A DISCOVERY OF D. JACKSONS' VANITY.  
OR A perspective Glass, whereby the admirers of D. JACKSONS' profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received.  
Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the Copy came to the Press.  job 38. 2. Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? 
Imprinted ANNO M. DC. XXXI.   

  

To the understanding Reader.  
TWo sorts of men there are (to pass by the mere Politicians ready to serve the times, and their own turns without any fear of God or man) which now undermine that doctrine of grace, which formerly they themselves have believed, and by the preaching whereof they have received the grace whereby they are what they are, in any true good. Some under a show of modestic and simplicity, hold off themselves and others from admitting so high points; as not willing to believe that which is above their comprehension. But others take up the cause a clean contrary way, and would bear the World in hand, that the failings of our divines, in this doctrine, came from shallowness, and want of profound knowledge in Metaphysical speculations. Of this later rank, Mr. D. jackson is the ringleader. This man doubteth not to profess, that he hath found no character of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence (no not in the Holy Prophets and Apostles writings) from which he hath received so full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration, as from one of Trismegist, an Egyptian Priest. part. 1. pag. 55. So that the sentence which he passeth upon Vorstius (whom he seemeth more to emulate in overturning the divine attributes, than any other) doth shrewdly reflect upon himself: The evaporations of proud fantastic melancholy, hath eclipsed the lustre of glorious presence, in this prodigious Questionists brain, which would bring us out of the Sunshine of the Gospel, into old Egyptian darkness. From the same Egyptian learning, through Plato and Plotinus, he taketh his draught of the divine decrees. For he acknowledgeth no decree of God, concerning humane actions, good or bad (no not of those which God promised to effect either concerning his mercy in Christ and Christians, or concerning his judgements to be effected by the wicked) but only disjunctive, that is by his own instances, part. 2. Sect. 2. cap. 17. Aut erit, aut non erit; it shall either rain all day tomorrow, or befaire all day tomorrow (in which example of a false disjunction, he may seem to teach that God's decrees may also be false;) the Sun will either shine, or not shine, this day at twelve of the clock. Surely from this character of a divine decree, though we can receyve no good instruction, yet have we as much fruit of admiration, as D. jackson himself received from the former of ubiquity. For what Christian can satisfy himself in wondering, how erit illa die, (which is the usual expression of God's decree, in the Prophet's phrase) can be interpreted by erit aut non erit? how all the promises, which declare God's decree of dispensing his grace, upon all nations, by the ministry of men, as ra ne or dew upon herbs, should be so glossed; it shall either rain, or not rain? or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevailing course of the Sun of righteousness in & by his, & his servants activity, should be flouted with this disjunction: it shall shine, or not shine? It would bring some fruit of admiration, if any Prince or Law maker, should make no other decree, about such things as concern their, and their subjects good, but merely disjunctive, either men shall do so, or not so; either they shall do good, or suffer evil: For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions, yet they come nearer to that, than the indifferency of an even-weighing disjunction doth import. They put so much weight as the efficacy of their will can bear, to that scale wherein they place, this shall be. But Plato and Plotinus conceyved (or rather in some of their discourses expressed) no more than this: All Christians therefore are by D. jackson called back again to this, as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been carried too far; It can not indeed be denied, but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane ideas of divine decreeing as D. jackson doth. For Alcinons de doctrina Platonis, cap. 12. hath the same relation in plain terms, which D. jackson hath turned into his strong lines of Oxford: Sic fatum (ex sententia Platonis) pronunciat: quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit, & hujusmodi quaedam commiserit, consequenter talia patietur. Libera ergo est anima, & in ejus arbitrio, vel agere, vel non agere ponitur; quod autem sequitur actionem, ab ipso fato perfinitur. Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapiet, quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio, sequetur ut Graeci de Helena decertent. Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit, statere lancem quodam modo declinante, mox aut verum aut falsum, ex possibili sit. But if D. jackson had not too much been carried away with admiration of these ideas, he might have received a double inctruction from this Alcinons. 1. That Plato did overthrow his own idea, by granting a fatal decree of the Grecians fight against Troy (in which war were contained so many thousands of humane actions as there were soldiers in the Grecian army) in exemplifying the liberty of humane actions from fatal decree. 2. That Plato went before Aristotle (of whom he was forsaken in better notions) in denying; upon that libertine ground, any contingent, especially free actions to come, to be true before they be acted. Which Swarez himself (in his Metaphysics) confesseth to be no less an error than the overturning of Christian faith doth amount to, libertate nostra, mox aut verum aut falsum▪ ex possibili sit. Had not the same passion of admixation stood in the way, he might have learned out of Marsilius Ficinus (to whom he is beholding for other Platonical notions) that Plato himself was, by fits of another mind. For so saith this Author, de Theol. Platon. cap. 13. Deus naturarum omnium temperator, dum regit cuncta, singula pro singulorum regit natura. Quoniam vero motor primus praevalere debet & dominari, ideo sic animos (ut Plato vult) quasi cogit ad bonum, ut bonum ipsum nolle non possint. And that these second thoughts of Plato were more agreeable to Christian faith, the same Marsilius Ficinus is witness, Epist. lib. 2. Epist. cui tit. Homo quam difficile extra habitum naturalem posilus felicitatem sequitur, tam facile hanc in naturalem habitum restitutus assequitur? where treating of the like question, he saith: Quid respondebimus? Magis, Pythagoraei, Platonici, Peripatetici forsan sic: Denique exactissima Theologorum examinatio rem omnem breviter ita concludit: Quamohrem motor ipse qui animum propriè vertit ad infinitum, est ipsamet sola infinita potestas, quae mentem, pro libera voluntatis natura, modo quodam movet ad eligendas vias maxime libero. Rursus pro infinita moventis potentia, ad appetendum finem usque adeo incitat, ut non appetere nequeat. From the same Platonist, D. jackson might have learned also more sense, then to outface all his readers with that unheard of stinking bull of his own proper forging (which both in his epistle dedicatory, and also in diverse parts of his treatises, he maketh the basis of his vain conceits,) namely that if God should have certainly▪ and immutably decreed any singular action or end of man, than God should be deprived of his freedom. For let him but look in Marsil. Ficin. Theolog. Platonica, de immort. anim. lib. 2. cap. 12. he shall find this Title: Voluntas Dei necessaria est simul & libera. And in the Chapter itself, he shall find that the Platonists would be ashamed of such flim-flam. In ipso bono certe summa naturae necessitas una cum summa libertate voluntatis concurrit. Atque ibi naturae necessitas, voluntatis confirmat libertatem, & libertas necessitati consentit, usque adeo ut necessario liber voluntariusque Deus sit, & voluntary necessarius. A nobis id tantum ubique affirmari optamus, quod Deo sit dignum, quale est, in Deo cum summa necessitate, summam congredi libertatem. Sed in hac re meminisse oportet, ut placet Thomae nostro, splendori Theologiae: quamquam divinae voluntatis actus, secundum conditionem, positionemve, quando dici potest rem hanc aut illam necessario velle, viz. postquam semel eam voluit, cum sit divina voluntas non aliter immutabilis, quam essentia, ipsum tamen suapte natura non habere eum necessitatis absolutae respectum ad effectus suos, quem ad seipsum habet. I would have englished these passages, but that I conceyve no man to be in peril of misguiding by D. jacksons' fustian kind of writing, except he understand not only a Latin style, but one of iron, clay, brass, sylver & gold, like the Babylonish image, which none but Daniel could interpret. Neither is it needful, that I should go about the examining or discovering of D. jacksons' dreams. It is done to my hands, with singular learning and judgement, in the ensuing censure. Which as it seemeth, was written by D. Twisse, for his own contentment; as Scholars are wont to find themselves willing work in communing with those, which bring forth extraordinary notions. But in such a subject as this, it could not long be kept private. An honourable man therefore having gotten from the Author a copy, could not but communicate the same with his friends, by whom at length it came to the Printer, whose profession is to make such works public, as are of public use. And howsoever upon Politic considerations, disputes of this kind are forbidden and suppressed; yet it were to be wished, that more were found, amongst those that are able to defend the truth, which were not so servile unto the times, as by their silence to become accessary unto the murder of that religion, which they profess and believe. In reason also, it were better that such as dislike of and undermine by piecemeal insinuations, the doctrine hitherto received amongst us, would lay us down the full platform of their opposite doctrine; and not content themselves with some plausible snatchinges and catchinges, at common tenants, not manifesting in the mean time, how they can bring their jarrings in those parts which they question, to agree with others, which as yet they dare not question. It is by experience proved, in the low Countries, that Arminianism tendeth directly to Socinianisme, which is the only dangerous and damnabled heresy of this age. If our Arminians can show us how to bond these waves of the same lake, or avoid those rocks any better than they of Holland, they have no reason to envy us the common courtesy of Seamen. Let them takeup therefore (if they love plain dealing) the Remonstrants confession and Apology, and either testify their full consent with them; or signify how far we ought to sail by that compass, and in what part of that Sea-card we are to leave them, and where the danger lieth. D. jackson would persuade us (pag. 1. sect. 3. cap. 18.) that if his doctrine of love and grace universal, were well taught and pressed in the particulars of it, all men would unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to be truly happy, and that with astonishing fruit. Surely if he know such particulars of any doctrine, as would bring forth such miraculous fruit (a hundred fold more than the doctrine of Christ himself and his Apostles could attain to, who never brought all their auditors to unfeigned endeavour and fervent alacrity in seeking of God) I say he knoweth such particulars, and will not impart them to the World, the engines which extort confession, might be better employed about him, than ever they were about any. It is well known by experience, that neither the generals, nor the particulars either of the jesuits doctrine concerning universal grace in Spain, or of the Lutherans in Germany, or of the Arminians in Holland, have brought any such miraculous fruit of piety. Neither have I yet heard of any such extraordinary success upon D. jacksons' doctrine at Newcastel or Oxford, but may at least be equalled (to say no more) by the success of their doctrine, which have pressed the contrary tenants, in a thousand congregations of England. Except therefore he declareth his doctrine in the particulars of it, he must pardon us, if we make no more account of his general colours, then of those new inventions or projects, which promise so incredible wonders, that they can find no credit, but only with those that are willing to be deceyved.   

TO THE PREFACE OR SOME PASSAGES IN THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY.  
I Desire to fetch a walk in your Paradise of contemplation; & although you profess to encamp therein, & are very martial in your words & phrases of terror, little answerable to that expectation which a Paradise doth bespeak; yet doth it nothing dismay me, because you profess opposition only against the enemies of God, & myself, though a chief of sinners, yet have found mercy at the hands of God, that I should be faithful unto him & to his truth in such sort, as to do nothing against it, but rather engage all my poor ability 
1. Cor. 13. 8  for it. And in case I find yourself going not the right way to the truth of God, (an error incident to as great an Apostle 
Gal. 2. 14.  as S. Peter), I shall take boldness to interpose my judgement forth discovery of error, & that I hope without all just blame, or deserved censure in respect of that old acquaintance which hath been between us; for as much as I have learned both of my great Mr. in knowledge natural, Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, amicior veritas. And of my far greater Mr. in knowledge spiritual, & to whose blessing also 
Ethic. 1. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  I chiefly owe my progress in knowledge natural, that he who loveth his Father or Mother more than him is not worthy of him; & whose peremptory voice is this also; If any man come to me & hate not his Father, & Mother, & Wife & Children, & brethren & Sisters yea & his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. God 
Matth. 10. 17.  forbid, the maintenance of truth should be interpreted to proceed from hatred, or want of love to a man's person; 
Luc. 10. 16  though in the manner of carriage offence may be given both to God & man. For he is a perfect man that sinneth not in word. Luther was conscious of this, when before the Germane Princes 
jam. 3. 2.  in a meeting at Worms, a part of his protestation was this, that he was not a man that made profession of holiness; acknowledging that as a man, he might err; but I am verily persuaded, he was conscious off a good heart towards God.  
The cause that moveth me herunto is partly the profession which you make in your Epistle Dedicatory, that divers passages in your discourse do manifest, that what I account the ●ower leven of Arminianism, is very tasteful unto you, which now you begin to set a broach in print, as heretofore you have uttered them in the pulpit, & afterwards by writing communicated unto others, whereof divers particulars have lately come unto my hands; which have put me to some pains, & to the spending of some precious time, in the scanninge of them. As for the passages, tending that way, in this book of yours, I reserve them to be considered in their place. But as for the profession which you make in your preface, I purpose here, to take that into consideration, before I pass on farther in my way. It is not so unusual (you say) nor so much for you to be censured for an Arminian, as it will be for his Lordship (to whom you dedicate it) to be thought to patronise Arminianism. Herby you seem praepared to stand upright & not couched under the burden of this censure, as Isachar was by Jacob's prophecy to couch under his: & withal you do imply that, that honourable Lord, to whose patronage you inscribe this your Treatise, may hereby be thought to patronise Arminianism. And you do well to signify, that his Honour is not like to take it well, to be so conceived off; as who hath ever hitherto been accounted both orthodox himself, & a Patron of those that are such. Yet these insinuations of yours, seem to me some thunge strange on your part. For I have found by experience in other writings of yours, that you heretofore have affected to be the inventor of a middle way, & so the report goeth of you: though I confess, I never found the issue of your discourses answerable; which hath made me conceive, that practice of yours to have been but a praetence; & herein I am confirmed by this your present profession. For aught I perceive, you are more foul than Arminius himself, both as touching your Tenets, & the manner of maintaining them; they more void of truth, this more void of Scholastical argumentation, to prove what you undertake. It may be you take more boldness to profess your opinions now then heretofore; although I see no reason for it, nor can believe, that Arminianism is like to find more countenance under the reign of King Charles, than it did under the reign of King james; who professed Arminius to be the enemy of the grace of God; & as I have heard, King Charles himself hath taken notice of his Father's distaste that way, & sometimes made profession of it. But satisfaction you endeavour to give unto his Lordship, which you say you are not bound to give to others. Yet it is well, that for his Honour's sake, your reader is like to partake of this courtesy in the way of satisfaction unto many as well as unto one. For my part, I desire not to oblige you unto any thing; but rather to entreat you, that you would be pleased to take notice of those moral obligations, that belong unto all, in the way of honesty; namely that you would undertake less, & prove more, as in this particular; when you profess that all other contentions in the point of God's Providence & Praedestinat●on, between the Arminians & their opposites, will be only about words, in case they do all agree in this, That your Almighty Creator hath a true freedom in doing good; & Adam's offspring a true freedom of doing evil. I think since the beginning of these differences, never any, neither Papist nor Protestant; neither Lutheran, Calvinist, or Arminian was of this opinion besides yourself; but the more transcendent and supereminent shall be your sufficiency, in being able to perforforme this. And indeed, I have found you wondrously conceited, of the force of consequence, which these propositions (as you imagine) do contain; & in two treatises of yours, you have spent a great many words, in dilatinge upon them, & shaping consequences from them, but as inconsequently, as an Adversary could expect; abusing yourself with the confusions of those things, which being distingnished, the consequences you frame, would streite-way vanish into smoke, & prove to be no better, then mere imagination of a vain thing.  
And this confusion of yours doth appear in that opposition which you make, of other positions to these; as when you say; If any in opposition to Arminius will maintain, that all things were so decreed by God before the creation of the world, that nothing since the creation, could have fallen out otherwise then it hath done, or that nothing can be amended that is amiss, than you must crave pardon of every good Christian to oppugn his opinion; & that not only as an error in Divinity, but as an ignorance. In which words of yours, I do observe first, that you do not herein oppose Gods decreinge all things, but only a certain manner of decreinge all things, as in denying that all things were so decreed by God. Secondly you do not well to couple yourself which Arminius in this. For I never found that Arminius maintained, that God did decree contingency, but not any thing contingent, which is your Tenet in divers pieces both printed & manuscript. He excepts, I grant against Perkins for saying, God did will that sin should be. Yet he himself professeth, that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram 
Exam Praedest. sect. Pag. 162.  scelerum suorum implere; & whereas the jews went far enough in their ignominious handling of jesus Christ, he confesseth that Deus voluit Judaeos progredi quousque progressi 
Pag 114. 115.  sunt. Thirdly, I would this were all, (to wit sin) that you are pleased to exempt from being the object of God's decree. But the case is apparent, that you deny faith, & repentance, & every gracious action to be the object of God's decree. For it is manifest, that these all are contingent actions; Now your opinion is, that God decreethe Contingency but not any contingent thing. Though on the other side you confess God cannot decree necessity, but withal he must decree things necessary also. Lastly, do you know any that maintain any such Tenet (either in opposition to Arminius, or otherwise) which here you obtrude upon your opposites? I assure you I know none such. But whatsoever our Tenet be, I pray remember your promise, that if we agree with you in the former, namely, that God hath a true freedom of doing good, & Man a true freedom of doing evil, than you will not descent from us in other points controverted. And do you know any of us to deny either of these? And yet we may desire explication of that, which you pass over smoothly, as though it needed none. For what do you mean by liberty of doing good, & liberty of doing evil? is it quoad specisicationem? or only quoad exercitium? dare you profess that God is free to do evil, as well as good? or that Man since his fall, & in the state of nature is free to do good as well as evil? quoad exercitium we grant that both God is free to do or not do, whatsoever he doth; & so likewise Man is free to do or not do, whatsoever he doth. Why do you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ, at least in not distinguishing them? Yet this is not all the confusion we complain of. For God's absolute power is one thing, his ordinate power is another thing, for this includs his will. God could have refused to make the world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing God's decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will should be changed. In like sort, God doth all this time continne the World, & he continueth it freely. But yet in respect of his decree to continue it certain years it is impossible, upon this supposition, that it should end before the time apppointed. Again, what mean you to feign any such Tenet, on our parts in opposition to Arminius, as that God for sooth hath so decreed all things, that nothing can fall out otherwise then it hath done? For we expressly to the contrary maintain, that God hath decreed many things to come to pass in such sort, that they could have fallen out otherwise, to wit all such things as are contingent. For we do not maintain that God hath decreed, that all things shall come to pass necessarily; but some things only necessarily, & other things contingently. And in respect of these modi rerum in general, which are necessity contingency, we say it is impossible that any thing should come to pass otherwise, than God hath decreed they shall come to pass, in this sense: to wit, if God hath decreed some things to come to pass necessarily, they shall come to pass necessarily; if he hath decreed some things to come to pass contingently, they shall come to pass contingently, & it is impossible, that things should come to pass otherwise. And I praesume you will not deny this, though thereby you shall contradict yourself, in respect of that Tenet, which here you cast upon your Adversaries, & disavow as an error & ignorance. I say, contradict yourself, unless you distinguish those things, which in this your Tenet, you deliver without distinction, and confound as your manner is. But by your leave, whatsoever God hath decreed, that shall come to pass, & that in such sort, as supposing his decree, it shall be impossible to be otherwise; neither will we fear your censures of error & ignorance, Noah nor your praesumptuous consequences of involvinge enmity against your sweet disposition, of the all-seieng and unerring providence of God; thus with words as sweet as butter, & as soft as oil you would work in your Reader an opinion of your devotion to Godward, to prevent suspicion of ill affection to his providence, when you turn out All decreeing, & put in Allseeing in the place of it. Whereas before you made show, as if you excepted not against our Tenet of Gods decreeinge all things, but only against the manner of it, & his so decreing all things. But be not deceived, God is not mocked. Let us ever fear to mask profanes, with the vizard of devotion, & do not you think with the smoke of words, in such sort to dazzle the eyes of your intelligent Reader as to disable him to discern your deeds in their proper colours. Neither have you any colour for this your Tenet in denying God to have decreed all things, but only in respect of sin. And what reason have you to range sin amongst the number of Things, without distinction, considering; it is rather a mere privation of some thing, then contains any positive thing therein. Yet, as I said before, your opinion were tolerable, did you maintain all other things to be decreed by God besides sin. But your opinion is, that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent, which is in effect to deny in plain terms that God hath decreed that any Man shall believe, or repent, or perform any gracious action. God foreseethe these things, but decreethe them not; this is your fowl opinion, in that opposition to the prerogative of God's grace. For if God by his grace & holy spirit doth work men unto faith & repentance (in showing, mercy unto whom he will) then undoubledly he did decree thus to work them. For God worketh all things according to the 
Eph. 1. 11.  caunsayl of his will. And his will I hope you will not deny to be eternal. Yet you seem to strengthen your opinion with a reason of State. Therefore be like (amongst other reasons yet concealed) you decline the acknowledgement of Gods all decreing providence; because that Tenet is aforerunner of ruin to most flourishing states, where it grows common, and comes to full light. Heathen States then undoubtedly, had never any experience of such ruins, proceeding from any such cause: I doubt not but you will accommodate this your prophecy, or political observation, unto Christian States. And what Ecclesiastical history (I pray) hath afforded you this oracle? No ancient history I am persuaded, do you rely upon in this; for as much as you will not acknowledge that this opinion which you impugn, was received amongst any States of ancient times. Is it then (as it is most likely) that the later times experience hath cast you upon this interpretation of God's providence, whereupon you are bold to make rules, & to commend them unto posterity? And I pray answer me, was the Kingdom of Bohemia one of those flourishing States, wherein the conceit of Gods all decreeing providence, was a forerunner to the ruin of it? And did Prince Palatine, & the lady Elizabeth, or their Asociates, bring in this conceit amongst them? did this opinion grow common there? Did that Kingdom consist of more Protestants then Papists? Or amongst the Protestants, was the number of Calvinists more, then of Lutherans? Speak plainly, & say, the choosing of a Calvinist to be their King, was the ruin of the State, & of the Provinces, which were as members incorporate thereinto: say Calvinisme was the ruin of the upper & the lower Palatinate. And herupon let your Almanac of Prognostications proceed, & be bold to tell the States of the Low Countries, that this Tenet is a forerunner of their ruin also, & unless they & we forthwith turn Arminians, we are like to be lost, & fall into the hands of Papists. But of what Papists? Not such as Thomists, & the Dominicans, the most learned Divines in the Church of Rome (for they maintain that God determineth the will of Men & Angels to every act of theirs whether good or evil, as touching the substance of the act, by influence general; & over & above also unto every good & gracious act, such as faith is & repentance, by influence special. And as he doth thus determine the wills of all his creatures, so from everlasting he did decree thus to determine them.) Belike the Jesuits are they into whose hands we are like to fall, unless with speed, we turn jesuits, that so hereafter we may comfort ourselves as Themistocles did, with Periissemus, nisi periissemus, we had been undone if we had not been undone, & that utterly both body and soul. Happy are the Lutheran & Arminian party, that they are acquainted with no such forerunner of their ruin. They are like to hold their own, while they acknowledge a sweet disposition of the alseeing, and unerringe providence, & leave out All deorecing providence, out of their Creed.  
But let the Dominicans look to it, lest their ruin be not at hand also, as well as ours. For there is to be found such an oracle in some men's writings; that whosoever shall embrace the doctrine of God's Alldecreeing providence, let them know this opinion is the forerunner of ruin ito most flourishing States & Kingdoms, where it grows common, or comes to full light. And the experience of the course of these times, & especially in the ruin of the Palsgrave, & of so many Christian Provinces with him. For certainly 〈◊〉 no time or part of the world beside, was any such experience to be found, so conveniently to serve your turn. Is it not great pity but that the King's majesty & his Counsel, & both houses of Parliament, should be acquainted with this mystery of State (for why should I doubt but that God will hear the affectionate prayers of his people, & in good time establish a perfect union between the King & his people. In the mean time we will wait upon the Lord, who hath hid his face from the 
Es. 8. 17.  house of jacob, & we will look for him; Yea & we will give him 
Es. 62. 7.  no rest until he restore jerusalem the praise of the world.) This I confess is a way to supplant your Adversary opinions, but of any power you have to confute them, and thereby to prevent the growth of them, I have found little evidence in other of your writings, & by the general survey I have already taken, I have small hope to find any great satisfaction in this. But let us examine this point a little more narrowly. You suppose that some in opposition to Arminius do maintain, that all things were so decreed by God before the Creation of the world, that nothing since the Creation could have fallen out otherwise then it hath done; and nothing can be amended that is emisse. But I know none of any such opinion; nay rather they whom I concenve you do most aim at, do directly teach the contrary. We are willing to profess with Austin, that Non aliquid sit, nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, velsinendo 
Enchirid. cap. 95.  ut siat, vel ipse faciendo; Nor ought cometh to pass but that which the Almighty will have to come to pass, either by suffering it to come to pass, or himself working it. And with the Articles of Ireland confirmed by our State in the days of King james, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pusic. Now whatsoever God willeth, he willed eternally. For in God there is no variableness nor shadow of change. And 
jam. 1.  supposing the will of God that such a thing shall come to pass, either by his operation or by his permission; it is impossible in sensu composite, in a compound sense, that it should not come to pass. But this impossibility is not absolute but only secundum quid, in respect of somewhat, to wit of God's will, decreeing it, & is always joined with an absolute possibility of coming to pass otherwise in sensu diviso, in a divided sense. As for example, it was absolutely possible that Christ's bones should be broken, as well as any of the thiefs bones that were crucified with him. For both his bones were breakable, & the soldiers had power & freewill to break them, as well as the others bones: but supposing the decree of God, that Christ's bones should not be broken, upon this supposition, I say, it was impossible, they should be broken. Nay further we say, that unless things impossible to come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed them, upon supposition of God's decree, be notwithstanding absolutely possible to come to pass otherwise; it were not possible for God to decree, that some things shall come to pass contingently. For to come to pass contingently, is to come to pass in such sort, as joined with an absolute possibility of coming to pass otherwise. Thus we say with Aquinas, that the efficacious nature of God's decree is the cause why contingent things come to pass contingently & necessary things necessarily; his words are these: Cum voluntas divina 
1. Quest. 14. art. 8.  sit efficacissima non solum sequitur quod si antea quae Deus vult fieri, sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem quaedam Deus sieri necessario, quaedam contingenter, ut fit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi. Seeing the will of God is most effectual, it followeth not only that those things come to pass, which God will have come to pass, but also that they come to pass after the same manner that God will have them come to pass. Now God will have somethings come to pass necessarily, somethings contingently, that there may be an order amongst things to the complete perfection of the Universe. And accordingly God hath ordained all sorts of second causes, both contingent causes to work contingently, as the wills of men & Angels; & necessary causes to work necessarily, as fire in burning, the Sun in giving light, heavy things in moving downwards, & light things in moovinge upwardes. And as he hath ordained them to be such kinds of Agents thus distinct; so he hath ordained, that they shall work agreably, & he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures, the one contingently the other necessarily. So that whatsoever, the will of God is, shall fall out contingently, the same falleth-out in such sort, as it might have fallen out otherwise; if good, so as it might have fallen out worse & been marred: if ill, yet so as it might have fallen out better & been amended. And the eleventhe Article of Ireland having professed that God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass, addeth herunto by way of explication that so this was ordained as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures, & neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent, are opinions of your own making, not of others maintaining; And to set an end to his own fancies, every man may take liberty when he pleaseth, without any great pains taking, about argument to overthrow them.   

SECT. I.  
IN the first Section and before the first Chapter, according to exact method (as you profess) in reference unto your former Discourse, you propose two things to be enquired: 1. How this truth of Gods being most certainly known by internal experience unto some, may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others. Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled. The latter of which two I should never have expected in a Philosophical, or Theological discourse. Yet I will prescribe to none, but give every vessel leave to vent his own humour, & to be delivered of such notions, wherewith his brains have been conceived. If we have any use to make of them, we may; if none, we are little the worse for that. Every being hath three passions denominating it. For there is a truth of it, there is a goodness of it, there is an unity of it. Therefore also all these are to be found in the being of God. But it seemeth not to be your meaning to speak of this truth, which is a passion of being, a simple term; but rather of the truth of this proposition, There is a good, to wit, how it may be made manifest by speculative argument, you desire to inquire; grantinge it to be most certainly known by internal experience, unto some, whereby unless you understand our Christian Faith, I discern not your meanninge. Upon the first point, you will not have us to look for much as yet; and the reason you give, is enough to put us out of expectation of any thing at all. For albeit a desperate enemy despairing of his life, Is thereby the more animated to sight; yet an Adversary in discourse, by evidence of argument brought to despair of maintaining his Tenet, is not thereby the more provoked to dispute. And therefore I see no just restraint to hinder you from bestowing your best ability upon this argument, even in this place. And yourself confess, that notwithstanding all this, you may proceed upon such advantages, as grounds of nature give you. And your main purpose extends no further.  

CHAP. I.  
YOUR first Argument is not like to strike your enemy with any great fear or despair. Arguments weak or weakly prosecuted, weakeneth the cause maintained, strengthenethe the cause oppugned. And first it is not handsomely carried, thus If every particular generation hath causes, than all generations have some cause; implyinge that every generation hath many causes; all have but one. But carry it how you will, it is not capable of any sound inference. It is true, Every generation hath his cause: therefore all generations have causes; But what causes? only the same causes, which every one hath a part, aggregated together. For as you make an aggregation of particular generations; so the cause of this aggregation, inferred, can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations. So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises, much less the being of the Godhead hereby evidenced. Then your second inference is as wild, when you add, Otherwise all should not be of one kind or nature. For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation, to be of the same kind or nature with every particular. For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu & potentia; But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens, consisting of many particulars (each whereof is unum per se) heaped together, not by any natural union united into one. As we do not say the bushel of corn is of the same kind with every particular grain, as also it cannot be said to be of a divers kind in any congruity, although there were divers kinds of grains therein; But rather an heap of grains, whether of the same kind, or of divers kinds. Again you propose your argument, not only of the generation of Man, who is of one kind, but of all generable bodies, who are well known to be of divers kinds, & therefore why should you account it any absurdity, for all these to be not of one kind or nature? Furthermore, when you make show of such an Inference as this, All must have some cause, otherwise they be not of one kind or nature, you do hereby imply, that All, that have some cause, are in a fair way to be of the same kind or nature, which upon consideration you will find to be utterly untrue. For all creatures have some cause, yet are they not any thing the more of one kind or nature; although they have not only some cause, but the same cause also, namely God. Like as though things have different causes, yet it followeth not that they are of different kinds: As all mice are of the same kind, though some are bred equivocally, some univocally; so of lise and divers others. For although Averro were of opinion, that mice bred equivocally, & mice bred univocally, by generation were of different kinds, & thereupon maintained that such as were bred equivocal, did never propagate their like by generation; yet I do not think you are of that opinion, it being contrary to manifest experience. And to us it is manifest (who believe the creation) that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation, yet did propagate their like, & were of the same kind with creatures propagated from them. But Averro was an Atheist even amongst Arabians, & denied all creation. I am sorry, you are so unhappy in defend●nge truth, especially such a truth as the being of God; but th● best is, that truth needethe no man's defence. I hope you will prove nothing more happy in defending errors. Yet I deny not, but that the greatest Divines do conclude that there is a first cause (that is God) because the progress from effects to causes, & from causes inferior to causes superior cannot be infinite. According whereunto your argument should● have proceeded thus. In generations, as of th● Son by the Father, the progress upwardes cannot be infinite. Therefore at length, we must ascend to th● first of Men, as Adam, who was not borne by generation of Man; (for then he had not been th● first) but otherwise; and in like sort of the generations of all other things, that they had their beginning from some superior cause, to their own natures; which supreme cause of all, we account to be God. But yet I think you are not ignorant, that some Schoolmen maintain the world might have been everlasting, and that by creation; in which case there should be an infinite progress in generations; unless as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeming contradictions in Aristotle, 
In Opusculis.  to prevent an infinite number of immortal souls hence ensuing devisethe, that though the World had been from everlasting, yet should it not be necessary that there should have been an infinite number of Men deceased, because say he, God could have praeserved the first Man from generation, & propagation of his like, until some five or six thousand years ago: so you should take some such course to prevent an infinite progress in natural generations. But I mean not to put you to any such shifts. For I hold creation from everlasting, to be a thing impossible, and that the impossibility thereof, may be made evident by demonstration; and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned, to be of a thing merely impossible also. So that in fine, this argument of yours, though with little accurateness proposed by you, is drawn from the creation; which kind of argumentation in the preface you seemed to put of, till another time, yet in the first place you have fallen upon it, ere you are aware. Bradwardine writing against the Pelagians, layeth down two suppositions as the ground of all, whereof 
Summa de causa Dei, contra Pelagium. Nullus est processus insinitus in Entibus. Deus est sum. perfectus & sum. bonus, tantum quod nihil perfectius vel melius esse potest.  this is the second, that there is no infinite progress in entities; but that in every kind there is one supreme. The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more. And lest he should seem to suppose this without all proof, one argument & but one he produceth to prove this. And the proof is to this effect: It implieth no contradiction to say, such a one there is; therefore it is necessary, that such a one have being, & it is impossible there should be no God. If any Man denieth the Antecedent, it behooveth him to show, wherein the contradiction doth consist. And it is very strange, & so strange as incredible, that for the best nature to have existence, it should imply contadiction. As for example, we find these manifest capital degrees of perfection amongst entities corporal. Some liave only being, some have being & life also; some have being, life, and sense; some unto all these add reason also. Now that nature which includes both being & life, is of greater perfection, than such, as have being without life, and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist. Again that nature which includes both being, life, and sense, is of greater perfection, then that, which includes only being and life, without sense, and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist. Again, that nature which besides all these, in the notion thereof includes reason also, is of far greater perfection than the former, and it implieth no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exists Lastly, there are beside all these, natures purely spiritual, which we call Angels or Intelligences, of far greater perfection, than natures material & corporal, & it implyethe no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist, as the Philosopher hath demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all material concretion: Why then should it imply any contradiction, for a nature of greater perfection than all these to exist, unless they are supposed to be of greatest perfection, even able to make a World out of nothing; and consequently to be of a necessary being themselves. For if possible not to be, how is it possible, they should attain to being? Not of themselves; For that which is not, hath no power to give being to itself. Nor of any other; whether of a nature superior or inferior. Not of any of inferior nature. For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angel, neither by generation, nor by creation. If by a superior; this is to acknowledge, that there is a nature existent superior in perfection, unto Angels. And if Angels had a necessary being; then seeing they are of a certain number, their number also must be necessary; Now if it implieth no contradiction, that God should be, it is most necessary, that he is and must necessarily be granted, that he is. For being supposed to include greatest perfection, if he had no being, it were impossible he should have being; seeing nothing can bring itself from, nothing to being, neither can ought else produce him. For if any thing could, then that, whatsoever it were, should be of greater perfection than he. This is the argument of Bradwardin. And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before, and but one of the five ways, which he takes in the proof of this. The first way & more manifest, as he 
Aquin. 1. qu. 2. art. 3  say, is that which is taken from the consideration of motion; where hence he concludeth that we must at length ascend to one who moovethe, and is not moved, & that is the first mover, which (say he) all understand to be God. The second is drawn from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (say he) we find even in insensible things an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherein he supposeth there cannot be an infinito progresse; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. Hence it followeth (say he) we must ascend & rest in one supreme efficient, which acknowledgethe no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hath been already prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of things possible, with things necessary. The fourth is from the degrees that we find in things, as some things are more or less true, more or less good, more or less noble; whence he concludes, that something must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truth, goodness, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heat. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and lastis drawn from the government of the World, & the consideration of the order of things amongst themselves; whence he concludeth, there is some thing that orderethe them, and that must be God.  
This last argument is, that which Raymund Sebond doth 
In his Theologia naturalis. In Prologo.  so much dilate & insist upon. And whereof he is very confident, like as of the success of his undertake in general; as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine, within the space of a month; and that without any knowledge to prepare him, so much as the knowledge of Grammar, & yet he shall not be proud of it neither.  
Vasquius further telleth us, that Aegidius was of opinion, 
Vasq. in 1. disp. 20. cap. 3.  that this truth, that there is a God, is a truth known of itself. And albeit Thomas Aquinas denieth it to be a truth per se notam quoad nos; Yet in itself he professethe that it is 
Aquin. 1. q. 2. art. 3.  per se nota for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject. And to my judgement it seems also to be so quoad nos, if it be duly considered & pondered what we understand by God, to wit the most perfect nature of all others. Now how is it possible, that that which is more perfect than all others, should not have being? And every man knows that, that which hath being, is more perfect, then that which neither hath, nor can have being, (such as is the nature of God, if it have no being.) For according to the Proverb, a live Dog is better than a dead Lyon.  
In the next place you inquire, whereunto you shall liken him? This indeed was the second thing you proposed to be inquired into. But in what congruity to a Philosophical, or Theological discourse, I leave it to others to examine. I will be content to sum up the account of what you deliver, rather than to argue the unseasonableness of such a discourse. Though nothing can exactly resemble him, yet som● thing, (you say) can better notify how far he is beyond all resemblance, than others. But truly, what you mean hereby is a mystery unto me. I should rather think, the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance, drawn from inferior things. That he is the cause of all things doth better represent the nature of God, than the resemblance of him to any thing; especially considering, what cause he is, to wit an efficient cause of all things, and that not univocal but equivocal; & consequently such as comprehends all things eminently, but in perfection without comparison beyond them. For comparison hath place only between things agreeing in kind, or in proportion. But God and his creatures agree in neither. This I confess may draw to admiration. As the Philosopher, who being demanded what God was, required three days liberty, to put in his answer; and at three days end, required three more, & at the end of these, three days more, giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter; because the more he gave himself to th● contemplation of the nature of God, the farther he found'st himself of from comprehending it, but whereas you add, that such admiration will more & more enlarge our longing after his presence: I do no way like either your collection, or the phrase, whereby you express it. For as for the presence of God; of the very apprehension thereof we are not capable in this World, but by faith. Neither can any natural admiration arising from natural inquisition after the nature of God, & consideration of the fruitless issue thereof, draw men to a longing after that presence of God which they know not. Both the knowledge of the presence of God, and a longing desire after it, I take to be a work of special grace, and not any work of nature; upon the power whereof I find you doane too much in all your writings.  
Painters (you say) can more exactly express, the outward lineaments of things, than we their natures. Painter's expressions are in colours; our expressions are not so, but rather in words. And what a wild comparison is it, to compare things so heterogeneal in exactness. But though the expression of the one fail in exactness, in comparison of the other, yet the delight taken therein (you say) needs not: And thus you plot to make the love of God a work of nature, whereunto the natural conceptions of him, though nothing exact, by means of the creature may lead us. These conceptions of yours, are in my judgement as far from truth, as from piety. The frequent ebbs & flow of Euripus, may cast a Philosopher into admiration, not comprehending the reason of it, yet bring him nothing the more in love with it. Angels are of very glorious natures, & in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason, both touching their being in place, their motion, their understanding, & the communicating of their thoughts, & exercising of their power; yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them. Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodness in the object, which alone makes things amiable; as a beautiful picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight. But now I find, that from the impression of love, you slip I know not how, to the impression of truth: & this I confess, delightethe some minds of purer metal; as Aristotle speaks of the delight that a Man takes, in the demonstration, whereby it is proved, that the Diameter in a squate, hath no common dimension with the sides of it, or that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right. Especially if the conclusion be rare & long sought after but not found, as the squaring of a circle received as knowable in Aristotle's days, though not known till of late, as Pancirolla writes & Salmuly in his commentaries upon him, about 30. years before that time. Yet some speculations may be as vain as curious: as to prove, that two Men in the World there are, that have just so many hairs on their head one as another. But to make a rain bow in the air, & by ocular demonstration prove the truth of that which reason concludes, namely that as often as a rainbow appears in the clouds, though it seem but one, yet indeed there are as many, as there are Men that behold it, because it discoverethe a secret of nature, very curious and nothing vain. For it is the glory of God to hide a thing, and it is 
Prov. 25. 1.  the glory of a King to find it out. And seeing God hath 
Eccle. 3. 11.  set the World in Man's heart, though a Man cannot find out the work that God hath wrought from the beginning to the end; yet it is good to be doing, & to discover as much as we can, especially such as have a calling herunto. But to proceed, you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances, namely to have a sight of some scattered rays, of a glorious light, which Saints have in blessedness; and to this purpose to elevate us, to a certain Horizon, whose edges and skirts shall discover this. Thus you phrasify the matter gloriously, & prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightness that appears in our Horizon after the Sun set. But surely that Sun did never yet rise upon us, and when it doth, surely it shall never set. And I much doubt, lest the glory of your phrases prove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part.  
Hence you proceed to a rule of Decorum in all resemblances, that so you may make way to betray your learning in Hieronymus Vida his Poetry, passing his censure upon a comparison of Homer, wherein he compares Ajax retiringe from the Troyans' unto an hards kinned ass, driven with bats or staves out of a corn field, by a company of children. The comparison is justified by Vida, but thought not fit to be applied in like sort unto Turnus, unless a Lion be put in the place of the ass, in the judgement of those courtly times wherein Virgil lived, thereby desiring belike to justify Virgil also. I still attend, when those scattered rays you promised us, of that glorious light, you spoke of, will break forth; But it may be, we are not yet come to the Horizon, whose edges and skirts alone can discover them. But yet to stay our stomaches you tell us by the way; that the Holy Prophets in their courtly Decorum observed in framing comparisons, are nothing inferior to any Poet, though as good as Virgil & Homer also. They are something beholden unto you, for your good word. Your instance is out of Esay 31. 4. Like as the Lion & young Lion roaring on his prey, when a multitude of shepherds is called forth against him, he will not be afraid of their voice, nor abase himself for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come down to fight for Mount Zion & for the hill thereof. I begin to conceive, this was it you went with child withal, in casting yourself upon this digression touching the resemblinge of the nature of God. And because the comparing of Virgil with Homer, is a pretty point of humanity learning; and you had observed this passage in Scripture suitable to that of Turnus his description in Virgil: to vent this piece of learning, you have drawn in by the cares a discourse or rather an inquiry, How God's essence is to be resembled, the issue whereof is but this, that the Prophet observes a very courtly decorum, in resembling him unto a Lyon.  
Yet by the way take this; If it were not courtly enough to compare Turnus to an ass as Homer compares Aiax, but rather to a Lion; do you think it courtly enough to compare the Lord of hosts to a Lion? And what courtly decorum is observed think you when the second coming of Christ is compared to the coming of a thief in the night? Persuade yourself; the holy Ghost affects no courtly decorums; his language is always savoury to a gracious spirit, not otherwise. The wits of Virgil & Homer both at the best, savoured but of the flesh, So doth not the word of God. I honour them both in their kinds; but I would not have them remembered the same day, wherein we consider the spiritual decorum of the language of God's spirit.  
Well, the child is delivered, & these pangs are over; Now we may expect to be advanced to the Horizon you spoke of, for the discovery of those scattered rays of glorious light, wherewith you enamoured us. But first we are to be acquainted with three sorts of errors out of Austin, in setting footthe the Divine nature; The first (you say) ariseth from comparing God to bodies, as by saying that he is bright or yellow; the second, from comparing him unto souls; as by attributing forgetfulness unto him; The third by attributing such things unto him, as are neither true of him, nor of any other, as in saying that he is able to produce, or beget▪ himself. Yet you tell us fictions, or suppositions must be used of things scarce possible, whereby to represent God, in default of better. And thus you make way for a fiction of yours, whereby to represent God, & that is of a soul diffused: through the whole Universe. Now that Deus was Anima Mundi, was an old opinion of certain heathens two thousand years ago. And what necessity, I pray, of any such fiction? And withal it is a fiction full of absurdity; considering that a great part of this Universe is a World of souls of divers kinds; and the rest are uncapable of souls whether they are inferior to animate things as base bodies, or superior even to reasonable souls themselves, as Intelligences. And I wonder what you meant by that sorry qualification, when you say. You must use fictions of things scarce possible; Implyinge that this fiction of yours which here you introduce, is of a thing scarce possible; Whereby you seem to conceive that this is a thing not absolutely impossible.  
Neither do I find any congruity, why bodies abstract or Mathematical, should be of fitter capacity to receive this imaginary soul whereby to represent God. Only I confess, that an imginary body is most fit for an imaginary soul, but neither fit to represent God by. For what virtues, I pray, can you find in them, fit to resemble him? Yet you are not at end of your extractions, though the end of this Chaptor touching God's resemblance, moovethe us to send an end to our expectations, and to look no more for those seattered rays of that glorious light you spoke of. The child you travayled with, was Homer's comparing Aiax to an ass, & Virgil's comparing Turnus to a Lion, & Vida his judgement thereupon, and the Prophet's concurrence with the wit of the latter, and three errors mentioned by Austin, in resembling the nature of God. And last of all a fiction to this purpose of a thing scarce possible, and that something refined, and the whole put of to further extractions, & all the glory, we were put in hope of, is the glory of a few phrases, wherewith you wish your Reader, seeing his cheer, to be merry, for he is welcome. And thus you have given us a flash of powder without shot, but not without smoke. Our entertainment may be better in the chapter following.   

CHAP. II.  
Concerning two Philosophical maxims which are said to lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite, & incomprehensible essence.  
FROM leight shows we come to solid discourse, at least we are promised such. The principles whereof are two, termed springs & founteynes, that they may be the fitter, for the baptising of Atheists, (so you speak) as they are fit enough for the confirming of Christians. The first is, Whatsoever hath limit or bounds of being hath some distinct cause, or author of being. This is taken for a proposition known of itself; yet are the terms very ambiguous, as namely the term limit or bounds. In one place you profess that beginning of being is one special limit of being. New I confess, that in this sense, the proposition is evident thus, Whatsoever hath a beginning, hath a cause thereof distinct from itself; because nothing can have a beginning of being without a cause; Neither can any thing give being unto itself. And therefore, if all things in this World are acknowledged to have had a beginning; it must be acknowledged that they had a Maker which is God. But that this World hath had a beginning hath not been acknowledged by all: Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God, as Aristotle and his Followers, have utterly denied the World to have had a beginning as you well know; And therefore unless, the contrary be proved, & these Philosophers confuted, we have hereby nothing profited in convicting men's consciences of this truth by the light of reason, That there is a God; and so are far enough from baptizing Atheists into the name of God the Father. Much more from baptizing them into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the H. Ghost. And therefore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense, but rather you extend the word limits or bounds to a greater generality of signification, in which sense, you would have it supposed, that All things, besides God himself, have limit and bounds of being, not in regard only that they had a beginning which is questionable, but in regard that they are Entia finita, which is out of question; In like sort the word being, is of ambiguous signification; For it may be taken, either for being of essence, or for being of existence. The limits of existence or duration are such as whereby things are said to have a beginning or an end; and that at such a time or other.  
But the limits & bounds of things according to their essence, are such, in respect whereof Entia are said to be fini●a, or infinita. Now in this latter sense, your proposition hath been very questionable, amongst the most learned Philosophers, that have been. For Aristotle and his peripatetics never doubted, but that this visible World was finite.  
Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it, is no where evident. Nay he opposethe Plato, & the rest before him, who maintained, that the World was made, & so accordingly, that it had a beginning: whereby it seems, that he, denying the creation of the World, denied therewithal that the World had any efficient cause. And indeed, whosoever maintains, that the world had a beginning by creation, must therewithal maintain, that either it was made of something, or of nothing. You will not say that 'tis a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter, which matter had existence without creation. For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe. Therefore you must be driven to maintain, that it is a truth evident of itself, that the World was made originally out of nothing; or at least, that it may be immediately concluded evidently, by a principle, which is evident of itself; thus Whatsoever hath bounds of being hath been made, the World hath bounds of being: therefore it hath been made; and seeing it was not made of any thing pre-existent; therefore it was made of nothing. Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident? considering how many Learned Philosophers conceived it to be a thing impossible, that any thing could be made out of nothing; as also considering that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement hereof, not to any natural evidence, but only unto faith, as where the Apostle say, by faith we believe that the World was made, so that things which we 
Heb. 11. 2.  see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not of things that do.  
2. You proceed to the enlargement of this position, & tell us, that this maxim is simply convertible thus, Whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being, because it hath beginning of being: For, omnis causa & principium, & omne causatum & principiatum. There is little soundness either of Logic or Philosophy in all this. For to say that a proposition is simply convertible, is in a Logical phrase, to say, that it is a good consequence which is drawn, from the proposition converted to the convertent, that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made. But this is untrue of the proposition convertible, which you speak of. For an affirmative universal cannot be thus converted by simple conversion, but only an Universal negative, & a particular affirmative. But I leave your words, and take your meaning; You say it is also true, that, Whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being. Now both this proposition is naught, and the reason worse. For the Son of God, 
Confundunt Graeci Theologi in hac disputatione 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Danaeus Censur. in Lombard. dist. 29.  the second person in Trinity, hath cause of being from his Father: for he is begotten of him. And the H. Ghost, hath cause of being both from the Father and from the Son: For he proceedethe from them both. Yet neither God the Son, nor God the holy Ghost, have any limits of their being. If you say, the Persons are limited, though the nature of the Godhead be not; I would gladly know how the Person of the Son, and of the H. Ghost are more limited than the Person of the Father. For of the Son and H. Ghost, I know no other limitation than this, that the Son is not the Father, nor the H. Ghost: Likewise the H. Ghost, is neither the Father nor the Son. And in this sense, the Father is limited as much as either. For as the Son is not the Father, so the Father is not the Son; and as the H. Ghost is not the Father, so the Father is not the H. Ghost. You should have said, All things that have cause of being by creation, have also limits or bounds of being; Or thus, All things that have cause of being in time, and not from everlasting, have limits, and bounds of being. Or if you would apply it to generation, thus, All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and bounds of being. Yet none of these is to the purpose, save the first. And that first proposition supposeth the creation, which yet is not evident, but unto faith. So than you see how weak this proposition is; Yet the reasons you bring for the proof of it, are much worse. Your first reason is this, because it hath beginning of being. Now if by limits of being, you mean limits of existence, such as is the beginning of duration, than your proof is merely identical. But if you mean by limits of being, limits of essence, whereby a thing is said to be Ens sinitum, the consequence is true I confess, but nothing more evident is the conclusion, by this reason, than it was before of itself. For that it hath a cause efficient which producethe it, doth as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced, then that it hath a beginning. Yet neither doth the having of an efficient cause sufficiently argue, that the effect produced is finite, unless the efficient cause be finite. For to say that a finite thing could produce an effect infinite, is to maintain that a cause in working should exceed the sphere of his activity. But there is no place for this exception, in case the efficient cause be infinite. And I have 
Hill. in hic Philosophia Luceppea, Epicurea, Democretica.  known some infer herehence that the World is infinite; Otherwise say they, there should be no effect of God suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent. And consider; finite things are able to produce finite things, equal unto themselves, why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite? It may be answered, that the experience of producing equals to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation. And so God also in the way of eternal and incomprehensible generation producethe a Son equal to himself, yea, the same with himself as touching his nature. But this is grounded upon a mystery of faith, which hath no evidence unto reason natural. For although by reason & meditation on Gods works we may attain to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature, yet can we not thereby attain to the knowledge of God as touching the Trinity of persons. Add unto this, that divers have not only believed, but undertaken to prove also, that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension, either in quantity continual or discrete.  
And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanish jesuit, and a late 
Disputatione in Philosophiam Vniversam a Summulis ad Metaphisicam.  Writer, is most eager in the maintenance of this. So far of are your propositions from carrying evidence in their for heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that whatsoever hath cause of being hath also a beginning, of being, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Son and Second person in the Trinity hath a cause of his being, to wit the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hath not only a cause, but causes of his being, to wit both the Father and the Sonn, for he proceedethe from them both; yet hath he not such beginning of being as you speak of. For both he and the Son are everlasting like unto the Father. Your second reason is worst of all, as when you say: For omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principiatum. For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium, are taken for voces synonymae, words of the same signification; not signifying two things, the one whereof is consequent unto the other. And what sober Scholar would affirm, that omnis causa est principium, as principium signifieth the beginning of being, whereas indeed it is the cause of beginning of being to its effect, rather than formally to be styled the beginning of being itself. That which followeth of the limits of things, more easily or more hardly discerned, according as the cause is found to be preexistent in time or no, is an assertion as wild, as the similitude whereby you illustrate it; and all nothing to the purpose, to prove, that whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being, though still you proceed ambiguously without distinction, either of being, or of the limits thereof.  
For first, where the cause is not preexistent in time, as in things rising by concomitance, or resultance, yet the effects are as easily seen to be limited, as when the cause is preexistent in time; as for example; the light of the Sun, and the light of the candle which flow from those bodies by natural emanation, was as easily seen to be limited, the first time it was, as after the light is a long time hid from us, and afterward appears again unto us. Secondly, what if the limits be not seen, what I say is that to the purpose? Angels are invisible, yet we know, their natures are limited. Thirdly, what think you of the World, hath it limits or no? You think (no doubt) it hath; yet was not God the cause thereof preexistent in time, but only in eternity. For before the World, no time had any existence. Again suppose the Wolrd had been made from everlasting, which some Schoolmen have held to be possible; in this case, God should have no preexistence either as touching time actual, or as touching time possible; Yet I hope that limits of the World, even in that case had been as discernible to Aristotle, as now they are to you. As for the similitude whereby you illustrate it, that rather showeth how in such cases when effects do rise by way of concomitance or resultance, they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernible. Yet what should move you thus to amplify, how hard it is to discern such effects, from their causes, I know not. For what hardness, I pray, is there, in discerning light to be different from the body of the Sun that gives it, or from the body of a Candle, or of a Glowewoorme, or of some kind of rotten wood, or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the dark? Yet is all this nothing pertinent to the confirmation, or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you. How far dependence upon a cause doth infer limits of being upon the thing depending, I have already spoken; What meant you to distinguish of the consideration of effects and causes, according to the consideration of them either distinctly, or in gross, unless it be to puzzle the Reader as much as you confound yourself, when eftsoons you manifest that you speak of them both as they have causes, which is to consider them only as effects. For that notion alone hath reference to a cause. But whether this doth infer that they are limited, I have already thereupon delivered my mind.  
3. Hence you proceed to the solution of new problems, and that as a mere naturalist. Why men in these days are not Giants; why Giants in former times were but men. And the reason you give is, because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables, of man especially, from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation, is less now than it hath been, at least before the flood. The latter of your two questions is wild. For what do we understand by Giants, but men of a Giantlike stature? & is it a sober question to ask, how it cometh to pass, that men of an huge stature are but men? For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts, as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor set up in the plain of Dura, or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes; should not men notwithstanding be men still? and neither Angels nor beasts; much less either inferior to the one or superior to the other. If the heavens were infinite as some conceive that an infinite body may be made by God, yet should those heavens be heavens still, and a body still.  
Neither doth it follow, that therefore those Giants were men still, because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite & limited. For though they had been turned into Woolves or other beasts, the matter of nutrition had been limited still; yet in such a case, they had ceased to be men. As touching the stature of men so much lessened in these days in comparison unto former times; I no way like the reason thereof assigned by you. First because it caryethe no evidence with it, & you give no light unto it, but barely suppose the truth of it. Secondly because you limit it, in comparison of the like causes before the flood; As if there were no Anakims' know since the flood. Of late years in the place where I dwell, hath been taken up the bone of a man's leg, broken in the digging of a well, the bare bone was measured to be two and twenty inches about, in the calf, and the spur about the heel was found also, & that of a very vast proportion. It seems the whole body lieth there. If King james were alive, and heard of it; it is like enough that out of his curious and Scholastical Spirit, whereby he was carried to the investigation of strange things, he would give order that the body might be digged up, & the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times. As touching the stature of men in these days what doth captain Smith write by his own experience of the Sasque Sahanocts, borderers 
Voyages a discoverye of Captain john Smith in Virginia.  upon Virginia on the north; He professethe they seemed like Giants to the English; One of their wero●nees that came aboard the English, the calf of his leg was 3. quartars of a yard about, and the rest of his limbs answerable to that proportion. Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood; and Homer writing of the stone that Aeneas took up to throw at his enemies calleth it 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  And he was little acquainted with Noah's flood, that said Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos. Thirdly in these days some are very low, some very tall of stature in comparison; yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each. So in all likelihood both before the flood and after, such difference was found.  
The Spies sent by josuah to take a view of the land of 
Nub. 13. 34.  Canaan, having seen the Sons of Anak, seemed in their own sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them.  
Yet the vigour of food and nourishment was the same to both. far better reasons might be alleged, if I mistake not, of this difference; and withal I see no reason to the contrary, but that men might be of a great stature in these days, as in former times, and that by course of nature; if it pleased God to have it so. But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse, it is unseasonable, and I desire rather to deal with you in matter of Divinity, and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets. The question following, why vegetables of greatest vigour, do not engross the properties of others less vigorous, is a senseless question.  
For whether you understand it of vegetables in the same kind, or of a divers kind, it is ridiculous. As for example. Would any sober man inquire after the cause, why that vegetable which is of the greatest heat, hath not the property of such a vegetable, that is of less heat? Or why that which is vigorous in heat, hath not the property of that which is vigorous in cold, or in any other disparate quality? Nay why should any man expect a reason why different kinds of things have different qualities? Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider, that they are different kinds of things, and therefore no merveyle if they have different properties? The cause hereof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound; For that which propagates, and that which is propagated is of the same kind, and consequently of the same property. And the question proceeds equally as well of the one as of the other. If you should ask how it comes to pass, that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angel; it were very absurd to say the reason is, because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angel, and therefore he could not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angel; lest so he should propagate a more intelligent creature than himself. I say this manner of answer would give little satisfaction. For the question was made of man, not of this man in particular, but of mankind, which comprehends the Father as well as the Son. And again, the Son may be more intelligent than the Father, though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angels are. The following question is as little worth the proposinge as the former. For what hostility is to be feared between the air and the water? But you make choice to instance in the hostility between the earth and the water, as a matter of dangerous consequence. You demand the reason why the restless or raging water swallows not up the dull earth. I had thought the earth had been fitter to swallow up water, than water to swallow up earth. For suppose the Sea should overflowe the Land, should it thereby be said to swallow it up? Then belike the bottom of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea. And by the same reason, the Element of the Air swalloweth up both Sea and Land, because it covereth them; and the Element of fire in the same sense, swalloweth up the Element of the air. And the heavens swallow up all the Elements, for as much as they do encompass them. Every Naturalist conceives, that it is not out of any hostility, that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth, but out of inclination natural, to be above the earth, being not so heavy a body, as the massy substance of the earth is; And we know it is withdrawn into certain valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles, as the Poet acknowledgethe, who was but a mere naturalist, & that in commoda● habitationem animatium, that the earth might become a convenient habitation for such creatures, in whose nostrils is the breathe of life; of whom the chief is man, made after the likeness and image of his maker, and made Lord over his visible creatures. The last question is worst of all, and all nothing to the purpose, but mere extravagants. What sober man would demand a cause, why the heavens do not dispossess the elements of their place? might you not as well demand, why the fire doth not dispossess the air, and then why it doth not dispossess the water? & last why it doth not dispossess the earth of her seat? which is as much as to say, why is not the heaven where the eartheiss, and the earth where the havens are? whereas every man knows, that the more spacious place, is fitter for the more spacious bodies; and the higher places more agreeable to lighter bodies, like as the lowest place is most fit for the body of the earth. To say that the nature of the heavens, hath not so much as liberty of egress into neighbour elements, is as if you should say, that light things have not so much as liberty of moving downwards, nor have heavy things liberty of moovinge upwardes. Yet there are cases extraordinary, when a certain universal nature moves them contrarily to their special inclinations, for maintenance of the integrity of the whole, and for avoidance of all vacuity. I see no reason for that other assertion of yours, that nature cannot set bounds to bodies natural, but rather is limited in them. What think you of the souls of men, do not these as other souls prescribe limits unto the matter? Materia prima was accounted in 
Zabarell. de materia prima.  our University, to have dimensiones in determinatas, and that it received the determination thereof from forms, but by the operation of Agents, in their several generations. I confess nature itself is but the effect and instrument of God, who is the God of nature as well as of grace. But yet whether every thing that hath bounds of nature, as the World hath, doth hereby evidence and infer the creation thereof, is such a question, wherein Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maintain the negative; and the Scripture itself do the impute unto faith, our acknowledgement of the Creation.  
4. Now we come to the scanninge of your second Principle, 
Heb. 1●.  Whatsoever hath no cause of being, can have no limits or bounds of being. This in part hath evidence of truth thus, Whatsoever hath no efficient cause of being, the same hath no beginning of being. But if it proceed of limits of essence, or of quality, or of quantity, it requires help of reason to make it good. For as many as denied the World to have a beginning, denied as it seems, that it had any cause of being; and thought the being thereof to be by necessity of nature. Yet did they maintain that the World had limits of quantity, and quality. For they maintained that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible, as Aristotle by name. By your distinction following, of divers ways whereby being may be limited, you make no mention of limitation by having a beginning thereof; which yet hath been the chief, if not only limit, which hitherto you have mentioned.  
Again, why should you make but two ways, confounding the limits of quantity, with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kind. It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantity, with limits of quality, which yet are both accidental. But most unreasonable it seems to confound either of these with intensive perfection of every several kind. But how will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition? almighty God hath no cause of being; therefore he hath no limits of being. Now, I pray, apply this to the members of your distinction concerning the kind of limits of being. Is he without limits in number? why then belike he is numberless. Yet indeed he is but one and can be but one in nature, and in persons can be but three, & must needs be three. Is he without limits in quantitio, and so infinite therein? But in very truth he hath no quantity at all. Is he without limits in qualities, not material (for such are not incident to him) but spiritual, & so infinite therein▪ Are there no bounds of the degrees of his goodness: why but consider, in God there are no degrees, no qualities at all.  
As touching perfections created thereof indeed, we have several kinds, but none such are to be found in God. Only because God is able to produce them, therefore they are said to be eminently in God, though not formally. But the like you may say as well of any material attribute, as of spiritual. For God can produce all alike. Therefore all are eminently alike in God. Of things visible the most perfect, you say, are but perfect in some one kind. It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible; but this kind is to be understood of a kind created. But you may not say, that God is perfect in all such kinds, but rather in none of them. For that were to be perfect in imperfections. God's perfection transcends all created kinds, and he is the Author of them, producing them out of nothing. They that maintain the World to have been eternal, maintain it to have been so, by necessity of nature. And all such would peremtorily deny, that it was possible for the World not to have been; and therefore in this discourse of yours it would have becomed you rather to prove the contrary, then to suppose it. How the Heaven of Heavens should be accounted immortal I know not, seeing they are not capable of life. And seeing death properly is a dissolution of body and soul, immortality must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soul, which is not incident to Angels (much less to Heavens) which have neither bodies nor souls whereof to consist. Neither doth Seneca, in the place by you alleged, speak of Angels, in my judgement, but rather of the Species of things generable; particulars, though subject to corruption, being enabled for generation, and thereby for perpetuation of their kinds, and consequently for the maintenance of the World, and that for ever. It is well known that the Platonics, though they maintained the World to have a beginning, yet denied the matter whereof the World was made, to have had any beginning. Of the same opinion were the Stoics. Their common voice was, De nihilo nihil, in nihilu● nil posse reverti, & accordingly they might well conceive, that God might be hindered in his operation, by reason of the stubbornness and churlishness of the matter; & so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers, I conceive to be just. Yet by your leave, I do not think, that any creature, capable of immortality, in what sense soever appliable to Angels as well as unto men, can be made immortal by nature. Yet I doubt not, but God can make creatures in such sort immortal by nature, as that no second cause can make them cease to be. For it is apparent, that God hath many such, as namely the Angels and souls of men. Yet still their natures are annihilable, in respect of the power of God. Neither can I believe, that to be immortal in Senecaes' language, was to be without beginning. For I do not find, but that the Stoics together with Plato, conceived that the World had a beginning. But in this respect he calleth them eternal, (I should think) because the World, together with the kinds of things therein contained, subject to corruption and generation in particulars, should have no end, and that by the Providence of God. We believe that nothing is absolutely necessary, but God. But Aristotle believed the World also to be everlasting without beginning, & of absolute necessity. For that the World should be created originally out of nothing, all Philosophers held impossible, and that the matter should be everlasting, and of absolute necessity, whereof the World was to be made, that seemed impossible unto Aristotle, and that upon good reason. The creation therefore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument, and not avouched only by bare contestation. That which followeth, we Christians are apt enough to believe, but you take upon you to convict Philosophers of the truth of them by evident reason; this I say you undertake, but prove not. You say, that the most strong and perspicuous way of inferringe the existence of God, is by this, that all things are originally derived from him, and made by him. And indeed, let it be proved, that the World had a beginning of being, and it will be manifest thereby, that there is a God, to wit, the Maker of the World. But you have not yet proved against Philosophers that the creation of the World is to be acknowledged. Nay this kind of argument (which I acknowledge to be the most pregnant and illustrious) you put of till another time, and to another discourse of yours, and yet all that you have to say doth but harp upon this, though herein you do but fumble, and prove nothing, supposing belike, that feeding us with expectation of some performance of yours, this way hereafter, we should be the more willingly drawn to bear with the imperfection of your discourse here. Yet had it been far better for your credit in my judgement, to have wholly passed it over according to your project mentioned at the first, than thus slightly to dispatch it.  
5. But you have not yet dispatched it as it seems. Now you begin to dispute the creation of the World; but your phrase in expressing it, is very incongruous, as when you suppose Philosophers to maintain, that the root of incorruption in the heavens, can brook no limits of duration, but must be imagined without end or beginning. Now Philosophers maintained (and they only were the Peripatetics. For Aristotle ingenuously acknowledgethe in his books de Caelo, that all 
Arist. de caelo. lib. 1. cap. 11. conti. 102.  that went before him, supposed the heavens to have had a beginning) that the Heavens were without beginning and without end, not that the root of incorruption in the Heavens (as you speak) was without beginning and without end. For of any such root of their incorruption he disputethe not; and I verily think, that herein, affecting to phrasifie, you speak you know not what. Now this he maintained, in opposition unto those, who feigned the World to have had a beginning ex praejacente materia; which matter had no beginning. And Aristotle concurring withal that went before him in this, that nothing could be produced out of nothing, and opposing them in the point of matter praejacent, drew up his Tenet to this pitch, that the World had no beginning. As if he had disputed thus; If the World had a beginning, it must have its beginning either ex aeterna materia praejacente, or no. But not ex aeterna materia praejacente, as he laboured to prove, therefore if it had a beginning, it must be of nothing; Now all granted that ex nihilo nihil sit; whence it followed that it could have no beginning at all. And truly, I am of opinion, that his Tenet was more sound than his opposites; and that with better reason it may be maintained that the World had no beginning, then that the matter or Chaos rudis indigestaque moles, whereof the World was made, had no beginning. Now that Principle wherein they all agreed, nothing can be made of nothing, they thought to be evident of itself, and such as needed no proof.  
Yet Averro in his commentaries upon the books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, gives a reason of it, disputing thus. 
Lib. 12.  If the World were made, and that of nothing, than it was possible to be made before it was made; which we willingly grant. Now say he I demand, in what subject this possibility was? And withal telleth us that joannes Grammaticus made this answer, that it was in Agente, which Averro takes up in scorn, but confutes it not. Now Grammaticus his answer rightly understood is fair and full; not meaning that any possibility or power passive was in God; but that there was an active power in God so almighty as enabled him to make a World out of nothing, & consequently was foundation sufficient to denominate the World possible to be, before it was; not by any physical possibility, which always requires a subject really existent, to support it; but only Logical, which is nothing else but negatio repugnantia, which is appliable to non ens. For that which is not, may be denominated possible to be, in case there be an active power existent sufficient to produce it. But to proceed; against the opinion of Philosophers you dispute thus, If the Heavens can brook no limits of your duration, such as are beginning and end, why should it brook limits of extension? as it doth. For the heaven is supposed by them to be finite in extension. For answer whereunto I say the reason is manifest. For an infinite magnitude actual is impossible, and admits manifest contradiction as Aristotle hath disputed the point at large. But to be without a beginning of duration, they conceived to be nothing impossible. Nay rather to the contrary, to have a beginning out of nothing, all of them conceived that to be a thing utterly impossible. And albeit in other cases they held motion, magnitude, and time to hold exact proportion, yet those cases were nothing to this purpose.  
And whereas you say duration is a kind of extension; implyinge thereby, that extension is the Genus to magnitude and duration, as unto two species comprehended by it, I take this to be untrue. I judge rather, there is no univocal notion common to duration, and magnitude; though this be little material. But if you can show that it implyethe as great contradiction that the World should be everlasting, as that it should be infinite in magnitude, than you should speak home indeed to the purpose. And I profess I make no doubt but the demonstration of the one may be as evident, as of the other: but that is a task, which you have not hitherto performed. And whosoever undertakes it, is like to find opposites enough. For there want not Schoolmen, that 
Biel: in 2. sect. dist. 1. q. 3. a Scot there answereth. Gandavatia his arguments prooving the impossibility of the World to be from everlasting.  maintain the possibility of both, namely both of the everlastingness thereof in duration without beginning; and of the infinity thereof in extension. And one though no Schooleman, hath adventured to prove that the World is actually infinite, saying that otherwise, there were no effect suitable enough, to so infinite a cause and agent as God is:  
Yet I fear not any of these colours, but am persuaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibility of each may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertook to prove, then proved it. Yet you proceed, saying things caused are always limited. But you should have proved, that things of limited essence are always caused, and have a beginning of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neither is this proposition always true, as hath been showed in the example of the persons in the Trinity. And yet on this point, which is neither universally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your following discourse.  
You should prove, that whatsoever hath limits of extension, the same also hath beginning of duration: which yet I deny not to be a truth, and demonstrable, but of the demonstration hereof, your discourse hath failed hitherunto. When you argue thus, It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing; as for any thing that is, to take limits, or set form of being from nothing. You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it. For they that maintain the World had no beginning, do also maintain, that it took no beginning of the limits thereof: And as they do not say, the World took his beginning from nothing; so neither do they say, that the World took the beginning of his limits, or took his limits or form from nothing. Now you, by this form of your dispute, do instruct Atheists how to discourse against the creation of the World, thus; If God made the World out of nothing, than he put a new fashion upon nothing: But it is impossible that any new fashion should be put upon nothing; therefore it is impossible that God should make the World out of nothing. Now in this Syllogism the minor is most true. For not any thing can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion, as the form thereof. But the consequence of the major, is most untrue. For when we say that God made the World out of nothing, our meaning is not that nothing was the matter whereof the World was made, but only that it was the terminus a quo, not materia ex qua. As much as to say God made the World, whereas nothing went before, neither had God any matter whereon to work when he made the World. And Philosophers affirming that the World had no beginning, do therewithal deny that the World took either being or limits from any thing. You turn their negative into an affirmative, so to corrupt their opinion, in stead of confuting it. They thought, it needed not any thing to give it being or bounds of being, lest they should be driven to affirm that something could be made out of nothing: whereas they had rather maintain; that the world ever had existence by necessity of nature. Neither did they maintain, that the world took limits or being from itself any more than from any other, which you devise and impute unto them, in stead of convictinge their Tenet of error, by force of argument, in the way of natural reason which you undertake. And therefore having so weakly disproved the everlastingness of things limited, you do thereby betray the weakness of your proof of God's illimited condition from the everlastingness thereof.  
6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived, in the point of creation, you proceed magnificently to suppose, that the conceit of being without limits is essentially included in the conceit of being without cause precedent, which if it were true, then were it a truth per se notae, and consequently the creation of the world evident of itself even to common reason, seeing it is supposed to have limits. And again your discourse is so fashioned, as if Philosophers maintained that the world took beginning of itself, which is untrue and indeed a thing evidently impossible, namely that any thing should take beginning of itself. And indeed if a thing could give being to itself, it might give what it lusted to itself, if so be it had a lust, which the Elements and Heavens have not: Yet those Aristotle maintained to have been from everlasting, not that they gave beginning to themselves, but that they took no beginning from any thing. The reason whereof was, because they could not conceive, how any thing could be made out of nothing, a thing contrary to all natural experience: upon which kind of ground yourself but erst builded your discourse, when you said, things caused, as induction manifestethe; are always limited and moulded in their proper causes. Yet notwithstanding upon this fiction, of a thing able to give being to itself, you dilate at large.  
I grant, that upon this fiction nothing could restrain it from taking all bodily perfection possible to itself, in case it had power to give being to itself. But never any Philosopher maintained, that it had power to give being to it self. For they that maintained a Chaos preceding the production of the world, maintained that out of this Chaos, God produced all things, and not that the Chaos or aught else gave being to itself. And Aristotle that denied such an eternal Chaos, & maintained the world had no beginning, was far from maintaining that the world gave being to itself. Secondly I answer, that though it should thus receive all bodily perfection possible, yet this should not be infinite, and without limits as you would have your Reader to suspect without proof, and indeed unless this be imagined, 'tis nothing no the purpose. The reason why in this case, it should not be infinite, is this; because all bodily perfection possible is but finite, as they conceived, and therein conceived nothing amiss. So of quantity or quality, the impossibility of either to be without measure in bodies, whose perfection is only finite, is a sufficient hindrance from taking either quantity or quality without measure. In like sort, let Vacuity (as you speak) be left free to give itself full and perfect act; let it take all possible perfection, yet since all possible perfection of bodies, is supposed to be only finite, it will not follow that the perfection taken shall be without limits: which yet you must prove, otherwise your discourse is of no force to prove, that whatsoever hath n● cause of bring distinct from itself, is without limits. although the Philosophers that maintained the world or matter thereof preexistent to be without beginning, driven herunto, because they conceived not how it was possible, that any thing should be made out of nothing; yet did they never maintain that the one or the other gave being to itself. Yet this fiction you pin upon their sleeve, to supply the weakness of your discourse. Much less could it enter into any sober man's conceit, that they gave power to a Vacuity, to give itself full and perfect act, seeing Vacuity is stark nothing; which the Chaos was not, but a material thing, though merely passive and nothing active. But as for vacuity that is neither active, nor passive, as being stark nothing. And yet to this you add a further solecism in this your fiction; as when you suppose this vacuity to have power to assume either bodily substances or spiritual; which the Chaos had not, no not so much as in capacity, being wholly material, whereas spiritual substances are immaterial. And yet, I confess as you give unto that which is nothing power to assume which it list, either bodily or spiritual substances; it may well be said that nothing hath power indifferently to assume either or both of them. This I propose by way of an universal negative, not by way of a particular affirmative as you do, making the term nothing, to be the subject in your propositions, and not an universal sign only. Yet all thus assumed (as you speak) should be but finite; because all possible perfection besides the nature of God itself, is but finite. Therefore I say it should be but finite, if any thing at all; which caution I do put in, because upon due account, it will be found, that the sum of all this, in a good sense, will prove to be no more, then just nothing. For suppose, nothing doth assume bodily substances; again suppose, nothing doth assume spiritual substances; put this together, and add nothing to nothing, and see whether the total will prove to be any jot more, then just nothing. You proceed further, and tell us that while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginning, no reason imaginable could confine it, to any set place of residence or extension, why rather in the centre, than circumference, or either rather then both. In this you seem to have reference to that which immediately went before, and that was a vacuity. And in very truth upon this supposition, where now the centre is, nothing was; where now the circumference is, nothing was; and in all the bodies between, nothing was. For you suppose a vacuity of all, and nothing to be, where now there is some thing. Yet this nothing by your leave, must be confined in reference to the places, where bodies were before or after. And the places where bodies were before, being the same, by your supposition, with the places which now are, must needs be finite. For undoubtedly, the space of this whole world, between the centre and circumference, yea & including both, is but finite. But foortwith you relapse to the former iniquity of your supposition; and in steed of having a being without beginning, which was indeed the opinion of some great Philosophers, concerning the world, or concerning preexistent matter, whereof the world was made, driven herunto upon supposition, (as of a thing impossible) that nothing could be made out of nothing; wherein all agreed, though otherwise of different opinions, nor different only but contrariant also: I say, from this true state of their opinion, you relapse, to the world's taking of beginning to itself; which is rather to maintain that it had a beginning (though of itself) then that it had none at all; yet this alone was affirmed by them, and not the other. Of which other, namely of taking beginning to itself, imagination only (you say) is the true cause. And therein you say true, but this cause is to be understood of your imagination, not theirs: For they imagined no such taking of beginning to itself, either in the world itself, or in the preexistent matter thereof. Yet upon this you found a new imagination, of extending (forsooth) its existence both ways, and drawing a circular duration to the instant, where it begins; to wit where it begins in your imagination not in theirs; for they imagined no such thing. And indeed, he that imaginethe white to be black, I see no reason why he may not proceed further and imagine black to be white, and add unto this a third, to wit, that white is neither white nor black, and black is neither black nor white. Of circular motions I have read; but of circular durations I have neither read nor heard till now; well, let us understand it of duration in circular motions. But if you please, imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbs, and in course of time to return at length to the beginning of it. For what else to make of the instant where it begins, I know not. It seems by this discourse, that you have seen the gig, and if your brains have not run round, I assure you mine have all most in following you. At length you come to a more sober supposition and expression; as when you relate their opinion thus, that the world hath a true present being without any cause precedent. This I confess is suitable to their opinion whom you impugn; who were driven herunto (as I said) because they could not comprehend, how any thing could be made of nothing. But when you add, without a superior guide to appoint it a set course, you something swerve from the right. All maintained the world could not be made out of nothing. But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it. The Platonics and Stoics acknowledged a divine understanding to have made the world, but out of a prejacent matter, which they conceived to be eternal, and to acknowledge no maker. Now as they acknowledged a maker, so they acknowledged a Governor, though sometimes hindered in his course, by the stubbornness of the refractory matter, which acknowledged no maker. Aristotle maintains also a first mover, therefore he acknowledged a guide also. But whereas he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent (as I conceive) it was in effect as much, as if he had acknowledged, no Governor. But all agreed that the duration either of the world, or of the prejacent matter was everlasting for the time past, and that the world should be everlasting for the time to come. To this Plato yielded. And so contained all duration imaginable both ways; namely both for the time past, and for the time to come; but with this difference, that for the time past it was actually infinite; only the duration for the time to come not actual, but in such sort infinite, as it should never have an end. Now this consideration openeth a fair way to a discovery of the impossibility of this conceit of theirs concerning the eternity of the world, or the eternity of time, and that by very evident reason; (though I deny not but men have and may set their wits on work in quashinge the evidence thereof; in their zeal I think to defend the honour of Aristotle.) For if the world were everlasting? Paulus Venetus, though zealous to defend the possibility hereof, yet acknowledgethe it would follow, that the part is equal to the whole, nay greater than the whole; and that in so evident a manner, that he hath no other way to answer it, then by professing that this maxim, Totum est majus sua parte, is of force only in materia finita, not in materia infinita; which in effect is as much as to say; The world may be everlasting I will maintain it, but I forbid any man to dispute against it. For I purpose to deny all maxims that are made use of, in disputing against it; and will be bold to say that they all have force only in materia finita, and not in materia infinita.  
And because seeing I have excepted against weak courses of argumentation, in defence of the creation; it may be expected I should substitute stronger arguments in the place of them. I will not spare to address myself herunto so far as out of the old store of my Philosophy I have in readiness. And yet if things be considered aright, there is no necessity of any such course. For certainly we have no need of it for the fortification of our faith, that being built only upon the word of God; and according to that old saying: Fides non 
Grego. in Euangel. hom. 26.  habet meritum quoties humana ratio praebet experimentum. And as for Atheists, may we not justly say of them, as Abraham say of the rich Gluttous brethren. If they believe not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe thoughen a man 
Luc. 16. 31.  should rise from the dead. Especially considering that the Scriptures suppose (in my judgement) the creation to be acknowledged by general instinct, actualed by consideration of the course of the world; as where it is said, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handy 
Psal. 19 1. 2. 3.  work, Day unto day uttereth the same, and night unto night teacheth knowledge. There is no speech or language, where their voice is not heard. And as is the voice of the Prophets in the old Testament, such is the voice of the Apostles in the new. The invisible things of God, that is his eternal power and Godhead, 
Rom. 1. 20.  is seen from the creation of the World, being considered in his works, so that they are without excuse. And Paul preaching before the Athenians, in an University much addicted to Aristotle's Philosophy, yet is bold to suppose this, as a thing without his preaching received amongst them, God that made 
Act. 17. 24. 25. 26.  the World, and all things that are therein, seeing that he is Lord of Heaven and Earth, dwelleth not in Temples made with hands. Neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though be needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life and breathe & all things. And hath made of one blood all mankind, to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hath assigned the seasons, which were ordained before, by the bounds of their habitation. And the being of the World from everlasting, though by creation, doth apparently limit the power of God thus far, that he could not then have made it sooner. And if God could make the creature like unto himself in everlastingness, why not in any thing else, seeing the Apostle, speaking of the Godhead as evidenced by his works, noteth it to consist in his eternal power. But come we to that manner of demonstration which is expected, leaving such arguments as Mornay prosecutethe, 
Rom. 1. 20.  as namely the novel invention of all Arts and Sciences, as appears by History, and the like, evidencinge that the World had a beginning: It is well known that the most general opinion is (even of Aristotle himself) that an infinite magnitude or a number actually infinite, is a thing utterly impossible as that which implyethe manifest contradiction. Now let those arguments be well observed, and considered, whether the most pregnant amongst them, may not with as great evidence be accommodated against the everlastingness of the World, to prove it to be a thing impossible. As for example. One of the most forcible arguments that I have found to prove the impossibility of an infinite magnitude is this. If a magnitude were actually infinite, than it should consist of an infinite number of yards or else; for if it consisted but of a finite number of them, the whole could be but finite. Now it is manifest that such an infinite magnitude can consist but of an infinite number of inches. And herehence it followeth, that the number of inches, and the number of yards or else in such a magnitude are equal; & herehence it followeth that an inch in this case should be equal to a yard or ●ll; which is impossible, and consequently as impossible it is that there should be any magnitude infinite. In like sort, if the World were everlasting, than the days passed should be infinite, & not so only but the years passed should be infinite; and so the number of days and number of years past, should be equal, and consequently a day should be equal to a year; For if twenty days were equal to twenty years, then certainly one day should be equal to one year. For fi ab aequalibus aequalia demas quae remanent erunt aequalia. Now it is impossible that a day should be equal to a year, & consequently it is impossible that the World should be everlasting without beginning. Perhaps some may say that the same reason might prove as well that it is a thing impossible the World should be without end. But this is untrue, though at first sight men are apt to be deceived with a show of parity, where indeade there is no parity. For though we shall continue as the Angels already do without end, yet herehence it shall never come to pass, that it can be verified of such that they have continued an infinite space of time; but still the space is finite, though with addition of continuance longer & longer in infinitum. But if the World were without beginning, than an infinite space of time were actually passed already, which implieth manifest contradiction as before hath been showed. Now consider the answer to the former argument, & whether it be of any force. The only: course to weaken it is to maintain, that datur infinitum, infinito insinitius. One infinite may be greater than another, to wit an infinite number of years past, greater than an infinite number of days past. This at first sight seems to be a mad kind of answer. For hence it followeth that one infinite can not be admitted, but that therewithal you must admit an numberless number of infinites. As for example; If there were passed an infinite number of years, then seeing every year contains 365. days, you must acknowledge that this infinite space of years consists of 365. parts, each whereof is infinite. And whereas if the World were eternal, & the space of time past, infinite, than the millions of years past were infinite also; whence we infer that the space of millions of years past being infinite consists of ten hundred thousand parts, each whereof is infinite, and each infinite part consists of 365. parts, each whereof is infinite also. And this is the very argument that Aristotle useth in his Metaphysics to prove that there cannot be an infinite magnitude; for than it should consist ex infinitis, now indeed this they do grant that strain their wits to maintain the possibility of infinity in magnitude as namely Hurtando de Mendosa in his disputations; 
A Summatis ad Metaphysicam tract. de infinito.  as being necessarily driven herunto. And the like course they must needs take that maintain the possibility of infinity in time past. But as for the possibility of it in time to come, that is altogether of another nature, as before I have showed. Now I will clearly overthrow this answer and prove evidently that an infinite number of years is not greater than an infinite number of days; and I prove it thus. If upon the position of an infinite number of days, there follweth hoc ipso, the position of an infinite number of years, than an infinite number of years is not greater than an infinite number of days. All experience justifieth this. For if upon the position of a quart of measure, followeth the position of two pints, than it is manifest that two pints is not greater than a quart, and so give instance in what you will, it never fails. Now to the major proposed I add my minor thus; But upon the position of an infinite number of days, hoc ipso there followeth the position of an infinite number of years; And therefore an infinite number of years is not greater than an infinite number of days. The minor I prove thus; Upon the position of an infinite number of days there shall follow a position of a number of years not finite, therefore infinite. Not finite; For if the number of years arising from the presupposed number of days were but finite, than the days whereof this number of years consists should be but finite; For the days should be but 365. times more than the years. And a finite number multiplied by a finite number, can bring forth but a finite number. But we have supposed, & the Tenet touching the possibility of the World's everlastingness doth suppose the days past, to be possibly infinite. Which yet by this one argument we have demonstrated to be impossible. Consider one argument more. Paulus Venetus maintains it is a thing possible that the time passed of the World should be infinite; yet to exercise his wit, he disputes against it in this manner in effect. If the time past were infinite, as we all confess, the time to come may be infinite, than the part shall be greater than the whole, as for example, the time from yesterday upwards shall be greater than the time from this day upwards; which he proveth thus. The time from yesterday upwards, is equal to the time from yesterday downwards. (This is supposed for as much as all confess it to be possible that time should be without end.) But the time from yesterday downwards is greater than the time from this day upwards; therefore the time from yesterday upwards, is greater than the time from this day upwards. The minor he proovethe thus. The time from yesterday downwards, is greater than the time from this day downwards. But the time from this day upwards is equal to the time from this day downwards; therefore the time from yesterday downwards is greater than the time from this day upwards; & consequently the time from yesterday upwards (being equal to the time from yesterday downward) is greater than the time from this day upwardes; which is as much as to say, that the part is greater than the whole. These inferences depend upon this maxim most evident, that which is equal to a greater, is also greater. Now mark how Paulus Venetus answereth this argument, which is of his own devisinge; & his answer is this; This maxim the whole is greater than his part, hath place only in matter finite, not in matter infinite. A most absurd answer; for it is in effect to forbid all disputation against him. For we cannot dispute without grounds to insist upon. And no more evident grounds can be devised, than such as contain the rules of contradiction. Yet I will make it manifest, that this maxim must have place in all matter, whether finite of infinite. To maintain that the whole is not greater than the part in some case is to maintain that both parts of contradiction are true in some case. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true in any case; neither in matter finite nor in matter infinite; Therefore in no case can it be truly maintained that the whole is not greater than the part. The minor I prove thus; there cannot be greater difference between matter sinite and matter infinite, then between ens & non ens. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true either about ens or non ens; (like as one part must be true de omni ente & non ente); therefore neither can they be true in any matter whether finite or infinite. Again if this which he say were granted, then there could be no disputation as touching the nature of God, seeing he is infinite. And if we take away the rules of contradiction, we take away all disputation. Now I proceed in scanning that which followeth in your discourse.  
7. I have hitherto followed you in the course of your own suppositions, and showed how far short you fall of provinge what you intended, although your fictions have been wondrous wild. We commonly say, Uno data absurdo, mille sequuntur, we do not say infinite. Yet I see no reason to the contrary, but that from these thousand absurdities, others may follow, and that in infinitum. Though fewer follow it suffizethe us, if your collections be of the number of them. By the way, let me tell you, your marginal quotation stands in no congruity with the text. Then you compare impossibilities, and tell us, that for a mere logical possibility, to take beginning of actual being from itself is as impossible, as for that which is thus supposed to take beginning, to be restrained to any determinate kind or part of being; Implyinge that the opinion of Philosophers, which you oppose did maintain, that a mere Logical possibility did take beginning of being from itself; whereas indeed there is no such matter. Never any Philosopher was found to dote in such manner as you fashion the nobler sort of them. This is a mere fiction of your own brain. For first whether they maintained the World to take beginning of itself, as you seem to fancy they did, or the praejacent matter, whereof it was made to take beginning of itself; yet hereby they did not maintain that a mere Logical possibility, did take beginning of actual being unto itself. For they were never found to maintain that the World was a mere Logical possibility, or that the matter praejacent whereof it was made, was a mere Logical possibility. Secondly they never avouched, that either the World, or matter praejacent whereof it was made, did take beginning of being to itself, as you impute unto them, without all modesty, only endeavouring to supply the weakness of your argument, and give some colour of strength to your discourse, by the corruption of other men's opinion. But Aristotle's opinion was, that the World was without beginning; and the former Philosopher's opinion was, that the matter whereof the World was made, was without beginning: and the reason of both was this, because they conceived not how it was possible, that any thing could be made out of nothing. So that your argument rightly accommodated should run thus, It is as impossible that the World was without beginning, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginning should have any limits of being, and be finite. Now this they would maintain to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of itself. And you have hitherto afforded no evidence at all to justifye it. And again there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of being, or no beginning of being, yet can it not be infinite, because that implyethe manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have been found to justify, that a body might have been everlasting, by the power of God, and consequently without beginning. And again, if the World hath a beginning (as we believe it hath) it must necessarily follow, that some thing should be made out of nothing, which not only Philosophers conceived to be impossible, but the H. Ghost also professethe it to be a truth so far overreachinge the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faith, saying, By faith we believe that the World was made. What I think of your models I have already signified. 
Hebr 11. 〈◊〉.  In fine you tell us, whereto they tend, which you express in pomp, saying, They are destinated to the errection of an everlasting aedisice. And that is a certain proposition concerning the nature of God, namely, that God is such a one, as he should have been, if he had had beginning of himself. Which assertion of yours how well it becometh the honour of God, let every sober Reader judge. For you affirm that God is of such a nature, as should be existent, upon supposition of a thing impossible; namely, The taking of beginning of being from one's self. By the way I observe, that though you maintain God to have no beginning of being, yet you deny him to take beginning of himself; and thereby distinguish between such things upon the confusion whereof alone, the plausibilite of your former discourse did wholly depend. For whereas Aristotle maintained that the World was without beginning; and the ancient Philosophers before him were of opinion, that the matter praejacent, whereof the World was made, was without beginning, you shaped their opinions in such sort, as if they had affirmed, that the World took beginning of itself, or the praejacent matter whereof the World was made, took beginning of itself, which indeed is most absurd; yet not their opinion but your fiction; the less was your ingenuity in pinninge such a conceit upon them: though I confess, it served your turn well, this corruption of their opinion wrought by you, being your best argument to strengthen your discourse. By the way I observe, you make God to be the sole Maker of all things, yet I never found you to acknowledge God to be, the sole Author, or so much as Author of faith and repentance.   

CHAP. III.  
Of Infinity of Being, or of absolute Infinity and the right definition of it by Ancient Philosophers.  
BEFORE you come to your Philosophical Divinity, you are pleased to acquaint us with some Logical formalities. You dispute that there is no medium between nihil & aliquid, praesupposinge that some Answerers in the Schools, though few, would make choice to affirm a medium between these. You say to find a medium betwixt them by abnegation, is as hard as to assign a space or vacancy between a line and a point that terminates it. And this is a very hard matter I confess, even as hard (to requite you in your own Rhetoric) as to find a space between a part of a line and the point that joins it to the other part. To this you resolately add, that what name soever we propose, unless it have some degree or portion of entity answering to it, we may justly say, It is just nothing. But this to my understanding is untrue. For to the name of God no degree or portion of entity is answering, but rather entity, without degree or portion. It may be you understand this part of your discourse as well as the former, of the names of entities create in distinct on from God the entity increate. For forthwith you confess, that these reasons notwithstanding though they firmly hold in secular disputes of predicamental or numerable entities, yet the infinite essence comes not within this division. So then God, is neither aliquid, nor nihil. And therefore it is not so hard to find a mean by abnegation between these, as to assign a space between a line and a point that terminates it; unless you will say, that to acknowledge a God is as hard, as to acknowledge such a space or vacancy. As than God is not nothing, so he is too excellent, you say, to be comprehended under the name of some thing. And indeed the word Aliquid signifieth a part of quiddity, or entity, which cannot be affirmed of God, neither in respect of created quiddity; For in that respect, he is verily nihil, and not at all aliquid creatum; Nor in respect of quiddity increate; for that hath no parts; and if it had, God should be rather all that quiddity, than a part of it. And thus we may say that aliquid and nihil are not contradictories: if they were, it could not be avoided, but God himself must admit the denomination of one of them. But if it be farther objected, that God is aliquid in respect of quiddity or entity, neither create nor increate in special, but considered in common to them both. So also it may be denied that God is aliquid, or a part of such entity or quiddity, seeing no entity, is common to create and increate entities. For entity is no univocal Genus, fit to comprehend God & his creatures; though some subtle inventions have been on foot brought in by some to justify that the word ens doth univocally comprehend God and his creatures. But you seem not to approve of such speculations. For as much as you deny him to be a numerable part of entity; and if he were a species of ens, he might well be numerable with the other species thereof. Therefore I think it needless for me to undertake the disproovinge of Scotus his reasons, though curious ones, whereby he proves the univocation of the word ens in respect of God and his creatures. It should rather have been your task, who undertake a discourse of this nature, which for my part, I had never meddled withal, had it not been for some pieces of corrupt Divinity, which you patch on in some places to this your Philosophy. Yet by the way we are to consider, that although the word aliquid be an unfit denomination of God, yet ens is not, which though it be not univocally attributed unto the Creator and the creature, yet usually it is analogically. God may well be said to be an ens independent, and upon whom all other entia do depend. You farther proceed to give a reason why the Latin word ens, is not fit to denominate God, so to make the Divine nature a mean by abnegation, not only between something, and nothing, but all so between ens and non ens. For the word ens you say, out of Mirandula, hath the form of a concrete. And every concrete hath his name from that nature whereof it participates; as hot is that, which participates of heat; white is such a nature as participates of whiteness. But God cannot be said to participate of essence. In this I find some defect. First, because you do not show, how ens, which you call a concrete is divided, (as concretes are) into a part material participating, and a part formal participated. In a word, you do not once offer to resolve ens into the parts of its signification. Secondly, there is little congruity between ens that which hath being, & hot or white, that which hath heat and whiteness. For that which hath whiteness in it, or heat, is a substance, or subject really existent, wherein the quality of heat or whiteness is found. But the word ens admittethe no division comparable, or congruous herunto. For you cannot with sobriety say, that ens signifieth a nature really existent, wherein essence is found distinct from the nature signified, or coming over and above unto it, as heat doth over and above to the constitution of the subject. And therefore it followeth not, that because hot doth signify a subject participating of heat, therefore ens also signifieth a subject participating of essence. A great deal of difference there is between concretes of accidental denomination, and concretes of essential denomination. As Homo & Animal, which may be accounted concretes, in respect of such abstract notions, as are conceived under the terms of Humanitas and Animalitas. The specifical essence being constituted by the abstract notion, and not participating of it, as bodies participate of heat. The truth is, all compounds do properly admit a concrete denomination, as in whom the suppositum (as Homo and Animal, differethe from the nature denominatinge it, as Humanitas & Animalitas. But in things not compound it is not so, lest of all in God. For though Homo be not Humanitas, yet Deus est ipsa Deitas. Aquin. 1 q. 3. art. 3. De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; & ideo de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita. Et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus ejus simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur Deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem, quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. That God is one, by whom all things are, is true; but this description is little congruous to the nature of God; in as much, as it could have no place before the creation, or in case the World had never been created. Yet God's nature is still the same. I cannot admit that things created participate of Gods being. They have their being from God, I grant; but I cannot admit their being to be any part of Gods being, or Gods being to have parts. Yet if all things are from him, how can you avoid, but that God himself shall be from himself. Unless the Apostle help you in this discoursing, In that he hath put all things under him, it is manifest that he is excepted who did put 
1. Cor. 1●.  all things under him. But be it so that all other things are from him; & then also accidents as well as substances are from him, and can they participate of Gods being? Of accidental being, I grant they do participate and that from God, but not of Gods being. If so; how much more must faith and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God; which I much fear, you will be found to deny, if not at first hand, yet at least in a second place, by maintaining it in such a manner to be the work of God, as upon condition of man's will; which in my judgement is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them. The name of God I am, openeth a fair way to the expounding of a mystery, which you meddle not with, contenting yourself with ventinge of phrases, in setting forth the nature of God. The existence of all creatures may be accounted as a mere accident to their essence; for as much as all of them have being after not being; and from being either do or may return again to not being. It is not so with God, who is everlasting and that formally by necessity of nature. So that whereas the essence of every creature abstract from existence, includes a possibility formally indifferent to being or not being, God's essence includes a necessity of being, an impossibility of not being. Your lines of amplification are either very wild and without sense, or my wits are too shallow to comprehend them, the rest I cannot construe, the close I can, when you say the essence of God is the bond of all things that can be combined or linked together. I can construe these words, but not comprehend their meaning. The combination of things together, you understand, it seems in affirmations & negations. Now that God's essence should be the copula, whereby the subject and predicate in all propositions, are linked together, and that whether true or false; Holy or profane, may well pass, I think, for the tenth wonder of the world. God only is by nature, all other things by the will of God. I am that I am say the the Apostle, but by the grace of God. God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence, we are in such sort, as that our existence is not our essence. For sometimes we were not; and if it pleased God, we might cease to be. But yet we live and move, and have our being, & all in him. I cannot admit that Angels participate of God's essence, or that God communicates his essence to any, but to his Son. They, as all other things, have their essence from God, but not his; Yet are they according to the Image of God. Other creatures may have vestigia footestes of God. In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God; I say the Image of God, but not the essence of God.  
2. Whether Angels are creatures, and consequently of a finite nature, no Christian makes question. But as touching their nature, understanding, place, and motion attributed unto them, they are such secrets and mysteries unto me, that I have no heart to meddle with them. The Scriptures, tell us, that 
Marc. 5. 9  a Legion of devils were in one man; and of the good, that 
Mat. 18. 10.  the Angels of little children do always behold the face of God their Father. But touching the nature of God, to say that his indivisible unity, comprehendeth all multiplicity is an ambiguous speech; both because multiplicity is found in evil as well as in good; and the phrase of includinge, to my thinking, inclines to signify, comprehension formal rather then virtual. As for Senecaes' sentence, which you so much magnify, as if we could not say more of him in fewer words, I judge to be an unwoorthy speech to denote the nature of God, as indeed more false than true, or rather false throughout, and void of all truth. And why should we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man, and from a Stoic, as Seneca was. So Lucan, Deus est quodcunque vides, quocunque movers, out of the mouth of Cato Vticensis, a man of Stoical profession, as Seneca was. And such sayings as these, Deus est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides, savour hotly of an Atheifticall opinion, of such, as being ignorant of the nature of the true God, deified the nature. And commonly their several Gods denoted only several parts of the World, as Vesta the Earth, jupiter the air, Baal or Bel, and as some say, Hercules, Tyrius the Sun. Yet several Nations, like enough had their several opinions, but all concurring in this, namely in adoring the creature, and specially all the host of heaven, in steed of the Creator. And then withal they had an universal Deity, whom they called Pan, representing the whole Universe. And according to Platonical opinion, God was accounted Anima Mundi. And thus with them, God was Totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides. Yet I may well grant, that more could not be said in fewer words, but this is in the way of falsehood, and not in the way of truth. The best construction, that can be made of it, is to say that God is the Author of all that we see, and of all that we do not see. Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoics, of whose profession Seneca was. For though he did believe the World was made, as Aristotle professethe in his books de Caelo, it was the opinion of all that went before him: Yet did he not believe, that it was made out of nothing, but that 
Lib. 1. cont. 102.  the matter whereof the World was made, was eternal. Therefore they did not believe, that God was the Author of all, both of that we see, and of that we do not see. Yourself confess, they conceived the matter to have been coeternal with him, and not so only, but able also to overmatch the benignity of his active power by its passive untowardlines. Again I do not find, that any of them maintained, that immaterial substances were made by God; for than they should all be made out of nothing. For Angels consist not of material extensions. And it was their general voice that nothing could be made out of nothing.  
3. The analogy you speak of, is without all proportion. For the picture of a man, though it be no true man, yet it may be a true picture; and whether a true picture or no, yet undoubtedly it hath a true being, though imperfect, in comparison to the being of a man. And therefore herehence to conclude, that no creature truly is, is without all proportion: Man indeed is but the Image of God, as some things are the Images of men: Whence it followeth; as the Images of men are not men, so man the Image of God is not God. But to infer that therefore man is not in truth, or hath no true being, hath no ground, no foundation. If the being of a creature is but the shadow of true being, than humanity (which is the being of a man) is but a shadow of true humanity, & brutality, which is the being of a beast, is but the shadow of true brutality. And is it proper think you to say, that the truth of all these are found in God, to wit true humanity etc. David and Solomon were types of Christ; but I never read, nor heard, that the creatures are types of the Creator. Effects they are, and the works of God; and as the cause doth shine in the effect, so God's eternal power & 
Rom. 1. 20.  Godhead are made manifest by his works. Yet the types of Christ, were not types according to their essence, but according to their course of life and actions. And yet the very actions, whereby they represented Christ, were true actions in themselves separate from typical signification; though the actions of Christ or office of Christ, were of far greater dignity and price than were the actions of men which represented him. Before the World was made, this proposition was true, God alone is, and he could again make it true if it pleased him, by turning all things into nothing, from whence they came. But now other things also are. Otherwise there could be no place, either for the name of creatures, or for the representation of God in them. And how can that be said not to be, or not truly to be which as you say, participates of Gods being? It is true, God alone is in such sort, as whose essence and existence are all one. For as much as possibility in him is mere necessity, not so in any creature; as who all were not, before they were, and again may return to nothing, if so it please him that made them, to dispose of them. What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speak of, and how well it accords with this, I know not. As touching the nature of God, I know no such discourses superior, if equal to the discourse of Aristotle 
Lib. 12. c. 3. cont. 39  in a certain chapter of his Metaphysics. Your text, I am God and there is none beside, is fair short of congruity with your present discourse. For will it follow that because there is no God, besides him; therefore there is nothing that hath any true being besides him?  
4. It is incredible that the Stoics or any other, held nothing worthy the name of essence, which was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any faculty of wit. But what think you? is God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? 
Cap. 1. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉.  Have you forgotten the diversity of errors, which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin, the last whereof was, to conceive that God could beget himself? Yet if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall be the property of God, as yourself confess by Plotins' Philosophy (you might as well have said by the Philosophy of Heathens that denied creation out of nothing) there shall be many Gods, even as many as there be immaterial substances, which they called minds or Intelligences from their narure; but from their office we call Angels. But this error, you say, was easy to be checked, If the favourers of it had been put in mind, that these their demi Gods, by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have been acknowledged infinite in being. So that had you lived in their days, you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle also & all others from this point of heathenism. For necessary consequences all must yield unto, especially if the consequence be perspicuous also, as you seem to suppose, by the little or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument. For oportet, ut lancem ponderibus, ita animum veris & perspicuis cedere. And seeing Intelligences, if made, must needs be made out of nothing, which I am persuaded you will not deny, hence it followeth, that you could evidently convict all those Philosophers of error in denying the Creation. Yet shall not you by this your confidence any way hinder us, from giving God thanks, for bringing us acquainted with his word, and giving power unto it by his Spirit, to make us by faith to believe that the world was made, and that the things 
Hebr. 11. 3.  that be, were not made of things that do appear. But of this your confidentiary consequence we have discoursed enough in the former chapter. Touching the comparison between Plato, & Aristotle; or between Platonical and aristotelical Christian, doth any aristotelical Christian deny, that immaterial substances have their dependence on God? If any man by Aristotle's discourse, hath been withdrawn from acknowledging this truth, he ceasethe to be a Christian, and becomes an Atheist. The meanest Christian by light of grace knows more than Aristotle by light of nature concerning God. So might Plato, if by tradition he received something derived from the Word of God, and believed, which Aristotle either received or believed not. Compare their achievements (if you please) by light of nature, either concerning the nature of God, or the knowledge of the World & the parts thereof: that is consider what each affirmed, & what reason for his assertion each delivered, and thence consider whose ability deserves to be preferred. Plato with the rest maintained the World to have a beginning, but the matter, whereof it was made, to be eternal. Aristotle maintained the World to be everlasting. Zabarell thinks he had better reason for this opinion of his, than Plato, and the rest had for that opinion of theirs. I am of Zabarells judgement in this. The eternity of the matter is as absurd to us Christians, and as contradictious to the truth of God, as the eternity of the World. But supposing the eternity of the matter, and denying the eternity of the World, this brings forth some proper absurdities over and above the former. The continuance of the World for everlasting is maintained by Plato as well as by Aristotle, herein cried down by others, in that maintaining it to have a beginning, yet denies that it shall have an end. Plato maintained you say, the creating of immaterial substances, Aristotle denied it: This was suitable with the opinion of Aristotle, who denied the possibility of creation: that not suitable with the opinion of Plato. For if the World could not be made out of nothing, which Plato affirmed as well as the rest, why should he think that Angels could be made out of nothing. For if the more excellent nature could be produced out of nothing, why could not the lesser nature, such as matter is by the same power, be brought out of nothing? Again you say, Plato denied things sensible truly to be: Aristotle, we doubt not, professed the contrary, which of these opinions, I pray, is most agreeable unto reason? Is not the latter, and that both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace? Is it not true of us all, that in God we live and move & have our being? And if our 
Act. 17. 2●.  life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our being also a true being? especially, if as you say, all things that are, do participate of Gods being. But let us come to Senecaes' interpretation hereof; that is they put on a countenance of being for a time, being incapable of the stability, and solidity of true being. Mark, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. For either the being of sensible things is a true being or no. You say a true being, then herein you shall contradict both, Plato and yourself also: If not a true being, then seeing it is said that in this they continue not, it followeth that they want not so much continuance of true being, as continuance of such a being, as is no true being. Nay the Gloss corrupts the text, as I prove thus. They that want continuance or stability of true being, fail not in the want of true being, but only in want of continuance of true being: so that her by it must be confessed, they have true being, though they have little or no continuance therein. Again it doth not follow, that because they want continuance, therefore they are uncapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earth for ever if it please him? Yet these are sensible things. Again what meant either the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible things have no stability of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earth were to continue for ever, as well as immaterial substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Chartar of their Maker. And of this we read from you, of the other we read not. I willingly confess, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by the Father unto the Son; and therefore I have already misliked, that you should maintain, that the Creatures do participate of Gods being.  
5. That Principle Omnia unum sunt, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And though Simplicius doth not double with you (for why should you suspect that, especially seeing any man may err and misreport another's opinion without doubling); but though he erred not, and Parmenides indeed acknowledged distinction (and no other liklihood but he did), yet this is far from justifyinge that mystical interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaning: although you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to wit that Multitude of things visible is but the multiplied shadow of invisible independent unity. He spoke Poetically, you Figuratively; which kind of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, either you mistake, or I; who rather think that saying to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all things are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signify respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter whereof every thiing consists, is of the essence thereof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other things, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other things besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter itself, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternal, as God himself. Nay nor all other things, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spite of the Agent, being overruled with the untoward lines of the matter, as yourself but a little before professed to be the opinion of the Stoics. In God's essence is only his own being formally, ours virtually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily also, but that, I confess, is something mysterious unto me, save that I conceive, it respecteth his understanding, like as to be in him virtually, respectethe his power. And I doubt not, but that the essence of God doth represent unto him, all nature's possible. But to say that this being of the creature in God, cannot be with safety committed to the creatures own charge and custody, is a very wild phrase, and as much as if you should say, God's infinite wisdom, & power, and essence cannot be committed with safety, to the creatures charge and custody: for nothing that is in the creature is formally in God; nothing that is formally in God, can be communicated to the creature.  
6. Howsoever Aristotle had employed his wit yet without grace it had never ended in his happiness. And yet I tell you, he hath done strangely herein, and in my judgement to the wonder of the World, in so much that I may wonder, that you take so little notice of it. But seeing he had only the book of God's creatures, whereabout to exercise his wit, & to read God therein, and whereby his eternal power & Godhead is manifested; and you know, this book is written in a wondrous hard language, and requires many years stoody to attain to the understanding of it; & necessarily we must begin with the knowledge of the creatures: Therefore no merveyle if he began with the knowledge of things visible; but thence he ascended to the discovery of things invisible. In his Physics he discoverethe unto us, a first mover; and he hath Metaphysics as well as Physics; and in his 12. book especially he discoursethe of the nature of this first mover, and that unto admiration. He showeth also the references of immaterial creatures unto him, and of material creatures unto them all. But as touching that reference which you glance at the reference of creation, he speaks nothing indeed thereof. For he believed it not; but as touching the opinion then current with some, of the making of the World out of a praejacent matter, he gave himself to the utter disproovinge thereof, in his 8. book of Physics. Undoubtedly he gave himself to the contemplation of this (whatsoever you out of cunning insinuate to the contrary, to make the better way, for the broachinge of your conceits) yet never perceaved, that the definition of infinity imagined by him in the divisibility of magnitude or succession of time, was but a mooveable image of that true and solid infinity, to wit of God. We are reasonably well acquainted with the nature of God in the School of Christ; yet have we not learned the Infinity of God to be such, as may sitly be resembled by the one, or by the other. To my understanding it is quite contrary, even by that definition of infinity which yourself applaud in saying. Insinitum est extra quod nihil est, infinity is that without which nothing is. Now infinity in division of magnitude and succession is quite of a contrary nature, being such as semper liceat accipere aliquid extra, we may always take something without it; as when more and more divisions in magnitude may be still made; and more and more revolutions in time may still succeed. And Aristotle might well deny that definition of infinity, which you propose. For by that definition, the uppermost sphere of the Heavens, might justly be accounted infinite. And other Philosophers, that proposed this definition, which you say was censoriously rejected by him, did as well as Aristotle understand Infinite only in quantity. And if you blame Aristotle, for this acception of the word, you must blame the rest as well as him. So that with all these that maxim, insinitum est, extra quod nihil est, signified, that an infinite body was such, as without which no body was, or no quantity was, the meaning whereof I conceive might be this; No measure of quantity could be imagined, that was not comprehended under infinite quantity. Now we know, that no quantity, or bodily dimensions are to be found in God, but altogether without him. Yet you seem to attribute such a kind of infinity unto God: for you would have the definition of infinite not to be appropriated to quantity only, but to be simply and absolutely considered, as much as to say, it should comprehend that which is infinite in quantity also. Yet we confess, immensity is one of the attributes of God, because he fills all places, but yet by your leave, without all quantity. Your comparison is very incongruous. For infinity in length comprehends all length formally; but will you say in like ●ort, that God's infinity in being, comprehends all being formally? Is the being of a body of a man, of a beast in God formally? Exemplarily and virtually, or eminently they are in God; but so is not all longitude, in that which is infinite in longitude, but rather formally, and admi●th all denominations of length. God doth not admit all denominations of being. Thus, say you, did these Ancients feel after, and seek the Lord; whereas alas, they thought not at all of God in this their definition of infinitum, when they said, infinitum est extra quod nihil est. Aratus, I confess, was far more Theological, than most of them, when he said, that in God we live and move & have our being; but this hath little correspondency with the former definition of infinitum. As sillily do you conclude against Aristotle, as for the other Philosophers, when you say he came far short of the truth in saying insinitum est, extra quod semper aliquid est. For this is applied by Aristotle only to division in magnitude, and succession in time, not unto God, as neither did the other Philosophers, which gave another definition of infinitum; apply that their other definition unto God, but all of them accorded in this, that finitum and infinitum were the differences of quantity and of corporeal dimensions. And as for infinity of being, Aristotle had nothing to do with that consideration in his Physics, where he treatethe of infinitum. For infinite applied to being, is a difference of ens, and so belongs rather in consideration to the Metaphysics, whose subject is ens, then to the Physics, the subject whereof is corpus naturale. To infer infinity of being from no better ground, than those branches of infinity, which consist only in possibility and succession, were a very sorry inference in my judgement, and little becoming any grave divine. For by continuance of time, and succession of creatures in time, no specifical perfection is added; but only individuals of the same kind succeed one another. The Angels themselves being to continue for ever, shall ever produce new thoughts new actions; but doth this argue any infinity in them? By this manner of discourse, Aristotle had better reason to conceive of God's infinity, than we Christians. For he maintained succession of time and of the parts of this World by individual propagations, both without beginning and without end, which we do not: but as we know the World hath had a beginning, so we believe it shall have an end; And consequently the producing of more individual substances shall have an end. And whereas all Species, and individuals formerly produced, being put together, do make up a number only finite, how can this infer, that God is infinite? especially if so be, more Species might be produced, then have been produced. For either it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things, or no. If it doth; then the producing of those that are produced, is no evidence of God's greatest power. If is doth not; then the number of things produced, were they double to that they are, or shallbe, cannot evidence that God's power is infinite. Again, seeing God is yet in producing more and more, we can have no evidence hereby of God's greatest power, till he come to the end of his works: therefore as yet we have hereby no evidence of his greatest power, or that his power is infinite, though perhaps the world may have, to wit, when God is come to the end of his working. Yet when that time is come, wherein God shall cease from producing new, all his works put together being but finite, how can that consideration, evince a power infinite? Wherefore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea etc. maintained, that the World already made, was infinite; because it was fit (as he thought) that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent, and therefore, say he, the world must be infinite. To proceed a little further; when the time shall come, that God shall surcease to produce any new thing either in kind, or individual the particulars produced put together from the beginning of the world to that day shallbe but finite, and how can this infer a power infinite? Now all this discourse of yours proceeds, upon supposition, that all things are produced by God, and not only by course of nature; but by such a cause as was first created, and since maintained, and governed, and ordered by God, which truth was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were. And you well know that the creation of materia prima, was denied by them all. And therefore I should conceive that the infiniteness of God, is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things, then by the number of things produced; as namely, by his creating of the World, & that of nothing. For if God hath power to give being, unto that which hath no being, but only is capable of being (as put the case to a man or Angel) and that by his word & will, he is as well able to give being to any thing conceavable, (that is capable of being,) by his word and will; and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens. He that can give being to any thing that is possible to be, he is Almighty.  
Again, if God were finite in perfection of entity, than it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing than God; & then that also should have an existence. For if the essence or existence of a nature less perfect should be all one, how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect. And consequently, there should be many Gods, one different in perfection above another.   

CHAP. IU.  
There is no plurality of perfections in the Infinite essence; albeit the perfection of all things be in him. Of the Absolute Identity of the Divine essence and attributes.  
AS for the argument, which you propose, We must either allow the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense, because sense is never found without a body. I see no great cause to mislike it; especially if it be rightly proposed, as it may be, thus, because sense (to wit in proper speech) cannot be found without a body. For is not sense an organical faculty, that is such a faculty as cannot exercise its function without material instruments? How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument, let the Reader judge. God the supreme Artificer can make Virtus formatrix, (you say) do more than Epicurus can by all his sense and reason; and hence you conclude, that therefore God hath both sense and reason. Whereas you may as well prove that God hath bodily substance in him, both because he sets virtus formatrix, on work in producing bodies, and can do more than we can withal our bodies and souls. Therefore if you please, you may in confidence of such illations, proceed to say that God consists of a body, and soul too. The Psalmists Philosophy is a poor ground for you to build on. For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist, that God hath eyes, and ears, and hands also, as when he say the, The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, & his ears are open unto their prayers. The 
Psal. 34. 15. Psal. 118. ●6.  right hand of the Lord is exalted, the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly. And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God, why do you not attribute unto him feeling, and smelling, and tasting also? Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses, why may not God understand the same without sense, as well as Angels. That God only is, and all things numerable are but mere shadows of his being, are your own principles and phrases; & to draw conclusions from such grounds, is to build Castles in the Air. You think to help it by saying, that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideal patterns or perfections, you might have taken in three senses more as well, and have said that smelling, wasting and feeling are in God according to Ideall patterns and perfections; and justify Epicurus too, in maintaining that the Gods have bodies. For though our Saviour said, a Spirit hath not flesh and bone, yet you know how to justify that bodies and souls, and flesh and bone, and 
Luc. 24. ●9  brains and senses, yea and the basest thing that is, are in God, to wit, according to their ideal patterns and perfections. For we make no question, but that all these things are known to God, and he is able to produce them, (& no more do you require in the next Section unto this, that all things are in God;) yea materia pr●a and all. And this conceit of yours you prosecute▪ with a great deal more Rhetoric than Philosophy or Logic. Certainly not to be, and not to have operation, are far more different between themselves, then nihil agere, and otium esse. For these are formally the same, the other are not. For like 〈◊〉, to be, and to work, are in themselves manifestly distinct, so must be their negations also; so are not nihil agere, & otium esse.  
2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge, more like a Rhetorician, than a Philosopher, makes you overlashe and cast yourself upon resemblances without all proportion. As when you say, all things are in God's power, as strength to move our limbs is in our sinews, or motive faculty. Now in this, I say, is no proportion. For seeing all things are in God because he can produce them, so strength (by just proportion) should be in our sinews, because our sinews could produce it, which is palpably untrue. You should rather say, as the motion of our limbs is in our sinews, or in our motive faculty rather, because our motive faculty can produce such motion. Yet this were a very strange resemblance taken at the best. For it is nothing strange that our motive faculty should move our limbs; but that God, should produce all things out of nothing, is so wonderful strange a thing, that the most learned Philosophers could never digest it, and the H. Ghost imputes it unto faith that we believe it. Here 
Hebr. 11. 3.  you confess that sense cannot be without a corporal organ, whence it follow the manifestly, that if sense be in God, then also corporal organs must be found in God. And again you confess, that what we feel by sense, he knows much better without sense: how little then did it, become you to profess, that he argued like himself (that is sottishly belike) who said, we must either allow the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense? I make no question, but that the Divine essence represents the natures of all things: For by knowing himself, Divines say, he knows all things. But is this representation only of natures extant as you speak? If so; how did he know all things before the World was? how shall he know all things, after that the World shall cease to be, some natures only reserved. How variety sets forth unity, as you speak, I am to seek; yet the variety of God's creatures, by your leave, is not infinite.  
3. Of the questions proposed by you, let the Reader judge, as they deserve; as also of your solution of them, & of your more accurate and exquisite distinction of universality, and totality, than the Platonics ever attained too, you distinguishinge it, not only from that totality, which arisethe from aggregation of parts, but from that also, whose extent is not more than equal to all the parts: which last member, I confess, is very curious, to wit, that there should be a totality more than equal to all his parts; and I little wonder that the Platonics, were not acquainted with this subtle curiosity. God's nature we acknowledge to have no parts, but yet contains all entities, not formally, but virtually, or eminently and examplarily; which eminent comprehension is equivalent to a formal comprehension of all (if possible) though the number of them were infinite; but not greater, because a number cannot be imagined greater than infinite. Exhaustinge by particulars derived from them, belongs to natures that contain the particulars formally; as a bushel of wheat by substraction of grains may be exhausted, it belongs not to natures, that contain particulars eminently. To say that God is being itself, or perfection, doth not exclude plurality in my judgement, and that for this reason. Humanity is humanity itself, yet this hinderethe not, but that many thousands may be partakers of humanity. In like sort, though divine perfection be perfection itself, yet this hinderethe not, but that many may be partakers of Divine perfection. But you speak, I confess, of plurality in the nature of God, and that in respect of attributes real, not of denominations personal. For plurality her of undoubtedly you do not deny. Now to say that God is all perfections eminently, doth no way hinder his formal unity; as likewise his formal unity doth nothing prejudice his perfectious eminent plurality.  
4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideall perfections, & internal perfections. For if you understand ideal perfections of perfections external and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the plurality of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created things are many, so they are all known by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and plurality of finite perfections represented unto God, and known by him, doth no way hinder the unity of God's infinite essence, no more than it hinders the unity of our soul's essence, such as it is. But if you mean it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to prove this unity in God, is neither congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to prove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kind of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of plurality, or without, that is another question, to the clearing whereof, you confer nothing for aught I yet perceive. You demand, if Gods being be absolutely illimited, what could limit or restrain it from being power, from being wisdom, from being goodness, from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is? I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by yourself. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether Gods being be both life and power, and wisdom, and goodness, and whatsoever any thing is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisdom, and all these his goodness, and every thing else, that any creature is, whose being also (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether all these things are in God, but whether all these are drawn to an unity in God, without all plurality? If you frame your argument in another fashion to help this, as thus; What hindereth God's life from being his power, and wisdom etc. I answer that the formal notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then hitherto you have done. A second incongruity I find in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision whereof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maintained; that all things were in God, in a kind of Ideall, and transcendental manner, now yourself have confessed that Ideas were of substances, if not only of them. For your words are these, If Plato meant that there were as many several Ideas eternally extant, whether in the first cause of things, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, etc. But here you give instance only in such things as are of accidental notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisdom, and goodness. Lastly, I have already showed that this argument of yours is not sound, whereby you prove Gods being to be illimited, because forsooth it is independent: As if this consequence were evident of itself, whereas on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maintained the World to be independent; all others maintained the matter whereof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceived, that herehence it would follow, that either of them was therefore illimited, or at all illimited. That God's attributes are not really distinguished, we all confess, you need not have brought in Augustine's authority to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherein you fail very much. For it will not follow, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, than the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not follow, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes thereof must needs be distinct from the essence. For the soul of man is limited, yet some have maintained that the faculties of the soul are not really distinct from the essence of the soul, as Scotus, & that by shrewd arguments. And Zabarell professethe, that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas. And All beit the power of God be distinct from the wisdom of God, yet if both be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kind, what prejudice is this to the infiniteness of God's essence? Neither will it follow, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite being in his kind, as another hath of proper being distinct from it; considering that these notions are of different kinds. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there should be both infinite length, and infinite breadth, and infinite thickness, neythers infiniteness being any whit prejudicial to the infiniteness of the other, because they are of different kinds. And what colour of reason have you, why infiniteness of power should prejudice the infiniteness of wisdom, though they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what think you, if some attributes be found answerable to personal distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly said that the second person in Trinity is the wisdom of the Father, and cometh from the Father per modum intellectus; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from both per modum voluntatis? But I have no edge to look into the Ark, or suffer my disputation to trench upon these mysteries. Yet I confess, though the Father be not the Son, nor the H Ghost, etc. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is alius & alius, not aliud & aliud. But you maintain that God's power is his wisdom, etc. which yet notwithstanding I mislike not, but only do question the argument, whereby you endeavour to prove it, and to my judgement it seems very superficial. But my comfort is this, if you weakly maintain the nature of God, you will as weakly oppose the grace of God. Again I say, it will not follow, that if the several beings of wisdom and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, than the essence should not be infinite. For it may be said that the essence is infinite in a being substantial; the power and wisdom of God are infinite in a being accidental, though such as necessarily flows from the nature of God. Indeed if it were proved, that there is no accident in God, than the case were clear, that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God, as indeed they are not; but this is more than hitherto you have proved. And till you have proved it, they may be conceived as distinct from the essence (as before hath been said) without any prejudice to the infinity of God's essence, or danger of exposing it unto nakedness, for aught your discourse, hath as yet alleged to the contrary.  
5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite; Infinitum est, extra quod nihil est, which you make so much reckonninge of; I take it to be a vain conceit; considering that the Philosophers who urged it, never made any such construction of it, as you do; but applying it only to material bodies of quantity and extension, maintained that in this sense the World was infinite. But Aristotle doth not approve of such a notion of infinite, as nothing agreeable with the denomination; the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion; and yet as they all thought, without the world nothing was. Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite, though I nothing commend either their learning, or their honesty herein. And in those former days finitum & infinitum, were taken only for material differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immaterial natures, abstract from bodily or material extension of parts. And Zabarell (as I remember) observes as much (as touching the opinion of Aristotle) upon the last chapters of the eighthe book of Physics. And how far forth infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature, Aristotle in his Physics hath discoursed. Now in the sense before spoken of, it is very absurd, to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God, who is not only a Spirit but the Father of Spirits, and incapable of parts, much more of extension in any material manner. But let the words be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God; to wit, as if he were such an entity, as comprehends all entity. I say it is manifestly untrue. For is not the World & all the parts thereof, from Angels unto the basest worm that creepethe, and drop of mire, or sparkle of fire, or the least cinder; are not all these something, and that extra Deum? For though eminently they may be said to be in God, yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally; and to my understanding it is absurd to say, they are identically contained in God's essence. It is true that God's essence doth represent them. For God knows them not, but by knowing of himself and his essence, and being of infinite power, can produce any thing that implies not contradiction. I cannot represent a fit comparison: but such as the creature can afford if you give me leave to make use of, I say that every thing which a glass represents, is not identically contained in the glass, neither is it true, that whatsoever is known by the understanding of man or Angel, is identically contained in the understanding or spirit of man or Angel. As I have said, so I say again; I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus; God is illimited, therefore all things are in God; and therefore also, all things that are in God, or are attributed unto him are all one. That which you add, when you say, whatsoever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numerical difference, is very ambiguous; and the ambiguity being cleared, will prove partly to be without all question, and nothing to the purpose, partly as questionable as ever, where it is to the purpose. For that, that which is infinite in essence, must be one and not many, I think is without question even amongst Atheists nowadays, that have any learning in them; although a man may fail in the demonstration of it, as here you do. For to be infinite in essence, is to comprehend all specifical entities not numerical. For such, as such, differ not in essence. And for it to be multiplied according to numerical differences only, seems nothing prejudicial to the infinity of the essence, save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceived to imply quantity. Infinity of power doth more evidently include opposition to numerical plurality, than infinity of essence in my judgement. But be it, not only without question, but also supposed to have been made evident by some demonstration of yours, yet is it nothing to the present question. For the question in present is not, whether there may be two Gods: but only, whether in the one nature of God, there be not things different; to wit whether God's wisdom be not different from his power, and both these different from his goodness; that is in a word, whether there be not any accident in God. And yet, unto this question you are arrived, but in a very indecent, and incongruous manner. For whereas before you had undertaken to prove, that all things were in God according to ideal perfections, by all things understanding substances chiefly, as of Angels, and men, and beasts of all sorts. And in this chapter do undertake to show, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of plurality, but drawn to unity: and accordingly should hereby prove, that the essence of an Angel, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thing: You shift of from this, and in the place thereof, only mention, how God's life, and wisdom, and power, and goodness are all one in God. And this you prove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sorry a consequence as that, whereby you proved his illimited condition, to wit from this, that he is independent, and received not his being from any thing. Which consequence of yours, is so far from natural evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of old, who maintained either the World, or the first matter (not to speak of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all making, yet did never conceive that herehence it must follow, that either of them should be infinite. No less inconsequent is that, which followeth also, as when you say, Whersoever it can be truly said, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits. I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case both length, and breadth, and thickness were infinite; yet length were only length, and not breadth, yet never a whit the less infinite. Neither is infinity in thickness any hindrance to infinity in breadth, though breadthe be not thickness; nor infinity in breadth, any hindrance to infinity in length, though length be not breadthe. In like sort the infinity of God's power should be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisdom, though his wisdom be not his power; Nor the infinity of his goodness, any prejudice to the infinity of his power, and wisdom, though his power, and wisdom, and goodness were different in themselves. But to come nearer; what think you of the Persons in the Trinity? The Father is the Father, and neither is he the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite? The Son is the Son, but he is neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost; will you therefore say, he is not infinite? The Holy Ghost, is the Holy Ghost, but neither the Father nor the Son, will you hence infer that he hath limits, and is not infinite? And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolmen, but even by our divines also, that the Son is produced of the Father per modum intellectus? Is he not the wisdom of the Father, and what difference between the wisdom of God, and the understanding of himself? And do they not also confess, that the H. Ghost proceeds from both per modum voluntatis? And as we say, God's understanding is not his will, though it be no different thing from his will; and Gods will is not his understanding, though it be no different thing from his understanding, so we may adore the indivisible unity of the Godhead, notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons, though we are not able to comprehended the mystery hereof. It is true, our understanding is such, as that, oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari; & imaginatio non transcendit continuum. Yet notwithstanding we attain by discourse to the acknowledgement of things immaterial, as of our souls, yea and of Angels; yea and of the God both of men & Angels; yet not by material things as by the pictures of them, as you phrasify it, but rather as in the effects; wherein as it were in glasses do shine the causes of them. Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hath inferred the existence of immaterial and abstract substances as the moovers of them. And we commonly say, that the World is as a glass wherein the glory of God is represented. His eternal power and Godhead being made manifest by his works, as the Apostle speaketh Rom. 1. 20. Of God's illimited being we make no question; but well we may question the soundness of your arguments, whereby you prove it, as also the soundness of those consequences, which you make from it. And far better it is to content ourselves with the simplicity of our Christian faith, in believinge of God, what Gods word teacheth us, then to depend upon weak reason for the confirmation thereof. For weak reasons do rather betray a cause, then justify it. We believe that God is one, and that there is no plurality of natures in him, but only of Persons. And we must take heed that the Metaphysical extract of vis unita fortior (which you speak of) do not so far possess us with the contemplation of God's unity, as to deny the Trinity. And touching the attributes of God, as neither distinct from the essence of God, nor from themselves, we do not much affect curiosity of demonstration; but if any man voluntarily undertake such a task, we look for substance of sound proofs, and are not content to have our mouths filled with emty spoons. You seem to gratify God with your hyperboles; but surely he doth not put us to tell any untruths for him, as man doth for man, to gratify him. You entertain a conceit of God's power, above all conceit of infinite power; of God's wisdom above all conceit of infinite wisdom; of God's goodness above all conceit of infinite goodness. To be essential to the nature of God, is more noble, I grant, then to be accidental: but how any power can be greater than power infinite, or any wisdom greater than wisdom infinite, or any goodness greater than goodness infinite, I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe, that whersoever infinite power, & infinite wisdom, & infinite goodness is found, that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerful, and wise, & good, as namely the nature of God: though of the evident demonstration thereof, for ought you have brought to help us herein, we may be still to seek. As for succession, and extension, we hold that each is impossible to be infinite. And neither of them any attribute of God, as power, and wisdom, and goodness is. And therefore, the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kind, must needs be wondrous wild.  
Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations, but rather wonder that succession, and extension should be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections contained in God, and that all these mentioned attributes laid out in several, should have infinities added unto them. Much more should we have wondered, if the issue of your discourse had been answerable to the original, which is to show, not how power, and wisdom, & goodness are all one in God, which are with us of accidental denomination; but to show how every substance is in God, of Angel, of man, of beasts, of birds, of fishes, of worms and every creeping thing; and that all these are to be accounted excellencyes and perfections. And surely they had need to be in God, in a more excellent manner, than they are in themselves; otherwise their advancing so high, would be too great a degrading of the nature of God.  
But to add my mite of discourse, touching the being of all things in God, and the precise unity of all things in God, which under a form of plurality according to our conceits, are attributed unto him. As touching the first, that all perfections are in God, is to be acknowledged without all controversy, because we understand by God such a nature, as nothing can be imagined better; and I approve of Aquinas his reason. Like as heat if it did exist of itself, it should comprehend all degrees of heat: so the essence of God being all one with his existence, that is he being essentially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him. But as for the perfections of being which are found without God, according to their several ranks and kinds therein; ●s namely of being, without life, of being and life without sense, or reason; of being, life, & sense without reason, of both being, life, and sense, and reason: as they are not like unto God according to any univocal notion of Species, o●kind, but only analogical, which as Aquinas showeth, is this, that God is entity by essence; every other thing is an entity only by participation. So likewise their perfections cannot be said to be in God univocally, but only analogically, as the effect is said to be in the Agent, in as much as he hath power to produce it. It is true, some things are attributed unto creatures, which cannot be attributed unto God; and some things are attributed both to God, and to the creatures. As for example; God is not a body, man is a body; God is a spirit, an Angel is a spirit; God hath being, so have all things; God hath life, so have many things. God is wise, good, powerful; these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angels. Yet these denominations, in admitting whereof both God and creatures do agree, are as different in respect of God and the creatures, as those denominations in the communion whereof they do not agree. As for example the Spiritual nature of God is as far different from the spiritual nature of an Angel, as from the bodily nature of ma● or beast, as being infinitely different from each. And therefore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God, but rather their remotion a non esse. One creature having more perfections of being then another, & consequently so much the more removed from not being. But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely removed from God who is infinite. So that like as the bodily nature of man doth not agree in any kind with the spiritual nature of God; so neither doth the spiritual nature of an Angel agree in any kind with the spiritual nature of God. But God is equally an equivocal Agent in respect of both. And no merveyle; for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree, are commonly such as are of accidental denomination unto the creatures; as when we say God is wise, and holy, and powerful; a man or Angel is wise, and holy, and powerful etc. But is there any colour why, the nature of God should come nearer unto those things that are of accidental denomination in us, then unto those that are substantial; whereas every mean scholar knows, that substances are more noble than accidents, and as for substantial denominations wherein God, and the creature do agree, if they be examined, it will be found that in the resolution of the truth, the agreement will appear to be only in negation. As when we say, God is a spirit, the negation of extension corporal and material, is the only thing, wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angel. Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirit in distinction from a man, to consist in this, that a spirit hath not flesh and bones. And 
Luc. 24.  as for the general not on of entity common to all, mark what a vast difference there is herein between God and the creature, and such as excludes all univocation. God is an entity independent, and whereof all other entities depend both for their production, and for their preservation, and that out of nothing, as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles. Let it suffice then, that all perfections are in God, and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence. But as for created perfections, the word created is a term diminishing perfection; but such as they are, they are in God only, as effects are in their causes, and they not univocal, but equivocal only, or at the best but analogical. Let us come to the consideration of the unity of God's attributes, especially with God's essence, whence it will follow, that an unity of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves. And the question will come to this, whether there be any accident in God? Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysical speculations; or that I think our language to be fit for them, for want of terms of Art in common use to express such notions, as here must necessarily occur: But only being provoked herunto by your discourse, who here and there inculcate foul errors in Divinity, & that depending sometimes upon these, or such like Metaphysical contemplations.  
Some therefore argue thus. If there were any accident in God, then there should be some essence common unto God with complete substances create, to wit an essence supporting accidents. And if there were any common essence to God with other substances, than there were to be acknowledged something in nature before God; as the Genus is commonly accounted in nature before the Species thereof. And further, it seems, that if any generical nature were common to God and us, than some part of God's essence should be found in us, and some part of our essence should be found in God. Like as the essence of animality being common unto man & beast, is found both in man and beast. And consequently. God creating substances, should create in part a certain common essence, which is found in himself, and so the self same essence should be both the Creator, and the creature. If to avoid these dangerous consequences, it be replied that to support accidents is not of any essential denomination, but accidental; as great absurdities seem to follow on that part also. For if to support accidents be an accident, this makes way to a progress in insinitum without end. For even this supportation of accidents, if it be an accident, must be supported by a substance and so without end. Again if to support accidents be an accident; it must either flow from substance, in case it be an accident proper; or be brought from without by some agent, if it be an accident common. This latter cannot be admitted in respect of God. If the former be, than there must be acknowledged some common essence both to God and other substances, whence this accident flows, and then we are, where we were.  
Another argument may be conceived thus. It is commonly received, that every substance is more noble, and of greater dignity than any accident. And therefore if accidents were to be found in God, some thing should be found in God, more ignoble than his creatures.  
If accidents were to be found in God, then either they shall denote entities of perfection or imperfection. Impossible it is that any entity of perfection should be found in God. For Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest. If of perfection, than it is the very essence of God and no accident, for as much as God's essence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which comprehends all perfection of entity. Like as heat comprehends all degrees of heat.  
Again an accident is compared to the subject, as an act to the power of receavinge it. But there can be no power passive in God: For as much as passive power is always perfited by the act. And so the nature of God should admit perfection from an accident.  
Lastly, God is a Spirit, and therefore no bodily or material accident can be found in God; if any be found in him, it must be spiritual. Now as Aristotle say, there are but three sorts of things in the mind of man, and they are either faculties, or passions, or habits. Of these, passions are too base to be attributed unto God, and they are not severed from change. And as for habits, they suppose an imperfect nature, which is perfited by them, which cannot be verified of the nature of God. Now the faculties of God are either of understanding, or of willing, which are operations immanent or of working without by operations transient. If it may appear, that God's faculty of understanding is all one with the act of his understanding, than it will thereby appear that the faculty of the understanding is not distinct from the nature itself of God: considering, that albeit it is without question that the faculty of man's understanding is distinct from the act of his understanding; yet some have questioned, whether the faculties of a man's soul be really distinct from the substance of the soul, and maintained that they are not, as namely the Sco●ists. But what need we proceed further. Aristotle himself, that great naturalist hath acknowledged the first mover to be his life, and his intelligence.  
Yet consider in reason; If God's essence and existence be all one; how much more his understanding faculty; and his actual intelligence. For an understanding faculty can easily produce the act of understanding; but essence cannot give itself existence. But essence and existence in God are all one. For if they were not, then either his existence should flow from his essence, which is a thing utterly impossible. (For act cannot flow from possibility; neither can any thing be conceived to be productive, unless it suppose existence.) Or existence must proceed from some exterior Agent that causeth it; Now this were to maintain some superior cause unto God himself, which hath power to create him. In which case he should have something better than himself, which is flat contradiction to the nature of God, whom we conceive to be such, as nothing better than he can be imagined. But I willingly profess, I nothing like these curiosities, neither did I ever give myself to this kind of study before. There is no reason but may be shaken by wrangling opposition. Faith cannot.    

