care is to be taken that we yield no advantage to the enemy. The first injury that we receive at the enemy's hands is but a step to the next, as hath been showed, and he that from the top of the stairs descendeth one step, shall sooner be thrust down to the bottom, then recover the top again. He that once beginneth to fall, is easily overthrown. The Africans that yielded one little piece of ground to them of Carthage, were in the end constrained to yield them their whole country. The Germans received into France by the Gauls, and Saxons into this Island by the ancient inhabitants, did after contend with them for the possession, and right of the whole country.  
The time to treat of peace which is four to be considered, is when both parties have tasted of the cup of calamities that wars bring with them, and yet neither part is overthrown, or thoroughly vanquished. When things do hang in equal balance, then is the fittest time to treat of peace by the judgement of Annibal, and then 
d Si integer quam si victus, pacem aequiorem impetrari posse ratus est. Liu. 30.  most equal conditions are liked of both parties. For being vanquished the conqueror giveth rather than receiveth conditions: as the Romans did to the Carthaginians, to Philip of Macedonia, to Antiochus, and to other Princes, and nations which they vanquished.  
Further we are to look that the conditions of peace be reasonable. If we contend about limits, towns, or countries, it is no honour to lose our right: if we have wrong done unto us, it is no reason we should rest without satisfaction. But because conditions are divers according to the causes of war, the times, and persons that contend, and divers other circumstances: therefore that is to be referred to the judgement of those, that are employed in such affairs. Whose chief ends should be the majesty of God, the honour of the Prince, the safety, and profit of their country.  
But most especial care is to be had, that the conditions be performed. without which all the treaty is nothing, but a vain show of fair words. This I commend as a specal matter to be considered of our nation, who although many times they were victorious in the field against the French, yet seldom could match them in conclusions of peace: and also because it is a hard matter to assure conditions of peace. The contempt of religion and true honour, and griedy desire of gain, have brought not only promises, but also oaths into such contempt. Yea some regard neither hostages, nor pledges, so they may take a good advantage. The 
a Histoir. de troubls. de Fr. l. 3.  French Kings of late years did so often break with the Protestants, that they little regarded either their word, or their letters patents. The ordinary means to assure the conditions agreed upon in treaty of peace, are divers, first word or promise, then writing and seal, thirdly pledges of towns, which the Protestants of France have found to be the best assurance, and we have chosen for the assurance of the contract betwixt us, and the Low country. Charles 
b Guicciar. li. 10.  the fifth, would not trust Clement the seventh for all his paternities' holiness without pledges. Fourthly hostages, of which King Edward the third accepted for confirmation of the peace agreed betwixt him, and King john of France. The same is an old practice, and was used both of the Romans and Carthaginians and other nations. But forasmuch as those that list to 
c Nunquam causa deerit cur victi pacto non stint. Liu. 9  quarrel, never want pretence, I see no other assurance of peace then either so to use the enemy, that he can not if he would hurt thee, or else to have arms in hand, that he can never break without loss or disadvantage.  
To avoid quarrels, and to take away all just cause of brabble, it were good, that the conditions were conceived in good terms, and set down in writing confirmed with the seals of the Princes or States whom it concerneth.  
Giulio the twelfth took 
d Guicciar. lib. 8.  exception against an Article agreed upon betwixt him, and Lewis the twelfth, for that it was not written. And 
e Guicciar. lib. 2.  Ferdinand of Spain by cunning interpretation of words, did directly contrary to his agreement with Charles the eight of France.  
Further if any doubt should arise, power would be given to some Prince, that hath honour in recommendation, and power to compel the froward to obey, both to interpret the words, and also to see the agreement performed.  
Lastly, as by conditions we covenant what should be done; so likewise in case of contravention there should penalties be set down. Howsoever penalties be set down, wise Princes do not only forecast, how to cause the enemy to perform conditions, but also how, in case he should break promise, he may be forced.  
The same considerations that are used in treaty of peace, have also place in treaties concerning truce, and confederacies. For truce is nothing but a surceasing of hostility for a time, the causes of war hanging still undecided, whereof peace is, or aught to be a final conclusion. But peace is made sometime where there is no confederacy. For this is among associates and friends, that may be made between enemies.  
The conditions of peace and confederacies are divers according to the condition, and state of the parties that are made friends. Those that are vanquished whose case is 
a Vae victis. Brennus' apud Plut. in vita Camilli.  most miserable, are not to refuse any conditions, as a certain Spaniard persuaded the Saguntins. Scipio offered peace to the Carthaginians with these conditions: first that they should redeliver up all prisoners of war which they had taken, likewise all 
b Transfugas. Liu. 3●.  revolters, and fugitives: secondly that they should withdraw their forces out of Italy and Liguria, nor afterward meddle with Spain, nor the islands betwixt Africa, and Italy: thirdly that they should deliver up all their ships of war twenty excepted, and should pay 500 measures of wheat and 3000. of barley: four that they should not make wars either in Africa, or out of Africa, without licence obtained of the people of Rome: fifthly that they should restore to Massinissa such things as they had taken from him, and should pay the soldiers, and find them victuals until a certain time: sixtly that they should deliver up their Elephants, and in time to come tame no more: seventhly that in 50. years by equal portions they should pay 10. thousand talents, & lastly for performance of these covenants they should give a hundred hostages neither younger than 14. years, nor above thirty years of age: if these things were performed, than the Romans promised that the Carthaginians should live free according to their laws, and possess such cities and countries in Africa as they held before the beginning of the wars.  
When the Romans had vanquished the 
a Liu. 8.  Samnites, they imposed upon them a tribute, took from them some of their country, & enjoined them to furnish them with so many soldiers, as was agreed upon betwixt them. Which conditions with others were also imposed upon Philip 
b Liu. 33.  of Macedonia, and Antiochus 
c Liu. 38.  king of Syria.  
The 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thucid. 1.  Thasians having long contended with the Athenians, after three years siege yielded, & had peace upon these conditions, that they should pull down the walls of their city, and deliver up their ships of war, & pay such sums of money as were due before that time, forthwith, & afterward their ordinary tribute, as it should be due: and finally that they should forego their mines of metal, & possessions they had in the main land. Those that were vanquished by the Romans as they were bound to help them, so might they not either oppugn their associates, or aid their enemies, with men, money, or victuals, albeit the same were not expressed in the articles of agreement. If they did, they prosecuted wars against them. For that was the cause of the wars both 
e Liu.  against the Carthaginians, and Nabis, and Philip of Macedonia, and divers other.  
When Princes or people of equal power join in league, & confederacy the conditions are more equal. Such were the agreements that passed betwixt Lewis 
f Philip. Com.  the 11. & Charles duke of Burgundy: between Edward the 4. & the same Lewis, and the associates of them two. Peace or rather truce was made for 9 years: the conditions on the French kings part were, that he should pay certain crowns, & that the Dolphin of France should marry king Edward the 4. his daughter, and have part of Guienne for the maintenance of the two young married folks. But other assurance than oath there passed none. Thus the French could feed us still with fair words, & buy out our advantage with a few crowns, & therefore little regarded our forces. The Carthaginians joining in league with Hierome king of Sicily agreed together, that after they should have expulsed the Romans out of Sicily, they should divide the country according to certain limits agreed upon betwixt them. Like agreement passed betwixt Annibal & Philip king of Macedonia, concerning their future conquest. In the mean time they both covenanted to oppugn the Romans both by sea, and land with all their force. The 
g Data ultrò citroque fide cosdem amicos inimicosque habituros jure iurando affirmatur. Liu. 29.  Carthaginians entered with Syphax into a stricter bond of friendship, and both promised each to other to have the same for friends and enemies.  
Sometime it falleth out that a mighty Prince or nation doth for some opportunity or help expected, join in league with those, that in power are inferior to them. Wherein albeit the conditions be not equal upon both sides, yet the weaker neither payeth tribute, nor looseth any commodity, or liberty. So the Romans joined in amity with Attalus, & Eumenes, and the Rodians, and in Italy with them of Caere and other towns: the Kings of England with the Dukes of Brittein, the Kings of Spain with some weak Princes in Italy. In which agreements the weak side had need to use great caution, that under colour of aid it be not oppressed, as the Dukes of Brittein by the French, Sforza Duke of Milan by Charles the 5. the States of the Low country by king Philip, and his Predecessors Dukes of Burgundy. The Capuans made peace with Annibal on these conditions, that no foreigner either in war abroad, or in peace at home should have any jurisdiction over a citizen of 
a Liu. 23.  Capua, & that no citizen of Capua should be forced to serve in wars, or to bear office against his will, nor should be subject to any other laws, than those of his own country.  
Those that are either equal or inferior in force each to other, do sometime join in league defensive, sometime in offensive also against such as are enemies to either, and that either with all their forces, or with some numbers of soldiers specified, & them also either paid of those that send them, or those that use them.  
Some nations for fear of their enemies do yield themselves into the protection of others with certain covenants, as they 
b Guicciar. li. 3.  of Pisa did first to the French king, & afterward to the Venetians, & as the Duke of Ghelderland, did to the French king. In this case as the receiver doth bind himself to defend those that yield themselves into his arms: so they either bind themselves to pay money, or to do him service, or to deliver him up certain towns. No man is bound to refuse the protection of others, unless it be specially covenanted: nay it is a dishonour not to protect those that are wrongfully oppressed, & much more to abandon those whom they have taken upon them to defend. 
c Guicciar. li. 8.  Lewis the 12. is taxed for his base mind, for that he covenanted to receive none into protection, that were the subjects or did depend upon julio the 2. And for that he much more forsook the lord of 
a Guicciar. lib. 5.  Piombino. Likewise are the florentines blamed for that they abandoned the house of Riarij at the request of the Pope. Contrariwise the Romans in nothing deserve commendation more, then that they defended all those that fled to them for protection. And in nothing did they dishonour themselves more, then in that they were so flow in succouring the Saguntins.  
Neither do Princes only & free States covenant each with other, but also subjects with their Princes, & Princes with their subjects, as the Arragonians with the Spanish king; the Protestants of France, with the French king. Wherein if they proceed no further, then to require each of other that, which the laws of nations require, it is more tolerable. But that the subjects should prescribe laws to their sovereign Princes, & bind them to inconveniences, it savoureth rather of force, than loyalty; and that Prince's hests should be obeyed against reason, proceedeth of tyranny, neither can any assurance be made of such agreements.  
That covenants of peace, & association may be well conceived and made, Princes & others are dililgently to consider unto whom they commit the managing of such affairs, & to furnish them with good instructions: and those likewise are to have regard, that they pass not their commission, & instructions. Without commission no man, under the degree of those that rule in sovereignty, is to make peace or league. The people of 
b Liu.  Rome held not themselves bound with the treaty made at Caudium, or Numantia, being made without their authority. Princes in the choice of Ambassadors do respect Nobility & are led sometime by favour, but the event showeth that wisdom, experience, & virtue are rather to be regarded. 
c Phil. Commin.  Lewis the 11. sent Oliver sometime his barber to them of Gant, and to the young Duchess of Burgundy, but the man was heard with scorn, and returned without effect.  
Ambassadors and messengers betwixt Princes, & States, are privileged by the laws of all nations: insomuch that among the points of weapons such men are suffered to pass safe.  
The Romans not only revenged sharply the death of their Ambassadors slain by the 
d Liu. 4.  Fidenians, and 
e Florus.  Illyrians, but also the scorn done unto them by them of Corinth. 
f 2. Reg. 20.  King David warred upon the children of Ammon for no other cause, but for an abuse offered to his messengers. 
g Phil. Comm.  Charles Duke of Burgundy, put all the garrison of the Castle of Nele to the sword, for that they killed his messenger sent to them to treat with them of peace. And albeit some do patiently digest all abuses offered to their messengers by the Spaniard, who deigned not to give them audience, yet the Romans 
a Liu. 42.  took the matter very heinously at the hands of Perseus' king of Macedonia. The death of 
b Quò diligentiùs in reliquum tempus ius Legatorum à barbaris conseruaretur, omnem senatum Caesar necavit, reliquos sub corona vendidit. Caes. bell. gal. 3.  Caesar's messengers sent to a city upon the sea coast of France, cost all the chief of the citizens their lives. The rest of that town Ceasar sold for slaves. If any of the Romans did wrong to the Ambassadors of other nations, the Senate caused such men to be taken, & to be delivered unto them, that they might judge them, as it pleased themselves, as is apparent not only by justice done upon those that did injury to the Ambassadors of 
c Qui Legatos Carthaginensium pulsaverant, Carthaginensibus traditi. Liu. 38.  Carthage, but also upon those that had wronged certain messengers coming from 
d Val. max. l. 6.  Apollonia. Tatius neglecting to do justice upon those that had wronged the messengers of the Laurentins, was himself 
e Liu. 1.  slain of them, when he came among them.  
But this privilege as it belongeth to Ambassadors betwixt Princes, & nations; so 
f Bodin. de la repub. l. 1.  some have supposed that it belonged not to such messengers, as come from rebels. And thereupon defend the fact of Charles the 5. that imprisoned the messengers of the Duke of Milan, that had revolted from him. And according to this supposal we understand, that hard measure hath been offered to divers messengers sent from the Protestants of France to the adverse party. As if Princes should make wars with his subjects with all extremity, and not admit the laws of nations, in matters which pass betwixt him and them. I grant there is a great difference betwixt public enemies, & rebels; yet necessity requireth oft times parley; and if the Prince look to have his Ambassadors to have good entertainment with them, he must likewise use their messengers well. The Romans practised that in the war which they had against their 
g Bello sociali.  associates, and did not offer violence to those which were sent by Antony: yet there may be I grant such wars, that admit no intercourse of messengers, which in the wars among the 
h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Greeks was sometime practised: but that was inhuman cruelty, and rather hurtful to themselves, then to the enemy.  
Yet if any purpose to enjoy the privilege of Ambassadors, he may not pass the bounds of an Ambassador, whose ordinary office is to denounce war, or treat of peace, or truce, or prisoners, and such matters as by Ambassadors are ordinarily handled. If Ambassadors come under that colour to espy our proceed, the name of their office doth not warrant their lewd dealing. Caesar 
a Caes. bell. gal. 4.  detained the messengers of the Tenctherians perceiving that they came for no other purpose, but to win time, and to espy his forces. The black 
b Froissart.  Prince caused a messenger, that came from the French king, to cite him to appear in the Parliament of Paris to be arrested: but it was for that he came not as an Ambassador in matters of state, but as a sumner or bailif to do him a disgrace. Francis the French king the first of that name caused a gibbet to be erected before he would hear a certain messenger that came from Charles the fift, fearing that otherwise he would have abused him in terms. That the Romans did dismiss the 
c Lin. lib. 2.  Ambassadors of Tarquin broaching a conspiracy in Rome, and the Ambassadors of the 
d Dionis. Halic. lib. 6.  Volscians, that came as espials, and that her Majesty did likewise dismiss Bernardin Mendoza, that was an abettor, if not a contriver of great treasons wrought against her, it was of special clemency and favour, rather than for that the laws of arms require it. for they warrant none to practise treason, nor rebellion, nor to abuse a Prince, nor to do other matters, then belong to the office of Ambassadors. The 
e Doctores in L. vlt. ff. de legationibus.  Laws of the Romans in matters of public crimes against the laws of nations make ambassadors to answer notwithstanding their privilege. Neither do any writers excuse the fact of Fabius Ambustus, that being sent in embassage to the Gauls besieging Clusium, put on arms and fought against them.  
Thus we see that Ambassadors coming from other Princes unto us in such matters, as belong to that office, are privileged; but whether our enemy's ambassadors going to other princes and nations, or contrariwise coming from other princes, to our enemies, are likewise to be privileged, it is of some doubted. The French complain, that their ambassadors sent to the Turk were slain by the Spaniard: and some do think hardly of the fact of Charles the fift, that allowed it; but without cause. For the word Ambassador, or Messenger being a word, that hath relation to those, to whom a man is sent, there can be no bond betwixt Ambassadors & others to whom they are not sent. The Romans detained not only the ambassadors of Annibal sent to Philip king of Macedonia; but also Philip's ambassadors sent to Annibal. And the Athenians put the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians to death, being taken as they were sent by them to require aid of the king of Persia against the Athenians.  
ambassadors therefore would be well chosen, and discreetly ought they to handle their business, without curious intermeddling with affairs that concern them not. Tully jesteth at a certain Ambassade consisting of three persons, one of which was an idiot, the second had a great scar in his head, the third had the gout. This Ambassade said he, had neither head, brain, nor feet. nothing ought they to speak that may prejudice the affairs of the Prince: wherein Philip of Comines noteth a certain English Heralds ignorance, whose foolish babbling was no small hindrance to the affairs of Edward the fourth, that sent him. Charles Duke of Burgundy conceived great displeasure against Lewes the xi. for certain foolish 
a Phil. Coming.  words uttered against him by an Ambassador sent from the king to his father.  
The Romans to the Ambassadors of their enemies gave audience without the City, and when they had given them their answer, sent certain to conduct them to their shipping, to see that they practised with no man. The like course did the Athenians follow in hearing, and entertaining the Ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians. Which course they may also follow, that fear least under such colours cunning fellows should espy our country, and our doings. And if those, that have the government of garrison towns have care, that no messenger shall come into the place, but blindfold; sure reason would, that men should have an eye also, that such messengers as come into other countries, should neither see so much as they do, nor have that liberty to talk with whom they list, as now they have. For by such means often time they understand their estate better, than they do themselves.   

