The Casket of jewels: Containing a plain description of Moral Philosophy, diligently and after a very easy Method declared by the well learned and famous Author Cornelius Valerius: Lately turned out of Latin into English, by I C.  invidia factum premit. 
¶ Imprinted at London, by William How, for Richard Johnes. 1571.   

 blazon or coat of arms 
G C  ●RTVS MEA VITA MEA.   

To the Right worshipful sir Ceruis Clyfton Knight, his daily Orator I C. wisheth long health with increase of much Worship and Vettu.  
IF we shall consider which thing I do oftentimes with myself, (right worshipful Sir) of what dexterity and sharpness of wit, the ancient Sages, and peerless Philophers have been, with what industry and painful toil they have sweated in bolting out the secret, and perplexed mysteries of Nature, we have doubtless an unspeakable occasion to rejoice, because through such their most excellent workings we are alured to the knowledge of sundry sciences: and yet we must, or at lest we should more bewail ourselves, that contemplating such worthy documents and unfallible principles conducing to the manifold kinds of Godliness and Virtue, we do little or nothing provide for our wealth and commodity, but rather unto our great shame and reproach confess ourselves wretched bondmen, & miserable captives to the sceptre and detestable servitude of Ignorance. For among all such benefits which we so bountifully at their hands have receiwed, no one seemeth so excellent, so precious, and so highli to be praised, and yet of us less followed and embraced, as is Moral philosophy, a matter comprehending the perfect trade how to live among men soberly and honestly, and so directly stakinge out the undeceivable bounds to the castle of Virtue, that none can be more apparent only Apostolical doctrine excepted. Of which when I pondered with myself how greatly the members of the Weal Public even at these our days have need of, though the cankered infirmity of a cowardly mind, had wellnigh suppressed my conceived purpose, yet advancing against the ensign of dastardly courage, & calling to my mind the bening clemency that so brightly casteth her beams from your countenance, and the prove, ready and willing mind, zeal and fervent desire towards all Godly and virtuous learning, which all men consider, and I myself assuredly understand, I concluded forthwith to finish this my Translation, that under the safeward of your Worship's protection it may creep along to the behoof of my Country, and the better be fenced and fortified against the encountering, & wilful reprehension of shameless tongues.  
Doubtless (right worshipful sir) among so many your renowned deeds of Godliness, this may not be the lest, if you shall accept this my industry and travel (such as it is) as a token of my hearty goodwill, very desirous hereby to show myself zealous of a friend of so worthy a vocation. And whereas larger matters cannot be compassed, these simple (such is my confidence) shall not be repelled & rejected: which if I shall perceive to take a prosperous success, henceforth more serious endeavour shallbe bestowed to achieve greater if ability, thereunto be correspondent.  
For I reckon all this my labour very feeble, and slenderly, or nothing able to prevail, without your worship were the Fortress hereof, which with all my good will and endeavour I dutifully exhibit, not as to learn you any precept in which already you are not exactly seen, but by your famous reputation, such is my desire, to procure it the better credit with others. For when our English youth shall contemplate Moral discipline to be ratified by so prudent and grave a Gentleman void of all troublesome moods of mind, polished with such excellent understanding, adorned with precious virtues, & practised profoundly in the experience of politic affairs annexed with Martial Exploits, no doubt they and all others will more lovingly regard the cause, as it is behovable for them to do, and more speedily will they settle themselves to pursue those fruitful instructions chief to be desired in a Commonwealth orderly, & discretely to be established. For herein is comprised a mean to procure rest and peasiblenesse in private life, to purchase estimation and dignity in bearing of office, in every degree to dismount unruliness, & contentious stirs to surprise all moodiness of mind to extirpate incestuous concupiscence, and finally to reinforce, strengthen & support an impregnable rule of usage, and laudable behaviour. This book is evidently the Glass of intelligence: the Theatre of comely conversation: The Stage of honest demeanour: the Treasure house of Civility: the Conduit to true Pleasure, and eternal Felicity. It is the Casket of jewels: the Mistress of Prudence: the Bulwark of equity: the Palace of Fortitude: the Nurse of Soberness: the Parent of Comeliness.  
Which my attempt (howsoever done) I have presumed upon hope of full remission for my boldness to dedecate the same unto your worship, although far unworthy and over base to be received, the which trusting you will none otherwise accept than did Artoexerxes the Apple of the poor man, I close up my matter, humbly beseeching Almighty God perfectly to guide you in the steps of his most holy will, mercifully to graff in you the light of true godliness, ardently to 'cause that Virtuous Lady of yours to burn in the perfect works of Christianity, abundantly to replenish you both with much worlds worship, wealth and prosperity, and after this transitory life to inaugure you both with the Blissful joys of celestial felicity. Amen.  
Your daily Orator I C.   

The Preface of the Translator to the Reader.  
TErence the worthy writer of Comedies, when as he had once ended his works and determined with himself to publish the same, doubtless he feared nothing more than the malevolous reprehension of carping tongues. For he knew assuredly, that at those days (as evermore hitherto it hath been) the common people as they polluted their bodies with voluptuous and ill favoured manners, so did they defile and contaminate their minds with the furious darts of ZOYLUS Spirit. And to say the truth, he wrought himself this suspicion not without a cause: for as soon as he had disclosed the secrettes of his study which not without great toil and painful labour he had wrapped together, there wanted not some who wear ready bent and prepared to be wreak the spiteful malice of their cankered hearts, and without just cause of controlment to manifest the privy stings of their venomous conscience. This (gentle Reader) when I considered with my self, I must needs confess that I was greatly dismayed, and marvelously terrified from mine enterprise, and already, as it were through sundry conclusions to myself, alured and persuaded rather to retire, than hardily and stoutly to adventure my journey. Yet contrariwise I pondering in my mind the contrariety of human Nature, and the marvelous diversity of disposition wherewith it is imbrued, and then again understanding that all are not enemies unto the Crown of Virtue, ne Foes to the Sceptre of Godliness, I thought it more expedient by my simple labour and industry to gratify and please the good, than by suppressing my attempt cowardly to flee the busy brains of the naughty and reprobate. Certes the wicked are to be abandoned with their wickedness, but the good are to be loved and cherished for their godliness. The studious searcher of wisdom will more seriously pursue the wholesome and necessary instructions for life, than the exquisite situation of words. and will rather covet fruitful lessons, and good admonitions, than sugared sentences, oratorial tricks, and outlandish terms. But the unsteadfast and unstable mind of the vicious person (I will speak of a thing manifestly and commonly known) had leiffer to espy some frivolous doubt to cavil and Question upon, than to follow any seemly advertisement, perfectly staking out the way to laudable Virtue. Such a Reader as hath his good will fully addicted to pastaunces and unhappy delights had rather I dare say both to see and read the brutish books of VENUS plays, than to spend his time and busy his brain in such a Treatise which may instruct and teach him to live prudently, justly, valiantly, and soberly: with the honest Reader I trust I shall purchase favour and just commendation, and to the other this little work shallbe sufficient to teach him for to vanquish and bridle his unsavoury delight in boarding, to mitigate his furious braid of reprehension, to assuage the comb of his insolent Arrogancy, to appease the rage of his scornful spirit, and finally to make him not only a fit Disciple or hearer, but also a profitable follower of Moral Philosophy. verily all estates, all degrees, all ages, have presently laid before their Eyes to look on the Glass of all Virtue: for as in a Glass they may easily contemplate what is decent, or else unseemly in their parsonage, and apparel, so by fastening their minds and understandings hereupon they may with no less facilitee ma●ke consider, and bear away what is to be followed in their whole course of life, or what is to be eschewed, what to be retained, as good and profitable, or what to be rejected as uncommodious and hurtful. Such whether they be noble or base, rich or poor, old or young, as have all their delices, and corporal delights as fleshfondinge, and paumperinges of the vital portion subject to the renowned & victorious bondage of REASON, such I say have here to gather advisements and instructions profitable and expedient to ratify and confirm their lives: and others who like EPICURTENS are vanquished with gorgeous fare and overwhelmed, buried, and drowned, in the bottomless Gulffes of innumerable vanities, have hereby to reform their insestuous conversations, to amend their notorious faults, to banish their toublesome woods of mind, to expel and put away their accustomed doings, and by adorning themselves with the flourishing Branches of Virtue by little and little to creep to the Fountain of that greatest sovereignty For assure thyself (gentle Reader) that no man living can attain unto the utterest good (as ARISTOTLE the Prince of all Philosophers doth say) unless he shall first subdue his appetites, bridle his desires, Imprison his lusts, and confounded his mad and bestial affections, through which nature is enfeebled, and he withdrawn from the fellowship of goodness and honesty. And that I may not borrow thy patience any longer, I do instantly request, that if any part of this my Transation shall offend thine ears, thou wilt courtously deal with me, rather considering the proper worthiness and sense of the Author which is most excellence, than my baseness and tennitie of Style, for the default of Eloquence.  
¶ Far well.   

¶ Wholesome Counsel for a Christian man.  

give alms to the poor daily.  
Endure affliction quietly.  
Remember thy end steadfastly.  
Utter God's word manfully.  
In all things work rightfully.  
Serve God and thy Prince duly.   

Call for grace hourly.  
love thy neighbours friendly.  
Yield to the truth meekly.  
Favour learning earnestly.  
Trust in Christ's mercy faithfully.  
Obtain thou friendship perfectly.  
No man oppress Wrongfully.    

Cornelius Valerius his Moral Description lately englished.  

Of the end and Parts of Moral Science. Cap. i  
EThica Philosophia, which in Latin is called De Moribus & Moralis, the philosophy of manners & Moral, is a mean to live well: either a Science to judge uprightly of conditions, and of the Actions and duties of common life. The Philosophers only imitating the light of Nature & Reason as their Guide, have delivered it unto us diligently adorned: whose whole industry especially either is conversant in the bolting out, and vnfoulding the perplexity of Nature, or else in the Doctrine of life and conditions.  

〈◊〉. 1. ●…d.  Albeit pardie, as CICERO writeth, incontinent after a three parted kind of Philosophy was received of PLATO: the one of life and fashions, the other of Natural and diffuse things: the third of reasoning and adiudging both what is true, and what is false, what is honest in talk, or evil, what is consonant, what disagreeable: yet they have pursued no member of Philosophy more exactly (SOCRATES being the Author and Counsellor) than that, than which nothing was more behovable to pass humane life delectably, which traineth and fashioneth the properties of men, and righteth all the operations of life by the Squire of Virtue: that the way to live honestly may be embraced: that the opinions of men might be uprightly informed of commodious and hurtful things, honest & filthy, of matters to be desired & avoided, of things profitable and unprofitable: who oftentimes giving Sentence of these perversely, do praise good and evil not according to their valuation. An upright judgement of divine & human matters is the very gorgeous reward of God For God both raising up the brightness of our mind, & also the power of understanding darkened through the infective sickness of the body, doth polish it with a new light eke redresseth our will through his clemency erst piteously depraved. We being armed with these props may assay to achieve unto the knowledge & intelligence of truth. There be some who deem that the best proportion of living aught rather to be gathered out of sacred Scriptures, 
W●… Phil●…phy i●… be m●…tated chris●… men ●…  than out of profane Philosophy: which we like wise would suppose to be more sure and certain, if those things were comprehended in those celestial learnings uttered by the mouth of the Omnipotent, which are descriued of Ethnical writers touching the Civil association of men among themselves, & the maintaining of the weal public, without which, they who obey the precepts of God, and the holy men are not of power to lead a peaceable life. Wherefore because the Philosophers ignorant verily of Christian Religion, yet very studious of human wisdom, imitating that law of Nature engraven from above in all men's minds, have given laws profitable to lead the life uprightly, and right excellent documents concerning manners with a constant and perpetual sentence of just and wrongful doings, and have left us grave sayings by which we may be encouraged to Virtue, and terrified from vices, and may understand that we aught to live well and honestly self Nature being our leader, eke discern the rewards which are prepared of God for the good, and punishments for the reprobate, and that conscience bearing witness, by which every wight is either accused, or excused: why should we be afraid to use these, especially which nothing impugn Christian Religion, and profit not a little? we therefore borrowing of the very best Philosophers the convenientest rules to live ordinately ought to measure them according to the precept of holy Scriptures. The sum of all Philosophy Moral consisteth in these three points: that the end of man and felicity may be understanded, that troublesome moods may be assuaged, that virtues and contrarious to these may be diligently considered, that them we may embrace, & eschew these, and may govern our life with virtue, godly, and justly: less we should conceive a perverse opinion of Catholic religion, or less we would charge another with that, which we would not ourselves. For that is the chiefest regard of well minded Philosophers, that the will of men may be shaped to virtue, and to all humanity, & amiable concord, that the life may be guided both privately and openly, and be obedient unto the determination of nature. This discipline of life trinely to be instituted although it be one, and the same notwithstanding being severed in three parts, after a divers consideration, it is distributed into Monasticen, into Oeconomicen, and into Politicen: that is to wit into solitary, Domestical and Civil: of which the first appertaineth to fashion the conditions of singular men: the other to govern the Family well: The third rightly to rule the common Wealth. The first furnisheth every man's mind, and allureth it to virtue, and is the seedplot of an household, as the multitude of households be the foundation of a City. And first and foremost verily that shallbe made apparent which beautifieth the guises and mind of each person, with the lessons of honest living. For first of all others he is to be learned who may be able to trade either the family, or else the City well. Afterwards compendiously the household providence, eke the politic shall be touched, which perhaps it shallbe lawful to comprehend under that place of the solitary member of philosophy, by which prudency is handled, except any one had rather to wrist it unto common justice, that there may be an equity domestical and civil. Because then the matter in which all this Philosophy of Manners is busied, are humane actions, which she teacheth to order discretli (for all they are adiected to some final scope) I think it convenient we say nothing in this place, before that briefly we debate of the end and greatest good, unto which the operations are directed.  
Which being understanded, immediately we shall dispute somewhat more abundantly of Actions, by which an entrance may be made unto that sovereignty.   