SECT. II.  
Of the Several branches of absolute infinity; or of the infinity of the Divine attributes as they are severally apprehended by us.  

CHAP. V.  
Of Divine immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity whereof infinity in magnitude or space imaginary is the shadow.  
HENCE you draw us to the speculation of the several branches of absolute infinity; and first of God's immensity, which you premise unto God's eternity; whereof I muse not a little: considering that immensity is an attribute denominating God in respect of creatures; and is not any otherwise considered by School Divines nor by yourself neither, but in this respect that he fillethe all places. And therefore before the World was, and before there was any place to fill, he could not be said to fill all places. As for eternity in being without beginning, that is an absolute attribute, and was ever verified of God. Perhaps you consider immensity not as it signifieth his filling of all places, but as it signifieth his ability to fill all places. Yet this is in reference unto place, and we commonly confound God's immensity with his ubiquity. Much less can I approve your Rhetoric, as when you make infinity of space to be the shadow of God's immensity. First because infinity of space is neither existent nor possible to be existent, and to my judgement, such a thing seems not fit to be a shadow of that which is existent, such as you suppose the immensity of God to be. Secondly immensity of space is in respect of that quantity which is called quantitas motis quantity of extension, and capable of division, but the immensity of God denominates him, in respect of that quantity, which is called quantitas virtutis, quantity of virtue, incapable of extension or division. And therefore the one seems no way sit to be the model of the other. Thirdly shadows do many times exactly represent the proportion of the thing shadowed; and if at some times they are far less, at other times again, they are far greater than the bodies which they represent, as when the day declineth and the shadows of the evening are stretched forth, as the Prophet speaketh. And indeed you may well say that 
jer. 6 4.  immensity of space is even in this respect a shadow of God's immensity. For immensity of space is absolutely infinite; but God's immensity as it signisies his existence in all places, (neither do I find it otherwise considered, either by Schoolmen or yourself) is absolutely finite: For as much as all places put together are but finite, nor can possibly be any more than finite. But let us consider the particulars of your discourse. You tell us, that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from time and place. This is a paradox to me. I had thought rather, it had been far 〈◊〉 for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then either of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined, 
Arist. phys. 1. cont. ●6.  as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend either time or place otherwise then infinite. If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite, it had been less distant from the truth; yet that also distant from the truth. For undoubtedly my imagination may conceive a time definite, as well as indefinite; As for example, it may as well conceive three years' space of time, as well as more years' space of time then three, without de●ing how much: the like may be said of place also. As for infinite time and place, as it is impossible that any such thing should be, so I promise you, I cannot conceive that it should be so easily (as you suppose) if possibly imagined. Yet you take upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion. But that proof is as inconsequent, as your former assertion was insolent. For though sensible things cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time, yet when herehence you infer, that place itself cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensity thereof, nor time itself from the eternity thereof, I find neither art in this consequence, nor any tolerable colour or show of reason to make it probable. And to the contrary (as I said) It is a ruled case that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci. And therefore it is so easy a thing to separate infinity from time & place; as it is impossible, that in the understanding of man it should be con●oyned with them. Yet this is not all the error of this your discourse. For the Antecedent is utterly untrue: as when you say, that sensible things when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding, they still retain their circumstances of time and place. Whereas to the contrary it is undoubtedly true, that Intelloctus abstrahit ab hic & nunc; the understanding considereth things abstract from time and place; and so doth the imagination also: Only this is the condition of the imagination, in distinction from the understanding, that imaginatio non transcendit continuum: It cannot consider things abstract from continuity, that is from extension of parts: but from time and place it can abstract, how much more from the infinity of each And surely each faculty were a sorry winnower, if it could not separate the grains of natural things, from such gross hu●kes that in wrap them. It is true we are apt to imagine a local distance, beyond the utmost surface of heaven, but it doth not herehence follow, that we imagine an infinite distance beyond it, but rather indefinite. And therefore we are apt to imagine a distance without the globe of Heaven, because we can imagine the globe of Heaven in as small a proportion as we list, even no bigger than one of the globes in our College Libraries. In like sort we may imagine time before the World; for who doubtethe, but that it was possible that time should have been sooner than it wa● & wh●s it is now about six thousand years since the World began; so if it had pleased God, it might have b●ne 1●. thousand. But do not you infer herehence, that we do imagine infinite time preceding the World; for that is not held to be possible as finite time is. But it is an easy leap, I confess, in the ●rrour of a man's imagination to pass from time indefinite, to time infinite, ●nd to take one for the other. To imagine a successive duration of time much longer before the creation of the world, th●n hath been the continuance of it since, is one thing▪ but to imagine an infinite duration of time before the World, is another thing, and much different, ●ea infinitely different. Looking back upon this discourse of yours to prove▪ whether it might admit any other tolerable construction; I concaved your meaning might perhaps be this; not that place and time could not be conceived without the immensity of the one, and the eternity of the other▪ but ●ather that immensity could not be conceived without place, nor eternity without time. But upon serious consideration I do● not find this latter interpre●tion to be any way congruous unto your text. For you plainly profess, that albeit both reason and faith drives us to confess both time and place to be finite, yet our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from them, which can admit no other interpretation then that which I have impugned. That which you talk, of certain School brains pu●ed in passing this unsoundable gulf, and that so far as to suspect, that God, who now is in every place of the world created by him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time before the creation was attempted; is nothing but a bundle of mysteries unto me. For I never know any that offered to p●sse that unsoundable gulf, you sp●ake of, otherwise, then by imagining●; ●nd how their brains were puzzled in giving way to this imagination I know not; much le● do I understand▪ how being pu●ed in this imagination, they should herehence grow to suspect, that God was as truly in ●hat imaginary distance of place as in things truly exist●t, and ●ruly distant ●ach from other. And most of all do I wonder, what you mean to clap the imaginary distance of time▪ with the imaginary distance of plac●. For though I hav● read of some that discourse of vacuum lo●i, an imaginary distance of place, and maintain that God was and is therein▪ yet I never heard nor read of any man discoursing in like sort of Vacuum temporis, and maintaining that God was and is therein. And as touching the question, whether God be i● Vacu● or in that imaginary distance you speak of; I have read the question proposed by Vasquius, and th● opinion of some 
Vasq. ●n 〈◊〉. p. disp. 29.  mentioned, who maintained that God was in Uac●; but very few; yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one; but whence doth he fetch this opinion of Cajetan? no● out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hi● Sums, where is the proper place for a Schooleman to manifest his opinion herabouts; but out of his Commentaries upon Io●n. 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelity of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan. The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction. And sinc● we are fallen upon it▪ I am willingly to confer discourse with you herabouts. And first, I say, that Scripture and reason seem to favour it. For King Solomon professeth 
1. King's 〈◊〉.  that the Heavens of Heavens do not contain the Lord: & likewise job say of him▪ that He is higher than the Heaven, 
job. 11.  and deeper than Hell; & certainly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens, and consequently in Vacuo; & herupon it seems to some, that in good reason God should first have a being there, before he produce the any body there. And this is one reason of many, which Brad wardine usethe to prove, that God is in Vacuo: (for tha● is his opinion) though Vasquius was not acquainted with him. Now by your leave, I will consider your reasons to the contrary. First you demand whether this local distance be created or no●▪ whether it be something or nothing? I answer, that ●rteinly it is not created, as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body should be, where before was no body. As for example where now the World is, before the World was, 〈◊〉 no body, yet was it then possible there should be a body, So without the Heavens is no body, yet is it possible that a body should be without the heavens. You proceed saying, If it be nothing, than they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing; and we grant they had. For they held it only an imaginary space or distance. Further you infer; If really nothing, than it could not be truly termed an imaginary space, before the World was created. A manifest inconsequence. For as men may imagine things that are not, so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not real. And there is no such difference, as you avouche, between these two, To imagine an infinite space, and to say, that There is an imaginary infinite space. For whersoever there is the imagination of an infinite space, there must needs be an infinite space imagined. And therefore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens, this is as much as to say, there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens. But I observe your subtlety following. Before the heavens, you say, there could be no imagination of any such space; therefore there was no such space imagined. I answer; though before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it, yet nevertheless was it imaginable, and now you confess it is so imagined. And not only do we imagine a Uacuum to have been before the World was, but even since the World is, to wit, without the Heavens. And taking it aright, is not only now so imagined by us, but a truth that a Uacuum is without the heavens, and was before the world was, where now the world is. For the error of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaning of Vacuum. For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent, whereas indeed it is rather the negation of a body existent, joined with the possibility of a body to exist. So without the heavens is no space or body, yet possible is it, that a bodily space should be. Neither is it required herunto, that it should be created by God; for only real things are created by God, but the negation of body's existent requires no creation, but rather the suspension of creation. You think the reality of this imagination to be God, whom the Hebrews call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place; I rather think the reality of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies. Touching which possibility, if it be demanded in what subject it is; I remember what answer joannes Grammaticus made to the like question, reported by Averro on the 12. book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, namely that it was in God, to wit fundamentally not formally. For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this. In God alone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing, whence it followeth, that before the world was, there was a possibility that the world should be, and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibility. A possibility physical or natural requires a subject to support it, but a possibility logical not so, as being only negatio repugnantie, a want of repugnancy. And if God was able to make a world out of nothing, then surely it was no contradiction, that the world should be, and consequently the world was possible before it was. And yet to draw a little nearer unto you in this; I profess, I find it more hard to maintain, that God i any where as in a place, then to maintain that God is in Uacuo. For mark how Durand distinguishethe; Place, say he, 
Durand. in 1. dist. 37. p. 1. q. 2.  is considered two ways, either as a natural thing, or as containing the thing placed therein. As it is a natural thing, God is in every place, but as it containeth the thing that is said to be therein; so God is in no place secundum se, in respect of himself. For nothing without him is able to contain him; but in respect of his effects, he is in all places; because he is contained of nothing, but rather containeth all things, and preservethe them. But in respect of his effects he is every where. For he fillethe every place with his effects; & in this sense, it is proper to God to be every where. Herupon some may conceive that God may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place, because he containeth all things, rather than is contained. Yet we know that the continency of place is corporal, and ordinarily the place is more base than the things contained therein. But God's continency is merely virtual and spiritual, and in dignity infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures. And we have no great cause to dote upon the Rabbins, whose Philosophy was never a whit better than their divinity. Yet one thing more: The question was whether God might be said to be in Uacuo, and your discourse is only to deny, that there is any such infinite space as is imagined, either now to be without the heavens, or heretofore to have been before the world was, but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary, much less do you take any care to answer any one of them. And yet to my thinking some are shrewd ones, and different courses are taken in answering them; which argues that one man's answer gave little satisfaction to another. I will therefore take this pains in part for you, & represent the arguments of Bradwardine, who takes upon 
Bradward. Summa de causa Dei contra Pelag. lib. 1. cap 5. coral. 2.  him to prove, that God is essentially and presentially every where, not only in the World, and all the parts thereof; but also without the World, in that Uacuum or site imaginary; & withal I will make bold to show you my judgement of them. His first argument is large; in effect this: God can move the World by a direct motion further Eastward, or further Westward. Upon this supposition he proceedeth thus. Either God was here before, whether the World is now moved or no; Again, either God continueth there from whence the World was moved, or no. If God was there before his motion thither, and continueth still where he was before the motion from thence, than it is manifest he was and is in Vacuo. But if from the time that the World moved from hence, he ceaseth to be here, and upon the World's moving more Eastward, he beginneth to be there, then God changethe his place with the world, ceasing to be where formerly he was, and beginning to be where formerly he was not; and consequently God shall be moved at the motion of the world, as the soul of man is said to be moved, upon the motion of the body. But this seems very uncouthe to be attributed unto God, though some are content to swallow it, not satisfying themselves in finding out a convenient answer. Others deny the supposition, to wit, of a direct motion competent to the world. But saith Bradwardine, to deny that God is able thus to move the world, is to curtll the Almighty power of God; and therefore that opinion say he, is amongst the Articles which were condemned by Steven Bishop of Paris. Yet of those Articles it was wont to be said, non transcendunt Alps, they do not climb over the Alps; and we may as well say, they do not go a ship board to sail over our narrow Seas. In my judgement the supposition is unsound and the contrary rather true, namely that the world cannot be moved Eastward or Westward; not through any impotency in God, who can do all things that imply not contradiction; but by reason that this is such a thing as implyethe contradiction, if it be well considered, and therefore is impossible. For it supposeth that without the world there is a space, consisting of parts, through some parts whereof more or less: the world may be moved. But this is utterly untrue; for they themselves confess, that the space they speak of is only imaginary. Now herehence it followeth that the motion through an imaginary space, must be only an imaginary motion, and no real motion. Secondly we answer, supposing the motion true and real and such a thing possible; that God is said to be in the world not secundum se, but secundum effectus, as before we had out of Durand, because with his effects he fills all things, all places. Now though these bodies do thus move, & therewithal the effects wherewith he filleth them, yet he himself is not moved; because himself, as himself cannot be said to be any where, but as in himself he was before the world was, so in himself he continueth to be still. His second argument is this: Suppose God create another world without the heaven; then either God is there, where he was not before, and so shall be changed in place; or if he were there before, than he was in Uacuo. I answer, that God may be in things, wherein he was not before, not because himself becommethe otherwise then he was before, but because things which before were not, now are; and God with his effects doth fill all things and all places, as they have their being, and ceasethe to fill all things, as they cease to have any being. In a word God is said to coexist, or not coexist with things anew, not that he doth either begin or cease to coexist with them; but in respect that they do either begin or cease to coexist with him. His third argument is, that as many as deny God to exist in Uacuo, must be driven to deny that God could make the world bigger or less than it is. But we see no cause, why we should be cast upon any so absurd assertion. We grant that God could and can make a real and spacious distance beyond the Heavens: but till God doth create such a distance, we deny that there is any such, though we deny not, but man may imagine such. Again he say the we must be driven to maintain, that God necessarily made the world n the site. A. where now it is, and that before the world was made, there was no other site, but the site A. where now it is. But we say that before the World was, there was no site at all, not only no site different from the site A. but also not so much as the site A. neither. And that to imagine any different sites before the world was, is to imagine distance of parts, where neither any parts were, nor distance; though such distance of parts be imagied by us, like as Chimaeras are, and such like fictions. Again he disputes thus: Except Uacuum be granted to have been sometimes, the world was everlasting; I answer; Uacuum sometimes was; but the question between us is not about the existence of it (as such negations and possibilities may be said to exist) but only about the nature of it, to wit wherher it contained any distance of parts as it is imagined after the form of a positive thing. This we deny, and do maintain that Uacuum is only a voydnes of bodies with possibility of existence of bodies, not of existence of bodies therein, as in a space capable of bodies as it is imagined, but simply of their existence. His chiefest argument is this 〈◊〉 when God created the world either he was there before he created it or no. If he were there before he created it, than he was in Uacuo. For before the creation was, nothing was without God, but Uacuum. If you say, God was not there before he created the world; this he say is contrary to reason. But to my judgement it is contrary to all reason, to say that the differences of site, as here 〈◊〉 there were extant, before any thing was created. Well he proves it thus; for say●●● he, God must first be there, before he works there. I answer; God's works are of divers sorts; there is a work of creation, a work of preservation, and a work of moovinge his creatures agreeably to their nature's divers and sundry ways, as he thinks good. Now all other operations of God about his creatures, suppose his being in them, they being already created, but his creation doth not, much less doth it suppose his being there as in Uacuo. For to be in Uacuo, is as much as to say to be in nothing. Which I confess is true of God taking it as a negative thus, God was not in any thing. The truth is, all differences of place and site as here, & there, and else where, are not, but by creation. For to say that God is in some site or place, is to say, that some site or place or thing is coexistent with God, which cannot be without creation. That which he addeth herunto is of the same nature, and admits the same solution, now I proceed along with you.  
2. To the Atheists demand, where God was before the world was; your answer is, God was in himself. I do not 
Mal. 3. 6.  mislike it: and so I say, God is in himself still. For he is not changed. Only in the creation and preservation of all things, virtue did and still doth flow out of him always, so that with his sweet influence he fillethe all things. To be contained in place, is too base a condition for the nature of God, he rather contains all things. So that even now, God is no where contained; before the world he was no where containing, because there was nothing without to be contained and nourished by him. Neither is it any thing harsh to say, that God was in no place, where there was no place for him, wherein to be. But between the question which you propose, and the answer thereunto, you do insperse some strange assertions, affecting curiosity of discourse, more than sobriety of sense, as when you say; In respect of eternity and immensity, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe, is so like unto him, as this negation of all things, which we describe by the name of nothing. A string may be strained so high, as by breaking to mar all the music; and some wits have affected so high a strain of subtlety of sentence, as that they have degenerated into nonsense. Such is this assertion of yours, wherein you affirm, that no numerable part of this Universe (as much as to say, neither man nor Angel; yet was man made after God's image & likeness) is so like unto God as nothing. Ou● upon such abominable speeches; whereby God himself who is the breath of, our nostrils is made, if not just nothing, yet to come nearest unto nothing. What sport are Atheists like to make with this? why like David's fool, say in their hearts, there is no God: when a Christian, and a Divine, and a great writer, whose works are current, when others are not, is found to profess, that no creature is so like unto God as nothing. Yet this is not all; for you say also, that no positive essence is so like unto God as nothing, as if God himself were not so like unto himself as nothing is. And indeed we commonly say nullum simile est idem. Yet by your leave the Son of God is the image of his Father, and dare you say that he is not so like his Father, as nothing is! No merveyle if the Spirit of confusion overspreades your discourse like a garment. For what sense, I pray, is there in this speech of yours as when you say, that this name, nothing, is the description of the negation of all things; whereas indeed the negation of all things, is much fitter to be the description of this name, nothing; then the name, nothing to be the description of the negation of all things. For the description is usually larger than the term described. The reason you bring to justify so uncouth a speech, is as absurd and odious, and false as your former assertion, as when you say, Nothing hath neither beginning nor end of days. Fie, fie upon such shameful assertions, as much removed from wit as from honesty. Hath nothing neither beginning nor end of days, which is as much as to say, that the days of it are everlasting? why I say, It hath no days at all, no being at all, no not so much being as propositions attribute unto negations and privations. I say it never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have any days, at all, neither is i● possible it should have days, for as much as it is utterly impossible, that God should not be, or cease to be, who is the sovereign being, and i● whom but erst, you professed that all things are, and that in a better manner than they are in themselves. And shall this name nothing be now so far advanced, as to be above all positive essences, or parts of this World, in likeness unto God, and that in respect of eternity, and immensity? But what eternity or immensity of being is to be found in that which hath no being at all, nor ever had, nor ever shall have, nor can have, no not so much as negations have? Yet the Heavens have had continuance so long, as not very well known to man; and so have the Angels had, and shall have for ever. The smallest part of this Universe, hath some magnitude; some parts have quantitatem motis, quantity of extension, and that all most incredibly great, certainly incomprehensible by the wit of man, as the Heavens; other parts have quantitatem virtutis, quantity of spiritual perfection, as the Angels, and that also inscrutable by the wit of man. But as for the name nothing, that hath no magnitude at all, neither of corporal extension, nor of spiritual perfection, unless you will return to the imaginary distance of space without the Heavens, which but erst you disputed against. For no immensity otherwise can be found in this your nothing, which you advance so high as in eternity and immensity, to be so like to God, as no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe more, or so much. If in consideration of the most monstruous incongruity of your assertion, and that as God hath his being necessarily, so it is a thing utterly impossible, that nothing should have any being; to shift yourself out of this absurdity, you shall say, that by nothing you understand not the negation or privation of any thing whatsoever (which yet was delivered by you without all limitation) but only the negation and privation of things created: yet herein you shall fall into a new nonsense. For than your proposition shall run thus in effect, No creature is so like unto God as no creature, which yet is as untrue as absurd. For surely every creature is more like unto God, than no creature, in as much as it hath a true being, which the negation or privation of a creature hath not. And yet you consider not that in this sense, nothing, hath an end of days. For as soon as the World began to be, forthwith ceased the being of nothing which went before it. But you proceed to take the word nothing in a more large signification, as when you forthwith say, The negation of all things is more like unto God than any one thing; You were as good say, that it is more like unto God, than God himself, yea then the Son is like unto the Father. What blasphemous conceits are these, & how fit for Atheists to make merry withal. And that you may not seem to run mad without all reason, you add a reason unto it, and the reason is this, Because no distinct or proper place of residence can be assigned to nothing, or to the negation of all things. A most absurd reason, and only plausible unto them, that have lost their wits, in the wilderness of their confused imaginations as you have done. For in such a sense no place can be assigned to the negation of all things, as makes it more base, than the vilest thing that is, so far of is it from advancing it to any likeness unto God above such things as have being at all. For therefore no proper place can be assigned to God, because he filleth all places, and if there were a thousand Worlds he should fill them all, nor by being contained in them, but by containing them, yet not locally containing them, but virtually. But therefore no place can be assigned unto the negation of all things, because it is uncapable both of place and being, whether, circumscriptive as bodies are capable of place; or desinitive, as Angels are said to be in place; or repletive, as God is said to be in all places. Nay it is not so much capable of place, as accidents are, which are in places not per se of themselves, but per accidens, as they affect bodies, which are in place of themselves. For in very truth, the negation of all things never had, nor hath, nor ever shall or can have, any such existence, as propositions attribute to negations or privations. For it was ever false, & is, and shall be to say, Nihil est; For as God all ways is, and that necessarily: so it is impossible, that this proposition should be true Nihil est. Yet that it may in some sort appear, that this your wild discourse proceeds from the zeal of the glory of God, that so you may advance him, above that which is most like him, to wit above nothing or above the negation of all things, you tell us, that this nothing is most unlike him. Yet this also is a new nonsense, namely that, that which is most like unto God, and that for eternity and immensity, prime branches of God's infinity, should be most unlike him; and herein you manifestly contradict yourself. For if it be most unlike him, than every thing is more like unto God than it, which before you denied; and to the contrary affirmed, that no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe was so like unto God as it, to wit, as nothing. Yet now you say even this nothing, is most unlike him: and as it were to endoctrinate our plumbeous cerebrosities, and to supply our insufficiency of proovinge so acquaint a point of Metaphysical untruthe, namely that this name nothing is most unlike unto God, you help us in a friendly manner with a reason hereof, and that is this, because for sooth nothing is truly, and absolutely no where. But why did you not add, that as it is no where, in respect of place, so it never was, nor is nor shall be in respect of time; nor is it possible that it should be, like as it is impossible that God should not be. For nihil esse, est Deum nonesse: to say that nothing is, is to say that God is not, or to deny that God is. But you proceed to exercise your wit in disparaging nothing; and whereas before you said, that it was no where; next you say, that It is not in itself; as if to be in itself, were some kind of being some where. And you add as it were a reason hereof, when you say, non entis non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio. But this reason is as good as the rest. For that nothing should be in itself, it is not requisite, that it should have either action, quality, or real condition. Or if it had either of these, it should not be in nothing. And why should you account it a condition of being, to be in nothing? You add that nothing cannot have any right or title to be accounted itself; a wondrous strange assertion. For if it be not itself, than it is not the same with itself; if it be not the same with itself, than it is different from itself, & that in something. For if in nothing it be diferent from itself, than every way it is all one and the same with itself. But if in something you conceive it to be different from itself, it behoves you to show what that something is, wherein nothing is said to be different from itself. But if nothing can be alleged, wherein it differethe from itself, then surely it is the same with itself, and consequently it hath good right and title to be itself. You proceed in your unprofitable subtleties, and tell us, that we may truly say some objective conceits are nothing. Yet surely every conceit is something, but the objects of some conceits, perhaps your meaning is, are nothing. Now the objects of conceits are the things conceived. You might then as well have said, that somethings conceived are nothing. And it is a truth; for Chimaeras may be conceived, and Tragolaphoi, and Centaurs, and after a sort privations and negations also, which yet are no real thing. But we cannot rightly conceive (you say) that nothing should have any degree or kind of being. And I say, that neither is any such conceit requisite to maintain, that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it self. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no being, than this proposition Nihilest, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in maintaining this proposition you have proceeded so far, as to affirm that nothing hath neither beginning nor end of days, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternity. Want of being, you say, is the worst kind of barrenness. But is it not more sober to affirm, that want of being is no kind of barrenness at all. For barrenness implies being. And why should you put yourself to such pains of phrasifyinge, in proovinge that nothing cannot bring forth any rank of being? since no such thing is needful to this, to wit, that nothing may have right or title to be termed itself; taking it as an affirmative proposition, wherein nothing is the subject, not as a negative, wherein the word nothing is only a sign of an Universal negative. For in this latter acception, it is utterly untrue, seeing every thing may be termed itself, as in saying a man is a man, and so is a mouse a mouse; and so the negation of all things (which is your own description of the word nothing) is also, itself, to wit, the negation of all things. And so it is true to affirm that nihil est nihil.  
Thus far you have discoursed of nothing; now you come to discourse of something, or rather of God.  
And God, you say, cannot be said to have being no where, before the World was made, but with this limitation, save in himself. But I judge this to be a very improper speech, as that which supposeth Gods being in himself to be a kind of being somewhere, which in my opinion is untrue.  
The truth is, God is in himself, but not as in place. And to be in place, here, or there, or every where, is a denomination too base to be attributed unto God: who as Durand say is no where that is in no place secundum se, in respect of his essence, but every where by his effects, as filling all places, all bodies, all Spirits, whether of men or Angels with his effects. You say, he is so in himself as that he is more than all things. But consider I pray, how is plurality a fit attribute for indivisible unity? Yet 'tis ●ue, he can produce more than all things of this world of creatures put together, are. You say he is longer than time; I had rather say, He is more ancient than days; because he is eternal, & being eternal and all mighty could have made time more ancient than it is. You say, he is greater than place; It had been more fit to say, he is greater than space; because the greatest place, is but the hollow superficies of the uppermost heaven, the spacious body whereof is far greater; and God greater than it.  
Yet is this a very improper speech, because comparisons ought to be of things in the same kind. But God's greatness & the world's greatness are far different in kind; the greatness of the world, being quantitas motis, quantity of extension; & the greatness of Gods being quantitas virtutis, quantity of spiritual perfection. Yet in this sense it may pass. He is virtually greater than the space of this world, because he could & can produce a greater space than this. You say he is more infinite than capacity itself; Belike you suppose capacity to be infinite, in saying God is more infinite. But created capacity cannot be infinite; though greater, and greater it may be in infinitum, yet still finite; and this is all the infinity, that we do or can conceive by succession or addition; & so God's power to produce greater neither doth nor can receive any bounds or limits. And as God is able to enlarge time and place, so is he able to limit it, but by your leave with distinction. It is not possible that time past should be made less, than it is. But if I mistake not you overlashe, when you say, that God by his essential presence or coexistence is able to limit time and place. For as the limitation of things proceeds from God's will, not from his essential presence; so likewise, it is God's power that denominates him able to limit all things according to the pleasure of his will, and not his essence, or essential presence or coexistence. It is true, that nothing could have beginning or continuance of being but by him: and it is true also, that all other things have had beginning, and still have continuance, and that from him. Though this was no Article of the Peripatetics faith, yet it is an Article of our Christian faith. And herehence, to wit, from Gods preserving all things, and working in all things, doth Aquinas infer, that God by his essence (not only by his power) is in all things, because, and that according unto Aristotle's doctrine, Movens & motum must be simul. But then again you know, or may know how this inference is impugned by Scotus and his followers. As if this were the 
Scot 1. sect. dist. ●7. qu. 1.  property of a finite Agent, to work only on things indistant from it. But God being an infinite Agent, they conceive it to be his property, to be of power to work upon that which is distant from him; if by supposition, it were possible, that God were distant from any thing, or any thing from it. And therefore though if he be in all things, at the centre of their supportance as you phrasifie; yet this is to be in them only by his power, and operation; and great Schoolmen have peremptorily denied, that herehence it can be sound inferred, that he is in all things by his essence. It is untrue that things in succession, may be in number infinite. They may by succession be more and more without end; but never shall they come to be infinite. Likewise it is impossible that God should be in more things than those that are, or may be; because it is impossible that there should be more things, than those that are or may be. And withal I wonder, how you can maintain that God is in those things that yet have no being, but only may be.  
3. You have discoursed so long of infinity, that your discourse seems to be transfigured into it. For the sentence, wherewith you begin this Section, hath no end, no way out of it. Had the evaporation of proud fantastic melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious presence, in that late prodigious questionists brain, which would bring us out of the sunshine of the Gospel, into old Egyptian darkness. Here your Reader becomes erect, to understand, what then: But you falling upon giving a reason of the last clause, by way of parenthesis, utterly forget to make up the sense of your former sentence. This Questionist you speak of, seems by that which followeth, to be Vorstius. For his opinion is, that of enclosing God in the Heavens, and excluding his essential presence from this inferior World, which was (as you report) first brought forth in Egypt. So that it seems, the Egyptians were long ago troubled with this disease, arising from the evaporations of proud fantastic melancholy, as well as Vorstius; yea and some Nations too. You say indeed it was not propagated to many Nations, thereby implyinge, it was propagated unto some. Only few Philosophers of the better sort entertained it (as you say) except Aristotle or the Author of the book De Mundo. You would say, I take it, that no Philosophers of the better sort entertained it, except Aristotle etc. as it lieth, your sentence is incongruous. But herein, you say, Vorstius did descent from them, in that he held that God was and is every where by his power and immediate Providence. This error of his, you censure as exceeding gross and unsufferable in that he makes God's infinite power, wisdom, and goodness in whole sweet harmony, Divine Providence especially consisteth, but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majesty: as if his infinite Majesty only were full compeer to his essence; unsitting to be employed abroad, or to keep residence any where save in the Court of Heaven. Concerning Vorstius, I profess, I never found any such sufficiency in him, especially for Metaphysical discourse, as should make any man zealous of salving his reputation. And that the essence of God should be confined to one place, more than to another, yea to the Court of Heaven, rather than to the basest corner of the earth, is so absurd to my judgement, that I profess ingenuously, all the reason and wit that I have, is not sufficient to make it good of Angels, as being Spirits abstract from material extension. And I will remember how Aquinas 
So Scotus understands him. 2. dist. 2. q. 6. Durand. in 1. dist. 37. quest. 1.  makes Angels to be in place, only in respect of their operation. And places are for the natures of bodies, and not of Spirits: and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angels, and such things, as I am willingly content they should continue as they do without the reach of my comprehension. How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place, then to another. And indeed, to my judgement, to be in place, is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God. And Durand as already I have showed, professethe that God secundum se is in no place, but only secundum effectus, and so every where, for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects. And as God is said to have been in seipso in himself, before the World was made, is he not so to be accounted still? according to those verses of course in this argument. 
Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter eum nihil esses:  
Tunc ubi nunc inse, quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.   
And is there not reason for it: For God's essence hath no respect to outward things, as his power hath, and his operation hath. And see, whether by ascribing place to him, you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo, which opinion but erst you impugned. For suppose many Angels existent in the air, (as some are called Princes of the air,) and so within the hollow of the moon, and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollow of the moon, the bodies and spheres of the Heavens only remaining. It will not follow herehence that the Angels supposed to be within the hollow of the moon, shall be annihilated, because they being abstract substances, and undependant on any matter, shall exist still, and consequently shall be in Uacuo. For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies, not of Spirits. And who doubts, but that God could have created spiritual substances only, and not bodily; in which case they must be said to be in Uacuo, or no where without them. Then again suppose these Spirits themselves within the hollow of the moon should be annihilated; yet God shall not cease to be existent there, upon the annihilation of Angels, like as Angels did not cease to exist there, upon the annihilation of bodies: and consequently God himself shall exist in Vacuo; and all this cometh to pass by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence, and from his power. Do not all confess that God is no where without himself as contained, but only as containing? now to contain is the work of his power, and of his will, & not of his essence, save as his essence, and power, and will are all one reality in God. And so God may be said to be every where, not only three manner of ways, to wit, by his essence, by his presence, & by his power: but more manner of ways, to wit, by his knowledge, by his wisdom, by his will, by his goodness. Yet all these shall be but one way, as all these are but one in God. But yet in proper speech as God's essence is no where, but it may content us to say, that God ever was and is in himself only: so his goodness is no where, but in himself, his knowledge, wisdom, and understanding no where but in himself; his will & mercy and justice no where but in himself; his power to make, to preserve, to work no where but in himself: but the operations of all these united in himself, are every where, and so saith Durand; God fillethe all things with his sweet influence and effects of his power, wisdom, and goodness, all which are as it were the Trinity of his one essence. Thus we may say, his power, and wisdom, and goodness reacheth unto the earth, and to every thing within this canopy, either by way of influence natural, or by way of influence gracious; like as in the Palace of the third Heaven, by way of influence glorious. All which are not properly his wisdom, and power, and goodness, but rather the effects of them; of them I say, which yet are all one thing with his essence. But God's essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward things, as his wisdom, power, and goodness do both, in the way of mercy, and in the way of judgement.  
It implies contradiction to affirm his power, or wisdom to be more infinite than his essence, if so be we conceive his power, and wisdom to be his essence. And yet to be in many places more than another thing is, is not to make it infinite, because all places put together, are but finite, much less to make it more infinite.  
Not only some great Schoolmen, as you speak, but all of them for aught I know to the contrary, distinguish of Gods being in all things by his essence, by his power, by his prosence; and so the vulgar verse runs, 
Enter, praesenter. Deus est, & ubique potenter;  although they take several courses in the explication of them, as we may read in Vasquez. Three of which explications, 
Vasq. in 4. cue 〈◊〉. art. 3. disp. 30.  he takes upon him to confute, to wit, that of Alexander Halensis, as also the way of Bonaventure, and lastly the way of Durand: & resteth himself upon the explication of Aquinas, followed as he say by Cajetan, Albertus, Aegidius, Ricardus, Capreolus, & Gabriel, & the exposition there set down is this. 1. God is in all things by his essence, because his substance is not distant from things, but joined with them, whether in respect of himself, or in respect of his operation. 2. By his presence, because he knows all things. 3. By his power, because his power reacheth unto every thing. Now I freely profess, I cannot satisfy myself in this distinction. And to my judgement, presence is only in respect of essence, or of that individual substance whatsoever it be, which is said to be present, whether it hath knowledge or no, what power soever it hath much or little, & whether it work or no. Now the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power. And God indeed cannot be said, in proper speech, to be more distant from one place or thing, then from any other. But he may be said, I confess, to be in one place more than in another, in as much as he doth manifest himself more in one place, then in another. He is in all places as the Author of nature, & communicating the gifts of nature; in special sort he is said to be in his Church as the Author of grace, & communicating the gifts of grace, but in most special manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory, & communicating himself in glorious manner unto his Angels and Saints; all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power, then of his essence. For how is God said to be in any thing? as contained? by no means, but rather as containing; which containing is a transient operation of God, proceeding from his power, & his will. Thus say the Apostle God is not far from every one of us; for as much as in him we 
Act. 17. 27. 28.  live, & move, & have our being. And mark but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius, according to the best opinion, in his judgement, to wit, according to that of Aquinas. God is in all things by his essence, because his substance is not distant (& this is most true, I confess; for certainly he is no more distant in place from a mouse, then from an Angel) but he is joined with the things themselves, whether in respect of himself, or of his operation.  
So than if God's operation be joined with the things themselves, it sufficeth, (by this opinion) to maintain, that God is present with them by his essence; yet if you consider it well, you shall find, that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power; for that was expounded thus; God is in the whole Universe, by his power, because his operation reacheth unto every thing. Next, consider, how God is in every thing by his presence. First, to say that God is in every thing by his presence, seems a very absurd manner of speech: for it is as much as to say, that God is present in every thing by his presence. Then consider the explication of it. He knoweth all things, therefore he is present with all things: Now this seems very absurd. For we read that God revealed to Elishah, what was done in the King of Arams' 
2. King. 6. 1●.  privy Chamber; might therefore Elishah justly be said to have been present in the King's privy Chamber? We know the number of the Stars, what therefore, are we present with them? God foreknows things to come, is he therefore present with them also, which yet are not? Vasquius himself professed before, in confuting the opinion of Durand, that Nothing is said to be present with another, unless that other thing were conscious thereof, and he proved it out of the digests, and out of the law Coram; Coram Titio aliquid fecisse jussus non videtur praesente eo fecisse, nisi is intelligat; & also out of the 112. epistle of Austin, plane sorsitan satis est, si praesentia hoc loco intelligamus, quae praesto sunt sensibus, sive animi, sive corporis, unde etjam ducto vocabulo. praesentia nominantur. As if praesens were as much as prae sensibus. To this I may add that of Aeneas in Virgil, when the cloud wherewith his mother Venus had covered him, vanished away, than he breaks out into these words Coram, quem quaeritis adsum Troius Aeneas. But now consider, according to this interpretation of the word present God shall be said to be present with none, but with intelligent creatures: for such alone can know him and take notice of him; and because but few of them take notice of him; therefore he can be said to be present, but with a few of them also. Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods being in 
Aquin in 〈◊〉. qu. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 3.  all things by his presence, is quite of a contrary nature, to wit, because God knows them, and not because they know or take notice of him. Last of all, to be every where by his power, is said to be in this respect, that his operation reacheth to every thing. Now who seethe not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation, and actual working, then of his power to work. And if we ascend to the ca●se of his operation, we must ascend not only to the power of God, but even to his wisdom, and goodness, as which is the cause of his operation, as well as his power. And if we look for some thing more proper, to admit this denomination than other, we must take notice of his will, rather than of his power, as which is the most immediate cause of his operation. For infinite power to be able to reach every possible effect, is no more, then to be able to produce it, or being produced to preserve it, or to work in it, or by it, whatsoever it pleaseth, which is nothing pertinent to the being of it, therein as in a place, which belongs to essence rather than unto power: For when I am said to be here and there, the meaning is not, my power is here or there, but my person, which is properly said of me, because I am a body, to which kind or natures, place properly belongeth. But as touching the essence of God, that being spiritual & infinite, it is not capable of any place to contain it, but rather it contains every thing: in which respect yourself have already observed, that by the Hebrews he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place itself. Now judge, whether God may be said in any congruity to contain bodies by his essence, or Spirits either created; and whether that were not to signify, that bodies and Spirits created, were of the essence of God. Neither is it proper to say, that God by his essence doth work either the creation or the conservation of outward things, but rather by his understanding, power, and will. For to work by essence, is to work in the way of natural Agents necessarily, but to work by wisdom & will, is to work after the way of free Agents, freely. If God were every where, (according to the saying reported and avouched by you) before there was any distinction of times; then surely God also was every where before there was any distinction of place. For certainly distinction of time, and distinction of place began together.) And must you not hereby be driven to the acknowledgement of a Vacuum before the World was, and that containing distinction of parts, in such sort, as to make way for the denominations of here and there, and every where, and that God was therein, and every where therein, before the World was? which opinion yourself in this very section have impugned. To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power, in case his knowledge were not infinite; or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite, I judge to be a very vain thing; because it is impossible that the one should be infinite without the other. For seeing many things cannot be brought to pass without knowledge; like as without knowledge none of such things can be brought to pass at all: so likewise, without sufficiency of knowledge, such things could not be brought to pass, as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to perform them. And if God had but a finite power, he could foreknow no more things, than could be brought to pass by that finite power. It is true, God is, where any thing is, but how? as containing it, not as contained by it; but it is untrue, that God is, where any thing may be. For without the Heavens something may be; but God is not without the Heavens. For without the Heavens is Uacuum; but God is not in Uacuo, as before yourself have disputed. And indeed how should he be there seeing he could neither be there as containing, nor as contained. For that which is nothing, is neither fit to contain, nor fit to be contained. In fine, I observe, how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads; The one is his creation; the other, his preservation of them. And so I confess, God is not distant from any of us; for as much as we live and move, and have our being in him as the Apostle speaketh.  
4. The two ways as you make them of Gods being every where, as you construe the Prophet jeremy, are by Piscator conceived to be but one; the latter words, Can any hide himself in secret places, that I should not see him? being but an explanation of the former, Am I a God at hand, and not a God a far off. As much as to say, that God seethe as well things done in earth, as things done in Heaven. So that in Scripture phrase, things done in earth are called things done a far of, God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension. Whereas God is said to fill Heaven and Earth, hence it is that God is said to be neither circumscriptively in place as bodies are, nor definitively as Angels are, but repletively, that is filling all things; but how? that is say Durand with his effects.  
God doth more than fill Heaven and Earth. For he hath made them, and doth maintain them, not only fillethe them with all creatures fit for them.  
Water fills the bucket, and the bucket contains the water: But God forbid we should so conceive of the nature of God, as by filling the Heavens and the Earth, to be contained in them.  
His infinite power and wisdom serves his turn first to make them, afterwards to preserve them, and unto proper & congruous ends to order them, and with his various effects to fill them, but not with his essence, lest we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence, and maintain that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have showed. Undoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earth, as with the Angels and Saints in Heaven, and no more distant or absent from us, then from them.  
But how is God present? Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Augustine's exposition of the word present; for God is no sensible thing, for than he were corporal, and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose. God doth coexist with every thing that is. For they do exist, and God doth exist: But doth God coexist with them in time? they do exist in time, that is their measure of duration, but God in eternity that is the measure of his duration, to wit himself.  
They do exist in place, that is the measure of corporal extension; but doth God exist in place, who hath no extension? doth he not rather exist in his own immensity which is all one with himself, like as is his eternity? In a word, the several beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses. 
Insunt pars, totum, Species, Genus, & calor igni.  
Rex in Regno, res in sine locoque locatum.   
Now see whether any of these are compatible unto God. Yourself have observed and approved the Hebrews conceit in calling him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place. Let this then pass for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures, whether visible or invisible, corporal or spiritual, namely that as he hath made them, so he contains them, praeserves them, ordereth them, fillethe them all with his effects, and works the good pleasure of his own will in them, and by them. And this his presence, it is impossible he should withdraw from them, ●ave as he shall be pleased ●o destroy them, and take all being from them; and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worm, as from the most glorious Angel. But to talk, of God's piercing or penetrating all things not with his effects only, but with his essence, as the light pierceth the air, I dare not entertain any such gross conceit of the most simple and spiritual nature of God, for fear attributing extension unto his essence, and such as should continue though the World were destroyed, and make room for the essence of God, to extend itself in Uacuo, and the parts thereof (which are merely imaginary) as well as in the World, and in the parts thereof, like as before I have argued. The power of God doth exercise itself, according to the pleasure of his will: And therefore it seems wondrous strange to me, that you should ascribe power to God, to dispose of his essence, as touching the placing of it in space local.  
Neither do I see cause, why glorious Angels should be required to prepare a place of residence for God, more than bodies inglorious.  
God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worm, as in the most glorious Angel. And so far forth as it beto God's essence to be every where, I presume no sober Divine will maintain, that it is other than a natural attribute unto God, & not in his power freely to dispose of his essence either otherwise, or so.  
And therefore when you ask, whether upon the creating of a new Heaven, it is not possible that God should be therein? I answer; look in what sense God is said to be any where, in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here. And yet without all change in them, though not without change in things without him, one creature being annihilated, and another created a new. And though Angels be subject to change, yet God is not. But when you shall prove that change is no fruit of impotency, I will reno●nce the Prophet that lay, The Lord is not changed, and 
Mal. 3. 6.  take you for my Apostle. And surely if not to be changed, were to be impotent; how impotent must God needs be, 
jam. 1. 17.  with whom is no variableness nor shadow of change?  
5. God's immensity is no more subject to his will and power to be straightened, than his eternity: But as God is not in time, that being a measure only fit for creatures subject to mutation, but in his own eternity, which is all one with himself: So neither is he in place a measure fit for creatures only subject to extension, but in his own immensity, which is all one with himself. And as by his eternity he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times: so by his immensity doth he comprehend all places. So that neither do we say, that the first could not be, neither do we say, that this your second way can be. Only we dare not say, the essence of God doth pierce all things; lest we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature, some kind of extension.  
And how can you avoid it, in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all things; how, I say, can you avoid the maintaining of God's essence to be changeable from place to place, (upon supposition that the World may move either Eastward, or Westward, farther than it is) or that his essence is in Uacuo, and that after a manner of extension, as before hath been argued. Now you tell us, that mutability is imcompetent with infinity: yet in the very next section foregoinge, you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change, as Angels do their mansions, when they mislike them. Of which course of Angels, either as touching their mistake, or change of mansion I am nothing conscious, as neither am I of any oracle tending that way.  
By your leave; there is no proportion between God's immensity in respect of all places filled by him, and the infinity of his nature.  
For seeing place and created things can be but sinite, his immensity this way, never extends farther than to the filling of a finite creature. Neither do you well to confound distinction with limitation, as if they were all one. For when we distinguish God's power, and wisdom, and goodness, or the Persons in the Trinity, hereby we do neither limit the nature of God, nor the Persons, nor his attributes.  
It is true, that God is the supporter of all things, and in this respect, the Apostle acknowledgeth, that He is not far 
Act. 17. 27. 28.  from any of us, for as much as In him we live, and move, and have our being.  
6. You say that God was, when nothing was. A most improvident speech, and as good as sack and sugar unto Atheists. For it is as much as to say, that God was nothing, or that sometimes God was not. But eftsoons you alter this dangerous form of words, and tell us that God was, when nothing was beside himself. Without all peradventure, before the creation of the world, there was neither distinction of time, nor of place. Though you do not clothe God with an imaginary space as without him; yet may you do as great wrong, to imagine such a space in the nature of God, as it seems you do, and that you call immensity. For you say, such an imaginary space should be a check to his immensity, as being a parallel distance local. So that you seem manifestly to acknowledge a distance in God's nature, but you would not have it checked by any parallel distance as immense as himself. This imagination is wondrous gross. Whereas on the contrary, I find none to conceit of any immensity in God, otherwise then as he is said to fill all places; and therefore before places or bodies are existent, only a power and ability is in God to fill all places; & that filling, Durand professethe to be in respect of the effects wrought by him, & wherewith he fills all places, not with his essence piercinge all things as you discourse, as if it were as big as the World, or as an infinite World: & yet you think to charm this extravagant conceit, with calling it indivisible.  
And so the light of the Sun which fills the world, with manifest extension, is yet indivisible.  
God's essence, you say, contains the Heavens. I would, you would consider this phrase well, & what it imports.  
If you were asked what the essence of man contains, would you say, that it contains any thing more than that, which is of the essence of man, as Animal rationale? Yet without making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your own conceits, you say that the essence of God contains the Heavens. May you not as well say, that the essence of God made the Heavens?  
I had thought it had been a more congruous speech, to say, that God by his power & will made the Heavens, & so doth preserve and contain them rather than by his essence. For in respect of essence, only such things are attributed unto God, as do necessarily belong unto him; as for example that he is, eternal, unchangeable, omnipotent, most wise, most good. But no sober man would say (I think) that God is the creator, preserver, conteyner of all things by his essence. But these attributes belong unto him by the freedom of his will. I nothing doubt, but that if the World were a thousand times bigger than it is, God should be as intimately coexistent to every part of it, as he now is to any part of this Heaven & Earth, which we now see. For all things that live or move or have any being, do & must live, & move, & have their being in him. But yet, as it is by his will that he made them, and not by his essence: so it is by his will, and not by his essence, that he doth preserve them.  
You pursue the phrasifying of your own conceits according to your own pleasure: But where do you find in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of God's essence through all things? Yet I confess Anselm say, that Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet; and whether you took it hand over 
Ansesm. Monolog. cap. 23.  head from him I know not: You seem to make God's essence a space of some spiritual extension; to which kind of conceit our imagination I confess, is wondrous prone; as if it did penetrate all things as light doth penetrate the air, and so fill all things with itself, and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it. Now this is a dangerous conceit and obnoxious to a foul error, and opposite to the simplicity of God's nature: which you perceive well enough, and therefore you think to check this error of conceit, by saying that he is indivisible, as if words would serve the turn to salve Gods pure simplicity.  
Durand I am sure professethe against this penetration which you are so enamoured with. Durand. 1. dist. 37. q. Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus penetrantem: sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei, non solum secundum durationem, quia & quando res sunt, nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec, virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus; quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum: sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui; For thus he writes, when we say, that God is in things, we do not understand him to be an intrinsicate part, or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them: but we understand him to be present to the thing, not only according to the duration thereof, in being when the things are, not by corporal touch, seeing he is not a body, nor any quality in a body, but according to order, which in Spirits, is answerable to situation in bodies. Which order in Spirits, excels situation in bodies in this respect; because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreme parts thereof immediately. But by order a Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part thereof.  
Our imagination, I confess, is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtle quantity penetrating all. But to conceive so of an Angel is too gross, how much more of God.  
Durand. 1. dist. 37. part. 2. qu. 1. num 17. Differentiae situs non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas, cujusmodi sunt Angeli. Huic autem contradicit imaginatio, quae non transcendit quantum & continuum, secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum. Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi, quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto, sicut a quali: & ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri, frigidi, aut calidi, & sic de caeteris qualitaetibus corporalibus: sic non sunt magni vel parvi, quia non sunt quanti, & per consequens hic vel ibi ratione suae essentiae, quia hae sunt proprietates quanti.  
The proper differences of corporal things say Durand are not to be extended to incorporal things, such as Angels are. Imagination contradicteth this, which doth not transcend quantities, according whereunto we fashion to ourselves Angels, as if they were of a most subtle quantity. But we do not well to follow imagination in this. For Angels are natures abstract as well from quantity as from quality; & therefore like as they are not white and black, cold and hit, and so of the rest of corporal qualities: and so they are not great or small, because they have no quantity, & consequently, are not here, or there, in respect of their essence, seeing these differences are proper unto quantity.  
But some may say, If God's essence be not here, where is it then? I answer that God is as much here as any where, and when I say God is here and every where, I do not exclude his essence. For by God I understand his essence. But I deny that he is here or any where else secundum ess●ntiam. as if his essence had any situation here, which kind of being is proper only to bodies, and not to Spirits, and makes God's nature subject to extension.  
We may be bold to say, that God's essence is indistant from every thing; For herein we go along with the Apostle, who saith, that God is not far from every one of us. For in him we live & move & have our being. But as for penetration of all things with God's essence, I leave that phrase to them that like it. As for Gregory's trimembred sentence, one part thereof alone is to your purpose, namely when he say, that God is intra omnia non ●nclusus. And indeed we all say, that God is so in all things as that he rather contains them, than is contained by them. Now which I pray is the more sober speech, to say that God's essence contains all things, or to say that God's power & will contains all things, let every learned and sober Reader judge.  
7. Though I deem it not much worth the while to search after this distinction in Anselm, the place whereof you conceal. Yet I have taken that pains to the end I might the better consider in what sense, and upon what ground of reason he doth deliver it. And in his Monologion I find he discoursethe of Gods being in time and place. But no such distinction can I find in him, nor any such assertions as you impute unto him. In his 19 chap. he disputethe that God is in no place and time. In the 21. How he is in all places, and in no place. In the 22. That It may be better understood that God is said to be always then in all time. In the 23. How it may be better understood, that God is said to be every where then in all places. But that it is fitter to be said of God that he is with place, then in place, I find no where nor in any place in Anselm. Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselm, and as well approved of good writers, but who they are, you keep to yourself. Notwithstanding you tell us, that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction, is unblamable in two respects. 1. For that it conceals much matter of admiration (which the description of immensity used by Barnard and others, doth promptly suggest. 2. Because it doth occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence. As touching the first; I see nothing to the contrary, but that Gods being with every place, doth every way contain the very same matter of admiration, which his being in every place doth. For the wonderful nature of his immensity in plain terms is but this, (though it may be phrasified divers ways as it pleaseth the writer) that he contains all things and is contained in none. Now this may as well be signified, by saying God is with every place, as by saying God is in every place. For being with a place is indifferent to admit, such a manner of being with it, as namely by way of containing it. But being in a place, doth rather incline to signify a being contained by it. Which is opposite to the active containing of it. Place say the Durand, may be 
Durand. 〈◊〉. dist. 37. q. 2.  considered two ways, either as a natural thing, or as containing the thing placed. As it is natural thing, so God is in every place; but as it contains the thing said to be in it, so he is in no place. For he contains all, and is contained of none. As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence, to my judgement, your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all things, hath been very prone thereunto. And how to be with every thing, doth more include a coextension of nature, then to be in every thing, I cannot possibly conceive. But I pray in what sense of truth, or truth of sense, can you aver that every body is with every place? You may as well avouche that every worm here on earth is with the Sun, or with the place of the Sun. And can the mathematical dimensions of a bodily substance, be accounted the place, of that bodily substance, that you should say, Every bodily substance is with the mathematical dimensions thereof, and that even there where you speak of a substance his being with a place? And why you should term them mathematical dimensions rather than Physical I know not.  
You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body, so as not to be contained in them, doth exclude all conceit of coextension. But I see no reason for this assertion: it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all things, then hinders or excludes the conceit of coextension with the things that are: especially whereas you maintain that God is in all things not only as containing them (with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence, as I have showed, but rather in respect of his power and will) but by way of penetration through all, and that in respect of his essence, (and not in respect of his power only) like as light is diffused through our Hemi sphere; which similitude I am bold to add, because you fail in affording us any resemblance to succour our capacity of apprehension this way. But I dare not adventure upon such an apprehension, because in my opinion it is too gross to be attributed to the nature of God. I content myself with this, that as God before the world, was in himself, so he is in himself still according to that old verse, 
Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.   
But then nothing being made, he had nothing to contain, & govern, and work by or in, as now he hath. As touching all other manner of being in all things, I content myself with ignorance. You magnify Trism g●sts definition of God's immensity, and much good do it you. It is suitable with your discourse. But do you remember what censure Aristotle passed upon Empedocles, for this figurative & obscure manner of expressions in Philosophical discourse? And indeed when we take pains in searching out the truth, why should we encumber ourselves with resolving figures into plain speeches, that so we may have something whereon to dispute. Heretofore you told us that God was the centre of all things, and that of supportance: now out of Trismegist you tell us, that God hath a Centre and that every where, but not of supportance passive I think, as whereby he should be supported, but of supportance active, whereby he supporteth all things. Now hereof we can easily find both a centre and a circumference. For Gods supporting of the earth, may well be accounted the Centre, and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accounted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earth. In as much as there is no divine supporting without it, at least of material creatures, but all with it. Though it be true, that God could & can make the world much bigger than it is. But Gods will hath herein circum●scibed himself, thus far to proceed as he doth, in supporting all things & no farther. I do not like your phrase of enlarging the actual coexistence of God's essence. For dare any sober divine say, that God's actual existence hath bounds, and that these bounds may be more or less enlarged? And yet the face I confess of your discourse, looks hitherwardes. How then do you say, that the bounds of God's coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged? The only way to help it, is to say, that God's existence is never enlarged, but the existence of creatures, by the increasing of new, may be enlarged, and consequently God's coexistence with them may be said to be enlarged, not that his existence is more than it was, but that the existence of created substances, is more than it was. And more creatures coexisting with God, then formerly there did, he doth coexist with more than he did. His existence is no greater than it was, nor hath no larger bounds than it had; but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God, more than formerly did exist. And yet the omnipotency of God hath pitched a circumference to God's coexistence with his creatures, and that is the circumference of the world. For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within. And albeit God could make the world greater and greater, yet still it should be but finite, & as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing, so likewise of Gods coexisting with them. To say, that God only truly is, is one of the paradoxes. That God alone is id quod est, that is, that whatsoever is attributed unto God, is essential to him, not accidental, I have often read. But that God only, truly is, I never read but in your writings. In him we live, and move, and have our being say Saint Paul: but this by your subtle commentary must be understood with a distinction: In him we live but not truly; in him we move but not truly, in him we have our being but not truly. That God contains all things, and is not contained in any thing, we easily grant. Spheres do contain by way of place; but I hope, you will not say, that God in such sort contains any thing; though therefore called by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because he containeth all things. And yet certainly, there is no Sphere contains so much, but that a square figure may contain as much, though not under the same limits. And can any man make doubt, but God could make a World of a square figure, that should contain as much as this World doth, though in this case the Circumference of the World should be greater than now it is? But because that all things cannot comprehend God, therefore you say, He is rightly resembled to a sphere, whose Circumference is no where.  
A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible, and fit matter for Atheists to make themselves sport withal, I say impossible more than one way.  
For first, it is a thing impossible, that a body should be infinite.  
Secondly it is impossible, that a body infinite should be Spherical. If you ask, of what figure then should it be? my answer is, it should be of no figure. For figures are the bounds of quantities; & it is contradiction to make a boundless quantity consist of bounds; or a bounded and figured quantity without bounds. And yet, if all this were received as fit, and convenient, what shall we gain thereby, when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporal, who indeed is merely spiritual? For I do not think you look to find spheres any other where then among bodies.  
We read and hear of the Spheres of Heaven; but I never read or heard of the Spheres of Angels or Spirits, as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are, much less is any such figure fit to resemble God. Yet upon these conceits as extraordinary achievements of yours in the way of Metaphysical discourse, you proceed in the next place to the solution of certain difficulties; that so Drismagist his definition of God's immensity, may find the more easy admittance, into the Articles of our imagination, if not into the Articles of our Creed. Which yet truly I should not have excepted against, but rather have admitted, if to no other end, yet to this, even to cut of curious speculations about the immensity of God; had you not so far magnified it, as if it had been some Oracle of nature's light, and made use of it, not as a Rhetorical flash, and diaculation only, but as a serious maxim to rely upon in Philosophical discourse; where the best decorum is, to make no use of tropes and figures, but of plain and proper terms, that we may not be to seek of our own meaning.  
8. Your former discourse about the Sphere, together with the Centre and Circumference (spoken of) of God's immensity, you perceive is likely to raise some Spirits; and therefore aforehand, you show a course how to lay them. The first is, How a Centre should be conceived to be every where? The second How the indivisibility of God's presence should be compared to a Centre? To the former, you answer, that As the Divine essence by reason of absolute insinity hath an absolute necessity of coexistence, with space or magnitude infinite; so were it possible there should be (as some Divines hold it possible there may be) a magnitude or Sphere actually infinite, this magnitude could have no set point for its centre, but of every point designable in it, we might avouch this is the Centre: Every point should have the negative properties of a spherical centre, there could be no inequality between the distances of several parts from the Circumference of that, which is infinite, and hath no bounds of magnitude. So then God by absolute necessity of nature must coexist with that, which neither doth exist, nor can exist by the opinion of most. For that an infinite body should exist, is not only by Aristotle and Aquinas proved, but most generally held to be impossible. But if such a thing be impossible to exist, it is also impossible that God should coexist with it; & consequently most false, is that which you say, namely that by reason of his infinity, it is absolutely necessary, that God should coexist with it.  
Now will it not follow herehence, that it is absolutely necessary, that God should not exist at all, and that by reason of his infinity? For to coexist with that which is impossible to exist, what is it, but not to exist at all? O' what dangerous consequences do your wild assertions go as it were with child, withal; and how fit are such lettuce for the lips of Atheists? mark how Durand discoursethe against this conceit of yours, as when you say, that by reason of his infinity God must be every where.  
Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse 
Durand. 1. dist. 37. p. 1 quest. 1.  ubique, ita quod infinitas suae substantiae sit ei, ratio ubique essendi, Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae hinc competi ei esse necessario ubique, vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut a contrario dicitur de Angelo quod ratione suae essentiae finite convenit ei esse in loco finito, & nullo modo in infinito.  
By the same reason we must say, it agreeth not to God to be every were, so as that the infinity of his substance, is unto him the reason of his being every where. For if it belonged to God to be every where in regard of his essence infinite, then necessarily he should be every where, or in an infinite place, and by no means in a finite place; like as on the contrary, it is said of an Angel, that in regard of his essence finite, it agreeth to him, to be in a finite place, by no means in a place infinite.  
Secondly you tell us, that some Divines hold it possible, there may be a magnitude or material sphere actually infinite. But you do not love to betray your Authors.  
I have read in a late Spanish jesuit a discourse to prove 
Petr. Hurtado de Mendosa. disp. in Vniversam Philosoph. Tract. de Infinito.  that infinitum potest dare. But in this he is a mere mountebank, and affectator of singularities, I have heretofore read also in Hills Philosophia Lencippaea, Democritica, so bold an assertion as this, That the World is infinite; Otherwise, saith he, the effect were not suitable to the cause. For God the Author of the World is infinite. But he was conscious of this his heterodoxy in the opinion of the World, & therefore would profess (as I have heard) that if in Oxford he should dispute thus, we in the University would cry out for a Limitor, for this Infinitor.  
And truly these and such like disputes, I reckon not worthy to be named the same day, with the demonstrations that are brought to the contrary. And I may take liberty to profess thus much, how that observing the jesuit before spoken of, Hurtado di Mendosa by name, to affect subtleties and curiosity of demonstration, in zeal of maintaining the truth, which as Austin sometimes saydo, A Deo dicitur verum quodcunque dicitur; I took leave of my better studies, destinated to the maintenance of God's grace against all Pelagian, jesuitical, and Arminian oppositions, and to examine the arguments of Hurtado in that point, and went a large way in the solution of them, & confutation of his insolent assertion, until I thought it high time to return to such alien meditations; considering it might be a practice of Satan, to cast a ball of provocation in my way, and thereby to cause a diversion, from more grave, more seasonable and more profitable contemplations. But yet I profess I never heard or read before of any that maintained the possibility of a Sphere to be infinite, as that which implies a manifest contradiction. For figures being the bounds of quantities it should imply a bounded quantity without bounds. But in the fiction proposed, you say, every point should be the centre as pertakinge of the negative properties of a Centre: that is, there should be no inequality between the distances of several points from the Circumference of that which is infinite as for example. Suppose the world were infinite Eastward, & infinite westward. Now consider a direct line passing over S. Michael's mount to Dover and so forwards Eastward, & in like manner from Dover to Saint Michael's mount, and so forward, westward. From dover Eastward is infinite, and from Saint michael's Eastward is but infinite. So then these two are equal that is the part is equal to the whole. For the line from, Dover Eastward is but a part of the line from Saint michael's Eastward in infinitum. This contradictious absurdity amongst many other, followeth upon supposition of any body or extension infinite. By the way observe a great incongrutie; though you suppose a sphere infinite, yet you conceive it to have a Circumference. But to have a Circumference is not to be infinite. Touching the second difficulty, to wit, how the indivisibility of God's presence in every place may be compared to a Centre: You say, this comparison is right, in as much as God hath no diversity of parts. And indeed I find no small uniformity, between the beginning of this your discourse of God's immensity, and the end of it. For about the beginning you professed; that No creature, no positive essence no numerably part of this Universe, was so like unto God as notting; And now you say, he is rightly resembled to a point, which every man knows, is much about the same proportion, & quantity of just nothing. For immensity & eternity no Angel so like unto God as nothing: & again for his indivisibility, you say he is rightly compared to a point, which is as much as nothing. Of the sobriety of these your discourses, let the Reader judge. But you think to help the matter by saying, that His presence again is like to magnitude actually infinite, in that it can have no circumference. Now consider I pray, How will you make the Majesty of God amendes, for these your injurious comparisons, to wit, in comparing him, to magnitude actually infinite, which indeed is just nothing? For in the most general opinion of Philosophers & Divines, magnitude actually infinite, is a thing utterly impossible to have any being. And mark withal, how you contradict yourself. For here you suppose, that magnitude infinite can have no circumference; & but a little before, your discourse was of an infinite Sphere that had a circumference. At length notwitstanding your▪ former assertion of justifyinge the comparing of God's indivisible essence unto a centre, or point of magnitude; Now▪ you confess that the indivisibility of the one, and indivisibility of the other are heterogeneal, and consequently asymetrall, the best Philosophical truth I have hitherunto found in your discourse. But least all this while you should seem utterly extravagant in your incongruous comparisons of the nature of God to vile things, or rather to Nothings; first you mince this Philosophical maxim, as when you say, They are of times asymetrall; and than you corrupt it by interpretation as if asymetrall signified not absolutely incommensurable, but only not exactly commensurable. Whereas in truth you shall as soon prove the Diameter of a square commensurable to his, side as to prove the indivisible nature of God commensurable to a point of quantity. Est quoddam indivisibile, saith Durand, quod est aliquid quantitatis ut punctus: 
Durand. 〈◊〉. dist. ●7. quest. 2.  Aliud est indivisibile quod est totalitur extra naturam quantitatis, ut Deus. What an absurd thing were it to compare the soul of man to a point in a quantity; the soul being so indivisible as to be all in all, & all in every part; how much more so to compare an Angel, most of all the divine Essence? And the soul of man is much fitter to represent God by (man being made after the image of God) and God is all in all, and all in every part of the world, but not as forma informans, as the soul is, and consequently neither extended with the extension of the world, nor moved at the motion of the world; nor any part thereof. Hence you say it is that the most subtle Schoolmen or Metaphysical Divines as well ancient as modern, resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane wit; whether a mathematical point or centre, can be the complete, and definitive place of an Angel, albeit they hold the Angelical natures to be as truly indivisible, as points or centres are.  
I doubt there is little truth & sobriety in all this. If there be, I must confess● I was never acquainted with any of these concealed Schoolmen or Divines either ancient, or modern, at least in these particulars; For you tell me that, which I never heard or read of before; yet I have been acquainted with fopperyes more then enough, amongst them, & might have been with more, if I had any mind thereunto. But for the most part I have ever shunned those trifling subtleties. But consider we the particulars, which here you give us a part. For to make your assertion good, you are to show, not only that these Schoolmen you intimate, do hold the point you speak of irresoluble, but also that Hence they do hold it so; that is, because the indivisibility of centres, or points, & of spiritual substances are heterogeneal and asymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable.  
But let us consider the point itself, concerning a Mathematical point. Now I pray consider this: As Mathematical quantity is herein distinct from quantity Physical, because that is abstract from matter, this is not: so a Mathematical point, must herein be distinct from a point Physical, in as much as that is abstract from matter, this is not.  
Now quantity, and points Mathematical thus abstract from matter, are but only in imagination. And do the Schoolmen, you speak of, maintain it as a point irresoluble, whether an Angel may be defined within a point of imagination only? what were this, but to have no being at all but in man's imagination? Wherefore you may be advised, to let the question run rather of a point physical, then of a point Mathematical, unless you look for some succour, from that rule of course Mathematici abstrahunt, nec mentiuntur.  
Yet that would prove but a broken tooth and sliding foot, to keep you from error in this. But I think the Nominals are those most subtle Schoolmen you speak of; I envy not the glory which you give them, be it as great as that which Scaliger passeth upon Scot, Occam, and Sincet. The nominals are much magnified by Hurtado di Mendosa. And I find in Gabriel Biel such a question as this, Whether an Angel may determine unto himself a certain quantity of place, 
〈◊〉. 2. dist. 2. q. 1.  in such sort as be cannot coassist unto, or be defined by either a greater or a lesser, and the answer is said to be according to Occam in his Quodlibets 1. quest. 4. First that there may be given the greatest place of an Angel, so that he cannot extend himself to a greater. Secondly, there cannot be given the least place of an Angel, in such sort that he cannot define himself within a less. For my part I utterly dislike all these conceits of an Angel's power to extend or confine his own essence: it seems so opposite at first sight to a spiritual perfection, and so obnoxius to the imputation of corporal extension unto them. And I manifestly perceive how they puzzle themselves, in labouring to scatter such mists of scruples, as their own fancies raise, and are driven to profess, Nihil in his materiis tam absconditis puto temere asserendum. But 
Gabriel. 1. dift. 2. q. 3.  let every man make his own bed, and lie as soft as he can, I will not hinder any. But we are not hitherunto come to the point; you point at; yet neither Physical nor Mathematical, but that which I mean is your point Philosophical. (Pardon me, if I pick up by the way some crumbs of merriment to refresh my Spirit in so unpleasing an argument.) The reason why the least place, for an Angel to define unto himself, cannot be given is, because say he, Posset coassistere loco punctuali pro eo quod ipse est indivisibilis.  
Now you see we are upon the matter; and withal quite off from your assertion. For even these Nominals do not hold it to be a point irresoluble, as you speak, but resoluble, and they actually resolve it for the affirmative, to wit Gabriel Biel, after Occam. Now what will you say if they resolve it for the negative, and so both ways, namely both negatively and affirmatively, (which you say, they hold for a point irresoluble). And indeed they resolve it both ways: for I have not told you all; They interpose a caution, & the caution is this, Si possibilie esset locus indivisibilis: Whence you may easily guess what their meaning is; to wit, that indeed a punctual and indivisible place cannot be existent, and consequently neither can an Angel be defined therein, or coasist thereto; there is the resolution negative. But in case such a punctual place were possible than an Angel might coasist thereto; there have you the resolution affirmative, in both opposite to this assertion of yours.  
But who they be you speak of, that hold this point irresoluble, you conceal. And yet it may be, some such there are.  
For as Cicero sometimes said; there was nothing so absurd, but had been delivered by some or other of Philosophers: so the like may be verified of Schoolmen also: For amongst all kinds of humane writers there may be some vanities more or less, and some think most amongst Schoolmen; according to the censure passed upon them, Ab hoc tempore 
joan. Trit. Abbas Sphanheimensis. P. Dialect.  Philosophia sacularis sacram Theologiam sua curiositate muliti saedari caepit. From Angels, you proceed to God, and without scruple maintain, that he is as properly in every Centre as in every place; and I confess the reason here added why you may say so, is very sound, seeing we acknowledge him a like incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both. For surely a man may say, that which he doth acknowledge; but take no more along with you herein, then are willing to accompany you, & upon good terms.  
Now Occam and Biel propose certain terms, and they are these, si locus punctualis possibilis esset. But if such a thing be not possible, to say that God is therein, is to say that God is in nothing, and so you return to your old course of amplifyinge the immensity, or indivisibility of the glorious essence of God that made us. And whereas we are willing to acknowledge that God is in all things as containing them; I do not find that a point is of any conteynable nature. As for example, there is punctus lineam terminant; now suppose God contains the line, and contains not the point, shall the line herupon be without an end? I profess I cannot find any other thing in the notion of such a point, but negatio ulteriorie tendentiae, and what need hath this of the divine power to contain it? And surely the point which continueth a line, is nothing more than the centre of the earth, and of that you profess in the next chapter and second section, that it is a matter of nothing. The manner of God's indivisibility we conceive (say you) by his coexistence to a Centre: his incomprehensibleness, by his coexistence to all spaces imaginable; as much as to say. The indivisibility and incomprehensibleness of God, is best conceived, when we conceive his coexistence to such things as are found only in imagination, or to things that are, but have no reality in them, Now if God be all in all, and all in every part, is he not better conceived, by comparison with the soul of man, (which is made after the image of God) then by comparison to a base Centre, or things in imagination only? especially seeing Imaginatio non transcendit continuum. If God were more in a great place then in a less; than it would follow that an Ass' head should participate the essential presence of the deity (I speak in your own instance and phrase) in greater measure, than a man's heart doth. And do not you affect some popular applause in this discourse of yours, the vulgar sort being apt to conceive the contrary, namely that a man's heart participates the essential presence of the deity in greater measure, than an Ass' head: and by the same reason; they may conceive that a man's head participates the essential presence of the deity in greater measure, than an asses heart, which yet is as contrary to your assertion, as to the truth. But it is manifest hereby, more than enough, that your care is not so much for the investigation of truth, as to give satisfaction unto vulgar conceit.  
9 That God's immensity or magnitude, is not like magnitude corporal, as being without all extension of parts, as there is no doubt, so we need no great pains to satisfy reason, how this may be; especially to every Scholar, that knows but that received▪ Axiom even amongst naturalists concerning the soul, namely, that she is all in all and all in every part, not only in the least child new borne, but in the greatest Anakim that ever was, which in my opinion gives far better satisfaction, then by multiplying bare words, as in saying God is unity itself, infinity itself, immensity itself, perfection itself pour itself, which serve neither for proof nor for illustration. But if we go about to satisfy imagination, we shall never come to an end. For Imagination transcends not that which is continual, and hath extension of parts; and all your courses of illustration hitherunto have inclined this way. You speak in your own phrase when you say that all these before mentioned, to wit, unity, infinity, immensity, perfection, power are branches of quantity; whereas we have more just cause to profess that no quantity is to be found in God, no more then material constitution is to be found in him. We make bold to attribute unto God quantitatem virtutis, quantity of virtue and perfection; but every scholar should know that Analogum per se positum stat pro famesiori significato. And yet to speak more properby, the quantity of God, which we call quantitatem virtutis, and the quantity of bodies, which we call quantitatem motis, quantity of extension, have no proportion at all between them; but the term of quantity attributed to both, is merely equivocal. It is true, that if God were not, nothing could be, for as much as all other things have their being from him. But it is a very incongruous course, in my judgement, which you take, by multiplying of quantity material, to guess of God's immensity. And yet you should have observed a better decorum in your phrase, if instead of multiplication, you had putin the word amplification. For immensity is rather magnitude infinite than multitude. I cannot away with that which you subjoine, that imaginary infinity of succession or extension should be a beam of that stable infiniteness which God possessethe. Heretofore you called it a shadow, now a beam. And is this a proper course, to run out to the imagination of things impossible to represent God by? For whereto tendeth this, but to conceive him infinite, first by way of extension, which is quite contrary to spiritual perfection, and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be. Yet such courses, all they must needs take, that seek out to satisfy imagination. For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schools non transcendit continuum. You proceed to show how God's immens●ie hath no diversity of parts; and your argument intends to draw to an inconvenience as many as maintain the contrary. But the inconvenience which you infer depends only upon peradventure thus. A concurrence of all parts in number infinite, would perhaps be impossible; why then perhaps it would not be impossible; and what then shall become of your argument. Besides this; the whole frame of your argument is unsound. For infinite natures, such as man is, there is no necessity of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions, no nor to the performing of any action. As for example if he gives himself to study and meditate, there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his mind. If he playeth upon the Lute, there is no use of his legs and feet. If he fighteth with his enemies, there is no use of his tongue or teeth, nor so much use of his legs as of his hands, though sometimes one pair of legs is better than two pair of hands, yet not to fight, but to run away rather; though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Demosthenes sometimes said, being put to his wits to save the credit of his courage. Indeed if God were not as he is, he could not be so omnipotent as he is, we need no pains at all to prove this.  
10. We are never so safe in matter of divinity, as when we go along with scripture, & one place may easily prevent the mistaking of another, if we give ourselves to the due consideration of it, and submit unto those means which God hath apppointed for our edification. And the Scriptures represent his being every where in respect of two things. 1. In respect of knowing all things, as Why sayest thou o jacob 
Es. 40. 27. 28.  and speakest o Israel. My way is hid from the Lord, and my judgement is passed over my God. Knowest thou not, or hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God the Lord hath created the ends of the Earth, etc. 2. In respect of his power containing 
Psa. 119. 7 8. 9 10.  them, as whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend into Heaven thou art there, etc. Let me take the wings of the Morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea, yet thither shall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me.  
But to talk of God's essence penetrating and diffufed, is to vent such phrases, as I dare not adventure on, I have already told you, what I have read to the contrary, in some, naming my Author, as you take liberty to do the like, without naming of them.  
Quando dicimus (saith Durand) Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus 
Durand. 1. dist. 37. part. 1. q. 2  eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus rem penetrantem, ut magis infra patebit: sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem, quia est, quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem, quum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem, qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus fitum in corporibus, quia persitum se habet anum corpus ad aliud immendiate, quoad sui extremum: sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quod libet sui: saltem non est hoc dubium de Spiritu increato scilicet de Deo, quicquid sit de aliis: propter quod potest dici esse non solum juxtares, fed in rebus. And 
Ibid. p. 1. q. 1.  again in a question following, Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique, ita quod infinitas suae substantia sit ei ratio ubique essendi: sed est ubique solum ratione suorum effectuum (us dictum fuit in praecedente questione. Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae, tunc competeret ei esse necessariò ubique vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut à contrariò dicitur de Angelo, quod ratione suae essentiae finitae convenit ci esse in loco sinito, & nullo modo infinito. Esse autem ubique non est esse in loco infinito. Ergo infinitas Divinae essentiae non est ipsi ratio essendi ubique, quod tamen assumebat ratio aliorum.  
In a word, I have no edge to cast myself upon any curious inquisition hereabouts, because errors are dangerous about the nature of God, either in denying unto him, what is beseeming him, or ascribing such things unto him, as do unbeseeme him; which in the Schools are accounted certain kinds of blasphemies.  
I content myself with the simplicity of Scripture institution; which professethe, that God filleth Heaven and Earth, and this undoubtedly is true, as Durand say in respect of God's effects, wherewith he filleth all things; as also that he knoweth all things, that he cannot be any where as contained, but is every where as containing, governing, ordering, working the good pleasure of his will, in and by all things.  
Now whether God containeth all things by his penetrative and diffused essence, and not rather by his power and will, let every sober Reader judge.  
Before the World was, God was in himself, and so he is still; how his power is extended to the making and containing of his creatures, I easily conceive, but how his essence is extended, I conceive not. I conclude with those old verses. 
Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter eum nihil esset,  
Tune, ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibisufficit ipse.    