CHAP. XXI. Wherein is declared that to encourage forward men to do valiantly, nothing is more effectual, than reward, nor for maintenance of military discipline, any thing more requisite, then severe punishment.  
THe course of wars, if nothing else did persuade us, yet showeth us, that after victory obtained, or troubles ended, such as have done valiant service, are to be rewarded. Wherefore albeit wars in our times admit no such order, which being ended, are the beginning of beggary and calamity to many poor soldiers: yet may I not omit the ordinary course though interrupted, and broken by men ignorant of wars, and all good order. There is nothing more effectual to move men to adventure their lives in the service of their country, than reward. Law doth much, and necessity more, yet neither of them in this behalf are so effectual as reward. By 
a Magni animi magnis honoribus siunt. Liu. 4.  great honours, men are encouraged to make great adventures. Men do 
b Eo impenditur labour & periculum, unde emolumentum atque honor speratur, nihilque non aggressuri sunt homines, si magnis conatibus magna praemia proponantur. Liu. 4.  willingly hazard, and bestow labour, where there is profit, and honour looked for. Neither is there any thing so difficult, which some will not attempt, if brave service be recompensed with honourable rewards. As it is in all arts, and professions, so it is in the profession of a soldier, 
c Honos alit arts etc. iacentque; ea semper quae apud quosque improbantur. Cic. Tuscul.  there is best service where there is greatest honour for well doing, and contrariwise where there is no reward, there is no man desireth to be singular. Lysander being demanded what manner of government he liked best, answered, that, where valiant men had reward, and coward's punishment, that common wealth pleased him best. Socrates praised that state above all, where most honours were given according to virtue and merit, and none for meed nor money. Of all laws, saith 
d Demosth. adverse. Leptin.  Demosthenes, those deserve best to be continued, which concern the reward of good men, and the punishment of lewd lozel's. And if reason cannot excite the cold affection of covetous wretches to consider the merits of valiant men: yet in the end necessity will work it. For neither 
e Neque domus, neque resp. stare potest, si in ea nec rectè factis praemia extant ulla, nec supplicia peccatis.  common wealth nor private house can stand, where there is neither reward for well doing, nor punishment for the contrary. The common wealth of the Romans had never grown to that greatness, if among other their virtues their thankfulness to valiant men had not been singular. Horatius Cocles that repelled the force of the Hetruscians, himself alone standing upon the bridge of wood over Tiber, had a 
f Statue in comitio posita, agri quantum una. die circumaravit, datum. Liu. 2.  statue of marble erected in the place of common meetings for continuance of his memorial, and so much ground given him as he could compass with his plough in one day. At the same time they gave lands also to 
g Mutio Scaevolae ager trans Tyberim virtutis cause datus. Liu. 2.  Mutius Scaevola for his singular valiantness. Cornelius the Consul, for a singular piece of service, gave unto Decius a 
h Livi. 7.  crown of gold, and an hundred oxen, to every of the soldiers that went with him double allowance of victuals, an ox & two suits of apparel. In the wars against the Samnites, Sp. Nautius, Sp. Papyrius, 4 
i Liu. 10.  centurions, & one whole squadron of targetters (the Romans call them hastatos) were rewarded with brace lets & coronets of gold by their General, Caesar Caesar 
a S●aeuam ad primipilun traduxit, 2000 aeris dedit, cohortem duplici stipendio, & frumento donavit, & aliis militaribus donis. Cas. de bell. ciu. 3.  for his valiant service advanced Scaeva to the highest place in his regiment, and gave him two thousand pieces of money, the whole company he rewarded with double pay and allowance, and other military presents. After the winning of new Carthage in Spain, 
b Liu. 26.  Scipio gave coronets of gold to those that first mounted the walls, and rewarded others every man according to his desert. Likewise did he reward such as showed themselves valiant men in the wars 
c Liu. 29.  against Syphax & the Carthaginians. And after the wars were ended not only did he give his soldiers money, but the state gave them lands also. after the end of wars, the 
d Agri veteribus mil●tibus qui auspicio Scipionis in Africa bellum perfecissent divisi. Liu. 31.  Romans divided ordinarily to some money, to some 
e Romulus' militibus agros captos divisit. Dionis. Halic. l. 2.  lands. Alexander 
f L. in agris. ff. de acquir rerdomin.  Severus divided the country that was upon the frontiers among the soldiers that served there. At that time honours and the highest places were rewards of valiant men. Valer. 
g Hac dextra mihi tres consulatus summámque laudem peperi. Liu. 7.  corvinus doubteth not to say that with his hands he had won to himself great praise & three Consulships, which was the highest dignity in that state. And Decius affirmeth that 
h Non generis sed virtutis est praemium. Liu. 7.  rewards were due to virtue rather than nobility. When by reason of their great losses the Senate of Rome was much diminished, & must be supplied, those were chosen which had the 
i Senatores lecti ex ijs qui spolia ex Rom. host sixa domi haberent, aut civicam coronam accepissent. Livi 23.  spoils of the enemy in their house, or had for the saving of the life of a citizen been rewarded with a crown. The spoil was not then, as now it is, given to those, that forsaking their colours run after spoil, 
k Livi. 6.  leaving the labour & danger to others; nor was it lawful for any to go before commandment given. The Consuls did sell and divide the spoil, saith 
l Praedam. coss. vendiderunt diviserúnt que. Liu. 25.  Livy, and rewarded those especially by whose forwardness the enemy's camp was taken, & before others, two captains whose valiantness was singular. And in another place 
m Data ex praeda militibus aeris octogeni bini, sagáque & tunicae, praemia illa tempestate haudquaquam spernenda. L. 10.  he testifieth, that the soldiers had every man a suit of apparel and 82. pieces of money given him. Neither were valiant soldiers forgotten no not in the most corrupt times for observance of military orders, nor when the Roman empire began now to decline. Tacitus 
n Tacit. annal. 3.  mentioneth those rewards that were given to Rufus Heluius at divers times for his service 
o Constantinus filios in paternam militiam vocabat. l. 1. & 2. C. de fill. off. militis. 12.  Constantine was most bountiful to his soldiers, and gave the rewards due to the father to his children also. neither were they bountiful to their own men, but also such as served with them. Marcellus presented 
p Liu. 23.  Bantius of Nola with a horse and furniture for his good service. They of Preneste for reward of a noble fact done by them, had 
a Liu 23.  double pay, and five years vacation from service. The 
b Ager Hispanic in Hispania, Numidis in Africa post bellum virtutis causa datu● est. Liu. 23.  Spaniards had possessions given them in Spain, the Numidians in Africa for their faithful service against Annibal. By Solon's law the sons of those that died in service of their country, were maintained upon the public charge. But what marvel is it if the Romans who are precedents of military orders, & the Greeks from whence learning and civility issued, rewarded their soldiers, when the most barbarous Turks do it, and at this day no man more than they? The most valiant men are made chief commanders, and of his counsel. He that first mounted the walls of Constantinople, of a common soldier was after made Bassa. What should I speak of the great advancement of Ariadine Barbarossa, and Dragut Reis. Ochiali Bassa of a poor Mariner, is now (if he be not lately dead) one of the greatest men of that state. There is none that doth service, but he is assured to have lands & possessions given him. The Spaniards also yield their soldiers great recompense. The common soldier is made Caporall, he is for his service made Sergeant, the Sergeant is made Ensign, the Ensign Captain, who if he deserve well, is afterward preferred to be Colonel, and then master of the camp. julian Romero, & Montdragon, & divers of them, of common soldiers, have risen to great dignities. Beside the due of their place, for every valiant act they have their pay increased, which they call Ventaias.  
Yet this holdeth not every where: for in some states there is neither reward, nor scarce praise for service. Honour is given for wealth, kindred, favour, and if any be rewarded, it is such as deserve none. By which abuses (as saith 
c Largitionibus corrumpitur militaris disciplina. Hirtius de bell. Alex.  Hirtius) the discipline of war was corrupted by Cassius in Spain, which afterward was much increased in the times of the Emperors, who for friendship gave great titles to men of no desert, and to valiant men were very sparing and restraintive. Even so now in some country is, rewards are given to great beggars; and valiant men, if they escape hunger, and the sword of the enemy abroad, yet come back to live in base sort at home. And so it cometh to pass as one complaineth in 
d Eurip. Hecuba.  Euripides, That the valiant hath no more reward than the treacherous coward, and that injuries are sure remembered, whereas good deeds are scarce thought upon, (as 
e Proclivius est iniuriae, quàm beneficio vicem exsoluere. Tac.  Tacitus saith.)  
As valiant deeds are to be rewarded, so treachery, cowardice, and disobedience are severely to be punished. These two, antiquity supposed to be of equal force. The Gentiles, that for the profit they reaped of divers things, did ascribe unto them divine names, did this also in reward & punishment. 
a Diogen. Laert.  Democritus honoured them, as two divine things. And if in any part of the government of the common wealth, punishment be necessary, sure most necessary it is in managing of arms, & maintenance of military discipline, which 
b Abscisso & aspero castigationis genere disciplina militaris indiget. Liu.  requireth peremptory & sharp punishment. For if the prince's commandment may without danger be neglected; & ambition & covetousness of particulars, cause public matters to be neglected, delayed, and dallied with; if public treasure may be abused to private uses, and that which should be employed in payment of soldiers & other necessary uses of the common wealth, may be lent to usury, or spent in purchases; if such officers as are to provide victuals, arms and munition, or else to keep them, may make their gain, and accountants give in false reckonings, and captains and officers bring in false numbers in mosters, and neither colonels obey the general commanders, nor captains their colonels and other superiors, nor inferior officers & soldiers their captains; who seethe not, that not only the sinews of military government, but of state also will easily be dissolved? The Romans therefore as in all feats of arms and government, so in this also deserved special commendation.  
divers sorts of punishment did they use, as 
c L. poenae. ff. de re milit.  Modestinus testifieth; as for example, Reproof, forfeitures, impositions of charge, change of degree, loss of place, dismissing with shame, yea sometime banishment, sometime death. Therefore were those that offended punished, (as saith 
d Ne discrimen omne virtutis, & ignaviae pereat. Liu. 24.  Marcellus) that there might appear a difference betwixt valiantness and cowardice. At the 
e Ita bello gesto praemio poenáque pro cuiusque merito persolutis Romam rediere. Liu. 8.  end of wars, as they rewarded valiant men, so they forgot not to punish offenders. Neither did they only punish the common sort, but their Generals also where they deserved it; yea the Generals spared not their own sons, friends, & kinsfolk. Fuluius for that by his negligence his army was discomfited by Annibal at Herdonea, himself flying among the foremost, as we said, was driven into banishment. M. 
f M. Postumius quòd eius ductu & culpa malè ad Veios pugnatum erat, decem millibus aeris damnatur. Liu. 4.  Posthumius was fined 10000 pieces of money, for that by his fault, & leading the Romans were overthrown at Veij. Manlius' executed his own son for transgressing military orders. Caesar dismissed divers colonels & chief commanders in Africa, for outrages by them committed. The more dangerous the wars were, the greater severity they used. Even barbarous nations perceived, that without severity the wars could not be administered, as Caesar maketh evident unto us by the example of 
a Summae diligentiae summam severitatem addit Vercingetorix. Caes. de bell. Gal. 7  Vercingetorix. By the laws of Sparta they that ran out of the field, might not return into their country. The Athenians did punish a negligence in their captains that did not take up their men that were slain & wracked at 
b Thucid.  Arginusa, but too severely. Neither was it the use only of two or three nations, but of all those, who by practice of arms have won to themselves any name, or reputation. The particular penalties due to every military offence, I have set down in the chapter following, if not to imitate in all points, yet to come as near as we can in most. The Romans without any table or writing set before them, did by their continual practice of arms, know not only all military laws, but also the punishments that were inflicted on the transgressers of them, as well as we know any custom of England not written: which were also to be wished in our soldiers. But because by long disuse of arms, & many abuses crept in among us, few know the laws of war, lest any man might pretend ignorance, or think themselves punished otherwise then they ought; I have for instruction of young soldiers comprised in writing such matters as for the good government of the camp and army, & those that converse in the army, I thought most necessary to be known and published in the camp, garrison, & other places of service. Neither is the course new or strange. The prince of Orange for the good government of his camp before Florence in the days of Charles the 5, by sound of trumpet 
c Cavalier Cicuta.  published such orders as he would have observed. The duke of Alva though otherwise cruel, yet a man skilful in matters of war, for reformation of divers disorders crept in among the 
d See debrian promulgar algunos estatutos con cuya osseruantia los soldados particulares, y privadoes no hisiessen desorden alguna. Sanch. de Lond.  Spanish soldiers, gave order to Sancho de Londonno, to frame certain statutes in writing, which being published, might give them particular notice of their duties. The 
e Puis avoir fait quelques ●ix militaires, & statutes politics firent juror lafoy noblesse, soldats, & autres de les entretenir inutolablement. Histoir. de troubls. de Fr. l. 4.  Protestants an. 1568. having made certain military laws & orders for the government of their army, did publish the same, & cause both the nobility & other soldiers to swear, that they would observe them inviolably. In imitation of others, I have thought good likewise to set down a form of military laws, not that all of them are necessary for all times & places, nor that I could set down so many as are necessary, but wise governors having this draft before their eyes, may choose such as are fittest, and apply them to their company and other circumstances.  
Howsoever it is, whether it be by 
a Res militaris legibus in tuto collocata. L. 1. Cod. de justin. cod. confirmand.  laws, or without laws: let those that have the government of soldiers, have care of the observance of military discipline, without which an army is like a body discrazed and disjoined, and by which, armies beforetime out of order have been made victorious. Before Scipio's coming into Spain, the Romans through their disorders had received many foils of their enemies. But after that he had 
b Scipio minor militarem disciplinam revocans pulcherrimam tulit de Hispanis victoriam. Plor. epit. Liu. l. 58.  removed those disorders, of a cowardly and disorderly multitude, he made a most victorious army. Like commendation did Metellus deserve in Africa, who removing all instruments and occasions of pleasure 
e Metellus adiumenta ignaviae sustulit, etc. Sallust. bell. jugurth.  and slothfulness, and restoring the strict orders of the Romans in their marching, encamping, labours and watches, brought jugurtha to great extremity, which before that time overcame, and contemned the Roman forces. Corbulo by like 
d Legiones Corbulo operum, & laboris ignaras populationibus laetantes ad veterem morem reduxit. Tacit.  severity causing the Roman soldiers to return to the observance of military laws, and to endure labour, and to keep array, and to refrain their outcourses for spoils, obtained divers great victories against the Parthians and others. Neither do I doubt if the ancient orders of wars might be observed of our English soldiers, but that they should be likewise victorious over all their enemies.  
To do them honour and my country good, I have as near as I could endeavoured to set them down in terms, beginning first with matters concerning religion, which howsoever it is now neglected and scorned of profane men; yet ought it both in this, and other things to have the first place.   