Of the end of man, and the Sovereign good. Cap. ij.  
Only men by reason they are endued with knowledge do not only somewhat for some end, but also purpose some utmost mark of all their labours, & hit most commodious for themselves: But all other living creatures are carried to that only which is present through the blind sweigh of Nature. Because every end verily, if it be to be wished for of a man, is good the latter end shallbe the sovereign good, and to be desired of itself, for whose sake all things are constituted, and through adeption of which men are made Fortunate and blessed: Yet what manner of thing that is, which may seem to be accounted last and one alone, eke the greatest good it is doubted of philosophers, and a long time inquired for in vain, and after sundry fashions called in Question: of which some have placed felicity in pleasure, others in knowledge, some in honour others in other matters. Plato more divine than the rest collocated the same in using the contemplation of the chiefest goodness, either of the good Idea or else of God and heavenly wisdom: Unto whom by how much any man may be made more like, by so much he thought him more happy, and the rather a copartner of be atitude: But this felicity not to chance in this life, because no man may be said happy before his dying day. Aristotle in his first book Ad Nicomachum, esteemed felicity to be situated in a perfect action answerable to perfect virtue, that is to wit which may be framed by the rule of wisdom: because she did appear to transport very commendable and sufficient perfection to man: Whereas also the Peripatetikes do commonstrate a blessed life to be concluded by virtue: Which yet if it be garnished with the goods of body and Fortune, should be most blessed: for he granted blessedness to consist of a triple sort of goods: but in his tenth Book he did suppose it to be pitched in delectation contemplative: that although that active felicity may be referred to this contemplative, yet in her proper kind she may be the final end. As who say truly, that which is one sovereign good, may be double.  
Plato more better, and more agreeable unto christian religion, & without doubt more truly did define it thus, that according to his opinion also a sovereignty should be appointed for us very commodiously, 
The ●…rayn●… for m●… God 〈◊〉 thro●… him 〈◊〉 lastin●…  an eternal pleasure of saying & having the fruition of God, to be wished for of itself: the which who that obtaineth is rightly named blessed: who now wanteth nothing unto perfect felicity, & so delighteth therein, that he may request no whit more, sith he is dispatched from all calamities, and enriched with everlasting life: which no man can compass but through the benefit and gift of god, less any one should glory in his own opinion. For that is not of him that is willing, nor yet purveying, but of God having compassion, and the peculiar dowry of the Holy Ghost granted through Christ our Lord: unto whom no man can attain, unless the heavenly father shall draw him, the Author of all felicity, in whom, known by the Son, the confidence of immortality is reposed for us: which are borne for no other intent, then that we should acknowledge him to be the builder, that we should attribute all glory unto him, that we should love him with all our mind, and should worship him as he hath given in commandment. Because we must pass unto this mark by the operations of virtue, it followeth that first of all we reason of these. But where as the Actions are voluntary, and good will itself is ingrassed in the mind of man, which being subject to God only hath a free original of doing, but is so disturbed with divers motions that human operations most commonly do rove from the straight path of virtue: We will in few words comprise the beginning of affections, and of vices, and virtues. The soul of man locked in a mortal corpse is as it were sundered in two parts, of which one is heavenly, like a certain beam glistering with divine excellency, as the mind.  
The other is yoked to the body, as appetite, or desire, and anger. The higher ●s a receiver of Reason: The lower is ignorant: it is her part to rule, and it belongs unto this to obey. But this oftentimes as an Horse waring fierce, not regarding the will of the Carter, is whirled with a violent brayed unto those things which him liketh, whether they be honest or filthy, yielding a deaf ear to reason, and not hearing the mind and intelligence, which is a copartner of those knowledges, which by nature are planted in us, or rather engendered of God: and at all times encourageth unto honest mattiers, whether they be pleasant, or lamentable. For there is a triple good: Honest, profitable, and pleasant. Honest is, which agreeth with the straight sentence of Reason: Profitable is, which succoureth nature and life. Pleasant is, which delighteth natural appetite, as the drink the thirsty. And out of these Fountains proceed all actions. It is the duty of the mind and Intelligence to determine: but to the other part it belongeth to execute the commandment of the mind, and to labour. The mind hath two principal Intelligences entalied of nature: the one of debatinge truth and falsehood, the other of discerning good and evil. For all men through a certain secret sense do discern what things are just, and wrongful (so that this light of nature be not pestered) for nature hath given to us as it were little sparks and seeds, and a certain proclivity of mind, and faculty to labour. This affection doth stir: Operation succeedeth the affection, and by often operations there is gotten a perfectness, either of virtue, if it be trained unto a ●ood end, or else of vice, if unto an evil. ●nd this is the ground of all humane action's.   

Of Affections. Cap. iij.  
SIth perdie every form of virtues and vices doth spring as it were out ●f these Fountains, ability, affection, operation, and perfection: we will compendiously manifest these: And certes those few things which are said concerning faculty shall suffice. And let that difference be observed betwixt the native readiness of the mind, & the braid or affection of this proclivity. As choler doth move the nature of an ireful man, so doth the coveting of glory force the covetous of honour. Henceforth than we have to break our mind of affections. Affection, is a commotion of the mind, disquieting the tranquillity thereof, which in Greek is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and of Cicero Perturbatio, a Perturbation, and it is defined, a troublesome and a violent mood of the soul, bended from reason, an enemy to the mind, and quiet life. The stoics when as they saw a man to be turmoiled hither and thither with many and wicked desires, and falsely supposed the very nature of man to be uncorrupted, and not deflower, dthey gainsaid affections to be natural, but granted them to be only opinions either of good or ill, and in their kind every one to be vicious, and to be rooted out of the nature of men, from which they would a wise man to be free: yet they are easily convicted of error. For first of all that they are Native and engendered, by that it is lightly confirmed, because motions and certain inclinations are engraffed in living creatures by nature, as the Zeal of parents towards their Children. And who seeth not some men to be more inclined to anger or love, to joyfulness or heaviness than other some. furthermore that all are not faulty thereby it is apparent enough, by reason the very law of God giveth us in charge to bear love toward him, toward all men, towards our wife, children, and parents: And enjoineth us mercy, hope, confidence, joy, and some other affections very profitable and expedient to encourage the mind. For what is more commodious for the life of man than the hope of glory, and rewards, and the fear of rebuke and punishments. And so doubtless affctions may be handsomely divided that some may be called good by nature, which agree with reason or else with the prescript of nature, as good will, compassion. Some evil, which do disagree, as Hatred, Envy, Pride, Dispere. Some betwixt both, as anger, hope, boldness, fear, desire, love, merriness, sorrow: which that they may not serve from virtue, they are to be ruled by the bridle of reason, and to be judged by mediocrity. But neither is that to be commended, which some construed, that affections are natural, not also voluntary. For whereas our will only subject to God may appear to have a free Original to work, it is to be thought, the very readiness perdie unto these or them, and likewise the first motion to be natural; but their vexations to be voluntary, and able to be chastised by th'authority of reason, less they should run headling, and be plucked with violence, eke enforce a man immediately welny unwilling unto naughtiness. Albeit truly at that time the will coveting doth range at liberty, and by some means may retain it if so she would invocate God the helper. For put case it be feeble, yet there is some liberty which when shame & fear are set out to the show may be of power to bridle the affections. And that they can be corrected by discipline, those words delivered of God do manifestly denounce. Sub te erit appetitus tuus, & tu Dominaberis illi: Under thee shallbe thine appetite, & thou shalt bear rule over it. Whereas also a man consisteth of two parts, a Soul and a body, and there is a double force of the soul, one a copartner of reason, the other voided: she is steadfast and quiet, this wandering, and tormented with affections, which most commonly doth disquiet her: where by it ensueth that a man, if he doth pursue the advise of reason and intelligence he may want perturbation: But if he had rather to become Subject unto the concupiscence of the body, he may be diversly provoked. The Fountain then of affections is that part of the Soul void of reason: and that is double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 waring angry, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 very desirous of a thing. The which if refusing the Empire and Yoke of the mind and reason, it be carried with his proper vehemency, it is needful that forthwith one or other of the perturbations be incensed, and plucked through the opinion or similitude of good or ill, sometimes bither and sometimes thither, eke now and then be brought all out of frame with pleasure or lust, and one while with timidity or hatred. For unto these two sorts it appeareth that any one of the affections may be referred, because all motions proceed from a suspicion of good or evil, whether it be present, or absent. Out of the judgement of good floweth pleasure, and out of the conceit of evil cometh sorrow. Unto pleasure are referred, love, desire, gladness, which succour nature, and among these especially joy: Unto sorrow appertain, anger, hatred, fear, sadness, which discommodity Nature most painfully. The Harbourough forsooth of them all is featelie disposed in the heart, to whom there is a great familyarity with will, which either may covet, or else eschew, if any thing be objected, which may seem either to pleasure, or damage nature.   

Of Love. Cap. iiij.  
Love is an inclination of will, prove to that which is thought good. For when as any thing is proffered, which either is good in deed, or else delighteth with a certain likelihood of good, through that opinion, the greedy faculti of the Soul is vehemently enticed to enjoy and possess the same. And of the goods, which are sought for of men, we told that there were three kinds: Honest, Profitable and Pleasant, which commonly are coupled together, because one thing both may be honest, and profitable, and pleasant: yet not by and by that which is either profitable, or pleasant, is honest: whereas these now and than may appear to contend with honesty. But for all this nothing is in deed either profitable, or pleasant, which same is not honest. Certes what is honest that is only required for the proper behoof, no consideration had neither of commodity, nor of delectation. How great the power of love is, the verses of Poets do bear witness, and we deem that there be very few which can quite themselves clear of all love. Plato constituted a threefold love, the first which embraceth and cherisheth only Virtue, but this is exempted from the number of affections, he appeareth rather to be reckoned among virtues, because he useth the judgement of upright Reason: The other filthy which cloveth to the pleasure of body: The third which mindeth the Soul and Body. Nothing is more noble than the first, nothing more foul than the other: The third truly is a companion of both, but yet he roameth abroad no less than the other: By reason he reverenceth the parsonage of the body, and ardenly esteemeth it. Unless we repined this love resorting amorously, and stroking the mind with sugared words and except this love sick soul brought unto another bait: Feats of Physic should be practised in vain, when as now the love shall grow in use, eke shall have taken deeper roots.   

Of Desire and Hope. Cap. v.  
DEsire is a lust to enjoy that good, which as yet is not present: If so that be in place, it is loved, but if it be out of sight, it is coveted. Out of this Fountain (if the sentence of reason be neglected, and the desire be immoderate, and exceed the bounds and Limits of Nature who is paid with few things) many vices do arise: as Niggardliness, Ambition, Sensuality, Riot & such other. Hope is defined of Cicero, an expectation of good, to whom despair is contrary, a supposed difficulty and mistrust of a good thing to be achieved, the which shallbe Recapitulated hereafter among the forms of sadness.  
It is the guise of a wise man, to hope for those things, which he may attain, neither rashly to despair, whither he may achieve through travail. And this hope verily by which we wish for good, either true or shadowed, differeth from that which is termed Theological, and it is a virtue, eke is depainted to be a waiting for eternal felicity: Unto whom in like case the repugnant vice is, Desperatio, despair.   

Of Gladness. Cap. vi.  
Gladness is an affection which is stirred with the opinion of some present goodness, wherewith the mind is delighted. Cicero doth distynguish Gaudium and Laetitiam, joy and gladness in this wise, that the mind should be moved with joy patiently, and constantly, but with gladness vainly and prodigally. With this affection the Nature is marvelously delighted, and the heart enlarged, and as it were embracing that which is apparent good, doth stir the mind sweetly and delectably, and faustreth life in the heart, which sorrow the contrary passion, doth oppress. And this pleasantness and delectation for the amplitude of the good which is propounded, may be greater or lesser, and either honest or filthy. It shallbe honest if it be answerable to the mean of nature, and unto reason: what one is gotten through the contemplation and studies of commendable things. But filthy if it be immoderate, and dissonant to reason: what one is received of corporal delights of perverse exercises, and of ill will: as if any man should be delighted with another man's harm, than which vice nothing aught to be more abrogate from a man, especially a Christian.   

Of Hatred and anger and like affections. Cap. seven.  
Contrary to Love is hatred: which is defined of Cicero, Ira inveterata, a long festered Anger, that is to wit of long continuance. This affection is engendered of the discontenting of the mind, detesting the harm which is understanded, & damaged either with the deed or saying of some man, or deeming himself hurted: and sometimes abhorring from another's friendship through a privy instinct of nature. Even as perdie by Love all all men are accorded, so by hatred they are unyoked, than which nothing is more pernicious to humane society, which also by so much is more irkesom, by how much more secretly it invadeth. To contemn vices it profiteth but to love a man Christian charity commandeth, and to forgive him which offendeth: But to hate a man for no cause, is very obsurde, and most dissonant from upright judgement. Unto hatred are ascribed many affection which are to be avoided of a godly man: As despite, as anger, as Hostility. Despite whereby any man thinketh another more base than himself: Whereas truly there is no cause why any one should suppose himself to be preferred before his fellow, by reason that he cannot commonstrate any thing of himself, which he hath not received else where, as it aught to be most evident unto the Christians by holy Scriptures. Anger is defined, a lust to punish him who may seem to have hurted with injury. This affection appeareth to be mingled with sorrow and a greediness of revengement, which grievously racketh a man, and sharply kindleth against him, of whom he is thought to be displeasured, the most troublesome of all the affections: by which not only the mind, but also the whole body is brought into such a perplexity that for anger a man can uneath see, and moderate his senses, and scarcely speak. Hereto doth Hostility belong, which is defined an anger of punishing observing opportunity. And hither discord the destruction of the common weal, and hither all hatred is referred. Iracundia doth differ from Ira, because Iracundia is a native faculty, by which any man is made prove to anger But Ira is a commotion of this virtue, and a rage bended from reason: Whereby now and than the mind is so turmoiled, that the angry man doth very little disagree from the Frantic. And truly it may be verified of Horace, Ira fu●or brevis, anger is a short fury: and of Ennius, Insaniae principium, the original of Madness. The blood is incensed with this passion, and waxeth hot in the body, and the Spirits suddenly disquieted do so trouble a man, and 'cause him so unagreeable to himself, that he is said to be out of his Wits, neither to become his own man before that the hot brained mood shall assuage, and the vehemency relinquished. But not every anger is like contentious: for one is easier, eke sooner provoked, and haileth a man unwares, but abideth not long: Another is more gentle truly, yet more bitter, and of greater endurance, and cleaving to hatred, and seeking avengement. Neither aught every anger appear vicious, sith in sacred Scriptures we may read in this wise: Irascimini, & nollite peccare: Become you angry and sin not. Neither uncommodiously of Aristotle the mediocrity of anger betwixt excess and defect is renowned, and moderate anger linked as a companion of worthy prowess unto fortitude, which the ancient Academikes (Cicero bearing record) reported to be as it wear the Whetstone of valiant courage, that is to wit, the assistaunte: which Seneca giveth in precept to use, not as a Captain but as a soldier. We must then be aggrieved with ungodliness, wrong, and other vices: and our mind must be advanced when need is, when time and place do require, but rest reigned, if no such occasion be ministered of anger. And by how much more grievously the mind is solicitated, by so much more painfully we shall bridle Choler, we shall master the brayed, and with all mean and might shall oppress it forthwith the dominion of reason revoked, and that dismounted which kendled the wrath, we shall extinguish the fervency, or else the punishment differred till another season, we shall extenuate the passion.   