CHAP. VI  
Of Eternity, or of the branch of absolute infinities, whereof Successive Duration of the imaginary infinity of time is the model.  
I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition wherewith you begin your discourse on this Argument, as touching the exact proportion between immensity and eternity. For God's immensity is that whereby he is ubique or every where, like as by his eternity he is semper or always: But to be every where supposeth the creations, but to be semper always, doth not: For God was always ever before the world: Again God in proper speech hath true being, and consequently true Duration of Being, which having neither beginning nor ending is properly eternal. But God in proper speech hath no quantity, and consequently neither extension, and so in proper speech cannot be counted immense, which signifieth extension without beginning and end; and having no extension at all, being merely spiritual and not material. And ere you turn over a new leaf, yourself make doubt, whether Time hath the same proportion to eternity, as magnitude created hath to Divine Immensity. In a word, I do not believe you are like to find so many nothings to resemble God by in this argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of Immensity. That saying of Tertullian you mention, is no more appliable to God's eternity as 'tis said he was to himself Time, then to his immensity, as 'tis therein said he was unto himself a World; And for aught I see, God is so still, and not only was so before all things; in as much as he hath no more need of them, then before all things he had. You say we cannot properly say God was in time before the world was made; I say such a speech in my judgement seems to be neither proper nor improper; but directly false, even as false, as to say God was in place before he made the world: For before the world was made there was neither time nor place: Now he is in neither as contained in them, but only as containing both time and place, which before the World, absolutely were not at all, & consequently could not be contained by him. I do not think that Austin himself was conscious of any acuteness in inferring that God could not have been before all times, if he had always been in time; for common sense doth justify, that that leg which was ever in the stocks, was never out of the stocks. But whereas you say, that we believe God to be as truly before all times future, as before all times past, & seem to affect it as a subtlety of opinion herein.  
I willingly profess, that if it be a subtlety, it is of so subtle a sense, as quite passeth mine intelligence: I had thought it might be avouched of every thing that is past, that it is before all times to come: And that all future things are behind the things that are past.  
Neither had I thought any reason needful to be given of this: because common sense, I think doth justify it.  
Yet you seem to make this a peculiar property of God, that like as he is before all times past, so also he is before all times to come.  
Yet I guess at your meaning: For we now existent, albeit we are before the things that are to come, yet it is not necessary, that we should be after them. But God as he is before all, so, if it please him, he may be after all; For God is that which was, & is, & is to come; that is, which shall be, and that for ever of himself.  
Now this phrase; to be after all, in a sublimate strain of conceit attributed unto God, is more truly and perfectly to be accounted his being before all, then after all, in your opinion, as it seems; like as the Heavens invironning the Earth, though they seem to sense to be under the Earth, and under our Antipodes, yet indeed they are above them; So God in being after all things future, is more properly and truly to be accounted before them.  
This mystery I seem to find by your subsequentd iscourse and I wonder what you mean to carry yourself so in the clouds, when you might have expressed yourself plainly.  
And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your own phrase, above the apprehension of your Reader, when your terms are not sufficient to express your meaning. This is to equivocate like the Jesuits. Of that conceit of yours I will prepanre myself to consider against the time, I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof, in the pa●s subsequent of this Chapter.  
In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this. His eternity then is the inexhaustible fountain or Ocean, from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow.  
But I can neither justify this inference, nor the truth of the proposition inferred: For I know not from what premises of yours, it can be inferred.  
That, which went immediately before, was this: God is before all times future, as well as all times past; Now to infer that God was before all time, therefore all time flows from his eternity, is no good consequence. You might as well argue thus. God was before all place, therefore all places flows from God's eternity. We ourselves are before all times that are to come; but herehence it follows not, that all times to come flow from our eternity, or from us.  
Suppose Angels had been made before the World, yet would it not thence follow that the World did flow from them.  
Now for the proposition itself inferred, it is subject to exceptions diverse ways. The phrase, to flow, savoureth of a natural & necessary emanation, & so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a fountain. But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God.  
Natural emanations from God are not to be found but in God, and that in respect of the Persons; the Son being natural and necessarily begotten of the Father, & the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father & the Son.  
Again, the water that floweth from the fountain on from the Ocean, is of the same nature with the fountain, on with the water of the Ocean, so is not time of the same nature, with eternity from whence, you say, it flows.  
Again it is untrue that eternity produceth time or duration of things created: for the duration of them is nothing else, but the continuance of their existence.  
Therefore look what produceth the things themselves, & maintains them, being produced, from thence they are to be accounted to have their beginning. Now it is the power and will of God, whereby things are created and preserved, & not the eternity of God. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, & all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. We no where read, that by the eternity of God all things were made, Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth.  
And so likewise as by his word he made all things, so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things. Heb. 1. And 
joh. 1.  therefore all things both touching their being and duration, depend upon the mighty word of God: this we have ground for: But that they depend upon his eternity, we have no ground to affirm; though it is true that both God, and his Word, and Spirit are eternal, otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World. Upon the back of this, you come in with a new Paradox, namely that From all eternity, there was a possibility for us to be; as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternity.  
Yet I know some Schoolmen have maintained it (as what will not wild wits dare to undertake): but doth it therefore become a Divine, to suppose it without all proof? I hold it to be impossible, and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant, in my judgement, than any that are brought for it: to wit, that then, years and months, days and hours should be equal; for each of them, even years, should be infinite, and days, and hours, yea and minutes past, should be but infinite; whence he infers, that to every minute should be equal to an year; and albeit he invadeth only eternity of things in motion; yet I see no reason to the contrary, but the argument is appliable as well to all created things, though not subject to motion, though the evidence of deduction is not so manifest as in case of motion.  
I know well that Aquinas entertained the opinion of this possibility, out of zenle to uphold the credit of Aristotle in some measure. But then taking upon him to reconcile seeming contradictions in his opuscula, and one of them being this; If the World were eternal, than the souls of men pa● were infinite, supposing the immortality of them; according to the opinion of Aristotle: And both Aristor. as well as Aquinas himself hold it impossible that there should be infinitum actu either in number or in magnitude: Mark how he reconciles this, and what course he takes to prevent an infinite number of souls; Though the World, and Man (saith he) had been everlasting, yet the first man might have been preserved without generation for an infinite space of time, & not begin to generate till about six thousand years ago.  
By this let every sober man judge to what shifts this great Schoolman was put to salve this opinion of a possibility, of the world's being eternal from contradiction. To this you add that in like sort our actual being or existence whiles it l●steth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity; you might well say so or in like sort, for there seems as like truth in this as in the former. Man as he is unum pierce is said to consist ex potentia et acts, which is as much as to say ex materia et forma rationali; which Maxim had a capacity of receiving this form, upon whose conjunction doth arise that compositum, which we call a man, and us it had a power, so an appetite thereunto, all which was contained under that principium generationis which is called Privatio, According to that saying Materia appetit formam sicut femina virum. But the particular appetite being satisfied with the form, it no longer remaineth, nor the capacity to receive it, that time being now past. But rather an appetite there is in the matter to a new form, by corruption of the present compound, which is the natural ground of man's mortality. And the general appetite of matter is never satisfied.  
Much less is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knows that the capacity of the matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio. Now Privatio, though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma; yet is it not principium compositi. Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertiu companitur? But perhaps you speak not of the capacity of the matter to receive a form, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the possibility of Being, before they are, which is extended even to Angels. But then I say much less is the nature of man to be said, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica, but a only potentia logica, to wit, negatio repugnantia, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implies no contradiction: For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angels should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neither man nor Angels can be said to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a real & positive thing is composed of that which is neither real nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not real or positive should be a part of that which is real & positive. But yet, you may say; All created things consist ex potentia & actu, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angels themselves, God alone is Actus purus void of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken in respect of the potentiallity going before the Act, which you say is actuated, but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we conceive it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.  
Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himself: In which respect they are said to consist ex potentia et Actu, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called Metaphysica; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be said to be filled, when essence is actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seems rather to contain essence, than essence, existence. But most paradoxical of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuation or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgement, is rather the actuation formal of essence, then is composed thereof.  
In the next place you tell us, that life (especially sensitive) is but the motion or progress of this capacity towards that which fills it; or as it were, a continual sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actual being, from somewhat preexistent. I think there is a liberal error in this, and instead of life sensitive, as I take it, there should be life vegetative. Now this doctrine of yours is wondrous strange. There is a motion & progress in life vegetative by way of augmentation, but not by way of generation.  
Neither hath the existence of any vegetable, much less man, any degrees: Neither is it of the nature of any substantial form, much less of a soul, least of all of the reasonable foul, to be brought in, much less to be sucked in, by degrees.  
And if our existence be present, as you call it, how can it be sucked in? For we suck in that which we have not; not that which we already have. Neither could we have power to suck in aught, much less the actual sucking in of aught, unless already we had existence: For without existence presupposed there can be no motion. And of degrees of existence, especially of substantial forms, or of the things compounded of them, I never heard till now: Degrees, or rather a gradual extension of quantity is gotten by that act of vegetation which is called growth or augmentation. So then, not existence, simply, but of quantity rather; nor the existence of quantity neither, but a greater extension thereof is sucked-in by things that grow: Neither is this extension sucked in; but rather matter of nourishment is sucked in, which by the peculiar operation of the soul is first fitted for nourishment diverse & sundry ways, and after that converted into nourishment, & appropriated to each part; and after that by another peculiar property of the soul, there flows from it augmentation of quantity; which is not sucked in from without, but only the materials of it: This wild phrase and manner of speech of yours, if it proceed, is sufficient to corrupt all Philosophy, & not Divinity only.  
The next point, I confess, is no Paradox, when you say, Except the vegetables by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us. This, I say, is most true: for if they had not being before, they were just nothing; and it is impossible that that which is nothing, should nourish any thing.  
Nay, if they had not their being before, they should have no being at all: for Milk or Bread if it had no being before it nourish us; surely it hath no being of milk or bread when it doth nourish us, by being converted into flesh and bone; for then surely, it is neither milk nor bread. The next assertion is very obscure, if at all it hath any truth in it, as when you say, These vegetables themselves cannot exist, unless they did draw their existence or continance of their being, from that which did exist before them, and unto which they do by motion or continuance oft their being approach: For you propose this of life vegetative, which is found in plants as well as men; and the matter of their nourishment is only the moisture or fatness of the earth; which fatness of the earth, how it draws existence or continuance of its being so much as in your sense, I cannot conceive; sc. Matter of man's nourishment, Honey, and potted butter, and powdered beef, and bacon, and biscuit, how they draw it from that whereunto by motion or continuance of their being they approach: Wherein you seem to have a sublimate conceit, resolving the continuance of all things into the operation of God: But, by your leave, they do not draw their continuance from God; God gives it rather, and that by natural means, whereby things are preserved from putrefaction, which is the destruction of their being: Which preservation against putrefaction, is either in the nature of the things themselves, which God by an ordinary natural course hath wrought in them, onby the Art of Men: Which you resolving without more ado into the operation of God carry yourself not like unto a Philosopher, but like unto that Grammarian who being demanded by a gardenar what should be the reason, why weeds thrived so fast notwithstanding all his care to weed them out, and pluck them up by the roots; when good herbs prospered so slowly notwithstanding all his care, not only to plant them, but being planted to water them, and to manure the ground that bore them; Derived the reason of all this from the providence of God; Whereat a Philosophes standing by laughed, not that he despised the Providence of God, but because he conceived there was a more immediate reason thereof, though it also were subordinate to the providence of God, and that was this. As for the weeds that grow of themselves, the earth is a natural mother unto them; but as for the herbs that were planted in her bosom, she was but a stepmother unto them; & ergo: no merveyle if she maintained her own children, her own fruits brought forth by her better, then strange children brought unto her to be fostered by her. But be it as you intimate, that all things draw their existence and continuation of their being from God; but how will you unfold that mystery of yours that follows, namely, that by motion or continuation of their being they approach unto God? For I have read, that the Crow liveth out nine men's lives (measuring every age to be an 100 years) and that the Hart liveth thrice as many years as the Crow; and that the Raven trebleth the Heart's endurance; whence came that Theophrastus his complaint of nature's inequality, that to Hearts and Crows had given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man: what shall we say therefore that these have approached nearer unto God then Man? Perhaps you will say, yes, in respect of God's eternity: Why but herein, yourself shallbe brought to plead against yourself; For in the eight sect: of your former chap. discoursing how the centre of God's immensity might be said to be every where; you gave this reason or exemplification of it; that be supposing a spear infinite, every point is equally removed from the circumference, as put the case, S. Michaells' mount should be as near to the circumference Eastward as Dover, and consequently Dover as far of as S. Michaells' mount, though the whole breadth of England lie between them.  
And by the same reason the life of a Raven shall be as far of from eternity, as the life of a Hart, and the durance of an Hart as far from eternity as the Durance of a Crow, though three times as much; & the durance of a Crow as far of from eternity, as the durance of a Man, though nine tunes as much.  
In the next place, as by way of inference, you add: So that future times and all things contained in time itself, presuppose a fountain of life. I will not trouble myself with your inference: What such move you to make choice of future times to instance in, rather of times in general, whether future, present, or past?  
I doubt preexistence to future times is in your imagination a very mysterious point; & such as you are loath your Reader should be acquainted with: For as Aristotle sayeth of Fallacies, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to discover them, is to solve them; so you may fear, the bare discovery of your conceit may be enough to discredit it. And yet, to show how well you please yourself in it, you say that this fountain of life, presupposed to future times, and all things contained in them, is as truly preexistent to their future terminations, as it was to their beginnings.  
How will you construe this sentence, and accommodate it to future times, whereupon notwithstanding it proceeds, as well as of things contained in time, both touching the terminations of them, which are future, and touching the beginnings of them which are passed? Surely you cannot; ergo: the latter part of the sentence must be accommodated not to future times wherewith you began this sentence, but to all things contained in time itself. And these indeed have had beginnings which are past, and we do expect future terminations or, motions of them, according to the parts of future time, so long as time itself shall last.  
But what is this strange assertion you are impregnated withal, when you deliver it as a rare and curious conceit, that things contained in time do suppose a fountain of life not only to the beginnings of them, but also to their future terminations and motions. Whereas to my poor conceit, if a fountain of life be presupposed to things past, it must be presupposed also to things to come: And there is no curiosity in this; the inference rather is most vulgar; For seeing future things are behind things past, quod est prius priori must needs be prius posteriori; yet, that which is before a former thing, must needs be before a latter thing.  
Hence you proceed (whether by following on, or falling of, let the Reader judge) to censure that common saying, Tempus edax rerum, as relishing more of poetical wit, then of Metaphysical truth. For which kind of censure delivered by you, I find no just reason; For what? can no truth satisfy you, but that which is Metaphysical? And why you should make such an opposition I know not; as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysical truth, were no truth, but rather of Poetical wit: and whatsoever relished of poetical wit, did not relish of truth. You may as well censure Aristotle's Physics, and Ethics, and Politics, and Rhetorics, for surely they do not relish of Metaphysical truths; no nor Euclides Mathematics; no nor of Poetical wit neither; belike they are liable to a double censure.  
Yet what think you? cannot Poetical wit have course in conjunction with truth, as well as in separation from it. Nec fingunt omnia Cretes. No nor Poets neither. And as for this saying, Tempus edax rerum: I never knew any sober man or other except against the truth of it before: But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure, to show your wit in refuting it; you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather than the Philosopher; for some of them have taken a course to shape stories, according to the use they had to make of them, and not to follow the direct truth: and this hath been said to be the difference between Sophocles and Euripides: And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is said Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur: And abstracting a line from the matter of it, they may add to it, or take from it what they list: So you construe this saying, Tempus edax rerum, as if it were delivered in proper speech, and not by a figure; whereas the meaning is synecdochical; that in course of time things do consume and waste, not that time itself doth waste them; For time being the duration of things; how can the duration of a thing consume itself?  
Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose, as when you say, If time did devour things, what could possibly nourish them or continue them from their beginning to their end, And that in two respects; for neither the saying signifies that time should devour them, before the time apppointed for the consumption of them: And though time did consume them, yet some thing else might contnue them; For their own natures wherein God hath made them, are for a time apt to resist that which laboureth to corrupt them. And other means also there are for the preservation of them: As man by using means for his preservation may hold out longer than he which useth none; neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying, Tempus edax rerum, ever conceit that any thing should desire the destruction of itself, as you are pleased to rove in impugning it: And look in what sense time doth not destroy, but things are destroyed in time; in the same sense, things temporal have not the continuation of their being from time, but from somewhat else in time; For when things are preserved, by the wit and industry of man from putrefaction, they do not receive this preservation of theirs from time, but from the wit and industry of man: And ergo: as time doth not waste, so neither doth time preserve from wasting.  
It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth, rather to say that the motions of things themsselfes, and their endeavours, to enjoy or entertain time approaching is that which doth waste and consume them; For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption, yet in all other creatures inferior unto man, as beasts of all sorts, how can you make it good that they out of a desire and endeavour to entertain time do waste themselves, who know not so much as what time is? How much less will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts, as plants and trees, and in all sorts of mixed bodies? Nay, how will you make it good in man? Some die by course of nature, and that either through age or sickness; when a man of 100 years old dieth, what motion or endeavour is there in him to entertain that wasted him? and how will you prove, that had not this motion or endeavour of his bone (as all endeavours are voluntary and free) he might have lived longer.  
When God sent apestilence among the Israelites, that in the space of 3. days swept away 70. thousand; was it a motion of theirs, or an endeavour to entertain time, that consumed them? Nay, when any disease proves mortal, how can it appear that when one man died of an Ague, another of the Dropsy, another of the squinancy, another of the pleurisy, another of the consumption, that all of them died of a certain disease, called their motions and endeavours to enjoy and entertain time approaching: A disease, that I think was never known to Hipocrates or Galin, or any Physician before or since. I should think the disease of Pastime should waste us more than the disease of enjoying Time. Others come to their ends by violent deaths, some in war, some by course of justice, others by private malice: In all these I find myself in the briers, and cannot possibly conceive, how men's own motions and endeavours to enjoy time should waste or consume them: or in case a man makes a way with himself by hanging drowning or poisoning. Not altogether so wild is that conceit of yours which followeth, in saying we naturally seek to catch time. Yet wild enough; for it is untrue that men catch. Time; they catch opportunity, which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and not a little differing from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time. As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth, ergo; I will roundly set myself to the making of Hay, while this opportunity is offered, wherein I catch not time but opportunity; for the Time were the same in case it rained, but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same, because the wether in that case were not the same; And Hay-making requires fair wether.  
Who they are, who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion, I know not; I should think no man so blockish as to confound them, seeing motion itself may be of more or less continuance in respect of Time, as well as any thing else, And in the same Time somethings more or less slowly, something more swiftly, some in one kind of motion, some in another: But of diverse kinds of time, that should belong to things moved, with diverse kinds of motions, I never heard that any Philosopher hath discoursed.  
Aristotle I confess, defines time to be numerus motus secund. prius & posterius; but this is not to confound time with motion, but rather to distinguish the one from the other: For he g●ves a far other definition of motion itself: And albeit the time of every temporal thing be the duration of it, whether it resteth or moveth, yet if the questions be made how long such a thing hath continued, or when such a thing began to be, or ceased to be; We have no better means to answer it, then by numbering the revolution of the Sun, if we will show how many years; or of the Moon, to show how many months; or of the Diurnal motion of the Heavens, to show how many days ago such a thing was done, or began, or ceased to be; or to show how many days, or months, or years any thing hath continued: & ergo: Aristotle in his Physics considering time as the measure, in such sort as hath been expressed, gives a definition suitable, in saying it was numerus motus per prius & posterius. Which definition when your true Philosophy shall mend, we shallbe so ingenuous as to give congruous respect unto it.  
As you began, so you proceed to acquaint us with your subtleties in Philosophy concerning time, Motion (you say) in true observation goes one way, and drives time another way, as the stream which runs Eastward, turns the wheel Westward.  
This curiosity is worth the examining, it may minister some merry matter of refreshment unto us, which in my judgement, your reader hath no little need of to take him of from too sad and serious attention in tracking your obscure phrase, and treading out therhence some morsel of good meaning.  
I think you speak of motion circular, and that of the heavens, because nothing so fit to notify unto us Time, as that, and of such motion you speak as immediately before you have signified: Well then; The circular motion of the Heavens goeth one way, and drives Time another way: Before you told us that Motion notifies Time, here you say, It drives Time; but how? Not the same way, but another way as the streams which runs Eastward, drives the wheel Westward: And which way. I pray doth Time pass: Eastward of Westward? As there is a motion of the heavens, that makes the day, which is from East to west; so there is a motion of the Sun which makes the year, and that motion is from West to East; doth each motion drive time a different way or the same way? Again each motion is not only from East to West, as the first, and from West to East as the second; but the first is again from West to East, and the second is again from East to West; You have not told us, which way Time is driven by motion; and ergo: being to seek, you drive our inquisitions diverse ways, and perhaps all different from your own; And all because you will not acquaint is with the way you conceive to yourself, ergo; you drive us other ways, as the motion drives time: Let us see whether we can have any help from your comparison.  
The stream, you say, running Eastward drives the wheel Westward; Now this seems to us untrue, & so far forth as it may be tolerated for true, surely it drius the wheel no more Westward then Eastward: First I say it is not true: For the wheel by the stream is turned neither Eastward nor Westward but round; Now to move Eastward or Westward is to move motu recto a straight motion, but to move round is not to move motu recto, but orbiculari, not by a straight motion, but circular: Yet because circular motions may be said to be towards the East or towards the West, & so the motion of the wheel may be (as you say it is) Westward; yet than I say it is no more Westward than Eastward, as it is manifest in all circular motions: And indeed the river moving according to his natural course drives the wheel before it, but the wheel being round, moves round, not only Eastward as the river goes, but Westward also; For to move circularly towards the East in respect of some parts, is to move circularly towards the West also in respect of other parts, not Westward only or principally so as to give the denomination of a motion Westward, rather them of a motion Eastward.  
But all this while we have not found which way Time is driven in your opinion: For sure your meaning is not that time is driven circularly (though I have observed you to discourse of circular duration.) And my reason is this: if the motion from East to West should drive Time another way of motion circular; then seeing that motion which makes the day is contrary to that motion which constitutes the year, it would follow, that the time of the day should go a way quite contrary to the Time of the year: And as little reason to drive time another way, in respect of direct motion.  
For there is no reason why the way of Time should be towards the East, rather than towards the West, or chose; and why rather either of these ways, then towards the North or towards the South.  
And no marvel, seeing the way of place is one thing, & the way of time another: For though the stream run directly Eastward, and turn a wheel round; 'tis nothing strange, sith both are bodies apt to move, and the stream apt to run downward, and a wheel apt to be turned round. But time is not a body that it can move one way.  
And this reflects my thoughes upon the consideration of another incongruity, as when you say, motion goes one way; you might as well have said, motion moves one way; whereas it is the body that moves, & motion is the act of it, but itself moves not.  
Yet there is a proper way for a body moving, & so for motion. And it may be there is a proper way for time as when that which is to come becomes present time, and present time, becomes past time; as this year the last year was to come, now it is present, and after a while it will be past: So all the way of time is this, & shallbe, it is, it was: one after another.  
And (by your leaves) motion drives it no more than rest: If the Heavens should stand still, yet might things continue still the same time that God hath appointed them, as well as in the case of their motion.  
Neither is it true, that our actual existence slides from us with time; our being still continueth the same, by you leave, and not our capacity of being only; For Socrates senex non differt a Socrate puero according to our University learning, which whether it be true Philosophy or no, let the Reader judge; I say, he differs not in substance, I do not say, he differs not in accidents: I doubt not but Socrates was auncienter in his old age, then in his childhood, and different both in quantity of body, and quality of mind; But I see no reason but his existence was still the same: And as for capacity of being, I see no reason why that should have any place where being already is: As for substantial actuation of capacity of Being (which you make to be continual) after a man hath his being I know none; Neither am I conscious of any such desire; and it is strange to me, that you should be more privy to my desires then myself. I desire to increase in knowledge, and to grow in grace and goodness, and in favour with God and man.  
But of any desire of actuation or replenishment (as you speak) of the capacity of being, I am nothing conscious to myself: Neither can I acknowledge any new coexistence (with time approaching in respect of any mutation of my existence, but in regard that times do change and succeed one another, I may be said to coexist anew with them, because they coexist anew with me.  
Neither do I know any such office of time as you devise to be assigned to it by eternity, as to repair that ruins which tions present or past, have wrought in our corruptible substance.  
No marvel that you could not brook that time should be accounted edax rerum: For now I perceive you maintain time to be reparatrix rerum, yea the curer of diseases; For to repair the ruins which motion hath made in our corruptible substances, what is it but to cure diseases? So that time is a simple of more sovereign virtue, than I was ware of; but I know not whether it were ever known to Hypocrates or Galen; I doubt it was not; And that tempus is edax rerum, hath better authority to confirm it I think, then that it is reparatrix rerum: And consider in reason, time is the duration of things temporal, whence it cometh to pass, that the very ruins themselves which are wrought in our corruptible substances have their time, that is, their duration; so have all diseases: Now let any sober man judge, whether the duration of such a ruin, such a disease, be fit to repair it, fit to cure it; What time then shall cure or repair it? Take the most sovereign remedies to repair such ruins, to cure such diseases, and the duration or time thereof hath no power to repair or cure it, but the nature of that remedy applied may; which nature and the application thereof, is not time, but the remedy hath a duration, which is the time thereof, whether it be applied or no.  
As for the motions of the heavens numbered according to preority and posteriority, which in a Physical consideration is the time of every thing, as the fittest measure to measure out the continuance of all things, as little power hath that to repair ruins or cure diseases, more than to make them.  
In the next place you draw us to the consideration of Plotinus his excellent observations. I had rather you would acquaint us with some accurate conclusions and demonstrations of his. Yet these observations which you so magnify in a Platonic, such as they are we will consider them. The first is that the best of our life, the very being of things generable is but as a continual draught or receit of being, from the inexhaustible fountain of life. This is one of his (so much by you magnified) observations, and a very proper one. As if a man should say, the very water, be it the best of waters, is but a stream flowing from the fountain of waters. Is not this an excellent observation, think you? Yet you add some thing of your own, which partly swerves from truth, and partly mars Plotinus his music; For you make the very being of things generable, and the best of our life to be all one; whereas the wickedest men that are, are the miserablest things that are, are things generable, and have a being as well as the best; And in the state of our corrupt nature we had a being, & so had Paul when he persecuted the Church of God, and Peter when he denied his Mr. and David when he committed adultery with Bathsheba and caused Vriah to be slain with the sword of the children of Ammon; but did this being of theirs, or their very being, deserve to be accounted the best of their life? Now whereas you say, Our being is a continual draught of being from the inexhaustible fountain of life: I find no mention at all of any fountain of life in Plotinus, His words as you cite them are, Videtur in rebus generabilibus id potissimum essentia esse, scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse, (this is all he hath concerning the inexhaustible fountain of life as you paraphrase it) ex generationis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat.  
And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens, like as we say, linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem. And thereupon his first sentence is this, that take away erit from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add erit to them, it shall befall them a seed ipfive esse labe, to slide from the seat of being; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in their subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not natural unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the fountain of life; as it is well known Plato first, and accordingly Platonics maintained, that the world was made by God.  
To this I answer, that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing, but out of matter actually preexistent; yet here Plotinus discourseth, not of the creation whereby the world was made, but of generation, whereby the parts of it were continually meynteyned; Neither doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable, but only of the formality thereof: But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being, who can doubt but his answer would be either ascribing this to the individual generating, and virtus seminalis as his instrument, working to the extracting of forms ex potentia materiae; or otherwise to the Dator formarum; in neither of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible fountain of life, whither you would draw him, to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious: But what should Christians expect from the Scholar of Ammonius and Mr. of Dorphity? Now, whereas he confines this to things generable, do you magnify that also! What think you of Augul●s? Is not their being also a continual draught or receipt of being from the inexhaustible fountain of life, as well as the being of things generable?  
But proceed we to take notice of the rest of his so excellent observation: Nature (saith he) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seeing it draws or sucks in that being which it hath, by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle, with the desire of essence, or of being what it is. By this I perceive where you dipped your pen that dropped forth such wild conceits as before in this very section I have encountered with; to wit, in Plotinus his Philosophy, fit lettuce for such lips as like them. And for the obscurity of conceit, your writings, to my thinking are very like unto his; and the rather may men be moved to suspect, there are some rare notions in them which they understand not; Yet by the way you sometimes insperse such glosses as make Plotinus meaning worse than it is; as when Plotinus saith of a thing generable, that movetur in orbem quodam essentiae desiderio, that it is moved round with a certain desire of essence; you render it this with desire of essence or being what is: Now Plotinus saith, not of any thing that it hath a desire to be what it is, which is very absurd; for nothing desires what it hath already, but rather what it hath not: So when Plotinus saith, that esse sibi haurit, it draws unto itself being; you render it thus, It sucks in what it hath; whereas indeed it is a thing impossible for any man to suck in that which he hath, but rather he sucks in that which he hath not.  
Nor can I approve this saying of Plotinus, that A thing generable hactens to that being which is to come; which Plotinus seems to understane only of Time; Now we rather on the contrary many times complain that time passeth away too fast; yet again some there are, I confess, that think time never passeth away fast enough: Both are conscious of times hasting more or less; but neither are conscious of their hastening to Times: And the truth is, the swiftest motion and the slowest motion is in respect of the same time, which indeed in neither swift nor slow, though motions in time may be swift or slow; yet the swiftest mover no more hastens to time to come, than the slowest mover, how excellent soever Plotinus observation be in your conceit, yet I grant we may be said to hasten to a being which is to come, but this being is alway accidental never essential: A man may make haste to be rich, and such a one saith Solomon can not be innocent: A man 
Pro. 28. 20.  may grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord jesus Christ, and to make hast therein is commendable: and so for 
2. Pet. 〈◊〉. 18  everyone to be diligent and quick in the works of his calling: But our essential being we hast not unto, it is the same still; for Socrates being old differs not essentially from himself being a child: Indeed we labour for the preservation of our being; but all our actions tend not hereunto, they tend to the service of God as well as to the service of ourselves.  
And how in these motions whatsoever we move in orbem, or as it were in a circle I know not; That acquaint conceit I leave to Plotinus till your commentary may unfold the meaning of it.  
Now you tell us (belike in a suitable proportion unto the conceits of Plotinus, or rather in some degree beyond them) that Nor we men, nor any creatures (specially generable) are permitted to draw or suck so much of our proper being from the fountain of eternity at once, or in any one point of time as we list, and that We have our portions of life or self-fruition distributed piecemeal and sparingly unto us, lest too much put into our hands at once might make us prodigal of the whole stock.  
It is great pity the pages of your book be not stored with the word Mystery; for they are nothing almost but mystery; This is delivered not only of men, but of all creatures generable: Why then, all creatures generable have a list to draw or suck more of their proper being from the fountain of eternity, than they do or can suck: Surely you charge them with that they are nothing guilty of; For, not to speak of stones and metals nor of vegetables; How doth it appear there is any such desire in brute creatures, whether beasts or birds or fishes● that neither know eternity, nor their own proper being, nor what it is to suck more of it at once then is fit.  
And as for myself amongst reasonables, one though a poor one, having some knowledge both of eternity in the way of Christian Divinity, and of my proper being in the way of natural Philosophy; yet what it is to suck more of my portion of being at once then God think fit, I am utterly ignorant, and therefore cannot be conscious to myself of any such transgression: Suppose the durance of my being in the appointment of God be between 50. and 60. years, do I desire or can I desire to enjoy these 60. years in the space of 20. or is it possible by the almighty power of God that I should? I grant the knowledge and goodness I have arrived unto by God's grace in the space of 50. years, I might have arrived unto in the space of 40. Yet am I not conscious of any desire I had of this: But this is only my accidental being, and therefore deserveth not simply to be accounted my proper being.  
The like may be as touching the Qualities or Quantity of my body: But my substantial being, that only deserveth to be accounted simply my Being; And this I had all at once, as I had my organical body, and soul all at once; though the continuance of it I had not all at once; For that was impossible I should have, it being a continuance by way of succession of days after days etc. And ●f I had had all at once, there had been no succession; and therefore, in my judgement, it is absurd to say our portions of life are pecemeale & sparingly distributed unto us, lest too much being put into our hands at once might make us prodigal of the whole stock. And which implies, that God could, if it had pleased him, have made us enjoy the whole space of our life at once; For that were to make time past, present and to come, to exist alltogeather, which, I think, every wise man will judge to be impossible: Yet this case being put; how were it possible to the contrary, but that we must needs spend it all at once? For like as the space of life of 60. years must necessarily be spent in 60. years: So if we had all this space together in one day, or one year, we wust needs spend it together in the space of a day, or a year: In a word, sith this cannot be true of our essential being, which we have all at once undoubtedly; nor of our accidental being; for that cannot be properly accounted our being; it remains to be understood only of the continuance of our being: And to desire to have all this at once, is to desire to have at 7. years, as much age as others at 60: But no man desires this, though lately we hear, that after the surrendering of Rochel, maidens, by reason of the famine there during the Siege, of 16. years old were found to look like women of an 100 years old. We rather desire in old-age to be young, like unto Moses who being an 100 and 20. his eye was not dim, nor his natural strength abated. Yet your conceit is manifestly impossible; for it proceeds not of having the qualities of age in youth, but the very continuance, which is as much as to say, at seven years of age to be as old as a man of 60. which no man desires, neither is it possible for God to effect.  
This piercing of time, or reduction of many years into a small space being as utterly impossible as the penetration of dimension in magnitude, if not much more.  
men's stocks may be spent in one year upon as much pleasure as another may be taking in seven years: but the continuance of space or time to come, can neither be taken before the time, nor spent.  
2. In the next Section you are more popular; I do not say more true: For you give me no cause to say so.  
For first, in my Judgement, it is a manifest untruth to say, that time is a participation of eternity: For as immensity is to place or magnitude, so is eternity unto time: But place or magnitude is no participation of immensity, therefore also time is no participation of eternity.  
And like as God's immensity is without extension, & therefore quite of a different nature from magnitudine corporal; So his eternity is without succession; and therefore of a quite different nature from duration corporal.  
And whereas you say, that He should desine the several branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher that several actuations, draughts, or replenishments, which are derived from the infinite fountain of life and being, to fill the capacities or satiate the internal desires of things temporal; Here again you slip back to the transcendental notions, far above, not only common sense, but all sobriety of conceit.  
You tell us of actuations, draughts, and replenishments derived from the fountain of life to fill capacities, and internal desires; all which together with the several branches of time you speak of, and their references to the actuations after mentioned, are so many hobgoblins unto me: what are the parts of time, I seem to understand, time past, time present, and time to come, but what the Several branches are, I know not.  
The fountain of life is it, that which brings natures possible into act of being? But how hereby he can be said to satiate their internal desires, I comprehend not: For while a thing is only possible, ●t neither hath, nor can entertain any desire of being. Perhaps you may say, that when things are, they may desire continuance: And it is the fountain of life, that as he made all things, so he doth perpetuate them so long as he thinks good. But what mystery, the deciphering of this actuation or perpetuation doth contain, so available to the definition of the several of time, I therefore know not, because you have not vouchsafed the enucliation hereof unto your Reader.  
I find no sense in that which followeth, as when you say the motion of the Heavens is more uniform than time (which you call the duration of things temporal): For every part of time is still uniform, and that in such sort as it impossible to be otherwise; be the motion never so deficient in uniformity. As an hour is still the same, whether motions herein be swift or slow, or both swift and flow (as such different motions may be in the same time without all question) and that according to all variety; yea though one and the same motion, I mean of one and the same subject be partly swifter, partly slower, and that in all variety of degrees.  
So is the month, so is the year most uniform, taking it to consist of how many days and hours soever you will: I grant things in time may dure more or less; but time itself admits no contraction or dilatation; as for example, a day cannot be contracted into the space of an hour; nor an hour cannot be dilated into the space of a day; but the motion of a day may be contracted and reduced within the space of an hour; that is, a thing may move as fast in an hour as it doth in a day, I have heard of a Pope, that when his country men presuming of his omnipotency, entreated they might have two sommers in a year, made answer as Elias did to Elisha, that he had asked a very hard thing; yet it might be obtained by them upon a condition: And when they being eager to obtain what they desired, showed their willingness to accept of any condition; Hereupon the Pope told them, that upon condition to account 24. months to their year, they should have two sommers every year: This was a cunning trick to fill his country men's mouths with empty spoons: He was no more able to gratify his countrymen in this, then Mark Anthony was the Athenians, who having imposed a double tribute in one year; was told by an Orator, that if he could give them two Summers, and two Springs within the compass of one year, he might exact two revenues, not otherwise.  
I know no such double duration or course of time indented, as you speak of, what if a man be sometimes in health, and sometimes in sickness? the condition of his life, and the quality thereof it diversified, his duration is not; as appeates by this: In the same time wherein one it sick, another is not; one in pleasure, another in pain; it is manifest, the time may be the same, though the condition much different.  
These conceits of yours are so popular, that they cross withal: In grief or pain to thrust time from us, is but to wish it were shorter than it is; as it is signified Deut. 28. 67. In the morning, thou shalt say, would God it were evening. and at evening thou shalt say, would God it were morning: And yet the meaning hereof in effect, is but this, to wish that our pain were shorter, than would we not care though the time were longer. And so our joy to be continued, we desire not the moments of our time to be fixed.  
Still you confound a man's condition with the time, as if time itself were sweet or sour. Let every sober man judge, whether it be not an absurd conceit to affirm, that men desire to prolong their days by living the same time over and over again. As if we could not have the sam●oy, without living the same time over and over again: Whereas it is manifest, that in one and the same time, one man may be in case and joy, another in pain and sorrow.  
And yet in serrow the fr●ction of our existence is never the less perfect, then in times of joy, for joy and sorrow are no parts of existence, for existence is found never a whitt the less where joy and sorrow have no place: This you confess in the next place, where you say; that the pleasure of borrowed ●ife is to the identity of being but at water to the pipe through which it runs. yet both serve alike to fill up the matter of your discourse, both the confusson of things different, and the correction of such confusion.  
And if the gluts and gushes of pleasure (as you phrasifie it) may be at one time much greater than at another, surely they may continue at one time as well as at another, and therefore for the continuance of pleasure, it is not necessary to desire the stay of time, which is a thing impossible: Yet you pleased yourself not a little in your former popular discourse of this nature.  
The fruition of pleasure may be as entire as ourselves; and it is no more true, that they are begotten and die in every moment, than it is true of us, that we are begotten & die in every moment: For this scrupulous hicetie ariseth from no other ground, than the being measured with time, their duration is partly past, partly future, and but a moment present: And judge whether this conceit of but a moment present, be not a vain conceit: For I pray, what is that which follows this present moment immediately? Is it a moment only, or no? if not a moment only, what is become of your conceit? If a moment only, will it not follow, that time consisteth of nothing but moments? And you may as well say, that magnitude consists of nothing but points, which were indeed, to consist of nothing.  
We truly say, this day is present; this month is present; this year is present, like as time is said to be present, to wit, by way of succession of parts, which parts are not moments succeeding one another, but times Homogeneal, though according to reason divisible in infinitum, as all things continual are.  
3. How the Angels do account the continuation of their duration, I know not; but surely we have no better means to account their duration past, then by the making of the World, and the number of yearly revolutions of the Heavens, that have been since. But because we believe, that God could have made Angels, & no visible World; yea and made the Heavens without moving of them; in which case yet I doubt not but their duration, & continuance thereof should be known to themselves, but by what means I know hor.  
The Learned do distinguish of the duration of Angels, from the duration of things material; & so accordingly their measures; making time to be the measure of the duration of the one; and even of the other: Yet I have no cause to think that their duration is a participation of eternity more than time: And like as their magnitude spiritual is no participation of immensity; so neither is their duration any participation of eternity.  
They are creatures as well as we, though no mortal creatures, and have their beginning as well as we; and the time shall come, when we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 even as the Angels themselves, and continue as long as they, yet never attain to 
Luk. 20.  any eternity of being, though our being shall never have end: But seeing both theirs, and ours had a beginning; therefore it is impossible that it should ever grow to be eternal.  
I see no reason why Angels should not be said to watch for opportunities of time as well as we.  
The Devil I am sure is still compassing the earth. job. 1. & goes about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour, and do they not wait all opportunities to do mischief? And why may not Angels as well wait all opportunities to do us good, according to the will of their and our Heavenly father? Especially considering they are all ministering Spirits sent forth for the good of them that shall be heirs of salvation. 
Hebr. 1.   
But I confess, how this waiting or expectance of opportunity should be said to feed them, I am as much to seek, as to define how it is said to feed us; unless in respect of Hope; & so I see no reason, but that it may be as well said to feed them also; for surely their own glory is not at full, & they wait for the enjoying of that; neither our glory nor grace is yet at full; & as they rejoice at the conversion of a sinner; how much more will they rejoice at our salvation; and why may they not be said to wait & hope for that also, & rejoice in the hope, as we do?  
If a desire to continue what they are doth argue, they have not all that in present possession which is allotted to their complete duration; then surely they never shall, nor we neither, no not in the state of glory, have all in present possession which is allotted to our duration: And what, I pray, is wanting? You will say the future duration; but what, I pray, do we get by that, when as fast as duration future becomes present, so fast duration present becomes past? Yet surely by continuing what we are, we lose nothing; & if by this, that our duration passeth in respect of time, we cannot be said to lose any thing; then surely by this, that duration cometh on as fast, we cannot be said to gain any thing. If indeed we should grow weaker and weaker, and our strength and prosperity should pass with time, than we should be loser's by it, not otherwise; So if we should grow stronger and stronger, & our strength or prosperity should increase with time, than we should be gainers by it, and not otherwise.  
Now I hope it is without question; that the glory of Heaven shall not increase, but be at full, at the very first, and so continue without end. And, in my judgement, it is a very poor conceit, to deny that a man hath his whole life together, because the duration of it, is not all at once.  
If we had our life by degrees, one part at one time, and another part at another time, this were a manifest imperfection; but having all of it together, to conceive that the duration & continuance hereof longer & longer is an imperfection, is a very wild conceit in my judgement: This were to cast us upon the denial of God's continuance; For like as our time being upon supposition of 60. years, if we should have all of it, within an hour, it should end at an hour's end; so likewise, if God should have his continuance all at once, it should end all at once.  
But we say, that the Divine essence as it is without beginning, so it is without end: and nothing past with him, nor nothing to come to him, as it is with all creatures, which are subject to motion in some kind or other: if not of corruption, yet of perfection, at least capable of it: if no such thing were, yet as they come from nothing, so they might return to nothing: But that God, as he gave them their being, so he continueth it. As for God he receieth not his being from anything, no not from himself: But is most necessary to exist, and most necessary to continue, without losing of aught that is in himself, no not so much as a thought; nor receiving any thing into himself, no not so much as a new thought, or a new affection: All which, and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angels, though not so much as unto us; who also have material motions, as local, and alteration, & that tending to corruption.  
In a word, as man's existence is as it were an accident to his essence; because the nature of a man is only of itself passively possible to exist, and God can give existence to such a nature, or make the humane nature to exist, as he hath done; so likewise to Angelical natures, existence is but an accident.  
And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them; so is continuance an accident to such existences. In which respect every day and hour, both man and Angel may be said to receive a new accident, which before they had not.  
But it is quite otherwise with God; For as his existence is all one with his essence; (because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist:) so his continuance is no accident to his existence: because it is necessary that God should be, & so be, as to be without beginning and without end: And therefore though our continuance be new to us, as being an accident unto us, and wrought by motions; yet God's continuance is no accident unto him; For it is impossible, he should not continue, who is of necessary being: But of this, and of the indivisible nature of God's continuance more hereafter.  
I willingly confess, that because Angels were made of nothing, therefore their continuance is merely at the pleasure of God, and have parts divisible, in regard that God can set an end to them, whensoever it pleaseth him.  
But I know no cause to deny, that they enjoy an entire self-fruition; For though they have not all their continuance at once, yet seeing their continuance is no part of their essence, which is a thing indivisible, I see no reason why they should be denied, entirely to enjoy themselves.  
Man grows to perfection in parts integral, though not in parts essential, which perfection of parts integral, as it daily groweth, so it makes him daily more fit to perform the offices of nature, and duties of his calling; and so may be said, not to enjoy himself entirely (according to that perfection) which belongeth unto him but by degrees: But it is not so with Angels; yet may they acquire something unto themselves accidentally, which before they had not.  
God can acquire nothing: His duration ('tis true) is indivisible; For there is no prius nor posterius therein; For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion.  
I do not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God: as when you say, he cannot gain aught to day, which yesterday he had not; or lose to day, what yesterday he had: For this, in my judgement, is incident to glorified creatures: For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angels be at full without gaining any new or losing any old? Yet no doubt, their duration notwithstanding shallbe divisible; God is not.  
Perhaps you will say, they lose the former day's existence, and gain the following days existence: And so we do much more properly in this world, but without impediment to the samenes of our existence: For to lose the former day's existence, and gain the following days existence, is but to lose our coexistence with the former day, and gain a coexistence with the day following: Now this is no impediment to the samenes of existence in duration; which I prove thus: It is incident to God, yet is he still the same in duration: And that 'tis incident to God, I prove thus; God himself was yesterday coexistent to yesterday, and now he is not; for if he were, than yesterday should now exist, which is not only untrue, but impossible to be true, for then time past should be present: And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same●nes in duration is manifest; for to coexist with some thing yesterday, and not to day, may arise from no variableness from within, but only from variableness in something from without: As, namely, therefore God doth not coexist to day, with many things to day, with which he did coexist yesterday, is not because of any change in God, but by reason of change in these outward things, which had a being yesterday, but to day have not.  
In that which follows you manifestly betray your cause: For that God hath such fullness of joy and sweetness of life, that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetness; doth no way infer, that therefore, the duration hereof cannot be added unto him, and the continuance thereof: Your comparison utterly overthrows you: For as in a body infinite, though there cannot be a middle nor extreme; yet there are parts without parts by way of extension; So in infinite life, though it hath, no extremes, as being without beginning and without end, yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before, and parts coming after by way of succession.  
And whereas you say, that Nature's capable of these differences have always the one accomplished by the other, is either without sense; as if you mean it of the parts of time, as if one were accomplished by the other; For how I pray you, is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come, or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past: Or if in respect of nature's subject to time, which are perfected by time, or rather in the course of time; thus, as it is sometimes true, so sometimes it is notoriously false: For as there is a time of growth in perfection, so it is well known that there is a time of diminution, & corruption also; And, I pray you, how doth a man's dotage accomplish him either in soul or body? And in the Kingdom of Heaven, what accomplishment by time, when our glorious condition shallbe as full and perfect at the first, as in the progress, for what space imaginable soever.  
As for this state, 'tis well known, that as there is a time of repairing and increasing, so there is a time of impairing and decaying: And though perfection cannot be perfected, yet it may be continued; so it is in man, so it is in God; but by necessity of nature continued in God; by the pleasure of his gracious will continued in the creature: And therefore though his essence being infinite excludes such a continuance as is wrought by reiterated acts; yet it excludes not such a continuance as is by necessity of nature, but rather includes it, it being of the nature of life infinite to be as with beginning, so also without end: Even created Angels and Saints shall have no want of continuance in the Kingdom of Heaven; much less God the Author of their continuance, more than of his own; Yet shall he continue and that by necessity of nature, both to the world's end, and after that without end. Yet nothing in him is to come to him; nor nothing from without can come to him; For who should give it him? But the duration both of men and Angels is maintained unto them by the will and pleasure of God: And herein consists the true difference between the duration of creatures and the Duration of God; For as for prius & posterius, past, and to come, this hath his foundation only in respect of motion, And therefore time is commonly not reputed a fit measure for the essences of things, but only for individual substances: and these only generables, not of substances merely spiritual, as you may remember Plotinus hath taught you. What do you mean by the degrees or acts of life, an infinity whereof you place in God? We commonly account three sorts of life, and no more, to wit, vegetative, sencitive, and rational; Of an infinity I never hard before in this kind: And as for the degrees of these, I doubt not but there may be degrees in any; as in each kind some may be more quick and vivacious than other. But none of these kinds, much less the degrees of them are found in God formally, but iminently: And as for the plurality in respect of such as are decreed by him, the case is clear, that they are infinitely far of from infinity; for undoubtedly the things decreed by God are but finite. I do not agree with you to conceive God to be everlasting in reference to perpetuity of succession; for that kind of everlastingness is a part past: But eternity chiefly consists in being everlasting a part ante, and before there was any succession at all.  
But here, by the way, you give me an hint of what you make your foundation of many wild discourses; and for which I have looked all along; And not till now you have bolted it out, as where you say, God's interminate existence is present to the whole and every part of succession: which long ago hath been discovered to be a very vain conceit, though embraced by as great a Schoolman as Aquinas himself; who hereupon builds his opinion of the presence of all things in God's eternity: And his opinion herein is built upon a very plausible comparison, and devised correspondency between God's immensity and eternity, for like as God by virtue of his immensity doth fill all places, and should coexist with every part of magnitude, although, upon supposition, it were infinite: In like sort God by reason of his eternity should fill all times, and coexist with all times, and all things that hereafter shall exist in time.  
But the fallacy of this comparison, and the error of this assertion hath now long ago been discovered by joannes Scotus: It is true indeed, God must needs coexist with all 
1. Sect: dist: 79. q. 1.  places. and all things in place; but not until the place itself▪ and the things therein do exist: As if the world were twice at big as it is, God should coexist in every part of it; But yet God doth not coexist with any such, because, as yet there is not any such to coexist with him: In like sort God shall coexist with all times, and all things existing in all Times; but when? Not till these times and the things therein shallbe found to exist: and as they shallbe found to exist, so shall God coexist with them: Now all Times, and all things contained in all times do not exist but by way of succession, (magnitudes exist otherwise, even all together) and in like sort God shall coexist with them, to wit, by way of succession: Nor that God's existence is or shallbe by way of succession; (for nothing in God is found that succeeds any thing in God) But because both times, and creatures in times do exist by way of succession, in respect of whose succession and not of any succession in God, God is denominated, and that properly enough, to coexist with them by way of succession, in as much as they exist, and consequently coexist with him by way of succession: Like as a pole fixed in a river doth coexist with diverse parts of the stream by way of succession; not that any motion or succession is found in the pole, but only in the parts of the stream, that succeed in their course one after another: velut unda supervenit und●: And albeit Alvarez hath taken great pains and showed great wit in justifying the opinion of Aquinas in this (yet no otherwise then upon the supposition of the predetermination of Gods will) and in dissolving the arguments which Scotus brought against it; and that in such so●t, that in so spinous of matter I have sometimes thought it a matter very difficult to find out a clear solution of his reasons; yet (I thank God) as it was the first work I undertook after I left the university, before ever I thought of dealing with Arminius, so I seem to have fully satisfied myself therein; and am reasonably persuaded of ability to give satisfaction, on that point, to others also.  
But to proceed along with you; In the next place you tell us, that God considered in himself, He is every way indivisibly infinite and interminable; not only, because he had no beginning, nor shall have ending: Here your attentive reader would expect what is answerable to this not only, and when you come in with but also; but here he must hold his breath till you have dispatched your parenthesis; and if he hold his breath till you come to make up this your imperfect sentence, he is likely never to draw it again: Again when you say, God is indivisibly infinite and interminable, considered in himself; you leave your Reader to suspect that your opinion is, that God considered not in himself, is not indivisibly infinite and interminable, and the meaning thereof I am yet to seek.  
But consider we what you insert in your parenthesis; For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the heavens have been created from everlasting: So they might, as much as to say, as well as that of whom but e●st you spoke, and that was of none but God: But God, you said was indivisibly infinite, and interminable, not terminable: Wherein in making so incongruous a comparison, whether you had forgot yourself, or strained to be delivered of some involved conceit, the congruity whereof must be far fett, and dear bought, before a man can meet with it, I know not he obvious meaning which your text aims at, seems to be this; God is infinite and interminable, not only, because he is without beginning and without end; for so the heavens should be infinite and interminable, put case they were created from everlasting, but in an other respect also; which respect or cause you forget to express, to perfect the sentence of yours, which is otherwise very imperfect; Yet in this way of interpretation of your text, there are faults enough; for to make the heavens like unto God in this, you should put the case, not only of being created from everlasting; but also of being to be continued without end, otherwise they cannot be like unto God both as he is without beginning, and also as he is without end: Secondly though the case were thus put, yet is it incongruous enough; for albeit herein they should be like unto God in being without beginning, and without end: Yet herein they should be nothing like unto God in being indivisibly infinite, and interminable; whereof notwithstanding proceeds your comparison: we acknowledge a difference in this, & that a mighty one, though the heavens had been created from everlasting, etc. not because all God's continuance to come is present, as you devise; but because God's duration and continuance is impossible to be divided, the continuance of a creature is not: For God can make the continuance of any creature to cease this day and hour; but it is impossible God's continuance should cease; for he is of necessary being: As for the conceit of prius & posterius in God's duration; that is a sorry conceit, for that is to be found no where, but where there is some motion or other, spiritual or corporal, either in place, or alteration in quality, or augmentation or dimination in quantity, or generation and corruption: And you may remember that your excellent Mr. Plotinus, whom you so much magnify, confines his discourse of time to things generable, as if he meant the Angels were free from such a division of duration as is made by prius and posterius; How much more God? But of such a division as I speak; the Angels cannot be free from it being creatures; but only God, who is ens necessarium, of necessary being; And therefore his continuance or duration is impossible to be divided from his continuance to morrow, because it is absolutely impossible, that it should ever cease: and therefore whensoever time and place, and things contained in them shall exist, & as long soever as they shall exist, God must necessarily coexist with them, and it is impossible it should be otherwise: But before time and place had course, though God did exist, yet did he not coexist with them; So likewise before time to come doth exist, and the things that are to exist therein, it is impossible that God should coexist with them.  
But whereas you say in your parenthesis, that had the Heavens been everlasting, their revolutions nevertheless should have been truly numerable, and therefore terminable; It is true, I confess, of some of them, as 10. 40. 60. 100 1000 etc. but impossible that all should; For had the Heavens been everlasting, their motions undoubtedly had been innumerable, neither could we ever come to the first number while we could.  
Secondly you say all things contained in their circuit should have gotten somewhat which before they had not, and this something, you say is either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or new acts of life, or sense, or reason.  
All very odd, and little or nothing congruous to things gotten by motion, without which nothing at all is gotten: Now every poor Scholar knows what is gotten by motion; For if it be motion local, a new site is gotten; If alteration, a new quality, if augmentation or diminution, a new quantity; If generation & corruption, the matter gets a new substantial form; Now where none of these are gotten, there is no addition of any new thing: And it is well known, that the Divine Essence is capable of none of these, neither of new place; nor new quality, not new quantity, nor new form substantial; albeit he continueth for ever, and consequently there can be neither prius nor posterius to be divided in God: But yet because you entertain a wild conceit of God's eternity indivisible; you would have his duration so, indivisible; as if both the time past, and the time to come were drawn together within an instant: And therefore, you say, that all other things have either addition of duration, or continuance of existence, or some new acts of life, or sense, or reason; the last whereof is only congruous & agreeing with the nature of that motion which is called alteration; as the two last and the first, may have reference also to generation, or augmentation; from all which the case is clear that God is free, notwithstanding that his continuance which is to come be not said, to be present, at which wild conceit and the justification thereof you seem to aim: But as for the two first, which yet you make to be all one, they have no place of consideration among the terms that are acquired by motion: And dare you deny, that God hath continuance of existence or duration? But you will say no new duration is added unto God: Who saith it is! And what new duration is added unto man by his continuance? God may add something unto him if it please him; but if he continue him in statu quo, what addition, I pray? You will say duration: I demand; whether naturally or supernaturally? if supernaturally, than God doth a new create it; But God hath long ago ceased from creation: again than not only every day, and hour, but every minute also, and every part of a minute God should creare a new duration: If naturally, then by motion corporal, or spiritual; Now I pray devise, if you can, what motion that is whereby duration is procured; Yet I confess, thus far God may be said to add duration; in as much as he will not set an end to it, though he can.  
But as for the duration of God, it is impossible, that should have any end.  
But some may say, If Gods future existence be not present, when it is present, something is added to God's former duration; As for example, when tomorrow comes God is a day older, than he was: I answer, nothing grows older by access of time, but that which took it being either with time, or in process of time; So did not God.  
Secondly, I answer, God's future existence is nothing else, but his coexistence with time to come, or with things which shallbe in time to come; which is an external denomination, arising from the futurition of things to come: In any other sense it is false to say that God hath any future existence, or past existence.  
But his coexistence with time or things in time may be said to be passed, or to come, as well as present; and in this sense is the Scripture phrase to be understood, when it is said that God is he which is, which was, and which is to come: That is, when this World, and Angels were fifst made, than he was, that is, he did coexist with them, and so all along unto this day present; And so shall exist all along with all creatures & times that are to come: Now this existence of God, more properly to be called his coexistence is partly past, partly present, partly to come; not in respect of God's existence, (who hath neither motion nor shadow of change, & consequently nothing in him is found to be past or to come) but in respect of the existence of creatures which is partly past, partly present, and partly to come.  
Henceforth you acquaint us with certain definitions of Eternity; The first is out of Boetius, which you commend above that which follows out of Aquinas, belike it fits your turn better in your conceits, than that other of Aquinas; and therefore deserving well at your hands you bestow upon it that preferment which you think good; Well let us consider it: Eternity (than in Boetius account) is the entire or total possession of interminable life, all at once, or together.  
The scope you aim at, is to prove that in God's eternal being there is no succession; Et quis Herculem vituperat? who ever said there was? In man the very life vegetable, sensitive and rational grows more and more perfect by degrees: No such motion, no not to perfection, is to be found in God; In Angels there may be a succession of thoughts & of affections: no such succession is to be found in God.  
Yet doth he and you also maintain God's life to be interminable, that is, of such a continuance as is without end, as well as without succession.  
But you shall never be able to prove herehence, that God's existence is present to every part of succession of other things, as namely, both to that which is past, and also to that which is to come.  
Aquinas definition though very artificial you grant, yet doth not, you say, imprint so lively a character and notion of the everliving God his infinite happiness, as the definition givon by Boetius doth: Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine principio & fine, mensurâ carens.  
This lettuce fits not your lips like to the former; because, belike you cannot find by this, that time past & future should be present unto God; as you conceive to find by the former; but you will never be able to make it good.  
4. Yet Plotin is your Oracle in Philosophy beyond all, who gives, as you say, a more deep apprehension of it in fewer terms, saying Aeternitas est vita infinita, which you render thus, Eternity is infinity of life: Like as if when man is defined to be a reasonable creature, you should render it thus, A man is the reasonableness of a creature.  
We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I do not mislike that saying of Plotius, to wit that when we say God is always, we breed in our minds a wand'ring imagination of plurality or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand God's duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no error, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to things to come.  
And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleged out of Boetius or Plotin, that can justify this; no more than in the definition of eternity made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a conceit of the existence of all things both past and to come in God's eternity, not only as they are known: For that is to exist rather in God's knowledge then in his eternity, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I do not dislike your notification of eternity, to be that which always is and cannot cease to be, save that I find no virtue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; although I conceive, that whatsoever always is the same, doth necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.  
And therefore the Apostle takes eternal power and Godhead to be terms equivalent. You say that in true Philosophical contemplation it is not onething truly to be & always to be. There is a typographical error in this, if I be not deceived; and the sentence should run thus, It is but one thing truly to be and always to be. This I take to be your meaning, but I acknowledge no truth in it. For if this were true, than all creatures should have no true being; for certainly they are not always.  
And if they have no true being, than they have no being at all, as afterwards yourself acknowledge this manner of consequence to be good. And albeit to have a being and to have a true being be all one, yet hence it follows not, that truly to be and always to be is all one. I grant that to be always, without beginning and without end, doth infer an independent being. But even true beings may be dependent; otherwise the beings of Angels and men made after the image of God were no true beings. For undoubtedly their beings are dependent beings.  
Another use of the word always is to note (as you say,) the interminable, indistiuguishable, and indivisible power, which needs nothing besides that which it actually & for the present hath. But I see no congruity in the word always to signify all this. And first I wonder what you mean to leap from God's life and power; seeing you propose the infinity of each, as several branches of God's infinity to be discoursed on a part, Say then it denotes his interminable and indivisible being or duration: yet I cannot like this neither.  
For though the term always, doth congruously denote his interminable being, to wit, without beginning and without end: Yet I see not how it can note his indivisible being. I grant this latter may be inferred out of the former, for as much as that which is always, cannot be produced, but must be of necessary being and consequently indivisible in such sort, as that the duration of it to day, cannot be divided from the duration thereof to morrow: for than it should cease to be, which is impossible, seeing it is presupposed to be of necessary being. We deny not, but God hath all that belongs to his divine nature; though not for the reason you give to wit, because he truly is. For that were to infer, that nothing besides God h●he any true being, which were to deny the being of all creatures.  
The divine nature contains a totality of increated entity (if a totality may be imagined of that which hath no parts.) As for created entity, that is not to be found in God at all but only from God. All creatures may have need of some thing else then continuance, as namely their natures being capable of greater perfection; then yet they have attained unto. As for continuance, they have only thus far need thereof, because otherwise they shall cease to be; and so likewise God himself, if he should not continue, he should cease to be. Only here is the difference. The creature may be said properly to need continuance, because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another, for the obtaining of it, to wit, upon the will of God.  
But God depends upon no other for the obtaining of his continuance; no nor upon his own will neither.  
And therefore he cannot be said to need continuance, but rather that he must needs be, because he is not ens contingens, but ens necessarium, of no contingent, but of necessary being. By your leave, Eternity contains more, then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had.  
For undoubtedly, it signifies also the continuance of all that without beginning, and without end.  
But you after your manner, seem under these ●rmes whatsoever is expedient to be had, to include and comprehend duration future, as if duration future were already present unto God; which is a groundless conceit, arising merely from a superficial interpretation of the nature of eternity, which is commonly called an instant of duration.  
〈◊〉 It is true, the duration of God is not to come; For it is present, and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation.  
But there is a duration of time, and of things measured by time to come; which future duration is no way present to God, in respect of his coexistence with it.  
It is most true, and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase, that God is he which was, & is, & is to come: which phrase of specche implies neither change, nor succession in God, but only in things without God.  
Again, wisdom, power, and goodness are expedient to concur in the supreme essence: But this eternity comprehends not, but only the continuance of all these without beginning, without end.  
That a thing looseth so much of perfection, as it wants of duration, is a wild assertion; unless under perfection, you comprehend duration; and then your proposition is identical, and no more than to say, that a thing looseth so much of duration, as it wants of duration.  
Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue, not only because Aristotle was bold to say that, Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius; good is not therefore better because the more lasting, or everlasting, but also, because by the same reason of yours it would follow that a Crow, an Hart, and a Raven were much more perfect than a Man; if it be true as some write, that a Crow lives three times as long as a Man, an Hart three times as long as a Crow, and a Raven three times as long as an Hart.  
Sure we are the least star hath continued from the beginning of the World.  
〈◊〉. I muse not a little to see Platonical and Plotinicall Philosophy, so much advanced by an Oxonian: as if Aristotle's learning left Logicians perplexed in a point of sophistry, and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them. And looking back to what you have discoursed of, out of Plotinus, if so be I might light on that parcel of subtlety suitable to this end you speak of, I profess, that as I find no thing in that which you have alleged out of Plotinus, that is not vulgar, nothing worthy of that commendation which you besto we upon him, (thereby reflectinge no small commendation upon your own peculiar studies in Plotinus:) so withal, I cannot imagine what piece of wit that is, the ignorance whereof doth perplex either any other better Logician, or myself either, in the resolution of that question, which you propose.  
Neither do you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus herunto, that might serve as a key to open that lock, which as you say, is so hard to be opened, but leave your Reader at random, to poor after it. But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your own, let us consider it.  
And first the question proposed is, Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man or corpse, or both. To be both (you say) implies contradiction, and yet you say, there is as much reason, that in this instant he should be both as either. Thus have we the question and that argued in part. Now followeth your resolution, as it were our of Plotinus, though you allege no crumb of any sentence of his for it. Now I observe that your solution, though you would have it seem to be but one, yet indeed it is divers; the one nothing to the purpose, the other something to the purpose, but utterly overthrowing your former assertion, as when you said, There is as much reason he should be both as either. The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question itself, in effect professing that it proceeds from a false ground or supposition.  
A manifest evidence that you are still to seek how to satisfy yourself herein, or others in this unproffitable speculation.  
And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus, make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy, I shall have no great cause to complain of my ignorance therein.  
Your first resolution is, that he was a man and shallbe a corpse. This I say, is nothing to the question. For the question proposed is, not what he was, or what he shallbe, but what he is in the instant of his dissolution.  
In the next place you seem to speak more to the purpose, when you say that in the instant of his dissolution, he ceaseth to be a man, and begins to be a corpse. But even this also, is not fully to the purpose. For the question is not, what he begins to be, or what he ceaseth to be, in that instant, but what he is.  
Yet because substantial forms have no degrees as accidental forms have, and therefore cease to be, or begin to be all at once; therefore I take your answer at the best to be this; that in the instant of his dissolution, he is a corpse, and not a man, which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed saying, There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both, as either.  
Your third resolution different from both the former is this: that the space of dissolution is not in an instant, as the question supposed, but a space of time consisting of parts, which is not to answer the question, but utterly to overthrow it; and withal it openeth a way to a new difficulty; for in this case it may well be demanded, what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man, and what to the being of a corpse; and take heed lest you ascribe one instant to the last of the first form, and another instant to the beginning of the succeeding of the second form.  
For seeing two instants cannot be immediate, it will follow herhence that materia prima, shall some space of time actually exist without any form.  
As for myself, I never ●ept upon Plotinus his Parnassus, nor was ever acquainted with his muses. Nay, I have been so long time departed out of the university, and while I was there so long removed from these kind of studies, that I may well be said to have forgotten Aristole. Nun● mihi sunt oblita sophis●ata. Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripatetic store with your achievements out of Plotinus.  
I say then, the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more general question.  
And that is concerning the beginning and ceasing of form, now the rules thereof most received as I remember, are these. The forms we speak of are, either permanent, or successive. Forms permanent begin per primum sui esse, by the first instant of their being; desi●unt per primum sui non esse, they cease to be, by the first instant of their not being.  
In such sort as to say, that immediately before such an instant they were not, but at such an instant, and in the time following they were. Again, touching their ending, you may say, Immediately before such an instant they were; in and after such an instant, they were not.  
As for forms successive, such as are time and motion, they are said to begin per ultimum sui non esse; by the last instant of their not being; and to end per primum sui non esse, by the first instant of their not being.  
That is, at such an instant motion (speaking of motion properly as it includes succession) was not: for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was.  
Again touching the ending of motion we may say, at such an instant motion was not, but immediately before, it was. And accordingly, to the question proposed, I answer; Corruption or dissolution is taken either in a complicate signification, comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the form, and then all that while, undoubtedly Socrates was a man, and not a carcase.  
But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the form humane. I say, in that instant, wherein he is said to desinere or cease (it being the first instant of his not being, as before hath been showed, to be the manner of desinence or ceasing of all forms permanent) he is a corpse; but immediately before he was a man.  
In the next place you tell us of Plotins' conclusion, namely, That while we seek to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, looseth its indivisible nature.  
First, I like not that assertion, whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin, in saying, that God alone truly is.  
I well know our being is of a quite different nature from Gods being: but to deny that we creatures have a true being, is as good as to deny that we have any being at all.  
Secondly, I know no man; that goethe about to fit God's nature, with any proportion of quantity.  
Yet we maintain, he was coexistent with all things past, is coexistent with all things present, shall be coexistent with all things that are to come in their order, & that without all, divisibility, or succession in himself: his coexistence after the manner forementioned, implying only divisibility and succession in the creatures.  
Of time, you say, no part truly is but the present.  
So then the present time, at least truly is. Yet but a little before and often heretofore you have professed, that nothing but God truly is.  
Now give me leave to maintain some paradoxes, as well as you.  
I say, all time truly is, and is present, as well as that which you account to be only present.  
For how doth this present hour exist but by succession of parts.  
If you account nothing present but an instant; it is well known, that an instant deserves no more to be accounted time, than a point deserves to be accounted magnitude.  
But if you speak of time properly, it must have parts, which cannot exist together, but only by succession. As for example, this minute of an hour is present but how? only as having a part past, and a part to come.  
For this only to exist is to exist by way of succession. In like sort this present hour doth truly exist; but how 〈◊〉 as having a part past, and a part to come.  
So this present year doth truly exist, as having a part past, and a part to come.  
In like sort the time of the Gospel, accoumpting from the day of Pent●cost, when the H. Ghost came down upon the Apostles, unto the end of the World, may as well be said truly to exist, namely thus, as having a part past, and a part to come.  
So dividing the World into two parts; The old world, from the beginning of time by creation unto Noah's flood; and the new World, computed from Noah's flood to the end of the World: I say the time of this World doth only exist, as having a part past and a part to come.  
So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the end, may be said truly to exist, to wit, by way of succession of parts, having one part past and another to come. For not the least part of time doth exist otherwise, to wit, by coexistence of parts, but only by succession of parts.  
They who made doubt, whether navigators were to be accounted amongst the living or amongst the dead, affected more wit than truth. For if Navigators, undoubtedly, they are living and not dead; Indeed after they have set forth, we are uncerteyne what is become of them: and equally as uncerteyne may we be, what is become of our friends that are travailed unto China by the way of the Continent. But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being, is a conceit little becoming a Philosopher in my judgement, though it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of things successive, and in motion, whether by Sea or land.  
I should think that sorry imagination, is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant, which if it were true, would infer that time were nothing but a succession of instants.  
But were it so; yet surely the shortness of continuance of any thing, nothing hinders the true being thereof, when it is. A child of a day old, hath as true being, as Methusalch had, who lived till he was, almost a thousand.  
It seems the sent of Plotinus his subtleties, hath perfumed all those that have dwelled under his shadow; and therefore no merveyle if Ficinus commenting upon him, savoureth hereof also. He compares, you say liternitie to a centre, and time to the points or extremities of the line in the circumference allway moovinge about the Centre, so that if it were an eye it might view them all at once.  
I doubt not, but ere we depart from this chapter, we shall meet with the Circumference of eternity as well as with the centre of it; but not from Plotinus his text, or Ficinus his Commentaries, but from one that will be bold to add a Gemora to their Talmud.  
For it is fit the World should profit in subtleties as well as in solid points, and not always to stand at a stay. But a word of this by the way: Though future times, and future things are all known to God, yet not by reason of any existence of theirs in eternity, or God's coexistence with them for the present. For how doth God at this time coexist with them, which at this time have no existence at all?  
Again, God looks not out of himself for the knowledge of any thing now, more than he did before the World was made.  
For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of change. When you take upon you to tell us how Eternity is indivisible, to wit, by containing all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be contained in time itself. I pray remember, that in like manner you professed, that God did contain all entities even the entities of brute beasts; and you expounded it in this sense, because forsooth he was able to produce them.  
And thus we easily grant God contains all perfections of successions, in as much as he can produce them. If so be succession may be counted a perfection, whereof but erst you made doubt, whether it had any being at all. Yet we doubt not, but God can produce them; yea so far forth as to exceed all that is contained in time.  
For as much, as he could have made the duration of the World, ten times more than it is like to be.  
I do not affect to quarrel with Plato his wit; much good do you with it, and if you please yourself with such fancies, as namely that time is a moovable image of that which is unmooveable; a divisible image of that which is indivisible; a successive representation of that which is without all succession; a model finite, with beginning and end of that whic● is infinite, without beginning and end, you shall not displease me.  
You have another sophism or seeming contradiction to unloose or salve by these rarities of curiosity; and that is, how it may be verified, that Petrus in aeternitate aegrotat, & Petrus in aeternitate non aegrotat. If this were spoken of the same time, you say it were contradiction; but being spoken of eternity, you say it is not, and yet you confess Eternity is more indivisible, than any time.  
Let who will think, that you have salved this knot of seeming contradiction, to my understanding you leave it as you find it. The propositions containing a seeming contradiction are both absurd.  
For Peter cannot be said to be sick in eternity, as in that which is the measure of duration eythe▪ of himself, or of his sickness, but only in time, with which time, eternity, I confess, is coexistent, but when? not till the time that Peter's sickness doth exist, nor after it hath ceased to exist. For coexistence supposeth existence on both sides. And as the existence of the creature is past, present, or to come; so is God's coexistence with it, either past, present, or to come; which hath both Scripture & reason to warrant it; whereas your wild conceits are warrantable by neither.  
6. Materia prima, is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is no body, but because it is no compound body. But God is ingenerable and incorruptible, because he is no body at all: Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angels who are ingenerable and incorruptible, because they are Spirits.  
All things generable come from matter only as touching their material parts, not as touching their forms; neither can they be said so properly to spring from it, as to be compounded of it. But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause, yea the matter itself also, and that out of nothing.  
If matter be most unlike him, in wanting the true unity of entity, other things belike have this; And if they have unity of entity, it is to be hoped they have true entity also, verity being the property of entity, as well as unity, and consequently they may be said to have a true being, which you heretofore, & that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God.  
I wonder why you make the Creator and essence itself to be terms of equal signification; whereas God is not the creator of all things by his essence, but by his freewill rather.  
Those things which necessarily belong to God, are usually ascribed unto him, by way of essence, but not such things, as contingently denominate him, arising from the liberty and freedom of his will.  
God, you say, is the incomprehensible perfection of all things; do you mean of things create only, or only of things increate, or of both? You cannot mean it of things create: For no create perfection is found in God: Nor of increate; For no imperfection at all is found in essence increate.  
The Earth is not unmooveable: some have conceived it to move naturally: Undoubtedly, it may be moved, otherwise it were not Corpus naturale; And Earthquakes do manifest as much.  
If it cannot be moved by the force of Man (yet by prayer of faith, mountains may be removed, and cast into the Sea), yet it may be moved questionless by the force of Angels, at least by the power of God.  
Neither is infinite vigour of vitality required to an immovable condition in the opinion of greater Clerks than ourselves, as who think all Angels to be no way capable of local motion.  
Yet you talk of a mobility of the Deity (a prodigious phrase) though you think to charm it, by calling it more than infinite, and calling the motion thereof a supermotion; and this his mobility, as well as his immobility formerly spoken of, you make to proceed from the infinite vigour of his vitality.  
Nor doth eternity (say you) receive addition from succession infinite; Belike it receaves succession (in your opinion) though no addition thereby. For if it receaves no succession at all, what sober man could expect, that it should receive addition by it.  
At length you come towards that, which I have a long time looked for: Eternity, you say, is like to a fixed centre, because indivisibly immutable, but it is also as you say, like unto a circle, but you tell us not wherein, nor why.  
And as Trismegist did define God's immensity, by the similitude of a Sphere, whose Centre was every where, but his Circumference no where.  
So you will take upon you to define God's Eternity, neither out of Trismegist, nor out of Plotinus, nor out of Ficinus, but out of your own invention to be a Circular duration, whose instants are always, whose terminations or extremities never were, never shall be.  
We willingly grant, that God's eternity is a duration without beginning, and without end; This is nothing strange, nothing remote from vulgar capacity.  
But to say it is a Circular duration, is such an attempt, and so audacious, as I think, it never entered into any sober man's brain either sleeping or waking, before it was fancied by yourself.  
Le's bid farewell to Aristotle's Philosophy, and let Plato's Divinity come in the place of it. Distil Plotinus his Philosophy, and Ficinus Commentaries upon Plotins Enneades throughout, and see whether any such Extract can be made, as this Circular duration you dream of, and commend to the World as some rare notion.  
Of Circular motion I have heard and read; But of Circular duration never.  
Nay things that have circular motion, were never affirmed to have Circular duration. For motion may be from space to space in a round figure, returning thither, where it begun, but duration is neither round, nor goethe round.  
For though the Heavens run round, yet the time of the Heavens and of the World runs not round, nor returns to the period of time from whence it began.  
Yet is duration successive more fit to be accounted duration Circular, than duration constant, which hath no parts succeeding.  
I hold it to be a notorious untruthe, to say that eternity coexists to every parcel of time. For to say it coexists with time to come, is to say, that eternity existethe, and time to come existethe also, which latter clause is most false. For if it were present, it were not to come.  
No time defines eternity, we say, but rather eternity sets 〈◊〉 end to time.  
But we dare not entertain so absurd a conceit as to say, eternity circumscribs time; as if time were some lower sphere, and eternity an upper sphere, and so time should be a circular duration as well as eternity.  
Your next sentence begins to open the mystery, as whe● you say, Though the motions of the Heavens should continue without end, yet every period of time shall fall within eternity, now totally existent.  
I mark your phrase well, as when you say, It shall fall within eternity, implyinge that eternity is beyond it, in respect of time to come; like as it is said to be before all time, in respect of time past.  
Now to discuss this phrase of yours of falling within eternity: This phrase (I say) here used, is utterly out of his place. For in proper speech it hath place only in respect of quantity continual, outreaching all other things we speak of.  
Thus all things in the World besides the uttermost Sphere, fall within the uttermost sphere; so that the uttermost sphere doth not only extend so far as they do, but beyond them.  
Now to say that every period of time falls within eternity, is to suppose, that eternity extends beyond it so as to exist beyond it; which is true of all time past. For God did both coexist with it, and doth continue after it.  
And as touching time present, it may be justified in this sense, to fall within eternity, in respect that God's continuance is not at an end with this present, but continueth without end.  
But to imagine that at this present God's continuance doth actually extend farther than this present, is a most absurd conceit; As if forsooth God had not only an existence present, but also an existence to come, and that this existence of God to come is present. Whereas neither of these is true, but each false, and that most absurdly false.  
For first God hath no existence to come, for if he had, than he should have also an existence past, and consequently he should be measured with time, and subject unto motion. And whereas the Scriptures do confess that God is he which was, and is, and is to come; this is to be understood of his coexistence and not of his existence; as much as to say God doth not only coexist with all things present, but also did coexist, with all things past; that is to say with every one of them in the time of their existence, and also shall coexist, with all things to come, that is to say, with every one of them in the time of theyre actual existence.  
Now this coexistence of God with things past, and things to come is not present, only his coexistence with things present, is present, his coexistence with things past, is passed, and in that respect 'tis said he was; so likewise his coexistence with things to come is to come, and in that respect only it is said that God is to come.  
By this we may judge of the proposition following which is this.  
God hath been, is, and ever will be, unto every minute or Scruple of time that hath been, is, or shallbe, alike everlastingly coexistent. If one word had been left out (to wit the word everlastingly) it might have admitted an handsome interpretation, and a sober meaning taken respectively thus, God hath been coexistent to things that have been, is coexistent to things that are, shall be coexistent to things that shall be.  
But to apply all these differences of time past, present, and to come, to each of the things mentioned, (as namely to say, that God hath been, and is, and shall be coexistent to all things that have been, and is, and shall be, coexistent to all things that shall be) is most absurd.  
For the coexistence of God doth as well imply the exisstence of the things themselves with which God is said to exist, as the existence of God.  
And therefore though it be true to say, that God was coexistent with all things past, because there was a time when these things did exist and at the same time undoubtedly God did coexist with them; yet it is false to say that God doth or shall coexist with things past; for that saying doth imply, that things past do now exist; and also are to come. In like sort though it be true: that God doth now coexist with all things that now are, for as much as both these things do indeed at this time exist, and God must needs coexist with them as the author and preserver of their existence; yet it is untrue to say that God doth now coexist with time past or to come, and with the things which were or shall be therein, for if this were true; it would follow that not only God is now present, but also that time past and time to come, are also present withal things contained in them, which every man knows to be most untrue.  
Last of all though it be true that God shall coexist with the time to come, and the things therein, because both they shall exist, and consequently God must needs coexist with them, as the author and preserver of them; yet it is most untrue to say that God shall coexist with time past and present and the things therein, for if this were true it would herence follow that both time past, and present with all things contained in them were both to come, which how absurd a speech it is, let every sober man judge.  
And yet that this is the meaning appears by the adding of the word everlastingly, which addition makes the proposition untrue in every member of it, though taken respectively, which otherwise as I have showed might admit a tolerable interpretation. For though it be true that God was coexistent with Noah's flood, yet is is un●ue that he was everlastingly coexistent with it.  
At the time of Noah's flood God was coexistent with it by virtue of his eternirye, which makes him necessarily to coexist with all things when they are, like as by virtue of his immensity he necessarily filleth all places, as soon as there are any places to fill. But God was not everlastingly coexistent with Noah's flood, for as much as neither before the time of Noah's flood, was God coexistent with it nor after: For to coexist with Noah's flood doth imply the existence of Noah's flood: But Noah's flood did neither exist before the time of it nor after.  
In like sort to say that God doth now coexist with all things present is true; but to say he doth everlastingly coexist with this time present, and the things therein is most untrue: For if this were true, than it were as true that he did coexist yesterday, with this day and shall coexist to morrow with this present, which is utterly untrue; for if it were true, then yesterday and to morrow should be this present day, Nay it would follow that this present day were everlasting (and not time only in general) if so be God did everlastingly coexist, with it.  
Last of all it is true that God shall coexist with the fall of Babylon; but it is untrue to say that God shall everlastingly coexist with it, for if that were true, than he should coexist with it both before it were, and after it were passed, which is impossible. For it would imply that Babylon should fall, before it shall fall, and after it hath fallen. And all this confusion ariseth from a precipitate and superficiary apprehension of the nature of eternity being commonly accounted but an instant, which indeed is a truth, because in the nature of God there is no succession, and that not only in respect of such motions whereunto bodies are subject, but in respect of such motions which are incident unto Angels. In regard of which motions the differences of time past, present and to come are attributed unto God, in respect of his coexistence with them, without bringing in such monstrous conceits as are hatched in the fancies of some, though I profess I know not many such, nor never read or heard of the like till now,  
So then the reason why God was coexistent with time past and the things therein; is coexistent with time present and the things therein, shall be coexistent with time to come and the things therein, is not only by reason of his own indivisible, and in erminable unitye; or rather is not at all by reason of this, for this consideration is rather opposite to the determinations of was, is, and is to come, which you attribute unto God, than any way suitable with it, but rather in regard of his eternity, in which respect he must necessarily coexist with all times according to theyre several differences; provided that they have an existence; for otherwise: how shall God be said to coexist with them.  
But then again I say not only in respect of eternity are these denominations given unto God, but also in respect of the acquisition of new successive parts, not in himself but in time and things contained therein. For because God cannot be said to coexist with such things that have no existence at all, And all things without God have not theyre existence at once but some at one time some at another, hence is coexistence with them attributed unto God, according to differences of time past, present, and to come, not by reason of any succession of parts in God, but only in respect of succession of parts in time, and motions, in all things without God.  
But we shall have a mad World quickly, when men shall take upon them doctórally to dictate conclusions unto others from certain principles (as about the eternity of God, and the indivisible nature thereof) superficiarily apprehended, and never rightly, much less sufficiently understood.  
What time you have bestowed in the study of these attributes of God I know not; but as for myself I profess I never bestowed any hereabouts as I can remember, but ever contented myself with common notions generally received. And whereas I met sometimes with strange suppositions grounded upon these common notions, I have rather contented myself with ignorance how to justify them, then to think it worth the while to enter upon the discussion, only in the question about the presence of all things in eternity maintained by Aquinas, I found in Scotus a discovery of that errourous conceit.  
And though Alvarez hath laboured to repair the credit● of Aquinas in that particular and to answer Scot, yet the vanity of that discourse of his, I have laboured to discover, and therein have reasonably well satisfied myself.  
Now being cast upon these Meditations, by reason of this your discourse, which in the very Epistle dedicatory manifest your affection towards Arminianism, which I profess I hate as much, as I love the grace of God, and desire to be zealous in the maintaining of it to my last gasp; I am driven herewithal to take into consideration your Philosophical discourse concerning the essence of God. and his attributes, and finding therein some prodigious assertions by way of deduction from the received notions of Gods indivisible and yet eternal being; out of the Logical faculty which I brought with me long ago, out of the University, I make bold to observe well the soundness of such illations, and finding no ground for them, but rather utter disproportion between them, and the principles wherehence they are inferred, in the course hereof I become better acquainted with the nature of God's eternity then before; and hope to be better enabled to encounter any unsound assertions, derived therehence and grounded thereupon, then heretofore.  
And we are like to be acquainted with your mysteries to the full in the next Section.  
7. You suppose duration successively infinite.  
In this case 'tis true that God cannot be said to be after all duration successive. For to be after it, is to be when duration hath an end, but you suppose that such duration shall never have end.  
And in this case it can neither properly nor improperly be said, that God is after it. For it is manifest contradiction to say, that hath an end which is supposed to have no end.  
You seem to groan in the delivery of some acquaint subtlety when you write thus: Yet that eternity now is and ever was a● infinitely preexistent to all ages in succession coming towards us one way; it is, and was to the World's nativity the other way.  
Here you make a full point, whereby it comes to pass, that wanting a principal verb, the sentence contains a manifest nonsense; & it is the observation of others as well as mine, if diverse such non-sensed propositions have dropped from your pen in this discourse, yet your meaning we see plainly in the sentence following, as when you say, This is a point which we must believe, if we believe God to be eternal, and know what eternity is.  
So the former speech of yours though imperfect, & indifferently capable of being, pronounced to be a fable as a truth, we perceive to be received by you as a truth, and not so only but affected also by you as a truth, whose consideration hath not been so well taken to heart, by those who have had Gods eternal decrees and the awardes of it most frequently in theyre mouths and pens; as it hath been by yourself.  
Thus you accommodate yourself to the venting, & your Readers to the expecting of some sublimate and so quintessential a conceit, that poor Calvin & Beza, and such like unproficients in Academical studies, never attained to the depth of any such speculation.  
Once before I observed a certain gradation tending to this purpose, and that with some wonderment, as when you affirmed in the beginning of this section, that God was as truly before all times future, as before all times past.  
As if to be before all times future, were a greater matter then to be before all times past; whereas I had thought that such poor snakes as myself might truly be accounted to be before all times future. So in this place it might well make a man wonder what you mean to affirm in solemn manner that God is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages coming towards us, as to the World's nativity.  
As if to be preexistent to the times to come, were as great a matter as to be preexistent to times past, which might seem to carry no sobriety in the forehead. For ever the meanest worm that creeps upon the Earth, is preexistent to all ages to come, but none is preexistent to all ages passed but God himself. But there is, no doubt a mystery in this.  
Heretofore I had a sent of it: But now it begins to break forth in great measure.  
For when we say God is preexistent to all ages past, & consequently must needs be preexistent to all ages that are to come, we understand all this but one way according to the course of time from future to the present, from being present to become past, and so that which is first actually existent, is before all that which arrives to actual existence afterwards. But you tell us of two ways & that God is preexistent before all ages past one way, & before all ages to come another way, by which other way your meaning seems to be this, that as God is afore all ages past, so also he is after or behind all ages to come; which phrase of speech in saying God is after or behind any thing, because you think it too ignoble to be attributed unto God, and perhaps in part to astonish your Readers with some strange language being never acquainted with the like; This being after all ages you are pleased to instile & call his being before them, but another way or a different way from his being, before all ages past.  
As if a man should say that the Horse goes before the Cart one way, and the Cart may be said to go before the Horse another way, which later is indeed and in substance of sense no other, then to go after the Horse.  
In like sort we may say the calling of the Gentiles is before the calling of the jews one way, and the calling of jews goes before the calling of the Gontiles another way, to wit as it comes after it.  
So the rising & flourishing of Antichrist goes before the fall of Antichrist one way, and the fall of Antichrist goeth before the rising and flourishing of Antichrist another way, to wit it followeth after it.  
Now if this manner of language doth not go beyond all Canting, I know not what doth. But take we your phrase according to this sense, yet there is no truth in this assertion. God indeed was before all ages past, because he was when they had no beginning; but he shall not be after all ages to come, because he shall not be when all ages have an end.  
For according to your own opinion all ages shall never have end. And for this reason in the very beginning of this section yourself affirmed, that God could not properly be said to be after all times and durations to come. For what (said you) can be after that which hath no end? To this I added, this could not be affirmed either properly or improperly, because there was no truth in it, as that which employed a manifest contradiction.  
Much less properly or truly can it be said that God is pre-existent to all ages to come after a different way from that whereby he is said to be preexistent to all ages past.  
But let us see whether any greater measure of sobriety, can be found in that which followeth.  
In the next place you tell us, that As he is no Christian Philosopher, much less a true Christian divine, that would deny that whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed before all worlds: So he is no Christian Philosopher, much less a true Christian divine, that shall refer or retract the tenor of this speech, (before all worlds) to that only which is passed before the world began, whatsoever can be more properly said or conceived to be passed, then to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable can have no property of eternity. So than whosoever shall dare say that it is a more proper speech to affirm, that God did choose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, then to say that God shall choose us in Christ after the end of the World, you will be bold to deny him the title both of a Christian Philosopher and of a true Christian divine also.  
By the way let me ask you, what that is which you call passed before the World was; for before the World was, nothing at all was but God. Again, though we say the decrees of God, were before the world was, yet no divine that I know saith they were passed before the World was; for the decrees of God are nothing but the Counsel and will of God, which undoubtedly we say continue the same and ever shall. In the last sentence you teach us that it may stand well enough with eternity, to be said to be passed, present, and to come; so we do not affirm it to be more properly passed, then present or to come. Yet I promise you, I nothing like to say that God is past, I had rather say he was and is, and is to come. As much as to say, God is of necessary being, and still continueth, and it is impossible he should be otherwise, in which respect we may truly and properly say he was coexistent with every thing that is past, (to wit in the time of its existence,) is coexistent to every thing present, shall be coexistent to every thing that is to come (to wit in the time of the existence of each thing) and all this not by any succession of parts in himself, (as who is subject to no motion) but by succession of parts in outward things, with which or whom, he is said to coexist, his own existence being perpetual and invariable.  
These your propositions I can find reason to make them good in some tolerable construction. Yet you add a reason of it, which should be more evident than the Conclusion, but indeed is far more obscure, and when the meaning of it is perceived, is found to have most need of reason to prove it, as being in show contrary to all reason; yet you content yourself with dictating it, & thence proceed to a wild goose race of illustration by the heavens that environ both us and the Antipodes; so to make way for the circular duration which formerly you attributed unto God, by comparing it with the heavens turning round (upon supposition) in a moment.  
The rational proposition without reason delivered is this: For that only is eternal which always is, and so always is, that it hath precedence or preexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever we look upon them or take theyre beginning, whether backwards or forwards: Now this saying of yours is full of incongruities if not rather of foul absurdi its.  
For first you suppose the beginning of succession may be taken backwards or forwards; but how is this possible? is succession indifferent to begin backwards or forwards? Is time indifferent to begin backwards or forwards? The first time is the beginning of it, but as for the last of time will any sober man call that the beginning of it, unless you make time like to a pudding, where a man may begin at which end he will. And surely I see no reason but a pudding may be in better sense, acknowledged to have two ends, than time two beginnings, Especially two such beginnings as you ascribe unto it, the one backwards and the other forwards; for begin at which end of a pudding, you will, you may be well said to go forwards and not backwards. Again suppose your own phrases be allowed you, and that the end of time may be taken for the beginning, yet where there is no end to be found how will you devise a beginning? As for example, Time we all know had a beginning but you suppose that time to come shall have no end, for though this world shall have an end, yet men and Angels shall have no end, but live with God for ever.  
For the same reason, though God be infinitely prexistent before times past, yet he cannot be said no not in your phrase and your meaning, that he is infinitely preexistent to all times to come, the meaning whereof is to continue infinitely longer than all ages to come; for that were to suppose that God shall be when all ages have run theyre course and are come to an end, which you suppose shall never be. Thus from your Antipodes which you devise in the course of time, I come to the consideration of the Antipodes in respect of place and situation. And hereupon I remember what you delivered in the entrance upon this discourse of eternity, and it is this; whatsoever hath, been or rightly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suit unto eternity, and in like manner whatsoever is incident to space of place, the same in porportion may be verified of space of time. And therefore like as Antipodes are found in place, so in some proportion Antipodes may be found in time. For when you begin at the ends of time you seem to turn the heels of it upwards.  
And like as the roundness of the heavens environing all, salves this and makes it appear how the heads every where are uppermost howsoever it seems otherwise to vulgar capacities: so here you have a devise of a circular duration to salve the turning of times heels upwards, for by this it appears that in truth time hath no heels to turn upwards, but rather wheels to turn roundwards; like as eternity hath a Circular duration, by way of supermotion or a vigorous rest as you phrasifie it.  
Well let Lactantius pass with his error in denying Antipodes, and the vulgar with their error pass, that think the heavens if they be ●ound be under us. Now we come to the comparison and comparative demonstration, which is this: As the heavens are every way above the earth: so is eternity every way before all worlds. Suppose there be truth in the parts of this assertion, yet I find no convenience in the resemblance.  
It is true that Tyburn is three square, and a Citizen's cap is round, but there is no congruity in saying that as Tyburn is three square: so a Citizen's cap is round. Yet I find as little accurateness in the propositions considered by themselves as in saying the Heavens are every way above the earth, for I know no other ways of the Heavens being above the whole earth which is round, then by compassing it; In my judgement it is more proper to say the heavens are every where above the earth (than every way above it,) and on every side above the earth, or which way soever we go, whether East, West, North, or South, we shall still find the Heavens to be above the earth.  
So likewise I know but one way how eternity can be said to be before all Worlds, and that is by being before they had beginning. As for that other way which you devise as it were an Antipodes in time as well as in place, namely to be when all Worlds are at end, that is to be after all Worlds rather than before them.  
And yet you flatter yourself in this erroneus conceit, as if it were some exquisite invention, by another fiction, & that is by conceyting eternity to compass and environ time, as the heavens environ the earth.  
Now because the earth is immovable, but time hath succession of parts; and the heavens wonderful nimble in motion, and chose eternity a constant and permanent instant; therefore you may do well to salve the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Sphere of your discourse to consult with Copernicus about blowing some quicksilver into the dull and sullen earth & set it going round, and on the other side persuade the Heavens to favour themselves and take their rest, the model of eternity, and time represented by you would be something the more accurate.  
Some helps for this you have, I confess, of your own divising, to wit, by supposing the Heavens to move in an instant, leaving it to the Readers judgement whether to account that motion a cessation from motion, or a vigorous rest, besides that of the top & scourge, which we may have time to consider of in due place. But to proceed; of the beginning of this World past, and the end of it to come, there is no difference between us.  
To this you add, that the eye of eternal providence, looks through the World, through all the several ages, successions, or durations in the World, as well from their last end, to their first beginning, as from their first beginning, to their last end.  
This World as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end. But successive duration even in your opinion, shall have no end.  
And therefore you cannot say without contradiction, that God looks through the several ages thereof from their last end to their beginning.  
Yet this last end, you might have called a beginning according to your phrase and tenent, maintaining God to be before all ages, not only before ages past one way, but also before ages to come another way. Again, that all things are known to him, as well things to come, as things past, or present, is without all question.  
This is to be present unto God, in esse cognito. But you have another wild conceit of the coexistence, both of things past and of things to come with God, & that for this present, which turn of yours this will nothing serve that God knows all things.  
Last of all as touching this manner of knowledge which you attribute unto God, it is nothing decent.  
We confusse, we may indifferently consider the course of the World past, either from the beginning unto this present day, or from this present day rising upwards unto the beginning of the World; because our understanding is of such a nature, as to consider things in succession one after another. But God's understanding, as you well know, is of no such nature, as to consider things one after another; for so you should maintain succession in the nature of God, and consequently subject him unto time.  
Again, God doth not look out of himself in knowing the course of the World throughout; for he knew it as well what it might be, and what it should be before the World was made, as now he knows what it is, yet certainly before the World was, he knew it not by looking without him, for then there was nothing without him to look into.  
And surely since the World was made, the manner of God's knowledge is nothing altered, for with him is no variableness nor shadow of change.  
Neither do I see any reason why the knowledge of God, whereby he knows all things, should be called the eye of his. Providence: seeing Providence began with the world, but his knowledge was the same before the world began, and by his providence it is more properly said, that he governs all things, then that he knows all things.  
Again you return to the devised Circular form of eternity (yet that will not warrant a Circular duration thereof, which was your former sigment) and tell us that there is no period of time, which is not so environed with eternity, as the earth or centre is with the Heavens; save only that the Heavens are finite, and eternity infinite.  
Give me leave to profess the absurdity of this conceit of yours amongst many others. For what do you talk of environning that which hath no sides, but only hath a kind of extension of succession in length of parts one after another.  
Every period of time hath eternity before it, and eternity after it, but this is not sufficient to maintain that eternity environs time as the Heavens environ the earth.  
Myself was borne before many thousands, whom also I have outlived, but yet I cannot be said to environ them as the Heavens environ the earth.  
If a Crow lives many ages of a Man, and an Hart more than the Crow, and the Raven more than the Hart; how many thousands have begun to breath & ceased to breath within the limits of their duration; yet what an absurd thing were it to say, that they environed them all, as the Heavens environ the earth, yet you proceed, sitting upon these addle eggs, to hatch congruous conclusions, you say that in this sense were it possible, the world might have been created from everlasting, the Eternal, notwithstanding should have been everlastingly before them. Which as it is most false, so it is most inconsequent. Most false, for like as God cannot be after that which hath no end (as yourself before in a manner professed) and the reason is manifest. Because to be after a thing, as for instance to be after the world, is to be after the world is come to his end, which were untrue if the world had no end.  
In like sort to be before the world, is to be while the world had yet no being, which is contrary to the supposition of being everlasting.  
Neither doth it follow, that because God is before every period of time which hath a beginning, therefore he should be before such a time which is supposed to have no beginning.  
I grant he should be before it by priority of cause, and by priority of dignity, but he should not be before it by priority of duration, which is the only priority whereof this discourse proceedeth.  
Yet you will bring a reason to prove the former assertion, and that is this, For that period of motion which must terminate the next Million of years shall have coexistens with eternity now existent, whose insinity doth not grow with succession, nor extend itself with motion; but stands immoovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as well in respect of any set draught or point. Whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens when time took beginning.  
This reason hath number enough of words; but let us consider what is the weight of sense it carrieth; And this is an hard matter to do by reason of the obscurity that accompanieth it; one peuliar character of your discourse; For what do you mean by the next Million of years? I know not how to account them, whether in respect of the time present; and so they proceed of the next Million that are to come; or rather of the Million of years next passed; For I presume, you mean it not of the first Million of years of the world, in case it were eternal: For if eternal, than it had no beginning, and consequently as it had no first year, so neither had it any first Million of years. Therefore I understand it of the next Million of years to this present, whether it be the Million next past, or next to come, all is one, and it must be true of both, as well as of either, that they are coexistent with eternity now existent; and what I pray of all this? when comes the form of Syllogism, whereby to conclude that God is not only before, but everlastingly before that which is without beginning. And that God's continuance extends not only beyond, but everlastingly beyond that, which never shall have an end?  
Give me leave to help you at a dead lift, thus; If the next Million of years coming, are coexistent with God, now existent, then also the Million of years coming next to that, shall be coexistent with God now existent: And so all the Millions of years that are to come, are coexistent with God now existent; But God's continuance of being, doth extend infinitely beyond his now existence: therefore it doth extend infinitely beyond all times to come, though they be without end; So on the other side: If the Million of years next passed doth coexist with God now existent, then also the Million of years next passed to them, doth coexistent with God now existinge, and so by the same reason all the years past do coexist with God now existent; But God's continuance, hath been infinitely before his now present existence; therefore also it hath been infinitely beyond all the Millions of years, though upon supposition they have been infinite; This I think is the But of argument you shoot at, though you have not expressed so much; whether because your Logic served you not, being used to a confused manner of dictatinge at pleasure what you think good, or because you envied so much your Readers facility in apprehendinge your meaning.  
Thus I have helped you in raising a Spirit: Now without your help I will assay to lay him again.  
To the Major; I grant it in part, namely that there is as much reason why the two next Millions of years, whether you take them of the time past, or of the time to come, should coexist with God now existent, as well as one Million; but when you proceed and say; therefore by the same reason all that are to come, and all that are past, are coexistent with God now existent, you make an incredible stride or leap, infinitely greater than the stride, not only of Polyphemus, but of the Colossus at Rhodes too: For a Million and a Million, yea & a third Million, yea and though you make the progression in such sort while you will, still the number is but finite, but to leap herehence to all that are to come, is an infinite leap: For all are infinite both ways, both as touching time past and time to come: in which respect, no progression, from Million to Million, shall ever reach to all, nay it shall never make the number of years remaining, either for the time past, or for the time to come, less than infinite.  
This is the fowl flaw we find in the major: let us come to the minor which was this; But God's existence extends infinitely further, and was infinitely before his now existence. I answer thus; By Gods now existence, you understand his existence, either in the present instant of time, or in the present instant of eternity; if of the present instant of time, than the proposition was not true in any one part of it; For certainly neither the Million of years next passed, nor the Million of years next to come, are coexistent with God, now existent in instant of time, both because neither many years can possibly exist in an instant of time; nor God himself; but rather his existens is in the instant of eternity, though both he and his eternity be coexistent with every instant of time: Now if it be understood of the instant of eternity, I deny that God was before this instant, or shall continue one ace of duration after it; And no merveyle, seeing both everlastingness for the time past, and everlastingness for the time to come, are supposed, to coexist in this instant of eternity; Yet have I not all this while discovered the vanity of the conceit, which is as a mist before your eyes: You say, the next Million of years doth coexist with eternity now existent; I say this is notoriously untrue, whether you take it of years past or of years to come, all is one; for that which is past, and that which is to come, hath no existence with God now existent: And I prove it thus; That which hath no existence at all at this present, that cannot be said to have any coexistence, but things past and things to come have no existence at all at this present, therefore they cannot be said to have any coexistence with God; Things future shall have coexistence with God, to wit, when the time of their actual existence cometh; Likewise things past have had their coexistence with God, to wit, when the time of their actual existence was.  
But neither things past, nor things to come have any coexistence with God now coexistent, for as much as they have no actual existence at all, the actual existence of the one being past, and that of the other being yet to come.  
Neither doth it follow that because God's infinity doth not grow by succession, therefore things future are now coexistent with God, but because things present and things future are in succession one unto another, therefore they cannot be said either future things to be present, or things present to be future.  
That reason of yours, (namely that God's infinity doth not grow by Succession, carrieth rather some colour of proof, why God's coexistence with his creatures or with time, cannot be said past or to come, then why things future shall be said, to be coexistent with God in this present; Yet yourself use these forms, as to say, God was coexistent with his creatures that are past, shall be coexistent with such things as are to come; and indeed your reason is too weak to infringe these forms of speeches.  
For this coexistence attributed unto God is not in respect of any succession in himself, but only in the things without him, which come and go one after another by succession, & you are in the right, when thereupon you deny all succession in God, because his nature is not subject to any kind of motion; God was before the World, and is coexistent with and in the World, and shall be after the World, which being after time, you in your language, enstile his being before the end of it; but after another manner, then whereby he is said to be before the beginning of it; But we must give you leave to be as disertus as you will in Lingua tua; Nobis non licet esse tam disertis, qui musus colimus severiores; At partinge you give us another paradox; when you tell us It is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginning or ending without conceavinge it Circular, or altogether void of succession, on the contrary it is as wonderful to me, how it should be possible for any man to conceive any duration to be Circular, whether finite or infinite; For the word Circular is a denomination only of form, and of such a form as belongs to magnitudes, that have coexistence of parts extended, and of motion in such a form: But time is neither any such magnitude, nor capable of motion; In a round figure, I confess, there is no beginning nor end of magnitude, But of duration, round figures have their beginning, as well as squares; The latter part is as untrue. Some have been of opinion that the World was everlasting, and the motions of the Heavens everlasting, as Aristotle and his followers.  
And some great Schoolmen have thought it possible; how much more could they imagine it. For surely we may imagine things altogether impossible; And in the very next lines you confess, men may imagine so if they list, and over and above you do them the favour, as to further them in this their imagination, to wit by conceitinge the uninterrupted sluxe of an instant; and why not as well I pray, the uninterrupted motion of the heavens; and what is this to the everlastingness thereof, seeing this hath place in the space of a few years? Neither do we find the Peripatetics needed any such helps to conceive the everlastingness of the world; In the last place you tell us, the stability of eternity may be best conceived, by the retraction of such a perpetual flux into one instant; And yet before you told us such at everlasting flux could not be imagined; sure I am the retraction of it into an instant is utterly impossible; And be not these proper things to represent God's eternity by, and fit for Atheists to make merry with? That God is everlasting, I trust we can demonstrate it, and that he is without succession, why should that seem hard to conceive, when it is improbable he should be subject to any motion?  
And now I come to the top and the scourge whence you derive observations of great force, If not for composinge some great controversies amongst learned men, yet for facilitatinge contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy whether sacred or humane affords to the concerte of the most curious. At my first coming to the university, it was a great comfort and encouragement, to me in the studying of Predicables to hear a Preacher out of the pulpit deliver that peccata juvenum Predicantur in quale; peccata senum Predicantur in quid. Shortly after in the Divinity School, I heard a divine in the question, whether the pope were Antichrist make use of that axiom 〈◊〉 uni opponitur; and an other in the point of predestination to allege, that Scibile was prius Scientia: To hear such notions which at that time were familiar unto me, so much dignified as to find use in the pulpit and in the divinity School, it brought me even in love with such learning, which before seemed to me but course stuff in comparison to one of Cicero's Orations especially, that conspicuae divina philippica famae volvitur à prima quae proxima, or Aiax Mastigophoros in Sophocles wherewith we were acquainted at winchester.  
How much more might a man like top and scourge the better while he lives, to observe what transcendent use good wits may make of it. And yet by your leave, I find no such difficulty in conceaving how eternity though Permanent, shall have coexistence with succession or motion.  
A Pole fixed in a River hath coexistence with infinite parts of the stream succeeding one another, without any succession in itself.  
While I stand still, an army of men may pass by my side, & thereby shall I have coexistence in the same time with every one successively; But if I be not deceived you would devise, how we may conceive eternity to have coexistens with all parts of motion at once; for such a mad coexistence you have devised to yourself, out of a wild apprehension of the nature of eternity, and you will not be beaten from it. And you may as well beat your brains to devise how all parts of time both past and to come, may coexist in one instant, and but erst you did cast us upon such an imagination, namely of the retraction of a perpetual flux into one durable or permanent instant. I have already laboured, veteres avias a pulmone revellere, to scatter these vain conceits.  
But proceed we along with you; the top turns so swiftly sometimes, that he seems to sleep; Indeed we were wont to say that in such a case the top sleeps; And in turning round every bright mark seems to make a circle; what of all this? hence you say it will be no hard supposal to conceit that a mover of strength and vigor infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment. I do not deny, but a man may conceit so, as they do conceit Chimeras; and great divines sometimes are found to entertain such conceits, as are found to be contradictions, such is this: never any question was made of this, rather it hath been generally received, as a thing impossible that local motion should be in an instant; And the reason of it in this round motion whereof you speak, is evident for to be in this instant in the same place what it was immediately before, is rather to rest then move; and so the parts of successive motion should not be contracted into unity as you speak, but rather into nullity.  
And you yourself are in doubt whether it were fit to call it a cessation from motion or a vigorous rest or supermotion: you may do well to put it to Plotinus to resolve this, or Ficinus his Commentaries upon his Enneads. I perceive you have very vigorous conceits, which whether I should so call them, or rather a cessation from all sober conceit or a superconceyte, let the reader judge. In the mean while that must needs be a proper motion which may be called a cessation from motion, and a rest and that a vigorous one. Yet wonderful strange is it, that a rest or cessation from motion should conteyn in it parts of motion successively infinite, and I confess it were a very hard thing to determine what to call it; for it is a certain kind of Chimaera, that never I think was hatched in the conceit of man or Angel before.  
If this were granted you, than you presume the mover would not move it more slowly this day or year than he should the former; But consider I pray, the point is not of moovinge it in a day or year, but in an instant; And because two instants cannot come together, therefore for the time between while, it must stand still, and because there be infinite instants in every day and hour, it followeth it should be moved about infinite times every day and hour; and infinite times stand still. Take what co●se you will, it must stand still as oft as it moves, and because between every two instants of motion there must be a time of rest, and every one infinitely greater than the instant of motion.  
For between that which is divisible and that which is indivisible, there is no proportion of greatness; Now this supposition being granted you, (which you professed to be no hard suppos●) we shall find parts successively infinite in one revolution, or revolutions successively infinite in one or the same instant. So like wise Elope would instruct his Master how to drink up all the waters in the Sea, provided that first all the Rivers might be stopped, from running into the Sea, for it was most unreasonable that as fast as he drank the water out, the Rivers should be suffered to pour water in again, and that with a longer and a larger spoon than he had need to use that eats with the devil.  
And I see no reason but a man might by ocular inspection discover the world which Galileus hath made report of, in the moon, provided that he might have a stair case sure enough & high enough & all necessary provisions by the way, & at his journeys end also, & safe return, to quit Lazarus relations of the dead, with celestial relations of ●he terra incognita in the moon. And yet I confess a truth, I do not find to what purpose you should say there be parts successively infinite in one revolution. For in the motion of a snail this is to be found as well as in the motions of the heavens; for every thing that is continual is divisible without end, to w tt into parts proportional; as for parts quotall, as namely fifts or thirds, or fowerths, or hundreds, these ever in the motion of the heavens are finite, the other are infinite. Whereupon it is that Aristotle denies there is principium motus, in the seventh of his physics, not speaking of principium externum and effectivum, for so the nature of every thing is the cause, both of his motion and of rest, but he speaks of principium internum, and of the integral parts of motion whereof no part can be assigned to be the fist, but that it may be divided in o two parts, whereof the one is before the other; And in the same sense as there is no first of motion, so there is no last; for what part soever you take; it is divisible into two parts, whereof the one is latter than the other.  
The like may be said of every thing that is continual, even of magnitude which is permanent, as well as of time and motion that consist in succession of parts: but then we must know too, that these parts proportional, are not to be accounted actual, but only potential; And so Aristotle dissolves that Achilles of Zenoes' arguments, whereby he would prove that motion being allowed to be continual, the swiftest mover should never overtake the slowest mover, if he were allowed never so little ground before him because in the time wherein he is to overtake the first space, wherein his fellow mover was before him, that fellow mover will have got some ground more, and while that is in passing over by the other, he will get some ground more, and so in infinitum● the answer whereunto I never yet found explicated by any.  
Hurtado di Mendosa amongst other difficulties, the solution whereof he undertakes, falls upon this also, but most unhappily; for he gives no satisfaction; Aristotle's answer unto it, is but this; parts sunt in toto non actu sed potentia; it is spoken in reference to parts proportional; which answer of his seems a mystery, the right explication and accommodation whereof I never could be so happy as to find in any; but if I be not dereived it contains an admirable and clear solution of the difficulty; but I do not affect the ostentation of such subtleties.  
I know not well how to give account for this very diversion from graver studies. To return I say it is a poor course to lash out unto the supposal of such impossibilities to show how in one revolution the parts are successively infinite; whereas this is found in every the meanest motion, which is a true motion and consists in succession; but in your feigned motion an instant, it is indeed not to be found, because in an instant there can be no succession.  
But further you say, that upon this supposal there shall be revolutions successively infinite in one and the same instant. But how this shall be you have not showed, although I easily conceive how it may be proved upon this supposal, but in a certain kind which I presume you dream not of.  
And it is this; if it be admitted that a revolution of the heavens may be in an instant, than it is as possible that two revolutions may be in an instant, and in the same instant as well as one, and three as well as two, and three hundred as well as three, yea and look how many thousand days are past, since the World began, so many revolutions of the heavens there might have been in one instant of time. And it is nothing strange if uno absurdo dato, mille scquantur; but I do not find that you once so much as dream of this; and what your meaning is, I find no where explained, much less the deduction thereof manifested. Yet as if you had proved many revolutions, (upon this supposal) to be possible in one and the same instant, you discourse what they are to be called; and you will not have them properly to be termed motion, but rather the producte of motions infinitely swift united or made up into a vigorous permanency; and herence to serve your turn in the explication of eternity, you add how should not duration of one or of all these revolutions be accounted as an instant of time, but a kind of duration indivisibly permanent. Here is strange language, had not we need of an interpreter, or of some urinator delius to dive into the depth, and sound the bettome if it? I remember what a friend of mine pleasantly discoursed in the university, by occasion of a certain disputants strange manner of disputation; I have longed saith he to hear a scholar dispute eagerly, & distinguish and go one boldly in school terms and phrases which himself understood not. And now to my judgement I have lighted on such a one.  
But whether you understand yourself or no I know not. I doubt I never shall; yet I will not give over, I will adventure to discuss it, and to shake this rotten stuff in pieces, that at least it may not abuse the readers with suspicion of some rare notions, whom they cannot endoctrinate. First you speak of revolutions plural yea infinite, how you have come by them I know not, unless as capons come by chicken; you made supposal of a thing impossible enough, namely of the revolutions of the heavens in one instant of time, but it was only one revolution, and hereupon you steal up many revolations, yea infinite, I know not how, neither do you once go about to explicate how.  
Secondly you will not have it called motion, but a product of motions. Had you said you would not have these revolutions called one motion but many, there had been some sense in the speech, though little reason.  
For you profess these revolutions to be successive, and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall.  
And if you take them as continual, why should they not be styled one motion? But this I think is not it, you insist upon; For you dislike the name of motion itself; you will rather have it called the product of many motions.  
Now here I am at fault, in hu●inge after the meaning of your invention, But yet as Plutarch makes the hound to discourse in hunting after an hare, thus; he went not that way, nor that way, therefore he came this way; so will not I give over, but inquire which way the hare runs.  
Now than this your product of motions is to be understood either of a product Physical, or of a product Mathematical; and I explicate myself (as you love to involve yourself) thus.  
The product of motion Physical, is the form that is acquired by motion; As for example, in alteration a quality is produced, in augmentation a certain measure of quantity; in local motion a new place or a new site; Either in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions, or only in respect of the parts, as in all motions Circular; which new site is said to be new in respect of that which immediately went before.  
Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you, there is no such product Physical, for look what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant, the same it hath still; And therefore you call it very significantly (I confess) a vigorous permanency; which is as much as to say, no motion at all; Neither do I think that by the product here spoken of, you mean a product Physical; Let us come therefore to consider, whether it may be verified of a product Mathematical, that is in the Arithmetical operation of addition: for if two numbers be added together, it will produce a total, and that total shall be the product.  
Now here you speak of revolutions infinite, which being added to greater, make a product which you call a vigorous permanency; which I profess, in my judgement seems to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye.  
For if in teaching my Scholar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition, and bid him write seven Cyphers in a rue thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Ciphers under them thus, 0000000, and then bid him add one unto the other, and tell me what in the product, & he will tell me that he finds seven Ciphers still, which is as much as just nothing; In like sort suppose the Heaven's standing still immediately before this instant, and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before, this deserves to be called a vigorous permanency: that is no motion rather than a motion: For to be where a body was immediately before, is the definition of rest, and not compatible unto motion.  
Nay take such an other revolution, and add unto the former, this also being rather a vigorous permanency, and so no motion rather than motion, add no motion, unto no motion, and what will the product be, but a vigorous parmanency; and so in infinitum, it shall be a vigorous permanency: For no motion added to no motion while you will, the product shall still be no motion; but a vigorous permanency.  
But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency, infinitely swift.  
And yet I confess by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster, than now they go or run: albeit they run so incredibly swift, in the judgement of some; that they had rather set the earth going, and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency, though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of: And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastard's Epigrams, which he made of himself riding on Sarisbury plain: For being overtaken by a gentleman well mounted, who desired to have his company; Bastard Spurs his cut, the Gentleman reins his gelding, yet could Bastard keep no way with him. Whereupon he complains thus, What should I do that was bestrided so. His Horse stood still faster than mine could go.  
So the Heavens by your supposal stand still faster than now they go.  
I am not a little sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine, as namely a great deal too light and vain for a Divine; especially in a matter of so high a nature, as of the essence of God, and his eternity.  
I profess I am often stricken with fear of transgression in this kind: and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholly, I take so little pleasure in these School quirks.  
Yet another consideration affrights me more than this, and that is lest coming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason, in following the course of my weak understanding this way (whereof in this case I am much suspicious) I should be found to shape the attributes of God in such a manner, as to attribute that unto God, which doth not become his Majesty, or deny that unto him, which doth well become him; and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave.  
I had rather submit unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine, by faith, so far forth as they are revealed unto us in God's word; then curiously inquire into the nature of them, by reason, & acquaint Scholastical argumentation.  
But again, I consider, that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophical as Theological, which he hath given me, to clear some difficult points, concerning the nature of God, & thereby to prevent blasphemies each way.  
And as, by his grace, I fear to entertain any indecent conceit of the Majesty of God; so I trust, he will not expose me, to have my fears brought upon me, but rather by exercise perfect those seeds of knowledge of his Divine nature, which have been sown in me, both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace, and assist me also even in these discourses, and make them means to keep others from being led away into erroneous opinions & enormous conceits, concerning his nature, and divine attributes.  
And as for the censure of lightness, and want of gravity, passable upon this discourse; let the Reader consider; we are now upon the By, and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition, and most ridiculous prosecutions thereupon, and let him judge how such deserve to be entertained.  
Again when we meddle with an obscure, perplex, and intricate manner of discourse, if matter of refreshing both of mine own, and of my Readers Spirits be offered, especially in that way of an harsh & unpleasing discourse; shall I balk it, and in the affectation of a Stoical gravity decline the quickninge of mine own, and of my Readers senses? It was wont to be said Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci; & again Ridentem dicere verum, quis vetap. In a word; I am at thy judgement Reader, to pass what censure upon me thou pleasest, neither am I unwilling thou shouldst know mine infirmities, as well as my poor sufficiencyes, that knowing me to be flesh and blood, as well as others, thou mayst receive nothing herein for the Author's sake, but only for the evidence it carryethe with it. And that evidence is the work of God, though the manner of carrying it be the work of Man.  
Now it is high time to confider the other member of this sentence following, which is this, So should not the duration of one, or of all these revolutions be accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kind of duration indivisibly permanent.  
Now I find no proportion between this and the former member, though they be coupled together with a particle of similitude, So. For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you; to be in an instant of time, why should not the duration of it also be accounted in an instant of time? So likewise, if you conceive divers revolutions, yea infinite revolutions, to be in the same instant of time; what reason is there why their duration should not be accounted also, in the same instant of time? Fof if these infinite revolutions you speak of, have each of them a several instant, why should not the duration of each be accounted in each soverall instant, and the aggregate duration of them all, be reckoned to be, in an aggregation of all the several instants, in each whereof, one of the former revolutions is found?  
Secondly, you do not well to join an instant, and a portion of time together, as terms equipollent, because; no portion of time is an instant, nor is an instant any portion of time; more than a point is a part of magnitude. For every thing consisteth of its parts; but neither magnitude consists of points, nor points of instants.  
Thirdly, much less reasen is there, why the duration of one or of all these revolutions, should be counted a kind of Eternity. First, because there is no kind of eternity indivisibly permanent (such as you here speak of) but one, and that is the eternity of God. Secondly, what an absurd thing is it to say, that the duration of a thing in an instant of time and no longer, is fitter to be called eternity then an instant of time. For the revolution you speak of is but for one instant of time. For the justifying whereof I appeal to your own supposal.  
It were no hard supposal to conceit that a mover of strength and vigour infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment: This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time. For to move a body in an instant of eternity, requires not a mover of infinite strength; the meanest motion of the meanest mover, is comprehended (as you acknowledge) within the instant of eternity. Nay all the revolutions you speak of, though successively infinite, are upon your supposition in one and the same instant, which cannot be understood otherwise, then of an instant in time. Now is it fit, that the duration of such a motion or motions, the beginning and end whereof are both in a instant of time, should be styled eternity?  
And how can that be called permanent, which both begins and ends in one and the same instant of time? Or how can that motion be counted indivisible, which hath parts successively infinite as yourself profess in the sentence immediately before? If these be sober conceits, I never knew, what sobriety in this kind meaneth. But let us proceed to the next; The motion of the eighthe sphere supposed to be such as hath been said, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sun moovinge successively as now it doth should have local coexistence to every star in the eighthe sphere, to every point of the ecliptic circle, wherein it moves, at one and the self same instant, or in every least parcel of time. The substance of this hath reasonable good consequence, from the former supposition of a thing utterly impossible, and consequently it is not more impossible than the former. Yet by your leave, you err in many a circumstance.  
For first, as touching the main intention of this sentence, the Sun shall not have local coexistence with every star or with any star in the eighthe sphere; how can it? there being the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheres, of three planets betwixt the firmament, and the orb of the Sun.  
But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawn from the North to the south I grant in Astronomical computation, and so by the same computation may be said to have local coexistence with it, though not in computation physical.  
Secondly, mark I pray you, what liberty of speech you take unto yourself. For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency, in this place you term it a motion infinitely swift: as if you should say, the motion is so incredidibly swift, that the body indeed stands still and moves not at all. As much as to say, such a one talks so fast that he seems, and that in a vigorous manner to hold his peace.  
And indeed I confess, that sometimes it falleth out, that the faster we ride, the later we come to our journey's end; as in case by fast riding, our horse playeth the jade, and tyreth under us, and we can hardly make him go. I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have been devised in the heavens, as namely, that a motion swift, should become a vigorous rest. In my judgement if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest, it would give far better satisfaction.  
Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession, yet you do impute unto it succession. For but erst you affirmed that it had parts successively infinite. Now if it hath succession, how is it possible, but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another? For like as magnitude having extension of parts, must needs be divisible in respect of its extension; so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts, so it must needs be divisible in respect of this succession.  
Yet you suppose the contrary, like unto the Friar in Chancer, who to show his contentedness with a little, professed that he desired, but of bread a shiver, and of a goose the liver, and of a pig the head, but that for him, nothing must be dead. So you will have the motion you speak of, to consist of parts succeeding, yet not divisible into parts succeeding. Lastly, your disi●nctive is not good, as when you say, in the false same instant, or in the least parcel of time. For your supposit on is of the revolution of the heavens, not in the least parcel of time at all, but in an instant, which you well know is no parcel of time.  
Yet I think to charm the absurdity of your former supposition, which perhaps makes you weary of it, and something confounded in the prosecution thereof, you would fayn turn it into some small parcel of time: but then, all that you build herupon falls utterly to the ground.  
One sentence remaineth to be considered, whereby in prosecuting your former supposition, you desire to lay a ground, for the commodious illustration of God's eternity, and that is this: Every star in the eyghthe sphere should be converted into a permanent circle, and so in one circle there should be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the ecliptic circle. All this I may be bold to say is nothing to the purpose, but proceedeth merely from affectation of holding your Reader in admiration, at the wonderful conclusions, which yet being not superficially but exactly considered, contain most superficial conceits; the things you here deliver, so far forth as they have any truth, are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heaven; yea as well verified in a tennis ball, at every turning round thereof.  
For look how many circles are made, upon the eighthe spheres turning round in a moment; so many circles are made, by the turning of it round in 24. hours, For the body of the heavens is divisible alike, whether it turn round in a day, or in an hour, or in a moment; saving that the turning of it round in a moment; deserves rather to be accounted a vigorous rest, and may be called a cessation from motion, as yourself have professed, and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all.  
But howsoever; I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that in infinitum, because it is corpus continuum; and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too & upon his turning round, you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him, according as the points therein are infinite.  
Now we come to the application of this fiction (prosecuted with much variety, partly of chimerical, and partly of vulgar inventions) unto eternity itself, as followeth: Thus in him that is eternal, or being infinite and in eternity, are actually contained durations successively infinite. Thus in him, say you; and what I pray, may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherein he say There is no God. For may he not rejoin in this manner? And if it be but Thus; like as the fiction here supposed by you, is of a thing utterly impossible, so you give us liberty to conceive alike of the Eternity of your God: not to reiterate the variety of vain conceits, which have bloomed from the several branches of this your discourse in prosecutinge so vile a fiction to represent God's eternity thereby. Again, how doth God contain durations successively infinite? Not formally, you well know, but only eminently, for as much as he can produce them.  
But no such thing appears, nor any model thereof in this your fiction. For this revolution in an instant, contains only itself formally it contains the motion of no other body, neither formally, nor eminently.  
Yet thus, you say, God's eternal being contains durations successively infinite, though there be no more resemblance between them, then between harp and harrowe; a fox and a fern bush, no nor any thing like so much.  
Yet you proceed in your accommodation thus: The former supposition admitted, we could not say, that the inferior orbs moving as now they do, did move after the eighthe sphere, but that the times of their motions were continually contained in it. For the eighthe sphere being moved in an instant, should lose the divisibility of time, and the nature of motion, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect (as if it no way comprised them) but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite, into an actual permanency. To this I answer, first; The Heaven's moovinge as now they do, I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbs do move after the eighthe sphere: But rather as in respect of their proper motion they go against it (supposing the eighthe sphere to be the uppermost Heaven) so in respect of Diurnal motion, they move not after it, but motu raptus are drawn a long with it: this is on the By.  
Now to the main: I deny that upon your supposition, it will follow, that the times of these inferior orbs motions, were eminently contained in the motion of the eighthe sphere.  
Your contrary affirmation seems to me wondrous absurd, neither can I devise any reason for it, or in what sense you take this phrase, to contain eminently.  
For the common acception of it is this: That contains another thing eminently, which not containing it formally, is able to produce it.  
So the Sun is commonly reputed to contain heat eminently, for as much as not being formally hot itself, yet is able to produce heat in bodies capable.  
So yourself before have acknowledged all things to be in God, not formally (for he is neither man nor Angel, much less any inferior creature), but yet is able to produce all these.  
But it is impossible that the motion of the eighthe sphere, supposed to be in an instant, should produce the times of the inferior Orbs motions.  
It cannot produce their motions, they moving as now they do.  
For how should an instantaneous or momentany motion in one body, produce a temporal motion in another body? Much less can it produce the times of their motions. For that is only in the power of God.  
He alone that gives existence to any thing, can give duration and time unto it.  
Neither doth it contain their motions formally. For their motions are supposed to be temporal, that is in time, the motion of the eighthe sphere is supposed to be momentany, that is in an instant.  
But a momentany or instantaneous motion cannot formally contain a motion that is made in time.  
A swifter motion can contain a motion less swift, because it is both so swift, and swifter also.  
And here by accident, and ere I am aware, I have a glimpse of your meaning; and while I dispute against it, I may seem to you, to make for it.  
For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you, to be infinitely swift, and therefore it may well contain the motions of Inferior orbs, which are less swift, as moving round no soever then in the space of 24. hours; whereas the eighthe sphere is supposed to move round in a moment. I think I have sprunge the partridge, now let me see, whether I have not a springe to take him: First than I say, this is not to contain eminently, but formally rather.  
Secondly I say, this swiftness of motion which you have invented is too swift, too infinite to serve your turn, to contain the revolutions of inferior Orbs. For you have already professed that it deserves to be called a vigorous rest, and that it may be called a cessation from motion,  
Now let any sober man judge, whether a cessation from motion, whether rest, and permanency, and that a vigorous one be fit, eminently to contain the true montions of inferior Orbs, which in the space of 24. hours are turned round. Yet if leave were given you to suppose this also, namely that a vigorous rest is so infinitely swift, that it might well be said eminently to contain the motions of inferior Orbs; yet how would it herhence appear, that it should contain the times of them also?  
Since this vigorous rest which you make to be infinitely swift, is but in an instant, and the motions of inferior Orbs of like quantity are performed, in no less space than 24. hours.  
Is an instant of time fit to contain 24 hours? Yes you may say eminently. For as fluxus puncti in Longitudinem makes a line, so fluxus instantis for a certain space of time, makes 24. hours. Any man hath reason to give me leave, to refresh myself a little while my wits are dulled about such stuff as this. But you labour to show how the times of the inferior Orbs motions should be eminently contained in the eighthe sphere, if it moved round in an instant. And that by this reason: For say you the eighthe sphere being moved in an instant, should lose the divisibilititie of time and the nature of motion, not by defect (as no way comprising them) but by swallowing up time into an actual permanency.  
'tis true, I confess, that motion, which is made in an instant; loosethe the divisibility of time, that is, is not made in time. For an instant is no part nor parcel of time; Again it is well that you do so ingenuously confess, that it looseth the nature of motion, also, and all the properties that accompany it. For you have already professed, that it may be called a cessation from motion, and is to be called a vigorous rest or permanency, rather than motion.  
All this I do not dislike. But yet to make way for the containing both of times and motions, you tell us, that all this is not by way of defect, as if it no way comprised them, but by swallowing up time or division successively infinite into an actual permanency; which assertion of yours if we should take for a truth, we should swallow many a goageon. For first you imply, that what a thing comprisethe not, that it hath not, by way of defect, which is untrue for my hand comprisethe not six fingers,; yet that it is without a fixed finger is not by way of defect. Secondly you give us to understand that a certain mutation may lose both the nature of time and motion, and all the properties of them, and yet some way comprise them which is contradictious.  
For look what way it compriseth time or motion, surely that way it hath it, and doth not lose it. Thirdly it is an absurd thing to say, that an instant of time swalloweth up time. For to swallow it up is to contain it. But it is impossible that an instant should contain the space of any time, as the space of 24. hours. For if it be impossible that an hour should contain the space of 24. hours, much more impossible is it, that an instant should.  
The motion indeed, which you suppose to be in an instant, contains an whole revolution of the eighthe sphere, (for upon the fiction of this impossibility, you are pleased to descant much:) but surely this supposition of yours, though it be of a thing impossible, yet doth it not infer, that this instant shall swallow up the space of 24. hours, though it swalloweth up the motion, (as you suppose) which usually is made in no less space than the space of 24. hours.  
Last of all consider I pray the sobriety of this speech: It swalloweth up motion into an actual permanency (as much as to say, into an actual rest) and so it comprisethe it, that is, rest containeth motion, and that in an instant; how much more shall the space of 24. hours' rest, be sufficient to contain a motion infinitely greater, than an instant doth. As for division successively infinite (as it were to make your deductions the more admirable to vulgar capacities) it is a very sorry conceit. For the least time or motion that is, is divisible in infinitum, like as every continual thing is, though never so small. By this, let the wise Reader judge, of the profitable nature of the improvements you speak of in improving motion infinitely swift into permanency or rest, which is as much as to say, into no motion; and let him well weigh and consider whether this be not to bring a noble unto nine pence, or rather unto no pence: and by such improovements, when you cast up your reckoning at the years end, you may put all your gains in your eyes, and never hurt your sight.  
After this you come in with a new way of conceavinge the first moovers' eternity, and that is as Mathematicians conceive the nature of a sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the Axis. There is such a definition, I confess, of a sphere, which is defined to be transitus circumferentiae as which transitus I conceive to be emanation rather than motion, like as a line is imagined to be fluxus puncti in longitudinem; and a superficies is imagined to be fluxus lineae in latitudinem. But all these are very vain imaginations. For neither is it possible, that such things should have any flux, or if they had, that by their flux they should make either length, or breadthe, or thickness in such a figure; but rather a length so made should consist of points, & a breadth so made should consist of lines, and a sphere so made, should consist of semicircles, which is utterly impossible.  
And shall we never lin to compare the nature of God to the vain imaginations of such vain things? Yet seeing you will take your course, we will take liberty to consider it. And thus you proceed, For let the eternal be but thus imagined, to be an intellectual sphere, capable of momentany motion or revolution throughout this World, and the indivisible coexistence of his infinity to every part of time and place, will be very conceavable. Very conceavable, you say; but first let us try, whether this conceit of yours contain any conceavable truth. For if it doth not, are we not well advanced to the conceaving of God's eternity, by comparing it to such impossibilities? And first you were as good bid us imagine God to be an intellectual body, as to be an intellectual Sphere.  
For a Sphere is a body, either physical or mathematical, that is, a body at least of quantitative dimensions. The world indeed is Spherical, and God is in every part of it; but will you therefore conceive the nature of God to be Spherical also, and his form altered, upon the making of the World, from that it was before?  
Remember I pray, God is in the World and in every part of it but how? as containing it, not as being contained by it.  
Secondly, you will have us imagine God to be capable of momentany motion, or revolution throughout the World? Now consider I pray, what a congery of wild conceits are involved here. Is a revolution, a motion throughout the world? Every man knows a revolution to be a turning round. The orbs of the heavens have their revolutions, but do they thereby move throughout the World? or rather keep their places, & each moveth only about the bodies that are within the compass thereof.  
Again you know momentany motion is a thing impossible. And that which doth so move round as you would suppose it, doth rather rest then move. For to be in the same place where it was immediately before is the definition of local rest. And yourself have confessed it may be called a cessation from motion, and do affect rather to call it a rest, a permanency, a stability.  
If it were a motion, is it fit to attribute motion unto God? Is it fit to maintain that God moves from place to place? Again the motion of an intellectual nature as intellectual, is rather the motion of the understanding in knowing things, than motion local from place to place. And it is true, that all things done in time and place are known unto God, but without all motion so much as in the understanding. For even in the understanding of God, there is no change, much less motion. Lastly by moving through the World in an instant, he shallbe coexistent to every part of place & that in an instant, but how shall we conceive hereby, any coexistence of his to every part of time, as well to all parts of time past, and time to come, as to the time present?  
The light of the Sun is diffused through all, let us suppose, through all the world, therefore it shallbe coexistent to every place, but not to every part of time, but only to the present. But is it not your meaning that God's eternity should be diffused not so much through the world; for that belongs to his immensity; but rather through the time of the world, from the beginning thereof, to the end of all durations successive without end (for you do maintain that successive duration shall have no end?) Certainly this seems to be your meaning, and then indeed, it is no hard thing to conceive God's eternity to coexist with all parts of time past, present & to come, if so be we conceive it diffused through them all, as God is coexistent to all parts of this World, if he be diffused through them all (which is your phrase, and not mine, and utterly disclaimed by Durandus.)  
But than what Meant you to add coxistence of place to coexistence of time, which are wondrous different, the one belonging to God's immensity, this alone to God's eternity.  
Secondly, what meant you to call this a motion through the World, whereas it is rather through the duration of the World, or through the time of the world, and the parts thereof, from the beginning of it to the end, and infinitely further. For by the World we usually understand a World of place, and not a world of time.  
Thirdly, what meant you to call, this motion throughout all times a revolution, doth time run round, & by fetching a compass about return to the beginning of it from whence it first issued? For this is the nature of revolutions.  
Fourthly, what meant you to call it a motion, seeing it can neither be alteration, nor augmentation, nor generation, nor local motion, though you seem to devise a motion throughout all time, like unto the local motion of the eighthe Sphere turning round in a moment. And so you devise as it were a local motion through time but it shallbe in an instant, to make up a world of wonders, that in an instant a motion may be conceived through all time, from the beginning of the World to the end, and infinitely beyond it in duration. Yet this motion through so many thousand years while the world lastethe, and millions of years after that, shall be in an instant.  
Fiftly when, I pray, did this motion begin? was it before the world, or with the beginning of the world? Not before the world: For, as there was then no place for God to penetrate (as you speak) and to fill, so there was no time for him to move through by his eternity. If with the world, then seeing this motion is supposed to be in an instant, in the first instant God moved through all time to come.  
But how was that possible, seeing like as before the World it could not be, because then there was no time; so in the beginning of the World it could not be, because the time to come as yet was not. If you say, though it were not present, yet it was to come, and therefore God could by virtue of his infinite eternity move through it in an instant, I answer, that by the same reason, he might as well move through all time before ever the World was. For even then, though there was no time present, yet there was time enough to come.  
But like as it is absurd to say, that God by his immensity did fill all places before the world, when as yet there was no place to fill: so it is alike absurd to say, that God by his eternity did fill all times before the world was, when as yet there was no time to fill. And now I pray, be pleased soberly to consider, what little need there is of all this pains, in straining our conceits as it were upon tenter hooks, till they are quite out of joint: what need of so many absurd fictions, of so many impossibilities to prove that which is most untrue, and yet confidently supposed by you as a principle out of a superficial consideration of the nature of God's eternity, Namely, that God by virtue of his eternity doth coexist with all times past, present, and to come.  
For consider I pray, will you say that God did by virtue of his immensity coexist with all places before the world was? No sober man I presume, will say this; why then should you affirm, that God by virtue of his eternity did coexist with all times before the world was? And if the actual existence of place, be required unto this, that God by virtue of his immensity should exist with it; why should not the actual existence of time as well be required unto this, that God by virtue of his eternity should coexist therewith? And if before the world was, God did not coexist with times that were to come (like as then he did not coexist with place that was to come:) then surely by the same reason, he shall not at this time present coexist with time that is to come; and consequently, neither shall he be said to coexist with times that are past, like as if the world were destroyed, he should not be said to exist with those places, and bodily spaces, which sometimes were, but in this case now were not.  
And therefore we have little need to trouble ourselves with any such wild and monstrous fictions to maintain the coexistence of God with every part of time. For as the parts of time shall be found to exist in their order, so shall God be truly said to coexist with them, and no otherwise, that is, not to coexist with them all at once, but only in succession, not of God's duration or of any thing in God, but in succession of time, and of the things contained therein.  
God's duration we acknowledge to be eternal without beginning and without end, yet indivisible; for as much as it is no way subject unto motion, no way subject to any variableness or shadow of change. For he is of necessary being, and therefore impossible it is, he should not be. Besides, whatsoever he is the same he is essentially, and therefore not subject to any kind of change, either in substance or quality, or quantity or in place.  
And as he is the Author of all things, so both the motions and rests of all things are produced and maintained by him, and so may be said after an eminent manner to be contained in him, and no otherwise. I mislike not Plotins' interpretation of God's totality of being, in as much as he is able to produce all kinds of being. As for eternity, I had rather rest upon Aquinas his definition of it, then on yours. For it hath no parts formally; and as for an eminent containing of all parts of duration, that is in respect of activity to produce them. Now time, and the duration thereof, together with the duration of things therein, is rather produced by the counsel and will of God, then by his eternity. And therefore all durations do flow rather from God's will, then from his eternitia. To my understanding a body casteth but one shadow, and not many; which casting of a shadow is no other thing then the hindering of light from the earth or water, according to the body's proportion, which thereupon are said to be shadowed by it. These divers shadows, as you call them, how they vanish in every moment, as you speak, I profess, I know not, sure I am the fishes in the water do not eat them, if they did, certainly they would be never a whit the fatter by them.   