CHAP. XXI.  

Wherein a form of Military laws requisite to be published and observed of our English soldiers and others employed in public service of their country, is prescribed. The first part of it containeth laws concerning religion and moral matters.  
1 Every Morning at the relieving of the watch, and every Evening at the setting of the watch, all Captains, Soldiers & others, both in camp and garrison, either in some special place to be appointed, or in their corpse de guard, or those that watch, in their guard, the rest in some other place shall assemble to hear prayers, and other exercises of Religion.  
2 No enterprise shallbe taken in hand, but the companies that are to execute the same, shall first commend themselves to God, and pray to him to grant them good success.  
3 Every Sunday the whole company at hours appointed shall meet to serve God, so much as the necessities of wars will permit. And for this cause a convenient number of Ministers are to be entertained, and such as abuse them, to be severely punished.  
4 Notorious swearers, and blasphemers shallbe punished according to the quality of their offence, yea with death, if their faults be heinous.  
5 All abuses of God's word, and holy Name in cursing, banning, charming and whatsoever other unlawful practice, shallbe punished by imprisonment of the offenders, and death also, if the crime be heinous, and the example scandalous.  
6 Many offences against God and man do spring of dicing, carding, and other such unlawful games. Therefore let all dice, and eardes, and such like instruments of abuse be taken away as much as may be, and let such gamesters be admonished, and if they do not so leave, and reform themselves, let them be imprisoned.  
7 Common women let them be whipped out of the camp, and garrison, and such soldiers, and others as use their company, let them be imprisoned. Officers that give bad examples of such matters, let them lose their places. Suspicious women let them be banished the camp, or garrison.  
8 For that God is greatly offended with drunkenness, and the abuses that come of it, and forasmuch also as camps, and garrisons are thereby much disordered, and many good men suffer for the abuse of such lewd drunkards: therefore such are to be imprisoned and fed with bread and water, so long as the quality of their offence shall deserve.  

Annotations and interpretations of the former laws, for the better understanding of them.  
[Concerning Religion.] The name of Religion, I know, will seem strange to most of our lusty young soldiers, that in swearing and blaspheming place their greatest bravery, & account it a shame for a soldier to be religious. But seeing not only Religion, but reason also may teach them, that no good success can be expected at God's hands, where he is not served; and that such wicked men as they show themselves to be, are rather to fear the wrath of God, then to hope for victory or other favour; let them if they be but motherwise, desist from scoffing at Religion, & if they be Christian-wise, let them learn to serve him, that is Lord of armies, and giver of victory. The very Gentiles, albeit ignorant of the true God, yet in matters of war were most devout, and religious. The Romans yielded such honour to their divines, and 
a Sacerdotio augurum tantus honos accessit, ut nihil belli, domique postea, nisi auspicatò gereretur. Livi. 1.  soothsayers, that nothing was attempted either in matters of peace at home, or in wars abroad, but after consultation with them. Before they began wars with any Prince or nation, they sacrificed to their God, and besought him to give them good success, as is evident in all their attempts 
b Livi. 22. & 23.  against Annibal, and in their wars against 
c Romani bello Philippo indicto à precatione, & re divina inchoarunt. Livi. 31.  Philip of Macedonia and 
d Res divinas faciebant, & supplicationes. Livi. 36.  Antiochus. When after long wars Annibal 
e Praetor extemplò edixit, ut aeditui sacras aedes tota urbe aperierent, ut salutandi Deos agendique gratias per totum diem, populo potestas fieret. Livi. 30.  departed out of Italy, they caused their temples to be set open, that every man might publicly give thanks. They did the same upon the report of Scipio's good success against their enemies in Africa. Contrariwise, they imputed their evil success to their contempt of Religion, and ceremonies, whereby then they thought they pleased God. Fabius did so interpret the 
f Q. Fabius Max. ab dijs exorsus edocuit patres plus negligentia caeremo▪ niarum, auspiciorumque temeritate, quam inscitia peccatum à Flaminio esse. Livi. 22.  cause of the calamity happened unto them in the overthrow of Flaminius, at the lake Thrasimene. The only means to recover God's favour, he declared to be reverence of Religion, and care to please God. Camillus after the recovery of Rome out of the hands of the Gauls, discoursing of religion affirmeth, that all good success did proceed from the 
g Intuemini horum deinceps annorum vel secundas vel secundas res, vel adversas, invenietis omnia prospera evenisse sequentibus Deos, adversa spernentibus Livi. 5.  favour of God, while he was honoured, and contrariwise that they had no good success since Religion was by them contemned. This was also the opinion of other nations. Pontius the famous captain of the Samnites saith, that as 
h Rerum humanarum maximum momentum est, quam propitijs rem quam adversis agant dijs. Livi. 9  God favoureth or disfavoureth their enterprises, so they sway one way or other. The ancient English and French used to compass the Church within their fortifications: or at least built a church within their castles; for that they imagined 
i Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 5.  that no fort could long hold out, unless God were there served. God promiseth to those that observe his laws, that one of them should chase ten, and ten a hundred, and a hundred a thousand, and threateneth the transgressors of them, that although they were many in number, yet they should fly many ways before their enemies. If therefore we hope or expect good success in our wars; let us first begin with the service of God, and let those be ashamed, that professing themselves to be Christians, yet are not so forward herein as the heathen that knew not God; and are occupied most in abusing Religion, and pulling down God's Church.  
1 [Every morning etc.] Little do they deserve favour at God's hands, that will not open their mouths to crave it: neither do they deserve to be delivered, that will not seek help in danger. That therefore which is here set down in this law, is nothing else, but the duty of all Christians, yet specially commended to soldiers, considering their great negligence therein. That they may do their duty more willingly, and know how to do it, certain short prayers would be framed for the purpose, which in the absence or want of Ministers may be said of the clerk of the band, or any of the company. Every captain ought to have care, that his company do herein their duty, as the general officers appointed for justice, aught to see the same done in the whole camp or garrison. The penalties are according to the faults either more or less, to wit, either admonition, loss of two days pay, or imprisonment.  
2 [No enterprise etc.] As the former law respecteth times, so this respecteth several actions, and enterprises, and enjoineth soldiers in all matters of weight to require the help of God; a thing acknowledged just of all Christians, and practised by the heathen. The Romans departed not from the city to go to the 
a Priùs quàm ab urbe moverunt, prodigia procurarunt. Livi 24.  wars, but first they pacified the wrath of God, as before I have showed by divers examples. The form of Scipio's prayer losing from the coast of Sicily, to go into Africa to war against the Carthaginians, is expressed in 
b Dij deaeque quae maria colitis, vos precor, quaesoque quae in meo imperio gerentur ea mihi, populo, plebíque Romanae, socijs, nominique Latino etc. been verruncent, eaque vos omnia bene iwetis, saluos victis perduellibus domos reduces sistatis. Livi. 29.  Livy, the sum of it is, that God would give him, and his company goodsuccesse, and safe return with victory. They did not attempt any great enterprise, but they made their 
c Supplicatio circa omnia puluinatia decreta. Livi. 27.  supplications before all their gods. Fabius escaped a great danger by means he went not on his journey being sent for by them of Metapontus, before that after his manner he had consulted with God. The same was likewise the proceeding of the Greeks. 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thucid. 2.  Archidamus bringing his army before Plataea began first with sacrifices to crave the favour of God, after his heathenish manner. The like did the Greeks long before at Aulis going against Troy. Xenophon in his return out of his voyage with Cyrus, would do nothing before he had reconciled his company to God. And when his men were in distress; he 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 3.  encouraged them, and willed them to put their confidence in God, for that he was able to save a few out of the hands of many, in what danger soever they were. Neither was ever any nation so 
b Caes. bell. Gal. 1. & 4.  barbarous, as to suppose, that victory came from other, than God, or could be procured by other means, than Religion. Shame then is it for Christians to be less religious than the heathen, or to have more irreligious conceits, than they had. The penalty of the transgressors of this law, howsoever some escape the hands of judges and officers, is very severely imposed by God himself, that overturneth their enterprises. By enterprises in this place, I understand battles, skirmishes, sallies, ambushes, and such like feats of Arms.  
3 [Every Sunday etc.] It is much to be lamented, that among other the cares of Governors, they have had no due care of Religion, and the service of God among soldiers, nor have made any allowance for the ministery among them. In so much that in some garrisons in the low Countries, soldiers have lived almost without exercise of Religion, and in camps without any due exercise of the same. This first gave me occasion by this law to excite their care and the care of Generals and captains, both for more devotion in religious exercises, and also for better means. If there were to every two Regiments one or two Ministers allowed, it were a very commendable course. The Papists have their priests in their armies, nay the very heathen had their exercises of Religion, but in our times those that are most curious, are in this point least careful, and religious. 
c Que ningun s●ldado p●nga las manos en ningun sacerdote, o religioso, ni le tratarè mal'de palabra, so pena de ser castigado ala calidad del delicto, Sanch. de Lond.  The Spaniards unto every tertio, or Regiment have divers Priests, whom they have in great estimation, and punish those that do violate them either in word, or deed. The punishment of the offenders against this law is arbitrary, according to the quality of the offence.  
4 [Notorious swearers etc.] For that there are divers sorts of oaths, and blasphemies in degree one worse than another, therefore have I left the punishment of them to the discretion of the judges, or officers that deal therein, respect always being had to the heinousness of the fault. The Spaniards inflict grievous 
a Ningun soldado rintegue, ni blaspheme, so pena porla primera vez de treinta pias d● drision, por la seconda vez sesenta, de mas de ser trahido a la verguenca c●n una mordaza a la lengua, y por la tercera, puesto en Galera perpetua, ●a volundad. Sanch. de Lond.  penalties upon them that transgress in this behalf: and all Christians ought to detest and banish all abuses.  
5 [All abuses. etc.] Under this title are comprised all profane scoffs at religion, all wicked opinions bolstered out with colours of religion. which together with other faults severally named, are severely to be punished by the governors of camps and garrisons, being contrary to good proceedings in war, and in peace, for which also they are condemned by civil laws.  
6 [Many offences etc.] In this point many abuses are committed by our soldiers, of which ensueth the displeasure of God, and many other great inconveniences. To furnish themselves at play some sell their arms, others their apparel. At play they lose their money, which should buy them victuals, and other necessaries. By loss some are driven to steal, and to use other unlawful practices. Some run to the enemy, and commit divers other outrages. For this cause the Spaniard in time of service, doth banish all 
b Que ningle soldado ivegue a ivegoes illicitos. Sanch. de Lond.  unlawful games. The best remedy of all these abuses is, first to take away cards and dice, and to forbid them the camp or garrison; the next is to erect some other warlike exercise; the third, is punishment both of those that play, and those also that maintain such implements of play. But as in other matters, so in this also, example is most available.  
7 [Common women etc.] Among this number, all those women that abuse their bodies unlawfully, are to be numbered. For avoiding of which abuses, no women are to be suffered to follow the camp, nor any suspected women to keep in the place of garrison. The 
c Que ningu●● soldado tenga in casa muger s●spechosa etc. San. de Lond.  Spaniards in their military laws, do restrain officers, by loss of their place, and common soldiers, by other punishment, from this abuse. Among the Roman soldiers such abuses were seldom heard of. but if they were, very severely were they punished, and carefully reform. Scipio the younger when military laws grew in contempt among the soldiers of Spain, did for redress banish all women out of the camp.  
8 [For that god etc.] The voyage of Portugal taught us the inconveniences of drunkenness by experience, but yet reason teacheth us much more. Thereof proceed quarrels, injuries, mutinies, and many other disorders. Drunken men are unfit to march, to watch, to fight, or to do any manner of service. too common it is notwithstanding among common soldiers. And I would to God that captains and officers of companies, were free from it. In whomsoever it is, the same may not be passed without punishment. Wherein that neither sober men be touched wrongfully, nor drunkards escape scandalously, I do think that those deserve to be punished as drunkards, which either through drink commit any excess, which sober men would not commit, or else are unfit to do the service required at their hands.    