Of Sadness. Cap. viii.  
Sadness, or heaviness, is a perturbation, drawing together & oppressing the mind, which is defined of Cicero, a fresh opinion of present evil, whereupon it may seem leifull the mind to be enlarged, and contracted. And after a bréefer way. Heaviness is a shrincking of the mind reason repining. This taketh beginning through the contemplation of some evil, or else through the want of some good thing. From this Fountain proceed sundry passions which Cicero numbereth in the end of the third book of Tusculans Questions, and in the fourth, when as he had constituted four sorts of perturbations, & had explained them, he recompteth them being reckoned in these words: But unto each disturbance more parts of the same sect are adiected, as unto sadness, envy, emulation, backbiting, compassion (but this we suppose to be a good affection, not a grief of the mind) vexation, wailing, sorrow, infelicity, woefulness, lamentation, pensiveness, disquietness, affliction, despair, of which below we shall debate, and if any more be of the same stock. Hitherto Cicero, whom read you yourself defining every of the forms. As every pleasure is not said to be vicious, so neither every sadness. And as it is a laudable thing to triumph at virtue: so to be sorrowful for vice, to restrain the mind immoderately delighting, is profitable: neither seemeth it an unhonest thing measurably to bewail our wives children, or Parents.   

Of Fear. Cap. ix.  
Fear is a waiting of evil, either a careful remembrance of pensiveness about to ensue, as Cicero recordeth, and it is repugnant to hope.  
Fear is engendered of the haling together of the heart through an opinion of imminent peril. Moderate fear is profitable, assenting to the counsel of reason: But the unmeasurable or over small is discommended. Some are more timorous, some more bold, which the Physicians deem to be attributed to the Complexion of body: but yet in this place their judgement is of no simple importance, by which timidity either is increased, or diminished. This perturbation doth very sore disprofit Nature, and chiefly so tormenteth a man ●n sudden cases, that who is horribly astonished may appear no less to fall ●t of his right wits, than he which is ●reeuously displeased. Under fear be many forms comprehended, of which all there is one cause; the end perdie and opinion of evil is diverse: Sloth, terror, shame, fear, quaking, dismaiing, trouble, dread, whose definitions you shall eftsoons find with Cicero in the same fourth book of Tusculans questions. To these been adjoined flattery, which also is termed Timorous enticement: Suspicion a fear through a consideration of mischief at hand: despair a low abashment of the mind: pensiveness a pricking care through the expectation of evil, and some other more forms. Cicero hath descriued shame, and hath not defined it. The definition may be absolved, that shame may be a fear of dishonesty, whom blushing doth follow, whereof hereafter we will debate more at large in Chapter of Sober mood.   

Of Boldness. Cap. x.  
Boldness is gauged against fear, that we may in this place understand a moderate virtue of adventuring and a confidence of the mind, & a certain mediocrity betwixt to much and to little either between timidity and unmeasurable hope, by which any one neither dreading mischief like to chance, nor present, doth adventurously icoperde his joints. This is engendered otherwise than fear, through the extending of the heart, the Spirits augmenting the heat thereof: through whose force by reason that the mind is governed more often than by reason and counsel, the appellation of boldness is welme taken in the worse part. It is disagreeable unto true Fortitude, which when as prudently the danger is thoroughly examined adventureth the same with a manly courage. And doubtless hitherto of affections: whose moderation is very requisite for such as contend to the wished end by virtues, that also we may enjoy a certain tranquility of mind in the Earth which in Greek is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Democritus defined the bound of good things, and the ●igure and semblance of that unfeigned Beatitude to come: The which without the benefit of Christ, who only is of power to appease the moods of men through the confidence of life which shall happen, no wight at any season hath obtained.   

Of Virtue and her division and Original. Cap. xi.  
Unto the end purposed in the beginning all the actions of men are directed: to the which they aspire virtue being the guide, which very briefly may be defined.  
A perfection by which the will is pricked to do agreeably to right reason. For under the appellation of right reason we understand the law of Nature, and the knowledges of those things which are engendered with us, and engraffed from above in our minds, that we may justly determine of things good and bad, honest and filthy: as, that God is to be worshipped, that no man is to be hurted, and such like, the which shall gaily be called the Squire of virtue, unto which the operation of the whole life may be directed: with whom less it doth consent it can not be nominated a virtue. Virtue is defined of Saint Augustine, Ars bene re●●eque vivendi: A science to live well and perfectly. Of Cicero it is termed sometimes Recta ratio, a right reason, sometimes Animi Habitus, a custom of the mind, answerable unto human nature, mean, and reason: sometimes Affectio animi constans conveniensque a steadfast and a convenient affection, of the mind, making them commendable in whom it persisteth. But of Aristotle it is defined Habitus animi judicio susceptus in mediocritate positus, A custom of the mind enterprised through reason situated in mediocrity. In these definitions this word Constans expoundeth what manner of thing Habitus is, that we understand him to be procured through use, and exercise. That it is said, Ratione susceptus, enterprised, or received through reason, that is to wit through election or advise: that signifieth that the operation of virtue is voluntary. That it is called Habitus animi, a custom of the mind, that doth commonstrate the habitacle of virtue. That it is, in mediocritate positus, placed in a competent degree, that is expressed in these words of Horace.  
¶ Virtue is a mean in mids degree  
Closed in both sides as thou mayst see.  
That we may conceive all virtues to be made moderated by a certain measurable rate, which should be approved of wise persons, and skilful in many cases, and good. But when we affirm that the operation of virtue is voluntary, either taken in hand through a free judgement: that is to be considered, that we being furthered by the secret benefit of God, and succour of the holy Ghost, without whom we are of strength to work nothing, obeying the right sentence of the mind, endeavouring with voluntary will, may procure the perfection of virtue through diligence and frequent use. For these be the two principal efficient causes of virtue, a mind judging rightly, and a will obeying him which judgeth and commandeth not amiss: Which yet are very much succoured through learning, the which may make brightsom the understanding of those sentences, who are within us by nature, and the light given of God oftentimes obscured through wonderful darkness, as the book of holy Scripture containing the ten Commandments, and through an encouraging of native proclivity, & through Discipline or observation of manners, and peinfulnesse in governing operations, as the shunning of Idleness, and of these things which minister an occasion of offending. Plato writeth in his book Meno, virtue to be given of God, not to be engendered in us of nature (as the stoics would) neither to consist only by practice, as the Peripatetikes reported.  
Certes it is to be thought that true virtues do not chance unless through a celestial benefit: 
True ve●… is the b●…fite of 〈◊〉  that also there be other some with less pains to be mollified of nature, notwithstanding to be ratified by reason and custom.  
Touching viciousness there is no doubt that it is voluntary. Very aptly than it seemeth to be granted that humane operations are without compulsion and that all virtues and vices are voluntary. For what is done by coaction, that meriteth neither praise, nor dispraise: but is esteemed worthy of forgiveness. Virtue is sundered of others into two parts: justice & Fortitude, and of others into un Prudence justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. Some suppose virtue, as the whole to consist of members, which being applied to sundry actions, may be of efficacy to constitute divers forms, whereas of all, one perfect virtue may be absolved: neither is there any one of them four virtues which may want the fellowship of the residue. Aristotle in only prudency supporteth all virtues to be knitted together. We approving the division of old Philosophers, will distribute virtue into them four brances, which even now we have placed: of whom the first doth govern the intelligence, the rest the will: to which may be annected whatsoever virtue else where may be traced out. And first and foremost we will minister talk of prudency, in whose rehearsal also Domestical and Politic affairs shall compendiously be remembered, which hereafter (if we shall think good) shall be debated more at large. Plato of these four virtues, doth name some perfect, who have fired there resting places in the mind: of which such is the society among them, that one being taken away, all do fall unto corruption: but some unperfect, of which certain, others being exempted, notwithstanding may be able to remain. There is an other partition of Virtues, by which they are divided, into politic, Purgatory, and of the soul cleansed, and into them as are like Patterns, and examples: which Macrobius doth copiously depaint in the eight Chapter of his former book of Commentaries on the dream of Scipio. The first Solomon teacheth in his Proverbs, the others we read in Ecclesiastes, the third in the Ballets, the fourth in God. The politic do rule human life, eke maintain the outward society of life: The Purgatory do scour the spots of the souls, and do contend unto victory. But the virtues of the soul cleansed are collocated in him, which (the vices now quite trodden under foot) doth constantly persever in the love of virtues: which S. Augustine, when as he confirmed the other three, did not allow. They are commonly termed Exemplares paterus and examples, which are as it were Ideae (as the greeks do call them) or else fourms and figures in the divine mind, sith God is the counterpane of all good things. Virtue is defined of Cicero, as it is declared, sometimes Recta racio a right reason, sometimes Natura in se perfecta, & ad sumum perducta, a nature sound in itself, and brought unto the utmost: Otherwhiles Rationis perfectio, a perfection of reason, which definition Seneca imitating, doth record: Virtue is none other than an upright reason, unto which as a rule all the doings of life are directed. And featly every Original of virtue proceedeth from perfect reason, neither is virtue any other thing, than (as Cicero minionly descriueth) a right affection of the mind, from whom as it were from some Fountain all undefiled operations, which are nominated duties, do proceed, of which Cicero hath excellently written. And thus I suppose it be understanded (because many have affirmed that there is one only virtue) that perdie there is one office either an action appointed to every man of upright reason, which (according to the multiplicity of the matter which it handleth, inclined to sundry affairs,) may procreate these four virtues, which we have remembered above. For there is in very deed, only one perfect affection of the mind, the mother of all virtues: whose changeable appellations be, Prudence, justice, Fortitude, Temperance, of which we will reason in order: if first we shall give this in Lesson, not only these which are called the gifts of the holy Ghost, but likewise all true virtues (as Plato devoutly supposed in that Dialogue which I have recited afore) to chance unto us by no means, unless by an heavenly benefit: undoubtedly if we embrace the goodnesses of God, and labour to attain to the end, he being our guide.   

Of prudency. Cap. xii.  
prudency, as it wear the Mistress and judge of other virtues, of which none can be destitute, is fitly placed in the first degree, as the captain of operations, and the science of living: which is defined of Cicero, the experience of desiring, and eschewing things: that is to wit a right affection of the mind, by which it is perceived what is to be done or shunned in human actions. Of Cornificius in books of Rhetorik unto Herennius, it is termed Calliditas a s●ines, which through a certain reason may obtain a choice both of good and bad, because all the faculty of wisdom is approved in the election of good and evil ●●ings, & of them as be neither good nor ●●●ll. He understandeth a wiliness, not 〈◊〉 vicious, who often times borroweth 〈◊〉 same appellation, but that subtlety ●ch privyly undermineth with a cerone honest, and profitable dissimula●n. Unto the which, crafty sayings, ●d deceitful doings, which in war● are called Stratagems, are refer● Of the same writer also prudency termed Multarum rerum memoria, 〈◊〉 memory of many matters, and the 〈◊〉 of plentiful affairs. Although per●●isdom as other virtues, is conuer●nte in humane actions. Notwithstanding especially troth is Subject berto, as the matter, which it hand●h. And certes the inquisition and ●arche of sooth, seemeth to be peculiar 〈◊〉 man. Unto the out finding of verity ●ue virtues comprehended under Intelligence are adioygned of Aristotle: Science, Art, Prudence, Sapience, understanding of which, Science, Sapience and understanding require a a definite knowledge, cake an absolute virtue: Art and prudency a probable one. Science is defined, a sure and an established knowledge and learning of some matter through the cause, which is perceived without any aid by natural motions of the mind, or else it is achieved through demonstration of arguments: and it is of those things which may not otherwise exist, or else be transfigured, as divinity. Art is said a perfection to dispatch those things by reason which otherwise may be: as all humane crafts. Prudency is defined, A quality to perform those things by reason which are either commodious or hurtful to man. Sapience verily, is a most exquisite knowledge of those matters, which are able to be learned of man, who compriseth the experience of divine and human affairs. Understanding is called a quality, perceiving the principles, out of which confirmations are deducted. Unto Prudency he annected Art, Science, Intelligence and Sapience; that although verily he gainesaieth Virtue to be a Science, yet he supposeth that she is not of power to persever without this. For although only goodness is purposed to virtues, and troth unto Disciplines: yet whereas to the search hereof a greediness of good is coupled. Science, Sapience, Art, and Intelligence, appear that they may not absurdly be nominated virtues, if they serve for the operations of Prudence, & succour the outfindinge of that which is good. They aught not attend verily to the contemplation of causes only, sithence all the commendation of Virtue consisteth in doing, and in governing the life undefiledly. Prudency then may take unto her as waiting mates, understanding, for to know matters: Science truly to conceive them: Art for the general use of life: Sapience for the out tracting of divers things that by these props she may pass to the knowledge of troth, and may comprehend the very Sovereign good, and the lively Fountain of all wisdom flowing with Heavenly waters, & rushing forth most swiftly into eternal life. Now whereas unto every virtue certain seats in the soul, from whence they issue, are attributed: A place is granted to prudency in the mind, to the remnant in the will: sith it belongeth to prudency to bolt out what is honest, or wicked in matters to be handled and to debate of the same with iustful sentence. Which thing doubtless is adepted not only by wit, although sharp, but by a great knowledge of sundry matters. And very prettily it is said, Longo prudentia surgit ab usu, Prudence ariseth through long practise: that we understand the perfection of the mind, whence creepeth this dexterity of triing out the truth, to be termed prudency, who desireth a long life, and the handling, and memory of divers matters, and the science of present cases to level uprightly the interchangeable operation of men. Moreover it is requisite that a prudent man be polished with a certain native faculty of through seeing and adiudging the troth: by which he may contemplate things present, and diligently discuss them, may call to remembrance matters past, & may foresee sequels: through which he may excel in taking advise, and in outfinding wittily: through which he may pass in perceiving clearly what is true in each matter, and what is to be attempted: through which he may flourish in proposinge sentence iustfully, eke in ratifying subtly and wisyly what is decent, what filthy, what profitable. For there are three parts contained under wisdom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a faculty of ministering wholesome counsel, good advise: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a perfect sight and cunning in finishing of that which is excogitated through profitable counsel: and Gnome, a sentence and just verdict of matters to be performed, and a steadfastness in that which is leeful. It is the duty than of a prudent wight (that I may drive my tale at his mark in few words) to remember those things which are past, to be skilful in many matters, to flow in counsel, to be quick witted, and to judge well: and furthermore to lead not only an undefiled conversation, but also, as place and opportunity in this common life shall crave, to become somewhat more chary and circumspect. And truly concerning the charge of prudency, who should be kept in human operations, we have treated hitherto. And by reason the variety of doings appertaining to men is sevored in three sorts, that some should be of peculiar persons, which be Coincident to every one, and general: some Domestical, which serve to the order of Family: others civil which we must put in ure, for the preservation of the Public fellowship of men: a three parted force of wisdom likewise may be gathered: the one common to all sorts, which is named Monastica solitary, the second Oeconomica belonging to household: the third Politica, which is thought to be the excellentest of all others, because first and foremost it is busied in common utility, unto which yet we must climb by degree. For he shall not well govern either a family or else a weal public, who is not a good man, and informed with the rules of conditions and fashioned unto every virtue, and shall come prepared to the common wealth, and shall wit perfectly to nurtur an household. The two latter of these three members of Moral Philosophy: Although they be severally debated of Aristotle, yet in this place likewise, because they are ruled of prudency, which (as Cicero telleth in his partitions oratoriall) in her proper affairs is accustomed to be termed domestical, and in common cases politic, we shall descriue.   