CHAP. VII.  
Of the Infinity of divine power.  
I Do not affect to contend with you in point of Rhetoric, or to call you to an account for styling Time, a spectator of all things. If it be so, it is the more like unto a Philosopher by his account, who comparing the world unto a market, ranged the people thereof into 3. sorts, buyers, sellers, and lookers on, and these were the Philosophers. Only I would desire that you would give other the like liberty to speak in theyre own phrase, and not to challenge them for affecting Poetical wit more than Metaphysical truth; as upon such like terms it was your pleasure to cry down that common adage Tempus edax rerum. For if you admit time to be a Spectator, you may by as good Rhetoric admit it to be a devourer, according to that of good authority Inspexit varias merces oculisque comedit. In like sort studious scholars are accounted Helluones librorum, devourers of books, though not for the reading of them only, but for the apprehension of them, and making them theyre own.  
So Cassius Severus had devoured Labienus his works, his orations. For when an edict came forth from the Emperor, for the burning of all his writings. (For as he was an admirable Orator, so he was of an high spirit, and as Seneca writes, qui in tantâ pace Pompeianos spiritus nondum deposuerat.) which edict when it came to Cassius Severus ears; why then say he, I must be burnt alive; for as much as I have learned them without book. Yet I could be content to allow you any liberty of phrase, so you would be pleased to speak to our understanding; whereof you fail in your very first sentence, when you tell us, that all things wanting place or time or being, present themselves anew in theyre proper shape or form; for how any thing can present itself, wanting both place, and time, and being also, it is a riddle unto me.  
I guess your meaning is, that the being of all things is produced in place and time, which before the time of theyre production were without both place and time, and being; which as it is a truth, so it is a most vulgar truth, yet obscuerly delivered by you, and to no purpose that I can conceive. But be it so, & that every thing brought forth on this stage, you speak of, acteth one part or other for the maintenance of the whole; and therefore is of some power; though in some you think it is to be accounted strength and power passive rather then active.  
And yet you say the very earth, in that it sustains weights laid upon it, and resisteth contrary impulsions, is perhaps of active force or operation; As for the power of moving to the centres that you say is no more passive than active but a mean betwixt both. I presume you mean by way of participation, and not by abnegation of the extremes. Yet in my judgement to sway or move to the centre is merely active, to be sweyed or moved is merely passive. Yet other properties there are of the earth, though you pretermitt them. For it is commonly said, that it covers the errors of Physicians.  
And I remember what a Sexton was wont to say, of all his sick neighbours; that when Physicians have done all they can, yet at length he must heal them, meaning by making their graves, and with the earth to cover them. I have heard a Mountebank report, that when a man's leg is stung with a viper, to put that leg into the cold earth is a present remedy.  
I have heard also what use the Irish sometimes have made of the cold earth, when they have overdrunke themselves with Vsquobath. Yet me thinks that power of the earth should not be pretermitted which the Holy Ghost gives unto it, in saying, Let the earth bring forth, etc. But as for the power of assimilating other things to themselves, and of preservinge symbolizinge qualities, that you say is found in the dullest bodies. The active force and power motive of winds, vapours and exhalations is well known, as also of celestial bodies especially the Sun, theyre productive operation cannot be unknown to any. You conclude that all this power is but finite, and that no created thing is capable of power infinite, which you affirm only with a perhaps, and such cautions are very frequent with you, which in this place I take to be most needless.  
Now as time and place were as you said shadows of God's eternity and immensity, So, the power of the creature is a shadow of God's infinite power. Yet shadows we all know have proportions to the substances shadowed by them, but between finite and infinite we commonly say there is no proportion.  
2. God, you say, is more infinite in every kind, than all the united powers of several natures, though they were for number infinite and each infinitely operative in its own kind. But let us not lie for God, as man doth for man to gratify him. True and natural beauty needeth no painting: And God's perfection needeth no Mountebank like amplifications to set him forth. The powers of the creatures are not formally in God, but eminently, that is, they are said to be in God in as much as he can produce them, and theyre effects also. As for example, though he be not hit, yet can he produce heat in greater measure than fire doth.  
But consider I pray you; Can God produce a greater heat, then that which is infinite? or can he produce a greater number than that which is infinite? It is apparent that he cannot, not by reason of any defect of power in God, but by reason that a greater than that which is infinite to be produced, is a thing utterly impossible. You are pleased to take notice of a former observation of yours, which was this, That things by nature most imperfect, do oftentimes best shadow divine perfection.  
You have already entreated of God's immensity and eternity; and therein you have told us, that no positive entity, no numerable part of this vinverse, doth so well represent the immensity and eternity of God, as the negation of all things, which we describe by the name of Nothing. I think there never dropped a more vile assertion from the pen of any wise man then this; yet you desire here again to commend it unto the Reader as some quaint observation. But what do you mean to repeat it under such form, as by calling it something though imperfect. Is Nothing, or the negation of all things, to be accounted something though imperfect? yet the same observation you will have to have place here also. As if this which we call nothing were the most fit to represent God's immensity by, yea and his eternity, yea and his infinite power also.  
How near draws this to the making of God to consist of nullities, since you say his natural properties are best resembled unto nullities? well, we have heard what that is which best representeth his immensity and eternity, now we are to expect what that is which best represents his infinite power. And this after a long deduction, you express to be the centre of the earth, which you say is matter of nothing.  
And thus you maintain a just proportion of discourse concerning Gods attributes; for still your wit serveth you to resemble them either to Nothing, or to that which you call matter of (just) nothing. But herein you proceed by degrees. And first you seem to conceive, that this centre of the earth, is in the language of the Holy Ghost, made to be the foundation of the earth, as in that speech of the Lord to job chap. 38. 4. 5 6. Where wast thou, when I laid the foundation of the earth? and whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened, who hath laid the corner stone thereof? And first you commend the phrase, as surmounting all poetical decorum, and will have the Majesty thereof consist therein, sufficiently testifying that it was uttered by God himself.  
Now heretofore, you have made poetical wit to stand in opposition unto Metaphysical truth. But of poetical de corum, especially in this place, like enough you have a better opinion. For my part I am persuaded the Majesty of God's speech consists in the power of the Spirit, rather than the Wisdom of the words. Paul also spoke by the Spirit of God, and some have observed great parts in his very language, but see what Castellio a friend to your opinions writes of Bezaas judgement concerning this in the defence of his translations upon the 2. Cor. 11. 6. Paulum (saith he of Beza) & grandiloquentiâ Platoni, & vehementia Demostheni, & Methodo Aristoteli atque Galeno anteponit: in quo mihi videtur Pictores imitari, qui Christi matrem dum honorare volunt, regio vestitu pingunt, & ●idem tamen ita cogente historia praesepe in quo jaceat Christus infans appingunt nobili sane solecismo. Quid enim mundanis regibus cum praesepibus? Mariae gloria est paupertas, & pictores eam divitiis exornant. Sic Pauli gloria & gloriatio est Sermonis imperitia.  
But let the Majesty of the speech pass as nothing pertinent to our present purpose, where do you find the centre of the earth to be mentioned or pointed unto in all this? doth the corner stone there mentioned, signify so much? or by the foundation there expressed, must we necessarily understand the centre of the earth? The Holy Ghost seems rather in this inquisition, to have reference to something without the earth that should uphold it or fasten it, and withal signifieth, that no such supporter can be found. Then you proceed to admiration at this that the centre should bear up the earth and all things thereon, which centre is no body or substance, no not so much as a mere Angle or corner, nay such as forth with you say is a matter of nothing.  
And so in the issue it comes to this, that nothing bears it up, which is true, in the form of a negative; but not as an affirmative as if there were any power in the centre to bear it up. And why should we conceive that the centre of the earth should bear it up, more than the centre of a tennis ball bears it up, which also might be the centre of all if it lay in the middle of the earth? And if any side of the earth were removed from the centre to the heavens, it would forthwith appear that the centre of the earth bears not up the rest; for that which before was the centre would now be driven Turrian great deal higher, and become the outside of the earth. So that the centre of the earth will not serve your turn; will you then run to the centre of vacuum or of the space imagined to contain the earth? Yet you distinguish not of centrum Physicum and centrum Mathematicum. For who doubts, but that one side of the earth may be heavier than an other. Again it was wont to be a received Maxim that Terra non gravitat in loco suo; and therefore there is no need of any thing to bear it up. For the middle of the world is the natural place of the earth, which when it hath gotten, it sways not, nor propendes not, nor can be swayed to weigh downwards; which indeed were to weigh upwards which way soever.  
And have heavy things any need (think you) of supportance to keep them from weighing upwards? Yet we acknowledge, the whole world and every part of it is from the finger of God. For the very course of nature is the work of God. That fire doth burn, that the Sun and stars do enlighten the earth, that heavy things move downwards, and light things upwards, all this I say, we acknowledge to be the work of God.  
And we wonder at the power of God in making all this by his word, and supporting all by his word. But being made and as wonderfully preserved by God, we wonder not at this, that heavy things move downwards, & light things upwards; or how it comes to pass, that the earth without a supporter continueth where it is, seeing if it did not continue where it is, it should move upwards towards the Heaven's lighter than a feather, which is quite contrary to the nature of the earth. We well wonder at the power of God in this, that as he made it by his word, so with the turning of an hand he could set an end unto it, if it pleased him. And therefore to talk of chamberinge up sustentative force (in the centre) multiplied according to the several portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable, to speak in proportion to your own language, is to affect more Rhetorical wit then Metaphysical truth, in plainer terms, is to multiply words without sense.  
So then to amplify the infinite power of God, by surpassing the imaginary sustentative force of a centre, which as yourself confess is a matter of nothing and consequently the sustentative force of it must be a matter of nothing, is a very poor amplification of the power of God. If the centre were able to support the earth not where now it is, but in the hollow of the moon, that were somewhat to magnify the sustentative power thereof. Yet I make no doubt, but God could do so by his power. Which case is of far greater force for the manifesting of his power, then in bearing up the earth where it is, which indeed being created, and preserved in being, hath no need of supportar●ō in his own place, where it can move no lower; and if it move by direct motion, it must needs move higher; which kind of motion is more proper for a feather than for the heavy earth, whose womb is impregnated with stones and metals.  
And therefore you do well to take this power of God into consideration as namely of his ability to toss this universe with greater case, than a Giant doth a tennis ball (yet I never read or heard before of Giants playing at tennis ball) through out the boundless courts of immensity. By the way your overlash, in talking of the Courts of immensity, wherein this motion should be. For as for the immensity of God, that is no fit space to toss the world in.  
And as for the immensity corporal, that is a thing utterly impossible; the motion you devise must needs be in vacuo or not at all. Now the force of the centre is no way fit whereby to illustrate this power of God. For certainly if the earth were placed in the hollow of the Moon, it together with his centre would tumble down again; as little congruous is it; for the illustration of that power of God, whereby he is able to dissolve Rocks of Adamant with the phillep of his finger, sooner than bubbles of water with the breath of the Canon; In all which you seem to affect not Metaphysical truth only, but Rhetorical if not Poetical flourishes also. We believe that God, as by his word he made all things out of nothing, so by his word he can return them into nothing; this is plain English neither hath his power need of any Pyrgopolinices bombast eloquence to illustrate the Majesty thereof or set it forth.  
3. But from the breath of the Canon you fall congruously upon the consideration of the mother of it, which creature is commonly called gunpowder. And here you tell us first that our admiration of God's active power may be raised by calculating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures; that which followeth divisible as well in quantity as operation, is of no importance but only to fill up. The Canon sends forth his bullet with greater violence than the Sacher, like enough, and so every Ordinance exceeds other in force of Battery, according to the quantity of charge, or length of barrel, which I leave to the consideration of the Master of the Ordinance. To this you add that if the same quantity of steel or iron, were possible to be as speedily converted into a fiery vapour as gunpowder is, the blow would be 10. times more irresistible than it is. I do not think your meaning is to instruct the would in a new way of making Saltpetre, if it were, Saltpetre men should be your scholars, I would be none of them.  
So much Philosophy I apprehend, that fire is most swift in moving upwards, as the Element of earth is most swift in moving downwards. And like as the contraction of more parts of the earth together makes a body the heavier, so likewise the more fiery anything is, so much the more swift in motion upwards. But to say that the active force or vigour of motion, always increaseth according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates, is an idle speech, & as much as to say the more swiftly it moves, the more vigorously it moves. It had more show of congruity to say the more vigorously it is moved (to wit in respect of the Agents force that moves it) the more swiftly it moveth.  
Now you come to the accommodation of all this, unto the infinite power of God, in this manner, Though the most active and powerful essence cannot be encompossed with walls of brass, nor chambered up in vaults of steel allbeit much wider than the Heavens, yet doth it every where more strictly gird itself with strength than the least or weakest body can be girt. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict so close or firm, as is the bond of indivisible unity, which can not possibly burst, or admit eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as entirely and totally encamp itself as in immensity. How incomparably then doth his active strength exceed all comparison? What a mad comparison is it in illustrating the infinity of God's power to say that God girds himself with strength more strictly, than the weakest body can be girt? Do weak persons gird themselves with strength; or is Gods girdinge of himself with strength, like to our girding of our clothes about us? By that which followeth it seems that you have an allusion to Gods girding of himself into a narrow compass, like Ladies that affect slender wastes. For to what other purpose do you tell us that Gods girding is as strict, as is the bond of indivisible unity.  
And before you told us that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts. Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united, that so his vigour might be greater? what base comparisons are these, to represent the infinite power of God by them? Then you roll in your wonted Rhetoric to amplify the vehemency of his motive power; in that it cannot be expressed by a motion that should bear levill from the Sunnesetting in the west, to the Moon rising in the East, which is a very fair mark I confess; for the case put, is in plenilunio, when the Moon is at full. Then to cast the fixed stars down to the centre, (belike you mean one after another, otherwise there would be no room for them in the centre;) and hoist the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible world, into the womb of vacuity whence they issued, would not strain his power motive.  
Yet all this you confess to be less then to bring nothing unto something, that is, to take not your words but rather your good meaning, to create out of nothing. Whereby nothing doth not become something, but something hath a being, which before it had not. But here you power out many wild conceits besides this: first as when you say, Essence swallows up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant. I had thought rather this had been the property of eternity, not of essence. You might as well say essence swallows up all places into an indivisible unity or point. Then how may eternity be said to swallow up that which it doth not contain; neither formally, (for certainly there is no formal succession in eternity) nor eminently. For to contain eminently, is to be able to produce succession; but it is not God's eternity that denominates him able to produce time, or the existence of things in time, but his power. So neither his essence nor his eternity, swallows up motion for the same reason.  
But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest, to wit by moving the eighth sphere round in a moment; Of the nakedness and absurdity, that is shameful nakedness of such an assertion, we have discoursed enough. Again, is it not enough for you to maintain motion in vacuo; but you must needs affirm that this visible world issued from the vacuum which now we imagine without the extremities of it? where now the world is, was a vacuum before the world was, but yet the world issued not from it, neither in the kind of a material cause, nor in the kind of a formal cause, nor in the kind of an efficient cause, much less did it issue from that vacuum, which you term without the extreamites of this world. Then again I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from God's immensity, but only from the counsel of his will, by his immensity he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections thereby.  
When you call Nothing the mother of God's creatures, tell me I pray, did you affect poetical wit or Metaphysical truth? I had thought Nothing had not afforded so much as the matter of any thing, as the Mother doth the matter (at least) of the child. It is true; we were not any thing before God made us. And as sure I am that this which we call nothing, did not contribute any thing to the creation of men.  
The baseness of man's original is a common place of another nature; Now your text is the Infinity of God's power, but you may squander from it as you please. Whatsoever implies not contradiction, the production thereof is within the compass of God's power, and whatsoever God can do, he can do with ease; His head ached not in the making of the World, neither doth it ache in providing for, and preserving all things. But to talk of the possibility of more world's hand over head, under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power, I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this. Yet as touching God's omnipotency, for the strengthening of our faith, we are promised something hereafter; as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination, by comparing it first to the sustentative force of a centre which is a matter of nothing, and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something. Whether we are like to meet with a more wise discourse, concerning Gods infinite Wisdom, if others know, yet I know not.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Of the infinity of divine Wisdom. That it is as impossible for aught to fall out without God's knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essential presence.  
1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike: we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power, unless he were infinite in Wisdom also. And that power ungoverned by Wisdom, would bring forth very enormous effects. But if a double portion of wit matched with half the strength would effect more than a triple portion of strength with half so much wit, surely where the power is equal, & the Wisdom insinitly unequal, there the effects cannot be the like. Yet you have been bold to affirm in another treatise of yours, not yet extant I confess, that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath, he might well think he could dispose thus of things as God hath disposed, by the Wisdom which man already hath.  
And you give this reason, for in things we can lay any necessity upon, we can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seek. As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or pen of any man. For we manifestly perceive that the difference of artificial operations in the World, doth not arise from the difference of men's powers, but merely from the difference of their skill and Wisdom in several trades.  
2. You do not well to confounded power with strength; for strength is only power natural; but there is a civil power goeth beyond that. And there is no question to be made, but Wisdom is to be preferred before the strength of the body, by how much the qualities of the mind are to be preferred before the qualities of the body. But where civil power is supreme that ruleth over the wisest counsellors. No question God is as infinite in Wisdom as in power. But I take it to be very absurd to say that God's wisdom is greater than his power. For is it possible that God by his wisdom can think of any course fit to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect? and seeing you confess his power to be infinite as well as his wisdom, what should move you to maintain the one to be greater than the other, I can not devise. Princes have guides to govern them, which yet are not therefore greater than they, but inferior by far. But in God, his wisdom and power, though different notions, yet the substance of them is all one and precisely one in God. The same is the proportion between infinite wisdom and power infinite, as between sinite wisdom and power finite. But finite wisdom doth not evacuate finite power; therefore neither doth infinite wisdom evacuate the necessity of infinite power.  
But to salve the matter, you add that it evacuates the necessity of power distinct from it. 'tis true indeed, in God, though the notions of wisdom and power are distinct, yet the things signified are one essence in God. And look in what manner soever infinite wisdom doth infer the indistinction of power with it, after the same manner, doth infinite power infer the indistinction of wisdom with it. For as much as God is essentially wise and powerful, and therefore infinite in both, & both indistinct in him, whose essence is most simple and admits no parts. That wisdom is the father and power the Mother of all God's works is such an assertion, that I do not think you can find any to father it, or mother it but yourself. Will you not give us leave to accommodate it unto the works of man and pronounce proportionably that his Wisdom is the Father, and his power the Mother of his actions? I take it to be absurd to inquire after a Father and Mother of works, save in case, the works themselves do admit these different sexes as being male or female; yet in such a case it hath a Father and Mother only in respect of univocal generations not equivocal.  
And as for the proportion to justify your allegory, we are content rather to expect your pleasure to acquaint us with it, then to trouble our wits about the deviseing of it. Yet Philo & the Platonics are a rub in your way, who (as you say; for I confess I am not so well seen in them,) make knowledge the mother of all God's works.  
To remove this you acquaint us with your conjectural dictates. First that 'tis probable they dreamt of a created knowledge. A most improbable conjecture, that they should conceive, that God brought his works to pass by the knowledge of a creature not by his own knowledge; Yet that creature by whose created knowledge God is conjectured to have wrought by, in their opinion, being one of God's works, how could that creatures knowledge be possibly accounted his mother in creation. Your second conjecture is, that under these terms they covered some transformed notion of the second person in the Trinity. Such a person more fit by far to be the Author of all God's works in order under God the Father; But equally improbable it is that this second person in Trinity should be called by them, The Mother of God's works. Rather Sapientia in Latin, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek being the feminine gender; in this grammatical notion they might account it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mother of all things created, which yet is more than my learning will encourage me to ascribe unto them. And Christ you deny not to be the wisdom of the Father, but you add that he is the wisdom personal; but you speak here not of the wisdom personal, but of the wisdom of the Godhead as it is essentially in the whole Trinity.  
Danaeus upon the 32. distinction of Peter Lumbards' first book of sentences, professeth the Son to be called the wisdom of the Father, for as much as he maketh the Father known unto us. But though you speak of wisdom as it is essential, and not personal; yet you may remember, that even the essential attributes are severally appropriated unto the Person by divines; and in the course of this appropriation, power is attributed to the Father, Wisdom unto the Son, 
Aquinat. 1. q. 39 art. 8. Durand. 1. dist. 3●. q. 3  and goodness unto the Holy Ghost. How suitable this is of making wisdom the Father of God's actions, let every intelligent Reader judge.  
Again I find that Gabriel Vasquius proposeth a question, Whether the power of God doth any manner of way differ 
In 1. q. 25. art. 1. disp. 111.  from God's knowledge and his will? And herein recites the opinion of Durand, maintaining that God's wisdom and his will, are but the remote causes of divine actions; and that the power of God is the immediate cause of all. The contrary whereunto he maintains, namely that power or execution is needelesly attributed unto God, as distinct from his knowledge and his will; and this he delivers according to the doctrine of Scotus, Bassolis, Ferrariensis, Caietan, and Aquinas. Neither of these opinions as I conceive serves your turn in making wisdom the Father, and power the Mother of God's actions. These flashes of conceit are far distant from the conceits of any School divine, that I am acquainted with.  
3. Wisdom (you say) as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge from which it differs not, save only in the dignity or usefulness of matters known or in the more perfect manner of knowing them. This promiseth no great depth, yet it passeth my slender capacity to comprehend your meaning herein, or to make any good sense thereof. You have so long enured yourself to a phrase of speech and expression beyond the capacity of your Reader; that I know not whether at length you may attain to such a faculty of speech as may transcend the Authors own comprehension. Who they are that agree in this, that Wisdom is the excellency of knowledge, I profess I know not.  
And I wonder you proceed to discourse of wisdom without distinction; seeing it may be taken in some sense by Philosophers, in which it is not taken by Canonical writers. Again in some sense it may be taken by Canonical writers, in which it is not taken by Philosophers. There is a wisdom to salvation which the Scriptures communicate to the meanest of God's children, which kind of Wisdom was nothing known to Philosophers. And there is a Metaphysical wisdom in knowing Ens quà ens, where about Philosophers did busy their brains, which you shall hardly find notice taken of throughout the Scriptures. Again wisdom is sometimes taken for that knowledge, that rest in contemplation; sometimes 'tis taken for such a knowledge as is not commendable nor right unless it be referred to action. Solomon's Wisdom it seems comprehended both. For the Wisdom that he prayed for, was the wisdom of government, which respects action; but God gave him other wisdom also. For this is reckoned up as a part of his wisdom, that he spoke of trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, even to the hyssop that springth out of the wall, he speak also of beast and of fowls and of creepeing things, and of fishes. And in this respect it seems, that he excelled the wisdom of all the Children of the East, and all the wisdom of Egypt. For of Moses it is said that he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. Act. 1. 22. And this wisdom I conceive to have been in sciences contemplative and not practical. Yet in Scripture phrase as I guess, it is most generally taken for wisdom practical, consisting in knowing how to bring about intended ends. And thus you seem to take it, when you profess that it differs not from knowledge save only in the dignity or usefulness of matters known; which is an harsh manner of expression.  
But I take your meaning to be this, that the difference is in the objecte, and that things of worth and of use are the special object of wisdom. For so a wise man by his wisdom discerns these things which are most behooveful, & advantageous unto him. So then wisdom seems to be (in your opinion) the knowledge of things useful and behooveful, that is, the discerning of what is best to be done to the compassing of this or that end. Yet by your leave if the end be not good, such a wizard in Solomon's phrase, shall be accounted no better than a fool. And the Holy Ghost hath discovered unto us both in the old Testament, that many Are wise to do evil, but to do well have no understanding, jer. 4. 22. and in the new Testament, that the children of this World are wiser in theyre generation, than the children of light. And the unjust Steward had a commendable measure of wisdom in this kind. Luc. 16. 8. But take it at the best; why should you call this, the excellency of knowledge? Hath not Aristotle delivered the contrary, and professed that felicity of contemplation is more eminent than the felicity of action? And I know no reason to forsake him in this. Do not we believe that our happiness in the Kingdom of Heaven shall consist in the vision of God? The knowledge of God's law is knowledge practical, and is not this far inferior to the knowledge of God, and of the mystery of godliness revealed to us in the Gospel? I confess the knowledge that we have of God in this life doth confer to action, but that is not enough to make it practical; The knowledge of things to be practised and put in execution, that and that alone denominates knowledge practical. Your last difference of wisdom from knowledge proposed disjunctively thus, or in the more perfect manner of knowing of them, I can hardly make any congruouse sense of.  
At first I thought the same difference had been intended though variously expressed, that the Reader might satisfy himself with which expression he pleased; little thinkeinge that yourself who take upon you herein to instruct others, were to seek, whether wisdom differed from knowledge, in the object known, or in the manner of knowing things; yet upon seconde thoughts this seems to be your meaning. But suppose the truth of both concerning wisdom, namely that it knows things of worth and useful, and that it knows them in a perfect manner; yet I pray consider, what a mad thing is it to say, that herein it differs from knowledge. Doth the knowledge of things useful differ from knowledge? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of things less useful, or not useful at all, but surely it differs not from knowledge. So likewise the perfect manner of knowing things, may be said to differ from an imperfect manner of knowing them, but surely it differs not from the knowing of them. For we do not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus, but rather one species from another. I profess I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to waste in correcting such anomalies, if your book should be too frequent in them.  
But to proceed, Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things and not be wise. In this likewise I find so much confusion, that a man may very well be to seek in what sense to justify it. I have heard of a sage Counsellor, that knew not a letter in his own Mother tongue. Comineus as I remember was no scholar, & yet a very wise consellor. The Turks are usually accounted as ignorant people as live; yet no doubt the grand Signior hath a wise counsel. And wisdom of government (which now a days alone is usually accounted wisdom) is many times accompanied with little learning.  
Achitophel in his time was accounted as an Oracle of God, but of his learning or great knowledge we read not. And in my judgement this kind of wisdom seems to be rather a natural gift, than an habit acquired by knowledge. And it seems to consist in judginge of most commodious means to compass ends intended, as in the counsels of Achitophel unto Absalon, as also it appears in Solomon's course that he took to discern the true mother of the Child which was in question; and because they may be crossed if they be known, therefore to discern how courses commodious for the compassing of designs may be closely carried undiscovered; as the two hundred men that Absalon took with him when he went to Hebron, are said to have accompanied 
2 Sam. 15. 11.  him in the simplicity of their hearts knowing nothing; and thus they were engaged in his treason before they were aware. And the same Absalon by his pretence of paying his vow at Hebron signified to his Father, prevented jealousy in his Father, and took away all suspicion of treason. On the other side, it is a great point of wisdom to discover the reaches of others in their courses; as Solomon, discerned the traitorous heart of Adoniah, by the motion which he made to have Abishag the Shunemite given him to Wife, which Bethsheba perceaved not, and was very willing to gratify him in the furtherance of his suit.  
This was a natural perspicacy in Solomon; for at this time he was very young, and had not as yet sought the Lord for that spirit of wisdom in government, as afterwards he did; And whereas you say, A man may know many things, and not be very wise; It is a truth, but a very mean truth. For a man may know many things, and yet be a very fool; and that more ways than one. For first few and many are terms of respect; and few things are many in respect of fewer. And though a man know never so much as these things, that nothing at all conduce to wisdom; what wise man would expect that he should be any thing the wiser thereby? Again, nothing denominates a man simply wise, but that which makes him a wise man. Now a man may not only know many things, but be also wise in many things, and yet not deserve the name of a wise man. He may be a wise painter, a wise graver, wise to work in handicrafts (which is accounted wisdom, both in the phrase of God, and phrase of Aristotle) and yet all this while be far enough from a wise man. For he only is a wise man that knows how to govern himself and provide for himself.  
Now many times wit, & that in great measure, in trades, is found to be in a fools keeping. Nay what will you say; may not a man be wise to do evil, jer. 8. 22. wise to satisfy his lust, wise to compass their own wicked ends; but shall he be accounted the wiser man for this? Hath not Aristotle delivered, that Incontinens non potest esse prudens, An incontinent man can not be a wise man? last of all suppose that a man knows all that belongs to true wisdom, but will not practise it, like the Athenians, of whom it was said, sciunt quae recta sunt sed facere nolunt, shall not such a one be accounted one of Solomon's fools in his proverbs? For are not the Moral virtues and recta ratio knit together indissolubly? But come we to the wisdom of God, Knowledge divine, as it comprehends all things, the name of wisdom best befits it, not as restrained to this or that particular. And why should it not be accounted wisdom, restrained to what particular you will, seeing he undoubtedly knows every particular, in most perfect manner▪ And but erst you profess that wisdom differs from knowledge only in the usefulness of things known, or in the more perfect manner of knowing them. The knowledge of God which is of himself, is the wisdom of contemplation. His knowledge of other things to be produced and ordered by him to the setting forth of his glory is the wisdom of action.  
And the Apostle breaks forth into admiration of the depth of God's rich wisdom and knowledge. Piscator thinks that by wisdom and knowledge one thing is meant. I am not of his opinion. The text seems to me to make against that construction; For thus it runs O the depth of the riches 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both of the wisdom and knowledge of God. In saying both it plainly intimates that wisdom and knowledge are considered as two, and therefore distinct. I take the meaning to be thus. God by his wisdom discerneth courses most convenient; but by his knowledge he comprehendeth all, whether convenient or inconvenient. And because a man may be so far wise as to discern of courses proposed to the compassing of a certain end, which is the most convenient; Yet because he is not able to invent all courses, he may fail in wisdom, therefore I conceive it is said that God is rich both in wisdom and knowledge; because he doth not only judge what is fittest amongst few or many, but amongst all; For he knows all even the most inconvenient and disorderly courses; but by his wisdom he judgeth of the conveniency of them, and according to his good pleasure useth them. Your reason follows to show why the name of wisdom best besitts the knowledge of God, and that is; For though many things known by him, whilst compared with others more notable, seem base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be the object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the mere matter or form or physical properties, but the Creator's power or skill manifested in it. You undertook to prove that God's knowledge of all things might most fitly be called wisdom; to which purpose, you should prove, that God may justly be accounted wise in knowing them; that is, that it might afford just matter of such contemplation unto God, as might justly be called wisdom. But the reason you bring, medles not at all with the contemplation of God, but with the contemplation of a Christian. For whereas in coherence you should say, it affords matter of wise contemplation unto God; you tell us 'tis an object of divine contemplation to a Christian.  
And whereas you would not affirm that God's knowledge, as restrained to this or that particular, was to be accounted wisdom, but only as it comprehends all things; yet your reason makes show of provinge what you affirmed, of God's knowledge restrained to this or that particular, and not so only but as restrained to the meanest particular; though it ends (as I said) not in avouching that such particulars may be an object of divine contemplation unto God, but only in saying that it may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian. What incongruities and most unscholasticall solecisms of discourse are these?  
And all this while you confine God's knowledge to the particulars of his own making. But what think you of the particulars of man's or the devils making, in the most wicked, and sinful courses that have been, are, or shall be in the World.  
Are not these also known unto God, and are these likewise matter of diyine contemplation in respect of the Creator's power, or skill manifested therein: We acknowledge the wisdom of God to be excellent in the composition of the meanest worm. Of some likewise we see excellent use as of the be, & silkworm; of others we do not, yet we believe that his wisdom being infinite, he doth nothing in vain; he hath use of every thing, though we know it not. And we take notice of a double knowledge the one called scientia visionis, whereby he knows all things that are, nor such only but even all such as have been, or shall be, the other called scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby he knows all things possible so far forth as they are knowable, and between these two knowledges, there is a great deal of difference, though you seem to confounded them.  
4. By useful knowledge as I take it, you mean the knowledge of useful things. Of this you say there are two offices, The one steadfastly to propose a right end: The other to make, and prosecute a right, choice of means for effecting it. By this it appears that you speak only of that kind of wisdom which is referred to action, and whereby agents are accommodated adores gerendas. From the consideration of humane wisdom's imperfection, you take a course the better to set forth the perfection of wisdom divine. Humane wisdom (you say) is oftimes blind in both, and usually lame in the latter.  
I will endeavour to give some illustration of this. The end, we aim at, is our good. For Finis., & bonum convertuntur. Ethic. 1. 1. This good is either natural, or supernatural, both in respect of power to discern it, as also in respect of power to compass it. The natural good which every one aims at, is the preservation of his esse, or natural being, and the acquiring of his bene esse, or well being natural. In both these are found errors enough. For though nothing is a more natural object of man's desires then the preservation of his being, yet sometimes they are found most unnaturally to affect their destruction; sometimes through passion, (and that in diverse kinds) in wonderful manner blinding reason, not only to avoid shame or rather the suffering of shame, or to avoid a worse kind of death, but sometimes out of miserableness, rather than they will part with a little, they are wilfully set to part with all. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   
Achitophel whose wisdom was as an oracle of God, went soberly this way, when he saw his counsel refused: For he went home & set his house in order and hanged himself; it seems his unsanctified wisdom urged him hereunto. For as it is written of Cesar that he alone came sobrius ad perdendam Rempublicam so Achitophel accessi● sobrius ad perdendum seipsum.  
As for the acquiring of well being, this is an end that all affect, but according to their several dispositions. For the good which they affect being bonum conveniens agreeing to their affections, so it comes to pass, that as men are of different affections, so they propose unto themselves different ends. The luxurious person sets his wits on work for compassing the satisfaction of his lust; the covetous person he affecteth to grow rich; the ambitious person to grow great, the virtuous person to be good according to nature's direction. And thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Ehit. 3. 5.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Look how every man is qualified, such is the end he aims at, but still natural. But in compassing, there is a great deal of difference; for some are wise to do evil as appears in Absalon's carriage of himself aspiring to the Kingdom; as also in Achitophells' counsels, which if Absolom had followed, it hath gone full ill with David. Nay generally they are found, even natural men, to be wiser in their courses though wicked (witness the un●●st steward) than the children of God are in theyres, though honest, and Christian. The children of this world (saith our Saviour) are wiser in their generation, than the children of light. Nay moral Philosophers, in their instructions unto virtuous courses, have advised their Disciples to set before their eyes the picture of vice, and to persuade them to take but the like course in prosecuting virtue, that the wicked do in prosecuting vice. 
Vt jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,  
Vt teipsum serves non expergisceris?   
A manifest argument of the great corruption of man, whose wit serveth him so well in evil things, so ill in good things. Tho improvement whereof is in no small degree also imputable unto Satan, who is most forward to impregnate the fancies of men with suggestions unto evil. We have known heavy headed, and dull persons brought up at school amongst us, when afterwards they have taken other courses, & given themselves to Ruffianisme, they have been accounted amongst the wits of the time. But as for the discerning of true good, that power transcends the region of nature. God must first regenerate us, and translate us into a supernatural state, before we can discern the things of God, or these things that belong unto our own peace, which when God hath granted us, than our end is no longer the preservation of our temporal being, but the salvation of our souls in the world to come, and to this purpose to cleave unto God by faith and love usque ad contemptum nostri, even to the contempt of ourselves, as touching this temporal life of ours. And to attain to this end, we need no consultatious with flesh, and blood; God in his word hath chalked out unto us a direct way unto this end, and therefore it is said to be a lantern unto our feet and a light unto our paths. But whatsoever the end be, you tell us that if it be much affected, the less choice of means is left, the more eagerly we apply ourselves unto their use, and strive as it were to strain out success, by close embracing them. And for this reason ignorance, or want of reason to forecast variety of means, for bringing about our much desired ends, is the mother of self will, and impatience. For what is self will, if a man should define it, but a stiff adherence to some one, or few particular means, neither only, nor chiefly necessary to the main point. It seems you are in a straight, and therefore fetch about for matter, though alien, and here we have met with a good phrase, of straininge out success by close embracing the means. Yet even in these unnecessary strains, your discourse is but loose in my judgement. For whether we discern many means, or few means, all is one as touching the close pursuing of that which we much affect; For if many, we will make choice of the fittest in our judgement, and as close embrace them as others do, that do not discern so great variety.  
And as for success, that is not in our power to be strained out, as you speak, by close embracing the means, Man is a resistible agent, and easily crossed in his courses; and the ends we aim at, in reference to our best means, are but of a conjectural nature, and so of uncertain issue; Neither do I seè any reason to the contrary, but that a man may be as self willed in the midst of variety of means discerned by him, as of few means, and if he be cr●st in them all, much more impatient. For surely the greater variety of means is represented, the more the way is open to take hold of that which is neither only, nor chiefly necessary, like as where many ways offer themselves, a traveller is in most danger to mistake the most direct way. Self will I confess is exercised in adherence to means unfit; as may be seen in the rude Irish, that will not be brought off from their rude courses, they will tie their ploughs or harrows to their horse tails, say what the English will to persuade them to another course. But it is as well seen in following different ends. Many will not be taken off from their unclean conversation, from their riotous and intemperate courses, they count it pleasure, (as S. Peter speaks) to live deliciously; these fruits of self-will are not in adhering to means so much, as in adhering to evil ends. But 
2. Pet. 2.  you proceed, and tell us in the next place, that Wits conscious of their own weakness for conqueing what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath or violence as partial, or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas he that out of fertility of invention can furnish himself beforehand with store of likely means for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteem the loss or miscarriage of some one or two. These may seem pretty contemplations, and as prettily expressed.  
But I had little thought that self will, and impatience joined with want of wit, had also been joined with consciousness of self weakness. For the sluggard though but a fool as Solomon saith, is as wise in his own conceit as seven men that can give a reason. And certainly self will, and self 
Pro. 26. 16  conceits are companions inseparable. And therefore such commonly make little question of accomplishing, or as you call it, of conquering their desires, by their own courses. And yet if they fail hereof, 'tis nothing strange, since the best means are but likely as yourself style them.  
I can as hardly believe that fertility of invention is of power to keep men from impatience. In my opinion patience as all other moral virtues, depends rather upon judgement then invention, though formally it is a quality of the will as all moral virtues are, and not any habit of the understanding. But suppose he miscarry in all, than a man's patience must needs bid farewell to invention to support it, and it is high time to rely upon judgement. Yet I trust patience which must have her perfect work, (jam. 〈◊〉.) may have course in this case also; though it be an hard matter you say to keep from fowl play, if the game whereat a man shoots be fair, and good, and most of his strings already be broken. It is good they say to have two strings to a man's bow. A virtuous man hath more than two, you suppose as much, for you suppose many to be broken yet not all. And surely virtue is not virtue if it keep not from foul play.  
The Stoics maintained that a virtuous man might descend into Phalaris bull, without the interruption of his happiness. We Christians are taught, and disciplined to rejoice even in tribulation, and mark well our bow strings, because tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
●m. 5. 4.  saith S. Paul, I am able to endure all things by the 
Phil. 4. 12.  power of Christ that enables me, and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospel, to wit by the 
2. Tim. 1. 8  power of God. The power of Christ, and the power of God are two such strings to our blow of patience, as can never be broke. We know his grace to be sufficient for us, and when his power is made perfect in our weakness, we shall 
2. Cor. 12.  have cause to rejoice in our infirmities. For when we are weak, then are we strong. In a man's own strength no man shall be strong. But blessed art thou o people, who art the saved of 
1. Sam. 2. 9  the Lord, who is the shield of thy strength, and the sword of our glory. 
Deu. 33. 29  He can make us to be as a Giant's sword, and he is a wall of fire round about jerusalem. All that sight against it, their flesh 
Zach. 9 13  shall consume away, though they stand on their feet, and their eyes 
Zach. 2. 5.  shall consume in their holes, and their tongues shall consume in their mouths. But to return. The contingency of the issue is 
Zach. 14. 12.  within the horizon of our fore sight.  
As for horizons of contrivances, let such as fancy them make themselves merry with them. All this while the matter of your discourse being of God's infinite wisdom, and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisdom of man, I have wondered what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience; unless it were to prepare your reader thereby with a more willing entertainment of your discourse.  
But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience, which that it might seem the more congruous, you pretend that the infiniteness of his wisdom carries him herunto. And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say, every minute of their lifes violently thwart, and cross some particular means, ordained for his glory and their good. God's patience in forbearing us, and our sins in provoking him are great enough in their proper colours, they need no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them, by saying that every minute of life we violently cross them. For surely either you must suppose man, every minute of his life, to be waking, or else you delivered this as it were slumbering.  
But to touch upon something more material, I pray remember, that you treat of the wisdom of God, as exercised in intending a right end, and prosecuting a right choice of means for the effecting of it. Now would you be so good as to consider, what is the end that God aims at in this, and particularly whether it be all one, in bearing thus with all, and that of an ambiguous nature, thus, that in case they do at length repent, and turn unto God, he may magnify his mercy in their salvation; if still they stand out, and dye in impenitency he may magnify himself in their just condemnation? And withal I pray consider, whether this be the course of any wisdom finite or infinite, in God, or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner. I mention no other end of God's patience, and long suffering, because I know no other end agreeable to your opinion. That which followeth tends rather to the commendation of the goodness of God's will, than the wisdom of his understanding, & therefore so much the more heterogeneal, and extravagant; as when you say out of the Apostle that He is light and in him is no darkness; and that He distingvisheth the fruits of light from fruits of darkness before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being. An amplification partly idle, partly unsound. For God must either distinguish them before they are, or not at all; For there is no change in his understanding; unsound, in saying God gives them possibility of being. The being of things is from the gift of God, but not the possibility of being. But you proceed in the same string. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he disernes truly good, as for his infinite essence to shrink in being. God indeed cannot shrink, for he is indivisible, and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter. But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God, from which you say his will cannot decline. I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular. What I pray is more truly good than the setting forth of God's glory either in his patience, and long suffering, or in aught else whatsoever? And is it impossible think you for Gods will to decline this? If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World.  
Is not this a faite way to Atheism? Many things (you say) may and every thing that is evil doth fall out against God's will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. In Scripture phrase we find that many things fall out not only beside, but contrary to God's expectation as Esa. 5. where God complaineth of the house of Israel, that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wild grapes. And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speech.  
By the proposition in this place it must be said, that God expects sour grapes, as well as sweet, for otherwise they should fall out besides his expectation which you here deny. So then God did expect that Shimei should rail on David, that Absalon should deflower his Father's Concubines, that judas should betray his Master, that David should defile his neighbour's wife, and cause her husband to be slain by the sword of children of Ammon, and that the jews should crucify the Holy Son of God. Say also if you will that God did with patience, and long suffering expect all this. As for the knowledge of God there is no question about that, all confessing that all things are known to God not only at their falling out, but long before, as David professeth of his thoughts that they were known to God a far-off or long before. Psal. 139. 2. But to say that any thing falls out against the will of God, I had thought it had been generally received for a notorious untruthe. Aquinas I am sure is flat against you, where he saith, Deus neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri, & hoc est bonum. God neither willeth that evils shall be, nor willeth that evils shall not be, but he will permit evils to be, & this is good. Part. 1. q. 19 art. 9 Arminius himself professeth ●e minimum quidem fieri praeter Dei voluntatem, nempe vel volentem 
Exam. Praedest. Perk. p. 114.  ut fiat, vel volentem non prohibere, sed permittere ut fiat.  
You profess that all evil falls out against God's will, Arminius professeth that nothing falls out besides the will of God, at least willing not to prohibit it, but to permit it. And no merveyle, for the Apostle hath given us to understand that nothing can resist the will of God. It is true all evil falleth 
Rom. 9  out against God's commandment, which usually is called also the will of God but improperly. For every one knows that he is well able to sin, to transgress, and consequently to resist this will of God.  
Further you tell us, that That which in its own nature (as being made such by his unalterable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not casual in respect of his providence or eternal wisdom. You are at length come to the wisdom of God from whence you digressed, but you seem to bring it in by the ears. For Casual things are suchas fall out praeter intentionem, besides intention which is an action of the will not of the understanding where wisdom is stated. And how can those things be said to fall out, not besides God's intention, which fall out against his intention, namely against his will, as already you have professed of many things; that they do fall out against God's will, though not without his knowledge. I would you had given instance in those absolute contingents which (as you say) are made so by God's unalterable decree. But because you have neglected it, I will do it for you. Rain to morrow is a thing contingent, in this sense, it shall rain, or not rain. For me to walk abroad or ride forth to morrow is a thing contingent, that is I shall walk or not walk, ride foerth or not ride. And accordingly in other of your traditionary writings I have read a discourse of yours touching a certain disjunctive decree of God. But I pray be entreated to consider, whether such a contingent before specified, or such a disjunctive proposition be a fit object of God's decree. God's decrees I suppose you will say are all voluntary, and free, he could have either not decreed at all what he hath decreed, or decreed their contraries. Therefore things of their own nature impossible to be otherwise, are no fit object of God's decrees. Now a disjunctive proposition as above mentioned, is such as it is impossible it should be otherwise. For this disjunctive (it shall rain, or not rain; my walking shall be, or not be) is of necessary truth, and therefore no more decreable by God to be, than the Godhead itself is decreable by him to be.  
Again may I not be bold to say, that it is too absurd to talk of his unalterable decree, if it proceed by way of distinction, to imply that some of God's decrees are alterable. All his decrees are more unalterable than the laves of Medes, and Persians; they are compared to brazen mountains Zach. 6. But here followeth a mystery in the next place, and a great mystery: In that he fully comprehendeth the number of all means possible, and can mix the several possibilities of their miscarriage in what degree or proposition he list, he may, & ofttimes doth infallibly forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed ends, by multiplicity of means in themselves not inevitable but contingent. Add hereunto all that follows in this Section. The absurdities that you mix in this mysterious sentence of yours I desire, and will endeavour to discover. Here we have three things to be considered.  
First certain ends proposed by God to be accomplished. Secondly means appointed for the accomplishing of these ends. Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends. Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speak of. One instance you give in the sequence of his action, and it is the apprehension of a Traitor which you suppose to be ordained by God. Yet is this as absolute a contingent as aught else. And contingents are no otherwise ordained by God, then to be contingents. For you have already signified that it is by God's unalterable decree; So than God hath decreed them to be contingents. Therefore this action also to wit the apprehension of a Traitor, God hath ordained to be of a contingent nature.  
The meaning whereof is no more than this, it may come to pass, it may not come to pass. It shall be, or it shall not be, and accordingly in other treatises of yours you have discoursed of a disjunctive decree of God, so called from the disjunctive object thereof, as to say, God hath decreed that such a Traitor either shall be apprehended, or shall not be apprehended. Now there is no need of any means to procure the accomplishment of such an end thus determined. For any man is able to avouch that a Traitor shall be apprehended, or no, and nothing at all to fail in the truth hereof; much less need is there of such variety of means, and those mixed with such possibility of miscarriage, as you treat of, to bring to pass such a decree, such an intention of this. But let the end pass as you have shaped it; this being of a contingent nature, and yet absolutely intended by God; for you neither express, nor intimate the signification of any condition, it will hence follow, that any thing of the like nature may be absolutely ordained by God notwithstanding the contingency thereof. That is, be it never so contingent and free, as the apprehension of a Traitor is a free act of man (for you do not suppose him to be apprehended by dogs or cats but by men rather) yet notwithstanding God is able absolutely to ordain that such a thing shall come to pass. Therefore God is as well able to ordain that at such a time a man shall believe, shall repent, yea or do any thing though never so free, notwithstanding the contingent nature thereof. Now I can no where find (though I have perused throughly diverse of your treatises) that you like of this. Yet here ere you are aware (as it seems) you are fallen upon it, and take upon you to acquaint us with mysterious conceits of yours, concerning the means whereby God doth inevitably accomplish such ends, you may as well say that God can bring to pass inevitably that man shall believe and repent though I have found you elsewhere to abhor this. To the consideration of which means we are now to proceed. Concerning these means you give us to understand, 1. that they are many possible, 2. that God comprehends the number of them all. 3. That he can mix the several possibilities of their miscarriage, in what degree, or proportion he list. 4. That in themselves these means are not inevitable, but contingent. I nothing doubt, but the same end God can bring to pass by diverse means, and that all these means are known to God but what you mean by mixing their several possibilities of miscarriage in what degree he list. I understand not. One kind of means is possible to miscarry, so is another, so is every one, for so you acknowledge them all to be in themselves not inevitable, but contingent; the meaning whereof I conceive to be this, they do not inevitably, but contingently accomplish the end proposed, this I take to be the meaning though incongruously delivered. But how can God be said to mix these possibilities, unless you mean hereby Gods comprehending of them all, which is a truth. For God comprehends them all in his mind, but without mixing of them. But you seem to project a farther meaning, by the last words as when you say in what degree, and proportion he list. I take the meaning obscurely delivered to be this; God knows every degree of their possibility to miscarriage, or rather God makes the possibility either of each his miscarriage, or of all their miscarriage in what degree he list; yet it seems you acknowledge no degree of possibility of the miscarriage of them all. For you maintain it as a thing necessary, that all shall not miscarry in the words immediately following. Have you not such a conceit as his? God hath ordained the apprehension of a Traitor, either by this means or by that means, or by a third means or by a fourth? if it be I would you had spoken out, and told us your mind plainly, yet we may take also that into our consideration in the end. But by the way I see no grounds of these degrees of possibility which you fancy. For all of the means being as you confess contingent, and evitable as you speak, I see no reason, but every one should be equally possible to miscarry. If you had talked of degrees of probability of miscarriage, I should not have excepted against it, but I seem to have just reason to except against the degrees of possibility.  
Let us come to the third, & that is God's inevitable forecast of the full accomplishment of his proposed ends by this multiplicity of means. Now this as it is plain enough, so it seems as manifestly to be untrue. For that God should foreknow the issue of things by the means which have only a contingent operation, is generally disclayned by School-divines the Jesuits themselves, and Frarius by name in his Opuscula; as that which would infer an uncertain, and not infallible knowledge in God. For as much as nothing can lay a better ground of certainty, than the nature of it can afford.  
Secondly either you suppose that all this multiplicity of means you speak of, shall be used or no. If all be not used, than God doth not forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed end by this multiplicity of means possible, you speak of, but only by some of them, namely so many as were used. And indeed it is very strange, that all means possible to be used should be used to the accomplishment of every proposed end, or indeed of any proposed end. But if all be used, and all fail save the last, upon what ground can you say that the end proposed must necessarily be accomplished by this last, which is as possible to miscarry as the former; for you have not signified that God always useth this course, as to use the courses first that are most possible to miscarry, and such as are least possible in the last place; nay yourself profess all the means to be alike possible, and probable. To this you seem to answer in the sentence following, that it comes to pass by the rules of eternal wisdom. Namely that if an hundred means be appointed for the apprehension of a Traitor, and ninety and nine do amiss, the hundreth, and last by the rules of eternal wisdom must of necessity take. But where these rules of eternal wisdom are to be found, that you do not tell us, and therefore we take liberty to discourse against it thus; was it not possible for God to have used this means in the first, or second, or third, or middle place, or in the place last save one which he useth in the last? you have not manifested the least likelihood to deny this. Now if used in the first place, or in the last place save one it might have miscarried, why not in this, seeing the nature of it is not altered but continueth the same still, working only contingently unto the producing of the end proposed, and not necessarily? Again all other means failing this takes effect (you say) by the rules of eternal wisdom. Now I demand if none other had been appointed but this, why could not this alone being used have taken effect by rules of eternal wisdom as well, as now it doth, that is why could not God ordain that by this means only used, the effect intended should be brought to pass, as well as by this means used after, the use of many other, seeing still the effect comes to pass by his means alone and not by any other: For if God can ordain that after other means have failed, this means alone shall bring about the end intended by God, why could he not as well ordain that this means alone should do it, without using of any other means before it.  
Last of all, what needs Gods forecast run out to these means for a ground of its certeynty, when God himself cannot be ignorant of his own determinations? and therefore having ordained such an end, as suppose the apprehension of such a Traitor, upon this ground he may be most certain that such a Traitor shall be apprehended. By the way I will take leave to observe some positions that have dropped from your pen in this Section. 1. That God can ordain such a thing to come to pass, which is of a contingent nature, as for example the apprehension of a Traitor. 2. That upon such an ordination of God success to the means used hereunto is absolutely necessary, you add and immutably also, committing a great indecorum therein, immutability being a congruous attribute only to the ordination of God, and not to the success of things. 3. That means of contingent operation only shall necessarily take effect. 4. This necessity of taking effect is not absolute but gotten merely by casual miscarriage of the possibilities of the former means, so you express it, whereas indeed the possibilities miscarry not; for the means are in their nature possible, yea and probable too, to produce the end intended as yourself profess. 5. Though this necessity in the effectual working of the means be not absolute, yet the success of them is absolutely necessary. I say no more but this, the Theses that Picus Mirandula proposed at Rome were many of them paradoxical enough but I do not find that any of these had place amongst them.  
5. There is a fallacy (you say) though the simplest one that ever was set to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent wits of these latter ages with some of the former have been pitifully entangled, you that have discerned the simplicity thereof in all probability, are not like to be entangled therein, for than you were not any wiser than they; yet it seems all these excellent wits are but woodcokes in comparison to yourself; well let us consider it. The more, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus (you say) frame and set. Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to pass; But God hath decreed every thing that is, therefore every thing that is, comes to pass of necessity. All things are necessary at least in respect of God's decree, The extract or Corollary whereof in brief is this. It is impossible for aught that is not, to be, for aught that hath been, not to have been, for aught that is not, to be, impossible for aught to be hereafter that shall not be. I promise you, you have engaged yourself very far not only to look to it that yourself be not found to be entangled herein, but for the performance of a very easy, and clear solution of this which you term a fallacy, lest yourself be not found as wise as they which were entangled herein. Yet I am not ignorant of such a trick of wit, as first to cry down an argument by disgracing it, and pouring contempt upon it, & thereupon presuming that any answer shall serve the turn, when the Reader is before hand awed with such a censure as to forfete the reputation of a scholar, and to be Metamorphosed into a woodcock, if he do not applaud it, and persuade himself to see a clear solution of the former argument, which is proclaimed base, and sufficient to discreditt all that favour it. Yet some wit is required to catch a woodcock. But this is so simple a fallacy as the like was never set to catch a wise Man. Now a man would have thought yourself had been one of those excellents wits that had been taken in this snare, if it be a snare; seeing you come but freshly from professing that God decreeth such a contingent, as the apprehension of a Traitor. In which case, it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to pass. Now why may not God as well decree every contingent thing, for aught the contingency can hinder it. For what is more contingent than the apprehension of a Traitor, yet this you say God may ordain, and in this case it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to pass. But let us consider what you have to say to it. I hope you will remember your own interpretation of it, namely that it must necessarily come to pass in respect of God's decree, and so by your own profession not only a contingent thing, but a free action, may be said to come to pass necessarily, to wit in respect of God's decree, as for example, the apprehension of a Traitor which is as free an action as any, you might have been pleased to have framed the proposition thus, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to pass, must necessarily come to pass. For you cannot be ignorant that God doth as well decree that some things shall not come pass, as that other things shall come to pass. As for example Ezek. 20. 31. O house of Israel as I live saith the Lord God I will not answer you when I am asked 32. Neither shall that be done that cometh into your mind: for ye say we will be as the heathen and serve wood, and stone, and Esay. 37. 33. Thus saith the Lord concerning the coming of Assur. He shall not enter into this city, nor shoot an arrow there, nor come before it with shield, nor cast a mount against it. Now we are ready to attend the discovery of this fallacy, this simple fallacy.  
First you tell us of an extract or Corollary hereof thus; It is impossible for aught that is not to be, etc. Is this the way you take to discover the simplicity of this fallacy? this savoureth strongly of your fallacious dealing; in as much as by callecting consequences you labour to discredit the syllogism, this surely is not to answer it. Besides not one of your consequences are sound, there is no ingenuity in the collection of them. For the conclusion of the former syllogism being this therefore, every thing that is comes to pass of necessity, yourself have acknowledged this necessity to proceed in respect of God's decree. And therefore what necessity of things soever you do infer herence, you must accordingly understand it in respect of Gods decree not otherwise. Now this necessity is but necessity secundum quid not simpliciter as the learned call it, and such as may stand with contingency, and possibility to the contrary. Like as the apprehension of a Traitor is a thing possible not to be and in its own nature merely contingent, but upon supposition that God hath ordained that such a Traitor shall be apprehended by certain means, you profess that the success of those means is absolutely necessary, which is as much as to say that the apprehension of that Traitor upon Gods ordaining it, is absolutely necessary; which is more than the divines whom you impugn as overlashing do use to say, or can in any sobriety of speech be justified. For if it must necessarily come to pass only upon supposition of God's decree, than not absolutely but upon supposition.  
But consider we your extracts apart; the first is this. It is impossible for aught that is, not to be; Now this proposition cannot at all be deduced out of the former syllogism, or out of any part thereof. It depends manifestly upon another proposition which is not at all mentioned in the former syllogism and the proposition is this, whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not be, it is impossible, that should be or come to pass. Now let every sober Reader judge, with what ingenuity you call this first proposition of yours an extract of the former syllogism, or of the conclusion thereof; whereas it is nothing necessary that he who affirms, that All things which God hath decreed shall necessarily come to pass, must also affirm the other, namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed, it is impossible that it should come to pass, wherhence alone is derived the first abstract you speak of. Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright, we shall find that these propositions are only proportional; Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to pass, the same shall necessarily come to pass; Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to pass, it is impossible that it should come to pass. These are suitable indeed, and accordingly we profess that it is impossible that any thing which is not, because God hath decreed that it shall not be, I say it is impossible that it should be. So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath been, so far forth as God hath decreed the being thereof, it is impossible not to have been.  
Your third extract is of the same nature with the first, and so admits the same answer. Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy; It may be we shall meet with it in that which followeth, and that is this, But if it be (as I suppose) very consonant to infinite wisdom, altogether consonant to infinite goodness and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred, will be the only lawful issue of the former Maxim or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our own choosing, etc. Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogism? Or are you to seek in the solution of a fallacy? If it be not concluded in mood and figure, you might have signified so much; but indeed no exception can that way be taken against it. If any term had been aequivocal, the answer had been by distinction. But no colour of any such just exception; so that every way the form is unquestionable. And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises.  
And I verily believe there is one of the premises that disliketh you, though you are ashamed plainly, and directly to manifest so much. For so the answer had been fair, and facile by denying it, if not the Major because thereof you make use in your own syllogism, wherewith you do as it were requite this, yet at least the Minor which was this, But God hath decreed every thing that is. For I verily believe this is such a dish of lettuce as fits not your lips. This you say you might have done, but now the liberty hereof is taken from you, and that by yourself. For although the Pope never binds his own hands, yet you have bound your tongue, and sealed up your own lips from taking any such exception as this. For you call the syllogism a fallacy, and that a simple one. Now fallacies are such forms of argumentation, as offend only in form of argumentation, which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it, and the truth of the premises, especially whereas you do not profess that it offends both in form, and matter, nor show any forwardness to deny either of the propositions. Well we gave you a syllogism to answer, in steed of answering it, you think to make us amends with another syllogism. I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward, Augustus in steed of a reward gave him verses of his own making. The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus. We expected at your hands not another syllogism, but the answearinge of our own. But though you fail to answer ours, I will not fail to do my best in accommodating an answer unto yours. You undertake to infer the contradictory to our conclusion, which is to outface your opposites, and to cry a syllogism down without answering it.  
Yet let us see how well you perform that you undertake. Your syllogism is this. Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to pass, but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, therefore of necessity there must be contingency. And for the better strengthening of your discourse or argumentation, you make a motion that an additional to the Mayor which is this, Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to pass. Now the judge, or Chancellor in Logical Courts to whom such a motion should be made, would cry out shame upon it. For that proposition is an universal affirmative, and you desire that an universal negative should be added to it to make up an entire Mayor proposition, which were like a sixth finger upon an hand. And indeed in that case it were neither categorical nor hypothetical. For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some hypothetical syllogisms, yet it is always by way of negation thus, Non & dies est, & nox: sed dies est, ergo non nox, Again upon a second consideration, the motion would be rejected as being altogether without wit. For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it, and this additional confers no strength to improve the inference. I appeal to every scholars judgement in this.  
Thirdly the proposition itself as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive, hath as little wit as the motion made for the admittance of it. As where it is said that God hath decreed that things may come to pass, you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to pass. For the possibility of the event of things is not from God's decree, but rather from God's omnipotency. For because he is able to produce every thing that implies no contradiction, therefore they are denominated possible.  
Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Trojan horse, it will do you more harm then good, as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest. Yet what need you desire more, your conclusion is granted you, namely that of necessity there must be contingency, supposing God's decree. For God's decrees are only of doing, or suffering some things, as it is free for God whether he will do them, or suffer them, yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency, yet decreing any thing, of necessity there must be contingency, though he had decreed nothing else, but such things as we count most necessary, in the course of nature. But we grant also that God did decree contingency, and decrees necessity in respect of second causes; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heat or burn necessarily, the Sun of such a nature as to enlighten the air necessarily, heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwardes, and all this necessarily. Necessarily I say in respect of second causes, though this necessity was mere contingency, in respect of the will of God. For he could have chosen whether there should have been any fire, or world at all, yea and can hinder the fire from burning if it please him, as he did hinder it from taking hold of the three noble children in the furnace of Babylon. And as God hath decreed many things to come to pass necessarily, so hath he decreed many things to come to pass contingently, as in course of nature many things there are that come to pass contingently by the will of God, and especially the actions of men and Angels.  
And as for that additional of yours which you craved to be admitted, Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to pass, we are so far from disliking it, that we cannot believe that you do believe it, and therefore you have taken a course to confound it, as in due time shall appear. We willingly profess that all things beside God, are created entities, and such as whose being must necessarily depend or God, or have no being at all. And not only do we subject res ipsas to the will and decree of God, but also modos rerum. And these modi rerum are necessity, and contingency.  
Nothing (we say) comes to pass, but what God hath decreed shall come to pass. Again nothing comes to pass after any manner whatsoever, but that God hath decreed, it to come to pass after that manner; whether it come to pass necessarily, God hath decreed it shall come to pass necessarily; or whether contingently, God hath decreed it shall come to pass contingently. In a word that which you deliver faultringly we say plainly Nothing comes to pass otherwise, than God hath decreed it shall come to pass. So then I say we grant your conclusion. But how doth it appear that this conclusion of yours contradicteth our former conclusion which was this, therefore Every thing comes to pass of necessity. You will say, if every thing comes to pass of necessity, than nothing comes to pass contingently. I confess this consequence is plausible, but to whom? to none but ignorants. Of which number you are not. For your very conclusion itself in the very outward face of it utterly contradicteth this consequence. For is not your conclusion this, therefore of necessity there must be contingency, which manifestly justifieth that necessity and contingency may stand together, and are nothing oppositie. And how, I pray, is this necessity, but in respect of the decree of God? And did our conclusion proceed in any other sense? Yourself have acknowledge that it doth not, though therein somewhat faltering also, as it is your usual course, in taking notice of any truth that makes against your tenants. For are not these your words in interpreting our conclusion, All things are necessary in respect of God's decree? Only you add at least in this respect as if you would fain draw it to another meaning. Now our meaning is plain. All things come not to pass necessarily, nor all things contingently, but some things come to pass necessarily as works of nature, some things contingently as the actions of men. But by your own received Maxim Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed they shall come to pass, therefore God hath decreed that some things shall come to pass necessarily, some things contingently. But by your own received principle, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to pass, that must of necessity come to pass, therefore of necessity it must come to pass that some things shall come to pass necessarily, some things contingently. Now give me leave to represent your own ill carriage, to your own eyes. The Mayor proposition in our syllogism, and the Mayor proposition in your syllogism are all one as yourself acknowledge in these words, Let the Mayor proposition stand as it did before. Now if they be all one why do you not propose them after one manner? do you practise to gull your Reader presuming this legier du maine of yours shall not be discovered?  
The Mayor proposition in both is all one I confess as touching each part, both the middle term, and the greater extreme. But when the greater extreme comes to be repeated in the conclusion, it is repeated in a far different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Mayor proposition of each syllogism it runs thus, must of necessity come to pass, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, must come to pass necessarily. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, of necessity there must be contingency; which is as much as to say, of necessity it must come to pass. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words must of necessity come to pass, the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed aught to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot be referred but to the words come to pass. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreme, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, come to pass. As for example, had our conclusion been shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both, the harshness of it had been qualified, thus, ergo all things of necessity must come to pass, which hath a fair, and facile construction thus; though some things come to pass necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to pass, both those things that come to pass necessarily, and those things that come to pass contingently. In like sort had your conclusion been shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreme, as indeed it ought, the greater extreme being all one in both, than your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, ergo Contingency must come to pass of necessity or thus some effects shall be contingent of necessity, for so runs the Minor, God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothing contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion. For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion, were only secundum quid and upon supposition of God's decree, which kind of impossibility is always joined with a simple and absolute possibility to the contrary, secluding God's decree. For even those things which God decreeth to come to pass contingently as the actions of men, must necessarily by the virtue of Gods decree come to pass, in such a manner as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass, otherwise it were impossible they should come to pass contingently. About which truth, namely that God decreeth some things to come to pass contingently, why do you falter in this fowl manner? If you like it not, why do you not in plain terms contest against it, if you do approve of it, why do you not plainly profess it, but carry yourself in the clouds of generality and ambiguity? As first, when you say, God hath decreed contingency, here a man might be apt to conceive, that you do believe that God hath decreed that some things shall come to pass contingently. Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity, but also that some things shall necessarily come to pass, which may seem to urge you in like sort to maintain that God decreeth contingency, so he should also decree that some things shall come to pass contingently.  
Most of all considering what here you seem to approve of in your additional, namely that Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed. Now the case is clear that many things come to pass contingently, therefore it followeth that God also hath decreed, that even those things shall come to pass contingently; But I have had experience of your opinion to the contrary in another treatise of yours, wherein though you confess that God hath decreed the necessity of things, & the things themselves that necessarily come to pass, and grant that it cannot be otherwise, yet on the other side though you grant that God decreeth contingency, yet you deny that God decreeth the things themselves that do contingently come to pass. A most prodigious opinion, as if God did bring to pass the contingency of a thing (which is but modus rei, and contains no reality different from the thing itself) yet doth not bring to pass the thing itself; for if he did he must decree it also. And as directly opposite to the word of God, plainly testifying a multitude of contingent things to have been decreed by God. The like ambiguity you content yourself withal, when you say that God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent, or as otherwise you express it, that some contingent effects shall be, which seems manifestly to imply as well the being or existence of them to be decreed by God as the contingent manner of their being.  
Yet I say, in another discourse of yours you fly of from this acknowledgement, but withal deliver yourself with as much confusion and perturbation, as any adversary could expect in an opposite maintaining erroneous points, and crying down the truth of God. Thus have I taken pains to answer your syllogism, but as for the discovery of the fallacy of ours we have hitherto found nothing tending thereunto: What is to come we are to expect. Yet hereupon as if you had performed some great service, very gravely and magisterially you tell us, that As ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned error once conceived, was quickly delivered of a second which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknowing things future, from an infallible necessity (as they conceived it) laid upon them, (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisdom, and wisdom essentially includeth knowledge. It seems you think you have sufficiently discharged yourself of that you undertook, namely the discovery of the fallacy of our syllogism, you proceed to the censure of another error, and that both obscurely and unsoundly expressed. It is about the ground of God's foreknowing things to come. Now the opinion you tax for an error, is the opinion of those that maintain that God foreknows all things to come, by seeing the determination of his own will to the producing of every action. This you express after your manner thus, God foreknows them from an infallible necessity laid upon them by his immutable decree. I do not think you can produce any Author of this opinion, that expresseth his opinion in this manner. Besides, it is notoriously untrue. For the Authors of this opinion maintain, that God by his decree, layeth contingency upon some things, as well as necessity upon others. And that as he will have the fire to burn, the Sun to enlighten necessarily, so he will have, Angels and men produce their actions contingently and freely. Nay which is more, even they that openly profess, that God doth determine the will of man unto every action as touching the substance of the action; do withal maintain that God determines the will of man and Angels to work contingently and freely in all their actions, and consequently neither doth he decree any other wise to determine them, which doctrine maintains that Gods will and decree doth lay upon all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation rather than any necessity. Yet upon supposition of God's decree, they maintain that of necessity such things as God hath decreed shall come to pass, and that after that manner as God hath decreed it to come to pass, that is, either necessarily as all the operations of natural agents, or contingently and freely, as all the actions of reasonable creatures. But this opinion you dislike, and upon what reason? Undoubtedly it seems they had need be weighty ones, considering that this question hath been abundantly canvassed, by the most learned and subtlest among Schoole-divines. And indeed it is one of the first points whereabout I have been acquainted with School divinity: Scotus proposeth this question, to wit; Now God doth foreknow future contingents; for thus they in their wisdom thought fit to propose it, to wit, of future contingents in special not as you do, of future things in general. And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which he impugneth. The first, is the opinion of Bonaventura, who maintained that God did foreknow future contingents, by the Ideas of them in the mind of God. The second is the opinion of Aquinas, who made the ground of Gods foreknowing of future contingents, to be Their real existence in eternity. Both these Scotus impugneth with such excellent arguments to my judgement at that time, and withal so clear, that as I remember this brought me first in love with School divinity. The third opinion is his own, which there he maintaineth, & that is this, which you invade, namely, That God knows all future contingents by knowing his own will and purpose to produce them. And as touching your objection that God foreknows the sins of men as well as their good actions, which yet undoubtedly he did not decree to produce, his answer is, that this also is foreknown by God in as much as he knows the determination of his will to produce every sinful act as touching the substance of it, and to permit the obliquity of it. The opinion of Calvin maintaining no other ground of God's foreknowledge of future contingents but this, & that out of Valla is apt to be exposed to scorn now adays, not only amongst Papists but amongst English Protestants also. But as for Scotus who is known to maintain the same opinion, he is reputed to be of sufficiency to bear the brunt of any adversary that in point of Metaphysical, and School divinity shall encounter him. Yet consider a little farther. The Thomists and Dominicans who stand much upon the terms of defence for the credit and reputation of their great Master Aquinas, they are apt enough to meet with Scotus his arguments opposing his opinion in laying the ground of God's foreknowledge upon the real existence of all things in eternity. But mark how Didacus' Alvarer a great Schoolman carrieth himself in this. Aquinas saith he did never deny Scotus his way of Gods foreknowing future contingents, to wit, by knowing the determination of his own will. But besides this he devised another, and that was by the real existence of all future things in eternity. Again, in maintaining the opinion of Aquinas concerning the actual existence of all future things in eternity, he first presupposeth the determination of Gods will for the producing of them, and thereupon makes future contingents to have their real existence, & not otherwise. So that for this opinion which you do very magisterially censure, as an ill weed hath not only poor Calvin for the patron of it, and Valla alleged by him; but Scotus also the Father of the Reals, yea and Didacus' Alvarer a Thomist, a sect of Schoole-divines commonly opposite to the Scotists, yet herein professedly concurring with Scotus himself, and avouching also Aquinas himself to be of the same opinion. You had need therefore look well to your tackling in opposing such who I tell you never were reputed Babies, but tall fellows.  
But yet I confess they were but men and may have their matches. But leave your censures, and trust to your sword and dint of arguments, & do not think that words or phrasoes or figures (much less imperious censures) will carry it.  
And here it would be required, not only to argue your own Tenet, but to make answer to their Arguments. But you Eagle like and as if they were but flies keep your state, and will not fly at such inferior gain. Wherein your proselyte shall be little beholding to you, when being possessed with your opinion, he shall find himself left to himself to sink or swim without any help from you to answer their arguments, that have maintained the contrary; They had need be of Chrysippus' temper, who was wont to pray his Master to give him principles and let him alone to maintain them; Yet it may be I am deceived and it was not Chrysippus but Carneades. Yet with one argument you are content to help your reader here. Belike it is some clear demonstration, such as it is, this it is. Every wise decree presupposeth wisdom, and wisdom includeth knowledge, and what of this? Nay if any man desires to far better in the endoctrinating himself in this point, he must go to the Cooks, you have no better entertainment for him. A very short dispatch (in a controversy of great moment) and a quick; Never was Schooleman so simple as to doubt, whether wisdom includeth knowledge or a wise decree presupposeth wisdom; yet never any one of them was found to discern any such inference as you imply herhence, as if herhence it did so evidently follow that Gods foreknowing of future things doth not depend upon the determination of his will. For you take no pains to clear this inference. But let us examine this a little. When we say the foreknowledge of future contingents depends upon the determination of God's will, the meaning is, therefore God foreknows them because he purposeth to produce them, so far as they are good, or to permit them in case they are evil. Now you in opposition to this, tell us, that God's knowledge goeth before his decree, and because you do not specify what knowledge, we have reason to expound it of the knowledge spoken of, that is of the knowledge of future contingents. In like sort because you specify not of what decree you speak, we have reason to understand it of the decree before spoken of, whereupon those divines, whom you impugn, do ground the foreknowledge of things to come. So then your meaning must be this in opposition to the Tenet which you censure for an error or weed in opinion. Whereas some think that God's foreknowledge of things to come is grounded upon God's decree, as if God ergo did foreknow them, because he purposeth to produce them. You are of a contrary opinion, namely, that God's foreknowledge doth go before his decree, that is, first God foreknows things to come, and then secondly he purposeth to produce them. For if you meant it of another decree, then that which was spoken of, what an absurd thing is it for you not to specify it, especially seeing you propose this by way of contradiction to the former opinion? which unless it proceeds of the same things is no contradiction. For if I say God doth first decree to produce things, and hereupon he knows them; and you shall as it were by way of opposition say; No this is not so; but God doth first foresee the actions of men, and thereupon decree to save or damn them, here is no contradiction at all, but an unlearned and foolish show of opposition, without any substance of contradiction. Wherefore if you speak to the purpose in this, and that by way of opposition, your meaning must be this; God doth not first decree them and afterwards foreknow them, but rather he first foreknows them and then decreeth them; which is as much as to say, that God foreknowing that they will be, doth hereupon decree that they shall be. So that God's decree of things future contingent proceedeth in this manner, Seing they will be, they shall be. But to consider your reason more closely, Every wise decree (you say) presupposeth wisdom. Now this being delivered in opposition to our opinion which maintain that the foreknowledge of future contingents followeth God's decree; and you saying plainly that wisdom rather goeth before God's decree than followeth after it, (which indeed is a truth, for God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will) this discourse of yours (I say) doth imply that this foreknowledge of future contingents, which we make consequent to God's decree is by us accounted the wisdom of God. For otherwise here again were no contradiction, though you make show of contradicting us; as whereas we say foreknowledge of future things is subsequent to God's decree, you as it were contradicting us reply, Nay rather Gods wisdom goeth before his decree, otherwise it were no wise decree. So that herein you do manifestly suppose that we by God's foreknowledge of future things did understand the wisdom of God. It seems you conceive it to be so, but as for us we take it to be so foul an absurdity that we desire, though you please your own lips with such lettuce, yet until you have better ground for it you will not charge it upon us. For even for a man to foreknow what he meaneth to do is no part of wisdom. For the veriest fool that is may know and be privy to what he meaneth to do. Every man is privy to his own thoughts and purposes. No man knoweth the things of man but the Spirit of Man. 1. Cor. 2. 8. So then the spirit of man is well enough acquainted with the purposes of man. But the wisdom that directeth the will of God is that which the learned call Scientia simplicis intelligenti●, whereby God knows what is most fit to be done for the compassing of his proposed ends, which yourself confess to be the part of wisdom in the beginning of the former Section. Where also you made not the least mention of any such part of wisdom as to foreknow what one meaneth to do. Now God's decree of producing future things in their season is a decree of the, means tending to the end which God h● intended, namely the setting forth of his glory. For God makes all things for himself. And this wisdom includeth knowledge, it is 
Prov. 16. 4  true the knowledge of all means whereby his glory may be set forth, and God makes choice of what he thinks fit, and all this knowledge is not the knowledge of what shall be, but only the knowledge of what may be, or is fi●t to be, which all the learned acknowledge to be scientia simplicis intelligentiae. and they make it distinct from scientia visionis which is the knowledge of what shall be. And these knowledges all acknowledge to be so far different as that the one to wit scientia simplicis intelligentiae is precedent to God's decree, the other to wit scientia visionis is subsequent which two knowledges in God, how judiciously and learnedly in the course of your magisterial censure you are pleased to confound let the Reader judge. But to proceed, hereupon you betake yourself ●o interrogatories.  
The first is, Shall we then grant that God's knowledge is antecedent, and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees? To this out of that which hath been formerly delivered may be answered. There is a knowledge goes before God's will, called scientia simplicis intelligentiae th● knowledge of what may be, or is fit to be, there is another knowledge called scientia visionis, that is the knowledge of what shall be, and thi● followeth after the will of God; and I know no tolerable divine that did deny it, until the opinion of scientia media rose up; which the Authors themselves confess to be a new invention; And here as if this opinion were both Law and Gospel unto you, you ●ise up in grave and supercilious manner to censure the contrary.  
Now as for the term of foreknowledge; I answer the knowledge of what may be, or is fit to be, goes before the will of God, and so may be called the foreknowledge of God; but the knowledge that things shall be, though it followeth God's will, yet may it be called foreknowledge in respect of the event of the things themselves. For the things exist in time, but God did know, that they should be, from all eternity, like as from all eternity he did decree the futurition of them. Your second interrogatory is this, Or shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of jewish blasphemy against his Son because he did most certainly foreknow it? You never showed your teeth till now, by this I perceive what you aim at, which hitherto you have been ashamed to profess in plain terms, namely, that future contingents which come to pass in the World are not decreed. But what mean you to deny that, in this cunning manner, which you durst not deny openly. For the syllogism you proposed to answer contained this, in plain terms in the Minor thus, All things that come to pass are decreed to come to pass: which if you had but in plain terms denied, your solution had been plain and brief, whereas you neglecting that course did fetch a great compass instead of answering to requite us with another argument whereby to infer a proposition contradictory to our conclusion.  
Secondly though then you might have denied it, yet now you cannot without contradicting yourself. For you justified the truth of the premises in that syllogism, in as much as all the exception you took against it was against the form● and not against the matter. For you told us, it was a fallacy, a very simple one. Now every Scholar knows that where no other exception is taken against a syllogism, but this, that it is a fallacy, this is as much as to justify the truth of each proposition contained therein.  
Thirdly, I give another reason why you have prejudiced yourself from denying this. For you have professed that Nothing can come to pass otherwise, than God hath decreed it to come to pass, jewish blasphemy against the Son of God came to pass contingently and freely, therefore God hath decreed, that that very jewish blasphemy against the Son of God should come to pass contingently and freely, etc. what followeth hereupon but that therefore God ordaineth it to come to pass, for to come to pass contingently and freely, is no terminus diminuens of coming to pass. You have nothing at all that I know to help you at this dead lift, but to fly to the confused manner of expressing that former proposition of yours, whereupon I take advantage, if so be your heart serve you to take hold thereof, whereof I much doubt. For it is true indeed that that proposition was not proposed categorically thus, Nothing shall come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to pass; whereupon I have taken advantage against you; but disjunctively thus Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to pass. If you will help yourself with this disjunctive you may; but I will be bold to tell you, it is like to prove a shameful help, and such as seems to be thrust in only to charm the dangerous issue of it (whereof it seems you had a glimpse) if it were left out. For consider, is it a sober speech to say that God hath decreed that things may come to pass? The possibility of things is known to God before ever his decrees go forth. He knows what he is able to bring to pass before he resolves what shall come to pass: And therefore too too absurd it is, to make the possibility of any thing the object of God's decree. Stick rather to this, and say, that though God did ordain, the jewish blasphemy against his Son should come to pass contingently & freely, yet therhence it follows not that he did ordain it should come to pass: Whereabouts when we know your mind è renatâ consilium capiemus, we will think of a convenient answer, in the mean time I will proceed. Therefore in the fourth place why should it seem so uncouthe that God should decree this very blasphemy, as to be cried down at the very hearing of it, especially by Christians who know and believe the oracles of God, and acknowledge that passage. Act. 4. 27. 28. amongst the rest to be dictated by the Spirit of God wherein the Apostles jointly profess in their meditations unto God in this manner, Doubtless against thy holy Son jesus whom thou hast anointed both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel gathered themselves together, to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel had determined before to be done. judas that betrayed him, the High-Priests that hired judas to betray him, the witness that testified against him, the people that cried away with him, were of the people of Israel; The soldiers that scourged him, crowned him with thorns, spate in his face, crucified him, pierced him with a spear & were of the Gentlis, yet all these together with Horod and Pontius Pilate, are avouched by the Holy Ghost to have gathered themselves together to do what God had determined to be done; and was there not both jewish and Gentilish blasphemy against the Son of God to be found in all this? and shall we fear to profess that they did in all this what God had decreed to be done, when the Holy Ghost professeth that they did what God had determined to be done? Could you be ignorant of this passage? and dare you in so apparent terms draw your Reader to contradict it, as some blasphemous assertion, without taking any pains to interpret the place, and so free yourself from manifest contradiction thereunto, as at first sight is obvious to every Reader, that will but compare this of yours with that of the Acts? Had you ventured upon an interpretation, I would have taken pains to consider it. I have shaken in pieces the rotten interpretation of Bellarmine and Arminius, different each from other. I would have tried what I could have performed upon yours also. And throughout the Scriptures we may perceive how jealous God is over the maintaining of his providence throughout, even in the most sinful things that come to pass, and that in such phrases, which when they are used by us, they are cried down for blasphemy; but in the mean t●me they consider not, that if they be the phrases of the Holy Ghost, ere th●y are aware they are found to charge the Holy Ghost with blasphemy. And the truth being rightly uttered, is far enough off even from harshness also, as well as from error, yea from harshness unto men's affections, though never so corrupt. As for example, what good soever there is found in such actions, we acknowledge God to be the author of it, but not of the the malice or evil that cleaves to it; yet that also we say God will have come to pass, but only by his permission. For, Non aliquid sit nisi volente Deo, Not any thing comes to pass (saith Austin) but God willing 
Enchirid. cap. 95.  it; and he comprehends both good and evil, as appears by that which follows, vel sinendo ut siat, as in case it be evil, vel ipse faciendo, as in case it be good. But of both these he pronounceth that not any thing comes to pass but God willing it. The like may be manifested to have been acknowledged by Anselmus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, and Bradwardine, yea and our greatest adversaries. For Bellarmine even in the midst of his heat against us, professeth, that Bonum est esse malum, Deo permittente: It is good that there should be evil by God's permission: and if it be good, I pray you why is it not lawful for GOD to will it, seeing upon the same ground it was affirmed long ago by St. Austin that God doth 
Enchirid. cap. 96.  will it. But as for Arminius, never any man was known to be smitten with the spirit of giddiness in opposing this truth more than he; for sometimes he professeth, It was God's will that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sins, and how I pray 
Exam. praed. Perk. pag. 162. Ibid. pag. 114, 115.  could that be, but by adding sin unto sin? Again, he professeth that it was God's will that the jews should proceed so far as they did proceed in their ignominious handling of Christ; and every man knows that they proceeded to a very foul degree of blasphemy and impiety therein. Last of all, it is true that Aquinas and Durandus both oppose this, but herein Aquinas manifestly opposeth Austin, though he names him not. And again, I desire no better trial of this truth then their oppositions. For if I do not make it appear that their arguments are merely sophistical, and manifestly unsound, let me be accounted a blasphemer in the maintaining of this Tenet. All which I have already performed, and taken in Valentianus his more copious and frothy exceptions also, but in another language. Lastly, yet were it tolerable if you did only deny that sins of men were decreed by God; but you will have nothing that comes to pass contingently and freely to be decreed by God; contingency you say is decreed, but not the things that fall out contingently: whence it followeth that by your opinion, God did decree no man's faith, no man's repentance, no man's obedience, but only did decree the contingency of this. This is the mysterious iniquity of your doctrine which you conceal, and make choice rather to give instance in sin and blasphemy, and to represent the harshness of maintaining that to be decreed by God, only that you may the better insinuate the approbation of your unlearned Tenets, into vulgar and popular affections. Yet you give me cause to guess that you would have your reader believe more herein, than you believe yourself. You would have your Reader believe that God did not decree the jewish blasphemy against his Son, but your belief is only that God did not decree the obliquity of it, and yet forthwith you doubt whether the obliquity may be distinguished from the act. Again, you would have your Reader believe that God did not decree the jewish blasphemy against his Son, but your belief here expressed is only this, that God did not inevitably decree the jewish blasphemy, implying that God did decree it, but not mevitably. And not any of our Divines that I know ever said any more, then that God did decree it.  
You add another absurd error hereunto concerning Gods decrees; that forsooth some of them are evitable, some inevitable. Now the meaning of our Divines in saying that God did decree any obliquity, is only this; God did decree that such an obliquity should come to pass by his permission, directly answering to the professing of Austin; Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut siat, vel ipse faciendo. 
Enchirid. cap. 95.  It is true, Arminius disputes, and that acutely as he thinks, that in some actions the obliquity cannot be distinguished from the actions themselves. I have dealt with him in this point; I am ready to deal with you also. But it is enough for you to show your affection to Armenius his Tenets; as for your sufficiency to maintain them, that you do dispense very sparingly, as if you affected state in this. Further you tell us, to admit your former conclusion, that the eternal foreknows all things because he decreeth them, or that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree, (the disjunctive here should be a copulative, for that which followeth is not verified of either of them disjunctively, but copulatively of them both,) were to imprison his infinite wisdom in his selfe-fettered power, to restrain the Eternal Majesty from using such liberty in his everlasting decrees as some earthly monarchs usurp in causes temporal or civil. For the Pope never ties his hand by any grant, which is a fault in him. But in that Holy One the reservation of such liberty is a point of high perfection. A little before you told us very gravely, that weeds grow apace, and the former error which you minced, as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly, touching Gods decreeing all things, was soon delivered of a second, to wit, the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will. You rather think, that God foreknows things to come, before, and without the determination of his will. Whether this opinion of yours be a tore or good corn, let the Reader judge. And of what nature not a second is, but seconds are, whereof it seems you are soon delivered, which now we come to examine. To say that God foreknows all things, because he decreeth them, is (you say) to imprison his infinite wisdom in his power. Why it is nothing so: for God's decree is God's will, not his power: yet how is God's wisdom imprisoned in his will, more than his power? For as God knoweth more things possible to be done, and fit to be done than he doth, so he can do more than he doth, and therefore his wisdom is no more imprisoned thereby then his power. But besides this, you take your aim quite amiss. For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to pass, is no part of wisdom. For, for a man to be privy to his own purposes, is no part of wisdom, for it is incident even to silly creatures. Again, to know what I mean to do, what a senseless thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge? and as like senseless a thing it is to say that God's knowledge or wisdom is imprisoned, by being privy to his own purposes? Again, how is God's power fettered by his will? Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it? you signify that his liberty is hereby restrained; wherein? in his everlasting decrees. A most senseless speech. Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree, God's liberty of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained? Perhaps you may say, by making it he cannot alter it. I answer, if he should alter it after he hath made it, this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting: but you suppose the contrary, namely, that God's decrees are everlasting. Or if God should for a while suspend his decrees, and not make them with the first, how is it possible they could be everlasting? This savoureth strongly of an affection to maintain that God's decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius, though you are ashamed to profess it, and therefore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention. For you would have God still indifferent to decree this or that, as the Pope is who by no grant binds his hands.  
And why so? is it, that upon emergent occasions, God might decree a new as he thinks fit? why but consider, all these emergent occasions were from everlasting known to God. So that if God at th●s time were indifferent to decree, he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting. For from everlasting he knew all that now he doth, and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was. For with him is no variableness nor shadow of change. 
jam. 1. 17.   
The wilderness of your inventions, I well perceive, is not at an end. I wonder whither the wantonness of our wits would bring us in the end. Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to believe lies, and that for not embracing his truth with love. And who can look for better from them who shamefully oppose the g●ace of God. Is it marvel if God infatuate them?. As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of God's decree, this is your language, not ours, in the last period of your former Section. We say, look what God hath decreed, that of necessity must come to pass, but how, not always necessarily, but sometimes contingently. Only the works of nature do by the decree of God come to pass necessarily; but as for the actions of men they come to pass by the decree of God contingently and freely. But whether works of nature, or actions of men, they of necessity must come to pass, if God hath decreed them, and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to pass, that is, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently.  
6. As a man or Angel having free power to do this or that, by producing any thing subject to the freedom of his will, doth therewithal produce contingency without decreeing it, (for in as much as he works freely the work must needs be freely wrought, that is contingently,) In like so●t God being free to produce any work without him, upon the producing of such a work doth produce contingency without decreeing it. For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely, and consequently it must needs come to pass contingently.  
To produce this or that, is the object of God's decree, because he can choose whether he will produce this or tha●; but to work contingently is no object of God's decree afore it is not in God's power to choose whether he will work contingently or necessarily. If he doth work at all ad extra he must needs work freely that is contingently. For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature to be necessarily, so it is the perfection of divine nature to work not necessarily in the producing of aught without him, but freely & contingently. But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angelical and humane, that he not only worketh freely, but also is able to create creatures herein like himself, that can work freely as namely Angels and men; like as he can and hath produced other creatures that work in all things necessarily.  
Again, considering that necessity and contingency are but modi rerum certain manners of bringing things to pass, & therefore cannot exist without the things themselves wh●ch are said to exist and to be brought to pass either necessarily or contingently. Therefore it cannot be said that God doth produce the necessity or contingency of this or that particular, unless he produceth the particular itself; neither can he be said to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular, except he decree the thing itself. So that for God to decree the necessity or contingency of this or that particular, is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to pass, or such a particular shall contingently come to pass.  
Neither is it reasonable to affirm, that God doth decree necessity or contingency in general, but not the necessity of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generals cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generals be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generals otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say rain to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to rain, it is possible not to rain. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to do it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not always the object of God's decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for God's decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very works of men and Angels in this kind of contingency are not the object of God's decree; for in as much as they are said to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truths are derived therefrom.  
Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angels should not be possible to be or not to be. But if the possibility were the object of God's decree, it might be otherwise. For God's decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth, so that if he decree them to be possible, he might have decreed them not to be possible. Yet you seem to speak of contingents in no other sense then this, as when you say, God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent, although I confess it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discern your meaning. But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation. So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God; your confirmation thereof we must expect, when you come to treat of man's fall. This, thus by fetching compass expressed by you, I doubt will prove no more than this, that God decreed to make man a free agent; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require, and promise some exquisite performance. And I am verily persuaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedom, as to make it good, will surpass the performance of any School divine that ever was, from the days of Anselmus to the days wherein we live.  
But of the nature of your perfourmances we have had reasonable experience. You may remember what he said while he was shearing his hogs, Here is a great deal of cry and a little wool. In the next place you dictate your parallels 
Eliam.  wherein it seems you take great pleasure. That God's wisdom is infinite we nothing doubt; but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to do, we take to be a very hungry description of it. For is either man or Angel any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to do? God's immensity consists in filling all places which are but finite, neither is it possible they should be infinite, yet beyond things that are, this immensity is not extended. And you have already denied precisely that God is in vacuo. But as for God's eternity that doth not only coexist with all time, but had existence before it actually and that without all beginning. In a word God's immensity is not in respect of any quantitas molis, quantity of extension, but only in respect of quantitas virtutis. And what is this different from his infinite power. And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing, but only after the way of containing and supporting all things. And look by what quantity he made all things, by the same quantity he supports all things, and that is the quantity of his power.  
A very weak amplification it is in my judgement of God's incircumscriptible presence, (which yet is nothing else but his immensity) to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures. For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe. For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it, as well as that which circumscribes it, coexists with that which is circumscribed by it.  
As for your Mathematical conceits of centre and circumscrence, I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them. To say that eternity is more than commensurable to time, is to grant that it is commensurable thereunto, which is very absurd. And how is it possible, that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable, which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end. You say it is in all durations; not as contained in them (I hope) if as containing them, this also is untrue. For like as it is not God's eternity whereby he made the World but by his power, so it is not by his eternity that he maintaineth the duration of it but by his power. What noon tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing, but as for fluent instants we know none. For fluent is as much as succedent▪ and succession is not but in respect of parts, and an instant hath no parts. Yet if we give way to such imaginations, like as sluxus puncti in Longitudinem is not contained in the line, but is the line; so sluxus instantis is not contained in a set time, but is the very set time itself. Nor is it a part of it as noontide is of the day; And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of God's eternity, to resen●ble the proportion that is between the part of time and the whole time, you may say as well the World is contained in God's immensity, like as half the yard is contained in the whole yard. Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest; the proportion of the least beam of light, to the light of the World may be expressed; the proportion of things that are, to the things that God is able to produce cannot, the first is finite, this is infinite. Yet by your leave, there is no greater disproportion between God's wisdom manifested and manifestable, then between his power manifested and manifestable. In a word, God hath so far manifested his power and wisdom, that we plainly discern both of them to be infinite; and do you think God can so manifest either of them, or both of them, that we may discern them to be more than infinite? And if his wisdom manifestable doth but so far exceed his wisdom manifested, as his power manifestable doth exceed that which is already manifested, etc. what meant you to say that Lest of all may his infinite wisdom be comprehended within those effects produced. For if there be but a parity of proportion, than no disproportion. You proceed to amplify the wisdom of God above all that can be gathered by this Universe, after your manner.  
But I pray consider, was it possible for God to take a more wise and convenient course for the salvation of the world than he hath done? I am sure Austin flatly denies it, Aug. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 10. Ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo desuisse cujus potestati cuncta aequaliter subjacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non suisse, nec esse oportuisse. I am apt enough to conceive, that God could have made and governed the world after another manner than he hath done, and that after as wise a manner as he hath done, but I dare not say that he could do it after a wiser manner than he hath done. Many other particulars might be instanced in, that might stagger the course of your amplifications, which yet sometimes are wondrous vulgar, as when you say, God knows what might have been and what may be, as perfectly as he knows the things that are. Which is as much as to say, God knoweth as well what he can do, as what he doth. Now is this strange in a silly man to know what he doth, or what he can do? And it were a vain exception to say that God knows as well things done by others as by himself; seeing not only their power of doing is from God, but the very doing itself is by you acknowledged to be by the concourse of God. As for the manner of God's concourse, if you conceit it to be upon supposition of God's foresight of man's endeavour first, you do not well to propose your errors or any other jesuitical paradoxes for principles and grounds to build upon.  
7. The incomprehensible wisdom of God doth appear more you say, in the harmony or mixture of necessity and contingency. And this you say is most conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of men or Angels, and ordering them to the certain accomplishment of his glory. In the forth Section you told us that the parts of wisdom were two; the one in intending the right end, the other in ordering right means. So then the prescription of right means is a part of wisdom, but why it should affect the mixture of necessity with contingency in accomplishing the end intended I see no reason. Nay rather I find that wisdom always affecteth the most certain means that can be had for the compassing of the end intended. As for example, all manual Arts do express their wisdom by means used by them which are altogether of necessary operation. In the art of physic also the means used by physicians as all sorts of medicines do all work by necessity of nature. In the Art of Oratory, the end is wholly conjectural, and the means they use being arguments of persuasion, there no necessity at all hath place. No where do I find that any wisdom affecteth the mixture of necessity with contingency, as you speak. Come we to the consideration of the wisdom of God. How is God's wisdom seen in the contexture of a man's body, and every part thereof? Who knoweth the breeding of young bones? saith Solomon. I am fearfully and wonderfully made, saith David. Galen in consideration of the body of man anatomised, was driven to acknowledge the Divine providence. Now what mixture of necessity with contingency did God affect in this? The fashioning of the body in the womb being merely an operation of nature, not of any free agent. Yet even this necessary operation of nature is contingent I confess unto God; for as much as he could either suspend the course of nature, or after it, or set an end unto it. So on the contrary the most free actions of men do of necessity come to pass in their kind and after their manner, as well as works of nature in their kind and after their manner. For to abstain from the breaking of Christ's bones was a free action of the Soldiers; so was josiahs' action in burning the Priest's bones upon the Altar; so was Cyrus his action in restoring the jews unto their country; so was the crucifying of Christ jesus, and other foul actions committed against him by jews and Gentiles, yet were all these decreed and determined by God, as the Scriptures plainly testify; and therefore as yourself acknowledge, of necessity they come to pass. Yet how God doth moderate the thoughts of men and Angels, you are not over hasty to communicate unto us. Solomon speaks plainly when he saith, The hearts of the Kings are in the hands of God, and he turneth them, etc. and both the preparations of the heart, and 
Prov. 21. 1 Prov. 16. 1 Prov. 29. 26.  answer of the tongue are from the Lord: and that many seek the face of the Ruler, but every man's judgement cometh of the Lord. But in what sense you say God moderates men's thoughts, and ordains them for the accomplishment of his glory, you do not love to discover: and I doubt all this will desinere in piscem in the end, and come to nothing. But although the means which man may use may be successively infinite, yet the ends (you say) which God doth forecast in their creation shall by any course which they take be inevitablely brought to pass; what these ends are which God did forecast in their creation, you come very soberly to express, or rather leave to the Reader to collect out of these words, the award of every thought is determined by God's eternal decree, that is to bring you to plain terms either Salvation or Damnation. These than are the ways whereby they shall accomplish God's glory in the end, what course soever they take; And herein consists the infinite wisdom of God.  
Now let us examine the sobriety of all this. First you told us of courses infinite, by which notwithstanding all theyre varieties and inconstancies, Gods ends should be accomplished. Now all these courses in reference unto the issue of damnation or salvation whereby God's glory shall be ●llostrated, (whereof you speak as of the end that shall be accomplished.) I say all these courses in reference hereunto are but two: good, and bade answerablely to Hercules his bivium, and Pythagoras his IN; according to that of Esay. Say ye surely it shall be well with the just, for they shall eat the fruit of theyre works; woe be to the wicked, it shall be evil with him, for the reward of his hands shall be given him. Esa. 3. 10. 11.  
Secondly, if this be all the fruit of God's wisdom, wherein doth this exceed the wisdom of every Magistrate; who ordeynes rewards for the good and punishment, for the wicked? Again what need is there of moderatinge men's thoughts unto this end; whereas though he never moderates any man's thoughts, yet his wisdom shall appear never a white the less in setting forth his glory in punishing the one and rewarding the other.  
Consider yet farther what I pray you, was the end of judas, which God did forecast in his creation? No doubt the setting forth of his own glory, but I desire to know whether he did intend to set it forth in judas his salvation, or damnation. So likewise I desire to know what end God did forecast of Paul the Apostle in his creation? his glory I doubt not, but whether in his salvation or damnation. It seems by the genius of your Tenet, that God did neither intend the salvation of the one, nor the damnation of the other in their creation; but indifferently intended each of them should be saved or damned accordingly as they departed this life, either in impenitency or in repentance. Now if God did not intend the salvation of Paul, nor the condemnation of judas at the time of their creation. I pray when did he begin to intend it? Say what you will, it followeth that these intentions of God were not eternal, and consequently neither the decrees of God are eternal; yet commonly you profess of God's decrees that they are eternal and everlasting. Yet here I confess you may play fast and loose, and say they are eternal so far forth as they are without end, but they are not eternal so far forth as to be without beginning. But what mean you so directly to contradict the word of God, as you do if this be your opinion? For the Apostle professeth that man's election was made before the foundation of the world: yea and touching the wicked, King Solomon professeth, that 
Pro. 16. 4.  God made him against the day of evil.  
As for the similitude, you use to represent unto us the wisdom of God by comparing of him unto a bird catcher, though you father it upon Austin, yet in this case it is nothing worth. For though it be more than humane after many birds formerly caught to catch them all again; yet for God it is nothing, who is everywhere, and in whom every thing hath that being, that life, that motion which they enjoy. The hairs of our head we know are numbered; and therefore nothing strange that our thoughts should be, considering that our thoughts shall come into judgement, but our hairs shall not. And if we shall give an account of every idle word, as 
Mat. 12. 26  our Saviour hath professed unto us, why not as well of every idle thought? He shall make the counsels of the heart manifest, 1 Cor. 4. 5. but that the award of every thought is defined by God, I cannot tell how to believe: my reason is, because evil thoughts are not fit to be rewarded; and as for the evil thoughts of God's children, shall not they be pardoned as well as their evil words and outward actions are, to wit, upon their repentance? For if we acknowledge our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, 1 joh. 1. 9 And Peter signified as much to Simon Magus conceiving evil thoughts also, when he said unto him, Repent of this thy wickedness, and pray unto God, that if it be possible the thought of thine heart might be forgiven thee, Act. 8. 22.  
8. Free it was for you to have done something the last year, which you did not, and every minute thereof, in case every minute thereof you were waking. For that a man hath free will in his sleep I never heard. But how thereby the whole frame of your cogitations or actions might have been altered, is a mystery unto me. Yet I doubt not but the whole frame of your cogitations and actions this year might have been altered. For actions free and contingent could not justly be accounted free and contingent, were they not accompanied with a possibility of being otherwise. And God you acknowledge to be the cause of this alteration, and of every thought and deed thus altered. So than if there had been another course of your thoughts and actions, God had been the cause of it, and of every thought and deed. What think you of that course which hath been of your thoughts and actions; is God the true and principal cause of this also, and of every thought and deed of yours this year? I see no reason to the conttary, but it stands you upon to justify this also, as well as the former; and as of yourself, so as concerning the actions of all o●her both men and Angels: and if for one year, why not for every year from the beginning unto this day? And so I see no colour of reason why you should not as freely acknowledge that all things are decreed by God; for if God hath decreed all the thoughts and actions of men, it will be no hard matter to grant that God hath decreed all things that in their times and seasons do successively come to pass. And if God be the true and principal cause of them, did he not decree that he would be the true and principal cause of them? that is, that he would in due time indeed and principally produce them, not withstanding all the evil that doth accompany them? For I do not think that you take upon you so much perfection as to avouch that amongst all your thoughts and actions for a year together, there was no evil thought, no evil action among them. For if you stand upon it that God cannot be the true and principal cause of any evil thought or action, we must not yield unto you that God was the true and principal cause of all the thoughts and actions that were conceived in you, or derived from you that year or years wherein you were hatching this book of yours, which I take to be a farthel of erroneous conceits both in Philosophy and Divinity.  
Neither if you did maintain that God is the true and principal cause of every free action, would we object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours; for there is no colour for any such objection; there is colour for the contrary, as namely, if he be the principal cause, than his will doth not depend on mine, but rather mine on his: and consequently our liberty seems to be infringed by making God the principal cause of all our actions. Yet you take no notice of this objection, (much less take pains to answer it) but go on desperately (in show and that against your own tenet) to maintain, that our will is necessarily subject unto his. But whether you mean in producing thoughts & actions, (which alone is to the purpose) or in some other sense and respect you betray not.  
Yet by the way what mean you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps thereby, we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angel he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needs no other cause or means to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) man's will doth incline, God's decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evil that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that God is the true and principal cause of every action, and deed that hath passed from you this year, like as he had been the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had been altered.  
The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto God's will, which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion. I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherein you pretend to give a reason of the former. But this performs nothing less. If you had done something the last year which you did not as you might, than the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this year had been altered, and God had been the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therein. And the reason is this, For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed, a determinate end. But I pray you consider, are the thoughts and actions of men this year the proportioned end of something that you did the last year? Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last year? Many man the last year was an opposite unto goodness, he is reform this year and become a proselyte. Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sin? The last year many a man was a formal professor; this year it may be he is turned Papist, or Turk, is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent? Yet many continue formal professors still, without any such alteration; some have changed their formality into reality. It may be some man the last year hath satisfied another's silthy lust, and this year is advanced by it.  
Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God? Some have prospered by empoisoning of others and proceeded in their sinful courses so much the more, without control. In a word by the last Clause it appears that by proportionate end, & correspondent consequents, you mean only the good and evil, that do befall men according to their former works, according to that God will reward every man according to his works. But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Author of every thought and action of man this year, which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last year; and God to be the true and principal cause of every one of those thoughts, and actions. For what? Are men's thoughts and actions this year, the rewards and punishments of the same men's actions the other year? What a ridiculous conceit in this? Well; still we hold you engaged to maintain, that, which you have plainly avouched, namely that God is the true and principal cause of every action, and thought of man for a year together, yea and of every thought and action of yours for the year past; which you have delivered without any explication. I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse, in general. In particular consider further: you say that man's will is necessarily subject unto God; this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the sentence before going; but you understand it in respect of rewards or punishments succeeding, proportionably unto former actions whether good, or bad. But by your leave it is not man's will, but his person rather that herein is necessarily subject unto God. For no wise man useth to say that man's will is rewarded or punished, but his person rather. Again, suppose God decreeth not the actions of men, but the rewards of them, yet you have not explicated how in this case God's will depends not upon the will of man, the true explication whereof that I know is only this; that the execution of his will may depend upon man's will to wit in rewarding, or punishing, but not the will of God himself: Yet if good or evil actions of men be foreseen by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish; neither have you offered to clear Gods will in this case from dependence upon the will of man, neither are you able to perform it. Again it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible. For many cogitations are possible which shall never be; And it is absurd to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never be. Again by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent, you understand rewards, or punishments; But it is false to say that God hath ordained to every cogitation a reward or punishment. For to the evil thoughts and words, and deeds of God's children he hath ordained neither reward nor punishment to befall them, but his purpose is to pardon them.  
Again punishments for the sins of men are many times inflicted by the sins of men; So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel, was slain by the sword of his own children; David's adultery was punished by the filthy actions of his own Son Absalon deflowering his father's Concubines.  
If these were proportionate ends to former sins, and correspondent consequents, and everlastingly decreed by God, what hindereth but that in your opinion, actions notoriously sinful may be said to be decreed by God? You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends, needsno other cause or means but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act: Which is plain gibberish; you instance in nothing for illustration sake, not as if your discourse were so plain that it needed it not, but rather it is so unsound, that you might well fear it: And darkness is fittest for them that hate the light: I will give instance for you; Absalon's deflowering his father's Concubines was a disproportionate end, and correspondent consequent to David's defiling his neighbour's wife; for God punished David hereby; and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absalon Inserviit castigand● 
Exam. praedest. Perk. p. 162.  Davidi: Now this fact of Absalon by your doctrine in this place, needed no other cause or means to produce it, but only the reducing of possibility (granted by God's decree) into act. Now what possibility do you mean? the possibility of David's defiling Bethsheba? It is manifestly untrue: first in general, that to produce a reward, and punishment, no cause is required but the producing of the fact, which is to be rewarded or punished, Consequents natural follow I confess upon antecedents natural, but it is not so with consequents moral, such as are rewards and punishments. And in particular the case is clear, that something else was required to Absalon's defiling david's Concubines, than David's defiling of Bethsheba. For both the counsel of Achitophel, and Absalon's corruption in yielding thereto, and the punishing hand of God herein, were found in this; and none of all these was found in David's sin.  
Or do you mean this of the possibility of Absalon's sinning as he did? so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absalon's reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act. Now this I confess is a truth, but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himself to the grave profession of it, though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein▪ For 'tis as much as to say, that to defile David's Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them; for this is to reduce possibility granted (as you say) by God's decree into act, and that is enough. But by your leave, it is not enough to salve your credit, to say that a possibility hereof was granted by God's decree. For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to every cogitation, but a proportionate end, and correspondent consequent. And therefore if the defiling of David's concubines by Absalon, was a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to David's former cogitations and actions, then by your doctrine this deiling of David's concubines by Absalon his son, was everlastingly decreed by God, and not the possibility of it. And how absurd a thing it is to say, that God decreed the possibility of any thing, whereas all contingent things are possible in their own nature without the decree of God, as the whole world was possible, and that not by the decree of God? But it seems you have reference to the possibility, not of the punishment, but of the time, for which correspondent punishment is decreed, as appears by that which follows: as when you say, Did we that which we do not, but might do, many things would immediately follow, which now do not: which though it be granted you, yet herehence it would not follow, that No other cause should be required to the producing of them, than our producing of the antecedent. But by this you justify that upon David's adultery, Absalon his defiling David's concubines; and upon Sennacheribs' blasphemy against the God of Israel; Ad●amelech and Sharezar his sons slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god, did inevitably follow. For these things did befall them, and those things which do befall you and us do come to pass, as you profess in the next place, though not as absolutely decreed by God, and in the first place, yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which he knew he would do. By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absalon defiling his fathes concubines in special, and all the sins of man whereby God doth punish former sins in general, are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God kn●w would be done.  
Now let us examine this a little further. You speak indifferently of good and evil that doth befall men; And these indifferently you profess to be ordained by God upon the foresight of some thing in man; So then like as the damnation of any man is ordained by God not absolutely, and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evil thing in the person damned; so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God, and in the first place, but upon the fore sight of some good in the person, saved or to be saved, which good must be either faith or good works or both; or which is worst of all some thing which is less evil (as suppose natural humility) in the state of nature. Yet you will not seem to be an abetter of their opinion, that maintain election to be upon the foresight of faith or works.  
Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also. God foreseeing some evil in man (say you) doth purpose to condemn him: Now because like as no evil can exist without God's permission; so God could not foresee evil but upon presupposal of his purpose to permit it, it followeth that the decree to permit sin, is before the decree of God to damn for sin, therefore permission of sin is in God's intention before damnation, and consequently it must be after it, in execution, as much as to say; God doth first damn men for sin, and afterwards permit them to sin. Hereupon you will reflect upon us with an interrogatory saying; Will you maintain that God did first decree to damn men for sin, and secondly to permit them to sin? I answer; If I did maintain this, I should look to be confuted by reason, and not to be cried down without reason, or contrary to all reason. Nay I had rather maintain an harsh opinion according unto reason, than a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason.  
Secondly, I answer by negation; For I do not maintain either of these to be subordinate unto other in God's intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these things decreed is the end of the other, but both jointly make up an integral means tending to the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sin, and of inferring damnation for sin. Now let us proceed to that which follows. It is absurd to say we have a possibility to do what we do not; but rather you should say we have an ability to do what we do not. For possibility is of a passive signification, not active: And ability to obey God, I confess we had in Adam, and in Adam we have lost it. That which you call the absolute necessity of God's decres, is not in respect of God's act in 〈◊〉. For his decrees are most free, but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of God's decree. So then things freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to pass. Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike (you say) from the absolute necessity of God's decree. Now because your present discourse is not of God's power, but of his wisdom that you might not seem beside the text, you tell us in the close, that herein is seen Gods incomprehensible wisdom, that nothing falls out without the circumference of it; whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed, it is rather the fruit of his power then his wisdom. And if you refer it to God's knowledge, yet it is no part of God, wisdom. For what wisdom is it to know what he hath decreed, or what he meaneth to bring to pass, whereas any man though simple may know what himself meaneth to do? But to know what is fit to be done for the setting forth of his own glory, and to direct all things most conventently hereunto, herein consists the wisdom of God. You content not yourself with ascribing, a Circumference unto God's wisdom, within which all things fall out, but you call it actual, also as if there were two sorts of circumferences, the one potential, the other actual.  
9 It seems you do not please yourself so well in this Argument of God's infinite wisdom, as in the former; neither is it your happiness to light upon such acquaint strains of invention, and expression here, as in the point of God's immensity, and eternity: It may be the matter will not afford it; For if it did, why should not you that seek after it, be acquainted With it as soon as another? Therefore, I guess, it is that you break forth into such a profession: the Christian writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speak more consequently to what they rightly conceive concerning other branches of divine absolute infiniteness, then concerning his infinite knowledge. And because you are bold by a confident supposition to put this out of question, (whereas yet I know no reason, save that you find no place in this argument for such chimaerical fictions as you vented in other points, especially in the point of God's immensity and eternity) you take upon you to give certain reasons hereof. Now because to my understanding God's immensity and eternity are far more obscure to treat of then God's wisdom, I am very willing to weigh well the weight of these your reasons. They are in number two. The first is this: All creatures are participant of Gods other attributes besides his wisdom and knowledge; but of his knowledge and wisdom men and Angels are of all his creatures the only participants: and those rules are always the most clear and certain, and most easily gathered, which are gathered from an uniform idenditie of particulars in variety of subjects: Those universal rules are hardly gathered, or are less certain, which can be experienced only in some one or sewer subjects. In this argument there is little or nothing sound. For (as touching the main) though creatures inferior unto man do not work by wisdom and knowledge of their own, yet the wisdom of God appears no less in their works then in the works of man, even to the admiration of man himself.  
What art, what industry is found in the little Bee in the gathering of his wax, in the fashioning of his combs, in the gathering of honey of diverse sorts, every one following and plying his proper and peculiar flower, and afterwards tempering it, the liquid stuff brought in their bottles, with the grosser stuff brought upon their thighs, and bringing it to that perfection which we see and use both for dainty food, and wholesome physic: then their government under one King as the Ancients conceived, but indeed under one Queen rather, as later writers even of these days have elegantly observed, and the exquisite manner of a common wealth among them. Is not the wisdom of God observable in this? And as it was said of such as suddenly became Prophets, But who is 
1 Sam. 10. 12.  their father? so may we ask concerning these, Who is their father, or who their Schoolmaster that instructed them, and bred them up in this occupation? I say the wisdom of God doth appear more in these then in the actions of men. For we know by what means men usually attain to wisdom, as namely, by instruction and by observation, but no such thing to be found in Bees; therefore this wonderful work being a work of nature, must necessarily be ascribed to the God of nature. But suppose the wisdom of God were to be observed no where but in the actions of men, is not the world of men sufficient to afford particulars sufficient for induction thereupon to conclude general rules?  
The wisdom of Arts and liberal professions are grown now adays to great perfection, and all these what are they but the searching out, and by searching the discovery of the wisdom of God, even in those creatures which are not participants of the wisdom and knowledge of God?  
The science of Astronomy, how hath it displayed unto the world the wisdom of God in the various motions of the heavens? and still they are searching, as having not yet attained to the full discovery thereof. So likewise the natural Philosopher in searching out the nature of the whole world; what is this but an inquiry after the wisdom of God in the whole and parts of this Universe? and albeit still there is enough to be discovered, yet that which is discovered, is it not sufficient to draw us to adore the wisdom of God, and that so much the more, because that though God hath set the 
Eccles. 3.  world in man's heart, yet can he not find out the works that he hath wrought from the beginning to the end?  
The Physician, what d●vine wisdom doth he find in the contexture of the body of man? Was not Galen hereupon driven to acknowledge a divine providence? Then in searching after the nature of Herbs and other simples, and considering the power and virtuous operation of them, both of each apart, and of severals together in composition fitting for the cure of every malady and disease of the body of man: what report can they make unto us of the wisdom of God even in those things which are not participants of the wisdom and knowledge of God? But come we to Arts manual, of man's invention, and wherein indeed we are more apt to derogate from God, then to give him the glory of them; yet both from the wisdom of man we may the better ascend to the contemplation of the wisdom of God, and also the wisdom of man is from God, who as we are taught instructeth all, as well the mean husbandman, Esay 28. 26. as the most curious artificer, Exod. 31. In the Turkish History I read of a present sent to the Grand Signior Achmat that Turkish Emperor; all the particulars (save three Birds of Paradise of rare and precious plumes, wonderful goodly to behold, and valued at 800. pound sterling,) were handicrafts work, as namely, two vessels of Crystal, wonderful rich and beautiful: four other vessels made of fishes bones, whereas the art seemed miraculous in the graving: forty pieces of cloth of gold of divers colours; five pieces of silk; five of Damask; five of silk watered and five plain; A staff of an Elephant's tooth graven with admirable industry; A Parrot set in a cage of Crystal so artificially done as no man could discern the entry; And many fair and rich table clothes of Holland cloth most part powdered with flowers to the life, and wrought in their lively colours. The which (it is said) the Sultan did accept with admiration. The Author adds in the close: All these things show sufficiently that the Estates from the beginning, or soon after have raised handy works as well as traffic and navigation to the highest point of perfection. This calls to my remembrance the rich presents, which the same Estates presented the Lady Elisabeth in her entertainment at the Hage, in her way out of England, unto the Palatinate being most of curious handicraft. First a Carcanet enriched with 36. Diamonds all of facet stones. 2. Two great hanging pearls weighing 35. Carals, and one grain. 3. A chain of pearls of 52. pieces, oriental water. 4. A gold needle enriched with a great Diamand, in form of a table, having 4. Diamonds round about, whereof the three out hanging were facet stones. All this laid in a little trunk of cloth of gold, betwixt a perfumed cushion. 5. A great looking glass enclosed in a silver quilted brim enriched with fair inlaid works. 6. Ten pieces of Tapestry of Francis Spierick, whereof two pieces were to be sent after unto her highness. 7. Six pieces moreover of Tapestry for a Cabinet of the same Master, whereof two were to be sent after to her highness. 8. Divers sorts of linen Damas' works pacted up in cases, rated numero. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. according to the works laid in every case. 9 Works of Spanish wax made according to the fashion of the East-Indies, whereof were divers particulars. 1. A cover of a bed standing on 4. pillars not plain but round. 2. A Cupboard. 3. A Table. 4. Two great trunks, 5. A middle trunk. 6. Five little trunks. 7. Two casket standishes. 8. Four and twenty middle dishes. 9 Nine and twenty little dishes. 10. Twelve fruit dishes. 11. Six Saucers. But come we from the wisdom of Manual arts, to wisdom moral and political. David was wise as an Angel of God. 2. Sam. 14. 17. Yet he feared the wisdom of Achitophel, whose counsel was accounted as an Oracle of God in those days. 2. Sam. 16. 23. And David prayed unto God to turn his counsel into foolishness, and the Lord heard him, and showed his wonderful wisdom in making that counsel of Achitophel, (which had soon dispatched David if it had been followed) seem foolishness in the judgement of Absalon, by the means of Hushai sent only to cross Achitophel. Yet Solomon was wiser than they both, and it was God that gave him a large heart, like unto the sand of the Sea shore; So that his wisdom excelled all the wisdom of the children of the East, and all the wisdom of Egypt. Wise heads there were, many it seems in those days both in Egypt, and in the East, yet Solomon was wiser than they all; And the Queen of the South came from the uttermost part of the earth to hear the wisdom of King Solomon. Since there have been men famous in this kind, that have boasted. 
Consilijs nostris laus est attonsa Laconum.   
Tiberius' his governments had it been matched with as much honesty as wisdom it had been admirable. It was wont to be said that the French got more upon us by parle then by the sword: Yet Henry the IV, of France was wont to say, he feared but two men in the World, and that was for their wits; the one was (as he called him) the fox of the mountains; the other was the lack an apes of the Iles. Yet some say the Spaniards herein outreach the French, and the Italian the Spaniards. And that of all the Italians the Florentines have been most cunning; and of all the Florentines the house de Medici's. And indeed Laurentius de Medici's was accounted the chiefest ballancer of States in his time, if News from Parnassus speak true. But the world of men (as you complain) are not sufficient to give precedents of wisdom fit to raise us to the contemplation of the infinite wisdom of God. Yet if you were acquainted with all the wisdom of the world, you might find matter enough of admiration thereat, and of adoration of the wisdom of God, that goeth infinitely beyond it.  
But whereas you say that all creatures are participants of Gods other attributes, in as much as they have some being, some power, some duration, some quantity; and therefore the knowledge of them confers something to the knowledge of those attributes of God. Neither the antecedent is true, nor the consequent sound. For what doth the quantity of a gnat confer to the knowledge of God's immensity? or what doth the duration of creatures that live but a day or a year confer to the knowledge of God's eternity? or the b●ting of a flea, to the discerning of the power of God? Again, the antecedent is st●●ke false. No creature that hath quantity is partaker of God's immensity. For the quantity of a creature is quantitas ●●lis▪ quantity of extension; but God's quantity is quantitas virtutis, quantity of spiritual and immaterial perfection, and it is impossible that one should be a part of the other: nay Gods immensity hath no parts, so neither hath his eternity, nor his almighty power, and therefore no creature can partake of any of these. It is true, God produceth the being, and maintaineth the duration of all things, but it is not by his essence he produceth their being, nor by his eternity he maintaineth their duration, but all is done by the power and counsel of his will.  
We come to your second reason; Why we cannot conceive and speak so right concerning God's knowledge, as concerning other attributes, and that is, say you, because we want fit terms to express it. But how do you prove that we have more fit terms to express Gods other attributes than this? you do not once go about to prove this; the instance you give is in the prescience of God, concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can be attributed unto God; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknown, and unto God nothing is future, but all things present. And for the same reason Austin (you say) would have God's knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science than prescience, seeing all things are present unto God. Now if this change of terms will serve the turn to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of God's knowledge, what cause is there to complain of the unfitness of terms, when as with so little ado the unfitness we speak of, may be corrected? It is like enough upon such conceits as these, some have entertained an opinion that all things are actually existent in eternity, not only things present, but things passed also still are, and things future already are existent in eternity: and you yourself also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity: The more I wonder to read you except against this doctrine of Gregory's and Austin's, as neither clear, nor accurate enough: And here first you tell us that we may not say, nor did Saint Austin, or Saint Gregory think that God doth not, or cannot know a distinction between times past, present, or to come. Neither indeed do I see any colour why any man should entertain a conceit of any such meaning of Austin or Gregory; neither do they deny that God knows all these things and consequently the differences of them, one from another; Only Gregory makes a doubt how the knowledge of future things in God should be called prescience. And Austin (as you say) had rather call it Science. But than you demand how it is said by Gregory that nothing to him is future, nothing past. Yourself have heretofore laid down that which may answer this; as when you said all things are coexistent in eternity, but not in time: And therefore God may know things to be so differenced in respect of such a course of eternity. In a word, that God knows the things that are past, present and to come, so called in respect of man who is measured with time, but not so called in respect of God who is measured with eternity. But though they are altogether present unto God, yet it follows not herhence that they are all one (as you infer) much less that they are so in respect of Gods eternal knowledge, as if God's knowledge did make them one, which in themselves and in their own natures are not. As God himself, so his knowledge is before all worlds, as worlds do exist in time. But you may remember what you have formerly maintained, that both all worlds which have an existence successively in time, and time itself is actually existent in eternity, and so not only present in respect of God's knowledge of them which ever was, but also in respect of their own existence (as you have accounted it) in eternity, which Aquinas makes the ground of God's knowledge of them. Then you dispute, and prove that foreknowledge is to be attributed unto God; because he forknowes them before they are, which is as much as to say, while they are yet to come. To this I answer out of your own doctrine thus; albeit God's knowledge be before them, yet if the same also be to come, and that as much after them as before them, what reason, why it should be called foreknowledge, rather than together knowledge, or after knowledge.  
But what knowledge soever we attribute to God, it can no more be said to be passed, than to come according to your doctrine pag. 77. your words are these. Whatsoever can be more properly said or conceived to be past than to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable, can have no property of eternity. And in very truth God's knowledge is not altered, but one and the same knowledge it is which God hath of things without him, before they were, when they are, and after they were. In the things themselves an alteration is found, but not in God's knowledge of them: And therefore the knowing of all things that are, were, and are to come is commonly called Scientia visionis, in distinction from Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae, whereby God knows all necessary truths, and all things possible.  
Your conclusion is, that God foreknows, and Man foreknows but with a difference, such as, you say, is oftentimes not well expressed by Teachers, nor duly considered by Readers; the identity of the word whereby we express both God's foreknowledge, and man's foreknowledge making us apt to confound the different meaning of them. Which confusion of things arising from communion of the same term, you say is a fertile nursery of many errors in this Argument. And is it not, I pray, as well in other Arguments as in this? But I bear with you, for if you had professed so much, you had utterly broken the neck of your second Argument. Yet we are like to be beholding to you in good time. For the displanting of these errors. For you promise to endeavour this, and therein to imitate Heralds, who give the same Coat to divers parties, but always which a difference.  
Thùs we have gained a flourish of allusion unto the pracctise of Heralds, and with this Kickeshewes we must be merry till more substantial provision cometh. As for my opinion, I acknowledge no existence of things in eternity, nor coexistence with eternity until the time of their actual production cometh. And so accordingly their coexistence with eternity first was to come, then is, afterwards is past, and ceaseth to be; and so accordingly foreknowledge, coknowledge, and afterknowledge of the same things may be attributed to God, all which are external denominatives attributed unto the knowledge of God, from the various condition of things known by him, who looks not out of himself for the knowing of any thing. For how could he, before any thing was? yet than he knew all things that were to come, as well as now he doth, yet without any change: For with him is no variableness, nor shadow of change. 
jam. 1.   
10. Here you enter upon the explication of the difference between man's knowledge and Gods. Our knowledge (say you) of things to come is many ways imperfect (and foreknowledge only) because the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of ourselves as yet can reach unto that point of time wherein things so known get first existence. No soundness of truth in all this.  
For first our foreknowledge of things to come, is not foreknowledge only, save so long as the things themselves are to come; but when they come, we know them never a whit the less, and after they are gone and passed. As the Eclipse of the Sun and Moon is known by us before it comes, when it comes, and after it is past. It is true, before they come, the knowledge of things is only foreknowledge, and not in man only, but God also. When they do coexist with God, than God's knowledge is no longer foreknowledge, but till they do coexist with God, his knowledge of them is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for than they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. For if they did coexist with God, than they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. Much less is it after them. For if so, than their coexistence with God were passed, but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once be both past, and also to come. And as for the duration of our knowledge, whereas you say it doth not reach to the things that are to come; I say neither doth the duration of God's knowledge reach thither. For if the duration of God's knowledge did reach unto things to come, than God's knowledge should in this present coexist with things to come, which is untrue. For if God's knowledge did coexist with things to come, at this present, than things to come at this present should co●exist with the knowledge of God, and consequently they should exist, that is, they should be present, and not to come. It is no way required to knowledge to coexist with things known. In like sort neither doth God's duration at this present reach unto things to come any more than ours. For if God did at this present coexist with things to come, then at this present things to come should coexist with God; for coexistence includes existence on both sides. But things to come do not at this present coexist with God, for if they did coexist, than they should exist, and consequently they should be said to be present, and not to come. And in a word, to maintain that God coexists with all things to come, is to maintain by just consequence, that the world did exist from all eternity. It is true, God shall coexist with things to come, because his years cannot fail, they endure for ever: but our years and days are as swift as a post, in comparison. But this makes no difference in the point of foreknowledge. But with such like wild conceits of yours as touching God's eternity, we are now reasonably well acquainted, they do so much the less move us, or trouble us. We have continuance of being for a time, God hath continuance of being for ever. God hath the continuance of his being from none, we have the continuance of our being from God. But as God by continuing doth not get continuance of being, so neither do we. Only we have it so, as that God coulds●t an end to it every day and hour; but it is impossible any end should be set to the continuance of Gods being, because he is of necessary being. But this is it that deceiveth you; we get many things by continuance, as growth and strength of body, increase of knowledge, and grace, and this maketh you affirm that we get continuance. Whereas indeed we get not continuance, but we get something else by continuing. Yet we may continue the same that we were; sure I am we shall so continue in the world to come.  
Sometimes again we lose by continuance both health and strength, and memory, and so grow towards our graves; and this is Alteration, so that we are still in motion. But God gets nothing by continuance, for there is no motion, no change in God. And where motion and change is not, there time is not, but either Aevum or Eternity. It is true, contingent things are not foreknown by us; and herein is a great difference between God's foreknowledge and ours. But this is a material difference only, but now we dispute of the form of foreknowledge, whereof hitherto you have showed no sound difference. No question but God precisely knows future contingents, we do not; And it is as true, that this is just nothing to the present purpose. Yet now you are fallen upon it, we must give due regard to your carriage in this. Of the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents questions, have been ventilated amongst Schoole-divines for many hundred years' continuance.  
The most flourishing opinion at this day, and wherein the Sects in other points very opposite of Scotists and Thomists do agree, is, that God foreknows them by seeing the determination of his own will, touching their coming to pass; this you invade both elsewhere and here; how well and scholastically you have carried yourself herein heretofore we have considered; now what else you have to vent against this tenant, we are ready to entertain as it shall deserve.  
But in the first place you fall upon it to my judgement very indecently, as when you say: If we shall mould the manner of God's foreknowglede of things future in our own conceit or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneously collect, that seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents so neither could they be infallibly foreknown by God, if to him or in respect of his decree they were contingent, and not necessarily predetermined. For first the question only was, whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God in respect of things to come. Now I see no reason but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man; which question is only about the formal denomination of it, not at all as touching the extent of God's foreknowledge in comparison unto man's foreknowledge, or in respect of the ground of it.  
Secondly, the comparison made by you hath no congruity in the members of it. For the first member is proposed absolutely, the second conditionally; whereas in reason, either both should be proposed absolutely thus. Seing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents, so neither could they be infallibly foreseen by God: which is so absurd an Argument, that any sober man might be ashamed to obtrude upon any adversary. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
If I would feign, I would feign things probable at the least. Or both should run conditionally, thus: Seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents, if in respect of our decree they be contingents, and not necessarily determined, so neither can they be infallibly foreknown by God, if to him, or in respect of his decree they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined. Yet if the comparison had run thus, it load been incongruous enough; For Man's foreknowledge is not usually accounted in respect of things determinable by his will, Sometime it may be, as I remember Erastus observes that Bellantius Senensis prophesied of Savanarola his death, but it was after notice was taken of him at Rome, as of an Heretic. So likewise I have read that the fruits of the Gunpowder Treason was prophesied of in a certain Liturgy, then of purpose prescribed for the use of Papists, but it was after those English boute-feux were known to have been engaged in that conspiracy.  
But usually man's foreknowledge of things to come is accounted in respect of things natural, and such as are out of the power of the determination of his own will. And as for such things as are subject to his will, it is an undoubted truth, that he cannot infallibly foreknow such things upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them; and that for two reasons. First, because his will is mutable from within. Secondly, because his power is resistible from without. But give we you leave to proceed.  
In the next place you tell us, That some push our proneness to this error forward, by another, not distinguishing between contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in itself uncertain, cannot certainly be known. Every future contingent is in itself uncertain, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be known. Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindereth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, laid in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you address yourself to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty, one formally relative, another only denominative or fundamental. And, as if these terms needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; That which is relatively uncertain, cannot be certainly known, for so it should be certain to him, to whom it is uncertain: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it. By relative uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertain, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certain knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and indenticall, as if it were expressed thus; That which cennot certainly be known, cannot certainly be known: And they undoubtedly are very prone to error, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae, & certitudo rei scitae, or scibilis; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speak of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamental uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing itself, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the Medius terminus man feasts its own meaning to be of fundamental uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: That which is uncertain in itself cannot be certainly known. Now that which is uncertain in itself, is not relatively uncertain, but rather absolutely. For whereas the most certain thing that is may be relatively uncertain, that is uncertain unto some; yet this shall never be called uncertain in itself.  
So then the syllogism corruptly interpreted by you, and the truth of it obscured by a preposterous distinction, take it in its proper vigour and force, is thus; That which in itself hath no foundation of certainty, cannot be certainly known. But every future contingent hath in itself no foundation of certainty: therefore it cannot certainly be known. Therefore if you will answer aright, show what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents, if you please to deny the Minor; or if you please to deny the Major, profess your mind plainly, and say, that That which hath no foundation of certainty in itself, may nevertheless be certainly known, which indeed is your course. For you profess plainly, that future contingents cannot be certainly known, of a sinite and imperfect knowledge, but they may be known by an infinite knowledge; such as is the knowledge of God.  
And thus you might have answered the former syllogism plainly, without the help of your former distinction, in this manner: That which is in itself uncertain, cannot be certainly known. It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: That which is uncertain in itself, cannot be certainly known by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly known by knowledge infallible: which were as much as to says It cannot be certainly known by knowledge that may err in knowing it, but it may be certainly known by knowledge that cannot err in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turn neither; For, though God's knowledge be infallible, yet it will not follow that God knows this infallibility; because, though he infallibly knows whatsoever he knows, yet perhaps this is a thing not knowable at all. for to know that such a thing certainly shall be, which in its own nature is no more certain to be than not to be, is not to know, but rather to err: and so the argument still holds good, ' and no way ' answered by you, but boldly outfaced by a mere begging of that which is in question. Yet nothing possible shall be uncertain unto God, for he knows it to be possible, and that most certainly. But with what colour can you infer, that because it is possible to be, therefore God most certainly knows that it shall be? For, consider, is it not as well possible not to be? and may not I by the same liberty of argumentation, which you usurp unto yourself, conclude, therefore God most certainly knows that it shall not be? In a word, things must be to come, before they can be known to be to come. But seeing future contingents are in their own nature only possible, and indifferent to be to come, or not to come; I pray consider by what activity or operation, they have passed from the condition of things possible, to the condition of things future? for if they have not passed into this condition, they are not as yet knowable to be future; and no infallibility of knowledge can make the knowledge extend to the comprehending of such things as are not knowable. Possible they are, and are most certainly known of God that they are possible. But as yet future they are not, (unless by some alteration they have been translated from the condition of things merely possible to the condition of things future, which it stands you upon to show, if you maintain it,) therefore as yet they are not knowable to be future.  
That which you add concerning the nature of God's knowledge, as being without succession, is nothing to the purpose. For though our knowledge be subject to succession, yet this nothing hindereth us from foreknowing things to come, so they be knowable, whether by natural reason, or by divine revelation. On the other side, though God's knowledge be not capable of succession, yet things not knowable he cannot know; things impossible he cannot know to be possible, and things which are only possible, and not future he cannot know to be future. And such a manner of knowledge, is no knowledge indeed, but error rather.  
And as for your terms of interposed, and expiring acts, and interminable knowledge; well they may serve to conjure your Reader from understanding you, but they have no force either of illustration, or probation of aught. In the close you acquaint us with a 
* See Rogers upon the Articles or the Church of England. the 17. Art.  new mystery, as if God's knowledge were like the suspending of a man's judgement, for as much as the act of knowledge in God doth not expire. A vile conceit and ridiculous, were it not concerning the nature of God. For what? because God's knowledge and judgement doth not expire, but continueth without alteration, shall he therefore be said to suspend his judgement? Belike Daniel was cast into the Lion's den not by judgement, but by suspension of judgement; For the Laws of the Medes and Persians were unalterable.  
So likewise the judgement, and counsel, and purpose of God, concerning the salvation of his elect, because it continueth without expiration, therefore it is suspended. In the same proportion of piety you say our ignorance resembles God's knowledge best, as heretofore you professed, that In respect of immensity and eternity, nothing was so like to God as nothing. But it may be joverlash, and upon better consideration, The imperfection of our knowledge or judgement while it is in suspense is rather ignorance, (you say) than Error. And this imperfection taken away it shall better resemble divine knowledge, than our actual resolutions and determinations do. But then, I pray, what is this that shall resemble the divine knowledge? is it our knowledge while it is in suspense? why, but if I am in suspense, how am I said to know? O, but you will have this imperfection taken away, but then I say, if the suspension be taken away, how shall it be in suspense, which you suppose? Again, how can suspension of judgement be taken away, but by resolution this way or that way? but this you deny to be that which resembles divine knowledge.  
The truth is, the sentence is so perplex, that I can divise no issue out of it. Yet I have reason to conceive that your opinion is, that ignorance best resembles the knowledge of God. For the comparison is between resolution and the opposite thereunto? and you plainly signify that the opposite to resolution doth better resemble God's knowledge, than resolution. Now what is opposite to resolution but suspension of judgement; and this suspension of judgement you plainly profess is to be called ignorance, rather than error. Wherefore ignorance consisting in suspension of judgement by your doctrine in this place, doth better resemble the wisdom of God than our actual resolutions and determinations do; yet out actual resolutions and determinations may be sound both in knowledge natural, and knowledge Theological, whereas ignorance or suspension of judgement is no knowledge at all. Only whereas you positively affirm, that Without the interposition of some determining or expiring acts there can be no error, I understand that plainly to be a notorious untruth. For determining or expiring acts are no more required unto error, than unto truth.  
And if a man continue, as many do, to their lives end in Popery, in Mahumetisme, in Heathenism, their errors are never a whit the less.  
It is true indeed that we can understand but one thing at once, and therefore the consideration of one thing must expire before we can pass to the consideration of another. This is the condition of Man's knowledge in general, not of an erroneous apprehension in special.  
11. What you discourse of knowledge conjectural which man may have of things contingent, cannot have of things casual, I leave it as I find it, I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents, and this you say is because our essence, and knowledge are but finite; so that things contingent are not so contained in us, that if we could perfectly know ourselves we might perfectly know them; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure, without affording one mite of reason, for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this. As finite as our knowledge is, we know contingents to be contingents. But to know that a thing merely contingent which denomination includes only a possibility of coming to pass, or not coming to pass, I say to know that such a thing shall come to pass, exceeds the reach of knowledge infinite. For infinite knowledge doth extend no farther than to things knowable. But, for a contingent, which both in his own nature, and from without doth yet continue indifferent to be or not to be, is not a thing, at all knowable, that it shall come to pass. For it must be a thing future, before it can be known to be future. But the contingents, you speak of, are supposed both in their own nature to be only possible, that is indifferent to be or not be, and as yet determined by no outward agent to be. In which case they still continue under the condition of things n●eerly possible. And so far they are knowable, and no farther. And accordingly so far they are ind●ed known by God, by that knowledge which is commonly called Scientia simplicis intelligentiae. But the knowledge of things future is called Scientia visionis. And things merely possible, till some determination doth come unto them from without, are not as yet future, and consequently cannot be known, to be future, yet notwithstanding you are bold to say, that In the divine essence, all real effects, all events possible, whether necessary, casual or contingent, are eminently contained; The perfect knowledge of his own essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge, not only of all things, that have been, are, or shallbe, but of all things that might have been, or possibly may be. A most ridiculous amplification? For it is as much, as to say, that God knows not only all contingent truths, but all necessary truths also. As if it were a harder matter to know things necessary, than to know things contingent. Whereas it is in the power of the Creature to know things necessary, and perhaps all things that are of necessary truth; but to know those things whose existence is only of a contingent nature, that belongs only unto God.  
Now what is possible, and what is not, we have a general rule to know that, as namely, whatsoever implieth no contradiction is possible, that which doth imply contradiction is impossible. And were it a sober speech for a divine to affirm; that God not only knows all things that have been, are or shallbe, but also he knows what implies contradiction, & what doth not? you seem to fumble here at the novel doctrine of the Jesuits concerning God's foreknowledge of future contingents conditionate; and you do but fumble at it.  
Secondly you say that in the divine essence all real effects are contained eminently; Now heretofore you told us, that For all things to be in God, is no more than that he alone can produce them. Ch. 4. num. 2. If this be your meaning in this place, as it seems, when you say they are in him eminently, for so we say that heat is in the Sun eminently, for as much as he doth produce heat in bodies capable; Then, I say, we deny not but all real effects are in God.  
But how doth this agree with your tenet, seeing herhence it follows that God can produce any act of Man's freewill, any casual thing and if he can so do, what hind●h but that he could from everlasting decree to produce them? Yet not alone as formerly you have interpreted what it is for things to be in God. For it is impossible that God should produce the act of man's will without man. For if without man, than it is not the act of man's will, which is an immanente act of the will.  
Thirdly, it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of God's essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all things that have been, are, or shall be. It includes I confess the knowledge of all necessary truths, and of all things possible; but as for the knowledge of contingent truths, and of these to come, it includes not that; unless under the essence of God, you comprehend the will of God. And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truth's God knoweth by necessity of nature, but all contingent truths he knoweth by the determination of his own will; which indeed is a truth, but flat opposite to your opinion. But that things contingent cannot be known to be future, but upon the determination of God's will, I prove thus. Things cannot be known to be future until they are future; (for to apprehend or conceive things to be future, when they are not future, is not to know, but to err,) but contingent things, and only possible to be or not to be, do not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future. Therefore contingent things cannot be known to be future but upon the determination of God will.  
The minor I prove thus: Of their own nature they are not future, but only possible; and they cannot pass from the condition of things merely possible, to the condition of things future, without a cause from without. And no cause of this translation can be devised, but the will of God. Which I prove thus. If some other cause, then either without God, or within God; not without God, for these things were future from everlasting; but from everlasting there was no cause at all existent without God; Therefore the cause hereof, if any where to be found, must be found within God. We say it is his will; which if you deny, you must show what else can be the cause: you commonly flee to God's knowledge, and the infinity thereof, but in vain, for already they are supposed to be future before God knoweth them. And indeed it belongs to knowledge to know all things that are to come, not to make them to be to come.  
Fourthly, it is possible that Antichrist shall fall in the year 1630, it is possible that he should fall the year before, it is possible he should fall the year after: it was possible he should have fallen ten years ago; it is possible he should fall ten years hence: all these being real effects possible, must by your doctrine be found eminently in the divine essence, and God knowing his divine essence, must know them all, and not only that they are possible, but that they shall all come to pass: For in this sense you speak of God's knowledge of future contingents, namely, of knowing that they shall come to pass, and when they shall come to pass.  
Again, set we the fall of Antichrist at an hundred different points of time, whereof let us suppose one to be true, and the other false; yet all in their own nature alike possible: why should the fall of Antichrist in the true point of time be included in God's essence more than the other, all being alike possible; and that very instant wherein the fall of Antichrist shall be, it being as possible that it should not be, and that possibility also being included in the essence of God, as well as any other? Perhaps you will say that this being a truth is included in the essence of God, and not the others, being untruths. But then I demand how this became to be a truth, that Antichrist should fall at such a time, rather than at another, it being as possible to fall out at any other time as at this, and as possible not to fall out at this time as at any other, and all these possibilities equally included in the essence of God I say again, how came this to be a truth, answer me, not of its own nature, for the contrary hereunto is supposed on both sides, namely, that of his own nature it was only possible: therefore you must assign some cause from without; and because you like not to acknowledge the determination of Gods will to be the cause hereof, you must allege some other cause. I see you usually fly to the infinity of God's knowledge, but in vain; for God's knowledge is to know truths, and not to make them.  
Lastly, by this doctrine of yours it will follow that God knew the world would be made, before ever God determined to make●●, to wit, by virtue of his infinite knowledge. Now what a fair way this openeth unto Atheism, let the wise and learned Reader judge indifferently. Heretofore I confess you seemed to maintain the existence of all things from everlasting in eternity; which if it were true, than this might minister an apparent ground of God's knowledge of all things, be they never so contingent, for as much as they are supposed to exist before him. But here you have assigned nothing for the ground hereof hitherunto, but only the infinity of God's knowledge. But in the next sentence I think you cast about for this also. As Balaam did many ways to serve his turn in the course of his divinations; and all is fish that comes to your net; so it may serve your turn to oppose in this question, the determination of Gods will. Well, thus it is: For as God's essence is present in every place as it were an ubiquitary centre, (for indeed if a body were infinite, everywhere might be imagined a centre: and you do much affect to compare the nature of God to impossibilities, and sometimes prefer him so far, as to compare him to just nothing,) so is his eternity or infinite duration coexistent to every part of succession, and yet withal is round about. He it is that drives things future upon us, being from eternity as well beyond as on this side of them. We have been acquainted with these absurd paradoxes of yors heretofore, so that now we cease to admire them. But first we do deny the comparative coherence So, which hath force of an argument by way of comparison: but it hath no force here, because there is no proportion betwixt the things compared. God's presence is in every place, no marvel; for all places do exist together. And so if all times did exist together, God eternity should coexist with all times: But it is impossible that all times should exist together, because time consists in succession of parts: But as one time and the things therein shall exist after another, so God shall coexist with them. So then God's presence is in every place, and God's eternity coexists with every time, and that indivisibly: but with a great difference: for God all at once coexists with every place, but not all at once doth he coexist with every time, but successively; for as much as time doth not otherwise exist then successively. Nay the comparison is flat against you. For like as God not only coexisteth at this present with every place that is existent, but shall coexist with a world ten times as big, whensoever by the will of God such a world shall have existence, but for the present coexisteth only with the places that are: In like sort God for the present coexisteth only with time present, and with all things in time present, but shall by virtue of eternity coexist also with all times to come, and all things therein ten times longer than the world shall last, if so be that by the will of God the world should last ten times longer than it shall: but for the present he doth coexist only with the time present, and the things contained therein.  
Yet this asseth not from any divisible succession in God, in whom as there is no shadow of change, so there can be no succession; but only from the divisible succession of things without God, both time and motion, & things subject thereunto, with all which God doth and still shall coexist in their courses of succession, without succession in himself; Like unto a Pole fixed in a river that coexisteth with several parts of water succeeding one another itself being unmoveable. Now that God doth not coexist at once by virtue of his eternity with all parts of time and the things therein, I demonstrate thus. If God at this time present did coexist with all parts of time, than all parts of time should at this present coexist with God, both time past and time to come; And by the same reason, before ever the World was, you might say that the whole course of time did coexist with God, And if coexist, then surely it did exist; and so time had an eternal existence as well as God's eternity itself. It is true some have conceited that eternity doth ambire tempus, but only in this sense, that as it was before it, so it is after it; If they had said so it shall be after it, it were tolerable. For we believe the World shall have an end. But I never yet heard or read of any but yourself that made eternity to be round about it, so to make way for your circular duration: For in this sense time shall not only have two ends but two sides also, or rather neither end nor side as if it were round as a tennis ball.  
In the prosecution of the same w●ld phrase, you tell us that God, by virtue of his eternity, is as well beyond all things to come, as on this side of them. Belike as the Heavens are on either side of the earth, so eternity is on either side of time. And indeed if the parts of time were coexistent as the parts of heaven and earth are, it were to the purpose; but the succession of time in the parts thereof mars the play and discovers the wildness of this fiction. That which we call beyond in space of place applied to time is rather long before then long after; & the reason is, because to be beyond, doth suppose existence either being as in place, or having been as in time. But as for things that are to come hereafter, they neither have existence at this present, nor ever had. But let it be applied as you will, so you speak plainly, that so we may encounter men and not shadows. Say that God is after all things to come; I say this is false, and thus I prove it. To be after another is to suppose the existence of that other thing precedent. But things to come have not yet had ●hiero existence, therefore God cannot be said to be after them. It is true to say that God shall be after all things to come in this World, for as much as after they are come and gone, God's existence shall continue.  
It is true as you say, Though God should create other creatures without the circumference of this World, they should be all within his presence. In like sort though the World should last ten times longer than God hath appointed it, yet should God by virtue of his eternity coexist with it: Herein the comparison holds with good congruity. But like as God's presence is not with a greater circumference till such a circumference doth actually exist; in like sort God's duration doth not coexist with any duration to come, until it existeth. And in each case it is true that he gains not any new existence, but only takes a denomination of coexistence with them; But not until they do exist; for till they exist they cannot be said to have any existence with him, which before they had not. And this yourself make the ground of denomination of God's coexistence with them. We do not only acknowledge that things when they come to pass, do fall within the Sphere of God's actual knowledge, but also before they come to pass, we say, they are known to God, and the precise time when every thing shall come to pass. I have already showed the absurdity of that conceit of yours of environing succession. Now I say it is directly false to say that God's knowledge is coexistent to every successive act. And the reason is not far off but at hand. For if God or his knowledge were coexistent to every successive act then every successive act were also coexistent to God's knowledge and to God himself; and if coexistent, then existent; and so both time past and time to come and all things in them should at this present be existent. And but erst yourself professed that God takes the denomination of coexistence with his creatures upon their existence in him, which before they had not: which is manifestly contradictious to those wild assertions which you have so often scattered, namely, that God is coexistent with every successive act, and with all times.  
Likewise in the next sentence you acknowledge that the creature gets coexistence with eternity anew; therefore it had not always coexistence with it, nor it with the creature: God's knowledge is still the same, and therefore not so much as in this respect is there any motion or change in God; and consequently no succession, though the things that are known may succeed in their coexistence to one another, and consequently in their coexistence with God.  
The Scripture without distinction professeth that God both is, and was, and is to come: which yet is not to signify any priority or posteriority in him in respect of any things succeeding in him, but only in respect of things succeeding without him. For as much as the things that are past did coexist with God at the time of their being, and things long before them also were not before God. In like sort things to come, whensoever they come shall find God coexistent with them, and whensoever they vanish, shall leave God's existence still continuing the same behind them. It is true, God's knowledge may be said to contain our knowledge, in as much as he knows all that we know, and much more: but it is absurd to say that his knowledge resembles ours; for there is no likeness between them.  
But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are only to come, thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes, that things to come are not only to come unto God; the meaning is, that they are not only to come to him, but present to him also. It is enough for you to dictate mysteries. By the same proportion of truth, things past, which are only passed to us, are not so only to him, but unto him they are not only passed, but present also; this is good hobgoblin stuff, whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity. In the next place you tell us that For us to apprehend a thing past as contingent, is not impossible. About the coherence I will not question you; you take liberty to discourse at pleasure. In the very next page you say that it is in our power to make a thing necessary to morrow, which is truly contingent this day. As I take it, it proceeds in congruity to that Maxim, Quicquid est quando est necesse est esse. And therefore if once I do that which is in my power to do, when I once have done it, it is necessary, whereas before it was contingent. 〈◊〉 on the contrary you will have it not impossible to apprehend a thing as contingent after it is done and passed, whereas this was wont to be held impossible to God himself to make undone that which was already done. In a word it is held flat contradiction. For to be contingent is to be indifferent to be or not to be. But that which is, neither is nor possibly can be indifferent to be or not to be. Yet herehence it followeth not, that it came to pass necessarily there is no colour for any such inference. For what? doth nothing come to pass but necessarily? but whether it comes to pass necessarily or contingently, being once come to pass the contingency of it is at an end, and passed irrecoverably. For it is no longer indifferent to be or not to be. And your caution is very idle that you put in, lest upon the passing of a contingent thing we should conceive it to come to pass necessarily. Yet notwithstanding that which comes to pass contingently in respect of the manner of existence, may of necessity come to pass upon supposition of God's decree, as the calling of the jews, the destruction of Antichrist which we look for. So the restoring of the jews out of the captivity of Babylon, the burning of the Prophet's bones upon the Altar by josiah, the kill of Sennacherib by his own children, the taking of Zedechiah and carrying him into Babylon, yet so as he could never see it, for his eyes should be pulled out first.  
Again, though they come to pass contingently, yet why should you deny, or would not have us conceive that they fall out certainly? though uncertainly to man, yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass most certainly unto God: yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent, yea and sometimes casual in respect of second causes. The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it. But being produced, now it must needs be produced, and it is impossible it should be otherwise.  
Neither doth our knowledge of any thing change the nature of it. Neither is our knowledge necessary (though you say so) of things past or present but merely contingent in the generation thereof also; Though as of all other contingents, so of our knowledge also, it is true that when once it is, it is imimpossible it should not be, or not have been at all. In a word upon the existence thereof, the indifferency thereof, to be or not be, is utterly vanished. But herhence to infer the like, not of God's foreknowledge only but of his decrees also, is a very wild inference. Yet we willingly grant that God's knowledge of things doth no way alier the nature of them, or of the manner of their existence. No nor his decree neither. For though he decreed to make the World, yet the World we say came to pass never a whit the less contingently. And though God hath decreed the fall of Antichrist, and that Babylon shall be burnt with fire: yet these shall come to pass never a whit the less contingently. For God decrees not only res ipsas, but modus rerum, to wit that some things shall come to pass necessarily, and somethings contingently. And so the effectual will of God in Aquinas his judgement is the rate of all contingency. But yet notwithstanding even from the foreknowledge of God there riseth a necessity of consequence as thus: If God foreknows such a thing shall come to pass, than it is necessary it shall come to pass, though perhaps he knows it shall come to pass not necessarily but contingently. How much more doth such a necessity arise from the decree of God as thus. If God hath decreed the World should have an end, it is necessary the World should have an end, yet not necessarily but contingently. For as God did work freely in making the World, so shall he work as freely in setting an end unto it. So far are we from saying that God's decrees take away contingency from any thing, as that rather we aver that it doth maintain it.  
And you show either a great deal of ignorance in not understanding aright your adversaries tenets which you impugn, or that which is a great deal worse in dissembling and corrupting it. But I bear with you, it may be you fashion it in such a kind as may best give way to some conceits of yours, and very few arguments. Yet by your leave the more infallible any knowledge is, either of God, Angel or man, the more fit it shall be to found a necessity of consequence thereupon thus; It is infallibly foreknown, ergo it is necessary that it should be. Here followeth another extravagant of yours, for instead of opposing that opinion which maintains the ground of God's foreknowledge of future contingents to be the determination of his will, you leave that and oppose the derivaiton of God's infallibility from the absolute necessity of the event. An opinion that I never knew any man patronise; but it seems you would draw their opinion unto this, who maintain that God foreknows all things by seeing the determination of his own will concerning the futurition of them. Now, I pray you, of those that take this course who ever said that the events decreed by God were of absolute necessity? Yourself I have observed to profess, that upon God's decree touching the futurition of a contingent thing, as namely, the apprehension of a Traitor, the success of the means tending thereunto is absolutely necessary as in this very chapter in the end of the first Section. But never was I acquainted with any of our divines that said so much. We profess that the producing of contingents is absolutely contingent, only this contingent production they hold to be necessary upon supposition of the will of God. And Durand wondereth that any should conceive things to fall out necessarily in respect of the will of God, whereas on the contrary he conceives it to be a clear thing, that not only contingent things but even necessary th●nges also (as we call them) do come to pass, all contingently in respect of the will of God.  
They that ground God's foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God, do usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves, as upon the causes producing them, which though they work contingently and not necessarily, yet this they th●nke nothing hindereth the infallibility of God knowledge, because he is able to comprehend all failings possible, and to discern in what case they take place, and in what not; which in effect is to rest upon the condition of God's knowledge in itself, as you here do: and because it is infinite therehence to conclude that it is infallible. An invention of late years, and brought in by the jesuits, together with their doctrine concerning scientia media.  
For whereas before there was only a double knowledge found in God, the one antecedent to his will which they called scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby he understood his own essence, and therewithal all necessary truths, and all things possible; the other subsequent to the will of God, which they called scientia visionis, and hereby he knoweth all things past, present, and to come, all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God; the jesuits have of late years devised a middle knowledge between th●se two, and it consists in knowing not things necessary, nor th●ngs contingent, that have been, are, or shall be, but in knowing what would be in such or such a case; as for example, what a man in such a case, thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evil, would do or not do  
And the ground hereof they make the infinity of God's knowledge, as I remember Vasquius expressly professeth so much, and so (as well they may) make this infinity of God's knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents. For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palatius, who as he hath maintained that God knows future contingents 
De absol. scientia fut. conting. l. 1 c. 5.  by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge, yet judge I pray, whether himself differ from him when he come to prove his own opinion, which is this: In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis, cum in virtute & efficacitate 
Ibid. c. 8.  intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita. In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible, considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite. So Vasquez; Deus, quae sua est infinitas, efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrate: and again, Quia divinus intellectus infinitae virtutis est, quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti & intelligere. Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi, à quo alio posset? And indeed were future contingents intelligible, there were no further question to be made, but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them. But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come, more th●n as a thing not to come in its own nature, and consequently God can no more know that it is to come, then that it is not to come; unless that which in its own nature is only possible be determined this way or that way, and consequently made future or not future.  
This objection Suarez forseeth and proposeth: Sicut divina 
Lib. de scien fut. conting.  potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile, ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est, neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est: Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum, neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine, & infallibilitate, quia requirit adaequationem. And to this purpose he allegeth Thomas, saying; Scientiam non posse esse necessariam, nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur, necessitatem habeat. Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam, id est, talem modum veritatis, quae apta sit, ut certum & infallibile judicium feratur, quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est. In which latter words he gives in brief a better and fairer answer, then in the whole distinction following, if he be able to make good what he saith. For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge.  
But I would know of him or you, how comes it to be true that such a contingent shall exist, whereas in his own nature it is only possible to exist, and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist. As for example, how is it true that to morrow it shall rain, rather than that to morrow it shall not rain, seeing in itself it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other. If the one were true and the other false, then there were no question, but God should know the one to be true and the other to be false. But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez, why the one should be true rather than the other; there is no reason why one should be known of God to be true more than the other. And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternity a determinate truth, but shows not how they come to have their truth; nor how things merely possible in themselves come to be future, which as it is apparent, could not possibly be without a cause. But had he gone about this work, which indeed was most necessary, the truth would soon have appeared in his colours. For it will soon be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God. Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus, and of Scotus, and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it.  
Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintains it to have been the opinion of Aquinas also. To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasqu us writes in 1. disp. 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the sa●e disputation, cap. 2. Durands' words are plain; Not only God's prescience of a thing to come is joined with his will to have t● come, in 1. dist. 35. q 3. num. 25. Deum prescire, A fore, coexigit. Deum velle, A fore. But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist. 39 q. 1. num. 10. in these words. Repraesentatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam, non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens, sed ut est volens rem possibilem sore, & quia libere vult rem fore. And Vasquius himself not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be gathered the certainty of knowledge which God hath of future contingents, in 1. disp. 65. cap. 4. but also proposing the same objection that Suarez doth above mentioned, answereth it not as Suarez doth by saying, Things contingent have a determinate truth, as touching their being for the the time to come, whereof we nothing doubt, but shows whence they have it, which point Suarez declined wholly tanquam praecipitium as a breakneck to his own opinion.  
But Vasquius deals more plainly, and professeth that future things of merely possible become future by virtue of the decree of God. Observandum est (saith he) futurum ita esse objectum scientiae Dei infallibilis eo ipso quod re ipsa futurum 
In 1. dist. 65. cap. 4. num. 22.  est, ut tamen nostro modo intelligendi supponat decretum Dei, tan quam causam ante quam nihil intelligitur vere esse futurum. And again, Quia nulla res ex se futura est, sed ex voluntate & omnipotentia Dei, ideo antequam intelligantur futura, supponitur Dei voluntas ut causa illius non quidem durationis ordine sed rationis, & num. 23. Sicut creatura nondum possibilis est, donec Deus intelligatur esse, qui est primum omnium ens, sic etiam creatura nondum est futura donec decretum voluntatis esse intelligatur, ex quo ut ex causa futura est. Thus Vusquius maintaining the infinity of God's knowledge to be the ground of his knowledge of future contingents, as well as you do, yet doth not make use of this his opinion to oppose the foregoing of the determination of Gods will as you do. Yet what have you conferred to the overthrow of that opinion which you impugn, that deserves to be named the same day with the least part of the meanest of those that have maintained it. You only show your teeth, and proceed confidently in dictating what pleaseth you without any evidence of reason to confirm what you so boldly propose. I long to come to an end of this.  
In the next place you give some reason for your assertion. As when you say, We are able by God's permission to lay a necessity upon contingents and so to foreknow them, yet our knowledge still is but finite. Hence you seem willing to infer that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessity upon them, by the determination of his will. I am very glad to hear you reason, because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Naevianus, Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis.  
Henry the seventh of England was wont to say he desired to look his dangers in the face: so I desire to know what my opposite hath to say against the truth I defend. I have been so long exercised in these points, and encountered such champions, that I have no cause to fear your colours, nor powder and shot neither: wherefore in the first place I answer, that the difference between knowledge finite and infinite doth not require that infinite knowledge should extend so far as to know things unknowable, for that were to extend beyond his object. But rather herein they differ, of things knowable, finite knowledge takes notice only of some; infinite knowledge comprehends all. Now things contingent till they are determined to come to pass, or not to come to pass, are not knowable that they shall come to pass, nor are knowable that they shall not come to pass; and consequently cannot be known that they shall come to pass, or known that they shall not come to pass.  
For if the understanding of man doth apprehend a thing as future which is not future, herein he cannot be said to know but to err rather. Now that which in its own nature is only possible, cannot pass from this condition into the condition of a thing future, without some cause. Now you have showed no cause of this alteration, nor you list not to inquire into it, it is too hot for your fingers. For by inquiry it would be found that no cause hereof can be assigned, but only the will of God.  
Secondly, I deny that God by determining things contingent, and in their nature merely possible, making them future, doth lay any necessity upon them, but rather decreeth a contingent manner of production unto them, answerable unto their natures. For as he decreeth that necessary things shall come to pass necessarily, so he decreeth that contingent things shall come to pass contingently.  
Thirdly, as touching your antecedent, I desire to know what things contingent those are, whereupon we can lay any necessity, whereby to foretell them, for it passeth my imagination to divine. This may well go for your own. I have been acquainted with many disputants in this argument, I never met with any argument of any kin to this. Certainly there is some exquisite curiosity in it. For you suppose men may doubt of this, and therefore you undertake to prove it: but when? In your treatise of the divine providence, that I hear is newly printed, we shall hear of it belike ere long, in case you do not forget what you promised: and the reason why I may doubt hereof is this; In the end of the fifth Section of this Chapter you told us that you were anon to intimate, that the reservation of such liberty unto God himselse, (as never to pass any decree whereby to bind his own hands) is a point of high perfection. Now this anon of yours is yet to come, for hitherto since we parted from that section we have received no intimation hereof. But be it, that you will be as good as your word, what is that which you undertake to demonstrate? That some events which are to day truly contingent, may by our industry become to morrow truly necessary. But this needs no demonstration. For whatsoever I do, by doing it, I make that necessary, which before was contingent. For every Sophister knows out of Aristotle, and out of common sense also, that Omne quod est quando est necesse est esse. But this is nothing to your purpose. For you speak of such a necessity laid upon contingents, as whereby we might foreknow them. But by doing things I cannot foreknow them; for knowledge of things upon the doing of them, is rather afterknowledge then fore knowledge.  
And therefore though heretofore I thought of no other meaning of these words of yours then this, yet now by pondering better upon it I conceive you have a farther reach, and that of a mysterious nature: for as much as you are loath to utter it, and give an instance of that which you deliver. Yet why should you be loath to utter that which you presume no intelligent Christian will deny? This makes me look back again upon your words, to try whether I can start the mystery. And hereupon I discover other mysteries, though not the main; as when you say, We are able (after this necessity laid upon them by ourselves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell. Now this speech is mysterious and imperfect: for you do not tell us what we may foreknow and foretell whether it be the things themselves whereupon we have laid the necessity spoken of, or rather some things else; but neither of these things do you acquaint us with here. For if you had I should make no question, but if we might foreknow them, whatsoever they be, we might without any more ado foretell them, if we were not tonguetied.  
Now no necessity can we lay upon any thing but by doing it, and such a thing cannot be said hereupon to beforeknowne, therefore undoubtedly your meaning is, that by doing something before contingent, and thereby laying a necessity upon, it we may foreknow another thing. Now this may prove nothing to your present purpose; and yourself in this argumentation quite besides the cushion. For God's foreknowledge which you impugn is the foreknowledge of a thing contingent, by willing it.  
But this foreknowledge of man, shall be the foreknowledge of one thing by willing and doing of another; now these are no more suitable than the hare's head and the goose gibletts. And to proceed a little further in my conjectures, because your concealments put me to it, I say your concealment is most unseasonable. For as much as you conceal that whereupon your argument depends, like unto a Physician that giving a Medicine to his patient, he should tell him there is one necessary ingredient more belonging to it, and he must suspend the taking of it, until he goeth to the East-Indies to ferche it. In which case his patient may have his green cap on his head before he return.  
Suppose faith and repentance be those contingent things upon which I may lay a necessity by believing and repenting; will you say hereupon I may foretell my salvation? If this be it, this again is nothing to the purpose in a second respect. For the assurance of my salvation is not so much built upon my faith and repentance, as upon my perseverance in faith and repentance unto the end. And I cannot hereupon foreknow or foretell my salvation until I am dead, which is not to foreknow it, much less to foretell it.  
Again my assurance of salvation depends not so much upon my faith and repentance, and perseverance in both, as upon the revelation that God hath made, that as many as finally believe and repent shall be saved; and also that if once I believe and repent truly I shall continue therein to the end; which I have cause to doubt whether you believe. Again do you think indeed, that it is by God's permission only that men do believe and repent? and do you think good to deny that God doth effectually work them unto faith and repentance? You must needs take this course. For if God be indeed the Author of faith & repentance, them he did decree to give men faith & repentance, & so contingents should be decreed by God, and God should foreknow them by seeing the purpose of his own will to bestow them.  
Thus I have ventured to bolt out the mysteries which you conceal. If I have miss of the mark, I will aim at it no more and give it over with a mysterium quaere, as Schoolmen sometimes when they have hunted themselves out of breathe they have ended their discourse with a Responsionem quaere. Yet we have not finished this Section. The very next sentence is a Crevecoeur unto me, I can make no sense of it: Succession is a scroll (as we imagine it) containing several columns of contingency or indifferent possibilities, of which only so many or so much of any as in revolution of time take ink and are unfolded become visible to men and Angels. Alas, what disaster hath befallen me, that I should divert from other studies wherein I fought the Lords battles against foreign enemies, and encountered with errors plainly set forth nothing involved with affected phrases, or streynes of expression in far fetched Metaphors, but strengthened with such arms as wit could afford without Rhetorical painting, their manner of fight well known unto me, and in confuting whereof I profited myself and gained increase of knowledge and of ability in maintaining the truth of God. And now to be cast upon such discourses the opening of the meaning, whereof in one sentence sometimes costs me more pains then the answering of their best argument, and all this without any profit redounding unto myself, my time wasted, my knowledge no whit bettered: well, jacta est alea, we must proceed, and since our hand is put to this plough, though oftentimes I look back, and come to a parley about not intermission only but interruption also, yet I must not break off. Succession is as much as time, and this you compare to a scroll containing possibilities. Out upon the shallowness of my wits, that can comprehend no analogy in this comparison. For though all changeable things are said to be in time, yet nothing like unto writing which is in a scroll, as in the subject of it. For time is rather an antecedent to things durable, than things durable an antecedent to time. But to say that time contains possibilities, is a wilder speech than the former. For before ever any time was, possibilities were as many as now, and more also. For the world was possible, and every part of it, and every thing that since hath been, or shall be, even before the world was, was possible like as the world was. Aga●ne, the duration of possibilties hath no succession; for if it had, than time should have been before the world was.  
By unfolding of these possibilities, I think you intent the bringing of them into act, and this is to take ink, as you phrasifie it. Now I had thought the scroll had contained only those things that are written in it, and so the things brought forth in it, and not those things that are not written, and so accordingly neither time is to be accounted to contain possibilities. Yet all things that are brought forth, surely are not visible to men, howsoever they are to Angels. So that when the painting with a great deal of intention of spirit and consideration, is washed off, the face of the sentence is but this. In time many things before possible are brought forth into act: what is mine understanding the better for this, or my readers either?  
Then you return to your former mad paradoxes, and tell us again, (to enure us to your bugbears, that hereafter we might be the less affrighted with them,) that the Almighty looks on all things as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past; and that his infinite and eternal wisdom doth not only encompass all things that come to pass, as the circumference doth the centre, but penetrates the whole scroll of succession from end to end, more clearly than the Sun's brightness doth the perspicuous air. To this I answer, that it is indifferent unto man in the course of his knowledge, to take notice of things that have been either from the beginning of the world to Noah's flood, or from Noah's flood to the beginning of the world. So likewise it is indifferent unto us to take notice of things done from this day upwards to the beginning of the world, or from the beginning of the world to this day.  
As for things to come they are unknown unto us. But if they were known unto us, as by revelation they may, it were as easy for us to take notice of them successively from the end of the world, rising upwards unto this day, or proceeding from this day unto the end of the world. As for notice of them all at once, it is impossible to be taken by us, our nature disposeth us to understand things only successively one after another. Now it is without question that all things are known to God that have been from the beginning of the world unto this day, and that shall be from this day to the end of the world. And therefore if God were to take notice of them, and that in a successive manner as we do, it were indifferent for him to take into consideration first the things that have been the first year of this world, than those things that came to pass the next year, and so forwards unto this present year, and so successively to take notice of what shall be the next year, and so onwards unto the end of the world. Or otherwise he might begin to take notice of those things that shall come to pass the last year of the world, then what shall come to pass the year before it, and so upwards unto this year, and thence proceed to consider what hath been the last year, and so upwards unto the first year of the world.  
But albeit this kind of successive consideration be incident unto man, yet it is not so with God. He hath from everlasting know what from the beginning of the world unto the end should come to pass, and that not successively but all at once. For his whole knowledge and every part of it is everlasting. And therefore it is absurd to say that God knows things from the beginning of the world unto the end, unless in this sense, God knows all things, which things come to pass from the beginning of the World unto the end, thereby denoting the succession of things in the World, not in the knowledge of God. But much more absurd is it to say that God knows all things from the end of the World to the beginning of it: because this speech can admit no tolerable congruity of explication, like the former, namely by applying it, not to any succession in the knowledge of God, but to the succession of things in the World. For albeit that we may well say that things do succeed in course from the beginning of the World to the end; yet it were absurd to say that things do succeed in course from the end of the World to the beginning. You may as well say, A man's life hath continued not only from the beginning to the end, but also from the end unto the beginning, which is as much as to turn a man's heels upwards, and place them where the head should be.  
As for Gods encompassing of time as the circumference doth the centre (whereunto you may add the circular duration formerly spoken of) and the penetrating of the whole scroll of succession from end to end, wherein you so much please yourself as in rare notions, I take them to be no better then sick men's dreams: we have nauseated enough upon them, you needed not to have repeated them, yet you will have these conceits of yours to be received for precious truths, as Mountebanks commend their oils and balms, and not so only, but to be as clear as the Sun also. It is well that paper blusheth not. Every man seeth how the brightness of the Sun doth pierce the air, doth every man acknowledge God to encompass time by his eternity? Sure I am Durand censures this conceit as absurd. Yet I deny not but that others might dote upon it as well as yourself, taking it upon trust without examination.  
And the corruptness of man's mind may appear in this very vanity, that he pleaseth himself many times in such notions as he understands not. Again, doth every man that clearly sees how the same peirceth the air, as clearly see how God's eternity doth penetrate all time both all that is past and that which is to come, in such sort as indivisibly (for eternity is indivisible) to coexist with it? For hitherto tends the reach of your me●ning. A most absurd conceit. For therhence it would follow that all parts of time past, and all parts of time to come do coexist together at this present; For if eternity doth now coexist with them, then at this present they must needs coexist with it, and consequently they must exist at this present, (otherwise how could they coexist) whence it followeth that both time past should be present, and also time to come, As absurd and void of all reason is that speech of yours, when you say that God's finger hath drawn columus of possibilities. God knows things possible, I confess, but his finger hath not drawn these possibilities, no more than he hath drawn himself and his own omnipotent nature. For nothing is required to the denomination of the possibility of any thing, but this, that God is armed with almighty power, whereby he is able to bring it to pass. Now amongst possible things some are brought forth immediately by God, some by second causes, whether by God or by second causes, they are all known to God, and who doubts now adays of this? yet this is the whole contents of your last sentence, which you have commended unto us so embroidered with art, and with the needle work of quilting eloquence, as if you travayled in childbirth to be delivered of words and phrases, which many times vent untruths, commonly deliver but vulgar sense, and sometimes end in no sense. Yet when a man or ox or ass brings forth any thing that is possible; you say it is like the embroiderer who fills the drawers obscure pattern with conspicuous branches of silk, gold, or silver, which yet notwithstanding is fulfilled in bringing forth that which is accounted the vl deadly sin among the Irish; were ever acquaint terms and silken similitudes worse bestowed? by the way forgetting that the Embroiderer himself is a second cause in bringing forth things possible into act, as well as a boy doth in playing at Top and scourge. And you may as well compare the Embroiderer to a boy playing at Top and scourge, as a boy playing at top and scourge to an Embroiderer. Turpe est difficiles habere nugas: If any man prove an ounce the wiser for this, he may soon prove as wise as Paul's steeple. I remember in the beginning you called this discourse of yours a paradise of contemplation, and I confess I find many flowers of Rhetoric growing therein, and especially pre●ty similitudes, but by applying them they are utterly cast away, for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths, or very vulgar truths. And great pity but they should find a place among the toys in London.  
12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austin's and Gregory's meaning, in passages before mentioned, you commend unto us certain observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto been delivered. This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them, for my part I see no necessity at all of them, nor of this whole discourse of yours. In like sort as little necessary it was that my brains should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences, thorough the thickets of wild phrases and figures, and affected obscure expressions.  
As touching the perfection of God's knowledge uncapable of addition, therein we argue with you. Your next position is worthy of consideration; As God's knowledge doth not make things to be, so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so known by him to be immutable, or absolutely necessary either in themselves, or in respect of his eternal knowledge. To this I answer, first to the first member of your sentence, that great Divines from Austin's days to these days have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. And the reason they give is th●s; because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis, the knowledge of a crafts-master. Now the case is clear, that craftsmasters by their knowledge do work and cause things. Yet I am content to help you with a distinction, if you will be pleased to accept of it. That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer, is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby he knows all things possible, and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends. But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis, whereby God ever knew what should come to pass: and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things. But as for the later member of this your sentence, it might have been● so carried as to give yourself satisfaction (if I be not deceived) and us also: as thus, So the certainty of God's knowledge doth not make things certain; or if you would add the word necessary we could have bo● with it, though it marreth the proportion; which precisely is this, As knowledge doth not make things to be, so certain knowledge doth not make things certainly to be. But you leaving out the word certainly, take away all evidence of proportion. Belike you would acknowledge that certain knowledge doth make things certainly to be. But I do not like the proposition, and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion, if it hath any force any way, hath force against it.  
Now if I do not acknowledge that certain knowledge makes things certainly to be, much less would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be. There is so manifest reason against it, considering that all those things that fall our contingently, are as certainly known to God, as those things that come to pass certainly. Yet you (as timorous men never think themselves sure enough,) are not content with this, but clog your inference with other needless circumstances, as in saying, absolutely necessary, and that not in respect of themselves, but of God's knowledge also: whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough. And these circumstances I say are needless, because I would grant what you desire without these. But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning: for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things known by God shall come to pass: for though knowledge doth not make them to be, much less to be necessary, yet upon supposition of God's knowledge, it followeth necessarily by way of argument, that such things as God foreknows shall come to pass. This is of an undoubted truth, which kind of necessity is not any necessity of being in the things themselves, but only of external denomination upon supposition of God's foreknowledge. And you do in vain seem to strive against this; For can you deny this argument? God foreknows that Antichrist shall be destroyed; therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseen by God, neither will it herhence follow, that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed, as you very weakly suppose. For necessity upon supposition only, commonly called necessity of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessity by any that I know. I meddle not with the term immutable, because it is nothing congruous in the application. For applied to God's knowledge, it signifieth that knowledge which having being cannot be altered, but applied in this sense to the event that cometh to pass is untrue. For no event, especially contingent, after it comes to pass is immutable. If applied to the manner of coming to pass, yet it is not congruous. For God knowing that it shall come to pass in a mutable manner (that is in a contingent manner, for if that be not your meaning, I know not what is) the immutability of God's knowledge doth rather confirm the contingency of the event, then diminish it.  
Yet you suppose some would infer the contrary: but I assure you I am none of them, and that for the reason before mentioned. Yet still it holds good, that if God forseeth such a thing shall come to pass; It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to pass, albeit not necessarily but contingently; when you say, God's knowledge of things mutable (that is of the futurition of contingents; give me leave to construe you so, that I may fairly understand you) is absolutely necessary, all Schoolmen I think that ever write are directly against you. And for good reason; for like as it was not at all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is, so neither was it necessary, much less absolutely necessary, that God should know this course; for if he had ordained another course of things (as it was very possible) than he had also known another course. But your meaning though incommodiously expressed I conceyve to be this: Upon supposition that thing should come to pass, it was necessary that God should know those things. For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come: And this is a truth. But you have marred it by adding the word, absolutely. For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned, is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely. Thus you see I would fain have healed the incongruity of your position, but it will not be healed.  
Again you tell us, that It is most true which S. Gregory saith that things future do not come upon God, as they do upon us, that things present do not pass from him or by him, as they do from us. That which you take to be most true, I take to be most false, in the sense wherein you deliver it. For like as they pass from us by ceasing to coexist with us, so they pass also from God as ceasing to coexist with him. And as they come upon us by beginning anew to coexist with us, so they come upon God also, as beginning anew to coexist with him. The conforming of space of time, with space of place, doth abuse your understanding, and cast you into error ere you are aware, though you will not be persuaded of it. In space of place it is true things both coming towards us yet do not come towards God; and passing by us and from us, yet do not pass by God or from God.  
The reason whereof is, because God doth coexist with all places, and filleth all but man doth not. And no marvel. For all places do actually exist, and God existing too, they are truly said to coexist together.  
But as for all the parts of time they do not exist together, and therefore consequently cannot be said to coexist with God, neither God at once to coexist with them. But as they do exist by succession one after another, so is God said to coexist with them, not by reason of any succession in God, but only in the creature, and as we lose our coexistence with creatures that cease to be, so doth God. For coexistence is an external denomination attributed unto God from the existence of the creatures. In which sense he is said to be He that was, and is, and is to come; to wit, in respect of his coexistence which was with things that are past, and which is with things that are present, and which shall be with things that are to come, to w●t, when they are come.  
But besides this succession in man of coexistence with other creatures, there is also a succession in man which is not in God. For he groweth or diminisheth in the quantity of his body, he is changed and altered to and fro in the qualities both of body and soul. In body sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometime fair, sometimes foul. In soul he hath for a while a growth in knowledge, afterward he 〈◊〉 and decayeth in knowledge. As for the duration of his essence, that is without succession, as the Angels are. And to continue the same as God doth, is not to gain aught, but to keep that which he hath. God is always; so are Angels since the time they have been. The manner of God's duration is indivisible; such also is reputed the duration of Angels; whom Schoolmen acknowledge, not to be measured by time, but by Aevum as touching their substance; only as touching their thoughts, whereof there may be a succession, they have invented a discreet time to be the measure thereof. God loseth no existence by antiquity: man neither loseth nor gets existence by continuance. For how should the continuation of existence be the losing of it? and how can he get that which he hath already? Accidents are gotten and lost, I confess, nothing so in God. Thus your fancies cast about to gain some confirmation of your former erroneous conceit, of God's coexistence with all parts of time; but nothing serves your turn. If by continuance alone we did gain any thing, which before we had not, God himself should gain something which before he had not. For without doubt he hath continuance. Times passing (you say) exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration without enlarging it; Times coming incessantly flow from it without diminution of it. No doubt you please yourself in these expressions: To me they are worse than Empedocles his Androprora were to Aristotle. There is no canting like unto this. The waters that run into the Sea, are a part of the Sea; thence they came, and thither they return, as Solomon telleth us. And therefore no marvel 
Eccles. 1●  if the Sea neither is diminished by their egress, nor by their regress enlarged. No creatures duration is a part of God's duration, as the rivers are part of the sea. And how doth our duration flow from Gods, but as an efficient cause, and that equivocal, that is wholly different? but water doth not come from the Sea, as from an efficient, much less equivocal, but as a part from the whole. Neither indeed doth our duration proceed from God's duration, but from his will. For our duration is our existence continued, and this from the will of God. For he worketh all things according to the 
Eph. 1. 12.  counsel of his will.  
Thus we can devise how our duration comes from God, though far different from the flowing of the water from the Sea: but how our durations do exonerate themselves into God, or into his duration, it surpasseth the sphere of my imagination to devise. I do not think Paracelsus was ever able to interpret this. Yet some say he heard the devil read a lecture through a grate in the University of Toledo. Yet you have not done traversing your ground. Time's future (you say) are said to come upon us, or to meet us, because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things whilst they are future. Your figure Catachresis when will it be at an end? when we talk of reaching, we suppose the thing to have existence whereat we reach, but time future as yet exists not. Yet you think God doth reach it by coexistence with it. Yet I mark of late you forbear th●s phrase. Is it not because it doth manifestly discover the error of your conceit? For to coexist with things future, doth imply that things future coexist, and consequently exist, and so they are present, and not future. The very Angels are not of so long standing to day as they shall be to morrow. This I confess is something, but I would gladly know what inference you make herehence.  
Angels have had a beginning; God hath not: if God had a beginning, as Angels have had, every day he should be of longer duration than he was the former, yet without any change, and consequently without succession. But will you infer herehence, therefore God hath coexistence with things future? A consequence of no colour of probability; and the consequent in itself implying manifest contradiction as before I have showed. Till future things exist, we have no coexistence with them; nor God neither. For if God did coexist with them, they should coexist with God, & consequently exist, and so cease to be future, and forthwith become present. Yet you labour to prove the contrary; and so you may, and sweat too, and be never a whit the nearer to that you seek for. God is every way before time, (you say) that is, not only before it, as we account (he is before that which is to come and so are we also, but he was before all Worlds) but after it and behind it also. For that which we account after or behind time, you call before it; that so with the better grace you may attribute it unto God. But we like plain fellows, love to speak plainly, and to call a spade a spade. And in the like language we deny that God is after time to come, and prove it thus. To be in duration after any thing is to be while that other thing is past, or at least, the first existence of it; but God in this sense cannot be said to be after time to come, because time to come is neither yet past nor yet existent. Yet at length when divinations will not serve your turn, you think to have gotten a text of Scripture for it. God's duration you say is Yesterday, to day to morrow and the same for ever. It is well you did not quote Scripture, lest so your pen might have been censured as Corruptor stilus for putting into the text to morrow, and that in small letters suitable with the former. Perhaps you may say, why may he not be as well said to be to morrow, as to be Yesterday. I grant the proportion of truth in both; but where do you find it, to be said of God that He is yesterday. Take heed of adulter sensus which may be as bad as Corruptor stilus. Not in the Hebrews where it is only said that Christ is the same yesterday, and to day and for ever. Not that he is Yesterday, nor that he is To morrow; but rather to the contrary thus, He was, he is, and he is to come: But still the same in opposition to alteration, more ways than you have expressed; nor to alteration only, but to all possibility of alteration. For he is of necessary being. 'tis false to say, that In his duration all things are. It being neither true formally as it is manifest (for time is no part of eternity) nor eminently. For it is nor God's eternity that produceth things, or maintaineth the duration of things, but the will of God armed with power and wisdom to do every thing. At first sight, I thought to have made no exception, against the last sentence; but upon second thoughts two members of the three seem to be as faulty as any. For things future have no being at all in esse real, as touching real being, they are in esse cognito and esse volito, known by God and decreed to come to pass in due time. So likewise things past have no being at all, only they are known of, and were decreed by God, to be in such a time as now is past. And how can they be said to be in God? Not formally as is manifest; nor eminently, for he cannot produce things past. For that were to make them not to be passed. Yet you end in a truth, that Things present cannot subsist without him. I would you had both begun, and continued so. Yet this you corrupt with a needlsse amplification, That presence cannot subsist without him, which being but a relation requires no distinct operation, to sustain it, distinct from that which sustaineth the foundation.  
In the end of the fifth Section you promised to intimate a certain point of high perfection in God consisting in the reservation of his liberty; but since that time we never heard of it more.   