CHAP. XXI. Part. 2. Wherein laws are set down, tending to the common safety of the state, army, or garrison.  
1 ALl soldiers, or others that conspire against the state, or Prince, or General, or go about to betray the General, or the army, or any part thereof, or any city, or ground in possession of the state or army, shall suffer death, and torments, if the matter be heinous.  
2 Such as practise, and entertain intelligence with the enemy without direction, or knowledge of their superiors, shall be punished as traitors.  
3 Mutinous and rebellious persons are to be punished with death.  
4 Whosoever yieldeth a town or fort to the enemy, or motioneth any such matter, but upon extremity, and that to the Governor, or in council, let him be executed as a traitor.  
5 No captain, officer, nor soldier may refuse to come, being entertained in pay, nor departed the camp, or place where he is appointed to serve, if the enemy be ready to charge us, or we ready to charge the enemy, upon pain of death, if it be not in time of service, upon pain of imprisonment. Except those always, that have licence of the General, or chief Governor, or other lawful cause. To hurt, and sick persons, the Colonel of the regiment, or judge martial, or other officer appointed, may give licence, that they may departed for a time, to refresh themselves.  
6 All that run to the enemy, or attempt to do it, as traitors to their country, are to be put to death.  
7 No man shall bewray the word to the enemy, or give a false word in time of service, nor when the enemy is near shall sleep in the watch, or suffer him to approach, without giving warning, upon pain of death.  
8 Whosoever of wantonness, or foolery, is cause that the enemy hath notice of our disseins and purposes, so that some good opportunity of service is thereby omitted, is to be punished according to the quality of his offence.  

Interpretations and annotations upon the former laws.  
1 [All soldiers etc.] If conspirators deserve death, much more do they deserve the same that execute their treasons, and conspiracies. 
a Liu. 28.  Scipio killed all the inhabitants of Iliturgi a town in Spain, and burned the town, for that they betrayed the garrison, and revolted to the enemy. 
b Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 1.  Orontes going about to betray Cyrus and his army to the enemy, was executed by Cyrus. This is nothing but the ordinary practice of the Romans, which as 
c Tacit. 1. & l. 3. § in bello. ff. de re milit.  Tacitus affirmeth, brought such matters within the compass of treason.  
2 [Such as practice etc.] There is no surprise nor dangerous treason wrought against a prince or his army, or garrisons, but the same proceedeth for the most part from secret practices, and intelligence of traitors with the enemy. Such practices therefore are not only diligently to be sought out, but also severely to be punished. 
d Supra 70 Nolanos damnatos proditionis, quod colloquia cum hoste habuissent, securi percussit. Liu. 24.  Marcellus executed seventy persons of them of Nola for treason, and secret talk, and intelligence they had with Annibal. The Romans having notice of divers cities in Hetruria and Vmbria, that had communed secretly with Annibal, 
e Liu. 28.  gave order that both inquisition might be made, and due punishment awarded. Neither it is sufficient for any to allege that he is not subject to our jurisdiction, for whosoever committeth treason against us, be he Dutch or French, is to be punished. Quintilius 
f Tacit.  Varus had intelligence how Harminius dealt with him treacherously, yet was slack in making inquisition of the matter, which was the ruin of him and his company.  
3 [Mutinous and rebellious etc.] Mutinous I do not call them, that use bad words to their captains, or that demand their due of them, although in tumultuous sort, albeit some do so take it, and have practised it. yet do I acknowledge that the same is a great offence, and to be punished, yet not in the degree of mutiny. But 
g Qui atrocen militum seditionem concitat capite plectendus est. l. 1. ff. ad leg. jul. mayest. sin verò intra vociferationem & leaven querelam seditio mota sit, gradu militiae dejiciendus est. l. 3. ff. de re milit.  mutinous persons are those that raise sedition, and stir up soldiers to rebellion against their governors, whereby the common cause may receive detriment and hindrance. He that raiseth sedition, and giveth cause to dangerous stirs, is to be punished with death (saith Modestinus) but if he proceed no further then to clamorous complaint, then is he to be punished with the loss of his place, if he be an officer; or if no officer, with some less punishment, than death. Yet are not all mutinous persons to be punished in one degree. Scipio when his army in Spain mutined under colour of want of pay, and long service; with the death 
a Liu. 28.  of thirty persons which were principal movers of the sedition, did pacify the matter. Caesar dismissed 
b Hirt. de bell. Afrie.  Fonteius, for that he was a seditious person. Suetonius 
c Sueton. in Caesar.  testifieth that he cassed all the tenth legion for the same cause. Mutinous I account them also, that dissuade the soldiers from performing any service commanded them by the General, and do think that they deserve no less punishment. The Marquis of Guast cast certain mutinous companions into the 
d Paul. iovius.  sea in sacks, for that they dissuaded the soldiers from the enterprise of Africa, whither Charles the fift than led them. Such mutinies are diligently to be suppressed in the beginning, with the death of the beginners, as 
e Tacit. ●.  Tiberius did the mutiny of his soldiers in Pannony, or with dismissing some of the principallest. 
f Liu. 25.  Fuluius understanding of a secret mutiny among his soldiers in Capua, gave them no leisure to execute their purposes, and presently dismissing the most seditious, had afterward reason of the rest.  
4 [Whosoever yieldeth etc.] This is nothing but a transumpt out of the Roman laws, which in like case decree like 
g Lege julia maiestatis tenetur, qui arcem nó tenuit, aut castra hostibus concessit. l. 3. ff▪ add leg. jul. mayest.  punishment. Pinarius being first prayed, then threatened by them of Aenna, if he would not departed out of the town where he was in garrison, told them that he might not do it, for that no man was to 
h Praesidio decedere apud Romanos capitale. Liu. 24.  departed, or give up the town of garrison, upon pain of death. The 
i Qui Vaccam amiserat condemnatus verberatúsque poenas capite soluit. bell. jugurth. Sallust.  Governor of Vacca, a town in Africa, was condemned, and executed to death, for that he yielded the town to the enemy. He that yielded Pont Charenton to the Protestants, upon the first appearing of their troops, was executed at Paris, anno 1567., by express commandment of the king. Rutilius spared not his own son, that by negligence lost the castle of 
k Val. max. l. 2. c. 7.  Taurentum in Sicily. So that not only treachery, but cowardice, and negligence deserveth in this case to be punished. Cotta caused a near kinsman of his to be beaten with rods, and afterward to serve as a common soldier for losing a place by his default, which was given him in guard. The Carthaginians executed most cruelly him that 
a Polyb.  surrendered up the castle of the Mamertines to the Romans. There is nothing that can excuse a governor in this case, but necessity, to wit, when either for want of men or victuals, or other weakness of the place, he can hold out no longer. So was 
b Liu. 27.  Attilius excused that departed the city of Locri, and the garrison of Scodra that yielded the town to the Turk, not only excused, but relieved by the Venetians: for they held it to the uttermost. The Romans suffered those to compound with Annibal, that were not able to resist his force. Except the case of necessity proved by men of judgement, in few other cases can those that surrender places to the enemy, be excused. In so much, that Alphonso Perrez (as the Spanish histories report) would rather suffer his son taken by the Moors to be slain before his face, than he would surrender up Tariffa into their hands, to recover his son. Nay it is not lawful without cause manifested before the counsel, so much as to parley, or motion any composition with the enemy. The women of Athens stoned Cirsilus to death, for that he 
c justin.  went about to persuade the townsmen to yield to the king of Persia. After the death of 
d Expedit. Cyr. Xenophon.  Cyrus, when the Greeks that went with him being far from their country, were in distress, one Apollonides despairing of other means, would have had them to yield themselves to the mercy of the enemy: but his speech seemed so unworthy the profession of a soldier, that he was there disarmed, & like a base minded beast laden with baggage. How many cities have under colour, and in the time of parley been betrayed, I have heretofore declared. The very motion of parley doth daunt the courage of soldiers: and therefore such motions are not to be made but in secret counsel, and in extremity.  
5 [No captain, officer, nor soldier, etc.] The first part of this law the Roman soldiers when they were first enroled, did swear to perform; the second part is comprised in the Roman laws against such as departed the army without leave. A matter very dangerous: for by such starting aside of soldiers, many garrisons are taken unprovided, and many companies that are full in mosters, are very thin in time of service. And therefore although among us every captain of a company take on him to give licence of absence, yet is the same against all practice of war. By the laws of the Romans no man had 
a Solus dux exercitus missionem dare potest. l. 1. ff. de his qui notantur infam.  power to dismiss soldiers, but the General: & if otherwise it were, the arm might be dissolved, or at least greatly weakened without his privity, & the cause hindered by inferior persons treachery.  
6 [All that run, etc.] It is a great fault for a soldier in time of service to forsake his General. But far greater to turn his hand against his country and friends, and to fly to the enemy. Such therefore deserve no favour, being not only traitors, but enemies. The Romans punished such more 
b De perfugis graviùs, quàm de fugitivis consultum, nominis Latini qui erant securi percussi, Romani in crucem sublati. Liu. 30.  grievously then fugitive slaves, and howsoever they compounded with others, yet always excepted them. Sometime they were nailed to gibbets, sometime they were 
c Perfugae omnes virgis in comitio caesi, ac de saxo deiecti. Liu. 24.  thrown down from hills. Those that did but endeavour to fly to the enemy although they performed it not, were 
d Volens transfugere qui deprehensus est capite punitur. l. desertorem ff. de remilit.  put to death. Yet would I not have them so deprived of hope of mercy, but that they may find favour, if they with any new service can blot out their former offence. No man fought with more resolution against the Romans, than these revolters. Fabius would not suffer the 
e Liu. 23.  Romans to punish Altinius, that offered to restore Arpi unto them, which himself before had caused to revolt to Annibal. Marcellus knowing the purpose of Bantius, and that he meant to fly to the enemy, yet by courtesy and liberality did choose rather to draw service from him, being a man of value, then to punish him. If then such poor men as by extremity and want are driven to fly to the enemy, will voluntarily return again and crave pardon, I would not have them debarred from hope of mercy, which rigour is due only to stubborn and wilful rebels.  
7 [No man shall bewray, etc.] This being a difference, and sometime, as in the dark, the only difference whereby soldiers know their fellows, great care is to be taken, that the enemy have no notice of it. In the night fight betwixt Vitellius and Vespasians soldiers, nothing did more prejudice 
f Tacit. 18.  Vitellius his side, then that the enemy came to have notice of the word. Which happened by the often repetition of it in the dark. By the same the enemy either passeth away safe, or cometh among us without resistance. Great punishment therefore doth he deserve, that giveth the enemy to understand it by simplicity or negligence, but greater if by treachery and false dealing. Likewise doth he deserve punishment that neglecteth his watch. For seeing that the safety of those that rest, consisteth oft times in the watch, who seethe not that they that neglect their watch, betray their fellows safety? the 
a Liu. 5.  watchman that suffered the Gauls to enter the Capitol, while he slept, was thrown down from the rock whereon the Castle stood, there to sleep for ever. By the laws of the 
b l. Qui excubias ff. de re milit.  Romans he that slept in the watch was put to death. Epaminondas going the round slew the 
c Plutarch. in Epaminonda.  watchman whom he found sleeping, affirming that he did him no wrong leaving him, as he found him. Yet would I not that any man in punishing these faults should proceed rashly, and without cause spill poor soldiers blood, that is so willingly spent in the service of their country. For if the enemy be far off, and the danger little, this fault is much lessened.  
8 [Whosoever of wantonness etc.] By two means especially the enemy cometh to have notice of our purpose, against the will and purpose of him that giveth the notice: first by making of noise and signs, which may be heard or seen of the enemy being far off; secondly by talking and prating of matters, that aught to be kept secret. by either of which means many enterprises are broken, & many good counsels discovered. The practice of the protestants against the town of 
d Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 5.  Saumur anno 1569 was broken, by firing of certain houses whereby the enemy had notice of their coming. A like enterprise of theirs against Diep the same year was discovered by discharging of a pistol. In our voyage of Portugal the Spanish horsemen that coasted our company, had fallen into a trap laid for them, if one rash companion had not discharged his piece too soon, & thereby given them warning before they entered into danger. If that certain rash fellows had not risen up too 
e Hist. de troubls. de Fr. l. 11.  soon and discharged their pieces upon the galleys of the Baron la guard: both he and his company had been taken at Ton Charente by Rochel An. 1569. by the babble and prating of a certain 
f Philip. Comines.  Herald sent to the French king, he knew more than was convenient of the estate and proceed of Edw. the 4. as I before have showed. Caesar therefore that he 
g Caes. bell. Gal. 7.  might take the Gauls unprovided, forbade his soldiers in their march to make fires. And Homer expressing the 
h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Homer. 3.  courage, and good order of the Greeks, saith they marched with great silence, whereas the Troyans' made a noise like a flight of crane's. Froissart reporteth that in ancient time the English did take an oath, that they should not discover any practice, or counsel of their superiors. But now (it seemeth) that custom is out of date. for no nation doth march with more noise, or talk more willingly. Wherefore although these matters may seem trifling, yet experience showeth what impediments they bring to our affairs. which caused me in this place, seeing other means too weak to work it: to forbid discharging of pieces, firing of houses, making of noise in the march without special direction; and also talking of secret counsels of our governors at any time, and to wish that the same were by law enacted.    

