Cassius of Parma his Orpheus: With Nathan Chitraeus his Commentary, abridged into short notes: most profitable for the framing of the manners of Scholars. Translated and abridged by Roger Rawlyns of lyncoln's Inn, Student in the Common Laws. At London. 1587. TO THE MOST Honourable Lord, the Lord Robert Earl of Essex and Ewe, Viscount Hereforde, and Bourghchier, Lord Ferrer of Chartley, Bourghchier, and Lovayne, Master of the Queen's majesties Horse, and Knight of the most noble Order of the Garter: Roger Rawlyns wisheth the true felicity. RIght Honourable, whereas Love among men, was sometimes of so great account, as the same hath been taken to be the first and chief cause of a Commonwealth, and not utility, (as affirmeth the learned Scot) which enforced men by a natural instinct to communicate their private labours to public use, being for such their love, requited with the love of those, whom they did so benefit. Now, the matter is clean contrary: for who is more misliked of the worst, which are the most, than he that studieth most to common profit? Which consideration, as it hath been one hindrance to me in my Study (the more is my fault) so is it the cause, why I purpose to suppress, to the use only of my private friends, that, which otherwise, I could be contented should be common. And although they can by no means occupy either their Sense, or Reason, but the same will lead them perforce unto a thankful remembrance of our fathers, who have by cunning, either ordered the nature, or invented, or ordered the qualities of things, in a most pleasant course: yet they themselves have no care, to practise in the like manner, for their own ease, and help of their posterity: suffering their knowledge gotten in the time of their life, to departed with their last breath: And some more unloving than others, neither will themselves, neither will they without reproaches, suffer others to labour in like practises of Art, seeming of condition, somewhat like the man, that being cured of folly, was highly offended, affirming, that he never lived so pleasant a life, as when he was a fool. So as we may see (except it be in some men more Christian than others) now, churlishness to succeed love, unthankfulness, thankfulness, folly, wisdom: that being most true in the multitude, which Juvenal saith of his times: The earth doth now bring forth, of body small Bad men, of little wit, or none at all. But to the Cause, the Scope, and Centre of all my speeches, that is, concerning the Art, in studying, or ordering the Common Laws, as I never fainted in opinion, that the same may be performed, and in what manner: as staying myself upon Principles, which of their own nature are inexpugnable, and fear not the frowning of a Censurer. So do I fear nothing more, than that I have small part in the same performance: for I am hindered in the means, which are said to belong to a Student of the Common Laws, that is, to be lead in his seat, to have an iron head, and a golden purse. For the first, how little time (of late) I have sat at it, they could be are me witness, that have been acquainted with my business. For the second, how greatly I have been distracted, I myself know, Nec ostentabo vulnera & sicatrices meas. For the third, my purse was never so heavy, but that I could lift it without help. Moreover, I find with some grief by observation in other men, that he that practiseth in any public cause, (as Cardanus saith) setteth to sale his own imperfections, his faults will swell in the eyes of his Adversaries, he must subject himself to infamous slanders, envious reproaches, and contempts, which notwithstanding aught again of him to be contemned: derisores nostros de sumno quasi despicientes, derideamus. Yet herein I do content myself, as, he to descry land, whereunto the Pilot must guide the ship: or as a weak wretch, to give aim unto others, whose strings I am not able to stir, and whom I wish, may strike the mark. London this 27. of September 1587. From Crown Court in Chancery Lane. Your honours most humble Ro. Rawlyns. ILLUSTRISSIMO DOmino, Comiti Essexio, studiosorum omnium Mecaenati, R. R. hanc Chartam (honoris causa) dicat consecrátque. CVi (obsecro) haec potiùs dicarem quàm tibi? qui nobilitate excellis, Nec sinis ingenium nobilitate premi: Quare, juris meum Compendium non potest solùm meam in te obseruantiam apud omnes testari, sed etiam te huius sanctissimae disciplinae admonere: Sanctissimam disciplinam appello, quia tecum loquor, cui non est ignota eius praestantia, & divinitas. Dubitarem sanè ita loqui si cum ijs sermo esset, qui, cùm artem sibi necessariam ignorent, eos odio prosequuntur, à quibus intelligunt seeo nomine superari: cupiúntque nulla esse iura, nullas leges, quo faciliùs arbitrio suo belluino omnia turbent. Sed, fremant, qui volunt, dicam quod sentio. Praestat judicandi scientia, judicandi potestati, & dignus igitur, qui praesit judicio, praestat judici imperito. Haec omnia tu optimè scis. Itaque ad te libentèr veniet ars illa, quae judicandi normam tradit, quae divinas, humanásque res disponit, quae omnes homines in officio continet, malos poenis coercet, bonos praemijs afficit, & (ut uno verbo dicam) humanam societatem conseruat. Inquit JULIUS PACIUS, Petro Saletano, epistola sua, in quatuor libros Institutionum, IMP. CAES. JUSTINIANI. Tui honori deditissimus: R. Rawlyns. To his loving Masters and friends, the Students of Lincoln's Inn, R. R. wisheth profit and pleasure in their studies. MOst beloved Gentlemen, I have herein desperately adventured upon your favours, hoping that you will take affection for satisfaction, where judgement is wanting for currant payment. If I have offended through folly or imperfection, you may give me thanks for that, because therein is exercised your wisdom and patience, (as Saint Paul speaketh of himself) wisemen can easily bear with fools. If you shall judge me of presumption, (as the Proverb is, Sus Mineruam) why then (alas) pardon that too, I most heartily pray you: for, I must confess, (without flattery) that I do so much the more fear your censures, by how much the more I long after your goodwills. The best for me, is, that the price of my books is but your pardon and love, which ye may give without cost: and which if ye shall deny me, yet will I not cease to love you, and to cloy you with my country fruits. Your most loving friend and servant: Ro. Rawlyns. Of Cassius of Parma, the Author of this Fragment. COncerning the Author, it is thought that this was the very same man, of whom Horace maketh mention in the 1. of his satires, the 10. book, verse the 62. to this purpose: Not otherwise then when a man hath brought His mind within the compass of six feet: Pleased herewithal, or if his hand have wrought Two hundredth verses, ere he go to meat: And after dinner, then as many more: Such was the wit of that Etrurian Cassius, which as a running stream did flow: So that a fire was made to burn this Man Of his own writings, as the fame doth go. And again Horace maketh mention of Cassius in the 1. book, Epistle. 5. which he wrote to Albius Tibullus, the 3. verse. Albius, O perfect judge of all our speech, What should I say, that thou hast now in hand? Thou writest somewhat (that may overreach Cassius his fragments) in the Pedan land. By which we may gather, that Cassius was of no small account, especially amongst those that were learned, and of judgement. Of Orphëus. Therefore did Cassius (as it seemeth) give this Pamphlet this inscription of Orphëus, as in commendation of whose labour in Study, and Continency, all his verses might be made. Of Orphëus, Plato maketh mention Book 10. of his Commonwealth, where he feigneth, that Orphëus his soul (when he died) would not be borne again of a woman, for the hatred which he bore to that Sex, but did choose rather the life of a Swan, as Thamyris had done of a Nightingale. Of the Argument of this Book. Cassius of Parma, would by these verses, as it were with the pencil of his wit, & eloquence, express the likeness & the pattern of a good and gentle Nature, contending to attain the height and excellency of learning and eloquence: and of such a Nature, he doth first show (not obscurely) the signs, than the needful helps, next, what should be done of boys, and young men, while they are yet in the flower of their age: and lastly, what is by them to be avoided, by the example of Orphëus, while he was yet but a young man. Cassijs Parmensis Orphëus. Arguta primùm cùm plectra parentis, & auro Distinctam sumpsit citharam Rhodopëius heres, Ridehan● segnes pulsus, digitósque micantes Serius, & chordis indoctè dissona vocis. Mox pudor exardens, & gloria dulcis honesti, Lusibus avertit puerilibus: omnis & illùc Pèrditus incumbens, Musae pallebat amore. Et nunc maternis inhiat, nunc ille paternis Cantibus: hìnc illìnc discens dependet utrinque. Nulla Venus faciem coepit mentita dolosis Compedibus: somni fuerat, parcusque Lydi: Donec, ridiculus dudùm, modulamine siluas, Euulsosque, suis scopulos radicibus egit: Ausus & ire utam mortalibus inconcessam, Poenarum oblitos demulsit carmine manes. " Non levis adscensus, si quis petit ardua: sudor " Plurimus hunc tollit: nocturno ex somnis olivo " Immoritur: delet, quod mox laudaverat in se, " Qui cupit aeterno donari frondis honore. The same Verses englished. When first the noble child of Rhodopy, His Parent's quill, in tender hand 'gan hold, Therewith to sound his harp of ivory Decked with lines and asterisks of gold: His singers drawled, and his strokes were cold With peering joints, wherewith they laugh, to see How to the strings his note did disagree. Strait shamefastness inflaming with desire And glorious sweetness of so fair a thing, From childish sports, which younger years require, Do turn him quite: henceforth to play and sing For life he plies: the love whereof doth bring Paleness of face: yet still through earnestness He hangs his jaw, while that with greediness He hears his father, or his mother play: On him, or her he listening doth depend Even at their lips, no painted wanton, gay By borrowed hue, could force his heart to bend Such guileful gives a liking eye to lend. Nor were his sleep and food outrageous: So that, now, he (lately ridiculous) Can cause the Rock to move, rend from the root, And woods draw near, he played and sang so well, That daring go, where else no mortal foot Had trod: he stilled the spirits and ghosts which dwell Below, did ease from punishments of hell. " None easy climbing can prevail to gain " Athing of worth: it will be got with pain. Which who desires, that man endureth sweat," Endangering his life through want of rest," The ●asting oil, can prove his labour great:" What first he liked, now he doth detest," And blots that thing, which whilom pleased him best." The man must, thus demean himself (I say)" Who seeks the gift of never dying bay." Signs. 1 Good Parents. 2 An alacrity, or natural quickness of wit. 3 To blush, or to be ashamed of evil doing. 4 A desire to balance the evil deed with greater poise of well doing. 5 A moderate disposition to pastime or playing. Helps. 1 A good Teacher or Schoolmaster, as here is supposed by Apollo and Calliope, the Parents of Orphëus. 2 If the Parents being themselves learned, do teach and oversee the teaching of their children, and so are not constrained to give credit to some blind Schoolmaster, reasoning with as little judgement, as a blind man doth of colours. 3 A mutual affection between the Scholar and the Master, so as the Scholar do bear a childlike love to the Teacher, and the Teacher a fatherlike love to the Scholar. 4 It helps much oftentimes, if the child be brought up in the father's vocation, with which, by seeing, and by hearing, even from his cradle, he seemeth to be acquainted. 5 That he begin to be taught in due time, not too late, lest he prove a loiterer: nor too soon, lest he be at the first discouraged. 