CHAP. IX.  
Of Divine Immutability.  
IN the first place you tell us that some Schoolmen mould immutability in the same conceit with eternity, and that others make that the offspring of this; but you conceal your Authors. I see no reason for either, but manifest reason I have against the first. For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability, than no man could conceive a thing to be eternal, but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable. But this is most untrue. For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternal both ways, without beginning, and without end; yet did not conceive them to be immutable, for as much as he acknowledged them to be all under motion; and the elements also, as touching their parts subject to corruption. Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning, yet he acknowledged it to be eternal one way, that is, without end, yet did not conceive it to be immutable. The first matter was generally held to be eternal both ways, yet none maintained it to be immutable. And no marvel. For mutation comprehends all kind of motion, and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion, but eternity signifieth only continuance for ever.  
Now like as continuance for seven years, or an hundred years, etc. doth not require that the same thing should be without all change for seven years or an hundred years, etc. much less doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of years in the conceit thereof: so neither doth continuance for ever include the notion of being without all change for ever in the conceit thereof.  
Adam was made immortal, and so had continued if he had not sinned, yet should he not have been free from all change. The Angels are eternal; that is, such as shall continue for ever, and so were made, yet neither are they now, nor were they made immutable. Indeed there are diverse kinds of motions, some are in quality, called alterations; some in quantity, called augmentation and diminution; some in place, called local motion; some in substance, as generation and corruption. Immutability in this last kind cometh nearest to the conceit of eternity, yet there is a difference. For eternity signifieth only an everlasting continuance which may be joined with a possibility of not-continuance, as in Angels, and the souls of men, and our bodies also in the world to come; but immutability cannot be joined with such a possibility; therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutability are much different. And for the same reason immutability cannot be the offspring of eternity, rather eternity is the offspring of immutability. I think both immediately flow from the manner of his being, which is necessary. The like judgement may be made of that you avouch in the next place, to wit, That the true explication of the former contains the truth of this. If by the former you mean eternity, as I think you do, (though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of God's infinite wisdom, which you chiefly place in foreknowing all things, which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will.) In my judgement immutability rather confirms eternity, than eternity confirms immutability: and the knowledge of God's eternity is the offspring of the knowledge of his immutability, rather than on the contrary; and that for the reasons before given, to wit, because immutability infers eternity, eternity doth not infer immutability.  
2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt, but in my judgement you do not well to prove it from the infiniteness of his essence; First because this consequent carrieth no evidence with it. That nothing can be added to that which is infinite carrieth some evidence, but that nothing can be diminished from it, doth not. Some have maintained that God can make an infinite magnitude, and a number infinite as Hurtado di Mendosa disputes. Secondly your argumentation is rather à Posteriori then à Priori. For if by essence infinite you understand infinite in duration, which is as much as eternity, I have already showed that immutability better infers eternity then eternity doth infer immutability. But as for the necessity of Gods being that doth manifestly and à Priori infer his eternal being, and that it is impossible he should cease to be. And Bradwardine maintains that this attribute of God ens necessarium is the first attribute, as whence all other perfections are manifestly derived. For that a less perfect nature should have a necessity of being, and a more perfect nature should have a contingent being is most absurd and impossible. For so that which is more perfect should have his dependence of being from that which is less perfect. Wherefore seeing God is of necessary being, it followeth manifestly that he must be most perfect. Yet I have cause to doubt of your sincerity in affirming, that To infinite perfection nothing can accrue. It is well known what conceit Vorstius entertained hereabouts, as namely that God's decrees are not everlasting; in which case some new act of will doth accrue to God, which before was not found in him. And I fear you will be found to be of the same opinion. And I pray what meant you in the former chapter and 5. Section to maintain that it is a point of high perfection for God, to reserve his liberty, and what liberty is this but of decreeing? Yet in the same Section you style God's decrees everlasting. But that denomination comes in against the hair, as if it were only to choke your reader and h●nder him from laying that to your charge which this reservation of liberty, (which you attribute to God, as a point of high perfection) doth manifestly import.  
When you say, that From infinite perfection nothing can fall but must fall into God, or into infinite perfection seeing that he is in being infinite, in such a conceit strained so high, that it breaks into nonsense and flat contradiction. For if it fall from him, it falls not into him; ●f into him, it falls not from him. In like sort in saying that God is indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined, you contradict that which formerly you have delivered in the chapter of God's immensity. For hence it followeth that God is in vacuo which you in plain terms denied there.  
3. In the next place you propose a difficulty, and that is this: How Gods will or counsel should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free. And in stead of answer you tell us, You see not what appearance of difficulty can present itself, at least to such as bear the two former principles before mentioned level in their minds and thoughts. So then two principles will serve the turn to clear all this, provided that we keep them level in our minds and thoughts: otherwise woe be to the funambulus if he swerve never so little awry. Now these principles you say are first, That God is absolutely infinite in being, the other, That he is absolutely perfect according to all the branches of being or perfection by us conceivable or more than all these, perfection itself. If you will believe me, I assure you, I do believe all this, and yet I am as far to seek for clearing of the former difficulty as ever. If the reason be because I do not keep them so levill in my mind and thought as I should, I assure you, I would willingly help this also if I knew how. I would do any thing for a quiet life, and to clear such a difficulty as this which in my opinion is a wondrous one, if rightly understood. But I much doubt whether every one that proposeth it, rightly understandeth it.  
For I have found by experience that many talk of the liberty of Gods will in proportion to our liberty; Now our liberty consisteth in an indifferency of entertaining different acts of will. But we shall foully err if we entertain any such conceit of the liberty of Gods will. For the act of Gods will being all one with God's will, and Gods will being his essence, and his essence being one most simple act, it was ever impossible that there should be any thing found in God which now is not, or that any thing should not be found in God which now is. You will say then was it not possible that other things might have been decreed by God then are? Yes undoubtedly even judas might have been an elect, and Paul a reprobate. Yet other things thus decreed should not have been decreed by any other act in God then now is in God, for the reason above specified, and that for aught I know so received by School Divines, as denied by none. And this is a mystery I confess, wherein we must content ourselves with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & leave to inquire how this may be; for we are uncapable of that. Only we can prove that the course of things that now is, in whole and part hath no necessary derivation from God, but merely contingent, and accordingly proceeded from the free will of God, yet everlastingly determining this course of things that now we see; and having everlastingly determined it, this will of God concerning this course of things, hath everlastingly continued immutable unto this day, and so shall for ever.  
As for your principles how they confer to the clearing of this, I persuade myself you are not able to manifest. And what need, I pray, of making a difference between these principles which seem to be all one; and yourself have coupled them together, as all one in the former section, and in that argument of yours whereby you proved the immutability of God. Yet these principles must be helped with another supposition, that so they may do the deed; that is, That absolute contingency, or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of God's eternal decree, as necessity in other works of nature.  
Which supposition to raise your reader's thoughts to an admiration of the momentous nature thereof, you say, You have often promised, and once for all by God's assistance shall undoubtedly prove: whereas you might well spare your pains in this, no man being so simple as to question it, were it not that you do intoxicate your reader's thoughts in the delivering of it with wild phrases, in calling the contingency of things possibilities aequipendent. enough to slagger a man at the very noise of such cracking of thorns. We maintain that God decreeth not only contingency, but things contingent; as namely Cyrus 
Es. 45. 13.  his restoring of the jews, and giving them liberty to return to their own country: the burning of the Prophet's bones 
1 King. 13 2. Act 4. 28.  by josiah upon the Altar; yea and the crucifying of Christ jesus, the Apostles with one voice directly expressing so much, Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free, continue immutable, and that from everlasting, as indeed being from everlasting. And we say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed, considering that he knoweth no more now than he did from everlasting.  
In that which followeth we agree with you, that immutability is a perfection, & mutability an imperfection; likewise that to work freely is a perfection, to work necessarily is an imperfection; and where both immutability and freedom of operation meet, the perfection of that nature is so much the greater. But this I find not so scholastically expressed, when you say, That if man were as immortal as the heavens are, he would be more perfect than they can be. This I say wants much of accurateness. For the heavens are not immortal. Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible, but not immortal. For like as in case they were corruptible, yet could they not be counted mortal, because they have no life to lose; so though they be granted to be incorruptible, yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortal, and that for the same reason, because they have not life, which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortal, and for want of life, the meanest of creatures having life do in excellency surpass the heavens.  
And if Aristotle had lived in our days to be acquainted with such Astronomical observations as we are, of so many Comets and blazing Stars in the celestial Region, not only above the Moon, but even in the firmament itself, and that of long continuance, and at length wasted and consumed; it is more than probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have been changed, considering his apologies and excuses in his books De Caelo, that the body of the heavens being so far remote, and little certain experience (whereupon all natual reason is grounded) to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof: therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to be taken in the better part, and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a natural Philosopher. And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens, he professeth that all experience did justify his opinion in that point, for as much as there was never known any alteration there. So then, had he known of any alterations there, this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle, and that no alteration was then known, was to be attributed to the weak nature of Astronomical observations in those days, whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions, being no Astronomer himself. In the next place you tell us, that Though freedom in itself be a great perfection, yet to be free to do evil is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedom. This deserves well the scanning. Adam in his innocency was free to do evil was he not? Yet was he made very good, and after the image of God, and no sin had yet estranged him from the life of God, and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather than of imperfection. Although I deny not but there be greater perfections than this of Adam.  
As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any, of all creatures. The perfection of Angels is above the perfection of man. The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency. Yet I see no cause why Adam's state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection, rather than of perfection. And for aught I see, freedom unto evil is no more favouring of imperfection than freedom unto good, considering that they both make but one moral freedom. For to be morally free to do good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will do good or no, and quoad specificationem, is to be free to choose whether he will do good or evil. So to be morally free to evil quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will do evil or no; quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will do evil or good. This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your own phrase, that speaks of freedom unto evil, but to speak in mine own phrase, I should not hastily speak of any freedom of the will of man to evil. You may say as well that the will of man in th● use of the eye is free to behold either colours or sounds which he will, or in the use of the ear is free to judge of sounds or colours as he will. There is a Common sense within, I confess, whereby the will is able to judge of these, but by the eye or ear she cannot.  
The reason is, no faculty extends beyond his object. Within the compass of his own object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is only colour, and the object of the ear is only sound. And a man may look upon what colours he will of many, that are presented unto him, so by the ear take notice of any sounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the ear apprehended aught that is not of the nature of sound. In like so● the will within the compass of her own object, may settle upon what she will, but beyond her object she cannot extend.  
Now the object of the will is good not evil, and therefore she is of free choice to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evil. But here some may say how then can any evil be committed? I answer two ways: First by error of judgement. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a less good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasurable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a far greater damage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superior authority hath forbidden it; both because an evil inclination makes us prefer things presently pleasing and profitable, and withal proud that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawful authority, such as undoubtedly is the authority of God.  
Hence it comes to pass, that we are said also to be free to good or evil, which we may call a moral liberty in distinction from the former, which is liberty natural, and consisteth in being indifferent to do aught that lies in our power to be done, provided that it may seem convenient to be done. As for that moral liberty, it scarce ever was to be found in the world. For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination neither vicious nor virtuous. Now where was ever such a disposition to be found? Not in man before his fall. For he was created good and holy, and inclined only to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God. Some will say, then how could he sin? I answer, his sin was the actuating of his natural indifferency to the doing of any natural thing. As to eat an Apple, or not eat it, or to eat this or that, a thing merely indifferent, had not God forbidded it, and in this case restrained his liberty: which prohibition of Gods, he harkening too much to the tentations of Satan, by the ministry of Eve, who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit, without any damage discernible, and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed. Since the fall of Adam a vicious inclination hath possessed all, which even in the regenerate continueth in part, though a supernatural virtuous or religious inclination hath possessed them, whereby it comes to pass that both carnal things are pleasing to them as they are flesh, and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit.  
Still the natural liberty continueth in all, to do any natural thing, whether commanded or forbidden of God. For even in the regenerate there is a power to do any natural thing, though God hath forbidden it, and too great a propension to the doing of it, (and that because God hath forbidden it) in respect of the flesh. And in the unregenerate a power also to do any natural thing which God hath commanded, and an affectation to do it also because God hath commanded it; but in the way of hypocrisy to further their own carnal ends and courses, yet have they no religious inclination to honour God. How freedom to evil is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedom, I do not yet understand.  
First, what mean you by the creatures freedom▪ Do you mean it of his freedom to good, or freedom to evil, or such freedom as is neither to good nor evil? I think your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good.  
Secondly, what mean you by the change of this freedom of the creature? If you speak of the creatures freedom unto good, how is it changed? or into what is it changed? here is nothing to answer, but by saying, that his freedom unto good is changed into a freedom unto evil. Which if it be your meaning, it was very absurd to say, that his freedom to evil did spring from his change into freedom unto evil. For thus the self same thing shall be both before and after itself. Yet you say not, I confess, that this freedom to evil springs from the mutation of the creatures freedom, but from the mutability; that is, from the possibility of change. But that is as absurd. For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change, but rather from the agent that changeth. Why did you not say plainly, it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator? I see a reason of this. First because freedom to evil doth rather go before disobedience then follow after it. Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency, whence came it? The truth is, not freedom to do evil, but bondage unto sin proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker. And this is a state of great imperfection indeed, or rather of great misery, as whereby all mankind are borne children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse. And are you pleased to mince it thus, calling it only a freedom to do evil, whereas if yet we are only free to do evil, it must needs follow that we are free also not to do it; yea and free also to do good, which freedom is now adays found in none but those whom the Son hath freed, according to that of our Saviour, If the Son hath made you free, then are you free indeed. 
joh. 〈◊〉.   
But let us proceed with you. It was, I doubt not, the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy. But hence it followeth not, that this mutability was necessarily prerequired. For how can that be said to be necessarily, which depended merely upon the free will and pleasure of God, without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God, upon supposition whereof, this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily prerequired before their happiness? Now what kin this is to the immutability of God, or to the reconciling thereof to his freedom, let the Reader judge. As also of the sobriety of that which followeth; God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable, essentially free and immutably happy, because infinitely good. Then follows the order of immutability and freedom; that the ground of this, this the perfection of that. Yet many creatures are free without any such grown as immutability, and where the one is wanting, the other cannot be the perfection thereof. And if we speak of immutability in respect of second causes, is it not in the power of God to make the heavens, the Sun, Moon and Stars immutabl● which notwithstanding should not be any free agents. And undoubtedly, the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedom thereof, then is presupposed by it. But these are matters of no great moment, that which followeth is of more, though you do but touch, and away, like the dog at the River Nilus, who fears the Crocodile, and it may be herein you fear some bugbear also. Freedom itself (you say) were no absolute perfection unless it were immutably wedded unto goodness. God's freedom then, you will have wedded unto goodness. In what sense is this delivered? I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth, it is impossible it should be otherwise then good. For it is impossible that God should transgress; As who hath no superior to give laws to him, but rather his will gives laws to all, yet in giving laws to others he gives none to himself.  
And if his will were a law unto himself, it were impossible he should transgress it in doing aught. For as much as whatsoever he doth, he doth according to the counsel of his own will. But you I doubt have some other sense which 
Aephe. 1. 11  I will labour to start out if I can. You signify his freedom must be wedded to goodness. When a man is wedded to his wife, he is restrained from all others, and must keep himself only unto her.  
So belike amongst divers things whereunto God's power doth extend, his freedom must not extend to all, but be confined to that which is good. As if there were some rules of good and evil prescribed unto God, and he were confined to the one, and restrained from the other. This is Arminius his language, upon which occasion, I have been bold to encounter their 〈◊〉 in two digressions, who maintain that there is a justice tha● doth oblige the will of God. If you would deal plainly in setting down your opinion, and Scholastically, in taking pains to dispute for it, and not in some sorry manner to beg the question, I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also.  
And at this time, had you named any thing that God cannot do in the way of justice, which otherwise he hath power to do, I would have taken the pains, not to consider it only, but to confute it. For I hold that tenant not far from blasphemy. And I do well observe that in expressing this your opinion, you do not signify that God's freedom must be wedded to his goodness, but that freedom must be wedded to goodness. And indeed the freedom of men and Angels is to be limited by the laws of God, who is their Creator, and may and doth give laws unto them. But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto, I know none, no not to his own goodness as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it: but by necessity of nature he loves it, that is, himself, and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth, he must do for himself, and for the setting forth of his own glory, as he shall think good, and not to any other end.  
He that is the supreme efficient, must necessarily be the supreme end of all things. So from him and by him, and for 
Rom. 11. 36.  him are all things. Much less is he bound to the rules of any goodness or justice without him. But it may be of this we shall hear more from you hereafter.  
In the next place you return to show, how immutability and freedom may stand together; and in stead of proving it you tell us, that we may easily conceive it, provided that they be rightly joined or sorted. And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them, and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so; (yet that serves for matter of your discourse,) but as touching the right sorting of them, I doubt we shall never hear of in such a manner as you promise, to wit, that our conceits shall easily comprehend it, no more than we have heard of that reservation of liberty which you promised to intimate as a point of very high perfection in God.  
Well, the ill sorting of them seems to be the conceiving of God to be freely immutable, and that you say implieth contradiction, if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceit of infinite being. I know no congruity of this discourse of yours. For freedom is only in respect of operation, not in respect of being. For freedom supposeth being according to the kind and nature of the thing which is said to be free. It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man, or that he were not freely reasonable. And no less absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable. You might as well tell us that God is not freely God. And yet if we list to walk along with you in the like vanity of discourse, we might maintain that God is freely immutable, freely of absolute perfection, freely of infinite perfection, if you take freedom in opposition to coaction. For God is not immutable by coaction, nor of absolute perfection by coaction, nor of infinite being by coaction. And to be that which a man is freely, is better than to be that which he is by coaction.  
To be freely immutable in your sense, is not a branch of imperfection, but rather of impossibility. For it is neither possible to the Creator, nor possible to the creature. But imperfections imply a possibility, rather than include any impossibility. But suppose there were any such freedom in God, yet it followeth not, that it should put all those perfections which are contained in his nature upon the hazard. For how improbable were it, that God by his will should choose to be imperfect rather then perfect? Possible indeed it were upon this supposition, but yet in respect of his wisdom and goodness, ●t were as good as impossible he should will any such thing, though he were free to will it. But God by necessity of nature is immutable, and impossible it is he should be otherwise; & in this nature of his the will of God delghteth. And accordingly we may judge of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions: yet by your leave, mutability is not always charged with possibility of doing amiss, but only in creatures reasonable, yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable, yea and without sense and life also, as in creatures reasonable. But to proceed: as it is impossible God should be freely immutable, so is it impossible he should be mutably free.  
But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason, more than to be immutably wise, immutably powerful, immutably good. Neither do I like your inference herehence, namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedom, as in power, wisdom, or goodness; like as because God is immutably wise, and powerful, and good, it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisdom, power, and goodness, as he is in freedom. The consequents, that is, the propositions themselves I approve, but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other. Now because God is immutably free, therefore he was, and is, and shall be eternally free, to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodness. All this we grant, and by all which you seem to go a birding, and if your tackling hold, you are like to catch something ere long; and if I mistake not, the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long: Free it is (you say) for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipotently to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate. In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them, I find more than at first blush I dreamt of. For that which you hunt after as now I perceive, is a soryconceit, and such as being granted you, will yield your cause as much support as a bulrush; what need you thus travel to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinks worth the ask. Only you carry it in such a phrase of obscurity, as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery, whereas if ●t were plainly delivered, and that in a sober sense, it is no more than this, God hath decreed that some things shall work contingently and freely, as namely, men and Angels; like as he hath decreed that other things, to wit, natural agents, shall work necessarily.  
And can you tell who is ignorant of this? or can you show that ever any was found to call this into question amongst Christians? All Naturalists acknowledge this difference between natural agents and voluntary agents; and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from God's inward decree, and outward operation according to this decree. But what if you have a further aim than this, and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves only to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth, that so in the mean time his intention may oversl●p the observation of foul things broached by you in a few words? For consider I pray, would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this, that God is at this time free to decree this? Why do you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man? For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another? and how contradictious is this to your own often profession of God's everlasting decrees, and also to your present doctrine of God's immutability? For if he be now free to decree this or that, then may some decree of God begin to be, which before was not, and consequently there shall be a change in God. For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not. And if God's decrees be everlasting, and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees, then is God free to change. Perhaps you will say, God's liberty is eternal, (for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of God's eternal liberty.) I answer, God is still and ever shall be free, but in respect of what? In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that God's eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to be made by him or no, is a thing utterly impossible. God alone cannot do this, as Philosophers were wont to say, to make that which is done to be undone, it being a thing implying manifest contradiction.  
Again, the liberty of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such liberty is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should be any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not be otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. God's liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you pass over this without any distinction.  
Again, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodness; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exercise of his power, nor communication of his goodness. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have been free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodness. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.  
Your next sentence is as wild as the former, or rather more, not to speak of the coherence of them. For it seems you have no more care of that, then as if you were dictating proverbs. That the course of man's life, or the final doom awarded to every man (though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses) should be immutable, because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth, then to say the omnipotent creator must needs be black, because he made the crows and Ebony black, etc. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances, as the course of your style is to exuberate in matters of no moment. You might as well have said that there is no colour of truth, why God that made a crow should be a crow, or that made the swan should be a swan. And indeed there is no colour of truth in this. For indeed a painter makes a fair picture, but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fair picture, or so much as fair.  
And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot, yet no colour of truth, that he should be therefore a chamber pot, or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimney, therefore himself should be a clean chimney. Never was any known to be so absurd, as to devise any such inferences. Like as I think never any before yourself was known to affirm, that there was as little colour of truth in collecting, that things decreed by God should be immutable, because his decree is immutable. For I pray, what proportion do you find in these? the efficient cause that is aequivocal, is not of the same nature with the effect produced, therefore the thing decreed is not immutable, by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed.  
Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likeness between these, as between a fox and a Fearne-bush. Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion itself to bear it out. Now the former inference which you deny, is drawn from the cause to the effect, the later inference which you deny is drawn from the effect to the cause. Yet these inferences you make proportionable. If you would make them suitable, after some such manner as this, it should proceed. God makes crows black; herhence it followeth not that God himself is black, so God decreed to damn Iuda● herehence it followeth no●, and what I pray? I am ashamed t● follow the proportion of your inference lest so I should utter that which in modesty is not fit, or thus. God makes judas his damnation immutable; herhence it followeth not that God is immutable, or to help you with a proportioned case fitter for your turn. God makes judas his damnation mutable, herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable.  
This I say better serves your turn, but this is not the inference whereupon you pass your denial, but rather quite came as we say; God's decree is immutable; herhence it followeth not that judas his damnation, though foreset by God is immutable. Yet as for that inference proposed, which I said was more fitter for your turn, who ever said that God decreed judas his damnation to be mutable, or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable? Who ever said that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul, or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable?  
And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect, after they have obtained it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touching his elect, that they shall ever be with the Lord, 
Thess. 4. Marc. 9 44.  and as touching the reprobate that their Worm shall never dye, and their fire never be extinguished? Yet I confess either is simply mutable, in respect that God hath power to alter it. But this kind of mutability is not the object of God's decree. For God doth not decreec to take unto himself power to do this or that. Yet it is true, that by virtue of God's decree some things come to pass contingently, and some things necessarily. But this is only in respect of the agency of second causes, some of them being made by God, agents natural working necessarily, some agents rational and free, working contingently and freely: Not in respect of Gods own agency, for whatsoever God doth work outwardly, that must needs come to pass contingently or freely: for it is not in the power of God to work necessarily; it is the perfection of God unalterable, to be necessarily, to work freely. Now the doom of any man is the work of God, and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels, and not the work of second causes: and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of God's decree. God doth not decree, that to fall out contingently, much less doth he decree that after it is, it shall be mutable: speak your mind plainly, and tell us whether the damnation of judas, or of the Angels that fell, or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable. I presume you dare not affirm this: and what is the reason? not because God wants power to alter, but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise, and his will can neither be changed from within, nor resisted from without, because it is omnipotent. In this case therefore this consequence is good: God hath decreed the damnation of judas, and his decree is immutable, and omnipotent, therefore the damnation of judas is immutable, to wit, supposing the foresaid decree of God.  
Now consider we the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life; hath God decreed it, or no? if no, than his decrees are not everlasting, the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words, though I fear your meaning is otherwise.  
Again, if God hath not yet decreed it, than hereafter he shall decree it, (for he must first will their damnation before he damns them) and consequently there shall be a change in God, and something found in him which before was not, contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter, sect. 2. in these words, Unto infinite perfection what can accrue? If then God hath decreed it, and this decree or will of God cannot be changed, for you confess it is immutable, nor can be resisted, for you confess it is omnipotent; will it not necessarily follow herehence, that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable? This I speak in your phrase, but in mine own phrase I say only that herehence it necessarily followeth, that all such shall be damned, which necessity is merely upon supposition of God's decree: and therefore not necessity simply so called, but only secundum quid, and upon supposition,  
So likewise concerning the salvation of God's Elect, who are yet surviving, if God hath decreed it, seeing his will is both unchangeable, and unresistible, their salvation must needs be immutable, to speak in your phrase, but to speak in mine own phrase, it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved.  
There is to way to help this, but by maintaining that God's decrees are not absolute but conditional; but it seems you dare not venture upon this assertion in plain terms, though the face of your tenet bespeaks such a course: And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certain disjunctive decree of God. It were a commendable thing in you to deliver yourself plainly of your meaning; for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement. And indeed if you would deal plainly, and maintain that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely, but to all conditionally, and withal by sound arguments confirm it, there should be no further question; we would willingly subscribe that no man's salvation should come to pass immutably, as you speak, or necessarily, as we speak; no not so much as in respect of God's decree; if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely, but conditionally; and that in such sort as that he may be either saved or damned as he will. But then withal you must maintain that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more than another; but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will believe and repent or no.  
For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon their final perseverance in faith and repentance; yet if God hath withal decreed to give some men faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein, and deny all this unto others; herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation, and not other; and it will necessarily follow herehence, that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance, and perseverance, they shall be saved; and as necessarily, that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the denial of the like grace, unless you will say that though God doth not give any such grace, yet they may believe and repent if they will, and therein persevere unto the end: I see no reason to the contrary, but this must be upon your opinion, as before hath been specified, albeit you are not very forward in plain terms to express as much. And in this place you scatter something that seems to me directly contrary hereunto.  
For consider, though God's decree concerning the doom of every man be immutable, yet you deny that hethence it follows, their doom shall be immutable. Now this of a conditional decree is evidently untrue, as I presume will appear of itself. For if God hath no other decree concerning Peter's doom then this; If thou believest, thou shalt be saved, if not, thou shalt be damned; the case is clear that this doom is immutable, not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely, but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God. Therefore seeing you speak of such a doom which you deny to be immutable, it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doom, as salvation, or damnation; but you must needs understand it of a single doom by itself, as the salvation of Peter by itself, or the damnation of judas by itself.  
And withal you do acknowledge this doom to be forset by the decree of God, which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God. Now I say if it be decreed by God, seeing his decrees cannot be changed, no● his omnipotent will resisted, it must necessarily follow that every one so destinated to salvation shall be saved, every one so destinated to damnation shall be damned. The best help you have against this, and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most run, is, that the object of God's decree is contingency, or mutability, (for so you are pleased to confound things that differ.) But you are nothing wary to keep yourself from contradicting yourself. For when you say that God decreeth contingency, you do withal deny that God doth decre● the thing contingent; as you have expressly professed in your treatise upon jer. 26. Did not Hezechiah fear before the Lord, etc. And withal to make your meaning the more plain, you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity, but withal decrecing the things that come to pass necessarily; yet in decreeing contingency, you deny that he decreeth withal the things contingent.  
But in this place you have plainly signified that the doom itself of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God, and not only the contingency of it; And no marvel, For albeit as touching the actions of men, there may be some colour for the exempting of them from being the objects of God's decrees, yet the dooms of men being the actions of God himself, there is no colour at all for the exempting of them from being the object of God's decrees. And therefore this distinction of God's decreeing contingency, or mutability, but not the things contingent themselves, will nothing avail you in this place. For you plainly profess that the doom of every one is forset by the decree of God: and it is impossible it should be otherwise. For God could not execute it, unless he did will it. He cannot execute the salvation of Peter, unless he did first will it, nor the damnation of judas except he did first will it, and his will was everlasting, otherwise there should be a change in God.  
And seeing his will can neither change, nor be resisted, therefore it necessarily followeth, that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be saved, and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be damned. And thus much as touching the doom of every man foreset by God's decree. You add unto this, The course of every man's life, and affirm, that it also is foreset by God's decree; And this course of every man's life you understand in respect of good and evil moral, as appears by this, that you proportion men's dooms unto the courses of their lives: which can bear no other interpretation then in respect of men's good and evil actions.  
●w at the first I wondered what you meant to bring so unequal heifers to plow under the same yoke, considering that the courses of men's lives in this sense are the actions or works of men; but the dooms of men according to their courses of life, are the actions or works of God, much more have I cause to wonder to read you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God. For as for the good, yea the most gracious actions of men, according to your opinion, they are not foreset by the decree of God. For your profession is (and that as of some singular subtlety and invention) that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent; whence it followeth, that as touching the most gracious actions of men, even faith and repentance (they being only contingent things) that God decreeth them not, but only the contingency of them. How much less fit is it for you (according to the tenor of your opinion) to join all the courses of men's lives, even the evil courses as well as good with the doom's proportional, and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God, as here you do▪ Yet I see how some one in your behalf might plead for you, namely, that this is delivered by you only by way of supposition, not positively affirmed; but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for yourself, but rather give yourself to the emasculating of God's decree by some frivolous distinctions. For you acknowledge God's concourse to every action.  
And in the preface you make show not so much of excepting against the doctrine of God's decreeing all things, as against the manner of decreeing them. And when you speak of the worst courses of men's lives, as of jewish blasphemy against the Son of God, and amplify the heinousness of their opinion, that maintain it to have been decreed by God, you rather except against the manner of decreeing it, to wit, ineritably, and that as touching the obliquity of it only, then simply against the decreeing of it. Your words a●e these, ch. 1. sect. 15. Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of jewish blasphemy? Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not, unless to make some declination from ma●fest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost, Act. 4. 28. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation unto God, saying, Uerily against thy holy Son Jesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, are gathered together to do what thy hand and thy counsel had determined before to be done. And indeed it is nothing but ignorance, or wilfulness in some, and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others, that makes those things seem harsh, which yet notwithstanding their harshness, are manifestly commended to us in the word of God. For what harshness I pray is in this: God determined that all the evil that was done to Christ should be done by his permission? And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware, than they that with might and main oppose it, as Arminius, who professeth that the jews proceeded so far in their ignominious handling of Christ, as God would have them, and this he delivers without all temperament.  
And Bellarmine prof●sseth, that it is good that evil should be by God's permission. And yet herein we say no more than Austin professed 1200. years ago, saying, Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, velsinendo ut siat, vel ipse faciendo. 
Enchirid. cap. 95.  And yourself in this place join the doom of every man with the course of every man's life in good or evil, and suppose them to beforeset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God. Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we do believe God to be eternally and immutably free; yet we do believe he is so, not to decree a new, (for God's decrees are eternal, not temporary) but to do any thing that is possible to be done, and to bring forth some creatures, agents natural to work necessarily, others, agents rational to work contingently and freely. As for the resemblance of God's freedom and immutability, your talk of it is like your other discourses; For what resemblance do you find of God's freedom in the mutability of the elements, in the generation and corruption of mixed bodies? The best resemblance of God's freedom is in the freedom of creatures rational, which are to be found as well in the superior, as in this inferior World. And why should any mutability be a resemblance of God's freedom, who is immutabile throughout? And as for the resemblance of his immutability in the Heavens, to make that good you had need devise a quintessence first, and deny all those appearances of comets, breeding and wasting in the Heavens, even in the firmament, the acknowledgement whereof is now commonly received by frequent observations.  
Sure I am the Prophet plainly professeth of the heavens, that they all wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture God shall change them, and they shall be changed, but God is the same, and his years fail not. You may do well to deny the Heaven's motion also, & so you may the better free them from all change, for as I take it, all motion is mutation, though all mutation be not motion. That God is both immutable, and irresistible our opinions manifest, so do not yours, but dangerously prejudice them both. But I know no reason why his irresistiblenes should flow from his immutability. For if his immutability be conceived as free from all possibility of change from within, there is no coherence at all between this and his irresistiblenes, which is in respect of agents from without. The essence of spirits is immutable from within, and so were the Heavens, if a simple essence, or quintessence as some call it; but hence it followeth not that any of these are irresistible from without. But if immutability be spoken of in respect of freedom from all change as from without, in as much as no outward thing is able to work any change in the nature of God, than it is only immutability passive, but irresistibility in God is in respect of his power active, able to bow and break all things without resistance, so that in this sense also there is no coherence between these two attributes, as if one could be said to flow from an other.  
To the preventing of wise contrivances is required not only wisdom to discover them, and means to prevent them, but also power for the execution of this prevention. And that God's contrivances are not prevented, it is a work of his power, as well as of his wisdom.  
As for the rule of God's decree, I know no goodness of God to be the rule thereof, but that goodness whereby he is inclined to the setting forth of his own glory, for He hath made all things for himself. Prov. 1. 16. 4. And seeing All things are from him and by him. Rom. 11. ver. last. There is great reason why all things should be for him also, even referred to his glory as to the end. What other goodness you dream of, as the rule of God's decrees, I know not, neither do the Scriptures teach any other, but it is generally your course to dictate much, and to prove wondrous little; Whether your ability that way be the more in store and reserved for some special subject to show itself therein, I know not.   

CHAP. X.  
Of the eternal and Immutable decree.  
Upon this you enter with a fair promise of betteringe or rectifying our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent decree. I hope we shall never be unwillinge to learn of any, much less of yourself. For why should we not affect to have our apprehensions if they swerve from the the truth to be rectified, and though in good propension thereunto, yet to have them bettered. For though good be good, yet better is better, especially in so precious a point of divinity as about the decree of God. Most of all if it be true (as you say) that in all ages it hath been most difficult, and is so common in this, that no divine can adventure upon any other service profitable, but he must either enforce his passage through it, or come so high, as to do homage to it. As for the difficulty you speak of, as you give me no edge to embrace it, so I profess I have no edge to oppose it. But as touching the commons thereof in such sort as in all profitable services to the Church, we must be driven to take notice of it, and that with appropriation to this age above all ages that went before possesseth me with admiration. For what reason can be devised why divines and fathers in former ages could handle divers worthy points of divinity without touching upon God's decree, and our divines in this age can not? I doubt your care in this sentence was to vent more phrases than truths. Three attributes you give us of God's decree, namely, that it is immutable. 2. Irresistible. 3. Eternal. But the first of these you choke with strange cautions, a manifest sign that you have some stitch or spleen against this attribute. The first proviso is, if we take it in the abstract; and you give no instance to explain your meaning. I had thought this word, the decree of God had been an abstract, and of abstract signification alone, and not indifferent to signification abstract & concrete also. Decretum, I confess in the Latin is indifferent to signify either in the abstract God's decree, or in the concrete a thing decreed. But God's decree in the English admitteth of no such equivocation, but is of abstract signification only and not concrete.  
Your other caution by way of exegeris and interpretation of the former is no less strange, as when you say, Or as it is in God, implying that God's decree may be taken two ways, either as it is in God, and so it is immutable, or as it is out of God, and so it is not immutable. Now I do not find it possible that God's decree can be any where but in God, it being an action immanent, or intramanent, not passing forth of God, but abiding within him, such as are all actions called elicit both in men and Angels, as the actions of their understanding, and the acts of their wills. Yet (you say) it is not agreed upon by all, either what a decree is or what to be eternal; at least the most part do not perfectly bear in mind the true importances of an eternal decree. With these differences which you intimate, I never was acquainted, but am ready to be, as soon as you shall inform me of them. I had thought no man had doubted what Gods decree is, as namely his purpose or resolution of will that something shall be brought forth in time, either immediately by himself, or by second causes and the agency of his creatures.  
And as for eternity, I had thought that all had agreed in this, that to be eternal is to be either without beginning or without end, or both; and as applied to God's decree, it signifieth the being of it without beginning. But it may be you travel in childbirth to be delivered of some subtleties, which you call here the importances of an eternal decree. We are ready to entertain them as soon as they come to light, with such consideration as becomes our poor abilities, in Philosophical or Theological speculations.  
First you tell us that to this purpose your former speculations concerning eternity of God's infinite wisdom, have been premised; that is to prepare for the delivery of the child: you fore saw belike you were like to have an hard labour of it, an hard bargain. Yet if a manchild prove to be borne, this hardness may well be endured, and will soon be forgotten. By the way it seems the importances you speak of do concern as well the wisdom of God's decree; as the eternity thereof; and therefore it is that you have premised the speculations of Gods infinite wisdom, as well as of his eternity. And all to prevent a mischief, to wit, lest by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture phrases (God foreknows, or hath decreed all things from eternity) that slumber might creep upon the unvigilant and unattentive reader, with whose dreams many deceived have spoken of God's decree or predetermination of things to come, as of acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; and by a consequent error, resolve that it is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. The child is born, but a monster, rather than a perfect child. For the doctrine you propose savoureth strongt lie of making Gods decrees to be of a revocable nature. Well, let us consider it piece meal. First, the proposition, than the consequent deduced therfrom. You are jealous over your reader, & that for his good as you pretend; & that is, lest Scripture phrases should carry him too far through incogitancy, and unvigilancy, and unattentivenes, whereupon a slumber may overtake him, & he may dream of God's decree, as of an act already irrevocably finished & accomplished. Well then to conceive of Gods decree as of an act already finished or accomplished, is but a dream as you censure it. And dreams have great liberty to err from truth. Let us scan this a little. First, doth it like you to affirm that God's decrees are finished and accomplished, provided that they be of a revocable nature, and may be altered? If this please you, what need you except against the conceiving of God's decree as an act past or finished? For though it be past and finished, yet if it be of a revocable nature it will serve your turn well enough. But if you deny it, positively and simply to be finished, what meant you to put in irrevocably, which manifestly implies an acknowledgement of the finishing of God's decree, though not irrevocably, but so as it may be revoked.  
Again, as touching the word accomplished, that is very ambiguous. For like as God's promises which are not eternal but in time, and the significations of God's decrees may justly be said not to be accomplished until they be fulfilled; in like sort God's decrees may be said in a good sense not to be accomplished until they be executed by performing that which God hath decreed. But you speak of the finishing of God's decree actu interno, not actu externo. For you oppose them that maintain that God's decrees of things to come are already (that is, before the things decreed do come to pass) finished. Now never any man was known to dream waking any such dream, as to think or affirm that God's decrees were finished actu externo, that is in plain terms executed before the things decreed were brought to pass.  
Now le's examine your opinion cleared from ambiguities. I say the decrees of God were finished actu interno before the World was made; And I prove it thus. Every decree is finished actu interno when it is made and hath existence. But the decrees of God were made and had their existence before the World was (otherwise they should not be eternal) therefore the decrees of God are not only already finished but were finished before the World was made. And the Major I farther prove thus. If before the World things were decreed by God, then also before the World, God's decrees were made and had existence, but before the World many things were decreed by God, therefore before the World, God's decrees were made and had existence.  
Again I prove that God's decrees are already finished actu interno. Every thing that hath entire and full existence is to be accounted finished, but God's decrees already have their entire and full existence, even as God himself, and so had before the World was; therefore Gods decrees are already finished and so were before the World was.  
Thirdly if God's decrees be yet unfinished I demand when they shall be finished or whether they shall for ever continue unfinished. If for ever they shall continue unfinished; then Gods executions of his decrees shall be finished before his decrees are; for they eternally shall be finished, these upon supposition never shall. If one day God's decrees shall be finished then either before the execution of them, or with the execution of them, or after the execution. If before the execution of them, then either for a certain space of time before the execution of them, or from eternity before them. If for a certain space before, name that space, and give a reason why such a space of time, rather than a greater or a lesser.  
Secondly show what hath accrued to God's decrees whereby after a certain space of time they are said to be finished, for want whereof they could not be said to be finished before.  
Thirdly it is manifest, this cannot hold, as touching the decree of creation. For as much as there was no space of time before the execution of that decree. And therefore if that decree were finished at all before the execution of it, it was finished from everlasting before it. And if that decree were finished before the World was made, then also all the decrees of God were finished before the World was made. For all God's decrees are alike everlasting as yourself (I think) will not deny. And here you propose not, this doctrine of any decree of God in special, but of his decrees in general, implying thereby that it is as true of one as of another, and consequently if it holds not in any one, it fails in all. If God's decrees are finished from everlasting before the execution of them, this is flatly contradictory to your assertion: But if you think to say that God's decrees are not finished actu intern until they are executed actu externo; then they had not their full and entire existence till the execution of them; and consequently they are temporal, not eternal; and though man finisheth his decrees before he executes them, yet God doth not.  
Secondly, if nothing doth accrue to the constitution of God's eternal decrees by the execution of them more than before; then Gods decrees cannot be said to have their full and entire constitution more at the time of execution then before. But nothing doth accrue hereby to the constitution of God's decree. For the execution is temporal, the decree eternal, but that which is temporal cannot belong to the constitution of that which is eternal.  
If they be not finished till after the execution, than God shall be said to execute things before he hath fully decreed them. Add unto this what Mr. Rogers writes in his Analysis of the Articles of the Church of England, printed by authority, and dedicated to D. Bamcroft Archiep. of Canterbury, upon the 17. Article, propos. 2. Those wrangling Sophisters than are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come, as present continually before his eyes; do say that God he did not in the time or age past only, but still in the present time likewise, doth predestinate. Thus I have considered your uncouth assertion, now I come to the consequence you draw herehence; and that is this, It is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. But I say this consequence is unsound, and I prove it thus: To recall that again which is past, is absolutely impossible, as implying manifest contradiction; but the impossibility of a thing to be otherwise then God hath decreed it, is merely secundum quid, & exsuppositione. And dare you deny that God's decrees had existence at the very beginning of the world; and is not that time long since past, though God's decrees continue like as God himself, for his will is unchangeable as well as his nature? And supposing things to be decreed by God to come to pass, dare you deny but it necessarily followeth herehence, that they shall come to pass? Yet I confess that of this consequence of yours there is some colour, but that which followeth is as wild as ever entered into a sick man's brain to conceive: as when you say, to make God's decrees already finished, is to involve, That God by his eternal and powerful decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistible and irretractable swinge, and since only looks upon it with an awful eye, as masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they go the way they are commanded. Thus it pleaseth you confidently to dictate, and positively without all reason, that which hath neither truth nor colour of truth, as it may be made manifest in each member.  
For as touching the first member; God doth not only set the course of nature going, but continueth it going, and that not only in working necessarily, but also contingently and freely, which manner of working is always joined with a possibility of the contrary, and that not only by way of resistance, but even of natural propension also, as appears manifestly in all free agents, whether Angels or men.  
In a word, both course of nature, and course of free will is not irresistible, as appears by the issue. For the most determinate course of nature hath been resisted, for the Sun 
jos. 10. 12. 13. 2 King. 20. 10. 11. joh. 3. 13. Exod. 14.  and Moon hath sometimes stood still; nay sometimes the Sun hath gone backward, and that ten degrees in the Dial of Ahaz; the river jordan hath stood still, and the red Sea hath been divided; and the fire itself hath been restrained from burning the three noble children cast into the 
Dan. 3.  fiery furnace. Only upon supposition of the will of God, it necessarily followeth that the course of nature shall have its course, or be restrained from having his course without resistance. For who hath resisted the will of God? 
Rom. 9 19   
As touching the second member, how absurd is it to infer that God only looks upon the course of nature, if the will of God concerning it be already finished. Whereas Gods will is for the continuance of the course of nature, either with disturbance or without disturbance, not of itself, but by the assistance, influence, and operation of God. For in him all things live, and move, and have their being. Pater meus usque 
Act. 17. joh. 5. 17.  hodie operatur, & ego operor, saith our Saviour. So far are we from denying that there is as much use of power and wisdom infinite in the managing of it, as in the making of it. What odd conceits possessed you to shape so absurd a consequence from this assertion, that the decrees of God are already finished, that is, that already they have their existence? In the next line you discover the original of this absurd fancy of yours, when you say, And as he ceaseth not to work, so doth he never cease to decree. By this I perceive, you would fain have your reader confound Gods working with his deeteeing, as you do.  
Indeed if we had said that God's works are already finished; it would follow that he should be a spectator only and not a worker for the time to come. But we say no such thing, we say that his decrees are finished and that from everlasting, we do not say his works are finished. Though you are pleased to confound these to make unto you matter of extravagant discourse, yet I pray give us leave to distinguish them: Yet here you seem to give a reason why God doth never cease to decree, and that drawn out of the Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all things according to the counsel of his will: when I consider that which went immediately before, I thought you had hereby gone about to prove, that God ceaseth not still to decree, which is as much as to make decrees; But when I look upon the collection you make herhence, I find you have no such meaning: For your inference is only this: So that albeit the counsel of his will by which he worketh, be eternal; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Now of this no man maketh any question.  
But the question in present is not whether Gods works be already finished, but whether his decrees be already finished. We say they are and were from everlasting, because from everlasting they did exist. You say they are not, but as God doth not cease to work, so he doth not cease to decree. Which in my judgement is a strange assertion, and the comparison is without all proportion; For God's works are temporal, and God brings forth new works one after another daily. But God's decrees are eternal and therefore cannot he be said to bring forth new decrees daily one after another.  
And though all his works he brings forth according to the counsel of his will, yet both this counsel and this will of his is eternal. Here you propose a question, shall we say then, he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us? And you answer it affirmatively in a certain sense which is this, He doth not now first begin to decree them. Now I appeal to every judicious Reader to determine, whether this interpretation of yours be not plainly contradictious to the manifest meaning of that assertion which you interpret. For if God doth not new begin to decree those things that befall us, doth it not manifestly follow here hence that he hath already decreed them, rather than that he hath not decreed them already? We willingly grant that God's decrees have no end but continue the same still, but you would have us think that they are still in making.  
As God himself was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlasting, in like sort God's decree or will was from everlasting, and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadow of change. But albeit Gods will continueth the same without change and end, yet I find no example to justify this phrase of yours, in saying God now decreeth the things that befall us; and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that do befall us; and that by the same reason; for his decree hath no end. And is it a sober speech think you to affirm, that God doth now decree the creation of the World, or the fall of Angels, or the turning of Adam out of Paradise, or Noah's flood, or the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone? You say it is much safer to think on God's decree as present to the whole course of our life, then as it was before the World: for so we shall think of them as of acts past and finished, more irrevocable than the laws of the Medes and Persians. Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World, if this be as much as to be now past and finished, then also it is true, that they are acts past and finished; which you deny; If to be before the world be not to be past and finished, then to think of them as they were before the World, is not to think of them as acts past & finished, which yet you say it is, but without all reason in this case. And I pray what think you? are God's decrees, which you dare not to deny to have had their existence before the world, of a revocable nature? Certainly they are no more alterable than that which is past irrevocable. But like as God cannot be said to be passed, though he was before the World: Because he still continueth and shall continue for ever: So the decrees of God cannot be said to be passed, though they were before the World; because the same will whereby he decreed all things, doth continue without all change and shall continue for ever, though the things decreed and willed by him do change from things to come to things present, from things present to things past. But the laws of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making, which they utterly take from them being enacted. Very well observed, and therefore let us think it fit to maintain that God's decrees are still in making, and none of them made, no not the decree of creation, nor of redemption, nor of sanctification, of all the holy Patriarches & Prophets that ever were; lest otherwise we should spoil God of his liberty. By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing still, but never doth any thing, lest after he hath done it he have no longer any liberty to do it or leave it undone. These conceits have as much wisdom as sobriety in them, being equally removed from both. For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as great liberty of will the last year of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. years old, notwithstanding many things had been done by him in the space of 900. years, which to do or not to do in the last year of his age was not a thing indifferent unto him. And were it not a mad thing to affirm that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty? or that the more idly a man liveth, the more liberty he keeps in store, and the more painful he is, the more his liberty perisheth?  
2. God's decrees are infinitely more unalterable than the laws of the Medes and Persians. For God cannot change, man can change. God's will cannot be resisted, the will of man may be resisted, even the will of the greatest Princes, by God himself, by his Angels, by men, by foreign enemies, by their own subjects. The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable, are either evils of sin, or evils of punishment; you will not say evils of sin. For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of God's decrees. If evils of punishment, it is false to say that God's decrees do not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men. For no decrees of men do make evils of men inevitable, but upon supposition of transgression.  
Now it is of an undoubted truth, that punishment designed by the decrees of God, is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men. For many malefactors escape the hands of men, but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God. Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of God's judgements to overtake them, it is said, that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travail upon a woman with child, and they shall not escape. 
1 Thess. 5. 3.  You are beside the truth when you say that wisdom hath just warrant to make decrees for men; this belongs to power and authority, not to wisdom.  
The subject many times may be wiser than the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make laws to bind him, but rather the Prince though inferior in wisdom, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to govern, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisdom of the governor to be bound to aim at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himself. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent habuit potestatem. 
Aug. de praed. & gra.  When you say that too strict obligement unto laws positive or decrees unalterable, deprives both lawgivers and others of their native liberty and opportunity of doing good, I find nothing sound in all this. For you confound the liberty of nature, which is equally common to all, with liberty of condition, which is greater by far in one then in another. Secondly, you range God the supreme Lawgiver, with other lawgivers which have only power deputed unto them; no obligement unto laws doth deprive any man of liberty natural. For whatsoever is forbidden any man, yet is he never a whit the less naturally free to the doing of it then before, though in case he transgress, he is subject to censure and punishment. And of this natural liberty you speak of hitherunto, as being most proper for the nature of decrees, that is, liberty from coaction and natural necessitation, though now you divert from this unto civil liberty, which is only liberty from subjection.  
As touching the laws of men, it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation, because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out, and by too strict observation of laws, summum jus may prove summa injuria. But this cannot without great absurdity be applied unto the decrees of God, who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing, but foresaw all things that were to come. And by the way, what do you manifest hereby, but a strange fancy, that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable, lest otherwise he might be deprived of liberty, in taking opportunity of doing good: implying withal, that God in course of time takes notice of something, whereof from everlasting he was not conscious. And though the Pope in reserving to himself power and liberty to send them forth or call them in again, doth take upon him more authority than is fit, because he hath neither wisdom nor integrity answerable to so great authority: yet seeing God wants neither wisdom nor integrity, it seems fit in your judgement (as may appear by the tenor of this sentence) that he should make decrees, and recall them at his pleasure. And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse, and since also you professed that God's decrees were unalterable; yet here you plainly signify that God's wisdom and integrity may well bear him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurps, to wit in making grants at pleasure, and at pleasure to revoke them. Which I confess the Pope doth with a great deal more ease, than he doth draw in the same breath, which once he hath breathed out; which if he doth, yet certainly it is more than it is in his power to do at his pleasure, unless he hath some extraordinary device that I know not of. I doubt your mysteries are not yet full; you seem to commend the condition of mutability, as a condition befitting the wisdom and integrity of God; it remains that you do as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition, that so with the better grace you may reject it, as unbeseeming the nature of God. In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text, and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should show how alteration of decrees is no sign of a fickle disposition, you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no sign of a fickle disposition. For by the same decree may different awards be executed, without any revocation or alteration of the decree. It was long ago the saying of Gregory, that Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. But by the way you signify that the former practice of Popes in making 
Greg. in job. l. 16. cap. 6.  grants and recalling of them, is no sign of mutability. A manifest untruth. Nay yourself laboured to justify such a change, as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparent change: but you justified it by the opportunity to do the greater good thereby, provided that wisdom and integrity be answerable. So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it, yet: apparently there is a change. But: the administration sometimes of rewards, sometimes of punishments doth argue I confess no mutability in decrees. One and the self same laws of men do cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to diverse persons, yea and to the self same persons at different times, without all colour of change in the laws themselves.  
Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before, I will not inquire, for what do I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgement you do not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by laws then by the wills of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good laws, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to choose, the reason in my opinion why they will choose to be governed by laws, is because by laws they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evil. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give laws and to execute justice thereby, then to be trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of laws, which may be particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in special cencerne them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himself, or a brother, or near of k●nne, which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him (though otherwise uncorrupt and fit enough to make: general laws) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partiality to corrupt the course of justice.  
Secondly, in case government is by succession; laws are most necessary, because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himself, or if he should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripeness of age and experience he shall be fit for government: and by experience we find that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyranny in the son. And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their country and people, have sometimes remitted off their absoluteness, the better to enjoy the hearts of their subjects (which is the best maintenance of perpetuity) then by force to compel them. Yet by your leave every Act, whereunto princes pass their consent doth not restrain them of their former liberty, or abate something of their present greatness. For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents; yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a year, or restoring and confirming unto him the customs called runnage and poundage, I do not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty, or abates any thing of his present greatness.  
It is true the laws of men can have no greater perfection than men that make them; and therefore they are said non cavere de particularibus; for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences, yet in this case there is an help in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences; without so much as taking any notice of the Pope, as the Chancellor of Christendom. For if S. Peter himself were alive and Bishop of Rome, yet what should he have to do with governing of States? Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances, and professed his Kingdom was not of this world, & Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feed his sheep, not with any civil coercitive power and authority to govern them. Yet Popes have laid title I confess to both swords: but the unfittest that ever were to manage either, such abominable abuses and corruptions have been found amongst them in the managing of both, as I think are without example.  
But that rule of the Canonists, Papa ●nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much enamour you, and great zeal ●oth inflame you to apply it unto God, to free him from impotent immutability, as hereafter you call it, and that his decrees may not oblige him, and indeed they do not; for how can he be said to be tied or restrained that is confined to nothing against his will, but to every thing according to his will? But to free God from an impotent immutability, you would have his decrees, not alterable, (for you dare not profess so much) but something else, I know not what, which you call reservation of liberty, and to be still as it were in making decrees, but not having decreed any thing till the time of execution or afterward: mysterious inventions of your own brain, which if perhaps you seem to understand yourself, I assure you I do not: but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this.  
3. In this Section, you begin with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternal power of jurisdiction. This is a truth and will nothing serve the turn of your reaches. By the way you deliver unto us the object of God's foreknowledge, and that you say is whatsoever will be; and the object of God's decree, and that you say is whatsoever may be, which later is a most absurd position. Look we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done they make choice to decree the doing of such courses, as seem most convenient. Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God which God can do, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to pass. As for example, before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made, was this by virtue of God's decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been p●ssible or no.  
Again, was not the creation of the World, is not the end of the World decreed by God, the rewarding of the godly & the punishing of the wicked, are they not decreed by God? What moves you then to make only things possible the object of God's decree, and the things that will or shall be only the object of his foreknowledge? This wit of yours is able to make us a new World of Divinity and Philosophy both, if it be let alone to run a wild goose race at pleasure. Well, God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternal power of jurisdiction. What of this? In the next place, you tell us that, what grant or promise soever he makes cannot bind the exercise of his everlasting liberty for a moment of time: they last no longer than Durante bene placito: seeing gracious equity, and only it, is his everlasting pleasure. Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure; and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises do proceed from his gracious equity, and this you say is his everlasting pleasure, and his grants and promises must last you confess during his good pleasure, is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make, they do so far bind God to performance, that we may assure ourselves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed? Only you discourse that they shall last no longer. And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity? Or what wisdom is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grant, shall last no longer then during pleasure, and withal confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting. But no promise you say, binds the exercise of his everlasting liberty for a moment of time: It is fit to consider this. To my judgement God's promises bind him as much, as our promises bind us; the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty, but to keep our honesty: For what promise soever he makes, he is still free naturally whether he will perform what he hath promised or no; but if he breaks his promise he shall be untrue. In like sort God if he should do otherwise then he hath promised, he should be untrue, though never a whit the less free. And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the less free.  
For even men do freely keep their promises though not always willingly, because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition, and when they come to performance they may be of another. But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God. Every honest Magistrate is free to recompense every man according to his evil ways; for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he commits, he will not punish him. And look what a good Magistrate resolves upon, when facts are committed either good or evil; the like may God decree from everlasting. For no Magistrate knows so well what man hath committed, as God from everlasting knows what he will commit. And more than that, God knows how to keep man from evil courses, or to expose him to evil courses, by having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will; which power and wisdom is not incident to a creature. Besides all this, a Magistrate is bound by duty, to recompense every man according to his works. But God is not bound by any such duty, to any such course. He can pardon one and punish another; have mercy on one and deal severely with another. Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some, deny repentance unto others. And if he hath made any such promise as this. If his children 
Psal. 49. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.  forsake my law and walk not in my judgements, if they break my statutes and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their transgressions with the rod and their iniquity with strokes, yet my loving kindness will I not take from him, neither will I falsify my truth; they to whom such promises are made, may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much, bound I say by moral obligation in such sort, as it is impossible he should do otherwise, yet shall he perform it never a whit the less freely; First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation, and because he is as well pleased still to do it as to promise it. For as much as look of what judgement and disposition he was when he promised, of the same he is when he makes it good; and consequently performs it as willingly as he made it.  
It is not always so with man in the execution of his promises. If Gods one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fits all the changes, several dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angels, as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for every one of them; what moved you heretofore to profess that the reservation of liberty, and that to make grants and to revoke them, is a point of so high perfection, as that you would fain bestow it upon the nature of God? What mean you here to profess that God ceaseth not to decree, which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were, that God is still in making of new decrees. God's decrees continue I confess as God himself continueth, and more unalterable than laws of Medes and Persians. But neither could they be said in this respect not to cease to make laws, so neither can God be said not to cease to make decrees. For like as while laws are in making, they are not yet made; so to intimate that God's decrees are in making (as you do while you say God ceaseth not to decree) is to imply that God's decrees are not yet made; which you do more plainly signify in the words following, when you say, They are conceived and brought forth as well befitting them as the skin doth the body, which nature hath enwraped in it. Whereby you manifestly profess that God's decrees are brought forth in time, not only the executions of them, and thus howsoever you flatter your reader's ear with bestowing on God's decrees the title of everlasting, yet you plainly declare your mind that they are brought forth in time, together with the execution of them.  
And hereto properly tends that reservation of liberty which you magnified as an high perfection, and the power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them, as a power only fit for God. And to this purpose you seem to discourse of eternal liberty, making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporal condition, lest if they were eternal, they should deprive God of liberty. Let every indifferent reader judge whether this be not the language of your heart, disclosed by the tenor of your discourses, howsoever you style God's decrees eternal; herein like unto boat-men, that look one way and row another.  
Besides, by this discourse of yours you seem to acknowledge no other●d crees of God then in rewarding them according to their works; for hitherto tends the congruity of God's decrees, which after your manner you amplify as no less congruous to the actions of men, than the skin to the body. A very good resemblance by the way, that as the skin doth befit the body, so God's recompenses do befit men's works. Yet this you apply most incongruously to God's decrees (for thereof runs your discourse) and not to the executions of them, and withal as touching the actions of men, though never so gracious, though actions of faith, love, repentance, these I say are not objects of God's decrees in your Divinity; but only the rewards of them. No not Cyrus his 
Es. 45. 13. 1 King. 13. 2. Gen. 15. 14 Ex. 3. 20.  restoring of the jews, nor josiahs' burning of the Prophet's bones upon the Altar, nor the children of Israel's coming out of Egypt, nor Pharaohs dimission of them; and infinite the like, God decreed none of these by your doctrine. He decreed only the contingency of these actions, not the actions themselves.  
Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of, when in the next words according to your course of argumentation, you tell us, No man living (as you take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies' line from the priesthood, or his two son's destructions by the Philistines. For here you seem to imply a grant that God decreed it, but not inevitably, and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition, but not absolute. Now it is well known that Solomon deposed Elies' house in Abiathar freely, and the Philistines by free actions of theirs were the death of Elies' sons. And therefore if God decreed them, the very free actions of men are the objects of God's decrees; and consequently no action by the freedom thereof is any way hindered from being the object of God's decrees. All which is directly contrary to your opinion, who maintain contingency to be the object of God's decree, and not the thing contingent, as you have plainly expressed and professed in another Treatise; and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men, as if the actions of men were no objects at all of God's decrees.  
Again, is it a sober distinction which here you imply, as if the decrees of God were some evitable, some inevitable; well it may be accommodated to the executions of God's decrees, but most absurdly to God's decrees, which being everlasting as you confess, were before any thing could have existence to avoid them. Yet we plainly profess that God decreeth some things to come to pass necessarily as works of nature, some things contingently as the actions of men. Again, some things to come to pass inevitably, as the end of the world, some things to come to pass evitably, as the judgements of God, which may be avoided by repentance. But you desiring to speak home, tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Elies' house. Indeed decrees are free, or else they are no decrees. Neither the making of the world, nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God, but freely. Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration, and add very cautiously (I take it) implying this ●o be your opinion, not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others. And as if you were fearful lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception, you propose it of absolute necessity; and so you think That no man living (whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise, that matters not) will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies' line. So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition, yet if he doth not say that it was absolutely necessary; or if he doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it; yet if he doth not say that this was so from all eternity, or though he should say this also, yet he shall not contradict you, provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it.  
And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this, and if you had used the like wariness in every sentence, he had need rise betime that would go beyond you in this k●nde of wariness and circumspection; yet to make all sure, you give a reason of it, saying, For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternal liberty. And herein you say very true, for if it were absolutely necessary for him to decree this, surely it were not absolutely free for him whether to decree it o● no.  
Yet I find some in opinion have transgressed in this later, but never any in the former. For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent, and conceived him to be a necessary agent, yet never believed that it was necessary for him to decree the deposition of Elies' house, or aught else. And therefore you do not well to prove a more plain thing by that which is less manifest. We have as good stuff in the next. To say that before Eli's days God past any act that could constrain his eternal liberty of honouring Eli's family, as well as any others, were impiety, because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability. Herehence are certain Aphorisms to be selected, worthy our consideration. 1. God is not to be charged with any thing that is impotent; but there is a kind of immutability that is impotent; therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability. Now to att●bute unto God ●hat which doth not become him, is a kind of blasphemy. The contradictory hereunto doth become God, and must be attributed unto him, to wit, immutability. For mutability and immutability are terms contradictory; and it is one of the most general principles that are, that one of two contradictory terms may be attributed to any thing, therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable, it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable. And in haec Amph●arae sub terram abd●tae? Old Prophet Ma●achy dost thou hear this, that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God, I the Lord am not changed? And thou james the Apostle, 
Mal. 3 6. ●ac. 1. 17.  how hast thou deceived us in ll●, that with God there is no variableness nor shadow of change? Yet now we are taught that it is no l●le then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable, yea it is to ascribe impotency unto him. He must be mutable that he may be potent.  
Well, let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist, to wit, in not being able to reverse his own act: so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his own act. Here by the way it is acknowledged that God's decrees are acts past, otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no colour of mutability. Yet hitherunto it hath been denied, that God's decrees were acts past. And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty. For so you thought better to discourse, then at the first to profess any revocable nature of God's decrees. But now that conceit not fadging, and yourself as it seems not throughly satisfied, you plainly break forth, and adventure to maintain that notwithstanding God's decrees are acts past, yet he can change them, and thus far he is mutable, and to say that God is immutable herein, is to charge him with impotency.  
From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprunge. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrained. I answer, this is a vain fiction, proceeding from the vain consideration of man's infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fain break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therefore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther than to do what we can or will.  
Now though God can do otherwise absolutely, yet he will not do otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to do this it is impossible that he should do otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfulness, or sicklenes or the like, and yet do not we say that the deposition of Elies' race, or the death of his Sons were absolutely necessary.  
But God had ordained them to come to pass contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary, and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage, but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage. If you rest yourself upon such a decree of God, They that dishonour me them will J●dishonour 
1. Sam. 2. 30.  what need you trouble the World with such distasteful speculations, as to affirm that to say God is immutable, is to charge him with impotency? But this is an indefinite proposition, and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God, you must deny that the will of God to depose Elies' line in particular from the priesthood, was eternal, and affirm thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty, but not to do it until Ely had dishonoured God. And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations; and these do far better suit with your first course, namely as touching reservation of liberty, and suspension of resolution, then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past.  
But the common and general opinion of making Gods decrees eternal made you to shuffle in that a long time; and at length plainly to fall fowl upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise, God's liberty should be restrained. Of Cicero Austin saith, that dum homines fecit liberos, fecit sacrilegos. And you to make God free make him immutable; and think to help it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent, like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceive.  
4. In conclusion you tell us, that to think of God's eternal decree without admiration void of danger; we must conceive it as the immediate axis or centre, upon which every successive or contingent act revolves. And I profess I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration. And the object of my admiration is, upon what axis or centre your wit did revolve when you pleased yourself with this resemblance. Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an heretic. For it had need be understood first. And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this. For like as he was a worthy Scholar that bid his Master give him positions and let him alone to prove them; so no l●sse worthy a Scholar is he also, that gives his Master leave to speak what gibberish he will, yet nothing doubts of understanding him; In this Section hereafter you say that Gods eternal decree is coexistent to each humane thought or action: But in what sense it is, your axis or centre whereupon every contingent act doth revolve, you no where explain that I know. As how every act (many of them being instantaneall) hath a revolution, or how the whole body of contingent actions being drawn into one by aggregation may be said to turn round. As if time from the beginning of the World unto this day did turn, and the change of things to come into things present, & of things present into things to come, were a spherical change; or lastly how Gods decree is the centre hereof, and yet coexist with every part of the circumference; These are mysteries I confess which we cannot think upon without admiration, yet no other danger herein do I find in haste, besides the wasting of precious time in the consideration of so wild and extravagant speculations. Yet one word more of this before we part. Every contingent act revolves you say upon the axis of God's decree.  
Now I demand whether these contingent acts are the objects of God's decrees or no. If not, what hath God's decree to do with them? or they with the decree of God? let them rather be thought fit (if you please) to revolve upon the axis of God's knowledge, and that will be with far less danger unto your tenet. For this revolution of contingent acts upon the axis of God's decree, doth savour strongly of making them the object of God's decrees. But this you may remember is directly opposite to your tenant, who maintain that God decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves.  
The next member of the first sentence in this Section had been very mystical, had we not been already reasonably well acquainted with this dialect of yours in the chapter of eternity. And upon my remembrance of that your discourse, I take that, wherein the whole frame of succession and contingency is fully comprehended, to be no other than that precious creature called time, wherein all contingent things come to pass, and so are comprehended therein as in the measure of their existence and duration. For of such a comprehension (as I take it) you do discourse, not of substantial or integral comprohension; For I see no reason why the decree of God should not be the axis of the whole body of contingent things as well as of any particular of them, whereon to revolve. But you make a far greater quiescent to be the axis of this, by which greater quiescent, I think you mean God's eternity. For that alone is it, as heretofore you have expounded it, which draws all the successive parts of motion into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. I am now almost grown as perfect in this canting language as yourself.  
But herein I had need of your help for satisfaction, as touching certain points. As namely, why time should be accounted by you, an unconstant and movable sphere. Time I confess cannot be conceived without motion, but it is neither motion itself nor a thing movable. Yet in the course of it to my understanding it is most constant; for things never so different in constancy or inconstancy are still measured with the same time; as whether motion be uniform or difforme, swift or slow, the same or different, yet the time wherein motion is, is still the same.  
But least of all do I see any reason, why you should account time a Sphere. For a spherical form is proper unto bodies, & such bodies moving round are said to move spherically, but of spherical time I see no congruity. Again, why should you account eternity a far greater quiescent, than the decree of God, you may as well say that eternity is a greater quiescent than God himself. Eternity as it is duratio manens, without beginning and without end, so it is of God's decrees also.  
Thirdly it is impossible that all the successive parts of motion should be drawn into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. For motion can neither be made indivisible nor permanent. Well it may cease, but it cannot be drawn into permanency, or indivisibility. Again, duration permanent of indivisible unity (if I understand the language aright,) is eternity. But motion cannot be drawn into eternity, no more than eternity can be drawn into motion. To swallow up motion into a vigorous rest● understand right well what it is, I am pr●ty well acquainted with this language.  
It is for a Sphere of Heaven to turn round in a moment, that is to turn so swiftly, as to stand stock still. For to be where it was immediately before this instant is to stand still. Yet if such a revolution should be in an instant, than every part of the larger Sphere should have coexistence local with all and every part of the lower Sphere under it, provided you understand it aright, & so shall every part of the lower sphere have coexistence with all and every part of the Sphere above it, without any pains more than ordinary. And that whether it move swiftly or slowly; to wit, in an instant. This is sober discourse, is it not? For if one body may move twice so fast as another in an instant; then in half an instant it may move as fast as the other in an whole instant.  
In the next place you tell us, that God's foreknowledge is included in the conceit of his eternal decree. And you speak of the foreknowledge of things contingent. For of no other things but contingent have you spoken in reference to God's decree; hence it followeth that contingent things are the object of God's decree; and that therefore he foreknows them, because he hath decreed them; otherwise how could the foreknowledge of such things be included in the conceit of God's decree? But that the foreknowledge of such things depends upon God's decree, is a thing which you impugned in the 8. chap. and 5. Sect. pag. 96. 97. God's ubiquitary presence you have heretofore compared sometimes to a centre, sometimes to a Sphere. And there must be an analogy as here you signify, between his decree and his ubiquitary presence, and therefore we must believe the decree of God to be as the axis or centre upon which every contingent act revolves, but you do not infer that therefore it must be as a Sphere also; yet analogy requires this as well as that.  
Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a centre whereupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of God's decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceit is (you say) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing, otherwise. Now to prevent this suspicion, we have no need of these acquaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving God's decree (or foreknowledge rather) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves. We say that by virtue and efficacy of God's decree, not only some things come to pass necessarily, as the works of natural agents: but other things also come to pass contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, only upon supposition of God's decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to pass: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.  
In like sort supposing God's foreknowledge of things to come, (which foreknowledge of God not only is to day, but was before the world was made, though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are, and afterward also with the notion of knowledge) it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily but contingently: Here follows a list of what you will prove; when time serves: 1. That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts. I pray tell me, had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world, and before that also? If it had, what mean you to say he doth decree it, as if this decree of God which yet you call eternal, had not existence till now? why do you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world, the turning of man out of Paradise, the drowning of the world in the days of Noah; the destruction of Sodom, and the like, for you have no colour of reason to justify your phraseology herein, but only this, that though (Gods) decrees be eternal, yet they still continue. Now this is as true of the decree of creation, and the rest above mentioned, as of any other decree. Secondly, what mean you to qualify your assertion, by saying In most humane acts: as if you durst not avouch it of all? Are not all humane acts of a contingent nature, and consequently have a contingency in them? and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others? It may be that herein you have reference to the jesuits distinction, of future contingents absolutely that shall be, and future contingents conditional that should be, if and in case some condition were put in esse. But how then will you prove, that the acts of men that shall be, are of a greater number, than those that might or should be, in some case? For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed, is in most humane acts. I have a manifest reason to the contrary. For the number of things that might be upon supposition, is far greater than the number of things that are, have been, and shall be; for in case the world had been made twice bigger than it is, and twice as many men as there are, and should last twice as long, the number of humane acts would be far greater than these are, wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency.  
Again, the jesuits maintain that God hath not only decreed contingency in humane acts, but the humane acts themselves, which you do not: we maintain that God decreeth the actions of men themselves, that they shall come to pass contingently and consequently; decreeth the contingency of them, but not that only, but the actions themselves. As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel, God decreed not only the contingency of it, but the act itself, that it should come to pass in a contingent manner. josiahs' burning of the Prophet's bones upon the Altar, God decreed not only the contingency of this act, but the act itself, to wit, to come to pass in a contingent manner. So Cyrus his restoring of the jews out of captivity, to their country, was an humane contingent act, and God decreed not only the contingency hereof, but the act itself, to come to pass in a contingent manner.  
2. The second Aphorism is, that God's eternal decree doth coexist to each humane action throughout the whole succession of time. This we do not deny, no more than we deny God's coexistence with every action: but heretofore you have professed, that God doth at this present coexist with all things, not only with all things present, but with all things that are to come: and this we deny, because God cannot coexist with that which doth not coexist with him: and therefore seeing things past, and things to come, do not at all exist at this present, and consequently do not coexist with God, therefore we profess that God at this present doth not coexist with them.  
In the next place you say, that God's decree doth inspire them with contingency in their choice. It was wont to be said, that praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato; rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth, than his decree; for his decree was from all eternity, yet nothing was inspired into man, till the creation, nor into us men, until we are brought forth, and grow capable of inspirations. When you talk of contingency in our choice, you might have spoken plainly and called it liberty in our choice. But doth God continually inspire this? It is too absurd: to inspire, is to bring forth something anew: as when God doth inspire good motions into us. You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us, as liberty of choice; more congruous it had been to say, that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures. For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a liberty of choice in all that we do: and he moves us so, as that we may move ourselves more ways than one. But when doth he move us thus? in the very time of doing aught, or before? and so doth he move us by persuasion only, or by mediate operation on the will? For all this whereabouts alone there is question now adays amongst Divines, we have nothing but blanks here: you are yet only upon the promise of performance, and not upon any performance itself.  
Yet whilst it moves them, it withal inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents, which were foreordained, to the choices which we make, whether they be good or evil. That is, God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved, they that die in impenitency shall be damned. Wherein you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God, to wit, of an indefinitive nature, thus, Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not, shall be damned. But that these men in particular shall believe, and repent, and so be saved; others shall neither believe, nor repent, nor be saved, you will be wise and wary enough to keep yourself from the acknowledgement of any such decree, unless it be provided that God be not charged with any such impotent immutability, as not to be able to revoke his decrees. For though the Pope wants wisdom and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himself, as namely, of making grants, and again revoking them; yet God doth not.   

CHAP. XI.  
Of transcendental goodness, and of the infinity of it in the divine nature.  
I Profess I have no desire to oppose aught in this, or in the Chapter following; yet having begun this work of examination it is fit to consider these also, if it be but to take notice of what you deliver, and rightly to understand the meaning thereof.  
They which fetch light beyond the Sun, must be content with Starlight; and they which cannot satisfy themselves with day light, but seek for starlight, they are well enough served if they go to bed darkling. We commonly say, Life is sweet, and it is a truth, not because it is a principal stem of being, in my judgement, (for reason is a more principal stem of being then it) and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable, as to creatures reasonable. And you confess that the appetite of preservation, of itself is natural unto all; yet it cannot be denied but that life is subject to sour things as well as sweet: whereupon some have said, Non est vivere sed valere vita. And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Better eye out then always aching; and better once dead than always dying. Nay the hope of a better state, without all others consideration, may make this life of ours distasteful unto us, I desire to be dissolved, saith S. Paul, and to be with Christ, I am not of your opinion, in your construction 
Phil. 1. 23.  of the Maxim, Omne ens qua ens est bonum, as if the meaning were, that it is good itself, for that which is good, and that whereunto a thing is good, should be rather different than the same, for the terms of relation, must be distinct. Your instances, are very incongruous, you should say, that poison is good to itself, not to the aspe, for the aspe is a different thing from his own poison, and so is the Adder's sting, from the Adder. And as sure I am that even of poison, good use may be made for the service of man; And the Scorpion cures the wound, that is made by his own sting: And even of the Adder's sting, God the Creator of it, hath a good use even in stinging, and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he saith: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
If natural qualities of contrary nature, do fight for the maintenance of their own being, it seems being to them, 
Dionys. peri ego sive discriptio orbis.  is as sweet, as life is to us, though life be a principal stem of being. How transcendental goodness, should be equally communicated by God to all, and not equally participated, by all, I understand not: the contrary seems true to my opinion, for as much as like as there can be no communication, where there is no participation, so there can be no equal communication, where there is no equal participation; And though a less vessel, may be as full as a greater, yet there is no equal communication of water unto them both, and the comparison is no way congruous, for as much as it is an easy thing, to distinguish between the water and the vessel, filled with it, but not so easy to distinguish between the thing, and the being of it. Rather thus. God doth sit every thing with qualities, or parts according to the being thereof, or as it shall require, like as every vessel small and great are filled with water. The being of a fly, of a man, of every thing is good in itself, and as it may be, and is referred to the glory of God, for God made all things for himself. 
Prov. 16. 4   
But in the things that God hath created, there are degrees of perfection, some creatures have only being, some being and life also, some add sense unto them both, some have reason over and above them all. The degree of entitative goodness, cannot arise from the specifical nature of it, for so it should arise from itself, for the degree of entitative goodness in any thing and the specifical nature thereof is all one; Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodness is as bad or worse, as when you derive it from the degree of their specifical nature: As if the specifical nature of a thing had degrees, which is untrue, as I remember; Aristotle compares specifical natures or forms of substances to numbers, that admit no intention or remission; three flies are as truly three, as three Elephants.  
The difference of individuals under the same species, is merely accidental not essential; Thus, that one is not so happy as another, is an accidental difference, not entitative or essential; It is true, sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once, yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman, that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds, upon his five senses. It is not the fruition of goodness incident to one sense that defeats another for the time, of that it most desires, but rather want fruition thereof by your instances. For if the belly be satisfied, it is free to delight in music also, if pinshed with hunger not so, yet too much feeding I confess may bring a man asleep, and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise, either of body or mind. On the other side deep contemplation, as you say pines the body, and is occasion of far worse accidents also sometimes; as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematical operations, made him neglect the Soldier that came upon him, and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies, to the great grief of Marcellus the General, who had given charge to the contrary. The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hands, though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him, had been more worth, to an ingenuous Conqueror, than the taking of Syracuse. I have great cause to be sensible, of that of solomon's, of making many books there is no end, for I think if I should live Methusalehs' years, yet I should not make an end. Much study is a weariness unto the flesh, but by the goodness of God I find this weariness, with a little refreshing quickly to vanish, and I return unto it with as great vivacity of mind and Spirit, as ever I did before. I desire to do the task, which God hath appointed for me. And if death prevent me, yet it is good to die doing something. I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get, the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied, yet it is true I confess the more we increase in knowledge, the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge. For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement, enabled to proceed in knowledge. And this capacity of ours will never be throughly satisfied, till the enjoying of God himself, yet I see not how the nature hereof hitherunto can be said to hinder the entire possession of ourselves, whether contemplation be vain or not vain, whether it be used as a pledge of a better life to come or no, I see no reason why it hindereth or furthereth the possession of ourselves, though it hinder or further our possessing of God.  
Certainly that life to come is no part of ourselves, like as eternal death is no part of the damned selves. But eternal life is a condition that God bestows upon us, and everlasting death is a just recompense, which God inflicts upon others. Yet in what sense contemplation may be used (as you say) as a pledge of a better life to come, I am to seek. The Spirit of God and the fruits of sanctification, are the pledges and earnest penyes hereof, but contemplations are not; How Angels are said entirely to possess their angelical natures, and men not to possess their natures entirely hath need of explication. Angels have no bodies, and consequently are not capable of augmentation as we are. In this sense I conceive how we by degrees attain to a fullness of age, Angels doc not. There is a growth of our souls in knowledge also, Eph. 4. 13. in grace, 2 Pet. 3. last. This fullness of age is not all at once in us; you suppose it is so in Angels, but without distinction; for there are Angels of darkness, as well as Angels of light. What think you of Angels of darkness, do they entirely possess their Angelical nature, or no? I should think they differ not in nature Angelical, though their accidental condition be much different. As for the elect Angels, do you think they do already possess all that may belong unto them, either in respect of knowledge or glory? It appears Eph. 3. 10. that the very Angels themselves do increase in knowledge, and that by the Church. It seems also, that though they are void of sin, and so void of sorrow, in respect of themselves, yet that all tears are not wiped from their eyes in respect of us; for if there be joy in heaven for one sinner that repenteth, what is there in respect of the falls of God's children? No question but the nature of man at best is inferior to the nature of an Angel. And on the other side, as little question is to be made (I should think) whether man shall not be as happy in his kind as the elect Angels in their kind: in the 20. of Luke, our Saviour professeth, that the time shall come when we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, like unto the Angels.  
God's infinity is nothing pertinent to the comparison of men and Angels, from whom Angels as well as men are infinitely distant, as the creature from the Creator; yet this infinity of God's joy is vainly amplified, by saying, he wanteth no moment of time to enlarge or perfect it by continuance, whereas time is no measure suitable with the being of God, no nor with the being of Angels. Yet God hath continuance, it cannot be denied, both without beginning, and in respect of being, without end, which is an essential perfection of God, as much as any, as being but the interpretation of his necessary being, whereas all the being of a creature is merely by the free will of God, and yet continuance to the creature adds no perfection. For will you say that the Angels and Saints of God in heaven do grow more and more perfect by continuance. In this world for a while we grow more and more perfect by continuance. But then again it is as true, that by continuance we decay more and more both in body and mind.  
Aristotle hath said, that Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius. But of the transcendental goodness of God (you say) you now entreat not, but of the transcendental goodness of the creature, which you make to consist in doing good to others: and withal you deliver another maxim, namely, that amongst visible creatures, the better every one is in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. And I confess this latter stands in much congruity with the former. But I have already showed my dislike of the former, and given reason for it, and I see no reason to embrace the latter. A Lion is the king of beasts, but of more good he doth to others, than the inferior beasts whereon he preyeth, I am nothing conscious. An Eagle is the king of birds, yet we commonly say, that a Lark is better than a Kite. What creature more profitable than the Sun, yet I pray consider, doth not a Mouse, or an Emmet, or a Fly, in entitative perfection go beyond it? for these are animate, the Sun is not, though God sends him forth as his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroom bedecked with light & comeliness, as you are pleased to expatiate or take the air, & breathe yourself in a rhetorical flourish. God himself to the contemplation of whom the Sun you say doth invite us, though from the boundless Ocean of his internal joy and happiness (as you say) sweet streams of perpetual joy and comfort more uncessantly issue, then light from the Sun, to refresh this vale of misery. Yet I hope you will not say, his entitative goodness consists in doing good to others.  
For before he made the world, he was no less good, then since the creation; and though he had never made it, yet had he continued every way as good as now he is. And in that dispensation of this his goodness, which proceeds not from his joy and happiness, though you say so, but from the counsel and freedom of his will; though as touching the comforts of this life, God maketh his rain to fall, and Sun to shine as well upon the wicked as upon the righteous; yet as touching the dispensation of his grace, though he be most good, that way also, yet it is but towards whom he will; for that Oracle of God, I will have mercy on whom I will; and again, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, must sway more with us, than any vain conceit or imagination of man to the contrary. And why do you call this world a vale of misery? is it not in respect of God's jugements, as well as in respect of sin? which judgements of God have their course as well as mercies, how then doth perpetual joy and comfort more uncessantly issue from him, then light from the Sun, to refresh this vale of misery? Surely as the Prophet said, his song should be of mercy and of judgement: so doth God also sometimes mourn unto us, that we may weep, as well as at other times draw us to dance after his pipe.  
You conclude with telling us the causes why men are not so happy as they might be. The one is, you say, That they do not believe the eternal happiness of their Creator to be absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are. The other, That they do not consider that the absolute infinity of this his eternal happiness, is an essential cause of goodness unto all others, so far as they are capable of it. As for the first of these, what Heathen Philosopher, that acknowledged the making of the world, that acknowledged a God, did ever doubt of his eternal happiness, and that as infinite as any other of his attributes. As touching the other, doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much, when he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God; and did this make them as happy as they might be? It is true indeed, their goodness they conceived to be from themselves. 
Det vitam det opes, animum mihi ipse parabo.   
And do not you I pray concur with them in this, even in this place? For although you carry it in general terms, when you say, he is the cause of all goodness, yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodness; as when you say, God is a cause of goodness to all that are capable of it, and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are, none but themselves can make them uncapable of happiness. And where is any mention of Christ jesus in all this? where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this, which you make sufficient to bring them unto happiness? It is true, God cannot be the author of evil of sin, but God forbid that we should so maintain God to be no Author of evil, as withal to deny him to be the author of good.  
Speak plainly, do you believe that God is the author of faith, that God it is who gives repentance, that works in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure? if you believe this, than you must believe that God did decree to give men faith and repentance. But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed, who profess that God doth decree contingency, but not things contingent. And who doubts but the faith of Peter, and his repentance, the faith of Paul and his repentance, were contingents? and if God did never decree them, surely he was not the author of them; for God doth nothing in time, but what he decreed to do before all time.  
And in case you did truly acknowledge God to be the cause of all goodness, we would not quarrel with you about the term essential, which with what learning you deliver, I profess I know not; but I observe you are very liberal of your words and phrases; we were never acquainted with any more than four causes, can you tell us which of them is called by any essential, unless matter and form be called essential, because they constitute the essence of that, whose matter and form they are. But I hope you will not say that God, in this sense, is the essential cause of all our goodness.   

CHAP. XII.  
Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodness, or as it is the pattern of moral goodness in the creature.  
I do not like this Title, the disjunctive argueth, that God's goodness communicative as communicative, is the pattern of moral goodness in the creature, I know no pattern of moral goodness, which we must imitate, but that which is commended unto us in God's Law, God's communicative goodness was exercised in making of the World, and us; Is this a fit pattern for us to imitate? As touching his providence, whereby he governs the World, we are called by our Saviour, to imitate him in some particulars, as when he suffereth his rain to fall, and Sun to shine on the bad, as well as on the good.  
But in most particulars we can not, in many we may not imitate him; He caused two she bears to come out of the wood, and tear 42. children that mocked Elisha, we must not 
2. King. 〈◊〉. Matth. 5.  imitate God in the like, we must still bless them that curse us, and pray for them, that persecute us.  
The sense of imbecility and indigence in ourselves, even in this corrupt state of man, doth only provoke us the more, to show pity unto others, in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. D●do, Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco: But it doth not breed it, for it is manifest that men little exercised with the Cross, or not at all, may show more mercy, than such as have been in great misery themselves. Yet these merciful natures having tasted of misery themselves, will be the more provoked to show compassion unto men in misery.  
2. And this is true, not only in the corrupt state of man, but even in the state of integrity, for is it not said of our Saviour, 
Heb. 2. 18.  that being tempted himself, he knew how to succour them, that are tempted? It is now a days without question, among divines, that mercy and pity as they signify passions are not in God, but attributed unto him, per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are the members of our body also. But the will of 
Psal. 107. 9 Math. 10. 20.  succouring creatures in their necessity, may with propriety enough be attributed unto God, for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him, and not a sparrow falleth to the ground, without the providence of our heavenly Father, how much more, is his love enlarged towards man, who when they were sinners, sent his Son to die for them, and when they lay weltering in their blood, said unto them, live, And washed them with water, yea washed away their blood from 
Ezek. 16. 6. 9  them, and anointed them with oil: Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery, and this will, and grace, and favour of God is in Scripture phrase, called mercy. But he showeth this mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, I wonder 
Rom. 9  you should applaud that saying; Nemo sponte malus, which hath no colour of truth; Save in respect of original sin, traduced to Adam's posterity of which original sin, the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant; And you in another sense treading the author's steps, seem to maintain it, not in respect of any natural corruption that hath soured our natures, but in respect, rather of the perfection of our souls, and their native inclination unto good, for external things, you say, do so captivate the humane soul, that she cannot do, as she would, but these strings, being cut, she followeth her native sway: And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this, Nemo sponte malus, manifesting thereby, that you acknowledge the native sway of the soul to be unto good.  
But by the way you cast yourself upon an erroneous assertion, convictable of untruth, by the very light of nature; as when you say, that external things do captivate the soul; as if the object had power to the will, which is a conceit contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity. And nothing indeed, but a man's own corruption is it that captivates him unto evil. For let joseph be tempted with a wanton Mistress, yet if lust be mortified within him, her wanton invitation, shall never captivate joseph. No nor the ladies admitted to his presence, could inflame Scipio Adricanus, though a man of war, with a lustful appetit. Show a Lion grass he is nothing affected with it saith Decumenius, because it is not 
Decum. upon the parable of the sour that went forth to sow. I am. 1. 14. 2 Tim. 2. last.  the diet of a Lion, but of an Ox; Show an Ox flesh, he hath no appetite unto it, for flesh is no diet for an Ox, but for a Lion rather; every man is tempted, (saith S. james) when he is drawn away by his own concupiscence and enticed. And by working upon this concupiscence, it is that the Devil leads men captive, to do his will, no such matter could he find in our Saviour.  
And so much some conceived to be signified, when he saith: The Prince of the World cometh and sindes nought in me: 
joh. 14. 30  Yet cannot the Devil certainly prevail to every particular, nor to any particular, so as to justify, that man doth not that evil which he doth sponte; for even beasts do sponte whatsoever they do, and man even the worst of men doth not only of his own accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also, yea and freely too; And yet the Devil is none of those external things you speak of, with far more colour of reason did they proceed, who maintained, that look what men did of passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraint of doing voluntarily, not from things external, but internal rather even from the passion themselves, but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long ago. 
Eth. 3.   
3. We must with patience expect and wait, till you come to your text, and entreat of the theme proposed, to wit of the infinity and immutability, of divine goodness communicative. The first sentence is not well stated; for Sarah was old stricken in age, and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women, when hearing from the Lord, something concerning the conceaving of a child by her, she said; After I am waxed old, and my 
Gen. 18. ●2  Lord also, shall I have lust? Lust, certainly may be in old age and not a sin, lust is one thing, inordinate lust is another thing, and where lust is, why should it seem a Monster, in corrupt nature, for that lust to be inordinate? And if a proud man be brought to a beggar's condition, why should it seem monstrous, if his moral condition be not altered, but he continue as proud as ever? As Plato discerned a proud heart, through Antisthenes' patched coat; And Diogenes might be as proud of his tub, as Alexander of his Crown; And a man may be as proud of carrying a cloak bag beh●nde him, as Cardinal Camprins, was of his sumpter horse, that followed after him; for pride though it be more hateful in one then in another, as the wiseman speaks, yet it disdeyns no condition, but accepteth entertainment in every breast; how much more in the breasts of Kings, and such may be found even amongst the wand'ring planets on earth, otherwise called Rogues, and beggars. Certainly men of a shifting disposition, if they have gotten wealth thereby, it is nothing strange if they continue their trade still, considering that Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit: especially if they have prospered well by it. And yet I confess, men sometimes give over their former trades, as horse leeches leave sucking, when their bodies are full; but I do not think, they can so easily, leave off their manners, neither do temptations, beget any sins, but rather provoke our corruptions, to actuate themselves; as a man's corrupted will and affection, to actuate itself, and bring forth actual sin.  
And as the Apostle saith, Sin not only provoked by temptation, 
Rom. 7. 9▪  but even taking occasion by the Commandment, doth bring forth in us all manner of concupiscences. It seems you are a very moral man yourself, that are so well persuaded of others▪ but in the mean time, you are little thankful unto God's grace; For this your morality, when you ascribe it to a general inclination of nature, belike you are loath to be beholding to God's grace; for the morality of your nature, I wonder the less at the prodigious blindness of your mind, maintaining that he, who hates his brother, desires, to deserve well of him, whereas S. john saith, that he, who hateth his brother, is a manslayer, that the avaricious person, desires to be liberal, and the 
〈◊〉 john. 3.  Hypocrite, desires to be upright, and the unmerciful to be compassionate, the Extortioner or robber to be just, and the Niggard to be bountiful, which is as much as to say, that the hot fire, desires to be cold as earth, and the cold earth desires to be as hot as fire.  
Why do you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a natural man, even of the worst of men, and say that they have a desire to repent, to please God, to be holy, to be religious? Continuance in sin was wont to be called altera natura, and secunda natura; and the Prophet justifieth it, where he saith, Can a black Moor change his skin, or a 
jer. 13. 23.  Leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed unto evil. The sight of God's judgements causing fear, may restrain from evil, like as an hedge of thorns, crossing a man's 
Host 2. 6.  way, may hinder him from finding his paths: But as for impulsions unto goodness, in a man abandoned unto his lusts, and who, as the Apostle speaks, commits sin with greediness, 
Eph. 4▪ ●8.  and is grown to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I know none. And Seneca seems to be your only Oracle for this; a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon. And yet upon the scanning, Seneca alleged by you in this place, I find pleads against you, rather than for you, as who plainly professeth, that They who err in matters of life and manners, are delighted with their errors; every criminal person is delighted with his crime, one sola●th himself in adultery, another delights in overreaching others, and in theft. He saith, that naughtiness is afraid of darkness itself, which may restrain from evil, I confess, but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodness, no more than his last conclusion, that naughtiness may be safe, but never secure. Which conclusion seves you for a passage to the next Section.  
4. It is very true, an evil conscience will not suffer a man to be secure; for if a good conscience be a continual feast, surely 
Prov. 15. 15▪  an evil conscience holds a man continually upon the rack. Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum. The wicked sly when no man pursueth him, saith Solomon; and, There is no peace, saith 
Esa. 48▪ 22▪  the Lord, to the wicked. It was one of the judgements God threatened to his own people, when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him; namely, that the sound of a leaf 
Levit. 26. 36.  should chase them, and they should fly, no man pursuing them: but this is no evidence of any impulsion unto goodness. And when Seneca saith, Even in minds drenched in the dregs of filthiness, there remains still a sense of goodness: this is no more than that which the Apostle informeth us of, when he saith, they have a conscience accusing them, by virtue of that law that is 
Rom. 2.  written in their hearts: yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drenched in the dregs of filthiness. He acknowledgeth elsewhere, that some through the course of sin become past all feeling, and have their conscience seared with an hot iron. And it is a proverbial speech in the world, Nemo senex metuit jovem. Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodness by the conviction of their conscience, & a far 
Eph. 4. 18. 1 Tim. 4.  different thing to have an impulsion unto goodness.  
Be it that the mind of man in that it is endued with reason, hath the rules of equity imprinted in it, is it not as true, that the rules of iniquity are imprinted in it also? doth he not know evil as well as good? Nay, hath he not more knowledge of evil then of good, at least as touching the compass of it? doth not the Lord complain of this, where he saith, They are wise to do evil, but as touching good they have no understanding. If 
Yer. 4. 22.  this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God, what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common 
Eph. 2. 12.  wealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise? especially considering what d●fference the Apostle puts between these, when he saith, We jews by nature, not sinners of 
Gal. 2. 15.  the Gentiles.  
And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferior faculties, she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity, as rules of equity. And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to be stamped upon faculties, that are not intellectual? appetites are guided by rules, in their motions, not instamped with them. Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing, not inherent in them. And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will, as well as on sensual appetites? or if it be so, why should you reckon the will an inferior faculty in comparison to the mind? whereas indeed the will rules in man as king, the mind is but his privy Councillor.  
To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature, as thus, If the mind have such good rules, and withal seeks to instamp them upon inferior faculties, how comes it to pass that there is so little love of virtue in many? your answer is, that this proceeds from their disposition, being overgrown with sensual desires. But by your leave this is a weak reason, for it only transfers the difficulty, but answers not the doubt; for still I may demand, how it came to pass that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensual desires, and without grace what place is left for any goodness in the nature of man? Philosophers had a love of virtue, but can you show they had any love of God? their most virtuous actions in the state of nature, was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata, 
Aug. contra jul. P●lag lib. 4. c. 3.  glorious sins? For the discerning of true virtue aright he gives us this rule, Noveris non officiis, sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes. I am sure they were not ordered by God's word, nor referred to his glory, nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God, yet they looked for justification by them: and as for repentance and confession of sins, they make that no part of their integrity. So that whether their knowledge were in a mist, or out of a mist, it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God: as the Sun, whether in a mist or out of a mist, was never known to set moist stuff on fire, but ●st dries it, then fires it. And our Saviour was bold to profess, that Publicans and 
Mat. 21. 31  Harlots●ntred into the kingdom of heaven before Scribes and pharisees.  
If the notions of the mind be ideal characters, you may, if it please you, bestow the phrase as well on notions of evil, as notions of good; and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unsealed affection of youth, it seems the bad are more permanent; yet these natural notions of good are far distant from true notions of God, or of true goodness; A heart hardened with vast desires, you say, 〈◊〉 hardly cured; but I pray tell me, when one man transgresser● for an handful of barley, or a morsel of bread, another saith, Si violandum 
Ezek. 13. 19  est jus impij causa violandum est, which of these is the greater hardness? yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape, so you signify the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame. I confess, to make a Camel 
Mark 10. 25. Gal. 1. 11.  go through the eye of a needle, is not impossible unto God: and what natural man hath not a body of sins to be cut off by spiritual circumcision? but that this you make to be a work of grace, you give not the least intimation: nay you rather imply the contrary, when you say, that if hopes of supplies from internals be intercepted, a work that may be done by course of nature, than you say, the soul thus freed, becomes more fashionable to reason; a saying that would become Seneca well, that knew no reason but natural; but full ill becoming a Christian Divine: let desire be never so vast, as you speak, let seven devils possess a man, yet the strong man Christ, by the power of his grace is able to cast them out, and make even Ekron become as the jebusite.  
Without grace, will any man's morality commend him in the sight of God? As Lebanon is turned into Carmell, so 
Zach. 9 7.  Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest. And most moral men have been as great enemies to Christianity, as any other; like as the Scribes and pharisees were greatest enemies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficial draught of reason, that endeavoureth to stamp the heart with real and solid kindness. I know no reason; this in my judgement deserves to be accounted a substantial operation. And when you tell me that Affability consists in this, you go about to teach me more than ever I learned out of Aristotle. I had thought affability might have place in all men, as a moral virtue, whether they were enabled to stamp the heart with real and solid kindness yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures, but not temperance; yet Epicurus, if my reading deceive me not, was known to be as temperate a man in moderating his appetite, as most that then lived. And that because he made man's happiness to consist in pleasure, the sense whereof was quickened by temperance, and dulled by intemperance. And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitableness to his neighbours or brethren, either in time of plenty, or time of scarcity. You do him the greater wrong, to charge him, with sucking in cruelty as wine, and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates: neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you do him in deeds; as for cutting morsels out of other men's throats; this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate man's diet: is fitter for a superstitious Papist, that in case the Priest should vomit the host, thinks the people bound to licks it up.  
The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first; between which, what suitable matter hath occurred, let the Reader judge. Though indigence be the mother of cruelty, yet herehence it followeth not, that it is not the mother of pity, for, Rara est concordia fratrum: Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother, yet there is a great difference in indigence, as the cause of these. Indigence heretofore suffered, is made the cause of pity; but indigence in present alone, is the cause of cruelty, and that only in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty.  
5 Philosopher-like, or rather mere naturalist-like, you make error of judgement the root of all evil: as the cause of covetousness you make to be the opinion of want, either that is for the present, or may be for the time to come. How far are you different from Aquinas, who maintains, that our wills are more corrupt, quoad appetitum boni, than our minds, quoad intellectum veri: yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his, Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor. Saint Paul, I think, was a man regenerate when he made that profession, I see a law in my members rebelling against 
Rom. 7.  the law of my mind, and leading me captive to the law of sin. It is true, there are bosom sins (as we call them) like familiar spirits to particular men, and so they may be dispensed withal in these, they will show themselves very moral in other points, and think it reason God should be merciful unto them in breaking one commandment, so they keep the other nine. Herod heard john Baptist gladly, until he touched upon the keeping of his brother Phillip's wife. judas was content to follow Christ, so he might b●are the bag, and so long as he could make best wages by his service; but thirty pieces of silver moved him to give his master the bag, and to betray him. A man for judgement able to arbitrate and void of exorbitant affections, which might expose him to partiality or prejudice, no doubt is the fittest arbitrator. But if you ask me whereto this running discourse tends, I cannot answer you yet, it may be you may answer yourself hereafter. Internal moderation mixed with outward competency, is the only supporter of true constancy. I had thought, integrity had made a man fit for arbitrement, not constancy, for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just; I presume, it proceeds from constant integrity, That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiency of estate, not only competent, but more than competent. And to my thinking, even in the course of natural morality, a virtuous condition should not depend upon outward things; the exercise of virtue doth, I confess, but not virtue itself. Bias his saying was, Omnia meo mecum porto: but we are taught of a better Master, that, Godliness is great gain with contentment, 
1. Tim. 6. 6.  and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his mind, which is delivered without distinction of poor or rich, like as that which followeth, The belly of the wicked shall want: And that, a dinner of green herbs, and love with it, is better 
Prov. 13. 25 Prov. 15. 17  than a stalled ox with hatred and strife. The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him, who answereth to the joy of his heart; and the most glorious King that ever was, professeth that, A good conscience is a continual feast; and David the father. 
Pro. 15. 15  a great conqueror, found no blessedness in any temporal state, but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects, saying, Blessed is the man whose iniquity is forgiven, and whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man to whom the 
Psal. 32. 1.  Lord imputeth no sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile. The truth is, if our pretences depend upon outward things, they shall be as frail as those are mutable; and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God? As there is no being but from God, so no permanence of being but from God: & till the time of temptation a man is not known; let the rain fall, and the floods rise, and the wind beat upon the house, than it will appear whether it were built upon the rock, or upon the sand. We know the Angels fell, we know Adam fell; and how vain a thing is it to discourse of any natural permanency in virtuous courses amongst natural men that knew not God. By the way, your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous; of satisfying desires we usually hear, but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse. You proceed to discourse unto us of another root of unconstancy, which you call contingency, which is a term of art with you and your peculiar dialect: this root you will have to be, the infinite capacity of reasonable creatures, conceits or desires, within whose compass their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular, as it were a star fixed in too wide a sphere. And this applied to the fall of Angels, in whom we find a double change or alteration; the one moral, to wit, a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created, into the state of sin; the second natural, to wit, a change from a blessed state, into a wretched and damned condition; the first change was their own work, as wherein they sinned; the second, the work of God whereby they were punished. Their inconstancy in not standing upright, but falling into sin, is only pertinent to the present purpose, and to inquire after the root of this, is to inquire after the cause of their fall. Now the cause hereof, as it is plain, so if we please, we may as plainly express it; for, as for their possibility to fall, that rose from the condition of their natures, being made by God free agents, and so accordingly, a law being given them by God, they might freely obey it, freely disobey it: what need we strain our wits for obscure expression of so plain a truth, as by referring it to the infinite capacity of their conceits or desires, within whose compass, their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular? What need we affect such perturbation of speech, in confounding conceits with desires, and placing finite motions within the compass of desires, infinitely capacious; which motions undoubtedly were their desires (for they sinned questionless in desiring somewhat) and comparing desires to spheres, and again, desires to stars fixed in spheres, that so the sin of Angels may be sinely phrasified, and called an excentrical motion; thus in catching after a phrase, you obscure the sense of a sentence, which when all is well scanned, is but this, the root of the Angels fall was this, that he might commit an irregular motion, which might have been done, although the capacity of his desire had not been infinite, that is, though he had not affected the greatness of the divine Majesty; for this I take to be the meaning, and yet this meaning is little congruous. For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide, and the finite motion you compare to a star fixed in this sphere, and to it you ascribe the irregular motion, not to the sphere, and that very incongruously too; for the finite motion of Angels you speak of, was their very sin; but the star fised in his sphere, is not his irregular motion. If ever Divinity and Philosophy have been frayed out of their wits, by any man's discourse, it is your discourse that hath done this deed. You suppose the sin of Angels consisted in affecting Majesty infinite, whereof, you say, he was more uncapable, than a whirrie of an Arposies sail. But how I pray you could such a thing be affected, without error of judgement? And was it possible that error, and so Fowl an error of judgement could be in an Angel before his fall? Should not so poena be prior culpa? Hereupon it is that Scotus maintains, there could be no affecting of any such thing, but only complacentia simplex therein, not that he did affect it, well knowing it to be a thing impossible. For my part, I do as little like that simplex complacentia he speaks of.  
No wise man (in this state of our corruption) will please himself, in conceiting himself to be a King, much less to be a God, but reckons of such fancies as most vain and frivolous: let us leave unto Clowns such conceits, O if I were a King I would live like a Lord, I would eat fat beese, and glorry porridge, and have a whip should cry slash. Dic mihi si sieres tu Leo qualis eris. And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concur with him in so unreasonable an affectation? Do you think the chief called in Scripture the Devil, did sin in one thing, to wit, in affecting majesty infinite, and the rest, called his Angels, in another thing, to wit, in standing with him, and standing for him? I should rather think their sin was one and the same: And I make no doubt but their sin was pride. Sure I am, they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eye, but to pride, spirits may be subject as well as men. But wherein this pride manifested itself, that is a great mystery; but if they did affect divine Majesty, I should think it was in a way whereby they were capable of it: and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing. And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angel, and as many as he would, as well as man. But I do not say that they did affect it; I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entered into their thoughts. But as God took a course to put Adam and Eve to the trial of their obedience, so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience, which became a scandal to many of them, through pride and disdain to be in subjection, not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God, but more likely to some inferior nature, which was to be advanced to the throne of God. For as God made this visible world for the service of man, so God might withal reveal unto them what his purpose was, namely, to advance the nature of man unto his own throne, so that all the Angels of God must worship him: Th●s I say might be the rock of offence to them, of any more fit than this, I cannot conceive.  
As touching the roof of man's unconstancy, you are nothing so curious, as about the Angels. But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth, but merely to the involving of a plain truth, by most wild expressions. The bitter fruit of Adam's prevarication we all feel in a general impotency unto that which is truly good, or to resist temptation unto sin in a gracious manner. But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation, without grace, but not in a gracious manner. For what think you? is it necessary that as often as the Devil tempts a man to incontinency, to murder, to theft, he should as often yield to the committing of any of these? It is apparent that many natural considerations may restrain us: but in a gracious manner, that is, in such a manner as is acceptable unto God, no man can resist any temptation unto sin, without grace.  
That maxim, Mora facilius moventur, hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it, for it proceeds of the same individuals, such as Adam and his children are not; yet by Adam's yielding unto sin, through Satan's temptation, all his posterity are made more prone to sin, than any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinful act. For a sinful or vicious act, in ordinary course, hath no more power to habituate a man's inclination unto evil, than a virtuous action hath unto good: but far greater is man's proneness unto sin, since and through the fall of Adam, then by any virtuous action is our proneness unto good.  
Touching your close, I say, to seek our own welfare with another's harm, is not to seek that which is good and right; yet in some cases another man's harm may be sought, without any transgression. For undoubtedly the judge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor: no nor the Israelites neither, in robbing the Egyptians; nor Abraham, in going about to cut the throat of his own innocent child Isaac.  
6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations, which you say is wrought by inequality, partly of our natural propensions, partly of the means which minister their several contentments or annoyances. Herein you propose a distinction, but I do not find you very careful to follow it, and make it appear how you accommodate yourself thereto. Great means of annoyances are apt to breed great fears, and fear is a strong passion hindering the course of reason, and of moral duty, according unto reason.  
Peter's confession of Christ at the very time when, and in the place where Christ was in his enemy's hands that sought his death, might have hazarded his life; and the consideration hereof, being suddenly put unto it, either to confess him or deny him, surprised him with fear; this fear exposed him to deny his master. Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poisoning of Sir Thomas Overbury, saw manifestly, that his refusal would have been an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower, which he had bought with a great sum of money. This temptation prevailed with him: we commonly say, The greater is the temptation, the less is the sin. So where small means of contentments are, the greater is the temptation to discontent, and to taste of the bitter fruits thereof. But I do not find that the particular instances following, do any way savour of this member of your distinction. You seem to keep yourself wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of natural propensions; yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected. For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit: Wit is a natural faculty, I confess, I never heard it called a natural propension till now. But as for wealth, it is neither propension, nor faculty natural, nor at all natural. It is true, I confess, that some men's wealth gets the start of wit, as he observed, that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors, When I behold your wealth, I wonder at your wit; again, when I behold your wit, I wonder at your wealth. I confess willingly, that to abound in wealth, is to abound in temptations unto sin; that fullness of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodom, 
Ezek. 16. Deut. 32.  that when Jeshurun waxed fat, he spurned with the heel. But the temptations herehence arising, prevail only on them that want wit, is an observation I have not been acquainted with before, neither am prone to believe it. I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians, or of Xerxes, who (as I remember) it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure; nor to Heliogabalus; among the Roman Emperors Nero was luxurious enough, I never heard it proceeded from want of wit, for the first quinquennium of his reign he manifested himself to be no fool: Hercules servivit Omphale, was it for want of wit? That the Merchant's son of whom it is reported, that in one night at Venice he spent sieve hundred pounds upon his five senses, had his honesty been answerable to his wit, he had kept his reputation with the best. And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys, that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turk, I never heard defamed for want of wit. Yet we commonly say, many men have good wits, but they are in fools keeping. And indeed a fool in Solomon's computation doth usually stand for a knave. And it is most true, that such are most unwise, as appears by the issue; for by such courses they shorten their days, and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves, there to grow green before their heads be grey; and after they are gone, their remembrance rots, and they leave a very ill savour behind them.  
But I should think, that dull fellows are neither so inventious of mad courses, nor of so active spirits to prosecute them, as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding. I grant men of great wits have not always revenues answerable: But I should think it is their pride, rather than their wit, that instigates them to injurious courses. For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their minds, this must needs expose them to lewd courses. Yet a good wit, I confess, to maintain a bad cause, may animate some more to molest and vex, and it is not the greatness of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses. Though men's bodies overgrow their souls, yet if they have not a spirit answerable, they will prove but lubbers, though great lubbers, as great as Gog-Magog, whom Corineus met withal at Dover, when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsy turvy, over and over. And it is a common saying, that a short man needs not a stool to give a great lubber a box in the ear: though he that is weak had need to be witty, yet it is not always true, or for the most part, that weak persons are wily: and where wiliness is found, it is a temptation strong enough without weakness, to move men to practise unlawful policy, where grace is wanting. But to say that wiliness shelters itself with craft, is as much as to say, it shelters itself with itself; and if the distinction be put between the disposition of wiliness that is within, and wily crafty courses without, well, something else, to wit, men's private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltered hereby, yet wiliness cannot. For like as wisdom is not sheltered, but rather discovered & laid open by wise courses, & folly by foolish courses, so also wiliness & craftiness, by wily and crafty courses. I see no reason to justify that saying, men love their wits more strongly, when they perceive them set upon that which in itself is good. And I give a reason for my negation, though you give none for your affirmation; for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite, the more strongly doth the appetite affect it; and the more convenient things are unto us, the more we love ourselves for affecting them. Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite, than objects temperate; and avaricious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person, than courses of liberality; and generally to all men in the state of corruption, the pleasures of sin are more grateful than the pleasure of righteous courses. Nay, a man regenerate may for good reason seem not to be so strongly carried in his affections unto good, as the wicked are in their affections unto evil; my reason is, because in the regenerate there dwells a flesh lusting against the 
Gal. 5. 23.  spirit, which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good: whereas on the contrary, in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh, to remit or qualify the fervour or fury, rather of their affection unto evil; especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them.  
Again, to do good to the poor, is not good in itself (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the University, that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that vainglory clotheth the poor as well as charity. And how can that be a good will to the poor, that practiseth to cousin others for the gratifying of the poor? ●o may he be said to bear a good will to Paul, that robbeth Peter to pay Paul; yet that which he willeth is good to Paul, I confess, but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfy Paul; it may well proceed from other intentions. No man is bound in conscience to hinder any man's welfare, or his own either, no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses; no nor doth the obligation rest in general, but it concludes in special, all good courses that lie in his power: so to tender it, a man is bound and not otherwise. You have discoursed of diverse enormities, in the close you open the cause of them unto us, and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence: this you say is the cause, not why such enormities are, but of the possibility of them. Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression. Therefore the infinite capacity of finite existence is the cause why sin is possible. I thought it had been satisfaction enough in this point, to conceive, that because we are in subjection to a Lord, who can give us a law, and are free agents, therefore we may either obey a law given unto us, or transgress it. And because, look what is the cause why disobedience is possible, the same is the cause why obedience also is possible. It followeth, that the cause why obedience is possible, must be the infinite capacity of finite existence. And because by finite existence you mean a reasonable creature, your meaning a little more plain is this, The reason why a man may sin, or abstain from sin, is his infinite capacity. We say, it is the liberty of his will, being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny, nor any sober man: herehence it followeth, that this infinite capacity you cant of, is but the liberty of man's will in subjection to the law of a superior Lord. For man being free, may overcope, as you speak, that is, to express in a small and still voice, without thundering, or fire, or mighty wind, to do that which he should not. And thus having attained to your plain meaning, we bid farewell to your mystical expressions of so plain a truth, by comparing this infinite capacity you speak of, to too wide a sphere, and finite motions, to a slarro fixed in that sphere, and thereby exposed to excentrical and irregular motions, which I think neither Copernicus, nor Tycho Brahe, were they alive, could well tell how to expound unto us, or to their selves either. We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible, as for the life and improvement of this possibility (for so you are pleased to bestow the being, and life, and improvement upon it) by the inequality of internal propensions, never fitly matching outward occurrences, that we reasonably well understand, and have discoursed thereof what we thought fit, enough, if not more then enough.  
7 At length you are come to the house itself of your present discourse, according to the title of this Chapter; hitherto we have been complementally entertained in the porch. But, in God, you say, there is no place for exorbitancy, he being an incomprehensible sphere, which hath omnipotency for his axis, ubiquity for its centre: if you had added, & nusquam for his circumference, the illustration, according to your former subtleties, had been more complete. We say, that God in doing what he will cannot sin, because he hath no superior Lord to give him laws, to bind him; his own wisdom alone can and doth direct him, and it becomes his wisdom to manifest his own glorious nature; and therefore whatsoever he can do, in case he doth it, it shall be wisely done, for as much as his power therein is manifested. You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this, that his capacities cannot overcope, though the Angels did. One branch of being in him you say, cannot missway or overtop another: what your meaning is I know not, but look unto it that you do not contradict yourself, in maintaining, that God can do some things by his omnipotency, which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him, which is as much as to say, that he can do that which is unjust. And if this be not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope, I do not know what is. To say that God possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have, is to say, that he possesseth nothing; for it is impossible that God should desire to have any thing, for this implies a want of something belonging to the deity. It is directly false and foul to say, that God is whatsoever possible can be; for if it be true, than it ever was true, seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time, and consequently, before the world was, it was true; wherehence it will follow, that God is an Angel, a man, and every vile thing, as we account them amongst the creatures: for all these were possible to be before the world was; neither will it salve this foul sore, to say, that God is a man, or an ox, infinitely, for he is no bodily substance at all, neither can any bodily substance be infinitely. We say, that God is all things eminently, whereby we mean no more than this, God is the cause of all things; and better thus in plain terms to express our meaning, then by affecting curious strains, and forms of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn & derision amongst atheists. God is of necessary being, and therefore of himself eternal, without beginning, and without end. To perfect himself, or to be greater or better than he is, is to suppose that he is imperfect, and not Optimus maximus, which is a thing impossible, and therefore not subject to, nor the object of Almighty power; nay, it destroys it, as one part of contradiction destroys the other: for Almighty power were formally destroyed, if it were imperfect, or less than Almighty. Therefore all outward employments are for the good of his creature, but how? not as tending to the good of the creature as God's end, but both his employments for the creatures good, and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory. Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much, that both from him and for him are all things: and the Prophet also, God hath made all things for himself, even the wicked for the day of evil: and 
Rom. 11. last. Prov. 16. 4 August. de praedest. & gratia.  that for good reason, as many hundred years ago hath been acknowledged in these terms, Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent, habui potestatem. If Gods will to have creatures when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essential goodness, I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are? The scripture tells us, that God worketh all things according to 
Eph. 1. 11.  the counsel of his own will; so he did when he made the world, so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it, so he should if he should set an end to all, and return them to the gulf of nothing from whence they came. It is false to say, that the continuance of being is desired by all, as the stamp of God's goodness: for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation, as by those Christians that do believe it. And as for the making of the world, it is in holy Scripture (the language of God) attributed to the word of God, to the breath of God, to the wisdom of God, to the power of God, to the counsel of God; but never, that I know, ascribed to the goodness of God. And it had need of explication, to show how God's goodness is communicated unto all, much more how it is communicated unto a stone; yet the earth is filled with his goodness, in as much as God provides for every thing that which is good for it; so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort, we call it God's goodness, for as much as things which are good to us, are derived to us from God, and therein we have a taste of his goodness towards us, in that he doth good unto us. Your last position I have heretofore spoken of, and showed the incongruity of it. That which is good, and that whereunto it is good, must be different; but the entity of any thing is not different from itself, and therefore it cannot be good unto itself, as you affirm.  
8. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serus irarum, slow to wrath, even against sinners that dishonour him to his face. But to say he is never swayed to sudden revenge, is a more bold assertion then sound. Did not Zimri and Cosbi perish in their incestuous act, and give up both lust and ghost together, without leisure to enjoy their sin, much less respite for repentance? Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborn, notwithstanding former sins, though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden. So perished Herod in his pride, and Balthasar in his revel, and the Israelites in the wilderness; while the meat was in their mouths, and the delicate flesh of Quails lay between their teeth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and before they could swallow their sweet morsels, sent them to the graves of lust to be swallowed by them.  
Again, Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven; were not some children in their mother's wombs, some hanging at their mother's breasts, some newly come to the use of reason, all consumed to ashes, and made an example of God's wrath, and suffered the vengeance of eternal fire, as Ind speaketh? Here is no forbearance of diverse particular persons: so it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be at the coming of the Son of man; for while they shall say, peace and safety, sudden destruction shall come upon them, as sorrow upon 
〈◊〉 Thes. 5. 2  a woman in travail, and they shall not escape.  
The difference you make between man and God, I like well; man by forbearance may bereave himself of power to execute vengeance, God cannot: and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the very reprobates; but towards his elect, a power exercised in another kind, yet a power too, namely, to sanctify the consideration of his forbearance, to bring them unto repentance; as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sins, by the blood of his Son. A sentence related out of the book of Wisdom. ch. 12. 15, 16, you say is canonical, although the Author be not; a distinction that I never read nor heard of before. And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical, the canonical Scriptures shall be multiplied unreasonably, not out of the book of Wisdom only, but out of the rest of the works of Philo the jew, and josephus too, yea and out of Senecaes' works, and Plutarch's morals; not to speak of Plato, and Aristotle, or your Plotinus. But let us consider this canonical sentence you speak of and weigh the truth of it in the balance of the Sanctuary. I pray, wherein had our Saviour Christ and the Son of God deserved to be punished? And did not God (think you) think it agreeable to his power to condemn him, notwithstanding his innocence, and his fervent prayers to be delivered from that cup, but with submission to the will of his Father? I pray consider the martyrdom of God's Saints, were their punishments according to their deserts? Nay, what think you? is it not agreeable to God's power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was? yet we do not say that God condemns any man, that hath not deserved to be punished, the Son of God and our Saviour only excepted. But the desert of eternal death is not only in sin actual, but in sin original also, which Pelagius did not say, Arminius doth not, whether you do or no, I know not; the latter clause, which is this, Because thou art the Prince of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all, makes a show to plead for universal grace, I cannot tell whether you lick your lips at this; yet the author of the book could not be ignorant what a difference, as touching the participation of his grace, God had put between the jews and the Gentiles, for, He had showed his word unto jacob, his statutes and ordinances unto Israel: But he 
Psal. 147. 19  had not dealt so with every nation, neither had the Heathen knowledge of his laws. And the Apostle, who undoubtedly was canonical, to speak in your own phrase, hath plainly professed, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.  
And as for the reason here used, drawn from this, that he is Lord of all, the Apostle himself taketh notice of it, but in a different manner, Rom. 10. 12. There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian, for he that is Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him: and who are they that call upon him, but they that believe in him? for it followeth, How can they call upon him in whom they have not believed? Yet like as it is the part of parents, not only to bring children forth, but after to provide for their bringing up: so God doth not only make things, but also preserveth them: and for their preservation causeth the Sun to shine, and his rain to fall, as well on the wicked as on the just; always provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right, but merely according to the good pleasure of his own will. For what grace was showed to infants, either unborn, or hanging at their mother's breasts, which perished in the flood, and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven? and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Niniveh that could not discern between the right hand and the left, and also much cattle, yet God was not bound to spare them. And can you doubt, but as many as these, if not in Sodom and Gomorra, yet at least, or rather many more, perished in Noah's flood. Yet by the way, this sparing of the Ninivites was but as touching salvation temporal, not spiritual.  
You have but trifled a long time, now you begin to be serious, yet in little or no congruity to the theme; you were more than half way over this chapter, before you came to entreat of God's goodness, and now you come to inculcate it, not in the infinity or immutability of it, but in the generality of it unto all, as whereby he wils and desires indifferently the salvation of all. This is the voluntas antecedens that so many are enamoured with now adays, and you as much as any, wherewith we are like to be acquainted much more in your following chapters. And a chapter you have hereof expressly in your book of Providence. But first you beat another bush where the bird is not; only it seems to have a reach a far off to something that is of kin to it; you demand, What lord would spoil his proper inheritance? what Architect would disgrace his own work? implying, that surely, God will not. Now if you had withal told us whom you do oppose in this, and in what particular point, we might be the bolder to reply in knowing what to answer; which now we do not because of your concealments. All creatures are the works of God, which as by generation they are wrought, so by corruption they are defaced: What a beautiful piece of work was Absolom? What a wise piece of work was Solomon? What a strong piece of work was Samson? yet these works of God are all defaced. And the defacing of them is the work of God undoubtedly, as well as the making of them. And no marvel, for when that work, for which God hath appointed them, is at an end, to what end should he continue them, considering that he made them but for himself? Nay, Kingdoms and Nations God hath raised, and made them glorious; then again, those glorious Kingdoms he hath defaced. Perhaps you will say, but the defacing of these is for sin. Be it so, yet God could set an end, both to kingdoms and to the whole world, though there were no sin: for God's well-being depends not upon his work, the world, as man's well-being depends upon his inheritance, yea, and upon the work of his own hands: for the master of it could have no comfortable habitation without an house, and every tradesman lives by his trade, and therefore it stands him upon not to deface his work when he hath made it. Again, only reasonable creatures are capable of sin, yet all other creatures are the workmanship of God, which he maketh and defaceth at his pleasure, without any prejudice to his wisdom or to his goodness. Yet there is another manner of defacing, and that is by damnation; and herein I know no colour of inveighing against any man, unless it be in the behalf of infants, as many as perish in original sin; wherein if it please you, or any man else, to show your teeth, or horns, we will be nothing dismayed, by God's assistance, but ready to encounter you. Yet there is another defacing, and that is by sin; so we say the Devil and his Angels defaced themselves by their free and voluntary rebellion against God: so Adam defaced himself, by a voluntary and free action, harkening to the voice of his wife; and Eve to the voice of the Serpent; each voluntarily and freely neglecting to hearken to the voice of God, and to maintain the consideration thereof always before their eyes. Thus every man, even the unregenerate, yea, and Devils themselves, do still continue voluntarily and freely to sin against God: so that this defacing is not the work of God, but of the creature, it being a thing impossible that God should be the author of sin, because it is impossible that he should do any thing that he ought not, of any thing in other manner than he ought. Again, it is impossible that he should omit any thing, or in anyother manner than he ought. And no other means can be devised to make any one become the author of sin. But it is enough for you to propose your interrogatories at pleasure. And in the third place you bring in another interrogatory, different from all the rest, which is more suitable with your tenet; for the delivery whereof in good time, you seem already to travail in childbirth, and that is this, Who would leave a good foundation bare or naked, unless he be not able to rear it up without injustice. I profess I wondered a long time, to what purpose the last clause of this exception was pulled in by the ears; for if a man want means to finish an house which he hath begun, though he would be unjust, yet hath he no certainty to enable himself for the finishing of that work he hath begun. But by comparing it well with the sentence following, I seem to spring your meaning. The foundation which God hath laid, is the creation of our reasonable natures, the finishing of this work, is the adding of salvation, or an happy being to this natural being. Thus to finish the work in every one, it is the will and pleasure of God, by your profession. This in another Tract of yours, that yet hath not seen the light of the press, you amplify, and call it, A most earnest desire in God of the salvation of all, and every one, though he much desire it, is, as here you say, because he cannot do it without injustice. And why so? Is it because they are sinners? why, what then shall become of us all, seeing we are all sinners? There be but two things that might be replied, the one is, that though all have sinned, yet Christ hath satisfied for the sins of his elect, Rom. 8. 33. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, it is God that justifieth, who shall condemn us? It is Christ which is dead, or rather risen again, who is also at the right hand of God, and maketh request also for us. But I presume, this kind of answer is no lettuce for your lips, for that were to maintain, that God willeth the salvation of none but of his elect. 2. The other answer is, that though all are sinners, yet all do not die in impenitency. To this I reply. 1. That if Christ hath made satisfaction for all their sins, I see no reason why they should not be saved, notwithstanding their impenitency: for, what justice can require, that damnation should be suffered for those sins for which full satisfaction is already made. 2. God could give them repentance, if it pleased him, as he gave to Israel, Act. 5. 31. Him hath God lift up with his right hand, to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance unto Israel, and forgiveness of sins. So then, Christ gives not only forgiveness of sins to them that repent, but he it is that gives repentance itself also: These be no Cabalismes, but the plain testimony of God's word. And as to the jews, so to the Gentiles also, Act. 11. 19 When they heard this they held their peace, and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life. And accordingly Saint Paul warns Timothy, to carry himself gently towards them that are without, waiting the time, when God will give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth, and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devil, by whom they were led captive to do his will. By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation, when you say, Wheresoever God hath laid the one (to wit natural being, it is to all that rightly consider his wisdom, truth, and goodness, and assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to finish it with the other. Why the truth of God is directly against it, professing, that he hath mercy on whom he will, and heardeneth whom he will: and that the same word of God is, a savour of life unto life, to them that are saved; he doth not say, to them that are careful to prepare themselves, and a savour of death unto death, unto them that perish, and a good savour unto God in both; he doth not say, to them that do not prepare themselves. And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are, even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation; for they believed, as there the Apostle professeth, as much as to say, the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them, and wot you the reason hereof? Why surely because they were ordained to salvation, like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that, God added to the Church day by day, such as should be saved. You might with as much modesty profess, that in as much as God hath made every man, It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to give every man repentance, before he drops out of the world. God's gifts are without repentance; it is true of the gifts of sanctification, but it is as true, that God repented that he made man. That the current of God's joyful beneficence can admit no intermission, is most untrue, for he dispenseth it freely, so he continueth it as freely; For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will, that is, nullo necessitatis obsequio, as Ambrose expoundeth it. Nay it doth admit intermission in this world. In the world to come, indeed, it shall admit no intermission, in this it doth, both in respect of blessings temporal, and in respect of motions spiritual. For as touching blessings temporal, God showeth the back sometimes, and not the face, jer. 18. 17. And as touching spiritual motions and consolations, what moved the Lord to cry out upon the cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me, but the intermission of these? It is true, sorrow to us hath no other original than our own sin, yet no sin in Christ could be found to be the original of his sorrow. And though the woman, by reason of sin, hath ever since conceived in sorrow, yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow, notwithstanding that they are incapable of sin. And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures, is merely according to the good pleasure of his will. And though all sorrow proceeds from sin in the way of a meritorious cause; yet all sorrow proceeds from God, in the way of an efficient cause. He is the great judge that inflicteth sorrow on some, as well as he causeth joy to others.  
9 The comparison is most absurd. For illumination proceeds from the Sun, as from a natural cause, working by necessity of nature; but to say that God in such sort doth communicate aught, or send forth any influence; is more Atheistical then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happiness, wherewith they were sown in their first creation; for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall, as well as the Angels of light. And all the influence that God sends forth, you say, is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happiness; whence it followeth, that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in the very Devils. And seeing God's concurrence to the actions of men and Angels, is a part of that influence that proceeds from God, and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits, without hope of recovery; in concurring to this assurance, God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in them. Besides this, with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinful actions, this yourself have often acknowledged, and this concourse of his is a part of his influence, and no influence (you say) can proceed from him, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happiness, wherewith their natures were sown in their creation. Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinful actions, doth cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in reprobate men and Angels also.  
Now proceed we along with you: God, you say, doth inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them. This is a bone very well worth the picking. I am persuaded many a sweet morsel will be found about it. You do not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will, but as many as are conformable to his will, he inspires with other good desires; whence I pray then comes conformity to his will, if not from the inspiration of God? do you make conformity to Gods will to be the inspiration of the flesh? For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world, or of the devil. Yet S. Paul saith, that it is God that worketh in us both the will and 
Phil. 2. 13.  the deed, not by any necessary emanation, as light issueth from the Sun, but according to his own good pleasure. Again, this very desire of doing others good, is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God? Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will, why not also with another? And so why may we not run over all parts of conformity to the will of God, and find as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God, as the cause of them? The mystery of your meaning in this, the next sentence serves as a key to open, when you say, that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his overflowing goodness, or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestial influence, become creators of their own woe, and raise unto themselves those storms wherein they perish. So then God's influence is to all, like as the light of the Sun; only the difference ariseth herehence, that some resist it, others yield unto it. As good Arminianism and Pelagianisme as ever dropped from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himself. So than it is not God, that ex nolentibus volentes facit, but man's free will. And in spite of St. Paul it shall be volentis & currentis, and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speak of, can be no other than exhortations, 
Rom. 9  whereunto some yield, and some resist. And I pray, who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith, the author of my repentance? he that exhorteth me hereunto, or rather I myself, that do believe, and do repent, though upon another's exhortations? For exhortation may thus far be performed by a reprobate: for such plead at the day of judgement, Have we not prophesied in thy name? and S. Paul observed, that some preached Christ not chastely, but upon pretence, 
Phil. 1.  and that with foul intentions, even to add affliction to Paul's bonds; yet howsoever he rejoiced in this, that Christ was preached, which he would never have done, if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance.  
Again, to inspire them with good desires, and with conformity to Gods will, this is no other in your language, then to exhort them hereunto. And thus it is that God works in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peter's speech bewrayed him; but with this difference, Peter's speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ, but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius, and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth; for thus did Pelagius discourse, Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futurae gloriae 
Aug. lib. 1. de gratia Dei, contr. Pelag. cap. 10.  magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit, dum revelatione sapientiae, in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem, dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est. Now see to what acknowledgement of grace Austin putteth him, if so be he will be a true Christian. Nos eam gratiam volumus, isti aliquando 
Ibid. cap. 11.  fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur & speratnr, nec solum reveletur sapientia, verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, verumetiam persuadetur. Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non mod● videri, sed esse Christianus. Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election, namely, that it must be upon the foresight of men's obedience to God's exhortations and persuasions, which here you call placid inspirations. Now because God exhorts us to faith, repentance, and all manner of good works, the foresight of our obedience hereunto must be it whereupon our election must depend, and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle, not of fellowship, but to bid him adieu, as who plainly professeth, that Election is not of works, but of God that 
Rom. 9  calleth us; and he proves it by this, that before they had done either good or evil, jacob was elected, and Esau reprobated, which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works, but the pre-consideration of them; otherwise he could not therehence conclude that election is not of works; and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith, as good works. For a man unborn is as unable to believe, as to perform any other work. And notwithstanding this foul injury, you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace, and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinks good, in making whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessels of wrath, yet you think to pacify him with an hungry, base, and mere verbal amplification of the streams of his goodness, the issue whereof is to injury him afresh in like manner, by robbing him, and adorning man with the spoils of his glory. For increase of joy and happiness shall be, you say, unto a man from the streams of life, proceeding from God as a fountain of life, provided that man gives free passage to their current. And what is this current, but God's spirations formerly mentioned, whereby he exhorts us to profit by the examples of his judgements on others, and also to patience when we are injuried by others. Now if we do ye●ld to this, and do profit by the consideration of God's judgements upon others, and do patiently bear the wrongs that are done us by others, then increase of joy and happiness shall be unto us from the fountain of goodness, who as he hath some streams of life, whereby he exhorts us unto that which is good; so he hath other streams of life and happiness, wherewith he rewards us for our obedience: so that whatsoever show you make of honouring God, the issue is to bestow all the honour upon the obedience of man. So that the amends you make herein for former injuries, is as if a man having given his neighbour a box in the ear, should make show of making him amends by kind stroking of him, and in stead of stroking him, give him another box in the ear, Thus joab took Amaza by the beard as though he would have kissed him, but, indeed, stabbed him to the heart. You are willing to make God the author of glory, but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author, but only the orator of grace: like to the Panims, who were wont to say, 
Det vitam, det opes, animum mihi ipse parabo.  You are given so much to painting, that it is a hard matter to discern the native countenance of your discourse, the proper face of your meaning. What mean you by the current of life? Is it a gracious current, or a glorious current? if gracious, that is the same with spirations before spoken of, and these are exhortations and persuasions. But how I pray do● these when they are refused by some, the more overflow to others? They that hear the same Sermon, have never a whit the more for others resisting it; they that hear it not, have no part of it, though all resist it. As for the currrent of glory, how hath any man the more, for that others are wholly deprived of it? yet it is true, that even the reprobation and damnation of some, tends to the increase of glory to the elect, in contemplation of the mercy of God towards them in comparison of others, and of the sorrows from which God hath freed them, as both the Apostle signifies, Rom. 9 22. And is maintained both by Didacus' Alvares, and Alphonsus Mendosa. But I do not find you have any such meaning. But when you have taken up a metaphor by the end, you play upon it, and make as good music with it as pigs do, in playing upon Organs.  
What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer, are unknown to us; we read that they believe and tremble, jam. 2. that they are kept in chains to the judgement of the great 
jude 6. Mat. 8. 29.  day. They ask our Saviour whether he be come to torment them before their time; they pray him not to send them into the deep. And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of 
Luc. 8. 31.  any good which their miseries work upon us, seeing that their miseries are so unknown unto us.  
Yet as conceiving yourself to have been somewhat free in●venting somewhat, which alas is but a vain ostentation of some momentous matter, which hath no moment at all in it; you demand whether God may yet inspire these castaways with mischievous thoughts, seeing their mischievous thoughts work for our good. A very vain objection; as if the devil and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villainy, or as if prompting unto villainy were fit to be called inspiration, which is never used, but either in the way of prophecy, or in the way of some gracious suggestion. Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan, yourself dare not deny God's concourse to the substance of the action; and as for the manner of concourse, we are willing to undergo with you, or any man else that breaths, any scholastical discourse or inquisition hereupon: as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator, or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather.  
As touching the evil itself, whether from our opinion can be inferred any more than this, that Gods will is it shall come to pass by his permission; and whether we cannot show better reason for this our tenet, than you or any man else for the contrary. As for the intending of the creatures woe and misery, as occasions or means of God's glory, what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and misery, as it signifies the misery of punishment, and in inflicting punishment on transgressors, undoubtedly he doth advance the glory of his justice, yea and the glory of his Saints also, who may see in others sufferings, what might have been their portion, if God had showed no more grace unto them then unto others, and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of God's goodness toward them. As for the misery of sin, be the sin as great as the crucifying of Christ, God determined it should be done, Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdom to the beast, little less than the giving of their kingdoms to the devil, yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to do his will even in this also: and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God, and the good of his elect. For 
Rev. 17. 17 2 Cor. 11. 19  both heresies must be, that they which are approved may be manifested, and God raiseth tyrants up, to exercise the patience of his children, yea their own sins redound to the profit of Gods elect. Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestamque cadere peccatum. But hereupon to make use of that 
August. de civ. Dei, l. 14. cap. 13.  maxim, Gods will is the rule of goodness, is most absurd; for the rule of goodness is Gods will of commandment; but the will of God, that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to pass, is far different: neither I hope will you make question, in case God willeth any thing to come to pass, whether God doth well in willing it; though that which he willeth or determineth be the crucifying of Christ jesus.  
As for the will of commandment, that is only the will of God touching what is our duty to do, or to leave undone, and accordingly called voluntas approbans, for certainly he approves obedience unto his will, in whatsoever he enjoineth us: yet this wide leap hath cast your meditations upon this point, to inquire forsooth whether Gods will be the rule of goodness. But as you have entered upon it without distinction of will and will, so you carry yourself therein with miserable confusion.   