CHAP. XXI. part 3. Containing laws concerning the duties of Captains and soldiers yet more particularly.  
1 ALl Captains, soldiers, and others shall yield their obedience to the lawful commandments of their superiors. Neither shall any lift his weapon against his commander correcting him, or others, for their offences orderly, upon pain of death.  
2 No Captain nor officer of a company shall departed the Camp, or garrison without licence, nor shall lodge or absent himself from his company in time of service, or when the enemy is ready to charge, upon pain of losing his place. except those always, that have lawful excuses of sickness, or hurts, and have appointed sufficient deputies in their place.  
3 All soldiers that wilfully absent themselves without lawful cause from their colours, or company, that goeth to charge, or resist the enemy, deserve death.  
4 No Captain nor officer shall defraud the soldier or other person of his pay, that is committed to his hands to be delivered unto him upon pain of loss of his place.  
5 No Captain nor other shall prefer, or subscribe to a false mostre roll, or fraudulently give in more, or other names, than he hath presently in his company, upon pain of imprisonment, and loss of his place.  
6 No captain, lieutenant, sergeant, nor other that ought to be armed, shall come into the field without their ordinary arms, upon pain of two armours to be deducted out of their pay, the one to their own use, the other to some other of the company that wanteth.  
7 No soldier, nor other shall go into service without the word, and some other mark to be known by, from the enemy especially in night service, upon pain of imprisonment.  
8 No captain, officer, nor other private gentleman in pay, shall entertain any others soldier, or servant, without consent, or lawful dismission from his former captain, or master, upon pain of loss of a months pay. Neither shall any soldier, or servant departed from his captain, or master without lawful cause, upon pain of imprisonment, and returning again of soldiers to their captains, of servants to their masters.  
9 Captains and officers of companies shall watch and ward with their colours, and companies, upon pain of loss of a months pay.  
10 No man shall march with the baggage but the companies appointed, neither shall any march out of his array, or straggle abroad, or go on pilfering when he should march, watch, or serve, upon pain of imprisonment. Such are also by bastonataes to be corrected by their officers, if they be taken in the manner.  
11 No companies shall go on foraging, or make any enterprise against the enemy upon private motion, without the knowledge, and direction of their general commanders.  
12 No soldier shall sell, or pawn, or lend, or lose, or give, or cast away, or play, or otherwise make away his horse, or arms, or weapons, or furniture wherewith he is appointed to serve: nor shall suffer his horse by his default to decay, or his arms to rust, or go to spoil upon pain of imprisonment, and infamy both to him that offendeth, and to his abettors, and aiders.  
13 No private captain shall give Passport to his soldier that is able to serve upon pain of loss of his place, neither shall any soldier in time of service departed without Passport upon pain of death.  
14 No soldier nor other being once placed in array either in marching, or fight shall departed thence, without lawful cause. Whosoever either to run to spoil, or to fly away, doth abandon his ensign, or standing where he is ranged to serve, shall suffer death.  
15 No soldier nor others shall use any shouting or crying, or without cause discharge a piece in marching, or embatteling, or lying in ambush, upon pain of bastonataes presently to be inflicted by the officers upon the offenders taken in the manner, of imprisonment afterward.  
16 No man shall give an alarm unto the army marching, or lodging without just cause, and that in quiet sort, nor shall any tumultuously run nor cry upon an alarm taken, upon such penalty, as the circumstance of the offence shall require.  
17 He that by negligence, or gross ignorance killeth his fellow with his piece, or other weapon, let him die the death.  
18 No man shall challenge another, or defy him in camp, or garrison, nor accept the challenge upon pain of imprisonment, and disarming before his company. Neither shall any offer an injury to his fellow to provoke him to fight, nor shall others privately revenge it, upon pain of imprisonment.  
19 All brawls, and quarrels betwixt fellows, are to be punished severely. Whatsoever therefore he is that in camp, or garrison killeth any man in any sudden brawl, or challenge, except he be thereto forced for his own defence, or striketh his fellow being placed in array ready to fight, let him suffer death for it.  
20 No soldier nor other shall fraudulently, or thievishly take any thing from any man's person, or their lodging, house, or cabin upon pain of death.  
21 When any company of soldiers shallbe lodged in any village, or pass through it, or by any dwelling house, or other belonging to our friends, they shall not hurt, nor injury the people in their persons, nor goods upon pain of death, or other grievous punishment according to the quality of their offence.  
22 No man shall burn any corn, hay, or forage, or destroy any provision, or house, barn, or cornemill, or other building that may serve for the use of the army upon pain of death.  
22 All murders, perjuries, forgeries forcing of women, or maidens, cosinages, or other disorders, whereby the army may any way receive disgrace, or hurt, although not comprised in these laws, shall be punished by such penalties, as the civil laws, or else common laws of England enjoin in such cases.  
24 No soldier nor other shall be mostered, or answer in two companies, or answer to two names in one company, nor shall any victualler, or other that is no soldier, pass in mosters for a soldier, upon pain of death.  
25 No soldier that hath victuals delivered unto him for certain days, shall spoil or spend the same in less time, then is appointed upon pain of imprisonment.  

Annotations upon the former laws.  
1 [All captains, soldiers etc.] Obedience is the bond that keepeth all in order, without which neither can our own men be governed, nor the enemy discomfited. If (saith 
a Liu. 24.  Papyrius) the common soldier might neglect the commandment of his captain, the captain of his colonel, the colonel of his superior commanders; all military proceed would fall out of order. The 
b Dictator signiferum cunctantem signum ut iussus erat infer, occidit. Liu. 4.  General of the Romans killed an ensign-bearer that refused to advance himself forward among the enemies, as he was commanded. Some spared not their own friends, no, nor sons, neglecting their commandments. This general rule therefore is to be observed strictly, and the offenders to be punished. Neither may they or others make 
c Que si algun soldado hiriere a algun official especialment sum superior muera porello.  resistance against those officers that punish them for their offences. Yet on the other side, I do not authorize rash brains to kill or hurt their soldiers. There is difference between correction and killing. By the orders of the Spaniards, he that killeth his soldier disorderly, dieth for it. By commandments in this place, are not understood every captains private pleasures, but orderly directions in time of service.  
2 [No captain nor officer etc.] No man may return into his country without licence; but captains least of all for example sake. For if this were lawful, it were not possible to keep an army together. Such as stay from their garrison, & are to seek, when they should lead their company to the charge, give just occasion of this law.  
3 [All soldiers etc.] These are next in degree to those that fly out of the field. For when they should fight, then like traitorous cowards they hide themselves; and therefore deserve equal punishment with those that fly.  
4 [No captain nor officer etc.] A far greater fault it is, that soldiers seldom have that pay, that their prince alloweth. But yet may not those captains, & officers be excused, which of that which is coming to them, do cut off some part, and pinch them of the rest by divers frauds, and devices. After that 
a Stipendio equites fraudantes Caesarem veriti transsugerunt. Caes. bell. Ciu. 3.  Caesar had notice how Roscillus and AEgus, two captains of horsemen, had defrauded their men of their pay, and taken from them their parts of the spoil, as soon as they perceived it, fearing punishment, they fled to the enemy.  
5 [No captain nor other etc.] Many are the incommodities that come of false mosters. The prince is defrauded, the army weakened, service neglected, opportunity given to the enemy. Neither is there any thing that in our times more dishonoureth captains, and officers, than the suspicion had of some in this behalf. The army of julio the second, being in the moster 
b Guicciard. l. 9  rolls double the number that it was indeed, could do nothing of those enterprises that were intended. The abuse of mosters was the ruin of 
c Guicciard. l. 15.  Francis the first before Pavy. Guicciardine reporteth, that four thousand 
d Guicciard. l. 17.  Suitzers were mostred, and paid for six thousand, and that lansquenets seldom are half so many, as are contained in the moster rolls; of which ensueth the spoil of princes without any effect done in service. This abuse was not known in ancient time, which maketh me much wonder, that no man goeth about to remove it: and more, that those that should reform it, in some places do suffer captains to have certain dead pays, which is a means to maintain it, and cover it. To remedy this abuse, there are two means; first to allow captains honourable maintenance, and to pay every soldier by the poll, as the 
e Liu. 28.  Romans did, and as the Spaniards do, that have their Pagadores, or Paymasters, for this purpose; the next is that the General cause all the army to be mostred at once, and all those that give in false numbers, or commit any abuse herein, to be punished most severely. By the laws of France they suffer death.  
[No captain, lieutenant etc.] This law may percase to some seem needless. for who would think, that any man would come into the field to fight without arms: but he that hath seen the disorder in wars in this point, and considered how many captains, lieutenants, sergeants, which are the bravest men of their companies, do come without arms defensive into the field, will acknowledge, I doubt not, that it is more than necessary to be thought upon, and redressed. As it is now, they only lead men to fight, and when they come near, convey themselves out of the brawl, letting their soldiers fight if they will. In time past, centurions, and their options, or lieutenants, were the first and principal men of their ranks, and the strength of the battle; and by the vantage of their arms prevailed against their enemies. Would not then so many brave captains, lieutenants, and sergeants now add a great strength to the army, if they stood in their ranks well armed: Now standing out of array, they serve for nothing, but for ciphers in the joining of the battle, unless it be to give evil example, and to trouble others. The Spaniards at mosters pay none, but such as present themselves before their officers with their arms, and furniture. If then in mosters, arms are to be showed; sure more requisite it is, that men should come armed into the field. For what reason hath he to reprove, and check his soldiers for casting away, or losing their arms, that hath no sufficient arms himself:  
7 [No soldier, nor other, etc.] For want of sufficient marks, and cognisances, oft times soldiers of one side hurt their fellows, especially where divers nations serve together. This was the death of Ponsenac, & divers brave men an. 1569. slain by their fellows in a skirmish in France, and is cause of many disorders. Diligently therefore is this point to be looked unto, especially where the enemy, and we speak both one language. Pompey himself for want of ready pronouncing the word, had like to have been slain of one of his own soldiers, in the wars against Settorius in Spain. For this cause the Protestants in these late troubles in France, wore white cassakes, and the Dutch that came in their aid, scarves of colours of their General.  
8 [No captain, officer, etc.] Of this cause proceed many quarrels among captains, and divers frauds in mosters, and disobedience of soldiers to their superiors. Which cannot be avoided if offending one captain, they may find protection, & shelter under another. Therefore both the receivers, & they that are received, deserve to be punished. By the orders of the Spanish camp, the captain looseth his place, the soldier is banished offending herein. Among the Romans such abuses were not usual. But if so be the soldier be evil entreated of his captain, or the servant by his master; then upon proof the lord marshal, or judge marshal is to set order.  
9 [Captains, & officers of companies etc.] For that the soldiers are oft times charged while their captains are absent, and thereupon fly, or commit some other error, as men without government: therefore are 
a Que se Huuieren de Levar vanderas a las guardias vayan los capitanes, officiales, the soldados con todas sus armas en orden, pena de castigo arbitrario.  captains & officers to watch with their companies, and to see that their soldiers depart not the place, nor there stay in disorder. They of the 
b Eam fraudem noctes, ac dies perstando in armis vitastis. Liu. 24.  garrison of Aenna could not have escaped the dangerous practice of the townsmen against them, but by continual watch day and night in arms. The Admiral 
c Hist. de troubls. de Fr. li. 8.  caused a certain ensign to be hanged in the siege of Poitiers for that he was found playing at cards, while his company watched.  
10 [No man shall march etc.] no man that hath care of his honour, or reputation, will be behind while his company is before: but because all are not of one metal, and divers regard not honour, to remedy the disorders in marching, this law is framed. Many inconveniences come of disorderly marching. the enemy hath opportunity given him to charge us: particulars that wander among the country people are either slain, or taken. 
d Scipio Romanum extra ordinem deprehendens vite, extraneum fuste caedebat. Flor. Epit. Liu. 58.  Scipio therefore did chastise such as he espied out of their ranks, with a Vine wand if they were Romans; with a cudgel, if they were other. Cato 
e Siquis extra ordinem avidiùs procurrit, & ipse interequitans sparo percutit, & tribunos, centurionesque castigare jubet. Liu. 34.  riding among the ranks of his soldiers as they were marching, struck those that were out of array with his leading staff, and commanded the colonels and captains to chastise them. By greediness oftentimes of a little spoil, while soldiers range out of order, an army may be defeated. The 
f Samnitium equites aviditate praedae impetum faciunt in impedimenta; iis praepediti caesi sunt. Liu. 8.  Samnites bought dearly the spoils which they ran after, being overtaken by the Romans in disorder. The Romans therefore among other things when they were enroled, did swear that they would keep their array.  
11 [No company shall, etc.] Although companies do go out with the General's privity, and sufficient order be taken to second them, and to favour their retreat, yet many times do some come short of home. What are then they to look for, that go forth without direction or succour: that the body of the army be not weakened, & divers good men lost by their own rashness, & that the enemy take not thereby opportunity to charge us, let good direction be given, & all dangers be forecast. The Romans 
g A procursationibus quaemultae temerè inter murum & vallum fiebant, edicto ne quis iniussu pugnaret, ad opus milites traducti. Liu. 5.  in the siege of Veij, seeing many men lost by sudden skirmishes, between the town and the camp, forbade their soldiers to fight any more without commandment. 
h Papyrius vincentem magistrum equ●tum quòd iniussu pugnaverat, caederevoluit. Liu. 8.  Papyrius would have executed the general of his horse, for that he fought contrary to his commandment, albeit he returned victorious, Manlius punished this disobedience, by the death of his own son. The 
a Que ningun soldado vaya a correre sin ordeny licencia de quin si la pudiere darque ningun soldado trave escaramuza, o vaya a saccomanno sin orden so pena da to castigo arbitrario. Sanch. d● Lond.  Spaniards neither make road nor skirmish without direction of their superior commanders.  
12 [No soldier shall sell etc.] To sell away, or to throw away their arms 
b Arma in bello alienare, aut amittere, capitale. l. 3. § mile's ff. de re milit.  was capital to the Roman soldiers. Appius 
c Appius armis amissis fugientes milites verborum insuper addita contumelia securi percussit. Liu. 2.  Claudius did behead those soldiers, that throwing down their arms fled from the enemy. Lycurgus' among the Spartans made a law, that no man should turn home, that turned his back to the enemy. And therefore did they banish Archilochus the Poet out of their city for that he affirmed, that it was better for a man to lose his arms, than his life. The Lacedaemonian women when they delivered shields to their sons 
d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  going into the wars, exhorted them either to bring them back again, or to die valiantly upon their shields. Epaminondas in the battle of Mantinaea having received his death's wound, asked if his shield were safe. Chabrias when his ship was ready to sink, and he might by 
e Aemil. prob.  swimming have saved himself, chose rather to die with his arms, then to save himself without them. In our time few do carry all arms into the field, & of those that do, few make conscience to lose them. Yet did the Romans carry beside their heavy arms both victuals, and certain stakes, and thought it great dishonour to lose their arms. Very requisite therefore it were, that this law were put in practice. Further it is not sufficient to have arms, unless the same be well kept and serviceable. 
f Arma tersa sint, ferramenta sana. Vopisc. in Aurelian.  Aurelian did enjoin his soldiers to keep their arms whole, and neat. Aemilius 
g Arma habeat miles apta corpus pernix. Liu. 44.  required no more of his soldiers, then that they should maintain their bodies in strength, and their arms fit. The 
h Que ningun soldado sin legitimo impedimento dexe de llevar, en la orden todas las armas, con que estwiere obligado a seruir s● pena de ser sacado de la hilera Vergon cosament.  Spaniards have at this day great care, that every soldier have all his arms, & them sound and fit for service, in which point whosoever offendeth, they draw him out of his rank with shame.  
13 [No private captain etc.] long experience hath taught men now to have more care in this point, then in time past, when any captains passport was thought sufficient to dismiss his whole company. and great reason there is men should look unto it. For while this was suffered, brave men were dismissed for some little money, and weak persons received in their places, and the pay of divers soldiers emboursed by the captains, and the prince's 
i Exercitum consul infrequentem commeatibus datis per abitionem culpabat. Liu. 40.  service slackly performed. Fuluius 
k Liu. 40.  a Colonel of the Romans was banished his country, for that he took upon him without other authority to dismiss a legion, whereof he had the commaundemet. Caius C. 
a Matienus quòd exercitum in Hispania deseruisset, sub furca caesus nummo sestertio veniit, Florus 55. l. epit. Liu.  Matienus for that he came from the army in Spain without passport, was beaten under a gibbet, & sold for one piece of money, to signify unto us, that such fugitive rascals are of no more value. While in the civil stirs in France every soldier came, & went at pleasure, & in the service in Flanders, and France, there hath not been that order herein, that was requisite; neither they in France, nor others could at any time assure themselves of their number, or strength.  
14 [No soldier nor other etc.] Among soldiers there can be no greater fault, then to forsake their ensigns & standing, & so to run out of the field. Be it for fear, or spoil, the same is grievously to be punished. 
b Liu. 2.  Appius beheaded the ensign bearers, & centurions, that fled away from their ensigns. To those companies that fled and lost their ensigns in a certain encounter with Annibal, 
c Cohortibus quae signa amiserant hordeum dari jussit, centurionesque manipulorum quorum signa amissa fuerat, districtis gla. dijs discinctos destituit. Liu. 27.  Marcellus gave nothing but barley to eat, the centurions he caused to stand with their garments lose, and swords drawn, which among their soldiers, was a great shame. Caesar did put certain ensign bearer from their 
d Caes. bell. ciu. 3.  places, for that they lost their ground, in a certain encounter with Pompey at Dyrrhachium. Crassus' 
e Appian. Alex.  causing his soldiers that fled, to cast lots, put every tenth man to death, which Antony did likewise execute upon his soldiers flying from the Parthians. Antonius Primus, 
f Vexillarium fugientem transuer. beravit hasta. Tacit. 19  one of Vespasians captains, seeing an ensign bearer turn his back, struck him through with a javelin. In this case Clearchus would have soldiers to fear their captains, more than the enemy.  
The fault of those that run to spoil, is not much less, then of those that run away. While those that pursued the enemy turned aside to spoil, the French were overthrown at Guinguast, the Italians at 
g Guicciard 1.  Taro, and the 
h Liu. 8.  Samnites in a certain encounter by the Romans, that turning head upon the victors, took the victory out of their hands. 
i Caesar à militibus contendit, ne in praeda occupati reliqui negotij gerendi facultatem dimitterent. Caes. de bell. ciu. 3.  Caesar having overthrown Pompey in open field, prayed his soldiers that they would not so set their minds on spoil, that they would omit the occasion to achieve the victory, and perfit other matters. The Romans what with reward, what with severity, wrought so much in the minds of their soldiers, saith 
k In bello saepiùs vindicatum est in eos, qui contra imperium in hostem pugnaverant quàm qui signa reliquere, aut pulsi loco cedere ausi sunt. Sallust. coniur. Catil.  Sallust, that they were more often punished for fight without commandment, then for flying away, or forsaking their ensigns. The Lacedæmonians banished such cowardly persons. Aristotle, no soldier, but a Philosopher, 
l 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. thetoric. 2.  holdeth it a dishonourable thing for a soldier to fly, or to cast away his arms. A certain soldier of Caesar, albeit he had vanquished his enemy, yet craved pardon, for that he was driven to forsake his shield.  
15 [No soldiers nor others etc.] the cries, tumult, and running up and down of disorderly persons do much discourage young soldiers, and 
a Caes. bell. gal. 5.  hinder them that they cannot hear the commandments of their leaders, and therefore are diligently to be avoided.  