6 That the Teacher be not oftentimes changed: for, as Trees often removed take no sure root in any ground: so children put from one Teacher to another, do no great good any where. 7 That the Parents between themselves do not vary, either concerning the matter or manner of their children's education, especially in the hearing of their children, who will easily take advantage of such controversies, and thereby, as in a doubt, whether they shall do this thing, or that thing, they will not easily apply themselves unto any thing. 8 That the instruments, means, or tools of their vocation, be in most fair wise ordered, as that a Scholar have his book of a fair print, well bound, phillited and spotted with gold, etc. for herein are children much delighted. 9 That all be begun, with the help of God, which is here inferred, because that Apollo and Calliope, are said to have been accounted among the number of the heathen Gods. Things to be done. 1 The Scholar must nothing esteem to be derided of others, for derision is incident to all good beginnings. 2 He must not be discouraged, though the thing seen hard at the first to be learned: for, nothing is easy at the first. 3 Though moderate recreation be allowed, yet, he must not take it in too great measure: for, not wisemen but fools keep a continual holiday. 4 Not many things, but only one thing is to be attempted for, one business of any moment will require one whole man. 5 He must prosecute his attempted and purposed vocation with earnest, and continual labour: which, it is thought they do, which are Lovers of enterprises, of Pains, with heat and continuance. 6 He must be a lover of learning: for, otherwise, be his labour earnest, and continual, yet it is done against the wool, for he performeth it with great coldness. 7 He must ask, and resolve questions, he must love commendations, and be desirous to find out the truth: that he be ready to ask, hear, and put in practise the councils and resolutions of his betters. 8 An exchange of his good endeavours, with others his equals for their like endeavours, and a comparing of the same together, with an emulation and desire to do better, and with an amending of his own doings. Things to be avoided. 1 A fantasy, or false opinion of his own well doing. 2 Slackness, which is, an intermission, or negligent handling of his Study: which is like unto recklessness, which neither knoweth, nor attempteth any good thing. Sloth knowing, but, not urging, nor bringing the thing known, to a good end, but deferring every thing to another day, by pretence of idle excuses. Idleness, which so performeth, that, as good never a whit, as never the better. 3 This nightly working, though it be here noted in Orphëus, yet is it not simply to be commended, but the day must be to the Scholar to travel in, the night for him to rest in: for by continual labour are the eyes hurt, the wit dulled, the face in colour, and the body by swellings, and other diseases thence growing, deformed and corrupted. 4 A resolute determination, not to amend the things, which he liketh himself, without cause, which seemeth to be somewhat like the first point Orphëus here doth the contrary, what late he liked, now he doth detest. For, a Scholar ought, upon good reason showed, to relinquish his own untrue, uncertain, or worse course, to follow the more certain, and better course of another man. 5 Lust, or unlawful love, which coming of Sloth, is nourished by excess: and how can he intend to his study, or any other good medirations, who, as it is in Plautus, is like a wretch, vexed, troubled, and tossed in the slaughter house of love: who, where himself is, his mind is not: where he is not, his mind is. 6 Too much sleeping, which is called the brother of death, and as Menander saith, A pattern Unto men, and an image of death. 7 Ouerliberall diet, or gluttony, which is a beastly vice in them, who like hogs, seem to grunt out these words: We care not for Rumours, so that we may have wherewith to fill the Rheum. FINIS. NESTOR his Antilochus: Pointing out the truth and necessity of Art in study: by R. R. of lyncoln's Inn, Student in the Common Laws. Ridentem dicere verum Quis vetat? Juvenal. At London. 1587. NESTOR HIS Antilochus. WHen I was come to read this Prosopopey, wherein Homer, the chief of Poets, who is said to be accompanied with the Muses, was to make a speech of counsel, fit to beseem the prudent King Nestor, called The Shepherd of men, to give to his own son, to the winning of a worthy prize, and with the prize renown, amongst other Runners, noble Kings and Princes of Greece, which was by Achilles ordained, to the celebrating of the funerals of his dear friend Patroclus, having hungerly tasted other of his pleasant devices, I conceived hope, herewith to be fed, even, (Ad satietatem) to fullness: Neque spes fallebat amantem. These be the verses: When prudent Nestor, standing near his son Wise like himself: his counsel thus begun. Antilochus: because, while but a lad B jove and Neptune (loving thee full well) All horsemanship, which either of them had Have taught thee: now I need not much to tell: Yet though thou know the reins to lose and pull, Be circumspect withal, thine horse be dull. Their horse indeed are far more swift, yet thou With wary wit, mayest counterpeize their pace: Then all good council take unto thee now My friend, to get the credit of the Race: The Carpenter by Art doth bring to pass That feat, which flies the strong, yet brainless Ass. Again, by Art, the Pilot, he doth guide On troubled Seas, his swift and tossed bark: By Art, the Couch-man knoweth how to ride: To leave his fellow far behind the mark. The man, who trusteth to his horse and Couch, Full fraught with folly, wandereth too much Amidst the Race, and lets his horses stray, When, who knows helps, although his horse be bad: An eye unto the mark, he still doth lay, And driveth close, with pace, discreet, and sad. He raynning well, doth evermore observe The goal, from which, he careth, not to . swerver. 