Of Domestical goveruernance. Cap. xiii.  
We have spoken of that part of wisdom which is tried in the operations of every man: Now we must entreat of that which is comprehended in the household duties whom the greeks term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to wit, consideration well to trade the family, either which is touching the preservation of housewifery affair. This respect is busied verily in the household, as in the matter which it handleth: to whom that scope is propounded, that it be wittily governed for the worthiness of every parson. Every Family consisteth of two parts, the man, and the substance. The man compriseth the Husband, or the Master, the wife, the Children, the servants: But the substance containeth the house and worldly pealthe. Let us briefly reason of these orderly, and let us take beginning of the duty of the good man of the house, because he is the first Original of a Family to be ordained. The Lord of the place then, whom we understand by nature studious of friendship and affinity, & getting children, aught both to know, and be able to protect the society of his wife and Children, and gently and courteously to rule over his, both Children and Servants: of which they oftentimes are of a more honest nature, these commonly of a more vile. The family now constituted, nourishment is to be sought for, sustenance, apparel and harborough which may defend us from storms, and inroads of Beasts. Groundtilthe, Hunting, Hawking, fishing, labour shall minister Food. Now whereas the goodman and wife are the chiefest and effeciente causes of Household, and the Children, and Servants, as it wear certain Instruments, and every one are conversant in the house and substance as the matter: we in this place first & foremost will utter a few words of them: and then we shall express the Offices of the persons a little before nominated. Before all others a mansion place is to be sought for, which the necessity of life compelled men to Build, that they might have whether to trudge, as birds into their Nests, Beasts, into their coverts: In the beginning houses were erected for a serviceable use, forth with by little and little Ornaments approached thereto. Especially a consideration is to be had of the profit and commodity, and next of each one's dignity. Overmuch cost and hurtful sumptuousness, it not to be admitted in building, and that the house, as he counseled, want not ground. The wholesomeness and fitness of place is to be viewed, and many more, which Victrunius and Philosophers, who have written, de re familiari, diligently have expressed. And hitherto reacheth the discourse of the house: henceforth we aught to dispute of affairs appertaining to Family. That is either natural, and the worthiest, of all: as Husbandry, Hunting, Fishing, Or else artificious, which considereth gain: as travels & trades through which the living is adepted. Besides there are others partly liberal, partly servile, as the craft of Painting, as the drawing of similitudes, as the science of building, which are brought to perfection both by wit and travail. Of these Arts (which are many and changeable, invented for the divers wants of men) the good man of the house aught to put that in practice in which he shall have skill, and should provide sustenance honestly for him and his without pilling and polling of any man: He aught to avoid incommodious and hateful trades, and aught to search for the profitable. The lucre of Usurers, and of Escheters, or of such as do self any manner of thing for a forfeiture is odious. Likewise the gain of those Merchants who are enriched with forged tales is filthy, which be the servants of Delyces. The master of the house aught to preserve such things which are gotten, & aught to use them temperately, and aught to understand that it is not lesser cunning to save them than to procure them. And these things have we compendiously made manifest touching the house and household provision: Now we will pursue the charges or offices of household dwellers, and first of the good man, of whom before we began to treat of. His cheefeste regard shallbe, to marry a wife, which is a companion and a copartner of life and goods, honest, prudent, wellnigh as rich as himself, not proud, nor more curious than needeth, or else wayward, which may both be loved, and love. He shall entreat her no otherwise than himself a Leagfellow and a partner as of Service and Domestical toil, so likewise of all casualties and affairs: And perdie he shall love her only ioigned unto him with a bond not able to be dissolved, and as becometh a free woman, he shall not withhold her over rigorously, if so that no just fear of Chastity doth interrupt. Neither shall he handle her uncivilly, but honestly, godly, comely, courteously, gently, that he remember how he is a Christian man, the head perdie of his wife, but whom he ought to tender as the half part of himself, and permit her also to use her certain peculiar right. He shall train up the Children begotten of his wife diligently, he shall fashion them to virtue and godliness being as yet tender, and shall provide them to be instituted with wholesome and expedient trades: he shall seek his pelth by his own travel and industry virtuously, and without envy: and he shall keep a commendable trade of clodding substance, either by making of Contracts, either by doing of works, or else through more honest and better means to espy out riches and promotions (which are ver●… many) he shall minister food both to himself and his, if necessity shall urge him to seek. If so be the wealth is not to be gotten with pains taking, but is left of the parents, he shall protect the same hedely, & he shall employ costs wisely and moderately, an advise being had of the place and condition, that neither he may be accounted a greedy gut, nor an outrageous spender, and had leiffer at all season both to be recitened, and also to be more liberal, than covetous. If the master hath servants, he shall know to use them well, and he shall instruct them, and shall friendly entreat them. But if they being hired for meed do faithfully serve, he shall consider their pains, and shall exercise them in convenient travel, he shall not fatigate them: and he shall nourish them as it becometh, he shall see unto them as the necessary instruments of the house, and he shall keep them in awe, nor shall permit them to be advanced arrogantly. He shall pay them gently their covenant at due time. If there shallbe many servants, they are to be preferre● either to a more excellent or viler office as each one's capacity requireth. The wife aught to respect the house painfully and daily, and aught to be present at domestical doings, she aught to mark the chairs of her servants: she aught to reverence her husband, not cursed and snappish, but pudique, and she aught to keep cleanly both her maids and children, and all the rest pliant and peaceable in their office: She aught not to be stately, not sumptuous, nor yet beastly, but apparelled with decent attier according to ability. Her chiefest regard aught to be in bringing up her children honestly. She aught to devise to increase her goods, & aught to keep that with soberness, which is gotten with the toil of her husband. The children aught to reverence their parents they aught to love them & (as God himself hath commanded) they aught to honour them, they aught willingly to execute their commandments, they aught to be obedient to them in all respects, they aught likewise to obey their school masters, which are the instructors of the mind, & as it were second parents, For they both are charged with one thing, to train up youth virtuously. They aught to apply the studies appointed them, they should eschew idleness and pleasure before the rest as pernicious plagues: they aught to reverence their elders, and magistrates as well spiritual as temporal, and the honest persons and discreet: But they aught to esteem those with a certain principal good will of whom both their utterance and heart are decked with right excellent sciences unto all humanity. The servants aught to be obedient and faithful to their masters, harkening to their precept, and always bend to finish their commandment: they aught to have in reverence, & love their masters as their parents; they aught to be thrifty, appayde with a moderate living, and requisite apparel, they aught willingly to enlarge the riches of their masters, they aught to steal nothing privily: They aught patiently to suffer their master, if he shallbe more curious than needeth; if he shallbe more easy to please, they may not neglect him.  
Whether it be leiful for Christians, to have bondmen, and whether any may be bondmen by nature (which thing Aristotle alloweth) I leave to be discussed of others.   

Of Politic governance. Cap. xiv.  
EVen as a Family consisteth of particular men, so doth a City of many Families, of which presently we will debate. In a common weal well to be governed, prudency is chiefly tried, without which no society of man can be ruled. Politic governance, or else a weal Public is defined of Plutarch in his book De tribus Reipub. generibus, a state and order of a City, to be observed in ruling of matters. This Civil wisdom prescribeth the actions of Citizens: eke is altogether occupied in defending the society of man, as in the matter which it hath taken in hand to be reasoned upon: and hath that scope propounded unto herself, that the weal public may be discretely handled, and that provision may be made for the safeguard of the inhabitants. Aristotle gave this difference betwixt a Family and a common wealth, that in the common wealth there should be an equality of prerogative, by which the highest should be valued with the low: But in the household the Master should have the Empire of a King over his children and Servants, as his Subjects among whom the like equality can not be. Of common weals six forms are recited: three good, which the prince, the Nobility and the commons' do minister iustfully, and conveniently for for the general profit of the whole City: and so many wicked, which the tyrant, and the band of a few, and the ●eane people do govern as their own ●st impelleth them, haling all things ●o their proper behoof. There appears no City of any nation, which may ●ot be referred to some of these. That Common weal which consisteth of them three which are esteemed good, Cicero in his books De Repub: supposeth to be best, by reason it is more excellent, more profitable, and of longer perpetuity than the rest. Among the Romans, after the kings expelled out of their Realms, even unto julius and Augustus Respub: Democratica, the form of the common wealth where the people had authority without any other state seemeth to have been so tempered with a certain moderation of the kingdom of Aristocratia which is a state of a Weal public, where many rule that are most worthy in virtue, and prowess, that a certain Princely majesty did excel in the Consuls Aristocraria in the senators, Democratia in the Tribunes of the common sort, but the chiefest power was in the possession of the people. Now a princely Monarchy ratified by the advice of prudent Peers, and Sauced with unremoovable decrees appeareth worthily to be advanced before all others for commodity and quietness especially sithence not by election, but through a certain Heavenly providence Realms are transported to the Children of Kings & Princes generated through the Law of blood being the successors of their Parents, or unto the next of alliance. Because pardie a City consisteth of the multitude of citizens leading their lives uprightly, let us manifest what once they aught to be. He is to be named a good Citizen of his country, who being trimmed with civil virtues, and espicially with justice and Fortitude, whom Prudence, and Temperance, do moderate, may be able to perform very well not only Domestical and familiar offices, but also Public both at home, and in war. There is need of common Schoolmasters both honest and learned to declare virtues, through whose travel Children gaily instituted from their youth, may departed exquisite in honesty and Godliness, and through the knowledge of most excellent matters, become profitable members to their country. If so be the riches of the Parents may not bear, that their Children by leisure may be enriched with liberal studies: the next remedy is that they be learned some kind of occupation, whereby they may get their living. Idleness and pleasure verily are diligently to be shunned of all men: Always study, and an honest and commodious exercise both of the mind and body is to be required. By all means possible it is to be laboured of all good citizens, but principally of the Parents and instructors, that by reason children, and youthstate can easily imitate any thing, they may lighten them in the purity of life, and may be a pattern of virtue to their younger: Let every occasion of trespassing, as much as ability will give leave, be taken away: Let the enticements of concupiscence and wantonness be removed: Let obedience be exhibited to the magistrate, if he be good. As to the father of the country, unto whom authority is given from above: But if he be ill, let him pacienly be suffered, and without sedition modestly and meekly be admonished of his duty. Let the Laws be observed: Let Religion chiefly be reverenced: Let peace and concord be kept among the Citizens. Let every cause of discord be eschewed. Let every man have a respect to his own business: Neither let any man give himself to bear Office in the common weal unless he be called: Let rest always be sought for: Let pensions be paid: Let the country be most dear to every man, for whom a good Citizen shall not fear to die, if need shall require. For the chiefest love next unto God is due to the Country, and to the Magistrate: the next to the Parents and kinsfulke, the third to the Citizens linked or united together through the commonness of Law. Let Foreigners or Strangers peruse their business, nor let them be over inqisitive in other men's affairs. Let them behave them elves modestly. It is the charge of a magistrate, to govern the weal public wittily: to use them moderately and warily, over whom he beareth rule (which he cannot absolve, unless he be of an honest mind and good judgement, as a wise and prudent man) to maintain the laws, that they may be observed, to the which also he himself shall obey: To behave himself decently according to the dignity of state, which he hath put on, courteously, modestly, justly, not filthily, not covetously, not proudly, not waiwardly, not cruelly: to give upright sentence to all men: to minister no rigorousness or partiality: to extend clemency, sharpness, and equity in castigations and punishments: less he should chastise some more sharply, others more softly which are accused of one matter, except any thing interrupt, that may enforce him so to work against his will: After one fashion to care for all the Citizens both rich and poor, noble and base: to think himself to be the father of the common wealth: to purney things behovable for the City, as Corn, if by chance scarcity and dearth of grain should be feared, as other things of which there shallbe need in the extremities of the common wealth: And then next to have an especial regard of the poor, when as necessity greatly oppresseth, chief a common penury, what? one is the poverty of corn. It shall be his part to entertain strangers, and aliens, and pilgrims friendly and favourably, less the city should be il spoken of among foreign Nations: To conclude, it lieth in him to refer all his cogitations to the safeguard of the common wealth: to attend upon her profits and utilities, especially to cherish every where the dignity and reputation thereof. And because ●ne cannot sustain all the duties, it is expedient that divers magistrates undertake divers offices: of which all notwithstanding there aught to be the like study, to tender the profits of the citizens, and more earnestly to seek for the commodity and safeguard of them, than their own. If so fortune serve that battle is to be waged (whereas nothing more pernicious than it can ●e inspired of God into the common ●ealth.) Let that of Terence be borne ●way. Consilio omnia prius experiri, ●uain armis, saprentem decet. It becometh a wise man first to assault all things with advise, than with dent of sword. If the danger cannot be with holden which is threatened all men, we must give the onset prudently, and we must repel it valiantly, yet no battle is to be enterprised but that which is just: to execute the which well, an ear●…est preparation is to be taken in hand: stout Champions are to be sought for and skilful of Marcial feats, nor strong men only, but also witty and Politic: Soldiers must be sought out speedily, and a choice is to be gathered of them: Argent is to be Coined, which truly is termed Nemus belli the sinew of warfare: The Soldiers are to be kept in office, unto whom (that he may appear to ●ear the mastery) wage is to be attributed at due time: And chary heed is to be had that they spoil not them whom they are hired to protect: which is sufficiently and more than enough experimented by the old complaint, both of country men and Citizens, what a cruel and loathsome a thing it is to the miserable commonalty. It is not meet that a Magistrate be altogether rude and unskilful of chivalry. And although at these days there is a far contrary fashion of waging Battle than in ancient times, by reason of the new invention of Hellish fire, yet the book of Marcial policy shall avail very greatly, as of Flanius vegetius, julius Frontinus, Ali●nus, and such like, through perusing of which a great knowledge of warfare shall be procured: the which is to be confirmed by the experience of old and sturdy Soldiers which have been present at sundry Skirmishes, and of stout and Prudente Captains which have learned warlike prowess through long practice: who would doubt it to become most absolute? Neither doth this science appear less conducible to the City, than Sage wisdom, or whatsoever craft there is commodious for life.  
For whereas there be three sorts of men in the common wealth: as officers, which should rule well and justly: as Captains & soldiers which should faithfully and valiantly defend: as artificers both of comely and undecent disciplines, which should aid the necessary and profitable trades: Yet unto all them aught there to be a like endeavour to maintain the weal Public with amiable agreement. And thus much in Politic Prudence to be considered.   