b Aemilius cum clamoribus omnia confunderentur tribunos militum Primipilo legionis secretum edere imperium jussit, singulos proximo cuique dicere. Liu. 44.  Aemilius perceiving the divers inconveniences that grew hereof gave all his directions to the colonels, and they to the first man of the legion, and he to the Centurions, and every one to his fellow secretly, and quietly. Among the 
c Que ningun soldado gritte. ni hable en la ord●n. etc. so pena de ser sacado de la hilera vergonçosament. Sancho de Lond.  Spaniards no man may cry out, nor speak loud, either marching, or embattled in squadrons. The punishment of the offence among them is shame, and infamy. Only at the joining of the battle, it is not only lawful, but also profitable to begin with a great noise. Of which, as it was greater, or lesser: some have gathered a 
d Veget.  presage either of loss, or victory.  
16 [No man shall give an alarm etc.] False alarms disquiet the army very much, and often trouble those that aught to rest. And therefore doth the enemy oftentimes suborn some to keep our men in continual alarm, that more easily he may prevail against us being tired and overwatched. Those difficulties therefore which the enemy casteth in our way, let us not 
e Que ninguna persona de arma falsa sin ' erden deed que se la pudiere dare, so pena de la vida.  increase by our unskilfulness, & let us in our watches and discoveries keep good order: and the rather, for that lodging for the most part without strong defence, and marching without diligent discovery, we lie open to many surprises, and sudden attempts of the enemy. The penalty is arbitrary, and may be more or less, according to the quality of the offence. Yet in avoiding the excess, we must take heed that we run not into the defect; and so for want of warning be taken unprovided.  
17. [He that by negligence etc.] If this did not fall out too often among our young soldiers, that either for want of skill, or through fear not looking before them do kill, & hurt their fellows, this law might seem needles. But as now it is, I would think this law very profitable, if by this proviso the soldiers might be made more wary. By the same not only those that hurt others negligently, but also, & much more they that hurt their fellows maliciously are to be punished.  
18 [No man shall challenge etc.] 
f In l. 18. & 19  The Romans contended among themselves rather who should kill most enemies, than who could overcome most of their fellows. 
g Commilitonem gladio ferire capitale erat, lapide percutiens militia reijciebatur. l. 3. §. qui aliena. ff. de re milit.  Those that struck their fellows with their sword died for it, those that threw stones at them, were displaced with shame. And therefore did seldom any quarrel or brawl arise among companions. Among us nothing is more common, neither will any law serve to restrain such disorders. Yet do I not doubt, but if these laws whereby not only the original, that is, injurious words and deeds, but also the means, that is, challenges and acceptance of challenges is taken away, were executed, and brawlers punished, that these faults would be less common. In experience we find that these spadassines, and common quarrelers prove not most resolute soldiers. Many inconveniences come of these quarrels. For not only brave men are often lost, but also the common cause hindered by them. The quarrels betwixt captains and gentlemen in Tifauges Anno. 1569. caused divers to departed malcontent, of which the enemy having notice took the town disfurnished of soldiers. The 
a Qualquiera persona que hiziere o fixare carteles o dixiere palabras escandalosas, de las quales puede causarse tumulto, o motin, muera por ello. Que ningun soldado sober enemistad, o pendentia vieia durant la guerra, y iornada rinne, nitrate, ni por pendentia nueva desafie a otro so pena de la vida al provocante, y destierro all provocado.  Spaniards therefore do expressly forbid all cartels, injurious words, and brawls upon great penalties, both in their armies, and garrisons.  
20 & 21 [No soldier nor other shall fraudulently etc.] Those that know what necessities poor soldiers are driven unto, cannot choose but pity their estate that contrary to orders of law are forced to shift. Yet for the necessity of some, the disorder of others, that as they stole at home, so steal abroad, may not pass unpunished. 
b Nemo pullum alienum rapiat, ovem nemo contingat, oleum, salem, lignum, nemo exigat. Vopisc. in vita Aurel.  Aurelian the emperor would not suffer his soldiers to take so much as a pullet, or oil, or salt, or wood from the country people. For 
c De praeda hostium non lachrymis provincialium habeat. Vopisc. ibidem.  soldiers, saith he, aught to enrich themselves with the spoils of the enemy not with tears of the people, that are friends. 
d Sueton. in Tiber.  Tiberius caused one of his guard to be put to death for taking a peacock out of a man's yard. 
e Tacit. annal.  Aufidius Cassius punished rapine, and theft most extremely. Of the Turk it is reported, that he put one of his soldiers to death for taking away a poor woman's milk. 
f L. 3. § qui aliena ff. de re milit.  Modestinus judged him worthy of death that stole his fellows arms. To restrain this disorder the Roman soldiers when they were first enrolled did swear that they would bring to the general, or his deputy, whatsoever they should take up. Only certain trifling things were excepted. Caesar setting guards at the gates of the city of 
g Leptitanis se tradentibus centuriones ad portam posuit, ne quis miles ingrederetur. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Leptis, that yielded to him, kept his soldiers out, for fear they should spoil the inhabitants. The Romans most severely punished 
h Liu. 29.  Pleminius, and others that spoiled the town of Locri wherein they lay in garrison. And put to death all that legion that driving out the townsmen seized Rhegium to their own use. The Spaniards do diligently 
a Que ningum soldado dentro ni suera del campo, tome, ni quite cosa alguna a persona alguna.  forbid such filcheries. In sum, the ancient orders of war require, that not only soldiers, and others within the camp or garrison, possess their arms, and goods in peace, but also that our associates, and friends be kept from spoil.  
22 [No man shall burn etc.] Many things may be found in the enemy's country, which might greatly benefit the army, if they could be saved from the wanton spoil of the soldier. Wherefore that soldiers fall not into needless wants through their own default; let this law among others be diligently executed.  
23 [All murders etc.] Such offences as by civil laws are punished at home, aught to have like punishment abroad. Yet must the judges and Officers that dealt herein, proceed with great discretion. For small matters in time of peace, as neglecting of the watch, and disobedience against Officers, are severely punished in time of wars: and contrariwise great matters in time of peace, are for some evident cause neglected in wars. Favour, and alliance 
b Aliter in ardore belli, aliter in pace judicandum saith Fabius. Liu. 24.  have lieu in choice of Officers in peaceable government: but in wars they that make not choice of worthy men, worthily repent themselves. Again in time of peace proceeding is flow, and forms are observed: but in proceeding in martial causes neither formalities, nor delays are admitted. Provided always, that in cutting off formalities, and delays injustice be not done.  
24 [No soldier nor other etc.] The fift law of this Chapter concerneth Captains and Officers, this is proper to soldiers and such as pass for soldiers. Both are little enough to redress disorders, and if there were divers other laws made to the same purpose, yet were it good if all could remedy the inconveniences that follow false and fraudulent dealing in mosters.  
25 [No soldier that hath etc.] Military discipline is so far grown out of use, that men are constrained, by express laws to prescribe many particular matters, which otherwise might seem either trifling or needless. And among other things as you see, that soldiers dispense and spend their victuals moderately, or rather sparingly. for he that betime spareth not, very timely shall want.    

CHAP. XXI. Part. 4. Wherein orders especially concerning the camp, or town of garrison are contained.  
1 Whosoever shall deal fraudulently, or negligently in such matters, as are by his Camerada committed to his trust or government, let him have punishemnt according to his offence, and make double restitution out of his pay.  
2 All manner of persons within the camp or garrison, after the watch is set, shall repair to their quarter, and there use silence, that every man may rest. All stragglers and tumultuous persons, that are taken abroad after that time, shallbe committed to prison, and there abide until their cause be examined by the officers of justice, & order taken for their punishment, or dismissing.  
3 No man in camp (or garrison in time of war) shall lodge out of his quarter, or delay to repair thither upon an alarm given, upon pain of imprisonment.  
4 No soldier nor other shall receive any stranger into his cabin, or lodging upon pain of imprisonment, nor shall harbour any spy, or messenger from the enemy, upon pain of death.  
5 No manner of person shall pass in, or out of the camp, or town of garrison any other, than the ordinary ways, upon pain of death.  
6 Women, and boys, and such as do idly follow the soldiers, not being entertained in pay, as much as may be, are to be banished the camp.  
7 No captain, soldier, nor other person, in time of necessity, and for defence of himself and the army, or garrison shall refuse to work with mattock, spade, basket, or other instrument, upon pain of imprisonment.  
8 No soldier appointed to stand sentinel, shall departed from the place, or sleep in the place, upon pain of death, nor shall sit down upon pain of imprisonment.  
9 For keeping the camp clean, and maintaining of men's health, some places shallbe assigned for the slaughter of beasts, & others for other necessities at the outsides of the camp, or town of garrison, out of which places it shall not be permitted to any to kill beasts, or do other offices upon pain of imprisonment. Every Colonel, and Captain shall look to the cleansing of his quarter every third day, upon pain of loss of a months pay; and shall cause such as cast out any garbage, or filth, and bury it not, to be imprisoned.  
10 No man shall spoil, or hurt any victualler or other person coming with provision for the army, or any merchant that bringeth necessary commodities to the camp, nor shall break open any shop, or steal any thing out of any tent, or cabin, or house, upon pain of death.  
11 No man shall buy, or sell any victuals, but in the place appointed for the market, nor until such time as the same be reasonably rated by the officers appointed, nor above that price that is reasonably set, upon pain of forfeiture of such victuals so bought, or sold, or the value thereof, and also imprisonment.  
12 No soldier nor other shall break down or burn any house that may serve for lodging of the company, nor shall trouble or defile any spring, or stream of water, that is to be used for the service of the army, upon pain of imprisonment.  