1 And first, whereas the Poet, supposeth the Hearer; to be wise like the Speaker, he therein counseleth, that no precious stone be thrown before a Cock, no learned speech to be uttered to swinish men: Qui balbi, praeter balba, nihil intelligunt, & palatum habent sapientius quàm ingenium: who can better relish reasons of the sun, than reasons that proceed from men. 2 For the Allegorizing hereof, from the particular use of Art in riding, to the general use thereof in Studying: lest I should therein seem to deal as auckwardlie, as the Grammar Scholar did in his Simile: (Even as a Ship is tossed on the Sea, so ought a father to love his child) it is to be remembered, that by some learned, the Affections, which follow the Sense, and are common to us with beasts, are likened to Horses: The heart and Brain wherein the Soul hath her chief residence, to the Seat of a Chariot, the whole body to a Chariot, and Reason the power of the Soul, to the Rider, which as with reins keepeth back, or putteth forward the Affections, lest they being too dull, should hinder from good: or too forward, should lead both body and soul to hurt: whence seems to be taken the reigning of Princes: for they being of a farther reach and entendment than the common sort, do seem no otherwise than the Rider doth the Horse, than Reason doth the Affections, to excel in ruling the common people, who are numbered among the three evils: Ignis, mare, Populus, tria mala. In conclusion the Allegory holding as before, I may translate this verse. Fertur equis Auriga, nec audit currus habenas. Thus: Affections do bear the man away, Which Reasons Rule, will near adeale obey. 3 Nestor granting natural wit and consideration to his son, and yet giving him counsel, or knowledge of Art, doth confirm that difference, between Consideration and Prudence, which is taken by Sir Thomas Eliot, viz. Consideration to be a bare considerance of the Causes, but Prudence to be with a consideration, a continuance also of the Causes helping, and an avoidance of the Causes hindering, the achieving of the ends of our purposes: that one being more proper to youth, this other to age. For which reason, Antilochus having by sleight, not by prudence, gotten the prize from the wise and aged King Menelaus, yet dejecting himself, and acknowledging Menelaus his wisdom, offereth him his gotten prize, with these words: O Menclaus, suffer now this wrong, Your years are more, your wisdom greater too Than mine: for why, I am but very young: And youth (you know) do many ways misdo. And though mine wit more ready be than thine, Thy prudent counsel overreacheth mine. Which modest confession of Antilochus notwithstanding, yet wisdom is not always in the grey hair, but in such as do overcome their Affections, according to that saying: Sedatis & extinctis cupiditatum ardoribus, & calore iwenili refrigerato, cum quadam tamen naturali probitate, senescere debent, qui sapientiam inhiant. But now for the council or knowledge of Art, which I have said Nestor gave unto his son, it is to be remembered that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is translated Ars, Consilium, or Prudentia, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Coniugate thereof, Artista, Consiliarius, or Prudens. Now, if Art and Counsel, an Artist and a Counsellor be converted, it should seem, that a Councillor should have skill in Art, especially, for that, that our Laws are known by the name of jurisprudentia, and Art, and Prudence, are signified by one and the same word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 4 I hope I shall not stretch the figure, if by the more swiftness of Horses, I understand, a greater promptness and alacrity of wit in some, than in other some. For by likening the Affections to Horses, I intend all other natural gifts common to us with Beasts, as Ingeny, in which the Fox excelleth the Ass, and in which, some men exceed others naturally, and yet they again, by Art & good habit of them, whom they do naturally excel for wit, are themselves excelled: which meaning I apply to this place. The excellency of Art, above natural wit, may appear by the event of that controversy between Atax and Ulysses, in penning whereof, Ovid, though in other matters he goeth beyond many other Latin Poets, yet therein he excelleth himself: In which controversy, though he attribute unto Ajax a good natural wit, as appeareth in that, he urged, whatsoever might stand, to the setting out of his own worthiness, in remembering the lewd and cowardly pranks of Ulysses, in extenuating those deeds of Ulysses, whereby he had gotten credit with the Grecians, yet Ulysses by more skilful and artificial insinuation with the judges, in urging his own Acts with more modesty, and Ajax his faults more sharply, in extenuating his good deeds more cunningly, and either passing over with silence, putting over to others, or else avoiding fault with fault, one of his own by objecting another to Ajax, he got the Armour, which causeth the Poet to conclude. Mota manus procerum est, etc. The Nobles, which were judges, did agree, And then, what cunning could, a man might see: The strong man's harness, was the wise man's see. Which excellency of cunning above wit and strength, may also appear by that part of Ulysses his speech, wherein he compareth himself with Ajax, to this meaning: I do foresee, but thou without a mind Bear'st strength: thou knowest to fight, but I the fit Seasons for battle, with Atrides find: Thou but in body: we excel in wit. How much the Pilot doth the Mariner, How much the Captain doth excel his man, So much am I for policy thy better: And of my body, by mine heart I can Perform by far, more than I may by hand: In inward parts doth all the glory sland. Which excellency of wisdom above strength, may also appear by the metiment, wherewithal Master Martin Luther is said to have jested at those Swatrouters, so called of their black Curtolles, wherewith they served, and at such other Lance Knights, who cutting their horse tails the beauty of horses, aware feathers in their helmets (a feather and a pen, being in Latin signified by one word Penna) intending, that now Soldiers did cease to take their glory from strength, which they defaced, and ascribed the same to learning, which they advanced. 