Of Vices contrary to wisdom. Cap. xv.  
Ignorance is a vice contrary to wisdom, who likewise after a contrary sort may be defined: An unskilfulness to discern good and evil things, or else to out find the truth, or to determine what is to be done, or what is to be left of. This is a common plague to all vices, as prudency to virtues, because no virtue can want the advise of wisdom: and every unjust, and sluggish and untemperate person, the same aught to be called unwise. The companions of imprudence be, the error of the mind, and temerity repugnant to perfect judgement: and the foolish person attributeth much unto Fortune, whom he reverenceth as a Goddess where as he useth not reason and counsel: and yielding his good will to affections doth commonly admit those things, of which afterwards he repenteth: or else contrariwise through cowardliness and negligence neither regardeth his children nor wife, and keepeth no instruction in his household, and no kind of authority. If such a Magistrate shallbe in the weal public the wicked will suppose that a licence is ministered unto them to tread amiss: if there be such a captain the Soldiers will become dastards, yea and they whom he retained valiant, what manner of fellows Scipio Amilianus found before the destruction of Numantia, whom he reduced to their antic manliness Martial discipline restored, and overslipped no occasion of any worthy feat to be practised.  
Wiliness verily is a vice, which with a certain cloak of virtue deludeth the uncircumspect: which sith it purposeth not to travel for the truth, it can not be called wisdom, but a subtle and a Foxlike counterfaiter of prudency: who yet somewhiles is counted a virtue, if it be wrested unto a commodious end. But the parts and operations of Prudence being perceived, it shall not be a perplexed business to undermine the contrary: Notwithstanding we must be very wary that vices do not deceive us, which appear to counterfeit virtue. Doubtless virtue herself is a mediocrity wellnigh betwixt two extremes, but of which th'one is a manifest dice, and is apertly perceived: as when ignorance is set against wisdom, wrong against justice, cowardness against Fortitude, Intemperance, against Temperance, Covetousness, against Liberality. But the other because he is a vice, cousin germane to Virtue is not so easily espied, as when craftiness or subtlety is gaiged against wisdom, cruelty against justice, lewdhardinesse against manliness, an outrageousness in despising of pleasures against temperance, Prodigality against liberality, Obstinacy against perseverance. For as ovid says.  
And mischiefs are of kin to good,  
for under that deceitful weed,  
Virtue oftentimes hath borne the check,  
for vices roots who bring the seed.   

Of justice. Cap. xuj.  
CIcero calleth justice Dominam ommum & reginam virtutum, The Lady and Princess of all virtues: and defines it, a perfection of the mind, which the common utility being maintained, yieldeth to every one his stateliness: and he calleth it, an affection of the mind, which giveth to each one his due, and defendeth the society of human fellowship bountifully and equally. Moreover it is described of the same author: An evenness, giving every one his right according to the dignity and desert of every person: Aristotle calleth it, an affection of the mind, whereby men are fit to work iustfully, and by which both they will and do such things as be rightful: & after the same sort we may manifest injustice, by which men exercise wrong, and are voluntarily enforced to unlawful matters. The lawyers term it, a constant and a perpetual will ministering to every man his right. For justice is conversant in distribution of equity, as in the matter, that the equality, which the law doth procreate, may be preserved. There be vices repugnant to every one, to this injustice, to the other injury: To Fortitude and Temperance more. Nothing is more expedient than this virtue to maintain the society of humane kind, nothing more agreeable to nature who hath fashioned us unto all humanity and natural benevolence. If so be we are borne for this fellowship (as mini-only Cicero confirmeth in his first bake De legibus) we must confess that we in like case are engendered for justice with out which that society and fellowship cannot consist: and that the same is naturally engrafted in us as a Torch carried before one to work rightful matters, & to eschew the contrary, through the opinion of undeceivable reason, given by the consent and benefit of God: which if it be ratified with the use of operation, then at length a custom & a perfection of virtue shallbe procured, whereof Nature hath given as it were little sparks. Touching that which is called in question concerning the mediocrity of justice, she is verily (as Aristotle deemeth) a mean: but she is placed betwixt both extremities after another sort than the residue of the virtues Moral, who is referred unto right and evenness: in preservation of which she is conversant, even as injustice and injury the disquieter of equal dealing and rightfulness is busied in unequality.   

Of the parts of justice. Cap. xvij.  
THE parts of justice be two: the one common and universal, which is occupied in preservation of the right of human society, and it considereth a common good, and learneth us to reverence right and equity: the other private, which is verified in restoring to every man what is dutiful. And this is double: One which retaineth equality in forms of choppinge and changing together, and in affairs, which usually is called Commutativa: Another which is occupied in distribution of honours according to each man's worthiness, which they term Distributivam. The charge of common justice is to maintain law, and equity, whereupon he is called a just man, who showeth himself obedient to all customs. Law is defined of Cicero, a reason engrafted of nature, which commandeth those things which are to be taken in hand, and forbiddeth the contrary: And in like sort, a right reason, and derived from the might of the Gods, charging such matters as are honest, disannulling the contrary. Hither all decrees may be referred, statutes, manners, ordinances, expedient for the safeguard of the weal public in observing of which justice is tried, in violating of which injustice. Equity coupleth herself to the law, who following the right sentence of reason, doth govern the law written, and as the worthiest interpreter of all laws, doth wittily assuage rigorous sharpness according to the place, opportunity, and dispositions of men. That member of private justice which is Tituled, Distributiva, perteaneth chiefly unto magistrates: who not only is occupied in granting Offices and rewards, but also in appointing punishments, that with an equal law the citizens may be ruled, both the virtuous beneficed, and the naughty corrected. This perdie is the charge of a Magistrate: but the intelligence of this virtue is necessary for all men, that every man may understand his place which he should keep in the common wealth, and the duty which he should execute: and should attribute and leave unto every one both place and duty, and should know himself, nor should glory over much in his proper conceit. This virtue by reason especially it studieth to secure equality, is compared to Geometrical proportion, in which a like consideration is had of greater and lesser numbers. But that parcel which they term Commutativam is occupied in bargaininges of men, and teacheth to yield unto every man his own, that ware for ware, the value for the chaffer be geeven, perfect equality being kept: and this hath a care rather to tender home debt, than to distribute promotion to the worthier: Wherefore in like case it is clogged with Arithmetical proportion, because in this the numbers, in the other an indifferency of reason is respected. This is conversant in contracts which the Lawyers do display: the other in Dignities and penalties, which are appointed of Magistrates. And hitherto of all kind of justice, and her parts. But because unto these other six members are subvected defined of Cicero in his books De Inuentione: Religion, Piety, Reverence, Troth, Revenging, Thank: to which shallbe adjoined liberality, magnificence, friendship, and vices disagreeable to every one: of these also we must express our opinion. These virtues by reason, they consist through the equality of reason, they seem to be adiected unto distributing justice, like as every varitye of bargains to the exchanging.   

Of the six parts of justice constituted of Cicero, and their vices, and of some other which be welnie of the same nature. Cap. xviij.  
CIcero in his second book De Inuentione hath rehearsed three parts of justice: the law natural, usual, and the law leiful. And the law natural he defineth, which opinion may not bring to us, but a certain instruction natural, whereof he numbereth six members, which even now I have declared. Religion is one, a rightfulness towards God, either a piety whereby we adore him: so called as Lactantius writeth in his fourth book. A religando, of sure binding, by reason for this cause we are engendered, that we may exhibit just and dutiful services unto God begetting us, that we should him only acknowledge, that him we should follow. We are linked and fastened unto God with this bond of godliness. Plutarch doth interpreate Religion, Scientiam rerum Dominarum, a science of divine matters: we term it Virtutem a Virtue, by which a just and a true worship is given to God. The which (as of all virtues) so likewise we shall well call it the ground, and doubtless the Parent and Mother of justice. Nothing is more necessary than this virtue to preserve the common wealth and to lead the life equally, and without covin among the Citizens: sith no strength may rather banish men from all unthriftiness, than if they shall perceive that there is affliction prepared of God for the transgressors, and a path made open unto Heaven and unto ●ternal felicity for such as lead their ●ues godly and justly. There hath been ●et never any Nation so Barbarous which hath not favoured some Religion although it were false, and forbidden from working of injury through the fear of some God, whereas an Oath was accounted a most straight band to wring their faith together. What is it expedient that Christians do? to whom faithfulness is given the ground of all religion of jesus Christ our Lord and ●auiour, and the holy Apostles and his successors, so ratified that neither by any human force, nor yet infernal rage it may be overthrown: I say, what is it meet for them to do, unto whom leading their lives with virtue God himself hath proposed a sure hope of blissful and sempiternal life: through the confidence of whose promise, what true godly man for sanctified religion will stagger to lose his breath, if need shall require? How easily might all injury be put to flight if that precept of God our saviour & master were deeply graven in all men's minds. Quod tibi fieri nolis, alteri nefeceris, What thou wilt not to be committed against thyself, thou shalt not do to another. Which sentence wise fellows also dissenting from our religion have so marveled at, that they esteemed nothing more divine, that nothing could be delivered more available to maintain the fellowship of men. Contrarious to Religion is superstition, a scrupulosity of holiness, which honoureth the Heavenly power not as it aught, either a vain and a foolish honour of God: than which vice impiety towards God and the contempt of reverent dread is surely a more detestable mischief: by which all faith is turned upside down, by which perjury, by which Sacrilegies are established.   

Of Godliness. Cap. xix.  
IN the second place Piety is rehearsed of Cicero, which although it be defined some while of him, a justice towards the Gods that it should be the same which Religion is: yet most commonly it is taken for justice towards our progenitors, or else for a thankful good will towards our Parents. But in his books of Rhetoric, Piety is more absolutely defi●ed, through which duty, and an earnest reverence is given unto alliance, and to them which are well willing to their country. And in like sort in another place. Piety is, which giveth in charge to observe duty towards our country, our parents and others our kinsfolk. This last virtue is well coupled to Religion, because the chiefest worship is to be given to God, the next to the Parents, and next of kin, and especially to the country, which one, Cicero saith comprehendeth all charity. Impiety is a contrary vice to Godliness, towards such to whom benevolence and love is due. Against this so detestable a wickedness, when as yet the title of murder was unknown, it was not necessary to establish a law: but afterwards when they began, who violating the law of nature, and more brutish than brute beasts, did murder & despoil them of whom they had received life, a most rigorous law was ratified, of which declaration is made in the digests under the title, Ad L. Pompeiam, de patricidus.   

Of Reverence. Cap. xx.  
Reverence is, by which we honour and worship them who excel us in age, either in wisdom, either in dignity, or in any estimation. For that God himself giveth in commandment by the law of nature, that with due obeisance and honour we should reverence our parents and the Magistrates whom he would to rule over us. This virtue of obedience is so necessary, that without it neither a house, neither a City, nor any fellowship can remain. How pernicious the vice repugnant to obedience is, the grievous ruin of the first parents of all mankind, which hath tormented every mother's Son, hath given a lesson to us. This enormity springeth of Pride, and arrogancy and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through which any man by overweening in himself to well, and favouring his person, maketh himself another cousin to God almighty. Nothing verily is more odious than pride both to God and men. For at all seasons, as the Latin Tragical writer recordeth, Sequitur superbos ultor a tergo Deus, God that taketh vengeance followeth the lofty behind their backs. The fall of wicked Angels which cannot be repaired, and than the which none hath been more grievous at any time doth witness the same.   

Of Troth. Cap. xxi.  
Troth is (saith Cicero) through which those things are said to be unchanged which are, or have been, or else are about to come: Either a right perfection of the mind whereby any man both telleth the truth, either in affirming, or else in denying, and also pretendeth no subtlety: whereof he may be called a true speaker. It is a necessary virtue to make bargains, in whom faith aught to bear rule, which is defined, a constancy and a sooth of sayings and doings: neither is truth any other thing in contracts and accounts, than faith: which if it be diligently observed, the proper office of duty shallbe fulfilled: which is to yield unto every man his own. A lie is a vice contrary to verity, & in like manner the malicious inventions of Sophisms, and all deceit and dissimulation and counterfeiting, and also arrogancy. A forged devise is mischievous and pernicious unto the common wealth for it wresteth a man from God which is true, and the wellspring of all verity, and purchaseth him friendship with the Devil, and bringeth everlasting death to the soul: and violateth humane society with a false merchandise, and incenseth hatreds and discords through a leasing tongue. That bostinge, especially foolish of some that are too glorious in their own estate, is irksome to the learned. Certes an alteration to be abandoned. Cloaking also is unseemly for an honest man, who speaketh no otherwise then he thinketh: he doth not commend him in presence, whom he dispraiseth in absence: he counterfaiteth and worketh wilily not with male engine, but wittily, if need should enforce.   

Of Revengement. Cap. xxij.  
Revengement is (saith Cicero) by which violence, and injury, and whatsoever at any time is like to discommodite, may be repelled by defending or avenging. And it is defined a taking of punishment, by which we put of from us a despite either by shunning hit, or by repaying the like. But this latter definition for this cause appeareth to us little commodious, because it containeth private revengement, likewise allowed of him in his first book of Duties: which we know to be reproved not only of Christians, but also of profane Philosophers, and ignorant of our Religion, who imitating the rule of nature did judge it better to suffer, than to commit injury: because that may be done justly, and this cannot be accomplished without injustice, as Aristotle also learneth in his .v. book of ethics. That likewise may be attributed to patience, doubtless an excellent virtue: this perdie to the contrary vice. Neither truly aught any man to think that any other talk is ministered, than that he may repel force by force, if it may not be eschewed: and that for to defend, not to damage or else to revenge: for a mind to discommodite breaketh justice the leiful revengement is committed of God unto the Magistrates, which be the ministers of laws: but withholden from private persons, unto whom no title of punishing is attributed.   

Of Thank. Cap. twenty-three.  
Thank which usually is called gratitudo, kindness, is (saith Cicero) in which the memory of the friendships and friendly turns of another man, and a good will to repay another is comprehended. The same man telleth: Thank is which aught to use observance in the remembrance and recompense of duties, and honours, and friendships. It is more compendiously descriued, A faithful memory of a thankful mind, Or else a desire mindful to do one good turn and pleasure for another: and perhaps it is defined more fitly: by reason this virtue is conversant in receiving, rather than in giving. For to give, is a point of liberality: To receive with a good will, and to be willing to repay, is the property of thank. It is his part to forget the benefit bestowed, nor to wait for a recompense. And to this man it belongeth to remember hit, and where opportunity giveth occasion with an overplus also, if he may, and he aught to think the reward well to be placed, and to be willing to tender the same readily and yet to retain a perpetual report of the pleasure exhibited. On both the parts heed is to be taken that the thing which either is given, or restored be profitable and commodious for him to whom it is given or restored, and just fully gotten, less we should be liberal and grateful on another man's purse.  
The vice repugnant to kindness is commonly termed ingratitude: which may be defined, a forgetfulness of a good turn received: and either an unwilling thank, or none, or else (which is worst of all) a displeasure requited: which is the chiefest injustice, than which nothing can be more hateful to all men.   

Of Compassion. Cap. xxiv.  
COmpassion, a most acceptable virtue to God, is thought good aptly to be annected unto these. For as we do own Love, truth and faith to all men godliness to few, revengement to such as do wrong, kindness to them as deserve well, so are we bound to show mercy unto them which suffer afflictions. I call not compassion verily in this place. Agritudinem a heaviness, or else as Seneca, a vice of the minds over much favouringe wretchedness, but a virtue through which the mind is pricked with the miseries and calamities of another man to secure the oppressed.  
Compassion is defined of Cicero, a grief through another's adversity: Of Seneca in his books De Clemencia, a smart of the mind, or else a sorrowfulness con●eyued by other men's harms, which ●e deemeth to chance to the undeserving. ●ut he endeavoureth to prove that this is ●vice in these words: Then the wise ●an shall not have compassion but shall ●de, but shall profit borne for a common help, and a public utility, whereof he shall reach a portion unto every ●ne. Yet we, as it is declared, do vn●erstande compassion a virtue, unto which Christ encourageth us after the example of his heavenly father, and his own in the .6. of Luke, which can be renowned sufficiently with no praises at any season: and truly is highly commended to us in holy Scriptures. For what earthly wight can at the lest conceive in mind, much less depaint in oration the infinite mercy of God the father, and Christ our Saviour? This virtue exalteth a man to blessedness. Christ calleth the merciful Beatos, blessed, because they shall receive mercy, in the .5.9. & .12. of Matthew, of whom Cap. 25. six duties of mercy briefly are propounded.   