Annotations for the better understanding of the former laws.  
1 [Whosoever shall deal etc.] Many are the commodities that proceed of camarades: 
a De Camaradas proceed poderse sustentar meior con el s●eldo que estando cadauno de pors●●y assimismo grand amistad con otras muchas vt●lidades.  Soldiers do live better, and cheaper in camarada then otherwise: they are linked in more straight bonds of friendship one with another: if any be sick or hurt, his camarada taketh care of him. When they are ranged together, one doth more willingly succour another. For which cause it were to be wished, that as it is among the Spaniards, very commonly, so among us our companies were divided into camaradaes, and that such as violate the laws of society should be sharply punished.  
2 [All manner of persons etc.] The cries and disorders of some lewd persons that take no delight but in their own lewdness, and disorder giveth occasion of this law sufficient. And all little enough to stop their mouths, and procure others rest. In the Roman army there was in time past great quietness in the night: and now the Turks after the watch set use great silence. The wandering up and down of soldiers, and others after that time doth cover spies: which if every man resort to his quarter, cannot long lie hidden.  
3 & 4 [No man in camp etc.] While men lodge out of order, it is hard to bring them in 
a Qua todos los soldados acudan a us vanderas con gran diligentia encommenaeando acoger los atambores.  the night into any order. Besides this inconvenience, while soldiers lodge out of their quarter, the same falleth out to be unfurnished oftentimes, if the enemy should then chance to assault it, and espials cannot be discovered, nor the dangers of secret meetings avoided. For which cause order is to be given, that all do lodge in their own quarter, and give notice to their superiors, if any stranger, or suspected person lodge there.  
5 [No manner of person etc.] While this is neglected, the way is made easy up to the rampire, guards and sentinels are abused, and espials pass in and out, and are not espied. For this cause the Romans did 
b Si quis vallum transcenderit, aut per murum castra ingreditur, capite punitur. ff. dear milit. l.  punish this disorder with death.  
6 [Women, and boys etc.] Infinite abuses come into the camp by these means. Victuals are consumed, disorder increased. And therefore as Scipio purged his camp at Numantia of all superfluous persons, so allowing boys to captains and certain officers, the rest are to be banished as much as may be.  
7 [No captain or soldier etc.] The stubbornness of some, and daintiness of others, that either refuse to work, or think it not belonging to the profession of a soldier to work, hath given but too just cause of this law; which is therefore set down, that every man not hindered with hurts, & sickness may know the it is the duty of a soldier no less to work with a spade in trenches, then to fight with the sword in the open field. The Romans, as before I have showed, generally set hand to the work: which made them victorious oftentimes without setting hand to the sword. 
c Xenoph. exped Cyr. 1.  Cyrus and all his nobility set hands to work, and holp forward the carriages that were often mired, as his army marched over certain moors, notwithstanding the Persian pride and bravery. But since our soldiers began to put such bravery in their silks, it is no marvel if they have made difficulty to mire themselves. For nothing is more contrary to silks then mire. Yet do not the Spaniards that think themselves as brave as the best, think themselves by these labours any whit disgraced.  
8 [No soldier appointed etc.] The safette of the camp, and garrison is oft reposed in the diligence of the sentinel, by whose watchfulness others rest assured. The more severely therefore ought his negligence to be punished. The Romans in time past, as before I have showed, and now the 
d Que ningun soldado dexe la sentinela so pena de la vida ni a part del lugar, ni se siente sopena de castigo.  Spaniards do punish this fault with death. Paulus Aemilius to avoid the sleeping of sentinels, ordered, that they should stand, or walk, which others likewise do now practise.  
9 [For keeping the camp etc.] There cannot be too much diligence used in this behalf. The incommodities that come of infection of the air, occasioned by the filthiness of the place, are so many: & the thing so loathsome. The 
a Ningun soldado ni otra persona each immunditias y es●rementos dëtro de los quarteles so pena de castigo arbitrario.  Spaniards therefore in effect decree as much as we, but they observe it far better. The Romans without law proceeded herein very carefully, by reason of their continual experience.  
10 11 & 12 [No man shall spoil or hurt etc.] The ancient orders of the Romans, that carried victuals with them sufficient for their company, being out of practice, and the provision of the army being made now from day to day by victuallers, that for gain follow the camp: it standeth the General upon to see that they may safely come and go: and that victuals may be provided and saved. The army of the Prince of 
b Cavalier Cicuta.  Orange that besieged Florence, had like to have been famished by the disorder of three or four lewd persons, that spoilt the merchants, & victuallers that came, and went from the camp; no sooner were they hanged, but the army had all things for their money plentifully. By the laws of the 
c Que ningun soldado ni otra persona salga a lo● camin●s ni a part alguna a tomar las victuallas, ni a impedir los conductores dellos, ni a romper o quemar los molinos, villas, granias, cazare, y lugares de la comarca, ni compre victuallas fuerae de las plaças, qu● para venderlas fuerē senna ladas, y despues deapreciadas per los officiales.  Spanish government, such spoilers are severely punished, and victuals both well saved, and reasonably rated. Neither are victuals only to be looked unto, but also corne-mils, and houses, and granges, that may serve for the use of the army: streams of water are to be kept clean, not only for the use of men, but of cattle also.  
These laws being well observed, and provision made not only of victuals, & things necessary for the whole, but also of physic & places of ease for the sick, & hurt, I would well hope, that matters would proceed in better order among soldiers, than they have done heretofore.    

CHAP. XXI. Part. 5. Wherein a form of laws especially concerning sea causes, and ships going in public service of the Prince is prescribed.  
1the ordinary practice and laws of war concerning religion, and the state, & also concerning obedience, and peaceable conversation betwixt fellows, which have course in service at land, shall be observed likewise at sea, respect being always had to the divers circumstances, which are divers in either.  
2 The execution of justice at sea appertaineth to the General, or chief captain with his counsel: if a ship be severed from the rest of the company, than the punishment of faults that may not be differred belongeth to the captain with the advise of the most apparent men in the ship. Provided that no execution be done at sea contrary to the laws of arms, nor that such as offend and escape at sea, do escape at land also, especially where the fault is heinous. For which cause those that have jurisdiction at sea, are to have their jurisdiction continued at land, until such time, as offences be punished.  
3 No ship shall go forth upon public service without sufficient ordnance, arms, soldiers, mariners, munition, victuals, surgeons and other necessary furniture.  
4 No man shall sell away the arms, tackle, artillery, victuals, or munitions belonging to the ship upon pain of death.  
5 Whatsoever ship having directions to come to a place certain, shall not keep course if it be possible, nor come thither so soon as the wind will serve, the captain, and master, and those that are in fault shall suffer death for it.  
6 Whosoever shall motion to do contrary to the General's direction, so long as there is possibility, or means to follow it; shall suffer imprisonment for the same: and if he persuade the company, so that the ship goeth another way, both he and those that willingly yield to him shall suffer death for their disobedience.  
7 Whatsoever captain or other doth board a ship of the enemies without direction, or reasonable cause, or when commandment is given, or a sign made of fight, doth see a ship boarded upon one side, and doth not if he be able board her on the other side, or at least do what hurt he can to the said ship, shall be dismissed from his charge, and suffer such further punishment, as the General shall think meet.  
8 Every particular person shall execute his charge imposed upon him in the ship where he is placed, upon pain of imprisonment.  
9 No soldier nor other when the enemy attempteth to board our ship, shall abandon his standing upon pain of death.  
10 No soldier nor other appointed to board the enemy's ship seeing his fellows entered, shall draw back, or refuse to follow in his turn, and order upon pain of death.  
11 No man shall break open his fellows, or others cabin, or coffer, nor shall take any thing thence, or from their persons, or hide any thing that is not his, upon pain of death.  
12 He that neglecteth his watch, or sleepeth leaving a candle or match light, or any fire in any place and putteth it not out, shall be put into the bilbowes, and have further punishment as the offence shall deserve.  
13 When a ship shall be taken, then shall the spoil be brought to persons deputed by the General or Captain. And whosoever shall hide any thing of value from their knowledge, shall not only lose the same, but his share of the rest also.  

Notes upon the former laws.  
1 [The ordinary practice etc.] How many voyages have been broken of late time for want of government, every one that is acquainted with sea causes, that have passed of late, understandeth. Nothing therefore is more requisite, then that such as go in those services that hereafter shallbe attempted, should have both authority to do justice, & a form of proceeding set before them. For this cause I have made this light, and as it were first draft, that men of wisdom & experience seeing what is wanting therein, may add more, and bring the same to more perfection. Those laws that concern treacheries against the prince and state, or against the General, or else concern mutinies, disobedience, brawls, murders, or else are common in service at land, and sea, I have not here set down, for avoiding unnecessary repetitions. Yet are they no less necessary at sea, then at land. And therefore let them be borrowed thence, that no military disorder, nor other offence escape unpunished.  
2 [The execution of justice etc.] The want of this consideration, hath been cause that many notorious treasons and villenies have escaped without punishment. I will not name particulars, for that my meaning is rather to provide against future disorders, then to have the sword drawn for matters forepast. Only let there be hereafter care, that such as go to sea may be furnished with authority to do justice, & that rules be set down, that they may know what to do.  
3 [No ship shall etc.] The Admiral of France in time of peace at home hath special care of this matter. In civil wars all things are in garboil. He putteth into men of war, the tenth man, and is at a tenth of the charge, and deserveth a tenth of the 
a Popelliniere in a treatise concerning the admitaltie of France.  prize. Which many do wonder how in our days certain officers contrary to all custom do come to challenge, especially in goods taken by reprisal. Where if law might take place, neither the taker, nor other aught to have more than hath been taken from him in foreign countries. But if men will needs have a tenth, yet let them have a tenth of the care that ships may go forth well furnished, that they be not lost, and the land disfurnished in time of service.  
4 [No man shall sell etc.] Every gunner, and petite officer in the Queen's ships can tell the mystery of this law. I would it were so well known how we might meet with their filcheries. The best means is to look to matters narrowly, and to punish such companions as offend, severely.  
5 [Whatsoever ship etc.] As at land, so at sea, if colonels, captains, and masters do not execute the generals commandment: there can be no performance of service. If ships may straggle from the company, and go on pilfering, or upon every light occasion return, and leave their General at sea, or if private men may take upon them to dissuade men from doing that, which the General hath commanded, and all this without fear of punishment, as hath been done in some countries, but too much heretofore in voyages at sea: there can be no better hope of success, then hath been had heretofore.  
6 [Whatsoever captain etc.] This law hath two parts: the first is against such as attempt matters without direction, by which means, they either endanger themselves going single, or else break the general purpose of the action: the second is against cowards and traitors, that look on while their fellows fight: against which no punishment can be devised sufficient. 
b Liu. 1.  Metius Suffetius was drawn in pieces by force of horses, for that while Tullus Hostilius encountered with the enemy, it pleased him to stand by, and give aim. And not much less punishment had Laetus one of the captains of 
c Herodian.  Severus his army; for that while the rest fought, he caused his men to make alta. 
d Lib. 25.  Amminian Marcellin reporteth, that certain horsemen of the Romans were disarmed, & had their horses taken from them, and were driven to serve with the baggaglioes of the camp, for that they retired when their fellows went to charge the enemy. The like reason is in fight at sea. For if when one ship entereth the battle, the rest do not second her, or if when one ship is charged, the rest come not to succour: there is no hope, that any great service can be done at sea.  
The laws of this section that follow are plain enough of themselves, and most of them like to those that are ordained for good service at land; and therefore I purpose not to spend words in explaining that, whose reasons every man may easily conceive of himself.    

CHAP. XXI. Part. 6. Wherein there is contained certain orders concerning adventures at sea.  
1 WHere men do adventure at sea upon their own charge, there the prizes taken are to be divided into three parts, whereof the first belongeth to the ship and captain, the second to the victuallers, the third to the soldiers and mariners, (Some allot a third part to the ship alone, but there seemeth therein to be no just proportion.) If by reason of the charge otherwise then is ordinary bestowed, other agreement be made, the same is to be observed and kept.  
2 Where two or more do join in consort, the division of the prize shall be made according to the composition that is made among them: if none be made according to the greatness and goodness of the ships and furniture: provided always, that where a ship is forced, those that first board her, and do most valiantly, be first rewarded, and their hurts, and losses repaired at the common charge.  
3 All adventurers that join in consort, and submit themselves to one man's government or to more, shall to them yield obedience, and of them receive justice according to the laws of arms, and customs of sea government.   

CHAP. XXI. Part. 7. Wherein an order is set down concerning the officers of the army or navy, or that have charge to make any provision for either.  
1 Whatsoever commissary, or officer appointed for levy, or muster of soldiers, or provision of victuals, munition, arms, weapons, carriages, ships, or other matter, doth deal therein fraudulently, or negligently, let him be imprisoned, & fined, and make satisfaction; and if the crime deserve it, let him suffer death for it.  