5 This Simile is herein excellent, because (as I have elsewhere showed) Mezimmah, which signifieth Structura, signifieth also, Prudentia, or Dolus malitiosus, no difference, being between Prudence and Subtlety, in the manner of doing, but in the purpose of the doer: So as Prudence being in the Hebrew tongue, so called of a building: the Simile seemeth good. I know not whether the ruling of the Magistrate may be said of the Carpenter his Rule, wherewith he ordereth in just measure and proportion. The Pilot: Tully hath the same Simile, whereof Princes are said, clawm tenere Reipub. To stern the Commonwealth. That of the Couchman: is continued through the whole discourse, and is commended as before. 6 The mind may be said to be beside her government, or to stray either by impotency of nature, by evil habit, or by want of good habit: when the defect is by nature, we call the man either a natural, or an idiot. An Idiot, may be said he, that exercising the fantasy with idle contemplations, never descendeth to particulars. But, when this exercise is in judgement unto some certain end, then is it no fault, but necessary to study: for who was more famous amongst the Philosophers for any thing, than was Plato, called Divinus, for his Idëa? which signifieth (originalis rerum species) or as Tully calleth it (ferè species) it seemeth therefore, if universals be the beginnings of Study: that they which labour almost wholly in particulars, go not the nearest way. If this use of the mind, be in Divinity, it is most commendable: for the Apostles are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: for they do lift from earthly things, and therefore are called separatae formae, and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cometh the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to see, which is as commonly spoken of the mind as of the Sense: whence cunning men were sometimes called Seers: and these make one part of Arte. But if this quality of the mind, in considering Vniversales do there rest, not descending to particulars, the knowledge of which are the other part, or orderly perfecting of Art, Arte being of things also, and not all only, of those separated forms: then is it said of such Scholars, that the greatest Clerks are not the wisest men. That straying of the mind, which cometh by evil habit, is either when a man is De non sane memory, or non compos mentis: The first, when reason is utterly defaced, coming, either by over labouring the mind, or by predominance of the affections, which make a man forget what he sometimes was, or by evil habit of the body, either in health, by defect, or superfluity of meats, defect of sleep, or by sickness. The other may come by the same means, but differeth in the manner, as being able which the other cannot) to speak the truth in manner of discourse, but not in (the matter of discourse, as of him, that would fetch over the old Moons, and would bring over islands, because younger brothers wanted in England. The mind strayeth for want of good habit, either when we are deceived in the Principles, or in not exact considering of the particulars: or else when the mind hath not gotten the mastery of the Affections, but reason yieldeth, by reason of the continual fight between the flesh, and her Ruffians with the Soul, which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The war of nature, whence Ovid maketh Medea, being in love with Theseus, to dispute her own cause, thus, pro, and contra. Shake off (if that thou mayst) from maiden's breast These flames of love, which thou dost entertain: Unhappy, if I could, it were my best, But this new force doth otherwise constrain: And when that love one thing persuades me to, Reason, another thing, would have me do. Reason being at the last overcome, she thus concludeth. I see the best, and do allow the same, I follow bad. 7 The Egyptians, by an eye, looking foreright, in their Hierogliphikes, betokened Prudence: And thereto agreeth the common saying: Remember the end, and thou shalt not do amiss: which I understand, to be spoken not only concerning death, but also concerning the practises of Study. 8 Soft fire makes sweet malt, and Soft and Sure, are the proverbs. The words in this place, are, Bovinis loris, An ox's pace: for Softness Ennius commendeth Fabius. One man delaying, hath restored our wealth, Not prising Rumours higher than our health. 9 That the shame of being foiled, aught to be a great encouragement to well doing, whence Nestor bidding his son beware, least in unadvised driving, he should wound his horses and break his Chariot, he addeth what would thence follow. Sport to thy fellows, but a shame to thee, Considering therefore, all so prudent be. Which in our purpose, differeth not much from that of Horace. Of idleness contempt will grow in end: Oh shame for me to live without a friend. And that of Virgil. He knowing his own Virtues, Very shame Doubled his strength, and did his force inflame. 