Of liberality, and vices contrary to this, Avarice and Prodigality. Cap. xxv.  
CIcero in his first book of offices maketh liberality the other branch of justice, the which same he termeth both bountifulness, & also benignity, the which seemeth not unhandesomly in this place to be annected to the former parts of justice. For although this virtue is placed in giving, not as they in restoring what is due (which same seemeth to be proper unto justice) yet because it spreadeth abroad herself unto others, as justice doth, eke considereth the utility of men, it shall be leiful to situate it among the members of justice. Liberality may be defined, a beneficial good will to gratify, or else a liberal desire to merit well of some person. This is conversant (as Cicero telleth) in the use of Money, the which to bestow honestly, and as it ought with a free and godly mind, is proper to liberality. For first of all a frank consent of the giver is required, less through an opinion of profit the mind be restrained from doing good.  
Therefore we must give, by reason we know it to be acceptable unto God, waiting for no reward. We must deal wittily when the cause and time shall postulate, to him on whom the gift is worthily bestowed, which will not abuse the same unto destruction, either his own, or else of others: and we must give part of our proper goods, not of another man's. For liberality ought to discommodity no man, but profit them as are worthy of a benefit: And we must give according to the worthiness of each one, and desert, and rather to a needy creature, than a rich Carl: not as much as perchance thou wouldst, but so much as thou mayst, lest liberality turn into the vice of outrageous spending, and thou afterwards begin to want, and be troublesome to thy friends: and loose pleasure, who is the companion of virtue, and contrariwise retain sorrow the leaguefellow of viciousness. And albeit rich men can with less travail perform the duty of liberality, yet the less ability may also become liberal: whose bounteous good will aught more to be considered, than the benefit itself. Cicero in his second book of duties doth ratify two sorts of liberality. One through which any man succoureth him who needeth with Argente: The other by which he aideth with travel or counsel. There be two vices unlike to liberality, covetousness and niggardship, and prodigality and riotousness: of which she is the defect of liberality, but this the excess, bexwixt which vices liberality is situated. Avarice is defined, a superfluus greediness of money, which being coldded together carefully for their avail the unsatiable persons do pleasure neither themselves nor others: which very well ●s termed in the sanctified Scriptures, Omnium malorum radix, the root of all mischiefs, out of which, felonies, robberies, despoilinges, deceits, bewrayinge, discords, hurly burlyes do spring. Et quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacrafames? and what dost not thou detestable hunger of gold enforce men's hearts to do? The desire of money is unsatiable, and a cruel Dropsy: of whom the more that the waters are supped up the more they are thrusted for, Nam crescit amor numini quantum ipsa pecunia crescit, for the love of money increaseth, as much as money herself doth increase. This bondage is altogether most wretched, and most vile, always careful, at all times fearful, never quiet, at no time content. Contrary to the vice of Avarice is excess which commonly they term prodigality: which same likewise is a vice, and resisteth liberality. For as the covetous man is over greedy in receiving and retaining, so contrary wise the prodigal person passeth a mean in giving. Therefore prodigality may be defined, an immoderate largesse, and committed upon no just cause. This pardie is vicious, yet may be revoked more easily unto liberality, than avarice: by reason she is accustomed to profit others, this no man, and not so much truly the very possessor: unto this oft-times youth is hurtful to the other old age. Moderate expense in like manner, as liberality is placed between two vices, unmeasurable riot & covetousness. here-hence a pinch-peny, or else a thrifty fellow, neither is called prodigal, nor yet a niggard.  
Saving is defined, a diligent laying up of those things which are gotten, and a guiding of expenses. Whereof there springs a Proverb, Magnum Vectigal parsimonia, sparing is a great revenue.   

Of Magnificence. Cap. xxvi.  
MAgnificence seemeth to be united to liberality, which is no other thing, than a certaone larger bountuousnesse, which is defined of Cicero, an handling or administration of great & excellent mat●ers with a certain honourable, & fa●us intent: here-hence cometh a sumptuous a notable man, & he who worketh wondrous feats. This virtue is not belonging unto poor men, which can not perform mighty and miraculous matters, but unto rich men, as to kings and Princes: of whom yet it is to be taken heed of, that they be not incensed more through the desire of vain glory than virtue, neither principally regarding the good will of God, nor passing for the commodity of men, less they wade beyond measure with their cost and administration in enterprising gorgeous acts. For also there be two vices repugnant to this virtue, the one which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a work of a base courage: and a beggarly magnificence, which is of kin to avarice: the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to wit an unruly sumptuousness, & riot, which accordeth with prodigality.   

Of Friendship. Cap. xxvij.  
Among the parts of justice, Friendship also is to be numbered: whereof sith Aristotle, and after him Cicero copiously have disputed, we will here briefly touch those things which appear necessary. Therefore, as Cicero telleth, in his first book De Legibus, all the force of Friendship is in the agreement of wills, studies and opinions: and in Laelius: Friendship (saith he) is no other thing than a perfect accord of all divine and human affairs, with benevolence and favour: which he calleth the aid of virtues given of Nature, not a companion of vices: And the same nominated of love, and begun of Natute herself: That we may understand love to be natural, by which men are united together among them ●elues. And because (as also we have known by the holy scriptures, by which the law of nature is approved in this cause) one man oweth good will and love ●o another, whereas also all other living Creatures may appear to maintain friendship in their kind, or else surely to preserve benevolence: it can not be doubted, but that fréendeship is to be referred unto justice, which also is very necessary for the use of life, and containeth the common wealth. What benevolence doth differ from friendship. Aristotle teacheth in the v Chapter of his ix book that also we may be united in good will with them, whom we do not know, and that the same may be secret, that it cannot be freendeship: and that benevolence is the Original and Fountain of amity. By whose Sentence friendship is thus defined. That it be an evident benevolence. Friendship is double. One true and sincere, and proceeding of virtue, which is among good men. The other forged, and vulgar which is two fold, for either it is procured through profit, or else through good william. The end than of true friendship is, Honesty, of the counterfeited, profit or pleasure. Pleasure joineth together children and young folks.  
Profit yoketh together merchants and such like: but virtue bindeth good men, who be friends indeed, and also do persist after death, but they love for a time. True friendship than because it ariseth out of virtue, can not be among wicked persons, as betwixt thieves, robbers, spoilers, traitors, conspirators: albeit somewhiles they may appear fettered together with a most straight bond, neither also is it sure enough among them, who are equal neither in manners, nor in exercise, nor in will nor in opinions, nor in riches (although these do not always hinder amity, like as neither the age) nor yet in stateliness. Among Princes and their friends the glozing of certain Courtiers doth wellnigh extinguish amity, approving all matters of their governors, both sayings and doings although they be foolish, whiles they get gain, promotion, and favour. The friendship then among equals is stronger, & more sincere, united together through consent of minds, both willing and nilling, one thing, whom also a like study doth delight. But this freendeship cannot be betwixt many: that narrow bond is appertaining to few: what manner of one we read to have flourished emongste them, of which scarcely four or five parts are reckoned, and perhaps it should be a difficult matter to trace out more, of whom truly it may be verified Amicus alter idem, a friend an other same, or one as like as it were the self same person, of which two there aught to be one mind. Although verily good men often times have many friends, and wish well unto those, of whom they themselves likewise are entirely beloved yet they communicate that chiefest consent of minds and good wills, and studies only with one or two, or else surely with very few. That true friendship is very seldom, what one was betwixt those few copartners of unfeigned friends, and so many times renowned. Because perdie friendship issueth of love, and the degrees of Love are divers, likewise more degrees of friendship are to be appointed. Of which the first is, of Parents, and Children: the second, of brothers and Kinsfolk, the third of beneficial persons and Citizens: the last of all men. Yet somewhiles that sincere friendship which is of a few, doth far exceed all the amities of all men, yea of the very parents & children, what love that was betwixt Pylades and Orestes, D●mon and Pythias: concerning whom read Valerius Maximus the four book and seven. Chapter. This true friendship surely is not suddenly made perfect, but she hath her degrees: till at length through long use of love sitting in the secret Cabane of the heart, and through great acquaintance, and amiable fellowship it be confirmed. Wherefore they say that he is to be elected, whom thou wilt love: giving to wit thereby, that we entertain not any one hastily into friendship without election, whom afterwards we may forsake with like foolhardiness for a trifle, less we apere rather with a certain rage of love, then with good advise to have been brought unto friendship. That such a vice may be eschewed, we ought to be slow to join in amity, and constant to retain it. Therefore all these things are to be taken heed of, which are wont to weaken freendships: as contentions, bitter brawlings, despites, waywardness, wrath, envy, emulation, and such like.  
But to admonish without sharpness, and to be admonished, is proper to friendship. Neither truly is it to be thought, that those friends any where be found among men, which although there be one like consent of wills and studies for the most part) may not some whiles seem to be put in remembrance, if they shall any whit offend: and also it aught to be denied these, if they ask any thing, which can not be accomplished honestly and godly. For honest matters are to be requested of friends, and honest causes are to be done for the friends sake. Rather pardie then being desired we should commit filthy things, we shall permit the friendship, which presently ceaseth to be true, by little and little through slackness of use to be minished, and to vanish away. For that which is suddenly broken of, appeareth never to have been true. But yet this same separation is to be avoided as much as may be. For neither must any man so love, as though sometimes he should be at a defiance. Hearty love that which the sacred Scriptures do approve, commendeth perfect friendship, by which we are willed to love our neighbour no less than ourselves. There aught then to be an indifferent benevolence of each others mind. Neither is it to be required, that the one should more fancy the other than himself. And of friendship surely hitherto. Enmite resistethe this, the most grievous plague of human kind, and which maketh men worse than beasts, and despoileth them of all humanity.  
For a man aught to be dear unto a man, sith he may see beasts of one sort to be coupled together among themselves. And as friendship maketh men courteous and grateful, so doth hatred 'cause them cruel and odious: and as she doth very much recreate the spirits, so is this not a little troublesome both to herself, and others, & the cause of many mischiefs. here-hence spring slaughters, here-hence proceed Murders, here-hence cometh all cruelty. For whom any man hateth, he wisheth destroyed, and the caitiff doth woefully crucify himself through a lust to revenge, and a desire to hurt, the mind a tormentor brandisshing a secret whip, as Juvenal saith: where as in holy Scriptures it is manifest, Homicidam esse quisquis fratrem suum oderit: That be is a man killer, whosoever shall hate his brother. Wherefore all enmity is to be avoided, cake diligently it is to be taken heed, that we minister not a cause of contempt to any man and if an occasion be given, it is to be laboured by all possibility that he be reconciled to us, who was estranged or fallen from us. If so be that by chance we shall hate any one, who may seem to have injured us, yet we aught to bear in mind that we are Christians, that we forgive, and put away anger and hatred, waiting for the like facility of remission at God's hand, which so many times we have experimented. No hostility truly is more grievous, than battle: not greater alienation, and separation of minds, none more pernicious none more fierce, and through which more may break forth violently with more bitter hatreds into mutual destruction, and so furiously somewhiles may be incensed that not only Citizens but also very brothers and kinsmen are brought in contentious turmoils among themselves, fight for life and death, ignorant of their alliance, inflamed with common madness, and now putting apart all humanity clad themselves with the cruelty of beasts. And albeit battle of itself, neither aught properly to be said good, nor evil, sith it may justly be used, and aught also necessarily to be taken in hand sometimes, especially if it be attempted in such sort upon lawful occasion, that it be a defence of justice, & be referred to that part which is termed Vindicatio, revengement: Yet whereas the contention of both enemies may not be a like justful, it appeareth not that any battle can be executed, unto whom on the one part Injustice may not be annected.  
Wherefore it is not to be enterprised rashly of potentates to whom the title of Warfare is committed, nor yet, unless for a right and a necessary cause: as if the things uniustfully taken from us should be fetched again, if injury were to be wreaked, or violence to be repressed: let it be proclaimed, and let it be referred unto that end, that nothing else appear to have been ment through battle, than peace sought for, or inquired. We must chiefly beware, as much as may be, that we wax not cruel toward innocentes, and the feeble sort, and suppliant people: that all things be not wasted with sword and fire: That more damage be not done to our friends, than to our enemies: That battle be not wittingly and greedily taken in hand, which cannot be perpetrated without cruelty. There be also other vices contrary to friendship, as testifnesse of mind, as Flattery a grievous pestilence to amity, unmeet for a liberal disposition, not much hurtful and dangerous to the wary, and to the glorious and simple, because it is a privy enmity, which disprofiteth with a flattering grace, seruily commending him who is present, and wrongfully carping and deriding him which is absent: whom Terence doth elegantly & featly set out in colours in the second Act and second Scene in Eunuchus. Unto ●oth is flattery alike miserable, both unto him which speaketh all things for another's pleasure, & also to him which admitteth this ill favoured sugared speech of one that upholdeth his yea and nay in every cause: but that he is a most vile bondslave, and this a Nodgecocke, who perceiveth not himself to be a laughing stock. And of justice, and of her branches sufficiently it is re●oned.   

Of Injustice. Cap. xxviij.  
Injustice is contrary to justice, which being adioygned pardie to all the parts of justice, now shall be debated somewhat more at large  
As justice yieldeth to every man his own, so doth Injustice hale unto herself, what is due unto others. And as before we have divided justice, so shall it be leifull, also to sevour Injustice.  
First and foremost into common and private, and this into distributing and changing: Secondly, as we have told the parts of justice, religion, godliness and others: so may the members of injustice be repeated superstition, impiety, and more which briefly we have descriued: Only in presence we will make manifest the parcels and common and private wrong. Common Injustice compriseth two forms: One which resisteth ordinance: the other which repungneth equity: the laws are violated, when as either through niggardliness, or the contempt of men, or else for some other occasion wholesome decrees, and statutes are inverted, or abrogated, or unrightfulye wrested, and weakened with counterfeit interpretations.  
Equity is defiled, when as not only the words of law are recited and writhed subtly, but the understanding and evenness the very soul of the law is neglected, and the Proverb winneth place Sumun ius, summa iniuria, extreme law, extreme wrong: as if the judges, or Lawyers should be corrupted with gifts, or distempered with the affections of love or hatred. These matters also are debated of Rhetoricians in the Chapter De statu scripti et voluntatis. There are two parts of private justice: against whom likewise two may be laid. ●niustè distribuens and iniustè commu●ns, wrongfully distributing and unjustly exchanging. Wrongfully distributing doth favour the wicked, doth not defend the good, them she exalteth, these she presseth down: she preferreth flatterers and lewd persons before the simple and honest: she more esteemeth nobility and riches, than virtue and sapience. Unjustly exchanging doth not restore what is due, she deceiveth them with whom she joineth in buying, selling, and in concluding other contracts especially in guage and confederacy: she deviseth titles of possessions: she taketh pleasure by long practice in things procured by covin: she travaileth to ●minish common and public comedies, and out of these to add somewhat herself: To conclude, she leaveth ●t unto every man his own. Doubt●e of all these parts of Injustice Injury is the mother, which is done, either to the common wealth, or else to all men, either in violating the laws, or else either in distributing, or exchaunginge unjustly.   