CHAP. XIII.  
In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodness.  
THe question was never before (that I know) proposed in this manner, viz. of God's infinite will, but only of Gods will. The Heathens painted justice as an assistant of jupiter. Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander, cast down with conscience of his foul fact, inmurthering his dear friend Clitus, deviseth an interpretation of this pageant, suitable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander; and that was this, jupiters' actions must always be esteemed just. So saith the great Monarches who are Gods on earth, their actions must be accounted just. Anaxarchus is censured by Arrian, and justly, for his gross flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth, who, it is well known, may degenerate into tyrants. But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God: you will not make question, I trow, whether God be righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, much less deny it, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, allowed Samson to sacrifice himself, the Israelites to rob the Egyptians; though he send an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem; though he put a lying spirit in the mouths of all ahab's Prophets, to seduce the King, and to persuade him to go up against Ramoth Gilead, that he may fall there; though he sends to Pharaoh a commandment to let Israel go, yet tells Moses he will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel go; though that work of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two, comprehending the defection of people from their lawful King, he by open protestation takes unto himself as his own work; like as touching the defiling of David's concubines, he telleth David to his face, that he would do this openly, saying, I will take thy wives from thee, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lie with them in the sight of the Sun.  
2. Your comparison of God's power with his goodness, I do not much mislike; only your comparing of him with Monarches in goodness, is not so fit; for alas what prerogative have they of goodness above other men? They are to be borne withal, though they are not so good as others, because they are exposed to greater temptations than others, and the greater is the temptation, the less is the sin. No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus, or Heliogabalus in goodness; yet we know there is a great deal of difference between the goodness of God, and the goodness of man in the course thereof: for man's goodness in the exercise thereof, is subordinate to a law, and they are bound to exercise it towards all: God's goodness is of no such condition, nothing could bind him to the making of the world, or to the making of any creature at all. They being made, he exerciseth his goodness towards whom he will: for though in the course of his natural providence he causeth his Sun to shine, and his rain to fall both upon the just and unjust; yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings, his spiritual blessings in heavenly things, he hath mercy on whom he will, yea and whom he will he hardeneth also. And though ordinarily all 
Rom. 9 18  are partakers of his temporal blessings, yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the communication of them also. Am. 9 7. I have withheld the rain from you, when there were yet three weeks to the harvest, and caused it to rain upon one City, and caused it not to rain upon another City; one piece was reigned upon, and the piece whereon it reigned not, withered. Some die in their mother's womb, some hanging at their mother's breasts, some after a long time are consumed with a lingering death: 
Rom. 9 13 In 1. disp. 85. & 8●. In opusc. de instit. commut. sect. 2. num 36.  neither is God's love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect. Thus jacob was loved, but Esau hated.  
Again, what justice do you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concur in this, that the justice of God towards man doth always presuppose his will, and God may bind himself as he pleaseth by promise. But Gods will (you say) is not the rule of goodness, because the designs thereof are backed with infinite power. Your theme was to prove, that Gods will is not the rule of goodness, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing less, but only that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodness, is not, for that his designs are backed with infinite power. This is not to disprove God's will to be the rule of goodness, but rather to confirm it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodness, you do imply, that you maintain, that his will is the rule of goodness, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintain Gods will to be the rule of God's goodness, do maintain it upon no other ground then this, to wit, Because his designs are backed with infinite power.  
But had it been so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would bear the world in hand, that yourself in some sort hold Gods will to be the rule of goodness, whereas you mean nothing less; and therefore in carrying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the main. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintain God's will to be the rule of goodness, for this cause, because his designs are backed with infinite power, as much as to say, because God can do what he will. This reason carrieth no colour of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can do what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore be honester men than other. But because God hath infinite lawful power, that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can do, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, otherwise he should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. Holiness (you say) doth so rule his power and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoin, or the other exact any thing, not most consonant to the eternal or abstract patterns of equity. You take great liberty of discourse throughout. What I pray, according to our understandings is the subject of God's holiness? is it not his will? And how can his holiness' work upon his will? Doth the heat of fire work upon the fire? or the cold of water work upon the water? Again, here we have power and will distinguished, and the act of enjoining attributed to the one, and exacting to the other. Both are acts of command: now I pray consider, doth God's power command? I had thought imperium had been the proper prerogative of the will, yet both these, by your discourse, are in subjection to the eternal patterns of equity; and equity before you confounded with justice. Now I know no such justice in God, different from his wisdom. And herein I am of the same mind with Aquinas, Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei, Art. 6. where he disputeth this question, Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat. And there he professeth, that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione, & ad se invicem, & ad suam causam. Now let any man name any thing that God can do, and then let him answer me whether God be not as well able by the infinity of his wisdom to do it wisely, as by the infinity of his power to do it at all. And mark what in the same place (where he seems most to favour your present Tenet) Aquinas professeth, Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus, & voluntas secundum rem & pro hoc nec idem, est voluntas & rectitudo voluntatis: Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus, & voluntas, & propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis, & ipsa voluntas. Although in us the understanding is one thing, and the will really another thing, whence it is that our will, and the rectitude of our will is not the same, yet seeing that in God, the understanding and the will are really the same, hence it is, that in God his will, and the rectitude of his will are all one. But be it that his will is consonant to the eternal or abstract patterns of equity, I pray, what more eternal and abstract pattern of equity than this, that it is lawful for God to make the world, if he will, and not to make it if he will; yea, and to do what he will, and leave undone what he will. I hope the will of God revealed, doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions, if things are therefore good because God wils them, as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them. Now the former of these is true, without all question, in most things; for whether the world had been made sooner or later, bigger or lesser, more Angels or less, more spheres or less, whether they had moved this way they do, or the contrary way; whether they should have continued longer or shorter time than they shall, all had been received as the good course of God's providence equally as now it is. But here you pass to a point of a far different nature; for it is one thing to inquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodness in this sense, whether whatsoever God brings to pass in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it, and a far different thing to demand, whether Gods will be the rule of goodness in this sense, that whatsoever God commands us in his word (for so I understand you when you speak of Gods revealed will) it is therefore good because God commandeth it. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of God's word, and without that, all men naturally are able to discern between good and evil, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousness, contempt of government, murder, uncleanness, gluttony, drunkenness, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evil, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evil written in the hearts of all, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing, Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say, that we know this or that to be good, because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, we know this to be good, and that to be evil, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good, therefore justice and goodness are the objects of his will; first, because we have heard out of Aquinas, that God's wisdom is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodness, or wisdom are the objects of his will. Again, if the goodness of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, than the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not be essential unto him, like as the rectitude of man's will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alleged. Whereas you say, unless this or that had been good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turn; for the wisdom of God may represent this or that to be good, that is, such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to be good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity. Nay, mark what Bradwardine professeth, suppose the wisdom of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that, yet is not God hereby bound to prefer the doing of that before this. Ratio praeponderans est, qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud, vel quod melius est, hoc facere 
Bradward. lib. 1. cap. 22.  quam dimittere, & talis ratio non movet, nec concludit voluntati divinae, nec eam determinat ad agendum. Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit & multa bona quae non facit. And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti. Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem, nisi faceret omnia possibilia, & horum quod libet infinitum, quod contradictionem includit. Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione, voluntas, vel saltem ratio congruens & concomitans praelaxata. Yet the will of God is always reasonable: but mark what is the ground of this denomination, according to Aquinas, in 1. Quest. 19 Art. 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid, sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud. Yet you would make the world believe that you fetch your divinity from the fountain, they that think otherwise never taste it but in trenches, yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountain from whence you take it?  
3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poor one, Seeing no thing can be without God's will, what can be good before God wills it? And your answer is by concession, That goodness actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will, as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet only from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodness actually existent in God himself, doth that depend merely upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends merely upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed only by outward works, and God might have chosen whether he would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for God's goodness, we that taste of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himself, and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will: There is, you say, a goodness objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will. What I pray? Is it any such as binds God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheism by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodness which you make the object of God's will, savoureth of ditch water rather than of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which showeth God's will, what is to be done. But every novice knows, it belongs not to goodness to give direction, but to wisdom rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I showed before, makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisdom of God's understanding. And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisdom in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alleged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, qaam rationabiliter velle. Yet neither the wisdom of God shall determine his will, unless it doth so direct, as to show that this or that aught to be done▪ For if it doth only direct by showing what is fit to be done, and of many courses which Gods wisdom can devise sit to be taken, if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what he list, it is apparent, that though before God choose, it was fit to be done, like as many other courses were also, yet no necessity why God should prefer this before an other: sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto, neither out of the fountain, nor out of the trenches. Intellectus divinus (saith one) singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerate, & omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat, Henry. quodlib. 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth, that whatsoever God is able to do, that also he can wisely do, in 1. Quest. 25. Art. 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit. And again professeth, that the order of things in the government of this world, doth not adequate the wisdom of God; as much as to say, he could have brought forth a world, and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as he hath showed in this: his words are these, Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio 
Aquin. de voluntate Dei. q. 25. 〈◊〉. 5.  justitiae consistit: non adaequat divinam sapientiam. sic, ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. And he proves it thus, Tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus à se factis imponit à fine sumitur. Quando igitur sinis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est sinis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas: unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum, ita ut non possit alius cursus rerum ess●uere. Scotus in like 
1. Dist. 44. 〈◊〉. unica.  sort, Nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus à voluntate divina acceptante statuta. And he gives this instance of his assertion, Omnis peccator finalis, damnabitur: quis autem dubitat Deum de potentia absoluta potuisse peccatorem non damnare, sed annihilare? See also what john Gerson saith to the same purpose, Deus non ideo vult res ad extra fieri, quia bonae sunt, quemadmodum movetur humana voluntas, ex objectione boni veri, vel apparentis: Est è contra potius, quod ideo res ad extra bonae sunt, quia Deus vult eas tales esse; adeo quod si vellet eas vel non esse vel aliter esse, id quoque jam bonum esset, propterea benè enuntiavit magnus Ambrosius post Basilium quod voluntas divina naturae primaria lex est. Yet of these you may say that they are but trenches. Although yourself hath hitherto brought nothing for your assertion, either out of fountain or trench, save only out of your own brain, which may be the fountain of your invention, and yet inferior to these trenches. But come we to the fountain, God is said to work all things according to the counsel of 
Eph. 1. 11. Eccles. pol. lib. 1.  his own will. Mr. Hooker passeth his censure upon those Divines that refer all the reason of justice to the will of God. Calvin belike is one of those divines whom he in his reprehension reacheth at; who in his Institutions hath these words, Adeo summa est justitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quicquid vult, eo ipso quod vult, justum habendum. Yet Calvin saith not, that in this respect it is just; but only that in this respect it ought to be received as just. But Mr. Hooker, though he acknowledgeth that there is a law of divine actions, yet he professeth that this law is to be resolved into the will of God, which is somewhat more than Calvin professeth, and as much as Perkins 
Perk. de praedest. mod. & ord.. 2.  professeth, when he saith, Nothing is just to God before it be willed by him, he speaks in respect of things to be done by him, and not of that justice which is called by the Schoolmen, Justitia condecentiae, which dictateth what may conveniently be done. For certainly, if a thing might not conveniently be done, God would never have done it: but he speaks of justitia obligationis, justice that binds to the doing of it; and maintains, that nothing binds God to the doing of it, but only his own will and determination. And in this sense have I elsewhere justified Mr. Perkins against Arminius. But as for Calvins' saying, when he professeth, that whatsoever God willeth must be received of us as just, is a most temperate speech. And to what purpose should we trouble ourselves to look any further, and to inquire after the reason of it. Whereas we are given to understand, that of the wisdom and knowledge of God there is such a depth as is unsoundable, O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God; how unsearchable 
Rom. 11. 33  are his judgements, and his ways past finding out? But upon the matter, we may easily perceive how little difference there is between Mr. Hooker and others, when he professeth, that though this counsel of God's will, according whereunto he worketh all things, doth signify a law of divine actions, yet withal, such a law as is resolved into the will of God. Again consider, how is it called the counsel of Gods will? not of Gods will giving counsel, for that belongs to the understanding; but of Gods will accepting the counsel proposed; and if many wise courses are proposed (as why should we conceive that Gods infinite wisdom is limited to the devising of one course) than the will doth freely accept one rather than another. And thus Suarez interpreteth it when ho saith, Non ita operatur Dei voluntas secundum consilium ejus, 
Suarez. relect. de lib. volunt. divin. disp. 1.  ut omnino à consilio determinetur, sed potius (si ita loqui liceat) ut ipsa determinat consilium. In like sort Didacus' Alvarez, though of a sect much opposite to the Jesuits, yet concurreth with Suarez in this exposition, Hic ut notavit Glossa, prius ponitur 
Alvar. de auxil lib. 2. disp. 17.  consilium, quod pertinet ad intellectum, deinde additur voluntatis suae, Ubi significat quod intellectus divinus, seuscientia ejus, ut determinatur à voluntata est causa rerum. You that pretend to fetch your divinity from the fountain, have not brought so much for proof of your assertion as this place cometh unto; it is enough for you to dictate and say, There is a goodness objective, precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will. And yet I willingly confess, it is so far good, as that God's wisdom doth represent it as a thing that decently and conveniently may be done; but that of necessity it must be done, and that thus divine wisdom represents it, yourself is so father from proving this, that you do not so much as take notice of this distinction. You proceed, and tell us positively, that Unto some things considered as possible, this goodness objective is so essentially annexed, that if it be his will to give them actual being, they must of necessity be actually good, nor can he that can do all things, will their contraries. Never, I think, was so vulgar an assertion so much honoured, as to be brought in with such state and pomp. As if any Scholar did make question, whether Ens & bonum convertuntur; or any sober man doubted, whether the works of God must needs be good. Whereas this is utterly beside the question: which is only this, Whether because God willeth any thing, therefore the doing of it be just; or rather because it is just therefore God doth it. So that the question is not, Whether any entity produced by God be good; but rather, Whether the producing of it be therefore good, because God willeth it.  
Yet your instance is more extravagant than your assertion, as when you add, God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. So God did reserve diverse beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodness of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodness, to imply no contradiction. Then let evil be goodness, and injustice goodness, and darkness light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, we understand it of things containing diverse notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essential goodness of God, as you expound it. For that which is continual, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetics, that I know, did ever maintain, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essential goodness of God; more than in contradiction to the nature and essence of an Angel, or to the nature and essence of a man.  
I do not find any reason why the making of the world should be esteemed more consonant to the nature of God, than the not making of it. And whatsoever God willeth, if he willeth it freely, he might forbear the willing of it, and that without sin. I know nothing that God willeth necessarily but himself; and it is improper enough to say, that God's nature is consonant to itself. But in what sense a sphere of heaven, or a tree, or any vile creature shall be said to be consonant to the nature of God, I am content to be ignorant. I know no purity or holiness without the will of God, as that must be which is the object of it. In a word, is it created purity and holiness which is the object of the will of God you speak of, or increated? Increated it cannot be; for the object of that will of God, whereof we speak, is such as God willeth to have existence: but God doth not will increated holiness to have existence; for that were to will himself to have existence, seeing increated holiness must needs be God himself. But to say that God doth will himself to have existence, were to imply, that God as yet hath no existence. If created purity and holiness be the object of God's will, you speak of, than God cannot but will some created thing to be, therefore he must necessarily create the world.  
A little before you told us, that God could not will ought contradictory to his own nature and essential goodness, as in this particular; he cannot will a man to be a man, and yet unreasonable. So than if he will have a man to be, he must have him to be a reasonable creature: in like sort, if he will have a beast to be, he must have him to be an unreasonable creature.  
But what purity and holiness, or what consonancy to God's purity and holiness is to be found in all this, as namely in willing a man to be a reasonable creature, a beast to be a creature unreasonable, seeing now you affirm, that God's will cannot pitch but upon that which is pure and holy? If I be not deceived, you are now passing to another point, and do begin to apply the terms of your assertion to Gods will of commanding; which makes me remember what the Welsh Tailor said to his boy, in making a garment while the owner stood by: for he cried out, Potherion, potherion, which afterwards by inquiry was found to signify, Wide stitches, wide stitches. At length you come to the fountain whence you fetch your Divinity, whilst others taste it but in trenches. And you tell us out of the book of Wisdom, that For as much as God 
Wisd. 12. 15.  is righteous, he ordereth all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to his power to condemn him that hath not deserved to be punished. God is righteous in keeping his word; I hope you will not deny it: neither Philo the jew, nor the author of the book of Wisdom, doth inform us of any other righteousness in God. Sure I am, that both Suarez and Vasquez, other manner of Scholars than Philo ever was, acknowledge no justice in God, in respect of his creatures, but upon supposition of his will. Now God hath promised, that every soul that sinneth, it shall dye, and not that the son's 
Ezek. 〈◊〉  teeth shall be set on edge for the sins of the father. And yet I appeal to your own judgement, whether thus to carry himself be to do that which is agreeable to his power, or rather that which is agreeable to his righteousness. God, you say, loveth truth & sincere dealing, because he himself is true & just. Yet when the devil testified of the Apostles saying, These are the servants of the most high God, which show unto us the ways of everlasting life, though it were a truth which they uttered, yet the coming of it out of such a ones mouth, I think was as little liked by God himself, as by his Apostle. Amongst the actions of heathen men, truth was found, as well as other virtuous conversation; yet of their best actions Austin was bold to profess, that they were no better than splendida peccata. 
Aug. cont. julian. Pelag. l. 4. c. 〈◊〉  And he gives this rule for the discerning of true goodness, Noveris non ossiciis, sed sinibus discernendas esse virtutes. And as one blemish of their best actions was this, that they were not performed in reference to his glory; so another very suitable hereunto I take to be this, that they were not performed in obedience to his will. For the horrible sin of the jews in offering their sons and daughters unto Moloch, is amplified thus in holy Scripture, Things that never entered into 
jer. 7. 38.  my heart to command them. And why should God regard that which is not performed in obedience to his will? Many things may be done, and are done by strangers living in far Countries, agreeable to the laws of this Kingdom; but we ken them no thanks for this, because they do it not in obedience to the laws in this kingdom. There is no likeness between the goodness of God, and the moral goodness of the creature. For look what goodness is in God, the same is in him necessarily; it is not so in man.  
As for justice, I have often showed the consent of Suarez and Vasquez, and that opposed by none that I know, that justice in God in respect of the creature, doth always presuppose the will of God. Then as touching the truth of God, it is well known that God is a spirit, and hath no tongue to be the interpeter of his mind, as he hath given unto man; only he hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles, to deliver his oracles unto his people. And though God is not bound to reveal himself unto any; yet if it be his pleasure to reveal himself, he is not capable of any such inducement, to deliver an untruth, as man is: man may advantage himself by untruth, when by other means he cannot: it is not so with God, who needs not untruth. thereby to advantage himself. But whereas you say that God's veracity is coeternal to his essence, in my judgement it is a very wild phrase. For veracity hath no place where speech is not; and seeing that God speaks not but by his Ministers, it followeth that before the world was, he never spoke at all; and seeing he could have forborn the making of the world, he might have never spoken at all; so far off from truth is it, that veracity, which supposeth speech, is coeternal to his essence. For if speech be not coeternal to his essence, how can truth of speech, or truth in speech be coeternal to his essence? Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech, or to speak by his Ministers, so it is all one with the nature of God, and no marvel if in this sense it be coeternal to his essence. Intemperancy, and consequently the opposite virtue of temperance and chastity is found only in bodies, not in spirits; and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angel to be chaste, so neither is it to the nature of God.  
You say, God could not give a law for the authorising of promiscuous or preposterous lust. Yet it is manifest, that promiscuous lust in bruit beasts, in all sorts, hath its course, without any transgression, and it being a course of nature in them, it cannot be denied to be a work of God. And Suarez, though he takes upon him to maintain a tenet like unto 
Suarez de legib. l. 2. cap. 15.  yours, namely, that God cannot dispense as touching his moral law; yet he professeth that God may make it lawful for one man to have many wives. And I pray you, why may he not as well make it lawful for one woman to have many husbands, and what then I pray you will this want of promiscuous and preposterous lust? It may be plurality of husbands to one wife, may bring a greater inconvenience in the course of nature, as touching the corrupting of conceptions, and hindering the course of generation, than plurality of wives; but how in morality it should be more intolerable than the other, I know not. And withal we read of Massalina, that notwithstanding all her luxurious courses this way, yet not only brought forth children, but also those like unto her husband also; and being demanded how that came to pass, made this answer, Non nisi pl●na nave vectorem fero. For the brother and sister to know one another carnally, we count it incest; yet unless Adam's sons had married with their sisters, it was impossible there should have been any propagation of mankind. And in like sort Abraham is supposed to have been the Uncle of Sarah; and do you think that holy Patriaroh would have continued in so sinful a course after his calling, had it been such that God could not any way have made it lawful?  
You proceed and tell us, That to legitimate violence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeathed to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of Omnipotency; and in stead of giving a reason of your opinion, you express it in 〈◊〉 double phrase, as if you would make up in figures, what is wanting in argument; and say, It cannot be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinity; and indeed I read in Virgil of a Parliament sometimes called in heaven by jupiter: but I doubt you are of Ovid's fault, who as Seneca writes knew not when it was well. But you overdo only in words, and underdoe in argument: and as if you had not phrasified enough, you further tell us, that The practice or countenancing of these and the like, are evil not in us only, to whom they are forbidden, but so evil in themselves, that the Almighty could not but forbid and condemn them, as professed enemies to his most sacred Majesty. Thus to phrasifie with you, is to fetch Divinity from the fountain, and not from the trenches; though you bring neither evidence of Scripture, nor evidence of reason to justify it. That which you do bring such as it is, is rather from reason then from Scripture. And if it be so manifest in reason, as you seem to signify, the less need I should think there was of forbiddng it: yet you say God could not but forbid it. And where I pray must he forbid it, and by what law? Is it by the law revealed in his word, or by the law of nature? As for the law revealed in his word, that was communicated only to the jews; and why God was necessitated to forbid it to one small nation, and not to another, I can devise no reason. The law of nature I confess is general, forbidding such things as are known to be evil by the light of nature; but doth it teach that God cannot legitimate any such actions? jephte thought otherwise, as appears by the message he sent to the King of Ammon, Wilt thou not possess that which Chemish thy god giveth 
judg. 11. 24  thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our. God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess. And it is observable, that whereas in other particulars you have derived the absolute unlawfulness of such actions, from the incongruity of them to the nature of God; as namely, because he is true, therefore he hateth falsehood; because pure, therefore he hateth lust, (whereas to touch one thing more by the way that was omitted, it is well known that God is as pure from lawful lust, as from lust unlawful) here in this place you make no mention at all of any condition in God, whereunto the practice of violence should be incongruous, but in place of reason, which you bring not so much as in show, you make us amends with variety of phrases. Yet what more violent act, then for the father to cut the throat of his most innocent child? and you well know, God sent Abraham that holy Patriarch in such an 
Gen. 22. Heb. 11.  errand as this. Samsons faith is commended by S. Paul; his first rising against the Philistines, was as the subject rising against their Princes, as the men of judah signified unto him, saying, Knowest thou not that the Philistines are rulers over us? and thereupon 
judg. 15. 11.  they were content to deliver him into their hands, to manifest themselves to be no confederates with him in this insurrection. Afterwards we read how he died flaming with desire of revenge upon the Philistines, and that for his two eyes; 
judg. 16.  and to the end he might be revenged on them, was content to be his own assassinate; and all this in an holy manner performed, commending himself by solemn prayer unto God. For he called unto the Lord, and said, O Lord God remember 
V. 2●.  me, I pray thee, and strengthen me I pray thee only this once; O God, that I may be at once revenged of the Philistines for my two eyes; and thereupon taking hold of the two pillars of the house, he bowed himself, and said, Let me die with the Philistines; 
V. 30.  and the house fell upon the Lords, and upon all the people that were within: so the dead which he slew at his death, were more than they which he slew in his life. What a strange zeal possessed Phinees, when he ran his javelin thorough Zimri and Cosbi, 
Numb. 25. 8.  thus perishing in their incestuous act, and thus he as it were sending their souls to hell, as well as their bodies to the grave. Yet God approves of it, and seals hereupon unto him the covenant 
V. 12, 13.  of the Priesthood. The children of Israel expel the Canaanites, and destroy them without all mercy, having nothing to justify them in these violent courses, but only the commandment of God. The Israelites are said to have robbed 
Exod. 3. 21, 22.  the Egyptians, in borrowing that which they never meant to restore, and the Lord animates them hereunto, and foretells unto Moses that he would cause them to march out of the land laden with the riches of Egypt; and a great part of this was afterwards consecrated to the service of the Tabernacle.  
4. In the next place you tell us after your manner positively, that the infinite goodness of God's Majesty cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousness as he sets us to follow; and this dogmatic assertion of yours is ushered in with a great deal of state, by a comparison forsooth of the contrary disposition of great men, for whom, to set patterns of the morality which they require in others, is reputed a kind of pedantisme or mechanical servitude; and why mechanical? forsooth because it is like the setting of us copies, or songs, or teaching us some honest trade. Yet I can hardly believe but that Sardanapalus or Heliogabalus both did think it better becoming the Majesty of a Prince to give examples of honest conversation, then to play the Scrivener or the Shoemaker. Instruction in morality, or in liberal Arts, may in some things have resemblance to mechanical instructions; but is any man so sottish as thereupon to conceive such moral and liberal instruction to be mechanical? An Ape may be like unto a man, Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis, yet no fool conceives him to be a man. Neither do I see any cause to wonder, that they who are willing to give laws to others, are loath to have any laws given to curb them. Well, though the garments of morality be too straight for great ones, yet they are not too straight for God; he can be content to put them on, to wear them, and they become him so well, that the infinite greatness of his Majesty cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousness as he sets us to follow. As I remember in Cyri paedia there is conceived such a good lesson becoming Princes, namely, themselves to observe those laws which they make for their people. This law you have such a transcendent conceit of, and of the goodness of it, that you think fit to establsh it in the Commonwealth of the Trinity. God (say you) cannot wrest his will. Consider, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. The corruptest man that lives, the devil himself cannot wrest his will. First because the will cannot be wrested: laws may be wrested by violent interpretations; men's goods may be wrested from them by violent courses, but I never read nor heard that any man's will may be wrested. For it is a received rule, that, Voluntas non potest cogi. Secondly, because a man cannot wrest anything that he undertakes to wrest, but by his will. Now in what congruity can the will of any be said to wrest itself? But take we your meaning, that God doth strictly observe the rules of righteousness, which he sets us to follow. Now the rules he setteth us to follow, eaten partly such as are contained in the first table, and partly such as are contained in the second. In the first we are commanded to love him, to fear him, to put our trust in him. Are these the rules that God himself doth so strictly observe? doth he fear himself? doth he put his trust or confidence in himself? In the second we are commanded to worship him according to his word; hath God a care to worship himself according to his word? God sometimes doth swear by himself, and I hold it impossible that God should do any thing in vain, much more that he should take his own name in vain.  
But as for the sanctifying of the Sabbath, whereunto we are bound, I cannot well conceive, how that day, and the sanctification thereof should be observed by God; unless you are of the jews opinion, who think that God spends some part of the day in reading their Talmud, and some part in lamenting jerusalem, and the desolation thereof; and the other part of the day he spends in playing with Leviathan; and you desire to translate these celestial devotions to the Sabbath. We are bid to honour our father and mother, God hath none to honour. We are forbid to kill any man, yet God did bid Abraham to sacrifice his son, and allowed Phinees in slaying Zimri and Cosbi, and exposed his own innocent Son to be crucified, and gives us power over inferior creatures, as Lords of life and death. God made Adam after his own image and likeness; Adam's integrity was the image of his holiness; but when man by his fall lost this his holiness, take heed you avouch not, that hereby he lost the image of God.  
Our holiness consisteth in seeking the glory of God; and no creature can be so zealous of God's glory as God is of his own. But how to express our zeal of God's glory better, then by obedience unto his will, I willingly profess I know not. As likewise what you mean by those ever living examples of goodness, which, as you say, God expresseth in his works; unless it be in making his sun to shine, and his rain to fall both upon good and bad. For unto this is the last precept which 
Matt. 5. 45  you mentioned, referred by our Saviour. And yet I doubt not (nor you neither) that God hath contrary ways and courses, as namely, in making us to discern between the righteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God, and him that serveth 
Mal. 3. 18.  him not; and that in respect of demonstration of mercy to the one, and execution of judgement on the other: Behold, my servant shall eat, and ye shall be hungry; behold, my servants 
Esa. 65. 13.  shall drink, and ye shall be thirsty: behold, my servants shall rejoice, and ye shall be ashamed: Behold, my servants shall sing for joy of heart; but ye shall cry for sorrow of heart, and house for vexation of spirit. Yea, and in making one piece reigned upon sometimes, and not another: yet I nothing doubt, but you 
Amos 4. 7.  will acknowledge God to be as holy in these ways as in any other; yea, in causing two Bears to come out of the wood, 
2 Kings 2. 24  upon Elisha his cursing in the name of the Lord, and tear forty two children. Yea, in revenging achan's sacrilege, 
jos. 7.  not only with his own death, but with his children's also; and in destroying suckling children, and children in the womb, both in the general deluge, and in the conflagration of Sodom: and when for the sin of Saul, he caused seven of his sons to be delivered into the hands of the Gibeonites, 
2 Sam. 21. 8. 9  to be put to death: for, God is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. And the equity of God's courses, 
Psal, 145. 17.  though sometimès discernible by man, as in the case you put out of Ezechiel 18. 25. yet not always so, but that we are driven sometimes to cry out with the Apostles, Oh the 
Rom. 11. 33.  depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgements, and his ways past finding out?  
5 I confess, that if to dictate like a positive Theologue be to instruct us, you have thus far instructed us, That those patterns of holiness or perfection, which we are bound to imitate in him, are not to be taken from his bare commandment, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternal practices which he hath exhibited, as so many express and manifest proofs that his will is always holy and just. The patterns of holiness which we are bound to imitate, are not to be taken (you say) from God's bare commandment: I find what you say, but I had rather find what you prove. When our Saviour exhorteth us to be holy as God is holy, and perfect as God is perfect, he speaketh it with a particular reference to a particular course in God's providence, taking thereby not an obligation to imitate him, but only an inducement to be so much the more forward in doing that which God commands us in loving our enemies. And unless we have a commandment from God for the rule of our obedience, it is nothing safe to imitate God. For what? shall Magistrates spare malefactors, because God spareth them a long time? Or because God causeth the children to be put to death sometime for the sin of the father, shall we do so too? Or because God makes his sun to shine as well upon one as upon another, shall we therefore put no difference between such as are of the household of faith, and others? We may not imitate Elisha in cursing little children that mocked him; nor the zeal of Phinees in killing Zimri and Cosbi in their lust; much less must we always imitate God, who hath greater power over men's lives than Elisha, or Phinees had. Yet why you should call the works of God in the course of his providence eternal practices, I know no reason, or colour of reason. It may be that in stead of eternal, it should be external practices. God no doubt is holy in all his ways and works, but herehence it followeth not, that we must imitate him in all his courses, but rather we must have an eye to his commandments. And what, I pray are those perfections whereof our general duties are the imperfect representations? Our general duties are such as these, We must not deal unjustly with any; we must deal justly with all, or we must be holy; Holiness becomes thine 
Psal. 93. 5●.  house for ever: and in the Priest's forehead was wont to be written, Holiness unto the Lord. Now, are these the perfections, 
Ex. 28. 35.  wherein God, as you say, is holy and just? Then 'tis as if you should say, God is eminently and apparently holy in the perfection which is called his holiness. God is eminently and apparently just, in that perfection which is called his justice. Of all his moral commandments, not one there is, you say, whose sincere practice doth not in part make us truly like him: and we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may be conformable to his nature, without conformity whereunto, we cannot participate of his happiness, for happiness is the immediate consequent of his nature. You proceed to cut out work for your Readers, as many as are willing to Try the spirits, and not hand over head to receive all for gold that glisters. That the practice of God's commandments maketh us like him, is a plausible speech. And it is true in the general: for as God is wise and holy, so our obedience to his commandments, is that which maids us wise and holy. And as God doth nothing but that which very well becomes him; so in obeying the will of God, we shall do nothing but that which very well becomes us. But as for particular duties, there is little or no correspondency between the carriage of superiors and inferiors. We have a God to worship by reverence and fear, and by praying unto him; these are moralities no way incident unto God.  
We have parents both natural and spiritual, and masters and magistrates whom we must honour; God hath none such to honour. We by our authority may not take away the life of any, be he never so great an offendor; God may take away the life of any, be he never so innocent, without any blemish to his holiness. Matrimonial chastity is a virtue commendable in a Christian; but this virtue is of so base a condition, that the divine nature is not capable of it, as who hath no lusts at all to order; like as on the contrary, the very Devils themselves, being Spirits, are no way obnoxious to unchristitie. The like may be said of temperance, and intemperancy in the use or abuse of God's creatures through gluttony and drunkenness. 'tis theft for us to take any man's goods from him against his will; it is not so with God, who can send any man as naked out of the world, as he brought him into the world, without any prejudice to the repuration of his justice. And seeing he is not capable of any manner of concupiscence, either of the eye or of the flesh, (for he is a Spirit, 
joh. 4. 24.  and not a body or flesh) nor in the way of pride of life: the contrary conditions cannot be in the way of any commendable virtues attributed unto God. In a word, all the goodness that is in God, is essential unto him; our goodness, whatsoever we be, is but accidental unto us: and therefore, 
1 Pet. 1. 16 Matt. 5. 48  when we are exhorted to be holy as he is holy, and perfect as God is perfect, it tends only to this, even to set before us certain actions of God, as patterns and precedents to imitate him therein; and that only so far forth as they are suitable and congruous inducements to the performing of God's commandments, not to affect any conformity of nature with the deity. For what conformity can there be between the nature of a creature, and the nature of his Creator? But Saint Peter telleth us, we are made partakers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
2 Pet. 1. 4.  I have observed some to have rendered this passage thus, We are made partakers of a godly nature; and the godliness of our nature undoubtedly consists in obeying the will of God; according to that of the Apostle, This is the will of God, even your sanctification. And what godliness can be greater, 
1 Thes. 4. 6  then for a man to obey the will of his Creator; and that is the will of God's commandment, though it may fall out to be contrary to God's purpose. For we are bound to pray for the life of our parents and princes, though it maybe, God will not have either the one or the other to live. And God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, he arose early about this business, though it appeared afterwards, that God's purpose was, Isaac should not be sacrificed. But let it be that we are partakers of the divine nature: in this sense I nothing doubt but that it proceedeth in respect of the holy Spirit, wherewith God hath endued us, and which he hath given us 
Rom. 5. 5 Rom. 8. 11 1 joh. 4. 13  to dwell in us; and whereby God the Father, and God the Son are said to dwell in us. But let us proceed inwashing away this painting, which makes error appear with a face of truth. We are bound by the law of God, to forgive our enemies, and to pray for them even to the last, as our Saviour did, and Steven did. But is God bound to forgive his enemies, and that always, as we are? we know he may, and doth sometimes forbear long (according to the pleasure of his will) but, If once he whet his glittering sword, and his hand take 
Deut. 32. 41  hold of judgement, he will execute vengeance on his enemies, and make his arrows drunk with blood. Again, Magistrates must not suffer a witch to live, being once discovered: God knows 
Exod. 22. 18  them when man doth not, yet suffers them to live as long as he thinks good, and sometimes very long. We are bound to have mercy on all according to our power; God hath mercy 
Rom. 9 18  on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will. Lastly, we may not suffer any man to sin, if it lie in our power to hinder it. But God suffereth all manner of all abominations to be committed before his eyes, and in all these he carrieth himself without blemish to his holiness. Nos cer●è (saith Austin) 
Aug. cont. julian. Pelag. lib 5. cap. 4  si cos in quos nobis potestas est, ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittemus, rei tum ipsis erimus: Quam verò innumerabilia ille permittit sieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset, nullaratione permitteret; & tamen justus, & bonus est, & quod praebendo patientiam dat locum paenitentiae nolens aliquem perire. That we are bound to conform to Gods revealed will, the Scripture teacheth us; Secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the 
Deut. 29. 29  things revealed are for us and our children to do them. But that therefore we must be conformable to his will, that we may be conformable to his nature the Scripture teacheth not: and therefore give us leave to take this superfoetation of yours to be but a revelation of flesh and blood. In the book of judges 
judg. 13. 17  we read that Manoah enquired after the name of the Angel 
junius & Pis at. in judic. 13 judg. 13. 18 1 King. 8. 12.  that appeared unto him; whom good Divines, upon pregnant circumstances, do collect to have been the Lord: but he answereth, Why askest thou after my name which is secret? God verily dwelleth in the dark cloud: and though sometimes again it is said, that he dwelleth in the light, yet forth with it 
1 Tim. 6. 16  is added, that this is such a light that no man can approach unto. As groundless is your following dictate, that, without conformity to his nature, we cannot participate of his holiness, it being the imodiate consequent of his nature. And what, I pray, will you make gods of us? or shall our glorification in the kingdom of heaven be a deification? as it must be if it be a participation of the divine happiness. But this is an usual liberty of discourse which you take to yourself. I hope you will not say, that formal glory which God hath provided for us, shall be a glory increated, though in the way of an efficient cause it shall proceed from the increated glory of God, but created rather.  
And all created glory, I hope, be it never so great, is no part of God's happiness, which is, you say, an immediate consequent unto his nature; wherein notwithstanding I doubt much, you speak as Peter sometimes did, when he spoke he knew not what; as namely, in distinguishing God's happiness from his nature, as an immediate consequent thereof. You doubt of Lactantius his consequence, as neither certain, nor authentic; as if it might be authentic, though not certain in your opinion. Yet you embrace the same consequence applied to another matter that serves your turn, and you swallow it with great facility, it never sticks by the way like a Burr in your throat, as if consequences were but ceremonies, and you the master of them. But you put a difference; Lactantius his inference is sometimes doubtful, you say; but out of all question, yours (if we may take your word) is not. But you take too great liberty to yourself, to put things at your pleasure out of question. We should have a mad Church and a mad world, if you had power to put out of question what you list. But let us consider your inference, God doth bid us unfeignedly bless our persecuoors, therefore he doth unfeignedly tender his blessings to such as persecute him in his members. This then belike is that conformity to God's nature which we must aspire unto. But by your leave I find no conformity herein. 
Matt. 5. 44  For first, we are bid to bless our persecutors, not to tender our blessings unto them upon condition they will admit them; but you do not say, God doth bless his persecutors; you only say, he doth tender his blessings unto them. Again, God biddeth us bless them that persecute us: you do not say, that God doth bless, or tender his blessings to them that persecute him, but to them that persecute others, to wit, his members. Thirdly, and chiefly, God bids us to bless all our persecutors.; for he exhorts us to be merciful unto all, as you confess in the next words; but you dare not say, that God doth bless, or tender his blessings unto all; but here you lisp, and speak indefinitely, saying, God doth tender his blessings to them that persecute him in his members; and that, He she weth kindness to them that are most unkind. Indeed, he doth so to some, but not unto all, but unto whom he will: for so himself professeth unto Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have 
Exod. 33. 19  compassion. And I pray consider, what blessing hath God tendered 
Rom. 5. 15  unto the Angels since their fall? So that albeit God's charity towards some infinitely exceeds the charity of man, yet man's duty is to be charitable towards all; God's duty is not to be charitable to any, but he loves whom he will, and hates whom he will, and that before they are borne, as he loved jacob and hated Esau. God's fidelity must needs be greater than man's, as being backed with power to perform that he promiseth, the creature is not: nay, all the power and readiness that the creature hath to perform fidelity towards God, proceeds merely from the grace of God.  
But to compare the chastity of Virgins with God's purity, is most absurd; neither is there any correspondency in the parts of this comparison, and of the comparison following, as betwixt the dross and corpulency on the one side, and the sublimated spirits of the same body on the other side: for both the dross and spirits you speak of are corporeal: no such proportions between the chastity of Virgins, and the purity of God. The children of God, though in a married estate, yet are they Virgins in the sight of God.  
As for Virginity corporal, it hath been found in Heathens, and is wondrous base metal to be compared to the spiritual purity of God, in spite of all preferment you give to the one above the other. That rule, Do unto every man as we would be done unto, must be rightly applied, otherwise it will be far from equity. For it becomes not a Magistrate to spare a malefactor, because if himself were in the like case of danger and desert, he would be glad to be spared. We must do that unto others, which in the way of justice, or equity, or charity, we would have done unto ourselves.  
As for that, Him that honoureth me, I will honour, it is merely 
1 Sam. 2. 3●  dependent upon the will of God. For all confess, that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is, secluding his ordinance to the contrary, and in this case should be nothing guilty of iniquity.  
At length you come to the point, and demand, Whether God doth intend thus well to all? but because the nearer you come to the light, by a true stating of the question, the more your deviations from the truth are like to be discovered, therefore you forthwith obscure it. For whereas the conformity you spoke of before, requires, that as we are bid to be merciful unto all, so should God be merciful unto all likewise. And so the question, to come to an issue, should be this, Whether God intends thus well to all, or no? You decline this; and whereas the proper place of God's liberty and carriage of himself according to the mere good pleasure of his will, is not in designing destruction or salvation unto whom he will, (for the case is clear, that God doth not determine, that destruction or salvation shall befall any, but according unto congruous dispositions preceding, at least in persons of ripe years,) but only in the dispensation of his grace and mercy, showing it towards whom he will, and denying it to whom he will; you again decline this state of the question, and propose it only of Gods wishing well to all, or destruction unto some.  
Nor do you content yourself with this, but as fearing left this state of the question be not safe enough to keep your shins whole, you propose it in a most wild manner, Whether God doth intend thus well to all, or destruction to some, as it is a means of bliss to those whom he loves. You have courage enough to dictate positively, but you manifest a very faint hart when you come to be put to the proof. What meant you to complicate so many questions into one? By your tenet God may intend thus well to all as you have spoken, to wit, in intending his blessings, albeit he did will destruction unto some, to wit, for the contempt or refusal of his grace offered. And a great deal of difference there is between these two questions, Whether God intends destruction unto any; and Whether he intends a man's destruction after this or that manner; as namely, Whether he intends it as a means of bliss to those whom he loves; and yet on this latter only you insist. And indeed you might well despair of getting any credit upon the former points: the case is so clear, that God in the dispensation of his grace doth not carry himself indifferently towards all, but hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. As also that in his sentences of condemnation or salvation he carrieth himself in due reference unto their former disobedience or obedience, and so accordingly did from everlasting purpose to carry himself.  
But consider we the third point, the only field wherein you have an edge to show your strength. And first I demand, Who ever said that God did intend the destruction of any as it is a means of bliss to them whom he loves? We usually profess that God intends to damn no men but for their sins, and that to this end, even to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice towards them; but withal we say, that God doth intend also, by the consideration of this their destruction, to illustrate his grace so much the more towards the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory. For when they shall consider not only their own salvation, but also the damnation of others, and that God might have made them also vessels of wrath as well as others; how can it be but that their joy should be the greater upon this? and if it be so, God must needs have intended it. And this not only our Divines 
Rom. 9 23 Alvar. de auxil. disp. III.  have observed out of the Apostle Saint Paul, but even Pontifician Divines also, as Didacus' Alvarez, and Alphonsus Mendosa. 
Mendos. disp. 1.  Now let us consider the force of your arietation against this. If so he did, say you, we might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evil that good might ensue. We deny this consequence, and as for your reason, it seems to be this, We may and must imitate our heavenly Father; and therefore seeing he doth evil that good may come thereof, so may we do too. To this I answer, 1. First, that the consequence is nothing true. For God intending the destruction of any, doth not therein do any evil, no nor intent any evil. For God doth intend only the destruction of impenitent sinners. But to intend the destruction of impenitent sinners, I hope you will not dare to say that this is evil. Thus may every one see how wide you rove from the mark in your inconsequent consequences. 2. Secondly I answer, it is not lawful for us to imitate God in all things, as before I have showed, and gave instance in diverse particulars. Now I will add one more. If we repent, God not only spares us, but forgives us; If we acknowledge our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins. 
1 joh. 1. 〈◊〉.  But Magistrates, when a malefactor is arraigned and convicted, and condemned of some capital crime, though he doth repent, yet may not they spare him. That wherein our Saviour exhorts us to imitate our heavenly Father, and to be perfect as he is perfect, is in a particular case, namely, in loving not 
Matth. 5. last.  only our friends, but our enemies. For so God not only loveth his children and his friends, but his enemies also, as appears in the pardoning of their sins, and changing of their hearts, as many as belong to his election. And it is false to say, that this is the only reason why we must love our enemies, and not our friends only: for the commandment of God is another reason, and a more chief reason; and we may not take inducements from God's actions to encourage us in the doing of any thing, unless in such cases, as when the actions whereabouts we set ourselves, are agreeable to the law of God. God determined the crucifying of Christ, but neither 
Act. 4. 28.  judas, nor the high Priests, nor Pilate, nor the people of Israel were the more free from sin for this, while they determined to bring him to his cross. God turns not only 
2 Cor. 11. 19  the evils of some to the good of others, but a man's own sins also to his own good, according to that of Austin, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum, manifestumque cadere peccatum. 
De Civit. Dei l. 14. c. 13.   
6. I wonder what glory of God doth appear in the punishment of the reprobate: not the glory of his mercy certainly; nor say I the glory of his justice. For vindicative justice, whereof this is spoken, hath only place in reference unto sinners. It is absurd to say, that God's dealings throughout are to be imitated by us; and you have no ground for this but the saying of our Saviour, Matth. 5. 48. which is applied to a special case. And will it follow, that because we must imitate God's actions in a special case, therefore we must imitate his dealings generally? To intend evil to some, before they have committed sin, admits a double interpretation; either this, to intend that evil shall befall some; in which sense it is manifest, that God doth intend the evil of punishment to befall none before they have sinned. Or thus, the very intention of evil unto some is not until sin be committed; in which sense it is notoriously untrue. For sin is not committed but in time; but God's intentions are everlasting. Of intending the destruction of any as means of others good, I have already spoken that which is sufficient. Why should your tautologies draw me to the like absurdity? The last clause is new, and therefore we will consider it. If God did absolutely ordain some to eternal inevitable misery, for the advancement of his own glory; we should not sin, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing judas to pay Paul, etc. Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem. This argument was in the close of the former section proposed, and the inconsequence thereof discovered. The consequence is this, God did ordain to punish some, therefore we may rob them; God did ordain this to the advancement of his glory; therefore we may rob, to pay our debts, No proportion is to be found in any part of this comparison. For if God take away the life of any man, will it follow that therefore we may do so also? It is well known ●od may do such a thing without all respect to sin; but it is not in our lawful power to do so, though with respect unto their sin. And what a senseless collection is this, that because God may do this or that to advance his glory, therefore we may do the like thing for our profit and advantage? We say, God intends to punish no reprobate, but for his sin; yet I hope you will not say, it is in any private man's power to rob or take any man's goods from him, by reason of his sin.  
We are beholden to you for your counsel in the next place, when you teach us to guess at the perfection of God's justice towards the wicked, and of his bounty towards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitation of it in earthly gods. A proper course to search out the goodness and justice of God, in the courses of heathen men. Yet it is a rule of State, Better a mischief then an inconvenience. And by wars is procured peace, but is it without intention of harm to any? Can wars be managed without harm? even as well as the Friar could be satisfied with a goose livor, and a pig's head, albeit nothing for him were dead. And in making Sodom and Gomorrah 
jude 7.  examples of his judgements, did he not intend our good? and was this without intention of harm to any? And though they of ripe years amongst them had committed abomination, 
Ezech. 16. 50.  and God took them away as he thought good; yet what I pray became of infants, some in their mother's womb, some hanging at their mother's breasts? And will you challenge God for injustice in this, because we do not find the like course in the commendable shadow or imitation of God's justice in earthly gods, as you are pleased to phrasifie it? In distribution of rewards upon the obedient, and execution of punishment upon the disobedient, God fails not, as he will manifest at the day of judgement. And as he executes, so he intends to execute, and no otherwise. But God hath a peculiar power, no shadow whereof appeareth in man or Angel; and that is, of giving grace, of giving repentance: and this he distributes to whom 
Rom. 9 18  he will, and denies to whom he will. You are content to leap over this; and no marvel; for the grossness of your opinion would be too clearly manifested to the world, if you should deal on this. Yet God, you say, draws men to repentance by gracious promises of inestimable reward. And where I pray are these herbs of grace known to grow, is it any where but in God's word? And was God's word afforded to all in the days of the Old Testament? or is it so in the days of the New? And where he doth afford his word, is this all the mercy he shows, namely, to persuade men to repent? or is this to give them repentance? And doth not God's word manifestly 
Act. 5▪ 31. Act. 11. 18 2 Tim. 2.  teach, that repentance is the gift of God? Again, do we maintain that God damns any but impenitent sinners? 'tis true, we say, if all the world should believe and repent, all the world should be saved, notwitstanding all their sins, and not Cain only. What more severe punishment than damnation? and what precedent loving instructions or good encouragements to do well, were afforded by God to all those infants, who perish in that sin which they drew from the loins of their parents? And will you challenge God of unnaturalness for this? or will you deny that any infants perish in original sin, as Pelagius did? And what loving instructions doth God minister to those Heathen, who do not so much as know God, nor ever were acquainted with his word 
1 Thess. 4. 6.  and Gospel?   

CHAP. XIIII.  
Of God's infinite love to mankind.  
YOur theme runs in an indefinite current as touching the object of God's love; but it appears by your discourse ensuing, that you have a farther reach, and do extend this love of God towards all and every one. For by the last clause of the first section it appears, that you conceive the notion of love infinite to bespeak as much, namely, that therefore it must extend to all and every one. And this reason of yours is soon dispatched, in less than two lines; all the rest of your first section is wide enough from the mark you shoot at, and yet unsound enough in many particulars. First you maintain that blessing and cursing both cannot proceed out of the mouth of God. Secondly, that God is the author of being to all, and therefore loves all. Thirdly, that in as much as he gives being to all, he loves all. For he hateth nothing that he hath made. All these I will examine in their order.  
Touching the first, you begin with the authority of St. james, Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my 
jam. 3. 10.  brethren, these things ought not so to be. And he doth illustrate it with similitudes drawn from natural things, as from a fountain that sends not forth at the same place sweet water and bitter: and from trees, which bring forth proper fruit only, according to their kind: Can the figtree bear Olive berries, or the Vine figs? And you seem to conceive that these reasons of the Apostle, as you call them, (which indeed are but illustrations) have more force to prevail, than the Apostles authority; for thus you write, If the Apostles authority could not persuade us to believe, his reasons would enforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and though same mouth are contrary to the course of nature, and argue the nature of man to be much out of tune. Herein I am not of your mind. I am rather of Abraham's mind. If they will not believe Moses and the Prophets, 
Luc. 16. 3.  neither will they believe, though a man rise from the dead. And yet a man rising from the dead, were as fit to make faith of the state of the dead (in my judgement) as these illustrations (secluding S. james his authority,) are of force to prove, that it becomes not a man out of the same mouth to send forth blessing and cursing. For fountains send forth water, and trees bring forth fruit by necessity of nature: But man speaks by freedom of will; and as a man may be induced to curse, so in case he curseth, and be challenged for it by a brother, he may answer as David did unto his brethren, And what have I 
1 Sam. 17. 19  now done? is there not a cause? For if all curses were causeless, Solomon would never have told us, that The curse which is 
Pro. 26. 2.  causeless shall not come. I never yet read of any that censured Elisha for cursing the children that mocked him, saying, Come 
2 King. 2. 23, 24.  up thou bald head, come up thou bald head; and indeed it is said, He cursed them in the name of the Lord. And yet this curse of his had a very bloody issue, two Bears coming out of the wood, and tearing forty two of them. And in the book of judges the Angel of the Lord bids the people curse Meroz. Curse ye Meroz, saith the Angel of the Lord; curse ye bitterly 
judg. 5. 23  the inhabitants of Meroz, because they came not to help the Lord, to help the Lord against the mighty. And as curses may have their due course, so blessings may be causeless. For as for him that blesseth himself in his heart, when he heareth the 
Deut. 29. 19, 20.  word of God's curse, saying, I shall have peace though I walk after the stubbornness of my heart, herein he doth but add drunkenness unto thirst, and the Lord will not be merciful to that man. And if some do sin in blessing themselves, how much more do others sin in blessing idols? We well know that 
Esa. 66. 3.  out of our Saviour's mouth came forth cursings sometimes, as well as blessings at other times. For he cursed the figtree, and 
Matth. 21. 19  anon it withered. And therefore it were fit to distinguish between cursings and cursings, yea and between blessings and blessings, lest otherwise we confound truth and error, good and evil.  
And to this purpose I think fit to distinguish between cursing as it signifies only the pronouncing of a curse; and cursing, as it signifieth cursed speaking. And S. james, as I take it, speaks of cursing as it signifies cursed speaking, and not as it signifies the bare pronunciation of a curse, which may be done without cursed speaking, and in an holy manner, as when our Saviour cursed the figtree, and Elisha the children that mocked him, moved undoubtedly thereunto extraordinarily by the Spirit of God. Like as when profane persons bless themselves, and superstitious persons bless their idols, their actions are unholy enough, and do bring the curse of God upon their persons. For they shall multiply sorrow upon 
Psal. 16. 4.  their heads that run after other gods. Now S. james useth fit similitudes to illustrate this duty of blessed speaking, and to move them to refrain from cursed speaking: considering that God's Spirit is as a fountain of holy life in their hearts; and therefore they should send forth nothing but sweet water, not indifferently either sweet water only, or bitter water only, but sweet water, and that only. And seeing they are trees of righteousness, of the Lords planting, that he may be glorified: 
Esa. 61. 4  therefore to bring forth nothing but good fruit, but that of diverse kinds, like unto that tree of life, that bore twelve manner of 
Revel. 22. 2.  fruits, and gave fruit every month.  
And yet if sometimes they break forth into cursed speaking, it is the less strong, considering they are in part carnal, 
Gal. 5. 23  and but in part, spiritual; and therefore in part out of tune, though nothing like so much as they were in state of nature; when they sent forth nothing but bitter water, neither blessing their brethren, nor God; no nor themselves neither. Not one of these instances, say you, but holds as truly in God as in man. He being the tree of life, cannot bring forth death. To cause the vine to bring forth figs, were not so hard a point of husbandry, as to derive cursedness or misery from the fountain of bliss. For a spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, is more compatible, then for hateful and harmful intentions, to have any issue from pure love. But God is love, yea love is his essence as Creator. Why do you not speak plainly, and tell us, that out of God's mouth cannot proceed blessing and cursing? Yet the Lord protesteth to Abraham, saying, Blessed shall he be that 
Gen. 12. 4. I will bless them that bless thee, and curse them that curse thee. Mal. 2. 2 Levit. 26 Deut. 28 Deut. 30. 19  blesseth thee, and cursed shall he be that curseth thee: And tells the jews to their face, that he would curse their blessings. Yea, that he had cursed them already. And equally and indifferently, as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient, so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient: and therefore calls heaven and earth to witness, that he hath set before them, life and death, blessing and cursing. So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God, as the Author of them, like as life and blessing; and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man, as it is found, either in the way of obedience, or in the way of disobedience. And in this respect perhaps you may say, that man is the cause of cursing, & not God. To this I answer; 1. By the same reason, man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing, and not God. 2. If in this respect, cursing be to be derived from sin, it is only in the way of a meritorious cause; so doth not fruit proceed from trees, but only in the way of an efficient cause. God, and none but God can be the Author, as of happiness, so of misery, as of eternal life, so also of everlasting death. And as none is truly blessed, but whom God blesseth; so none is truly accursed, but whom God curseth. Yet no man, I think, that hath his wits in his head, will say, that this cursing proceedeth from God's love, but rather from his hatred. God's love towards the creature is essential, his love to the creature is not so, no more then to be a creator, is of God's essence. And love is no more of God's essence as a Creator, than hatred is of God's essence as a revenger. And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alleged, belong to God only as a judge, to execute the one by way of reward, and the other by way of punishment. Albeit there is another course of God's blessing and of his cursing, though you love not to distinguish, but to confound rather; as all that maintain bad causes, love darkness rather than light. 
joh. 3. 19   
I come to the second point, wherein you insist, In that he is the Author of being, he is the Author of goodness to all things that are. And this is very true; for, God saw all that he had made, and lo it was very good. And as it is very true, so it is nothing at 
Gen. 1. 31  all to the purpose. For when we inquire, whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one, we presuppose their beings in their several times and generations. And secondly, we speak of a love proper to mankind, which consisteth not in giving them their being; for, God hath given being unto Angels, even unto Devils as well as unto men; and as to men, so to all inferior creatures, be they never so noisome and offensive unto man. And it is a strange course of yours, to magnify the love of God to man, in giving him being, which is found in the basest creature that breathes, or breathes not. I have heard a story of a great Prince, when one of the prime subjects of the land, being taken in a foul act of insurrection, and yielding upon condition to be brought to speak with that Prince, presuming of ancient favour, whereof he had tasted in great measure, and which upon his presence might haply revive, he found nothing answerable, but imperious tarts rather, and dismission in this manner, Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad. Yet you magnify the love of God to mankind in as comfortable manner, when you say that ho hath given us being, which we well know God hath given to lions, rigers, and beasts of prey; yea, to snakes and adders, to frogs and toads, and fiery serpents.  
Herehence you proceed to the third point, and do infer, That because he hath made us, therefore he loveth us; for, He hateth nothing that he hath made, as saith the wise man: and to give the greater credit to the authority alleged by you, you use an introduction of strange state; for you say, The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive, nor be deceived, that, He hateth nothing that he hath made, But to what purpose tends all this pomp? Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all, and can neither deceive nor be deceived? May not fools speak of him, that can neither deceive nor be deceived, as well as wise men, and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this? If the author of that sentence had been such a one, as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived, then indeed the sentence had been of greatest authority, and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the jew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull, & take the author of it for such a one, as could neither deceive nor be deceived? If you did, this were very foul play, and no better than a trick of coney-catching. Yet we except not against the sentence, but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours, taken from the same ground, above two hundred years ago.  
You shall find it in Aquinas his sums, where his first objection is this; Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. 
Aquin. 1. 〈◊〉 23. art. 3.  Nullus enim reprobat, quem diligit: sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt, & nihil odisti eorum quae secisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat. It seems that God reprobates no man. For, no man reprobates him whom he loveth. But God loves every man according to that, Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing that thou hast made. Therefore God reprobateth no man. And the answer he makes unto this objection followeth in this manner, Adprimum dicendum, quod Deus omnes homines diliget, & etiam omnes creaturas, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: 
Ibid.  non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare. To the first is to be answered, that God loves all men, yea, and all creatures, for as much as he willeth some good to them all: but yet he willeth not every good to all. Therefore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good, which is life everlasting, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them. And you might have been pleased to take notice, not only of that wise man (though as wise as Philo) who speaks herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived, but of that wise God, who is wiser than men and Angels, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, and affirmeth openly, that He hath loved jacob and hated Esau; as also of the Apostle Saint Paul, who by the infallible direction of God's Spirit, applieth this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne. And if to inflict the torments of hell upon these, or these for their sins be to hate them; surely to intend to inflict the torments of hell upon them for their sins, is to hate them. And seeing God from everlasting intended to do whatsoever he doth in time, it followeth, that from everlasting he did hate them.  
Yet this truth you dare secretly to outface, without taking any notice of it. But here you argue; well, let us consider it; For men to bless God and to curse men, doth argue a dissolution of that internal harmony which should be in the humane nature: therefore for God to hate some men, and to love others, would necessarily infer a greater distraction in the indivisible essence, besides the contradiction which it implies to infinite goodness. This latter clause is thrust in to make weight, and to turn the scale, but being nothing save mere breath and air, makes it rather lighter. Like as when the Spaniard to make his state weigh as much as the state of France, and finding that Spain and other places 
News from Parnassus.  would not serve the turn, clapped in Milan and Naples into the balance, whereupon it was found well the lighter. Yet I am content to consider that also in its turn. But first of the argument. My answer hereunto is twofold: First, as touching the antecedent; I say, and have already showed, that the passage of james, whereat you aim, proceeds of cursing, only 
jac. 3. 9  as it signifies cursed speaking, not as it signifies the pronouncing of a curse, which may be in an holy manner, it being clear, that both God and man; both God the Father, and God the Son, may, and have pronounced curses in an holy manner, without giving evidence of any dissolution of that internal harmony which should be in them; and yet such a dissolution is to be acknowledged to have its place more or less in the best of men in this world, for they have flesh in them 
Gal. 5. 2●  as well as spirit, but neither is nor can be in God. Secondly, I deny the consequence; for, it doth not follow, that, because it is not lawful for man to curse, therefore it is not lawful for God to curse. Are not Devils accursed? At the day of judgement shall not our Saviour pronounce that sentence on thousands, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire? And why should this argue any distraction in God, more than in a judge that absolveth some, and condemneth others? So our Saviour at the day of judgement will say unto some, Go ye cursed into 
Matth. 25.  everlasting fire: unto others, Come ye blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. If you do not speak of blessing and cursing in the way of execution of judgement and reward, what mean you to walk thus in the cloud of generalities? If you speak not of execution, but of intention: as God doth execute judgements for sin, and rewards of obedience; so doth he from everlasting intent both the one and the other, as it is impossible it should be otherwise. Yourself acknowledging in words Gods decrees to be eternal. And doth it not become God from everlasting to intend to proceed in the day of judgement, as before spoken of? As great a divine as you are taken for, I much doubt you little understand the state of the question, wherein you seem to oppose some body, for, I cannot be persuaded you do wilfully dissemble it. But there is another course of God's providence in another matter, and far different from the execution of punishment and reward, maintained by your opposites, and impugned by you: but you are loath to be seen in your opposition therein, and to have your opinion known particularly for fear lest the common voice should cry shame upon you, as upon a professed Arminian, a manifest impugner of the sovereignty of God, in showing mercy on 
Rom. 9 18  whom he will, and denying mercy to whom he will, and so hardening whom he will. Now here you have no comparison to help yourself withal, drawn from the condition of man. For in man's power it is not, either to give grace, or to deny it. But to the contrary we find, that Superiors have the dispensation of favours and gratifications in their power, which they enlarge or restrain at their pleasure, and extend to whom they will. How much more shall the Lord of all take liberty unto himself, to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to show compassion on whom he will show compassion; yea, and as to have mercy on whom he will, so to harden whom he will also; and that I hope without contradiction to his goodness, which you beside the word of God cast in, to outface the proclamation of God himself. For as God's goodness did not bind him to make the world; so neither doth it bind him to save the world. And as when he made the world, he made as many creatures as he thought good; so in saving the world, he saves as many creatures as he thinks good, both amongst men and Angels, by giving grace to whom he will, and denying grace to whom he will. When you say, that, To love the work of his own hands is more essential to him that made all things out of his mere love, than it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible. This speech of yours is a gross unsavoury speech, transforming God into a natural and necessary agent: for, it is well known that the fire burns naturally and necessarily. And if God doth more essentially love his creatures, than he must naturally and necessarily preserve them in being, and cannot destroy them And because it is out of the same love that you derive the creation of the world, it followeth, that God was necessitated by the necessity of nature to make the world; and consequently that the world was everlasting without beginning, and so shall continue without end. Behold the flowers that grow in the paradise of your contemplation, fitter for Aristotle's Physics, or Metaphysics, then for the meditations of a Christian Divine, as being fit only to make a nosegay for the Devil. The love of God towards himself is essential, towards his creatures is merely accidental. He needed not to have made them, neither is it any whit necessary that he should preserve them. And as creation and preservation are attributed of extrinsecall denomination unto God, so is his love towards his creatures also. Neither was it out of love to the creature that he made the world, but out of love to himself, as who is the end of all. For, both Solomon professeth, that God 
Prov. 16. 4  made all things for himself: and Saint Paul likewise gives us to understand, that as things are from him, so all things are for him 
Rom. 11. last.  also. But God's love is infinite, therefore, say you, it extends to all, seeing all are less than infinite. A proper argument, and as well suitable unto your text, which undertaketh only to show, that God's love is infinite to mankind. And this argument proves as well, that it is extended to frogs and toads; to Angels and Devils, as well as to mankind. This is only to profess, that it extends to all. Now this is a very improper interpretarion of infinite love: for less love, and less liberality, may extend to more then greater love, and greater liberality: for he that gives ten shillings to one person, is more liberal, then that divides five shillings amongst threescore persons, in giving them a penny apiece. Lastly, the fruit of this love can be but being: and is it not a proper commendation of God's infinite love towards mankind, to say that he gives being unto all? And doth God's love to man appear more herein, then to the vilest creature that is?  
2 In the next Section you discourse at large after your manner of the amplitude of God's love in comparison, which is nothing at all to your purpose, whose chief aim is to insinuae, that God's love is alike to all.  
Yet having proceeded thus far, my resolution is to go on, and to consider what you bring. What think you of Adam's love in the state of innocency, was it perfect, or no? Though without sin awhile, yet he fell into sin: so did the Angels before him, so should we, though as perfect as they, if God should not uphold us. Yet our love in greatest perfection could not be so much as a shadow of God's love, there being no resemblance between them: our love being a love of duty, God's love to us of mere grace and mercy. Besides, between the fruits of God's love to us, and the fruits of our love towards God, no colour of resemblance. Man is bound heartily to desire the good of all; but God is free, and hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Many widows were in Israel in the days of Elias, when 
Luc. 4. 25. 26. 27.  heaven was shut three years and six months, and great famine was throughout all the land: But unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta a city of Sidone, unto a certain widow. Also many lepers were in Israel in the days of Elesaeus the prophet, yet none of them was made clean but Naaman the Syrian. And if God's will had been to do the best that might be, he could have cured no doubt all other lepers as well as Naaman, and succoured other widows as well as the widow of Sarepta. Yet I confess, God's good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively also: for not a sparrow falleth to the ground 
Matth. 10. 29.  without the providence of our heavenly Father: he saveth both man and beast, and heareth the young Ravens that call 
Psal. 36. 6. & 147. 9 & 145. 15.  upon him: the eyes of all do wait upon the Lord, and he gives them their meat in due season.  
And as touching the conferring both of grace and glory, therein he saveth more than we know, or are acquainted with. The number of the children of Israel, is as the sand of the sea that cannot be counted for multitude. As touching 
Host 1. last.  temporal blessings, all partake of his goodness therein, in their natural preservation and consolation; therein we must imitate him in doing good to all, as it lieth in our power, though chiefly to the household of faith, yet not to them only, 
Gal 6. 10. Luc. 10. 30.  but to others also. But though he causeth his sun to shine, and his rain to fall upon the just and unjust; yet pronounceth not the sentence of salvation on all promiscuously, whether they be just, or unjust.  
And whereas all are equally corrupt in state of nature, yet he doth not equally show mercy on all, or bestow the means of grace on all; or where he doth bestow these means of salvation, he doth not make them effectual unto us. He blinds the eyes, and hardens the hearts of some, that they should not see with 
joh. 12. 40.  their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, and be converted, that he might heal them. Whereby it comes to pass, that the word of God, though it be the savour of life unto life unto some, yet it 
2 Cor. 3.  is the savour of death unto death unto others; and the Ministers of God are a good savour unto God in both; even both in them that are saved, and in them that perish. For God made all 
Pro. 16. 4.  things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. Mercy, you say, is not restrained from ill deservers in distress, so long as the exercise of it breeds no harm to such as are more capable of bountiful love and favour.  
This is a consideration, which I confess hath place among men sometimes, and in some cases. Yet hardly can I devise how to suit with a fit instance. For no states (for aught I find) do take notice of any such distinction of times, wherein the exercise of mercy will not breed harm, and wherein it will, but they execute condign punishment upon malefactors according to the laws, that all may see, and fear to do the like; not be encouraged malorum facta imitari, but rather eorum 
Deut. 17. 13.  exitus perhorrescere. God doth not so. His patience and long suffering is exceeding great; yet if he should give every man repentance in his death bed, and save their souls, what one in the world should be the worse for this? And though the wicked many times spend their days in mirth, and suddenly 
job 21. 13.  go down to the grave; yet by the grace of God we shall be nothing the worse for this, nor provoked hereupon to condemn 
Psal. 73. 15.  the generation of God's children. Yet what is it that makes one man more capable of bountiful love and favour then another I know not: what makes him more capable of love in the execution of reward, I know; but what makes him more capable of love in the communication of grace, and in showing mercy towards him, I know not. Sure I am, that woman who had many sins forgiven her, loved so much the more, the ninety nine just persons that think they need no repentance, 
Luc. 7. 47. Luc. 15. 7.  like enough love so much the less.  
It is true, the laws of States take order for the just execution of punishment upon offenders for the common good; yet by your leave, Kings on earth, by their absoluteness do give pardons to whom they will, respecting more their own pleasure then the common good. And withal I think Princes do less offend (if at all offend) in refusing to pardon malefactors, then in granting pardons unto them. As for God, to whom you say the execution of justice is unnatural, he being the Father of mercy; I pray consider, if God should give repentance to all on their deathbeds, and consequently save all, what common good of mankind would be hindered by this? And as God is the father of mercy, so is he also the judge of all the world, and I conceive the execution of justice punitive to be as natural to him, as he is judge of all the world; as the 
Gen. 18. 25  execution of mercy is natural unto him, as he is the Father of mercy. Yet you seem to have a place of Scripture to prove a notorious untruth; as namely, that the execution of justice punitive is unnatural unto God; and that is out of Lament. 3. 33. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Thus you take Scripture hand over head to serve your turn. But I pray consider, is it possible that God should do any thing against his will? men may have reluctations, and conflicts in them, and do things volentes nolentes; is such a condition possible to be found in the nature of God? Yet in this case Aristotle hath defined the action to be simply voluntary, 
Eth. 3.  and done willingly. If God be represented sometimes unto us as it were fluctuating like men between different resolutions of executing either mercy or justice, as in the Prophet, How shall I give thee up Ephraim, how shall I deliver thee Israel? 
Host 11. 8.  how shall I make thee as Admah, how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, and my repentances are rolled together; like as he is represented unto us, as well in the shape of the members of our body, as of the passions of our mind; we have cause rather to take notice hereby of the goodness of God in condescending thus far to our infirmities, to make us the better acquainted with him, and the more sensible of his favour, then hereby to take occasion to fashion God like unto ourselves, either in body or mind. Yet the meaning of the Prophet is plain enough, namely, that God comes not to afflict his children, unless he be provoked by sin, and herein he differeth from earthly parents, who sometimes chasten their children for their own pleasures; but God as he doth not, 
Heb. 12. 10  but in case he is provoked; so he doth it for our profit, as the Apostle telleth us in the same place. To do a thing willingly hath the same signification with the Latin phrase, animi causa, that is, when nothing is the cause thereof but a man's own will, as Causabon observes out of Seneca de beneficiis 4. whose 
In Characteres Theophrasti, pag. 172.  opinion was, Neminem adeo à naturali lege descivisse, & hominem exuisse ut animi causa malus sit.  
You further say, that Nothing can provoke good men to execute punitive justice upon offenders, but the good of others, deserving either better, or not so ill, which might grow worse and worse through evil doers impunity. I pray consider, do parents chastise their children for the good of others, and not for the good of the children themselves? God himself chastiseth his own children all manner of ways, and is this for the good of others that deserve better, or not so ill? and not rather for the good of those his own children themselves? No chastising for the present 
Heb. 12. 11.  is joyous, saith the Apostle, but grievous, but afterwards it bringeth forth the quiet fruit of righteousness to them that are exercised thereby. Mark I pray, To them that are exercised thereby, he doth not say that this fruit is brought forth to others.  
As for the torments in the world to come, who is the better for them, unless they tend to the improvement of joy in those blessed ones, while they behold in others that misery which only by the grace of God, themselves have escaped. For as for any other welfare of the Saints of God, or any welfare at all of the damned crew, or avoidance of grievances that is procured by the damnation of the wicked, if you know, it is well, but I assure you it is more than I can divine of. Yet do we not say, that God hath pleasure in the torture either of men or devils, but only in the demonstration of his own glorious justice towards them, and in the magnifying of his mercy so much the more toward his Saints.  
You say, It goeth against the nature of God to punish the works of his own hands. A vile speech, and withal senseless; and no marvel if when men prostitute all honesty and the fear of God in opposing manifest truth, they lose their wits also, and fall upon most unsober meditations. For what a vile speech is it to say, that any work of God goeth against his nature, who as the Apostle professeth, worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. Then again, what a senseless speech 
Eph. 1. 11.  is it to insinuate, that it were not so contrary to GOD'S nature, to deal thus with those creatures which were not the works of his own hands; but being the works of his own hands, you say, it is against his nature to punish them. A wonderful assertion, and whereat the most barbarous people might be astonished in the consideration of the impiety, shall I say? or the insulsity thereof, or both rather, namely, that it should be against God's nature to punish sinners. For it is well known that God punisheth none other, nor ever did; Christ jesus the Son of God only excepted. And what a field have you here to expatiate in if you list to aggravate the unnaturalness of any action in God? And with as little sobriety do you amplify that unnaturalness in God by the consideration of man especially, as who (you say) is more dear to him then any child is to his Father. So then to punish others, you are willing to grant not to be so unnatural an action in God, as the punishing of man. And I pray what are those other creatures? Are they inferior, as Oxen and Sheep, and all these never sinned; yet is it not unnatural to punish them, if punishment may have place (as being taken for the afflicting of them) where there is no sin. For God gives us leave to wear them out, with ploughing, carrying, riding, for our necessity, for our delight; yea to set one creature upon another, the greyhound upon an hare, upon a dear, the hawk upon a partridge, or pheasant, or wild fowl. No unnaturalness do we exercise in all this, such is the liberty which God hath given unto us. But yet to punish man, though a sinner, (for he punisheth no other) this how greatly (say you) doth it go against the nature of God? It seems you cannot tell how greatly; neither can I help you herein. For I do not see how it is against his nature at all. But you seem to give a reason, in saying that God is loving kindness itself. But I pray consider, is he not justice itself also as well as loving kindness? and is it against the nature of justice to punish sinners? no nor against his loving kindness neither. For I hope that no attribute of God is contrary to another, though according to their different notions, some actions are more suitable to the one, then to the other. And why man should have more special consideration here then Angels, I know no reason. For if you say that God is the father of man, in as much as he hath created him, by the same reason he may be the father of the ignoblest creature that is. To say that God is the father of man, in as much as he made him after his own image, this is no more true of man, then of Angels, even of the very Angels of darkness. And men also are borne the children of darkness, and so continue until the time that God calleth them, and enlighteneth them. Or will you say that in special sort he is the father of man, by way of redemption; yet I find hitherto in your discourse no intimation of this fatherhood. But will you say that all and every one have redemption in Christ through his blood? you may as well say, that all and every one have the 
Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14.  remission of their sins in Christ through his blood. For this is it which in Scripture phrase is meant by redemption. Arminius who maintains that Christ died for all and every one, professeth plainly, that the immediate effect of Christ's passion is but this, that God now may, his justice nothing hindering him, give pardon of sins and salvation, upon what condition he will. Which upon the matter is all one, as if he should say, that seeing faith and repentance are the conditions whereupon God gives forgiveness of sins, none but such as believe and repent do obtain the forgiveness of sins, that is, do obtain redemption in Christ, through his blood. Now consider, are not faith and repentance the gifts of God? It cannot be denied but they are; the Scriptures evidently 
Eph. 2. 8. Act. 5. 39 Act. 11 18. 2 Tim. 2. last.  give testimony hereunto, namely that faith is the gift of God, that repentance is the gift of God. And doth God give faith and repentance unto all? All experience of the world doth manifest that he doth not; no nor so much as the outward means unto all, whereby faith and repentance are wrought. I wonder you blush not in setting down such incongruities; as first, in saying that God as he is willing to be called the father of the sons of men, so he is ready to do the kind office of a father unto them: and for proof hereof allege that of the Psalmist, As a father pitieth his own children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. In which passage, the fatherly love of God is not extended unto all, but restrained to those that fear him. And yet I pray consider, what father would torment his children with everlasting fire, though never so unnatural towards him? or would not keep him from it, if it lay in his power, without sinning against God? Yet God torments even those whom you call his children, justly for their sins, in the torments of hell fire, that never shall have end. We willingly grant the love of God the Father, and the love of God the Son is such a love as passeth knowledge; but it is enlarged only towards 
Eph. 3. 19 Gal. 3. 26.  those that are his children by faith in Christ jesus. This is the filiation alone which the Apostle takes notice of; you take no notice of this at all. And again, Because ye are sons, God hath sent 
Gal. 4. 6.  the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Now is this common unto all, as you make God's fatherhood common unto all? So saith the Apostle in another place, As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. 
Rom. 8. 14  Here is a description of that sonship we have in respect of our heavenly Father. And again, The Spirit of God witnesseth 
Rom. 8. 16  with our spirits that we are the sons of God. Of these passages I finde no account made throughout this whole discourse of yours. And towards these sons of God, we shall willingly give you leave to extend and intend the love of God as much as you think fit. But you still continue to extend the fatherhood of God unto all, as it were in despite of all these passages formerly alleged. Where do you find throughout the Scriptures, that the title of the sons of God is attributed to the uncircumcised, or to the Heathen? To the contrary we read both before the flood, that The sons of God saw 
Gen. 6. 2.  the daughters of men that they were fair: where we have a manifest distinction opposite to your confusion: And after; for this is the message which God sent unto Pharaoh, Israel is my son, even my first borne,— and if thou refuse to let him go, I will 
Exo. 4. 22.  slay thy son, even thy first borne. How much more under the Law? Is Ephraim my dear son, or pleasant child? yet since I spoke unto him, I still remembered him; therefore my bowels are 
jer. 31. 20.  troubled for him, I will surely have compassion on him, saith the Lord. Most of all under the Gospel: Behold what love the Father, 
1 joh. 〈◊〉. 1.  hath showed us, that we should be called the sons of God. What have you here said of God's love to man, that may not as well be said of his love to the very Angels of darkness? For is it not true in respect of them as well as in respect of us, that having given them being, he doth much more love them, after they are enstamped with his image. For he sows not wheat to reap tares; nor did he give life to Angels that he might bring forth death. God gave both man and Angels life for the manifestation of his own glory; and for the manifestation of his own glory doth he punish transgressors amongst men and Angels with everlasting death.  
3. You would willingly draw Heathens to the acknowledgement of this fatherhood in God towards all; though thinking it too narrow to comprehend all references of loving kindnesses between him and demi gods, which demi gods you take to be men. I think rather they were conceived to be inferior spirits; like as Aristotle makes all inferior intelligences to depend upon the first mover. And what reference of loving kindness is comprehended in this, that jupiter is said to be both male and female, you may at leisure dilate of when you please. God's affection to his children exceeds the affection of any mother towards the fruit of her womb. For God was content to purchase his Church with 
Act. 20. 23  his own blood. Your next sentence contains mere non sense: I rectify it thus; And as if his love could not be sufficiently expressed by these dearest references amongst men, etc. he hath chosen the most affectionate female, etc. Thus I make sense of it; but the poorest sense that ever was vented in so grave a matter of discourse. As if the greatness of place, or curiosity of education did make mothers so little compassionate towards their children, that God is fain to seek out for more proper resemblances. Thus you fetch about for matter, as Balaam did for divinations; as if there were no women in the world, but delicate Ladies, or such nice & curious dames, whose niceness hath made them so unnatural, that our Saviour was driven to compare his tender affection unto the affectionof a hen towards her chicken; which creature is magnified by you (to hold up the jest) for the most affectionate female amongst reasonless creatures: implying that reasonable creatures may in tenderness of affection right well exceed the hen, and so you quite mar your own play. But where do you find (if a man might be so bold to ask) that an hen is so superlative a creature in her affection towards her chicken? I can hardly believe that either Aristotle or Pliny hath afforded you any such observation, but rather your comment upon them, or upon the book of Nature. What? is an henue more affectionate to her young ones, than a Pelican is to hers, who is said to let herself blood to feed them? or then a Stork, that hath her name from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and in the Hebrew is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is a word near of kin to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bowels of compassion, as which indeed are most tender in her. A story whereof we have in the description of the Netherlands: namely, of a Stork, that when the house was on fire where her nest was, kept the fire off from her young ones with her own body and wings so long till she was burnt herself.  
Still you proceed in amplifying the love of God, nothing to the purpose. For the question is not, how great God's love is towards those on whom it is placed; but whether it extend to all or no? You say, All the sweet fruits and comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their children, or of husband's towurd their wives, or of brethren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or of one friend to another (their sinfulness excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. We well know, the love of God exceeds all this; bu● I verily think your pen hath run riot ere you are aware, and you have written you know not, or you consider not what. For, herehence it followeth, that there is no act so abominable of the will of the creature, but God may infuse it, the sinfulness only thereof excepted; which yet is a very sorry exception. for sinfulness is not a thing that can be infused by God, Angel, or man. Of old is was determined by Austin, that sin hath 
De civet. Dei, lib. 〈◊〉 cap. 7  not causam efficientem, but deficientem only.  
And herein you manifestly contradict yourself, as who maintain, that whosoever is the author of the act, must therewithal be the author of the sinfulness thereof, for as much as sinfulness doth result (relative like) upon position of the foundation. And of this kind of argument I have found you wondrous confident, in a certain treatise of yours, though a very weak argument, and long ago proposed and answered by Capreolus, and whose answer thereunto is again rehearsed by Soncinas.  
But here I show only how you make no bones of contradicting yourself very handsomely, in saying, God doth infuse an act which is sinful, though not the sinfulness of it. The love of God (you say) though infinitely increased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalise God's love towards every particular soul created by him. Thus you steal up, without all proof, the extension of God's love to every particular; and that in infinite manner. Whereas the Scripture professeth as plainly, that God hath hated Esau, as that he hath loved Jacob. And seeing God's love can be but infinite towards his elect, and towards his dearest Son, and towards himself, you make it infinite towards the very reprobates, whether men or devils: for every particular of them hath been created by him. Is not this good divinity, and very comfortable divinity? Yet no Arminian will say, that God so loved the Angels that were fallen, that he sent his Son to die for them. When you say, The creatures for fear do not so much good for their little ones as they might; not so much for the model of their wit or strength, as God for his part (though infinite in wisdom and power) doth for the sons of men. As he said of his Boar that was sent him, Noster te non capit ignis conturbator Aper, so may I say of this your eloquence, that it passeth mine intelligence. I can neither construe your sentence, nor correct it.  
To say that the creature cannot do so much for his young as God doth for the sons of men, is so vulgar a truth, that when you introduce it with such pomp and state, I may well say ', Tu pulicem Gaure giganta facis: yet the adversative interposed (Though infinite in wisdom and power) hath no congruity to this sense neither; for God's infinite wisdom and power is no adversative to this I trow, but rather a coroborative thereunto. Be it that God had done as much as could be done for his unfruitful vineyard, what is this to prove, that God's love extends to all? whereas the place itself doth manifestly restrain this love of God unto his vineyard. Yet what is there mentioned besides the well husbanding of this vineyard; wherein he appeals to their consciences, whether a better course could be devised than he had taken for the well husbanding thereof. But I pray consider, doth the work of grace extend no further then to planting and watering? Is it not God that gives the increase also? Is it not in God's 
1 Cor. 3. 6.  power to give faith, to give repentance? you that will have God to infuse that love in carnal men, which is found to be sinful, and not to infuse the sinfulness thereof, cannot endure that God should infuse faith and repentance into the heart of man. But if God can do this, surely he can do more than aught that is expressed in that song of God concerning 
●s. 5. 1. etc.  his vineyard. Yet it is true, that in the way of outward husbandry, God's course was without all exception, neither could the wisdom of man devise a better course for God to take, than was that which he took with them. And therefore you have small cause to charge your adversaries with such sorry shifts, so atheistical, as if we thought God's serious protestations deserved no credit with us. These are fictions of course, proceeding from an addle brain, to supply the room of so and arguments.  
And surely, did we not believe Gods serious protestations, why should we regard his oath? For, amongst men, he that is found to be no man of his word, is usually little regarded for his oath. God's word, without protestation, is, and ever shall be through his grace, sufficient ground of our faith in him. Look you unto it that you hunt not after some other foundation, the tenor of whose discourse in many places, and in this very place, treating of his infinite love to all and every one, runs in a current of manifest opposition against the word of God: though now and then you have a snatch at it, and away, like the dog at the river Nilus, for fear of the Crocodile; and content yourself only with a superficial consideration of it, as in this place, like as in the former. For what? is this spoken indifferently of all? of the Gentiles as well as of the jews? It is manifestly spoken of the house of Israel, concerning whom the Lord asketh this question, Why will ye die ye house of Israel? And the whole proceedeth by way of answer to their murmuring against the providence of God, in saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; and hereupon God proceedeth to justify the course of his providence unto their face. Now when God doth not take men upon the hip, as soon as they have sinned against him, but spares them, and not only gives them space of repentance, but useth means to bring them unto repentance, by sending Prophets unto them to admonish them, to admonish them of their sins, and to denounce the judgements of God against them; is not this a manifest evidence that God is not delighted in their death, but rather in their repentance, although he still reserves liberty to himself to bestow the gift of repentance on whom he will? And therefore all this is only in respect of his church, not in respect of those who are strangers from the common wealth of Israel, and aliens from the covenants of promise. then concerning those within the church, All are not Israel, that are of Israel, Rom. 9 And though the means of grace have their course withal, yet God intends to make them effectual only with his elect, according to that, As many as 
Act. 13. 4● Rom. 9 30  were ordained to eternal life believed; and whom he hath predestinated, them hath he called, and justified, and glorified. For as Austin saith, Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit. 
Aug. cont. julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Ibid.  quis aget poenitentiam: And speaking of the Non pradestinatis. Istorum neminem, saith he, adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritatemque poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat. Therefore we say, that as concerning the elect, though they sin, yet God willeth not their death, but willeth their repentance, and their salvation. But as touching others who are mixed amongst them, as tares amongst the wheat, and are partakers of the same means of grace and invitations unto repentance; in as much as he spares them, and giveth them not only time to repent, but admonisheth them of their sins, and affords them the outward means of repentance, it is sufficient to justify, that God doth not willingly bring judgement upon them, neither for their sins, because he comes not hastily thereunto, but upon wilful despising of the means of grace, used to reclaim them; like as before I showed in what sense God is said, not to afflict the sons of men willingly. And as for this present place, yourself elsewhere hath interpreted it thus, I will not the death of an impenitent sinner, but that God wills undoubtedly the death of an impenitent sinner. To quash this construction in this place, you say, this oath of God proceeds as concerning those, who all their life long have hated him. Here I am persuaded we shall find no little inconsiderateness.  
To hate God all a man's life time, what is it but to hate him from the first hour of coming to the use of reason, unto the last, even unto the moment of death? now I pray consider, Will not God the death of such a one as dieth in impenitency? The text I confess runs thus, I will not the death of him that dieth. But do you think indeed the meaning is, that as for such a man as now dieth, and hath lived all his life time in the hatred of God, God will not the death of such a one? Like enough you are content your Reader should entertain such a conceit. But I cannot be persuaded you take this to be the meaning. The text is manifestly against it; for it followeth, But rather that he return and live; so that it is spoken of a man living, and such as is capable of repentance. And we know, the whole Chapter is to justify God's providence in afflicting men with his judgements: so that to die in this place, is to be under the afflicting hand of God, and so in the way to death and to destruction.  
Our living is reputed a continual dying; for as much as nature consumeth and wasteth, as the Poet wittily expresseth it; 
Childhood ends in youth,  
And youth in old age dies;  
I thought I lived in truth,  
But now I die, I die; I see,  
Each age of death is one degree▪   
Whereupon he concludes his resolution to correct his former phrase of speech, saying, 
Farewell the doting score  
Of world's Arithmetic:  
Life, I'll trust thee no more;  
But henceforth, for thy sake,  
I'll go by deaths new Almanaeke.  
— For while I sing,  
A thousand men lie sick, a thousand bells doring.   
And would you know what is the difference between me and them; 
They are but dead, and I dying.   
So that I guess your meaning according to the articles of your own creed, is but this; That God's love is such to them that all their life past (not simply all their life, but all their life passed) have hated him, that, He will not their death, but rather that they return and live. And I grant, that this is true of many in most proper speech, namely, of all the elect of God, though it be long ere God calleth and converteth some of them. Of others also that live in the Church, I have showed, how it may have course in the same sense, that God is said, not so much willingly to afflict them for their sins, as for refusing to repent and turn unto God after they have sinned.  
When you tell us of infinite places more of sacred texts, and those most perspicuous in themselves, and also that, The whole ancient Church, with some small exception, which yet may be counterpoised, is ready to give joint verdict for you, it savoureth hotly of Smithfield eloquence; 
Pessima quò vendas opus est mangone perito  
Qui Smithfieldensi polleat eloquio.   
Yet it was an old observation, 
Multa fidem promissa levant cum plenius aequo,  
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.   
If you had some about you to justify you in cleanly manner by some pretty qualification, it had been absolute. As the Gentleman who professed that he had certain ponds wherein Carp were taken as big as that Somer-pole which he then road by; and withal asked his man that road with him, whether it were not so. Sir, quoth his man, though they were so big, yet I am sure they were nothing like so long: and indeed, the dimension of length is more suitable to the proportion of an Eel, then of a carp. As Cicero answered him that told a strange tale concerning the length of certain Eels which he had seen: for Tully handsomely to convince him of his vanity, made show of going beyond him in his own element of tossing; and forthwith replied, saying, That is nothing strange, for I know a place where Eels are taken, of such a length that they use to make their Angling-rods of them. And this assertion of yours may come as here to the truth, as an Eel is to an Angling rod.   