10 Perseverance is counseled: which is hence noted in Antilochus, that when Atrides being offended, did counsel him to drive after another manner than he did. Antilochus, without regard or fear, drove faster still, as one that did not hear. 11 In general, Art is after one manner thus described, Ars est 〈◊〉 consideratio ex finibus assumptis, Arte is the consideration of causes from 〈◊〉 ends propounded: according unto which, and orderly consideration must be taken of the causes, as it is in this other description of Art, Ars est ratio, ordinem & viam efficiens, Arte is reason, causing order and way: That is ordering, and making easy: So that from both these descriptions one more plain may be drawn, which is this: Art is an orderly consideration of the Causes from certain ends propounded: For, that which in the latter is said Reason, is here Consideration: Order is included by his Coniugato; Orderly; way is an effect and no efficient cause of Art: for as a fair way is to a traveler, so is a way made by Art, pleasant to a Scholar. FINIS. CERTAIN General Conclusions concerning the condition of our Common Laws, and that of the same there may be made a Science. By R.R. etc. Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth. 1. Cor. Chap. 10. vers. 24. As when an Eunuch offereth violence to a Virgin, so doth he which abuseth the Laws. Eccles. At London. 1587. Certain general Conclusions concerning the condition of our Common Laws. 1 That of many imperfect Laws, our Common Law, as having fewer imperfections, is most perfect. THis shall be manifested by comparison. First, The Laws of the Medes & Persians were of such condition, as that they might not be altered, whereby was taken away that Rule, which is the very Sinews of all Laws. Quod inconsultò fecimus, consultò revocemus: Like unto these were the written laws of the Athenians. It is said of the Venetians, who (besides our Common weal) are of all Nations in the world chiefly governed by Common Laws of their own: He that shall substantially consider the manner of their proceed, shall plainly see that all matters are determined by the judges consciences, and not by the Civil nor yet by their own Laws: but all good Laws grounded upon reason do exercise a power over the Judge himself, as shall be more plainly showed in the 9 Conclusion. Again, it is said of their Laws, that in trial of matter upon life and death, the party himself is never suffered to speak, but he hath an advocate for him, and the Auagadori against him: So that many times the person tarrieth two, three, and sometime four years or ever he come unto his trial of life and death. It is otherwise, and better in our Law, where the person is not only suffered to speak, but also divers prisons have books touching Pleas of the Crown, by which some of them during the time of their imprisonment, become so cunning, as that they cannot only judge of their own case, but also instruct others, whose cases are different from theirs: besides the Sessions or jail delivery are often times: so as the persons are not long troubled with the fear of death, which is worse than death itself. If we shall compare our Law with the Civil Law, a learned Lawyer Master Fortescue hath given an instance, how in the Civil Law trial is by witnesses only, but in our Law by witness and by the Country, where also it is lawful by just proof to except against a witness, and where the jury (if the action be local, of lands or houses) is panelled, from, or as near as may be to that County where the thing in controversy lieth: which is a special point, in as much, as in vain are good laws made, if that in trial they may be corrupted. Accipe sio legum errores, & crimine ab uno, Disce omenes. But our laws, as the laws of the famous Lawgiver Lycurgus, are not written, that is, they are not therefore laws, because that they are written, as those of the Persians and Athenians, but they are yearly observations upon manners, as are our yeare-bookes: whence it is said of the laws of the Lacedæmonians, and so likewise many be said of our laws: Lacedamonij verò, non jure scripto, sed moribus tantùm usu annorum comprobatis pro legibus use sunt: Ideóque Locurgus leges scriptas Spartanis nullas dedit, sed omnium conscensu, mores, tanquàm silex edita fuisset, experiundo obseruárunt: hique adeò tenaces fuêre, ut omni scripto juri anteïrent. So that hence may be gathered two extremities: one, in attributing too much unto the writing, as those of the Medes and Persians, and of the Athenians: another, in attributing too little to the writing, that is, to the written reason as those laws of the Venetians, between both these standeth our law, neither giving too much to the law, which without good reason is written, nor taking any thing from that law which is written with good reason. 2 That it is impossible that our Laws, as they are now, should be perfect. LIke as is the cause, such is the effect: but man in his reason unreformed, is imperfect, therefore cannot the laws be perfected without Logic, which is a Reason reform. The ways of God are perfect with justice in mercy, but the laws of men are merciless justice, or rigour, whence the law is thus described: Lex est commune praeceptum, virorum prudentium, delictorum, quae sponte vel ignorantia contrahuntur coërtio, Reip sponsio communis. justice, in regard of the imperfection and untruth of the precept, which no way can prejudice the perfection and truth of Art, is thus described: justitia est constans & perpetua VOLUNTAS suum cuique tribuendi: And again, Lex est ratio suum unicuique tribuens, vel id saltèm AFFECTANS. Lastly, because that by the alteration of times, it may be necessary to alter the laws. 3 That though the Law in itself be rigorous and imperfect, yet as much as the common profit will suffer, it is made gentle, merciful, and perfect by the Chancery. FOr that is one end of that Court, and is therefore called a Court of Conscience, because it reasoneth on the part of the complainant by Argument taken from the law of nature Quod tibi fieri non vis alters ne feceris: & hence also is it called Cancellaria quasi Cancellans, as taking away & anihilating the extremities of the Common Laws: So is the Clients matter in the Common Law termed a Case, but in the Chancery a Cause: A Case it is termed because, according to the description of casus (casus dicitur quandò prater efficientis scopum, nec necessariò, neque evidenti causa antecedente, aliquid accidit) the party at the Common Law doth not of himself