Of Fortitude. Cap. xxix.  
WE have disputed of wisdom and justice: it ensueth that mention be made of Fortitude. Fortitude may be defined. A custom, or else an affection of the mind, which taketh in hand premeditated dangers, and labours, and sustaineth what ever incommodities do chance, repelling timidity and anger. Of Cicero it is defined an affection of the mind, patient in adventuring peril, and in travel and sorrow whose principal duties he will that there be two, a contempt of death and sorrow: because all valiant courage is tried, either in woefulness, or in labour, or in danger, and in the undertakinge and putting to flight of dreadful matters. The stoics define Fortitude, a virtue contending for equity. Chrysippus an affection of the mind, in suffering and sustaining, yielding unto extreme law without fear. Manly courage seemeth to be engendered partly of will, partly of the faculty of the angry soul, because the operation of Fortitude requireth some commotion hereof: who notwithstanding herself is voluntary and is busied in the suffering of sorrow, and in adventuring of perils: and the will aught to rule, but that rage aught to be obeisant unto desire and counsel. Fortitude is conversant in restraining of fearful matters, both causing timidity of some danger about to hurt, and also the expectation of peril, as it were in the matter wherein she is exercised, whether it be in Marcial prows, or else in Domestical troubles, that at last she may obtain that utterest good: This virtue (as likewise the residue) is a mediocrity betwixt overmuch and to little that is to wit, between timidity and boldness, which vices after what fashion they may be eschewed. Horace expoundeth in these Verses.  
In need appear stout and strong: be thou wise  
To shrink in thy sails beginning to rise.  
The duty of Fortitude is double, to adventure, and to sustain dangers & adversities with that mind that it may content God, and obey his commandments, for whose sake all things aught to be done, and doubtless to enter on them, and to abide them not only courageously and manfully, but also prudently is the part of a valiant man: for neither should he take in hand any thing unadvisedly and harebraynly, and with no consideration, less he may seem rather to be alured with violent mood, than with perfect reason. Unto Fortitude true and sincere, & adorned with other virtues. Aristotle hath annected in his third book Add Nicomachun other five forms not absolute, yet as of kin. The first of Citizens fight for their country: The second of Soldiers who by Martial policy do adventure perils: the third of them which trust unto experience: the fourth of them which travel through an hope to win: the fift of such as have all their affiance in Fortune, neither sufficiently examining the dangers, whom ignorance causeth sturdy. Verily it is no less the part of Fortitude to suffer calamity, to sustain injury, to bridle the moods of mind with an upright and constant courage, than to hazard the life, to contemn death, and doubtless with heart and will to die, if so he shall purpose to please God. And because Fortitude is conversant either in the receiving of dangers, or else in the enduring: unto this virtue four forms are subnected, Confidence & magnanimity which pertain unto receiving. Patience and Perseverance who ●e referred unto enduring: The two ●t belong as it were to the first mo●n of Fortitude, the latter to the suf●ance, and stableness and constancy of evils. Of all these perfect manliness doth consist.   

Of Confidence and Magnanimity. Cap. thirty.  
Confidence's (saith Cicero) is a sure trust of mind: either by which the mind hath planted in herself much belief in weighty and honest matters, with a sure hope. And unto this Boldness appeareth to be of alliance, and yet it is a vice: sith it is led not with counsel and judgement, as Fortitude, unto whom Prudency is a perpetual companion, but with violence and temerity: not taking sufficient advise, before it give the assault on dangers, whether it may overcome: and how it may, and whether it be honest to undertake the same. But confidence doth not adventure jeopardies stoutly and with a great trust, unless diligently premeditated afore. For they are not to be judged strong men who dare to adventure less, but they which commonstrate a moderate virtue of mind, whom reason aught to rule, and make agreeable to virtue. Contrary to confidence is mistrust, a low abashment of the mind, the same which despair is, which above we have compendiously touched in the chapter of desire and hope. Magnanimity is an ampleness of a noble, and an unconquerable stomach, and a might and stoutness to commit valiant acts. This supporteth confidence, and as an helper doth fortify her being of kin. Understand you a noble courage, not a proud, neither an arrogant, but a modest, and keeping under foot insolency, very noble, and contemning worldly vanities. For this virtue is principally tried in the contempt both of those great matters which the greedy common people hath in wonderful admiration: and also in the repressing of perturbations, that all ambition, niggardliness, and concupiscence may be resisted with a triumphing courage, that all adversities may be constantly endured. Cicero in his first book of duties, doth teach that there are two parts of the greatness of courage; of the which one is tried in prosperity, the other in adversity: because neither tribulation is of strength to discourage a noble stomach, nor the riches of fortune of power to make him presuntuous. Contrary unto Magnanimity be two vices, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superfluous haughtiness, either a proud and swelling mind: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a want or defect of courage. In the first vice is contained an avaunting, extolling itself insolentely and foolishly, and a mind strutting out unwisely: what one is of Thraso in Terence a vain and peevish person, and blind with overmuch love of himself, than which nothing can be excogitated more foolish, whom no good and modest man may be able to abide. This sect of companions is odious unto all sorts, save only unto parasites. Repugnant to this vice is that other which is called Demissio animi, lack of courage, usually termed Pusillanimitas cowardice, that is to say, a foul and an unseemly faintness of courage, fleeing imminent danger, and villainously languishing in large and wondered exploits, what one hath been of Effemynate persons, as of Sardanapalus, who verily not resisting, banished from his Empire, concluded his own destruction through a prevented despair: as of Heliogabalus, as of others, who being enfeebled with pleasures have led a slothful and a beastly life. To them which went afore may be adjoined, a desire of good estimation, of which in like manner there are two vices: the one inordinate suit, the other a contempt of Fame and reputation.   

Of Patience and perseverance. Cap. xxxi.  
Patience Cicero defineth, a voluntary, and a long permission of hard and difficult matters for honesties sake or profit: that is to wit, a stable and a constant sufferance of humian things, through which we sustain what ever adversity shall chance unto us with a patient mind. He called it voluntary, because this virtue, as also Magnanimity, is situated in will, which that angry faculty of the Soul doth help.  
That it is added of him, for honesties sake: he propoundeth the end of this virtue, which also is appertaining unto all the rest. For if labours be sustained not for Virtue, but either by reason of hatred, or riches, or honours, he termeth it an horrible asperity, which imitateth patience. But of us at all seasons the mark is to be appointed, that our doing please God, unto whom virtue is acceptable. The charge of patience is double: One in abiding Injuries received: The other in suffering all casualties of Fortune with an upright mind. He overcometh who beareth Injury, by reason both he vanquisheth himself, and his adversary, sith he repelleth the affection: He is brought in bondage, who doth injury, because he yieldeth unto affections, and is surmounted of anger and greediness. He is just, this fellow unjust. It is the part then of a patient man, both to conquer injury by contemning, and not to take revengement of it to himself, but to commit it unto God, unto whom it belongeth to chastise Iniquities, and to receive all chance with an equal mind, to endure poverty, banishment, barrenness, weeping, and wailing, reproach, despite, servitude, grievous diseases, blindness, and if any thing also be more wretched; never to despair, never to be discouraged through calamities. For whereas the life of man is full of miseries, and distresses, who had not some while rather to leave his life (as, certain cursed Imphs & dastards have done) eke at one time to close up all his cares, than always to lead a peineful life: except he being Haruaised with the breast plate of patience, would valiantly gaineset a ready and an unvincible courage to abide all things to the end, and would reckon any life well to be passed over, virtue being his guide? Some have falsely supposed them to be strong, who in desperate cases have wilfully murdered themselves, eschewing either beggary, or ignominy, or captivity, or bondage, or not sustaining love, or else avoiding any other calamity: whom Aristotle more rightfully judged to be nice and womanish: sithence it is the guise of a steadfast and a valiant person to take any Fortune in good worth: but the property of a timorous and a sluggish to mistrust, and to be dismayed with labours, and shamefully to faint in courage. Impatience may be said a vice repugnant to patience, an eschewing of an honest pain and sorrow: whose nature it is not a perplexed matter to understand by those things which presently are declared. There are some unsufferable who fear travels, others who flee wofullnesse: and think them intolerable which patience learneth to be sustained.  
They do yield unto turmoils, these are crucified with passions, and cares, & do abide injury hardly and grievously.  
There be some likewise who are not able moderately enough to use their prosperity, whose minds are to much puffed up with the insolency of their good estate: as much to be discommended as they, because it is a thing, no less unseemly to be discomfited, then peevishly to triumph. perseverance is defined of Cicero, a stable, and a perpetual abode in reason uprightly examined.  
This is a faithful companion for patience, and an aid in bearing adversity, and in moderating prosperity with equality, and in bridling all the surges of the mind, and bringing them in subjection to the discourse of reason. For a puissant stomach, as he saith, without constancy and honest moderation of mind, is nothing worth, wavering or lightness and an unstable government of humane affairs is a Vice contrary unto perseverance: which either for a womanlines of mind doth unadvisedly give place unto difficulties, nor is of efficacy to endure vexations: or else by reason of an obstinacy continueth in his opinion arrogantely and stubbornly, which reason commandeth to change.   

Of the Vices between which Fortitude is placed. Cap. xxxij.  
FOrtitude is the mean betwixt two vices, boldness and timidity. Boldness is an unadvised enterprise of perils, or else a rash confidence, by which any man not paysing his ability doth adventure danger with a blind invasion, either through the ignorance of the difficulty, or through the loftiness of stomach and desire of renown, or through despair, or else doubtless through a dastardliness and madness ransacking the mind. This vice is far dissonant from Fortitude, because it giveth not reason and counsel. This also is reposed above among the affections; by reason it stirreth up the rage of the mind to work Hairebrainely and adventurously. To this mischief the repugnant vice is Timidity, through which any one without occasion is pierced with terror, and feared with any creaking, and dreadeth those things which are valiantly to be enterprised for virtue: A dastard, an effeminate person, and one not able to abide honest toil: who whiles he is over careful for his life, he shunneth not shame, and disworshippe, which especially is to be avoided. Of either vice otherwise it is debated in the explication of affections, than in this place, in which not the affection, but a vicious property contrarious to manliness is to be understanded.   

Of Temperance. Cap. xxxiii.  
Temperance is a virtue which subdueth pleasures unto the dominion of reason. The same is defined of Cicero, a firm and a temperate rule of reason over lust, and other evil braides of the mind. It is also termed a moderation of desires, obedient to reason: and in another place, the governess of all commotions, it is conversant in refusing of pleasures, as the same Author agreeth with Plato and Aristotle. In Greek, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which our countryman calleth both Temperance, and Modesty, and also Frugality. For it is occupied in refraining delices, and desires, as in the matter, whereof it entreateth: And because some pleasures are natural, and common to all living creatures: others consisting in opinion: and they both either of the mind or of the body: of which some are good, which are referred unto a good end: others vicious, which are directed to an ill: this virtue is familiar with good and honest men: it abstaineth from the contrary: verily it bridleth all concupiscencies with the judgement of reason: which Seneca confirmeth in these words: Temperance ruleth pleasures: some it hateth and driveth away, with others it dispenseth, & traineth to an wholesome fashion. By which words it is to be understanded that this is a virtue very well acquainted with prudency. Sigh than Temperance is busied in measuring of appetites, her first charge is, to contemplate, what the necessity of nature may postulate for to pass the life commodiously, that she may satisfy her, who is contented with few things, whereby the superfluous use of things natural may be eschewed, and may be retained within the bound of Nature, The other is, that when as now she ●ath unquisshed the delights of the body, she conquer also the passions of the mind struggling against reason, that she keep under arrogancy, that she know herself, that she stifely repined sensuality, and endeavour by little and little to bring it in servitude to Reason. Three parts are annected of Cicero unto Temperance: Continence, Clemency, and Modesty. Of which the first doth govern Lust through the rule of Counsel: The other remitteth Hatred: The third preserveth honest shamefastness, and demureness, without which nothing can be accounted ●ight.   

Of Continence and Abstinence. Cap. xxxiiij.  
BEtwixt Continence and abstinence that appeareth properly to be the difference, that Continence doth guide affections, and keepeth a mean in all order of living and trimming, and especially (as Cicero beareth witness) in overslippinge of pleasures: unto whom Incontinence is repugnant. Abstinence represseth the hands from other men's goods, unto whom Ravenie is apposite. This is in an innocent man, the in a temperate: Continence is defined of him, a virtue by which the greediness is ruled through the government of counsel. It is contrary to desire, to pleasure, to lust. For the charge hereof is, to moderate all appetites, lust, riot, drunkenness, gluttuous, devouring of meats, and to 'cause all senses and delices obedient to reason. This virtue not only maketh men commendable, & rulers of desires, but also uncorrupted, and iocant, and also neat to conclude very excellent matters: But contrariwise of intemperancy grow many kinds of diseases, the paunch burdened with overmuch meat and drink, doth both pester the mind and darken the reason.  
But yet that scope evermore ought to be proposed unto all men, that they restrain themselves therefore, because they aught to know by so doing to please God, whom they must serve, not by reason it advauntageth the health. For if any man doth avoid incontinency only for health, or else for utilities sake, be meriteth not guerdon: unto continence may be referred all those virtues, whatsoever appellation they may have, which do moderate pleasures, apparel, living, meat, drink: which make chaste modest, and sober persons: which bridle those abominable destructions, superfluity, unleyfull appetite, greediness, drunkenness, and such like, through which voluptuous, Lecherous, effeminate gourmanders, drunken men, and worse than beasts are made. Through Continence we come unto the praise of Temperance. She is perdie rather an unperfect virtue than an absolute, as liketh Aristotle: yet very necessary for the duty of Temperance, a virtue fully accomplished. Celius Calcaguinus hath entitled in his inquisitions, that Aristotle doth declare in his ethics, and Plutarch in his Commentary of Moral Virtue, what difference there is betwixt the continent man and uncontynent, Temperate and untemperate. For the Continent person contendeth with affections, and vanquisheth them: the uncontinent perdie doth repined, but being overcomed doth lament. Contrariwise the temperate hath no struggling: but useth appeased affections, as the calm Sea, which is tossed with no wind. But the untemperate without resisting granteth unto perturbations, take professeth himself willingly consenting to all delices. The contrary vice unto Continence, is incontinence, spreading abroad her branches equally. She may be defined, An immoderate desire of pleasures, which is not governed with the Empire of Reason: either it is a superfluous use, and repugnant to reason, of lust, gluttony, drunkenness, and other unseemly pleasures. Nothing is more filthy and vile than this vice, which maketh a man a bound servant, and despoileth him of all liberty: whom it delivereth in bondage to most wanton rulers, as to Desires, Lusts, Fleshfondynges, Wrath, avarice, and such other stewards of reproach & deformity: as elegantly it is disputed of Cicero in his first Paradox.   