CHAP. XV.  
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of God's love: Of the distinction of Singula generum, and Genera singulorum. Of the distinction of Voluntas signi, and Voluntas beneplaciti.  
WHat you mean by a course of Compromising contentions between some other reformed Churches, in certain points of religion, I know not, neither am I acquainted with any such course. I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative, as of God's grace effectual to every good action; so of his sovereignty in electing whom he will, according to his good pleasure, and passing by others, as any Church in Christendom; which I do not speak upon, snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church, whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I think good (as your fashion is) but this I speak upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set down in the articles of religion, manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England. Yet you would persuade your Readers, the Church of England concurreth with you, in extending the love of God towards all. But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause, by walking in the clouds of generalities; as if you feared to come to the light, and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him. You talk of God's unspeakable love towards mankind, but you define not in what kind, but keep yourself a loose off for all advantages.  
We acknowledge God's love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal, and that in an unspeakable manner. But the question only is, whether God doth bestow, or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all, or salvation upon all. If God's love in these respects, in your opinion doth extend to all, say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus, and predestinated all. For predestination in Austin's divinity is but praeparatio gratiae & gloriae. Now the Church of England, in her public and authorized doctrine; plainly professeth, that God hath predestinated none, but those whom he hath chosen in Christ, as vessels of honour. If you say, that the reason why God did not predestinate all, nor elect all in Christ, proceeds not from the mere pleasure and free disposition of God, but that only upon the foresight of the obedience of the one, and disobedience of the other he elected those, and reprobated these (for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you, though you are loath in plain terms to profess as much) let any man judge whether this be suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church, whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority, and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft, observes in his fifth proposition, that, In Christ Jesus of the mere will and purpose of God, some are elected and not others unto salvation. And he just fi it by holy Scripture, Rom. 9 11. that the purpose of God might remain according to election, not of works, but of him that calleth, Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us, according to the good pleasure of his will, 2 Tim. 1. 9 Not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, Exod. 33. 19 Rom. 9 15. I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy, Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil, Rom. 9 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour.  
But consider the Article itself, They which are endued with so excellent a benefit (to wit, as election and predestination is) are called according to God's purpose by his spirit, working in due season; they through grace obey their calling, they be justified freely, they be made sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ, they walk religiously in good works, and at length by God's mercy they attain to everlasting felicity. Whereby it appears, that election and predestination is made the fountain and cause of obedience, and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life; whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance; our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination, rather than our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance.  
Again consider, these alone whom God hath elected in Christ, and predestinated, are noted to be made in due time the sons of God by adoption. But you make all to be the sons of God, and Gods infinite love in unspeakable manner to be enlarged towards all and every one; even towards them that have hated God all their life.  
Lastly, only the elect are here noted to be those vessels whom God hath made unto honour; not that any others are made unto honour: which is nothing answerable to your tenet. But proceed we along with you. You undertake to prove that God's love is extended to mankind, which no Christian ever called in question; but your meaning is, that it extends to all and every one of mankind, and that so far forth as to will the salvation of all and every one, as appears by the sequel, and all this out of the public and authorized doctrine of our Church. And yet you insist only upon certain passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church. The Liturgy I hope is not the doctrine of our Church, though it be not contradictory to our doctrine. But therein we have been content to conform unto the practice of the Church, so far forth as it might seem tolerable, and such as might be performed with a good conscience, which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion, it is rather to receive correction from the Articles, than the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy.  
But consider we what is that which you plead for yourself. You enter upon it after your course with great state, discovering unto us a wonderful providence of God, in drawing those Articles; for you tell us, that No national Council, though assembled for that purpose, could fit their doctrine more expressly to meet with all the late restrictions of God's love, than the Church our Mother, even from the beginning of reformation, hath done, as if she had then foreseen a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing schisms or distractions of opinions amongst her sons. Here we have a pretty Comedy towards, and you have a poetical wit for fiction. Had our Church foreseen a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, where I pray was it fit that she should do this, but in the Articles of Religion? But you find no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of God's love, but in the Liturgy and Catechism. Was that think you a fit place to fit her doctrine for the preventing of schisms and distractions in opinion?  
Again, had she intended to prevent (as you say) distractions in opinion about the extension of God's love, would she not have done it rather expressly, then only in such a manner as to leave it to others to draw conseque●s therefrom, for the manifesting of her opinion about the large extent of God's love to mankind? Who would think that a sober man should be carried away with such vain and frivolous presumptions, without all tolerable ground? But let us come to the particular scanning of the places. All of them, I mark, are only the expression of prayer for others. Whence it no way followeth, that God will therefore save them, because we pray for their salvation. The child prayeth for his father, the father for the child, the brother for the brother; but hence it followeth not that God will save them; though we are bound to pray for the salvation of one another.  
Moses prayed God to wipe him out of the book of life, rather than to destroy his people in the wilderness. God had no such resolution, and what sober Divine could doubt, but that Moses knew well that this could not be, yet he shows hereby what his desire was, secluding the consideration of Gods will to the contrary, and what he would prefer, ●f he were left to himself, even his own eternal confusion, rather than the glory of God should be obscured. And who ever censured this prayer of Moses for sin? I am sure God doth not: so S. Paul could wish himself separate from Christ for his brethren's sake, which were his kinsmen according to the flesh, Rom. 9 2. yet he well knew that nothing could separate him from the love of God in Christ. Our Saviour in like sort well knew that the cup must not pass from him, yet nevertheless he prayed earnestly that that cup might pass, if it were possible, and with final submission of his will to the will of his Father.  
The first place you allege, is that passage of the Liturgy, where we pray unto God, that it may please him to have mercy upon all men. And for good reason do we pray so: for is not every one bound to seek the salvation of all men, as much as lieth in his power? did not the Apostles labour for this in their place? And is not prayer a special means for this? We are bound to pray for them that persecute us, we are bound 
Mat. 5. 4●.  to pray for them that hate us. For what, if God will not save all, and we know so much, shall that hinder us from doing our duty in seeking by all means the salvation of all: specially considering we are not able to put a difference and to discern who are elect, and who are not. S. Paul, though he saved 
1. Cor. 9 2●.  but some, yet would he become all things unto all men that he might save them. Yet he well knew that the word in his mouth was the savour of death unto death unto many; yea 
2. Cor. 2. 10.  to Israel in special manner, and yet notwithstanding his hearty desire and prayer unto God for Israel wa●, that they might 
Rom. 11▪ 〈◊〉  be saved. And albeit God should save all, and every one that live in some one time or age, yet were this ●o prejudice to the doctrine of election. For the number of Gods chosen, for all this might be but few in comparison to the reprobate: And therefore we see no cause why you should upbraid your opposites, as if they thought this practice of the ancient and modern Church had need of reformation.  
As for the restraint of the universal all men, in the place of Timothy, by S. Austin unto genera singulorum, it is according to the usual Scripture phrase. For Matth. 3. 5. it is said that There went out unto John the Baptist Jerusalem and all judea, and all the region round about Jordan; what sober Divine doth extend the signification hereof any father then to give to understand, that some from all parts of judea, and of the region round about jordan had resort unto him? Matth. 4. 23. it is likewise said, that jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their Synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom, and healing every sickness, and every disease among the people; and that his fame spread throughout all Syria, and they brought unto him all sick people. Do you think there was not one sick person left in all Galilee and Syria that was not brought unto him? Act. 10. it is said, that while Peter was in a trance he saw in a vision a vessel let down from heaven, wherein was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, every fourfooted beast; who doubts but that the meaning hereof is no more than this, that of all sorts some, or rather of most sorts some? 1 Cor. 15. 22. it is said, that in Christ all shall be made alive; is this true think you of all and every one? All flesh shall see the salvation of God; what sober man will apply this to all and every man? Rom. 5. 18. As by the offence of one man the fault came upon all unto condemnation: so by the obedience of one, righteousness came upon all men, to the justification of life: will you hereupon extend the benefit of Christ's death to the justification of all men unto everlasting life, like as all and every one are fallen into condemnation by the sin of Adam? Rom. 7. 8. the Apostle professeth that sin wrought in him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, can this possibly be applied to every particular concupiscence?  
But by the way, what do you mean to apply S. Augustine's restraint to this universal in this place? whereas Austin applieth it only to this universal in the place following, where it is said, that God will have all to be saved. And if no other place did afford us any such restraint of course, yet we must 〈◊〉 driven so to interpret it in this place, lest otherwise we be cast upon denying the first Article of our Creed. For seeing all are not saved, and the cause thereof is not because God will not save them; it necessarily followeth, that the cause thereof must be because God cannot save them. And it would have becomed you well to have answered this argument, and not presumed to carry your Reader to the embracing of your construction hand over head, in spite of so manifest a reason to the contrary. Now if you had but accommodated yourself to make answer hereunto, I doubt not but we should have had good matter to work upon; which I speak upon experience of another discourse of yours that passeth by tradition; but you were loath to intersert it there; and made choice rather to pitch upon the universal in the former place; that so you might be out of danger of that gunshot that must needs have rung a peal in your ears from this place. Yet in this place alone S. Austin interprets the universal according to the restraint mentioned, and not in the former. And therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin, but only to say that it is somewhere; and indeed so it is; and that somewhere is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before, he professrth; Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostrae fidei confessionis initium, quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus. That look how easy it is unto God to do what he will, so easy is it not to suffer that to be which he willeth not. Unless we believe this, the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken, whereby we profess to believe in God the Father Almighty. For he is not truly called Omnipotent, in any other respect then because he can bring to pass whatsoever he will have to be, neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindered by the wit of any creature. So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father, and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse. To avoid the brunt whereof, you juggle and consider his restraint there, where he doth not use it.  
And here you tell us magnificently, that if any man will lay this restraint upon this place, the scanning of the words following, the fitting of the matter contained in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other real circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease than it can be laid upon it. Here we have a great deal of cry, if the wool be answerable, we shall speed a great deal better than he in Aelian that shore his hogs. But the mischief is, S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place; but conceives the Apostles commandment to be this, ut oraretur pro singulis. So that your pains is like to be well bestowed, in shaking of Austin's restriction from this place, whereupon he laid no restriction at all. It seems you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at putfinger in the dark.  
We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other than whose salvation we are unfeignedly to desire, and we are to desire the salvation of every man, of what condition soever, or fort, or nation, provided that we know him. For do you think it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom? If so, I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what. Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine, I am bound to pray for, and I shall be sure to take notice of such a one, for I shall be sure to feel him. And as well for mean persons as for Kings, that I have any thing to do withal: albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings than others, and that without accepting of persons: because by the good affection of Kings to God's Church, the Church of God is like to prosper far better than by the conversion of mean persons. And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings, that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and 
1 Tim. 2. 2  honesty. And therefore I hope you will bear with me, if I pray with greater devotion for God's grace upon the King's heart, and God's blessing upon his head, then for meaner persons: because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of God's glory, in the liberty and prosperity of his Church, than the gracious disposition of meaner persons. And herein I hope I shall not be censured for an accepter of persons, a conceit of yours quite besides the Apostles text you treat of. But yet the Apostle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings (whereunto you drive it, devising circumstances to fill the scale.) For what have I to do to pray for the king of Bungo, if any such king or kingdom there be? or for the kings in Terra Australis incognita, discovered by Ferdinand de Quit? yet his relations are of so little efficacy, that hitherto he hath made no men's mouths water after them. It is enough for us to pray for the fullness of the Gentiles, that it may come i●, so to make way for the calling of the jews. But by virtue of the Apostles exhortation, every Christian congregation is bound to pray for their own king. Like as Darius, though an heathen Prince, desired the prayers of God's people that lived under him: Ezr. 6. 10. Let them have to offer sweet odours to the God of heaven, and pray for the King's life, and for his sons. When I pray for the coming in of the fullness of the Gentiles, and the calling of the jews, I except none; as likewise when I pray for the ruin of Antichrist, I except none.  
I find, you do not much satisfy yourself in the weight of this your discourse, you are still casting about for somewhat more to make up the total of your account, We must desire (you say) the spiritual good of all men, not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our universal consideration. So that belike you are still jealous, lest we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an universal consideration. I desire to deal as plainly as you would wish; name any man throughout the world unto me, try me whether I will not pray God bless him, and convert his heart, and save his soul. And yet to my thinking, you should not urge me to pray for one with whom I have nothing to do, only I hear a relation of him, perhaps dwelling in the I'll of japan. For though I am bound to love my neighbour as myself; and by neighbour I must comprehend a jew, although myself be a Samaritan, yet this is in case we meet together, and I see him to have need to make use of my charity. Otherwise to my judgement, general prayers should serve the turn, as I showed, for the fullness of the Gentiles to come in, for the calling of the jews, for the ruin of Babylon. Neither do we find any practice of the Saints to the contrary; and herein I assure you I except none. But because I see you travail to be delivered of somewhat, and I take pity of you, tell me I pray, is not your meaning this, that we must pray for all and every one that liveth in the world? If this be your meaning, and it did not satisfy you to say we must pray for all, or desire the salvation of all; you do as much as confess hereby, that to pray for all doth not include the praying for every one; & consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all, doth not exhort to pray for every one. I would I knew once what form would satisfy you; for I am apt to entertain a resolution to gratify you therein. But to say that we must pray for all, not in an indefinite, but in an universal consideration, if you could make me understand it, I would soon come to capitulation with you. In the mean time, I appeal to your conscience, did you ever pray in this style, for all, and signify that your meaning was to pray for them, not in an indefinite, but in an universal consideration? I profess unto you, if God should leave me unto myself and to follow mine own desires, I should desire not only that all that now live, but that all that ever lived might have been converted and saved, yea the Angels that fell might have been kept from sin; or having sinned might have been brought to repentance, & saved. I see no cause why I should desire the contrary. But considering the will of God, whereby the angels that fell are bound in chains, and kept to the judgement of the great day, I dare not pray for their salvation. And to pray that every one that now lives might be saved, with submission to the will of God, I see no incongruity; but we have better grounds of faith, and those sufficient to take up our thoughts especially in these days wherein we live, whereupon to proceed in the ordering of our prayers. And I would be loath you should put upon us any course or form of prayer for all, which you practise not yourself. And if I knew your practice in this kind, I would soon give in mine answer whether I thought good to subscribe to your form or no.  
In the next place you tell us, that the reason why we are bound to desire the spiritual good of all men universally considered, is, because we must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Here again you bewray your jealousy of the weakness of your own cause, as when you content not yourself in saying, we must pray for all men, but add hereunto, that we must pray for all men universally considered; the opposite member whereto before you signified to be this, To pray for all men indefinitely considered. Now the Apostle is far from these scrupulosities. He simply exhorts us to pray for all men; he doth not add as you do, We must pray for all men universally considered, and not indefinitely. Yet in no other sense you think it will serve your turn.  
That reason of yours drawn from the conformity to the courses of our heavenly Father, whereon you so much insist, I have already showed how little it serves your turn. Now I will show you how in another respect it is rather repugnant, then consonant to your Tenet. For that example of conformity is only in an indefinite consideration, thus; We must pray not only for our friends, and them that love us, but also for them that are our enemies, and hate us, and persecute us; like as God doth good unto the just and wicked, and not only to the just and good. To our desires you say we must add our endeavours, that saving truth may be imparted to all. It seems you have not failed herein. Now I would gladly know▪ what those endeavours of yours have been hitherto, whereby you have endeavoured, that saving truth may be imparted to the inhabitants of terra Australis incognita, or to the Negroes, or to the Tartarians, yea or the Turks, Saracens, or Arabians. Hitherto you have seemed to dispute thus: God will have it our duty to pray for the salvation of all: therefore God willeth the salvation of all; but now you dispute in a quite contrary manner, thus: God wils that all should come to the knowledge of his truth, therefore we must desire and endeavour that his saving truth may be imparted unto al. The consequence of your former argument is utterly untrue, as I have already showed; and as Austin long ago discoursed, man's will in an holy manner 
Aug. Enc● cap. 101,  may be contrary to the will of God; and again in a most unholy manner may the will of man be concurrent with the will of God. As it is the duty of the child to pray for the life of the father, though God will have the father to dye, and not live: On the other side, a wicked child wisheth the death of his father in an ungracious manner, yet it may be that herein he concurreth with the will of God, supposing (as it may well be) that God willeth the death of the father at the same time that the son wisheth it.  
As for the second argument, we deny therein the antecedent, if you understand it of all and every one. For the case is clear, that God doth not bring all and every one to the knowledge of his truth; not because he cannot; for doubtless he could bestow his Gospel upon them that want it, as well as upon us that enjoy it; therefore the reason must needs be because he will not. As he plainly professeth, he will bring a famine of his word upon a Land, Amos 8. 11. Behold the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord. vers. 12. And they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the North even to the East shall they run to and fro, to seek the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. So the Lord threatens the Church of Ephesus, to remove her candlestick out of his place, Revel. 2. and long before threatened the jews to take his vineyard from them, and let it out to others that 
Mat. 12. 14  should bring him the fruit thereof in due season. And it is very strange that these and such like judgements should come to pass, and God should not will them. This is the reason whereupon Austin is moved to inquire into a commodious construction of that place, left otherwise we should fall upon a direct contradiction to the prime Article of our Creed; and therefore after he hath given two constructions of the place, the last whereof is this, which you impugn, but not answer his reasons, which are two; the one drawn from the analogy of Scripture phrase, as where our Saviour saith unto the pharisees, you tithe Mint, and Rue, and every herb: which phrase cannot be understood otherwise, then of every kind of herb: the other reason is that formerly spoken of; as if we say, That God willeth such a thing to come to pass, which yet doth not come to pass; we shall thereby deny God's omnipotency. Yet see the ingenuity of this worthy father: he gives any man leave to give any fair construction of the place, provided that God be not made unable to bring to pass whatsoever he will have to come to pass. Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credero non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem statutum voluisse fieri factumque non esse: qui sine ullis ambagibus si in coelo & in terra (sicut veritas dicit) qucunque voluit, fecit, profecto facere noluit quaecunque non fecit. Let it, saith he, be understood after what other manner soever it may be construed, so that we be not constrained to maintain, that the Almighty God would have something come to pass, which notwithstanding comes not to pass. For, without fetching any further compass; if he hath done whatsoever he will both in heaven and in earth, as the truth witnesseth, certainly, he would not do whatsoever he hath not done.  
2 But you proceed to show, that both this duty of ours to pray for all sorts, and for every man of what sort soever; and also that Gods will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved, are expressly included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England. And the Collects whence you gather this, are in number three: they are, I take it, all appointed for Good Friday. In the first, we pray, that God would graciously behold this his family, for ●he which our Lord jesus Christ was contented to be betrayed. Now this family, being the present congregation wherein the prayer is made, it is very strange, that hereby should be signified all sorts of men, and every man, of what sort soever throughout the world. And what express signification do we find here, that Gods will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved?  
To help your argument drawn herehence; as if you should reason thus, We must pray for this family, therefore we must pray for every one throughout the world. You tell us that, The tenor of this petition, if we respect only the form, is indefinite, not universal: but being in a necessary matter it is equivalent to an universal, as every logician knows. To which I answer, first, that the tenor of the petition is not indefinite, but definite, (to follow you in your own language) for therein we pray definitely for that family which is before us. Now that family is a particular family; and never any Logician was so simple as to think it law full to infer an universal out of a particular. Again, here is no necessary matter in it. For to use such a form of prayer is merely the arbitrary constitution of our Church.  
Suppose God had bid us to pray in this form, to wit, for this family present; yet this makes not the matter necessary absolutely, but merely upon supposition of the will of God, and yet in this particular only. As for example, Our Saviour 
joh. 17. 〈◊〉. & v. 20  prayed for them that his father gave him, and for all those that should afterward believe through their word, will you infer herehence, that therefore he was to pray for the world also? Again, God hath expressly bidden us to pray for them that 
1 joh. 5. 16  sin unto death; and therefore, unless I may be assured, that there is none in the world that sinneth a sin unto death, I have no reason to pray for all and every one; though I were bound to do so, it would nothing pleasure and advantage you. Hitherto I have followed you in your own most unlogicall discourse, the absurdity whereof, every simple Logician may easily discover.  
Where have you been taught, that petitions indefinite in a necessary matter are universal: we were taught indeed, that propositions indefinite in a necessary matter are as good as universal: but for petitions indefinite to be counted universal in a matter necessary, is one of the absurdest notions that ever I heard to proceed from the mouth of a Logician. You proceed to prove, that the form of the petition is in the intention of the Church of England to be extended to all and every one of the congregation present. But erst you told us, the matter indeed was universal, but not the form, which you acknowledged to be indefinite. Now the very form, you say, is to be universally extended: this is not to extend, but to destroy. But this that you labour for in so uncouth a manner, I never doubted of, namely, that by this family is understood all and every one of the Congregation there present: only I deny, that herehence it followeth, that our Church binds us to pray for all and every one throughout the world; and if it doth, we must comprehend even those that sin sins unto death, amongst the rest, unless we believe that there are no such sinners in the world: and he had need be of a strong faith, and have some extraordinary revelation that believeth that.  
So that your second place tending to no other end but to prove that which we never doubted to be comprehended in the first, we need not trouble ourselves about any answer thereunto; save only this, though we are bound to pray, not only for the congregation present, but for the whole Church and every member of it; yet there is a great gulf of separation between the City of God, and the city of the Devil; which makes me remember what Abraham answered Dives, and therefore we can no way approve this consequence; We are bound to pray for all Christians, therefore we are bound to pray for all Atheists and heathens. We are bound to pray for Christ's members, & therefore we are bound to pray for Antichrist and his members. Therefore you tell us, the third and last prayer will clearly quit this exception, and free both the foremr petitions from these and the like restrictions.  
But in this last clause you overlash miserably; I see no reason but I may as well say, that the restrictions in the former prayer will quit this latter prayer, for its extension. Certainly two of the three prayers you proposed to evince your Tenent are nothing to the purpose. Herein indeed we pray unto God, to have mercy upon all Jews, Turks, and Heriticks; which in effect is no more than to pray, that the fullness of the Gentiles may come in, and thereupon the calling of the jews. And whereas you desire to infer herehence, that it is Gods will, that all these should come to his truth and knowledge, and be saved. As the consequence you shall never be able to make good, so the consequent is directly contrary to the word of God; for it is not, nor ever was it the will of God that all this should be done together, but one after another, namely, that the fullness of the Gentiles shall come in first, and after that the calling of the jews, Rom. 11. Luc. 21. 24. Hence you conclude, That if God will not the death of any Turk, Jew, or Infidel, because of nothing he made them men; we may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. In reading your antecedent I wondered at your boldness, in supposing that which you are never able to gain by force of argument; but when I view your consequence, I wonder what giddiness possessed you, to take so wild a course in proving that which no Christian will deny. For your conclusion is, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. Did ever any Christian deny this? Is this it you are to prove, that God wils the salvation of all Christians? Have you not rather undertaken to prove that God willeth not the salvation of all sorts of men only (which was Augustine's gloss, and which you set up here as a mark to shoot at, thinking by the power of your discourse to bear down the authority and learned discourse of that worthy Father hereupon) but that he willeth the salvation of every man, of every sort throughout the world? And this you would prove out of the doctrine established in the Church of England, that is, out of their Liturgy: and three prayers therein you insist upon, whereas the two first are apparently nothing for the purpose; whereof yourself seem to be sensible enough, and therefore the third place (Triary like) was to do the feat, and to clear all: and the conclusion herehence definite in piscem: being no more but this, that God willeth the salvation of all men whom he hath vouchsafed to make Christians: which no man denies or calls into question. May I not justly ask, and that with admiration, 
Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu?  
Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus.   
But what should move you to carry yourself so preposterously, and to balk or blast rather so fair a consequence, and so beneficial unto your cause, as your antecedent doth bespeak? For if your antecedent be true, namely, that God willeth not the death of any Turk, jew, or Infidel, will it not manifestly follow, that God willeth not the death of any Turk, or jew, or Infidel? To my thinking it should follow as manifestly, as to say, that if the Sun shineth it shineth; though in my poor judgement this is identity rather than consequence or concomitance; I say, I wonder what moved you to blast this consequence with such a dash of your pen, in the very face of it, and the addition of such a proviso as this, whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. First, especially considering that no such qualification is in the antecedent; and it is most unreasonable that any qualification should be foisted into a conclusion that hath no ground in the premises; especially it being such a qualification as utterly mars your market, and that at the end of the day, and you have a long time waited for a good pennyworth, and now yourself are the man that cuts your own throat. Did the conscience of so foul a conclusion as was towards, make you blush to put it in writing? that cannot be, for you have it full and whole in the antecedent; though straining to proceed most indecently, it fares with you as it doth with the horse in the Poet: 
Peccat ad extremum ridendus & ilia ducit.  Or by the way did your consequence suggest unto you that the argument drawn from this prayer, proves no more but this, that God will save every jew, Turk, and Infidel, in case he be first made a Christian? If so, than the supposed consequence in your antecedent, was made against your conscience; and therefore by the consequence herehence made, you desired to strangle it, that so the birth of it might be abortive. Yet because you carry some show of argumentation in the antecedent, I will not trust to the corruptness of your consequent deduced therhence, but I will take the pains to strangle it myself, since the press hath brought it to light: your antecedent is this, If God therefore will not the death of any jew, Turk, or Infidel, because of nothing he made them men. Now this includes such an Enthymeme: Of all Turks, jews, and Infidels it is true, that God of nothing hath made them men; therefore he will not the death of any jew, Turk, or Infidel. Now I say this consequence is notoriously false, and in stead of your proving it in any manner, I disprove it in this manner. Of all Devils it is as true, that God of nothing made them angels; shall I herehence infer, therefore he will not the death of any devil? So likewise of all cats and dogs, horses and hogs it is as true, that God of nothing made them such as they are; will it therefore follow, that God willeth not the death of any of them?  
But perhaps some may say, that the Collect implieth some such argument, for it runneth thus; Merciful God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, have mercy upon all Jews. I answer first, here is no such argument employed, as to infer that God will not the death of any jew, Turk, or Infidel, but only it implieth a reason why we pray God to have mercy upon all jews, Turks, and Infidels. But albeit we do thus pray for all, yet it followeth not that God will save every jew, Turk, and Infidel that liveth, as before I have showed. For who doubts but the child is bound to pray for the recovery of his father's health, being cast down upon the bed of sickness, at what time it may be, it is God's will that his father shall not recover, but die the death. Secondly, the complete reason why we pray for all, signified in this prayer, is not this, because God hath made all men, and hateth nothing that he hath made; for by the same reason we might be urged to pray for devils as well as for men: This is only a part of the reason, not the whole reason. The whole reason is this, Who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldst the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live. And we find by manifest experience, that most wicked men are converted, and God hath revealed unto us, that the fullness of the Gentiles shall come in, Rom. 11. and that then shall be the calling of the jews; therefore we pray for the fullness of the one, and of the other; but with submission unto the will of God, as touching the time of this, and the manner how.  
Thirdly and lastly; like as it followeth not, that because we must pray for all men, therefore we must pray for every man throughout the world; in like sort it followeth not, that because our Church prescribes us to pray for all jews, Turks and Infidels; therefore it prescribes us to pray for every jew, Turk, and Infidel throughout the world; and look what restraint may be laid upon all men, the very same restraint of interpretation may be laid upon all Jews, all Turks, and all Insidels. Yet you keep your course, and tell us that as God made all things without invitation, (a pretty phrase for them that affect eloquence beyond intelligence) out of mere love, made nothing hateful. Apply this I pray to devils, and see whether we have not as good a ground to pray for them as for others. Again, if sin hath made them hateful, is there not sin enough in the world, in jews, Turks, and Infidels to make them hateful? Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them, than they should not be hateful to God, and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers; yet seeing they are in the state of sin, and consequently hateful to God; for the same cause, in just proportion of reason, they are no fit matter for our prayers. Though a full measure only of enmity against God exempt men from God's love, yet will you deny that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world? and will not this be sufficient to forbid our prayers for all and every one? Sure I am, if there be any in the 
1 joh. 5. 16.  world that sin a sin unto death, we may not pray for such an one.  
3. From the authorized devotions in our Church, you proceed to the Catechism; and ask what can be more clear than that, as God the Father doth love all mankind without exception, so the Son of God did redeem all mankind, not only some of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken. And I think indeed that the one is as clear as the other. Throughout the Scriptures show me one passage wherein the love of God is expressed to Reprobates. If the Son of God did redeem all and every one, than all and every one have redemption in Christ, through his blood, and consequently the forgiveness of their sins. For in Scripture phrase, remission 
Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14. 2 Co. 5. 19  of sins is that redemption which we have in Christ: so is reconciliation also all one with forgiveness of sins. Sure I am, Christ professeth, john 17. 9 that he would not pray for the world, but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him, and for those that should believe through their 
joh. 17. 19 20.  word. And for their sakes did he sanctify himself for whom he prayed; and to what did he sanctify himself, but unto his death and passion, by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonate had seen, as the jesuit himself professeth on that 17. of john: and he had seen very many, as there he signifieth, namely, Chrysostome, Cyril, Austin, Theodorus Mopsuestenus, and Heracleotes, Leontius, Beda, Theophilact, Enthymius, Rupertus.  
But to proceed; out of our Catechism you allege, that God the Father made us and all the world; now the Church our mother hath taught us, that God hateth nothing that he hath made. The book of Wisdom saith so indeed; but because of the little authority that book hath in matter of faith from God our Father, therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother. Now you are not ignorant, I suppose, whence the Church our mother taketh this, which hath its course amongst Papists, as well as amongst us. And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists; and what interpretation he makes of this place, though received to be canonical Scripture amongst them, I have already showed out of his Sums: God (saith he) loves all things, in as much as 
Aquin. in 1 q. 23. art. 4.  he willeth unto them some good or other: but in as much as he willeth not a certain good to some, to wit, eternal life, he is said to hate them, and reprobate them. And indeed God saveth both man and 
Psal. 36. 6.  beast, as the Psalmist speaketh; and so he may be said to love them all; and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to be the Saviour of all men, but especially of them that believe. And to profess 
1 Tim. 4. 10  ingenuously what I think, I see no cause of controversy hereabouts, if so be the question be rightly stated. For when we say, Christ died for mankind, our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankind. Now let this benefit be distinguished and considered apart, and forth with contentious hereabouts will cease. For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sins, and the salvation of our souls; these being benefits obtainable only upon the condition of faith and repentance: As on the one side no man will affirm that Christ died to this end, namely, to procure forgiveness of sin and salvation to all and every one, whether they believe or no; so on the other side, none will deny, but that he died to this end, that salvation and remission of sin should redound to all and every one, in case they should believe and repent. For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price, which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world. But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also, even the very grace of faith and of repentance. For all God's promises are Yea and Amen in Christ; and amongst 
1 Co. 1. 20 Deut. 30. 6 Esa. 57 18. Host 14. 5.  these promises one is, the circumcision of the heart, the healing of our ways, of our rebellions. These promises do include the grace of faith and of repentance. Now consider ingenuously, did Christ die to this end, that the grace of faith and repentance should be bestowed absolutely or conditionally? Not conditionally, for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes, there is nothing to be found in man but works of nature. Now it is mere Pelagianisme to affirm that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a work of nature. And the Apostle clearly 
2 Tim. 1. 9 Tit. 3. 5.  professeth that God doth not call us according to our works. Therefore it remains, that albeit remission of sins and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance; yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred: and consequently they must be conferred absolutely. If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and every one absolutely, it would follow herehence, that all and every one should believe and repent. But this being found to be a notorious untruth, it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces only unto some; and who can those be, other than the elect of God? Accordingly as our Saviour professeth, that for those who were Gods, and whom he had given unto Christ, or should in time to come give unto him (the rest excluded) for those he sanctified himself, that is, offered himself upon the Cross; which interpretation of Christ's sanctifying of himself, Maldonate professeth, was received by all the Fathers whom he had seen. 
In johan. 17. 19   
Now to go along with you. Secondly, we are taught, you say, by the same Catechism, to believe in God, who hath redeemed us and all mankind. What I pray is this more than to say, He hath redeemed us and all men? Is all mankind more than all men? and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength; and the issue of all was to prove but this, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians.  
By the way I observe an incongruity. Of Infidels we are made Christians, as whereby we cease any longer to be Infidels: but I hope of men we are not made Christians so, as to cease any longer to be men. Yet you couple them together under one yoke, though very unequal heifers: you should have said rather, of mere men we are made Christians. All that are redeemed are unfeignedly loved; but if all mankind signify no more than all men; and all men, no more than all sorts of men, what are you the nearer to that you reach after? And you know, I suppose, that this was Augustine's interpretation of that universality; and he gives reasons for it; though you magisterially will have your own way, in spite of the pie, without answering his reasons.  
Again consider, whether to pay a price which is sufficient for the redemption of all and every one, be not in a fair sense to redeem all & every one. And what one of our Church will maintain, that any one obtains actual redemption by Christ without faith? especially considering that redemption by the blood of Christ, and forgiveness of sins are all one. I would 
Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14.  you would speak plainly, and tell us what is meant by redemption, which, you say, every one hath in Christ, denying that every one hath sanctification. So that whereas the Apostle joins these two together, where he saith, Christ is of 
1 Cor. 1. 2●  God made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption, you divide them, telling us, that Christ is made redemption to all and every one, but not sanctification. And truly I had thought that Christ had deserved the one as well as the other, for all those for whom he died. And it is very strange that God should be said to love them whom he never means to sanctify.  
But I pray answer me, Doth he unfeignedly love the Devils? I think you will say he doth not; what reason have you then to say, that he loveth all men, though you will easily persuade yourself that the most part of them are reprobates, and whom he never will bring unto wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ, as Austin writes, lib. 5. cont. julian, Pelag. cap, 4. and whether you mean to contradict Austin in this also I know not as yet: yet one word more with you before we part; How long doth God continue to love them? till the measure of their sin is at full? 'tis your own oracle in the former Section. And then belike he begins and continues to hate them. But I pray consider, how can this change, this alteration stand with the nature of God, that his love, his will to save them should be changed into hatred, into a purpose to dam them, considering that Gods will is his essence? And the Lord professeth of himself, saying, I the Lord am not changed, and ye sons of jacob are not consumed, Mal. 3. 6. All that are baptised, in your opinion, are not sanctified: yet some others much agreeing with you in other opinions maintain, that all that are baptised are regenerate, and they allege a better testimony out of the book of Common prayer, than any you have brought to serve your turn, namely, the profession that is made by the Minister thus, Now this child is regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's congregation. Yet that hath been answered by a Bishop of our Church, and that out of the doctrine of Austin. Yet I grant, baptism is the seal of redemption, and of forgiveness of sins also, but to whom? to none but such as believe: for God hath not ordained, that the benefit of Christ's blood shall redound to the redemption and forgiveness of the sins of any man, unless he believeth. For God hath set him forth to be a propitiation 
Rom. 3. 25  for our sins through faith in his blood. But your inferences you conceive to be as clear as crystal, so that the consideration of them makes you doubt, whether such amongst us as teach the contrary to these, have at any time subscribed to the book of Common prayer.  
And no question is to be made of your subscription, which deny all them to be sanctified that are baptised; though in plain terms the book of Common prayer professeth of every baptised child, that he is regenerate. And now you have played your part so well in working our authorised devotions, as you call them, and Catechism to serve your turn; you promise to perform as much touching the book of Homilies; but we must expect your performance therein, until you come to the article concerning Christ: in the mean time you will give us space to breathe, and take notice of your concludent proof, as you call it, thus. God wills the salvation of all that are saved, and all that are not saved, therefore he wills the salvation of all and every one. Now the second part of the Antecedent, which alone is called in question, is proved out of that of Ezech, As I live I will not the death of him that dieth.  
I had thought you had done with this; but if it be your course to tautologize in repeating former arguments, I may take liberty to repeat (without tautology) my former answer.  
First therefore, I say, the words as they lie in proper speech are contradictions to your tenant in two respects; First, because in another discourse of yours, you maintain, that he whose death God wills not, is the penitent; but here you profess, that God willeth not the death of them that are not saved, when they die; which as as much as to say, that God willeth not the death of impenitent sinners.  
Secondly, there is a time you confess, in the former Section, when God hates sinners, to wit, when the measure of their sin is full; and if then he hates them, he may then as well be said to will their death and damnation, as he was said to will their salvation, while he loved them. In the second place, the words as they lie in proper speech, are contradictions to manifest reason; for, seeing God is he that inflicts death and damnation upon them, he must needs will their death and damnation, because whatsoever God doth, he doth it according to the counsel of his own will, Eph. 1. 11. Secondly, if God doth not will the death which he inflicts, than neither doth he will the punishment that he inflicteth, nor the chastisement that he inflicteth; and so indeed it is said, Lam. 3. That he doth not punish willingly, nor afflict the children of men; which cannot be understood in proper speech; for than it would follow, that God doth afflict and chastise the children of men against his will. Therefore I say, this must be understood by a figure of speech, to wit, by a metaphor; and God said not to will or this or that, which he doth, because in the doing of it he is similis nolenti; as first when he doth it not, according to the Latin phrase, animi causa, for his pleasure's sake, but being provoked; and yet not hastily neither, though provoked, but after long forbearance, and giving time of repentance, upon the despising of this goodness of God, as Ezek. 14. 23. They shall comfort you when you see their way, and their enterprises: and ye shall know that I have not done without cause all that I have done in it, saith the Lord God.  
Secondly, when God doth chastise, not as parents, for their own pleasures, but with an eye to the good of those whom he chastiseth, Rom. 12. 10. According thereto is that of Augustine, Qui trucidat non considerat quemadmodum laniet, 
Epist. 48.  sed qui curate considerate quemadmodum seret.  
This is my answer, following the course of your own reading of the place, whereas Piscator blames the vulgar translation in this place which you follow: for, saith he, in the Hebrew it is not, I will not the death of a sinner; but this, I am not delighted in the death of a sinner. But saith he, A man may will that wherein he takes no delight: as a ficke man may will to drink a bitter potion, wherein he takes no delight. For he may will to take it, not for itself, but for something else, to wit, to recover his health. And so God willeth the eternal death of reprobates for his own glory, to wit, for the manifestation of his just wrath in punishing of their sins. And junius reads it and translates it in like manner: and with these acordeth our last English translation, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live, Ezek. 33. 11. And the 18. of Ezekiel doth clear the meaning of the Holy Ghost, where the same phrase is used, and in the same manner translated by our worthiest Divines, and followed in our last translation, vers. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should dye, saith the Lord God, and not that he should return from his ways, and live? and verse 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, wherefore turn yourselves and live ye.  
Now in this chapter the Lord justifieth himself against an imputation of harsh, if not unjust, dealing, as if he punished the children for the sins of their fathers, which in a proverbial manner was delivered thus; The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; which might occasion a desperate disposition in them, and provoke them to cast off all care of amending their ways, and turning to God by repentance; because all was one, whether they repented, or repented not, because the sour grapes which their fathers had eaten, were enough to set all their teeth on edge: Against this the Lord made a solemn protestation, that all souls were his, even the souls of the children, as well as the souls of the fathers, and that the soul that sinned, that should dye; and hereupon expostulates with them thus, Have I any pleasure in the death of a sinner, to wit, so as to bring death upon him, notwithstanding his repentance, because forsooth his father had eaten sour grapes? No, no; the Lord hath no delight in their death, but if they return and live, he delights in that, and therefore concludes with exhorting them to return unto the Lord, that they may live.  
Now when you forsake the translation of our Church, and slick unto the Vulgar corrupt translation, to hold up your odd conceits; doth it become you to make question whether they that oppose you in your extravagant tenants and proofs, have subscribed to the book of Common Prayer? Piscator proceedeth further, and saith, that the meaning is not simply, that God delights not in the death of the wicked, but in case he ceaseth not from his iniquity; as appears, saith he, by comparing of it with that which goeth before, and with that which cometh after: for otherwise God takes delight in all his works: like as Lyra upon Ezech. 18. Punitio improbitatis bene est à Deo volita quia justa. In Proverbs 1. 26. thus we read, I will laugh at your destruction, and mock when your fear cometh. How are these places to be reconciled? Piscator answereth, God is not delighted in the death of man, as it is the destruction of the creature, but is delighted therein, as it is the just punishment of the creature: which is as much as to say, he delights in the execution of his own justice: like as we read, jer. 9 24. Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me. For I am the Lord which show mercy and judgement, and righteousness in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.  
4. Now as if you had made all sure on your side, partly out of our authorised devotions, wherein you make choice of three prayers; whereof two are nothing to the purpose, and the third, at your uttermost straining of it, doth but encourage you to conclude finally that God wils not the death, but the life rather of them that of Infidels are made Christians; and partly out of the Catechism, where you find that Christ hath redeemed all mankind, which hath no coloutable extent further than all men; and without manifest opposition to Austin, you find this phrase will not serve your turn; whom yet you oppose so, as without answering any one of his arguments; one whereof was drawn from analogy of Scripture phrase, another from manifest reason, professing therewithal that your construction of this place contradicts the prime Article of the Creed.  
And last of all, driving the nail of your discourse home, with a concludent proof depending upon a translation of the text quite different from the most authentic translation of our Church, which yet must be without prejudice to your conformity, having a sound heart of your own, and therefore some peccadilies may be well borne withal, and you take liberty to question others your opposites, whether they have subscribed or no to the book of Common Prayer; such is the height of your imperious carriage, bearing down all before you.  
Now you come to inquire, By what will God doth will they should be saved that are not saved; and you demand whether God doth will their salvation by his revealed, and not by his secret will. As if this were our opinion; whereas neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concur upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years ago, and which you impugn; and how judiciously, we have already considered. Peter Martyr proposeth it amongst diverse others, but embraceth it not; neither do I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations.  
As you doubt whether your opposites have subscribed to the book of Common prayer; so if you take a liberty to put upon us the opinions and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not subscribed to the Council of Trent. We plainly deny that God doth will the salvation of any, but of his elect. For to will to save, and decree to save is all one, and election we say is the decree of salvation. And as God hath not elected all unto salvation, nor ordained all unto eternal life, so neither hath he willed to save all. For hence two absurdities do manifestly follow; first, that the reason why many are not saved, must be, because God cannot save them; which is the argument of S. Austin. Another is, that Gods will shall be changed: for undoubtedly when God damns any man, than he will not save him; and therefore if before he did will to save them, his will is afterwards changed, both by changing his old will, which was everlasting, and by entertaining a new will, which was not everlasting. Hemnigius, a great patron of universal grace, interpreteth the place of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 2. 4. Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri modo fide oblatam salutem recipere non recusaverint. Neither do I like Cajetans' interpretation after this manner, when he saith, Est sermo devoluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus praecepta salutis, doctrinamque Euangelij; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospel to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospel to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certain sign that God will have them to believe, like as it is no certain sign that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; for it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance to all that hear the Gospel, nor to a major part of them; but it is a sign, I confess, that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe. God's commandment is usually called his will, and the commandment of God Schoolmen make to be one of the signs of Gods will. So he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaak. This they call voluntas signi, but yet he was determined that Isaak should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event; this they call voluntas beneplaciti. So he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, this was his voluntas signi; but yet he told Moses, he would harden Pharoahs' heart, that he should not let Israel go; this they call his voluntas beneplaciti; the end whereof was, that God might have occasion to show his power, and magnify himself, in his plagues brought upon the Egyptians, to break those hearts that would not bend unto him.  
So that you are out in the interpretation of voluntas signi, 
The will of sign, and the will of good pleasure.  and beneplaciti, as well as in the accommodation of it, as out of our opinion. God proposeth no signification of his good will to any man, as touching the saving of him, otherwise then by faith and repentance: and plainly protests, that without faith and repentance they shall not be saved.  
You would fain have your adversaries grant, that God doth will the salvation of all men by his revealed will, or voluntate signi. Indeed if you may have the fashioning of our opinion, you may soon be victorious, in conquering men of straw in stead of real opposites. This distinction of yours is absurdly applied to our opinion, in this case; who deny that God doth at all or any manner of way will the salvation of reprobates. For revealed will, and voluntas signi, is the will of God's commandment, and the objects of commandments are only moral duties, and not the rewards of them, such as is salvation. Yet it is truth, that what God is said to will by his will of commandment (so usually called, though improperly the will of God) the same at once he doth not will, but rather the contrary sometimes, by his voluntas propositi, will of purpose and decree, which alone is properly to be accounted the will of God, and which none can resist, Rom. 9 19 And this we can prove, and have alreaby proved by two instances; the one as touching the sacrificing of Isaak, commanded to Abraham, but not determined by God that it should be brought to pass; as also in the letting of Israel go, commanded unto Pharaoh, yet God resolving for a long time to harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let them go.  
Neither will it herehence follow, that there are two wills in God, as you most unlearnedly urge; but that God may command one thing, which yet he is resolved shall not come to pass; so that the thing commanded may be contrary to the thing determined by God, as when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaak, but withal determined that Isaak should not be sacrificed.  
But God's commandment, though it be usually called his will, yet it is improperly so called; only the will of purpose and decree is properly Gods will; according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9 19 Who hath resisted his will? For the commandment signifieth only what is our duty to do, it doth not signify what God hath determined shall be done. For as for the crucifying of the Son of God; God's hand and his counsel had determined before that it should be done, but he commanded none to crucify him; but rather commanded all the contrary, namely in forbidding the shedding of innocent blood. Neither shall there be a contradiction between the objects of God's will which is one, but only betwixt the objects of his commandment, and the object of his will and determination, as in the instances proposed I have manifested. As for your applications of the distinction of voluntas signi, 
The will of signification, and the will of resolution.  and voluntas beneplaciti, to the salvation of mankind, I know none of our Divines that embrace it. We plainly deny, that God willeth the salvation of any but of his elect. For Gods will we conceive to be all one with his decree, and election we define to be the decree of salvation, or the ordaining of men to everlasting life. So that we may well give you leave to run riot in your fruitless argumentation. You on the contrary do apparently maintain a manifest contradiction between the object of Gods will. For seeing God doth damn many, it followeth that he did will to damn many, and that from everlasting, though only for their sin: yet these whom from everlasting he did will to damn, you maintain that out of infinite love he did will to save, till the measure of their sin was full. So that at once he did will to save, and will to damn the same persons by your opinion; thus the contradiction fairly and fully lights upon yourself, which upon a mere fiction of yours, and that contrary to our professed opinion, you charged upon us. We grant the will of God is but one, but we say his will properly so called, and his commandment usually called also his will, though improperly, are two distinct things. For by the one he showeth what is our duty to do, or to leave undone; by the other he determineth what shall be done or not done, what shall come to pass, or not come to pass in the world. Of what force and credit your words are, when you talk of manifest contradiction upon our part, let the indifferent consider and judge.  
5. But you will seem to gratify your opposites, by not carrying yourself so rigorously critical, as to banish this distinction of voluntas signi and voluntas beneplaciti out of the confines of Divinity. But therewithal you continue your former fiction, in the stating of our opinion, as if we maintained that God did will the salvation of all, by that will which is called voluntas signi, but not by that will which is called voluntas beneplaciti: whereas I know none of our Divines that do profess their opinion in that manner, but rather they utterly deny in plain terms, that God doth will the salvation of all. And in my judgement, the application of this distinction in this case, by some that are orthodox in the point of Predestination, as namely by Aquinas and Cajetan, is most unseasonable, And therefore we have small cause to fear the imputation you cast upon us, forsooth of canonisation of jesuitical perjuries, and deification of mental evasions or reservations; seeing it is only grounded upon a mere fiction of yours, fashioning our Tenent at your own pleasure most unseasonably, and most incongruously, in respect of our opinion, who grammatically and plainly profess, God willeth not the salvation of all men. And yet I am persuaded that in the end this canonisation of Jesuitical perjuries, and deification of mental evasions or reservations, will justly light upon yourself, according to the laws of your own making; and the tenor of your consequences, when you come to manifest wherein this distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti may have place. Yet I purpose to consider well, how you carry yourself in this imputation you cast upon us.  
You acquaint us with two jesuitical equivocations, each consisting in part of a protestation, and in part of a mental reservation. The first as touching the protestation, is this, I do not intend the ruin of King or State; as touching the reservation this, so they will become Roman Catholics. The second protestation this, I know of no conspiracy against them; the reservation this, with purpose to reveal it unto them. Now let us see how you make us to deify these or such like equivocations, upon your fiction of our opinion. You need not trouble yourself about putting any interrogatory unto God, it is enough to prove that God by our opinion doth make protestations of such intentions, or express such speeches with such reservations. God protests, you say, that he would not the death of him that dies; and we (you say) profess this to be spoken with such a reservation, So he will repent, which I know he cannot do. A second is this, God doth not will the non-repentance of him that dyeth; the reservation that we make, as you say, is this, with purpose to make it known to him; however, according to my secret and reserved will, I have resolved never to grant him the means, without which he cannot possibly repent, whereas without repentance he cannot live, but must die. To each of these I answer distinctly, and to every part of each.  
First therefore I deny, that God professeth any such thing in the place you beat upon, as that he will not the death of him that dieth, but only that he delighteth not, nor hath any pleasure in the death of him that dieth. And not only Piscator and junius do so interpret the place, but our last, and best, and most authorized English translation doth so render it. And we cannot but wonder at your inconsideration, if you take no notice of it, or at your boldness thus to proceed in despite of it, if you did take notice of it, and yet question your opposites Archdeacon like at least, whether they have subscribed to the book of Common Prayer.  
Secondly, touching the reservation; I say it is your own interpretation, as I have read in a manuscript of yours, namely, that he whose death God willeth not, is the penitent sinner. And in the end of the seventh section of this Chapter you profess that God necessarily hates them that have made up the full measure of their iniquity: whence it seemeth that when God saith (according to your translation) I will not the death of him that dieth, it is to be understood with this provision, provided that he fill not up the measure of his iniquity.  
Again, I say this supposition of repentance is no reservation, but plainly signified by the tenor of the Prophet's discourse, as appears manifestly both by the consideration of the 33. chapter in Ezekiel, and especially by comparing of it with the 18. wherein are found the same words, as I have already showed in the end of the third section. So that we add not this by way of reservation, as you impute unto us, but make it appear to be the meaning of the Holy Ghost, by the tenor of the Text: and if Jesuits did in like sort make their meanings clear unto us, we should never challenge them for equivocation or reservation. We see by this what is the issue of your imputation, which in great pomp you called out deisication of mental evasions and reservations; as if you spent your strength in phrasifying. You seemed to be sensible of your own weakness in justifying this your calumniation, and therefore to give weight unto it, you have your additions, without all congruity to the precedent, of jesuitical equivocations, whereunto notwithstanding you desired to conform our tenant; and rest yourself wholly upon the odious nature of that conformity, especially as being charged upon God by our opinion, as you manage the matter. But your addition hath no colour of conformity thereunto, but proceeds of itself without all respect of proportion. For the jesuit protesting he intends not the ruin of the King and State, with this reservation, So they become Roman Catholics; doth not add hereunto these words, Which I know they cannot do; I do● not doubt but they have a more comfortable opinion of us then so.  
Yet when you come to show how our opinion doth deisie, as you speak, this very jesuitical trick, the greatest strength of your odious expression of our Tenet, consists in such like addition, whereunto not any thing on the jesuitical equivocations part is conformable. Do you see how well you perform the part of a disputant, and that in making good so foul a calumniation as is the deisying of equivocations? As if you followed the politicians counsel, who bids his disciples be bold to calumniate; for as much as though a man might clear his good name, yet in such a case cicatrix manet calumniae. Fie upon such shameless courses. And as for this addition of 
A scarte remains.  yours, what tail of consequence soever it draws after it, it is like to fall foul on your part, and not on ours. For you maintain, that there is a state of man in this life, in respect of a certain measure of iniquity, wherein it is not possible for him to repent. I know no such state, nor any rule that God hath given to himself to confine his grace. Nay to the contrary we read, that neither continuance in sin, nor greatness of sin, doth preclude the grace of God; but that God's grace as it can, so it doth many times prevail over both. But you love not to speak distinctly, but to carry yourself in the clouds of generalities. They that maintain a weak cause had need play least in sight; we say plainly, that God well knows, no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance; the Scriptures in diverse places expressly testifying 
Act. 5. 31. & 11. 18. 2 Tim. 2. last.  that repentance is the gift of God, though you love not to hear of that ear, nor are well pleased, as it seems, with the music that riseth upon the touching of that string. On the other side, God knows that every man at any time can repent, if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance, yea and that he shall repent also; the habitual grace serves for the one, and the actual and effectual motion of God's Spirit is requisite to the other.  
I come to the second parallel of jesuitical equivocation, or rather the deification of it, as you are pleased out of glorious spleen to calumniate your opposites. The protestation is on God's part, I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth, the reservation, with purpose to make this part of my will known unto him. But where, I pray, do you find any such protestation on God's part? Ezekiel hath none such. In him it is said, I will not the death of him that dieth. But no where doth he say, I will not the non repentance of him that dieth. This is a trick of your own device, as if you followed the counsel of Lysander; and where the Lion's skin will not reach, you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skin. We profess in plain terms, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he 
Rom. 9 〈◊〉  hardeneth whom he will; and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some, so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others. Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministry of his word, (I mean all those that hear it) To repent and believe 
Mark 1. 〈◊〉  the Gospel. So he did bid the jews, and that with great earnestness, to keep the covenant, Deut. 30. 19 I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live. By loving the Lord thy God, by obeying his voice, and cleaving unto him, for he is thy life, and the length of thy days, that thou mayest dwell in the land which the Lord did swear unto thy fathers. ' Yet I hope you will not say, this could be done without grace, though of the nature of grace, what you think, and of the universal extension thereof, I should be very glad to understand, and that therein you would speak your mind plainly.  
As for the reservation here, it is most ridiculous, neither is any equivocation of Jesuits, I trow, answerable hereunto: for by reservations, a sense is raised, contradictious to the sense of the protestation; but by this reservation, no contradiction ariseth to the former as it lieth, but only it denyeth a certain purpose to be joined with it: but, be it that jesuits allow such artifice, what Divine of ours doth? Did we say, that God wills not the non repentance of any; we would say, he willeth it not, in as much as he forbiddeth it. And God's prohibitions and commandments are usually (though improperly) called the will of God. And here voluntas signi hath proper place enough.  
Like as God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet his determination was, that Isaac should not be sacrificed. Some may have said, that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth, in case he repent. But was ever any heard to affirm, that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth, to wit, with purpose to make it known unto him? What madness possessed you to ascribe so incredible a thing to your opposites, so contrary to the rule of fiction, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Callimachus hath set it down.  
Your addition here likewise, which draws a long tail after it, hath no conformity to the pattern. And as for the substance of it, as touching God's resolution, never to grant some repentance, or the means of it (if thereby you mean the Gospel) we acknowledge it to be truth: for the arm of the Lord is not revealed unto all, neither doth he give repentance, 
Esa. 53. 1.  or faith to all: but hath mercy on some only, even on whom he will; and hardenneth othersome, even whom he will; that is, denieth them repentance, and consequently, they cannot repent, which interpretation of obduration, yourself make in the seventh section following: and consequently they cannot live; this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us.  
And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end, you proceed to talk of God's oath in giving assurance, that he will not the death of them that are damned; built merely upon a translation which you follow, different from the most authorized translation of our Church; and that contrary to evident reason: for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent, so he must needs will it; for he doth all things according to the counsel of his own will, Ephesians 1. 11. And yet according to your reading of it, a good construction may be given without all reservations, as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God itself. And what God hath manifested unto us in his word, I hope is not to be accounted a reservation, but a revelation rather. I am not of your mind to think, that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection; or to keep a man's word either, which yet is a better point of morality, then to keep an oath.  
Such justice is to be found amongst heathen men; yet works of mercy go beyond works of justice, yet no great perfection neither; but to be merciful to our enemies, When 
Matt. 5. 4●  they are hungry to feed them, when they are thirsty to give them drink: this is the perfection that our Saviour calleth us unto, and sets before our eyes the goodness of our heavenly Father, in suffering his rain to fall, and his sun to shine on the bad as well as on the good. And here withal, how well your calumniation hath sped, imputing to us the deification of jesuitical equivocations, let the indifferent Reader judge.  
6 Here you proceed learnedly to distinguish between somethings determined by oath, and somethings else, and in the accommodation of your distinction, you tell us, that Voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in things determined by divine oath, but well it may in other things. What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by divine oath, you express not, but leave to your reader to conjecture. Now because usually when oaths are spoken of by way of distinction, the opposition is made between oaths and bare words, therefore we conceive your distinction completely delivered to run thus. Some things are determined by God's oath; other things are determined by God's bare words. Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the form, nor sound in the matter thereof.  
As touching the form. It is not right to say things are determined either by God's oath, or by his word, but rather by his will. For determination is the act of Gods will. Words and oaths are but the signification and outward protestation of the determination of his will. Then as for the matter, I see no cause but that by what reason soever the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, hath course in the one, by the same reason it may have course in the other also. For God's word undoubtedly is as certain as his oath; albeit in condescending to our infirmity he is pleased to protest in solemn manner, and by oath, for the strengthening of our faith. We commonly say that an honest man's word is as good as his oath to bind him. Certainly as God cannot break his oath, so is he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a God that cannot lie, and his will 
Ti●. 1. 2.  can neither change from within, nor be resisted from without.  
When you come to explicate your meaning by instance as touching the accommodation of this distinction, we will perhaps speak more of this. The distinction you say of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in their doctrine who make the bare entity and personal being of men the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting. It seems you desire to speak enough, as if you could hardly satisfy yourself, no marvel if you do not satisfy your reader. Yet in my judgement it is usual with you to overdo. For the distinctions implied by you, of the object of God's decree mediate or immediate; and especially of Gods decree mutable or immutable, may soon cast us upon wild-goose meditations. By the entity or personal being of man, I take your meaning is, (for you speak in your own peculiar phrase) to express the pure mass of mankind. This (it seems) you like not to be made the object of election and reprobation, but rather the corrupt mass of mankind after Adam's fall. Now because there was an election and reprobation of Angels as well as of men, if you can devise how a corrupt mass should be the object of God's predestination, in the election and reprobation of Angels, you shall perform such a piece of work as never any man adventured on before you.  
And as for the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, I am persuaded I shall devise a more commodious place for it, supposing the pure mass to be the object of predestination, than you can upon supposition of the corrupt mass to be the object of predestination. This I presume taking the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti in that sense which they take it that have been the devisers of it. But if you shall take liberty unto yourself, to put what sense upon it you think good, and make your own grounds; as Aesop advised his master how to make his undertake good in drinking up all the water in the sea, to wit, always provided that all the rivers that run into the sea were first stopped. For it were unreasonable that as fast as he drank up, the rivers should pour in, and that somewhat faster too. And I perform my undertake thus. To promise salvation upon obedience, and to command obedience unto all, is in the phrase of Schoolmen to will the salvation of all voluntate signi. But withal to determine, that by his special grace heo will keep some from sin, and save them, but not others; is not to will the salvation of those others voluntate beneplaciti, whose salvation he is said to will voluntate signi. So that albeit to will and not to will the salvation of one and the same man voluntate proprie dicta, which alone is voluntas beneplaciti, be contradictions; yet to will the salvation of one man voluntate improprie dicta, which is voluntas signi, and not to will it voluntate proprie dicta, which is voluntas beneplaciti, is no more contradictious then to will the sacrificing of Isaak by commanding it, and to nill it by determining the contrary, is contradictious.  
Again, if massa corrupta be the object of predestination, which is the more common opinion of our Divines, this distinction in this sense (which I take to be the only true sense of it) cannot be so well accommodated. For as much as in that case, the only way left for salvation is faith and repentance; for performing whereof there is no power in nature, as there was power in nature for the performing of obedience before Adam's fall. And you hold it ridiculous to say that God wils the salvation of man so he repent, in case he cannot repent, as but erst you signified.  
But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place, if the pure mass be the object of predestination. For (say you) the entity or personal being of man is so indivisible, that an universal negation, and a particular affirmation of the same thing (to wit salvation) falling upon man as man, or upon the personal being of man, draws to the strictest kind of contradiction. All this is but one proposition, but it contains more than one fault. For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men, to follow upon voluntas signi touching their salvation, and voluntas beneplaciti touching their non salvation. Whereas no such thing will follow. For although from voluntas beneplaciti, whereby God doth will the salvation of one man, it followeth, such a one shall be saved; yet upon the voluntas signi, whereby God doth will their salvation, it shall not follow that such shall be saved: like as from voluntas signi, whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his son, it did not follow that Isaak should be sacrified: yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing; but an Ostrich will sooner digest a tenne-peny nail, than any sober and intelligent Scholar will digest this consequence. If you would deal directly, you should profess, that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction; but that is untrue as well as the former. For unto contradiction is required that it must be, ad idem, secundum idem, eodem modo, & eodem tempore. Now these conditions are not found in this that we speak of. For we do not say, that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man, voluntate eodem modo accepta; for that he wils the salvation of this man, is only voluntate signi; that he doth not will it, is voluntate beneplaciti; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure, is only the will of God in proper speech, and that S. Paul speaks of when he saith, Who hath resisted his will? 
Rom. 9 1●  the other, to wit, voluntas signi, is improperly (though usually) called the will of God. It being indeed nothing else but God's commandment; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his son; yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech, that Isaak should not be sacrificed. And because you perceived how easily the show of contradiction might be washed off, if it were proposed in this manner, therefore you made bold upon dame Logic, and without her leave, and in despite of her, fain a contradiction under another form by way of consequence, which indeed proves most inconsequent.  
Thirdly, you speak in a strange language when you say that the affirmation and negation of salvation falling upon the personal being of men, contains contradiction; implying that it might fall otherwise then upon the personal being of men, and in that case it would not prove contradictious; both which are not only untrue, but absurd also. For the affirmation of the salvation of man cannot fall otherwise then upon the person of man, and consequently upon the personal being of man, whatsoever be the cause of it; which cause you most preposterously conceive, to give unto man a being different from his personal being, whereupon, and not upon his personal being his salvation should fall.  
Again, no distinction of personal being and other being will serve your turn, to save the affirmation and negation of salvation of one and the same man from contradiction. I say of one and the same man, which is of principal consideration in the course of contradiction, and yet wholly permitted by you in this proposition, though therein you talk of the strictest point of contradiction. Strain your invention while you will, you shall never be able to free these propositions from contradiction; Peter shall be saved, Peter shall not be saved. But to change the nature of these propositions, and of absolute to make them conditional thus; Peter shall be saved if he believe and repent: Peter shall not be saved if he believe and repent not; is neither to affirm nor deny the salvation of Peter. For to affirm or deny the salvation of Peter, is categorical, not hypothetical. What you want of force of argument, you supply with devotion, as if you came to enchant your reader, and not to inform him; as when you say, far be it from us to think that God should swear to this universal negative, I will not the death of him that dieth; and yet believe withal that he wils the death of some men, that die as they are men, or as they are the sons of Adam. This is proposed by way of an holy and confident asseveration; but consider how sottish it is, and most averse from sobriety.  
For first, what if God had not sworn it, but only said it, had there been the less truth in it for this? Is not God's word sure enough without an oath? yet before we heard, that in things determined by divine oath, the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti could have no place.  
Secondly, where were your logical wits, when you said this was an universal negative, I will not the death of a sinner? I pray examine your rules well, and see whether it be not a singular? will you measure the quantity of a proportion by the predicate, and not rather by the subject? Yet if you should do so, it would not serve your turn. For both Aristotle of old hath taught us, that it is absurd to put an universal sign to the predicate; and here is no universality added either to the whole predicate, which is, Nolens mortem peccatoris, nor to any part of it (which you seem to confound.) For he that dyeth, is a term indefinite. Neither is it in a necessary matter. For the most holy Angel God could turn into nothing, if it pleased him. And in the 18. chapter of Ezekiel it is apparent, that this is restrained to him that repenteth, without any mental reservation, but by plain evidence of the Text itself.  
Thirdly, you harp upon a false string, and an erroneous translation, as it were in spite of the most authorized translation of our own Church, and follow the vulgar Latin herein. And withal in opposition to manifest reason to the contrary; for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon every one that dyeth, and is damned; and he doth all things according to the counsel of his own will, Eph. 1. 11. it is impossible he should do any thing and not will it, that he should inflict death on him that dieth, and not will it.  
Fourthly, be it as you will have it, that God doth not will the death of him that dieth; will you herehence infer that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth as man, or as the son of Adam, implying that notwithstanding he may will the death of him that dieth in some other respect, without any prejudice to his oath? what a senseless collection and interpretation is this? You may as well say, God willeth the life of him that liveth, ergo, far be it from us to say that he willeth not the life of him that liveth, as he is a man, or as he is the son of Adam; implying that for all this God may be said not to will the life of him that liveth in some other respect. But I say that if God willeth not the death of any man that dieth, (as you will have it, and to be confirmed also with the Lords oath,) then in no respect can it be said that he willeth the death of any man that dieth. For it is both ad idem, death is the same in both; and it is secundum idem, for we speak of the same man in both; and it is eodem modo, for we speak of the will of God in the same sense in both; and it is at the same time, and must be; for Gods will is everlasting, and therefore willing whatsoever he doth everlastingly, he cannot be said at any time not to will it. As for the cause of death and damnation willed by God, we maintain, that God willeth not the death of any man, or the condemnation of any man, but for sin. But I pray what think you of infants perishing in original sin? If Goth doth not will their death as the sons of Adam, how doth he will it? Or had you rather shake hands with Arminius in this also, and profess, that no man is damned for original sin only; but that all the children of Turks, and Saracens, and jews, and Cannibals that die in their infancy, are saved, and enjoy the joys of heaven, as well as the children of the faithful?  
You proceed in your devout asseveration, and will have it to be far from us to think, that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath. We are so far from thinking, that God recalls any part of his will declared by oath, that we do not believe that he doth or can recall any part of his will that he hath declared by his bare word. And we think it equally impossible for God to lie, and to perjure himself; for he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Neither when he kept Abraham from sacrificing his son Isaac, do we say that he recalled any part of his will, which he had formerly declared by his word, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: for Gods will of commandment, signifieth only what God will have to be our duty to do, not what he hath determined to be done: though you confound these usually, and that as wilfully and unlearnedly as Arminius himself, because it serves your turn, and advantageth your cause to confound them. But look you to it how you free yourself from maintaining, that God doth recall something which he hath properly willed and determined to be done. For that God willeth the death of no man that dieth, you make to be the word of God confirmed by oath, and you understand it of Gods will properly so called, and yet you maintain, that God willeth the death of him that dieth, though not as man, and as the son of Adam, yet in some other manner; which either is flat contradiction, or else God doth recall and change his will.  
The last part of your devout asseveration is, far be it from us to think that God should proclaim an universal pardon to all the sons of Adam, under the seal of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibility of receiving any benefit by it. Here you seem to show your teeth, but I had rather understand your meaning: for to proclaim pardon to all is ambiguous; for it may be done absolutely, as kings on earth grant pardons; and usually our kings grant pardons at the end and conclusion of parliaments. I do not think this is your meaning; for then all should be pardoned; for to proclaim pardon is to signify his Majesty's pleasure that he doth pardon them. But if conditionally; it is true, God proclaims, that whosoever believeth shall be saved, this is a known truth, no man takes exception against it. And how do we exempt any from all possibility of receiving it? You will say, that this we do, in exempting many from all possibility of performing the condition, to wit, of believing. I answer, that your own opinion is to be charged with this, ours is not; for you maintain that Pharaoh after the seventh wonder, was exempt from all possibility of repentance; and the like you avouch of all reprobates, and such as have filled up the measure of their sin, which according to your opinion, may be many years before their death: and in the seventh Section following, you express it thus, Having their souls betrothed unto wickedness: such undoubtedly was Ahab, that sold himself to work wickedness, and many such like.  
And in this case you profess in your own phrase, that the door of repentance is shut upon them. But we like not this opinion of yours, we know no measure of sin, nor continuance of sin that doth prescribe unto the grace of God, and forbids the banes of matrimony betwixt him and his Church, but that in a due time the power of God's grace shall break through all obstacles, even through the furious idolatry of Manasses, in giving his children unto Devils, and that sealed with blood, wherewith he filled jerusalem from corner to corner; yea, and through his sorcery and witchcraft also, and through the rage of Saul, persecuting Gods saints, and making havoc of the Church of God. 
* When I speak thus, I am to be understood only of sins of course, and▪ know sins, secluding the consideration of the sin. against the holy Ghost, which is 〈◊〉 secret.  And for as much as we maintain it to be possible for every one to believe and repent through God's grace, it is manifest, that we exempt no man from all possibility of believing and repenting, to wit, in consideration of the power of God. But in consideration of the power of man, we exempt not many only, but all and every one, from possibility of believing and repenting by power of nature. And dare you avouch the contrary? It is apparent that whatsoever you think, you dare not openly profess thus much. And therefore are content to hide your head, and lurk under generalities. So that the case is clear, that you do us wrong in saying we exempt many from all possibility of repenting: I say it is a notorious slander; for we exempt men from possibility of repenting only by power of nature; and so we exempt not only many, but all and every one from possibility of repenting. But perhaps you may say, that withal we maintain that God doth not purpose to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all, but to deny it unto many, yea unto most; and upon this supposition we exempt them from all possibility of repenting.  
But I pray consider, to exempt some from possibility of repenting upon supposition; is this to exempt from all possibility without supposition? For you have delivered this without all supposition. And then the issue is to inquire, whether God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all, or rather to deny it to many, yea to most. And dare you affirm that God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all? It is apparent you dare not openly profess this, and therefore carry yourself in the clouds, without any clear and distinct proposing of your meaning. In S. Paul's days there was a remnant amongst Israel which are called God's election, Rom. 11. and these had obtained this grace of faith and repentance, as there the Apostle signifieth, but the roast were hardened. And if God hath purposed to give grace unto all, you may as well say God hath elected all. But 
Rom. 11.  the Holy Ghost witnesseth, that many are called, and but few are chosen. Many I say are called, not all neither, nor the 
Mat. 20.  most part; as all experience, and the histories of the world do manifest: and therefore though God proclaims in his word pardon of sin to all that believe; yet he doth not proclaimethiss unto all.  
By the way I observe, that whereas you say, that God doth proclaim an universal pardon to all the sons of Adam under the seal of his oath; this of God's oath, which you add, doth draw us to conceive that the meaning of those words, As I live I will not the death of him that dies, contains this sense in your construction, that God will pardon the sins of all, and since these words (as you understand them) do not run conditionally, but absolutely; herehence it followeth, that according to your opinion God hath sworn absolutely to pardon the sins of all men, the absurdity whereof I leave to every man's sober consideration.  
7. Hitherto you have told us in what matters the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti cannot have place. Now you tell us in what matters it may have place, to wit, in matters of threatenings, or of plagues not denounced by oath. And why not I pray in matters of promising, or of rewards not denounced by oath. Now you have already signified, that look in what matters this distinction may have place, there God may recall by his secret and reserved will, what he hath declared to be his will by bare words. For therefore you professed that this distinction may not be admitted in matters determined by oath, because, far be it from us thus to think that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath. Let the Reader mark it well, and the force of consequence therehence; which I doubt not but you approve of, as we shall farther understand in that which followeth. Now we are so far from maintaining that God can recall any thing, of that which he hath sworn shall come to pass, that we stand in defiance of any such opinion, as maintains, that God may choose whether he will be so good as his word, and that he hath liberty to recall aught of that which upon his bare word he hath testified shall come to pass. And it seems you are ashamed to propose it in these terms, but keep yourself in the general of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, the meaning whereof every one understands not; and the best Divines take it in a far different sense from this of yours. And they that do understand your meaning and explication, yet do not always consider it, and therefore are the more apt so to be deluded by your generalities.  
But proceed we along with you. God by his Prophet Ionas (you say) did signisie his will to have Ninevie destroyed at forty day's end; this was voluntas signi: and he truly intended what he signisied, yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti, his good will and pleasure at the very same time that the Ninevites should repent and live. Now I do observe in all this, you do not say God recals by his secret will, what he signisied to be his will upon his bare word. Yet the reason why the foresaid distinction might not be admitted in matters determined by God's oath, you made to be this, because than God should by his secret will recall that which he had declared to be his will by solemn oath; permitting that God may have liberty to recall what he hath determined (as you speak) by his bare word. But here you forbear these expressions; you decline this precipice. And justly. For if it be a part of God's perfection to keep his oath, as you have said, I see no reason but it should be a part of greater perfection to be as good as his word. Secondly, I say that if God's intentions and Gods will be all one; for you to say that God at the same time did intend and not intend that the Ninivites should be destroyed, is flat contradiction. And you do as good as say so. For at the same time God did will that they should be destroyed, you say; and also intended that they should live, which is as much as to say he did intend they should not be destroyed. And I prove it thus: To affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject, at one and the same time, is flat contradiction; but you herein do affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject for the same time; therefore herein you speak flat contradiction. But you pronounce there is no contradiction in this; yet in clearing yourself, your carriage in words is very preposterous. For whereas to purge yourself you should say, there is no contradiction in this speech of yours; you quite besides the cushion tell us there is no contrariety between Gods will declared, which you call voluntas signi, and his good will and pleasure, which you call voluntas beneplaciti; and forthwith you tell us there is no contradiction in the object of his will, however considered. All which is delivered very fumblingly, and so perplexedly, as nothing answering to those logical brains and accurate Philosophy, the want whereof elsewhere you pity in others, but not in yourself. I say you speak contradiction, in saying that God at the same time both willed that Niniveh should be destroyed, and willed that it should not be destroyed.  
As for contradictions in the objects of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, we maintain that such contradiction may have place without any contradiction in the maintainer: As for example; The object of God's commandment to Abraham (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me call voluntatem signi,) was the sacrificing of Isaak; but the object of God's purpose and determination (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me, voluntatem beneplaciti) was the not sacrificing of Isaak. Which are terms contradictory. Yet is it no contradiction for me to maintain that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son; and yet resolved with himself that Isaak should not be sacrificed.  
Yet we must give you leave to take your course, and consider what a fluttering you keep to unentangle yourself of this contradiction, wherein you are not taken as in a snare, but wilfully and with your eyes open cast yourself thereinto, presuming either by the fineness of your wit to escape, or rather by the perplexity of your discourse so to confound your reader, as not to discover your fumbling to deliver your self.  
You say the object of God's will was not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by Ionas, and of his good will and pleasure, which not signified by him was fulfilled. And because you repeat this distinction again containing the difference between voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, I must needs tell you the exorbitancyie of it. Suppose God had made known to jonas, that he purposed upon this his preaching to give them repentance, to save the Ninivites, had this been no longer voluntas beneplaciti? If you think so, I think you cannot name one Divine in the world that ever was of your opinion in this. If it ceased not to be voluntas beneplaciti for all this, than you see how absurdly you make the difference between voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti to consist in this, that voluntas signi is God's will declared, voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed.  
The resolution at length to free your former assertion from contradiction, is this, One and the same immutable decree of God did from eternity award two dooms much different unito Ninevie, taking it as it stood affected when jonas threatened destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected, and taking it as it stood upon the judgement threatened. All the alteration was in Ninevy, none in God's will and decree; and Ninevie being altered unto the better, the self same rule of justice doth not deal with it after the self same manner. The sum of all (were you pleased to speak plainly) would come to this: When he signified by jonah to the Ninevites, that Ninevie should be destroyed at forty day's end, the meaning was but this, that in case they continued in their sins without repentance they should be destroyed; but in case they repented they should not be destroyed. I find no fault in this as touching the substance of truth; but I wonder not a little to see you fail in the accommodation of it, both to the distinction of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti; as also in the reconciling of yourself unto yourself, in respect of what formerly you have delivered concerning the meaning of jonahs' message to the Ninevites. For you do not tell us which of these dooms is Voluntas signi, and which of the dooms is voluntas beneplaciti: or if both be voluntas signi, (as indeed they are) what is left for voluntas beneplaciti to be distinguished from voluntas signi in this place? It seems you distribute those dooms, and make one the object of voluntas signi, and the other the object of vol●itas beneplaciti, in which course there 〈◊〉 no sobriety in comparison to your own dictates. For you make voluntas signi to differ from voluntas beneplaciti in this, that voluntas signi is God's will declared, voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed. According to the tenor of which distinction, both these decrees are to be accounted voluntas signi for God hath declared this to be his usual course; as namely Jer. 18. 7. I will speak suddenly against a nation or a kingdom to pluck it up, and to root it out, and to destroy it. 8. But if this nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their wickedness, I will repent of the plague that I thought to bring upon them: 9 And I will speak suddenly concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build it up and to plant it: But if it do evil in my sight, and hear not my voice, I will repent of the good that I thought to do for them. Neither indeed can you in reason maintain the one of the dooms to be the object of voluntas signi, and the other the object of voluntas beneplaciti. For if jonas had delivered his message thus, God seeth in what sinful courses you are, and hath determined that you continuing in the same your City shall be destroyed at forty days end; they would never have doubted but that the Lords determination was, that upon their humiliation and repentance, and turning from their evil ways, Ninevie should not have been destroyed; and so each doom had been the object of voluntas signi, and nothing (for aught I can gather out of your discourse) should remain to be the object of voluntas beneplaciti.  
Again, this elucidation of the doubt doth contradict your former assertion, when in contradictious manner you affirmed, that God at the same time did both will that Ninevie should be destroyed, and also intent that Ninevie should not be destroyed; whereas by the interpretation which here you make of jonahs' message to the Ninivites, according to the two dooms by you mentioned, God was so far from intending both the destruction and the not destruction of Ninevie, as that he intended neither the one nor the other. For to determine to destroy them, in case they continued in their sins without repentance, and not otherwise, is to resolve neither one way nor other, but to remain in suspense, which is a kind of reservation of liberty; which heretofore you have so much magnified as a point of very great perfection, and therefore fit to be attributed unto God.  
But then I pray consider, did not God from everlasting know whether they would repent or no? I think you doubt not, but that God knew they would repent. And I pray what need was there then of any two such dooms as you have devised, when one would serve the turn, and that absolute, to wit, that God from everlasting determined they should not be destroyed, and thereupon took a course whereby they might be brought to repentance.  
By the way I am glad to hear you make the repentance of the Ninevites the object of God's will, which is called, voluntas beneplaciti, which we take to be all one with God's decree; but I have no cause to rejoice to see you thus contradict yourself: for you have in diverse places maintained, that no contingent thing, especially no act of man is the object of God's decree: but to the contrary have professed, that God, though he decreed the contingency of things, yet he doth not decree the contingent things themselves. You must be driven to take the same course in respect of God's promises of blessing, as well as of his threatenings of judgement. But to distinguish herein as you do between God's word and his oath, is most out of season. For suppose God had sent jonah with the same message in this manner, say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord, yet forty days and Ninevie shall be destroyed, might it not admit the same justification according to the dooms proposed by you thus, As I live, Ninevie continuing in this sinful course, wherein I find it shall be destroyed at forty days end, not otherwise.  
Or if God should have been charged with perjury in saying this, As I live, yet forty days and Ninevie shall be destroyed; should he not as well be charged with untruth in saying barely thus, Yet forty days & Ninevic shall be destroyed? Now whereas in the judgement pronounced by jonah against Ninevic, you never speak of any revoking the judgement threatened, though your tenant carried you (as there I signified) so to speak, yet here (the case as you profess being all one) you are bold to profess, that God may revoke the blessing promised (and why (I pray you) may he not revoke his blessing promised upon oath, as well as a blessing promised upon his bare word? for if he may the one without breaking his word, why may he not do the other without breaking his oath. Or if it be not lawful for God to break his oath, dare you say it is lawful for him to break his word? Alas, do your wits carry you? and whither would you carry us, if we should suffer ourselves to be led by you? You conclude with a qualification thus, Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truly the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is unto whom he threateneth destruction. This you say, but I had rather hear what you prove.  
By the will of God, called voluntas beneplaciti, we understand no other thing then God's decree, or the determination of his will. And hath not God as truly willed the destruction of them that die in sin, without faith and repentance, as he wills the salvation of them that die in faith and repentance. It is true, God takes no delight in the destruction of any, considered in itself, much less in their sins, whereby they bring destruction upon themselves; but God delights both in the faith and repentance of his elect, and in their salvation.  
But this signification of good pleasure, is nothing to the purpose in this distinction; for no Schooleman understands it in this sense. And I well know Arminius, considering the usual acception of Voluntas beneplaciti, amongst Divines professeth, he had rather call it, Voluntas placiti, then Voluntas beneplaciti. If such lettuce like your lips, you may make yourself merry with them.  
A second extent and accommodation of this distinction of Uoluntas signi, and Voluntas beneplaciti, you allow of, applied to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are cut off from all possibility of repentance. I had thought no man had filled up the full measure of his sin until his, death; like as on the other side, no man hath fulfilled the measure of his obedience, until he hath finished his course, as Revel. 11. 7. When the witnesses had finished their testimony, the beast that came out of the bottomless pit, made war against them, and slew them. You seem to speak it of a certain measure, whereupon the door of repentance is shut upon them, and thereupon excluded from all possibility of repentance; as here you say it was with Pharaoh, especially after the 7. plague upon Egypt; whereupon you have taken great pains to discourse at large in another Treatise, which I have well considered, and examined your reasons throughout, and that following you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; yet there you confess that it must have been so with Pharaoh at Moses first coming unto him, yea and was possible to have been so, when he was but 3. years old. And indeed I do not see how it can be avoided, but that as many as depart this life in their infancy are excluded from all possibility of repentance.  
But it may be you will apply this only to men of ripe years, but by your leave such Pharaoh was not at three years old. And though God willed Pharaoh to let his people go, and sent Moses and Aaron to him to that purpose; yet you say, It was no branch of God's good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent: Rather it was his good will and pleasure to have the heart of Pharaoh hardened: though you restrain this to Pharaohs condition after the seventh plague, for which I see no reason. So that in such a case you will have it lawful for God by his reserved will, to recall that part of his will which he hath declared by his word or oath: and therefore as touching your holy asseveration mentioned in the sixth Section, it must be restrained to them that have not yet filled up the measure of their sin, as Pharaoh had after the seventh plague. For in such a case God may will their death, notwithstanding his oath in show to the contrary. For his meaning is this, As I live I will not the death of him that dieth, that is, I will not his death as a man, or as the son of Adam; neither do I herein deify jesuitical equivocations or mental reservations; for I take liberty to charge that upon mine adversaries, and therefore you may well think I would not be so simple as to transgress in the same kind myself. And I think so too, if God had not confounded your wits, but it is God's course, and most just, to strike with confusion those that build Babel; and he makes the Egyptians to err in their counsels as a drunken man erreth in his vomit, the issue whereof is to defile himself and his own favourites, even those that sit next unto him.  
In the same spirit you profess that God did punish Pharaoh for not letting his people go; as though it had been free and possible for him to repent, though indeed in your opinion it was not. But Pharaohs case was extraordinary, you say, and not to be drawn into example. But by your leave if God did so but once, it is no unjust thing for God to do so oftener; and therefore pray look unto it, that whensoever it is your lot to oppose your adversaries in such a point, you do not lay to their charge that they make God to be unjust, if not for conscience sake of the truth, yet at least for fear of contradicting yourself.  
As for the Apostles intimation (you touch upon by the way) that it was an argument of God's great mercy and long suffering to permit Pharaoh to live any longer upon earth, after he was become a vessel of wrath, destinated to everlasting punishment in hell; I profess I am not so quick or accurate as to observe any such intimation of the Apostle. What if you devised this to make good some fictions of yours to that purpose, in another Treatise of yours, which I have already weighed in the balance, and found them a great deal too light of worth, to move any sober man to concur with you in opinion thereabouts.  
But whatsoever it be that the Apostle intimates, you seem to express strange conceits, when you talk of God's providence in suffering Pharaoh to live longer on earth, after he was become a vessel of wrath destinated to everlasting punishment in hell. I had thought every reprobate had been destinated to everlasting punishment in hell before he was borne. For God's destination of them is the ordination of his will; and that I had thought you had not denied to be everlasting. But you refer it to a certain time, as in special to Pharaoh after the seventh plague; and in special to all after they have filled up a certain measure of iniquity; and shall not men in like sort be destinated to everlasting joys in heaven after they have filled up a certain measure of obedience? And so a little after you tell us, that men do not become reprobates, till a certain measure of iniquity be filled up; and so in proportion men are not elect till a certain proportion of obedience be filled up. Yet the Apostle plainly telleth us, that the elect are elect of God before the foundation of the world, Eph. 1. 4. and consequently so are reprobates reprobated before the foundation of the world: for the word election of some doth connotate the reprobation of others. Yea jacob was loved of God before he was borne, and was not Esau hated also before he was borne? Rom. 9 Did God wait till the measure of Esau's sins was full, and the measure of Jacob's obedience, before he did elect the one, and reprobate the other? And if destination unto the punishment of hell, and on the other side destination unto the joys of heaven, begin in time after the obedience of some, and disobedience of others, what is the meaning of predestination? for what is that, but the destination of some to the joys of heaven, and others to the sorrows of hell? No doubt but if you proceed as you begin, we shall have a world of new Divinity communicated unto us, to endoctrinate us in these latter days.  
To what end soever God plagued Pharaoh, for not doing that which he could not do, all possibility of amending being taken from him, this action was just in God, and so is the like, whersoever it be found to proceed from God. And although Pharaoh could not repent without the grace of God, yet I make no doubt but that he could have let Israel go, notwithstanding his obduration. And it appears he did let them go after the ninth plague, which followed sometime after the seventh plague. And so I doubt not but he could have refrained himself from pursuing them when he had once dismissed them. And yet as for not letting Israel go God brought ten plagues upon Egypt, so for pursuing after them he drowned Pharaoh and his host in the red Sea.  
Now in confidence of your performances in clearing yourself from contradictions in one point, you are as adventurous to fall upon another. The Jesuits pretend they can equivocate without lying, and you take upon you to speak contradiction without all contradiction: yet by your leave, if no body else will, I will take care it may not pass without contradiction. There is no contradiction (you say) between these two propositions; God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh. In like sort we may say there is no contradiction between these two propositions, God from all eternity did will the salvation of Judas; God from all eternity did not will the salvation, but the condemnation of judas: and to proceed in the strain of your subtle discourse, I go along by you step by step. For albeit judas continued one and the same man from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all that time continue one and the same object of God's immutable will and eternal decree. This object did alter as judas his dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbour altered. There is no contrariety, much less contradiction between these, God unfeignedly hateth sinners; God doth not hate, but love the elect, though they be sinners. For here the object of his hatred and love is not the same; he hates sinners unfeignedly as sinners, not having made up the full measure of faith and repentance; but having made up the full measure of faith and repentance, and good works, and having their souls betrothed unto holiness, he loves them. His love of them as elect is no less necessary or usual, than his hatred of them as sinners. But though he necessarily loves them being once become elect, or having made up the full measure of good works; yet was there no necessity laid upon them by his eternal decree to make up such a measure of good works. No; to this sufficed the liberty of their wills, both to perform such a measure of good works, and to carry themselves like stout champions and patrons of this power of their free wills, and to gratify the grace of God so far as to admit her activity, both to admonish them aforehand, and upon their propension to that which is good to concur to the performing of it.  
He that walks in the Sun must needs be coloured, and I have so long been versed in the contemplation of your argumentive faculty, that I am grown almost as sufficient to plead for the elects electing of themselves, as you to plead for the reprobates reprobation of themselves; and which of us dischargeth his part best, I leave it to the indifferent reader to consider; and I doubt not but his sentence will be this; Et vitulo tu dignus & hic.  
But let us run over the contexture of your discourse once more, and consider it in itself. I say there is more sobriety in saying, God from all eternity did not will the salvation of an elect, then that he did from all eternity not will the damnation of a reprobate. For the only qualification of your saying is this, He did not will the damnation of Pharaoh as a man; but the qualification of my congruous assertion on the other side is this, God did not will the salvation or life of an elect as a sinner. Now I appeal to any man's judgement whether there be not greater congruity between the terms in my proposition, then between the terms in yours. The terms in mine are these, Not will the salvation of an elect as a sinner; in yours they are these, Not will the death of a reprobate as a man. Seeing it is well known, and Arminius confesseth it, that God can turn the holiest creature into nothing, without any show of repugnance unto his justice, But to will the salvation of a sinner, hath some show of repugnancy to God's justice.  
But to deal with you closely, and upon a point. I deny that God did ever will the salvation of Pharaoh; and I prove it by two reasons; If he did ever will it, than Gods will is now changed; for certainly now he doth not will his salvation: But God's will cannot change, He is without variableness or shadow of change. If God would save Pharaoh, and did not, as it appears he did not, than the reason why Pharaoh was not saved, was because God could not save him. This was Austin's discourse long ago. For a father desiring the saving of his child, and not performing of it; who doubts but that the reason is because he cannot. It is enough for us that Pharaoh continued the same man; for like as of the same man it cannot be verified that both he shall be saved, and shall not be saved; so neither can it be verified of the same man, that both God will save him, and will not save him. Neither was Pharaoh ever in any other estate, then in the state of damnation.  
In like sort the contradiction is evident enough in those propositions which you add to illustrate the contradictious nature (as you pretend) of the former; as if you should say, Ask my fellow whether I am a thief, which is nimis familiaris probatio. As if you should say, I unfeignedly love such a man, and yet I hate him; here is no contradiction: or as if a King should say, I unfeignedly love such a one, yet I'll hang him; yet this with more probability may be saved from contradiction.  
It is true, we may parcere personis, & dicere de vitiis, love the man, and hate his qualities, and manifest my love in seeking to redeem him from his lewd conversations, by prayer unto God, by persuasion towards the man himself. But to say I unfeignedly love him, and yet I hate him, and think to save it from contradiction, by saying I love him as a man, and hate him as a lewd person; is worse than for Adam to seek with fig leaves to cover his nakedness.  
To say God loves men as they have not made up the full measure of their iniquity, is manifestly to imply that God loves a reprobate until he hath made up the full measure of his iniquity, and that this measure being full, God ceasing to love him, God is changed; for God's love is an act in God, and is made to cease after a certain time by your doctrine, and be turned into hatred. More probable it is to say that God hates all men, (seeing they are borne and bred in sin) until they are regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ. Yet this is untrue: For God's love is an everlasting love, as without end, so without beginning.  
If you had distinguished of love as Aquinas doth, 1. q. 23. art. 4. and said, that God may be said to love all things that he hath made, in as much as he wisheth some good unto them; but for as much as he wisheth not unto them a certain good, to wit, eternal life, therefore he is said not to love but to hate some, your discourse had been more specious.  
Touching a necessity laid upon them by God's decree to fill up the measure of sin, Arminius acknowledgeth, Deum voluisse Achabam mensuram scelerum suorum implere, God would that Ahab should make up the full measure of his iniquity; which is as much as to say that God decreed it; and the Scripture professeth that both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together to do what Gods hand and his will had determined before to be done; so then in betraying, condemning, and crucyfying of Christ, they did but that which God determined should come to pass.  
And upon supposition that God will expose any man unto temptation, and leave him therein destitute of his grace, all which it is but to harden him; we say it is necessary that men shall go on in sin without repentance, as yourself acknowledge was verified of Pharaoh after the seventh plague: only we say this is necessity only secandum quid, and not simpliciter, and hinders not our liberty: for it is necessary that such a thing should come to pass, but not necessarily but contingently and freely, like as upon supposition of God's decree to make the world; it is necessary that God should make it, but how? not necessarily like a natural agent, but freely, like a voluntary agent.  
Yet once again to take a view of your uncouth tenants obscurely delivered, when you say, Pharaoh did not continue one & the same object of God's decree. It is a very strange speech; for was not the man Pharaoh the object of God's decree? If he was so, & continued the same man, doth it not follow, that he continued the same object of God's decree; notwithstanding his person altered much in the space of his life? You may as well say of one of Gods elect, as of David and Paul, that neither of them continued the same object of God's decree, if the alteration of their natures made them become different objects of God's decree. Nay, much more may you say so, because far greater alterations are found in the elect of God then in the reprobate: for in the elect there is found an alteration from the state of nature, to the state of grace; no such alteration is found in the reprobate: the reprobate only grows from bad to worse; the elect have grown so too before their calling, but by their effectual calling they are changed, and of the children of this world, they are made the children of God. And after their calling, though after the committing of one sin, they fall into another, as do the reprobate; yet withal again, they return unto God by repentance; no such alteration is found in the reprobates, but still prosiciunt in pejus, they grow worse and worse.  
Again, if because the person of a man altereth, therefore the object of God's decree altereth, seeing that a man's person altereth not only in the course of manners, but in the course of nature, from childhood to youth, from youth to middle age, from middle age to old age, as also from health to sickness, from sickness to health, therefore the object of God's decree in this respect altereth also.  
If you say the case is not alike; I say you might then have prevented this objection by plain dealing, and told us not only in what case, but why, in the case you mean, the object of God's decree altereth: whereas we are now driven to fish it out as well as we can, and bring your opinion to light, and set it forth in the proper and distinct lineaments thereof. Now the reason of the difference I conceive to be this, to wit, because God doth not will the death of a man, according to his naturals, but according to his morals, and considered in his morals. As if you should say, God did not will the death of Pharaoh, but of wicked Pharaoh.  
But say I, Pharaoh did always continue wicked Pharaoh, from his birth to his death, never altering from wickedness to goodness; and therefore even in this respect he still continued the same object of God's decree to damn him. Perhaps you will further say, that Pharaoh, as wicked, was not the object of God's decree of condemnation, but as having filled up the measure of his iniquity.  
But I say again, from the first time that he thus became the object of God's decree of condemnation, he still continued the same: for yourself confess, after once they have filled up a certain measure of iniquity, all possibility of repentance is taken from them. The last refuge for you, is to say, that this speech of yours in denying Pharaoh to continue the same object of God's decree, is to be understood not in respect of one and the same decree, but in respect of different decrees, thus; Though Pharaoh were wicked all his life, yet he was not all along the object of God's decree of condemnation, but until he had filled the measure of his iniquity, he was the object of God's decree to save him. For in the consequence you acknowledge, that God doth unfeignedly love all men, until such time as they have filled up the measure of their sin. And accordingly in another Treatise of yours you acknowledge, that men may change from the state of the elect, to the state of reprobates. And immediately before, you profess that God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh.  
This you might have expressed in plain terms without faltering, but you were loath, as it seems, to alienate men's minds with so foul a Tenent, touching the change, not of the object of Gods will and decree only, but of Gods very will and decree also; which manifestly appears by this opening your Tenent, though in terms you profess God's will is immutable, and would have your reader conceive, that all the alteration is in the object of Gods will and decree, not in the will and decree of God himself.  
And over and above herehence it followeth, that if Pharaoh had died before the seventh wonder (for till than he had not filled up the measure of his sins by your opinion) Pharaoh had been saved, though he neither had faith nor repentance. For till their souls be betrothed unto wickedness, God doth not hate them; this is your dialect: whence it followeth, that either all infants of Turks and Saracens dying in their infancy are saved, or else all men as soon as they are borne are betrothed unto wickedness, and consequently all reprobates from their birth unto their death continue the same objects of God's decree without alteration.  
And then again, I pray consider, if God hates them not, and wils not their damnation, until by filling up the measure of their sin they are betrothed unto wickedness (as you speak) then surely he did not hate them, nor will the condemnation of them in their infancy, much less did he will it before they were borne, much less did he will it before the world was made; yet you have already plainly professed, that God willed the death of Pharaoh from all eternity; and if from all eternity, then sure he willed it before the world was made, much more before Pharaoh was borne, much more before Pharaoh had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet I confess that though God from all eternity willed the death of Pharaoh, and consequently before Pharaoh was borne, and much more before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity, much less that he should be damned in his infancy, much less before he was borne, much less before the world was. So that these two propositions may well stand together without contradiction, God from all eternity willed that Pharaoh should be damned; but God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned from all eternity, or before he was borne, or in his infancy, or before he had filled up the measure of his sins. But the propositions which you take upon you to free from contradiction, are of a far different nature, and indeed directly contradictious. God did from all eternity will the death of Pharaoh; God did not from all eternity will the death, but rather willed the life of Pharaoh. And for clearing it, you only tell us that Pharaoh was not the same object of God's decree, though he continued the same man. A proposition both very obscure in itself, and void of all efficacy to free yourself from contradiction, neither do you take any pains to accommodate it, but leaving that as a blank for your propitious reader to fill up after his own judgement or affection rather. And the issue of all is, to profess that God did indeed from all etetnity will the life of Pharaoh, and so continued to will it, until such time as he had filled up the measure of his sin; and that from thenceforth he hated him, as he doth all reprobates, having once betrothed themselves unto wickedness: which assertion manifestly betraying your opinion as touching the making of Gods will mutable, your desire to satisfy your reader with calling Gods will immutable, and saying that the object of God's decree is not still the same: Sed quid ego verb a audiam facta cum vidiam? You manifestly maintain, that God's love and will to save, doth cease upon the filling up the measure of sin, and betrothing a man's self to wickedness, and thereupon and from thenceforth he hates them, and wills their death and damnation, whereas till that time he willed their life and salvation. These propositions (God loves all men, God doth not love all men) I say, are contradictories. All rules of contradiction justify these to be contradictions.  
And yourself confess as much in effect; when going about to clear them from contradiction, you quite alter the form of them, by shaping them thus in effect, God loves all men till they have filled up the measure of their sins, but when once they have filled up the measure of their sins, he loves them not. Now these propositions are quite different from the former, neither do we charge these with contradiction as we charged the former. But that wherewith we charge these is this, they make the will of God mutable, contrary to the express testimony of the holy Ghost, saying, I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6. And Saint james professeth, that with the Lord there is no variableness nor shadow of change, which you perceiving, are loath to speak your mind plainly, but to avoid so gross an untruth, had rather cast yourself upon a manifest contradiction, in saying, God loves all men, and God loves not all men; and to free yourself from contradiction, betray your corrupt opinion another way, in making Gods love to change into hatred after a certain time, to wit, after the measure of sin is filled up: and the only shift you have to charm it, is to confound the difference of time (which alone avoides the contradiction) and expressing it thus, God loves all men as men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity; but having made up that, or having their souls betrothed to wickedness, he hates them.  
But this will not serve your turn: for seeing this contradiction of making up the full measure of sin, did not belong unto man from the beginning, but only after a certain space of time; the difference specified must necessarily resolve itself into a mere difference of time, thus God did love them till they had made up the full measure of sin, but after that he hated them. And this is further proved: For if the difference only consisted in respect of different considerations at the same time; then the distinction should have place as well after this full measure of sin is made up, as before. And so Pharaoh after the filling up of the full measure of sin, might be said to be loved of God as a man, and hated as having filled up the measure of sin: but no where do● you make use of any such distinction. Nay, much more should it have use in this case, and indeed only in this case: for until a man hath filled up the measure of his sin, this distinct consideration hath no place: for a body may be considered as Ens, or Naturale, or as Quantum, because he is both Ens and Naturale, and Quantum.  
But a man cannot be considered at any time as having filled up the measure of his sin, but only after that time comes, he may be so considered; for to consider him to be that which he is not, is not to consider him what he is, but to feign him to be what he is not. Again, when you say, God loves all men as men; What is the meaning of this? What do● you denote by this love of God? For we commonly say, love is not in God, Quoad affectum, but Quoad effectum; at least, Quoad affectum, it is nothing at all different from Gods will. Now I desire to know what that thing is which God wills to man as a man, or what is the effect of this love: and I doubt not but when you say, God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sin: your meaning is, that God wills their damnation, and that for this measure of their sin. In proportion your answer should be this, That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men; yet here is very great disproportion; for when you say, God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin: I find herein a manifest difference between the reprobate & the elect as touching the cause of damnation, and that on man's part; namely, the making up the full measure of their sin, which is found only in reprobates, not in the elect.  
But when you say on the contrary side; God wills the salvation of all men as they are men, I find no difference at all between the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation, either on man's part, or on God's part; for as touching Gods will, that passeth (you say) upon the salvation of all without difference: then on man's part likewise there is no difference at all, if they are considered only as men; for the reprobates are men as well as the elect. To help this, you rest not in this consideration of them as men, but add a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the form, thus, Or at having made up the full measure of their sin. Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent, which is untrue; for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second.  
But I conceive the weakness of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helps, and thereupon you confound things that differ; for in some cases, the first consideration usually hath place; as when 'tis said, God hateth nothing that he hath made: therefore he hateth not man, true, say some, he hateth not man as man: and this distinction seems plausible to some, and therefore you seemed willing to help yourself with this by the way, for it might stir some propitious effection in a pliable reader. But then finding this bed a great deal too short to stretch yourself thereon, you added by way of disjunctive another consideration, which is this; As not having made up the full measure of sin. And because you rest upon it, I think good to consider it.  
Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates, and in the particular of Pharaoh; and argued, that then Pharaoh had been saved, had he died before the seventh wonder? for, till then in your opinion he had not made up the full measure of his sin: yet we do not find, that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance.  
Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect. Paul never filled up the measure of his sin, for if he had, than had he been a reprobate; but he was an elect, therefore if he had died immediately after the stoning of Steven, he had been saved, though accessary to his death; For he kept the garments of them that slew him, as himself confesseth. In a word, all the elect, though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance, should notwithstanding be saved also.  
My third exception is against the disproportion that nevertheless is found in these propositions; for when 'tis said, God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sin, the filling up the measure of sin, is noted here as the cause of their damnation; but in saying God willeth the salvation of all, not having filled up the measure of their sin, the not having filled up the measure of their sin, cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation. And therefore to mend this foul disproportion, the Genius of your tenet, drives you in conscience to proceed, and profess plainly, that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent: and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that do not believe and repent, and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sin. Now herein we agree with you, namely, in justifying the truth of both these propositions.  
But like as from the latter it followeth not, that God willeth the damnation of all, but of some only, namely of those that do fill up the measure of their sin, and break not off their sins by faith and repentance: so from the former it followeth, not that God willeth the salvation of all, but only that he willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent. And if you please further to infer that, because perseverance in sin of infidelity and impenitency, as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also: I think I may with as good reason take liberty to infer from the former, that seeing faith and repentance, yea and good works also are the disposing causes of salvation, therefore they are to be accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation, that is of our election also: And so your opinion shall appear at full and to life in his proper colours, not an hair's breadth different, either from the Arminian heresy of late, or from the Pelagian heresy of old.  
8 The deductions you speak of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions. As for modern Catechisms, you are not the first that nibble at them: it is a point of imperious learning now a days from on high to despise such performances. But to speak as a free man, the less they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them, the less shall they differ from the truth. As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandments, which you glory of now a second time: In this place it is hard, if not impossible to discern by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers, which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him, as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdom. In the close of the second Section of this chapter, you told us, That it was not every degree of man's hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from God's love; and withal, that this was observed by Bishop Hooper. But in stead of alleging any passage in him to this purpose, you referred us there to the fourth paragraph of this chapter, which is this present section.  
Yet concerning that sentence, I see a good construction may be made of it, taking love, quoad effectum (as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God, and not quoad affectum) and the chiefest effect of God's love is salvation. Now it is most true, that nothing but final perseverance in sin doth bereave men of salvation, of glory; nothing but final perseverance in sin, stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject. Now albeit in that which followeth it cannot be judged by your text, what you borrow out of Bishop Hooper, and what you do not. Yet upon consulting Bishop Hoopers' Preface unto his exposition of the ten Commandments, I find, that both this sentence following, Every man is called in the Scripture wicked and the enemy of God, for the privation and lack of faith and love that he oweth to God; and all that followeth hereupon to the end of this eighth Section of yours, is taken out of that Preface of his: and I wonder not a little what you meant, not to discover so much, neither by express profession, nor by changing the letter, that thereby at least it might be taken to be another man's discourse, and not your own.  
Well, I am willing to consider what you allege out of him, and whether his writings be so consonant as you speak to your deductions. First, you call him, A learned Bishop, and blessed Martyr; Et quis Herculem vituperat? You add, that this exposition of the ten Commandments made by him, Is a fit Catechism for a Bishop to make. I am persuaded, the whole Church of England hath a reverend opinion of his learning, of his holiness, of his martyrdom; and that this Catechism of his is worthy of a Bishop: but it followeth not herehence, that every Bishop in England doth: neither do I think you yourself expect they should concur with him in every opinion of his expressed in this book.  
In his declaration of the ninth Commandment. Fol. 80. he justifieth mendatium ossiciosum, and professeth, that it is required in some cases; Do you look that all the Bishops of England should concur rather with Bishop Hooper, then with Bishop Austin in this opinion.  
Upon the eighth Commandment, Fol. 74. he complains, saying, A great pity it is to see how far that office of a Bishop is degenerated from the original in the Scripture, it was not so at the beginning when Bishops were at the best, as the Epistle of Paul to Titus testifieth, that willed him to ordain, in every City of Crect a Bishop: and Fol. 79.▪ as sharply as closely censureth the Bishops of his days, for arrogating to themselves so much wit as to rule & serve in both states, in the Church and in the Civil policy; and to the contrary professeth, that one of them is more than any man is able to satisfy; and that it is not possible that one should do both well, and that it is a great oversight of the Princes and higher powers of the earth, so to charge them with two burdens, when none of them, as he saith, is able to bear the least of them both. Do you expect that all the Bishops in England should be of his judgement in this?  
On the same commandment, Fol. 73. as touching those who have great Forests or Parks of Dear or Coneys, which pasture and feed upon their neighbour's ground, or Columbaries whereas Doves assemble and haun●, and those feed on the poors corn, he refers it to the charity of every man, whether the keeping of such beasts be not against God's laws, and man's laws, and whether it be not suffered rather for a few men's pleasures, then for many mens prosit: Do you think that either Church or State are precisely of his opinion, as it is manifested by this?  
Upon the seventh Commandment, Fol. 69. he maintains, that upon divorce in case of adultery, it is lawful to marry another; and not so only, but that the adulterous party ought to be put to death: Do you wish that the Church and State of England would be of the same mind with him in this?  
Upon the fourth Commandment he avoucheth, that although the ceremony of the Sabbath be taken away, which appertained only to the common wealth of the Hebrews, yet one day of the week to preserve and use the word of God and his Sacraments, is not abrogated: and that therefore in this are two things to be observed, the one ceremonial during for the time, the other moral, and never to be abolished as long as the Church of Christ shall continue upon the earth. Again, This Sunday, saith he, that we observe, is not the commandment of man, as many say, that would under the pretence of this one law, bind the Church of Christ to all other laws that men have ungodly prescribed unto the Church: but it is by express words commanded that we should observe this day (the Sunday) for our Sabbath, as the words of Saint Paul declareth, commanding every man to appoint his alms for the poor in Sunday: the text saith, in one of the Sabbath: it is an Hebrew phrase, and it is as much as to say, in the Sunday: as you may read the same manner of speech in Luke and John, of the women that came to the Sepulchre to anoint the dead body of Christ. Luke saith, In one of the Sabbaths early they came to the Sepulchre: and so saith john by the same words, the which was the Sunday, as no man doubteth; for 'tis our faith, that Christ roso the third day.  
I presume you will not prescribe to all the Bishops and Divines in this kingdom to be of Bishop Hoopers' opinion in this point. Now if in these particulars it be lawful to differ from him in opinion, without offence of Church or State; I hope we shall have as great liberty to differ from him in other things also upon good ground.  
Yet I speak not this, as if I found this godly Bishop to justify that Tenet of yours, for confirmation whereof you make use of his authority. And that Tenet of yours is this, that there is a certain time when the wicked have filled up the full measure of their iniquity, though they live many years after; and such you conceive was the case of Pharaoh after the seventh plague. And that from that time forwards all possibility of amendment is taken from them. And until that time God doth unfeignedly love them. But having made up that measure, and so having their souls betrothed unto wickedness, he hates them. That then they become reprobates, and not till then; and from thence to their lives end it is not Gods will and pleasure they should repent, but rather that it is Gods good will and pleasure that they should have their hearts hardened. Your words are these in the precedent Section, pag. 180. God loves all men unfeignedly as they are men, or a● men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but having made up that, or having their souls betrothed unto wickedness, he hates them. And again; He necessarily hates them being once become reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquity. And pag. 179. It was no branch of God's good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent, or be willing to let Israel go. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (specially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardened. And a little after, God plagued Pharaoh for not doing that which now he could not, all possibility of amendment being taken from him. My opinion to the contrary is, that no man hath filled up the full measure of his iniquity till death. As touching the possibility of amendment, I acknowledge none in man, without the regenerating grace of God, whereby he gives man repentance. Neither do I know any time in the course of man's life wherein any man is excluded from possibility of repentance by the grace of God. We know God gave the thief repentance upon the cross. Our Saviour gives us to understand, that God calleth some at the very last hour of the day. Paul admonisheth Timothy to carry himself gently towards them that are without; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if so be God at any time may give them repentance, that they may come to amendment, out of the snare of the devil, by whom they are led captive to do his will. Of old it was wont to be said, Inter pontem & fontem; and the like is usual amongst us: 
Between the stirrup and the ground,  
Mercy I asked, mercy I found.   
All this which followeth, and which you have transcribed out of Bishop Hooper, I find nothing that contradicteth any of these assertions of mine, or that justifieth any of your opposite assertions, not in this which immediately followeth thus; Every man is in Scripture called wicked, and the enemy of God, for the privation and lack of faith and love, that he oweth to God. Et impij vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pij; that is, They are called wicked, that in all things honour not God, believe not in God, and observe not his commandments as they should do; which we cannot do by reason of this natural infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as Paul calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh Paul the word wicked. So must we interpret S. Paul, and take his words, or else no man should be damned. In all this I find nothing to that purpose whereto you allege it.  
Yet by the way, I am not of Master Hoopers' opinion, in saying, that They were called wicked (meaning in holy Scripture) that in all things honour not God, believe not in God, and observe not his commandments as they should, which we cannot do by reason of this natural infirmity, etc. For all this is verified of the very Saints and children of God here on earth; and I do not find that the Saints of God in holy Scripture, by reason of their infirmities, not honouring God, not believing in God, not observing his commandments in such measure as they should (as God knows, and our consciences well know that in many things we offend all,) are therefore called wicked. Especially considering that the Greek word which Master Hooper aims at, and which he renders by the word wicked in English, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as appears by his reference to Rom. 5. 8. In this sense (saith Bishop Hooper) taketh Paul this word wicked, when he saith that Christ died for the wicked. Now this state noted by S. Paul in these words, is not the state of grace, but the state of sin precedent to justification, and the state of enmity against God, as appears by the two next verses; Much more being justified by his blood, we shall be saved by his life. 10. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, etc. Whereby it is manifest that the state of sin in which we were when we were reconciled to God by Christ's death, was the state of enmity against God. And indeed otherwise there were no place for reconcilement, which consists in making them friends which before were enemies. Neither do I know any Divine of master Hoopers' opinion, in construing S. Paul in this manner, as if these sinners 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which he calls wicked) for whom Christ died, were only such as do not honour God, believe in God, and observe his commandments as they should, which we know is incident to the very children of God, and to the most righteous Saints that are on the earth, who yet are never accounted in holy Scripture (for aught I know) the enemies of God. Yet such are they termed for whom Christ died, and who S. Paul saith are reconciled to God by the death of his Son.  
I willingly grant that Christ died to procure the salvation of none but such as sooner or later should become the Saints of God, to honour him, believe in him, and observe his commandments, though not in such measure as they should, by reason of the flesh which they carry about them, still lusting against the spirit; and this seems, by this place, undoubtedly to be the opinion of Bishop Hooper, though he erreth in the interpretation of S. Paul, who in this place considereth not what shall be their condition sooner or later, for whom Christ died, but only showeth what was their condition when Christ died for them, thereby the more to commend the love of God towards us, who sent his Son to die for us, when we were sinners, and reconciled us to himself by the death of his Son, what time we were his enemies. And I am persuaded yourself are of the same opinion with me in this, though I will not say that the evidence of S. Paul's text seemed so plain unto you, this very way I have interpreted it, that therefore you concealed S. Paul's passage, mentioned by master Hooper thus, When he saith that Christ died for the wicked; and in the margin refers us to Rom. 5. 8. all which you have handsomely left out, to what end I know not. But hereby it comes to pass, that the reader may be to seek of that passage of S. Paul, in case he have no other means to judge thereof, than your transcribing it.  
As for the reason of Bishop Hooper to justify this interpretation of S. Paul's text, it is nothing consequent, as when he saith, So we must interpret Saint Paul's words, or else no man should be damned. If S. Paul had said, Christ died for all the wicked, or for all sinners, than indeed we should be driven to seek out some such interpretation of the word wicked, or sinners, or else none should be damned. But S. Paul doth not say, Christ died for all that are wicked, or for all sinners, but for us sinners: his words are these, God commendeth his love to us, that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Now he writes unto Christians, and for such only he died, though they were not Christians when Christ died for them, but rather in the state of enmity against God. And thus to appropriate Christ's dying for mankind, doth manifestly appear to be master Hoopers' meaning, as before I showed, albeit he deviates from the right interpretation of S. Paul's Text, in the place mentioned by him.  
That which followeth doth in my judgement carry a greater show of justifying your former assertions, and yet but a show neither; as when he saith, Now we know that Paul himself, S. john, and Christ damneth the contemners of God, and such as willingly continue in sin, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the general promise of grace. It may seem that The contemners of God, and such as willingly continue in sin and will not repent, in master Hoopers' phrase, are the same in your judgement with those, whom you account to have filled up the measure of iniquity. But what ground have you for that? Master Hooper saith not, that all such whom he accounts contemners of God, and such as willingly continue and sin, and will not repent, have hereupon filled up the measure of their iniquity, or that hereupon all possibility of amendment is taken from them; these are your assertions, they are not master Hoopers'. Again, all contemners of God, and such as willingly continue in sin, and will not repent, master Hooper saith, the Scripture excludes from the general promise of grace, and this he utters without any distinction, as well he may, to wit for the present, and so long as they continue in this their contempt and hardness of hart. For as much as the promise of grace, both for the pardon of sin, and salvation of our souls, belongs to none but such as break off their sinful courses by faith and repentance. But you distinguish between such contemners of God, and presumptuous sinners, and tell us that some of them have arrived to the full measure of their iniquity, and that there is no possibility of their amendment, such as Pharaoh was after the seventh plague; others, though contemners of God, etc. yet in this their course of contempt, have not filled up the measure of their iniquity, such as Pharaoh was before the seventh plague, who undoubtedly was a contemner of God before that time, and one that willingly continued in sin, and would not repent; and of all such you profess that God doth unfeignedly love them.  
Now there are no tracks or footsteps of such strange assertions as either of these to be found in Bishop Hooper. Of all contemners of God he professeth according unto Scripture, that they are excluded from all promise of grace, to wit, for the present; he doth not say, God unfeignedly loves any of them: but as for the time to come, he doth not affirm that all possibility of amendment is taken from them. Had he thought so, than he should acknowledge them to be in a desperate condition.  
But he is so far from this, that he accounts Desperation to be a principal let and impediment unto godliness, chap. 18. fol. 90. The first let, saith he, or impediment is desperation, when as men think they cannot be saved, but are excluded from all mercy; and a little after, Of the contrary nature (to presumption) is desperation, it taketh from God his mercy: For when they offend and continue in sin, they think there is no mercy left for them; and that as in the next sentence he showeth, specially because of custom and long continuance in sin. Then he proceeds, saying, This discourse and progress in that knowledge of sin beareth him in hand that it is impossible to return unto God: This is as much as in your phrase to affirm, that, all possibility of amendment is taken from him.  
But, doth Mr. Hooper justify this? Nothing less, for this is a main let or impediment to repentance, which he desires to remove out of the way of sinners, and to that he proceeds in this manner, Moses, saith he, like a good Physician teacheth a remedy against this dangerous disease, and showeth the way unto God, declareth that God is full of mercy, and ready to forgive; and beginneth his oration in this manner, unto such as be afflicted and oppressed with sin; When there cometh upon thee all those things, when God hath afflicted thee for thy sins, and thou returnest unto him with all thy heart, he shall deliver thee from captivity, and receive thee to his mercy again. Of the which text learn this doctrine, that God will always forgive, how many and how horrible soever the sins be, and learn to fear presumption, and to beware of desperation. So that ho acknowledgeth no just cause of desperation, no not in respect of custom and long continuance in sin.  
The next sentence in Mr. Hooper, transcribed by you in this eighth Section of yours, contains no more than that which we all acknowledge. Thou seest, saith he, by the places before rehearsed, that though we cannot believe in God as undoubtedly as is required, by reason of this our natural sickness and disease; yet for Christ, sake in the judgement of God, we are accounted as faithful believers, for whose sake this natural disease and sickness is pardoned, by what name soever Saint Paul calleth the natural infirmity and original sin in man. This is something concerning the nature of original sin, in the opinion of Mr. Hooper; nothing at all touching a certain state of sin, wherein all possibility of amendment is taken from a man, to which purpose Mr. Hooper is alleged by you in this place.  
Yet because I do not know what reaches you have in this also; I answer, that Mr. Hooper speaks of original sin, as it is found in the regenerate, and as it is in them, he calls it only, A natural sickness and disease. And indeed, when we are once regenerate, we are no longer dead in sin, no longer estranged from the life of God.  
But herehence it followeth not, that Mr. Hooper was of opinion, that original sin was even in the unregenerate to be accounted only A natural sickness and disease, and not rather a death in sin; especially considering that the holy Apostle acknowledgeth, A law in his members rebelling against the law of his mind, and leading him captive to the law of sin, and calleth it, A body of death, crying out against it, and saying, Who shall deliver me from this body of death? Rom. 7. 1. The last clause, as I take it, makes more for your present purpose, as when he saith, And this imperfection and natural sickness taken of Adam, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except we transgress the limits and bounds of original sin by our! own folly and malice, and either of a contempt or hate of God's word, we fall into sin, and transform ourselves into the image of the devil. Then we exclude by this means ourselves from the promises and merits of Christ, who only received our infirmities and original disease, and not the contempt of him and his law.  
This passage I confess is somewhat strange, and of my knowledge hath troubled some, conceiving it as an assertion of yours, and not so much as dreaming that it was delivered by Mr. Hooper. I answer therefore; First of all, that this serves not your turn for the present, & that in two respects. First, you distinguish the contempt of Godsword, and of his law, according to different degrees; eithersuch as was in Pharaoh before the seventh plague, or such as was in Pharaoh after the seventh plague. And notwithstanding the former contempt of God's word and his law, you profess, that God unfeignedly loves all such, in whom such a contempt is found, because for sooth as yet they have not filled up the full measure of their contempt: And as for such in whom is found a farther degree of contempt than this, all possibility of amendment is taken from them.  
Now Mr. Hooper doth not make any such distinction, much less doth he cast himself upon any such uncoth assertions as you deliver hereupon, as before I have showed. Secondly, your doctrine of filling up the measure of iniquity, proceeds of men in state of nature; but Mr. Hooper delivers that before rehearsed of men in the state of grace. And in my judgement his meaning is no more than this, that imperfections of faith and holiness, may and do still consist with the ●ate of grace in this life; but contempt or hate of God's word, and transformation of ourselves into the image of the Devil, cannot stand with the state of grace; not denying but that all contempt and hatred of God's word, and the fruits of the image of the Devil in us, in case they are broken off, and an end is set unto them by repentance, are borne by Christ upon the Cross, and satisfaction made for them by the death of Christ, as well as for original sin: nor affirming that any man once brought unto the state of grace, doth at any time break forth so far, as to contemn or hate God's word, or to transform himself into the image of the Devil.  
But his meaning in my judgement is only this, that Christ hath made satisfaction for the imperfections of our faith and holiness, although we continue therein until death: but he hath not made satisfaction for the contempt and hatred of his word, and for our transformation of ourselves into the image of the Devil (as h● calleth it) in case men do continue therein unto death.  
Imperfections may and shall continue, and still be pardoned, but contempt must not. This hath seemed to others as well as to myself, an harsh sentence, and I have taken some pains to clear it: but how little it serves your turn, to that purpose whereto you allege it, is easily discovered.    

SECT. III.  
That Gods will and pleasure is never frustrated, albeit his unspeakable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfeignedly tendered.  

CHAP. XVI.  
In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, and for such as perish.  
I Have now waded thorough fifteen Chapters of these your Contemplations, and should by this in reason be pretty well acquainted with the manner of your discourse. But I find myself as much pushed in searching after the coherence of the parts of the first Section here, as hitherto I have been in any part of the Treatise. But it may be I do but labour to gather that which you never strewed, and then no marvel if I labour in vain.  
As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write Quodlibets: well, such as they are, I purpose to consider them as I find them. To sum up the particulars; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties, and of ignorance in assoiling them, and that is because we extend this Maxim, (Both parts of contradictories cannot be true,) not so far as we should, and the reason thereof is (you say) because we extend our power to the utmost, yea farther than justice or goodness can accompany it: To this you add 〈◊〉 our nature is humourous and inconstant, and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature, and that look what is constant and still the same, that will at one time or other contradict our humour. And humours, you say, enraged with contradiction arm power against whatsoever contradicts them.  
By the way you tell us, that the use of power in creatures sensitive is to satiate their appetite of sense; in man, to accomplish his will and desire of good. And that being corrupt, his power becomes an undercommander unto his unruly appetites, as in voluptuous men; and that in men esteemed good, motions of equity are so weak, that men yield their consents to such proposals, as were they firm, they would offensively contradict them. And the reason why they yield, is lest upstart appetites, which custom countenanceth, should be enlarged by reluctance: But love, you say, is not alike set on diverse objects, but divides itself unequally, when it comes to opposition between sense & reason; ourselves and friends or common equity: And the inconveniences whereto the world and flesh exposeth us are reducible to two heads, the blinding of the judgement, and consequently the abusing of power and authority.  
Then again you return to our unconstant humour, and upon the back of that tell us, that though none doth good, yet we may do less evil than others. And lastly, that they who love equity, are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice; and at last having sat long, you hatch an excellent Maxim, that where judgement is infallible, and love to justice invincible, there ●s not possible to transgress in judgement. All which when I compare together, and with your theme proposed, How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, it calls to my remembrance a certain mad fellow's discourse, when I was a Scholar at Winchester, that would talk of master Killigree, and Abbey lands, fat venison, and such like uncoherences a long time together.  
But let us examine them apart: Both parts of contradiction cannot be true; and it is as true that both parts of contradiction cannot be false. But whereto this tends, and how pertinent to your purpose in this place, I cannot devise; Only you tell us that the not extending of this Maxim so far as we should, is the cause why we conceive difficulties in your wild discourse premised, as also of our ignorance in assoiling them. A strange conceit, and whereof I see no colour of reason, neither do you take any pains to explicate it, by accommodation or instance, but let fly at random, as if you would employ your readers in seeking after sense and reason where there is none to be found. And if this were true, yourself should have assoiled the difficulties conceived in the points proposed, by extending this Maxim to the utmost, to serve your turn; and showed, how by not extending it so far as is meet, difficulties are conceived, and no means found to assoil them: but yourself have taken no such course: And who was ever known, not to extend this Maxim to the uttermost? where can you find any limitation or confining of it? what do you mean to abuse your reader's patience with such incredible fictions?  
Again, herehence it followeth, that whosoever do extend this maxim so far as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeal to every man's conscience that reads your writings: of whom I am persuaded not one of a thousand, if Scholars, doth deny but that this Maxim holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so far as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our own power to the utmost, even farther than true goodness can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxim to the utmost, and consequently less apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and less ignorant to assoil them: and the reason why men do conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoil them, is for want of honesty. And you in the mean time would not be supposed to show any want either of wit or honesty in your discourses. Well, this article of your natural Creed is observable, They that do things unjustifiable, they do not extend this Maxim (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) so far as naturally it would reach, which is a mystery unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither do you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and we find contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arm power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restrain the rules of contradiction; unless out of some such curious sophistry and subtlety as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we do restrain the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce think me sober, if I should go about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse looks no other way then this. And I confess the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never fail to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turn commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will always be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I find no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.  
Power, you say, is for the execution of will, and so is wit too, and no marvel if sometimes both of them are in knaves keeping. This is stuff serving to fill paper. And if S. Paul complained of a law in his members rebelling against the law of his mind, and leading him captive to the law of sin, no 
Rom. 7. 23  marvel if natural men, esteemed good and sober, do sometimes yield to things unfit: but that it is out of such mature deliberation as you speak, to prevent forsooth the enraging of carnal appetites, (which why you should call upstarts, I know not, unless you deny them to be as old as the fall of Adam) I see no reason. I give a thief my purse, lest I should lose my purse, and somewhat else also. But if I give over unto my passions my honesty, to be defiled by them, alas what have we more or greater to lose? And let them rage while they will, we can but lose our honesty, therefore in reason we will not stop passions mouth at the first with our honesty, we will rather tug and pull for it, and keep more ado than Michah for his gods; Ye have taken away my gods, 
jud. 18. 24  and the Priest, and go your ways, and what have I more? The motions of the flesh must needs offend the spirit, for they are lustings against the spirit. But there is no proportion between 
Gal. 5. 17▪  this contradiction, and that which is between pain and pleasure. For pain and pleasure are not felt at once, as this contradiction is.  
Love, as not alike set on diverse objects, is brought in by way of adversative, whereas the sentence is no other than that which went before, touching the contradiction between carnal desires, and virtuous motions. Yet to betray some acquaint strain of learning, by way of parenthesis, you make question whether Love be one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of diverse inclinations rooted in one centre: neither do you determine it, but leave your reader to gaze upon it, as a child doth upon a cluster of grapes first ripe, and the more like to be first rotten: you might make the same question of hatred also. For Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dic●tur & alterum. It was wont to be said of love, that it was as the weight of the soul. Anima amore quasi pondere fertur quocunque fertur. But it hath different acceptions. For there is amor amicitiae, and there is amor concupiscentiae. And this amor concupiscentiae is either ordinate or inordinate: ordinate love becomes moral virtue, and inordinate, moral vice. And S. john divides this inordinate concupiscence into three kinds; concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eye, 
1 joh. 2. 〈◊〉  and pride of life. And will you put all these into one cluster, or posy rather, consisting partly of garden flowers, partly of stinking flowers of the field? The two originals you speak of, if subordinate, they are not two originals, there is but one; and the love of the world and the flesh carry men on, even in despite of judgement and conscience to the contrary, into manifest impieties, iniquities, impurities.  
I do not find it strange that things seem not impossible to us, if they are within our power, yet though they be within our power one way, I see no cause but they may seem impossible, and be impossible another way. And be our variousness never so great, yet I see no reason to justify you in saying, that what cannot be admitted to day, will be allowed of to morrow. For the vicious person, 
Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit,  to that which is good. And Absolom two years together watched opportunity to revenge himself on his brother Amnon, and afterwards continued as settled in his course os aspiring 
2 Sam. 13. 22, 23.  to the kingdom: And therefore herein certainly you reckon without your host. Yet it is most true, that the better men are, the more hardly are they drawn to unjust courses: this I say is as true, as that all this is nothing to the purpose: yet hereupon you commend unto us by way of consequence, a truth in great state, and scored in the margin as very remarkable, and yet you call it an experienced truth, That if any man's judgement in matters of equity and justice were infallible, and his love to justice constant and invincible, it would be impossible for him to transgress in judgement; and indeed if this were not true, both parts of contradiction manifestly should prove true. For 'tis impossible to transgress but either by error in judgement, or corruption in will: And therefore where judgement is infallible, and will incorruptible, 'tis not possible for such a one to transgress. This is as true as one of Euclides elements. But it depends upon such Ifs and Ands, that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honesty by this information. Only in this clause alone I find some coherence with the former, to wit, with the first sentence of this Section: for that laid down the thesis, this delivers the self same in hypothesis.  
The conclusion is, that God's ideal perfection in integrity and constancy hath no mixture of vice or humorous impotency. And our conceit of this perfection in God, you say, is rectified thus, to wit, by experience of the strength of unconstant humorous desires, & of the faintness of our love and equity, as well as by the contrary virtues. Your wit hath played his part here, when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits, touching God's integrity and constancy, from the contrary disposition in man.  
Belike, if Adam had never fallen, our conceits could not have been so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are, neither shall they be so well rectified in the kingdom of heaven, because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconstancy, or faintness of equity in man.  
2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxim mentioned, so far as naturally it would reach, and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour, and the cause of it. The consequence was partly aptness to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you, and ignorance to assoil them. The cause was the extending of our own power too far. And in this Section you endeavour to rectify our conceits hereabouts; now whereas I was intent (as it is fit every Reader should be) to observe what was your drift and scope in all this, in the end of the former Section, you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideal perfection, in the way of integrity and constancy, as if that were the scope you aimed at: but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto, though finally it lighted thereupon, neither do I yet perceive whereunto this ideal perfection of God, you speak of, is directed, as being nothing congruous, for aught I discern, to the point in hand. I rather think, that was delivered (as many other things in that Section) on the by, and that the immediate end you aim at, is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section, namely, the rectifying of our conceits, touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxim, which is the principal negative touching contradictories. Both parts of contradiction cannot be true, (no, nor false neither) you had rather express it thus, To make both parts of contradiction true (or false) is no object of power omnipotent: Now we seem to have found the hare again, at least the tract and sent of the hare, and desire to pursue, without making any fault, as near as we can. Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxim mentioned, is this, Many effects are very possible to power alone considered, which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes. This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me, and as it were, juterpretationem commodam indignata, such as could not admit a commodious interpretation: and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof, is not to justify it, but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein.  
In the former Section you complained of men, as extending their own power too far, which you conceived to be the reason why they did not extend the maxim there proposed so far as naturally it would reach.  
But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright, not considering it at large, but rather as joined with other attributes of God.  
Secondly, you complained, that men did not extend the maxim you speak of so far as naturally it would reach, and therefore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright, every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full, whereas indeed you take a course to restrain it, for you tell us here, that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power, but in reference unto other attributes of God also, as love, truth, goodness, and justice, which manifestly doth restrain the possibility of any thing, rather than enlarge it.  
Thirdly, whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place, is only this, To make both parts of contradiction true, when you tell us, that, Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes. What do you but hereby give us to understand, that this effect, to wit, of making both parts of contradiction true, though it be possible to power alone considered, yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine.  
Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobriety, whether this be a decent thing to say, that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered, whereas indeed it is no more possible, in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true, then to make both parts of contradiction false. Neither indeed is it in the power of God, as touching any one part of contradiction, if it be not true, to make it true, or if it be true to make it false. As for example, I am alive; it is not in the power of God to make it false. He may take my life from me, but that is not a course to make that proposition false. For it was true only for that time when it was pronounced, not for the time to come when my life is taken from me. So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false, Socrates is alive, neither is it in the power of God to make it true: for though he can restore life to Socrates, yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true. For that proposition was true for that time only, when it was pronounced, not for the time to come, least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates. But you will say, the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true, not on the contrary. And God is the cause of the being of things.  
This I confess is a truth in part. God is the cause of the being of things, yet not of all things, but only of things contingent. God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being, such as he is himself. So that these like propositions, God is eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, most simple, etc. no way depend on the execution of God his power, which proceeds always according to the counsel of his own will. But hereupon depends not the nature of God, nor many other principles containing necessary truth: I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature, which are not so in reference to the divine. For the humane nature hath power to transgress, the divine nature hath not. Yet if you mark it well, this which in this case is called power, will finally be resolved not so much into power, as into impotency: For it is not to be presumed that our Saviour had less power than another man, because he could not sin; or the Angels since their confirmation, than they had before, or that men in their glorified condition shall be more impotent than before. And indeed confirmation of integrity and innocency, doth not abolish power, but only rectify the use of it, and establish that rectitude in the use of power. Yet there is a denomination of power attributed to man, and denied unto God, as when we say man can transgress, God cannot: But the ground of this is not the want of power in God, and a surplusage of power in man; but only this, that a man is capable of restraint from a superior power, God is not. For to say, that man can transgress, is as much as to say, that man can do that which he is forbidden to do, or from the doing whereof he is restrained. But this cannot be affirmed of God, as who hath no superior power to restrain him.  
Your next sentence is full of nonsense, as when you say, It is more shameful than impossible for rich men to lie or cousin, or for Magistrates to oppress and wrong their inferiors; albeit the one's riches or others power were infinitely increased, without internal increase of their fidelity. For the better opening whereof I will resolve it into its parts. And they are two, considered apart without comparison.  
The first is this, It is shameful for rich men to lie and cousin, for Magistrates to oppress and wrong, albeit the one's riches and the others power were infinitely increased, without internal increase of their fidelity. Now I say there is plain nonsense in this, and that in diverse respects.  
First in saying it is is shameful for rich men to lie and cousin, albeit their riches be never so much increased: for the coherence by virtue of the particle albeit, doth imply, thatit is a shameful course for them to lie, though never so much provoked thereunto. This I say should be the sense. But your sentence hath a quite contrary sense. For whereas according to the most convenient sense it should run thus; It is a shameful course for a man to lie and cousin, though he be never so poor, poverty indeed being usually a provocation unto lying and cozening, as we read Prov. 30. 9 you pronounce it in a quite contrary sense thus: It is a shameful thing for a rich man to lie and cousin, though he be never so rich.  
Secondly, your adversative is as unreasonable in respect of the latter part of it, which is this, Albeit he be without increase of internal fidelity: As much as to say, it is a shameful thing for a rich man to lie and cousin, though he be never a whit the more honest for his riches: and 'tis like unto his speech that said of a swine, It was a creature which though it was polluted yet it was not clean, as if there were an opposition between being polluted, and being not clean: so you imply an opposition between being never the more honest, and doing that which was shameful. Whereas indeed he that doth shameful things, is hoc ipso never a whit the more honest.  
The solecism is the same applied to the Magistrate, as touching the latter part, not as touching the former; because their power and authority may seem to countenance them in dealing more hardly with inferiors, then if they were not in magistracy would seem fit.  
The second part is this; It is possible for rich men to lie and cousin, though they were rich, and never a whit the more honest.— It is possible for the Magistrate to oppress and wrong, though they were never so powerful, and never a whit the more honest. Here the solecism is alike in both, as touching the latter part. For you imply by the form of the sentence, that want of honesty were some hindrance to lying and cozening, some hindrance to oppressing and wronging.  
But as touching the former part, the solecism is most foul in the speech concerning the Magistrate, as when you imply, that the great power the Magistrate hath, is an hindrance to his possibility of oppressing and wronging his inferiors, whereas it appears manifestly, that rather it is a furtherance thereunto.  
But it is impossible for God to speak an untruth, or to do wrong. Before, I have showed, that to have a power to transgress, is to imply a being in subjection to a superior power that restraineth him, and consequently such a power is resolved into weakness and impotency. In special to speak untruth implieth less power then to speak truth; for to speak truth implieth knowledge of truth: And to know truth is a thing of more power, then to be ignorant of truth.  
But it may be you propose this of lying, which is to speak contrary to a man's knowledge: but this is not power to do aught: For the speaking of this or that is not the lying: but lying is a denomination of the act of speaking, arising from the contrariety of the speech, to the knowledge or intentions of the mind. So that if he speak the same thing in his dream, or if another delivereth the same words, yet is it no lying. In a word, power to do ill, or peccabilitas, which is per naturam, doth no more relish of true power, then impoccabilitas per gratiam doth savour of impotency and weakness. But God you say cannot speak untruth. The truth is, God cannot speak at all in proper speech; for God hath no tongue to be the interpreter of his heart. But God doth inspire his servants with truth, and move them to speak it, or to write it: And it is 
Aug. Ep. 174.Ille in servis sui loquitur.  impossible he should inspire with falsehood; man himself would never speak falsehood, but always truth, if he might advantage himself as much with telling truth, as telling untruth. Now though a man sometimes promotes his ends by false courses, yet it is absurd to think that God needs false courses to promote his ends, seeing he is almighty.  
As for the doing of wrong, it is well known, that if he should command Abraham to sacrifice his son, and see him execute it; or command Samson to sacrifice himself by dying with the Philistines, he shall do no wrong either to the one or to the other; or by making Prince job as poor as poor job, in destroying his substance, his children, and last of all striking his body with a sore boil, yet shall he not do any wrong to job. Nay were job as innocent as Adam was in his creation, or as the elect Angels are now in their confirmation, and should deal so with them as he did with job, yet should they have just cause to say as Eli did, He is the Lord, let him do what seemeth good in his sight. 
1 Sam. 3. 1●   
Arminius confesseth, that the most innocent creature God 
Exam. praedest. Perk. p. 107. In 12. q. 87. art. 8.  can annihilate without prejudice to his justice, yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature. Medina maintains, that God as Creator hath such power over his creature, Ex 〈◊〉 omnium Theologorum sententia: yet do we distinguish between potentia absoluta, and potentia ordinata; God can do that by power absolute, which he cannot do on supposition that he will not do it: for that were to change, and that were impotency, rather than power. And to speak in proper terms; It is not fit to say that God cannot do this because he will not; for there is no consequence in this, either in respect of God or man: Such a one will not do this or that; therefore he cannot do it.  
But supposing Gods will to do this or that, 'tis more proper to say, that upon this supposition, it is impossible God should do otherwise, because it is impossible he should change his will. For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution, the one fickleness of the will, the other improvidence of the understanding, in not foreseeing all that might come to pass. But neither of these is possibly incident unto God. So then if God hath promised aught, 'tis impossible that it should not be performed, or that God should provountrue. If God loves a man, 'tis as much as to say, he is determined to doc him good, and 'tis impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined. But to say that God in point of justice cannot perform that, without performing whereof he shall be untrue, is a paradox of paradoxes. For if in performing it he shall be true, then in not performing of it he shall be untrue. And doth God's justice bind him to be untrue? you might as well say, it binds him to be unjust.  
Again, if God out of his love hath resolved to do this or that good unto man; shall his justice hinder the fulfilling of the counsels and determinations of his own will? This is strange Divinity; yet you deliver these uncouth assertions like a positive Theologue, without all proof, as if they carried their evidence in their foreheards. Men are bound by rules of a superior power to work after this or that manner; and therefore it is not lawful for them to do many things, from the doing whereof they are restrained by lawful authority, which commands them. It is not so with God, who doth what he will in heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and no man can say unto him, What dost thou? In this sense you think you may say that all before Christ were thiefs and robbers. And though I think this interpretation is very alien from the true meaning of the Text you point at, yet I 
joh. 10. 8.  doubt not but that every one, Christ excepted, hath been found in sin, and thereby more or less found to play the thief, and rob God of that glory of obedience which is due unto him.  
I doubt not but the Angel of the Lord that discomfited the army of Senacherib, might in like manner have smoked away the army of the Romans, yea and God might have done so to, even the one as well as the other, had it pleased him, without any prejudice to his justice. For if it be justly possible to him to pardon our sins, 'tis as justly possible to him to remove his judgements. And both Suarez and Vasquez, though opposite in some specialties about the justice of God, 
Disput. de just. Dei. In 7. disp. 86.  yet concurres in acknowledging that there is no justice in God in reference to his creature, but upon presupposition of his will. 'tis just with God to approve a merciless war. And 'tis as just with God to approve a merciful peace: neither is it disgraceful to God though by his long suffering and patience he gives space for repentance, although his goodness were despised unto the end.  
As many live prosperously in sinful courses unto the death and then obtain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an easy departure at last, as Guiccia●dine observes in the particular of Pope Alexander the sixth; and no marvel: for what is wanting in the condign vengeance in this life, God can and will supply to the full at the day of judgement. And the reason why God leaves some men's sins unrequited in this world, is out of a special providence, as Chrysostome hath observed of old, namely to this end, that we may entertain some conceit of a resurrection, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And though God doth not afflict them with outward terrors, yet he hath inward terrors enough to exercise the wicked, and to keep peace as far from them, as a guilty and tormenting conscience is near unto them, according to that of Solomon, The wicked flieth when no man pursueth him. The Deer when he is stricken, albeit Sylvas saltusque peragrat Dictaeos, yet, haeret lateri laetalis arunde. O what an uncomfortable sentence do you edge this Section withal; as if God's infinite power could not save them that stubbornly abandon the ways of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendered unto them? For consider, did you never abandon the ways of peace, or wilfully neglect saving health, lovingly tendered unto you? Were you never out of the state of grace? For Austin hath taught me, that Libertas sine gratia, non est libertas sed 
Aug. ep. 〈◊〉  contumatia. Or were you converted at the first, or second, or at the third sermon that you heard? Nay, when God's children are converted, do they not too often abandon the ways of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health? Did not David in the matter of Vriah and Bathsheba? Did not Solomon in his idolatry? Did not Manasses in his idolatrous fury, sealing it with blood? Saint Paul exhorts Timothy, to carry himself 
2 Tim. 2.  gently towards them without, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if at any time God give them repentance, implying manifestly, that God can at any time give repentance to any man if he will. Neither are we taught, that God hath denied possibility of renovation 
Heb. 4. 5. 〈◊〉  by repentance unto any, but such as sin the sin against the Holy Ghost.  
3 You say, it had been unjust with God to strike the men of Sodom with blindness, before lust had entered their eyes. A manifest untruth which yet you deliver, satis magistraliter, as a dictate without any reason to enforce it. In the ninth of john we read of one that was borne blind, is it not just with God to deal with any one so as he dealt with him? You will not deny I hope this work to have been the work of God; if you should, our Saviour would convict you of error, when he saith, that he was borne blind, to the 
joh. 9 3.  end the mighty work of God might be manifest in the curing of him. And this work to this end could be no others but God's work.  
I had thought, to have been borne blind had been a judgement, yet you make it to be a blessing, as whereby the Sodomites had been guarded from temptations. And indeed, lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes. Yet the Poet tells us also of one, 
Qui nunquam visae slagrabat amore p●ellae.   
So than it had been a mercy of God that their eyes had been pulled out of their heads in your divinity. I do not deny, but the greatest temporal blessings may be cursed unto 
Mal. 2. 2.  a man by the power of God, and the greatest temporal ●nrses, blessed unto him. But I never heard or read before, that blindness should be considered only as a mercy, and such a mercy as whereby we are guarded from temptation. But were a man never so lustful, yet I think in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eyes then to lose them, that so he might be partaker of God's word by private reading, which hath more power to his salvation, than the sight of any Cockatrices to his destruction.  
And if Democritus had been acquainted with this word of God, I do not believe he would have pulled out his eyes, in pretence as if they hindered his meditations. Alas, what had the Sodomites been the better for the blindness of their eyes, if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts? Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight, for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknown object. For a man can fancy him as he lusteth. Say rather, God could not in justice change their hearts, seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodness, and abused his long suffering and loving kindness.  
Yet this saying of yours should be far enough off from truth and sobriety? Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodness, and abused his long suffering? All out of the state of grace do so; for, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia. 
Aug. Ep. 89.  Yea and too often we do so in the state of grace also. Then again, a year before, this sin of the Sodomites was not so obstinate, less a year before that, and so the farther we descend to times passed, they were less and less obfirmate. Why did no● God then change their hearts; or if you will have this to be a fruit of mercy, why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keep them from these temptations? But you put it out of question, that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindness, did imply contradiction to his goodness, and eternal equity. A most unreasonable assertion. For I demand, Hath God prevented your wilful contempt of his goodness, yea or not? your abusing his long suffering and loving kindness, yea or not? If he hath not prevented it, then either yourself have prevented it without his grace, or you are guilty or have been guilty of wilful contempt of his goodness, and abusing his long suffering and loving kindness: which if it be so, what would become of you, if God should deal with you according to these immutable and eternal rules, according whereto you profess he deals with all? I persuade myself you have a good opinion of your own sufficiency to prevent these foul symptoms of humane corruption, otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning.  
The reason you give to enforce this assertion, is in part nothing for you, in part against you. For though all his ways are truth, yet this is nothing for you, unless you can prove that in such a state of sin as the Sodomites, God hath determined to use no effectual means to the curing of them. But how will you prove this? for hitherto you have not. You might as well say, God could not cure ●he sin of those jews, to whom our Saviour said, It shall be easier for Sodom and Gomorrah 
Mat. 10. 15  in the day of judgement, then for you: If this were granted you, yet herehence it follows only, that God cannot cure them, because he will not, for he hath determined the contrary. But you undertake to prove, that God cannot do it in point of justice, although he would do it out of his love to mankind.  
But when you say that all God's ways are mercy, that is directly rather against you then for you. For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sin, than not to pardon it: and withal we are given to understand, that as touching the execution hereof, God will have mercy on whom he will; and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he will.  
You talk after your fashion of an eternal rule of goodness appointing his justice to debar the fruits of his mercy. But you are a mere talker, and prove nothing. Who is not wilful in the state of nature in contemning God's goodness? Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit ex nolentibus volentes facere? Doth not Austin profess that God hath converted 
Ep. 107. add Vital.  not only aversos à vera fide, but adversus verae fidei voluntates also, and binds it with a Novimus, we know it to have been so. Was it not so in Saul? Doth not God profess of his wilful and stubborn people, that he will rule them with a mighty hand, and make them pass under the rod, and bring them under the bond of his covenant, Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first, some not till the last hour of the day?  
Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason, that because a creature cannot be impeccabilis from his creation, therefore God cannot cure men's wilfulness in the way of his mercy towards them, as you most incoherently discourse, as if you were in potting verses, rather than upon meditating a coherent and methodical course of argumentation: yet the maxim here mentioned, though brought in with some state of self conceit, is very preposterously contrived by you. We commonly say, a reasonable creature cannot be impeccabilis per naturam, uncapable of sin by nature; he may be impeccabilis per gratiam, uncapable of sin by grace, as the elect Angels are, elect men shall be in the state of glory: but of being so some while after the creation, and not immediately from the creation; of being so absolutely, and of being so not absolutely, I know no sobriety in these conceits, neither do I think you have any authority to countenance them. The Son of God I doubt not but you will confess that he was impeccabilis from the first: So might Angels have been, so might men have been by grace, had it so pleased God to make them; I see no reason to the contrary; yet had not this been absolutely impeccable, but merely upon the supposition of the will of God. Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present, such shall be ours in the world to come. God indeed without supposition, & out of his own absoluteness is no way obnoxious unto sin: If Angels are, or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition, it is and shall be by the mere will and good pleasure of God; whereby yet I mean not to exclude all second causes in the way of God's glorious qualification of our natures: And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certain manner, to wit, by way of reward of our obedience; therefore he could not make us immutable at first. For thus to discourse, is to profess that God could make them so upon supposition, to wit, upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability. And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable, but to prove that God could not make them impeccable only upon a certain supposition. Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse. If to decline to evil, implies no contradiction but only to omnipotent being, then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have, nor the Saints of God for the time to come, shall have any omnipotent being, it follows that to decline from evil is neither contradictory to the present state of the elect Angels, nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God: God is impeccabil●s per naturam, the creatures some are & others shall be impeccabilis per gratiam, & to decline to evil implieth contradiction to them both. To say that to decline to evil is possible to all creatures, is true only in men, in the confirmed Angels 'tis not true. It was once of them also I confess, but now it is not: It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven; it ever was false of the manhood of Christ, which yet was and is a creature, yet i● Christ as man more like to his Creator, than either Angel or any other Saint of God. If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evil, doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good, then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned, or else he was never truly and inherently good. Further, if the elect Angels from within few days after their creation have continued truly and inherently good, notwithstanding their impeccability, from that time forward, why they should not have been altogether as truly and inherently good, if their impeccability had begun a few days sooner, even with their creation, I see no reason. For did not God make them good, yea truly and inherently good? Surely he did; therefore if immediately they had been impeccable by grace, they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truly and inherently good: God's goodness is his happiness, this happiness of his being increate, cannot be communicated unto us subjectively, but objectively only.  
Yet there is a goodness created, called God's goodness, because it proceeds from God, which is our happiness of grace, shall be our happiness of glory, not the foundation of it, but it; save that the happiness of grace is the foundation of our happiness of glory, but to this manner of foundation you seem to have no reference.  
Neither is there any colour of reason to infer as you do, that therefore God's justice and loving kindness did remove all necessity from man's will, because that had utterly extinguished that goodness wherein only it was possible for the creature to express the Creator's goodness manifested in creation. And you may as well say, that Christ also might have sinned; for necessity to keep him from sin would have utterly extinguished that goodness, wherein only it was possible for his manhood (being a creature) to express his Creator's goodness manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Son of God. Nay the truth is, if from the beginning we had been necessarily inclined unto good, we had more lively expressed Gods goodness, than now we do being freely good. For God himself is good necessarily, not freely.  
It is a senseless speech to say that man's goodness expresseth God's goodness communicative: for man's goodness is 
Observe, communicative goodness is here taken for the goodness of God which is communicable, and opposed to God's good nesse incommunicable.  the very goodness communicative of God. For God's goodness communicative is no goodness formally in God; but God's formal goodness is uncreate, and therefore incommunicable unto creatures. Therefore it must be goodness create which is God's goodness communicative; and that is the very goodness of man itself. For God is the author of it, in genere causae efficientis. Create in me a new heart, and renew a right spirit within me. And therefore the distinction of the goodness of God communicative, and communicated is very absurd: like as your similitude resembling it to a seal, and the stamp thereof: Only the Son is the image and character of his Father, we are made after the image of God. His 
Psal. 51.  goodness increate is that which doth communicate goodness unto us in genere causae efficientis. And our goodness is the work of God's goodness. But no more proportion between them, than is between nature increate, and nature create. But it is your usual course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety.  
Yet you have found out a proportion between God's goodness and ours: but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented. For you compare Gods working freely with man's being freely, most incongruously. God communicates his goodness freely, that which duly answereth unto this, is man's communicating his goodness freely. But seeing Gods being good, is as a being necessarily, if God had made us to be good necessarily, that is impeccable by his grace, herein had we better expressed the manner of his goodness. And if otherwise we could not be like unto God, it follows that the Angels now for many thousand years have not been good like God, because they have been good by necessity, and not freely. So neither God's Saints in heaven are good like God, because they are good by necessity, and not freely. 'tis untrue which you add, that man could not be confirmed in such goodness as he had, or translated unto everlasting happiness, but by continuing freely good for some space. For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception, yet this never hindered his confirmation in his goodness, or translation to everlasting happiness. And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodness which man had from the beginning, even from the creation. For if God made him good and withal impeccable, how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein he was created? And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question, as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely. For I hope yourself will not deny, but that Christ was impeccable, and that what good soever he did, he did it freely: For like as the wicked, in state of nature, cannot but sin in general, that is one way or other; yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sin, therefore there is no particular evil that they do, but they do it freely: In like sort though Christ could not but do good in general, so that whatsoever he did should be good; yet seeing he was not necessitated to any particular good, therefore what good in particular soever he did, did it freely. So do the Angels, so shall we in the kingdom of heaven.  
Hitherto under colour of consequence, which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence, you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand, (to wit, of God's obligement in justice to make men taste of the fruits of his mercy, after their wilful contemning of it) into an alien matter far removed, touching impeccability.  
Now you seem to return to your former discourse, but in such a manner, as if you meant utterly to overthrow it: for here you give us to understand, that so long as man doth less evil than he might do, he may be confirmed in goodness, and translated unto happiness. Now I pray, as bad as the Sodomites were, yet were they not less evil than they might be? For if God had suffered them longer, and left them destitute of his grace, had they not profited in pejus, growing worse and worse? And yet I confess hereupon to be confirmed in no better goodness than they had, had not been much, seeing this their goodness had been never a whit: but you say not only this, that they that do less evil than they might, may hereupon not only be confirmed in that goodness which they have (which may be very far off from any goodness at all) but also translated to everlasting happiness. Since man's fall (you say) we are not capable of mercy, but by free abstinence from some evils.  
Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evils, be of grace or no? If of grace, whether this grace be not a fruit of mercy? If so, than it appears that before we abstain from any evil, we are capable of mercy, thereby to obtain grace, to abstain from evil.  
I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life, but only the state of sinning against the holy Ghost. I do not like your distinction of doing good, and doing it naughtily; for, whatsoever we do naughtily, therein we cannot be said to do good, but evil rather: for therein we sin, and in sinning we do not any good, but evil rather. Yet I confess, we may be said to do good imperfectly, but not naughtily in my judgement. Though we do both less evil, and the good that we do less naughtily then possibly we might do, God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us. I profess at first sight, I took this to be a notorious untruth, but when I considered a claw of your sentence, which is this, less evil than possibly we might do. I reverse my judgement, and find it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit, though in the way of truth. For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible. For how is it possible that a man can do at once all the evil that he can do? Now if he doth not do all the evil that possibly he can do, there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations, and he need not fear lest God proceed to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him. And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst, for certainly they had not done all the evil that possibly they might do. Now it was well worth the having, to hear you explain unto us, what you understand by the influence of God's gracious providence, which you say God restrains, and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickedness to another, suffering the reins of our unruly appetites to be given into our u●ieldie hands. Here be good phrases, which if you would be pleased to interpret unto us in plain terms, I doubt not but we should find good matter to work upon.  
But to the comfort of all profane persons be it spoken, God doth never deal thus with any by your computation, but such as have done as much evil as possibly they can do. To be capable of well doing is to be capable of God's mercy, and you have already told us to our comfort, that to do less evil than possibly we can do, doth make us capable of God's mercy; yet here you say, this cannot be done without God's love and favour. Now to my judgement, no person is so profane or impious, but that he doth less evil than possibly he might do; whence it followeth, that to this state of impiety considered as less than possibly might be, he is arrived through the love and favour of God. Yet what you mean by the love and favour of God I know not, and throughout I find cause to doubt, that you mean nothing less than to advance the honour of God's grace, but only your scope to advance the power of man's free will.  
And I wonder you consider not how you interfere, and cross your own shins in your discourse, when you conceive the love and favour of God as a means to make us capable of the mercy of God; you might as well say, that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy: for love and favour showed unto him that is in misery, is in the way of mercy. So when you make a great difference between withdrawing a man's self from the extremities of mischief, and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing, you contradict yourself: for to do less evil than possibly might be, what is it other, then to withdraw from extremities of mischief? yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing, as you have signified in this very page more than once, as namely, both in the first sentence, and in the third, yet this is wild enough to say, A man must do good to make himself capable of well doing. By the sentence following it seems that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing, is to repent, and this you say cannot be done without the attractions of infinite love; yet usually you make a work of nature to be a preparation to grace, and sometimes you call that work of nature humility, sometimes the doing of less evil than we might do. And what you mean by the attractions of infinite love, I know not, for you make it incident to men without the Church, who are not so much as drawn hereunto by the word, so that, as it seems, it can be no other than God's patience in sparing them, and so leading them to repentance, that you mean in this place.  
Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast yourself, while you make show to honour the grace of God; as namely, when you say, since Adam's fall, our love to sinful pleasures is so strong, that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love, implying thereby that before Adam's fall, we could repent without infinite attractions of love. But I pray consider, what need was there of repentance before Adam's fall? Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and undefiled nature, could he perform without special grace? Yes you think he could: this is a bit you can swallow easily, and digest with as great facility.  
And so belike your opinion is of the Angels, to wit, that the good Angels stood by the mere freedom of their own wills, having no other adjutorium gratiae than the reprobate Angels had: directly against Austin de Civitate Dei, l. 12. c. 9 You begin to discover the mystery of your meaning, when you say, that Many whom this infinite love doth daily embrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it, to true repentance. So then the attractions of Gods infinite love are the causa sine qua non, but what is the cause, qua posita ponitur effectus? O this is our apprehending of it. And I pray what style do the learned give to that causa sine qua non? do they not commonly account it causam fatuam? So than you make show to magnify the attractions of God's love, and the efficacy thereof, but 'tis only in a fatuous manner, and you make but a fatuous efficacy thereof: but man's will alone, in the apprehending of it, hath the true efficacy of repentance in the course of your Divinity. Now I pray what is this love you speak of, and what manner of attraction is it, and wherein doth it consist? and how are we said to apprehend it? and wherein doth that consist? By the place alleged out of Rom. 2. 4. you signify that this love of God is no other than that goodness whereby he leadeth unto repentance, and that goodness there mentioned seems to be no other than God's forbearance and long suffering. Call you this the attractions of his infinite love? Yet notwithstanding Austin was bold to profess, Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nis● Deus dederit quis 
Cont. jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.  aget poenitentiam? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except God gives repentance? your present discourse preacheth unto us another doctrine, to this effect; Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisi homo apprehenderit quis aget poenitentiam? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except he apprehends it? And I pray what is it to apprehend God's patience, or his leading of us to repentance by his goodness and patience? Can it be any thing else then the taking of the opportunity offered, and to repent indeed?  
So then your meaning is this in plain terms, Many whom this infinite love of God doth embrace, (to wit, in leading them by his goodness and patience unto repentance) yet are never brought by the attraction of it to true repentance, and all because they do not apprehend it, that is, because they do not repent.  
Is not this issue of your discourse very grave and Theological? yet when you say the reason why by this love they are not brought to repentance, is because they do not apprehend it, you seem to imply that they may apprehend it if they will. Yet because the Text alleged by you is expressly against this, therefore you are contont to nick your former assertion your self, with a cross blow, that so yourself may have the first credit of contradicting and confuting yourself, as when you say, of whom speaks he thus, of such only as truly repent? A mad question as ever was proposed, as if there were any colour that the Apostle should say of them that repent, that they despise the riches of God's goodness, leading them to repentance; yet that you may have some matter to work upon, having erected an enemy of straw, you foil him most valiantly, by answering, Nay, but of them who for hardness of heart cannot repent. Not considering how fond herein you contradict yourself. Nay by the way I note an aknowledgement of yours, to wit, that a man may despise the goodness of God leading him to repentance, though through the hardness of his heart he cannot repent at all.  
4. You demand in the next place, whether the riches of God's bounty were feigned, or whether he did only proffer, but not purpose to draw them to repentance which repented not? I answer, it was not feigned, neither do I find any thing that he proffered at all in this passage of the Apostles. But that this is a mere fiction of yours, ut recto stet fabula talo, and that he did truly draw them to repentance; but how? as by patience and long-suffering he may be said to draw them, and no other goodness of God drawing them to repentance is mentioned in this place. Like as opportunity is said to draw and invite men to the doing of something in season.  
In like sort the judgements of God invite unto repentance, the mercies of God provoke unto▪ obedience, to thankfulness. But yet Austin was bold to say, Quantamlibet praebuerit 
Cont. jul. 〈◊〉 Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.  patientiam nisi Deus dederit, quis aget poenitentiam? So that this is a tacit exhortation and invitation to repentance by God's works. And much inferior to the power of the exhortations of his word: yet God doth exhort by the ministry of his word, many whose hearts notwithstanding he hardeneth. As is apparent in sending unto Pharaoh, and commanding him to let Israel go; yet withal made known to Moses, that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let Israel go.  
And dare you profess this course of his, so plainly testified in holy Scripture, to be no part of God's protection, no fruit of that wisdom which is from above, but a point of earthly policy devoid of honesty, a mere trick of worldly wit, to whose practice nothing but weakness and impotency to accomplish great designs, can misincline man's corrupted nature? And the truth is, in this course of God nothing is proffered at all, but only something suspended, to wit, the execution of just vengeance. In his word something is proffered, but what is that? Not repentance, as you misconceive, that rather is required and commanded only upon repentance, remission of sins, and salvation is proffered. And if repentance were proffered, I pray upon what terms? you will say, in case they would apprehend it. This have I already showed to be all one, as if you should say, In case they did repent; and of the sobriety hereof let any man judge.  
Again, you profess that this is proffered to such men as through the hardness of their hearts cannot repent, and judge whether the same incongruities which you charge upon our Tenet, are upon any other ground then this, and while you maintain this, whether they do not reflect upon your Tenet also.  
Now on the contrary, whereas we object against you, that if God willeth, and so ardently as you speak, that all men should repent and be saved, how comes it to pass that they do not repent? Considering that the Apostle professeth that God's will cannot be resisted, and that it manifestly implies an impotency or weakness in God, in not being able to bring to pass what he so ardently desires. Now to the latter objection of these, you answer, by denial that it implieth any such impotency in God; yet Austin long ago did acknowledge this consequence, Enchirid. 96. Deo quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatur, ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium, qua consitemur in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere. Neque veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest; nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur effectus. Et cap. 27. In caelo & in terra non quaedam voluit & fecit: quaedam vero voluit & non fecit, sed omnia quaecunque voluit fecit. Et cap. 98. Quis porro tam impii desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere.  
And whereas you say, that man is not capable of endless joys, unless he will be wrought by mere love, without the impulsions of unresistible power to love him, to love God, the same infinite love which draws him unto repentance in congruity leaving a possibility not to be drawn by it: This is a notorious untruth. For was there any possibility in Christ to sin, or not to be drawn to that which was good? I think you will not avouch it: And was he not therefore capable of endless joys? And if Gods will be unresistible, as the Apostle plainly testifieth, shall not the operation whereby his will is accomplished, be irresistible? And shall such a bugbear deter us from acknowledging God to be the author of repentance? and move us to give the glory thereof to the will of man, who through the hardness of his heart cannot repent, as the Apostle speaketh.  
Again, the Scripture testifieth that whatsoever God willeth, that he doth both in heaven and earth; whether it be by power resistible or unresistible is nothing to the purpose. But you maintain, that what God ardently willeth, is not brought to pass, by reason that man willeth not. Neither do w●e maintain, that God in working whom he will unto repentance, doth do this by bereaving man of power to resist, (which alone denominates the operation of God irresistible) but only by taking away the will of resisting, while ex nolentibus volentes facit. And consequently we say not, that God takes away all possibility of refusing to be drawn by it. For we maintain that God brings to pass contingent things contingently, that is, with a possibility to the contrary; though supposing Gods will to the contrary, this possibility shall not be actuated. And so when God works a man to faith and to repentance, nullum humanum resistit arbitrium, No man's will resists; and that the grace which God gives, a nullo duro cord respuitur, is refused by no hard heart. So that all this is done without all coaction. For neither can the will be constrained, and God in making men volentes ex nolentibus, cannot without great absurdity be said to constrain them, as you would fain insinuate, having no sound argument for it, but such poor tricks to serve your turn withal.  
And when God promiseth to circumcise the hearts of his people, and thereby to make them love the Lord their God with all their heart, and with all their soul, he doth not say he will constrain them to repent, Deut. 30. 6. So when he promiseth to take away their stony heart, and give them an heart of flesh, and put his own Spirit within them, and cause them to walk in his statutes and judgements, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 27. he doth not signify that he will constrain them. For God can change any man's will without constraining. Nay in making them willing, it is contradiction to say he doth constrain them to be willing: for constraint is against the will: but it is impossible a man should be willing against his will; yet this you obtrude upon your adversaries, as though they maintained that God by his power did make them repent against their wills.  
Neither yet can we like that other extreme which you approve, that men must first be brought to a willingness, and then God makes them repent. For to will to repent, is to repent; for repentance is the very change of the will. Neither can you in any sober manner expound unto us, how God is said to make men repent after they are made willing hereunto. And yet the very will to repent is the work of God, as who it is that worketh in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure, Philip. 2. 13. not by such attractions only you speak of, though you are loath to betray your Pelagian Tenet, though you express the threatening of judgement and thereby imply what you mean by attraction of love, to wit, the promises of reward.  
Now this apparently is not to work it: for this is only suadere, and suadere is not to work it. And the case is clear, even by your opinion, that God doth not work it, as oft as he doth exhort unto it, which yet he should, if suadere and hortari thereunto were to work it. And indeed suadere & hortari ut resipiscamus; is only to exhort and persuade, that we would work ourselves unto repentance: And in this sense to interpret S. Paul, where he saith, God works in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure, was of old the practice of the Pelagians, as S. Austin hath discovered long ago, the great. Christi cont. Pelag. & Calest. cap. 10. For thus Pelagius played the commentator upon S. Paul: Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos mutorum more animalium tantummodo praesentia diligentes, futurae gloriae magnitudine & praemiorum pollicitatione succendit; dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium sui stupentem suscitat voluntatem; dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est. And therefore he urgeth Pelagius to confess another manner of grace then this, if he will be accounted a Christian: Ibid cap. 11. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur, qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur us speratur. Nec solum revelatur sapientia verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, sed & persuadetur: han● debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri, si vult non modo vocari, sed & esse Christianus.  
And thus to circumcise our hearts in causing us to love him, and to walk in his ways, and to keep his statutes and judgements, and to do them; this I hope is not to strangle us, yet here is no violent operation in all this. For, Dum non mod●versas à vera side, sed adversas verae fidei voluntates convertit & ex volentibus nolentes facit: it is so far from violence, that the will rejoiceth that God hath thus reform it; we do but as Scriptures teach, when we make the work of faith a work of power, 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a work of power? and is not the work of grace such a work, Eph. 2. 2?  
But you do ill, under colour of magnifying the love of God, to dishonour both his love and his power; his love, in confining it only to promises, and threatenings, as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance; his power, in denying that God brings to pass those things which he desires to bring to pass, and that ardently. And this latter is Augustine's objection as well as ours; and he makes the former to be mere Pelagianisme, as wel'l as we do.  
In the next place you tell us, We are to believe that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him; but constrains no man's will to love him. But doth he make man's will to love him without constraint? why did you not express your mind on this point? you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory; but I do not find you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodness, the author and finisher of our faith, of our repentance, of our obedience. Did you acknowledge this, there should be no difference between us. For we do not affirm that he works faith and repentance in us, by way of constraint. And when the Apostle prayeth that God would work in the Hebrews, 
Heb. 13. 21.  that which was pleasing in his sight; you shall never find in any of our Divines, that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was, that he would constrain them to do that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: I know no power in God but infinite, and seeing what work soever he works, is by the exercise of his power, it cannot be denied, but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite.  
Again, is man or Angel able to circumcise our hearts, so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts; It is not, as I presume you will confess; why then shall not this work of God's love in circumcising our hearts, and making us to love him, be accounted a work of power infinite? And Austin diverse times professeth, that God doth convert our hearts, omnipotenti facilitate, by an almighty facility, and when God regenerates us he quickeneth us and raiseth us from death to life, Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform, us as it were of beasts to make us become men, Esay 9 and how can this be wrought by less than power infinite, as when Bernard confesseth of God saying, Bern●n circumcis. Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum. As for God's power to the immediate parent of our love to God, it is no article of our Creed, but a 
Deut. 30, 〈◊〉  trick of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your own cause seem plausible: we rather conceive God's grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts, whereby we are brought to love him. Neither do we say, that he works in us the love of himself immediately, but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us, according to that of john, 1 joh. 3. 19 We love him, because he loved us first; and to that of S. Paul, The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience, and faith unfeigned, 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God, do I acknowledge to be sown in our soul.  
Yet I doubt you refer this to a seed of nature, and not to a seed of grace, though you do not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly, as it were fit you should. And no marvel. For they which do evil hate the light. As for constraint; 
joh. 3. 2●▪  we hold that infinite power cannot so work the will: Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of men's lusts upon them, and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained.  
As for the will, that non potest cogi, cannot be constrained: And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity, whereof others do not, should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxim as this: though I confess your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game; for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceit, as if they maintained, that the will of man may be constrained: yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him, would this breed in God a loathing of him? Thus the foul and uncivil resemblance you make transports you. Yet I have read, My soul loathed them, and their soul abhorred me: but I never heard the contrary, My soul loathed them, 
Zach. 11. 〈◊〉  and their soul loved me: for while we abhor God, as enemies unto him, yet notwithstanding even then he loved us, Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love, will he continue to love us, and not turn his love into loathing; as men's lusts turn into loathing sometimes, as being satisfied, and disdaining to be scorned by them, whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts, yet could not win their loves.  
But God never makes us unwillingly to love him (it is a thing impossible) but as Austin saith, Ex nolentibus volentes facit. 'tis true, God loves a cheerful giver, but who makes this cheerfulness but God? and whose works is it fit he should love but his own? Like as it is said of him, that Cor●nat non merit a nostra sed donasua, he crownes not our works, but his own: And where there is a willing mind, there it is accepted, not according to that which a man hath not, but to that which he hath: but whose work is this willing mind? Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deed? And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us, but makes us willing, and ready, and cheerful in the performing of it, not only in the way of doing what he commandeth, but in suffering what he inflicteth, or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us. In so much that the Apostles rejoiced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevail to work his child to dutifulness, though with much a do, yet in the end masters his stubbornness, will he love his child, or his obedience, or dutifulness the worse for this: yet God more effectually, and with a great deal more case changeth our hearts, even omnipotent facilitate, as Austin speaketh, and shall he love our obedience, our thankfulness, our repentance the less for this?  
5 Now we are like to receive something concerning the main problem, to wit, In what sense God may be said to do all that he can for his vineyard: All this while you have been as it were in trimming your instrument, and it seems not to be yet in tune: the first music is so harsh, and without all harmony, I cannot devise a construction thereof to carry any tolerable sense. But the sentence following seems to be of the same nature: where you call that Revenue, which before you called Charge very incongruously, as if a man's revenues were a burden unto him, whereof he did exonerate himself. Or if it be spoken of Bursers' accounts in Colleges, the incomes are not to them that are charged, and put to exonerate themselves, but to the Colleges; this at the best is but a gambol, le's come to the naked truth. Though man's love to his dearest friend, be in respect of God's love to us, but saint, and his power small, yet because his love to justice is much less, he● ofttimes effects that for his temporal good, which God, though infinite in power doth not effect for those whom he infinitely loves. I think I may be bold to say that this is infinitely false: God loved jacob, and hated Esau: now all whom God hates as he hated Esau, he damns; and all those whom he loves as he loved jacob, he saves; yet this love was but infinite: and what love of man or Angel, vicious or virtuous, can effect the like? Yet God blessed both Esau and Ishmael with temporal blessings; and what friend by good courses or lewd courses was able to equal it? what creature can equal that temporal good that God affords to any reprobate? for he gives him his being and all that he enjoys; nay, what man or Angel can do aught for him, in the effecting whereof, God hath not a greater hand than the man or Angel himself? Yet you suppose that God infinitely loves the very reprobates. It is familiar with you to suppose, that God loved Esau, and that infinitely, of whom the Scripture professeth, that God hated him. Your suppositions are fat and well fed, but your arguments are more lean and ill favoured then the lean kine of Pharaoh.  
Yet I will be content to help you a little in the way of argument: God's love, saith Aquinas, is in respect of designing some good to his creature; now God doth will temporal good to the very reprobates, and that in such a manner as cannot be supplied unto them but by power infinite.  
In no other sense do I find, that it may be tolerably avouched, that God loves them infinitely, though you are pleased to suppose it often.  
It is untrue, that his grants made to man, must undergo the examination of justice; for it is law full for him to do what he will with his own, to bestow being, and gracious being, and consequently glorious being on whom he will; for both grace and glory is executed on man in the way of mercy, and he hath mercy on whom he will. And though he hath revealed unto us by what rules he will proceed in pronouncing the sentence of salvation, or condemnation, yet hath he revealed unto us no rules, according whereunto he proceedeth in giving grace unto some, and denying grace unto others. And both Suarez and Vasquez (though opposite in other points about the justice of God) concurrently profess, that there is no justice in God towards man, but upon presuposition of his will.  
And those unchangeable rules you speak of, for confining God in the execution of his power, according to his gracious will, are like Castles in the air that have no foundations, and fit for nothing but to discover the new world in the Moon, and to ease the man there of his burden, that traveled so long with a bush at his back: God may convert whom he will, and consequently save whom he will, as the Holy Ghost teacheth us; this is no fiction, Quis porro, saith 
Enchirid. cap. 98.  Austin, tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? Who doth so impiously dote as to say, that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, whom he will, when he will, and where he will. Yet you say as much as this comes to, when you tell us of unchangeable rules of justice, restraining God from converting and changing the hearts of men, without all fear of imputation, either of dotage or impiety: God you say loves justice more than mankind: God loves himself better than he loves mankind, or all his creatures; for he made all things for himself, Prov. 16. 4. But as for any justice in God that limits his will, I know none, neither are you able to prove any as I am verily persuaded. What you have hitherto delivered, I think I have not suffered in any material part to pass unsaluted, unanswered.   