Annotations upon this last law.  
The ancient Captains of the Romans as in skill and experience in wars: so in care also and labour far excelled the men of our times. And therefore neither had they, nor needed they so many lieutenants, and petit officers, as now are used, to bear together with them the several parts of their charge. Themselves saw their soldiers levied, mostered, exercised, paid, lodged, provided of arms, and victuals, and other necessaries, and had seldom any commissioners for levies of men, and never any moster-masters, nor sergeant mayor, nor special officers of justice, nor quartermaster, nor trenchmaster, nor scoutmaster, nor commissaries for provision of arms, nor victuals, nor such matters. For the pay of the soldiers, & saving of the spoil they used a 
a They called him Quaestorem.  treasurer. The tribunes or colonels did execute the office of the campmaster, and sergeant mayor. The generals themselves with their counsel did oversee the works of the soldiers in their mines, banks, trenches, and other military labours. Now the general care of all matters belongeth to the General. But to assist him several men are deputed to every several charge. Who if they behave themselves fraudulently or negligently, his general care availeth him nothing. Great care therefore ought the to have, that his officers be not only loyal, but also careful and sufficient to discharge that office, that is imposed upon them. If they be not such; that he see them not only removed, but also punished according to their deserts. For if soldiers be not levied in time, or else if sufficient men be dismissed for money, & the stumme of the people put in for soldiers, or if young soldiers be not trained and fashioned by light skirmishes, or if that soldiers be famished or not furnished, or have not their arms or victuals in order, or that military orders be not observed, or soldiers unpaid or unprovided for by fraud, or the country ransomed by Captains, and quartermasters, or the honour of the Prince sold for money, or other abuse committed, & finally if those that deal in these offices may do what they list without punishment, or controlment, whatsoever labour and pains is taken otherwise, yet is it to no purpose.  
Among the Romans those that dealt in public charges, were very sufficient men for the most part, and dealt therein loyally. But if at any time they did otherwise, they were most severely punished. L. 
a Liu. 38.  Scipio and his Officers were condemned, & fined for ransacking the friends and associates of the Romans in Asia. Aquilius hardly escaped condemnation for his concussions & exactions in Spain, and Sicily. Against the exactions, and frauds of Officers, they framed divers laws, whereby they not only punished 
b ff. ad leg. jul. repetunda●um.  the offenders, but caused restitution, and reparation of damages to be made. He that by occasion of 
c Qui occasione transitus ab vibibus, vel praediis per concussionem quid accipit, tenetur in ●upium▪ Authent de transit milit▪ col. 10.  passing his army by any city, or country extorted any thing, was bound to restore double. The examples of those that took money for redemption of lodging, and passing of soldiers are rare. Tacitus doth 
d Irinerum spatia & stativorum mutationes venditavit. Fab. Valens foedis pactionibus. Tacit. annal. 17.  mention it in one Fabius Valens, as a notorious and singular greediness, and filthy kind of gain. That equality might be therein observed, Arcadius & 
e Tertia pars domus mil tibus assignabatur. l. 2. Cod▪ de metat▪ & epid.  Honorius, decreed that no soldier lodging in any man's house should have more, than one third part thereof, the rest to remain to the owner, & his family. No soldier by the orders of the Romans might exact so much as salt, light, or vinegar, of those where he lodged. The laws of France upon pain of death forbidden their 
f Petr. Gregor. Tholos. Syntag. juris.  furriers or quartermasters to take any money of any, either for lodging, or for sparing them for lodging.  
By the law julia made against exactions 
g Lege julia repetundarum tenetur qui ob militem legendum, mittendumue pecuniam acceperit. l. eadem. §. lege jul. ff ad leg. jul. repetundarun.  of Officers, he was banished, and condemned to make restitution, that either for choosing or dismissing of soldiers received money. Cassius caused a revolt in Spain by reason of the people's discontentment. For that he 
h Hi●t▪ de bell. Alexander.  exacted money of such, as would not go with him into Africa, whither he pretended a voyage, that rich men being enrolled might redeem themselves with great sums of money. Of which abuse Caesar had no sooner understanding, but he gave order for to displace him.  
The Romans condemned those Colonels, Captains, 
i Tribunus, Centurio, vel alius, qui refert falsuna numerum militum, stipendia intercipiens condennatur in quadruplum, & d●gnitate privatur▪ l▪ vlt. § pro limitaneis. Cod. de office praefect. Afric.  and Officers, that brought in false moster rolls, or inter cepted the pay of soldiers to pay four fold, and to lose their places. By the constitutions of France such as deal in 
k Petr. Greg. Tholos. Syntag. juris.  mosters fraudulently, whether they be Officers or others, are condemned to die: and yet all this is not sufficient to restrain the unlawful shifts, and practices that are therein used.  
The like severity did the Romans use against them that dealt fraudulently in any other military charge. M. Posthumius and other 
a Liu. 25.  merchants for deceit used in provision of victuals, and other necessaries for the army in Spain, and for giving in false accounts, and pretence of loss, where in deed they lost nothing, were banished the city of Rome, and all their goods confiscate. But what should I need to show their justice against fraud and deceit, when they used to punish and dismiss those, that were negligent in their charge? Caesar disarmed, and dismissed 
b Hirt. de bell. Afric.  Auienus, for that in a ship wherein he should have transported soldiers into Africa, he put nothing but his own private servants, and goods. And for that divers of his men, and ships were intercepted, and taken by the enemy, as they passed into Africa, he 
c Quos apud Thapsum custodiae causa esse, iusserat ob negligentiam ignominiae causa dimittendos ab exercitu curavit. Hirt. de bell. Afric.  dismissed his Admiral, and others, and put them from their charge. For by their negligence he received that great loss.  
If then the Romans when these offences were yet new, and rare, for repressing them used great diligence and severity: how much more ought Princes to use justice, and severity herein, when scarce any punishment, unless it be very peremptory, can restrain men's griedy and unsatiable desires? the principal cause of the neglect of military discipline proceedeth from fraud, negligence, and insufficiency of Officers. He therefore that desireth to bring things into order, must begin with reformation of Officers, who both first brought in, and since have continued many disorders, in the proceeding and practice of arms.    

CHAP. XXI. Part. 8. Comprising orders concerning booties, spoils, and prisoners taken in wars.  
1 AFter that the enemy is driven out of the field, or the fortress or town besieged is entered, yet shall no man leave his rank, or ensign to run to spoil before licence, or a sign given upon pain of death.  
2 Whatsoever adventurers that serve upon their own charge, and are not enroled in companies that receive pay of the Prince or State, shall win from the enemy by their own labour: that shall they have divided among themselves, except a fift part that goeth to the Prince. If they join with other companies in consort; then shall there be a proportion made of the spoil according the number of adventurers, and other soldiers. Provided always that no adventurers attempt any enterprise without direction from the General, or lord martial.  
3 All spoils taken from the enemy belong to the Prince, or State, that payeth the army. And therefore whatsoever any soldier shall take or find, being in value above ten shillings, the same is to be brought to the General, or his deputy upon pain of imprisonment, and loss of the double value of the thing concealed. By this means the General may reward the most valiant & forward soldiers, & have wherewith to make payment of the soldiers wages.  
4 Every man shall have liberty to ransom his prisoner taken in wars at his own pleasure. But if once he compound with his prisoner, that composition shall stand, if it be made without fraud. Also if the prisoner be a Prince, or great man, than the General is to have the prisoner to make what commodity he can of him for the benefit of his Prince and country; allowing to the taker either the value of the prisoner, or an honourable reward.  

Annotations upon the former laws.  
1 [After that the enemy etc.] This hath been already enacted in former laws in other terms. Yet when I consider the disorders herein committed, and greediness of soldiers; I thought good more specially to prohibit their disorderly running to spoil: of which I have by divers examples showed the inconveniences. 
a Phil. Comm.  Charles Duke of Burgundy having in the taking of Liege made proclamation against breaking of Churches, killed a certain soldier with his own hands, for that he took him in the manner doing contrary to his commandment.  
2 [Whatsoever adventurers etc.] This is to be understood of companies of adventurers, not of every single person, that shall follow the army upon hope of spoil: likewise of spoils taken only by their own prows, and not of spoils, which the enemy forsaketh for fear of the army. Such adventurers we have few in our wars, & therefore I say the less of them: yet because good it were they should be there, somewhat I thought good to say of them.  
3 [All spoils taken etc.] Nothing is more equal, nor profitable either for the Prince, or the soldier, then that the spoil be brought to the General. For by that means the Prince may be eased of some part of his charge, and the soldiers the better paid & rewarded. Contrariwise nothing is more unreasonable, than that those that do least, should have most, & those that do most, should have nothing, as it falleth out when the sack of a town is given to the soldiers. For a coward that entereth the last, may percase light upon the greatest spoil, while those that first entered can not stir for their hurts. Therefore did the Romans bring all the spoil to the General for the most part; and 
a Nomb. 13.  Moses having vanquished the Midianites, after he had the spoil brought to him; divided it among all the soldiers. Neither doth any reason permit, but that those that watch, and fight should have as good part, as stragglers that run to spoil. And to permit all to go to spoil together were to yield the victory to the enemy. How hard therefore so ever it seem to keep the soldiers from spoil; yet do I think they might easily be persuaded, if they were well dealt withal. and albeit it were a hard point; yet must captains endeavour to obtain it.  
4 [Every man shall have etc.] It is an inhuman, and hard part to massacre such as yield themselves, and throw down their weapons confessing themselves vanquished, and flying to our mercy. The Lacedæmonians in the first beginning of the Peloponnesian war, killed as many Athenians as they caught, which the Athenians likewise practised upon the Lacedæmonians, to requite them: but in the end, saith 
b Thucid. 2.  Thucydides, this cruelty displeased them both. The Spaniards in the beginning of their wars in the Low countries killed cruelly as many as they took: but when they saw themselves to be dealt withal in like sort, they repent, and perceived that such savage cruelty is contrary to the nature of fair wars. but if it be inhumanity to kill him, that yieldeth, much more is it for men to kill those in cold blood, whom they have promised to save. Who doth not detest the cruel slaughter of the Prince of Condè after he was taken at Bassac, and of those Gentlemen that then were taken prisoners, & stain three days after in the General's lodging? Prisoners therefore let them be saved, if it may be, and that composition that is made with them for their ransom, let it be performed.    

CHAP. XXI. Part 9 Wherein certain orders are contained concerning the execution of Laws and administration of justice.  
1 THat the auctors of disorders may be detected and punishment awarded accordingly, it shallbe lawful for the judge Martial, or others that have commission from the General, or lord Martial to do justice, to inquire of the auctors, and circumstances of offences committed, by the oaths of such, and so many as they think convenient, and shall further use all means for examination, and trial of persons accused, dilated, suspected, or defamed.  
2 All causes and controversies arising between Captains, and soldiers or others within the camp, or towns of garrison, shallbe heard and discussed summarily, and execution done according to military laws without appeal or relation, unless the greatness of the cause, or other circumstance require stay, or deliberation.  
3 If any Captain, Gentleman, or soldier declare or make his testament, or last will of goods he hath in camp, or fortress, or which he hath gotten in service, the same shall be enroled in the judge Marshal's office, and executed by those that are named executors: if no will be made, then shall his goods descend to his next kindred, or wife if he have any. If he have none, or if none come to demand his goods, within one year: then shall his goods be bestowed on the poor soldiers of the regiment, or company, the division being made by two or three deputed to administer them.  
4 The Provost martial shall see all judgements, sentences, and commandments of the General, high martial, or judge Martial put in execution.  
5 Every soldier, and other person shall assist the Provost martial, and his Officers apprehending of malefactors, and executing of justice, upon pain of imprisonment, neither shall any rescue a prisoner taken, or to be taken for any capital crime, upon pain of death.  
6 No man shall interrupt or trouble the judge Martial or Officers of justice, doing their office, but upon request made shall be ready to assist them upon pain of imprisonment.  
7 No gaoler nor prison keeper shall refuse to keep a prisoner committed to his charge, or dismiss him being once received without warrant, upon like pain as he should have suffered, that is so dismissed▪ or suffered to escape.  
8 Wheresoever there is not special order set down in laws already written, and published, there the ancient course of military discipline shall be observed, until such time as the General or the Officers appointed for the administration of justice, cause order to be taken, and by sound of drum to be published, which shall afterward stand in force.  
9 If any that is culpable of any notorious disorder do fly over into England, hoping thereby to escape the danger of martial laws; the same party upon request made to the justices, Sheriffs, Majors, Bailiffs, or Constables, shallbe sent back to the camp to the Provost martial. And every of them shall do their endeavour to assist those that are sent for the apprehension of him. But if request be made for the punishment of him, then shall the same offender be tried before the judges, at the next assizes, and by them be punished.  
10 Although the wars be ended, yet are those that offend against the laws of arms and during that time are not punished, to be apprehended, and punished according to the same either by the judge martial, and Provost martial, whose commissions are to be extended so far, or by the judges of the Realm; that notorious faults do not pass without punishment.  
Annotations.  
1 [That the authors etc.] If neither state nor house can stand without justice; much less can any army be governed without it. Most necessary therefore are the laws of this section: and so much the rather, for that law is nothing without execution. But because justice cannot be executed unless offenders be detected, therefore the first care of those that purpose to proceed orderly, is to find out the authors of offences, and persons culpable. This is by examination and oath both of the parties principal, as far as they are bound by law to answer, and of witnesses also: further where presumptions are sufficient, and the matter heinous; by rack or other pain. The administration of justice belongeth to the General, and lord Marshal, or those to whom they shall give authority: where there is no superior commander, to Captains joining together, as it is evident by our practice, and also by the examples of the Greeks returning from the voyage with Cyrus, which 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 5.  appointed certain Captains judges, and gave them authority to determine of matters, and to punish offenders.  
2 [All causes etc.] Whether the causes arise of specialties, or other contract, or act, if the parties be in camp or garrison, they are there to be heard and determined.  
3 [If any Captain etc.] Many inconveniences do fall out for want of order in this behalf. The goods of the dead are either lost, or spoiled; yea many poor men lying sick, and in distress, are hastened to their ends by those that gape for that they have: the next friends of the dead have nothing, few are better for any thing they have. which I think would be in part remedied, if order were taken for the bestowing of their goods. Therefore were it good not that any new invention, but that old laws herein should take place. By the laws of the 
b Bona militis qui successorem non habet, deferuntur legioni, non admisso fisco. l. siquis. § eius. ff. de injust. rupt. irrit. test. l. 2. Cod. de haered. decur.  Romans, soldiers goods went to their next kindred: if they had no wife, nor kindred: yet came they not to the Prince, but were bestowed on the regiment wherein they served. By the laws of 
c Balthasar Ayala de iur. bell.  Spain, the pay & reward that is due unto soldiers at their death, cometh to their sons. And howsoever practice overruleth law, yet in this point the laws of nations require, that men's last wills be performed. The which that they may take effect, nothing is more requisite, then that they be enroled, and kept in record, and inventaries of their goods likewise, whether they die testate, or intestate.  
4 [No man shall interrupt etc.] The interrupting of justice is commonly the beginning of sedition, mutiny, and rebellion. Therefore do the 
d Que ningun soldado impida a los ministros de justitia, el exercitar sus officios so pena de la vida, Sanch, de Lond.  Spaniards in their orders, decree such to be punished with death. But because the interruption may be with words only, or noise without further matter; the rigour of the law is by discretion to be moderated. If any do interrupt the ministers of justice doing their office, with force and in tumultuous manner, he falleth within the compass of laws ordained against sedition, and mutiny, and in that degree is to be punished.  
The rest of the laws of this section are plain, & need execution, rather than further exposition. Therefore what need we seek for knots in rushes, or look for stumbling blocks in so plain a way? this is the sum of all, that wars can not be managed without execution of military orders, and observance of the orderly practice of arms: that maketh our forces effectual, that maintaineth them, encourageth them, and maketh them victorious, victory maketh an end of wars, and assureth us of peace, if it he followed and used. Peace is the end not only of this labour of mine, but of all their labours that wish the good of their country. And therefore to obtain peace, we are to desire him that is Lord of armies, that once we may see our wars artificially, and judicially managed. Before which time he that looketh for peace with the Spaniards, unless God do work extraordinarily: he neither understandeth what belongeth to peace, nor war.    
Deo, qui Dominus est exercituum, laus, honour, & gloria in secula seculorum.   

Faults escaped.  
IN pag. 17. lin. 16. lege Tatius. pag. 42. in margin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. pag. 56. in margin. gowernarsi. pag. 61. lin. 7. scrivanoes. pag. 83. lin. 13. by long peace. pag. 88 in margin. arcendi belli. Liu. 21. pag. 112. lin. 31. a la legiere. pag. 117. lin. 17. Purlilia. pag. 130. lin. 32. their country. pag. 159. lin. 18. of dust and smoke. pag. 191. lin. 15. ordnance, or shot. pag. 231. lin. 5. Sansac. pag. 238. lin. 5. defer. pag. 243. lin. 11. Lymoges. pag. 248. lin. 25. some degenerate English. pag. 249. lin. 24. Aluarez Saunder. pag. 255. lin. 9 Brovage. pag. ead. lin. 15. defence and government. pag. 264. line 8. Plymouth, Dartmouth. pag. 277. line. 4. disorder. pag. 284. line 24. Philippin D●oria. pag. ead. lin. antepenult. Spaniards.