Of Clemency. Cap. xxxv.  
EVen as Continence is tried in the restreigninge and moderating of desires, so is Clemency in the bridling of an●er. For there are two parts of the Soul, as before it is declared, the desiring, and the angry: out of which all af●ections do proceed: Clemency is defi●ed of Cicero, through which the minds unadvisedly enforced to hate one, are ●epressed with gentleness. Seneca alleging sundry definitions of the same Virtue sayeth, Clemency is a temperance of the mind in power to revenge: either, a gentleness of the superior towards the inferior, in ordering of punishments: either, a bending of the mind unto favourableness, in exaction of punishment. For it is called the same pleasantness, or meekness, and Clemency, by which the braid of anger is repelled with reason, and a modesty is showed in revenging, and chastising. But wisdom doth so rule her, that neither all should be pardoned, nor any man corrected. For both of them rather doth answer unto cruelty, than Clemency: yet notwithstanding it is better to offend in the more friendly point, than in the contrary: unless perhaps they who bear office in the common wealth, shall suppose an example needful to be practised on some, whom Cicero wisheth to be like unto the laws, who are trained to punish, not through anger, but equity. It is the part of Clemency to search out the causes of favouring. Certes no private person ought to fear to bend himself to the more Courteous part, neither aught to devise at any time how to requited the Injury inferred to him: but aught to bear under foot the incensinges of choler, & aught to understand this to be the excellentest victory of all others, and chiefly convenient for a Christian man. Cruelty, and fiersnesse, or else stoutness of the mind in revenging, and punishing, is repugnant to Clemency, whose companion is Brutishness: that is to wit a bestiaal hostility. Than which two vices nothing is more diverse from the nature of man, unto whom appertaineth Humanity and Clemency: and compassion joined hereto with an amiable bond, which maketh men gentle and courteous: than which no virtue may be more acceptable to God, whose mercy is unmeasurable & unestimable. Softness seemeth to be of kin to Clemency, but it is a vice: which is belonging to an ●iotte, not to a man favourable.   

Of Modesty. Cap. xxxvi.  
MOdestia, Modesty, so called, because it keepeth a certain mean and moderation. Cicero defineth it in his second book De Inuencione, through which honest shame doth get a worthy and a stable authority, and in his first book of Offices, of all things which are done, and which are said, an order and a mean, and a knowledge of an opportunity of fit seasones to accomplish a thing. The stoics, a Science of setting those things which shallbe done or said, in their proper places. The first definition commendeth unto us Honest shamefastness which Cicero termeth a certain natural Timidity, and a bashfulness, which is a certain reverend ●eare towards men: whose property ●s to offend no man: as it belongeth to justice, to violate no man which is ●efined of him in Partitions oratory, the ward of all virtues, eschewing disworship, and chiefly seeking for praise.  
And Aristotle calleth it a fear of reproach & infamy. And these definitions verily seem not to declare one certain virtue shamefastness, but a certain general united together with all virtues, which by another appellation is called Decorum's Comeliness. Shame is rehearsed of us among the affections: where we covet a sudden commotion to be understanded, through which any man is troubled unwares: but in this place an affection limited to virtue, confirmed by use, which through the fear of reproach and infamy calleth us back from vices, if we acknowledge it, not as Virtue herself, yet verily yoked with Virtue. Diogenes named the redness, engendered of this affection, Virtutis colorem the colour of Virtue, declaring that kind of shame to proceed from a good disposition, which yet in this place we will to be moderate: that it be a mediocrity, which is proper to virtues, betwixt overmuch shame and timidity a counterfayter of bashfulness and impudency. Of shame a shamefast or a bashful man is called by the title of virtue: unto whom is contrarious an impudent, and an unshamefast person.  
This fear of dishonest matters is commendable, and in the younger sort it signifieth a towardness of Virtue, & besides the especial ornament of women. But Impudence is a detestable Vice, by which the comeliness, and all the honesty of life is neglected: and an entrance unto vices is opened, because they are not feared. The other definitions of Cicero, which even now we have put, do sufficiently declare, what Modesty is: that there be an order, and mean cunningly to be observed of those things which are done, and said, whereby every matter may be excecuted in his proper place and time, & decently.  
For the duty hereof is, so to assuage the troublesome moods, that a certain harmony of all doings be observed: That nothing which is foolish, & scarce seemly, either be done or said, that nothing be committed covetously through Envy, Love, Lust, Arrogancy, Ambition, and other unlawful appetites. Under Modesty be placed Lowliness of mind, a desire to learn, pleasantness, either delectableness, or civility of talk, and furniture of body. Lowliness of mind, which they call Humility, is the very notable virtue of Christian men: by which any man doth so press down the malipertnesse of courage, that by how much the higher he is, by so much the more lowly he should behave himself. Christ himself would that we learn this virtue of him, who called himself meek, and of an humble and low spirit: that we likewise according to his example should extenuate our goods, if there be any: whereas we can obtain no good thing, which is not given us by the will and gift of God: that there should be no occasion to any man of bragging of himself, sith every perfect gift cometh by inspiration from God the Father, who lighteneth the minds of men, through jesus Christ our Saviour, through whom men have received perfect wisdom authorized by the benefit of the holy ghost. Therefore this virtue teacheth that especially, which in times past was said to fall down from Heaven Nosce te ipsum, know thyself: that no man pardie should attribute overmuch to himself, sithence he hath nothing, which he hath not received. This also is the charge of a prudent person whereby you shall understand Modesty and Temperance at all seasons to be very straightly joined to prudency: whereof also she is termed of the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were the Fortress of wisdom. The contrary vice is arrogancy, through which any man blinded with the love of himself, feigneth many notable things to be in him, which are not in him, and greater than may be in him: either an insolent and vain bostinge, and wanting the judgement of the mind. This vice of foolish persons by overweening in themselves to well, is hateful both to God and men. The other part of Modesty is coupled to the former with great affinity, the desire of learning, by which any man acknowledging his ignorance is holden with the love of Science, to the procuring of which he frameth his mind. He doth easily learn many things, who is studious of wisdom, and understandeth that he is ignorant in many matters: what fellows were the Philosophers, whose whole life hath been nothing else than a certain perpetual study of knowledge and wisdom. Contrary unto these be such, who might attain to great learning unless they did suppose themselves already to have stored their Pouches: the which chief repugneth this virtue, which proceedeth from Modesty and confession of proper ignorance. This virtue is situated betwixt two vices, Curiosity and carelessness, either negligence of learning, and knowledge. Curiosity is a superfluous pain, or an immoderate greediness to know things either pernicious or vain, and little available: contrary to the laudable and native, and vehement desire and endeavour to learn engendered in all men naturally. For the search & inquisition of truth is proper to man. And as over much industrious labour is worthily dispraised, so is negligence, and the contempt of Science, which is appertaining to blockish and dull persons, who appear more like unto bruit creatures, then to men. The third branch of Modesty is merriness or Pleasantness, and delectableness, and also Humanity, and courtesy of talk, which who that shall use prudently, he shallbe pleasant to all men, and for that also the better accepted. merriness is which ascribeth a certain mean to sports and pastimes: and useth these same in time and place with them, unto whom they are thankful, to stur up honest mirth, and to wipe away the anguishs of the mind with a certain delight. This also is a mean betwixt two vices, as Aristotle beareth witness in his second book Ad Nicomachum, unhonest skoffing, and carterlike unsavournesse. He that keepeth a mean of pleasantness applied to sport, is reckoned merry and civil: He that passeth degree, is counted a railer, what manner of fellows are the Parasites, and stage Players, and other light and foolish men. But he which altogether abhorreth May-games is judged beastly, and uplandish. But we must diligently take heed, less through our boarding we offend any man: that there be not immoderate conceits, not filthy, not foolish. The work of Apothegms collected of Erasmus shall minister many merry toys. And as concerning that pleasantness of life which is remnant: who that shows himself delectable in such sort, as reason requireth, he is called easy, gentle, courtise: and Facility is reckoned Mediocrity. He which passeth the mean, if he be led with no occasion, is to be counted over easy, and pliant: but if for his own profit, he is to be esteemed a flatterer. But he which altogether dissenteth and departeth from mean and reason, and showeth himself sad in all respects, he is to be thought testif, and churlish, and worthy of all men's hatred, with that uncourteise sadness, and rude gravity, and unthankful to wise men. A certain sad sageness in countenance seemeth to be engraffed in certain, what one is given to that Crito of Terence: which if it be natural, surely it can neither be called properly good, nor evil. It shallbe reckoned good, if it agreed to right reason. But there is a certain sect of men which cloak foolishness in their face and countenance, and also in their gesture, jetting and communication. Whose affectate gravity ratified by lewd custom, is wont to appear very foolish unto witty men, and more rightly informed unto humanity. The last member of sober mood doth teach that the paumpering and appareling of the carcase is to be moderated, and seemliness to be kept in it as in other matters, less either over curious care and riot, or else carterlye and unnatural slovenry and uncleanliness be reproved. For this virtue which consisteth of adourning agreeable for the commodity of the body, & necessity of nature is a mean betwixt superfluity and filth. Let the apparel than be moderate, clean, fit for the body: and convenient for use, not for foolishness, and ridiculous ostentation, what one the barbarous and outlandish is wont to be; let it be applied to the persons according to their dignity and riches: and to kind, to age, to place, to time, and to honest custom. One beseemeth noble and rich men, another the base and poor: one men, another women: one old fathers, another the gallant youth.   

Of Intemperance and her two parts. Cap. xxxvij.  
intemperancy, is a readiness conseting to desires against reason: which Cicero in his fourth book Tusculanarun questionum doth define, a swerving from all understanding, and from right reason, so bended from the prescript of reason, that by no means the appetites sensual neither can be ruled nor yet repressed. The parts of this vice are two. One which verily addicteth herself unto pleasures: the other which doth nothing at all. Through her men do rush headlong after the usage of beasts into all delices, the Empire of Reason thrown away. Through this, by the rudeness of mind some (as it were with a certain abashment) are made dull unto all pastaunces, and also do reject and contemn honest and necessary delight without occasion. But these I judge a man may seek, and found a few, which through a certain Brutishness would so abhor all pastime, wherewith Nature is chiefly delighted, that they may be entreated with no delectation. The better sort by a great deal are wont to go astray in the other part, and to give to much scope unto pleasure, which temperance doth bridle by the Squire of reason: who being collocated between those two vices, doth always say claim to that precious & peculiar Mediocrity of Virtue.   

Of the conjunction of Virtues among themselves, the difference and excellency. Cap. xxxviij.  
ALl Virtues, which now are absolute, and brought unto the perfection of reason, are so connected together among themselves with a certain mutual copulation, as the members of our body: they do so agree in amible concord as musical Harmony. This is that manifold order of Rings, which Plato writeth to be drawn unto of the loadstone.  
For you shall not call him perfectly and truly a prudent man, which same is not both just, and valiant, and temperate: neither just, who wanteth the rest: nor valiant, nor Temperate, who is not ●urnished with the fellowship of the residue, although he be conversant more commonly in one Virtue, than in another. But the unperfect virtues are not so yoked together that they may make as it wear a consent and agreement. We have heard that Socrates was Temperate and Modest: yet that boarding which is said to have been peculiar unto him, when as he would reprehend the unskilfulness of others so greedily, can not escape the check of arrogancy. But truly that great patience and Temperance of job published in holy Scriptures was most perfect of all others. But not so many examples are alleged of this absolute Virtue: yet many may be disclosed of the unperfect. Some virtues excel others in excellency and operation: as prudency whose harborough is placed in the mind, and is occupied in the out finding of truth, she is preferred before Temperance which moderateth delices, and appointeth a mean unto all things, unto whom a place is assigned in the desiring faculty of the soul. justice passeth Fortitude because she preserveth the equality of human society, and hath no certain habitation, but is indifferently spread abroad unto all parts of the Soul: this aught to be busied in despising of perils, and ought to be situated in the Virtue of the angry Soul: what soever verily be subject unto these chief Virtues, as they are lower in order, so be they in stateliness, by reason that some of them are under others: neither forthwith should be referred unto the greatest good, which those principal Fountains do next consider, but every one to their proper beginnings, and should have regard of us rather than of felicity: sith not they of their own power, but by those four Capitalles may be straightened unto God himself, who is the end of all good things. To this wished mark, and eternal felicity we attain, by the operation of Virtue verily (as in the beginning it is expressed) yet the which God himself may make prosperous unto us, through his Clemency: to whom be due all praise, honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen.   
FINIS.   

 

   

This book translated by john Charlton, late fellow of Exetre College, in Oxford, & now School master of Wyrksop, in the county of Nottingham.  Mors ultima Linea rerum.  

The Table.  

OF the end and parts of Moral Science. Cap. i  
Of the end of man, and the Sovereign good. Cap. two.  
Of Affections. Cap. iii  
Of Love. Cap. iiii.  
Of desire and hope. Cap. v.  
Of Gladness. Cap. vi,  
Of hatred and anger and like affections, Cap. seven.  
Of Sadness. Cap. viii.  
Of Fear. Cap. ix.  
Of Boldness. Cap. x.  
Of Virtue and her division and Original. Cap. xi  
Of prudency Cap. xii.  
Of Domestical governance. Cap. xiii,  
Of Politic governance Cap. xiiii.  
O Vices contrary to wisdom Cap xv.  
Of justice Cap xuj.  
Of the parts of justice Cap xvii.  
Of the six parts of justice constituted of Cicero, and their Vices, and of some other which be welnie of the same nature cap, xviii  
Of Godliness cap. xix.  
Of Reverence, Cap. xx  
Of Troth, cap. xxi  
Of Revengement, Cap. xxii  
Of Thank, cap. xxiii  
Of compassion, Cap. xxiiii  
Of Liberality and vices contrary to this, Avarice and Prodigality, cap. xxv  
Of Magnificence Cap. xxvi  
Of Friendship cap. xxvii  
Of Injustice Cap. xxviii  
Of Fortitude cap. xxix  
Of Confidence and Magnanimity Cap. thirty  
Of patience and perseverance, cap xxxi  
Of the Vices between which Fortitude is placed cap. xxxii  
Of Temperance cap. xxxiii  
Of Continence and abstinence cap. xxxiiii  
Of Clemency. Cap. xxxv  
Of Modesty Cap. xxxvi  
Of intemperance and her two parts, cap. xxxvii  
Of the conjunction of Virtues among ●hem selves the difference and excellency. Cap. xxxviii   
FINIS.   

 printer's device of William Howe (McKerrow 142)  
¶ These are to be sold, at the south-west door of Paul's Church.