know the reason or cause why it is by law adjudged with, or against him: but it is otherwise in the Chancery, where he is more able by light of nature to foresee the end, and to give a reason himself of his cause or matter. The judge at the Common Law by reason maketh just, or putteth a finite determination of the Law: but the Chancery adding nothing, it only maketh equal, that is, by the use thereof it tendeth more to a perfection: as when a Carpenter having cut his pillar, doth not so leave, but proceedeth to polish it: whence it is said of the judge of the Common Law, Ratio statuentis: and of the judge in the Chancery, Aequitas decernentis. Where note that the Lord, Chancellor is entitled with a special addition of discretion, because that he ought so to relceve the case of a private person, as notwithstanding the prudence of the Law may be kept touching common profit, for better is it to suffer a mischief to one man, than an inconvenience to the whole Commonwealth: and of this balancing or discerning in causes may it be said of the Lord Chancellor, Qui sub libra mansuetudinis, & lenimento clementiae cuncta deliberate. Now, weighing is not but of two several matters; so as in one scale is the Common Law, in another Conscience: yet not that the Common Law doth never join with Conscience, but because that Conscience cannot ever in all cases be joined with the Common Laws, and is by reason of the subtle practises of common persons to deceive laws: so that the judge cannot so circumspectly pitch his hays, but that these crafty fellows will find cuasions: for whereas Trespass is described thus, Transgressio est, quicquid prater modum fit: and the manner or means of doing being but ab Accident in outward things, and the Common Law having ability to see no further: such subtle devisers, will so handle those offences which they make, as the causes of the same resting only inward in their hearts, the party grieved shall be left remediless at the Common Laws: wherefore in this Court is the matter brought to light from out his conscience: and as for a Fox which like as a Bear or Wolf, will not rudely rush into every engine made for his apprehension this grin as proceeding of further purpose is ordained, as in case of a Pledge by Moses laws, the defendant was driven to an oath to end controversies. 4 That notwithstanding the Laws are imperfect, yet that of them so much as they are they may be made an Arte. Because that Art maketh nothing but of things already made, putteth a distinct determination. 5 That the Law though infinite in practise, is notwithstanding finite in precepts. FOr that thing may be certain, finite, and perfect in precepts, which is uncertain, infinite, and imperfect in practise: and so do I desire to be understood whereas I said before of Reason that it was imperfect, whereby I mean, the practise of Logic, and so the practise of every other Science: for I doubt not, but that there may be a perfect Logic. Ptolomey to this purpose putteth a conclusion: Certa possunt esse, qua tamon sunt infinita: which the Logician (as I take it) expounding, saith, Rations certa sunt, quae numero sunt infinita: And to this purpose the Wiseman himself seemeth to affirm, saying, Man's wisdom is unperfect, and his knowledge in each Science uncertain. But who knoweth not, that nothing is more proper to any thing, than certainty is to a Science concerning the precepts? therefore must this uncertainty and this imperfection be understood of practise. The Lawyer saith of King E. 1. Quam just, quàm misericorditèr, quàm discretè erga subditos suos tempore pacis, pacis author, & amator se habuit, non ambigitur: cùm tantae aequitatis sit suae celsitudinis cura, quòd, in ca nullus judicum tàm attritae frontis, tàm temeraria sit presumptionis, quòd à justiae tramite, aliquatènus declinare, aut aequitatis excedere praesumat. By which speech as he maketh it plain, that the Law is an Art, and so finite and perfect, so elsewhere, though calling the Law an Art, yet comparing the same to the game at the Chests, he calleth it both infinite and imperfect, which we therefore must understand of the practise: as thus, Haec quidem ars arts lusili Scaccarij rectè comparatur, tùm quod utraque infinita est & imperfecta, tùm quòd sicut Rex, regem Scaccorum asfuta quarit subtilitate mactare, sic pars actrix litigád, vel disrationando, reum nititur convincere, redargutum sua veritate, vel cautela. Again, of God it is said, that his ways are unsearchable, and his paths past finding out, therefore man's doings may be sought for, man's doings may be found out. The Wiseman saith that it is, The glory of God to keep a thing secret, but the King's honour is to search out a thing: It is a man's honour to bring a thing to light: as to make a Science of that which is obscure: To give some light that the laws infinite in practise are notwithstanding finite in principles and reasons: let it be thus. As the Physician hath finite Simples, and concerning them finite reasons, of which Simples, though he do make infinite Compounds, yet are they all proved good or bad to that end whereunto they are prepared, by reasons drawn from the finite Simples: So the Lawyer hath his finite elements, Acts, Persons, Things, and their Adjuncts, and concerning them finite reasons, of which though he compound Cases infinite, yet are all those cases decided, according to the finite reasons of the finite elements. 