CHAP. XVII.  
The truth and ardency of God's love unto such as perish, justified by our Saviour, and S. Paul.  
I Would your propositions were only paradoxes; but indeed, we have weighed them in the balance, and found them plain untruths; yet what those propositions are which you intimate when you say, These are no paradoxes, but plain truth, I am to seek; neither can I tell whereto to refer it, but to a point which you aim at and insinuate rather than express, as if you feared plain dealing most. For, that which you undertook to show in the former Chapter, was only this, In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could do for his vineyard: yet your ensuing discourse throughout hath very little correspondency thereunto. But the point you aim at is to persuade, that God doth all that he could do for all reprobates, and that he doth as much for them as for his elect, and the difference between the elect and reprobates, ariseth rather from their free wills, then from any different dispensation of God's providence, in giving that grace unto the one which he denies unto the other. A most foul opinion, and therefore no marvel if you are content to travail long in the delivery of such a monster, and seem to desire that your Readers forwardness in understanding your meaning, should deliver you thereof, and if his propitious affections should be as ready to embrace it upon your weak suggestions, the whole business shall be very preposterously carried.  
Yet unless this conceit of yours be admitted, you tell us, We shall hardly find any true sense or good meaning in God's protestations of sorrows for his people's plagues, or in his expostulations of their unthankfulness, or in his kind invitations of them to repentance which never repent, or in his tender proffer of salvation to those that perish.  
Whensoever you shall charge us with any of these like places; if a true sense and good meaning of them shall be found by us, though hardly, without the acknowledgement of your foul Tenets, we shall not fail to obtain wherewithal to answer you.  
Certainly, sorrow is not incident to God, no not for the plagues of his elect, and therefore cannot be attributed unto him but, per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by conformity to the nature of man. Sorrow may be incident unto Christ, for he was man as well as God; and so man is subject to the law of God, which commands us to love our neighbour as ourself, and who is to be accounted our neighbour, himself hath taught us in the parable of a certain man that descended from jerusalem to jericho, by the way as he went fell into the hands of thiefs; and a fruit of this love is well known to be compassion, whereby we rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep; yea, weep for them who weep not for themselves.  
And yet it is very strange to infer, that because God's sorrows for his people's plagues, doth infer that he hath done all that he can for his people, therefore God hath done all that he can do for them that perish. Or, because God doth expostulate with his people for their unthankfulness, therefore he doth all he can do for the salvation not only of his people, but of them that perish also. But it is true, in the ministry of the word, he invites them to repentance that do not repent.  
And it is as true, that if this be required to the doing of all that he can do for the salvation of them that perish, than many thousands perish, for whose salvation God doth not all he can do. For many thousands have perished that never enjoyed the ministry of the word to bring them to repentance. They indeed that live within the precincts of God's sanctuary enjoy this benefit, though many thousands of them perish. Neither doth it follow, that because God invites them to repentance, he doth all he can do for their salvation: For if it pleased him, he could not only invite them to repentance, but give them repentance, 2 Tim. 2. last, and Act. 5. 35. and Act. 11. and the 18. And as Austin saith, Quantamlibot Deus 
Cont. jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.  praebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam; so may I say, Quantumlibet Deus invitaverit ad rescipiscendum nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam. And as Austin in the same place professeth of such as God hath not predestinate, whether out of the Church or in the Church, Istarum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illud ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat.  
And consequently though he proffereth salvation upon condition of faith and repentance (for no otherwise doth he proffer it to any) unto some of those that perish; yet herehence it followeth not, First that he proffereth this unto all that perish; or secondly, in proffering it to any that perish, he doth all that he could do for the salvation of them that perish, as when he saith, Esa. 65. 2. I have spread out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people which walk in a way that was not good; and herehence it followeth not, that he did all that he could do for their salvation: For this signifieth only his invitation of them, and readiness to embrace them upon their repentance, and complaint of the hardness of their heart in not repenting.  
But God could do more than this, he could take away their stony heart, and give them an heart of flesh, and put his own Spirit within them, and cause them towalke in his statutes, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 27. And therefore it is a very vain discourse of yours, when you say, The unremovable rules of eternal equity, will not suffer him to stretch out his hand any further than he doth towards the sons of men: for it is apparent that he doth stretch them further, to as many as in the course of his loving kindness he doth convert; and thus far he doth stretch them out to as many as he transports into the land of promise, as yourself confess.  
But whereas you say, The measure of their iniquity being accomplished, is an obstacle to God, as whom his justice in this case will not suffer to stretch them out so far any longer; this is one of the articles of your creed, besides all text of Scripture, or Christian reason: for God calls some even at the last hour of the day, as the Gospel preacheth in the parable of the labourers hired into the vineyard, end in the example of the thief upon the cross, & the example of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 2. sc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if at any time God may give them repentance: and the ancient saying is, inter pontem & fontem. And S. Augustine counts it impiety and madness to think otherwise, Enchir. 98. Quis porro tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? And the order of our Church in visiting the sick doth justify this, in urging us to visit all, to invite all to repentance, even to the last gasp. saving that indeed no man's iniquity is at full till his death, and after death no calling to repentance; for the wicked immediately upon their death are carried into hell, as Dives was; and, Ex inferno nulla redemptio, out of hell no redemption. At you say, that with sorrow he doth withdraw his hands, so you may with as good sobriety say, that with soraow he doth punish the reprobate men and Angels with eternal fire, and directly contrary to Scripture phrase, Prov. 1. 24. Because I have called and you refused: I have stretched out mine hand and none will regard: 26. I will also laugh at your destruction, and mock when your fear cometh.  
As for the love of God in stretching out his hands, I deny it not, because to stretch out his hands in inviting unto repentance, is a special favour which God denies to many thousands, and such as whereby many a reprobate may and doth profit, ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitiùs puniantur, to an outward emendation of their lives, that they may be punished more mildly.  
But you make this love to reprobates equal to the love of God towards his elect; for you maintain, that God doth as much as he can do for the salvation of the reprobates. And it it apparent, he doth no more for the salvation of his elect. Now this is an abominable opinion. And the stranger is God's mercy in electing you (whereof as I have read in some of your writings you make no doubt) when you think you are not bound to render him more thanks for his goodness towards you then a reprobate is: but though yet you do not, you may do ere you die, and be pulled out of this abominable opinion of yours, as out of the fire with fear. For as Paul was a chosen vessel of God, though for a while he persecuted the 
Act. 9 15:  truth of God, even unto blood, so may you be not withstanding your impugning of it, though in a milder manner I confess: for your impugnation is not like to do any great harm save only to yourself.  
Our Saviour was the Son of man as well as he was the Son of God, and made under the law, and therefore was 
Gal. 4. 4●  bound to be as compassionate to his people as jeremy was, jer. 13. 17. But if you will not hear this, my soul shall weep in secret for your pride, and mine eye shall weep and drop down tears, because the Lord's flock is carried away captive: So our Saviour wept over jerusalem, saying, If thou hadst known even then a● the least in this thy day the things which belong unto thy peace, but now they are hid from thine eyes. Luk. 19 42. You ask, whether he spoke this as man, or whether the spirit doth not say the same? and I ask whether your wits were your own when you made such a question? Who could weep and speak but man, and how could man weep or speak this but as man? Hath God any heart to be filled with woe, or eyes to be filled with tears? yet the Spirit moved him to speak this.  
So if any Prophet had said it, as he might have said it, the Spirit of God had moved him hereunto. And when jeremy said, My soul shall weep in secret for your pride, and mine eye shall drop down tears, the Spirit of God moved him to utter this, for, Holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the holy Ghost, 2 Pet. 1. 21. The truth is, the words are congruous to him, both as God, and as man, but the sorrow of heart, and tears of eyes wherewith it was uttered, are only agreeable to the nature of man.  
How do you prove, that he that spoke this, spoke nothing but words of Spirit and life; because our Saviour saith, joh. 6. 63 It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing, the words that I speak unto you are spirit and life: will it therefore follow that all that he spoke was spirit and life? Suppose it were so, would it herehence follow, that these words were not spoken by him as man? Then belike, when he said I thirst, this also being words of Spirit and life (as it needs must if all that he spoke were spirit and life) he spoke not this as man likewise when he said, My soul is heavy unto death, and on the cross, My God my God why hast thou forsaken me, these words were not his words as he was man: and though he spoke nothing, but what the Father gave him in commandment to speak, yet herehence it followeth not, that therefore he spoke them not as man. For by just proportion of reason, if this were admitted, it would follow, that he spoke nothing as man; no not that, I have desired to eat this Passeover with you; nor that, How was it that he sought after me, wist he not that I must go about my Father's business? nor that, My Father is greater than I,  
'tis true, His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards them in exact conformity, not so much to the love of God (as you discourse at pleasure, according to your own extravagant conceits of the love of God, equally extended to the elect and reprobate) as to the will of God: for, being made under the law, he was bound to the like compassion & commiseration, as to pray for his persecutors, so to mourn for the judgements of God upon his brethren, according to the flesh: yet one word by the way concerning this, Was the measure of jerusalem's iniquity at this time filled up, or no? It seems it should be so in your computation; for now it's said, The things that belonged unto their peace, were now hid from their eyes; When should the door of repentance be shut upon them, if not at such a time, and in such a case as this? If so, then by your own doctrine, God's love ceaseth towards them, as but in the former sentence you signified; & consequently Christ's love and compassion should cease also, if it were but in conformity to God's love; but rather it was in conformity to God's law, as I have showed; God the Father having made him in subjection to the law, and consequently was he bound to mourn for them, as well as to pray for them: for he was by virtue of the law to love his neighbour as himself. This incongruity (as it seems) of yours you observed, and therefore as I guess, you added, that his bowels of compassion were restrained also, by the same conformity, and though you tell us, that from different motions and distractions, occasioned from the indissolvable union of his divisible soul (this is your own language) with these two attributes of the indivisible nature (to wit, love and justice) his tears were squeized out.  
Yet neither do you tell us how his bowels of compassion were restrained, or wherein; neither do you make known unto us what these different motions and distractions in our Saviour were: Neither doth the story of the Gospel afford us any discovery of any such different motions & distractions you talk of: But to the end he continued in his bowels of compassion towards them, as it appears by his prayers for them upon the cross: for indeed, his first coming was not 
joh. 12. 47  to condemn the world, but to save the world. But in the old Testament, God himself, as God, expresseth his desires of his people's obedience; O that my people had harkened unto me. This you will have to be understood in proper speech: Piscator by a figure of speech, Talis optatio, saith he, Deotribuitur per anthropopathiam. Utri creditis. With Piscator concurreth junius also. And we have reason for it, because whatsoever God wills, that brings he to pass both in heaven and earth; how 
Ps. 135. 6.  much more what he desires, and that ardently. Yet you keep your course contrary to reason and authority, in attributing desires unto God, of such things which never come to pass, which Austin long ago professed to be all one with the denying of God's omnipotency.  
And not content with this, you most ridiculously contradict yourself, and call it also an unquenchable desire, whereas yourself have often professed, that the filling up the measure of man's iniquity doth quench this desire in God; thereby making God not only impotent, but mutable also.  
Israel might have truly said, Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord embraced me? But what Israel? even the true Israel of God we say: but the true Israel of God cannot say so, the elect of God cannot say so according to your Tenet, for as much as you make the love of God towards reprobates to be as great as the love of God towards the elect, yet as if you strained your words, you call it the excessive fervency of his loving kindness, to wit, even towards them that perish: and add by way of Parenthesis, that Gods will is infinite, as if you had a mind to infer thereby, that his love towards them were infinite.  
Now of God's infinite will I never heard before: his power we say is infinite, because he can do every thing that is possible to be done, his knowledge is infinite because he knows all things that may be known, but God doth not will all things that may be willed by him: Nay, his power receives limitation and restriction by his will, as touching the execution thereof; for he doth no more than what he will. Likewise we say God's love is infinite in the way of extension, for it neither had beginning, neither shall it have end. But such is not God's love towards them that perish, for it ceaseth by your doctrine when the measure of their iniquity is filled up: but such as it is, you say, it layeth no necessity upon their wills. A most ridiculous speech, as much as to say, it doth not make men repent necessarily; whereas concerning them that perish, it is apparent that it neither makes them repent necessarily; nor contingently.  
And as for the elect, he gives them repentance, which he doth not to the reprobates; as Austin long ago professed, Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam 
Cont. jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.  qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorem patientiam sive non imparem praebeat. Nyither do we say, that to whom God gives repentance, he gives obedience, he makes them to repent necessarily, to obey necessarily, but freely. For it is manifest that grace takes not away the power of disobedience, but only prevents the act of disobedience, and that not in all particulars neither: for the children of God sin too often. And as for those which want this grace which God bestows on his elect, they have not only liberty left them unto sin, but also this liberty turns into wilfulness, according to that of Austin, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace is not liberty but wilfulness. 
Ep. 89.   
But yet we say upon supposition, that God will give any man repentance and that at such a time. that man shall repent at such a time; and 'tis impossible he should not repent; yet in repenting he shall repent freely, and not necessarily Like as God ordaining Christ's bones should not be broken, upon this supposition it was impossible it should be otherwise, albeit the soldiers abstained from breaking of his bones, not necessarily, but deliberately and freely. It is true the Lord saith, Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it: but his people would not hearken unto his voice.  
And now the question is only as touching their obedience, whether God did any otherwise will that, then by commanding it in respect of those that perish; we say he did only command it in respect of such, we say he did not resolve to give them repentance, to give them obedience, though he could have done this, and doth do this unto his elect, making 
Ezech. 20. 37.  them to pass under the rod, and bringing them under the bond of the covenant, not only seeing their ways, but healing them also; 
Esa. 57 1● Host 14. 5. Mic. 7. 19 Rom. 16. 7 Act. 26. 18 Eph. 2. 2. Psal. 51.  healing their rebellions, and subduing their iniquities, and treading Satan under their feet: opening their eyes, and bringing them out of darkness into light, and from the power of Satan unto God, quickening them when they were dead in trespasses and sins, creating a new heart, and renewing a right spirit within them: Do you but acknowledge this, as you must unless you will renounce the Scriptures, and we will never quarrel with you for saying, God doth all this contingently, and not necessarily.  
2 The Apostles move a question to our Saviour concerning him that was borne blind, joh. 9 whether he had sinned or his fathers, that he was horn blind, this was in respect of judgement corporal, you apply this to a judgement spiritual; that judgement was positive to be bereft of sight, which in course of nature is otherwise then only permissive, in suffering them to be such as he found them. That was spoken in respect of some not common, but extraordinary sin: for though there be sin common unto all, yet this judgement is not; and therefore they might well think, if sin were the cause, it must be some extraordinary sin, but our Saviour signifieth, that it befell him in the course of God's providence, not so much in respect of sin, as in respect of a certain end whereto God had ordained it. But I hope neither the Apostles, nor any sober man would imagine that some extraordinary sin was required unto this, that God should leave men as he finds them, without bestowing some supernatural grace upon them.  
And in despite of sin, God doth afford this grace to many thousands: for God hath mercy on whom he will; like as 
Rom. 9 18  on the other side, in despite of men's civility, and natural morality, whom he will he hardeneth. Yet to the question by you proposed at pleasure you make no answer, but add hereunto out of jon. 2. 8. They that follow lying vanities forsake their own mercies: as if you had a mind to imply, that there is something in man, that makes a difference, why some are suffered to walk in their own ways, some are not, wherein you do but corrupt the state of the question after your usual manner.  
For the question is not about the consequent of lying vanities, or not observing them, but about the observing of lying vanities itself, or not observing them; that is, how cometh it to pass that some are suffered to go on in the course of their lying vanities, some are not, but rather are taken off from those ungodly courses wherein they have been brought up, as many thousands were taken off thus in the Apostles days: we say it is the mere good pleasure of God that puts this difference, having mercy on some, and hardening others; you take another course, as when you say, in your familiar and soliloquiall meditations with God; Never hadst thou given them up to their own hearts lust, to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, had they not despised the riches of thy bounty: Here you mix different courses of God together; for when you talk of giving them over to their own hearts lusts, (Which scripture applieth to Gods dealing with his own people Israel, upon the despising of his grace, offered them in his word) but the rest, as this also, being accommodated unto the heathens, you seem to refer to the despising of the riches of God's bounty declared to them in his works: for as for the riches of God's bounty declared in his word, the heathen were not partakers of this, until the days of the Gospel: and whereas by the phrase of speech used, you seem to have an eye to that of the Apostle, Rom. 2, 3. 4. the riches of God's bounty in that place is specified only to consist in patience and long-suffering: And how did they refuse it, but in refusing to repent? For the bounty there mentioned is noted to be a bounty leading unto repentance. So that in the issue your meaning comes to this, that God would never have suffered them thus to have walked in their own ways, and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, if so be they had repent?  
Now the question is, whether they had power to repent or no; you seem to imply they had, but you dare not express so much, because you see how manifestly contradictious that were to the text itself, where it is expressly said, But thou after the hardness of thine heart, which cannot repent, treasurest up wrath against the day of wrath. So that you, what by taking up pieces of Scripture at pleasure, and leaving out pieces as you list, make up a patched coat contrary to the Scripture, which yet you commend unto us as Scripture itself; Nay, what will you say if God did not so much as admonish them to repent? Doth not the same Apostle plainly signify so much, Act. 17. 30. where he saith And God regarded not the time of this ignorance: but now he admonisheth all men every where to repent. Again, consider I pray you what is to be accounted the time, when this ceasure deserved to be fastened upon them, namely, of despising the riches of his bounty? It seems by your former discourse, it is not till they have filled up the measure of their iniquity; for till then God's infinite love was towards them (according to your opinion) and he did not give them over to their own lests. Now I pray consider, did he not even afore this time suffer the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, according to the Apostles meaning, Act. 14. 16. although as the same Apostle saith, even at that time, He left not himself without witness, giving them rain and fruitful seasons, filling 
〈◊〉. 17  their hearts with food and gladness.  
And this you take hold of in the next place, and tell us, that, these were unquestionable earnests of Gods everlasting love, and to prove it you add by way of reason, for thou so lovedst the world, still holding up your deyout Soliloquies, as if you would enchant your Readers with an affected strain of devotion, that thou gavest thine only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish.  
If this be not like capping of verses, I do not know what is: for will it follow by any Logical method, that because the giving of Christ for everlasting life to all that believe in him, is an evidence of God's love to all; therefore the giving of rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, is an unquestionable earnest of God's everlasting love to all? Yet I grant it is an evidence of God's love as touching the preservation of their state temporal; but you urge it as an evidence of God's love, as touching the state of their souls spiritual and eternal: otherwise your discourse were nothing to the purpose. Yet to speak according to the Apostles drift in that place, he proposeth them not as witnesses of his love, but as of his providence, which we know extends even to bruit beasts, and to the very lilies of the field. Only man is capable of deserving this testimony of divine providence, and so accordingly should be moved to seek the Lord, and to worship him as God, who governs all, and provides for all, and not as a corruptible thing, thus we interpret the Apostle, Act. 14. 16. according to the Apostle, Act. 17. 27. and Rom. 1. 23. and not at random as you do, fashioning his meaning in such a manner as may best accord with your extravagant opinions.  
Lastly, who seeth not, that if these be unquestionable earnests of God's love towards them, then notwithstanding they have filled up the measure of their iniquity, yet God's love continueth towards them the same still, and therefore cannot be said to give them over to their own lusts, and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath. For these and the like temporal blessings they enjoy still, and that in greater measure than is usually the portion of Gods own dear children. To conclude this, we make no doubt but that if all and every one should believe in Christ, all and every one should be saved by Christ.  
But the question is, whether God gives faith to all: it is apparent he doth not, but only to those whom he hath predestinated, Rom. 8. 30. to those whom he hath ordained to everlasting life, Act. 13. 45. to such as shall be saved, Act. 2. last. Perhaps your meaning is, that though God doth not give faith to all, but only to some; the reason is, because some fit themselves for faith, and others do not. And I verily believe this is your opinion, but it seems you are ashamed to profess it and speak it out plainly.  
Yet the texts mentioned are directly against you, which confine the giving of faith not to man's disposition, but to God's predestination; like as those other also, Rom. 9 God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, and it is not of him that willeth, or of him that runs, but of God that showeth mercy: and 2 Tim. 1. 9 the Apostle professeth, that God calleth us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace.  
To the prosecuting of every which place, and making it good against any exceptions that you shall bring, I shall be willing to condescend, so long as God affords me life and opportunity. But as yet you dissemble your Tenet, and play least in sight, and discover your meaning only by insinuation. I know there is no greater argument of God's love, than the giving of his Son, whence it manifestly followeth, that unless God's love to reprobates be as great as his love to his elect, Christ was not given to the reprobates; like as our Saviour signifieth, that, He sanctified himself unto his death and 
joh. 17. 9 20.  passion; not for the world, but for those for whom he prayed, which were partly those whom God had already given him, and partly those who hereafter should believe through their word. Yet I confess you are audacious enough to resist this argument, and openly to profess, that God's love to the reprobate is as great as his love to the elect, which no Arminian was ever yet known to profess: yet you take upon you to prove, that this love was tendered to all.  
A strange phrase, which I think was never heard of before, as if love were like an ointment in a box, that might be offered and received if a man would. Of tendering grace I have heard, to wit, the grace of remission of sins and salvation upon our belief, but of tendering love I never heard.  
And of the tendering of this grace in Christ unto all that hear it preached, who ever doubted? For this is no more than to say, that It is tendered unto all to whom it is tendered. And are you well in your wits to address yourself to the proving of this, with some notable argument, which should be like a thunderbolt, and therefore no great marvel if some great noise preceded it.  
But still I perceive your meaning reacheth further than you dare as yet to profess; for your meaning is to prove, that All that hear the Gospel and do not believe it, seeing they shall be guilty of greater sin, and incur greater condemnation at the day of judgement, therefore they could believe it if they would. This is the point that sticks in your teeth, and which you dare not openly and plainly profess, as indeed it is manifest Pelagianisme, and which the Arminians dare not at this day openly avouch, but rather profess that no man can believe or repent without grace.  
Whereas yet, like as yourself maintain, that no man in state of nature can do otherwise of himself then sin, yet is he justly condemned for sinning, none compelling him: in like sort, no man of himself can believe the Gospel, yet he may be as justly condemned for not believing. For as for that natural impotency unto that which is good, which is in all derived unto us from our father Adam, that is of itself sufficient to condemn us, and therefore most unsufficient to excuse us. And that impotency being in all alike, the condemnation therefore shall be unto all alike; but the increase of it by actual transgressions which are freely committed, is not in all alike: for neither doth inclination natural, or tentations spiritual, or occasions temporal hinder a man's liberty, in doing or refusing to do any act; so likewise neither can it hinder the aggravation of his sin. But neither can this natural impotency be cured in any part but by the grace of God habitual, neither any good act according to this grace habitual he performed without another grace, both prevenient and subsequent actual. If your mind serves you to deal plainly in opposing aught of this, you shall not want them that will be ready to enter with you into the lists, and scholastically to encounter you. Yet I confess the providence of God, especially in ordering and governing the wills of men, is a mysterious thing, and the operation and cooperation of his will, with the operation and cooperation of the will of man.  
But I am a long time enured unto this, and now I fear no bugbears, lest of all from yourself, with whom I have been of old acquainted in our private and familiar discourse on these and such like arguments, and to tell you plainly my opinion, I doubt you have written so much, that you have had time to read but little. And truly as for myself, as I have written little, so also I have not read much. But in these points I have spent not a little time, in searching after truth, and examining arguments.  
As for the place of the Apostle, Act. 17. 30. it seems your meaning is, it pleads for universal grace now after Christ's death: yet yourself immediately before profested, that only they that hear it and do not believe, are guilty of greater sins; implying manifestly, that since Christ's death all do not hear it. Yet if you have any other meaning, and will deal roundly in propounding it, I will be ready to consider this or any other place that you shall be able to produce to what purpose soever, if orthodox in my judgement to subscribe unto it, if otherwise, to do my best to confute it.  
3 In the next place you are so far from maintaining universal grace, that you undertake to give causes why all men in the world have not heard of this love of God in Christ. But these causes to be assigned by you are put off till hereafter, and that not of certainty neither: you only say, They may be assigned. 'tis your usual course to feed your Readers with expectation, as it were with empty spoons. If you do not gull them in putting them off to expectation 'tis somewhat the better.  
The reason you give why many might have heard of Christ, which yet have not heard of him, and might have been partakers of his death, (I think you mean of the benefit of his death) which yet have not been partakers of it, is stark naught. For that evil courses of men cannot hinder them from the participation of Christ's death, appeareth by the calling of the Gentiles, and casting off of the jews. For were the deeds of Babylon (think you) better than they of Zion? We Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, Gal. 2. 15.  
The Apostle in diverse places, puts no difference between them that are called, and them that are not, as touching their manners before grace, 1 Cor. 6. 11. Eph. 2. 23. Tit. 3. 23. God sindes us weltering in our blood, when he saith unto us, Live, Ezech. 16. and Saul was taken off from his bloody courses to be made a member of Christ.  
And your doctrine to the contrary tends shamefully to the obscuring and disparaging of God's grace, and to the advancing of the power of nature, and liberty of will; the trick of the Pelagians of old, of whom Austin professed thus, Inimici gratiae Dei latent in commendatione naturae, The enemies of God's grace welter themselves under the commendation of nature. And Austin professeth it to be impiety and madness 
Cont dua● epist. Pelag l. 2. c. 1. Enchir. 9 8  to deny, that God can convert any man's will, when he will, and where he will. And you blush not to profess in another discourse of yours, that humility is the disposition, which prepares us for grace. I doubt you will find little comfort in such humility, and that at the day of judgement, such humility will be found abominable pride.  
What you mean by pledges I know not, you love to walk in clouds, and in the dark: if you mean the fruits of Gods temporal blessings, how will you prove that these were evidences of that love which God man feasted in the death of his Son? And if it were so, than this evidence should be manifested to all of ripe years: for all are partakers of Gods temporal providence, even they that have filled up the measure of their iniquity. Yet than you usually profess, God withdraws his love from them: but how can that be if he afford them the unquestionable earnests thereof, as before you called these pledges: whereas in the close you say, that many are not acquainted with this manifestation of God's love, and that out of mere mercy, it may well pass for one of your paradoxes. I never doubted but that it was a mercy to know Christ, and the love of God to the world in him; but that it was a mercy to want Christ, I never read nor heard till now. Neither is it necessary that men, though reprobates, should be enraged to evil by the Gospel: for God can make even reprobates to profit by it, ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quà mitius puniantur, To the outward emendation of their lives, to the end their punishment may be the milder. And we find by experience that all were not enraged against it.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
Want of consideration, or ignorance of God's unfeigned love to such as perish, a principal means or occasion why so many perish.  
FRom God's love to his Vineyard, you have proceeded to discourse of his infinite love towards them that perish; and because in the issue they are never the better for it: and Solomon saith, that open hatred is better 
Prov, 27. 5  than secret love, which some understand of fruitless love: therefore to salve this inefficatious nature of God's love as you shape it, (though yet you count it infinite and ardent, and excessively fervent) you here take upon you to discover unto us the reason why it proves so inefficacious, and that without prejudice to the love of God; and that is, you say, on man's part, to wit, Want of consideration, or ignorance of God's unfeigned love towards them.  
Yet we do not say, God is made any loser by the damnation of so many thousands, both men and Angels: for the glory of God is indifferently advanced, as well in the condemnation of them that perish, as in the salvation of his Elect. And the Apostle in this case professeth, saying, 2 Cor. 2. 15. We are unto God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them that perish: But you proceed and tell us, That God hath from eternity infallibly forecast the entire redemption of his infinite love, which unto us may seem utterly cast away. And of men, if many die, the fault is their own, or their instructers.  
But by your leave, I see not how Gods infinite love (if there be any such towards them that perish as you plead there is) is redeemed from being utterly cast away; for surely, they that are thus cast away, are never a whit the better for it. God I confess is never a whit the worse for their damnation: but if God's love were such towards them that perish as to will their salvation, surely God is much the worse for that in two respects; First, because his omnipotency is hereby shaken, in as much as that is not brought to pass which he would, and ardently desired (as you speak) that it should come to pass. In which case it followeth, that God is not omnipotent; as Austin long ago discoursed, and thereupon was driven to give such commodious interpretation of that place (whereupon you only insist in your own sense, notwithstanding the analogy of Scripture phrase is as directly against that construction of the place, which you lay for a ground of your present discourse as for it) as might not interfere upon God's omnipotency: for by experience we find, that whatsoever we desire to bring to pass, we always do bring to pass, if it lies in our power to bring it to pass: and if we do not effect it, it is a manifest sign that we are not able to effect it. Secondly, God is the worse for it in another respect; for this love and will of God to them that perish, you make to cease, as soon as they have filled up the measure of their iniquity, how much more after the time of their damnation is come? And this is to make God mutable, and his will and love to be of a changeable condition. But God is so perfect as to be without 
jac. 1.  all variableness or shadow-of change.  
And by the way I observe, you are apt to discourse of God's infinite love towards them that perish amongst men, but of any such love towards them that perish amongst Angels, nor a word: yet it is as evident, that if any perish amongst Angels, it is merely their own faults also: Nay, much more evident is this in the nation of Angels, then in the nation of men. For many thousand infants perish in original sin, for no personal original fault of their own, but for the transgression of Adam, and in that corruption which is naturally derived unto them from the loins of Adam, after that by his actual transgression he fell into the state of that corruption, which since from him is become hereditary unto us all. As for that miscarriage which makes all men obnoxious unto the wrath of God, and unto condemnation, we hold it impossible to be prevented.  
For original sin and Adam's transgression is it, which you well know, cannot be prevented: Only God may have mercy on whom he will, even in despite of any actual miscarriage (which you dote upon as an only hinderer from grace) like as on the otherside he hardeneth whom he will, in spite of all civil and moral good carriage found in the best of heathen men.  
This I speak according to the doctrine of Saint Paul; I confess, I speak it not according to the doctrine of Silius Italicus, nor according to the doctrine of Sozimus, as sound at heart for true heathenism, as Silius was for his life. And that Sozimus amongst other reproaches he casts upon Christianity, this is one, that we offer Gods free grace of pardoning all manner of sins, to all manner of men that believe in Christ jesus. And to touch by the way, if it be the fault, or may be the fault only of their instructors that many perish, than it is not their own fault.  
Yet certainly it is their own fault that Angels perish: yet we see not any pains you take to show, How God hath infallibly forecast the entire redemption of his infinite love towards Angels that are cast away: belike he never entertained any love towards those Angels at all. But Silius Italicus himself, that knew this, and considered this, and preacheth it unto others, what did he far the better for it, was he saved by it think you?  
Nay, how many thousands knew this amongst heathen men, as well as Silius, that Mite & cognitum est homini Deus, and that he delighted not in the sacrificing of the blood of men, which yet were never a whit the nearer unto salvation for all this: Much less so near as Abraham, even at that time when he traveled three days journey to the sacrificing ofhiss son Isaac. Yet we confess, his love is unfeignedly extended to all that call him Maker; for in that he made them, and a world for them, and by giving rain and fruitful seasons, doth fill their hearts with food and gladness, he may 
Act. 14. 16  be said to love them, but herehence it followeth not, that he loves them unto salvation.  
And yet how many are so far from having their hearts filled with food and gladness, that sometimes they perish for want of bread? But in stead of arguing you turn to prophesying, and tell us, that Had the doctrines which those divine oracles (God is love and would have all men to be saved) naturally afford, been for these forty years last passed, as generally taught, and their right use continually pressed with as great zeal and fervency as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing some, and reprobating most in that space have been; the plentiful increase of God's glory and his people's comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, ●as would have put their mutinous mouths to silence.  
I commend your wit in this; for I profess of all inartificial arguments, I never heard any answerable unto this. Now if you had added an artificial argument, unto this inartificial which you might have had the hap to have read in Southwell, it had been most complete; and I had not easily devised what could have been added hereunto. And the argument is this, Suppose God the Father had written this, and that with the pen of his Spirit, dipped in the blood of his Son, would you not then have believed it? I presume you would, why then believe it now, for the difference is not in substance, but only circumstance.  
It is the only thing I remember in that book of Southwell; and this argument of yours I may perhaps remember when you have forgotten it. But I pray consider, what sect is there in the world that might not use the like? Perhaps you will say, they might use it, not so truly as you do. But then I pray consider, what evidence have we for the truth of it on your part, but your own confidence, and your bare word expressing it? And I hope you will give every sect leave to be as confident of the truth of their own way, as you are of yours; and as liberal in proving their bare words for it as yourself.  
I have read in Chaucer (to betray unto you what use I can make of him, as well as you of Silius Italicus) of somo rhyme that is called rhyme doggerel, and if there be any Logic doggerel, I think this is it. But I do not mean to let your grave discourse pass thus; those Oracles, God is love, and would have all men to be saved, you suppose do naturally afford your doctrines, to wit, that God's infinite love extends to all and every one, as that he will that all and every one should be saved.  
But no such things do these oracles afford, either expressly, or by any just consequence. And of the first (God is love) it is apparent that it containeth no such thing expressly; and as for the deducing of any such consequence herehence, yourself never yet adventured, nor yet do; you may as well deduce herehence, that he will save all Angels, as well as all men, yea the very devils. And as for the second, you think that doth expressly signify as much; but that is untrue; the Scripture phrase doth use that universal sign frequently in another sense, as when it saith of the Pharisees that they did tithe omne olus, which cannot be meant of every herb in particular, but of every sort of herb in special, as Austin himself 1200. years ago observed. So Peter is said to have seen a vessel let down from heaven, wherein was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which cannot be meant of every particular, but only that of every sort, or of most sorts, or of many sorts some one. So it is said, that all jerusalem and all judea went forth to john, the meaning whereof can be no other than that of all parts of judea and of jerusalem, some went forth unto him.  
As for the plentiful increase of God's glory and the people's comfort, which you promise upon the preaching of your doctrine; this is only upon your word, which unless you take upon you to be a Prophet, and be received also for such a one, is of no force.  
But suppose it had been preached, and not received nor believed by the hearers, I pray what then? Had the people's comfort been any whit the more increased? And for you to presume, that upon the preaching of it, it had been received, is to take upon you too much; the Gospel itself when first preached, the jews told S. Paul when he came to Rome, it was every where spoken against: Yet I confess, the more erroneous 
Act. 28.  a doctrine is, especially if it be plausible to the judgement of flesh and blood, the more apt it is to be entertained by flesh and blood.  
But I pray, what comfort is this you speak of, is it comfort in things spiritual, or comfort in God's blessings temporal? I grant willingly, that the truth of God is more apt to breed comfort spiritual, than errors in matters of faith. Now first you must prove your doctrine to be true, and then we will nothing doubt but it shall be comfortable. You take too much upon you to prophesy that it shall be comfortable and therehence infer that it is true. But if you speak of comfort in respect of blessings temporal; as I guess by comparing this with what you delivered in the Epistle dedicatory, we have but your bare word for this also. But suppose it would prove so, shall we from the temporal comforts we may enjoy, conclude, that therefore our religion is the true religion?  
Alas, what comfort in outward things had christianity in the first three hundred years? why may you not as well conclude, that the Synagogue of Antichrist is the very Church of Christ; and our Churches which we call reform, are no Churches of Christ; seeing for many years God hath humbled us under their hands, and given us over into the 
Ezech. 2●. 31.  hands of beastly men, skilful to destroy, and still sends serpents and cokatrices amongst us, that will not be charmed? 
jer. 4. 17.  Well, this we see is the comfort you afford us in these heavy times; you give us to understand that 'tis God's just judgement upon us, for preaching so much of God's absolute decree of electing some, and reprobating most,  
And yet the Lutheran Churches preach as little of this as you do, and yet wherein have they fared better than their brethren the Calvinists; witness the Marquisate of Baden, the land of Brunswick, the land of Hulst, the land of Pomerania and Meckelburgh. And the whole kingdom of Bohemia, wherein it is well known, the Calvinists were but few in comparison to the Lutherans. In the days of King james, a restraint began of preaching the doctrine of predestination. Did the people's comforts, or the comforts of this kingdom increase any whit hereupon? Within these four years' space books savouring of Arminianism, such as yovas, have had the press open unto them with far greater liberty than their opposites, yet how do the comforts of the people, and of this kingdom increase?  
Yet this is an old trick of Satan, who is therefore called by one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a circling Dragon: For in Saint Austin's days, when the Empire began to be invaded by the Goths, the cause of this was by the heathens alleged to be the embracing of Christian religion, whereupon it was that Austin was moved to write his two and twenty books of the City of God. Why may not we as well say, that the cause why we taste so little of the grace of God is, because there are so many risen up with might and main impugning the grace of God. And it is well known, no reformed Churches prosper so well as the Hollanders, though no doubt they have as rank sins to be found in them as others; yet this they have to their singular commendation, that they suppressed Arminianism, that Cankerworm of God's grace, and of his sovereignty over his creatures, & banished the greatest patrons thereof out of their territories.  
This inartificial argument of yours I thought deserved the canvasing, and therefore I have spent so many lines in discovering the rottenness of it.  
Now to proceed; you ask, Who would not be willing to be saved, if he were fully persuaded that God did will his salvation in particular? When we read this, I muse at the contrariant disposition of our adversaries: for, when we discourse of election absolute, the Arminian party cryeth out against us; as if hereby we took a course to make men most careless of their salvation; you, though you shake hands with the Arminian party, oppose in a direct contrarious manner, and say, Who would not be willing to be saved (which is as much as to say, Who would not be careful of his salvation) if he were fully persuaded, that God did will his salvation in particular. Your meaning is, every one would be careful of it. So then, all that are of your mind, are most careful of their salvation: so that it is opposite to the Arminian Tenent, to harden himself, or humour himself in any profane course, or lewd course of life.  
All such must needs turn Saints here on earth, which if it were true, 'tis to be feared they would be accounted Puritans, and then their opinions would be liked so much the worse for that. Touching Gods protestation that he will not the death of any, but the repentance of all, we have said enough, and showed how you vary from the most authentical translation of our Churches. And it is apparent, that God neither gives repentance nor life to all; and to say that God wills any thing (otherwise then by his will of commandment, which is improperly, though usually called his will) which cometh not to pass, Austin long ago professed, was as much as to deny God to be omnipotent.  
How sorily you have performed the justifying of your doctrine in this particular, by the authority of the Church of England, we have likewise showed in its proper place. And if it be true, that if this doctrine of yours were believed, all would unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to be truly happy, than it must needs be that like as yourself do, so every Arminian doth, unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity (words enough) to be truly happy: So that a profane person like Esau, that sold his birthright for a mess of pottage, is not likely to be found amongst the Arminian generation: And I doubt not but a part of your own unfeigned endeavours, with fervent alacrity in this kind, consists in writing such books as these, containing so many blasphemies both against the nature and against the grace of God.  
For proof whereof I appeal to the consideration and judgement of every indifferent Reader, that shall peause the answer of mine thereunto. You tell us, God's love and goodness is so great. that he cannot pass any act, whereby any of his creatures should be debarred, either from being like him in love or goodness. Thus you dictate magisterially, more like a Prophet then a Pastor of God's Church. But though you bring no reason for what you say, I will try whether I cannot bring something against it.  
And because it is proposed of his creatures in general, I will begin with the Angels. If this be true, than the Devils are not excluded by any act of God from being like him in love and goodness. What hinders then, but that they may be like him in love and goodness if they will, and that they may will it? for is not their will as free as man's, in the state of his corruption? Secondly, God hath decreed, that all that are descended from Adam, shall be born in original corruption; also he hath ordained, that many thousands of them shall die in their infancy, as well out of the Church as within the Church. Now let any man judge, whether by virtue of these decrees of God, they be not utterly excluded from being like unto God in love and goodness, after an ordinary manner, whereof alone you speak. Again, all that shall be damned, God hath ordained unto damnation. Now let any man judge, whether by virtue of this decree, and upon supposition thereof, it is not impossible that such should be saved. Of those who are not predestinated unto life, God brings none unto wholesome and spiritual repentance; If God brings none of them 
Aug. cont. jul. Pelag. lib. 5. c. 4.  unto true repentance, than he hath decreed to bring none of them unto true repentance; and by virtue of this decree they are debarred from being like unto God in love and goodness, which I prove thus, None can be like unto God in goodness without true repentance, and none can repent except God gives repentance: therefore God having decreed not to give them repentance, by virtue of this decree they are debarred from repentance, and consequently, from being like unto God in goodness.  
You close this Section with an, Alas, the effect whereof is, that by your opposites doctrine, a mispersuasion is wrought in most men of his goodness towards them; and consequently your meaning is, they grow careless of their salvation. Because as before we heard from you, carefulness of salvation is an herb that grows only in the gardens of Arminianism. And what is this dangerous doctrine? Surely it is very prettily expressed by you, to wit, in teaching that God doth oftentimes dispose his blessings of this life, not as undoubted pledges of a better. Well then, to say, that God doth dispense his blessings of this life unto Turks and Saracens, not as pledges of a better, is in danger to make Christians conceive that God is not good to them.  
But perhaps you mean it only in respect of those who partake of these blessings. Now I profess I never read any of our divines make use of any such consideration in this argument: you love to shape opposites opinion after your own fancy: And yet the truth is, that according to Scripture evidence, temporal blessings are so far from being generally the pledges of a better life, as that they are noted out unto us in Scripture to be the character of the wicked, namely, to have their portion in this life. Woe be to you rich (saith our Saviour) 
Luk. 6.  for you have received your consolation. And they are the poor of this world for the most part that God hath chosen. jac. 2. 5. God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith and heirs of salvation. And on the other side, the prosperity of the wicked is such as hath been a scandal to the children of God, as we read Ps. 73. David himself took offence at it, until he went into the sanctuary of God, than he understood their end, vers. 17. Surely (saith he) thou hast set them in slippery places, and castest them down into desolation, how suddenly are they destroyed, perished, and horribly consumed.  
So likewise jeremy desired to dispute with God hereabouts, O Lord (saith he) if I despute with thee thou art righteous: 
jer. 12. 1●  yet let me talk with thee of thy judgements: Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? why are all they in wealth that rebelliously transgress, 2. Thou hast planted them, and they have taken root: they grow and bring forth fruit: Thou art near in their mouths, and far from their heart. 3. But thou, O Lord, knowest me, thou hast seen me and tried my heart toward thee: pull them out like sheep for the slaughter, and prepare them for the day of slaughter.  
Now to my simple understanding, the Prophet herein discovereth unto us that particular of God's providence which you impugn; when he seeth the prosperity of the wicked, he is scandalised, but when he seeth that this prosperity of theirs is but like the fatting of sheep and oxen unto the day of slaughter, he is satisfied. For as Solomon saith, Ease slayeth 
Prov. 1. 32●  the foolish, and the prosperity of fools destroyeth them. And look in what sense God doth make men's tables to be their snares, Psal. 69. 22. may he not, or doth he not in the same manner make their prosperity be their snares? how can it be otherwise if God doth not bless their prosperity, but rather curse it?  
And is not this in God's power? Nay, is it not found to be practised in the course of his providence? I will send a curse upon you (saith the Lord) and will curse your blessings; yea, I have 
Mal. 2. 2.  cursed them already. And if it be lawful for God to make Christ to be a snare, and a rock of offence unto many, how 
Esa. 〈◊〉. 14.  much more may it well become him to make temporal blessings to be snares unto them, wherein they shall be taken unto destruction? As S. Peter compares some to bruit beasts, borne to be taken and destroyed, 2 Pet. 2. 12. And that Christ was made by God a snare unto many, you may learn out of your Forerius (whom I have heard you commend not a little) upon that in Esau 8. 34. And he shall be as a sanctuary, to wit, unto some, but unto others, a stumbling stone, and a rock to fall upon, and as a snare and a net to the inhabitants of jerusalem. And old Simeon prophefied as much of him, saying, Behold, this child is appointed for the fall and rising again of many in Israel, and for a sign which shall be spoken against, Luk. 2. 34. Even heathen men have observed, that in the course of God's providence, wicked men are exalted to their greater shame in their ruin. Tolluntur in altum, ut lapsa graviore cadant. And 
Claudian.  if it be a base mind in any man to bestow gifts on others, hoping thereby for advantage in the way of his commodity: shall it not be lawful unto God to give the wicked their hearts desire, which is only set on temporal prosperity; and to expose them unto temptation, and abandon them, leaving them destitute of his grace, for the distribution whereof he is bound to none; to advance his glory in making them examples in the way of his justice, punishing their pride, unthankfulness, lusts, and intemperance?  
What can you say to that of Solomon, God hath made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil, Pro. 16. 9 and that of the Apostle, Rom. 9 21. Hath not the potter power of the clay to make of the same lump, one vessel to honour, and another unto dishonour?  
But you keep your course in the way of your own invention, without reflecting your eyes upon these sacred oracles, as if you meant to broach unto the world a new Law, and a new Gospel. As for the love of the reprobates, God cares not for it. It is in his power alone to work his love in the hearts of men, by the circumcision of them, Deut. 30. 6. and that he will do in whom he will, for he hath mercy on whom 
Rom. 9 1●  he will, and whom he will hardeneth.  
2 As for sinister respects, they may be found in the creature; they may be found in man, they cannot be found in God. He must respect, and cannot but respect himself, and the manifestation of his own glory as the supreme end of all. For, as all things are from him, so all things must be for him, Rom. 11. last. And accordingly, He made all things for himself. Prov. 16. 4. And his glory is as well seen in the heardening of whom he will, as in the comiserating of whom he will.  
And for all the good wit that you and others have learned, to take good turns, and not to be taken by them; There is a wisdom of God that will be sure to take them, for whom he hath laid snares; and make their wisdom, and cunning, and pride, and insolency, and wilfulness, tend to the praise of his glory, in what kind soever pleaseth him, either in the way of his justice in their just condemnation, or in the way of his glorious grace, in the pardoning of their sins, and saving their souls.  
As for your rules of observation, touching the natures of men, I might let them pass: I am no professed student in such like; yet I find yours shallow enough. I see no reason but such as are worldly wise may meet with their matches, that may know when to trust them, and when not, and work out their own advantage either way.  
Why mistrust should make an honest man the worse, I know no reason; as for a knave, whether he mistrusts others or no, what becomes he the better? A silly conceit it is in my judgement, to think that any man should be moved to justify an others ill opinion of him, by doing evil, unless that evil be pleasing to him, whose good opinion he affects for his own advantage. For as he that refraineth himself from evil, maketh 
Esa. 59 15.  himself sometimes a prey; so a man must, audire aliquid brevibus Gyaris & carcere dignum si vult esse aliquid. And there never want some knights of the post, and such as will prostitute their conscience to serve any turn for advantage. No faithless age can make any good rules of morality out of date of truth, though out of date of practice. Yet I have heard a story of a French Gentleman in the wars of France, when certain Freebooters were unawares entered within his house, saved his own life, and his family from spoiling, by mere confidence, and was bid at parting, to thank his own confidence for speeding so well.  
It is always true, Ipsa sides habita (in good ground) obligat fidem● it is sometimes true, procurat fidem. Themistocles found it true, when he offered himself to the king of the Molossians, who formerly had been his enemy: and many generous General's deal never a whit the worse with them that cast themselves at the foot of their mercy. Yet God is true, and every man a liar.  
Let us be bold to trust in God, and desire to fall into his hands, and keep us from falling into the hands of men: yet if God calleth us thereunto, to commit ourselves unto God, when we do cast ourselves into the hands of men. Because in God's hands are the hearts of kings, and he turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him; certainly, They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good, even at such times when Lions want and suffer hunger. Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence, but the revealed will of God. For whatsoever Gods nature is, he works freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us: but he hath revealed, that he will never fail them that put their trust in him. And this is that loving kindness of God, as much as to say, his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us, which excites the sons of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings. It was improbable that there should be any motive from the creature, why God should give them a being; neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature, as you superficially use to discourse, but merely the love of himself. For he made all things for himself. 
Prov. 16. 4   
And the creature before God made him was just nothing, neither was there at that time any distinction between King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus. It is a strange conceit to say, that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being, who is the Creator. For what likeness is there between an apple and a nut, between an horn and a bagpipe, an harp and an harrow.  
Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities, much less as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator, and the creature. Certainly all do not love God whom he loves; for he loved us when we were his enemies, Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him, as all shall either sooner or later, it will not follow that all should be saved. For only such as jacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase, and such as Esau are hated rather.  
And though you will not be beaten off from that uncoth assertion, That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved, yet we had rather abhor so foul a sentence with Austin, as denying God's omnipotency, then concur with you in boldness to the embracing of it. The apprehension of God's love to us, is the cause (moral) of our love to him: though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts works it, Deut. 30. 6. But if loveliness in the object be the cause of love; how dare you profess God loves the reprobate, and that ardently, and with excessive and infinite love. Is there any loveliness in them in the state of their corruption, and not rather unlovelinesse throughout?  
Neither will it serve your turn to say, that he loves them as his creatures: For if this be sufficient to qualify the business of the object which he loves, you may as well say that he loves frogs and toads; yea, and the Devils and damned Spirits.  
3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evil, as brethren in evil do love one another: and our Saviour hath taught us as much, Matt. 5. 49. If ye love them that love you what reward shall ye have? do not the Publicans even the same? I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable. The doing of things otherwise unlawful, in some cases may be dispensed with, but punishment was never known to be dispensed with; it may be remitted, but that is not to dispense with it. I take your meaning and leave your words, you think belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation. I no way like such extravagant assertions, though frequent in your writings; as if you would innovate all both natural reason, and divinity.  
I know no sin which infinite mercy cannot pardon; neither do I know any sin beside the sin against the Holy Ghost, and final impenitency, which God will not pardon in his elect. Much less is man's dull backwardness to love him unpardonable. For though as it seems you were never conscious of any such dulness in yourself, yet I cannot easily be persuaded until I find cause, that any Christian in the world entertains such a conceit of himself, as you do of yourself. Be God never so lovely, yet if a man know him not, how can he love him?  
And do you think it is natural for a man to know God? Suppose we do know him to be most wise, most powerful: yet if he be our enemy, how should this move us to love him, or put our trust in him? If we know him to love us, and to be our friend, yet are not the best backward enough from loving him, when we are easily drawn to sin against him? And are all sins of this kind unpardonable? what an uncomfortable doctrine is this, and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation? God regards not our love unless we keep his commandments, joh. 14. 5. Again, what is the love of God? Is it not to love him above all things? even above ourselves? as Gerson expresseth it, Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui. Is this natural? long ago Austin hath defined it to be supernatural: And if any dull backwardness be found in us to this love of God; if we are loath to lose our lives for Christ's sake, is this sin unpardonable? You are a valiant Champion, I hear you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions, but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ.  
But, alas, what should become of poor Peter, that for fear of some trouble upon confessing himself to be a follower of Christ, denied that he knew him, and that with oath and imprecation? Yet Christ looked back upon him, ●s before he had prayed for him, that his faith might not fail; and Peter looked back upon himself, and went forth and wept bitterly; and within three days after the Angels take special order, that Peter by name should be acquainted (with the first) with the comfortable news of Christ's resurrection from the dead; that as he died for his sins, so he rose again for his justification. The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate, who take notice of it chiefly, as touching blessings spiritual. As for temporal blessings, Gods love therein to man, how can it be known to a man unregenerate, seeing it can be known only by faith? Those temporal blessings you speak of in the judgement of flesh and blood, coming to pass only by course of nature.  
But that his intention in bestowing temporal blessings upon the wicked, is to bind himself to instate them in the incomprehensible joys of endless life, which he never means to perform, is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes. To the children of God there is no such obligation: for 'tis not the blessings, but the sanctified use of them, that is a pledge and assurance to them of the favour of God unto salvation; and so the sanctified use of God's temporal curses, are no less evident a pledge and assurance to them of the same favour of God: For by chastising diverse and sundry ways with crosses and afflictions, he manifests unto them, that God receives them for his sons, and so esteems of them, and not as bastards, Heb. 12. 8.  
I am glad to hear you acknowledge, that, Of all the motions of our hearts and souls God is the sole author and guide. For such acknowledgements are most rare with you; and which you cannot embrace without manifest contradiction to yourself, and overthrowing all your discourse touching God's decree, which as you say, decreeth contingency, but not the contingent things themselves.  
But the motions of the soul and heart are contingent things, and these must needs he decreed by God, if they be produced by God: And if God be the author of them, he must needs produce them. So that the whole tower of your discourse touching God's decree is suddenly overthrown by yourself, and that with the blast of this one sentence. Besides, when you acknowledge God to be the author of all the motions of our hearts and souls, you therewithal acknowledge him to be the author of evil motions as well as good: For you do nor say, he is the author of all good motions, but, of all whose motions (in reference to our hearts, our souls, our strength) God is the sole Author and guide: yet we dare not avouch that God is the Author, much less the sole Author of all our motions, without manifold distinctions. And to my thinking, it became you to be very cautelous of such assertions, who are so apt to charge your opposites with making God the Author of sin.  
Of every action of man that is free, we maintain man to be the author as well as God; but man we make in operation subordinate unto God, the second cause unto the first. This is true as touching actions naturally considered, and as touching good actions, but with a difference; man in working any natural action we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence general; in working good actions, we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence special.  
But as touching evil actions there we make man alone to be the author of them as they are evil, without any subordination unto God in respect of any influence, general or special. And cannot sufficiently wonder what improvidence hath overtaken you, to out-lash in so strange a manner. But even in this we acknowledge a providence of God confounding the wits and lungs of them that build up Babel. I remember what the Prophet saith of the Egyptians, The Lord 
Esa. 19 14  hath mingled among them the spirit of errors: and they have caused Egypt to err in every work thereof, as a drunken man erreth in his vomit: and how is that, but in defiling himself; and that which is before him. o● his own favourites that sit next unto him. Christ's yoke is easy and his burden light to the regenerate: but is it so unto natural men? do they not account it coards and bands? Psal. 2. Doth not the Apostle tell us, The affections of the flesh are not subject to the law of God, nor can be? It seems you are a very moral man, you do so willingly 
Rom. 8. 7.  fall upon this theme, of advancing the power of man's natural morality. But I remember withal what Austin sometimes said, Malo humilem peccatorem quam superbum innocentem. And arrogancy is a special fruit of pride: And you discourse in such sort of the nature of man, as if it had never been corrupt in Adam.  
4 If our love of God be raised from the belief of his loving kindness to us, than our love to God is not the first conception or plantation of true happiness, but rather our faith, as the Apostle plainly testifieth, 1 Tim. 1. 5. saying. The end of the law is love, out of a pure heart, and good conscience, and faith unfeigned. And neither the one nor the other is the work of nature, but of Grace; nor the work of God neither by influence general and natural, but by influence special and spiritual.  
As for the conclusion you deduce herehence, it is well known that life, and sense, and reason we obtain by course of nature, and natural generation of natural and reasonable parents. And to know that God gives all this, and maintains natural generation by the counsel of his will, that he it is that fashioneth us in the womb, is not known by light of nature: for the greatest Philosophers knew not this but by light of grace, and so the moanest christian comes acquainted with this mystery. But herehence to infer that God hath a purpose to give me with them whatsoever good things my heart, my sense, or reason can desire, is a very loose inference. God hath no purpose to give his own children whatsoever good thing they do desire, much less what they can desire. Paul desired 
2 Cor. 11.  and prayed thrice to be delivered from the buffet of Satan, but God granted it not unto him. Moses desired to go 
Deut. 3. 25  over jordan to see the goodly mountain, and Lebanon, but it was denied him. Abraham desired that the blessing might be conferred on Ishmael, but could not obtain it. And no marveyle. For God knows what is better for us then ourselves; the child prayeth for his Father's health saith Austin, but it is God's pleasure to take him away by death. God hath not promised to give us all that we desire, much less that sense desireth; but hath promised that all things shall work together for our good. even poverty as well as riches, sickness as 
Rom. 8. 28  well as health, and adversity as well as prosperity. For every creature of God is sanctified unto them that believe and know 
1. Tim. 4. 3  the truth. This is the faith only of a child of God, who is 
Rom. 4. 13  the heir of the World by faith in Christ. But to say of all and every one, hand over head that God hath a purpose to give them all eternal life, is your common error, that now is like an hereditary sickness unto you: driving you to maintain two foul tenets; the one, that God is not omnipotent, as purposing to give that which he never performs, a manifest sign that he is not able to perform it; as Austin many hundred years ago disputed Enchirid 95. Deus noster in caelo sursum, in caelo & in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. Quod utique non est verum, si aliqua voluit & non fecit, & quod est indignius, ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret, quod volebat omnipotens, voluntas hominis impedivit. And Enchirid. 96. Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse, non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus. The other tenet as foul as the former is this, that God changeth. For undoubtedly at this time he hath no purpose to save the Devils and damned souls of men: therefore if ever he had any such purpose it is now changed; and consequently God is changed himself, You have no way to avoid this, but by saying that Gods purpose you speak of, is not absolute but conditional as before you upbraided your opposites for maintaining God's decree of electtion to be absolute. Yet the Arminians at the conference of Hage utterly declined the maintenance of God's decree of election to be conditional,  
Yet the shifre will not serve your turn, being too narrow a leaf to cover the shameful nakedness of your assertion. For to purpose conditionally is no more a purpose of salvation then of condemnation; which is no way an evidence of God's love to any man in particular, the issue whereof is indifferent to be condemnation as well as salvation. But you hitherto in this respect have insisted upon the maintenance of God's love to all and every one.  
The beginning which God found out for mankind was a being indifferent to stand or fall, which indifferency fitted him no more for salvation in case he stood, then for damnation in case he fell; save that God was withal resolved to provide him of a Saviour upon his fall, that should be as tabula post naufragium, but to whom? only to these whom he loved as he loved jacob, not unto those whom he hated as he hated Esau. For as he made all things for himself, so also he made the wicked against the day of evil, and ever that for himself also. 
Pro. 16. 4:  Why Gods love in respect of creation, should be accounted his infinite love, I know no reason, considering, that the meanest creature was partaker of that love as well as man.  
And as he gave being unto all things, so he maintains being to Devils and damned men and ever will do. We are knit unto God by faith as well as by love and of the two, faith is the more noble as being the Fountain and cause of love. If God out of love be said to make us what we are; it may as well be said that out of love he made all other creatures what they are. If you reply, that they were made out of his love to us, for as much as they were made for our use and service: In like sort I answer, that it was out of love to himself that he made us, for as much as he made us for his own use and service; yea and all things else that were made. For he made all things for himself. In like sort if God made us what we are because he was loving to us: he made also all creatures what they are because he was loving to them. Yet by your leave, He made all things for himself.  
And this is the four and twenty Elders acknowledgement Revela. 4. 11. Thou art worthy o Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power. For thou hast created all things, and for thy wills sake they are and have been created. You say true, where faith and love is found there is assurance of God's favour towards us to set both his wisdom & power on work to make all things work together for our good, and so to preserve us to his heavenly Kingdom.  
But the question is whether this faith and love be the works of nature, and whereof all are capable by power of nature or whether they are the mere fruits of God's grace, afforded to some denied to others according to the good pleasure of his own will, as who hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth.   

CHAP. XIX.  
How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge.  
NOw because you cannot but perceive how this pincheth sore upon the unchangeable nature of God. Therefore you spend two chapters in the clearing of this difficulty; wherein if you satisfy yourself it is well. As for my part I am so far from receiving satisfaction that I am utterly to seek in understanding the course you take to give satisfaction. Whether anger, hate, or jealousy, have any seat in the omnipotent Majesty is little to the purpose.  
But to show how God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge, without any change, this alone is to the purpose. For the very manner of proposing it doth imply the ceasing to be a loving Father which he was, but becomes a severe & inexorable judge, which he was not. For to be a loving Father and a severe judge all at once, is not of a loving Father to become a severe judge. And though this were granted you; yet it is not congruous to your tenet to maintain that God was an inxorable judge to any, before the measure of his iniquity be full. And as then he first begins to become an inexorable judge, so it is requisite that then he ceaseth to be a loving Father. And albeit you are loath to acknowledge this because it doth so manifestly imply a change in the nature of God; yet you must be driven hitherto whether you will or no unless you maintain, that still God continueth a most loving Father unto the Devils and ever shall be both unto them and to all damned persons notwithstanding the wrath of God continue upon them to everlasting damnation.  
And it is a very strange dialect to acknowledge that God is a most loving Father unto damned persons: especially considering that in Scripture phrase we are said to be the Sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus. Gala. 3. 26. And indeed if you can make good, that to inflict everlasting damnation, doth consort with infinite mercy; than you shall obtain, not that God of a most loving Father doth become an inexorable judge; but that at once he is both a most loving father and a most inexorable judge also.  
As for anger whether it be in God or no, or whether Lactantius hath carried himself well or no in this Argument, it is nothing at all to this present business. The question is whether God ardently desiring the salvation of any man doth at length cease to desire it, or whether still he continueth to will and ardently desire a man's salvation notwithstanding that he purposeth to inflict or actually doth inflict upon him condemnation. For this seems to be the intended issue of your discourse as when you undertake to illustrate, how extreme severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeigned love. As much as to say, that God loves the Devils and loves the damned; and continueth the fervency of fatherly unfeigned love towards them, notwithstanding that he doth inflict everlasting condemnation upon them, and because this love you account all one with mercy and that it is infinite; in like sort infinite mercy may consort (as before you speak) with extreme severity.  
Hence it followeth that all are vessels of merey, the reprobate as well as the elect, only here is the difference, the elect are only vessels of mercy, but the reprobate are both vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath also. Now I demand what is the fruit of this love, and of this mercy of God towards the damned. Can you devise any fruit of this but the preservation of them in being? And may you not as well say; that he loves at this day every creature, in as much as he preserveth them? And consider I pray do you call this fatherly love and do you account this the fervency of fatherly love? And doth either Scripture or eclesiastical phrase allow you in this? Yet speak your mind plainly, and say that Gods will to preserve his creatures may stand with extreme severity used towards them, and no man will contend with you at all in this.  
But then consider, whether you are well in your wits, when you enter upon the proof of this as of some rare notion; when the issue of your meaning falleth upon a most vulgar conceit and explication. And whether this be to prove that God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge, when the only fruit of his love is the holding of his children's noses unto the grindstone of his wrath, and inplacable displeasure. Yet let us take notice of your illustration.  
2. Here we have a large discourse of Manlius Torquatus and his severe execution upon his own Son, for transgressing the commandment of his General; therefore Martial law was executed by the father (being at that time General) upon his own son. But were it all true that you discourse in justifying that father's severity upon his child; Yet you miserably forget yourself, when you say, That excessive love which he bore unto his person, whilst his hopeful beginnings did seem to promise an accomplishment of his Martial virtues, turns into extreme severity and indignation after he proves transgressor. For this is not to show, how extreme severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeigned love; but rather to show how fatherly love ceaseth and severity and indignation comes in the place thereof.  
This is rather answerable to the theme proposed how a most loving Father becomes a severe judge, and answerable to the former discourse of Gods withdrawing his goodness from those that have once filled up the measure of their iniquity. But because in this manner it cannot be applied unto God without acknowledging mutability in the nature of God, as well as in the nature of men: Therefore as I conceive your pretence was to illustrate how extreme severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly love; though indeed you perform nothing less, but rather show how that fatherly love ceased as being turned into extreme severity and indignation. Yet it seems you did but forget yourself in this.  
And that your drift was to show how notwithstanding his love towards his son continuing the same, yet in a greater love of Martial discipline he caused his head to be stricken of. But this also will nothing serve your turn. For notwithstanding this, we see a manifest alteration. For Manlius conceived not any such indignation against his son till now, never entertained any will to cut him off till the noise of his transgression came unto his ears. All which cannot be said of God (as it must be if the case be alike) without acknowledging as manifest alteration and innovation in the nature of God.  
There was a time wherein Manlius desired his son's life and prosperity; there was a time when he willed and commanded him to be put to death. It was impossible that both those should be at once in Manlius as implying flat contradiction: Yet you place them both in God either at once and so imply contradiction, or successively and so introduce alteration into the nature of God: Manlius his purpose and will was changed upon the fact of his son, and his son was consumed by it.  
But God is the Lord and is not changed, and therefore the 
Mal. 3. 6.  sons of jacob are not consumed. So Selencus never entertained any thought or purpose of pulling out his son's eyes till he was found guilty of adultery; this cannot be said of God without subjecting him to variableness and somewhat more than shadow of change. And therefore though Manlius and Selencus be justified in their courses and God justified in his, as no man makes question, whether God be just in that which he doth: yet this proves not that God is exempt from alteration one way, in making a will to damn a man succeed in God his will to save him; or yourself from contradiction another way, in making God at one and the same time both to will a man's salvation, and at the same time to will the same man's condemnation, yea and to inflict it also. And look by what reason God may at one, and the same time will both the salvation, and condemnation of the same man, by the same reason he may at the same time both damn and save the same man.  
For if you say he wills to save him as he is a man, and wills to damn him as he is a sinner; by the same reason you may say that he can both save him, as he is a man, and damn him as he is a sinner. For the contradiction is as manifest in the one, as in the other: Yet there is a great deal of difference between the course of Manlius Torquatus and the courses of God. For Manlius did not cut of his son's head, but for an actual and personal transgression of his son: but God causeth many thousand Infants to perish in original sin, through no actual and personal transgression of their own. What place can you find for that fervency of God's fatherly love towards them?  
Again God hath power in the course of his gracious providence to keep men from those transgressions, which make them incur condemnation.  
Now let any man judge whether Manlius would not have kept his son from transgression in this kind if he could. Thirdly Manlius was not able to provide that the strictness of Military discipline should not be remitted, by relaxation of the punishment of his son; but God is able to procure that no discipline shall be the more remitted by reason of his showing mercy on whom he will. Nay there is mercy with thee saith the Prophet that thou mayst be feared. 
Ps. 130. 4.   
Lastly Manlius had no power to pardon whom he would without partiality: but God hath power to have mercy on whom he will, yea and to harden whom he will and that without injustice or partiality. Yet I am content to consider the course you take in justifying Manlius.  
First you acquaint us with your persuasions and lay them for grounds, a very proper course of argumentation. And these are that few had taken the like care and pains to trains up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age.  
Secondly, that None would have adventured his own person further to have rescued his son from the enemy, or justified him in any honourable quarrel; and this is very ponderously amplified by comparison with a tender hearted Mother whom notwithstanding all her tenderness, the imbecility of sex would not suffer to go so far. Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici? Most frivolous conjectures and serving to no purpose. For no man doubts but that it might well be, that the love and care of maintaining Martial discipline prevailed above the love of his son.  
I say it might well be so, I do not say it was so. Now give me leave to say something against Manlius and the like Manliana imperia as you have spent many wasteful lines in pleading for him and them. Consider what Livy observeth hereupon; in his return homewards victorious, the fathers only went forth to meet him: the youth of Rome both then and ever after hated and abominated him. Before this we read of Aulus Posthumius a famous dictator, of him Livy writes thus: Egregiae dictaturae tristem memoriam faciunt 
Livy. dec. 〈◊〉 lib. 4.  qui silium ab Aulo Posthumio, qui occasione bene pugnandi captus, injussu discesserit praesidio, victorem securi percussum tradunt, nec libet credere: & argumento est quod imperia Manliana non Posthumiana appellata sint quam qui prior autor tam saevi exempli foret, occupaturus insignem titulum crudelitatis fuerit.  
After this L. Papirius Cursor nothing inferior in care of Martial discipline to Manlius Torquatus, as whom the Romans had destinated as fit to oppose Alexander the great, had he invaded Italia, in the like case pardoned Q Fabius, upon the intercession of the people; who yet was no son of Papirius. Consider the case itself. No laws of men are so strict but may admit temperantum aliquod, because man's providence is so shallow, as cannot foresee all particular cases. Lex non cavet de particularibus. For a stranger to go upon the walls of the Town in some places hath been Capital, yet when the enemy hath been in skalinge the walls, and a stranger seeing it hath encouraged himself to advance, and beat down the enemy, this fact of his hath been deemed rather meritorious of reward then of punishment.  
Manlius the young Gentleman was provoked by the proud speeches of Metuis the Captain of the enemy. To endure his braving, had been to suffer the reputation of cowardice, and enough to have discouraged his own troop & made his enemies insolent. As Goliahs' defying of Israel struck fear and terror into the hearts of the Isralites and lifted up the hearts of the Philistines.  
Neither do I comprehend how any rank was broken or disordered by this single fight or any inconvenience might redound by this fact of his. But the end being victorious and all the damage redounding to the disgrace and dishonour of the enemy. I fear something else possessed the carnal heart of Manlius the Father besides care of Martial discipline. Why might he not disdain that the glory of his son already equalling the glory of his father, might shortly blemish it? at the best a dogged and pertinaciouse adherence to the maintenance of his own imperiouse course might quench all natural affection in him. For could no other punishment serve the turn but death?  
And might not discipline be maintained unless in so extraordinary a case, the Consul's son trasgressing, were adjudged to the same punishment that the basest coward deserved? Observe what issue the like severity of Papirius had; and whether it had not been likely to have marred all, had not he in time tempered it with mildness and gentleness. For the enemy understanding of such like strict commands, whensoever the Dictator was absent, then would they stir most, knowing that the Roman Soldiers durst not stir, yea the 
Levy. dec. 1 lib. 8.  hearts of his own Soldiers began to forsake them, that they had no courage to fight.  
Yet consider how Papirius carried himself towards a Captain of Praeneste (not his son) and that when he had played the coward. Praenestinus Praetor per timorem segnuis ex subsidijs suos duxerat, in primam aciem, quem cum inambulans ante tabernaculum vocari jussisset, victorem expedire securim jussit. Ad quam vocem examine stante Praenestino. Agedum lictor, excide radicem hanc, inquam, incommodam ambulantibus: perfusumque ultimi supplicij metu, multa dicta, dimisit. By the way I cannot but take notice of an inconsideration if not altogether ridiculous passage of yours, as when you say of this Manlius, that the more desirous he was to make him like himself in religious observance of Martial discipline, and practise of justice towards the enemies, the readier he was to do justice upon him for doing the contrary. Why was the cutting off of his head a fit course to make him like himself in religious observance of Martial discipline, and practise of justice towards the enemy? I profess, I see no reason for it, it might rather make him the moro desperate, because now he had no more heads to lose. Yet I confess he taught him effectually hereby never to spare any in the like transgression.  
As for the rest, I esteem it but froth, I have no cause to trouble myself or others with any farther consideration thereof.  
3. God you say must enjoy liberty or privilege of loving himself best. Your form in expressing this I do not so well like: For I had thought this had rather been a necessity then a liberty; And privilege is of signification too base to be applied unto God. For privileges are granted from superiors to inferiors. But who shall privilege God? In a word God loves himself only as the end of all other things, and all other things which he loves but as means tending to that end. For he made all things for himself; and of Israel he professeth that he hath form him also for himself. Here you conclude 
Es. 43. 21▪  that he loves equity and justice better than he doth any man; but what meant you to leave out Mercy? did that stick in your teeth, especially considering that forthwith you acknowledge him to be the eternal pattern of mercy as well as of justice? And if he be equity itself, is he not justice itself also? And if he be justice itself, is he not mercy itself also seeing you make him the eternal pattern of the one as well as of the other? And give that as a reason why he must love justice better than any man? Yet I no way like your divinity in this. For I do not acknowledge the nature of God to be the pattern which we must imitate in the first place, but rather the law of God; and we are to imitate his nature only in those things, the performance whereof is allowable by God's law, God might allow the Israelits in robbing the Egyptians, Abraham in sacrificing his son, Samson in sacrificing himself; we may not allow any in the like: God hath power to expose men unto sin, to harden men's hearts, we may not take any such courses; but rather do all we can to keep our brethren from sin.  
Now from your discourse it no more followeth that God cannot be unjustly merciful, then that he cannot be unmercifully just, especially towards those whom he loves more dear than any man doth himself as you speak. And if you would be pleased to take notice by the way of the oracles of God, and not follow still the course of your own inventions you might find that God hath mercy on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will. Yet is not he either unjustly merciful in the 
Rom. 9 18  one, or unmercyfully just in the other; Neither should he be, though the case were altered, and he were merciful to those whom now he hardeneth, and hardened those whom now he comiserateth satis contraria fata reponens.  
But let us go with you along the coast of Barbary. God's love (you say) extends itself unto our nature so polluted with corruption. It is true and that not only in respect of corruption by sin orginal but by sin actual. For he gave his son to die for us, when we were his enemies, and when we were dead in sin and walked after the Prince of the air, and fashions 
Rom. 5.  of the world, he quickened us. Ephes. 2. 29. The effects of this love you say are limited towards men by the correspondency, which they hold or lose with that absolute goodness, or with those rules of equity, in which his will is to have man made like him. This manner of limitation is unsound, and foully unsounde; as that which apparently excludeth our correspondency to God's goodness, and unto God's love, out of the number of the effects of God's love; as much as to say that faith and repentance, thankfulness and obedience are no effects of God's love, but merely works of nature, as if it were not God that worketh in us both the will & the deed according to his good pleasure. 
Phil. 2. 13.   
As if regeneration were but the imagination of a vain thing; For I presume, you will not say, it is in the power of man to regenerate himself. And how can it be a work of God if not an effect of his love, and correspondency unto God's goodness you make to prevent the effects of God's love. Again the effects of Gods love the Scripture teacheth us are limited according to the good pleasure of God, both as touching graces of edification (for he distributes to every one as he will. 1. Cor. 12.) and as touching the graces of sanctification. For he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom. 9 And according to his purpose and grace he hath saved us and called us not according to our works. 2 Tim. 1. 9 And of his own will hath he begotten us, etc. There is a condition 
jac. 〈◊〉  of moral goodness, which God doth accept to reward with glory; but there is no condition of moral goodness which God doth accept to reward with grace: For then grace were of works, and consequently no more grace. And then God should call us according to our works which he expressly denyeth. Tit. 3. 5. and 2 Tim. 1. 9 There is no condition of moral viciousness that excludes God's mercy in calling men unto faith and salvation.  
Austin coumpts it impiety and madness to think otherwise, as I have often alleged him. Enchirid. 96. He calls some at the first hour of the day, some at the last. And what absurd conceit is it to require some mitigation of sin or moral good qualification to make correspondency unto mercy in pardoning sin and curing it? As no disease of the body is uncurable by God; so no disease of the soul or simfull course is unpardonable or uncurable by the mercy of God the Father, the merits of God the son. For each are infinite; but the sins of all the world are finite. God himself may limit the demonstration and exercise of his mercy as he thinks good. Now as touching the limitation hereof nothing is revealed unto us, but only this, that the sin against the Holy Ghost shall not be pardoned and cured no small infidelity and impenitency.  
All other limitations are merely revelations of flesh and blood, and the inventions of idle Brains; that impugn the prerogative of God's grace, and in the place thereof advance the operation of nature, as that which first commends us in some sort unto God's grace; you are apt to discourse of Gods inviting men unto God, and of the riches of his bounty that way; but of Gods working men unto God, and of the riches of his bounty, that may never any Arminian or Pelagian spoke less than you. Yet the despising of God's goodness showed either in his word or in his works shall indoubtedly increase men's condemnation. But God can break of these their contemptiouse courses in whom he will, and when he will, and where he will, as Austin professeth with such confidence, as that he censureth him of impiety and dotery whosoever he be that denyeth it.  
A silly course it is, to infer that vicious courses do exclude men from God's mercy, because God hates filthiness or uncleanness. For God undoubtedly hates all manner of filthiness and uncleanness whether the measure of it be filled up or no; For did he not hate Manasses his idolatry and his bloody courses, and his using them that were given to sorcery and witchcrast? Yet all this excluded him not from the participation of God's mercy. And if for this reason, to wit because God hates filthiness, men are excluded from God's favour, so as to be uncapable of his mercy; then every man should be a reprobate and incapable of mercy; and abandoned as a vessel of wrath unto everlasting condemnation.  
And you consider not, that to be uncapable of mercy is to be uncapable of God's love; even in your own discourse; whence it followeth, that God must after a certain time cease to love them; as in reason it should be acknowledged by you, according to the tenor of your opinion; and that when the door of repentance is shut upon them, as yourself have phrasified it, most of all when God condemns them to everlasting torments in hell fire, he must needs cease to love them. And consequently you must necessarily admit mutability in the nature of God, which is directly contrary to the perfection of God delivered unto us in holy Scripture. I the Lord am not changed and you sons of jacob are not consumed. Mala. 3. 6. And with God is no variableness nor shadow of change. jac. 1. 19 This rock you have in your eye & labour to keep your Tenet from dashing itself desperately against it. Wherein how well you have carried yourself we are to consider in the next place.   

CHAP. XX.  
Whilst God of a loving Father becomes a severe judge, there is no change or alteration at all in God, but only in men and in their actions. God's will is always fulfiled even in such as go most against it. How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressors temporal with torments everlasting.  
THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration, yourself proposed in the former chapter; but you address yourself to make answer thereunto in this yet not without fetching a great compass which inclines rather to a work of circumvention then of satisfaction. Love you say is the Mother of all God's works and the fertility of his power and essence; that is the fruitful Mother of all things, and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitful Mother of all things. Yet to show how apt you are to forget yourself (which usually falleth out when men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit) in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a acquaint conceit that we may conceive wisdom to be the Father and power the Mother of all God's works of wonder; and I think you account few or no works more wonderful than the creation.  
And yet that which you say here, I prefer before that which you had formerly expressed there; because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God than either wisdom or power. But you have not discovered unto us, if love be the Mother what is to be accounted the Father. Or if you refer this to the loving will and affection of God, why this should be accounted the Mother rather than the Father of the works of God.  
Again we have earthly parents as Father and Mother, which are endued with wills and loves and other affections, and it is out of all course to say that their love or their will is the Mother of their children; especially considering that will is found in the Father, as well as in the Mother, yea and love also; if not in greater measure. But I deny not but that God made the world out of love; but out of love to whom? to the creature? Nothing less I should think (as before I have showed) but rather out of love to himself, as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himself. And great reason, God who is the sovereign Creator of all things, should be the supreme end of all things. But let this pass. Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous, but very preposterous, and unsound. First it contains a general proposition with the reason of it; and then a qualification or limitation thereof (by way of exception) unto a certain time. The proposition is this: No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love. Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory, but our temporal being also and the preservation thereof. For you make creation to be a fruit of God's love.  
Now this proposition so general to my understanding is utterly untrue. For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any. (For they are merely gratuita dona, and it is lawful to do what he will with his own, in bestowing it on whom he will, and denying it to whom he will. And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.) But more than this as God was not bound to create any, so neither can any thing (save his own will) bind him to preserve any thing in being. But as he deals with other creatures so could he deal with men, even take their temporal being from them, without any purpose ever to restore it, and not only the being of their bodies, but of their souls also, turning both into nothing. Yet thus could God deal with men and Angels were they never so innocent, never so holy as Arminius confesseth.  
But let us consider the reasons whereupon you ground this. Now these are two, the one because God hath created our natures: Now the unsoundness of this reason appears by this, that God hath created other things as well as man; Yet who will conclude herehence, that God must needs preserve them, and not exclude them from this fruit of his love. Your other reason is because, God cannot change and this is as weak as the former. For like as God though at one time he gives us life, another time takes life from us; yet all this is done by him without any change in himself, like as in course of nature, though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the year in the wether, in the heavens, in the earth, in the Sea, in the states and Kingdoms of the World, and in the bodies of all creatures, yet without any change at all in himself; yea though he set an end to this visible World, this can infer no variableness in God, so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angels, and so exclude them from all fruits of his love: Yet should all this come to pass without any shadow of change in God.  
Yet you have a third reason, which is this; Love is the nature of God as Creator: You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World, and therefore that it was not natural to God to create it; therefore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator, the sense and meaning whereof I comprehend not. And I have made it already appear that though God creates a thing, yet is he not thereby bound to preserve it any longer than he seeth good; and what other sense you imply when you say, Love is God's nature as a Creator, I discern not. You make creation to be a fruit of God's love; it is very incongruous to say that this love of God, whereby he creates any thing belongs unto him as a Creator: But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them. For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause, than the cause by the effect in denominating any subject. Who ever said that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis?  
But let us proceed to the limitation of this your proposition; and that is this: No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love, until the sinister use of that contingency wherewith he endued it, or the improvement of inclinations, naturally bend unto evil come to that height, as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. First touching your meaning in this, then touching the manner how you express this meaning; your meaning in brief is this. No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of God's love: until men have filled up the measure of their iniquity. Of this your opinion I have spoken often; I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it. And that is this, Such an height of sin implieth a contradiction to infinite justice to vouchsafe them any favour.  
Now of this proposition of yours I see no reason. Nay I seem to observe manifest reason to the contrary. For justice consists in giving to every one his own; Now seeing the wages of any sin is death even everlasting death; Not to condemn him that hath deserved to be condemned, seems as contradictory to justice as not to condemn him that is come to an height of impiety.  
And which is more, many thousand infants perish in Original sin, and yet we believe that Manasses who unto Original sin added many abominable sins, was notwithstanding all this, saved; and will you say, there was any contradiction unto God's justice in all this? And I wonder you so much beat upon the contradiction unto God's justice and take no notice of God's mercy, whereas we do not consider the pardoning of sins as an act of God's justice but rather as an act of his mercy: and without quest on it is not contradiction to God's mercy to pardon any sin.  
And God is merciful as well as just; and it is very absurd in my judgement to say that God in performing an act of mercy contradicts his justice, as well as to say that in performing an act of justice he contradicts his mercy. And the reason is because it is indifferent to God to exercise either his mercy in commiserating whom he will, or his justice in hardening whom he will. And therefore when the Apostle proposeth such an objection, against his former doctrine of election & reprobation as this; What shall we say then, is there any injustice with God? He answereth it by this, that God is free and hath a 
Rom. 9 14  lawful power to exercise mercy and compassion on whom he will. God forbid saith he we should think so; For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on him to whom I will show mercy, and will have compassion on him, on whom I will have compassion. 
v. 15.   
And yet I pray consider, what colour of contradiction to God's justice in pardoning the sins of them, be they never so many never so fowl; for whom the son of God (as you say) hath suffered the sorrows of death, and thereby made full satisfaction for all their sins; unless you will say, that Christ died to make satisfaction for original sin only and not for sins actual, or for some of their actual sins and not for all; to which strange and uncouth opinion: You seem to incline in the end of your 15. Chapter, where you say, that Christ only received our infirmities and original disease, and not the contempt of him and his law. I have cause to suspect that you concur with Arminians in maintaining, that all Infants, the very children of Pagans, Turks and Saracens that perish in their infancy are saved. For how can it be conceived that any improvement of evil inclinations is made in them unto such an height as that it should imply contradiction to God's justice, to show them any favour?  
And where such an height of impiety is not, you profess they cannot be excluded from all fruits of his love. Yet I confess their souls have a being and that eternal; and if this be a fruit of God's love, then though the height of impiety be never so great, yet is no man or devil excluded from this fruit of God's love: For they shall continue for ever and that to their everlasting wo. As touching your manner of expressing your meaning, this increase of sin, you call the sinister use of contingency that God hath bestowed upon them, your meaning must be the sinister use of the liberty of their wills: which in your phrase is the sinister use of contingency, whereof I am persuaded you can give no example.  
And by the way I observe you suppose in every natural man, a power to use the liberty of his will, either will or ill. I had thought and do still think there is no power in carnal man to use their natural liberty well, but only to use it either in this or that subject, but so as still the use of it shall be evil. For the affection of the flesh is not subject to the law of God nor can be, saith the Apostle, and every man is dead in sin till 
Rom. 8. 7.  God quickeneth him. Ephesi. 2. 2. And a dead man can perform no action of life natural, if dead naturally, no action of life spiritual, if dead spiritually: But whether natural inclinations unto evil may be thus far improved in the children, by their Forefathers on no, (you say) is disputable but in another place: that is, it is a disputable question, whether children may not by the sins of their Father be so far corrupt, that it implieth contradiction to God's justice to show them any favour.  
You might as well say it is a disputable question whether there be any God or no; For that there should be a God, and yet not able to cure the natural corruption wherein any man is borne is contradiction. And if he were, then sure he were able to show them no small favour. And as for contradictions to God's justice, there is so little colour hereof in the saving of Infants, that on the contrary, there is nothing (the condemnation of the Son of God alone excepted) wherein the justice of God is more obscure, then in the condemnation of Infants. I think you have little mind to come to an account, how you do accommodate this your doctrine unto Infants; yet you must be called hereunto whether you will or no, unless you clip the wings of your general propositions, as when you say: None can be excluded from the fruits of God's love until the improvement of inclinations naturally bend to evil come to that height of impiety as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. Yet by the way you put in an exception concerning Infants, and that is in case there be a neglect of duties, to be performed to them by their Elders; why do you not speak plainly and say, saving in case they are not baptised? And what think you in this case? Are they damned? I cannot believe you think so; yet the face of your discourse looks this way. I say I cannot believe it; and that for two reasons.  
The one is, because the tenor of your tenet carrieth you rather to maintain with the Arminians, that all children dying in their Infancy though they dye without the Church, are saved. My second reason is, because herein you should directly contradict the discourse King james had with certain Divines a little before his death, and his apparent profession to the contrary; not as his private opinion, but as the opinion generally of our Divines, whom he had learned in his younger days to have censured Austin for his opinion to the contrary, as one that was Durus Pater Infantum. Now I am so well persuaded of you, that I think you would not willingly enter upon so flat a contradiction to such a discourse of King james in the days of King Charles, and that so soon after his death.  
If you write only concerning men of ripe years, you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly, and not to give them longer wings than is fit.  
In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of, and as much advanced by some as cried down by others. Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable, and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him, an orthodox interpretation thereof, though neither suitable to the mind of Damascen commonly reputed the Father of it. Yet look what in this kind is wanting in them is supplied by Arminiensis, who gives both an orthodox construction thereof, and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene, of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodox interpretation and the more orthodox the more opposite to their constructions, who with great cry of words draw it to the countenancing of their Arminian Tenets without cause, Love you say is the fruit of God's antecedent will, wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent will. Fruit and effect you make all one (as with good reason you may.)  
Now what, I pray you, is this effect which you call love? You seem to intimate, that they are the effects of creation, as when you say, Every particular faculty of soul or body is a pledge undoubted of God's love. Yet faculties of souls and bodies are found in beasts, but God's antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men. Neither doth Damascene at all refer it to the work of creation; but makes it to be that whereby God will have all to be saved.  
Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts, but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxius unto damnation as well as capable of salvation? Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of God's consequent will, what do you mean by wrath? Is it either a resolution to take vengeance, or the execution of vengeance itself? I think you take it for the execution of vengeance itself. Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speak of, it became you to express so much, or whether you conceive it to be different, yet it were fit you should take notice of it, and acknowledge that this is a fruit of God's consequent will, as well as wrath; that as effectually presupposing obedience, as this disobedience: and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed, as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it. A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time, how well you perform it we may in good time consider with God's help.  
Next you enter upon another form of the same distinction (as you pretend) and you suffer it to fly with one wing; For you talk of God's absolute will, (which you seem to confound with God's antecedent will) but as touching the member congruously opposite, you leave us to seek for that. But as it is we are to consider it; Gods absolute will was (you say) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell, of joys and miseries immortal. This cannot be understood of God's consequent will; for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment, and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of either; but his consequent will is not so indifferent. For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity, and this presupposeth rather than causeth capableness.  
Neither can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning. For the antecedent will in Damascene, is only referred to the will of God, whereby he wills man's salvation: but this absolute will is (you say) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell. To help this you tell us: That this absolute will (whose possible objects are two) is in the first place set on man's eternal joy. But you do not proceed to show on what it is set in the next place, as if by such like incongrueties you desired rather to confounded your reader, then to satisfy him.  
Yet by the tenor of your discourse you leave it to us to guess, that in the second place to wit upon the despising of God's love, it is set upon a man's damnation. So that by this your doctrine, both God's antecedent will and consequent will is all one, and that is God's absolute will. But no such thing is found in Damascene, from whom such as you are, do usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God, and will consequent: And indeed you do well to make one as absolute as another; for like as wrath, the fruit of this will of God in the second place (as you imply) hath not its course but upon presupposition of disobedience; so in like manner, the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruit of this will of God in the first place, hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience.  
And that you may know what this fruit I speak of is; I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance; so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward; And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience, as well as the other presupposeth disobedience. And thus shall God as truly be said absolutely to wish a man's damnation as his salvation, and no more conditionally will the one than the other. And like as if God be absolutely said to will a man's salvation, it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it, as to contradict himself by frustrating the contrary possibility, which unto man he had appointed: so though God be said absolutely to will a man's damnation; yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himself by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed: Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility. It is I confess a possibility to the contrary, but not a contrary possibility. Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evil are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners: but yet they are no contrary liberties; so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation, which are consequent upon the use of this liberty, though they are possibilities to contrary things, yet are they not contrary possibilities. And as God's anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up, but upon the despising of his love alluring unto good; so Gods love signifying the execution of reward, doth never rise up, but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good.  
But if you take God's wrath for his will to punish. I say that look by what reason God's wrath, as it signifies his will to punish, doth not arise in God but upon foresight of man's disobedience; in like sort the love of God, as it signifieth his will to reward, doth never arise in God but upon foresight of his obedience. And look in what congruity Gods will to punish for sin deserves to be called reprobation: in the same measure of congruity God's will to reward for obedience, is to be called Election, if so be we will make Election and reprobation congruously opposite, as it is fit we should. Neither can it be avoided, but that the turning of tender love and compassion into severity and wrath must imply manifestly an extreme change in God. For like as when man's obedience is turned into disobedience, this cannot be without change; so when Gods fervent love is turned into severe wrath, this cannot be possibly without change. Which I further prove a priori thus, where that which was, ceaseth to be, and that which formerly was not, beginneth to be, there must needs be a change, and that more ways than one: But where tender love is turned into severe wrath and that inexorable (as before you have expressed) there that which was, ceaseth to be, and that which was not, begins to be: therefore there must needs be change, and that more ways than one, to wit a change from some thing, and a change into another thing.  
The minor is proved; For if the same tender love did still continue, it could not be said to be turned into wrath, but rather it should be said to consist with wrath. Likewise wrath formerly was not in God; for as much as you make it arise out of the ashes of his love despised, whereby that phrase (the ashes of God's love) doth manifestly argue that you will have God's love as it were consumed to ashes; therefore it must needs cease towards those that have thus despised it.  
Neither is it true but a bold affirmation without all truth, to say that the changs is wholly seated in man's deviation, which you avouch without any colour of proof: But I have already proved that this Tenet of yours maintains a change in God, unavoidable by all the wit of man.  
It seems you would reason thus, the cause why the love of God is turned into wrath, is wholly seated in man; therefore the change is only in man. But this is so inconsequent that it seems common modesty would not suffer you expressly to insist upon it.  
Though we sin, yet can we not make any change in God; I the Lord am not changed: therefore ye Sons of jacob are not 
Mala. 3. 6.  consumed. To touch this by the way; Adam I confess deviated from the good course of obedience, which he might have taken: but I deny that any natural man hath liberty, to take any good course of obedience, till God hath renewed him; yet such Pelagian acknowledgements are so frequent in your discourse, that they are found in every hedge.  
2. The Sun indeed never changeth with the Moon, nor without the Moon, saving from place to place, and so he never changeth, one time only excepted in the days of josuah.  
But what mean you to say, that it is one & the same heat, that is with us in the spring time, and with them that travail in the sands of Africa? Can it be one and the same accident in so not different only but distracted subjects. Yet it is one in kind but not in degree; like as grace and glory in the Saints of God is the same kind though different in degree; and produced in them all by one and the same love of God, that neither differs in kind nor in degree. The same heat of the Sun inflames matter capable of combustion not other matter. So God the same and without all change doth refresh the good, and consume the wicked. We nothing doubt of this; but then we must not say, his love is turned into wrath. For like as the heat of the Sun could not be turned into cold without change in the Sun; so neither could God's love be turned into wrath without alteration in God himself: God consumes the wicked, but not by love. God saves his Elect, but not by wrath; Yet his will is one and the same in both, though the effects be different, and no marunile; For his will is free, as whereby he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth; and as the one tends to the salvation of some, so the other tends to the condemnation of others.  
It is true, there is none but hath been partaker of God's blessings one way or other. It is true, the measure of his wrath is equal to the riches of his bounty despised thus far. The more riches of his bounty we despise, the greater will by the measure of his wrath, of we continue in impenitency. Yet there is a subordinate difference, according as the same riches of God's bounty, may be in greater measure despised by one then by another. You are pleased needlessly to phrasifie this over and over again instead of affording better matter to satisfy your reader; but you are very liberal of words. But by the way you foist in a false die as thinking, that in the multitude of words it might not be perceaved, as truly I was like to have overslipped it. As when you say, the only rule for measuring sin or transgression right, must be taken from the degrees of man's opposition to God's delight or pleasure in his salvation. Wherein you manifestly contradict yourself; For before you said it was to be taken from the degrees of mercy despised; But now you say it is only to be taken from the degrees of man's despising it. Which indeed is the righter of the two. So then the measure of judas his sin is to be taken from the degrees of his opposition unto grace; which you in a strange manner express by the delight that God doth take in his salvation; Why what mean you by this? Is judas saved think you or shall any reprobate be saved and not damned rather? what moved you then to talk of God's delight in the salvation of them, that are or shall be damned?  
Is it possible that God can take delight in that which never was, nor is, not ever shallbe? You may as well say that God takes delight in a multitude of other worlds of men and Angels, which were and are possible.  
Yet as if this conceit of yours were a principle of credit you tell us demurely, that not a dram of God's delight or pleasure can be abated not a scruple of his will, but must be accomplished, to wit of that delight in judas his salvation, which you do very gravely attribute unto God, and so consequently, Gods will you speak of, which must be accomplished, is his will of judas his salvation.  
And this must be accomplished, & indeed so it had need, before God can take any delight and pleasure in it. But how or when shall God's will of judas his salvation be accomplished? Will you give me leave to read this riddle out of your intimations? You seem to me to imply that this will of God is accomplished in judas his damnation. Because look in what measure of love, God would have saved him, in such a measure of wrath, he doth damn him and so accordingly, look in what measure, God's delight would have been in judas his salvation had he been saved; in the same measure God doth delight in his damnation he being damned. Vous avez; thus have you the interpretation of this riddle.  
And by the same reason, you may proceed to make other riddles, and ask how is the will of God as touching Peter's damnation, and God's delight and pleasure therein accomplished to every dram and scruple; and answer that this is accomplished in his salvation. For look in what measure God would have delighted in his damnation had he been damned; in the same measure God now delights in his salvation, he being saved.  
And thus the delight and pleasure that any man takes in his child's salvation may be said to be accomplished in the delight and pleasure, which he shall take in his child's condemnation. For the Saints shall judge the World, even the Godly Father join with Christ in pronouncing the sentence 
2 Cor. 6.  of condemnation upon his ungodly Son, etc. God delights in our obedience and in our repentance when it is; but where there is no repentance or obedience how is it probable he or any should delight in that which is not. 1 Sam. 15. 22. Hath the Lord as great pleasure in burnt-offrings and sacrifices as when the voice of the Lord is obeyed? Perhaps you will say, yet his will is that all should repent; I answer his will commanding, is so to all that hear it; but his will decreeing is not that all shall repent that are commanded to repent. For then all should repent: To say, that God will have any thing come to pass which yet never comes to pass, Austin hath long ago professed to be as good as to deny God's omnipotency. And whereas repentance is the gift of God, as the Scripture plainly testifieth, it is apparent that God doth not give repentance 
Act. 11. 1●. 2 Tim. 2. last.  unto all, and therefore neither did he will or determine to give repentance unto all. God is said to love persons in as much as he willeth good things unto them. God may be said to love things moral as repentance and obedience, in as much as he will reward persons for their repentance and obedience.  
Neither of these loves is accommodable to punishment, no more then unto reward. Yet look in what respect God may be said to love the one, so may he be said to love the other; And the Apostle professeth of himself, and his fellows that they were the good savour of the Lord even in them that perish. And every man knoweth reward to be a fruit of justice 
2 Cor. 2●  remunerative, as well as punishment is of justice vindicative; and each presupposeth the will of God, as well one as the other. For God is not bound to punish sin, he may pardon it. Nay how is he not bound to pardon all sin, of all men, if so be Christ hath made satisfaction for the sins of all?  
And with these Tenets of yours you are grown so far in love, that because some school points do not bear such fair wether towards them as might be wished; you would put the maintainers of them upon some better explication of such Tenets. The Tenet is, that God doth punish sinners in the life to come citra condignum. The Modern divines (as it seems) by your margin are Calvin & Zanchy that maintain this; against whom you oppose Coppenius, a Lutheran I guess, I do not think he is a Papist. Sure I am, Bradwardine and Gerson maintain the same; and as I remember it is 
And Aquinas 1. 9 21. Art. q. ad. 〈◊〉  most generally received amongst the Schoolmen. And as for Coppenius his reasons; when he demands whether God doth remit aught for Christ's satisfaction or no: I answer it is not for Christ's satisfaction; but merely according to the good pleasure of his own will.  
And when he urgeth that of james, judgement merciless shall be to him that showeth no mercy: I answer that like as when 
2 Tim. 〈◊〉  the Apostle prayeth for Onesiphorus that he may find mercy at that day, his meaning can be no other than this, that his sins might be pardoned and his soul saved: so likewise in just proportion they may be said to taste of judgement merciless, whose sinners are not pardoned and whose souls are not saved. As for your reason it is grounded merely upon a fiction of your own, that subjecteth the delight of God unto degrees, (whereas his simplicity freeth him as well from composition of degrees, as from any other kind of composition,) as also unto change even there where you undertake to clear God from change: If judas had been saved and Peter damned, God had still been the same and no other than now he is, as touching will and delight, and every thing that is in God. But by the way let me tell you, you corrupt the state of the question in supposing that by this Tenet, which you dislike, the punishment of reprobation is less than divine justice exacts. For they maintain no such thing, but rather the contrary that no degree of punishment is exacted by any justice in God, but left indifferent to the determination of God's will; And therefore Bradwardine distinguisseth between meritum actuale and meritum potentiale. Meritum actuale is in reference 
Bradward. lib. cap. 39 pag. 360.  to such a degree of punishment or reward, which the will of God hath determined.  
But meritum potentiale is in reference to any degree of reward or punishment which God might have determined. And Gerson professeth that when a sin is committed, it is merely in the good pleasure of God to inflict what kind or 
Gers. de vita spiritualli anima lect. 1. Coroll. 8.  degree of punishment he will.  
2. Your text is to prove that God's nature admitteth no change, albeit of a loving Father he becomes a severe judge; albeit his tender love be turned into wrath. And for proof of this you think it enough to say that the change is in man: and that God's wrath kindles not but out of the ashes of his love despised. To this you take on an other point (nothing at all to the purpose) that God's wrath is in proportion to men's sins, neither less nor more; and this you prosecute a whole leaf and more, that what you want of solid answer, you may supply by shilling men's eyes with an idle discourse. Well we have considered what your discourse hath been on the by, touching this, that men's punishments are not less than their deserts. Now let us consider your following extravagancy, in showing that men's punishments are not more than their deserts.  
And here you tell us that to think God should punish sin, unless it were truly against his will, or any sin more deeply than it is against his will and pleasure is one of those 3. gross transformations of the divine nature which Saint Austin refutes. For thus to do, is neither incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. I would we were worthy to know 3. things. First who they are whom you oppose in this: Secondly what those 3. so gross transformations are, which you speak of out of Austin. Thirdly, to what end tends all this, on which you spend so many words.  
But to take it as we find it. No Christian I think ever doubted, but that all sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a transgression of God's law, & accordingly contrary to the commandment of God, which is usually called the will of God. But that any sin should be committed contrary to the will of God, as it is taken for the decree and determination of God, I had thought no sober man would have affirmed. Austin I am sure plainly professeth that Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens feri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo. And albeit Aquinas seems concealedly 
Enchirid. cap. 95.  to oppose Austin in this in q. 9 19 art. 9 Yet notwithstanding concludeth thus: Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri: Ibid. ad tertium. Yet I willingly grant that every sin is against God's will and pleasure, as it signifieth his pleasure what shall be our duty to do; which is nothing else but his commandment. And it is as true that herein are no degrees, every sin is equally against the commaundments of God.  
And the will and pleasure of God whereby he will have this or that to be our duty to do or leave undone, hath no degrees. For God's simplicity freeth him as well from composition of degrees as from any other composition. But yet some transgressions are greater than others in as much as God may be more or less wronged by us, or ourselves, or our brethren. It is neither incident to the divine nature nor to the humane, to punish any more than it is one's will and pleasure to punish. But to a man it is incident to punish for those crimes wherein themselves take delight. For a man may be condemned and punished for adultery by them who are adulterers themselves; as appears in those that brought unto our Saviour a Woman taken in adultery. For when our Saviour said. Let him that is amoungst you without sin cast the first stone at her, the text saith herupon being accused by their own conscience, 
john. 8.  they went out one by one beginning at the eldest, even to the last. john. 8. 7. Wherefore you do overlash in not contenting yourself to affirm this of the divine nature, but extending it to every nature imaginable.  
Again, what mean you to call that a way wardness of men, whereof you profess the humane nature is uncapable; as namely to be offended at that which doth not offend them? What is a wild manner of discourse, if this be not? Nothing inferior in absurdity is that which followeth, as when you say, that To punish any which do not contradict their wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabitans of Hell. If the Devils punish any, as you say they do; do they punish them for sins committed in contradiction to their wills? And how many Magistrates do punish even such sins, whereof themselves are guilty? They are bound by law to punish profane swearers, to punish drunckerds; is it necessary that every such Magistrate should be free from such sins themselves? But the Devils themselves you say do not vex the wicked but the Godly; this being a most absurd conceit at first sight, you have taken a course to charm the absurdity of it by adding, concerning the wicked. Till God's justice overtake them; might you not as well add concerning the Godly, Till Gods will and pleasure is, and so far as his pleasure is, the Devil shall vex them; as appears in the example of job? But ordinarily in the course of God's providence; who are more vexed by the Devil, the godly or the wicked rather?  
Now because it it apparent that in your opinion the Devil torments infernally the damned and hath no power over the Saints of God; though they are more prone to vex the godly than the wicked as you think: therefore you put yourself to devise a reason why the Devils torment the damned, whereas the sins of the damned men were committed only in following the will of the Devil too much.  
But the reason you give is of the wildest and most contradictious nature that ever any I think was heard of. For the reason you give is this: Therefore the Devils cease not to torment them, because they can find no ease in tormenting them: Whereas if they could find any case in tormenting them, than (you say) they would be less displeased with them, and consequently torment them less; which if it were true the Devils should be as arrant fools as ever lived; as namely in ceasing to do that, by the doing whereof they should find ease, by this supposition of yours.  
And in the mean time you represent unto as a proper model of God's providence, while you conceive, the tormenting of the damned to be put over by God to the will of the Devil; as if the dispensation of the degrees of punishment, thereby to justify Gods proceeding, were remitted to the discretion and equity of those Angels of darkness. And who I pray shall be the dispenser of that punishment, that in justice belongs to the Devils themselves? Yet as if you had performed some great exploit against some body, you demand bravely; Whether they did not rather dream than think of God, that some times write, as if it were not as much against God's will, to have men dye, as it is against man's will to suffer death. In writing this, you think, they did rather dream than think on God in writing of the former, sure I am you did if not dream yet think of the Devil.  
But which writing yours or theirs, be like unto a sick man's dream, let not the indifferent only, but the unindifferent also judge. For you show as little sobriety in the impugning of these, in their writing concerning the will of God, then in inventing your former fancies concerning the Devil. Is it not by the will of God apppointed that all must dye? And is it probable then, it should be against God's will that any should dye? O but you speak belike of the second death, I answer; Is it not as well apppointed by the will of God that all that die the first death in sin, shall dye the second death of everlasting sorrow; as it is apppointed by the will of God that all shall dye the first death? And will it not by the same reason follow; that look in what sense it is impossible that any should dye the first death against the will of God, in the same sense it is impossible that any should dye the second death against the will of God? and if they suffered death (as you say) to this end, that Gods will may be fulfiled in their suffering; how is it possible that this their suffering of death should be against the will of God? which yet you boldly affirm and that with such confidence as to break out into a censure of them that think the contrary, as if they did rather dream than think the contrary.  
And yet when you break forth in avouching manifest contradiction, would you have your reader conceive yourself to be in a sober discourse waking? or in a dream sleeping? Yet this is usual in your writings.  
4. The main point proposed: (to wit how God without change of a loving Father becomes a severe judge) you dispatched in a few words saying, the change is wholly in man; and therein giving us your word for it; and afterwards served yourself with certain illustrations nothing to the purpose. And to refresh your spirits and get some breath you turned aside, to the consideration of the proportion of men's punishments to their sins; points merely extravagant. And now you take liberty to maintain your extravagant discourse by enquiring, how it stands with God's justice to inflict eternal punishments for temporal sins. We must be content to follow you in your wild goose race; For seeing we are in, we must go through and get out as we can. Yet you acknowledge the doubt proposed nothing pertinent; but to make matter of farther discourse you tell us, it were pertinent, if the immortal happiness whereunto the riches of God's bounty did daily lead them here on earth, had not farther exceeded the pleasure of this life, than the pains of Hell do those grievances which caused them to murmur against their heavenly Father. You are very bold to acknowledge, God to be the heavenly Father of the reprobates. Whereas the Apostle professeth that we are all the children of God by faith in Christ jesus. Gal. 3. 25. And if sons than heirs even heirs of God and coheyres with Christ. Rom. 8. Much more bold, if because our Saviour Christ exhorts the Apostles to be like their heavenly Father, therefore you will acknowledge him the heavenly Father, even of reprobates also.  
This is by the way, I come to the main: and say first; were it so as you speak, yet this doubt were nothing pertinent to this place, of clearing God from innovation and change of nature, as often as his tender love is turned into fierce wrath. Secondly, your argument contracted being this. Immortal happiness doth more exceed the pleasures of this life, than the pains of Hell exceed the grievances of this life: therefore it is impertinent to make a doubt how God's justice doth appear in inflicting eternal punishment for temporal sin. I see no just consequence at all in this. I will draw it to the best form I can devise, in congruity to your meaning which I desire to pick out as well as I can. And that is this; Their obedience should be rewarded with infinite joy: therefore their obedience may be justly punished with infinite sorrow: and no doubt is to be made hereof. And this I confess is more suitable, speaking of the protension & duration of each then of their intention as you do. For though the joys of Heaven were never so great beyond the degree of sorrows of Hell.  
Yet if they were not everlasting the comparison would not hold. Because there could be but a finite difference between their intentions; for joys of man cannot be infinite in degree. But if the one were everlasting the other not; there should be an infinite difference in this. And albeit the joys of Heaven were but of equal degree, in proportion to the sorrows of bell; Yet the argument would every whit proceed as well upon supposal of inequality, and that of exuberancy on the part of joys.  
Now I will show, what exception may be taken against this. First no laws of the World (the execution whereof are reputed just) do or can proceed after any such proportion? Let a man take a purse upon the high way, or kill a man he shall dye for it; Let him give ten times as much to the poor; let him save ten men's lives, they neither do, nor can reward, in proportion to the punishment; Let the greatest honour or any other kind of rewards be heaped upon him; all are inferior to his life. For all that ever a man hath, he will give for his life.  
But than you will say, if it be just with man, to punish with 
job. 1.  death; though they cannot possibly administer rewards in any proportion thereunto; how much more is it just with God, to punish with eternal death, seeing be can and will reward obediency with eternal life? And I nothing doubt but that it is just; but the question is wherein consisteth this justice? For it seems that justice in this kind should stand in reference to the work, and not be measured by any alien consideration. Especially considering that the question may be revived on the part of the reward. For how stands it with justice to reward with everlasting bliss a temporal obedience, so that still we shallbe to seek of the right measure of justice in this kind.  
Again, if a Master shall say unto a servant; do such a thing and I will give thee an hundred pound; it will not herehence follow, that for his disobedience the Master may make him pay an hundred pound. And the reason is because it is manifest, that like as a man may give what he will freely; so he may reward as liberally as he will. But it is not so manifest that God himself may do what evil he will unto his creature, and accordingly afflict what punishment he will for the transgression of his creature.  
And therefore the reason that you give for justifying God in this is unsound; and you seem to be sensible of it, when you desire to help yourself with the consideration of men's multiplied contempts of grace, all which nevertheless do make up but a short continuance in sin. Besides that, this consideration hath no place in such infants as perish in original sin. You cannot find any neglect in them, much less often, and yet to say, and barely to say That often and perpetual neglects turns slames of eternal love into an eternal consuming fire, is to please yourself in your own dictates, but to prove nothing. The same song you sing still; when you tell us, the oftener God pardons a man, the greater is his wrath against impenitency; save that the prosecution of it is more absurd than the former; For it hath reference rather to the intention of his wrath, which is greater or less according to the qualities of men's sins, not to the protension and duration of it, which is equal to all.  
But by the way, where I pray doth it appear, that God doth often pardon the sins of reprobates or that he doth at all pardon them? Doth God pardon any sins without repentance? Or are the reprobates at any time brought by God unto repentance? I am sure Austin professeth the contrary, where he saith, Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque 
Contra. I●lia. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4.  poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem praebeat. But to return to the point; with far more reason do they discourse, that considering the infinite nature of God against whom sin is committed, do therhence infer the desert of infinite punishment, and because a creature being but finite is not capable of infinite punishment in intention, therefore make him liable to infinite punishment in duration. Though I well know also, this is excepted against; and therefore Miranrandula whom you mention makes choice to reply on this, that as many as dye in sin, their sins, being never broken of, continue with them in infinitum, and therefore do justly expose them to infinite punishment in duration.  
Yet I very well consider what just exceptions may be taken against this also, and the less we can satisfy ourselves in the reason hereof, the more cause have we to refer all to the will and pleasure of God; until such time as the wonderful wisdom and congruity of his actions shall be more clearly discovered unto us.  
5. As for Lactantius I am not apt to quarrel with him about any incommodious speeches; but willing to accept any convenient interpretation of them; In anger, as it is in man, we all know there is something material as the kindling of the blood about the heart, and something formal, which is the desire of revenge.  
But as divers other passions do include imperfection in the very formal part of them, so doth anger, for it supposeth grief: Yet some passions in the formal part of them imply no imperfection as love and joy. And accordingly the rule that Aquinas gives is this: Cum nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est naturale in eyes: illaque imperfectionem important; etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphoricè propter similitudinem effectus: Quae autem imperfectionem non important de Deo propriè dicuntur ut Amor & Ga●dium, tamen sine passione, ut dictum est: 1. q. 20. art. 1. ad 2. And in another place, Ira non dicitur in Deo secundom passionem animi, sed secundum judicium justitiae: prout vult vindicta facere de peccato. 12. q. 47. art. 1. ad. 1. God you say is more deeply displeased with sin then man, as if God's displeasure and man's differed only in degree, and not rather toto genere.  
Neither are there any degrees of displeasure at all in God properly, but attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus, as anger is, when God punisheth; so he shows a grenter anger when he punisheth more severely, and a less anger, when he punisheth jesse severely. You make God unchangeable in word yet not so always neither, as where you discoursed of an impotent immutability. But if you maintain that God did for a time will the salvation of any man before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity, and not afterwards: or that his tender love is turned into severe wrath, it cannot be avoided but you must make change and innovation in the nature of God.  
6. It is true that love includes no imperfection in it, as touching the formal part thereof, unless it be considered as a passion, but anger doth, in as much as it supposeth grief. But take love as it signifieth a will to do good, and anger as it signifeth a will to take vengeance on them that do evil; and the one is as natural unto God as the other. The truth is, neither of them natural, but free; Gods love to himself is: natural and nessary, but his love to his creatures is not, no more than his mercy, and he hath mercy on whom he will. He is neither tied by any natural inclination to make the World, nor being made, is he bound to maintain it, but as he made it according to the good pleasure of his will, so he doth maintain it. Every love of God to his creatures is not suitably opposite to his anger. 〈◊〉 ●he anger of God being the will of punishing, nothing is congruously opposite herunto but his love, as it signifieth the will of rewarding, and rewarding presupposeth obedience, as well as punishing presupposeth disobedience; but the will of doing the one or the other presupposeth neither.  
You might as well say that justice is not so natural to God as mercy; and I wonder at your unreasonable declination of this comparison in this place; whereas in other places you insist so much on God's justice, as to take little or no notice of his mercy. Yet if it be true, as you have heretofore discoursed, that there is a justice before the will of God, by which the will of God is ordered; how can you make that doctrine conformable unto this? It is true, God condemns no man but for sin; and it is as true that God rewards no man but for obedience; only here is the difference. The best obedience of man's is no meritorious cause of his salvation, but only disposing thereto: but man's disobedience is not only a disposing cause, but meritorious of his condemnation.  
It is untrue that compassion come naturally from God; it comes freely ●so doth punishment also, not naturally, much less unnaturally, but freely: For he could pardon sin in allof it pleased him, and doth pardon it in all his elect. 〈◊〉 God when he punisheth, relinquisheth the exercise of his merciful nature, but undoubtedly he exerciseth his vindicative nature. Now indeed the exercise of his merciful nature is proper to his own people, as whom he hath made vessels of mercy, and for whom Christ hath made satisfaction upon the cross.  
And therefore when he proceeds to punishment against them, he may be said to exercise alienum opus, and is represented unto us loathe to come unto it. How shall I give thee up. Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as 
●os. 11. 8.  Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, etc. God's anger is seen and felt by the effects of it, but to whom? only to those that know God to be the Author of the things they suffer.  
But the Angels and Saints of God do otherwise see God in the joys of Heaven. In this world the manifestation of God's wrath doth not always hide God from men, but rather is many times a means to make God known unto them; yea a better means then continual prosperity, which makes men grow proud and say, Who is the Lord? If anger and hate are 
Pro. 30. 9  not in God, but upon supposal of sin, than they cannot be said to be in God, but only by eternal denomination attributed unto him, lest otherwise we should introduce a manifest innovation into the nature of God.  
And indeed anger saith Aquinas is often attributed unto God propter similitudinem effectus, and so as often as he punisheth: and not till then is he said to be angry. But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi, this must needs be as everlasting as God's will; and if you deduce any cause hereof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of God's will, which Aquinas professeth never any man was so mad as to do. And God's hatred of Esau, is in Scripture 
v. q. 23. art. 5.  made suitable to God's love of jacob, and if this love be the will of election, than hatred must be the will of reprobation. And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory; be deservedly accounted God's love, why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory, be as deservedly accounted God's hatred? You undertake to show how, Love and anger being passions or linked with passions are rightly conceived to be in God; but I hope you will not attribute them unto God, either a● passibus, or linked with passions. For albeit love and joy man's formally be attributed unto God, because they include no imperfection, yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleged out of him.   

CHAP. XXI.  
How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature.  
TWO is true some Schoolmen think that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative; not because this includes rationem dati & accepti, but rather because it includes, aequalitatem dati & accepti. Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety, than justice commutative: as may be seen in Vasque 1. in 1. part. disput. 86. Likewise I know none, that think, mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger. For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God, as voluntas miserandi: that being as easily abstracted from grief, as this from compassion.  
As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or moral qualities may be contained in the divine essence eminently, is a very poor justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as yourself heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitely different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truly verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certain reference unto his creatures without all passion.  
So there is a will and understanding in God, but nothing like to the will and understanding of man: For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God. Our anger at the best, as being displeased only with such things that displease God, though in some little thing it be like God's anger; yet in many things it is very unlike: For it is a passion in us, not in God, it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God. God's anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so, but only in case we are his ministers. For vengeance is mine I will repay saith the Lord. I cannot justify you in so speaking, when you say that mercy is more real, and truly affectionate in God then his anger; For taking them sequestered from their imperfections, each is formally attributed unto God, though not as passions, and not eminently only as you have delivered it.  
As for the execution of each more or less, that receieth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will. For he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and far more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men, than vessels of mercy, though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis. Mercy consists in pardoning sins, and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God, but passion enough, even unto death upon the cross in the nature of man, & person of the Son of God. The better use men have of reason, the less are they subject to perturbation, but no whit less do they participate of affection, for virtues are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle hath taught us; but the right ordering of them. Christ's soul was heavy unto the death, at the approaching of his passion, and wept often before this; yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason; For all this. But no passion at all can be in God; for passions rise and fall upon new occasion, but no such alteration is incident unto God. I know not what you mean by devouring affections. They may be concealed or restrained not in a virtuous manner, but vicious; only to keep the rancour of their hearts from discovery, 
2. Sam. 13. 22. 25.  as Absalon a long time said nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had deflowered his sister Thamar, he was not any whit the more charitable in that, but played the fox in waiting opportunity to do mischief. Likewise, when Haman saw 
Ester. 5. 9 10.  Mordecai in the King's gate that he stood not up nor moved for him than was he full of indignation at Mordecai. Nevertheless Haman refrained himself, though he had plotted the destruction both of him and all his nation. To say that passions are moderate in matters, which men least affect is as much as to say, that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect. And indeed affections must needs be moderate, when they are least in motion.  
But perpetual minding of a thing should argue strength of passion, in my judgement rather than moderation. To my thinking, now you are in a vain of writing essays: Yet I find no great substance of truth in them. How secret carriages can be violently opposed I conceive not; For if opposed then no longer secret. And the more cunning men are, the more notice (I should think) they take of violent opposition, unless they do apparently, see such opposites are like to overshoote or come short; which is a very race case and comes ofter into a scholars fancy then into real practice. I find no great passion in Achitophel; but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country. So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himself. To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a great point of policy, undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity; not always to restrain them, but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinks of them.  
As Moses in the cause of God was moved so far as to break the tables of the law, and calling others unto him to fall upon the massacring of the people, yet this testimony is given of him that, he was the meekest man on the earth. I do 
Num. 12. 3  not dislike your allowance of men to be passionate, in the promoting of God's glory; I hope you will give like allowance to men to be passionate in the defence of God's truth. I have no great edge to make Christians contend in passion, with worldly men how wise soever.  
Yet well I wot, that David (one of the worthies of the World amongst Martialists) his eyes did gush out with rivers of water, because men kept not the law of the Lord: & holy 
Psal. 119. 136. 2. Pet. 2. 7  Lot did vex his heart with the unclean conversations of the Sodomites. These moral essays of yours have a foul issue; as when you infer, but most inconsequently (as arguing from the nature of man to the nature of God) that passions are in God, nor so only, but even such affections as essentially include perturbation; you were as good plainly profess, that God is not exempt from perturbation.  
Neither is, to be zealous or compassionate, to be like God in wisdom, but rather in affection. Yet zeal and compassion are accidents in man, not in God; arise in man never without alteration, but no alteration, as yourself have made show to maintain, is incident unto God. Yet I do easily grant you, that the vehemency of man's passions doth as significantly represent the want of passion in God; as the swift motions of the Heavens doth represent God's immutability; Like unto him that presenting an unsufficient person to his degree, and being demanded what he meant to prostitute himself to such profaneness; made answer he might do it with a safe conscience; For he undertook for him, but tam, quam, tam moribus quam doctrina, and he thought him as good one way as the other, though indeed good at neither.  
And now if yourself be arrived after all this unto a rest (I do not say vigorous lest that might prove the emblem of greater motion) from your passion; I pray consider how these do agree: First to say that God's wisdom doth not exempt him from passion; and then to acknowledge a want of passion in God.  
2: I see no reason why you should complain of the barrenness of your imagination, in illustrating the attributes of God; to my judgement it hath been more fruitful than all that ever went before you; who I dare say were never able to discern that lively resemblance you speak of between the swift motion of the Heavens and the immutability or vigorous rest of God, as also between the vehemency; of men's passions and the vacuity of all passion in God. Your Mathematics (though I profess myself a very sorry scholar in that science) I do reasonablely well understand; as namely that a circular figure is, as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and of all figures of equal circumference the most capacious, and that all other figures the nearer they draw to a circle, and the more Angles they contain of equal circumference are the more capacious. I expect your mysterious and profound explication.  
3. The Analogy spoken of between sides and Angles, as found in circles and other figures doth fitly express (you say) that analogy which School divines assign between wisdom, science, love, hatred, goodness, desire, as they are found in God and man. Your theme was, how Anger, Love, Compassion, mercy or other affections are in the divine nature: of all these there is but one found in this latter enumeration of yours, and that is love; and whereas you proposed to speak only of the affection, and to show how they are in God. Yet here you mention wisdom, science, goodness; which never were accounted affections. No name or title of affection can (you say) be univocally attributed unto God.  
And this is true, and as true of habits and powers of our souls, that they cannot univocally be attributed unto God. For whatsoever is in God is mere essence; and therefore such titles as signify accidents in us, cannot denominate God secundum nomen & nominis rationem. But as we love by an act of passion: so God may love by an act, which is his essence. Our wills and understandings are accidents; yet doth God as truly will and understand as we, by his very essence; not by any act which is really distinguished from his essence, God's love, God's wrath, are merely his will, to do good or to revenge evil, as they signify any thing within God. But if they be used as external denominations, so, when God punisheth us, he is said to be angry with us; when he doth us good, he is said to love us.  
And in the like sense may every name of any affection, be attributed unto God, provided it doth not essentially imply any imperfection, as fear doth, and desire doth, which cannot be attributed unto God but metaphorically. The fruits of love & compassion proceed from none so freely, so plenteously as from God, and therefore he may justly be said to be most loving most compassionate, but to whom he will. In like sort the fruits of wrath and a revenging will, proceed from none more powerfully and more heavenly then from God. Psal. 90. 11. Heb. 10. 13. Who knoweth the power of thy wrath? Psalm 90. It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of God. Therefore may he justly be accounted a most severe regenger of iniquity, but on whom he will; For he can pardon it and cure it in whom he will, these being but the fruits of his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will. But to say he is wholly love and wholly displeasure, is a wild expression in my conceit. For to say, that he is wholly love, is as much as to say, that whatsoever he is, is love; whence it followeth that seeing he is displeasure also, as you say his very displeasure is love; and consequently by the same reason, his very love is his displeasure.  
The truth is, affections in us belong only to the will; and so translated unto God they should only denominate his will. Now his power, his understanding, his will are very distinct notions; though in God they are not really distinct: yet so far distinct as that it seems absurd to say, that his power is his will, or his wisdom, or that his wisdom is his will or his power, or that his will is either his power or wisdom. So you speak truth, we are content, you take what liberty you think good in the illustration of it, and to satisfy yourself with your illustrations, though your readers you do not. I find you are much pleased in the commodious illustration which a circle doth afford you, or which you divise in a circle, which you call the true emblem of eternity.  
Some I confess have professed that eternity doth ambire tempus, but I never observed that they compared it to a circle; but only I conceive their meaning was, that at this present it was not only before all time, but after all time. You add unto this, and will have this comprehension to be circular; and elsewhere have called it a circular duration. Yet as for this conceit of theirs, Durand hath long discovered the absurdity thereof, & confuted it. And as great a Mathematician as you are, I do not like your interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which you render, as if it signified all sides and all angles; I rather take it to signify, all angle, all side, as if it were an angle throughout and one side throughout not all sides and angles.  
Antony's it is apparent the circumference is but one that encloseth this figure, and angles arising from inclination of lines in the circumferenc, there is a perpetual inclination, not the least part that may be designed and imagined, but hath an inclination of parts. When you say, the sides are angles, and the angles sides if not essentially yet penctratively the fame. You speak gibberish, you may as well say, in any right angled figure, that the angles and sides are penetratively the same; the sides are lines, and in the predicament of quality the angles, are the beginning of figures, as points are of lines, and so in the predicament of quality: of which figures, lines are the determinations and outward limits.  
This I speak but upon remembrance of my old philosophy; and the angles arise from the inclinations of lines one towards another. What liberty you take in saying that a circle is of equal sides and of equal angles, whereas indeed it is but a side, throughout, and an angle throughout, let the reader judge. Yet it contains the space of any other figure of equal circumference and somewhat more: and so virtually it may be said to contain them even their sides and angles, in as much as it doth contain the space of them. So whatsoever the power, habits and affections of men do signify (always provided that you take their signification as touching the perfections in them severed from their imperfections) they are in God, and much more.  
And thus touching your theme proposed how Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy and other affections are in God, your resolution may be this, if you think good, that all perfections are contained in him, not tanquam trigonum in tetragonon, but tanquam triganon and tetragonon and pentagonon, and all angled figures in circulo; but then they must be of equal circumference, which limitation hath no place in the comparison between God the Creator and his creatures. If your meaning be no other, then that these, which we call passions, are in God eminently the resolution of the question proposed had been as easy as it is vulgar, for to be in God eminently is by your own exposition, no more than God to be the Author of them. And no Christian doubts but that as God is the Author of our bodies and of our souls; so he is the Author of our natural affections also.  
4. The Diameter I confess is the measure of a circle; that being known all is easy to be known, I mean in the point of measure: but as for the proportion, you speak of, between that and a man in reference to the World. I leave to every one to judge of that. Who they be that are the Authors of such proportions, I willingly confess I know not. In these kinds of proportions you are very excellent, although you complain of the barrenness of your imagination that way; as when you tell us, that man's nature uncorrupt did include such an eminent uniformity to all things created as the eye doth unto colours. I profess you stone me with these resemblances of yours, and make me wonder at my dwarfy capacity, that is so overcoped (to speak in your own phrase) with these your tall inventions. For it were strange you should not understand yourself; that were like the Nun at Delphos, to give out oracles to set others on work to understand, that which she understood not herself.  
And first I cannot devise, what that uniformity should be, which you say the eye hath to all colours; you seem not to understand it of the moral constitution of the eye; for that is different as colours are different, but rather of the formal constitution in respect of the discerning faculty it hath. Now the uniformity between this is no other than between any faculty and his object.  
So then the uniformity runs this way; like as the eye of man judgeth of all colours; so man was in his innocency to all things created; here I was about to add, for the completing of this sentence, I know not what; but on a sudden I remembered what erst you proposed, namely, that man was like the diameter in a circle, the measure of all things. The meaning whereof I conceived to be this; as by the knowledge of the diameter the circle is easily known: so by the knowledge of man, which contains the nature of all things created, the nature of all created things may be known. In like sort touching this last uniformity you speak of. Like as the eye judgeth of all colours; so by the knowledge of man we may judge of all other things created. I need not trouble myself in taking exception against these illustrations; I doubt not but I shall perform a meritorious work in gratifying your reader so far a● to blanche your meaning, and of the congruity or incongruity to leave it unto him to judge. Thus was man the true image of God for his essence; and in this properly bears a true shadow of the divine prerogative. For like as all perfections are contained in God: so all created things are contained in the nature of man; save that they are eminently contained in God, in such sort as he is able to produce them; but so created things are not contained in the nature of man: Yet as the eye judgeth of all colours; so man participates of all other natures, and by the knowledge of him men may judge of them.  
If the divine nature contained less perfections than the perfections of all things, than indeed it were something strange, it should be the measure of all. But seeing perfections in him are infinite, there was no reason, that you should bring man's acknowledgement, that his essence is the measure of all perfections; with an (although) in reference to his measureless perfection. Yet I profess I am to seek how to conceive God's essence to be the measure of created perfections; seeing mensura & mensuratum ought to be in the same kind, as it was wont to be said. But all this may be helped with saying he is the measure of them eminently; and indeed he is the Author of them; For he made all things in number, weight, and measure.  
And indeed ere I was aware, I find you fall upon this in the very next sentence, where you say. All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by Philosophers are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but far more eminently. Upon this I look for an enumeration of the conditions and properties of a measure, and the application of them unto God; and particularly that, that a measure must be that which is better known then the thing measured.  
And it is of use to bring us acquainted with the things measurable. Now God is not better known to us then any other thing. To himself I confess he is as well known as aught else. But he hath no need of any measure, whereby he should arise to the knowledge of any thing; though in knowing himself he knoweth all other things, nor looks out of himself to be acquainted with aught. But you I perceive are willing to ease yourself of this burden; you tell us what a measure he is not, as when you say, the Divine essence is a measure not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversities of parts; as who hath no parts: but instead of telling us what measure it is, you say that the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things are applied to it, in that they have actual being.  
So that for God to measure all things, belike is as much as to say, God hath created all things. Now if to be created is to be applied to God; then to create is to apply. And so Gods creating and application active, in order of nature was before their creation and application passive. You say it is impossible the Creator should be fitted to any thing created. And is it not I pray alike impossible that the thing created should be fitted to the Creator? Yet before you said that God is a measure not applied to things created, but whereunto things created are applied, in as much as they have their actual beings. God is immutable and eminently containeth all things in his indivisible essence; but to say that he eternally and immutably, site all the possible varieties whereof contingency itself is capable. I doubt, will prove non sense in every particular. For first contingency is not capable of such variety you speak of: The things contingent themselves are various indeed, but not the contingency of them. Things are very various, but the modi rerum are not. There are but two modi rerum; the one we call contingency, the other necessity. You may say necessity is capable of variety as well as contingency. And indeed there is far greater variety of agents necessary, then of agents voluntary.  
Again what is it to fit varieties, other then to produce them? For if you meant of fitting them after they were produced, it is like you would have told us, whereunto God doth fit them. Thirdly it is absurd in a Philosopher's phrase to say God doth produce varieties; for variety is no fit object of production, it being a relation, which indeed results upon the producing of the foundation, rather than is produced. But suppose you understand it of the things produced in all possible variety: Yet this is directly untrue. For it is possible for God undoubtedly to produce things in greater variety than he doth.  
Neither is this production eternally wrought, or the things you speak of fitted by God; for surely this fitting of varieties, as you speak, began not till the world began. And what you mean in saying that God doth immutablely fit them I well understand not, God I doubt not is immutable, but the things he fits are not, especially contingency, which includes mutability you say God is fitness itself; but either you consider not, that fitness is a word of relation, or if you did, you were to blame in not telling us, in what respect this fitness is. With great pomp of words filling up eleven lines you tell us, that God fitteth all things better by eternal immutable, and incomparable fitness, than it could be by any other measure fitted.  
And do you think any man doubts whether that fitness, which is measured by incomparable fitness, should be better than that which is measured and ordered by any inferior measure of fitness? And what is all this, if we speak plainly, but to say, that rewards of obedience, and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted, as they cannot be amended. And this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in terms as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in. Not only rewards and punishments which are chiefly reserved for another world, but every thing in this world we believe to be so ordered, that the wits of men and Angels were not able to mend it.  
But yet whether the infinite wisdom of God might not exceed this, the Schoolmen in their disputation herupon, as I remember do generally deny. He is eminently all, in as much as he produceth all; but you may be pleased to except relations, such as contrariety and equality. For they are not termini producibiles but such as do usually result upon position of their foundation. When you say, As of his other attributes one truly and really is an other, so in respect of man his measure is his judgement, etc. You seem to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one, which you call his measure; and this you say is not only the rule whereby he rewards or punisheth, but the reward and punishment itself. Rewarding and punishing are kinds of Gods working. Now if we would know by what rule God works, the Apostle plainly informs us herein, when he saith, God worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will. Ephes. 1. 11. But when you say that his retribution of rewards and punishments is his measure; I pray of what? for measure is a term of respect; but you speak in a dialect of your own making; and if we had a dictionary too of your own making for the opening of your own dialect, perhaps we might understand you better than we do.  
There is no composition in God, such as is between the subject and the accident, which found'st the distinction of abstract and concrete. We admit God to be bounty itself, love itself, mercy and compassion itself, but to whom say you? only to those who are touched with the sense of their own misery; or only in soliciting men to repentance? As you would fain steal up your Arminian Tenets and cunningly obtrude them upon the faith of a credulous reader, of a weak reader. We say his mercy and love and bounty chiefly appears in causing man to be touched with the sense of his own misery, as also in giving repentance and not only in soliciting thereunto, not only in being gracious unto them that repent. A great deal of froth of words you spend, in amplifying the goodness of God in rewarding our repentance, when in the mean time you endeavour to drown all consideration of God's goodness unto sinners, while they lie weltering in their sins as in their blood, and draw away the minds of your readers from taking notice thereof, as if humility and repentance were a work of nature, not of grace, a work of flesh and blood and not of the spirit of God.  
And all the way no touch of faith, your discourse savouring of the humour of a naturalist throughout, rather than of a Christian. To them that are sanctified, he is you say felicity and salvation; but what is he to them that are not sanctified? belike to them damnation. Yet the holy Apostle hath taught us, that God hath made Christ to be unto us, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. 1 Cor. 1. 30. And that God is he that justifieth the ungodly. Rom. 4. Alas, how often hath the best despised his bounty, love, mercy, grace, and salvation; yet is not he justice, indignation, and severity unto them, but bounty still, love still, mercy, and grace and salvation still, and at length overcomes them, and brings them from the power of Satan unto God. When for their wicked covetousness he was angry with them, and hath smitten them: he hid himself and was angry, yet they went away, & turned after the way of their own hearts: Yet after all this, He hath seen their ways and hath healed them. Es. 57 17. 18. Yea he rules them with a mighty hand and outstretched arm, and makes them pass under the rod, and brings them under the band of the covenant. Ezech. 20. 37. He takes away their stony hearts and gives them an heart of flesh, and putteth his own spirit within them, and causeth them to walk in 
Ezech. ●6. 27.  his statutes, and keep his judgements and do them. I am sorry to find so little evidence throughout your discourse, that yourself have need of this.  
What did the heathens understand by their Nemesis? God? or a creature? If God, surely he is not more powerful than himself. If a creature, is it strange that the power of a creature should be inferior to the power the Creator? When the Apostle saith, God shall be all in all, he speaks only of his elect, to fill them with the joys of Heaven, and with God himself. Will you take boldness to apply this presence of God to the very devils and reprobates? It is true we look for the coming of the mighty, God, who shall be glorified in his Saints, & even then shall he show himself from Heaven with his mighty Angels, in slaming fire rendering vengeance to them 
2 Thess. 1.  that do not know God, as also unto them which obey not the Gospel of the Lord jesus Christ: which shall be punished with everlasting perdition from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power: When he shall come to be glorified in his Saints, and to be made marveylous in all them that believe (and because his servant's testimony towards us, was believed) in that day. Then shall the Heaven depart away like a scroll, when it is rolled and every mountain and isle be moved out of their place. And the Kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief Captains, and the mighty men, and every bond man, and every free man, hide themselves in dens and among the rocks of the Mountains; and say to the Mountains and to the rocks, fall on us and hide us from the presence of him, that sitteth on the throne, & from the wrath of the Lamb. For the great day of his wrath is come, and who can stand? Anno Dom. 1629. Aprilis 30.   
FINIS.   

The Errata.  
IN the Epistle to the Reader. pag 7. lin. 24. for (pag, 1. read (page 642. In the preface. pag 4, lin. 30. for which 〈◊〉 with. p 6. l. 13. r necessity & contingency. lin. 31, for your sweet, r. the sweet, p, 10 l, 32 for si antea; read sint ea.  
1. Sect. p. 1. 2. l. 14 for good r. God● p. 20 l. 7. for Salumy, r. Salmuth. p. 23. l● 22. for kite sh●s, r. kickshewes. p. 25. l. 25. r. of things that do appear l. 29. r. omnis causa est principium, & omnis causatum est principlarum. p. 30. l. 24. r. to be some 12 or 13 inches. p. 31. l. 4. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 50. l. 3. r. and as we all confess. l. 32. r. finite or infinite. p. 63. l. 17. r. If you say a true being p. 74. l. 18. r. are life and power.  
2. Sect. p. 92. l. 27. for is not only r. it is not only. p. 99 l. 16. for motis, r. molis. p. 102. l. 29. for most unlike, r. most like. p, 104 l, 1. for motis, r. molis. p. 1, 18. l. 21 for quia et, r. quia est. p. 119. l. 24. for & so they are, r. so they are. p. 123. l. 28. for the paradoxes, r. your paradoxes. p. 125. l. 2. for diaculetion, r. ejaculation. p. 126. l. 7. competi, r. competeret. l. 23. dare; r. dari. p. 127, l. 8. for, return to, r, return from. p, 128 l. 4. for, numerably. r, numerable. l. 5. for, notting, r. nothing. p, 130: l, 15. for, Sincet: r Snicet. p, 131: l. 31: for, mutili: read iuhtili. p, 133. l. 30: for properby, r, properly. l, 32, for motis r, molis. p, 135. l, 29: for persitum, rea per situm. p, 141, l, 23,, for maxim, r: matter p, 142, l, 4 for tertium, r, tantum. pag 143, l: 12 for liberal, r, literal. p, 144, l, 26, blot out so. & l, 28 they draw it from. leave out, it, and in the place thereof interline; their existence & continuance of being from that which did every way exist before them, I know not: how much less how they draw it. p, 145, l: 33, for sect: r, section. l, 36 for spear r, sphere. p, 146, l: 15, for what such move, r, what should move. l, 21, blot out the first word of the Greeks there, and read instead thereof, earum p, 147, l, 18 for what I ever, r, what ever. p, 148, l, 15, for cortune, r, continue. p, 149, l, 8, r, entertain time that wasted. p, 150, l, 9, r: some things move more or less. p, 152, l, 31: r, move any way. p, 153, l, 5, for and shall be, r, it shall be. p, 155, l, 7, r, and the miserablest. p. 156, l. 17. for Dorphiry r. Porphiry. pag 157. l. 1, r. or of being what it is, l. 10. for hactens r. hastens l, 16. for Times, r. Time is p. 158, l, 8. for be not stored, r. be not scored. p, 161. l, 3. r. several branches of time, l, 9 r. is impossible. p, 162. l, 7. r. is diversified. l, 8. r. one is sick, l, 11. for cross, r crass. p, 163. l, 11. r then that being, p, 164. l, 3. for even, r, aevum. l, 34, r. in that hope. p. 169, l, 4. r. with out beginning. l, 28. r. but eminently, p, 172. l, 2. r. I know not: the, l, 31. r. diminution in quantity, p, 177. l, 35. r. to his power. p, 182. l, 9 for form, r. forms. p, 148. l, 13. r. world doth truly. p, 191. l, 9 10, 11. to all things that have been & is and shallbe, coexistent to all that shallbe) is most absurd. read the sentence thus. to all things that have been; hath been and is and shallbe coexistent to all things that are; hath been and is & shallbe coexistent to all things that shallbe) is most absurd. p, 192. l, 3. r. that is your meaning. p, 195. l, 10. r. as it is and was. l, 14. r. that diverse such. p, 205. l, 7. r. coexist. p, 208. l, 17. at everlasting, r. an everlasting. p, 210. l, 6. for what r, where. p, 211. l, 30. for fist, r, first. p, 213. l, 14. for how should, r. so should. p, 218. l, 12. for nor points of instance, r. nor time of instants. p, 221 l, 1. for the wonderful, r. your wonderful. p, 222. l, 16, 17, 18. beginning at. To this] should be of the same letter with that which follows. p, 235. l, 7 & 8. r, rather than in the wisdom. p, 237. l, 28. r you overlash. p, 248. l, 37. r: so much of these things p, 249. l, 27. r. professed: pag 293. l, 14: for frarius, r. Sua●ius. p, 265: l, 20. for more r. snares. p. 269. l: 35. between the words pass & now, put in, may be annexed. p. 27●. l, 18 r: as God decreeth. p, 276. l, 23. r, within School, l, 24 r. how God doth. p, 297. for conceiving, r, concerning. p, 3●6. l, 7, r. whereof as yet. p, 309. l, 6. for quilted, r. g●ilded, l, 11. for pacted, r. packed. p, ●18. l, 23. for indenticall, r. identical. p. 320. l, 1. for infallibillity, r. infallibly p. 330. l. 3. r. existence with him p. 332. l. 26. for rate, r root. p. 334. l. 33. for as he hath, r. (as he saith.) p. 348. l. 20. r. it is untrve, p 351. l, 30. r. figure Catechresis. p. 356. l. 33. r. is such a conceit. p. 356. l, 34. r. natural reason, 364. l. 13. for growns, r. ground, p. 379. l, 29. for commons, r. commonesse. p. 380. l, 9, for i've, r. give, l. 17. r. exegesis. p. 383. l. 12. for eternally, r. certainly p. 392. l. 3. for grounded r. governed. p. 400. l. 23. for And in, r. Audin. p. 402. l. 18. r. mutable. p. 403, l. 1. r. the axis. p. 408. l 25. for mediate, r. immediate. p, 409. l. 35. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 410. l. 5● r, good to itself p, 411. l, 26. r, want of fruition. p, 418. l, 33. r, power to cativate the will. p, 419. l, 2. r, Africanus. p, 425. l, 16, r, Eteocles and Polynices, l, 28. r, yea the Poet. p, 426. l, 36. for praetences, r, virtues. p, 428. l, 13, r, your meaning. p, 329. l, 32, for roof, r, roots. p, 434. l, 9 for hinder, r, tender. l. 11. for concludes, r. includes. p. 435. l. 10. r. bestow the being. p. 436. l. 5. r. possibly. p. 443. l. 20. r. an assured: p, 446. l, 37. r. suadet omne quod, p, 451. l, 13. r. (saith he,) p, 459. l. 31, r. it is a most, p, 474. l, 6. r. and that always, l, 21. r, rei cum ipsis, p, 475. l, 32. r. persecutors, p, 486. l, 7. for the creature, r. himself, p, 489. l, 35. for divine, r. divine, p, 491. l, 17. r. that as all things are, p, 493. l, 7. r. effectual unto all, l, 21. r. suit it with, p, 504. l, 25. r, a penitent, p, 513. l, 11. for there, r. here, l, 32. r. hindered by the will of, p, 508. l, 18. r. bidden us to pray, l, 21. r. though if I were, p, 531. l. 31. for s●ret, r. s●cet, p, 547. l, 37. r praetermitted, p. 569. l, 35. r. you desire, p, 575. l, 22. r. Austin in opinion upon this point, p, 578. l, 12. r. In all this which followeth.  
3. Sect: p, 593. l, 37. r. principle, p, 603. l, 7. for descend, r. ascend, p, 605. l, 35: r: It was once true of, p. 607: l, 29: r. is his being necessarily, p, 610. l, 23. r. your scope is to advance p, 613. l. 11. r. Now by the way: l. 35. r. withal he made known, p. 615. l. 3. r. impie p. 617. l, 28. r. nolentibus nolentes, p, 618. l 3●. for imitatione, r. immutatione, l. 37. r. to be the immediate p. 619. l. 37. r. when we love him, p, 62●. l, 3●. for ●rimming, r. tuning, p, 625. l, 9 r. sive illis, l, ●9 blot out and, p, 628. l, 15, & 16. r. that ye sought after me, wist ye not that, p. 630. l, 31. r. gives repentance, gives obedience: p, 634. l, 270. r. capable of discerning, p, 638. for welter, r. shelter, p, 643. l, 20. for proving, r. pawning, p, 653. l, 26. for business, r. loveliness, p, 654. l, 28. for contentum, r. contemptum, p, 660. l, 3. for but becomes, r. and becoming, p, 666. l. 2. r. temperamentum aliquod, p. 667: l. 3. r. which he loves, he loves but as means: p. 670. l. 8. for no small, r. not final infidelity, l. 17. for that may, r▪ that way, p: 686. l. 31. for take on, r. tack on, p. 687. l. 27. blot out in, q. 9 19 art. 9▪ and put in, 1. q. 19 art 9 p. 689, l. 33. blot out then, and put in as, p. 696. l: 1●. r: external: l: 34. r: love and joy may sormally be attributed, l: 26. r: verrified of God: p: 699. l. 20. r. rare case.  
FINIS.