6 That such Lawyers as affirm, that there is no science of the Laws, do affirm that they profess they know not what. BEcause (that except the Law be wholly known) there may be somewhat in the law which not being in the Councillor his knowledge may alter the case. Besides it is said, Forma dat esse, because that in all study we strive to perfection, which is a Science: therefore in that respect can no man be said to know the same, except he know the same as a Science: For as a web of Arras, beautiful for diversity of colours, goodly for proportions, and profitable for the matter of the story, is nothing so beautiful, nothing so goodly, nothing so profitable, when as it is mangled and cut in pieces: so the Law dispersed here and there confusedly, is nothing so beautiful, nothing so goodly, nothing so profitable, as if it were built up in one Structure: Notwithstanding, if a man know the whole law but for any one case, for so much he may be said to have the science of the whole law. 7 That for want of the science of the Laws, the Queen way sometime lose her right, what she doth by law may be suspected of wrong: justice may be corrupted in the judge and Officer, and the making of the laws more perfect, greatly hindered. WIthout instance I will speak in a general manner, thus: because that such matters in law as are of one sort, as well of the Crown, as of right and title in land, of debt, of trespass, and of the case with the duty and authority of officers in judgement, as also of the writs, and of the Acts of practise, lie so confounded together, as forgetfulness & neglect may cause ignorance through their misorders: whereas by Art an easy way is made to find every thing, and that fully and wholly in his proper place: for that is the effect of Art: whence a learned man faith, that Art worketh, non sit necesse quaerents, caepitulorum numerosit atem evoluere, cui, brevit as collecta, quod quaritur, offered sine labore. And of Division, it is said, Divisio animum legentis incitat, mentem intelligentiae praeparat, & memoriam artificio●è reforman. The Laws (if in a Science) might be greatly perfected: because that with better judgement do we apprehend and judge of the effects of that thing which is composed and set up before our eyes, than of that which is dispersed, and is not all at once presented unto us. 8 That Logic is the instrument of the science of the Law. Because that it is the instrument of all Sciences. 9 That any argument drawn from Divinity or humanity (saving the prudence of the Law, wherein may be crossed no rule of Divinity) is of forcible proof, though there be no books for it. THis is proved by the first definition of law: and he that shall deny a good argument so drawn for want of a book, shall do as much as take away the Sun, from which the Law as the Moon taketh her light: for the principles which are taken from the law of God, of nature and of reason, are many more than those which are of Man, and are given by the absolute discretion of the judge, and which do concern the prudence of the Law. And therefore hereunto may be applied that saying of a Lawyer: Leges autem Anglicanas, licèt non scriptas, leges appellari, non est absurdum: Si enim ob solum scripturae defectum leges minimè censerentur, maioris procùl dubio auctoritatis robur, ipsis legibus videretur accommodare scriptum, quàm decernentis aequitas, aut ratio statuentis. 10 That though it require great practise to know the whole body of the Law and to order the same, yet may it being ordered and well opened be without difficulty understood of a man, which is no Lawyer. BEcause that to make easy is the end of Art, and because that it is easier (as experience teacheth) to understand many principles well put together, than to put many principles well together. So therefore may a man hearing the Law well delivered, understand the same, though he do not profess the study of it. 11 That whereof there is no reason given, that can be no Law, and so that the elder Law, if it have the better reason, is the better Law. BEcause that the Law is nothing else but reason, and (as Tully saith) that Venus taketh her name à Venustate, not Venustas à venere, so may it be said of the judge, that he taketh his name judex à judicio, not judicium à judice. Raemus he saith of the inartificial argument, which is Testimony, whereof Law is a species, Argumentum in artificiale est, quod non sua natura, sed assumpta alicuius artificialis vi arguit: It aque cùm exquisita rerum veritas subtiliùs exquiritur, perexiguam vim probationis habet: in civilibus autem, & humanis rebus plerumqùe hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit, si prudentia, virtus, & benevolentia adfuerint. 12 That of the two, it were better the Laws were bad, and the Lawyers good, than to have good Laws and bad Lawyers. BY how much the efficient is more worthy than the effect: for a good Lawyer being a good man, of necessity must make good Laws, but not convertibly: for good Laws are abused sometimes by the practises of the professors themselves: whence is that saying, Meliùs gubernatur civitas ab optimo viro, quàm ab optima lege. In Conclusion. THat the Laws (though in themselves sometimes too strict) are qualified, and so though being imperfect, are perfected, and though imperfect yet may they be made an Art: though Cases and their reasons are uncertain and infinite in practise, yet are they certain and finite, in precepts: though hard at the first to be known and ordered, yet being ordered, they may with more ease be understood by the Student, and by him being well opened may without great difficulty be understood by the Client. FINIS. WHo knows to plot the fashion of a frame, Albeit, it flatter not unlearned eyes, 'tis like, can tell, how to set up the same, Through little chinks, that who such light espies, Encouraging he hasteneth for an end The good beginnings of a loving friend. But wretched I, for sight though not the worst, My feebled wits supporting ill their charge Surcharged (alas) in chase by men accursed, (Whose honey mouths their hidden wrongs enlarge) As toiled Deer seeks shelter in the Town, Do fly those curs, before you falling down. For, well I know your help and favour might Be staves, whereon my fainting Muse should guide Such steps, that Error could not strangle Right Through idiot tongues, or hearts of hellish pride: Your Honour shall be rich in title then, As Princes erst, a fosterer of Men. Malum, patienti, Lucrum.